1 2 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 3 Electronically Filed 4 LIBORIUS AGWARA Jul 27 2016 01:51 p.m. 5 Tracie K. Lindeman Petitioner, Clerk of Supreme|Court Case No. 6 VS. 7 STATE BAR OF NEVADA and SOUTHERN NEVADA DISCIPLINARY 8 BOARD. 9 Respondents. 10 PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 11 PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION 12 COMES NOW the Petitioner, LIBORIUS AGWARA, by and through his 13 counsel, WILLIAM B. TERRY, ESQ., of the law offices of WILLIAM B. TERRY, 14 CHARTERED and moves that this Honorable Court entertain a petition for writ of 15 mandamus or, in the alternative, writ of prohibition in the instant case. 16 This request is made and based upon subpoenas served upon Mr. Agwara by 17 the State Bar of Nevada. This petition is made and based upon the attached analysis 18 of facts, prayer for relief and points and authorities in support hereof. 19 WILLIAM B. TERRY, CHARTERED 20 21 22 evada Bar No. 1028 WILLIAM B. TERRY, CHARTERED 23 530 S. Seventh Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 24 (702) 385-0799 Attorney for Appellant 25

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS

On December 16, 2015, the State Bar of Nevada forwarded a Subpoena Duces Tecum to Petitioner, Liborius Agwara, allowing him a period of time to respond to said Subpoena. A copy of said Subpoena is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit "1". While the Subpoena itself is self-explanatory, it required Mr. Agwara to produce retainer agreements, documents pertaining to the settlement and/or the distribution of funds, accounting records for all deposits, withdrawals and disbursements in reference to a Nevada State Bank account and perhaps most critically, "All personal and business tax returns for each of those individuals and businesses listed on Exhibit C with schedules, W-2's, and 1099's to include W-2's or 1099's issued to your employees, contract personnel or other entities for the tax years 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014..." On March 1, 2016, after getting the extension, Petitioner Agwara filed an objection to the Subpoena, a copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein as Exhibit "2". Amongst the objections raised, Mr. Agwara included the fact that he was asserting a Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination respect to producing or testifying about the subpoenaed documents and/or records. He further alleged that the State Bar was subpoenaing documents that were time barred and further alleged in reference to the income tax returns "...the State Bar is seeking documents (income tax returns) which are outside of its jurisdiction and have nothing to do with how Respondent practices law..." Along with the objections to the Subpoena, Agwara obtained counsel. Further objections were filed by counsel which were responded to by the State Bar. Ultimately the matter was referred to Luke Puschnig, Esq., as chair of the Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board. Without any oral argument but assuming having considered the written objections and responses, Mr. Puschnig caused to be filed on May 27, 2016 an "Order Regarding Objection to Subpoena Duces Tecum and

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Motion to Compel Production...", a copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein as Exhibit "3". Again as set forth within the Order, the objection was denied and the State Bar's motion to compel was granted. Oddly enough, the order thereafter indicates "This Order does not, in any manner, prevent Liborius Agwara, Esq. from making similar arguments in the future if this matter continues to hearing..."

The reason counsel suggests that this was an odd provision to add to the order includes the fact that there was not at that point in time any Bar complaint filed against Mr. Agwara. Additionally, as will be argued herein, it does do Mr. Agwara any good to make similar arguments in the future if the items sought are delivered to the State Bar including but not limited to the income tax return. A Notice of Entry of Order was likewise filed on the same date being May 27, 2016. A copy of that document is attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein as Exhibit "4". By the time Mr. Puschnig entered his order in reference to what is referred to herein as Subpoena #1, counsel has been advised that an additional subpoena had been served upon counsel and Mr. Agwara, a copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein as Exhibit "5". This subpoena required the production of documents by June 6, 2016. In order to litigate the issues pertaining to the second subpoena, neither Mr. Agwara nor counsel filed a Petition for Mandamus or, in the alternative, a petition for writ of prohibition because of the expected ruling by Mr. Puschnig to objections to the second subpoena. As a result, of the second subpoena counsel filed objections to the second subpoena duces tecum, a copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein as Exhibit "6". The Court is asked to note that oral arguments were requested on the objection to the second subpoena. See Exhibit "6". The State Bar thereafter responded to the objections to the subpoena and Petitioner herein filed responsive points and authorities again

objecting to the subpoena and again requesting that the subpoena be quashed.

On June 2, 2016, Chairman Puschnig entered an order which set a telephonic hearing for July 7, 2016 at 2:00 p.m. regarding the objection to subpoena and the motion to quash the subpoena. The Order likewise provided both the State Bar and counsel with a telephone number and conference ID number and conference pin number. A copy of this document is attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein as Exhibit "7". There was therefore an expectation that there would be oral arguments granted on July 7th since that is what the Chairman had ordered. Contrary to this order, however, on June 29, 2016, apparently after Mr. Puschnig had considered the points and authorities by both Mr. Agwara and the State Bar, an order was entered denying Mr. Agwara's objections to the second subpoena duces tecum. The order again included the language "This Order does not, in any manner, prevent Liborius Agwara, Esq. from making similar arguments in the future if this matter continues to hearing..." Counsel for Mr. Agwara thereafter forwarded an email to Chairman Puschnig, which was likewise forwarded to both Janeen Isaacson and Stephanie Barker with the State Bar, a copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein as Exhibit "8". In part, it referred the fact that Chairman Puschnig had already denied the objections to the second subpoena duces tecum. It thereafter continued "You had scheduled oral arguments on this matter for July 7, 2016 at 2:00 p.m. Am I to presume that that is now vacated since you have ruled without oral arguments?" The email further requested that Mr. Puschnig enter a stay of his order so that Mr. Agwara could file a writ with the Nevada Supreme Court. Less than fifteen minutes later, Mr. Puschnig responded as set forth in Exhibit "9" in an email indicating "Oral hearing was vacated because I do not see a reason for the oral hearing. The written pleadings were enough to decide the matter. I am also hereby denying the Request for a Stay on my order..." A copy of that email

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is attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein as Exhibit "9".

ANALYSIS OF SUBPOENA #1 AND SUBPOENA #2

SUBPOENA #1

The original basis of the objections to Subpoena #1 have already been outlined but a review of the Subpoena itself shows clearly there is a basis to assert a Fifth Amendment right, a limitation of actions right, and others to the subpoena. Additionally, much of the information sought pursuant to the subpoena either can be or has been obtained through Nevada State Bank through account number 2097335 including the fronts and backs of checks. Sought in part are "...accounting records for all deposits, withdrawals and disbursements of funds...", "documents that evidences the creation of an attorney client relationship or otherwise indicates a request for said funds to be held in trust or escrow...", "accounting records for all deposits..." Again, under paragraph 3, all personal and business and tax returns "...of those individuals and businesses listed on Exhibit C with schedules, W-2's, and 1099's to include W-2's or 1099's issued to your employees, contract personnel or other entities for the tax years 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014..." 2009 through 2011 and arguably 2012 are well outside the limitation of actions rule for which the State Bar could file any form of a complaint.

Subpoena #2

This Subpoena seeks information in reference to Wells Fargo IOLTA account ending 8027 "...between December 1, 2014 and present..." Part of the sought documents include settlement or distribution sheets, pre-settlement loans, correspondence evidencing negotiation/settlement, check memos, wire instructions, account journals, accounting database or account summaries.

- 1. That the Chairman of the Southern Nevada Disciplinary Committee be directed to modify his order denying the motion to quash subpoena #1 and #2.
- 2. To prohibit the State Bar from enforcing the orders of the Chairman of the Southern Nevada Disciplinary Committee.
- 3. That the motions to quash the subpoenas be granted.
- 4. To prohibit the State Bar from enforcement under Rule 25(c) of the Disciplinary Rules of Procedure as adopted by the Board of Governors on July 9, 2014.
- 5. For such other relief as the Court deems fit including, but not limited to, a recognition of the Petitioner's right to assert the Fifth Amendment regarding the Subpoena Duces Tecums outlined herein.

JURISDICTION

Unless the Supreme Court intercedes, the orders of the Chairman of the disciplinary panel will stand the State Bar will be allowed to enforce said orders. Under Chapter 34, those provisions set forth the requirements dealing with a petition for writ of prohibition or, in the alternative, a petition for writ of mandamus. Obviously, those writs may be filed alternatively which is exactly what is being done herein. The writ of prohibition is to direct the State Bar to take no further action and the writ of mandamus is to direct the Chairman, Mr. Puschnig, to reconsider his orders consistent with this Honorable Court's further directives. It is submitted that there is no other adequate remedy at law since the choice of the Petitioner is either to disregard the orders or to comply with them. If he complies with them, however, contrary to the finding of the Chairman, Mr. Puschnig, the harm will already be done because the documents would have been produced independent of the Petitioner's assertion of Fifth Amendment rights.

In Waters v. State Bar of Nevada, 103 Nev. 694, 747 P.2d 900 (1987) Mr. Waters filed an original petition for writ of mandamus to compel former counsel of the State Bar to investigate two Assistant United States Attorneys. Part of the finding by the Nevada Supreme Court was that the court has inherent supervisory authority over the State Bar and a strong interest in assuring that all members of the State Bar perform their duties properly. The court also found that when the Supreme Court exercises it's supervisory authority it need not confine it's order to the entry of a writ recognized in common law but may structure relief to the purpose at hand.

In a series of cases involving a petition for writ of prohibition or, in the alternative, a writ of mandamus and specifically in *Whitehead v. The Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline*, 110 Nev. 380, 873 P.2d 946 (1994) the court found that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to entertain petitions for extraordinary relief in the nature of a prohibition or mandamus. In reference to judicial discipline, it is submitted that if the court has jurisdiction through either of these writs over judicial discipline they likewise have jurisdiction over attorney discipline.

ARGUMENT

I. PETITIONER AGWARA HAS A FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO NOT COMPLY WITH SUBPOENA #1 AND #2.

Based on information and belief this is a question of first impression presented to this Honorable Court in reference to the assertion of a Fifth Amendment right to a bar disciplinary action in Nevada. The subject matter of the dispute herein is in dealing with the two subpoenas issued by the State Bar.

In perhaps the leading case decided by the United States Supreme Court being Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) someone in Mr. Agwara's position being a lawyer in a disciplinary proceeding has a right to remain silent and the right to refuse to give testimony in a disciplinary proceeding without suffering a disciplinary sanction. It is submitted that this same right applies to the production of documents

as exemplified in Subpoena #1 and #2 and most particularly in reference to the income tax reports of the Petitioner.

In Spevack at 516 supra, the court specifically indicated:

We find no room in the privilege against self-incrimination for classifications of people so as to deny it to some and extend it to others. Lawyers are not exempted from the words "no person...shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself" and we can imply no exception...

In considering the instant issue, this Honorable Court is respectfully reminded that it was the bankruptcy judge who referred the matter to the State Bar and likewise referred the matter to the United States Attorney's office. In the case of *In Re: Artis*, 883 A.2d 85, 103 (DC 2005) the court held that the Fifth Amendment protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be used. This is particularly relevant in the instant case since the Chairman's ruling was that Mr. Agwara was not protected by the Fifth Amendment but could assert it at a later point in time. Again, that would do no good if the production were required.

In the case of *In Re: Sheldon Oliver Zisook*, 88 Ill.2d 321, 430 N.E. 2d 1037 (1981), the court considered the applicability of a Fifth Amendment invocation to subpoenas that had been issued to an attorney. The *Zisook* case involved the scope of an attorneys Fifth Amendment privilege against incriminating himself in reference to a disciplinary action. Unlike Agwara herein who practices as a sole-proprietor and not under a corporation, *Zisook* had formed a professional corporation. He had been served a subpoena duces tecum to testify and produce files. It was in fact a third defendant in the *Zisook* case by the name Elias who was an attorney practicing as a sole-practitioner. In coming to their decision, the Illinois court recognized that it has long been the law that the privilege extends to private papers as well as oral testimony. See *United States v. White*, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).

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It is further suggested that the privilege is not limited to oral questioning and that an individual may refuse to provide documents to an investigative body if the act of production would be testimonial. See, for example, *In Re: Grand Jury Subpoena dated April 18, 2003*, 383 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2004).

In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976) the court held that the act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena has both communicative aspects and also denotes possession or control by the tax payer. This is completely different than what the contents of the paper produced disclosed. Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers demanded and their possession or control by the taxpayer. In United States vs. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 104 S.Ct. 1237, 79 L.Ed.2d 552 (1984) it was held that business records of a sole-proprietorship are no different from the individual owners personal records. Additionally, if production of business records is protected by the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination production cannot be compelled without a statutory grant of immunity. It is further submitted that based upon the broad language of the subpoenas herein the more likely it is that the production of the documents would be testimonial in nature. It has also been held that in limited circumstances the act of producing the document can be testimonial under the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination as when the act of producing the document is evidence that the document even exists. See Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 55 A.L.R. Fed.2d 717 (2nd Cir. 2008). In the case of Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 87 F.3d 464, 149 A.L.R. Fed. (5th Cir. 1996) it was held that an attorney for a judgment debtor was entitled to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege in refusing to release attorney billing records and that the imposition of sanctions for the attorneys refusal to release those records was error. There the attorney's invocation of the privilege was not frivolous and a further

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recognition that some of the documents demanded by the discovery orders might furnish incriminating information because the attorney did not admit at any earlier stage of the proceeding to guilt or to facts that were themselves incriminating.

The finding of the United States Supreme Court in the case of the United States v. John Doe, 104 S.Ct. 1237, 465 U.S. 605 (1984) is relevant herein. In Doe the owner of a sole-proprietorship upon whom a subpoena had been served demanding production of certain business records filed a motion seeking to quash the subpoenas. Ultimately the matter reached the Supreme Court which found that the contents of the business records were not privileged but the act of producing the records was privileged and could not be compelled without a statutory grant of use immunity. Specifically, the court held that where an owner of a sole-proprietorship upon whom a subpoena was served demanding production of certain business records in conjunction with a federal grand jury investigation pertaining to corruption did not concede that the records listed in the subpoena actually existed or were in his possession so that by actually producing the records the owner would tacitly admit their existence and its possession and where production of the documents would relieve the government of its need for authentication the act of producing the documents at issue was privileged and could not be compelled without a statutory grant of use immunity.

Applying *Doe*, supra, to the instant case, to require the production of the documents being anything sought under Subpoena #1 and #2 would make the Petitioner tacitly admit to the existence of these documents and therefore relieve the State Bar of any need to authenticate the documents. Consistent with *Doe* this cannot be done. Again, it is the act of production that is protected by the Fifth Amendment. This particularly is true since each of the documents sought would be testimonial in nature.

Following Doe, supra, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals considered a similar issue in the case of In Re: Grand Jury Subpoena dated April 18, 2003, 383 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2004). In that case the court ultimately found that because of the breath of the subpoena and the government's limited knowledge of the documents sought Doe's production of the documents would have a testimonial aspect protected by the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The subpoena in Doe was broad as it is in the instant case and was served upon a corporation and covered a period from 1998 through the date of the subpoena and requested amongst other things all documents relating to contracts and communications. The subpoena commanded Doe to appear and testify before the grand jury and to bring the documents with him. Doe asserted a Fifth Amendment basis and refused to provide the documents and was held in contempt and the matter went before the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. The court noted that Doe's claim of privilege was directed not necessarily to the documents themselves but the act of producing the documents and the court considered prior cases holding that a witnesses production of documents in response to a subpoena may have incriminating testimonial aspects. These include an authentication requirement. It also includes the fact that the witness is admitting that the documents exist and are in his possession or control as well as being authentic. The court concluded that these types of admissions implicitly communicates statements of facts that may lead to incriminatory evidence.

The finding of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in *United States vs. Sideman* and Bancroft, LLP, 704 F.3d 1197 (2013) is also applicable to the instant case. There, the IRS had filed a petition for enforcement of an administrative summons for a law firm to produce certain tax documents of a tax payer client. The court recognized that before this could occur the government must establish, or in the instant case the Bar must establish, its independent knowledge of three elements: (1)

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that the documents in fact exist; (2) that the documents are authentic; and (3) that the respondent's possession or control of the documents is in place. The court went on to hold that the authenticity prong requires the Government to establish that it could independently verify that the compelled documents are in fact what they purport to be. It is submitted that because the documents are testimonial in nature they cannot be compelled to be produced and that this would implicitly acknowledge authenticity.

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORTS OF SPECIFIC PRAYERS FOR RELIEF

I. THAT THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SOUTHERN NEVADA DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE BE DIRECTED TO MODIFY HIS ORDER DENYING THE MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA #1 AND #2.

Based on the cases cited dealing with the right of an attorney to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights which include his right to not deliver documentation it is suggested that the ruling of the Chairman of the disciplinary committee was in error. The first prayer for relief is that the Court direct pursuant to mandamus procedure or due to its inherent jurisdiction that the motion to quash Subpoenas #1 and #2 be granted. The Chairman issued two orders, one dated May 27, 2016 and one dated June 29, 2016 in reference to Subpoena #1 and #2. Although oral argument had been granted on Subpoena #1 and #2 that was revoked by the Chairman without notice.

Rule 22 of the Disciplinary Rules of Procedure as adopted by the Board of Governors July 9, 2014 provides in pertinent part as follows:

Rule 22. Motions or stipulations, rulings to be written to be filed. The hearing panel chair, if appointed, shall hear and decide all motions or stipulations. All rulings issued by the hearing panel chair shall be in writing and filed with the appropriate disciplinary board through the office of bar counsel.

In the instant case since no disciplinary action was pending against Mr.

Agwara at the time Subpoenas #1 and #2 were issued against him, the State Bar referred the matter to the Chairman of the Southern Nevada Disciplinary Committee. In other words, the matter had not been assigned to a specific "...panel chair..." due to the fact that no complaint existed. Separate and aside from Rule 22 is at a minimum instructive on what the individual ruling on motions should do. It is the position of the Petitioner herein that when the rule says the ruling of the panel chair shall be in writing it means that there must be some form of basis for the ruling set forth within the order. There is in fact no basis for the ruling of the chair in subpoena #1 or #2 but in fact it simply is a denial order. To make the matter even more complex the Chairman put what can only be referred to as a caveat in there that his ruling did not prohibit the Petitioner from raising his Fifth Amendment rights at a later point in time. The problem with this is that if the Petitioner is directed to comply with Subpoena #1 and #2 there will be no further opportunity to raise a Fifth Amendment right. Authentication will be established by the mere production of the record by the Petitioner. If the records do not exist, this likewise will be construed against Petitioner. It is submitted that these are testimonial in nature and covered under the Fifth Amendment privilege.

II. TO PROHIBIT THE STATE BAR FROM ENFORCING THE ORDERS OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SOUTHERN NEVADA DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE.

The State Bar has certain avenues available to it to enforce the orders of the Chairman of the Southern Nevada Disciplinary Committee. Those include a request for a contempt and what other procedures the State Bar may suggest. It is requested that this Honorable Court prohibit the State Bar from enforcing the orders of the Chairman of the Southern Nevada Disciplinary Committee based on the arguments above.

III. THAT THE MOTIONS TO QUASH THE SUBPOENA BE GRANTED.

The instant request is more in line with the petition for writ of mandamus because it would be directed to the Chairman of the panel, Mr. Puschnig, to quash the subpoenas. That would be based upon either pronouncements by this Honorable Court or further directive by this Honorable Court.

IV. TO PROHIBIT THE STATE BAR FROM ENFORCEMENT UNDER RULE 25(c) OF THE DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROCEDURE AS ADOPTED BY THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS ON JULY 9, 2014.

Rule 25 deals with subpoenas. In making the instant argument, this Honorable Court is reminded that at the time that Subpoena #1 and #2 were issued, no disciplinary procedures were pending against the Petitioner. Subsection (a) of Rule 25 deals with Bar counsel and attorney members of hearing panels and indicates that they "...may administer oaths and affirmations and issue and compel by subpoena the attendance of witnesses and the production of pertinent books, papers and documents..." The State Bar issued the subpoenas prior to any disciplinary proceedings. As a result, no "hearing panel" was set up. When objections were raised to the subpoena the Bar referred the matter to Puschnig in his position as Chairman of the Southern Nevada Disciplinary Committee.

Subsection (c) sets forth the procedure for failure to comply with the subpoena. While it is initially suggested that this procedure would not be available to the Bar since at the time of the subpoenas no disciplinary procedures were pending against the Petitioner, that would not prohibit them from attempting to utilize the procedures under Rule 25(c). In essence, what subsection (c) indicates is that when any individual is subpoenaed to produce books, papers or documents and refuses to do so "...that person shall be deemed in contempt of the disciplinary board and the chair of the disciplinary board shall report the fact to a district court of the county..." The provision goes on that the district court shall promptly issue a

attachment which directs that the attorney be brought before the court forthwith. The attorney is then put in a position to either comply with the subpoena or continue to resist the subpoena. As subsection (c) provides production would "...purge himself or herself of the contempt..." Petitioner herein, however, does not wish to "purge" the procedure due to the fact that he believes he has a legitimate Fifth Amendment claim.

If this Honorable Court does not quash the subpoenas, it is believed that the State could invoke the provisions under Rule 25.

V. FOR SUCH OTHER RELIEF AS THE COURT DEEMS FIT INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, A RECOGNITION OF THE PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO ASSERT THE FIFTH AMENDMENT REGARDING THE SUBPOENA DUCES TECUMS OUTLINED HEREIN.

As this Court recognized in *Waters v. State Bar*, 103 Nev. 694, 747 P.2d 900 (1987) this Court has the right to hear a petition for writ of mandamus or a petition for writ of prohibition or utilized its inherent supervisory authority over the State Bar. Whether the Court invokes it's powers under a writ of mandamus or prohibition or under its supervisory authority, the prayers for relief outlined herein are still equally applicable. As an example, the Court could direct the Chairman to reconsider the motions and to issue written findings of facts and conclusions of law. The Court could direct that oral arguments be set before the Chairman. The Court could grant the prayer for relief in part or in full as requested by the Petitioner. What is most important, however, is a recognition by this Honorable Court of the Petitioner's right to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights under the Constitution and that those Fifth Amendment rights being testimonial in nature are equally applicable to calling upon the Petitioner to answer questions or directing that the Petitioner provide documents.

CONCLUSION

For the above-indicated reasons, it is respectfully requested that the Petition for Writ of Mandamus or, in the Alternative, Writ of Prohibition be granted or

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alternatively that the Court exercise its supervisory powers over the State Bar and quash Subpoenas #1 and #2 as prayed for herein.

DATED this 27th day of July, 2016.

WILLIAM B. TERRY, CHARTERED

WILLIAM B. TERRY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 1028 WILLIAM B. TERRY, CHARTERED 530 S. Seventh Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 385-0799 Attorney for Appellant

VERIFICATION

STATE OF NEVADA ss: **COUNTY OF CLARK**

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 24 day of July, 2016.

in and for said

LIBORIUS AGWARA, being first duly sworn according to law, upon oath, deposes and says:

That I am the Petitioner, LIBORIUS AGWARA, in the above-entitled action; that I have read the foregoing Petition for Writ of Mandamus, or in the Alternative, Writ of Prohibition, and know the contents thereof, and that same is true of my own knowledge, except as to those matters therein alleged on information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

me this 24

County and State

ABORIUS AGWARA



VERIFICATION

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STATE OF NEVADA **COUNTY OF CLARK**


WILLIAM B. TERRY, being first duly sworn according to law, upon oath, deposes and says:

That he is the attorney for the Petitioner, LIBORIUS AGWARA, in the aboveentitled action; that affiant has read the foregoing Petition for Writ of Mandamus, or in the Alternative, Writ of Prohibition, and know the contents thereof, and that same is true of his own knowledge, except as to those matters therein alleged on information and belief, and as to those matters, he believes them to be true.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 27⁺¹ day of July, 2016.

BLIC in and for said

County and State



CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th of July, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE WRIT OF PROHIBITION by depositing a true and correct copy in the United States mail, postage pre-paid addressed as follows:

Stephanie Barker, Esq. Assistant Bar Counsel State Bar of Nevada 3100 E. Charleston Boulevard, #100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102

Luke Pucshnig, Esq.
Southern Nevada Disciplinary Committee
3150 Paradise Road Las Vegas, Nevada 89109

An Employee of William B. Terry, Chartered



AFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL

Case No. SG13-1818, SG14-0100, SG14-0485, SG14-1137

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VS.

Bar No.

STATE BAR OF NEVADA,

LIBORIUS AGWARA, ESQ.

Respondent.

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!!! !!! STATE BAR OF NEVADA
SOUTHERN NEVADA DISCIPLINARY BOARD

SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM

Liborius Agwara, Esq. 1058 E. Sahara Ave.

Las Vegas, NV 89102-1859

YOU ARE HEREBY directed to set aside any and all business and excuses and appear before Brian T. Kunzi, Deputy Bar Counsel for the State Bar of Nevada, at 3100 W. Charleston Boulevard, Las Vegas, Nevada, 89102, on *Monday, February 1, 2016, at 1:00 p.m.*, and produce true and correct copies of the following items.

NOTE: Your production of the requested items relieves your obligation to personally appear before Deputy Bar Counsel on the designated dated and time. Any questions or documents produced can be directed to the attention of:

Dawn Meeks Senior Paralegal/Investigator Office of Bar Counsel 702-317-1439 dawnm@nvbar.org

INSTRUCTIONS

This subpoens is a request for documents in your possession or in the possession or control of any of your attorneys, accountants, employees, agents or representatives. The term "document(s)" refers to any written, recorded or graphic representation, invoice, e-mail, and any items that have been optically scanned and/or electronically stored in any form, including but not limited to, all correspondence, telexes, written communications, notes, jottings, memoranda, telegrams, electronic wires, records, reports, computer printouts, calculations, worksheets, written agreements, account summaries, receipts, invoices, checks, check stubs, bills or other tangible item regardless of how it may be stored, produced or reproduced.

- 1. For each of the individuals listed on Exhibit A, attached hereto and made a part hereof, copies of the following documents:
 - a. Retainer agreement or other documents that evidences the creation of the attorney/client relationship, and the terms of the representation, to include, but not limited to, the scope of services to be provided and any termination letter upon the conclusion of the services, if applicable.
 - b. Documents related to the settlement or distribution of funds processed through Nevada State Bank Account Number 2097335 to include, but not limited to, medical liens, settlement agreements, pre-settlement loans, distribution/settlement sheets, correspondence evidencing negotiation/settlement of medical liens, releases or satisfactions of any legal obligations.

- c. Accounting records for all deposits, withdrawals and disbursement of funds to or from Nevada State Bank Account Number 2097335 to include, but not limited to, checks (front and back), check stubs, check ledger, check memos, wire instructions, account journals, account records, accounting database, or account summaries.
- 2. For each of the transactions listed on Exhibit B, attached hereto and made a part hereof, copies of the following documents:
 - Documents that evidences the creation of an attorney/client relationship or otherwise indicates a request for said funds to be held in trust or escrow.
 - b. Accounting records for all deposits, withdrawals and disbursement of funds to or from Nevada State Bank Account Number 2097335 to Include, but not limited to, checks (front and back), check stubs, check ledger, check memos, wire instructions, account journals, account records, accounting database, or account summaries.
- 3. All personal and business tax returns for each of those individuals and businesses listed on Exhibit C with schedules, W-2's, and 1099's to include W-2's or 1099's issued to your employees, contract personnel or other entities for the tax years 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014.

This subpoena is issued pursuant to Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 110 in connection with a CONFIDENTIAL INVESTIGATION undertaken pursuant to the Nevada Supreme Court Rules. It shall be regarded as contempt of the Supreme Court Rules for you to in any way breach the confidentiality of this investigation. It shall not be regarded as a breach of confidentiality for you to consult with an attorney or answer questions asked at the above time

and place. For failure to provide as herein directed, you will be deemed in contempt of the Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board and subject to citation from the District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Clark to show cause why you should not be punished for such contempt as provided in SCR 110.

ISSUED this Kanaday of December, 2015.

STATE BAR OF NEVADA C. STANLEY HUNTERTON, BAR COUNSEL

Brian T. Kunzi, Deputy Bar Counsel Nevada Bar No. 2173 3100 W. Charleston Bivd., Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 (702) 382-2200

Exhibit "2"



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
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OBJ LIBORIUS AGWARA, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 7576 4693 E. Flamingo Rd. Las Vegas, NV 89121 (702) 385-4800 Office (702) 385-4900 Facsimile Respondent



STATE BAR OF NEVADA SOUTHERN NEVADA DISCIPLINARY BOARD

STATE BAR OF NEVADA,

LIBORIUS AGWARA, ESQ. Respondent. CASE NO: SG13-1818, SG14-0100 SG14-0485, SG14-1137

OBJECTION TO SUBPOENA

Comes now, Respondent above-named, and hereby objects to, and contests, the SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM issued by the State Bar of Nevada and filed on December 17, 2015. This Objection is made pursuant to SCR 110(4) and Rule 25(d) of the State Bar of Nevada Disciplinary Rules of Procedure. Respondent objects on the followings grounds:

- Respondent asserts his 5th amendment right against self-incrimination with respect to producing or testifying about the subpoenaed documents and records.
- 2. The subpoenced documents are time-barred.
- The State Bar is functioning as a conduit for other entities/persons to obtain documents 3. that those entities are otherwise not entitled to under the law.
- The State Bar is seeking documents (income tax returns), which are outside of its jurisdiction and which have nothing to do with how Respondent practices law.

Respondent will be filing a brief in support of this Objection and will attach documentary evidence demonstrating why the subpoena should be quashed or the grievance placed in abeyance, pending the completion of Respondent's bankruptcy proceeding, a likely ongoing investigation by the U.S. Attorney's office, and an Internal Revenue Service examination.

DATED this 29 day of February 2016.

LIBORIUS AGWARA, ESC Nevada Bar No. 7576 1058 E. Sahara Ave., Suite B Las Vegas, NV 89104 (702) 385-4800 office (702) 385-4900 fax Respondent



Case No: SG13-1818, SG14-0100,

SG14-0485, SG14-1137

STATE BAR OF NEVADA

OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL

STATE BAR OF NEVADA

SOUTHERN NEVADA DISCIPLINARY BOARD

)

) THE STATE BAR OF NEVADA'S
In Re: LIBORIUS AGWARA, ESQ.) RESPONSE TO OBJECTION TO
) SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM
BAR NO. 7576) AND
·) MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION
)

TO: Luke Puschnig, Esq.
Southern Nevada Disciplinary Panel, Interim Chair
3150 Paradise Rd.
Las Vegas, NV 89109

COMES NOW the State Bar of Nevada, through Assistant Bar Counsel Stephanie A. Barker, and hereby moves the Chair of the Southern Nevada Disciplinary Panel (Panel Chair) for an order directing that LIBORIUS AGWARA (Agwara), Nevada Bar No. 7576, comply with the December 16, 2015 Subpoena Duces Tecum (SDT) lawfully issued in accordance with Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 110, and served upon Agwara on January 12, 2016, in connection with the investigation of State Bar grievances against Agwara.

Agwara has objected to the SDT and has thereby refused to provide the responsive documents. Pursuant to SCR 110(4), the contest of a subpoena shall be heard and determined by the chair of the appropriate disciplinary board. Accordingly, the attached Objection by Agwara, in conjunction with this Response by the State Bar and Motion to Compel Production in compliance with the SDT, is submitted for ruling by the Panel Chair.

I.

BACKGROUND

On April 9, 2014 the State Bar opened an investigation into Agwara's trust account management after having been notified of a bankruptcy proceeding in which Agwara's sworn testimony revealed trust account misuse. After review of Agwara's testimony, and review of trust account records subpoenaed from Nevada State Bank (NSB), the State Bar sought client and accounting information from Agwara directly and issued a Subpoena Duces Tecum (SDT) on December 16, 2015. **Exhibit 1**. The SDT was served on Agwara on January 12, 2016. **Exhibit 2**.

Agwara did not provide the documents requested by the SDT and instead, on March 1, 2016, an Objection to the SDT was delivered to the State Bar. **Exhibit 3**. In accordance with SCR 110(4), Agwara's Objection is hereby submitted to the Panel Chair, along with this Motion to Compel Agwara's production of documents in compliance with the SDT, for the Panel Chair's consideration and order.

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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Notification to State Bar / Agwara's Personal Bankruptcy

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

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On April 9, 2014, the State Bar received a letter from the law firm representing Agwara in his personal bankruptcy. During an April 2, 2014, bankruptcy court hearing, Agwara's attorneys were directed by the Judge to report to the State Bar that Agwara "may not maintain his trust account in accordance with Rule [SCR] 78.5 (b)." Specifically, the State Bar was advised that Agwara keeps no ledgers, vouchers or receipts related to his trust account funds. Exhibit 4.

The State Bar subsequently obtained a copy of the March 26, 2014, Declaration of the Bankruptcy Analyst / CPA assigned to conduct financial analysis of Agwara's NSB Trust Account. Exhibit 5. The Analyst confirmed that: Agwara was operating his firm as a sole proprietorship; Agwara's NSB Trust Account records did not include a ledger for the account, client ledgers reflecting the amount held in trust for the clients, receipts, copies of checks deposited into the NSB Trust Account, or documentation regarding wire transfers through account; and that during a March 6, 2014 creditors meeting, Agwara stated that he was on a cash basis and did not have a list of accounts receivable, including amounts due to him for reimbursement of expenses and attorney's fees.

The State Bar sought Agwara's response to the information received from the bankruptcy proceeding. **Exhibit 6**. On May 6, 2014, Agwara advised the State Bar that he objected to the bankruptcy review of his trust account, asserting that the bankruptcy was his personal bankruptcy, and not for his business and the money belonging to his clients and medical providers were not part of the bankruptcy estate.

Exhibit 7. Agwara stated:

I am not aware of a professional rule that requires me to keep a ledger. I do not even know what a ledger is. The fact that [the Analyst] does not like my accounting method does not necessarily mean I engaged in professional misconduct. He wanted me to do it his way.

In light of Agwara's refusal to provide the State Bar with a substantive response to the bankruptcy court's concerns regarding his NSB Trust Account, on June 20, 2014, the State Bar subpoenaed Agwara's NSB Trust Account records directly from the bank. While analysis of those records was pending, on July 23, 2014, the bankruptcy court issued an Order freezing Agwara's NSB Trust Account pending investigation by the Bankruptcy Trustee. **Exhibit 8**.

On July 21, 2014, two days before entry of the order freezing the NSB Trust Account, United States Bankruptcy Judge Bruce Beesley corresponded with the State Bar advising of Agwara's mismanagement of client funds, and of commingling of personal and client funds. **Exhibit 9**. Judge Beesley provided the Bar with pertinent portions of the transcript of an April 2, 2014 bankruptcy hearing at which Agwara gave

sworn testimony regarding his NSB Trust Account. The full transcript of that hearing, **Exhibit 10**, reveals in pertinent part:

- a. Agwara described transactions linked to the client trust account that were personal in nature, or otherwise unrelated to his practice of law. For example, Agwara deposited \$90,000 in insurance proceeds to compensate for water damage to his personal residence, and subsequently issued checks from the trust account to pay for repair of the damage. (Ex. 10, pp. 132-133, ll. 5-2, and pp. 135-137, ll. 16-24.)
- b. Agwara confirmed multiple wire transfers out of the trust account, consisting of thousands of dollars, unrelated to his legal practice. For example, \$22,319.03 (May 2013) for the purchase of real property in Atlanta Georgia (Ex. 10, pp. 137-138, ll. 22-8); \$17,795.61 (May 2013) for freight related to furniture shipped to Nigeria and to Nevada (Ex. 10, pp. 145-146, ll. 21-11); \$49,195 (September 2011) to purchase a BMW X6 for Agwara's cousin in Nigeria (Ex. 7, p. 247, ll. 2-18); \$161,225 (from August 2010 to February 2012) for development of Agwara's real property located in Nigeria (Ex. 7, p. 156, ll. 12-23; pp. 163-165, ll. 16-17; pp. 175-176, ll. 11-6; pp. 176-177, ll. 18-8.)
- c. While Agwara testified that the money transferred from the trust account for personal purposes had been earned by him as "fees," he could not provide any detail regarding which client or case had generated the fee. For example,

Agwara received a million dollar settlement in August 25, 2009, and a \$900,000 settlement in 2010, and in 2014 Agwara could not attest to whether or not his fees earned on those settlements had been distributed for his personal use, in total.

(Ex. 10, pp. 165-167, II. 8-2.)

- d. Agwara testified that he does not implement a reliable or identifiable system of accounting for his client trust account as follows:
- (i) Between 2009 and 2014, 90-95% of Agwara's practice was personal injury (Ex. 10, pp. 34-35, ll. 25-3) and as of April 2, 2014, Agwara could not state how many clients were owed sums of money from Agwara's trust account. (Ex. 10, pp. 42-43, ll. 21-3.)
- (ii) Agwara does not keep a comprehensive ledger of his client trust account, tracking client names and amounts owed, but rather keeps that information as separate documents in each client file. (Ex. 10, pp. 48-49, 1l. 21-13.)
- (iii) When Agwara earns fees from client funds that are deposited into the trust account, he does not withdraw the earned fees all at the same time in order to leave money in the account to run his office in the event there might not be another settlement for the next two or three months he does not move earned fees into an operating account. (Ex. 10, p. 143, ll. 6-25.)

(iv) In order to track how much trust account money was attributable to earned fees, Agwara would have to go back through the account to see how much money had been withdrawn either to him or to his office, or wired out of the trust account on his behalf, in an effort to determine how much was left. (Ex. 10, p. 165, ll. 13-17.)

- (v) In order to determine which case a withdrawal was attributable to, Agwara would see whether there were indications on the check stubs. (Ex. 10, p. 167. II. 7-11.) For personal wires for which there was no check, Agwara would add them together with what he believed was money he had left in the trust account, and "usually there's it covered everything." (Ex. 10, pp. 171-172, II. 15-172.)
- (vi) "[I]f it becomes necessary to go back and say, okay, part of the 50 came from this client, part of the 50 came from that client, then I would do that. But I usually know how much belongs to my office in the trust. Okay. So it—and I never had the need to go and explain where did this one come from and where did this one come from." (Ex. 10, p. 172, II. 5-17.)

The Bankruptcy Court Order freezing the NSB Trust Account was extended by the Court on October 6, 2014. Exhibit 11. Per the Bankruptcy Court's Orders, once frozen, Agwara was required to obtain approval from the Trustee regarding the deposit and distribution of all client settlement funds.

2. The State Bar Investigation

Having received the above-detailed information, evidence, and testimony elicited in bankruptcy court regarding Agwara's handling of his Trust Account, the State Bar opened an investigation. See Exhibit 12, Affidavit of Senior Investigative Paralegal, Office of Bar Counsel. In that investigation the State Bar obtained records from Wells Fargo Bank (WFB) for both an operating account and a second trust account held by Agwara. The existence of this trust account was previously unknown to the State Bar as it had not been disclosed by Agwara as required by SCR 78.5(5).

a. Wells Fargo Bank Operating Account (8515)

Review of the WFB Operating Account records establishes that commencing July 2014, at approximately the time when the NSB Trust Account was first frozen, Agwara bypassed the frozen NSB Trust Account and began diverting client monies into the WFB Operating Account. Ex. 12, ¶ 8. For the next approximate six months, while the NSB Trust Account was frozen and being monitored by the Bankruptcy Trustee, Agwara comingled and disbursed client funds, personal funds, and law practice operating funds through the WFB Operating Account. Ex. 12, ¶¶ 8-10.

The WFB Operating Account records covered dates of service from January 2009 through December 15, 2015. During this period of time, the account reconciliation reveals that there were thirty-four (34) occasions on which Agwara deposited into this operating account, funds received on behalf of a client in the form of either a settlement

check or a medical payment coverage check. **Exhibit 12-B**. The total amount of the client fund checks deposited into the WFB Operating Account over approximately nine months between July 14, 2014 and April 22, 2015, was \$343,876.39. **Exhibit 12-B**.

The reconciliation also shows that during this same nine-month period of time, there were non-client related transactions being processed through this operating account, including withdrawals for office repair and maintenance, pool service, paralegal services, child support, vehicle maintenance, personal litigation expense (bankruptcy and divorce), payroll, lawn maintenance at a personal residence, self-storage fees, CLE fees, payroll costs, etc. **Exhibit 12-C**.

The accounting performed with regard to the WFB Operating Account illustrates that Agwara comingled client, business and personal funds, and failed to properly distribute all of the deposited settlement funds, utilizing a portion of these funds for his business and personal needs at various times.

b. Wells Fargo Bank Trust Account (8027)

The WFB Trust Account was opened in December of 2014, shortly after the second bankruptcy court freezing order had lifted. Ex. 12, ¶ 11. Examination of this trust account demonstrates that although this account appears to have been primarily utilized for client funds, Agwara continued to engage in accounting practices that prevent reconciliation of the sums contained therein. Ex. 12, ¶ ¶ 12 & 13.

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More specifically the WFB Trust Account records covered dates of service from December 15, 2014 (the date the trust account was opened) through December 15, 2015. Pertinent sections of the State Bar reconciliation of these records are attached hereto as **Exhibit 12-D** and **12-E**. The reconciliation demonstrates that client funds deposited into the account are not being properly accounted for leaving client balances in the trust Account because they have not been disbursed in total. **Exhibit 12-E**.

- (i) On 2/10/15, \$10,000 was deposited from ESIS re: Sofia Contreras. Between 2/23/15 and 6/30/15, only \$5,283 of that sum was withdrawn, including payment to Agwara, with no payment to the client, leaving a client fund balance of \$4,717 in the trust account as of 12/15/15.
- (ii) On 2/10/15, \$14,200 was deposited from Liberty Mutual re: Alexis Escobar. On 3/24/15, \$4,733 was withdrawn payable to Agwara & Associates. As of 12/15/15 there were no other withdrawals from the account that referenced Alexis Escobar, and no withdrawal indicating that the client was paid, leaving a client fund balance of \$9,467 in the trust account as of 12/15/15.
- (iii) On 3/12/15, \$8,000 was deposited from Progressive Insurance re: Rene Romero-Alfano, and on 5/6/15, \$2,005.82 was deposited from Allstate re: Rene Romero-Alfano, totaling \$10,005.82. Between 4/7/15 and 4/9/15, \$8,302.82 was withdrawn reference this client, including payment to Agwara, leaving a client fund balance of \$1,703 in the trust account as of 12/15/15.

(iv) On 3/12/15 and 3/24/15, a total of \$65,000 was deposited from Fred Laya Insurance and nationwide Insurance re: Jose Sanchez Martinez. Between 4/2/15 and 6/18/15, a total of \$67,359.19 was withdrawn with reference to this client, including payment to Agwara, creating an overdraft of (\$2,359.15) with regard to this client.

- (v) On 5/6/15, \$15,000 was deposited from GEICO re: Magdalena Hosseini. Between 5/15/15 and 11/16/15, \$8,600 of that sum was withdrawn with reference to this client, including payment to Agwara, leaving a client fund balance of \$6,400 in the trust account as of 12/15/15.
- (vi) On 5/6/15, \$50,000 was deposited from Farmers re: Mere Godfrey. Between 5/15/15 and 6/15/15, \$48,854.75 of that sum was withdrawn with reference to this client, including payment to Agwara, leaving a client fund balance of \$1,145.25 in the trust account as of 12/15/15.
- (vii) On 7/27/15, \$6,000 was deposited from GEICO re: George Goldwair. Between 7/30/15 and 9/8/15, \$4,694 of that sum was withdrawn with reference to this client, including payment to Agwara, leaving a client fund balance of \$1,306 in the trust account as of 12/15/15.
- (viii) On 10/1/15, \$55,000 was deposited from Frias Management, re: Markos Amare. Between 10/7/15 and 10/26/15, \$33,501.50 of that sum was withdrawn with reference to this client, including payment to Agwara, leaving a client fund balance of \$21,498.50 in the trust account as of 12/15/15.

(ix) On 10/9/15, \$4,150 was deposited from GEICO re: Baksh Qadir. As of 12/15/15 no withdrawals were made from the trust account reference this client, leaving a client fund balance of \$4,150 in the trust account as of 12/15/15.

3. Subpoena Duces Teccum for Agwara's Client and Financial Records

In an effort to reconcile Agwara's use of the above-described accounts to process client funds, on December 17, 2016 the Office of Bar Counsel issued the now contested SDT to Agwara, Exhibit 1, seeking:

- 1) client records to include, by named client, retainer agreements, termination letters, documents related to the settlement or distribution of funds to include, but not be limited to medical liens, settlement agreements, pre-settlement loans, distribution/settlement sheets, correspondence evidencing negotiation/settlement of medical liens, releases or satisfactions of any legal obligations;
- 2) accounting records for all deposits, withdrawals and disbursement of funds to or from Nevada State Bank Account Number 2097335 to include, but not be limited to, checks (front and back), check stubs, check ledger, check memos, wire instructions, account journals, account records, accounting database, or account summaries; and
 - 3) personal and business tax returns from 2009 through 2014.

After extension of time for Agwara's response to the SDT, on March 1, 2016, Agwara served the State Bar with an Objection to the SDT, Exhibit 2, refusing to produce the required documents, asserting that:

- 1. The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination protects Agwara with respect to producing or testifying about the subpoenaed documents and records.
 - 2. The subpoenaed documents are time-barred.
- 3. The State Bar is functioning as a conduit for other entities/persons to obtain documents that those entities are otherwise not entitled to under the law.
- 4. The State Bar is seeking documents (income tax returns) which are outside of its jurisdiction and which have nothing to do with how Agwara practices law.
- 5. The SDT should be quashed or the grievance placed in abeyance pending the completion of Agwara's bankruptcy proceeding, a likely ongoing investigation by the U.S. Attorney's Office, and an Internal Revenue Service Examination.

Agwara's Objection indicates that Agwara would be filing a brief to which Agwara would attach documentary evidence in support of the objection. No brief or documentary evidence in support of the Objection has been submitted to the State Bar as of this date.

B. ARGUMENT

Supreme Court Rules and Rules of Professional Conduct Require Agwara to Comply with the Subpoena Duces Tecum

SCR 110 provides that the State Bar may compel production of attorney records by way of subpoena, in matters under investigation by the State Bar. Agwara's conduct with regard to trust account and operating account management, and his failure to

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disclose client accounting information in response to a subpoena from the State Bar, demonstrates attempted evasion of oversight concerning client fund management.

SCR 78.5(1)(b) requires that:

[E]very lawyer . . . shall maintain and preserve . . . records of the accounts including checkbooks, cancelled checks, check stubs, vouchers, ledgers, journals, closing statements, accountings or other statements of disbursements rendered to clients or other parties with regard to trust funds or similar equivalent records clearly and expressly reflecting the date, amount, source, and explanation for all receipts, withdrawals, deliveries and disbursements of the funds. . .

Agwara's accounting systems, based upon his sworn testimony in the bankruptcy proceeding, do not comply with SCR 78.5(1)(b).

RPC 1.15 requires that Agwara safe-keep client funds as follows:

Rule 1.15. Safekeeping Property.

- (a) A lawyer shall hold funds or other property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own property. All funds received or held for the benefit of clients by a lawyer or firm, including advances for costs and expenses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable bank accounts designated as a trust account maintained in the state where the lawyer's office is situated, or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person. Other property in which clients or third persons hold an interest shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of seven years after termination of the representation.
- (b) A lawyer may deposit the lawyer's own funds in a client trust account for the sole purpose of paying bank

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service charges on that account, but only in an amount necessary for that purpose.

- (c) A lawyer shall deposit into a client trust account legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned or expenses incurred.
- (d) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.
- (e) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of funds or other property in which two or more persons (one of whom may be the lawyer) claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. The lawyer shall promptly distribute all portions of the funds or other property as to which the interests are not in dispute.

Agwara's accounting practices do not comply with RPC 1.15, demonstrate a pattern of comingling client funds with Agwara's personal and law practice operating funds, and evidence a failure to promptly distribute funds to third-party claimants, to his clients, or to himself.

RPC 8.1(b) requires Agwara to comply with requests from the State Bar in its investigation of complaints regarding violations of rules of professional conduct as follow:

Rule 8.1. Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters.

... [A] a lawyer . . . in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:

- (a) ...
- (b) Fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from . . . disciplinary authority, except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.

RPC 8.1(b) compels an attorney to cooperate with a State Bar investigation of alleged violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Agwara has refused to respond to the State Bar's lawful demand for information regarding his client funds in violation of Agwara's RPC 8.1(b) obligations, and has failed to raise a credible objection to the same. Addressing Agwara's specific objections serially:

1. The Fifth Amendment does not protect an attorney from production of documents in a State Bar investigation of attorney conduct.

In the case of *Spevack v. Klien*, 385 U.S. 511 (1967), the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the disbarment of an attorney which was issued for the attorney's failure to testify at his hearing and to respond to a Subpoena Duces Tecum. The Court determined with respect to his *testimony*, the attorney was entitled to assert the Fifth Amendment. However, with regard to the refusal to respond to the Subpoena Duces Tecum, the Supreme Court only noted that the attorney should have been given an opportunity to show that the requested documents were outside the scope of the required records rule and were private papers with no "public aspects". *Id. at* 519.

In Nevada, there are several rules requiring attorneys to comply with lawful records requests from the State Bar including SCR 78.5, RPC 1.15 and RPC 8.1, as set forth hereinabove. A subpoena issued pursuant to SCR 110 is a lawful request, and these rules require Nevada attorneys to cooperate with the State Bar and provide records necessary to, and relevant to a State Bar investigation of the handling of client funds, including the attorney's earned fees. Accordingly, Agwara's blanket assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege does not shelter him from response to the State Bar's demand for records regarding the handling and disposition of client funds in trust and operating accounts, and other financial records pursuant SCR 78.5, RPC 1.15 and RPC 8.1(b).

2. The records sought by the SDT span a time frame relevant to the investigation opened by the State Bar in April 2014.

On April 9, 2014, the subject investigation was opened when the State Bar received a letter from Agwara's bankruptcy attorney advising that the bankruptcy court had directed him to notify the State Bar that Agwara "may not maintain his trust account in accordance with Rule [SCR] 78.5 (b)." Transcripts of hearings in bankruptcy court revealed that dating as far back as 2010, Agwara failed to keep ledgers of his Trust Account activity and instead could only attempt to track his withdrawal of earned fees and client payments by cross-reference to client files. (Ex. 7, pp.165-167.) The State Bar's SDT seeks production of client records and accounting records regarding those transactions, in part based on Agwara's testimony that review of those records is

 necessary in order to track deposits and disbursement of client funds for periods of time relevant to this investigation.

SCR 106(2) addresses time limitations regarding disciplinary proceedings as follows:

Rule 106. Privilege and limitation.

2. **Limitation**. Disciplinary proceedings shall not be commenced against an attorney for alleged misconduct occurring more than 4 years prior to the receipt of that grievance or filing of the complaint by bar counsel. In the event of fraud or concealment, the 4 year period begins on the date the fraud or concealment was discovered by the grievant...

Because the State Bar has been advised that Agwara keeps no ledgers, vouchers or receipts related to his trust account funds, the request for records that may extend greater than four years prior to the date the State Bar received a report of Agwara's trust account mis-use, is not unreasonable. Only by looking to prior year records will the investigation be able to adequately determine if receipt and disbursement of client funds can be accounted for on the dates those funds were processed, or whether income is being concealed within the trust account via Agwara's failure to properly distribute and account for fees earned by and owed to him in that regard.

3. The State Bar's investigation of potential violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, is confidential pursuant to SCR 121.

The Supreme Court has outlined the confidentiality of a State Bar misconduct investigation as follows:

Rule 121. Confidentiality.

- 1. Generally. All proceedings involving allegations of misconduct by an attorney shall be kept confidential until the filing of a formal complaint. All participants in a proceeding, including anyone connected with it, shall conduct themselves so as to maintain the confidentiality of the proceeding until a formal complaint is filed.
- 2. When no formal complaint filed. In the event no formal complaint is filed, the disciplinary proceeding shall become public upon its conclusion, whether by dismissal or otherwise.
- 11. What becomes public. Once a matter has become public pursuant to this rule, all records of the lawyer discipline agency shall become public except bar counsel's work product and the panel's deliberations.
- 12. Proceedings before the supreme court. Unless these rules specifically provide that a matter in the supreme court is confidential, all filed documents and arguments in lawyer discipline proceedings in the supreme court shall be public, unless for good cause shown, the supreme court enters an order sealing all or part of the record in the court.
- 15. Statements by the State Bar of Nevada. Notwithstanding Rule 121(1), the state bar may disseminate the procedural status and the general nature of a grievance or complaint upon request.
- 16. Exclusions. These rules shall not prohibit any complainant, the accused attorney, or any witnesses from discussing publicly the existence of the proceedings under these rules or the underlying facts related thereto. However, disclosures made under this subsection, in whatever form or by whatever means, outside the disciplinary process shall not be covered by the civil immunity afforded in Rule 106(1).

Agwara broadly asserts that the State Bar has misused its subpoena authority at the behest of or for the benefit of "other entities/persons." Agwara has provided no

explanation, and has not alleged any event or circumstance on which this assertion is based. Therefore, this office is unable to substantively respond to this portion of Agwara's "objection." Nonetheless, the Office of Bar Counsel advises that there is no purpose for the subject SDT other than investigation of the extent of Agwara's misuse of his trust account, as testified to by Agwara himself.

4. The State Bar's request for tax returns is within its jurisdiction as relevant to investigation of violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Agwara's sworn testimony at a hearing before the Honorable Judge Beesly in bankruptcy court, revealed that Agwara has utilized his trust account as a holding account to retain earned fees. More specifically, rather than withdraw earned fees as earned income, Agwara instead withdrew money from the trust account to directly pay personal expenses. This failure to account for, withdraw, and potentially declare as income the fees earned from his legal work is a violation of RPC 1.15 (Safekeeping Property) and RPC 8.4 (Misconduct). Before charging these professional conduct violations it is reasonable and necessary for the State Bar to seek documentation of the accuracy, or inaccuracy, of Agwara's sworn testimony in the bankruptcy proceeding.

5. The pendency of a bankruptcy proceeding, investigation by the United States Attorney's Office, or an Internal Revenue Service Examination is not a reason to stay Agwara's subpoena response.

Per the Supreme Court Rules, processing of a grievance or State Bar complaint shall not be deferred due to pending civil or criminal proceedings. SCR 108 provides:

/ / /

Rule 108. Matters involving related pending civil or criminal litigation. Before or after a grievance file has been opened, processing of a grievance or complaint shall not be deferred or abated because of substantial similarity to the material allegations of pending criminal or civil litigation, unless authorized, for good cause, by a three-member screening panel appointed pursuant to Rule 105(1).

The existence of bankruptcy proceedings, or criminal or civil investigations by either the United States Attorney's Office or the Internal Revenue Service, are not a basis for Agwara to refuse to comply with the State Bar subpoena for documents relevant to its investigation, pursuant to Nevada Supreme Court Rule.

III.

CONCLUSION

Agwara has testified to misuse of his client trust account. "[T]he paramount objective of bar disciplinary proceedings is . . . to protect the public[.]" State Bar of Nevada v. Claiborne, 104 Nev. 115, 129, 756 P.2d 464, 473 (1988). See also In the Matter of Cochrane, 92 Nev. 253, 255, 549 P.2d 328, 329 (1976). Agwara's engagement in comingled accounting practices, and continued disregard for the risk presented thereby, demonstrates a complete and total disregard for protecting the interests of his clients. The records sought by the State Bar's SDT are necessary to a complete evaluation of injury and potential injury created by Agwara's imprecise and risky accounting practices.

The Office of Bar Counsel therefore seeks a ruling denying Agwara's objection to the SDT, and an order compelling his response through provision of the subpoenaed documents, forthwith.

DATED this 17 day of May, 2016.

STATE BAR OF NEVADA C. STANLEY HUNTERTON

Stephanie A. Barker, Assistant Bar Counsel

Nevada Bar No. 3176

3100 W. Charleston Blvd., Ste. 100

Las Vegas, NV 89102

Phone: 702-382-2200

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies a true and correct copy of the attached THE STATE BAR OF NEVADA'S RESPONSE TO OBJECTION TO SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM AND MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION was deposited in the United States mail at Las Vegas, Nevada, along with the exhibit identified therein and attached thereto, postage fully pre-paid thereon for first class mail addressed to:

William B. Terry, Esq. 530 S. Seventh St. Las Vegas, NV 89101 Attorney for Agwara

DATED this 17th day of May, 2016.

Employee of the State Bar of Nevada

Danmel

EXHIBIT LIST

		ENZARRIPE I RAIN I
2	Exhibit 1 –	Subpoena Duces Tecum to Agwara dated December 16, 2015
3	Exhibit 2 –	Affidavit of Service filed January 19, 2016
5	Exhibit 3 –	Agwara's Objection to Subpoena Duces Tecum dated March 1, 2016
6	Exhibit 4 –	April 9, 2014, Correspondence to the State Bar from the Schwartz Law Firm
7 8	Exhibit 5 –	March 24, 2014, Declaration of Bankruptcy Analyst/CPA, D.A. Clarke Finneran
9 10	Exhibit 6 –	April 17, 2014, Correspondence from the Office of Bar Counsel to Respondent
11 12	Exhibit 7 —	May 6, 2014, correspondence from Respondent to the Office of Bar Counsel
13 14	Exhibit 8 –	Order Approving Stipulation To Freeze IOLTA Bank Account Pending Investigation by Trustee, USBC Docket 236, July 23, 2014
15	Exhibit 9 –	July 21, 2014, correspondence from United States Bankruptcy Court Judge Bruce Beesley to the State Bar
16 17	Exhibit 10 –	Transcript of April 2, 2014, United States Bankruptcy Court Motion Hearing
18 19	Exhibit 11 –	Order Approving Second Stipulation To Freeze IOLTA Bank Account Pending Investigation by Trustee, USBC Docket 285,
20		October 6, 2014
21	Exhibit 12 –	Affidavit of Dawn Meeks, State Bar of Nevada Senior Paralegal Investigator, May 6, 2016
22		
23		
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-24-

Case No: SG13-1818c SG14-0100, SG14-0485, SG14-1137 1 2 3 4 5 STATE BAR OF NEVADA 6 SOUTHERN NEVADA DISCIPLINARY BOARD 7 8 STATE BAR OF NEVADA, 9 Complainant, SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM AND MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION 10 VS. LIBORIUS AGWARA, ESQ., 11 NV BAR No. 7576 12 Respondent. 13 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Objection to Subpoena Duces Tecum is hereby denied 14 and the State Bar's Motion to Compel production is hereby granted. 15 This Order does not, in any manner, prevent Liborius Agwara, Esq. from making similar 16 arguments in the future if this matter continues to hearing. DATED this May of May, 2016. B Nevada Bar No. 3792

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MAY 27 2016

STATE BAR OF NEVADA

y:	
Luke Puschnig, Esq.	-

Chair of Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board

Exhibit "4"

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Case No. SG13-1818, SG14-0100, SG14-0485, SG14-1137

MAY 27 2016

	this at Epito
SOUTHER	STATE BAR OF NEVADA N NEVADA DISCIPLINARY BOARD AR COUNSEL
STATE BAR OF NEVADA,)
VS.) NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER
LIBORIUS AGWARA, ESQ. Bar No.)
Respondent.	
	

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an ORDER REGARDING OBJECTION TO SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM AND MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION in the abovereferenced matter was entered on May 27, 2016. A true and correct copy is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 1.

DATED this (day of May 2016.

> STATE BAR OF NEVADA C. STANLEY HUNTERTON

STEPHANIE A. BARKER, ESQ. Assistant Bar Counsel

3100 W. Charleston Boulevard Las Vegas, Nevada 89102

(702) 382-2200

Attorney for Complainant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL

The undersigned hereby certifies a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER RE: ORDER REGARDING OBJECTION TO SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM AND MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION was deposited in the United States Mail at Las Vegas, Nevada, postage fully pre-paid thereon for first-class regular mail, addressed to:

Liborius I. Agwara, Esq. c/o William B. Terry, Esq. 530 South Seventh Street Las Vegas, NV 89101-6011

and via email to:

- 1. Luke Puschnig, Esq. (SNDB Chair): lpuschnig@lvcva.com
- 2. William B. Terry, Esq.: info@williamterrylaw.com
 DATED this ²⁷¹⁰day of May, 2016.

Bv:

Dawn Meeks, an employee of the State Bar of Nevada.

Case No: SG13-1818c SG14-0100, SG14-0485, SG14-1137 1 2 MAY 27 2016 3 STATE BAR OF NEVADA 4 OFFICE OFBAR COUNSEL 5 STATE BAR OF NEVADA 6 SOUTHERN NEVADA DISCIPLINARY BOARD 7 8 STATE BAR OF NEVADA, ORDER REGARDING OBJECTION TO 9 Complainant, SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM AND MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION 10 VS. LIBORIUS AGWARA, ESQ., 11 NV BAR No. 7576 12 Respondent. 13 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Objection to Subpoena Duces Tecum is hereby denied 14 and the State Bar's Motion to Compel production is hereby granted. 15 This Order does not, in any manner, prevent Liborius Agwara, Esq. from making similar 16 arguments in the future if this matter continues to hearing. 17 DATED this day of May, 2016. 18 19 By 20 Luke Puschnig, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 3792 Chair of Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board 21 22 23

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Exhibit "5"

Case No. SG13-1818, SG14-0100, SG14-0485, SG14-1137 STATE BAR OF NEVADA SOUTHERN NEVADA DISCIPLINARY BOARD STATE BAR OF NEVADA. SECOND VS. **DUCES TECUM** LIBORIUS AGWARA, ESQ. Bar No. FILED Respondent. MAY 1 7 2016 Liborius I. Agwara, Esq. c/o William Terry, Esq. STATE BAR OF NEVADA 9 530 S. Seventh Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 10 11 YOU ARE HEREBY directed to set aside any and all business and excuses and 12 appear before Stephanie A. Barker, Assistant Bar Counsel for the State Bar of Nevada, at 13 3100 W. Charleston Boulevard, Las Vegas, Nevada, 89102, on Monday, June 6, 2016, by 14 4:00 p.m., and produce true and correct copies of the following items. 15 Your production of the requested items relieves your obligation to 16 personally appear before Assistant Bar Counsel on the designated dated and time. Any 17 questions or documents produced can be directed to the attention of: 18 Dawn Meeks 19 Senior Paralegal/Investigator Office of Bar Counsel 20 702-317-1439 dawnm@nvbar.org 21 22 23 24 25

INSTRUCTIONS

This subpoens is a request for documents in your possession or in the possession or control of any of your attorneys, accountants, employees, agents or representatives. The term "document(s)" refers to any written, recorded or graphic representation, invoice, e-mail, and any items that have been optically scanned and/or electronically stored in any form, including but not limited to, all correspondence, telexes, written communications, notes, jottings, memoranda, telegrams, electronic wires, records, reports, computer printouts, calculations, worksheets, written agreements, account summaries, receipts, invoices, checks, check stubs, bills or other tangible item regardless of how it may be stored, produced or reproduced.

- 1. During the time period between December 1, 2014 and present, deposits were made into and withdrawals taken from Wells Fargo Bank IOLTA Account ending 8027. In connection with these transactions, provide copies of the following documents:
 - Retainer agreement or other documents that evidences the creation of the attorney/client relationship, and the terms of the representation, to include, but not limited to, the scope of services to be provided and any termination letter upon the conclusion of the services, if applicable.
 - b. Documents related to the settlement or distribution of funds processed through Wells Fargo Bank IOLTA Account ending 8027 to include, but not limited to, medical liens, settlement agreements, pre-settlement loans, distribution/settlement sheets, correspondence evidencing negotiation/settlement of medical liens, releases or satisfactions of any legal obligations.

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- Accounting records for all deposits, withdrawals and disbursement of funds to or from Wells Fargo Bank IOLTA Account ending 8027 to include, but not limited to, checks (front and back), check stubs, check ledger, check memos, wire instructions, account journals, account records, accounting database, or account summaries.
- 2. For the time period between July 1, 2014 and present, deposits were made into Wells Fargo Bank business account ending 8515 that were relating to settlements, medical payment coverage, or retainers. In connection with these transactions, provide copies of the following documents:
 - a. Retainer agreement or other documents that evidences the creation of the attorney/client relationship, and the terms of the representation, to include, but not limited to, the scope of services to be provided and any termination letter upon the conclusion of the services, if applicable.
 - b. Documents related to the settlement or distribution of funds processed through Wells Fargo Bank business account ending 8515 to Include, but not limited to, medical liens, settlement agreements, pre-settlement loans, distribution/settlement sheets, correspondence evidencing negotiation/settlement of medical liens, releases or satisfactions of any legal obligations.
 - c. Accounting records for all deposits, withdrawals and disbursement of funds to or from Wells Fargo Bank IOLTA Account ending 8027 to include, but not limited to checks (front and back), check stubs, check ledger, check memos, wire

instructions, account journals, account records, accounting database, or account summaries.

This subpoena is issued pursuant to Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 110 in connection with a CONFIDENTIAL INVESTIGATION undertaken pursuant to the Nevada Supreme Court Rules. It shall be regarded as contempt of the Supreme Court Rules for you to in any way breach the confidentiality of this investigation. It shall not be regarded as a breach of confidentiality for you to consult with an attorney or answer questions asked at the above time and place. For failure to provide as herein directed, you will be deemed in contempt of the Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board and subject to citation from the District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Clark to show cause why you should not be punished for such contempt as provided in SCR 110.

ISSUED this Lorday of May, 2016.

STATE BAR OF NEVADA C. STANLEY HUNTERTON, BAR COUNSEL

Stephanie A. Barker, Assistant Bar Counsel

Nevada Bar No. 3176

3100 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite 100

Las Vegas, Nevada 89102

(702) 382-2200

Exhibit "6"

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Case No.: SG13-1818, SG14-0100, SG14-0485, SG14-1137

JUN - 1 2016

STATE BAR OF NEVADA BY

OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL

SOUTHERN NEVADA DISCIPLINARY BOARD

In Re: LIBORIUS AGWARA, ESQ.
BAR NO. 7576

OBJECTION TO SUBPOENA AND MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA

COMES NOW the Respondent, LIBORIUS AGWARA, through his counsel, WILLIAM B. TERRY, ESQ., of the law offices of WILLIAM B. TERRY, CHARTERED and moves to quash the "Second Subpoena Duces Tecum" a copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein as Exhibit "A" and likewise files the instant objection to said Subpoena.

This Motion is made and based upon the pleadings and papers on file herein, the attached analysis of facts and points and authorities in support hereof, and any oral arguments as may be presented at the hearing in this matter.

WILLIAM B. TERRY, CHARTERED

WILLIAM B. TERRY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 001028

WILLIAM B. TERRY, CHARTERED

530 South Seventh Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

(702) 385-0799

Attorney for Respondent

ANALYSIS OF FACTS

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On May 17, 2016, the State Bar of Nevada under case numbers SG13-1818, SG14-0100, SG14-0485, and SG14-1137 issued a "Second Subpoena Duces Tecum", a copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein as Exhibit "A". The subpoena directs the production of documents by June 6, 2016.

On December 16, 2015, the State Bar issued a subpoena to Mr. Agwara, a copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein as Exhibit "B". Objections were filed to that subpoena and were ultimately ruled upon by the Chair. Neither the Respondent nor his counsel concur with the finding of the Chairman of the panel and intend to seek a writ of prohibition or in the alternative a writ of mandamus in reference to said subpoena. There are two sections to the subpoena. Section 1 deals with a period of time between December 1, 2014 with no ending date. In reference to a Wells Fargo Bank IOLTA account ending in 8028. Without referring to any specific case, client or transaction, the subpoena requests "retainer agreement or other documents that evidences the creation of the attorney client relationship..." It also requests documents related to the settlement or distribution of funds processed through Wells Fargo account ending in 8027. Subsection 2 of the subpoena requests documents for a period of time between July 1, 2014 and a non-ending date. It requests the same types of documents but is much broader and pertains to the Wells Fargo business account ending in 8515 as well as the Wells Fargo IOLTA account ending in 8027. Unlike Subpoena #1 there is no list of cases attached for reference. As a result, the Respondent would enter objections to the subpoena and ask that the subpoena be quashed consistent with Rule 110 of the Supreme Court Rules of the State of Nevada. Rule 110(4) provides in pertinent part as follows:

Contest of Subpoena: A contest of a subpoena shall be heard and determined by the Chair of the appropriate disciplinary board...

ARGUMENT

I. THE SUBPOENA IN QUESTION SHOULD BE QUASHED SINCE IT IS OVERLY BROAD.

Without referring to any cases or any individuals, the subpoena under subsections 1 and 2 request retainer agreement in the singular and documents in the plural pertaining to Wells Fargo

Bank IOLTA account ending in 8027 and Wells Fargo Bank business account ending 8515. The State Bar has indicated in it's caption that the scope of their investigation pertains to what will be referred to as four cases: SG13-1818; SG14-0100; SG14-0485; and SG14-1137. No complaint has been filed against the Respondent and the scope of these case numbers and their investigations is unknown. Without knowing the specific scope of these "case numbers" the Respondent is not placed on notice of that which he should be prepared to defend against and in fact is limited in what he can represent as far as being objections to the subpoena other than the fact that it is overly broad. An additional objection is that the Bar has not shown any nexus or relevancy in reference to the subpoenaed material and concerning any investigation. Any subpoena should be limited to the scope of that which is being investigated and must be determined to be relevant to that investigation.

II. THE RESPONDENT ASSERTS HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION WITH RESPECT TO PRODUCING ANY OF THE SUBPOENAED DOCUMENTS AND/OR RECORDS.

In their definition of the term "documents" the Bar has requested any written, recorded documents, any emails, any written communications, notes, jottings, memorandums, etc. The subpoena does not delineate what specifically they are requesting and in fact the Bar is on a "fishing expedition" in reference to the Respondent. To provide the material requested would take an exorbitant about of time because it is not limited to any specific case or individual. Additionally, many of the documents which are being sought are items that deal with a potential Fifth Amendment assertion. The burden should not be on the Respondent but should be on the State Bar to show both the relevancy of the documents, the specific documents which are being requested and how they do not affect a Fifth Amendment right. The Respondent herein asserts that Fifth Amendment right. Even settlement documents or retainer agreements are subject to the Fifth Amendment. If for example a retainer agreement calls for no costs to be paid but costs had been asserted, then the Bar could allege both a misconduct violation and/or a safekeeping violation. As a result, the Respondent goes on record in asserting his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution applies in lawyer disciplinary proceedings. See *Spevack v. Klein*, 385 U.S. 511 (1967). Consistent with *Spevack*, courts have been in agreement that a lawyer cannot be sanctioned solely for invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege

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against self-incrimination. While there are no specific cases in Nevada on the assertion of the Fifth Amendment right by an attorney in a bar proceedings or in reference to a subpoena, *Spevack*, supra is not limited to testimonial situations but is likewise applicable to documents. In the case of *In relibility*, 545 A.2d 1019 (Ver. 1988) the court upheld the assertion of a Fifth Amendment privilege by a convicted judge subpoenaed to testify in a judicial disciplinary proceeding against another judge because the court found that she was not required to demonstrate she would be prosecuted or that an answer would result in her conviction only that there was a valid risk of further prosecution.

III. THE SUBPOENA IS OVERLY BROAD TO SUCH A DEGREE AS TO NOT ALLOW THE RESPONDENT TO ARGUE THAT THEY ARE TIME BARRED.

Pursuant to the instant argument, the position of the Respondent is that the subpoenas are so overly broad that they prevent the Respondent from arguing that any allegations pertaining to a specific client as opposed to clients in general is time barred. While both subsection 1 and subsection 2 of the subpoena deal with a date starting December 1, 2014 and alternatively July 1, 2014, they may affect clients that existed prior to the period of time.

CONCLUSION

For the above-indicated reasons, the Respondent objects to the subpoena and moves that it be quashed.

DATED this 1st day of June, 2016.

WILLIAM B. TERRY, CHARTERED

WILLIAM B. TERRY, ESO.

Nevada Bar No. 001028 WILLIAM B. TERRY, CHARTERED

530 South Seventh Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

(702) 385-0799

Attorney for Respondent

RECEIPT OF COPY

RECEIPT OF COPY of the OBJECTION TO SUBPOENA AND MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA in the above-entitled matter is hereby acknowledged this __/stday of June, 2016. Stephanie Barker, Assistant Bar Counsel 3100 West Charleston Boulevard Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Luke Puschnig, Esq. 3150 Paradise Road Las Vegas, Nevada 89109

Case No: SG13-1818c SG14-0100, SG14-0485, SG14-1137



2	JON - 2 2016
3	STATE BAR OF NEVADA BY: Man - July
4	OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL
5	STATE BAR OF NEVADA
6	SOUTHERN NEVADA DISCIPLINARY BOARD
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8	STATE BAR OF NEVADA,
9	Complainant, ORDER FOR HEARING ON OBJECTION TO SUBPOENA AND MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA
10	vs.
11	LIBORIUS AGWARA, ESQ.,) NV BAR No. 7576)
12	Respondent.
13	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a telephonic hearing has been set for Thursday, July 7th at
14	2:00pm regarding the Objection to Subpoena and Motion to Quash Subpoena. The call-in number is
15	702-892-7625, conference ID: 8507, conference PIN #: 582207.
16	DATED this S day of June, 2016.
17	$\left(\frac{1}{2} \right)$
18	By:
19	Luke Puschnig, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 3792
20	hair of Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL

The undersigned hereby certifies a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER FOR HEARING ON OBJECTION TO SUBPOENA AND MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA was deposited via electronic mail to:

- 1. Paul "Luke" Puschnig, Esq. (Committe Chair): lpuschnig@lvcva.com; Dtorres@lvcva.com
- 2. William H. Terry, Esq. (Respondent's Counsel) info@williamterrylaw.com; Sarah Daniels (Sarah@WilliamTerryLaw.com)
- 3. Janeen V. Isaacson, Esq. (Assistant Bar Counsel): janeeni@nvbar.org;
- 4. Stephanie Barker, Esq. (Assistant Bar Counsel): stephanieb@nvbar.org; dawnm@nvbar.org

DATED this day of June, 2016.

Jana L. Chaffee, an employee of the State Bar of Nevada.

Office Email

From:

Office Email <Info@WilliamTerryLaw.com>

Sent:

Thursday, June 30, 2016 9:29 AM

To:

'Luke Puschnig'

Cc:

'Janeen Isaacson'; 'Stephanie Barker'

Subject:

Liborius Agwara

Dear Chairman Puschnig:

I received your order denying our objections to the second Subpoena Duces Tecum by way of email dated June 29, 2016 at 4:58 p.m. You had scheduled oral arguments on this matter for July 7, 2016 at 2:00 p.m. Am I to presume that that is now vacated since you have ruled without oral arguments?

I am also requesting a stay of your order on both subpoena #1 and subpoena #2 so that I can file a writ with the Nevada Supreme Court. I have to make this request even if you deny it so that I can represent in the writ that a stay has been requested but denied. I would suggest that if you deny the request for stays, your denial also set forth the reason why the previously set oral argument which was to be heard on July 7th at 2:00 p.m. was vacated.

As always, thank you for your courtesies.

William B. Terry, Esq. 530 S. Seventh Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 385-0799 Info@WilliamTerryLaw.com

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

This message or any attachments may contain information that is privileged, confidential, or exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you have received this message in error, please do not forward or use this information in any way, immediately notify the sender by reply e-mail, and delete the message and any attachments. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, or the employee or agent for delivering the message to the intended recipient, you are hereby notifed that any dissemination or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited.

Office Email

From:

Luke Puschnig < lpuschnig@lvcva.com>

Sent:

Thursday, June 30, 2016 9:47 AM

To:

Office Email

Cc:

Janeen Isaacson; Stephanie Barker

Subject:

Re: Liborius Agwara

Oral hearing was vacated because I do not see a reason for the oral hearing. The written pleadings were enough to decide the matter. I am also hereby denying the Request for a Stay on my order.

Luke PUSCHNIG

Sent from my iPad

On Jun 30, 2016, at 9:29 AM, Office Email < lnfo@WilliamTerryLaw.com> wrote:

Dear Chairman Puschnig:

I received your order denying our objections to the second Subpoena Duces Tecum by way of email dated June 29, 2016 at 4:58 p.m. You had scheduled oral arguments on this matter for July 7, 2016 at 2:00 p.m. Am I to presume that that is now vacated since you have ruled without oral arguments?

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As always, thank you for your courtesies.

William B. Terry, Esq. 530 S. Seventh Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 385-0799 Info@WilliamTerryLaw.com

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