IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

Case No.: 72371

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PARDEE HOMES OF NEVADA

Appellant,

v.

JAMES WOLFRAM and WALT WILKES, et al.

Respondents.

Appeal Regarding Judgment and Post-Judgment Orders Eighth Judicial District Court District Court Case No.: A-10-632338-C

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08/10/2015	Pardee Homes of Nevada's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of the Order on Pardee's Emergency Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment	67	JA010582- JA010669
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06/30/2016	Pardee Homes of Nevada's Reply in Support of Motion to Amend Judgment; and Opposition to Plaintiffs' Countermotion for Attorney's Fees	82	JA013183- JA013196
07/01/2016	Pardee Homes of Nevada's Reply in Support of Motion to Retax Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs Filed May 23, 2016	82	JA013197- JA013204
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08/25/2014	Plaintiff's Accounting Brief Pursuant to the court's Order Entered on June 25, 2014	49	JA007647- JA007698
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06/29/2015	Plaintiffs' Motion Pursuant to NRCP 52(b)	54-56	JA008395-
	and 59 to Amend The Court's Judgment		JA008922
	Entered on June 15, 2015, to Amend the Findings of Fact/conclusions of Law and		
	Judgment Contained Therein, Specifically		
	Referred to in the Language Included in		
	the Judgment at Page 2, Lines 8 Through		
	13 and the Judgment At Page 2, Lines 18		
	Through 23 to Delete the Same or Amend		
	The Same to Reflect the True Fact That		
	Plaintiff Prevailed On Their Entitlement to the First Claim for Relief For an		
	Accounting, and Damages for Their		
	Second Claim for Relief of Breach of		
	Contract, and Their Third Claim for Relief		
	for Breach of the Implied Covenant for		
	Good Faith and Fair Dealing and That		
	Defendant Never Received a Judgment in		
	its Form and Against Plaintiffs Whatsagyer as Mistalyanky Stated Within		
	Whatsoever as Mistakenly Stated Within the Court's Latest "Judgment – sections		
	filed under seal		
03/14/2016	Plaintiffs' Motion to Settle Two (2)	70	JA011168-
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08/06/2013	Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants	17	JA002830-
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Dated this 28th day of February, 2018.

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By: /s/ Rory T. Kay

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Attorneys for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of McDonald Carano LLP, and on the 28th day of February, 2018, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was e-filed and e-served on all registered parties to the Supreme Court's electronic filing system:

/s/ Beau Nelson
An Employee of McDonald Carano LLP

Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 DISTRICT COURT 2 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 3 4 5 JAMES WOLFRAM, et al., 6 Plaintiffs, 7 vs.)CASE NO. A-10-632338-C) DEPT. NO. IV PARDEE HOMES OF NEVADA, 8 9 Defendant. ORIGINAL 10 11 12 13 14 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF BENCH TRIAL 15 VOLUME II 16 BEFORE THE HON. KERRY L. EARLEY, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 17 On Friday, December 13, 2013 At 1:00 p.m. 18 19 20 APPEARANCES: 21 For the Plaintiffs: JAMES J. JIMMERSON, ESQ. JAMES M. JIMMERSON, ESQ. 22 23 For the Defendant: PATRICIA K. LUNDVALL, ESQ. AARON D. SHIPLEY, ESQ. 24 25 Reported by: Jennifer D. Church, RPR, CCR No. 568

Jennifer D. Church, CCR No. 568
District Court, Dept. IV

1 FRIDAY, DECEMBER 13, 2013, 1:00 P.M. LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 2 3 -000-4 THE COURT: Good afternoon. MS. LUNDVALL: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 5 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Good afternoon Are you 6 7 ready, Your Honor? 8 THE COURT: I am ready. I have my notepad. 9 I'm ready. MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: First of all, I would like 10 11 to thank the Court and its staff for its patience and time it's given to all parties and to all counsel. And 12 13 I thank opposing counsel, Ms. Lundvall and Mr. Shipley, 14 for their opportunity to work opposite them in a 15 professional manner, and it's been an experience I've 16 enjoyed, my son has enjoyed and, perhaps, not so much for the clients. 17 18 But on behalf of Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes, 19 who is not able to be here this afternoon, we thank you 20 and all concerned for your time and attention. 21 THE COURT: You're very welcome. 22 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: I would now like to take 23 this opportunity to speak about what we believe to be a 24 summation of the facts in evidence and the law that you 25 have been provided that will allow you to make an

informed decision. And we certainly believe that, based upon all the evidence, that the plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment in its favor in the manner that I will describe towards the end of our argument.

2.2

I will be speaking to some exhibits with you, and through this time process we've all memorized a good deal of them or portions of them, but I will be making references to exhibits and to documents so that the Court has a good understanding and can follow along. So thank you very much.

I would like to begin then with what we believe to be a clear demonstration of the evidence, certainly by a preponderance of the evidence with regard to the facts of this case.

Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes, working for their then companies Award and General Realty companies, and thereafter having acquired their own interest in this commission entitlement, had worked with Mr. Jon Lash in particular of Pardee Homes prior to spring of 2004. They had discussions, according to the testimony of Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes.

And they had shown Mr. Lash the White Hills property across the Hoover Dam bridge. In fact, he testified, Mr. Wolfram, that it was actually in escrow for a period of time. They showed him the Sandy Valley

property and then they showed him the Coyote Springs property amongst others.

Even in years following, they showed them other properties that did not result in anything being placed into escrow, but that evidenced Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes' desire to, of course, earn a commission for themselves and their families, but also to provide a service to Mr. Lash and to Pardee as they had done in the past.

I will note that Mr. Andrews didn't recall that the White Hills property went so far as to be into escrow, kind of dismissing that. And I think it's a fair statement that Mr. Andrews, who had probably more hands-on information about this project than even that of Mr. Lash, although Mr. Lash was certainly very knowledgeable, as was Mr. Whittemore and our client, that Mr. Andrews didn't have a lot of -- had a bit of disdain for Realtors and didn't have the same relationship with Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes as Mr. Lash did.

After the all hands meeting in which

Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes participated, mostly staying

quiet -- although we heard this morning that Mr. Wilkes

was interjecting himself -- there was no further

involvement, at least in terms of meetings or

conversations, between them, between Mr. Wolfram and 1 Mr. Wilkes as the parties, Pardee and CSI, 2 Coyote Springs, which I'll refer to occasionally as CSI, 3 4 began the negotiations for the acquisition of this property through and including the execution of the 5 Option Agreement for the Purchase of Real Property and 6 Joint Escrow Instructions, dated the blank day of May 7 2004, that we generally refer to as June 1, 2004, the 8 signature date by Pardee accepting the offer as being 9 10 prepared and negotiated between the two sides through competent counsel and competent principals. 11 12 The Court has read ad nauseam the terms of the 13 Option Agreement. There are points, though, notwithstanding the fact that I am counting and know 14 15 that the Court has memorized these terms, that I want to hit upon, and there is, indeed, a recognition within the 16 four corners of this document that this was a 40-year 17 18 contract.

It was a contract that, of course, could terminate sooner than 40 years, but there are so many provisions within the four corners of the document that evidence an ongoing relationship between Pardee, as purchaser of single-family production real estate property, and CSI, as seller of that real estate, that you could see from the parties that there was

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contemplated, through the terms, the express terms of the Option Agreement, Exhibit 2, a 40-year relationship potentially between the two parties.

What is also important is at the time, and through all the evidence we've heard, the only contemplation, the exclusive contemplation as of June 1, 2004, was that Pardee was only going to be permitted to buy single-family production real estate as so designated between the two parties and would not be permitted to buy any other type or category of real estate, whether it be multi-family, whether it be golf course, whether it be backup commercial, whether it be custom lots or the like. And, indeed, all of those rights within this contract are expressly reserved to CSI.

So when the parties inked this agreement, CSI and Pardee knew that Pardee was being granted, as Mr. Andrews confirmed today in his testimony, the exclusive right to be the provider of production single-family residential lots and homes for this huge project.

As Mr. Andrews pointed out, he was quite excited about the project, as was Mr. Lash, because in terms of the development of Southern Nevada and Clark County, this may be the single largest piece of property

that has been attempted to be developed over the years.

I don't know and we didn't have testimony whether it's bigger than Del Webb's Sun City or whether it would be bigger than Green Valley by the Greenspun family. But it is a huge project, a city, to use the words of Mr. Andrews, that's being contemplated here.

2.2

The terms within the Option Agreement,

Exhibit 2, are defined and static. That is to say they

are clearly understood. There's not a dispute between

the parties. And through testimony that we've garnered

over the last nine days, we have a clear understanding

of what these definitions mean.

First, Purchase Property is defined specifically as 3,600 acres bounded by Parcel 1 of the map recorded as 98-57, Document No. 01332, shown on page 1, paragraph B, of the Option Agreement, Exhibit 2.

And I know the Court knows this, but when I refer to Option Agreement, I'm referring to this document, June 1. And if I refer to the March 28th agreement, I'll refer to it as the Amended and Restated agreement.

THE COURT: We've used those terms consistent.

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Thank you.

The Entire Site is 30,000 acres, capital E, capital S, also a defined term. And the Purchase

Property, as we've shown, is defined here. It is further defined as a map of Parcel 1, which is attached as part of Exhibit 4, the second amendment, where all of the exhibits to the Option Agreement, Exhibit 2, were finalized and attached and incorporated by reference expressly by the words of the second amendment to relate back to the earlier June 1, 2004 document that had noticeably a number of absent exhibits, except for the key one from Mr. Whittemore's perspective, Exhibit E. He had his price escalating from \$40,000 per acre with the cost of living increases to a greater amount as the years go forward.

Again, just that schedule alone evidences the multi-year nature of the project where Mr. Whittemore, on behalf of his company, would be allowed to charge greater than \$40,000 per acre after the first five years going forward on an escalating basis.

The second definition, as we've now heard through Mr. Lash, Mr. Whittemore, from these two witnesses as well as from Mr. Wolfram, is that there is, in addition to Purchase Property of which 1,950 acres were contemplated to be built, was the definition of Option Property.

Option Property was all other property designed for single-family production residential use that wasn't

Purchase Property, by definition on page 1, paragraph B, and page 2, paragraph B of Exhibit 2.

The parties, you can tell, also contemplated that there would be future designations by the parties of single-family residential property beyond the initial takedown of 1,950 acres. How do we know that? Let's look to page 1, paragraph B, and this is very important language for the Court to consider because it speaks to this latest issue that we uncovered after October 28th, after October 29th, after Mr. Whittemore's testimony as to designation of intended use.

Here's the language, beginning with paragraph B, The parties desire to enter into this agreement -reading from Bates stamp Plaintiff 1, page 1 of
Exhibit 2, the Option Agreement of June 1, 2004 -- The
parties desire to enter into this agreement to provide
for, (i), buyer's purchase of the portion of the entire
site consisting of Parcel 1, as shown on Parcel
Map 98-57, recorded July 21, 2000, in Book Number
so-and-so, official records, Clark County, Nevada,
containing approximately 3,605.22 acres as shown on the
map attached hereto as Exhibit B and made a part hereof,
the so-called Purchase Property, and (ii), buyer's
option to purchase the remaining portion of the entire
site which is or becomes designated for single-family

detached production residential use as described below,
parentheses, the Option Property, in a number of
separate phases referred to herein collectively as the,
quote, option parcels, end of quote, parcels being
plural, and individually as a, quote, option parcel,
upon the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth,

7 period.

If the Court focuses upon this language, it is clear that they are not just speaking to Pardee's right to acquire Option Property defined as everything outside of Parcel 1. But, secondly, that they have the right to purchase property that is, as of June 1, 2004, or becomes designated for single-family detached production residential use in the future.

This is important because this parcel we have discovered that we call Residential 5, shown on Exhibit B-6 in Exhibit E, Exhibits 12 and 13, respectively, and why it's proper for you to consider an award of appropriate money damages to the plaintiff is, Your Honor, this was single-family designated -- this was single-family detached production residential use from the outset, from June 1, 2004 going forward.

This was single-family production residential property designated in 2004, not designated in 2011 when the county planning and zoning department approved the

tentative map, Exhibit 43, but in 2004 it was so designated for single-family detached production residential use outside of the \$84 million of property acquired by Pardee as outlined in Mr. Lash's letter, for example, of November 24, 2009, or all the maps that we've shown you in all the exhibits.

In addition, of course, we have unqualifiedly the intended designation of that same property as the epicenter of the construction of new single-family detached production residential homes on one of two sites, there, which was the exchange parcel and the attached property, Residential 5, which was acquired by the multi-family agreement, and across the street to the west of the Coyote Springs Parkway, just south of the exchange parcel that then became the property of CSI.

I would anticipate from opposing counsel, and she tried to elicit some of that from Mr. Andrews this morning, that, Well, listen, it's a tentative map and, therefore, it can be changed. It's not a final map. And even final maps can be changed. And, therefore, plaintiffs are not entitled to a commission because maybe until it's built, we won't know if the intended use will carry forth.

We do know from the testimony of Mr. Lash unqualifiedly that the next purchase of land beyond the

\$84 million clearly was Option Property and clearly entitled our clients to a commission if used to develop single-family production residential housing.

But what's even more compelling is within this agreement, Exhibit 2, there is the definition of Option Agreement that is, quote, Buyer's option to purchase the remaining portion of the entire site which is or becomes designated for single-family detached production residential use.

Under the facts of this case, the parcel in question, Residential 5, which was acquired separately through the multi-family agreement, was even then, in 2004, designated for single-family production residential use and confirmed by the same seven years later as part of the February 16, 2011 process, in which, unbeknownst to the plaintiffs, Pardee had applied for and received tentative map approval for the intended use.

One of the things I think you come away from is there is a conflict in testimony between the parties. I think it's reasonable to say that as to what can you glean from the information that was delivered by Pardee to Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes or what could Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes have acquired if they went to, for example, the Clark County recorder's office, and there's

some dispute over that, and I will speak to that a little bit more in a few minutes.

2.2

But for now I would like for you to accept what I believe to be unrebutted fact, and that is no information could be found from recorded documents or from the documents provided by the defendants to the plaintiffs of intended use.

Even today Mr. Andrews stated, No, no maps are going to show intended use. Mr. Lash said the same thing. Mr. Andrews said, No, unless you go to the county to see whatever's been filed, you won't know designated use. And in addition, he was very specific to state -- and this is very important for an overall understanding -- Pardee's internal decision-making of prospective designated use is not known by anyone except Pardee and possibly CSI.

But as you've indicated, we've developed several maps, he said, as to intended use and we do not share that information with outside parties. We keep that internally and it is not recorded. It is not submitted to the county or the like.

Here you have a designation by Pardee of 53 acres of land. Mr. Andrews did the math yesterday. 83 or 82 acres or 80 acres, 80-point-something acres minus 26.96 equals 53.25 acres, approximately -- was applied

for and received, upgrading the schedule from either R-U or MPL to single-family production residential property.

Now, what's also clear here is that the initial development of 1,950 acres was within Parcel 1. We have that testified to by Mr. Lash. We have that testified to by Mr. Whittemore, and we have that testified to by Mr. Wolfram. And that was -- it took some days to develop, but the Court clearly has that in her notes. So when you couple that to all land, the 1,950 acres for production residential property within Parcel 1, that is Purchase Property.

On June 1, 2004 -- this is important and the Court, I know, will do this -- but it's important to understand what is it the parties knew or reasonably could have known on June 1, 2004? And on that date what they knew or reasonably could have known was that there was only one way to buy land after Purchase Property has been purchased, and that is to exercise the right to buy Option Property pursuant to paragraph 2 of Exhibit 2.

And, indeed, the structure of the agreement is, paragraph 1, purchase and sale of Purchase Property, and the witnesses testified, both Whittemore and -- both Lash and Andrews, the ability to purchase is virtually the same steps. You open up an escrow. You pay money. You receive clear title. You close escrow. That's how

you do it for the purchase and sale of Purchase Property.

With Option Property there's one additional ingredient that's specified starting at page 3, you submit a notice of Option Property exercise rights, and you pay money according to the terms of the agreement, and you complete the purchase. There's deeds to be signed. But it's very similar to the five takedowns that were part of the \$84 million.

Now, there was no other contemplated way for Pardee to buy single-family residential property after the \$84 million, the approximate 1,950 acres, except by use of paragraph 2, Option Property purchase mechanism. There was no provision here for a side agreement. There was provision here for some later agreement.

There was a statement that if you are going to buy additional property after the Purchase Property was completed to add further single-family production residential property, you would be necessarily obliged to comply with paragraph 2 of Exhibit 2 for the acquisition of Option Property.

And that's important because at the time the contemplation of the parties that they knew or reasonably could have known was that all -- I'm not saying all -- because it was a big thing -- that Pardee

was buying was the exclusive right -- we heard it from Mr. Andrews -- to be the developer of single-family homes for the entirety of Coyote Springs 30,000-plus acres of this project in exchange for which they would pay initially \$84 million to buy approximately 1,950 acres, which developed by virtue of the exchanges and the necessity to subtract golf lots or subtract roads, would give them a use of 1,950 acres, which turned out to be a gross of 2,112 acres, per the letter of Mr. Lash to Mr. Wolfram of November 24, 2009.

So that is what the structure of this agreement was. And what is clear is that that is what was agreed to between these parties. Now, we know two years later, in 2006, approximately, the beginning of four additional agreements occurred, including right up to 2009 in the eighth amendment, where in the eighth amendment there is the acquisition of the golf course and the backup rights to the commercial property that attaches to the exchange parcel and attaches to Residential 5, which we saw through Tentative Map 2 of Exhibit 43.

And you had to start it with the multi-family agreement of 2006 and the seven amendments. It followed with the custom lot agreement. It followed with the golf course property, and then it followed with the backup rights under the commercial property. The

commercial property backup rights were actually attached to the eighth amendment, but the other three are by separate agreement, we have been advised by all parties.

So that is the method here. That the parties later change their mind and enter into separate agreements is their right to do so as between themselves. They do not, however, have the right to adversely affect the rights of Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes by changing the agreement between Mr. Whittemore, on behalf of CSI, and Mr. Lash, on behalf of Pardee Homes. And that is where the defendant is most vulnerable to a finding by this Court.

This is not an issue of mens rea. This is not an issue of proving an intent to defraud. This is a breach of contract for three reasons. One, the need for accounting, Count I, because of the elements that are required for an accounting, the superior knowledge, possession of superior knowledge over the matters that are subject to account. That's the decisions we cited in our pretrial brief.

It is the equity that the Court is allowed to impose when there's been a failure to act appropriately and fairly to the parties and when there's damage caused thereby.

The second claim is the breach of the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Here you have the parties having entered into a Commission Agreement, which I'll speak to in just a minute, and there is within that contract, and, in fact, within every contract under Nevada law, the implied covenant to deal with each party fairly and reasonably in the performance of their contract, the breach of which would constitute a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, entitling the plaintiff to money damages as the court would deem proper.

And third is the breach of contract claim, and the breach of contract claim, Your Honor, is the failure to keep the plaintiffs reasonably informed as to all matters relating to their entitlements to receive commissions for the sale of production real estate or single-family residential property.

So when you look at the Option Agreement, what was known on June 1, that's what these parties defined. We heard a huge amount of testimony by Mr. Whittemore and Mr. Lash that their defense to this was, We don't care what the words of the Option Agreement said, we always knew, because this was a development over many years, that we would run into circumstances where there would be a need to alter our earlier plans to accommodate later plans. An example of that was the

cost of utilities. I heard that on several occasions.

So did the Court.

2.2

And, therefore, there was a decision made, just prior to March 28, 2005, to build more horizontally along Highway 168, then vertically along Highway 93.

And, of course, there was a substantial refinement of the term Purchase Property from 3,605 acres, of which the initial developed parcel would be 1,950 to 511 acres, and Option Property being defined as everything else.

And I resisted that. When I first heard it, I resisted that. But after I've listened to the testimony for many days, I think there's probably truth in what we've heard. And that is that there has to be some flexibility between the parties to allow the development of Pardee's dreams or visions for what its single-family residential homes would look like and Mr. Whittemore's desire to build a city.

MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, now that Counsel has finished this particular thought, I need to place an objection in the --

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Your Honor, what is this --

MS. LUNDVALL: Hold on. The objection is under the Lioce decision. I don't know if I'm pronouncing it

right, but it's L-i-o-c-e. It is the ethical
prohibition for an attorney to express a personal belief
into the truthfulness of the testimony of a witness.

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Fine.

MS. LUNDVALL: That's where -- I'm trying as far as not to be technical, but I'm not going to waive my right, because the subsequent decisions obligate opposing counsel, to preserve your right, to object to that, and that's what I'm doing, Your Honor.

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. I honestly took it that based upon the evidence, the plaintiffs' position has changed.

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: That's right.

THE COURT: That's how I took it. I didn't take it as his personal opinion on what was truthful or not. That's how I was looking.

Is that how it was intended?

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: It is. And I will be very careful to reach the Lioce decision. I'm quite familiar with it. It was quite a heated case and it came at a good teaching moment for the lawyers who take the time to read it. But that's exactly right.

It is not an unreasonable position, although my clients thought it was, to suggest that it would not

change. But it is an unreasonable position and a breach of contract to think that you can adversely affect my clients' rights to a commission by making a later deal between the parties that would change defined terms and entitlement to money and sequence of construction which would lead to different calculations of commission because of the fact that Option Property is paid on a different formula than Purchase Property was paid.

Purchase Property was a percentage of the \$84 million, four percent up to \$50 million and one and a half percent above \$50 million to \$84 million, whereas Purchase Property was property that was being acquired and developed, that it would be one and a half percent times \$40,000 per acre times the number of acres. So the math is very different depending upon your finding as what was purchased by these parties.

So while we say within Exhibit A that there has been, and through the testimony of our clients,

Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes, there has been a payment of the appropriate percentage of the \$84 million to the plaintiffs if all \$84 million of property is found by the Court to be Purchase Property, it is not the right calculation if the Court finds that some or a portion of the 2,100 acres was, indeed, Option Property for which they would be paid a different formula and a different

sum.

What I'm suggesting to the Court, though, is the legal principle that I think the Court would find acceptable is that by signing the Amended and Restated Option Agreement, Exhibit 5, and canceling, superseding, replacing -- the verbs used by these witnesses before you starting with Mr. Lash and thereafter -- the original Option Agreement, Exhibit 2, by Exhibit 5, they cannot adversely affect the rights of our clients to a commission.

That is where -- that is the folly of Pardee

Homes of Nevada, Inc.'s position throughout the nine

days of trial that we've been working together in this

matter. Because they believe, as they've testified, We

knew that boundaries would change, that the direction of

which building might change -- they didn't say they knew

it would change, but they were going to be flexible

enough to change, and that was the testimony.

Mr. Whittemore was humorous enough to note,
Listen, I'm here to entice them to buy more property, as
much as I can get them to buy. Mr. Andrews confirmed
that this morning saying that Mr. Whittemore would sell
them anything that they would be interested in that
Mr. Whittemore's company had an interest in, from water
rights to all types of other aspects, golf course, the

rest.

2.2

But there was on June 1 -- that's where this begins, June 1, 2004 -- very defined terms and an expectation that not only would Pardee be buying single-family production residential property from the get-go, up to 1,950 acres, although within the confines within a larger 3,600 acre parcel, Parcel 1, but in addition they reserved themselves the right to buy, buyer's option to purchase the remaining portion of the entire site, which is everything other than the 3,600 acres which is or becomes designated for single-family detached production residential use.

This is also important because, as counsel, both sides, it's slip and parry, you know. It's a sword out. It's a shield back. It's the nature of the advocacy rules that we both possess, all parties possess, as attorneys where the crucible of cross-examination and the presentation of evidence gives this court an opportunity to measure credibility, demeanor of the witnesses, and to sort of size up the situation.

Before this became a litigable point, nine years ago -- this case started in September of 2010. So I would say to you six years before this became a litigable issue, these parties, without the benefit of

litigation counsel, predicted, expected, contemplated when they signed this contract that there not only would be the designation at the outset of 1,950 acres to be paid for \$84 million -- it was 66 million, as you recall and grew to 84 million -- but that there would be the potential for becoming, the property being later designated for single-family detached production residential use for which there would be the right of Pardee to acquire the same.

And then there was a fair amount of negotiation and agreement as to the definition of production residential property, which I'm not going to read throughout, but it's found at page 2, again the same paragraph B, and it says that the Purchase Property, capital P, capital P, and the Option Property, capital O, capital P, are sometimes referred to herein collectively as the production residential property.

And this is what I acquired through Mr. Lash's cross-examination, and Mr. Whittemore, but particularly Mr. Lash, that production residential property runs through both. Production residential property can exist within with the Purchase Property, Parcel 1, and it can exist within the Option Property.

And that's why the contract says Purchase Property, a defined term, 3,600 acres of which they were

going to develop 1,950 on this day, and the production residential property -- excuse me, and the Option Property are sometimes referred to herein collectively as the production residential property. So the two types of property, purchase and option, are collectively referred to as production residential property if the property is being used for the seven reasons that are set forth in the definition that immediately follows.

б

So we can see that Pardee is not looking to limit itself on June 1 of 2004. It is investing \$66 million at that point, and for about 1,500 acres, and then it raised it up to 1,950 acres for \$84 million. And how did we get the price? Just take 2,000 acres times 40,000 an acre, \$80 million. So we know that that's how they got to the price.

And when you look at it, it was actually 44,000, if the Court remembers, \$44,800 per acre, and then we did the math and had a little bit of humor, where he said, I guess Mr. Lash got the best of me, because when you take 2,112 acres and divide it into \$84 million, you get 43,700-some-odd dollars. I guess he got the best of me. The Court remembers that.

So production residential property, as used in this agreement, the term production residential property means the portion of the net usable acreage as defined

here, and that encompasses all of the Purchase Property and the Option Property, which includes, without limitation, all single-family detached production residential lots.

2.2

Let's stop there. Again, you can see that the concept of production residential property crosses the boundary between Purchase Property and Option Property, not only by definition, which I've just read to you, but here it's repeated again where it states, As used in this agreement, the term production residential property means that portion of the net usable acreage, as defined below, that encompasses all of the Purchase Property and the Option Property.

And so not only does is include the 3,600 acres, which is defined as Purchase Property at this point in this agreement, and the balance of, what, the 27,000 acres of Option Property, totaling 30,000 acres, which includes, without limitation, all single-family detached production residential lots. Keep in mind, we're not talking about houses. We're not talking about something that's being constructed. We're talking about lots.

And, of course, that translates to what a broker is entitled to. A broker is entitled, for putting a seller and a buyer together, to a commission

for being the procuring cause. Here it's limited to lots, not construction. But when they paid commission based upon the acquisition of the property, they weren't requiring the property to be developed. They weren't requiring the property to reach final map stage or even tentative map stage. They were entitled to a commission from the beginning.

And then the seven areas I've mentioned to you are the ones that are used for production residential lots, number one; which includes lots on which custom homes are constructed by buyer, that's two. Three, all land for roadways, utilities, government facilities, including schools and parks, and park sites are subject to the provisions of paragraph 7(c), which gave the reduced cost, half cost.

Open space was a fifth area, required or designated for the benefit of residential development pursuant to the master plan. Six was a habitat conservation plan or a development agreement. Seven was the drainage ways or other use associated with or resulting from the development of the Purchase Property and each option parcel of the Option Property, period.

And for purposes of this agreement, the term net usable acreage that I just referenced here shall mean the 30,000 plus or minus acres of the entire site

remaining after the final reserve designation made
pursuant to the Coyote Springs Multi-species Habitat
Conservation Plan as now drafted or as hereafter
approved.

So that is the beginning portion of this contract which frames the expectations of the parties, CSI and Pardee, when they made their agreement on June 1, 2004.

The second amendment -- the first amendment, Exhibit 3 has no role in this. It just allows for the release of \$125,000 out of escrow in favor of CSI.

Then Exhibit 4, which is the second amendment, this is important because it fleshes out the exhibits referenced in Exhibit 2, and, therefore, by approximately September 6, approximately -- it's dated August 31 or September 1 -- by September 1, 2004, 60 days later, there are all of the agreed-to exhibits that are to be attached to the Option Agreement.

Those exhibits you have reviewed extensively.

However, they are quite important because when you look at the exhibits, you will see that there is, in the first exhibit, the map of the entire site with the donut hole in the middle, the donut hole being that property leased or otherwise in the possession of the Bureau of Land Management, which was contemplated to be sought to

have an exchange sometime thereafter.

And, therefore, you have the provision of what the land looks like before reconfiguration and what they believe it will look like after reconfiguration if they can get their desires on. And they had an expectation that they would be able to do that, but not a guarantee. So that's why they took the care to show what the site would look like.

They are very clear, as you know, in the bottom left-hand corner, south of the Lincoln County line down to 168 highway going east and 93 highway going north and south, to designate the 3,600 acres which

Mr. Whittemore, through his companies, had fee simple title to, which was then becoming defined as the parcel property. That's Exhibit A-1.

Exhibit A-2 to Exhibit 4 is after reconfiguration, where it shows the donut hole has been moved substantially to the east, and you have two types of property. You still have Parcel 1, still defined here as of September 1, 2004, and then you have the Option Property, which is immediately to the east, of about equal size, equal size there, and then everything north of the Lincoln County line as also Option Property. So there's clear definitions of what it looks like.

The third exhibit, Exhibit B, is just the Parcel 1 map, and it shows by crosshatch. We had a map of it here that shows you what that looked like.

And then you have Exhibit C-1, which shows you what is the property -- the map of the Option Property before BLM reconfiguration and C-2, the property after BLM reconfiguration. What's important here at C-2, as we look at this, because when you look at it, even after reconfiguration the boundary lines of Parcel 1 remain intact. C-2, Bates stamp 1566 makes it clear that Parcel 1 still has an eastern boundary in precisely the location reflected on the deed in 2000, which was the Purchase Property 1, defined in the Option Agreement, 60 days later, through September 1, 2004.

Now, they could have erased the line. They could have said, You know, we're going to go east here and so we're not going to bound our Purchase Property to just within the 3,600 acres as they had set forth in the agreement, and as conceded to by Mr. Lash and Mr. Whittemore. They could have erased the line and said they could go any direction, but they didn't.

And as it's particularly noted in this amendment, Amendment 2, Exhibit 4, all of the defined terms are maintained, retained, and confirmed and remain the same from that of 60 days earlier defined within the

larger agreement, Option Agreement 2.

Therefore, the defense by Pardee that, We had the right, it was contemplated we could build east as well as north, that may or may not be true. It is certainly not evidenced by the four corners of the agreement. We hear from opposing counsel so many objections in this trial, it's four corners, it's a fully integrated agreement. We accept that. That's an agreement that goes both ways.

That is because they cannot, through their oral recitation about what their intent is to later make changes, change, modify, or defeat the plain meaning of the words of Exhibit 2, the Option Agreement.

And that's the major defense here, but it must fail as a matter of law as well as fact because we know what was contemplated factually by the parties, as I discussed with you, and we know under the law that it's an entire agreement and there's not going to be parole evidence permitted to modify or amend or change its meaning, that within the plain words of now four documents, or now three documents -- June 1 document, Exhibit 2; the Amendment 1, which doesn't play a role, but confirmed what was going on; and Amendment 2, Exhibit 4, restating the same provisions -- are now three documents that confirm the accuracy and relevancy

and definitions that are set forth in the agreement as being true.

2.2

And the exhibits by themselves evidence the parties' intent now, of September 1, 60 days later, as it relates to Exhibit 2. And clearly the intent was Option Property was everything other than Purchase Property 1, Parcel 1, with or without redesignation or reconfiguration as shown in Exhibit C-1 and C-2, and the boundaries are firm.

That they say between themselves, Listen, we understood the boundaries may not stay the same is irrelevant if they don't involve Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes in those conversations.

And if we listen to Mr. Andrews today, they were anything but welcome to be part of the development process and the negotiation process between CSI and Pardee in the period of February 2004 through signing the document on June 1, 2004 from the all hands meeting. And, indeed, Mr. Andrews had no involvement with them thereafter. Other than the one meeting, he had no communication. He didn't care for Mr. Wilkes and didn't have any use for them. They added nothing, in his testimony.

Mr. Lash negotiated with Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes the Commission Agreement between June 1 of

2004 and September 1 of 2004 alone, and nowhere does he testify that he shared with them the terms and agreement of the Option Agreement as it relates to our intent to later modify the terms of the agreement.

2.2

In the Commission Agreement there is no suggestion, no wording, no nothing -- and Ms. Lundvall says it's an integrated agreement. The language at the bottom of page 2 says this is the parties' entire understanding. Again, that works to benefit both parties. We concur.

There is no language, therefore, within that simple three-page agreement that identifies that the terms Purchase Property, that the terms Purchase Property Price, that the terms Option Agreement, are ever subject to change in the future. There's no communications orally between the parties that the terms are ever subject to change in the future.

So whether or not it is true or not true that parties knew that the development plans may change in the future, what is clear, unrefuted is there's not a single piece of testimony or written evidence to suggest that Wolfram and Wilkes knew that the direction of construction was going to change from being virtually vertical along 93 highway to then virtually horizontal along the little sliver of property retained by

1 Coyote Springs that Mr. Whittemore called the boot and

- 2 | the reconfigured property going from west to east in
- 3 | that direction beyond the Parcel Property 1 line to the
- 4 east.
- In the maps, when you look at them, they are
- 6 all most supportive of the plaintiffs' position in the
- 7 | form of grant, bargain and sale deeds for the Purchase
- 8 Property, for the Option Property, Exhibits G-1 and G-2
- 9 follow all of this, as did the rest of the exhibits.
- 10 Can we turn to the most important document in
- 11 | this case which is Exhibit 1, the Commission Agreement?
- 12 THE COURT: Exhibit?
- MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Exhibit 1. I believe that
- 14 Ms. Lundvall also called it Exhibit L.
- 15 THE COURT: The Commission Agreement. I know
- 16 | what it is.
- 17 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: I would just say as an
- 18 aside, if we try this case again, Judge, let's don't
- 19 have a duplication of exhibits.
- 20 THE COURT: I would have suggested that in the
- 21 | first place.
- MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: I'm just saying both
- 23 parties are kind of culpable for that, but I did find
- 24 | myself saying, What was the Exhibit L, and memorizing
- 25 two sets of exhibits.

THE COURT: Usually that's why you do joint exhibits.

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: We just didn't get it together. So I assume responsibility for that as well.

THE COURT: We worked it out. I have notes on both. So it's okay.

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Look at Exhibit 1 or Exhibit L, being the identical document, it's Option Agreement for the Purchase of Real Property and Joint Escrow Instructions dated June 1, 2004, as amended, the Option Agreement between Coyote Springs Investment, LLC, Coyote, and Pardee Homes of Nevada, Pardee.

Now, while this is a simple agreement, and it does contemplate the parties' entire understanding, it's a powerful agreement for what it says. First, just the RE tells you what is being referred to. It is expressly referencing the June 1, 2004 Option Agreement and the terms of that Option Agreement.

It was in the possession of Mr. Wilkes and Mr. Wolfram through their respective companies. They understood, as they negotiated this Commission Agreement in July and August of 2004, what the terms Purchase Property Price means, what the term Option Property means, what all the capitalized terms here meant, as defined by the Option Agreement for the Purchase of Real

Property and Joint Escrow Instructions dated June 1, 2004, Exhibit 2, herein.

It's important that you understand this point, which I do -- I want to say it. I know you do, but I want to say it out loud. Purchase Property Price, by definition, does not mean \$84 million. The definition of Purchase Property Price under Exhibit 2, the Option Agreement, is the price for Purchase Property.

And that's because Mr. Whittemore was hoping they would buy more. It was a fluid situation. You have the express provision that they could buy more property. So the Purchase Property Price is the price to buy Purchase Property. It's not defined and it's not equal to \$84 million.

I want you to understand these points as being particularly central to today's presentation. At the time of June 1, 2004, Pardee had the right to buy Purchase Property. They estimated a purchase about 1,500 acres for \$66 million, which by Amendment 2, September 1, grew to \$84 million and 1,950 acres.

To buy more property would require the exercise of an option, sending notice and complying with the many steps that Ms. Lundvall made a big thing to do about what had to be done.

And she is saying as her defense for Pardee is

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1
    the failure to send a notice, the failure to open an
    escrow, the failure to have a deed, the failure to have
 2
 3
    escrow instructions, the failure to close an escrow, the
 4
    failure to record a deed for Option Property, therefore,
    means they never bought Option Property. That's not
 5
 6
    true.
7
             THE COURT: Can I just clarify what you are
             When you say Option Property, you mean --
8
    saying?
9
             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Everything else.
10
             THE COURT: -- single -- you mean everything
11
    else?
12
             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON:
                                  No.
                                        I mean --
13
             THE COURT:
                         It's limited to -- I want to make
14
    sure because --
15
             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: I have been guilty of that
16
    for nine days, and my son told me at lunch I've been
17
    guilty for nine days. I'm referring to Pardee's
18
    acquisition of --
19
             THE COURT:
                         Single-family.
20
             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: -- single-family
21
    production residential lots in either -- because I just
22
    made a big point about it -- Purchase Property or either
23
    within Option Property -- and they have the right to do
24
    either -- requires one single method to do so under this
25
    contract, Option Agreement.
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THE COURT: I understand. I just wanted to make sure. I knew that's what you were saying, but just for the record I wanted to make sure I'm not missing something.

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: You are not at all.

The only way they can buy single-family production residential property outside of the Purchase Property is through the mechanism shown to buy Option Property, paragraph 2.

Compare that to the Commission Agreement. The Commission Agreement entitles Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes, if you'll allow me to speak on behalf of Award and General in 2004, and now for themselves, to receive a commission irrespective of the method in which the defendants choose to acquire single-family production residential property. How do we know that? Because of the anti-circumvention or avoidance provision within the four paragraph of page 2.

And I believe if you listen to the testimony of Mr. Lash and Mr. Andrews, particularly Mr. Andrews yesterday afternoon through my examination and this morning, the nature of a Commission Agreement needs to be and has been testified to, that's different than this development agreement, Option Agreement, Exhibit 2.

A Commission Agreement for a real estate

1 commission involves the concept of procuring cause. And

- 2 | it generally refers that whoever is hiring the broker,
- 3 | in this case Pardee -- retaining, it wasn't employed, so
- 4 retaining them -- agrees to pay a percentage of the
- 5 purchase price for having located the property, brought
- 6 the property to the buyer or seller, for having
- 7 | facilitated the sale of real estate, in this case, from
- 8 Pardee's perspective, facilitating the purchase of real
- 9 estate. That's the nature of the agreement.
- 10 That's why, as Mr. Andrews testified and
- 11 | Mr. Lash the same, but Mr. Andrews quite in detail, his
- 12 familiarity with many, many brokers, and perhaps his
- 13 disdain for them, because he doesn't appreciate how much
- 14 | they are paid or doesn't appreciate the quality of their
- 15 | services, but nonetheless, was very clear that they are
- 16 | typically paid as a percentage of the purchase price or
- 17 | sale price. This is no different than here.
- 18 The important point here is the Commission
- 19 Agreement, Exhibit 1, captures our clients' rights to
- 20 | receive a commission irrespective of the method in which
- 21 | the buyer, Pardee, acquires it.
- 22 There is no limitation within this contract
- 23 | that says only if Pardee exercises its right to buy
- 24 Option Property under paragraph 2 of Exhibit 2, Option
- 25 Agreement of June 1, and only if it sends a notice of

exercise of Option Property and only if it opens up an escrow and only if it deposits money and only if it closes escrow and only if it records a deed and only if it uses a settlement statement and a title company will you be entitled to a commission if we, Pardee, construct or -- excuse me -- designate for use single-family production residential property, residential lots, the word being "lots."

That is, I believe, the folly of the last minute gasp by Mr. Lash in changing his testimony here on Tuesday -- I'm sorry -- on Monday and Mr. Andrews' testimony here yesterday afternoon and this morning.

Because when you look at the agreement, as

Mr. Lash testified to and as Mr. Lash testified on

cross-examination to opposing counsel's questions, this

document had several iterations, developed over a 60-day

time period, July and August, it's signed about

September 1. It might have been a couple days later.

And in the agreement it talks in terms of the structure of the agreement is mimicking the Option

Agreement to the extent that it models the percentage of Purchase Property Price, which is what, the price of Purchase Property, which at that time was \$66 million, for which four percent of the first \$50 million would be granted and one and a half percent of the next

\$16 million would be paid to them if they acquire that property.

And then the (iii) is in respect to any portion of the Option Property purchased by Pardee pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Option Agreement, Pardee shall pay one and one and a half percent of the amount derived by multiplying the number of acres purchased by Pardee by \$40,000 times one and a half percent.

Now, understand, we heard Mr. Andrews say, you know, that -- Ms. Lundvall said, Did you think you were being fair?

And the answer was, We were generous to them.

Yet, if you recall the complexity of the whole comprehensive nature of the testimony, Mr. Lash says they typically paid four percent of their purchase price to their brokers. Here Mr. Lash negotiated a better price for himself, four percent to a limit of \$50 million, and then reduced substantially to one and a half percent of the balance of \$16 million.

And, indeed, when they added another \$18 million purchases to \$84 million, it was the same four percent to \$50 million and one and a half percent for the balance of \$34 million, as shown in Amendment 2, Exhibit 4. So the compensation was fair considering the unusual nature and size of this project.

As Mr. Andrews says, it's the biggest project Pardee has ever been involved in. And that's saying something because Pardee has enjoyed a good reputation over the years, certainly here in Nevada, for its development of single-family production residential homes.

In the course of the negotiations, as brought out by Ms. Lundvall in her examination of Mr. Lash, Mr. Lash concedes that Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes, through our law office, requested new language from one draft to another that prevented circumvention or avoidance of this obligation.

Keeping in mind that when the parties are negotiating Exhibit 1, the Commission Agreement, the only way that the parties understood by the plain words of the Option Agreement for them to acquire land was Purchase Property or Option Property. How do you acquire Option Property? Through the processes in paragraph 2, which are defined within that agreement.

So then when you look at the structure of this Commission Agreement, you have -- some of the mechanics are spoken about in the first paragraph, which is to say that they will be paid as Pardee makes payments to Coyote Springs monthly. And then as it relates to Option Property, they will wait, and they will wait

until they actually close escrow. To show some bona fides, Pardee will deposit that money, that commission into an escrow and, therefore, demonstrate the money is available to be paid over, but there's the need for Option Property to the wait until the parcel has been acquired, close escrow has occurred and deed recorded in Pardee's name.

The second paragraph is, of course, an important paragraph for this issue, Pardee shall provide to each of you a copy of each written option exercise notice given pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Option Agreement together with information as to the number of acres involved and the scheduled closing date. In addition, Pardee shall keep each of you reasonably informed as to all matters relating to the amount and due dates of your commission payments.

Mr. Lash conceded on Monday that commission payments, being the plural, applied equally to both commission payments received as a result of the \$84 million Purchase Property purchased as well as any monies received as a result of acquisition of Option Property for single-family production residential use.

You'll recall the testimony of Mr. Lash on October 28, 2013. I would like to just say to you that we did not understand and did not know of the RES 5

development, the tentative map, Exhibit 43, the 332 lots that encompass all of the Residential 5 and a portion of the multi-family purchase agreement as well as the exchange parcel.

And when I was asking the questions, because we didn't know where the trial went, I'm asking for posterity. I'm asking these questions for Mr. Wilkes' and Mr. Wolfram's heirs and assigns, spouses and children.

So I asked a series of questions about, Well, what happens -- because I knew the language in the first page of the Option Agreement which is designated or later designated for production residential property -- what would happen in 2024, an arbitrary year? What would happen in 2024, Mr. Lash, if you had acquired property that you changed and designated later for single-family production residential use?

Answer, Well, I haven't given it much thought, but I think you would be entitled to a commission. That was one answer.

The next answer was, as we read to the Court, a much more specific determination, and that was that if we went to the point of going to the county and getting zoning -- the question was, In any event, because you do retain the right to change the use -- that certainly is

undisputed here -- and if you need to, to obtain the governmental approvals and zoning, that then would cause my clients to be entitled to dollars associated with that if you built residential; correct?

Answer: Correct.

2.2

That wasn't something I haven't given much thought. That was ten questions later, the same examination, the same consistent position. What is the need to change the testimony?

This Court has been -- and I appreciate the opportunity to practice in front of you -- this Court, and this record should reflect this, goes out of its way to benefit the parties as to credibility. It's your other personal style. You don't like a lot of theatrics, of which I'm guilty. You don't like a lot of game playing, and you are not crazy with the word "lie" or "cheat." Those are words that run hard on you, and you are very careful and judicious before you use words like that.

So you are willing to accept the credibility of Jim Wolfram and Walt Wilkes and assume or Accept credibility of Jon Lash, Harvey Whittemore, or Klif Andrews.

MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, now I need to also place another caution. There is additional case law

that speaks to the fact that you are not to personalize is the argument to the finder of fact. And, therefore, I don't think it appropriate for this counsel to be suggesting that, This is how I know the Court deals with certain circumstances.

2.2

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: I am speaking to my observations of how this Court has conducted this trial. And responsively to opposing counsel's comments, I would have the obligation, I believe, if I felt the judge was acting in a way that needed to have a record made that it was inappropriate or improper or likewise giving each side the benefit of the doubt.

Because if we are successful in this case, I want a record that the Nevada Supreme Court can read that Judge Earley was fair to both parties. So there's no suggestion by opposing counsel in her brief later on two years from now that somehow Jimmerson got something over on the Court or that there was anything other than a fair rendition of verdict by the Court. So that's appropriate, in my judgment, to make a record. It's not something I'm belaboring.

I'm getting these objections in the middle of my closing argument. That's why.

THE COURT: I hope -- I will say I hope that if
I did anything that you felt showed prejudice -- it's

1 difficult because I'm up here for a long time. If I did

- 2 do something that in any way made you think I did
- 3 something inappropriate or as favoring one side, I'll do
- 4 like the jury instruction in front of the jury, I did
- 5 | not intend to convey any of that. And, likewise, if I
- 6 have an observation, I tried very hard on credibility.
- 7 So either way, I hope that you all know I did
- 8 | not do anything by my facial the wrong way, because I
- 9 have not felt that way.
- 10 MS. LUNDVALL: And, Your Honor --
- 11 | THE COURT: And I do try to judge everybody's
- 12 credibility. Yes, I do. Your point is I don't like
- 13 | calling people liars, just because I think I want to
- 14 | judge the facts of the case based on the facts and the
- 15 law.
- 16 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: I will say that my
- 17 | comments will work both ways. If you find in favor of
- 18 | the defendants, these comments can be used by opposing
- 19 | counsel to suggest to the Nevada Supreme Court we got a
- 20 fair shake and lost.
- 21 THE COURT: I understand where you are going,
- 22 | but I don't --
- MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, from my perspective,
- 24 | I'll make a record for you. We have not suggested that
- 25 | there's been some type of influence outside the four

corners of this courtroom that Mr. Jimmerson has exerted.

What my objection was, and he cannot twist my objection, was the very standard objection that when an attorney, during closing argument, tries to personalize the remarks to the finder of fact, that is inappropriate.

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: I was not doing that. I appreciate the caution.

THE COURT: I see why you would think he was doing it that way, and I think he was trying to be more objective, but I understand your objection. And I did not take it that way, but I think, for the record, that was appropriate.

Let's go back to credibility, because I want to talk about credibility. I think that's why you were.

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: I absolutely was.

The only major change of testimony in this case in nine days, plaintiffs to defendants, defendant's witnesses, plaintiffs' witnesses, was that of Mr. Lash.

What occurred between October 28, 2013 when he testified without our having discovered this issue involving Residential 5 was his best estimate of what he was to try to demonstrate the theme that you heard announced in the opening statement by the defense that

Pardee always does the right thing, those words, was to fairly, when faced with the terms of this Commission

Agreement, which is what the subject was when it was being asked, was what did the circumvention mean? What does the word "circumvention" mean? What does "avoid" mean?

But on October 28th, it was in 2024, because we know you can change use -- and I went through this. He didn't change the testimony about use. We have the right to change use, he conceded. He didn't change that in his testimony. We have the right to change methods.

And then if you decide to change property that's later acquired -- excuse me, that's acquired by you and use it and designate it, affirmatively designate it, like an affirmative act, not a mistake and not some sort of inadvertent act, but when you go out of your way to make a designation so it's unqualified for single-family residential use, would they be entitled to commission, the answer is yes.

And that's the fair reading of the Commission

Agreement. Because Pardee not only would send you a

copy of the written option notice if they chose to

acquire land, which was the only contemplated way on

June 1 and on September 1, when the Commission Agreement

was they were to do it this way, but as a fallback, as a

1 catchall, as a broker seeking to protect the mischief of

- 2 a party, whether it be intentional, whether it be
- 3 | inadvertent, whether it be mistake, whether it be in
- 4 2024 and you forgot about the Commission Agreement --
- 5 | could happen. People will die. My clients will not be
- 6 here in 2024, let alone 2044 -- that you are obliged,
- 7 | Pardee, to keep each of you reasonably informed as to
- 8 all matters relating to the amount and due dates of your
- 9 commission payments.
- 10 I want to make it very clear that there's been
- 11 | a default, a clear default by Pardee in keeping Walt
- 12 | Wilkes informed. Other than one letter, two letters at
- 13 the max, there's no effort on the part of Pardee to keep
- 14 | each of you reasonably informed.
- The November 24, 2009 letter of Mr. Lash is
- 16 written to Mr. Wolfram. Of course, Ms. Lundvall asked
- 17 Mr. Lash, Why did you send it only to Mr. Wolfram?
- 18 The answer was, Well, I thought they were
- 19 partners. I thought that, you know, one would
- 20 | communicate with the other.
- 21 This is a breach contract because there is no
- 22 effort to send the November 24th letter, nor, what, 13
- 23 out of the first 16 key exhibits that are exchanged
- 24 | between Mr. Lash and the plaintiffs, between
- 25 Mr. Jimmerson and the defendants, between the defendants

writing back to Mr. Jimmerson. There's no effort to communicate directly with each of the parties. So there is clearly a breach on that point alone.

But just as, perhaps, more importantly, but just as importantly, is the obligation to keep each of you reasonably informed as to all matters relating to the amount and due dates of your commission payments.

It is an incorrect interpretation on the part of Pardee to think that they can send commission payments, Exhibit A in evidence, and discharge fully its obligation under this paragraph.

It is also false for the defendants to say you can go look for deeds, but as we know, intended use is never found in any of these documents by anything delivered by them. And you certainly had the error made by Mr. Lash in his November 24, 2009 letter that he didn't designate that within the multi-family purchase agreement, there was already planned, already set forth a designated use of Residentials 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, and particularly 5, of the maps that show single-family homes. That's how this came to be.

I want to go back to those maps in a few minutes, but I want to stay on what's before you. What does "reasonably informed" mean, keeping each of you reasonably informed as to all matters, Mr. Lash?

Answer: Sufficient information being provided by Pardee to your clients, Mr. Jimmerson, so that they could on their own, independent of Pardee, confirm the intended use and what Pardee is doing. That was his answer. He confirmed it again on Monday. That was the exact testimony he gave at page 211 of his --

2.2

THE COURT: Of Monday or of before?

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: The 28th of October, and he confirmed it again on Monday. I asked him the same question and he gave the same answer as to reasonably informed meaning independent verification.

And you recall I went so much further to say,

In other words, there's not an obligation on the part of

Wolfram and Wilkes to take your word for it?

Answer: That is right.

That is what was wrong with the November 24, 2009 letter, Exhibit 15. First, contrary to Mr. Lash saying, I don't know how many maps we gave them, a very kind of reckless comment on Monday, there was only one map that Pardee ever gave the plaintiffs as contained as an attachment to Exhibit 15, the November 24, 2009 letter.

And that map is inaccurate on its face because it fails to contain the single-family production residential use already designated by November 2009 of

RES 5 within the portion of the multi-family agreement
adjoining the exchange parcel that we saw in Exhibit E

of Exhibit 13. And that was the -- you recall, that was
the map that turned --

THE COURT: I have it.

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: -- this light on. Because when you look at Exhibit E, you saw the exchange parcel, the dark gray patch, and to the left was the sign Pardee. But in looking at the amendments, I couldn't see where Pardee acquired that land in the seven amendments.

And so when you look at the seventh amendment, Exhibit 12, you'll see it's by a separate agreement, the multi-family agreement referenced, not part of the \$84 million as shown on the Schedule 5 at Exhibit 12.

And, therefore -- and you see that the lots are already drawn. They are already depicted as of June of 2009.

The seventh amendment is April 24, 2009. The eighth amendment is June 2009, 60 days later, a little bit less.

The seventh amendment shows Exhibit B-6 and B-1, which I'll show you in a minute. And eighth amendment shows you Exhibit E, the exchange parcel, but right next to it is the already designated single-family home lots.

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             So Mr. Lash's change in testimony is a
    recognition that between October 29th, 2013, when
 2
    Mr. Whittemore testified, and December 9, 2013, with the
 3
    delivery on November 27th, 2013 of Exhibits 33 through
 4
    43, of which 39, 40, 41 and 43 are admitted into
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    evidence, that there was a need to change the testimony
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    because his testimony would be the designation of the
    single-family land would entitle our clients to an
8
    approximate $31,000. If you use 50 acres, it's 30,000.
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    If you use 53 acres, it's about $32,000, what
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    Mr. Andrews calls chump change.
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12
             Now, but notwithstanding the intended use and
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    the designation, which still stands today -- it's the
    last map, it's the action of Pardee for this property --
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    what I want you to understand is it was intended for
    single-family residence in 2009, in 2008.
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17
             One of the maps that we have not spent a lot of
18
    time on, but I did want you to turn to, please, if you
19
    would, is Exhibit 12 --
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             THE COURT: 12 or 13?
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             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: 12, B-1. It's just before
2.2
    B-6.
23
             THE COURT:
                         Okay.
24
             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: I'm referring now
25
    specifically to the map at 1156, CSI-Wolfram 1156,
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1 Exhibit B-1. If the Court, please, plainly for the Court's edification, is Residential 5 shown just to the 2 3 right and at Denali Summit Parkway or Avenue. 4 May I approach the bench? THE COURT: 5 Yes. MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: This is Tentative Map 2 6 7 right here. That is the -- you can see it is already zoned, 2009, for single-family residential lots. 8 9 THE COURT: Did you say zoned for it? 10 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: I misspoke. It is already 11 designated. Forget the zoning. It's already designated, as defined by the Option Agreement, 12 13 Exhibit 2, for single-family production residential It's plain as day right there. 14 15 So what is crucial here is to understand why --16 not only do we explain and you can see it -- why there would be a motivation, whether it be true or not, a 17 18 motivation for Pardee to change this one answer out of 19 two long days of testimony by Mr. Lash, because he 20 recognized that this property from the outset, at least 21 April 24, 2009, if not earlier, had found this 22 property -- already designated this property for 23 single-family use, but didn't include it in the 24 November 24, 2009 letter. 25 And when you look at the November 24, 2009

letter, it is carefully written, perhaps with aid of
counsel, certainly by Mr. Lash, because nowhere in that
letter does it say this map represents all of the
property Pardee has designated for single-family
production use. Nowhere will you find in a sentence in
that letter.

What you find in that letter, when you look at Exhibit 15, is this is how -- this is the property we acquired with the \$84 million that we expended and gave to CSI. And, indeed, that is exactly what the letter says. This is the property we acquired. And it says the adjustment in price per acre for these nonresidential uses has increased the 1,950 acres originally described to the purchase and sale agreement, but has now changed the original price. Your commission is based on a percentage of the total price and not the number of acres, period, end quote.

That is an incorrect statement. If you find, as I believe it's now undisputed, that Option Property east of the Parcel 1 location was acquired by Pardee for single-family production residential property, then a different computation for which an accounting is warranted, under Count I of the Complaint, by Pardee to Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes to ascertain the number of acres, what the computation price would be, times

1 \$40,000 an acre, times one and a half percent, and then compare it to what was actually paid by them. 2 You are talking about the RES 5? 3 THE COURT: 4 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: No, I'm not. I'm talking about property outside of that parcel generally. 5 THE COURT: Do it again then. I'm sorry. 6 You 7 are saying --8 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Let me stay on RES 5. You 9 are right. We've now switched. 10 THE COURT: MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: I did. Shame on me. 11 12 So what I'm saying to you is that the letter, 13 either inadvertently or intentionally, does not disclose that on November 24, 2009, as evidenced by their 14 15 acquisition in the seventh amendment, April 24, 2009, six months later, seven months later, that they had 16 acquired property under the side agreement, multi-family 17 18 agreement, that had already been designated for 19 single-family use as shown by B-1 of Exhibit 7, Exhibit 12 -- the seventh amendment is Exhibit 12 -- and 20 21 did not disclose it. 2.2 And it was that property, along with two 23 others, that caused Mr. Wilkes to write his letter --24 Mr. Wolfram to write his letter to Jon Lash on April 21, 25 2010, Exhibit 23, where he attaches his map, and he

references the other four parcels that he found under the name of Pardee for which there's no designated use.

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And he says: Dear Jon, as we discussed on the phone, please find enclosed a map of purchases on Coyote Springs. As you can see, my map does not agree with your map on acreage purchased by Pardee. information came from county records. Please study the Then we can discuss the map, as I have your map. Once we get the acreage settled, it is situation. imperative we establish a format for future transactions on Coyote Springs. My attorney sent your attorneys a simple format that would take any title company only a few minutes to complete, but we never received a reply. Walt's family, my family, and Pardee could understand this document in the event something happened to any of I will contact you in a few days after you've had time to study the maps, Jim Wolfram.

And Mr. Wolfram then testified, After I sent him this letter, I did call Jon Lash, and Jon Lash was adamant that this was not subject to a commission, and he would not be providing the information.

In the letters between Stringer and Jimmerson, you see demands repeatedly by Mr. Jimmerson for the documents, and refusals by Mr. Stringer initially, despite a promise that he will provide it, and

Mr. Curtis, where they never provide information, just saying it doesn't apply, it's not part of the 84 million, you are not entitled to commission, and we're not providing the documents.

б

That, by itself, Your Honor, is a breach of contract, Exhibit 2, of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and a breach of the contract to keep them reasonably informed as to all matters regarding their commission statements.

Again, how would our clients know what is in these agreements without the ability to confirm the same? That was Mr. Lash's words to objectively or objectify what a reasonable man's test, a reasonable woman's test would be to understand what does it mean to keep each of you reasonably informed as to all matters that relate to payment of commission payments to you.

And this can be obtained by a signing confidentiality agreement, which our clients would freely sign. There was a lack of care about confidentiality when they submitted the Amended and Restated Agreement, Exhibit 5, because it was deemed confidential, but sent by the title company.

And so the concept they are hiding behind, well, the documents were confidential, does not excuse a contractual obligation to keep them reasonably informed.

How would we know that all the property under the multi-family agreement is multi-family designated use property?

And according to Mr. Lash's letters and Mr. Curtis' letter and Mr. Stringer's letter, the answer is, You have to take our word for it. You have to trust us. We affirmatively and intentionally decline to provide you the documents.

It was only after a lawsuit is brought do you now have the right to obtain some documents, like the Amendments 1 through 8, and as Mr. Wolfram testified, particularly as it relates to Amendment 7, Amendment 7 and 8 being the guts of it, he could know what was purchased, what was designated intended use for homes or not. That was never sent.

And further, we know that while Mr. Stringer testified in his deposition before you that he doesn't recall or didn't give me a promise to provide the detailed information that was set forth in my correspondence to him, he didn't respond for a period of approximately three months. In his deposition he testified, so you know, I don't recall that and I don't think I promised Mr. Jimmerson the documents that he specifies.

THE COURT: That's the depo I still have to

read?

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Right. But he did not write a letter saying back, Mr. Jimmerson, I received your letter wherein you state that I promised to provide the following nine categories of documents. I don't recall that or you are a liar or I didn't say that.

None of that is forthcoming from Mr. Stringer or Pardee throughout any of this correspondence.

And the letters from Mr. Wolfram through the Jimmerson Hansen firm are replete and consistent with information requesting maps. We saw the affirmative rejection by Mr. Lash to provide maps. Requests for plat maps, rejected by Mr. Lash in his correspondence. And the request for escrow documents -- you know that none of the actual documents were ever delivered to plaintiffs?

If you had the escrow documents, you would have the APN number, you have the amount of money expended, you'd have the number of acres, you'd have a legal description, and you wouldn't be relying upon a deed that doesn't necessarily have acres. We went through several deeds that didn't have any acreage on it, which we know there's no intended use, and no explanation.

And, indeed, as you saw in Exhibit JJ and if you look at Exhibit MM, there's two additional efforts

on the part of Mr. Lash to affirmatively instruct

Mr. Butler and another employee not to provide the

information requested by Mr. Wolfram. Indeed, there's

an exhibit here that talks in terms of Mr. Wolfram being

troublesome for his repeated requests for information,

So while you've heard the defense by Pardee that there was no exercise of notice, clearly this Commission Agreement is much broader to capture any entitlement to commission.

using that term.

THE COURT: I just want to make sure that is what you are saying. You are saying that it doesn't matter what label or how they purchased it, whether it was multi-family, whether it was under -- they paid CSI for multi-family or they paid it for commercial. Once they acquire it, if they designate it at any time in the future for single-family residence, it's your interpretation of the Commission Agreement that Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes will get a commission?

THE COURT: I thought that was it, but I really wanted to make -- we've kind of talked -- I don't want to say talked around it, but I wanted to make sure that is what you are saying.

That is true.

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON:

And that's why you look to the terms of

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    designation when you were looking as opposed to
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    purchase?
             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Exactly. Because the
 3
    Option Agreement, Exhibit 2, talks in terms of
 4
    designated, is or later designated single-family
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    production residential property.
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             THE COURT: A little different from -- okay.
    just wanted to make sure I'm on the right page because I
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    want very clear what your positions are, and I apologize
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    to stop you.
             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON:
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                                  That's fine.
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                         If I don't understand, I really
             THE COURT:
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    want to make sure I'm crystal clear on the issues.
             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON:
                                  There's at least --
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15
    there's then three -- many obligations of Pardee to
    Wolfram and Wilkes under the Commission Agreement.
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    Obviously, to pay the commission is one of them.
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18
             But secondly, you have an obligation to keep
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    them, as an additional point --
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             THE COURT: Reasonably informed.
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             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: -- reasonably informed.
             And the third is the circumvention or
22
    avoidance. So those are --
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24
             THE COURT:
                         Really, those are the three major
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issues?

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: I think so. I think you are absolutely right.

THE COURT: I just want to make sure because there's been so much testimony. I really don't want to miss anything that you feel is --

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Those are, I believe, to be the three major points of the Commission Agreement.

THE COURT: So you were just talking about the reasonably informed?

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Now I'll speak to circumvention and avoidance. What's important here is under reasonably informed is you have a clear and mutual understanding by Pardee, through Lash, and plaintiffs, by Wolfram and Wilkes, of what it means.

Pre-litigation, pre-pressure to exaggerate, pre-pressure to fit your answers into some legally developed defense without the purview or the onset or complication of litigation. The pure intent of the parties is what I would say.

Then the fourth paragraph, For purposes of this agreement, the term Pardee shall include any successor or assign of Pardee's rights under the Option Agreement and Pardee's obligation to pay the commission to you at times and amounts described above shall be binding upon Pardee and its successors and assigns.

That inures to the benefit of Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes. It also explains that successors in interest of Pardee, whether it be a merged company, whether it be a company that is acquiring Pardee, whether it be Tri Pointe that's in the process potentially of buying Weyerhauser's interest, which then would include both of the Pardee subsidiaries we've talked about in this of California and of Nevada, would be obliged to honor the terms of this agreement.

And then it continues, Pardee, its successors and assigns, shall take no action to circumvent or avoid its obligation to you as set forth in this agreement.

THE COURT: Okay.

2.2

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: That is a gold-plated sentence. Because it is not a bar against cheating.

It's not a bar against fraud. It's a bar against taking action, any action -- the words "any action" -- shall take no action to circumvention or avoid its obligation to you as set forth in the agreement.

So the position of the defense has changed from, We have been doing the right thing -- the opening statement and the first seven or eight words out of Mr. Lash's mouth when I had cross-examination of him on the 28th of October -- to, Are you trying to cheat the plaintiffs, is now the questions being asked of both

Andrews and Lash in the last two days. That's a very different approach.

Because of the sensitivity that opposing counsel has to what was discovered of the admission made by Lash on behalf of his company to pay the chump change commission and of the recognition that there wasn't clarity and/or honesty in the November 24th letter or the words of Mr. Lash or to that extent, to some extent, Mr. Whittemore relative to having acquired property for property already designated in April of 2009 as single-family property.

And the language -- you know, hindsight is a wonderful thing, but the language is really broad and all encompassing. Pardee, its successors and assigns, shall take no action to circumvention or avoid its obligations to you as set forth in this agreement.

It doesn't require us to prove fraud. It doesn't require us to prove mens rea. It's a bar against taking any action to circumvention or avoid its obligation.

Buying property originally designated for single-family production residential housing under the rubric of a multi-family contract, which access was intentionally denied by Pardee, knowing it was already designated in 2009 before you completed this purchase

and squared up all the property as single-family designated property, then to confirm that, when you confirm and deem this to be the epicenter, one of two epicenters of beginning construction for single-family production residential homes, that coupled with the one to the west of the Coyote Springs Parkway, and to go forward and inject yourself into the county planning commission process through affirmative action with the county commission sitting as the zoning commission on February 16, 2011, Exhibit 39 and 41, and the map, Exhibit 43, is an effort, whether intentional or not, to avoid or circumvent its obligation to you to pay a reasonable commission, as defined.

I don't have to prove intent. Ms. Lundvall doesn't win the day by convincing you that her witnesses didn't mean to cheat the plaintiffs. That's not the standard. That's not what was agreed upon. This is a breach of contract for failure to keep them reasonably informed. It is a breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing for failure to do the same.

And the request for an equitable finding of accounting for you to tell us, using your sophisticated means, using your civil engineers on retainer to compute the curves and the straight lines and tell us how much property was outside of the Purchase Property 1, then

use that property calculation and, number two, to come clean, to recognize that under the name of the multi-family agreement you purchased 50-odd acres, about 53 acres, 50 to 53 acres -- we see two different documents that show different numbers. One is 50, the other is 53 -- production residential property as defined in the Option Agreement, Exhibit 2, and that should be reasonably compensated for the same.

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That's why I say to the Court, the Commission Agreement is different than the Option Agreement because the Commission Agreement is not only speaking to the nature of commissions, which is, I brought you this buyer, buyer wants this property desperately. It is a It excites his planners. blank canvas. opportunity to be the new Del Webb, to be the new Summerlin, to be the new Green Valley, and even a much bigger one at that, and to have the exclusive right to single-family projects that you can't do and exercise your rights to be the exclusive developer of single-family production residential is circumvent or avoid your obligation to the broker so that you later designate the property as such and the Option Agreement expresses that.

We know that all 1,950 acres or all 3,600 acres within Parcel 1 was designated single-family residential

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    property -- not all of it, but the 1,950 acres were
    contemplated, but also if they were to expand that, they
 2
    would also be buying single-family production
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 4
    residential.
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             THE COURT: Can I ask what is the plaintiffs'
    position then -- as we know, Mr. Andrews testified, We
 6
7
    have no intention going forward right now with
    single-family.
8
             What is the position if they never go forward
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10
    on that RES 5 property as single-family residential, but
    they end up developing it and having it as multi-family?
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    What is your position then on, if they pay a brokerage
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    fee, what happens in that circumstance?
             Because, as we know from all the testimony,
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    it's -- they are free -- and you've acknowledged that --
16
    to change designations.
17
             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON:
                                  I have.
18
             THE COURT: At what point in the process do you
19
    feel the broker's fee is due? Just when it's
20
    designated?
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             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON:
                                  The answer is yes, but for
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    this it's an easier question. I thought about this and
23
    my clients --
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             THE COURT:
                         It's an actual question.
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             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: I respect the Court's --
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             THE COURT:
                         I'm sure you are going to address
 2
    it, but that's in my mind.
 3
             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON:
                                  Thank you. I'll address
 4
    it now.
             A tentative map is just that. It's a tentative
 5
          It is a statement, however, an intentional
 6
    map.
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    statement made by applicant, in this case Pardee Homes,
    of its intended designation of this property for
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9
    single-family production residential lots.
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             THE COURT:
                         Okay.
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             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: To answer your question
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    directly, the contract, which is all we can base it
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    upon, which is the Option Agreement, Exhibit 2, page 1,
    the last lines of paragraph B say if the property is or
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    is later designated for single-family production
    residential use, they have a right to acquire it.
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             THE COURT: You are getting that language off
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    Exhibit 1?
             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Exhibit 2, page 1,
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20
    paragraph B.
21
             THE COURT: Let me write it down, Exhibit 2,
22
    page 1.
23
             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON:
                                   Paragraph B.
24
             THE COURT: Let me read this, which is or
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becomes designated -- that's how --

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             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: That's the basis for --
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             THE COURT: That's your interpretation. Okay.
             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: This contract is
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 4
    referenced and, I mean, that's why I say the first thing
    on the page is RE: Option Agreement for the Purchase of
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 6
    Real Property and Joint Escrow Instructions.
                                                  That's on
7
    page 1 of the Commission Agreement, referring to the
    agreement being incorporated there.
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9
             THE COURT: So your answer to my question is if
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    they change it for another use, as soon as they --
11
             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Designate it for --
12
             THE COURT:
                         Which is or becomes -- once it is
13
    designated, then the question is the -- okay.
                                                   Then they
14
    have to pay the commission. If they don't end up using
15
    it for that, too bad. You paid the commission.
16
    gone and --
17
             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Right.
18
             THE COURT: And there's no reimbursement;
19
    right?
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             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Exactly. There's no
21
    reimbursement.
2.2
             THE COURT: I just wanted to know what your
23
    position was. Okay.
             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: We're not here to be
24
25
    unfair to Pardee.
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THE COURT: I'm not trying to infer. I'm just trying --

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: I'm going to say the reason that this is easier for the Court to come to is not only did they make the designation -- by the way, they made the designation before they completed the purchase of the \$84 million of property right. You see that in April of 2009. It's Amendment 7.

But in addition, and here's the most helpful fact to avoid any concerns from the Court, is it was already designated single-family before that. In other words, it wasn't designated in 2011 after the fact. It was designated in April of 2009, before they even expended the full \$84 million as a separate property, by definition, would be Option Property outside of the \$84 million of property that's shown in Exhibit 15, the Lash map. It was already single-family shown right from the beginning.

So it's not a situation where, as you say, they change their use now next year, and then, My gosh, Mr. Jimmerson, isn't it unfair to them that they have a commission unless they actually do build it? But the single answer is the contract doesn't get that way. The contract says is or becomes designated.

But as it relates to the facts of the

particular case, you are also aided by the fact that it
was already knowingly designated, before 2009, when they
knew they had to pay a designation, when they were
paying commissions, but they bought this property under

THE COURT: What happens in the situation when we know they paid a commission to the brokers because they purchase it and single-family residential and then they were converting it to another use? Doesn't that --

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: That's their choice.

THE COURT: That's their choice. The commission stays?

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Exactly.

THE COURT: Okay.

the name of multi-family.

2.2

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Yes. And the reason for that is very simple. There's no language in the Commission Agreement to suggest that there would be a give-back or a reimbursement due to the decision-making of Pardee. Again, the decision of designation or redesignation is exclusively and unilaterally Pardee's. It's not something they seek or ask Wolfram or Wilkes to be a part of.

That is, in our judgment, the greatest weakness the defense argument, is they didn't involve the plaintiffs when they went from Option Agreement,

1 Exhibit 2, to Amended and Restated agreement, Exhibit 5. They intentionally excluded them and they 2 didn't recognize -- let's take any intent out of it. 3 4 They didn't recognize that in their changing of 5 development strategy and changing of definitions of both Purchase Property and changing definition of Option 6 7 Property, they didn't remember that those were defined terms under the original Commission Agreement. 8 9 And if they were going to do that, pick up the 10 phone and just say, Listen, fellas, we want to change 11 the direction which we're going to build. Is it okay 12 with you? Can we make a deal? Maybe pay you an extra 13 50,000 and call it square. None of that takes place. It's an attitude by Pardee, at least through their local 14 15 office in Nevada, of a disdain for the brokers, and I'm not going to involve them in this. And there was a 16 derogation of their contract. That's the mistake they 17 18 made. 19 THE COURT: You think they had a duty, when 20 they changed the underlying agreement, to get their 21 permission or just --2.2 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Absolutely. Get --23 THE COURT: Get their permission to change that 24 underlying agreement? 25 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: No, not to -- no.

can change the agreement all they want. They just can't do it and defeat our clients' entitlement to a commission. That's all.

THE COURT: If the interpretation is it was defeating them, circumventing the agreement of paying them. All right.

2.2

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: You can't conform their understanding of the new amendments to the old agreement. You cannot, by later actions between the two of them, Pardee and CSI, somehow affect the contract that existed between Wolfram and Wilkes and Pardee from the earlier agreement.

They certainly didn't get our clients' consent to supersede the agreement and replace it. Now, that's something the two of them can do all day long, but they can't undo the Option Agreement for purposes of today's trial. Do you understand? They can't say the agreement has no longer force and effect and, therefore, the Commission Agreement has no longer force and effect.

THE COURT: I don't think they were saying that.

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: They were trying to suggest that no matter where they built, inside or outside Parcel 1, that they do it and call it Purchase Property. That's their defense. Their position is we

never bought Option Property. We never exercised an option. We never gave a notice, therefore, we never bought Option Property. Therefore, we don't calculate

4 the commission based upon the different formula.

THE COURT: Right. And you are not saying they
bought Option Property. What you are saying is they
bought -- well, you are calling it Option Property
because it was built under the multi-family. You are
using the designation part now to make it Option

10 Property?

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MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Exactly right.

THE COURT: That's what you are doing?

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Right. Because it wasn't

14 Purchase Property and because --

THE COURT: It was not Purchase Property. They

16 know it wasn't --

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: And it wasn't included in the \$84 million.

THE COURT: I'm only asking because I want to make sure I'm very clear, because it's very important to me that I'm clear what everybody's saying. And we all know we've gone through a long process here. So I don't mean to infer anything by my questions. I just want to make sure I understand. You understand that,

25 Mr. Jimmerson --

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             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: I do, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: -- what I'm doing?
             I can't make good decisions if I'm not really
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    clear what you're saying. That's perfect.
             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON:
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                                 What I'm saying is under
    the name of multi-family, the definitely bought property
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7
    that, by definition, in either agreement was Option
    Property. That's all I'm saying.
8
             THE COURT: Because they changed it to multi,
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10
    that's how -- I get it.
                             That's how you hook up the
11
    Option Property. Okay.
                             And that's your point of they
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    don't have to go through the exercise option?
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             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Also, it was not part of
14
    the Purchase Property. No matter where they built.
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             THE COURT: Of course. It was part of the
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    multi-family. I understand that. I'm just trying to
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    understand your reasoning how you get there. I do
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    understand it. I thought I did, but I wanted to make
    sure.
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                                  I just wanted --
             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON:
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             THE COURT:
                         Then it hooks all together.
2.2
    understand that.
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             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: When I asked Mr. Lash, Why
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    didn't you send the November 24, 2009 letter to
25
    Mr. Wilkes, and the answer was -- Why did you exclude
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1 Mr. Wilkes? Mr. Lash said there was no reason -- Lash,
2 page 247, lines 10, 20 and 13.

As I confirmed already, Mr. Wilkes and Mr. Wolfram did introduce, were the producing cause, Lash, at page 22 of his testimony, Would you agree that there has not been provided to Mr. Wolfram or Mr. Wilkes any writing that would designate all the uses of the property that's shown on the maps we've looked at?

Answer: I believe that's true.

And certainly it's not shown on the one and only map that you've seen that you provided within Exhibit 15?

Answer: That's correct.

Lash, page 275.

2.2

If we go forward from here on out, whatever we purchase is truly Option Property for single-family, and we're more than happy to pay a commission. Lash, page 75 and also page 83.

This is important because this was never recanted by Mr. Lash. So any future purchases from today going forward or any future redesignations, in our judgment, for the reasons we've articulated --

THE COURT: That's the distinction?

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Right.

-- would be, of Option Property for

single-family use, single-family production use, would be commission.

Now, you know, we've thought about it because we don't want a harsh result. One of the things we're looking for from you is orders that would require the accounting so they would provide to us the property in and out of Purchase Property and Option Property so we can see.

But also, as I mentioned to you, to properly interpret the Commission Agreement, that there be some affirmative duty, as set forth here, to advise the clients when or if Pardee, as a company, or its successors and assigns, develops single-family production residential lots beyond that which they have purchased now in the future.

THE COURT: And you used the word "develop" them? So does that mean purchase?

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Acquire.

THE COURT: The terms are very -- I have to be really precise.

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: If they acquire, if they purchase single-family production residential property in the future at that location, that they be -- that the plaintiffs --

THE COURT: So you're using the word "acquire"?

1 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Or purchase. 2 THE COURT: I know they mean the --3 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: -- that they be 4 affirmatively advised of the same. 5 THE COURT: And you are looking for something different than what they have to already do when they 6 7 open escrow and all that, if it's Option Property? are going to be arguing to me something in addition to 8 all that's already provided under have the Amended and 9 10 Restated Option Agreement? Really, it was under the 11 first one and it got incorporated. Right? 12 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Yes. Because what has 13 happened here, whether it be innocence or not, they 14 acquired property, residential production real estate, 15 under name of multi-family, unequivocally. There's no 16 question. THE COURT: Wait a minute. Now you are using 17 18 the word "acquired" and "purchased" together, but 19 purchased isn't the same. They purchased it under the 20 multi-family. 21 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: That's right. THE COURT: The terms are tough for me to 22 23 follow. I want to --24 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: They purchased 250 acres

under an agreement that was called multi-family

1 agreement. 2 THE COURT: Which you haven't seen. MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: 50 acres of the 250 acres 3 4 was already designated single-family under the tentative -- excuse me. It was also before that. 5 If you look at Exhibit -- I just told you --6 7 B-1, that is Amendment 7 to Exhibit 5. That property, even in April of 2009, while they're performing the 8 purchase and development of the Purchase Property, the 9 10 \$84 million, in addition to that they bought 11 approximately \$30 million worth of real estate. 12 If you take \$100,000 an acre times 300 acres, 13 you get \$30 million. Of the 300 acres, 50 acres had 14 already been designated, as shown by B-1 of Exhibit 12, 15 residential property. 16 THE COURT: Okay. I see what you are referring 17 to. 18 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: And then if you look at 19 Exhibit E --20 THE COURT: Of the same exhibit? 21 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: No. Exhibit 13. 2.2 THE COURT: Okay. I got it. 23 The property to the left MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: 24 or to the west is the same property already drawn right

This is part of the multi-family property, but

1 | it's already designated in 2009.

THE COURT: You are saying by the squares?

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: By the squares.

4 THE COURT: I remember Whittemore talked to

5 that.

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MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Also, you note that

Mr. Whittemore told us that this was the beginning

point, that Pardee changed -- and it was confirmed by

Mr. Lash and Mr. Andrews -- as to where they were going

production residential building was here and one other place across the street, the Coyote Springs Parkway.

to build beginning, commence their single-family

So when you look at this, you can see that that's why it's not unfair to charge them for this responsibility. Because not only did they designate within the meaning of the Option Agreement, paragraph B, page 1, is or becomes designated, which triggers the commission right on the spot, but it's not a situation of maybe they are going to change later on. Because

this was from the beginning designed for single-family residential.

That they included multi-family was inappropriate. That they didn't pay an extra commission at that time was inappropriate. And their intent to treat it as single-family is confirmed by, two years

later, here in 2011, February 16, to get county commission approval for its single-family.

2.2

That's what makes it so different than the possibility of changing tentative maps later on. I appreciate the Court is asking and understand that the Court wants to be fair to both sides. Maybe it wouldn't be fair to pay a commission unless they do go forward with that.

But in this particular case, you have a knowing purchase of property that has already, prior to completion of the expenditure of the \$84 million, buying separate property under a multi-family agreement that is intended, already designated, for single-family production residential use, and then confirmed two years later by going forward to the county and getting their tentative map approved for 332 lots.

That's why the equities, as well as the facts, clearly support the plaintiffs and are not supportive of the defense. It also explains the change in testimony, in our judgment. And that's the only claim of change of testimony by Mr. Lash, and it was occasioned by the fact we discovered this after Mr. Whittemore went over Exhibit E.

If you remember, the exchange parcel is what we went over on the 29th of October. And when we look at

it, why are these properties single-family? And
Mr. Whittemore testified they are not part of the
3 \$84 million. That's what he testified to.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Now, let me just finish up and I'll be done here.

The letters I wanted to just show you. The Complaint we filed in December of 2010, Exhibit 00 in evidence, has simply been marked by myself as matching up to the exhibits and letters. And you have been read these letters until you are blue in the face. I don't intend to do that again.

But I did want to show you that this whole recent theme by Pardee that this is really just an unbridled, unabashed money grab by the plaintiffs, it's all about money -- Mr. Lash's testimony, I think, was generally credible. Mr. Whittemore testimony was generally credible. Mr. Wolfram's testimony was generally credible. Mr. Wilkes' testimony was generally credible.

But in this -- and I do take issue with both Mr. Lash and Mr. Whittemore's testimony, because when you read the Complaint and go through it, as we will now, you'll see it wasn't a money grab. The breach of contract is very different.

I mean, how many times have you seen in your lawsuits a lawsuit that says the breach of contract is the failure to provide information? I mean, it's an exception. I don't say it never happens. I'm saying that most of the time it's you breached the contract for which you've caused damage in excess of \$10,000.

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So in this Complaint we have the background is we talked about they executed a Commission Letter of September 1, 2004, Exhibit 1. If we turn the page, it talks about their having been assigned their real estate companies' interest for which summary judgment is granted.

Paragraph 6, pursuant to the Commission Letter, they are entitled to be paid a commission for all real property sold under the Option Agreement. Pursuant to the Commission Letter, plaintiffs were to be fully informed of all sales. And I say "fully." The words are reasonably informed, and I quote it. And it says, Pardee shall keep each of you reasonably informed as to all matters relating to amount and due dates of your commission payments, Exhibit 1.

Then on April 23, 2009, plaintiffs sent to defendant documents which detail the purchase and sales of certain real property for which plaintiffs believe are part of property outlined in the Option Agreement

and, therefore, property for which they are entitled to receive a commission. A parcel map was also requested to identify which properties have been sold, Exhibit 24.

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Judge, this is a little bit of irony here.

April 23 is when the letter is dated and sent,

presumably received on the 24th or 25th. That day, the

next day, April 24, 2009, is the seventh amendment date

to the Amended and Restated Option Agreement that

specifically referenced Residential 5 and the

single-family production residential as being part of

the multi-family agreement.

That is why, when it comes to measuring the credibility, Mr. Lash was very careful to say in his letter, This is the property we've acquired using our \$84 million dollars, intentionally avoiding, in my view, the statement or representation, This is all of the single-family residential property we've acquired, because that would have been false.

His map did not include RES 5 as part of the documents. Part of the property that was shown in Exhibits -- Addendum 7 and 8 within Exhibits B-6, B-1, and Exhibit E of Exhibit 13.

Then the defendant replied to plaintiffs' letter of April 23, 2009 with a letter dated July 10, 2009. The April 23 letter, Exhibit 24, memorializes the

1 request for documents that have been assuredly provided by Mr. Stringer to Mr. Jimmerson. 2 It's not responded to, and then the response comes April of -- July 10, 3 2009, Exhibit 21, which fails to produce a single 4 document or include a single document, save and except to say you are not entitled to it. 6

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And that doesn't meet the objective standard that both Mr. Lash and Mr. Wolfram and Wilkes reached when they signed the agreement on June 1, or as testified to by Mr. Lash and the plaintiffs here in trial the last nine days that there would be an ability to independently confirm the propriety of Pardee's actions in purchasing single-family production real estate for which our clients would be entitled to a commission.

Paragraph 10, plaintiffs again requested additional documents, Exhibit 18. After conversations with the plaintiffs, he sent a two-page letter, which is Exhibit 15.

Paragraph 12, plaintiffs relied upon plaintiffs' representations made on November 24th as being truthful and accurate. And paragraph 13, that they learned afterwards that it wasn't accurate.

Now, Exhibit 20 is the letter we reference here of May 17, 2010, from plaintiffs to defendants.

you'll also see Exhibit 23, which is not referenced in this Complaint, but Exhibit 23 was Mr. Wolfram's map, which today Mr. Andrews, just this morning -- I guess it was yesterday afternoon, said, Yeah, his map matches, it's generally accurate.

2.2

But it included four parcels that Mr. Wolfram had found for which there had been no explanation, save and except in 2007 when Mr. Wolfram had called and said, You are overpaying me. And they wrote the letter back saying you owe us \$50,000. As we move along, we'll subtract a little bit here and there so we'll capture our \$50,000.

In that document, the second page, middle paragraph it says, And we bought other property through side agreements or through other agreements. But it didn't tell them what they bought and certainly didn't tell them that part of the property we bought under multi-family has already been designated single-family pursuant to both the Option Agreement, Exhibit 2, as well as the designation within their own workings, within their own plans, internal to Pardee for which our clients would not know.

And but for the fact that they then acted upon their earlier designation of April 24, 2009, the seventh amendment, declaring RES 5 residential single-family

production homes, two years later they went to the county and confirmed the same. Why was that? Because with the effect of the economy and, believe it or not, a water pressure table that we learned about, they would begin their construction there and not more northerly.

And, therefore, they were going to use both the exchange parcel and the other, which is 26.9 or 28.96 acres and the other 53 acres to make up the 83-acre parcel for the commencement of single-family residential construction.

In the claims, I just want you to understand —
I know you've read these before. Paragraph 17, first
claim for accounting, plaintiffs have requested
documents promised to them by defendant in the
Commission Letter and have not received them.
Specifically, they have requested the name of the
seller, the buyer, the parcel numbers, the amount of
acres sold, the purchase price, the commission payment
scheduled and amount, title company contact information
and escrow numbers, copy of close of escrow documents,
and comprehensive maps specifically depicting this
property sold and with parcel numbers specifically
identified, end of quote.

Had that information been provided, this lawsuit would have been resolved by agreement between

1 | the parties. This would have been discovered and we

2 | wouldn't have had a nine-day trial. This is what was

- 3 | not provided. This is what was promised by
- 4 Mr. Stringer. This is what had been discussed with
- 5 Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Lash, and Mr. Wolfram asked from
- 6 Mr. Lash, that Mr. Lash, in his letter of November 24th,
- 7 | intentionally refused to provide.

8 And the proof is in the pudding. Our case

9 might have been different had we not discovered the

10 | tentative map, except to say that, irrespective of

11 | finding that, the strength of the plaintiffs' case, as

12 | shown to you throughout the development of our case, the

13 discovery, the motions for summary judgment that you

14 | heard and ruled upon, was it didn't -- you were in a

superior position, Pardee, to provide information that

16 | you chose intentionally not to provide.

17 And if you are going to be reasonably informed

18 | and able to independently confirm the accuracy of your

19 representations, you need to provide that information,

20 which they didn't do.

15

21 Then the icing on the cake, though, is finding

22 | that they intentionally did not disclose 50 acres of

23 prime residential production property that was going to

24 be the first of the acreage developed. That is what

25 | made it so compelling, previously designated long before

this lawsuit was filed, and rendered Mr. Lash's letter of November 24th, seven months later, inaccurate in its representations. And I could be kind in just calling it inaccurate.

Breach of contract is the second claim for relief, for failure to bring -- look at what it says.

Defendant has a duty to honor its contractual obligations. Defendant has failed and refused to perform the obligations pursuant to the terms and outlines of the commission letter.

In the previous paragraph, plaintiffs have requested documents promised to them by the defendants in the Commission Letter and have not received them.

That's paragraph 22. As a result of defendant's breach of contract, we suffered damages in excess of \$10,000.

Under Sandy Valley you have an entitlement to reasonable dollars when you expend money to obtain information like this, both in terms of prevailing party attorneys' fees, but also as money damages, as the Court has already ruled upon.

But notice, I would say, the wisdom and care of Jim Wolfram and Walter Wilkes. That is to say it's not a Complaint saying, You owe us money that you haven't paid us. You cheated us out of money. All the arguments we hear now in response to the newly

discovered information.

Here you have a most conservative Complaint that says, You didn't provide us the information. We're having to start a lawsuit and pay \$274 to file a Complaint and serve you to get the information you should have provided.

And while we got the information because of public knowledge, because of judicial notice, because of the balancing of admission at the late date for the reasons you've articulated, a fair statement can be made, Why didn't you move to compel?

But in terms of the agreement, the Commission

Agreement, the defense is Jimmerson has to file a

lawsuit and then a motion to compel before we will

intentionally not provide documents and then have to

provide documents. That's why it's a losing

proposition.

Yes, Your Honor, I could have filed a motion to compel. You could have decided on it or not as the case may be, or the Discovery Commissioner then coming up to you. But under the obligation of the contract, that's not the requirement. That's not the burden of the plaintiffs.

It's the burden of the defendants to keep the plaintiffs reasonably informed as to all -- I would

suggest the word "all" means "all" -- matters as they relate to the commission payments. Those are words that the defense, no matter how they squirm, cannot get out from underneath, the consequence of those.

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2.2

Even though they consider this amount chump change, it means the world to my clients, not for the dollars, not for the 30-odd thousand dollars and the attorneys' fees that we should win as prevailing party and money damages, as testified to by myself and in our other briefs, but because this is a 40-year process.

I listened to Mr. Andrews, and he may be right, and there may never be another purchase of single-family production residential in Coyote Springs by Pardee. It could very well be. I don't know. But neither does he. It is 30-plus more years to go between now and the end of this contract, and we don't know what's going to take place.

When a company has invested hundreds of millions of dollars, per Mr. Andrews, they are not walking away from this project. Now, do they only build on 1,950 acres? Do they only build on 1,950 acres or 2,112 acres plus the 50 we've uncovered? I don't know.

But I know this: Our clients are entitled to a 40-year look of entitlement to commissions if they do build additional single -- or they designate, excuse me,

single-family residential property. They already designated 2,112 acres, and they've already designated 50 additional acres that we didn't know about until the middle of this trial.

That's why I say, in terms of when you hear this argument or question by Mr. Lash, I read the letters as asking for money -- there is a couple letters that say, We were the procuring cause, maybe we're entitled to a commission. It's true.

But most of the letters, of the 16 or 18 letters you have before you, it is, I want information, I want information, I want -- he wasn't certain whether he was owed any money, but he was entitled to the information. They broke their agreement by not doing so, for which they are entitled to that.

And then the third claim is most compelling too. It's the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that runs with this contract and is set forth in paragraphs 27 through 30. They continue to have a duty of good faith fair dealing. They were asked for documents. They didn't provide the documents. And as a result, they are in breach.

When you listen to the words of opposing counsel -- I'll conclude with this -- that, Oh, you could have done to the deed and seen -- what could you

have done? Let's go through it. You could have seen the deeds.

And I went through the examination of Mr. Lash, Mr. Whittemore. The deeds that were shown many times don't show the acreage at all. Absolutely, the deeds don't show the designated use. And it's the designated use that is the triggering language within the Option Agreement, which is the predicate to the Commission Agreement, and Commission Agreement specifies that, we think.

It also doesn't tell you the exact location unless you can find a map. Maps aren't always recorded. Out of these 49 payments, there were only five maps, five takedowns over several years.

My client, by April of 2010, Exhibit 23, wrote to Mr. Lash saying, I've received your map and it's incomplete. Here are four additional parcels that you've acquired. Are you telling me that they don't include single-family residential use? Would you please tell me what the designated uses are?

He picks up the phone and calls him. Would you tell me what the uses are? And Mr. Lash won't take his call or says you are not entitled to it, I'm not sending the documents. And that's confirmed by multiple letters of Stringer and Curtis in July and August of 2009 --

excuse me, 2010, prior to the lawsuit being brought in December.

2.2

So the defense of opposing counsel that we could have moved to compel doesn't meet the terms of the Commission Agreement, which is an affirmative obligation on the part of Pardee to keep their clients reasonably informed.

THE COURT: I understand the distinction.

Can I ask something real quick? When you went through the Complaint, are you saying to the Court now we aren't asking for money damages?

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: We were not. We're asking for the damages associated with the --

THE COURT: Getting the information?

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: The information.

THE COURT: Is that still your position now?

Are you now adding more?

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: I don't think we're adding anything.

Paragraph 25, if you look at paragraph 25, it says as a result of the breach -- defendant's breach of contract, plaintiffs have been forced to bring this matter to Court. They are entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.

THE COURT: Thank you. I did want that

- 1 clarified.
- MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: So to answer your
- 3 question, with the help of my son --
- 4 THE COURT: The answer is yes.
- 5 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Yes. We would like to
- 6 have \$135,000 as shown by Exhibits 31A.
- 7 THE COURT: Hold on. That's the attorneys'
- 8 fees?
- 9 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Yes. We're asking for
- 10 | \$30,000 or one and a half percent times 50 acres times
- 11 | 40,000 an acre, which is certainly giving the defendants
- 12 | the best of it, because they paid 100,000 an acre, but
- 13 | we understood that as part of the 100,000 an acre,
- 14 Mr. Andrews was clear to make it, We were buying the
- 15 | rights. Rights were different than the underlying
- 16 | property. It's just that Jon Lash says, If we're going
- 17 to pay 100,000 an acre for the rights, let's get the
- 18 property to match.
- 19 THE COURT: So the testimony is they paid
- 20 | 100,000 for it, but you are asking for a commission not
- 21 off the 100,000?
- MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Off the 40,000, which is
- 23 | the Option Agreement.
- 24 THE COURT: Okay.
- MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: And Roman numeral III to

1 the Commission Agreement. MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Roman numeral III. 2 3 THE COURT: Of the Commission Agreement, yeah, which is how -- if it was, if the Court determines it is 4 Option Property, everybody agrees how it would be paid, 5 certainly not anything to do with the 100,000. 6 7 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: The last point --THE COURT: What else? 8 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: That's it. So you got the 9 10 prevailing party attorneys' fees. We're asking for \$135,000, plus 30,000 commissions, plus an order --11 12 THE COURT: That's what I need a little more. 13 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: -- an order that affirmatively obliges Pardee in the future for the 14 15 length of the term, the 40 years counted back from 2004 to 2044, that there be an obligation to notify the 16 estates of Wolfram and Wilkes, if they are passed away, 17 18 or them now while they are alive, of any future 19 designation of single-family production residential in 20 either the Purchase Property, which is now exhausted, or 21 the Option Property. 2.2 THE COURT: What I would like, could you give me what language? Because I certainly want that so I --23 24 I don't want to go outside what you want, and I 25 certainly don't -- I want to be able to look at it, in

1 terms of the defendant, whether that is what I want to 2 give. MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, from this 3 4 perspective -- I didn't mean to interrupt. 5 THE COURT: You see where I'm going? saying I'll do it. But before you start -- I apologize. 6 Before -- I just wanted to get this out anyway. 7 I looked at the findings of fact and conclusions of law. 8 9 As you know, this trial changed a little bit. 10 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: It sure did, a lot of it. 11 MS. LUNDVALL: That's why we said revised. 12 THE COURT: I got the -- I checked and it 13 looked like, Ms. Lundvall, your second was identical to 14 the first one. 15 MS. LUNDVALL: Absolutely not, Your Honor. THE COURT: I hope I got the right second one 16 then, because actually had my law clerk compare it. 17 But 18 I'll make sure that I got the revised one from you 19 because --20 Absolutely. We'll help you out. MS. LUNDVALL: 21 THE COURT: I was going to ask the same, 22 obviously to help me out -- I could do this, but I don't 23 have four months, as you can imagine, of revised. 24 thought yours was, but he looked at -- I had David look 25 at it real quick, and he didn't think -- but he's been

doing a double load here too, to be honest, while I'm here.

So if it is revised, we'll -- the defendant's, we will look at it. And if for some reason it isn't, I will -- because that is very important to me.

MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I was going to ask that when you closed your case. Because I don't want to sit here and -- I want to fashion, if I did do something like that, nothing more than you want. And if I have to deal with it, I want it --

MS. LUNDVALL: I understand.

13 THE COURT: And I want --

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MS. LUNDVALL: What I'm trying to do is to be responsive to --

THE COURT: I was just going to say, how are you going to respond to it?

MS. LUNDVALL: Well, to the suggestion that they are going to submit something to you later, how do I respond to something that's --

THE COURT: Here's what I was --

MS. LUNDVALL: That's what their obligation is during closing arguments, to tell the Court what it is they are asking for, so that I can have an adequate opportunity to respond to that.

1 THE COURT: Okay. Here's what we could do: 2 will let supplemental briefing, if I need it, on 3 something like that, because I agree. I don't want -- I 4 understand you're in a position now, how are -- you can -- I worried about this all through trial because I 5 knew this was coming up, how -- how to do that in 6 7 fairness to both of you. MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: 8 Here's --MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: 9 May I offer a suggestion? 10 THE COURT: I want to work with you both. 11 And you have your closing. But since they are 12 still in theirs, I want to make sure we have an 13 agreement here. If not, then I'll just write down what I don't know. 14 he said. 15 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Most states across the 16 country, when applying an accounting, have a separate proceeding. So to the extent that you would invite 17 18 supplemental briefing or oral argument on what is 19 necessary to produce for the accounting, you would allow 20 that at a later date. And so your idea of supplemental 21 briefing and whatnot, there would be that separate 2.2 proceeding. 23 I was wondering about that. THE COURT: 24 didn't have a chance to look at the case law. And I can

see by Ms. Lundvall, no, I don't want to do that.

1 Because you don't feel, for an accounting, 2 there should be a separate --3 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Here's what we need from 4 the accounting. I'll write it down as best I can. 5 THE COURT: Be specific. 6 7 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: It is undisputed that some portion of the 2,100 acres is to the east of Parcel 1, 8 9 purchase Property, under Exhibit 2 here. Instead of building up here, as they indicated in both --10 THE COURT: I understand that. 11 12 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Here's the point. 13 THE COURT: Tell me what --The accounting would be to 14 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: 15 use their engineers -- because Mr. Lash says you have to have an engineer to do this. Well, Mr. Wilkes and 16 Mr. Wolfram don't have one and his wife does not have 17 18 The engineers will tell us how many acres fell 19 outside Parcel 1. That's one part of the accounting. 20 THE COURT: You want them to provide to you how 21 many acres that have already been purchased? 2.2 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Correct. Which would include the 84 million 23 THE COURT: 24 Purchase Price Property and the multi-family and the 25 commercial?

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1
             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON:
                                  Multi-family, Judge, would
2
    just be Residential 5.
             THE COURT: I'm not willing to go like this.
3
 4
    can tell you right now. I'm not going there.
             MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: That would be contingent
5
6
    upon your finding that the Purchase Property is
7
    defined --
             THE COURT:
                         Is Parcel 1.
8
9
             MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Exactly. You would have
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    to make that finding and then our request --
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             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: That's the only finding
12
    you can make from our --
13
             THE COURT: I'm not sure. Can we do something?
    Tell me what you need if for -- if the Option Property
14
15
    is bought, what documents -- I'm not going to go through
16
    what -- what documents other than what is already given,
    they are given under the escrow instructions, that's all
17
18
    detailed in, you know, the Option Agreement and then
19
    it's been incorporated into the Amended and Restated
20
    Option Agreement. It has a list of things they get, as
21
    we know -- what, in addition to that, you would want the
2.2
    Court to order. Do you see where I'm going?
23
             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Affirmative notice and
24
    designation of use because --
25
             THE COURT: You want affirmative -- I want
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1 to --

- 2 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Affirmative notice of the
- 3 acquisition of property intended for single-family
- 4 production use and the use.
- 5 THE COURT: Affirmative notice of everything
- 6 | that they acquire?
- 7 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Of all acquisition of
- 8 property intended for single-family use.
- 9 THE COURT: Affirmative notice of Option
- 10 Property?
- MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Yes. Because everything
- 12 they buy now is Option Property.
- 13 | THE COURT: Not under your agreement.
- 14 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: If it's intended for
- 15 | single-family production use, yes, it is.
- 16 THE COURT: They know that already. I don't
- 17 | even have to --
- 18 MS. LUNDVALL: I'm doing my best to sit in this
- 19 | chair.
- THE COURT: He's trying. Both of us -- we all
- 21 understand.
- MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: We're going to want the
- 23 | following documents: We going to want all maps
- 24 | reflecting designation of use of all property that is
- 25 purchased by Pardee.

1 THE COURT: Of all future property? MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: No. All current property 2 3 that has been purchased. 4 THE COURT: Do it again. 5 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: All maps reflecting --THE COURT: You want the information on what 6 7 the multi-family is and what they've done on commercial? MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Just where that property 8 9 is located, where it's designated. So we are not asking 10 for, you know, the price information. We're not asking 11 for any -- we need to confirm that all of the property, 12 okay --13 THE COURT: That's already owned by Pardee. MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Exactly. How much of it 14 15 is single-family residential versus the other 16 properties. So to the extent --17 THE COURT: Because we have this real issue 18 between designated, that would be -- because they may 19 designate something tomorrow and change it. We have to 20 be within the realm of reality here. 21 Mr. Andrews here said, You know what, the one 22 we did for RES 5 is probably not going to be renewed, 23 and we're almost at the four years and that's gone. 24 So that would be asking the Court to order, for 25 Mr. Wilkes and Wolfram, all the details that they do

- 1 | from -- I don't think that's --
- 2 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: I'm not talking about
- 3 | going forward.
- 4 MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, if I may have a
- 5 suggestion, if Counsel would identify what they want,
- 6 then we would know what it is that they are asking you
- 7 to order.
- 8 THE COURT: That's what we started with and
- 9 they were willing to do that. But, Ms. Lundvall, you
- 10 | said they have to do it now for the closing.
- MS. LUNDVALL: I do.
- 12 THE COURT: Isn't that what we just went
- 13 | through?
- 14 MS. LUNDVALL: That's what I'm trying to get
- 15 from them.
- 16 THE COURT: You know what, I am just going to
- 17 cut this. I do want to have a chance to see specifics,
- 18 | because -- and you know what, in all honesty, I may have
- 19 another hearing, and I want the defense to have a chance
- 20 | to respond to it. You can't respond to generalities.
- I want to get this lawsuit -- if I did do that,
- 22 | I'm not saying I would -- but I want things finalized
- 23 | for both of your positions now. I don't know if I'm
- 24 | going there, I'll be honest. I have no idea. But I
- 25 | want to know if I do go there, I don't want this to come

1 back.

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The last thing I want either for Pardee or

Mr. Wilkes or Wolfram is to not understand each other's

duty. I don't feel I'm in a position right now, where

we are right now, to do that. I started listing

questions last night of what we were going to do, and I

8 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Well, then we maybe 9 haven't done our best job.

had more questions than I had answers.

THE COURT: I mean for the order, not for the other, but for how to be fully informed. I've heard lots of testimony of what -- how -- why you weren't reasonably informed.

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: One of the reasons --

THE COURT: But it was hard for me to get a

handle on in the future what you feel you would need.

In all honesty, I read through the testimony as best I could a little bit -- not a lot of time last night -- because I knew this was coming today. And I couldn't

20 get a handle on it, in all honesty. I don't know if I'm

21 just not --

MS. LUNDVALL: Can I get the list from
plaintiffs as to what they claim that they believe they
are entitled to?

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: I would -- okay. This is

1 the answer: What's in the Option Agreement, Exhibit 2, 2 which includes the escrow instructions, a map, a deed --MS. LUNDVALL: Hold on. I'm making a list. 3 4 You want escrow instructions. What kind of map? MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: A map depicting the 5 6 property that is being designated or acquired. 7 MS. LUNDVALL: And you want a deed? MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Our Complaint is pretty 8 good about what it is we need, really. 9 10 MS. LUNDVALL: Respectfully, thank you as far 11 as for giving me a list so I can respond to it. 12 THE COURT: And the Court would appreciate it, 13 because she needs to respond and I need to understand so there is no ambiguity, if we did go there, of what it 14 15 is, because that -- I don't want any more lawsuits between you if we can avoid it. I'm sure both clients 16 don't want that. This needs to be put to bed. 17 18 And because we have this long-standing Option 19 Agreement, that is a big concern to me. That is one 20 thing you need to accomplish out of this lawsuit. 21 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: No question. The result 22 of that from both sides is some sort of a recordation or 23 recording with the county recorder's office of the 24 Commission Agreement and whatever the Court orders here

so that both sides know what has to be provided long

1 after everybody in this room is no longer in practice. THE COURT: I just know it has to be something 2 that will have force and effect for over 40 years, since 3 4 some of us may not be around. MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: So what we request at 5 6 paragraph 17 for the accounting is --Why don't we do -- were you 7 THE COURT: finished with your closing or did I stop you? 8 9 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: No, no. 10 THE COURT: Let me -- you probably need a break 11 If you want to work it out --12 MS. LUNDVALL: No, no. From this standpoint, I 13 think that I am entitled as far as to know what it is as 14 far as a judgment that --15 THE COURT: Absolutely. MS. LUNDVALL: -- they are asking for from you. 16 I agree. I just thought you could 17 THE COURT: 18 work it out while I take a break or -- I'm not saying 19 you're going to agree. I know where you are coming I'm not saying you agree, but let's, at least --20 21 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: We can't get agreement? 22 THE COURT: -- have them put specifics of what 23 they want so you can respond to it and I can have an 24 idea what they are asking for. And if that would help 25 before you -- we need it before your closing.

- 1 also need a break.
- MS. LUNDVALL: Tell me what it is that you are
- 3 asking for.
- 4 THE COURT: The Court is taking a break now and
- 5 | you let me know --
- 6 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: We'll put it on the record
- 7 | when you return, Judge.
- 8 THE COURT: Everybody take a comfort break.
- 9 (Whereupon, a recess was taken.)
- 10 THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, did we work
- 11 | anything out?
- 12 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: I don't know that we
- 13 | worked anything out, but Ms. Lundvall asked that I read
- 14 | the language into the record. So I'll do that.
- 15 THE COURT: So this is what you are asking for
- 16 | an order?
- 17 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Yes. The vast majority of
- 18 | this is found at paragraph 17 of the Complaint,
- 19 Exhibit 00.
- THE COURT: Okay.
- 21 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: And it is, Plaintiffs have
- 22 | requested documents promised to them by defendant -- and
- 23 | that's part of this, but I'm just reading it as the
- 24 | allegation -- in the Commission Letter and have not
- 25 received them. Specifically requested the name of the

1 seller -- so it's the name of seller, Your Honor, the buyer, the parcel numbers, the amount of acres sold, the 2 purchase price, the commission payments scheduled and 3 4 amount, title company contact information and escrow numbers, a copy of all escrow documents including escrow 5 instructions, comprehensive maps specifically depicting 6 7 the property purchased or sold, and its designated use. If there is a change in designated use, 8 particularly a change to single-family residential 9 10 production property --11 THE COURT: If there's a change in designated 12 use? 13 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: A change in designated use to single-family production residential property, 14 15 Pardee, its successors and assigns, shall affirmatively notify plaintiffs or the estates of plaintiffs at an 16 address to be supplied by plaintiffs, with a copy to its 17 18 counsel of record, of the change of designation, number 19 of acres involved, and the purchase price, and the number of acres involved and its location. 20 21 THE COURT: And when you say plaintiffs have 22 requested -- promised to them by defendant -- you are 23 referencing any -- we know we don't have any more 24 Purchase Price Property. Correct?

Correct.

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON:

1 MS. LUNDVALL: So any Option Property, as 2 defined by the Commission Agreement, paragraph 2. 3 Right? MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: 4 Exactly. THE COURT: Subsection 3. 5 6 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: And we would just make 7 sure that all these requests are inured to the 8 obligation of Pardee, its successors and assigns, and to the benefit of Wolfram and Wilkes, their successors and 9 10 assigns. 11 MS. LUNDVALL: And with the qualification, I 12 meant that's for the Option Property pursuant --13 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: We will follow up, of 14 course, pursuant to the Court's request with the 15 written. THE COURT: And, Ms. Lundvall, they had given 16 me -- they thought it was your revised one, and it was 17 18 the same one. It was sitting -- it's my fault. 19 MS. LUNDVALL: No problem. 20 THE COURT: So they had two copies of the same 21 So evidently -- so you did give us a revised one 2.2 and it has a CD-ROM on it. 23 MS. LUNDVALL: Yes, it does, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Somehow I got two of the same

25

thing.

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1
             Okay. So you have -- all right.
             MS. LUNDVALL: Is plaintiffs' counsel finished?
2
                         I think so.
             THE COURT:
3
 4
             You closed; right?
5
             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Yes, Your Honor.
             MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, before I even do my
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7
    to-dos or do any general statements or express my thanks
    to you and your gracious staff, all of your gracious
8
    staff for its accommodations, what I want to do is to
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10
    directly address the issue that was raised by
11
    Mr. Jimmerson concerning the R-5 property.
12
             THE COURT: Okay.
13
             MS. LUNDVALL: It is his theory that in
    December of 2005, Pardee applied for a tentative map,
14
15
    and on that tentative map we made requests for
    designations of single-family residential property.
16
17
    it is also his contention that, in fact, we have already
18
    designated that single-family residential property.
19
             And he pointed you to Amendment No. 7, and he
20
    said look at the R-5 designation. That's what he said,
21
    R-5 designation. Okay? And then he went on to tell
2.2
    you, without any foundation whatsoever, what R-5 means.
23
             R-5 can be found at Clark County Code
24
    30.40.160.
25
             THE COURT:
                         Clark County Code?
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1
             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Your Honor, I never said
2
    R-5. I said RES 5. R-5 is a zoning designation.
                                                        Ιt
3
    has nothing to do with this case, Residential 5.
4
             THE COURT: Hold on.
5
             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: I never --
6
             THE COURT: Do you mind if I make sure I look
7
    at my notes?
             MS. LUNDVALL: I want this to be --
8
9
             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: We never discussed zoning.
10
    The Court wouldn't even allow it.
11
             THE COURT: I have a note here, RES 5.
12
             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: RES 5, short for
13
    Residential 5.
14
             THE COURT: Well, it's a designation I have
15
    seen with RES 1 on these maps between --
16
             MS. LUNDVALL: Now hold on. Please do not
17
    interrupt me.
18
             THE COURT: Let me see if there's any --
19
             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: I object to the statement.
20
                         Interesting, I have an R-5.
             THE COURT:
21
    maybe he interchanged. I put RES 5 five times so far
2.2
    and one R-5. So did you mean RES 5?
23
             MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Only, yes. Only RES 5, of
24
    course.
25
             MS. LUNDVALL: But that's okay, Your Honor.
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Because you know what, he told you what RES 5, that he used interchangeably with R-5, meant.

- 3 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: I did not.
- THE COURT: Just tell me what he says RES 5
- 6 MS. LUNDVALL: Please do not interrupt me as
 7 far as during my argument.
- 8 THE COURT: In my notes --
- 9 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Don't misstate something.
- 10 | I said RES 5, referring to the one parcel that was in
- 11 | the multi-family use. I never referenced a zoning
- 12 designation. R-5 is a zoning designation for apartment
- 13 | buildings. This RES 5 is residential. You sell it as
- 14 | residential lots. I don't know where this is coming
- 15 | from. I never mentioned R-5 at all. RES 5 would be any
- 16 reference I have as to RES 5. It's the only RES 5 in
- 17 | this entire trial.
- 18 THE COURT: For the record, that's what I wrote
- 19 down. One time I did do R-5, but -- do your closing
- 20 how --

5

was.

- 21 MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you, Your Honor. But the
- 22 | point I want to try to make is this, is he told you that
- 23 | RES and R-5 meant single-family residential, that Pardee
- 24 | had already designated it single-family residential.
- 25 | That's what he told you and that's how, in fact, that he

used the foundation in a preface for claiming some type
of entitlement to the tentative map application that was
made in December of 2010.

The RES 5 designation is found at the exhibits to Amendment No. 7, which is found at Tab 5. And we expressly asked Mr. Whittemore in any of those depictions on those maps, the reference is to multi-family land. Answer: Yes. You can go back and to look through his testimony.

Moreover, the RES 5 that is depicted on these maps matches the R-5 designation that is multi-family land that is found at 30.40.160. And so, therefore, I think that that is a very important point that plaintiffs' counsel originally made, and that is the Court is entitled to take judicial notice of the Clark County codes, statutes, case law, anything from a legal perspective. So we would ask the Court to take a look at that.

THE COURT: 30.40.160, Clark County Code.

MS. LUNDVALL: Clark County Code.

THE COURT: I want to make sure I have the right reference. That's R-5 designation.

MS. LUNDVALL: That's correct. If you take a look at, there is a standard as far as agenda maps that is used by the Clark County Commission. In the lower

- 1 | right-hand corner what they use is also as
- 2 | identification as residential districts. You are going
- 3 to see the R-5 reference. Where is it under?
- 4 Multi-family. That's a standard form that is used then
- 5 by the Clark County Commission.
- Now, from here, Your Honor, what I'd like to do
- 7 | is this, is to hand a copy to the Court as well as to
- 8 opposing counsel our proposed findings of fact and
- 9 conclusions of law.
- 10 THE COURT: This is the new one?
- 11 MS. LUNDVALL: That is the revised.
- 12 THE COURT: Okay, that I did just find it.
- MS. LUNDVALL: One of the things, Your Honor,
- 14 | that I found is giving the closing remarks in a bench
- 15 | trial differs significantly from giving closing remarks
- 16 | to a jury.
- 17 THE COURT: Usually the trier of fact doesn't
- 18 ask questions. And I don't know if that's appropriate
- 19 or not, but sometimes you have to. I bet jurors -- they
- 20 | can, but they don't like writing it down. They get
- 21 intimidated.
- 22 MS. LUNDVALL: The other thing that I found too
- 23 | is in doing closing remarks then to the bench is that
- 24 | the courts typically are more analytical. We all kind
- 25 of move in progression. We move and we analyze in

1 linear fashion, and we look at things and we're trying

- 2 to find checklists. Like essential elements, have they
- 3 | been demonstrated? Has proof of this issue been
- 4 | demonstrated in this trial?
- And, therefore, what I intend to do is to
- 6 | fashion my remarks, my closing remarks, around our
- 7 | proposed findings and conclusions of law. I'm going to
- 8 pull these up on the screen in addition to having the
- 9 written document in front of the Court. The screen
- 10 helps me go along. So Brian is going to simply follow
- 11 me.
- 12 THE COURT: That's fine.
- MS. LUNDVALL: What the Court is going to
- 14 | learn, what your court staff regrettably will learn, is
- 15 | it takes a little bit longer and it's not --
- 16 THE COURT: I promised both of you you could
- 17 have as much time as long as we do it today. They're
- 18 | fine.
- 19 MS. LUNDVALL: And it's not as exciting. So
- 20 | I'm hoping everybody is able to stay awake at this late
- 21 | hour on a Friday afternoon.
- THE COURT: I promise you, I will.
- MS. LUNDVALL: If we pull up the first page,
- 24 | I'm going to start going through some of these things
- 25 | because they are not -- you need to blow up for me so I

can see these as they come up.

2.2

Some of these issues and some of these foundational proposed findings of fact there's no dispute for, and I'm going to run through these fairly quickly.

There's no question about that both Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes were real estate agents, who they work for. Moreover, there is no question that the Court has already ruled that they have standing then to bring this case.

THE COURT: That's under your A. It's almost like stipulated facts, although it doesn't say stipulated facts.

MS. LUNDVALL: But there is no dispute concerning these particular issues.

There's no issue that, in fact, in the 1990s Mr. Whittemore was the one that began developing the project that was to be known as Coyote Springs. We also know, and there's no dispute, that this included over 43,000 acres of unimproved real property and where its location was.

Now turn to the next one, please. We also know that Pardee is a home builder, and you learned through the testimony then what a production home builder is, and they do business here in Nevada. Pardee, in this

1 reference, is shorthand for Pardee Homes of Nevada.

2 They are the defendant then to this action.

2.2

Its parent company has been in business, as Mr. Lash testified, since 1921. And we also heard and we saw examples of Pardee's slogan of "Do the right thing." I'm going to talk about these in a little bit more detail.

But the two principal examples that I think the Court has seen how Pardee has done the right thing with these plaintiffs is, first and foremost, by entering into the Commission Agreement in the first place. Even though there was a dispute as to whether or not they were the procuring cause, Pardee went forward. Mr. Lash testified they went forward and entered into this Commission Agreement.

Second, you had another example from Mr. Lash, and that is that he gave them what he believed was more information than to which the contract, the Commission Agreement, entitled them to. When Mr. Wolfram, and Mr. Wolfram only, began asking questions, there was responses back to Mr. Wolfram, and there was additional information over and above what was set forth within the Commission Agreement that was sent to Mr. Wolfram.

Now, I don't think there's any dispute that Mr. Wilkes received that information. Why? Because we

know from both of them that they shared it back and forth with each other.

2.2

Next page, Brian. It was 2002 that both Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes indicated that they had become familiar with Mr. Whittemore.

Next page, we also know by that same time frame they had been acquainted with Mr. Lash, who was then responsible for land acquisition.

Page 6, please. On a previous occasion they had approached Mr. Lash with a potential development deal, and it was according, particularly, to Mr. Wilkes that he had testified that there had been other deals that they had entered into and that Pardee had paid them in full on those commissions. In other words, at the time that they began this relationship, they had no reason by which then to distrust Pardee or that Pardee was going to do them wrong in some fashion or another.

Number 7, the testimony, particularly, was from Mr. Wilkes is that while Mr. Wolfram was on vacation, they had learned that Mr. Whittemore had acquired his water rights. And they had contacted Mr. Lash asking him if he was interested in meeting with Mr. Whittemore concerning Coyote Springs. They also as far as then contacted Mr. Whittemore. There's no dispute concerning these particular facts.

If you go on to Item No. 8, is that, unbeknownst to Mr. Lash, Mr. Whittemore and Mr. Andrews had already begun a relationship. They had already developed a relationship, and they had already began discussing Pardee's involvement at Coyote Springs. You heard from Mr. Whittemore that prior to this all hands meeting, he had already developed an interest in working with Pardee. You heard from Mr. Andrews that prior to this all hands meeting, that they had already -- that Pardee had already developed an interest in working with CSI, with Mr. Whittemore.

Now, why is it that I'm emphasizing this particular issue? Because the plaintiffs, they continue to push this idea that they were the procuring cause and somehow that that means something and it changes or modifies or suggests a different interpretation from the contract that they negotiated and entered into with the plaintiffs. Respectfully, it does not.

The procuring cause doctrine that the Court, as you indicated that you had done some research into this, is a doctrine whereby it was designed to protect brokers who had no written agreement. It's designed to protect brokers that basically got left out in the cold when they had put a buyer and a seller together and the buyer and the seller refused to pay them a commission. That's

how the procuring cause doctrine was developed.

But the procuring cause doctrine has made real clear that if, in fact, the parties go forward, in this case Pardee Homes of Nevada and the plaintiffs, and they consummate their relationship into a contract, it is the terms of that contract that prevail. And it is those terms of that contract that we are going to highlight during the course of my remarks to determine what the scope of the plaintiffs' responsibilities were to Pardee, as well as Pardee's responsibilities to the plaintiffs.

Both Mr. Wolfram and both Mr. Wilkes indicated that the parties' contractual obligations to each other were reduced to writing in this Commission Agreement.

No more and no less. And, therefore, that's why I intend to focus on it.

And if there's any question about the fact that you cannot use, somehow, some other doctrine to make the duties bigger than what they are within the Commission Agreement, we would cite the Court then to the decision, and we cited this decision in previous submissions to the court, but the Highway Builders case versus Nevada Rebar. Nevada Rebar is probably one of the most important contract cases that our Nevada Supreme Court has issued. It is found at 128 Nevada Advanced Opinion,

1 page 36, 284 Pacific 3rd, page 377. It's a --THE COURT: 284 Pacific 4th, right, P4? 2 3 MS. LUNDVALL: That's a good question. I think Whatever is found in 2012. I'm 4 it's Pacific 3rd. pretty sure we're still in Pacific 3rd. 5 The basic holding from that case, Your Honor, 6 7 is this: That you cannot argue that, in fact, your agreement is more than what the parties had 8 memorialized, particularly when they have an integrated 9 clause in their contractual document. And there's no 10 question about the fact that the Commission Agreement 11 12 contains an integration clause. 13 Next topic, we go on and we talked about what is referred to as the all hands meeting. And one of the 14 15 things I think that is important from this is the fact that what it was that Mr. Whittemore at that time was 16 willing to sell to Pardee and what Pardee was willing to 17 18 buy at that point in time. 19 And that issue then turns upon and it informs 20 this argument that the plaintiffs made afterwards that 21 somehow that they were entitled to additional 2.2 commissions on the multi-family land, the commercial land, et cetera, because that's what their position was 23

And so that's why I highlight this and that's

before the litigation began.

24

why I point it out. And that's why, based upon the undisputed facts that are before the Court, it was clear that the only thing that Pardee was interested in buying was the single-family production lots. The only thing that CSI was interested in selling was the single-family production lots.

2.2

At that meeting, there was no question about what happened, what lands were under negotiation.

There's also no question between CSI and Pardee what was the result of their negotiations. There's no question between Pardee and CSI what the status of the lands were.

Both Mr. Whittemore, as well as Mr. Andrews told you there was a blank canvas out there. There was no mapping. There was no entitlements. They didn't know where the sewer provisions were. They didn't know where the roads were to be mapped. They didn't know where the golf course was going to be located, nothing. The parties were starting from ground zero. And I think that's important because there's been no contrary evidence as to what the slate looked like at that time that they began their negotiations.

There was also no dispute as to the obstacles that they were facing. We learned about the utility corridor and how that was going to change the

boundaries. We learned about the BLM configuration and how that was going to change the boundaries.

We learned about, bless his heart, Jack
Nicklaus, and his -- everyone tried to put their best
gloss on it and say how creative he was, but it also
sounds like maybe he was a bit demanding. And he would
say, My vision is I want my course to go up there. And
guess what, the parties accommodated that and they
changed and made their contours then of where the land
and the mapping were going to be based upon
Mr. Nicklaus.

You also heard about wildlife issues. You heard about utility issues. Those were all factors that were going to inform then the parties' future dealings and their future mappings and what they intended to do.

Number ten. There's no question about the fact that Pardee and CSI began several months of negotiations. Item No. 11 is that plaintiffs were not needed for any of those negotiations.

One of the things I think that's interesting is, both from Mr. Wolfram's perspective, from Mr. Wilkes' perspective, from Mr. Lash's perspective, from Mr. Whittemore's perspective, all of them testified to what is standard or custom within the industry, that if brokers are involved in putting parties together,

that they are not needed for any subsequent negotiations. They are not the attorneys. They are not the land use people. They are not the engineers. They are the people that make introductions.

Nobody disputed this from an evidentiary standpoint that, in fact, Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes were not needed for any of the negotiations that led up to the Option Agreement or anything thereafter. The only people that are contending that there's something wrong with that are plaintiffs' counsel. They've characterized it in their argument that there's something nefarious about that, but none of the evidence matches the argument.

Now turning to Item No. 12, the single meeting that they were in attendance at was the only meeting of the participation that the plaintiffs had in the original transaction which was memorialized into the Option Agreement. I don't think anybody fusses about that. Nobody has any dispute that, in fact, they attended the single meeting.

Mr. Wilkes talked about that maybe it took him about a week or so, collectively, to put all the information together, and that's what he had into the research aspect of it. Maybe that these guys had taken Pardee on as far as a couple day trips for looking at

other properties.

But as to the amount of time that they had into this transaction, when you compare and contrast to what they got out of this transaction, they did very well by themselves, and they have the opportunity in the future, particularly if our economy ever picks up, to do well in the future. And had our economy continued to go, they would have been in great shape.

But the facts are what they are and where we are at as far as within this circumstance and that is this: For the time invested that the plaintiffs have into this, from this standpoint, they have gotten benefit of the bargain and they have the opportunity to continue to receive the benefit of their bargain.

You heard from Mr. Andrews that this is by far the largest commission that Pardee has ever paid for a transaction here in Nevada.

Turning your attention then to Item No. 13,

Finding No. 13, we talk about how that there was months

of intensive negotiation. Nobody disputes that they

entered into the Option Agreement. We have the Option

Agreement designated as Item B. We know that the Option

Agreement was amended twice. The first one you can find

at Exhibit E. The second one you can find at Exhibit J.

Both the plaintiffs testified from the witness

1 stand that not only did they receive the Option

- 2 Agreement, but they also received the two amendments.
- 3 And the thing that I think is notable is who they
- 4 received it from. And if I could, at this particular
- 5 | point, I'm going to skip ahead a little bit, but you are
- 6 also going to see at Items P and you are going to see at
- 7 Items Q where they also received a copy of the Amended
- 8 and Restated Option Agreement.
- 9 Now, from where did they get those documents?
- 10 They got them from the title company. So the issue
- 11 | becomes is what duty did the title company then have to
- 12 give them that information? Title companies have
- 13 | independent duties to the parties that are part of their
- 14 escrow.
- Now I want to cite the Court particularly to
- 16 | the case, the Broussard case, which is kind of the
- 17 penultimate case in Nevada that deals with and describes
- 18 | the fiduciary duties that an escrow officer has.
- 19 | Broussard, which is B-r-o-u-s-s-a-r-d, versus Hill, is
- 20 | found at 100 Nevada 325, 682 Pacific 2nd 1376, and it's
- 21 | a 1984 case. And that decision then is a decision that
- 22 | identifies the fiduciary duties and the obligations that
- 23 | an escrow officer and escrow company has.
- Now, this is important in this context,
- 25 | Your Honor. As the Court saw in the different

iterations of the Commission Agreement -- and you will see as far as that different -- the draft of the Commission Agreement where the black lines were applied by the plaintiffs.

2.2

Where did they place their trust? Where did they place their reliance? Who did they count on to protect them? It was the escrow company. And that only makes sense, to be quite candid. These are individuals that work within the industry all the time. They work with escrow companies, with escrow officers all the time. They put -- and they insisted on special protections in their Commission Agreement to ensure that those escrow officers, who had a fiduciary duty to inform them of anything that may have impacted their Commission Agreement, gave them that information.

You heard Mr. Wolfram testify that he confirmed that his Commission Agreement, that his and Mr. Wilkes' Commission Agreement was with the escrow company. And it is demonstrative as to who gave copies of the Option Agreement, the amendments and the Amended and Restated Option Agreement to Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes.

And the one question that is probably going to be posed or at least a question that you may sit back and scratch your head a little bit, and you'd say, Why would the escrow company have given Mr. Wolfram and

Mr. Wilkes copies of the Amended and Restated Option
Agreement? Why? Because the initial closing date
changed and that impacted their Commission Agreement.
So the single change that was going to impact them out
of their Commission Agreement, they were informed of
that by the escrow company.

And one of the things that I'm going to -- I'm now getting way ahead of myself when it comes to these findings of fact. But when you take a look at all of the relevant and all as far as the capitalized terms, you don't see any changes in the subsequent amendments.

And I'm going to go through that entire list with you and ask you to be able to compare the Commission Agreement with those capitalized terms against the subsequent amendments. And what you are going to learn is there have been no changes to those, and, therefore, there would have been no duty to give those to the plaintiffs. But like I said, I'm getting ahead of myself. So let me go back as far as to my general outline.

One of the things that I'd like to do at this point in time is to address a little bit of the legal theory or the theories that the plaintiffs have advanced as to why they are entitled to additional commissions.

We know from my tired blowup that, in fact,

that these are the three provisions that speak to the commission portions as far as of the Commission

Agreement. And what I'm going to do is try to point out, and that is this, that from these three paragraphs, the theory that the plaintiffs have espoused is not found with these three paragraphs, which is the Commission Agreement.

And let me begin by pointing out this, is they contend that Parcel 1 under the Option Agreement was what Pardee was purchasing back in May of 2004. Now, everybody involved with Pardee says, Huh-uh, that wasn't what was going on. The representative of CSI that came in said, Huh-uh, that wasn't what was going on. And if you take a look as far as at the Option Agreement and go past the recitals in the Option Agreement, you can see that wasn't what was going on.

But most importantly, though, Your Honor, that is this: Under paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 that identify then the payments that were under Purchase Property, there is nothing that indicates that either the timing of the takedown of Purchase Property or the location of the Purchase Property was something that impacted their commission arrangement. Nothing within this. The location and the timing, let alone the number of acres is not even referenced in the payment

provisions of their Commission Agreement.

And so it's hard for me to understand how it is that the plaintiffs can contend that these two paragraphs that obligated Pardee to pay based upon Purchase Property Price, and then when we look at the second page as to the timing of those particular payments and how those payments were to track, the installment payments that were being made by Pardee to CSI, point by point by point, that's how they were being paid under 1 and 2, and it had nothing to do with specific takedowns, locations, amount of acreage, nothing.

But how would they have known, though? And let me -- I want to pose a rhetorical question. They suggest that, Well, we didn't know that Parcel 1 was not Purchase Property. We knew that in the original Option Agreement that Pardee was going to pay \$66 million, and if you look at paragraph 1, subsection D, what we know is that Pardee was going to pay \$44,800 per acre.

Now, if you run the math on that, it's really pretty simple. You take 3,602 acres that was identified as Parcel 1, you multiply that then by \$44,800 an acre. And what do you get, \$161 million, almost \$162 million. So just that simple calculation alone should have put them on notice that Parcel 1 was not Purchase Property.

And they had to dig farther then past the recitals into
the Commission Agreement itself to have an understanding
of what CSI and Pardee had agreed to do.

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There are a number of places within the parties' agreement that, in fact, references the cooperative mapping and how the boundaries were going to change. I'm going to as far as give the Court a recitation of these number of different places. If you go through what is our Exhibit B, the Option Agreement, what you are going to see is that page 1, paragraph A, there is references to changing boundaries. paragraph B, there's references to changing boundaries. Page 2, paragraph 1A, there's references to changing boundaries. Page 4, paragraph 1C, twice within that paragraph there's references to changing boundaries. Page 7, paragraph 2F, there's references to changing boundaries. Page 14 paragraph 4D, references to changing boundaries. Page 15, paragraph 4E; page 17, paragraph 4H; page 19, paragraph 6A; page 31, paragraph 12E.

In sum, if you read the entirety of the Option Agreement, you will see and reference what it is that Mr. Lash, Mr. Andrews, and Mr. Whittemore undisputedly testified what the parties not only expected to happen, but what they memorialized would happen.

And that was because they had a blank slate out there, that they knew that there was going to be cooperative mapping. They knew there needed to be certain assignments of duties to each other as part of that process, and they engaged in that process so as to be able then to identify what it was that Pardee was going to get in exchange for the \$84 million Purchase Property Price that they had agreed to and set forth within the four corners of their Option Agreement.

Now, if you take a look also then at the Amended and Restated Option Agreement. I'm not going to go through all of the same references, but if they had gone through that Amended and Restated Option Agreement, what you are going to see is that same thing.

Going to Finding No. 14, this speaks to the fact that what basically the land was at the time that they began the negotiations that consummated then in the Option Agreement. They talked about how there was no zoning, parceling, mapping, entitlements, permitting, et cetera.

The only thing Mr. Whittemore testified that had been done was that he had a development agreement that he had entered into with the county at that point in time. That was the only thing that had been done.

As to the rest of all of this, all of that needed to be

done in the future.

2.2

Mr. Whittemore was looking for a co-developer. He got a co-developer in Pardee. And part of the Option Agreement identified the duties that Pardee was going to undertake as the co-developer. And one of those duties involved the mapping that we're talking about.

Also this finding makes reference for which that there has been undisputed testimony as to the different obstacles the parties faced for which that they knew the mapping and boundaries were going to change.

Turning your attention to Finding No. 15, in my opinion, the facts that underlie Finding No. 15 are undisputed, and I submit that they are undisputed to the Court, and I submit, Your Honor, that they are dispositive of two of the parties' claims.

Let me explain first how I believe that they are undisputed, and I'm going to go through these in detail. At the same time that Pardee was negotiating with Coyote Springs, Pardee was also negotiating with the plaintiffs concerning their finder's fees. Nobody disputes that.

Pardee and the plaintiffs extensively negotiated the Commission Agreement that bears the date of September 1 of 2004. Mr. Lash testified to that on

one side. Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes testified to that on the other side. They also testified that they were represented by Mr. Jimmerson throughout that process.

They also testified that they relied on Mr. Jimmerson to secure the best deal for them and that they were pleased with his efforts and they, themselves, elected and decided to accept the deal that he had negotiated. There is no dispute about that.

In addition, there's no dispute that these two individuals were knowledgeable real estate professionals and that they were well familiar with the documents that are typically involved in land development. Both of them identified that from the witness stand.

The obligations to each other, both sides testified, were reduced to the four corners of the Commission Agreement, and they acknowledge that it was an arm's length transaction. They placed no special reliance on Pardee akin to what you see in an insurance agreement.

Why is that important? It is important because without a special relationship, which is a legal term in a legal conclusion, without that special relationship between Pardee and the plaintiffs, their accounting claim fails, as well as their covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim.

And when we get into the legal conclusions that we're going to ask the Court to make, I will cite the Court then directly not only to the Court's previous orders where it was identified that those were essential elements of those particular claims. And, respectfully, we submit that these facts are undisputed, and without a special relationship between the plaintiffs and Pardee, then, in fact, their claim for accounting fails, as well as their claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Finding 16, no dispute that, in fact, Pardee went forward and negotiated the Commission Agreement, notwithstanding that Pardee had already done work then with CSI before that.

Finding No. 17, the Commission Agreement governs the payment of commissions and the provision of certain information related to their purchase. We know that it's a fully integrated document. We also know, from Mr. Wolfram, Mr. Wilkes, and Mr. Lash that there's no other deal between them. This is the sum total of their deal. And so the scope of their responsibilities and their obligations is found within that Commission Agreement.

It is also this Commission Agreement that they accuse Pardee of breaching. I asked Mr. Wolfram, This

case to you is principally about breach of contract?
Answer: Yes.

Mr. Wilkes, this case to you is principally about breach of contract? Answer: Yes.

And the contract that's at issue is your Commission Agreement? Answer yes, by both of those individuals.

And they also -- Mr. Wolfram in particular -- went on to acknowledge that it's that breach of contract that underpinned their covenant of good faith and fair dealing as well as their accounting claim.

But their focus, from the plaintiffs'
perspective, they looked at this case as a breach of
contract case. And, therefore, I'm going to focus then
pretty much the balance of my remarks on what is
required then by the Commission Agreement.

We know from taking a look at Exhibit L, which is our Commission Agreement, Exhibit 1 for the plaintiffs, no dispute about that, that all of the capitalized terms then from the Option Agreement are what inform the construction then of the Commission Agreement. And so, in other words, if there's some question about the scope or the definition or something of that nature in the Commission Agreement, these gentlemen knew to go to the Option Agreement to look for

those.

Now, importantly, Your Honor, is if you take a look at the amendments, even the Amended and Restated Option Agreement, and if you take a look at Amendments 1 through 8 to the Amended and Restated Option Agreement, the Court will see no changes to the definition of Purchase Property Price. It will see no changes to the definition of Option Property. If you compare and contrast the Option Agreement to the Amended and Restated Option Agreement, there is no difference between the procedure under paragraph 2 by which the options were going to be exercised.

Now, why is that important? And I know that I'm going to sound like a broken record on this particular point, Your Honor, but when you go to (iii), (iii) doesn't say if Option Property is purchased. (iii) entitles these gentlemen to commission with respect to any portion of the Option Property purchased by Pardee pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Option Agreement.

And so I do believe that, in fact, a proper definition of Option Property includes this. But if there's any question that that's not what the parties intended, all you have to do is look at their agreement. They made it express within their agreement.

approach that has been advocated and that has been urged upon you by plaintiffs' counsel. It is Option Property purchased pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Option

Agreement. That helps the Court and informs the Court's interpretation of this Commission Agreement as to what the parties had agreed to, when were they going to receive a commission.

And I would note that there's nothing within these provisions or the balance of the agreement that says once Pardee acquires property of some fashion or another, that for which it has paid Purchase Property or it is bought in any other component and somehow changes the designation of the use of that property, that then we go back and we reshuffle the deck and we give them additional commissions.

We have to look at what the language is of the Commission Agreement. And there's nothing that the plaintiffs can point to, nothing within the Commission Agreement that they can point to that if there are subsequent changes that Pardee and CSI made to the use designations that, in fact, those subsequent changes, after the original transaction closed, that entitles them to more commissions.

The simple answer to that is, number one, it's

not found within the four corners of the agreement. The second answer to that is, all right, when were they entitled to some type of payment?

We know that they have acknowledged that under

(i) and (ii) that they've been paid in full. So then we have to go to (iii) and what does three say? I'm back to my broken record. It's Option Property purchased pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Option Agreement.

I got off on a little bit of a tangent. We were talking about how there were no changes to the definition of initial purchase closing settlement dates, deposits, parcel maps, option parcels, option closing, contingency periods. Those were all provisions found within the Commission Agreement.

And, moreover, if, for some reason, that there was some type of a concern because there had been a change to a definition from Option Property to the Amended and Restated Option Agreement, which we know that the parties had already started to do the process of mapping so that they were able to identify what that initial purchase was going to be, and it was 511 acres, the plaintiffs knew that.

They knew that there was a change from the Option Agreement that talked about this 3,600 acres that Mr. Whittemore described and the balance of the document

described as it was going to be security for the parties and the Amended and Restated Option Agreement that had the first parcel identify as Purchase Property as 511 acres. They knew of that change because they were given those documents.

Did they think it was a big deal? Apparently not. They never sent a letter to Mr. Lash or anyone at Pardee saying, What does this mean? They never called Mr. Lash in March of 2005 and said, What does this mean? They never contacted the escrow company and said, What does this mean? Why? Because it was irrelevant to how they were going to be paid. They were going to be paid on the Purchase Property Price, and we know that was \$84 million, and we know that there were installments that Pardee was going to make.

And we know that by taking a look at, and if the Court compares the installment schedule that's found on the second amendment, it's also echoed in the Amended and Restated Option Agreement. And if you take a look at what the aggregate payments, the aggregate deposits were, they total \$10 million. They got paid. Their first commission payment was on \$10 million.

And then they got paid 44 additional payments based upon the \$1.5 million monthly payments that Pardee was making to CSI. And, in addition, they got paid

based upon the final three payments, which were \$2 million payments, installment payments that were being made from Pardee to CSI, and that's all set forth within the schedule.

2.2

And the thing that I think is important at this point, or at least I'll point it out at this point in time, is that we know that in 2007 that the plaintiffs were overpaid by the escrow company. We also know from Mr. Wolfram's testimony that he was able to discern from the information available to him at that time as to whether or not that he was being paid properly, and he determined that he was being overpaid.

And Mr. Wolfram identified that, in fact, what was available to him, the Option Agreement, the two amendments, the Amended and Restated Option Agreement, and the commissions that were being paid to him at that time, and he was able to discern and contact Pardee and say, I don't know for certain, but I think I'm being overpaid. And guess what, he was.

He, at that point in time, didn't know the locations of property. He didn't know the acreage. He didn't know land use designations. He didn't know anything about the takedowns. He offered you no testimony that he went down and looked for deeds or anything of that nature. What he knew is the schedule

for payment of the Purchase Property Price set forth in
the parties' agreement, and what he knew is based upon
what he had received from the escrow company to discern
if he was being paid properly for the amount and the due

5 dates of his commissions.

2.2

Now, one of the things, while we're at this point in time, what I want to do is to echo what I offered to the Court in my opening statement about connect the dots. Let me tell you where I was going with those connect the dots, because I do think this is important.

Plaintiffs acknowledge and admit that they've been pain in full under paragraph 1 and paragraph 2. So we get down here to paragraph 3. And what is that procedure, what is that process then that was set forth pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Option Agreement. I walked Mr. Whittemore through that, and what I'd like to do then is to highlight that for purposes of my argument to you right now.

If you take a look at page 2 of Exhibit B, which is the Option Agreement, it gives you -- Exhibit 2.

THE COURT: Okay. I got it.

MS. LUNDVALL: Exhibit B.

THE COURT: Of Exhibit 2?

MS. LUNDVALL: I think Exhibit 2 and Exhibit B are the same thing, the Option Agreement.

THE COURT: Right. I got the Option Agreement.

MS. LUNDVALL: All right. At page 2, we know that it requires a designation by CSI. How many times did we hear that? And so that part was found on page 2.

If you go to page 5, what you are going to see at page 5, beginning at paragraph 2, is that the first thing that is required is a written notice. That's the very first stage. After you get past the designation, you gotta have a written notice. And it says to whom it's supposed to be sent. That's paragraph number 17.

There's miscellaneous different procedures then that are set forth at B, C, D, E, F and G. But the one I think that is probably the most important for the Court to take a look at is at page 14, and you are going to see on page 14 -- let me see if I can identify where specifically on that page so the Court takes a look at that.

About halfway down that first paragraph that's found at the very top of page 14, and it speaks to after the final purchase closing the buyer timely exercises its option.

I asked Mr. Whittemore what did that mean. He said that the Option Property was going to be taken down

after Pardee got property for the \$84 million it was

spending with Pardee. The final purchase closing is the

final closing that you'll see earlier defined in the

agreement was the last parcel that Pardee would receive

for its \$84 million. And then if, in fact, that they

are going to purchase additional single-family land,

then the Option Property and the definitions and the

process and the procedure kick in.

2.2

So there's where you look particularly to learn that this is a linear transaction. It's not a transaction as described by the plaintiffs where it was Parcel 1 was Purchase Property and anything outside of Parcel 1 was Option Property. That's not how the parties defined it. That's not how CSI and Pardee defined it in their own agreement. They defined it in a linear fashion.

Pardee was going to spend \$84 million first.

And if, after spending that \$84 million in Purchase

Property Price and getting land, and if they needed

additional single-family land after that, then they had

the right, if CSI had designated single-family land, to

send an exercise option.

The testimony unequivocally has been that that has not happened. Factually, that's what the undisputed evidence is before the Court.

Equally factually from a business perspective is that Pardee has no need for additional single-family lands at Coyote Springs. You heard Mr. Andrews' testimony they probably have enough for a lifetime, at minimum his lifetime.

In addition, you heard Mr. Lash that said at the very minimum, under the best of circumstances, they've got inventory for at least 14 to 15 years. And so to the extent that they have enough inventory of the single-family land for which their business needs may dictate, it would be only after that point in time for which that this process from a business perspective may be kicked in.

And so to the extent let me continue going on then and marching through then what the process would be. If you take a look also on subsection D that is found on page 14, the Court will see that there is reference to an Option Property deed. It was a form of the deed that the parties had identified.

The form of that deed was one of the exhibits to Amendment No. 2, and it expressly states on the form of the deed Option Property. And if Pardee had exercised its option, if CSI had accepted that, if they had gone through the entirety of the transaction, they were to record that Option Property deed, that form, to

1 take the legal description and insert it into the form

- 2 on that deed and make it a matter of public record.
- 3 That is all set forth in the language that is found on
- 4 page 14 under subsection D.
- And the point to be made here is this: That
- 6 Option Property deed, Your Honor, would have been a
- 7 | public document. So that if the plaintiffs wanted to
- 8 discern if Pardee had purchased any Option Property,
- 9 pursuant to paragraph 2, what would they have done?
- 10 Mr. Andrews' testimony and, by logic, is the first thing
- 11 | that you would do is you would go to the public records
- 12 and look for that Option Property deed.
- There's none there. It doesn't exist. Why?
- 14 | Because as Mr. Whittemore, on behalf of CSI, as Mr. Lash
- 15 and Mr. Andrews testified, Pardee has never exercised
- 16 | any option to purchase additional single-family lands
- 17 pursuant to paragraph 2, had no need to do so.
- 18 | Therefore, there was no Option Property deed to be found
- 19 in the public record.
- 20 If the Court also takes a look at additional
- 21 | procedures, you are going to see on page 15,
- 22 | subsection E, that speaks to the description being
- 23 | inserted into the form deed. There's additional
- 24 procedures that are identified at page 16.
- 25 Equally important at page 17, subparagraph H,

it makes reference to the option memo and the addition or the edits and changes that need to be made to the option memo. On page 22, there's further discussion concerning the written notice, and on page 27 there's the description about the preparation of the tentative maps for purposes of the Option Property, none of which that exists.

So that process and that procedure was all very document intensive, as any land transaction is. Pardee wouldn't have been the only party that had that information. CSI would have had that information. The escrow company would have had that information.

They sent a subpoena to CSI. Didn't get any information on Option Property being purchased by Pardee. No exercise, no notice of exercise option, no escrow instructions, none of this process I've just described.

They sent a subpoena duces tecum then to the title company, asked for all of this information. It doesn't exist. There was nothing to give back to them.

You've also heard as far as how that in the public record there is no Option Property deed. So Pardee is not the only party that would have this information that would have memorialized if, in fact, that this paragraph would have been kicked in.

1 There are other parties, CSI and, at a minimum, the escrow company, and at a minimum the public record. 2 All of those places have been searched and scoured. 3 4 None of those places unearthed any information to 5 support the fact that Pardee had purchased Option 6 Property. In other words, when Mr. Lash told Mr. Wolfram 7 that there had not been any Option Property that had 8 9 been purchased for which that they would have been 10 entitled to a commission, he was telling them the truth. Paragraph 21, please. Is that where I'm at? 11 12 Brian, take me to 18. 13 THE COURT: You just went through 20 and we 14 went through --15 MS. LUNDVALL: I thought so. 16 THE COURT: You were on 21. I've been following it. If you look, you have your (i), (ii), 17 18 (iii), and we just went through it. So the next would 19 be starting on the Purchase Property. 20 MS. LUNDVALL: I do believe that the Court is 21 accurate. 21, that's where I'm at, at least in my 2.2 notes. 23 THE COURT: That's where I'm at. So hopefully 24 I'm following. 25 Paragraph 21, the term Purchase MS. LUNDVALL:

Property Price was defined in the second amendment, and also it was defined in the Amended and Restated Option Agreement, \$84 million.

The due dates then for the commission -- and I think that this is important, Your Honor. Because one of the things that helps the Court in trying to determine what do these mean, is when you look at -- and under standard contract interpretation, you are supposed to look at the entirety of the agreement in context, not supposed to pick out things here and there. You are supposed to look at it in its context.

So let's take a look then at when the due dates for the commissions were due under paragraphs (i) and (ii). If you go to page 2 then of the agreement, there hasn't been a lot of focus on this portion of the Commission Agreement, but it does inform the interpretation.

It speaks to Pardee shall make the first commission payment to you upon the initial purchase closing, and then it talks about what that is supposed to be with respect to the aggregate deposits. All right. What is all that referring to? It's all referring to that schedule that was found in the second amendment and the Amended and Restated Option Agreement as to the schedule of payments that Pardee was making to

CSI.

2.2

And then it talks about each additional commission payment pursuant to clause one and two goes concurrently with the applicable Purchase Property Price payment to Coyote. And that's where you go back right then to that same schedule I keep making reference to.

And that informs the Court then as to what Pardee obligated itself to under paragraphs (i) and paragraph (ii). There's nothing in the language about the due dates or the obligation to pay in the first place that makes any reference to acreage, location, where are the lands, if the lands had actually closed.

I think this is important as far as in respect to Mr. Wolfram. Mr. Wolfram had testified that this Commission Agreement was something that he had never dealt with before. Every other transaction in his professional life that he had dealt with, that there was some type of a deal that was cut between a buyer and a seller. Land closed. There was an exchange of deeds and he got paid. That's what his experience was. And I'm not going to discount that experience because that's what he understood.

But that's not the Commission Agreement his attorney negotiated for him. His attorney actually negotiated a much better deal than that for him.

Because at the time that the original aggregate deposits

had been made, there had been \$10 million that had

already been paid by Pardee to CSI and there had been no

And when you take a look then at each one of those payments on a monthly basis when \$1.5 million was paid to CSI, there weren't any closings each month.

There weren't any acreages identified each month.

2.2

closings at all.

Nothing. There weren't any deeds that were exchanged.

As Mr. Lash has identified and as the documents and the records all reflect, there was only five closings. But how many commission payments and checks were there made? 49. The original, the 44, and the last three.

So what you end up with is nothing either about the language of the parties' agreement, let alone the performance of the parties under the agreement, suggests that these two clauses had anything to do with location, acreage, or the timing of the closings. And, therefore, that information was irrelevant to determining if Pardee had complied.

Now, turning the Court's attention then to paragraph 22, paragraph 22 speaks to paragraph 3. In paragraph 3 there's also, on page 2, additional language that informs the Court as to the interpretation of this

subparagraph 3. On page 2 the Court is going to see when Pardee was supposed to be making commission payments pursuant to clause 3, and that was upon the close of escrow on Pardee's purchase of the applicable portion of the Option Property.

Provided, however, in the event that the required parcel map creating the applicable option parcel has not been recorded, the commission shall be paid into escrow concurrently with Pardee's deposit of the Option Property Price, and the commission shall be paid directly then from escrow.

Break all this down and what this says is that Pardee was going to make a payment to CSI. In exchange it was going to get a piece of land. There was going to be a closing for which a deed would be recorded, and these gentlemen got paid at that point in time. It makes no reference, no reference whatsoever to if there's been some redesignation. If there's a tentative map that has been filed, there makes no reference to that whatsoever.

What the plaintiffs are asking you to do is something that you are prohibited from doing, and I know that no judge likes to hear something that we have limits. None of us like to know we have limits. But the case law is clear, you can't rewrite the parties'

1 agreement. This is what the parties had agreed to.

2 This is what you are being asked to interpret. And to

3 offer and to allow what the plaintiffs are asking for

4 demands and requires you to rewrite their agreement.

Now, the thing I think that what I want to do is to identify then a couple of these theories or address a couple of the theories that the plaintiffs

have offered along this particular line, and let me

9 address these somewhat out of line.

The first one that Mr. Jimmerson talked about is that Parcel 1 was Purchase Property and so Option Property was everything else. If there's something outside those boundaries, they should be entitled to commissions here under (iii).

Number one, I want to suggest to the Court that if they genuinely believed that to be true, then Mr. Wolfram's testimony is equally to be believed. And that is this: He knows the locations. They know the locations of the land that Pardee actually took down. They know how much exists outside of Parcel 1. They apparently may not have the skill set to calculate what that acreage is, but they had all of the information or the tools available to allow someone who is qualified to do that.

Pardee doesn't employ all the engineers in the

world. They could have gone to an engineer. The assessor's office and recorder's office, they have people that make those calculations all the time. You go through the phone book and you can see all kinds of engineers that offer those services. They could have made that determination, but they did not.

2.2

So what does that mean? What it means -- well, let me back up. They had the tools available to them. They knew where the locations of the land were. They knew the locations of the parcel. They knew how much was outside. They knew the price that Pardee was supposed to pay for that under the schedule. They also knew the date by which that Pardee had acquired the lands, because that was found within the deeds. And, therefore, they could have calculated, not only the amount of commission they were due, but also how much interest on those commissions.

Did they bring those calculations to you? No. What have they done? They've failed in their burden of proof on the very first theory that they have offered to you.

Second, there's also a, Well, jeez, Your Honor, if you didn't like that theory, let me give you another one. And the other one that they wish to offer is this theory about somehow if Pardee changes the use

designation, then, in fact, we should be able to be entitled to a commission when there's been some type of a use designation change.

First and foremost, found nowhere within the four corners of the agreement. That's point number one.

Point number two is that we know from the testimony of Mr. Andrews that, in fact, those use designations have changed repeatedly across time and are likely to change again across time. So what that suggests to me is that this process is going to be constantly, Okay, we're going to give some money to the plaintiffs. But if we change the use designation, isn't the flip side of that then equally applicable, that they have to give some money back? Isn't that the flip side of their argument?

Every argument has both a positive side and it has a side that cuts back against you. And the argument that they advance would mean that if, in fact, Pardee changes some type of a use designation at a point in the future for which that they've already been paid commission, why wouldn't Pardee be entitled to that commission back if that theory was appropriate under the Commission Agreement?

We've already seen examples, Your Honor, that that's been done. Mr. Andrews gave you two examples.

He identified, remember, as far as on the boundary, that on Exhibit No. 15, that multi-family designations have been put up in that upper left-hand corner.

Brian, can you pull up 15 for me quickly? I'll show the Court what I'm talking about.

Your Honor, on 15, Mr. Andrews identified this parcel here that is in yellow has already been changed. They have moved multi-family designation up to this area. So in other words, the plaintiffs have already been paid a commission, we know, on these lands, and there's already been a change. So why, under their theory then, is the plaintiff not entitled to have to give something back?

Equally what we know is this: That he drew on the map, Exhibit 15, and labeled A and B, which were the exchange parcels that were the subject then of the beginning of the town center. And he identified how the buyer's exchange parcel, which is what Pardee had owned, was lands that were down here for which Pardee had already paid them a commission. What happened to those lands? They got moved to another area.

And so to the extent that they got moved then to the multi-family area, and so that designation is also another change for which the plaintiffs have already received payment and we moved use designations

off there. And so why is it that they wouldn't have to give it back?

2.2

And the logical answer to that, Your Honor, is this, is because if, in fact, this is going to be a moving target for the next 40 years, based upon any redesignations of use, and not -- not based upon what the language of the parties' agreement was, it's a theory that does not hold water. And we respectfully submit that that theory does not entitle the plaintiffs to additional money.

It's the same component then of the earlier argument they made that they contended that multi-family property that we purchased and that Mr. Whittemore made it abundantly clear that the lands that were the subject then of this exchange were multi-family lands that Pardee had already purchased. And we know from the testimony of Mr. Wolfram and everyone else that they weren't entitled to monies on the multi-family property.

So there's a swap then as far as those designations as part of what was happening then at the tentative map application process in December of 2010. So to the extent, Your Honor, that based upon the theory that they have espoused that somehow these redesignations or the parties going through their standard and their normal business development and

having genuine and realistic and needed business needs for these changes, that somehow that entitles them to additional commissions.

2.2

And what their argument is is that, based upon the language that says that Pardee can't circumvent or avoid its duties, is that somehow by taking legitimate business needs, for which that is the only evidence that this Court has -- the only evidence is that the reason the parties entered into the eighth amended agreement was to deal with the downturn in the economy, and that the only reason that they had for doing that were legitimate business reasons. It had nothing to do with trying to circumvent or avoid its obligation.

And I do think that it is important to take a look at what the definition of "circumvent" is because it also informs the definition of "avoid." And as the Court elicited from Mr. Lash, it was his understanding what that meant is that we couldn't do something bad. We couldn't try to do a bad act. We couldn't try to cheat them out of their commissions, and nor did we try to cheat them out of their commissions.

The lands that were at issue through the tentative map application were lands for which they had already been paid a commission, number one, and lands that were purchased pursuant to the multi-family

agreement for which they concede that they weren't entitled to any commissions upon.

2.2

Now, one of the things we've heard repeatedly throughout the course of this case is that between Pardee and CSI, we made a change to the definition of Option Property.

Brian, can you move on to 23 for me, please.

23 gives you the definition of Option Property. You can see all the stuff that's in between. Where it's found is in Exhibit B. That definition is the exact same definition that is found -- go to 24 for me, Brian. It is the exact same definition that is found in Amendment No. 1 to the Option Agreement, Amendment No. 2 to the Option Agreement, to the Amended and Restated Option Agreement, and all of the amendments thereafter. There has been no change to the definition of Option Property.

In addition, there has been no change to the process and procedure from Option Agreement to Amended and Restated Option Agreement pursuant to paragraph 2 as to how those lands would be acquired then by Pardee.

Finding No. 25, your Honor, we already talked about.

Number 26, I want to talk then about our performance under the Commission Agreement. If you go

1 to 26 for me, Brian.

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We know that the plaintiffs were paid in full and on time on the \$84 million Purchase Property Price.

4 | That's a very simple process to take a look at

5 Exhibit A. They were informed of the amount and the due

6 dates of those commission payments, first through

7 | Stewart and then through Chicago Title. How do we know

8 that? By looking at Exhibit A.

We also know, Your Honor, that the plaintiffs were able to discern when they had been overpaid and how they were going to fix that. Those additional exhibits then identify that.

We know from Mr. Wolfram's testimony that at one point in time his commission payments started to be electronically deposited into his account. So he didn't see this description detail. But we also know from his testimony that when he started asking questions, he was able to get all of the orders to pay commission. So he got all of those orders to pay commission that could be found at Exhibit A.

If you take a look, I think that we go through -- Brian, move forward a little bit for me.

I'll get to it. Go back to the exhibit. I'll point it out to the Court what I'm talking about.

We know that Mr. Wolfram went to the escrow

1 | company. He asked Frances Butler for a number of pieces

- 2 of information. And when he asked for pieces of
- 3 information, he asked Frances to send him copies of all
- 4 the previous orders to pay commission. She did. She
- 5 | memorialized that. Mr. Wolfram testified, I received
- 6 those.
- 7 So he has all of those orders to pay
- 8 commission. Each and every one of those orders to pay
- 9 commission memorialized the amount and the due date then
- 10 under paragraphs one and two of the arrangement of their
- 11 | Commission Agreement.
- 12 Turning your attention then, and I'm going to
- 13 | go through this quickly because I don't think that it is
- 14 excessively relevant, but I do think it does inform the
- 15 | Court as to what the mind-set was of Pardee going into
- 16 | this dispute.
- 17 And that was this: It started when Jon Lash
- 18 | sent the letter to the plaintiffs, both of them,
- 19 Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes, that said this: You guys
- 20 | have been overpaid. This is how we're going to fix it.
- 21 | And, oh, by the way, we're taking down additional
- 22 | properties, and you guys aren't entitled to commissions
- 23 on these other takedowns. We saw that letter and I
- 24 | think that letter, if my recollection serves me, is at
- 25 | Exhibit W.

And what did Mr. Lash get back from both Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes, they got back a letter that says, I don't know how you came to the conclusion that we're not entitled to commissions on these other properties. We believe we are. That's what they told him. And that letter is found at Exhibit Z.

2.2

And then what do you see? You see letters that are found at Exhibit 18, 19, 20 and 24. And what do those letters ask for? They ask for all of the documents that memorialized all of the transactions between Pardee and CSI.

Mr. Lash understood all of those to be referencing the other transactions for which that he had already told them that they weren't entitled to payment upon. That's what his testimony was. That's how he understood those, when they were asking for all, that's what they wanted.

He authorized the title company to give them all the single-family stuff, but not the other transactional documents. And, therefore, I believe that gives an explanation as to the mind-set that Pardee had into the dispute that arose between the parties.

And, Your Honor, one of the things that I would like to do, if you don't mind, because it is 5:15, I know that I've been going for about an hour and 15

1 minutes. 2 THE COURT: Do you need a break? MS. LUNDVALL: I would like to take a very 3 4 short comfort break, not only for the Court, but for your staff as well, if that's okay. 5 That's fine. A quick 15 minutes. 6 THE COURT: (Whereupon, a recess was taken.) 7 8 MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: You're welcome. 9 10 MS. LUNDVALL: We're on Finding No. 27, and 11 what we had started to do was to go through Pardee's performance under the Commission Agreement. And I'm 12 13 going to cover this portion because, to be honest with you, I'm a little bit confused throughout the course of 14 15 this trial. I don't know if there's money being sought. 16 one hand I'm being told that it's not. On the other 17 18 hand now I'm hearing through closing argument that it 19 So, therefore, I'm going to walk through then is. whether or not the facts, the evidence before the Court, 20 21 to determine whether or not that there are additional 2.2 monies owed to Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes. Because like 23 I said, I'm getting mixed messages, and I'm not going to 24 turn any stone unturned concerning this.

First and foremost, we know that the

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    provisions 1 and 2 were based upon the Purchase Property
    Price. And I pulled this quote out of the opening
 2
    statement that the plaintiffs had given to the Court.
 3
 4
    And I can tell the Court specifically it's on page 14,
    if the transcripts are available to the Court, and if
 5
    anyone wants to verify the accuracy of this.
 6
             THE COURT: I didn't read opening statements.
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8
    I just read testimony.
             MS. LUNDVALL:
9
                            But you know, as far as the
10
    statements on behalf of an agent --
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             THE COURT: I understand.
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             MS. LUNDVALL: And I think that they also
13
    inform the Court.
             In their opening statement what they
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15
    acknowledged is that under the Purchase Property
16
    formula, they were entitled to a percentage of the
    Purchase Property Price. No quarrel about that
17
18
    whatsoever. Absolutely none.
19
             Then they went on to say there is no benefit or
20
    additional commission for additional acreage being
21
    purchased if there's no corresponding increase in price.
2.2
    And we agree with that as well.
23
             The Purchase Property Price under 1 and 2, as
24
    we've well seen how many times now, was $84 million.
25
    That price didn't change across any of the amendments.
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Once it had been amended pursuant to the second amendment to the Option Agreement and was restated then in the Amended and Restated Option Agreement, there was no changes to that \$84 million, no corresponding increase in price.

So under the acknowledgment from the plaintiffs themselves, that's what was determinative of if they were entitled to commissions under 1 and 2.

Moreover, we have the testimony of Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes themselves that they received all of their commissions timely under paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 of the Commission Agreement.

Let's go to the next finding then, Brian.

We know, if you take a look at Exhibit A and you total up all of those orders to pay commission, that's the amount you get. \$2,632,000. That, to me, is a lot of money, but that's what they received. It was split equally between Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes, and that's what Exhibit A reveals.

Go on, Brian.

The plaintiffs acknowledge that their commissions that were due under paragraphs (i) and (ii) were based on that price, not acreage or location. Both Mr. Wilkes, before he left the witness stand, and Mr. Wolfram in the very first day, acknowledged that the

acreage and the location of the property that Pardee acquired was not determinative of what their commissions were under (i) and (ii). They also admitted that they've been paid in full under (i) and (ii) of the Commission Agreement.

Brian, go to the next one, please.

We know from Pardee's perspective Mr. Lash had testified they did not pay more than \$84 million. We know that the lands were used for Purchase Property takedowns.

Turning your attention then to 31, please.

CSI, from Harvey Whittemore's perspective, CSI, he confirmed, never received more than \$84 million as payment for those lands. And Mr. Whittemore also memorialized, as well as Mr. Lash, that all of the transactions had been memorialized in publicly recorded deeds.

Next, no commissions were due to the plaintiffs under (iii) unless the property purchase fell within the definition of Option Property purchase pursuant to paragraph two of the Option Agreement. I've already argued that to the Court, and I'm not going to repeat myself even though it's probably one of the most critical issues.

We believe that there are multiple documents

1 that would have memorialized such a transaction and that none of those documents exist. All of the tools were 2 3 available by which to try to capture those documents. 4 None of those documents were found. The plaintiffs were able to confirm that Pardee was telling them the truth 5 that it had not purchased any Option Property. 6 7 Mr. Whittemore confirmed they had not purchased any Option Property. 8 9 33, Brian. 10 They also concede that the Commission Agreement 11 describes the only commissions to which they were 12 entitled. How do we know that? We have a fully 13 integrated agreement.

Next provision, Brian.

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We know that we've never exercised any options. If we had, there would be multiple public records that would memorialize the transaction. This is the argument I just made to the Court. Both the representatives of CSI and Pardee deny that any Option Property was purchased pursuant to paragraph 2 and, therefore, we don't owe any commissions to the plaintiffs under paragraph (iii) of the Commission Agreement.

Next one, Brian.

All right. This is where we get into, I don't want to say the meat of this dispute, but I think this

is where the plaintiffs have been a bit ambivalent. And what they've tried to suggest is that we owe them more information than what we contracted to provide to them. So I'm going to walk through in detail to the Court the interpretation that is found within the plain meaning of the Commission Agreement.

2.2

That paragraph has two sentences to it. We can all probably recite them from memory at this point in time. And I'm not going to repeat them, but we know the paragraph that's at issue. There's no other paragraph, there's no other provision, there's no other place within the Commission Agreement where Pardee promises to give information to the plaintiffs. This is it. It's the sum total. And this is really the meat of what the Court is being asked to interpret then as to whether or not that we had discharged our duty in this regard.

Go to the next one, Brian.

The first one, in my opinion, is easy. That first sentence, Pardee shall give you a copy of each written option exercise notice given pursuant to paragraph 2 together with the information about the number of acres involved and the scheduled closing date.

If there was no written option exercise notice, then there's nothing to give to the plaintiffs. If Pardee is not purchasing Option Property, there's

nothing to give them regarding acreage. If Pardee is not purchasing Option Property pursuant to paragraph 2, there is no scheduled closing date information by which to give them.

This, to me, is one of the hardest arguments I think to make as a defendant when you are trying to prove a negative, and I respectfully submit that we have discharged that proof. Even though it's not our burden, we have affirmatively stepped to the plate to demonstrate that, in fact, none of this exists because it did not happen. We didn't purchase any Option Property pursuant to paragraph 2, so there's no notice, no acreage, no closing dates to give them.

Turning your attention to the second. So now let's talk about to keep them reasonably informed under the sentence two. Go to the next one, Brian, for me. I think I start to lay out in detail then. All right.

So let's begin to identify the detail so that the Court can interpret then what does the language that says reasonably informed as to all matters relating to the amount and the due dates of your commission payment, because if you want to boil this case down to even its greater definition, that sentence is what it is. That's the sum total of what the parties are fussing about.

Respectfully, I would submit this: First and

foremost, related to the amount and the due dates of
your commission payment, doesn't that assume that
there's a commission payment that's due? If there's no
commission payment due, then you don't have any
information about the amount or the timing of that due

is so fat.

date.

And so I think the common sense interpretation of that is that, first and foremost, the Court needs to determine, Was there a commission payment due? I don't think it hinges upon that, but I do think that that helps inform the Court as to its interpretation. What

did the parties mean by the scope of that?

So let's look at what Pardee gave to the plaintiffs for the commissions that they were due. It gave them Exhibit A. We've talked about that ad nauseam. And so each and every time that Pardee made a payment of the Purchase Property Price to CSI, they got a commission. There was an order to pay commission. That order to pay commission then identified how it was being paid, why it was being paid, to whom it was being paid, the escrow number on there. All of that information is on the order to pay commission, Your Honor, for each and every one of those payments. That's why Exhibit A is so thick. That's why Exhibit A

When we changed escrow companies from Stewart to Chicago, we advised them of that change, both Mr. Wolfram, both Mr. Wilkes. And that's found at Exhibit E. And thereafter Chicago Title continued to inform the plaintiffs then of the amount and the due dates of the commission. Chicago Title's orders to pay commission are also found at Exhibit A.

Can you go to the next one, Brian?

Now, if you take a look at when Pardee was supposed to make the first commission payment, it is informed by the Commission Agreement. It was supposed to be done at the initial purchase closing, and then each payment thereafter was concurrent with the payment being made pursuant to Amendment 2. That's what this language is, the very first portion of this.

And so if you take a look then at each commission payment first by Stewart and by Chicago, match it up then to the schedule, what you'll see then is that they were informed as to the amount and the due date of their commissions.

The commission checks themselves that the plaintiffs received, if they received a check -- now, the thing that I find interesting about this, a little bit, is that they did receive checks at the very beginning, and Mr. Wilkes continued to receive checks

all the way through. And you'll see that in Exhibit A.

There came a point when there was an electronic deposit for Mr. Wolfram, but that was for his preference, for his choice. And so he may not have seen, in essence, what the check stub was and this particular information, but he had the opportunity to see that information at the time it was being made. And at the very minimum, we know that all of those were given by Frances Butler directly to Mr. Wolfram so that he could confirm that he had been fully informed as to

We also know the evidence about when they were overpaid. We sent the letter explaining the overpayment. That's found at Exhibit W.

the amount and due dates of his payments.

At that point in time there was an amended order to pay commission that fixed that. It articulated how that was going to be fixed. You go into the guts of Exhibit A at 95B, you'll see those amended orders. If you also take a look at Exhibit K, it's also memorialized in there.

In addition, we sent them a letter that informed them we had made our last payment. That's found at Exhibit GG. At that point in time -- and all of this information is being sent to both Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes.

It's Mr. Wolfram then that begins asking questions and he gets additional information. What additional information does he get? He gets a number of explanations in the form of letters from Mr. Stringer and Mr. Curtis that explain our interpretation, our understanding of how the Commission Agreement worked.

In addition, we went one step further, and we articulated to him at Exhibit 15 and said these are the lands we bought with that \$84 million, and we identify the specific locations of those.

And in addition, when Mr. Wolfram continued to ask questions, we authorized the title company to give him all the information dealing with the single-family land transactions. If you look at Exhibit II, you are going to see that instruction.

Now, at Exhibit JJ what you are going to see, also, is the inquiry that was made, Do we give him on the other transactions? Answer, No, only the single-family lands.

And then we go on and we talk about the deeds that underlie Pardee's acquisition of all the Purchase Property from CSI. You can see those at KK, at LL and at MM. And the most interesting thing I think about this particular exchange is this: What did the plaintiffs ask for? What did they ask for in

Exhibit 18, 19, 20 and 24? Those were the letters that were sent by Mr. Jimmerson asking for documentation.

2.2

And this is what he asked for, and the Court probably thought I was crazy as to a number of different witnesses that I asked this question, but I asked, On a deed can you find the seller, can you find the buyer, can you identify what the location of the lands are, can you identify the parcel maps, can you identify the parcel numbers, can you discern the price that is paid? Look at the stamp in the upper right-hand corner. Can you discern the escrow company? Can you discern the document numbers? You look at the letters that were sent that were requested of us, that's what they got back.

Equally important, Your Honor, Mr. Jimmerson stood here and told you that those letters asked for land use designations. That's what he told you. You scour those letters and you look for a request for land use designations and you don't find it anywhere.

Brian, can I get you to move forward? I'm hoping people are happy I'm turning a lot of these pages forward. Okay?

One of the things, too, is on this particular point, Your Honor, I wanted to interject here, it's a little bit outside these findings, but it responds to an

1 allegation that Mr. Jimmerson made in his closing remarks. He said that Mr. Lash testified at page 211 of 2 his testimony that -- he said that Mr. Lash's testimony 3 was that Wolfram and Wilkes were entitled to 4 verification by having all of those land documents and 5 land use designations and to be able to verify then 6 7 these transactions. I would direct the Court's attention then very 8 9 specifically to that testimony. The question --10 THE COURT: Which day was that? It was --11 MS. LUNDVALL: The first day. 12 The first two weeks? THE COURT: 13 MS. LUNDVALL: That's right. The original 14 first two weeks. 15 It is found on page 210, question by Mr. Jimmerson: Yes or no, was the provision of the 16 second paragraph of the Commission Agreement, Exhibit 1, 17 18 from Pardee's perspective, that Pardee would provide 19 enough information so that Wilkes and Wolfram could -independent of taking your word for it -- confirm the 20 21 accuracy of your representations? 2.2 Answer: Yes. We thought we did that. 23 Now, that's what his testimony was. When I 24 asked him, What did you mean by you thought you did 25 He said, Well, we gave them all of the orders to

pay commission. He identified all of the information that Pardee had given to them so that they could verify that Pardee was telling the truth. That's what Mr. Lash testified to, not something else.

2.2

And so if the Court has any questions concerning that, the Court does have the record that somebody has asked the court reporter then to transcribe.

THE COURT: The court reporters -- everything that everybody asked to have transcribed, I have it all.

MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you, Your Honor. And so the Court can be able to verify then the accuracy of the parties' --

THE COURT: I have it on my table.

MS. LUNDVALL: -- representations on this.

Turning your attention then to Finding No. 40, Finding No. 40 deals with the other land transactions. We described and the Court has heard testimony on that as we co-developed the Coyote Springs project, we began separate negotiations. Those separate negotiations had nothing to do with the plaintiffs' activities.

Pardee informed the plaintiffs, even before they asked, we told them we're engaging in these other transactions. We told them that there's multi-family transactions, commercial transactions, custom lot

transactions. We told them that. And the plaintiffs now acknowledge that they are not entitled to commissions on those other transactions.

2.2

Those other land designations include the golf course, commercial activity, custom lots, multi-family, and industrial. And Mr. Wolfram, in particular, acknowledged that he was not entitled to commissions on those.

So I want to think about that in this context.

Before this case began, we told the plaintiffs we were

doing these other deals. We told them that they weren't

entitled to commissions on those other deals. And they

didn't believe us.

Now, as a result of this litigation, they've admitted from the witness stand they are not entitled to commissions on these other deals. So why would they be entitled to damages in any form to verify that Pardee was telling the truth? If you want to boil their case down to its bare essence, what they claim is that somehow they are entitled to damages for verifying that Pardee told the truth.

Equally, Your Honor, Pardee told the plaintiffs, We did not take down any Option Property.

We did not engage in all the process and the procedures pursuant to paragraph 2. We, respectfully, submit we

1 | have demonstrated we have not purchased any Option

- 2 Property pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Option
- 3 Agreement. And, therefore, we have proven that we were
- 4 telling the plaintiffs the truth.
- 5 So, once again, my question is rhetorical, and
- 6 | rhetorical in this regard, how is it that the plaintiffs
- 7 | can claim an entitlement to damages for Pardee proving
- 8 | that it told them the truth before this litigation ever
- 9 began?
- 10 What I want to do then is I'm going to try to
- 11 | very quickly go through these conclusions of law, and
- 12 | I'm going to do the level best I can to move as guickly
- 13 as I can. The first conclusion of law deals with the
- 14 essential elements for proving up a breach of contract.
- 15 | Now, I start with the breach of contract because that's
- 16 | what Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes said was the principal
- 17 | reason that they were bringing this case.
- 18 These are the four essential elements. I don't
- 19 | think there's any quarrel between the attorneys that
- 20 | these are the essential elements. Move forward.
- 21 Number one, we believe -- number two, we
- 22 | believe that the evidence proved that we did not commit
- 23 | a material breach of the Commission Agreement. We also
- 24 | believe that we have demonstrated, number three, that
- 25 they did not suffer any damages.

Number four, now, the obligations between Pardee and the of plaintiffs are governed by the four corners of the Commission Agreement, which both sides have acknowledged. It's clear and unambiguous.

Number five, contracts are supposed to be construed in the written language and enforced as written. Number six, when a contract is clear, unambiguous and complete, the terms must be given their plain meaning and the contract must be enforced as written.

And concomitant to this, we didn't give the specific case citation, but I'm nearly positive the Court is familiar with this case law, the Court is not entitled to rewrite the parties' agreement. And, respectfully, given the demand that has been made by the plaintiffs, they are asking you to rewrite the parties' agreement. They are asking you to do something more than what the parties are contracted to each other.

Seven, we agree to pay commissions and provide information. Eight -- and if you keep going with me, Brian -- speaks to the plain language about payments under one and two. I've already given the Court our argument on that. Nine, only entitled to commissions on Option Property. We have not exercised any options to purchase Option Property. Finding No. 10, same argument

1 | that I just made.

2.2

Finding No. 11, we paid in full and timely on the commissions on the \$84 million Purchase Property Price.

Finding 12, the plaintiffs acknowledge that their commissions were based upon the Purchase Property and not on the acreage. We've already argued that to the Court.

Finding 13, we argued that the Purchase Property price was \$84 million. 14, that that's what Pardee paid to CSI.

15 is that from the very beginning CSI and
Pardee acknowledged that the specific boundaries of the
Purchase Property and the Option Property may change for
a variety of reasons. I went through all of those
provisions, gave you the citations to the Option
Agreement as to where the parties had included that.

And by provision then of those agreements to the plaintiffs, they too knew that those boundaries could change. We also heard unrefuted testimony as to what factors may impact those changing boundaries.

Finding 16, it is clear that those factors were out of CSI and Pardee's control concerning the changing of the boundaries. And as a result of those boundaries changing, so too did the potential boundaries for the

Option Property change. There's no dispute, I don't think, about that.

2.2

But the definitions of Option Property and the process by which that that Option Property was supposed to be taken down, that did not change. It is unrefuted that that did not change.

They've offered no evidence that CSI designated specific lands or that, in fact, we exercised any options for those lands.

17, Brian. This is starting to get a little redundant, but in drafting Court's proposed findings, I think sometimes they are a little bit redundant. We talk about paragraphs one and two. We've already argued that to the Court.

pursuant to paragraph number 2. We've identified and we've articulated to the Court where you can find that multi-step process. That multi-step process would have resulted in a myriad of different written documents.

Each and every one of those written documents would have been found in other third-party files. None of those documents were presented to this Court.

We brought the subpoenas. If you take a look at our exhibits, you'll see the subpoenas to the title companies, both to Chicago as well as Stewart. You are

1 going to see the subpoenas that went to CSI. We know

- 2 that they subpoenaed these documents. We know that they
- 3 had the opportunity to find them if they existed. They
- 4 do not exist. They brought nothing to the Court's
- 5 attention that memorializes the process and the
- 6 procedure by which then if we would have purchased
- 7 Option Property.
- 8 19, we also talked about the failure to provide
- 9 information, and I'm going to try to go through this
- 10 quickly because this is now, like I said, it's getting
- 11 | redundant.
- 12 20, Brian. This is simply a repeat then of the
- 13 | provision of the Commission Agreement. Respectfully, we
- 14 | believe that we have fulfilled all of our obligations
- 15 under this particular provision.
- 16 22 speaks to paragraph two of the Option
- 17 Agreement. Specifically it covers Pardee's right to
- 18 purchase the Option Property.
- 19 Finding 23, Pardee has not purchased any Option
- 20 | Property. Pardee agrees with that. CSI agrees with
- 21 | that. There's no document that suggests otherwise. In
- 22 essence, it is undisputed that Pardee has not purchased
- 23 any Option Property to which that they would be entitled
- 24 then to a commission.
- 25 Number 24, it was Pardee and the escrow

companies that kept the plaintiffs reasonably informed of the amount and due dates of their payments.

Number 25, they complain that they did not receive Amendments 1 through 8, but those amendments did not change or impact their commissions under (i) and (ii) of the Commission Agreement and nor did they contain any option exercise notices. Each and every one of those amendments can be looked at and analyzed and the Court can confirm then that this is an accurate and true statement by taking a look at Exhibits 6 through 13.

They did not change or alter the definitions contained within the Commission Agreement, and the plaintiffs did not complain -- what I'm referring to here -- I'm sorry. I lost my train of thought. It's getting late. And I'm going to be honest with you, my blood sugar starts to crash about this time of the day. So I'm going to push through this, and my apologies to everyone if I don't do as good a job as what I should.

They complained about not receiving the multi-family or the custom lot agreements, but they identified no entitlement to receipt of that information. That's what I meant there. We explained why it was that we did not give them that information.

And, respectfully, we believe that that explanation was

reasonable and it was justified.

26, when they asked us, when they began questioning, we gave them information like maps, deeds, all of which were related to the Purchase Property acquisition.

The thing I think that the Court, hopefully, you might have a little fun with is learning some additional definitions. Mr. Wolfram kept saying, I needed a parcel map, I wanted a parcel map, a parcel map.

Well, Mr. Lash or Mr. Andrews identified what a parcel map is. And what is a parcel map? It's kept by the recorder's office and the assessor's office. How do we get our tax bill every year? If you own a home, you get a tax bill based upon information that is found in a parcel map that is recorded. Where do the APN numbers come from? From the recorder's office and the assessor's office. Why do they need this? Principally to tax us, so they get their property tax payments. All of that information is a matter of public record.

Turning your attention then to 27, this is the one that deals with the fact that how the plaintiffs now concede that, in fact, they are not entitled to any monies under the other transactions.

28, we told them how we didn't exercise any

1 options.

2.2

29, Mr. Stringer identified when we made the last of our payments, and we also pointed out in full that they've been paid.

30, we gave the Exhibit 15, which was the narrative of each Purchase Property acquisition reference to the color maps. It had a breakdown of the amounts that were paid to CSI at each closing.

31, Pardee's obligation to inform the plaintiffs of any purchase if there was -- I think I have a typo here. But the point I'm trying to make here is this: If there was never any exercised options, there was never any purchase of Option Property, there was nothing we could give them in that regard. And that I guess is the point I'm trying to make in 31.

In sum, Your Honor, 32, we believe that we have demonstrated that there has not been a material breach of the Commission Agreement. And I think it's important then to take a look at what the case law requires. The case law requires a material breach. We believe that there's no breach whatsoever, let alone a material breach.

There's also an additional why where we believe, in fact, we're entitled to judgment on their breach of contract claim, and that is you don't have any

evidence before you that they've suffered damages because of a material breach of contract.

2.2

And let me explain what I mean to you by this. At paragraph 34, we gave the Court the case law that identifies that it is the party seeking to demonstrate breach of contract, and you have one of the essential elements is proving damages, and that burden falls upon the plaintiffs.

If you assume the truth of their theory, they had all of the information and the tools available to them to calculate under their own theory about Parcel 1 was Purchase Property and Option Property exists outside of that. All of those tools were available and they could have done that calculation. They have not done that calculation and brought that evidence to the Court.

By their failure to do that, having all of the tools available to them, they have failed to demonstrate an essential element of their claim. They have failed to demonstrate damages and, therefore, respectfully, that's an additional reason as to why their breach of contract claim fails.

Now let me try to go quickly through some of these because I don't think we need to spend undue time on them. Let me take a very quick peek at 41. Brian, take me to 41, please.

We brought the Court's attention to the Highway Builders case and the Nevada Rebar case. So you do have the citation about -- and also at finding 42 we brought the Court the citation about how you cannot rewrite the parties' agreement. And the Court then has case law then to support that particular finding.

2.2

And, therefore, we submit that at 43, is that if you try to seek some type of a theory of recovery that goes beyond the four corners of the Commission Agreement, that they are not entitled to do so.

Let me try to highlight a couple of quick points under the breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim, because I do believe it is important to understand the argument that I made to the Court before. It is based upon the case law. And that case law, under breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing or under the accounting, and the accounting order by the Court itself had identified that a special relationship, which was the argument that was advanced to the Court by the plaintiffs -- let me back up just a little bit.

We had moved for --

THE COURT: That was because they had information. Your client solely had the information to give them. Am I on the right page?

MS. LUNDVALL: Their argument was this, that there was a special relationship that existed between Pardee and the plaintiffs. And that special relationship then is what -- it's special term within the law.

THE COURT: It is. I'm aware of that.

MS. LUNDVALL: And it requires, in essence, then a finding by the Court. And if that special relationship, which is one of the essential elements of their claim for accounting --

THE COURT: And for --

MS. LUNDVALL: -- and for the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. And what we tried to do is to bring to the Court all of the legal foundation for this argument that I've just now tried to integrate into one.

Because this is an issue that arose all the way back when we were bringing to the Court's attention the Aluevich case. Aluevich was an attorney as far as she practiced up in Reno. She was a great gal, and she had an arrangement with Harrah's concerning a gift shop, and it was her argument that there was a covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim that she had against Harrah's. And because of the special relationship she had with Harrah's, it allowed her to recover damages

under that. It's an old, I think it's a 1970-something case, if my recollection serves me.

And our Nevada Supreme Court says no. Why?

Because they were two sophisticated parties that were

fully negotiating an agreement, and the result was not a

contract of adhesion, similar to what you see in the

insurance context.

When all of us think about our insurance, do we negotiate anything with our insurance company?

Particularly for health insurance now with Obamacare, are we ever going to get to negotiate anything? No.

They're contracts of adhesion because we don't get to have input into the language of those contracts.

Our Nevada Supreme Court has been uniform, when you have contracting parties that come to the table with equal bargaining power and each party has the opportunity for input into the contract that is at issue, that it is not a contract of adhesion and, therefore, there is no special relationship between the parties.

And what do we have here? You have Pardee on one side negotiating with the plaintiffs, who are represented by Mr. Jimmerson, and we have different drafts, different reiterations, different revisions to the Commission Agreement. They had the opportunity

for input. That input is found in the Commission Agreement.

2.2

Most particularly what we wanted the Court to understand is they placed their faith, not in Pardee to tell them what was going on, particularly under the option portions of this, but placed their faith in the escrow companies. And you are going to see then those exhibits where the black lines occurred where they inputted the escrow company protections into that agreement, and it is still found within their Commission Agreement, and that was input from the plaintiffs and their attorney.

And you heard from both of them that they were happy with their attorney. There's been no evidence to suggest that they were not fully and properly and fairly represented. Respectfully, Mr. --

THE COURT: I want to make sure I understand. What you are arguing is to the reasonably informed as to all matters relating to -- I should have it memorized -- as to the -- the reasonably informed that we're talking about?

MS. LUNDVALL: It's here, Your Honor, at the very bottom.

THE COURT: I know it's reasonably informed, so -- as to all matters relating to commissions and

1 amounts --MS. LUNDVALL: To the amount and --2 3 THE COURT: Are you arguing to me that then the 4 escrow company had the responsibility to make sure under this Commission Agreement that Mr. Wolfram and 5 Mr. Wilkes got that information? That's where they 6 7 placed their trust, not to Pardee? I'm trying to make 8 sure I'm getting where you are going. MS. LUNDVALL: I think I understand where 9 10 the -- I don't want to confuse the Court, because we've 11 got two concepts here. Number one, Pardee has a duty. Pardee 12 13 delegated that duty, we know, as far as with the amounts 14 and the due dates. All right? 15 THE COURT: They delegated it to escrow? 16 MS. LUNDVALL: To the escrow company. THE COURT: Because they had -- okay. 17 18 MS. LUNDVALL: In addition, all the other 19 information that we gave to the plaintiffs. 20 THE COURT: Right. 21 MS. LUNDVALL: But the most important thing, 22 though, I'm trying to make is this point, is whether or 23 not that they placed special trust, special reliance on 24 Pardee.

THE COURT:

And you are saying in negotiating

25

3 2 7

1 this contract -- that's where you are going? 2 MS. LUNDVALL: Yeah. In negotiating this 3 contract they demonstrated that they were not placing their trust in Pardee to make sure that they got all the 4 5 They were placing their trust in the information. escrow companies. And let me see if I can't --6 7 because --THE COURT: That's a new twist. 8 9 MS. LUNDVALL: To show the Court particularly 10 their black line --11 THE COURT: I know we went through the black 12 line and it was explained to me in the testimony. 13 black line was what was being inserted by Mr. Jimmerson. I wasn't quite -- to be honest, I wasn't quite sure what 14 15 the significance necessarily was at the time. Now it's 16 being tied up. So I want to make sure -- I know it's 17 late. 18 MS. LUNDVALL: At Exhibit K you are going to 19 see the black line that the plaintiffs have put 20 together. Both Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes have 21 identified that those were their insertions. 2.2 THE COURT: I understood that from the 23 testimony. Okay. 24 MS. LUNDVALL: And at K, subsection 2, you are 25 going to see where they inserted the language as to how

1 | the escrow shall be paid or the commission shall be paid

- 2 | into escrow. All right? They also identified that the
- 3 commission shall be paid directly into escrow from the
- 4 proceeds of escrow.
- 5 So what I'm saying is this: They are the ones
- 6 that put these protections in there that the escrow
- 7 | company was the party that was going to protect them in
- 8 | the event that Pardee didn't do what it was supposed to
- 9 do. In other words --
- 10 THE COURT: But the escrow -- okay.
- MS. LUNDVALL: The escrow company has an
- 12 | independent duty to these guys.
- 13 THE COURT: I understand all that. But the
- 14 | information that the escrow company gets comes from
- 15 Pardee.
- 16 MS. LUNDVALL: Precisely. Precisely,
- 17 | Your Honor. And I'm following you exactly. And the
- 18 point being is that if Pardee had the escrow company do
- 19 a closing for Option Property, all of that is going
- 20 through escrow.
- THE COURT: I follow you there, and we all know
- 22 | everything that has to go with that.
- MS. LUNDVALL: That's correct, Your Honor.
- 24 THE COURT: Get back to what you are arguing on
- 25 | this special trust so I know where you are going with

3 2 9

- 1 | that. I know it's late.
- MS. LUNDVALL: I'm going to go through these --
- THE COURT: How much longer?
- 4 MS. LUNDVALL: I'm only going to be about ten
- 5 | more minutes, Your Honor.
- 6 THE COURT: I don't want to cut you short. I'm
- 7 | just thinking if we have hours more, I have to be
- 8 honest, I'm fading. It's very important to me that I
- 9 hear your argument. But okay. I'm fine. I need a
- 10 | cookie. I get low blood sugar like Ms. Lundvall.
- 11 | MS. LUNDVALL: If you turn to page 55, it is a
- 12 finding in the citation.
- THE COURT: Page 55, paragraph 55.
- MS. LUNDVALL: All right.
- THE COURT: Okay. I'm there.
- 16 MS. LUNDVALL: So at 55 we start advising the
- 17 | Court how there needs to be some type of a special
- 18 | element of reliance or fiduciary duty to be able to
- 19 establish the foundation for this special relationship.
- 20 If I continue to go on --
- 21 THE COURT: So I can read through your cases
- 22 and follow it?
- MS. LUNDVALL: There we go.
- 24 THE COURT: I'm more than willing to do all
- 25 that.

THE COURT: At 55, 56, 57. And then we get to their claim for accounting.

THE COURT: So that was all working with the breach of good faith and fair dealing. Okay.

MS. LUNDVALL: That's correct. But there's a common denominator to their breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing and their accounting claim.

At Finding No. 63 we brought to the Court's attention from your order how that to prevail on a claim for an accounting, the plaintiffs must establish the existence of a special relationship.

THE COURT: That came out of the order for the --

MS. LUNDVALL: That came out of the order denying our motion for partial summary judgment. That's correct. So that was their burden of proof, to try to demonstrate that there was something special, legally special, about the relationship then between Pardee and the plaintiffs.

And that's where, respectfully, Your Honor, you have no evidence before you whatsoever. The parties have explained each one of them was represented by counsel. Each one of them is a sophisticated contracting party. Each one of them had the opportunity and exercised the opportunity for input into the

1 | Commission Agreement. The agreement itself discharges

- 2 any fiduciary duty in the sense of, We're not partners,
- 3 there's no joint venture between us, there's no
- 4 employment relationship.
- 5 THE COURT: Now I understand where you are
- 6 going with that testimony. Okay.
- 7 MS. LUNDVALL: All right. And so --
- 8 THE COURT: I heard it. I just didn't get the
- 9 hook-up. I do now. Okay.
- 10 MS. LUNDVALL: And, respectfully, Your Honor,
- 11 | you've heard no evidence to suggest that there is
- 12 | something special, legally special, about the
- 13 | relationship.
- 14 THE COURT: I know what that means. Okay.
- 15 MS. LUNDVALL: We went through all of those
- 16 | findings and brought the Court all of that case law and
- 17 | you'll find that from 67 all the way through 77.
- 18 THE COURT: Okay.
- 19 MS. LUNDVALL: I'm not going to address as far
- 20 | as their issue concerning the attorneys' fees as special
- 21 damages. We brought the Court our case law, what the
- 22 | findings have to be concerning that. And, respectfully,
- 23 | we submit that there's no evidence that would suggest
- 24 that.
- 25 And I go back to my argument that I made to

begin with and that being this: The only way that there are damages to which that they are entitled to is if they demonstrate that Pardee did something wrong.

And what I submit to the Court is that they have two issues. They complained that we told them about these other transactions and that they weren't entitled to it. They now concede that they weren't entitled to any additional commissions. And, therefore, they have conceded that Pardee was telling them the truth.

How is it that Pardee --

THE COURT: So you are saying that for an accounting cause of action, that if getting the accounting, getting with the information they need, if they find out the other party is wrong, then they can get the money. But if they find out by getting all the information they didn't have before that they are right, they don't have any --

MS. LUNDVALL: That's right.

THE COURT: So they are at a huge risk. If they want the information and they don't know whether a party is right or wrong until they get the information, how else can they get it if it's not an accounting claim? I have to follow you a little bit better.

MS. LUNDVALL: Let's go back to what the

1 parties contracted for.

THE COURT: Okay. I see where you are going.

3 Okay.

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4 MS. LUNDVALL: So what I'm saying is what the

5 parties contracted for, the information that we

contracted to give them was the notice --

7 THE COURT: Okay. That goes back to the breach

8 of contract?

MS. LUNDVALL: That's right.

10 THE COURT: So you have to decide that in

11 | tandem?

12 | MS. LUNDVALL: Exactly. We didn't make any

13 other promises to give them any information. We didn't

14 | make any other promises that, We will provide you with

15 | this information. Absolutely nothing, Your Honor. Our

16 | obligation to give them information is informed by the

17 | four corners --

18 THE COURT: Of the document.

MS. LUNDVALL: -- of the document.

THE COURT: Can I ask you, in your position,

21 | that we all know the sentence, In addition, Pardee shall

22 keep each of you reasonably informed as to all matters

23 | relating to the amount and due dates of your commission

24 | payments, your position is that's unambiguous? That

25 | reasonably informed as to all matters relating, your

1 interpretation is that's not ambiguous? That just means 2 we have to give them the amounts and the due dates, 3 period? 4 MS. LUNDVALL: All matters relating to the 5 amounts and the due dates. 6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 MS. LUNDVALL: So then it gets to the Court's What are all matters? 8 Interpretation. 9 THE COURT: I understand what you are saying. 10 MS. LUNDVALL: Is it realistic to say we have 11 to give them everything to confirm that we're telling the truth? I'm sorry, but I find that hard to imagine 12 13 that a party like the plaintiffs can advocate in a case 14 like this to say, All right, we admit we're not entitled 15 to multi-family commissions, we are not entitled to commercial land transactions, the custom lots, we admit 16 that, but you guys didn't give us the information about 17 18 that. 19 Where is it that we promised to give them 20 information about that? We didn't promise to give them 21 that information. And so, therefore, how is it that 22 when we tell them the truth, you punish a party like 23 Pardee for telling the truth? Because that's what's 24 going to happen. If, in fact, you find that they were

entitled to this other information, even though we

25

1 contractually did not promise to give that to them, to 2 confirm that we were telling the truth, you are 3 punishing a party, a contracting party, for telling the 4 truth. I think the balance of our findings, 5 Your Honor --6 7 THE COURT: A lot is case law I'm going to have 8 to go through. 9 MS. LUNDVALL: -- are self-explanatory. And what I'd like to do is to address the 10 11 question that Mr. Wolfram posed to me when he was on the 12 witness stand and that I would have liked very much to 13 address when he was testifying, but as the Court well 14 knows, I get to ask questions. I don't get the 15 opportunity to give answers. 16 THE COURT: You don't testify. MS. LUNDVALL: That's correct. 17 18 THE COURT: I understand. 19 MS. LUNDVALL: Closing argument is that. 20 Mr. Wolfram testified about all of the 21 information that he had received and how all of that information fell within the four corners of what his 2.2 23 attorney had asked for. He wanted to know the seller. 24 He wanted to know the buyer. He wanted to know the date

of the land transactions. He wanted to know the parcel

25

maps. He wanted to know the legal descriptions, how much was paid. All of that information was found in the deeds. All of that information was able to be given to him.

And what he said to me, he said, Why did I have to play detective?

The answer to that question, Your Honor, is directly related to the theme that I just advanced. He played detective to confirm that Pardee was telling the truth. He disbelieved us when we told him he wasn't entitled to commissions on the other transactions. He disbelieved us when we told him we had not taken down any Option Property. He played detective to confirm that we told him the truth.

And, therefore, respectfully, Your Honor, a party like Pardee cannot be punished or be found liable for either breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, or an accounting when they have told the opposite contracting party the truth, and that there has been no evidence brought before this Court's attention that, in fact, that we lied to him, that we misled him, that we did not give him the information that we contracted to give to him or to Mr. Wilkes.

And, therefore, we respectfully submit,

3 3 7

1 Your Honor, that the money damages claim that the

- 2 plaintiffs are asking for has not been demonstrated.
- 3 The accounting claim has not been demonstrated. And in
- 4 addition, this order that they have asked the Court to
- 5 do demands that the Court rewrite the parties'
- 6 agreement, and the Court is prohibited from being able
- 7 to rewrite the parties' agreement.
- 8 There are two things that I would like to be
- 9 able to close with at this point in time. And that is
- 10 | that, first and foremost, I am going to acknowledge that
- 11 I think that it is tough to be in your position,
- 12 especially after being a practicing attorney. You know
- 13 the effort and the energy that goes into production of a
- 14 case. And, therefore, it makes it hard to say somebody
- 15 | wins and somebody loses.
- 16 THE COURT: It does, but that's the system.
- MS. LUNDVALL: That's the system.
- 18 THE COURT: That's what the law is.
- 19 MS. LUNDVALL: And what the plaintiffs have, I
- 20 | want to say suggested to the Court is they've been
- 21 | trying to kind of give a soft way to the Court by
- 22 | suggesting, All we want is information. But that
- 23 | information verifies that what we were doing was telling
- 24 | them the truth in the first place.
- 25 And, therefore, the soft way, which appears to

- 1 be kind of, you know, a soft way of not saying, I want
- 2 big money damages or something like, but there are
- 3 consequences that flow from those decisions. And the
- 4 | consequences are not consequences, respectfully, that we
- 5 | contend that Pardee should be charged with.
- 6 The last thing I would like to say to the Court
- 7 and that is this, thank you.
- THE COURT: You're welcome. It's been a
- 9 pleasure to have all counsel here.
- 10 MS. LUNDVALL: Also to be able to say thank you
- 11 to your staff, to your bailiff, thank you to opposing
- 12 | counsel for their worthy adversaries, but most of all
- 13 | thank you for your time.
- 14 THE COURT: It has been a pleasure and I do
- 15 | mean that.
- 16 MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Thank you, Judge. May it
- 17 | please the court, Judge, out of respect for our son who
- 18 | has worked so hard on this case, I would like him to
- 19 give our reply closing argument and some compelling
- 20 | reasons to find in favor of the plaintiffs.
- MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Your Honor, I will do my
- 22 best to be brief.
- Before I begin my formal remarks, I did want to
- 24 address the RES 5, R-5 matter. If the Court would look
- 25 | to both plaintiffs' and defendant's exhibits,

- specifically Plaintiffs' 39 and 41 and Defendant's

 Exhibit XX, you'll find a litany of references to how
 that parcel is zoned.
- Using their own exhibit, their own piece of
 paper that they blew up to you, okay, where they said,
 Here's R-5 under multi-family, look up here, it says
 R-2. The same thing for the black-and-white version,
 the same thing for where it says zone R-2 on the
- MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, that was not the argument that they made. The argument that they made was that the map --
- 13 | MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Am I allowed --
- MS. LUNDVALL: -- originally depicted R-5
 designation, and we confirmed the designation as
 single-family residential through the tentative maps.
 - And what I pointed out to the Court is that it had never been designated as single-family land, that R-5 is a multi-family designation, and it came from an agreement that dealt with multi-family property being acquired.
- 22 THE COURT: I do understand the evidence.
- 23 | So -- I understand.

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application.

- MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: I understand that,
- 25 Your Honor, but, respectfully, I would like to be able

to give the statement to you without being interrupted constantly.

On that issue there was no evidence about anything being zoned R-5. There isn't a piece of paper. There's isn't witness testimony. The reason you got R-5 is because it's RES 5. It is the fifth residential portion of the multi-family deal. That's why we have R-5.

Had it been R-1 or RES 1, you would have gotten R-1. Had it been RES 2, it would have been R-2. And it was stated one time during the closing and that was it. Again, Exhibit 39 refers to it as R-2 and Exhibit 41 also R-2.

Now on to the balance of the closing. I think it's fair to begin with how we got here, how we began with the allegations of breach for failure to give information, the contract and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and the need for a claim for an accounting.

Hindsight is always 20/20. And after months and years of discovery and argument and taking a closer look at everything, it's a lot easier to say all the information was out there.

First, let's just assume that the information

Jim Wolfram had was the same as Walt Wilkes had, which

we know is not the case, at least as it pertained to Pardee providing them information. Let's look at what James Wolfram had. He had orders to pay commission. He had some communications with Mr. Lash, representatives of Pardee, and representatives of the title company, but was not provided any maps until November 24, 2009, and was not provided any of the amendments to the Amended and Restated Option Agreement.

There was no scheme disclosing how the land was being designated, how it was going to be used. In fact, we heard from Mr. Andrews that that information is generally held tight to the vest. We heard him disclose that they had plans. They designated certain multi-family lands just in the northern portion of the multi-family deal that are internally designated, but haven't been papered with the county yet. We've heard that only one of the multi-family deals that have been designated have been papered with the county.

So when you look at the information that was provided to Mr. Wolfram prior to this litigation, you have the payments, you have one map, which we'll get to in a minute, and you have promises that, You've been paid everything and everything else that we've done doesn't apply to you.

We've heard testimony --

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             MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, that would be a
    misrepresentation of the evidence. We know that there
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 3
    was additional information he got from the title
 4
    companies.
5
             THE COURT:
                         I recall the evidence. Just arque
 6
    this is what you think the evidence shows. I understand
7
    that.
8
9
             MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: I would appreciate if I
10
    could --
11
             THE COURT:
                         It's okay. I know the evidence,
    and they probably disagreed with some of your evidence
12
13
    or your what you say was provided. But let me follow
14
    the argument, at least. I'd appreciate it.
15
             MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Your Honor, when you look
16
    at what he had, we know that he's --
17
             THE COURT: You are talking prior to the
18
    lawsuit?
19
             MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Exactly. Prior to the
20
    lawsuit.
21
             THE COURT: You need to distinguish.
22
             MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Prior to the lawsuit he
    has his commission orders. He receives a November 24,
23
24
    2009 letter attaching a map. He's given closing
25
    statements which reference deals which are defined in
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defined terms in the Amended and Restated amendments.

He doesn't know what they mean.

He's given some deeds, which he already had access to because he went to the county recorder's office, he went to planning and zoning, he went to the assessor's office, he went to the development -- he went everywhere in the Clark County building trying to find information about this development.

And, yet, he didn't have one critical piece of information and that is designation. We heard it a million times. Someone says all the rest of the property is Option Property. No, no. It's all the rest of the property which is designated as production residential property is Option Property. We've always focused on the designation, time and time again.

So when you are informed, as Mr. Wolfram was by a colleague of his at Nevada Title by the name of Phil Zobrist, that Pardee is buying additional land and he's not being informed about it, that he doesn't know where it is, he doesn't know how it's designated, he asks questions. He's going to be curious. When he's told they are buying additional land pursuant to other agreements, a multi-family agreement and a custom lot deal, he gets a little more curious.

When he learns, finally, after getting a map,

that the location of the land is outside of Parcel 1, which has been, his understanding from day one, the definition of Purchase Property, and the definition of Option Property being the balance of the entire site which is or becomes designated for single-family homes, but he does not receive option notices, he did not receive copies of the documents he should in the event Option Property is purchased, he's again wondering what is going on.

2.2

So when we look at and examine the testimony of both sides -- Mr. Wolfram, Mr. Wilkes, Mr. Lash -- when asked, What does it mean to be reasonably informed as to all matters related to the amounts and due dates of the commissions, in this commission -- I'm sorry -- in this transaction it meant the ability to confirm that the commissions are being calculated accurately and paid appropriately. That's what it meant from both sides. That you didn't have to say, Trust -- you didn't have to believe, Trust me, we're paying you the right commissions. You had the ability to confirm that. That's what started this all, is that we didn't have -- our clients didn't have that information.

Now Ms. Lundvall brings up an interesting point. Well, what happens if Pardee is telling the truth that they had given them the proper amounts of

commissions, that they had given them the information because it pertained to all matters related to the amounts and due dates of the commissions? Should they be punished? No, they shouldn't be punished if they complied with the contractual obligations. Absolutely not.

But when there is a failure to fulfill your obligations to keep them reasonably informed as to all matters related to the amounts and due dates of the commissions, even if your trust to me is right, you shouldn't have to bring a lawsuit to confirm it.

Because the duty in that contract said otherwise, that Pardee -- not the title company, not Frances Butler -- Pardee has this duty.

So that's how we got here. We have a map. We have some commission orders. We have some deeds. We don't have a complete picture of what's going on at Coyote Springs. We don't have a complete map. That was created by Mr. Wolfram himself after hours and hours and hours working to find it. And we don't have a key piece of information, which is the designation information. Because if the land isn't designated for single-family homes, they can't receive a commission on it.

And so when you, once again, look at the November 24, 2009 letter, ask yourself, Is there a

residential property that Pardee has purchased at
Coyote Springs? You are not going to find it. The
reason you are not going to find it is because that
statement couldn't be made truthfully. And we'll get to
that portion a little later. But that's how we got
here.

2.2

And so when Mr. Wolfram looks at Exhibit D showing the initial developed parcel inside is the 3,600 acres of Parcel 1, the Purchase Property as defined in the original agreement, when he sees C-2, that even after the BLM land transaction, where you actually have room to move east, you still see the easternmost boundary of Purchase Property. Still there, doesn't go away after the contemplated BLM transaction.

And then he sees that the land that they purchased is outside of the boundary, that it's being told to him that he's being paid a percentage of price, when under the Option Property formula he would be paid a percentage of acres. And he was informed that they purchased other property which was not disclosed to him, the location or the designation thereof.

So when he knows that he's just not looking at a company that owns \$84 million of property, they own much more. As you heard from Mr. Andrews, they've

invested hundreds of millions of dollars in this
investment. They now have a custom lot agreement. They
now have a multi-family agreement. They've now taken on
responsibilities for commercial property.

The question is when, knowing that it is outside of Parcel 1, and knowing that other property has been purchased, that portion of the information hasn't been disclosed to you, can you be said -- can

Mr. Wolfram know that he received the proper amount of commission payments? The answer to that question is no, if only because he didn't have the designation information.

A related point Ms. Lundvall made was observing that Mr. Wolfram thought he had been overpaid back in 2007. And it's interesting because we get to the conclusion Mr. Wolfram thought he was overpaid and he only had, at that point, orders to pay commission. He was only tracking his own money.

The reason why he knew he was overpaid, and Mr. Wolfram told you about this, was because he had received more money beyond the \$50 million, but was being paid at the four percent rate. He didn't need to know where they were buying it. He just knew that, according to their own formula, he was being overpaid. That didn't mean he had the information to confirm that

he had been properly paid before or after.

2.2

Knowledge of a mistake and having the information to have that knowledge is not the same as having the information to confirm accuracy of the commission payments. That's the flip side of the coin. And that was what was necessary under the commission letter agreement.

So now fast-forward to the filing of the Complaint. There's been requests for information. They've been unsuccessful. The best we've received or the best Mr. Wolfram received was that map, but there was not any complete disclosure. There was not an explanation or a reconciliation of what's going on, what's the difference between Mr. Wolfram's map and Mr. Lash's map.

There was a letter that said, The parcels that are on your map but not on Mr. Lash's are outside the scope of your agreement. Again, a conclusion, no factual information to support it.

You didn't hear any testimony from Mr. Lash or Mr. Andrews explaining the phone calls, the details that they provided to him about how Coyote Springs was developing and why the \$84 million had been spent this way and why they'd been paid the right amount of commissions and why they weren't entitled to commissions

under the multi-family deal, why the information provided there wouldn't help them to confirm they had received the proper amount of commissions. You never heard that testimony. And the reason you didn't hear it was because it didn't happen.

2.2

You heard from Mr. Wolfram how many times, They didn't give me any information. He was like a broken record, I swear to God. But it was true. It's because there was no explanatory phone call. We wouldn't be here if there was an explanatory phone call, because there would have been disclosure of all of the production residential property that had been purchased. There would have been resolution of that matter.

Had the issues of changing boundaries and the evolution of the development of Coyote Springs become a real issue, Mr. Wolfram would have answered the call. He would have said, I'll sign the confidentiality agreement if you need me to. They trusted him with four confidential agreements, and they don't trust him with eight more related to the same underlying base transaction for the Purchase Property and the Option Property.

So when he is forced at this point to finally, after three years of requesting information, to hire an attorney, file suit, get access to the tools in

discovery, subpoena power, most importantly to appeal to this Court's equitable powers to give equitable relief in the form of compelling an accounting to ensure they are receiving the appropriate amount of information and to issue an order interpreting the contract consistent with the evidence, that is, you need to give them information to confirm they are receiving the right amounts, that is why we have a damage claim as it specifically relates to attorneys' fees. And I won't get into the law. You have read countless briefs on that matter.

But without that power, we don't have the CSI documents. We don't have the documents from Stewart Title or Chicago Title. We don't have the information that we brought forward to you today, information which was quite eye-opening when fully explained.

And this is how it relates to the second portion of the breach claim, which is specifically, Did they buy production residential property and not pay a commission?

Mr. Whittemore, I thought, was a very, very compelling witness, very knowledgeable. I thought there were a couple points, though, that gave me pause. Every single document presented in front of him, there wasn't an issue with any of the designation maps, B-1 through

B-5, about how the land was located and how it was designated.

And, yet, for the critical piece of information, the five residential parcels in the multi-family land deal, that's when it all hit the skids. That's he said it was also multi-family even though there was already a previous designation under parcels MF-1 and MF-2.

We learned later through it the examination of Exhibit 13, specifically Exhibit E, the land just to the left of the seller exchange parcel, that was RES 5.

That was Residential 5 on B-6. We learned that that was the plans for the first development, the first subdivision for single-family home, production residential property.

But when faced with that question,

Mr. Whittemore responded with, I didn't know what they

did. I didn't know if they downgraded. He went from

saying it's all multi-family to then, when faced with

serious evidence that it wasn't multi-family, he

suddenly became ignorant. And I'm making this point

because this Court needs to make a determination is the

paper right or is the testimony right?

And we've been told to look to paragraph B on page 14 countless times, look to the specific provisions

of the contract to learn what it means. And, yet, the most basic of information, looking at a map, a picture showing what's going on, that's incorrect, and in the most curious of situations where it would have most impact on the plaintiffs' ability to receive a commission, but also to confirm that they had received the appropriate amounts of commission.

If the Court finds that the map is more trustworthy than the testimony, saying it's not accurate, it's also going to have to find that they took -- that Pardee took down production residential property under the guise of multi-family land deal. And I speak to all five parcels and not just RES 5.

RES 5, the evidence is clear, that land is for single-family homes. You heard it from Klif Andrews. You saw it on the map. You've got Exhibit 43, which shows each and every one of the 332 lots, single-family homes. It's an 80-acre parcel which is split up into the 26 and change acres for the seller exchange and the balance being Residential 5.

We know that at least one-fifth of that multi-family deal of the residential parcels is production residential property, and we know that it wasn't just designated in-house by Pardee. We know that it was serious enough to file paperwork with the county,

unlike what Mr. Andrews explained that they did with the multi-family portion which is the northern portion of that site.

What was interesting also about Mr. Andrews' testimony when asked, How was the rest of it designated, he said, I don't know. He knew where the multi-family was, which I would expect him to. It's his business. He's the hands-on head of the Nevada team. But there wasn't any disclosure of any other possible designation of land.

He said that CSI still reserves much of the commercial property. You've got multi-family, which he discussed earlier. What is the other option?

Single-family residential. Exactly what the map says on B-6, supported by the Exhibits 43, 39 and 41 talking about how it is zoned, what the use is supposed to be for. The question is which would you believe more? The records, the map of Coyote Springs and Pardee, their agreements, or the testimony of a couple witnesses?

You have the maps from the county and the agreements between the parties. At the time there was no amendment to Amendment No. 7. There was no correction of we need to change to designation. You heard these are all eight amendments. But we're now expected to believe that when it says residential, it

means multi-family, when we have already a multi-family designation on that map.

2.0

If the Court finds that that land was production residential property when it was purchased or ever redesignated, it must find that there was a breach of the contract for a number of reasons, the first of which is information.

Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes had every expectation that they would be paid a commission and informed, necessary as required by the Commission Agreement, for every acre of production residential property purchased by Pardee throughout the entire site.

Let's be clear here. In 2004, September 1, when they signed that agreement, there was one operative agreement between Pardee and CSI. That was the Option Agreement. There was two amendments thereto, but there was not some other deal. There was not some other negotiation to buy commercial land, multi-family land, other designations of land between Pardee and CSI at that time.

The only interest Pardee had on September 1,

2004 in Coyote Springs was for single-family homes, and
according to the Option Agreement, had only one
mechanism of buying land once Purchase Property had been
completed. That is the exercise of options.

So when you read the Commission Agreement,

Counsel pointed you to the language purchased pursuant
to paragraph 2 of the Option Agreement. That is not
limiting language. Under that interpretation, under a
straight interpretation of that, if they bought
production residential property in any other manner, our
clients would not be able to receive a commission, nor
would they be entitled to information concerning it.
But that's not the case.

When they signed that had agreement, there were only two ways Pardee was going to buy production residential property, buying Purchase Property and buying Option Property. So when the Commission Agreement says that you get a commission when they buy Option Property pursuant to paragraph 2, there's no contemplation that they are going to buy production residential property in any other way. At that time there was no other mechanism for Pardee to buy production residential property except for what was in the Option Agreement.

Here's where we get to the noncircumvention portion, unless they try to bypass the Option Agreement, bypass our clients in the interim. They entered into separate agreements whereby they purchased this production residential property, specifically the

multi-family land deal.

2.2

It took a second agreement for them to get access to this land. They didn't do it through the underlying Option Agreement. That's why you didn't see the written option exercise notice. That's why you didn't see the option deed. They did it through a separate agreement. So when you look at the justified expectations of our clients from the Commission Agreement, they had a justified expectation that every acre of production residential property purchased by Pardee, they would receive a commission on, because the only way for Pardee to buy production residential property was through the Option Agreement at that time.

So when you learn that they bought -- excuse me -- when they bought production residential property through other agreements, through separate agreements, and neither compensated our clients, nor informed them about it --

THE COURT: So you are equating buying and purchasing as the same thing as designating it something different, redesignating it?

MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: I'm going to move separately. I'm just using that example.

THE COURT: Because we all know they bought it, purchased it, under a multi-family agreement and they

1 purchased not -- under multi-family price. That is not 2 in dispute. MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: 3 4 THE COURT: We all know that. I just want to 5 follow you. \$100,000 an acre. 6 MS. LUNDVALL: 7 THE COURT: I remember. It was 100,000. 8 Okay. So go ahead. I'm sorry. 9 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Our position on that 10 issue --11 THE COURT: Terms are so precise in this. 12 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: You are a hundred percent 13 right. 14 THE COURT: Terms are so precise to me that 15 they have to be. So I want to make sure I'm in the 16 right step of what you are arguing. 17 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Our position is, and the 18 evidence is pretty clear on this, at least the paper 19 evidence, is that when they bought it, they bought 20 residential property. They bought multi-family property 21 too, but they bought production residential property. 2.2 They bought it at \$100,000 an acre. 23 But the reason they did it wasn't because they

are getting \$100,000 an acre land. It's because they

are getting the rights associated with the multi-family

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development, which is what Mr. Andrews spoke to. He said, We were really buying rights and Jon Lash got them to throw in some land. That's what he said.

THE COURT: But that land is what they got for the 100,000 an acre. Right?

MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Well, they got rights and land, but you are right.

THE COURT: Well, it's tied together. He explained that.

10 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Yes. But the question 11 is --

12 THE COURT: I'm following you.

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MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: The question is whether or not it was designated then or whether it was redesignated later. Our position is whether it was designated in the very beginning when they bought it or whether it was designated later, it doesn't matter, would be a breach.

THE COURT: You position is any time, anything they buy, if they, in this developing process, if Pardee decides to designate it for their purposes in developing single-family residential, your clients, under this Commission Agreement, are owed?

MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Yes, Your Honor.

25 THE COURT: Even though they didn't directly

- 1 purchase -- okay.
- 2 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: And the reason for that is
- 3 because of the ability to convert it to production
- 4 residential property arises from the Option Agreement,
- 5 | which our clients --
- 6 THE COURT: Do that again.
- 7 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Pardee's right to acquire
- 8 and purchase production residential property from CSI --
- 9 THE COURT: Is limited by the first option
- 10 | agreement?
- 11 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: No, no.
- 12 THE COURT: They can't do it any other way?
- 13 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: It arises from that Option
- 14 | Agreement.
- 15 THE COURT: Are you saying that limits their
- 16 ability to buy residential --
- MS. LUNDVALL: His argument started --
- 18 THE COURT: It's okay. I'm working on it.
- MS. LUNDVALL: -- with the ability to reconvert
- 20 | it. That's quote/unquote.
- 21 THE COURT: I'm just trying to follow.
- MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: The ability to convert
- 23 | it -- the ability to purchase production residential
- 24 | property arose from the Option Agreement.
- 25 THE COURT: Absolutely. That's what they

1 intended at the time and that's when they were 2 contracting for.

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THE COURT: Go ahead. I just want to make sure I follow.

MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: So the rights to acquire and to control, possess, and develop single-family homes arose from that agreement. Later agreements allowed them and gave them rights to develop multi-family property and, to a certain extent, these custom lots we heard a lot about.

But the ability to reconvert or convert from one designation, whether it be multi-family or custom lots, to production residential property, again stems from the Option Agreement. Without the Option Agreement, Pardee would not have had the right to buy, control, acquire, or develop production residential homes.

So under those -- under that contract, without that contract, without our clients' efforts, you don't have that right to convert.

More importantly, I don't believe you even need to even get there in terms of looking at their ability to reconvert. The Option Property is very clear. When it defines Option Property, it is the balance of the

entire site for land that is or becomes designated for single-family homes.

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So whether it is in 2004 or becomes at some point single-family property, it is Option Property by that definition. And so when they convert it, it then becomes single-family property.

THE COURT: What happens if they reconvert it and never do anything with it? It just keeps changing. It's like a chameleon. It gets to change five different times? If you take your scenario, your argument, that's -- I'm having a hard time with that a little bit.

So like he even says, you know, Mr. Andrews was very candid, We probably won't even do that.

So your position is they still owe a commission to your clients just because of what they did. If they even say anything that that property is going to be single-family production residential, every time they use that designation, whether they actually go through with it or not, your clients get a commission? That's where your argument goes?

MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Yes. That's our position.

THE COURT: Okay. I just want to make sure.

MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: And the reason for it,
Your Honor, is because designation is a term of art. It

25 | has real meaning. It is not just some ambiguous, Well,

1 this morning for 15 minutes I thought we were going to do some production residential property, then we're 2 going to do multi-family for the rest of the day. 3 It is a conscientious decision by Mr. Andrews and the 4 rest of his team that this is the plan we're talking. 5 Now, that may change six months, a year --6 7 THE COURT: So when does it become -- for your purposes of your argument, designation, the minute they 8 9 even do anything, put it on a property map or ask for a 10 tentative plan, that's a permanent designation and then 11 the commission is owed then? That's your argument? 12 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Yes. 13 THE COURT: There's a whole scale here of when it really becomes -- I know the term of art designation. 14 15 But what's the evidence to when is it a designation if you are using that for purposes of commission? 16 17 where I'm looking at. 18 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Okay. 19 THE COURT: And I didn't -- so that's where I 20 Tell me your position is -want to go. 21 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Our position --2.2 THE COURT: -- a tentative map is enough. 23 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Tentative map is enough, 24 especially because it not only represents Pardee's 25 internal workings, which we heard a lot about.

internally designate. But it's the expression to the rest of the world that, This is how we're designating it, by virtue of the fact that they are filing it with

Clark County.

THE COURT: So your position is if they hadn't done the -- let me ask this: Is it your position that as soon as they put on some of their development maps RES 5 for that area, was that designation enough for your clients to get commission based on your theory?

MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Your Honor, to the extent that it was countersigned by Coyote Springs, I would say yes. To the extent it was maybe -- for example, in the future, a memoranda, we're going to want to designate this, it would have to be some official declaration, May 1 --

THE COURT: Between Pardee and CSI?

MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: It may not have to be between Pardee and CSI. Because we've now learned from Jon Lash and from Klif Andrews, CSI really didn't care about how it was designated.

THE COURT: That's what I was going to say.

They just -- Harvey just wanted his money. I get that.

MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: So once they take an official position, okay, an official position a declaration this is now designated for this and then

- 1 begin to take some subsequent action consistent with
- 2 that, whether it's the filing of a tentative map,
- 3 whether it's the plans in support thereof, it can't just
- 4 be, Well, it's on a piece of paper, it means it's
- 5 | magically turned into a redesignation. But it needs to
- 6 have some combination of an official designation
- 7 | followed by action and support.
- 8 THE COURT: And that's your position on the
- 9 interpretation?
- 10 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Yes.
- 11 THE COURT: The tentative map, that's why you
- 12 | say that's enough. It doesn't matter that it's going to
- 13 expire in four years, a year or so from now?
- 14 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Well, we don't know if
- 15 | it's going to expire.
- 16 THE COURT: Well, the terms of it said it would
- 17 | in four years.
- 18 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: But we don't know if it
- 19 | will expire. We don't know if six months before they
- 20 | could file the final map, get it all done, and --
- THE COURT: That's what I'm saying. How
- 22 | much -- how far on that continuum do they need to go
- 23 before they get a commission? That's my interest.
- 24 Okay. I understand your -- your point is you feel
- 25 | that's enough for the designation, that they should get

- 1 a commission.
- 2 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: The reason for it is that
- 3 | if it creates some reliance, if people inside are
- 4 | relying upon the fact this is going to be designated as
- 5 blank, okay, it should apply, because that is -- that is
- 6 very specific decisions. They are -- it is a business
- 7 judgment. Okay. They are not doing it just for kicks.
- 8 It's not arbitrary.
- 9 THE COURT: No, no. They are trying to develop
- 10 | their property to the best -- like that's the whole
- 11 | thing they did in 2010. They were trying to regroup and
- 12 | get some economic --
- 13 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Exactly.
- 14 THE COURT: -- downturn.
- 15 But you say the tentative is enough. You don't
- 16 | think something like the final map where all -- you
- 17 | don't feel that's enough for them to get a commission
- 18 under your theory of designation?
- 19 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: No, Your Honor. And the
- 20 | reason I would say that is this, is that there's been
- 21 | very few if -- I don't believe there's a been a single
- 22 | final map filed with Clark County.
- THE COURT: Probably not, because their
- 24 development didn't go forward.
- MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: And, yet, they've already

previously designated, at a minimum, 2,112 acres of production residential.

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THE COURT: That's what they purchased under the agreement. That, I understand. I understand that for that property. And they paid a commission. I understand that.

MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: I understand. But the idea that they can make a decision that this is going to be designated as production residential property before any of that happens, if the same reasoning applies, for example, to the multi-family deal where they did buy five parcels of production residential property, that should apply the same way.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: So it's -- if the Court wants to wait until the final --

THE COURT: I'm just asking your theory. All I'm doing is asking where your theory is going and what is your basis for it in the evidence. That's all I'm trying to understand, what is the basis in the evidence that you feel supports that they owe a commission to Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes on that RES 5 property? That's all I'm -- and that's what you are asking for. You are asking for that?

MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Absolutely, a hundred

1 percent, Your Honor. THE COURT: I understood that at the end. 2 So that's why I'm asking your basis in evidence. 3 4 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: The other part of it that I would marshal in support would be the changed 5 testimony of Mr. Lash. We have --6 THE COURT: 7 I know. MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: The most prominent change 8 9 in testimony in this entire case was that of Mr. Lash, 10 and I think it expresses a view that there was a 11 justified expectation that any and all production 12 residential property on the site, our clients would get 13 a commission from. Because when they signed the agreement, the only way they would be able to get 14 15 production residential property is either through 16 Purchase Property or exercising options. 17 So if that's the understanding, if that's the 18 justified expectation --That was your clients' expectation? 19 THE COURT: MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Yes, Your Honor. 20 21 THE COURT: That any single-family production 22 residential home that was ever built by Pardee there or that land was used for that, they got a commission? 23 24 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Exactly. Because at the 25 time there was no other way to acquire that property

other than to buy Purchase Property, which is covered by Roman numerals I and II, or by exercising options which is Roman numeral III.

THE COURT: All right. I understand your argument.

MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: And then it goes to the circumvention argument, which is, you know --

THE COURT: Obviously, if that's their understanding, then obviously you can't circumvent it by doing it. It depends on what the understanding was whether they circumvented.

MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Exactly.

THE COURT: I understand that.

MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: So the next issue is this, and this has to do with information. If that's their understanding and if that's their expectation and 15 years down the road, 20 years down the road, they find out that they've been paid for 2,112 acres of residential property and Pardee has acquired 2,500 acres of production residential property, as evidenced by their building, and they've done it through a mechanism such as through the multi-family deal, or through redesignating other land that they acquired through another deal to production residential property, our clients, at a minimum, would need to be informed as to

why they aren't being paid. Under what interpretation or what theory allows them to do that, to not pay them, and why their commission payments were accurate.

Again, this goes back to why they needed to know the location of the land, in addition to designation information, is because they're being told it's all Purchase Property, but Purchase Property is defined with hard boundaries at that time of land within Parcel 1.

So in that event, okay, even if they could avoid getting out of paying a commission, they surely can't avoid letting them know we're designating land or redesignating land and so we're not going to pay you a commission because it's not part of the Option Agreement or it's not called for in the Commission Agreement.

But I would submit to you, Your Honor, that that would be that circumvention, that that would be that avoidance of obligations. And whether intentional or not, whether it's a mistake, whether it's negligent, whether it's the most willful thing on the planet, it's still an avoidance of the obligation.

And as Mr. Lash told you, there's no mens rea necessary, there's no need to defraud under that clause, there just would need to be some form of action taken to

circumvent or avoid their obligation. So if that's the 1 2 case, if they have an obligation, at least so far as the 3 understanding of the parties, to both pay them a 4 commission for production residential property and to inform them as to all matters related -- to reasonably 5 inform them as all matters related to amounts and due 6 7 dates of their commission, that they can't get around that by executing separate agreements, and that's 8 9 exactly what we have here. 10 The single-family -- as an aside, there's been no discussion of Pardee's counterclaim. We would 11 12 submit --13 THE COURT: In her findings of fact, she said 14 she was withdrawing it. 15 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: I'm sorry. I did not see 16 that. 17 THE COURT: Didn't you say you were withdrawing 18

the counterclaim?

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We would withdraw the MS. LUNDVALL: counterclaim in the event that the Court finds the time and material damages are not a recoverable or compensable form of damages under the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

In other words, if they don't prevail on their breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,

- 1 then we acknowledge that we can't either. So they were 2 mirror images of each other, Your Honor.
- 3 THE COURT: So you are still going for your 4 counterclaim?
- MS. LUNDVALL: Only if, in fact, the Court 5 finds a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 6 7
- 8 THE COURT: I just saw that briefly when I was 9 sitting up here.
- 10 MS. LUNDVALL: If you take a look, I think the 11 language we did is we said as a conditional 12 counterclaim, we've alleged this.
- MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: There was no testimony. 13
- 14 THE COURT: Okay.
- 15 MS. LUNDVALL: There was testimony by the
- 17 THE COURT: But you know what, you can't argue.
- 18 I'm sorry. Argument is over.
- 19 I'm really getting tired. It's getting long
- 20 So could you at least --
- 21 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Five minutes, Your Honor,
- 2.2 and we're done.

defense.

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dealing.

- 23 THE COURT: I'm not cutting you off.
- 24 just -- but I don't want to open any more argument. No
- 25 evidence, in your opinion, as to any counterclaim by

1 defendants? MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Yes, Your Honor. 2 3 MS. LUNDVALL: The Court asked us to remind you 4 that there was a deposition transcript before the Court. 5 That deposition transcript is part of the evidence. 6 THE COURT: I'm sorry. What are you referring 7 to now? MS. LUNDVALL: Jim Stringer. 8 9 THE COURT: Oh, yeah. I'll looking at it. 10 haven't looked at it yet. So I don't know if there's 11 any evidence in that one or not. I haven't had a chance 12 to read that. 13 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: What you will find is that ultimately the two people or three people who could 14 15 inform the understanding of the agreement -- Mr. Lash, Mr. Wolfram, Mr. Wilkes -- never once testified there 16 was an obligation of Mr. Wilkes and Mr. Wolfram to 17 18 refrain from asking the questions, to inquire further as 19 to what the status of the development at Coyote Springs 20 Without that testimony, without that explanation 21 or understanding or any words to that effect, inside 2.2 the --23 MS. LUNDVALL: If Counsel is now addressing our 24 counterclaim, then he's now going beyond the scope of

what my argument was. Therefore, I would ask him to

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1 move on. His rebuttal is limited to --

THE COURT: No. If you are still maintaining your counterclaim, just because you didn't argue it to me, he certainly gets to address it. I mean, I know

5 it's rebuttal. I understand that, but, I mean --

MS. LUNDVALL: He gets to rebut what I argued.

7 THE COURT: I know.

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MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Your Honor, I will finish with this, and this deals with the claim for an accounting.

THE COURT: It's getting late.

12 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: I know.

The issue here, the claim for accounting, is whether or not there's a relationship or a duty that gives rise to the claim for accounting. Nevada law is very clear. Fiduciary relationship, special relationship, where a party reasonably imparts special confidence in the defendant, and the defendant would reasonably know this confidence, or, three, where a party has superior knowledge or the material facts are peculiarly within the knowledge the party sought to be charged and not within the fair and reasonable reach of the other party, Dow Chemical versus Mahlum,

Clearly, this is an issue of superior knowledge

and the ability of plaintiffs to get access to it. Thi is under the duty to disclose. This is separate and apart from the special relationship in the context of the breach of the covenant good faith and fair dealing in tort.

So the duty to disclose arises in these three situations. That duty clearly is evidenced here because the designation information wasn't available to my clients. The information as to the location of where exactly they're buying Purchase Property wasn't available to my clients. All of the information necessary to confirm the amount and due dates, to confirm the accuracy of the calculations of the commissions wasn't available to my clients. That is why there needs to be an accounting sought and rendered in this case.

I began opening by saying this case is about fairness and will conclude on that remark. Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes have spent their entire lives being fair to people and expecting the same in return.

They repeatedly asked Mr. Lash, representatives of Pardee, and the escrow company for information. In response they got nothing. In fact, they were told, You have everything. But they didn't have everything.

Mr. Lash instructed someone to say they have everything

when they don't and when he knows they don't. That isn't being fair with them. That isn't doing the right thing.

And now that we've been through this nine-day trial, they are asking this Court to fairly observe and take notice of all the evidence and treat them fairly as a result and find in favor of them. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Okay. We're completed; right?

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Once again, I do have your revised findings of fact. I would like -- let me tell you on my time frame. I'm just concerned -- here's what's going on with me. I have a products liability case which I got that starts January 13th. They have already filed almost 40-some motions in limine, and they are thinking they may get to 60-some over my holiday.

MS. LUNDVALL: Oh, boy.

THE COURT: So I tried very hard to kind of put you so I could have a block of time to look at this, and I'm really concerned -- I want to be honest with you.

I'd rather just work on it right now while it's fresh in my mind, But I have motions in limine already filed.

It's an Actos case. It's got Kemp and Eglet. And they

just brought in two attorneys from New Jersey,
associated in today with them. I've got five different
law firms the representing the defendant they are

associating in.

And you have to be fair to the judge that I have fair time do this. So I'm going to try to work on this as much as I can next week, but like I said, my Christmas and stuff is shot, and this trial is January 13th. We're already trying to figure out if I can even hear all the motions in limine before January 13th. And the trial is supposed to go six weeks to eight weeks.

So I don't want to rush this either because that's not fair to you guys. So I just want you to know, if I don't get something out, it's not because I don't want to work on it, because it makes more sense to me to do it now. I was trying get some stuff off my calendar next week, and my law clerk will tell you, as you can imagine, everything got put on to next week.

Because the way this job works, not that I'm complaining, we basically have a 40-hour week just doing my motion calendar. You add a 40-hour week with a trial, I have an 80-hour workweek. It's very difficult to do that, as you can imagine.

So to give you all the time from 8:30 as long

as I could, because I wanted it done for you, I pushed everything.

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: We appreciate it,

4 Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Because I think it's more important to me to give you blocks of time to present it, and to your witnesses and everything. It just backs up my days.

But I just wanted to explain that to you. It may be longer than I would every want it to be. I will start next week, but I also don't want to push. I have a lot to do here. I'm the first to acknowledge that. I want -- you've worked very hard to present it, and I certainly want a fair time to be able to work on it. So I just wanted to be up-front with you.

After that I don't have another big trial.

Next week I have a bench trial. After that I have another big one, but not until June. So I've asked some of these other cases to see if someone else can take them. And I am working with the senior judges to see -- because I have -- it's just really tough. And I have to have blocks of time. I'm sure you can appreciate. I can't do this at night.

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: You gave 40 hours today, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm working very hard. Please

don't get discouraged with me if it doesn't come as fast

as you would like. I'm just telling you that up-front

because I -- calendar just got really tight on me

because of that trial.

MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you, Your Honor.

7 THE COURT: It was a preferential trial 8 setting. So here we go.

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MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: We will submit to you our updated proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and decisions within the first half of next week.

MS. LUNDVALL: May we get copies of what they submit?

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Of course. We'll serve her, of course.

MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Absolutely.

THE COURT: So I just wanted to let you know and be up-front with you.

MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Like I said, I will do my very best. I tried to get somebody else to take my bench trial next week. Not so much.

I truly believe a judge has to have a fair amount of time to do a fair decision, and I know you all would agree with that.

1		MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Thank your staff.
2		MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you, Your Honor.
3		-000-
4	ATTEST:	FULL, TRUE AND ACCURATE TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS.
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6		
7		/s/ Jennifer D. Church
8		JENNIFER D. CHURCH, CCR. No. 568, RPR
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