IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

David Harrison Degraw,

Petitioner.

VS.

The Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Clark, and The Honorable Linda Marquis, **District Court Judge**,

Respondents,

Misty Jo Degraw,

Real Party in Interest.

Sup. Ct. Docket NoElectronically Filed Sep 12 2017 11:04 a.m.

Dist. Ct. Case No. **Dize 54th 67-Brown** Clerk of Supreme Court

PETITIONER'S APPENDIX TO REPLY

DATED this 11th day of September 2017.

Keith F. Pickard, Esq.

Nevada Bar No. 12470 NEVADA FAMILY LAW GROUP 10120 South Eastern, Suite 140 Henderson, Nevada 89052 (702) 910-4300 **Attorneys for Petitioner**

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FAMILY DIVISION CLARK COUNTY NEVADA

Case No.: D-16-543167-D

Dept. No.: B

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an ORDER was entered in the above-entitled matter on the 11th day of September, 2017, a copy of which is attached hereto.

DATED this 11th day of September 2017. NEVADA FAMILY LAW GROUP

Keith F. Pickard, Esq. Nevada Bar No.: 12470

10120 South Eastern Avenue, Suite 140 Henderson, Nevada 89052

Attorneys for Defendant,

David DeGraw

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1 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** I hereby certify that on the 11th day of September 2017, I served a true and 2 correct copy of Defendant's NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER, pursuant to NRCP 3 5(b), by the following means: 4 by electronic service, pursuant to NEFCR 9, to be electronically served 5 through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system, with 6 7 the date and time of the electronic service substituted for the date and place of deposit in the U.S. Mail; and/or 8 by placing same to be deposited for mailing in the United States Mail, in 9 a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was prepaid in 10 Henderson, Nevada; and/or 11 12 by sending the same via facsimile pursuant to EDCR 7.26 (the consent for which was previously established); and/or 13 **NEVADA** 14 electronically delivered via email pursuant to EDCR 8.05 (the consent 15 for which was previously established). 16 Brian Blackham, Esq. 725 S. 8th Street, Suite 100 17 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorney for Plaintiff 18 19 An Employee of NEVADA FAMILY LAW GROUP 20 21 22 23

Electronically Filed **ORDR** 1 09/11/2017 Keith F. Pickard, Esq. Nevada Bar No.: 12470 CLERK OF THE COURT NEVADA FAMILY LAW GROUP, LLC 10120 South Eastern Avenue, Suite 140 3 Henderson, Nevada 89052 Tel.: (702) 910-4300 4 Fax: (702) 910-4303 KeithP@NevadaFamilyLaw.com 5 6 Attorneys for Defendant. David DeGraw 7 8 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT **FAMILY DIVISION** 9 CLARK COUNTY NEVADA 10 * * * 11 **MISTY JO DEGRAW** Case No.: D-16-543167-D Dept. No.: B 12 Plaintiff, FAMILY LAW ORDER § 13 c. VS. § 14 DAVID HARRISON DEGRAW, Date of Hearing: March 2, 2017 Time of Hearing: 3:00 P.M. Defendant. 16 17 NRCP 1 and EDCR 1.10 govern the procedure in District Court and require the 18 Court be administered to ensure efficient, speedy, and inexpensive determination in 19 every action. 20 These Parties were married in 2004 and have two minor children. A Complaint for Divorce was filed November 29, 2016, and an Answer and Counterclaim filed December 27, 2016. The Court ordered the parties to mediation on January 3, 2017. Plaintiff (Mother) filed a Motion for Temporary Orders Re: Joint Legal and Joint Physical Custody, Child Support, Attorneys Fees and Costs, and Related Relief on

January 23, 2017. Counsel for Defendant (Father), Keith F. Pickard, Esq., states he was unable to respond to the Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Orders, prior to the start of the Nevada Legislative Session on February 6, 2017. Instead, Mr. Pickard filed a Motion to Continue on February 2, 2017, requesting a stay of all litigation in the instant matter pursuant to NRS 1.310.

NRS 1.310 requires the adjournment or continuance of litigation for the duration of any legislative session, if an attorney for a party is a member of the Nevada Legislature and states as follows:

- 1. If a party to any action or proceeding in any court or before any administrative body is a member of the Legislature of the State of Nevada, or is President of the Senate, that fact is sufficient cause for the adjournment or continuance of the action or proceeding, including, without limitation, any discovery or other pretrial or post-trial matter involved in the action or proceeding, for the duration of any legislative session.
- 2. If an attorney for a party to any action or proceeding in any court or before any administrative body, who was actually employed before the commencement of any legislative session, is a member of the Legislature of the State of Nevada, or is President of the Senate, that fact is sufficient cause for the adjournment or continuance of the action or proceeding, including, without limitation, any discovery or other pretrial or post-trial matter involved in the action or proceeding, for the duration of any legislative session.
- 3. The adjournment or continuance provided for in subsections 1 and 2 must be granted without the imposition of terms. [Emphasis added.]

Mr. Pickard states in his Affidavit that he was retained in this matter prior to the commencement of the legislative session. Mr. Pickard further states in his Affidavit that the parties are operating under a mutually-agreed-upon temporary joint legal and joint physical custody arrangement and that there is currently no emergency circumstance that would warrant challenging the mandatory nature of the

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continuance afforded under NRS 1.310. Conversely, Counsel for the Plaintiff (Mother) alleges that Father is significantly limiting visitation between mother and the small children. Counsel for Plaintiff further alleges that Mother and children will suffer irreparable harm and be denied an existing right should the Court grant the legislative continuance. NRS 1.310.

Through NRS 1.310(2), the Nevada Legislature assures the attendance of its lawyer-legislator membership. NRS 1.310(2) relieves Nevada's lawyer-legislators of the burden of choosing between serving in the legislature and appearing as an attorney in a pending litigation during the legislative session. Legislative continuance usually serves a dual purpose of encouraging good men and women to sacrifice their time in the interest of good government and of protecting a party to a law suit whose attorney may be serving the Legislature. Collier v. Poe, 732 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Tex.Crim.App.1987).

NRS 1.310 appears on its face to merely postpone pending matters. Postponing adjudication of a dispute, generally, will not give rise to any injury, over and above any inconvenience associated with delay. However, the delay may inflict harm in certain situations that may not be able to be remedied at a later date. NRS 1.310 makes no provision for those cases in which delay will cause an injury that can only be prevented by immediate access to the court. NRS 1.310 mandates legislative continuance, eliminating any judicial discretion.

The statute, which eliminates judicial discretion, seems to run afoul of the separation of powers doctrine, as it interferes with the judiciary's authority to manage the judicial process. The separation of powers doctrine is the most important

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foundation for preserving and protecting liberty by preventing the accumulation of power in any one branch of government. *See* Secretary of State v. Nevada State Legislature, 120 Nev. 456, 466 (2004). Article 3, section 1, of the Nevada Constitution provides in pertinent part:

The powers of the Government of the State of Nevada shall be divided into three separate departments, the Legislative, the Executive and the Judicial; and no persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions, appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases expressly directed or permitted in the constitution.

As coequal branches, each of the three governmental departments has inherent power to administer its own affairs and perform its duties, so as not to become a subordinate branch of government. Halverson v. Hardcastle, 123 Nev. 245, 261 (2007). The judiciary, of course, has the inherent power to govern its own procedures. A motion for continuance is within the trial courts discretion. *See* Hopper v. Hopper, 79 Nev. 86 (1963) (While a failure of justice sometimes can result from a denial of such motion, it is likewise true that a failure of justice can result from granting of the same.)

Members of the Nevada Legislature are required to attend sessions of that body and a good-faith request by a lawyer-legislator for a continuance to attend a legislative session should not be arbitrarily denied. However, the Nevada Legislature, through NRS 1.310(2), attempts to exercise the ultimate authority to determine when and under what circumstances litigation involving lawyer-legislators proceeds through the judicial system. As Mr. Pickard declares in his own Affidavit, NRS 1.310 ostensibly removes jurisdiction from the Court to hear the

substantive issues of Plaintiffs motion... [Emphasis added.]

Other States, with similar legislative continuance statutes, have found the absence of judicial discretion renders the legislative continuance statute unconstitutional, violating the separation of powers doctrine.

In <u>A.B.C.</u> Business Forms, Inc. v. Spaet, 201 So.2d 890 (Fla.1967), a Florida trial court granted a legislative continuance and the Florida Supreme Court ordered the trial court to hold a hearing, ruling:

(T)he courts should support the legislative attempt to assure the presence of its membership unless the legislative enactment is a clear invasion of the judicial field. Generally, in non-emergency cases (the statute providing for legislative continuances) is constitutional and should be liberally construed. But, as to litigation involving emergency relief and irreparable damage, we find the statute an invasion of the judicial field and violative of constitutional prohibition As a right guaranteed by the Constitution, the courts must be open to every person for relief against injury. Whether, in a given cause, the litigant may suffer irreparable injury in the application of the statute is one of sound judicial discretion, not subject to legislative control.

In <u>Thurmond v. Superior Court</u>, 66 Cal.2d 836, 59 Cal.Rptr. 273, 427 P.2d 985 (1967), a California trial court granted a legislative continuance in an action against the father of an unborn child for support, maintenance, and medical expenses necessary for the child during pendency of a paternity suit. The California Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to hold a hearing on the motion for continuance.

The guardian in the present case points out that the right of the mother and child to apply for relief pendente lite will be materially impaired and perhaps destroyed by the imposition of any substantial continuance; neither the birth of the child nor its need for care and support can be postponed. A similar result could follow in other

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cases in which a party has a right to invoke a provisional remedy, such as pendente lite support in domestic relations controversies, attachment and sale of perishable goods, receivership of a failing business, and temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions. Situations other than those involving provisional remedies may also arise in which a substantial existing right would be defeated or abridged by extended continuances.

In <u>Waites v. Sondock</u>, 561 S.W.2d 772 (1977) the Supreme Court of Texas found that a legislative continuance is mandatory except in those cases in which the party opposing the continuance alleges that a substantial existing right will be defeated or abridged by the delay. Further, the Court held that the trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the allegations of irreparable harm are meritorious.

In the instant case, Plaintiff opposes the lawyer-legislator's request for legislative continuance and alleges that a substantial existing right will be defeated or abridged by the delay, that she will be irreparably damaged by the delay, and that emergency court invention is warranted.

Therefore, the Court FINDS NRS 1.310 unconstitutional as written as it violates the separation of powers doctrine of the Nevada Constitution by allowing the legislature to commandeer the inherent power of the judiciary to govern its own procedures, removing all discretion from the Court. There are instances in which the postponement of an action would result in irreparable harm or defeat an existing right, and emergency relief is warranted. In those instances, the Court must be able to be allowed to exercise discretion.

The Court GRANTS Mr. Pickard's request, IN PART, for stay of the majority of

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