

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

ELAINE P. WYNN,

Petitioner,

vs.

THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF
NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CLARK; AND THE
HONORABLE ELIZABETH
GONZALEZ, DISTRICT JUDGE,
DEPT. XI,

Respondent,

and

WYNN RESORTS, LIMITED,

Real Party in Interest.

Case No. 71432

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Clerk of Supreme Court

**APPENDIX TO REAL PARTY IN
INTEREST WYNN RESORTS,
LIMITED'S ANSWER TO PETITION
FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION OR,
IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
MANDAMUS**

VOLUME I OF III

DATED this 12th day of December, 2016.

PISANELLI BICE PLLC

By: /s/ Todd L. Bice

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am an employee of PISANELLI BICE PLLC, and that on this 12th day of December, 2016, I electronically filed and served a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing **APPENDIX TO REAL PARTY IN INTEREST WYNN RESORTS, LIMITED'S ANSWER TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MANDAMUS (VOLUME I OF III)** properly addressed to the following:

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
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/s/ Shannon Thomas

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ARUZE USA, INC. and UNIVERSAL
ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

WYNN RESORTS, LIMITED, a Nevada
corporation.

Plaintiff.

vs.

KAZUO OKADA, an individual, et al.,

Defendants.

AND ALL RELATED CLAIMS.

Case No. A-12-656710-B

Dept. No: XI

ELECTRONIC FILING CASE

**FOURTH AMENDED
COUNTERCLAIM OF ARUZE USA,
INC. AND UNIVERSAL
ENTERTAINMENT CORP.**

COUNTERCLAIM
JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. Counterdefendants Wynn Resorts, Limited (“Wynn Resorts” or the “Company”), Stephen A. Wynn (“Mr. Wynn” or “Steve Wynn”), Kimmarie Sinatra, Linda Chen, Ray R. Irani, Russell Goldsmith, Robert J. Miller, John A. Moran, Marc D. Schorr, Alvin V. Shoemaker, D. Boone Wayson, Elaine P. Wynn, and Allan Zeman (collectively, “Wynn Parties”) have each individually and in concert with one another, caused the acts and events alleged herein within the State of Nevada and all are subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. Venue is also proper in this Court.

2. This matter is properly designated as a business court matter and assigned to the Business Docket under EDCR 1.61(a) as the claims alleged herein arise from business torts.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

3. Plaintiff and Counterdefendant Wynn Resorts initiated this litigation on the same night it claims to have forcibly purchased (*i.e.*, “redeemed”) nearly 20% of its own common stock held by its largest shareholder, Counterclaimant Aruze USA, Inc. (“Aruze USA”). Wynn Resorts understood that, as soon as it became known that it was doing this, Aruze USA would sue Wynn Resorts and the Wynn Directors.¹ Wynn Resorts had undertaken the redemption in the dead of night through a rushed and secretive process.

4. Among other things, Wynn Resorts purported to redeem the shares at a flat 30% discount to the most recent market price. Aruze USA’s interests, valued by the market at more than \$2.7 billion and by Wynn Resorts at \$2.9 billion three weeks prior to the redemption, would be forcibly purchased in exchange for a non-transferable promissory note to pay approximately \$1.9 billion in a single “balloon payment” 10 years from now. So Wynn Resorts raced to court, electronically filing a complaint at 2:14 a.m. on a Sunday morning – even before giving notice to

¹ The Wynn Resorts’ Board of Directors (the “Board”), other than Kazuo Okada (“Kazuo Okada” and “Mr. Okada”), were Steve Wynn, Linda Chen, Russell Goldsmith, Ray R. Irani, Robert J. Miller, John A. Moran, Marc D. Schorr, Alvin V. Shoemaker, Boone Wayson, Elaine P. Wynn, and Allan Zeman (collectively, the “Wynn Directors”) during the events underlying the claims raised in this Counterclaim.

1 Aruze USA of the purported redemption. Wynn Resorts apparently thought that its position as
2 the named “plaintiff” would help obfuscate the issues and distract the court from the claims of
3 wrongdoing sure to be filed against it by Aruze USA and Counterclaimant Universal
4 Entertainment Corporation (“Universal” and collectively with Aruze USA, “Counterclaimants”).
5 Wynn Resorts’ cynical tactics are unavailing. Based on the facts and the law, it is clear that it is
6 Counterclaimants who have been grievously damaged in this case, and any suggestion to the
7 contrary is entirely without credibility.

8 5. This Counterclaim arises because this purported redemption would: (a) violate the
9 express terms of agreements between Mr. Wynn, Elaine Wynn and Aruze USA; (b) allow
10 Mr. Wynn and others to profit unjustly from their illegal acts and a process that was corrupt and
11 unfair; and (c) subject Aruze USA to an unconscionably punitive remedy based on an unproven
12 pretext.

13 6. To be clear at the outset, Aruze USA disputes that any redemption has occurred.
14 Among other things, even if the redemption provision in the Company’s Second Amended
15 Articles of Incorporation (“Articles of Incorporation”) was legally enforceable (which it is not),
16 Aruze USA’s stock has never been subject to the redemption provision in the Company’s Articles
17 of Incorporation, because Aruze USA entered into a Stockholders Agreement before the Articles
18 of Incorporation were amended and filed, which preclude any redemption of Aruze USA’s stock.
19 Specifically, Mr. Wynn covenanted that Aruze USA shall be the “record and Beneficial owner”
20 of its common shares in Wynn Resorts and “shall have the *sole power of disposition* [and] *sole*
21 *power of conversion...*” of the shares “with no material limitations, qualification or restrictions
22 on such rights....” (Emphasis added.) Aruze USA and Mr. Wynn entered into the Stockholders
23 Agreement *before* Mr. Wynn unilaterally amended the Articles of Incorporation of Wynn Resorts
24 to provide a discretionary right to redeem shareholders’ stock. Elaine Wynn later became a party
25 to the Stockholders Agreement and likewise covenanted that Aruze USA shall have the “sole
26 power of disposition [and] sole power of conversion” of its shares in Wynn Resorts. Aruze USA
27 never agreed in writing to the redemption rights in the Articles of Incorporation, as would be
28

1 required to amend the “sole powers of disposition” set forth in the Stockholders Agreement. The
2 right of redemption thus does not apply to Aruze USA’s shares.

3 7. Moreover, even if the Articles of Incorporation allowed the redemption of Aruze
4 USA’s interests in Wynn Resorts (which they do not), Steve Wynn and Elaine Wynn are not
5 excused from breaching the express terms of the Stockholders Agreement by voting for the
6 redemption in violation of Aruze USA’s “sole right of disposition and sole right of conversion”
7 and are liable for all damages caused by their breach. Likewise, by voting in favor of and giving
8 effect to the redemption of Aruze USA’s shares, Wynn Resorts and the other individual directors
9 of Wynn Resorts tortiously interfered with the Stockholders Agreement and are thereby liable for
10 all damages proximately caused by their interference, including for any losses incurred by Aruze
11 USA as a result of the unprecedented \$1 billion discount Wynn Resorts purported to apply to
12 Aruze USA’s shares.

13 8. The redemption of Aruze USA’s shares is also invalid and unlawful because there
14 was no legitimate factual or legal basis to invoke the redemption provision in this case. Wynn
15 Resorts undertook a secret investigation, hiding the subjects of the investigation from Aruze USA
16 by erroneously invoking attorney-client privilege and confidentiality, even after Wynn Resorts
17 had leaked a “report” of the investigation to the *Wall Street Journal*. Wynn Resorts refused
18 Aruze USA any reasonable opportunity to respond prior to redeeming Aruze USA’s interests,
19 despite prior written promises to do so. If Wynn Resorts had provided the opportunity, it would
20 be clear why redemption is unwarranted.

21 9. The Wynn Directors breached their fiduciary duties to Wynn Resorts and to Aruze
22 USA in not undertaking a thorough, independent, and objective examination of the law, facts, and
23 evidence before purporting to usurp the role of the gaming authorities in finding Aruze USA
24 “unsuitable.” Similarly, they breached their duties by then voting for a wholly unnecessary and
25 improper “redemption” on unconscionable terms. As a result, the Wynn Directors cannot rely on
26 the “business judgment rule,” as they did not act in a fully informed, good faith, and independent
27 manner, and their actions are both contrary to the law and not objectively reasonable.
28

10. Mr. Wynn, Kimmarie Sinatra and Wynn Resorts later used the secret and one-sided investigative report to try and extort Aruze USA into selling its approximately \$3 billion stake in Wynn Resorts to Mr. Wynn at a significant discount.

11. In addition to the lack of any legal basis for Wynn Resorts' actions, Aruze USA sues because Wynn Resorts, for all its accomplishments, is not a corporation in any ordinary sense. Rather, Wynn Resorts' flamboyant Chairman, Mr. Wynn, has run Wynn Resorts as a personal business, packing the Board with friends who do his personal bidding, and paying key executives exorbitant amounts for their loyalty.

12. The wrongful acts complained of here cannot be countenanced, and the purported taking of Aruze USA's property cannot stand.

PARTIES

13. Counterclaimant Aruze USA is a company organized and existing under the laws of the State of Nevada and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Universal. Aruze USA has its principal place of business in Las Vegas, Nevada. Aruze USA has been found suitable by the Nevada Gaming Commission as a stockholder of Wynn Resorts. Aruze USA owns 24,549,222 shares or 19.66% of the total outstanding stock of Wynn Resorts, making it the largest single owner of Wynn Resorts' stock.

14. Counterclaimant Universal (f/k/a Aruze Corp.) is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Japan. Universal manufactures and sells pachislot and pachinko machines. Universal is registered with the Nevada Gaming Commission, and has been deemed suitable by the Nevada Gaming Commission as a 100% shareholder of Aruze USA. Mr. Okada is the Chairman of the Board of Universal.

15. Counterdefendant Wynn Resorts is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Nevada with its principal place of business in Las Vegas, Nevada. Wynn Resorts' stock is publicly traded on NASDAQ under the ticker symbol "WYNN."

1 16. Counterdefendant Steve Wynn is the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive
2 Officer of Wynn Resorts and is a resident of Nevada. Mr. Wynn owns 10,026,708 shares of the
3 common stock of Wynn Resorts.²

4 17. Counterdefendant Kimmarie Sinatra is the General Counsel, Secretary, and a
5 Senior Vice President of Wynn Resorts and, on information and belief, is a resident of Nevada.
6 Ms. Sinatra owns 40,887 shares of the common stock of Wynn Resorts.

7 18. Counterdefendant Elaine P. Wynn is a director of Wynn Resorts and, on
8 information and belief, is a resident of Nevada. Elaine Wynn is Mr. Wynn's ex-spouse. Elaine
9 Wynn owns 9,742,150 shares of the common stock of Wynn Resorts.

10 19. Counterdefendant Linda Chen was a director of Wynn Resorts and, on information
11 and belief, is a resident of Macau. Ms. Chen owns 265,000 shares of the common stock of Wynn
12 Resorts. Ms. Chen stepped down as a director of Wynn Resorts on December 13, 2012.

13 20. Counterdefendant Ray R. Irani is a director of Wynn Resorts and, on information
14 and belief, is a resident of California. Mr. Irani owns 18,000 shares of the common stock of
15 Wynn Resorts.

16 21. Counterdefendant Russell Goldsmith was a director of Wynn Resorts and, on
17 information and belief, is a resident of California. Mr. Goldsmith owns 40,000 shares of the
18 common stock of Wynn Resorts. Mr. Goldsmith stepped down as a director of Wynn Resorts on
19 December 13, 2012.

20 22. Counterdefendant Robert J. Miller is a director and Chair of the Gaming
21 Compliance Committee of Wynn Resorts and, on information and belief, is a resident of Nevada.
22 Mr. Miller owns 20,500 shares of the common stock of Wynn Resorts.

23 23. Counterdefendant John A. Moran is a director of Wynn Resorts and, on
24 information and belief, is a resident of Florida. Mr. Moran owns 190,500 shares of the common
25 stock of Wynn Resorts.

26
27 ² All references to the number of shares owned by Counterdefendants are as of March 1, 2012, as
28 disclosed in Wynn Resorts' Schedule 14A Proxy Statement, filed with the SEC on March 7,
2012.

1 24. Counterdefendant Marc D. Schorr was a director and Chief Operating Officer of
2 Wynn Resorts and, on information and belief, is a resident of Nevada. Mr. Schorr owns 250,000
3 shares of the common stock of Wynn Resorts. Mr. Schorr stepped down as a director of Wynn
4 Resorts on December 13, 2012.

5 25. Counterdefendant Alvin V. Shoemaker is a director of Wynn Resorts and, on
6 information and belief, is a resident of New Jersey. Mr. Shoemaker owns 40,500 shares of the
7 common stock of Wynn Resorts.

8 26. Counterdefendant D. Boone Wayson is a director of Wynn Resorts and, on
9 information and belief, is a resident of Maryland. Mr. Wayson owns 90,500 shares of the
10 common stock of Wynn Resorts.

11 27. Counterdefendant Allan Zeman was a director of Wynn Resorts and, on
12 information and belief, is a resident of Macau. Mr. Zeman owns 30,500 shares of the common
13 stock of Wynn Resorts. Mr. Zeman stepped down as a director of Wynn Resorts on December
14 13, 2012.

15 **GENERAL ALLEGATIONS**

16 **II. KAZUO OKADA AND STEVE WYNN LAUNCH WYNN RESORTS**

17 **A. Turned Out By Mirage Resorts, Steve Wynn Turns to Kazuo Okada to**
18 **Finance the New Wynn Project**

19 28. Mr. Wynn has a long history of involvement in Las Vegas as a casino operator.
20 As Las Vegas changed, Mr. Wynn sought to present himself as a representative of the new
21 “corporate” Las Vegas. Mr. Wynn developed Mirage Resorts, Inc., a casino conglomerate that
22 owned and operated the Mirage, Treasure Island, and Bellagio. On May 31, 2000, MGM Grand
23 Inc. completed a merger with Mirage Resorts, Inc. In June 2000, after a bruising boardroom
24 battle, which centered on allegations that Mr. Wynn misappropriated company funds, MGM
25 Grand, Inc. ousted Mr. Wynn as Chief Executive Officer of Mirage Resorts, Inc.

26 29. Humiliated by his public ouster, Mr. Wynn was anxious to re-enter the casino
27 business and rebuild his reputation and standing in Las Vegas. He purchased the old Desert Inn
28

1 casino and had plans to build a new casino on the site – it was to be a monument to himself,
2 called “Wynn.” But Mr. Wynn lacked the capital to fund the development of the casino, so he
3 undertook an extensive search for investors. Having recently been forced out of Mirage Resorts,
4 Inc., however, he was shunned by other sources of capital; Mr. Wynn eventually called on
5 Universal, Aruze USA, and Mr. Okada to become the means for Mr. Wynn to get back on his
6 feet.

7 30. Mr. Okada was and is a highly successful Japanese entrepreneur and himself a
8 pioneer in the gaming industry. After leaving high school, Mr. Okada attended an electronics
9 trade school. In 1969, Mr. Okada founded Universal Lease Co. Ltd., which is now Universal.
10 Mr. Okada became a leader in the businesses of pachinko. In addition, Mr. Okada founded a
11 company that created one of the first video poker machines. In fact, Mr. Wynn originally met
12 Mr. Okada when one of Mr. Okada’s affiliated companies, Aruze Gaming America, was selling
13 electronic gaming machines in Nevada.

14 31. Beginning in October 2000, Mr. Wynn used a Nevada limited liability company
15 called Valvino Lamore, LLC (“Valvino”) as the holding entity for his new Desert Inn casino
16 project. After in-person discussions between Mr. Wynn and Mr. Okada, Aruze USA made a
17 contribution of \$260 million in cash to Valvino in exchange for 50% of the membership interests
18 in Valvino effective October 3, 2000. This contribution was the seed capital that allowed for the
19 development of what is now Wynn Resorts. Valvino is referred to by Wynn Resorts as Wynn
20 Resorts’ “predecessor.”

21 32. In April 2002, Aruze USA made two additional contributions totaling \$120 million
22 to Valvino. Mr. Wynn told Mr. Okada that \$30 million was related to Macau, but Mr. Wynn did
23 not explain to Mr. Okada how Mr. Wynn actually spent the money. Serious questions now exist
24 about how Mr. Wynn used the money and whether Mr. Wynn used the funds for his personal
25 benefit and/or for other inappropriate purposes. There are also serious questions about the use of
26 the other \$90 million Aruze USA contributed.

1 **B. The Stockholders Agreement**

2 33. In 2002, all three owners of LLC interests in Valvino – Mr. Wynn, Aruze USA,
3 and Baron Asset Fund³ – understood that the Wynn organization was planning to go public as
4 Wynn Resorts. This required a series of legal steps by which the owners’ interests in Valvino
5 were converted into shares of a newly formed corporation, “Wynn Resorts, Limited,” that could
6 then sell additional shares to the public.

7 34. On April 11, 2002, prior to the filing of the Articles of Incorporation for Wynn
8 Resorts, Mr. Wynn, Aruze USA, and Baron Asset Fund entered into the Stockholders Agreement,
9 which imposed certain restrictions on the sale of the stock they were to receive in “NewCo,” the
10 entity that would become Wynn Resorts. As described in Wynn Resorts’ prospectus, dated
11 October 29, 2002, “the stockholders agreement establishes various rights among Mr. Wynn,
12 Aruze USA and Baron Asset Fund with respect to the ownership and management of Wynn
13 Resorts.”

14 35. Notably, the parties to the Stockholders Agreement stated that the terms of that
15 agreement were a condition of transferring their LLC interests in Valvino to Wynn Resorts. The
16 Stockholders Agreement stated “as a condition to their willingness to form [Wynn Resorts], either
17 through the contribution of their interests in the LLC or through a different technique, the
18 Stockholders are willing to agree to the matters set forth” in the Stockholders Agreement.

19 36. Under the Stockholders Agreement, Steve Wynn, Baron Asset Fund, and Aruze
20 USA each warranted and covenanted that “[t]he Stockholder shall be the record and Beneficial
21 Owner of all of the Shares” of Wynn Resorts’ common stock, and “shall have the *sole power of*
22 *disposition* [and] *sole power of conversion...*” of the shares “with no material limitations,
23 qualification or restrictions on such rights...” except as provided for under applicable securities
24 laws and the agreement. (Emphasis added.) The Stockholders Agreement “may not be amended,
25 changed, supplemented, waived or otherwise modified or terminated, except upon the execution
26

27 ³ Baron Asset Fund is a Massachusetts business trust comprised of a series of funds. It became a
28 member of Valvino pursuant to the First Amendment to Amended and Restated Operating
Agreement of Valvino Lamore, LLC, dated April 16, 2001.

1 and delivery of a written agreement executed by the parties....” As described in further detail
2 below, Elaine Wynn made this same covenant to Aruze USA when she became a party to the
3 Amended and Restated Stockholders Agreement in 2010.

4 37. Wynn Resorts publicly acknowledged the impact of the Stockholders Agreement
5 on the Company and the shareholders. The Wynn Resorts share certificates issued to Aruze USA
6 on September 24, 2002, bear the following express, written legend, in bold and all caps: “**THE**
7 **SHARES REPRESENTED BY THIS CERTIFICATE ARE SUBJECT TO THE TERMS**
8 **AND CONDITIONS OF A STOCKHOLDERS AGREEMENT DATED AS OF APRIL 11,**
9 **2002....”** Additionally, in a Form S-1/A filed with the SEC on October 7, 2002, Wynn Resorts
10 disclosed that the Stockholders Agreement established “restrictions on the transfer of the shares
11 of Wynn Resorts’ common stock owned by the parties to the stockholders agreement.” In this
12 way, Wynn Resorts – and all other stockholders – were aware that there were limitations written
13 in the Stockholders Agreement on the transferability of the Wynn Resorts’ stock held by Aruze
14 USA.

15 38. The Stockholders Agreement removed Aruze USA from the purview of later-
16 adopted redemption provisions in Wynn Resorts’ Articles of Incorporation, as confirmed by, on
17 information and belief, Wynn Resorts’ own attorneys *before* the redemption provisions were
18 added to the Articles of Incorporation.

19 39. In addition to restricting the power of disposition and conversion of all stock
20 distributed pursuant to the Stockholders Agreement, the Stockholders Agreement also contained a
21 voting agreement, granting Mr. Wynn the right to nominate a bare majority of directors, and
22 Aruze USA the right to nominate all remaining directors. Each Stockholder covenanted to vote
23 all of their shares in favor of the directors nominated by Mr. Wynn and Aruze USA. Pursuant to
24 this voting agreement, Aruze USA repeatedly tried over the years to nominate directors to the
25 Board of Directors of Wynn Resorts. Each time, Mr. Wynn refused to endorse and vote his
26 shares in favor of Aruze USA’s proposed directors, instead nominating all of the directors himself
27 to ensure and perpetuate his complete control of the Board. Finally, the Stockholders Agreement
28

1 gave Mr. Wynn the power of attorney to sign all documentation necessary to transfer Aruze
2 USA's LLC interests in Valvino to Wynn Resorts in exchange for Wynn Resorts' stock, and
3 thereby created a fiduciary duty as between Mr. Wynn and Aruze USA.

4 **C. Wynn Resorts' Original Articles of Incorporation**

5 40. On June 3, 2002, Mr. Wynn, on behalf of Wynn Resorts, caused the filing of the
6 Company's initial Articles of Incorporation. Those Articles of Incorporation did not include any
7 provision establishing Wynn Resorts' purported right to redeem shares held by "Unsuitable
8 Person[s]."

9 41. Echoing a false statement made in a February 19, 2012 Wynn Resorts press
10 release, Matt Maddox, Wynn Resorts' Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer, erroneously stated
11 in a conference call with investors on February 21, 2012, that the redemption provision in the
12 Articles of Incorporation had "been there since the Company's inception."

13 **D. The Contribution Agreement**

14 42. Before Wynn Resorts could go public, the LLC interests in Valvino held by
15 Mr. Wynn, Aruze USA, and Baron Asset Fund had to be transferred to the new Wynn Resorts
16 entity. This was no small matter. By this point, Aruze USA had contributed some \$380 million
17 in exchange for its LLC interests in Valvino.

18 43. On June 10, 2002, Mr. Wynn, Aruze USA, Baron Asset Fund, Wynn Resorts and
19 the Kenneth R. Wynn Family Trust entered into the Contribution Agreement (the "Contribution
20 Agreement"), by which they agreed to contribute all of the Valvino membership interests to
21 Wynn Resorts in exchange for the capital stock of Wynn Resorts. The Wynn Resorts' stock
22 acquired by Aruze USA was subject to the provisions of the Stockholders Agreement.

23 44. Wynn Resorts further agreed that the existing restrictions could be altered only
24 with Aruze USA's express written consent. The Contribution Agreement stated: "This
25 Agreement may *not be modified or amended* except by an instrument in *writing* signed by the
26 corporation and all of the Holders." (Emphasis added).
27
28

1 **E. After Securing Aruze USA's Contribution, Steve Wynn Unilaterally Amends**
2 **the Articles of Incorporation**

3 45. After entering into the Contribution Agreement, but before transferring the LLC
4 interests in Valvino, Mr. Wynn unilaterally changed Wynn Resorts' Articles of Incorporation to
5 include a restriction that purportedly allows Wynn Resorts to "redeem" stock held by Wynn
6 Resorts' stockholders. At this time, Mr. Wynn was the sole stockholder and director of Wynn
7 Resorts. It was not until 2012, however, that Mr. Wynn and Wynn Resorts attempted to apply
8 this redemption restriction to Aruze USA's shares, even though the Stockholders Agreement
9 precluded Wynn Resorts from unilaterally adding restrictions to the shares.

10 46. Under the Stockholders Agreement, Mr. Wynn had power of attorney to transfer
11 the LLC interests in Valvino to Wynn Resorts. Although the Contribution Agreement obligated
12 Mr. Wynn to "as soon as practicable ... deliver or cause to be delivered to Holders certificates
13 representing the Common Stock[,]" Mr. Wynn delayed the contribution of the LLC interests in
14 Valvino to Wynn Resorts. On information and belief, the final closing condition under the
15 Contribution Agreement was met by July 9, 2002. Nevertheless, Mr. Wynn's delay meant that,
16 although he had already received Aruze USA's commitment via the Contribution Agreement and
17 the Stockholders Agreement, Mr. Wynn would continue to maintain unilateral control over Wynn
18 Resorts for the period of the delay. This enabled Mr. Wynn to improperly change the Company's
19 Articles of Incorporation in an apparent attempt to achieve Mr. Wynn's own long-term interests at
20 Aruze USA's expense. Through this deliberate delay, and the intervening acts taken by
21 Mr. Wynn before he fulfilled the terms of the Contribution Agreement, Mr. Wynn breached his
22 fiduciary duties to Aruze USA as the attorney-in-fact of Aruze USA under the Stockholders
23 Agreement and Contribution Agreement, as well as a director and officer of Wynn Resorts.

24 47. On September 10, 2002, Mr. Wynn amended Wynn Resorts' Articles of
25 Incorporation. Although this change would purport to alter the securities received by Aruze
26 USA, Mr. Wynn made the change unilaterally, without affording Aruze USA the opportunity to
27 vote on the changes, let alone expressly consent in writing to the added restrictions as required in
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1 the Stockholders Agreement and Contribution Agreement, in order to make the provision
2 enforceable. The language Mr. Wynn unilaterally added to the Articles of Incorporation provided
3 a *discretionary* right of redemption, which the Board of Directors had the right to waive
4 whenever a waiver “would be in the best interests of the Corporation.” That provision provided,
5 in pertinent part:

6 The Securities Owned or Controlled by an Unsuitable Person or an
7 Affiliate of an Unsuitable Person shall be subject to redemption by
8 the Corporation, out of funds legally available therefor, by action of
9 the board of directors, to the extent required by the Gaming
 Authority making the determination of unsuitability or to the extent
 deemed necessary or advisable by the board of directors. ...

10 48. If Mr. Wynn had done what he was bound to do pursuant to the trust and duties
11 placed in him under the Stockholders Agreement and Contribution Agreement, and transferred
12 the LLC interests in Valvino to Wynn Resorts *before* adding the redemption restriction, Aruze
13 USA would have had the right under Nevada law to vote on the changes to Wynn Resorts’
14 Articles of Incorporation.

15 49. Years later, in February 2012, Mr. Wynn, Elaine Wynn, the individual directors,
16 and Wynn Resorts improperly applied the redemption provision to Aruze USA’s stock and acted
17 to redeem Aruze USA’s shares, thereby breaching and tortiously interfering with the Stockholders
18 Agreement. Prior to Wynn Resorts’ improper attempt to apply the redemption restriction to
19 Aruze USA’s stock, Aruze USA was not and could not have been aware that Wynn Resorts
20 would ever attempt to apply the discretionary redemption provision against Aruze USA because
21 the Stockholders Agreement, which predated the amended Articles of Incorporation, gave the sole
22 power of disposition and conversion of Aruze USA’s stock to Aruze USA, precluding any right
23 of redemption by the Wynn Resorts. Indeed, on information and belief, counsel for Mr. Wynn
24 informed Aruze USA’s counsel in or around June 2002, that any redemption restriction, if later
25 added to the Articles of Incorporation through an amendment, would *not* to apply to Aruze
26 USA’s shares.

1 50. Thus, although the first acts perpetrated in furtherance of this fraud occurred in
2 2002, the misconduct did not cause harm until recently, when Wynn Resorts purported to use the
3 redemption provision to redeem Aruze USA's shares in 2012 for a fraction of their true value.

4 **F. Wynn Resorts Goes Public**

5 51. On September 28, 2002, Mr. Wynn eventually contributed the LLC interests in
6 Valvino to Wynn Resorts. Thereafter, on October 21, 2002, Mr. Okada became a member of
7 Wynn Resorts' Board.

8 52. On October 25, 2002, Wynn Resorts conducted an initial public offering ("IPO")
9 on NASDAQ at \$13 per share. At this time, Mr. Okada and Mr. Wynn each owned about 30% of
10 the outstanding stock. Aruze USA contributed an additional \$72.5 million to Wynn Resorts by
11 purchasing stock through the IPO, and also invested \$2.5 million in bonds issued by two
12 Company subsidiaries, raising its total investment to \$455 million. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Okada
13 became Vice Chairman of Wynn Resorts' Board.

14 53. On April 28, 2005, Wynn Las Vegas opened. It was an instant success. On
15 September 10, 2006, Wynn Resorts opened in Macau. "Encore" hotels followed in both
16 locations. Again, each property has been very successful. None of this success would have been
17 possible without the capital funding, support, and expertise of Aruze USA and Mr. Okada.

18 54. As one form of recognition for Aruze USA's contributions, Wynn Resorts
19 included a high-end Japanese restaurant at both the Las Vegas and Macau resorts. These
20 restaurants were named "Okada."

21 **G. The Close and Trusting Relationship of Steve Wynn and Kazuo Okada**

22 55. Although they have very different backgrounds and educational experiences, both
23 Mr. Wynn and Mr. Okada are of similar ages, interests, and ambitions. Beyond their business
24 dealings, Mr. Wynn gave every indication that he considered Mr. Okada to be a close personal
25 friend, and repeatedly called him his "partner."

26 56. For example, at hearings before the Nevada State Gaming Control Board and
27 Nevada Gaming Commission, on June 4 and 17, 2004, respectively, Mr. Wynn affirmed that
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1 “Mr. Okada was not only suitable” to receive a gaming license “but he was desirable.”

2 Repeatedly referring to Mr. Okada as his “partner,” Mr. Wynn said Mr. Okada was “dedicated to
3 the pursuit of excellence.”

4 57. In this sworn testimony, Mr. Wynn also affirmed Mr. Okada’s generosity and
5 unwavering trust in Mr. Wynn. Mr. Wynn said “I have never dreamed that there would be a man
6 as supportive, as long-term thinking, as selfless in his investment as Mr. Okada.” Mr. Wynn
7 recalled a conversation with Mr. Okada on a plane from Macau to Tokyo: Mr. Okada “told me
8 the most important thing, Steve ... is the right thing. Take the high road. Do the right thing.
9 Don’t worry about me. I’ll support any decision you may make.”

10 58. In recognition of this trust and in “the spirit of friendship and cooperation that
11 exists between [Steve] Wynn and Mr. Kazuo Okada . . .” on November 8, 2006, Mr. Wynn
12 caused Aruze USA to enter into an Amendment to the Stockholders Agreement, which purports
13 to contain a mutual restriction on the sale of stock without the other party’s written consent, with
14 all other relevant terms of the Stockholders Agreement remaining unchanged.

15 59. And, indeed, Mr. Okada trusted Mr. Wynn. Mr. Wynn knew this, and callously
16 and illegally set out to exploit this trust for his advantage.

17 **III. UNIVERSAL DISCLOSES AND ULTIMATELY PURSUES FOREIGN**
18 **DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS**

19 **A. In 2007, Universal Fully Discloses to Wynn Resorts Its Interest In Pursuing a**
20 **Casino Project in the Philippines**

21 60. Universal and Mr. Okada first began exploring the possibility of acquiring and
22 developing land in the Philippines in 2007, with one possible option for development being a
23 casino and hotel resort. Although the initial discussions were preliminary, Mr. Okada brought the
24 opportunity immediately to Mr. Wynn, hoping that Wynn Resorts might be interested in
25 undertaking the project. Mr. Wynn told Mr. Okada that Wynn Resorts was not interested at that
26 time in pursuing a project in the Philippines. However, Mr. Wynn voiced no concerns at all with
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1 Universal's pursuit of the project. Mr. Okada thereafter kept Mr. Wynn fully informed of the
2 project's progress.

3 61. On December 20, 2007, Universal publicly announced a planned casino project in
4 the Asian market.

5 62. On April 25, 2008, Universal announced its planned casino project in the
6 Philippines. While the plans were preliminary, they took shape in the months to come.

7 63. From that point on, Wynn Resorts and Universal had an agreement. Universal
8 could pursue a project in the Philippines, but at least for the time being, it would not formally be a
9 Wynn Resorts project. On a May 1, 2008 conference call with stock analysts, Mr. Wynn affirmed
10 that Wynn Resorts' Board and management team had longstanding knowledge of and fully
11 supported Universal's project in the Philippines:

12 Well, first of all, I love Kazuo Okada as much as any man that I've
13 ever met in my life. He's my partner and my friend. And there is
14 hardly anything that I won't do for him. Now, we are not at the
15 present time an investor, nor do we contemplate, an investment in
16 the Philippines. *This is something that Kazuo Okada and his*
17 *company, [Universal], has done on its own initiative. He consults*
18 *me and has discussed it with me extensively and I've given him my*
19 *own personal thoughts on the subject and advice. And, to the extent*
20 *that he comes to me for any more advice or input, all of us here at*
21 *the Company will be glad to give him our opinions. But that's short*
22 *of saying this is a Wynn Resorts project. It is a [Universal] project.*

23 (Emphasis added).

24 64. Importantly, Mr. Wynn voiced no concerns about the potential of the Philippine
25 project competing with Wynn Macau, Ltd. ("Wynn Macau"). As reflected in his public statement
26 to Wynn Resorts' shareholders and analysts, Mr. Wynn's attitude reflected Wynn Resorts'
27 official position on the Philippine project until at least late 2011 or early 2012 when Mr. Wynn
28 decided to use it as a pretext to deprive Aruze USA of its stock in Wynn Resorts.

65. As a further example of Wynn Resorts' knowledge and approval of Universal and
Aruze USA's activities in the Philippines, on April 4, 2008, Kevin Tourek, a member of Wynn
Resorts' Compliance Committee, emailed Frank Schreck, the then-head of Universal's
Compliance Committee. The email was regarding Universal's investment in the Philippines.

1 Mr. Tourek confirmed that – so long as Universal was in compliance with the laws of the
2 Philippines – the investment would not be something that would concern Nevada regulators or
3 Wynn Resorts.

4 66. Once again, on September 24, 2009, Wynn Resorts acknowledged Universal's
5 project in the Philippines. Wynn Macau's IPO prospectus explicitly acknowledged Universal's
6 plans to develop a casino in the Philippines:

7 In addition to its investment in Wynn Resorts, Limited, [Universal]
8 has invested in the construction of a hotel casino resort in the
9 Philippines, which is anticipated to open to the public in 2010.
10 Mr. Okada confirms that, as at the Latest Practicable Date, except
11 for his indirect shareholding interests in Wynn Resorts, Limited
12 through Aruze USA, Inc., neither he nor his associates holds, owns
13 or controls more than 5% voting interests in an entity which,
14 directly or indirectly, carries on, engages, invests, participates or
15 otherwise is interested in any company, business or operation that
16 competes, or is reasonably expected to compete, with the business
17 carried on by us in Macau.

18 67. In this way, Wynn Macau's prospectus acknowledged and ratified Universal's
19 plans to open a casino in the Philippines and – by adopting Universal's statement – affirmed that
20 a casino in the Philippines will not materially compete with Wynn Macau.

21 **B. With the Blessing of Wynn Resorts, Universal Commits Significant Funds**
22 **and Energy to the Philippine Project**

23 68. As was disclosed fully to Wynn Resorts and the Nevada Gaming Commission,
24 Universal went about the difficult process of acquiring land and approvals to build a casino in the
25 Philippines.

26 69. In 2008, after negotiations with private landowners that spanned several months,
27 Universal purchased contiguous land in and about a special economic zone in Manila Bay that
28 was specifically zoned for casinos. It made this purchase with a Philippine-based partner, and at
all times (contrary to statements in the Complaint and by Mr. Freeh) has complied with the laws
of the Philippines requiring the citizenship for landholding.

70. The Philippine government approached Universal as early as 2006 and courted
Universal for years. The Philippine government ultimately secured an agreement that Universal

1 would employ significant numbers of local people to work in the casinos. Press reports estimated
2 that Universal's project and surrounding development could create as many as 250,000 jobs for
3 Filipinos, and generate billions of dollars in tax revenues for the Philippine government. When
4 Universal delayed the project in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the Philippine government
5 again stepped up its efforts to encourage Universal to advance the development of its project.
6 While Universal certainly expects the Manila Bay Project to be a "win-win" for the Philippines
7 and Universal, the idea that Universal needed to curry special favor with Philippine government
8 officials is profoundly mistaken.

9 **C. Steve Wynn and Elaine Wynn Divorce**

10 71. In March 2009, Mr. Wynn divorced Elaine Wynn. The divorce proved to be
11 damaging to Mr. Wynn's financial position and standing within Wynn Resorts. By early 2010,
12 Mr. Wynn had reached an agreement to split his ownership of Wynn Resorts' stock with Elaine
13 Wynn. As a result of the divorce settlement, Aruze USA was now by far Wynn Resorts' largest
14 stockholder, owning some 24,549,222 shares of Wynn Resorts, or 19.66% of the outstanding
15 stock. Mr. Wynn would now own less than half what Aruze USA owned of Wynn Resorts' stock.
16 While neither Aruze USA nor Mr. Okada ever made any threats against Mr. Wynn, the possibility
17 loomed that Mr. Wynn could be losing control of Wynn Resorts, as had happened ten years
18 earlier, when Mr. Wynn lost control of Mirage Resorts, Inc.

19 72. On January 6, 2010, Mr. Wynn obtained an Amended and Restated Stockholders
20 Agreement ("Amended Stockholders Agreement,") which made Elaine Wynn a party to the
21 Stockholders Agreement. The Amended Stockholders Agreement carried forward the covenant
22 of all the Stockholders that the "Stockholder shall be the record and Beneficial Owner" of all
23 Wynn Resorts common shares and "shall have *the sole power of disposition* [and] *sole power of*
24 *conversion*" of the shares "with no material limitations, qualifications, or restrictions on such
25 rights" except under applicable securities laws and the terms of the Stockholders Agreement.
26 (Emphasis added.)
27
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1 73. The amended agreement also altered the Stockholders Agreement language
2 regarding Aruze USA's right to nominate directors. Aruze USA could endorse nominees so long
3 as the majority of nominees were endorsed by Mr. Wynn. Although the agreement required
4 Mr. Wynn to support a minority slate of directors proposed by Aruze USA, he never did so. On
5 information and belief, Mr. Wynn obtained the Amended and Restated Stockholders Agreement,
6 with the intention of never supporting any director proposed by Aruze USA. In fact, Mr. Wynn
7 consistently refused efforts to consider Aruze USA directors for the Board, in an effort to
8 continue to monopolize control over Wynn Resorts. [ADD EXAMPLES FROM CLIENT]

9 74. In addition, the Amended and Restated Stockholders Agreement continued to
10 contain a non-compete clause that prohibited Mr. Okada, Aruze USA, and Universal only from
11 operating casinos in Clark County, Nevada and in Macau, and certain Internet gaming ventures.
12 Neither this version of the Stockholders Agreement, nor any prior or subsequent agreements,
13 contained any prohibition or concerns regarding the Philippines or Korea.

14 75. In January 2010, Mr. Okada indicated that he was willing to move ahead with the
15 amendments provided that Mr. Wynn reciprocated by allowing Aruze USA to sell publicly the
16 same number of shares as Mr. Wynn and Elaine Wynn. In this way, Mr. Okada expected to
17 receive liquidity for Aruze USA whenever Mr. Wynn and Elaine Wynn asked permission to sell
18 or transfer their stock.

19 **D. Steve Wynn and Kazuo Okada Visit the Philippines in 2010, as Wynn Resorts**
20 **Considers Involvement with the Philippine Project**

21 76. Though Mr. Wynn had consistently declined to involve Wynn Resorts formally in
22 the Philippine project, he began to reconsider the opportunity in 2010. On June 14, 2010,
23 Mr. Wynn and Mr. Okada jointly visited Manila to conduct due diligence on behalf of Wynn
24 Resorts and Universal. On information and belief, Mr. Wynn was considering pursuing the
25 project in his individual capacity as well as on behalf of Wynn Resorts.
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1 77. As illustrated in the photographs, this pre-arranged trip involved meetings with
2 dignitaries and officials and informational presentations on the project.
3





78. Mr. Wynn never formally committed Wynn Resorts to the Manila Bay project, but was clearly interested in pursuing the opportunity. The idea – promulgated by Mr. Wynn in press conferences following the purported redemption – that Mr. Okada and Universal were off “doing their own thing” unbeknownst to anyone at Wynn Resorts, is not true.

E. Over Kazuo Okada’s Objection, Wynn Resorts Makes an Unprecedented \$135 Million Donation For Wynn Macau

79. In May 2011, Wynn Macau pledged to donate HK\$1 billion (about \$135 million) to the University of Macau Development Foundation. This contribution consisted of a \$25 million contribution made in May 2011, and a commitment for additional donations of \$10 million each year for the calendar years 2012 through 2022 inclusive. Suspiciously, Wynn Macau’s current gaming concession covers essentially the same 10-year period expiring in

1 June 2022. Wynn Macau and Wynn Resorts also disclosed that Wynn Macau was in the process
2 of seeking to obtain land in Macau and the rights to develop a third casino in the area.

3 80. At a Board meeting in April, 2011, Mr. Okada objected to and voted against this
4 donation, which appears to be unprecedented in the annals of the University of Macau, and in the
5 history of Wynn Resorts. Mr. Okada objected to the unprecedented size and duration of the
6 commitment. It was unclear how the University of Macau would use the funds. Mr. Okada
7 wondered why a wealthy university that sits on government land and largely caters to non-Macau
8 residents might need or want such a large donation. Mr. Okada, who is himself a significant
9 philanthropist, wondered whether such a donation actually benefits the people who live in Macau.
10 He was concerned about the lack of deliberation of the boards of Wynn Resorts and Wynn Macau
11 (the donation was approved at a joint meeting in Macau of the two boards), and that pending
12 approvals in Macau related to a new development in Cotai, and the coincidence of the date of the
13 donation and the term of Wynn Macau's gaming license in Macau, might make it appear that
14 Wynn Macau and Wynn Resorts were paying for benefits.

15 81. Notably, for example, the Chancellor of the University of Macau is also the head
16 of Macau's government, with ultimate oversight of gaming matters. The only other charitable
17 donation Wynn Resorts has disclosed in SEC filings in its history was a \$10 million Ming
18 dynasty vase donated to the Macau Museum in 2006—the same year in which Wynn Resorts first
19 applied for a land concession on the Cotai Strip in Macau.

20 82. While Wynn Resorts claims to have received a legal opinion sanctioning the
21 unprecedented University of Macau donation, Wynn Resorts did not provide that legal opinion to
22 Mr. Okada or, on information and belief, to any other members of the board of either Wynn
23 Macau or Wynn Resorts. On information and belief, Mr. Wynn – and potentially others – misled
24 the Wynn Resorts Board by securing its consent to the donation, without disclosing his personal
25 knowledge of the close connection between the University of Macau and officials responsible for
26 regulatory decisions related to Wynn Macau's gaming operations.

1 83. Mr. Okada's opposition to this donation caught the attention of the U.S. Securities
2 and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). According to Wynn Resorts 2011 Form 10-K, Wynn
3 Resorts received a letter from the Division of Enforcement of the SEC indicating the SEC has
4 commenced an "informal inquiry" regarding matters in Macau. Mr. Wynn, Ms. Sinatra (Wynn
5 Resorts' General Counsel), and Mr. Miller (head of Wynn Resorts' Compliance Committee) did
6 not take kindly to Mr. Okada's scrutiny of the donation. On information and belief, Mr. Wynn,
7 Ms. Sinatra, and Mr. Miller set out to discredit Mr. Okada, in an effort to distract attention from
8 the problematic Macau donation.

9 **F. Steve Wynn and Kimmarie Sinatra Fraudulently Promise Kazuo Okada**
10 **Financing for the Philippine Project**

11 84. On or about April 29, 2011, Mr. Wynn married his current wife Andrea Hissom.
12 Shortly thereafter, on May 16, 2011, Mr. Wynn and Mr. Okada met in Macau. Ms. Sinatra was
13 present at the meeting, as was Matt Maddox ("Mr. Maddox"), the Chief Financial Officer of
14 Wynn Resorts, and Michiaki Tanaka ("Mr. Tanaka") of Aruze USA, who prepared a transcript of
15 the meeting.

16 85. According to the transcript of the meeting, Mr. Wynn told Mr. Okada that Elaine
17 Wynn was very angry at Mr. Wynn for remarrying. Knowing she was going through a difficult
18 time, Mr. Okada expressed sympathy for Elaine Wynn. Mr. Wynn said that Elaine Wynn had a
19 desire to transfer her shares to a new owner, and that there was an urgent need for Mr. Okada to
20 immediately consent on Aruze USA's behalf to the transfer of the securities under the
21 Stockholders Agreement.

22 86. Mr. Okada was amenable to allowing Elaine Wynn to transfer her stock because of
23 this exigency but in return, Mr. Okada wanted to pledge some of Aruze USA's Wynn Resorts
24 stock in order to obtain a measure of liquidity from the stock.

25 87. Mr. Wynn suggested that instead of having Aruze USA pledge its shares, he had
26 "good answers to solve [Mr. Okada's] ... requests." Mr. Wynn suggested that Wynn Resorts
27 would make a loan to Aruze USA. Mr. Wynn told Mr. Okada that this was better than Aruze
28

1 USA liquidating its stock (which could have hurt Wynn Resorts' stock value), and much better
2 than a bank loan because a bank: (1) would set a credit line of only 50% of the market value of
3 Aruze USA's stock; (2) would require additional guarantees if the market value of Aruze USA's
4 stock decreases; and (3) could require forfeiture of Aruze USA's stock if there was any delay in
5 payment.

6 88. Mr. Wynn gave Mr. Okada an explicit personal assurance that financing would
7 occur. Mr. Wynn stated that this proposal would be good for Mr. Okada and good for Wynn
8 Resorts, because it will contribute to the stability of Wynn Resorts. And, based on such
9 assurances, Mr. Okada agreed to financing from Wynn Resorts, rather than pledging Aruze
10 USA's stock.

11 89. Unbeknownst to Mr. Okada, Universal, or Aruze USA at the time, Mr. Wynn was
12 simultaneously orchestrating Wynn Resorts' "investigation" to have Mr. Okada, Aruze USA, and
13 Universal deemed unsuitable. Indeed, Wynn Resorts has publicly asserted that it began its
14 "investigation" into the Philippines as early as February 2011, well before Mr. Okada proposed to
15 pledge Aruze USA's shares of Wynn Resorts' stock. Through his assurances, however,
16 Mr. Wynn took deliberate steps to keep Aruze USA, Universal, and Mr. Okada associated with
17 Wynn Resorts. If Wynn Resorts and Mr. Wynn were truly concerned with any risk that Aruze
18 USA, Universal, and Mr. Okada supposedly posed to their gaming licenses, they would have
19 allowed Aruze USA to liquidate its position. Instead, to perpetrate the fraudulent scheme, and
20 seek to forcibly redeem Aruze USA's shares at a vast discount under extremely oppressive terms,
21 Mr. Wynn instead misled Aruze USA into not liquidating its shares.

22 90. Ms. Sinatra was present at the meeting, and participated in this fraudulent scheme.
23 On information and belief, Ms. Sinatra is a highly sophisticated and knowledgeable attorney, and
24 is one of the highest-paid general counsels in the United States. Toward the end of the meeting,
25 Ms. Sinatra stated that draft loan agreements would be provided to Aruze USA within 10 days to
26 support the agreement reached between Mr. Okada and Mr. Wynn. Neither Mr. Wynn nor
27 Ms. Sinatra said anything about internal or external limitations on loans to directors and officers.
28

1 For example, neither of them made any mention of Section 402 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
2 (“SOX”). Unlike Japanese law that has no such prohibition, on information and belief,
3 Ms. Sinatra believed Section 402 barred any loan to Aruze USA by Wynn Resorts. On
4 information and belief, at the time of this meeting, Ms. Sinatra was intimately familiar with SOX
5 and Section 402, having overseen the implementation of SOX compliance policies at Wynn
6 Resorts that specifically addressed prohibitions on loans to officers and directors.

7 91. At the conclusion of the meeting, and in reliance on the assurances by Mr. Wynn
8 and Ms. Sinatra that Wynn Resorts would make a loan to provide liquidity for Aruze USA and
9 that loan documents would be forthcoming, Mr. Okada signed a waiver and consent granting
10 Elaine Wynn the option to transfer her stock. Simultaneously, Mr. Tanaka of Aruze USA made a
11 handwritten note to memorialize the agreement that Wynn Resorts would provide financing to
12 Aruze USA.

13 92. Later that day, in response to Mr. Tanaka’s note and after Mr. Okada had signed
14 the waiver and consent about Elaine Wynn’s stock, Ms. Sinatra prepared a draft “Side Letter” to
15 replace the one prepared by Mr. Tanaka. The “Side Letter” prepared by Ms. Sinatra stated that
16 Wynn Resorts would negotiate a loan from Wynn Resorts to Aruze USA secured by Aruze
17 USA’s stock “*to the extent compliant with all state and federal laws.*” (Emphasis added.) On
18 information and belief, Ms. Sinatra inserted this language because she believed Section 402 of
19 SOX prohibited the loan proposed by Mr. Wynn and agreed to by both Mr. Wynn and Mr. Okada.

20 93. At the time, Wynn Resorts had extensive SOX compliance policies. Yet,
21 Ms. Sinatra said nothing to Mr. Okada or Aruze USA concerning any purported loan prohibitions
22 under SOX, leading Mr. Okada and Aruze USA to believe that financing through Wynn Resorts
23 was not only possible, but would be forthcoming in the near future. Ms. Sinatra’s role in this
24 transaction makes clear that she was not working on Wynn Resorts’ behalf. Rather, in breach of
25 her duty to Wynn Resorts, she intentionally sought to deceive Mr. Okada for the personal benefit
26 of Mr. Wynn, who would benefit from stringing along Aruze USA.

1 94. On June 9, 2011, Ms. Sinatra emailed Aruze USA's attorneys regarding the "Side
2 Letter," expressing "concern." For the first time, Ms. Sinatra specifically referred to Section 402
3 of SOX. She provided no further explanation (although this confirmed that she understood the
4 issue). Ms. Sinatra urged Aruze USA to "obtain sophisticated US securities lawyers to assist."
5 Ms. Sinatra also disputed that Mr. Wynn had committed to provide financing at the meeting, a
6 statement that she knew to be false.

7 95. On June 20, 2011, Ms. Sinatra asked Aruze USA's counsel if Mr. Okada's consent
8 to Elaine Wynn's transfer of shares was conditioned on Aruze USA receiving the loan. On
9 July 13, 2011, Aruze USA's lawyer emailed Ms. Sinatra stating that Aruze USA, through
10 Mr. Okada, would allow the immediate transfer of Elaine Wynn's shares because he understood
11 that approval was needed urgently, but stated that the consent was "based upon the mutual
12 understanding between Mr. Okada and Mr. Wynn that Mr. Wynn would pursue avenues for
13 Mr. Okada to obtain financing." Ms. Sinatra immediately sent an email back: "Thank you very
14 much for this."

15 96. In the same email, Ms. Sinatra then explained that Wynn Resorts was negotiating
16 with Deutsche Bank on a margin loan transaction, with Wynn Resorts acting as a "backstop."
17 Ms. Sinatra suggested holding a telephone conference with Aruze USA's counsel to discuss the
18 proposed transaction further. She did not dispute that Mr. Okada's consent to the amendment in
19 the Stockholders Agreement was based on Wynn Resorts' agreement to continue to pursue
20 financing for a loan to Aruze USA (using Aruze USA's Wynn Resorts shares as collateral). At
21 no point in time did Ms. Sinatra call into question the Philippine project.

22 97. On July 15, 2011, Ms. Sinatra and Aruze USA's counsel held a telephone
23 conference to discuss the proposed financing from Deutsche Bank. Ms. Sinatra provided
24 background information on the state of the negotiations, and explained that Deutsche Bank was
25 considering a margin loan of \$800 million to Aruze USA. She stated that Deutsche Bank
26 expected that they would be able to provide draft documentation within two to three weeks, and
27 that the loan would be proposed to the Wynn Resorts Compliance Committee thereafter.
28

1 98. On or about September 23, 2011, Ms. Sinatra called Aruze USA. Ms. Sinatra
2 informed Aruze USA that Wynn Resorts' Compliance Committee would be meeting the
3 following week regarding the Philippines, which could impact whether Wynn Resorts would
4 allow the loan.

5 99. Wynn Resorts' Compliance Committee is not an independent committee of the
6 Board. Rather, it is made up of one Wynn Resorts director, former Nevada Governor Bob Miller,
7 and two Wynn Resorts insiders. On information and belief, each member of Wynn Resorts'
8 Compliance Committee depends on Mr. Wynn for his livelihood and each is beholden to
9 Mr. Wynn. On information and belief, Mr. Wynn has plenary control over the Compliance
10 Committee. On September 30, 2011, the Compliance Committee refused to permit the loan to
11 Aruze USA.

12 **G. The Chair of Universal's and Aruze Gaming America's Compliance**
13 **Committee Resigns**

14 100. Also, on or about September 27, 2011, Frank A. Schreck, who had been the
15 Chairman of the Universal Compliance Committee for years, abruptly resigned his position. In
16 addition to being the Chair of the Universal Compliance Committee, he was (and, on information
17 and belief, still is) a long-time lawyer for Mr. Wynn.

18 101. Richard Morgan, the new Chairman of the Universal Compliance Committee,
19 spoke with Mr. Schreck regarding his reasons for resignation. Mr. Schreck told Mr. Morgan that
20 he did not resign from the Committees because of any suitability concerns about Mr. Okada.
21 Mr. Morgan asked Mr. Schreck if he knew of any facts that gave Mr. Schreck concerns about
22 Mr. Okada's suitability; Mr. Schreck told Mr. Morgan that he knew of no such facts.

23 102. Notably, Mr. Schreck's law firm thereafter appeared as litigation counsel for
24 Wynn Resorts on January 27, 2012, representing Wynn Resorts in the Nevada state court in
25 seeking to deny Mr. Okada his right as a director of Wynn Resorts to review Wynn Resorts'
26 records regarding the enormous donation it made to the University of Macau.

1 **IV. STEVE WYNN DIRECTS WYNN RESORTS TO CONDUCT A PRETEXTUAL**
2 **INVESTIGATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF REDEEMING ARUZE USA'S**
3 **SHARES**

4 **A. Wynn Resorts Seeks Kazuo Okada's Resignation and Threatens Redemption**
5 **in an Attempt to Secure a Personal Benefit for Steve Wynn**

6 103. On September 30, 2011, Aruze USA's lawyers, Robert Faiss and Mark Clayton of
7 the Lionel Sawyer & Collins law firm, met with Ms. Sinatra and Kevin Tourek of Wynn Resorts.
8 The conversation took a very unexpected turn.

9 104. First, Ms. Sinatra and Mr. Tourek said that Wynn Resorts' Compliance Committee
10 had commissioned two "investigations" and that the Compliance Committee had produced an
11 investigative "report." Ms. Sinatra and Mr. Tourek were concerned that Universal had purchased
12 land from a person in the Philippines who was now under indictment for tax evasion. Neither
13 Ms. Sinatra nor Mr. Tourek explained how Universal or Mr. Okada could bear any responsibility
14 for another man's alleged failure to pay his taxes.

15 105. Second, Ms. Sinatra and Mr. Tourek said that Wynn Resorts has a "policy" that
16 officers and directors cannot pledge their Company stock. This was the first mention of such a
17 policy, despite extensive discussions of a loan secured by Aruze USA's stock.

18 106. Third, Ms. Sinatra and Mr. Tourek stated that, if there was a loan, Mr. Okada
19 would have to step down from the Board and then would have the right to pledge or sell Aruze
20 USA's shares subject to the voting agreement. Again, this was the first mention of such a
21 requirement.

22 107. Fourth, Ms. Sinatra and Mr. Tourek proposed to change the Stockholders
23 Agreement to allow Aruze USA to sell or pledge shares, but subject to a voting trust, which
24 would allow Mr. Wynn to vote the shares, and a right of first refusal for Mr. Wynn to purchase
25 the shares. This proposal was improper. Ms. Sinatra and Mr. Tourek were again advocating for
26 Mr. Wynn, not for Wynn Resorts. This was another breach of duty by Ms. Sinatra to Wynn
27 Resorts and to its largest shareholder, Aruze USA.
28

1 108. Fifth, Ms. Sinatra and Mr. Tourek stated that Mr. Okada has a fiduciary duty to
2 present to Wynn Resorts any proposed competitive opportunities. Further, they stated that if
3 Mr. Okada has a competing casino business, he should consider stepping down from the Board.
4 This was the first mention of any “competitive” concerns. Mr. Wynn and Wynn Resorts (and,
5 indeed, Ms. Sinatra and Mr. Tourek) had known about Universal’s Philippine project for years.
6 Universal had committed hundreds of millions of dollars to pursuing the project. Wynn Resorts
7 and Mr. Wynn had never objected to the Philippine project.

8 109. Sixth, toward the end of the meeting, Ms. Sinatra gave Mr. Okada’s counsel a
9 copy of the Articles of Incorporation of Wynn Resorts, with certain provisions highlighted in
10 yellow. The highlighted portions included the redemption provision. That was the first time that
11 redemption was ever obliquely mentioned to Mr. Okada or his counsel.

12 110. Ms. Sinatra then brought her threat into stark relief. She stated that the
13 Compliance Committee would meet on October 31, 2011 (in advance of a November 1 Board
14 meeting). She told Mr. Okada’s counsel that she hoped a “resolution” would be reached before
15 those meetings regarding Mr. Okada’s directorship and the voting rights of Aruze USA’s stock,
16 so as to avoid presenting this matter to the Compliance Committee and the Board. Ms. Sinatra’s
17 threat was clear: if Aruze USA did not agree to sell its shares in Wynn Resorts to Mr. Wynn or
18 pledge its shares – subject to both a voting trust that would allow Mr. Wynn to vote the shares
19 and to a right of first refusal for Mr. Wynn to purchase the shares – then Ms. Sinatra and Mr.
20 Wynn would, as officers of Wynn Resorts, (a) inform the Board of alleged concerns regarding
21 Universal’s and Mr. Okada’s project in the Philippines, and (b) request that the Board redeem
22 Aruze USA’s shares in Wynn Resorts on the basis of yet undisclosed investigative “findings” that
23 Defendants had not been allowed to review or permitted any opportunity to rebut.

24 **B. Steve Wynn and Kimmarie Sinatra Try to Intimidate and Threaten Kazuo**
25 **Okada While Hiding Supposed Evidence of Wrongdoing**

26 111. On an October 3, 2011 telephone call, Aruze USA’s counsel asked Ms. Sinatra to
27 provide Aruze USA with a copy of the Compliance Committee’s investigative report regarding
28

1 Mr. Okada. Ms. Sinatra replied that she would have to check to see if a copy could be provided;
2 in fact, she did not and has never provided a copy of the investigative report to Aruze USA,
3 Mr. Okada, or their counsel.

4 112. On October 4, 2011, Mr. Wynn and Ms. Sinatra met with Mr. Okada and his
5 counsel. At the meeting, Mr. Wynn stated that Wynn Resorts' other directors had already
6 decided that Mr. Okada must be removed as Vice Chairman of the Company's Board and as a
7 director of both the Wynn Macau and Wynn Resorts Boards. It apparently did not matter to
8 Mr. Wynn and Ms. Sinatra that in Nevada *only stockholders can remove directors*. Based on a
9 false threat, Mr. Wynn demanded Mr. Okada's resignation as a director.

10 113. Mr. Okada's counsel told Mr. Wynn that in all his years, he had never before
11 experienced a situation where the subject of an investigative report had never been formally
12 questioned or even permitted to respond to the accusations being levied against him. Mr. Okada's
13 counsel once again requested a copy of the investigative report so that he and Mr. Okada's other
14 attorneys could ensure they were advising Mr. Okada properly and that the Wynn Directors could
15 make a decision based on accurate information. Over the course of the remainder of the
16 October 4 meeting, counsel for Mr. Okada asked at least two additional times for a copy of the
17 investigative report. Ms. Sinatra finally replied that Mr. Okada and his counsel could not see a
18 copy of the investigative report because it was "privileged." On information and belief,
19 Ms. Sinatra once again intentionally misrepresented the law (Mr. Okada, as a director of the
20 Company, has a right to see the Company's books and records, including its communications
21 with counsel), in breach of her duties to Wynn Resorts.

22 114. During the October 4, 2011 meeting, Mr. Wynn stated that the purported
23 "grounds" upon which the other directors based their decision to move against Mr. Okada were as
24 follows:

- 25 • That the Philippines were so corrupt that no one could possibly do business in that
26 country without violating the FCPA;

- That “research” showed Mr. Okada owned land without a Philippines partner, and that this violated Philippines law;
- That the other directors were “convinced” that Mr. Okada’s use of his Wynn Resorts business card in other countries had caused a belief that Wynn Resorts was involved in the Philippine project and that the Company would not be in this position had he instead used his Universal business card;
- That Mr. Okada had used the Wynn Resorts building design and other trade secrets without permission; and
- That Mr. Okada had associated with persons who had later been indicted in the Philippines on charges unrelated to the Philippine project.

115. Mr. Wynn’s characterizations of the allegations are telling for several reasons. First, many of these claims were not ultimately used as a basis to redeem Aruze USA’s stock. Rather, Wynn Resorts had an ever-changing list of supposed transgressions it claimed against Mr. Okada, strongly suggesting that Mr. Wynn and Wynn Resorts were seeking to find something – anything – to justify a predetermined outcome. Second, many of these claims are demonstrably false – as one example, the acquisition of the land in the Philippines was entirely compliant with Philippine law.

116. Mr. Wynn closed the meeting by telling Mr. Okada that if he had any respect for Mr. Wynn and the other members of the Board, he would voluntarily step down from his role as a director and Vice Chairman of Wynn Resorts. At this time, Mr. Okada’s counsel explained to Mr. Wynn that Mr. Okada should not be required to respond to his demand for resignation until he had time to further consider it. Mr. Wynn agreed and the meeting was adjourned.

117. Around this same time, the Chairman of Universal’s Compliance Committee also requested a copy of the investigative report through the Chairman of Wynn Resorts’ Compliance Committee. This request has been ignored.

1 **C. A Letter From Steve Wynn’s Outside Lawyer Confirms that, While Wynn**
2 **Resorts Had Already Determined the Outcome, a Pretextual “Investigation”**
3 **was Only Just Starting**

4 118. On October 13, 2011, Robert L. Shapiro, Esq., an attorney retained by Wynn
5 Resorts, sent a letter to Aruze USA. Without any elaboration, the letter reiterated the same
6 mistaken – and soon to be abandoned – conclusions that Mr. Wynn outlined in the October 4
7 meeting. Mr. Shapiro also explicitly stated that Universal’s Manila Bay project “raises questions”
8 regarding “possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.” The letter again demanded
9 Mr. Okada’s resignation.

10 119. Curiously, Mr. Shapiro’s letter admitted that the Compliance Committee was only
11 then beginning the very investigation that Mr. Wynn and Ms. Sinatra claimed to have already
12 been concluded. They also claimed to have already generated a report. Yet Mr. Shapiro wrote
13 that “The Compliance Committee of Wynn Resorts must fully investigate the foregoing acts and
14 have retained Louis J. Freeh ... to conduct an independent investigation.” On information and
15 belief, as of the date of Mr. Shapiro’s letter, Mr. Freeh had not started his investigation.

16 **D. Wynn Resorts Refuses to Allow Kazuo Okada and Aruze USA to Review Any**
17 **Supposed “Evidence”**

18 120. On October 24, 2011, Mr. Okada through his counsel made an initial demand for
19 documents regarding the Philippine investigation. Although he was plainly entitled to such
20 documents as a director under Nevada law, Wynn Resorts refused this and numerous subsequent
21 demands for documents. Wynn Resorts aimed to conduct a secret investigation and never allow
22 Mr. Okada or his counsel to scrutinize or respond to the supposed “evidence” against him.

23 **E. The Board Summarily Removes Kazuo Okada As Vice-Chairman**

24 121. At the Board’s November 1, 2011 meeting, Mr. Miller presented an oral report of
25 an alleged investigation by the Compliance Committee into Mr. Okada’s and Universal’s
26 activities in the Philippines. The report disclosed that the Compliance Committee had allegedly
27 conducted one internal and two “independent” investigations into allegations of suitability,
28

1 conflicts of interest, and possible breaches of fiduciary duties related to acquisition of land for the
2 Philippine project and charitable contributions made by Universal. To date, the contents of these
3 purported investigations have not been presented to Mr. Okada.

4 122. Mr. Miller reported that the Compliance Committee (and not a committee
5 consisting of the independent directors) had retained Freeh Sporkin & Sullivan LLP (“Freeh
6 Sporkin”) as a special investigator to conduct an investigation into the allegations against
7 Mr. Okada. The Board – without debate, deliberation, or allowing Mr. Okada a chance to
8 respond – summarily eliminated Mr. Okada’s position as Vice-Chairman of the Board and ratified
9 the decision to hire Freeh Sporkin.

10 **F. Kazuo Okada Seeks More Information Regarding Wynn Macau**

11 123. The vehemence of the actions by Mr. Wynn, Ms. Sinatra, Mr. Miller, and the
12 Board against Mr. Okada is highly suspicious. After all, Mr. Okada had raised concerns about the
13 donation to the University of Macau before Wynn Resorts had raised any type of unsuitability
14 allegations against Mr. Okada and before anyone associated with Wynn Resorts even mentioned
15 the word “redemption” to him. Mr. Okada made several requests for access to Wynn Resorts’
16 books and records for information relating to the donation made by Wynn Resorts to the
17 University of Macau, all of which were denied without a valid basis. In the state court of Nevada,
18 Mr. Okada even filed a petition for a writ of mandamus on January 11, 2012 to compel Wynn
19 Resorts to grant him access to Wynn Resorts’ books and records. *Okada v. Wynn Resorts, Ltd.*,
20 case number A-12-65422-B, Department XI (the “Inspection Action”). At a hearing on
21 February 9, 2012, the Court ordered Wynn Resorts to comply with Mr. Okada’s reasonable
22 requests. In an order dated October 12, 2012, the Court further ordered that Wynn Resorts
23 produce to Mr. Okada documentation regarding expenditures advanced directly or indirectly by
24 Mr. Wynn in pursuit of gaming concessions in Macau.

1 **G. Aruze USA Nominates Directors, But Steve Wynn Refuses to Endorse Them**
2 **Despite His Obligation to Do So**

3 124. To further address the concerns about Wynn Resorts management, on January 18,
4 2012, pursuant to Section 2(a) of the Stockholders Agreement, Aruze USA, submitted a letter to
5 the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee of the Company designating three
6 individuals as candidates to be considered for nomination as directors of the Company and
7 included in the Company's proxy statement relating to the Company's 2012 annual meeting of
8 the stockholders or any stockholder meeting held for the purpose of electing Class I directors.
9 Despite numerous written requests to Mr. Wynn to endorse the slate of directors nominated by
10 Aruze USA, as required by the Stockholders Agreement, Mr. Wynn refused to do so.

11 **H. The Freeh Investigation Proceeds Without Seeking Any Input From Kazuo**
12 **Okada**

13 125. In early November 2011, counsel for Mr. Okada contacted Freeh Sporkin
14 requesting further information regarding how its investigation would proceed and to request
15 copies of documents, evidence, or reports related to the allegations against Mr. Okada.
16 Mr. Okada requested the documents so that he could address the allegations made against him.
17 Freeh Sporkin declined to provide any materials and instead directed counsel for Mr. Okada to
18 make such requests of Mr. Shapiro. When such requests were made of Mr. Shapiro, they were
19 rejected.

20 126. Freeh Sporkin did not contact Mr. Okada or his counsel about an interview until
21 January 9, 2012, at which time it demanded (not requested) an interview of Mr. Okada during the
22 week of January 30 (*i.e.*, January 30-February 5). On January 15, 2012, four days after
23 Mr. Okada filed his Inspection Action, Freeh Sporkin informed Mr. Okada's counsel that the
24 "schedule has changed" and pressured Mr. Okada to agree to an interview *before* the week of
25 January 30.

26 127. On January 19, 2012, Mr. Miller, Chair of Wynn Resorts' Compliance Committee,
27 wrote directly to Mr. Okada, threatening that if Mr. Okada failed to make himself available for
28

1 interviews with Freeh Sporkin on January 30 or 31, the Compliance Committee “can only
2 conclude that you have refused participation.” The letter stated that the Compliance Committee
3 originally had a goal of receiving a report by the end of 2011, which was extended to January 15,
4 2012. In addition to this being the first time anyone shared the Compliance Committee’s
5 purported deadlines with Mr. Okada, these dates are inconsistent with Freeh Sporkin making its
6 initial request to conduct an interview of Mr. Okada that would take place in the first week of
7 February. It proved not to be the first time Mr. Miller was “confused” about the “investigation”
8 that was supposedly operating under his direction.

9
10 128. Mr. Okada had only recently hired new counsel to assist with the response to the
11 Freeh Sporkin investigation. In order to prepare for the interview, the new counsel requested that
12 the parties seek a mutually convenient date for an interview by February 15, 2012. Freeh Sporkin
13 then agreed to schedule the interview on February 15th.

14 **I. Freeh Sporkin Refuses to Provide Meaningful Information Regarding the**
15 **Investigation to Kazuo Okada**

16 129. While attempting to set a date to schedule the Freeh Sporkin interview,
17 Mr. Okada’s counsel requested that Freeh Sporkin identify the specific matters under review so
18 that Mr. Okada could prepare appropriately for his interview. After all, Mr. Okada is the
19 Chairman of a publicly traded corporation – and cannot be expected to know every operational
20 detail in his organizations. In addition, translations between Japanese and English are notoriously
21 difficult because of subtleties in language. Mr. Okada’s counsel repeatedly requested documents
22 that Freeh Sporkin might use in the interview and topics so Mr. Okada could prepare for the
23 interview and be ready to provide information and documents that could help Freeh Sporkin (and
24 the Board) understand the facts concerning whatever topics and issues it wanted to discuss with
25 Mr. Okada.

26 130. Freeh Sporkin refused to provide anything more than a statement that it was
27 investigating “all matters related to Mr. Okada’s, Universal’s, and Aruze’s activities in the
28 Philippines and Korea.” This was the first time that Korea was even mentioned as the subject of

1 any investigation by the Company. Again – the basis of Aruze USA’s supposed “unsuitability”
2 kept changing.

3 131. Instead of sharing the topics of the interview with Mr. Okada, Mr. Freeh chose to
4 conduct the interview as an ambush, not unlike the hostile interrogation of a suspected criminal,
5 rather than a respectful and cooperative interview seeking information from a director of Wynn
6 Resorts. If he was afforded the opportunity to do so, Mr. Okada could have helped Mr. Freeh and
7 Freeh Sporkin avoid the public embarrassment of a report that is riddled with factual and legal
8 errors.

9 **J. Kazuo Okada Voluntarily Sits For A Full-Day Interview With Freeh Sporkin**

10 132. On February 15, 2012, Mr. Okada sat for a full-day interview with Mr. Freeh and
11 other lawyers for Freeh Sporkin.

12 133. The questions focused mainly on expenses that Mr. Freeh claimed had been paid
13 by Universal for lodging and meals at Wynn Resorts properties on behalf of persons Mr. Freeh
14 identified as foreign officials. This was a subject that had never been mentioned in the months
15 before when Ms. Sinatra asserted that an investigation had already been conducted by the
16 Company, or when Mr. Wynn or Mr. Shapiro, in a subsequent letter, listed the supposed bases for
17 the directors taking action to eliminate Mr. Okada’s position as Vice Chairman. Other than
18 allegations regarding such purported expenses, Mr. Freeh also asked questions about Universal’s
19 compliance with Philippine landownership requirements, which had been handled for Universal
20 by one of the Philippines’ leading law firms.

21 134. The interview went well into the evening, hours past the time originally estimated
22 by Mr. Freeh. At the end of the interview, Mr. Okada stated that he would look into the matters
23 raised during the interview, and that he would be willing to report back with detailed information
24 once it could be assembled.

1 **K. Wynn Resorts Allows No Opportunity for A Reasonable Response**

2 135. At a press conference following the redemption of Aruze USA's stock. Mr. Miller
3 made a number of statements that will prove to be false. One stood out in particular. Mr. Miller
4 said:

5 Following the interview, [Mr. Freeh] informed Mr. Okada that he
6 would be finalizing the report on Friday, February 17, and offered
7 [Mr. Okada] an opportunity to present any exculpatory evidence
8 prior to that time frame. [Mr. Freeh] determined that no additional
exculpatory evidence was presented, and thus a final report was
presented.

9 136. Similarly, the Wynn Resorts Seconded Amended Complaint states that "Freeh
10 advised Mr. Okada and his counsel that he would be reporting his findings to the Wynn Resorts
11 Board on February 18, 2012...." (SAC at ¶ 47.)

12 137. Neither statement is true. Mr. Freeh said nothing regarding the date of the
13 completion of his report at the interview, and, in fact, said at the February 15, 2012 interview of
14 Mr. Okada that his investigation was not complete and that his report was not complete.

15 138. On February 16, 2012, Mr. Okada's counsel emailed Mr. Freeh stating:

16 Louis:

17 I hope you had a good trip back to the US. Following your
18 interview of Mr. Okada, we understand that you will be drafting a
report for submission to the Wynn Resorts Compliance Committee.
19 I am writing to request an opportunity for Mr. Okada and Universal
Entertainment to submit additional material for your consideration,
20 prior to the submission of your report. Please let me know as soon
as you are able if you will allow us to do.

21 139. In response, on February 17, 2012, Mr. Freeh, acting as an agent for Wynn
22 Resorts, offered two options to Mr. Okada's counsel:

23 Joel Friedman called you about 900a today (PT) and left a message
24 for you to call a well as an email.

25 I can suggest two possibilities in response to your letter:

26 First, that you provide me as soon as possible, and no later than
600p PacT today, with a proffer of what Mr. Okada and Universal
27 wish to submit for additional consideration. Your very able firm
has represented Mr. Okada now for several weeks and you know
28 the principal areas of our investigation based on Wednesday's
interview. So I would expect you can make such a proffer.

1 *Secondly, Mr. Okada will have the opportunity to respond to my*
2 *report after he receives a copy, along with the other Wynn Resorts'*
3 *directors. I will certainly consider and evaluate whatever*
4 *information may be provided.*

5 ...

6 I also note that Mr. Okada's litigation against Wynn Resorts has
7 now predicated an SEC inquiry and no doubt drawn the proper
8 attention of other regulatory agencies. Consequently, the
9 Compliance Committee has given me instructions to conclude my
10 report with all deliberate speed.

11 ...

12 Anyway, I have a great deal of respect for you and believe the
13 above alternatives allow for a fair resolution at this stage.

14 Best regards.

15 Louie

16 (Emphasis added.)

17 140. Given the timing, Mr. Okada elected to respond to the Freeh Sporkin report once
18 he was able to see it, responding through his counsel:

19 Louis:

20 Thanks for your response. I am still traveling in Asia, and did not
21 have a chance to review Joel's message or contact him. I appreciate
22 your willingness to review any supplemental information that we
23 provide and to consider it in your findings. *Under the*
24 *circumstances, and in particular the tight time framework, I think it*
25 *makes the most sense for Mr. Okada, UE, Aruze USA, and our Firm*
26 *to review your report and to use it to focus our efforts in providing*
27 *you additional information.* So, we accept the second of the two
28 proposals in your letter, and would expect that the opportunity to
respond will include an opportunity for our law firm to work with
Mr. Okada, UE, and Aruze USA in order to be able to respond in a
complete and helpful fashion. Thanks very much.

(Emphasis added.)

141. Mr. Freeh responded "Thanks Tom and safe travels."

142. Curiously, about an hour and half later (now late in the day on Friday,
February 17), Mr. Freeh sent a second response, stating:

Just to confirm, I will now deliver my report to the Compliance
Committee having completed my investigation regarding the
matters under inquiry. It is my understanding that the Compliance
Committee will thereafter provide all of the Directors, including

1 Mr. Okada, with a copy of the report. As we both stated,
2 Mr. Okada can then submit any responses to the report which will
3 be considered and evaluated. However, the report I am submitting
4 is not a 'draft' subject to being finalized after Mr. Okada provides
5 any response. Rather this is akin to a final brief being submitted
6 with the opportunity for a response to be made.

7 Please let me know if you have any questions.

8 Best regards

9 Louie

10 143. This statement would prove to be misleading. As it turned out, Wynn Resorts
11 refused to give Mr. Okada a copy of the Freeh Sporkin report and then purported to redeem Aruze
12 USA's stock (at a nearly \$1 billion discount) *on the day the other Wynn Directors received the*
13 *report*, without giving Mr. Okada any reasonable opportunity to respond.

14 144. In addition, Mr. Freeh's statement that he was preparing a "final brief" is very
15 telling about how Mr. Freeh viewed his role in the process. Mr. Freeh was not preparing an
16 objective report of the facts by an "independent" investigator – he was providing the Board with
17 an argumentative document as an *advocate* against Mr. Okada. But even so, Mr. Freeh clearly
18 contemplated that Mr. Okada would and should have the opportunity for a response.
19 Nevertheless, spurred on by Mr. Wynn, the Board ignored Mr. Freeh's promise of an opportunity
20 to respond to the report (and the express statements in Mr. Freeh's report that further
21 investigation would be needed on certain topics), and instead acted rashly to redeem Aruze
22 USA's stock on an incomplete factual record and a faulty understanding of governing legal
23 principles, including, for example, the application of the FCPA to the facts, as well as Wynn
24 Resorts' (lack of) contractual rights to attempt to redeem Aruze USA's stock.

25 **L. Steve Wynn Hurriedly Schedules Board of Directors Meeting**

26 145. On February 15, 2012, scant hours after the completion of Mr. Freeh's interview
27 of Mr. Okada, Wynn Resorts noticed a special meeting of its Board. The meeting was set for
28 Saturday, February 18, 2012, at 9:00 a.m. in Las Vegas – which is 2:00 a.m. Sunday morning in
Japan. Although the notice for the Board meeting went out immediately following the conclusion

1 of the interview of Mr. Okada, and was scheduled to occur a mere three days after the interview,
2 Mr. Wynn and Ms. Sinatra included on the agenda a review of the Freeh Sporkin report.

3 **M. Steve Wynn Tries to Use the Threat of Redemption to Buy Aruze USA's**
4 **Stock at a Substantial Discount**

5 146. Following the interview, Mr. Wynn communicated to Aruze USA through
6 intermediaries that, instead of having the Board consider the Freeh Sporkin report, Mr. Wynn
7 would be willing to buy Aruze USA's stock for his benefit at a significant discount off of the fair
8 value of the shares. Mr. Wynn, through his intermediaries stated that in exchange for Aruze USA
9 selling its stock to Mr. Wynn, Mr. Wynn would ensure that the Freeh Sporkin report would not be
10 disclosed. A sale to Mr. Wynn was presented as an alternative to the public embarrassment and
11 regulatory issues attendant to possible disclosure of the Freeh Sporkin report. Aruze USA did not
12 accede to these demands, ultimately causing Wynn Resorts, Mr. Wynn, and Ms. Sinatra to make
13 good on their threats and commence a systematic process of defaming Mr. Okada, Aruze USA,
14 and Universal and precipitating the redemption Aruze USA's shares at a \$1 billion discount off
15 the fair value of the shares.

16 147. On information and belief, this is not the first time Mr. Wynn has attempted to co-
17 opt state gaming regulations to consolidate his ownership and control over a gaming company.
18 According to published reports, in 1980, Mr. Wynn forced out the second largest shareholder of
19 the Golden Nugget, Inc., Mr. Edward Doumani. Mr. Doumani was also a board member, and had
20 expressed concerns about Mr. Wynn's practices as CEO of the Golden Nugget. Mr. Wynn
21 eventually strong-armed Mr. Doumani into selling his stake by threatening to instigate an
22 investigation of Mr. Doumani, contending that his continued association with the company
23 caused a risk to a potential gaming license in Atlantic City. Three decades later, Mr. Wynn
24 attempted the same scam, only this time Aruze USA refused to accede to Mr. Wynn's demand to
25 sell him its stock on the cheap.
26
27
28

1 **V. WYNN RESORTS' UNFOUNDED AND UNPRECEDENTED REDEMPTION OF**
2 **MORE THAN \$2.9 BILLION OF ARUZE USA'S SHARES**

3 **A. Wynn Resorts Publicly Asserts That the Value of Aruze USA's Stock Is \$2.9**
4 **Billion**

5 148. In a letter to Aruze USA's counsel dated December 15, 2011, Mr. Shapiro asserted
6 that Aruze USA's shares were worth approximately \$2.7 billion.

7 149. Hardly a month later (and a mere 22 days before purporting to redeem the shares),
8 on January 27, 2012, Wynn Resorts filed its opposition papers in response to Mr. Okada's
9 Petition for a Writ of Mandamus. In that court filing, Wynn Resorts declared that Aruze USA's
10 holdings were worth *more* than \$2.7 billion, stating that Aruze USA's shares are "valued at
11 approximately \$2.9 billion[.]" In the 22 days following Wynn Resorts' \$2.9 billion valuation of
12 Aruze USA's stock, Aruze USA's stock was not sold, transferred, or further encumbered by any
13 additional restrictions.

14 **B. The Board Hurriedly Meets and Rushes to Redeem Aruze USA's Stock**

15 150. On February 17, 2012, Mr. Okada's counsel contacted Wynn Resorts'
16 representatives to express Mr. Okada's concerns with the substantive and procedural process for
17 the Company's investigation, and stated that any discussion of unsuitability or redemption,
18 including any discussion involving the Freeh Sporkin report at the February 18 Board meeting,
19 would be premature.

20 151. Rather than addressing the substantive and procedural issues raised by Mr. Okada
21 and his counsel, Wynn Resorts responded briefly, informing Mr. Okada's counsel that additional
22 accommodations would not be made to facilitate translation to enable Mr. Okada's participation
23 by teleconference. The Company also informed Mr. Okada's counsel that, despite the seriousness
24 of the accusations against him, Mr. Okada was not permitted to have counsel present for the
25 Board call.

26 152. When it came time for the meeting, at 2:00 a.m. on Sunday morning, Mr. Okada
27 sat ready to participate by telephone. Mr. Wynn yelled at Mr. Okada's counsel when he
28

1 introduced himself. Mr. Wynn also said that Mr. Okada's counsel could not be present to advise
2 Mr. Okada even though counsel made clear that he would not address the meeting. (At the threat
3 of having Mr. Okada's telephone connection to the meeting severed, Mr. Okada's counsel had to
4 sit outside the room while the meeting went on, despite Wynn Resorts having a battery of lawyers
5 from multiple law firms present on its end of the line.) Mr. Wynn and a company lawyer
6 informed Mr. Okada that – despite prior assurances that Mr. Okada would receive a copy of the
7 Freeh Sporkin report along with the other directors – he would not receive a copy of the report
8 unless both he and his legal counsel signed a nondisclosure agreement. The nondisclosure
9 agreement would have arguably precluded Mr. Okada from using the report in legal proceedings.
10 Mr. Okada did not sign the nondisclosure agreement.

11 153. As alleged in detail below, a few hours after demanding that Mr. Okada sign the
12 nondisclosure agreement claiming confidentiality, Wynn Resorts “leaked” a copy of the Freeh
13 Sporkin report to the *Wall Street Journal* and attached a copy to its Complaint in this action.

14 154. There were numerous translation problems during the Board meeting. Mr. Wynn
15 provided a translator who was woefully unable to perform an accurate simultaneous translation.
16 Mr. Okada requested that the translation be provided sequentially (with each speaker and the
17 translator speaking in turn) rather than simultaneously (with the translator speaking at the same
18 time as the speaker at the meeting), but this request was denied. As a result, Mr. Okada could not
19 follow or participate in the proceedings.

20 155. In this way, Mr. Okada sat and listened while Mr. Freeh made a presentation in
21 English that Mr. Okada could not understand. After Mr. Freeh completed his presentation, the
22 Board asked if Mr. Okada had any questions. Mr. Okada stated that he could not understand the
23 presentation, and that he would be able to address the claims of the report only after receiving a
24 copy and discussing with counsel. Mr. Okada also asked the Board to delay making any
25 resolutions until he could respond to the Freeh Sporkin report.

26 156. At some point, someone at Wynn Resorts hung up the telephone, cutting
27 Mr. Okada off from the meeting. Mr. Okada waited to be reconnected, staying up until the sun
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1 rose in Asia, all the while not knowing whether the Board had resolved anything following the
2 presentation by Mr. Freeh. Ms. Sinatra later claimed that cutting off the telephone connection to
3 Mr. Okada was a “misunderstanding.” No other contact was made with Mr. Okada.

4 157. At 1:45 am PT on February 19, 2012, Aruze USA’s counsel received
5 correspondence, containing a notice of determination of unsuitability and a purported redemption
6 notice. In the redemption notice, the Company stated that it would redeem Aruze USA’s stock
7 for a promissory note of approximately \$1.936 billion, a discount of exactly 30% off the \$2.7
8 billion value measured by the stock market’s valuation of the stock based on the prior day’s
9 closing price and 33% less than the value (*i.e.*, \$2.9 billion) Wynn Resorts had publicly
10 proclaimed three weeks before.

11 158. Although Wynn Resorts had claimed the Freeh Sporkin report was confidential
12 and tried to extract a signature from both Mr. Okada and his legal counsel in order to see the
13 report prior to redemption, a copy of the report was leaked to the *Wall Street Journal* in the early
14 morning Eastern Time of February 19, 2012. Almost immediately, reports appeared on the *Wall*
15 *Street Journal* website regarding the contents of the report.

16 159. In addition, at 2:14 a.m. PT on February 19, 2012, Wynn Resorts electronically
17 filed a complaint attaching the supposedly confidential Freeh Sporkin report (without exhibits).

18 160. Despite repeated requests to Ms. Sinatra and Mr. Shapiro, Mr. Okada’s counsel
19 only obtained a copy of the “confidential” report when it sent a messenger to court on
20 February 21, 2012, the first court day following the weekend Board meeting. Wynn Resorts
21 refused to provide the Freeh Sporkin report’s exhibits to Mr. Okada or Aruze USA until ordered
22 to do so by this Court.

23 **C. Aruze USA Disputes That Redemption Has Occurred**

24 161. In public statements, representatives of Wynn Resorts have claimed redemption is
25 complete and that the securities formerly held by Aruze USA have been cancelled. Aruze USA
26 disputes that this has happened. Among other reasons, as explained elsewhere in this
27 Counterclaim, the purported redemption is void *ab initio* because it is in violation of the
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1 Stockholders Agreement, which predates the amended Articles of Incorporation purporting to
2 grant Wynn Resorts a right of redemption.

3 **D. The Board Redeems on False Premises**

4 162. Even if Aruze USA were bound by the redemption provision (which Aruze USA
5 disputes), the Articles of Incorporation only purport to allow redemption in three situations.

6 163. First, according to the Articles of Incorporation, Wynn can redeem when it “is
7 determined by a Gaming Authority to be unsuitable to Own or Control any Securities or
8 unsuitable to be connected or affiliated with a Person engaged in Gaming Activities in a Gaming
9 Jurisdiction.” This has not occurred. In fact, Aruze USA has been found to be “suitable” by the
10 Nevada gaming authorities.

11 164. Second, according to the Articles of Incorporation, Wynn can redeem when a
12 person “causes the Corporation or any Affiliated Company to lose or to be threatened with the
13 loss of any Gaming License.” This has not occurred.

14 165. Third, Wynn Resorts’ Articles of Incorporation profess that the Company can
15 redeem where a person “in the sole discretion of the board of directors of the Corporation, is
16 deemed likely to jeopardize the Corporation’s or any Affiliated Company’s [a] application for,
17 [b] receipt of approval for, [c] right to the use of, or [d] entitlement, to any Gaming License.”
18 Subsections [a] and [b] do not apply because, on information and belief, at the time of redemption
19 Wynn Resorts had no present plan to apply for a license and was not awaiting approval of any
20 pending application. So, even under the standards of the Articles of Incorporation, Wynn Resorts
21 could only seek redemption upon a showing that Aruze USA’s stock ownership was “likely to
22 jeopardize” Wynn Resorts’ “right to the use of, or entitlement to” its existing gaming licenses.

23 166. No such showing was made in the rushed Freeh Sporkin report. In fact, in the
24 gaming industry, any impact on the right to use or entitlement to a gaming license requires action
25 by the cognizant gaming authority. No gaming authority has found Aruze USA, Universal, or
26 Mr. Okada to be “unsuitable.” Furthermore, association with an “unsuitable” person would only
27 conceivably create a problem for a gaming license *after* that person has been found by a gaming
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1 authority to be unsuitable. Even then, such concerns can be addressed via a voting trust or
2 orderly sale of shares. If Wynn Resorts' true aim was to disassociate itself from Aruze USA in
3 order to protect its interests, it failed miserably. Even if the redemption were effective, Aruze
4 USA would now be Wynn Resorts' largest holder of debt – a circumstance which would be
5 impermissible under Nevada law if Aruze USA were truly "unsuitable." Under the
6 circumstances, it is obvious that the supposed redemption of Aruze USA's shares was simply a
7 pretext to seek to quiet a potential dissident shareholder and director, increase the relative
8 ownership interests of the Board members by virtue of their shareholdings in Wynn Resorts, and
9 to enhance and maintain Mr. Wynn's personal control over Wynn Resorts.

10 **E. Even if Aruze USA Were Subject to the Redemption Provision (Which it is**
11 **Not), the Wynn Parties are Still Liable for Breaching and/or Tortiously**
12 **Interfering with the Stockholders Agreement and Amended Stockholders**
13 **Agreement.**

14 167. Even if Aruze USA were subject to the redemption provision, which it is not, the
15 Wynn Parties are not excused from breaching and/or tortiously interfering with the Stockholders
16 Agreement when they purported to redeem Aruze USA's shares. Steve Wynn was bound by the
17 terms of the Stockholders Agreement before he unilaterally amended the Articles of Incorporation
18 to include a purported redemption right. The remainder of the Wynn Parties also knew or
19 reasonably should have known that Aruze USA's shares were subject to the limitations of the
20 Shareholders Agreement and Amended Shareholders Agreement when they purported to utilize
21 their discretionary authority under the Articles of Incorporation to redeem Aruze USA's shares.
22 Thus, even if the redemption provision of the Articles of Incorporation applies to Aruze USA, the
23 Wynn Parties are liable for all harm caused to Aruze USA as a result of the redemption.
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F. Even if Aruze USA Was Subject to the Redemption Provision (Which it is Not), the Unilateral Blanket 30% Discount that Wynn Resorts Applied to the Stock is Erroneous and the Promissory Note is Unconscionably Vague, Ambiguous, and Oppressive

168. According to a press release dated February 19, 2012, Wynn Resorts issued a note in the amount of \$1.936 billion to Aruze USA. This amount is exactly 30% less than the market value of Aruze USA's stock as measured by the closing price of Wynn Resorts' stock on the Friday prior to the Saturday Board meeting. According to its press release, Wynn Resorts arrived at this value because "it engaged an independent financial advisor to assist in the fair value calculation and concluded that a discount to the current trading price was appropriate because of restrictions on most of the shares which are subject to the terms of an existing stockholder agreement." The irony here is rich, because the Stockholders Agreement, by its terms, either precludes the redemption of Aruze USA's stock altogether or, alternately, the transfer restrictions are not binding on Aruze USA as a result of Steve Wynn's and Elaine Wynn's breach of the Stockholders Agreement (by voting in favor of the redemption of Aruze USA's shares and by Steve Wynn's failure to vote in favor of directors nominated by Aruze USA). The transfer restrictions are also invalid and unenforceable to the extent that they constitute an illegal restraint on alienability. Thus, the restrictions in the Stockholders Agreement could not legitimately impact the value of Aruze USA's shares so as to support a discount against the market price.

169. The February 19, 2012 Wynn Resorts press release also falsely stated that the redemption process in the Articles of Incorporation had “been [in place] since the Company’s inception.” This is untrue, as Mr. Wynn unilaterally *amended* the Articles of Incorporation to include the purported redemption language months *after Wynn Resorts was created*, and nearly 90 days after Aruze USA agreed to invest in Wynn Resorts and committed its interests in Valvino to Wynn Resorts. Wynn Resorts and Mr. Wynn thus sought to continue their fraudulent scheme by publishing a false basis under which Wynn Resorts purported to have the authority to redeem Aruze USA’s shares of Wynn Resorts’ stock.

1 170. Nevertheless, hoping to unilaterally decide on a “clearance” price for Aruze
2 USA’s almost 20% shareholder interest in the Company, Wynn Resorts relied solely on one
3 opinion from Moelis & Company (“Moelis”), *which has done business with Wynn Resorts in the*
4 *past.*

5 171. Mr. Wynn and Kenneth Moelis (“Mr. Moelis”) – the founder of Moelis – go way
6 back. Mr. Moelis first worked with Mr. Wynn when Mr. Moelis worked at the investment
7 banking firm of Drexel Burnham Lambert (“Drexel”). At Drexel, Mr. Moelis was the banker
8 who helped Mr. Wynn finance his Golden Nugget Casino in Atlantic City and Mirage casino in
9 Las Vegas. On information and belief, Mr. Wynn has a close personal and professional
10 relationship with Mr. Moelis. According to press reports, Mr. Moelis has stated that he would
11 take the first flight out of LAX to rush to the assistance of Mr. Wynn. Mr. Wynn reciprocates
12 Mr. Moelis’ loyalty and support. Among other things, Mr. Wynn engaged Mr. Moelis to serve as
13 the lead underwriter of Wynn Resorts’ \$210 million common stock offering in March 2009.

14 172. Mr. Wynn called on Mr. Moelis’ loyalty in this case. Despite the fact that at least
15 some of the stock was exempted from the Stockholders Agreement, Moelis discounted Aruze
16 USA’s more than \$2.7 billion shares of Wynn Resorts’ stock by around 30%.

17 173. The terms of the note are unreasonable and one-sided in the extreme, completely
18 lacking reasonable and customary terms used to protect and preserve the interests of the note
19 holder. Among other things, the amount of compensation paid for Aruze USA’s shares do not
20 reflect the “fair value” of the shares under the Articles of Incorporation and/or under governing
21 law. Additionally, the hastily issued, ten-year \$1.936 billion promissory note is unsecured and
22 fully subordinated, not merely to current outstanding Wynn Resorts debt, but potentially to all
23 future debt Wynn Resorts may incur, and pays a mere 2% interest per annum. In contrast, for
24 example, less than a month after the purported redemption, Wynn Resorts issued \$900 million
25 aggregate principal amount in collateralized notes paying 5.375% interest. Moreover, though
26 Nevada gaming regulations do not permit an “unsuitable” person from holding debt of a publicly-
27 traded licensee, by its terms the note sent to Aruze USA is not even transferable. Wynn Resorts
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1 prepared the promissory note without any input from Mr. Okada, or any representative at Aruze
2 USA, forcibly imposing an unsecured, non-transferrable, non-voting, un-marketable, severely
3 discounted and oppressive debt instrument on its largest shareholder.

4 **G. The Timing of the Redemption Demonstrates that Wynn Resorts Redeemed**
5 **Aruze USA's Shares Based on Material, Non-Public Information that Was**
6 **Not Incorporated Into the Redemption Price**

7 174. On March 2, 2012, Wynn Resorts released a Form 8-K.

8 175. The Form 8-K purported to disclose positive news regarding Wynn Resorts'
9 efforts in Macau to receive certain land concessions related to Cotai:

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11 As previously disclosed ... Wynn Macau, Limited ("WML"), an
12 indirect subsidiary of the Registrant with ordinary shares of its
13 common stock listed on The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong
14 Limited, announced that Palo Real Estate Company Limited
15 ("Palo") and Wynn Resorts (Macau) S.A. ("Wynn Macau"), each
16 an indirect subsidiary of the Registrant, formally accepted the terms
17 and conditions of a land concession contract (the "Land Concession
Contract") from the government (the "Macau Government") of the
Macau Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of
China ("Macau") in respect of approximately 51 acres of land in the
Cotai area of Macau (the "Cotai Land"). The Land Concession
Contract permits Palo and Wynn Macau to develop a resort
containing a five-star hotel, gaming areas, retail, entertainment,
food and beverage, spa and convention offerings on the Cotai Land.

18 The Land Concession Contract was published in the official gazette
19 of Macau (the "Gazette") on January [•] 2012. Effective from such
20 publication date, Palo will lease the Cotai Land from the Macau
21 Government for an initial term of 25 years with the right to renew
22 the Land Concession Contract for additional successive periods,
23 subject to applicable legislation. The Land Concession Contract
24 also requires that Wynn Macau, as a gaming concessionaire,
25 operate and manage gaming operations on the Cotai Land. In
26 addition, as previously disclosed in the Registrant's filings with the
Commission, on August 1, 2008, Palo and certain affiliates of the
Registrant entered into an agreement (the "Agreement") with an
unrelated third party to make a one-time payment in the amount of
US \$50 million in consideration of the latter's relinquishment of
certain rights in and to any future development on the Cotai Land.
The Agreement provides that such payment be made within 15 days
after the publication of the Land Concession Contract in the
Gazette.

27 The foregoing description of the Land Concession Contract is
28 qualified in its entirety by reference to the full English translation of
the Land Concession Contract (originally published in the Gazette

1 in traditional Chinese and Portuguese), which is filed as
2 Exhibit 10.1 hereto and incorporated herein by reference. Dollar
amounts in the Land Concession Contract refer to Macau Patacas.

3 176. Such a land concession is significant positive development for Wynn Resorts. In
4 fact, Wynn Resorts' stock immediately spiked 6% on this news.

5 177. After initially attempting to backtrack from the filing as a "mistake," Wynn
6 Resorts filed another Form 8-K on May 2, 2012. The Form 8-K reconfirmed the material
7 information Wynn Resorts disclosed on March 2, 2012.

8 178. On information and belief, these positive developments in Macau (or elsewhere in
9 Wynn Resorts operational sphere) were imminent and known by Wynn Resorts. To the extent
10 that the redemption of Aruze USA's stock actually occurred, Wynn Resorts redeemed Aruze
11 USA's stock based on this material, non-public information. Although Wynn Resorts claims to
12 have purchased Aruze USA's stock using the current stock market value, Wynn Resorts knew,
13 but failed to disclose, that the stock market value did not reflect the land concession contract that
14 it had obtained in Macau. Therefore, Wynn Resorts continued its fraudulent and misleading
15 omission of this information in calculating the redemption price knowingly based on materially
16 misleading information.

17 **CLAIMS FOR RELIEF**

18 **COUNT I**

19 **Declaratory Relief**

20 **(By Aruze USA and Universal Against Wynn Resorts and the Wynn Directors)**

21 179. Aruze USA and Universal reassert and reallege Paragraphs 4 through 178 above as
22 if set forth in full below.

23 180. Aruze USA and Universal seek a judicial declaration that the purported
24 redemption of Aruze USA's shares is void *ab initio*, and that Aruze USA is the owner of
25 24,549,222 shares or 19.66% of the total outstanding common stock of Wynn Resorts, with all
26 rights and privileges appurtenant thereto (including, but not limited to, payment of dividends and
27 voting rights). This declaration is appropriate because, as alleged above: (1) the redemption
28 provision in the Articles of Incorporation is inapplicable to the Wynn Resorts' stock owned by

1 Aruze USA because Aruze USA entered into the Stockholders Agreement, which prevented any
2 further restrictions without agreement of the parties and vested in Aruze USA the “sole power of
3 disposition” of its shares, before the enactment of the redemption provision; (2) the redemption
4 provision in the Articles of Incorporation is inconsistent with Nevada law and public policy, and
5 thus void; (3) the Board lacked a sufficient basis for a finding of “unsuitability” or for
6 redemption; and/or, (4) the redemption provision as written and as applied is unconscionable.

7 181. In addition or alternatively, Aruze USA and Universal seek a judicial declaration
8 that the redemption provision in Wynn Resorts’ Articles of Incorporation is invalid as a matter of
9 law because it is impermissibly vague, contrary to law and public policy, and/or unconscionable.
10 This declaration is appropriate because, among other things, Nevada gaming regulators are given
11 the authority under the laws of Nevada to make determinations regarding “suitability.” The
12 redemption provision in Wynn Resorts’ Articles of Incorporation purportedly relied on here by
13 the Wynn Directors improperly and illegally usurps that authority. Furthermore, if and when
14 Nevada gaming regulators were to make such a determination, redemption that simply replaces
15 equity with debt is ineffective to effect a disassociation; the redemption provision, therefore,
16 would not comply with Nevada law.

17 182. In addition or alternatively, Aruze USA and Universal seek a judicial declaration
18 that the Board resolution finding Aruze USA, Universal, and Mr. Okada “unsuitable” was
19 procedurally and/or substantively defective and contrary to the Articles of Incorporation and/or
20 Nevada law. As alleged in detail above, this declaration is appropriate because the Wynn
21 Directors’ finding that there was a likely jeopardy to Wynn Resorts’ gaming licenses lacked a
22 sound foundation and was made without a thorough and complete review of relevant law, facts,
23 and evidence.

24 183. In addition or alternatively, Aruze USA and Universal seek a judicial declaration
25 that the Board resolution to redeem Aruze USA’s shares was procedurally and/or substantively
26 defective, and contrary to law and public policy. As alleged in detail above, this declaration is
27 appropriate because (1) the Stockholders Agreement, executed before the redemption provision
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1 was added to the Articles of Incorporation, prevented any further restrictions on Aruze USA's
2 shares without agreement of the parties and vested in Aruze USA the "sole power of disposition"
3 of its shares; (2) the Board lacked a sufficient basis for a finding of "unsuitability" or redemption
4 and made its findings without a thorough and complete review of relevant law, facts, and
5 evidence; (3) the redemption provision in the Articles of Incorporation is inconsistent with
6 Nevada law and public policy, and thus void; and, (4) the redemption provision, as written and as
7 applied, is unconscionable.

8 184. Alternatively, to the extent that redemption is not otherwise barred, Aruze USA
9 and Universal seek a judicial declaration that the form and amount of compensation paid for
10 Aruze USA's shares was improper and/or inadequate and that Aruze USA is entitled to cash in an
11 amount equivalent to at least the closing price of the stock on February 17, 2012. Indeed, Wynn
12 Resorts asserted in a court filing dated January 27, 2012, that "[w]ith holdings valued at
13 approximately \$2.9 billion, Aruze is one of Wynn's largest shareholders." As alleged in detail
14 above, this declaration is appropriate because simply converting Wynn Resorts' largest
15 shareholder to Wynn Resorts' largest creditor serves no valid legal purpose. Furthermore, the
16 discount applied to Aruze USA's shares based on the transfer restrictions of the Stockholder
17 Agreement is invalid because of Steve Wynn's and Elaine Wynn's prior breach of the
18 Stockholders Agreement. Moreover, the amount and form of compensation paid for Aruze
19 USA's shares does not represent the "fair value" of the shares under the Articles of Incorporation
20 and governing law. The "fair value" of the Aruze USA's stock at the time of the redemption
21 should not have included any discount for the transfer restrictions or lack of marketability of
22 Aruze USA's stock. In addition, the valuation by Moelis was not objective, independent, or the
23 product of sound financial analysis, and, among other things, did not consider material non-public
24 information available to Wynn Resorts that would militate in favor of a higher valuation, did not
25 account for the premium that would be applied to such a large block of shares, and did not
26 consider the extent to which transfer restrictions were not valid as to Aruze USA.

185. Aruze USA and Universal bring this claim within the relevant statute of limitations under Nevada law, having discovered facts giving rise to this claim, including injury arising from the purported redemption of Aruze USA's shares of Wynn Resorts' stock, on or about February 18, 2012. Despite having exercised reasonable diligence, Aruze USA and Universal did not and could not reasonably have discovered earlier the facts giving rise to this claim.

186. An actual justifiable controversy has arisen between parties whose interests are adverse, and the dispute is ripe for adjudication. Wynn Resorts acted unlawfully when it purported to “redeem” Aruze USA’s equity interest in Wynn Resorts.

187. It has been necessary for Aruze USA and Universal to retain the services of attorneys to prosecute this action, and Aruze USA and Universal are entitled to an award of the reasonable value of said services performed and to be performed in a sum to be determined.

COUNT II

Permanent Prohibitory Injunction

(By Aruze USA Against Wynn Resorts and the Wynn Directors)

188. Aruze USA reasserts and realleges Paragraphs 4 through 178 above as if set forth in full below.

189. Aruze USA seeks a permanent injunction enjoining and restraining Wynn Resorts and the Wynn Directors, their agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all those acting in concert or in active participation with Wynn Resorts, from enforcing a redemption notice upon Aruze USA, and from engaging in any efforts to redeem Aruze USA's equity holdings in Wynn Resorts, including but not limited to making any demands that Aruze USA surrender its Wynn Resorts stock, instructing any transfer agent for Wynn Resorts' stock to effect any transfer or cancellation of Aruze USA's Wynn Resorts stock, and/or making any other changes to Wynn Resorts' stock ledger regarding Aruze USA's stock.

190. For the reasons alleged above, the purported redemption is invalid as a matter of law and violated applicable contracts, and/or depends on provisions of contracts that are unenforceable as a matter of law. Even if there were a potentially valid legal mechanism to

1 redeem Aruze USA's stock, which there is not, redemption would be inappropriate in this case
2 because the Board lacked sufficient basis to find Aruze USA or any of its affiliates or employees
3 "unsuitable."

4 191. Harm will result if relief is not granted because Aruze USA's interest in Wynn
5 Resorts is not fungible and Aruze USA's status as the largest shareholder in Wynn Resorts cannot
6 be fully remedied through damages.

7 192. Injunctive relief poses no appreciable risk of undue prejudice to Wynn Resorts and
8 the Wynn Directors.

9 193. Aruze USA brings this claim within the relevant statute of limitations under
10 Nevada law, having discovered facts giving rise to this claim, including injury arising from the
11 purported redemption of Aruze USA's shares of Wynn Resorts' stock, on or about February 18,
12 2012. Despite having exercised reasonable diligence, Aruze USA did not and could not
13 reasonably have discovered earlier the facts giving rise to this claim.

14 194. It has been necessary for Aruze USA to retain the services of attorneys to
15 prosecute this action, and Aruze USA is entitled to an award of the reasonable value of said
16 services performed and to be performed in a sum to be determined.

17 **COUNT III**

18 **Permanent Mandatory Injunction**

19 **(By Aruze USA Against Wynn Resorts and the Wynn Directors)**

20 195. Aruze USA reasserts and realleges Paragraphs 4 through 178 above as if set forth
21 in full below.

22 196. To the extent it might be determined that Wynn Resorts' purported redemption has
23 already occurred, Aruze USA seeks a permanent mandatory injunction directing Wynn Resorts
24 and the Wynn Directors, their agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all those acting in
25 concert or in active participation with Wynn Resorts, to restore Aruze USA's ownership interest
26 in Wynn Resorts. The injunction sought should restore both Aruze USA's ownership interest, as
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1 well as the value of Aruze USA's stock, and all dividends and other rights and privileges accruing
2 to the shares.

3 197. For the reasons alleged above, the purported redemption was contrary to law and
4 violated applicable contracts, and/or depends on provisions of contracts that are unenforceable as
5 a matter of law. Even if there were a potentially valid legal mechanism to redeem Aruze USA's
6 stock, redemption would be inappropriate in this case because the Board lacked sufficient basis to
7 find Aruze USA or any of its affiliates or employees unsuitable.

8 198. Harm will result if relief is not granted because Aruze USA's interest in Wynn
9 Resorts is not fungible and Aruze USA's status as the largest shareholder in Wynn Resorts cannot
10 be fully remedied through damages.

11 199. Injunctive relief poses no appreciable risk of undue prejudice to Wynn Resorts and
12 the Wynn Directors.

13 200. To the extent that Aruze USA cannot be restored to its status and/or its full rights
14 as a Wynn Resorts shareholder, and to the extent further compensation is warranted or punitive or
15 exemplary damages are warranted, Aruze USA seeks damages from Wynn Resorts in an amount
16 to make Aruze USA whole, as alleged in multiple damages counts below.

17 201. Aruze USA brings this claim within the relevant statute of limitations under
18 Nevada law, having discovered facts giving rise to this claim, including injury arising from the
19 purported redemption of Aruze USA's shares of Wynn Resorts' stock, on or about February 18,
20 2012. Despite having exercised reasonable diligence, Aruze USA did not and could not
21 reasonably have discovered earlier the facts giving rise to this claim.

22 202. It has been necessary for Aruze USA to retain the services of attorneys to
23 prosecute this action, and Aruze USA is entitled to an award of the reasonable value of said
24 services performed and to be performed in a sum to be determined.

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COUNT IV

Breach of Contract in Connection with Wynn Resorts' Involuntary Redemption

(By Aruze USA Against Steve Wynn and Elaine Wynn)

203. Aruze USA reasserts and realleges Paragraphs 4 through 178 above as if set forth in full below.

204. The Stockholders Agreement, with Mr. Wynn in 2002, and as amended in 2010 to include Ms. Wynn as a party, forms a contractual relationship and understanding between, *inter alia*, Aruze USA, Mr. Wynn, and Elaine Wynn.

205. The Stockholders Agreement between Aruze USA, Mr. Wynn, and Elaine Wynn prohibits the involuntary disposition of any shares of Wynn Resorts held by Aruze USA. Specifically, the Stockholders Agreement provides that Aruze USA "shall be the record and Beneficial owner of all of the [Wynn Resorts' common] Shares. . . [and] shall have the *sole power of disposition* [and] sole power of conversion..." over its shares in Wynn Resorts and there are "no material limitations, qualification or restrictions on such rights...." (Emphasis added.)

206. Any redemption of Aruze USA's shares of Wynn Resorts is an involuntary disposition of Aruze USA's shares in violation of the Stockholders Agreement. By voting in favor of the redemption, Steve Wynn and Elaine Wynn did knowingly, willfully, and intentionally breach the Stockholders Agreement.

207. Aruze USA has been damaged in excess of \$10,000.

208. Aruze USA brings this claim within the relevant statute of limitations under Nevada law, having discovered facts giving rise to this claim, including injury arising from the purported redemption of Aruze USA's shares of Wynn Resorts' stock, on or about February 18, 2012. Despite having exercised reasonable diligence, Aruze USA did not and could not reasonably have discovered earlier the facts giving rise to this claim.

209. It has been necessary for Aruze USA to retain the services of attorneys to prosecute this action, and Aruze USA is entitled to an award of the reasonable value of said services performed and to be performed in a sum to be determined.

COUNT V

Breach of Articles of Incorporation/Breach of Contract in Connection with Wynn Resorts'

Discounting Method of Involuntary Redemption

(By Aruze USA Against Wynn Resorts)

210. Aruze USA reasserts and realleges Paragraphs 4 through 172 above as if set forth in full below.

211. In the alternative, to the extent the Court finds that the redemption provision in the Articles of Incorporation applies to Aruze USA's shares, Wynn Resorts' involuntary redemption breaches the terms of the Agreement.

212. Wynn Resorts' Articles of Incorporation provides that fair value will be provided for shares redeemed under its provisions.

213. On or about February 18, 2012, Wynn Resorts purportedly redeemed Aruze USA's shares for far less than the value of the shares, *e.g.*, as reflected by the closing market price of Wynn Resorts' stock on NASDAQ.

214. Wynn Resorts improperly discounted the fair value of the Aruze USA stock to the extent the Stockholders Agreement is not enforceable as a result of Mr. Wynn's and Elaine Wynn's breach of the Stockholders Agreement. In addition, the purported stock restrictions impose an unreasonable restraint on alienation and are therefore unenforceable.

215. In the alternative, if the Stockholders Agreement is enforceable, Wynn Resorts used an excessive discount amount and failed to provide fair value for Aruze USA's stock.

216. Among other things, although known to Wynn Resorts, Wynn Resorts did not take into account material non-public information concerning positive developments for Wynn Resorts regarding the Cotai land concession in Macau, as well as other positive non-public information, when redeeming Aruze USA's shares for far less than the value of the shares. Furthermore,

1 Wynn Resorts' unilateral valuation did not account for the premium that would be applied to such
2 a large block of shares.

3 217. Aruze USA has been damaged in excess of \$10,000.

4 218. Aruze USA brings this claim within the relevant statute of limitations under
5 Nevada law, having discovered facts giving rise to this claim, including injury arising from the
6 purported redemption of Aruze USA's shares of Wynn Resorts' stock, on or about February 18,
7 2012. Despite having exercised reasonable diligence, Aruze USA did not and could not
8 reasonably have discovered earlier the facts giving rise to this claim.

9 219. It has been necessary for Aruze USA to retain the services of attorneys to
10 prosecute this action, and Aruze USA is entitled to an award of the reasonable value of said
11 services performed and to be performed in a sum to be determined.

12 **COUNT VI**

13 **Breach of Fiduciary Duty**

14 **(By Aruze USA Against the Wynn Directors)**

15 220. Aruze USA reasserts and realleges Paragraphs 4 through 178 above as if set forth
16 in full below.

17 221. Directors of a corporation owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation and to its
18 shareholders, including a duty of care and a duty of loyalty toward the corporation and each
19 shareholder.

20 222. Under Nevada law, directors of a corporation are individually liable to a
21 stockholder for any act or failure to act that constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty.

22 223. The terms of the Wynn Resorts' Articles of Incorporation purported to define an
23 "Unsuitable Person" as a person who "in the sole discretion of the board of directors of the
24 [Wynn Resorts], is deemed likely to jeopardize [Wynn Resorts'] or any Affiliated Company's ...
25 right to the use of, or entitlement to, any Gaming Licenses."

26 224. The Wynn Directors abused their discretion in finding Aruze USA, Universal, and
27 Mr. Okada "unsuitable" and resolving to have the Company cause the purported redemption of
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1 Aruze USA's shares of Wynn Resorts' stock. The outcome of the Compliance Committee's
2 "investigation" was already determined prior to engaging a supposedly "independent"
3 investigator, which then openly acted as an advocate against Aruze USA, Universal, and
4 Mr. Okada rather than providing an objective, balanced, and fully informed review of the facts
5 and law. Despite the fact that Freeh Sporkin informed the Board that further investigation would
6 be required with respect to matters encompassed by its report, and despite assurances that Aruze
7 USA, Mr. Okada, and Universal would be permitted to respond substantively to the report, the
8 Wynn Directors deprived them of an opportunity to understand and to present any information to
9 address the allegations against them prior to the vote on redemption.

10 225. On information and belief, the Wynn Directors acted at the direction of Mr. Wynn
11 and abandoned their own independence and objectivity in evaluating the allegations. The Wynn
12 Directors failed to conduct a fair, comprehensive, and thoughtful investigation, and failed to
13 ensure that they were properly and adequately informed before acting.

14 226. Wynn Resorts, at the direction of Mr. Wynn, conducted an "investigation" that
15 was hurried, incomplete, one-sided, and unfair to Aruze USA, with a result that was preordained
16 by Mr. Wynn and his cohorts before the "investigator" was even hired. Aruze USA was not
17 given an opportunity to review the allegations against it or rebut or address any findings of
18 improper conduct or any other supposed basis for redemption. The entire process was tainted by
19 the desire to serve Mr. Wynn's pretextual goals of removing Aruze USA as the largest single
20 shareholder of the Company, silencing Mr. Okada, and consolidating and maintaining
21 Mr. Wynn's control over Wynn Resorts. Such actions do not withstand any standard of
22 fundamental fairness or due process.

23 227. Further, the purported redemption was voted on by persons with irreconcilable
24 conflicts of interest, including breaches of the duty of loyalty, the duty of care, and the duty of
25 good faith.

26 228. Through their acts, the Wynn Directors have acted in a manner that seeks to
27 deprive Aruze USA alone from its right to vote its shares, receive dividends, elect directors, and
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1 to utilize other privileges incident to controlling the largest single block of shares in a publicly
2 traded company.

3 229. Harm will result if relief is not granted because Aruze USA's more than \$2.7
4 billion equity stake in Wynn Resorts will be instantaneously and irreversibly damaged by the
5 Company's purported action to convert Aruze USA's substantial ownership interest into a wholly
6 subordinated ten-year promissory note in a principal amount 30% less than the fair market value
7 of the stock, and paying a mere 2% percent interest, without providing Aruze USA any voting
8 rights, rights to dividends, or the right to transfer the note.

9 230. As a further direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct by the Wynn
10 Directors, as alleged herein, Aruze USA was and continues to be damaged in an amount in excess
11 of \$10,000.

12 231. Aruze USA brings this claim within the relevant statute of limitations under
13 Nevada law, having discovered facts giving rise to this claim, including injury arising from the
14 purported redemption of Aruze USA's shares of Wynn Resorts' stock, on or about February 18,
15 2012. Despite having exercised reasonable diligence, Aruze USA did not and could not
16 reasonably have discovered earlier the facts giving rise to this claim.

17 232. It has been necessary for Aruze USA to retain the services of attorneys to
18 prosecute this action, and Aruze USA is entitled to an award of the reasonable value of said
19 services performed and to be performed in a sum to be determined.

20 **COUNT VII**

21 **Imposition of a Constructive Trust and Unjust Enrichment**

22 **(By Aruze USA Against Wynn Resorts)**

23 233. Aruze USA reasserts and realleges Paragraphs 4 through 178 above as if set forth
24 in full below.

25 234. By engaging the in the wrongful conduct alleged herein, Wynn Resorts
26 purportedly redeemed Aruze USA's stock in exchange for a wholly subordinated, unsecured ten-
27 year promissory note in a principal amount at least 30% less than the fair value of Aruze USA's
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1 stock, and paying a mere 2% interest, without providing Aruze USA any voting rights, rights to
2 dividends, or the right to transfer the note.

3 235. As a result of the relationship between the parties and the facts stated above, Wynn
4 Resorts will be unjustly enriched if it is permitted to retain Aruze USA's stock and dividends and,
5 therefore, a constructive trust should be established over Aruze USA's stock, and all dividends
6 that would be paid on such shares if held by Aruze USA. These shares and dividends are
7 traceable to Wynn Resorts.

8 236. Aruze USA brings this claim within the relevant statute of limitations under
9 Nevada law, having discovered facts giving rise to this claim, including injury arising from the
10 purported redemption of Aruze USA's shares of Wynn Resorts' stock, on or about February 18,
11 2012. Despite having exercised reasonable diligence, Aruze USA did not and could not
12 reasonably have discovered earlier the facts giving rise to this claim.

13 237. It has been necessary for Aruze USA to retain the services of attorneys to
14 prosecute this action, and Aruze USA is entitled to an award of the reasonable value of said
15 services performed and to be performed in a sum to be determined.

16 **COUNT VIII**

17 **Conversion**

18 **(By Aruze USA Against Wynn Resorts)**

19 238. Aruze USA reasserts and realleges Paragraphs 4 through 178 above as if set forth
20 in full below.

21 239. Wynn Resorts did not have a legal right to redeem and in addition lacked a proper
22 and sufficient basis to find that the allegations in the Freeh Sporkin report against Aruze USA,
23 Mr. Okada, and Universal were activities that "were likely to jeopardize [the Company's] or any
24 Affiliated Company's ... right to the use of, or entitlement to any Gaming License."

25 240. As a result, Wynn Resorts' Board lacked a fair, proper, and sufficient basis for
26 seizing Aruze USA's stock.

27 241. Wynn Resorts wrongfully exercised dominion over Aruze USA's stock.
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242. Wynn Resorts' dominion over Aruze USA's stock without a valid basis for redemption is inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation and Aruze USA's rights in the stock under the Contribution Agreement and the Stockholders Agreement.

243. Wynn Resorts converted Aruze USA stock, damaging Plaintiff in an amount in excess of \$10,000.

244. Aruze USA brings this claim within the relevant statute of limitations under Nevada law, having discovered facts giving rise to this claim, including injury arising from the purported redemption of Aruze USA's shares of Wynn Resorts' stock, on or about February 18, 2012. Despite having exercised reasonable diligence, Aruze USA did not and could not reasonably have discovered earlier the facts giving rise to this claim.

245. It has been necessary for Aruze USA to retain the services of attorneys to prosecute this action, and Aruze USA is entitled to an award of the reasonable value of said services performed and to be performed in a sum to be determined.

COUNT IX

Fraud/Fraudulent Misrepresentation in Connection with Financing for Aruze USA

(By Aruze USA Against Wynn Resorts, Steve Wynn, and Kimmarie Sinatra)

246. Aruze USA reasserts and realleges Paragraphs 4 through 178 above as if set forth in full below.

247. Wynn Resorts, Mr. Wynn, and Ms. Sinatra made false and misleading statements and omissions of material facts to Aruze USA. Specifically, on or about May 16, 2011, and for months thereafter, Mr. Wynn and Ms. Sinatra made false and misleading statements and omissions concerning the ability of Wynn Resorts to loan money to Aruze USA, which Wynn Resorts, Mr. Wynn, and Ms. Sinatra agreed would be backed by shares of Wynn Resorts' stock held by Aruze USA.

248. Mr. Wynn and Ms. Sinatra, acting in their individual capacity and as agents of Wynn Resorts, made these false and misleading statements and omissions knowingly or without sufficient basis of information because they believed Wynn Resorts was not permitted to enter

1 into such a lending transaction pursuant to the restrictions in Section 402 of SOX. As alleged
2 above, Mr. Wynn and Ms. Sinatra engaged in this wrongful conduct for the purpose of
3 maintaining Mr. Wynn's control over Wynn Resorts after Mr. Wynn's shares in the Company
4 were split with Elaine Wynn following their divorce, and keeping alive the opportunity to later
5 have Wynn Resorts seek to redeem Aruze USA's shares at a discount.

6 249. Furthermore, Mr. Wynn and Ms. Sinatra, acting in their individual capacity and as
7 agents of Wynn Resorts, made these false and misleading statements and omissions knowingly or
8 without sufficient basis of information regarding the immediate need for Elaine Wynn to transfer
9 her shares under the Stockholders Agreement. On information and belief, Mr. Wynn and
10 Ms. Sinatra knew or were without a sufficient basis to make those material statements.

11 250. Aruze USA relied on the false and misleading statements and omissions made by
12 Wynn Resorts, Mr. Wynn, and Ms. Sinatra. Aruze USA's reliance on the false and misleading
13 statements and omissions was reasonable and justifiable, especially in light of Mr. Okada's
14 trusting relationship with Mr. Wynn.

15 251. On information and belief, Wynn Resorts, Mr. Wynn, and Ms. Sinatra knew that
16 Aruze USA intended to rely on this information as a reason for Aruze USA to consent to Elaine
17 Wynn's transfer of shares under the Stockholders Agreement, and for Aruze USA to refrain from
18 taking steps to invalidate the purported restrictions on alienability contained in the Stockholders
19 Agreement. On information and belief, Wynn Resorts, Mr. Wynn, and Ms. Sinatra further knew
20 and intended that, in reliance on these misrepresentations, Aruze USA would relinquish its own
21 opportunity to liquidate its own shares of Wynn Resorts' stock to fund Universal's project in the
22 Philippines or seek other financing. Therefore, Aruze USA relied on the fact that Wynn Resorts
23 was a committed lender to the project at the expense of pursuing other financing options.

24 252. As a further direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct by Wynn Resorts,
25 Mr. Wynn, and Ms. Sinatra, as alleged herein, Aruze USA was and continues to be damaged in an
26 amount in excess of \$10,000 to be proven at trial.
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253. Pursuant to N.R.S. § 42.005, by reason of the fraudulent, reckless, misleading, malicious, willful, and wanton misconduct of Wynn Resorts, Mr. Wynn, and Ms. Sinatra, Aruze USA is entitled to punitive damages not to exceed three times the amount of compensatory damages awarded.

254. Aruze USA brings this claim within the relevant statute of limitations under Nevada law, having discovered facts giving rise to this claim, including injury arising from the purported redemption of Aruze USA's shares of Wynn Resorts' stock, on or about September 30, 2011.

255. Aruze USA brings this claim within the relevant statute of limitations under Nevada law, having discovered facts giving rise to this claim on or about September 30, 2011. Despite having exercised reasonable diligence, Aruze USA did not and could not reasonably have discovered earlier the facts giving rise to this claim.

256. It has been necessary for Aruze USA to retain the services of attorneys to prosecute this action, and Aruze USA is entitled to an award of the reasonable value of said services performed and to be performed in a sum to be determined.

COUNT X

Negligent Misrepresentation in Connection with Financing for Aruze USA

(By Aruze USA Against Wynn Resorts, Steve Wynn, and Kimmarie Sinatra)

257. Aruze USA reasserts and realleges Paragraphs 4 through 178 above as if set forth in full below.

258. Wynn Resorts, Mr. Wynn, and Ms. Sinatra made false and misleading statements and omissions of material facts to Aruze USA. Specifically, on or about May 16, 2011, and for months thereafter, Mr. Wynn and Ms. Sinatra made false and misleading statements and omissions concerning the ability of Aruze USA to obtain a loan from Wynn Resorts, which Wynn Resorts, Mr. Wynn, and Ms. Sinatra agreed would be backed by shares of Wynn Resorts' stock held by Aruze USA.

1 259. The false statements of facts alleged herein were material because had Wynn
2 Resorts, Mr. Wynn, and Ms. Sinatra provided Aruze USA with truthful and correct information,
3 Aruze USA would not have consented to Elaine Wynn's transfer of shares under the Stockholders
4 Agreement, and would have taken steps to invalidate the purported restrictions in the Shareholder
5 Agreement.

6 260. Wynn Resorts, Mr. Wynn, and Ms. Sinatra failed to exercise reasonable care or
7 competence in obtaining or communicating the false statements of fact alleged herein.

8 261. Wynn Resorts, Mr. Wynn, and Ms. Sinatra made the false statements or omissions
9 of fact alleged herein with the intent to induce Aruze USA to consent to Elaine Wynn's transfer
10 of shares under the Stockholders Agreement without pledging its own shares in a manner that
11 would reduce Mr. Wynn's control over those shares. Furthermore, Wynn Resorts, Mr. Wynn,
12 and Ms. Sinatra made the false statements of fact alleged herein with the intent of gaining their
13 own financial advantage to the disadvantage of Aruze USA, including, but not limited to, the
14 opportunity to seek to have Wynn Resorts redeem Aruze USA's shares at a discount.

15 262. Furthermore, Mr. Wynn and Ms. Sinatra, acting in their individual capacity and as
16 agents of Wynn Resorts, made these materially false and misleading statements and omissions
17 knowingly or without sufficient basis of information regarding the immediate need for Elaine
18 Wynn to transfer her shares under the Stockholders Agreement.

19 263. Aruze USA relied upon the false statements of fact alleged herein by providing
20 consent for Elaine Wynn to transfer her shares under the Stockholders Agreement. Aruze USA's
21 reliance on these representations and concealment of facts was reasonable and justifiable,
22 especially in light of Mr. Okada's trusting relationship with Mr. Wynn.

23 264. Wynn Resorts, Mr. Wynn, and Ms. Sinatra aided and abetted each of the others in
24 making the false statements of fact set herein by each failing to exercise reasonable care or
25 competence in obtaining or communicating those statements.

26 265. Aruze USA has suffered and continues to suffer economic and non-economic
27 losses because of Wynn Resorts', Mr. Wynn's, and Ms. Sinatra's false statements of fact. The
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1 amount of losses will be determined according to proof at trial, but damages are in an amount in
2 excess of \$10,000.

3 266. Pursuant to N.R.S. § 42.005, by reason of the fraudulent, reckless, misleading,
4 malicious, willful, and wanton misconduct of Wynn Resorts, Mr. Wynn, and Ms. Sinatra, Aruze
5 USA is entitled to punitive damages not to exceed three times the amount of compensatory
6 damages awarded.

7 267. Aruze USA brings this claim within the relevant statute of limitations under
8 Nevada law, having discovered facts giving rise to this claim on or about September 30, 2011.
9 Despite having exercised reasonable diligence, Aruze USA did not and could not reasonably have
10 discovered earlier the facts giving rise to this claim.

11 268. It has been necessary for Aruze USA to retain the services of attorneys to
12 prosecute this action, and Aruze USA is entitled to an award of the reasonable value of said
13 services performed and to be performed in a sum to be determined.

14 **COUNT XI**

15 **Civil Conspiracy in Connection with Financing for Aruze USA**

16 **(By Aruze USA Against Steve Wynn and Kimmarie Sinatra)**

17 269. Aruze USA reasserts and realleges Paragraphs 4 through 178 above as if set forth
18 in full below.

19 270. Aruze USA, Mr. Wynn and Elaine Wynn entered into an agreement regarding the
20 disposition of shares pursuant to the January 6, 2010 Amended and Restated Stockholders
21 Agreement.

22 271. Ms. Sinatra, as General Counsel for Wynn Resorts, had knowledge of the
23 Stockholders Agreement and its restriction on transfer of shares.

24 272. On information and belief, Ms. Sinatra had knowledge that Mr. Wynn needed
25 Aruze USA to waive the restriction in order to permit Elaine Wynn to transfer her shares.

26 273. On information and belief, Ms. Sinatra and Mr. Wynn agreed to persuade Aruze
27 USA to permit Elaine Wynn to transfer her shares without permitting Aruze USA to transfer or
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1 pledge any shares to anyone outside the control of Mr. Wynn. In fact, upon receiving an email
2 from Aruze USA's representative on July 13, 2011 permitting the immediate transfer of Elaine
3 Wynn's shares, Ms. Sinatra expressed happiness for Mr. Wynn, stating, "Thank you very much
4 for this. I'm sure Mr. Wynn will be happy about the clarification."

5 274. Wynn Resorts, Mr. Wynn, and Ms. Sinatra made false and misleading statements
6 and omissions of material facts to Aruze USA. Specifically, on or about May 16, 2011, and for
7 months thereafter, Mr. Wynn and Ms. Sinatra made false and misleading statements and
8 omissions concerning Wynn Resorts' ability and/or willingness to loan money to Aruze USA,
9 which Wynn Resorts, Mr. Wynn, and Ms. Sinatra agreed would be backed by shares of Wynn
10 Resorts' stock held by Aruze USA.

11 275. Mr. Wynn and Ms. Sinatra, acting in concert with Wynn Resorts, made these false
12 and misleading statements and omissions knowingly or without sufficient basis of information
13 because they believed Wynn Resorts was not legally permitted to enter into such a lending
14 transaction pursuant to the restrictions in Section 402 of SOX. As alleged above, Mr. Wynn and
15 Ms. Sinatra engaged in this wrongful conduct for the purpose of maintaining Mr. Wynn's control
16 over Wynn Resorts after Mr. Wynn's shares in the Company were split with Elaine Wynn
17 following their divorce, and keeping alive the opportunity to later have Wynn Resorts seek to
18 redeem Aruze USA's shares at a discount.

19 276. Furthermore, Mr. Wynn and Ms. Sinatra, acting in their individual capacity and as
20 agents of Wynn Resorts, made these false and misleading statements and omissions knowingly or
21 without sufficient basis of information regarding the immediate need for Elaine Wynn to transfer
22 her shares under the Stockholders Agreement. On information and belief, Mr. Wynn and
23 Ms. Sinatra knew or were without a sufficient basis to make those material statements.

24 277. Aruze USA relied on the false and misleading statements and omissions made by
25 Wynn Resorts, Mr. Wynn, and Ms. Sinatra. Aruze USA's reliance on the false and misleading
26 statements and omissions was reasonable and justifiable, especially in light of Mr. Okada's
27 trusting relationship with Mr. Wynn.
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278. On information and belief, Wynn Resorts, Mr. Wynn, and Ms. Sinatra knew that Aruze USA intended to rely on this information as a reason for Aruze USA to consent to Elaine Wynn's transfer of shares under the Stockholders Agreement. On information and belief, Wynn Resorts, Mr. Wynn, and Ms. Sinatra further knew and intended that, in reliance on these misrepresentations, Aruze USA would relinquish its own opportunity to liquidate its own shares of Wynn Resorts' stock to fund Universal's project in the Philippines or seek other financing. Therefore, Aruze USA relied on the fact that Wynn Resorts was a committed lender to the project at the expense of pursuing other financing options.

279. As a further direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct by Wynn Resorts, Mr. Wynn, and Ms. Sinatra, as alleged herein, Aruze USA was and continues to be damaged in an amount in excess of \$10,000 to be proven at trial.

280. Aruze USA brings this claim within the relevant statute of limitations under Nevada law, having discovered facts giving rise to this claim on or about September 30, 2011. Despite having exercised reasonable diligence, Aruze USA did not and could not reasonably have discovered earlier the facts giving rise to this claim.

281. Pursuant to N.R.S. § 42.005, by reason of the fraudulent, reckless, misleading, malicious, willful, and wanton misconduct of Wynn Resorts, Mr. Wynn, and Ms. Sinatra, Aruze USA is entitled to punitive damages not to exceed three times the amount of compensatory damages awarded.

282. It has been necessary for Aruze USA to retain the services of attorneys to prosecute this action, and Aruze USA is entitled to an award of the reasonable value of said services performed and to be performed in a sum to be determined.

COUNT XII

Promissory Estoppel in Connection with Financing for Aruze USA

(By Aruze USA Against Wynn Resorts, Steve Wynn, and Kimmarie Sinatra)

283. Aruze USA reasserts and realleges Paragraphs 4 through 178 above as if set forth in full below.

1 284. On or about May 16, 2011, Mr. Wynn, in the presence of Ms. Sinatra, gave
2 Mr. Okada an explicit personal assurance that Wynn Resorts would provide a loan or facilitate the
3 lending of money to Aruze USA, which would be backed by shares of Wynn Resorts' stock held
4 by Aruze USA. As alleged above, Mr. Okada agreed to the financing from Wynn Resorts –
5 rather than causing Aruze USA to attempt to liquidate or pledge its shares of Wynn Resorts or
6 seek alternative financing – based on assurances made by Mr. Wynn. Ms. Sinatra agreed to
7 provide draft loan agreements to Aruze USA within 10 days to support the agreement reached
8 between Mr. Wynn and Mr. Okada.

9 285. Based on the foregoing agreement, on July 13, 2011, Ms. Sinatra stated in an email
10 to Aruze USA's counsel that Wynn Resorts was negotiating with Deutsche Bank on a margin
11 loan transaction on Aruze USA's behalf, with Wynn Resorts acting as a "backstop."

12 286. Mr. Wynn and Ms. Sinatra, acting in their individual capacities and as agents of
13 Wynn Resorts, made these statements knowingly or without sufficient basis of information
14 because they believed Wynn Resorts was not legally permitted to enter into such a lending
15 transaction pursuant to the restrictions in Section 402 of SOX. As alleged above, Mr. Wynn and
16 Ms. Sinatra engaged in this wrongful conduct with the intent to induce Aruze USA to consent to
17 Elaine Wynn's transfer of shares under the Stockholders Agreement. Mr. Wynn and Ms. Sinatra
18 acted with the purpose of maintaining Mr. Wynn's control over Wynn Resorts after Mr. Wynn's
19 shares in the Company were split with Elaine Wynn following their divorce, and keeping alive
20 the opportunity to later have Wynn Resorts seek to redeem Aruze USA's shares at a discount.

21 287. At the time, Aruze USA was not aware that Wynn Resorts would take the position
22 that it was not legally permitted to enter into such a lending transaction pursuant to the
23 restrictions in Section 402 of SOX. Aruze USA relied on the false and misleading statements and
24 omissions made by Wynn Resorts, Mr. Wynn, and Ms. Sinatra. Aruze USA's reliance on the
25 false and misleading statements and omissions was reasonable and justifiable, especially in light
26 of Mr. Okada's trusting relationship with Mr. Wynn.
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288. On information and belief, Wynn Resorts, Mr. Wynn, and Ms. Sinatra knew that Aruze USA intended to rely on this information as a reason for Aruze USA to forego seeking to liquidate its shares or seeking another source of financing backed by its Wynn Resorts shares. On information and belief, Wynn Resorts, Mr. Wynn, and Ms. Sinatra further knew and intended that in reliance on these misrepresentations, Aruze USA would relinquish its opportunity to liquidate its own shares of Wynn Resorts' stock to fund Universal's project in the Philippines or seek other financing. Therefore, Aruze USA relied on the fact that Wynn Resorts was a committed lender to the project at the expense of pursuing other financing options.

289. On September 30, 2011, Wynn Resorts' Compliance Committee refused to permit the loan to Aruze USA or to otherwise serve as a "backstop" for a margin loan transaction on Aruze USA's behalf.

290. As a further direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct by Wynn Resorts, Mr. Wynn, and Ms, Sinatra, as alleged herein, Aruze USA was and continues to be damaged in an amount in excess of \$10,000 to be proven at trial.

291. Aruze USA brings this claim within the relevant statute of limitations under Nevada law, having discovered facts giving rise to this claim on or about September 30, 2011. Despite having exercised reasonable diligence, Aruze USA did not and could not reasonably have discovered earlier the facts giving rise to this claim.

292. It has been necessary for Aruze USA to retain the services of attorneys to prosecute this action, and Aruze USA is entitled to an award of the reasonable value of said services performed and to be performed in a sum to be determined.

COUNT XIII

Fraud/Fraud in the Inducement of the Stockholders Agreement

(By Aruze USA Against Steve Wynn)

293. Aruze USA reasserts and realleges Paragraphs 4 through 178 above as if set forth in full below.

1 294. In the alternative, to the extent the Court finds that the redemption provision in the
2 Articles of Incorporation applies to Aruze USA's shares, Aruze USA asserts the claim of
3 fraudulent inducement against Steve Wynn. Aruze USA thus brings this claim in the alternative
4 to Aruze USA's claims that assert the purported redemption by Wynn Resorts is void *ab initio*.

5 295. On or about April 11, 2002, Aruze USA, Baron Asset Fund, and Mr. Wynn
6 entered into the Stockholders Agreement in recognition of their desire to form Wynn Resorts. On
7 June 3, 2002, Mr. Wynn caused Wynn Resorts to file its Articles of Incorporation with Nevada's
8 Secretary of State without including a redemption provision.

9 296. On behalf of Aruze USA, on or about June 10, 2002, Mr. Wynn caused Aruze
10 USA to enter into a Contribution Agreement between Aruze USA, Baron Asset Fund, Kenneth R.
11 Wynn Family Trust, Wynn Resorts, and Mr. Wynn. The Contribution Agreement committed
12 Aruze USA's LLC interests in Valvino in exchange for Wynn Resorts common stock.

13 297. Prior to causing the exchange to occur, on or about September 10, 2002,
14 Mr. Wynn unilaterally filed amended Articles of Incorporation that, for the first time, included a
15 redemption provision. On information and belief, Mr. Wynn deliberately delayed in causing the
16 exchange in order to allow Mr. Wynn to unilaterally amend the Articles of Incorporation without
17 affording Aruze USA a shareholder vote as would have been required pursuant to N.R.S.
18 § 78.390. At the time of the amendment, Mr. Wynn was the sole stockholder of Wynn Resorts.
19 On or about September 28, 2002, about eighteen days after Mr. Wynn unilaterally amended the
20 Articles of Incorporation, Mr. Wynn caused the exchange of Aruze USA's LLC interests in
21 Valvino to Wynn Resorts for Wynn Resorts common stock.

22 298. Mr. Wynn intentionally made materially false and/or misleading representations to
23 Aruze USA regarding Wynn Resorts' stockholder obligations under the Articles of Incorporation
24 to induce Aruze USA to enter into the Stockholders Agreement. The Stockholders Agreement
25 expressly provided that Aruze USA would have the sole power of disposition of its stock in
26 Wynn Resorts and there were to be no other provisions regarding the disposition of Aruze USA's
27 stock, voluntarily or involuntary. Mr. Wynn misrepresented and/or failed to disclose that Wynn
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1 Resorts' amended Articles of Incorporation would seek to impose substantial financial risk on
2 Aruze USA's shares of Wynn Resorts stock by providing Wynn Resorts' Board – which was
3 controlled by Mr. Wynn – purported discretion to redeem Aruze USA's stock on potentially
4 onerous terms.

5 299. The misrepresentations and concealment of facts alleged herein were material.

6 300. Mr. Wynn knew the misrepresentations and concealment of facts alleged herein
7 were false, or alternatively, made misrepresentations of facts with reckless disregard for whether
8 those representations were true.

9 301. Wynn Resorts and Mr. Wynn made the misrepresentations and concealed facts as
10 set forth herein with the intent to induce Aruze USA to enter into the Stockholder Agreement.
11 Furthermore, Mr. Wynn made the misrepresentations and concealment of facts alleged herein
12 with the intent of gaining his own financial advantage to the disadvantage of Aruze USA.

13 302. Aruze USA relied upon the misrepresentations and concealment of facts made by
14 Mr. Wynn regarding Wynn Resorts' common stock at the time Aruze USA entered into the
15 Stockholders Agreement. Aruze USA's reliance on these representations and concealment of
16 facts was reasonable and justifiable, especially in light of Mr. Okada's trusting relationship with
17 Mr. Wynn.

18 303. Aruze USA was not aware of and could not have known about the
19 misrepresentations until September 30, 2011, when Wynn Resorts, for the first time, indicated
20 that it might attempt to apply the redemption restriction to Aruze USA's shares.

21 304. Aruze USA has suffered and continues to suffer injury because of Mr. Wynn's
22 misrepresentations and concealment of facts set forth herein. As a direct and proximate result of
23 Mr. Wynn's wrongful conduct, Aruze USA suffered injury when the redemption provision was
24 purportedly invoked by Wynn Resorts' Board on or about February 18, 2012.

25 305. As a remedy for Mr. Wynn's fraudulent inducement, Aruze USA seeks imposition
26 of a constructive trust over Aruze USA's Wynn Resorts shares purportedly redeemed by the
27 Board, or, in the alternative, recovery of unjust enrichment/restitution.
28

306. Pursuant to N.R.S. § 42.005, by reason of the fraudulent, reckless, misleading, malicious, willful, and wanton misconduct of Wynn Resorts, Mr. Wynn, and Ms. Sinatra, Aruze USA is entitled to punitive damages not to exceed three times the amount of compensatory damages awarded.

307. Aruze USA brings this claim within the relevant statute of limitations under Nevada law, having discovered facts giving rise to this claim, including injury arising from the purported redemption of Aruze USA's shares of Wynn Resorts' stock, on or about February 18, 2012. Despite having exercised reasonable diligence, Aruze USA did not and could not reasonably have discovered earlier the facts giving rise to this claim.

308. It has been necessary for Aruze USA to retain the services of attorneys to prosecute this action, and Aruze USA is entitled to an award of the reasonable value of said services performed and to be performed in a sum to be determined.

COUNT XIV

Negligent Misrepresentation in Connection with the Stockholders Agreement

(By Aruze USA Against Steve Wynn)

309. Aruze USA reasserts and realleges Paragraphs 4 through 178 above as if set forth in full below.

310. In the alternative, to the extent that the redemption provision in the later amended Articles of Incorporation is found to apply to Aruze USA's shares, Aruze USA asserts the claim of negligent misrepresentation in connection with the Stockholders Agreement against Steve Wynn. Aruze USA thus brings this claim in the alternative to Aruze USA's claims that assert the purported redemption by Wynn Resorts is void *ab initio*.

311. On or about April 11, 2002, Aruze USA, Baron Asset Fund, and Mr. Wynn entered into the Stockholders Agreement in recognition of their desire to form Wynn Resorts. On June 3, 2002, Mr. Wynn caused Wynn Resorts to file its Articles of Incorporation with Nevada's Secretary of State without including a redemption provision.

1 312. On behalf of Aruze USA, on or about June 10, 2002, Mr. Wynn caused Aruze
2 USA to enter into a Contribution Agreement between Aruze USA, Baron Asset Fund, Kenneth R.
3 Wynn Family Trust, Wynn Resorts, and Mr. Wynn. The Contribution Agreement committed
4 Aruze USA's LLC interests in Valvino in exchange for Wynn Resorts common stock.

5 313. Prior to causing the exchange to occur, on or about September 10, 2002,
6 Mr. Wynn unilaterally filed amended Articles of Incorporation that, for the first time, included a
7 redemption provision. On information and belief, Mr. Wynn deliberately delayed in causing the
8 exchange in order to allow Mr. Wynn to unilaterally amend the Articles of Incorporation without
9 affording Aruze USA a shareholder vote as would have been required pursuant to N.R.S.

10 § 78.390. At the time of the amendment, Mr. Wynn was the sole stockholder of Wynn Resorts.

11 314. On or about September 28, 2002, about three months after Aruze USA entered into
12 the Contribution Agreement, and eighteen days after Mr. Wynn amended the Articles of
13 Incorporation, Mr. Wynn caused the contribution of Aruze USA's LLC interests in Valvino to
14 Wynn Resorts in exchange for Wynn Resorts common stock.

15 315. Mr. Wynn made materially false representations and/or omissions to Aruze USA
16 regarding Wynn Resorts' stockholder obligations under at the time Aruze USA entered into the
17 Stockholders Agreement. The Stockholders Agreement expressly provided that Aruze USA
18 would have the sole power of disposition of its stock in Wynn Resorts and there were to be no
19 other provisions regarding the disposition of Aruze USA's stock, voluntarily or involuntary.
20 Mr. Wynn misrepresented and/or failed to disclose that Wynn Resorts' amended Articles of
21 Incorporation would seek to impose substantial financial risk to Aruze USA by providing Wynn
22 Resorts' Board (which was controlled by Mr. Wynn) purported discretion to redeem Aruze
23 USA's stock on potentially onerous terms.

24 316. Aruze USA was not aware of and could not have known about the
25 misrepresentations until September 30, 2011, when Wynn Resorts, for the first time, indicated
26 that it might attempt to apply the redemption restriction to Aruze USA's shares.

1 317. The false statements and/or omissions of facts alleged herein were material
2 because, had Mr. Wynn provided Aruze USA with truthful and correct information, Aruze USA
3 would not have entered into the Stockholders Agreement.

4 318. Mr. Wynn failed to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or
5 communicating the false statements of fact alleged herein.

6 319. Aruze USA relied on the false and misleading statements and omissions made by
7 Mr. Wynn regarding Wynn Resorts' common stock at the time Aruze USA entered into the
8 Stockholders Agreement. Aruze USA's reliance on the false and misleading statements and
9 omissions was reasonable and justifiable, especially in light of Mr. Okada's trusting relationship
10 with Mr. Wynn.

11 320. On information and belief, Mr. Wynn knew that Aruze USA intended to rely on
12 this information as a reason for Aruze USA to enter into the Stockholders Agreement.

13 321. Aruze USA has suffered and continues to suffer injury because of Mr. Wynn's
14 false and misleading statements and omissions alleged herein. As a direct and proximate result of
15 Mr. Wynn's wrongful conduct, Aruze USA suffered injury when the redemption provision was
16 purportedly invoked by Wynn Resorts' Board on or about February 18, 2012.

17 322. As a remedy for Mr. Wynn's negligent misrepresentations, Aruze USA seeks
18 imposition of a constructive trust over Aruze USA's Wynn Resorts shares purportedly redeemed
19 by the Board, or, in the alternative, unjust enrichment/restitution.

20 323. Aruze USA brings this claim within the relevant statute of limitations under
21 Nevada law, having discovered facts giving rise to this claim, including injury arising from the
22 purported redemption of Aruze USA's shares of Wynn Resorts' stock, on or about February 18,
23 2012. Despite having exercised reasonable diligence, Aruze USA did not and could not
24 reasonably have discovered earlier the facts giving rise to this claim.

25 324. It has been necessary for Aruze USA to retain the services of attorneys to
26 prosecute this action, and Aruze USA is entitled to an award of the reasonable value of said
27 services performed and to be performed in a sum to be determined.
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COUNT XV

Breach of Contract in Connection with the Stockholders Agreement

(By Aruze USA Against Steve Wynn)

325. Aruze USA reasserts and realleges Paragraphs 4 through 178 above as if set forth in full below.

326. Mr. Wynn, Elaine Wynn, and Aruze USA are parties to the Stockholders Agreement.

327. Section 2(a) of the Stockholders Agreement provides that Mr. Wynn must endorse and vote for Aruze USA's proposed slate of directors so long as the resulting Board is composed of a simple majority of directors selected by Mr. Wynn.

328. Mr. Wynn has failed and refused to endorse Aruze USA's slate of directors in violation of his obligations under the Stockholders Agreement and failed and refused to provide assurances of his intent to vote his and Elaine Wynn's stock in favor of those nominees.

329. Mr. Wynn's actions constitute a material breach of the Stockholders Agreement without justification and has frustrated the essential purpose of the Stockholders Agreement.

330. The Stockholders Agreement provides that each of the parties to it recognizes and acknowledges that a breach by any party of any covenants or agreements contained in the Agreement will cause the other parties to sustain damages for which they would not have an adequate remedy at law for money damages, and therefore each of the parties agrees that in the event of any such breach the parties shall be entitled to appropriate equitable relief.

331. On account of Mr. Wynn's material breach of the Stockholders Agreement, Aruze USA was excused and completely discharged from any further performance of its obligations contained therein.

332. Further, the breaches by Mr. Wynn have frustrated the entire purpose of the Stockholders Agreement, and have instead served to further entrench Mr. Wynn's control over the Company to the detriment of the other parties to the Agreement.

1 333. Aruze USA brings this claim within the relevant statute of limitations under
2 Nevada law, having discovered facts giving rise to this claim, including injury arising from the
3 purported redemption of Aruze USA's shares of Wynn Resorts' stock, on or about February 18,
4 2012. Despite having exercised reasonable diligence, Aruze USA did not and could not
5 reasonably have discovered earlier the facts giving rise to this claim.

6 334. It has been necessary for Aruze USA to retain the services of attorneys to
7 prosecute this action, and Aruze USA is entitled to an award of the reasonable value of said
8 services performed and to be performed in a sum to be determined.

9
10 **COUNT XVI**

11 **Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Stockholders Agreement**

12 **(By Aruze USA Against Steve Wynn)**

13 335. Aruze USA reasserts and realleges Paragraphs 4 through 178 above as if set forth
14 in full below.

15 336. In every contract, there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

16 337. Aruze USA and Mr. Wynn are parties to the Stockholders Agreement, between
17 Mr. Wynn, Elaine Wynn, and Aruze USA.

18 338. Aruze USA has properly sought to exercise its rights under the Stockholders
19 Agreement in seeking to designate directors for endorsement by Mr. Wynn while complying with
20 the contractual condition that the Board will consist of a majority of directors nominated by
21 Mr. Wynn.

22 339. Mr. Wynn has materially breached the Stockholders Agreement by failing to
23 endorse Aruze USA's slate of nominees for directors to the Wynn Resorts Board and by failing to
24 confirm his intent to vote his and Elaine Wynn's stock in favor of those nominees, thereby
25 frustrating the essential purpose of the Stockholders Agreement.

26 340. Mr. Wynn has breached the reasonable and justifiable expectations of Aruze USA
27 with respect to Aruze USA's ability to successfully designate director candidates, an essential
28 purpose of the Stockholders Agreement.

341. Mr. Wynn also has breached the reasonable and justifiable expectations of Aruze USA by unreasonably withholding his consent for Aruze USA to liquidate stock, and by falsely promising financing in order to persuade Aruze USA to delay its demands for liquidity.

342. Accordingly, Mr. Wynn's conduct has breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. On account of Mr. Wynn's material breach, Aruze USA is entitled to contract damages, or in the alternative, Aruze USA is entitled to be excused and discharged from its obligations under the Stockholders Agreement.

343. By virtue of his purported position as power of attorney under the Stockholders Agreement, Mr. Wynn owed fiduciary duties to Aruze USA. Given the existence of this “special relationship” between Mr. Wynn and Aruze USA, Mr. Wynn is also liable for a tortious breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing and the accompanying tort damages.

344. Aruze USA brings this claim within the relevant statute of limitations under Nevada law, having discovered facts giving rise to this claim, including injury arising from the purported redemption of Aruze USA's shares of Wynn Resorts' stock, on or about February 18, 2012. Despite having exercised reasonable diligence, Aruze USA did not and could not reasonably have discovered earlier the facts giving rise to this claim.

345. It has been necessary for Aruze USA to retain the services of attorneys to prosecute this action, and Aruze USA is entitled to an award of the reasonable value of said services performed and to be performed in a sum to be determined.

COUNT XVII

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

(By Aruze USA Against Steve Wynn)

346. Aruze USA reasserts and realleges Paragraphs 4 through 178 above as if set forth in full below.

347. In the alternative, to the extent the Court finds that the redemption provision in the Articles of Incorporation applies to Aruze USA's shares, Aruze USA asserts the claim of breach

1 of fiduciary duty against Steve Wynn. Aruze USA thus brings this claim in the alternative to
2 Aruze USA's claims that assert the purported redemption by Wynn Resorts is void *ab initio*.

3 348. Section 2(c) of the Stockholder Agreement provided that "Aruze [USA] hereby
4 constitutes and appoints [Mr.] Wynn as its true and lawful attorney-in-fact and agent, with full
5 power of substitution and reconstitution for it and in its name, place and stead, in any and all
6 capacities, to execute and deliver any and all documents in connection with or related to the
7 formation of [Wynn Resorts]." As Aruze USA's attorney-in-fact and agent, Mr. Wynn had a
8 fiduciary duty to Aruze USA to act in good faith and in Aruze USA's best interest.

9 349. By virtue of his purported position as power of attorney under the Stockholders
10 Agreement, Mr. Wynn owed fiduciary duties to Aruze USA. In breach of these duties, on or
11 about September 10, 2002, Mr. Wynn caused to be filed amended Articles of Incorporation that
12 included, for the first time, a redemption provision.

13 350. Mr. Wynn's act of unilaterally amending the Articles of Incorporation
14 demonstrated that Mr. Wynn possessed a conflict of interest in his dual roles of sole shareholder
15 in Wynn Resorts and attorney-in-fact and agent of Aruze USA. If applied to Aruze USA, the
16 redemption provision would violate the Stockholders Agreement and impose substantial financial
17 risk on Aruze USA's shares of Wynn Resorts stock by providing Wynn Resorts' Board – which
18 was controlled by Mr. Wynn – purported discretion to redeem Aruze USA's stock on potentially
19 onerous terms. Despite the conflict of interest, Mr. Wynn included the redemption provision in
20 the Articles of Incorporation to the detriment of Aruze USA in breach of his fiduciary duties as
21 attorney-in-fact to Aruze USA. Further, as Aruze USA's attorney-in-fact, Mr. Wynn had a duty
22 to inform Aruze USA that the redemption provision could be used against Aruze USA. In
23 violation of this duty, Mr. Wynn not only failed to inform Aruze USA of this risk, but, on
24 information and belief, his attorneys represented to Aruze USA's attorneys that such a
25 redemption provision would *not* apply to Aruze USA's shares.

26 351. Mr. Wynn's fiduciary obligations to Aruze USA as attorney-in-fact are not subject
27 to the business judgment rule.
28

352. Aruze USA was not aware of and could not have known about the breach of fiduciary duties until September 30, 2011, when Wynn Resorts, for the first time, indicated that it might attempt to apply the redemption restriction to Aruze USA's shares.

353. As a further direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct by the Mr. Wynn, as alleged herein, Aruze USA was and continues to be damaged in an amount in excess of \$10,000.

354. Aruze USA brings this claim within the relevant statute of limitations under Nevada law, having discovered facts giving rise to this claim, including injury arising from the purported redemption of Aruze USA's shares of Wynn Resorts' stock, on or about February 18, 2012. Despite having exercised reasonable diligence, Aruze USA did not and could not reasonably have discovered earlier the facts giving rise to this claim.

355. It has been necessary for Aruze USA to retain the services of attorneys to prosecute this action, and Aruze USA is entitled to an award of the reasonable value of said services performed and to be performed in a sum to be determined.

COUNT XVIII

Tortious Interference of Contract

**(By Aruze USA Against Wynn Resorts, Linda Chen, Russell Goldsmith, Ray R. Irani,
Robert J. Miller, John A. Moran, Marc D. Schorr, Alvin V. Shoemaker, Boone Wayson,
and Allan Zeman)**

356. Aruze USA reasserts and realleges Paragraphs 4 through 178 above as if set forth in full below.

357. In the alternative, to the extent the Court finds the redemption of Aruze USA's shares enforceable, Aruze USA asserts the claim of tortious interference of contract against Wynn Resorts, Linda Chen, Russell Goldsmith, Ray R. Irani, Robert J. Miller, John A. Moran, Marc D. Schorr, Alvin V. Shoemaker, Boone Wayson, and Allan Zeman.

358. On or about February 18, 2012, Wynn Resorts purportedly redeemed Aruze USA's Wynn Resort shares for 30% less than the market value of the shares as measured by the closing

1 price of Wynn Resort's stock on the Friday prior to the Saturday Board meeting. Wynn Resorts
2 announced that it arrived at the 30% discounted value because of the existence of the
3 Stockholders Agreement.

4 359. Wynn Resorts, Linda Chen, Russell Goldsmith, Ray R. Irani, Robert J. Miller,
5 John A. Moran, Marc D. Schorr, Alvin V. Shoemaker, Boone Wayson, and Allan Zeman knew of
6 the existence of the Stockholders Agreement between Aruze USA, Mr. Wynn, and Ms. Wynn,
7 and believed the Stockholders Agreement to be valid and enforceable prior to voting to redeem
8 Aruze USA's stock in Wynn Resorts.

9 360. By voting in favor of the redemption of Aruze USA's shares, Wynn Resorts, Linda
10 Chen, Russell Goldsmith, Ray R. Irani, Robert J. Miller, John A. Moran, Marc D. Schorr, Alvin
11 V. Shoemaker, Boone Wayson, and Allan Zeman knew or should have known that the
12 redemption would violate the Stockholders Agreement by denying Aruze USA the right to have
13 the "sole power of disposition" of its shares in Wynn Resorts.

14 361. To the extent the Court finds that the redemption of Aruze USA's stock actually
15 occurred, Wynn Resorts, Linda Chen, Russell Goldsmith, Ray R. Irani, Robert J. Miller, John A.
16 Moran, Marc D. Schorr, Alvin V. Shoemaker, Boone Wayson, and Allan Zeman intentionally and
17 tortiously interfered with contractual relations, which resulted in injury to Aruze USA.

18 362. As a further direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct by Wynn Resorts,
19 Linda Chen, Russell Goldsmith, Ray R. Irani, Robert J. Miller, John A. Moran, Marc D. Schorr,
20 Alvin V. Shoemaker, Boone Wayson, and Allan Zeman as alleged herein, Aruze USA was and
21 continues to be damaged in an amount in excess of \$10,000 to be proven at trial.

22 363. Aruze USA brings this claim within the relevant statute of limitations under
23 Nevada law, having discovered facts giving rise to this claim, including injury arising from the
24 purported redemption of Aruze USA's shares of Wynn Resorts' stock, on or about February 18,
25 2012. Despite having exercised reasonable diligence, Aruze USA did not and could not
26 reasonably have discovered earlier the facts giving rise to this claim.

364. It has been necessary for Aruze USA to retain the services of attorneys to prosecute this action, and Aruze USA is entitled to an award of the reasonable value of said services performed and to be performed in a sum to be determined.

COUNT XIX

Unconscionability/Reformation of Promissory Note

(By Aruze USA Against Wynn Resorts)

365. Aruze USA reasserts and realleges Paragraphs 4 through 178 above as if set forth in full below.

366. In the alternative, to the extent that the redemption provision in the Articles of Incorporation is found to apply to Aruze USA's shares and the redemption is found to be lawful, Aruze USA asserts that the promissory note is unconscionable and therefore subject to reformation.

367. On January 27, 2012, Wynn Resorts declared in a publicly filed Opposition to Mr. Okada's Petition for Writ of Mandamus that Aruze USA's nearly 20% stake in Wynn Resorts was "valued at approximately \$2.9 billion."

368. Just 22 days later, on February 18, 2012, Wynn Resorts acted to forcibly acquire Aruze USA's stake in Wynn Resorts in exchange for a \$1.936 billion promissory note, paying a mere 2% interest per annum over a ten-year term.

369. The promissory note is unconscionably vague, ambiguous, and oppressive.

370. Aruze USA was never permitted the opportunity to negotiate the amount of the promissory note given the market value of its shares, nor was Aruze USA permitted the opportunity to negotiate the terms of the promissory note, including, but not limited to, the interest rate, the restrictions on transfer, and the subordination provisions.

371. Wynn Resorts received a grossly one-sided windfall by forcibly redeeming \$2.9 billion of securities at a deep discount, transforming equity into a 2 percent per annum debt instrument that Aruze USA may not transfer, retaining the ability to issue additional debt at any

1 time and provide any new lender priority rights above Aruze USA's note, and removing voting
2 and other rights from Aruze USA.

3 372. Aruze USA, therefore, seeks reformation of the promissory note, including but not
4 limited to its principal, duration, interest rate, restrictions on transfer, restrictions on
5 subordination, and inclusion of other customary and reasonable terms, conditions, and covenants.

6 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

7 WHEREFORE, Aruze USA and Universal each expressly reserves its and their right to
8 amend these Counterclaims before or at the time of the trial of this action to include all items of
9 injury and damages not yet ascertained. Aruze USA and Universal pray that the Honorable Court
10 enter judgment in favor of each of them, and against Wynn Resorts, Mr. Wynn, Ms. Sinatra, and
11 the other Wynn Directors, as follows:

- 12 a. For general damages in an amount in excess of \$10,000;
13 b. For consequential damages;
14 c. For treble and statutory damages;
15 d. For punitive damages three times the amount of compensatory damages awarded;
16 e. For disgorgement of profits;
17 f. For constructive trust and unjust enrichment;
18 g. For preliminary and/or permanent injunctive relief;
19 h. For declaratory relief;
20 i. For reformation of the promissory note;
21 j. For costs and expenses of this action, prejudgment and post-judgment interest, and
22 reasonable attorneys' fees incurred herein; and
23 k. Any and all such other and further equitable and legal relief as this Court deems
24 just and proper.

25 **JURY DEMAND**


26 Defendants and Counterclaimants hereby demand a trial by jury on all claims and issues
27 so triable.
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Dated: November 26, 2013

LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS
SAMUEL S. LIONEL (SBN 1766)
CHARLES H. McCREA, JR. (SBN 104)
STEVEN C. ANDERSON (SBN 11901)

MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
MARC J. SONNENFELD
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JOSEPH E. FLOREN
BENJAMIN P. SMITH
CHRISTOPHER J. BANKS

By 
Charles H. McCrea, Jr.

Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimants
ARUZE USA, INC. and UNIVERSAL
ENTERTAINMENT CORP.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee of LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS and that on this 26th day of November, 2013, I caused documents entitled FOURTH AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM OF ARUZE USA, INC. AND UNIVERSAL ENTERTAINMENT CORP. to be served as follows:

☐ by depositing same for mailing in the United States Mail, in a sealed envelope addressed to:

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
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
☐ pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D) to be sent via facsimile as indicated:

☐ to be hand delivered to:

and/or

☒ by the Court's ECF System through Wiznet.


An Employee of
LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS



CLERK OF THE COURT

TRAN

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
* * * * *

WYNN RESORTS LIMITED

Plaintiff

vs.

KAZUO OKADA, et al.

Defendants
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CASE NO. A-656710

DEPT. NO. XI

**Transcript of
Proceedings**

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

HEARING ON MOTIONS

TUESDAY, JUNE 7, 2016

COURT RECORDER:

JILL HAWKINS
District Court

TRANSCRIPTION BY:

FLORENCE HOYT
Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording, transcript
produced by transcription service.

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

JAMES J. PISANELLI, ESQ.
TODD L. BICE, ESQ.
DEBRA SPINELLI, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

J. STEPHEN PEEK, ESQ.
BRYCE K. KUNIMOTO, ESQ.
DONALD JUDE CAMPBELL, ESQ.
COLBY J. WILLIAMS, ESQ.
WILLIAM R. URGAS, ESQ.
MICHAEL T. ZELLER, ESQ.

1 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, TUESDAY, JUNE 7, 2016, 8:04 A.M.

2 (Court was called to order)

3 THE COURT: Good morning. Mr. Peek said he was
4 running about five minutes late, so I thought I'd come in a
5 couple minutes before he got here so we can all be sitting
6 here watching him.

7 (Pause in the proceedings)

8 THE COURT: Mr. Kunimoto, what'd you do with Mr.
9 Peek?

10 MR. KUNIMOTO: I'm trying to reach him, Your Honor,
11 but I --

12 THE COURT: He called us. He said he was late. But
13 it didn't sound like him. It sounded like someone
14 masquerading as him.

15 (Pause in the proceedings)

16 THE COURT: 'Morning, Mr. Peek. How are you today?

17 MR. PEEK: I'm well, Your Honor. Thank you.

18 THE COURT: All right. So we're on Wynn versus
19 Okada. What motion would you like to start with, since I do
20 not have a preference today.

21 I'm used to people not listening.

22 MR. PISANELLI: I'm sorry, Your Honor.

23 THE COURT: It's okay. It's been that kind of a
24 week, and it's only Tuesday.

25 MR. PISANELLI: So, Your Honor, if I might.

1 THE COURT: Sure.

2 MR. PISANELLI: We have a couple of things that
3 before I even argue them you may want to take into
4 consideration. So we're talking about further deposition of
5 Jim Stern, further deposition of Governor Miller, and further
6 deposition, potentially, of Joel Friedman. All of them touch
7 upon a series of issues, but one common one being privilege
8 and the privilege that is before the Supreme Court to be
9 resolved. So I just question for Your Honor, since we're not
10 up against the close of discovery yet, whether it doesn't make
11 sense for all of us so that we don't continue to do these
12 piecemeal depositions -- and this is, you know, with no idea
13 which way you're leaning, for or against any of us, but I just
14 pose whether it makes sense that we put those off.

15 THE COURT: So what did you guys argue yesterday?
16 Didn't you have an argument yesterday afternoon at 1:30 or
17 something?

18 MR. ZELLER: We did.

19 THE COURT: In this case?

20 MR. ZELLER: Yes.

21 THE COURT: On what?

22 MR. ZELLER: There were two -- there were two
23 motions that the Wynn Resorts put on shortened time. One was
24 a motion for protective order as to --

25 THE COURT: No, no. In the Supreme Court.

1 MR. ZELLER: Oh.

2 MR. PEEK: Supreme Court. That was Pisanelli Bice I
3 think did that.

4 MR. PISANELLI: That was --

5 THE COURT: Different case?

6 MR. PISANELLI: Different case.

7 THE COURT: Oh. Okay.

8 MR. PISANELLI: But we have the writ pending --

9 THE COURT: So do you have any arguments scheduled?

10 MR. PEEK: We do not, Your Honor.

11 THE COURT: Okay.

12 MR. PISANELLI: Is the writ scheduled for hearing?

13 MR. BICE: No. They have directed an answer, and so
14 that hasn't been filed. And then we will do our reply, and
15 then --

16 THE COURT: So at this point --

17 MR. PEEK: So we have two writs. One has been
18 ordered reply -- a response. That's due Friday. Their reply
19 is do the 24th. The other writ with respect to the Freeh
20 documents has not even been requested to be answered. It's
21 the Brownstein Hyatt.

22 THE COURT: Okay. So let me go back to my question.
23 So at this point we are not even to the point where we're
24 waiting for the Supreme Court to make a decision on something
25 that's been fully briefed and submitted.

1 MR. PISANELLI: Right.

2 THE COURT: And so how long would you want me to
3 wait to see what they do? Because my past life experience is
4 sometimes it takes a long time for them to do things.

5 MR. PISANELLI: Sure. I understand that. I've
6 experienced that with you from time to time. So, you know,
7 I'd defer to your judgment. I guess there's a different
8 alternative here, and that would get us to arguing these
9 motions, is that part of the frustration that we're
10 experiencing, I'll use Mr. Stern as an example, that the
11 parties go forward with knowledge that they don't have the
12 documents and with knowledge that pending issues of privilege
13 haven't been resolved yet. And in other cases that are not as
14 complex as this we've all made those choices with our eyes
15 wide open that if you take the depo now knowing that you may
16 get more information later, this is your one opportunity. But
17 instead --

18 MR. PEEK: Yeah. This is my motion.

19 THE COURT: Yeah, but that's -- wait.

20 MR. PEEK: This is my motion. I'd like to be able
21 to argue my motion.

22 THE COURT: But, Mr. Pisanelli, that's not how we've
23 operated in this --

24 MR. PISANELLI: I can't hear you, Your Honor.

25 THE COURT: That's not how we've operated in this

1 case. And I had expressly said that if additional documents
2 are produced after the deposition is completed that I will not
3 preclude someone from asking for that deposition to be reset.

4 MR. PISANELLI: I'm aware of that.

5 THE COURT: Okay.

6 MR. PISANELLI: And my only point is whether we can
7 within the confines of that ruling, which I think has been
8 abused --

9 THE COURT: It's not a ruling. It's a statement of
10 my usual practice.

11 MR. PISANELLI: Okay. Well, I'm just saying that
12 we're getting piecemeal multiple depositions of a lot of
13 different witnesses with kind of a blank check that they keep
14 bringing them back. It's not just Mr. Stern, it's a bunch of
15 them. And so my proposal is merely to put these depositions
16 and these motions aside for the time being, see if we get a
17 ruling.

18 THE COURT: Well, let me ask a question of the
19 parties. And this is one of the things that I was thinking of
20 as we were going through the bigger stack of information than
21 I anticipated. Which means that people did a really good job
22 getting oppositions on order shortening time.

23 Have you discussed among yourselves whether you want
24 to stay discovery pending certain decisions by the Nevada
25 Supreme Court?

1 MR. PISANELLI: We have not had that discussion.

2 THE COURT: Okay. Well, until you have that
3 discussion I'm not going to make a decision on that issue.

4 So I'm going to go Mr. Peek, because these are his
5 motions, at least most of them, on the depositions.

6 MR. PISANELLI: Okay. So I can manage my time
7 appropriately and with other counsel here, how are we dividing
8 up?

9 THE COURT: Well, that's a really good question.
10 Laura just asked me. Because I've got the Quinn Emanuel
11 disqualification issue, and so I can't make Mr. Peek share
12 time with them. And can we seven and a half, seven and a
13 half, fifteen?

14 MR. PEEK: And I have four motions. I think I may
15 be able to well get them within that time frame, seven and a
16 half minutes.

17 THE COURT: Okay. We'll do our best to hit that.

18 MR. PISANELLI: Your Honor, I have 15 minutes.

19 THE COURT: Can you use less?

20 MR. PISANELLI: I'm going to do my best. But I have
21 colleagues that are arguing other motions. Would Your Honor
22 have any opposition to going --

23 THE COURT: You have to share on that side of the
24 room.

25 MR. PISANELLI: I understand. That's actually my

1 point. Can -- would you mind terribly if we go first with the
2 disqualification motion?

3 THE COURT: Sure. I don't mind terribly if we
4 choose to do that one first.

5 MR. PISANELLI: Thank you.

6 So, Your Honor, the legal landscape in Nevada has
7 been changing seemingly month by month here, partly as a
8 result of this case, partly as a result of the Sands-Jacobs
9 case, in that it's just a lot of complicated litigation that
10 was going up and down in the Supreme Court, and we're getting
11 some new guidance as we move forward. One thing that has been
12 made perfectly clear to us has recently emerged from the Sands
13 decision, and that being who owns and controls privilege after
14 an executive leaves the company. That question no longer has
15 any ambiguity in the state of Nevada, and that is the
16 corporation. The Supreme Court tells us that the sole client
17 -- or communications between corporate counsel and the company
18 is the corporation, and that it is the corporation's
19 protection and the corporation's choice whether to waive it.
20 That doesn't change if the person who had access was a CEO or
21 whether they were a number of the board of directors. And so
22 that's what brings us here today.

23 We have wrestled with this issue here and with other
24 cases of what to do before we got that guidance of counsel
25 reading things, et cetera. There's different approaches.

1 There's a conservative approach available to everybody, don't
2 read it until you know, until there's a ruling, or there's an
3 aggressive approach to do just do what you want and ask for
4 permission later. It appears from what we have learned --

5 THE COURT: The conservative approach being notify
6 the other side that you have potentially privileged
7 information in your possession, let the other side know that
8 you are willing to do something to secure that and prevent
9 disclosure of that information to you, which might lead to
10 your disqualification, and then wait and see what the ruling
11 is from the court. That being the conservative description.

12 MR. PISANELLI: That sounds like the best practice,
13 as I would describe it to my colleagues and young lawyers
14 entering my firm.

15 THE COURT: Okay.

16 MR. PISANELLI: Quinn Emanuel took a different
17 approach. We have -- we have to argue this case with somewhat
18 limited information, because obviously we don't have access to
19 their communications with Ms. Wynn. We sometimes have to read
20 between the lines, sometimes have to read actual lines. Here
21 during the course of Ms. Sinatra's deposition the fear and
22 suspicion came to fruition as email which were produced the
23 day before, which in and of itself is a suspicious fact, email
24 the day before which contains communication between a then
25 sitting director and a then general counsel where there are

1 communications about the company business, including a
2 conflict analysis, which by any standard it is the mental
3 impressions and legal advice of the in-house counsel. Rather
4 than take the best practice approach that Merits Incentives
5 and Your Honor just described to us, Quinn Emanuel took a
6 different approach, and that is the bull in the china shop
7 that we have seen in other circumstances, and went ahead and
8 put it in the record and started examining the general counsel
9 on that topic.

10 We have put forth in our papers as best we can
11 descriptions for you so that you could see the nature of the
12 questions that followed on that email and the email itself
13 offering to Your Honor to submit anything you want to see in
14 camera, understanding there are two violations that Ms. Wynn
15 appears to have committed here, violations of both her common-
16 law and contractual obligation to maintain confidentiality of
17 information from this company and then, of course, the
18 obligation to preserve privileged information. She by all mrs
19 appears to have violated them both for her own gain
20 notwithstanding this nonsensical suggestion in her opposition
21 that she is somehow a whistleblower. I won't even spend any
22 of my 15 minutes on that absurd proposition. But in order to
23 relitigate her divorce, not a whistleblower by any standard,
24 she went ahead and violated those obligations in order to
25 present and pursue her campaign of destruction against our

1 company.

2 So we find ourselves now, as Merits Incentives and
3 other cases have directed, figure out what do we do about
4 this. I have shown you the questions asked. There's lots of
5 questions in there that suggest and even prove that Quinn
6 Emanuel is in possession of information they are not entitled
7 to have. We now have at least one email that shows that. And
8 so we can go through the six factors of Merits Incentives,
9 which we did in our papers, which shows that at least five of
10 the six weigh towards disqualification and other relief.
11 Quinn Emanuel and Ms. Wynn fall back on the same argument we
12 hear, I would suggest, in every single debate of this sort,
13 and that is it wasn't privileged. Caught with the proverbial
14 hand in the cookie jar, that's all that's left for somebody
15 that says that. They did not employ a best practice, they did
16 not employ a conservative practice. They just said, we have
17 already made the determination it was not privileged and so
18 let's move on, alleging that we are frivolous and vexatious in
19 their opposition.

20 So, you know, unlike the Keker matter that was
21 brought to your attention -- there both sides put all the
22 cards face up on the table for you and put Mr. Keker with his
23 own notes of what the communication with Ms. Wynn was, and
24 that left Your Honor with a pretty clear issue of law to
25 decide, here are the facts, nobody's arguing what happened.

1 You found them to be privileged information and that he was
2 disqualified. Here we don't have a real argument on the law.
3 We have the opposite. We have Quinn Emanuel on behalf of Ms.
4 Wynn saying this wasn't privileged. We can see on its face
5 that there is some privilege there. So I think the only way
6 to protect us, to get to the bottom of this to see if
7 disqualification is appropriate, to see if an injunction on
8 multiple is appropriate, is to have an evidentiary hearing.
9 We're willing to do it quickly, because we think it is highly
10 prejudicial to us to allow tainted counsel to continue to
11 conduct depositions, continue to file motions, continue to
12 pursue discovery.

13 So timing is of the essence from the harmed party in
14 this perspective, and that's us. And so we'd ask you to set
15 an evidentiary hearing at your earliest opportunity. Let's
16 put some witnesses and some documents before Your Honor, maybe
17 in camera, maybe in open court, and figure out what happened,
18 number one, and what to do about it, number two.

19 THE COURT: Okay. And you do not know the nature of
20 the communications that have been disclosed at this point,
21 because there's been no identification to you of the Quinn
22 Emanuel firm as to the materials that have been provided to
23 them?

24 MR. PISANELLI: None. All they just tell us is this
25 is frivolous and there's nothing privileged.

1 THE COURT: Thank you.

2 MR. PISANELLI: Thank you.

3 THE COURT: Mr. Zeller.

4 MR. ZELLER: Your Honor, the motion suffers under a
5 basic misapprehension not only of the law, but the facts. I'm
6 sure the Court has seen our opposition.

7 THE COURT: I read it.

8 MR. ZELLER: And we put in the communications and
9 the surrounding circumstances. So this idea that we have not
10 disclosed them is just simply fundamentally false. Moreover,
11 as we point out in our opposition, these allegations in terms
12 of the substance of the conversation that happened between Ms.
13 Sinatra and Elaine Wynn back in 2009, number one, has been in
14 our pleadings since March. So the idea that somehow they were
15 surprised by this or somehow that we did not disclose this is
16 just simply incorrect. That has been in our pleadings that
17 the Court allowed back in March. It is also something we
18 specific referenced in the motion to dismiss papers. So the
19 facts are and we have put in evidence showing exactly what
20 those communications are, and then in both instances they are
21 not privileged.

22 Furthermore -- and I assume that there's no issue if
23 I briefly summarize what Kim Sinatra testified to.

24 MR. PISANELLI: There is an issue, please.

25 MR. ZELLER: Well, the Court has her testimony.

1 THE COURT: I have some of her testimony.

2 MR. ZELLER: Well, the Court has her testimony as --

3 THE COURT: I have some of her testimony.

4 MR. ZELLER: Well, Your Honor, we put the entirety
5 of it in in connection with the Sinatra motion.

6 THE COURT: That's all I got from you.

7 MR. ZELLER: I understand, Your Honor. But this is
8 one reason why we were suggesting that perhaps that if the
9 Court heard also the Sinatra motions on the motion to compel,
10 the Court would see the overall context of the deposition. So
11 we put --

12 THE COURT: Let me ask you the question --

13 MR. ZELLER: Sure.

14 THE COURT: -- I was concerned about as I read this
15 last night.

16 MR. ZELLER: Sure.

17 THE COURT: It appears to me that your position is
18 there was not an attorney-client relationship between Ms. Wynn
19 and Ms. Sinatra and that when Ms. Wynn and Ms. Sinatra were
20 talking that there was no attorney-client relationship. My
21 concern is, and this is what I'm trying to figure out from
22 reading your information, that it doesn't matter whether
23 there's an attorney-client relationship between Ms. Wynn and
24 Ms. Sinatra. What matters is whether Ms. Wynn is seeking
25 information and advice from Ms. Sinatra or providing

1 information for Ms. Sinatra to do additional work on behalf of
2 Wynn.

3 MR. ZELLER: Well, let me unpack that, Your Honor.
4 Because it's not our -- the issue is not whether there was an
5 attorney-client relationship from our perspective. We are
6 arguing specifically that, first of all, as the Court is
7 aware, not every communication with an in-house lawyer,
8 particularly one who has business roles as Ms. Sinatra does,
9 is by definition privileged.

10 THE COURT: I agree.

11 MR. ZELLER: So that's point one. Point two is in
12 these conversations, and we have submitted evidence and Ms.
13 Sinatra has conceded with respect to at least one of those
14 conversations there was no legal advice sought, no legal
15 advice given. Those are essential elements in order to
16 establish the privilege. So we're not talking about the
17 overall larger context of relationship, Your Honor. There was
18 no question that Ms. Sinatra had certain --

19 THE COURT: I think you misapply the standard,
20 Counsel.

21 So let me see if I can skip ahead.

22 MR. ZELLER: Sure.

23 THE COURT: I have concerns about whether Ms. Wynn
24 has provided you with information that may arguably be
25 privileged. How do I make a determination, since you didn't

1 notify anyone of what you received from Ms. Wynn and set it
2 aside as they did in the Jacobs versus Sands case?

3 MR. ZELLER: Well, number one, Your Honor, as to the
4 2009 conversation, that has been --

5 THE COURT: And you're talking about the
6 conversation between Ms. Wynn and Ms. Sinatra --

7 MR. ZELLER: Yes.

8 THE COURT: -- about other activities by other board
9 members so Ms. Sinatra could tell her whether she thought
10 there were issues, not issues, do an additional investigation
11 or something?

12 MR. ZELLER: Well, I guess there's a couple of
13 issues on that, Your Honor. Number one is that in terms of
14 what it is that Wynn Resorts is complaining about here today
15 only involves two things, the 2009 conversation, which is in
16 our pleading and has been since March and which we put in
17 evidence that that is not privileged, and that's undisputed.
18 The second component --

19 THE COURT: I don't think it's undisputed. That's
20 where I think you're missing the boat.

21 MR. ZELLER: No, see, I do -- I don't agree, Your
22 Honor. I think it is undisputed. They put in absolutely no
23 declaration or evidence from Ms. Sinatra asserting that in
24 that conversation legal advice was sought or given. And in
25 fact her deposition testimony forecloses that very argument.

1 THE COURT: Okay.

2 MR. ZELLER: So in terms of the actual specific
3 instances that they are complaining about, there's only two of
4 them, one, there's the 2009 conversation, and then the other
5 is the email, which I can address separately.

6 THE COURT: Okay. So let me go back to what I asked
7 you and you didn't answer and you're dodging.

8 MR. ZELLER: Sure.

9 THE COURT: And let's stop dodging.

10 MR. ZELLER: Right. No. I'm sorry, Your Honor.

11 THE COURT: I need you to identify for me the
12 information which was provided to your firm by Ms. Wynn, and
13 whether it's a privilege log or something, so I can make a
14 determination as to whether there are factual issues as to
15 whether privileged information of the company has been
16 provided to your firm. Because she can't waive the privilege
17 and give it to you even if she had it in her possession as a
18 director.

19 MR. ZELLER: Well, first of all, Your Honor, I'm not
20 sure that that's entirely true.

21 THE COURT: Really? Have you read the decision from
22 the Supreme Court in Sands versus Jacobs?

23 MR. ZELLER: Your Honor, we represent Elaine Wynn in
24 her capacity as a director against Mr. Okada's claims.

25 THE COURT: Absolutely.

1 MR. ZELLER: So -- but let me just state for the
2 record -- and I'm sorry if I appear to be dodging --

3 THE COURT: You are dodging, Counsel.

4 MR. ZELLER: Your Honor, the fact is that there are
5 only two things that have been disclosed to us, and those are
6 the ones that are at issue here. I mean, I can certainly put
7 in a declaration in order to confirm any concerns that the
8 Court has on that issue. But my -- as the Court is aware,
9 they filed this on Friday. They only raised, you know, as far
10 as we understood it, two particular instances. Those are the
11 ones we addressed. If the Court has broader concerns --

12 THE COURT: That's not what I'm asking you, Counsel.
13 I asked you a very different question, and I haven't got an
14 answer.

15 MR. ZELLER: The answer is, Your Honor, there is
16 nothing more. We can -- we can --

17 THE COURT: So the only information that your client
18 provided to you and you're going to stand here tell me that
19 might arguably be privileged is the email about --

20 MR. ZELLER: Correct.

21 THE COURT: -- the potential board member to Ms.
22 Sinatra --

23 MR. ZELLER: Right.

24 THE COURT: -- and then an email or conversation
25 with Ms. Sinatra related to potential breach of fiduciary duty

1 by other high-ranking members of the board?

2 MR. ZELLER: That's correct.

3 THE COURT: Okay.

4 MR. ZELLER: And we'll put in a declaration to that
5 effect, Your Honor, if that is what the Court is -- where the
6 Court is headed. But, honestly, just in fairness -- and I
7 apologize if I look like I was trying to dodge that -- the
8 only thing that they are raising are those two things.

9 THE COURT: Counsel, it's an iceberg issue.

10 MR. ZELLER: Sure. I understand. I understand.

11 And there's only this --

12 THE COURT: What do you think I mean when I say it's
13 an iceberg issue, Counsel, so we're clear there's no
14 ambiguity?

15 MR. ZELLER: I understand, Your Honor. But there is
16 no iceberg.

17 THE COURT: There's a lot more under the water is
18 what it means.

19 MR. ZELLER: I understand.

20 THE COURT: And that's the concern --

21 MR. ZELLER: Sure.

22 THE COURT: -- is that there may be two instances
23 that have been -- now arisen in the litigation, but now
24 there's much more that's been provided to you that's arguably
25 privileged.

1 MR. ZELLER: And there is not. This is not the
2 Jacobs case, Your Honor. This is not an instance --

3 THE COURT: I know this is not the Jacobs case,
4 Counsel.

5 MR. ZELLER: Yeah. Right. And it's not -- this is
6 not an instance where there's all sorts of documents that she
7 took and has. So -- but the fact is, Your Honor, what's been
8 disclosed to us as the lawyers I can tell you are these two --
9 these two instances that we actually pled in our pleading
10 going back to March. That's why it's a little surprising that
11 we're standing here today, them acting like it's some sort of
12 emergency, both tone at the top, including by Ms. Sinatra,
13 which is -- that's what that is referring to, is that email,
14 as well as the 2009 conversation were both pled quite
15 specifically in our pleading going back to March. And that is
16 the universe of what we're talking about. And I can -- you
17 know, like I say, if the Court -- if the Court would like me
18 to, I'll put it in a declaration to establish that. But we
19 think that the evidence that we've put in for the Court,
20 undisputed evidence is that neither of those communications
21 are privileged. And there's nothing, nothing in the record
22 that Wynn Resorts has put in to dispute it.

23 If I may just briefly address the one --

24 THE COURT: No, Counsel. You're out of time.

25 MR. ZELLER: Thank you, Your Honor.

1 MR. PISANELLI: So, Your Honor, a couple of things
2 that Ms. Wynn and her counsel seem to have backwards. First
3 of all they say that there's only two things that we have
4 discovered. Well, there's only two things we have disclosed
5 to them that they have that's inappropriate. The law is the
6 other way around. We don't know what they have. They were
7 supposed to disclose it to us.

8 Secondly, simply because they -- we have only
9 discovered and now argued about one email doesn't mean that
10 that's the end of the analysis, doesn't mean that it's one
11 email, and doesn't also mean that email is the only issue,
12 right. The issue about preservation of privilege has to do
13 with information, not the form. And so if Ms. Wynn walks into
14 Quinn Emanuel after dismissing Munger Tolles and now spills
15 everything that was privileged, that is as important as if she
16 was giving a computerful of documents that had all kinds of
17 privileged information in it. So Quinn Emanuel can't sit back
18 and wait to find out what they got caught doing, what we
19 discovered. They are supposed to put it up front. Sometimes
20 you see lawyers do this with independent counsel to review the
21 client's information to see if there's privilege in there so
22 that the trial counsel doesn't get tainted. There's lots of
23 ways to do this. But just simply saying, let's wait and see
24 what we caught with, is not what Merits Incentive and it's not
25 what the Las Vegas Sands case tells us to do.

1 We would ask Your Honor for a full disclosure not
2 just of this one email, but of all information. If that
3 includes debriefing notes when they met with Ms. Wynn and show
4 them to you or a special master so a special master can now go
5 through this information in the exact way that occurred with
6 Mr. Keker, where Your Honor got to see what Mr. Keker wrote
7 down by way of his notes, and Your Honor said, yes, he's
8 tainted and he's got to go. Same process should apply here.
9 We would like to see what information is in the hands of Quinn
10 Emanuel and not do what they are telling us and now telling
11 you to do is take their word for it. That's not good enough.

12 THE COURT: Thank you.

13 So I need, Mr. Zeller, not a declaration. I need an
14 identification of all potentially privileged information that
15 was provided by Ms. Wynn to your firm to be provided for me
16 for an in-camera review. How long will that take to gather
17 and provide? That includes not only documents, but also
18 conversations related to privileged communications in her
19 capacity as a board member.

20 MR. ZELLER: I think a week.

21 THE COURT: How about two? Because I want it done
22 right.

23 MR. ZELLER: Yes, Your Honor. I know the universe
24 of materials. But I'll take two weeks, Your Honor.

25 THE COURT: All right. Once you give me that I'm

1 going to review it, and then I'm going to make a determination
2 as to whether I need to release that information to the other
3 parties and whether I'm going to set an evidentiary hearing.
4 If you would also like to submit the declaration that you've
5 offered me, I would be happy to accept that as part of this.

6 So I'm going to set this on my chambers calendar for
7 two weeks from Friday.

8 MR. PISANELLI: Couple of things, Your Honor.

9 THE COURT: No.

10 THE CLERK: June 24 in chambers.

11 THE COURT: Okay. Now did you want to go to the
12 motions related to the depositions?

13 MR. CAMPBELL: I think we can raise it there.

14 MR. PISANELLI: Well, the only thing I was in need
15 of is to know if we're going to get a log of what was given to
16 you to avoid the ex parte issue.

17 THE COURT: Maybe.

18 MR. PISANELLI: Okay.

19 THE COURT: Maybe.

20 MR. PISANELLI: And whether you would --

21 THE COURT: The reason I asked for it as
22 information, as opposed to a log is the conversations are more
23 difficult to provide as a log if she had additional
24 conversations with Ms. Sinatra about the company's business.

25 MR. PISANELLI: Okay.

1 THE COURT: Those need to be included on the
2 identification. I have not called it a log, because it's not
3 really a privilege log, because you would be provided a
4 privilege log if it was.

5 MR. PISANELLI: Fair enough. I'm just -- okay.

6 THE COURT: Okay. Now I'm on the depos. Mr. Peek.

7 MR. PEEK: Thank you, Your Honor.

8 Your Honor, if there's one of the two that you'd
9 like me to start. Both have overlapping issues, but --

10 THE COURT: They're all overlapping.

11 MR. PEEK: Yeah, they are. And, Your Honor, I
12 appreciate Mr. Pisanelli's remarks of at least making an
13 effort to see if we couldn't reach some agreement with respect
14 to the depositions. Certainly you'll see from our papers that
15 that is at least the way we approach both -- or each of the
16 motions.

17 First of all, we have said with respect to Governor
18 Miller that we recognize that there are issues pending before
19 the Supreme Court, we recognize that those issues will
20 certainly resolve one way or the other the time and the amount
21 of time necessary for Governor Miller.

22 We are both two -- we have two pending writs in the
23 Supreme Court, one with respect to the Brownstein Hyatt
24 documents, and one with respect to the Freeh Group documents.
25 As I noted and as Mr. Bice concurred, the Brownstein Hyatt

1 documents or Brownstein Hyatt issue has been ordered to be an
2 answer. The Freeh Group is still pending.

3 We are entitled to seek the discovery that we need.
4 They have produced documents related to Governor Miller and
5 his testimony since his original deposition, and we're
6 entitled to ask him questions about those documents. The Wynn
7 parties have refused to produce Governor Miller even if the
8 Supreme Court rejects either writ petition. That goes to Mr.
9 Pisanelli's point about, well, let's talk about this later.
10 The reason why we're here is because they have refused to
11 produce him at all.

12 They don't mention that they've refused to produce
13 Governor Miller if either written petition is rejected. They
14 don't say a word about that. Without any agreement from Wynn
15 Resorts that they will produce Governor Miller in those
16 circumstances and because there's so little time left for
17 discovery, the Court should consider our request for
18 additional time now. We don't want to wait. Supreme Court
19 acts, we want to be prepared to go.

20 We're obviously willing to work with both Ms. Wynn
21 and Governor Miller's counsel in good faith to attempt to have
22 our additional questioning dates set at a time and within
23 proximity for the convenience of everyone. There's no basis
24 right now to refuse to produce Governor Miller for an
25 additional four hours. That's all we ask, an additional four

1 hours to go over those documents that we were prohibiting from
2 reviewing with him in light of the Supreme Court. We do not
3 need any more than that full four hours. We thought we'd ask
4 for a full day, but we think that the additional questions
5 that we need to ask him with respect to those documents and
6 with respect to those conversations that he had with both
7 Brownstein Hyatt, as well as with Freeh Group, they will avoid
8 -- in those four hours will avoid imposing too much of a
9 burden on Governor Miller. So we ask just for the four hours.
10 That's all I have on that motion.

11 THE COURT: Thank you. Do you want to do any of the
12 other motions while you're up there? Because they all have
13 interrelated issues.

14 MR. PEEK: They do have interrelated issues, and so
15 I'm happy to move forward. And, as I understand and
16 appreciate that the Stern deposition has been vacated and is
17 to be scheduled for another day with respect to Ms. Wynn's
18 request. So it certainly -- I preview that. I don't know
19 what impact it might have, if any, on this, but I understand
20 it has been vacated.

21 Your Honor, Wynn Resorts continues to try to dictate
22 the Aruze parties discovery process in this case, especially
23 when the issues surrounding Mr. Stern are of Wynn Resorts'
24 making, their making. This Court required Mr. Stern first to
25 return for two days of testimony because Wynn Resorts

1 obstructed the first session by refusing to let Mr. Stern
2 answer any questions about his interaction with the
3 government. You recall that motion. This Court has already
4 overruled Wynn Resorts' privilege claim on the pre-redemption
5 investigation, demonstrating that the instructions not to
6 answer were inappropriate.

7 Second, Wynn Resorts has failed to produce Mr.
8 Stern's documents timely even though we first requested them
9 not recently, as they argue, but back in our fourth set of
10 requests for production in April 2015. But, to make it clear
11 to Wynn Resorts, because they seem to be confused by it, we
12 issued the subpoena. That request in April 2015 was in
13 conjunction with our original motion for expert discovery and
14 sanctions of Mr. Stern. You may recall that motion now over a
15 year ago. In fact, Wynn Resorts still has not produced some
16 of these key documents despite promising numerous times to do
17 so. Once they do and once the Nevada Supreme Court upholds
18 this Court's decision Wynn Resorts will also have to produce
19 what we believe to be thousands of documents, many involving
20 Stern. We should be entitled and will be entitled to question
21 Mr. Stern about these documents and issues as part of the
22 discovery process.

23 Third, the fact that Wynn has raised privilege
24 claims does not prohibit the Aruze parties from seeking
25 discovery from Mr. Stern. Such discovery could have and did

1 have an impact on other depositions and discovery issues. We
2 used information obtained from Mr. Stern in depositions of
3 McCall, Scotty, and Freeh. Wynn suggests that the Aruze
4 parties chose to move forward with Stern and forfeited the
5 right to seek additional time; but Wynn ignores that the
6 additional time was because Mr. Stern did not answer questions
7 in the first place, nor did they produce fully all documents
8 that had been requested. They also ignore that it cannot
9 dictate the discovery schedule to suit its self-serving
10 claims. We're entitled to move forward. We're entitled to
11 proceed with other discovery of Mr. Stern, rather than wait
12 for WRL's obstruction on some points; but we should not allow
13 them to delay us on other questioning of Mr. Stern, which is
14 they want us to do. They don't want us to have any testimony
15 of Mr. Stern. Elaine Wynn's counsel's notice of Mr. Stern for
16 deposition should not impact our independent and long-standing
17 need to depose Mr. Stern.

18 We understand that your preference is that Mr. Stern
19 only be called back once. I think given the way the parties
20 have worked through this, that may or may not occur. However,
21 we recognize that until the Supreme Court decides certain
22 issues with respect to Freeh it may not go forward. However,
23 there are a number of documents they have yet to produce that
24 we want to review, we want to see, we want to have as part of
25 our examination of Mr. Stern.

1 We'll be prejudiced if we're forced to conduct our
2 only remaining deposition of Mr. Stern at the same time as Ms.
3 Wynn before those privilege issues have been resolved. And
4 given his presence here in Las Vegas and the lack of need for
5 him to travel, we respectfully request that while Ms. Wynn
6 proceed on June 30th, now vacated, we be permitted to wait for
7 our final deposition of Stern until after the privilege issues
8 are resolved.

9 So I guess the question that you ask me is are we
10 willing to enter into a stay with respect to those two
11 depositions, those two depositions only.

12 THE COURT: Miller and Stern?

13 MR. PEEK: Miller and Stern. I don't want to call
14 it a stay. We're not going to schedule them, Your Honor,
15 until such time as the Supreme Court acts, even though we
16 don't have a decision.

17 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

18 MR. PISANELLI: So as it relates to Mr. Stern I
19 wrote down the quote, "They don't want us to have any
20 testimony from Mr. Stern." That's a little bit of a shocking
21 statement considering he's the most deposed person in this
22 case because there's no translation issues here. Mr. Stern
23 has been -- has already sat for four days. He's scheduled to
24 sit for his fifth for Ms. Wynn on the 30th, and now the Okada
25 parties say they need more,

1 This is why they need more, Your Honor. They have
2 asked -- and we've heard comments about documents not produced
3 yet. They issued subpoenas to Mr. -- for Mr. Stern's records
4 other than phone records, for documents that came into
5 existence after their depositions already occurred. The point
6 is this. They want these serial depositions of him not
7 because he has anything to do with the company, but because he
8 is doing investigation and having communications with federal
9 prosecutors and they are building a defense case there. So
10 they want to continue to know, what have you found now, what
11 have you found now, anything new since the last time we've
12 seen you that you've given to the government. Enough is
13 enough as it relates to Mr. Stern. Any suggestion that they
14 don't have any testimony from him is belied by the record
15 here. They made decisions early on unrelated to what you told
16 us earlier is the practice and rule in this court about
17 documents that were subject to debate and argument over
18 privilege. They're now making these serial depositions so
19 that they can continue to find out what he's up to, and they
20 just can't do that anymore.

21 The alternative argument that -- or position that
22 Mr. Peek takes is that apparently he wants an order today as
23 it relates to the privileged information, but will wait and
24 conduct the deposition after the Supreme Court rules. That
25 seems to be a flipped analysis. There shouldn't be an order

1 if the deposition isn't going forward until after the Supreme
2 Court rules anyway as it relates to privilege.

3 So as it relates to Governor Miller Mr. Peek also
4 says that he hasn't received any documents. And Mr. Miller's
5 motion and the debate about Mr. Miller has nothing to do with
6 any documents. In the meet and confer BuckelySanders was very
7 clear that has nothing to do with documents, and it's not in
8 their papers that it has anything to do with documents. It
9 has to do with privilege, the assertion of privilege that will
10 be resolved by the Supreme Court. Again, asking this Court to
11 rule that he's obligated to give answers even though he's not
12 going to be deposed and after we get that ruling. The simple
13 way to handle this, I would suggest, is let's wait till we get
14 the ruling, figure it out then, come back in on an order
15 shortening time when the dust has settled and have a
16 discussion with you of what, if any additional time for these
17 directors and for this employee Mr. Stern should occur. Our
18 suggestion and request to the Court is that you rule that
19 they've had their chance and then another chance and then
20 another chance and then another chance, that's been enough.

21 THE COURT: Thank you.

22 The motions as to Governor Miller and Mr. Stern are
23 both granted. However, given Mr. Peek's comments that they
24 are going to await the decision from the Nevada Supreme Court,
25 I am declining to set the amount of time set aside for the

1 deposition, because the number of hours will depend on whether
2 the Supreme Court grants the petition or doesn't grant the
3 petition.

4 MR. PEEK: Thank you, Your Honor. We'll prepare the
5 order.

6 THE COURT: So we now have a motion for protective
7 order.

8 MR. PEEK: Your Honor, can we do the motion to stay
9 now? Because it's --

10 THE COURT: But you agreed to the motion to stay.
11 You said, given them 60 days, Judge, and then make them come
12 back.

13 MR. PEEK: Okay. Well, I didn't know that's what
14 the Court's ruling was.

15 THE COURT: I haven't -- you're running out of time,
16 so I wrote that one down because I could do that with nothing.

17 MR. PISANELLI: So the motion for protective order,
18 Your Honor, has to do with one of the company's outside
19 counsels, Joel Friedman.

20 THE COURT: And Hagenbuch and Virtue.

21 MR. PISANELLI: Okay. That's a different issue.

22 THE COURT: I've got three motions.

23 MR. PISANELLI: Which one do you want to hear first?

24 THE COURT: I don't.

25 MR. PISANELLI: Because I'm not arguing the other

1 two.

2 THE COURT: Well, then do the one you're arguing,
3 because you may use up all the time.

4 MR. PISANELLI: How much time do I have?

5 THE LAW CLERK: Three minutes.

6 MR. PISANELLI: All right. So I'll use one minute
7 of those three. As it relates to Mr. Friedman, the
8 deposition, Your Honor, was conducted in bad faith. They --
9 Ms. Wynn attempted to take the company's counsel, outside
10 counsel, and examine him on information he learned about the
11 company. That just falls squarely in violation of Club Vista.
12 There are other ways to obtain information, discoverable
13 information other than swearing in the company's lawyer and
14 say, what did you learn about this policy, what did you learn
15 about that policy, what are your thoughts on taking those
16 policies into a new scenario. In other words, under the guise
17 of a hypothetical they crammed in their arguments, Ms. Wynn's
18 arguments to the company's lawyer for what he learned from
19 representing the company to try and get a quasi-expert opinion
20 from him to turn the outside counsel into this unretained
21 expert. It was conducted in bad faith. I made sure that they
22 had the opportunity to answer all questions that were fair
23 game. They did that. The only thing left was this bad-faith
24 examination, and we'd like Your Honor to order that this
25 deposition be concluded.

1 THE COURT: You're out of time, but you can have a
2 minute.

3 MR. ZELLER: Thank you, Your Honor. Very briefly.

4 As the Court is aware, of course, this is part of
5 the Freeh Group. To call them outside counsel for the company
6 is not really an accurate characterization. They were brought
7 in to do an independent investigation. One reason why we
8 believe that Mr. Friedman should be answering these questions
9 is that Mr. Freeh was deposed this last Friday, and he
10 basically said he didn't know about the nuts and bolts of what
11 was uncovered in terms of, you know, weaknesses and internal
12 controls and the like. That's the purpose of our questioning,
13 is to ask him. And that is something we have specifically
14 pled in our complaint. So it is part of our claims, it is
15 absolutely related to it, and this investigation uncovered
16 from our perspective evidence of this is in internal controls,
17 and that's all that Mr. Friedman has been asked about. And he
18 was not acting as an outside lawyer for the company. He may
19 be a lawyer, but he was hired to do the investigation. He has
20 factual information. And to go back to one privilege point is
21 that just because an attorney uncovers information, does not
22 make that information privileged. Thank you.

23 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

24 The motion for protective order is granted in part.
25 To the extent that any inquiry is made for information or work

1 done by Mr. Friedman following the decision for redemption the
2 request for protective order is granted.

3 For that information including the work he actually
4 did related to the investigation provided to the board for
5 their determination on redemption the motion is denied. He is
6 not permitted to be able to be asked hypothetical questions
7 about internal procedures.

8 MR. PISANELLI: Thank you, Your Honor. But may we
9 have a stay on the pre-redemption --

10 THE COURT: Yes.

11 MR. PISANELLI: -- portion? Thank you. We'll file
12 a writ on that as quickly as possible.

13 THE COURT: Maybe.

14 MR. PISANELLI: Maybe?

15 THE COURT: And package it with all the others?

16 MR. PISANELLI: Yeah. That makes sense.

17 THE COURT: Because it's the same issue.

18 MR. PISANELLI: I agree with you. I'll work with
19 Mr. Bice on that. Thank you.

20 THE COURT: All right. So that takes me to the
21 Virtue-Hagenbuch motion.

22 MR. BICE: Good morning, Your Honor.

23 THE COURT: I feel like I'm revisiting issues I've
24 heard about before.

25 MR. BICE: Well, my involvement in this case is

1 modest and relatively new. So, Your Honor, all I would say --
2 understand the time is very limited -- with respect to these
3 two individuals, Your Honor, they are board members of Wynn
4 Resorts, they have been identified not by Okada, who has the
5 claims against the company, but by Ms. Wynn. And Ms. Wynn had
6 also deposed him. We have offered to produce them in Las
7 Vegas when they are here as board members for a board meeting
8 at the beginning of August. Ms. Wynn has vacillated as to the
9 amount of time which she needed. Originally when these were
10 scheduled it was a half-day deposition for each of them. It's
11 now transformed into, well, two days, although they haven't
12 sought any leave of the Court for the two days.

13 What we have proposed, Your Honor, and I think is
14 imminently reasonable is that they will be here for the board
15 meeting, they can be deposed for a day. We have set aside a
16 day for each of them when they are here at the beginning of
17 August. There's plenty of other depositions and discovery
18 going on in this case that these depositions don't need to be
19 accelerated simply because these witnesses are in New York
20 when they're going to be here. Otherwise everybody would
21 otherwise have to travel to New York for those depositions.
22 And we believe all that can be avoided by simply entering a
23 protective order until they are here on the 3rd and 4th of
24 August, Your Honor.

25 THE COURT: A minute or less.

1 MR. URGAS: Thank you, Your Honor.

2 THE COURT: You guys used all your time.

3 MR. URGAS: I will try to be brief. The most
4 critical one we want is Mr. Virtue, and he was already noticed
5 at least twice. And all we're asking for at this point is to
6 give us our day, we'll go wherever he wants to go. But we
7 don't want to wait till August 3rd and 4th. Once again the
8 company is dictating what is going on. We will go to wherever
9 Mr. Virtue lives, or if he wants to come here, that's fine.
10 But we want this done this month or at least the first couple
11 weeks in July. We can't keep postponing everything. And
12 that's what is happening here. We want this done sooner.

13 We thought we had him in February when he decides a
14 skiing trip is more important so he doesn't show up. We then
15 set it again in April. We then have been trying to get this
16 -- and you've seen all of the email back and forth. We have
17 agreed one day right now. If it turns out we have to come
18 back as this Court has allowed us to do, we will. But right
19 now will take one day, we will go wherever he lives or
20 wherever wants to show up at, but we want it sooner than
21 August 3rd and 4th.

22 Same thing with Mr. Hagenbuch. They both are in New
23 York. We could do them in one time.

24 THE COURT: Thank you.

25 The motion is granted. Mr. Hagenbuch and Mr. Virtue

1 will be taken in their capacity as board members adjacent to
2 the board member [sic] in August on or about August 3rd and
3 4th at times not to exceed seven hours per individual.

4 Next? So you have a motion to extend your stay.
5 I'm going to grant you 60 additional days. If we haven't
6 heard from the Nevada Supreme Court, come back.

7 MR. PISANELLI: Thank you, Your Honor.

8 THE COURT: Alvin Shoemaker --

9 MR. PEEK: Your Honor, with respect to that there is
10 no -- there was a request, as well, by the party seeking the
11 stay for a 30-day window within which to produce documents.

12 THE COURT: I didn't grant that part. I gave them
13 60 days. If we hear from the Supreme Court, then we'll talk
14 about the length of time needed to comply.

15 So the motion to de-designate the testimony of Alvin
16 Shoemaker is premature, so I am not acting on it. I'm not
17 going to de-designate it at this time. It does not mean that
18 eventually I may not act upon it, but it is not appropriate
19 today.

20 And I think that hit every one of the issues.

21 MR. PEEK: No, Your Honor. We have one motion, I
22 thought.

23 THE COURT: All of you are out of time.

24 MR. PEEK: Colby and I have a motion --

25 MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, I'm just going to stand

1 up to tell you that I have nothing to add.

2 THE COURT: Your motion for reconsideration? Okay.
3 Anything else on your motion for reconsideration?

4 MR. PEEK: I opposed it, Your Honor.

5 THE COURT: Anything else on your motion for
6 reconsideration?

7 Motion for reconsideration is denied. But thank you
8 for briefing it.

9 Anything else?

10 MR. URGAS: Yes, Your Honor. We had filed a motion
11 to amend the complaint or our cross-claim. It is set in
12 chambers calendar on Friday, July 1st, I believe it is. We've
13 asked that it be moved to a hearing date. We would prefer to
14 have it sooner, rather than later because of everybody's
15 schedule.

16 THE COURT: Can I put it on June 28th?

17 MR. URGAS: That's fine with us, Your Honor.

18 MR. WILLIAMS: No, we're not here.

19 MR. CAMPBELL: We're out of town.

20 THE COURT: July 5?

21 MR. URGAS: 28th?

22 THE COURT: July 5? I heard June 28 was bad, so I
23 went to July 5.

24 MR. CAMPBELL: Your Honor, if I might.

25 THE COURT: Sure, Mr. Campbell.

1 MR. CAMPBELL: Your Honor, Mr. Williams and I are
2 leaving town. We're going to be gone I think from the 27th
3 and then through like I think it's the 11th of July. I
4 normally don't even leave town that much. My son, who Mr.
5 Williams is a surrogate uncle to -- Colby and I have been
6 together 26 years -- has to deploy again, and he's flying out
7 from a special operation command before he goes out. And
8 we're going to try to spend as much time with him as possible.
9 We're going to Sun Valley.

10 THE COURT: Do you want the 12th?

11 MR. CAMPBELL: Yeah. I think we'll be back the
12 12th.

13 THE COURT: July 12th, Mr. Urga?

14 MR. URGa: Well, I would prefer before he leaves.
15 If we could go the 25th or 26th or whatever it is.

16 THE COURT: When do you leave, Mr. Campbell?

17 MR. CAMPBELL: I think it's the 27th Mr. Williams
18 and I are departing.

19 THE COURT: I can do it on the 23rd.

20 MR. URGa: The 23rd is fine.

21 MR. WILLIAMS: I don't care.

22 THE COURT: 23rd?

23 MR. PISANELLI: June?

24 THE COURT: Who sent me documents in Japanese
25 yesterday?

1 MR. URGAL: Not me, Your Honor.

2 MR. PEEK: You're looking at the right one, Your
3 Honor.

4 THE COURT: Hi, Mr. Kunimoto. How are you?

5 MR. KUNIMOTO: Your Honor, as you may know, my
6 Japanese is --

7 THE COURT: I asked Laura when she handed the
8 binder. I said, are they in English, or Japanese. She opened
9 a page, she said, gosh, they're in Japanese. And I go, darn.

10 MR. PEEK: I thought the two of them could read it,
11 though.

12 THE COURT: She reads Korean, he reads Japanese.

13 MR. PEEK: Your Honor, there was one other issue,
14 and that had to do with the Kim Sinatra motion. You may
15 recall we spoke about it yesterday. Mr. Urgal was going to get
16 back to us. He has not. So I'm waiting to hear from him as
17 to whether we can move that --

18 THE COURT: He's standing next to you.

19 MR. PEEK: I know.

20 MR. URGAL: We will give -- we will get in touch with
21 him. We've had kind of a busy day, Your Honor.

22 MR. PEEK: Your Honor, I just want to have it heard
23 when I get back on the 21st, as opposed to on the 14th.

24 MR. ZELLER: That's fine, Your Honor.

25 THE COURT: Sounds great.

1 MR. PEEK: That way we'll have a joint motion -- or
2 we'll have a companion motion. Thank you, Your Honor.

3 THE COURT: If my 8:00 o'clock could leave so I
4 could start my 8:30 calendar 27 minutes late.

5 MR. ZELLER: Thank you, Your Honor.

6 MR. URGAS: I only used one minute of it, Your Honor.

7 THE COURT: Goodbye.

8 THE PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 8:56 A.M.

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
CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

AFFIRMATION

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.


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FLORENCE M. HOYT, TRANSCRIBER

6/8/16

DATE



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DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

WYNN RESORTS, LIMITED, a Nevada
Corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.

KAZUO OKADA, an individual, ARUZE
USA, INC., a Nevada corporation, and
UNIVERSAL ENTERTAINMENT CORP., a
Japanese corporation,

Defendants.

AND RELATED CLAIMS

Case No.: A-12-656710-B

Dept. No.: XI

**WYNN RESORTS' MOTION TO
DISQUALIFY QUINN EMANUEL
AND FOR ORDERS REQUIRING
TURNOVER OF PRIVILEGED
MATTER, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF,
PROTECTION AND OTHER
APPROPRIATE RELIEF ON AN
ORDER SHORTENING TIME**

Hearing Date:

Hearing Time:

It is now apparent that Elaine Wynn has provided Quinn Emanuel with attorney-client privileged and otherwise confidential materials belonging to Wynn Resorts – information known to her and only in her possession by virtue of her former position as a member of Wynn Resorts Board of Directors. She does not own that information and did not have the right to share it with

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1 third parties, even her attorneys. Quinn Emanuel wrongfully received this information and used it
2 against Wynn Resorts in this lawsuit.

3 Indeed, it is now clear that at the very time Ms. Wynn and Quinn Emanuel were complaining
4 about John Keker's *potential misuse* of a small amount of allegedly privileged information,
5 Quinn Emanuel was gathering from Ms. Wynn and planning for the *actual misuse* of a substantial
6 amount of Wynn Resorts' privileged information.

7 This conduct is improper, unethical and necessitates immediate intervention by this Court.
8 *Wynn Resorts requests that this matter be heard on an OST and that the Court hold an immediate*
9 *evidentiary hearing because there are many hearings and other events upcoming in this case,*
10 *including several depositions, in which Quinn Emanuel – tainted by the improper disclosure of*
11 *privileged material – should not be permitted to participate.*

12 Wynn Resorts hereby moves the Court for an order disqualifying Quinn Emanuel and for
13 orders requiring turnover of privileged matter, injunctive relief, protection and other appropriate
14 relief.

15 This Motion is made and based on the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities,
16 the pleadings and papers on file herein, and any argument this Honorable Court allows at any
17 hearing of this matter.

18 DATED this 3rd day of June, 2016.

19 PISANELLI BICE PLLC

20 By: 

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28 and

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
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ORDER SHORTENING TIME


Before this Court is the Request for an Order Shortening Time accompanied by the Declaration of counsel. Good cause appearing, the undersigned counsel will appear at Clark County Regional Justice Center, Eighth Judicial District Court, Las Vegas, Nevada, on the 7 day of June, 2016, at 8:30 a.m., in Department XI, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, to bring this **WYNN RESORTS' MOTION TO DISQUALIFY QUINN EMANUEL AND FOR ORDERS REQUIRING TURNOVER OF PRIVILEGED MATTER, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, PROTECTION AND OTHER APPROPRIATE RELIEF ON AN ORDER SHORTENING TIME** on for hearing.

DATED: June 3, 2016


DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Respectfully submitted by:

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and Allan Zeman

DECLARATION OF DEBRA L. SPINELLI, ESQ

I, DEBRA L. SPINELLI, Esq., hereby declare as follows:

1. I am one of the attorneys representing Plaintiff Wynn Resorts, Limited ("Wynn Resorts") in above-entitled action. I make this Declaration in support of Wynn Resorts' Motion to Disqualify Quinn Emanuel and for Orders Requiring Turnover of Privileged Matter, Injunctive Relief, Protection and Other Appropriate Relief on an Order Shortening Time ("Disqualification Motion"). I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein and I am competent to testify to those facts.

2. This Motion raises serious issues regarding violations of the attorney-client privilege, Quinn Emanuel's use of Wynn Resorts' privileged information and, among other things, whether Quinn Emanuel can continue to represent Ms. Wynn in this case.

3. *Wynn Resorts requests that this matter be heard on an OST and that the Court hold an immediate evidentiary hearing because there are many hearings and other events upcoming in this case, including several depositions, in which Quinn Emanuel – tainted by the improper disclosure of privileged material – should not be permitted to participate.*

4. The attorney-client privileged May 23, 2016, email chain that is one of the subjects of this Motion was not disclosed by Quinn Emanuel or produced until the late afternoon hours of May 23, 2016 – the day before the deposition of Kimmarie Sinatra, Wynn Resorts' general counsel, was set to commence.

5. I certify that the foregoing Motion is not brought for any improper purpose.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 3rd day of June, 2016.

/s/ Debra L. Spinelli
DEBRA L. SPINELLI, ESQ.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Elaine Wynn's ("Ms. Wynn") constant refrain in this lawsuit has been that she served for many years as a devoted, highly principled member of Wynn Resorts' board of directors. As Ms. Wynn would have it, she was an exemplary fiduciary who unfailingly placed the company's interests ahead of her own. But events of the past several weeks belie that virtuous image and call into question Ms. Wynn's ethics and those of her attorneys. It is now clear that Ms. Wynn repeatedly disregarded a central tenet of corporate governance by disclosing to her personal counsel, Quinn Emanuel, the attorney-client privileged information and other confidential information that she acquired solely by virtue of her position on Wynn Resorts' board. As will be shown, Ms. Wynn has no right to reveal to third parties the privileged material she obtained in her capacity as Wynn Resorts' fiduciary. Now that she is adverse to Wynn Resorts, and her attorneys have chosen to employ a "scorched earth" strategy against Mr. Wynn and the Company, their efforts to use that very material to harm the Company is highly improper and must be enjoined.

Quinn Emanuel committed an even more egregious wrong by accepting attorney-client privileged material and other confidential information from Ms. Wynn. Worse still, Quinn Emanuel unabashedly used that material to achieve Ms. Wynn's ends in litigation. Quinn Emanuel was sufficiently indifferent to the attorney-client privilege that it included privileged communications in pleadings that are now part of the public record. On top of that, it used confidential information to obtain an unfair advantage in depositions. Quinn Emanuel plied this tactic with special diligence during the deposition of Wynn Resorts' General Counsel, Kimmarie Sinatra. At that proceeding, it posed question after question based on Wynn Resorts' privileged communications with Ms. Sinatra – all of which took place during, and as a result of, Ms. Wynn's tenure on the board.

The Rules of Professional Conduct forbid counsel from communicating with a former corporate officer or director in a manner that violates the corporation's legal rights. Quinn Emanuel not only violated those rules, but flouted them. Under Nevada law, Quinn Emanuel's conduct warrants disqualification. Although the misuse of Wynn Resorts' attorney-client communications and other confidential information has caused irremediable harm, this Court can insure that the

1 damage spreads no further by disqualifying the firm and ordering that Elaine Wynn and her
2 attorneys promptly return all privileged materials to Wynn Resorts. Until Elaine Wynn obtains
3 new, untainted counsel, and relinquishes all privileged materials, she should be prohibited from
4 participating in further depositions.

5 This Court is familiar with the factual background in this case. It need not be recited, once
6 again, in this Motion. Set forth below is limited information (as much as can be revealed here
7 without further jeopardizing the privilege) regarding examples of questions asked by Ms. Wynn's
8 counsel during Ms. Sinatra's deposition that can leave no doubt that Ms. Wynn shared
9 Wynn Resorts' privileged information with Quinn Emanuel. Immediate intervention by this Court
10 is required.

11 Wynn Resorts requests that the Court set an immediate evidentiary hearing. At that hearing,
12 Wynn Resorts can more fully address the invasion and abuse of its attorney-client privileged
13 information, as highlighted below. At that hearing, the Court will also hear more about Ms. Wynn
14 sharing with Quinn Emanuel confidential business information that she obtained subject to her own
15 confidentiality obligations, apparently providing Quinn Emanuel unfettered access to restricted
16 information, circumventing the discovery process and this Court's oversight which would have
17 allowed Wynn Resorts to object (and this Court to rule on) the relevance of some matter and, where
18 relevant, to appropriately designate materials as either confidential or highly confidential. Finally,
19 Wynn Resorts believes that the Court will also hear evidence that Ms. Wynn has solicited
20 confidential information from other Wynn Resorts' employees whom she knew were subject to the
21 same confidentiality obligations that applied to her.

22 These issues are serious. They impact Quinn Emanuel's ability to continue representing
23 Ms. Wynn. And, ultimately, they may impact whether Ms. Wynn can proceed with her affirmative
24 claims.

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1 II. ARGUMENT

2 A. Wynn Resorts – Not Its Former Director – Controls Its Privileged
3 Communications With Corporate Counsel.

4 Corporate directors are routinely privy to confidential or privileged communications
5 between corporate counsel and the company. This is entirely appropriate and necessary because
6 directors are among the human agents through whom the company speaks. However, it is the
7 corporation – not its director – that is the sole "client" in these communications, and it is the
8 corporation that is the exclusive holder of the attorney-client privilege. *Las Vegas Sands v.*
9 *Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.*, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 69, 331 P.3d 905, 914 (2014) ("[A] corporation's current
10 management controls the privilege 'to refuse to disclose, and to prevent any other person from
11 disclosing, confidential communications.'").

12 Ms. Wynn's status as a former director does not change the analysis. The Nevada Supreme
13 Court has been clear that there is nobody "outside the corporation's *current* officers and directors
14 who [is] entitled to access the client's confidential or privileged information over the client's
15 objection for use in litigation" – not even former managers and directors who were previously
16 within the privilege. *Id.* When a director leaves the board, s/he retains no control over the
17 attorney-client privilege and has no authority to waive it – even as to communications that s/he
18 initiated. As the United States Supreme Court explained: "[D]isplaced managers may not assert the
19 privilege over the wishes of current managers, even as to statements that they might have made to
20 counsel concerning matters within the scope of their corporate duties. . . . [A former director] who
21 is now neither an officer not director . . . retains no control over the corporation's privilege."
22 *Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub*, 471 U.S. 343, 349, 105 S.Ct. 1986, 1991
23 (1985).

24 Ms. Wynn served on Wynn Resorts' board of directors for nearly fifteen years. In her
25 capacity as a board member, she had innumerable communications with Wynn Resorts general
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1 counsel, Ms. Sinatra.¹ At all times, the attorney-client privilege that attached to those
2 communications belonged to – and belongs to – Wynn Resorts.

3 In 2012, while still a member of Wynn Resorts' board, Ms. Wynn filed suit against
4 Mr. Wynn, in part, to avoid her obligations under the 2010 Stockholders Agreement,
5 notwithstanding the negative impact that could have on Wynn Resorts. She did this to benefit
6 herself personally, and not in her capacity as a member of the board. In 2015, Ms. Wynn's tenure
7 on the board ended when her appointment expired and she failed to win re-nomination to the board
8 or reelection after she launched her own proxy fight. Thereafter, she not only continued to prosecute
9 her lawsuit against Mr. Wynn, but also sought to expand the scope of the litigation through amended
10 pleadings that asserted additional claims against Mr. Wynn as well as new claims against
11 Wynn Resorts and the Company's general counsel.

12 Under Nevada law, Ms. Wynn is prohibited from using the privileged or confidential
13 communications to which she was party during her directorship for any purposes, particularly to
14 advance her personal interests in the litigation. In *Las Vegas Sands* the Nevada Supreme Court
15 held that, while a displaced corporate officer may have had access to privileged information while
16 employed as CEO, he was "duty-bound to keep such information confidential" and forbidden to use
17 it in his lawsuit against the corporation. *Las Vegas Sands*, 331 P.3d at 912 (citing *Weintraub*,
18 471 U.S. at 349, 105 S.Ct. at 1991).

19 The *Las Vegas Sands* Court provided a cogent explanation of the policy underlying this
20 rule:

21 Allowing a former fiduciary of a corporation to ... use privileged
22 information after he or she becomes adverse to the corporation solely
23 based on his or her former fiduciary role is entirely inconsistent with
24 the purpose of the attorney-client privilege. We believe such a
situation would have a chilling effect on candid communications
between attorney and client.

25 *Las Vegas Sands*, 331 P3d at 913.

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28 ¹ Indeed, Ms. Wynn refers to those communications repeatedly and with specificity in her Fifth Amended Complaint. See, e.g., pages 35:22-28; 36:13-15; 37:13-24; 41:20-26; 42:10-11; 45:1-14; 46:5-8; 48:1-3.

1 Ms. Wynn should be prohibited from using or disseminating Wynn Resorts' privileged
2 materials to any third party, including her attorneys.

3 B. Elaine Wynn Improperly Provided Attorney-Client Privileged and
4 Confidential Material to Quinn Emanuel.

5 It is glaringly apparent that Ms. Wynn has communicated privileged and confidential
6 information to Quinn Emanuel. She did this not only in violation of her duty to maintain such
7 material in confidence but also in violation of *her express confidentiality obligations to the*
8 *Company*. In November 2013, the Company, through its Board of Directors (on which Ms. Wynn
9 served) amended its Code of Business Conduct and Ethics (the "2013 Code"). The 2013 Code was
10 publicly available on Wynn Resorts' website. Declaration of Kevin Tourek ("Tourek Decl."), ¶2
11 (Exhibit 1, hereto); 2013 Code, § 5.4 (Exhibit 2, hereto). Section 5.4 of the 2013 Code specifically
12 addresses Ms. Wynn's confidentiality obligations:

13 Directors and employees are expected to maintain the confidentiality
14 of information entrusted to them, from whatever source, during the
15 course of performing their responsibilities for the Company, unless
16 disclosure is expressly authorized or legally required. This includes
17 information about the Company and information about third parties
18 such as current or prospective vendors, suppliers, tenants, business
19 partners, customers or employees. You should use Company and third
20 party confidential information only for legitimate business purposes,
21 and limit the dissemination of the information (both inside and outside
22 the Company) to those who have a need to know the information for
legitimate business purposes. If you are uncertain about whether
information is confidential, you should treat it as such until you obtain
further guidance. *The obligation to protect confidential information
continues even after your relationship with the Company ends.* If
you have any questions regarding the use or protection of confidential
information, please call the Legal Department. In addition to the
provisions of this section of the Code, directors should also refer to
the Company's Policy Regarding Nondisclosure and Nonuse of
Confidential Information. (emphasis added).

23 Notably, the 2013 Code also makes reference to the Company's Policy Regarding
24 Nondisclosure and Nonuse of Confidential information. That document and information about how
25 Ms. Wynn voted with regard to that policy will be made available for the Court's *in camera* review
26 if the Court requests. Of course, no written agreement or policy was required. As the
27 Nevada Supreme Court made clear in its ultimate conclusion in *Las Vegas Sands*, there is nobody
28 "outside the corporation's current officers and directors who [is] entitled to access the client's

1 *confidential or privileged* information over the client's objection for use in litigation. *Id.* at 914;
2 *In re Mortgage & Realty Trust*, 195 B.R. 740, 751 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996) ("The duty to protect
3 and preserve confidential information received during service as a director continues after the
4 director leaves the board.").

5 Courts have held that agreements of this kind operate to prevent a corporate employee's
6 disclosure of any corporate information – even to his/her personal attorney in litigation. In
7 *In re Marketing Investors Corp.*, 80 S.W.3d 44, 48 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998)², the court held, "[t]he
8 employment agreement recites that all information is a Corporation asset, that an employee will not
9 disclose any information without prior written consent of the Board of Directors, and the agreement
10 continues after an employee leaves the Corporation. The agreement provides no exception for an
11 ex-employee to disclose Corporation information to his personal attorneys who are in an adversarial
12 position with the Corporation." *Id.* at 48. On that basis, the *Marketing Investors* Court overturned
13 the trial court's denial of a motion to disqualify counsel for failing to return privileged documents.

14 Wynn Resorts' confidentiality policy is significant here. In addition to her fiduciary
15 obligation to refrain from disclosing the corporation's attorney-client communications, she was well
16 aware of the corporation's express policies on disclosures of confidential information. Indeed, the
17 board upon which she served adopted them. Under the circumstances, it is reasonable to infer that
18 Ms. Wynn disclosed the company's privileged material to her attorneys knowingly and in disregard
19 of Wynn Resorts' legal rights.

20 *1. The July 31, 2012 email between Ms. Wynn and Kim Sinatra.*

21 Evidence of Ms. Wynn's improper disclosures to Quinn Emanuel is plentiful.

22 One blatant example consists of an email dated July 31, 2012. Wynn Resorts will not
23 compound the harm caused by Ms. Wynn and Quinn Emanuel's disregard of privilege by further
24 publicizing the content of the email in this brief. It will be made available for this Court's *in camera*
25 review at the hearing of this motion or at such earlier time as this Court might request. It should be
26 noted that *this email was not disclosed by Quinn Emanuel or produced until the late afternoon*

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28 ² *In re Marketing Investors Corp.* was cited with approval by the Nevada Supreme Court in
Merits Incentives, LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist., 127 Nev. Adv. Op. 63, 262 P.3d 720, 724 (2011).

1 *hours of May 23, 2016 – the day before the deposition of Ms. Sinatra, the Company's general*
2 *counsel, was set to commence.* Spinelli Decl., ¶4. As a general matter, and limiting the information
3 to what would normally be on a privilege log, the email exchange is between Ms. Wynn and
4 Ms. Sinatra. Ms. Wynn was communicating with Ms. Sinatra "as corporate counsel." It pertains
5 to another individual's potential nomination to the board of directors. In the email, Ms. Sinatra
6 renders legal advice regarding an issue relevant to the subject. The mere fact that Ms. Wynn
7 provided this privileged email to Quinn Emanuel suggests that she provided other privileged and/or
8 confidential correspondence to her lawyers.

9 2. *The deposition questions posed to Ms. Sinatra reveal that Ms. Wynn*
10 *disclosed attorney-client communications to Quinn Emanuel.*

11 Other examples of improper disclosure permeate Ms. Sinatra's deposition transcript.
12 Ms. Wynn's attorney, John Quinn, conducted the deposition of Ms. Sinatra on May 24, 2016. In
13 the course of the proceeding, Mr. Quinn posed a series of highly specific questions that he could
14 have formulated only after familiarizing himself with attorney-client communications between Ms.
15 Sinatra and Ms. Wynn in her director's capacity.

16 Mr. Quinn queried about:

17 [REDACTED]
18 [REDACTED] (Deposition of
19 Kimmarré Sinatra, Volume 1 ("Sinatra Depo"), p. 65:4-7) (this and
20 the other excerpts will be provided to the Court for *in camera* review);

21 [REDACTED] (Sinatra Depo., pp. 65:22-24; 67:3-6; 83:25-84:1-2;
22 90:9-11);

23 [REDACTED] (Sinatra Depo., pp. 83:20-22; 84:11-13; 87:23-6;
24 89:9-12);

25 If there were any doubt that the foregoing inquiries and others like them were based on
26 Quinn Emanuel's conversations with Ms. Wynn regarding her privileged communications with
27 Ms. Sinatra, that doubt was extinguished by the follow-up questions posed by Mr. Quinn, all of
28 which reflected very specific content that only could have been obtained from Ms. Wynn. In

1 particular, Mr. Quinn asked [REDACTED]
2 [REDACTED] (Sinatra Depo., pp. 93:13-16; 94:5-9).

3 Again, Wynn Resorts will not reveal the details of the problematic exchange in this brief,
4 but the Court, will see that the first nine questions show that Ms. Wynn told Quinn Emanuel about
5 her communication with Ms. Sinatra concerning a sensitive company matter. The last two drive
6 home the fact that Ms. Wynn's improper disclosures to her counsel were so detailed that Mr. Quinn
7 was able to incorporate Ms. Sinatra's alleged responses into them.

8 Wynn Resorts' counsel appropriately objected to these questions on attorney-client privilege
9 and other grounds. On several occasions, counsel instructed Ms. Sinatra not to answer. But
10 Mr. Quinn was undeterred. In the final minutes of the deposition, he asked: [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED]
12 [REDACTED]
13 [REDACTED] (Sinatra Depo., pp. 111:24-25-112:1-2; 112-6-7.)

14 At that point, Wynn Resorts' counsel terminated the examination, stating, [REDACTED]

15 [REDACTED]
16 [REDACTED]
17 [REDACTED]
18 [REDACTED] (Sinatra Depo., p. 113:10-16.)

19 Counsel further notified Mr. Quinn that [REDACTED]

20 [REDACTED]
21 [REDACTED] (Sinatra Depo., pp. 113:17-114:1-5.)

22 C. Quinn Emanuel Should Be Disqualified for Using Wynn Resorts' Confidential
23 Communications to Its Client's Advantage.

24 The Nevada Supreme Court has recognized that "[d]isqualification may be necessary to
25 prevent disclosure of confidential information that may be used to an adverse party's disadvantage."
26 *Nev. Yellow Cab Corp. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.*, 123 Nev. 44, 53, 152 P.3d 737, 743 (2007). Where
27 there is a risk that confidential information has been disclosed and may potentially be misused,
28 *doubts should generally be resolved in favor of disqualification. Brown v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.*,

1 116 Nev. 1200, 1205, 14 P.3d 1266, 1270 (2000); *Hull v. Celanese Corp.*, 513 F.2d 568, 570
2 (2d Cir.1975).

3 Courts have not hesitated to disqualify attorneys who knowingly accept and use their
4 opponent's privileged material. In *Maldonado v. New Jersey*, 225 F.R.D. 120, 125 (D.N.J. 2004),
5 the court upheld the propriety of disqualifying counsel who accepted from his client a confidential
6 letter from the opposing party in litigation to its own counsel. The court found that disqualification
7 was proper given that the attorney neither disclosed his possession of the letter nor returned it to
8 opposing counsel. In *In re Marketing Investors Corp.*, 80 S.W.3d at 46-47, counsel was properly
9 disqualified for accepting documents from his client that the latter took in violation of an
10 employment agreement. In *Castellano v. Winthrop*, 27 So. 3d 134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010),
11 disqualification was deemed proper when an attorney used material contained on opposing party's
12 flash drive. The *Castellano* Court emphasized that "disqualification is appropriate where a party
13 obtains an unfair informational or tactical advantage through the disclosure of privileged
14 information to that party's counsel." *Id* at 134.

15 In *Merits Incentives, LLC v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.*, the Nevada Supreme articulated six
16 non-exclusive factors that trial courts should consider in determining whether to disqualify
17 an attorney who has received an opponent's privileged materials. *Merits*
18 *Incentives*, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. 63, 262 P.3d at 724. As will be shown, at least five of those factors
19 support disqualification in this case.

20 The first factor is "[W]hether the attorney knew or should have known that the material was
21 privileged." Attorneys who know that their clients have provided them with their opponent's
22 privileged material are more culpable and deserving of disqualification than attorneys who receive
23 such material inadvertently.

24 In this case, Ms. Wynn's attorneys will be hard pressed to persuade the court that they
25 acquired Wynn Resorts' privileged communications unknowingly. Quinn Emanuel is a highly
26 reputed law firm with vast litigation experience. Its website boasts that it is "Better. Tougher.
27 Faster. Scarier" than other firms and that it "knows how to win." It did not naively question
28 Ms. Wynn about her communications with Wynn Resorts' general counsel. Nor was it oblivious to

1 the fact that Ms. Wynn was providing it with privileged material. It understood that its receipt of
2 privileged matter had serious, adverse ethical implications, but it accepted and used the material
3 anyway.

4 One need look no further than Ms. Wynn's Fifth Amended Crossclaim to perceive that a
5 critical basis for the relief sought is the legal advice that Ms. Sinatra gave to Ms. Wynn and other
6 members of Wynn Resorts' board. Ms. Wynn alleges that Ms. Sinatra, "the Company's General
7 Counsel," "intentionally fed misinformation" to Ms. Wynn and her fellow board members
8 (Fifth Am. Crossclaim, 35:25-28). She alleges that Ms. Sinatra dec[ided] to keep secret from the
9 Board and other Company counsel . . . the fact that the Chairman and CEO had engaged in alleged
10 misconduct on Company property against at least one Company employee serious enough to
11 warrant a multimillion dollar payment[.]" (Fifth Am. Crossclaim 37:17-24.) And, she explicitly
12 alleges that "Ms. Sinatra stated" that the matter "should not be disclosed to the Board or other
13 Company counsel." (*Id.* at 45:6-14.) Ms. Wynn alleges that she and Kim Sinatra discussed former
14 Chief Operating Officer Marc Schorr's fitness for service, and that Ms. Sinatra "rebuffed her
15 complaints." (*Id.* at 46:7-10; 47:48:1-3.) Simply put, Quinn Emanuel made Wynn Resorts'
16 privileged communications with its counsel the lynchpin of its case. This strategy is not merely
17 "knowing" but intentional.

18 The second factor in the disqualification analysis is "the promptness with which the attorney
19 notifies the opposing side that he or she has received its privileged information." Here,
20 Quinn Emanuel never notified Wynn Resorts that Ms. Wynn gave it detailed information about
21 attorney-client communications.

22 The third factor is "the extent to which the attorney reviews and digests the privileged
23 information." As noted above, Mr. Quinn not only digested the privileged material but based
24 Ms. Wynn's theories of liability upon it.

25 The fourth factor is "the significance of the privileged information; *i.e.*, the extent to which
26 its disclosure may prejudice the movant's claim or defense, and the extent to which return of the
27 documents will mitigate that prejudice." Until the court orders Quinn Emanuel to restore to
28 Wynn Resorts the privileged material it obtained from Ms. Wynn, the full significance of the

1 disclosure cannot be gauged with certainty. One thing is certain: In the realm of attorney-client
2 communications, improper disclosure is irremediable as the privilege bell cannot be un-rung.
3 When, as in this case, attorney client communications are set forth in publicly available pleadings,
4 the candid, open communications between corporate representatives and corporate counsel that the
5 privilege is designed to protect are profoundly chilled.

6 The fifth factor in the disqualification analysis is "the extent to which movant may be at
7 fault for the unauthorized disclosure." Here, the privileged communications are in Quinn Emanuel's
8 hands for one reason alone: Elaine Wynn provided them. Wynn Resorts bears no responsibility for
9 the disclosure.

10 The sixth and final factor is "the extent to which the non-movant will suffer prejudice from
11 the disqualification of his or her attorney." In this case, Quinn Emanuel came to the litigation
12 relatively recently. It substituted in for Ms. Wynn's prior counsel in January of this year. While
13 Quinn Emanuel has initiated a great deal of discovery and motion practice, it has not advanced the
14 case to the point where Ms. Wynn would be unduly prejudiced by its withdrawal. Moreover, this
15 is not a case in which society has an interest in Quinn Emanuel's continued participation. The
16 parties are not seeking to resolve a point of civil rights or First Amendment law. This case is a
17 business dispute between well-heeled parties, neither of whom is at risk of poor representation.
18 Ms. Wynn had able local counsel and retained other counsel before she hired Quinn Emanuel. She
19 certainly is in a position to hire a replacement.

20 **D. Quinn Emanuel's Conduct Violates The Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct.**

21 In determining whether disqualification is appropriate here, the court should note that Quinn
22 Emanuel has run afoul of two Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct. RPC 4.4 states in pertinent
23 part:

24 In representing a client, a lawyer shall not ... use methods of
25 obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of a [third] person.

26 RPC 8.4 (d) states that

27 It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... [e]ngage in conduct
28 that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.

1 In this case, Quinn Emanuel undertook to represent a former member of Wynn Resorts'
2 board of directors in a matter adverse to the company she once served. It had every reason to know
3 that, as a consequence of her directorship, Ms. Wynn possessed privileged and confidential
4 information that could easily be misused. In the exercise of ordinary prudence, it could have
5 reminded her that she was bound to maintain the confidentiality of Wynn Resorts' attorney-client
6 communications and that the firm, itself, was ethically prohibited from receiving such material. It
7 could have complied with Nevada law by notifying opposing counsel if it acquired privileged
8 information unintentionally. If it truly believed that some of the communications Ms. Wynn
9 described were not protected by the attorney-client privilege, it could have come to this Court and
10 awaited a decision before making use of the material. It followed no such course. Instead, it
11 obtained and used privileged material to its client's advantage and to its opponents' prejudice. In
12 fact, it studied the privileged communications and wove them into the very fabric of Ms. Wynn's
13 lawsuit. When the Rules of Professional Conduct are openly disregarded in this way, the sanction
14 of disqualification is more than justified.

15 E. **The Court Should Act to Prevent Any Further Violation of Ms. Wynn's**
16 **Fiduciary Duties.**

17 Of course, disqualification of Quinn Emanuel will serve no purpose if Ms. Wynn is able
18 simply to continue her breaches through new counsel. Further, until this Court can rule on
19 disqualification, Wynn Resorts will suffer further harm unless this Court acts to protect it. Thus,
20 in addition to disqualification of her current counsel, Wynn Resorts requests that the Court issue a
21 preliminary injunction against Ms. Wynn continuing to breach her fiduciary duties and
22 confidentiality obligations. Wynn Resorts further requests the Court to enter a protective order
23 against Ms. Wynn appearing at depositions in this matter until she is represented by new counsel
24 not in possession of privileged and confidential information and materials.

25 1. ***The Court should enter a preliminary injunction preventing Ms. Wynn***
26 ***from further breaching her fiduciary duties and contractual obligations of***
confidentiality.

27 This Court has broad discretion in determining whether to enter a preliminary injunction.
28 *Univ. & Community College Sys. of Nev. v. Nevadans for Sound Gov't*, 120 Nev. 712, 721, 100 P.3d

1 179, 187 (2004). A preliminary injunction is appropriate "to preserve the relative positions of the
2 parties until a trial on the merits can be held." *Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch*, 451 U.S. 390, 395
3 (1981). Under NRCP 65, to obtain a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order,
4 Wynn Resorts must show: (1) Ms. Wynn's conduct will cause irreparable harm if it continues,
5 (2) Wynn Resorts has no adequate remedy at law, and (3) Wynn Resorts has a reasonable likelihood
6 of prevailing on the merits. *Dept. of Conservation & Natural Resources, Div. of Water Resources*
7 *v. Foley*, 121 Nev. 77, 80, 109 P.3d 760, 762 (2005). Each of these standards is met here. A
8 preliminary injunction is appropriate relief to prevent further violation of Ms. Wynn's fiduciary
9 duties and contractual obligations of confidentiality.

10 Without injunctive relief, Wynn Resorts faces irreparable harm. Improper disclosure of
11 privileged and confidential information is just the sort of harm injunctive relief is appropriate to
12 prevent. *See, e.g., Continental Group, Inc. v. Kinsley*, 422 F. Supp. 838, 844 (D. Conn. 1976)
13 (injunctive relief against former employee appropriate to protect against disclosure of confidential
14 information, even if it did not qualify as a trade secret). In this case, the threat of disclosure is not
15 speculative; rather, Ms. Wynn has already revealed privileged and confidential information which
16 her counsel has used in this litigation, and her misuse of Wynn Resorts' privileged and confidential
17 information will predictably continue unless enjoined. *See Union Carbide Corp. v. UGI Corp.*, 731
18 F.2d 1186, 1191 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding irreparable harm where movant presented strong
19 circumstantial evidence that defendant had already revealed confidential information); *SI Handling*
20 *Sys., Inc. v. Heisley*, 753 F.2d 1244, 1261 (3d Cir. 1985) (same). *Compare Continental Group, Inc.*
21 *v. Amoco Chems Corp.*, 614 F.2d 351, 358-59 (3d Cir. 1980) (denying injunction against disclosure
22 of confidential information for lack of any "imminent threat of the allegedly harmful disclosure").
23 Moreover, her improper disclosures are designed to threaten Wynn Resorts' reputation and
24 goodwill, itself an irreparable harm. *See, e.g., Multi-Channel TV Cable Co. v. Charlottesville*
25 *Quality Cable Op. Co.*, 22 F.3d 546, 552 (4th Cir. 1994) (loss of goodwill constitutes irreparable
26 harm), abrogated on other grounds, *Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7
27 (2008); *Tantopia Franchising Co. v. West Coast Tans of PA, LLC*, 918 F. Supp. 2d 407, 417-18
28 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (finding irreparable injury in potential harm to reputation, trade and goodwill)

1 Wynn Resorts has no adequate remedy at law. There is no claim for damages that can
2 adequately unwind Ms. Wynn's disclosure of privileged and confidential information. As the Sixth
3 Circuit held in the specific context of disclosure in the course of litigation of information covered
4 by a confidentiality agreement, "[i]t was sufficient to show that [nonmovant's] use and disclosure
5 of the information in the context of pre-trial communications with others presented a significant
6 threat that [movant's] information would no longer be confidential." *Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co.*
7 *v. Hudson*, 97 F.3d 1452 (table), 1996 WL 520789, *9 (6th Cir. Sept. 12, 1996).

8 Further, as shown above, Ms. Wynn's counsel has received and made use of attorney-client
9 privileged communications and information protected by confidentiality obligations. Thus, it is
10 likely that she has committed and continues to commit breaches of her fiduciary duties and her
11 contractual obligations to Wynn Resorts, such that injunctive relief is appropriate.

12 Consistent with these standards, preliminary injunctive relief is appropriate to prevent a
13 director from breaching fiduciary duties. *See, e.g., Johnson v. Couturier*, 572 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir.
14 2009) (enjoining directors from paying defense costs with corporate funds, where plaintiffs had
15 shown likelihood of success on merits of claim for breach of directors' fiduciary duties). The
16 injunction may appropriately include a requirement of returning confidential corporate documents
17 received directly from Wynn Resorts. *See, e.g., In re Marketing Investors Corp.*, 80 S.W.3d at 48
18 (requiring return of confidential corporate documents). *Cf Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co.*, 88 Nev. 592,
19 597-98, 503 P.2d 4, 7 (1972) (finding district court's injunction requiring turnover of corporate
20 documents overbroad, because it could encompass documents obtained elsewhere that were only
21 indirectly related to the corporation). Maintaining the status quo by preventing any further breaches
22 of her fiduciary duties "will impose small burden" on Ms. Wynn. *Ottenheimer v. Real Estate Div.*
23 *of Nevada Dept. of Commerce*, 91 Nev. 338, 342, 535 P.2d 1284, 1285 (1975).

24 Accordingly, Wynn Resorts requests the Court to enjoin Ms. Wynn from further breaches
25 of her fiduciary duties and contractual obligations of confidentiality. Specifically, Wynn Resorts
26 asks that the Court: (i) enjoin Ms. Wynn against any further use of privileged or confidential
27 information or documents, (ii) order Ms. Wynn to return privileged materials in her possession, and
28

(iii) order Ms. Wynn to produce a log of all documents she provided to Quinn Emanuel, any other counsel, any other person and for her counsel to do the same.

2. *The Court should enter a protective order against Ms. Wynn's participation in depositions until she can be represented by new counsel.*

Finally, until such time that this Court can rule on the disqualification of Quinn Emanuel and all relevant disclosures are mitigated and returned, the Court should enter a protective order preventing Ms. Wynn from appearing at any further depositions in this matter.

Pursuant to NRCP 26(c), the Court "may make any order which justice requires to protect [Wynn Resorts] from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden," including placing conditions on discovery or designating who may be present. Here, it is apparent from their recent conduct in discovery that excluding Ms. Wynn and her counsel from depositions is necessary to prevent further disclosures of Wynn Resorts' privileged and confidential information and to prohibit Ms. Wynn from benefiting from such disclosures. Meanwhile, there would be no prejudice to Ms. Wynn from such a temporary order. Once Ms. Wynn has retained counsel untainted by improper disclosures, her new counsel will be able to review the transcripts of depositions taken by other parties and will have the opportunity to continue the depositions of those witnesses relevant to the claims involving Ms. Wynn. This is the appropriate outcome to allow this litigation to move forward expeditiously without further compromising Wynn Resorts' confidential information and attorney-client privilege.

III. CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, Wynn Resorts respectfully requests that this Court hold an immediate evidentiary hearing, issue the orders necessary to remediate the breaches of Wynn Resorts privileges, order the appropriate protective orders to prevent further harm while the

1 Court considers this motion, and, ultimately, disqualify Quinn Emanuel from representing Elaine
2 Wynn in this case.

3 DATED this 3rd day of June, 2016.

4 PISANELLI BICE PLLC

5
6 By: 

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18 Russell Goldsmith, Ray R. Irani, Robert J. Miller,
19 John A. Moran, Marc D. Schorr, Alvin V.
Shoemaker, Kimmarie Sinatra, D. Boone Wayson,
and Allan Zeman

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am an employee of PISANELLI BICE PLLC, and that on this 3rd day of June, 2016, I caused to be electronically served through the Court's filing system true and correct copies of the foregoing **MOTION TO DISQUALIFY QUINN EMANUEL AND FOR ORDERS REQUIRING TURNOVER OF PRIVILEGED MATTER, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, PROTECTION AND OTHER APPROPRIATE RELIEF ON AN ORDER SHORTENING TIME** to the following:

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An employee of PISANELLI BICE PLLC

EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 2

WYNN RESORTS, LIMITED
CODE OF BUSINESS CONDUCT AND ETHICS
(Amended as of November 5, 2013)

Dear Colleague:

All of us at Wynn Resorts are focused on our commitment to providing an elegant environment, high-quality amenities, a superior level of service and distinctive attractions for our customers. However, our ability to conduct our business and sustain the respect of the investment community and the people who regulate our industry rests first and foremost on our commitment to integrity.

What follows in this booklet is the Code of Business Conduct and Ethics of Wynn Resorts, Limited, as approved by our Board of Directors. The purposes of the Code are not only to comply with federal securities laws and the marketplace rules of The Nasdaq Global Select Market, but also to reinforce and enhance the Company's commitment to an ethical way of doing business.

We live in an age where legal and ethical missteps of others have resulted in the law imposing special duties on our personal and business lives. In the midst of this unfortunate environment, the good name and reputation of Wynn Resorts are a result of the dedication and hard work of all of us. Together, we are responsible for preserving and strengthening this reputation. Our goal is not just to comply with the laws, rules and regulations that apply to our business; we also continuously strive to abide by high standards of ethical business conduct.

This booklet is not to be ignored or taken lightly. All employees, officers and directors of Wynn Resorts and its subsidiaries must comply with the Code. Please read the Code carefully and make sure that you understand it, the consequences of non-compliance, and the Code's importance to the success of the Company. Your signature on the acknowledgement form at the conclusion of the Code certifies that you have read, understood and complied with its contents.

The Code cannot and is not intended to cover every applicable law, or provide answers to all questions that might arise; for that we must ultimately rely on each person's good sense of what is right, including a sense of when it is proper to seek guidance from others on the appropriate course of conduct. If you have questions, speak to your supervisor, the Compliance Officer or any of the other resources identified in the Code.

Warmest personal regards,

Steve Wynn
Chief Executive Officer

1. PUTTING THE CODE OF BUSINESS CONDUCT AND ETHICS TO WORK

1.1 *About the Code*

Our business depends on the reputation of all of us for integrity and principled business conduct. The purpose of this Code of Business Conduct and Ethics (the "Code") is to reinforce and enhance the Company's commitment to an ethical way of doing business. The Code applies to all employees, officers and directors of the Company and its subsidiaries. This Code also applies to certain independent contractors and consultants who work at the Company's facilities or on the Company's behalf, in which case those persons will be notified and provided a copy of this Code. The policies set forth here are the basis for Wynn Resorts to continue a tradition of high ethical business standards. The Company has additional policies that supplement the policies in this Code. These policies are set forth in the policy guide applicable to your particular operating subsidiary, which is available on the Company's Intranet on **the Wire**.

The Code is a statement of policies for the individual and business conduct of the Company's employees and directors and does not, in any way, constitute an employment contract or an assurance of continued employment. Any rights you have as an employee and the Company's rights as an employer are governed by the laws of the country of employment, the work rules of your employing unit and your individual written employment contract, if any.

1.2 *Meeting Our Shared Obligations*

Each of us is responsible for knowing and understanding the policies and guidelines contained in the following pages. If you have questions, ask them; if you have ethical concerns, raise them. The Compliance Officer is responsible for overseeing and monitoring compliance with this Code. The Compliance Officer and the other resources identified in this Code are available to answer your questions and provide guidance and for you to report suspected misconduct. Our conduct should reflect the Company's values, demonstrate ethical leadership, and promote a work environment that upholds the Company's reputation for integrity, ethical conduct and trust.

1.3 *Seeking Guidance*

This Code cannot provide definitive answers to all questions. Unless a particular provision of the Code directs otherwise, if you have questions regarding any of the policies discussed in this Code or if you are in doubt about the best course of action in a particular situation, you should seek guidance from your supervisor, the Compliance Officer or the Legal Department.

Compliance Officer and Wynn Las Vegas

Kevin J. Tourek
Compliance Officer
3131 Las Vegas Boulevard South
Las Vegas, Nevada 89109
702.770.2113
Kevin.Tourek@wynnlasvegas.com

Wynn Macau

Jay Schall
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Wynn Resorts

Kim Sinatra
Legal Department
3131 Las Vegas Boulevard South
Las Vegas, Nevada 89109
702.770.2112
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1.4 Reporting Violations

If you know of or suspect a violation of applicable laws, rules or regulations, the Code, or the Company's related policies, you must immediately report that information to your supervisor or the Compliance Officer. Violations of this Code may result in disciplinary action, up to and including discharge.

Compliance Officer

Kevin Tourek
Compliance Officer
3131 Las Vegas Boulevard South
Las Vegas, Nevada 89109
702.770.2113
Kevin.Tourek@wynnlasvegas.com

Alternatively, if an accounting, internal accounting controls, auditing matter or a securities law is involved, you have the option of reporting the matter to the Legal Department or to In Touch, a service that will transcribe the reports and send them directly to the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors. Executive officers and directors also may report known or suspected violations directly to the Audit Committee.

Legal Department

Kim Sinatra
General Counsel
3131 Las Vegas Boulevard South
Las Vegas, Nevada 89109
702.770.2112
Kim.Sinatra@wynnresorts.com

In Touch (Las Vegas)

1-866-204-9791 or
info@getintouch.com

In Touch (Macau)

+853.6262.5201
integrity@getintouch.com

You can make a report confidentially and anonymously through In Touch, although you are encouraged to provide your name to facilitate investigation and follow-up.

All reports of potential misconduct will be treated confidentially to the extent reasonably possible. No one will be subject to retaliation or adverse employment action because of a good faith report of suspected misconduct or for assisting in the investigation of suspected misconduct.

2. RESPONSIBILITY TO OUR ORGANIZATION

2.1 *Compliance With Laws, Rules And Regulations*

You are required to comply with the laws, rules and regulations that govern the conduct of our business. No one is expected to know the details of all applicable laws, but you should be knowledgeable about specific laws, rules and regulations that apply to your areas of responsibility. If you have questions about the applicability or meaning of a law, rule or regulation, or if you have any questions regarding whether particular conduct is proper, you should consult the Legal Department.

The Company operates in more than one country and interacts with many different cultures. What is appropriate in some parts of the world may be entirely inappropriate or even unlawful in others. You should always abide by the laws, rules and regulations of the country in which you are conducting business, the federal law of the United States of America and applicable laws of the State of

Nevada and the Macau Special Administrative Region. You should also abide by generally accepted business practices of the countries in which you are conducting business, unless they conflict with any of the foregoing laws, rules and regulations, in which case you are to abide by the law. If there is a conflict between local laws and this Code or any other law applicable to the conduct of the Company's business, you should consult with the Legal Department before taking any action.

2.2 *Promoting a Diverse and Productive Workforce*

The Company is an equal opportunity employer committed to complying with all state and federal fair employment practice laws, as well as maintaining a workforce that reflects the diversity of the community. The Company believes in and supports equal opportunity in employment to all persons regardless of race, color, national origin, citizenship status, sex, marital status, gender identity or expression, sexual orientation or perceived sexual orientation, age, religion, veteran status, military status, disability, history of disability or perceived disability. Harassment or discrimination of any sort will not be tolerated.

3. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Company employees and directors are expected to dedicate their best efforts to advancing the Company's interests and to make decisions that affect the Company based on the Company's best interests, independent of outside influences.

A conflict of interest occurs when your own interests (including the interests of a family member or an organization with which you have a significant relationship) interfere, or even appear to interfere, with the interests of the Company. A conflict situation can arise when you take actions, have interests or are offered benefits that make it difficult for you to perform your Company work objectively and effectively. Moreover, even the appearance of a conflict of interest can create problems, regardless of the propriety of your behavior.

Your obligation to conduct the Company's business in an honest and ethical manner includes the ethical handling of actual, apparent and potential conflicts of interest between the Company's business and your personal and business relationships. This includes full disclosure of any actual, apparent or potential conflicts of interest, as set forth below. Many actual, apparent or potential conflicts of interest can be resolved or avoided if they are appropriately disclosed and approved. In some instances, disclosure may not be sufficient and the Company may require that the conduct in question be stopped or that actions taken be reversed where possible.

Although we cannot list every conceivable conflict, what follows are some common examples of actual, apparent and potential conflicts of interest, and the

persons to whom employees should make disclosures. You may not engage in any conduct that creates an actual or apparent conflict of interest, including those situations described below, unless you first disclose all the relevant facts to the Compliance Officer and the Company, in its sole discretion, determines to approve the situation. Any such approval must be obtained in writing. If you are involved in a conflict situation that is not described below, you should discuss your particular situation with the Compliance Officer.

Special rules apply to actual, apparent or potential conflict of interests involving executive officers and directors. Specifically, before engaging in any conduct that may involve such a conflict, executive officers and directors must make full disclosure of all facts and circumstances to the General Counsel who will inform and seek the approval of the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors.

3.1 *Improper Personal Benefits from the Company*

Conflicts of interest arise when an employee or director, or a member of his or her family, receives improper personal benefits as a result of his or her position in the Company. You may not accept any benefits from the Company, including any Company loans or guarantees of your personal obligations, that have not been duly authorized and approved pursuant to Company policies and procedures, including without limitation the Company's Corporate Aircraft Policy and the Company's Personal Loan Policy. Consistent with applicable law and the Company's Personal Loan Policy, the Company will not make any personal loans to, nor guarantee the personal obligations of, directors or officers. Please refer to the Company's Personal Loan Policy for more details.

3.2 *Financial Interests in Other Businesses*

You may not own a significant interest in any company that competes with the Company. You may not own a significant interest in a company that does business with the Company (such as a Company tenant or supplier) without the prior written approval of the Compliance Officer. However, it is not typically considered a conflict of interest (and therefore, approval is not required) if the entity is a publicly traded company and you and your family members' only relationship with any such entity is to have an interest of less than 2% of the outstanding shares of the company.

3.3 *Business Arrangements with the Company*

You may not participate in a joint venture, partnership or other business arrangement with the Company.

3.4 *Outside Employment or Activities With a Competitor*

Simultaneous employment with or serving as a director of a competitor of the Company is prohibited, as is any activity that is intended to or that you should reasonably expect to advance a competitor's interests. You may not market products or services in competition with the Company's current or potential business activities. It is your responsibility to consult with the Compliance Officer to determine whether a planned activity will compete with any of the Company's business activities before you pursue the activity in question.

3.5 *Outside Employment With a Guest, Patron, Visitor, Tenant or Supplier*

You may not be employed by, serve as a director of or represent any supplier, joint venture partner or tenant of the Company. Similarly, you may not be or be employed by, serve as a director of, or represent, a supplier to the Company. In addition, you may not accept money or benefits of any kind as compensation or payment for any advice or services that you may provide to a guest, patron, visitor, tenant or supplier or anyone else in connection with its business with the Company, other than gratuities or tips received in accordance with generally accepted business practices for the industry.

3.6 *Charitable, Government and Other Outside Activities*

The Company encourages all employees to participate in projects and causes that further the welfare of our local communities. However, employees must obtain the prior written approval of the Compliance Officer before serving as a director or trustee of any charitable, not-for-profit, for-profit, or other entity or before running for election or seeking appointment to any government-related position. Directors and senior officers should refer to the Company's Corporate Guidelines before serving as a director or trustee of another organization.

3.7 *Family Members Working In The Industry*

You may find yourself in a situation where your spouse, domestic partner or significant other, your children, parents, or in-laws, or someone else with whom you have a close familial relationship is a competitor, supplier, or tenant of the Company or is employed by one. Such situations are not prohibited, but they call for extra sensitivity to security, confidentiality and potential conflicts of interest.

There are several factors to consider in assessing such a situation. Among them: the relationship between the Company and the other company; the nature of your responsibilities to the Company and those of the other person; and the access each of you has to your respective organization's confidential information. Such a situation, however harmless it may appear to you, could arouse suspicions among your colleagues that might affect your working relationships.

To remove any such doubts or suspicions, you must disclose your specific situation to the Compliance Officer to assess the nature and extent of any concern and how it can be resolved. In some instances, any risk to the Company's interests is sufficiently remote that the Compliance Officer may only remind you to guard against inadvertently disclosing Company confidential information and not to be involved in decisions on behalf of the Company that involve the other company.

3.8 Corporate Opportunities

Employees and directors owe a duty to the Company to advance its legitimate interests when the opportunity to do so arises. If an employee or director learns of a business or investment opportunity through the use of corporate property or information or his or her position at the Company, such as from a competitor or actual or potential customer, supplier or business associate of the Company, he or she may not personally participate in the opportunity or make the investment without the prior written approval of the Compliance Officer. Executive officers and directors must obtain the prior approval of the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors. Such an opportunity should be considered a business or investment opportunity for the Company in the first instance. You may not use corporate property or information or your position at the Company for improper personal gain, and you may not compete with the Company.

4.0 ENTERTAINMENT, GIFTS AND GRATUITIES

4.1 Receipt of Gifts and Entertainment

Accepting gifts from any organization or individual doing business or seeking to do business with the Company is prohibited. All employees and directors are prohibited from accepting gifts valued at more than \$250 (including below market purchases of goods and services). Gifts worth more than \$250 should be returned with the explanation that Company policy prohibits the acceptance of substantial gifts. Gifts considered customary, reasonable and valued at less than \$250 may be accepted. However, even nominal gifts should not be accepted if the potential for a conflict of interest or personal obligation exists. Additionally, employees and directors should avoid a pattern of accepting frequent gifts from the same source.

This policy does not prohibit tip category employees from accepting gratuities received during the performance of their regular job duties.

4.2 Offering Gifts and Entertainment

When you are providing a gift, entertainment or other accommodation in connection with Company business, you must do so in a manner that is in good

taste and without excessive expense. Except for complimentary goods and services customarily provided to customers in the ordinary course of the Company's business, you may not furnish or offer to furnish any gift that is of more than token value or that goes beyond the common courtesies associated with accepted business practices. You should follow the above guidelines for receiving gifts in determining when it is appropriate to give gifts.

Our suppliers and tenants likely have gift and entertainment policies of their own. You must be careful never to provide a gift or entertainment that you know violates the other company's gift and entertainment policy. Special rules apply in the context of dealing with government officials and employees. See "Interacting with Government—Prohibition on Gifts to Government Officials and Employees" below.

Giving or receiving any payment or gift in the nature of a bribe or kickback is absolutely prohibited.

5. PROTECTION AND PROPER USE OF COMPANY ASSETS AND INFORMATION

We each have a duty to protect the Company's assets and promote their efficient use. Theft, carelessness and waste have a direct impact on the Company's profitability. We should take measures to prevent damage to and theft or misuse of Company property. When you leave the Company, all Company property must be returned to the Company. Except as specifically authorized, Company assets, including Company time, equipment, materials, resources and proprietary information, must be used for business purposes only. Incidental personal use of equipment such as telephones and office supplies is permitted.

5.1 *Computer, Internet, Intranet, E-mail Use*

The Company provides access to computers, the internet, the Company's intranet, e-mail and other electronic communication and data storage devices ("Computer Systems") to assist individuals in performing their job duties. Employees should not consider their use of the Computer Systems provided by the Company to be subject to personal privacy. All such use can and will be monitored and controlled by the Company. All employees authorized to use the Computer Systems must take care to safeguard all login and password information to protect the integrity of the Computer Systems. Additionally, employees must use the Computer Systems as intended and maintain the confidentiality of all proprietary information.

Please refer to the policy guide applicable to your particular operating subsidiary for more details.

5.2 *Workplace Monitoring – Ensuring Safety and Security for All*

The Company conducts regular and routine video monitoring of its physical premises, including but not limited to all public, work and back of house areas. Video monitoring is utilized for numerous reasons, including but not limited to promoting guest service, identifying potential safety concerns, maintaining quality control standards, detecting acts of misconduct, and preventing acts of harassment and/or violence. The Company reserves the right to utilize other monitoring techniques as deemed necessary and appropriate for the protection of its guests, its employees and its property.

Employees should have no expectation of privacy in any public, work and back of house areas on the Company's premises. In addition, the Company's provision of an office to an employee that may otherwise have restricted access does not transform the office into a private area. These offices are considered work areas and are also subject to video monitoring. Therefore, occupants of offices should have no expectation of privacy in such areas.

5.3 *Protection of Intellectual Property*

The Company, and its affiliates, own multiple copyrights, trademarks, service marks, domain names and other forms of intellectual property ("Intellectual Property"). The Intellectual Property must not be used or reproduced without the consent of the Company and then only for authorized use in connection with the Company's business. Every effort must be undertaken to protect the Intellectual Property from illegal copying or misuse. If you have any questions regarding the use or protection of Intellectual Property, please call the Legal Department.

5.4 *Confidentiality*

Directors and employees are expected to maintain the confidentiality of information entrusted to them, from whatever source, during the course of performing their responsibilities for the Company, unless disclosure is expressly authorized or legally required. This includes information about the Company and information about third parties such as current or prospective vendors, suppliers, tenants, business partners, customers or employees. You should use Company and third party confidential information only for legitimate business purposes, and limit the dissemination of the information (both inside and outside the Company) to those who have a need to know the information for legitimate business purposes. If you are uncertain about whether information is confidential, you should treat it as such until you obtain further guidance. The obligation to protect confidential information continues even after your relationship with the Company ends. If you have any questions regarding the use or protection of confidential information, please call the Legal Department. In addition to the provisions of this section of the Code, directors should also refer to the Company's Policy Regarding Nondisclosure and Nonuse of Confidential Information.

5.5 *Insider Trading*

You are prohibited by the Company's Insider Trading Policy and the law from buying or selling securities of any company at a time when you are in possession of "material non-public information" about that company. This conduct is known as "insider trading." The prohibition on insider trading applies to Company securities and to securities of other companies if you learn material non-public information about other companies, such as the Company's suppliers or tenants, in the course of your duties for the Company. Communicating material non-public information about a company to someone who may buy or sell the company's securities - known as "tipping" - is also illegal. Federal and international law enforcement officials have sophisticated techniques for identifying insider trading and tipping and vigorously enforce these laws regardless of where the activity occurs or the amount involved.

Information is "material" if (a) there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would find the information "important" in determining whether to trade in a security; or (b) the information, if made public, likely would affect the market price of a company's securities.

Information is considered to be "non-public" unless it has been disclosed and broadly disseminated to the public by the Company, which means that the information must be publicly disclosed by the Company through appropriate channels (such as by means of a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, a press release or a widely disseminated statement from a senior officer) and adequate time (generally at least a full trading day) must have passed for the securities markets to digest the information.

Insider trading is a crime punishable by civil penalties of up to three times the profit gained or losses avoided on a transaction, criminal fines of up to \$5 million, and up to 20 years in prison. Companies may also face civil penalties, up to the greater of over \$1 million or three times the profit gained or losses avoided, for insider trading violations by their employees and other agents. "Tipping" can result in the same civil and criminal penalties that apply if an individual engages in insider trading directly, even if the individual does not receive any money or derive any benefit from trades made by others to whom the individual passed material non-public information.

5.6 *Record Retention*

In the course of its business, the Company produces and receives large numbers of records. Numerous laws require the retention of certain Company records for various periods of time. The Company is committed to compliance with all applicable laws, rules and regulations relating to the preservation of records. The Company's policy is to identify, maintain, safeguard, sort and either destroy or

retain all records in the Company's possession on a systematic and regular basis. Under no circumstances are Company records to be destroyed selectively or to be maintained outside Company premises or designated storage facilities, except in those instances where Company records may be temporarily brought home by employees working from home in accordance with approvals from their supervisors.

If you learn of a subpoena or a pending or contemplated litigation or government investigation, you should immediately contact the Legal Department. You must retain and preserve ALL records that may be responsive to the subpoena or relevant to the litigation or that may pertain to the investigation until you are advised by the Legal Department as to how to proceed. You must also affirmatively preserve from destruction all relevant records that without intervention would automatically be destroyed or erased (such as e-mails and voicemail messages). Destruction of such records, even if inadvertent, could seriously harm the Company. If you have any questions regarding whether a particular record pertains to a pending or contemplated investigation or litigation or may be responsive to a subpoena or regarding how to preserve particular types of records, you should preserve the records in question and ask the Legal Department for advice.

5.7 *Company Books and Records*

It is Company policy to make full, fair, accurate, timely and understandable disclosure in compliance with all applicable laws, rules and regulations in all reports and documents that the Company files with, or submits to, the Securities and Exchange Commission and all other governmental, quasi-governmental and self-regulatory bodies and in all other public communications made by the Company. You are required to abide by Company standards, policies and procedures designed to promote compliance with this policy.

You must complete all Company documents accurately, truthfully, and in a timely manner, including all travel and expense reports. When applicable, documents must be properly authorized. You must record the Company's financial activities in compliance with all applicable laws and accounting practices. The making of false or misleading entries, records or documentation is strictly prohibited. You must never create a false or misleading report or make a payment or establish an account on behalf of the Company with the understanding that any part of the payment or account is to be used for a purpose other than as described by the supporting documents.

5.8 *Responding to Inquiries from the Press and Others*

Company employees who are not officially designated Company spokespersons may not speak with the press, securities analysts, other members of the financial community, stockholders or groups or organizations as a Company

representative or about Company business unless specifically authorized to do so by the vice president of investor relations or the public relations department. Employees generally should refer requests for financial or other information about the Company from the media, the press, the financial community, stockholders or the public to the vice president of investor relations or the public relations department. Requests for information from regulators or the government should be referred to the Legal Department. Directors should refer to the Company's Policy Regarding Board Communications.

6. INTERACTING WITH GOVERNMENT

6.1 *Prohibition on Gifts to Government Officials and Employees*

Different governments have different laws restricting gifts, including meals, entertainment, transportation and lodging that may be provided to government officials and government employees. You are prohibited from providing gifts, meals or anything of value to government officials or employees or members of their families in connection with Company business without prior written approval from the Compliance Officer.

6.2 *Political Contributions and Activities*

Laws of certain jurisdictions prohibit the use of Company funds, assets, services, or facilities on behalf of a political party or candidate. Political contributions (including direct or indirect payments of corporate funds to any political party, candidate or campaign, contributions by political action committees funded by employee donations, contributions to social welfare and political organizations, and trade association dues) may be made only if permitted under applicable law and approved in writing and in advance by the Compliance Officer or Chief Executive Officer. Affiliates of the Company have filed applications for gaming licenses in both the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Both Pennsylvania and Massachusetts law prohibits the Company, its affiliates, its officers, directors and key employees, from making political contributions (cash or in kind), direct and indirect, to candidates, political parties, political party committees or other groups, committees or associations, including PACs for any candidate for public office in either Pennsylvania or Massachusetts. Any proposed political contributions relating to Pennsylvania or Massachusetts candidates, parties or organizations must be cleared in advance by the General Counsel.

Your work time may be considered the equivalent of a contribution by the Company. Therefore, unless required by applicable law, you will not be paid by the Company for any time spent running for public office, serving as an elected official, or campaigning for a political candidate. Nor will the Company compensate or reimburse you, in any form, for a political contribution that you intend to make or have made.

If you speak out on public issues, including through postings on social media websites or communications, you should make clear that you are expressing your individual views. Employees should not indicate or do anything to suggest that they are speaking or acting on the Company's behalf.

6.3 *Prohibition on Bribery of Government Officials*

The Company's Anti-Corruption Policy, the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (the "FCPA"), and the laws of many other countries prohibit the Company and its directors, officers, employees and agents or other third parties from giving or offering to give money or anything of value, directly or through an intermediary, to a foreign official, employees of a state-owned company, a foreign political party, a party official or a candidate for political office in order to attempt to influence official acts or decisions of that person or entity, to obtain or retain business, or to secure any improper advantage.

Please refer to the Company's Anti-Corruption Policy for more details regarding prohibited payments to foreign government officials.

7. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CODE

7.1 *Responsibilities*

While each of us is individually responsible for putting the Code to work, we need not go it alone. The Company has a number of resources, people and processes in place to answer our questions and guide us through difficult decisions. Copies of this Code are available from the Compliance Officer and on the Company's website. This Code will be distributed annually to all employees, directors and other individuals to whom it applies who will be asked to certify that they have read and understand the Code and that they have complied and will comply with its terms. If you know of or suspect a violation of applicable laws, rules or regulations, the Code, or the Company's related policies, you must immediately report that information as described in Section 1.4 of this Code.

7.2 *Investigations of Suspected Violations*

All reported violations of the Code will be taken seriously and promptly investigated. All reports will be treated confidentially to the extent reasonably possible. It is the Company's policy that no one will be subject to retaliation or adverse employment action because of a good faith report of suspected misconduct or for assisting in the investigation of suspected misconduct. It is imperative that reporting persons not conduct their own preliminary investigations. Investigations of alleged violations may involve complex legal issues, and acting on your own may compromise the integrity of an investigation and adversely affect both you and the Company.

7.3 *Discipline for Violations*

The Company intends to use every reasonable effort to prevent the occurrence of conduct not in compliance with the Code and to halt any such conduct that may occur as soon as reasonably possible after its discovery. Subject to applicable law and agreements, Company personnel who violate this Code and other Company policies and procedures may be subject to disciplinary action, up to and including discharge.

7.4 *Waivers of the Code*


The Company may waive application of the policies set forth in this Code but only when the Company determines in its sole discretion that circumstances warrant granting a waiver. Any waivers must be obtained in writing from the Compliance Officer or the Legal Department. Waivers of the Code for directors and executive officers may be made only by the Board of Directors as a whole or the Audit Committee of the Board and must be promptly disclosed to the extent required by law or regulation. Any waiver granted by the Audit Committee of the Board must be reported to the Board of Directors as a whole.

7.5 *No Rights Created*

This Code is a statement of the fundamental principles and key policies and procedures that govern the conduct of the Company's business. It is not intended to and does not create any obligations to or rights in any employee, director, client, supplier, competitor, stockholder or any other person or entity.

7.6 *Remember*

Ultimate responsibility to see that we as a Company comply with the many laws, rules, regulations and ethical standards affecting our business rests with each of us. You must become familiar with and conduct yourself strictly in compliance with those laws, rules, regulations and standards and the Company's policies and guidelines pertaining to them.



CLERK OF THE COURT

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4 DISTRICT COURT
5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

6 WYNN RESORTS, LIMITED, a Nevada
7 Corporation,

8 Plaintiffs,

9 vs.

10 KAZUO OKADA, an individual; ARUZE
11 USA, INC., a Nevada corporation,
12 UNIVERSAL ENTERTAINMENT
13 CORPORATION, a Japanese corporation,

14 Defendants.

15
16 AND ALL RELATED CLAIMS.

CASE NO. A-12-656710-B
Dept. No.: XI

**ORDER ON WYNN RESORTS,
LIMITED'S EX PARTE APPLICATION
FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER**

Hearing Date: July 22, 2016

Hearing Time: 2:00 p.m.

ELECTRONIC FILING CASE

17 Plaintiff Wynn Resorts, Limited's ("Wynn Resorts") *Ex Parte* Application For Temporary
18 Restraining Order, Motion For Preliminary Injunction, And Motion For Sanctions For Violations
19 Of The Protective Order; Ex Parte Application For An Order Shortening Time, filed on Order
20 Shortening Time on July 20, 2016 (the "Application"), came before this Court for hearing on July
21 22, 2016 at 2:00 p.m. James J. Pisanelli, Esq., Todd L. Bice, Esq., and Debra L. Spinelli, Esq., of
22 Pisanelli Bice appeared on behalf of Plaintiff/Counterdefendant Wynn Resorts, Limited and
23 Counterdefendants Linda Chen, Russell Goldsmith, Ray R. Irani, Robert J. Miller, John A. Moran,
24 Marc D. Schorr, Alvin V. Shoemaker, Kimmarie Sinatra, D. Boone Wayson, and Allan Zeman
25 (collectively the "Wynn Parties"). J. Colby Williams, Esq., of Campbell & Williams, appeared on
26 behalf of Counterdefendant/Cross-defendant Stephen A. Wynn ("Mr. Wynn"). William R. Urga,
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1 Esq. and David Malley, Esq., of Jolley Urga Woodbury & Little, and Michael T. Zeller, Esq. of
2 Quinn Emmanuel, appeared on behalf of Counterdefendant/Counterclaimant/Cross-claimant
3 Elaine P. Wynn ("Ms. Wynn"). And, J. Stephen Peek, Esq., of Holland & Hart, LLP, appeared
4 behalf of Defendant Kazuo Okada ("Okada") and Defendants/Counterclaimants/Counter-
5 defendants Aruze USA, Inc. ("Aruze USA") and Universal Entertainment Corp. ("Universal")
6 (collectively the "Okada Parties").

7 The Court having considered the Motion, the Opposition filed by Ms. Wynn, as well as
8 the arguments of counsel presented at the hearing, and good cause appearing therefor, THE
9 COURT HEREBY FINDS THAT:

10 Based on the record before the Court, the Court finds it appropriate to grant the motion for
11 temporary restraining order in a limited respect. In particular, the temporary restraining order is
12 granted to the extent that the Court is requiring that Elaine Wynn specifically comply with all
13 terms of the protective order with respect to confidentiality that was entered by the Court on
14 February 14, 2013.

15 THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED THAT:

- 16 1. Wynn Resorts' Application for a Temporary Restraining Order is GRANTED; and
- 17 2. Ms. Wynn is required to specifically comply with all terms of the Protective
18 Order.
- 19 3. Wynn Resorts will suffer irreparable harm because if Ms. Wynn releases
20 information designated as Confidential or Highly Confidential under the Protective Order.
- 21 4. Prior to release of any information, Ms. Wynn (or her agents, or counsel) must
22 seek permission from the Court to release information obtained in discovery, including
23 information from any deposition that has been designated as Confidential or Highly Confidential
24 pursuant to the Protective Order.
- 25 5. The deposition of Ms. Wynn and the individual who placed the anonymous phone
26 call to Ernst & Young; and the deposition of either the 30(b)(6) designee of Ernst & Young or the
27 person at Ernst & Young who received the phone call may be completed prior to the hearing on
28

1 the preliminary injunction. Additional discovery on these issues may be taken upon agreement of
2 the parties¹ or by order of the court.

3 6. The Court further orders that security is set at a nominal amount of \$ 100.

4 7. The Hearing on Wynn Resorts' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Sanctions
5 will be scheduled after completion of the discovery ordered herein.

6 8. The Temporary Restraining Order shall remain in place until the conclusion of the
7 preliminary injunction hearing.

8 IT IS SO ORDERED.

9 DATED this 12 day of Aug, 2016.

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12 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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26 ¹ Because of the privileged nature of the issues which form the basis of these depositions, the
27 Okada parties are precluded from participation in the depositions, but may request a copy of the
28 record of the depositions. Wynn may seek redaction or other protection from the Court to
maintain privileged information.