## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

Case No.: 72371

Appellant,
v.

JAMES WOLFRAM and WALT WILKES, et al.
Respondents.

Appeal Regarding Judgment and Post-Judgment Orders
Eighth Judicial District Court
District Court Case No.: A-10-632338-C

## JOINT APPENDIX - VOLUME 70 OF 88

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| 06/29/2015 | Motion to Strike "Judgment", Entered June 15, 2015 Pursuant to N.R.C.P. 52 (B) And N.R.C.P. 59, As Unnecessary and Duplicative Orders of Final Orders Entered on June 25, 2014 And May 13, 2015, And as Such, Is A Fugitive Document | 53 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA008328- } \\ & \text { JA008394 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 12/08/2015 | Notice of Defendant Pardee Homes of Nevada's Non-Reply and Non-Opposition to "Plaintiff's Opposition to Pardee Homes of Nevada's Motion to Amend Judgment and Countermotion for Attorney's Fees" | 69 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA010896- } \\ & \text { JA010945 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/13/2017 | Notice of Entry of Amended Judgment | 88 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA014130- } \\ & \text { JA014143 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 06/27/2014 | Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order | 48 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA007475- } \\ & \text { JA007494 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 06/15/2015 | Notice of Entry of Judgment | 52 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA008154- } \\ & \text { JA008158 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 05/17/2016 | Notice of Entry of Judgment | 71 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA011392- } \\ & \text { JA011396 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 01/10/2017 | Notice of Entry of Order and Judgment from August 15, 2016 Hearings Regarding Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013629- } \\ & \text { JA013635 } \end{aligned}$ |


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| 01/10/2017 | Notice of Entry of Order and Judgment from August 15, 2016 Hearings Regarding Defendant's Motion to Amend Judgment | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA013636- } \\ & \text { JA016342 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 01/10/2017 | Notice of Entry of Order and Judgment from August 15, 2016 Hearings Regarding Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013622- } \\ & \text { JA013628 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/25/2013 | Notice of Entry of Order Denying Motion for Partial Summary Judgment | 31 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA004812- } \\ & \text { JA004817 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/25/2014 | Notice of Entry of Order Granting Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens | 48 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA007574- } \\ & \text { JA007578 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 06/05/2013 | Notice of Entry of Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint | 16 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA002665- } \\ & \text { JA002669 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 01/13/2017 | Notice of Entry of Order on Defendant's Motion to Retax Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs Filed May 23, 2016 | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013652- } \\ & \text { JA013656 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 05/13/2015 | Notice of Entry of Order on Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Supplemental Briefing re Future Accounting | 49 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA007712- } \\ & \text { JA007717 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/10/2015 | Notice of Entry of Order on Pardee's Emergency Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment; and Ex Parte Order Shortening Time | 62 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA009755- } \\ & \text { JA009758 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 01/12/2017 | Notice of Entry of Order on Plaintiffs' Countermotion for Attorney's Fees and Costs Pursuant to NRS 18.010 and EDCR 7.60 | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA013645- } \\ & \text { JA013648 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 04/03/2013 | Notice of Entry of Order re Order Denying Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment | 16 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA002465- } \\ & \text { IAOO2470 } \end{aligned}$ |


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| 03/15/2013 | Notice of Entry of Order re Order Granting Plaintiffs Countermotion for Summary Judgment | 14 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA002354- } \\ & \text { JA002358 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/13/2017 | Notice of Entry of Order Re: Defendant Pardee Homes of Nevada's Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment and Post-Judgment Orders | 88 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA014147- } \\ & \text { JA014151 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 12/16/2011 | Notice of Entry of Stipulated Confidentiality Agreement and Protective Order | 1 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA000040- } \\ & \text { JA000048 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 08/30/2012 | Notice of Entry of Stipulation and Order to Extend Discovery Deadlines (First Request) | 1 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA000055- } \\ & \text { JA000060 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/14/2017 | Notice of Entry of Supplemental Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Entitlement to, and Calculation of, Prejudgment Interest | 88 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA014111- } \\ & \text { JA014117 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 11/07/2012 | Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' Counter Motion for Partial Summary Judgment | 2 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA000322- } \\ & \text { JA000351 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/14/2014 | Opposition to Pardee's Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens | 48 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA007495- } \\ & \text { JA007559 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 01/09/2017 | Order and Judgment from August 15, 2016 Hearings Regarding Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA013619- } \\ & \text { JA013621 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 01/09/2017 | Order and Judgment from August 15, 2016 Hearings Regarding Defendants Motion to Amend Judgment | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA013613- } \\ & \text { JA013615 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 01/09/2017 | Order and Judgment from August 15, 2016 Hearings Regarding Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA013616- } \\ & \text { JA013618 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/23/2013 | Order Denying Motion for Partial Summary Judgment | 21 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA003210- } \\ & \text { JA003212 } \end{aligned}$ |


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| 04/26/2016 | Order from January 15, 2016 Hearings | 71 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA011385- } \\ & \text { JA011388 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/24/2014 | Order Granting Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens | 48 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA007571- } \\ & \text { JA007573 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 05/30/2013 | Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint | 16 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA002659- } \\ & \text { JA002661 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 06/05/2013 | Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint | 16 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA002662- } \\ & \text { JA002664 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 01/12/2017 | Order on Defendant's Motion to Retax Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs Filed May 23, 2016 | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013649- } \\ & \text { JA013651 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/10/2015 | Order on Pardee's Emergency Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment; and Ex Parte Order Shortening Time | 62 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA009753- } \\ & \text { JA009754 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 01/12/2017 | Order on Plaintiffs' Countermotion for Attorney's Fees and Costs Pursuant to NRS 18.010 and EDCR 7.60 | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013643- } \\ & \text { JA013644 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 04/02/2013 | Order re Order Denying Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment | 16 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA002462- } \\ & \text { JA002464 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 03/14/2013 | Order re Order Granting Plaintiffs Countermotion for Summary Judgment | 14 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA002351- } \\ & \text { JA002353 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/12/2017 | Order Re: Defendant Pardee Homes of Nevada's Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment and Post-Judgment Orders | 88 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA014144- } \\ & \text { JA014146 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 11/29/2011 | Order Setting Civil Non-Jury Trial | 1 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA000031- } \\ & \text { JA000032 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 11/02/2017 | Pardee Amended Notice of Appeal | 88 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA014152- } \\ & \text { JA014154 } \end{aligned}$ |


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| $07 / 15 / 2015$ | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Consolidated <br> Opposition To: (1) Plaintiff's Motion to <br> Strike Judgment Entered on June 15, 2015 <br> Pursuant to NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59; <br> and (2) Plaintiffs' Motion Pursuant to <br> NRCP 52(b) and 59 to Amend the Court's <br> Judgment Entered on June 15, 2015 | 63 | JA009919- <br> JA009943 |
| 09/12/2015 | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Consolidated <br> Reply in Support of (1) Motion to Retax <br> Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs Filed <br> June 19, 2015; and (2) Motion for <br> Attorney's Fees and Costs | 68 | JA010812-- <br> JA010865 |
| $12 / 30 / 2015$ | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Consolidated <br> Response to: (1) Plaintiffs' Notice of Non- <br> Reply and Non-Opposition to Plaintiffs' <br> Opposition to Pardee's Motion to Amend <br> Judgment and Countermotion for | 69 | JA010946- <br> JA010953 |
| Attorney's Fees; and (2) Plaintiffs' <br> Supplement to Plaintiffs' Opposition to <br> Pardee's Motion for Attorney's Fees and <br> Costs |  |  |  |
| $06 / 01 / 2016$ | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Motion to <br> Amend Judgment | 72 | JA011455- <br> JA011589 |
| $07 / 02 / 2015$ | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Motion to <br> Amend Judgment | 59 | JA009207- <br> JA009283 |
| $06 / 27 / 2016$ | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Opposition to <br> Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees and <br> Costs | 82 | JA013025- <br> JA013170 |
| $07 / 15 / 2015$ | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Opposition to <br> Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees and <br> Costs | 62 | JA009759- <br> JA009771 |


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| 08/10/2015 | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of the Order on Pardee's Emergency Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment | 67 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA010582- } \\ \text { JA010669 } \end{array}$ |
| 06/30/2016 | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Reply in Support of Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 82 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013171- } \\ & \text { JA013182 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 06/30/2016 | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Reply in Support of Motion to Amend Judgment; and Opposition to Plaintiffs' Countermotion for Attorney's Fees | 82 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013183- } \\ & \text { JA013196 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/01/2016 | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Reply in Support of Motion to Retax Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs Filed May 23, 2016 | 82 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA013197- } \\ & \text { JA013204 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 03/23/2016 | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Settle Two (2) Sets of Competing Judgments and Orders | 71 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA0112144- } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| 08/25/2014 | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Supplemental Brief Regarding Future Accounting | 49 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA007699- } \\ & \text { JA007707 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 02/08/2017 | Pardee Notice of Appeal | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013657- } \\ & \text { JA013659 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/08/2015 | Pardee's Emergency Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment: and Ex Parte Order Shortening Time | 62 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA009663- } \\ & \text { JA009710 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 06/06/2016 | Pardee's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 72 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA011590- } \\ & \text { JA011614 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 05/28/2015 | Pardee's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 49 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA007718- } \\ & \text { JA007734 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 06/24/2014 | Pardee's Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens - section filed under seal | 48 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA007411- } \\ & \text { JA007456 } \end{aligned}$ |


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| 06/24/2015 | Pardee's Motion to Retax Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs Filed June 19, 2015 | 52 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA008192- } \\ & \text { JA008215 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 05/31/2016 | Pardee's Motion to Retax Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs Filed May 23, 2016 | 71 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA011442- } \\ & \text { JA011454 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 04/07/2017 | Pardee's Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment and Post-Judgment Orders | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013660- } \\ & \text { JA013668 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 05/10/2017 | Pardee's Reply in Support of Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment and PostJudgment Orders | 88 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA014069- } \\ & \text { JA014071 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/17/2016 | Pardee's Supplemental Brief Regarding Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest Pursuant to the Court's Order | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013591- } \\ & \text { JA013602 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/08/2015 | Pardee's Supplemental Briefing in Support of its Emergency Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment | 62 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA009711- } \\ & \text { JA009733 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 08/25/2014 | Plaintiff's Accounting Brief Pursuant to the court's Order Entered on June 25, 2014 | 49 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA007647- } \\ & \text { JA007698 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 09/12/2016 | Plaintiffs' Brief on Interest Pursuant to the Court's Order Entered on August 15, 2016 | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013566- } \\ & \text { JA013590 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 05/23/2016 | Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements | 71 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA011397- } \\ & \text { JA011441 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 06/08/2016 | Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 77 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA012115- } \\ & \text { JA012182 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 06/29/2015 | Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 52-53 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA008216- } \\ & \text { JA008327 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/24/2015 | Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, Ex Parte (With Notice) of Application for Order Shortening Time Regarding Stay of Execution and Order Shortening Time Regarding Stay of Execution | 67 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA010482- } \\ & \text { JA010522 } \end{aligned}$ |


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| $07 / 18 / 2013$ | Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine To Permit <br> James J. Jimmerson, Esq. To Testify <br> Concerning Plaintiffs' Attorney's Fees and <br> Costs (MIL \#25) | 17 | JA002732- <br> JA002771 |
| $06 / 29 / 2015$ | Plaintiffs' Motion Pursuant to NRCP 52(b) <br> and 59 to Amend The Court's Judgment <br> Entered on June 15, 2015, to Amend the <br> Findings of Fact/conclusions of Law and <br> Judgment Contained Therein, Specifically <br> Referred to in the Language Included in <br> the Judgment at Page 2, Lines 8 Through <br> 13 and the Judgment At Page 2, Lines 18 <br> Through 23 to Delete the Same or Amend <br> The Same to Reflect the True Fact That <br> Plaintiff Prevailed On Their Entitlement to <br> the First Claim for Relief For an <br> Accounting, and Damages for Their <br> Second Claim for Relief of Breach of <br> Contract, and Their Third Claim for Relief <br> for Breach of the Implied Covenant for <br> Good Faith and Fair Dealing and That <br> Defendant Never Received a Judgment in <br> its Form and Against Plaintiffs <br> Whatsoever as Mistakenly Stated Within <br> the Court's Latest "Judgment - sections <br> filed under seal | JA008395- <br> JA008922 |  |
| Plaintiffs' Motion to Settle Two (2) <br> Competing Judgments and Orders | 70 | JA011168- <br> JA011210 |  |
| $08 / 06 / 2013$ | Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants <br> Motion for Partial Summary Judgment <br> 7.60 | 17 | JA002830- <br> JA002857 |
| $06 / 21 / 2016$ | Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant, <br> Pardee Homes of Nevada's, Motion to <br> Amend Judgment and Plaintiffs' <br> Countermotion for Attorneys' Fees and | 81 | JA012813- <br> JA013024 |
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| 03/20/2013 | Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiffs Claim for Attorney's Fees as an Element of Damages MIL 1 | 15 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA002359- } \\ & \text { JA002408 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 03/20/2013 | Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants Motion in Limine to Plaintiffs Claim for Damages in the form of compensation for time MIL 2 | 15 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA002409- } \\ & \text { JA002433 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/17/2015 | Plaintiffs' Opposition to Pardee Homes of Nevada's Motion to Amend Judgment and Countermotion for Attorney's Fees | 65-67 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA010203- } \\ & \text { JA010481 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 06/30/2015 | Plaintiffs' Opposition to Pardee's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 57-58 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA008923- } \\ & \text { JA009109 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 06/21/2016 | Plaintiffs' Opposition to Pardee's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 80 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA012625- } \\ & \text { JA012812 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 05/12/2017 | Plaintiffs' Opposition to Pardee's Motion Stay Execution of Judgment and PostJudgment Orders | 88 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA014072- } \\ & \text { JA014105 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/08/2015 | Plaintiffs' Opposition to Pardee's Motion to Retax Costs | 60-61 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA009284- } \\ & \text { JA009644 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 06/20/2016 | Plaintiffs' Opposition to Pardee's Motion to Retax Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs Filed May 23, 2016 | 77-79 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA012183- } \\ & \text { JA012624 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 11/04/2016 | Plaintiffs' Reply Brief in Support of Brief on Interest Pursuant to the Court's Order Entered on August 15, 2016 | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013603- } \\ & \text { JA013612 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 04/23/2013 | Plaintiffs Reply in Further Support of Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint | 16 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA002503- } \\ & \text { JA002526 } \end{aligned}$ |


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| 01/17/2013 | Plaintiffs' Reply in Further Support of Their Counter Motion for Partial Summary Judgment | 13 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA002102- } \\ & \text { JA002144 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 08/02/2016 | Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Countermotion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 84-85 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013358- } \\ & \text { JA013444 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 08/02/2016 | Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 83-84 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013205- } \\ & \text { JA013357 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 01/11/2016 | Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants Consolidated Response to (1) Plaintiffs' Notice of Non-Reply and Non-Opposition to Plaintiff's Opposition to Pardee's Motion to Amend Judgment and Countermotion for Attorney's Fees And (2) Plaintiffs' Supplement to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Pardee's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 69 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA010954- } \\ & \text { JA010961 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/15/2013 | Plaintiffs Reply to Defendants Counterclaim | 17 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA002724- } \\ & \text { JA002731 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 09/11/2015 | Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 68 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA010680- } \\ & \text { JA010722 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 09/11/2015 | Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion Pursuant to NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59 to Amend the Court's Judgment Entered on June 15, 2015 | 68 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA010768- } \\ & \text { JA010811 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 09/11/2015 | Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant's <br> Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Strike <br> "Judgment" Entered June 15, 2015 <br> Pursuant to NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59 | 68 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA010723- } \\ & \text { JA010767 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 04/20/2016 | Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant's Response and Supplement to Plaintiffs' Motion to Settle Two (2) Sets of Competing Judgments and Orders | 71 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA011271- } \\ & \text { JA011384 } \end{aligned}$ |


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| $04 / 27 / 2017$ | Plaintiffs' Response to Pardee's Motion to <br> Stay Execution of Judgment and Post- <br> Judgment Orders | 88 | JA014066- <br> JA014068 |
| $05 / 10 / 2013$ | Plaintiffs Supplement to Motion for Leave <br> to File a Second Amended Complaint <br> Pursuant to the Courts order on Hearing <br> on April 26, 2013 | 16 | JA002627- <br> JA002651 |
| $12 / 08 / 2015$ | Plaintiffs' Supplement to Plaintiffs' <br> Opposition to Pardee's Motion for <br> Attorney's Fees and Costs | 68 | JA010866- <br> JA010895 |
| $09 / 27 / 2013$ | Plaintiffs Supplement to Their Opposition <br> to Defendants Motion for Partial <br> Summary Judgment | $19-21$ | JA002988- <br> JA003203 |
| $07 / 22 / 2013$ | Plaintiffs Supplemental Opposition to <br> Defendants Motion in Limine to Plaintiffs <br> Claim for Damages in the Form of <br> Compensation for Time MIL 2 | 17 | JA002787- <br> JA002808 |
| $10 / 25 / 2013$ | Plaintiffs Trial Brief Pursuant to EDCR <br> 7.27 | 31 | JA004818- <br> JA004847 |
| $06 / 19 / 2015$ | Plaintiffs, James Wolfram and Walt <br> Wilkes' Memorandum of Costs and <br> Disbursements | 52 | JA008159- <br> JA008191 |
| $03 / 16 / 2016$ | Release of Judgment | JA011211- <br> JA011213 |  |
| $01 / 07 / 2013$ | Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's <br> Motion for Summary Judgment | 13 | JA002081- <br> JA002101 |
| $09 / 16 / 2013$ | Reply in Support of Defendant's Motion <br> for Partial Summary Judgment | 17 | JA002858- <br> JA002864 |
| $09 / 16 / 2013$ | Reply in Support of Defendant's Motion in <br> Limine to Exclude Plaintiff's Claim for <br> Attorney's Fees as An Element of <br> Damages | 17 | JA002865- <br> JA002869 |
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| 09/16/2013 | Reply in Support of Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiffs' Claim for Damages in the Form of Compensation for Time | 17 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA002870- } \\ \text { JA002874 } \end{array}$ |
| 07/15/2014 | Reply in Support of Pardee's Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens | 48 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA007560- } \\ & \text { JA007570 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 08/17/2015 | Reply Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Reconsideration | 67 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA010670- } \\ & \text { JA010678 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 11/08/2011 | Scheduling Order | 1 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|l\|} \hline \text { JA000028- } \\ \text { JA000030 } \end{array}$ |
| 06/06/2013 | Second Amended Complaint | 16 | $\begin{array}{\|l} \hline \text { JA002670- } \\ \text { JA002677 } \end{array}$ |
| 04/17/2013 | Second Amended Order Setting Civil Non-Jury Trial | 16 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA002501- } \\ & \text { JA002502 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 12/15/2011 | Stipulated Confidentiality Agreement and Protective Order | 1 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA000033- } \\ & \text { JA000039 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 08/29/2012 | Stipulation and Order to Extend Discovery Deadlines (First Request) | 1 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA000051- } \\ \hline \text { IAOOOn54 } \\ \hline \end{array}$ |
| 06/30/2015 | Supplement to Plaintiffs' Pending Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, Motion to Strike Judgment, Motion Pursuant to NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59 to Amend the Court's Judgment, and Plaintiffs' Opposition to Pardee's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 59 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA009110- } \\ & \text { JA009206 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 09/27/2013 | Supplemental Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment | 21 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA003204- } \\ & \text { JA003209 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/12/2007 | Supplemental Order Regarding Plaintiffs' <br> Entitlement to, and Calculation of, Prejudgment Interest | 88 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA014106- } \\ & \text { JA014110 } \end{aligned}$ |


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| 03/05/2013 | Transcript of Proceedings - March 5, 2013 | 14 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA002211- } \\ \text { JA002350 } \end{array}$ |
| 10/25/2011 | Transcript re Discovery Conference | 1 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA000024- } \\ \text { JA000027 } \end{array}$ |
| 08/27/2012 | Transcript re Hearing | 1 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA000049- } \\ \text { JA000050 } \end{array}$ |
| 04/26/2013 | Transcript re Hearing | 16 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA002527- } \\ \text { JA002626 } \end{array}$ |
| 07/09/2013 | Transcript re Hearing | 17 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA002688- } \\ \text { JA002723 } \end{array}$ |
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Dated this $28^{\text {th }}$ day of February, 2018.

## McDONALD CARANO LLP

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## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of McDonald Carano LLP, and on the $28^{\text {th }}$ day of February, 2018, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was e-filed and e-served on all registered parties to the Supreme Court's electronic filing system:
/s/ Beau Nelson
An Employee of McDonald Carano LLP


LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, FRIDAY, JANUARY 15, 2016

$$
10: 00 \text { A. M. }
$$

THE COURT: Good morning, counsel.
MR. JIMMERSON: Good morning.
MS. LUNDVALL: Good morning, your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you very much for letting
me do this session today. I was in the middle of a triple kidnapping. I thought it was unfair to you and kind of unfair to the Court because $I$ had worked on all this, but $I$ just could not give you the time in the middle of that, so thank you for letting me reset it.

MS. LUNDVALL: I'm hoping it wasn't you that was being kidnapped.

THE COURT: Not at all. We were in the trial for a while, three weeks, but it was one of those cases we were trying to complete before Christmas. We made it, whatever, so we were just out of time. And typical in criminal, you did not know it was going to go forward but it did.

Okay, here's what I've done, I have put these motions in the order that $I$ think they should go in. Bear with me and make sure.

I've gone through them all, but $I$ have broken
them up. I have no idea what the calendar says. I quit looking at it, it was so confusing to me, counsel, so I will start with how I've done the orders so you can kind of follow what the Court's doing.

The first one $I$ have, since some of them were duplicates, $I$ have plaintiffs' motion to strike judgment entered June 15th, 2015, pursuant to NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59 as unnecessary and duplicative orders of final orders entered on June $25 t h, 2$ thousand -- I don't know if that's the right date -- June 25th, 2014, and May $13 t h$, and such that the, that judgment that was entered on the $6 / 15 / 2015$ was punitive -- no, fugitive.

I'm starting with that, because that's a procedural one. To me, that was a little bit easier, so if we want to start with that, and I did look at NRCP 58(a), Mr. Jimmerson.

MR. JIMMERSON: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And I, I will tell you I do agree that we do need a judgment. It does require the entry of a judgment in this case. Convince me otherwise, because $I$ read through all the motions, and $I$ did extensive research as best $I$ could on my own to see, you know, when it came up, Hey, was the, was my order, my findings of fact, conclusions of law order that was entered on 6/25/2014, plus, as we know, the
supplemental one which was required because $I$ had asked for that on the supplemental briefing regarding the future accounting, and that was entered on 5/13/2015, and had this judgment was subsequent, but you tell me.

I do believe under NRCP $58(a)$ that a judgment was required.

MR. JIMMERSON: Right.
THE COURT: Do you agree with me? Or if I'm off, tell me why.

MR. JIMMERSON: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Yes. I want to start there.
MR. JIMMERSON: I do not agree with you, but thank you very much.

THE COURT: So I'm not doing substance. We don't go to the substance yet. I really want to --

MR. JIMMERSON: I read you loud and clear.

THE COURT: I worked very hard to do issue by issue, and I'm sure you feel the same way, because we could be here -- okay, so I want to be very clear on the record I'm not going to the substance, I'm strictly doing it as whether it is, a judgment, would be a fugitive document under NRCP 58(a).

MR. JIMMERSON: Thank you, Judge.
THE COURT: Okay. I'm not trying to be -loud and clear $I$ guess is good.

MR. JIMMERSON: Yes, your Honor, and I
appreciate the direction, and $I$ will speak to that, as you say, and not to the substance.

THE COURT: Right. I'm not there yet.
MR. JIMMERSON: I will comply with the
Court's orders.
We had this trial submitted to you December of 2013. You issued your first order, I believe it was June 25 --

THE COURT: 2014 , yes, my findings of fact, conclusions of law and order.

MR. JIMMERSON: Right. Now, you, you would know what you intended.

THE COURT: Absolutely.
MR. JIMMERSON: I don't, I don't have, you know, the opportunity to go inside your mind what you were thinking, but $I$ know what you produced, and I think the work product that you did evidenced you spent really a lot of time and effort and concern, and, you know, every effort to be fair to both parties and a very good effort to interpret the evidence as you understood it, and you made your findings.

So what you did procedurally is you issued your ruling on June 25, 2013 .

THE COURT: And order.

MR. JIMMERSON: And you addressed all of the issues that were presented by both sides at trial on seven days between October and December 2013. And then we also followed our request, plaintiffs' request for an accounting, which the court granted as part of its findings of fact and conclusions of law of June 25 .

THE COURT: Right.
MR. JIMMERSON: So what we had at that point, in my judgment, was, and my interpretation of what you had done is a final order and judgment. You didn't use the word "judgment."

THE COURT: I did not.

MR. JIMMERSON: Okay. But you used the word
"order" where you have findings of fact, conclusions of law and order that resolves all matters with regards to our breach of contract, our breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and our need for accounting, and you then granted our request which we had made to you in our opening statement and throughout the trial and our closing statements that there be a second proceeding of some sort.

THE COURT: Right. I wanted supplemental
briefing on how we were going to decide, since $I$ granted the accounting, how we can agree this should be done based on the evidence.

MR. JIMMERSON: Exactly.

THE COURT: Absolutely, and that was very
explicit --

MR. JIMMERSON: Right.
THE COURT: -- in my order, because I did not have information at trial on how we could do that --

MR. JIMMERSON: Correct.

THE COURT: -- when $I$ looked through all the evidence. That's very true.

MR. JIMMERSON: But then say I can't read your mind, you would need to tell us whether you intended that to be a final judgment on the monetary issues and the --

THE COURT: I will tell you I did not. I envisioned, and I'm very honest and up front, I envisioned after we did the second one, I expected, after we did the supplemental and we got all that worked out, and that was my second order, I envisioned a final judgment.

MR. JIMMERSON: Okay.
THE COURT: And the reason $I$ wanted that is so both parties would know here's where we're at, and here's, you know, especially in a case like this, and everybody is a very zealous advocate, as we know, and there were a lot of issues. That's why I worked so
hard, you know, I'm not asking for -- I worked so hard. MR. JIMMERSON: I understand.

THE COURT: I'm just saying that's why I
tried to be as explicit as $I$ could in this one, and I envisioned that going into a judgment.

MR. JIMMERSON: All right.
THE COURT: So I did, and that's why I did not put "judgment."

MR. JIMMERSON: Okay.
THE COURT: I'll be honest, I thought about it until $I$ realized $I$ need the supplemental briefing on what we were gonna do on the accounting, and $I$ wanted a judgment under $58(a)$ to have no questions.

MR. JIMMERSON: Right.
THE COURT: And where each party, especially in a case like this, $I$ will tell both of you, since there are future duties based on what Pardee may do in the future, that's why, that's why I did what I did.

And if $I$ would have found enough facts and evidence in what was given at the trial to have done the accounting thing, I would have, but until I ruled on the accounting, I, I looked for -- there was not enough evidence for me to feel comfortable in saying what Pardee should do to comply with that future.

I felt like, and I'll be -- I, I wanted more
information to be able to then complete that part of the order.

MR. JIMMERSON: And we agree, because --
THE COURT: Okay. And that's why. In fact, you agreed because you all worked on it for me very hard.

MR. JIMMERSON: And in the fall of --
THE COURT: I agree both of you worked very
hard to get me that --

MR. JIMMERSON: Okay.
THE COURT: -- supplemental order, and that's why I also didn't put "judgment" on that when it was given to me, can $I$ be very honest, on the one, and you want me to be, 5/13/2015.

MR. JIMMERSON: May 13, yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm telling you in my head that's
why when $I$ had these two, then I did envision a final judgment.

MR. JIMMERSON: Okay.
THE COURT: So we would have one document so both parties would know where we're at, what was owed and what was then -- and then $I$ envisioned after the judgment that we then would have the costs and the attorney's fees and all the post-judgment, so I did, I will be honest.

MR. JIMMERSON: Okay. Well, then you have resolved the matter.

THE COURT: Okay, so that's, that's why. So that was when I --

MR. JIMMERSON: The purpose for our, the purpose for our motion, just so $I$ can complete my statement, was when you did issue your what is called your amendment to findings of fact and conclusions of law, your May 13th, 2015 supplemental order --

THE COURT: Correct.
MR. JIMMERSON: -- that in our judgment completed --

THE COURT: No.

MR. JIMMERSON: -- your decision making relative to facts and law and final order. No one took an appeal from either order, June of '14 or May of 2015, so that became a final order. That is why I did not belief it appropriate for Pardee to submit a judgment as it did in the middle of June.

THE COURT: Right, and why you might not have been looking for it.

MR. JIMMERSON: Well, I wasn't, correct.
THE COURT: I, I have put this all together.
MR. JIMMERSON: Okay.
THE COURT: It's like anything else, I
figured out what happened.
MR. JIMMERSON: If you, as you've been very
clear now to say that no, you did not intend, even with the supplemental amendment of findings of fact, conclusions of law in May of 2015 to have served as the final order of the Court.

THE COURT: Final judgment.
MR. JIMMERSON: Final judgment then.

THE COURT: And that is why did $I$ not put the word "judgment." I thought about it, I mean I did, I addressed it, but $I$ did not for those reasons.

MR. JIMMERSON: Okay.
THE COURT: Because $I$ wanted to have what needed to be done with accounting, and $I$ wanted one document, $a$ judgment, so that both the plaintiffs, especially with these future issues, and Defendant
Pardee would know, especially on a case like this,
here's the document, here's what it means, especially
after this case, when --

MR. JIMMERSON: Right.

THE COURT: -- I wanted to make sure what was done here was explicit for both parties so hopefully you would understand so we don't have any more litigation over this commission agreement.

MR. JIMMERSON: Let me just finish.

THE COURT: That's why I did it that way.

That's why when $I$ got a judgment, $I$ was not, $I$ was expecting it.

MR. JIMMERSON: Got it.

THE COURT: Does that makes sense?

MR. JIMMERSON: It does.
THE COURT: If I hadn't, I would have called both parties and said, $I$ don't expect a judgment.

MR. JIMMERSON: Let me just say that over
many years of litigation, as you have seen as well and opposing counsel, I'm sure, that orders can be
interpreted --

THE COURT: Absolutely.
MR. JIMMERSON: -- as a judgment and as
final --

THE COURT: Absolutely.
MR. JIMMERSON: -- and appealable within the Nevada rules of appellate procedure.

THE COURT: I agree with you.
MR. JIMMERSON: But nonetheless, if this was your intent, then so be it.

THE COURT: I agree with you. That's why -but that was my intent.

And I want you to understand my thought process, so that's why I did that, and my once again my
thought process, $I$ want one judgment so both parties will know here's where we're at, I mean, and make it as explicit -- and that's why $I$ went into as much detail on the findings of fact from my order of 6/25/2014, and that's why $I$ worked diligently with you, as you know, to come up with a supplemental.

And you worked together, $I$ commend both of you, so we could actually resolve that supplemental issue on the accounting, so that's why I wanted a supplemental, and you did, order on findings of fact, okay?

MR. JIMMERSON: Very good.
THE COURT: So based on that, $I$ hope $I$ did it right, $I ' m$ doing them in order here, $I ' m$ denying that just pursuant to NRCP 58(a), that I did envision, I did want a judgment, and that was this Court's intent on this case, okay?

MR. JIMMERSON: Okay.

THE COURT: And I'm not -- okay. So that takes -- I'm gonna put them here in order.

Okay. Then number two, this is plaintiffs' motion pursuant to NRCP 52(b) and 59(a) to amend the Court's judgment entered on June 15th, 2015, to amend the findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment contained therein, specifically referring to the
language included in the judgment at Page 2 , Lines 8 through 13 of the judgment, at Page 2, Lines 18 through 23, to delete the same or amend the same to reflect the true fact that plaintiff prevailed on their entitlement to the first claim for relief for an accounting and damages for their second claim for relief of breach of contract, and their third claim for relief for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and that that defendant never received a judgment in its form and against plaintiffs whatsoever as it mistakenly stated within the Court's latest judgment, and you were referring to the June 15th, 2015, okay.

This is the nuts and bolts. This is where we're going now.

MR. JIMMERSON: Right.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. JIMMERSON: All right, Judge. Thank you.
THE COURT: You're welcome. That's the place to start.

MR. JIMMERSON: As the Court has properly noted, we did not anticipate the need for a third document called "Judgment," which the Court has already discussed with us, and the Court's indicated otherwise that it did want this judgment.

Now, as you saw from the history of this
case, whether it be a good practice or a poor practice, I, personally, do not review many of my emails or any of my emails on a daily basis. I have staff helping me. This became an issue in this case prior to June of 2015 .

In the fall of 2014, the defendant, Pardee, through counsel, submitted a document to me by email only and to myself addressed only and to no other staff which I did not read.

By virtue that we had hearings and I
communicated my objection to that to the Court and my custom and practice of not reviewing email, $I$ wrote correspondence to opposing counsel of Pardee, explaining that and that $I$ wanted to make sure that they added my secretary, who still remains my secretary, Kim Stewart, and the associate assigned to the case at the time, which was Burak Ahmed, and so the defendant clearly knew that sending me an email had a fair chance of not being read based upon its prior experience.

This repeated itself in June of 2015 , as the Court sees. The judgment as proposed by defendant was submitted to me by an email, copied to no one, despite my prior request that it be sent to my secretary, who remained the same, and to the associate on the file.

That was not complied with.
You then received the judgment, and you, like many other fine jurists, pause when you receive a document like that. You don't immediately sign it the next day, not only because you might have many other things to do at that moment, but as a matter of good practice.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. JIMMERSON: You want to make sure that both side have some opportunity to object, to communicate between themselves, you know, to take some action to advise the Court with regard to the propriety of entering such a document.

THE COURT: Well, it's not just, I will tell you right now it's not just good practice, it's the rules of this Court, the rules of this Court from the beginning on this. And $I$ actually have spent a long time, the rules of Department $I V$ have always been, from the beginning, and they were complied with, I looked back in the history, that when there is an order for a -- and $I$ consider a judgment an order, that it is to be signed as to form and content and approved, whoever drafted it, approved by the other, or then my rule is if not, then if someone submits one that has not had the approved to form and content, I am to receive
either a letter or information why, what efforts they made, and if the other side wants to do it, they are to either send me a letter to explain here's why we don't approve it, or send me another proposed.

MR. JIMMERSON: Agreed.
THE COURT: I don't sign orders -- and I
looked back through this case, because that has been my practice since I've been on the bench, since July of 2012, and $I$ looked back, and this case did exactly that, whether it was Ms. Lundvall's firm or whether your firm, gave me the orders, and I looked back all the way from $10 / 23 / 2013$ it was done that way, $1 / 25 / 2013,3 / 14 / 2013,4 / 12 / 2013,5 / 30 / 2013,6 / 5 / 2013$, 7/23/2013, 10/8/2013, 8/14/2014 and 5/13/2015.

The only order other than this judgment of 6/15/2015 that was not approved for form and content is one done by Judge Bonaventure when $I$ was, $I$ think $I$ was at the judicial college that week, but whenever it was, when there was a collection issue that $I$ wasn't here, I did not sign that.

My other ruling is when a senior judge or someone else sits in here, $I$ will not sign their orders unless they either give me a letter or -- because I can't always tell by minutes what exactly happened. That is the only one.

So for the record, this judgment of

6/15/2015, it's not my good practice that $I$ would pause, it didn't comply with the known practice and the standard order of this court that both of you are aware of and you complied with until this one on 6/15.

MR. JIMMERSON: This order --
THE COURT: So $I$ wanted that in the record.

And I looked back to make sure if for some reason $I$ had made a waiver in this case, and $I$ certainly had not.

MR. JIMMERSON: And the Court should --

THE COURT: I wanted that on the record.
MR. JIMMERSON: Thank you.
And the Court should note, of course, that I was not given that opportunity to sign off on this document.

THE COURT: It's my understanding from your affidavit you were not.

MR. JIMMERSON: Correct. They sent me an email that included this document. They knew that $I$ don't read my emails as a matter of course. They then submitted it to you in a day or two following that and you signed it, but on the face of the document the judgment is very clear that $I$ did not sign off on that, and just the face of the document evidences the same.

THE COURT: It does.

MR. JIMMERSON: And what's deeply offensive by Pardee here is that they knew that $I$ don't read this and $I$ had requested them to have them sent to my staff by virtue of there had been an issue in the fall of 2013 in a court hearing we had here in which communication $I$ had directly with Pardee's lead counsel that they include in my staff, which they did not do in the following June.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. JIMMERSON: Now, when I say I can't look into your mind, $I$ want to say that again, but one thing we can say is that this court worked very hard and made rulings in the findings of fact and conclusions of law and order that you would recall, you know as your findings --

THE COURT: Absolutely.
MR. JIMMERSON: And let me say that if you, and $I$ have done this, if you compare your order to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law of the plaintiff and as the defendant, you drew upon both as well as making your own independent findings within this judgment, so it is very clear to me --

THE COURT: I did not adopt your findings.
MR. JIMMERSON: Correct.
THE COURT: And did $I$ not adopt --

MR. JIMMERSON: Correct.

THE COURT: I literally spent a week of my time off, I'm paid a lot, I'm supposed to do that, to do that for you.

MR. JIMMERSON: Exactly.
THE COURT: So don't -- all you have to do is look at your two proposed and you will see that's not what I did.

MR. JIMMERSON: Absolutely right.

THE COURT: And I reviewed all the testimony again, because as you recall, unfortunately after your next week of trial, $I$ had to start the Actos trial.

MR. JIMMERSON: Right.
THE COURT: Hopefully $I$ never have to do that again, I've learned if $I$ do a bench trial I'm not gonna let them back me up, but you learn when things happens.

So I will tell you for the record I read every transcript again. I, wherever I sat, at home, I read every -- because honestly, it's like the trier of fact, $I$ can't remember all of the testimony and it was extensive. And we had that break also, remember,

Mr. Jimmerson?

MR. JIMMERSON: Yes, your Honor, I do.

THE COURT: Okay. So that is true.
MR. JIMMERSON: The point being that you well
know more than opposing counsel or myself your intent
and --

THE COURT: I do.

MR. JIMMERSON: -- your convictions with regard to the entry of findings, conclusions, and the final order that you entered on June 25 th of 2014 as supplemented by your amended findings of May $13 t h$ of 2015 .

Speaking to your findings of fact and conclusions of law and order of June of 2014 , you know, having listened to all the testimony, from opening statements to closing remarks and all the testimony in between, that there was never a claim by the plaintiff for $\$ 1.9$ million in damages that you have found in the judgment that was asserted improperly by Pardee as part of this judgment submitted to you in June and that you signed on that date.

Here specifically what the finding says that we ask pursuant to this motion be stricken or deleted, and as you properly noted, Judge, it's at Page 2, Lines 8 through 17, and again at Page 2 at Lines 18 through 23.

THE COURT: I marked it up. I got it.
MR. JIMMERSON: Plaintiffs' claimed
$\$ 1,952,000$ in total damages related to their causes of
action. Specifically, Plaintiffs' claim $\$ 1,800,000$ in damages related to lost future commissions from Pardee's purported breach of the commission agreement, \$146,500 in attorney's fees incurred as special damages and for prosecuting the action, and $\$ 6,000$ in consequential damages for time and effort expended searching for information regarding what Pardee purportedly owed them under the commission agreement.

And you make the order based on that Lines 18 through 22, It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that judgment is entered against the plaintiffs and for Pardee as to plaintiffs' claim for $\$ 1,800,000$ in damages related to lost future commissions under the commission agreement.

Pardee has not breached the commission agreement in such way, any way in which as to deny plaintiffs any future commissions, and Pardee has paid all commissions due and owing under the commission agreement.

This is a phony assertion of words that are not supported by your findings of fact, conclusions of law, and it's an attempt by them which followed immediately after this for this ridiculous claim for attorney's fees, that somehow they were the prevailing party. You see the dominoes that fall.

THE COURT: Absolutely, I saw the dominoes.

MR. JIMMERSON: So I'm speaking to this --

THE COURT: I worked on it.

MR. JIMMERSON: This is the central issue in all seven motions, and once you resolve this, it will help resolve every other issue.

THE COURT: I'm aware of that. I analyzed it. I'm very aware of that, Mr. Jimmerson. Believe me, I'm aware of that.

MR. JIMMERSON: All right. Judge, I think that Pardee is really acting in bad faith by making this type of a finding and making this kind of order, which would never have been approved by me had $I$ seen it. Let's go through it.

The deposition of James Wolfram that was taken in 2013 just before trial, at page -- it was also taken in 2011. It was two volumes of the deposition of James Wolfram, but reading from the deposition of November 8th, 2011, Page 102 , Ms. Lundvall, on behalf of Pardee, asked Mr. Wolfram, on behalf of the plaintiffs, she said this:

All right. Can you tell me -- I'm reading from Lines 7 through 9 of his deposition.

All right. Can you tell me how much that you believe you've been damaged, sir, and that
you're seeking to recover from Pardee?
Mr. Wolfram: I can't. I don't know enough about what I'm talking about. I don't know enough about what I'm talking about. That's the reason this whole thing has come about. I can't tell you that. I don't have enough information, end of quote.

That's during discovery, and that's Pardee's direct inquiry. It is the only inquiry that Pardee makes with regard to plaintiffs' damages. They never serve any interrogatories, they never serve any requests for production of documents that speak to damages. They never inquire about that.

Nowhere in the opening statement does the defendant speak to $\$ 1.8$ million. Nowhere does the plaintiff speak to $\$ 1.8$ million. The $\$ 1.8$ million only appeared as a number in two places, and 1 will tell you exactly where they are, and none of them are part of the court record in terms of the trial.

The first reference to $\$ 1.8$ million is filed as a 16.1 supplemental disclosure by plaintiff in 2 thousand -- is it '11 -- 2013, that said that if the 30,000 acres were all designated single-family production residential property as defined under the option agreement, and if you were to take a $\$ 40,000$ per
acre, and multiply that over the number of acres that are being built out over the next 40 years, and you multiply that by 1.5 percent, our clients could be entitled to up to $\$ 1.8$ million in damages, period. That's it.

The second time that that number was raised was in our opposition to the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment that was argued and briefed in 2013, which was denied by the Court in denying the defense's motion for summary judgment, where we stated that up to 30,000 acres could lead to future commissions of \$1.8 million.

Neither one of those references were ever introduced into evidence or spoken to you, and $I$ say to you more than anything, and we can talk for seven hours today, but in the next three minutes, you can answer this question.

Did you hear any testimony by the plaintiff or by the defendant or any rebuttal or opposition by the defendant or the plaintiff of any claim of \$1.8 million? The answer is no. How do we know that? Because you start with the opening statement of plaintiff, Mr. Jimmerson, the opening statement of Pardee, Ms. Lundvall. There's not one reference to a claim for future commissions of $\$ 1.8$ million that is
due now. Not anything.

What is said, in fact, to you in our opening statement by myself is we don't know. We're looking for whether or not future commissions are owed. We need the information.

THE COURT: And by "future commissions," you mean if $I$ had agreed that when they change, where -the option property, and if $I$ had agreed with that, that your claim was that they had already, Pardee had already sold to -- bought from CSI, what property that was option property, and that would have been due and owing.

MR. JIMMERSON: Correct.
THE COURT: Under the commission.
MR. JIMMERSON: Right.
THE COURT: So when you say "future," that's not really -- that's, that's -- I don't understand that one, because not future, not for future if they were selling in the future, but may have been owed if, once you got all those documents and all those amendments and we had discussion, $I$ understand it completely, I went through it, you felt like your position was that they had already sold property under that option agreement.

MR. JIMMERSON: Right.

THE COURT: The Court disagreed.

MR. JIMMERSON: Agreed.
THE COURT: I looked at the evidence, but
that's what you were talking about.
MR. JIMMERSON: That's exactly --
THE COURT: Not future, as in future that $I$
would have thought of by this accounting.
MR. JIMMERSON: Correct.

THE COURT: So it wasn't future, so that was very unclear until I --

MR. JIMMERSON: Right.
THE COURT: That was not what it really was,
it was potentially past commissions --
MR. JIMMERSON: You got it.
THE COURT: -- under the commission agreement letter, which I'm, I almost know word for word right now, the commission agreement based on your interpretation, what your interpretation was. I understood it. I read the testimony.

MR. JIMMERSON: Right.
THE COURT: Which I admit, during trial I did not, $I$ did not find that $I$ thought any would be due and owing.

MR. JIMMERSON: I understand.
THE COURT: There was never anything that $I$
-- I don't even remember if $I$ had gone that way how I would have figured an amount out. In fact, when $I$ was looking at it, I'm not gonna go through it, I didn't.

MR. JIMMERSON: Right.
THE COURT: I didn't go there, because I
found that $I$ did not the feel that what $I$ said --

MR. JIMMERSON: Right.
THE COURT: It's in my findings.

MR. JIMMERSON: Right.
THE COURT: I told you my reasoning. I did not feel that there was anything more due and owing.

MR. JIMMERSON: You're correct.
THE COURT: And I felt that they -- that was my choice. I was the trier of fact. I felt that the changes that were done did not make it option property and did not make it something that commissions were -I was very clear, and that was obviously --

MR. JIMMERSON: I'm really glad, I'm really glad that you prepared for today's hearing. You are a hot bench right now. You really know this stuff.

THE COURT: Well, this --
MR. JIMMERSON: So thank you.

THE COURT: I invested so much time for both of you, I felt in my heart. I wanted this right, you know.

This, this is the most distressful thing I've ever gone through, I'll be honest, because, you know, you work so hard, and, you know.

MR. JIMMERSON: Right. So I can explain to you --

THE COURT: It's a tough job. You work so hard because I, as any judge would do, this was so important --

MR. JIMMERSON: So you understand.

THE COURT: -- that this be done right for both of you, very much so. Whether you agree how I do it or not, $I$ certainly have put the time in and am trying very hard to do what's fair for both of you, as I'm supposed to. That's my job.

MR. JIMMERSON: You bet.

THE COURT: I'm not asking that you say, Good Job, Earley, you're doing your job. That is my job. But right or wrong, I will tell you $I$ have invested the time that $I$ know was required, not only for all the motions prior for the trial, but for all of this.

MR. JIMMERSON: Well, this motion certainly is --

THE COURT: You're not having a judge that doesn't get it. I get.

MR. JIMMERSON: This motion is aimed at the
improper insertion of a finding that was not
appropriate. Certainly it was not something the Court
did. The Court found actually otherwise, the reverse
of that, in your order.
Just so you understand, the $\$ 1.8$ million is
based upon a theoretical purchase of all the remaining
property and assuming that all of it's designated by
Pardee as single family over the next 30 years. That's
how you got the $\$ 1.8$ million. This case wasn't about
\$1.8 million. It was exactly what you said.
We believed, which you found differently, but
we believed they only had the right to build within
Parcel 1, and if they went east of Parcel 1 it would be
the exercise of option property.
THE COURT: And that would have been past
damages.
MR. JIMMERSON: Exactly. And the amount of
those acres was unknown to us, because we didn't know
how much was to the east of the line on the east side
of Parcel 1, and that's why we were asking for the
accounting.
Now, you resolved that against the
plaintiffs --
THE COURT: I did.
MR. JIMMERSON: -- and said that there was
enough evidence within the option agreement and its amendments to evidence that Pardee had the right to go horizontally to the east and not vertically to the north within Parcel 1. That's something we obviously didn't agree with, but that was your findings.

THE COURT: That was my findings from looking at the evidence, absolutely.

MR. JIMMERSON: But the important, the pertinent part as a result of that is, as you correctly characterized and analyzed what the issues were, there was never a claim by Jim Wolfram or Walt Wilkes at trial or in their depositions that they had an existing obligation owed to them by Pardee of $\$ 1.8$ million or any number that even resembled such a number.

His only claim for damages when he was asked about that by Pardee's counsel, Ms. Lundvall was, I spent, you know, hours trying to find information. I used $\$ 80$ an hour. The Court awarded $\$ 75$ an hour, and so I'm entitled to $\$ 7,200$. The Court awarded $\$ 6,000$, and then the Court --

THE COURT: That was based on the evidence.
MR. JIMMERSON: Right. And the Court looked upon the testimony that $I$ offered, as provided by the Supreme Court rules, of approximately $\$ 146,500$. The Court awarded $\$ 135,500$, combined for a judgment of
$\$ 141,500$. That's what the Court did. The Court found that there were no further commissions due and owing because the Court found they had the right to build east horizontally. I'm with you.

THE COURT: I was very detailed in my
findings of fact and conclusions of law and order.
MR. JIMMERSON: And the last part of that was, as you know, during the course of the trial and having listened to the testimony of Lash, Andrews, and Whittemore, we double checked the County Commission records and found that they had redesignated a multi-family parcel, Res. 5, if you remember the map.

THE COURT: To single.
MR. JIMMERSON: To single-family production real estate, and you ruled against us again there.

THE COURT: I did.
MR. JIMMERSON: Where you said --
THE COURT: Based on the evidence.
MR. JIMMERSON: -- that the redesignation would not entitle the plaintiffs to those damages.

THE COURT: Right.
MR. JIMMERSON: And as you've seen in both the proposed findings that the plaintiffs submitted as well as the testimony that Res. 5 was in the ballpark of a 50 acre parcel which you could you multiply times

40,000 times $1 / 2$ would be about a $\$ 30,000$ commission. And we didn't know what that would be, that would be something you would take up in the second part of the trial, accounting trial, which was obviated by the Court's ruling that they could redesignate.

THE COURT: I agree with that. I agree with that in the record, yes, I do.

MR. JIMMERSON: So what $I$ have to say to you is sort of like this: If you stick to your guns with regard to your findings of fact and conclusions of law and order, then you can clearly see how Defendant Pardee has misled the Court and has inserted a finding that led to an order that somehow they prevailed in this case is completely a mischaracterization and distortion of this trial.

I want to go further, because there's just nothing -- again, it's just a preposterous suggestion. Judge, in the opening statement by either party, no one raises the $\$ 1.8$ million. Number two, nobody ever claims that that's been done, because the $\$ 1.8$ million on its face is a hypothetical calculation of if 30,000 acres of option property in the next 35 years from the time of trial were exercised, that would be a possible commission due to the plaintiff.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. JIMMERSON: That's all, but everybody understood that that wasn't the case. The case here was for information. The breach of contract was failure to give information. The first claim was for an accounting. The second claim was for breach of contract, not for money damages due and owing, but for information, and the third is the breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

So all I'm gonna try to say to you is this, You have the affidavit of plaintiffs' lead counsel who says 90 percent of our time was devoted to defeating their claim for $\$ 1.8$ million. Well, first of all, if you just calculate the amount of time that they charged their client, as evidenced by their bills through the time in 2013 when this fifth disclosure was made, they already had 20 percent of their time already expended, so it couldn't be 90 percent, but beyond that, when you look at the entries of their, the specific entries within their billings, you don't see any reference to \$1.8 million. It's just a phony claim.

What they won in your finding was that there was no present commissions due to the plaintiffs beyond what had been paid because the court found that it had the right, Pardee had the right to build east horizontally and to, and that, at least in the first

Parcel Map 1, would have been option property. I got it.

THE COURT: You can disagree, but --
MR. JIMMERSON: Right. But that certainly
does not obviate the need and the obligation of Pardee to pay a future commission in the event they, in the future, by additional property, designate it single-family production residential property, and that would entitle the plaintiffs to additional commission.

In fact, you remember the testimony of Jon Lash was that the next purchase by Pardee of option property will be a commissionable event owed to the plaintiffs.

THE COURT: And that's why we have the supplement.

MR. JIMMERSON: Exactly.
THE COURT: To say if they do it, you'll have the information, you'll be on the same page, and you'll know that it was option property that was pursuant to the commission agreement.

MR. JIMMERSON: The findings --
THE COURT: I understand that.

MR. JIMMERSON: The findings of fact,
conclusions of law of yourself that was entered in
June --

Loree Murray, CCR \#426 District Court IV

THE COURT: June 25th, 2014, right.
MR. JIMMERSON: It makes no reference to a \$1.8 million and makes no reference to the defendant Pardee prevailing at all. I know you have but $I$ did it again, of course in preparation, read every single finding of fact and conclusions of law of your findings of fact, conclusions of law order, and you will find the following:

One, that an accounting is warranted. The first claim for relief by the plaintiffs is warranted, and there will be an accounting that we will determine how to do that by briefs 60 days from then, and that there was an entitlement to accounting because of the special relationship that existed between the plaintiffs and Defendant Pardee because of the reliance and the need, you know, and control that the plaintiffs needed of the defendants and the defendant's control of all the information that would be able to be and was required by contract to be provided the plaintiffs that hadn't been provided.

And third, that there had been an intentional bad faith withholding of information, particularly as it related to designation of property that the defendant owed to the plaintiffs, and therefore, the plaintiffs were entitled to accounting and we will do
so by supplemental brief.
That's your findings with regard to the first claim.

You have to understand from this case, and I know you do, this was never a case of plaintiffs are entitled to commissions in the amount of blank dollars. Read the complaint, read the second -- first amended complaint and the second amended complaint, they all say the same thing, the breach of contract is the failure to provide the information that this special relationship and superior knowledge that Pardee had, and we don't know whether or not there's additional monies due and owing, and if there is we want them to be paid to us but we need that information. And that was consistent throughout the case. You couldn't have found a more conservative complaint by any plaintiff against any defendant.

These plaintiffs are taking on the behemoth of Pardee. They filed a complaint because they had written four or five letters beforehand requesting the information and they were not provided it.

Mr. Lash independently tells Chicago Title not to give information to Mr. Wolfram, and the Court makes that finding within its orders. So when you look at that, you have your Court's specific findings,
plaintiff prevails as to the accounting.
Second claim for relief, breach of
contracted, granted. I find that there was a contract, I find that the duties of the plaintiffs have been fully satisfied, I find the duties of the defendant were not satisfied and that they did not provide the information required to do so, and $I$ find in favor of the plaintiffs.

What damages do I award? I award the special damages pursuant to Sandy Valley of the time and effort of Mr. Wolfram pursuant to decisional law both in California and elsewhere that allows for that in the modest amount of $\$ 6,000$, and $I$ allow $\$ 135,500$ in attorneys fees out of $I$ think we requested about $\$ 146,000$ in attorney's fees, that I'm satisfied is directly and devoted and required only as the result of the failure of the defendant to provide the information it was obliged to do, and that's the judgment, \$141,500 plus interest as we go forward.

That's your findings on breach of contract, and you were very specific to find there was a breach, and you find the bad faith of the defendant with regard to the failure to provide this information.

The third claim for relief, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, you
find breach of that. There was certainly a covenant that ran with this contract, and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing was not complied with by Pardee, I find a breach and $I$ find the same damages of $\$ 141,500$, and you have entered the order that says so, and then you have the accounting in 60 days.

So I want you to know how preposterous, it's
the only word $I$ thought of it can be, you know. I could be melodramatic. I don't want to do that. I want to be as professional as we all can be, but it's a preposterous claim this be inserted into a complaint. You don't make any findings, any findings that the defendant prevailed. You don't make any findings that's in this judgment that says that the court has ordered judgment in favor of defendant and against the plaintiff on this issue at all. It's not referenced anywhere. Why? Because it was not an issue tried at trial.

I have gone back and have provided to you in this record the proposed --, the opening statements -well, I've given you the entire transcript. We have the entire transcript. It's part of the record, the entire transcript. There's not one word of \$1.8 million or the plaintiffs' claim for \$1.8 million. and therefore, your Honor, you should enter a judgment
in favor of us to say that we defeated them on that issue.

In the opening statement of Pat Lundvall doesn't reference one thing about, you know, your Honor, the plaintiffs are making a claim of $\$ 1.8$ million, and you need to make a finding against them. That wasn't an issue, because it was a theoretical mathematical calculation of all the rest of the 30,000 acres, all of it being designated as single-family production real estate, and all of it being built out for the next 35 years at the time of trial. Everybody understood that, and the testimony of Jim Wolfram from his deposition first given in 2011 right through the present evidenced that.

My opening statement is recorded in our briefs. It simply states, Judge, this is a case about a need for information and the damages that followed therefor.

The trial, at the trial Mr. Wolfram took the witness stand on two different occasions, Mr. Wilkes went one time, and the court may remember the difficulty that Mr. Wolfram had on the first day in terms of some of the questions that were asked, but he was on the stand for many, many hours. At no time did plaintiffs' counsel -- excuse me, defendant's counsel,
let alone plaintiffs' counsel, but certainly at no time did defendant's counsel ask a single question about \$1.8 million. At no time was Mr. Wolfram asked a question like: Are you claiming today that you were entitled to lost commissions of $\$ 1.8$ million? That was not asked. It's not part of this case. It was simply a theoretical calculation of what could be owed in the event of all this happening in the next 35 years, not what's going on in 2013 when this case was tried, not one question about that by Pardee's counsel, not one question of Mr. Wilkes with regard to that.

There is no evidence, there is no exhibit that references $\$ 1.8$ million. There is no entry of time by Jimmerson Hansen by McDonald's Carano that references $\$ 1.8$ million.

This case was about whether or not the defendant had breached its duty to provide information and whether or not it owed to the plaintiff an accounting for that information. That's what this case is. And it was hotly contested, as the Court indicated, and there was a lot of, you know, intense work, and it was very, the best way to describe it, a hotly contested case, but at no time did the defendant at any time make reference to plaintiffs' alleged claim of $\$ 1.8$ million, because plaintiff never made that
claim in any complaint, any amendment to that complaint and any document. There's not one piece of information introduced in evidence or argued to you orally that references that.

THE COURT: Right.
MR. JIMMERSON: So when $I$ saw this judgment here in June of 2015, having not been given the opportunity to sign off on it as the court's standard rule would require, $I$ moved to strike this document specifically, as it found your finding plaintiffs' claim $\$ 1,950,000$ in total damages.

Judge, none of the findings of fact and conclusions of law of either side, plaintiff or defendant, makes any reference to this, nor, as I mentioned before, was there any interrogatories or requests for production of documents or requests for admissions or any use of depositions, Rules $30,33,34$, 36 ever promulgated by the defendant on this issue of alleged entitlement to \$1.8 million.

And you have your own recollection, which is the most important. Did the plaintiff ever make a claim during the course of this trial for $\$ 1.952$ million? The plaintiffs claim $\$ 1,952,000$ in total damages, that was a lie. That's untrue. And you heard the trial.

THE COURT: I did.
MR. JIMMERSON: That has no basis to be part of this judgment.

And then what they say is: It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that judgment is entered against plaintiffs and for Pardee. Read your findings of fact and conclusions of law.

THE COURT: I did.

MR. JIMMERSON: Is there any entry of any judgment against the plaintiffs in those findings? No. It is concocted. Why is that? Because there's an ulterior motive by Pardee. Pardee is trying to find a way to get their attorney's fees back.

They expended an extraordinary amount of money, $\$ 550,000$ they claim in this case, and they want 90 percent of it returned to them because they prevailed on a claim that didn't exist, that you never heard, that they introduced no evidence on somehow so they would have the basis to make this claim. And then what happens after this judgment is entered? They filed a motion for attorney's fees which you will rule upon today or in the future.

And then based upon this alleged finding that plaintiffs claim $\$ 1,952,000$ or $\$ 1.8$ million in damages related to lost future damages, and therefore a
judgment is entered, it is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that judgment is entered against the plaintiffs and for Pardee as to plaintiffs' claim for $\$ 1,800,000$ in damages related to lost future commissions under the commission agreement, that can't possibly be, because as you properly stated, we don't know what purchases Pardee is going to make from CSI in the future for the next 35 years, so how could we possibly have won a claim that's going to be over the next 35 years when everyone in this courtroom will be dead?

Please understand that was the whole purpose of this judgment, because how is Sharon or Jim's children going to follow what's going on in the next 35 years?

Now, we had no idea about the transfer of Weyerhaeuser and all the other things and the litigation with the Seeno brothers that may have affected the future events, but as we tried this case, nobody was asking for $\$ 1.8$ million or the like.

So then they enter order is against
plaintiffs for Pardee as to plaintiffs' claim for $\$ 1,800,000$ in damages. We never made that claim. There's not a document to support that. There is not one piece of testimony about it. What can $I$ say? The words $\$ 1.8$ million or a claim for anything like that, a
million dollars, 1.3 , 1.5 was never referenced in this trial.

I reviewed the trial transcript. It's not
there. I reviewed the opening statements by both parties. It's not there. I reviewed the findings of fact proposed by both of parties. It's not there.

So you tried this case. You know it was not
there, and so your, you know, your entry of this judgment based upon, as $I$ understand, your receiving this judgment from the defense counsel for Pardee, waiting some time to hear from the Jimmerson Law Firm, having heard nothing you entered the judgment.

THE COURT: I will clear up the record on exactly what happened there.

MR. JIMMERSON: I don't know.
THE COURT: I know, so I will put everything on the record.

MR. JIMMERSON: That's fine.
THE COURT: The record for you is you did not approve this and you did not see it, and that's what you're saying as a matter of law.

MR. JIMMERSON: That's exactly right.
THE COURT: I mean as an officer of the Court, and that's fine, and I --

MR. JIMMERSON: Regardless, regardless of
that, Judge, is it an improper finding.

THE COURT: I understand we went the next
step, which is substance-wise, does that judgment actually reflect my findings of fact and conclusions of law - -

MR. JIMMERSON: You got it.
THE COURT: -- and order that was entered on 6/25/2014 and the subsequent one on 5/13/2015, I understand.

MR. JIMMERSON: And I would submit that it does not.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. JIMMERSON: Now, the balance of the judgment, although it wouldn't be how $I$ would have written it, but it does say that judgment in favor of the plaintiffs against Pardee on causes of action breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and the accounting. Listen, Judge, there was never a claim for $\$ 1.8$ million. That's my point.

THE COURT: I understand your position
exactly.
MR. JIMMERSON: I don't want to repeat myself.

THE COURT: You don't have to.

MR. JIMMERSON: In your own findings you
granted plaintiffs as the prevailing parties and
against the defendant, 141,500. That's fine.
Let me turn to the next page of the judgment.
THE COURT: I got it.
MR. JIMMERSON: And it concludes -- I guess
that's it, right?
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. JIMMERSON: Am I missing a page?
THE COURT: It's three pages. I've got it
here.
MR. JIMMERSON: All right. And then you
referenced the need for the accounting and going
forward.
THE COURT: And it incorporated, $I$ mean
incorporated my order of May 13th, 2015.
MR. JIMMERSON: Exactly. Exactly. So that's
that.
THE COURT: I'm very familiar with this
judgment.
MR. JIMMERSON: Now, because you really have
prepared for this, I'm so grateful for that, because
two years have passed and it's easy to miss some of the
nuances and minor details, which is understandable, but
having gone back, you will understand, you know,
otherwise $I$ was prepared, am prepared, I'm sure counsel will do the same on behalf of the defendant, $I$ can walk you through every single trial exhibit. Your Honor remembers the --

THE COURT: I am very aware of the trial exhibits.

MR. JIMMERSON: There's no reference to it. There's no evidence of plaintiffs claiming $\$ 1.8$ million.

THE COURT: I understand.
MR. JIMMERSON: There's no ability, there was never an ability of plaintiff to make that claim because first of all, they didn't have the information. Didn't know what they were entitled to, and more importantly, we knew that they had only built out on 511 acres. You'll remember the first one was 1,500 acres. The second amendment in March of 2005 was 511 acres, everything else being option property, so my point is we knew that they hadn't built out, you know, 10,000 acres, you know, you can drive out there and know that, but we were claiming that they had built east beyond where they were entitled to exercise option property.

THE COURT: Right. I understand what you were claiming.

MR. JIMMERSON: But because you understand
what we were claiming, you know that judgment was never entered by you in favor of Pardee and against the plaintiffs. It's just a fiction. And what's so unhappy and unfortunate about it is what happens then is that then becomes the basis for the request for attorney's fees which should be denied as well, as we'll discuss today.

With that deletion, you have from your own findings a very clear point: Plaintiffs prevailed on its claim for accounting, plaintiffs prevailed on its claim for breach of contract for information and the damages and the special damages under Sandy Valley, and by the way, and Liu, which you had read. They make a motion to set aside, claiming you didn't read Liu. You cited Liu in your conclusions of law.

THE COURT: I'm very aware of that,
Mr. Jimmerson. I read that case. I found it on my own in between the trial and when -- because there was the delay of the Actos trial.

MR. JIMMERSON: And you make reference to it in your findings, and when you read Liu, it clarifies, and the Morgan case and it makes it clear that there are other situations in which attorney's fees can serve as special damages and reversed the trial Court's
denial of that in the Liu case, and my point is that you were very much aware of that issue.

So when you have no evidence, no claim of the plaintiffs for $\$ 1.8$ million, there's not a document -one thing that the defendant didn't do, as an example, in the only two references to $\$ 1.8$ million, they didn't introduce that into evidence. They didn't introduce our disclosures. They didn't introduce the opposition for the motion for summary judgment. They didn't introduce any of that. That's not part of this record. All that is is a theoretical calculation about what might happen in the next 35 years if Pardee were to complete its purchase and its rights under this option agreement to buy the last 30,000 acres less what was being taken down.

I don't know what to say to you, Judge. This was wrongly-filed judgment. It should be stricken as to those points. And when it comes to the issue of who prevailed in this case, it's just not close.

When you have these arguments, it's just, you know, it's disappointing that Pardee would put the plaintiffs under the knife to have to respond to this stuff, all these motions, when you know what happened in this trial more than anyone, and $I$ call upon you to recall that, and $I$ know plaintiffs will be served well
by that recollection.

Thank you, ma'am.
THE COURT: All right, Ms. Lundvall?
MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, let me start with a preface, and it is based upon the argument and the exchange you just had with Mr. Jimmerson.

THE COURT: Okay, because $I$ would like to start with the first argument on this, on what happened with this judgment and why the standing order of Department IV was not complied with, because I had pieced it together, but maybe you can give -- what I think happened based on me speaking and understanding from staff members, but $I$ would like an explanation. Why was the standing order of Department IV not complied with as far as the judgment that was entered 6/15/2015, because you agree it was not approved by Mr. Jimmerson as to form and contented, correct?

MS. LUNDVALL: I would.

THE COURT: So please, I really do want to know this. Why did you not follow that?

MS. LUNDVALL: All right, so let me, as far as --

THE COURT: Let's do that before we get to substance, because that is very, very critical to this Court.

MS. LUNDVALL: All right. You entered your
findings of fact and conclusions of law first on
June 25th of 2015.

THE COURT: I got that.
MS. LUNDVALL: All right, so in that --
MR. JIMMERSON: I think it was 2014,
Ms. Lundvall.
THE COURT: It's 2014. 6/25/2014.
MS. LUNDVALL: If that's not what I said, I misspoke and my apologies.

All right. In that findings, you requested supplemental briefing.

THE COURT: Absolutely.
MS. LUNDVALL: Okay. So we did the supplemental briefing.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MS. LUNDVALL: And in your supplemental briefing you issued a minute order, and that minute order found exactly in the briefing that Pardee had submitted to you, incidentally.

THE COURT: Right. You submitted, I agree you submitted the order 5/13. Well, I filed it 5/13/2015, and it was signed according to Department IV's -- correct?

MS. LUNDVALL: Correct.

THE COURT: I mean do you agree with me on
the record, you prepared it and it does have

Mr. Jimmerson's reviewed and approved as to form and content, correct?

MS. LUNDVALL: In your minute order, you expressly informed us to work with Mr. Jimmerson.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. LUNDVALL: So as to submit an order.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. LUNDVALL: That was both approved as to
form and content by --
THE COURT: Right.
MS. LUNDVALL: By Mr. Jimmerson.
THE COURT: And that is part of my standing order, all right.

MS. LUNDVALL: And that's what we did.

THE COURT: No problem.
Then what happened on the June 15th, 2015
judgment? Why did you not comply? Why was it not -- I mean why was it not either -- there's a section for approved, and if you -- you either get his approval, or the second thing that happens in this department, send a cover letter saying you sent an email to Mr. Jimmerson on this date, it has been so many days, he has not responded, and so we're submitting it, you
know, without his form and content because he has not responded? That was not done, correct?

MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, from our
perspective --
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MS. LUNDVALL: -- your standing order applies to, and as $I$ read it, it applies to orders.

THE COURT: Oh, my goodness, are you gonna
say to me -- oh, Ms. Lundvall, are you gonna literally stand there to me and say, Judge, it doesn't apply to judgments?

MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor?

THE COURT: Is that your, is that your position?

MS. LUNDVALL: What my understanding of your standing order is, is that when we come before the Court and we have contested hearings, and, in fact, that you instructed Pardee by which then to prepare the order.

THE COURT: No, no, no. I had a standing order to do that and you know it.

Are you saying it's your understanding that every time if $I$ don't do the order, that you don't do it?

MS. LUNDVALL: No. I'm saying --

THE COURT: Because I'm consistent on that because it's a standing order. I usually try to put it in the minutes. If not, I will tell you that is a standing order, has been from day one.

MS. LUNDVALL: And --

THE COURT: So I want -- so you did not -well, you did email it to him.

MS. LUNDVALL: I --

THE COURT: Correct?

MS. LUNDVALL: I sent a letter to the Court, the copy of the judgment, and we copied Mr. Jimmerson on that letter, and so to the extent that we had no ex parte communication with the court, we weren't trying to slide something under his nose.

THE COURT: Oh.

MS. LUNDVALL: Moreover, this Court would have called me on something that, in fact, if $I$ had prepared an order that was not reflective of your findings of fact.

THE COURT: And I would have done it on a judgment too if -- and let me tell you what happened then, because $I$ have a recollection of this.

MS. LUNDVALL: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: Because - -

MS. LUNDVALL: And so do I.

THE COURT: I'm sure you do.

MS. LUNDVALL: What I'm trying to do is try
to explain to the court what it is that we had did.
THE COURT: Done.

My understanding, okay, you submitted it. I did not see the letter, but sometimes it goes to my law clerk.

MS. LUNDVALL: We have a copy of the letter that was appended as one of the exhibits then to our opposition to his motion, and that letter was transmitted to you, and it was copied to Mr. Jimmerson, and so there should be no question about the fact that he was aware of what we were submitting to the court.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. LUNDVALL: And so from that perspective, the accusation that $I$ somehow had ex parte communications with the Court, that somehow I was gonna try to pull the wool over your eyes, and that, moreover, somehow you allowed yourself to have the wool pulled over your eyes --

THE COURT: Oh, no, I did not, I was not asleep at the trigger. I love that expression, I was not, but $I$ will tell you what $I$ was asleep at, $I$ was asleep at $I \quad--I$ would never -- judgment is the same as an order. I have a standing order here, and $I$ want
to put in the record what exactly occurred.
This was given to me by my law clerk at the
time. I said, Where's the approval for form and content, I'm not even looking at it without approval to form and content. It was given back. This is why there was a time delay.

Then $I$ said not only do you -- I want approval as to form and content, I also want to make sure that it is in compliance with my orders of 5/13/2015 and my findings of fact of 6/25/2014, because that's my standing order.

I will tell you it came back to me, and I don't know, and $I$ will tell you exactly what happened. It did not have that. I said, No, I will not sign this. In fact, I actually, and $I$ will tell you for the record, was very uncomfortable with some of these sections on Page 2, because $I$ thought, Wait a minute, and I, I'm gonna be very honest here, that's why $I$ want it to form and content, to make sure, because I, I looked at the some of this, I go, Wait a minute, and I was -- and $I$ don't know if my staff person either misunderstood, because it was -- misunderstood a communication or was misinformed, $I$ don't know Ms. Lundvall, and $I$ was told before $I$ signed it, No, Mr. Jimmerson was aware, and maybe it was my fault, I
didn't cross-examine and do the next question and say, And does he have any objection?

Because I, for the record, once -- once again, if he's aware, and my idea of "aware" is he has reviewed it and gotten back with the person who's proposing it and has no objections. That's how I understood it, because that's how -- I mean the frustration is $I$ so, $I$ so go by that rule, Ms. Lundvall.

And the one time I didn't, you know, I fell asleep at my own procedure and not saying, You know what, $I$ want this in writing, but I usually, if it is done this way, $I$ want it in writing.

I'll be honest, because it was you and Mr. Jimmerson and $I$ have such high respect, I felt like it must have been, he must have been aware of it and said to you, I'm fine, or $I$ would not have signed it.

And I'm telling you, as a judge, I take responsibility that $I$ did not enforce my procedure and get it in writing. I took oral information from my staff. I have to own that, and I own that, and I, I will tell from my -- I'm not perfect. I'm obviously not perfect. I try to have procedures, and you know why, so things like this will not happen.

I mean the repercussions from this, I own
that. I accepted information that it had been approved, and I will tell you never again. I have a new standing -- I will not even look at orders. They are not even given to me, after this incident, unless I have it approved to form and content or $I$ have either competing orders or a letter from both sides saying, Here's what we disagree with, so that $I$ can put it together, because this is exactly what happens.

So I don't know what happened. I will tell
you I never got the cover letter, which can happen, you know. What's given to me is the order, and I don't even know what's in the cover letter. What's given to me is the order.

What my distress is about and I own, I did not enforce my procedure. My frustration thing is that I do rely on people to comply with the standing order, and I'm very frustrated. I'm very, I don't know, I don't know what happened, but $I$ will tell you I don't make a distinction on something like a judgment.

To me this is so critical, Ms. Lundvall, after all the work we did on this trial, all the work we did on all those motions, and I'll be honest, all the work this Court did to really do what $I$ felt was fair on the findings of fact, conclusions of law and order and the supplemental envisioning -- and I agree
with you, it should be in a judgment. That's why seeing a judgment did not surprise me, it's the content that this would have happened, you know.

So your thought was I didn't -- you felt like if a cover letter came to me that you sent it to him, then it was up to the court to call and see if he had, and also Mr. Jimmerson to call us, right, or call you?

MS. LUNDVALL: Precisely, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. LUNDVALL: We had taken your orders and we had reduced them then to a judgment.

THE COURT: No, your version of the judgment, I can see that very much.

MS. LUNDVALL: And so from that perspective, and we sent those then along with the cover letter to the Court explaining what it was that we had done.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. LUNDVALL: And we, and we had copied that letter to Mr. Jimmerson, so to the extent that there's an accusation that somehow, that we did something in bad faith, that we were trying to have --

THE COURT: I don't find that at all, that's why I said I own the responsibility. I can see very well why $I$ had those standing orders, and let me tell you, nobody in Department $I V$ is gonna get an order
after what happened here that does not have -- which has been my standing order from day one.

I guess I, I'm a little distressed that you would think somehow a judgment, which to me has even more final implications than an order, would not, I will be honest. And $I$ was a practicing lawyer out there like you are, and to me this is a more, I don't want to say critical, but this has --

MR. JIMMERSON: Sacred.
THE COURT: I'm thinking of my word.
This to me is even more, I'll say critical that $I$ have an agreement between the parties, or if not, then $I$ pull on -- because especially this kind of case of what should be in the judgment, because this is what both of you are gonna go to in the future when this case hopefully is off my docket, and I'll miss you two, come back, when this case is gone and these people have finality and this client has finality, what you're gonna be -- what the critical thing I think I started this whole thing about is the judgment much more than -- that's why I didn't look at these as -- so to me this is even more critical that $I$ have my rule of findings of facts, conclusions of law approved to form and content.

No, I will tell you, Ms. Lundvall, I don't
think you did anything devious. I truly believe you have -- I read all your stuff. You truly believe and you have a right, $I$ mean, to believe that. You think this was appropriate. You have a legal -- I'm not saying you don't, okay? I worked on this a long time, and $I$ want both people to understand that.

I feel like you felt and you defended this, that you felt you did have a legal basis.

I, you know, I agree.
MS. LUNDVALL: All right.

THE COURT: I'm not saying you were in bad faith. What I'm saying is my frustration is that I felt like my -- and $I$ don't know how I got the misinformation, because $I$ did not fall asleep at the switch, $I$ was concerned that this judgment was approved by both of you. That's what -- and the reason $I$ do that then is then once $I$ have your approval, and that's why I do it, then $I$ can make sure that I'm comfortable with it.

Does that makes sense? And so --
MS. LUNDVALL: Then let's move on to the next point.

THE COURT: I want you to know that was distressful to me, $I$ will tell you that, and I'm gonna make it very clear to your firm and to any firm that
comes in here that a judgment, to me, is anything that you want me to sign, whether it's an order, and I consider a judgment an order, it has to be approved to form and content.

And $I$ can tell you now, $I$ won't $--m y$ law clerk will not even give them to me now, because, you know, they go through it all before for me to do it easier with that, or $I$ have to have competing orders or letters explaining it, so that was distressful.

So I understand you felt like -- okay, I just wanted that for my own edification, because I'll be honest, I was distressed. And I own that I didn't enforce my policy, and $I$ accepted an oral, which, you know, $I$ own that responsibility.

So I don't feel like you did it devious, I'm just angry that $I$ did not enforce my own rules, and $I$, I let something that $I \quad--I$ got a misunderstanding, and I don't know where it came from, and I'm not -- I don't know, so I'm certainly not going to go after that.

So, okay, that explains to me, at least
somewhat, why it wasn't to form and content, okay.
MS. LUNDVALL: All right.
THE COURT: So now let's go to the substance, right, of why you feel this is appropriate.

MS. LUNDVALL: So let's go to the next point
though as far as even before we get to the substance. THE COURT: Okay.

MS. LUNDVALL: And that would be this, as the Court is well advised: That even if the attorneys bring an order to you, and even if there is approved to form and content --

THE COURT: I don't have to sign it.
MS. LUNDVALL: That's right, you don't have to sign it.

THE COURT: Heck no.

MS. LUNDVALL: You've got to do your own job, and you've already said you've done your job and that you reviewed this judgment and that you signed it, and that, in fact, you made it yours, no matter who drafted it and no matter who approved it and who --

THE COURT: Oh, I understand I had the
judgment. I understand I signed it, if that's what you're saying to me, yes.

MS. LUNDVALL: And so from that perspective, we respectfully submit that you did not fall asleep on the job, as it was suggested by Mr. Jimmerson, so let's look then at the substance.

MR. JIMMERSON: I never said that.

MS. LUNDVALL: And $I$ want to start by the very comment and the exchange that you had with

Mr. Jimmerson.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. LUNDVALL: You exchanged with him the fact that if you had agreed with his theory about the purchases of option property, then there would have been monies that would have been due and owing.

THE COURT: If $I$ had had the testimony.
MS. LUNDVALL: If you --
THE COURT: If I'd had the testimony, which I didn't.

MS. LUNDVALL: And it was --

THE COURT: And you know what $I$ was gonna do, Ms. Lundvall, $I$ was gonna then have to do an accounting for it because $I$ had absolutely no-- I didn't get to there, because $I$ had no information on what it would have been.

MS. LUNDVALL: Precisely. He set up his case in a two-part step. He set up his case alleging two different forms of breach of contract. The first --

THE COURT: I agree, two different theories of liability.

MS. LUNDVALL: Yes.

THE COURT: For the breach.

MS. LUNDVALL: Two different theories of liability. One is that there were purchases of option
property, and therefore, that there would be commissions that were due and owing.

His second theory was that there was insufficient information that was given to the plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Okay, I would reverse that.
MS. LUNDVALL: All right.
THE COURT: In fairness, the first theory,
when you look at the first, he didn't even have -- and let's be fair here, his first claim was to get information because of those amendments that were missing, as we know. We all went through them. Was it eight of them?

MR. JIMMERSON: It was eight.
THE COURT: Okay. And you had given, this is my recollection of the testimony, one and two but not -- some of them but not all of them prior to the case, so when you look at the case, he did the accounting and he did the original claim for breach because they didn't have information to find out if any more was due and owing. Once through discovery the amendments came and the different information came, only through discovery in this case, then he looked at the amendments and then said, Wow, I feel I have another -there may be in his mind, if $I$ had done what his theory
was on what options, because there were facts that they were not aware of. He was not aware of any of that before he filed the lawsuit, don't you agree, Ms. Lundvall? He was not aware of the facts on moving easterly on the option, that theory, or he wasn't aware that they had sold, you know, first was it multi-family and then changed them -- well, yes, it was, remember, to multi and then single family, but I didn't find them single-family detached residential property, as you know.

So I look at the case, I'll be honest, it was definitely a claim to get information, and then once he got the information, whether, based on that commission agreement, he had any other claims. I truly believe that, that this how it happened.

MS. LUNDVALL: And you, as far as discussed with him in the course of this very hearing that if $I$ had agreed with your theory concerning the purchases of option property, then, in fact, there would have been additional commissions that were due and owing.

THE COURT: Past ones. Not future, past
ones.
MS. LUNDVALL: And he acknowledged that and he admitted that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. LUNDVALL: And so to the extent though, the point being made here is he lost on that.

THE COURT: He lost on a theory of liability, but he didn't lose on a claim. That doesn't -- and you're trying to say that because he lost on that, that makes you the prevailing party?

MS. LUNDVALL: Let me as far as see if $I$ can as far as initially, because one, just because one of the things that $I$ wanted to do then is to be able to walk the Court then through the history then of this case, so the Court --

THE COURT: Oh, okay. I'm aware of it, but I would be glad to be walked again.

MS. LUNDVALL: Well, what $I$ want to do is to make sure that you understand that his theory and he was asking for money damages from the very beginning until all the way to the end, and he lost on that theory, your Honor. And the point that we had tried to make is that that loss on that theory, the flip side of that is a win to Pardee.

THE COURT: No. You have to say the win makes you the prevailing party over him being the prevailing party over the other claims.

MS. LUNDVALL: So what I'm trying to do is to stick as far as to this motion to amend.

THE COURT: Okay. So you're abandoning this $\$ 1.8$ million case?

MS. LUNDVALL: Absolutely not, your Honor, because one of the things you're gonna see as far as all the way through is they asked for money damages, they quantified that amount at 1.8 , and --

THE COURT: Okay. No, I agree, if you're saying, -- so you feel the quantify of what they wanted for damages was 1.8 million, and you're gonna show me where the evidence came in in trial and how that was argued at trial, right?

MS. LUNDVALL: So, in fact, let's start with their complaint.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. LUNDVALL: Their complaint alleged that there was a financial relationship, that pursuant to the commission letter that they were to be paid a commission, and they prayed for compensatory damages in excess of $\$ 10,000$.

THE COURT: We all know that's true.
MS. LUNDVALL: The second amended complaint then made the same allegations. It was the same basic allegations. In other words, they asked for money damages once again.

We get to their first 16.1 disclosure. In

Their first 16.1 disclosure, Mr. Jimmerson makes a big deal out of the fact that they didn't serve me with any interrogatories, they didn't send any requests for production. I don't have to. Rule 16.1 obligates them to set forth their damage theory and the amount of their damages.

THE COURT: Right.
MS. LUNDVALL: So we relied upon that, and that's what they, that's what they said to us.

THE COURT: I understand NRCP 16.1.
MS. LUNDVALL: Their first four disclosures under rule 16.1 , they just made the broad claim that they were entitled to all damages that flowed from the breach of the commission agreement, okay?

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. LUNDVALL: So then what we did is we filed a motion for summary judgment. If you go back and take a look at our motion for summary judgment, we break out their case into the two theories that they had advanced at that point in time during discovery, number one is that we owed them more money in commissions, and that number two, we had breached, and that we had breached the agreement then by not paying them those additional monies, and number two, that, in fact, that we had not given them sufficient
information. Our motion for summary judgment is broken into those two particular sections, all right?

THE COURT: Right.
MS. LUNDVALL: They opposed our motion for summary judgment, and in opposing our motion for summary judgment, they highlighted this theory that they, that they advanced all the way through trial, is it all depends upon what you call option property.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MS. LUNDVALL: They went on to say that we had made a significant purchase of option property, that we had purchased option property, and, in fact, they went on to say that the damages that flowed from our purchases of option property were being, that they were being denied $\$ 1.8$ million in commissions. This is their opposition.

So it's not something that $I$ fabricated, it's not something that $I$ made up, it's not something that $I$ pulled out of thin air, it's not something that $I$ have deceptively tried to put before the Court. This is their theory. That's what we defended against.

THE COURT: Okay. And when was that said? I looked in the -- continue your presentation.

MS. LUNDVALL: All right. We filed a motion for summary --

THE COURT: I remember that.
MR. JIMMERSON: It was never part of the

MS. LUNDVALL: Our motion for summary

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judgment --
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THE COURT: Mr. Jimmerson, in fairness, Ms. Lundvall has her chance to make here record too, all right? That's not fair.

MS. LUNDVALL: We filed our motion in October of 2012. My prediction is, is that the opposition that they failed would have been then in November of 2012 .

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. LUNDVALL: And my recollection is that
the Court issued an order on that in February of 2013,
something along that line.

So if, in fact, if you want --
THE COURT: I have one in March. Well, I have 10/23. That wouldn't have been it, so probably my March 14 th of $2013 . \quad I$ went through all the orders.

MS. LUNDVALL: And so as I indicated, my prediction is that opposition could be found then in the November of 2012 time frame.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. LUNDVALL: And I'm quoting --
THE COURT: I'm sure that's true.

MS. LUNDVALL: And I'm quoting from their opposition, and maybe it might make it easier for the Court to have a paper copy of our powerpoint.

THE COURT: Sure, so I can follow it instead of looking up.

MS. LUNDVALL: And $I$ have a copy for Mr. Jimmerson as well.

So anyway, so they opposed then our motion for summary judgment. They say this whole case is about what you call option property. They claimed that we had made purchases of option property, and the quantification of those purchases then yielded 1.8 in -- 1.8 million in commissions that we had not paid to them. That was their theory. That's what we defended against, that's what we prevailed upon at the time of the trial.

All right, so let's go on then. What did we get nearly immediately after filing our motion for summary judgment? And part of our motion for summary judgment, very noticeably, had indicated that they had not quantified their damages in compliance with Rule 16.1.

THE COURT: Right.
MS. LUNDVALL: Therefore, under the sanctioning provisions under 16.1 , they should not be
able to advance any quantification of their damages.
And what did they do? They filed then their Rule 16.1 disclosure, and for the first time then, after we filed our motion for summary judgment, they indicated that they calculate their damages to be in excess of 1.9.

Now, $I$ don't know about you, but any attorney
that $I$ know that gets a disclosure, a Rule 16.1
disclosure of what the opposing side's damages are, we know that's what you're defending against.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. LUNDVALL: That's what the case is about.
That's what we're defending against, all right?
So they made their disclosure and they
identified how they calculated it. And it tracked the two calculations on the two theories that they were advancing.

The first one was the loss of the
commissions, and they gave calculations on that. And they go on and they talk about how we reclassified the lands as purchase property and option property, and we divested then the plaintiffs of any opportunity then to recover this $\$ 1.8$ million in commissions. That's what their theory holds. That's the theory they tried, and that's the theory, your Honor, that they lost, that you ruled against them upon.

All right. So then what we do is we get then to what they actually tried. Their supplement then gave us plenty of information as to what they were going to try at the time of trial. So let's get into then we talked -- I have a number of slides in here about how every single one of their Rule 16.1 disclosures.

Even disclosures that were given to us during the course of trial included this figure of
\$1.8 million. It made it abundantly clear that they were seeking money damages in addition to additional information.

And if you think about --
THE COURT: Once they got the additional information, which started the lawsuit. They got it.

MS. LUNDVALL: That's correct.
THE COURT: Once they got it.
MS. LUNDVALL: And so --
THE COURT: I didn't see any of this, as you know, that's not evidence at trial. I only review the evidence at trial, but yes, okay.

MS. LUNDVALL: But this is all part of the record then before the Court as to what the parties were doing as it relates then to this motion to amend as it relates to the prevailing party. We put all this
information before you.
THE COURT: You put all this information
before me at trial?

MS. LUNDVALL: No, no, no, I'm not suggesting that.

THE COURT: No, no.
MS. LUNDVALL: What I'm suggesting is --

THE COURT: This is discovery. This is to put people on notice, you're right, as to what they may or what may happen at trial. There's things in 16.1 that never come up at trial. You and $I$ both know we could have this theory initially, and after discovery, we go, whoops, that's not the way we're going, so this is discovery, $I$ understand that, so $I$ just want to make sure -- I don't remember, and $I$ went -- you didn't ask me to review 16.1.

Did you put into evidence 16.1?

MS. LUNDVALL: Absolutely. All of this is in as far in our oppositions to their various motion to strike.

THE COURT: No, no, not for this, but at trial. Believe me, $I$ read everything, but at trial did you have an exhibit of 16.1?

MS. LUNDVALL: Absolutely not.
THE COURT: All right. I just wanted to make
sure $I$ didn't miss it, because that would concern me.

MS. LUNDVALL: As a defendant, I'm not going
to put in evidence --

THE COURT: Of course not.

MS. LUNDVALL: -- of what a plaintiff claims is their damages.

THE COURT: Okay. Right, but at trial is what you're defending. You take what the burden of proof is and what they put on, and you do your defense according to the testimony of the plaintiffs and their exhibits. That's your burden, I understand completely, of what's done at trial.

Okay, I'm on the same -- I'm following your reasoning.

MS. LUNDVALL: All right. But I guess let me step back from this to make sure the Court understands the arguments that $I^{\prime} m$ making is --

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. LUNDVALL: Is that they told us what their theory was and what they were seeking to recover. For the attorney's fees we incurred in defending this case, it was based upon what they had disclosed to us, and those disclosures are all before the court.

And I'm gonna get to the trial where you're gonna see that, in fact, they continued in this, the
same theory that they'd advanced.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. LUNDVALL: Their theory was all the way back to their motion for summary judgment that said it all depends on what you call option property.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MS. LUNDVALL: Their theory that they tried to you was we had purchased option property. The theory we defended against was we didn't purchase any option property, and you agreed with us. And their quantification of that purchase was the $\$ 1.9$ million -it was actually 1.8. They add the additional component then for the attorney's fees that they incurred on the second portion of their theory.

But going back then to what happened then at the time of the trial, all right, so we get to the witnesses. Mr. Wolfram gave nearly three days full of testimony, and Mr. Wilkes was there for about a half day, Mr. Whittemore. And these are the key witnesses, what $I$ tried to highlight as to who the Court heard with the greatest frequency and the most information, and Mr. Whittemore had nearly three full days.

And during the course of the trial, there was numerous questions about lost commissions and this theory about how we had reclassified option property
and that reclassification was really what they termed purchase property, and therefore they were entitled to a commission upon them.

THE COURT: Wouldn't you agree with me, I just want to ask wouldn't you agree with me that a lot of questions was educating the court and themselves on how, especially Mr. Whittemore, how did you treat Pardee, because they were not privy to this, and as you know, how this was done, how you decided to do the redesignation, how you decided to treat it, why you moved the boundaries, wouldn't you agree with me a lot of that information you're now basically saying to this Court, Oh, that was all to defeat their \$1.8 million claim, the damages they put in discovery, but a lot of it was to figure out, I felt, whether they were entitled to option property, not what the amount was yet, but to find out whether they were actualy entitled based on third party, you know, that they weren't a part of, you know, that's a whole different thing to incorporate into a commission agreement.

I'm sure this may not happen again, because they were not part of CSI, Coyote Springs and pardee. A lot of questions, because $I$ spent a long time on it, was trying to figure out whether they even have that theory.

And that's why, I'll be honest, a lot of the questions -- because I'm being very -- I looked through it, and in honesty, a lot of it was just Mr. Jimmerson was trying to figure out how it was treated and what they did to see if it could go under his under the commission agreement.

Do you agree with me or not, or do you think it was all I'm just, I'm gonna make them -- you know, because the questions were trying to understand, especially Whittemore, how did this work; Jon Lash, how did you do this, why did you do this, what happened on these amendments, you know, it was substantive to see.

And $I$ look at it and $I$ did at the time, you know, $I$ looked at it as the time of them trying to figure out whether -- which was the basis, whether they did owe anything, whether they did owe any under, I was gonna use the word "option," whether that actually, when they changed the boundaries and whether that actually was option. A lot of that was done, to me, when it was done at trial was questions to really find substance.

And $I$ see what you're saying, well, then, if it went the way they wanted, they would have had substance for their, they could have had evidence to this Court that they had $\$ 1.8$ million in damages,
correct?

Do you guys agree would me on my questions?
MS. LUNDVALL: Yeah, you've got two questions
there, two principle questions there, and you say, Well, wasn't the trial about this.

THE COURT: Yes.
MS. LUNDVALL: But what $I$ want you to think about is this: All the discovery was about that as well, all of the discovery that we went through with all the different witnesses, and they took Harvey Whittemore's deposition, they took Jon Lash's deposition, they took many depositions, no different than we did. All the way through discovery, we learned all this information.

But what is a trial? Is a trial is --
THE COURT: To prove.

MS. LUNDVALL: Take it to the finder of fact.

THE COURT: Correct.
MS. LUNDVALL: And to convince --
THE COURT: Convince me.
MS. LUNDVALL: That's right, and to convince
the finder of fact, so they weren't using trial as a discovery device. The weren't --

THE COURT: I have to -- when they came up with that one, oh, my gosh, what was the one that they
hadn't seen before?

MR. JIMMERSON: Res. 5.

THE COURT: Let me think it through --
I'm sorry, Mr. Jimmerson -- on when they had bought it as multi -- I will tell you some of the information when $I$ read it back, I felt, was -- and you can do discovery in trial. It's dangerous.

MS. LUNDVALL: That's correct.
THE COURT: It's a dangerous proposition, but I understand your argument.

MS. LUNDVALL: But at the same token, your Honor, think about it from this perspective, that's what we were defending against, and that is what we were defending against and we prevailed on that. I want to go back to the fact we prevailed on that.

MS. LUNDVALL: To go back and try to underscore Jim Wolfram's testimony. He was questioned very clearly about how he earned commissions, and it was his testimony that Pardee was obligated to pay him commissions on option property.

And he went through all kinds of questions then through Mr. Jimmerson about the definitions from the documents on this purchase property price and option property. He testified that it wasn't fair that Pardee had executed amendments that affected his
commission agreement, and in his theory, had changed then as to whether or not they should get a commission based upon Pardee's purchases.

He went on to say, talk about the three different provisions then of the commission agreement himself. He testified that the location and the boundaries of the parcels would determine what type of property was being purchased, and therefore, whether or not they were entitled to additional commissions.

And then he went on then and talked about parcel maps as demonstrative evidence and how there was definite boundaries, in his opinion, to the purchase property and how if we went outside of certain boundaries, then, in fact, we were obligated to pay him commissions upon that.

The Court will probably recall, $I$ can visualize it as far as in your courtroom, we were here. He had huge maps with overlays. He talked about how we had purchased property that should be vertical, but we had developed in a horizontal fashion.

THE COURT: Correct.
MS. LUNDVALL: That, that, you know, should ring a bell as far as with the Court.

THE COURT: I remember. I remember it all very well, the entire theory.

MS. LUNDVALL: Their entire theory was if we went outside somewhat what they --

THE COURT: What they labeled as option.
MS. LUNDVALL: They wanted that all as option property.

THE COURT: They said they defined it as option property under the agreement.

MS. LUNDVALL: And that they thought they should get a commission then upon those purchases.

THE COURT: If it had been deemed option, I understand.

MS. LUNDVALL: All right.
THE COURT: I understood the theory of the case.

MS. LUNDVALL: And he said he believed he was entitled to additional commissions also on the custom lots. If you recall, there was an issue regarding the custom lots.

THE COURT: Yes.
MS. LUNDVALL: All right.
THE COURT: Whether those would be
single-family detached residential property, since they are single family, and the question is based on the agreement whether that could -- I agree.

MS. LUNDVALL: All right. So he said he was
most certainly entitled to additional commissions. That's what we tried. He said he was most certainly entitled to additional commissions.

All right, then we get to Walt Wilkes.
Walt Wilkes, he too testified, and he also said, I do think we're entitled to other and more commissions. He says his understanding was they were gonna get commissions on the whole of all of the transactions, and he thought that the plaintiffs were owed additional commissions for the custom lots as well.

And so then we get to he theorized and characterized it that this is Pardee trying to take money from us, and he, too, echoed this boundary theory about if we purchased property outside of certain boundaries, then they should be entitled then to additional commissions. That's what his testimony was.

Harvey Whittemore, the other key witness -even though you heard many other witnesses, I'm trying to focus on what the keys were.

THE COURT: Well, this issue was focused on Harvey Whittemore and a little Jon Lash.

MS. LUNDVALL: And so the extent then he was on the witness stand for three days, and he talked about his original conception and the negotiations and what, in fact, the contracts provided. He also
testified that Pardee had not purchased any option property, if the Court would recall.

And when asked about what he understood this case was about, he says, Who gave you the idea that the focus of this case was past due brokerage commissions? He says, $I$ took that impression from my deposition. Why? Because all of those questions were asked of him in his deposition. He spent nearly an entire day asking questions also about the redesignation issue.

So not only did they want money for the custom lots, but they also wanted additional commissions on the redesignations.

All right. He said that we talked about and highlighted, continuing as far as Mr. Whittemore's testimony, and how he went on and talked about how they could not have anticipated what the specific boundaries were and why it is that they had crafted their agreement in the form that it was.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. LUNDVALL: And then when we got to
Jon Lash, Jon Lash echoed the same thing, and he said that's why they had crafted the commission agreement. It wasn't based upon boundaries or specific parcels of purchase, it was based upon the purchase property price that was set forth, and that was unambiguous --

THE COURT: I remember this.
MS. LUNDVALL: -- in the commission
agreement, all right?
THE COURT: I painfully remember all of this, and $I$ mean that nicely.

MS. LUNDVALL: And so to the extent that
Mr. Whittemore talked about the principle reason was that they needed this flexibility so as to be able to do a development that was going to go across many years.

This continues on to highlight then, your Honor, how that the $\$ 84$ million that Pardee had paid to CSI was this purchase property price, and if you go all the way back to the commission, as the court -- the commission agreement, the Court will recall it was the purchase property price upon which one part of their commissions was based.

THE COURT: Correct.

MS. LUNDVALL: And it was option property
then --
THE COURT: Was the second.
MS. LUNDVALL: -- that was the second part.
And so all of this was to demonstrate then that Pardee had not made any purchases of option property, and if we did not make any purchases of option property, then
they weren't entitled to any additional commissions other than what they had already been paid.

So then we get to opening and closing
arguments. Let me as far as see if $I$ can't highlight then a couple of points that were made in the plaintiffs' opening and closing arguments, because $I$ want you to think about that his basic position is, your Honor, is that they were never seeking money damages. That's their basic position.

And he further puts a fine point on it, as he said, If we were never seeking money damages, and moreover, we were never seeking 1.8 , well, we know from their rule 16.1 disclosures is that that's what they had quantified.

THE COURT: I think what he was saying, Ms. Lundvall, the basis of this suit was to get an accounting and see what the information was, and then once they got it, to see if they have money damages. That's why there's this disconnect.

And I understand why they had to do, because you did, you did a motion you didn't comply with 16.1, you didn't give us a damage figure, and then guess what, and they had to.

MS. LUNDVALL: So --

THE COURT: Do you see where I'm --

MS. LUNDVALL: I understand the point, but that -- what we have here, your Honor, is there were two theories of breach.

THE COURT: There was theories of breach of the contract.

MS. LUNDVALL: And we prevailed on one, they prevailed on the other.

THE COURT: On the other.

MS. LUNDVALL: Okay. So to the extent that Mr. Jimmerson, in his motion to amend, says that we didn't prevail on anything, that we didn't, that they never, number one, asked for any money damages, let alone we didn't prevail on it, that is the point that I'm trying to make.

THE COURT: And here's my thought process, so help me. I broke it down. I get that, but here's my thought process: You can sue for breach of contract, you may have five different things where the trier of fact can say you breached here, you breached here, you breached here, you breached here, but those are theories of breach.

If the trier of fact, which $I$ did in this case, found a breach, just because you were able to defend the other breaches, why did they not, were they the prevailing party in their claim?

Do you see what I'm saying?
I agree their theories of liability, and that's my thought process, if you -- that's my thought process, you're right, but they, they had a breach. There was a breach. I found a breach to that commission. I didn't find a second breach as far as more commissions. I mean my findings are my findings. They're very clear. They're very clear what $I$ did.

And so what your point to me is, Well, they may have prevailed on one breach but we prevailed on the other, so we're really the more prevailing party, is --

MS. LUNDVALL: Well, and see --
THE COURT: Is there such a thing as a --

MS. LUNDVALL: Absolutely.

THE COURT: -- more prevailing party?
MS. LUNDVALL: Absolutely.

THE COURT: That's basically what you're arguing to me.

MS. LUNDVALL: Absolutely, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. I just wanted to put in
terms what you were saying, okay.
MS. LUNDVALL: Absolutely, your Honor.

THE COURT: Because they prevailed on one
theory but they didn't prevail on the second and
because we won on the second, we think that was a bigger theory or makes us more the prevailing party? Okay, That makes -- at least I put together what I thought you were saying, okay. That's good, all right? Not "good," but I want to make sure I'm following very well, okay.

MS. LUNDVALL: What I'm trying do is continue to focus then on the motion to amend, and on the motion to amend they keep saying we didn't prevail on anything.

THE COURT: You didn't prevail on their claim for money damages is how they say it. I agree that, and I'm gonna say $I$ agree it's in my findings of fact and conclusions. You prevailed on their theory of breach of whether they were owed any unpaid past commissions. There's no way you can't read this to say that they did, but in all honesty, this doesn't say that.

MS. LUNDVALL: Yes, it does.
THE COURT: Well, you and $I$ have a -- this does not say it, say it that way, but go ahead. I'm not disagreeing with you, my findings of fact and order says exactly that. It's a theory of liability, I agree with you there, so go on.

MS. LUNDVALL: All right. So let me as far
as to step back as far as from this for just a second, because if, in fact, that there is a perception that we are claiming that we prevailed on everything --

THE COURT: Oh, no.

MS. LUNDVALL: -- that perception is wrong.
THE COURT: No, absolutely. I even said you lost your claim. You had a, you actually had a claim against the plaintiffs for that same commission, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and you did not --

MS. LUNDVALL: That was not the portion, that was not the foundation for our good faith and fair dealing.

THE COURT: I understand that, but I'm saying --

MR. JIMMERSON: Excuse me.

THE COURT: No, that's okay.
MR. JIMMERSON: Let me just mention that claim was withdrawn by Ms. Lundvall as part of her closing arguments before submitting it to you. That's the part $I$ was clarifying.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. LUNDVALL: So let me, I want to start --
THE COURT: I get what you're saying.
MS. LUNDVALL: I want to start from ground
zero to make sure that there's no misunderstanding as to our position. There were two theories. They prevailed on one, we prevailed on the other one.

THE COURT: For the breach of contract.
MS. LUNDVALL: The case law, the case law,
when we get to the motions for summary judgment, $I$ will identify the specific case law says what the court needs to do is identify then and quantify then what did the parties focus upon and what did they prevail on.

THE COURT: No, I read that. I get that. Same with the accounting. I understand I'm to look at the totality of the circumstance.

MS. LUNDVALL: Precisely.
THE COURT: I read every single case. I
understand that, including their accounting one, I am to focus on all of that. Yes, I understand that.

MS. LUNDVALL: So what we end up with then at the end of the day is that they prevailed on something, we prevailed on something, and it's the Court's job then by which to try to quantify where was the bulk of this trial upon, what was the bulk of the trial on? Was the bulk of the trial on trying to demonstrate that we had purchased option property through all of those witnesses and all of those theories and the additional argument about the custom lots and that they were
entitled to commissions upon those as well as the redesignation, that's what the bulk of the trial was about, your Honor.

THE COURT: But $I$ also have to consider the accounting claim, and the only way they got all their documents to even go to their theory that they were on the option property was because you had to produce -not you, the defendant, only through this lawsuit actually produced the documents that then they could come up with a second theory.

There's no question they did not have enough information until the option agreement and everything was produced to them, so $I$ have to balance that the reason for the lawsuit, and it's very clear in the record, was to get an accounting and to get the rest of those option agreements and to try to find out, because they tried to do it and I remember it all, they tried to get Mr. Whittemore, and he goes, No, I can't.

I remember they were confidential, although a couple of amendments had gone and the rest of them didn't, but $I$ also have to balance in that the impetus was, the only reason for the first lawsuit was an accounting to get the information so they could determine if there was anything.

MS. LUNDVALL: All right, your Honor.

THE COURT: And so that, $I$ just wanted to be very clear on the record. You agree with that, right? I have to consider the accounting claims.

MS. LUNDVALL: One of the things I think that you have to consider as a result of that is what the consequence is once they received that information.

THE COURT: Oh, absolutely.
MS. LUNDVALL: Okay.
THE COURT: What would their consequence be, once they get the information they just drop the lawsuit?

MS. LUNDVALL: If you would allow me as far as to finish what my thought is?

THE COURT: I apologize, $I$ do that to you all the time because $I$ go one ahead of you, I'm sorry, the consequence of what they did.

MS. LUNDVALL: Okay. So during the
discovery, they got all the information --
THE COURT: They did.
MS. LUNDVALL: -- to which they claimed that they were entitled to. They had all that information. And what did they do as a result of that? Did they say, We were paid everything that we were entitled to? We got everything that we were entitled to? No. What they did is they advanced the theory that they talked
about in their letters before they started the case, that they set forth in their complaint, that they set forth in depositions, that they set forth in the opposition for the motion for summary judgment, that even though we have all this information from Pardee, we still think our interpretation is right and that we're entitled to money damages.

If they, in fact, had gotten all this
information and stopped and said that Pardee is right, they haven't purchased any option property, then -- and they would have gone forward with their breach of contract at the time of the trial, then maybe their argument may have merit, but they did not, and that is the point that I'm trying to underscore here.

They argued in both opening and closing arguments how the case was going to hinge upon these purchases, and they continued to advance their theory that we had purchased option property.

They talked about how it was a breach of contract that affected their clients' rights to a commission by making these later deals, once again continuing to try to underscore the fact that they were adversely affected by our conduct, and as a result of that, they should have been entitled to more money.

Their actions -- one of the things $I$ wanted
to get to at this point in time is this: If there is
any question whatsoever that the plaintiffs sought
money damages as a result of the trial, I would ask the
Court to look at one document and one document only,
and I'm gonna offer a copy of what $I$ want you to take a
look at.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MS. LUNDVALL: This was the very last
submission that the Court had before you prepared your findings of fact and conclusions of law. This is what they gave you. This is what they said that they thought they --

THE COURT: No, this is their proposed, like you gave me a proposed.

MS. LUNDVALL: And I want, and I want to underscore it.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. LUNDVALL: And I want you to think back to everything you've read in all these motions that Mr. Jimmerson has brought before you.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MS. LUNDVALL: He said that he never asked for money damages.

MR. JIMMERSON: I never said that.
MS. LUNDVALL: He said, I've never asked for
money damages and specifically we never asked for 1.8 , all right? So let's look to see whether or not they did ask for money damages.

So go to Page 4. Page 4 sets forth their entire theory about this option property and how we had purchased option property. That's what their Finding 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, and 23 all track.

They go on and they talk about on Page 7 the non-circumvention clause within the commission agreement, Paragraphs 34,35 , and 36 , and they claim then that Pardee and CSI had circumvented their opportunity to receive commissions by entering into these subsequent agreements.

They then go on at Page 9, at 48, 49 and 50, and they talk about specifically what they had proven at trial were the actual purchases, and they go on at Page 10 on line -- at their Finding 58 and talk about the geography and specifically where the court can find that.

They go on then at Paragraph 60 that's on 11 , and that says that under the multi-family agreement. In addition to the custom lot agreement arguments --

THE COURT: I'm sorry, where are you now, Page --

MS. LUNDVALL: Page 11.

THE COURT: I just didn't hear your paragraph.

MS. LUNDVALL: And they talk about under the multi-family agreement that we had purchased 225 acres of that residential property.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MS. LUNDVALL: And they talk about at 62, 63, 64, and 65 how the court could calculate what they were then due.

THE COURT: For that Res. 5 property, I remember that.

MS. LUNDVALL: That's correct.

And if you go to Page 12 then, they also talk about what that amount was that they should be paid as a result of that. They ask for money damages, based upon the information that they had provided at the time of the trial, of $\$ 134,000$--

THE COURT: $134,964$.

MS. LUNDVALL: That had nothing do with their attorney's fees, because their attorney fee provisions come in at other places in this proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

They then go on in the entirety of the findings of fact and conclusions of law and say, Your Honor, we think that we should be entitled additional
monies that only can be accounted for once you adopt our theory, and if you adopt our theory, then we are going to be entitled to even more money than this. That's what they gave to you in their findings of fact and conclusions of law.

And so to the extent that this case, yes, it was about money damages in part.

THE COURT: In part.

MS. LUNDVALL: And the "in part" is what we prevailed upon.

And so to the extent that once we get -let's start limiting it then to the motion that the Court has in front of it right now.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MS. LUNDVALL: The motion to amend, were we --

THE COURT: This judgment.

MS. LUNDVALL: The judgment.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. LUNDVALL: Were we accurate and were you accurate then in saying that Pardee prevailed on the portion of the case by which that they sought money damages and that they were not entitled to additional --

THE COURT: It doesn't say that here. It
doesn't say that wording, Ms. Lundvall. I mean that's different wording than what you put in here.

MS. LUNDVALL: It puts in there the
quantification as to what they had articulated.
THE COURT: $1.8 \mathrm{million}, 1,8000,000$.
MS. LUNDVALL: That's what they --
THE COURT: That's, nowhere was that put into
evidence. Even their proposed was, you just gave me 30,000 plus 134 , and the second, which is exactly what I said with Mr. Jimmerson, that if they did prevail on the other, they're gonna have to then later do something on that, and I'm not sure if it's even accounting, and my thought process was if they prevailed on the other, then $I$ don't know if they have to do another suit or what, because that really wasn't damages that were put into the lawsuit.

MS. LUNDVALL: Well --

THE COURT: The damages were the 30,134 ,
which I did buy the Res. -- not "buy," I did not agree on the Res. 5 property, so, you know, so I just have a hard time with this 1.8 , but give me your explanation again, all right.

MS. LUNDVALL: Well then as far as, your

Honor, let me as far as to offer it very simply then, as we have, I've tried to do --

THE COURT: Very simply.

MS. LUNDVALL: -- that they had two theories.
THE COURT: I have that. You don't have to be that simple, believe me.

MS. LUNDVALL: They, they quantified their
first theory at $\$ 1.8$ million. That's not mine, $I$ don't have to --

THE COURT: And they quantified that at trial as 1.8 million?

MS. LUNDVALL: Hold on.

THE COURT: They did not. They did not.
MS. LUNDVALL: This is what we did -- well,
your Honor --

THE COURT: They didn't say 1.8. I looked
for it.

MS. LUNDVALL: You know, let me as far as see if can't --

THE COURT: I understand they wanted damages, I, believe me, $I$ understand that completely.

MS. LUNDVALL: Let's see.
THE COURT: I got the -- I looked through all
your supplements.
MS. LUNDVALL: Let me see if $I$ can find what I'm looking for here.

Here we go.

THE COURT: This is the summary judgment.
MS. LUNDVALL: Let me make this point, and that is this: As a defendant, $I$ am never ever going to put into evidence what, in fact, the plaintiffs are contending are their damages.

THE COURT: Of course not.
MS. LUNDVALL: That is the plaintiffs' burden of proof.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. LUNDVALL: If you recall -- hold on. If you recall during my closing argument, even though it was pretty late at night, both you and $I$ and everybody else in the courtroom were pretty tired, if you recall.

THE COURT: No, I --
MS. LUNDVALL: One of the arguments that we made is that they could not prevail on their money damages claims because they did not put evidence in of what their money damages were. That was part of our theory. But the fact that they failed in their burden of proof does not mean that we did not prevail in defending against that or does it mean that they did not quantify what that theory was that they had lost upon.

I can't as far as imagine any defense attorney putting evidence in the record --

THE COURT: You don't have to do that again. I get that. My only question to you is: What did they quantify at trial?

So let me make it simple for you,
Ms. Lundvall, because you keep saying "simple."
MS. LUNDVALL: What were we defending against?

THE COURT: Okay, so then $I$ see your semantics, what were you defending against, you're saying the 1.8 , that you were defending that at trial because they told you they were gonna prove 1.8. They didn't put in 1.8 , but when you went there, you thought you were gonna defend 1.8.

That what you're saying?
MS. LUNDVALL: Absolutely.
THE COURT: Okay, perfect. I just want to make sure I'm following you. You don't have to simplify it any more. I just asked you the simple question what did they quantify at trial, okay? I got you.

MS. LUNDVALL: It's not what $I$ believe their claim was, it is what the plaintiffs believed.

THE COURT: So it's what the plaintiffs have the burden of proof to convince this trier of fact. I don't look at the supplementals. It's what their
burden of proof was and what they put in to me, to this trier of fact, as to what they thought their damages were. I agree with you there, okay.

MS. LUNDVALL: And so from this --

THE COURT: I got that.

MS. LUNDVALL: From this perspective, your
Honor, throughout the entirety of this motion practice is that the plaintiffs had contended that this case was never about money damages.

We have walked you through that not only as far as what their theory was and how they claimed if they were successful on that theory, that they were gonna get money damage. It would come in a two-step process. They had a little two step going on.

THE COURT: I got that.
MS. LUNDVALL: They wanted, as far as they wanted first as far as a finding from you, and then they wanted as far as to come in for a subsequent evidentiary hearing.

So to the extent then that they were the ones
that identified and quantified, they identified first their theory was in two parts, they quantified the values they put on their theory, and that's what we defended against, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. LUNDVALL: And we successfully defended against that. And so when we get into the portion of the motion practice dealing with the prevailing party analysis --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MS. LUNDVALL: -- we will bring you the cases and identify and underscore the cases where, in fact, other judges sitting in your situation have found where a party has prevailed on one issue and what it cost them by which to litigate that issue, whereas the adverse party then had prevailed on others and what it cost by which to prevail on that, and what the Court is supposed to do in that circumstance, it has been upheld by the Nevada Supreme Court, and so the point --

THE COURT: I think you already provided me -- I read that. Didn't you give me those cases?

MS. LUNDVALL: There's one additional case.
THE COURT: Oh, because I read every case that you give me on that. I understood prevailing party. That's down here somewhere.

MS. LUNDVALL: And the other, I guess the one thing that $I$ guess that $I$ still want to try --

THE COURT: But what we're really addressing right here, can $I$ be honest, is whether this is a proper -- you're saying this is proper from my findings
of fact. I thought that's what we were addressing. MS. LUNDVALL: That is what we were addressing.

THE COURT: And I see what you're saying. You're saying that there was a plaintiffs' claim for 1.8 million, and this is appropriate, for lost future commissions and that's appropriate. That's where we were at.

MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, what we, as defendants, are obligated to do, and think about this, when you get a case in your office, you look at it and you try to quantify it, because that quantification depends upon how much resources you throw at it and the type of resources that you throw at it and the energy that you throw at it, and let me tell you, when the plaintiffs identified that this case was about lost commissions, and we pushed and we pushed to try to get them to quantify how much are we talking about, they told us how much we were talking about, and what they told us is that this case was worth $\$ 1.8$ million in lost commissions.

And they told you in their opposition to the motion for summary judgment that this case was worth 1.8 in lost commissions.

THE COURT: We've been through this. I get
it.

MS. LUNDVALL: That's what drove it. That's what drove our defense.

THE COURT: I understand.

MS. LUNDVALL: And the fact they did not meet
their burden of proving that at the time of trial doesn't mean that they didn't try on their theory of liability. They did try on their theory of liability. They asked for a smaller number as a result. They asked for the opportunity to do the two step to get to the bigger number as a result, but you ruled against them, but that does not mean that we didn't defend against that.

Our entire defense was driven by what they informed us their case was about. We prevailed on the most important component of their case. They prevailed on another piece of it, and we have the ability and can and will provide the Court then with the quantification of those two so that you can determine an offset, but it does not negate the fact that we prevailed on their claim that they quantified at $\$ 1.8$ million.

And so therefore, to suggest that somehow I was deceptive, that $I$ was fraudulent, that $I$ had fabricated a claim, when, in fact, it was their information to us that defined not only the fact of the
claim, but the amount of the claim, that's what we put in the judgment.

THE COURT: No, I saw where you got it from.
Just as the trial attorney listening to it, that is, that is not what $I$ saw at trial, and $I$ went by the evidence, but -- and you're making -- and this is to say what $I$ found at trial.

So what you're saying to me is you want me to make, by what you put here, you want me to determine that the claim was for 1.8 million, not by what was shown at trial, because that was not shown at trial? You realize this is judgment from trial --

MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor?

THE COURT: -- not from discovery.
MS. LUNDVALL: From this perspective, what
the Court has a hard time with --
THE COURT: Yes, very big difficulty --

MS. LUNDVALL: Well, hold on.

THE COURT: -- with the 1.8.

MS. LUNDVALL: With the quantification --
THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MS. LUNDVALL: With the quantification, what
that suggests is that you think that I'm fabricating the quantification was that the plaintiffs put on then.

THE COURT: No, no, that's not what $I$ said.

What $I$ said is you want me to make the determination that their claim was 1.8 million from what $I$ heard at trial. That's what you're saying in this. That's what a judgment is.

Now, that's different than if you want me to do post-judgment and come up with who's the prevailing party and factor in the 1.8 and everything else, that's a different analysis, is what I'm saying to you.

This is a judgment based on what $I$ heard and saw at trial.

Do you agree with that?
MS. LUNDVALL: No, I don't.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. LUNDVALL: I agree that a judgment comes at the conclusion of a case, and it ends the work, but for the post-trial or the post-judgment motions that the district Court is obligated to do.

THE COURT: I agree.

MS. LUNDVALL: But does that mean that, in fact, that the Court looks as far as only at a prism? And let me as far as let me offer this observation.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. LUNDVALL: If the Court's concern is the quantification portion that was put into the judgment, and I've now explained where we got the quantification,
that quantification came from the plaintiffs themselves.

THE COURT: Oh, I got it. You have told me nothing different than what you put in your motions. I know exactly where you got it.

MS. LUNDVALL: If the Court --
THE COURT: I looked at all the discovery. I know where you got it.

MS. LUNDVALL: If the Court has a problem as far as with the quantification, it still does not negate the fact that we prevailed on that portion of their claim, no matter what value they placed on it.

THE COURT: You just said that perfectly, Ms. Lundvall. You just said you prevailed on that portion of their claim, the plaintiffs' claim.

Here's what you wrote in, that you, that judgment is against as to plaintiffs' claim for, and then you put that you won -- where was it, let's see, there was a section here that was, that -- hold on.

It's a word, they're saying "their claim," and here's my concern: Is a claim, how do you define that, as different -- I look at claims as causes of action, okay? I'm just gonna be very -- I worked, you know, and this didn't really -- claims are causes of action, and that's why $I$ very distinctly said to you
theory of liability, and you agreed with theory of liability, but you used -- that's why I -- you used the word "claim" in here. When you do a complaint, you can say "claim" or "cause of action," and that was one of my concerns when $I$ looked at that.

And we're on the same page. I understand
there were two theories of liability for the breach of contract. I could not have sat through this -- I got that completely. What $I$ don't understand is you're saying so a theory of liability is the same as a cause of action or a claim? Because that's what you're saying here.

MS. LUNDVALL: Well, what --

THE COURT: Because really what you prevailed on is defeating one theory of liability.

MS. LUNDVALL: And what I'm trying --

THE COURT: Right? Do you agree with me there?

MS. LUNDVALL: What I am going to explain as far as to the Court, you and I may have a difference in semantics.

THE COURT: Well, it seems that we do.

MS. LUNDVALL: But $I$ think we are talking about the same thing.

THE COURT: All right. As long as you --

MS. LUNDVALL: So Rule 8 obligates you as far as to give a fair statement to the defense of what the nature of your claims are. They said to us that you breached the contract.

THE COURT: Right.
MS. LUNDVALL: They said that you breached the contract by not paying us the commissions and we're entitled to additional information.

THE COURT: Right.
MS. LUNDVALL: We defended on both alleged breaches.

Now, if the Court has issue then once again with the idea that somehow that a claim is different than a theory, $I$ don't have any problem with that either.

THE COURT: See --

MS. LUNDVALL: I disagree with the semantics, but it does not change the result that we prevailed on the predominant theory that they were advancing at the time of the trial. That's the point I guess that I'm trying to make.

THE COURT: I get that. I get that. I absolutely get that, but that was part of my problem with this, was not just the quantification, but the claim, because that was a theory of liability. Maybe
it's semantics, but it's really not. When I looked at
the cases, to me it does make a distinction, so that's,
that's -- I did look at this.
MS. LUNDVALL: One of the things, and I don't
know if you wanted us to continue or --
THE COURT: Let's keep going. Do you want to
go eat? Can we finish at least this?

MS. LUNDVALL: All right. So I guess what I want to make sure that as far as the court understands, I'm only addressing at this point in time the motion to amend.

THE COURT: Correct.

MS. LUNDVALL: I believe, I believe that the Court has an understanding then --

THE COURT: Right.
MS. LUNDVALL: -- of how it is that we got to the language in there.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. LUNDVALL: And where it is that the quantification came from.

THE COURT: I do.
MS. LUNDVALL: And why it is based upon the Court's own findings and what the claims were that had been alleged and what we were defending against, why it is that we believe that we prevailed on part of it and
why they prevailed on another part of it.
THE COURT: I understand that.
MS. LUNDVALL: All right. And so from that perspective, your Honor, respectfully, we submit that the judgment that you entered does not need to be amended, and moreover -- but if the Court quibbles with the language that we had used, what we were, what we would ask the Court to do is to ensure that the theory of liability that the plaintiffs advanced that they did not prevail upon is memorialized into the judgment. That's what our simple request is, your Honor.

THE COURT: What you want is this to reflect that as far as the theory of liability, that language as opposed to all that's included in here, all right.

MS. LUNDVALL: And all that's included in
there is simply a description then of the claim and the quantification of the claim that was given to us by the plaintiff.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.
I will tell you that $I$ do not agree, that this judgment entered June 15, 2015, I do feel is an erroneous judgment. I do not feel it is in compliance with my orders, my previous orders, and that's what it's supposed to do.

Now, based on that, I understand there's
issues. I will not, I do not -- I feel this is erroneous, $I$ feel, the way it is. I understand that you have the theory of liability, but this, I am going to strike this. I don't feel it is.

I started to -- what $I$ would like to do, based on that, and I, I understand where you're coming from on the theory of liability. I could obviously have all these other motions and then we can get to it, but until $I$ really agree with the language here, whether you agree with it or not, I think it's more than quibbling. I think it's more than semantics. I want to know what's in here to apply those cases on prevailing party, I'm very honest, because I looked. I think it's more than a quibble, so $I$ am going to strike this.

Once again, I apologize. I, I thought there was an agreement on the language. It became very obvious there wasn't, and I want, I want to do my procedure of an agreement of the language in the judgment, and if you can't, then $I$ want a proposed order, but $I$ will not $--I, I$ do not want to $--I$ do not believe the 1.8 million is a fair quantification of the damages that were -- and I disagree with you, that were presented at trial. I feel a judgment should, should encompass what was presented at trial.

What you had to defend against, I understand, is part, can be or is an analysis on prevailing party, but $I$ find that -- and if I'm wrong, I'm wrong, but as far as what's in a judgment, $I$ do not want to -- I don't think it's proper to say it was quantified as 1.8 million.

I have been as distinct as $I$ can here, so what $I$ would like -- and I know, you know --

MS. LUNDVALL: If the Court --

THE COURT: -- everything flows from this, and that's why this was so critical.

MS. LUNDVALL: And if the Court wishes for us as far as to take the guidance that you have given to us during the course of this hearing then, particularly within the last few comments, and for us to craft a new judgment then, and we will submit it to Mr. Jimmerson then for his review, and hopefully we can reach agreement on it. If we can't --

THE COURT: Absolutely.
MS. LUNDVALL: -- then we'll submit both of
the competing language then to you --
THE COURT: That's exactly what $I$ would want.
MS. LUNDVALL: -- for your review.
Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: The reason $I$ did the hearing
today is because $I$ read everything, and $I$ wanted to make you understand how I look at it so that we can hopefully come to one. Then once we agree on the judgment, then it goes, $I$ understand we go from there. And $I$ did read -- but once we get that -- and I have done a lot of the analysis, but $I$ understand better, I'll be honest. I understand Lundvall's side better, I understood exactly Jimmerson's side before. I put yours together a little differently, and that's why I'm not quibbling, I want to rephrase, but the language to me is important in the judgment. It is. It, to me, is the most critical, so that's what I would like to do.

Now, there's a couple of other -- but that is what $I$ would like to do, and then you know what, no one's waiving any arguments on anything else, because as you know, the memos of costs, all the prevailing party, once I strike this then those all are gone because that would be, I guess, an advisory opinion if I did feel somebody -- but the prevailing party, I want to get this done. I have done a lot of work on it.

And if you have another case please give it to me, because $I$ have, $I$ will be very honest, that is an issue $I$ understand, $I$ understand is an issue. It has to stem from this though, how $I$ want it in here.
I'm not saying --
MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor?
THE COURT: But $I$ want the wording in here
based on what $I$ saw, in fairness, all right, and I
understand that, so $I$ do want this -- this is stricken,
and $I$ do find it is erroneous, and $I$ do feel that this
judgment does not reflect my findings and what $I$ feel
would be appropriate in a judgment from the trial. I
want to be very clear on that. I feel it is erroneous
under -- and what's my rule, NRCP 58(a), correct?
MR. JIMMERSON: Also 52, your Honor.
THE COURT: 52. I have them both, 52(b).
MR. JIMMERSON: That the findings are
erroneous.
THE COURT: The findings are erroneous.
Well --
MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor?
THE COURT: -- let's do this --
MS. LUNDVALL: One of the things that I would
ask - -
THE COURT: I want to be specific, yes.
Go ahead. I'm sorry.
MS. LUNDVALL: One of the things that $I$ would
ask would be this: The conclusion of the court's
ruling is that $I$ 'm going to prepare new language for a
judgment. We're going submit it then to Mr. Jimmerson,
and we're gonna hopefully then agree upon language to
submit to you.

THE COURT: Right.
MS. LUNDVALL: In the event that we are not in agreement and the Court has to make a ruling upon that --

THE COURT: Correct, $I$ have to.

MS. LUNDVALL: -- that, in fact, we can articulate then in the letters we transmit then to you why, what it is and why it is we disagree.

THE COURT: Absolutely. That's how I do it, because otherwise, $I$ don't know if -- I understand a lot of it is going to be based on all this.

MS. LUNDVALL: The Court may make, enter a judgment at that point in time.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. LUNDVALL: Currently, there's a stay in place of any enforcement.

THE COURT: Right, because there is no judgment.

MS. LUNDVALL: Well, no, hold on. Judge Bonaventure --

THE COURT: Bonaventure, I'm sorry, you're right.

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MS. LUNDVALL: Judge Bonaventure entered the stay, so my request is that we have the opportunity to allow that stay to be in place for any new judgment until there may be resolution then of any of the outstanding motions to amend that may result, any additional motion practice that may result by reason of a new judgment.

MR. JIMMERSON: Your Honor, the rules call for a stay for ten business days from the date that a judgment is entered, so there is that protection for that two-week time period, including weekends, to the defendant. Afterwards, the defendant must post a bond or there is the right to collect under Rule 62 and --

THE COURT: Well, didn't Judge Bonaventure hear and put a stay in effect?

MR. JIMMERSON: He put a stay until you -THE COURT: So you know what, I'm gonna comply with --

MR. JIMMERSON: Until these issues are resolved?

THE COURT: I'm going to comply with Judge Bonaventure. I'm going to do what Judge Bonaventure did, because $I$ want to make sure when this judgment is done that everybody gets their chance to do their motions, and when it is done, it is done as far as this

Court, and then they can execute.
MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: And all the other post-trial that results from the judgment, those can all still happen, and $I$ know they're going to, depending on -- but $I$ want this judgment cleared up, because I looked at it because it does, it does stay you executing your money, Mr. Jimmerson.

I did look at what Judge Bonaventure did. I understand it, so I am going to do that.

MS. LUNDVALL: Okay.
THE COURT: And I want to make that as part of the order for denying -- granting, I am sorry, granting the motion to amend this judgment of June 15th, 2015.

MR. JIMMERSON: Is it your intention, Judge, as I'm listening to your remarks, thank you, is it your intention to defer the other motions that are pending for resolution today until a final judgment is entered by you?

THE COURT: Yes. I will be honest, I worked on them all, but $I$ can still work on them, but $I$ realized they all flow from this judgment.

MR. JIMMERSON: They do.
THE COURT: Now, there is one other one that
we could do.

Let's make sure this is all clear.

MR. JIMMERSON: I would like to do a brief reply.

MS. LUNDVALL: What $I$ want to make sure is
that the record is clear.
THE COURT: Yes.

MS. LUNDVALL: I believe the Court has
indicated that any new judgment that you intend to order, to enter, that Judge Bonaventure's order of a stay pending resolution of any post-judgment motions --

THE COURT: Regarding the judgment.
MS. LUNDVALL: -- continues to be in place.
THE COURT: It is.

MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you.

THE COURT: That is my ruling.

MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you.

MR. JIMMERSON: May I have --
THE COURT: I did want to give -- I cut you off on the reply. We kind of got ahead, but yes, I want you to be able to reply to Ms. Lundvall's.

MR. JIMMERSON: I just have a short reply.
THE COURT: That's fine. I'm taking it all
in.

MR. JIMMERSON: The pressure that Pardee may
be placing upon their law firm to reverse the Court's findings must be intense, but it doesn't justify distorting the record.

Let's talk as lawyers and judges here. This lawsuit was brought by a complaint, and there were two amendments, so you have a complaint, you have an amended complaint and a second amended complaint, and the only differences in the complaints was there was a clarification of the assignment from the general realty companies to the individuals, and then there was the permission to plead as attorney's fees special damages, but the nature of the claims were identical.

In that complaint, in the complaint and the amended complaints, all the complaints, is just simply all that is stated is --

MS. LUNDVALL: And your Honor, may I clarify one thing?

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. LUNDVALL: You've made your ruling on the motion to amend. Are we now moving into the motion for attorney's fees?

THE COURT: No.
MR. JIMMERSON: No. I'm doing a reply.
THE COURT: What $I$ did is I, unfortunately, made my ruling and didn't give him a chance to reply.

I made my ruling. It's not going to change, but if he wants to give a reply, we did it out of order. And it's my fault because $I$ know where I'm going, but if he wanted to add anything, I should have waited. I knew where $I$ wanted -- no, we are not getting into the other motions.

There's another motion $I$ wanted to handle too. I'm sorry it's taking so long, but this is really important. Do you mind going through lunch a little bit? You don't care. If I can stay here, you can stay. It's just too important, okay?

MR. JIMMERSON: Thank you.
The amended complaint was served upon the defendant in approximately January of 2 thousand -- not approximately, in January of 2011, and it had general allegations as to who the parties were, and then it talked about the entry of the commission agreement and then the original option agreement which allowed the payment of the commission.

The allegation then at Paragraph 6 and 7 and 8 is pursuant to the commission agreement, plaintiffs were to keep -- excuse me, defendants were to keep the plaintiffs fully informed of all issues and all sales and purchases of real property governed by the option agreement.

Specifically the letter said Pardee shall provide each of you a copy of each written exercise notice given pursuant to Paragraph 2 of this option agreement, together with the information as to the number of acres involved and the scheduled closing dates. In addition, Pardee shall keep each of you reasonably informed as to all matters relating to the amount and due dates of your commission payments, and then it went on.

There is clearly -- the main thrust of this entire case was for information. There is clearly a claim that if the court found that there were past due commissions due, largely because the Court would find option property was exercised.

THE COURT: Right.
MR. JIMMERSON: Although no notices were given, because it was to the east of the Parcel 1 location, then that would be compensable potentially to the plaintiffs. We didn't know if that had been done and how the Court was going to rule on that.

And secondly, during the course of the trial, not beforehand, we discovered 225 acres of multi-family property being redesignated as single family, and then one part of that, Res. 5, actually having been filed with Clark County as residential production real
estate, which would have quantified at 1.5 percent to $\$ 30,000$, okay? We didn't know that until the trial, as you know.

And then the whole issue of redesignation came up during the trial. We had not argued about redesignation, because we simply were asking for the commission based upon what they were designating as residential production property and then whether it fell within the original purchase as an exercise of option property.

THE COURT: That was your theory from the beginning. I understand that.

MR. JIMMERSON: Right.
And of course none of this about 1.8 million ever entered the trial, but $I$ want you to -- and this was attached to their opposition. It was our fifth disclosure.

And I want you to read it and understand what it says, because there was never -- everybody in this courtroom knew that what had been purchased by Pardee was roughly 1,800 acres that grew to about 2,000 acres. How do we know that? Because you can take $\$ 84$ million, you can divide it by 40,000 an acre, you get 1,800 acres, and as Mr. Whittemore said, with parks and different things it turned out that we deeded over to
them, about 2,100 acres.
THE COURT: Right, I remember.
MR. JIMMERSON: There were 5,000 or more acres in this whole development that was designated for single-family potential for Pardee. Pardee in the option agreement, therefore, had another 3,000 acres over the next 35 years to build production single-family real estate, and for which our clients would be entitled to a commission. This is our fifth supplement.

That's why they're in this case, because everybody knew that there hadn't been a subsequent purchase of any acres, let alone 3,000 acres for, you know, beyond that. We just didn't know how the lines were drawn. We knew about what had been purchased and whether or not it quantified to a commission.

This is what we wrote: Computation of
damages. See, this is where $I$ believe respectfully the Court and opposing counsel have inadvertently misstated this, there is no theory -- the theory of liability, the claims, which are claims under our Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, are three: Accounting, breach of contract for failure to provide information, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing for failure to give information, and if there are damages
-- if there are commissions due through discovery, then that should be paid. That's what the complaints say.

There was no two different theories. What was discussed was two possible areas or theories of calculation of damages, so $I$ just want to make it clear.

THE COURT: Do that again. You're saying you didn't have a theory that they breached because they didn't pay and you didn't --

MR. JIMMERSON: No, that's not true. I'm saying --

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. JIMMERSON: -- that our complaint and amended complaints always said the same thing, that there was a need for an accounting because we didn't - -

THE COURT: I understand that.

MR. JIMMERSON: Because we needed to know if there were more commissions due to us, breach of contract for failure to give that information, and if there were monies due to us, to be paid those monies, and the same with the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

THE COURT: So if they had money due, if, if they had actually not paid you the full commission based on what they had bought, you had -- that was a
breach of the contract.

MR. JIMMERSON: Exactly.
THE COURT: Okay. That's all I was saying.
MR. JIMMERSON: Right. You got it right.
THE COURT: That's what Ms. Lundvall was
saying.
MR. JIMMERSON: So what we had then were two components. The defendant used the word "theory."

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. JIMMERSON: But two components of
damages. We had whatever commissions would be due to us that we learned through the case and through the trial, and second would be, of course, the damages associated with the need to file a lawsuit and alternatively find information from CSI that was never intentionally produced by Pardee to the plaintiffs, which the Court awarded $\$ 141,500$.

The number $\$ 1.8$ million, as shown in the disclosure, has nothing to do with what $I$ just said. What we wrote was specific and clear about what might happen in the future, so what was read in the
disclosure is under Computation of Damages. It's at Page 7 of the document. It was filed October, I think 13th, but $I$ may be wrong.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JIMMERSON: 2012. Let me look at the exact date.

The 26 th day of October 2012 , so it's a year before trial. This is what's written: There appears -- this is Line 22. There appears to be at least 3,000 acres of property defined as option property, not purchase property, not the 84 million.

THE COURT: No.

MR. JIMMERSON: Defined as option property under the option agreement effective June 1, 2004, currently owned by Coyote Springs. Under the option agreement effective June 1, 2004 , these 3,000 acres can be purchased by Pardee and designated as production residential property purchase and a designation that would entitle plaintiffs to a 1.5 percent commission on a per acre price of 40,000 .

If 3,000 acres were purchased by Pardee under this scenario, plaintiffs would be entitled to \$1.8 million in commissions; however, Pardee's course of conduct by failing to appropriately discharge its duties under the commission agreement robbed plaintiffs of this opportunity to be paid these commissions.

Pardee's actions have served to reclassify the land originally labeled as purchase property and option property, and under the new reclassifications,
all option property has been removed from Clark County, thereby divesting plaintiffs of any hope to collect any part the $\$ 1.8$ million in commissions that would be paid had no reclassification occurred.

The second part is, the second component is calculation, is the attorney's fees associated with that at that time was $\$ 102,000$ in October 2012 .

So all I'm saying to you is that we knew that they had purchased about 2,100 acres.

THE COURT: Out of the --
MR. JIMMERSON: Out of the 5,000 --
THE COURT: Right.
MR. JIMMERSON: -- that they had, and all I was saying to them is that if you have gone ahead behind our back and purchased the other 3, 000 then, or if you're going to in the future, that would entitle us to commission, because they would be paying $\$ 120$ million for the 3,000 acres. Multiply that by 1.5 is a million, eight. That's all.

THE COURT: That relates to the million, eight. I understand.

MR. JIMMERSON: That's right.
THE COURT: It's a quantification issue.

MR. JIMMERSON: This trial was never about 1.8 million, and that's where I respectfully believe

Pardee has distorted in their motions and presentations to this point, because they understood and you understood no 3,000 acres had yet been purchased by Pardee. We were debating on the 2,100 acres that was purchased as to whether it was purchase property --

THE COURT: I agree.
MR. JIMMERSON: -- or whether it was option property.

And by the way, as it turns out, it may have not made much of a difference, because you're still multiplying by 1.5 percent above $\$ 50$ million, so it may not have changed the actual dollars, but $I$ do want to make it clear that the defendant, Pardee, clearly knew this was a theoretical possibility in the next 35 years, that this could be owed and certainly would be owed if Pardee brought 3, 000 acres of this real estate.

THE COURT: Hold on. I'm gonna let you.
MR. JIMMERSON: So what is a fair
characterization of what occurred was --

THE COURT: What occurred, okay.
MR. JIMMERSON: Was our claim for additional commissions was lost at trial. I totally understand that.

THE COURT: Okay. We're on the same page.
MR. JIMMERSON: And in our proposed findings
and in the defense's proposed findings, you have both sides of the issue of whether or not we're entitled to a commission on the 225 acres or the Res. 5. The reason that we broke it to Res. 5 was it was the one parcel that had been platted and given to Clark County as opposed to the whole 225 which resulted in that 30,000 --

THE COURT: The other acres with the geographical boundary issue, so we're all there.

MR. JIMMERSON: All right. So had you gone with the plaintiffs' position, as part of the accounting you would have had a discussion of what has been purchased, what is owed.

THE COURT: Right, because --
MR. JIMMERSON: Redesignation entitles the plaintiffs to $\$ 30,000$. We have gone through that. That would have been part of the accounting, but at no time was anybody defending $\$ 1.8$ million.

THE COURT: And here's the issue --

MR. JIMMERSON: Because the 3,000 acres
hadn't even been purchased.
THE COURT: And $I$ understand they wanted you to quantify, but you can't quantify until you find out how much, through those documents, were actually, of the option property, would go under it. I understand
all that.
MR. JIMMERSON: Absolutely.

THE COURT: That's why I had the disconnect on the 1.8 million. I understand that. That's why this was helpful. We're on the same page.

MR. JIMMERSON: Got it.
THE COURT: I certainly understand.
MR. JIMMERSON: So here's, here's an issue
for you. You found -- and one of the things that disturbed me when $I$ read this is the, the part of the judgment, the finding in the first order which you've stricken, it was completely outside of your findings. You know, that was offensive to Mr. Wolfram and to Mr. Wilkes and myself, because there was no attempt to write a judgment that would mirror or, you know, state in some fashion your findings, and so this whole issue of $\$ 1.8$ million and somehow Pardee prevailed was nowhere part of your findings, so it was just a creativity by Pardee because they were looking for a way to try to get their attorney's fees back.

I think $I$ said $I$ understand the pressure that counsel is under for the defense, but it's not right to distort the record to do that.

THE COURT: No.

MR. JIMMERSON: So hear me out. We asked for
141,000 -- excuse me, we asked for 150,000. I asked
for 146,000 plus 6,000. You gave us 135,500 plus
6,000. I lost $\$ 10,000$, but my point is $I$ won that
claim, all right?
I didn't win the 30,000 for Res. 5, and I
didn't win a calculation of what dollars may be owed to
the plaintiffs for option property to the east of the
Parcel 1 boundary. I lost.
THE COURT: Okay. I agree.
MR. JIMMERSON: And we don't know what that
was. You see, when Ms. Lundvall stands here before
you, she nowhere can quote any testimony from
Mr. Wolfram or Mr. Wilkes or from anyone for the
defendant that quantifies what is owed. That's why the
whole $\$ 1.8$ million is a fugitive issue.
THE COURT: I think $I$ was very clear when $I$
spoke with her that the 1.8 was my disconnect, and
Ms. Lundvall said to me if you have a quantification
issue -- I certainly do.
MR. JIMMERSON: Right. So all I'm trying to
say to the Court is that you have three claims, you
have a couple theories of damage, but they're not
theories of -- the claims are just accounting. The
three, they never changed, but we do have two aspects
or two components of damages, and we lost one.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JIMMERSON: In the sense that we didn't win additional commissions. Okay, I mean I wasn't happy with that ruling, but that's what it was. But what was being discussed was the information.

You see, where the defendant distorts this is they somehow say to you, we entirely spent 90 percent of our time defending against the money claim. Well, that wasn't this trial. They defended against the claim of accounting and breach of contract on damages. We spent all the time -- not damages, on the information.

We spent all the time on what information was provided, and the defense argued that was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of the commission agreement letter to provide information, which the court disagreed with. That's the thrust of this case.

So I guess what I'm saying to you is when you win on accounting, when you win on breach of contract for failure to inform and you win $\$ 141,500$, and you lose some unknown amount of dollars, depending on what that may have been, to the east of Parcel 1, I mean was it $\$ 50,000$ ? Was it $\$ 200,000$ ? We don't know, because nobody quantified it, because we wouldn't know the number of acres to the east without an accounting.

Jon Lash I asked this specifically: How many acres are to the east of Parcel 1? I don't know, Mr. Jimmerson. Well, if he didn't know, no one's going to know, and that's what the second phase of this trial would have determined had you gone with that point.

So I'm totally with defendants and with you to say that aspect of entitlement to additional commissions we lost, but that aspect had nothing to do with $\$ 1.8$ million, it had to do with the 30 acres Res. 5 and had to do with whether or not you allowed them to build east of the Parcel 1 boundary. That's it. That's what this trial was about.

And when you read the deposition testimony -I'm sorry, when you read the trial testimony of Mr. Wolfram, and this was what was cross-examined by Ms. Lundvall, he testifies this: Plaintiff has -excuse me.

Mr. Wolfram testifies: And this is, to me, the basis of my whole court case here. I don't, I don't care about money and all that stuff. My basis is that I've been breached on information. I should not have had to go to this particular map. There are other things too. Not my family could ever ever have tried to find out what's going on and do a map like this, I mean there is just not a chance, October 30th, 2013
testimony, Page 174, Lines 8 through 15 of the trial transcript.

Our opening statement and our closing statement mirrors that point, that the evidence will demonstrate that he could have lost commissions, may have lost commissions, so we knew that, we believed we may have been entitled to that but we didn't know that.

And there was so much discovery during the trial, because we didn't have access to Mr. Whittemore in the fashion that you did. You know, your questioning of him, okay, as well as some of the other witnesses, is very helpful, because they can, they can dance if I'm asking a question or opposing counsel is questioning, but when a judge asks you a question, you know, you tend to get a more honest, truthful response and a more, in this regard, comprehensive understanding of this, and the Court was probing him, if you look at the record.

So all I'm getting at is we can't have revisionist history. Pardee cannot try to change what occurred, which was a struggle, a really hotly contested case. My compliments to the defense counsel with their eagerness. They certainly spent a lot of money on this case apparently in fees, but they didn't prevail, because their clients didn't do the right
thing. It's not the lawyers did right or wrong, their clients didn't do the right thing, as found by you.

And $I$ will tell you we're gonna have an issue on this judgment. This judgment has to say, has to mirror your findings. I have no problems saying that an unknown amount of money, an unquantified amount of money that the plaintiffs thought they may be entitled to were the court to agree you can't redesignate to beat somebody out of commission, and you can't build east of the Parcel 1 without compensating them as option property, that would have been owed to them, but that, that is certainly the minor part of the case. The case was --

THE COURT: But now you're going to the arguing of the prevailing, and $I$ understand we both did it.

MR. JIMMERSON: Right. I'm just saying, I'm demonstrating to you though --

THE COURT: Right.
MR. JIMMERSON: -- for purposes of today's motion, that any suggestion that they won any part of this case is false. They did defend successfully our claim for an unknown amount of commissions based upon their actions building east of the Parcel 1 or redesignating property that we discovered during trial.

I understand that, but that is really not what this case was about. That's not what they did. They didn't defend against Res. 5, they were defending against the accounting. They were defending against their claim that they didn't provide -- that they did provide information, which the court found against them on those. That's what this case was about and that's what the testimony was about.

And that's why when you ask questions of opposing counsel, when she does choose to answer them, she doesn't answer many of your questions, but when she answered the question, Yes, there is nothing in the record that talks about $\$ 1.8$ million, there's nothing in the record that says this is a quantification, because the whole thing going forward will be, as we'll discuss later, $I$ guess, that 1.8 million is bigger than $\$ 141,500$; therefore, we should at least get a break on his fees that he's entitled to as prevailing party on the commission as well as exceeding the offer of judgment.

That's where the mischief was. The mischief by Pardee is $I$ got to rewrite to the judgment to reflect somehow that we won so that we can somehow mitigate the damages that we obviously will owe to the plaintiffs in the form of the attorney's fees, and
that's what will come later on, but $I$ needed to correct the record because it's not two theories, it's two elements of a claim of damages, one of which we were not successful on.

But when you talk in terms of the testimony, if you just look at Jon Lash's testimony, Harvey Whittemore's testimony, the plaintiffs' testimony, it was not about quantification of damages, it was about whether or not they breached their agreement to provide information. And then the second part of the trial that we had spoken to would have been that quantification, that's true.

And I never said, respectfully, it's upsetting to suggest that $I$ never said this was not about dollars. What $I$ was saying to you is that we didn't know.

And when you're at trial and Ms. Lundvall asked Mr. Wolfram, What are you claiming? What are you asking for? I don't know, I can't tell you. That's about as clear as you need to have evidence to know that this was about the liability portion of the case in terms of establishing the right to an accounting, establishing a breach of contract for failure to provide information, and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to do the same, and then from
that we would have had a second trial. You ruled in their favor with regard to those issues, but that clearly was not the dominant part of that.

And when you look at your own finding, that is really the final point. When you look at your own finding, there's nothing in what you said that would have supported what they wrote, and that's why you're granting this motion to strike, in addition to the irregularities with regard to how it got signed in the first place.

THE COURT: Right.
MR. JIMMERSON: I'm not familiar with the cover letter. I don't know that they produced the cover letter. You didn't see the cover letter, but all I'm trying to get at is it's an important document. Both of sides know it.

I had an issue with the defendant not giving me notice the previous October with regard to a submission that they made to you. I wrote them a letter to please add someone. They didn't do that, you know. It's just a matter that they have an obligation. I would no more submit a judgment without at least contacting them and either having their name on the document and slash it in case they refuse to cooperate, but, of course, what would happen and what likely will
happen here is you will be given competing orders.

THE COURT: You know, we're kind of back to where we would have been if this judgment was first submitted, because $I$ don't think you would have, based on all that's happened it probably would have not, but that's okay.

I just want to get us back to square one so that then -- plus, in all honesty, if $I$ would have gotten competing judgments like that, $I$ probably would have asked for a hearing on it, because you've now fleshed it out, in all honesty, so I feel bad we lost some time, but we didn't, because it probably would have done its normal course.

Does that make sense?

MR. JIMMERSON: I only --
MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor?

MR. JIMMERSON: Can I just mention one other thing?

MS. LUNDVALL: What I would like to do is to respond as far as to the comments.

THE COURT: Are you finished, Mr. Jimmerson?
MR. JIMMERSON: I do want to speak to the stay for just a second.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. JIMMERSON: Judge?

MS. LUNDVALL: The Court has made a ruling on
this. I guess this is a motion for reconsideration now?

THE COURT: I'm gonna keep the stay,

Mr. Jimmerson.

MR. JIMMERSON: I understand.
THE COURT: Until $I$ get this judgment clear, and it's not going to be an easy -- I don't have a crystal ball, but $I$ feel like it will be contested, and that's important.

So I'm not gonna let you execute on a judgment until $I$ know what $I$ feel truly it should be.

MR. JIMMERSON: I appreciate it.
THE COURT: I'm not, I'm not gonna change that.

MR. JIMMERSON: I don't agree, but I respect your decision and I'm not rearguing. That's not my style.

I just want to indicate a bond would have been appropriate here, and they have not posted a bond. See, $I$ don't know what's going on with Pardee.

THE COURT: Did he -- when he did the stay, did he ask for a bond?

MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, hold, hold, hold, hold.

MR. JIMMERSON: He said no bond is necessary because Pardee is a big company. I mean that's what Judge Bonaventure said.

THE COURT: All right. I'm not gonna redo
that. I'm not going to require a bond, I'm not, but --
MR. JIMMERSON: At some point, when a
judgment is entered, $I$ would ask you to reconsider that.

THE COURT: All right. Let's just, let's just, let's just step back and let's get this judgment done, because that is very critical.

And I'm more than letting you -- I agree.
MR. JIMMERSON: Is there a reason, is there a
reason why Ms. Lundvall is at the podium?
THE COURT: You know what, I would like to hear everything while I've got it in my mind, because this is argument I'm going to have to know about when this judgment -- so I don't mind letting you respond.

MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you.

THE COURT: And if you need to, I'll stay
here all day, if you all fall over from hunger. This
is too important to me. I will stay.

MR. JIMMERSON: It's important to the
plaintiffs too, your Honor.
THE COURT: I would never infer it's not
important to everybody. That has been blatantly clear from day one of this case. I would stipulate everybody has done great efforts.

MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you, your Honor.
One of the comments $I$ want to make simply is
that the concession that Mr. Jimmerson made in the remarks that he made to you, he identified the fact that one of the theories that they were advancing was the fact that we had purchased option property, and he's absolutely correct in that regard. What we were defending, what we were defending against is whether or not that we had purchased option property. That, your Honor, was 90 percent of your case.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. LUNDVALL: And the Court found, the Court found in our favor, that we had not purchased option property.

Now, Mr. Jimmerson and the Court now has identified that you quarrel with the quantification that we put on that, but there is no question about the fact that what they had suggested is that we had purchased option property, but what we had defended against is that we did not, and that you had found in our favor on that point.

Now --

THE COURT: I would have agreed to that if you walked in from day one. My findings showed that, and he understands that.

MS. LUNDVALL: Now --

THE COURT: That could have been day one stipulated, okay?

MS. LUNDVALL: One of the things $I$ want to do is that the Court has indicated that you had an interest in some additional cases --

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. LUNDVALL: -- that we had spoken to.
THE COURT: On the --
MS. LUNDVALL: Prevailing party issue.
THE COURT: Yes. Sorry.
MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you.
THE COURT: I read every one.
MS. LUNDVALL: And that's why I'm standing at the podium.

THE COURT: Okay. I appreciate it. Please make sure they get it too.

MS. LUNDVALL: So a couple points $I$ want to make as far as a preface to this when giving these to the Court, when $I$ look at all of the papers and in preparation for this hearing, in my opinion it's easy to get lost, and so what I'm gonna try to do is my
level best to give a little bit of a road map on this prevailing party issue then to the Court.

And the most important part that I think that
the Court needs to do is to start from why it is that the Court's being asked to make this determination.

The reason that the court is being asked to make this determination is because there's a clause within the commission agreement.

THE COURT: For attorney's fees.
MS. LUNDVALL: Correct.

THE COURT: I saw that.

MS. LUNDVALL: And there's, there's case law that has been bounded about, in particular from Mr. Jimmerson's office, that speaks to NRS 18.010 and interpreting 18.010 .

And what $I$ want to do is to make sure that the court looks at the entirety of the statute, because the statute says this: In requesting attorney's fees, and making a determination for prevailing party under 18.010 --

THE COURT: 18.010 .

MS. LUNDVALL: -- it does not apply to a private contract and there is a provision within the private --

THE COURT: Did you brief it that way?

MS. LUNDVALL: 18.010 , Subsection --
THE COURT: No, I have read it, 18.010. I actually almost brought it up here until $I$ realized there was a judgment issue.

MS. LUNDVALL: All right. Section Sub. 4, and I'm going to quote, the Sections 2 and 3 upon which they rely do not apply to any action arising out of a written instrument or agreement which entitles the prevailing party to an award of reasonable attorney's fees.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. LUNDVALL: So when they contend in their brief that we did not get a monetary damage in our favor, and therefore, we can't be the prevailing party, they cite to NRS 18.010 cases, and guess what, those cases don't apply.

And so what $I$ did is $I$ tried to laser focus my research to be able to identify for the court the cases that arise from a contract provision --

THE COURT: Right.
MS. LUNDVALL: -- that has a prevailing party, because that's what's at issue, and so I've got one.

THE COURT: I read, I read every one of those. If you have another one, that's fine, because
this is gonna come up when we do our judgment.

MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, what I would hand to the Court and what $I$ would hand a copy then to Mr. Jimmerson --

THE COURT: Is that Nevada, I hope?
MS. LUNDVALL: Yes. This is from the Nevada Supreme Court. It's called Davis versus Bailey.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. LUNDVALL: It's 278 Pacific 3d 501. It's a 2012 case.

The sum total of this case, which was a case involving a contract provision that had a prevailing party clause within that contract was that when there is a successful defense, that successful defense can be used as a foundation to argue that you are the prevailing party, all right? It's pretty simple.

THE COURT: Okay. That's not too difficult.
MS. LUNDVALL: All right. The second
decision that $I$ intend to offer the Court then --
THE COURT: Did you -- you didn't cite this
in your brief, right?
MS. LUNDVALL: To be honest with you, I don't know the answer to that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. LUNDVALL: If we did not, we are
supplementing.
THE COURT: It doesn't ring a bell to me, but I've read so many I'm not gonna say you didn't.

You have another one?
MS. LUNDVALL: Now, the second one, it's quite possible we did not cite this, and the reason why was that there was recently a rule change for our Nevada Supreme Court as to whether or not that you can cite to unpublished decisions.

THE COURT: Yes. You're not supposed to, but we all did it, but after January they'll actually say it has authority.

Don't you love that? I think it's great what they did.

MR. LUNDVALL: And here's one for the Court then to consider, and I'm gonna hand a copy to Mr. Jimmerson as well.

THE COURT: And I have to do it under the new rule since it was December 20th, I get it.

MS. LUNDVALL: Understood.
And it's a case that's called Freedman versus Freedman, and it's found at 2012 Westlaw 6681933. It's a 2012 decision from our Nevada Supreme Court. And what this decision, if you go through this, this dealt with a marital agreement, and there was two parties
then that were obviously on opposite sides, and each had differing views concerning that marital agreement, but the marital agreement had a provision for prevailing party.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. LUNDVALL: All right. So what happened in this case is that the plaintiff prevailed on a portion of their case, and the defendant prevailed on a portion of his, and what the Court did then in the district court is it quantified the damages that were entailed with the portion that the plaintiff prevailed upon, compared that then to the portion that the defendant prevailed upon, and created a net judgment in accordance with the prevailing party provision.

THE COURT: Sure.
MS. LUNDVALL: And that's what we ask the Court to do, and you can make that same determination then in this case.

THE COURT: I see where you're coming from.
MS. LUNDVALL: Okay. So from the standpoint you've already quantified the amount of attorney's fees that they incurred by reason then of not getting the information, and you made that a form of special damages.

THE COURT: I did.

MS. LUNDVALL: And we know what that sum is.
THE COURT: Right.

MS. LUNDVALL: So then what the issue becomes
then, we also know that Pardee prevailed on a portion of this case, so then the issue is --

THE COURT: Is the quantification.
MS. LUNDVALL: Precisely.
THE COURT: I get it, Ms. Lundvall. That's
what started me on the 1.8 million.
MS. LUNDVALL: All right. So let's focus on
our motion for attorney's fees.
THE COURT: No, I'm not gonna go there.
MS. LUNDVALL: But let --
THE COURT: All $I$ want to do is address the quantification. I'm on the same page with you on the prevailing party. I understand what you're saying. I don't want to get -- I'm not going to go through the attorney's fees.

My problem on this judgment, and I'm still gonna stand with it, is the 1.8. The quantification was an issue that just stuck out to me from the beginning, and it still does.

MS. LUNDVALL: But what $I$ understand then that the Court will allow us to do, is once that you finalized your new judgment, that you're gonna give us
the opportunity then to argue our motions for attorney's fees.

THE COURT: Absolutely.
MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you.
THE COURT: That's --
MS. LUNDVALL: That's --
THE COURT: If $I$ didn't make that clear, absolutely. When $I$ worked through all this and then when $I$ looked it up and realized, whether you disagree with me, $I$ have a problem on the judgment. It has to be right. And going back, I started to write one myself, and $I$ go, No, I'm gonna enforce my own rule.

And $I$ wanted to give you an understanding why
I do not agree with this judgment. I would not have agreed with that, and we went through why it happened. Once again, $I$ take responsibility. We didn't follow our procedure, but once -- now we're gonna start with that, okay, absolutely.

In fact, that's what $I$ was going to go
through. Let me keep my notes here, one second.
Then my notes here, the only -- so then I've got -- let's do this then.

MS. LUNDVALL: My prediction is that --
THE COURT: Let's do this. The defendant's -- then $I$ can go through, I've got them all here.

Defendant's motion to amend the judgment entered 6/15/2015, this is your one on wanting to change on -now, here's what I looked at. Let me do this, and maybe -- when $I$ looked at your motion as far as the Sandy Valley damages, you were saying you were amending this judgment, the one $I$ just said was erroneous.

Do you realize that's what it said here?
MS. LUNDVALL: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. I realize that I need --
this I can address, and $I$ went through it extensively. My only question to you was whether you're really wanting to amend my findings of fact, conclusions of law and order where I cited, or whether you can -- you didn't waive anything by that, because obviously -- so this is gonna, you're gonna do this, because it still would -- that part is still gonna be in the new judgment, based on my findings of fact and conclusions of law. So, to me, then this would become moot, obviously.

Is it still gonna be there? Absolutely. You are not waiving anything.

Here's my question. I've read it a lot. If you want to amend, supplement, fine, but $I$ feel like I have a lot of briefing on that, so this one I'm going to deny without prejudice, because --

MS. LUNDVALL: May I explain to the Court why it is we brought that motion?

THE COURT: No.
MS. LUNDVALL: Very simply, I have two lines, and that is the one issue is we had not cited to Liu to you.

THE COURT: I did.
MS. LUNDVALL: I recognize and acknowledge you did, but we had not.

This is an issue that quite possibly may be taken up on appeal.

THE COURT: Oh, Ms. Lundvall, I would guarantee you it was from day one.

MS. LUNDVALL: I did not want an argument coming from plaintiffs' counsel that we had not argued Liu to you.

THE COURT: How could you, it came in after the motion?

MS. LUNDVALL: I understand that.
I got another appeal that, where that argument has been advanced, and we have been hashing through those issues. And what $I$ was trying to do is to preserve my record.

I understand very likely where the Court may come out on this, but $I$ did not want to get any
argument that somehow we have waived it by failing to raise Liu in the court below. That's the reason, your Honor, that we filed it.

MR. JIMMERSON: Judge, I want to add one other factor that does cut into this that's quite important, and it will help you in your calculation and your calculus.

We have filed a motion for attorney's fees on two different bases.

THE COURT: Right. I know.
MR. JIMMERSON: One under prevailing party. The reason $I$ say the fact that we offered a judgment which was denied or declined and we exceeded that judgment, you know, you need to be aware of it, because that cuts off even an analysis for prevailing party.

In other words, when you look at the case law, if the Court finds that the plaintiffs have exceeded their offer of judgment and that the statutory requirements under the then existing 17.115, which was later delayed but it was applied at the time, that cuts off the whole issue of prevailing party or you won on three issues and you won on one issue, because the offer of judgment resolves all matters, so I'm just asking you, that's something you will need to look at in conjunction with prevailing party.

THE COURT: I think that was kind of -- I
inferred that that was going to be an issue. I understand you don't agree with that. I agree with you, I actually, like I said, worked a lot on these until $I$ backed it up into realizing on this judgment. I spent the longest time on this for obvious reasons, because everything flows.

MR. JIMMERSON: The prevailing party analysis as to published decisions makes it clear that --

MS. LUNDVALL: The point that Mr. Jimmerson just articulated though, two points to this, number one, it assumes that he has a valid offer of judgment, which he doesn't, and we briefed that and the court is gonna hear argument on that.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. JIMMERSON: Right.
MS. LUNDVALL: Number two, and that is that the law he's now citing to the Court, which is why I'm trying to underscore this, is under NRS 18.010, it's not under the prevailing party provisions in a contract, and so that there's a different analysis that applies.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. LUNDVALL: Even if by some strange thing that the Court finds his offer of judgment valid, let
alone if he beat his offer of judgment, because he didn't under the plain language of it, but the point being is it still does not cut off the Court's analysis under the contract provision.

THE COURT: I appreciate that. I get it, so let me clean this up.

And here's the other thing, I'm not gonna set these all on one day, in fairness to all of us. I'm gonna try -- you can see $I$ got into a criminal trial, but when I -- I wanted to reserve today to really do a fair record for both of you on this judgment issue and also give exactly what $I$ did, give guidance on where $I$ feel we should go to at least give you some idea of what I want. I accomplished that. That was my goal. It took me -- but in fairness, $I$ understand that.

So what $I$ want to do is now clean this up. As far as defendant's motion to amend judgment entered, which basically $I$ call them the Sandy Valley, as we all know, damages, I'm going to deny this as moot because I have stricken the judgment.

I'm keeping all this. You are not waiving anything when this new judgment -- because it will have the Sandy Valley damages in it, because -- and here's the other thing: To be honest, I, I understand why you now say you feel it was a record on appeal, I honestly
felt it was just another chance to argue Sandy Valley, but I'm okay with that, because to be real honest, I want the most there, you know, in there for our appeal, because I know we all -- I suspected strongly from my rulings that, that the Sandy, that this would be, because I, I -- and that's why it would go up. That does not shock this Judge at all.

In fact, that's why I tried, honestly, Ms. Lundvall, that's why I looked for every new case that came down between when, after my Actos trial, between when we finished your trial and before $I$ took the week off to do this, so you're not surprised I found the case.

It's fine, and honestly, Mr. Jimmerson, that's why $I$ don't mind if you briefed it. I have no problem if that's in my record, in this record, so this is moot only for that reason, okay? Because the judgment, okay, nothing is waived, as we know. I'm very explicit.

The next one, the Number 4, which one is this?

The countermotion, okay, the countermotion for attorney's fees on Pardee's motion to amend judgment, this is also moot, because I did not hear the motion to amend the judgment, but $I$ will tell you, I, $I$
do look at -- I can't give you advisory.
Let me just say, since we've opened up a lot
of topics here, I do look at NRCP 11(a)(1)(a), instead
of allowing countermotions, I will tell you, because I
do look at it that if $I$ agree you can have a motion for
sanction, if you think it's, if the Court has grounds
for that, but $I$ do require a separate motion just even
before you did it, just for that reason, because $I$ am
trying so hard, because people do countermotions, so I
do read Rule 11 that way, okay?

But that does not waive any of your rights for that, you do understand, so that's not advisory, I'm just telling you how $I$ read Rule 11 on the countermotions.

Okay. The plaintiffs' motion for order -okay, this one we could do, the plaintiffs' motion for order requiring defendant, when serving by electronic means, to serve three specific persons.

I don't know how Wiznet works. I tried to find out.

Basically the defense is, Hey, if they want it through the electronic, it can go to Wiznet.

Here's my thought, because of this case I have no problem, because that's whether it gets to your firm, not you specifically.

MR. JIMMERSON: Well, your Honor, we're
talking two different things.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. JIMMERSON: By Wiznet, there is an
obligation by each lawyer, each firm, to serve the list, to serve whoever you've designated.

THE COURT: Right, on the list service.
MR. JIMMERSON: We're not talking about that.
This motion doesn't speak to that. This motion speaks to emails to myself.

MS. LUNDVALL: No, it doesn't.
MR. JIMMERSON: I want emails that are gonna be communicated to me by McDonald Carano to be added to my secretary and now to Mr. Flaxman.

THE COURT: Are you asking me for any email between you?

MR. JIMMERSON: That's right. Any order, any email communicated to me is to be sent to three people, not one person, and the defense has no defense to that. They are confused. They say we're talking about Wiznet. Well, Wiznet, you got to serve whoever is on the mailing list.

If they submit a judgment to me by email, and they know I don't read it, I'm asking for a Court order so there is no excuse by them not to comply and that
they would serve my secretary and my associate.
THE COURT: When you say "email," you mean any order? You're not saying every correspondence?

MR. JIMMERSON: I'm saying every
correspondence from McDonald Carano on this case be done, not on other cases, this case. I want to make sure that $I$ read it and that $I$ see it, and that what happened in this case on June 15 th or so does not repeat, that's all.

It's so easy for them to add one other name or two other names to the "to" box on a computer, that's all, to the point where don't send it to me, send it -- my point is it's no big deal to send it to three people.

What gets me is if she would have asked me, Would you make sure you send Rory a copy, yes, of course, but not with Pardee. Pardee, they're just never gonna communicate or cooperate, so $I$ want an order that obligates them that with regard to this case, any communications by email as opposed to a letter in the mail be sent to three people, not just to me.

MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, I'm not trying to be difficult here, but you know what, there are rules that have consequences in this case, and there are
issues that interrelate to this request that he has made now orally.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MS. LUNDVALL: And $I$ want to as far as point
the Court specifically to his motion.
THE COURT: I got it.
MR. LUNDVALL: Mr. Jimmerson is so very apt to read, and let me read from his own motion.

He says on Page 1 of his motion, Request this

Court for an order compelling defendants and its counsel, if they are choosing to serve documents by electronic means, and especially when serving by electronic means without hard copies by U.S. Mail to plaintiffs' counsel, to serve three individuals.

MR. JIMMERSON: Right.
MS. LUNDVALL: And now he's changing the identity of who it is he wants to have served from his motion, but the point being is that we serve documents through wiznet. You can't order what happens through Wiznet. I can't order what happens through Wiznet.

If he wants things served upon him, then he and his staff have to register with Wiznet. That is all I'm talking about.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. LUNDVALL: Now, to the extent he's made
an oral motion that is separate and apart from what the actual motion he filed before the court is, from my perspective, I am a stickler for rules, and especially when those rules will adversely impact my client, because $I$ know what's gonna happen. His argument is going to be that since we did not do this in the past, that somehow there was something nefarious then, because we had sent the letter to the court, we had copied him on that letter.

And so to the extent that what he's trying now by which to do is not only to accomplish something prospectively, but to accomplish then something then that's going to have a relationship to an issue that's already before the court, and so his oral motion, number one, has no factual basis. His oral motion has no legal foundation. He has no rule, no citation to a rule by which that he can say, Your Honor, to compel her to send me an email and compel her to copy somebody else. That, with all due respect, your Honor, is ridiculous.

THE COURT: So here's how I'm gonna do this motion, because the reason $I$ brought it up is because of what happened in our first motion.

And I am a stickler for rules too, you know, that affects this court and everybody, as you know,
because of what happened on not approving as to form and content, so I, above all people, I am a stickler for rules now.

What I'm going to say as far as I'm not going to grant this motion, but I'm going to emphasize that for any orders or any judgment in this case, that you, both of you are ordered to give it to the other person as to form and content, and that if you do not have someone to form and content within a reasonable time, you are to let this Court know what the reasonable time was, what efforts you made to get ahold of the other person, and -- before you do it, and if you get ahold of them and they disagree, do exactly what I said. Tell me either you both proposed and your basis for it. That's what I'm going to do.

MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: Which I thought was my standing order, but obviously I am going to do a specific one here, so if there's a misunderstanding that an order is different from a judgment, it won't happen again.

MR. JIMMERSON: Could I have the Court order
that any communication to myself be directed to my secretary? They don't have to send it to me.

THE COURT: I'm not sure I have the
jurisdiction.

MR. JIMMERSON: When you hear that they
refuse to serve somebody $I$ asked to be served, and $I$ don't read it, and they knew about it a year and a half ago, and they still go through that, what is somebody to believe? I just want to make sure that when $I$ get something from the McDonald Carano firm in this case that I'm aware of it, and so sending it to me will not make me aware of it.

I would like to have an order from the court or a stipulation from the defendant.

THE COURT: Here's what $I$ said, let's be real plain here, any communication, whether it's written or whether it's email or -- who do you want them to, if it's not you, who do they --

MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor?

MR. JIMMERSON: Ks@jimmersonlawfirm.com.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, there is a way for you to be able to accomplish what it is he wants, and let me make a suggestion. There is a function in Wiznet that when $I$ file something, I also have to ask for it to be served, but if $I$ don't want something filed, $I$ can simply say I'm going to serve him.

Now, whoever they have had register for their service, they get it automatically. They're in charge
of that.

THE COURT: But he's going beyond service.
MR. JIMMERSON: I'm not talking about
service, I'm talking about --
MS. LUNDVALL: This is what I'm talking about, is that if I'm going to send him a proposed judgment, $I$ can do that through the service function on Wiznet.

MR. JIMMERSON: But you didn't do that this year, you didn't do that in --

THE COURT: Okay. You know what, it's real easy, I'm sorry.

MS. LUNDVALL: And $I$ will do that. That's the point $I^{\prime} m$ trying to make, and so it will accomplish what it is that he wants.

THE COURT: You will serve it to that person?
MS. LUNDVALL: I will do it through Wiznet, and whoever they have through wiznet, they receive copies of it. So once again, it puts the ball in their court to have somebody register for --

MR. JIMMERSON: No problem, we have
registered everyone in this case.
THE COURT: But you're going beyond that, you're going beyond other emails.

Am I understanding you right?

MR. JIMMERSON: Absolutely right.
THE COURT: That's his oral motion, and I agree he just asked about service, and I agree.

Who, instead of them doing it to you, and they're not going to -- on different communications, they are not going to have to do three people. You're telling them who you want any communication to go to.

MR. JIMMERSON: Right, any emails, just send it to ks@jimmersonlawfirm.com.

You know, we send everything to Ms. Lundvall and to Rory.

Sorry, I don't remember your last name.
They won't accommodate that, and they know I don't read it.

THE COURT: Okay. It's very easy, if you want to -- I absolutely feel like, so we don't have any more misunderstandings, any emails on this case that you want to go to Mr. Jimmerson, do not send it to his email, send it to --

MR. JIMMERSON: Ks@jimmersonlawfirm.com.
THE COURT: Ks@jimmerson, and he cannot come to this Court and say he didn't get it.

MR. JIMMERSON: Agreed.
MS. LUNDVALL: And from this perspective, one of the things that $I$ would suggest to the court, let me
offer this suggestion to you. I've made the representation that any emails, any letters, anything, we will send to Mr. Jimmerson through the serve function on Wiznet and so it gets to them. I've made that representation, and so that's a stipulation.

THE COURT: You're using Wiznet for
everything, like Mr. Jimmerson --
MS. LUNDVALL: Absolutely.
THE COURT: You're using --
MS. LUNDVALL: Absolutely. You can use
Wiznet for that function, absolutely.
MR. JIMMERSON: Do you understand the game they're playing?

MS. LUNDVALL: What I'm trying to do is to give the Court an out, because number one, you don't have a motion before you. Number two, you don't have any grounds before you, and I'm trying to make sure that there's no issue in your record that --

THE COURT: Well, if you want to appeal me on this, have at it, Ms. Lundvall. I mean $I$ have an issue in front of me that somebody -- and $I$ can tell you the issue came because the stickler for the rules, the rules didn't happen on this judgment.

MR. JIMMERSON: That's right.
THE COURT: So I do have an issue. My
concern is how do $I$ address it?
If you're saying you don't do private email,
every email you send goes through Wiznet?
MR. JIMMERSON: That's not true.
THE COURT: I just, $I$ just want her to get on
the record and tell me. Every email, whether it's,
Mr. Jimmerson, I'm going to be late for court on
January 14 , so please don't start without me, that
would go through Wiznet?
MS. LUNDVALL: Prospectively, for this case,
I will do that from this point forward.
MR. JIMMERSON: I'm not asking her to do
that. She does not need to do that.
THE COURT: But if that accomplishes, if you
will do that, then you have them on Wiznet, and then you can get five of them or whoever you have on Wiznet. We're done.

MS. LUNDVALL: That's right.
THE COURT: If that's what you'll do, that's fine.

MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: We accomplished what we want.
I'm fine.
And then not only that one, but then if it's -- then we actually have a basis to trace that it went
through Wiznet.
MS. LUNDVALL: Absolutely. That's my point.
THE COURT: Well, $I$-- so based on that, I'm gonna order that. That's regarding plaintiffs' motion for ordering client, defendant, when serving electronic means, to serve three, what $I^{\prime} m$ going to say is that I am going to deny that -- no.

MS. LUNDVALL: Yes, you are denying it.
THE COURT: I'm just trying to think how I
make sure $I$ get in the ruling, denying it based on the ruling that you, prospectively, the defendant prospectively will serve all email through wiznet.

MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you, your Honor.
MR. JIMMERSON: For this case.
MS. LUNDVALL: For purposes of this case prospectively.

THE COURT: For this case. This is the only case $I$ have with you, so for this case, so we're very specific, yes. Okay.

We have Pardee's motion for attorney's fees. This is Number 6. It is also moot, because it's based on the judgment of 6/15/2015.

This is the prevailing party -- I understand. The notes from what you just gave me, $I$ will put it with that. We can get into so many things, can we not,
on this case?

So this is denied only because it is moot.
MS. LUNDVALL: Hold on, your Honor. From
this prospective, are you denying these motions --
THE COURT: No.
MS. LUNDVALL: -- or are you holding them over for future --

THE COURT: That's a good question. I was going to deny them as moot. Then you would have to refile them.

MS. LUNDVALL: Then everything would have to be refiled, then there would be a new opportunity if you want to -- my suggestion to the court is to simply continue these then.

THE COURT: Well, but your motion is asking for a judgment of 6/15/2015.

MS. LUNDVALL: Well, from this perspective, your Honor, though, no matter what is contained within the judgment, based upon what you've said today, our position being the prevailing party on the portion of the case, as we've talked about, we prevailed on a portion of this case.

THE COURT: Okay. Just, just --
MS. LUNDVALL: They prevailed on another one. That's all set forth.

THE COURT: Okay. You know what, I am going -- no, no. I'm going to deny it, and you can just -you have it all in your briefing, and you can refile it based on the new judgment.

MR. JIMMERSON: Could we have a --
THE COURT: I'm denying it as moot, and you can refile it.

MR. JIMMERSON: For both parties, Judge, can we have the opportunity to say plaintiff and defendant, individually have 10 days to exchange proposed judgments to keep it on track?

THE COURT: Yeah, however you want to do it.
MR. JIMMERSON: I'm just suggesting it might be a fair time, because we plan on preparing one.

THE COURT: If you think you need to clarify anything else on your exchange on judgments, I'm fine.

Okay, Pardee's motion to retax memo of costs filed June 19th, that also applies to the June 15th, 2015 .

MR. JIMMERSON: Yes, it does.
THE COURT: So I'm gonna it as moot at this time, and let's see what happens, because it's the NRS. It goes back to the prevailing party thing.

And plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees and costs, same thing, I'm gonna deny it as moot, and we'll
go from there.

What is the last thing then, you want to make sure on these from my ruling of the first motion on exchanging these new judgments, do you want to add you each --

MR. JIMMERSON: I'm just suggesting that we exchange them within the next ten days, that's all.

THE COURT: Oh.

MR. JIMMERSON: So we keep it on track, and then you'll make -- and then maybe if we have a dispute, we would telephone you. I'm just suggesting a joint call and/or your law clerk and just say, Listen, we're not able to get this together ourselves, we need a hearing by the Court on competing orders. You will have two orders in front of you, and you may make a third of your own. I'm just saying that may be a fair way to --

THE COURT: Well, what are your thoughts on that?

MS. LUNDVALL: The Court has told us you have a standing order and you want us to comply with that standing order.

THE COURT: Let's just do it.
MS. LUNDVALL: So my suggestion is that we do it that way.

THE COURT: I have to agree, because as soon as I do something outside the normal course, as with this case, then $I$ have issues.

And if I feel like $I$ need a hearing, I'm not shy, $I$ will ask for a hearing.

MR. JIMMERSON: Very good, your Honor.
THE COURT: I would like to do it that way.
MR. JIMMERSON: It's getting to the point where if $I$ suggest today is a Friday, I'm going to get an opposition.

I'm with you. We'll just submit it.
THE COURT: Okay. It's all important. I take no dispersions. It's all important. I get that.

MR. JIMMERSON: So as I understand it, we're going to exchange between ourselves, try to reach an accommodation. If not, we'll be sending letters served upon the opposing side so each side has --

THE COURT: Okay, here's what $I$ would like to do, here's how it works: One of you does the proposed order. The other one looks at -- judgment, excuse me, judgment. The other one looks at it, says what their issue is and whether they can approve it or not. If not, you try to work together.

If you can't, then whoever, then each of you, the first one who proposed the judgment and the second
one who couldn't agree, you couldn't work it out, give me competing judgments or give me information on what sections of the judgment you can't agree on.

MR. JIMMERSON: Okay.
MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: Do it that way, and $I$ will make the determination whether $I$ want more. And based on this, I may, you know. I'm very aware of peoples' arguments now.

One thing with both of you, oral argument helps, because $I$ do think there's so much stuff, and trying to focus where we're at, but $I$ will make that determination when $I$ get there.

MS. LUNDVALL: As the Court has previously, as the Court has previously ordered at least three times before, $I$ will prepare the judgment.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. LUNDVALL: And I will give it to

Mr. Jimmerson.
THE COURT: That was my --
MR. JIMMERSON: I didn't know you ordered it
three times before for the defendant, who lost this case, to prepare the judgment. Your Honor, I'm just saying it will not alter the ultimate result, but since I won the case, my clients won the case, we should be
preparing the order. It's okay.
THE COURT: Unfortunately, the way it started
out in the first place, $I$ 'm going to keep consistent.
I'm fine. No one's waiving any rights.
MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: You know, no one has to take
their ball and go home, okay? We're okay, I promise,
okay?
MR. JIMMERSON: You got it.
THE COURT: Thank you for staying so long.
MR. JIMMERSON: Thank you for all your time
and your staff's time too. I appreciate everybody's
efforts.
THE COURT: You're welcome, okay.
* * * * * *
ATTEST:
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Loree Murray, CCR \#426

01/15/16

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MOT
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## DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
JAMES WOLFRAM; and ANGELA L. LIMBOCKER-WILKES as trustee of the WALTER D. WILKES AND ANGELAL. LIMBOCKER-WILKES LIVING TRUST,

Plaintiffs,
vs.
PARDEE HOMES OF NEVADA,
Defendant.
COMES NOW, Plaintiffs, JAMES WOLFRAM and ANGELA L. LIMBOCKERWILKES as trustee of the WALTER D. WILKES AND ANGELA L. LIMBOCKERWILKES LIVING TRUST (hereinafter collectively "Plaintiffs"), by and through their counsel of record, JAMES J. JIMMERSON, ESQ. and MICHAEL C. FLAXMAN, ESQ. of THE JIMMERSON LAW FIRM, P.C., and hereby submit their Motion to Settle Two (2) Sets of Competing Orders.

The basis for the Motion is that there is a dispute between the parties through their respective counsel with regard to the proper and final language to be included within the Court's Order of January 15, 2016, regarding the two (2) competing Orders from that day. Plaintiffs proposed Order from that day is attached hereto as Exhibit "1."

It includes certain Findings that Defendant, Pardee Homes of Nevada and its counsel objects. Defendant's competing Order, which includes no Findings whatsoever, is attached hereto as Exhibit "2."

Separate and apart from the same, this Court tasked each party to propose a new final Judgment that incorporated the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of June 25, 2014, and the Court's Order of May 13, 2015 Order on Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Supplemental Briefing Re: Future Accounting, filed on May 13, 2015. Again, the Court requested Defendant's counsel to prepare the first new proposed, revised and corrected Judgment, which the Court can see constitutes the grossest of revisionist history, and nowhere recites accurately the Court's Order from June 25, 2014, and the Plaintiffs who are unwilling to agree to this income, had prepared their own Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, which closely tracks the Court's Findings, Conclusions, and Order from June 25, 2014, to reverse the Court's Findings, Conclusions, and final Order. The Plaintiffs' proposed Order with regard to the new proposed Judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit "3," and the Defendant's new proposed Judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit "4."
$1 / 1$
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It is clear that the Court will need to review and settle these Orders between the parties. The Court may choose to write its own Orders. The Court's Orders from June 25, 2014 and May 13, 2015, are a fair and clear statement of the Court, Findings, Conclusions and final Orders, regardless of whether either party agrees to the same or not.

DATED this $14^{\text {th }}$ day of March, 2016.
THE JIMMERSON LAW FIRM, P.C.


## NOTICE OF MOTION

TO: ALL INTERESTED PARTIES:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will bring PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO SETTLE TWO (2) SETS OF COMPETING JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS on for hearing before the above-entitled Court on the 27 day of APRIL_ 2016, at the hour of 9:00A .m., of said date, in Dept. IV, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard. DATED this $14^{\text {ith }}$ day of March, 2016.

THE JIMMERSON LAW FIRM, P.C.
Michael C. Y Cadman-
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Nevada State Bar No. 000264
MICHAEL C. FLAXMAN, ESQ.
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Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

## REPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

## I. INTRODUCTION AND BRIEF STATEMENT OF FACTS

Following the January 15, 2016 hearing, this Court instructed Defendant, Pardee Homes of Nevada (hereinafter "Defendant"), to submit their proposed final judgment to accurately reflect the Court's June 25, 2014 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order and the Court's subsequent Accounting Order, filed May 13, 2015. To no surprise, the Defendant's proposed Judgment given to Plaintiff's counsel on February 5,2016, attached hereto as Exhibit 1, fails to incorporate any of the findings enumerated in either of the aforementioned Orders.

Once again, the Defendant seeks to rewrite the record in its proposed final Judgment by erroneously claiming that the Plaintiffs asserted a claim of relief arising out of Pardee's failure to pay commissions. Given the differing opinions and interpretations regarding this Court's orders and Defendant's failure to incorporate this Court's Findings, it is no surprise that both sides submitted competing final Judgments. It is the intent of the Defendant to make this Court believe that the Plaintiffs asserted two (2) theories of breach by Pardee, to include an alleged failure to properly pay commissions owed and failure to properly inform Plaintiffs. Nothing could be farther from the truth, as demonstrated in the January 15,2016 hearing before this Court.

So as to ensure that the final Judgment entered is an accurate reflection of the record and this Court's Orders, Plaintiffs request that the Court withhold execution of either proposed Judgments until such time as the Court hears oral argument attesting to the validity of Plaintiffs' proposed Final Judgment and to the lack of validity in the Defendant's version.

Pursuant to NRCP 54(b), the Court's order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the rights and liabilities of all the parties. Based on a closer examination of the differing understandings of this Court's orders, it is clear that a hearing is required so that this Court's final Judgment is aligned with this Court's decision granting relief, pursuant to NRCP 58(a)(2).

Furthermore, counsels have been unable to reach a resolution regarding the language to be contained in the Order from the January 15, 2016 hearing. As such, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court also refrain from execution of the competing Orders After Hearings until such time as counsels have had an opportunity to brief and oral present their arguments before this Court. Plaintiffs reserve the right to supplement this Motion with further briefing regarding Defendant's attempt to reverse the Court's Orders and otherwise, seek to gain an unfair advantage from their loss at Trial and from their having been found to have materially breached their contract with Plaintiffs, the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing within that contract with Plaintiffs, and their requirement to provide an accounting to the Plaintiffs. Defendant misrepresentations of the Court's previous Orders and Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Orders, in a transparent effort to avoid the court's award of costs and attorney's fees against the Defendant is reprehensible and by the Defendant that is in abject bad faith. See EDCR 7.60, NRS 18.011.

## II. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court grant its Motion to Settle Competing Orders, based upon the differing opinions as it relates to this Court's June 25, 2014 and May 13, 2015 Orders and based upon Defendant's willful failure to incorporate this Court's prior Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order. Plaintiffs request that this Court withhold execution of the final Judgment until such time that oral argument has been given on the same.

DATED this $\qquad$ day of March, 2016.

THE JIMMERSON LAW. FIRM, P.C.


## EXHIBIT "1"

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DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

JAMES WOLFRAM and WALTER D. WILKES
and ANGELA L. LIMBOCKER-WILKES
LIVING
TRUST, ANGELA L. LIMBOCKER-WILKES, TRUSTEE,

CASE NO.: A-10-632338
DEPT. NO.: IV
ORDERS FROM JANUARY 15, 2016 HEARINGS

Plaintiffs,
v.

PARDEE HOMES OF NEVADA,

Defendant.

This matter coming on for a hearing on the 15th day of January, 2016, on Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike "Judgment" Entered June 15, 2015 Pursuant to NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59 et al., Plaintiffs' Motion Pursuant to NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59 to Amend the Court's Judgment Entered on June 15, 2015 et al., Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Requiring Defendant, When Serving by Electronic Means, to Serve Three Specific Persons, Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees and

Costs, Defendant's Motion to Retax and Defendant's Motion to Amend Judgment, James J. Jimmerson, Esq. and Michael C. Flaxman, Esq. appearing on behalf of Plaintiffs, JAMES WOLFRAM and ANGELA L. LIMBOCKER-WILKES as trustee of the WALTER D. WILKES AND ANGELA L. LIMBOCKER-WILKES LIVING TRUST and Plaintiff James Wolfram being present, and Pat Lundvall, Esq. and Rory T. Kay, Esq. appearing on behalf of Defendant, Pardee Homes of Nevada, and the Court having reviewed the papers and pleadings on file herein, and heard the arguments of counsel, and for good cause appearing:

THE COURT HEREBY FINDS that it did not consider its prior Orders from June 25, 2014 and May 13, 2015 as final judgments pursuant to NRCP 58(a) and had contemplated that it would enter a final judgment after the parties had fully briefed the supplemental issue of future account.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the Judgment entered on June 15, 2015 was erroneous, did not comport with the Court's prior findings and Orders, and did not encompass what was presented at Trial in this matter.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike "Judgment" Entered June 15, 2015 Pursuant to NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59, as Unnecessary and Duplicative Orders of Final Orders Entered on June 25, 2014 and May 13, 2015, and as such, is a Fugitive Document, is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs' Motion Pursuant to NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59 to Amend the Court's Judgment Entered on June 15, 2015 et al, is granted. The language provided in the June 15, 2015 Judgment, specifically contained on page two (2), lines $8-13$ and lines $18-23$, is hereby stricken.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Court expects to enter a final judgment pursuant to NRCP 58(a) once the parties have submitted a proposed judgment or competing proposed judgment for the Court's review. Should the parties ding it necessary to submit competing proposed judgments for the Court's review, each party shall explicitly enumerate in a cover letter to the Court both the efforts made by the parties in attempting reach an agreement on the proposed judgment and the issues that precluded the parties from reaching an agreement on the language to be contained in the proposed judgment.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Court's Order entered July 10, 2015 shall remain in full force and effect. That Order stays any execution upon a final judgment until ten (10) days after written notice of entry of orders resolving all parties' post-judgment motions, including any motions to amend or alter the final judgment and motions resolving the parties' competing claims for attorney's fees and recoverable costs, or until further order of the Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Requiring Defendant, When Serving by Electronic Means, to Serve Three Specific Persons is denied in consideration of Defendant's counsel's concession that any and all Orders, Judgments and/or electronic communications submitted by Defendant's counsel prospectively be served upon Plaintiffs' counsel and staff via Wiznet.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs is denied as moot in consideration that the Court has stricken the June 15, 2015 Judgment.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant's Motion to Amend Judgment is denied as moot in consideration that the Court has stricken the June 15, 2015 Judgment. Plaintiffs' Countermotion for Attorney's Fees is also denied as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees is denied as moot in consideration that the Court has stricken the June 15, 2015 Judgment.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant's Motion to Retax is denied as moot in consideration that the Court has stricken the June 15, 2015 Judgment.

DATED this $\qquad$ day of $\qquad$ 2016.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Respectfully submitted by: APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:

Dated this $\qquad$ day January, 2016. Dated this $\qquad$ day January, 2016.

JIMMERSON HANSEN, P.C. McDONALD CARANO WILSON, LLP

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## EXHIBIT "2"

## EXHIBIT "2"

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JAMES WOLFRAM, WALT WILKES

Plaintiffs,
vs.

PARDEE HOMES OF NEVADA,
Defendant.

CASE NO.: A-10-632338-C DEPT NO.: IV

ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE JUDGMENT ENTERED ON JUNE 15, 2015

The Honorable Judge Kerry Earley heard Plaintiffs James Wolfram and Walt Wilkes' ("Plaintiffs") Motion to Strike "Judgment" Entered June 15, 2015 Pursuant to N.R.C.P. 52(b) and N.R.C.P. 59, as Unnecessary and Duplicative Orders of Final Orders Entered on June 25, 2014 and May 13, 2015 and as such, is a Fugitive Document (the "Motion") on January 15, 2016 at 10:00 a.m. James J. Jimmerson and Michael C. Flaxman, of the law firm Jimmerson Law Firm P.C., appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs. Pat Lundvall and Rory Kay, of the law firm McDonald Carano Wilson LLP, appeared on behalf of Defendant Pardee Homes of Nevada ("Pardee").

The Court reviewed the papers and pleadings on file, and heard the arguments of counsel presented at the hearing. For good cause appearing, the Court hereby finds as follows:

Plaintiffs' Motion IS DENIED. The Court did not consider its previous orders dated June 25, 2014 and May 13, 2015 as final judgments under Rules 54 and 58 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure. Instead, the Court always contemplated that it would enter a final judgment after the parties had fully briefed the supplemental issue of future accounting and the Court had an opportunity to rule on it.

Accordingly, as discussed at the hearing, the Court expects to enter a final judgment pursuant to Rules 54 and 58 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure once the parties have submitted a proposed judgment or competing proposed judgments for the Court's review. Until such time, the Court has not entered final judgment in this case.

Moreover, the Court's previous Order entered July 10, 2015 remains in effect. That Order stays any execution upon a final judgment until 10 days after written notice of entry of orders resolving all parties' post-judgment motions, including any motions to amend or alter the final judgment and motions resolving the parties' competing claims to attorney's fees and recoverable costs.

DATED this ___ day of January, 2016.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Submitted by:
McDONALD CARANO WILSON LLP
/s/Rory T. Kay PAT LUNDVALL (NBSN \#3761) RORY T. KAY (NSB \#12416)
2300 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 1200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Attorneys for Pardee Homes of Nevada

[^0]
## EXHIBIT " 3 "

## EXHIBIT " 3 "

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CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

JAMES WOLFRAM and WALTER D. WILKES and ANGELA L. LIMBOCKER-WILKES LIVING TRUST, ANGELA L. LIMBOCKERCASE NO.: A-10-632338 WILKES, TRUSTEE,

Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER

## v.

PARDEE HOMES OF NEVADA

Defendant

On October 23, 2013, this matter came on for bench trial before the Honorable Kerry L. Earley. The Court, having reviewed the record, the testimony of witnesses, the documentary evidence, stipulations of counsel, the papers submitted by the respective parties, and considered the arguments of counsel at trial in this matter, with good cause appearing therefor, the Court now enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Plaintiffs James Woliram ("Wolfram") and Walt Wilkes ("Wilkes") (collectively "Plaintiffs") filed this action against defendant Pardee Homes of Nevada ("Pardee")
alleging clains for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair deaing, and accounting related to a Commission Agreement entered into on September 1, 2004, between Plaintiffs and Fardee (See Second Amended Complaint). As a conditional counterclaim, Pardee alleges against Plaintiffs breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing arising from the Commission Agreement. The Court ordered both parties to provide the Court with supplemental briefs detailing information the Defendant should provide to the Plaintiffs consistent with the Court's Decision. The parties complied with the Court's order, as the Plaintiffs submitted Plaintiffs' Accounting Brief and the Defendant submitted Pardee Homes of Nevada's Supplemental Brief Regarding Future Accounting as well as a Notice of Submission. On February 10, 2015, the Court issued a minute order reflecting its decision on the supplemental briefing.

Now, having considered the parties' briefings, any arguments by counsel presented in support of the same, and good cause appearing therefore, the Court decides the submitted issues as follows:

## I. FINDINGS OF FACT

## A. THE PARTIES

1. Plaintiffs James Wolfram and Walt Wilkes have been licensed real estate brokers working in Southern Nevada and the surrounding area for over 35 years.
2. Plaintiff Wolfram previously worked for Award Realty Group. Plaintiff Wikes previously worked for General Realty Group. In a previous order, the Court ruled that Wolfram and Wilkes were assigned all claims from Award Realty Group and General Realty Group, and, therefore, had standing to assert the claims at issue.
3. Defendant Padee Homes of Nevada ("Pandee") is a Nevada compotaton operating as a residential homebulder constucting homes and other stuctures in Southem Nevada and elsewhere.
4. In the 1990 's, Harvey Whittemore, through his then-owned company, Coyote Springs Investment LLC ("CSI") began developing a project to be known as ("Coyote Springs".) The project included over 43,000 acres of unimproved real property located north of Las Vegas in the Counties of Clark and Lincoln.
5. In 2002, Plaintiffs had begun tracking the status and progress of Coyote Springs located in the Counties of Clark and Lincoln, Nevada.
6. By 2002, Plaintiffs had become acquainted with Jon Lash, who was then responsible for land acquisition for Pardee's parent company, Pardee Homes. Plaintifis had previously worked with Mr. Lash in the pursuit of different real estate transactions, but none were ever consummated prior to the Coyote Springs transaction.
7. After learning that Mr. Whittemore had obtained water rights for Coyote Springs, Plaintiffs contacted Mr. Lash and asked if he would be interested in meeting with Mr. Whittemore of CSI, for the purposes of entering into an agreement for the purchase of real property in Coyote Springs. When Mr. Lash agreed, Plaintiffs contacted Mr. Whittemore advising they had a client interested in Coyote Springs and wanted to schedule a meeting.
8. Mr. Lash agreed to allow Plaintiffs to represent Pardee as a potential purchaser, and a meeting was scheduled to take place at Pardee's office in Las Vegas. Present at the meeting were Plaintiffs, Mr. Whittemore from CSI, and Mr. Lash and Mr. Klif Andrews from Pardee. While this meeting was introductory in nature, it ultimately resulted in plans to structure a deal between Pardee and CSI to develop Coyote Springs after
approximately 200 meetings between Pardee and CSI. Duing the exensive negotiating procese, Mr. Whittemore, on behalf of CSI, expressed CSt's decision to only sell certain portions of real estate at Coyote Springs. Pardee made it clear that it only wanted to purchase the land designated as single-family detached production residential ("Production Residential Propery") at Coyote Springs. At that time it was understood by Pardee and CSI, that CSI was to maintain ownership and control of all other land at Coyote Springs including land designated as commercial land, multi-family land, the custom lots, the golf courses, the industrial lands, as well as all other development deals at Coyote Springs.
9. Plaintiffs only participated in the initial meeting, as Pardee and CSI informed Plaintiffs their participation was not required for any of the negotiations by Pardee to purchase Production Residential Property. As such, Plaintiffs were the procuring cause of Pardee's right to buy Production Residential Property in Coyote Springs from CSI.
B. OPTION AGREEMENT BETWEEN CSI and PARDEE AND COMMISSION AGREEMENT
10. In or about May 2004, Pardee and CSI entered into a written agreement entitled Option Agreement for the Purchase of Real Property and Joint Escrow Instructions ("Option Agreement"), which set forth the terms of the deal, among many others, concerning Pardee's acquisition of the Production Residential Property from CSI at Coyote Springs.
11. Prior to the Commission Agreement at issue in this case being agreed upon between Pardee and Plaintiffs, the Option Agreement was amended twice. First, on July 28, 2004, Pardee and CSI executed the Amendment to Option Agreement for the Purchase of Real Property and Joint Escrow Instructions. Subsequently, on August 31, 2004, Pardee and CSI executed the Amendment No. 2 to Option Agreement for the

Purchase of Real Propery and doint Escrow instructions. The Option Agreement, along with the subsequent amendments, will be collectively referred to as the "Option Agreement"). Plantiffs acknowledged receiving the Option Agreement and the two amendments.
12. At the time of Pardee's and CSl's original negotiations, the land was the rawest of all in terms of land development. No zoning, parceling, mapping, entiflements, permiting, etc., had been accomplished. All of that work had yet to be done. At that time multiple issues were outstanding that would impact the boundaries of any land to be acquired by Pardee from CSI for Production Residential Property. Those issues included, among others, the BLM reconfiguration, Moapa Dace and other wildife protections, moving a utility corridor from Coyote Springs to federal lands, and the design by Jack Nicklaus of the golf courses. At multiple places in the Option Agreement it was acknowledged by CSI and Pardee that boundaries of various lands would change.
13. At the same time Pardee was negotiating with CSI, Pardee was also negotiating with Plaintiffs concerning their finders' fee/commissions. Pardee and Plaintiffs extensively negotiated the Commission Agreement dated September 1, 2004. Plaintiffs were represented by James J . Jimmerson, Esq. throughout those negotiations. Plaintiffs offered edits, and inputwas accepted into the Commission Agreement under negotiation, with certain of their input accepted by Pardee. The Plaintiffs' and Pardee's obligations to each other were agreed to be set forth within the four corners of the Commission Agreement. Plaintiffs and Pardee acknowledge that the Commission Agreement was an ams-length transaction.
14. The Commission Agreement between Plaintiffs and Pardee provided that, in exchange for the procuring services rendered by Plaintiffs, Pardee agreed to (1) pay to

Plaintifs certain commissions tor land purchased from $C S 1$, and (2) send Plaintifis infomation concerning the realestate purcheses made under the Option Agreement and the corresponding commission payments.
15. Since Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wikes had already performed services for Pardee, the Commission Agreement placed no affirmative obligation on them.
16. The Commission Agreement, dated September 1, 2004, was executed by Pardee on September 2, 2004, by Mr. Wolfram on September 6, 2006, and Mr. Wikes on September 4, 2004.
17. The Commission Agreement provides for the payment of "broker commission[s]" to Plaintiffs in the event that Pardee approved the transaction during the Contingency Period, equal to the following amounts:
(i) Pardee shail pay four percent (4\%) of the Purchase Property Price payments made by Pardee pursuant to Paragraph 1 of the Option Agreement up to a maximum of Fifty Million Dollars (\$50,000;000);
(ii) Then, Pardee shall pay one and one-half percent ( $1-1 / 2 \%$ ) of the remaining Purchase Property Price payments made by Pardee pursuant to paragraph 1 of the Option Agreement in the aggregate amount of Sixteen Million Dollars ( $\$ 16,000,000$ ); and
(iii) Then, with respect to any portion of the Option Property purchased by Pardee pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Option Agreement, Pardee shall pay one and one-half percent (1-1/2\%) of the amount derived by multiplying the number of acres purchased by Pardee by Forty Thousand Dollars (\$40,000).
18. The Commission Agreement states that all of the capitalized terms used in the Commission Agreement shall have the exact meanings set forth in the Option Agreement. Copies of the Option Agreement, the amendments including changes to the Purchase Property Price, and the subsequent Amended and Restated Option Agreement were given to Plaintififs by Stewart Title Company, the escrow company chosen by Pardee and CSI to handle all of its land transactions. Plaintiffs also
acknowledge receiving these documents. However, Amendments 1 though 8 to the Amended and Restated Option Agreement between CSI and Pardee were not provided to Plaintifis until after this litigation wes commenced by Plaintifis.
19. The term "Purchase Property Price" was defined in Amendment No. 2 to the Option Agreement as Eighty-Four Milion Dollars ( $\$ 84,000,000$ ), which was payable in installments over a period of time. The due dates for commissions' payable under paragraphs (i) and (ii) were described in the Commission Agreement as follows:

Pardee shall make the first commission payment to you upon the Initial Purchase Closing (which is scheduled to occur thirty (30) days following the Settlement Date) with respect to the aggregate Deposits made prior to that time: Pardee shall make each additional commission payment pursuant to clauses (i) and (ii) above concurrently with the applicable Purchase Property Price payment to Coyote.
20. By vitue of Amendment No. 2 increasing the Purchase Property Price from $\$ 66$ militon to $\$ 84$ million, Plaintiffs became entitled to commissions on the increased Purchased Property Price, which they subsequently received.
21. Commission payments required under paragraphs (i) and (ii) were not dependent upon acreage or location of the lands being acquired, or upon the closing of any land transaction. In sum, when Pardee paid CSI a portion of the Purchase Property Price, under the agreed schedule, then Plaintiffs were also paid their commission. Pardee and CSI anticipated that the Purchase Property would be, and was, cooperatively mapped and entitited before the specific location of any lands designated for single family detached production residential would be transferred by CSI to Pardee.
22. The due date for any commissions payable under paragraph iii was described in the Commission Agreementas follows: "Thereafter, Pardee shall make such commission payment pursuant to clause (iii) above concurrently with the close of escrow on Pardee's purchase of the applicable portion of the Option Property; provided, however, that in the
event the required Parcel Map creating the applicable Option Parcel has not been recorded as of the scheduled Option Closing, as described in paragraph $9(c)$ of the Option Agreemen, the commission shall be paid into escrow concurrently with Pardee's deposit of the Option Property Price into escrovy and the commission shall be paid directly from the proceeds of said Escrow."
23. The general term "Option Property" is defined in the Option Agreement as follows: "the remaining portion of the Entire Site which is or becomes designated for single-family detached production residential use, as described below . . . in a number of separate phases (referred to herein collectively as the "Option Parcels" and individually as an "Option Parcel"), upon the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth." The general definition of "Option Property" was never changed by CSI and Pardee in any documents amending either the initial Option Agreement or the subsequent Amended and Restated Option Agreement. The definitions of other capitalized terms found within the Commission Agreement were never changed by CSI and Pardee.
24. The Commission Agreement requires Pardee to provide Plaintiffs with notifications and information concerning future transactions between Pardee and CSI under the Option Agreement. Specifically, the Commission Agreement states:

Pardee shall provide to each of you a copy of each written option exercise notice given pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Option Agreement, together with information as to the number of acres involved and the scheduled closing date. In addition, Pardee shall keep each of you reasonably informed as to all matters relating to the amount and due dates of your commission payments. (Emphasis Added)
25. After executing the Commission Agreement, Plaintiffs never entered into another agreement with Pardee concerning the development of Coyote Springs.
26. Pardee's purchase of the "Purchase Property Price" properity and any Option Property designated in the future as single family deteched production residential lands
was a separate and disthot traneaction from any other purchases by Pardee fom CSI for unclated propery at Coyote Springs.
27. The relationship between Pardee and Plaintiffs was such that Plaintiffs reasonably imparted special confidence in Pardee to faithfuly inform them of the developments at Coyote Springs which would impact their future commission payments. Pardee and CSI agreed to designate documents relevant to the development of Coyote Springs as confidential. Among said documents were documents relating to the designation of the type of property Pardee was purchasing from CSI during the development of Coyote Springs that were part of a distinct and separate agreement between Pardee and CSI.
28. The designation of the type of property Pardee was purchasing from CSI during the development of Coyote Springs was material to Plaintiffs to verify if the commissions they had received were accurate and, if not, what amount they were entitled as further commissions pursuant to the Commission Agreement.
29. Pardee should have known that the Plaintiffs needed to have access to information specifying the designation as to the type of property being purchased by Pardee from CSI during the development of Coyote Springs to verify the accuracy of their commissions.
30. Although certain documents were public record regarding the development of Coyote Springs, the documents referencing internally set land designations for certain land in Coyote Springs were not available to Plaintiffs.

## C. PARDEE'S PERFORMANCE UNDER THE COMMISSION AGREEMENT

31. Pardee did purchase "Purchase Property Price" property from CSl for $\$ 84,000,000.00$. Flaintifis have been paid in full their commissions on the $\$ 84,000,000.00$ Purchase Propery Price.
32. Plaintiff wee intomed of the amount and due dates of each commission payment for the Purchase Property Price: first through Stewar The Company, and then Chicago Tite Company, pursuant to the Commission Agreement.
33. Under the express terms of the Commission Agreement, pursuant to paragraphs (i) and (ii), these commissions were based solely on the Purchase Property Price for the land, not the number of acres acquired or the location of those acres. Under the Purchase Properiy formula, they were entitled to a percentage of the Purchase Properiy Price. There was no benefit or additional commission for additional acreage being purchased if there is no corresponding increase in price.
34. Plaintiffs were paid a total of $\$ 2,632,000.00$ in commissions pursuant to paragraphs (i) and (ii) of the Commission Agreement.
35. Pardee did not pay more than $84,000,000.00$ as the Purchase Property Price to CSI under the Option Agreement, the Amended and Restated Option Agreement, or any amendments thereto. CSI has never received more than $\$ 84,000,000.00$ as payment under the Option Agreement, the Amended and Restated Option Agreement, or any amendments thereto.
36. No commission to Plaintiffs is payable under clause (iii) of the Commission Agreement unless the property purchased fell within the definition of Option Property purchased pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Option Agreement.

Pardee as of the present time has not exercised any options to purchase single family production residential property pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Option Agreement. Therefore, Pardee as of the present time does not owe any commission to Plaintiffs under paragraph iii of the Commission Agreement.
37. The other provision of the Commission Agreement alleged by Plaintifis to heve been breached states as follows:

Pardee shall provide to each of you a copy of each written option exercise notice given pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Option Agreement, together with information as to the number of acres involved and the scheduled closing date. In addition, Pardee shall keep each of you reasonably informed as to all matiers relating to the amount and due dates of your commission payments.
38. Pardee did provide information relating to the amount and due dates on Plaintiffs' commission payments under paragraphs (i) and (ii). Specifically, Plaintiffs were paid their first commission at the \{nitial Purchase Closing and then each commission thereaiter concurrently with each Purchase Property Price payment made by Pardee to CSI pursuant to Amendment No. 2 to the Option Agreement as was required by the Commission Agreement. Each commission payment was made pursuant to an Order to Pay Commission to Broker prepared by Stewart Title (later Chicago Title) which contained information including the date, escrow number, name of title company, percentage of commission to be paid, to whom and the split between Plaintiffs. Each Order to Pay Commission to Broker was signed by Pardee and sent to either Plaintiffs brokerage firms or Plaintiffs directly. Each commission check received by Plaintiffs contained the amount, escrow number, payee and payer, along with a memo explaining how the amount was determined. When Plaintiffs were overpaid commissions, a letter was sent by Pardee explaining the overpayment and how the amount and due dates to compensate for the overpayment would be handled. An Amended Order to Pay Commission to Broker reflecting these changes was sent to and signed by each Plaintiff. A letter was sent by Pardee to Plaintiffs informing them when Pardee made its last paynent of the Purchase Property Price to CSI.
39. However, from the documents in Pbintifs possession provided by Pardee, Plaintife were unable to verify the accuracy of any commission payments that may have been due and owing pursuant to paragraph ili of the Commission Agreement. The documents in Plaintiff' possession included the Option Agreement and Amendments No. 1 and No. 2 to the Option Agreement, the Amended and Restated Option Agreement, various Orders to Pay Commissions, and their commission payments. Amendments Nos. 1 through 8 to the Amended Restated Option Agreement were nof: provided to Plaintiffs until after commencement of this litigation.
40. When Plaintiffs began requesting information regarding Pardee's land acquisitions from CSI, the only information provided by Pardee was the location of the Purchase Property purchased for the Purchase Property Price from CSI. All information provided was limited to the single family production property acquisitions. Pardee informed the Plaintiffs that it had purchased from CSI additional property at the Coyote Springs development, but took the position that any documentation regarding the designations of the use of the additionally purchased property was confidential and would not be provided to Plaintiffs. Interestingly, Pardee had already provided to Plaintiffs the initial Option Agreementi, Amendments No. 1 and 2 and the Amended Restated Option Agreement, which were also confidential documents between Pardee and CSI. 41. Although Pardee co-developed with CSI a separate land transaction agreement for the acquisition of lands designated for other uses than single family detached production residential lots, Pardee had a separate duty to Plaintiffs pursuant to the Commission Agreement to provide information so Plaintiffs could verify the accuracy of their commission payments.
42. Whour access to the infomation regarding the type of land designation that was purchased by Pardee as pan of the separate land tansaction with CSI, Plaintifis were not reasonably informed as to all matters relating to the amount of their commission payments as they could not verify the accuracy of their commission payments.
43. Athough the complete documentation when provided in this litigation verified that Plaintiffs were not due any further commissions at this time for the additional purchases of land by Pardee, Pardee still had a duty to provide sufficient information regarding the design the type of land that had been purchased to Plaintiffs. Plaintiff Wolfram attempted through public records to ascertain information regarding the additional lands, but he was unable to verify the required information of the land use designations.
44. Plaintiffs have also contended that they are entitled to a commission if Pardee redesignates any of its land purchased from CSI to single family production residential property. Plaintiffs are not entitled to commissions on any re-designation of lands by Pardee pursuant to the Commission Agreement.

## 11. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

## A. PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT

1. To sustain a claim for breach of contract, Plaintiffs must establish (1) the existence of a valid contract between Plaintiffs and Defendant; (2) a breach by Defendant, and (3) damages as a result of the breach. Richardson v. Jones, 1 Nev. 405, 405 (1865); Calloway v. City of Reno, 116 Nev. 250, 256, 993 P.3d 1259, 1263 (2000) (overruled on othergrounds by Olson v. Richard, 120 Nev. 240, 241-44, 89 P.3d 31, 31-33 (2004)).
2. Contract interpretation strives to discem and give effect to the parties' intended meaning...before an interpreting cout can conclusively declare a contract ambiguous or
unambigucus, 音 must consuft the context in which the parties exchanged promises. Galardiv. Naples Polaris, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 33, 301 P.3d 364, 367 (2013).
3. Contractual provisions should be hamonized whenever possibie, and constued to reach a reasonable solution. Eversole v. Sunrise Villas V/II Homeowners Ass 'n, 112 Nev. 1255, 1260, 925 P. $2 \mathrm{~d} 505,509$ (1996).
4. The Commission Letter Agreement constitutes a valid and enforceable contract between Plaintiffs and Defendant.
5. Pardee agreed to pay commissions and provide information to keep Plaintiffs reasonably informed as to all matters relating to the amount and due date of their commissions pursuant to the express terms of the Commission Agreement.
6. The language of the Commission Agreement required the payment of commissions under paragraphs i and ii according to percentages of the Purchase Property Price. Undisputedly, those commissions were paid.
7. The Commission Agreement also required Pardee to pay commissions on the purchase of Option Property if Pardee exercised its option to purchase Option Property pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Option Agreement.
8. Pardee has never exercised any such option.
9. Pardee paid Plaintiffs in full and timely commissions on the $\$ 84,000,000.00$ Purchase Property Price.
10. The Purchase Property Price was $\$ 84,000,000.00$.
11. CSI has not received more than $\$ 84,000.000 .00$ for the single family detached production residential land acquisition by Pardee from CSI at the Coyote Springs project.
12. From the very beginning, CSI and Pardee acknowledged that the specific boundaries of the Purchase Properiy and Option Property may change, for a variety of
ressons. There are many teferences to the changing boundaries of propery at Coyote Springs in Pardee's and CSI's Option Agreement. There are many factors that necessitated those changes, including the BLM configuation, moving the utility comidor, mapping, the subdivision process, the entitlement and permiting processes, the Moapa Dace issue and other wildlife issues, and the design by Jack Nicklaus of the golf courses. There were a number of factors that were out of CSI's and Pardee's control that were expected to change and did change the boundaries and configuration of the Purchase Property. As a result of those boundaries changing, so too did the potential boundaries for Option Property change.
13. The Plaintiffs' commissions pursuant to paragraphs (i) and (ii) were solely based on the Purchase Property Price, not the acreage acquired by Pardee or its location or its closing. Therefore, the change in boundaries had absolutely no impact on the amount or due date of Plaintiffs' commissions.
14. Plaintiffs were also entitled to be paid commissions if Pardee exercised option(s) to purchase Option Property pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Option Agreement. To exercise such an option is a multi-step process involving a myriad of written documents. If such an option had been exercised by Pardee those documents would be found in the public record. Since Pardee as of the present time has not exercised any options pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Option Agreement, no commissions are due at the present time to Plaintiffs.
15. In addition, the Commission Agreement required Pardee to keep Plaintiffs reasonably informed as to all matters relating to the amount and due dates of Plaintiffs' commission payments.
16. Plaindifs did not receive amendments I through 8 to the Arnended and Restated Option Agreement. Although those amendments did not change Plaintiffis commissions due under the Commission Agreement, the information conteined in the amendments contained the designation information about the separate land transactions involving muiti-family, custom tots, and commercial. This information was needed by Plaintiffs as it was necessary to determine the impact, if any on their commission payments. However, Pardee could have provided the requisite information in various forms other than the amendments. Pardee failed to provide information in any form required by Plaintiffs to determine the accuracy of their commission payments.
17. Pardee did not keep Plaintiffs reasonably informed as to all matters relating to the amount of their commission payments that would be due and owing pursuant to the Commission Agreement. Therefore, Pardee breached the Commission Agreement.
18. Plaintiffs satisfied any and all of their obligations under the Commission Agreement.
19. In order to award consequential damages, the damages claimed for the breach of contract must be foreseeable. See Bames v. WU. Tel. Co., 27 Nev. 438, 76 P. 931 (1904). Under the watershed case, Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854), foreseeability requires that: (1) damages for loss must "fairly and reasonably be considered [as] arising naturally . . . from such breach of contract itself," and (2) the loss must be "such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract as the probable result of the breach of it." See Clark County School District v. Rolling Plains Const., Inc., 117 Nev. 101, 106, 16 P.3d 1079, 1082 (2001) (disapproved of on other grounds, 117 Nev. 948). Stated another way, the damages claimed for the breach of contract must be foreseeable. Id.
20. Plaintifs suffered toeseeable damages due to Defendants breach of not keeping Plaindifs reasonably infomed as to all matters relating to the amount due and owing on the Commission Agreament in the form of their time and effots attempting to obtain the information owed to them pursuant to the Commission Agreement. The testimony by Paintiff Wolfram was that he expended 80 hours of time to obtain said information by going through public records and contacting different sources. Using a rete of $\$ 75.00$ per hour for Mr. Woifram's time as a real estate agent, the damages total $\$ 6,000.00$.
21. Plaintiffs also suffered damages in the form of the attorney's fees and costs incurred as they were necessary and reasonably foreseeable to obtain the requisite information regarding the land designations of land acquired by Pardee from CSI in the Coyote Development pursuant to the separate transaction between Pardee and CSI. Plaintiffs specifically requested numerous times from Pardee information to determine the land designations of these additional purchases, but to no avail. In fact, Mr. Lash on behalf of Pardee instructed a third party that said information should not be provided. CSI was not able to provide the requisite information due to the confidentiality agreement with Pardee. Plaintiffs had no alternative but to file suit, use the litigation process to obtain the requisite information, and request an equitable remedy from this Court to obtain said information in the future. The above-referenced facts allow this Court to award reasonable attomey's fees and costs as special damages. See Liu v. Christopher Homes, LLC, 103, Nev. Adv. Op, 17, 321 P.3d, 875 (2014); Sandy Valley Assoc. v. Sky Ranch Owners Assoc., 117 Nev. 948, 35 P.3d 964 (2001).

Mr. Jimmerson testified regarding the attorney's fees and costs to pursue the Plaintiffs' claim for acquiting the information from Pardee related to the Plaintiffs'
commission amounts based on billings contaned in Exhibit 31A. The damages for reasonable attomeys' fees and costs are $\$ 135,500.00$.
B. PLANTIFS' CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FATTHAND FAR DEALING

1. To sustain a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing sounding in contract, Plaintiffs must establish: (1) Plaintiffs and Defendant were parties to the contract; (2) the Defendant owed a duty of good faith to Plaintiffs; (3) the Defendant breached that duty by performing in a manner that was unfaithful to the purpose of the contract; and (4) Plaintiff's justified expectations were thus denied. See Perry v. Jordan, 111 Nev. 943, 947, 900 P.2d 335, 338 (1995);
2. An implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is recognized in every contract under Nevada law. Consolidated Generaior-Nevada, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 114 Nev. 1304, 1311, 971 P.2d 1251, 1256 (1998). Under the implied covenant, each party must act in a manner that is faithful to the purpose of the contract and the justified expectations of the other party. Momis v. Bank of America Nevada, 110 Nev. 1274, 1278 n. 2, 886 P.2d 454,457 (1994). The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing forbids arbitrary, unfair acts by one party that disadvantages the other. Frantz v. Johnson, 116 Nev. 455, 465 n. 4., 999 P.2d 351, 358 (2000).
3. Plaintiffs, pursuant to the Commission Agreement, were entitled to commissions for Purchase Price Property and Option Property. Plaintiffs had justifiable expectations that Pardee would keep Plaintiffs reasonably informed as to all matters related to the amount and due dates of their commission payments.
4. Plaintiffs needed sufficient information regarding purchases of land by Pardee from CSI at Coyote Springs to enable Plaintiffs to verify the accuracy of commission payments. The designation of the land purchased by Pardee from CSI was the basis for

Plantifis' entement to commissions pursuant to Option Propery under (iii) of the Commission Agreement.
5. Pardee was not faithful to the purpose of the Commission Agreement by failing to provide information regarding other land designations purchased by Pardee at Coyote Springs so Plaintifs could verify the accuracy of their commission payments. Without this information, Pardee failed to keep Plaintiffs reasonably informed as to all matters relating to their Commission Agreement.
6. Pardee did not act in good faith when it breached its contractual duty to keep Plaintiffs reasonably informed as to all matters relating to the amount and due dates of their commission payments. Plaintiffs did not breach any obligation they had to Pardee under the Commission Agreement by requesting information regarding other land acquisitions by Pardee from CSI at Coyote Springs. Plaintifis acted in good faith at all times toward Pardee and did not deny Pardee its justified expectations under the Commission Agreement.
7. Pardee suffered no recoverable damages from Plaintiffs' inquiries.

## c. PLANTIEFS' CLAMM FOR AN ACCOUNTING

1. An accounting is an independent cause of action that is distinct from the equitable remedy of accounting. See e.g. Botsford v. Van Riper, 33 Nev. 156, 110 P. 705 (1910); Young v. Johnny Ribiero Bldg., Inc., 106 Nev. 88, 787 P.2d 777 (1990); Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini Street, inc., No. 2:10-CV-00106-LRH-PAL, 2010 WL 3257933 (D. Nev. Aug. 13, 2010); Teselle v. McLoughlin, 173 Cal. App. 4th 156, 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 696 (Cal. App. 2009); Mobius Connections Group, Inc. v. Techskills, LLC, No. 2:10-CV-01678-GMNRJJ, 2012 WL 194434 (D. Nev. Jan. 23, 2012).
2. To prevail on a daim for accounting, a Plantim must estabish the existence of a special relationship whereby a duy to account may arise. See Teselle y. Moloughin, 173 Cal. App. Ath 156,92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 696 (Cal. App. 2009). The right to an accounting can arise from. Defendart's possession of money or property which, because of the Defendant's relationship with the Plaintifi, the Defendant is obliged to surrender. /d.
3. This Court has previously held that for Plaintififs to prevail on an independent cause of action for an accounting, Plaintiffs must establish the existence of a special relationship of trust whereby a duty to account may arise. See Teselle v. McLoughlin, 173 Cal. App. 4th 156 (2009); See also, Order Denying Pardee's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
4. Courts have found the existence of a special relationship of trust when, in a contractual relationship, payment is collected by one party and the other party is paid by the collecting party. Wolf v. Superior Court, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 860 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); Mobius Connections Group, Inc. v. Techskills, LLC, No. 2:10-CV-01678-GMIN -RA 2012 WL 194434 (D. Nev. Jan. 23, 2012).
5. In contractual relationships requiring payment by one parity to another of profits received, the right to an accounting can be derived from the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in every contract, because without an accounting there may be no way by which such a party entitled to a share in profits could determine whether there were any profits. See, Mobius Conections Group v. Techskills, LLC, Id.
6. The Court finds there is a special relationship of trust between Plaintiffs and Pardee that entitles Plaintifis to an accounting for the information conceming the development of Coyote Springs in the future as it pertains to Plaintiffs' commissions on option property. There is no way for Plaintiffs or their heirs to determine whether a
commission payment is clue in the fure withoutan scounting of the type of land of any future purchases by Pardee from CSI at Coyote Springs. Access to said infornation is required to ensure the acourecy of commission payment that may be due and owing in the future.
7. Pardee or its successors in interest and/or assigns shall provide to Plaintififs an affidavit or unswom declaration in lieu thereof pursuant to NRS 53.045 executed under penalty of perjury by a corporate representative from Weyerhaeuser NR Company ("WNR") acknowledging and confirming the representations contained in Pardee counsel, Pat Lundvall's, letter dated August 5, 2014, regarding the transactions which resulted in Pardee's rights and obligations under the Commission Agreement being assigned/transferred to WNR.
8. Pardee shall provide to Plaintiffs and their successors and/or assigns all future amendments, if any, to the Amended and Restated Option Agreement dated March 28, 2005. The documents will be designated CONFIDENTIAL pursuant to the protective order in the above-referenced matter.
9. In compliance with the Court's Decision, Pardee provide the following to Plaintiffs in the future to keep them reasonably informed pursuant to the Commission Agreement:
10. Within fourteen (14) days of the relevant event described below, Pardee shall provide Plaintiffs with courtesy copies of the following:
a. All publicly-recorded documents related to any transaction involving

Pardee's purchase of Option Property ${ }^{1}$ from CSI;

[^1]b. Each witten option exercise notice given pursuant to Parggraph? of the Option Agteement, ogether with information as to the number of acres involved and the scheduled closing date;
c. A parcel map which reflects the exact location of the related Option Property, if one is available;
d. Documents that reflect the purchase price of the Option Property, along with a breakdown of the calculation of commission owed pursuant to paragraph (ii) of the Comimission Agreement; and
e. Pardee shall notify Plaintiffs which escrow company will handle any Option Property purchases.
2. If there is a purchase of Option Property, Pardee shall pay into escrow any commissions owed to Plaintiffs concurrently with Pardee's deposit of the Option Property Price.
3. If the Option Agreement is terminated, Pardee shall provide notice thereof to Plaintiffs within fourteen (14) days of the effective date of the termination.
4. Plaintiffs shall notify counsel for Pardee and WNR of the name and address of the person or entity that should receive notice of the foregoing information and documents.

## JUDGMENT

Now, therefore, in consideration of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by this Court, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1. The Court finds that Defendant Pardee Homes of Nevada is liable to Plaintiffs for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and its failure to account to Plaintiffs regarding the information concerning the development of Coyote

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## DSTRCT COURT JWDG:

Fespectuly submited by:
Dated ñe $\qquad$ day March 2016

WMMERSON HANSEN PC.
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$\qquad$
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## EXHIBIT "4"

## EXHIBIT "4"

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JAMES WOLFRAM, WALT WILKES

Plaintiffs,
vs.

PARDEE HOMES OF NEVADA,
Defendant.

## AND RELATED CLAIMS

On October 23, 2013, the above-referenced matter came on for bench trial before the Honorable Judge Kerry Earley. The Court, having reviewed the record, testimony of witnesses, the documentary evidence, stipulations of counsel, the papers submitted by the respective parties, and considered the arguments of counsel at trial in this matter, entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on June 25, 2014.

In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court ordered the parties to provide supplemental briefing within 60 days detailing what information Defendant Pardee Homes of Nevada ("Pardee") and its successors and/or assigns should provide Plaintiffs James Wolfram and Walt Wilkes ("Plaintiffs") and their successors and/or assigns consistent with the Court's decision on the accounting cause of action.

After reviewing the parties' supplemental briefing, the Court then entered an order on April 20, 2015 reflecting its decision on the supplemental briefing (the "Accounting Order").

In accordance with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on June 25, 2014 and the Accounting Order entered on April 20, 2015, the Court finds the following:

In their NRCP 16.1 disclosures, Plaintiffs stated they were entitled to $\$ 1,952,000$ in total damages related to their asserted causes of action. Specifically, Plaintiffs disclosed $\$ 1,800,000$ in damages related to lost future commissions from Pardee's purported breach of the Commission Agreement, $\$ 146,500$ in attorney's fees incurred as special damages in prosecuting the action, and $\$ 6,000$ in consequential damages for time and effort expended searching for information regarding what Pardee purportedly owed them under the Commission Agreement.

Plaintiffs' asserted causes of action included accounting, breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Each asserted claim was predicated upon allegations of breach of contract by Pardee of the Commission Agreement. Plaintiffs asserted two theories of breach by Pardee: failure to properly pay commissions owed and failure to properly inform Plaintiffs.

Having considered the entire record presented at trial, including testimony of witnesses, the documentary evidence, stipulations of counsel, the papers submitted by the respective parties, and the arguments of counsel at trial in this matter, the Court enters judgment as follows:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT JUDGMENT IS
ENTERED against Plaintiffs and for Pardee on Plaintiffs' causes of action for accounting, breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as to Plaintiffs' theory that Pardee owed them money damages under the Commission Agreement. Pardee has not breached the Commission Agreement in such
a way as to deny Plaintiffs any commissions, and Pardee has paid all commissions due and owing under the Commission Agreement.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT JUDGMENT IS ENTERED in favor of Plaintiffs and against Pardee on Plaintiffs' causes of action for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as to Plaintiffs' theory that Pardee failed to properly inform Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are entitled to damages from Pardee in an amount totaling $\$ 141,500.00$, of which $\$ 6,000$ are consequential damages from Pardee's breach of the Commission Agreement and the remaining $\$ 135,500.00$ are special damages in the form of attorney's fees and costs.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT Pardee shall provide Plaintiffs with future accountings related to the Commission Agreement consistent with the Accounting Order entered by the Court on April 20, 2015.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT JUDGMENT IS ENTERED in favor of Plaintiffs and against Pardee on Pardee's cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Pardee is not entitled to any damages on this cause of action.

This Judgment may be amended upon entry of any further awards of interest, costs and/or attorney's fees.

DATED this $\qquad$ day of February, 2016.

Submitted by:
McDONALD CARANO WILSON LLP

PAT LUNDVALL (NBSN \#3761) RORY T. KAY (NSB \#12416)
2300 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 1200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102

Attorneys for Pardee Homes of Nevada

Approved by:
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

# - <br> McDONALD•CARANO•WILSONs 

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Reply to Las Vegas<br>ELECTRONICALLY SERVED 02/05/2016 01:49:34 PM

February 5,2016

## VIA WIZNET ELECTRONIC FILING

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## Re: James Wolfram, Walt Wilkes v. Barde Homes of Nevada A-10-632338-C: Draft Judgment

Dear Messes. Jimmerson and Flaxman:
Pursuant to the Court's oral instruction at the January 16, 2016 hearing and the Court's updated standing order available on the Court's website regarding submission of proposed orders, please see the attached draft judgment resolving this matter. As the Court instructed at the hearing, this judgment will be a final order in accordance with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that the Court entered on June 25, 2014 and the Court's subsequent Accounting Order entered on April 20, 2015.

Please execute the attached or indicate any desired modifications to the judgment on or before February 12, 2016. Contact me if you would like to discuss this issue in more detail.

Sincerely,

cc: Conrad Smucker


[^0]:    JAMES J. JIMMERSON (NBSN \#0264) MICHAEL C. FLAXMAN (NSB \#12963) 415 South 6th Street, Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorneys for Plaintiffs

[^1]:    ${ }^{1}$ Any capitalized term in this. Onder refering to the Amended and Restated Opton Agreement dated March 28,200 will have the same meaning as in the Amended and Restated Option Agreentent or any amendmente therto.

