You are not to discuss or even consider whether or not the Plaintiff was carrying insurance to cover medical bills, loss of earnings, or any other damages she claims to have sustained.

You are not to discuss or even consider whether or not the Defendants were carrying insurance that would reimburse them for whatever sum of money they may be called upon to pay to the Plaintiff.

Whether or not any party was insured is immaterial, and should make no difference in any verdict you may render in this case.

If, during this trial, I have said or done anything which has suggested to you that I am inclined to favor the claims or position of any party, you will not be influenced by any such suggestion.

I have not expressed, nor intended to express, nor have I intended to intimate, any opinion as to which witnesses are or are not worthy of belief, what facts are or are not established, or what inference should be drawn from the evidence. If any expression of mine has seemed to indicate an opinion relating to any of these matters, I instruct you to disregard it.

AA_001442

There are two kinds of evidence; direct and circumstantial. Direct evidence is direct proof of a fact, such as testimony of an eyewitness. Circumstantial evidence is indirect evidence, that is, proof of a chain of facts from which you could find that another fact exists, even though it has not been proved directly. You are entitled to consider both kinds of evidence. The law permits you to give equal weight to both, but it is for you to decide how much weight to give to any evidence. It is for you to decide whether a fact has been proved by circumstantial evidence.

AA_001443

In determining whether any proposition has been proved, you should consider all of the evidence bearing on the question without regard to which party produced it.

Certain testimony has been read into evidence from a deposition. A deposition is testimony taken under oath before the trial and preserved in writing. You are to consider that testimony as if it had been given in court.

AA_001445

During the course of the trial you have heard reference made to the word "interrogatory". An interrogatory is a written question asked by one party of another, who must answer it under oath in writing. You are to consider interrogatories and the answers thereto the same as if the questions had been asked and answered here in court.

In this case, as permitted by law, Plaintiff, Emilia Garcia, served on the Defendant, Andrea Awerbach, a written request for the admission of the truth of certain matters of fact. You will regard as being conclusively proved all such matters of fact which were expressly admitted by the Defendant, Andrea Awerbach, or which Defendant, Andrea Awerbach, failed to deny.

The credibility or "believability" of a witness should be determined by his or her manner upon the stand, his or her relationship to the parties, his or her fears, motives, interests or feelings, his or her opportunity to have observed the matter to which he or she testified, the reasonableness of his or her statements and the strength or weakness of his or her recollections.

If you believe that a witness has lied about any material fact in the case, you may disregard the entire testimony of that witness or any portion of this testimony which is not proved by other evidence.

Discrepancies in a witness's testimony or between his testimony and that of others, if there were any discrepancies, do not necessarily mean that the witness should be discredited. Failure of recollection is a common experience, and innocent misrecollection is not uncommon. It is a fact, also, that two persons witnessing an incident or transaction often will see or hear it differently. Whether a discrepancy pertains to a fact of importance or only to a trivial detail should be considered in weighing its significance.

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INSTRUCTION NO. 17

An attorney has a right to interview a witness for the purpose of learning what testimony the witness will give. The fact that the witness has talked to an attorney and told him what he would testify to does not, by itself, reflect adversely on the truth of the testimony of the witness.

AA_001450

A witness who has special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education in a particular science, profession or occupation is an expert witness. An expert witness may give his or her opinion as to any matter in which he or she is skilled.

You should consider such expert opinion and weigh the reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound, however, by such an opinion. Give it the weight to which you deem it entitled, whether that be great or slight, and you may reject it, if, in your judgment, the reasons given for it are unsound.

A question has been asked in which an expert witness was told to assume that certain facts were true and to give an opinion based upon that assumption. This is called a hypothetical question. If any fact assumed in the question has not been established by the evidence, you should determine the effect of that omission upon the value of the opinion.

_ .

Whenever in these instructions I state that the burden, or the burden of proof, rests upon a certain party to prove a certain allegation made by him, the meaning of such an instruction is this: That unless the truth of the allegation is proved by a preponderance of the evidence, you shall find the same to be not true.

The term "preponderance of the evidence" means such evidence as, when weighed with that opposed to it, has more convincing force, and from which it appears that the greater probability of truth lies therein.

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The preponderance, or weight of evidence, is not necessarily with the greater number of witnesses.

The testimony of one witness worthy of belief is sufficient for the proof of any fact and would justify a verdict in accordance with such testimony, even if a number of witnesses have testified to the contrary. If, from the whole case, considering the credibility of witnesses, and after weighing the various factors of evidence, you believe that there is a balance of probability pointing to the accuracy and honesty of the one witness, you should accept his testimony.

AA_001454

As to Defendant Jared Awerbach, the Plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence all of the facts necessary to establish the following:

- 1. That the Plaintiff sustained damages; and
- 2. That Jared Awerbach's negligence, which has been established by the Court, was a proximate cause of the damage sustained by the Plaintiff.

When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean any cause which, in natural, foreseeable, and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury complained of and without which the result would not have occurred. It need not be the only cause, nor the last or nearest cause. It is sufficient if it concurs with some other cause acting at the same time, which in combination with it, causes the injury.

There may be more than one proximate cause of an injury. When negligent conduct of two or more persons contributes concurrently as proximate causes of an injury, the conduct of each of said persons is a proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to which each contributes to the injury. A cause is concurrent if it was operative at the moment of injury and acted with another cause to produce the injury.

If you find that a Defendant is liable for the original injury to the Plaintiff, that Defendant is also liable for any aggravation of the original injury caused by negligent medical or hospital treatment or care of the original injury, or for any additional injury caused by negligent medical or hospital treatment or care of the original injury.

The court has taken judicial notice that sunset on January 2, 2011, the date of
the accident that is the subject of this lawsuit, occurred at 4:46 p.m., Pacific Standard
Time. You are to accept this fact as true and give it the weight you deem it deserves.

Certain charts and summaries have been received into evidence to illustrate facts brought out in the testimony of some witnesses. Charts and summaries are only as good as the underlying evidence that supports them. You should therefore give them only such weight as you think the underlying evidence deserves.

There was in force at the time of the occurrence in question a law (NRS 484C.110) which read as follows:

It is unlawful for any person who . . . [i]s under the influence of a controlled substance . . . to drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle on a highway or on premises to which the public has access. . . .

It is unlawful for any person to drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle on a highway or on premises to which the public has access with an amount of a prohibited substance in his or her blood or urine that is equal to or greater than:

Prohibited substance	Urine Nanograms per milliliter	Blood Nanograms per milliliter
• • • •		
(h) Marijuana metabolite	15	5

A violation of the law just read to you constitutes negligence as a matter of law.

It has been established as a matter of law that Defendant Jared Awerbach was impaired at the time of the January 2, 2011 collision. After the subject collision, Defendant Jared Awerbach consented to having Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department take a sample of his blood. The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Toxicology Laboratory tested Defendant Jared Awerbach's blood and determined that at the time of the subject collision, Defendant Jared Awerbach had 47 nanograms of marijuana metabolite per milliliter of blood. This exceeds the legal level of 5 nanograms of marijuana metabolite per milliliter.

Defendant Jared Awerbach has been deemed impaired as a matter of law.

In order to establish a claim of negligent entrustment against Defendant Andrea Awebach, Plaintiff has the burden of proving the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence:

- (1) That the Defendant Andrea Awerbach knowingly entrusted her vehicle to an inexperienced or incompetent person; and
- (2) That the Defendant Andrea Awerbach's entrustment of her vehicle was a proximate and a legal cause of the damage to Plaintiff.

Among other factors, you may consider that fact that Defendant Jared Awerbach was unlicensed as evidence that he was inexperienced or incompetent to drive a motor vehicle on the date of the collision.

Entrustment may be established through proof of either express or implied permission.

The law provides for a rebuttable presumption that Defendant Andrea Awerbach gave Defendant Jared Awerbach permission, express or implied, to use her car on the day of the subject accident.

The effect of this rebuttable presumption is that it places upon Defendant Andrea Awerbach the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she did not give Defendant Jared Awerbach permission, express or implied, to use her car on the day of the subject accident.

2 3

An owner of a motor vehicle is liable for any damages proximately resulting from the negligence of an immediate family member in driving and operating the vehicle upon a highway with the owner's express or implied permission.

As advised in these instructions, Defendant Jared Awerbach was negligent and caused the accident that gives rise to this case. You must then determine whether or not he was driving with the express or implied permission of Defendant Andrea Awerbach.

If you find that Defendant Jared Awerbach did not have such permission, then your verdict must be in favor of Defendant Andrea Awerbach.

But if you find that such permission, express or implied, had been given, you must find Defendant Andrea Awerbach also liable.

In determining the amount of losses, if any, suffered by Plaintiff as a proximate result of the accident in question, you will take into consideration the nature, extent and duration of the injuries or damages you believe from the evidence Plaintiff has sustained, and you will decide upon a sum of money sufficient to reasonably and fairly compensate her for the following items:

- 1. The reasonable medical expenses Plaintiff has necessarily incurred as a result of the accident.
- 2. The reasonable medical expenses which you believe Plaintiff probably will incur in the future as a result of the accident.
- 3. Any loss of household services proximately caused by the accident from the date of the accident to the present and any loss of household services you believe Plaintiff will probably experience in the future as a proximate result of the accident.
- 4. The physical and mental pain, suffering, anguish and disability endured by Plaintiff from the date of the accident to the present, including lost enjoyment of life or the lost ability to participate and derive pleasure from the normal activities of daily life, or for the inability to pursue talents, recreational interests, hobbies, or avocations.
- 5. The physical and mental pain, suffering, anguish and disability which you believe Plaintiff will probably experience in the future, as a proximate result of the accident, including lost enjoyment of life or the lost ability to participate and derive pleasure from the normal activities of daily life, or for the inability to pursue talents, recreational interests, hobbies, or avocations.

Where Plaintiff's injury or disability is clear and readily observable, no expert testimony is required for an award of future pain, suffering, anguish and disability. However, where an injury or disability is subjective and not demonstrable to others, expert testimony is necessary before a jury may award future damages.

A person who has a condition or disability at the time of an injury is not entitled to recover damages therefor. However, a Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for any aggravation of a preexisting condition or disability, caused by the injury.

This is true even if a condition or disability made Plaintiff more susceptible to the possibility of ill effects that a normally healthy person would have been, and even if a normally healthy person probably would not have suffered any substantial injury.

Where a preexisting condition or disability is so aggravated, the damages as to such condition or disability are limited to the additional injury caused by the aggravation

No definite standard or method of calculation is prescribed by law by which to fix reasonable compensation for pain and suffering. Nor is the opinion of any witness required as to the amount of such reasonable compensation. Furthermore, the argument of counsel as to the amount of damages is not evidence of reasonable compensation. In making an award for pain and suffering, you shall exercise your authority with calm and reasonable judgment and the damages you fix shall be just and reasonable in light of the evidence.

Whether any of these elements of damage have been proven by the evidence is for you to determine. Neither sympathy nor speculation is a proper basis for determining damages. However, absolute certainty as to the damages is not required. It is only required that Plaintiff prove each item of damage by a preponderance of the evidence.

4 *5*

If you find that Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages for actual harm caused by Defendants' breach of an obligation, then you may consider whether you should award punitive damages against Defendant Andrea Awerbach. The question whether to award punitive damages against a particular defendant must be considered separately with respect to each defendant.

You may award punitive damages against Defendant Andrea Awerbach only if Plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the wrongful conduct upon which you base your finding of liability for compensatory damages was engaged in with oppression and/or malice on the part of Defendant Andrea Awerbach. You cannot punish Defendant Andrea Awerbach for conduct that is lawful, or which did not cause actual harm to the Plaintiff. For the purposes of your consideration of punitive damages only:

"Oppression" means despicable conduct that subjects the Plaintiff to cruel and unjust hardship with a conscious disregard of the rights of the Plaintiff.

"Malice" means conduct which is intended to injure the Plaintiff or despicable conduct which is engaged in with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of the Plaintiff.

"Despicable conduct" means conduct that is so vile, base or contemptible that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary, decent people.

"Conscious disregard" means knowledge of the probable harmful consequences of a wrongful act and a willful and deliberate failure to avoid these consequences.

The purposes of punitive damages are to punish a wrongdoer that acts with oppression and/or malice in harming a plaintiff and deter similar conduct in the future, not to make the Plaintiff whole for her injuries. Consequently, a plaintiff is never entitled to punitive damages as a matter of right and whether to award punitive damages against the Defendant is entirely within your discretion.

At this time, you are to decide only whether Defendant Andrea Awerbach engaged in wrongful conduct causing actual harm to the Plaintiff with the requisite state of mind to permit an award of punitive damages against Defendant Andrea Awerbach, and if so, whether an assessment of punitive damages against Defendant Andrea Awerbach is justified by the punishment and deterrent purposes of punitive damages under the circumstances of this case. If you decide an award of punitive damages is justified, you will later decide the amount of punitive damages to be awarded, after you have heard additional evidence and instruction.

Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the jury a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be established. It is an intermediate degree of proof, being more than a mere preponderance but not to the extent of such certainty as is required to prove an issue beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof by clear and convincing evidence is proof which persuades the jury that the truth of the contentions is highly likely.

If you find that Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages for actual harm caused by Defendant Jared Awerbach's breach of an obligation, you may also consider whether you should assess punitive damages against Defendant Jared Awerbach on the basis of his impairment with a controlled substance, if Plaintiff proves that:

- 1. Defendant Jared Awerbach willfully consumed or used marijuana knowing that he would thereafter operate a motor vehicle; and
- 2. Defendant Jared Awerbach thereafter caused actual harm to Plaintiff by operating a motor vehicle.

The purposes of punitive damages are to punish a wrongdoer that harms the plaintiff and to deter similar conduct in the future, not to make the Plaintiff whole for her injuries. Consequently, a plaintiff is never entitled to punitive damages as a matter of right and whether to award punitive damages against the Defendant is entirely within your discretion.

There are no fixed standards for determining the amount of punitive damage award; the amount, if any, is left to your sound discretion, to be exercised without passion or prejudice and in accordance with the following governing principles.

The amount of punitive damage award is not to compensate the Plaintiff for damages suffered but what is reasonably necessary (in light of the Defendant's financial condition) and fairly deserved (in light of the blameworthiness and harmfulness inherent in the Defendant's conduct) to punish and deter the Defendant and others from engaging in conduct such as that warranting punitive damages in this case. Your award cannot be more than otherwise warranted by the evidence in this case merely because of the wealth of the Defendant. Your award cannot either punish the Defendant for conduct injuring others who are not parties to this litigation or financially annihilate or destroy the Defendant in light of the Defendant's financial condition.

In determining the amounts of your punitive damage awards, if any, against Defendant Jared Awerbach, you should consider the following guideposts:

The degree of reprehensibility of the Defendant's conduct, in light of (a) the culpability and blameworthiness of the Defendant's fraudulent, oppressive and/or malicious misconduct under the circumstances of this case; (b) whether the conduct injuring Plaintiff that warrants punitive damages in this case was part of a pattern of similar conduct by the Defendant; and (c) any mitigating conduct by the Defendant, including any efforts to settle the dispute.

The ratio of your punitive damage award to the actual harm inflicted on the Plaintiff by the conduct warranting punitive damages in this case, since the measure of punishment must be both reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to the Plaintiff and to the compensatory damages recovered by the Plaintiff in this case.

How your punitive damages award compares to other civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct, since punitive damages are to provide a means by which the community can express its outrage or distaste

for the misconduct of a fraudulent, oppressive or malicious Defendant and deter and warn others that such conduct will not be tolerated.

Evidence has been presented concerning Defendant Jared Awerbach's 2008 car accident. You cannot use such evidence to award Plaintiff punitive damages for conduct injuring others who are not parties to this litigation, or conduct that does not bear a reasonable relationship to the conduct injuring Plaintiff that warrants punitive damages in this case. You may consider such evidence only with respect to the reprehensibility of the Defendant's conduct and only to the extent the conduct is similar and bears a reasonable relationship to the Defendant's conduct injuring plaintiff that warrants punitive damages in this case.

The court has given you instructions embodying various rules of law to help guide you to a just and lawful verdict. Whether some of these instructions will apply will depend upon what you find to be the facts. The fact that I have instructed you on various subjects in this case, including that of damages, must not be taken as indicating an opinion of the court as to what you should find to be the facts or as to which party is entitled to your verdict.

It is your duty as jurors to consult with one another and to deliberate with a
view toward reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violation to your
individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but should do
so only after a consideration of the case with your fellow jurors, and you should not
hesitate to change an opinion when convinced that it is erroneous. However, you
should not be influenced to vote in any way on any questions submitted to you by
the single fact that a majority of the jurors, or any of them, favor such a decision. In
other words, you should not surrender your honest convictions concerning the effect
or weight of evidence for the mere purpose of returning a verdict or solely because
of the opinion of the other jurors. Whatever your verdict is, it must be the product of
a careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case under the rules of
law as given by the court.

If, during your deliberation, you should desire to be further informed on any point of law or hear again portions of the testimony, you must reduce your request to writing signed by the foreman. The officer will then return you to court where the information sought will be given to you in the presence of the parties or their attorneys.

Readbacks of testimony are time consuming and are not encouraged unless you deem it a necessity. Should you require a readback, you must carefully describe the testimony to be read back so that the court reporter can arrange his notes. Remember, the court is not at liberty to supplement the evidence.

When you retire to consider your verdict, you must select one of your number to act as foreman, who will preside over your deliberation and will be your spokesman here in court.

During your deliberation, you will have all the exhibits which were admitted into evidence, these written instructions and forms of verdict which have been prepared for your convenience.

In civil actions, three-fourths of the total number of jurors may find and return a verdict. This is a civil action. If your verdict is in favor of the Plaintiff, you are directed to make special findings of fact consisting of written answers to the questions in a form that will be given to you. You shall answer the questions in accordance with the directions in the form and all of the instructions of the court. As soon as six or more of you have agreed upon a verdict and six or more of you have agreed upon every answer in the special findings, you must have the verdict and special findings signed and dated by your foreman, and then return with them to this room.

...

During opening statements, counsel for Defendant Andrea Awerbach stated that "just because there's no evidence of any preexisting records, doesn't mean that none exist." You should disregard this statement. There is no evidence that Plaintiff Emilia Garcia ever sought medical treatment related to back pain prior to the accident. It would be improper for you to speculate that such medical records exist.

Now you will listen to the arguments of counsel who will endeavor to aid you to reach a proper verdict by refreshing in your minds the evidence and by showing the application thereof to the law; but, whatever counsel may say, you will bear in mind that it is your duty to be governed in your deliberation by the evidence, as you understand it and remember it to be, and by the law as given you in these instructions, and return a verdict which, according to your reason and candid judgment, is just and proper.

Given this 8TH day of March, 2016

ONORABLE JERRY A. WIESE II

EXHIBIT 18

EXHIBIT 18

1	DORIGINAL		ILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT
2	VER		MAR / 0 2016
3			
4		BY,_	ALICE JACOBSON, DEPUTY
5	DISTRICT	COURT	
6	CLARK COUNT		A A-11-637772-c
7	EMILIA GARCIA, individually,		30
8	Plaintiff,		
	v.		JURY VERDICT
9	JARED AWERBACH, individually; ANDREA AWERBACH, individually; DOES I – X, and ROE CORPORATIONS I – X, inclusive,		
11	Defendants.		A – 11 – 637772 – C JV
12			Jury Verdict 4530909
13			
14	On the questions submitted, the jury finds as follow	ws:	
15			
16	1. What amount of damages do you find we	ere sustained	by Emilia Garcia (excluding any
17	punitive damages) as a proximate result of the auto	collision on .	January 2, 2011.
18	Past medical expenses		\$ 574846.01
19			
20	Future medical expenses		\$ <u>O</u>
21	Past Loss of household services		\$ <u>O</u>
22	Future Loss of household services		\$
23	Past pain, suffering and loss of enjoyment o	f life	. \$ <u>250000.00</u>
24	Future pain, suffering and loss of enjoymen	t of life	. \$
25	TOTAL		s 824 846.01
26			· 1
27			
28			

Page 1 of 3

1	1
1	2. Do you find that Plaintiff proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that Jared Awerbach
2	willfully consumed marijuana, knowing that he would thereafter operate a motor vehicle?
3	
4	YES NO
5	If you answered "YES," answer question 3. If you answered "NO," please skip to
6	question 5.
7 8 9	3. Should punitive damages be assessed against Defendant Jared Awerbach for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant?
10	YES NO
11	If you answered "YES," answer question 4. If you answered "NO," please skip to
12	
13	question 5.
14	4. We assess punitive damages against Jared Awerbach in the amount of:
15	\$ <u>2,000,000.00</u> .
16	5. Did Defendant Andrea Awerbach give express or implied permission to Defendant Jared
17	Awerbach to use her vehicle on January 2, 2011?
18	YES NO
19	If you answered "YES" to question 5, answer question 6. If you answered "NO"
20	please skip to the end of the form and have the Jury Foreperson sign where
21	indicated
22	6. Did Defendant Andrea Awerbach negligently entrust her vehicle to an inexperienced or
23	
24	incompetent person on January 2, 2011?
25	YES NO
26	If you answered "YES" to question 6, answer question 7. If you answered "NO"
27	please skip to the end of the form and have the Jury Foreperson sign where
28	indicated. Page 2 of 3

1	7. Was that negligence a proximate cause of harm to Emilia Garcia?
2	YES NO
3	If you answered "YES" to question 7, answer question 8. If you answered "NO",
4	please skip to the end of the form and have the Jury Foreperson sign where
5	indicated.
6	
7	8. Did Plaintiff prove by clear and convincing evidence that Andrea Awerbach acted with
8	oppression or malice (express or implied) in negligently causing harm to Emilia Garcia?
9	YES NO
10	
11	If you answered "YES", answer question 9. If you answered "NO", please skip to
12	the end of the form and have the Jury Foreperson sign where indicated.
13	9. Should punitive damages be assessed against Defendant Andrea Awerbach for the sake of
14 15	9. Should punitive damages be assessed against Defendant Andrea Awerbach for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant?
16	example and by way of punishing the detendant:
17	YES NO
18	
19	DATED this 10th day of March, 2016.
20	
21	
22	Chile Klini
23	FOREPERSON
24	
25	
26	
27	
- 1 6 1	

Page 3 of 3

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA -000-

-000-		
EMILIA GARCIA,		
Plaintiff,) vs.	CASE NO.: A637 DEPT. XXX	77 2 Electronically Filed 08/17/2016 07:31:16 AM
JARED AWERBACH, individually, and) ANDREA AWERBACH, individually,)	NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER RE:	Alun D. Lehrin
Defendants.)	POST-TRIAL MOTIONS	CLERK OF THE COURT
NOTICE OF ENTRY		

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

RE: POST-TRIAL MOTIONS

You are hereby notified that this Court entered an Order Re: Post-Trial Motions, a copy of which is attached hereto.

DATED this _____ day of August, 2016.

JERRY A WIESE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that on the date filed, a copy of this Order was electronically served through the Eighth Judicial District

Court EFP system, or, if no e-mail was provided, mailed or placed in the Clerk's Office attorney folder for:

ADAM SMITH

CRAIG HENDERSON

DANIEL POLSENBERG

MARIA ESTANISLO


PETER MAZZEO

RANDY TINDALL

AUDRA BOONEY

GEMMA ENDOZO

TIM MOTT



Tatyana Ristic, Judicial Executive Assistant

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA -000-

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	EMILIA GARCIA,		
	Plaintiff,	CASE NO.: A637772 The South	-
		DEPT. XXX CLERK OF THE COURT	
	vs.		
	JARED AWERBACH, individually, and)	ORDER RE:	
	ANDREA AWERBACH, individually,)	POST-TRIAL	
)	MOTIONS	
	Defendants.		
)		

On June 23, 2016, the above-referenced matter came on for hearing before Judge Jerry A. Wiese II, with regard to Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial or, in the Alternative, for Additur, Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, Jared Awerbach's Motion for New Trial, and Andrea Auerbach's Countermotion for Remittitur. The Court had previously reviewed the pleadings, and at the time of the hearing allowed oral argument on the part of all parties. The Court indicated that it would subsequently issue an Order, and the Court's Order now follows:

With regard to Plaintiff's and Jared Awerbach's Motions for New Trial, NRCP 59 provides the following standard:

A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues for any of the following causes or grounds materially affecting the substantial rights of an aggrieved party: (1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, master, or adverse party, or any order of the court, or master, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial; (2) Misconduct of the jury or prevailing party; (3) Accident or surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against; (4) Newly discovered evidence material for the party making the motion which the party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial; (5) Manifest disregard by the jury of the instructions of the court; (6) Excessive damages appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice; or, (7) Error in law occurring at the trial and objected to by the party making the motion. On a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment.

I

[As amended; effective January 1, 2005.]1

Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to a New Trial, based upon the following arguments: 1) the jury engaged in improper experimentation during deliberations; 2) the jury was improperly advised by the Court during deliberations that they may award Ms. Garcia past medical expenses and not award future medical expenses; 3) Defendants inappropriately previewed Dr. Scher's opinions, and then used them again in closing argument, even though Dr. Scher's opinions were stricken; 4) defense counsel violated numerous pre-trial Orders; and 5) the damages awarded to Ms. Garcia were clearly inadequate, and consequently, additur is necessary. The Court will address each argument in order.

1) Did the jury conduct an improper experiment during deliberations, which warrants a new trial?

Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to a new trial because the jury conducted an improper experiment during deliberations. This argument is obviously premised on the Declaration of Keith Berkery, (Juror 5) in which he explained how the jury chose Juror 6, Jessica Bias, to reach over the wood hand/rail/divider, to pick up a water bottle, which the Jurors had apparently seen the Plaintiff do during the Trial, so they could determine the effect that it had on Ms. Bias, and therefore, on the Plaintiff.

In ACP Reno Assoc., ACP v. Airmotive and Villanova,² the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed its adherence to the general rule "prohibiting the use of juror affidavits to impeach the jury's verdict."³ The Court has held that there is an exception to the general rule, and "[w]here the misconduct involves extrinsic information or contact with the jury, juror affidavits or testimony establishing the fact that the jury received the information or was contacted are permitted."⁴ An extraneous influence includes, among other things, publicity or media reports received and discussed among jurors during deliberations, consideration by jurors of extrinsic evidence, and third-party communications with sitting jurors. In contrast, intra-jury or intrinsic influences

NRCP 59.

¹⁰⁹ Nev. 314, 849 P.2d 277 (1993).

ACP Reno Assoc., ACP v. Airmotive and Villanova, 109 Nev. 314, 318, 949 P.2d 277 (1993); See also Weaver Brothers, Ltd. V. Misskelley, 98 Nev. 232, 645 P.2d 438 (1982).

Meyer v. State, 119 Nev. 554, 80 P.3d 447, 454.

involve improper discussions among jurors (such as considering a defendant's failure to testify), intimidation or harassment of one juror by another, or other similar situations that are generally not admissible to impeach a verdict." The Court stated that "proof of misconduct must be based on objective facts and not the state of mind or deliberative process of the jury. Juror affidavits that delve into a juror's thought process cannot be used to impeach a jury verdict and must be stricken."

The Nevada Supreme Court has cited heavily to the case of Meyer v. State, for the proposition that "[A] motion for a new trial may . . . be premised upon juror misconduct where such misconduct is readily ascertainable from objective facts and overt conduct without regard to the state of mind and mental processes of any juror."7 Additionally, ACP Reno Assocs. v. Airmotive & Villanova, Inc.,8 holds that "juror affidavits [are] inadmissible to show that the jurors misunderstood the judge's instructions." In order to prevail on a motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct, admissible evidence must establish "(1) the occurrence of juror misconduct, and (2) a showing that the misconduct was prejudicial."9 "Prejudice is shown whenever there is a reasonable probability or likelihood that the juror misconduct affected the verdict." 10

Plaintiff's Motion cites to the case of *Russell v. State*,¹¹ in which the appellant's counsel argued during closing argument, that the accused would not have been able to get from Reno to Carson City in time to commit the alleged offense. During a recess in the trial, a juror drove to Reno, and then measured the time it took him to drive to Carson City from the accused's place of employment in Reno. During the jury deliberations, he told the other jurors that it took him twenty-five minutes to travel that distance. The District Court agreed that the juror's actions constituted "misconduct," but concluded that the misconduct was "harmless." The Nevada Supreme Court, however, concluded that the district court's conclusion was an abuse of discretion. The

Meyer v. State, 119 Nev. 554, 562, 80 P.3d 447, 454 (2003).

Id., at pg. 563.

Meyer at pg. 563.

¹⁰⁹ Nev. 314, 318, 849 P.2d 277, 279 (1993).

Meyer at pgs. 563-64.

Meyer at pg. 564, (Note that the Court has taken these citations directly from a Nevada Supreme Court Order of Reversal and Remand in Estate of William George Dyer v. Vicky Guernier, et al., Nev. Supreme Court Case No.: 62941, filed 2/19/2015.)

⁹⁹ Nev. 265, 661 P.2d 1293 (1983).

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27 28 Supreme Court noted that "juror misconduct is particularly egregious where, as here, the juror has engaged in independent 'research' of the facts." The Court further noted that "the information disclosed by the juror related to a crucial aspect of appellant's defense. Appellant's case was therefore significantly harmed by his inability to cross-examine the juror, during the trial, concerning the many variables which may have affected his driving time." ¹³

This Court notes that the "experiment" conducted by the jury in the present case, occurred after the jury had asked to return to the courtroom to view the steps leading into the witness stand.14 The Court saw no problem with this "view" because it was something that the jury had been able to view throughout the trial. There was no indication that the jury intended to conduct any type of experiment, or the Court would not have allowed it. Based upon Mr. Berkery's affidavit, however, the jury used the opportunity to conduct an "experiment" and reenact what Mr. Berkery had apparently seen the Plaintiff do (the Plaintiff leaning over the wooden rail to obtain a bottle of water.) According to the Nevada Supreme Court, a juror's affidavit may only be considered as it relates to establishing objective facts.¹⁵ In the present case, this Court may rely on Mr. Berkery's affidavit, only to the extent that it establishes the objective fact that an "experiment" was conducted, and how it was conducted. The determination of whether, and to what extent, the experiment affected the jurors, must be determined based on an "objective" standard, not on a juror's affidavit. This Court concludes that the experiment conducted by the jurors, in the Courtroom, constituted juror misconduct. The jurors had been instructed that they were to "decide all questions of fact in this case from the evidence received in this trial and not from any other source."16 They were instructed not to "make any independent investigation . . . [or to] visit the scene, conduct experiments, or consult reference works for additional

Russell at pg. 267, citing to Barker v. State, 95 Nev. 308, 312, 594 P.2d 719 (1979).
Russell at pg. 267.

The actual question from the jury foreperson said, "We would like to see a courtroom to see the stairs in the witness area and the attorney area." (See Court Exhibit 17, March 10, 2016).

[&]quot;A motion for a new trial may . . . be premised upon juror misconduct where such misconduct is readily ascertainable from objective facts and overt conduct without regard to the state of mind and mental processes of any juror." Meyer v. State, 119 Nev. 554, 563, 80 P.3d 447, 454 (2003).

See Jury Instruction No. 6.

information."¹⁷ Clearly, the affidavit of Mr. Berkery establishes that the jury did conduct an "independent investigation," and conducted an "experiment" in violation of Jury Instruction No. 6. As the Supreme Court has indicated, "juror misconduct is particularly egregious where . . . the juror has engaged in independent 'research' of the facts."¹⁸

After concluding that misconduct occurred, the more important question, and the one that is more difficult to answer, is whether the jury's misconduct was "prejudicial." The Supreme Court has indicated that "[p]rejudice is shown whenever there is a reasonable probability or likelihood that the juror misconduct affected the verdict." This Court concludes that the experiment conducted by the jurors "related to a crucial aspect" of the Plaintiff's case – credibility of the plaintiff, and the nature and extent of the plaintiff's injuries. The Court further concludes that the Plaintiff's case was "significantly harmed by [her] inability to cross-examine the juror . . . concerning the many variables which may have affected [the result of the experiment]." The Court concludes that there is a reasonable probability or likelihood that the juror misconduct affected the verdict."

Did the Court improperly advise the jury that it could award past medical expenses and no future medical expenses?

Plaintiff contends that it was error for the Court to advise the jury that it could award the Plaintiff her past medical expenses and no future medical expenses. The question posed by the jury foreperson was as follows: "Based on Instruction 25 would it [be]possible to award the Plaintiff [the] entire amount of Past Medical Expenses without awarding anything for Future medical expenses?" The Court responded with "yes." The Plaintiff argues that the Plaintiff's future medical expenses were "either

See Jury Instruction No. 6.

Russell at pg. 267, citing to Barker v. State, 95 Nev. 308, 312, 594 P.2d 719 (1979).

See Meyer at pgs. 563-64.

Meyer at pg. 564.

Russell at pg. 267.

Meyer at pg. 564.

See Court Exhibit 19, March 10, 2016. Note that instruction No. 25 read as follows: If you find that a Defendant is liable for the original injury to the Plaintiff, then Defendant is also liable for any aggravation of the original injury caused by negligent medical or hospital treatment or care of the original injury, or for any additional injury caused by negligent medical or hospital treatment or care of the original injury."

undisputed or [were] disputed on the exact same grounds as her past expenses."²⁴ Consequently, since the jury awarded all of Ms. Garcia's past medical expenses (\$574,846.01), Plaintiff argues that the jury had no choice but to award the Plaintiff her future medical expenses.

This Court finds that Plaintiff's argument lacks merit, as the jurors were instructed to "bring to the consideration of the evidence [their] everyday common sense and judgment as reasonable men and women;"25 they were instructed that it was up to them to determine the "credibility or believability" of the witnesses;26 they were instructed about "discrepancies in a witness's testimony;"27 they were told that they were "not bound" by any expert testimony, but that they were to give such testimony "the weight to which [they] deem it entitled;"28 and with regard to damages, they were instructed that they could award the Plaintiff the "damages [they] believe from the evidence Plaintiff has sustained," and they could award "[t]he reasonable medical expenses which [they believed] Plaintiff probably will incur in the future as a result of the accident;"29 and finally, the jurors were instructed that "[w]hether any of these elements of damage have been proven by the evidence is for [them] to determine."30 The jury was free to disregard the testimony of the experts, and was free to believe or disbelieve the testimony of the Plaintiff, the treating doctors, etc. This Court will not disturb the verdict of the Jury with regard to its award of future medical expenses, or refusal to award such damages. The Court recalls that there was sufficient evidence presented, through cross-examination of the medical care providers, cross-examination of the Plaintiff herself, and other evidence, upon which the Jury could have based its decision to deny the Plaintiff any future medical expenses. Particularly, the Court recalls Facebook pictures that were presented to the Jury showing the Plaintiff participating in activities which could have been interpreted as inconsistent with the Plaintiff's pain complaints. Although Plaintiff argues that the evidence supporting past and future damages was "undisputed," the Court does not agree, and the Jury was free

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⁽See Motion for New Trial at pg. 7 of 30).

See Jury Instruction No. 7.

See Jury Instruction No. 15.

See Jury Instruction No. 16.

See Jury Instruction No. 18.

See Jury Instruction No. 33.

See Jury Instruction No. 37.

to accept or to disregard the evidence which it saw and heard, and reach the verdict that it reached. A verdict that is unsupported by evidence is improper and must be overturned,³¹ but in this case, the verdict was supported by the evidence, and need not be overturned.

2) Did the Court err in allowing Defense counsel to preview Dr. Scher's opinions during opening statement, and then refer to such opinions during closing argument?

Plaintiff next argues that the Court erred in allowing Defense counsel to preview Dr. Scher's foundationless opinions regarding forces of impact, during opening statement, and then Defense counsel again referred to such evidence in Closing Argument, even after Dr. Scher's testimony had been stricken. The Court allowed a preview of Dr. Scher's opinions during opening statement, because the Court allows the attorneys to explain what the evidence will show, and what they have a good faith belief will be entered into evidence during the course of the trial. Based upon representations from Defense counsel, the Court had no reason to believe at the outset, that Dr. Scher's testimony would be stricken. Prior to Trial, the Court had evaluated the proposed testimony of Dr. Scher, and was convinced that there was "at least arguably" sufficient foundation for that testimony. During the presentation of evidence, however, it became evident that there was "inadequate foundation" for Dr. Scher's opinions, and consequently, his testimony was stricken from the record, and the Jury was instructed to disregard it. During closing argument, Mr. Awerbach's counsel argued that the Plaintiff sustained "no physical forces greater than the roller coasters she rode before."32 The Court overruled an objection to that statement, indicating that the Court felt that Mr. Strassburg was simply using a "common sense" argument, but later the Court noted that the Court should have sustained the objection because it was a conclusion that didn't have any basis in evidence.33 The Court acknowledges that the objection should have been sustained, and Defense counsel should have been admonished not to "testify" or refer to Dr. Scher's opinions during closing argument, since Dr. Scher's opinions had been stricken from the record. Although the Court acknowledges the error, the Court is not convinced that the statement regarding the

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Arnold v. Mt. Wheeler Power, 101 Nev. 612, 614, 707 P.2d 1137, 1139 (1985).

See Trial Transcript 3/9/16 at pg. 19:6-7.

See Trial Transcript 3/9/16 at pg. 65:10-24.

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"roller coasters" or the other general references to "forces" were sufficiently prejudicial to have made a difference to the Jury. There is no indication that such statements made a difference in the minds of the jurors, and the jurors were instructed more than once that opening statements and closing arguments were "not evidence." Although the Court acknowledges the error, the Court finds that such error may have been harmless, and by itself such error would not justify a new trial. In combination with the other irregularities during Trial, however, it may.

3) Did the accumulation of juror misconduct, error, and improper presentation of biomechanical testimony, and repeated violation of Pre-Trial Orders prejudice the Plaintiff to the extent that a new trial is warranted?

Plaintiff's final argument in support of its Motion for New Trial is that the accumulation of juror misconduct, error, and improper presentation of biomechanical testimony, in addition to repeated violations of Pre-Trial Orders by Defense counsel, prejudiced the Plaintiff and affected the verdict. Plaintiff argues that defense counsel violated at least 15 Pre-Trial Orders. This Court acknowledges that Defense counsel did walk a fine line, coming close to violating, and sometimes went past the line, actually violating, some of the Pre-Trial Orders. Consequently, many of Plaintiff's counsel's objections in that regard were sustained. The Court is not convinced that such violations, by themselves, justify a new trial, but in combination with other irregularities, they may.

4) Are the damages "clearly inadequate" such that Plaintiff is entitled to an "additur?"

Plaintiff argues that as an alternative to a new trial, she is entitled to an "additur." The Plaintiff correctly cites to the cases of Drummond v. Mid-West Growers,34 and Lee v. Ball,35 as authority for the potential use of an additur, but those cases stand for the proposition that an additur is only appropriate if 1) the damages are clearly inadequate; and 2) the case would be a proper one for granting a motion for new trial limited to damages. This Court cannot conclude that the damages awarded by the Jury are "clearly inadequate," and consequently, the Court does not feel comfortable

⁹¹ Nev. 698 (1975). 121 Nev. 391, 393-94 (2005).

substituting its judgment regarding damages for that of the Jury. As a result, the Court concludes that an "additur" in this case would not be appropriate. A similar analysis would preclude the Court from granting Andrea Awerbach's request for "remittitur."

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based upon the foregoing, this Court finds that a "new trial" of all issues is warranted, based upon NRCP 59(a)(2) (Misconduct of the jury – conducting an experiment); NRCP 59(a)(5) (Manifest disregard by the jury of the instructions of the court – specifically the instruction that the jury was prohibited from conducting its own experiments or investigation); and NRCP 59(a)(7) (Error in law occurring at the trial and objected to by the party making the motion – specifically the statements by Defense Counsel during closing argument, improperly referencing the "forces of impact" testimony of Dr. Scher, as well as the cumulative effect of multiple violations of various Pre-Trial Orders). Based upon these irregularities, the Court concludes that the parties were prejudiced, and were prevented from having a fair trial.

Based upon the foregoing, and good cause appearing therefor,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial or, in the Alternative, for Additur, is hereby **GRANTED** as it relates to a request for a new trial, and **DENIED** as it relates to a requested additur.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Andrea Awerbach's Countermotion for Remittitur is hereby **DENIED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a new trial will be scheduled at the Court's next available date in the regular course, and a new Trial Setting Order will issue.

DATED this 12th day of August, 2016.

JERRY A. WIESE II

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

EIGHTHJUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

DEPATMENT XXX

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that on the date filed, a copy of this Order was electronically served through the Eighth Judicial District

Court EFP system, or, if no e-mail was provided, mailed or placed in the Clerk's Office attorney folder for:

ADAM SMITH

CRAIG HENDERSON

DANIEL POLSENBERG

MARIA ESTANISLO

PETER MAZZEO

RANDY TINDALL

AUDRA BOONEY

GEMMA ENDOZO

TIM MOTT

Tatyana Ristic, Judicial Executive Assistant

Electronically Filed


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2	CLARK COUNTY	, NEVADA	•
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3	EMILIA GARCIA,	CLERK OF THE COL	
5	Plaintiff,)	
6	vs.)	
7	JARED AWERBACH, individually, and ANDREA AWERBACH, individually,) NOTICE OF) ENTRY OF	
8	ANDREA AVVERBACII, individually,	ORDER RE:	
9	Defendants.) MINUTE ORDER	
10) OF 8/22/16	
10			
11	You are hereby notified that this Court entered a	an Order Re: Minute Order of 8/22/16	
12	(re: Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Judgment as	a Matter of Law), a copy of which is	
13	attached hereto.		
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15	DATED this day of August, 2016		
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17	IERR\	VA MIESE	


DISTRICT COURT JUDGE


Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that on the date filed, a copy of this Order was electronically served through the Eighth Judicial District Court EFP system, or, if no e-mail was provided, mailed or placed in the Clerk's Office attorney folder for:

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PrintPreview.jsp Page 13 of 21

Type: ClaimSubject: Claim StatusTopCreated By: TERESA MERAZCreated: 01/17/2011 04:29 PMUpdated: 01/17/2011 VM rec'd from Geraldine at atty's office Glen Lerner & Assoc (702) 877-1500. She states they rep clmt but only for BI. We can still deal directly w/ clmt for PD. She is sending LOR. She states clmt tx at ER and is tx w/ chiro for s/t inj. I returned the call to discuss, I was transferred to Geraldine's vm, left message. Clmt is now atty rep'd. Per atty's office, clmt tx at ER and w/ chiro for s/t inj. ER bills expected around \$1k-\$2k since no dx testing done. Chiro specials expected around \$4k-\$5500 for about 3-4 mos of tx. Opac cited for DUI and drug possession. Opac denies being under the influence Waiting for LOR. Subject: Total Loss Type: Claim Top Created By: GLORIA HEUSER Created: 01/17/2011 12:35 PM Updated: 01/17/2011 LIEN HOLDER: Wells Fargo Contact Name/ Dept: Phone #/ Ext: 800-289-8004 Fax #: Payoff Amount/ Date: \$4,441.03 til 2/1/11 LOG Request Amount: Account #: 9380197988 Gap Insurance: Payment address: Remittance Center, MACE2717-024, 15750 Alton Pkwy, Irvine, CA, 92618-3825 Names on title: rep could not adv Subject: Total Loss Top Type: Claim Royd c/from copart, veh not released. ob. I did xfernce c/with clmt, Emilia and Christy at shop, veh is released. ОÞ I adv copart. Subject: Rental Management Top Type: Claim

Current Rental Status: M.Cousins set LD Rental Start Date: 1/6/11 Last Authorized Date: 1/21/11 Days Authorized to Date: 16 days @ \$24.74 /day Type: Claim Subject: Total Loss Created: 01/14/2011 05:22 PM Created By: MICHELLE COUSINS Updated: 01/14/2011 attmptd to get payoff got message hold times longer then normal Type: Claim Subject: Total Loss Created By: MICHELLE COUSINS Created: 01/14/2011 05:19 PM **Updated:** 01/14/2011 Seller: L235 LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE Adjuster: GLORIA HEUSER Claim#: 017331078-02 Insured: ANDREA AWERBACH Owner: EMILIA GARCIA Lot Number Assigned: 10407161 Description: 01 HYUN SANTA FE WHITE Yard Assigned: 057 NV - LAS VEGAS Yard Address: 4810 N. LAMB BLVD LAS VEGAS, NV 89115 Yard Phone: (702) 638-9300 Yard Fax: (702) 638-9494 Salvage Type: VEHICLES Assignment Date: 01/14/2011 Seller Reference#: N/A VIN Number: N/A Date of Loss: 01/02/2011 Estimated Advance Charge: \$.00 Subject: Rental Management Type: Claim Top Created By: MICHELLE COUSINS Created: 01/14/2011 05:15 PM **Updated**: 01/14/2011 LD of rental set 1/21 Subject: Negotiation/Settlement Type: Claim Created By: MICHELLE COUSINS Updated: 01/14/2011 Created: 01/14/2011 05:13 PM Settlement made to whom: Emilia Agree Rental last day: 1/21 Date Paperwork sent: 1/14 Subject: ICP/1st Call Type: Claim Top Created By: MICHELLE COUSINS Created: 01/14/2011 05:08 PM Updated: 01/14/2011

1st Call – Total Loss Note		
1st i/b call @ 3:05 s/w Emelia Location of Vehicle: Ultimate Collision Date permission to pick-up obtained: Date salvage yard notified of pick-up: Lien holder: Wells Fargo Phone #/ Account#: 9380197988 / 80 GAP Insurance: Y/N Explained? Options reviewed(y/n): yes List missed options/Receipts if any: Rental explained: yes LOSSHIST/ISO/NICB reviewed: TL procedures explained: yes Name/s on Title: Emilia Garcia Paperwork sent (date): 1/14 Replacement Cost Endorsement (Y/N	0-289-8004	
Type: Claim Created By: GLORIA HEUSER	Subject: Total Loss Created: 01/13/2011 11:41 AM	<u>Top</u> Updated: 01/13/2011
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ob No ans, I lvm for clmt.		
No ans, I lvm for clmt. T/L TO DO: -icp -neg/sttle		7 KI TI S TO THE STATE OF THE S
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No ans, I lvm for clmt. T/L TO DO: -icp -neg/sttle -p/u veh Type: Claim Created By: SANDRA M WILCH	Created: 01/13/2011 10:34 AM trz poa, keys, auth (Ih unk) Subject: Total Loss Created: 01/12/2011 06:19 PM	Updated: 01/13/2011

Subject: Total Loss Type: Claim Top Created By: MICHELLE COUSINS Created: 01/12/2011 02:26 PM Updated: 01/12/2011 i/b call from Ms Garcia wanted status of claim and when rental was due back will reviewing claim Ms Garcia hung up called back was unable to reach clmt. Type: Claim Subject: Claim Status Created By : DAVID A COOK Created: 01/12/2011 01:35 PM **Updated:** 01/12/2011 IB cal from the 3pc and it was confirmed that the clmt. does not have MP. I confirmed that liab, has been accepted. I provided the call w/ the contact info. re the CS assigned to the file. Subject: Claim Status Type: Claim Created By: TERESA MERAZ Created: 01/11/2011 01:00 PM **Updated:** 01/11/2011 Rec'd call back from clmt. She states she doesn't get good reception w/ her cell phone in her apt. She states she is in a great deal of pain and has anxiety and unable to sleep. She wants to f/u w/ Dr to see if they can prescribe meds. I reminded clmt of claims process and benefits of DD. She states her welfare got cancelled in Dec so she is trying to get it back. She does not have money to pay for tx oop or for meds if they are prescribed. Advised clmt we do not pay for tx as she is receiving it but once she is ready to settle and settlement is reached. She is not ready to settle due to pain worsening and f/u tx planned. In an effort to maintain DD, I offered to advance the cost of prescriptions if needed. I asked her to ctc me about this if needed. Clmt agreed. Advised I will f/u in a couple of weeks but if any quest to call me. RADD. Subject: Claim Status Type: Claim Top Created By: TERESA MERAZ I called clmt to f/u. She states pain has not improved. I asked for tx status but call was disconnected. I tried calling clmt back but went straight to vm, left message requesting tx status and advising veh is t/l and provided t/I rep ctc info. Subject: Rental Management Type: Occurrence Top Created By: DELENE K MCQUEEN Created: 01/11/2011 12:41 PM **Updated:** 01/11/2011 i/b call mrs garcia issue; rental ext disc; revinotes, appraisal rec 1/7 for t/l, approved ext on rental for 2 more days, mn to t/l contact clmt, advierac Authorization changed by MCQUEEN, DEE at 9:43 AM. S - Rental extended by MCQUEEN, DEE at 9:43 AM for 2 day(s). S - Current authorized date is 1/13/11. S - Extended 2 days at \$24.74/day. Subject: Coverage qo Type: Occurrence Created By: TERESA MERAZ Created: 01/11/2011 12:12 PM **Updated:** 01/11/2011

bus# and was told o	almt is having bre	akfast w/ students. I left message requestir	ng a call back.
Appears insd is a te	acher so may be	e difficult to reach.	
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environ de las fantingens de la navanna (et en las, ett litte anne en et en	omphopment mediates and appropriate system that the efficiency is a solid	er minet ern i system en	o nakan kabupat katat an mari kabapat nakak kabapanan in muunka Jappan komik kata kabapankan kabapa kabapan ka
Type: Claim		Subject: Damages	Тор
Created By : TERE	SA MERAZ	Created: 01/10/2011 10:13 AM	Updated : 01/10/2011
Estimate/photos rec	d in e-folder of c	clmt veh. \$5464.27 in damage, veh is a T/L.	T/L has been assigned.
Misc note to t/l rep to	o advise Lx post	ed at 100%.	
Type: CLAIM	Subject	: APPRAISER NOTES	Тор
Created By :	Created	: 01/07/2011 06:03 PM	Updated:
HIDDEN DAMAGE:	POSSIBLE ADD	DL DAMAGE TO INNER ROCKER AND AD	DDL TO WHEELHOUSE
Type: CLAIM	Subject	: APPRAISER NOTES	<u>To</u> p
Created By :	Created	: 01/07/2011 06:03 PM	Updated:
APPT: NO APPT SE	ET TOW IN CAR	NOT DRIVABLE	Militaria (Militaria (Militaria and America and Americ
Type: CLAIM	Subject: \	/EHICLE DISCREPANCY	Top
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Vehicle Year = 2001 KM8SC83D81U053	•	= HYUNDAI; Vehicle Model = SANTA FE;	Vehicle VIN =
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Vm rec'd from insd.	I called insd to d	iscuss permissive use. I got vm, left messo	ge,
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Created By : TERE	SA MERAZ	Created: 01/06/2011 05:47 PM	Updated : 01/06/2011
opac's left in left lane	e of 2. Opac pull	Statements taken from a lane to clmt's left was stopped and blocking of driveway causing collision. POI was stopped and blocking collision.	was to opac's front end and clmt's
p/s rear door and rea attempted to swerve and drug possession	left to avoid.		Clmt . Opac cited for DUI
Lx decision posted.	. James American Marine Marine Marine .		Control to the control of the contro
Type: Claim	gan yan menin sebagai di kebasar	Subject: Rental Management	Тор
Type: Claim		Charten Management	1.44

TT E.Garcia and discussed rental proceedures -- she adv that could provide a small deposit to the brnch if need be

sent db auth thru ARMS and did conference call w/Donovan at brnch 5427 expln deposit issue and he said would be okay w/\$1 on deposit -- E.Garcia adv okay with this -during conversation found that another branch would be closer to clmnt's work

TT Erika at brnch 5404 who adv that will be okay w/\$1 deposit

Current Rental Status: Reservation for 1/6
Days Authorized to Date: 6 days @ \$24.74 /day

Authorized Total: \$148.44*

Type: Occurrence Subject: Policyholder Top

Created By: TERESA MERAZ Created: 01/06/2011 05:28 PM Updated: 01/06/2011

I called opac (702) 772-6256 and was able to reach him. Obtained RI. Posting version. Opac is mhsd but is in the process of getting his own apt at same apt complex. He did not ask insd to use the veh b/c he was not supposed to be driving. There was an issue w/ his permit. He thought he had a permit but didn't. Opac does not have a drivers license or valid permit. Opac has used insd veh in the past with and without permission. Insd has given him permission to use veh in the past to run errands. Opac could not say how many times. Opac states insd was home at the time. Keys were on the counter. Opac took the keys and was going to visit his child. Opac states he was cited for DUI, drug possession, no drivers license, no insurance in veh, and FTY. Opac states he was not under the influence of drugs at the time. He had marijuana on his person. The last time he smoked was weeks ago. He had not smoked on DOL.

Type: Claim Subject: Damages Top

I called TLC Ultimate Collision and arranged to have clmt veh picked up from Ewing Bros for inspection. TLC assignment sent.

Type: Claim Subject: Rental Management Top

 Created By : TERESA MERAZ
 Created : 01/06/2011 04:52 PM
 Updated: 01/06/2011

OK standard size rental, DB. Clmt veh inspection pending. Will arrange for TLC Ultimate Collision to pick up veh from tow yard for appraisal.

Type: Claim Subject: Claim Status Top

Created By: TERESA MERAZ Created: 01/06/2011 04:51 PM Updated: 01/06/2011

CONT..Advised I'm sending med auth and I will f/u once estimate is completed. Established DD. Transferred clmt to ERAC.

Clmt has had 1 ER visit for back pain. No dx testing done. No f/u tx planned, only if pain gets worse. Opac was arrested for DUI

Med auth sent.

Type: Claim Subject: Claim Status Top

I called clmt at 1pm (NV time) and obtained RI. Posting version. Clmt states opac was arrested for DUI. Officer told clmt that opac was high. Clmt has back pain w/ numbness/tingling in both legs. She went to Mountain View Hospital on her own and was checked out. No dx testing done, meds given. Clmt will seek f/u tx if pain gets worse. Her health ins is not active yet so ER bill will be mailed to her. No WL. Attempted to make 1st call settlement but clmt would like to wait to see how she feels. No offer made. Clmt veh is at Ewing Bros. She called 3pc to get it moved but was told she would have to pay her ded so 3pc not handling her PD. Advised Lx pending but appears adverse to opac. Unk if opac still in jail so we do not want to delay PD. Clmt does not think veh is a t/l so advised I will have TLC shop pick up veh and have it inspected. In an effort to establish DD, I agreed to set up rental on DB for standard size. Clmt was appreciative. CONT...

Type: Claim Subject: Claim Status Top

Created By: TERESA MERAZ Created: 01/06/2011 12:11 PM Updated: 01/06/2011

Vm rec'd from clmt. I returned her call and requested RI. Clmt was at work and unable to discuss claim at the time. She requested I call back at 1pm (NV time). Advised I will back then.

Type: Occurrence Subject: Coverage Top

I called insd to discuss permissive use. I got vm, left messge.

Per Collision notes:

Unlisted Operator Questions for Policyholder

Did the operator have permission to drive your car? NO

Is the operator a member of your household? YES

What is your relationship to the operator? SON

Does the operator have their own set of keys to your car? NO If not where did they obtain the keys to your car?

ACCESS TO KEYS BECAUSE SAME HOUSEHOLD

Has the operator driven your vehicle before? NO

Does the operator have a valid driver's license? NO - HE SD HE HAS A PERMIT

How often does the operator use this vehicle? UNK

Does the operator have a vehicle of their own? NO

If yes, who is their insurance carrier? N/A

If operator was son or daughter, when did they obtain their license? NONE

Still need to verify additional details w/ insd.

Type: Occurrence Subject: Claim Status Top

Created By: DELENE K MCQUEEN Created: 01/06/2011 11:51 AM Updated: 01/06/2011

i/b mrs garcia clmt

issue; req to speak to rep disc, trans call to bi teresa m

Type: Claim Subject: Claims Strategy Top

*Rec'd claim. Appears opac pulled out of driveway while clmt headed straight. Per notes, opac was DUI. Need to obtain statements from both drivers. P/R ordered.

*50/100/50 PL. Opac is insd's son and unlisted operator. Appears opac is mhsd. Per Collision notes, insd states opac did not have permission to drive but had access to keys since he is mhsd, opac does not have his own

*Clmt reported neck/back pain. Unk if seeking tx.

POI appears to be to clmt's p/s rear and insd's front end

Also, opac was DUI.

Type: Claim

Subject: Rental Management

Top

Created By: PAMELA GOODNIGHT Created: 01/05/2011 06:29 PM Updated: 01/05/2011

recv call from E.Garcia very upset w/clm process and fact that had to speak with so many diff people -- she is a single mother of 3 and needs rental today w/out paying any \$\$

adv that would be speaking with many diff people at LM but they all work as a team effort -- in regards to rental it will not be possible to get one at no expense to her -- LM must protect their customer and a rental cannot be auth w/out LM's consent

adv that clm was just assigned to T.Meraz and she has not seen this clm yet but would transfer her to vmail, she can leave a msg and I would also let T.Meras know

Transfered call to T.Meraz

Type: Claim Subject: Claim Status Top
Created By: MARY-LOU HUDSON Created: 01/05/2011 04:01 PM Updated: 01/05/2011

Hi Teresa, clmt injured, DD, please handle. Thank-you, eh

Type: Claim

Subject: Claim Status

Top

RECEIVED VM FROM CLMT--Emelia Garcia at (702)358-8470

*Clmt woke up w/ back & neck pain

OB call to Clmt--Garcia

- *Adv Ix is still pending OPAC's statement
- *Clmt may seek tx today--updated clmt info
- *adv Clmt will need to get veh. moved from tow yard ASAP---she s/w her ins. co. & she was told that she needs to have LM get veh moved.
- *explained that LM has not accepted Ix & to let 3pc know that--if she has coll covg they should be able to move veh. from tow yard.
- *clmt in need of rental--adv we typically use ERAC--hold on to all receipts if necessary, she does not have rental on her own policy.

*adv I created inj file--will follow up

Type: Claim

Subject: Total Loss

Top

Created By: AMANDA HOHMAN

Created: 01/05/2011 01:22 PM

Updated: 01/05/2011

Revd TL assignment, Ix is pending, cv in storage. Sent s/s letter w/ 1/10 cutoff. Note to AshleyF to instruct clmt to move veh during 1st call..ah 1121

Type: Occurrence

Subject: Claim Status

CO

Created By: ASHLEY FLANAGAN

Created: 01/03/2011 02:44 PM

Updated: 01/03/2011

Received vm from Ins. Ms. Awerbach. She stated in message son was driving her vehicle w/o permission. Ins. son got a DUI and vehicle is currently in impound. OB left message for Ms. Awerback to c/b when available

Type: Occurrence Subject: Claim Status Top

Created By: ASHLEY FLANAGAN **Updated:** 01/03/2011 Created: 01/03/2011 02:38 PM

Ordered PR.

Type: Occurrence Subject: 800 Center

Created By: LISSETTE GRAY Created: 01/03/2011 12:58 AM **Updated:** 01/03/2011

Clmt needs a rental this is her only veh

Subject: Total Loss Probability Type: Claim Top Created By: SYSTEM

Created: 01/03/2011 12:54 AM Updated:

Probability Percentage = 0.9739 Probability of Total Loss = TRUE Accident Description Code = 02 Date of Loss, Month = 1 Date of Loss, Year = 2011 Is Vehicle Driveable? = N Lag Time = 1 Vehicle Make_Model = HYUN_SANTAFE Policy State = NV Severity of Damage = 03 Vehicle Age = 10

EXHIBIT "L"

PLOG Alexandra B. McLeod Nevada Bar No. 8185 amcleod@bvrclaw.com BRADY, VORWERCK, RYDER & CASPINO 2795 East Desert Inn Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89121 Telephone: (702) 697-6500 Facsimile: (702) 697-6505 Attorneys for Defendants, JARED AND ANDREA **AWERBACH** 7 8 DISTRICT COURT 9 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 10 11 EMILIA GARCIA, Case No.: A-11-637772-C Dept. No.: XXVII 12 Plaintiff, PRIVILEGE LOG PERTAINING TO 13 PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR ٧. PRODUCTION NO. 7 14 JARED AWERBACH, individually, ANDREA AWERBACH, individually, DOES I-X, and ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, 16 inclusive, Defendants. 17 18 19 COME NOW Defendants, JARED AND ANDREA, by and through their counsel of record, ALEXANDRA B. M^CLEOD, ESQ., of the law firm of BRADY VORWERCK RYDER & CASPINO, 20 and hereby submits the instant Privilege Log in the above-entitled action, pursuant to the Nevada 21 Rules of Civil Procedure and the Discovery Commissioner Opinions. 22 Pursuant to Alboum v. Koe, M.D., et al., DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER OPINION #10 (November, 23 2001), "In order to properly discharge the burden of establishing a privilege in the Eighth Judicial 24 25 District, the first step by the objecting party, in sync with E.D.C.R. 2.34, is to produce an informative privilege log. This log should be served along with the privilege claims on the discovering party." 26

Furthermore, that opinion lays out a specific procedure for doing so:

27

20 |

The requirements of a privilege log in the Eighth Judicial District Court shall be substantially as follows: For each document the log should provide 1) the author(s) and their capacities, 2) the recipients (including cc's) and their capacities, 3) other individuals with access to the document and their capacities, 4) the type of document, 5) the subject matter of the document, 6) the purpose(s) for the production of the document, 7) the date on the document, and 8) a detailed, specific explanation as to why the document is privileged or otherwise immune from discovery, including a presentation of all factual grounds and legal analyses in a non-conclusory fashion. Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Diamond State Ins. Co. v. Rebel Oil Co., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 691 (D.Nev. 1994); Nevada Power Co. v. Monsanto Co., supra. Such explanation may require affidavits or other evidence as a supplement to the log. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Systems, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 84 (N.D. III. 1992).

Therefore, following the format outlined above, Defendant ANDREA AWERBACH, provides the following privilege log for documents withheld from the its production of the insurance company's adjusting/investigation file:

A. Adjuster's claims notes dated January 18, 2011 et. seq.

- 1. AUTHOR: Claims handler and supervisors from Liberty Mutual
- 2. RECIPIENTS: Internal
- 3. ACCESSIBLE TO: Liberty Mutual representatives, Defense counsel
- 4. TYPE OF DOCUMENT: Print-out of computer claims notes, 15 pages redacted and produced (Bates labels LM001-006; LM019-027), 12 pages withheld (Bates labels LM007-018).
- 5. SUBJECT MATTER: Subject accident, strategy for defending same
- 6. PURPOSE: Handling of Plaintiff's claim and subsequent litigation, determining liability and damages valuation/reserves for same
- 7. DATE: January 18, 2011-Sept 26, 2011
 - OBJECTION: The redacted/withheld documents are privileged as they contain the mental impressions of the insurance adjuster in anticipation of litigation and after receipt of Plaintiff's counsel's letter of representation. "There would be no incursion into the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation. If such impressions, opinions or conclusions are mixed in with a statement of facts from a witness, the document can be submitted to the court or Discovery Commissioner in camera who will make the appropriate deletions of such protected materials from the statement." *Moyns v. Creviston*, DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER OPINION #1 (June,

1988) (citing Henry Enterprises, Inc. v. Smith, 592 P.2d 915 (Kan. 1982) and Anderson v. St. Mary's Hospital, 428 N.E.2d 528 (III.App. 1981)). If the explanations proffered through this privilege log are not satisfying, Defendants will be agreeable to submitting the computer log documents to the Discovery Commissioner for an in camera review of same. DATED: July 22nd, 2013 BRADY, VORWERCK, RYDER & CASPINO Nevada Bar No. 8185 2795 E. Desert Inn Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89121 Attorneys for Defendants, JARED & ANDREA **AWERBACH**

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

EMILIA GARCIA,

Plaintiff,

) Case No.: A-11-637772-C) Dept. No.: XXVII

VS.

JARED AWERBACH, individually,)
ANDREA AWERBACH, individually,)
DOES I-X, and ROE CORPORATIONS)
I-X, inclusive,)

Defendants.

DEPOSITION OF ANDREA AWERBACH

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 2013

REPORTED BY: GINA DILUZIO, RPR, CCR #833

JOB NO.: 186406

```
DEPOSITION OF ANDREA AWERBACH, taken at Glen Lerner
 1
      Injury Attorneys, 4795 South Durango Drive, Las Vegas,
 2
      Nevada, on Thursday, September 12, 2013, at 4:21 p.m.,
 3
      before Gina DiLuzio, Certified Court Reporter, in and for
 4
 5
      the State of Nevada.
 6
 7
      APPEARANCES:
      For the Plaintiff Emilia Garcia:
 8
 9
                   GLEN LERNER INJURY ATTORNEYS
                  BY: ADAM D. SMITH, ESQ.
                   4795 South Durango Drive
10
                  Las Vegas, Nevada 89147
                   (702) 877-1500
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      For the Defendants Jared Awerbach and Andrea Awerbach:
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                  BRADY, VORWERCK, RYDER & CASPINO
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                  BY: ALEXANDRA B. McLEOD, ESQ.
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                  Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
                   (702) 997-3800
21
                   jpitegoff@rlattorneys.com
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23
24
25
```

LITIGATION SERVICES & TECHNOLOGIES - 800-330-1112

1		Q.	Did he ask for permission to drive your car
2	that	day?	
3		Α.	No.
4		Q.	How did he get the keys?
5		Α.	I don't know.
6		Q.	Where were the keys when he took the car?
7		Α.	I don't know, because I don't know when he took
8	them	•	
9		Q.	Do you know where you were when he took your
10	car?		
11		Α.	No.
12		Q.	Would you have been home when he took your car?
13		Α.	Yeah, I'd have to be.
14		Q.	Is there a regular place that you leave the
15	keys	in you	r house?
16		Α.	No.
17		Q.	And that's poor question. At the time, on
18	Janua	ary 2,	2011, was there a regular place where you kept
19	your	car ke	ys in your house?
20		Α.	I think I was answering based on January 2.
21	No.	I cons	tantly hid the keys.
22		Q.	You didn't hide them that day, did you?
23		Α.	Yes.
24		Q.	Now, Jared said the keys were left out on the
25	coun	ter. I	s he not telling the truth?

LITIGATION SERVICES & TECHNOLOGIES - 800-330-1112

1	Α.	I don't remember. It was quite some time ago.
2	Q.	It was totaled, correct?
3	Α.	Yes.
4	Q.	Do you know if Jared was talking on the phone
5	at the time	of the accident?
6	Α.	No.
7	Q.	Do you know if he got injured in the accident?
8	Α.	I don't know.
9	Q.	Do you know if he got any treatment as a result
10	of the accid	dent?
11	Α.	I don't know.
12	Q.	Have you ever given a statement to your
13	insurance co	ompany about the accident?
14	Α.	Yes.
15	Q.	When was that?
16	Α.	I'm sure days following the accident. I don't
17	remember the	e dates.
18	Q.	Do you know if they recorded that statement?
19	Α.	I don't know.
20	Q.	You know, sometimes they tell you, at the
21	beginning o	f the call, we're going to be recording this.
22	Α.	Uh-huh.
23	Q.	Do you recall if that happened?
24	Α.	Assuming that it happened.
25		MR. SMITH: Can I have you check into that,

LITIGATION SERVICES & TECHNOLOGIES - 800-330-1112

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

EMILIA GARCIA, individually,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CASE NO.: A637772

DEPT. NO.: XXVII

JARED AWERBACH, individually;

ANDREA AWERBACH, individually;

DOES I-X, and ROE CORPORATIONS

I-X, inclusive,

VIDEO DEPOSITION OF ANDREA AWERBACH
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 24, 2014

REPORTED BY: JACKIE JENNELLE, RPR, CCR #809 JOB NO.: 224205

Defendants.

ANDREA AWERBACH - 10/24/2014

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Page 2
             VIDEO DEPOSITION OF ANDREA AWERBACH, taken
 1
     at 4795 South Durango Drive, Las Vegas, Nevada on
     FRIDAY, OCTOBER 24, 2014, at 1:30 p.m., before
 3
     Jackie Jennelle, Certified Court Reporter, in and
     for the State of Nevada.
 5
 6
 7
     APPEARANCES:
 8
     For the Plaintiff:
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             GLEN LERNER INJURY ATTORNEYS
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             BY: PETTER MAZZEO, ESQ.
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             3890 West Ann Road
             North Las Vegas, Nevada 89031
19
             (702) 870-3940
20
     The Videographer:
21
             MONICA HAYWORTH
22
23
24
25
```

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Page 82

- 1 hindsight, did they need to be hidden better? Yes.
- 2 It doesn't mean I didn't hide them well.
- 3 Q. You could have kept the keys with you?
- 4 A. In the shower or wherever I went? If I had
- 5 thought to do that and not believe Jared would come
- 6 in. I mean, mostly they were with me. If they
- 7 weren't with me, it was because for that moment I
- 8 thought they were safe or for that moment I had to
- 9 do something where I couldn't take the keys.
- 10 Or, again, I'm a human being. I had
- 11 forgotten for the 30 seconds that it took.
- 12 Q. And you were in the practice of hiding the
- 13 keys because you knew there was a risk he would take
- 14 the keys and take the car; right?
- 15 A. I was in the practice of hiding the keys
- 16 because I kept track of everything that was
- important to me. I hid the keys. I hid my wallet.
- 18 I kept track of any school things I needed.
- I knew that I was living in a precarious
- 20 situation, and I was also hypervigilant because I
- 21 was under so much stress. So it wasn't just the
- 22 keys.
- Q. About the keys though, you hid the keys
- 24 because you knew there was a risk that Jared would
- 25 take the keys and take your car; correct?

Page 161
1 clever. I think that I'm not as relentless and
2 clever.

- I think that it is to his advantage to be
- 4 able to take what he needs to take, and when you are
- 5 an addict who is craving, whether it's gambling or
- 6 drugs, you do things that people who are not craving
- 7 don't know you're going to do.
- 8 BY MR. SMITH:
- 9 Q. You know Jared says that he took the keys
- 10 off the counter; correct?
- 11 A. I have read that.
- Q. Why would he lie about that?
- MR. MAZZEO: Objection, mischaracterizes --
- 14 (Multiple parties speaking.)
- MR. SMITH: Well, wait a minute. Let me
- 16 ask you the question first.
- 17 BY MR. SMITH:
- 18 Q. Do you think he's lying about that?
- 19 A. I think he's mistaken. I think he may have
- 20 seen them there earlier. I also don't think it
- 21 matters.
- Q. Why don't you think it matters?
- 23 A. Because you -- because I leave keys on the
- 24 counter does not mean you have permission to take
- 25 the car.

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1	DISTRICT COURT
2	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
3	TIMITE TO CODCE TO A STATE AND THE
4	EMILIA GARCIA, individually,
5	Plaintiff, No. A637772
6	VS.
7 8	JARED AWERBACH, individually; ANDREA AWERBACH, individually; DOES I-X, and ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive,
9	Defendants.
10	~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
11	VIDEOTAPED AND VIDEOCONFERENCE DEPOSITION OF
12	TERESA MERAZ
13	
14	January 8, 2015
15	2:17 p.m.
16	
17	11811 Tatum Boulevard
18	Phoenix, Arizona
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	JOB NO.: 230760
25	Talia Douglas, RPR, CR No. 50775

TERESA MERAZ - 01/08/2015

```
Page 2
                      APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
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 5
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 9
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          andrew.green@knchlaw.com
24
                    Brent Jensen, Videographer
25
     ALSO PRESENT:
```

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Page 15 Because my follow-up MR. SMITH: 1 No. question is going to be, is that your usual practice, and 2 that's the same question I'm asking right now --3 MR. KERWIN: I would let her answer that --4 MR. SMITH: -- and that is a proper 5 foundation question. 6 7 MR. KERWIN: I would let her answer that follow-up question if you frame it my way. 8 9 BY MR. SMITH: Did you speak with Andrea or Jared Awerbach about 10 the January 2nd, 2011 accident? 11 12 Α. Yes. What was your process for documenting the 13 Q. conversations you had with Jared and Andrea Awerbach about 14 the January 2nd, 2011 accident? 15 16 What do you mean my process? I'm going to go back to the same question that I 17 Q. 18 asked before. When you speak with people about a claim, do 19 you have a regular procedure that you use for documenting 20 the conversation? 21 22 My notes -- my notes reflect an accurate account Α. 23 of the conversation. You write down what was said during the 24 conversation, right? 25

> Litigation Services | 1.800.330.1112 www.litigationservices.com

ELECTRONICALLY SERVED 10/20/2014 01:43:13 PM

		10/20/2014 01:43:13 PM						
	1	RSP PETER MAZZEO, ESQ.						
	2	Nevada Bar No. 9387						
	સ	BARRON & PRUITT, LLP 3890 West Ann Road						
		North Las Vegas, Nevada 89031-4416 Telephone: (702) 870-3940						
	4	Facsimile: (702) 870-3950						
	5	E-Mail: <u>pmazzeo@lvnvlaw.com</u> Attorney for Defendant Andrea Awerbach						
	6.	DISTRICT COURT						
	7	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA						
	8	EMILIA GARCIA,	Case No:	A-11-637772-C				
	9	Plaintiff,	Dept No:	XXVII				
	10	vs.		NT ANDREA AWERBACH'S				
	11	JARED AWERBACH, individually,		ION TO HER RESPONSES LIFF'S FIRST SET OF				
<u>д</u>	12	ANDREA AWERBACH, individually, DOES I-X, and ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive,		S FOR ADMISSION				
, LL.	13	Defendants.						
JITT LAW ROAD EVADA 870-39-370-3953	14							
& PRI NEYS AJ SST ANN EGAS, NI NE (702)	15	Defendant Andrea Awerbach by and through her attorneys, BARRON & PRUITT, LLP, and						
ON ATTOR	16	pursuant to Rule 36 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure answer Plaintiff's First Set of Requests						
SARR SNORTH TE FF	17	for Admission as follows::						
	18	REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2:						
	19	Admit Jared Awerbach was operating your v	vehicle on Janu	ary 2, 2011, with your permission.				
	20	RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION	NO. 2:	•]				
	21	Andrea admits she learned after the accident	that Jared Aw	erbach had operated her vehicle on				
	22	January 2, 2011 but Andrea denies she gave him per	rmission,					
	23	DATED this 20 th day of October 2014.						
	24	BARR	ON & TRUIT	T, LLP				
	25	h						
	26	प्रसम्बद	MAZZEQE	089				
	27	Nevada	a Bar No. 938; Vest Ann Road	7				
	28	North 1	Las Vegas, Ne	vada 89031-4416 ant Andrea Awerbach				
6	27.62	1 of	`2					

627.62

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2 of 2

Electronically Filed 02/25/2015 03:43:40 PM

ORDR

CLERK OF THE COURT

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DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

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EMILIA GARCIA,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO: A-11-637772 DEPARTMENT 27

ANDREA AWERBACH and JARED AWERBACH

7023661404

Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE ANDREA AWERBACH'S ANSWER: GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE; AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTS

These matters having come on for hearing before Judge Allf on the 15th day of January, 2015; Adam Smith appearing on behalf of Plaintiff Emilia Garcia, (hereinafter "Plaintiff" OR "Emilia"); Peter Mazzeo, Esq., and Danielle Kolkoski, Esq. appearing for and on behalf of Defendant Andrea Awerbach (hereinafter "Andrea") and Roger Strassberg, Esq. and Lily Richardson, Esq. appearing for and on behalf of Defendant Jared Awerbach (hereinafter "Jared") and the Court having heard arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises:

COURT FINDS after review the Court ruled from the bench on some of the matters before the Court. The Court granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that Defendant Jared Awerbach was Per Se Impaired Pursuant to NRS 484C.110(3) and denied Defendant Jared's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Claims for Punitive Damages. The Court granted Defendant Andrea's Motion to Continue Trial, as well as Defendant Jared's Joinder, and set the case on the trial stack

beginning April 6, 2015. The Court also ordered the parties to participate in a settlement conference on February 19, 2015; based on the minute order entered by the settlement judge, all parties participated in good faith.

COURT FURTHER FINDS after review the Court took Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant Andrea Awerbach's Answer under submission on January 15, 2015. Plaintiff moves to strike Defendant Andrea's answer under NRCP 37(b)(C) for conduct in discovery relating to concealment of an entry on her insurance claim log. COURT FURTHER FINDS after review that striking the answer in inappropriate because Plaintiff became aware of the concealed entry during discovery and was able to conduct a deposition of the claims adjustor, but a lesser sanction is warranted. COURT FURTHER FINDS after review Andrea gave her son permission to use the car and a finding of permissive use is appropriate because the claims note was concealed improperly, was relevant, and was willfully withheld by Defendant Andrea.

to Show Cause why Defendant Jared Awerbach Should Not be Held in Contempt for Violating the Court's Protective Order. Plaintiff seeks a recovery of attorneys' fees relating to Defendant Jared's violation of the Discovery Commissioner's Report and Recommendations (DCR&R) of August 26, 2014 that limited Defendant Jared's subpoenas to spinal injuries claimed from this accident. COURT FURTHER FINDS after review that Defendant Jared did not notify the recipients of the subpoenas of the limitations in the DCR&R and received information outside of the limited scope. Defendant Jared produced the protected documents in a NRCP 16.1 supplement on November 3, 2014. COURT FURTHER FINDS after review that Defendant Jared

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should be held in contempt for not complying with the August 26, 2014 DCR&R and Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys' fees in the amount of \$5,000.

COURT FURTHER FINDS after review Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike 1) December 5, 2014 Supplemental Report of Defendants' Expert Witness Dr. Gregory Brown; 2) December 5, 2014 Supplement of Dr. Joseph Wu; 3) December 5, 2014 Supplement of Dr. Raymond Kelly; and 4) December 11, 2014 Supplement of Dr. Curtis Poindexter. COURT FURTHER FINDS after review that the Motion should be granted in part and denied in part. As to the Supplemental Report of Dr. Brown, the Court denies the Motion to Strike to remain consistent with the decision of the Court on December 30, 2014. The Court held that the scope of the experts' testimony will be determined at the time of trial and experts can consider the opinions of other in their opinions, but they are foundational only and the Court will not allow cumulative evidence. As to the Supplements of Drs. Wu and Kelly, the Court grants the Motion to Strike because after the Court struck Defendant Jared's experts on November 18, 2014, he did not redesignate either Dr. Wu or Dr. Kelly. Because neither Dr. Wu nor Dr. Kelly is an expert witness, their supplemental reports are stricken as well. As to Dr. Poindexter, the Court grants the Motion to Strike as to the billing records because they were not timely disclosed. Dr. Poindexter is limited to opinions set forth at the time of the expert disclosure deadline. To remain consistent with previous rulings, Dr. Poindexter is allowed to consider the opinions of others as part of his opinion, but they are foundational

COURT ORDERS for good cause appearing and after review the Motion to Strike Defendant Andrea Awerbach's Answer is DENTED, but a sanction of a finding of permissive use is GRANTED.

COURT FURTHER ORDERS for good cause appearing and after review the Motion for Order to Show Cause why Defendant Jared Awerbach Should Not be Held in Contempt is GRANTED.

COURT FURTHER ORDERS for good cause appearing and after review Plaintiff's Motion to Strike is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; DENIED as to Dr. Brown's Supplemental Report, GRANTED as to Drs. Wu and Kelly Supplemental Reports, and GRANTED as to the billing analysis in Dr. Poindexter's Supplement Report only.

Dated: February 24, 2015

NANCY ALLF

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on or about the date signed I caused the foregoing document to be electronically served pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a) and 8.05(f), through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system, with the date and time of the electronic service substituted for the date and place of deposit in the mail and/or by Fax transmission to:

Glen J. Lerner & Associates - Adam D. Smith, Esq. - asmith@glenlerner.com FAX: 702-933-7043

Mazzeo Law, LLC - Peter Mazzeo, Esq. - pmazzeo@mazzeolawfirm.com FAX: 702-589-9829

Resnick & Louis, P.C. – Roger Strassburg, Esq. – <u>rstrassburg@rlattorneys.com</u> FAX: 702-997-3800

Karen Lawrence

Judicial Executive Assistant

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DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

EMILIA GARCIA,

Plaintiff,

ANDREA AWERBACH and JARED **AWERBACH**

Defendants.

CASE NO: A-11-637772

DEPARTMENT 27

DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT ANDREA AWERBACH'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM FINAL COURT ORDER

This matter having come on for hearing before Judge Allf on the 15th day of April, 2015; Adam Smith appearing on behalf of Plaintiff Emilia Garcia, (hereinafter "Plaintiff" OR "Emilia") and Peter Mazzeo, Esq. appearing for and on behalf of Defendant Andrea Awerbach (hereinafter "Andrea"), and the Court having heard argument of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises:

COURT FINDS after review that in its February 25, 2015 Decision and Order, the Court denied Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant Andrea's Answer. However the Court did enter a lesser sanction under NRCP 37(c), finding there was permissive use of Defendant Andrea's vehicle because "the claims note was concealed improperly, was relevant, and was willfully withheld by Defendant Andrea."

RT COURT FURTHER FINDS after review Defendant Andrea filed a Motion for S Relief from Final Court Order on March 13, 2015 under NRCP 60(b) and EDCR 2.24. Under NRCP 60(b), a moving party can be relieved from an order for "(1) mistake, Badvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due

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diligence could not have been discovered in time" It is the moving party's burden to show there was a mistake on the part of the court or there is newly discovered evidence relevant to the previous order. Pursuant to EDCR 2.24, the motion for reconsideration must be filed within 10 days after written notice of the order; here the Notice of Entry of Order was filed on February 27, 2015 and the Motion for Relief was timely filed.

COURT FURTHER FINDS after review Defendant Andrea's Motion for Relief does not cite to any newly discovered evidence. Instead, Defendant Andrea's Motion argues, without citation to case law, that the Court cannot issue a sanction under NRCP 37(c) unless Plaintiff first moves for a Motion to Compel under NRCP 37(a). Here, however, where Plaintiff discovered the concealed claims note without court intervention, to argue that no sanctions could be entered without an order would have the effect of condoning Defendant Andrea's concealment of a relevant and discoverable claim note.

COURT FURTHER FINDS after review that although NRCP 37(b) requires a finding that a party failed to comply with a court order, NRCP 37(c) allows the Court to impose an "appropriate sanction" from those allowed under NRCP 37(b)(2), including "(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting that party from introducing designated matters in evidence." The plain language of NRCP 37(c) does not require violation of a previous order, and all case law cited in the reply stems from NRCP 37(b) and the requirement in the language of the rule that a party violate the court order before sanctions may be issued.

COURT FURTHER FINDS after review the Nevada Supreme Court has addressed the court's ability to issue sanctions.

[C]ourts have 'inherent equitable powers to dismiss actions or enter default judgments for ... abusive litigation practices.' Litigants and

attorneys alike should be aware that these powers may permit sanctions for discovery and other litigation abuses not specifically proscribed by statute.

Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Bldg., Inc., 106 Nev. 88, 92, 787 P.2d 777, 779 (1990) (internal citations omitted). "Non-case concluding sanctions for discovery sanctions do not have to be preceded by other less severe sanctions." <u>Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.</u>, 126 Nev. Adv. Op. 26, 235 P.3d 592 (2010). Here, the finding of permissive use does not conclude the case.

COURT FURTHER FINDS after review Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Bldg. directs a court to a non-exhaustive list of pertinent factors for severe discovery sanctions, specifically dismissal with prejudice. The court must thoughtfully consider the following factors:

the degree of willfulness of the offending party, the extent to which the non-offending party would be prejudiced by a lesser sanction, the severity of the sanction of dismissal relative to the severity of the discovery abuse, whether any evidence has been irreparably lost, the feasibility and fairness of alternative, less severe sanctions, such as an order deeming facts relating to improperly withheld or destroyed evidence to be admitted by the offending party, the policy favoring adjudication on the merits, whether sanctions unfairly operate to penalize a party for the misconduct of his or her attorney, and the need to deter both the parties and future litigants from similar abuses.

Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Bldg., Inc., 106 Nev. 88, 93, 787 P.2d 777, 780 (1990).

COURT FURTHER FINDS after review that here the Court did consider the Ribeiro factors and did enter the less severe sanction of finding there was permissive use rather than striking Defendant Andrea's answer as requested by Plaintiff's Motion. The finding of permissive use specifically relates to the content of the improperly withheld claims note, which included a statement by Defendant Andrea that she had given Defendant Jared permission to use her car at the time of the accident. The finding of permissive use does not prevent adjudication on the merits because Plaintiff still

maintains the burden of showing causation and damages. The withholding of the note and the misleading privilege log was willful, and sanctions are necessary to "deter the both the parties and future litigants from similar abuses." <u>Id.</u> Although the note was withheld by previous counsel, Defendant Andrea's deposition testimony at both of her depositions was contrary to her statement to her insurance carrier. The sanction was crafted to provide a fair result to both parties, given the severity of the issue.

her burden under NRCP 60(b) for relief from a final order. Defendant Andrea has not provided any evidence that would change the court's February 25, 2015 order. Defendant has also failed to show there was a mistake of law because <u>Ribeiro</u> and <u>Bahena</u> hold that a court has the equitable power to enter sanctions and not require a lesser sanction to issue or a party to violate a specific discovery order.

COURT FURTHER ORDERS for good cause appearing and after review Defendant Andrea's Motion for Relief from Final Court order is DENIED.

Dated: April 22, 2015.

NANCY ALLE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on or about the date signed I caused the foregoing document to be electronically served pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a) and 8.05(f), through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system, with the date and time of the electronic service substituted for the date and place of deposit in the mail and/or by Fax transmission to:

Glen J. Lerner & Associates - Adam D. Smith, Esq. – asmith@glenlerner.com FAX: 702-933-7043

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Karen Lawrence

Judicial Executive Assistant

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1	CASE NO. A-11-637772-C
2	DEPT. NO. 30
3	DOCKET U
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5	DISTRICT COURT
6	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
7	* * * *
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9	EMILIA GARCIA, individually,)
10	Plaintiff,
11	vs.
12	JARED AWERBACH, individually;)
13	ANDREA AWERBACH, individually;) DOES I-X, and ROE CORPORATIONS) I-X, inclusive,
14	Defendants.
15	
16	
17	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
18	OF
19	PROCEEDINGS
20	BEFORE THE HONORABLE JERRY A. WIESE, II
21	DEPARTMENT XXX
22	DATED TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 2015
23	
24	REPORTED BY: KRISTY L. CLARK, RPR, NV CCR #708, CA CSR #13529
25	CA COL WIDDED

1	APPEARANCES:
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15	- AND -
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18	Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113
19	(702) 408–3800
20 21	
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EDCR 2.21A, which requires affidavits. In weighing and balancing, the preponderance of the evidence clearly favors the defense in this case.

Now, another possible legal test that you — you might use — and the supreme court really hasn't given any of us much guidance as to how to apply that, the Millen test — is the weighing and balancing of Texas versus Burdine, that standard test developed in the Title VII litigation, age discrimination, a lot of discrimination—type cases where plaintiffs state a prima facie case. We say that the plaintiff hasn't even produced the necessary factual basis for — for that.

But the -- but Burdine test says plaintiff states prima facie case burden of production shifts to the defense to articulate a nonimproper reason for the complained of action, which we have done here, and then the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the reason given is pretext. That showing hasn't been made either. So under either test, the straight preponderance of the evidence test or the Burdine, the -- your verdict should be -- or, I'm sorry, your decision should be for the defense in this matter.

I'd also draw your attention to the question

EXHIBIT 12

EXHIBIT 12

1	CASE NO. A-11-637772-C
2	DEPT. NO. 30
3	DOCKET U
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5	DISTRICT COURT
6	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
7	* * * *
8	
9	EMILIA GARCIA, individually,)
10	Plaintiff,
11	vs.
12	JARED AWERBACH, individually;) ANDREA AWERBACH, individually;)
13	DOES I-X, and ROE CORPORATIONS) I-X, inclusive,
14	Defendants.
15	
16	
17	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
18	OF'
19	PROCEEDINGS
20	BEFORE THE HONORABLE JERRY A. WIESE, II
21	DEPARTMENT XXX
22	DATED MONDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 2016
23	
24	REPORTED BY: KRISTY L. CLARK, RPR, NV CCR #708, CA CSR #13529
25	CE COL HECKS

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23	
24	* * * * *
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Internet, or radio. You are not to conduct any 1 research on your own, which means you cannot talk with 2 others, Tweet others, text others, Google issues, or conduct any other kind of book or computer research with regard to any issue, party, witness, or attorney involved in this case. You're not to form or express any opinion on any subject connected with this trial 7 until the case is finally submitted to you. 8 We'll see you back at 1:00 o'clock. 9 (The following proceedings were held 10 outside the presence of the jury.) 11 THE COURT: All right. We're outside the 12 presence of the jury. 13 Anything we need to put on the record yet? 14 Nothing from us, Your Honor. MR. ROBERTS: 15 Your Honor, just, do you have 16 MR. MAZZEO: a -- something other than this lecturn? Do you have a **17** smaller portable lectern because I know this is kind of 18 grounded here with the wires and --19 It swivels. THE COURT: 20 It does. MR. MAZZEO: It does? It turns? 21 Well, that may work. 22 Okav. THE COURT: Okay. 23 About how much longer do you 24 MR. ROBERTS: think you have with your part, Judge? Not exact, but 25

just --

THE COURT: Probably half an hour.

MR. ROBERTS: Very good.

THE COURT: Okay? All right. Off the

record. See you back at 1:00.

(Whereupon a lunch recess was taken.)

THE COURT: Go back on the record, Case

No. A637772. We're outside the presence of the jury.

I know that one of the things that you guys wanted me
to tell you how we're going to handle is this issue of
permissive use. So I talked to Judge Allf this morning
to try to figure out what was her intention when she
entered that order.

I don't think she understood the difference between permissive use and auto negligent entrustment. That being said, it was her intention that her ruling would result in a rebuttable presumption, not a determination as a matter of law, even though that's what the order says.

I'm not going to change from permissive use to negligent entrustment, even though I think that's probably what she envisioned. But I am going to make it a rebuttal presumption as it relates to the permissive use. So — and that's based upon what her intention was.

1 So what that means is I need both of you to propose an instruction dealing with the rebuttal presumption on permissive use. Because it's a rebuttal presumption, the defense gets to put on whatever evidence you have to try to rebut it. Okay? I know 5 that's not what everybody has prepared for. 6 7 MR. MAZZEO: No, but ... It's -- I think it's the only 8 THE COURT: thing I can do to try to -- to try to move forward the trial with the orders that are in place based on the 10 intention of the judge that issued those orders. 11 Doesn't make either of you happy; right? 12 MR. MAZZEO: Well, no, it makes the defense 13 It's not --14 somewhat happy. MR. STRASSBURG: Doesn't make me happy, 15 Judge. 16 THE COURT: 17 Okay. 18 MR. MAZZEO: But --19 THE COURT: Sorry. MR. MAZZEO: But it does throw a wrench in 20 the works because we didn't anticipate as -- as we're 21 preparing for trial, I'm sure both sides were not looking at this case in terms of, okay, what evidence 23 do we need now to rebut the ruling on permissive use so 24 that we can fight both the joint liability, 41.440, and 25

negligent entrustment. So wow. The good thing is we'll be doing jury 2 selection today and tomorrow, and I don't anticipate getting to openings until Wednesday, but it may create a little ---THE COURT: That gives you time. 6 MR. MAZZEO: It gives us some time, you know. 7 MR. ROBERTS: Look, Judge, I have to -- to 8 say that --THE COURT: I know. 10 MR. ROBERTS: -- I'm somewhat taken aback by 11 this. We weren't there at the time. So I've been 12 mainly relying on the order in preparing to try the case. The order says nothing about rebuttable 14 presumption. It says that permissive use is found as 15 matter of law as a sanction. 17 THE COURT: I know. MR. ROBERTS: There's no rebuttal 18 presumption. The file and the admissions that were 19 made were made to an insurance adjustor. The insurance adjustor was excluded as a witness because permissive 21 22 use has already been found as a matter of law. would have moved to reopen discovery. Now, we have the burden -- I know it's not 24 really our burden, but now we have to be prepared to 25

put on evidence of permissive use when we have planned for trial and governed our discovery attempts and not asked for additional discovery after the claims file was produced outside of discovery period.

THE COURT: If you want to bring the adjustor, I'm going to allow you to bring them.

MR. MAZZEO: Well, maybe over objection.

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THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MAZZEO: -- lot to digest right now in three minutes.

THE COURT: I know.

MR. MAZZEO: And — and also, if you don't mind me jumping in, but — but also, I'm also still considering thinking about not fighting liability. So it's just — it's something that's rolling around in my brain that if we don't contest it, then we still need a an instruction from the Court, because we certainly have to defend punitive damages. You received our trial brief and my argument last week as far as we have to — that — that — and I'm sure after speaking with Judge Allf, you asked her about — or you confirmed there was a discovery sanction, so it had nothing to do with the circumstances by which Andrea might have given permission to Jared to use the vehicle. Facts of the

EXHIBIT 13

EXHIBIT 13

Page 1 of 13

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I. INTRODUCTION

On the first day of jury selection, this Court drastically modified two sanction orders issued by Judge Allf one year ago that conclusively establish permissive use. The last minute reversal was based on a conversation the Court had with Judge Allf wherein she conveyed her recollection that her initial written decision was not intended to establish permissive use, but instead was only intended to establish a rebuttable presumption of permissive use. Contrary to Judge Allf's recollection, two months after entering her original order finding that a finding of permissive use would be appropriate, she clarified her intentions by entering a second order affirming her finding of permissive use as a matter of law. She discussed the issues remaining for trial. The remaining issues did not include permissive use in any way, shape or form.

Judge Allf's recollection as to her intentions when issuing an order one year ago is conclusively rebutted by not only the language of the original order, but by her second order affirming the first: "[T]he Court did consider the Ribeiro factors and did enter the less severe sanction of finding there was permissive use" and "[t]he finding of permissive use does not prevent adjudication on the merits because Plaintiff still maintains the burden of showing causation and damages." The entire purpose of Judge Allf's orders was to preclude Andrea from disputing permission at trial because Andrea concealed critical evidence pertaining to permission, thereby preventing Emilia from adequately investigating the issue during discovery, and thereafter provided fabricated testimony on two occasions while apparently believing the concealed evidence would never see the light of day. The orders were always intended to be a punitive sanction and were there is nothing on the face of the written orders that would indicate a rebuttable presumption was intended by the Court. Judge Allf's orders, on their face, contemplate Andrea would be precluded from disputing permissive use at trial (the orders were drafted by Judge Allf, not counsel).

Judge Allf has no proper ability or power to change her written orders or influence this court to modify her orders once she recused herself in August, 2015. The law is abundantly clear that a judge must not substantively influence a case after her recusal. Once Judge Allf voluntarily recused

Page 2 of 13

herself from the case, her involvement ended and any influence by her was improper and constitutes reversible error.

Finally, and of great significance, Andrea has conclusively admitted permissive use on two prior occasions: First, in her Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint she admitted permissive use, only to recant the admission in her Answer to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Second, in her responses to Plaintiff's requests for admissions Andrea again admitted permissive use. This second admission is binding in the absence of the court affirmatively relieving her of the admission. No relief has been sought or granted. Indeed, all of the parties likely assumed this issue was moot in light of the conclusive finding of permissive use by Judge Allf. If this Court's expressed intent to modify Judge Allf's order is formally adopted as a written order, the admission becomes dispositive.

Andrea later attempted to change her position in these responses, almost one and a half years later and only after obtaining new counsel. Amended responses were served, but without leave of Court and without compliance with NRCP 36(b). Andrea's admission conclusively establishes permissive use.

Regardless of Judge Allf's orders, Andrea must be precluded from disputing permissive use at trial. For these reasons and the reasons set forth more fully below, Plaintiff requests that this Court preclude Andrea from disputing permissive use at trial.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. ANDREA'S ANSWER TO EMILIA'S COMPLAINT ADMITTING PERMISSIVE USE.

This accident occurred on January 2, 2011. Emilia initiated the lawsuit on March 25, 2011. Defendants answered Emilia's Complaint on January 23, 2012, and, of great significance, admitted that "Defendant ANDREA AWERBACH, did entrust the vehicle to the control of Defendant JARED AWERBACH." See Plaintiff's Complaint (3/25/11), paragraph 23, on file with this Court; Defendants' Answer to Complaint, paragraph 2, on file with this Court. One year later, in response to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Andrea conveniently flipped her answer on this critical issue.

B. ANDREA'S ANSWER TO EMILIA'S REQUEST FOR ADMISSION.

On June 5, 2012, Andrea answered Emilia's requests for admissions and unequivocally admitted that Jared operated her vehicle on January 2, 2011 with her permission. Specifically:

REQUEST NO. 2:

Admit JARED AWEBACH was operating your vehicle on January 2, 2011, with your permission.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 2:

Admit.

Ex. 1-A.

C. ANDREA ACTIVELY CONCEALED EVIDENCE IN THE FORM OF A CLAIMS NOTE.

On July 22, 2013, after Emilia filed a motion to compel, Andrea produced what appeared to be the complete claims notes from her claim with Liberty Mutual in a pleading styled Second Supplement to List of Witnesses and Documents And Tangible Items Produced At Early Case Conference. *See* Mot. to Strike, at Ex. 1-G. What Andrea did not tell Emilia was that one of the notes dated January 17, 2011, at 4:44 p.m., had been secretly redacted making it appear as if that note never existed. In fact, Andrea furthered the ruse by producing a misleading disclosure and privilege log that further concealed the existence of the 4:44 p.m. note. Specifically, Andrea's disclosure indicated that "Adjustor's Claims Notes between January 2-17, 2011 (Bates Labels LM001-LM006; LM019-027)" were disclosed, and only "notes after January 17, 2011, [were being] withheld (Bates labels LM007-018)." *Id.* Indeed, Andrea's privilege log indicated she was only claiming a privilege for claims notes dated "January 18, 2011, et seq.", i.e., notes dated on or after January 18, 2011. It is now obvious this was misleading because the January 17, 2011, note from 4:44 p.m. was not contained in the disclosure or identified on the privilege log. Instead, that note was whited-out, making it appear as if the note never existed. It was surreptitiously redacted.

D. ANDREA FURTHERED THE CONCEALMENT THROUGH HER DEPOSITION TESTIMONY.

Emilia first deposed Andrea on September 12, 2013, approximately two months after Andrea served Emilia with the whited-out claims note. During the deposition, Andrea testified inconsistently with the whited-out claims note, which, of course, had not yet been uncovered by Emilia's counsel. Andrea also admitted speaking with her insurer following the accident, but claimed ignorance whether the conversation was recorded or when the conversations occurred.

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In fact, Andrea furthered the ruse shortly after her first deposition by filing a Motion for Summary Judgment claiming it was undisputed she did not give Jared permission to drive her car on January 2, 2011. See Defendant Andrea Awerbach's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, on file with this Court. Again, this motion was made while Andrea was actively concealing evidence that contradicted her motion. Andrea ultimately withdrew her Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Andrea was deposed again on October 24, 2014, and again testified extensively to material information that clearly contradicted the claims note, which, at that point, had still not yet been uncovered by Emilia's counsel. As detailed below, the withheld information did not come to light until Emilia independently obtained it from Andrea's insurer.

E. THE HIDDEN CLAIMS NOTE, WHICH WAS UNCOVERED ONLY THROUGH THE DILIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL, CONTRADICTED ANDREA'S DEPOSITION TESTIMONY.

Emilia discovered the concealed claims note on November 10, 2014, when Andrea's insurer, Liberty Mutual, produced the note in response to Emilia's subpoena duces tecum. The Liberty Mutual adjustor who created the note subsequently testified to the note's authenticity and confirmed the note accurately memorialized the adjustor's January 17, 2011, conversation with Andrea.

The contents of the concealed note contradict Andrea's adamant testimony at both of her depositions, wherein she vehemently claimed (i) that she constantly hid her keys for fear that her drug abusing son might have access to the car, (ii) that she never gave Jared permission to drive her vehicle, and (iii) that she had no idea how Jared obtained the keys on the day of the crash. The surreptitiously concealed portions of the claims note establish that Andrea told her insurer days after the crash that she had previously let Jared drive her car, she gave him the keys earlier in the day, and she usually kept the keys on the mantle. Amazingly, when Andrea was asked under oath about Jared claiming Andrea left the keys out, Andrea claimed her son was mistaken. It is clear, however, that Andrea was changing her story and trying to cover for herself once she understood the legal ramifications of permissive use.

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F. ANDREA IMPROPERLY AMENDS HER DISCOVERY RESPONSE.

Conveniently, almost eighteen months after Andrea admitted in her Responses to Plaintiff's Requests for Admissions that she gave Jared permission to use her vehicle on January 2, 2011, and only after Andrea changed counsel, Andrea attempted to improperly modify the aforementioned response, without leave of court, to state that "Andrea admits she learned after the accident that Jared Awerbach had operated her vehicle on January 2, 2011 but Andrea denies she gave him permission."

This improper and ineffective attempt to amend was of no concern to Emilia. The issue was rendered most shortly thereafter as a result of Judge Allf entering the finding of permissive use based on Andrea's discovery sanctions, as set forth below.

G. JUDGE ALLF UNAMBIGUOUSLY MADE A CONCLUSIVE FINDING OF PERMISSIVE USE IN TWO SEPARATE ORDERS.

On December 2, 2014, Emilia filed a motion to strike Andrea's answer based on Andrea's intentional concealment of the claims note. *See* Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Andrea Awerbach's Answer, on file with this Court. On February 25, 2015, Judge Allf granted Emilia's motion in part and issued a written decision (drafted by Judge Allf, not counsel) providing in relevant part:

COURT FURTHER FINDS after review the Court took Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendant Andrea Awerbach's Answer under submission on January 15, 2015. Plaintiff moves to strike Defendant Andrea's answer under NRCP 37(b)(C) for conduct in discovery relating to concealment of an entry on her insurance claim log. COURT FURTHER FINDS after review that striking the answer in [sic] inappropriate because Plaintiff became aware of the concealed entry during discovery and was able to conduct a deposition of the claims adjustor, but a lesser sanction is warranted. COURT FURTHER FINDS after review Andrea gave her son permission to use the car and a finding of permissive use is appropriate because the claims note was concealed improperly, was relevant, and was willfully withheld by Defendant Andrea.

See Decision and Order, filed with this Court February 25, 2015 (emphasis added). On March 13, 2015, Andrea filed a motion seeking reconsideration of the Court's order. The Court denied Andrea's motion and issued a second written decision, again drafted by Judge Allf, not counsel:

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COURT FURTHER FINDS after review that here the Court did consider the Ribeiro factors and did enter the less severe sanction of finding there was permissive use rather than striking Defendant Andrea's answer as requested by Plaintiff's Motion. The finding of permissive use specifically relates to the content of the improperly withheld claims note, which included a statement by Defendant Andrea that she had given Defendant Jared permission to use her car at the time of the accident. The finding of permissive use does not prevent adjudication on the merits because Plaintiff still maintains the burden of showing causation and damages. The withholding of the note and the misleading privilege log was willful, and sanctions are necessary to "deter the both the parties and future litigants from similar abuses." Id. Although the note was withheld by previous counsel, Defendant Andrea's deposition testimony at both of her depositions was contrary to her statement to her insurance carrier. The sanction was crafted to provide a fair result to both parties, given the severity of the issue.

See Decision and Order, filed with this Court April 27, 2015 (emphasis added).

Neither of Judge Allf's two written orders is ambiguous, and neither mentions a rebuttable presumption. Moreover, even if the first order was ambiguous, it was unmistakably clarified through Judge Allf's second order denying reconsideration. The parties relied on Judge Allf's orders for the next year and prepared for trial believing the issue of permissive use was resolved and no longer an issue for trial. This governed the totality of the parties' trial preparation, including drafting motions in limine and making crucial strategic decisions regarding witnesses, evidence, and trial presentation.

H. JUDGE ALLF RECUSES HERSELF.

On August 27, 2015, Judge Allf recused herself because of a conflict with Jared's newly associated counsel, Randall Tindall. Emilia requested Mr. Tindall be disqualified and the action reassigned to Judge Allf because she was familiar with the case, the action was on the eve of trial, and it was improper for new counsel to be hired knowing his retention would result in recusal based on prior recusals by Judge Allf (i.e., forum shopping). During the September 15, 2015, hearing on Emilia's motion, this Court denied Emilia's request to reassign the case back to Judge Allf, but made it clear: "I'm going to follow what her rulings were." See Sep. 15, 2015, Transcript.

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I. This Court reverses Judge Allf's orders on permissive use on the first day of Jury Selection.

On February 8, 2016, one year after Judge Allf issued her sanction order, ten months after she reaffirmed that order, six months after Judge Allf recused herself from the action, and a half day into jury selection, this Court overruled both of Judge Allf's permissive use orders, *sua sponte*, with no notice to the parties:

THE COURT: ... We're outside the presence of the jury. I know that one of the things that you guys wanted me to tell you how we're going to handle is this issue of permissive use. So I talked to Judge Allf this morning to try to figure out what was her intention when she entered that order. I don't think she understood the difference between permissive use and auto negligent entrustment. That being said, it was her intention that her ruling would result in a rebuttable presumption, not a determination as a matter of law, even though that's what the order says. I'm not going to change from permissive use to negligent entrustment, even though I think that's probably what she envisioned. But I am going to make it a rebuttal presumption as it relates to the permissive use. So -- and that's based upon what her intention was.

Feb. 8, 2016, at 61 (emphasis added). The reversal was based upon a discussion with Judge Allf (who long ago recused herself due to a conflict and should no longer be influencing the rulings of this court). Moreover, it is without dispute that the Court's decision contradicts the plain language of both of the orders drafted by Judge Allf:

MR. ROBERTS: -- I'm somewhat taken aback by this. We weren't there at the time. So I've been mainly relying on the order in preparing to try the case. The order says nothing about rebuttable presumption. It says that permissive use is found as matter of law as a sanction.

THE COURT: I know.

Feb. 8, 2016, at 63.

Even Andrea's counsel (the primary beneficiary of the reversal) recognized the parties' inability to anticipate a reversal of the permissive use order in preparing for trial:

MR. MAZZEO: But it does throw a wrench in the works because we didn't anticipate as -- as we're preparing for trial, I'm sure both sides were not looking at this case in terms of, okay, what evidence do we need now to rebut the ruling on permissive use

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Feb. 8, 2016, 62-63.

III. ARGUMENT

A. A RECUSED JUDGE MUST NOT HAVE ANY INFLUENCE ON A CASE AFTER RECUSAL.

"Patently a judge who is disqualified from acting must not be able to affect the determination of any case from which he is barred." *Arnold v. E. Air Lines*, 712 F.2d 899, 904 (4th Cir. 1983); *see also Doe v. Louisiana Supreme Court*, 1991 WL 121211 (E.D. La. June 24, 1991). "[C]ourts have almost uniformly held that a trial judge who has recused himself should take no other action in the case except the necessary ministerial acts to have the case transferred to another judge." *Doddy v. Oxy USA, Inc.*, 101 F.3d 448, 457 (5th Cir. 1996); *see also Stringer v. United States*, 233 F.2d 947, 948 (9th Cir. 1956) (acknowledging that after disqualification, judges are confined to performing only the "mechanical duties of transferring the case to another judge or other essential ministerial duties short of adjudication"); *Moody v. Simmons*, 858 F.2d 137, 143 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that once a judge has disqualified herself, she may only perform the ministerial duties necessary to transfer the case to another judge any may not enter any further orders in the case, except for "housekeeping" ones), *cert. denied*, 489 U.S. 1078, (1989); *El Fenix de P.R. v. The MIY Johanny*, 36 F.3d 136, 142 (1st Cir. 1994) ("recused judge should take no further action except to enable administrative reassignment of the case").

Once Judge Allf made the decision to disqualify herself, she was not permitted to have any influence on this case. Her recusal ended her involvement and any further influence by Judge Allf that caused this court to *modify* her prior orders was improper and constitutes reversible error. Moreover, as set forth in more detail below, Judge Allf's recollection as to her intention when initially entering the permissive use order one year ago is conclusively rebutted by her second order on permissive use. A Judge's belated recollection of her intention cannot prevail over the plain terms of her written order. This is a formula for anarchy, uncertainty and loss of faith in the integrity of the judicial system.

B. THE COURT'S DECISION REWARDS ANDREA'S IMPROPER DISCOVERY TACTICS.

Courts have recognized that "[p]rior interlocutory orders should be vacated or amended by a successor judge only after careful consideration, especially if there is evidence of judge shopping."

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Legget v. Kumar, 212 Ill. App. 3d 255, 274 (Ill. 1991). "In the context of discovery, it is particularly appropriate for a judge before whom a motion for reconsideration is pending to exercise considerable restraint in reversing or modifying previous rulings. A successor judge should revise or modify previous discovery rulings only if there is a change of circumstances or additional facts which would warrant such action." Id. In other words, it is improper to reverse an order the parties "justifiably relied upon . . . for over a year . . . as they prepared the case for trial." Franklin v. Franklin, 858 So. 2d 110, 122 (Miss. 2003) (Mississippi Supreme Court overturning trial court's order that reversed the original trial court's ruling since the original ruling was made within the judge's discretion and the "lawyers justifiably relied upon th[e] order for over a year . . . as they prepared the case for trial"; and further finding that the reversal of the original trial court's ruling "reache[d] an inequitable result"). This case is no different.

The Court's decision to overturn Judge Allf's long standing orders rewards the intentional concealment of evidence and unfairly prejudices Emilia. Permissive use has been established three times in this case and has now been changed (or attempted to be changed) each time:

First, Andrea admitted permissive use in her Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint, only to later switch positions and claim the complete opposite in her Answer to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.

Second, Andrea admitted permissive use in her responses to Plaintiff's requests for admissions, again only to later switch positions almost one and a half years later, and after retaining new counsel, to claim no permissive use. Of great significance, however, Andrea's attempted "amendment" of her binding admission fails as a matter of law as "[a]ny matter admitted under [Rule 36] is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission." NRCP 36(b) (emphasis added). Since Andrea admitted permissive use and never filed a motion to change her admission, Andrea must be bound by the admission, irrespective of any modifications to Judge Allf's long standing orders. It is too late to file a motion now that jury selection has started and trial is imminent.

Finally, Judge Allf conclusively found permissive use based on Andrea's blatant discovery violations and issued two separate orders establishing the permissive use, only to have this court express an intention to reverse the rulings.

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Allowing Andrea to dispute permissive use allows Andrea to continue committing the same conduct that resulted in the Court's sanctions in the first place. By the time Emilia independently found the hidden claims note in late November, 2014, Emilia had already deposed Andrea twice. Each time Andrea's testimony contradicted the hidden claims note and Jared's testimony that he obtained the keys from the counter of their home. In other words, Andrea claimed she did not give Jared permission, hid evidence that showed otherwise, and prevented Emilia from discovering the evidence that directly contradicted her deposition testimony. That was the basis for Judge Allf's sanction orders. Judge Allf's orders preventing Andrea from challenging permissive use at trial entered the only logical sanction that could have been imposed at that point because it was Andrea's concealment and deceptive deposition testimony that prevented Emilia from being able to properly conduct discovery on the issue. It was also a lesser sanction than the one sought by Emilia. Consequently, it would be patently inequitable to allow Andrea to dispute permission after she (1) intentionally concealed critical evidence that would allow Emilia to prove permissive use and (2) admitted permissive in her Answer and responses to requests for admissions. Allowing Andrea to challenge permissive use now gives her the best of both worlds: she is allowed to dispute permission at trial after thwarting Emilia's attempts to prove permissive use by hiding evidence during discovery.

C. EMILIA HAS RELIED ON JUDGE ALLF'S ORDERS IN PREPARING FOR TRIAL.

The Court's intention to reverse Judge Allf's sanction order is also improper because the parties have relied on the order for an entire year. See Franklin, 858 So. 2d at 122. Emilia adjusted her discovery strategy accordingly, and has been preparing for trial for a year in reliance on the Court's order that she would not have to prove permission at trial. In other words, after Judge Allf issued her order and confirmed it in a second order, Emilia no longer needed to seek leave to conduct discovery on the issue, and, as a result, she did not seek to re-open discovery, she did not seek to re-depose Andrea or Jared, and she did not seek testimony from other knowledgeable witnesses. Emilia appropriately relied on the Court's order rendering permissive use a non-issue for trial. Now, after jury selection has started and after the parties spent an enormous amount of time preparing for trial not knowing permissive use was an issue, Emilia's entire trial strategy has

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6385 S. Rainbow Boulevard, Suite 400 Las Vegas, Nevada 89118 Las Vegas, Nevada (702) 938-3838 to be readjusted without the ability to vet evidence that would have been obtainable in discovery. Emilia now has to be prepared to rebut Andrea's testimony regarding permissive use, despite the fact that Andrea's prior deposition testimony is unhelpful because it consists of a string of untruths that misled Emilia throughout years of discovery.

Allowing Emilia to, now, depose the Liberty Mutual adjustor while trial is proceeding is not a compromise, but further inflicts prejudice on Emilia. There is limited time to conduct a discovery deposition during trial, and it would further delay Emilia's day in court and completely upend this Court's schedule to continue trial to allow the deposition. The simple fact is that all parties relied on the Court's order for a year leading up to trial, when additional discovery could have been conducted had the parties known permissive use was an issue. It is highly improper and prejudicial for this Court to reverse Judge Allf's decision, with no notice and on the first day of jury selection, after the parties placed significant reliance on the orders.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Emilia requests that this Court reconsider its decision to modify both of Judge Allf's sanction orders, and refrain from issuing a written order modifying the binding written orders of Judge Allf (which still bind these proceedings until modified by a written order of this Court).

DATED this 10th day of February, 2016.

/s/ Marisa Rodriguez-Shapoval

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 10th day of February, 2016, a true and correct copy of the foregoing **PLAINTIFF'S TRIAL BRIEF REGARDING PERMISSIVE USE** was electronically filed and served on counsel through the Court's electronic service system pursuant to Administrative Order 14-2 and N.E.F.C.R. 9, via the electronic mail addresses noted below, unless service by another method is stated or noted:

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EXHIBIT 14

EXHIBIT 14

1	CASE NO. A-11-637772-C
2	DEPT. NO. 30
3	DOCKET U
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5	DISTRICT COURT
6	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
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9	EMILIA GARCIA, individually,)
10	Plaintiff,
11	vs.
12	JARED AWERBACH, individually;) ANDREA AWERBACH, individually;)
13	DOES I-X, and ROE CORPORATIONS) I-X, inclusive,
14	Defendants.
15)
16	
17	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
18	OF
19	PROCEEDINGS
20	BEFORE THE HONORABLE JERRY A. WIESE, II
21	DEPARTMENT XXX
22	DATED WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2016
23	
24	REPORTED BY: KRISTY L. CLARK, RPR, NV CCR #708, CA CSR #13529
25	

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22 23	
24	* * * * *
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have more people sitting here. 1 MR. TINDALL: That would be dependent upon whether everybody exercises their strikes. 3 THE COURT: 4 Okay. 5 MR. MAZZEO: You still need a starting point with more jurors, then, in the box. 7 MR. TINDALL: And I'm not sure I ever heard Mr. Lee Roberts pass for cause. Did that happen? I didn't -- I never heard that. THE COURT: He passed the jury. I'm guessing 10 he was passing for cause. 11 12 MR. ROBERTS: I think that may have been 13 implied by my action. If something new comes up, 14 something new comes up, but I pass for cause. 15 I -- I agree that things have THE COURT: changed based on my ruling at the beginning of trial. 16 I don't know that it necessarily puts you guys as 17 adverse to each other as you may think. But -- but I 18 also agree with Mr. Roberts's suggestion that it's 19 probably too late. So I'm going to leave it the way it 20 21 is. 22 What else? 23 On our trial brief, Your Honor, MR. ROBERTS: one, we just wanted to make sure we -- we made a 24

complete record and filed the brief. We understand

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that you've told us what your inclination is. But, you know, as -- as I mentioned when you told us this for the first time after lunch on Monday, it's our position that, you know, the supreme court's been pretty clear that a written order is the law of the case and minute orders don't change the written orders and oral pronouncements from the bench don't change the written orders. So we've still got a written order.

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There are some additional things in here that I thought the Court should know about before deciding whether to modify the — the orders of Judge Allf.

One, is that I didn't mention on Monday that there was a motion for reconsideration or clarification, after the first order that I read into the record, and I believe that second order is much more clear that — that a finding of permissive use as a matter of law is being entered.

THE COURT: That's the one you cited on the top of page 7?

MR. ROBERTS: That is — that is correct.

And — and this is what I think is particularly probative to the intent of Judge Allf as reflected in the actual written order she signed. She says, The finding of permissive use does not prevent adjudication on the merits because plaintiff still maintains the

burden of showing causation and damages.

So if — it seems to me if it was her intent to preserve their ability to adjudicate the merits of permissive use when she was talking about what they still had left, she would have mentioned, Oh, and they can try to rebut this finding, if they want. They can do that too. So we are still adjudicating it on the merits.

The written -- regardless of her recollection now, a year later, the written order she signed is fairly clear and fairly unambiguous and doesn't preserve a rebuttable presumption, doesn't make a rebuttable presumption. And when talking about what's left for trial on the merits, does not mention permissive use in any fashion.

So we believe that the record is clear and that once she recused herself, she said, I'm out of this case, and it's improper for her through either written orders or conversation with the new judge to try to influence the new judge in either new findings or an interpretation of her old findings. She's recused herself. She's for whatever reason said, I'm not going to be involved anymore. And we all know what that reason is. And — and certainly there could be an implication that she'd be biased against Mr. Tindall,

but we all know when there's a facial bias, sometimes judges go the other way to prove they're not biased.

But for whatever reason, she recused herself. She's now out of the case. And — and I — I don't believe it's proper for this Court to rely on what she may have told you about her intent when her written orders entered a year ago are clear.

Now, there was another issue which we haven't spent any time on and thought was moot, and that was that at the beginning of this case, they answered interrogatories indicating that he had permission. But more importantly, they responded to a request for admission on permissive use, and we've indicated that here in our pleadings, that — where she admitted permissive use in response to a request for admission. Not just failed to respond, but admitted permissive use.

Now, when she got new counsel, she filed an amended response denying permissive use. But at that time, this is when the motion for sanctions was being made, we were moving to strike their answer altogether. We got a finding of permissive use. It doesn't matter that they tried to amend their answer. But the statute, NRS 36B, is clear that if you admit something, the only way to get relief from that admission is upon

motion to the Court and upon a showing. And they've never filed a motion for relief from the admission they properly made under 36A, long before the Court made a finding of permissive use as a sanction.

So there is still a binding admission in place which they've never moved for relief from, and it's simply too late to move for relief from that admission now that the trial has started. We'd be prejudiced in our preparation, the same way we believe we're prejudiced by the modification of Judge Allf's sanction order.

Thank you, Judge.

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MR. MAZZEO: Not much different from the way Andrea believes she was prejudiced by the initial ruling by Judge Allf regarding a discovery sanction when she found a fact — made a fact that's in dispute, took it out of dispute and found permissive use against her.

With regard to the trial brief regarding the permissive use, I haven't had —— I know it was filed today. It has a date on it of February 8th for a hearing date, but I know it was filed today. Haven't had the opportunity to read it or —— or to address the points and authorities that —— I guess addressed by the plaintiff in the brief.

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THE COURT: No.
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             MR. MAZZEO: No, not at all?
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             Well, in any event there is a conflict.
             THE COURT:
                         Okay.
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             MR. MAZZEO: And -- and so we -- we need --
   we were talking for about five or ten minutes, I guess,
   and we're at an impasse with -- with legal strategy at
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   that point based on --
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             MR. STRASSBURG: It's not --
             MR. MAZZEO: It's actually based on
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   responses
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             MR. STRASSBURG: It's not an impasse.
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                          It's based on responses by
             MR. MAZZEO:
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   jurors, so we need to give it a little bit more thought
   and -- and -- before we resume with jury selection.
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   And -- and to also properly review plaintiff's trial
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   memo regarding permissive use unless you're not going
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   to --
                         Whether I rule on that right now
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             THE COURT:
   or not shouldn't affect whether we go forward with the
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   jury selection; right?
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             MR. STRASSBURG:
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                               Correct.
                          Correct. Yeah, if you're not
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             MR. MAZZEO:
   going to give us additional peremptory challenges,
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   that's true.
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THE COURT:
                         Sounds like we should go forward.
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   Let's keep picking a jury.
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             MR. MAZZEO: Okay.
                             Thank you, Judge.
             MR. STRASSBURG:
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             THE COURT: Do you want make -- cause
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   challenges at this point?
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             MR. MAZZEO:
                          No.
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             THE COURT: Okay.
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             MR. MAZZEO: Not yet.
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             THE COURT: Before we bring the jury as a
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   whole back in --
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             MR. MAZZEO: Hold on, Judge. One minute.
             MR. STRASSBURG: We'd like to challenge for
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   cause, Judge.
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             MS. ESTANISLAO: Raquel Go.
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             MR. MAZZEO: There is one --
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             THE COURT: Go ahead.
             MR. MAZZEO: There is one juror, and it would
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   be Raquel Go in Seat No. 19, because of her dad --
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   dad's death two weeks ago, you saw that she had an
   emotional breakdown when I asked her about that. And
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   she indicated -- I asked her if that would be a
   problem, and she said she would be distracted or have
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   problems focusing at times. So there's a whole lot of
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   information coming from -- between openings and
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EXHIBIT 15

EXHIBIT 15

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DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
-oOo-

CLERK OF THE COURT

EMILIA GARCIA,

Plaintiff,

DEPT. XXX

VS.

JARED AWERBACH, individually, and ANDREA AWERBACH, individually,

Defendants.

Defendants.

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Judge Allf previously entered an Order in the above-referenced matter finding "permissive use" as a matter of law, which was a discovery sanction against the Defendant, Andrea Awerach. This sanction was issued based upon what Judge Allf obviously concluded was a deliberate attempt to conceal information in an insurance claims note. The concealment of this information prejudiced the Plaintiff's ability to discover information and establish evidence in support of the Plaintiff's claim of negligent entrustment. As trial approached, defense counsel requested on several occasions that the Court allow Defendant the opportunity to tell the jury what she believed to be the "truth," about permissive use, even though there was a finding by the Court that "permissive use" was established as a matter of law. The Court was not inclined to disturb the prior findings and orders of Judge Allf, but the Court was faced with the dilemma that Judge Allf's prior Order not only established "permission" by Andrea Awerbach to Jared Awerbach, but it also essentially established an element of the Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages against Andrea Awerbach, without allowing Ms. Awerbach the opportunity to explain herself. This Court was not comfortable with such a finding, especially as it applied to the punitive damage claim. Because this Court appreciates the difference between "permissive use" and "negligent entrustment," the Court contacted Judge Allf to question what her intention was in granting the prior sanction. She indicated that it was actually her intention that at Trial, the parties would be able to present the various contradictory statements relating to "permissive use," and it was her intention that the sanction was to be a "rebuttable presumption" of

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"negligent entrustment." This Court believes that giving partial effect to Judge Allf's "intention" is more "fair" to the parties in this case. Regardless of whether or not this Court contacted Judge Allf or not, and regardless of what her opinion or intention was, this Court believes that it is more "fair" to all involved parties, to modify Judge Allf's prior Order, and instead of "permissive use" being established as a matter of law, this Court will impose a Rebuttable Presumption that "permissive use" is established against Andrea Awerbach. The presumption still serves the purpose of sanctioning the Defendant for the discovery improprieties, but allows the Defendant to present evidence in an effort to try to rebut the presumption, and allows the Defendant the opportunity to defend against the Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages.

This Court acknowledges that this modification of Judge Allf's prior Order, may result in the parties needing to modify how they planned to present this case to the jury. Due to the fact that a continuance of the trial was not possible due to a quickly approaching 5-year deadline, the Court inquired what additional preparation the Plaintiff needed to prepare. Plaintiff's counsel suggested that they needed to re-depose the claims adjuster. The Court ordered that the adjuster be made available within the following week. Counsel thereafter discussed the issue and decided that the re-deposition of the claims adjuster was unnecessary, and the trial is consequently proceeding without delay.

Dated this 12TH day of February, 2016.

VERRY A. WIESE II

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

EIGHPH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

DEPATMENT XXX

EXHIBIT 16

EXHIBIT 16

1	CASE NO. A-11-637772-C
2	DEPT. NO. 30
3	DOCKET U
4	
5	DISTRICT COURT
6	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
7	* * * *
8	
9	EMILIA GARCIA, individually,)
10	Plaintiff,
11	vs.
12	JARED AWERBACH, individually;) ANDREA AWERBACH, individually;)
13	
14	Defendants.
15	Defendancs.
16	
17	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
18	OF
19	JURY TRIAL
20	BEFORE THE HONORABLE JERRY A. WIESE, II
21	DEPARTMENT XXX
22	DATED MONDAY, MARCH 7, 2016
23	
24	REPORTED BY: KRISTY L. CLARK, RPR, NV CCR #708, CA CSR #13529
25	CA COIL #13323

1	APPEARANCES:
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18	For the Defendant Jared Awerbach:
19	RESNICK & LOUIS BY: ROGER STRASSBURG, ESQ.
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21	Las Vegas, Nevada 89118 (702) 997-3800
22	
23	
24	* * * * *
25	

Okay. And you know that your attorney 1 Q. 2 admitted this statement on your behalf; right? 3 Α. Yes. Okay. Request No. 2 --4 Q. 5 MR. MAZZEO: Objection. Your Honor, can we specify which attorney? I did not admit that on her behalf. THE COURT: Say it was a different attorney. 8 9 That's fine. 10 MR. ROBERTS: We'll agree it was a different attorney who signed the document, Your Honor. 11 12 BY MR. ROBERTS: And Request No. 2, "Admit Jared Awerbach was 13 operating your vehicle on January 2nd, 2011, with your 14 permission." 15 16 And, again, your attorney admitted this on your behalf; correct? 17 18 Α. Yes. 19 You -- you told the jury about rehab --Q. 20 Yes, sir. Α. -- that Jared Awerbach has been through since 21 Q. this collision occurred. 23 Α. Yes. And I just wanted to clarify for the jury. 24 Q. 25 That rehab was not just for marijuana use;

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1 sitting here waiting for each other to get back
 2 together again. You still can't do that. Okay? You
 3 can't talk to each other until everything is done and
   you are in the deliberation room together. All right?
 5 I'm just emphasizing that to you because sometimes
   people get confused once both sides have rested.
   Nothing has changed. I will tell you when you can talk
   about the case. Okay?
 9
             Thank you, folks. We'll see you tomorrow
10 morning at 10:00 o'clock.
11
                   (The following proceedings were held
12
                   outside the presence of the jury.)
             THE COURT: All right. We're now outside the
13
  presence of the jury. Anything we need to put on the
   record now, Counsel?
15 l
16
             MR. ROBERTS: I have got a few motions to
          I don't know if -- and then we need to settle
17
18
   jury instructions, but we can ...
19
             THE COURT: Go ahead. Make your motions.
20
             MR. ROBERTS: Thank you, Your Honor.
21
                         You have a few?
             THE COURT:
22
             MR. ROBERTS: Well, a few. Sorry, Your
23
           So many I have to get out my notes to remember
24
   them all.
25
             The first one is, we would request a directed
```

1 verdict on the issue of permissive use on whether or not Mr. Awerbach had permission, express or implied, to use the vehicle. Under the Court's modified order on the sanctions, there is a presumption of permissive use shifting the burden of proof to the defendants to rebut.

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I would submit that there was no evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that they, indeed, met their burden of proof. There's been 10 undisputed evidence now that she allowed Mr. Awerbach to drive her car on past occasions. There's been undisputed evidence that she put the keys to the car in his hand on the day of the incident. And while I understand that it's -- it was a close question and might not otherwise have been an appropriate motion, I think what pushes us over the top is the admission. The -- under the rules, the admission conclusively establishes permissive use as a matter of law; and, therefore, we're entitled to directed verdict on that motion.

While Counsel stated that they were going to introduce into evidence an amended admission and proof that this was withdrawn and later corrected, I don't recall seeing that come into evidence. If I missed it because I was doing something else, I apologize.

don't think -- I think they rested their case without putting the amended admission into evidence; therefore, the only thing in evidence is an admission that he had permissive use, and that's conclusive. 5 THE COURT: But didn't we just have an argument on that on our last break, and I said I wasn't going to allow the amendment based on the -- based on the rule, but I was going to allow them to use the interrogatory answer? MR. MAZZEO: You did. 10 MR. ROBERTS: I guess I'm confused. 11 if it's conclusively established and they're not being 12 allowed to amend, how could there be an issue of fact 13 for the jury? 14 That goes back to Mr. Tindall's 15 THE COURT: argument. And -- and I said -- I read it as being 16 conclusively presumed as it related to Rule 36. 17 why I didn't allow the amended admission response, but 18 I was going to allow additional discovery responses 19 because I knew they were inconsistent. 20 Okay. Well, I still want to 21 MR. ROBERTS: make my motion. 23 That's fine. THE COURT: 24 MR. ROBERTS: You can deny it. 25 THE COURT: Okay. Denied.

EXHIBIT 17

EXHIBIT 17

1	JI DRIGIN	A · · · · ·
2		MAR 0 8 2016
3	j	BY,
4		ALICE JACOBSON, DEPUTY
5	DISTRICT	COURT :
6	CT ADIZ COTING	PV NJEVADA
7	CLARK COUNT	II, NEVADA
8	EMILIA GARCIA, individually,	Case No.: A-11-637772-C Dept. No.: 30
9		Dopt. 110 50
10	Plaintiff,	JURY INSTRUCTIONS
11	V.	
12	JARED AWERBACH, individually; ANDREA AWERBACH, individually;	
13	ANDREA AWERBACH, individually; DOES I – X, and ROE CORPORATIONS I – X, inclusive,	;
14		
15	Defendants.	•
16		•
17 18		-
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		•
25		
26		
27		A - 11 - 637772 - C JI
28		Jury Instructions 4533115

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY:

It is my duty as judge to instruct you in the law that applies to this case. It is your duty as jurors to follow these instructions and to apply the rules of law to the facts as you find them from the evidence.

You must not be concerned with the wisdom of any rule of law stated in these instructions. Regardless of any opinion you may have as to what the law ought to be, it would be a violation of your oath to base a verdict upon any other view of the law than that given in the instructions of the court.

AA_001434

The purpose of the trial is to ascertain the truth.

If, in these instructions, any rule, direction or idea is repeated or stated in different ways, no emphasis thereon is intended by me and none may be inferred by you. For that reason, you are not to single out any certain sentence or any individual point or instruction and ignore the others, but you are to consider all the instructions as a whole and regard each in the light of all the others.

The order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative importance.

The masculine form as used in these instructions, if applicable as shown by the text of the instruction and the evidence, applies to a male person or a female person.

The evidence which you are to consider in this case consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits, and any facts admitted or agreed to by counsel.

Statements, arguments and opinions of counsel are not evidence in the case. However, if the attorneys stipulate as to the existence of a fact, you must accept the stipulation as evidence and regard that fact as proved.

You must not speculate to be true any insinuations suggested by a question asked of a witness. A question is not evidence and may be considered only as it supplies meaning to the answer.

You must disregard any evidence to which an objection was sustained by the court and any evidence ordered stricken by the court.

Anything you may have seen or heard outside the courtroom is not evidence and must also be disregarded.

You must decide all questions of fact in this case from the evidence received in this trial and not from any other source. You must not make any independent investigation of the facts or the law or consider or discuss facts as to which there is no evidence. This means, for example, that you must not on your own visit the scene, conduct experiments, or consult referenced works for additional information.

Although you are to consider only the evidence in the case in reaching a verdict, you must bring to the consideration of the evidence your everyday common sense and judgment as reasonable men and women. Thus, you are not limited solely to what you see and hear as the witnesses testify. You may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence which you feel are justified in the light of common experience, keeping in mind that such inferences should not be based on speculation or guess.

A verdict may never be influenced by sympathy, prejudice or public opinion. Your decision should be the product of sincere judgment and sound discretion in accordance with these rules of law.

No. 71348

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF

Electronically Filed Oct 15 2018 01:04 p.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

EMILIA GARCIA, Appellant,

v.

ANDREA AWERBACH, Respondent.

APPELLANT'S APPENDIX VOLUME VI, BATES NUMBERS 1251 TO 1500

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V, VI	1304 – 1486	Appendix of Exhibits to Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law	05/26/2016
I	1 – 6	Complaint	03/25/2011
III	642 – 646	Decision and Order Denying Defendant Andrea Awerbach's Motion for Relief from Final Court Order	04/27/2015
III	623 – 629	Decision and Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Andrea Awerbach's Answer; Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Show Cause; and Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Supplemental Reports	02/25/2015
I	164 – 165	Defendant Andrea Awerbach's Correction to Her Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Requests for Admission	10/20/2014
III	630 – 641	Defendant Andrea Awerbach's Motion for Relief from Final Court Order	03/13/2015
I	96 – 163	Defendant Andrea Awerbach's Motion for Summary Judgment	11/08/2013
I	13 – 21	Defendant Andrea Awerbach's Responses to Request for Admissions	06/05/2012
I	29 – 35	Defendants' Answer to Amended Complaint	02/07/2013
I	7 – 12	Defendants' Answer to Complaint	01/23/2012
I	36 – 60	Defendants' Second Supplement to List of Witnesses and Documents and Tangible Items Produced at Early Case Conference	07/22/2013
I	61 – 95	Deposition of Andrea Awerbach [Vol. 1]	09/12/2013
I, II	166 – 391	Deposition of Andrea Awerbach [Vol. 2]	10/24/2014

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IV	948 – 997	Jury Instructions	03/08/2016
IV	998 – 1000	Jury Verdict	03/10/2016
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III	647 – 649	Notice of Department Reassignment	08/27/2015
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IV	933 – 945	Plaintiff's Trial Brief Regarding	02/10/2016

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VIII, IX, X	1997 – 2290	Trial Transcript – 02/10/2016	11/10/2017
X	2291 – 2463	Trial Transcript – 02/11/2016	11/10/2017
X, XI	2464 – 2698	Trial Transcript – 02/12/2016	11/10/2017
XI, XII	2699 – 2924	Trial Transcript – 02/16/2016	11/10/2017
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XXVI	6423 – 6440	Trial Transcript – 03/10/2016	08/23/2018

- 1 I would agree with that. Α.
- 2 Q. Okay. And the reason you need to know the mass is the amount of energy Mr. Awerbach's vehicle has, one component is mass and another component is 4 velocity; right?
- 6 That's true. Α.

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- So the more -- assuming the exact same angle Q. of impact, the greater the speed, the higher the delta-v; right?
- In general, yes. 10 Α.
- 11 Assuming the same speed, the higher the Q. angle, the less delta-v; right? 12
- 13 The delta-v direction will change, but maybe Α. not the magnitude.
- Okay. Thank you. That is more accurate. 15 Q. So in this case, before you even get to -- to 16 MADYMO -- did I say that correctly? 17
- I believe so. 18 Α.
- Okay. And that's Mathematical --19 Q.
- Dynamic Model. 20 Α.
- Thank you. Mathematical dynamic model. 21 Q.

22 In your report of August 21st of 2014, you 23 provide national weighted estimates and percent of restraint far-sided occupants injured in lateral 24 impacts with a delta-v between 5 and 10 miles an hour, 25

l characterized by severity; right?

A. Let me pull that up. You're looking at which?

- Q. I'm looking page 17 of your August 21st, 2014, report.
- A. Page 17. Bear with me.

 I'm there.
- Q. Okay. So you look at some data from recognized sources, and you determine that, for delta-v's between 5 and 10, here are the reported injuries and reported injuries to the lumbar spine of two severities; right?
- A. Yeah. There's more to it. So these are lateral impacts, single collisions. There's not multiple collision. These are far-side occupants. So there's more to it than just that. But, yes, the tables in here and the text describes it.
- Q. And then you give the conclusion that "Based on the NASS/CDS data, it is unlikely that an individual would sustain AIS 2+ lumbar spine pathologies from an accident similar to the subject accident."

And the things that make it similar are lateral impact; right? Which is undisputed?

- A. That's right.
- Q. Far-sided, which undisputed, and delta-v;

right?

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- Those are all true. Α.
- So one of the fundamental opinions you want Q. to give is solely based from -- at least from a disputed standpoint, on delta-v; right?
- So this is a check on the biomechanical 6 and engineering analysis portion. And this actually comes in as a way of looking at delta-v's overall and injury likelihood. And so some of these may be pure 9 lateral impacts and no rotation; some may have 10 rotation. But the point being that, with or without 11 it, we have zero cases with lumbar spine AIS 2+ 12 injuries. 13
- Right. And the database you used is delta-v Q. between 5 and 10. 15
 - That's part of the query. Α.
- And in this case you've calculated a delta-v 17 Q. of 9 using PC-Crash; correct? 18
 - 9 is the upper bound. Α.
 - Right. So let's assume that we changed a few Q. of these things around a little bit and we got an upper bound of 11. Then this table would no longer apply; We'd have to look at different data. right?
- I could do that, sure. 24 Α.
 - So then what you told the Court is that you Q.

- A. The output of PC-Crash into MADYMO.
- Q. Right. And so this is very detailed output from PC-Crash that goes into your biomechanical program; right? And let's take a look at it. We don't have to -- to argue about semantics.

What you put into MADYMO was X, Y, and Z position and yaw, pitch, and roll rotation of the vehicles during the duration of the accident; right?

A. That's correct.

- Q. And so it's not just the rotation of the vehicle that's important to you and that you entered into MADYMO; it's how fast the vehicle rotates around; right? Rotation by time.
- A. Sure. All of these are time histories, of course.
- Q. And this is your Attachment D. And all of this information that you put into MADYMO is the output from PC-Crash after you enter speed, angle, and all of the other things that you told Mr. Strassburg.
 - A. This is output, that's correct.
- Q. Okay. And then MADYMO calculates sheer forces on the spine; right?
 - A. It does.

- Q. Okay. And you calculated an axial force or compressive force; right?
- A. Right. So let's be clear there is a force that has components in different directions.
- Q. And the two you mentioned in your report as, in your words, most significant were the compressive axial force and the shear force.
 - A. That's right.

- Q. And in your report you show the shear force going perpendicular to the -- to the body; right?
 - A. I show an anterior-posterior force.
- Q. Right. And the force of the accident being balanced by the force of the ligaments in the muscles and the skeleton?
 - A. Not sure what you mean. Sorry.
- Q. Force from the accident, resistive force of spine, ligaments, and muscles.
- You prepared this; right? It's part of what you want to tell the jury?
 - A. I did, yes.
- Q. And then what you want to tell the jury is and this is page 65 of the PowerPoint that's been provided here is your occupant motion rotation only, and it shows that the occupant would experience a force making it go over toward the door of the vehicle;

right?

A. That's right. A rotational motion of the vehicle creates an outward motion for the occupant.

- Q. Okay. And that would be a different type of force than you think happened in this case; right?
 - A. No, I think that's present in this case.
 - Q. The force from side to side?
- A. There is some small shear force laterally. It's provided in my file. But as you can see, it's very small.
- Q. Right. And reason that you say it's small and are going to tell the jury it's small is because in this case we've got rotational force which counteracts the lateral the the lateral force counteracts the rotational force; right?
- A. It's close enough, yes. It's not quite how I would say it, but sure.
- Q. Okay. And -- and then I think there's some slides in here where you actually show those two forces as counteracting in addition to the slide I just showed.
 - A. That's right.
- Q. Now, in your reconstruction from your PC-Crash input, you have Ms. Garcia's vehicle going from the No. 1 travel lane going south, across the

median, and over into the No. 1 northbound lane; right?

- A. In the animation that I showed, yes.
- Q. Okay. And you would agree that it takes lateral force to move the vehicle from one side of the road over to the other side of the road.
 - A. Sure.

- Q. And if the vehicle is staying in its lane, you've got more rotational force, and it's not being offset by the lateral force the way your calculations show.
- A. Yeah. That would be physically impossible from what you described. It has to move laterally.

 And the only way it could get back into its original lane would be with the steering input that I mentioned earlier at the end of the accident sequence.
- Q. So based on your calculations and the assumptions you've made about angles of impact, it has to move laterally?
 - A. Based on the laws of physics.
- Q. Let's talk about crush for a minute. You would agree that there are no pictures or photographs you reviewed looking down from the top of the vehicle; right?
- 24 A. That's true.
 - Q. And so you attempted to use photogrammetry to

- estimate crush; is that right?
 - A. That's right.

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- Q. And in your report you said that, since you couldn't actually go out and measure the crush, you had to come up with a range?
 - A. That's right.
- Q. And you overstated that range; correct? You overestimated crush as a conservative measure?
 - A. That's right.
- Q. Would you agree with me that, in order to conserve energy, as you have talked about doing in the laws of physics, that you've got a certain amount of energy that goes into an accident a collision, and those energies on one side have to equal the total energies on the other side?
 - A. You mean before and after the impact?
- 17 Q. Correct.
- 18 A. That's correct.
- Q. So if there's more crush, there's less
 delta-v of Ms. Garcia's vehicle, because more of the
 energy, holding speed constant, angles constant, more
 crush equals less delta-v?
 - A. In general that's the right idea. In the number ranges that we're talking about, it makes a very minor impact. No pun intended.

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Mr. Garcia's vehicle was damaged on the
1
        Q.
   passenger side; correct?
             THE COURT: Ms. Garcia or Mr. Awerbach's?
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             MR. ROBERTS: I'm sorry, Your Honor. It gets
 4
   that time of day; I start misstating everything.
   BY MR. ROBERTS:
             Mr. Awerbach's vehicle was damaged on the
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        Q.
   passenger side; right?
             That's correct. The passenger side of the
 9
        Α.
   front -- I'm sorry. It's front damage, more on the
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   passenger side.
             Okay. So -- so you've got his vehicle.
                                                       The
12
        Q.
   angle goes like this; right?
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             Not sure which way is front on your paper for
14
   the vehicle.
15
             Okay. If this is Mr. Garcia's vehicle --
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        Q.
             Why don't we use -- can we use something else
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        Α.
   where -- something that's more directional?
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             THE WITNESS: Can we use the tissue box, Your
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20
   Honor?
                         How about this?
              THE COURT:
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             MR. ROBERTS: Okay.
                            Thanks.
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              THE WITNESS:
                            Thank you.
             MR. ROBERTS:
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BY MR. ROBERTS:

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- Q. All right. So the spine is the front of the vehicle. You got Mr. Awerbach coming in like this, and then you got him turning left; right?
 - A. Correct.
- Q. Assuming Ms. Garcia's going straight down the road, the vehicle the damage to Mr. Garcia's vehicle would be on the driver's side; right?

MR. SMITH: Mr. Awerbach.

10 BY MR. ROBERTS:

- Q. Mr. Awerbach's vehicle would be on the driver's side. So if Mr. Awerbach turns left as you state, the -- and Ms. Garcia's parallel, the damage is going to be on the driver's side; right?
- A. If you angle it in like that, sure. But if you have the contact -- may I?
 - Q. Sure.
- 18 A. Okay.

If you have the contact coming in like this, and she's swerving this way (witness indicating) -- and I am pointing -- she is driving down the street swerved to the left. So on the paper she's going to the right. He's coming in this way, to the right on the paper. And, remember, there's contact with the wheel. And that's contacting the driver's side of his vehicle.

The wheel rotates around as she's moving out 1 this direction. That would account for the scuffs, the marks that we see on the bumper of the Forenza, and it matches up well with how the impact that actually created the force on both vehicles. But in order to make that work, you've got to 6 Q. turn Ms. Garcia's vehicle at an angle heading over into the northbound lanes; right? A slight degree, which is what she testifies 9 Α. 10 to. Does she testify to what the angle was or did 11 Q. you have to guess at that? I wouldn't say it's a guess. I would say 13 14 we'd --MR. MAZZEO: Objection, Judge. There's 15 nothing in -- in -- in the -- the amount of angle by 16 Ms. Garcia. There's no testimony regarding that. 17 So you didn't want him to testify 18 THE COURT: about it? 19 Withdrawn. 20 MR. MAZZEO: The question was did she testify 21 THE COURT: to what the angle was, or did you have to guess; right? That was the question. 23 MR. ROBERTS: The objection, then, would be MR. TINDALL: 24

vaqueness, whether he was guessing about the testimony

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or guessing about the angle.

THE COURT: I'm going to let him answer.

THE WITNESS: I used what I thought were reasonable estimates of what it could be.

BY MR. ROBERTS:

- Q. And the reason that you felt your estimates are reasonable is that's the angles that you had to use in order for the rest of your calculations to come up the way you wanted them to; right?
- A. Well, I wouldn't quite say it like that because I didn't have any way that I wanted them to come up with. What I would say is that, in order for everything to be consistent, it had a very narrow range of angles that she could have turned at. She can't turn 45 degrees and then have the damage to her vehicle, the damage to Awerbach's vehicle, her rotation of 180 degrees match up. It wouldn't work.
- Q. And and, actually, if you read her whole testimony, she says she saw something coming really fast at the corner of her eye and tried to swerve. But as a reconstructionist, you know about perception—reaction time, and you know that she probably didn't have time to turn at all. In the time where she barely saw him out of the corner of her eye, she didn't have 2.5 seconds to perceive and react and

input steering motion, did she?

MR. MAZZEO: Objection, Judge. Relevance to the scope of inquiry for -- for establishing his credibility for doing the PC-Crash analysis. This --

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: I think it is possible for her to have initiated a swerving motion.

THE COURT: Finish up, Mr. Roberts.

MR. ROBERTS: Thank you.

10 BY MR. ROBERTS:

Q. And, in fact, her quote from her deposition was, "I thought I could swerve because I did see him coming really fast."

MR. STRASSBURG: Page 22.

15 BY MR. ROBERTS:

- Q. And, finally, you're not telling us that your report is incorrect when it says in two places that you tried to validate your PC-Crash inputs and your simulation by verifying that the final resting place of the vehicle matched the location set forth by the witnesses; right?
- A. I probably should have been more precise in my language in terms of what I meant by that, and, specifically, it's Ms. Garcia's vehicle rotating 180 degrees.

I'm not a lawyer. I'm an engineer. 1 Sorry. I don't use words as well as you guys. Okay. So when you said "final resting Q. place, " you didn't mean final resting place; you meant the rotation and motion of the vehicle before it ended up in the resting place. I mean the final orientation of the 7 Α. vehicle. MR. ROBERTS: Okay. Your Honor, I'm sorry. 9 10 Thank you for your indulgence. THE COURT: You guys done? 11 12 MR. MAZZEO: Yes. Sure. MR. STRASSBURG: 13 MR. MAZZEO: Judge, I'd just like to make 14 one -- not for the witness. I'm done with the witness. 15 But I -- I -- you cited Hallmark earlier, and I just 16 wanted to distinguish that from this case. 17 18 THE COURT: Okay. MR. MAZZEO: All right. So Hallmark is the 19 distinguishable, as you -- as you put into the record, 20 you had stated that Tradewinds did not introduce any evidence; that Dr. Bowles attempted to recreate the collision by performing an experiment. 23 Well, in this case Dr. Scher did recreate the 24 collision by -- by -- he performed a check and actual 25

were unknown and no marks were made by the motorcycle upon the pavement at the time that the impact occurred.

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He did testify as to -- the expert did -- testify as to the range of probabilities, which included the possibility that the accident had occurred in the northbound lane.

So based on the cases that we cited and the testimony of Dr. Scher, as to all the data that he replied upon and the fact that it satisfies the requirements of the PC-Crash analysis, I would encourage the Court to change its prior decision or ruling in excluding him as an expert with respect to the accident — the PC-Crash analysis.

MR. ROBERTS: And in Provence, it was rebuttal evidence that was deemed admissible and the court said, "You just put on a witness that had no greater foundation than him. You can't now be heard to say that their rebuttal expert can't give opinions on the same level of information. So it's not in evidence."

THE COURT: Okay, guys. I understand the distinction that you have tried to draw.

Unfortunately, I think his calculations in MADYMO are still based on the output from the PC-Crash. The PC-Crash analysis is based on speed, angles -- I mean,

1 that's where you get the delta-v from. And I think all
2 of the information that went into that is,
3 unfortunately, more assumption, conjecture, and
4 generalization.

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I don't take any pleasure in not allowing you to put him on. That's -- I think that's what I have to do in the case. You haven't changed my mind. I'm sorry.

So thanks for being here, Dr. Scher. I don't think we're going to need you any further. Appreciate your time.

When we start tomorrow morning, I'm guessing that you guys have more witnesses.

MR. ROBERTS: Well, they had originally asked to take Poindexter, I believe, out of order tomorrow because of his schedule. We're still willing to accommodate that, but we're also ready to go if they don't need that anymore.

MR. MAZZEO: Yeah. No, we didn't ask to take him out order. We had scheduled Dr. Poindexter for the defense case, which we anticipated starting days before Friday. So he's been scheduled for Friday for several weeks now. And so we — yeah, we do plan on calling him tomorrow morning. That's his only —

THE COURT: Okay.

EXHIBIT 11

EXHIBIT 11

1	CASE NO. A-11-637772-C				
2	DEPT. NO. 30				
3	DOCKET U				
4					
5	DISTRICT COURT				
6	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA				
7	* * * *				
8					
9	EMILIA GARCIA, individually,)				
10	Plaintiff,				
11	vs.				
12	JARED AWERBACH, individually;) ANDREA AWERBACH, individually;)				
13	DOES I-X, and ROE CORPORATIONS) I-X, inclusive,)				
14	Defendants.				
15	<u> </u>				
16					
17	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT				
18	OF				
19	JURY TRIAL				
20	BEFORE THE HONORABLE JERRY A. WIESE, II				
21	DEPARTMENT XXX				
22	DATED FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2016				
23					
24	REPORTED BY: KRISTY L. CLARK, RPR, NV CCR #708, CA CSR #13529				
25					

the jury? 1 2 MR. ROBERTS: Yes, Your Honor. 3 MR. MAZZEO: Yes, Your Honor. MR. STRASSBURG: Yes, Judge. 4 Okay. Folks, so you got stuck 5 THE COURT: out in the hallway yesterday, and then I sent you home without bringing you back in. Sometimes things like that happen. And I know I told you at the beginning of trial, sometimes scheduling things like that -- and it's just outside of our control. 10 I'm going to tell you that the Court 11 concluded yesterday that there was inadequate 12 foundation for Dr. Scher's testimony. So you're 13 instructed to disregard his testimony that you heard 14 yesterday. 15 This morning -- we are still not finished 16 with the plaintiff's case, but I believe the defense 17 has another expert that is scheduled to be here. So 18 we're going to take that expert out of order. 19 Mr. Mazzeo, go ahead. 20 MR. MAZZEO: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you. 21 At this time we call Dr. Curtis Poindexter. 22 Come on up, Doctor. If you come 23 THE COURT: all the way up on the witness stand. Once you get 24

there, please remain standing and raise your right hand

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EXHIBIT 12

EXHIBIT 12

1	CASE NO. A-11-637772-C
2	DEPT. NO. 30
3	DOCKET U
4	
5	DISTRICT COURT
6	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
7	* * * *
8	
9	EMILIA GARCIA, individually,)
10	Plaintiff,
11	vs.
12	JARED AWERBACH, individually;) ANDREA AWERBACH, individually;)
13	
14	Defendants.
15)
16	
17	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
18	OF
19	JURY TRIAL
20	BEFORE THE HONORABLE JERRY A. WIESE, II
21	DEPARTMENT XXX
22	DATED THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 2016
23	
24	REPORTED BY: KRISTY L. CLARK, RPR, NV CCR #708, CA CSR #13529
25	CA CON TIDES

if he did something wrong and led to this kind of a situation where the patient can't pay me.

- Q. But the -- ultimately, your -- the reason why you would have a medical lien -- or typically you'll have patients of yours sign a medical lien when they have a claim against a third party, usually a medical-legal claim of a car accident or -- or some type of injury where a third party is responsible; correct?
 - A. I'm not following what you just asked me.
 - Q. Okay. Let me rephrase it.
 - A. Please.

- Q. Typically, you'll have patients in your office with -- where you'll provide and -- and -- medical treatment on a medical lien with patients who have medical-legal claims, typically.
- A. That is correct. Somebody who gets into a some kind of a battle and has no way to pay me at the moment, can owe me the money at a later date. And I have them sign a lien because trying to collect money after a date of service isn't as easy as you would think.
- Q. And you understand, Doctor, that if the jury ultimately determines that the services that you or any other provider provided, which are not related to the

subject accident, that you may not be compensated for it by way of the third party.

Do you understand that?

A. No, that's not true.

Q. Okay. I'm not saying you won't be compensated at all. I'm saying you won't be compensated if the jury determines that — that the services you provided, or any other doctor provided, are not related to the subject accident for which gives rise to — to the medical—legal claim, then you may not be compensated by way of moneys coming from the third party involved in the legal claim.

You understand that; right?

- A. I understand what you're saying, but you're not accurate.
- Q. Okay. You're still -- ultimately, your client or your patient is still responsible, and/or as you said, plaintiff's counsel, for the payment of the -- for the medical services you provided to the patient; correct?
- A. I want to say, as we sit here right now, I've been paid on everything I'm going to get paid on.

 Nothing is weighted on my testimony. Patient's bills have been covered already.
 - Q. I understand -- and we understand --

So I've already been paid. So I don't know 1 Α. what you're asking me. You keep asking me if something 2 is weighted on a payment afterward, but it's not. 3 MR. MAZZEO: Judge, can we approach, please? 4 Sure. 5 THE COURT: (A discussion was held at the bench, 6 not reported.) 7 MR. MAZZEO: May I proceed, Your Honor? 8 9 THE COURT: You may. BY MR. MAZZEO: 10 Dr. Lemper, isn't it a fact that -- well, you 11 said a moment ago that you were paid for -- for the 12 medical bills that you had charged in this case; 13 correct? 14 15 Correct. Α. But isn't it a fact that you weren't paid the 16 Q. full amount for the -- that you had told us a few 17 18 minutes ago? MR. ROBERTS: Objection, Your Honor. 19 That's what we just talked about. 20 THE COURT: Come up here. 21 22 (A discussion was held at the bench, 23 not reported.) All right, folks. I'm going to 24 THE COURT: get you guys to lunch so we can have a little argument. 25

During our break, you're instructed not to 1 talk with each other or with anyone else about any subject or issue connected with this trial. You are not to read, watch, or listen to any report of or commentary on the trial by any person connected with this case or by any medium of information, including, without limitation, newspapers, television, the Internet, or radio. You are not to conduct any 8 research on your own, which means you cannot talk with others, Tweet others, text others, Google issues, or 10 conduct any other kind of book or computer research 11 with regard to any issue, party, witness, or attorney 12 involved in this case. You're not to form or express 13 any opinion on any subject connected with this trial 14 until the case is finally submitted to you. 15 Take till about 1:15. See you back then. 16 (The following proceedings were held 17 outside the presence of the jury.) 18 19 THE COURT: We're outside the presence of the 20 jury. Do you guys want Dr. Lemper here for the 21 argument, or we can excuse him? 23 MR. MAZZEO: Yes, please. Just come back quarter after 24 THE COURT: 25 Thanks, Doc. 1:00.

Thank you. THE WITNESS:

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So the issue is whether or not THE COURT: I'm going to allow you to ask Dr. Lemper if he collected less than the full amount of his bills. think we've discussed this. We discussed it at the bench. You thought that he had opened the door by saying that his bills were paid, but you pressed him to -- to say whether or not he -- he wasn't going to get paid if -- by a third party, by your client, if the plaintiff wasn't successful in the case. I mean, he --10 he couldn't have agreed to that because that's not the truth because he's already been paid. 12

So I think you forced him into saying my bills have been paid, and then you -- you think that that opened the door for you to ask questions about the fact that he hasn't been paid in full. understanding from Mr. Roberts is that he sold the lien for 100 percent, so there is still a full amount of the lien out there. And I mean, I don't understand the argument.

MR. MAZZEO: Well, the argument is pretty simple, Judge. Dr. Lemper, all he needed to say was no to my question. That's all he had to say. But he added to it. He said that I've been paid for my bills indicating -- and I don't remember the exact answer

that he gave, but he indicated that he was paid for the full amount of — for his services for his bills. And I established on the record that the full bills that he had submitted in this case came out to approximately 2 — I'm sorry, \$43,159, somewhere around there.

Now, I know from his deposition testimony that he sold those at a discount, which I wasn't going to elicit, for around 50 percent or somewhere around there or less. So — so he gave the — his answer opened up the door. I didn't press him to give that answer. All he needed to say to my question, again, was no.

So by him saying -- saying to the jury -- he made a misstatement to the jury, to this Court under oath, that -- indicating that he was paid for the full amount. And that's -- that was improper. So I should be able to ask him that he did not receive -- or that he received a -- sold them at a discounted amount or received moneys at a discounted amount for his bills.

THE COURT: I'm guessing that he was probably told by plaintiff's counsel what he could and couldn't say because what he said is, "I want to say, as we sit here right now, I've been paid on everything I'm going to get paid on. Nothing is weighted on my testimony. Patient's bills have been covered already." So I think

he was trying to be as honest as he could while staying within the bound of what he could and couldn't say. I think he did a good job answering that and trying to stay within the rulings.

MR. MAZZEO: Well, and I disagree. I think that by him saying that, he opened up the door for me to inquire about what he was paid with respect to the overall bills that he had originally submitted.

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MR. ROBERTS: And, Your Honor, I would point out several things for the record. One, as Mr. Mazzeo just acknowledged, they asked him the question about selling his lien. He didn't discount to us and we paid him less than full value. What he did was there's a market for medical liens out there and they're discounted based on the difficulty of collection and the length of time that it's going to take to collect. And in this case, the lienholder now holds 100 percent of the value of the lien, but they didn't pay Dr. Lemper for it one hundred percent. And he made that financial decision to get money now rather than to wait on payment.

But what -- what we can see happened here is that Mr. Mazzeo, with full knowledge that Dr. Lemper had sold his lien and that Dr. Lemper had no financial interest in the outcome of this trial and the testimony

today, and knowing that he had no financial interest to collect against the third party, pointing to the clients over here, knowing that he had no bias and no interest, continued to press him on that issue with no reasonable basis to believe he had a bias or an interest in the outcome because he knew from the deposition.

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And he did it anyway. He got an answer he didn't like. He came up to Court, and it's not on the record, but he made his argument, and the Court expressly told him, No, you can't ask that question. You can't go there, Mr. Mazzeo. He walked right back after the conference and asked the question anyway in blatant defiance of this Court's order because he didn't agree with it.

And — and I just want the record to reflect that this is intentional misconduct. The Court told him not to go there, and he did anyway with knowledge that this witness has no bias and no interest in the outcome.

MR. MAZZEO: And I -- and I -- I object to that, Your Honor. I disagree with Mr. Roberts. I wasn't told not to ask that specific question. I wasn't going to go into how much. I was going to ask him that one question, and I don't think the Court had

instructed me not to ask that specific question.

Secondly, with regard to Dr. Lemper's interests in the outcome of the litigation, well, yes, he certainly does because at the time that he provided these services, he had not sold any liens to any third party. He had an actual interest in — in — in the totality of his — of the medical bills that he had provided. And at the time that he — he rendered the opinions in this case, which we saw on the screen all morning, he related everything to the subject accident.

So at the time that he had Ms. Garcia sign the lien and at the time that he provided the services, he definitely had an interest in the outcome of this litigation. And that doesn't — that — that's not — that's still relevant to this case, notwithstanding the fact that he sold his lien — his — his lien to a third party. So yeah, he does have an interest.

And he has an interest as he's testifying because all of what he testified to he related to the subject accident. So I think that I have -- I have a right to explore that area.

MR. STRASSBURG: Judge, joining with Mr. Mazzeo, we would also reiterate that at the time that the witness prepared the medical records that Mr. Roberts has been essentially reading to him on

direct, he hadn't been paid. And he knew that his prospects of being paid were related to the litigation.

Further, the credibility is always relevant. And when a witness says the billings are reasonable in amount, it — it is certainly appropriate for purposes of credibility to test his statement by eliciting the evidence that he sold those bills for a lesser amount and what that amount was as an alternative refuting evidence of the actual value of those services.

If he wants to explain that, you know, I needed the money or there were other factors that led me to take less than what I really think was reasonable value, well, okay. He gets to explain that, and Mr. Roberts gets to elicit that. But he places his credibility at issue when he talks about the reasonableness of the bills. And we should have the right, and do, to fully probe all issues of credibility for this witness for his particular bills.

I mean, if they want to bring this kind of evidence in through a consulting expert like Oliveri, well, that's a different way. But this is the witness that sold those bills and gave that testimony, and his credibility is directly implicated.

MR. ROBERTS: Your Honor, this had been excluded.

1 THE COURT: We're not going to argue anymore. Sorry. I don't -- I think my ruling at the bench may have been vague enough that Mr. Mazzeo's statement may not have been intentionally in violation of what I had instructed. So I'm not going to find it was intentional misconduct. But I think that was the intention of my ruling is to keep you away from that 7 subject. 8 9 I think the fact that a doctor sold his lien 10 to some company that thereafter goes and tries to 11 collect the lien, I don't think has any bearing on 12 whether or not it's reasonable or not. You got to have 131 somebody that has medical expertise to talk about 14 whether a bill is reasonable or usual and customary. So I'm not going to let you get into it. 15 If I may, Your Honor, just --16 MR. MAZZEO: 17 but prior to him selling his lien, he definitely had an 18 interest in the outcome of the litigation. THE COURT: That's not what you were asking 19 20 him. 21 MR. MAZZEO: And do you have any -- do you have any opposition -- objection to me asking him about 23 that? The fact that --24 THE COURT: No. 25 MR. MAZZEO: Prior to him -- prior to him

CLERK OF THE COURT

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DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Plaintiff,

v.

JARED AWERBACH, individually; ANDREA AWERBACH, individually; DOES I – X, and ROE CORPORATIONS I – X, inclusive,

Defendants.

EMILIA GARCIA, individually,

Case No.: A-11-637772-C Dept. No.: 30

PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins, Gunn & Dial, LLC 6385 S. Rainbow Boulevard, Suite 400

Plaintiff Emilia Garcia ("Plaintiff"), by and through her counsel, hereby files this *Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law* pursuant to NRCP 50(b). This Motion is made and based upon the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the pleadings and papers on file herein, and any oral argument that this Court may allow.

DATED this 26th day of May, 2016.

D. Lee Roberts, Jr., Esq.
Timothy A. Mott, Esq.
Marisa Rodriguez-Shapoval, Esq.
WEINBERG, WHEELER, HUDGINS,
GUNN & DIAL, LLC.

Corey M. Eschweiler, Esq. Adam D. Smith, Esq. Craig A. Henderson, Esq. GLEN J. LERNER & ASSOCIATES

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Attorneys for Plaintiff Emilia Garcia

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NOTICE OF MOTION

TO:	All	Interested	Parties;	and
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Their Respective Counsel. TO:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT

AS A MATTER OF LAW ("Motion") will come on for hearing in the above-entitled Court on the 23rd day of June, 2016, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., in Department XXX, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard. This Motion in being heard on said date and time in accordance with this Court's instruction on May 10, 2016, at the Post-Trial Motion Status Check hearing.

DATED this day of May, 2016.

D. Lee Roberts, Jr., Esq. Timothy A. Mott, Esq. Marisa Rodriguez-Shapoval, Esq. WEINBERG, WHEELER, HUDGINS, GUNN & DIAL, LLC.

Corey M. Eschweiler, Esq. Adam D. Smith, Esq. Craig A. Henderson, Esq. GLEN J. LERNER & ASSOCIATES

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins, Gunn & Dial, LLC 6385 S. Rainbow Boulevard, Suite 400 Las Vegas, Nevada 89118

ORDER SHORTENING TIME

Good cause appearing, it is ordered that the hearing on PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW shall be heard on the 23rd day of

June, 2016, in Department XXX at 9:00 a.m.

JERRY A. WIESS-II DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Submitted by:

D. Lee Roberts, Jr., Esq.

Timothy A. Mott, Esq.
Marisa Rodriguez-Shapoval, Esq.
WEINBERG, WHEELER, HUDGINS,
GUNN & DIAL, LLC.

Corey M. Eschweiler, Esq. Adam D. Smith, Esq.

Craig A. Henderson, Esq.
GLEN J. LERNER & ASSOCIATES

Attorneys for Plaintiff

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF ORDER SHORTENING TIME

STATE OF NEVADA)
) ss
COUNTY OF CLARK)

Timothy A. Mott, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

- 1. I am over the age of eighteen, of sound mind, and give the following affidavit based on my personal knowledge.
- 2. I am an attorney with Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins, Gunn & Dial, LLC, and counsel of this matter for Plaintiff Emilia A. Garcia ("Plaintiff").
- 3. On May 10, 2016, this court held a status check hearing on post-trial motions and at that time, this Court ordered that any and all post trial motions be heard on June 23, 2016 and that such motions be filed by May 26, 2016.
- 4. If this post-trial motion is filed without an Order Shortening Time ("OST"), master calendar may schedule the motion for a day other than June 23, 2016, as ordered by this Court.
- 5. Thus, there is good cause to grant Plaintiff's request to hear this motion on an OST and schedule the hearing for June 23, 2016.

Timothy A. Mott, Esq.

Subscribed and Sworn before me this _____ day of May, 2016

Notary Public

AUDRA R. BONNEY
Notary Public State of Nevada
No. 00-63044-1
My appt. exp. June 8, 2016

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. Introduction & Summary of the Argument

This personal injury action arose on January 2, 2011, when Defendant Jared Awerbach ("Jared"), driving a car owned by his mother, Defendant Andrea Awerbach ("Andrea"), failed to yield the right of way and made an improper left turn in front of Plaintiff Emilia Garcia's ("Emilia") approaching vehicle. Following the accident, Jared was determined to have illegal levels of marijuana metabolite in his blood. Emilia sued Jared for negligence and negligence per se, Andrea for negligent entrustment and joint liability pursuant to NRS 41.440, and asserted a claim for punitive damages against both Jared and Andrea.

Prior to trial, it was established as a matter of law that Jared was operating Andrea's car with her permission ("permissive use"). Both sides prepared for trial with this knowledge. On the first day of jury selection, this Court drastically reversed and modified two sanctions orders issued by Judge Allf (a year prior) that conclusively established permissive use as a matter of law. The last minute reversal was made in conjunction with a conversation the Court had with Judge Allf wherein she conveyed her recollection that her initial written decision was not intended to establish permissive use, but instead was only intended to establish a *rebuttable presumption* of permissive use. Contrary to Judge Allf's recollection, two months after entering her original order finding that a finding of permissive use would be appropriate, she clarified her intentions by entering a *second order* affirming her finding of permissive use as a matter of law. She discussed the issues remaining for trial. The remaining issues did not include permissive use in any way, shape or form.

Judge Allf's recollection as to her subjective intention when issuing an order one year prior is conclusively rebutted not only by the objective language of the original order, but by her second order affirming the first: "[T]he Court did consider the *Ribeiro* factors and did enter the less severe sanction of finding there was permissive use" and "[t]he finding of permissive use does not prevent adjudication on the merits because Plaintiff still maintains the burden of showing causation and damages." The entire purpose of Judge Allf's orders was to preclude Andrea from disputing permission at trial because Andrea concealed critical evidence pertaining to permission, thereby preventing Emilia from adequately investigating the issue during discovery, and thereafter

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provided fabricated testimony on two occasions while apparently believing the concealed evidence would never see the light of day. The orders were always intended to be a punitive sanction and there is nothing on the face of the written orders that would indicate a rebuttable presumption was intended by the Court. Judge Allf's orders precluded Andrea from disputing permissive use at trial, and relieved the Plaintiff of its obligation to come forward with any evidence on this issue. Of note, the orders were drafted by Judge Allf herself, not counsel.

Judge Allf had no proper ability or power to change her written orders or influence this Court to modify her orders once she recused herself in August, 2015. The law is abundantly clear that a judge must not substantively influence a case after her recusal. Once Judge Allf voluntarily recused herself from the case, her involvement ended and any influence by her was improper and constitutes reversible error.

Additionally, and of great significance, Andrea had conclusively admitted permissive use on two prior occasions. First, in her Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint she admitted permissive use, only to recant the admission in her Answer to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Second, in her responses to Plaintiff's requests for admissions Andrea again admitted permissive use ("permissive use admission"). This permissive use admission is binding in the absence of the court affirmatively relieving her of the admission. Andrea later attempted to change her position in these responses almost one and a half years later and only after obtaining new counsel—amended responses were served, but without leave of Court and without compliance with NRCP 36(b). Thus, Andrea's attempt to recant her permissive use admission was of no legal effect.

Prior to trial, Andrea did not move to be relieved from her permissive use admission nor was such relief granted. Indeed, all of the parties likely assumed this issue was moot in light of the conclusive finding of permissive use by Judge Allf. At trial, finally realizing that Andrea's permissive use admission conclusively established permissive use as a matter of law in the absence of a motion and court order, Andrea's counsel orally moved for Andrea to be relieved from her permissive use admission after Plaintiff rested her case. This Court denied this Motion, but nonetheless refused to give preclusive effect to the admission. When Andrea rested her case,

Plaintiff moved for directed verdict (i.e., judgment as a matter of law) on the "permissive use" issue, preserving this issue. This Court denied Plaintiff's request.

Before jury deliberation, the jury was presented with Jury Instruction No. 14, which stated: "Plaintiff, Emilia Garcia, served on the Defendant, Andrea Awerbach, a written request for the admission of the truth of certain matters of fact. You will regards as being conclusively proved all such matters of fact which were expressly admitted by the Defendants, Andrea Awerbach" In other words, Jury Instruction No. 14, presented the jury with no choice but to find that permissive use had been conclusively established. Nonetheless, the jury returned a verdict finding Andrea did not give permission to Jared to use her vehicle on January 2, 2011.

In sum, the issue of permissive use should never have been presented to the jury as permissive use had already been established as a matter of law, not only by Judge Allf's Orders but by Andrea's own admission. No reasonable jury could have found a lack of permission in light of Jury Instruction No. 14. Plaintiff renews her motion for judgment as a matter of law and asks this Court to find that "permissive use" was established as a matter of law.

II. STANDARD FOR RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

"Motions for judgment notwithstanding verdict [i.e., renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law] presents solely a question of law to be determined by court." *Dudley v. Prima*, 84 Nev. 549, PIN CITE, 445 P.2d 31, PIN CITE (1968). Pursuant to NRCP 50(b), a party may move to "renew its request for judgment as a matter of law by filing a motion no later than 10 days after service of written notice of entry of judgment." The Court may then "direct entry of judgment as a matter of law." NRCP 50(b)(1)(C).

Here, it is proper for this Court to enter judgment as a matter of law with regard to permissive use and find that Andrea is liable under the negligent entrustment cause of action and jointly liable pursuant to NRS 41.440. First, this Motion presents solely a question of law proper for judicial adjudication. Second, this Motion is timely as it is being filed before a Notice of Entry of Judgment. Finally, this is a renewed motion, filed after Plaintiff already sought judgment as a matter of law (*i.e.*, directed verdict) at trial, after presentation of the evidence, and before jury deliberation.

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III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

ANDREA'S ANSWER TO EMILIA'S COMPLAINT ADMITTING PERMISSIVE USE. **A.**

This collision occurred on January 2, 2011. (See Complaint (3/25/11), ¶ 9, attached as Exhibit 1). Emilia initiated the lawsuit on March 25, 2011. (See id.) Defendants answered Emilia's Complaint on January 23, 2012, and, of great significance, admitted that "Defendant ANDREA AWERBACH, did entrust the vehicle to the control of Defendant JARED AWERBACH." (See Complaint (3/25/11), ¶ 23, attached as Exhibit 1; Defendants' Answer to Complaint, ¶ 2, attached as Exhibit 2) One year later, in response to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Andrea conveniently flipped her answer on this critical issue. (See Amended Complaint (1/14/13), ¶ 23, on file with this Court; see also Answer to Amended Complaint (2/7/13, ¶ 17, on file with this Court)

В. ANDREA'S RESPONSE TO EMILIA'S REQUEST FOR ADMISSION.

On June 5, 2012, Andrea responded to Emilia's requests for admissions and unequivocally admitted that Jared operated her vehicle on January 2, 2011 with her permission. Specifically:

REQUEST NO. 2:

Admit JARED AWEBACH was operating your vehicle on January 2, 2011, with your permission.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 2:

Admit.

(See Defendant Andrew Awerbach's Responses to Request for Admissions, Req., no. 2, attached as Exhibit 3).

ANDREA ACTIVELY CONCEALED EVIDENCE IN THE FORM OF A CLAIMS NOTE.

On July 22, 2013, after Emilia filed a motion to compel, Andrea produced what appeared to be the complete claims notes from her claim with Liberty Mutual in a pleading styled Second Supplement to List of Witnesses and Documents And Tangible Items Produced At Early Case Conference. (See Second Supplement to List of Witnesses and Documents And Tangible Items Produced At Early Case Conference, attached as Exhibit 4) What Andrea did not tell Emilia was (702) 938-3838

that one of the notes dated January 17, 2011, at 4:44 p.m., had been secretly redacted making it appear as if that note never existed. In fact, Andrea furthered the ruse by producing a misleading disclosure and privilege log that further concealed the existence of the 4:44 p.m. note. Specifically, Andrea's disclosure indicated that "Adjustor's Claims Notes between January 2-17, 2011 (Bates Labels LM001-LM006; LM019-027)" were disclosed, and only "notes after January 17, 2011, [were being] withheld (Bates labels LM007-018)." *Id.* Indeed, Andrea's privilege log indicated she was only claiming a privilege for claims notes dated "January 18, 2011, et seq.", *i.e.*, notes dated on or after January 18, 2011. It is now obvious this was misleading because the January 17, 2011, note from 4:44 p.m. was not contained in the disclosure or identified on the privilege log. Instead, that note was whited-out, making it appear as if the note never existed. It was surreptitiously redacted.

D. ANDREA FURTHERED THE CONCEALMENT THROUGH HER DEPOSITION TESTIMONY.

Emilia first deposed Andrea on September 12, 2013, approximately two months after Andrea served Emilia with the whited-out claims note. During the deposition, Andrea testified inconsistently with the whited-out claims note, which, of course, had not yet been uncovered by Emilia's counsel. (*See e.g.*, Andrea Awerbach's Depo. Tran. Vol I (09/12/13), at 21:1-23, attached as Exhibit 5 (testifying Jared did not ask for permission to drive the car that day, that she did not know where Jared got the keys, that there was no regular place where she would leave the keys, and that she constantly hid the keys)). Andrea also admitted speaking with her insurer following the collision, but claimed ignorance whether the conversation was recorded or when the conversations occurred. (*Id.* at 26:12-19).

In fact, Andrea furthered the ruse shortly after her first deposition by filing a Motion for Summary Judgment claiming it was undisputed she did not give Jared permission to drive her car on January 2, 2011. (See Defendant Andrea Awerbach's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, on file with this Court) Again, this motion was made while Andrea was actively concealing evidence that contradicted her motion. Andrea ultimately withdrew her Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Andrea was deposed again on October 24, 2014, and again testified extensively to

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material information that clearly contradicted the claims note, which, at that point, had still not yet been uncovered by Emilia's counsel. (See e.g., Andrea Awerbach's Depo. Tran. Vol II (10/24/14), at 82:1-18, attached as Exhibit 6 (testifying she hid the keys)). As detailed below, the withheld information did not come to light until Emilia independently obtained it from Andrea's insurer. E.

THE HIDDEN CLAIMS NOTE, WHICH WAS UNCOVERED ONLY THROUGH THE DILIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL, CONTRADICTED ANDREA'S DEPOSITION TESTIMONY.

Emilia discovered the concealed claims note on November 10, 2014, when Andrea's insurer, Liberty Mutual, produced the note in response to Emilia's subpoena duces tecum. The Liberty Mutual adjustor who created the note subsequently testified to the note's authenticity and confirmed the note accurately memorialized the adjustor's January 17, 2011, conversation with Andrea. (See Teresa Meraz's Depo. Transcript (11/10/14), at 15:19-23, attached as Exhibit 7).

The contents of the concealed note contradict Andrea's adamant testimony at both of her depositions, wherein she vehemently claimed (i) that she constantly hid her keys for fear that her drug abusing son might have access to the car, (ii) that she never gave Jared permission to drive her vehicle, and (iii) that she had no idea how Jared obtained the keys on the day of the crash. The surreptitiously concealed portions of the claims note establish that Andrea told her insurer days after the crash that she had previously let Jared drive her car, she gave him the keys earlier in the day, and she usually kept the keys on the mantle. Amazingly, when Andrea was asked under oath about Jared claiming Andrea left the keys out, Andrea claimed her son was mistaken. (See Andrea Awerbach's Depo. Tran. Vol II (10/24/14), at 161:9-19, attached as Exhibit 6). It is clear, however, that Andrea was changing her story and trying to cover for herself once she understood the legal ramifications of permissive use.

ANDREA IMPROPERLY AMENDS HER DISCOVERY RESPONSE. F.

Conveniently, on October 20, 2014, almost eighteen months after Andrea admitted in her Responses to Plaintiff's Requests for Admissions that she gave Jared permission to use her vehicle on January 2, 2011, and only after Andrea changed counsel, Andrea attempted to improperly modify the aforementioned response, without leave of court, to state that "Andrea admits she learned after the accident that Jared Awerbach had operated her vehicle on January 2, 2011 but

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Andrea denies she gave him permission." (See Defendant Andrea Awerbach's Correction to her Responses to Request for Admissions, Req., no. 2, attached as Exhibit 8).

This improper and ineffective attempt to amend was of no concern to Emilia. The issue was rendered moot shortly thereafter as a result of Judge Allf entering the finding of permissive use based on Andrea's discovery sanctions, as set forth below.

JUDGE ALLF UNAMBIGUOUSLY MADE A CONCLUSIVE FINDING OF PERMISSIVE G. USE IN TWO SEPARATE ORDERS.

On December 2, 2014, Emilia filed a motion to strike Andrea's answer based on Andrea's intentional concealment of the claims note. See Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Andrea Awerbach's Answer, on file with this Court. On February 25, 2015, Judge Allf granted Emilia's motion in part and issued a written decision (drafted by Judge Allf, not counsel) providing in relevant part:

> COURT FURTHER FINDS after review the Court took Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendant Andrea Awerbach's Answer under submission on January 15, 2015. Plaintiff moves to strike Defendant Andrea's answer under NRCP 37(b)(C) for conduct in discovery relating to concealment of an entry on her insurance claim log. COURT FURTHER FINDS after review that striking the answer in [sic] inappropriate because Plaintiff became aware of the concealed entry during discovery and was able to conduct a deposition of the claims adjustor, but a lesser sanction is warranted. FURTHER FINDS after review Andrea gave her son permission to use the car and a finding of permissive use is appropriate because the claims note was concealed improperly, was relevant, and was willfully withheld by Defendant Andrea.

(See Decision and Order, filed with this Court February 25, 2015 (emphasis added), attached as Exhibit 9) On March 13, 2015, Andrea filed a motion seeking reconsideration of the Court's order. (See Defendant Andrea Awerbach's Motion for Relief from Final Court Order (3/13/15), on file with this Court). The Court denied Andrea's motion and issued a second written decision, again drafted by Judge Allf, not counsel:

> COURT FURTHER FINDS after review that here the Court did consider the Ribeiro factors and did enter the less severe sanction of finding there was permissive use rather than striking Defendant Andrea's answer as requested by Plaintiff's Motion. The finding of permissive use specifically relates to the content of the improperly withheld claims note, which included a statement by Defendant

Andrea that she had given Defendant Jared permission to use her car at the time of the accident. The finding of permissive use does not prevent adjudication on the merits because Plaintiff still maintains the burden of showing causation and damages. The withholding of the note and the misleading privilege log was willful, and sanctions are necessary to "deter the both the parties and future litigants from similar abuses." Id. Although the note was withheld by previous counsel, Defendant Andrea's deposition testimony at both of her depositions was contrary to her statement to her insurance carrier. The sanction was crafted to provide a fair result to both parties, given the severity of the issue.

(See Decision and Order (4/27/15) (emphasis added), attached as Exhibit 10)

Neither of Judge Allf's two written orders is ambiguous, and neither mentions a rebuttable presumption. Moreover, even if the first order was ambiguous, it was unmistakably clarified through Judge Allf's second order denying reconsideration. The parties relied on Judge Allf's orders for the next year and prepared for trial believing the issue of permissive use was resolved and no longer an issue for trial. This governed the totality of the parties' trial preparation, including drafting motions in limine and making crucial strategic decisions regarding witnesses, evidence, and trial presentation.

H. JUDGE ALLF RECUSES HERSELF.

On August 27, 2015, Judge Allf recused herself because of a conflict with Jared's newly associated counsel, Randall Tindall. (*See* Notice of Department Reassignment, on file with this Court) On September 8, 2015, Emilia requested Mr. Tindall be disqualified and the action reassigned to Judge Allf because she was familiar with the case, the action was on the eve of trial, and it was improper for new counsel to be hired knowing his retention would result in recusal based on prior recusals by Judge Allf (*i.e.*, forum shopping) (*See* Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Defendant Jared Awerbach's Counsel Randall Tindall and Motion for Reassignment to Department 27 on Order Shortening Time (9/8/15), on file with this Court). During the September 15, 2015, hearing on Emilia's motion, this Court denied Emilia's request to reassign the case back to Judge Allf, but made it clear: "I'm going to follow what her rulings were." (*See* Sep. 15, 2015 Hearing Transcript, at 20:19:20, attached as Exhibit 11)

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I. THIS COURT REVERSES JUDGE ALLF'S ORDERS ON PERMISSIVE USE ON THE FIRST DAY OF JURY SELECTION.

On February 8, 2016, one year after Judge Allf issued her sanction order, ten months after she reaffirmed that order, six months after Judge Allf recused herself from the action, and a half day into jury selection, this Court overruled both of Judge Allf's permissive use orders, *sua sponte*:

THE COURT: ... We're outside the presence of the jury. I know that one of the things that you guys wanted me to tell you how we're going to handle is this issue of permissive use. So I talked to Judge Allf this morning to try to figure out what was her intention when she entered that order. I don't think she understood the difference between permissive use and auto negligent entrustment. That being said, it was her intention that her ruling would result in a rebuttable presumption, not a determination as a matter of law, even though that's what the order says. I'm not going to change from permissive use to negligent entrustment, even though I think that's probably what she envisioned. But I am going to make it a rebuttal presumption as it relates to the permissive use. So -- and that's based upon what her intention was.

(See Feb. 8, 2016, Hearing Transcript, at 61:8-25 (emphasis added), attached as Exhibit 12) The reversal was based upon a discussion with Judge Allf (who had long ago recused herself due to a conflict and should no longer had been influencing the rulings of this court). Moreover, it is without dispute that the Court's decision contradicts the plain language of both of the orders drafted by Judge Allf:

MR. ROBERTS: -- I'm somewhat taken aback by this. We weren't there at the time. So I've been mainly relying on the order in preparing to try the case. The order says nothing about rebuttable presumption. It says that permissive use is found as matter of law as a sanction.

THE COURT: I know.

(*Id.* at 63:11-17)

Even Andrea's counsel (the primary beneficiary of the reversal) recognized the parties' inability to anticipate a reversal of the permissive use order in preparing for trial:

MR. MAZZEO: But it does throw a wrench in the works because we didn't anticipate as -- as we're preparing for trial, I'm sure both sides were not looking at this case in terms of, okay, what evidence do we need now to rebut the ruling on permissive use.

(*Id.* at 62:20-63:1)

200, 400 020.200 00011)

J. EMILIA FILES A BRIEF ASKING THE COURT TO RECONSIDER ITS DECISION.

On February 10, 2016, two days after this Court's oral pronouncement of his intention to *sua sponte* amend Judge Allf's prior orders, and before he drafted an order officially amending the orders, Emilia filed a brief asking the court to reconsider its decision. (*See* Plaintiff's Trial Brief Regarding Permissive Use (2/10/16), attached as Exhibit 13). Emilia explained in detail how permission had been established as a matter of law by Judge Allf's orders, by Andrea's Answer to the original Complaint, and by her permissive use admission. (*See generally id.*) Plaintiff's counsel also argued these points in open court. (*See* Trial Transcript (2/10/16), at 139:24-143:11, attached as Exhibit 14). The Court did not issue an order from the bench. (*Id.* at 147:19-148:2). On February 12, 2016, the Court filed an Order he drafted modifying Judge Allf's prior orders, which reversed Judge Allf's sanction that permissive use was established as a matter of law; and, imposing a rebuttable presumption that permissive use was established against Andrea Awerbach. (*See* Order Modifying Prior Order of Judge Allf (2/12/16), attached as Exhibit 15). The 2/12/16 Order did not address Plaintiff's argument with regard to Andrea's permissive use admission. (*See generally id.*)

K. ANDREA TESTIFIES ABOUT THE ADMISSIONS.

At trial, Andrea testified that in her written response to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions, Request No. 2, which stated, "[a]dmit that Jared Awerbach was operating your vehicle on January 2nd, 2011, with your permission;" her "attorney admitted this on her behalf." (*See* Trial Transcript (3/7/16), at 115:13-18, attached as Exhibit 16)

L. EMILIA ASKS FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.

Also on March 7, 2016, once both sides had rested, counsel for Plaintiff requested a directed verdict on the issue of permissive use. (See Trial Transcript (3/7/16), at 146:25-148:25) attached as Exhibit 16). Counsel addressed the lack of "evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that [Andrea], indeed, met [her] burden of proof" as it related to the 2/12/16 Order establishing a rebuttable presumption of permissive use. (See id. at 146:25-146:13). Counsel further stressed how Andrea's permissive use "admission conclusively established permissive as a matter of law,"

entitling plaintiff "to directed verdict [i.e., judgment as a matter of law] on that motion." (Id. at 147:15-20) This Court denied Plaintiff's request. (Id. at 148:25).

M. THE JURY RECEIVES JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 14, ESSENTIALLY OBLIGATING THEM TO FIND PERMISSIVE USE HAD BEEN CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED.

On March 8, 2016, the jury received the Jury Instructions. (*See* Jury Instructions (3/8/16), attached as Exhibit 17) Jury Instruction No. 14 stated as follows:

In this case, as permitted by law, Plaintiff, Emilia Garcia, served on the Defendant, Andrea Awerbach, a written request for the admission of the truth of certain matters of fact. You will regard as being conclusively proved all such matters of fact which were expressly admitted by the Defendant, Andrea Awerbach, or which Defendant, Andrea Awerbach, failed to deny.

In other words, Jury Instruction No. 14, coupled with Andrea's testimony regarding her permissive use admission, gave the jury with no choice but to find that permissive use had been conclusively established.

N. THE JURY RETURNS A VERDICT OF "NO PERMISSIVE USE"

On March 10, 2016, the jury returned a verdict. (See Jury Verdict (2/10/16), attached as Exhibit 18) In spite of Jury Instruction No. 14 and Andrea's testimony regarding her permission use admission the jury found that that Andrea did not give permission to Jared to use her vehicle on January 2, 2011. (See id. at 2)

IV. ARGUMENT

A. A RECUSED JUDGE MUST NOT HAVE ANY INFLUENCE ON A CASE AFTER RECUSAL.

"Patently a judge who is disqualified from acting must not be able to affect the determination of any case from which he is barred." *Arnold v. E. Air Lines*, 712 F.2d 899, 904 (4th Cir. 1983); *see also Doe v. Louisiana Supreme Court*, 1991 WL 121211 (E.D. La. June 24, 1991). "[C]ourts have almost uniformly held that a trial judge who has recused [herself] should take no other action in the case except the necessary ministerial acts to have the case transferred to another

judge." *Doddy v. Oxy USA, Inc.*, 101 F.3d 448, 457 (5th Cir. 1996); *see also Stringer v. United States*, 233 F.2d 947, 948 (9th Cir. 1956) (acknowledging that after disqualification, judges are confined to performing only the "mechanical duties of transferring the case to another judge or other essential ministerial duties short of adjudication"); *Moody v. Simmons*, 858 F.2d 137, 143 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that once a judge has disqualified herself, she may only perform the ministerial duties necessary to transfer the case to another judge any may not enter any further orders in the case, except for "housekeeping" ones), *cert. denied*, 489 U.S. 1078, (1989); *El Fenix de P.R. v. The M/Y Johanny*, 36 F.3d 136, 142 (1st Cir. 1994) ("recused judge should take no further action except to enable administrative reassignment of the case").

Once Judge Allf made the decision to disqualify herself, she was not permitted to have any influence on this case. Her recusal ended her involvement and any further influence by Judge Allf that caused this court to *modify* her prior orders was improper and constitutes reversible error. Moreover, as set forth in more detail below, Judge Allf's recollection as to her intention when initially entering the permissive use order one year ago is conclusively rebutted by her second order on permissive use. A Judge's belated recollection of her intention cannot prevail over the plain terms of her written order. This is a formula for anarchy, uncertainty and loss of faith in the integrity of the judicial system.

B. THE COURT'S DECISION REWARDS ANDREA'S IMPROPER DISCOVERY TACTICS.

Courts have recognized that "[p]rior interlocutory orders should be vacated or amended by a successor judge only after careful consideration, especially if there is evidence of judge shopping." Legget v. Kumar, 212 Ill. App. 3d 255, 274 (Ill. 1991). "In the context of discovery, it is particularly appropriate for a judge before whom a motion for reconsideration is pending to exercise considerable restraint in reversing or modifying previous rulings. A successor judge should revise or modify previous discovery rulings only if there is a change of circumstances or additional facts which would warrant such action." Id. In other words, it is improper to reverse an order the parties "justifiably relied upon . . . for over a year . . . as they prepared the case for trial." Franklin v. Franklin, 858 So. 2d 110, 122 (Miss. 2003) (Mississippi Supreme Court overturning trial court's order that reversed the original trial court's ruling since the original ruling was made within the

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judge's discretion and the "lawyers justifiably relied upon th[e] order for over a year . . . as they prepared the case for trial"; and further finding that the reversal of the original trial court's ruling "reache[d] an inequitable result"). This case is no different.

The Court's decision to overturn Judge Allf's long standing orders rewards the intentional concealment of evidence and unfairly prejudices Emilia. Permissive use has been established three times in this case and has now been changed (or attempted to be changed) each time:

First, Andrea admitted permissive use in her Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint, only to later switch positions and claim the complete opposite in her Answer to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.

Second, Andrea admitted permissive use in her responses to Plaintiff's requests for admissions, again only to later switch positions almost one and a half years later, and after retaining new counsel, to claim no permissive use. Of great significance, however, Andrea's attempted "amendment" of her binding admission fails as a matter of law as "[a]ny matter admitted under [Rule 36] is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission." NRCP 36(b) (emphasis added). Since Andrea admitted permissive use and never filed a motion to change her admission, Andrea must be bound by the admission, irrespective of any modifications to Judge Allf's long standing orders. It was too late to file a motion once jury selection started.

Finally, Judge Allf conclusively found permissive use based on Andrea's blatant discovery violations and issued two separate orders establishing the permissive use, only to have this court reverse the rulings.

Allowing Andrea to dispute permissive use allowed Andrea to continue committing the same conduct that resulted in the Court's sanctions in the first place. By the time Emilia independently found the hidden claims note in late November, 2014, Emilia had already deposed Andrea twice. Each time, Andrea's testimony contradicted the hidden claims note and Jared's testimony that he obtained the keys from the counter of their home. In other words, Andrea claimed she did not give Jared permission, hid evidence that showed otherwise, and prevented Emilia from discovering the evidence that directly contradicted her deposition testimony. That was the basis for Judge Allf's sanction orders. Judge Allf's orders preventing Andrea from challenging 938-3838

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permissive use at trial entered the only logical sanction that could have been imposed at that point because it was Andrea's concealment and deceptive deposition testimony that prevented Emilia from being able to properly conduct discovery on the issue. It was also a lesser sanction than the one sought by Emilia. Consequently, it would be patently inequitable to allow Andrea to dispute permission after she (1) intentionally concealed critical evidence that would allow Emilia to prove permissive use and (2) admitted permissive in her Answer and responses to requests for admissions. Allowing Andrea to challenge permissive use gave her the best of both worlds: she was allowed to dispute permission at trial after thwarting Emilia's attempts to prove permissive use by hiding evidence during discovery.

EMILIA HAS RELIED ON JUDGE ALLF'S ORDERS IN PREPARING FOR TRIAL. C.

The Court's intention to reverse Judge Allf's sanction order is also improper because the parties relied on the order for an entire year. See Franklin, 858 So. 2d at 122. Emilia adjusted her discovery strategy accordingly, and prepared for trial for a year in reliance on the Court's order that she would not have to prove permission at trial. In other words, after Judge Allf issued her order and confirmed it in a second order, Emilia no longer needed to seek leave to conduct discovery on the issue, and, as a result, she did not seek to re-open discovery, she did not seek to re-depose Andrea or Jared, and she did not seek testimony from other knowledgeable witnesses. Emilia appropriately relied on the Court's order rendering permissive use a non-issue for trial. Now, after jury selection had started and after the parties spent an enormous amount of time preparing for trial not knowing permissive use was an issue, Emilia's entire trial strategy had to be readjusted without the ability to vet evidence that would have been obtainable in discovery. Emilia had to be prepared to rebut Andrea's testimony regarding permissive use, despite the fact that Andrea's prior deposition testimony is unhelpful because it consists of a string of untruths that misled Emilia throughout years of discovery.

"PERMISSIVE USED" SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AN ISSUE FOR THE JURY BECAUSE D. ANDREA'S ADMISSION CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF LAW THIS ISSUE.

NRCP 36(b) states, in part, "[a]ny matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission."

(emphasis added) In this case, Andrea expressly admitted Jared was driving her vehicle on January 2, 2011 with her permission. (See Defendant Andrea Awerbach's Responses to Request for Admissions, Req., no. 2, attached as Exhibit 3). Although Andrea attempted to recant her admission, she did not file a motion seeking permission to withdraw or amend her admission. In fact, prior to trial Andrea never sought leave of court to amend her permissive use admission. It was not until Plaintiff had rested her case in chief, that Andrea's counsel orally moved for permission to amend the response. This motion was unequivocally denied. Consequently, Andrea's admission conclusively establishes as matter of law that she gave permission to Jared to driver her car on January 2, 2011. Thus, the issue of permissive use should have never been presented to the jury. As such, Plaintiff renews her motion for judgment as a matter of law regarding permissive use.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Emilia requests that this Court issue an Order finding that "permissive use" has been established as a matter of law and enter judgment with regard to finding Andrea liable for negligent entrustment and joint liability pursuant to NRS 41.440.

DATED this 26th day of May, 2016.

D. Lee Roberts, Jr., Esq.
Timothy A. Mott, Esq.
Marisa Rodriguez-Shapoval, Esq.
Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins,
Gunn & Dial, LLC.
6385 S. Rainbow Blvd., Suite 400

6385 S. Rainbow Blvd., Suite 400 Las Vegas, Nevada 89118

Attorneys for Plaintiff Emilia Garcia

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Adam D. Smith, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 9690
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4795 South Durango Drive
Las Vegas, Nevada 89147

Attorneys for Plaintiff Emilia Garcia

Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins, Gunn & Dial, LLC 6385 S. Rainbow Boulevard, Suite 400 Las Vegas, Nevada 89118

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 26th day of May, 2016, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF
LAW was electronically filed and served on counsel through the Court's electronic service system
pursuant to Administrative Order 14-2 and N.E.F.C.R. 9, via the electronic mail addresses noted
below, unless service by another method is stated or noted:

Peter Mazzeo, Esq.

pmazzeo@mazzeolawfirm.com

MAZZEO LAW, LLC

631 S. Tenth St.

Las Vegas, NV 89101

Attorneys for Defendant Jared Awerbach Attorney for Defendant Andrea Awerbach

Corey M. Eschweiler, Esq. Adam D. Smith, Esq. asmith@glenlerner.com
Craig A. Henderson, Esq. chenderson@glenlerner.com
GLEN J. LERNER & ASSOCIATES
4795 South Durango Drive
Las Vegas, NV 89147

Attorneys for Plaintiff Emilia Garcia

An Employee of WEINBERG, WHEELER, HUDGINS, GUNN & DIAL, LLC

CLERK OF THE COURT

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1	APEN
	D. Lee Roberts, Jr., Esq.
2	lroberts@wwhgd.com
	Nevada Bar No. 8877
3	Timothy A. Mott, Esq.
	tmott@wwhgd.com
4	Nevada Bar No. 12828
	Marisa Rodriguez-Shapoval, Esq.
5	mrodriguez-shapoval@wwhgd.com
	Nevada Bar No. 13234
6	WEINBERG, WHEELER, HUDGINS,
	GUNN & DIAL, LLC.
7	6385 S. Rainbow Blvd., Suite 400
_	Las Vegas, Nevada 89118
8	Telephone: (702) 938-3838
	Facsimile: (702) 938-3864
9	C DI : ::CC
	Attorneys for Plaintiff
10	Emilia Garcia
Į.	

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

EMILIA GARCIA, individually,

Plaintiff,

v.

JARED AWERBACH, individually; ANDREA AWERBACH, individually; DOES I – X, and ROE CORPORATIONS I – X, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: A-11-637772-c Dept. No.: 30

APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS: PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

Timothy A. Mott, Esq., a resident of the State of Nevada, declares as follows:

- 1. I am a licensed attorney currently in good standing to practice law in the state of Nevada and before this Court.
- 2. I am an attorney in the law firm of Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins, Gunn & Dial, LLC, 6385 South Rainbow Boulevard, Suite 400, Las Vegas, Nevada 89118, and I am one of the counsel representing Emilia Garcia, in this action.
- 3. I have personal knowledge of the matters contained in this declaration and am competent to testify regarding them.
 - 4. The exhibits below are true and correct copies as noted:

Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins, Gunn & Dial, LLC 6385 S. Rainbow Blvd., Suite 400 Las Vegas, Nevada 89118 (702) 938-3838

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Exhibit	<u>Description</u>				
1.	Complaint 03/25/2011				
2.	Defendants' Answer				
3.	Defendant Andrea Awerbach's Responses to Request for Admissions				
4.	Second Supplement to List of Witnesses and Documents and Tangible Items Produced at Early Case Conference				
5.	Selected pages of Deposition of Andrea Awerbach, Volume I, taken 09/12/2013				
6.	Selected pages of Deposition of Andrea Awerbach, Volume II, taken 10/24/2014				
7.	Selected pages of Deposition of Teresa Merez taken 11/10/2014				
8.	Defendant Andrea Awerbach's Correction to Her Responses to Request for Admissions				
9.	Decision and Order 02/25/2015				
10.	Decision and Order 04/27/2015				
11.	Hearing Transcript 09/15/2015				
12.	Hearing Transcript 02/08/2016				
13.	Plaintiff's Trial Brief Regarding Permissive Use 02/10/2016				
14.	Trial Transcript 02/10/2016				
15.	Order Modifying Prior Order 02/12/2016				
16.	Trial Transcript 03/07/2016				
17.	Jury Instructions 03/08/2016				

18.	Jury Verdict 02/10/2016

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

DATED this day of May, 2016.

D. Lee Roberts, Jr., Esq.
Timothy A. Mott, Esq.
Marisa Rodriguez-Shapoval, Esq.
Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins,
Gunn & Dial, LLC.
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Las Vegas, Nevada 89118

Attorneys for Plaintiff Emilia Garcia

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the <u>26th</u> day of May, 2016, a true and correct copy of the foregoing **APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS: PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW** was electronically filed and served on counsel through the Court's electronic service system pursuant to Administrative Order 14-2 and N.E.F.C.R. 9, via the electronic mail addresses noted below, unless service by another method is stated or noted:

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r Defendant bach

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chenderson@glenlerner.com

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Attorneys for Plaintiff Emilia Garcia Attorney for Defendant Andrea Awerbach

Peter Mazzeo, Esq.

An Employee of Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins, Gunn & Dial, LLC

EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 1

CIVIL COVER SHEET

Clark County, Nevada Case No. A-11-637772-C XXVIII

(Assigned by Clerk's Office) I. Party Information Plaintiff(s) (name/address/phone): EMILIA GARCIA Defendant(s) (name/address/phone): JARED AWERBACH, individually, ANDREA AWERBACH, individually, DOES I - X, and ROE CORPORATIONS I - X, inclusive Attorney (name/address/phone): THE POWELL LITIGATION GROUP; Paul D. Powell, Esq. Attorney (name/address/phone): 9525 Hillwood Drive, Suite 100 Las Vegas, NV 89134 UNKNOWN Arbitration Requested II. Nature of Controversy (Please check applicable bold category and applicable subcategory, if appropriate) Civil Cases Torts Real Property Negligence Product Liability Landlord/Tenant Negligence - Auto Product Liability/Motor Vehicle Unlawful Detainer Other Torts/Product Liability Negligence - Medical/Dental ☐ Title to Property ☐ Negligence - Premises Liability Intentional Misconduct Foreclosure ☐ Torts/Defamation (Libel/Slander) ☐ Interfere with Contract Rights (Slip/Fall) Liens Negligence - Other Quiet Title Employment Torts (Wrongful termination) Specific Performance Other Torts Condemnation/Eminent Domain Anti-trust ☐ Fraud/Misrepresentation Other Real Property Insurance Partition Legal Tort ☐ Planning/Zoning Unfair Competition Other Civil Filing Types Probate Appeal from Lower Court (also check Construction Defect Summary Administration applicable civil case box) Chapter 40 General Administration ☐ Transfer from Justice Court General ☐ Justice Court Civil Appeal Special Administration Breach of Contract Building & Construction Civil Writ Set Aside Estates Insurance Carrier Other Special Proceeding Trust/Conservatorships Commercial Instrument Other Civil Filing ☐ Individual Trustee Other Contracts/Acct/Judgment Compromise of Minor's Claim Collection of Actions Corporate Trustee Conversion of Property **Employment Contract** Damage to Property Other Probate Guarantee Employment Security Sale Contract Enforcement of Judgment Uniform Commercial Code Foreign Judgment - Civil Civil Petition for Judicial Review Other Personal Property Recovery of Property Other Administrative Law Department of Motor Vehicles Stockholder Suit Worker's Compensation Appeal Other Civil Matters III. Business Court Requested (Please check applicable category; for Clark or Washoe Counties only.) Enhanced Case Mgmt/Business Investments (NRS 104 Art. 8) ☐ NRS Chapters 78-88 Deceptive Trade Practices (NRS 598) Other Business Court Matters Commodities (NRS 90) Securities (NRS 90) Trademarks (NRS 600A) Signature of initiating party or representative

Nevada AOC -- Planning and Analysis Division

Form PA 201 Rev. 2.3E

1	COMP Paul D. Pourell, For					
2	Paul D. Powell, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 7488	Electronically Filed				
3	THE POWELL LITIGATION GROUP 9525 Hillwood Drive, Suite 100	03/25/2011 10:30:42 AN				
4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 (702) 288-7200	Alun D. Chrim				
5	(702) 288-7300 – FAX ppowell@powelllit.com					
6	Attorneys for EMILIA GARCIA	CLERK OF THE COURT				
7	DISTRICT	COURT				
8						
9	CLARK COUN'	IX, NEVADA				
10	EMILIA GARCIA,					
11	Plaintiff,) CASE NO.A - 11 - 637772 - C				
12	V\$.) DEPT. NO. XXVIII				
13	JARED AWERBACH, individually, ANDREA AWERBACH, individually, DOES I - X, and ROE					
14	CORPORATIONS I - X, inclusive,) <u>EMILIA GARCIA COMPLAINT</u>				
15	Defendants.					
16	Plaintiff EMILIA GARCIA, by and through	attorney of record, PAUL D. POWELL, ESQ				
17	of THE POWELL LITIGATION GROUP, complain	ns against Defendants as follows:				
18	GENERAL AL					
19						
20	1. That Plaintiff EMILIA GARCIA (hereinafter "Plaintiff") is, and at all times					
21	mentioned herein was, a resident of	the County of Clark, State of Nevada.				
23	2. That Defendant JARED AWERBAC	CH is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a				
24	resident of the County of Clark, Stat	e of Nevada.				
25	3. That Defendant ANDREA AWERB	ACH is, and at all times mentioned herein was. a				
26	resident of the County of Clark, Stat	e of Nevada.				
27						
28		f the Defendants designated herein as Doe or				
	Roe Corporations are presently unki	nown to Plaintiff at this time, who therefore sues				

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said Defendants by such fictitious names.	When the true names and capacities of
these defendants are ascertained, Plaintiff	will amend this Complaint accordingly

- 5. That at all times pertinent, Defendants were agents, servants, employees or joint venturers of every other Defendant herein, and at all times mentioned herein were acting within the scope and course of said agency, employment, or joint venture, with knowledge and permission and consent of all other named Defendants.
- That at all times mentioned herein, Plaintiff was the owner and operator of a 2001 6. Hyundai Santa Fe.
- That at all times mentioned herein Defendant JARED AWERBACH was the 7, operator of a 2007 Suzuki Forenza (hereinafter referred to as the "Vehicle").
- That at all times mentioned herein Defendant ANDREA AWERBACH was the 8. owner of the Vehicle.
- That on January 2, 2011, in Clark County, Nevada, Defendant JARED AWERBACH 9. negligently failed to yield to Plaintiff's right-of-way, causing a collision with Plaintiff.
- At the time of the crash, Defendant JARED AWERBACH was driving under the 10. influence of alcohol and/or an illegal drug substance.
- That as a direct and proximate result of the negligence of Defendant JARED 11. AWERBACH, Plaintiff sustained injuries to Plaintiff's shoulders, back, bodily limbs, organs and systems, all or some of which condition may be permanent and disabling, and all to Plaintiff's damage in a sum in excess of \$10,000.
- That as a direct and proximate result of the negligence of Defendant JARED 12. AWERBACH, Plaintiff received medical and other treatment for the aforementioned

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injuries	, and	that s	said	services,	care,	and	treatme	nt are	continuing	and	shall	continue
in the fu	iture,	all to	the the	damage	of Pl	ainti	ff.					

- 13. That as a direct and proximate result of the negligence of Defendant JARED AWERBACH, Plaintiff has been required to, and has limited occupational and recreational activities, which have caused and shall continue to cause Plaintiff loss of earning capacity, lost wages, physical impairment, mental anguish, and loss of enjoyment of life, in a presently unascertainable amount.
- That as a direct and proximate result of the negligence of Defendant JARED 14. AWERBACH, Plaintiff's vehicle was damaged and Plaintiff lost the use of that vehicle.
- 15. That as a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned negligence of all Defendants, Plaintiff has been required to engage the services of an attorney, incurring attorney's fees and costs to bring this action.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

- 16. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 15 of the Complaint as though said paragraphs were fully set forth herein.
- Defendant JARED AWERBACH owed Plaintiff a duty of care to operate the 17. Vehicle in a reasonable and safe manner. Defendant JARED AWERBACH breached that duty of care by striking Plaintiff's vehicle on the roadway. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of Defendant JARED AWERBACH, Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount in excess of \$10,000.00.
- 18. The actions or omissions of Defendant JARED AWERBACH, at least in part, were willful and/or wanton and oppressive, in conscious disregard of the safety of others,

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and therefore, an award of punitive damages is appropriate in an amount to be determined at trial.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

- 19. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 18 of the Complaint as though said paragraphs were fully set forth herein.
- 20. The acts of Defendant JARED AWERBACH as described herein violated the traffic laws of the State of Nevada and Clark County, constituting negligence per se, and Plaintiff has been damaged as a direct and proximate result thereof in an amount in excess of \$10,000.00.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

- 21. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 20 of the Complaint as though said paragraphs were fully set forth herein.
- 22. Defendant ANDREA AWERBACH was the owner, or had custody and control, of the Vehicle.
- 23. That Defendant ANDREA AWERBACH, did entrust the Vehicle to the control of Defendant JARED AWERBACH.
- 24. That Defendant JARED AWERBACH was incompetent, inexperienced, or reckless in the operation of the Vehicle.
- 25. That Defendant ANDREA AWERBACH actually knew or, by the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that Defendant JARED AWERBACH was incompetent, inexperienced, or reckless in the operation of motor vehicles.
- 26. That Plaintiff was injured as a proximate consequence of the negligence and incompetence of Defendant JARED AWERBACH, concurring with the negligent

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entrustment	of the	Vehicle by	Defendant ANDREA	AWERBACH
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That as a direct and proximate cause of the negligent entrustment of the Vehicle by 27. Defendant ANDREA AWERBACH to Defendant JARED AWERBACH, Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount in excess of \$10,000.00.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, expressly reserving the right to amend this complaint prior to or at the time of trial of this action to insert those items of damage not yet fully ascertainable, prays judgment against all Defendants, and each of them, as follows:

- For general damages sustained by Plaintiff in an amount in excess of \$10,000.00; 1.
- For special damages sustained by Plaintiff in an amount in excess of \$10,000.00; 2.
- For punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial; 3.
- For property damages sustained by Plaintiff; 4.
- For reasonable attorney's fees and costs; 5.
- For interest at the statutory rate; and 6.
- For such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

day of March 2011.

THE POWELL LITIGATION GROUP

Paul D Powell, Esq.

Nevada Bar No. 7488

9525 Hillwood Drive, Suite 100

Las Vegas, Nevada 89134

Attorneys for EMILIA GARCIA

EXHIBIT 2

EXHIBIT 2

Electronically Filed 01/23/2012 04:38:00 PM

. 1	ANS	Alm to Chrim				
2	Alexandra B. M ^c Leod Nevada Bar No. 8185	CLERK OF THE COURT				
3	BRADY, VORWERCK, RYDER & CASPINO A Law Corporation					
4	2795 East Desert Inn Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89121-3635					
5	Telephone: (702) 697-6500					
6	Fax: (702) 697-6505 amcleod@bvrclaw.com					
7	Attorneys for Defendants Jared Awerbach and Andrea Awerbach					
8						
9	DISTRIC	CT COURT				
10	CLARK COU	NTY, NEVADA				
11						
12	EMILIA GARCIA,	Case No.: A-11-637772-C Dept. No.: XXVIII				
13	Plaintiffs,	•				
14	V.	[ELECTRONIC FILING CASE]				
15	JARED AWERBACH, individually,	DEFENDANTS' ANSWER TO COMPLAINT				
16	ANDREA AWERBACH, individually,	CONTRA ESTABLIA				
17	DOES I – X, and ROE CORPORATIONS I – X, inclusive,					
18	Defendants.					
19						
20						
21	COMES NOW Defendants, JARED AV	VERBACH and ANDREA AWERBACH, by and				
22	through their counsel of record, ALEXANDRA B. McLEOD, ESQ., of the law firm of BRADY,					
23	VORWERCK, RYDER & CASPINO, and hereby answer the allegations of Plaintiff's					
24	Complaint as follows:					
25	1. In answering Paragraphs 1, 4 and 6 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendants state that they					
26	do not have sufficient knowledge or information upon which to base a belief as to the truth or					
27	validity of the allegations contained therein, and upon such grounds, deny each and every					
28	allegation contained therein,					
BRADY, VORWERCK RYDER & CASPINO		1				
2795 East Desert Inn Road Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89121-3635	DEFENDANTS' ANSV	VER TO COMPLAINT				

2.	In ans	wering	Paragraphs	2,	3, ′	7, 8	, 22	and	23	of Plaintiff's	Complaint,	Defendant
admit the	allegati	ons con	tained there	in.								

- 3. In answering Paragraphs 5, 9, 10, 17, 18, 20, 24, 25 and 26 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendants deny each and every allegation contained therein.
- 4. In answering Paragraphs 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 27 of Plaintiff's Complaint, these answering Defendants deny as to the claims of negligence and/or gross negligence of Defendants, but are without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the residual of said allegations contained therein, and therefore deny the same.
- 5. In answering Paragraphs 16, 19, and 21, Defendants repeat and reallege their answers to the preceding Paragraphs, respectively, and incorporate the same as if fully set forth herein.

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim against these answering Defendants upon which relief can be granted.

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiff's Complaint fails to join a party necessary for just adjudication under NRCP 19.

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiff had notice of all the facts and acts of Defendants set forth in the Complaint, and has thereby been guilty of laches as should in equity bar the Plaintiff from maintaining this action.

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiff has failed to mitigate Plaintiff's alleged injuries and damages, if any.

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

That, at the time and place alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint, and for a period of time prior thereto, Plaintiff did not exercise ordinary care, caution or prudence for the protection of Plaintiff's own safety and the injuries and damages complained of by the Plaintiff in the Complaint, if any, were directly and proximately caused or contributed to by the fault, failure to act, carelessness and negligence of the Plaintiff herself and, as such, is responsible for comparative fault in excess of fifty percent (50%), thereby exonerating any liability as against

BRADY, VORWERCK RYDER & CASPINO 2795 East Desert Inn Road Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89121-3635

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these Defendants. Should Plaintiff's comparative fault be assessed at less than fifty percent (50%), these Defendants are entitled to reduce Plaintiff's recovery accordingly.

SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

At all times referenced in Plaintiff's Complaint on file herein, and for a period of time prior thereto, Defendant JARED AWERBACH was operating a vehicle with due care and caution. All damages as allegedly sustained by Plaintiff in the Complaint on file herein were caused by the negligence, carelessness or want of care among the known third parties.

SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The damages and injuries sustained by Plaintiff, as alleged in the Complaint herein, if any, were the result of an unavoidable accident.

EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

That at all times referenced in Plaintiff's Complaint on file herein, and for a period of time prior thereto, to the best of the knowledge of Defendant ANDREA AWERBACH, Defendant JARED AWERBACH was known to be a safe driver and to operate the vehicle with due care and caution. Defendant ANDREA AWERBACH had no knowledge nor should have had knowledge that JARED AWERBACH was an unsafe driver.

NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

That an award of punitive damages would be unconstitutional, in that it would deny the answering Defendants their rights as guaranteed in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of both the United States and Nevada Constitutions.

TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

That an award of punitive damages would be unconstitutional, in that it would deny the answering Defendants, in theory and application, their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment protections of the United States and Nevada Constitutions.

ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

No award of punitive damages can be made against this answering Defendants pursuant to NRS 41.031, et seq.

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BRADY, VORWERCK RYDER & CASPINO 2795 East Desert Inn Road Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89121-3635

TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

That an award of punitive damages against the answering Defendants under NRS 42.010 would be unconstitutional, as such statute is a "vague sentencing provision."

THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

If punitive damages are recoverable in this case, which the answering Defendants specifically deny, such are criminal punishment in nature, and must be proven by at least clear and convincing evidence. Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts sufficient to satisfy Plaintiff's burden of proof by convincing evidence that Defendants engaged in any conduct that would support an award of punitive damages.

FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

If punitive damages are recoverable in this case which the answering Defendants specifically deny, such an award cannot be disproportionate to the actor's(s') alleged misconduct.

FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

No award of punitive damages can be awarded against these answering Defendants under the facts and circumstances alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint.

LAST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Pursuant to NRCP 11, as amended, all possible affirmative defenses may not have been alleged herein insofar as sufficient facts were not available after reasonable inquiry upon the filing of Defendants' Answer, and therefore Defendants reserve the right to amend this answer to allege additional affirmative defenses if subsequent investigation warrants.

WHEREFORE, Defendants prays that the Plaintiff take nothing by reason of the Complaint on file herein, and that Defendants recover from Plaintiff a reasonable attorney's fee,

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BRADY, VORWERCK RYDER & CASPINO 2795 East Oeset Inn Road Suite 200 Las Vegas, NV 89121-3635

1	costs and disbursements in this action, and, for such other and further relief as the Court may
2	deem proper.
3	DATED: January 23, 2012 BRADY, VORWERCK, RYDER & CASPINO
4	
5	A39164132
6	Alexandra B. M. Leod
7	Nevada Bar No. 8185 2795 East Desert Inn Road, Suite 200
8	Las Vegas, Nevada 89121-3635 Telephone: (702) 697-6500
9	Fax: (702) 697-6505 amcieod@byrclaw.com
10	Attorneys for Defendants, JARED AWERBACH and
11	ANDREA AWERBACH
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Brady, Vorwerck	
RYDER & CASPINO 2795 East Desert Inn Road	DEFENDANTS ANSWED TO COMPLAINT
Sulte 200 Las Vegas, NV 89121-3635	DEFENDANTS' ANSWER TO COMPLAINT


1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23 day of January, 2011, I served the foregoing
3	documents described as DEFENDANTS' ANSWER TO COMPLAINT, on the parties set
4	forth below by:
5	VIA U.S. MAIL: by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with
6	postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at Las Vegas, Nevada.
7	VIA FACSIMILE: pursuant to E.D.C.R. Rule 7.26, by sending a true and correct copy
8	to counsel on the attached service list at the facsimile numbers specified.
9	□ VIA PERSONAL OR HAND DELIVERY:
10	A James TD. Consists
11	Adam D. Smith Glen Lerner & Associates
12	4795 South Durango Drive Las Vegas NV 89147
13	(702) 877-1500 (702) 877-0110 - FAX
14	Attorneys for Plaintiff
15	
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17	Kim & aller In
18	An employee of
19	BRÀDY, VORWERCK, RYDER & CASPINO
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BRADY, VORWERCK RYDER & CASPINO 2795 East Desert Inn Road	6

DEFENDANTS' ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

Sulte 200 Las Vegas, NV 89121-3635

EXHIBIT 3

EXHIBIT 3



add meaning to known facts, as well as establish entirely new factual conclusions and legal contentions, all of which may lead to substantial additions to, changes in, and variations from the responses herein set forth. The following responses are without prejudice to Responding Party's right to produce evidence of any subsequently discovered fact or facts which this Responding Party may later recall or discover. Responding Party accordingly reserves its right to change any and all responses herein as investigation is conducted, additional facts are ascertained, analyses are made, legal research is concluded and contentions are made. The responses contained herein are made in a good faith effort to supply as much factual information as is presently known but should in no way be to the prejudice of this Responding Party in relation to further discovery, research or analysis. These responses are made solely for the purpose of this action.

RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS

REQUEST NO. 1:

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Admit that on January 2, 2011, a traffic accident occurred between an automobile owned by you, and an automobile driven by Plaintiff Emilia Garcia in Clark County, Nevada.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 1:

Admit

REQUEST NO. 2:

Admit JARED AWERBACH was operating your vehicle on January 2, 2011, with your permission.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 2:

Admit

REQUEST NO. 3:

Admit JARED AWERBACH's negligent operation of your vehicle was the proximate cause of the subject accident occurring between Plaintiff Emilia Garcia and Jared Awerbach on January 2, 2011.


RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 3:

Denied

REQUEST NO. 4:

Admit Plaintiff suffered injuries as a result of the crash.

DEFENDANT ANDREA AWERBACH'S RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

- 11	
2	I hereby certify that on the Laday of May, 2012, I forwarded a copy of the above and
3	foregoing DEFENDANT ANDREA AWERBACH'S RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR
4	ADMISSIONS as follows:
567	by depositing in the United States mail, first-class postage prepaid, at Las Vegas, Nevada, enclosed in a sealed envelope, pursuant to NRCP 5(b)(2)(B) and EDCR 7.26(a)(1) [FRCP 5(b)(2)(C)]; and/or
8	by facsimile transmission pursuant to NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) and EDCR 7.26(a)(3) [FRCP 5(b)(2)(E)]; as indicated below; and/or
9	by electronic transmission [via CM/ECF], pursuant to NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) and EDCR 7.26(a)(4) [FRCP 5(b)(2)(E)]; and/or
10	by email as indicated below pursuant to NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) [FRCP 5(b)(2)(E)];
11 12	TO:
13	Adam D. Smith, Esq.
14	Glen J. Lerner & Associates 4795 South Durango Drive
15 16	Las Vegas, Nevada 89147 (702) 877-1500 (702) 933-7043 – Fax Attorneys for Plaintiff
17	Attorneys for 1 taintiff
18	Swan R Sondetur
19	Employee of BRADY, VORWERCK, RYDER & CASPINO
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	DEFENDANT ANDREA AWERBACH'S RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS

EXHIBIT 4

EXHIBIT 4

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1	APEN
	D. Lee Roberts, Jr., Esq.
2	lroberts@wwhgd.com
3	Nevada Bar No. 8877 Timothy A. Mott, Esq.
ر	tmott@wwhgd.com
4	Nevada Bar No. 12828
	Marisa Rodriguez-Shapoval, Esq.
5	mrodriguez-shapoval@wwhgd.com
	Nevada Bar No. 13234
6	WEINBERG, WHEELER, HUDGINS,
_	GUNN & DIAL, LLC.
7	6385 S. Rainbow Blvd., Suite 400
	Las Vegas, Nevada 89118
8	Telephone: (702) 938-3838
	Facsimile: (702) 938-3864
9	Attorneys for Plaintiff
10	Emilia Garcia
IU	Emilia Garcia
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12	
	CI
13	EMILIA CADOLA in dini decelle

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

EMILIA GARCIA, individually,

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No.: A-11-637772-c
Dept. No.: 30

JARED AWERBACH, individually; ANDREA AWERBACH, individually; DOES I – X, and ROE CORPORATIONS I – X, inclusive,

Defendants.

APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS: PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

Timothy A. Mott, Esq., a resident of the State of Nevada, declares as follows:

- 1. I am a licensed attorney currently in good standing to practice law in the state of Nevada and before this Court.
- 2. I am an attorney in the law firm of Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins, Gunn & Dial, LLC, 6385 South Rainbow Boulevard, Suite 400, Las Vegas, Nevada 89118, and I am one of the counsel representing Emilia Garcia, in this action.
- 3. I have personal knowledge of the matters contained in this declaration and am competent to testify regarding them.
 - 4. The exhibits below are true and correct copies as noted:

Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins, Gunn & Dial, LLC 6385 S. Rainbow Blvd., Suite 400 Las Vegas, Nevada 89118 (702) 938-3838

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Exhibit	Description
1.	Complaint 03/25/2011
2.	Defendants' Answer
3.	Defendant Andrea Awerbach's Responses to Request for Admissions
4.	Second Supplement to List of Witnesses and Documents and Tangible Items Produced at Early Case Conference
5.	Selected pages of Deposition of Andrea Awerbach, Volume I, taken 09/12/2013
6.	Selected pages of Deposition of Andrea Awerbach, Volume II, taken 10/24/2014
7.	Selected pages of Deposition of Teresa Merez taken 11/10/2014
8.	Defendant Andrea Awerbach's Correction to Her Responses to Request for Admissions
9.	Decision and Order 02/25/2015
10.	Decision and Order 04/27/2015
11.	Hearing Transcript 09/15/2015
12.	Hearing Transcript 02/08/2016
13.	Plaintiff's Trial Brief Regarding Permissive Use 02/10/2016
14.	Trial Transcript 02/10/2016
15.	Order Modifying Prior Order 02/12/2016
16.	Trial Transcript 03/07/2016
17.	Jury Instructions 03/08/2016

Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins, Gunn & Dial, LLC	6385 S. Rainbow Blvd., Suite 400	Las Vegas, Nevada 89118	(702) 938-3838

	$1 \mid \mid$	
	2	18. Jury Verdict 02/10/2016
	3	I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
	4	DATED this day of May, 2016.
	5	DATED and day of May, 2010.
	6	
	7	D. Lee Roberts, Jr., Esq. Timothy A. Mott, Esq.
	8	Marisa Rodriguez-Shapoval, Esq. Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins,
	9	Gunn & Dial, LLC. 6385 S. Rainbow Blvd., Suite 400
	10	Las Vegas, Nevada 89118
	11	Attorneys for Plaintiff Emilia Garcia
	12	Emilia Garcia
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Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins, Gunn & Dial, LLC 6385 S. Rainbow Blvd., Suite 400 Las Vegas, Nevada 89118 (702) 938-3838

I hereby certify that on the day of May, 2016, a true and correct copy of the foregoing APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS: PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW was electronically filed and served on counsel through the Court's electronic service system pursuant to Administrative Order 14-2 and N.E.F.C.R. 9, via the electronic mail addresses noted below, unless service by another method is stated or noted: Roger W. Strassburg, Jr., Esq. strassburg@rlattorneys.com Randall Tindall, Esq. trindall@rlattorneys.com RESNICK & LOUIS, P.C. 5940 S. Rainbow Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89118 Attorneys for Defendant Jared Awerbach Corey M. Eschweiler, Esq. ceschweiler@glenlerner.com Adam D. Smith, Esq. asmith@glenlerner.com Craig A. Henderson, Esq. chenderson@glenlerner.com Clen J. Lerner & Associates 4795 South Durango Drive Las Vegas, NV 89147 Attorneys for Plaintiff Emilia Garcia An Employee of Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins, Gunn & Dial, LLC	<u>CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE</u>
### JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW was electronically filed and served on counsel through the Court's electronic service system pursuant to Administrative Order 14-2 and N.E.F.C.R. 9, via the electronic mail addresses noted below, unless service by another method is stated or noted: Roger W. Strassburg, Jr., Esq. rstrassburg@rlattorneys.com	I hereby certify that on the day of May, 2016, a true and correct copy of the
the Court's electronic service system pursuant to Administrative Order 14-2 and N.E.F.C.R. 9, via the electronic mail addresses noted below, unless service by another method is stated or noted: Roger W. Strassburg, Jr., Esq. rstrassburg@rlattorneys.com Randall Tindall, Esq. rtindall@rlattorneys.com RESNICK & LOUIS, P.C. 5940 S. Rainbow Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89118 Attorneys for Defendant Jared Awerbach Corey M. Eschweiler, Esq. ceschweiler@glenlerner.com Adam D. Smith, Esq. asmith@glenlerner.com Craig A. Henderson, Esq. chenderson@glenlermer.com GLEN J. LERNER & ASSOCIATES 4795 South Durango Drive Las Vegas, NV 89147 Attorneys for Plaintiff Emilia Garcia An Employee of Weinberg, Wheeler,	foregoing APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS: PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION FO
the electronic mail addresses noted below, unless service by another method is stated or noted: Roger W. Strassburg, Jr., Esq. rstrassburg@rlattorneys.com Randall Tindall, Esq. rtindall@rlattorneys.com RESNICK & LOUIS, P.C. 5940 S. Rainbow Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89118 Attorneys for Defendant Jared Awerbach Corey M. Eschweiler, Esq. ceschweiler@glenlerner.com Adam D. Smith, Esq. asmith@glenlerner.com Craig A. Henderson, Esq. chenderson@glenlerner.com GLEN J. LERNER & ASSOCIATES 4795 South Durango Drive Las Vegas, NV 89147 Attorneys for Plaintiff Emilia Garcia Peter Mazzeo, Esq. pmazzeo@mazzeolawfirm.com MAZZEO LAW, LLC rtindall@rmazeolawfirm.com MAZZEO LAW, LLC rtany Defendant pmazzeo@mazzeolawfirm.com Ant LC pmazzeo@mazzeolawfirm.com MAZZEO LAW, LC rtany Defendant pmazzeo@mazzeolawfirm.com pmazzeo@mazzeolawfirm	JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW was electronically filed and served on counsel through
Roger W. Strassburg, Jr., Esq. rstrassburg@rlattorneys.com Randall Tindall, Esq. rtindall@rlattorneys.com RESNICK & LOUIS, P.C. 5940 S. Rainbow Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89118 Attorneys for Defendant Jared Awerbach Corey M. Eschweiler, Esq. ceschweiler@glenlerner.com Adam D. Smith, Esq. asmith@glenlerner.com Craig A. Henderson, Esq. chenderson@glenlerner.com GLEN J. LERNER & ASSOCIATES 4795 South Durango Drive Las Vegas, NV 89147 Attorneys for Plaintiff Emilia Garcia Peter Mazzeo, Esq. pmazzeo@mazzeolawfirm.com MAZZEO LAW, LLC 631 S. Tenth St. Las Vegas, NV 89101 Attorney for Defendant Andrea Awerbach Attorney for Defendant Andrea Awerbach An Employee of Weinberg, Wheeler,	the Court's electronic service system pursuant to Administrative Order 14-2 and N.E.F.C.R. 9, v
rstrassburg@rlattorneys.com Randall Tindall, Esq. rtindall@rlattorneys.com RESNICK & LOUIS, P.C. 5940 S. Rainbow Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89118 Attorneys for Defendant Jared Awerbach Corey M. Eschweiler, Esq. ceschweiler@glenlerner.com Adam D. Smith, Esq. asmith@glenlerner.com Craig A. Henderson, Esq. chenderson@glenlerner.com GLEN J. LERNER & ASSOCIATES 4795 South Durango Drive Las Vegas, NV 89147 Attorneys for Plaintiff Emilia Garcia pmazzeo@mazzeolawfirm.com MAZZEO LAW, LLC 631 S. Tenth St. Las Vegas, NV 89101 Attorney for Defendant Andrea Awerbach Attorney for Defendant Andrea Awerbach Attorney for Defendant Andrea Awerbach An Employee of Weinberg, Wheeler,	the electronic mail addresses noted below, unless service by another method is stated or noted:
	rstrassburg@rlattorneys.com Randall Tindall, Esq. rtindall@rlattorneys.com RESNICK & LOUIS, P.C. 5940 S. Rainbow Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89118 Attorneys for Defendant Jared Awerbach Corey M. Eschweiler, Esq. ceschweiler@glenlerner.com Adam D. Smith, Esq. asmith@glenlerner.com Craig A. Henderson, Esq. chenderson@glenlerner.com GLEN J. LERNER & ASSOCIATES 4795 South Durango Drive Las Vegas, NV 89147 Attorneys for Plaintiff Emilia Garcia pmazzeo@mazzeolawfirm.com MAZZEO LAW, LLC 631 S. Tenth St. Las Vegas, NV 89101 Attorney for Defendant Antorney for Defendant Antorney for Defendant Antorney for Defendant Antorneys for Plaintiff Emilia Garcia An Employee of Weinberg, Wheeler,

Page 4 of 4

1	SUPP							
2	Alexandra B. M ^c Leod Nevada Bar No. 8185							
3	amcleod@bvrclaw.com BRADY, VORWERCK, RYDER & CASPINO							
4	2795 East Desert Inn Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89121 Telephone (702) 607,6500							
5	Telephone: (702) 697-6500 Facsimile: (702) 697-6505							
6	Attorneys for Defendants, JARED AWERBACH							
7	and ANDREA AWERBACH							
8	DISTRIC	T COURT						
9	CLARK COU	NTY, NEVADA						
10								
11	EMILIA GARCIA,	Case No.: A-11-637772-C Dept. No.: XXVII						
12	Plaintiff,	DEFENDANTS' SECOND SUPPLEMENT						
13	V.	TO LIST OF WITNESSES AND DOCUMENTS AND TANGIBLE ITEMS						
14	JARED AWERBACH, individually, ANDREA AWERBACH, individually, DOES	PRODUCED AT EARLY CASE CONFERENCE						
15	I-X, and ROE CORPORATIONS I-X, inclusive,							
16	Defendants.							
17								
18		D ANDREA AWERBACH, , by and through their						
19	counsel of record, ALEXANDRA B. McLEOD,	ESQ., of the law firm of BRADY, VORWERCK,						
20	RYDER & CASPINO, and hereby submits the	following List of Witnesses and Documents and						
21	Tangible Items Produced at the Early Case Conference in the above-entitled action, pursuant to NRCP							
22	16.1. Supplemental information is presented in	bold italic type.						
23		I.						
24	LIST OF Y	WITNESSES						
25	1. EMILIA GARCIA, Plaintiff c/o ADAM D. SMITH, ESQ.							
26	Glen Lerner & Associates 4795 South Durango Drive							
27	Las Vegas, Nevada 89147							
28								

1	EMILIA GARCIA is a Plaintiff in this matter and is expected to testify to the facts and					
2	circumstances surrounding the subject incident, as well as to her alleged injuries sustained thereby and					
3	medical treatment received therefor, and to all other relevant matters.					
4						
5	2. JARED AWERBACH, Defendant c/o ALEXANDRA B. M ^c LEOD, ESQ.					
6	Brady, Vorwerck, Ryder & Caspino 2795 East Desert Inn Road, Suite 200					
7	Las Vegas, Nevada 89121					
8	JARED AWERBACH is the Defendant in this matter and is expected to testify to the facts and					
9	circumstances surrounding the subject incident and to all other relevant matters.					
0	3. ANDREA AWERBACH, Defendant					
. 1	c/o ALEXANDRA B. M ^c LEOD, ESQ. Brady, Voerwerck, Ryder & Caspino					
2	2795 East Desert Inn Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89121					
3	ANDREA AWERBACH is the Defendant in this matter and is expected to testify to the facts					
4	and circumstances surrounding the subject incident and to all other relevant matters.					
5	4 OFFICED D. FICHEDOA ID/Padas #0602					
6	4. OFFICER D. FIGUEROA, ID/Badge #9693 c/o Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department					
17	400 East Stewart Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89101					
8	OFFICER FIGUEROA was the investigating officer on the scene of the accident in question					
19	and is expected to testify as to the facts and circumstances surrounding the subject incident and to all					
20	other relevant matters.					
21	5. PERSON MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE Employer of Plaintiff at the time of the subject incident					
22	Employer of Plaintiff at the time of the subject incident					
23	The PERSON MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE of the Employer of Plaintiff at the time of the					
24	subject incident is expected to testify as to any loss of time and/or wage loss to be potentially claimed					
25	by Plaintiff as a result of the subject incident and to all other relevant matters.					
26	6. ANY AND ALL APPROPRIATE MEDICAL CARE PROVIDERS OF PLAINTIFF					

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on the day of July, 2013, I forwarded a copy of the above and 2 foregoing Defendants' Second Supplement to List of Witnesses and Documents and Tangible Items Produced at Early Case Conference as follows: 5 by depositing in the United States mail, first-class postage prepaid, at Las Vegas, Nevada, enclosed in a sealed envelope, pursuant to NRCP 5(b)(2)(B) and EDCR 6 7.26(a)(1) [FRCP 5(b)(2)(C)]; and/or 7 by facsimile transmission pursuant to NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) and EDCR 7.26(a)(3) [FRCP 5(b)(2)(E); as indicated below; and/or 8 by electronic transmission [via CM/ECF], pursuant to NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) and EDCR 9 7.26(a)(4) [FRCP 5(b)(2)(E)]; and/or 10 by email as indicated below pursuant to NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) [FRCP 5(b)(2)(E)]; 11 TO: 12 13 Lara Hoover Adam D. Smith, Esq. Mitchell J. Resnick Glen Lerner & Associates 14 4795 South Durango Drive RESNICK & LOUIS, P.C. 415 S. Sixth Street, Suite 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89147 15 Las Vegas, NV 89101 (702) 877-1500 (702) 877-0110 (Fax) (702) 997-3800 16 Attorneys for Plaintiff Fax (702) 997-3800 Attorney for Defendant, 17 Jared Awerbach 18 19 Employee of BRADY, VORWERCK, RYDER & CASPINO 20 21 22 23 24

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EXHIBIT "K"

