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Sep 22 2016 11:36 a.m.
Tracie K. Lindeman
Clerk of Supreme Court
16-735072-W

S. Ct. No.: 71039

District Ct. No.: A-16-735072-W


VS.

STATE OF NEVADA,
Real Party in Interest.

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Order Denying Petitioner's Writ Of Habeas Corpus (Post Conviction), August 5, 2016.....	01 – 05
Notice Of Appeal, August 8, 2016.....	06 – 12
Notice Of Entry Of Order, August 11, 2016.....	13 – 14
Notice Of Appeal, August 15, 2016.....	15 - 23



CLERK OF THE COURT

1 ORDR

2 DISTRICT COURT
3 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

4 WILLIAMS, JESSICA,
5 Petitioner,

CASE NO. A-16-735072-W
DEPT NO. 24

6 vs.

7 NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF
8 CORRECTIONS (NDOC);
9 JO GENTRY, WARDEN, (JEAN
CONSERVATION CAMP),
Respondent,

10 STATE OF NEVADA,
11 Real Party in Interest.
12 _____/

13 ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
14 (POST CONVICTION)

15 Petitioner asks this Court to order that Petitioner is entitled to have NRS 209.4465 Statutory
16 Credits deducted from her minimum sentences as well as her maximum sentences.¹

17 Petitioner argues that "[t]he law until June 24, 2015 precluded NRS Chapter 209 'good time'
18 credits being deducted from a person's minimum sentence. See *Breault v. State*, 116 Nev. 311, 314,
19 996 P. 2d 888, 889 (2000) ("... credits earned to reduce his sentence pursuant to NRS Chapter 209
may only reduce the maximum term.")²

20 Petitioner contends that the law has been changed by an unpublished Nevada Supreme Court
21 disposition, *Vonseydewitz vs. Robert LeGrand*³ and that, as a result, the Nevada Department of
22 Corrections (hereafter NDOC) must apply NRS Chapter 209 Credits to Petitioner's minimum
23 sentences as well as her maximum sentences.⁴

24 The State opposes this petition contending that Petitioner's reliance upon *Vonseydewitz* is

25 _____
26 ¹ Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post Conviction) (hereafter, "Petition"), filed April 14, 2016, p. 9:10-12.

27 ² Petition, p. 8:1-4. Emphasis supplied by petitioner.

28 ³ *Vonseydewitz vs. LeGrand*, "Order of Reversal and Remand", No 66159 (June 24, 2015); En banc reconsideration denied, February 19, 2016.

⁴ Petition, p. 9:2-6.

misplaced because it is an unpublished, three-judge panel decision with no value as a legal precedent.⁵ The state further points out that the analysis and reasoning in *Vonseydewitz* directly contradicts another earlier unpublished, three-judge panel decision, decided the year before *Vonseydewitz*, which reached the opposite conclusion – i.e. no application of credits to minimum term sentences – under similar legal circumstances.⁶ None of the justices on the *Vonseydewitz* panel were also on the *Kille* panel.

This Court concludes *Vonseydewitz* has not, in fact, changed the law and there is, therefore, no error in the way that Petitioner's incarceration times have been calculated. For that reason, the petition is denied.

ANALYSIS

The unpublished dispositions in *Kille* and *Vonseydewitz* are of no assistance to the Court in its analysis other than to provide some insight into what three of our seven Supreme Court Justices thought of the facts and circumstances presented in *Kille* and what three *other* members of the Court thought of the facts and circumstances in *Vonseydewitz*. Since both cases reached opposite results under legal circumstances which, on their face, appear to be comparable, little is gained from reviewing either of these cases. The fact that the cases were not chosen for publication only underscores their lack of value in considering *this* case.⁷

The statutes in question all have one thing in common: they are legislative enactments. As such, it is crucially important to determine what the legislative intent was when the statutes were enacted. Our goal is not to evaluate whether we agree or disagree with their intent, nor is it for those of us in the judiciary to second-guess the wisdom of the legislature, regardless of how strongly we may feel about the collective wisdom or lack thereof. Instead, our purpose in reviewing a statute must be to consider what the legislature's goals and purposes were; what they were trying to accomplish, not based upon what we might later substitute as our own rationale, but based upon what was in the contemplation of the legislators at the time of enactment.

⁵ Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (hereafter, "Response"), filed 6/25/16, p. 2:11-13.

⁶ Response, p. 2:13-17).

⁷ "An unpublished disposition, while publically available, does not establish mandatory precedent" NRAP 36(c)(2).

1 It is understood that the statutes that were in effect at the time the offense was committed,
2 govern.⁸

3 Petitioner was convicted and sentenced under NRS 484.3795, which stated that a person who
4 violated the statute was "guilty of a category B felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the
5 state prison for a minimum term of not less than 2 years and a maximum term of not more than 20
6 years." (Emphasis added.)⁹

7 The *Vonseydewitz* Court said that "...the lack of reference to parole eligibility in a minimum-
8 maximum statute suggests that the minimum term imposed was not the minimum term that must be
9 served before an offender was eligible for parole."¹⁰ This Court disagrees.

10 The legislative intent could not be more clearly expressed: the minimum term that a person
11 shall serve when convicted under NRS 484.3795 is two years. The Petitioner offers nothing to
12 suggest that a sentencing judge would be permitted to impose a minimum sentence of anything less
13 than two years. In this case, the sentencing Judge's compliance with the statute is clear and the
14 Judgment of Conviction lacks no clarity in sentencing the Petitioner to a "MAXIMUM term of
15 NINETY-SIX (96) MONTHS with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of THIRTY-SIX (36)
16 MONTHS" for Count I through Count VI.

17 In considering the application of NRS 209.4465(7) and NRS 213.120(2) relevant to
18 Petitioner's conviction, this Court concludes that these statutes are consistent and may be interpreted
19 in a manner which does not create a conflict.

20 At the time of Petitioner's offense in 2000, NRS 209.4465(7) provided that:

21 Credits earned pursuant to this section:

- 22 (a) Must be deducted from the maximum term imposed by the sentence; and
23 (b) Apply to eligibility for parole unless the offender was sentenced pursuant to a statute
24 which specifies a minimum sentence that must be served before a person becomes
eligible for parole.

25 ⁸ *Weaver v. Graham*, 450 U.S. 24, 31-33 (1981).

26 ⁹ It is true that there are some statutes which *emphasize* or state somewhat differently that a certain number of years must
27 be served before a person becomes eligible for parole, e.g. NRS 200.030(4)(b)(2); NRS 200.366(2)(a)(2) but, in terms
of analyzing legislative intent, the difference in phraseology does not, in this court's opinion, reflect any meaningful
28 difference.

¹⁰ *Vonseydewitz*, p. 4.

1 NRS 213.120(2) provided, in part, that:


2
3 "a prisoner who was sentenced to prison for a crime committed on or after July 1, 1995, may
4 be paroled when he has served the minimum term to imprisonment imposed by the Court.
5 Any credits earned to reduce his sentence pursuant to chapter 209 of NRS while the prisoner
6 serves the minimum term of imprisonment may reduce only the maximum term of
7 imprisonment imposed and must not reduce the minimum term of imprisonment."

8 It is this Court's opinion that the legislature's expression of "minimum term" means
9 "minimum term" and that, by definition, a "minimum term" is not to be further diminished by
10 credits that would reduce the minimum term. Indeed, a "minimum term" is, by its nature,
11 irreducible: it is the minimum term.

12 Are we to conclude that when the legislature enacts a statute which states a convicted person
13 must serve a minimum term, and implements a provision for good-time credits which excludes
14 application toward minimum sentences, the legislature envisioned anything other than the convicted
15 person serving their required minimum term in prison? To attribute that kind of subliminal thinking
16 to the legislature would require jumping through imaginary hoops that depart from the trajectory of
17 logic and reason.

18 Accordingly, the petition for habeas corpus is denied.


19 DATED: August 5, 2016

20 
JIM CROCKETT, District Judge

21 I hereby certify that on or about the date filed, a copy of this Order was served upon the
22 parties as follows:

23 JOHN G. WATKINS, ESQ.

24 DENNIS C. WILSON, ESQ.

25 
ANGELA MCBRIDE, Judicial Executive Assistant




EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
Clark County, Nevada

Jim Crockett
District Court Judge

Department 24
ph: 702-671-0591
fax: 702-671-0598

TO: JOHN G. WATKINS, ESQ. @ 702-383-8118
TO: DENNIS C. WILSON, ESQ. @ 702-486-8768
FROM: ANGELA MCBRIDE, JEA - DC24
RE: Williams v. NDOC A-16-735072-W
DATE: August 5, 2015

See attached order re: Williams v. NDOC filed this date.



CLERK OF THE COURT

JOHN G. WATKINS, ESQ.
804 South Sixth Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Telephone: (702) 383-1006
Facsimile: (702) 383-8118
e mail: johngwatkins@hotmail.com

ELLEN J. BEZIAN, ESQ.,
Nevada Bar No. 6225
804 South Sixth Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
(702) 471-7741
Facsimile: (702) 383-8118

**DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

WILLIAMS, JESSICA,
Petitioner,

VS.

**NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS (NDOC);
JO GENTRY, WARDEN,
(JEAN CONSERVATION CAMP),**
Respondent,

STATE OF NEVADA,
Real Party in Interest.

Case No.: **A-16-735072-W**
Dept. No.: **XXIV**

NOTICE OF APPEAL

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Petitioner JESSICA WILLIAMS appeals to the Supreme Court of Nevada, the "ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (POST CONVICTION)¹" entered in the Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Clark, Department

¹ Attached as Exhibit.

No. 24 on August 5, 2016.


JOHN G. WATKINS, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 1574

804 South Sixth Street

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Telephone: (702) 383-1006

Facsimile: (702) 383-8118

e mail: johngwatkins@hotmail.com


ELLEN J. BEZIAN, ESQ.

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Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

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
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL

I, Sheila Varga, hereby certify pursuant to N.R.A.P. 3(d)(1), that on this 8th day of August, 2016 I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL addressed to:

Nevada Department Of Corrections
Jo Gentry, Warden
Jean Conversation Camp
3 Prison Road
PO Box 19859
Jean, Nevada 89019

Adam Laxalt, Attorney General
Dennis C. Wilson, Esq.
555 East Washington # 3900
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Jessica Williams # 68716
Jean Conversation Camp
Box 19859
Jean, Nevada 89019


Sheila Varga
an employee of John G. Watkins, Esq.

1 ORDR

2 DISTRICT COURT
3 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

4 WILLIAMS, JESSICA,
5 Petitioner,

6 vs.

CASE NO. A-16-735072-W
DEPT NO. 24

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9 JO GENTRY, WARDEN, (JEAN
10 CONSERVATION CAMP),
11 Respondent,

12 STATE OF NEVADA,
13 Real Party in Interest.

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15 (POST CONVICTION)

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17 Credits deducted from her minimum sentences as well as her maximum sentences.¹

18 Petitioner argues that "[t]he law" until June 24, 2015 precluded NRS Chapter 209 'good time'
19 credits being deducted from a person's minimum sentence. See *Breault v. State*, 116 Nev. 311, 314,
20 996 P. 2d 888, 889 (2000) ("... credits earned to reduce his sentence pursuant to NRS Chapter 209
21 may only reduce the maximum term.")²

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26 The State opposes this petition contending that Petitioner's reliance upon *Vonseydewitz* is

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6 were also on the *Kille* panel.

7 This Court concludes *Vonseydewitz* has not, in fact, changed the law and there is, therefore,
8 no error in the way that Petitioner's incarceration times have been calculated. For that reason, the
9 petition is denied.

10 ANALYSIS

11 The unpublished dispositions in *Kille* and *Vonseydewitz* are of no assistance to the Court in
12 its analysis other than to provide some insight into what three of our seven Supreme Court Justices
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18 The statutes in question all have one thing in common: they are legislative enactments. As
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20 enacted. Our goal is not to evaluate whether we agree or disagree with their intent, nor is it for those
21 of us in the judiciary to second-guess the wisdom of the legislature, regardless of how strongly we
22 may feel about the collective wisdom or lack thereof. Instead, our purpose in reviewing a statute
23 must be to consider what the legislature's goals and purposes were; what they were trying to
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10 The legislative intent could not be more clearly expressed: the minimum term that a person
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16 MONTHS" for Count I through Count VI.

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18 Petitioner's conviction, this Court concludes that these statutes are consistent and may be interpreted
19 in a manner which does not create a conflict.

20 At the time of Petitioner's offense in 2000, NRS 209.4465(7) provided that:

21 Credits earned pursuant to this section:

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24 which specifies a minimum sentence that must be served before a person becomes
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25 ⁸ *Weaver v. Graham*, 450 U.S. 24, 31-33 (1981).

26 ⁹ It is true that there are some statutes which *emphasize* or state somewhat differently that a certain number of years must
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
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3 "a prisoner who was sentenced to prison for a crime committed on or after July 1, 1995, may
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13 must serve a minimum term, and implements a provision for good-time credits which excludes
14 application toward minimum sentences, the legislature envisioned anything other than the convicted
15 person serving their required minimum term in prison? To attribute that kind of subliminal thinking
16 to the legislature would require jumping through imaginary hoops that depart from the trajectory of
17 logic and reason.

18 Accordingly, the petition for habeas corpus is denied.

19 DATED: August 5, 2016

20 
JIM CROCKETT, District Judge

21 I hereby certify that on or about the date filed, a copy of this Order was served upon the
22 parties as follows:

23 JOHN G. WATKINS, ESQ.
24 DENNIS C. WILSON, ESQ.

25 
26 ANGELA MCBRIDE, Judicial Executive Assistant
27
28



EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
Clark County, Nevada

Jim Crockett
District Court Judge

Department 24
ph: 702-671-0591
fax: 702-671-0598

TO: JOHN G. WATKINS, ESQ. @ 702-383-8118
TO: DENNIS C. WILSON, ESQ. @ 702-486-3768
FROM: ANGELA MCBRIDE, JEA - DC24
RE: Williams v. NDOC A-16-735072-W
DATE: August 5, 2015

See attached order re: Williams v. NDOC filed this date.

COPY

Electronically Filed
08/11/2016

Steven D. Grierson
CLERK OF THE COURT

NEOJ

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

JESSICA WILLIAMS,

Petitioner,

vs.

NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
(NDOC); JO GENTRY, WARDEN, (JEAN
CONSERVATION CAMP),

Respondent,

STATE OF NEVADA,

Real Party in Interest

Case No: A-16-735072-W

Dept. No: XXIV

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on August 5, 2016, the court entered a decision or order in this matter, a true and correct copy of which is attached to this notice.

You may appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision or order of this court. If you wish to appeal, you must file a notice of appeal with the clerk of this court within thirty-three (33) days after the date this notice is mailed to you. This notice was mailed on August 11, 2016.

STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CLERK OF THE COURT

/s/ Chaunie Pleasant

Chaunie Pleasant, Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING


I hereby certify that on this 11 day of August 2016, I placed a copy of this Notice of Entry in:

- ☒ The bin(s) located in the Regional Justice Center of:
Clark County District Attorney's Office
Attorney General's Office - Appellate Division-

1 ☒ The United States mail addressed as follows:

2 Jessica Williams # 68716 John G. Watkins, Esq.
3 P.O. Box 19859 804 South Sixth Street
4 Jean, NV 89019 Las Vegas, NV 89101

5 /s/ Chaunte Pleasant
6 Chaunte Pleasant, Deputy Clerk
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CLERK OF THE COURT

JOHN G. WATKINS, ESQ.
804 South Sixth Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Telephone: (702) 383-1006
Facsimile: (702) 383-8118
e mail: johngwatkins@hotmail.com

ELLEN J. BEZIAN, ESQ.,
Nevada Bar No. 6225
804 South Sixth Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
(702) 471-7741
Facsimile: (702) 383-8118

**DISTRICT COURT
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¹ Attached as Exhibit.

No. 24 on August 5, 2016 (Notice Of Entry Of Order on August 11, 2016).

/s/ John G. Watkins, Esq.

Ellen J. Bezian, Esq.

JOHN G. WATKINS, ESQ.

ELLEN J. BEZIAN, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 1574

Nevada Bar No. 6225

804 South Sixth Street

804 South Sixth Street

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

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Telephone: (702) 383-1006

Telephone: (702) 471-7741

Facsimile: (702) 383-8118

Facsimile: (702) 383-8118

e mail: johngwatkins@hotmail.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL

I, Sheila Varga, hereby certify pursuant to N.R.A.P. 3(d)(1), that on this 14th day of August, 2016 I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL addressed to:

Nevada Department Of Corrections

Jo Gentry, Warden

Jean Conversation Camp

3 Prison Road

PO Box 19859

Jean, Nevada 89019

Adam Laxalt, Attorney General

Dennis C. Wilson, Esq.

555 East Washington # 3900

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Jessica Williams # 68716

Jean Conservation Camp

Box 19859

Jean, Nevada 89019

/s/ Sheila Varga

Sheila Varga

an employee of John G. Watkins, Esq.

COPY

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08/11/2016

Steven D. Grierson
CLERK OF THE COURT

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/s/ Chaunte Pleasant

Chaunte Pleasant, Deputy Clerk

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
804 South Sixth Street

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Las Vegas, NV 89101

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25 Corrections (hereafter NDOC) must apply NRS Chapter 209 Credits to Petitioner's minimum
26 sentences as well as her maximum sentences.⁴

27 The State opposes this petition contending that Petitioner's reliance upon *Vonseydewitz* is

28 ¹ Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post Conviction) (hereafter, "Petition"), filed April 14, 2016, p. 9:10-12.

² Petition, p. 8:1-4. Emphasis supplied by petitioner.

³ *Vonseydewitz vs. LeGrand*, "Order of Reversal and Remand", No 66159 (June 24, 2015); En banc reconsideration denied, February 19, 2016.

⁴ Petition, p. 9:2-6.

1 misplaced because it is an unpublished, three-judge panel decision with no value as a legal
2 precedent.⁵ The state further points out that the analysis and reasoning in *Vonseydewitz* directly
3 contradicts another earlier unpublished, three-judge panel decision, decided the year before
4 *Vonseydewitz*, which reached the opposite conclusion – i.e. no application of credits to minimum
5 term sentences -- under similar legal circumstances.⁶ None of the justices on the *Vonseydewitz* panel
6 were also on the *Kille* panel.

7 This Court concludes *Vonseydewitz* has not, in fact, changed the law and there is, therefore,
8 no error in the way that Petitioner's incarceration times have been calculated. For that reason, the
9 petition is denied.

10 ANALYSIS

11 The unpublished dispositions in *Kille* and *Vonseydewitz* are of no assistance to the Court in
12 its analysis other than to provide some insight into what three of our seven Supreme Court Justices
13 thought of the facts and circumstances presented in *Kille* and what three *other* members of the Court
14 thought of the facts and circumstances in *Vonseydewitz*. Since both cases reached opposite results
15 under legal circumstances which, on their face, appear to be comparable, little is gained from
16 reviewing either of these cases. The fact that the cases were not chosen for publication only
17 underscores their lack of value in considering *this* case.⁷

18 The statutes in question all have one thing in common: they are legislative enactments. As
19 such, it is crucially important to determine what the legislative intent was when the statutes were
20 enacted. Our goal is not to evaluate whether we agree or disagree with their intent, nor is it for those
21 of us in the judiciary to second-guess the wisdom of the legislature, regardless of how strongly we
22 may feel about the collective wisdom or lack thereof. Instead, our purpose in reviewing a statute
23 must be to consider what the legislature's goals and purposes were; what they were trying to
24 accomplish, not based upon what we might later substitute as our own rationale, but based upon
25 what was in the contemplation of the legislators at the time of enactment.

26 ⁵ Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (hereafter, "Response"), filed 6/28/16, p. 2:11-13.

27 ⁶ Response, p. 2:13-17).

28 ⁷ "An unpublished disposition, while publically available, does not establish mandatory precedent" NRAP 36(c)(2).

1 It is understood that the statutes that were in effect at the time the offense was committed,
2 govern.⁸

3 Petitioner was convicted and sentenced under NRS 484.3795, which stated that a person who
4 violated the statute was "guilty of a category B felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the
5 state prison for a minimum term of not less than 2 years and a maximum term of not more than 20
6 years." (Emphasis added.)⁹

7 The *Vonseydewitz* Court said that "...the lack of reference to parole eligibility in a minimum-
8 maximum statute suggests that the minimum term imposed was not the minimum term that must be
9 served before an offender was eligible for parole."¹⁰ This Court disagrees.

10 The legislative intent could not be more clearly expressed: the minimum term that a person
11 shall serve when convicted under NRS 484.3795 is two years. The Petitioner offers nothing to
12 suggest that a sentencing judge would be permitted to impose a minimum sentence of anything less
13 than two years. In this case, the sentencing Judge's compliance with the statute is clear and the
14 Judgment of Conviction lacks no clarity in sentencing the Petitioner to a "MAXIMUM term of
15 NINETY-SIX (96) MONTHS with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of THIRTY-SIX (36)
16 MONTHS" for Count I through Count VI.

17 In considering the application of NRS 209.4465(7) and NRS 213.120(2) relevant to
18 Petitioner's conviction, this Court concludes that these statutes are consistent and may be interpreted
19 in a manner which does not create a conflict.

20 At the time of Petitioner's offense in 2000, NRS 209.4465(7) provided that:

21 Credits earned pursuant to this section:

- 22 (a) Must be deducted from the maximum term imposed by the sentence; and
23 (b) Apply to eligibility for parole unless the offender was sentenced pursuant to a statute
24 which specifies a minimum sentence that must be served before a person becomes
eligible for parole.

25 ⁸ *Weaver v. Graham*, 450 U.S. 24, 31-33 (1981).

26 ⁹ It is true that there are some statutes which *emphasize* or state somewhat differently that a certain number of years must
27 be served before a person becomes eligible for parole, e.g. NRS 200.030(4)(b)(2); NRS 200.366(2)(a)(2) but, in terms
of analyzing legislative intent, the difference in phraseology does not, in this court's opinion, reflect any meaningful
28 difference.

¹⁰ *Vonseydewitz*, p. 4.

1 NRS 213.120(2) provided, in part, that:


2
3 "a prisoner who was sentenced to prison for a crime committed on or after July 1, 1995, may
4 be paroled when he has served the minimum term to imprisonment imposed by the Court.
5 Any credits earned to reduce his sentence pursuant to chapter 209 of NRS while the prisoner
6 serves the minimum term of imprisonment may reduce only the maximum term of
7 imprisonment imposed and must not reduce the minimum term of imprisonment."

8 It is this Court's opinion that the legislature's expression of "minimum term" means
9 "minimum term" and that, by definition, a "minimum term" is not to be further diminished by
10 credits that would reduce the minimum term. Indeed, a "minimum term" is, by its nature,
11 irreducible: it is the minimum term.

12 Are we to conclude that when the legislature enacts a statute which states a convicted person
13 must serve a minimum term, and implements a provision for good-time credits which excludes
14 application toward minimum sentences, the legislature envisioned anything other than the convicted
15 person serving their required minimum term in prison? To attribute that kind of subliminal thinking
16 to the legislature would require jumping through imaginary hoops that depart from the trajectory of
17 logic and reason.


18 Accordingly, the petition for habeas corpus is denied.

19 DATED: August 5, 2016

20 
JIM CROCKETT, District Judge

21 I hereby certify that on or about the date filed, a copy of this Order was served upon the
22 parties as follows:

23 JOHN G. WATKINS, ESQ.
24 DENNIS C. WILSON, ESQ.

25 
ANGELA MCBRIDE, Judicial Executive Assistant



EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

Clark County, Nevada

Jim Crockett
District Court Judge

Department 24
ph: 702-671-0591
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TO: JOHN G. WATKINS, ESQ. @ 702-383-8118
TO: DENNIS C. WILSON, ESQ. @ 702-486-3768
FROM: ANGELA MCBRIDE, JEA - DC24
RE: Williams v. NDOC A-16-735072-W
DATE: August 5, 2015

See attached order re: Williams v. NDOC filed this date.