## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

Case No.: 72371

Appellant,
v.

JAMES WOLFRAM and WALT WILKES, et al.
Respondents.

Appeal Regarding Judgment and Post-Judgment Orders
Eighth Judicial District Court
District Court Case No.: A-10-632338-C

## JOINT APPENDIX - VOLUME 72 OF 88

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Attorneys for Appellant

## Chronological Index to Joint Appendix

| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :--- |
| $12 / 29 / 2010$ | Complaint | 1 | JA000001- <br> JA000006 |
| $01 / 14 / 2011$ | Amended Complaint | 1 | JA0000007- <br> JA000012 |
| $02 / 11 / 2011$ | Amended Summons | 1 | JA000013- <br> JA000016 |
| $03 / 02 / 2011$ | Answer to Amended Complaint | 1 | JA000017- <br> JA000023 |
| $10 / 25 / 2011$ | Transcript re Discovery Conference | JA000024- <br> JA000027 |  |
| $11 / 08 / 2011$ | Scheduling Order | 1 | JA0000031- <br> JA000032 |
| $11 / 29 / 2011$ | Order Setting Civil Non-Jury Trial | 1 | JA000033- <br> JA000039 |
| $12 / 15 / 2011$ | Stipulated Confidentiality Agreement and <br> Protective Order | 1 | JA000040- <br> JA000048 |
| $12 / 16 / 2011$ | Notice of Entry of Stipulated <br> Confidentiality Agreement and Protective <br> Order | 1 | JA000049- <br> JA000050 |
| $08 / 27 / 2012$ | Transcript re Hearing | JA000051- <br> JA000054 |  |
| $08 / 29 / 2012$ | Stipulation and Order to Extend Discovery <br> Deadlines (First Request) | 1 | JA000055- <br> JA000060 |
| $08 / 30 / 2012$ | Notice of Entry of Stipulation and Order to <br> Extend Discovery Deadlines (First <br> Request) | JA000061- <br> JA000062 |  |
| $09 / 21 / 2012$ | Amended Order Setting Civil Non-Jury <br> Trial | 1 | 1 |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 10/24/2012 | Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment | 1 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA000063- } \\ & \text { JA000082 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/24/2012 | Appendix of Exhibits in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment | 1 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA000083- } \\ & \text { JA000206 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/24/2012 | Declaration of Aaron D. Shipley in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment | 1 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA000207- } \\ & \text { JA000211 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/25/2012 | Appendix of Exhibits in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment - filed under seal | 2 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA000212- } \\ & \text { JA000321 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 11/07/2012 | Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' Counter Motion for Partial Summary Judgment | 2 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA000322- } \\ & \text { JA000351 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 11/09/2012 | Appendix of Exhibits to Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiffs' Counter Motion for Summary Judgment - sections filed under seal | 3-6 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA000352- } \\ & \text { JA001332 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 11/13/2012 | Appendix of Exhibits to Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiffs' Counter Motion for Summary Judgment | 7-12 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA001333- } \\ & \text { JA002053 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 11/29/2012 | Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Counter Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Real Parties in Interest | 13 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA002054- } \\ & \text { JA002065 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 12/06/2012 | Transcript re Status Check | 13 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA002066- } \\ & \text { JA002080 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 01/07/2013 | Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment | 13 | $\begin{array}{\|l} \hline \text { JA002081- } \\ \text { JA002101 } \end{array}$ |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 01/17/2013 | Plaintiffs' Reply in Further Support of Their Counter Motion for Partial Summary Judgment | 13 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA002102- } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| 03/01/2013 | Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiffs' Claim for Attorneys' Fees as an Element of Damages (MIL \#1) | 13 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA002145- } \\ & \text { JA002175 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 03/01/2013 | Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiffs' Claim for Damages in the Form of Compensation for Time (MIL \#2) | 13 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA002176- } \\ & \text { JA002210 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 03/05/2013 | Transcript of Proceedings - March 5, 2013 | 14 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA002211- } \\ \text { JA002350 } \end{array}$ |
| 03/14/2013 | Order re Order Granting Plaintiffs Countermotion for Summary Judgment | 14 | $\begin{array}{\|l} \hline \text { JA002351- } \\ \text { JA002353 } \end{array}$ |
| 03/15/2013 | Notice of Entry of Order re Order Granting Plaintiffs Countermotion for Summary Judgment | 14 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA002354- } \\ & \text { JA002358 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 03/20/2013 | Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiffs Claim for Attorney's Fees as an Element of Damages MIL 1 | 15 | $\begin{array}{\|l} \hline \text { JA002359- } \\ \text { JA002408 } \end{array}$ |
| 03/20/2013 | Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants Motion in Limine to Plaintiffs Claim for Damages in the form of compensation for time MIL 2 | 15 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA002409- } \\ & \text { JA002433 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 03/21/2013 | Motion to File Second Amended Complaint | 15 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA002434- } \\ \text { JA002461 } \end{array}$ |
| 04/02/2013 | Order re Order Denying Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment | 16 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA002462- } \\ & \text { JA002464 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 04/03/2013 | Notice of Entry of Order re Order Denying Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment | 16 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA002465- } \\ & \text { JA002470 } \end{aligned}$ |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :--- | :---: | :--- |
| $04 / 08 / 2013$ | Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs' <br> Motion for Leave to File a Second <br> Amended Complaint | 16 | JA002471- <br> JA002500 |
| $04 / 17 / 2013$ | Second Amended Order Setting Civil Non- <br> Jury Trial | 16 | JA002501- <br> JA002502 |
| $04 / 23 / 2013$ | Plaintiffs Reply in Further Support of <br> Motion for Leave to File Second Amended <br> Complaint | 16 | JA002503- <br> JA002526 |
| $04 / 26 / 2013$ | Transcript re Hearing | 16 | JA002527- <br> JA002626 |
| $05 / 10 / 2013$ | Plaintiffs Supplement to Motion for Leave <br> to File a Second Amended Complaint <br> Pursuant to the Courts order on Hearing on <br> April 26, 2013 | 16 | JA002627- <br> JA002651 |
| $05 / 10 / 2013$ | Defendant's Supplemental Brief in Support <br> of Its Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for <br> Leave to File a Second Amended <br> Complaint | 16 | JA002652- <br> JA002658 |
| $05 / 30 / 2013$ | Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for <br> Leave to File a Second Amended <br> Complaint | 16 | JA002659- <br> JA002661 |
| $06 / 05 / 2013$ | Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for <br> Leave to File a Second Amended <br> Complaint | 16 | JA002662- <br> JA002664 |
| $06 / 05 / 2013$ | Notice of Entry of Order Granting <br> Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File a <br> Second Amended Complaint | 16 | JA002665- <br> JA002669 |
| $07 / 03 / 2013$ | Answer to Second Amended Complaint <br> and Counterclaim | 16 | JA002678- <br> JA002687 |
| SA002670- |  |  |  |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :--- |
| $07 / 15 / 2013$ | Plaintiffs Reply to Defendants <br> Counterclaim | 17 | JA002724- <br> JA002731 |
| $07 / 18 / 2013$ | Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine To Permit <br> James J. Jimmerson, Esq. To Testify <br> Concerning Plaintiffs' Attorney's Fees and <br> Costs (MIL \#25) | 17 | JA002732- <br> JA002771 |
| $07 / 22 / 2013$ | Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary <br> Judgment | 17 | JA002772- <br> JA002786 |
| $07 / 22 / 2013$ | Plaintiffs Supplemental Opposition to <br> Defendants Motion in Limine to Plaintiffs <br> Claim for Damages in the Form of <br> Compensation for Time MIL 2 | 17 | JA002787- <br> JA002808 |
| $07 / 23 / 2013$ | Transcript re Status Check | 17 | JA002809- <br> JA002814 |
| $08 / 05 / 2013$ | Defendant Pardee Homes of Nevada's <br> Response to Plaintiffs' Motions in Limine <br> \#1-5; And \#20-25 | 17 | JA002815- <br> JA002829 |
| $08 / 06 / 2013$ | Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants <br> Motion for Partial Summary Judgment | 17 | JA002830- <br> JA002857 |
| $09 / 16 / 2013$ | Reply in Support of Defendant's Motion <br> for Partial Summary Judgment | 17 | JA002858- <br> JA002864 |
| $09 / 16 / 2013$ | Reply in Support of Defendant's Motion in <br> Limine to Exclude Plaintiff's Claim for <br> Attorney's Fees As An Element of <br> Damages | 17 | JA002865- <br> JA002869 |
| $09 / 23 / 2013$ | Transcript re Hearing <br> Time <br> Damages in the Form of Compensation for <br> Limine to Exclude Plainiffst Claim For in | 17 | JA002870- <br> JA002874 |
| $09 / 16 / 2013$ | JA002875- <br> JA002987 |  |  |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :--- |
| $09 / 27 / 2013$ | Plaintiffs Supplement to Their Opposition <br> to Defendants Motion for Partial Summary <br> Judgment | $19-21$ | JA002988- <br> JA003203 |
| $09 / 27 / 2013$ | Supplemental Brief in Support of <br> Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary <br> Judgment | 21 | JA003204- <br> JA003209 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Order Denying Motion for Partial <br> Summary Judgment | 21 | JA003210- <br> JA003212 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Transcript re Trial | 22 | JA003213- <br> JA003403 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit A | 23 | JA003404- <br> JA003544 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit B - filed under seal | JA003545- <br> JA003625 |  |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit C | JA003626- <br> JA003628 |  |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit D | 23 | JA003629- <br> JA003631 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit E - filed under seal | 23 | JA003632- <br> JA003634 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit F | 23 | JA003635- <br> JA003637 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit G | JA003641- <br> JA003643 |  |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit H | JA003639- <br> JA003640 |  |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit I | 23 | JA |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit J - filed under seal | 24 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA003644- } \\ \text { JA003669 } \end{array}$ |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit K | 24 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA003670- } \\ & \text { JA003674 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit L | 24 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA003675- } \\ & \text { JA003678 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit M | 24 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA003679- } \\ & \text { JA003680 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit N | 24 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA003681- } \\ & \text { JA003683 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit O - filed under seal | 25-26 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|l\|} \hline \text { JA0003684- } \\ \hline \text { JA004083 } \end{array}$ |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit P | 27 | JA004084 |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit Q | 27 | JA004085 |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit R | 27 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA004086- } \\ & \text { JA004089 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit S | 27 | JA004090 |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit T | 27 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA004091- } \\ & \text { JA004092 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit U | 27 | JA004093 |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit V | 27 | JA004094 |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit W | 27 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA004095- } \\ & \text { JA004096 } \end{aligned}$ |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :--- |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit X | 27 | JA004097 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit Y | 27 | JA004098 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit Z | 27 | JA004099- <br> JA004100 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit AA | 27 | JA004101- <br> JA004102 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit BB | 27 | JA004103 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit CC | 27 | JA004105 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit DD | 27 | JA004106- <br> JA004113 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit EE | 27 | JA004114- <br> JA004118 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit FF | 27 | JA004119- <br> JA004122 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit GG | 27 | JA004123 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit HH | JA004126- <br> JA004167 |  |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit II | Trial Exhibit JJ | 27 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | TA004124 |  |  |
| $10 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit KK | 27 | JA004125 |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :--- |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit LL | 27 | JA004168 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit MM | 27 | JA004169 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit NN | 27 | JA004170- <br> JA004174 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit OO | JA004175- <br> JA004183 |  |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit PP | 27 | JA004184- <br> JA004240 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit QQ | JA004241- <br> JA004243 |  |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit RR | JA004244- <br> JA004248 |  |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit SS | JA004249- <br> JA004255 |  |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit TT | 27 | JA004256- <br> JA004262 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit UU | 27 | JA004263- <br> JA004288 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 1 | 27 | JA004289- <br> JA004292 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 6 - filed under seal | JA004311- <br> JA004312 |  |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 7 - filed under seal | JA004293- <br> JA004307 |  |
| Trial Exhibit 8 - filed under seal | $27308-$ |  |  |
| 1013 |  |  |  |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :--- |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 9 - filed under seal | 27 | JA004313- <br> JA004319 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 10 - filed under seal | 27 | JA004320- <br> JA004329 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 11 - filed under seal | 28 | JA004330- <br> JA004340 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 12 - filed under seal | 28 | JA004341- <br> JA004360 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 13 - filed under seal | 28 | JA004361- <br> JA004453 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 21 | 28 | JA004454 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 25 | 29 | JA004455- <br> JA004462 |
| $10 / 24 / 2013$ | Transcript re Trial | JA004463- <br> JA004790 |  |
| $10 / 24 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit VV | 31 | JA004791 |
| $10 / 24 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 26 | 31 | JA004792- <br> JA004804 |
| $10 / 24 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 30 | 31 | JA004805- <br> JA004811 |
| $10 / 25 / 2013$ | Notice of Entry of Order Denying Motion <br> for Partial Summary Judgment | 31 | JA004812- <br> JA004817 |
| $10 / 25 / 2013$ | Plaintiffs Trial Brief Pursuant to EDCR <br> 7.27 | Transcript re Trial - filed under seal | JA004818- <br> JA004847 |
| 101827 |  |  |  |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 10/28/2013 | Trial Exhibit 15 | 34 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA005228- } \\ & \text { JA005232 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/28/2013 | Trial Exhibit 18 | 34 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA005233- } \\ & \text { JA005235 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/28/2013 | Trial Exhibit 19 | 34 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA005236- } \\ & \text { JA005237 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/28/2013 | Trial Exhibit 20 | 34 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA005238- } \\ & \text { JA005254 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/28/2013 | Trial Exhibit 23 | 34 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA005255- } \\ & \text { JA005260 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/28/2013 | Trial Exhibit 24 | 34 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA005261- } \\ & \text { JA005263 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/29/2013 | Transcript re Trial - filed under seal | 35 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA005264- } \\ \text { JA005493 } \end{array}$ |
| 10/29/2013 | Trial Exhibit 28 | 36 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA005494- } \\ & \text { JA005497 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/29/2013 | Trial Exhibit 29 | 36 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA005498- } \\ \text { JA005511 } \end{array}$ |
| 10/30/2013 | Transcript re Trial | 37-38 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA005512- } \\ & \text { JA005815 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/30/2013 | Trial Exhibit 23a | 39 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA005816- } \\ & \text { JA005817 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/30/2013 | Trial Exhibit 27 | 39 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA005818- } \\ \text { JA005820 } \end{array}$ |
| 12/09/2013 | Transcript re Trial - filed under seal | 40-41 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA005821- } \\ & \text { JA006192 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 12/10/2013 | Transcript re Trial | 42-43 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA006193- } \\ & \text { IAAO6530 } \end{aligned}$ |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :--- |
| $12 / 10 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit WW | 43 | JA006531- <br> JA006532 |
| $12 / 12 / 2013$ | Transcript re Trial - filed under seal | $44-45$ | JA006533- <br> JA006878 |
| $12 / 12 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit XX | 46 | JA006879- <br> JA006935 |
| $12 / 12 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 39 | 46 | JA006936- <br> JA006948 |
| $12 / 12 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 40 | 46 | JA006949- <br> JA006950 |
| $12 / 12 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 41 | JA006951- <br> JA006952 |  |
| $12 / 13 / 2013$ | Transcript re Trial - Part 1 | 46 | JA006953- <br> JA007107 |
| $12 / 13 / 2013$ | Transcript re Trial - Part 2 | JA007108- <br> JA007384 |  |
| $12 / 13 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 31a | 48 | JA007385- <br> JA007410 |
| $06 / 24 / 2014$ | Pardee's Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens - <br> section filed under seal | 48 | JA007411- <br> JA007456 |
| $06 / 25 / 2014$ | Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and <br> Order | 48 | JA007457- <br> JA007474 |
| $07 / 15 / 2014$ | Reply in Support of Pardee's Motion to <br> Expunge Lis Pendens | 48 | JA007560- <br> JA007570 |
| $06 / 27 / 2014$ | Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact, <br> Conclusions of Law and Order | 48 | JA007475- <br> JA007494 |
| $07 / 14 / 2014$ | Opposition to Pardee's Motion to Expunge <br> Jis Pendens | 48 | JA007495- |
| 1007559 |  |  |  |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :--- |
| $07 / 24 / 2014$ | Order Granting Motion to Expunge Lis <br> Pendens | 48 | JA007571- <br> JA007573 |
| $07 / 25 / 2014$ | Notice of Entry of Order Granting Motion <br> to Expunge Lis Pendens | 48 | JA007574- <br> JA007578 |
| $07 / 17 / 2014$ | Transcript re Hearing | 49 | JA007579- <br> JA007629 |
| $07 / 31 / 2014$ | Transcript re Hearing | 49 | JA007630- <br> JA007646 |
| $08 / 25 / 2014$ | Plaintiff's Accounting Brief Pursuant to the <br> court's Order Entered on June 25, 2014 | 49 | JA007647- <br> JA007698 |
| $08 / 25 / 2014$ | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Supplemental <br> Brief Regarding Future Accounting | 49 | JA007699- <br> JA007707 |
| $05 / 13 / 2015$ | Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law <br> and Supplemental Briefing re Future <br> Accounting | 49 | JA007708- <br> JA007711 |
| $05 / 13 / 2015$ | Notice of Entry of Order on Findings of <br> Fact and Conclusions of Law and <br> Supplemental Briefing re Future <br> Accounting | 49 | JA007712- <br> JA007717 |
| $05 / 28 / 2015$ | Pardee's Motion for Attorney's Fees and <br> Costs | 49 | JA007718- <br> JA007734 |
| $05 / 28 / 2015$ | Appendix of Exhibits to Pardee's Motion <br> for Attorney's Fees and Costs | $50-51$ | JA007735- <br> JA008150 |
| $06 / 15 / 2015$ | Judgment | 52 | JA008151- <br> JA008153 |
| $06 / 15 / 2015$ | Notice of Entry of Judgment | JA0008154- <br> JA008158 |  |
| $06 / 19 / 2015$ | Plaintiffs, James Wolfram and Walt <br> Wilkes' Memorandum of Costs and <br> Disbursements | 52 |  |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $06 / 24 / 2015$ | Pardee's Motion to Retax Plaintiffs' <br> Memorandum of Costs Filed June 19, <br> 2015 | 52 | JA008192- <br> JA008215 |
| $06 / 29 / 2015$ | Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees and <br> Costs | $52-53$ | JA008216- <br> JA008327 |
| $06 / 29 / 2015$ | Motion to Strike "Judgment", Entered June <br> 15, 2015 Pursuant To NRCP. 52 (B) And <br> N.R.C.P. 59, As Unnecessary and <br> Duplicative Orders Of Final Orders <br> Entered on June 25, 2014 and May 13, <br> 2015, and as Such, is a Fugitive Document | 53 | JA008328- <br> JA008394 |
| $06 / 29 / 2015$ | Plaintiffs' Motion Pursuant to NRCP 52(b) <br> and 59 to Amend The Court's Judgment <br> Entered on June 15, 2015, to Amend the <br> Findings of Fact/conclusions of Law and <br> Judgment Contained Therein, Specifically <br> Referred to in the Language Included in <br> the Judgment at Page 2, Lines 8 Through <br> 13 and the Judgment At Page 2, Lines 18 <br> Through 23 to Delete the Same or Amend <br> The Same to Reflect the True Fact That <br> Plaintiff Prevailed On Their Entitlement to <br> the First Claim for Relief For an <br> Accounting, and Damages for Their <br> Second Claim for Relief of Breach of <br> Contract, and Their Third Claim for Relief <br> for Breach of the Implied Covenant for <br> Good Faith and Fair Dealing and That <br> Defendant Never Received a Judgment in <br> its Form and Against Plaintiffs <br> Whatsoever as Mistakenly Stated Within <br> the Court's Latest "Judgment - sections <br> filed under seal | $54-56$ | JA008395- <br> JA008922 |
| $06 / 30 / 2015$ | Plaintiffs' Opposition to Pardee's Motion <br> for Attorney's Fees and Costs | $57-58$ | JA008923- <br> JA009109 |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $06 / 30 / 2015$ | Supplement to Plaintiffs' Pending Motion <br> for Attorney's Fees and Costs, Motion to <br> Strike Judgment, Motion Pursuant to <br> NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59 to Amend the <br> Court's Judgment, and Plaintiffs' <br> Opposition to Pardee's Motion for <br> Attorney's Fees and Costs | 59 | JA009110- <br> JA009206 |
| $07 / 02 / 2015$ | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Motion to <br> Amend Judgment | 59 | JA009207- <br> JA009283 |
| $07 / 08 / 2015$ | Plaintiffs' Opposition to Pardee's Motion to <br> Retax Costs | $60-61$ | JA009284- |
| $07 / 08 / 2015$ | Errata to Motion to Strike "Judgment", <br> Entered June 15, 2015 Pursuant to NRCP <br> $52(b)$ and NRCP 59, as Unnecessary and <br> Duplicative Orders of Final Orders <br> Entered on June 25, 2014 and May 13, <br> 2015, and as such, is a Fugitive Document | 62 | JA009645- <br> JA009652 |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :--- | :---: | :---: |
| 07/08/2015 | Errata to Plaintiffs' Motion Pursuant to <br> NRCP 52(b) and 59 to Amend the Court's <br> Judgment Entered on June 15, 2015, to <br> Amend the Findings of Fact/Conclusions <br> of Law and Judgment Contained Therein, <br> Specifically Referred to in the Language <br> Included in the Judgment at Page, 2, Lines <br> 8 through 13 and the Judgment at Page 2, <br> Lines 18 through 23 to Delete the Same or <br> Amend the Same to Reflect the True Fact <br> that Plaintiff Prevailed on their Entitlement <br> to the First Claim for Relief for an <br> Accounting, and Damages for their Second <br> Claim for Relief of Breach of Contract, <br> and Their Third Claim for Relief for <br> Breach of the Implied Covenant for Good <br> Faith and Fair Dealing and that Defendant <br> Never Received a Judgment in its form <br> and Against Plaintiffs Whatsoever as <br> Mistakenly Stated Within the Court's <br> Latest "Judgment" | 62 | JA009653- <br> JA009662 |
| Pation to Stay | 62 | JA009663- <br> JA009710 |  |
| Pardee's Emergency Motion <br> Execution of Judgment: and Ex Parte <br> Order Shortening Time | 62 | JA009711- <br> JA009733 |  |
| $07 / 08 / 2015$ | Pardee's Supplemental Briefing in Support <br> of its Emergency Motion to Stay <br> Execution of Judgment | 62 | JA009734- <br> JA009752 |
| $07 / 10 / 2015$ | Transcript re Hearing | JA009753- <br> JA009754 |  |
| $07 / 10 / 2015$ | Order on Pardee's Emergency Motion to <br> Stay Execution of Judgment; and Ex Parte <br> Order Shortening Time | 62 |  |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $07 / 10 / 2015$ | Notice of Entry of Order on Pardee's <br> Emergency Motion to Stay Execution of <br> Judgment; and Ex Parte Order Shortening <br> Time | 62 | JA009755- <br> JA009758 |
| $07 / 15 / 2015$ | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Opposition to <br> Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees and <br> Costs | 62 | JA009759- <br> JA009771 |
| $07 / 15 / 2015$ | Appendix of Exhibits to Pardee Homes of <br> Nevada's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion <br> for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 63 | JA009772- <br> JA009918 |
| $07 / 15 / 2015$ | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Consolidated <br> Opposition To: (1) Plaintiff's Motion to <br> Strike Judgment Entered on June 15, 2015 <br> Pursuant to NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59; <br> and (2) Plaintiffs' Motion Pursuant to <br> NRCP 52(b) and 59 to Amend the Court's <br> Judgment Entered on June 15, 2015 | 63 | JA009919- <br> JA009943 |
| $07 / 15 / 2015$ | Appendix of Exhibits to Pardee Homes of <br> Nevada's Consolidated Opposition to: (1) <br> Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Judgment <br> Entered on June 15, 2015 Pursuant to <br> NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59; and Plaintiffs' <br> Motion Pursuant to NRCP 52(b) and 59 to <br> Amend the Court's Judgment Entered on <br> June 15, 2015 | 64 | JA009944- <br> JA010185 |
| $07 / 17 / 2015$ | Plaintiffs' Opposition to Pardee Homes of <br> Nevada's Motion to Amend Judgment and <br> Countermotion for Attorney's Fees | $65-67$ | JA010203- <br> JA010481 |
| Apposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for |  |  |  |
| Attorn's Fees and Costs |  |  |  |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 07/24/2015 | Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, Ex Parte (With Notice) of Application for Order Shortening Time Regarding Stay of Execution and Order Shortening Time Regarding Stay of Execution | 67 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA010482- } \\ & \text { JA010522 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/24/2015 | Declaration of John W. Muije, Esq. In Support of Motion for Reconsideration | 67 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA010523- } \\ & \text { JA010581 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 08/10/2015 | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of the Order on Pardee's Emergency Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment | 67 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA010582- } \\ \text { JA010669 } \end{array}$ |
| 08/17/2015 | Reply Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Reconsideration | 67 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA010670- } \\ & \text { JA010678 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 08/24/2015 | Minute Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, Ex Parte (With Notice) of Application for Order Shortening Time Regarding Stay of Execution and Order Shortening Time Regarding Stay of Execution | 67 | JA010679 |
| 09/11/2015 | Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 68 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA010680- } \\ & \text { JA010722 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 09/11/2015 | Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Strike "Judgment" Entered June 15, 2015 Pursuant to NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59 | 68 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA010723- } \\ \text { JA010767 } \end{array}$ |
| 09/11/2015 | Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion Pursuant to NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59 to Amend the Court's Judgment Entered on June 15, 2015 | 68 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA010768- } \\ & \text { JA010811 } \end{aligned}$ |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: |
| 09/12/2015 | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Consolidated <br> Reply in Support of (1) Motion to Retax <br> Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs Filed <br> June 19, 2015; and (2) Motion for <br> Attorney's Fees and Costs | 68 | JA010812- <br> JA010865 |
| $12 / 08 / 2015$ | Plaintiffs' Supplement to Plaintiffs' <br> Opposition to Pardee's Motion for <br> Attorney's Fees and Costs | 68 | JA010866- <br> JA010895 |
| $12 / 08 / 2015$ | Notice of Defendant Pardee Homes of <br> Nevada's Non-Reply and Non-Opposition <br> to "Plaintiff's Opposition to Pardee Homes <br> of Nevada's Motion to Amend Judgment <br> and Countermotion for Attorney's Fees" | 69 | JA010896- <br> JA010945 |
| $12 / 30 / 2015$ | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Consolidated <br> Response to: (1) Plaintiffs' Notice of Non- <br> Reply and Non-Opposition to Plaintiffs' <br> Opposition to Pardee's Motion to Amend <br> Judgment and Countermotion for <br> Attorney's Fees; and (2) Plaintiffs' <br> Supplement to Plaintiffs' Opposition to <br> Pardee's Motion for Attorney's Fees and <br> Costs | 69 | JA010946- <br> JA010953 |
| $01 / 11 / 2016$ | Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants <br> Consolidated Response to (1) Plaintiffs' <br> Notice of Non-Reply and Non-Opposition <br> to Plaintiff's Opposition to Pardee's Motion <br> to Amend Judgment and Countermotion <br> for Attorney's Fees And (2) Plaintiffs' <br> Supplement to Plaintiffs' Opposition to <br> Pardee's Motion for Attorney's Fees and <br> Costs | 69 | JA010954- <br> JA010961 |
| $01 / 15 / 2016$ | Transcript re Hearing | 70 | JA010962- <br> JA011167 |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 03/14/2016 | Plaintiffs' Motion to Settle Two (2) Competing Judgments and Orders | 70 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA011168- } \\ & \text { JA011210 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 03/16/2016 | Release of Judgment | 71 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA011211- } \\ \text { JA011213 } \end{array}$ |
| 03/23/2016 | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Settle Two (2) Sets of Competing Judgments and Orders | 71 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA011214- } \\ & \text { JA011270 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 04/20/2016 | Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant's Response and Supplement to Plaintiffs' Motion to Settle Two (2) Sets of Competing Judgments and Orders | 71 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA011271- } \\ & \text { JA011384 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 04/26/2016 | Order from January 15, 2016 Hearings | 71 | JA011385- <br> JA011388 |
| 05/16/2016 | Judgment | 71 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA011389- } \\ & \text { JA011391 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 05/17/2016 | Notice of Entry of Judgment | 71 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA011392- } \\ & \text { JA011396 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 05/23/2016 | Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements | 71 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA011397- } \\ & \text { JA011441 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 05/31/2016 | Pardee's Motion to Retax Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs Filed May 23, 2016 | 71 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA011442- } \\ \text { JA011454 } \end{array}$ |
| 06/01/2016 | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Motion to Amend Judgment | 72 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA011455- } \\ & \text { JA011589 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 06/06/2016 | Pardee's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 72 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA011590- } \\ \text { JA011614 } \end{array}$ |
| 06/06/2016 | Appendix of Exhibits to Pardee Homes Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs Volume 1 | 73-74 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA011615- } \\ & \text { JA011866 } \end{aligned}$ |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 06/06/2016 | Appendix of Exhibits to Pardee Homes Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs Volume 2 | 75-76 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA011867- } \\ \text { JA012114 } \end{array}$ |
| 06/08/2016 | Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 77 | $\begin{array}{\|l} \hline \text { JA012115- } \\ \text { JA012182 } \end{array}$ |
| 06/20/2016 | Plaintiffs' Opposition to Pardee's Motion to Retax Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs Filed May 23, 2016 | 77-79 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA012183- } \\ \text { JA012624 } \end{array}$ |
| 06/21/2016 | Plaintiffs' Opposition to Pardee's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 80 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA012625- } \\ \text { JA012812 } \end{array}$ |
| 06/21/2016 | Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant, Pardee Homes of Nevada's, Motion to Amend Judgment and Plaintiffs' Countermotion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs Pursuant to NRS 18.010 and EDCR 7.60 | 81 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA012813- } \\ \text { JA013024 } \end{array}$ |
| 06/27/2016 | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 82 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA013025- } \\ \text { JA013170 } \end{array}$ |
| 06/30/2016 | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Reply in Support of Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 82 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA013171- } \\ & \text { JA013182 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 06/30/2016 | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Reply in Support of Motion to Amend Judgment; and Opposition to Plaintiffs' Countermotion for Attorney's Fees | 82 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA013183- } \\ \text { JA013199 } \end{array}$ |
| 07/01/2016 | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Reply in Support of Motion to Retax Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs Filed May 23, 2016 | 82 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA013197- } \\ \text { JA013204 } \end{array}$ |
| 08/02/2016 | Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 83-84 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA013205- } \\ \text { JA013357 } \end{array}$ |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 08/02/2016 | Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Countermotion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 84-85 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA013358- } \\ \text { JA013444 } \end{array}$ |
| 08/15/2016 | Transcript re Hearing - August 15, 2016 | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013445- } \\ & \text { JA013565 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 09/12/2016 | Plaintiffs' Brief on Interest Pursuant to the Court's Order Entered on August 15, 2016 | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA013566- } \\ & \text { JA013590 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/17/2016 | Pardee's Supplemental Brief Regarding Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest Pursuant to the Court's Order | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013591- } \\ & \text { JA013602 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 11/04/2016 | Plaintiffs' Reply Brief in Support of Brief on Interest Pursuant to the Court's Order Entered on August 15, 2016 | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013603- } \\ & \text { JA013612 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 01/09/2017 | Order and Judgment from August 15, 2016 Hearings Regarding Defendants Motion to Amend Judgment | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013613- } \\ & \text { JA013615 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 01/09/2017 | Order and Judgment from August 15, 2016 Hearings Regarding Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA013616- } \\ & \text { JA013618 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 01/09/2017 | Order and Judgment from August 15, 2016 Hearings Regarding Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 86 | $\begin{array}{\|l} \hline \text { JA013619- } \\ \text { JA013621 } \end{array}$ |
| 01/10/2017 | Notice of Entry of Order and Judgment from August 15, 2016 Hearings Regarding Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013622- } \\ & \text { JA013628 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 01/10/2017 | Notice of Entry of Order and Judgment from August 15, 2016 Hearings Regarding Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013629- } \\ & \text { JA013635 } \end{aligned}$ |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 01/10/2017 | Notice of Entry of Order and Judgment from August 15, 2016 Hearings Regarding Defendant's Motion to Amend Judgment | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA013636- } \\ & \text { JA016342 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 01/12/2017 | Order on Plaintiffs' Countermotion for Attorney's Fees and Costs Pursuant to NRS 18.010 and EDCR 7.60 | 86 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA013643- } \\ \text { JA013644 } \end{array}$ |
| 01/12/2017 | Notice of Entry of Order on Plaintiffs' Countermotion for Attorney's Fees and Costs Pursuant to NRS 18.010 and EDCR 7.60 | 86 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA013645- } \\ \text { JA013648 } \end{array}$ |
| 01/12/2017 | Order on Defendant's Motion to Retax Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs Filed May 23, 2016 | 86 | $\begin{array}{\|l} \hline \text { JA013649- } \\ \text { JA013651 } \end{array}$ |
| 01/13/2017 | Notice of Entry of Order on Defendant's Motion to Retax Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs Filed May 23, 2016 | 86 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA013652- } \\ \text { JA013656 } \end{array}$ |
| 02/08/2017 | Pardee Notice of Appeal | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013657- } \\ & \text { JA013659 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 04/07/2017 | Pardee's Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment and Post-Judgment Orders | 86 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA013660- } \\ \text { JA013668 } \end{array}$ |
| 04/07/2017 | Appendix of Exhibits in Support of Pardee's Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment and Post-Judgment Orders, [Volume I] | 87 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA013669- } \\ \text { JA013914 } \end{array}$ |
| 04/07/2017 | Appendix of Exhibits in Support of Pardee's Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment and Post-Judgment Orders, [Volume II] | 88 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013915- } \\ & \text { JA014065 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 04/27/2017 | Plaintiffs' Response to Pardee's Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment and PostJudgment Orders | 88 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA014066- } \\ \text { JA014068 } \end{array}$ |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :--- |
| $05 / 10 / 2017$ | Pardee's Reply in Support of Motion to <br> Stay Execution of Judgment and Post- <br> Judgment Orders | 88 | JA014069- <br> JA014071 |
| $05 / 12 / 2017$ | Plaintiffs' Opposition to Pardee's Motion <br> Stay Execution of Judgment and Post- <br> Judgment Orders | 88 | JA014072- <br> JA014105 |
| $07 / 12 / 2007$ | Supplemental Order Regarding Plaintiffs' <br> Entitlement to, and Calculation of, <br> Prejudgment Interest | 88 | JA014106- <br> JA014110 |
| $07 / 14 / 2017$ | Notice of Entry of Supplemental Order <br> Regarding Plaintiffs' Entitlement to, and <br> Calculation of, Prejudgment Interest | 88 | JA014111- <br> JA014117 |
| $10 / 12 / 2017$ | Amended Judgment | 88 | JA014118- <br> JA014129 |
| $10 / 13 / 2017$ | Notice of Entry of Amended Judgment | 88 | JA014130- <br> JA014143 |
| $10 / 12 / 2017$ | Order Re: Defendant Pardee Homes of <br> Nevada's Motion to Stay Execution of <br> Judgment and Post-Judgment Orders | 88 | JA014144- <br> JA014146 |
| $10 / 13 / 2017$ | Notice of Entry of Order Re: Defendant <br> Pardee Homes of Nevada's Motion to Stay <br> Execution of Judgment and Post-Judgment <br> Orders | 88 | JA014147- <br> JA014151 |
| $11 / 02 / 2017$ | Pardee Amended Notice of Appeal <br> FA014152- |  |  |

## Alphabetical Index to Joint Appendix

| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $01 / 14 / 2011$ | Amended Complaint | 1 | JA000007- <br> JA000012 |
| $10 / 12 / 2017$ | Amended Judgment | JA014118- <br> JA014129 |  |
| $09 / 21 / 2012$ | Amended Order Setting Civil Non-Jury <br> Trial | 1 | JA000061- <br> JA000062 |
| $02 / 11 / 2011$ | Amended Summons | 1 | JA000013- <br> JA000016 |
| $03 / 02 / 2011$ | Answer to Amended Complaint | JA000017- <br> JA000023 |  |
| $07 / 03 / 2013$ | Answer to Second Amended Complaint <br> and Counterclaim | 16 | JA002678- <br> JA002687 |
| $10 / 24 / 2012$ | Appendix of Exhibits in Support of <br> Defendant's Motion for Summary <br> Judgment | JA000083- <br> JA000206 |  |
| $10 / 25 / 2012$ | Appendix of Exhibits in Support of <br> Defendant's Motion for Summary <br> Judgment - filed under seal | 2 | JA000212- <br> JA000321 |
| $04 / 07 / 2017$ | Appendix of Exhibits in Support of <br> Pardee's Motion to Stay Execution of <br> Judgment and Post-Judgment Orders, <br> [Volume I] | 87 | JA013669- <br> JA013914 |
| $04 / 07 / 2017$ | Appendix of Exhibits in Support of <br> Pardee's Motion to Stay Execution of <br> Judgment and Post-Judgment Orders, <br> [Volume II] | 88 | JA013915- <br> JA014065 |
| $06 / 06 / 2016$ | Appendix of Exhibits to Pardee Homes <br> Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs - <br> Volume 1 | $73-74$ | JA011615- <br> JA011866 |
|  | An |  |  |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 06/06/2016 | Appendix of Exhibits to Pardee Homes Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs Volume 2 | 75-76 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA011867- } \\ & \text { JA012114 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/15/2015 | Appendix of Exhibits to Pardee Homes of Nevada's Consolidated Opposition to: (1) Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Judgment Entered on June 15, 2015 Pursuant to NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59; and Plaintiffs' Motion Pursuant to NRCP 52(b) and 59 to Amend the Court's Judgment Entered on June 15, 2015 | 64 | JA009944- JA010185 |
| 07/15/2015 | Appendix of Exhibits to Pardee Homes of Nevada's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 63 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA009772- } \\ & \text { JA009918 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 05/28/2015 | Appendix of Exhibits to Pardee's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 50-51 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA007735- } \\ & \text { JA008150 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 11/09/2012 | Appendix of Exhibits to Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiffs' Counter Motion for Summary Judgment - sections filed under seal | 3-6 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA000352- } \\ & \text { JA001332 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 11/13/2012 | Appendix of Exhibits to Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiffs' Counter Motion for Summary Judgment | 7-12 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA001333- } \\ & \text { JA002053 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 12/29/2010 | Complaint | 1 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA000001- } \\ & \text { JA000006 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/24/2012 | Declaration of Aaron D. Shipley in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment | 1 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA000207- } \\ & \text { JA000211 } \end{aligned}$ |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 07/24/2015 | Declaration of John W. Muije, Esq. In Support of Motion for Reconsideration | 67 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA010523- } \\ & \text { JA010581 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 08/05/2013 | Defendant Pardee Homes of Nevada's Response to Plaintiffs' Motions in Limine \#1-5; And \#20-25 | 17 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA002815- } \\ & \text { JA002829 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/22/2013 | Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment | 17 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA002772- } \\ & \text { JA002786 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/24/2012 | Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment | 1 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA000063- } \\ & \text { JA000082 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 03/01/2013 | Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiffs' Claim for Attorneys' Fees as an Element of Damages (MIL \#1) | 13 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA002145- } \\ & \text { JA002175 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 03/01/2013 | Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiffs' Claim for Damages in the Form of Compensation for Time (MIL \#2) | 13 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA002176- } \\ & \text { JA002210 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 11/29/2012 | Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Counter Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Real Parties in Interest | 13 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA002054- } \\ & \text { JA002065 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 04/08/2013 | Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint | 16 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA002471- } \\ & \text { JA002500 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 05/10/2013 | Defendant's Supplemental Brief in Support of Its Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint | 16 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA002652- } \\ & \text { JA002658 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/08/2015 | Errata to Motion to Strike "Judgment", Entered June 15, 2015 Pursuant to NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59, as Unnecessary and Duplicative Orders of Final Orders Entered on June 25, 2014 and May 13, 2015, and as such, is a Fugitive Document | 62 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA009645- } \\ & \text { JA009652 } \end{aligned}$ |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 07/16/2015 | Errata to Pardee Homes of Nevada's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 65 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA010186- } \\ & \text { JA010202 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/08/2015 | Errata to Plaintiffs' Motion Pursuant to NRCP 52(b) and 59 to Amend the Court's Judgment Entered on June 15, 2015, to Amend the Findings of Fact/Conclusions of Law and Judgment Contained Therein, Specifically Referred to in the Language Included in the Judgment at Page, 2, Lines 8 through 13 and the Judgment at Page 2, Lines 18 through 23 to Delete the Same or Amend the Same to Reflect the True Fact that Plaintiff Prevailed on their Entitlement to the First Claim for Relief for an Accounting, and Damages for their Second Claim for Relief of Breach of Contract, and Their Third Claim for Relief for Breach of the Implied Covenant for Good Faith and Fair Dealing and that Defendant Never Received a Judgment in its form and Against Plaintiffs Whatsoever as Mistakenly Stated Within the Court's Latest "Judgment" | 62 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA009653- } \\ & \text { JA009662 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 05/13/2015 | Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Supplemental Briefing re Future Accounting | 49 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA007708- } \\ & \text { JA007711 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 06/25/2014 | Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order | 48 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA007457- } \\ & \text { JA007474 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 06/15/2015 | Judgment | 52 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA008151- } \\ & \text { JA008153 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 05/16/2016 | Judgment | 71 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA011389- } \\ & \text { JA011391 } \end{aligned}$ |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 08/24/2015 | Minute Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, Ex Parte (With Notice) of Application for Order Shortening Time Regarding Stay of Execution and Order Shortening Time Regarding Stay of Execution | 67 | JA010679 |
| 03/21/2013 | Motion to File Second Amended Complaint | 15 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA002434- } \\ \text { JA002461 } \end{array}$ |
| 06/29/2015 | Motion to Strike "Judgment", Entered June 15, 2015 Pursuant to N.R.C.P. 52 (B) And N.R.C.P. 59, As Unnecessary and Duplicative Orders of Final Orders Entered on June 25, 2014 And May 13, 2015, And as Such, Is A Fugitive Document | 53 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA008328- } \\ & \text { JA008394 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 12/08/2015 | Notice of Defendant Pardee Homes of Nevada's Non-Reply and Non-Opposition to "Plaintiff's Opposition to Pardee Homes of Nevada's Motion to Amend Judgment and Countermotion for Attorney's Fees" | 69 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA010896- } \\ & \text { JA010945 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/13/2017 | Notice of Entry of Amended Judgment | 88 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA014130- } \\ & \text { JA014143 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 06/27/2014 | Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order | 48 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA007475- } \\ & \text { JA007494 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 06/15/2015 | Notice of Entry of Judgment | 52 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA008154- } \\ & \text { JA008158 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 05/17/2016 | Notice of Entry of Judgment | 71 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA011392- } \\ & \text { JA011396 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 01/10/2017 | Notice of Entry of Order and Judgment from August 15, 2016 Hearings Regarding Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013629- } \\ & \text { JA013635 } \end{aligned}$ |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 01/10/2017 | Notice of Entry of Order and Judgment from August 15, 2016 Hearings Regarding Defendant's Motion to Amend Judgment | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA013636- } \\ & \text { JA016342 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 01/10/2017 | Notice of Entry of Order and Judgment from August 15, 2016 Hearings Regarding Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 86 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA013622- } \\ \text { JA013628 } \end{array}$ |
| 10/25/2013 | Notice of Entry of Order Denying Motion for Partial Summary Judgment | 31 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA004812- } \\ \text { JA004817 } \end{array}$ |
| 07/25/2014 | Notice of Entry of Order Granting Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens | 48 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA007574- } \\ \text { JA007578 } \end{array}$ |
| 06/05/2013 | Notice of Entry of Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint | 16 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA002665- } \\ & \text { IAA02669 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 01/13/2017 | Notice of Entry of Order on Defendant's Motion to Retax Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs Filed May 23, 2016 | 86 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA013652- } \\ \text { JA013656 } \end{array}$ |
| 05/13/2015 | Notice of Entry of Order on Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Supplemental Briefing re Future Accounting | 49 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA007712- } \\ & \text { JA007717 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/10/2015 | Notice of Entry of Order on Pardee's Emergency Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment; and Ex Parte Order Shortening Time | 62 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA009755- } \\ & \text { JA009758 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 01/12/2017 | Notice of Entry of Order on Plaintiffs' Countermotion for Attorney's Fees and Costs Pursuant to NRS 18.010 and EDCR 7.60 | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013645- } \\ & \text { JA013648 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 04/03/2013 | Notice of Entry of Order re Order Denying Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment | 16 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA002465- } \\ & \text { JA002470 } \end{aligned}$ |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 03/15/2013 | Notice of Entry of Order re Order Granting Plaintiffs Countermotion for Summary Judgment | 14 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA002354- } \\ & \text { JA002358 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/13/2017 | Notice of Entry of Order Re: Defendant Pardee Homes of Nevada's Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment and Post-Judgment Orders | 88 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA014147- } \\ & \text { JA014151 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 12/16/2011 | Notice of Entry of Stipulated Confidentiality Agreement and Protective Order | 1 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA000040- } \\ & \text { JA000048 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 08/30/2012 | Notice of Entry of Stipulation and Order to Extend Discovery Deadlines (First Request) | 1 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA000055- } \\ & \text { JA000060 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/14/2017 | Notice of Entry of Supplemental Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Entitlement to, and Calculation of, Prejudgment Interest | 88 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA014111- } \\ & \text { JA014117 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 11/07/2012 | Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' Counter Motion for Partial Summary Judgment | 2 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA000322- } \\ & \text { JA000351 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/14/2014 | Opposition to Pardee's Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens | 48 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA007495- } \\ & \text { JA007559 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 01/09/2017 | Order and Judgment from August 15, 2016 Hearings Regarding Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA013619- } \\ & \text { JA013621 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 01/09/2017 | Order and Judgment from August 15, 2016 Hearings Regarding Defendants Motion to Amend Judgment | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA013613- } \\ & \text { JA013615 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 01/09/2017 | Order and Judgment from August 15, 2016 Hearings Regarding Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA013616- } \\ & \text { JA013618 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/23/2013 | Order Denying Motion for Partial Summary Judgment | 21 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA003210- } \\ & \text { JA003212 } \end{aligned}$ |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 04/26/2016 | Order from January 15, 2016 Hearings | 71 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA011385- } \\ & \text { JA011388 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/24/2014 | Order Granting Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens | 48 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA007571- } \\ & \text { JA007573 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 05/30/2013 | Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint | 16 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA002659- } \\ & \text { JA002661 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 06/05/2013 | Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint | 16 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA002662- } \\ & \text { JA002664 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 01/12/2017 | Order on Defendant's Motion to Retax Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs Filed May 23, 2016 | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013649- } \\ & \text { JA013651 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/10/2015 | Order on Pardee's Emergency Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment; and Ex Parte Order Shortening Time | 62 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA009753- } \\ & \text { JA009754 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 01/12/2017 | Order on Plaintiffs' Countermotion for Attorney's Fees and Costs Pursuant to NRS 18.010 and EDCR 7.60 | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013643- } \\ & \text { JA013644 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 04/02/2013 | Order re Order Denying Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment | 16 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA002462- } \\ & \text { JA002464 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 03/14/2013 | Order re Order Granting Plaintiffs Countermotion for Summary Judgment | 14 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA002351- } \\ & \text { JA002353 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/12/2017 | Order Re: Defendant Pardee Homes of Nevada's Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment and Post-Judgment Orders | 88 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA014144- } \\ & \text { JA014146 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 11/29/2011 | Order Setting Civil Non-Jury Trial | 1 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA000031- } \\ & \text { JA000032 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 11/02/2017 | Pardee Amended Notice of Appeal | 88 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA014152- } \\ & \text { JA014154 } \end{aligned}$ |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $07 / 15 / 2015$ | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Consolidated <br> Opposition To: (1) Plaintiff's Motion to <br> Strike Judgment Entered on June 15, 2015 <br> Pursuant to NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59; <br> and (2) Plaintiffs' Motion Pursuant to <br> NRCP 52(b) and 59 to Amend the Court's <br> Judgment Entered on June 15, 2015 | 63 | JA009919- <br> JA009943 |
| 09/12/2015 | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Consolidated <br> Reply in Support of (1) Motion to Retax <br> Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs Filed <br> June 19, 2015; and (2) Motion for <br> Attorney's Fees and Costs | 68 | JA010812-- <br> JA010865 |
| $12 / 30 / 2015$ | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Consolidated <br> Response to: (1) Plaintiffs' Notice of Non- <br> Reply and Non-Opposition to Plaintiffs' <br> Opposition to Pardee's Motion to Amend <br> Judgment and Countermotion for | 69 | JA010946- <br> JA010953 |
| Attorney's Fees; and (2) Plaintiffs' <br> Supplement to Plaintiffs' Opposition to <br> Pardee's Motion for Attorney's Fees and <br> Costs |  |  |  |
| $06 / 01 / 2016$ | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Motion to <br> Amend Judgment | 72 | JA011455- <br> JA011589 |
| $07 / 02 / 2015$ | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Motion to <br> Amend Judgment | 59 | JA009207- <br> JA009283 |
| $06 / 27 / 2016$ | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Opposition to <br> Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees and <br> Costs | 82 | JA013025- <br> JA013170 |
| $07 / 15 / 2015$ | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Opposition to <br> Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees and <br> Costs | 62 | JA009759- <br> JA009771 |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 08/10/2015 | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of the Order on Pardee's Emergency Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment | 67 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA010582- } \\ \text { JA010669 } \end{array}$ |
| 06/30/2016 | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Reply in Support of Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 82 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013171- } \\ & \text { JA013182 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 06/30/2016 | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Reply in Support of Motion to Amend Judgment; and Opposition to Plaintiffs' Countermotion for Attorney's Fees | 82 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013183- } \\ & \text { JA013196 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/01/2016 | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Reply in Support of Motion to Retax Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs Filed May 23, 2016 | 82 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA013197- } \\ & \text { JA013204 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 03/23/2016 | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Settle Two (2) Sets of Competing Judgments and Orders | 71 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA0112144- } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| 08/25/2014 | Pardee Homes of Nevada's Supplemental Brief Regarding Future Accounting | 49 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA007699- } \\ & \text { JA007707 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 02/08/2017 | Pardee Notice of Appeal | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013657- } \\ & \text { JA013659 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/08/2015 | Pardee's Emergency Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment: and Ex Parte Order Shortening Time | 62 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA009663- } \\ & \text { JA009710 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 06/06/2016 | Pardee's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 72 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA011590- } \\ & \text { JA011614 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 05/28/2015 | Pardee's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 49 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA007718- } \\ & \text { JA007734 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 06/24/2014 | Pardee's Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens - section filed under seal | 48 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA007411- } \\ & \text { JA007456 } \end{aligned}$ |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 06/24/2015 | Pardee's Motion to Retax Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs Filed June 19, 2015 | 52 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA008192- } \\ & \text { JA008215 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 05/31/2016 | Pardee's Motion to Retax Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs Filed May 23, 2016 | 71 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA011442- } \\ & \text { JA011454 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 04/07/2017 | Pardee's Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment and Post-Judgment Orders | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013660- } \\ & \text { JA013668 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 05/10/2017 | Pardee's Reply in Support of Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment and PostJudgment Orders | 88 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA014069- } \\ & \text { JA014071 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/17/2016 | Pardee's Supplemental Brief Regarding Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest Pursuant to the Court's Order | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013591- } \\ & \text { JA013602 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/08/2015 | Pardee's Supplemental Briefing in Support of its Emergency Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment | 62 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA009711- } \\ & \text { JA009733 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 08/25/2014 | Plaintiff's Accounting Brief Pursuant to the court's Order Entered on June 25, 2014 | 49 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA007647- } \\ & \text { JA007698 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 09/12/2016 | Plaintiffs' Brief on Interest Pursuant to the Court's Order Entered on August 15, 2016 | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013566- } \\ & \text { JA013590 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 05/23/2016 | Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements | 71 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA011397- } \\ & \text { JA011441 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 06/08/2016 | Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 77 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA012115- } \\ & \text { JA012182 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 06/29/2015 | Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 52-53 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA008216- } \\ & \text { JA008327 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/24/2015 | Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, Ex Parte (With Notice) of Application for Order Shortening Time Regarding Stay of Execution and Order Shortening Time Regarding Stay of Execution | 67 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA010482- } \\ & \text { JA010522 } \end{aligned}$ |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $07 / 18 / 2013$ | Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine To Permit <br> James J. Jimmerson, Esq. To Testify <br> Concerning Plaintiffs' Attorney's Fees and <br> Costs (MIL \#25) | 17 | JA002732- <br> JA002771 |
| $06 / 29 / 2015$ | Plaintiffs' Motion Pursuant to NRCP 52(b) <br> and 59 to Amend The Court's Judgment <br> Entered on June 15, 2015, to Amend the <br> Findings of Fact/conclusions of Law and <br> Judgment Contained Therein, Specifically <br> Referred to in the Language Included in <br> the Judgment at Page 2, Lines 8 Through <br> 13 and the Judgment At Page 2, Lines 18 <br> Through 23 to Delete the Same or Amend <br> The Same to Reflect the True Fact That <br> Plaintiff Prevailed On Their Entitlement to <br> the First Claim for Relief For an <br> Accounting, and Damages for Their <br> Second Claim for Relief of Breach of <br> Contract, and Their Third Claim for Relief <br> for Breach of the Implied Covenant for <br> Good Faith and Fair Dealing and That <br> Defendant Never Received a Judgment in <br> its Form and Against Plaintiffs <br> Whatsoever as Mistakenly Stated Within <br> the Court's Latest "Judgment - sections <br> filed under seal | JA008395- <br> JA008922 |  |
| Plaintiffs' Motion to Settle Two (2) <br> Competing Judgments and Orders | 70 | JA011168- <br> JA011210 |  |
| $08 / 06 / 2013$ | Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants <br> Motion for Partial Summary Judgment <br> 7.60 | 17 | JA002830- <br> JA002857 |
| $06 / 21 / 2016$ | Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant, <br> Pardee Homes of Nevada's, Motion to <br> Amend Judgment and Plaintiffs' <br> Countermotion for Attorneys' Fees and | 81 | JA012813- <br> JA013024 |
|  |  |  |  |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 03/20/2013 | Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiffs Claim for Attorney's Fees as an Element of Damages MIL 1 | 15 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA002359- } \\ & \text { JA002408 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 03/20/2013 | Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants Motion in Limine to Plaintiffs Claim for Damages in the form of compensation for time MIL 2 | 15 | JA002409- |
| 07/17/2015 | Plaintiffs' Opposition to Pardee Homes of Nevada's Motion to Amend Judgment and Countermotion for Attorney's Fees | 65-67 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA010203- } \\ & \text { JA010481 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 06/30/2015 | Plaintiffs' Opposition to Pardee's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 57-58 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA008923- } \\ & \text { JA009109 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 06/21/2016 | Plaintiffs' Opposition to Pardee's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 80 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA012625- } \\ & \text { JA012812 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 05/12/2017 | Plaintiffs' Opposition to Pardee's Motion Stay Execution of Judgment and PostJudgment Orders | 88 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA014072- } \\ & \text { JA014105 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/08/2015 | Plaintiffs' Opposition to Pardee's Motion to Retax Costs | 60-61 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA009284- } \\ & \text { JA009644 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 06/20/2016 | Plaintiffs' Opposition to Pardee's Motion to Retax Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs Filed May 23, 2016 | 77-79 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA012183- } \\ & \text { JA012624 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 11/04/2016 | Plaintiffs' Reply Brief in Support of Brief on Interest Pursuant to the Court's Order Entered on August 15, 2016 | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013603- } \\ & \text { JA013612 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 04/23/2013 | Plaintiffs Reply in Further Support of Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint | 16 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA002503- } \\ & \text { JA002526 } \end{aligned}$ |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 01/17/2013 | Plaintiffs' Reply in Further Support of Their Counter Motion for Partial Summary Judgment | 13 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA002102- } \\ & \text { JA002144 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 08/02/2016 | Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Countermotion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 84-85 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013358- } \\ & \text { JA013444 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 08/02/2016 | Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 83-84 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013205- } \\ & \text { JA013357 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 01/11/2016 | Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants Consolidated Response to (1) Plaintiffs' Notice of Non-Reply and Non-Opposition to Plaintiff's Opposition to Pardee's Motion to Amend Judgment and Countermotion for Attorney's Fees And (2) Plaintiffs' Supplement to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Pardee's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 69 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA010954- } \\ & \text { JA010961 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/15/2013 | Plaintiffs Reply to Defendants Counterclaim | 17 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA002724- } \\ & \text { JA002731 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 09/11/2015 | Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 68 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA010680- } \\ & \text { JA010722 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 09/11/2015 | Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion Pursuant to NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59 to Amend the Court's Judgment Entered on June 15, 2015 | 68 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA010768- } \\ & \text { JA010811 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 09/11/2015 | Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant's <br> Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Strike <br> "Judgment" Entered June 15, 2015 <br> Pursuant to NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59 | 68 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA010723- } \\ & \text { JA010767 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 04/20/2016 | Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant's Response and Supplement to Plaintiffs' Motion to Settle Two (2) Sets of Competing Judgments and Orders | 71 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA011271- } \\ & \text { JA011384 } \end{aligned}$ |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $04 / 27 / 2017$ | Plaintiffs' Response to Pardee's Motion to <br> Stay Execution of Judgment and Post- <br> Judgment Orders | 88 | JA014066- <br> JA014068 |
| $05 / 10 / 2013$ | Plaintiffs Supplement to Motion for Leave <br> to File a Second Amended Complaint <br> Pursuant to the Courts order on Hearing <br> on April 26, 2013 | 16 | JA002627- <br> JA002651 |
| $12 / 08 / 2015$ | Plaintiffs' Supplement to Plaintiffs' <br> Opposition to Pardee's Motion for <br> Attorney's Fees and Costs | 68 | JA010866- <br> JA010895 |
| $09 / 27 / 2013$ | Plaintiffs Supplement to Their Opposition <br> to Defendants Motion for Partial <br> Summary Judgment | $19-21$ | JA002988- <br> JA003203 |
| $07 / 22 / 2013$ | Plaintiffs Supplemental Opposition to <br> Defendants Motion in Limine to Plaintiffs <br> Claim for Damages in the Form of <br> Compensation for Time MIL 2 | 17 | JA002787- <br> JA002808 |
| $10 / 25 / 2013$ | Plaintiffs Trial Brief Pursuant to EDCR <br> 7.27 | 31 | JA004818- <br> JA004847 |
| $06 / 19 / 2015$ | Plaintiffs, James Wolfram and Walt <br> Wilkes' Memorandum of Costs and <br> Disbursements | 52 | JA008159- <br> JA008191 |
| $03 / 16 / 2016$ | Release of Judgment | JA011211- <br> JA011213 |  |
| $01 / 07 / 2013$ | Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's <br> Motion for Summary Judgment | 13 | JA002081- <br> JA002101 |
| $09 / 16 / 2013$ | Reply in Support of Defendant's Motion <br> for Partial Summary Judgment | 17 | JA002858- <br> JA002864 |
| $09 / 16 / 2013$ | Reply in Support of Defendant's Motion in <br> Limine to Exclude Plaintiff's Claim for <br> Attorney's Fees as An Element of <br> Damages | 17 | JA002865- <br> JA002869 |
|  |  |  |  |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 09/16/2013 | Reply in Support of Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiffs' Claim for Damages in the Form of Compensation for Time | 17 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA002870- } \\ \text { JA002874 } \end{array}$ |
| 07/15/2014 | Reply in Support of Pardee's Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens | 48 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA007560- } \\ & \text { JA007570 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 08/17/2015 | Reply Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Reconsideration | 67 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA010670- } \\ & \text { JA010678 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 11/08/2011 | Scheduling Order | 1 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|l\|} \hline \text { JA000028- } \\ \text { JA000030 } \end{array}$ |
| 06/06/2013 | Second Amended Complaint | 16 | $\begin{array}{\|l} \hline \text { JA002670- } \\ \text { JA002677 } \end{array}$ |
| 04/17/2013 | Second Amended Order Setting Civil Non-Jury Trial | 16 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA002501- } \\ & \text { JA002502 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 12/15/2011 | Stipulated Confidentiality Agreement and Protective Order | 1 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA000033- } \\ & \text { JA000039 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 08/29/2012 | Stipulation and Order to Extend Discovery Deadlines (First Request) | 1 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA000051- } \\ \hline \text { IAOOOn54 } \\ \hline \end{array}$ |
| 06/30/2015 | Supplement to Plaintiffs' Pending Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, Motion to Strike Judgment, Motion Pursuant to NRCP 52(b) and NRCP 59 to Amend the Court's Judgment, and Plaintiffs' Opposition to Pardee's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs | 59 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA009110- } \\ & \text { JA009206 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 09/27/2013 | Supplemental Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment | 21 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA003204- } \\ & \text { JA003209 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/12/2007 | Supplemental Order Regarding Plaintiffs' <br> Entitlement to, and Calculation of, Prejudgment Interest | 88 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA014106- } \\ & \text { JA014110 } \end{aligned}$ |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 03/05/2013 | Transcript of Proceedings - March 5, 2013 | 14 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA002211- } \\ \text { JA002350 } \end{array}$ |
| 10/25/2011 | Transcript re Discovery Conference | 1 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA000024- } \\ \text { JA000027 } \end{array}$ |
| 08/27/2012 | Transcript re Hearing | 1 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA000049- } \\ \text { JA000050 } \end{array}$ |
| 04/26/2013 | Transcript re Hearing | 16 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA002527- } \\ \text { JA002626 } \end{array}$ |
| 07/09/2013 | Transcript re Hearing | 17 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA002688- } \\ \text { JA002723 } \end{array}$ |
| 09/23/2013 | Transcript re Hearing | 18 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA002875- } \\ & \text { JA002987 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/17/2014 | Transcript re Hearing | 49 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA007579- } \\ \text { JA007629 } \end{array}$ |
| 07/31/2014 | Transcript re Hearing | 49 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA007630- } \\ \text { JA007646 } \end{array}$ |
| 07/10/2015 | Transcript re Hearing | 62 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA009734- } \\ \text { JA009752 } \end{array}$ |
| 01/15/2016 | Transcript re Hearing | 70 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA010962- } \\ & \text { JA011167 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 08/15/2016 | Transcript re Hearing - August 15, 2016 | 86 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA013445- } \\ & \text { JA013565 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 12/06/2012 | Transcript re Status Check | 13 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA002066- } \\ & \text { JA002080 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 07/23/2013 | Transcript re Status Check | 17 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA002809- } \\ \text { JA002814 } \end{array}$ |
| 10/23/2013 | Transcript re Trial | 22 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA003213- } \\ \text { JA003403 } \end{array}$ |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
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| 10/24/2013 | Transcript re Trial | 29-30 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA004463- } \\ & \text { JA004790 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/28/2013 | Transcript re Trial - filed under seal | 32-33 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA004848- } \\ & \text { JA005227 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/29/2013 | Transcript re Trial - filed under seal | 35 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA005264- } \\ & \text { JA005493 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/30/2013 | Transcript re Trial | 37-38 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA005512- } \\ & \text { JA005815 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 12/09/2013 | Transcript re Trial - filed under seal | 40-41 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA005821- } \\ & \text { JA006192 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 12/10/2013 | Transcript re Trial | 42-43 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA006193- } \\ & \text { JA006530 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 12/12/2013 | Transcript re Trial - filed under seal | 44-45 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA006533- } \\ & \text { JA006878 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 12/13/2013 | Transcript re Trial - Part 1 | 46 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA006953- } \\ & \text { JA007107 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 12/13/2013 | Transcript re Trial - Part 2 | 47-48 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA007108- } \\ & \text { JA007384 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit A | 23 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA003404- } \\ & \text { JA003544 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit B - filed under seal | 23 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA003545- } \\ & \text { JA003625 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit C | 23 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA003626- } \\ & \text { JA003628 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit D | 23 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA003629- } \\ & \text { JA003631 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit E - filed under seal | 23 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA003632- } \\ & \text { JA003634 } \end{aligned}$ |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
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| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit F | 23 | JA003635- <br> JA003637 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit G | 23 | JA003638 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit H | 23 | JA003639- <br> JA003640 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit I | 23 | JA003641- <br> JA003643 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit J - filed under seal | 24 | JA003644- <br> JA003669 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit K | JA003670- <br> JA003674 |  |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit L | 24 | JA003675- <br> JA003678 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit M | JA003679- <br> JA003680 |  |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit N | 24 | JA003681- <br> JA003683 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit O - filed under seal | $25-26$ | JA003684- <br> JA004083 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit P | 27 | JA004084 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit Q | 27 | JA0004086- <br> JA004089 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit R | Trial Exhibit S | 27 |
| 1013 |  | 27 |  |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit T | 27 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA004091- } \\ & \text { JA004092 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit U | 27 | JA004093 |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit V | 27 | JA004094 |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit W | 27 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA004095- } \\ & \text { JA004096 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit X | 27 | JA004097 |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit Y | 27 | JA004098 |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit Z | 27 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA004099- } \\ & \text { JA004100 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit 1 | 27 | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { JA004289- } \\ \text { JA004292 } \end{array}$ |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit 10 - filed under seal | 27 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA004320- } \\ & \text { JA004329 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit 11 - filed under seal | 28 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA004330- } \\ & \text { JA004340 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit 12 - filed under seal | 28 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { JA004341- } \\ & \text { JA004360 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/23/2013 | Trial Exhibit 13 - filed under seal | 28 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA004361- } \\ & \text { JA004453 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/28/2013 | Trial Exhibit 15 | 34 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA005228- } \\ & \text { JA005232 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 10/28/2013 | Trial Exhibit 18 | 34 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { JA005233- } \\ & \text { JA005235 } \end{aligned}$ |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :--- |
| $10 / 28 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 19 | 34 | JA005236- <br> JA005237 |
| $10 / 28 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 20 | 34 | JA005238- <br> JA005254 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 21 | 28 | JA004454 |
| $10 / 28 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 23 | 34 | JA005255- <br> JA005260 |
| $10 / 30 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 23a | 39 | JA005816- <br> JA005817 |
| $10 / 28 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 24 | JA005261- <br> JA005263 |  |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 25 | JA004455- <br> JA004462 |  |
| $10 / 24 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 26 | 31 | JA004792- <br> JA004804 |
| $10 / 30 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 27 | 39 | JA005818- <br> JA005820 |
| $10 / 29 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 28 | 36 | JA005494- <br> JA005497 |
| $10 / 29 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 29 | 36 | JA005498- <br> JA005511 |
| $10 / 24 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 30 | JA0 | JA004805- <br> JA006936- <br> JA004811 |
| $12 / 13 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 31a | Trial Exhibit 39 | JA007385- <br> JA007410 |
| 12018 |  |  |  |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :--- |
| $12 / 12 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 40 | 46 | JA006949- <br> JA006950 |
| $12 / 12 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 41 | 46 | JA006951- <br> JA006952 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit $6-$ filed under seal | 27 | JA004293- <br> JA004307 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 7 - filed under seal | 27 | JA004308- <br> JA004310 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 8 - filed under seal | 27 | JA004311- <br> JA004312 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit 9 - filed under seal | 27 | JA004313- <br> JA004319 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit AA | 27 | JA004101- <br> JA004102 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit BB | 27 | JA004103 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit CC | 27 | JA004104 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit DD | 27 | JA004105 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit EE | 27 | JA004106- <br> JA004113 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit FF | Trial Exhibit HH | JA004114- <br> JA004118 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit GG | $27004123-$ |  |
| JA004122 |  |  |  |$|$


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
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| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit II | 27 | JA004124 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit JJ | 27 | JA004125 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit KK | 27 | JA004126- <br> JA004167 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit LL | 27 | JA004168 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit MM | 27 | JA0004170- <br> JA004174 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit NN | 27 | JA004175- <br> JA004183 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit OO | JA004184- <br> JA004240 |  |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit PP | 27 | JA004241- <br> JA004243 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit QQ | 27 | JA004244- <br> JA004248 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit RR | 27 | JA004249- <br> JA004255 |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit SS | JA004256- <br> JA004262 |  |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit TT | JA004263- <br> JA004288 |  |
| $10 / 23 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit UU | JA004791 |  |
| 1013 | Trial Exhibit VV | 27 |  |
|  |  | 27 |  |


| Date | Document Description | Volume | Labeled |
| :---: | :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $12 / 10 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit WW | 43 | JA006531- <br> JA006532 |
| $12 / 12 / 2013$ | Trial Exhibit XX | 46 | JA006879- <br> JA006935 |

Dated this $28^{\text {th }}$ day of February, 2018.

## McDONALD CARANO LLP

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## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of McDonald Carano LLP, and on the $28^{\text {th }}$ day of February, 2018, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was e-filed and e-served on all registered parties to the Supreme Court's electronic filing system:
/s/ Beau Nelson
An Employee of McDonald Carano LLP

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Barde Homes of Nevada

## DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

JAMES WOLFRAM, WALT WILKES

Plaintiffs,
vs.

BARDE HOMES OF NEVADA,
Defendant.

CASE NO.: A-10-632338-C DEPT NO.: IV

## BARDE HOMES OF NEVADA'S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT

Date:
Time:

Pursuant to NRCP 52(b) and 59(e), defendant Pardee Homes of Nevada ("Pardee") moves the Court to amend its findings and judgment in this case. NRCP 52(b) and 59(e) permit a party to move the trial court to amend its factual findings, make additional findings, or amend the final judgment to correct legal or factual errors. Amendment is required here for two reasons.

First, the Nevada Supreme Court has held, and recently clarified its prior pronouncements, that attorney's fees are available as special damages only in three very specific circumstances. None of those specific circumstances apply to this breach of contract case. Consequently Pardee respectfully requests that the Court amend its
findings and judgment to eliminate Plaintiffs Walt Wilkes and James Wolfram's (collectively "Plaintiffs") award of special damages for certain of their attorney's fees.

Second, in striking the first judgment entered June 3, 2015 and instead entering a second judgment on May 11, 2016, the Court has omitted language reflecting Plaintiffs' failure to recover any additional claimed commissions from Pardee, which was the case's most substantial issue. Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed that Pardee purchased "Option Property" during the project and thus owed them additional commissions pursuant to the Commission Agreement in this case. This theory constituted over $90 \%$ of the trial in this case, as Plaintiffs continually questioned witnesses about this Option Property and Pardee's purchases during the development. The Court entirely rejected this theory, finding that Pardee did not owe Plaintiffs any additional commissions related to any breach of the Commission Agreement. Language noting Pardee's successful defense on this issue should be expressly included in the judgment entered on May 11, 2016 because without it, the judgment does not conform to the Court's previous rulings in this case nor does it accurately reflect the litigation's outcome.

This Motion is based on NRCP 52 and 59, the pleadings and papers on file, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, and any oral argument the Court may entertain at the hearing of this Motion.

DATED this 1st day of June, 2016.

McDONALD CARANO WILSON LLP
/s/ Rory Kay
PAT LUNDVALL (NBSN \#3761)
RORY T. KAY (NSB \#12416)
2300 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 1200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102

Attorneys for Pardee Homes of Nevada

## NOTICE OF MOTION

TO: All Parties and Their Counsel of Record:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will bring the foregoing PARDEE HOMES OF NEVADA'S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT for hearing before the above-entitled Court on the 06 day of JULY, 2016 at the hour of $9: 00 \mathrm{~A}$ in Department IV of the above-entitled Court, or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard.

MCDONALD CARANO WILSON LLP<br>/s/ Rory Kay<br>PAT LUNDVALL (NSBN 3761)<br>RORY KAY (NSBN 12416)<br>2300 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 1000 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102<br>Attorneys for Pardee Homes of Nevada

## MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. RELEVANT FACTS.
A. Plaintiffs and Pardee Become Involved in the Coyote Springs Project.

This dispute arose from Pardee's and Plaintiffs' involvement in the Coyote Springs Project (the "Project"), a 43,000 acre development in Lincoln and Clark Counties. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2:9-12, on file with the Court. As licensed real estate brokers, Plaintiffs began tracking the Project in 2002, and shortly thereafter, they contacted Jon Lash, Pardee's executive responsible for land acquisition, to see if he was interested in purchasing land and/or developing homes on the Project. See id. at 1:27-2:18. Lash agreed to allow Plaintiffs to represent Pardee as a potential purchaser, and the Plaintiffs arranged an introductory meeting between Pardee and Harvey Whittemore to discuss Pardee's interest in the Project. ${ }^{1}$ See id. at $\mathbb{T} 8$.

After the initial meeting, Pardee and CSI informed Plaintiffs that their services were no longer needed because Pardee and CSI could negotiate the land sales between themselves. See id. at 2:24-3:8. Accordingly, Plaintiff and Pardee began negotiating the Plaintiffs' broker commissions related to the Project and Plaintiffs' introduction of Whittemore and Lash. See id. at 4:9-16.

## B. Plaintiffs and Pardee Execute the Commission Agreement.

The end result of those negotiations was a Commission Agreement, which Pardee and James Wolfram executed on September 2, 2004 and Walt Wilkes executed on September 6, 2004. See id. at $\mathbb{T}$ 16. The Commission Agreement sets forth the parties' rights concerning Pardee's land purchases on the Project. See generally Commission Agreement Dated September 1, 2004, attached as Exhibit A.

[^0]The Commission Agreement expressly addressed attorney's fees should the parties resort to litigation to enforce their rights under the contract:

## In the event either party brings an action to enforce its rights under this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.

Id. at p . 2 (emphasis added).
The Commission Agreement included a merger clause, noting that "all oral statements, representations, and negotiations" were merged into the Commission Agreement, and also a provision prohibiting modification unless in writing signed by all parties. Id.
C. Pardee Purchases Certain Lands and Pays the Plaintiffs' Commissions Pursuant to the Commission Agreement, but the Plaintiffs Demand More.

Soon after the parties executed the Commission Agreement, Pardee purchased relevant land from CSI that was covered by the Commission Agreement. See Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law at 8:6-9. Pursuant to the Commission Agreement, Pardee paid the Plaintiffs $\$ 2,632,000.00$ in commissions based upon the purchases. See id. at 8:19-20. These were the only commissions due under the Commission Agreement, and Pardee has made no other purchases from CSI that would require them to pay Plaintiffs any commissions under the Commission Agreement. See id. at 8:21-9:10 and 10:25-11:3.

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs insisted that they were due additional commissions from Pardee and filed the current case on December 29, 2010. See Complaint, on file with the Court. The Plaintiffs claimed that Pardee owed them over $\$ 1.9$ million in damages, including $\$ 1.8$ million in purportedly lost commissions, $\$ 146,000$ in attorney's fees, and $\$ 6,400$ in time and effort expended related to the accounting cause of action. See Plaintiffs' Thirteenth Supplement to NRCP 16.1 Disclosure of Witnesses and Documents at 10:17-11:9, attached as Exhibit B. ${ }^{2}$ Plaintiffs argued that Pardee

[^1]"reclassif[ied] the land" originally labeled Option Property and that doing so "robbed Plaintiffs of their opportunity to be paid these commissions" pursuant to the Commission Agreement. Id. at 11:2-4.
D. During Trial, Plaintiffs Spend the Majority of Their Time Pursuing This Theory of Additional Commissions Due and Owing.

At trial, Plaintiffs spent numerous hours questioning witnesses about Plaintiffs' commissions under the Commission Agreement and Pardee's purported reclassification of land on the project. For example, Plaintiffs' counsel immediately began questioning Plaintiff James Wolfram about how he earned commissions and how Pardee was to pay him those commissions based on its purchased Option Property. See October 23, 2013 Transcript ("10/23 Trans.") at 75:9-76:20 and 88:16-24, attached as Exhibit C. Wolfram testified that it was not "fair" that Pardee and Coyote Springs Investment, LLC ("CSI") reclassified certain land on the project, which purportedly influenced and reduced Plaintiffs' commissions. See id. at 95:3-17. During this questioning, Plaintiffs' counsel offered parcel maps as demonstrative exhibits to allegedly show how Pardee and CSI reclassified land on the project, and Wolfram stated that Plaintiffs were "most certainly" entitled to additional commissions because of this reclassification. See id. at 125:11-151:17; see also October 24, 2013 Transcript ("10/24 Trans.") at 249:25-250:1, attached as Exhibit D.

Plaintiff Walt Wilkes also testified that Plaintiffs "were entitled to other, more commissions" and that their "understanding [was] we were going to get the whole commission" had Pardee and CSI not purportedly reclassified land. October 30, 2013 Transcript ("10/30 Trans.") at 98:19-20 and 100:3-4, attached as Exhibit E. Wilkes stated that Pardee "tried to take the extra money from [Plaintiffs]" and that Pardee and CSI went "outside of [the boundaries]" in reclassifying certain land. Id. at 102:16-18 and 136:1-8.

Plaintiffs also heavily questioned CSI's founder and former principal, Harvey Whittemore, about the purported reclassification of Option Property on the project.

Whittemore testified that he believed the case was about "past due brokerage commissions" because it was the "impression that [he] took from [his] deposition" due to Plaintiffs' counsel's questioning. Exh. D, 10/24 Trans. at 10:12-15. During that same day at trial, Plaintiffs' counsel spent almost the entire day asking numerous questions about reclassification of land on the project and the contractual definition of Option Property. See generally id. at 35:14-216:13. Whittemore testified that Pardee and CSI had not conspired to deny Plaintiffs any commissions by reclassifying certain land on the project, but rather that the parties needed "the greatest degree of flexibility to allow the parties to ultimately get the best plan" for the entire project. Id. at 83:21-84:4.

Plaintiffs' counsel's opening and closing arguments similarly focused on Plaintiffs' claims to additional commissions on the project. Counsel opened by stating that the case largely "hinge[d]" on whether Pardee's purchases were considered Purchase Property or Option Property, and that the evidence would "show that [Pardee's] commission payments were inaccurate, [and] were not property calculated." Exh. C., 10/23 Trans. at 14:8-15:1 and 20:3-4. Counsel's closing argument again focused on this purported reclassification, as he claimed that "it is . . . a breach of contract to think that [Pardee] can adversely affect [Plaintiffs'] rights to a commission by making a later deal between the parties that would change defined terms and entitlement to money." December 13, 2013 Transcript ("12/13 Trans.") at 153:1-8, attached as Exhibit F. Counsel claimed that he was suggesting to the Court "the legal principle that . . . [Pardee] cannot adversely affect the rights of [Plaintiffs] to a commission." Id. at 153:17-154:10.

At all stages of trial, Plaintiffs focused almost exclusively on their purported entitlement to additional commissions from Pardee.
E. $\quad \frac{\text { After Trial, the Court Awards Plaintiffs Certain of Their Attorney's Fees as }}{\text { Special Damages But Rejects Their Claim to Lost Commissions. }}$

After a multiple-week bench trial, the Court entirely rejected Plaintiffs' claim to additional commissions but did find that Plaintiffs were entitled to an accounting and
also certain of their attorney's fees as special damages. See generally Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, on file with the Court. Although the Court explained that "Pardee as of the present time does not owe any commission to Plaintiffs . . .," it awarded Plaintiffs their "reasonable attorney's fees and costs as special damages" for Pardee's breach of the Commission Agreement Id. at 9:2-4 and 14:23-25; see also Judgment Entered June 3, 2015 (the "Original Judgment") at 2:24-3:2, on file with the Court.

In the Original Judgment, which the Court entered on June 3, 2015, the Court expressly noted that Pardee had not "breached the Commission Agreement in such a way as to deny Plaintiffs any future commissions, and Pardee has paid all commissions due and owing under the Commission Agreement." Original Judgment at 2:20-23. Thus, the Court entered judgment "against Plaintiffs and for Pardee as to Plaintiffs' claim for $\$ 1,800,000$ in damages related to lost future commissions under the Commission Agreement." Id. at 2:19-20.

After Plaintiffs moved the Court to set aside the Original Judgment, the Court struck that judgment and instead entered another judgment on May 16, 2016. See Judgment Entered May 16, 2016 (the "Second Judgment"), on file with the Court. Although the Second Judgment incorporates the Court's previous finding that Plaintiffs were not entitled to additional commissions, the Second Judgment does not expressly include any language reflecting Pardee's successful defense of this issue. Instead, the Second Judgment only explains that Plaintiffs succeeded on their causes of action for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 2:6-13. The Second Judgment awards Plaintiffs $\$ 6,000$ in consequential damages from this breach and also awards Plaintiffs $\$ 135,500$ in special damages for "attorney's fees and costs" associated with the same. Id. at 2:11-13.

## II. ARGUMENT.

A. Legal Standard.

NRCP 52(b) permits the trial court to "amend its findings or make additional findings and [] amend the judgment accordingly." NRCP 59(e) allows the trial court to "alter or amend the judgment." Normally, parties seek relief under Rules 52 or 59 "after a bench trial or where summary judgment has been granted." Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 289 F. Supp. 2d 555, 561 (D.N.J. 2003). These alterations and amendments are most often appropriate to correct manifest legal or factual errors, present newly discovered evidence, prevent manifest injustice or to notify the court of an intervening change in controlling law. See Stevo Design, Inc. v. SBR Marketing, Ltd., 919 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1117 (D. Nev. Jan. 25, 2013); see also Allstate Insurance Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011).

## B. The Court Erred in Awarding Plaintiffs' Attorney's Fees as Special Damages, And There Have Been Changes To Controlling Law.

Generally, a litigant may not recover attorney's fees "absent authority under a statute, rule or contract." Liu v. Christopher Homes, LLC, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 17, 321 P.3d 875, 878 (Mar. 27, 2014). A narrow exception to this general rule exists that permits a court to award attorney's fees "as special damages in limited circumstances." Id. The Nevada Supreme Court has identified only three limited circumstances that permit a trial court to award attorney's fees as special damages:
(1) When a plaintiff becomes involved in a third-party legal dispute because of the defendant's breach of contract or separate tortious conduct;
(2) When a plaintiff incurs fees in recovering real or personal property that the defendant acquired through wrongful conduct; or
(3) When a plaintiff seeks declaratory or injunctive relief necessitated by the opposing party's bad faith conduct.

See Sandy Valley Assoc. v. Sky Ranch Estates Owners Ass'n, 117 Nev. 948, 957-58, 35 P.2d 964, 970 (2001); see also Liu, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 17, 321 P.3d at 880.

In a breach of contract case that does not involve a third-party legal dispute, the plaintiff is not entitled to attorney's fees as special damages because "parties always know that lawsuits are possible when disputes arise" and so "the mere fact that a party was forced to file or defend a lawsuit is insufficient to support an award of attorney fees as damages." See Sandy Valley Assoc., 117 Nev . at 957, 35 P .2 d at 969-70. Moreover, allowing attorney's fees as special damages in a routine breach of contract case would contravene the Nevada Supreme Court's statement that "attorney fees are rarely awarded as damages." See id. If courts awarded attorney fees as special damages in routine breach of contract cases, the "narrow exception" will swallow the general rule that attorney's fees are only recoverable under statute, rule or contract.

Additionally, the Nevada Supreme Court's approach reflects the common damages theory from other jurisdictions, in which attorney's fees established by contractual language are not considered special damages. "Special damages are those which are unusual given the type of claim, and thus might surprise the opponent if not specifically pleaded." Fleet Bus. Cred. V. Krapohl Ford Lincoln Mercury Co., 735 N.W.2d 644, 648 (Mich. App. Ct. 2007); see also McNaughton v. Charleston Charter School for Math and Science, Inc., 768 S.E.2d 389, 396 (S.C. Jan. 28, 2015) ("Where a plaintiff seeks special damages in additional to general damages, he must plead and prove the special damages to avoid surprise.") Thus, "attorney fees, when specified by the contract language, are not special damages." Fleet Bus. Cred., 735 N.W.2d at 649. This is true because there is no element of surprise when the contract itself calls for attorney's fees in the event of a breach.

1. Plaintiffs have not proven that any of Sandy Valley's or Liu's exceptions apply.

In this matter, it was legally erroneous for the Court to award Plaintiffs' certain attorney's fees as special damages, and the judgment should be amended to eliminate the award of attorney's fees. This is a standard breach of contract case where Plaintiffs alleged that Pardee breached the Commission Agreement by failing to pay them
commissions owed and keep them reasonably informed of Pardee's purchases on the Project. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 11:10-15:3. Plaintiffs did not identify any of the three limited circumstances noted in Sandy Valley and Liu that would permit them to recover attorney's fees as special damages. See generally Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, on file with the Court. This is not an action for recovery of real or personal property. The Plaintiffs have not alleged that they are involved in a third-party dispute because of Pardee's purported breach of the Commission Agreement. Nor did the Plaintiffs seek declaratory or injunctive relief because of any bad faith conduct; instead, Plaintiffs only alleged breach of contract, breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and an equitable cause of action for accounting.

Understandably, the Court did not have the benefit of the Liu v. Christopher Homes, LLC case when it initially ruled upon the Plaintiffs' request for certain attorney's fees as special damages. ${ }^{3}$ A copy of that decision is attached as Exhibit G. Liu is the Nevada Supreme Court's most recent statement on attorney's fees as special damages, and the opinion noted that there was "confusion over Sandy Valley's and Horgan's effect on the law regarding the recovery of attorney fees as special damages." 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 17, 321 P.3d at 877. In removing that confusion, the Liu court noted that "a party to a contract may recover, as special damages, the attorney fees that arise from another party's breach of the contract" only when the breach "causes the former party to incur attorney fees in a legal dispute brought by a third party." Id. at 880 (emphasis added). Thus, the Nevada Supreme Court did not hold that attorney's fees

3 As the Court may recall, Pardee filed a motion to exclude the Plaintiffs' claim for certain attorneys' fees as special damages on March 1, 2013. See Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiffs' Claim for Attorneys' Fees as an Element of Damages, attached as Exhibit H. The Court heard that motion on April 16, 2013.

However, the Nevada Supreme Court did not decide Liu until almost a year later, on March 27, 2014. Thus, the Court could not benefit from Liu's protracted discussion of the three narrow circumstances permitting an award of attorney's fees as special damages.
as special damages were available in routine breach of contract cases. Instead, they are only available when the breach places the non-breaching party in a legal dispute brought by a third party. No such third-party action is present in this matter. Thus Liu clarifies that Plaintiffs cannot recover certain of their attorney's fees as special damages.

Accordingly, without any of Sandy Valley's special circumstances and given the additional clarification that Liu provided and which the Court was not able to rely upon for its initial ruling, Plaintiffs are not entitled to their attorney's fees as special damages under Nevada's narrow exception to the general rule that attorney's fees arise from contract, statute or rule. And because the Court awarded Plaintiffs their attorney's fees as special damages because of Pardee's alleged breach, the judgment must be amended to comply with Sandy Valley and Liu by eliminating the award of Plaintiffs' attorney's fees as special damages.
2. Because the parties' addressed attorney's fees in the Commission Agreement, they are not unusual and therefore cannot be special damages.

Moreover, the Plaintiffs' attorney's fees cannot be special damages because they were specifically addressed in the Commission Agreement's plain language. See Commission Agreement, Exhibit A, at p. 2. Thus, the attorney's fees were not "unusual given the [breach of contract] claim" asserted by Plaintiffs. See Fleet Bus. Cred., 735 N.W.2d at 648. As the Nevada Supreme Court clarified in Sandy Valley, "parties always know that lawsuits are possible when disputes arise" and so damages are not "special" unless they provide some element of surprise requiring specific pleading. See Sandy Valley Assoc., 117 Nev. at 957, 35 P.2d at 969-70. Because the Commission Agreement specifically included the attorney's fees provision, there was no need for Plaintiffs to specifically plead them to avoid surprising Pardee and thus the fees cannot be special damages.
/ / /
/ / /
C. The Court Erred in Deleting Language in the Second Judgment Indicating Pardee's Successful Defense of Plaintiffs' Claims to Additional Commissions.

As discussed above, Plaintiffs' claims to additional commissions because Pardee purportedly reclassified Option Property on the project was the case's most substantial issue. Plaintiffs devoted over $90 \%$ of the trial to this issue, continually questioning witnesses about Plaintiffs' commissions pursuant to the Commission Agreement and Pardee's purported reclassification of land. See Part I(D), supra. Harvey Whittemore, a third party to the litigation, testified at trial that he believed the case was about Plaintiffs' commissions because Plaintiffs' counsel repeatedly asked him at his deposition about reclassification of the land and the definition of Option Property and Purchase Property. Id. The issue was the central part of Plaintiffs' counsel's opening and closing statements, as counsel repeatedly told the Court that the case was about Pardee's unfair act of denying Plaintiffs' commissions and that the evidence would conclusively establish that Plaintiffs were owed additional commissions from Pardee. Id. After trial, however, the Court entirely rejected Plaintiffs' flawed and predominant theory that they were entitled to additional commissions. Id.

Accordingly, the Second Judgment must accurately reflect the Court's finding on this matter, as Nevada has long recognized that a judgment must conform to the evidence actually offered at trial. See, e.g., Finnegan v. Ulmer, 31 Nev. 523, 104 P. 17, 18 (1909) (noting a party may move the trial court to revise the judgment when the evidence does not sufficiently justify the verdict or other decision); see also Bream v. Nevada Motor Co., 51 Nev. 100, 269 P. 606, 607 (1928) (explaining that evidence must support the judgment); Cardan Overseas, Ltd. v. Harris, 92 Nev. 62, 64-65, 544 P.2d 1202, 1204 (1976) (modifying a judgment "to conform to the evidence which is nonconflicting"). Absent language showing that Pardee prevailed on the issue of additional commissions, the Second Judgment does not conform with the evidence offered at trial and the Court's post-trial conclusion that Pardee did not owe Plaintiffs' any additional commissions. Consequently, the Court should amend the Second

Judgment by re-inserting the language from the Original Judgment, in which it expressly stated that Pardee had not breached the Commission Agreement in such a way as to deny Plaintiffs any future commissions, and that Pardee has paid all commissions due and owing under the Commission Agreement.
III. CONCLUSION.

NRCP 52 and 59 provide the Court with the ability to amend its factual findings, conclusions of law, and judgment when legal errors have occurred. In this matter, the Court erroneously awarded Plaintiffs their attorney's fees as special damages despite this being a routine breach of contract case that is not within one of Sandy Valley's or Liu's three limited exceptions for awarding fees as special damages. The Court also incorrectly deleted language from the Original Judgment explaining that Pardee successfully defended against Plaintiffs' claims to additional commissions, which was the case's most substantial issue. Therefore Pardee respectfully requests that the Court amend its judgment to eliminate the award of Plaintiffs' attorney's fees as special damages. Pardee also asks that the Court re-insert language clarifying that Pardee prevailed on Plaintiffs' claims to additional commissions.

DATED this 1st day of June, 2016.

## MCDONALD CARANO WILSON LLP

/s/ Rory Kay
Pat Lundvall (NSBN 3761)
Rory T. Kay (NSBN 12416)
2300 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 1200
Las Vegas, Nevada 89102
(702) 873-4100
(702) 873-9966 Facsimile

Attorneys for Defendant Pardee Homes of Nevada

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am an employee of McDonald Carano Wilson LLP and that on the 1st day of June, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing PARDEE HOMES OF NEVADA'S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT via e-service through Wiznet as utilized in the $8^{\text {th }}$ Judicial District on the following:

James J. Jimmerson

Holly A. Fic
Kim Stewart
JIMMERSON, HANSEN, P.C.
415 S. Sixth Street, Ste 100
Las Vegas, NV 89101
Attorney for Plaintiffs

Via U.S.Mail:
John W. Muije
John W. Muije \& Assoc.
1840 E. Sahara Ave., \#106
Las Vegas, NV 89104
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs
/s/ Michelle Wade
An Employee of McDonald Carano Wilson LLP

EXHIBIT A

# 1 PardeeHomes 

10880 Wishlire Bowlevart, Suile 1950 Los Angeles, Califomia 90024-4iD

September 1, 2004

Mr. Walt Wilkes
General Realty Group, Inc.
10761 Turquoise Valley Dr.
Las Vegas, Nevada 89144-4141
Mr. Jim Wolfram
Award Realty Group
10761 Turquoise Valley Dr.
Las Vegas, Nevada $89144-4141$
Re: Option Agreement for the Purchase of Real Property and Joint Escrow Instructions dated as of June 1, 2004, as amended (the "Option Agreement") between Coyote Springs Investment ILC ("Coyote") and Pardee Homes of Nevada ("Pardee")

## Gentlemen:

This letter is intended to confirm our understanding concerning the pending purchase by Pardee from Coyote of certain real property located in the Counties of Clark and Lincoln, Nerada pursuant to the above-referenced Option Agreement. Except as otherwise defined herein, the capitalized words used in this Agreement shall have the meanings as set forth in the Option Agreement.

In the event Pardee approves the transaction during the Contingency Period, Pardee shall pay to you (one-half to each) a broker commission equal to the following amounts:
(1) Pardee shall pay four percent ( $4 \%$ ) of the Purchase Property Price payments made by Pardee pursuant to patagraph 1 of the Option Agreement up to a maximum of Fifty Million Dollars $(\$ 50,000,000)$;
(ii) Then, Pardee shall pay one and one-half percent (1-1/2\%) of the remaining Purchase Property Price payments made by Pardee pursuant to paragraph 1 of the Option Agteement in the aggregate amount of Sixteen Million Dollars ( $\$ 16,000,000$ ); and
(iii) Then, with respect to any portion of the Option Property purchased by Pardee putsuant to paragraph 2 of the Option Agreement, Pardee shall pay one and onehalf percent $(1-1 / 2 \%)$ of the amount detived by multiplying the number of acres purchased by Pardee by Forty Thousand Dollars $(\$ 40,000)$.

Mr. Walt Wilkes
My. Jim Wolfam
September 1, 2004
Page 2

Pardee shall make the first commission payment to you upon the Initial Purchase Closing (which is scheduled to occur thirty (30) days following the Settlement Date) with respect to the aggregate Deposits made prior to that time. Pardee shall make each additional commission payment pursuant to clauses (i) and (iii) above concurrently with the applicable Purchase Property Price payment to Cogote. Theteafter, Pardee shall make each commission payment pursuant to clause (iii) above concurtently with the close of escrow on Pardee's purchase of the applicable portion of the Option Property; provided, however, that in the event the required Parcel Map creating the applicable Option Parcel has not been recorded as of the scheduled Option Closing, as described in paragraph 9 (c) of the Option Agreement, the commission shall be paid into escrow concurrently with Pardee's deposit of the Option Property Price into Escrow and the commission shall be paid directly from the proceeds of said Escrow.

Pardee shall provide to each of you a copy of each written option exercise notice given pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Option Agreement, together with information as to the number of acres involved and the scheduled closing date. In addition, Pardee shall keep each of you reasonably infomed as to all matters relating to the amount and due dates of yout commission payments.

In the event the Option Agreement terminates for any reason whatsoevet prior to Pardee's purchase of the entire Purchase Property and Option Property, and Pardee thereafter purchases any portion of the Entire Site from Seller, at the closing of such purchase, Pardee shall pay to you a commission in the amount determined as described above as if the Option Agreement remained in effect.

For puxposes of this Agreement, the term "Pardee" shall include any successor or assignee of Pardee's tights under the Option Agreement, and Pardee's obligation to pay the commission to you at the times and in the manner described above shall be binding upon Pardee and its successors and assigns. Pardee, its successors and assigns, shall take no action to circument or avoid its obligation to you as set forth in the Agreement Nevertheless, in no event shall pou be entitled to any commission or compensation as a result of the resale or transfer by Pardee or its successor in interest of any portion of the Entire Site after such property has been acquired from Seller and commission paid to you.

In the event any sum of money due hereunder remains unpaid for a period of thirty (30) days, said sum shall bear interest at the rate of ten percent ( $10 \%$ ) per annum from the date due until paid. In the event eithet party brings an action to enforce its rights under this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be awarded teasonable attomens' fees and costs.

This Agreement zepresents our entire understanding concerming the subject matter hereof, and all oral statements, representations, and negotiations are hereby merged into this Agreement and are superseded hereby. This Agreement may not be modified except by a written instrument signed by all of us. Nothing herein contained shall create a partnership, joint venture of employment telationship between the parties hereto unless expressly set forth to the contrary. The language of this Agreement shall be construed under the laws of the State of Nevada according to its normal and usual meaning, and not strictly for or against either you or Pardee.

Mr. Walt Wilkes
Mr. Jim Wolfram
September 1, 2004
Page 3

Out signatures below will represent our binding agreement to the above.
Sincerely,
PARDEE HOMES OF NEVADA,
a Nevada corporation


## Agreed to and accepted:

GENERAL REALTY GROUP, INC.


SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me


M土. Walt Wilkes M. Jim Wolfram September 1, 2004 Page 4

AWARD REALTY GROUP


SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this_G2 day of $5 E \rho T, 2004$.
Vergruic Uttioune

NOTARIXUBLIC in and for the County of Clark, State of Nerada


## EXHIBIT B

SUPP
JAMES J. JIMMERSON, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 000264
LYNN M. HANSEN, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 0244
JAMES M. JIMMERSON, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 12599
JIMMERSON HANSEN, P.C.
415 So. Sixth St., Ste. 100
Las Vegas, NV 89101
Tel No.: (702) 388-7171; Fax No.: (702) 380-6406
iii@jimmersonhansen.com
Imh@jimmersonhansen.com
imi@jimmersonhansen.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs
James Wolfram and Walt Wilkes

## DISTRICT COURT

## CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

JAMES WOLFRAM AND WALT WILKES
CASE NO.: A-10-632338-C DEPT NO.: IV

## vs.

PARDEE HOMES OF NEVADA,
Defendant.

# PLAINTIFFS' THIRTEENTH SUPPLEMENT TO NRCP 16.1 DISCLOSURE OF WITNESSES AND DOCUMENTS 

COME NOW Plaintiffs, JAMES WOLFRAM and WALT WILKES, by and through their attorneys, Lynn M. Hansen, Esq., and James M. Jimmerson, Esq., of the law firm of Jimmerson Hansen, P.C., and hereby submit the following Thirteenth Supplement to their list of witnesses and production of documents, as follows (new items in bold):
I.

## WITNESSES

Plaintiffs provide the following witnesses' identities, last known address and telephone numbers:

1. James Wolfram c/o Jimmerson Hansen, P.C.
415 South Sixth Street, Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
(702) 388-7171

This person most knowledgeable is expected to render testimony regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the subject matter of this litigation.
2. Walt Wilkes c/o Jimmerson Hansen, P.C. 415 South Sixth Street, Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 388-7171

This person most knowledgeable is expected to render testimony regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the subject matter of this litigation.
3. Frances Butler Dunlap Chicago Title Company Las Vegas, Nevada

This person was the head of the Real Estate Commercial Department of Chicago Title Company, is most knowledgeable, and is expected to render testimony regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the subject matter of this litigation.

## 4. PARDEE HOMES OF NEVADA <br> Custodian of Records <br> McDonald Carano Wilson LLP <br> 100 West Liberty Street, 10th Floor <br> Reno, Nevada 89501 <br> (775) 788-2000

Pardee Homes of Nevada is a named Defendant in this matter. Its present or former employees, representatives, agents, person to be designated pursuant to NRCP 30(b)(6) and/or custodians of records are expected to testify regarding the facts and background of this case.
5. PARDEE HOMES OF NEVADA

Person Most Knowledgeable McDonald Carano Wilson LLP
100 West Liberty Street, 10th Floor
Reno, Nevada 89501
(775) 788-2000

Pardee Homes of Nevada is a named Defendant in this matter. Its present or former employees, representatives, agents, person to be designated pursuant to NRCP 30(b)(6) and/or Person Most Knowledgeable are expected to testify regarding the facts and background of this case.
6. Jon Lash
c/o McDonald Carano Wilson LLP
100 West Liberty Street, 10th Floor
Reno, Nevada 89501
(775) 788-2000

Mr. Lash is an employee of PARDEE HOMES OF NEVADA and is expected to testify regarding the facts and background of this case.
7. Clifford Anderson
c/o McDonald Carano Wilson LLP
100 West Liberty Street, 10th Floor
Reno, Nevada 89501
(775) 788-2000

Mr. Anderson is an employee of PARDEE HOMES OF NEVADA and is expected to testify regarding the facts and background of this case.
8. Harvey Whitemore
c/o Coyote Springs
Address Unknown
Mr . Whitemore is the owner of the property involved in this lawsuit and is expected to testify regarding the facts and background of this case.
9. Chicago Title Company

Las Vegas, Nevada
Custodian of Records
The Custodian of Records is expected to testify regarding the facts and background of this case.
10. Chicago Title Company

Las Vegas, Nevada
Person Most Knowledgeable

The Person Most Knowledgeable is expected to testify regarding the facts and background of this case.
11. Peter J. Dingerson

D\&W Real Estate
5455 S. Durango Dr., Ste 160
Las Vegas, NV 89113
Mr. Dingerson is the owner of D\&W Real Estate and is expected to testify regarding the
facts and background of this case.
12. Jay Dana

General Realty Group
6330 S. Eastern Ave Ste 2
Las Vegas, NV 89119
Mr. Dana is the owner of General Realty Group Inc. and is expected to testify regarding the facts and background of this case.
13. Jerry Masini

Award Realty Corp.
3015 S. Jones Blvd.
Las Vegas, NV 89146
Mr. Masini is the owner of Award Realty and is expected to testify regarding the facts and background of this case.
14. Mark Carmen

Exit Realty Number One
6600 W. Charleston, Suite \#119
Las Vegas, Nevada 89146
Mr. Carmen is the owner of Las Vegas Realty Center and is expected to testify regarding the facts and background of this case.
15. James J. Jimmerson, Esq.

C/O JIMMERSON HANSEN, PC
415 South Sixth Street \#100
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Mr. Jimmerson is a principal of Jimmerson Hansen, P.C and is expected to testify regarding Plaintiffs' attorney's fees and costs.
16. Klif Andrews
Pardee Homes of Nevada
650 White Drive, Suite 100
Las Vegas, Nevada 89119

Page 4 of 13
12.11.13.ECC Supplement 13..wpd/fh

Mr. Andrews is the President of Pardee Homes of Nevada and is expected to testify about facts and circumstances about the case. Specifically he is expected to testify concerning all production of residential property at Coyote Springs.
17. Chelsea Peltier Slater Hanifan Group
5740 S. Arville, Suite \#216
Las Vegas, Nevada 89118
Ms. Peltier is an employee of Slater Hanifan Group and is expected to testify and is expected to testify about facts and circumstances about the case. Specifically she is expected to testify concerning all production of residential property at Coyote Springs.
18. Jerry Slater Slater Hanifan Group 5740 S. Arville, Suite \#216 Las Vegas, Nevada 89118

Mr. Slater is a principal of Slater Hanifan Group and is expected to testify and is expected to testify about facts and circumstances about the case. Specifically he is expected to testify concerning all production of residential property at Coyote Springs.
19. Kenneth Hanifan Slater Hanifan Group 5740 S. Arville, Suite \#216 Las Vegas, Nevada 89118

Mr. Hanifan is a principal of Slater Hanifan Group and is expected to testify and is expected to testify about facts and circumstances about the case. Specifically he is expected to testify concerning all production of residential property at Coyote Springs.
20. Jim Rizzi

Pardee Homes of Nevada 650 White Drive, Suite 100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119

Mr. Rizzi is an employee of Pardee Homes and is expected to testify and is expected to testify about facts and circumstances about the case. Specifically he is expected to testify concerning all production of residential property at Coyote Springs.

Plaintiffs reserve the right to call any and all witnesses who may be disclosed or deposed throughout the course of discovery.

Plaintiffs reserve the right to call any and all of Defendant's witnesses; and
Plaintiffs reserve the right to call any and all rebuttal witnesses.
Plaintiffs' experts, if any, as yet unidentified.
Plaintiffs reserve the right to supplement this list of witnesses as discovery progresses and until the time of trial in this case.

## II.

## DOCUMENTS

Pursuant to NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(B), Plaintiffs provide the following documents relating to Plaintiffs and Defendants:

1. Any and all written agreements between the Parties;
2. Any and all documents evidencing damages to the Plaintiffs;
3. Any and all correspondence between the Parties;
4. Any and all appropriate Custodian of Record documents;
5. Any and all pleadings in this matter;

These documents are being reproduced as Plaintiffs' Initial NRCP 16.1 Disclosures of Witnesses and Documents had duplicate documents. The duplicate copies have been removed and the documents are listed as follows:

1. Option Agreement for the Purpose of Real Property and Joint Escrow Instructions dated May 2004 (Bates No. PLTF0001-0080);
2. Amended and Restated Option Agreement for the Purchase of Real Property and Joint Escrow Instructions dated March 28, 2005, (Bates No. PLTF0081-0152);
3. Two Assignments of Real Estate Commission and Personal Certification Agreement (Bates No. PLTF0153-0157A)
4. Letter dated September 2, 2004 from Pardee Homes to Mr. Walt Walkes Page 6 of 13
regarding the attached Commission letter dated September 1, 2004, (Bates No. PLTF0158-0162);
5. Amendment No. 2 to Option Agreement for the Purchase of Real Property and Joint Escrow Instructions, (Bates No. PLTF0163-0174);
6. Letter dated April 6, 2009 from Pardee Homes to Mr. Jim Wolfram, (Bates No. PLTF0175-0179);
7. Letter dated April 23, 2009 from James J. Jimmerson, Esq., to Jim Stringer, Esq., (Bates No. PLTF0180-0187);
8. Letter dated May 19, 2011 from James J. Jimmerson, Esq., to Jim Stringer, Esq., (Bates No. PLTF0188-0191);
9. Letter dated July 10, 2009 from Charles E. Curtis to James J. Jimmerson, Esq., (Bates No. PLTF0192-0193);
10. Letter dated August 26, 2009 from James J. Jimmerson, Esq., to Charles E. Curtis, (Bates No. PLTF0194-0196);
11. Letter dated November 24, 2009 from Jon E. Lash to Mr. Jim Wolfram, (Bates No. PLTF0197-0202);
12. Letter dated April 21, 2010 from Jim Wolfram to Mr. Jon Lash, (Bates No. PLTF0203-0205);
13. Letter dated May 17, 2010 from James J. Jimmerson, Esq., to Mr. John E. Lash, (Bates No. PLTF0206-0209);
14. Letter dated June 14, 2010 from Charles E. Curtis to James J. Jimmerson, Esq., (Bates No. PLTF0210-0211);
15. Bates Nos. PLTF0212-0244 are the duplicative documents produced in Plaintiffs' Initial 16.1 Disclosure of Documents and Witnesses.
16. Documents produced by Stewart Title in response to Plaintiffs' Subpoena Duces Tecum on CD, (Bates No. PLTF0245-PLTF1423);
17. Documents produced by Chicago Title in response to Plaintiffs' Subpoena Duces Tecum on CD, (Bates No. PLTF1424-PLTF10414);
18. Documents produced by Coyote Springs Investments in response to Plaintiff's Duces Tecum on CD, (Bates No. CSI_Wolfram 000014-CSI_Wolfram0003004), attached hereto;
19. Coyote Springs Investment, LLC's Privilege Log, (Bates No. PLTF10415 PLTF10417), attached hereto;
20. Affidavit of Custodian of Records, (Bates No. PLTF10418-PLTF10419); attached hereto;
21. Non-Party Coyote Springs Investments, LLC.'s Supplement and Amended Objection and Response to Plaintiff's Subpoena Duces Tecum, (Bates PLTF10420-PLTF10424, attached hereto.
22. Chicago Title Company's previously bates stamped documents no. PLTF 1424 Page 7 of 13
12.11.13.ECC Supplement 13..wpd/h
through PLTF 10414 (on bottom right of documents bate stamped) and rebated as bates nos: Cht 00001 through Cht 08998 (on bottom left of documents bate stamped), including the Custodian of Records Subpoena to Chicago Title Company including the executed Certificate of Custodian of Records bates stamped as Cht 08997.
23. Stewart Title Company's previously bate stamped documents no. PLTF 0245 through PLTF 1423 and rebated as bates nos: Stwt 0001 through 1202. Documents Stwt 0699 and Stwt 0731 are copy coversheets and were inadvertently bates stamped.
24. Copy of Plat Map recorded in the Clark County Recorder's Office in Book 138, page 51, bates PLTF 10427 through PLTF 10438.
25. Copy of Parcel Map recorded in the Clark County Recorder's Office in File 116, page 35, bates PLTF 10439 through PLTF 10440.
26. Copy of Parcel Map recorded in the Clark County Recorder's Office in File 117, page 18, bates PLTF 10441 through PLTF 10443.
27. Copy of Plat Map recorded in the Clark County Recorder's Office in Book 140, page 57, bates PLTF 10444 through PLTF10456.
28. Copy of Parcel Map recorded in the Clark County Recorder's Office in File 113, page 55, bates PLTF 10457 through PLTF 10462.
29. Copy of Parcel Map recorded in the Clark County Recorder's Office in File 98, page 57, bates PLTF 10463 through PLTF 10468.
30. Copy of redacted billing sheets representing attorney's fees charged by Jimmerson Hansen, P.C. from November 3, 2010 through October 19, 2012, bates PLTF 10469 through PLTF 10481.
31. Affidavit of Peter J. Dingerson, bates PLTF 10482 through PLTF 10484.
32. Assignment of Rights, Title and Interest from Jay Dana on behalf of General Realty Group Inc. to Walt Wilkes, dated January 11, 2011, bates PLTF 10485.
33. Assignment of Rights, Title and Interest from Jerry Masini on behalf of Award Realty to James Wolfram, dated December 20, 2010, bates PLTF 10486.
34. Letter from Jeffrey King, M.D. dated November 1, 2011 regarding the health of Walt Wilkes, bates PLTF 10487.
35. Affidavit of Jerry Masini, bates PLTF 10488 through PLTF 10490.
36. Assignment signed by Mark Carmen dated December 3, 2012 along with Exhibit A signed by Jay Dana dated January 11, 2011, attached hereto as bates PLTF 10491 through PLTF 10493; and
37. Assignment signed by Peter J. Dingerson dated December 20, 2012 along with Exhibit A signed by Jerry Masini dated December 20, 2010, attached hereto as bates PLTF 10494 through PLTF 10496.
38. Copy of redacted billing sheets representing attorney's fees charged by Jimmerson Hansen, P.C. from October 24, 2012 through February 21, 2013, bates PLTF 10497 through PLTF 10499.
39. Copy of redacted costs representing costs expended by Jimmerson Hansen, P.C. from December 29, 2010 through February 4, 2013 bates PLTF 10500 through PLTF 10505.
40. Copy of redacted billing sheets representing attorney's fees charged by Jimmerson Hansen, P.C. from February 21, 2013 through March 29, 2013, bates PLTF 10506 through PLTF 10508.
41. Copy of redacted costs representing costs expended by Jimmerson Hansen, P.C. from February 27, 2013 through March 13, 2013 bates PLTF 10509 through 10510.
42. Copy of redacted billing sheets representing attorney's fees charged by Jimmerson Hansen, P.C. from April 1, 2013 through April 18, 2013, bates PLTF 10511 through PLTF 10512.
43. Color copy of the map as edited by James Wolfram, attached hereto as bates PLTF 10513.
44. Color copy the original map from Jon Lash to James Wolfram of the entire site, attached hereto as bates PLTF 10514.
45. Three (3) color copies of maps from James Wolfram to Jon Lash, originally produced by your office on April 21, 2010, attached hereto as bates PLTF 1051510517; and
46. A further detailed computation of the attorney fee damages is found at Exhibit "1" attached hereto. Exhibit " 1 " is a collection of the previously produced attorney's fees with the highlighted sections representing the line items which were aggregated at $100 \%$ plus the non-highlighted line items which were aggregated at $33.3 \%$ to equal $\$ 102,160.00$. The pink highlighted line items represent those damages for a breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims, which total $\$ 7,602.50$.
47. Emails dated from September 2008 between Nevada Title and Plaintiffs with their attachments (commercial sales and parcels designated for the upcoming BLM land action from Nevada Tile), attached hereto as bates PLTF 10518-10527.
48. Computation of attorneys fees and billing from April 22, 2013 through May 21, 2013, attached hereto as bates PLTF 10528 through 10530.
49. Computation of attorneys fees and billing from May 20, 2013 through June 20, 2013, attached hereto as bates PLTF 10531 through 10533.
50. Documents regarding Coyote Springs Major Plan dated 8/4/2008, previously produced as Bates Nos. CNTY00001-CNTY00543.
51. Documents regarding Coyote Springs Major Plan dated May 5, 2006, previously produced as Bates Nos. CNTY00542-00898.
52. Documents regarding Coyote Springs Major Plan dated 6/2002, previously produced as Bates Nos. CNTY00899-CNTY01193.
53. Documents regarding Coyote Springs Development Agreement dated 6/16/2004, previously produced as Bates Nos. CNTY01194-CNTY01262.
54. Documents regarding Coyote Springs Development Agreement dated Page 9 of 13

12/18/2002, previously produced as Bates Nos. CNTY01263-01334.
55. Notice of Final Action Clark County Zoning Commission dated 2/16/2011, previously produced as Bates Nos. CNTY01335-01347.
56. Tentative Map Application filed 12/29/2010, previously attached as Bate Nos. CNTY01348-01349.
57. Tentative Map Application 0094-10 Coyote Springs Village \#4 approval 2/15/2011, previously produced as Bates Nos. CNTY01350-01351.
58. Map of Coyote Springs dated $5 / 23 / 2008$, previously produced as Bates Nos. CNTY01352.
59. Coyote Springs Village \#4 tentative map dated 12/28/2010, previously produced as Bates Nos. CNTY01353-01358.

Plaintiffs reserve the right to any and all documents the Defendants disclosed by any parties or used at any depositions.

Plaintiffs reserve the right to any and all other relevant documents to this matter.
Plaintiffs reserve the right to identify and produce different and/or additional documents as the investigation and discovery in this case proceeds.
III.

## COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES

Plaintiffs calculate their damages to be in excess of $\$ 1,930,000.00$ associated with the Defendant's breach of contract and the Defendant's failure to faithfully meet their obligations to the Plaintiffs.

There are two primary components to this calculation. The first component is the loss of future commissions from future sales or takedowns of property located in Clark County, subject to the September 1, 2004 Commission Letter Agreement. There appears to be at least 3,000 acres of property, defined as Option Property under the Option Agreement effective June 1, 2004, currently owned by Coyote Springs Investment, LLC in Township 13 South, Range 63 East M.D.M., Clark County, Nevada. Under the Option Agreement effective June 1, 2004, these 3,000 acres can be purchased by Pardee and designated as Production Residential Property-a purchase and designation that would entitle Plaintiffs to a $1.5 \%$ commission on a per-acre price of $\$ 40,000.00$. If 3,000 acres were purchased by Pardee under this scenario, Plaintiffs would be entitled to $\$ 1,800,000$ in commissions. However, Pardee's course of
conduct in failing to appropriately discharge its duties under the Commission Letter Agreement has robbed Plaintiffs of this opportunity to be paid these commissions. Pardee's actions have served to reclassify the land originally labeled

1, 2004 Commission Letter Agreement. As stated in the Agreement, "In the event, either party brings an action to enforce its rights under this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees and costs." Plaintiffs in bringing this suit expect to be the prevailing party and, as such, are entitled to their reasonable attorney's fees as damages for Defendant's breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and for compelling the accounting due to Plaintiffs.

As stated by the Court in its most recent minute order, Plaintiffs' claims for attorney fee damages are governed by Sandy Valley Assoc. v. Sky Ranch Estates Owners Assoc., 117 Nev. 948 (2001). Pursuant to Sandy Valley, Plaintiffs calculate their attorney fee damages as follows: all fees and costs incurred for filing the complaint, prosecuting the claim for accounting, and seeking documents owed to Plaintiffs under the September 1, 2004 Commission Letter Agreement (for the breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims) plus one-third of the fees and costs incurred for the prosecution of all of the claims (as one of the three claims is for an accounting for which all of Plaintiffs' fees are damages). Exempt from the damages are fees in connection with the prosecution of the breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims, specifically not in furtherance of the recovery of documents. To date, Plaintiffs' attorney fee damages are greater than or equal to: $\$ 135,486.87$. Specifically, Plaintiffs' attorney fee damages for the accounting claim equal or exceed $\$ 135,486.87$; for the claim for the breach of contract equal or exceed $\$ 7,602.50$; and for the claim for the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims equal or exceed $\$ 7,602.50$.

Finally, Plaintiffs must be compensated for the time and effort expended attempting to discover from public records what information was owed to them under the Commission Letter Agreement. Specifically, Plaintiffs spent at least 80 hours in attempting to acquire this information. At a fair hourly rate of $\$ 80.00$ per hour, Plaintiffs' damages equal or exceed $\$ 6,400.00$ for their time.

Discovery is still ongoing therefore the Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend and supplement this response as the investigation and discovery in this case proceeds.

Dated this $11^{\text {th }}$ day of day of December, 2013.
JIMMERSON HANSEN, P.C.
/s/ James M. Jimmerson
JAMES J. JIMMERSON, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 000264
LYNN M. HANSEN, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 0244
JAMES M. JIMMERSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 12599
415 So. Sixth St., Ste. 100
Las Vegas, NV 89101
Attorney for Plaintiffs
James Wolfram and Walt Wilkes 5(b) addressed as follows below
$\qquad$ By facsimile, pursuant to EDCR 7.26
By receipt of copy as indicated below
PAT LUNDVALL, ESQ.,
AARON D. SHIPLEY, ESQ.
McDONALD CARANO WILSON, LLP

Pardee Homes of Nevada

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that service of a true and correct copy of PLAINTIFFS' THIRTEENTH SUPPLEMENT TO NRCP 16.1 DISCLOSURE OF WITNESSES AND DOCUMENTS was made on the 11th day of December , 2013, as indicated below:

X By first class mail, postage prepaid from Las Vegas, Nevada pursuant to N.R.C.P.

By electronic service through the E-filing system
/s/ Stephanie Spilotro
An Employee of JIMMERSON HANSEN, P.C.

EXHIBIT C

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DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
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JAMES WOLFRAM, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
PARDEE HOMES OF NEVADA,
Defendant.
()
)
) CASE NO. A-10-632338-C
) DEPT. NO. IV
PARDEE HOMES OF NEVADA, )
)

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF BENCH TRIAL
BEFORE THE HON. KERRY 工. EARLEY, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE On Wednesday, October 23, 2013 At 8:30 a.m.

APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiffs: JAMES J. JIMMERSON, ESQ. JAMES M. JIMMERSON, ESQ. LYNN M. HANSEN, ESQ.

For the Defendant:
PATRICIA K. LUNDVALL, ESQ. AARON D. SHIPLEY, ESQ.

Reported by: Jennifer D. Church, RPR, CCR No. 568

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\text { Jennifer D. Church, CCR No. } 568 \\
\text { District Court, Dept. IV }
\end{gathered}
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not come from anyone else. Plaintiffs had tried to receive it from Pardee. Plaintiffs had gone to Coyote Springs. Plaintiffs had gone to Chicago Title. Plaintiffs had gone to the Clark County Recorder's Office, to zoning and planning, to the other public offices to find what was happening in the development of Coyote Springs as it pertained to their commissions.

This case will largely hinge on was the property purchased Purchase Property or was it Option Property? This is because the Commission Letter Agreement establishes two separate formulas, two separate mechanisms for calculating how the commission -- how much the plaintiffs are entitled to for commission.

Under the Purchase Property formula, they are entitled to a percentage of the Purchase Property Price. There is no benefit or additional commission for additional acreage being purchased if there is no corresponding increase in price.

Conversely, the Commission Letter Agreement specifies that the formula for commissions for Option Property is dictated by acreage. It is a set flat rate per acre, and you find out the number of acres and that is the commission.

The evidence will show in this case that Pardee

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purchased both Purchase Property and Option Property. We know this by referring to the Option Agreement which defines those critical terms. For Purchase Property, the portion of the entire site consisting of Parcel 1 as shown on Parcel Map 98-57 recorded July 21, 2000 in Book 20000721, as Document 01332, Official Records, Clark County, Nevada.

Option Property, the remaining portion of the entire site which is or becomes designated for single-family detached production residential use as described below, the Option Property. And as the Option Agreement further describes, that as described below refers to production residential property, which is defined -- which includes, quote, without limitation, all single-family detached production residential lots, which shall include lots on which custom homes are constructed by buyer, all land for roadways, utilities, government facilities, including schools and parks, which school and park sites are subject to the provisions of 7 (c) below, open space required or designated for the benefit of the residential development pursuant to the master plan, a habitat conservation plan, or development agreement, drainage ways or other use associated with or resulting from the development of Purchase Property and each option parcel

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\text { District Court, Dept. IV }
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breached its duties under the September 1, 2004 Commission Letter Agreement.

The evidence will show that the commission payments were inaccurate, were not properly calculated. The evidence will show that in addition to improperly calculating these commissions, Pardee -- and this is the most important part of the case -- failed to keep plaintiffs reasonably informed as to all matters related to the amount and due date of their commissions.

You will hear evidence that in order to be reasonably informed as to these pieces of information, that Pardee had to provide evidence, had to provide information, had to provide records allowing plaintiffs to check, to verify that they had received the appropriate commission payment at the appropriate time.

You will hear evidence that without that information, the information that did not allow them to do that, was no information at all. You will hear that effectively plaintiffs were forced to trust Pardee and could not check and make sure that they had received the appropriate commission payments.

Now, these breaches are important not simply because it's on a piece of paper between two parties. It's important because of the magnitude of this transaction. You will hear evidence that the option

First it came from Stewart Title and then later it became Chicago Title. It had escrow numbers. It had name of the title company. It had percentage of the commission to be paid, to whom, and how it was going to be split then between the plaintiffs. All of that is found within each Exhibit A.

You are also going to find each commission check that was received by the plaintiffs. That too contained the amount of their commission, the escrow number, the payee, the payor, along with a memo explaining how that amount was determined.

There came a circumstance across the course then of when Pardee was paying these monthly payments to the plaintiffs that they were overpaid. We learned of that and we sent them a letter telling them that, in fact, that they had been overpaid and how that overpayment was going to be taken into account, in other words, how we were going to catch up that overpayment that was given to them.

As part of that letter, we also told them -and we're now like into 2007, into the 2007 time frame. The relationship between Pardee and the relationship between CSI moved on, and the parties had additional negotiations, and they had additional negotiations for other properties. And we told them that we had
agent?
A. 1974.
Q. And where were you in 1974?
A. Here in Las Vegas.
Q. How long were you employed as a real estate agent?
A. Until -- until $I$ retired. I mean, I retired probably seven or eight years ago.
Q. As a real estate agent, how did you earn money?
A. I earned money by bringing people together on different purchases, and $I$ got paid a commission for doing that work.
Q. And how would you receive this commission?
A. Well, you have to be the procuring cause, and you have to have ready, willing, and able people to be buyers. And then you draw up a commission agreement. And if the real estate closes, then you get a commission.
Q. When, if ever, would you receive a commission if the land transaction did not close?
A. Wow. I don't think that's ever happened to me. That would be rare.
Q. Why wouldn't you receive a commission if the Iand didn't close?
A. I didn't earn i.t.

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Jennifer D. Church, CCR No. S68
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Q. In your experience, is it normal that a real estate agent only receives a commission when a land transaction closes?
A. When a transaction closes, that's when you get a commission.
Q. What would a normal commission be in your line of work?
A. Well, in land, which is mostly what $I$ worked in, it's usually one to ten percent. Ten percent is usually the highest. I'm not saying it can't go above that. There are people that go -- there's usury above there and all that, but normally it's one to ten percent, and you sort of negotiate out what the commission is going to be.
Q. And how would that negotiation proceed?
A. Well, you'd have to sit down with the seller or the buyer, the one that's paying the commission. You have to sit down and come to some kind of a fair agreement, what both parties thought was a fair agreement.
Q. After you had negotiated the commission and entered into a commission agreement, what would you do to ensure that you received the proper commission payment?
A. Do you mean -- restate that.
entered into evidence as Plaintiffs' 1 , is that the agreement contemplated by this sentence?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, it says here --

MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, I'm going to object to that question and that answer and ask for it to be stricken. This gentleman was not a party to this agreement and, therefore, he doesn't know what was contemplated.

THE COURT: Why don't you just rephrase the question? Ask is it his understanding, if you would ask it that way.

MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You're welcome. Sustained, but just ask it a different way.
Q. (BY MR. J.M. JIMMERSON) Mr. Wolfram, what is your understanding as to the relationship between your Commission Agreement and this sentence in the option Agreement?
A. My understanding is just what it says here, they would pay a finder's fee to General Realty Group, Walt Wilkes, and Award Realty Group, Jim Wolfram, pursuant to a separate agreement, that they would pay me a commission and they would pay walt a commission.
Q. Was there a separate agreement executed?

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1 MS. LUNDVALL: We will do that at the first
break. I see that we're pretty close.
    THE COURT: We'll go ahead forward assuming
what Mr. Jimmerson is saying is true, but you can
certainly look at it.
    MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: I certainly hope so.
    THE COURT: I do too.
    MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: I'll wait for Your Honor.
    THE COURT: I'll unroll mine. I really do want
to follow. Okay. I got it.
    Q. (BY MR. J.M. JIMMERSON) Mr. Wolfram, what is
this a parcel map of?
    A. To me, this is the parcel map of my original
Commission Agreement. This is the -- Parcel }1\mathrm{ is the
Purchase Property.
    Q. And what is the parcel map number there on the
bottom left-hand -- bottom right-hand portion?
    A. File 98, page 57.
    Q. Is the same file and page referenced in the
Option Agreement --
    A. Yes.
    Q. -- as Purchase Property?
    A. Yes.
        MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Your Honor, I'd now like
to move for the admission of this evidence as
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    125
    Plaintiffs' Exhibit 25.
THE COURT: Any objection?
MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, number one, based on
his testimony, he's already testified that the Purchase
Property Price was the calculation upon which his
commission was based upon and acreage wasn't important
to him. So it's hard for me to understand what
relevance this particular map has.

THE COURT: Because he said for him to determine whether he was getting the actual commission for outside, he wanted to -- he wanted to know what was in Parcel 1. That's what his understanding was of what the Purchase Property was.

So it's very relevant because for him it was his understanding of the Commission Letter. And I think that Parcel 1, as in Exhibit 25 he's identified, is what his understanding was is what was covered by Purchase Property. Everything else was option.

THE WITNESS: Option.
THE COURT: So I do find the relevance of his understanding of what this is, because that's what he was making his determination of as to his understanding. So --

MS. LUNDVALL: I understand the Court's --
THE COURT: Truth or not, I do feel it is

1 relevant.
2 MS. LUNDVALL: I understand the Court's ruling 3 on this, recognizing that, in fact, there is going to be 4 testimony from the actual parties to the agreement as to 5 what this was supposed to constitute.
6 THE COURT: I absolutely understand that. I 7 understand this is his understanding, and I know we're all here because there was different understandings. I fully appreciate that. That's why we're all here.

But I'm going to go ahead and admit Plaintiffs'
Exhibit 25. There's several pages. Are they marked?
MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: They do have sheet
numbers.
THE COURT: For your record, we'll do -- the
sheet numbers are Plaintiffs' 10463 through 10468, so we make sure we have the complete exhibit. All right.

MS. LUNDVALL: 10463?
THE COURT: I'm using the PLTF Bates stamp
number on the bottom.
MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you, Your Honor. My
apologies.
THE COURT: I'll tell you, I do more by Bates
stamp. So if I refer to exhibits, I use the Bates
stamps. When it's Plaintiffs' 25, I use the Bates
stamps so we know we have the complete. That's easier
127
for me to follow.
MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: I will endeavor to use those Bates stamps.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. It's years of doing it. I want you to have a clear record.

MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Actually, I'm going to put this demonstrative so I'm following along with Mr. Wolfram.
Q. Mr. Wolfram, please flip to Sheet 2, which is the Bates stamp PLTF 10464. Are you there?
A. Where it shows Parcel 1, 3605.22 acres?
Q. Are you seeing the Lincoln-Clark County line?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. Okay. Looking at Sheets 2, 3 and 4, the 464, 465 and 466 , if you were to put them on top of each
other, would you get a map that looks something like this?
A. Yes.
Q. If you were to look at the first page of this exhibit, PLTF 10463, does that indicate how the sheets
are supposed to be constructed to reveal what the shape
of the parcel is?
A. Yes.
Q. Is the shape of the parcel similar to this parallelogram-like structure?


| 1 THE COURT: You don't need to apologize. We're | 1 THE WITNESS: You want me to add all those up? |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 all trying to get the truth. | THE COURT: If you could. |
| 3 Your experience reading these kind of maps, all | 3 THE WITNESS: He can go faster than I can. |
| 4 your years, you tell us what numbers you are adding up, | 4 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: You are the witness, |
| 5 Mr . Jimmerson will follow along here, so we get a total. | 5 Mr . Wolfram. |
| 6 So far we have -- am I right -- we started out | 6 THE WITNESS: Okay. I got 11,000-- 11,654. |
| 7 with what, 1796.84? | 7 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Do you want to try it |
| 8 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: I thought we started with | 8 again? |
| 91398 and then we went to 1796. | 9 THE COURT: Mr. Shipley, did you do it? What |
| 10 THE COURT: I'm confused too. | 10 did you get? The Court is wanting to know. |
| 11 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: The last thing I have in | 11 MR. SHIPLEY: 7996. |
| 12 my phone is that number. | 12 THE WITNESS: That's what I got the first time |
| 13 THE COURT: That's the new one. Let's start | 13 when we were talking, close to 8,000 . This time I put |
| 14 from scratch. | 14 another number in there. |
|  | 15 THE COURT: So Mr. Shipley got 7996 point |
| 16 THE COURT: There's numbers above the solid | 16 something. |
| 17 black line and numbers below it. Do you see that? | 17 THE WITNESS: That's what I got when we did it |
| 18 THE WITNESS: I see that. | 18 again. |
| 19 THE COURT: Do you add all of them together or | 19 THE COURT: So you are going to testify to me, |
| 20 do you add the ones below or -- | 20 before you started redoing it, you also got 7996.92? |
| 21 THE WITNESS: Well, to me -- | 21 THE WITNESS: Yeah, point 92, right. |
| 22 THE COURT: How would you read it? | 22 THE COURT: Okay. I'll accept that. |
| 23 THE WITNESS: To me, I add the numbers like | 23 THE WITNESS: I know what I did. |
| 24 between the -- you start out with the first dot. It | 24 THE COURT: That's the westerly to the easterly |
| 25 comes over to it looks like a balloon, to a dot, and I <br> 133 | 25 quarter on the Lincoln-Clark County line. All right. |
| 1 can see that that's 1398.35 feet. Then I go from that | 1 THE WITNESS: It's nearly 8,000 feet. |
| 2 dot to the next dot, I can see that that is 1796.84 . I | 2 Q. (BY MR. J.M. JIMMERSON) Mr. Wolfram, you see |
| 3 go from that dot to the next dot, 861.24. Then we got a | 3 these lines right here in the middle of the page of |
| 4 long one right here, 2662.52. And then from there to | 4 Sheet 2? |
| 5 the end, it's 1277.97. It came out to almost 8,000. | 5 <br> A. I do. |
| 6 MS. LUNDVALL: Is all this going on the record? | 6 THE COURT: When you say Sheet 2 -- |
| 7 THE COURT: Start again. I'm just trying to | 7 MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: I apologize. 10464, it's |
| 8 follow. And we'll get it all on the record so you are | 8 on the same sheet. |
| 9 not left out. | 9 THE COURT: Perfect. Keep the Bates number. |
| 10 THE WITNESS: You want me to say it again? | 10 Okay. Perfect. I see it. |
| 11 THE COURT: Are you starting with the -- which | 11 Q. (BY MR. J.M. JIMMERSON) Do you see it says |
| 12 number are you starting with? I can find the location. | 122640 and then it goes 5280? |
| 13 THE WITNESS: I'm starting with 1398.35. | $13$ <br> A. Yes. |
| 14 That's the number I'm starting with. | 14 Q. If you flip the sheet, the next sheet, which is |
| 15 THE COURT: Okay. So you are starting with | 15 10465? |
| 16 1398.35. Then what number are you doing next? | 16 A. Same number. |
| 17 THE WITNESS: Then the next number, I'm going | 17 Q. And if you were to look at the third sheet, |
| $181796.84 .$ | 18 which is 10466 -- |
| 19 THE COURT: All right. | 19 <br> A. Same numbers. |
| 20 THE WITNESS: Then the next number I'm going is | 20 Q. Are you -- what are you able to conclude as to |
| 21861.24. | 21 whether or not the boundaries, the eastern-western |
| 22 THE COURT: Okay. | 22 boundaries, as to whether or not they are parallel? |
| 23 THE WITNESS: And then we've got a long one, | 23 A. They're parallel because the distance is the |
| 242662.52 and then the last number, 1277.97. | 24 same all the way down. |
| 25 THE COURT: Okay. | 25 Q. So to understand you correctly, when you say |
| 134 | 136 |

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the distance is the same all the way down, the 7996.92
number would be the same at the same angle here and here
and here?
    A. Yes.
    MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Excuse me, Your Honor.
    Mr. Wolfram --
    THE WITNESS: Am I done with this one?
    MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Almost. I have a couple
more questions, and then we can break, Your Honor, if
that would be convenient.
    THE COURT: That's fine.
    Q. (BY MR. J.M. JIMMERSON) Looking at your
sheets, what is the western border of this Parcel 1?
    A. That's the highway that goes, Highway }93
    Q. Does the Highway }93\mathrm{ run the length of Parcel 1?
    A. Yes.
    MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Your Honor, I think we can
take a break. We'll be moving into another document.
    THE COURT: Okay. We'll go ahead and take our
luncheon recess. It's up to your preference, Counsel.
I know you are the ones preparing for stuff. Do you
want to come back at 1:30, an hour?
    MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, an hour, 1:45?
    THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. We'll take a
recess then until 1:45.
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(Whereupon, the lunch recess was taken from 12:44 p.m to 1:45 p.m.)
THE COURT: Good afternoon, Counsel.
MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Good afternoon,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: We're going to continue with
Mr. Wolfram?
MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You are still under oath.
Q. (BY MR. J.M. JIMMERSON) Mr. Wolfram, please flip to Tab 2, the Option Agreement.
A. Okay.
Q. Again, referencing paragraph $B$, (i), Buyer's purchase of the portion of the entire site consisting of Parcel 1 as shown on Parcel Map 98-57 recorded July 21, 2000, in Book 20000721, as Document No. 01332, Official Records, Clark County, Nevada, containing approximately 3605.22 acres as shown on the map attached hereto and as Exhibit B and made a part hereof, the Purchase Property. In this Option Agreement, did it include a map of this Parcel 1 of Parcel Map 98-57 at Exhibit B?
A. I don't know. Yeah, I guess it did.
Q. Well, can you flip to Exhibit B?
A. Okay. I have to think about that. THE COURT: 050, that little number on the
right side.
THE WITNESS: Okay.
Q. (BY MR. J.M. JIMMERSON) Do you see a map here
of Purchase Property?
A. No. And that's what I was telling you earlier.

Yeah. Okay. Go ahead.
Q. It appears, and correct me if I'm wrong,

Exhibit $A$, the map of the entire site, $B, C$, the map of
Option Property, D, the map of initial developed parcel,
basically these maps were not included in the Option
Agreement. Is that right?
A. No, they were not.

MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, I'd like to, as far as have a continuing caution that the witness is
supposed to testify, not the attorney. And what I would
like to do is to make sure that we get the testimony of
Mr. Wolfram and not of the attorney.
THE COURT: Okay. So what she's saying, your
question was the other ones don't say it and he agreed.
It's really more a leading question. It may take a
little longer, but say, Look at Exhibit A, look at
Exhibit C. Okay?
MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: SO I'm going to sustain the objection. And you want a clear record too.

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Q. (BY MR. J.M. JIMMERSON) Mr. Wolfram, does it include -- do the exhibits include a map of the entire site?
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A. No.
Q. Do they include a map of the Option Property?
A. No.
Q. Do they include a map of the initial developed parcel and phasing plan?
A. No.
Q. Did it include a map of the Purchase Property?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever have any communications, after
receiving this document, the Option Agreement, with a
representative of Pardee concerning Parcel 1 on Parcel Map 98-57 on the boundaries of Purchase Property?
A. Yeah. I've had a conversation.
Q. Who did you speak with?
A. Jon Lash.
Q. What did Mr. Lash say?
A. Well, the Purchase Property, to me, had specific boundaries. Is that the direction that I'm headed right here?
Q. I was just asking what he said.
A. I talked to Jon a lot of times on properties. And to be very, very honest with you, when I'd call over

140

1 there, the answer I got most is, You'll just have to trust us.

I asked for certain individual things. And
they'd say, No, no, no. You know, we're doing what we
gotta do. You have to place your trust on us and everything will be right.

And I'd explain the fact that I can't go on trust. I need some maps. You've got to show me. You have to show me something where I have something concrete, but I never really -- I never really got anything concrete.
Q. Were those conversations where you were requesting maps, were they around the time of summer of 2004?
A. Yes.

MS. LUNDVALL: Once again, leading question, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm going to go ahead. I agree it's leading, but it's foundation.

See if you can get -- ask him if he knows the time frame. If not, you can try to refresh his recollection from now.

Since it's out, we'll go ahead and go forward, but I understand your objection.

THE WITNESS: Okay.

THE COURT: Now we have summer of 2004.
THE WITNESS: Okay. What you are asking me on the Option Agreement, Option Agreement for the Purchase of Real Property and Joint Escrow Instructions, ask me that again, what you are talking about.
Q. (BY MR. J.M. JIMMERSON) Well, you said that you had conversations with Pardee about Parcel Map 98-57, Parcel 1, and the boundaries of Purchase Property. I just want to know what was said in the conversations.
A. We had boundaries on the Purchase Property. There were definite boundaries on what we were going to do with Purchase Property.
Q. Did you later receive copies of these maps at Exhibit B and Exhibit A to Exhibit C, later?
A. Well, I heard about -- later on. But before I ever signed the contract, my commission contract on, I guess it was August 31st, there was an amendment, a second amendment, which definitely defined the boundaries of the Purchase Property. I mean, in no uncertain terms, it defined them. Even though I hadn't seen it at that particular point, I knew about it.
Q. Have you seen a copy of a map of Parcel 1 on Parcel Map 98-57?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you please flip to Exhibit 4?
A. Okay.
Q. Page 1.

It's going to be the first page, Your Honor.
A. Okay.
Q. At the very bottom of the page, paragraph 3, it
says, Upon execution of this amendment --
MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, maybe a question might be appropriate.

MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Your Honor, I'm about to get there.

THE COURT: You are just --
MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: If he wants to read it
silently, it's fine.
THE COURT: Why don't you point him to -- do
you see where he's pointing to, the last paragraph?
Q. (BY MR. J.M. JIMMERSON) Do you see
paragraph 3?
THE COURT: The bottom.
THE WITNESS: Yeah, 3.
THE COURT: Can you read that to yourself? And then counsel is going to ask you a question.

THE WITNESS: Okay.
Q. (BY MR. J.M. JIMMERSON) Did those Exhibits A, $B, C, D, G, I, J, K, P, I$, and $Q$-- I'm sorry. Strike

## that.

## Is Exhibit A attached hereto?

A. No.
Q. Can you please check, Mr. Wolfram?
A. Okay. Let me check. I had some questions about that one. Oh, oh, oh, okay. Which exhibit was it you said?
Q. Are there maps reflecting on --
A. Yes, there are.
Q. -- Exhibit A?
A. Yes. I'm sorry.

THE COURT: That's okay. Just take your time.
Q. (BY MR. J.M. JIMMERSON) Please look to CSI-Wolfram 1563. It's Exhibit B.
A. All right.
Q. What is this a map of?
A. That's the Parcel 1, the Purchase Property. Parcel 1.
Q. What exhibit, looking back to Exhibit 2, was supposed to be the map of Purchase Property, Parcel 1, as show in Parcel Map 98-57?
A. When you look at the maps in the back, it shows Purchase Property. The Purchase Property is in all those maps, really.
25 Q. But this map -- I just want to talk

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specifically about Exhibit B. Is this the map -- what
exhibit was the map attaching the map of Purchase
Property or Parcel 1, 98-57, on the original Option
Agreement on Exhibit 2?
A. I'm not understanding what you are doing here.
Q. Mr. Wolfram, you've testified that this is a
map of Purchase Property at Exhibit B?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Okay. This is part of Exhibit 4, Amendment No. 2 to Option Agreement for the Purchase of Real
Property and Joint Escrow Instructions. Is this the
agreement that you were referring to when you talked
about the August 31st document?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you receive the attached exhibits of the maps of \(A-1, A-2, B\), as contained herein?
A. Yeah. I knew exactly -- I knew where they 8 were, but I didn't -- but I didn't really know the --
how do I put that? You've got me confused on what you are asking me, and I don't want to answer wrong. It's very important.
Q. I just want to know, is this the same exhibit that was supposed to be attached --
A. Yes, it was.
Q. -- reference to --
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A. Right.
Q. -- Exhibit 2 to the original Option Agreement?
A. Right. That is exactly right. Now I
understand.
Q. I just wanted to confirm.

Mr. Wolfram, this Amendment No. 2 also included other exhibits as we discussed; is that right?
A. Right.
Q. Please look at Exhibit A-1, CSI-Wolfram 1560.
A. Okay. Got it.
Q. What is this a map of?
A. That's before the realignment. That's -- the property had an open space in the middle, and they were going to do a realignment to get that to the outside so that the property was whole.

THE COURT: This is Parcel 1 with the BLM land in the middle of it?

THE WITNESS: No.
THE COURT: Please do it again.
MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: I'm about to.
THE COURT: I'm sorry. You were going to clarify.
Q. (BY MR. J.M. JIMMERSON) When it says at the top here "map of the entire site," what is that referring to?
2 all the way, the whole site.
3 Q. Are you able to look at this map and see where
Parcel 1 is, if it's indicated here?
A. Yes.
Q. Where is that?
A. Lower left-hand corner.
THE COURT: Lower left-hand.
THE WITNESS: Right here.
MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Your Honor --
THE COURT: For the record, there's a black
line at the bottom, the second black line towards the
lower. And it's anything below that on the left side of
the BLM land?
THE WITNESS: Right below this line.
THE COURT: Why don't you, for the record --
can you show Counsel?
MS. LUNDVALL: There's no labels on this
document. He's just --
THE COURT: I know, but that's where he thinks
it is. So I want it clear of what he is interpreting
this map he thinks it is.
So we need you to hold it up for us and
describe it and point to it --
MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Yes.

THE COURT: -- so we have a record.
MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Jim, take it out of the book, please.
Q. (BY MR. J.M. JIMMERSON) Mr. Wolfram, can you point --
A. This is what we're referring to right here. THE COURT: Okay. And does it go all the way from the black line there all the way down?

THE WITNESS: Right here.
THE COURT: For the record, he's pointing -you can do it. I'm sorry.
Q. (BY MR. J.M. JIMMERSON) Mr. Wolfram, can you tell the Judge what that bottom line is, that dashed line, that big black going horizontal one-third up from the bottom of the page?
A. That's the top of Parcel 1.
Q. Is that the county line? Do you know?
A. Yeah. That's Lincoln County line, right.
Q. Again, for the record, can you please point to where Parcel 1 is on this map? Let the record reflect that he's pointing to the bottom left-hand corner rectangular section -THE COURT: The striped section. MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: -- the striped section of Exhibit A-1 on CSI-Wolfram 1560, below the county line.

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1 Q. Mr. Wolfram, please flip the page to
Exhibit A-2.
    A. Okay.
    Q. What is this a map of?
    A. That's a map after the configuration, Judge.
        MS. LuNDVALL: Is that his understanding of
what this map is?
        THE COURT: Yes. You are testifying to your
understanding of what the map is?
        THE WITNESS: Yeah. It's after the -- they
took the donut out, took the hole out of the middle and
made a whole property.
    Q. (BY MR. J.M. JIMMRSON) Mr. Wolfram, does this
map identify the boundaries of Purchase Property or
Parcel 1?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Where is it?
    A. Lower left-hand corner.
    Q. Can you point to it?
    A. Same place.
    Q. Mr. Wolfram, comparing Exhibit A-1 to
Exhibit A-2, is there any difference that you can tell
of the location of Purchase Property or Parcel 98-57?
    A. One and the same.
    Q. Mr. Wolfram, please flip to Exhibit C-1,
CSI-Wolfram 1565.
    A. Okay.
    MS. LUNDVALL: Where are you at?
    MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: 1565, Exhibit C-1.
        THE WITNESS: C-1 is -- okay.
    Q. (BY MR. J.M. JIMMERSON) DO you have it in
front of you? Can you tell the Court what this is a map
of?
    MS. LUNDVALL: What he understands this to be a
map of.
    THE COURT: Yes. Everything you are testifying
to regarding these maps is your understanding. Correct?
    THE WITNESS: Yes.
    THE COURT: I'm clear on that.
    THE WITNESS: It's the map of the entire site
before the configuration, and I do see the Purchase
Property down in the lower left-hand corner.
    Q. (BY MR. J.M. JIMMERSON) Is it shaded in?
    A. No. It's not shaded in.
    Q. Do you know why?
    A. Well, it wasn't really a part --
    Q. Mr. Wolfram, I'm confused. Because I'm reading
here, it says, "Map of Option Property prior to BIM
reconfiguration" at the top here. I want to know -- are
you looking at --
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1 handwriting. Map of Option Property prior to BLM reconfiguration. Right.
Q. Do you understand this --
A. I understand what your question is now. I do understand.

What he wants me to see, and I do see it, is that the Parcel 1 in the lower left corner, that was not Option Property. That was Purchase Property. And so it wasn't shaded in like the rest of the property.
Q. Okay. Can you please flip the page to $\mathrm{C}-2$, CSI-Wolfram 1566?
A. All right.
Q. What is this a map of?
A. That's the reconfiguration with the Purchase Property down in the lower left-hand corner. The stripes are still the Option Property.
Q. Mr. Wolfram, did you receive a copy of Amendment No. 2 to Option Agreement for the Purchase of Real Property and Joint Escrow Instructions?
A. Eventually. Let me explain how I think this happened. I signed my Commission Agreement. I actually signed it on September 6th. The Commission Agreement is dated September 1st.

THE COURT: I saw your signature was
151

September 6th. The record speaks for that.
THE WITNESS: And on August 31st, there was the
second amendment. And the second amendment defined
exact boundaries, like my contract, exact boundaries on
that Purchase Property, the portion in the lower
left-hand corner, distinct boundaries of what it was.
Q. (BY MR. J.M. JIMMERSON) Did you receive a
prior amendment to Option Agreement for the Purchase of
Real Property and Joint Escrow Instructions?
A. No.
Q. Can you please flip to Exhibit 3?
A. Bear with me. I don't do as good as you guys.

Did you say 3 or 2?
Q. Exhibit 3.
A. Give me a number at the bottom. I don't see it.
Q. It's the Court's Exhibit 3, the Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3.

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Bates stamp 91, 2 and 3.
THE COURT: It's in the Plaintiffs' book.
THE WITNESS: The plaintiff, okay.
THE COURT: It's okay. Take a deep breath.
You are fine.
THE WITNESS: All right.
Q. (BY MR. J.M. JIMMERSON) Did you receive this
until a bench trial on the 7th. I can move everything
else around. That's not until November 7th. So that is
the only thing $I$ don't want to move just because pro per
people don't understand when the Judge has to move
calendars, or they are not as gracious. So that is --
everything else we can move around. I will do whatever
you need.
So if that reassures you, I'll work around your
schedule. And you are not inconveniencing a jury or
anything, so $I^{\prime} m$ fine. $\quad$ will make myself available.
(Remarks between counsel off the record.)
THE COURT: If that would work for you, that
will work for me.
MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You're welcome. I promise I'll
give you whatever time you need.
MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Thank you very much,
Your Honor.
- OOO-
ATTEST: FULL, TRUE AND ACCURATE TRANSCRIPT OF
PROCEEDINGS.
JENNIFER D. CHURCH, CCR. No. 568, RPR

## EXHIBIT D


argument.
THE COURT: I understand. I think what she is trying to say is not relevant is what you're trying to -- I'm gonna overrule that. I don't know the relevance yet.

I assume Mr. Jimmerson is going to ask the question and get an answer, and then we can see whether it is or is not relevant, so I'm going to overrule it.

MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: Start again.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Who gave you the idea that the focus of this case was undue -- past due brokerage commissions?
A. It was my impression that I took from my deposition.
Q. And did you, did I advise you we were looking at obtaining information regarding purchases by Pardee Homes during the course of their work with you?
A. You did.
Q. Let's focus upon that.

Did there come a time then following December of 2002 when there was a meeting that Mr. Wolfram brought a Pardee representative?
A. I can't say whether Mr. Wolfram brought a Pardee representative. I can say that Mr. Wolfram and


District Court IV


District Court IV


District Court IV

Page 36

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depiction by map of what was being sold as Purchase
Property referred to in the first sentence of
paragraph B, correct?
    A. As you combine these documents together, the
answer is correct.
    Q. Okay. Thank you.
    MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: And I have it and you
have it in front of yourself, your Honor, and it's also
right here on the easel.
    THE COURT: I understand Mr. Wolfram's
testimony yesterday, it's all these pieces. I
understand that.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. It's this parcel here, correct?
    A. Yes, sir.
    Q. All right. And this is the county line at
the top, correct?
    A. That is correct.
    Q. All right. And so at this point in May of
2004, there's gonna be a donut hole right at --
    No, sir.
    Q. There's not?
    A. No, sir.
    Q. It's over here? Where is the donut hole?
    A. The whole reason why there's straight lines
    A. No, sir.
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                                    District Court IV
    page 38

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were ultimately going to acquire pursuant to this
agreement until that mapping and entitlements and
development process had taken place.
    Q. And I accept that.
    A. Thank you.
    Q. You're not gonna have any quarrels from me
that's my understanding as well. Fair enough.
    But what is being purchased here,
understanding that you believe it was subject to change
as you define entitlements, as you work with the BLM
and the like, was selling them purchase property
described as 3,600 acres, Exhibit 25, correct?
    A. I'll try to do this again.
    Q. Yes or no?
        THE COURT: No, honestly, please answer,
because I'm a little confused too. Could can you
answex that yes or no?
        THE WITNESS: No.
        THE COURT: Okay. Then please --
        THE WITNESS: No, your Honor, I cannot.
        THE COURT: Okay. Could you please --
        THE WITNESS: Yes.
        THE COURT: -- try to clarify for all of us.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. Please tell me under that contract what the
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District Court IV

Page 39
definition of Purchase Property is?
A. I would like to --
THE COURT: I would like further --
THE WITNESS: we --
'THE COURT: Could you please give us, I would
like to hear --
THE WITNESS: Mr. Jimmerson and Judge, the
property which is described on that exhibit,
Exhibit 25, what's in front of me, what's in front of
the Judge, is a delineation of a portion of the coyote
springs property which served as a guarantee that
pardee would be able to acquire their portion of the
single-family residential property which the parties
would subsequently describe on a map after the planning
process and entitlement process, and, quite frankly,
the development process associated with the golf course
had taken place, because until that took place, this
was my way of guaranteeing to them $X$ number of acres,
because what they wanted was $X$ number of acres.
Mr. Jimmerson, that we had a right to reacquire this
from Pardee if the thing blew up, because we didn't
want to have a situation where there was a party out
there who had this piece and had a blocking strategy,
as opposed to what the intent of the parties was, which
definition of Purchase Property is?
THE COURT: I would like further --
THE WITNESS: We --
THE COURT: Could you please give us, I would
like to hear .-
property which is described on that exhibit
Exhibit 25, what's in front of me, what's in front of
Springs property which served as a guarantee that
Pardee would be able to acquire their portion of the
single-family residential property which the parties
would subsequently describe on a map after the planning
process and entitlement process, and, quite frankly,
development process associated with the golf cour
was my way of guaranteeing to them $X$ number of acres,
because what they wanted was $X$ number of acres.
Mr. Jimmerson, that we had a right to reacquire this
from Pardee if the thing blew up, because we didn't
there who had this piece and had a blocking strategy,
as opposed to what the intent of the parties was, which

District Court IV
was to combine their joint planning efforts and come up with the right plan for Coyote Springs BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. No problem about that.
A. Thank you.
Q. To establish the events beforehand, in the
meeting you had, the all-hands meeting at Pardee's
offices roughly January/February 2004, after that,
after Pardee evidenced their interest to acquire the
land, and daily communication occurred between March
and May of 2004, is Mr. Wolfram or Mr. Wilkes present?
A. At any meeting?
Q. Yes, at any meeting.
A. No, six. No.
Q. Okay. Were they, to your knowledge, privy
to the communication going on between you and
John Lash, you on behalf of Coyote Springs, John Lash on behalf of Pardee?
A. No, sir. I was not aware of them.
Q. As far as you know, the answer is --
A. No, that's correct, sir.
Q. All right. So you know when or if they ever received this Option Agreement, Exhibit 2?
A. No, I'm not aware.
Q. Did you deliver them, prior to this

| Page 41 |
| :--- |
| litigation, this document, and by "you" I mean Coyote <br> Springs? <br> A. Not that I recall. <br> Q. Okay. All right. <br> All right. Now, understanding what you say <br> was the idea, that you're going to now do entitlements <br> and refine things and the like, at least for purposes <br> of this document, would you agree with me that the term <br> "Purchase Property" refers to Exhibit 25 for purposes <br> of this contract? <br> I understand you're gonna tell me, Jim, it's <br> gonna change, but for a moment in time, was the <br> Purchase property Exhibit 25 ? <br> A. Jim, I'm gonna say you have to take into <br> account what the property was gonna look like with the <br> BLM configuration and reconfiguration, so you cannot, I <br> cannot sit here and tell you or the Judge that Exhibit, <br> Exhibit 2 was complete until the reconfiguration <br> determination was made, because as a part and parcel of <br> this agreement, it had maps which, quote, required, and <br> I don't recall the numbers, but my recollection is that <br> there was, there were exhibits that were required to <br> say this is what the property is gonna look like, the <br> pre-configuration versus post configuration. <br> Q. Mr. Whittemore, you're not gonna concede to |

District Court IV

Page 42

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me that you defined in this contract Purchase Property
as Exhibit 25, yes or no? I know you're gonna tell me
it was subject to change, and I'm willing to accept
that. Will you not accept the fact in one moment in
time, May of 2004, Purchase Property is defined as
Exhibit 25.
    MS. LUNDVALL: I'm gonna now object. This
has been asked and answered.
    THE COURT: I'm not sure he did answer. He's
explaining. I think he's trying to just do a very .-
he's just trying to say for purposes of just looking at
Exhibit 2, is Purchase Property, at least why, your
understanding, defined according to Plaintiff's
Exhibit 25, I think that's what you're asking?
    MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: Precisely, yes.
    THE COURT: Just for purposes of this?
    THE WITNESS: Mr. Jimmerson, your Honor,
Purchase Property is defined within Paragraph B as the
3,605 --
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Thank you.
    A -- 22 acres within Paragraph B.
    And is Option Property, at that moment in
time, defined as everything else outside of Parcel 1,
the 3,600 acres?
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A. No, sir.
Q. What is Option property defined as?
A. Option property is specifically defined.
That is portion of the entire site which is or becomes
designated for single-family detached production
residential use.
Q. Okay.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Did I interrupt you?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. And therefore, and therefore, depending upon
what happened with respect to any portion of any
subsequent agreements, entitlement, mapping, the option
Property could be zero, because I was going to
designate it as multi-family, I was going to designate
it as commercial, I was going to designate it as golf
course, I was gonna designate it as any of a huge
number of potential uses pursuant to the entitlements,
which I received from clark county.
Q. Fair enough.
A. That's the complete answer.
Q. Would you then agree from your last answer
istrict Court IV

Page 44

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care where it was, it's just not part of Parcel 1?
    A. Within the constraints of paragraph B, yes.
    Thank you. That's all I need to know.
    Okay.
    Q. Thank you.
        I'm gonna fill in the blanks with you. Work
with me. Trust me, okay?
    A. Okay.
    Q. All right. So June 1, when they sign this,
this is Purchase property, a defined term, and
somewhere within the other 43,000 acres, less the
13,000 approximately, you're gonna retain for yourself,
and Option Property is defined as property outside of
Parcel 1 for single-family residential use, correct?
    A. Within the context of Paragraph B, the answer
is yes.
    Q. Great, okay.
        Now, as you noted, there are no schedules or
maps attached to that document?
    A. To Exhibit 2?
    Q. To Exhibit 2.
    A. Correct.
    Q. You first, in fact, learned that in your
deposition last year, correct? Do you recall thinking
that they had been attached to the document but then
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later on weren't?

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later on weren't?
A. Well --
A. Well --
Q. On October 19th of 2012?
Q. On October 19th of 2012?
A. I don't recall what my --
A. I don't recall what my --
Q. Fair enough.
Q. Fair enough.
MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor --
MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor --
THE COURT: Just let him finish. I know
THE COURT: Just let him finish. I know
you're trying to be real, Mr. Jimmerson, I know where
you're trying to be real, Mr. Jimmerson, I know where
you need to go. Slow down, I know what you're trying
you need to go. Slow down, I know what you're trying
to -- he doesn't recall in his deposition, and you're
to -- he doesn't recall in his deposition, and you're
gonna show him, okay.
gonna show him, okay.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Look at now, look at the schedules attached
Q. Look at now, look at the schedules attached
as of June 1 of 2004.
as of June 1 of 2004.
THE COURT: Pursuant to Paragraph B?
THE COURT: Pursuant to Paragraph B?
MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: Correct, as of June 1
MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: Correct, as of June 1
of 2004.
of 2004.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Now, have you noticed attached to this
Q. Now, have you noticed attached to this
document are blanks for the schedules?.
document are blanks for the schedules?.
THE COURT: We're still on Exhibit 2?
THE COURT: We're still on Exhibit 2?
MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: Exhibit 2.
MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: Exhibit 2.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. In other words, when you look at this,

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    Q. In other words, when you look at this,
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District Court IV

Page 45

District Court IV
Page 47
document of June 1, 2004?
A. We were in the process of finalizing the
exhibits, and because we had not yet been able to
finalize what those exhibits were, the parties felt it
appropriate that we extend time under which part of the
money was supposed to go hard, and therefore, in
fairness to Pardee, we said we'll extend the
contingency periods, and we'll continue to work,
honoring what needs to be done to make this agreement
work for you.
Q. And there was some release of funds, $\$ 125,000$
from Pardee through escrow, released out of escrow to
Coyote Springs?
A. Yes. I made them pay a little bit to dance.
Q. I got it. Fair enough.
And the date of this is roughly July 28 th of
2004?
A. That is correct.
Q. About seven weeks after the signing of the
original agreement?
A. Close enough.
Q. Fair enough.
Now, would you look at Exhibit 4 --
A. Yes, sir.
Q. -- in evidence, all right.

Page 47
document of June 1, 2004?
A. We were in the process of finalizing the exhibits, and because we had not yet been able to finalize what those exhibits were, the parties felt it appropriate that we extend time under which part of the money was supposed to go hard, and therefore, in
beginning with -- let me find it here. Page 46 .
A. Bates stamped 48, list of exhibits, do you
see that, Mr. Whittemore?
A. Yes, 46 and 48, yes, sir.
Q. And you listed the anticipated exhibits, and
they're all referenced in the course and agreements,
but when you go looking for them, you see that they're
not attached?
A. Right. What the parties did was prepare a
complete list of what was going to be subsequently
attached to Exhibit 2 to make it a complete agreement.
Q. Fair enough. Good.
Just turn to the next page, Exhibit 3, the
tab right below .-
A. Exhibit 3, yes, sir.
Q. It's Bates Stamp Number 91?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Pardee Homes 91, and it's called Amendment To
Option Agreement for The Purchase of Real Property And
Joint Escrow Instructions.
Do you see that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Now, this is not central to this case, but
just tell us what was occurring here in July of 2004,
approximately six or seven weeks after the signed

District Court IV


Page 46

Page 48
Do you know what Amendment Number 2 Option,
I think this answers a lot of questions you were
talking about earlier?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. All right. So let's work together now
talking about this. .
What is going on now, it's dated August 31,
and I don't know if that's the exact date it was
signed, but it bears the date August 31,2004 .
We're going on to Amendment Number 2 Option
Agreement For The Purchase of Real property And Joint
Escrow Instructions, Exhibit 4 .
A. Okay. Thank you.
The parties have finally determined that it's
time to bring greater specificity to what is your
Exhibit 2, which is the Baseline Agreement to me, and
it says that the parties hereby agree that upon
execution of this amendment, all of those exhibits
attached, A, B, C, D, G, I, J, K, L, P, and Q, are
gonna be made part of the agreement.
The Exhibit $H$ reference was deleted. We had
an Exhibit m reference in the underlying agreement, but
we deleted it in its entirety, and the most important
piece of this, from my perspective and John's
perspective, was that Exhibit E, the price that they
Do you know what Amendment Number 2 Option,
I think this answers a lot of questions you were
alking about earlier?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. All right. So let's work together now
talking about this
What is going on now, it's dated August 31,
and I don't know if that's the exact date it was
signed, but it bears the date August 31, 2004.
We're going on to Amendment Number 2 Option
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Escrow Instructions, Exhibit 4.
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time to bring greater specificity to what is your
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it says that the parties hereby agree that upon
execution of this amendment, all of those exhibits
attached, A, B, C, D, G, I, J, K, L, P, and Q, are
gonna be made part of the agreement.
The Exhibit $H$ reference was deleted. We had
an Exhibit $H$ reference in the underlying agreement, but
we deleted it in its entirety, and the most important
piece of this, from my perspective and John's
perspective, was that Exhibit E, the price that they

District Court IV
District Court IV

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were going to pay for this land purchase in the future
would remain in affect.
    Q. All right. And why, what's the most
important feature of this in your and Mr. Lash's minds?
    A. Because Exhibit E was the amendment which we
got done most quickly to attach to the underlying
agreement, because he wanted to know, Harvey, I trust
you, but I want to make sure if I want to buy the
entire property that you designate as single-family
residential, that over a period of 40 years this is
what I'm gonna have to pay for the property.
    I wanted to make sure that I had a deal that
I was, I was going to have a partner who was gonna be
in it with me for the long haul.
    Q. Okay. Now, I don't see Exhibit E here. Is
it here?
    A. No. It's back on Exhibit -- if you turn to
your Exhibit 2?
    Q. Please do that. I want the court to do that.
    I want everybody in the room to follow along
    A. Okay. And you'll see Exhibit E on Bates
Stamp 54.
    Q. Okay. So now looking at Exhibit 2, Bates
Stamp 54.
    A. Yes, sir.
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District Court IV

Page 49

Page 51
Page 52

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BY MR.J.J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. And as you've indicated, anytime they buy,
including the entire site of 30,000 acres, 43 minus the
13, it's 40,000 an acre Years 0 to 5?
    A. If I designated it, if they say, I want to
buy the entire property without regard to any
designation, commercial or anything else, their strike
price is $40,000 per acre for the full 30,000 acres,
which would be 1.2 billion.
    Q. B, as in billion?
    A. Not an M, B.
    Q. So that's the magnitude of this potentially,
is a $1.2 billion purchase by Pardee if they --
            MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, once again, we've
got -- the witness is supposed to provide the
testimony, the examiner asks the questions.
            THE COURT: I think he's trying to clarify it
to make sure I understand it, but that's if the whole
site was designated as single-family residential,
nothing else.
            THE WITNESS: Or they simply said we want to
take down the entire site.
            THE COURT: And do what we want?
            THE WITNESS: Yeah, and we'll do the
planning.
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District Court IV

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    Q. Which is --
    A. 54, Exhibit E.
        THE COURT: It don't have a page number. It
just says Exhibit E.
        MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: Thank you.
        THE WITNESS: Right.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. And so that schedule, that had been agreed to
June 1, 2004?
    A. Yes.
    Q. It was an attached exhibit?
    A. Yes, sir.
    Q. All right. And so that is being reaffirmed,
if you will, through Exhibit 4?
    A. It's just not addressed.
    Q. But it remains in force?
    A. Yes, it remains in force.
    Q. And that's why you say that was the most
important part to him, to make sure he was able to buy
out the entire property you designate single-family
residential at the price established June 1, 2004?
    A. And for me to be able to guarantee I was
gonna send a bill in the year 40 for $74,923 for any
piece of property designated as single-family
residential they want to exercise the option on,
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District Court IV


District Court IV

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BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. And there was an agreement in Exhibit E on
June 1 of 2004, part of Exhibit 2, as to the escalation
so you wouldn't have any quarrels about what does the
escalation compute to?
    A. That's why it's the most important part of
the deal.
    Q. Price sometimes is, all right.
        Now --
        THE COURT: I think we would all stipulate to
that. It can be a deal breaker.
    THE WITNESS: Uh-huh.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. Now, for purposes of Amendment 2, that's the
exhibit you're filling in the blanks that had been left
on June 1?
    A. Absolutely, fair characterization.
    Q. Okay. So now let's fill in the blanks
together.
    A. Okay.
    Q. Let's take a look at the attachments, please,
and you'll walk us through what it is now that we are
doing.
    Right.
    What is Exhibit A-1, CSI Wolfram 1560?
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District Court IV

Page 55

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Q. The bottom left corner below the county
    THE COURT: And on the left
    THE WITNESS: This area which is designated,
which is shown to be crosshatched on Exhibit A-1 is
identical to what's been referenced as Exhibit 25.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. Purchase property as originally defined in
the May agreement?
    A. I'm gonna keep qualifying that, in
Paragraph B.
    Q. Okay, no problem.
    A. Yes, sir.
    Q. Now, Purchase Property in Amendment Number 2
remains the same, the same definition, correct?
    A. I don't think we changed anything. In fact,
if I drafted this right or my people did, it will say
that all the definitions remain the same.
    Q. Thank you.
    A. Let me look, please.
    Q. Please confirm it.
    A. Yes. paragraph 23 basically said that the
provisions of this amendment control over the prior
terms of the agreement, so technically, you would have
to look at Amendment Number 2 as compared to the prior
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line --
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line --
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THE COURT: And on the left
THE WITNESS: This area which is designated,
which is shown to be crosshatched on Exhibit A-1 is
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Page 56

agreement, your Honor.
Amendment 2, Exhibit 4, does not change the definition
of Purchase property found on the first page of
Exhibit 2, the June 1, 2004 Baseline Agreements?
THE COURT: Is there anything in this
amendment that even talks about purchase property?
THE WITNESS: That's what I want to find out.
THE COURT: Right, perfect, on the same page
THE WITNESS: I would like it if somebody
could do a word search real quickly. It would help a
10t
Q. You're years ahead of me. What is a word
THE COURT: I wish we had it on a computer.
Come on, you've got to have OCR on the computer
MS. Lundvall: We don't, your Honor. We
don't have it.
THE WITNESS: We don't have OCR
MS. LUNDVALL: Not for these documents.
THE WITNESS: Okay. So now I can tell you
25

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manager, Rob Dirk, to show what the site looked like
before any BLM reconfiguration
            You can see the area which is white, your
Honor.
    THE COURT: It's the BLM land?
    THE WITNESS: It's the BLM land, and you'll
see a little area on the upper left-hand corner which
is also BLM land.
THE COURT: BLM land also.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. Looking at Exhibit 25, the BLM property is
right along the eastern border of the purchased
property?
    A. Yes, sir.
    Q. And here's the county line, and we find other
parts up in here?
    A. Way off the chart but up to the northwest,
that's correct.
    Q. All right. And just hold it up so, hold it
up, show me this. Tell me what this is, please.
    A. Okay.
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District Court IV

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Got it.
    Q. What is that?
    A. Got it, thank you
    Okay. Exhibit A-1 was prepared by my general
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Page 57
this, that the parties at the time that this document
is executed clearly anticipate that the Purchase
Property, the purchase price of the Purchase Property
is gonna be $84 million.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. Right.
    A. And that's contained in Paragraph 4 (b).
        THE COURT: That's how you get to the
$84 million?
        THE WITNESS: That's how we get to the 84,
because I negotiated with Mr. Lash an increase in the
prior number to this, based upon my obligation to put
in certain improvements that Pardee wanted to guarantee
that we were gonna put the money in the land rather
than just pocket it and go home.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. Got it.
    A. But it's critical that you look at
Paragraph 4 (b), because it describes throughout the
rest of this document all of the commercial
improvements, clearly contemplating commercial
property. It talks about all the different things
which are required from recreation facilities, so I
impose upon the buyer an obligation to commit to build
a recreation facility, which means you need parks and
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District Court IV
the remaining 1,700 acres.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Now, can we agree that the 1,950 acres is
just what I just said, it's part of, part of the
Purchase Property, it's part of Exhibit 25?

THE COURT: Do you need to explain something
else?
THE WITNESS: No.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. It's, it relates to the commission
agreements, not anything to do with your being
accurate, it's just how we're paid differs whether it's
Purchase Property or Option Property, that's why I'm
being so emphatic to describe where the 1,950 acres is.
A. Okay.
MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, again, I would ask
to have the speech stricken by Mr. Jimmerson.
MR. J. J. JIMMERSO: I agree to have it
stricken, that's just fine.
MS. LUNDVALL: And I would ask for him to
exercise restraint, as the Court has repeatedly
admonished him not to do that.
MR. J. J. JIMmerson: I didn't have breakfast
District Court IV
recreation land, and so again, now we have the
integration of this agreement with this amendment to
contemplate or to reach the contemplation of the
parties.
Q. Very good.
And would you agree that during the course of
this document, there is a specification that the first
purchase that Pardee is going to make is purchase
property of roughly 1,950 acres?
A. Yeah. That's, I think that's .-
Q. And the 1,950 acres is a portion of the
overall 3,600 acres purchase property, correct?
A. Well, this is where you get, this is where
you need to allow me to explain, if I could.
If you please look at 1568, the map of the
Initial Developed Parcel.
Q. Okay.
THE COURT: 1568 Bates Stamp?
THE WITNESS: Yes, Bates Stamp 1.568.
THE COURT: Got it
THE WITNESS: You can see the double
crosshatched area, the Initial Developed Parcel, the
1,950 , and Phase 1 is located in the southern portion
of the parcel, and the parties will mutually agree upon
the phasing of the additional purchases, your Honor,

District Court IV

| with the witness. I didn't have the opportunity to talk to him. <br> THE COURT: You both had an opportunity. I don't infer anything from you talking to him. I know not to infer any -- I certainly would be disappointed if both of you didn't talk to a witness if you had the chance, so I'm not inferring anything by that. <br> Honestly, it's easier if I get as much testimony as I can out of Mr. Whittemore, to be honest, so -- <br> MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: I understand, I'm gonna go through all of it. <br> THE COURT: I know you know where you're going. <br> MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: I'm gonna go through all of it, Judge, so we have a clear understanding. BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: <br> Q. So let's start at Exhibit A-1. We're gonna go through the exhibits that are now locked in. <br> This is what the provision of Amendment 2 says: Subparagraph 3, Upon execution of this agreement by both parties, Exhibits A, B, C, D, G, I, J, K, L, P and $Q$ to the agreement shall be the exhibits which are included in Exhibit 1 attached hereto and made a part hereof. Exhibit H to the agreement is hereby deleted. |
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District Court IV

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Right.
    Q. So now you're confirming what you had thought
you had in May, but now you've got the attachments,
right?
            What's wrong with that?
    That's not what we thought we had in May
it's what we were going to do because we were going to
use a deliberative collegial process to ultimately
reach resolution.
    And you, you got by this amendment --
    We got here, okay, we got here.
    And it's dated roughly August 3l of 2004, two
months later?
    A. Yes, sir.
    Q. So let's start at A-1.
    A. Yes, sir.
    Q. You already answered the question, but to
summarize, this is as it was with the donut hole?
    A. That's correct.
    BLM leaves the property?
    That's true.
    And the purchase property is the bottom
left-hand corner of --
    A. As defined in Exhibit B on Page 1.
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Page 64
26 July, 2004.
Q. Okay. And it was the Exhibit $B$ description
of it, Page 1 of the original Baseline Agreement,
June 1, 2004, it's the Exhibit $B$ that wasn't attached
on June 1 and that is now attached?
That's fair
Q. Thank you.
So what's shown herein is the Purchase
Property as that is a defined term in the Baseline
Agreement?
A. In Paragraph B.
Q. All right. Thank you
Let's turn to the next page, 1565, and it
does skip one, 1563 to 1565
What's C-1?
A. C-1 is the map of the, what's described as
Option Property prior to BLM reconfiguration, and then
it says. The actual option Property will be the
production residential property within the designated
area determined pursuant to the Option Agreement.
Q. Okay. So again, it shows the Purchase
property bottom left-hand corner, right?
A. By definition -- no. By the fact it's
excluded, it must be referring to prior documents,
which therefore would be .-

District Court IV
District Court IV


District Court IV

Page 66

## as of August 31, Amendment Number 2, the document in

## front of you, Exhibit 4?

A. Yeah. The effective date of the agreement is
when all of these exhibits were gonna be attached.
Q. I just want the court to know you did it,
it's not something Ms. Lundvall or I did during

## discovery?

A. Absolutely not.

THE COURT: He's testified to have that, you
said they were actually there before you signed the agreement?

THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. All right. Thank you.

THE COURT: I understand that, that would be
true of $\mathrm{C}-2$ and any --
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
It's true for all of them?
Any of the notations, your Honor.
Now, continue to the next page.
A. 1566 is, again, the actual Option Property has the exact same quote, okay?
Q. All right. And this is with the swap or the removal of the donut hole, the readjustment of BLM land to the east?

District Court IV

Page 70

## Bargain and Sale Deed.

A. G-1, yes, sir.
Q. What's going on with -- it's called Grant,

Bargain and Sale Deed, parentheses, Purchase Property, close parenthesis.
A. This is a document prepared for my general manager's signature giving to Pardee cextain land as described on Exhibit A, excluding water rights, and our right to put in and over the designated property the construction of fiber optic and telephone lines and those sorts of things, because we were retaining those, as it was our business plan to engage in that activity.
Q. Okay. Looking at the Exhibit A, what is the legal description? Can you tell me the legal description so we can look at the map and see what's being conveyed from Coyote Springs to Pardee by this Grant, Bargain and Sale Deed, G-1?
A. I would have to look at the Parcel 1 of the parcel map which was recorded, and if you're telling me that it's Number 25 -
Q. It is.
A. And those are the appropriate file designations, and then it would be all of that property.
Q. Thank you

District Court IV

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Now look at the next exhibit, Form Of Grant,
Bargain and Sale Deed, Option Pxoperty, Exhibit G-2,
Bates stamped 1573.
        What property is being conveyed there from
Coyote to Pardee?
    A. Okay. I don't want to be hypertechnical, but
I have to be. No property is being conveyed by either
of these documents. These are forms of exhibits
    Q. Right.
    A. That's --
        THE COURT: I understand nothing has been
signed, they're just deeds.
        THE WITNESS: They're just proposed deeds,
your Honor, and therefore, okay --
        THE COURT: I understand that
        THE WITNESS: Okay. And the attachment is
blank
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. All right. Now, as of September 1, August 31
of 2004, looking at maps that have been now discussed,
have been agreed to, and have been attached to the
agreement by Amendment Number 2, where was the Option
Property located?
    A. The parties had not finalized what it would
be. It would clearly be included within the fee
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District Court IV

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Page 7
portion of any property which Pardee had not yet
purchased and for which a single-family residential
designation had taken place after Year 5.
    Q. And not including the Purchase Property?
    A. And not including the prior Purchase
Property, because Purchased Property was designated
within a prior exhibit.
    Q. Thank you.
    Now, continuing on the set of exhibits,
please, would you look at the next exhibit, which I
think is, is it I? I'm sorry, my eyes are poor,
Exhibit I, Wolfram 1577?
    A. }1577\mathrm{ is Exhibit 11.
    Q. 11?
    A. Uh-huh
    Q. The actual commercial property will be
portion of the Designated Area which is not --
    A. Deemed --
    Q. -- deemed Option Property pursuant to the
Option Agreement?
    Q. So we're not talking Purchase Property, we're
not talking about Option Property for residential use,
we're talking a third category, right?
    A. Yes.
        THE COURT: Slow down, let him explain.
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Page 72
THE WITNESS: So what we had done is we had completed an overlay, a crosshatched portion, that said this can be the Option Property, and we had said that that identical land could be commercial property, because in effect what we were saying was coyote Springs was retaining the right to do what it wanted to do with respect to that property.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. And had we looked at the previous D-1 --
A. If we go here from Exhibit 11 and if you go to Exhibit D-1
Q. I think it was $\mathrm{D}-1$.

THE COURT: Let's find it, is it D-1 or D -THE WITNESS: I'm going to say it's
Exhibit D.
THE COURT: I have that.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Now, looking at, comparing D with 11 , tell us what we're looking at?
A. Right. So what we had done is to ensure that there could be no confusion between the parties, we had said clearly that the blank portion which is included on Exhibit 11, that area was designated single-family residential at this point in time, and what we had said was that all the remaining map was going to be, if you

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just hold them up here, because all they did when they
drew the maps was simply erase the crosshatch that,
those are identical, so both maps depict an area which
can be, quote, called the Option Property or commercial
property.
    THE COURT: So you were just keeping your
options.
    THE WITNESS: Our options.
    THE COURT: And if you decided CSI to
designate it as single-family dwellings, that's what
Pardee would have the first option on?
    THE WITNESS: Unless, your Honor, and I want
to make this very clear, that between Years 0 and 5, if
they had said, we want to take the whole property, they
would simply pay 40,000 times the --
    THE COURT: And they get everything.
    THE WITNESS: And Harvey is a lot heavier
than he is today.
    THE COURT: I got you, it would have been
Pardee's problem.
    THE WITNESS: So, and you guys would have
been -- okay, nevermind.
    THE COURT: I understand the contingency, but
it didn't happen.
    MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: I should add that to
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    District Court IV
    commercial property, i.e., the, it's the mirror image post BLM reconfiguration to maintain the same contingency and ability to designate all the property commercial.
Q. Got it.

THE COURT: You just moved it, got ya.
THE WITNESS: We moved it over and retained

## the flexibility.

THE COURT: Same rights, just changed if you
could move over BLM, same thing?
THE WITNESS: Yes, ma'am.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. The next document, Exhibit J, is Description

Of Commercial Improvements.
What does Exhibit J?
A. Exhibit $J$ is the obligations for the seller to produce certain improvements on the property with the money and additional resources that the seller has to improve the property adjacent to the property which it was selling to Pardee.
Q. Fair enough.

THE COURT: Was that why there was the increase from 66 to 83? THE WITNESS Yes, your Honor. That was part of the reason, was because .-
the amended complaint.

## right.

BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. And then I'll continue on the next page,

Mr. Whittemore.
A. Okay.
Q. Close that up, and we'll turn the next page.

THE COURT: Now we're at Exhibit 12?
THE WITNESS: I did not see a 1576 . Did I
miss something?
MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: NO.
THE COURT: No.
THE WITNESS: While I was putting this back
in.
THE COURT: You're right.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. It's the way you guys produced it.

THE COURT: It's okay, we skip them
sometimes. No inference there.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Okay, 1578, Exhibit 12.
A. Okay.
Q. What's Exhibit 12, Wolfram 1578?
A. 1578 is the corresponding map of the

Page 76
THE COURT: You were committing to do things. THE WITNESS: We were committing to do more,
Pardee was asking us to do more, and therefore, I was
going to say to Pardee, You're gonna have to step up to
the plate.
THE COURT: You were committing to do things.
THE WITNESS: We were committing to do more,
Pardee was asking us to do more, and therefore, I was
going to say to Pardee, You're gonna have to step up to
the plate.
THE COURT: And help.
THE wITNESS: To give us a little more money,
your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. And that's one of the reasons. There may
have been others, but that's one of the reasons why the
price went up to \$84 million?
A. Yes. And with that, the corresponding
increase in the, quote, actual per acre price
associated with the first sale. It didn't magically go
from 40,000 it's a construct, a resulting sum by
determining l, 950 into the 88 million.
Q. 84 million?
A. That's the number you get per acre.
Q. Thank you.
somewhere else at this point now, I'm talking now
September l, August 31 of 2004, designate where outside
of the 1,950 acre takedown of pardee that commercial

THE WITNESS: To give us a little more money,
your Honor
THE COURT: Okay.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. And that's one of the reasons. There may
have been others, but that's one of the reasons why the
price went up to $\$ 84$ million?
A. Yes. And with that, the corresponding
increase in the, quote, actual per acre price
associated with the first sale. It didn't magically go
from 40,000 it's a construct, a resulting sum by
determining 1,950 into the 88 million.
Q. 84 million?
A. That's the number you get per acre.
Q. Thank you.
And did you, within Exhibit $J$ or maybe
somewhere else at this point now, I'm talking now
September 1, August 31 of 2004, designate where outside
of the 1,950 acre takedown of pardee that commercial

District Court IV


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forcing Coyote Springs to, in effect, give them
additional land a little bit outside the 1,950, because
on a 50/50 basis, if you, if CSI was paying for it, you
got to adjust it up.
    Q. Got it, okay.
    A. And, and this is more important, if it made
better sense for the golf course because of the wash
considerations to develop a hole along the washes
within that particular area.
    THE COURT: The 1,950?
    THE WITNESS: Within the 1,950 acres, your
Honor, that the parties would compensate each other on
a one for one basis, that if I took land that was gonna
be associated with these golf courses, put it there,
that you will then subsequently see, your Honor, the
normalcy of a business transaction which the purchaser
says that you're gonna put a golf course on my
property, and we say yes, and in return --
    THE COURT: What are you giving me?.
    THE WITNESS: Exactly. You're gonna give us
a golf course premium.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. Got it.
    A. So of course they were gonna be adjustments
as contemplated by the parties with respect to the
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District Court IV

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            Page 79
1,950.
    Q. All right. Is there any language in the base
agreement or in Amendment Number 2 that gives the right
to put the golf course on the 1,950 acres being
purchased by Pardee within those two documents as of
September 1 of 2004?
    A. Well, I would have to see if it was in this
or later.
    Okay, for example, if you take a look at
1554, Item Number 17.
    Q. I have it in front of me, go right ahead?
    A. Uh-huh. It talks about the fact that buyer
is going to construct a recreation center.
    Q. And the buyer is Pardee?
    A. Buyer is Pardee.
    Q. Go ahead.
    A. And as a result of that, we're agreeing to
sell up to }15\mathrm{ acres of land within the, what is termed
here the entire site to buyer without cost for such
purpose.
    Q. Okay.
    A. So that's an example where you contemplated
the construction and use by Pardee of property outside
the Purchase Property, and there was a corresponding
understanding that if we went into, as a result of the
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District Court IV
planning process, if the government, of course, went in there, that we would negotiate what those terms would be, so in a subsequent document, I'm sure you're going to find - -
Q. Right.
A. - an agreement that talks about view
premiums or golf course premiums.
Q. We're talking about September 1, I want to
find out if the 15 acres is still gonna be within the Purchase Property --
A. No, sir.
Q. -- contemplated in paragraph?
A. No, sir. That's what I'm saying.
Q. Why is --
A. It said 15 acres within the entire site.
Q. So where was the retail -- excuse me, the,
the recreation center was going to be within the 15 acres?
A. No, sir.
could I show you?
Q. Please.

THE COURT: Please.
THE WITNESS: So if we went to ask what
ultimately happened, if you went to take a tour of the site, which I don't suggest you do, but you will see,

District Court IV

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you will see a great big lake that was dug for purposes
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of creating a recreation center, because Pardee's

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of creating a recreation center, because Pardee's
appetite at the time was with the understanding that
appetite at the time was with the understanding that
they thought they were going to build a, an amenity
they thought they were going to build a, an amenity
that involved the construction of a beautiful lake,
that involved the construction of a beautiful lake,
because that was where we were going to be able to
because that was where we were going to be able to
store water and do all those sorts of things.
store water and do all those sorts of things.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. And that would be outside the purchase
    Q. And that would be outside the purchase
Property, outside of Parcel I in this area if I were to
Property, outside of Parcel I in this area if I were to
point?
point?
    A. Probably a little bit lower.
    A. Probably a little bit lower.
    Q. No problem if you want to write a cixcle
    Q. No problem if you want to write a cixcle
yourself?
yourself?
    A. I will say about there.
    A. I will say about there.
        THE COURT: You're doing an approximation.
        THE COURT: You're doing an approximation.
        THE WITNESS: Yes.
        THE WITNESS: Yes.
        THE COURT: Your point is it's outside, for
        THE COURT: Your point is it's outside, for
the question. It doesn't --
the question. It doesn't --
    THE WITNESS: Wait, wait, let me finish.
    THE WITNESS: Wait, wait, let me finish.
    THE COURT: Please.
    THE COURT: Please.
    THE WITNESS: You were talking about the
    THE WITNESS: You were talking about the
initial, the initial property, the 1,950?
initial, the initial property, the 1,950?
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. Right.
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    Q. Right.
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that involved the construction of a beautiful lake,

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that involved the construction of a beautiful lake,

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District Court IV
Page 81
A. The reason why it was specifically saying
this, notwithstanding Paragraph 17 of the agreement,
Seller hereby agrees to transfer legal title to up to
15 acres of land within the entire site to buyer
without cost for such purpose. Such land shall be at a
location which is mutually agreeable and, what was,
ultimately it was to the west of the 1,950 acres
    Q. To the west would be on the street?
    A. Excuse me, east of the 1,950 acres.
    Q. Okay.
    A. Okay. And then ultimately moved in its
entirety of being the lake and the recreation building
which was starting to be constructed and move it onto
property which was down more. The recreation
facilities were ultimately going to be built in town
center somewhere in here
    Q. Okay. Also outside of parcel 1?
    A. Without getting a snapshot physically, I'm
giving you the concept.
    THE COURT: Your best estimate?
    THE WITNESS: Yes. I'm giving you the
concept that the parties had contemplated the transfer
and the swapping of land on a post agreement basis
simply because that was smart planning.
/ / / /
District Court IV

Page 84
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project in Clark County, that when you do a new town

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development, that you have to have the greatest degree
of flexibility to allow the parties to ultimately get
the best plan.
    And ultimately what Pardee wanted was a great
golf course community to start with. What CSI wanted
was a great community that ultimately would allow us to
sell property to other people if pardee did not want
it, or to development it ourselves.
            THE COURT: Okay.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. Between June 1 of 2004 and September 1 of
2004, did you have any meetings with Jim Wolfram or
Walt Wilkes?
    A. I did not
    Q. Do you know whether or not Pardee had any
meeting with Mr, Wolfram or Walt Wilkes?
    A. I don't.
    Q. With regard to Amendment Number 2, the
negotiations that took place between June 1 of 2004 and
roughly September of 2004, did Mr. Wolfram or Mr.
Wilkes attend any such meetings, that you were aware
of, between yourself and pardee?
    A. No, they did not.
    Q. Were they on any telephone calls, as far as
District Court IV
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BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:

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BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. Got it.
    Q. Got it.
    A. Let me make sure, the parties, when you're
    A. Let me make sure, the parties, when you're
talking about -- the parties had contemplated.
talking about -- the parties had contemplated.
            THE COURT: Parties, I know, party/Pardee.
            THE COURT: Parties, I know, party/Pardee.
It's hard. Our court reporter said yesterday, oh, my
It's hard. Our court reporter said yesterday, oh, my
gosh, I don't know if they're saying "parties" or
gosh, I don't know if they're saying "parties" or
"Pardee." I said, Jennifer, do the best you can, but
"Pardee." I said, Jennifer, do the best you can, but
my understanding of the parties, which are pardee and
my understanding of the parties, which are pardee and
CSI, contemplated a swapping of land after these
CSI, contemplated a swapping of land after these
agreements, which includes the Option Agreement and the
agreements, which includes the Option Agreement and the
Amendment I and 2.
Amendment I and 2.
    THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor.
    THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor.
    THE COURT: Fill it in for me.
    THE COURT: Fill it in for me.
    THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor.
    THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. How many years later did they do that?
    Q. How many years later did they do that?
        THE COURT: Could you just fill in, I want to
        THE COURT: Could you just fill in, I want to
make sure I understand your complete answer. I
make sure I understand your complete answer. I
apologize, not trying to be slow.
apologize, not trying to be slow.
    THE WITNESS: At the inception of the
    THE WITNESS: At the inception of the
earliest discussion, John Lash and I made a personal
earliest discussion, John Lash and I made a personal
commitment to each other that with a project that could
commitment to each other that with a project that could
go over 40 years, that there would be absolutely no way
go over 40 years, that there would be absolutely no way
that you could identify, as you might in an infield
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that you could identify, as you might in an infield

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Page 83

Page 86
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you recall, between Pardee and Coyote Springs?
A. Not that I was aware of
Q. Did you have any conversations where you
disclosed the terms of Exhibit Number 2 with
Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes with respect to the 2004
time period?
A. No.
Q. Now, is there a reason why -- I'll just ask
this question: Is there a reason why exhibits K, L, P,
and Q are not attached as documents, because both sides
say this is the document?
A. Yes. They were excluded by agreement between
John and I at the time as not being necessary for
purposes of executing this document. Let me explain
why.
Q. Is there a document that says that, or is
this sort of an oral agreement between you and
Mr. Lash?
A. That was an oral agreement, because we were
still working on, working on how to use all the
information.
THE COURT: I apologize, my clerk just went
out, so she obviously needed a break, and I'm still
interested in the testimony, but we probably do need a
break.

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to the subpoena we got?
MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, once again, I'm
going to object as far as the commentary.
MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: I'm asking the
question: Did you provide it to them in 2004, as
opposed to what the company provided to us in response
to subpoena that's a legitimate question, your Honor.
THE COURT: I think the question was: In
addition to complying with the subpoena, and did you
give it earlier.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Earlier.
A. Not that I'm aware of.
Q. Thank you.
Now, because it's in two books, I actually
planned it that way, but if you compare 4, the second
amendment, and now pull up Exhibit 2 -- maybe you can
take that out.
A. You want me to take Exhibit 4 out?
Q. Well, either one. If you go to 2 --
THE COURT: 2 is the --
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Why don't you take it out.
A. Thank you.
THE COURT: Exhibit 2.

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District Court IV
Page 88
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BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Take that out?
A. Okay.
Q. Put them side by side.
MS. LUNDVALL: Are you asking him to place
two next --
THE WITNESS: Put 4 next to 2.
THE COURT: Yes. I think he wants them
available, easiex for him to cross reference then.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. All right.
A. Okay.
Q. Thank you.
And all I'm saying is that by September 1,
you have the exhibits that you had hoped to have when
you signed the Baseline Agreement on June 1, right?
A. We had most of the --
Q. Right.
THE COURT: Most of the exhibits, okay.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON
Q. Let's look at Exhibit 2.
THE COURT: I'm sorry.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Look at the language of Exhibit 2.
THE COURT: Okay.

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District Court IV
Page 89
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BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:

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BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Go to the Baseline Agreement?
Q. Go to the Baseline Agreement?
A. Can we refer to plaintiff's exhibits as, you
A. Can we refer to plaintiff's exhibits as, you
know, and defendant's exhibits?
know, and defendant's exhibits?
Q. I'll be happy to do it, so you know
Q. I'll be happy to do it, so you know
plaintiffs are numbers?
plaintiffs are numbers?
A. I know that.
A. I know that.
Q. You know from your practice days.
Q. You know from your practice days.
THE COURT: Plaintiff's Exhibit 2.
THE COURT: Plaintiff's Exhibit 2.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Follow along the language of Paragraph 2 of
Q. Follow along the language of Paragraph 2 of
2 Plaintiff's 2, the original Option Agreement,
2 Plaintiff's 2, the original Option Agreement,
June 1, 2004, and let's speak to the amendments that
June 1, 2004, and let's speak to the amendments that
are maps, Exhibits A through G and 11 and 12, like
are maps, Exhibits A through G and 11 and 12, like
we've just gone through.
we've just gone through.
So we know from Paragraph B what the Purchase
So we know from Paragraph B what the Purchase
Property is, I'm not replowing that ground. The next
Property is, I'm not replowing that ground. The next
page, we know what the Option Property is, you've
page, we know what the Option Property is, you've
already defined that for us.
already defined that for us.
Now, Paragraph 1, Page 2 of Exhibit 2,
Now, Paragraph 1, Page 2 of Exhibit 2,
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, Bates Stamp Number 2, Page 2,
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, Bates Stamp Number 2, Page 2,
talks about the purchase and sale of purchase property.
talks about the purchase and sale of purchase property.
Do you see that?
Do you see that?
A. On Page 2?
A. On Page 2?
Q. Yes.

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    Q. Yes.
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        On Page 2?
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        On Page 2?
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District Court IV

Page 92

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Paragraph 1 (c), Page 4 of Exhibit Plaintiff's 2, Bates
stamped 4: Notwithstanding any provision in the
contrary in this Paragraph 1, Seller and buyer
acknowledge and agree that the first portion of the
Purchase Property that will be developed by buyer is
that area containing approximately 1,500 acres of
production residential property as shown on Exhibit D.
        Do you see that?
    A. Yes, sir.
    Q. Let's go to Exhibit D now, Amendment 2.
        And again, to help everything, what I'm
seeing is Bates Stamp Number 1568 of Plaintiff's 4.
    Do you see that?
    A. Well, Exhibit D of Plaintiff's Number 2 is .-
        THE COURT: I think he wants you to go to
Exhibit D.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. Is there an Exhibit D to Plaintiff's 2?
    A. I want to explain.
    THE COURT: Perfect.
    THE WITNESS: I want to explain. The
parties' contemplated a map of the Initial Developed
Parcel and a phasing plan.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. Right. Let's go through that.
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    Q. All right. Now, when you look at paragraph,
    Page 2, Paragraph 1, Page 2, let's just follow that
along. It says --
THE COURT: I'm sorry, counsel, where are
you?
MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: I'm gonna ask you to
focus. I just want to go through the structure of the
development so we're familiar with this.
THE COURT: Okay.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Page 2, Paragraph 1, talks about the purchase
and sale of Purchase Property and which --
THE COURT: 1,950 acres
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. In June, 66 million. In September, it went
to 1,950 acres.
Go back, back to Page 4, Paragraph 1 (c).
You've already indicated if it's not
specifically amended in the second amendment, it still
stands, correct?
A. Unless there's a provision that says
Notwithstanding the provision of that, yeah.
Q. Right. I'm with you.
Okay. Here's one of those provisions in
25
District Court IV
District Court IV

Page 94

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    Q. You had agreed to develop the term Initial
Developed Parcel as roughly 1,500 acres?
    A. And it was modified as a result of --
    Q. Okay.
        THE COURT: 2
        THE WITNESS: -- Exhibit D.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. I just need you to say yes or no.
    A. Yes.
    Q. Initially, in June 1, it was estimated to be
1,500 acres, and that was defined as the Initial
Developed Parcel?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Now, two months later, September 1, or three
months later, three months later it's now been agreed
to be modified, changed to 1,950 acres, right, and it's
shown in the crosshatch area of Exhibit D, Wolfram
1568?
    A. Yes, the 1,950, with the understanding that
Phase 1, which is what we were really referring to, is
the 250 acres in the lower corner.
    Q. Got it. Got it
    THE COURT: So Phase 1 of the 1,950 was 250?
That was include in the 1,950?
    THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor. And most
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Page 95
importantly, that was the area which finally had been fixed by both parties.

THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: Somewhat in stone
THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: Subject to my earlier testimony
that if there were changes into that 250 , that they'd
be -- you'd swap out the acreage if it was for planning
purposes or you needed something for a wash. THE COURT: Okay. That was kind of in stone? THE WITNESS: Kind of in stone. THE COURT: Okay.

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BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
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Q. Now, within the crosshatch of 1,950 acres,

Exhibit $D$, where is the 250 approximately?
A. Where is it?
Q. On your crosshatch?
A. Yeah.
Q. Where is the 250 within the 1,950 ?
A. It's the lower southwest corner.
Q. Okay. I think that is the southeast corner. You think it's the .-
A. Southwest corner, right at the bottom of -Q. Uh-huh. THE COURT: Can you -.

Page 96
THE WITNESS: Can I show you?
MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: Right in here.
THE COURT: I want to get it right.
THE WITNESS: Since this is a judge trial, if
we could put this little line as being Highway 168. THE COURT: Okay. THE WITNESS: If you put that there, and if you put this line as Highway 93, we can define the 250 acres as the 250 acres on the corner at the intersection of Highway 93, north/south, and Highway 168.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Why don't you take a pen, use my pen and just put a designation, put this 93. And this is the highway right here, Harvey?
A. Uh-huh, Highway 168

MS. LUNDVALL: Do you want to identify, for
purposes of the record, which exhibit you're drawing on?

THE WITNESS: Yes, it's Page 1568.
MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you.
THE WITNESS: It's Bates stamped 1568.
Do I need to say anything else?
THE COURT: Exhibit 4? It's 4, right?
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON


District Court IV

Page 99
And it's $\$ 120$ million
MS. Lundvalis: hold on, please let the witness testify.

THE COURT: I would appreciate that too
Start again, so 3,605 was security for th performance?

THE WITNESS: For the performance. If you had multiplied 3,605 by either the 40,000 net number or the 44,000 number, which is ultimately achieved down the rode in furtherance -- you would come up with a number of 120 million plus.

THE COURT: Right.
THE WITNESS: Not 66 million, not 84 million, not anything else. It was security for the performance of my obligations, because they wanted record title to a parcel, because Pardee did not -- nobody had maps. BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:

## okay.

That's -- sorry.
That's no problem. That's fine.
And by Amendment Number 2, you did have --
A. By Amendment Number 2, we had $a$, we had an idea of -- if you take a look at what is on Bates 1568, by virtue of what $I$ see on that Exhibit $D$, it appears to me that the crosshatch of 1,950 acres would have to

Page 100

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have been done by map.
    Q. Thank you.
    A. And that there would be exhibits reflecting
that.
    Q. Thank you.
    THE COURT: And that would just be a portion
of the 3605.22?
    THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor.
    THE COURT: Not where the remaining portion
of the 3605.22 is located?
    THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor.
    THE COURT: Is that your testimony?
    THE WITNESS: That is.
    THE COURT: I just want to make sure.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. Now, in reading the two agreements together?
    A. Yes, sir.
    Q. Okay. Exhibit 2, plaintiff's 2, the June 1,
2004, what you call the Baseline Agreement?
    A. Yes.
    Q. All right. And the Amendment Number 2, the
September 1, 2004, Amendment Number 2, reading them
together .-
    A. Yes, sir.
    Okay. For definitional purposes, Purchase
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Property remains, as of September 1, 3,600 acres,
correct? I want to go down one by one.
    A. Now --
    Q. Yes or no, Mr. Whittemore
        THE COURT: Can you answer that yes or no?
        THE WITNESS: The answer is no as of this
date because, because the 1,750 --
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. You mean 1,950?
    A. The 1,950, minus the 250, the 1,950 now
represents the total parcel that the parties are
contemplating as being security for the entire purchase
price.
        THE COURT: For the 84 million?
        THE WITNESS: For the }84\mathrm{ million.
        THE COURT: So basically the 84 million was
for 1,950 acres?
        THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. Is there a definitional, is there a change in
definitions from, in the second amendment, from that
which is in the first amendment? That language that
says Purchase Property, defined as Exhibit 25 of 3,600
acres, is now something different? There isn't, is
there --
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istrict Court IV

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    A. It's, is there a sentence that says that, is
there an exhibit that, is there a sentence that says
it? No. Is there an exhibit that says it? Yes.
    Q. Okay. Thank you.
        Now, the 1,950 acres, let's look at Amendment
Number 2, if we could.
    A. Yes, sir.
    Q. All right. Specifically referenced -- let me
find it.
    I will ask you this question: Do you know
where the 1,950 acre reference is?
    A. In --
    THE COURT: Amendment 2?
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. It will be in Exhibit 4.
    THE COURT: The first one has ..
    MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: I had it, and I just
lost it here
    THE COURT: Okay.
    MS. LUNDVALL: 1,950 is a designation for not
Purchase Property, but for the initial development.
    MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: Correct.
    THE COURT: Paragraph Number 5, it is found
on Page 3 of Exhibit Number 4.
1/1/
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Page 103
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Right, exactly, and that's my point. The only thing that changed between plaintiff's 2 and Plaintiff's 4, the Initial Developed Parcel, that changed from 1,500 acres to 1,950 acres.

Do you see that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. The Purchase property definition never changed between the amendments, would you agree? MS. LUNVALL: Your Honor, once again, this is not a question.

THE COURT: I think what he is doing is to
clarify his testimony, so Mr. Whittemore, if his understanding is incorrect, you let him know.

THE WITNESS: I'll let him know. I am not shy. I try to be honest.

THE COURT: Do it again.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Purchase Property remains the same as defined in both agreements, both agreements being defined as Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 4 ?
A. Purchase Property in -- because now that you brought me this page, I need you to understand why I'm creating the distinction between a recital,
paragraph B --

Page 104

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Q. Right.
    A. Bates Number 1, your Honor.
        THE COURT: Okay, I'm there.
        THE WITNESS: That reference is to a map.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q.....Right.
    A. Okay. Now, if you go to Page 4, Bates 4 in
the actual agreement, the purchase price of the
Purchase Property on Paragraph B, your Honor, right in
the middle of the page.
            THE COURT: Paragraph B or C?
            THE WITNESS: B, B on Page 2 -- 3, I will get
to 4, so the purchase price of the property is
$66 million.
            Now, if you go through and read all of
paragraph C and go to Paragraph D, you'll now
understand why, and Paragraph C is very important,
because it creates the process by which the 1,500 acre
initial development, Initial Developed Parcel, is taken
out, and that there's a reversionary right out of that
3,600 acres that is contemplated by Paragraph C, and
that was all the reconveyance mechanisms that I was
talking about earlier, and then up go to Paragraph D,
and Paragraph D says, Buyer shall be entitled to legal
title to the portion of the Initial Developed Parcel
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consisting of approximately 250 net useable acres, even
though buyer shall receive record title to
approximately 3,600 acres.
            That's why, your Honor, that's why the 3,600
is simply a place holder security interest reference in
a way that doesn't create lot of deeds of trust or we
have to do anything else, because I was sticking my
hand out to Pardee and saying, I trust this company so
much, I'm going to give you title to 3,600 acres when
pursuant to this agreement, you're only buying 250
acres for $10 million.
    But back to your question of has that
changed. The answer is by definition it's changed,
because now they're committing to buy 1,950 acres for
$84 million.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON
    Q. Right, okay.
    Now, I'm gonna ask the same question now, and
I would like you to answer. I've heard your
explanation.
            would you work with me?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Did the term "Purchase Property" change as
defined in Exhibit 2 in Exhibit 4?
    A. Now we're switching to Purchase property?
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            District Court IV
    

District Court IV


District Court IV
page 108

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    Q. No problem.
        And that included a reversionary interest
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beyond the 1,950 acres of September 1 of 2004?
A. And within the 1,950 , if they didn't perform.
Q. Got it. Thank you.
THE COURT: So once again, so I'm clear,
Pardee committed to buy 1,950 acres within that
designated Parcel 1 for $\$ 84$ million?
THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor
THE COURT: Thank you.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Okay. Now, would you turn, please, to
Paragraph 2 of Exhibit 2, Bates Stamp Number 4, Page 5?
This is called Grant of Option.
A. That's correct.
Q. There's two types of options, and you've
already worked with me on it?
A. Yes.
Q. One is I get to buy it all, you go home a
rich man 1.2 or 1.4 billion richer, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Fine. Then there is a second type of option
that talks about a another feature or right given to
pardee.
What is that second type of option?

That's called the Option Property price which relates to the land which CSI designated as single-family residential.
Q. Right. And for purposes of definitions, on June 1, it was outside of 3,600 acres. On September 1 it is outside of 1,950 acres, fair?
A. No.
Q. Okay. On a map, show me the option Property THE COURT: Can you explain your answer so I
know, because we need to know?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: We need to understand.
THE WITNESS: The Option Property, by
definition, because we had retained the right, we had only really sold them 250 acres to start at this point and 1,950 acres at some other point, that property within that area or outside that area could either be if it was outside that area it could have been designated commercial then residential or residential, and then commercial within the area that we retained, our right to reacquire, could have been a golf course, could have been a water facility.

Excuse me, your Honor, may I point some other things out?

THE COURT: Yes.
District Court IV

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    THE WITNESS: So, for example, within, within
the area of the development, because of the constraints
of where the wells were gonna be and where the water
campus needed to be, within what Mr. Jimmerson is
calling the purchase Property, it's clear that the
parties contemplated that there would be other uses
within that, like those that I just gave.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. Okay.
    A. So when you say CSI did not retain any
interest or somehow the Option Property was just
limited to the Purchase Property, I think we're
conflating the agreements of the property.
    Q. First of all, I'm not saying anything like
that.
    THE COURT: Can I ask a follow-up question?
    If you go to what's defined as Parcel 1, the
Purchase Property within the Option Agreement, and CSI
uses it for other uses, then that protects -- you would
have to make that up if they brought that property some
other place, right, so they're even .-
    THE WITNESS: Yes. At any time, at any time
that, that CSI reacquired and used for another purpose
property which had previously been designated as --
THE COURT: For pardee?
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District Court IV


District Court IV

Page 112

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A. Three acres, five acres, and roads and major
arterials and areas that couldn't be built upon because
they had utility trumps, all of those things had to be
taken into account post designation of this simple
snapshot of bare dessert along Highways 93 and 168.
    Q. I'm with you.
    A. So that's the only thing I want to correct,
because I think you got it. The bottom line is the
parties agreed to sell land, the parties' then further
intent said, Here's the next phase, how we get down to
1,950, because we're giving you a little bit more
money, now we want you to do more, so the number goes
up a little bit, and that's how you get to the
84 million.
    Q. Okay, good
        THE COURT: Okay. I assume if you're gonna
swap out land, it's gonna be something that Pardee will
agree to, and it will be of mutual benefit?
        THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. All right. September 1 then we have two
agreements that have been inked, right?
    A. Oh, September l, the commission letter?
    Q. We have two documents that have been inked?
    A. Yes. Well, two documents, yes
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District Court IV

Page 113
Q. And you also -- that is the first amendment?
A. That's what I was going to say.
Q. So three documents have been inked, no
problem. The second one doesn't have --
A. Right.
Q. The next one, being the key here .-
A. Uh-huh.
Q. -- as we've already established this morning, under the terms of the two agreements read together option property is outside of the 1,950 acres, correct, subject to your swap option that might happen in the future? For definitional purposes, knowing where you were exactly at a moment in time, September 1, 2004, you had Purchase Property defined, and you had option Property defined as shown by the maps?

MS. Lundvall: And once again, I'm going to object to this as leading. I think the question is more appropriate to the witness: What was Option Property?

THE COURT: I think we kind of went through
this, I'm gonna overrule it. We have gone through it with the maps, so I think we're pretty clear, you know, what you meant by Purchase Property and option
Property, he's trying to make sure we clarify, am I right, following you, Mr. Jimmerson?

District Court IV
Q. And they've enlarged the Initial Developed parcel from 1,950 acres up from -.
A. That's correct, and none of that is outside of anything or inside anything, that's just what the parties agreed.
Q. But we do know geographically it was in what
was initially described as Purchase Property,

## Exhibit 2, as you have described it?

A. The answer is yes.
Q. As the documents described it?
A. As it's been described.
Q. And through the september ist second
amendment, that definition remained the same?
A. There's no change in the words.
Q. All right. Now, about that same time period,
real estate commission agreement was negotiated between
Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes and Pardee.
Did you have any involvement in that?
A. No, sir.
Q. All right. Months pass, and there is yet now a third agreement.

Can I just ask you when is, when does close
of escrow for the 250 acres occur?
A. I would have to take a look at when the, the
wire transfer came in. I don't recall the specific


District Court IV

| date. <br> Q. Do you remember it was in 2004 versus 2005? <br> A. I would have to look at the agreement. <br> Q. All right. In any event, you got paid \$10 million? <br> A. Yes, sir. <br> Q. 40,000 an acre, was that the first drawdown? <br> A. There is a, that's the first drawdown, I believe that's correct. <br> Q. Now, look now at Exhibit 5. Seven months pass and -- <br> A. Okay. <br> MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, I now need to make an objection as to seven months passing from the close of escrow. <br> MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: I didn't say, "Erom close of escrow." <br> MS. LUNDVALL: That's what the question was and what the implication was, and that's a false statement based on the context of these documents; therefore, I'm objecting. <br> BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: <br> Q. Five months passed between September 1 and March 28th -- excuse me, did five months pass from September 1 of 2004 to March 28th of 2005? Six months? |
| :---: |
|  |  |

District Court IV

Page 11

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BX MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. Now, did you have any meetings with
Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes from the beginning of 2004
to March 2005?
    A. Not that I recall.
    Q. Specifically, did you have any conversations
regarding this Amended And Restated Option Agreement of
March 28, 2005?
    A. No, I did not
    Q. Were they part of any negotiation with regard
to the changes on behalf of Coyote and Pardee to be
made?
    A. No.
    Q. And did you cause this document to be sent to
Wolfram and Wilkes after it was signed in late March of
2005?
    A. No, I did not.
    Q. I read the document, and I agree with you,
there are significant changes from June 1 and
September l of 2004?
    A. Right. We restated and redid the agreement.
    Q. All right. Now, would you tell the Court
what changes, as it relates to drawdowns, occur now on
March 28th, 2005?
    A. Okay. There's a purchase and sale of
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District court IV

Page 119

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property which provides for payments to be made by
Pardee to reach the acquisition target price of
84 million.
    THE COURT: And that 1,950 acres minus the
250 that had already been .-
    THE WITNESS: Yes.
    THE COURT: Had it been taken down by this
point?
    THE WITNESS: It had, so your Honor is
absolutely correct, we've got money that is remaining
to be paid under the original .-
    THE COURT: Agreement?
    THE WITNESS: -- agreement that's been
restated, and they're going to now, over time, buy a
total of 1,950, and we said, Okay, your option to
acquire the entire site is restated, and we put a
schedule of payments that have to be made, the
obligations of the parties with respect to how they're
gonna work together with respect to water development,
how we're gonna work together on planning and
developing the property. It is now a very .-
    THE COURT: Real thing?
    THE WITNESS: It's getting very, very real.
BY MR. J. J. JMMMERSON:
    Q. I want to show you one other definition in
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District Court IV

Page 120
the original agreement, Exhibit 2, that will go into 2, into 5.

Exhibit 2, the original Baseline Agreement, I just want to show you the term, what's called Purchase Property Remainder. I want you to explain that. I didn't ask that question. I omitted to do that It's at Page 4 of Exhibit 2.
A. Bates 4.
Q. Right, exactly, Paragraph $I$ (c).
A. Yes.
Q. So we have an understanding now, there's

Purchase Property defined as 3,600 acres, there's Initial Developed Parcel of 1,500 acres, and then there's this concept of the remainder. Define what that means, and we'll see it in the later document.
A. Yes. All of the -- when you specifically pick out one parcel of a larger parcel, the parcel that's picked out is the parcel, and the remainder parcel now becomes a parcel, because in the process of creating one, you end up with two.

THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: So this reversionary parcel is, by definition, retained by the original owner, which is, which is --

THE COURT: So if you take one off another
Page 121
one, you get what's left. They don't take --
one, you get what's left. They don't take --
THE WITNESS: That's correct, and it creates
THE WITNESS: That's correct, and it creates
a parcel.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. And the more they acquire, the less the
reversionary parcel would be?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, we see that again here on March 28th of
2005 repeated again. So just a couple of things I want
to establish.
Would you agree with me that the definition
of Purchase Property in Exhibit 2, the original
Baseline Agreement of June 1, 2004, never changed even
with the amended restated document, Exhibit 5, March
28,2005 , in terms of the definition?
A. Okay. Now, this is gonna get hypertechnical,
but you have to be.
This document --
THE COURT: "This," meaning Exhibit -
THE WITNESS: Excuse me, your Honor, thank
you very much. Exhibit 5.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Yep.
A. It's an amended and restated agreement, and
therefore, nothing which is contained in the earlier

District Court IV

Page 123


District Court IV

Page 122

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agreements, please, your Honor, to Bates 125, Page 45
of the agreement --
    THE COURT: Okay, I'll find it. I got it.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. To use your words, would it be a superceding
document?
    A. Yes.
    Q. That's the concept you're trying to
communicate here, right?
    A. Yes. Whatever terms anybody wants to use.
        THE COURT: I understand superceding,
Mr. Jimmerson.
        It means, what you're saying is, say this is
the new complete agreement. Any agreements prior to
that have no force and effect?
        THE WITNESS: That is correct
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. And to evidence the point, there is, in fact,
a new definition of Purchase Property, isn't there,
within Exhibit 5, Page 2, Bates stamp Number 82?
        THE COURT: Can we -- I apologize,
Mr. Jimmerson, I'm trying to follow the witness. I
apologize if I stopped you.
        MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: That's okay.
        THE COURT: But we're on Page }125\mathrm{ Bates
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            District Court IV
    Page 125
A. And you will see from my perspective that the

Exhibit C-1 --
THE COURT: Of this document, okay.
THE WITNESS: Exhibit C-1, it's 749, your
Honor.
THE COURT: Let me get there. Thank you. THE WITNESS: Uh-huh.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. I don't know where you're getting 749. Can you help me?
A. Yes. It says Bates Stamp 749.

THE COURT: They're real small.
THE WITNESS: It's in Exhibit C-1.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. I've got pardee 52, 53.

THE COURT: It's right here.
THE WITNESS: It's a purple one on the side.
Can I go to the map, your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes. Hold on
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. I need you to look at the document you have
in your book there.
A. It's there. It's 749.

I got it.
Jim, it looks like this
District Court IV

Page 126
THE COURT: We're on the same page THE WITNESS: May I approach the map? THE COURT: Absolutely, you can explain how

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we got there.
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    THE WITNESS: So this portion of the land,
    which extends probably over to the edge of this board,
that is the parcel which has now been acquired in fee
as a result of the BLM reconfiguration moving over.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. So one thing we have to establish is
reconfiguration occurs between September 1 and
March 28?
A. Well, the designation of the land which is
going to be actually done occurs, whether it's
finalized or not, the parties are -
THE COURT: But at least you know what it's
gonna be.
THE WITNESS: Yes. We know what it's gonna
be your Honor, and therefore, if you turn on that page
and if you turn the exhibit to head north/south .-
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Can we agree the highway is on the left?
A. Highway 93 is on the left.
THE COURT: It says, Highway 93.
THE WITNESS: And it cuts it off,

Page 127


Page 128
THE COURT: Okay. The initial property is the first 250 acres they'd already paid for at this point.

THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: Taken it down.
THE WITNESS: They have taken it down.
THE COURT: I don't want to use the wrong
term.
THE WITNESS: They had taken it down. We had

## received the money, they had received the title. It

 was not subject to any reversionary right.THE COURT: It was theirs? THE WITNESS: That was theirs. THE COURT: That's what -THE WITNESS: That's what I was pointing out,
if you turn sideways, that little thing right there that says, Initial property.

THE COURT: Okay.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. And it might go down a little further?
A. For sure it goes down a little further,
because the designation of the Exhibit -. the map cuts off the southernmost parts of my property. THE COURT: It doesn't go to the other
highway?


District Court IV

|  | Page 13 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 1 | THE COURT: But you haven't even done all |
| 2 | that yet. |
| 3 | THE WITNESS: No, your Honor. |
| 4 | THE COURT: So we don't know what they may |
| 5 | have an option on. |
| 6 | THE WITNESS: We're doing it. |
| 7 | THE COURT: I don't mean you're doing it |
| 8 | unilaterally, I understand that. |
| 9 | THE WITNESS: And collectively, the parties |
| 10 | are designating this because pardee wants to buy, and |
| 11 | CSI wants to sell. |
| 12 | THE COURT: Okay. So they have an option, |
| 13 | Pardee does, to buy all or any part thereof of what CSI |
| 14 | will designate as single property. |
| 15 | THE WITNESS: Single-family residential. |
| 16 | THE COURT: Single-family residential. |
| 17 | THE WITNESS: SFR, Single-Family residential |
| 18 | production. You'll see in the record, your Honor, |
| 19 | traditional residential neighborhoods, you'll see it as |
| 20 | production residential property. There are lots of |
| 21 | different designations within this industry that mean |
| 22 | the same thing. |
| 23 | / / / / |
| 24 | BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: |
| 25 | Q. But designations are important. |

District Court IV


District Court IV

Page 132

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BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. Exhibit 5, Page 2, we've established now and
with this superceding amended and restated document we
have a new definition of Purchase property. It's no
longex 3,600 acres, it's 511 acres.
        Do you see that?
    A. The 500?
    Q. I'm just reading the words.
    A. I'm gonna wait for the Judge to get there.
        THE COURT: Because I put my question here:
How did it become 511.82 acres?
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. They made it that way.
    A. We have made that definition apply to the
511, because we can identify the 511 on the entire site
through the map.
    Q. Okay.
    A. And it doesn't change, it does not change the
underlying obligation to buy the 1,950 that we
subsequently designate, your Honor, to reach the total
purchase price of }84\mathrm{ million, so we're gonna go through
that process.
            THE COURT: As you keep going forward, you
are able to solidify in stone what was included in the
1,950?
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THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: That's all, so the 84 million.

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BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
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Q. The designations, therefore, are subject to change as the months and years go by as this project unfolds?
A. Right.

THE COURT: Designation for --
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Residential?
A. Yes. If CSI took property and said, We're going to sell it as multi-family, it wouldn't be available for sale as single-family.
Q. Exactly.
A. Or you'll pay a multi-family price, down
zone, continue and make it into single-family, but that would all be the work of the individual purchase.

## Q. Okay.

A. Nor could -- excuse me, let me finish, nor could we, nor would the property include the sites that we have designated as golf course, recreation, water facilities, recreational facilities, major interior or arterial roads, paths, recreational areas throughout. THE COURT: Right. So I want to make sure
I'm clear, so it was March 28th, 2005, when this
District Court IV

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Amended And Restated Option Agreement For The Purchase
Of Real Property And Joint Escrow Instructions, you
have solidified to Pardee 511.82 acres where that's
gonna be located at CSI. You still owe them the
difference between I,950 and 511 to designate specific
sites by map.
    THE WITNESS: You're correct, your Honor.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. Subject to them paying the balance?
    THE COURT: I know if they don't pay, I'm
trying to get acreage.
            MS. LUNDVALL: Is it possible for us to take
a lunch break?
    THE COURT: Let me write this down.
    MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: Could I have two
minutes? I just want to complete this line of
questioning.
    THE COURT: Okay.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. Now, Purchase Property is now tied to a map.
Let's look at Exhibit B.
        THE COURT: Let me ask this: How much longer
are you going to be?
        I need to talk to the witness.
        Can you come back?
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        District Court IV
    Page 135
THE WITNESS: I can stay.
THE COURT: I know you mentioned something. MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: At the break I

## referenced something that we weren't gonna get done by

 lunch.THE COURT: We're almost done with this line
of questioning.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Just with regard to $B$, the purchase, it's defined as 511 acres, 500 acres as shown in Exhibit B-1 and made a part hereof of the purchase Property, that's the new defined term of the Purchase property.

Let's turn to 745, which is, -- I am not --

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not \(\mathrm{B}-1\). \(\mathrm{B}-1\) ?
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not \(\mathrm{B}-1\). \(\mathrm{B}-1\) ?
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A. 52 .
Q. 51 and 52, but the map shows it as 52 and show us what that is?
A. Okay. Because the parties knew, because the parties knew that they were going to have the 250 in the corner, they, and the, the fee area was going to move over to this side.

THE COURT: Move over, because you traded with BLM?

THE WITNESS: Right. What they did was say,
We're gonna take all along the state highway these
District Court IV

Page 136
parcels. Rather than go up here, we're gonna come along here, so that map reflects going along from west to east if you turn to the map. Again, you have to turn the map.

THE COURT: That's 52, right? THE WITNESS: Yes. If you turn to 52, your

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Honor, and you go sideways.
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BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Which one would be north? THE COURT: I think it says, The Mount Diablo Meridian. BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. So the words, "The Mount Diablo," that would

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be at the top?
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A. This is supposed to be designating north, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: And this corner, this corner,
if you take a look, your Honor, at this point right
here.
By MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. I want to see it too.
A. If you take a look at this point here, if you put a red dot right there, or blue dot, for the record, I'll show the other counsel.

District Court IV

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    THE COURT: Yes,
    THE WITNESS: I'm circling that.
    THE COURT: It's a blue dot.
    THE WITNESS: It's a blue circle.
    My understanding is that if you blew it up,
that corner would look exactly like that right here, so
what they've done is flipped things on the side, and
that corner is the corner of Highway 93 and State Route
168.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. Don't run away.
    THE COURT: So that's what's gonna be an
addition to the original 250, that's the difference to
get up to your 511.82 at that point?
    THE WITNESS: I'm not gonna hold myself to
that, because I haven't done the calculation, but the
general intent of that was in that direction, your
Honor.
    THE COURT: So the general intent was to go
from the 250, so it was a contiguous 511.82.
    THE WITNESS: And if you needed to go above,
you would, but right now we have parcels, we have
sections that you can give an aliquot.
    THE COURT: Hence, the description we just
had.
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District Court IV

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if you read real quickly, I know Jim wants me back up

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if you read real quickly, I know Jim wants me back up
there, but if you turn to Page 51, you'll see that it
there, but if you turn to Page 51, you'll see that it
is an aliquot description rather than metes and bounds.
is an aliquot description rather than metes and bounds.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE COURT: Okay.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. And when you used the word "aliquot," what
Q. And when you used the word "aliquot," what
did you mean to communicate?
did you mean to communicate?
A. Aliquot is a real estate term which describes
A. Aliquot is a real estate term which describes
by sections and quarter sections or lots within those,
by sections and quarter sections or lots within those,
a portion of properties.
a portion of properties.
Q. And you've got more recorded maps by this
Q. And you've got more recorded maps by this
time too?
time too?
A. We've each got, because we haven't yet
A. We've each got, because we haven't yet
finalized all the plans, we're making, we're gonna be
finalized all the plans, we're making, we're gonna be
using this as a temporary way to describe --
using this as a temporary way to describe --
THE COURT: Where they're going.
THE COURT: Where they're going.
THE WITNESS: Where they're going.
THE WITNESS: Where they're going.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. And I get you back up here, I just didn't
Q. And I get you back up here, I just didn't
understand why the circle is on this map.
understand why the circle is on this map.
A. Go like that.
A. Go like that.
So this is at an angle. This is at an angle.
So this is at an angle. This is at an angle.
Q. Okay.
Q. Okay.
A. So that point, this here and this here, this

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    A. So that point, this here and this here, this
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District Court IV

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            Page 139
here.
    Q. Got it.
        Now, how far east is this far east point on
Bates Number 51, B-1?
    A. Okay. I can tell you exactly.
    Q. Please.
    A. It is quarter sections, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
8, it is two miles from this point, your Honor.
    THE COURT: Okay.
    THE WITNESS: Two miles further here. I
can't tell you.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. This is 8,000 feet, we know that.
    A. I know this is 8,000.
    Q. No, here is 8,000. I will give you that this
is 7,999.
    A. It keeps going, so there is Parcel 2, Parcel
2, right there is 526 acres along here.
    Q. And there's, okay, so it's --
    A. All I want the Court to understand is now,
rather -- because the way this map was presented to
you, you could get confused that this going this way --
    THE COURT: Is that --
    THE WITNESS: This, and it's not --
1111
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| BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: <br> Q. Right. <br> A. It's this .- <br> THE COURT: The bottom portion. <br> BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: <br> Q. And that's what I'm trying to establish before we break for lunch, where the Purchase Property was in June of 2004 has now changed to another location by March 28th of 2005? <br> A. Absolutely. <br> Q. It's no longer here or here, it's now horizontal more, and it does, in fact, extend beyond the Parcel 1 line from -- <br> A. I don't know, Mr. Jimmerson, whether it cuts off here, because there's a section line. The point is what they were trying to do was, again, while we were doing this with Mr. Lash and Pardee, we were always making sure that the Pardee received more than the amount of land that they had paid for, that there was additional security. <br> Q. Now, would you -- <br> THE COURT: And then as you went along, what they paid for, you gave them what they bought. You said, Here's what you get for this much, you know, we're gonna make up the difference. We know you paid |
| :---: |
|  |  |

District Court IV

Page 141

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84 million, we're gonna get there.
            THE WITNESS: Exactly. That's exactly what
we are doing.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. Before the lunch break, I need to establish
this: Isn't it true that some of the land here,
Exhibit B-1, extends more to the east, beyond the
Parcel 1 Purchase Property limit to the east?
    A. I think based upon, based on my understanding
of what that exhibit shows and your representations
that that's 8,000 square feet -- I mean 8,000 feet,
yes, it would extend into an area that is not described
on that map.
    THE COURT: As Parcel 1?
    THE WITNESS: As parcel 1.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. In this area?
    A. Yes.
    MR, JIMMERSON: I have nothing further at
this time. I'm not passing the witness
    THE COURT: He's not finished with his
direct
    MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: The defendant asked to
take a lunch break.
    THE WITNESS: Jim, are you buying lunch?
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        District Court IV
    Page 142

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        MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: I will buy lunch,
absolutely.
    THE COURT: All right. We'll take a break.
        (A lunch recess was taken.)
    THE COURT: So are you on standby?
    THE WITNESS: I'm gonna have to leave right
at 3:15.
    THE COURT: Okay, that's fine. You
graciously said you will come back.
    THE WITNESS: Yes.
    THE COURT: Whatever, we'Il do what we do.
I'm keeping an open mind until all the evidence is in,
but thank you for your time.
    THE WITNESS: Thank you.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Mr. Whittemore, good afternoon.
    A. Good morning.
    Q. We'll work at least another hour and fifteen
minutes. Let me know when you have to go.
    I've read the agreements. I don't see the
right to swap in the written words of either Exhibit 2,
4, or 5.
    Am I mistaken?
    MS. LUNDVALL: From his perspective, once
again, not starting out the afternoon very well, what
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District Court IV

Page 143

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he has interpreted out of these agreements is
irrelevant. He needs to answer the question without
giving the commentary to the Court, and I would ask for
this, that is continuing problem that we have.
    THE COURT: I think what he's asking is, is
literally, in those two documents. It refers to either
party getting the right to swap.
    MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: Right.
    THE COURT: And he can answer, I mean that's
-- so I'm gonna overrule.
    THE WITNESS: And if you were to refer to
Exhibit --
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. Let's start with 2.
    MS. LUNDVALL: You've asked the question.
Please allow him to answer.
    THE COURT: Sustained. Let Mr. Whittemore
tell us. I've already got my exhibits out. This is
Exhibit 5.
            THE WITNESS: An example of that,
Mr. Jimmerson, is page 1568.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. What do you, are you looking at, please?
    A. It's Bates stamped 1568, which is in the
Plaintiff's Number 4.
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Page 144

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| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | the crosshatch series, the Initial Developed Parcel is 1,950, Phase 1 is 250 acres located in the southern portion of the parcel, and the parties already mutually agree upon the phasing of the additional purchases. BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: <br> Q. All right. <br> A. Okay. Now, may I finish, please? <br> Q. I'm not saying anything. <br> A. Okay. Then if you go to the other map we had? <br> THE COURT: Exhibit 5? <br> THE WITNESS: Yes, please. <br> Your Honor, what Bates Stamp is that? <br> THE COURT: 749 of Exhibit 5. It's the real <br> small one. <br> THE WITNESS: Right. Right. I have it as 751, youx Honor. <br> THE COURT: Okay. <br> THE WITNESS: 749, they are -- no, your Honor |  |
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|  |  |  |

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Page 145
is correct, there are two exhibits, and Exhibits C-l
with two separate maps, and Exhibit C-2, and, and then
the second page of Exhibit C-2, Page 749, I don't know
whether that was in the wrong, or, or not.
    THE COURT: I see where it -- it's in front
of it.
    THE WITNESS: Right in front of it.
    Then 751, and 752 are all exhibits that talk
about, and then you turn the page to the biggest one,
which is 755, developed by Pardee's consultants
GC Wallace.
    And your Honor, may I approach the big thing
again?
    THE COURT: Yes.
    Did I pull out 755? I don't have mine here.
    MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: It is part of the same
exhibit, just as Exhibit D, second page, I believe.
    THE COURT: I'm looking at --
    MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: It's Exhibit 5.
    THE COURT: I have Exhibit 5. And I go from,
I see where I go from 751, 752, and then this goes to
58.
    MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: Keep going.
    THE COURT: }55\mathrm{ is what I'm looking for?
    THE WITNESS: }755
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District Court IV

## curvy.

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Now, these documents, all the exhibits that
are attached with respect to those plans have the notations on these exhibits that reflect what compels the parties to agree to the specific parcel lines, and therefore, swap within those areas, by saying, as used on this exhibit, the term traditional residential property means the production residential property, which is also described as the Option property together with the Purchase property.
The Initial Developed Parcel is located in the southern portion of the area marked Traditional Residential Neighborhood, and this parcel is Phase 1 of the production residential property.
Buyer anticipate the development of phases of
production residential property to start along the southerly boundary and move northward to the adjacent areas.
All these things taken together compel one to understand that as the development proceeded, when we put a golf course, it's physically there, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: When you put a golf course in that area, you take land away from Pardee that you have to replace at a location different, in a different
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e 147

District Court IV
$\left.\begin{array}{l}\text { THE COURT: I apologize. I'm used to it } \\ \text { being in consecutive order. } \\ \text { THE WITNESS: Well, these exhibits -- } \\ \text { Mr. Jimmerson asked is there anything in the documents } \\ \text { that refers to "swap." } \\ \text { THE COURT: Swap. } \\ \text { BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: } \\ \text { Q. Language. } \\ \text { If we can go to } 755 \text { and hold it this way. } \\ \text { THE COURT: Okay. } \\ \text { MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: That corner, again, } \\ \text { that are corner is right here. That corner is right at } \\ \text { the bottom. } \\ \text { THE COURT: I see a six. Is that similar? } \\ \text { THE WITNESS: This is, this part right there, } \\ \text { your Honor. } \\ \text { THE COURT: Right. } \\ \text { THE WITNESS: It has Number } 6 \text { on it. } \\ \text { THE COURT: Okay. } \\ \text { THE WITNESS: Number } 6 \text { on it. } \\ \text { THE COURT: And that is -- } \\ \text { THE wITNESS: That is this corner of this, } \\ \text { kind of curvy, and then you go over Exhibit -- parcel } 5 \\ \text { now, it says Parcel } 5, ~ a n d ~ i t ' s ~ s t a r t i n g ~ a ~ l i t t l e ~ b i t ~\end{array}\right]$

District Court IV

Page 148
location within that might be reflected on the first document.

So, Mr. Jimmerson, these documents and others that occur later in time require the parties to jointly plan the development and concur where the roads go, and therefore, where the parcel line goes, where a golf course goes, and therefore, as a result of creating a parcel for a golf course to create a parcel for a residential subdivision adjacent to this golf course.

To the north of the golf course, along the edge of the golf course are some custom lots, but all along the way, within that development area, your Honor, the parties came up with --

THE COURT: Single-family.
THE WITNESS: Single-family and what we retained and what we did, but at the end of the day, you had to what we call equalize the money to the property and who had to pay 50 percent for this, who had to pay 25 percent for that, all those equalizations took place, and that's how I meant swapping, Mr. Jimmerson.

I didn't mean that there was a phrase in here that said that the parties shall do $A, B, C, D$, and $E$, I was giving you a process rather than necessarily a specific description in the document.
Page 149

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BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
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BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. All right. I think we both have accomplished
    Q. All right. I think we both have accomplished
our goals. There's no language in the four corners of
our goals. There's no language in the four corners of
the agreement that requires swapping. What you will
the agreement that requires swapping. What you will
say as you sit here, and I understand, is it requires a
say as you sit here, and I understand, is it requires a
mutual agreement of the parties to operate in good
mutual agreement of the parties to operate in good
faith, and there's many good faith requirements that
faith, and there's many good faith requirements that
are in writing here?
are in writing here?
    A. Yes, Mr. Jimmerson, I think that's fair.
    A. Yes, Mr. Jimmerson, I think that's fair.
    Q. Okay.
    Q. Okay.
    A. With one caveat. I believe that at some
    A. With one caveat. I believe that at some
point in our relationship, we did get around to
point in our relationship, we did get around to
formalizing and saying those exact: words, which are,
formalizing and saying those exact: words, which are,
You get this, we get this, and therefore --
You get this, we get this, and therefore --
        THE COURT: To become memorialized later down
        THE COURT: To become memorialized later down
the line, but not as of .-
the line, but not as of .-
        THE WITNESS: Not as of this time, because
        THE WITNESS: Not as of this time, because
nothing had been built yet.
nothing had been built yet.
        THE COURT: Exhibit 5, okay.
        THE COURT: Exhibit 5, okay.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. Would you look at Exhibit 5 again? It's the
    Q. Would you look at Exhibit 5 again? It's the
restated agreement of March 28th, and it's renumbered
restated agreement of March 28th, and it's renumbered
slightly, instead of 18, Broker Commission, it's 19.
slightly, instead of 18, Broker Commission, it's 19.
Look for these at Paragraph }19\mathrm{ of Exhibit --
Look for these at Paragraph }19\mathrm{ of Exhibit --
    A. Exhibit 19?
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    A. Exhibit 19?
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District Court IV

Page 150
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commissions, okay.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. And by my review --
MS. LUNDVALL: Once again, I'm gonna ask him
not to say, "This is what I read," to the witness.
MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: This is my style, your
Honor. Sorry it doesn't suit the opposing counsel.
BY MR. JAMES M. JIMMERSON
Q. The line in the earlier Option Agreement,
Exhibit 2 --
A. It looks very similar without doing word for
word.
Q. Would you agree the word for word,
Notwithstanding, is also identical, Notwithstanding the
foregoing?
A. Oh, yes, yeah, it's still in there.
Q. Now, were you advised that by now, March 28th
of 2005, there had been, indeed, a contract entered
into between Pardee and Wolfram and Wilkes and their
respective companies?
A. I was advised that by Mr. Levy.
Q. Lawyer for Pardee?

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THE COURT: Paragraph.
MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: Paragraph THE COURT: Paragraph 19, excuse me. Broker

District Court IV

Page 151
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    A. Lawyer for Pardee, that they had reached an
    agreement, because I had asked him in one of our
meetings, Do we still need this language, and he said,
Yes.
Q. Okay. And in that meeting of Levy and
yourself --
A. It was a group meeting, but it was --
Q. Sometime preparatory of March 28, 2005?
A. Before this agreement was signed, as I
indicated, we had negotiating sessions every day, every
week over the phone, and again, you sit down when you
finally get the document, and I can't tell you this is
Carl Savely's second version, so we had received
comments and put them in here, and then by March 28th,
the parties are agreed and ready to go.
Q. So in terms of conversation you had with
Mr. Levy, and not being precise, would a February/March
2005 time period be accurate in terms of when you
learned that there was still a necessity to have the
Broker Commissions and Finder Fees paragraph restated
here?
A. From my perspective, yes, because I did not
want to pay a broker's fee.
Q. Go back to the definitions. We talked about
purchase property and how that definition changed

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District Court IV

Page 152
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Let's see if the Option Property definition changed
herein in the amended and restated document in
Exhibit 5.
Turn to Page 2, same paragraph we were
talking about, and it follows after the description of
Purchase Property of 511 acres, and I will pick it up.
And little i, the fourth line, Buyer's option
to purchase remaining property, entire site, which is
or becomes designated for single-family detached
production residential use as described, the Option
Property and a number of several phases referred to
here collectively as Option parcels and individually as
Option Parcel upon the terms and conditions hereinafter
set forth, end of quote.
Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. By looking at the maps or whatever you feel
is best for us, tell me now how Option Property has
been defined now under the new amended restated March
28th agreement, Exhibit 5?
A. Okay. I advanced this discussion, apparently
inappropriately, because you now need to go to
Exhibit C-1, which are the three, if you look at
PH Bates Number 53
THE COURT: Okay.
Let's see if the Option Property definition changed
herein in the amended and restated document in
Exhibit 5 .
Turn to Page 2 , same paragraph we were
talking about, and it follows after the description of
Purchase Property of 511 acres, and I will pick it up.
And little i, the fourth line, Buyer's option
to purchase remaining property, entire site, which is
or becomes designated for single-family detached
production residential use as described, the option
Property and a number of several phases referred to
here collectively as option parcels and individually as
Option parcel upon the terms and conditions hereinafter
set forth, end of quote.
Do you see that?
Yes.
A. By looking at the maps or whatever you feel
Q.
is best for us, tell me now how option Property has
been defined now under the new amended restated March
$28 t h$ agreement, Exhibit 5 ?
A. Okay. I advanced this discussion, apparently
inappropriately, because you now need to go to
Exhibit c-1, which are the three, if you look at
pH Bates Number 53.

District Court IV

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that we put the little blue circle around.
    THE COURT: Okay.
    THE WITNESS: It says, Map Of Option
Property.
    THE COURT: Let me get to it, please. You
are ahead of me a little bit.
    Exhibit C-1, did you say?
    THE WITNESS: It's your reference to
Exhibit C, Map Of Option Property, and you look at that
and it is blank.
    THE COURT: Yeah, I see a blank.
    THE WITNESS: Yes, exactly.
    THE COURT: Okay.
    THE WITNESS: You're on the right page.
    THE COURT: Okay. I got nervous.
    THE WITNESS: No, because the parties needed
more specificity.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. Okay.
    A. And therefore, they started to create the
Exhibits C-1, has two pages, okay.
    Q. I'm with you, thank you.
    A. So --
    Q. And C-1, so we have it here, is at Bates
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District Court IV

Page 156
THE WITNESS: 749.
Q. It's blank, and then 749 and 65.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. My eyes are bad.
A. Now, what do we show? We show all the
potential option property in Clark County on Page 749.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: That's everything to the west
of the Pahranagat Wash.
Can I identify this? Can I approach, your
Honor.
THE COURT: Yes.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. I need you to show us by holding it up and
showing the position, counsel?
A. I will.
Q. Thank you.
A. So 749 shows it, your Honor.
Q. Okay. This is --
THE WITNESS: This is the southern edge, and
again, it's cut off a little bit. It's cut off a
little bit, and then the northern edge, which is the
Lincoln County line, so now this shows everything to
the east of U.S. Highway }93

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Stamp 7 --
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Stamp 7 --

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District Court IV

Page 155
THE COURT: Right.
THE WITNESS: And everything south of, up to
the Lincoln County line, and everything east of the demarcation section lines, that shows the eastern boundary of the Coyote Springs project in Clark County. BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
A. What is missing is the bottom line, which we
know is Highway 168.
THE COURT: we just don't show it.
THE WITNESS: We just don't show it here.
So this, so this, you want to know what the option
Property is.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Right.
A. This is the Option property in Clark County.

Then the next page --
THE COURT: This is the Option Property in
Clark County.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. So would you say here and there, in other
words, is the everything but the little rectangle in the bottom left corner?
A. Well, as defined in this agreement.
Q. That's what I'm asking.

District Court IV
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
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THE COURT: Right. \\
THE WITNESS: And everything south of, up to the Lincoln County line, and everything east of the demarcation section lines, that shows the eastern boundary of the Coyote Springs project in Clark County. BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
\end{tabular} \\
\hline 10
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12
13
14
15
16 & \begin{tabular}{l}
Q. Okay. \\
A. What is missing is the bottom line, which we know is Highway 168. \\
THE COURT: We just don't show it. \\
THE WITNESS: We just don't show it here. \\
So this, so this, you want to know what the option Property is. \\
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: \\
Q. Right. \\
A. This is the Option Property in Clark County. \\
Then the next page -- \\
THE COURT: This is the Option Property in Clark County. \\
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: \\
Q. So would you say here and there, in other words, is the everything but the little rectangle in the bottom left corner? \\
A. Well, as defined in this agreement. \\
Q. That's what I'm asking.
\end{tabular} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Page 157
you're just giving them every available that you can? THE WITNESS: We're giving them their choice,
their options, and as this development plan went, they certainly wouldn't go from, your Honor, this corner to this corner, because there would be no advantage of continuity of development.

THE COURT: But you gave them the option if
they want to go up north?
THE WITNESS: They can go up, they can go
here, but the reason why this happens, your Honor, they come down in this direction is 'cause we designed and built a Jack Nicklaus signature golf course, because it's part of our requirements under our obligation to spend money to develop there

THE COURT: That would be attractive to Pardee.

THE WITNESS: That is extremely attractive to Pardee and their lots, your Honor, located within the area that has the golf courses, as he we sit here today. Their lots are here and our property, CSI's property is in this same area because they own the golf course.

BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. If I can sort of summarise, stay right here,
if you will. purchase property, including the 1,950 of
District Court IV

2004 June and September 1 now changes. March 28 th of 2005 has it going along here, right?
A. Sure
Q. \(\quad 511\) acres going this way? THE COURT: They have 511.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. With that being that, where is the Option
Property as you read the language of the new agreement? THE WITNESS: The Option Property is located
within the Purchase Property, as defined by the entire
Clark County side.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Okay.
A. If Pardee designates it and we agree this should be residential production property, and we want to exercise our option to purchase it, we'll probably go along with it, because everybody's interest is in getting the right kind of mix and everything else. THE COURT: You're basically giving them everything else that hasn't been squared down -- I know that's not in stone -- purchased. THE WITNESS: Yes. Subject to, subject to the limitation that we're gonna retain commercial we're gonna retain multi-family. THE COURT: But you have to designate, you,

\section*{District Court IV}

Page 160
Lincoln County, and it's clear that the parties were saying if Pardee agreed to build single-family homes within these areas after the joint planning process, that they would have the right to purchase that property by exercising an option to do so. THE COURT: Could have.
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BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON

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Q. Okay
A. Now, if we go to c-2, both c-2's.

THE COURT: Give me the Bates Stamp number. THE WITNESS: Bates Stamp 751 and 752 THE COURT: Okay.

THE WITNESS: And I hate to keep doing it
but it's just easiest now to go to PH 58 and Bates Stamp 755.

Okay. That's okay. Because now these four, and 754, if you take all those out from 751, including the Pardee Homes 55, excuse me, Pardee Homes 751, your Honor.

THE COURT: Right.
THE WITNESS: 752, your Honor.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON
Q. 56 ?
A. 58, Map Of Initial, and 755 and 754, why
they're out of order, I don't know.

District Court IV
District Court IV

THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: Okay. Now, if you take that
package, your Honor --
THE COURT: Together.
THE WITNESS: -- together, if you simply say,
Okay, where are we, what do we have, who's got what, by
going through each of these documents, you can identify
where the planning process has taken place.
For example, the first page of Exhibit 2 ,
it's the planning process on all of Clark County, as
you see it, right?
THE COURT: Correct.
THE WITNESS: Then you go to 752, and I'll
see the opposite, the rest of that gray area.
the Court: Right.
THE WITNESS: You see, your Honor, that those
lines match up?
the court: They do.
THE WITNESS: Do you see that, your Honor, or
should I come up and show you just to make sure.
the court: why don't we --
THE WITNESS: You want your record.
THE COURT: We want to get it right.
THE WITNESS: Right.
Everything on the same thing.
District Court IV


District Court IV


Page 164
THE WITNESS: On the ground
contemporaneously. You could not understand that there were these great big parcels that were taken out as a result of development choices made by both parties. THE COURT: Right.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Now, would you look, please --

THE COURT: It's almost a moving target.
THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor, it is.
By MR. JAMES M. JIMMERSON:
Q. Would you look then, please, at Exhibit 55, which falls at 749?
A. You want me to look at Bates 755? THE COURT: This one.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Yes. The bottom says it's Option Property,
that property crosshatched area designated as production residential property or traditional residential neighborhood during the joint planning process.

\section*{Do you see that?}
A. Yes. I'm trying to find it, but I recall reading it.
Q. I want you to have it in front of you. It's 55, and it follows 749, it's the second \(C-1\). You had

Page 166
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two c-1's in your hand. It's the second one
A. Can't find the first C-1 now.
Q. Just find any C-1?
A. I have a C-2, I got a --
Q. Hang on, it's gotten out of place here.
That's Exhibit D. That's 755, Here's Exhibit C-2?
Q. Right.
A. C-1 and then the second C-1, you're talking
about 55.
Q. Let's talk about this one first.
Okay. Back --
The C-1?
Back to the C-1's.
Q. Right. C-1 now with the color map, which is
749, Bates Stamp 749?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay, great, and we'll turn the page to page
755.
A. Okay.
Q. At the top, it says I believe the following:
Parcel boundaries and phasing may be modified during
development. As used in this Exhibit, the term
"traditional residential neighborhood" means that the
production residential property the Option Property is
that portion of the production residential property

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District Court IV
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located outside the boundary of the initial property.
Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you agree with that statement, yes or no.
THE COURT: If you can't answer yes or no .-
THE WITNESS: It's a no.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. It's a no. You don't agree with your own
statement on this document?
A. I do not believe it's accurate in that the
initial property, in my judgment, had already been
planned to be modified. The golf course was gonna
be --
Q. And the initial property, that which we see
looking at the documents, top left-hand portion, but it
would really be the bottom left-hand portion?
A. It's the bottom property map as you hold it
correctly, and remember, that was identified as 250
acres that that was gonna be the starting point of the
development to ensure that pardee had \$10 million worth
of land.
Q. Right. But whether you agree with it or not
this document says what it says.
A. Oh, yeah, it definitely says what it says.
Q. All right. Now, turning the page .-

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District Court IV

Page 167
A. Yes, sir.
Q. -- to c-1, Bates Stamp P H 55?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. It says at the bottom of the option Property,
that property crosshatched designated as production
residential property or traditional residential
neighborhood during the joint planning process, end of
quote, and it shows everything north of the north edge
of clark County.
A. Yo you see that?
Q. And is that what is being referenced as
crosshatched?
A. Yes.
Q. That's how I interpret it.
A. You're accurate.
Q. So now, in combination, that is to say the
land south of the Lincoln line, first C-1, 749 ?
A. Yes.
Q. And land north of the county line, pH 55 is
the Option property?
A. It includes the option Property, that's
really, if you combine these two things, Mr. Jimmerson,
it's really called the entire site.
Q. For purposes of this contract, you title it

Page 168
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Option Property?
A. No, sir. For purposes of this contract, we
cannot lose sight of the fact that this is an entire
site, and that within specific areas we identify
single-family production property, which becomes the
option property that remains.
There are two options. The parties
negotiated an option which allowed Pardee to buy the
entire site. That's Option Number 1.
Option Number 2 was Pardee negotiated and
said, We, Pardee, want to be the single person that
controls what happens on single-family production
property. We want to be the master developer of that,
either build our own homes or bring in guest builders.
At no time did anybody think that these maps
were going to require }\textrm{X}\mathrm{ number of acres of land. That
was done in a different section of the contract when
Mr. Lash asked me to use my best efforts to get, I
think 13,000 acres of single-family homes in Lincoln
County.
At the time we all had a big appetite. As it
turned out, they weren't going there.
Q. It, it didn't happen.
A. Not going north of the Clark County line.
Right.

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District Court IV


District Court IV
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respect to Purchase Property. It affects those terms
in the agreement in Exhibit l that I haven't bothered
this man with, but I'm trying.
You have to understand how this developed. I
don't have any quarrel with the cooperation between
these parties, I understand that, but they never went
back to the plaintiff to modify the definitions.
THE COURT: That's a whole different issue.
My problem with the question is he's not here as an
expert on parol evidence. You happen to be an
attorney, God love you, but I will object, I don't want
the question anyway, because I think that's a legal
issue. I'm sure we will at some point or have argued
it recently.
MS. LUNDVALLL: Exactly.
THE COURT: He's a percipient witness, and
that's why I'm going to sustain the objection that I
don't think it's appropriate to ask him a legal
question.
Now, and I understand, okay, so we'll do it
that way.
MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you, your Honor.
And in addition, the Court's order dealing
with the parol evidence only dealt with the initial
agreement.

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District Court IV

Page 171
THE COURT: I understand. I went back and
looked at it, Ms. Lundvall.
MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: I know where we stand, and let's
move forward, and Mr. Jimmerson is ready to move
forward.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. The parcel boundaries and phasing required
the continual mutual agreement of the parties; is that
right?
A. Yes.
Q. And the continual mutual agreement of the
parties is something that progressed months and years
following May of 2004 through 2008 and 2009 ?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. And the definition of purchase
Property, as we see in March of 2005, is different than
the definition of the purchase Property from May of
2004, correct?
A. The, the entire document reflects an approach
which is becoming more refined with every paragraph,
because every day there's something happening to change
the boundaries. So when we say, so when we say the
Purchase Property is fixed at a specific point in time,
in my judgment, is irrelevant with respect to whether

Page 172
or not Pardee and CSI agreed to sell certain property and that they performed in doing so.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Do you know whether or not the definitions of Purchase Property and option Property impact the amount of compensation my clients are entitled to receive?
A. No. I recall that during the deposition
there was a percentage difference, something like that.
Q. Would you agree that the choice to build
I, 950 going north changed between September 1 of 2004,
Amendment 2, to March 28th of 2005?
A. There was a physical change?
Q. There was a physical location change, yes?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And there was a physical location change in the definition of Option Property in March of 2005 , correct?
A. No.
Q. In other words, what you're looking at,
these, Exhibit \(\mathrm{C}-1\), are different than the Exhibit C's of the earliex agreements we went over the Amendment Number 2 or the original agreement?

MS. LUNDVALL: Once again, your Honor, this is now misstating this witness! testimony. I don't know how many times he has to tell Mr. Jimmerson that

Page 173
it, it requires a designation by CSI of what the Option Property was.

MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: I understand.
MS. LUNDVALL: And he --
THE COURT: I understand. I do understand
the testimony. I think we've gone over this many
times, so let's just move on.
MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: Thank you.
THE COURT: Because we understand the point
of what's in the documents, so we understand the
interpretation and the understanding of at least CSI,
which is what Mr. Whittemore is here for.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. The parties to the amended and restated
agreement March 28, 2005, were CSI and Pardee, right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes generally a
party to that agreement?
A. Not that I recall.
Q. Would you turn, please, to the amendments in

\section*{Exhibit 6?}
A. Okay.
Q. We're gonna cover eight more amendments to
this now restated document.
THE COURT: Hold on. Exhibit 6, we need a
District Court IV

Page 174
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new book.
THE WITNESS: I apologize if these are going
back out of order.
MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: 20 lashes.
THE COURT: Mr. Whittemore, mine went back
out of order, but we'll fix them at the end of the day.
We'll get them fixed.
Exhibit 6, right, Mr. Jimmerson?
MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: Yes, your Honor.
THE WITNESS: And we're talking about --
THE COURT: A new binder
MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: It's a new binder,
hundred percent, right.
THE WITNESS: Can I put in Number 4, please?
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Please.
A. Thank you.
Okay, back up on the shelf. Thank you.
Okay. Jim.
Q. Would you look at Exhibit Number 6, which is
called, Amendment Number 1 to the Amended And Restated
Option Agreement, which I will tell you we've been
looking at Exhibit 5.
MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, at this point in
time, I need to place a caution for purposes of the

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District Court IV

Page 175
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court reporter and ask her for to designate this
portion of the record as confidential that is
confidential beginning at Exhibit 6. That begins the
designation for the purposes of our stipulated
protective order.
THE COURT: Can you note that in the record,
and after we do the testimony we'll see how we want to
do it, but absolutely.
(The following portion of the transcript
is designated as confidential by
agreement of counsel for the parties.)
THE COURT: So we're starting out with
Exhibit 6, Amendment Number l to Exhibit 5.
THE WITNESS: Yes, because the other ones
didn't exist
Let's go.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Now, a year and four months, a year and three
months have passed. The date of this document is the
28th of July, 2006
Do you see that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. So we were at the amended and restated
superceding document, March 28th, 2005?
A. Yes, sir.

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District Court IV

Page 176
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Q. And a year and three months have passed,
we're in the July of 2006
What happens to this Amendment Number 1 to
the superceding amended and restated document of
March 28th of 2005?
Okay. Within this document, Pardee exercises
its right to purchase an additional parcel, and we also
have created a, on the land itself, on the physical
land as reflected in Exhibit A, Bates 1103, your Honor,
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
That's referred to as Exhibit A, as part of
the document?
THE WITNESS: As part of the document, your
Honor. It says, Map Showing Parcel Map Land And
Additional Purchase Parcel. That's the, that's what
it's entitled.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: So what have we done? Pardee
and CSI have agreed -- and the orientation of this map,
your Honor, is correct
THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: So that the lower left-hand
corner of this map, you have the great big north. They
actually put it in the correct way.
THE COURT: Okay.

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District Court IV
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline & Page 17 \\
\hline 1 & THE WITNESS: This goes along on the map in \\
\hline 2 & front of us simply straight up Highway 93. \\
\hline 3 & BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: \\
\hline 4 & Q. Like that? \\
\hline 5 & A. Yes. \\
\hline 6 & Q. Like that? \\
\hline 7 & A. Yes. \\
\hline 8 & Q. And so what is happening? \\
\hline 9 & A. What is happening? \\
\hline 10 & Q. A takedown of 822 acres? \\
\hline 11 & A. We are doing the following: If you could \\
\hline 12 & blow up the numbers on the little parcels that look \\
\hline 13 & like fingers, they are golf holes, your Honor. \\
\hline 14 & THE COURT: This is what you're talking about \\
\hline 15 & here? \\
\hline 16 & THE WITNESS: If I could show -- \\
\hline 17 & THE COURT: Would you please? \\
\hline 18 & THE WITNESS: I'm not gonna get them out of \\
\hline 19 & order, because otherwise the books are gonna be \\
\hline 20 & horrible, but this, your Honor, these are, these are \\
\hline 21 & golf holes. \\
\hline 22 & THE COURT: That's okay. \\
\hline 23 & the witness: These, your Honor, these \\
\hline 24 & fingers are golf holes. \\
\hline 25 & See, this is .- \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

District Court IV

Page 178
THE COURT: Oh, these are golf holes?
THE WITNESS: Yes, that look like they're
coming out of this.
THE COURT: Oh, so for the record, for the
record - poor Ms. Lundvall, she's left out.
It's on the right side of this exhibit, which
is lio3. It looks like, it does look like fingers.
These are golf holes on the right side, correct?
THE WITNESS: That's correct, from the
Highway 93 to -- this is called coyote Springs parkway.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: So those are holes, and if you
were to count them out, you'd find nine or ten holes
within those areas designated in that corner.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: This is the good news and the
bad news. Mr. Jimmerson is gonna say, Isn't that the
first parcel?
THE COURT: Parcel Number l?
THE WITNESS: Isn't that the first part of
agreed that these were placeholders until we developed
where residential homes are gonna be.

District Court IV


District Court IV

Page 180
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and if we could show it?
THE COURT: There are three locations of SFR
land, correct?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
Can we show it on the map? This would really
be helpful if you bring it up for the Judge. This is
so clear.
Your Honor, here's Highway 93.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: And here's 168.
THE COURT: }168
THE WITNESS: And this little thing
Mr. Jimmerson was pointing to was that outer edge
boundary of what has been on these various exhibits.
THE COURT: Right.
THE WITNESS: And you will see, you can get
Google Earth, you will see, you will see, number one,
the golf course; number two, you will see actually
graded lots that were ready for production, and you'd
see there's nothing over here, because we don't know,
but Pardee has in the back of their minds that, Wait a
second, that could potentially be a multi-family, I
will have to go back to Mr. Whittemore, see if I can
keep that for multi-family and get more single-family
residential up there, see if he will let me buy

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multi-family. Can we buy all the custom lots? No.
We'll keep those. We'll sell them. We'll split them.
If you want to pay us and put in the infrastructure,
we'll come up with a custom lot agreement.
THE COURT: That was a separate --
THE WITNESS: Separate agreement totally,
happened after the golf course was being built.
THE COURT: But CSI has to compensate them
for what you took?
THE WITNESS: Yes. That land is now part of
-- it's like jellybeans, you take three, you've got to
give me back three somewhere else, okay, because at the
end of the day, you still have to -- Pardee's given us
84 million.
THE COURT: For 650 acres?
THE WITNESS: 950 acres.
THE COURT: 950 acres?
THE WITNESS: Yes. And anything other than
that is all just simply adjustments of where these
things are going.
Here's the water plant that I was talking
about right up here. Here's, these are, these are
ponds where you're actually delivering water to
everything.
The point was that none of this could have

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Page 182
been identified during the process of negotiating this agreement, because you didn't have all the
professionals coming in and identifying where they want
to, your Honor.
        So now Mr. Jimmerson asked, Okay, tell me
what these exhibits mean now in Number 6, and what
we're doing --
        THE COURT: Okay. What you are doing
July 28th, 2006?
        THE WITNESS: What we're doing is showing
that we're gonna build exactly that on this exhibit and
start to put together a plan where you can see that
buyer is exercising their right to purchase an
additional 822 acres.
        THE COURT: When you say "buyer," you mean
Pardee?
        THE WITNESS: Pardee. They're gonna add
822.88 towards their 1,950, and then that segment also
includes areas designated as commercial property and
certain lands which also is designated for custom lots,
because again, the parties have an agreement as to what
happens with those specific things. While they're
getting 822, they're not ultimately gonna get to keep
exactly that 822 , because there will be further
adjustments, so again, Pardee, in my perspective, is
build additional golf courses and to do other things, and CSI is going to be paid a water commodity charge of \(\$ 150,000\) a month, because it's very expensive to pump that water, deliver the water and do all that, so the parties are again splitting costs and coming up with plans to --

THE COURT: Keep the golf course? THE WITNESS: -- keep the golf course green.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Okay.

THE COURT: As part of this Amendment 1? THE WITNESS: That's correct, because you will see we talk about water, financing it through GID, we talk about infrastructure, sharing infrastructure costs, we've negotiated a CC\&R handbook, and that's reflected in this agreement. We're adopting it. So throughout this document, paragraph by paragraph, we are now describing again a brand new deal.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Okay.
A. Modified, but it is not a superceding
document yet, because the lawyers haven't gotten mad at us enough to say, well, we have to put it into one document.

THE COURT: And the 822.88 acres, that still
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BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Okay.
\(\square\)

Page 184
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            Page 183
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            Page 183
being overcompensated for what they're paying. In
being overcompensated for what they're paying. In
other words, they're getting more land during this
other words, they're getting more land during this
process.
process.
    MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: Okay.
    MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: Okay.
    MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, at this point in
    MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, at this point in
time, can we capture this Google Earth image and mark
time, can we capture this Google Earth image and mark
this as Defendant's next in line? It would be
this as Defendant's next in line? It would be
Exhibit vV.
Exhibit vV.
    THE COURT: I assume your technical person --
    THE COURT: I assume your technical person --
    MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: That's fine. It
    MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: That's fine. It
doesn't matter.
doesn't matter.
    THE COURT: I assume you're the one that can
    THE COURT: I assume you're the one that can
capture it for us, your technical person?
capture it for us, your technical person?
    MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you.
    MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you.
    THE COURT: And make it VV.
    THE COURT: And make it VV.
    MS. LUNDVALL: It will be Exhibit Vv.
    MS. LUNDVALL: It will be Exhibit Vv.
    THE COURT: I want to make sure my clerk
    THE COURT: I want to make sure my clerk
heard it.
heard it.
    MS. LUNDVALL: And we would move for the
    MS. LUNDVALL: And we would move for the
admission of VV.
admission of VV.
    THE COURT: Any objection? Okay, it's
    THE COURT: Any objection? Okay, it's
admitted.
admitted.
            MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: No objection.
            MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: No objection.
            THE WITNESS: So what happens, this is really
            THE WITNESS: So what happens, this is really
critical, CSI is relieved of lots of obligations to
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critical, CSI is relieved of lots of obligations to

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capture it for us, your technical person?
MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you.
THE COURT: And make it VV.
THE COURT: I want to make sure my clerk
heard it.
MS. LUNDVALL: And we would move for the
admission of \(V V\).
THE COURT: Any objection? Okay, it's
admitted.
MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: No objection.
THE WITNESS: So what happens, this is really
page 183
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District Court IV

2511

District Court IV

Page 185

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could be applied towards 1,950, but it may not all be
applied, depending on what happens.
    THE WITNESS: Exactly, your Honor, because
again, just like the earlier property was subject to
these minor modifications, until you have a very
specific plan and you've done all your calculations and
adjustments --
    THE COURT: Right.
    Is somebody keeping track of all these
jellybeans, I hope?
    THE WITNESS: That's exactly the point, is
that Pardee will never lose a jellybean, and neither
will CSI, I can just tell you that, okay?
    THE COURT: Somehow I suspected that. I
don't even want to know what the jellybean counter got,
okay.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. Could we just look at the balance of the
exhibits?
    A. Sure.
    Q. Okay. What is Exhibit A, please? Is it 822
acres? Is it 250 acres? Is it 1,950 acres? What's
Exhibit A? I read it as 822 acres. If I'm misreading
it, correct me. The parcel says, it says }822\mathrm{ acres,
see?
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District Court IV

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designated as -- well, unfortunately we're gonna have
to get into - to make sense of this, your Honor, I'm
gonna have to take you forward, Mr. Jimmerson, to 1105.
    THE COURT: Bates Stamp 1105, that's fine,
because right now Exhibit A, which is 1102, is blank.
It says, See attached, but I don't know if the order we
have here, do you, Mr. Whittemore?
    THE WITNESS: I think the order is correct.
    THE COURT: Okay.
    THE WITNESS: So I think that that
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information, I think that that shows you something
that, in relationship to 1105, will become clear.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: So if you'll please turn to
1105?
THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: Okay. Now, here we go.
To get to the total that -- and 1106 .
THE COURT: Think of them in conjunction with
each other?
THE WITNESS: Yes, I would ask that you do
so, simply because, Mr. Jimmerson, your Honor, what has
happened --
THE COURT: Mr. Jimmerson, do you want to


Page 188
THE COURT: Okay.

| THE COURT: Okay. <br> THE WITNESS: And this wraps around to cover, and I can't tell you the exact wash, your Honor, but this is a good estimation. It's something like that. That's also Pardee. <br> THE COURT: That's also Pardee. |
| :---: |
| THE WITNESS: Again, it had to be acquired, your Honor, to equalize the amount of land they needed. <br> THE COURT: Sure. <br> THE WITNESS: And then this makes it very clear, so if I grew this line, I grew this line a little bit more like this, it looks like it's a little bit higher, and I fit it down a little lower, it makes it clear the CSI/Pardee planning area, 4,207 acres, which clearly would have your 1,950 in this, leaving excess acres for CSI. That's 4,207 acres. <br> The CSI planning area -- <br> THE COURT: So you're saying what we see as Exhibit 1106, the 4,207 would include -- <br> THE WITNESS: The 1,950 , yes. <br> THE COURT: So we're at 1,950 now, not -- at least the area, not necessarily what each plot is? THE WITNESS: That's correct. Therefore, this line is extremely important, because the parties have said, Well, CSI, this is your planning area for |

District Court IV

Page 189
the PGA Village. That alone .-
THE COURT: I see.
THE WITNESS: You see, so the parties have
said to Pardee, Looks like your single-family
residential is gonna be over here, you should make
arrangements to provide services to do whatever is next. Let's build the road together, and by the way, we have just negotiated with the PGA to become the PGA Village, the only one, huge, you know, pluses, yada, yada, yada.

THE COURT: So this CSI planning area most
likely will not be available, you're telling Pardee most likely, if it all works?

THE WITNESS: But if things are going really
well, we might drop you off over here, which, your
Honor, in time, there was considerable negotiation as to whether we could get some single-family homes,
right, because pardee was in the business of buying, and we were in the business of trying to sell.

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BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
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Q. Just a question, where is the 822?
A. Right here and right here.
Q. Okay.

THE COURT: And the 822 is part of the 1,950 ? MS. LUNDVALL: Can I see that again?

Page 190

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            THE WITNESS: Yes. The 822 is in here, and
the 1.950 is all in here.
    THE COURT: Because the 822 included the golf
course?
    THE WITNESS: Yes.
    Well, but it wasn't -- you have to subtract
it out.
            THE COURT: Exactly, so the jellybeans --
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. But here's the question: Is the 822, the way
you explained it, I understood it being the }822\mathrm{ is out
of the 1,950; is that correct?
    A. No.
    Q. It's part of the 1,950?
    A. Yes, it is, sir.
    THE COURT: So the 822 is part of the 1,950.
I had that right, all right.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. And you indicated there were some other
concessions that were important to CSI, including not
having to do certain infrastructure, remember, that
Exhibit C had shown early on, and then there's this
joint and financed improvements where you're having a
sharing relationship with Pardee?
    A. This is the most important document between
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District Court IV

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Page 19
CSI and pardee with respect to -- and this shows the level of trust, hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars of improvements that Pardee is putting in and knows that CSI is going to have to pay a percentage of these down the road
So this document, while it looks like, oh, it's just one page, is extraordinarily significant, because it literally involves hundreds of millions of dollars.
Q. Got it.
As it has turned out, did this project end by virtue of the economic downturn?
A. I believe that Coyote Springs will succeed. There has been, there have been reports of lawsuits between pardee and the successor owner members in CSI, and I believe that those disputes, as well as the economic realities, have caused the parties not to advance construction on certain facilities.
Q. And the last three years, four years, as I recall, 2009 to the present?
A. I would say that really, things started to come to a grinding halt the summer of 2010
Q. Okay
A. Through today
Q. And when did you lose your interest in CSI,
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Page 192

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if you have lost your interest at all? I don't know if
you have.
    A. Your Honor, the terms of my settlement
agreement with the Seenos is confidential.
    Q. I just want to know the year when it. Ended
I don't want to know the terms.
            THE COURT: We don't want to know that.
That's not relevant to our issues.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON
    Q. I want to know when does your personal
knowledge of these amendments end?
            THE COURT: That's what we're looking for
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON
    Q. I'm sorry.
    A. Fair enough.
        I retired from Coyote Springs in March of
2011, and I resolved my disputes in probably January of
'12.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON
    Q. Very good. Thank you.
        MS. LUNDVALL: January 2012?
    THE WITNESS: I think so, yes.
    MS. LUNDVALL: You resolved your disputes
with the Seenos in 2012?
    THE WITNESS: Yes, ma'am.
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District Court IV
District Court IV

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    MS. LUNDVALL: January?
        THE WITNESS: Yes, ma'am.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. Let's turn to the next exhibit.
    A. My brain could be wrong on that, but I'm
giving you the best estimate.
    MS. LUNDVALL: Was it this year or last year?
    THE COURT: January of this year or last
year?
    THE WITNESS: '13. Thank you.
    THE COURT: I think she's refreshing your
recollection.
    THE WITNESS: She did.
    THE COURT: Okay. She doesn't want to
suggest --
    THE WITNESS: It is.
    THE COURT: -- it was this year, and we are
in 2013.
    MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: It was one of the
greatest non-suggestions there ever was.
    THE COURT: I get confused on 2012 and 2013.
    THE WITNESS: I had totally missed that.
    THE COURT: That's all right.
    Okay, Mr. Jimmerson, where are we at now?
1/11
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District Court IV

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BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. Turn now to Exhibit 7.
    A. Exhibit 7, okay.
    Q. This is called Exhibit 2, 2 of 8, so you have
the superceding restatement document in March 2005,
Exhibit 5, now we have the second of the two
amendments. There's gonna be eight.
    Number 2, this is -- now, follow along if I'm
reading the date right. I think it's september the
30th, 2006, so this is just a month and a half after
the previous one.
            So what is going on with this Amendment
Number 2?
    A. I needed money.
    Q. So what is happening here? If it doesn't
relate to the property, I'm gonna kind of move on.
    A. No, because again, it's everything that they
did related to, ultimately, the payment for property.
    Q. Okay.
    A. And what they did was prepay the referenced
installments from Paragraph l (b) (3) of the prior
agreement and prepaid $6 million to help me at a time
where I needed the help.
    Q. Did you have to give anything back, free land
or anything like that?
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District Court IV

Page 195
A. No. We negotiated a, a, a discount at the back end as a result of the prepayment, which was a calculation of the interest that they would have lost on it.
Q. Okay. A discount towards the end?
A. yes

Let's go to the next, sir, to Exhibit 8 that is Amendment Number 3 to that amended and restated option agreement of March 2005, and this one is dated November 22nd of 2006, so now it's about two and a half months later?
A. Yes.
Q. What's going on with Amendment Number 3? We're transferring the escrow from Stewart Title to Chicago Title.
Q. What was that?
A. The partners had made a decision that they wanted to move to Chicago Title.
Q. So had this essentially been a move from Lisa Jones to Francis Butler or Francis Dunlap?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Do you see Francis Butler is now identified as the person to receive this information in the middle of the page on Paragraph 2 ?

Page 196


District Court IV
District Court IV
hereby amended so that the term "Parcel Map Land" described and defined in Paragraph 2 of the first amendment shall consist of 810.05, acres and not the acreage originally stated therein, which was the 822 and change?
A. 882 .

THE COURT: So it was changed to .-
THE WITNESS: 810. It went down because
there was adjustments.
THE COURT: But the 810.05 was still part of
the designated 1,950 ?
THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: Just to make sure we're
consistent.
THE WITNESS: And this agreement then
restates, introduces the concept of the per acre price now being reflective of that which was contained on the original exhibit, and therefore, in Paragraph 3, the price per acre was $\$ 43,076.92$.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Okay. Stay in Paragraph 2.

It also says, Certain land designated for development of custom lots pursuant to a separate agreement between the parties, the 250 acre parcel previously purchased by buyer at the initial closing, a

Page 198
portion of the first golf course to the west of Coyote Springs Parkway, and a portion of other areas
designated as commercial property pursuant to the
agreement which will be transferred to seller as
provided in the agreement.
What's happening here, the second portion of
the same paragraph? We reduced 882 to 810 . What's
going on here?
A. What you're doing here is we have created
custom lots, which I showed your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Around the golf course?
THE WITNESS: Around the golf course and said
by separate agreement, What do you want to do? And we
negotiated and said, okay, if you put in the
infrastructure to those custom lots, we'll sell them
and agree to split the proceeds in the following
fashion, and I believe it was 50/50.
by Mr. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Okay. And was there a purchase price
structure? In other words, how did that work if you're
gonna go 50/50 on developing and selling custom lots,
and maybe you sell them to Tull Brothers or you sell
them to somebody else, how do you get paid since you
own them originally?
A. By separate agreement when they're closing
Springs Parkway, and a portion of other areas

Page 199
per parcel, per lot sold. There would be proceeds that would be sent to Pardee and proceeds that would be sent to CSI.
Q. Earlier in the documents I saw where you retained for yourself and negotiated for Pardee what I call a custom lot enhancement or increase in price?
Q. I thought, if my recollection was right, it was one and a half times, one and a half times if -- it was a 50 percent increase in the basic price? MS. LUNDVALL: It's not a custom lot enhancement.

THE WITNESS: What we --
THE COURT: Does that refresh your recollection, or do you know what he's speaking of? THE WITNESS: No, I don't recall that, but I do recall what we negotiated. THE COURT: Okay. Well, that would help us. THE WITNESS: We negotiated. We negotiated a premium on each of those lots, and we agreed with respect to some of those lots that there would be a floor so that someone other than Pardee would come in, sell the house at a stated price, and not include a view premium or course premium unfairly to deprive the original seller of the benefits of the deal.

Page 200

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THE COURT: Of the bargain.
THE WITNESS: Pardee would nevex do that to
us, but if Pardee sold it to somebody else, they might
come in and just simply say that the price of the house
is 425 instead of the price of the house being 350,
because as compared to everything else along the
neighborhood, it was 350, and that they received a
$75,000, you know, increase.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. So how did you receive, if at all, how did
CSI received the custom lot premium?
    A. We haven't yet, and we haven't received any
of the premiums on the lots along the golf course,
because none have been sold.
    Q. Okay. But what was the agreement? What was
your premium increase?
    A. My understanding is that what we did is
billed that premium increase just for that, the price
of the lot, because all of those lots were under the
control of Paxdee and CSI.
    Q. All right. And then the proceeds, if and
when they're sold, will go 50/50?
    A. Yes. That's my recollection.
    Q. Do you remember how many custom lots are
affected on --
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District Court IV

Page 201
A. I don't recall how many, but we were, what we had determined was our value of the land was somewhat equivalent as to the cost of infrastructure, and therefore, the parties would basically, basically we'd throw in the land and they would throw in the improvements.
Q. All right. Thank you.

THE COURT: And that's a totally separate
agreement?
THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: It has nothing do with --
THE WITNESS: Not anything at all.
THE COURT: As far as our issues, I
understand what you're saying, nothing do with the
first Option Agreement?
THE WITNESS: No, no, your Honor
THE COURT: I wanted to clarify.
THE WITNESS: No. It was totally done as a
result of separate negotiations and separate agreements.
the court: Okay.
MS. LUNDVALL: While we're here, do you want
to cover Paragraph 6?
MR. J. J. JImmerson: You're not telling me
how to conduct my examination, are you?
District Court IV

Page 203
all of these parcels, all of these specific parcels now
have specific acreage next to their little name.
THE COURT: But that's all a separate
agreement?
THE WITNESS: Well, no, this includes .-
because, because we're including everything, your
Honor.
the court: yes.
THE WITNESS: We are counting everything
here, and the subtotal is --
THE COURT: I see it now.
THE WITNESS: If you take a look, we've
charged for the wash, we've charged for a park, we charged for, you know, everything that -- the highway. You take a look at who is who for what, and then each of those calculations, John I sat down and negotiated. For example, if you take a look at 93-1, the
number is 21,583 . By my calculation, it looks like it's 50 percent of the 43,000 , your Honor. THE COURT: I see. And that would be your negotiation? the witness: yes. And then you will see 30,000 down below for the washes, simply because I said, John, it's not fair, these are only half, let's negotiate a fair price for

Page 202

| along. <br> MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: I appreciate it. <br> BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: <br> Q. What else is being accomplished here in this <br> Exhibit Number 9, Amendment 4? <br> A. Well -- <br> Q. You modified the price as reflected in <br> Exhibit E, Paragraph 3? <br> A. Uh-huh. <br> Q. And what's happening with regard to the <br> \$12 million? What's happened here? <br> A. Well, what happened, we have a modified price per acre. <br> BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: <br> Q. Per acre. <br> A. What happened is we had calculated what the additional purchase, parcel price is, and it says it's $\$ 12,641,331$, which if you look at Exhibit A to the Parcel 1 acreage calculation of July 30th, 2007, at Bates Number 1121, your Honor. <br> THE COURT: Okay. There it is. <br> THE WITNESS: You'll see the custom lots. <br> There's a, there's total acreage, there's golf course lots, there's Highway 93, there's Lake Village Park, |
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District Court IV

Page 204

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your obligation to pay for the washes that are
necessary for you to build the lots that you're
building on. He said, Okay, that's fair, and we agreed
to 30,000.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. All right.
    a. And then the water campus you'll see is at
half price, and you add up all of those things on the
value, you come up with a subtotal of 22,964,408.
They've already paid $10,000. Now, at 810.05, you see,
your Honor, the subtotal?
    THE COURT: Hold on.
    Yes.
    THE WITNESS: Yes.
    THE COURT: Okay.
    THE WITNESS: And then across you'll see the
value of what the 810 would be in money.
    THE COURT: }12\mathrm{ million.
    THE WITNESS: And you subtract out
the }10\mathrm{ million you've already paid and then subtract
out a park credit, which they had already given to us,
so they don't pay us twice.
        THE COURT: Right.
    THE WITNESS: And you end up with a total of
$12,641,331, which means that they're buying, as of
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this date, that they're ahead of us. They have paid more for that the kitty than we've given them property for.

THE COURT: The property.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. Okay. Now, a couple of questions, first, do you recall that as it relates to custom lots, even though you had a separate agreement here --
A. Uh-huh.
Q. -- by 2007, do you recall the custom lots that were developed by Pardee were part of the definition of residential lots originally in May of 2004?
A. No.

MS. LUNDVALL: I'm going to object to that representation, because that's not the language of the agreement.

MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: Okay.
THE COURT: Do you have a recollection of it?
THE WITNESS: I specifically do.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: We would never have --
THE COURT: Based on that objection, as long
as Mr. Whittemore has a recollection of what's in
there, I don't -- can you tell us what you recall?
District Court IV


Page 206


District Court IV

District Court IV

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to the document in the Number 5, the amended and
restated agreement.
    Q. All right.
    A. And every single planning document referred
to what Pardee got as single-family production lots.
    Q. Okay.
person -- I was never going to designate the land
custom lots for pardee. The custom lots were gonna be
retained. Just because I said, Well, if you allow us
to do so, we can, that's fine, but we were never -- and
that's why I explained it, we were never going to give
up the custom lots without us negotiating something
else for it.
Q. Within Exhibit 2, where does it state you were never going to give them custom lots when their definition in this contract that you signed speaks to their residential properties including custom lots on which they build houses?
MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor, once again, I'm
gonna have to object. He keeps making reference to
custom lots. It's a reference to custom homes.
THE COURT: Homes?
MS. LUNDVALL: There is a difference between custom homes and custom lots.
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District Court IV


District Court IV


District Court IV

|  | Page 21 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 1 2 3 4 5 6 | ```look at it, okay? You've referenced to Page 2, Bates 082. Could you take your time and look at that? BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: Q. In the middle of the page, same language, As used in this agreement, are you with me?``` |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | A. Yes. <br> Q. As used in this agreement, the term "production residential property" means that portion of the net useable acres as defined below that encompasses all of the Purchase Property and Option Property, which includes, without limitation, all single-family detached production residential lots, which shall include single-family detached production residential lots on which custom homes are constructed by buyer. <br> I don't see an amendment for that Exhibit 2, <br> do you? <br> A. Mr. Jimmerson, the language provides the following: If I've designated a lot, a single-family production lot, and it's on the golf course, and I give them the approval that it can become a custom lot under any sense of the word, that would be a land purchase for which your clients would be entitled a commission, based upon your statements to me that they're entitled to commissions on residential production homes. |

District Court IV

Page 212
The custom homes referenced here are those
which require a two step process, not a one step process.

A one step process, your Honor, is I own it, I designate it as a custom, I designate it as a custom lot.

THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: And in the example that
Mr. Jimmerson is going to, I would designate is as a single-family production lot, and he would come back and ask for my consent to come in and say, I would now like, based upon what I see, to turn these
single-family production homes into custom lots. I had the absolute right to say, No, because single-family homes on custom lots was retained by me as part of the negotiations.

They could, if -- just because it's an allowed use does not mean that the owner gives up his right to say, Stop, to say, Even though this is an allowed use. I'm telling you you cannot do this at this time, and that's what this process was all about, was the control that we had on designating what went on on the particular site.

THE COURT: And when you say, "you," you mean CSI?
page 21.3

Page 214
particular piece of land so that we could guarantee that it gave flexibility to pardee but did not ruin or change the area plan we had devised.

And so, your Honor, what we did, and again

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this happens every day in my business, if someone comes
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in and says, Harvey, we planned this, we want to change
it, I'm certainly not going to allow someone who pays
$\$ 43,000$ an acre for a single-family home to come in and
say, I'm turning it into commercial that's worth
$\$ 500,000$ without me getting my little piece of the
action. That's the reality.
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
Q. I'm with you.
All I'm saying to you is that when you sold
-- we know when you sold residential production
residential property to Pardee?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. You did not retain, at least under the
terms of the agreement that I read, the ability to veto
their use of, their construction of lots for custom
homes?
A. I, I -- Jim, Mr. Jimmerson.
MS. LUNDVALL: Your Honor?
THE COURT: Let him answer.
THE WITNESS: I don't know whether it's, I

Page 215

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don't know whether it's in any of the documents that
you have in front of you. I don't have a clue of all
the things that have been put together or haven't been
put together, and I don't have any documentation in
front of me that says this is the agreement that does
A, B, C, D, and E
    What I do know is that by agreement, Pardee
and CSI agreed that no use that was designated could be
changed without the approval of the other if it
impacted a particular use or the valuation, because
Mr. Jimmerson, can you imagine Coyote Springs
controlling the commercial parts of this parcel and
immediately deciding that they thought that they could,
under their master plan amendments and their
development agreement, to put in a pig farm?
BY MR. J. J. JIMMERSON:
    Q. Next to custom homes, I'm with you.
    A. So there's zero chance that in that, in the
documentation and the relationships of the parties,
that you would have a circumstance where somebody could
use property in a way that harmed the other or to take
advantage of the other.
    Q. I'm with you.
    How many custom lots are allocated for pardee
to build?
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District Court IV

Page 216

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A. I believe the custom lots, I believe that the
total number of lots within that area might be like 72
or something
    Q. I thought it was less, right.
        And my understanding of your testimony, they
have not yet been constructed; is that right?
    A. They have not been sold. There has been work
done on the lots, rough grading, and no, I don't know
of any.
    Q. But no foundations and no sales?
    A. Nothing.
    MR. J. J. JIMMERSON: That's fine.
    Thank you very much.
    (End of the confidential portion of the
    Transcript.)
    THE COURT: Mr. Jimmerson? Mr. Jimmerson,
who's your next witness?
    MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: Jim Wolfram, your Honor
    THE COURT: Okay, where are my notes?
    THE CLERK: Please remain standing and raise
your right hand.
            JAMES F. WOLFRAM,
having been duly sworn to tell the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, was examined and
testified as follows:
```

Mr. Wolfram, you said we would need to multiply the scale of one inch to 600 feet to get how many feet from US Highway 93 to the easternmost edge of Parcel 2?
A. You could be 15 and $3 / 8$ times the scale, times the scale, and that will tell you how many feet we got in there.
Q. Okay. Can you please tell us how many feet that is, if you've got a calculator in front of you?
A. Go ahead and do it. You've got it in your hand.

MR. J.M. JIMMERSON: If there's no objection?
THE WITNESS: It's simple math, inches times, you know.

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Could we offer 9,225 feet, subject to defense counsel's confirmation? Six times -- 9,000 plus $3 / 8$ of six hundred is $225,9.225$. BY MR. J.M. JIMMERSON:
Q. Okay. Mr. Wolfram, from that calculation, are you able to draw a conclusion as to whether or not Parcel 2 is entirely within the bounds of Purchase Property or Parcel 1 of that Map 9857?
A. It's outside the bounds of Parcel 1.
Q. How do you know that?
A. From yesterday, it's nearly 8,000 feet, and
this is over 9,000 feet.
Q. So if I were to subtract 9,225 from 8,000?
A. It would give you the number of feet to the south side of the parcel.
Q. So approximately 1,225 feet?
A. Right.
Q. Thank you, Mr. Wolfram.

Mr. Wolfram, the next map, excuse me, the next line below says, Parcel LP-1 of Book 138, Page 51 of Plats.

Does that mean there's a plat map entitled "Book 138, Page 51"?
A. Let me get my bearings.

THE COURT: It's the second line down. It's below Parcel 2 on the same map. BY MR. J.M. JIMMERSON:
Q. I'm sorry, I'm back to Exhibit 10. I apologize, Mr. Wolfram.
A. Oh, okay.

THE COURT: It has the next description.
THE WITNESS: That was it right there. BY MR. J.M. JIMMERSON:
Q. Okay. Mr. Wolfram, have you looked at Plat Map Book 138, Page 51?
A. Yes.

21
4
necessary.
THE COURT: Okay.

Loree Murray, CCR \#426
THE COURT: Okay.



EXHIBIT E

## DISTRICT COURT

## CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

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JAMES WOLFRAM,
    PLAINTIFF,
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    vs.
    PARDEE HOMES OF NEVADA,
DEFENDANT.
CASE NO. A-10-632338-C
)
TRANSCRIPT
OF
TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE HONORABLE KERRY L. EARLEY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
HELD ON WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 30, 2013
AT 8:30 A.M.
APPEARANCES :
For the Plaintiff: JAMES J. JIMMERSON, ESQ.
JAMES M. JIMMERSON, ESQ.
For the Defendant:
PATRICIA K. LUNDVALL, ESQ.
AARON D. SHIPLEY, ESQ.
Reported by: Loree Murray, CCR No. 426
in this litigation, and how can he comment about what she knows we've never seen?

THE WITNESS: The answer is no.
THE COURT: Hold on, let's address the objection.

Can't we just say, Under this Commission Agreement, do you feel you are entitled to a commission for multifamily property?

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: That is a different question, your Honor. That sounds very appropriate.

THE COURT: Can we ask that question? That's
what this whole case is about, is this Commission Agreement. That's all I can deal with, because that's what's in front of me.

THE WITNESS: I think I know what the question is.

THE COURT: I hope so. Don't ask me to rephrase.

THE WITNESS: I do think we're entitled to other, more commission.

MS. LUNDVALL: No, hold on.
THE COURT: Based on -- I'm sorry.
BY MS. LUNDVALL:
Q. What I'm trying to ask is --

THE COURT: Not taking it over. I apologize.

Agreement that says you're entitled to commissions on golf course property?
A. No, but it was our understanding we were gonna get the whole commission.
Q. And is there anyplace in the Commission Agreement that says that you're entitled to commissions on the custom lots?
A. No, but that's single-family, and we should get those.
Q. What $I$ want to do is turn your attention then back to Exhibit 17, Mr. Wilkes.
A. Sure.

17?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. So we're still in the same place.

I guess I'm confused here. I don't see a 17.
Q. And your point is well made, sir. I don't want to confuse you. Let's see if I can --

THE COURT: 17 is -- I thought it was what's on the screen.

THE WITNESS: I have arthritis on my whole body, I can't turn my neck.

MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Judge, 17 is the same as AA.

BY MS. LUNDVALL:

Page 2, Mr. Wilkes.
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. Now, at Page 2, you're gonna see a sentence in that first full paragraph, and $I$ will read it aloud.

As of this date, Pardee has not exercised any
option to purchase the Option Property.
Did I read that correctly?
A. You did.
Q. All right. Did you believe that?
A. No.
Q. Did you trust him?
A. No.
Q. So you didn't trust him at the beginning, and you didn't trust him at this point in time either, correct?
A. I didn't trust them from the point where they tried to take the extra money from us. I thought we might have money coming.
Q. I'm gonna go on. The second sentence reads: As required by the agreement, we'll provide you with copies of each written option exercise notice in a timely fashion.

Did I read that correctly?
A. You read it correctly.
Q. Mr. Lash is making that statement to you,
A. I think we are, personally, okay? They've gone outside of this. They've gone around, they've done this, taken that right turn on the property. I think that even though they've got -- I think we're entitled to commission on the single lots, the single-family lots, and I think we're entitled, I think we should be entitled to commission on the multifamily too, because we sold them the whole property.
Q. I understand that, and I understand kind of the basis for the agreement, but under the agreement, just talking about the terms of the agreement, are you eligible for commissions on property that isn't designated for production residential property?
A. Yeah, or anything else, that Option Property.
Q. Yes, but within Option Property, are you eligible for commissions for property that is not production residential?
A. In my opinion, yes.
Q. Okay. Mr. Wilkes, please flip to the different, different binder, Defendant's binder for Exhibit A.
A. This?
Q. Yeah.
A. Okay.
Q. Yeah.


## EXHIBIT F

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\begin{gathered}
\text { Jennifer D. Church, CCR No. } 568 \\
\text { District Court, Dept. IV }
\end{gathered}
$$

change. But it is an unreasonable position and a breach of contract to think that you can adversely affect my clients' rights to a commission by making a later deal between the parties that would change defined terms and entitlement to money and sequence of construction which would lead to different calculations of commission because of the fact that Option Property is paid on a different formula than Purchase Property was paid.

Purchase Property was a percentage of the $\$ 84$ million, four percent up to $\$ 50$ million and one and a half percent above $\$ 50$ million to $\$ 84$ million, whereas Purchase Property was property that was being acquired and developed, that it would be one and a half percent times $\$ 40,000$ per acre times the number of acres. So the math is very different depending upon your finding as what was purchased by these parties.

So while we say within Exhibit $A$ that there has been, and through the testimony of our clients, Mr. Wolfram and Mr. Wilkes, there has been a payment of the appropriate percentage of the $\$ 84$ million to the plaintiffs if all $\$ 84$ million of property is found by the Court to be Purchase Property, it is not the right calculation if the Court finds that some or a portion of the 2,100 acres was, indeed, Option Property for which they would be paid a different formula and a different

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\begin{gathered}
\text { Jennifer D. Church, CCR No. } 568 \\
\text { District Court, Dept. IV }
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sum.
What I'm suggesting to the court, though, is the legal principle that $I$ think the Court would find acceptable is that by signing the Amended and Restated Option Agreement, Exhibit 5, and canceling, superseding, replacing -- the verbs used by these witnesses before you starting with Mr. Lash and thereafter -- the original Option Agreement, Exhibit 2, by Exhibit 5, they cannot adversely affect the rights of our clients to a commission.

That is where -- that is the folly of Pardee Homes of Nevada, Inc.'s position throughout the nine days of trial that we've been working together in this matter. Because they believe, as they've testified, we knew that boundaries would change, that the direction of which building might change -- they didn't say they knew it would change, but they were going to be flexible enough to change, and that was the testimony.

Mr. Whittemore was humorous enough to note, Listen, I'm here to entice them to buy more property, as much as $I$ can get them to buy. Mr. Andrews confirmed that this morning saying that Mr. Whittemore would sell them anything that they would be interested in that Mr. Whittemore's company had an interest in, from water rights to all types of other aspects, golf course, the

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\begin{gathered}
\text { Jennifer D. Church, CCR No. } 568 \\
\text { District Court, Dept. IV }
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MR. J.J. JIMMERSON: Thank your staff.
MS. LUNDVALL: Thank you, Your Honor.
-000-
ATTEST: FULL, TRUE AND ACCURATE TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS.

JENNIFER D. CHURCH, CCR. No. 568, RPR

## EXHIBIT G

321 P.3d 875
Supreme Court of Nevada.

JUN LIU, Appellant, v .

CHRISTOPHER HOMES, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; and Christopher Homes Ridges, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liabiliy Company, Respondents.

No. 61435.
I
March 27, 2014.

## Sybopsis

Background: Subcontractor brought action against general contractor, developer, and homeowners seeking to foreclose on its liens Appeal from a district court judgment in a real property action. Homeowner filed cross-claim against general contractor and developer asserting breach of contract and sought attorney fees and costs incurred in defending against subcontractor's action. The District Court, Clark County, Susan Johnson, J., 2012 WL 8883479, following dismissal of subcontractor's claims after parties entered into stipulated agreement, denied homeowner's attorney fee claim. Homeowner appealed.
[Bolding:] The Supreme Court, Saitta, J., held that homeowner could recover attorney fees as special damages that were purportedly sustained in defending herself against subcontractor's suit that was allegedly caused by developer's breach of contract with homeowner.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Gibbons, C.J., filed dissenting opinion.

West Headnotes (6)

## [1] Appeal and Error

## *: Cases Triable in Appellate Court

Arguments concerning the district court's application of caselaw to claims for attorney fees are legal issues that are reviewed de novo.

3 Cases that cite this headnote

## Coses

* American rule; necessity of contractual or statutory authorization or grounds in equity


## Bamages

$$
\% \text { Elements of damages in general }
$$

Generally, attorney fees are not recoverable absent authority under a statute, rule, or contract; but, as an exception to the general rule, attorney fees may be awarded as special damages in limited circumstances.

1 Cases that cite this headnote
(3] Queting Titfe
*. Form of remedy
Generally, an action to clarify or remove a cloud on title is either an action in equity or an action for declaratory relief.

Cases that cite this headnote

## [4] Damages

* Litigation with third persons

Homeowner could recover attorney fees as special damages that were purportedly sustained in defending herself against subcontractor's suit that was allegedly caused by developer's breach of contract to convey good and marketable title to homeowner.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

## Damages

\% Litigation with third persons
A party to a contract may recover from a breaching party the attorney fees that arise from the breach that caused the former party to accrue attorney fees in defending himself or herself against a third party's legal action.

Cases that cite this headnote
[6] Appeal and Error
$\%$ Authority to find facts

Supreme Court does not resolve matters of fact for the first time on appeal.

Cases that cite this headnote

## Attorneys and Law Firmbs

*876 Pengilly Robbins Slater and James W. Pengilly and Craig D. Slater, Las Vegas, for Appellant.

The Hayes Law Firm and Dale A. Hayes, Jr., Las Vegas, for Respondents.

Before GIBBONS, C.J., DOUGLAS and SAITTA, JJ.

## OPINION

By the Court, SAITTA, J.:
The court in Sandy Valley Associates v. Sky Ranch Estates Owners Association stated that when a defendant's breach of contract with a plaintiff causes the plaintiff to incur attorney fees in his or her defense in a legal dispute that is brought by another party, the plaintiff can recover from the defendant the attorney fees as damages that arose from the breach of the contract. 117 Nev. 948, 957, 35 P. $3 \mathrm{~d} 964,970$ (2001). The Sandy Valley court also stated, "Attorney fees may ... be awarded as damages in those cases in which a party incurred the fee ... in clarifying or removing a cloud upon the title to property." Id. The court in Horgan v. Felton retreated from this latter statement about the recovery of attorney fees in cloud-on-title cases, stating that "in cases concerning title to real property, attorney fees are only allowable as special damages in slander of title actions, not merely when a cloud on the title to real property exists." 123 Nev. $577,579,170$ P.3d 982, 983 (2007). It held that slander of title was a prerequisite for a plaintiff to "recover as damages the expense of legal proceedings necessary to remove a cloud on the plaintiff's title." Id. at $584-85,170$ P. 3 d at 987.

Here the district court relied on Horgan in denying appellant Jun Liu's specially pleaded request to recover attorney fees from respondents Christopher Homes Ridges, LLC (CHR), and Christopher Homes, LLC (CH), concluding that because the breach of contract related to title to real property, and because Liu failed to allege and prove slander of title, she could not recover the attorney fees that she sought as special damages. We conclude that the district court erred in rejecting
as a matter of law Liu's claim for attorney fees as special damages, as Horgan does not apply to preclude such recovery here. Although Horgan held that slander of title must be pleaded as a prerequisite for a party to recover attorney fees as damages in an action to clarify or remove a cloud on title to real property, that opinion did not retreat from the portion of Sandy Valley which held that a party, such as Liu, may recover attorney fees incurred in defending against third-party litigation because of CHR's or CH's breach of contract. Horgan, 123 Nev. at $583-86,170$ P. $3 d$ at $986-$ 88. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's judgment to the extent that it denied Liu's request for special damages and affirm all other aspects of the district court's judgment. We remand this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

## FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Liu's appeal only challenges the district court's legal determinations regarding the recovery of attorney fees as special damages. Thus, our discussion of the facts is based on the district court's findings of fact, which Liu does not contest or seek to undo on appeal.

CHR was the developer of a residential community that hired CH as a general contractor for the construction of homes within its community. CH subcontracted with K \& D Construction, LLC, for various construction services. One of the homes upon which $\mathrm{K} \& \mathrm{D}$ performed its services was Liu's. Liu had purchased the home from CHR pursuant to a contract (the Agreement), wherein CHR agreed to convey good and marketable title to Liu at the close of escrow. As K \& D performed its construction services at CHR's residential community, K \& D was neither timely nor fully paid. As a result, $\mathrm{K} \& \mathrm{D}$ recorded liens on various properties within CHR's residential community, including Liu's property.

In addition, $\mathrm{K} \& \mathrm{D}$ filed a civil action against $\mathrm{CHR}, \mathrm{CH}$, Liu, and other homeowners. In its complaint, K \& D sought to *877 foreclose on its liens on numerous properties, including Liu's property. Liu filed an answer to K \& D's complaint and a cross-claim against CHR and CH. She asserted a breach of contract claim against CHR and CH, alleging that they breached their duty under the Agreement to deliver good and marketable title when they failed to pay the debts to K \& D that resulted in a lien on her property. Under this claim, Liu tried to recover from CHR and CH the attorney fees and costs that she allegedly incurred in defending herself
against K \& D's action. She also sought attorney fees that she incurred in prosecuting her claim for attorney fees.
$\mathrm{K} \& \mathrm{D}, \mathrm{CHR}$, and CH entered into a stipulated agreement that resolved the payments of the outstanding balances owed to K \& D, dismissed K \& D's claims against Liu, and resulted in the discharge and removal of $K \& D$ 's liens. After the dismissal of K \& D's claims, Liu's claims against CHR and CH remained, including the claim to recover attorney fees as damages that allegedly arose from the breach of the Agreement.

Before the district court, Liu contended that, pursuant to Sandy Valley, she could recover attorney fees as special damages that were caused by the breach of the Agreement by CH and CHR. The district court determined otherwise, concluding that CHR, not CH , possessed and breached a contractual duty to deliver good and marketable title to Liu when a lien was imposed on Liu's property because of unpaid debts to K \& D. Relying on Horgan, the district court resolved that, as a matter of law, Liu could not recover attorney fees as special damages. According to the district court's interpretation of Horgan, Liu was required to prove slander of title in order to recover attorney fees as special damages, which the district court found that she failed to do. As a result, Liu filed this appeal challenging the district court's determinations regarding the recovery of attorney fees as special damages.

## DISCUSSION

Liu argues that the district court erred in relying on Horgan for its conclusion that her failure to assert and prevail on a slander of title claim prevented her from recovering attorney fees as special damages in an action that related to the title to real property. She contends that Horgan does not bar a party from recovering attorney fees as special damages when the civil action incidentally pertains to title to real property. Liu reads Horgan to disallow attorney fees that stem from an action in which a claimant tries to remove a cloud on title but fails to prove slander of title. She emphasizes that she did not seek attorney fees as special damages from an action to remove a cloud on title but rather as special damages that resulted from CHR's breach of contract. Liu argues that Sandy Valley permits the recovery of attorney fees as special damages that arise from a breach of contract and thus her attorney fees claim below was not barred as a matter of law.

CHR and CH respond that the district court did not err in finding against Liu on her claim for recovery of attorney fees as special damages. They read Horgan to provide that a party, such as Liu, who fails to assert and prevail on a slander of title claim in an action relating to the title to real property cannot recover attorney fees as special damages.
[1] These arguments indicate that there is confusion over (a) Sandy Valley's and Horgan's effect on the law regarding the recovery of attorney fees as special damages and (b) the extent to which Horgan retreated from Sandy Valley's discussion about the grounds for recovering attorney fees as special damages. We take this opportunity to clarify our precedent. In so doing, because the arguments concern the district court's application of caselaw to Liu's claims for attorney fees, we review these legal issues de novo. ${ }^{1}$ See Thomas $\mathfrak{v}$. City of N. Las Vegas, 122 Nev. 82, 90, 127 P. $3 \mathrm{~d} 1057,1063$ (2006)
*878 (providing that a denial of attorney fees is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion but that de novo review applies when an attorney fees matter concerns questions of law).

## Horgan's partial abrogation of Sandy Valley

[2] Generally, attorney fees are not recoverable "absent authority under a statute, rule, or contract." Albios v. Horizon Communities, Inc., 122 Nev. 409, 417, 132 P. 3 d 1022 , 1028 (2006). But, "[a]s an exception to the general rule," attorney fees may be awarded "as special damages in limited circumstances." Horgan, 123 Nev. at 583, 170 P. 3 d at 986.

The court in Sandy Valley made three significant statements about the grounds for recovering attorney fees as special damages. 117 Nev at $956-57,35$ P. 3 d at 969-70. First, the court stated that attorney fees may be recovered as special damages when they are pleaded as such pursuant to NRCP $9(\mathrm{~g})$ and are a "natural and proximate consequence of the injurious conduct." $I d$. at $956-57,35$ P.3d at 969 . Second, the court explained that
[a]ttorney fees may be an element of damage in cases when a plaintiff becomes involved in a third-party legal dispute as a result of a breach of contract ... [and] [t]he fees incurred in defending ... the third-party action could be damages in the proceeding between the plaintiff and the defendant [who breached the contract].

Id. at 957, 35 P. 3 d at 970 . Third, the Sandy Valley court stated the following about the recovery of attorney fees as special damages in actions concerning a cloud on title to real property: "[a]ttorney fees may ... be awarded as damages in those cases in which a party incurred the fees ... in clarifying or removing a cloud upon the title to property." $I d$.

The Horgan court revisited Sandy Valley in addressing a matter involving the recovery of attorney fees that were accumulated in seeking declaratory relief to remove a cloud on title to real property. Horgan, 123 Nev . at 579-80, $583-86,170$ P. 3 d at $983-84,986-88$. In clarifying Sandy Valley, the Horgan court retreated from the third statement above concerning the award of attorney fees in cloud-on-title actions. Horgan, 123 Nev. at $579,585,170$ P. 3 d at $983,988$. In doing so, it did not retreat from the Sandy Valley court's position regarding the recovery of attorney fees as damages that are caused by injurious conduct or a breach of contract. ld. Disapproving of Sandy Valley's broad statement that " '[a]ttorney fees may ... be awarded as damages in those cases in which a party incurred the fees ... in clarifying or removing a cloud upon the title to property,' " the Horgan court stated that "in cases concerning title to real property, attorney fees are only allowable as special damages in slander of title actions, not merely when a cloud on the title to real property exists." Id. at $579,583,170$ P.3d at 983, 986 (alterations in original) (second emphasis added) (quoting Sandy Valley, 117 Nev , at $957,35 \mathrm{P} .3 \mathrm{dat} 970$ ). When read in isolation, this statement conveys that in any action that merely relates to title, clarification of title, or removal of a cloud on title to real property, a party can recover attorney fees as special damages only if he or she asserts and prevails on a slander of title claim. See id. Thus, when read by itself, this statement appears to support the district court's determination that Liu could not recover attorney fees.

However, the meaning and effect of Horgan cannot be ascertained by reading one statement to the exclusion of the rest of the opinion. See Orr v. Allen, 248 U.S. 35, 36, 39 S.Ct. 23, 63 L.Ed. 109 (1918) (indicating that language in an opinion must not to be taken out of context or segregated from the remainder of the opinion); Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 585 (1st Cir.1979) ("Different sections of an opinion should be read as consistent with each other."). Rather, Horgan "must be read as a whole, without particular portions read in isolation, [so as] to discern the parameters of its holding." Fisher v. Big Y Foods, Inc, 298 Com. 414, 3 A. $3 \mathrm{~d} 919,926-27$ (2010).

The remainder of the Horgan court's opinion indicates that it did not hold that a party in any matter that relates to title to real property must prevail on a slander of title claim in order to recover attorney fees as $* 879$ special damages. 123 Nev. at 583-86, 170 P.3d at 986-88. Rather, the Horgan court contemplated a party's ability to recover attorney fees as special damages that were incurred in a specific type of civil action that is brought by that party: an action to clarify or remove a cloud on title. Id.

The Horgan court stated that a "plaintiff may recover as damages the expense of legal proceedings necessary to remove a cloud on the plaintiff's title" when he or she prevails on a slander of title claim. $1 d$. at $584-85,170$ P. 3 d at 987 (emphasis added). It stated that "attorney fees are only available as special damages in slander of title actions and not simply when a litigant seeks to remove a cloud upon title." Id . at 586,170 P.3d at 988 (emphasis added). In asserting these conclusions, the Horgan court primarily relied on authorities that permit the award of attorney fees as special damages to parties who brought claims to clarify or remove a cloud on title, accrued attorney fees in bringing those claims, and prevailed on a slander of title claim. See id. at 584-86, 170P.3d at 987-88 (citing: Wright v. Rogers, 172 Cal.App. $2 \mathrm{~d} 349,342$ P. $2 \mathrm{~d} 447,449,457$ (1959) (providing that in an action to remove a cloud on title, the plaintiff may recover attorney fees as special damages if he or she prevails on a slander of title claim); Price $v$. Tyler, 890 So. 2 d 246 , $248-49,251,253$ (Fla.2004) (explaining that parties cannot recover attorney fees as special damages that were accrued in declaratory relief and quiet title actions absent a slander of title); Rayl v. Shull Enters., Inc., 108 Idaho 524, 700 P. 2 d 567,573 (1984) (concluding that a plaintiff who sought to remove a cloud on his title was entitled to attorney fees as special damages that arose from the slander of title); Paulson v. Kustom Enters., Inc, 157 Mont. 188, 483 P. 2 d 708 , 71516 (1971) (remanding a matter to allow parties to recover attorney fees accrued in removing a cloud on title resulting from slander); Den-Gar Enters. v. Romero, 94 N.M. 425, 611 P.2d 1119, 1121, 1124 (N.M.Ct.App.1980) (providing that plaintiffs who sought to remove a cloud on title through a quiet title action could recover attorney fees under a slander of title claim); Peckham v. Hirschfeld, 570 A.2d 663, 667-70 (R.I.1990) (providing the same); Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., 116 Utab 106, 208 P. $2 \mathrm{~d} 956,958-59$ (1949) (concluding that a plaintiff was entitled to special damages, including attorney fees, in an action to remove a cloud on his title because the defendant slandered it); and Rorvig v. Douglas, 123 Wash. 2 d 854, 873 P. $2 \mathrm{~d} 492,494,497-98$ (1994) (providing the same)).
[3] Thus, the Horgan court's holding that one must prevail on a slander of title claim to recover attorney fees as special damages is one that applies to the recovery of attorney fees that are accrued from pursuing an action to clarify or remove a cloud on title. Generally, an action to clarify or remove a cloud on title is either an action in equity or an action for declaratory relief. See MacDonald v. Krause, 77 Nev. 312, 317-18, 362 P.2d 724, 727 (1961) (identifying actions to quiet title and to remove clouds on title as actions in equity); Kress v. Corey, 65 Nev. 1, 25-26, 189 P. 2 d 352 , 363-64 (1948) (stating that a cloud on title may be removed by a declaratory judgment). Hence, when discussing the recovery of attorney fees as damages that arose from actions to clarify or remove a cloud on title, the Horgan court was not concluding that a slander of title claim is a prerequisite to recovering attorney fees as special damages in all civil actions that relate to title to real property. See 123 Nev, at $579,583-86,170$ P. 3 d at $983,986-88$. Rather, as revealed by its language and the authorities it relied on, the Horgan court held that slander of title is a prerequisite to a party's recovery of attorney fees that were amassed in asserting claims to clarify or remove a cloud on title, such as declaratory or equitable relief claims. $I d$.

In explaining its analysis and conclusions, the Horgan court stated that when a plaintiff incurs attorney fees as a result of a defendant's intentional effort to cloud title, the plaintiff deserves the fees because he or she had no choice but to litigate. Id. at 585-86, 170 P.3d at 987-88. Otherwise, absent slander of title, the plaintiff shoulders the debt for the attorney fees that he or she risked accruing when deciding to clarify or remove a cloud on title by suing the defendant. See id.
*880 [\$] Here, Liu was not a plaintiff who incurred attorney fees by asserting equitable or declaratory relief claims to clarify or remove a cloud on title. Rather, she pleaded to recover attorney fees as special damages that she allegedly incurred defending against K \& D's civil action as a result of CHR's breach of the Agreement. Thus, the attorney fees that Liu incurred in her defense against K \& D's action and her claim for attorney fees were not within the purview of Horgan's requirement that a party who brought an action to clarify or remove a cloud on title must prove slander of title in order to recover the attorney fees that he or she incurred in the action. See Horgan, 123 Nev. at 583-86, 170 P.3d at 986-88.

The portion of Sandy Valley that Horgan did not overturn
[5] When revisiting and abrogating Sandy Valley, the Horgan court only overturned the analysis and conclusion in Sandy Valley that concerned the recovery of attorney fees that are accumulated in actions to clarify or remove a cloud on title to real property. Horgan, 123 Nev . at $579,583-86,170 \mathrm{P} .3 \mathrm{~d}$ at 983,986-88. The court did not retreat from Sandy Valley ' $s$ conclusion that a party to a contract may recover, as special damages, the attorney fees that arise from another party's breach of the contract when the breach causes the former party to incur attorney fees in a legal dispute brought by a third party. See Horgan, 123 Nev, at 579, 583-86, 170 P. 3 d at 983,986-88 (omitting from its discussion Sandy Valley 's language that concerns the recovery of attorney fees as special damages that arise from a breach of contract); Sandy Valley, 117 Nev. at 957,35 P. 3 d at 970 . Thus, this portion of Sandy Valley was not undercut by Horgan. In unity with the various jurisdictions that have held the same, we maintain that a party to a contract may recover from a breaching party the attorney fees that arise from the breach that caused the former party to accrue attorney fees in defending himself or herself against a third party's legal action. See, e.g., Masonic Temple Ass'n of Crawfordsville v. Ind. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 837 N.E. $2 d 1032,1039$ (Ind.Ct. App.2005) (providing that when the defendant's breach of contract caused the plaintiff to engage in litigation with another party, the attorney fees from that litigation "may be recovered as an element of ... damages from [the] defendant's breach of contract"); Pac. Coast Title Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident \& Indem. Co, 7 Utah $2 \mathrm{~d} 377,325$ P. $2 \mathrm{~d} 906,907-08$ (1958) (providing the same); Fid. Nat'l Title Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. S. Heritage Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 257 Va. 246, 512 S.E. 2 d 553 , 558 (1999) (concluding that attorney fees incurred in litigation caused by a party's breach of contract can be recovered as special damages); Kremers-Urban Co. v. Am. Emp'rs Ins. Co., 119 Wis. $2 \mathrm{~d} 722,351$ N.W. $2 \mathrm{~d} 156,168$ (1984) (recognizing that attorney fees and expenses incurred in third-party litigation are recoverable "when they are the natural and proximate result of the breach of contract or other wrongful act" that caused the plaintiff to be involved in litigation with other parties).

In light of the above, Sandy Valley permits, and Horgan does not bar, Liu's claim to recover attorney fees as special damages that were purportedly sustained in defending herself against K \& D's suit, which was allegedly caused by CHR's breach of the Agreement. Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in relying on Horgan to conclude that Liu cannot recover attorney fees as special damages. ${ }^{2}$
*881 The district court must revisit Liu's claim for attorney fees
[6] Determining whether a party's breach of contract caused another party to incur attorney fees in defending himself or herself from a third party's complaint involves factual inquiries. See Frantz v. Johnson, 116 Nev. 455, 468, 999 P. 2 d 351,359 (2000) (indicating that causation is an issue of fact). In our appellate capacity, we do not resolve matters of fact for the first time on appeal. See Round Hill Gen. Improvement Dist. v. Newman, 97 Nev. 601, 604, 637 P.2d 534, 536 (1981) (noting that "an appellate court is not an appropriate forum in which to resolve disputed questions of fact").

When the district court determined that Horgan barred Liu's claim to recover attorney fees as special damages, it also found that CHR breached its contract with Liu by leaving its debts to K \& D unpaid. But, because it erroneously reasoned that Horgan disposed of Liu's attorney fees claim as a matter of law, the district court did not resolve whether the evidence before it proved that CHR's breach of the Agreement caused Liu to accumulate the attorney fees in defending her interests against K \& D's suit. We do not resolve this factual issue that the district court did not reach, as doing so would require us to inappropriately weigh the evidence and resolve questions of fact for the first time on appeal. It is up to the district court on remand to resolve these questions.

## CONCLUSION

In light of our analysis and determinations above, we reverse the district court's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
judgment on Liu's claim for the recovery of attorney fees as special damages that allegedly arose from CHR's breach of the Agreement. ${ }^{3}$ All other aspects of the district court's judgment are affirmed. We remand this matter for further proceedings that are consistent with this opinion.

I concur: DOUGLAS, J.

GIBBONS, C.J., dissenting:
As the majority notes, we concluded in Horgan v. Felton, $123 \mathrm{Nev}, 577,579,170 \mathrm{P} .3 \mathrm{~d} 982,983$ (2007), that "in cases concerning title to real property, attorney fees are only allowable as special damages in slander of title actions, not merely when a cloud on the title to real property exists." In Horgan, the concurrence noted that there are other types of cases that allow attorney fees as damages, such as "actions for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, wrongful attachment, trademark infringement, false imprisonment or arrest." Id. at 587, 170 P. 3 d at 989 (Maupin, J., concurring). Breach of contract is not one of the exceptions specified in Horgan and should fall into the same category as actions to quiet title. This would further address our concern in Horgan that the scope of real property cases where attorney fees are available as special damages was "inadvertently expanded." Id. at 586,170 P. 3 d at 988 . For this reason, I conclude that the district court correctly interpreted the holding of Horgan, and I would affirm the district court's denial of attorney fees.

## Aus Citations

321 P.3d 875, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 17

## Footnotes

1 In addition to the arguments above, CHR contends that the district court rejected Liu's claim for attorney fees for reasons other than its interpretation and application of caselaw, such as insufficient evidence to support Liu's claim that the breach of the Agreement caused her to incur attorney fees in defending herself against $K \& D$ 's action. This contention lacks merit because the district court rejected Liu's attorney fees claim solely as a matter of law.
2 It appears that Liu also relies on Sandy Valley for the contention that she can recover attorney fees and costs that she incurred when prosecuting her claim against CHR to recover attorney fees as special damages-in addition to the attorney fees that she incurred when defending herself against K \& D's action. Sandy Valley does not support this contention. See 117 Nev. at 957,35 P. 3 d at 970 . It only provides for the recovery of attorney fees as special damages that are incurred in defending against third-party litigation that is caused by a breach of contract. Id. Because Liu has not provided any other salient authority in support of her argument, we do not address the recovery of attorney fees and costs that are incurred when prosecuting a claim for attorney fees as special damages. Edwards v. Emperor's Qarden Rest., 122 Nev. 317,330 n. 38,130 P. 301280,1288 n. 38 (2006) (providing that this court need not address an argument that is not cogently made).

3 The dissent disagrees with our conclusions, relying on a concurrence in Horgan which noted that there are claims, other than slander of title, under which a party can recover attorney fees as special damages, such as "actions for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, wrongful attachment, trademark infringement, false imprisonment or arrest." 123 Nev . at 587, 170 P.3d at $988-89$ (Maupin, J., concurring). The dissent appears to conclude that because the Horgan concurrence did not include a breach of contract claim within its list, it is persuasive authority that attorney fees that arise from a breach of contract cannot be recovered as special damages. We disagree. We do not read the Horgan concurrence as conveying a comprehensive and exclusive list of claims on which a party can recover attorney fees as special damages. Rather, the Horgan concurrence stressed that the Horgan opinion did not preclude the recovery of attorney fees as special damages in circumstances other than those presented in that appeal. id. In so doing, it offered examples of claims under which one may recover attorney fees. ld. Thus, like the Horgan concurrence, we conclude that Horgan does not bar the recovery of attorney fees in circumstances that are not addressed in Horgan, such as the circumstances that are present in this appeal.

## EXHIBIT H

MIL
PAT LUNDVALL (NSBN 3761)
AARON D. SHIPLEY (NSBN 8258)


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JAMES WOLFRAM, WALT WILKES

Plaintiffs,
vs.

PARDEE HOMES OF NEVADA,
Defendant.

CASE NO.: A-10-632338-C
DEPT NO.: IV

## DEFENDANTS MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AS AN ELEMENT OF DAMAGES

(MIL \#1)

Hearing Date: Hearing Time:

Trial Date: April 15, 2013

Defendant Pardee Homes of Nevada ("Pardee") hereby moves the Court for an order in limine on the non-admissibility of the issue of attorneys' fees as an element of damages, sought to be introduced by Plaintiffs James Wolfram and Walt Wilkes ("Plaintiffs") in the trial on this matter. Testimony and evidence at the trial regarding Plaintiffs' alleged attorneys' fees and costs would be improper in the context of this breach of contract case as they cannot be considered an element of Plaintiffs' damages. Such issues should be handled in post-trial briefing only.

This Motion is brought pursuant to NRS 47.060, the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the exhibits attached hereto, the pleadings and papers on file herein, and any oral argument this Court wishes to consider.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this $1^{\text {st }}$ day of March, 2013.
McDONALD CARANO WILSON LLP
/s/ Aaron D. Shipley
Pat Lundvall (\#3761)
Aaron D. Shipley (\#8258)
2300 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 1000
Las Vegas, Nevada 89102
Attorneys for Defendant Pardee Homes of Nevada

## NOTICE OF MOTION

## TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD HEREIN:

YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will bring the foregoing DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AS AN ELEMENT OF DAMAGES on for hearing before the above-entitled Court on the 16 day of April 2013, at the hour of $8: 30$ a .m. or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this $1^{\text {st }}$ day of March, 2013.
McDONALD CARANO WILSON LLP
/s/ Aaron D. Shipley
Pat Lundvall (\#3761)
Aaron D. Shipley (\#8258)
2300 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 1000
Las Vegas, Nevada 89102
Attorneys for Defendant Pardee Homes of Nevada

AARON D. SHIPLEY, after being sworn, declares as follows:

1. I am licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada, and am a partner with the law firm of McDonald Carano Wilson LLP, attorneys of record for Defendant Pardee Homes ("Pardee").
2. This Declaration is made of my own personal knowledge except where stated upon information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be true.
3. This Declaration is submitted in compliance with EDCR 2.47 and in support of Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Plaintiffs' Claim for Attorneys' Fees as an Element of Damages (the "Motion").
4. On February 28, 2013, I spoke to James M. Jimmerson, counsel for Plaintiffs, via telephone, as required by EDCR 2.47. We discussed the issues relevant to this Motion. We disagreed on the issue of whether Plaintiffs could properly seek an award of their attorneys' fees as an element of their damages at trial, as opposed to seeking an award of their fees in post-trial motion practice if they are found to be the prevailing party at trial. Ultimately we were unable to resolve this issue during our telephone conference.
5. Under the circumstances, despite a good faith effort to confer, the motion has become necessary.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
DATED this $1^{\text {st }}$ day of March, 2013.
/s/ Aaron D. Shipley AARON D SHIPLEY

## MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

## I. INTRODUCTION AND RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case, simply put, involves claims for breach of contract arising from the Commission Agreement dated September 1, 2004 ("Commission Agreement" or "Commission Letter"), which Pardee and the Plaintiffs negotiated and executed. A copy of the Commission Letter is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The undisputed evidence reveals that Pardee performed all of its contractual obligations.

Plaintiffs acknowledge that their contractual relationship with Pardee is dictated entirely by the Commission Agreement. The Commission Agreement governs the payment of commissions from Pardee to Plaintiffs related to Pardee's purchase of certain property from CSI related to the Project. It is this Commission Agreement that Plaintiffs accuse Pardee of breaching. The Commission Agreement contains an attorneys' fees provision, which states: "In the event either party brings an action to enforce its rights under this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees and costs." See Exhibit A, at p. 2.

Plaintiffs have claimed that their attorneys' fees should be considered an element of their damages. Their NRCP 16.1 disclosure states, in part: "The second component of this calculation [of damages] is attorney's fees. Plaintiffs' attorney's fees currently exceed $\$ 102,700.00$. This amount represents all work from the date of drafting of the Complaint in November 2010 through October 19, 2012. These attorney's fees constitute damages pursuant to the September 1, 2004 Commission Letter Agreement...Plaintiffs in bringing this suit expect to be the prevailing party and, as such, are entitled to their reasonable attorney's fees as damages for Defendant's breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing." See Plaintiffs' Seventh Supplement to NRCP 16.1 Disclosure of Witnesses and Documents, at p. 8:14-22, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

Plaintiffs' contention that they are entitled to reimbursement of their attorney's fees as an element of their alleged damages is misguided and contrary to Nevada law.

Therefore, Pardee requests the Court issue an order in limine that Plaintiffs are precluded from offering any evidence at trial, in the form of documents, testimony, expert opinions and any other evidence, related to their claim for an award of their attorneys' fees. Attorneys' fees in the context of a breach of contract case such as this cannot be awarded as an element of damages. In this context, Attorneys' fees can only be only properly awarded to the prevailing party. There can be no determination of prevailing party until the conclusion of the trial. An order in limine on this issue will promote efficiency in preparation for and during the trial.

## II. LEGAL ARGUMENT

## A. Legal Standard.

Pursuant to NRS 47.060, a motion in limine is the proper vehicle to prevent the introduction of inadmissible evidence at trial. See NRS 47.080(1). ("[p]reliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the judge."). The ruling on a motion in limine lies soundly within the district court's discretion. See State ex. rel. Dept. of Highways v. Nevada Aggregates and Asphalt Co., 92 Nev. 370, 551 P.2d 1095, 1098 (1976).

Motions in limine take two forms: (1) to procure a definitive ruling on the admissibility of evidence at the outset of trial; or (2) to prevent counsel for the opposing party from mentioning potentially inadmissible evidence in his opening statement, or eliciting such evidence from a witness until a definitive ruling on the admissibility or nonadmissibility of the evidence can be made. Born v. Eisenman, $114 \mathrm{Nev} .854,962$ P.2d 1227 (1998); Nev. Rev. St. 47.080; see 21 Charles Alan Wright and Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure $\S 5037.6$ (2007). This motion takes both forms.

An order in limine further promotes efficiency at trial and helps minimize disruptions, increasing uninterrupted flow of evidence during trial. Kelly v. New West Federal Savings, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 803, 808 (1996).

## B. Plaintiffs Are Precluded From Presenting Evidence At Trial About Their Alleged Attorneys' Fees as an Element of Damages.

Plaintiffs argue that they have suffered damages in the form of attorneys' fees. However, Plaintiffs have not specially pled attorneys' fees as an element of their damages. See Sandy Valley Assoc. v. Sky Ranch Estates Owners Assoc., 117 Nev. 948, 35 P.3d 964, (2001). In Sandy Valley, the Nevada Supreme Court discusses the difference between attorney fees as a cost of litigation and attorney fees as an element of damages. See id., 117 Nev . at 955, 35 P.3d at 968-969. The court acknowledges that attorney fees cannot be recovered as a cost of litigation unless authorized by agreement, statute, or rule. See id., 117 Nev . at 956, 35 P.3d at 969 (internal citation omitted). The Nevada Supreme Court also recognizes that when parties seek attorney fees as a cost of litigation, documentary evidence of the fees is presented generally by post-trial motion. See id. In contrast, however, when attorney fees are claimed as foreseeable damages arising from tortious conduct or a breach of contract, they are considered special damages and must be pled in the complaint pursuant to NRCP $9(\mathrm{~g})$. See id. "The mention of attorney fees in a complaint's general prayer for relief is insufficient to meet this requirement." Id.

Plaintiffs have only generally alleged attorneys fees, and therefore, cannot now claim their attorneys' fees as an element of damages. In their Amended Complaint, a recovery of attorneys' fees was only mentioned in the Plaintiffs' general prayer for relief. Plaintiffs did not articulate its current position until a very late NRCP 16.1 disclosure. Thus, Plaintiffs have now wrongfully asserted their attorneys' fees as a basis for their argument that they have suffered recoverable damages.

Most recently, in 2011 the Nevada Supreme Court again recognized the development of Sandy Valley and its progeny by summarizing:

In Sandy Valley Associates v. Sky Ranch Estates, we distinguished between attorney fees as a cost of litigation and as special damages. 117
Nev. 948, 955-60, 35 P.3d 964, 968-71 (2001), receded from on other grounds as stated in Horgan v. Felton, 123 Nev. $577,579,170$ P.3d 982, 983 (2007). Attorney fees that are a cost of litigation arise from an
agreement, statute, or rule authorizing the fees, whereas attorney fees that are considered special damages are fees that are foreseeable arising from the breach of contract or tortious conduct. Id. at 956, 35 P.3d at 969. In Shuette v. Beazer Homes Holdings Corp., we supplemented Sandy Valley by explaining that fees as special damages "constitute a rather narrow exception to the rule prohibiting attorney fees awards absent express authorization." 121 Nev. 837, 862, 124 P.3d 530, 547 (2005)(emphasis added).

Reyburn Lawn \& Landscape Designers, Inc. v. Plaster Dev. Co., Inc., 127 Nev. Adv. Op. 26, ---, 255 P.3d 268, 279 n. 11 (Jun. 2, 2011). Thus, Plaintiffs have wrongfully asserted their attorneys' fees as a basis for their argument that they have suffered recoverable damages.

By completely failing to specifically plead for such an award at the outset of this litigation, Plaintiffs cannot now claim their attorneys' fees as an element of damages. Plaintiffs should be precluded from introducing any evidence at trial to support this claim. In this case, pursuant to the attorneys' fees provision in the Commission Agreement attorneys' fees can only be awarded to the prevailing party. There can be no determination of prevailing party until the conclusion of the trial. Therefore, this issue should be handled in post-trial briefing only. In this regard, if Pardee is the prevailing party at trial, it will seek an award of its attorneys' fees and costs after the trial under the same attorneys' fees provision in the Commission Agreement.
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## IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Pardee requests the Court issue an order in limine to preclude impermissible evidence, in the form of documents, testimony, expert opinions and all other evidence, at trial on the issue of attorneys' fees as an element of Plaintiffs' alleged damages. This early in limine ruling will allow the parties to more efficiently prepare for trial.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this $1^{\text {st }}$ day of March, 2013.
McDONALD CARANO WILSON LLP
/s/ Aaron D. Shipley
Pat Lundvall (\#3761)
Aaron D. Shipley (\#8258)
2300 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 1000 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Attorneys for Defendant Pardee Homes of Nevada

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am an employee of McDonald Carano Wilson LLP and that on the $1^{\text {st }}$ day of March, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AS AN ELEMENT OF DAMAGES via U.S. Mail on the following:

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Lynn M. Hansen
James M. Jimmerson
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Attorney for Plaintiffs
/s/ Melissa A. Merrill
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Barde Homes of Nevada

## DISTRICT COURT

## CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

JAMES WOLFRAM, WALT WILKES

Plaintiffs,
vs.

BARDE HOMES OF NEVADA,
Defendant.

CASE NO.: A-10-632338-C
DEPT NO.: IV

## PARDEE'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

## Hearing Date:

Time:

Pursuant to NRCP 54(d) and the Commission Agreement dated September 1, 2004, Defendant Barde Homes of Nevada ("Pardee") moves the Court for an award of its reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending the above-referenced matter. Pardee achieved its principal litigation objective by successfully defending against Plaintiffs' inflated and baseless claim to additional commissions. Plaintiffs' claim to additional commissions was the case's most substantial issue, and Pardee unequivocally succeeded on it. As such, Pardee is the prevailing party in this matter. As the prevailing party under the Commission Agreement, Barde is entitled to recover its attorney's fees incurred in achieving its principal litigation objective.

In 2004, Pardee and plaintiffs James Wolfram and Walt Wilkes (collectively "Plaintiffs") executed a Commission Agreement concerning the Coyote Springs Project.

The Commission Agreement broadly discussed Pardee's development on the Coyote Springs Project and included a provision entitling the prevailing party in any litigation to recover all reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

After disagreement between the parties regarding certain transactions on the Coyote Springs Project, Plaintiffs brought suit and claimed over $\$ 1.9$ million in damages resulting from Pardee's purported breach of the Commission Agreement, including the following claimed damages:
(1) $\$ 1.8$ million in lost future commissions;
(2) $\$ 146,000$ in attorney's fees as special damages; and
(3) $\$ 6,000$ in time and effort expended searching for information regarding what Pardee owed them under the Commission Agreement.

Perhaps realizing the frailty of these claimed damages, Plaintiffs served Pardee with an Offer of Judgment for $\$ 149,000$ before trial. Pardee rejected the Offer, contending that Plaintiffs were not due any lost future commissions under the Commission Agreement and could not recover attorney's fees as special damages in this routine breach-ofcontract case.

When trial began on October 23, 2013, Plaintiffs spent the overwhelming majority of their time advancing their lost commissions argument. Their theory for recovery was centered upon their claim that Pardee had purchased "Option Property" from CSI, but did not pay Plaintiffs' commissions on those purchases. At trial Plaintiffs augmented that theory with a contention that Pardee had re-designated certain real property purchases and Plaintiffs were entitled to additional commissions based upon that re-designation. Plaintiffs made their claim concerning Option Property purchases the centerpiece of both their opening and closing statements, they questioned every single witness about those purported Option Property purchases, and on the last day of trial they served a supplemental NRCP 16.1 damages disclosure claiming these lost commissions as damages. Plaintiffs' actions pre-trial and at trial made it clear their main objective in this litigation was to secure these additional commissions from

Pardee. According to Plaintiffs, securing these additional commissions was a two-step process: first, prove that Pardee made Option Property purchases and second, once the acreage of those purchases was established at trial, to seek the commission amounts through their accounting claim.

After a full presentation of the evidence, however, the Court entirely rejected Plaintiffs' claim that it had purchased Option Property and that Plaintiffs were entitled to lost future commissions, finding in Pardee's favor on the issues. The Court awarded Plaintiffs only $\$ 6,000$ in compensatory damages on their second theory under their breach of contract and accounting claims, and \$141,000 in attorney's fees as special damages on those claims. Pardee entirely prevailed on Plaintiffs' claim to lost future commissions, which was the case's most significant and bitterly contested issue. Therefore, pursuant to the Commission Agreement, NRCP 54, and applicable case law, Pardee is entitled to its attorney's fees and costs as the prevailing party in this case.

This Motion is based on NRCP 54, the Commission Agreement, the pleadings and papers on file, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the declaration of Pat Lundvall, and any oral argument the Court may entertain at the hearing of this Motion.

DATED this 6th day of June, 2016.

# McDONALD CARANO WILSON LLP 

/s/ Rory T. Kay
PAT LUNDVALL (NBSN \#3761) RORY T. KAY (NSB \#12416)
2300 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 1200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102

Attorneys for Pardee Homes of Nevada

## NOTICE OF MOTION

TO: All Parties and Their Counsel of Record:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will bring the foregoing PARDEE'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES for hearing before the above-entitled In Chambers Court on the 11 day of July, 2016 at the hour of XXXXX in Department IV of the above-entitled Court, or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard.

MCDONALD CARANO WILSON LLP
/s/ Rory T. Kay
PAT LUNDVALL (NSBN 3761)
RORY KAY (NSBN 12416)
2300 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 1000 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102

Attorneys for Pardee Homes of Nevada

# DECLARATION OF PAT LUNDVALL IN SUPPORT OF PARDEE HOMES OF NEVADA'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 

Pat Lundvall declares as follows:

1. I am an attorney with the law firm of McDonald Carano Wilson LLP ("McDonald Carano"), counsel of record for Pardee Homes of Nevada ("Pardee") in Clark County, Nevada District Court Case A-10-632338-C.
2. This Declaration, which is submitted in support of Pardee's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, is made of my own personal knowledge. The information contained in this declaration and the attached invoices from McDonald Carano Wilson to Pardee for this case are not intended to waive the attorney-client or work product privileges, nor should they be construed to waive those privileges.
3. I have been practicing law in Nevada since 1989. I have been an attorney with McDonald Carano Wilson since June 1994, and a partner with the firm since January 1996. I have represented clients in all aspects of commercial litigation in state court (including the Nevada Supreme Court), federal court, the Ninth Circuit of Appeals and the Supreme Court of the United States. A copy of my resume is attached as Exhibit A. I was lead counsel for Pardee in the case brought by Plaintiffs James Wolfram and Walt Wilkes. My hourly rate varied between $\$ 465$ and $\$ 525$ during Plaintiffs' case against Pardee.
4. Aaron Shipley joined McDonald Carano in 2002. He is admitted to the Bars of Nevada and Utah. McDonald Carano offered Mr. Shipley partnership in 2012, which he accepted. He has over ten years of experience litigating complex commercial matters in Nevada and federal courts. A copy of his resume is attached as Exhibit B. Mr. Shipley served as second chair in this matter, and his hourly rate varied between \$290 and \$325 during Plaintiffs' case against Pardee.
5. Rory Kay joined McDonald Carano in 2012. He is admitted to the Bars of Nevada and California. Mr. Kay is an associate at McDonald Carano, and he has three years of experience litigating complex commercial matters in Nevada and federal
courts, including representing Pardee in other litigation involving the Coyote Springs Project. A copy of his resume is attached as Exhibit C. Mr. Kay provided limited services in the post-trial phase of this case, and his hourly rate was $\$ 240$ during the entire time he defended Pardee in Plaintiffs' case.
6. Brian Grubb and Karen Suroweic served as paralegals on this matter. They helped prepare and present important documents during depositions, trial preparation and the trial. They also completed relevant legal research related to Plaintiffs' causes of action, helped the billing attorneys with witness preparation, and assisted with various filings in the case.
7. All attorney's fees invoiced to Pardee were discounted $10 \%$, pursuant to an agreement with Pardee.
8. I am familiar with the billing rates for attorneys and paralegals in the Las Vegas legal market. All of the foregoing hourly rates are fair and reasonable rates for professional services by litigation attorneys and paralegals with similar levels of experience and expertise within the Las Vegas legal market.
9. All of the work performed in this case was necessary to protect Pardee's rights pursuant to the Commission Agreement and on the Coyote Springs Project. Pardee's counsel handled the case from beginning to end, vigorously conducting discovery, preparing for and executing the trial, and litigating the case until its final posttrial judgment. Pardee also brought various meritorious motions and defeated a substantial number of Plaintiffs' motions. All of the work done was consistent with civil litigation practice in Las Vegas, Nevada in similar cases, especially in cases where the damages sought were close to $\$ 2$ million.
10. In connection with the foregoing work, each attorney's work was billed on an hourly basis and reflected on each attorney's time sheets, which were required to be made at or about the time of the activity reflected thereon, and to accurately reflect the amount of time expended on the particular activities done on Pardee's behalf. The individual time sheets were entered into a billing program in McDonald Carano's
computer system, and sorted by client and matter number so that each client/matter number received a separate accounting of the time spent by each attorney on that file during the preceding month. Those entries were then prepared in a format that constituted a draft of the monthly bill, with time converted to dollar amounts. Each attorney and I reviewed the draft bills for accuracy. If I, as the billing attorney, believed that a write down was appropriate, then the client was given a discount which was never reflected on their invoice. I made such write downs to my time and other billing professionals throughout the entire case. This procedure has proven to be trustworthy and to render accurate and timely billing statements.
11. The billing statements that are attached hereto as Exhibit $D$ are true and correct copies of the billing statements generated in connection with McDonald Carano's activities on Pardee's behalf in this case. All of the work identified in the billing statements was reasonable and necessary, as were all of the costs. The invoices were sent to the client and McDonald Carano Wilson has been paid in full on those invoices.
12. The spreadsheet that is attached to the Motion as Exhibit E is a summary of the fees and costs contained in the billing statement.
13. By this Motion, Pardee does not seek to recover all of its attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending against Plaintiffs' claims. Instead, Pardee only seeks to recover its reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending against the lost future commissions portion of plaintiffs' breach of contract claim, which was the most significant and bitterly contested portion of the case.
14. I estimate that $90 \%$ of Pardee's incurred attorney's fees and costs relate to that defense against plaintiffs' claims to lost future commissions. Thus, consistent with Exhibit E, Pardee requests a total award of $\$ 642,236.39$ for its reasonable attorney's fees and costs, which is equal to $\$ 622,767.20$ for its incurred fees and $\$ 19,559.19$ for its incurred costs.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed this 6th day of June, 2016.
/s/ Pat Lundvall
Pat Lundvall

## MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. RELEVANT FACTS.
A. Plaintiffs and Pardee Execute the Commission Agreement.

In 1990s, Harvey Whittemore formed Coyote Springs Investment, LLC ("CSI") and began developing the Coyote Springs Project (the "Project"), a 43,000 acre development just northeast of Las Vegas, Nevada. The Project straddled both Clark and Lincoln Counties. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2:9-12, on file with the Court. As licensed real estate brokers, Plaintiffs began tracking Whittemore's Project in 2002, and shortly thereafter, they contacted Jon Lash, Pardee's executive responsible for land acquisition, to see if he was interested in purchasing land and/or developing homes on the Project. See id. at 1:27-2:18. Lash agreed to allow Plaintiffs to represent Pardee as a potential purchaser, and Plaintiffs arranged a meeting between Pardee and Whittemore to discuss Pardee's interest in the Project. See id. at 2:24-3:8. At this meeting, Pardee indicated it only wanted to purchase the land designated as single-family detached production residential. See id.

After the initial meeting, Pardee and CSI informed Plaintiffs that their services were no longer needed because Pardee and CSI could negotiate the land sales between themselves. See id. at 3:9-12. Accordingly, Plaintiff and Pardee began negotiating Plaintiffs' broker commissions related to the Project and Plaintiffs' introduction of Whittemore and Lash. See id. at 3:9-12. The end result of those negotiations was a Commission Agreement, which Pardee and James Wolfram executed on September 2, 2004 and Walt Wilkes executed on September 6, 2004. See id. at 4:24-26.

The Commission Agreement sets forth the parties' rights concerning Pardee's land purchases on the Project. See generally Commission Agreement Dated September 1, 2004, attached as Exhibit F. The only provision relevant to this Motion is the one that details the prevailing party's right to attorney's fees and costs if litigation arose to enforce the Commission Agreement:

In the event either party brings an action to enforce its rights under this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.

Id. at p . 2 (emphasis added).
B. Pardee Purchases Land on the Project and Pays Plaintiffs' Commissions Pursuant to the Commission Agreement.

After the parties executed the Commission Agreement, Pardee purchased relevant land from CSI that was covered by the Commission Agreement. See Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law at 8:6-9. Pursuant to the Commission Agreement, Pardee also paid Plaintiffs $\$ 2,632,000.00$ in commissions. See id. at 8:19-20. These were the only commissions due under the Commission Agreement, and Pardee had made no other purchases from CSI that would require them to pay Plaintiffs any commissions under the Commission Agreement. See id. at 8:21-11:3.

## C. Plaintiffs Demand $\$ 1.8$ Million in Additional Commissions and File Suit Against Pardee.

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs insisted that they were due additional commissions from Pardee and filed the current case on December 29, 2010. See Complaint, on file with the Court. In their operative Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged causes of action for accounting, breach of the Commission Agreement, and breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. See generally Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs claimed over $\$ 1.9$ million in damages, including $\$ 1.8$ million in purportedly lost commissions, $\$ 146,000$ in attorney's fees, and $\$ 6,400$ in time and effort expended related to the accounting cause of action. See Plaintiffs' Thirteenth Supplement to NRCP 16.1 Disclosure of Witnesses and Documents at 10:17-11:9, attached as Exhibit G. The dominant theory giving rise to Plaintiffs' lawsuit was that Pardee purportedly reclassified certain land purchases on the Project from "Option Property," ${ }^{1}$ thereby

[^2]"robbing" Plaintiffs of $\$ 1.8$ million in future commissions. See id. at 8:27-9:14. The $\$ 1.8$ million in future commissions were $92 \%$ of Plaintiffs' claimed damages. See id.

## D. The Suit Proceeds to Trial and the Court Entirely Rejects Plaintiffs' Claim to Additional Commissions.

During trial, Plaintiffs spent considerable time advancing this lost commissions theory. For example, Plaintiffs' counsel immediately began questioning Plaintiff James Wolfram about how he earned commissions and how Pardee was to pay him those commissions based on its purchased Option Property. See October 23, 2013 Transcript ("10/23 Trans.") at 75:9-76:20 and 88:16-24, attached as Exhibit H. Wolfram testified that it was not "fair" that Pardee and CSI reclassified certain land on the project, which purportedly influenced and reduced Plaintiffs' commissions. See id. at 95:3-17. During this questioning, Plaintiffs' counsel offered parcel maps as demonstrative exhibits to allegedly show how Pardee and CSI reclassified land on the project, and Wolfram stated that Plaintiffs were "most certainly" entitled to additional commissions because of this reclassification. See id. at 125:11-151:17; see also October 24, 2013 Transcript ("10/24 Trans.") at 249:25-250:1, attached as Exhibit I.

Plaintiff Walt Wilkes also testified that Plaintiffs "were entitled to other, more commissions" and that their "understanding [was] we were going to get the whole commission" had Pardee and CSI not purportedly reclassified land. October 30, 2013 Transcript ("10/30 Trans.") at 98:19-20 and 100:3-4, attached as Exhibit J. Wilkes stated that Pardee "tried to take the extra money from [Plaintiffs]" and that Pardee and CSI went "outside of [the boundaries]" in reclassifying certain land. Id. at 102:16-18 and 136:1-8.

Plaintiffs also heavily questioned CSI's founder and former principal Whittemore about the purported reclassification of Option Property on the project. Whittemore testified that he believed the case was about "past due brokerage commissions" because it was the "impression that [he] took from [his] deposition" due to Plaintiffs' counsel's questioning. Exh. I, 10/24 Trans. at 10:12-15. During that same day at trial,

Plaintiffs' counsel spent almost the entire day asking numerous questions about reclassification of land on the project and the contractual definition of Option Property. See generally id. at 35:14-216:13. Whittemore testified that Pardee and CSI had not conspired to deny Plaintiffs any commissions by reclassifying certain land on the project, but rather that the parties needed "the greatest degree of flexibility to allow the parties to ultimately get the best plan" for the entire project. Id. at 83:21-84:4.

Plaintiffs' counsel's opening and closing arguments similarly focused on Plaintiffs' claims to additional commissions on the project. Counsel opened by stating that the case largely "hinge[d]" on whether Pardee's purchases were considered Purchase Property or Option Property, and that the evidence would "show that [Pardee's] commission payments were inaccurate, [and] were not property calculated." Exh. H, 10/23 Trans. at 14:8-15:1 and 20:3-4. Counsel's closing argument again focused on this purported reclassification, as he claimed that "it is . . . a breach of contract to think that [Pardee] can adversely affect [Plaintiffs'] rights to a commission by making a later deal between the parties that would change defined terms and entitlement to money." December 13, 2013 Transcript ("12/13 Trans.") at 153:1-8, attached as Exhibit K. Counsel claimed that he was suggesting to the Court "the legal principle that . . . [Pardee] cannot adversely affect the rights of [Plaintiffs] to a commission." Id. at 153:17-154:10.

But after a full bench trial beginning on October 23, 2013, the Court rejected Plaintiffs' claim to additional commissions. See generally Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, on file with the Court. The Court noted that Pardee had paid Plaintiffs $\$ 2.6$ million in commissions pursuant to the Commission Agreement for all land purchases that Pardee made on the Project. See id. at 8:19-20. The Court also explained that "Pardee as of the present time does not owe any commission to Plaintiffs . . . ." See id. at 8:25-9:4. According to the Court, Plaintiffs' dominant theory that Pardee reclassified certain land purchases on the Project and "robbed" Plaintiffs of \$1.8 million in future commissions had no basis in law or in fact. See id. at 12:16-13:9. The

Court did award Plaintiffs $\$ 6,000$ in time and effort expended to research accounting matters related to their commissions and $\$ 135,500$ in special damages for attorney's fees and costs, suggesting that Plaintiffs were entitled to additional information from Pardee to verify that they had been accurately paid. See id. at 14:7-15:3 and 17:2518:2. The Court's total award of $\$ 141,500$ was even less than Plaintiffs' pre-trial Offer of Judgment. See Plaintiffs' Offer of Judgment, attached as Exhibit L.

Because Pardee entirely prevailed on Plaintiffs' demand for lost future commissions, which was the case's most significant and bitterly contested issue, Pardee now moves for the portion of its attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending against that argument. Pardee does so pursuant to the Commission Agreement as the prevailing party in this litigation.

## II. ARGUMENT.

## A. Legal Standard.

1. Prevailing Party Analysis Pursuant to Contract.

NRCP 54 permits a party to claim attorney's fees by motion, based on a "statute, rule or other grounds entitling the movant to the award." NRCP 54(d)(2). Thus, a district court may award attorney's fees if authorized to do so by statute, rule or contract, and parties "are free to provide for attorney fees by express contractual provision." See Davis v. Beling, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 28, 278 P. 3d 501, 515 (2012). Pardee seeks recovery of a portion of its attorney's fees based upon the contract provision found in the Commission Agreement. The goal in "interpreting an attorney fees provision, as with all contracts, is to discern the intent of the contracting parties." Id. The Court should be mindful that contractual provisions for fees and costs "provide an incentive to settle and reduce litigation" rather than pressing forward with trumped up claims or damages. Dimick v. Dimick, 112 Nev. 402, 405, 915 P.2d 254, 256 (1996). In this matter, the parties' agreement calls for attorney's fees for the "prevailing party" in "an action to enforce its rights under this Agreement." Exh. F, Commission Agreement at p. 2.

The term "prevailing party" is "broadly construed" to encompass both plaintiffs and defendants. Valley Elec. Ass'n v. Overfield, 121 Nev. 7, 10, 106 P.3d 1198, 1200 (2005); see also Moritz v. Hoyt Enterprises, Inc., 604 So. 2d 807, 810 (Fla. 1992). Because the term "prevailing party" is a "legal term of art," the Nevada Supreme Court has never provided an exact definition of prevailing party in the contractual context. Cleverley v. Ballantyne, No. 2:12-CV-00444-GMN, 2014 WL 317775, at *2 (D. Nev. Jan. 28, 2014) (noting "Nevada case law does not define prevailing party in the contractual context"). Nevertheless, it has explained that, with respect to contractual attorney's fees provisions, a party prevails if it "succeeds on any substantial aspect of the case." Davis, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 28, 278 P. 3d at 515; see also Moritz, 604 So. 2d at 810 ("[T]he party prevailing on the significant issue in the litigation is that party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorney's fees.").

Davis and Friedman v. Friedman are particularly instructive regarding this analysis. In Davis, homeowners sought to recover attorney's fees against their former real estate agent for successfully defending against the agent's claims of breach of the listing agreement between the parties. See 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 28, 278 P. 3d at 506. In writing for the Nevada Supreme Court, Justice Saitta noted that the matter was straightforward:
[B]ecause the [homeowners] successfully defended against [the agent's] breach of contract action[], pursuant to the clear language of the[] agreements, the [homeowners] were entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the defense of those particular claims.

Id. at 515. Justice Saitta affirmed these attorney's fees and costs even though the agent had recovered $\$ 115,455$ against the homeowners on a related unjust enrichment cause of action. Id. at 507. She did so because under a common sense meaning of "prevailing party," the homeowners won on the major issue of the case even though they lost on another secondary issue.

Friedman also embraces the pragmatic principle of awarding contractual attorney's fees to a defendant who successfully defeats a plaintiff's predominant legal
theory. Friedman was a divorce case in which the district court heard numerous issues related to the divorcing parties' assets. See 2012 WL 6681933 (Nev. Dec. 20, 2012) (unpublished). The plaintiff filed a motion to compel against his former wife, arguing that she had failed to comply with the terms of the parties' marital settlement agreement and asking for his attorney's fees pursuant to that agreement. See id. at * 1. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment in which she argued her former husband's arguments regarding compliance were meritless. After hearing the motions, the district court ruled in the defendant's favor and awarded her \$2,500 in attorney's fees pursuant to the contract for successfully defending against the plaintiff's claims. In affirming the award of attorney's fees to the defendant as the contractual prevailing party, the Nevada Supreme Court explained that the term "prevailing party" is not limited to the individual initiating the suit and that the former wife prevailed because she successfully defended against the plaintiff's claims "with regard to the majority of the issues that the parties litigated." Id. at *6. Accordingly, the fact that the district court found the wife breached "one provision" of the agreement was immaterial because, as a practical matter, she won the majority of the contested issues. Id. at *2.

Numerous other jurisdictions have considered and ruled on how to define a prevailing party in contractual disputes involving an attorney's fees provision. For example, California's case law is the most robust on this issue, and California courts note that a prevailing party is the one that "most accomplish[es] its litigation objective." Maynard v. BTI Grp., Inc., 216 Cal. App. 4th 984, 992, 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 148, 153 (2013). Thus the California Supreme Court explained that the analysis was a pragmatic one:

We agree that in determining litigation success, courts should respect substance rather than form, and to this extent should be guided by equitable considerations. For example, a party who is denied direct relief on a claim may nonetheless be found to be a prevailing party if it is clear that the party has otherwise achieved its main litigation objection.

Hsu v. Abbara, 9 Cal. 4th 863, 877, 891 P.2d 804, 813 (1995). That court later explained that if a contract does not expressly define "prevailing party," the court must "base its attorney fees decision on a pragmatic definition of the extent to which each party has realized its litigation objectives, whether by judgment, settlement or otherwise." Santisas v. Goodin, 17 Cal. 4th 599, 622, 951 P.2d 399, 414 (1998).

The Ninth Circuit has also recognized this objective-based approach, noting that prevailing party analysis must be done within the "common sense meaning" of the phrase and that successfully defending against a plaintiff's argument, even by technicality on voluntary dismissal, makes a litigant a prevailing party under a contractual attorney's fees provision. See, e.g., Anderson v. Melwani, 179 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 1999). In applying California law on contractual prevailing parties, the Ninth Circuit has also held that a party's failure to recover a majority of its requested damages from a purported breach of contract means that it cannot be the prevailing party:

While a plaintiff who obtains all relief requested on the only contract claim in the action must be regarded as the party prevailing on the contract for purposes of attorney's fees . . . a court could also determine that a party is not prevailing when it receives only a part of the relief sought.

Berkla v. Corel Corp., 302 F.3d 909, 920 (9th Cir. 2002). In fact, although the plaintiff in Berkla recovered \$23,502 in compensatory damages on its breach-of-contract claim, the Ninth Circuit determined the plaintiff was not the prevailing party because it had sought $\$ 1.2$ million in damages for the breach, and thus the defendant had successfully prevailed because plaintiff only recovered "less than $3 \%$ of what he affirmatively sought before the jury at trial." Id. at 919-20. Because the plaintiff's pre-litigation "demands and objectives clearly involved a substantial financial payoff," which the defendant successfully defeated at trial, the "equitable considerations" in the case prevented plaintiff from being the prevailing party. Id. at 920.

Thus, numerous jurisdictions, including Nevada, embrace an equitable, common sense approach to evaluating the prevailing party. Under such an approach, the focus
is appropriately on which party achieved most of the litigation objectives it had before trial.

## 2. Reasonableness of Attorney's Fees.

Once a litigant shows it is the prevailing party under a contract, it must also show that its attorney's fees and costs are reasonable. The guiding case in this analysis is Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat'l Bank, which demands that the trial court consider the following factors to determine reasonableness: (1) the quality of the advocate; (2) the character of the work done; (3) the work actually performed; and (4) the result obtained. 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969). NRCP 54 also requires an affidavit or declaration from the movant's attorney swearing that the fees were reasonably incurred and supporting documentation evidencing the fees claimed.

The Nevada Supreme Court has further clarified that awarded costs must be reasonable, and that the parties may not simply "estimate" a reasonable amount of costs. See Cadle Co. v. Woods \& Erickson, LLP, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 15, 345 P.3d 1049, 1054 (Mar. 26, 2015). Instead, the statute requires the requesting party to provide a verification under oath that "to the best of his or her knowledge and belief the items are correct, and that the costs have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding." Id. Thus, the party must provide supporting documentation to "demonstrate how such fees were necessary to and incurred in the present action." Id. This documentation may include receipts or court records, or it may be line item entries of the cost so long as they indicate "the reason for each [cost]," which is "precisely what is required under Nevada law." Id.
B. Pardee is Entitled to Its Reasonable Attorney's Fees and Costs in this Litigation.

1. Pardee is the "prevailing party" and is therefore entitled to its attorney's fees pursuant to the Commission Agreement.

The significant issue in this case during trial was always Plaintiffs' claim to lost future commissions under the Commission Agreement. Plaintiffs spent hour after hour at trial trying to induce testimony regarding Pardee's purported reclassification of land.

See Part I(D), supra. As the Court no doubt recalls, Plaintiffs introduced numerous demonstrative exhibits outlining the purported boundaries of Option Property, all in an attempt to show that Pardee conspired with CSI to change those boundaries and consequently "robbed" Plaintiffs of additional commissions. See id. Plaintiffs both testified that they believed they were entitled to additional commissions, and CSI's founder Whittemore testified that he believed the case was about lost commissions because of Plaintiffs' counsel's questioning at his deposition. See id. Plaintiffs' counsel repeatedly told the Court in his opening and closing arguments that the evidence would show Pardee underpaid Plaintiffs' commissions due and owning, and that Pardee could not change the Commission Agreement's terms and the land boundaries on the project to justify that underpayment. See id.

Despite all of Plaintiffs efforts, however, the Court entirely and unequivocally rejected Plaintiffs' dominant theory about Pardee owing additional commissions. The Court noted that Pardee had paid Plaintiffs $\$ 2.6$ million in commissions pursuant to the Commission Agreement for all land purchases that Pardee made on the Project. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 8:19-20. The Court also explained that Pardee did not owe any commission to Plaintiffs, and that Plaintiffs' theory that Pardee reclassified certain land purchases on the Project and "robbed" Plaintiffs of $\$ 1.8$ million in future commissions had no basis in law or in fact. See id. at 8:25-9:4 and 12:1613:9. The Court's damages award reflects this, as the Court awarded Plaintiffs nothing in lost commissions. See generally id. This was the case's most substantial issue, and Pardee—not Plaintiffs—prevailed on it.

The following chart illustrates Plaintiffs' claimed damages in this case, including a breakdown of each type of damages and the percentage of total damages that the type represented:

| Type of Damages | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Claimed } \\ & \hline \text { Amount } \end{aligned}$ | Amount Awarded by the Court | $\frac{\text { \% of Plaintiffs' }}{\frac{\text { Total Claimed }}{\text { Damages }}}$ | $\frac{\text { \% of Plaintiffs' }}{\frac{\text { Total Awarded }}{\text { Damages }}}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Lost Future Commissions | \$1,800,000.00 | \$0 | 92.2\% | 0\% |
| Time and Expense to Conduct Accounting | \$6,400.00 | \$6,000 | .3\% | 4.2\% |
| Attorney's Fees | \$146,000.00 | \$135,500 | 7.5\% | 95.8\% |
| Totals | \$1,952,000.00 | \$141,500 |  |  |

See Exhibit G, Plaintiffs' Thirteenth NRCP 16.1 Supplement at 8:23-10:15; see also Judgment, on file with the Court. As the chart shows, Plaintiffs' claim to lost future commissions was the significant issue in the case because it comprised $92.2 \%$ of Plaintiffs' total claimed damages and also provided the very incentive for Plaintiffs to bring the lawsuit. See Letter Dated May 19, 2009 from James J. Jimmerson to Pardee ("My clients are of the belief that they have not been paid for all of the sales which they are due, and Pardee's failure to comply with its contract constitutes a material breach of this contract for which my clients will be obliged to seek appropriate legal redress for the harm your company has, and is, causing them."), attached as Exhibit M. And although Plaintiffs recovered compensatory damages for breach of contract in this case, just as the Berkla plaintiff did, Plaintiffs only recovered $\$ 6,000$ in compensatory damages, or $.3 \%$ of their total claims damages before litigation. Consequently, Plaintiffs did not achieve their pre-litigation objectives, and so they cannot be the prevailing party in this litigation. Instead, it was Pardee who achieved its pre-litigation objective—namely defeating Plaintiffs' inflated demand for lost commissions—and accordingly Pardee is the prevailing party in this case.
2. Pardee's attorney's fees are reasonable and supported by adequate evidentiary documentation.

Brunzell's demand that the Court consider the quality of Pardee's counsel, the character of the work done, the work actually performed, and the result obtained shows the reasonableness of Pardee's claimed attorney's fees. Moreover, under Cadle Co.,

Pardee has provided sufficient supporting documentation to prove the reason for each cost.

## a. Quality of the Advocates.

Pardee was primarily represented by Pat Lundvall and Aaron Shipley through trial, and Rory Kay performed work after the trial concluded. Ms. Lundvall, as a partner in the law firm of McDonald Carano Wilson LLP ("McDonald Carano"), has over 25 years of experience litigating in Nevada courts, is AV rated by her peers, and has been named to the Legal Elite, Super Lawyers, Best Lawyers in America, the Silver State's Top 100, and Chambers USA. She is board certified by the National Board of Trial Advocacy, the National Board of Civil Pretrial Practice Advocacy, and the State Bar of Nevada, and was lead counsel on this matter.

Mr. Shipley, as one of Ms. Lundvall's partners at McDonald Carano, has 13 years of experience in Nevada courts, and has been recognized as a Mountain States Super Lawyer. He has experience handling commercial litigation, including claims similar to the ones at issue in this case, and he served as second chair throughout the trial.

Mr. Kay is an associate at McDonald Carano, having been admitted to the Nevada Bar in 2011 and the California Bar in 2013. He has experience litigating complex commercial matters, including representing Pardee in other litigation regarding the Project.

Ms. Lundvall, Mr. Shipley and Mr. Kay all charged hourly rates commensurate with their experience and education, and consistent with prevailing rates in the Nevada legal market.

## b. The Character of the Work Done.

The work of Pardee's attorneys was necessary to protect Pardee's interests on the Project and under the Commission Agreement. Pardee's counsel handled the case from beginning to end, vigorously conducting discovery, preparing for and executing the trial, and litigating the case until its final post-trial judgment. Pardee also brought
various meritorious motions. All of the work done was consistent with civil litigation practice in Las Vegas, Nevada in similar cases where damages sought were close to \$2 million.

## c. The Work Actually Performed.

A breakdown of the work performed (including the nature of the work, the attorneys' hourly rates, and total fees incurred in connection with each task) and costs incurred is contained in Exhibits D and E.
d. The Results Obtained.

As discussed above, Pardee's counsel successfully defended Pardee on the significant issue in the case, eliminating $92.2 \%$ of Plaintiffs' total claimed damages. Moreover, Pardee's counsel successfully reduced Plaintiffs claimed damages for the other types of damages so that Plaintiffs only recovered $7.2 \%$ of their total claimed damages, an amount less than Plaintiffs' final pre-trial Offer of Judgment.

## III. CONCLUSION.

The Commission Agreement grants attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing party in any litigation arising from the contract. In this case, Pardee prevailed on the most significant issue in the litigation, entirely eliminating Plaintiffs' claim to lost future earnings, which equaled $92 \%$ of Plaintiffs' total claimed damages. Only Pardee achieved its pre-litigation objective in this case and it accordingly is the prevailing party pursuant to the Commission Agreement. Pardee is therefore entitled to its reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Consistent with the Brunzell analysis above, Pardee
respectfully requests that the Court award Pardee \$622,767.20 in attorney's fees and $\$ 19,559.19$ in costs, for a total award of $\$ 642,236$.39.

DATED this 6th day of June, 2016.

MCDONALD CARANO WILSON LLP<br>/s/ Rory T. Kay<br>Pat Lundvall (NSBN 3761)<br>Rory T. Kay (NSBN 12416)<br>2300 West Sahara Avenue, Suite 1200<br>Las Vegas, Nevada 89102<br>(702) 873-4100<br>(702) 873-9966 Facsimile<br>Attorneys for Defendant Pardee Homes of Nevada

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am an employee of McDonald Carano Wilson LLP and that on the 6th day of June, 2016, I e-served and e-filed a true and correct copy of the foregoing PARDEE HOMES OF NEVADA'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS via Wiznet, as utilized in the Eighth Judicial District in Clark County, Nevada, on the following:

James J. Jimmerson
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JIMMERSON HANSEN, P.C.
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and
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/s/ Michelle Wade
An Employee of McDonald Carano Wilson LLP

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[^0]:    1 Whittemore was the founder and owner of Coyote Springs Investment, LLC ("CSI"), the entity that owned the Project's land at the time of this introductory meeting.

[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ Notably, Plaintiffs served this supplemental disclosure on the last day of trial.

[^2]:    ${ }^{1}$ Pursuant to the Commission Agreement between the parties, Pardee was to pay Plaintiffs a commission for certain Option Property that Pardee purchased on the land. If Pardee purchased no such land, Plaintiffs were not owed any additional commission.

