#### Case No. 71577

### In the Supreme Court of Nevada

IN THE MATTER OF: THE W.N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, DATED MAY 18, 1972,

JACQUELINE M. MONTOYA; AND KATHRYN A. BOUVIER,

Appellant,

VS.

ELEANOR C. AHERN A/K/A ELEANOR CONNELL HARTMAN AHERN,

Respondent.

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#### **APPELLANT'S APPENDIX**

from the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County
The Honorable GLORIA STURMAN
District Court Case No. P-09-066425-T

## APPELLANT'S APPENDIX, VOLUME 8 OF 8

(PAGES AA1521-1648)

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# INDEX TO APPELLANT'S APPENDIX

Description	Date Filed	Vol. No.	Page No.
Accounting and Report of Trust Activity From 2013-2015	02/01/17	8	AA1638- AA1648
Affidavit of Fredrick P. Waid, Trustee	05/06/15	4	AA0772- AA0776
Amended Notice of Appeal	07/29/15	4	AA0950- AA0961
Case Appeal Statement	10/26/16	8	AA1634- AA1637
Case Appeal Statement	05/18/15	4	AA0839- AA0844
Case Appeal Statement	04/07/15	3	AA0699- AA0703
Case Appeal Statement	07/31/14	2	AA0476- AA0481
Certificate of Mailing	09/27/13	1	AA0138- AA0139
Errata to Response to Motion to Refer Contested Probate Matter to Master- Probate Commissioner Per EDCR 4.16	11/08/13	2	AA0262- AA0263
Judgment and Order Approving Award of Attorney's Fees	06/23/15	4	AA0929- AA0934
Motion to Strike Supplement to Motion for Assessment of Damages Against Eleanor Ahern; Enforcement of no Contest Clause; and Surcharge of Eleanor's Trust Income	08/03/15	5	AA1011- AA1024
Motion for Assessment of Damages Against Eleanor Ahern; Enforcement of No-Contest Clause; and Surcharge of Eleanor's Trust Income	06/03/15	4	AA0845- AA0868

Motion to Refer Contested Probate  Matter to Master-Probate	11/04/13	1	AA0142- AA0246
Commissioner Per EDCR 4.16			
Notice of Appeal	10/19/16	8	AA1626-
			AA1633
Notice of Appeal Regarding Order	04/07/15	3	AA0692-
Appointing New Temporary Trustee			AA0698
Notice of Appeal	07/31/14	2	AA0474-
			AA0475
Notice of Appeal	05/18/15	4	AA0807-
			AA0838
Notice of Entry of Order Regarding	09/28/16	8	AA1621-
Motion for Assessment of Damages;			AA1625
Enforcement of No Contest Clause;			
and Surcharge of Trust Income			
Notice of Entry of Order to Show	04/16/15	3	AA0706-
Cause			AA0709
Notice of Entry of Order Re Pending	07/08/14	2	AA0464-
Motions and Scheduling			AA0473
Notice of Entry of Order	04/06/15	3	AA0688-
			AA0691
Notice of Entry of Order of Judgment	06/30/15	4	AA0948-
and Order Approving Award of			AA0949
Attorney's Fees			
Notice of Entry of Order	12/03/15	5	AA1194-
			AA1198
Notice of Entry of Order	04/20/15	4	AA0757-
			AA0763
Notice of Entry of Order Compelling	04/24/15	4	AA0764-
Eleanor Ahern to Turn Over Trust			AA0767
Records to Acting Successor Trustee			
Notice of Entry of Order Confirming	04/24/15	4	AA0768-
Acting Successor Trustee			AA0771
Notice of Entry of Order on Summary	04/17/15	4	AA0727-
Judgment			AA0746

Opposition to Motion for Assessment	06/29/15	4	AA0935-
of Damages Against Eleanor Ahern,	00/27/15		AA0947
Enforcement of No-Contest Clause,			1110517
and Surcharge of Eleanor's Trust			
Income			
Order Compelling Eleanor Ahern to	04/20/15	4	AA0755-0756
Turn Over			
Trust Records to Acting Successor			
Trustee			
Order Re: Motion to Compel Eleanor	12/01/15	5	AA1191-
Ahern's Authorization			AA1193
Order Confirming Acting Successor	04/20/15	4	AA0753-
Trustee			AA0754
Order Regarding the Accounting,	04/20/15	4	AA0748-
Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims and			AA0752
Award of Attorney Fees			
Order Appointing New Temporary	04/01/15	3	AA0686-
Trustee			AA0687
Order Denying Motion to Refer	01/06/14	2	AA0344-
Contested Probate Matter to Master-			AA0348
Probate Commissioner Per EDCR			
4.16; Directing Payment of All Oil,			
Gas, Mineral and Interest Royalties			
and Rent to Eleanor C. Hartman, also			
Known as Eleanor C. Ahern, as			
Trustee of No. 2 of the W. N. Connell			
and Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust			
dated May 18, 1972; and Setting			
Calendar Call and Hearing			
Order Re Pending Motions and	07/07/14	2	AA0456-
Scheduling			AA0463
Order to Show Cause	04/16/15	3	AA0704-
			AA0705
Order Regarding Motion for	09/19/16	8	AA1617-
Assessment of Damages; Enforcement			AA1620
of No Contest Clause; and Surcharge			
of Trust Income			
<u></u>			

Petition for Declaratory Judgment Regarding Limited Interest of Trust Assets Pursuant to NRS 30.040, NRS 153.031(1)(E), and NRS 164.033(1)(A)	09/27/13	1	AA0001- AA0137
Pre-Trial Memorandum	02/17/16	6	AA1199- AA1304
Receipt of Copy	04/17/15	4	AA0747
Receipt of Copy	11/08/13	2	AA0264
Recorder's Transcript, January 14, 2014	01/24/14	2	AA0349- AA0376
Recorder's Transcript, December 4, 2014	12/11/14	3	AA0494- AA0505
Recorder's Transcript, January 24, 2014	02/04/14	2	AA0377- AA0387
Recorder's Transcript, December 17, 2014	12/24/14	3	AA0506- AA0552
Recorder's Transcript, August 5, 2015	08/21/15	5	AA1025- AA1098
Recorder's Transcript, September 2, 2015	09/25/15	5	AA1099- AA1113
Recorders Transcript, November 4, 2015	11/18/15	5	AA1114- AA1190
Recorders' Transcript, March 3, 2016	Filed Under Seal	8	AA1521- AA1616
Recorder's Transcript, April 22, 2015	06/09/15	4	AA0777- AA0806
Recorder's Transcript, March 20, 2015	03/31/15	3	AA0596- AA0685
Recorder's Transcript, May 13, 2014	05/20/14	2	AA0396- AA0455
Recorder's Transcript, September 3, 2014	09/19/14	2	AA0482- AA0493
Recorder's Transcript, June 22, 2015	06/29/15	4	AA0869- AA0928
Recorder's Transcript, January 14, 2015	07/06/15	3	AA0553- AA0595
Recorder's Transcript, November 12, 2013	12/06/13	2	AA0274- AA0343

Recorder's Transcript, February 22,	03/29/16	7	AA1305
2016			AA1520
Recorder's Transcript, April 22, 2014	04/28/14	2	AA0388-
			AA0395
Reply of Eleanor C. Ahern to	11/11/13	2	AA0265-
Response of Jacqueline M. Montoya			AA0273
to Motion to Refer Contested Probate			
Matter to Master-Probate			
Commissioner Per EDCR 4.16			
Response to Motion to Refer	11/07/13	2	AA0247-
Contested Probate Matter to Master-			AA0261
Probate Commissioner Per EDCR			
4.16			
Summary Judgment	04/16/15	3	AA0710-
			AA0726
Supplement to Motion for Assessment	07/31/15	5	AA0962-
of Damages Against Eleanor Ahern;			AA1010
Enforcement of No Contest Clause;			
and Surcharge of Eleanor's Trust			
Income			
Verification for Petition for	09/27/13	1	AA0140-
Declaratory Judgment Regarding			AA0141
Limited Interest of Trust Assets			
Pursuant to NRS 30.040, NRS			
153.031(1)(e)E), and NRS			
164.033(1)(A)			

1	TRAN					
2	DISTRICT COURT					
3	CLARK COUNTY	, NEVADA				
4	* * * *	* *				
5	5					
6	In the Matter of the Trust of:)					
7	) CASE NO. P-09-066					
8	1. Connerr biving rouse, Dated)	Transcript of Proceedings				
9	May 18, 1972.	<b>,</b>				
10	BEFORE THE HONORABLE GLORIA STURMAN, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE					
11	ALL PENDING MOTIONS; EVIDENTIARY HEARING; STATUS CHECK					
12	THURSDAY, MARCH 3, 2016					
13	APPEARANCES:					
14	·	LENHARD, ESQ.				
15	TAMARA PETERSON, ESQ.					
16	For the Trustee,	WOODY TOO				
17	II.	TODD MOODY, ESQ. RUSSEL GEIST, ESQ.				
18	For Kathryn Bouvier and					
19	The state of the s	JOSEPH POWELL, ESQ. LAYNE RUSHFORTH, ESQ.				
20		i Robiii Okiii, 10g.				
21		ESPARZA, COURT RECORDER				
22	TRANSCRIBED BY: KRIST	FEN LUNKWITZ				
23	Proceedings recorded by audio-y	isual recording transcript				
24	produced by transcr					
25	5					

THE COURT: All right. Ready? We're ready to go on the record, then everybody can state appearances.

MR. POWELL: Good morning, Your Honor. Joey Powell appearing on behalf of Jacqueline Montoya and Kathryn Bouvier.

MR. RUSHFORTH: Layne Rushforth appearing on behalf of the same movant.

MR. LENHARD: Kirk Lenhard and Tammy Peterson on behalf of Ms. Ahern.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MOODY: Todd Moody and Russel Geist on behalf of the Court appointed trustee, Fred Waid.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. We have a number of things on calendar today, including wrapping up the motion which we're here on which is the Motion to Enforce the No-Contest Clause, but we do have a couple of other issues that I thought we needed to deal with sort of preliminarily, those being the -- there was a request to submit documents in-camera and I think that was something pertaining to a different -- some different litigation that we might need to talk about first and then another thing that I thought we probably should talk about was, I think, there was a request on this medical report, for that to be

disclosed as well.

So, we can maybe address those issues first and then I think we might also want to talk about the 65-day Rule. So, Mr. Moody.

MR. MOODY: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll be brief. I know this just -- the OST got signed, I think, on Monday and it was filed on yesterday, but we did -- well, here's the issue. We have in this Trial Memorandum, that was filed under seal, some issues that I think are germane to the Mann case in front of Judge Johnson. Really what we're looking for, Your Honor, is specifically some of the billing entries and some of the pleadings as they pertain to Susanne Nuna [phonetic]. They are claiming attorney-client privilege with Susanne Nuna as well as Ms. Ahern and, under the crime fraud exception, with this issue of undue influence being raised, I think that it may be the door that opens the way to overcome the attorney-client privilege through that.

And, so, before we filed that or put it in front of Judge Johnson, because it was filed under seal in this Court, we wanted the Court's permission and --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MOODY: -- we wanted the other parties to be able to weigh in on it, but I can represent to the Court that that case, the case we want to file this in, remains

1 under seal. And, so, I can assure everybody, including this Court, that if we're allowed to file it, it, at least 3 for now, remains under seal. 4 THE COURT: Okay. And the reason that you need it 5 unsealed in this case in order to be refiled under seal in 6 Judge Johnson's case is there is no way to look at it from 7 another department since it's under seal. So Judge Johnson 8 couldn't go and access the -- it's an electronically stored 9 document. So, it -- but it's just he doesn't have any way 10 to access it if you were --11 MR. MOODY: Well I guess I could --12 THE COURT: -- to refer him to it, he would not be 13 able to look to access it. 14 MR. MOODY: I have a hard copy that I could file, 15 you know, but --16 THE COURT: Right. 17 MR. MOODY: -- I don't think that that honors the 18 intent of sealing files. And, so, you know, out of an 19 abundance --20 THE COURT: Right. 21 MR. MOODY: -- of caution, --22 THE COURT: So you need something that says it's 23 unsealed for the purpose of being filed under seal in your 24 case in Department 20?

MR. MOODY: Exactly because I can tell you that

25

besides Judge Johnson, the other person that would be seeing it is Ms. Ahern's attorney, James Shapiro, who represents her and Susanne Nuna in that case in Department 20.

THE COURT: Okay. I got it. Okay. Thank you.

All right. So, we're going across the room. Mr. Powell,

do you take any position or Mr. -- sorry, about that. Mr.

Rushforth, any position on this issue?

MR. RUSHFORTH: We have no objection.

THE COURT: Thank you. All right.

MR. LENHARD: We don't take any position on it.

It's -- we're not the proper parties to be arguing it.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So, if the request is that a document that's under seal in this litigation be unsealed, although technical -- I mean, technically, the only reason to do that is to authorize Mr. Moody, who has a hard copy of it in his possession but can't do anything with that, to be able to file it under seal in a different case that -- and that case, the entire case is sealed?

MR. MOODY: It is.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Odd. Okay. So, for purposes of this request, if you could specify in your order the exact document to be unsealed and authorize that that exact document then be filed for the limited purpose of being filed in the other case, then the Clerk's Office

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1
   knows they can accept a document that's under seal here and
   file it under seal there as well.
2
3
            MR. MOODY:
                         Thank you.
4
            THE COURT:
                         Okay.
5
                     [Colloquy between counsel]
6
            MR. MOODY: Yeah, I --
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            THE COURT: And then our document remains sealed.
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            MR. MOODY: That's exactly right. So we're really
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   not asking for it to be unsealed --
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            THE COURT: No.
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            MR. MOODY: -- in this case. We're not going to
12
   make it public.
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            THE COURT: No.
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            MR. MOODY: It'll just be filed in the other case
   and --
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16
            THE COURT: Right. That this --
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            MR. MOODY: -- remain under seal.
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            THE COURT: A document that's under seal in this
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   case may be filed under seal in another case. So, however
20
   way you want to frame it, we're not unsealing our document
21
   permanently, we're just saying that it can be -- for
22
   purposes of being filed in another department, it can be,
23
   quote, unsealed, so that it can be refiled under seal there
   and then resealed here.
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25
            MR. MOODY: Thank you, Judge.
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1
            THE COURT: So even though technically, physically
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   nothing happens, it's just that's how it gets from this
3
   case to Judge Johnson's case remaining under seal.
4
            MR. MOODY: Okay. Thank you.
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            THE COURT:
                        Or maybe it's better to say it remains
6
                I don't know. If the Clerk's Office has any
   under seal.
7
   questions about the order, you can certainly refer them to
   us and, yes, because sealed documents are very -- you know,
8
9
   a very touchy thing. Okay. So that's the sealed document.
10
   So that's number one.
11
            The next item is, I think, that Mr. Powell, it was
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   your request with respect to the IME that was filed under
13
   seal in this case or I -- was it under seal --
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            MR. POWELL: Their motion, Your Honor.
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            THE COURT: Yeah, so that -- and I think Mr.
16
   Powell had objected --
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            MR. POWELL: We filed Opposition.
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            THE COURT: -- to it.
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            MR. POWELL: Yeah, an objection.
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                         So, I don't know. Is that Ms.
            THE COURT:
21
   Peterson?
              Is that Mr. -- the request to seal the IME
22
   report, or Mr. Lenhard, who is going to take that?
23
            MS. PETERSON: Your Honor, we ask to just submit
24
   it in-camera.
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THE COURT: Right.

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MS. PETERSON: It would be our request that the IME, because it contains personal health information, not be permitted to be seen by the other beneficiaries or their counsel. We are trying to comply with a Court order that she attend an IME. We wanted to show that she did comply, she did receive that, but there's no reason to file that in a sealed capacity where parties could review it. It's a personal health information.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RUSHFORTH: Your Honor, we have no objection to it remaining confidential, but we see no purpose in having it reviewed by anybody. Since they've conceded that there's no objection to her sitting for a deposition, there's really no purpose to having it reviewed in-camera otherwise. So our position is that if it is reviewed incamera and it's being offered as some evidence of something, then we have a right to see it. If it's just that they're conceding that she doesn't have an excuse not to sit for a deposition, I think we can just let it go and not have it filed or reviewed by anybody.

MS. PETERSON: Well, Your Honor, I would say I think you need to review it and then you can decide. If you want to keep it under seal and allow the beneficiaries or if you just want to keep it as a -- and just return it back to us and not file it, but I do think that it should

be submitted for your review like you would any other privileged document trying to determine if it's sufficiently privileged. I think that would be appropriate. You did order her to go to an IME. She did sit for one.

MR. RUSHFORTH: And our position would be -- is that there's really no reason for you to even see it unless it's being offered as evidence, and then if it is being offered as evidence for you to review, we need to know what it's intended to prove and we should have an opportunity to review it. So, if it's not needed for evidence, we'll acknowledge that they -- that she sat for it, she complied with the Court order. I don't think it's needed for any other purpose.

THE COURT: And just for the record, I did review it to see what it was the dispute was over. I mean, the ultimate conclusion of the physician is that there's no medical excuse for a -- sitting for the deposition. He found no actual medical reason for her not to sit. So, you know, that conclusion, I think, to the extent that Mr. Waid or anyone was concerned about putting someone through a -- something -- when they're claiming a medical reason not to do it and if you insist that they do it, then argue -- you know, putting that person at any kind of a risk and I think all it does is reassure the parties that a physician said

that there's medical reason why she can't do it. Having taken a look at the things that -- the actual medical condition that she is in, she's in pretty good medical condition. I don't see that these things that she complains about limit her ability. She was able to answer questions for the physician. So, he said: I have no medical reason to excuse her.

So, if that conclusion needs to be made available so that the parties know that they can proceed and they are not putting Mrs. Ahern's health at risk so they have that level of confidence, then, you know, that much I can see disclosing, just that the conclusion that I see no medical reason why this person cannot sit for a deposition. I think you're entitled to know that so that you have the comfort of knowing if you could go forward with it, that you are -- this physician has said there's -- that you aren't putting her at risk.

SO, to the extent that that -- the medical conclusion could be disclosed and that, actually, it's not really even the -- in the IME itself, it's more of -- there's a, I guess, a telephonic inquiry about the final page.

MS. PETERSON: I'm not sure what you mean about the telephonic inquiry. I was just going to say, Your Honor, I would -- I think we can say that this physician

did not see any physical reason she could not sit for a deposition. He did make a recommendation for a further evaluation and I think that that is -
THE COURT: Okay.

MS. PETERSON: -- the only issue that's still out there.

THE COURT: Right. So, perhaps if counsel could approach?

[Bench conference began at 10:32 a.m. - not transcribed]

[Bench conference concluded at 10:37 a.m.]

THE COURT: Okay. So, for the record, we are returning documents that were submitted to the Court incamera review. The Court has indicated to counsel for the parties the portion of one page that the Court finds doesn't disclose any confidential medical information but states the physician's conclusion and further recommendation. That will be provided to all parties as a confidential document filed under seal, again, so we don't violation any HIPAA rights or rights of the -- of Ms. Ahern, but can be disclosed to them so they have, for their records, the opinion of the physician. It is not part of his independent medical examination, but it is a -- sort of more like an interoffice note in which he concisely states his conclusion and his further recommendation.

So, even though it's not the medical report, it

takes out all of the confidential HIPAA information and just discloses his ultimate conclusions. So, for that, we will -- Ms. Peterson will make that available through a confidential filing.

MS. PETERSON: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And we seal when she submits that -the ultimate document that will be sealed is that one page
and that's what will be submitted under seal and available
to the other parties to review them.

MR. MOODY: And can I just say, Your Honor, we did not take a position on this --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MOODY: -- but in light of the information, we do intend to proceed with Ms. Ahern's deposition.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Okay. So, the Motion to Review In-Camera was granted. The Opposition was also granted to the extent that the Court will disclose the physician's conclusion and further recommendation. Okay. Anything else on that or does that handles both of those issues? Okay.

All right. So then the -- then next, before we get to the ultimate issue that we're here about, was the remaining issue was the status check concerning our -- we're here on the 65<sup>th</sup> day tomorrow. So we're around the 64<sup>th</sup> day. So, thank you. Is that Mr. Geist's?

MR. GEIST: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor.

On behalf of Mr. Waid, who has petitioned this Court for instructions regarding the unpaid distribution — unpaid revenue that is currently being held in trust, in short, the 65-day rule that the IRS has regarding distributions for trust purposes indicate that if a distribution is paid or credited after the end of the previous tax year, but before the 65<sup>th</sup> day, the end of the 65<sup>th</sup> day of the next tax year, the trustee can take a deduction, in essence, on that distribution and count it towards the previous tax year.

Because Mr. Waid presently has approximately \$624,000 representing Ms. Ahern's unpaid revenue received by the trust and they are currently the issues before the Court, Mr. Waid asks this Court for instructions regarding the allocation, in essence, for income tax purposes, of this \$624,000.

The two options -- well, the two options that the trustee would like to raise, number one, is that the trust can simply continue to hold onto these -- this unpaid revenue and pay the income tax on that amount. The consequence of that would be that the trust would pay a maximum tax rate of 43.4 percent at an amount greater than \$12,000 -- \$12,300 of taxable income, a significant amount of taxes would be paid on that.

The other alternative would be to, because it is Ms. Ahern's share of the revenue, allocate that amount, pending a determination from this Court as to where that actually gets paid to, but allocate or credit that amount to Ms. Ahern in whole or in part in which that portion that's allocated to her would be taxable to her at her individual tax rate.

The trustee has a couple of concerns about that.

Number one, given the declarations that were made in Ms.

Ahern's trial brief, and previously, that she is having a hard time paying for her living expenses, the trustee is concerned that giving her that kind of allocation of income could create a more significant income tax burden that she probably would not be able to pay for.

The other concern is that even if we continue to allocate this amount of unpaid revenue to her, and assuming that she's not able to pay the income tax on that, or if she has significant income tax liabilities presently, which the trustee believes may be the case given he has to really refile previous year tax returns, the concern is that the IRS is going to have a continuing interest in her share in the trust and, as a super creditor, could come in and assert a claim over the unpaid revenue over and above what she would get individually and over and above what the Court may order as any other remedy that the Court fashions

in the future, which the trustee is not taking a position on.

So, Mr. Waid has given some options to the Court, which are, number one, the trust retains the unpaid revenue and pays the tax on it and we've discussed the consequence of that. The other is credit the unpaid revenue to Ms. Ahern in whole or in part, or however the Court decides to fashion that, and then pay the MTC Trust for any outstanding liabilities. We're aware of a judgment that needs to be paid. I don't know what the -- where that is in the process.

THE COURT: And the reason you wouldn't want to just pay the MTC Trust, the beneficiaries themselves directly from this share is because then that'd sync them to them. It's not income to them. It's a damage award that they were given for the fees and costs. So that wouldn't -- they shouldn't be paying the tax on it, --

MR. MOODY: Correct.

THE COURT: -- in other words?

MR. MOODY: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MOODY: Another option is to, again, credit the unpaid revenue to Ms. Ahern and continue to hold the unpaid revenue. Again, the IRS rules allow us to pay or credit that amount of revenue to her. Again, this would result in a significant income tax liability to Ms. Ahern, which we are concerned about her ability to pay that in the future. We have no indication of whether or not she can. It's just a concern that a trustee has raised.

And then the last is to simply suspend her interest in the trust and I think this would involve a lot of moving parts, but this is certainly an option that the trustee has come up with, and pay and credit the unpaid trust revenue to the MTC Trust going forward until such time as the Court feels that any obligations which I think are under consideration would be satisfied.

That's what the trustee is asking this Court to instruct him on. I'm sure the other parties have positions that they wish to express. The Court's willing to -- or the trustee is willing to defer to the Court on its instructions regarding this. So we would like to turn that over to --

THE COURT: Okay. Well, with respect to the final option, the suspending Ms. Ahern's interest and credit the unpaid 2015 revenue to the MTC Trust, then if you do that, then the MTC Trust has to pay the taxes and that would be that same high tax rate.

MR. MOODY: That's -- well, it wouldn't be the same high tax rate, it would pass through or flow to to the --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MOODY: -- MTC Trust beneficiaries. So they would pay the tax on their individual ordinary income tax rate.

THE COURT: Right. But, I guess, that, again, is my question is if it's being paid to them to satisfy the award of attorneys' fees, then why are they paying the taxes on it?

MR. MOODY: Mm-hmm. That's certainly a valid question. I don't take a position on that.

THE COURT: Yeah. Okay. All right. Thanks.

MR. MOODY: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. RUSHFORTH: Your Honor, speaking to answer that last question you just had, our clients are willing to take that distribution, pay the -- to the MTC Trust and report the income tax with the understanding that we can sort that out. We still -- we all acknowledge that we've got to crunch numbers. We've got to do a final accounting. We've got to assess damages. There's a lot of number crunching that still needs to go on. And, so, our clients are willing to let that come to the MTC Trust, knowing that they're going to have a 2016 distribution that's going to be reported as taxable income for the time being and yet they think that -- our feeling is that that's the safest way to take care of this issue and everything else, all the

number crunching, can sort that out in the rest and that way we don't create extraordinarily high tax rates and we don't give access to money to a trustee that committed malfeasance. This is the safest way to go.

I am prepared, as part of the other motion that's before the Court, to go into why there are other reasons that the -- Ms. Ahern's interest should be suspended, but I'll defer that to the next motion, but --

THE COURT: Okay. And I guess the --

MR. RUSHFORTH: -- for the purposes of --

THE COURT: -- question that I have is: How does that different -- differ from the option number -- option B that the trustee gave us, which was to credit the unpaid trust revenue to Ms. Ahern and pay the MTC Trust for the liabilities? The difference there is that then the tax liability is Ms. Ahern's even though the money ultimately goes -- it would be paid to the daughters.

MR. RUSHFORTH: But then -- that is giving her a credit that we would rather she not get.

THE COURT: Mm-hmm. Okay. Thanks. All right. So, Mr. Lenhard.

MR. LENHARD: Thank you, Judge. We also made a 5<sup>th</sup> proposals on page 2 of our Reply and that was worked with our accountants and I want to remind the Court of something because I keep harping on this. November 4, you issued an

oral order, over objection from the sisters, stating that Ms. Ahern would get interim attorneys' fees to cover her defense costs as well as minimal living expenses. The order was reduced to writing in early January. It's now early March. Myself and my law firm, in reliance of the good faith of your orders and the strength of your orders, have soldiered on. We've defended in the Supreme Court, we've defended here, and we've done our job.

To date, Mr. Waid has just refused to pay us and he testified in open court that he basically is disobeying your order.

There's an element of fairness here that seems to be lacking. Whatever the Court does, whether it be suspending, crediting, or whatever, you -- I am suggesting -- I can't tell you what to do, but I am suggesting, in fairness, your order has to be obeyed. I will not be made whole by any way, shape, or form by the interim payment but I had a right to rely upon that. And I'm standing here asking the Court to enforce its own order and I don't think that that is an unfair request in any way, shape, or form.

You -- I prefer the option we've given as far as how to handle the funds, but I'll leave that to the Court and the tax experts, but I want this Court to take into account its order which has been willfully disobeyed now for four months. Thank you.

1 THE COURT: All right. So, I just want to make 2 sure I understand what this proposal is that your -- you 3 have provided, Mr. Lenhard, just to make sure so that Mr. 4 Geist can respond to it. It's sort of a hybrid of 5 something that they had recommended as one of our options 6 and that was to credit the income to Ms. Ahern, she gets a 7 K-1, she reports it, it's her tax liability is her tax 8 liability, and that then the -- your suggestion though is 9 that the trustee would pay the taxes? MR. LENHARD: Yes. That way you're assured of it 10 11 being paid. 12 THE COURT: Okay. 13 MR. LENHARD: Now that does not take into account, 14 and my client has approved me to represent today that we need to have a deduction out of there and that's for 15 16 obeyance of your order. 17 THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. LENHARD: So the interim attorneys' fees are paid and interim living expenses are paid. I think it comes out to about \$90,000. So those numbers would have to be reworked.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So then -- and then whatever the remainder is goes to pay --

MR. LENHARD: We would use that formula.

THE COURT: Go to pay the previously entered award

and whatever any other --

MR. LENHARD: Of course. And I don't care, frankly, if the money eventually goes to pay their judgment or whatever. You know, you can decide how to do that. I'm just asking you to enforce your order at this point in time. I'm having a hard time explaining to people why I keep coming to this courtroom with a court order and nothing --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. LENHARD: -- happens.

THE COURT: All right. Thanks.

MR. RUSHFORTH: Your Honor, do the flashing mics indicate we're not on the record.

THE COURT: For the -- the system --

MR. LENHARD: Oh.

THE COURT: -- continues to record.

MR. LENHARD: Okay.

THE COURT: But it does need to be rebooted, so

Kerry sent a note to the appropriate people and they'll

come down and reboot the -- it does still record even

though -- unless and until she gets locked out. Once -
and it will ultimately get there if it doesn't get fixed.

So for right now, until she tells us that she's been locked

out, then we're good to continue, but we may have to take a

break when they come to reboot/reset it.

Okay. So, Mr. Geist.

MR. GEIST: Thank you, Your Honor.

with regard to Mr. Lenhard's comments about enforcement of a prior order, I believe it's inappropriate that, procedurally, that issue is not before the Court.

Ms. Ahern has not raised that issue in a motion that's currently being heard. I understand his concern, but I would point out that -- you know, jurisdictionally, of course, this Court has the power to enforce this order and -- but I would point out that there is a pending appeal regarding that order. It certainly does not divest the Court of its jurisdiction, however, there is an emergency --

THE COURT: But there's never been a stay.

MR. GEIST: I understand that.

THE COURT: Every time this comes up, I -- that's what I keep saying is it's never been stayed. Nobody ever -- it's not stayed.

MR. GEIST: I understand that, Your Honor, and --

THE COURT: So I don't understand.

MR. GEIST: -- I would remind the Court that on the first day of the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Waid testified that he is willing to comply with that order. He understands that there is an Emergency Motion for a Stay and I think it's reasonable for him to -- and for the Court

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to simply wait until the Supreme Court makes the decision
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   on that.
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            THE COURT: Where's the Motion for --
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            MR. GEIST: But we are --
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            THE COURT: Where is the Motion for Stay? Is that
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   pending in the Supreme Court?
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            MR. GEIST: I --
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            MR. LENHARD: It's been pending for three weeks
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   now.
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            MR. GEIST: Yes.
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            THE COURT: At the Supreme Court?
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            MR. GEIST: Yes.
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            THE COURT: Okay.
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            MR. GEIST: Yes, Your Honor.
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            MR. LENHARD: Do I have to sue the trustee to
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   enforce your order? Is that what I'm being forced to do
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   here?
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            THE COURT: Yeah. That's --
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            MR. LENHARD: I will.
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            MR. GEIST: Again, Your Honor, --
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            THE COURT: -- a concern I have.
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            MR. GEIST: -- I don't think that issue is proper
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   before the Court.
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            THE COURT: Okay.
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            MR. GEIST: We can certainly deal with that.
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The tax ramifications of this, certainly enforcing that order, are what we're trying to discuss.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GEIST: You had asked what the -- you had asked Mr. Rushforth what the difference between B and C was in our options in our Petition for Instructions. The concern that the trustee has is that option B where we credit the unpaid revenue to Ms. Ahern and pay the MTC Trust, or any other party, outstanding liabilities that she may owe, including attorneys' fees, that would most certainly invite the scrutiny of the IRS if she currently has outstanding tax liabilities or if she in the future will incur tax liabilities based on that distribution or credit of that revenue.

We believe that option D, where we reform the trust, in essence, and suspend her share would give Mr.
Waid at least a colorable argument to the IRS that there is a reason that he is not involving the IRS as a creditor of Ms. Ahern, because, as we know, her share under the trust, is a mandatory distribution of net income. If Mr. Waid determines that there is net income, net of any expenses that the trust has to other beneficiaries or his professional fees or whatever the case may be, that is mandatory to be distributed to her; however, her creditors can stand in her shoes and certainly the IRS would assert

that position that it is above and beyond any other creditor that she may have and take that.

So, we believe that that's the difference between those two options. But, again, we leave it up to the Court

THE COURT: And the -- you did not address it and it did just come in yesterday afternoon, the suggestion of Mr. Lenhard in which, you know, I understood that they have continued to object to the fact that this Court's order was not being honored. I mean, that came up the very first day of this trial. So, you know, it certainly is before the Court that -- and I understood for very valid reasons that Mr. Waid has in his exercise as her trustee that, you know, he has to be careful that he doesn't do something that exposes her to further liability or opens her up to a -- I guess expose her to action by the IRS.

MR. GEIST: That's the biggest concern that we tread lightly on these issues. I -- again, we under -- we absolutely understand Mr. Lenhard's concern and we understand the lengths that he has gone to and Mr. Waid is willing to comply with that order, we just have this serious tax issue that needs to be addressed. How is this -- the order indicates that it is an advance. Are we to interpret that that is a distribution, therefore, she bears the income tax liability for that? If that's the case, if

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   all the parties agree, then we'll do that. Then what do we
   do with the rest of the revenue? I think that's what would
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   like the Court's instruction and we will carry it out.
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            THE COURT: Okay. And the difference in suspend -
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   - this technical term, suspending, versus the request that
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   the other beneficiaries have made which is that she --
7
   which is what is still pending, wrapping up this hearing,
   is that the no-contest for -- clause be enforced and her
8
9
   share is permanently revoked.
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            MR. GEIST: Yeah. Correct.
11
                         So, technically, in suspending, that
             THE COURT:
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   sends a message to the IRS that there is no current right
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   to her to receive any funds, therefore she doesn't have any
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   current tax liability?
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            MR. GEIST: I think --
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            THE COURT: I don't know if I'm understanding --
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            MR. GEIST: I think that's probably the way to
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   describe it.
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                         I'm over --
            THE COURT:
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                         Now the I --
            MR. GEIST:
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                         -- simplifying this. The IRS is way
            THE COURT:
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   over my head.
23
            MR. GEIST:
                         And I hoped not to get into --
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            THE COURT:
                         I hated that class.
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                         -- the intricacies of the tax code or
            MR. GEIST:
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any of the issues. I hope to keep it on that level.
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                         I don't want to get into the IRS --
            THE COURT:
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            MR. GEIST: But I think you've got --
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            THE COURT: -- tax code.
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            MR. GEIST: -- that correct. It -- and I would
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   just point out that even if the Court takes that position
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   and we do suspend her interest for as long as it takes to
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   satisfy whatever the Court determines, I think the IRS
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   could still take the position that the trust says what it
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   says, she's entitled to that, and still could go after her.
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   But, again, we represent the trustee. We're asking the
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   Court for instructions regarding this so that the trustee
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   can at least say: I'm doing this, because this is what we
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   were told to do.
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            THE COURT: Right. And to get it all -- all the
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   paperwork and everything processed by the close of business
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   tomorrow, our 65<sup>th</sup> day.
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            MR. GEIST: Correct.
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            THE COURT:
                         So that the trust doesn't have to pay
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   the enormous tax rate that --
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            MR. GEIST: Correct, Your Honor.
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            THE COURT: -- it would pay.
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            All right. So, I guess, in the end, what's in
24
   everybody's best interest at --
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            MR. GEIST: Right.
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THE COURT: -- this point in time. It's not, as the trustee is operating for everybody's best interest, and also we don't want to expose him to any questions from the IRS that would bear on his performance of his abilities, of his duties.

I -- with all due respect to Mr. Lenhard, I appreciate their view that you just pay Ms. Ahern, pay her taxes, and then the rest of it can go to other people. I really am not convinced that that is in her best interest and I understand that it's cleanest for them, but, you know, with all due respect, I'm not convinced on that one.

I really -- I actually do believe that D is probably our best option, which is to, quote, hold this in suspense; however, I've got to say this one more time, why have -- I just don't understand. Why have we not paid the attorney fees and the living expenses? That order was never stayed and, until it is, and until the Supreme Court tells me I should never have let her have distributions from the trust pending a resolution, she should not have been allowed to pay her attorneys pending resolution, I don't understand why they're not being paid and, at this point in time, I just -- how does this affect you proposal D? Because, for me, that's what's in everybody's best interest is that we keep a level playing field here.

We've got very, very profound remedy that is being

sought by the other beneficiaries, one that is life changing and deprives her of a property right that she has had for 40 years. It's a big deal and you're being told that I should do this -- there is no right to -- what we call civil Gideon. You have no right to have a court appointed attorney. I understand that, but I have a real problem with taking the position that I'm going to deprive somebody of property that they have lived on an expectation of receiving, and have been receiving, and I understand that there's a really serious allegation of extreme malfeasance, arguably perhaps at influence of people who don't have her best interest. I understand all of that.

We don't have anything telling us any differently, that, in fact, she does have money, that she doesn't have to stand in line at the food bank. I don't have any of that. I understand we have suspicions and I understand that there's some real questions about — as have been quoted by Mr. Powell, you know, we've got a few options here. There's only a few places this money could have gone and I don't understand if it really is being held for her somewhere why she's not recovering it so she can get herself out of this situation. That's her choice. She's an adult. I can't force her to do that, but until it's proven to me that it is somewhere being held for her, then I have to assume some

-- either it's just been spent or some very bad people stole it. And I don't understand why they're not being prosecuted because that's a pretty serious crime in our state and, you know, to take \$500,000 from a person over the age of 60 with the intent to commit fraud is a really serious crime and if those people did that, there are some really serious detectives at the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department who take those things incredibly seriously and prosecute them to the fullest extent of the law and people go to jail for that all the time.

So, if that's what's happened here, and perhaps
Mr. Waid will find that to be true, then there's a remedy
there, but I don't know how we're ever going to get the
money back. On the other hand, if it's just being held
somewhere for her, then that's the other option, and she
can end this all, and put all of us out of this misery, and
she's got a choice.

So, in the interim though, I'm in this position where I'm told that this is somebody who is -- has been forced to live on very reduced circumstances that she's not accustomed to living on and has not -- is not equipped to live on. Other people might roll with the punches, but this is somebody who has been accustomed to receiving a substantial income every year. I mean, this is a lot of money and this is only like three-quarters of the year,

over \$600,000. And all of a sudden to be deprived of that, it's -- it would, you know, it would take an adjustment and I'm not sure that, you know, we have any other way until it's proven for her to at least have a minimal lifestyle and to represent herself in court because she can't represent herself personally. She needs to have representation. I think that's pretty clear.

So that's my question, is: Why have we not honored that order?

MR. GEIST: Your Honor, so with your direction, the 90,000 that we're talking about for her attorneys' fees and living expenses, you're directing the trustee to pay that, allocate that as income distributed to her, so for income tax purposes, we will issue a K-1 to her, credited for 2015, as part of her income taxes for last year. The remaining 534,000, we're going to be suspending that, -
THE COURT: Suspending.

MR. GEIST: -- in essence, and credited and allocated to the MTC Trust until further direction from this Court. Correct?

THE COURT: In at least satisfaction of that -- the one award that we have.

MR. GEIST: Yeah. And I think that goes a long way towards staving off some of the issues with the IRS. I still think, still given that a distribution was made,

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   there may or may not be an income tax issue for last year.
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            THE COURT: And there may be some terminology, I
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   don't -- like I said, I try to avoid the revenue code. So
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   there might be some type of terminology that can be used
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   that makes it clear that this is an advance, that --
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            MR. GEIST: Well, --
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            THE COURT: -- her interest is suspended, but she
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   is being advanced some funds on her potential future
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   rights.
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            MR. GEIST: Yeah.
                                The issue though is we either
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   credit it to her as income and it's either present year or
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   previous year tax year income, if we do it before the 65
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   days.
14
            THE COURT: Right.
                               Mm-hmm.
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            MR. GEIST: Or the trust pays it. So, if your
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   direction is we credit it to her --
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            THE COURT: The trust pays it.
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            MR. GEIST: Yeah. Then we'll do it as --
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            THE COURT: Whatever --
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            MR. GEIST: -- the previous year.
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                         I think the new order would be
            THE COURT:
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   whatever has the least adverse income tax impact --
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            MR. GEIST: Okay.
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            THE COURT: -- for everyone and, as I said, I
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   would hope that -- and this is my concern here and I hope I
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understand what Mr. Rushforth was telling us, is that the - if we're to pay the -- the first thing that we know is
that this award that's out there for the attorneys' fees.

If we're going to pay back the attorneys' fees through the
trust, because that's something that she -- there's an
order saying that she owes this money on these attorneys'
fees, I can -- I still have a concern and although -- as I
understand Mr. Rushforth, they're willing to take that
money as a distribution to them and pay the taxes on it
themselves.

So I guess that's my question because if we credit it to Ms. Ahern and say we're paying off her debt, then that's income tax to her that she can't pay. It's already clear from what Mr. Lenhard has proposed that, you know, the only way she could pay the income taxes due on that would be if the trust paid him. And I'm not willing to go there because, as I said, I'm just not convinced that she should — that the daughter should have to pay the income tax on that money, but, on the other hand, I'm not willing to say that she gets off — that the trust is going to pay any more for her liabilities, her income tax liabilities. It's just not —

MR. RUSHFORTH: Your Honor, can we go off the record for a minute and discuss some -- approach the bench and discuss some --

1 THE COURT: Sure. MR. RUSHFORTH: -- options? 2 3 THE COURT: Thanks. 4 [Bench conference began at 11:07 a.m. - off the record] 5 [Bench conference/recess concluded at 11:50 a.m.] 6 Okay. So we'll go back on the THE COURT: 7 record. Thanks. Are we ready to proceed -- so, are we 8 ready to proceed on the record? 9 MR. GEIST: I think we are, Your Honor. Thank 10 you. 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 MR. GEIST: So, my understanding of what the 13 parties have discussed and what my understanding that the 14 Court's direction regarding our Petition for Instructions 15 is that the order to Mr. Waid that he advance a certain 16 amount to Ms. Ahern, and the order states if the funds are 17 available, that the payments for the living expenses to Ms. 18 Ahern are to be done net of her income tax liabilities. 19 Mr. Waid is to hold onto what would be her share of income 20 tax liabilities and distribute to her the net amount so

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tax on that distribution.

Our concern was that it was turned in advance, but

that he, in his own fiduciary capacity, will not incur a

income tax or have -- Ms. Ahern has not paid that income

personal liability to the IRS for having not paid the

given the 65-day rule, we're going to have to count it as either current year or previous year and we'd like to count it as previous year distribution.

The amount that the Court has ordered that Mr. Waid pay as the attorney's expenses for Ms. Ahern's attorneys, Mr. Waid will make that payment and will treat it as an expense of the trust, deduct it as such, and later credit that amount against Ms. Ahern's future income received in the trust or future revenue received in the trust, subject to adjustments. Again, her share is mandatory of -- mandatory payment of the net income.

I would just like to point out again that Mr. Waid was subject to an order that was entered, I believe,

January 11<sup>th</sup> to make these payments. It did say that the payments were to made if available, if the funds were available. Mr. Waid's position has been that Ms. Ahern herself has indicated that she owed the trust money. The Restatement is clear that when a previous trustee commits a breach of trust, --

MR. MOODY: Court's indulgence.

[Colloquy between Mr. Moody and Mr. Geist]

MR. GEIST: Thank you, Your Honor. The Restatement is clear that when a trustee has committed a breach of trust and has caused damage to the trust or to the other beneficiaries, that that beneficiary is not

entitled to further distributions or further benefits from that trust until that is made whole. That was the law that Mr. Waid was relying on. He is, of course, willing to and will comply with the Court's order to make these payments, as indicated.

with respect to the payments for the living expenses to Ms. Ahern, it's my understanding that Mr. Waid will be holding those funds as a discretionary fund to pay her living expenses. If she has medical needs, any other needs, she can make an application either through her attorneys or to the trustee directly and he will pay those for her. It's the Court's order that she be able to live and that these funds are available for her living expenses and he will do that.

And the payment of the attorneys' expenses that are made to Ms. Ahern's attorneys, again, that will be a debit against Ms. Ahern to the trust that will come out of her future revenue share as this Court so directs. That's my understanding of what the parties have discussed and what this Court has directed.

THE COURT: Okay. I believe you wish to make an objection on the record, Mr. Rushforth?

MR. RUSHFORTH: I do.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RUSHFORTH: First, I'd like to repeat what Mr.

Geist said earlier is that I don't believe this issue on the payment with respect to the order that was entered in January is actually properly before the Court at this time. There's been no motion related to that and it's just been argument on a different order and so I just, for the record, state I don't think this is a proper time to deal with that issue.

Number two is that, you know, this is an order that was appealed. First there was a Motion for Reconsideration. The hearing was in November. The order was entered in the record on January 5<sup>th</sup>, and then the Notice of Entry of Order was on January 11<sup>th</sup>, and then there was a Motion for Reconsideration, and then there was an appeal, and almost — in February, and almost concurrently there was an emergency stay, and a request for response within 14 days was made, and for some unknown reason beyond our control, the Supreme Court has not responded to that.

And, so, we feel like this is inappropriate to deal with this at this time because this was -- this is -- this ruling that you're ready to make at this time that Mr. Geist has outlined really frustrates our appeal. And so we go on the record and I just want to reinforce what Mr. Geist said about the Restatement. Restatement of Trust, Section 251, says:

If a beneficiary is under liable to the trustee --

And that's clearly on the record. It's been admitted.

To the trustee assets, his interest in the trust is subject to a charge for the amount of the liability. He is not entitled to receive his share of the trust without discharging his lability.

We object to any payment that is to or for Ms. Ahern until there's a proper adjudication of whether or not she's entitled to a share. And, so, we'd just state for the record that we feel like it's appropriate to make the payments that are in -- the funds should be -- not just stayed as to a portion of it. As to -- we -- all of it should go to the MTC Trust and that's our position.

THE COURT: Thank you. Anything from Mr. Lenhard and Ms. Peterson?

MR. LENHARD: Ms. Peterson.

THE COURT: Ms. Peterson.

MR. LENHARD: We have nothing to add. We stand on your record. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. All right. I'll enter the order as Mr. Geist has stated his understanding is. If you prepare that, we'll get it signed and do you need that signed before tomorrow in order to -- that Mr. Waid can proceed and in compliance with the 65-day --

MR. GEIST: I can keep, in effect, the allocation

Waid's accounting is finalized with the final numbers in

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1 the future. THE COURT: And to the extent that they pay any 2 3 taxes on that that otherwise would have been paid by Ms. 4 Ahern, I think Mr. Lenhard calculated approximately 5 \$170,000, they'll report to Mr. Waid what that amount is --6 MR. GEIST: Correct. 7 THE COURT: -- and he'll account for that in the 8 future? 9 MR. GEIST: Yes. 10 THE COURT: Okay. Because that was part of my 11 concern was this is what Ms. Ahern was ordered to pay, she 12 should bear the tax liability for it. 13 Okay. All right. So, if you'll -- you're going 14 to prepare that order? MR. GEIST: I will prepare the order. 15 16 THE COURT: Best of luck. 17 MR. GEIST: Thank you. 18 THE COURT: Okay. 19 MR. GEIST: I will run it past counsel to make 20 sure I get it --21 THE COURT: Okay. 22 MR. GEIST: -- correct. 23 THE COURT: All right. So, we've dealt with then 24 the Petition for Instructions.

MR. RUSHFORTH: Your Honor, with respect to the

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   other motion, because you have as a calendar item and what
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   not, if I -- I've got about 30 minutes and I think Mr.
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   Lenhard indicated about 15. If you have the time, I'd like
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   to go through --
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            THE COURT: Okay.
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            MR. RUSHFORTH: -- those arguments. If you don't
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   have --
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            THE COURT: Okay. I quess the question for Mr.
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   Lenhard is: Were you -- it was an evidentiary hearing.
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   Did you have any witnesses you wish to call?
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            MR. LENHARD: No. We've decided not to call Ms.
12
   Ahern.
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            THE COURT: Okay. All right.
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            MR. LENHARD: And my estimation, by the way, I
   don't want to be held to the 15 minutes, you know, when you
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   go second, obviously, --
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            THE COURT: Right.
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            MR. LENHARD: -- sometimes you have to play off
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   the first argument. It may be a few minutes longer, just
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   so --
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            THE COURT: Okay. All right.
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            MR. RUSHFORTH: May we proceed?
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            THE COURT: You may.
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            MR. RUSHFORTH: Okay. I have a PowerPoint that
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   I'm providing. May I approach?
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THE COURT: You may. And then, for the record, at the conclusion, we'll mark it as a Court's Exhibit and the Clerk will keep it in the record.

MR. RUSHFORTH: Thank you, Your Honor.

Basically, I'm going to cover really three points, but I'm going to try to do it in sufficient detail so that there's no ambiguity about where we stand. The first issue is going to be the no-contest clause. The second issue is going to be if the no-contest clause doesn't apply, are there any distributions that should come out to Ms. Ahern. And then the third is really -- the third issue is just basically saying that the objections and defenses that have been raised are really irrelevant.

And, so, let's start with the no-contest clause. In slide -- on page 2 of the slides, it's a summary, a portion, an excerpt from NRS 163.00195, which is the trust version of the no-contest clause legislation that was adopted by the Nevada Legislature in 2009 and updated in 2011. And I will state for the record that I was on the legislative committee that helped draft this legislation and the purpose of this legislation was because there has been a weakening of people wanting to follow the settlor's intent and one of the paramount laws -- one of the paramount purposes of Nevada trust law has been to carry out the settlor's intent.

In subsection 1 of this section it says that except for a couple of exceptions that we'll discuss in a minute, a no-contest clause in a trust must be enforced. This is to take the discretion out of the Court and, so, subsection 2 says that it is to be construed to carry out the settlor's intent. And subsection 2 goes onto say that the settlor can specify conduct, not just a contest, but any conduct that the settlor that defines can be construed to trigger a forfeiture or a diminution of a beneficiary's share.

So, the -- if you go to page 3 of the PowerPoint, the statutory exceptions are in subsections 3 and 4. Subsection 3 relates to a beneficiary's efforts to enforce the trust instrument. That doesn't apply here. Subsection 4 relates to an action relating to the validity of the document and it's the good faith exception that was created in the Hannam case and this is really a statutory confirmation of the Hannam case, but somewhat of a limitation, but basically saying there had to be good faith reliance on evidence showing the trust document to be invalid. There's been no challenge of the validity of the trust in this instance in terms of the actual settlor's intent. So, those exceptions don't apply here.

Subsection 1 says you must enforce it unless it fits within those two exceptions and they don't apply. And

so, unless the Court is willing to do a little legislative action, a judicial legislation, it's quite clear that you have to enforce the clause and to -- because there have been issues raised about whether one of the settlors or one of the grantors wanted or wouldn't want to have a forfeiture, the statute goes onto say that extrinsic evidence is not admissible. So really there cannot be a mission there where the document is clear.

There's been an argument -- moving onto the slide 4. There's been an argument that the law, especially the common law of [indiscernible] to forfeiture, and while that considers to be the true -- the statute in 1 -- NRS 1 -- Chapter 1, 1.003 -- . -- 1 -- strike that. NRS 1.030 basically says that the common law is superseded by statutory law and, clearly, NRS 163.00195 trumps the importance of a forfeiture.

And in the construction of the no-contest clause, the conduct is the key an what did the settlor define as the conduct? And filing a petition to ask for more than one is entitled is clearly a violation of the clause. And, so, we're saying if you take overt actions, that's worse than filing a petition because if you take funds that aren't yours, it's not like asking for more money, it's taking it and it's even worse.

So, the -- one of the arguments, moving to slide

5, one of the arguments that has been raised is that there needs to be strict construction and the -- Ms. Ahern's counsel wanted to say: Oh, we didn't attack anything or we didn't do things. Well, there's a lot more words than just There's the word seek, there's a word -- there's a lot of different things and it's contrary to the legislative intent to require a settlor to enumerate every possible violation. If -- requiring specific and detailed examples is going to end up actually frustrating the intent rather than carrying it out and, in construing contracts, the Supreme Court has ruled that every word must be given effect and no clause in a contract should be construed to make it meaningless. Well, the arguments that have been raised in this argument would actually really make the nocontest clause meaningless if we require that every -- you know, if the no-contest say, well, it doesn't apply unless you actually embezzle funds, or it doesn't apply unless this -- all that kind of stuff just renders it inadvertent.

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So the legislative intent is: Let's carry out the settlor's intent. So, now let's look at the actual nocontest clause in the document, which is in Article 10. Slide 6, quote:

The grantor specifically desire that the trust be created herein be administered and distributed without the litigation or dispute of any kind, close quote.

It's a fact and it's been established by uncontroverted evidence that Ms. Ahern's conduct necessitated this litigation. But for her conduct, we wouldn't be here. So she's already frustrated the settlor's intent.

Slide 7, quote: If any beneficiary should seek or establish to assert any claim to the assets of these trusts established herein, that violates the no-contest clause.

Fact: Ms. Ahern removed assets from the trust accounts even after she was removed as trustee. She also asserted a claim to 100 percent of a trust that only gave her 35 percent. She's clearly asserted the claim that was not in the trust instrument.

So, the word claim, what is a claim? Well, the position that I'm taking is that as a matter of law, asserting a claim, if I file a petition, that's going to be a violation of the no-contest clause. Well, conversion is also a way of asserting a claim. It's seeking to get assets that you're not entitled to and Ms. Ahern has admitted she owes the trust money and she's, therefore, admitted conversion and that's not excused. Conversion is not excused by lack of wrongful intent, good faith, or lack of knowledge.

And, although Ms. Ahern's counsel went to some

length at the last hearing to say that some of the property has been returned, a return of property does not nullify the conversion. So that is a -- the facts show that she violated the intent of the no-contest clause.

Going to slide number 9: If any beneficiary should seek or should attack, oppose, or seek to set aside the administration and distribution of said trust or to have the same declared null and void or diminished or to defeat or change any part of the trust, that's a violation of the no-contest clause.

Well, go to slide 10. She converted assets. She the ignored fiduciary duties. And spent money, trust money, for personal use. We -- one of the examples was private airplanes and such and that clearly frustrates the intent and it frustrates the proper administration and the proper distributions of the trust. You can -- if you're taking money, after you've been removed as a trustee, and you go move money out of accounts that would be in the hands of the successor trustee, you are frustrating the administration of the trust and you're seeking to nullify not only the trust, but the proper orders of the Court.

The Court found, on slide 11, in its April  $20^{th}$  order, quote:

The Court concludes as a matter of law that Eleanor breached her fiduciary duties.

Well, again, if a threat or a petition can violate the no-contest clause, her conduct constitutes more than an attempt to set aside the trust administration.

Now let's talk about the evidence in this case. Slide 12. Ms. Ahern incurred inappropriate charges, renting a private jet for tens of thousands of dollars, she failed to repay the \$500,00 from Fidelity account, Ms. Ahern has paid 700 to a million -- and a 100,000 to \$1,000,000 for attorneys' fees to defend her conduct without any benefit to the trust and attorneys' fees are not properly paid out of the trust unless it benefits the trust.

Her testimony also said that she interfered with trust assets after being removed as the trustee and has indicated that she jeopardized the trust and created additional expenses for the trust and the beneficiaries by properly -- failing to properly and timely comply with federal tax law.

Now that's setting aside the proper administration of the trust. She did things that nullified what was intended by the grantors.

Going on to slide 14: If any beneficiary should seek to have the same declared null and void or diminished or to defeat or change any part.

She converted and diverted assets. She claimed

that she was entitled to the 65 percent when she wasn't.

That's clearly a frustration in trying to seek -- set aside a part of the trust.

Okay. That's argument number one with the nocontest clause. In my estimate, we have provided facts
that show that the no-contest clause has been violated
multiple times, over and over again, contrary to both the
statutory intent and the grantor's intent.

Slide 15. Now we're moving to argument number two, is saying: Okay. Let's just say the no-contest doesn't apply. If it does apply, we're done. But if it doesn't apply and we're going to move on, if you're going to come up with an exception that says that, oh she needs money to live on, or she needs support, or she — this is really a harsh remedy, if you're going to create an exception for that, then we go on to say: Okay. Even if that's true, she shouldn't get a penny until every cent, every cent of damages and restitution has been made. The trust has to be made whole before she gets any benefit from the trust.

Now in NRS Chapter 153.031 subsection (3):

Compensation can be reduced and if we can show negligence or breach, which we clearly have, and the facts are not only not controverted, they've been admitted, the trustee can be personally liable for all costs of adjudication

including attorneys' fees.

Slide 16: Restatement of Trust, Section 100.

Quote:

A trustee who commits a breach of trust is chargeable with (a) the amount required to restore the values of the trust estate and trust distributions to what they would have been if the portion of the trust affected by the breach had been properly administered; or (b), the amount of any personal benefit to the trustee as a result of the breach.

Slide 17. Now this is still Restatement of Trust, Section 100, but let's read comment 1 -- I mean, comment A:

The primary objectives of this rule if suit is brought against a trustee and if that suit is successful are: 1, to make the trust and it's beneficiaries whole; and, 2, to ensure that the trustee does not personally benefit from the breach.

That's why we very strenuously argued that she shouldn't get her attorneys' fees paid for, she shouldn't have her living expenses paid for because that benefits her before the trust is made whole.

To have the trust make distributions, including the payments of Ms. Ahern's attorneys' fees or taxes, would allow her to benefit from the breach and would not make the beneficiaries whole.

Now, punitive damages are not the general rule, but the Restatement, comment D, in Section 100, says that, after stating that exemplary damages are not normally granted, but it says, quote:

In the egregious case, however, punitive damages are permissible under the laws of many jurisdictions. This is especially so if the trustee has acted maliciously, in bad faith, or in a fraudulently or particularly reckless or self-serving manner.

Well, all of that applies here and in our brief, in our petition, we made an argument for treble damages and we think that should apply.

Now going on to the Restatement Section 253 on slide 19, quote:

If one of several beneficiaries misappropriates or otherwise deals with trust property causing a loss to the other beneficiaries, he is personally liable for the amount of the loss and his beneficial interest is subject to a charge therefor.

Now, up to this point, we've established that the -- that there needs to be a charge against the share and I don't think that's really been argued against.

257 goes on to say, Section 257 of the Restatement of Trust says, quote:

If a trustee who is also one of the beneficiaries

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commits a breach of trust, the other beneficiaries are entitled to a charge upon his beneficial interest to secure their claims against him for the breach of trust.

Now, here's where we differ from the ruling that you just made with the other order is that we think that there can be no advances and there can be no benefit and the Restatement of Trust, Section 257, Comment A, Illustration 1 says:

A bequeaths \$100,000 to B and C in trust to pay income to B for life and, on B's death, to pay the principal of D. B makes an improper investment resulting in the loss of \$10,000. B is not entitled to receive any of the income until he's made good the loss.

And then there's a subsequent example that applies to the same rule to the principal. So if you cause a loss, whether it's of income or principal, you've got to restore it before you get any distribution.

Section 251, Comment A: A beneficiary who owes money to the trust, quote:

Is not entitled receive his share of the trust estate without discharging his liability.

Comment B: When a beneficiary's interest is subject to a charge, the trustee is under a duty to the other beneficiaries to pay out any amount -- to refuse

to pay out any amount due to the charged beneficiary until the charge is satisfied.

This is where we have said to -- there was a lot of questions about the letter we wrote to Mr. Waid about telling him that we were going to hold him responsible, if he made a distribution, because under the law, if he makes a distribution, when -- to a beneficiary who owes the trust money and he does so, then he's subjecting himself to a lawsuit because he can't do that. It's not appropriate. He breaches his fiduciary duty by benefitting the wrongdoer.

And then I just use the analogy that we've used in our Petition and slide 23, compelling the trustee to make a distribution to or for Ms. Ahern before she has made the trust and its beneficiaries whole is like compelling a bank to subsidize or finance the personal support and legal defense of a person who has admitted robbing the bank. And that's what we're being asked to do in this case. We have a bank robber and the trust is being asked to subsidize that and provide for her support and to provide for her legal fees and that's just plain wrong. It's just like asking the bank to help the bank robber with his legal fees. That's just wrong.

Now let's go to the third level of the arguments here and that's the specious defenses that they've raised.

One -- we're on slide 24.

The first one they keep bringing up is undue influence. Number one, that is not applicable in this situation. There is no defense against no-contest clause or breach of fiduciary duties. You can sue whoever hurt you or whoever did things. You might have a part -- and action against somebody who took advantage of you, but undue influence does not absolve them of liability. It doesn't. If they were going to plead incompetence, that's a different issue, but they haven't plead that and it -- so, undue influence is not a thing.

Point number two on undue influence, slide 25, Ms. Ahern is actually estopped judicially from arguing any lack of mental capacity because she took positions that she wasn't under undue influence. Her prior counsel said, quote:

And we have an EPS social worker saying there's no undue influence. Eleanor is completely with it, very intelligent, and capable of managing not only her personal finances, but the finances of the trust, close quote.

So, taking a contrary position at this point is just wrong.

Now, let's get to the real issue. Undue influence requires proof. They have offered no evidence of undue

influence and one of the things that we have to understand here is that undue influence requires a high level of proof. In the *Hegarty* case, which is an old, longstanding case, it's been upheld. It states that, quote:

In order -- it's not quote yet. In order to establish undue influence under Nevada law, quote:

It must appear either directly or by justifiable inference from the facts proved that the influence destroyed the free agency of the testator.

You and I can influence each other all right. If my child comes to me and says, dad, leave me my entire estate, and I said, well, you've got five brother and sisters, well, no, leave it all to me. That's influence. Now if they coerce me, if they say, dad, I'm not going to feed you, I'm not going to help you with your dialysis unless you give me your estate, that's undue influence. That's coercion. There's been no level of undue influence here.

The quote -- quoting from the same case in Hegarty:

The mere possession of influence and the opportunity and motive to exercise it are not sufficient.

There's been no proof. In fact, what did they offer? Let's go to slide 27. Even if the case -- undue

influence constituted a defense against no-contest clause or against the withholding of distributions, the only proof that they even did is they called Jackie or Jacqueline to talk about the -- her concerns and suspicions that she brought up in one of the pleadings that we filed on her behalf. For the record, that information about her concerns was provided with a disclaimer that that information was not intended to have any legal significance. She was just explaining what was going on. No credible evidence of undue influence was presented. And what did Ms. Ahern testify? She testified it was essentially unreliable hearsay. What had been -- what happened in her presence didn't amount to any proof of anything. There was not even proof of influence, let alone undue influence.

So, let's get to the conclusion. Number one, the no-contest clause must be enforced. The grantor's intent and the Legislature's intent coincides. Multiple violations have been established by fact, even by admission, and only one is needed to trigger the no-contest clause.

Number two, slide 29, if the no-contest clause is not enforced, Ms. Ahern cannot be paid any funds and no distributions to or for her can be made until, one, the damages triggered by her malfeasance have been accurately

determined, and that still remains to be done and I'm sure an evidentiary hearing will be required, and then once we determine what they have, they have to be fully satisfied. And until that happens, her share needs to be frozen and the Restatement is clear on that, on two points.

Number one, it would benefit the wrongdoer and, number two, it would put the trustee in breach of trust to the other beneficiaries and one of the duties of a trustee is impartiality. You can't be impartial if you're favoring a beneficiary that's a wrongdoer.

And then the defense is, the last slide, slide 30, Ms. Ahern's, quote, defenses and arguments are really smokescreen. They're red herrings. They throw the hunting dogs off the scent and they're not supported by the law and no evidence has supported them at all.

And, so, those are our arguments.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Rushforth.

MR. RUSHFORTH: Thank you.

THE COURT: I did have a question about slide 29.

MR. RUSHFORTH: Okay.

THE COURT: Addresses really two issues, I think, Mr. Lenhard might want to be prepared for and one is the issue -- you say that in the event that the no-contest clause is enforced, then she cannot be paid until the damages have been ascertained. So it's not your position

1 that we have information today to know what those damages That -- because I wasn't clear what the amount --2 3 MR. RUSHFORTH: Yes. 4 THE COURT: -- that you --5 MR. RUSHFORTH: Because we -- until Mr. Waid can 6 finish his accounting and --7 THE COURT: Okay. 8 MR. RUSHFORTH: -- ascertain what were proper 9 trust expenses, what were personal expenses, what the tax 10 consequences are, all of those things have got to be sorted 11 through before we can really know what the full amount of 12 the damages are. 13 THE COURT: And then my question about punitive 14 damages is whether you were looking to treble that amount, 15 whatever that amount might be if it was later determined 16 there was a specific dollar amount or just punitive 17 damages, which would be some other amount intended to 18 punish, which --MR. RUSHFORTH: Well, I'll --19 20 THE COURT: -- is the true definition of punitive 21 damages. 22 MR. RUSHFORTH: Our argument would be that we're 23 entitled to punitive damages and we think that the statute 24 that we cited in NRS Chapter 143 gives us treble damages,

but if the Court isn't willing to apply that statute, we

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1 still feel that we're entitled to some sort of exemplary 2 damages. 3 THE COURT: Okay. Because I just didn't know if 4 you were looking to have a specific amount determined and 5 then that amount trebled or if you're just looking for this 6 is so egregious, you can't, you know, as a trustee, you 7 can't do this. There's just punitive damages, just a general concept of what punitive damages are, and just 8 9 should be assessed. 10 MR. RUSHFORTH: Well we're asking for treble. 11 Which requires a different kind of a 12 hearing to determine --13 MR. RUSHFORTH: Right. 14 THE COURT: -- you know, what the person can pay 15 for -- under our statute for punitive damages. 16 MR. RUSHFORTH: Correct. 17 THE COURT: I was just trying to figure that out. 18 MR. RUSHFORTH: Yeah. We're asking for treble, but then our fallback position if that doesn't --19 20 THE COURT: Just punitive. 21 MR. RUSHFORTH: -- apply, then we'll go to 22 punitive. 23 THE COURT: Got it. Okay. Thank you. 24 And just, again, for the record, it will be a 25 Court's Exhibit.

MR. LENHARD: Going in reverse order, to answer the question that the Court just asked, our position is the Court is not in a position today to determine how much Ms. Ahern's interest in the trust should be surcharged for any malfeasance. That's subject to Mr. Waid's final accounting and a future evidentiary hearing.

That is also true for the claim of punitive damages, as it's being made today. The Court is not in a position yet to assess punitive damages either by an amount or even award in concept punitive damages until a later hearing. What we're here today to argue about is whether a no-contest clause is be enforced against my client and she is to be removed as a beneficiary of the trust.

It's rather clear that our position is that that remedy is inappropriate and that the appropriate remedy is and always has been a surcharge of her interest in the trust until the trust is made whole for any malfeasance that she occurred or that she incurred. That would be subject, again, to Mr. Waid's final report and assessment of what those damages are and our opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Waid, Mr. Rushforth's opportunity to examine Mr. Waid so that the Court can then make a finding as to the total amount of damage and then surcharge appropriately. That has always been our position as to the appropriate remedy.

But what brings us here today though is something much more aggressive. It's an effort by two of the beneficiaries to remove a third beneficiary from the trust and I would suggest to the Court that that remedy is highly inappropriate.

I'm not going to repeat what I said in opening statement, nor am I going to repeat the basic points established in the evidentiary hearing. It was only last week, I believe, the beginning of last week, so I'm sure that you remember everything that occurred. I will go through certain basic points to tie into the basic language of the trust and what you are being asked to do.

The no-contest clause, and Mr. Rushforth has referred to the no-contest clause in his PowerPoint. I'm going to refer though to specific language of the no-contest clause. And give me just a second. I managed to misplace it already.

One of the first clauses that I'm concerned about is:

The grantor specifically desire that these trusts created herein be administered and distributed without litigation or dispute of any kind.

Now, I agree with Mr. Rushforth. If my client misapplied funds, they had a right to petition the Court to seek an accounting. That is not in reasonable dispute.

What is in dispute is their effort to remove a beneficiary from the trust. That is an aggressive action that is not called for under clause 10. In fact, that is in violation of the specific provision without litigation or dispute of any kind.

They have instituted litigation to remove a beneficiary when the appropriate remedy is to surcharge that beneficiary for any misappropriated funds. So they, in truth, are in violation of clause 10, the no-contest clause of the trust.

Now I think we can all agree on this record that you have found that Mrs. Ahern has in fact misapplied trust funds, disobeyed your order, and been untruthful to the Court, all actions that generally would result in surcharging her interest. But those actions don't justify the additional step of attempting to remove her as a beneficiary, contrary to the clear language of clause 10.

The law does [indiscernible] a forfeiture in this state and that is the common law and it's not been changed by statute.

There has been a reference and I'm now going to refer you to some of the evidence that we did adduce.

There's been a reference to an attack on the trust and that's been one of the justifications and the primary justification in their moving papers for this motion. It's

the language: Attack, oppose, or seek to set aside the administration, distribution of the said trust.

Well, how did Ms. Ahern attack the trust?

Apparently it's the misallocation of funds. If you look at page 3, which is Exhibit -- to Exhibit G, which is Mr.

Waid's interim report, according to that report, and he cites the Marquis and Aurbach document, \$1,984,564 should have been retained in the trust at the time it was returned over to him.

We clearly can concede that the designation of accounts provided to Mr. Waid were incorrect, but the person supposedly attacking the trust, and I walked Mr.

Waid through this exercise for this purpose. The purpose 
- the person supposedly attacking the trust helped Mr. Waid retrieve funds. April 8<sup>th</sup>: \$409,228, those were obtained in a cashier's check into the trust account. April 13: \$500,000 from U. S. Bank was identified as Eleanor, retained or retrieved by Mr. Waid. April 16: \$700,000 in a cashier's check was forwarded to Marquis and Aurbach, forwarded on to Mr. Waid.

So, within two weeks of his appointment, or within a couple weeks of his appointment, I don't have it exactly right, \$1,609,228.50 had been recovered. You were only a couple of hundred thousand dollars off at that point in time.

So, the attack -- let's keep it in perspective. The person supposedly attacking -- misallocating all the funds is helping the trustee retrieve the funds. I say that not to justify Ms. Ahern's actions, but to suggest that the remedy being sought, contrary to the language in Paragraph 10, is highly inappropriate.

Now Mr. Waid went on to make the eventual determination, based on the income received in the first three months of 2015, he determined the trust shortfall was \$664,000. As we all know, we've been attempting, and I hate to use this word tender, whatever the appropriate word is, we've been attempting to return some of the money to the trust. We would virtually wipe out 80 percent of that number with however we handle these funds that we've offered to the Court last week and today.

That leaves really then the primary issues to be resolved by the trustee are the tax issues, which we clearly acknowledge that if Ms. Ahern has caused the trust tax damages, her interest has to be surcharged for that, but it's surcharged, not removed.

Now, it's also been alleged that Ms. Ahern has not been cooperative with the trustee and that's a basis for her removal. Well, as Mr. Waid admitted on the stand, her counsel has agreed and worked with him to get the IME and arrange for the deposition. We have certainly not been

opposing that deposition.

As counsel, we've not opposed the authorization. We didn't get a signature. We didn't oppose his effort to get an order for the authorization. So the cooperation issue is really -- I -- to quote counsel, a red herring.

Now I'm asking you to contrast Eleanor's actions now with the actions of the two sisters. First, they have filed this petition to remove Eleanor as a trustee and I again ask you and request you to read clause 10 closely and ask you if it fits within the parameters of clause 10. Clearly, it does not. They are the ones that are attempting to violate the trustor's intent.

But it doesn't stop there. On November 20, 2015, and I think it was our Exhibit E, I don't know how it was responded to Exhibit E. I'm not sure how it was eventually entered, Ms. Clerk. It's a letter dated November 20, 2015. Do you have that in front of you, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Which --

MR. LENHARD: I'm going to read report -- a couple of appropriate sections of it.

THE CLERK: What was the date?

THE COURT: November 20<sup>th</sup>, 2014 [sic].

MR. LENHARD: I may be referring to the wrong exhibit number. We have some confusion in the last week, if you recall.

1 THE CLERK: Exhibit E. 2 MR. LENHARD: Is it Exhibit E? 3 MS. PETERSON: It's also their H, I believe. 4 MR. LENHARD: Okay. 5 MS. PETERSON: Is that right? 6 MR. LENHARD: I'm sorry. 7 THE COURT: Yeah. I have the wrong stuff here. 8 Two sets of the same thing, I think. Okay. 9 MR. LENHARD: On November 20, the Rushforth Firm 10 sent correspondence to Mr. Waid requesting him to 11 immediately cease and desist in further investigative 12 efforts. The letter went onto state: 13 My clients must insist that you no longer spend 14 time and resources on this matter and that you waive 15 the white towel and conceded you can no longer move 16 forward. Your --17 Down at the bottom of the paragraph, on page 3: 18 But as your investigation has been an attempt to 19 recover assets for them that have been stolen from 20 them, I would respectfully assert that they, too, must 21 have a say and instruct you to cease your efforts. 22 I asked Mr. Waid what he was doing on November 20<sup>th</sup>, 2015and he told the Court the efforts he was 23 24 undertaking on behalf of the trust. This letter is a clear

violation of Paragraph 10, the no-contest clause, which

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says:

Attack, oppose, or seek to set aside the administration or distribution of said assets or to have the same declared null or void or defeat or change any part of the provisions of the trust established herein.

Mr. Waid is attempting to administer the trust and they are interfering with that action.

It goes on, on January 29<sup>th</sup>, when they send correspondence to Mr. Waid. I have Exhibit F. It doesn't matter if you look at it or not. We've discussed it before. They sent correspondence to Mr. Waid saying if you obey the Court's order, we're going to sue you. We're going to hold you personally liable for obeying an order of the Court which is in further administration of the trust, once again, interfering with the administration of the trust and violating clause 10, the no-contest clause.

I'm only pointing this out because this is a Court of equity, they have unclean hands, and what I'm trying to point out to the Court is, yes, my client has misallocated funds. She's behaved poorly. They have interfered with Mr. Waid's effort to end this trust, to locate assets, and to appropriately allocate assets.

Under these circumstances, I'm suggesting to the Court, it is appropriate to not remove Ms. Ahern from the

trust, but to surcharge her interest in the trust.

You've been shown a PowerPoint and I wanted to go through a couple of these, if I can, with you. Actually, bear with me just a second.

If a trustee -- this is page 20 and this is really our circumstance, isn't it?

If a trustee, who is also one of the beneficiaries, commits a breach of the trust, that's Eleanor, the other beneficiaries are entitled to a charge upon his beneficial interest to secure their claims against him for the breach of the trust.

We are arguing for exactly that. We are arguing for exactly that remedy, that her interest be surcharged until such time as it's paid off in full. It does not call for the removal from her from the trust.

Now, the undue influence issue, it's kind of a sorry history and a sorry story, isn't it? But I will tell you, as I refer to you the other day, proof of undue influence is rarely by direct testimony. Rarely do you have a victim come in and say: I was unduly influenced. Instead, you've got to do it by indirect testimony. In this case, we had directly from one of the moving plaintiffs.

We went through the set the record straight document. I'm not going to do it again. The record is

clear on the numerous items of influence of others upon Ms. Ahern, but I am going to read to you a section from the EPS document, which is an exhibit in this case and I think it was filed under seal. So I don't know how I do this when I read this into the record.

But in any event, I ask Ms. Montoya to verify this clause of the EPS. She read it and she verified its accuracy. So let me read it into the record and then I'm going to ask you the question: Is this not indicative of someone under the influence of others? And I'm not arguing undue influence to excuse Ms. Ahern's actions. She still has to pay the price if she was under the influence of others and have her interest surcharged. What I'm arguing is someone under this type of influence that had these type of things happen to her should not be removed from the trust. That's what I'm arguing. There's a significant difference.

RP, which I believe is the reporting party, states:

Client has been going into the West Cheyenne and Jones branch since December of 2011. Client often comes into the bank requesting large sums of cash, 50,000 or more. When asked why she needs so much cash, client would state that God told her withdraw the money or Sue told her to withdraw the money. Sometimes the

client would return and deposit the money back into the account. God or Sue would tell her it's okay to deposit the money back into the account. Reporting party states that client's daughter, Jacqueline Montoya, contacted the banker and stated somehow hers and the client's address had been changed. notes that the new address was changed to Susanne Nuna's address. 

We believe that's Nuanna [phonetic]. Susanne is the client's bookkeeper.

I wanted to bring that to the Court's attention because I don't think anybody in this room is believing that God is telling Eleanor Ahern to remove that money.

I don't believe, and you have to determine what the trustor's intended by referring to Paragraph 10, but I think it's clear from this record that someone has been influencing the actions of my client. My client was a trustee who was influenced by others. My client has to pay the price of that influence. But to remove my client under the circumstances that are presented to you would be a gross injustice. She should be surcharged, she should be pay the price, and the Court can do that in a separate hearing, and the Court can determine what is the level of damage. And if there's punitive damage, the Court can make that determination, but to remove the beneficiary in light

of what's happened in this case, in light of the active interference of the daughters in the administration of the estate, in light of influence of others, again, I would suggest is highly unfair.

Finally, I've got to refer to the bank robbery slide. Compelling the trustee to make a distribution to or for Mrs. Ahern before she has made the trust whole [indiscernible] to subsidize or finance the personal support and legal defense of a person who has admitted robbing the bank. You know, I was a PE for a long time, I've defended bank robbers. I've got to tell you, I've never defended a bank robber yet that owned 35 percent of the bank. So I don't see how the slide really adds to anything here.

The end of the day, the appropriate remedy is what I'm suggesting and I'll suggest it again. Her interest should be surcharged. She should be granted a stipend or a small living expense until she pays off her obligations in full. That living expense can be handled, or doled out, or distributed by the trustee or under the supervision of the trustee. That way, the sisters, or these movants, will eventually retrieve their funds.

Any other remedy is much, much too harsh and contrary to the terms of that document. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

1 MR. LENHARD: And also, to -- I'd be remiss, 2 Judge, in also thanking you for your ruling earlier today 3 on the order. 4 THE COURT: Thank you. Okay. I'm assuming 5 there's -- the trustee takes no position? Thank you. All 6 right. Mr. Rushforth, in conclusion. 7 MR. RUSHFORTH: May I? 8 THE COURT: Yes. 9 MR. RUSHFORTH: I just want to --10 MR. LENHARD: If you want, I'll get out of your 11 way. 12 THE COURT: And just for the record, Mr. Moody, I 13 think, is indicating the trustee takes no position. 14 MR. MOODY: The trustee takes no position. 15 THE COURT: Thank you. 16 MR. RUSHFORTH: I just want to -- just a couple of 17 things for the record. 18 Number one is that they want to apply the no-19 contest clause against our clients for enforcing the no-20 contest clause and there is an exception under NRS 21 163.00195 and that subsection (3) that says if you're 22 seeking to enforce the terms of the trust, that's an 23 exception. That's what we're trying to do. 24 Number two is that the bank robber applies, even

if there is a 35 percent owner.

Number two -- number three is that the restitution doesn't eliminate the fact that -- the partial restitution doesn't eliminate the damages and what not.

And one of the things that really wasn't addressed was even if the no-contest clause doesn't apply, and I, again, repeat creating an undue influence exception to the no-contest clause is not within the purview of this Court, that's a legislative function. They gave two exceptions and not an undue influence exception, so you're going to have to legislate a new exception to that. And that -- there -- the standard for undue influence has not been met in this case. They haven't met it.

And, so, the final thing that I want to say is that even if a no-contest clause doesn't apply for any reason, not one penny should benefit Ms. Ahern under any circumstances until that's been -- he read slide 20 but he didn't read slide 21 that says no penny can come out until it's been fully restored.

THE COURT: The question I have about the statute on no-contest clause is it does state throughout that a beneficiary's share may be reduced --

MR. RUSHFORTH: Or eliminated.

THE COURT: -- or eliminated.

So, do they give us -- and there's no test for the difference between when do you reduce it versus when do you

2 MR. RUSHFORTH: It's actually intended to mean it 3 may be reduced or eliminated as provided in the no-contest 4 clause. That's what the meaning of that statute is. 5 THE COURT: Okay. All right. 6 MR. RUSHFORTH: So the settlor --7 THE COURT: Because it doesn't really say that and 8 MR. RUSHFORTH: Well, if you read it in context, 9 10 it says: The settlor may provide that the beneficiary's 11 share may be reduced or eliminated. 12 THE COURT: Okay. 13 MR. RUSHFORTH: And it's the settlor's provision 14 that is the governing thing. 15 THE COURT: Okay. MR. RUSHFORTH: 16 That's all. 17 THE COURT: All right. 18 MR. LENHARD: We would ask, obviously, you 19 strictly enforce the statute and read the statute as 20 written. 21 THE COURT: All right. Thanks. The concern that 22 I have here, and have had since the beginning, is that 23 instead of initiating litigation to determine whether the 24 action to -- the initial distributions of the 65 percent to

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eliminate it?

the beneficiaries was stopped without seeking prior Court

approval and that's -- at that point in time, ultimately, the conclusion of that was that she should have asked for direction from the Court as to whether that was an appropriate determination, was Ms. Ahern really entitled to the entire 100 percent and entitled to then stop the distributions of the 65 percent.

So, ultimately, that was the conclusion. No, that was inappropriate. You need to get permission from the Court and the ultimate conclusion of the Court was: No, you can't do that. The 65 percent was Mrs. Connell's to give and she gave it as she wished to and, so, ultimately, that determination was adverse to Ms. Ahern.

So, the question is then: Whether in just stopping the payment, as she did, instead of seeking the Court approval, that alone was probably not enough to trigger either of these remedies that are being sought here.

However, the misuse of the funds during that period of time is the thing that has troubled the Court and continues to trouble the Court to this point in time.

There may not have been either of these actions up to that point in time, may not have resulted in the same kind of a sanction because, ultimately, the decision -- when it gets to her that she was not entitled to the 65 percent, that's what it is, she still had her 35 percent, but the next step

was how did she use the funds during that period of time. That's where we run afoul of what was intended and that's where have a problem here and clearly she didn't do that in violation of the no-contest clause to the extent of bringing any kind of litigation, it was just miss -- she misapplied -- she just didn't properly apply her duties as a trustee.

So the question is: The fact that during that period of time, when she was solely in control of the 100 percent being told to maintain the 65 percent, pending the outcome of who was entitled to it, just a gross misuse of those funds during that period of time.

I thought all along somebody probably needed to go to jail. Judge Gonzalez didn't send her to jail. That's her choice. She felt that that wasn't properly set up since there is that type of contempt of a Court order requires very specific findings before a person can be sent to jail, as I've said here today. Somebody did something really wrong and something that may, in fact, justify criminal prosecution. It's pretty shocking to me what has happened here.

But that's why I asked very specifically -- the difference that I see between punitive damages and treble damages because I'm not sure, ultimately, what damages would be here if we're just looking at the surcharge,

before we talk about the no-contest clause. Punitive damages are intended to punish and this seems to me to be a very willful and malicious -- if we read our jury instruction on liability for punitive damages, you know, the conduct probably satisfies that. I don't have any real concern that we can satisfy the standard for punitive damages in this case.

But the question is: Do we also satisfy the statute or is this just a -- just, by just I don't mean to make it sound like this isn't -- this is a small thing, because it was a very gross misuse of trust funds and they clear -- I still believe to this day, contempt of this Court's order, even though it was not punishable by confinement in jail, I still think it's contempt of this Court's order.

So, the question is: Does that contempt rise to the level where Ms. Ahern should be deprived entirely for all time of any claim to trust funds or is it a violation under the Restatement which should be punished by having her interest surcharged? And the reason why I ask about the language of the statute saying reduced or eliminated as the trustee -- the settlor directed in the trust, I just -- you know, I have some real questions and I've always had questions from day one about what the settlor really meant with this trust and what he really intended.

And specifically, what was said back in '70, whenever this was written, 1972, that the trust be created herein be administered and distributed without litigation or dispute of any kind. The sanction's already been imposed for the dispute of not coming to Court to ask for guidance. What really happened here was just the trustee improperly administering this trust and, as I said, to me, even though there's no official finding of contempt in this case, that's what I consider it to have been.

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And, so, for me, it seems to me that this is a case that is appropriate for a surcharge as opposed to the enforcement of the no-contest clause because that's the part of what she violated. She violated her duties as a trustee, which is a very serious thing, and that's why, for me, I ask -- and I want to make real clear that I don't think a surcharge is limited just to everything that it's taking for Mr. Waid to figure out where this money went and to reconstruct it and to figure out how much that all is. I think there is liability here for, at a minimum, treble damages, and I say that seriously. I mean that at a I think this is punitive damage time. think that this is something that needs to be punished. trustee should be allowed to behave this way without It's a very serious thing and I believe consequences. should be -- should subject the trustee to some kind of

punishment and I think that's probably punitive damages.

That's why I wanted to distinguish with Mr. Rushforth, I see it as different. I'm not saying it's one or the other. It might be both, but I think the damage phase needs to go forward.

At this point in time, as I said, I think we dealt with the issues that might have triggered the no-contest clause with the holding that she should not have taken unilateral action to stop paying the 65 percent to her daughters. She should have sought Court approval for that and the ultimate outcome of that would have been: Sorry, you lose. And so she did lose, but in the end, I think that the question is more appropriately handled through a surcharge and appropriate damages, as I said, for -- to be determined at a future date, whether that's punitive or trebling or both. I think it's pretty shocking and needs to be dealt with in a very serious fashion.

So, I would reserve my ruling as to what exactly I think is appropriate. I think you need to specifically look at that issue and brief that issue because I think it's a big deal, to impose punitive damages on an individual is a very huge undertaking and it requires its own separate hearing and I take it very seriously, however, I do think that just looking at the standard set forth in our jury instructions for jurors when they're to look at

punitive damages, we've met it and I don't have any doubt that we have. However, whether there should also be some other kind of damages imposed as to the actual amount that's actually proven, through some other statutory remedy, whether they're exclusive or they can be combined, you know, I think those issues need to be addressed and so we look forward to doing that when we can finally find a hearing on this and I don't know when that is.

So I would hear what counsel --

MR. RUSHFORTH: What's your ruling as to the withholding of all distributions? Our argument has been that she should not have any further distributions until he trust is made whole.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

MR. RUSHFORTH: What's your ruling on that?

THE COURT: That is the statute -- the Restatement of Trust so holds. They recently have cited to the Restatement Third and so there's an indication the Court wants to follow that law. I guess my question is, as I've said here all along, you know, we are, nevertheless, a Court of equity, but I find it's kind of shocking. As I said, up until this point, we haven't -- there is no order in place depriving her of any funds. As I said, there's probably at least first quarter of 2016 income that should be credited to her because we don't have an order in place

yet, she has the right to appeal this. So I would say probably 30 days from Notice of Entry of Order -- I wouldn't think it would go into effect until at least 30 days from Notice of Entry of Order because until then, she's not been deprived of anything. So, only after that, going forward, you know, I think that is -- unfortunately, that is the remedy that the trust -- that the Restatement suggests. So that's what I would say is that while -
MR. LENHARD: Are you ordering that at the close of 30 days that she not receive any additional living expenses? Just so I --

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. LENHARD: Okay.

THE COURT: Correct. And, so, that would be ruling is that we haven't cut her off until we get an order in place. She's got the right to appeal that order, so 30 days from entry of that order.

MR. RUSHFORTH: I'll prepare an order, Your Honor, and if it's -- my understanding is that you are ruling as a matter of law that the no-contest clause does not apply?

THE COURT: Correct. I believe that the exception would be that we already dealt with what might have triggered the no-contest clause when we said: No, you should have filed -- you should have come to court and asked for leave before you cut off the 65 percent. My

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   problem with this has been since the order went into place,
   that she didn't properly maintain the funds. That, to me,
3
   feels -- is her duty as a trustee and that's under the
4
   Restatement appropriate for a surcharge and, as I said, I
5
   think under Nevada law, --
             MR. RUSHFORTH: And her conduct after --
6
7
             THE COURT: -- possible additional damage.
8
             MR. RUSHFORTH: -- she was removed as trustee
9
   doesn't affect that?
10
             THE COURT: No. That's where is aid -- that's
11
   where you've got -- I said I thought it should be punished
12
   by contempt.
13
             MR. RUSHFORTH: But not by the no-contest?
14
             THE COURT:
                         They did not -- they were able to
15
   successfully defeat my referral for contempt. I still
16
   think that conduct was so egregious that it should be
17
   punished in some way. That's why I said I think that we
18
   need to take a look at punitive damages because --
19
             MR. RUSHFORTH:
                             Okay.
20
             MR. LENHARD: But you're not awarding --
21
             THE COURT: -- that is so --
22
             MR. LENHARD: -- punitive damages in this order
23
   yet.
24
             MR. RUSHFORTH: No.
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MR. LENHARD: That's in a separate hearing, so

1 we're clear. 2 THE COURT: That's what I said. 3 MR. LENHARD: Okay. 4 THE COURT: I said that requires a separate 5 hearing. That --6 MR. LENHARD: All right. 7 THE COURT: -- requires a separate type of 8 briefing because it may be different from this concept of: 9 Are they entitled to have their damages trebled? 10 MR. LENHARD: Well there's all kinds of issues 11 with punitive damages. 12 THE COURT: There's a whole different issue there 13 and that's why is aid I think this conduct of just clear 14 contempt of the Court's orders needs to be punished in some 15 way and I think that's punitive damages, but I'm willing to 16 listen to whether instead a statutory approach of trebling 17 damages is the better way to go. 18 MR. LENHARD: Well you've got to find out first --19 THE COURT: I think the conduct rises to punitive 20 21 MR. LENHARD: -- what the damages are. 22 THE COURT: -- damages. 23 Correct. 24 And we've got to find out what he MR. LENHARD:

can retrieve from other law firms and so forth.

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             THE COURT: And that's why I said --
2
             MR. LENHARD: Yeah.
3
             THE COURT: -- it may be the --
4
             MR. LENHARD: Yeah.
5
             THE COURT: -- damages can be trebled but the
6
   thing that for -- is, for me, so shocking is this conduct
7
   of violating the Court's orders, which I said I think
   rises, if you just read the instruction, it rises to the
8
9
   level of punitive damages for me.
10
             MR. LENHARD: We'll fight -- I'll live to fight
11
   that one another day.
12
             THE COURT: Right.
13
             MR. LENHARD: I just want to be certain that we're
14
   clear that that's not part of the order today.
15
             THE COURT:
                         I'm not -- I am not awarding anything
16
   now.
17
             MR. LENHARD: Right.
18
             THE COURT: We have to have a hearing on what the
19
   damages are.
                 I believe -- and that's why I said we have to
20
   look at --
21
             MR. LENHARD: You're keeping her in the trust.
22
          She's still in the trust?
   Right?
23
             THE COURT: She's still in the trust.
24
                           Whenever it's paid back, she gets
             MR. LENHARD:
25
   her 35 percent. Whatever the award is, it's paid back, she
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1
   gets her 35 percent? That's the first thing.
2
             THE COURT: That's her first thing.
3
             MR. LENHARD: Okay. Secondly, so I'm clear, is
4
   after 30 days from the Notice of Entry, she does not
5
   receive a living stipend. Is that -- that's --
6
             THE COURT: Correct.
7
             MR. LENHARD: -- my understanding.
             MR. RUSHFORTH: And can we also have --
8
9
             THE COURT: Until that's -- until it's paid back.
10
   Until --
11
             MR. RUSHFORTH:
                             And --
12
             THE COURT: -- whatever the damages are determined
13
   to be, are --
14
             MR. LENHARD: I understand.
15
             THE COURT: -- paid back.
16
             MR. LENHARD: That's clear.
17
             THE COURT: So, 30 days from the entry of this
18
   order, then there would be no further advances of living
19
   expenses.
20
             MR. LENHARD:
                           Okay.
21
             MR. RUSHFORTH: And can I have it in the order
22
   that the amounts that after the 30 days, the amounts that
23
   would otherwise go to her, can be applied towards her
24
   already adjudicated obligations like attorneys' fees and
25
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things --

1 THE COURT: If they haven't been paid in full yet. 2 I mean, I don't know. The -- whatever is left of this 3 \$620,00, I don't know if that's -- if we're going to have -4 - what's been adjudicated right now is the attorney fee 5 award which was 300 and something, wasn't it? 6 There's more money coming in. MR. LENHARD: THE COURT: That's what I said. We've got first 7 8 quarter, 2016. MR. RUSHFORTH: But --10 MR. LENHARD: I think the trustee should be the 11 one distributing that, frankly. 12 MR. RUSHFORTH: Right. And --13 THE COURT: We've got first quarter 2016. 14 MR. RUSHFORTH: But in the order, I can put in that the trustee is authorized from this money that is not 15 16 being distributed to her, to start making it whole, 17 including the awards to --18 THE COURT: Well, I think I would like to know 19 from the trustee -- not an accounting, but a report as to 20 how far he's gotten towards payment back because I think 21 the attorneys' fees award, there should be enough from this 22 624, minus whatever is being paid to pay the attorneys' 23 fees. Isn't there? 24 MR. RUSHFORTH: And that can be in the order that

25

that's appropriate?

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1
             THE COURT: That's coming out of the -- that's
2
   coming out of 2015 money.
3
             MR. RUSHFORTH: Okay. Good. I'll put it in the
4
   order and I'll run it by counsel to make sure.
5
             THE COURT: Yes. And that's why I said, they've
6
   got 30 days from the Notice of Entry of Order to appeal
7
   this, so --
8
             MR. LENHARD: Just so I can get it on the record
9
   for --
10
             THE COURT: -- I'm -- that's why --
11
             MR. LENHARD: -- purposes of --
12
             THE COURT: -- saying it doesn't take effect until
13
   then.
14
             MR. LENHARD: -- what the Supreme Court is seeing.
15
   The stipend that you had ordered between was what? 5,000 a
16
   month that she gave? What was it, Mr. Waid?
17
             MR. WAID: 5,000 for four months.
18
             MR. LENHARD: 5,000 for --
19
             MR. WAID: It ends in February.
20
             MR. LENHARD: All right. So I would assume that
21
   the stipend that she's not getting in the future would have
22
   been $5,000 a month, just so I can accurately put things in
23
   our pleadings?
24
             THE COURT: We hadn't gotten to that. This was to
25
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get her through this hearing.

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1
             MR. LENHARD: Right.
2
             THE COURT: That was the plan.
3
             MR. LENHARD: So we hadn't even determined, it
4
   could have been less.
             THE COURT: Correct. I mean, could have been --
5
6
             MR. LENHARD: Because, you know, it's somewhat
7
   incredible to me that with all this money owed that the 3
8
   or $4,000 a month really makes a big difference.
9
             THE COURT: I understand.
10
             MR. LENHARD: And I'm going to be raising that,
11
   you might expect.
12
             THE COURT: It's a --
13
             MR. LENHARD: Yeah.
14
             THE COURT: That's why I said, for me, it's
15
   equity, but yeah.
16
             MR. RUSHFORTH: For the record, we have an award
17
   of attorneys' fees to our firm for about $400,000 and I
18
   just --
19
             THE COURT: I thought the total between Mr.
20
   Stoddard --
21
             MR. RUSHFORTH: Yes.
22
             THE COURT: -- and your firm --
23
             MR. RUSHFORTH:
                             Right.
24
             THE COURT: -- was 400?
25
             MR. RUSHFORTH: But all that -- all the attorneys
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1	that represent our clients and we just want to make sure
2	that the money that comes
3	THE COURT: Right.
4	MR. RUSHFORTH: from the what's not going to
5	the 90,000 can be paid to us for those fees.
6	THE COURT: I think that was the previous order.
7	MR. WAID: It is the previous order, but if the
8	Court is going to specifically require me to pay those to
9	your firm,
10	THE COURT: Yeah.
11	MR. WAID: or the firms,
12	THE COURT: No.
13	MR. WAID: then I'm doing that pursuant to a
14	judgment against Eleanor, which triggers those same
15	problems again.
16	THE COURT: Yeah. And that's why I've said that
17	the money is being distributed and it's all going to be
18	accounted for later.
19	MR. WAID: I were paying those directly to MTC,
20	THE COURT: Right.
21	MR. WAID: it becomes their tax liability, as a
22	distribution.
23	THE COURT: And then they get the tax they get
24	the money from the tax back.

MR. RUSHFORTH: But if you pay it to us as her

1 attorneys' fees, then it's distribution to her.
2 MR. WAID: It has to be because it would be for

her -- it's satisfying a judgment against her.

MR. GEIST: Correct. And I think that comes back to -- sorry, Your Honor, to interrupt, but I think that comes back to our Petition earlier, the tax --

THE COURT: That's the previous --

MR. GEIST: -- consequences.

THE COURT: Yeah. That's the previous order. I mean, I don't think that's part of this order. This order is --

MR. GEIST: But the --

THE COURT: -- simply --

MR. RUSHFORTH: But --

THE COURT: I'm denying the request to enforce the no-contest clause. I think we've dealt with that. This, to me, is the conduct both during the period of time she was acting as trustee and should have been holding that 65 percent and then the attempt of the Court's orders in like — and lying to the Court about how much money she was holding. That's what I think needs to be further punished. So that's my — I think that we need a surcharge, but we have to determine what the damages are and then we have to address whether it's treble damages, punitive damages, some combination of both. That's — and during that period of

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   time, she's not entitled to any money, but that's 30 days
   from Notice of Entry of Order.
2
             MR. RUSHFORTH: And after that 30 days, I want the
3
4
   trustee to be able to start paying that $400,000 --
5
             THE COURT:
                         That's -- that can be addressed at a
6
   different time. I -- if you're viewing --
7
             MR. RUSHFORTH: Why can't we address --
             THE COURT: If you're viewing --
8
             MR. RUSHFORTH: -- now?
10
             THE COURT:
                         I thought we were dealing with --
11
                              I mean, we have a judgment.
             MR. RUSHFORTH:
12
                         I thought that essentially the money
             THE COURT:
13
   that was going to be paid now was --
14
             MR. RUSHFORTH: Yeah, it's going to the MTC Trust.
15
             THE COURT:
                         Going to the MTC Trust.
16
                             I'm talking about 30 days from
             MR. RUSHFORTH:
17
   now.
18
             THE COURT: Should be enough to satisfy it,
19
   shouldn't it?
20
             MR. RUSHFORTH:
                             It's not because --
21
             THE COURT:
                         Okay.
22
             MR. RUSHFORTH: -- it's going to the MTC Trust as
23
24
             THE COURT:
                         Then I think we need to come back and
25
   see, once the trustee has another interim report for us, or
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1 some sort of a -- some sort of information, to how much 2 we're off because --3 MR. GEIST: Your Honor, if I may? 4 THE COURT: -- I think we need some accounting on 5 here. 6 MR. GEIST: We certainly do. 7 THE COURT: I've lost track of the money. 8 MR. GEIST: We certainly do, and I think the first 9 step is we need to get Ms. Ahern's deposition to help 10 facilitate that, but --11 THE COURT: Right. 12 MR. GEIST: -- just to reiterate, our previous 13 concern about suspending Ms. Ahern's distributions after 14 this 30 days and post entry lapses, that's going to create an issue with the trustee where he is, you know, holding 15 16 onto, in essence, unless there's a reformation of the trust 17 regarding her share. 18 THE COURT: Her interest is suspended at the 19 present time. 20 MR. GEIST: I understand. 21 THE COURT: So she's not entitled to any -- to 22 anything right now and to the extent that she would be 23 getting, which I don't think we'd ever addressed, would be 24 getting any future distributions for --

MR. GEIST: Okay.

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THE COURT: You know, I'm saying: No, pending, --
1
   you know, she's not getting any more money personally, you
2
3
   know, just the word personally, --
4
             MR. GEIST:
                         Right, but --
             THE COURT: -- she's not to receive any future
5
6
   personal distributions but they have the right to appeal
7
   that.
8
             MR. GEIST:
                         Right.
9
             THE COURT:
                         So that's why I'm saying 30 days after
10
   Notice of Entry of Order.
11
             MR. GEIST: And after that point, if what she
12
   would normally get under her 35 percent --
13
             THE COURT: if she --
14
             MR. GEIST: -- if that's going to the MTC Trust,
15
   the IRS could come in and say: Under the terms of the
16
   trust, she should be getting that, notwithstanding Your
17
   Honor's order. So --
18
             THE COURT: I --
19
             MR. GEIST: -- our concern --
20
             THE COURT:
                         Her interest is suspended right now.
21
             MR. RUSHFORTH: Here's the situation is that if
22
   she is going to restore the trust, it's going to come from
23
   taxable income.
24
             MR. GEIST: Right.
25
             THE COURT:
                         Correct.
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1
             MR. RUSHFORTH: And, so, if you have income coming
2
   in that she would normally get, and it starts now wiggling
3
   down what she owes back to the trust, that's still going to
4
   trigger a tax liability to her.
5
             MR. GEIST: Correct.
6
                             So, what's your concern?
             MR. RUSHFORTH:
7
             MR. GEIST: Our concern is: Is her interest
8
   suspended or does she have taxable income coming in?
             MR. RUSHFORTH: And --
10
             THE COURT: Right now, it's suspended and until --
11
   and if -- it would remain -- like I said, she's -- no more
12
   money is being distributed. 30 days, give us 30 days from
13
   Notice of Entry of Order. That gives you some time to work
14
   this all out, figure --
15
             MR. GEIST:
                         Okay.
16
             THE COURT: -- out what some of the numbers are,
17
   and what kind of tax liabilities there are because there
18
   are a lot of them.
19
             MR. GEIST:
                         Yes.
20
             THE COURT:
                         And I don't purport to understand any
21
   of it.
22
             MR. RUSHFORTH:
                             Okay.
23
             THE COURT:
                         Don't come talk to me about taxes.
24
                         We'll work on the order with counsel.
             MR. GEIST:
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So, all I'm saying, and make it

THE COURT:

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1
   however you want to make it, I -- your order says she's
               There's nothing that says that she's suspended
2
   suspended.
3
   only for the 2015 income. It's suspended. We have to have
4
   this hearing on what the damages are.
5
             MR. RUSHFORTH:
                             Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.
6
             THE COURT: And decide how we're going to -- how
7
   long it's going to take to earn all that back, but anyway.
8
             MR. GEIST: So just to be clear on the record, --
             THE COURT: So I'm denying -- yeah.
10
             MR. GEIST: -- her mandatory distribution interest
11
   is suspended by order of the Court?
12
             THE COURT:
                         It's suspended. It remains suspended
13
   and that no distributions would be made to her --
14
             MR. GEIST:
                         Thank you.
15
             THE COURT: -- in any kind of interim fashion for
16
   -- starting 30 days from Notice --
17
             MR. GEIST:
                         30 days.
18
             THE COURT:
                         -- of Entry of Order.
19
                         Thank you, Your Honor.
             MR. GEIST:
20
             THE COURT: Okay. Good luck writing all that.
21
   Okay. All right.
22
23
                 PROCEEDING CONCLUDED AT 1:06 P.M.
24
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## CERTIFICATION

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the audio-visual recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

AFFIRMATION

I affirm that this transcript does not contain the social security or tax identification number of any person or entity.

KRISTEN LUNKWITZ

INDEPENDENT TRANSCRIBER

ORDR

DISTRICT COURT

CLERK OF THE COURT

## CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CASE NO.: P-09-066425-T

DEPT. NO.: XXVI

In the Matter of THE W.N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST DATED May 18, 1972, An Inter Vivos Irrevocable Trust

ORDER REGARDING MOTION FOR ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES; ENFORCEMENT OF NO CONTEST CLAUSE; AND SURCHARGE OF TRUST INCOME

Date of Hearing: February 22, 2016 Time of Hearing: 9:30 a.m.

On June 3, 2015, Jacqueline M. Montoya and Kathryn A. Bouvier ("Movants" or "Ms. Montoya and Ms. Bouvier"), through counsel, filed a *Motion for Assessment of Damages Against Eleanor Ahern; Enforcement of No Contest Clause; and Surcharge of Eleanor's Trust Income* (the "Motion"), and on July 31, 2015, filed a Supplement to the Motion.

On June 29, 2015, Eleanor Connell Hartman Ahern ("Ms. Ahern"), through counsel, filed an opposition to the Motion and, on August 3, 2015, filed a Motion to Strike Supplement to Motion for Assessment of Damages Against Eleanor Ahern; Enforcement of No Contest Clause; and Surcharge of Eleanor's Trust Income ("Motion to Strike"). The Court has not yet ruled on the Motion to Strike.

The Court held an evidentiary hearing on February 22, 2016, which continued on March 3, 2016 (the "Hearings"). On February 22, 2016, legal arguments were presented by all parties, and the testimony of two witnesses, Fredrick Waid and Jacqueline Montoya, was offered. On March 3, 2016, the parties made closing arguments.

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At the Hearings, Ms. Montoya and Ms. Bouvier were represented jointly by attorneys Layne T. Rushforth, Esq., Joseph J. Powell, Esq., and Daniel P. Kiefer, Esq., of The Rushforth Firm, Ltd; Ms. Ahern was represented by Tamara Beatty Peterson, Esq., and Kirk B. Lenhard, Esq., of Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP; and Fredrick P. Waid, in his capacity as the acting trustee of The W.N. Connell and Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust, dated May 18, 1972 (the "Trust"), was represented by Todd L. Moody, Esq., and Russel J. Geist, Esq., of Hutchison & Steffen, LLC.

After consideration of the evidence and arguments presented by the parties and their counsel at the Hearings, and the papers and pleadings on file herein, the Court finds as follows:

- Ms. Ahern, as Trustee, did not comply with the Court order to protect the 65% share of the Trust that was to be segregated under the terms of the Trust for the Movants, Ms. Montoya and Ms. Bouvier.
- 2. Ms. Ahern's failure to properly apply her duties as a Trustee does not warrant imposition of the harsh remedy of imposition of the no-contest clause, specifically her failure to seek Court approval before ceasing payments to the Movants. Therefore, the Court will not enforce the no-contest clause as against Ms. Ahern as beneficiary.
- 3. Ms. Ahern's failure to comply with the Court's Order to protect the Movants' 65% share, however, resulted in a misapplication of the Trust income, which deprived the Movants of funds owed to them under the terms of the Trust. Ms. Ahern's misapplication of Trust funds warrants a surcharge against Ms. Ahern's 35% share of the Trust, to be paid to Movants, in a total amount to be determined at a future hearing to be set by this Court.
- 4. Additional briefing and argument is needed on the issues of punitive and treble damages. It is expected that the additional briefing on such damages, and the hearing on the total amount owed to Movants, will be scheduled after the Successor Trustee, Fredrick P. Waid ("Mr. Waid") finalizes his accounting for the Court.

5. Until such time as the Court decides the total amounts owed by Ms. Ahern, it is necessary to withhold all distributions to Ms. Ahern, other than those amounts previously approved as advancements by the Court's Order Instructing Trustee to Advance Funds dated December 29, 2015, which was entered on January 5, 2016. The suspension of Ms. Ahern's share under this order will be effective thirty (30) days after a Notice of Entry of Order is filed with respect to this Order. This ruling does not supersede or modify the Court's Order on Petition for Instructions Regarding Allocations of Eleanor Ahern's 2015 Trust Unpaid Distributions.

- 6. In further violation of this Court's Orders, Ms. Ahern removed some funds from Trust accounts before turning those accounts over to the Successor Trustee, Mr. Waid. Some funds have since been turned over to the Successor Trustee, however, until such time as Mr. Waid can provide an Accounting the Court cannot rule on Ms. Ahern potential liablity. The exact amount of any damages resulting from these serious breaches of fiduciary duty will be determined at a later evidentiary hearing.
- 7. NRS Chapter 165 imposes a fiduciary duty on Ms. Ahern, as Trustee, had to account for all assets and income received by her and for all distributions made by her. Although Ms. Ahern has been removed or suspended from her role as Trustee, she has not be discharged from her fiduciary duties pending her compliance, and the Court's approval of the accounting to be filed by the successor Trustee, Mr. Waid. The Court found that the account Ms. Ahern filed, under penalty of perjury on March 13, 2015, titled "Brief Regarding Accounting Fiduciary Duties, and Trust Administration", was incomplete and intentionally inaccurate. Ms. Ahern, therefore, remains statutorily obligated to cooperate with the successor Trustee, Mr. Waid, in furtherance of Mr. Waid's accounting, until such time as the Court enters a full and complete discharge of Ms. Ahern.
- Movant's seek punitive damages, which requires a finding of willful and malicious conduct. In the alternative, Movants seek treble damages for breach of fiduciary duty.
   Ms. Ahern's conduct was shocking and needs to be dealt with in a serious fashion,

but the final decision on whether punitive and/or treble damages should be awarded in addition to restitution will be made at the evidentiary hearing to be scheduled after Mr. Waid concludes discovery and prepares his report and accounting to the Court.

 After viewing an independent medical evaluation in camera, the Court finds that Ms. Ahern is competent to sit for a deposition in this matter.

## ORDER

Upon the Court's consideration of the evidence and arguments presented by the parties and their counsel at the hearing on the Motion, and good cause appearing therefore:

- IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Movants' request to enforce the no-contest clause against Ms. Ahern is denied.
- IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Trust distributions to Ms. Ahern are suspended upon the following conditions:
- a. The suspension shall take effect thirty (30) days after notice of entry of this Order is filed;
- b. The suspension shall continue until Movants have been paid in an amount to be determined at a hearing set by this Court following the completion of an accounting of the Trust assets by the interim Trustee, Mr. Waid.
- 3. IT IS FURTHER ORDER ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Mr. Waid shall prepare a report and a trustee's account, and upon completion, a hearing on the amounts owed by Ms. Ahern, including any punitive or treble damages, shall be conducted, unless the parties stipulate otherwise.

DATED this Sof September, 2016.

DISTRICT COURT YUDGE

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I JOSEPH I POWELL	F THE COURT	
	F THE COURT	
THE RUSHFORTH FIRM, LTD. P. O. Box 371655		
4 Las Vegas, NV 89137-1655 Telephone: (702) 255-4552		
fax: (702) 255-4677 e-mail: probate@rushforthfirm.com		
6 Attorneys for Jacqueline M. Montoya		
and Kathryn A. Bouvier		
DISTRICT COURT		
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
9 In the Matter of		
THE W.N. CONNELL and MADIODIE T. Case No. P-09-066425-T		
CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18,		
12 1972,		
A non-testamentary trust.		
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER REGARDING MOTION FOR ASSE		
DAMAGES; ENFORCEMENT OF NO CONTEST CLAUSE; AND SUR TRUST INCOME	CHARGE OF	
16		
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:		
The "Order Regarding Motion for Assessment of Damages; Enforcement	ent of No Contest	
Clause; and Surcharge of Trust Income" was entered on September 13, 2016 and fi	iled on September	
20 19, 2016, a copy of which is attached		
21		
hereto.		
Respectfully submitted by:		
24		
25	28/16	
Joseph J. Powell	Date	
State Bar No. 8875		
28		

**ORDR** 

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DISTRICT COURT

CLERK OF THE COURT

## CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

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In the Matter of THE W.N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST DATED May 18, 1972, An Inter Vivos Irrevocable Trust CASE NO.: P-09-066425-T DEPT. NO.: XXVI

ORDER REGARDING MOTION FOR ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES; ENFORCEMENT OF NO CONTEST CLAUSE; AND SURCHARGE OF TRUST INCOME

Date of Hearing: February 22, 2016 Time of Hearing: 9:30 a.m.

On June 3, 2015, Jacqueline M. Montoya and Kathryn A. Bouvier ("Movants" or "Ms. Montoya and Ms. Bouvier"), through counsel, filed a *Motion for Assessment of Damages Against Eleanor Ahern; Enforcement of No Contest Clause; and Surcharge of Eleanor's Trust Income* (the "Motion"), and on July 31, 2015, filed a Supplement to the Motion.

On June 29, 2015, Eleanor Connell Hartman Ahern ("Ms. Ahern"), through counsel, filed an opposition to the Motion and, on August 3, 2015, filed a Motion to Strike Supplement to Motion for Assessment of Damages Against Eleanor Ahern; Enforcement of No Contest Clause; and Surcharge of Eleanor's Trust Income ("Motion to Strike"). The Court has not yet ruled on the Motion to Strike.

The Court held an evidentiary hearing on February 22, 2016, which continued on March 3, 2016 (the "Hearings"). On February 22, 2016, legal arguments were presented by all parties, and the testimony of two witnesses, Fredrick Waid and Jacqueline Montoya, was offered. On March 3, 2016, the parties made closing arguments.

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XSTRUT FFOGE BEPT XXVI VEGAS, NV 89155

At the Hearings, Ms. Montoya and Ms. Bouvier were represented jointly by attorneys Layne T. Rushforth, Esq., Joseph J. Powell, Esq., and Daniel P. Kiefer, Esq., of The Rushforth Firm, Ltd; Ms. Ahern was represented by Tamara Beatty Peterson, Esq., and Kirk B. Lenhard, Esq., of Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreek, LLP; and Fredrick P. Waid, in his capacity as the acting trustee of The W.N. Connell and Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust, dated May 18, 1972 (the "Trust"), was represented by Todd L. Moody, Esq., and Russel J. Geist, Esq., of Hutchison & Steffen, LLC.

After consideration of the evidence and arguments presented by the parties and their counsel at the Hearings, and the papers and pleadings on file herein, the Court finds as follows:

- 1. Ms. Ahern, as Trustee, did not comply with the Court order to protect the 65% share of the Trust that was to be segregated under the terms of the Trust for the Movants, Ms. Montoya and Ms. Bouvier,
- Ms. Ahern's failure to properly apply her duties as a Trustee does not warrant imposition of the harsh remedy of imposition of the no-contest clause, specifically her failure to seek Court approval before ceasing payments to the Movanis. Therefore, the Court will not enforce the no-contest clause as against Ms. Ahern as beneficiary.
- 3. Ms. Ahern's failure to comply with the Court's Order to protect the Movants' 65% share, however, resulted in a misapplication of the Trust income, which deprived the Movants of funds owed to them under the terms of the Trust. Ms. Ahern's misapplication of Trust funds warrants a surcharge against Ms. Ahern's 35% share of the Trust, to be paid to Movants, in a total amount to be determined at a future hearing to be set by this Court.
- 4. Additional briefing and argument is needed on the issues of punitive and treble damages. It is expected that the additional briefing on such damages, and the hearing on the total amount owed to Movants, will be scheduled after the Successor Trustee, Fredrick P. Waid ("Mr. Waid") finalizes his accounting for the Court.

- 5. Until such time as the Court decides the total amounts owed by Ms. Ahern, it is necessary to withhold all distributions to Ms. Ahern, other than those amounts previously approved as advancements by the Court's Order Instructing Trustee to Advance Funds dated December 29, 2015, which was entered on January 5, 2016. The suspension of Ms. Ahern's share under this order will be effective thirty (30) days after a Notice of Entry of Order is filed with respect to this Order. This ruling does not supersede or modify the Court's Order on Petition for Instructions Regarding Allocations of Eleanor Ahern's 2015 Trust Unpaid Distributions.
- 6. In further violation of this Court's Orders, Ms. Ahern removed some funds from Trust accounts before turning those accounts over to the Successor Trustee, Mr. Waid. Some funds have since been turned over to the Successor Trustee, however, until such time as Mr. Waid can provide an Accounting the Court cannot rule on Ms. Ahern potential liablity. The exact amount of any damages resulting from these serious breaches of fiduciary duty will be determined at a later evidentiary hearing.
- 7. NRS Chapter 165 imposes a fiduciary duty on Ms. Ahern, as Trustee, had to account for all assets and income received by her and for all distributions made by her. Although Ms. Ahern has been removed or suspended from her role as Trustee, she has not be discharged from her fiduciary duties pending her compliance, and the Court's approval of the accounting to be filed by the successor Trustee, Mr. Waid. The Court found that the account Ms. Ahern filed, under penalty of perjury on March 13, 2015, titled "Brief Regarding Accounting Fiduciary Duties, and Trust Administration", was incomplete and intentionally inaccurate. Ms. Ahern, therefore, remains statutorily obligated to cooperate with the successor Trustee, Mr. Waid, in furtherance of Mr. Waid's accounting, until such time as the Court enters a full and complete discharge of Ms. Ahern.
- 8. Movant's seek punitive damages, which requires a finding of willful and malicious conduct. In the alternative, Movants seek treble damages for breach of fiduciary duty. Ms. Ahem's conduct was shocking and needs to be dealt with in a serious fashion,

but the final decision on whether punitive and/or treble damages should be awarded in addition to restitution will be made at the evidentiary hearing to be scheduled after Mr. Waid concludes discovery and prepares his report and accounting to the Court.

9. After viewing an independent medical evaluation in camera, the Court finds that Ms. Ahern is competent to sit for a deposition in this matter.

### <u>ORDER</u>

Upon the Court's consideration of the evidence and arguments presented by the parties and their counsel at the hearing on the Motion, and good cause appearing therefore:

- IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Movants' request to enforce the no-contest clause against Ms. Ahern is denied.
- 2. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Trust distributions to Ms. Ahern are suspended upon the following conditions:
- a. The suspension shall take effect thirty (30) days after notice of entry of this Order is filed;
- b. The suspension shall continue until Movants have been paid in an amount to be determined at a hearing set by this Court following the completion of an accounting of the Trust assets by the interim Trustee, Mr. Waid.
- 3. IT IS FURTHER ORDER ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Mr. Waid shall prepare a report and a trustee's account, and upon completion, a hearing on the amounts owed by Ms. Ahem, including any punitive or treble damages, shall be conducted, unless the parties stipulate otherwise.

DATED this \_\_\_\_\_of September, 2016.

DISTRICT COURT YUDGE

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**CLERK OF THE COURT** 

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	LAYNE T. RUSHFORTH
2	State Bar No. 1004
3	JOSEPH J. POWELL
	State Bar No. 8875
4	DANIEL P. KIEFER
	State Bar No. 12419
5	THE RUSHFORTH FIRM, LTD.
	P. O. Box 371655
6	Las Vegas, NV 89137-1655
	Telephone: (702) 255-4552 / Fax: (702) 255-4677
7	e-mail: probate@rushforthfirm.com
8	Attorneys for Jacqueline M. Montoya
	and Kathryn A. Bouvier
I	1

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

In the Matter of the Estate

THE W.N. CONNELL and MARJORIE T CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, 1972,

A Non-Testamentary Trust.

Case No. P-09-066425-T Department: XXVI (Probate)

NOTICE OF APPEAL

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Petitioners Jacqueline M. Montoya and Kathryn A. Bouvier hereby appeal to the Supreme Court of Nevada from the Order Regarding Motion for Assessment of Damages; Enforcement of No Contest Clause; and Surcharge of Trust Income (the "Order"), entered in this action on September 19, 2016, for which a Notice of Entry of Order was subsequently entered on September 28, 2016. A true and accurate copy of the Order is attached hereto as **Exhibit 1**.

Dated this 19th day of October 2016.

THE RUSHFORTH FIRM, LTD.

By: LAYNE T. RUSHFORTH
JOSEPH J. POWELL

DANIEL P. KIEFER

Attorneys for Jacqueline M. Montoya and Kathryn A. Bouvier

### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

Pursuant to Rule 5(b), I hereby certify that service of the above **NOTICE OF APPEAL** was made via wiznet.com on this date as follows:

Todd Moody, Esq. HUTCHISON & STEFFEN LLC 10080 W. Alta Drive #200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Attorney for Interim Trustee

Kirk B. Lenhard, Esq. BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER SCHRECK, LLP 100 North City Parkway, Suite 1600 Las Vegas, Nevada 89106 Attorney for Eleanor Ahern

DATED this 19th day of October, 2016

Employed of Rushforth Firm, Ltd.

# Exhibit 1

# Exhibit 1

<b>a</b> 1	Lyrox	Alm & Chum					
1 2	NEOJ JOSEPH J. POWELL State Bar No. 8875	CLERK OF THE COURT					
3	THE RUSHFORTH FIRM, LTD.						
4	P. O. Box 371655 Las Vegas, NV 89137-1655						
5	Telephone: (702) 255-4552 fax: (702) 255-4677						
6	e-mail: probate@rushforthfirm.com Attorneys for Jacqueline M. Montoya						
7	and Kathryn A. Bouvier	Tr Ooting					
8		CT COURT					
9	CLARK COU	NTY, NEVADA					
10	In the Matter of	Case No. P-09-066425-T					
11	THE W.N. CONNELL and MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18,	Department: XXVI (Probate)					
12	1972,						
13	A non-testamentary trust.						
14	NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER REGARDING MOTION FOR ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES; ENFORCEMENT OF NO CONTEST CLAUSE; AND SURCHARGE OF						
15		INCOME					
16	NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:						
17							
18	The "Order Regarding Motion for Asse	ssment of Damages; Enforcement of No Contest					
19	Clause; and Surcharge of Trust Income" was ente	ered on September 13, 2016 and filed on September					
20	19, 2016, a copy of which is attached						
21 22	hereto.						
23	Respectfully submitted by:						
24							
25		9/28/16					
26	Joseph J. Powell	Date					
27	State-Bar No. 8875						
28							
i							

Electronically Filed 09/19/2016 02:58:06 PM

**ORDR** 

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### DISTRICT COURT

CLERK OF THE COURT

### CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CASE NO.: P-09-066425-T

DEPT. NO.: XXVI

In the Matter of THE W.N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST DATED May 18, 1972, An Inter Vivos Irrevocable Trust

ORDER REGARDING MOTION FOR ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES; ENFORCEMENT OF NO CONTEST CLAUSE; AND SURCHARGE OF TRUST INCOME

Date of Hearing: February 22, 2016 Time of Hearing: 9:30 a.m.

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On June 3, 2015, Jacqueline M. Montoya and Kathryn A. Bouvier ("Movants" or "Ms. Montoya and Ms. Bouvier"), through counsel, filed a Mation for Assessment of Damages Against Eleanor Ahern; Enforcement of No Contest Clause; and Surcharge of Eleanor's Trust Income (the "Motion"), and on July 31, 2015, filed a Supplement to the Motion.

On June 29, 2015, Eleanor Connell Hartman Ahern ("Ms. Ahern"), through counsel, filed an opposition to the Motion and, on August 3, 2015, filed a Motion to Strike Supplement to Motion for Assessment of Damages Against Eleanor Ahern; Enforcement of No Contest Clause; and Surcharge of Eleanor's Trust Income ("Motion to Strike"). The Court has not yet ruled on the Motion to Strike.

The Court held an evidentiary hearing on February 22, 2016, which continued on March 3, 2016 (the "Hearings"). On February 22, 2016, legal arguments were presented by all parties, and the testimony of two witnesses, Fredrick Waid and Jacqueline Montoya, was offered. On March 3, 2016, the parties made closing arguments.

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Georga a stierman District Hedge Henymove Laby Hedgs, ny mass At the Hearings, Ms. Montoya and Ms. Bouvier were represented jointly by attorneys Layne T. Rushforth, Esq., Joseph J. Powell, Esq., and Daniel P. Kiefer, Esq., of The Rushforth Firm, Ltd; Ms. Ahern was represented by Tamara Beatty Peterson, Esq., and Kirk B. Lenhard, Esq., of Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP; and Fredrick P. Waid, in his capacity as the acting trustee of The W.N. Connell and Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust, dated May 18, 1972 (the "Trust"), was represented by Todd L. Moody, Esq., and Russel J. Geist, Esq., of Hutchison & Steffen, LLC.

After consideration of the evidence and arguments presented by the parties and their counsel at the Hearings, and the papers and pleadings on file herein, the Court finds as follows:

- 1. Ms. Ahern, as Trustee, did not comply with the Court order to protect the 65% share of the Trust that was to be segregated under the terms of the Trust for the Movants, Ms. Montoya and Ms. Bonvier.
- 2. Ms. Ahern's failure to properly apply her duties as a Trustee does not warrant imposition of the harsh remedy of imposition of the no-contest clause, specifically her failure to seek Court approval before ceasing payments to the Movanis. Therefore, the Court will not enforce the no-contest clause as against Ms. Ahern as beneficiary.
- 3. Ms. Ahern's failure to comply with the Court's Order to protect the Movants' 65% share, however, resulted in a misapplication of the Trust income, which deprived the Movants of funds owed to them under the terms of the Trust. Ms. Ahern's misapplication of Trust funds warrants a surcharge against Ms. Ahern's 35% share of the Trust, to be paid to Movants, in a total amount to be determined at a future hearing to be set by this Court.
- 4. Additional briefing and argument is needed on the issues of punitive and treble damages. It is expected that the additional briefing on such damages, and the hearing on the total amount owed to Movants, will be scheduled after the Successor Trustee, Fredrick P. Waid ("Mr. Waid") finalizes his accounting for the Court.

5. Until such time as the Court decides the total amounts owed by Ms. Ahern, it is necessary to withhold all distributions to Ms. Ahern, other than those amounts previously approved as advancements by the Court's Order Instructing Trustee to Advance Funds dated December 29, 2015, which was entered on January 5, 2016. The suspension of Ms. Ahern's share under this order will be effective thirty (30) days after a Notice of Entry of Order is filed with respect to this Order. This ruling does not supersede or modify the Court's Order on Petition for Instructions Regarding Allocations of Eleanor Ahern's 2015 Trust Unpaid Distributions.

- 6. In further violation of this Court's Orders, Ms. Ahern removed some funds from Trust accounts before turning those accounts over to the Successor Trustee, Mr. Waid. Some funds have since been turned over to the Successor Trustee, however, until such time as Mr. Waid can provide an Accounting the Court cannot rule on Ms. Ahern potential liablity. The exact amount of any damages resulting from these serious breaches of fiduciary duty will be determined at a later evidentiary hearing.
- 7. NRS Chapter 165 imposes a fiduciary duty on Ms. Ahern, as Trustee, had to account for all assets and income received by her and for all distributions made by her. Although Ms. Ahern has been removed or suspended from her role as Trustee, she has not be discharged from her fiduciary duties pending her compliance, and the Court's approval of the accounting to be filed by the successor Trustee, Mr. Waid. The Court found that the account Ms. Ahern filed, under penalty of perjury on March 13, 2015, titled "Brief Regarding Accounting Fiduciary Duties, and Trust Administration", was incomplete and intentionally inaccurate. Ms. Ahern, therefore, remains statutorily obligated to cooperate with the successor Trustee, Mr. Waid, in furtherance of Mr. Waid's accounting, until such time as the Court enters a full and complete discharge of Ms. Ahern.
- 8. Movant's seek punitive damages, which requires a finding of willful and malicious conduct. In the alternative, Movants seek treble damages for breach of fiduciary duty. Ms. Ahern's conduct was shocking and needs to be dealt with in a serious fashion,

but the final decision on whether punitive and/or treble damages should be awarded in addition to restitution will be made at the evidentiary hearing to be scheduled after Mr. Waid concludes discovery and prepares his report and accounting to the Court.

9. After viewing an independent medical evaluation in camera, the Court finds that Ms. Ahem is competent to sit for a deposition in this matter.

### **ORDER**

Upon the Court's consideration of the evidence and arguments presented by the parties and their counsel at the hearing on the Motion, and good cause appearing therefore:

- IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Moyants' request to enforce the no-contest clause against Ms. Ahern is denied.
- 2. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Trust distributions to Ms. Ahern are suspended upon the following conditions:
- a. The suspension shall take effect thirty (30) days after notice of entry of this Order is filed;
- b. The suspension shall continue until Movants have been paid in an amount to be determined at a hearing set by this Court following the completion of an accounting of the Trust assets by the interim Trustee, Mr. Waid.
- 3. IT IS FURTHER ORDER ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Mr. Waid shall prepare a report and a trustee's account, and upon completion, a hearing on the amounts owed by Ms. Ahem, including any punitive or treble damages, shall be conducted, unless the parties stipulate otherwise.

DATED this \_\_\_\_\_of September, 2016.

DISTRICT COURT VEDGE

28 GLONIA CETTORNIAE DEFENDE SEPTIONE LAS VEGAS, NV 19135

1 ASTA LAYNE T. RUSHFORTH **CLERK OF THE COURT** State Bar No. 1004 JOSEPH J. POWELL State Bar No. 8875 DANIEL P. KIEFER State Bar No. 12419 THE RUSHFORTH FIRM, LTD. P. O. Box 371655 Las Vegas, NV 89137-1655 Telephone: (702) 255-4552 / Fax: (702) 255-4677 e-mail: probate@rushforthfirm.com Attorneys for Jacqueline M. Montova 8 and Kathryn A. Bouvier 9 **DISTRICT COURT** 10 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 11 In the Matter of the Estate Case No. P-09-066425-T 12 Department: XXVI (Probate) THE W.N. CONNELL and MARJORIE T (702) 255-4552 13 CONNELL LIVING TRUST, dated May 18, CASE APPEAL STATEMENT 1972, 14 A Non-Testamentary Trust. 15 Petitioners Jacqueline M. Montoya and Kathryn A. Bouvier hereby provide their Case Appeal 16 Statement in accordance with NRAP 3(a)(1). 17 The District Court Case Number and Parties (NRAP 3(a)(1)(A)) 18 Judicial District County: Eighth 19 County: Clark District Ct. Case No. P-09-066425-T 20 Appellants: Jacqueline M. Montoya and Kathryn A. Bouvier Respondent: Eleanor C. Ahern a/k/a Eleanor Connell Hartman Ahern 21 Other Interested Party: Fredrick P. Waid, Court-Appointed Interim Trustee 22 The District Court Judge (NRAP 3(a)(1)(B)) 23 Department: 26 24 County: Clark Judge: Gloria J. Sturman 25 26

THE RUSHFORTH FIRM, LTD. 1707 Village Center Circle, Suite 150 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134

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### Previous Appeals in this Matter (NRAP 3(a)(1)(J))

Yes: Appeal No. 69737 (dismissed by stipulation of parties), and Appeal Nos. 66231; 67782; 68046 (consolidated and fully briefed).

### Child Custody and Visitation Issues (NRAP 3(a)(1)(K))

N/A

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### Possibility of Settlement ((NRAP 3(a)(1)(L))

Previous settlement attempts have been unfruitful. The parties did previously reach a global settlement, but Ms. Ahern later reneged on the agreement. The petitioners moved to enforce the settlement agreement, but their motion was denied. Furthermore, petitioners do not believe that enforcement of the no-contest clause is an issue that can be resolved through settlement.

Dated this 26<sup>th</sup> day of October 2016.

### THE RUSHFORTH FIRM, LTD.

State Bar No. 1004

By:

JOSEPH J. POWELL

State Bar No. 8875

DANIEL P. KIEFER

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Attorneys for Jacqueline M. Montoya

and Kathryn A. Bouvier

### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

Pursuant to Rule 5(b), I hereby certify that service of the above CASE APPEAL STATEMENT was made via wiznet.com on this date as follows:

Todd Moody, Esq. HUTCHISON & STEFFEN LLC 10080 W. Alta Drive #200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Attorney for Interim Trustee

Kirk B. Lenhard, Esq. BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER SCHRECK, LLP 100 North City Parkway, Suite 1600 Las Vegas, Nevada 89106 Attorney for Eleanor Ahern

DATED this 26th day of October, 2016

Employee of Rushforth Firm, Ltd.

PROFESSIONAL

PECCOLE PROFESSIONAL PARK COBO WEST ALTA DRIVE, SUITE 20 LAS VEGAS, NV 89145 ACCT
Todd L. Moody (5430)
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CLERK OF THE COURT

Attorneys for Fredrick P. Waid Court-appointed Trustee

# DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

In the matter of

THE W.N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST DATED May 18, 1972, an Inter Vivos Irrevocable Trust.

Case No.: P-09-066425-T Dept. 26

### ACCOUNTING AND REPORT OF TRUST ACTIVITY FROM 2013 TO 2015

Fredrick P. Waid, Successor Trustee of the W.N. Connell and Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust, dated May 18, 1972, (the "Trust"), hereby files this Accounting and Report of Trust Activity from 2013 to 2015 ("Report"). During most of this time period, Eleanor Ahern served as the sole trustee of the Trust and had exclusive access and control of all Trust checking, savings and other accounts. The Successor Trustee filed an Interim Report under seal on July 6, 2015.

The Court is well aware of the litigation history in this case and a narrative recital is not warranted in this Report. Since the Appointment of the Successor Trustee in April 2015, this Court has issued numerous orders requiring Ms. Ahern to produce records, comply with deposition notices and cooperate with the Successor Trustee's efforts to prepare an accounting for time periods when she served as Trustee. In response to the Court's orders Ms. Ahern has produced, through her various counsel, only limited records primarily consisting of forwarded mail. She did not appear for any scheduled or ordered depositions notwithstanding the findings

of the Court regarding fraud and other misconduct pursuant to hearings on the Motion to Enforce the Trust's No Contest Clause.

Due to her failure to appear and cooperate as ordered, a significant portion of the transactional history that occurred during Ms. Ahern's tenure as trustee cannot be reconciled or explained. As such, and pursuant to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), the Successor Trustee is unable to this provide the Court with definitive information or explain as to the greatly expanded Trust expenditures, either in dollars spent or to whom those dollars were paid, during the accounting period and Ms. Ahern's tenure as Trustee.

For clarification, in years prior to June 2013, the Trust expenditures were generally limited to three categories, including (1) property taxes, (2) liability insurance premiums and (3) limited professional fees for legal or accounting services. All other income/royalties were distributed to the Trust beneficiaries who were individually responsible for any associated tax liabilities. The Trust was designed to eliminate any taxable income at the Trust level with all income passing to the respective 65% beneficiary, the MTC Trust ("MTC"), and the 35% beneficiary, Eleanor Ahern as a lifetime beneficiary of income only.

During Ms. Ahern's tenure approximately thirty (30) other companies and/or individuals were paid with Trust funds. (A list of payees and amounts is attached as Exhibit A.) Again, due to Ms. Ahern's failure to answer questions under oath, the rationale and basis for the expenditures remain unanswered and unclear. What is clear is that MTC did not receive a single distribution of royalty income from the Trust between June 2013 and April 2015. Only after Ms. Ahern was removed as Trustee by the Court did MTC once again begin receiving its share of distributions. A significant number of expenses that were authorized by Ms. Ahern appear to have provided no benefit to the Trust and cannot be deemed appropriate, deductible business expenses as defined and permitted by the Internal Revenue Code.

After reviewing available records from the Internal Revenue Service, various banks, oil and gas producers, common royalty recipients (*i.e.*, the Miller family, which shares an equivalent 25% royalty interest as the Trust) and partial reconciliations completed by the accounting firm

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of Gammet & King CPAs, the Successor Trustee prepared the chart attached as Exhibit B, which sets forth the best available basis for calculation of royalties not paid to the MTC Trust, as required by the terms of the Trust and as determined by this Court's previous findings and orders.

MTC should have received royalty payments of \$481,010 for 2013, \$2,028,134 for 2014 and \$1,447,406 for 2015, totaling \$3,956,550. MTC received for the three (3) year period a total of \$2,214,497, with \$1,914,622 of the amount being paid after Ms. Ahern was removed as Trustee. The total undistributed royalties for the period is \$1,742,053.

The Successor Trustee takes no position as to the Court's imposition of damages relating to the conduct of Ms. Ahern. The Trustee has ongoing fiduciary duties to Ms. Ahern, notwithstanding her interest being temporarily suspended. Additionally, the Successor Trustee continues his efforts to recover certain tax payments made to the U.S. Treasury as a result of Ms. Ahern's failure to comply with and administer the Trust according to its terms and intent. It is anticipated that amended tax returns and refunds will be resolved and closed by mid-2017. As of the filing of this Report, Ms. Ahern has not identified or confirmed any successor counsel to represent her in this matter.

On Saturday, January 21, 2017, the Successor Trustee coordinated and participated with the Mesquite Police Department in a "well check" of Ms. Ahern. After inspecting her residence and interviewing her, the responding officer determined that Ms. Ahern had sufficient food, clothing and shelter and appeared to be in good health based on his observations and Ms. Ahern's declaration to the officer. It should be noted that the last mailing address provided by Ms. Ahern's former counsel is not the address where Ms. Ahern currently resides. She currently ///

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# HUTCHISON & STEFFEN

A PROFESSIONAL LLC PECCOLE PROFESSIONAL PARK 0080 WEST ALTA DRIVE, SUITE 200 LAS VEGAS, NV 89145 

resides at 111 Paradise Pkwy., Mesquite, Nevada	, 89027.
Dated this day of <del>January</del> , 2017.	
Dated tills day of randary, 2017.	

HUTCHISON & STEFFEN

Todd L. Moody (5430)
Russel J. Geist (9030)
10080 W. Alta Dr., Ste 200
Las Vegas, NV 89145
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Attorneys for Fredrick P. Waid Court-appointed Trustee

- 4 -

# HUTCHISON & STEFFEN

PECCOLE PROFESSIONAL PARK COBO WEST ALTA DRIVE, SUITE 2. LAS VEGAS, NV 89145 1

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as follows:

### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of HUTCHISON & STEFFEN and that on this 1<sup>st</sup> day of February, 2017, I caused a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing ACCOUNTING AND REPORT OF TRUST ACTIVITY FROM 2013 TO 2015 to be served

[X] by placing same to be deposited for mailing in the United States Mail, in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was prepaid in Las Vegas, Nevada; and/or

[X] pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a) and 8.05(f), to be electronically served through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system, with the date and time of the electronic service substituted for the date and place of deposit in the mail; and/or

[ ] Pursuant to EDCR 7.26, to be sent via facsimile; and/or

[ ] to be hand-delivered;

to the persons listed below at the address and/or facsimile number indicated below:

### Via U.S. Mail Only:

Eleanor Ahern 111 Paradise Pkwy. Mesquite, NV 89027

### Via Wiznet Only:

Joseph J. Powell, Esq.
The Rushforth Firm
1707 Village Center Circle, Ste. 150
Las Vegas, NV 89134
Attorneys for Kathryn A. Bouvier and
Jacqueline M. Montoya

### Via U.S. Mail Only:

Eleanor Ahern 400 Paradise Pkwy., Unit 111 Mesquite, NV 89027

### Via Wiznet Only:

Kirk Lenhard, Esq.
Tamara Beatty Peterson, Esq.
Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP
100 North City Parkway, Suite #1600
Las Vegas, NV 89106

### Via Wiznet Only:

Daley A. Hayes, Esq. Liane K. Wakayama, Esq. Candice E. Rinka, Esq. Marquis Aurbach Coffing 10001 Park Run Drive Las Vegas, NV 89145

An Employee of Hutchison & Steffen, LLC

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# **EXHIBIT A**



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# WN CONNELL AND MARJORIE T CONNELL 1972 TRUST CONNELL TRUST ACCTS #1254900135/8737649197/1985753274

January 2013 through December 2015

Type	Date	Memo	Account	Split	Amount
AMERICAN EXPRESS					
Check	04/07/2014	CSH CK #291	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Unknown Expe	-5,000.00
Check	07/03/2014	CSH CK #674	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Unknown Expe	-10,000.00
Check	12/26/2014	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Unknown Expe	-10,000.00
AMERICAN PATROLS					
Check	03/05/2014	RE: AIRAERI	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Unknown Expe	-1,000.00
BANK OF AMERICA					
Check	03/05/2014	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Unknown Expe	-2,000.00
BARBARA SHORTZ					
Check	04/07/2014	CSH CK #291	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Counseling Ex	-2,301.40
Check.	10/17/2014	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Counseling Ex	-3,000.00
Check	10/17/2014	CASH / CSH	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Counseling Ex	-3,000.00
Check	12/19/2014	REF #9166	CONNELL TRUST #1254900135	Counseling Ex	-8,600.00
BREATH OF LIFE SYST					
Check	12/19/2014	REF #9167	CONNELL TRUST #1254900135	Unknown Expe	-5,198.46
BRENNAN LEGAL COU					
Check	05/13/2013	CSH CK #745	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Legal Expense	-2,000.00
BURKS SECURITY					
Check	12/26/2014	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Security Expen	-30,400.00
CENTURY LINK					
Check	12/31/2014	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Telephone Exp	-1,000.00
CIRRUS AVIATION SER	RVICES			•	
Check	03/17/2014		CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Airline Expense	-23,160.60
Check	07/21/2014	CSH CK #674	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Airline Expense	-7,709.91
CITY OF LAS VEGAS S				, ,,,,,,,,	.,
Check	12/31/2014	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Utilities Expense	-612.00
CLARK COUNTY ASSE				C	,,
Check	12/31/2014	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Taxes - Property	-7,000.00
CONNELL FAMILY FOU				, 4,,00	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
Check	05/08/2013	(NOT USED	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Unknown Expe	-27,449.54
COX COMMUNICATION		(1101 0020	30/11/222 11/001 //0/0/0/0/0/0/	Official Expos	21,110.01
Check	12/31/2014	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Cable Expense	-800.00
CURT BAGGETT	12/3/1/2014	OON ON WZTIM	OO!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!	Odbie Expense	555.55
Check	08/20/2013	CSH CK #745	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Unknown Expe	-1,000.00
	02/14/2014	RE: W/M CO	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Unknown Expe	-7,000.00
Check	02/14/2014	RE. WING CO	CONNECT TROST #0757043137	Olikilowii Expe	7,000.00
DAREL BURKS	4047/0044	0011 010 #041	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Cooughty Evener	3 000 00
Check	10/17/2014	CSH CK #241		Security Expen	-3,000.00
Check	12/19/2014	REF #9164	CONNELL TRUST #1254900135	Security Expen	-2,000,00
DAVID MANN	4 4 4 4 4 600 4 4	mm. mmmanii	CONNELL TRUCT #400575007	t to too one of manage	10.000.00
Check	11/14/2014	RE: REIMBU	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Unknown Expe	-10,000.00
DCP MIDSTREAM	0010710010	014 #040000	CONNECT TOURT HOTOTOLOGO	010311	00.54
Deposit	08/07/2013	CK #818622	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Gas/Oil Leases	62.54
DEE DETAILING CLEAP		0011014-#04	CONNELL TRUCT #400575927	to the sign mass	##0 no
Check	12/31/2014	CSH CK #24	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Janitorial Expe	-550.00
DOUG EDWARDS			COMMENT TRANSPORTATION		10.000.00
Check	01/26/2015	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Legal Expense	-10,000.00
ELEANOR M AHERN			COMMENT TRUCK CONCRETE		17 5 40 40
Check	03/06/2013	CSH CK #745	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	ELEANOR M A	-17,548.22
Check	03/06/2013	LESS 3899.5	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	(UNKNOWN)	-17,548.22
Check	09/11/2013	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	AHERN/POD	-2,000.00
Check	09/11/2013	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	(UNKNOWN) #	-5,000.00
Check	09/11/2013	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	ELEANOR M A	-5,000.00
Check	09/11/2013	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	AHERN/POD J	-5,000.00
Check	09/11/2013	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	(UNKNOWN)	-5,000.00
Check	09/11/2013	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	AHERN/POD	-5,073.80
Check	09/11/2013	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	AHERN/POD	-7,000.00
Check	09/11/2013	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	AHERN/POD	-11,000.00
Check	03/23/2015	CSH CK #084	CONNELL TRUST #1254900135	Unknown Expe	-100,000.00
EXPERT JET CHARTER	₹				
Check	09/06/2014	CSH CK #678	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Airline Expense	-53,003.90
FORENSIC SPECIALIST	LIMITED				
Check	10/27/2014	REF #8699	CONNELL TRUST #1254900135	Unknown Expe	-9,613.94
GAMMETT AND KING O	PA'S				
Check	02/24/2014	RE: W/M CO	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Accounting Ex	-5,000.00
HANDWRITING LLC				Ŭ	
Check	12/31/2014	RE: CURT BA	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Unknown Expe	-5,477.00

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# WN CONNELL AND MARJORIE T CONNELL 1972 TRUST CONNELL TRUST ACCTS #1254900135/8737649197/1985753274

January 2013 through December 2015

Туре	Date	Memo	Account	Split	Amount
Check	12/29/2014	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Income Taxes	-55,000.
AMES MANN Check	10/24/2014	REF #3765	CONNELL TRUST #1254900135	Unknown Expe	-125,000.
ASON COLLINS					
Check	04/07/2014	CSH CK #291	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Unknown Expe	-2,200:
Check	07/03/2014	CSH CK #674	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Unknown Expe	-2,200.
Check	07/11/2014	OVERPD BY	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Unknown Expe	-2,200.
Check	08/04/2014	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Unknown Expe	-2,200.
			CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	•	-22,000.
Check	10/17/2014	CSH CK #241		Unknown Expe	
Check	12/19/2014	REF #9165	CONNELL TRUST #1254900135	Unknown Expe	-9,250.
Check	12/31/2014	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Unknown Expe	-4,400.
Check	01/31/2015	CSH CK #718	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Unknown Expe	-7,600
Check	02/18/2015	REF #1144	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Unknown Expe	-6,600.
		1021 // 1111	00,771244 7,7001 7,7000,70021		- 4,
EFFREY BURR LAW F		0011 01/ #010	DONNELL TELLOT #0707040407	Land Evanna	ED 200
Check	05/08/2014	CSH CK #649	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Legal Expense	-50,000
Check	06/03/2014	REF #5032	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Legal Expense	-60,000
Check	10/17/2014	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Legal Expense	-125,000
EFFREY JOHNSTON 8				J .	•
		DELLECAL E	CONNELL TOLICE #9727640407	Legal Evacaga	-7,000
Check	06/10/2013	RE: LEGAL F	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Legal Expense	-1,1000
ET PARTNERS WORL					<b></b>
Check	11/06/2014	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Airline Expense	-25,800
OHNSTON & ASSOCIA					
Check	06/05/2013	CSH CK #649	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Legal Expense	-5.000
		CONNELL TR	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Legal Expense	-20,000
Check	08/07/2013				-50,000
Check	08/15/2013	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Legal Expense	-50,000
INGDOM TITLE SOLU	TIONS				
Check	12/29/2014	WIRE	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Unknown Expe	-75,000
ARRY PRUCKA	, 2, 20, 21, 1			,	
	04/07/0044	CPA / CSH C	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Accounting Ex	-4.000
Check	04/07/2014			9	
Check	07/03/2014	CSH CK #674	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Accounting Ex	-2,000
AURIE HOELTZEL					
Check	07/11/2014	CSH CK #674	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Unknown Expe	-740
ISA JOHNSON	071111111111111111111111111111111111111				
	001400040	CSH CK #745	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Unknown Expe	-2,000
Check	06/10/2013	C2L CV #143***	COMMETE 11/001 #0/3/043/3/	Offictions Expe	2,000
YNCH, CHAPPELL & /				. (	4.000
Check	01/10/2013	RE: Legal Fe	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Legal Expense	-4,000
Check	05/13/2013	RE: HARPER	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Legal Expense	-5,000
ARGARET WURDELL					
	05/08/2014	CSH CK #649	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Unknown Expe	-3,500
Check		COIT CR #043	OOMILEE 11/001 #0/3/043/3/	Official Expensi	0,000
IARGARET WURDELL			2 - 111 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1		4.750
Check	02/27/2015	CSH CK #848	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Unknown Expe	-1,750
IARQUIS AURBACH C	OFFING				
Check	11/24/2014	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Legal Expense	-15,000
		CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Legal Expense	-21,782
Check	12/26/2014				-21,000
Check	12/31/2014	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Legal Expense	
Check	01/26/2015	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Legal Expense	-30,394
Check	02/20/2015	WIRE	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Legal Expense	-75,000
ICNAIR & ASSOCIATE					
	05/13/2013	CSH CK #745	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Accounting Ex	-1,200
Check			CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Accounting Ex	-900
Check	08/07/2013	CSH CK #745			
Check	07/03/2014	RE: CPA / CS	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Accounting Ex	-2,144
ITC LIVING TRUST					
	02/15/2013	CSH CK #745	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Unknown Expe	-47,603
Check	424 141210	RE: LESS W	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Unknown Expe	-44,477
Check	05/00/2042	131 ELVI VV			-37,000
Check	05/09/2013		CONNELL TOHET #9737640107		
Check Check	05/09/2013 06/11/2013	RE: GIFT 201	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Unknown Expe	,
Check Check		RE: GIFT 201			
Check Check			CONNELL TRUST #8737649197  CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Utilities Expense	
Check Check IEVADA POWER Check	06/11/2013 12/31/2014	RE: GIFT 201			
Check Check IEVADA POWER Check OMNI HOTEL AND RES	06/11/2013 12/31/2014 SORTS	RE: GIFT 201 CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Utilities Expense	-1,000
Check Check IEVADA POWER Check DMNI HOTEL AND RES Check	06/11/2013 12/31/2014 SORTS 07/03/2014	RE: GIFT 201  CSH CK #241  REF: FORT	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274 CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Utilities Expense Hotel Expense	-1,000 -7,000
Check Check IEVADA POWER Check OMNI HOTEL AND RES Check Check	06/11/2013 12/31/2014 SORTS 07/03/2014 07/11/2014	RE: GIFT 201 CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Utilities Expense	-1,000 -7,000
Check Check IEVADA POWER Check OMNI HOTEL AND RES Check Check	06/11/2013 12/31/2014 SORTS 07/03/2014 07/11/2014	RE: GIFT 201  CSH CK #241  REF: FORT  CSH CK #674	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274 CONNELL TRUST #8737649197 CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Utilities Expense Hotel Expense Hotel Expense	-1,000 -7,000 -6,500
Check Check  EVADA POWER Check  DMNI HOTEL AND RES Check Check	06/11/2013 12/31/2014 SORTS 07/03/2014 07/11/2014	RE: GIFT 201  CSH CK #241  REF: FORT	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274  CONNELL TRUST #8737649197  CONNELL TRUST #8737649197  CONNELL TRUST #1254900135	Utilities Expense Hotel Expense Hotel Expense Rent Expense	-1,000 -7,000 -6,500 -8,600
Check Check IEVADA POWER Check DMNI HOTEL AND RES Check Check PROPERTY SERVICES Check	06/11/2013 12/31/2014 SORTS 07/03/2014 07/11/2014 07/11/2014	RE: GIFT 201  CSH CK #241  REF: FORT  CSH CK #674	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274 CONNELL TRUST #8737649197 CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Utilities Expense Hotel Expense Hotel Expense	-1,000 -7,000 -6,500 -8,600
Check Check IEVADA POWER Check OMNI HOTEL AND RES Check Check PROPERTY SERVICES Check Check Check	06/11/2013 12/31/2014 SORTS 07/03/2014 07/11/2014 07/11/2014 10/27/2014 12/31/2014	RE: GIFT 201 CSH CK #241 REF: FORT CSH CK #674 CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274  CONNELL TRUST #8737649197  CONNELL TRUST #8737649197  CONNELL TRUST #1254900135	Utilities Expense Hotel Expense Hotel Expense Rent Expense	-1,000 -7,000 -6,500 -8,600
Check Check IEVADA POWER Check OMNI HOTEL AND RES Check PROPERTY SERVICES Check Check Check Check Check Check Check	06/11/2013 12/31/2014 SORTS 07/03/2014 07/11/2014 3 10/27/2014 12/31/2014 ANA GRP	RE: GIFT 201  CSH CK #241  REF: FORT  CSH CK #674  CSH CK #241  CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274  CONNELL TRUST #8737649197  CONNELL TRUST #8737649197  CONNELL TRUST #1254900135  CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Utilities Expense Hotel Expense Hotel Expense Rent Expense Rent Expense	-1,000 -7,000 -6,500 -8,600 -6,000
Check Check IEVADA POWER Check OMNI HOTEL AND RES Check PROPERTY SERVICES Check	06/11/2013 12/31/2014 SORTS 07/03/2014 07/11/2014 3 10/27/2014 12/31/2014 ANA GRP 03/05/2014	RE: GIFT 201 CSH CK #241 REF: FORT CSH CK #674 CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274  CONNELL TRUST #8737649197  CONNELL TRUST #8737649197  CONNELL TRUST #1254900135	Utilities Expense Hotel Expense Hotel Expense Rent Expense	-1,000 -7,000 -6,500 -8,600 -6,000
Check Check IEVADA POWER Check OMNI HOTEL AND RES Check Check PROPERTY SERVICES Check Check Check Check	06/11/2013 12/31/2014 SORTS 07/03/2014 07/11/2014 3 10/27/2014 12/31/2014 ANA GRP 03/05/2014	RE: GIFT 201  CSH CK #241  REF: FORT  CSH CK #674  CSH CK #241  CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274  CONNELL TRUST #8737649197  CONNELL TRUST #8737649197  CONNELL TRUST #1254900135  CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Utilities Expense Hotel Expense Hotel Expense Rent Expense Rent Expense	-1,000 -7,000 -6,500 -8,600 -6,000 -2,250

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# WN CONNELL AND MARJORIE T CONNELL 1972 TRUST CONNELL TRUST ACCTS #1254900135/8737649197/1985753274

January 2013 through December 2015

		6.0	Account	Split	Amount
Туре	Date	Memo	Account	opiir	Amount
Check	04/23/2014	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Unknown Expe	-90,000.00
Check	05/08/2014	CSH CK #649	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Unknown Expe	-50,000.00
Check	07/21/2014	CSH CK #574	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Unknown Expe	-150,000.00
REPUBLIC SERVICES					
Check	12/31/2014	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Trash Expense	-420.00
ROBINSON REALTY					
Check	04/07/2014	CSH CK #291	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Unknown Expe	-2,500.0 <b>0</b>
RYAN SCHARAR					
Check	08/20/2013	REF #2561	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Legal Expense	-10,0 <b>00</b> .00
Check	08/20/2013	RE: ELEANO	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Legal Expense	-20,000.00
SHAUNA BRENNAN					
Check	01/10/2013	RE: Legal Fe	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Legal Expense	-5,000.00
SHERRY DOBER					
Check	06/10/2013	CSH CK #745	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Unknown Expe	-1,000.00
SHORTZ CONSULTING					0.5.000.00
Check	08/15/2013	REF #5534	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	AHERN/POD	-35,000.00
Check	12/26/2014	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Counseling Ex	-31,200.00
STAN CRAWFORD ESC					m noo no
Check	05/08/2014	CSH CK #649	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Legal Expense	-2,000.00
STERLING CLARK					#AA 00
Check	11/24/2014	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Unknown Expe	-500.00
TMOBILE			AANUTAN TENINGT PAGGETOGEA	0.11.1.15	4 000 00
Check	12/31/2014	CSH CK #241	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Cellular Expense	-1,0 <b>0</b> 0.00
TONY DAVE & ASSOCI			00111511 751107 44051000105	the terror many	E 0 <b>00</b> 00
Check	10/27/2014	RE: CONSUL	CONNELL TRUST #1254900135	Unknown Expe	-5,0 <b>00</b> .00
UPTON COUNTY APPR			OONNEL! TOUGH #4005750074	Taura Dynamatic	-3.199.06
Check	02/25/2014	RE: 2013 TA	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274 CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Taxes - Property Taxes - Property	-65,000.00
Check	12/26/2014	RE: 2014 TA		Taxes - Property Taxes - Property	25,799,78
Deposit	02/28/2015	Overpayment	CONNELL TRUST #1254900135	raxes - Property	25,105,10
W/M CONNELL TRUST		0011 01/ 1/7 17	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Unknown Expe	-45,336.10
Check	04/09/2013	CSH CK #745	CONNELL TRUST #1254900135	Unknown Expe	-1,287,580.85
Check	02/18/2015	CSH CK #084	CONNELL TRUST #1254900135	Unknown Expe	-500,000.00
Check	03/23/2015	CSH CK #084	CONNELL IROS1 #1254900135	Olikilowii Expe	*0 <b>00,000</b> ,000
WATTS BUSINESS SE		001101/4745	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Unknown Expe	-500.00
Check	08/07/2013	CSH CK #745	COMMETE INCOL #0101049191	OTHEROWIT EXPO	555.00
WELLS FARGO	00/44/0040	MASTERCAR	CONNELL TRUST #1985753274	Unknown Expe	-25,000.00
Check	09/11/2013	RE: MASTER	CONNELL TRUST #8737649197	Unknown Expe	-10,000.00
Check	04/07/2014	NE. WAS IER	COMMERCINOST TOTOTOMOTOT	Officional Expo	10,000.00

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## EXHIBIT B



# W.N. CONNELL AND MARJORIE T. CONNELL LIVING TRUST