1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 2 3 TROY MULLNER S.Ct. No. 71030 **Electronically Filed** 4 Feb 27 2017 03:24 p.m. Appellant, D.C. No. C283463 Elizabeth A. Brown 5 Clerk of Supreme Court VS. 6 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 7 Respondent. 8 9 APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 10 11 STEVEN S. OWENS, ESQ. JEAN J. SCHWARTZER. ESQ 12 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar No. 11223 13 Nevada Bar No. 4352 Law Office of Jean J. Schwartzer Clark County District Attorney's Office 10620 Southern Highlands Pkwy 14 200 Lewis Avenue Suite 110-473 15 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 Las Vegas, Nevada 89141 (702) 979-9941 (702) 671-2500 16 Attorney for Respondent jean.schwartzer@gmail.com 17 State of Nevada Attorney for Appellant Troy Mullner 18 19 20 ADAM LAXALT, ESQ. 21 Nevada Attorney General 100 North Carson Street 22 Carson City, Nevada 89701 23 (775) 684-1265

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii-iv
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
ROUTING STATEMENT1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE2-6
STATEMENT OF FACTS6-8
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 8
ARGUMENT8-17
CONCLUSION17
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

<u>CASES:</u>	PAGE		
Allred v. State, 120 Nev. 410, 92 P.2d 1246 (2004)	14-15		
Arajakis v. State, 108 Nev. 976, 843 P.2d 800 (1992)			
Blume v. State, 112 Nev. 472, 915 P.2d 282 (1996)			
<u>Culverson v. State</u> , 95 Nev. 433, 596 P.2d 220 (1979)			
French v. State, 98 Nev. 235, 645 P.2d 440 (1982)	9, 11		
<u>Harmelin v. Michigan,</u> 501 U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (1991)			
Lozada v. State, 110 Nev. 349, 871 P.2d 944 (1994)	1		
Mulder v. State, 116 Nev. 1, 992 P.2d 845 (2000)			
Sessions v. State, 106 Nev. 186, 789 P.2d 1242 (1990)	9, 11		
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288, 103 S.Ct. 3001 (1983)			
State v. Javier, 289 P.3d 1194, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 50 (Oct. 4, 2012)			
STATUTES & REGULATIONS	PAGE		
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 62A.330	12		
Nev. Rev. Stat. §193.165			
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 193.330			

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.310	2
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.320	2
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.380	2-3
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.481	13
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 202.360	3
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 205.060	2-3
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 207.010	8-11
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 207.190	2-3
NV. CONST. Art I, §6	14
ILS CONST AMEND VIII	14

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

TROY MULLNER

Appellant,

Vs.

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has appellate jurisdiction over the instant matter pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. § 177.015(3). The Appellant appeals from his Amended Judgment of Conviction, which was entered on January 28, 2014. Appellate counsel filed an untimely Notice of Appeal on April 15, 2014. However, the District Court granted Appellant an appeal pursuant to <u>Lozada v. State</u> ¹ after post-conviction habeas proceedings, and filed a timely Notice of Appeal on August 11, 2016.

ROUTING STATEMENT

Appellant was convicted of a category A felony. Therefore, pursuant to N.R.A.P. 17(b)(1), this appeal presumptively is routed to the Supreme Court of Nevada.

110 Nev. 349, 8/1 P.20 944 (1994)

Page 1

¹ 110 Nev. 349, 871 P.2d 944 (1994).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

- I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SENTENCING MULLNER AS A SMALL HABITUAL CRIMINAL
- II. MULLNER'S SENTENCE AMOUNTS TO CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
- III. CUMULATIVE ERROR

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On August 15, 2012, the State charged TROY LEE MULLNER ("Mullner") by way of Indictment with the following: Eleven (11) counts of BURGLARY (Category B Felony – NRS 205.060); Sixteen (16) counts of ROBBERY (Category B Felony – NRS 200.380); Two (2) counts of FIRST DEGREE KIDNAPPING (Category A Felony – NRS 200.310, 200.320); Four (4) counts of COERCION (Category B Felony – NRS 207.190); Four (4) counts of BURGLARY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony – NRS 200.060, NRS 193.165); Two (2) Counts of ATTEMPT ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony – NRS 200.380, 193.330, 193.165); Three (3) counts of ATTEMPT ROBBERY (Category B Felony – NRS 200.380,

Page 2

193.330) and One (1) count of POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY EX-FELON (Category B Felony – NRS 202.360). 1 AA 12-27.

The State filed a Notice of Intent to Seek Punishment as a Habitual Criminal. 1 AA 28-30.

Pursuant to negotiations, on October 21, 2013, the State charged Mullner by way of Amended Indictment with the following: One(1) count of BURGLARY (Category B Felony – NRS 205.060); Two (2) counts of ROBBERY (Category B Felony – NRS 200.380); One (1) count of COERCION (Category B Felony – NRS 207.190); Two (2) counts of BURGLARY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony – NRS 200.380, NRS 193.165); Two (2) Counts of ROBBERY WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony – NRS 200.380, 193.165); One (1) count of ATTEMPT ROBBERY (Category B Felony – NRS 200.380, 193.330) and One (1) count of POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY EX-FELON (Category B Felony – NRS 202.360). 1 AA 31-34.

On October 21, 2013, Mullner was arraigned on the Amended Indictment, and a Guilty Plea Agreement ("GPA") was filed. 1 AA 35-38. The State reserved the full right to argue, including for habitual criminal treatment. <u>Id</u>. Mullner

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pleaded guilty to the charges alleged in the Amended Indictment. Id. On January 23, 2014, Mullner was adjudged a habitual criminal and sentenced to TEN (10) YEARS to LIFE on Count 1; TEN (10) YEARS to LIFE on COUNT 2 to run consecutive to Count 1; TWO (2) to SIX (6) YEARS on COUNT 3 to run consecutive to COUNT 2; TEN (10) YEARS to LIFE on COUNT 4 to run concurrent to Count 3; TEN (10) YEARS to LIFE on COUNT 5 to run concurrent to Count 4; TEN (10) YEARS to LIFE on COUNT 6 to run concurrent to COUNT 5; TEN (10) YEARS to LIFE on COUNT 7 to run concurrent to COUNT 6; TEN (10) YEARS to LIFE on COUNT 8 to run concurrent to COUNT 7; TEN (10) YEARS to LIFE on COUNT 9 to run concurrent to COUNT 8; and ONE (1) to FOUR (4) YEARS on COUNT 10 to run consecutive to COUNT 9. 1 AA 49-51. Mullner received FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY-TWO (572) DAYS credit for time served. Id. On January 28, 2014, the Judgment of Conviction was filed. Id. On February 5, 2014, an Amended Judgment of Conviction was filed because of a clerical error which was corrected to read as follows; COUNT 7 – ATTEMPT ROBBERY. 1 AA 52-54.

On April 15, 2014, Mullner filed an untimely Notice of Appeal after repeatedly requested that his attorney do so with no success. 1 AA 55-58. On May

13, 2014, the Nevada Supreme Court issued an Order of Dismissal because Mullner's untimely filed his Notice of Appeal. 1 AA 59-60. Remittur issued on June 12, 2014. 1 AA 74-75. On June 13, 2014, Mullner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 1 AA 61-73. On May 22, 2014, the Court appointed Jean Schwartzer as counsel for Mullner.

On December 3, 2015, Mullner filed a Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction). 1 AA 81-100; 2 AA 101-155. On January 27, 2016, the State filed a Response to Mullner's Supplemental Memorandum. 2 AA 156-169. On May 2, 2016, a hearing was held wherein the District Court granted an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised in Muller's Petition. 2 AA 170.

On May 2, 2016, an evidentiary hearing was held where both Mullner and his previous attorney, Frank Kocka, Esq., testified. 2 AA 171. Prior to testimony being given, Mullner withdrew his request to withdraw his guilty plea. <u>Id</u>. The Court heard testimony was given regarding only Mullner's deprivation of appeal claim. <u>Id</u>. The District Court took the matter under advisement. <u>Id</u>.

On May 9, 2016, the District Court issued a Minute Order granting Mullner's Petition. 2 AA 172. On August 10, 2016, the Court filed its Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 2 AA 173-178. On August 11, 2016, the Court filed Notice of Entry of Decision and Order. 2 AA 179-185. On August 11, 2016 the District Court also filed Mullner's Notice of Appeal. 2 AA 186-187. This Opening Brief follows:

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Between the dates of April 11, 2012 and June 30, 2012, a series of 14 robberies were committed in Las Vegas, Nevada and Henderson, Nevada. 1 AA 5-10. A man entered these stores and demanded that the cash registers be emptied. Id. He accomplished this by simulating the act of holding a weapon under his shirt, showing the handle of knife tucked into his pants or wielding a fake handgun. Id. After the last robbery of a Subway sandwich shop on June 30th, one of the victims followed the fleeing perpetrator; he watched the man get into an older model minivan and collected a partial plate number for police officers. 1 AA 11.

After the June 30, 2012 robbery of a Subway, Las Vegas Metro Police Department ("Metro") Officers reviewed surveillance video and determined that the suspect matched the description of a serial robbery suspect identified as Mullner. 1 AA 7. Metro officers constructed two photo line-ups using recent

photographs of Mullner and presented them to the two victims/eyewitnesses of the June 30th robbery. 1 AA 11. Both witnesses identified Mullner as the suspect. Id.

Metro officers located Mullner's mini-van parked in front of a house and began surveillance of the vehicle. 1 AA 2. After witnessing Mullner's presence at the home, Metro officers obtained and executed a search warrant for the house and mini-van. <u>Id</u>. Mullner, along with other individuals in the house, exited the house as directed and without any use of force and without incident. <u>Id</u>. During a search of the property Metro Officers found two cell phones, multiple articles of clothing supposedly worn during the robberies, and a fake gun; all such items belonged to Mullner. 1 AA 2-3.

Dayna Curliss, Mullner's girlfriend, stated during an interview that she was unaware of Mullner committing any robberies, but that Mullner had told her previously that he owns a gun. 1 AA 4. Curliss had never actually seen the gun. <u>Id</u>. Curliss also stated that Defendant is an alcoholic and suspected Mullner of smoking meth due to his recent weight loss. <u>Id</u>.

After the execution of the warrant, Mullner was read his Miranda rights, which he later waived. 1 AA 11. Mullner admitted to committing the June 30th Subway robbery along with thirteen other robberies. <u>Id</u>. He further stated that he

Page 7

had used a fake handgun on one of the robberies. <u>Id</u>. He voluntarily identified himself in the surveillance photographs. <u>Id</u>. During his interview, Mullner also admitted to having a methamphetamine addiction and stated that he committed the robberies to pay his bills as well as to support his drug habit. Id.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Mullner was sentenced as a Large Habitual Criminal using three prior felonies—2 of them were stale and one of those convictions was the result of a crime committed as a juvenile. This was done in error.

Mullner was sentenced to thirty-one (31) to life for a series of crimes where no one was physically harmed and a total of \$3089.40 was stolen. This sentence amounts to cruel and unusual punishment.

These errors combined amount to cumulative error.

ARGUMENT

I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SENTENCING MULLNER AS A SMALL HABITUAL CRIMINAL

a. Standard of Review

Pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. § 207.010, "It is within the discretion of the prosecuting attorney whether to include a count under this section in any information or file a notice of habitual criminality if an indictment is found. The

trial judge may, at his or her discretion, dismiss a count under this section which is included in any indictment or information." The purpose of this section is to permit dismissal "when the prior offenses are stale or trivial, or in other circumstances where an adjudication of habitual criminality would not serve the purposes of the statute or the interests of justice." Sessions v. State, 106 Nev. 186, 190, 789 P.2d 1242, 1244 (1990) quoting French v. State, 98 Nev. 235, 237, 645 P.2d 440, 441 (1982). A trial court's adjudication of a defendant as a habitual criminal is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Sessions, 106 Nev. at 190, 789 P.2d at 1244. Under the habitual offender statute, considerations of the nonviolent nature of charged crimes or remoteness of prior convictions are within the discretion of district court. N.R.S. 207.010. Tillema v. State, 112 Nev. 266, 914 P.2d 605 (1996); Arajakis v. State, 108 Nev. 976, 843 P.2d 800 (1992).

b. The Court Erred in Adjudicating Mullner as a Small Habitual Criminal by Basing its Decision on Stale Prior Convictions

On March 13, 2013, the State filed a Notice of Intent to Seek Punishment as a Habitual Criminal pursuant to NRS 207.012 and NRS 207.101. 1 AA 28-30. In this Notice the State listed following three prior convictions: 2006 Robbery in Case No. C226003 (Clark County, Nevada); 1997 Second Degree Kidnapping in Case

No C134348 (Clark County, Nevada); and 1984 First Degree Robbery in Case No. CR84-147 (South Dakota). <u>Id</u>. Although the state sought habitual criminal treatment under either NRS 207.012 or NRS 207.010, it appears from the Judgment of Conviction and the sentencing transcript that Mullner was adjudicated a Large Habitual Criminal under NRS 207.010. 1 AA 49-51; 1 AA 76-80.

NRS 207.010 provides in relevant part:

- 1. Unless the person is prosecuted pursuant to NRS 207.012 or 207.014, a person convicted in this State of:
- (a) Any felony, who has previously been two times convicted, whether in this State or elsewhere, of any crime which under the laws of the situs of the crime or of this State would amount to a felony is a habitual criminal and shall be punished for a category B felony by imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum term of not less than 5 years and a maximum term of not more than 20 years.
- (b) Any felony, who has previously been three times convicted, whether in this State or elsewhere, of any crime which under the laws of the situs of the crime or of this State would amount to a felony is a habitual criminal and shall be punished for a category A felony by imprisonment in the state prison:
- (1) For life without the possibility of parole;
- (2) For life with the possibility of parole, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 10 years has been served; or
- (3) For a definite term of 25 years, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 10 years has been served.

Pursuant to NRS 207.010(2), "It is within the discretion of the prosecuting attorney whether to include a count under this section in any information or file a notice of habitual criminality if an indictment is found. The trial judge may, at his or her discretion, dismiss a count under this section which is included in any indictment or information." The purpose of this section is to permit dismissal "when the prior offenses are stale or trivial, or in other circumstances where an adjudication of habitual criminality would not serve the purposes of the statute or the interests of justice." Sessions v. State, 106 Nev. 186, 190, 789 P.2d 1242, 1244 (1990) quoting French v. State, 98 Nev. 235, 237, 645 P.2d 440, 441 (1982).

In <u>Sessions</u>, Sessions was convicted of drug trafficking and drug possession adjudicated a Habitual Criminal under NRS 207.010. 106 Nev. at 187, 789 P.2d at 1242-43. Sessions was sentenced to, *inter alia*, life without the possibility of parole. <u>Id</u>. at 187-88, 789 P.2d at 1243. The prior convictions used to obtain habitual criminal status were for theft, grand theft and escape, which ranged from twenty-three (23) to thirty (30) years old. <u>Id</u>. This Court held that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to sentence Sessions as a Habitual Criminal and impose the maximum sentence because "surely a case involving crimes less violent and more stale than presented here would be hard to find; hence, the adjudication

 of habitual criminality in this case serves neither the purpose of the statute nor the interests of justice." <u>Id</u>. at 191, 789 P.2d at 1245.

Here, the District Court used three prior felony convictions to adjudicate Mullner a Large Habitual Criminal. 1 AA 28-30. At the time of the commission of these crimes, these convictions were six (6), fifteen (15) and twenty-eight (28) years old. (See Presentence Investigation Report at 5). The fifteen (15) year old conviction for Second Degree Kidnapping is arguably stale and the twenty-eight (28) year old conviction for Robbery is most certainly stale. More important is the fact that Mullner was a juvenile at the time he committed the twenty-eight (28) year old crime. Id.

Juvenile convictions are civil in nature pursuant to Chapter 62 of the Nevada Revised Statutes and that because of this, the activity is not "felonious." In <u>State v. Javier</u>, this Court recently addressed the civil nature of juvenile adjudications. 289 P.3d 1194, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 50 (Oct. 4, 2012). In <u>Javier</u>, Javier C. was adjudicated delinquent and committed to the Nevada Youth Training Center (NYTC), "a state facility for the detention or commitment of [delinquent] children." NRS 62A.330. While there, he allegedly battered a group supervisor.

² This document is not contained in the Appellant's Appendix. Mullner will file a Motion for Order Directing District Court to Transmit Appellant's PSI.

The State charged him as an adult with battery by a prisoner under NRS 200.481(2)(f), a category B felony. Id. This Court dismissed and held that, because Javier C.'s detention at NYTC was civil, not criminal, he was not a "prisoner" to whom NRS 200.481(2)(f) could apply. Id. The State appealed. Id. This Court held that Javier's confinement was civil in nature, not criminal, and that he was not a prisoner for purposes of the charge of battery by a prisoner, despite the fact that had he committed these crimes as an adult, he would have been in prison being punished for a felony. Id., at 1196-97.

While Mullner recognizes that Chapter 62 of the Nevada Revised Statutes and this Court's holding in Javier are not directly applicable to the instant case due to the fact that, according to his PSI, Mullner was certified up as an adult, Muller would ask on appeal that the Supreme Court extend its holding in Javier to instances where a juvenile is certified up to District Court and then convicted of a felony. This felony conviction, although not a juvenile adjudication, is the result of the actions of a juvenile and therefore it should not be used to enhance the sentence of the adult defendant twenty-eight (28) years later. Therefore, it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to adjudicate Mullner a Large Habitual Criminal based upon three felonies, 2 of which were stale and one of which was a juvenile

offense. Mullner was prejudiced by this error given the fact that being adjudicated a Large Habitual Criminal exposed him to and resulted in a sentence of thirty-one (31) to Life, effectively putting him in prison for a majority of the rest of his life for stealing \$3089.40 without physically injuring anyone.

II. MULLNER'S SENTENCE AMOUNTS TO CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

a. Standard of Review

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution as well as Article 1, Section 6 of the Nevada Constitution prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. The Nevada Supreme Court has stated that "[a] sentence within the statutory limits is not 'cruel and unusual punishment unless the statute fixing punishment is unconstitutional or the sentence is so unreasonably disproportionate to the offense as to shock the conscience." Allred v. State, 120 Nev. 410, 92 P.2d 1246, 1253 (2004) quoting Blume v. State, 112 Nev. 472, 475, 915 P.2d 282, 284 (1996) quoting Culverson v. State, 95 Nev. 433, 435, 596 P.2d 220, 221-22 (1979)(emphasis added); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (plurality opinion) quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983).

b. A Sentence of Thirty-One Years to Life in Prison is Disproportionate to the Crimes Mullner Committed

Mullner pleaded guilty to committing numerous robberies and burglaries. That being said, this was done over the course of only three months, and appears to have been drug fueled. He admitted to stealing a total of \$3,089.40 combined from fourteen difference victims. Although someone could have been harmed physically and no doubt there was a certain amount of emotional and mental harm, no one was physically harmed and the monetary impact on each individual victim was not incredibly large and *totaled* across all victims \$3089.40. Therefore, his sentence of thirty-one (31) years to life is so unreasonably disproportionate to the offense as to shock the conscience and amounts to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution as well as Article 1, Section 6 of the Nevada Constitution. Allred v. State, 120 Nev. 410, 92 P.2d at 1253.

Although Mullner is not arguing that his sentence is an *illegal* sentence under Nevada law, it is certainly disproportionate to the crimes he was convicted of given the affect this has had on the victims and the amount of damage done to society. Therefore, Mullner's sentence of thirty-one (31) years to life amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. Allred, 120 Nev. 410.

III. CUMULATIVE ERROR

When evaluating a claim of cumulative error, this Court considers the following factors: (1) whether the issue of guilt is close, (2) the quantity and character of the error, and (3) the gravity of the crime charged. Mulder v. State, 116 Nev. 1, 17, 992 P.2d 845, 854-55 (2000).

Here, even if the aforementioned instances of misconduct are viewed by this Court as harmless individually, the cumulative effect of the District Court's errors are harmful and have prejudiced Mullner.

The issue of guilt was not close and Mullner pleaded guilty to the crimes he was charged with. However, in the instant case, the cumulative error does not occur in the guilt phase of Mullner's case but, rather, it does so in the sentencing phase. As discussed *supra*, every error that occurred during Mullner's sentencing was prejudicial resulting in him spending at least thirty-one (31) years in prison and potentially the rest of his life in prison. Mullner was adjudicated a Large Habitual Criminal based upon stale convictions, one of which was committed when Mullner was a juvenile, and his sentence amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. Finally, the crimes Mullner were charged with were not grave—there was no physical injury suffered by the victims and a total sum of \$3,089.40 was

1	stolen. Therefore, this Court shoul
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d vacate Mullner's sentence because the 's errors renders his sentence prejudicial. See 2.2d at 854-55.

<u>ICLUSION</u>

erein, supra, Mullner's sentence should be DED for further proceedings according to the

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submitted,

<u>/s/ Jean Schwartzer</u> JEAN J. SCHWARTZER, ESQ Nevada State Bar No. 11223 Law Office of Jean J. Schwartzer 10620 Southern Highlands Pkwy. Suite 110-473 Las Vegas, Nevada 89141 (702) 979-9941 Jean.schwartzer@gmail.com Counsel for Appellant Troy Mullner

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

1. I hereby certify that this brief complies with the formatting requirements of
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requirements of NRAP 32(a)(6) because:
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using Microsoft Word 2010 Edition in Times New Roman 14 point font; or
[] This brief has been prepared in a monospaced typeface using [state name
and version of word-processing program] with [state number of characters per inch
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3. Finally, I hereby certify that I have read this appellate brief, and to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, it is not frivolous or interposed for any improper purpose. I further certify that this brief complies with all applicable Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, in particular NRAP 28(e)(1), which requires every assertion in the brief regarding matters in the record to be supported by a reference to the page and volume number, if any, of the transcript or appendix where the matter relied on is to be found. I understand that I may be subject to sanctions in the event that the accompanying brief is not in conformity with the requirements of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure.

DATED this 27th day of February, 2017.

1 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** 2 I hereby certify that Appellant's Opening Brief was filed electronically with 3 the Nevada Supreme Court on the 27th day of February, 2017. Electronic Service 4 5 of the foregoing document shall be made in accordance with the Master Service 6 List as follows: 7 8 ADAM LAXALT, ESQ. 9 STEVEN S. OWENS, ESQ. 10 I further certify that I served a copy of this document by mailing a true and 11 12 correct copy thereof, postage pre-paid, addressed to: 13 Troy Mullner 14 Inmate # 54371 **High Desert Correctional Facility** 15 P.O. Box 650 16 Indian Springs, Nevada 89070-0650 17 18 19 20 Suite 110-473 21 22

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