## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA Electronically Filed Jan 09 2018 09:27 a.m. **ELIZABETH HOWARD** Elizabeth A. Brown Appellant, Clerk of Supreme Court Case No. 64463 VS. SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES Dist. Court Case No. 15DC-100876 Respondents, **APPENDIX TO: APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF Volume One** AA 0001-AA 0100

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1	Case No. <u>15-1000-0876</u> FILED
2	Dept. No 2015 JUL 27 PM 2: 48
3	The undersigned hereby affirms that this document does not contain the social security number of any person.
5	JUSTIN M. TOWNSEND, Esq.
6	JUSTIN M. TOWNSEND, Esq.
7	IN THE TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
8	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CHURCHILL
9	
10	SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES, an
11	individual,
12	Plaintiff,
13	vs. <u>COMPLAINT</u> (Exempt from arbitration)
14	ELIZABETH C. HOWARD, an individual; and DOES I through
15	XX, inclusive.
16	Defendants.
17	COMES NOW, Plaintiff, SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES, by and through his counsel
18	ALLISON MacKENZIE, LTD., and hereby complains and alleges against Defendants as follows:
19	GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
20	1. Plaintiff and Defendant, ELIZABETH C. HOWARD, own, in joint tenancy
21	an undivided one hundred percent (100%) interest in and to that certain real property situated in
22	Churchill County, State of Nevada, commonly referred to as 11633 Fulkerson Road, Fallon, Nevada
23	89406 (the "Property") and more particularly described as follows:
24	PARCEL 2 AS SHOWN ON THE PARCEL MAP FOR AMMERCON
25	ENTERPRISES, RECORDED IN THE OFFICE OF THE CHURCHILL COUNTY RECORDER'S OFFICE ON DECEMBER 28 <sup>TH</sup> , 2000 AS FILE NO. 333468, OFFICIAL RECORDS.
26	FILE NO. 333400, OFFICIAL RECURDS.
27	2. There may exist additional Defendants, whose true names and capacities
28	whether individual, corporate, associate, or otherwise are unknown to Plaintiff, and are therefore

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sued by fictitious names, DOES I through XX, inclusive. Plaintiff will seek leave of this Court to amend this Complaint if and when the true identities of these Defendants become known to Plaintiff. Plaintiff is informed and believes and alleges that each of Defendants, DOES I through XX, inclusive, may have cognizable interests in the Property.

- The Property consists of approximately 11.09 acres upon which exist several 3. improvements including but not limited to a single family residence, a hangar, other buildings and certain improvements erected by Plaintiff at significant cost, in terms of time and money, to Plaintiff.
- Plaintiff is informed and believes that there are no liens or interests in the Property other than the joint tenancy interests of Plaintiff and Defendant.
- 5. The Property was deeded to Plaintiff and Defendant as joint tenants by quitclaim deed recorded in the official records of Churchill County on July 11, 2012 as Document No. 428132.
- Plaintiff and Defendant were romantically involved for a period of 6. approximately six (6) years until March 2015.
- On or about March 16, 2015, Defendant filed an application for protective 7. order.
- 8. A hearing was held on Defendant's application for protective order on March 23, 2015 at which time New River Township Justice of the Peace, Michael D. Richards, denied Defendant's application and ordered her to allow Plaintiff access to the Property to retrieve his belongings.
- 9. On April 3, 2015, Plaintiff, accompanied by a Churchill County Sheriff's Deputy, went to the Property to retrieve his personal belongings, but was denied access to the Property by Defendant.
- Defendant has added a padlock to the entry gate to the Property such that 10. Plaintiff is denied access to the Property.
- On May 3, 2015, with the assistance of the Churchill County Sheriff's Office, 11. Plaintiff was able to retrieve his personal belongings from the Property.

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- From March 2015 Defendant has had sole possession of the Property without 12. any compensation to Plaintiff for Defendant's sole possession of the Property.
- 13. Until March 2015 Plaintiff operated a licensed, internet-based firearms sales business out of the Property pursuant to a Federal Firearms License and a Churchill County Special Use Permit, each of which was specific to the Property.
- 14. As a result of Defendant's actions to deny Plaintiff access to the Property, Plaintiff lost the ability to use his Federal Firearms License and lost the Churchill County Special Use Permit, which resulted in Plaintiff losing the ability to operate his business.
- 15. Plaintiff continues to pay expenses associated with the Property, including but not limited to all property taxes thereon.
- Plaintiff paid \$2,011.85 to the Churchill County Assessor's Office on July 13, 16. 2015 for taxes assessed on the Property for the 2015-2016 tax year.
- 17. Plaintiff has demanded compensation from Defendant for his interest in the Property.

# FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF (Partition – NRS 39.010 et seq.)

- Plaintiff incorporates and re-alleges each and every paragraph of the 18. Complaint as though fully set forth herein.
- Plaintiff, as joint tenant, has an absolute right to insist upon partition of the 19. Property.
- 20. Plaintiff is entitled to an accounting of his interest in the Property, which must take into account the amounts owed for Plaintiff's contributions to the Property, his continued payment of expenses on the Property, Defendant's sole possession of the Property without rents, and Plaintiff's loss of business resulting therefrom.
  - Partition of the Property cannot be made without great prejudice to the parties. 21.
- 22. As partition of the Property cannot be made without great prejudice to the parties, sale of the Property and equitable division of the proceeds thereof is appropriate.

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- Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment quantifying the parties' interests in the 23. Property and ordering a sale thereof on terms equitable to the parties.
- 24. This matter is exempt from the District Court Arbitration Program under NRS Chapter 38 as Plaintiff is seeking equitable relief.
- 25. Plaintiff has been forced to incur fees and costs in pursuit of this action, for which it is entitled to recover pursuant to NRS 39.170.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES, prays for judgment as follows:

- For entry of judgment identifying the parties' respective interests and shares 1. in the Property;
- For entry of judgment ordering partition of the Property by sale on terms 2. equitable to the parties;
  - 3. For attorneys' fees and costs of suit;
  - 4. For such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper. DATED this 27th day of July, 2015.

ALLISON MacKENZIE, LTD.

By:

JÚSTIN M. TOWNSEND, ESQ. Nevada State Bar No. 12293 402 N. Division St.

PO Box 646

Carson City, NV 89702

Attorneys for Plaintiff, SHAUĞHNAN L. HÚGHES

4841-6064-2854, v. 2

Case No.15-10DC-0876

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JUSTIN M. FOWNSEND, Esq.

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IN THE TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CHURCHILL

SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES, an individual,

Plaintiff,

PROOF OF PUBLICATION

VS.

ELIZABETH C. HOWARD, an individual; and DOES I through XX, inclusive.

Defendants.

Attached hereto is the Proof and Statement of Publication of the Summons from the

Lahontan Valley News.

DATED this 23<sup>rd</sup> day of October, 2015.

ALLISON MacKENZIE, LTD. 402 North Division Street Carson City, NV 89703-4168

By:

JUSTIN M. TÓWNSEND, ESQ. Nevada State Bar No. 12293

Attorneys for Plaintiff, SHAUĞHNAN L. HÜGHES

4843-5278-4169, v. 1





## roof and Statement of Publication

P.O. Box 1888, Carson City, NV 89702 (775) 881-1201 FAX: (775) 887-2408

Customer Number: 1063889

Allison Mackenzie, Ltd.

P.O. Box 646

Carson City, NV 89702-0646

**Attn: Nancy Fontenot** 

Kristin Ritter says:

That (s)he is a legal clerk of the LAHONTAN VALLEY NEWS, a newspaper published Wednesday, Friday and Sunday at Fallon, in the State of Nevada.

**Hughes Summons** 

AD# 11566683

of which a copy is hereto attached, was published in said newspaper for the full required period of 4 times commencing on September 30, 2015, and ending on October 21, 2015, all days/inclustve/

Signed:

State of Nevada, Carson city

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2 day of October, 2015.

Notary Public

TAMMY MECKLER Notary Public, State of Nevada Appointment No. 14-12567-2 My Appt Expires Jan. 6, 2018

STATEMENT:

Date	Amount	Credit	Balance
10/21/15	\$381.08	\$0.00	\$381.08

Cassandra G. Jones, Esq. Bar No.: 8518 1625 Highway 88, Suite Minden, Nevada 89423 775-782-0040 Attorney for Petitioner
The undersigned affirms that
this document does not
contain personal information,
pursuant to NRS 603A.040

IN THE NINTH JUDICIAL IN THE NINTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT OF
THE STATE OF
NEVADA IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF
DOUGLAS
In the Estate of
NAOMI M. BUSH,
Deceased
Case No. 15-PB-0089
Dept. I

NOTICE TO CREDITORS
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Alissa A. Burns and Cynthia R. Lange were appointed and qualified by the above-entitled Court on September 29, 2015, as Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of Nao mil M. Bush, deceased. deceased.

Naomi M. Bush was bom on April 7, 1926. All creditors having claims against the estate are required to file their claims, with supporting

documentation attached, with the Clerk of the Court at the Ninth Judiclal District Court, P.O. Box 218, Minden, NV 89423, within 90 days after the date of mailing or the first date of publication (as the case may be) of this Notice. Dated this 30th day September, 2015.

HERITAGE LAW GROUP, P.C. /s/ Cassandra G. Jones, Esq.

Pub: October 7, 14, 21, 2015 Ad#11588537

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# IN THE TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CHURCHILL

SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES, an individual.

Plaintiff,

CORRECTED PROOF OF PUBLICATION

VS.

ELIZABETH C. HOWARD, an individual; and DOES I through XX, inclusive.

Defendants.

Attached hereto is the Proof and Statement of Publication (Corrected) of the

Summons from the <u>Lahontan Valley News</u>.

DATED this 29th day of October, 2015.

ALLISON MacKENZIE, LTD. 402 North Division Street Carson City, NV 89703-4268

By:

JUSTÍN M. TOWNSEND, ESQ. Nevada State Bar No. 12293

Attorneys for Plaintiff, SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES

4849-5501-4954, v 1



P.O. Box 1888, Carson City, NV 89702 (775) 881-1201 FAX: (775) 887-2408

Customer Number: 1063889

Allison Mackenzie, Ltd.

P.O. Box 646

Carson City, NV 89702-0646

Attn: Nancy Fontenot

Kristin Ritter says:

That (s)he is a legal clerk of the LAHONTAN VALLEY NEWS, a newspaper published Wednesday, Friday and Sunday at Fallon, in the State of Nevada.

**Hughes Summons** 

AD# 11566683

of which a copy is hereto attached, was published in said newspaper for the full required period of 4 times commencing on September 30, 2015, and ending on October 21, 2015, all days inclusive

Signed:

State of Nevada, Carson city

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 27 day of October, 2015.

**Notary Public** 



TAMMY MECKLER Notary Public, State of Nevada Appointment No. 14-12567-2 My Appt. Expires Jan. 6, 2018

#### STATEMENT:

Date	Amount	Credit	Balance
10/21/15	\$381.08	\$0.00	\$381.08

## roof and Statement of Publication CORRECTED

Case No.15-10DC-0876 Dept. No. 1 In the Tenth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Churchill

SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES, an individual, Plaintiff,

ELIZABETH C HOWARD, an Individual; and DOES I through XX, inclusive, Defendants,

SUMMONS
TO THE DEFENDANT.
YOU HAVE BEEN
SUED. THE COURT
MAY DECIDE AGAINST
YOU WITHOUT YOUR
BEING HEARD UNLESS
YOUR SESOND WITHOUT

BEING HEARD UNLESS YOU RESPOND WITHIN 20 DAYS. READ THE INFORMATION BELOW VERY CAREFULLY. A civil Complaint has been filed by the plaintiff against you for the relief as set forth in that document (see complaint) When service is by publication, add a brief statement of the object of the action. See Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(b).\*

Rule 4(b), \*

1. If you intend to defend this lawsuit, you must do the following within 20

the following within 20 days after service of, this Summons, exclusive of the day of service:

a. File with the Clerk of this Court, whose address is shown below, a formal written answer to the countries and the countries and the countries of t to the complaint, along with the appropriate filing fees, in accordance with

the rules of the Court. b. Serve a copy of your answer upon the attorney whose name and address is shown

oesow.

2. Unless you respond, a default will be entered upon application of the plaintiff and this Court may enter a judgment against you for the relief demanded in the Complaint.

This action is brought to partition the real property described in the Complaint,

Dated this 27th day of July, 2015. Issued on behalf of the Plaintiff's attorney: JUSTIN M. TOWNSEND, Esq. ALLISON MacKENZIE,

LTD. 402 North Division Street Carson City, NV 89703 Telephone: 775-687-0202

CLERK OF THE COURT By Sue Sevon
Deputy Clark
Tenth Judicial District
Count
73 N. Maine St., Se. B
Fallon, NV 89406
Telephone:775-423-6088

Pub: September 30. October 7, 14, 21, 2015 Ad#11566683

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	The undersigned hereby affirms that this document does not contain the	COURT CLERK
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5	Church / Galy	
6	CHARLES R. KOZAK, ESQ.	
7	IN THE TENTH JUDICIAL DIST	FRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVAD.
8	IN AND FOR TH	E COUNTY OF CHURCHILL
9	SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES, an	
10	individual,	
11	Plaintiff,	ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM
12	VS.	
13	ELIZABETH C. HOWARD, an	
14	individual; and DOES I through	
15	XX, inclusive,	
16	Defendants	
17		
18	ELIZABETH C. HOWARD, an individual,	
19		
20	Counterclaimant, vs.	
21	   SHAUGHAN L. HUGHES, an	
22	individual; and DOES 1 through	
23	XX, inclusive,	
24	Counterdefendants/	
5		ANSWER
6	ELIZABETH HOWARD, an indiv	vidual (hereinafter "Defendant/Counterclaimant"),

and through her attorney of record, Charles R. Kozak, Esq., answers SHAUGHAN L.

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by

HUGHES', an individual (hereinaster "Plaintiff/Counterdefendant"), Complaint as follows:

Answering Paragraph 1 of Plaintiff's Complaint. Defendant admits that Plaintiff and Defendant are recorded as joint owners of the property described in Paragraph 1 but denies Plaintiff is in fact entitled to any interest in the property whatsoever;

Answering Paragraph 2, Defendant denies the allegations therein;

Answering Paragraph 3, Defendant admits improvements have been made to the property but denies Plaintiff has any interest in said improvements;

Answering Paragraph 4, Defendant admits the allegations contained therein;

Answering Paragraph 5, Defendant admits there was romantic involvement for a time.

but was substantially less than six years.

Answering Paragraph 6, Defendant admits the allegations contained therein;
Answering Paragraph 7, Defendant admits the allegations contained therein.

Answering Paragraph 8, Defendant admits the allegations contained therein.

Answering Paragraph 9, Defendant denies the allegations therein;

Answering Paragraph 10, Defendant admits the allegations contained therein;

Answering Paragraph 11, Defendant admits the allegations contained therein;

Answering Paragraph 12, Defendant admits the allegations contained therein;

Answering Paragraph 13, Defendant denies the allegations contained therein;

Answering Paragraph 14, Defendant denies the allegations contained therein;

Answering Paragraph 15, Defendant admits the allegations contained therein;

Answering Paragraph 16, Defendant admits the allegations contained therein:

Answering Paragraph 17, Defendant admits the allegations contained therein; and

Answering Paragraphs 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25, Defendant denies the

allegations contained therein.

### **COUNTERCLAIM**

#### STATEMENT OF FACTS

- Defendant/Counterclaimant was employed by Professional Hospital Supply located in Fairfield, California from September 2007 until August 2008. On July 23, 2008,
   Defendant/Counterclaimant was seriously injured on the job in San Francisco, California, and thus is disabled from that accident.
- Defendant/Counterclaimant was forced to sell precious metals and jewelry to make ends
  meet after her worker's compensation was stalled and she was waiting for a third party personal
  injury settlement.
- 3. Defendant/Counterclaimant met the Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, Shaughnan L. Hughes, who was employed by a precious metal buying company when she sold her coins to him. At the time, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant seemed very friendly and eager to help her.
- 4. Eventually a relationship developed between Defendant/Counterclaimant and Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, and Defendant and they decided to move to Fallon, Nevada in August of 2010, after dating for almost a year. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant requested that Defendant/Counterclaimant give him all her jewelry and extra money from her worker's comp check and state disability payment so they could rent a place in Fallon, Nevada.
- 5. On November 2, 2010, Defendant/Counterclaimant received \$4,489.14 as a settlement for her dog bite case. Defendant/Counterclaimant used part of her settlement being \$2,500 to purchase one-half interest in a 1995 Toyota 4-runner with the Plaintiff/Counterdefendant. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant also insisted Defendant/Counterclaimant purchase a bed for \$1500 for Defendant/Counterclaimant and Plaintiff/Counterdefendant to sleep on since they were

 sleeping on a sponge on the floor.

- 6. In April 2011, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant took a cut in pay to avoid going on the road for his company and was reduced to answering prospective customers' questions on the phone. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant spent most of his \$15 dollar per hour earnings on bullets, projectiles, casings and firearms.
- Plaintiff/Counterdefendant also had child support obligations for his two daughters which he resented paying.
- 8. In September 2011, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's ex-wife was going to move to Indiana and take Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's two daughters with her, and Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's father did not want to lose contact with his granddaughters, so Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's father hired an attorney to help Plaintiff/Counterdefendant fight for custody of his two girls. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's ex did not want to wait a year before moving, so the ex-wife called Plaintiff/Counterdefendant and told him that he had ruined her life again and to come and get the girls. Defendant/Counterclaimant accompanied Plaintiff/Counterdefendant to all court cases involving his children, including picking up the girls and bringing them back to Fallon, to the small two bedroom, two bath manufactured home on one acre which Plaintiff/Counterdefendant and Defendant/Counterclaimant rented when they first moved.
- 9. Life at home became extremely stressful as Savannah (the eldest daughter) was becoming mentally unstable. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant was ill-prepared to be around his children full time, and vented his frustration on the Defendant/Counterclaimant. His children were and are habitual liars and Plaintiff/Counterdefendant would constantly yell at Defendant/Counterclaimant over things his children had done. As a result, Defendant/Counterclaimant threatened to leave Plaintiff/Defendant.

- 10. Eventually, Defendant/Counterclaimant received her settlement check in the amount of \$156,000 on June 13, 2012. With the proceeds, Defendant/Counterclaimant purchased the property located at 11633 Fulkerson Road in Fallon, Nevada.
- 11. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant insisted that Defendant/Counterclaimant put numerous improvements on the property all of which she paid for. They included a \$25,000 garage, a few thousand dollars of base rock, and about 700 railroad ties for retaining walls and fence posts.
- 12. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant exerted undue influence on Defendant/Counterclaimant to quit claim Plaintiff/Counterdefendant on the deed to her residence five (5) days after she closed the sale. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant represented that if she should die on one of her many trips to her work comp doctors' appointments in San Francisco, California, that he and his children would be out in the street, and brow beat her until she complied with his demands.

  Plaintiff/Counterdefendant also took Defendant/Counterclaimant to an attorney in Fernley, Nevada and wanted Plaintiff/Counterdefendant to make out a living will to him and his children so they could inherit her things in case Defendant/Counterclaimant passed away.
- 13. Defendant/Counterclaimant was under a doctor's care and on heavy medication at that time due to her injuries, and does not have a clear recollection as to the circumstances surrounding her execution of the quit claim deed.
- 14. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant began introducing Defendant/Counterclaimant as his "wife" to all of their friends and Defendant/Counterclaimant was very afraid because she truly couldn't remember if they had married.
- 15. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant took Defendant/Counterclaimant and her mother to Virginia City, Nevada, in or around March of 2013, to show Defendant/Counterclaimant's mother around. While there, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant showed Defendant/Counterclaimant and her

mother "Verda" where he would like to get married to Defendant/Counterclaimant, in a little church setting in a bar in Virginia City.

- 16. At this time, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant had demanded that Defendant/Counterclaimant put all her money in cash in his safe and stated that "if you die, your family will get it all and I won't be able to afford to live here. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant was constantly using intimidation, coercion and guilt tactics to convince Defendant/Counterclaimant to put her assets under his control.
- 17. In January of 2013, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant was fired from his job. He never obtained further employment because he didn't want to take any jobs that the EDD wanted him to interview for. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant never obtained further employment and Defendant/Counterclaimant was forced to pay all the bills and buy food.

  Defendant/Counterclaimant did so under duress; and if she complained,

  Plaintiff/Counterdefendant would yell, "I don't have a job, and you have a paycheck, you're loaded". Defendant/Counterclaimant was existing on a \$912 per month social security disability check, and Defendant/Counterclaimant's mother "Verda" was also chipping in over \$200 a month.
- 18. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant started driving Defendant/Counterclaimant's because he totaled his own and couldn't afford to buy another one, and he complained that the Toyota was a gas hog and couldn't afford to put gas in it.
- 19. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant began a campaign of terror, control and isolation over the Defendant/Counterclaimant. He berated her in front of his daughters who as a result lost complete respect for Defendant/Counterclaimant. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant constantly yelled at her that she was crazy and needed to see a psychiatrist. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant never shut

 up.

20. When Defendant/Counterclaimant was on the phone with anyone,

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant would drop what he was doing and come running in and start talking to Defendant/Counterclaimant and grabbing her breasts and pulling his pants down and spreading his butt cheeks in her face and try to hit her in the face with his penis while giggling and laughing in an idiotic manner. This was a daily occurrence.

- 21. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant spent most of Defendant/Counterclaimant's money while she was on opiate medication, and to this day she does not know where it all was spent.
- 22. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant eventually convinced Defendant/Counterclaimant's mother "Verda" to sell her home of 67 years in the Bay area, and to move to Fallon, Nevada by repeatedly stating to her that "we will have so much fun!".
- 23. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant insisted that instead of buying a home in town, she should build one on the property behind the main house because Plaintiff/Counterdefendant didn't want Defendant/Counterclaimant to be going to her mother's all the time.
- Defendant/Counterclaimant's mother "Verda" is also disabled and needs constant help and that Defendant/Counterclaimant could take care of him and his children as well as her mother at the same time. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant told Defendant/Counterclaimant that her job was to take care of him and his children first.
- 24. Defendant/Counterclaimant's mother purchased a fifth wheel to sleep in while her home was being built on the property.
- 25. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant insisted that Defendant/Counterclaimt's mother "Verda" keep all her cash in his safe and stole thousands of dollars from her. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant incurred unauthorized expenses purportedly for her home so that she was unable to complete

 her home.

- 26. After Plaintiff/Counterdefendant had depleted all of Defendant/Counterclaimant and her mother's assets, he did not feel the need to be civil to them. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant never mentioned getting married again; and if Defendant/Counterclaimant brought it up, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant would say, "why would you want to get married to someone that isn't working?", then Plaintiff/Counterdefendant would say "I consider us married".
- 27. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant became very distant and angry and found fault with everything Defendant/Counterplaintiff did. On November 1, 2013, Defendant/Counterclaimant was cut off from all medical help as worker's comp insisted Defendant/Counterclaimant could pay for her own medical through Medicare, and Defendant/Counterclaimant went into severe withdrawals.
- 28. In August of 2014, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, Defendant/Counterclaimant and the kids were in the car coming from Fernley, and Plaintiff/Counterdefendant decided to start berating Defendant/Counterclaimant in the car in front of his kids until he had Defendant/Counterclaimant in tears. Upon arriving at home, Defendant/Counterclaimant got out of the car, walked up to the trees they planted a few months earlier and was crying, when Plaintiff/Counterdefendant decided to come up and start ridiculing Defendant/Counterclaimant for no reason until Defendant/Counterclaimant told him she was tired of watching Plaintiff/Counterdefendant wrestle with his two teenagers and putting his hands where they don't belong right in front of Defendant/Counterclaimant's mother and company. Afterwards, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant stepped back and blasted Defendant/Counterclaimant with calling him a pedophile, at which time Defendant/Counterclaimant said "it doesn't look right!", and Plaintiff/Counterdefendant started yelling at Defendant/Counterclaimant telling her that "why

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doesn't she just hurry up and die and leave them alone, and then he started running back to the house yelling at his daughters "did you see that, she's gonna kill me, she's gonna kill us!, over and over, screaming like a girl, yelling for them to call 911. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant ran into the house and hid behind his 13 year old while yelling to his older daughter (Savannah) to push Defendant/Counterclaimant off the steps, and she did. The Sheriffs came and took everyone's statement, and Plaintiff/Counterdefendant lied about everything so he could have more control over Defendant/Counterclaimant. Defendant/Counterclaimant's mother had just left that morning to stay with Defendant/Counterclaimant's youngest sister in La Pine Oregon, and wasn't there to be a witness.

- After this incident, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant made life hell for Defendant/Counterclaimant in her own home by constantly berating her in front of his teenage daughters and was intent on getting rid of Defendant/Counterclaimant and her mother at all costs. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's father even confronted Defendant/Counterclaimant at her home in 2015 demanding that Defendant/Counterclaimant put her mother in a rest home, at which time Defendant/Counterclaimant told Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's father that her mother "Verda" wasn't sick enough to be put in a rest home and what did he want her to do, throw her mother into the street? After that, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's father "John" velled "YES!", because he wanted to move into her home.
- Plaintiff/Counterdefendant paid no bills or expenses with the exception of the property 30. taxes and guns and ammo for his business since January 2013. Defendant/Counterclaimant applied for and received a food stamp card because Plaintiff/Counterdefendant would not do it and complained that he wasn't going to sit in that office with all those low lives. So Defendant/Counterclaimant sat in there and was able to get a food card for the four of them, and

when Defendant/Counterclaimant got home and Plaintiff/Counterdefendant found out that Defendant/Counterclaimant had a food card, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant demanded it from Defendant/Counterclaimant and wouldn't let her have it back, proclaiming that he was better at buying food than her. All Plaintiff/Counterdefendant bought was breakfast food telling Defendant/Counterclaimant that if she wanted dinner stuff, then she could buy it with her own money.

31. In December of 2014, Defendant/Counterclaimant had helped her mother sell the fifth wheel since now Defendant/Counterclaimant's mother was able to move into the home that was built and Plaintiff/Counterdefendant was helping Defendant/Counterclaimant to flush the septic out, but Defendant/Counterclaimant had a very bad dizzy spell and woke up on the dirt by the fifth wheel, and Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's daughters were kneeling beside

Plaintiff/Counterdendant, he was standing about 6-7 feet behind his daughters and said in a very

Defendant/Counterclaimant doesn't remember answering him. The

Defendant/Counterclaimant and when Defendant/Counterclaimant saw

nasty tone to Defendant/Counterclaimant "do you need an ambulance?", but

Plaintiff/Counterdfefendant's two daughters stood Defendant/Counterclaimant up and walked her to the house. When Defendant/Counterclaimant said she thought she broke her nose,

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant was caustic and told her that nothing was wrong with her, and Defendant/Counterclaimant had to beg Plaintiff/Counterdefendant to take her to the ER, which

made Plaintiff/Counterdefendant mad. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant dumped

Defendant/Counterclaimant off at Banner Hospital and told Defendant/Counterclaimant to call him when she was done, that he was going to take his daughter (Savannah) shopping, and Plaintiff/Counterclaimant and his daughter sped off. Defendant/Counterclaimant was taken by

ambulance to Renown and kept for a week at which time Defendant/Counterclaimant had a discectomy and fusion on her C-5 and 6. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant never called her to see how she was and only came by once at Defendant/Counterclaimant's request to bring her some toiletries.

#### **COUNT I**

#### **FRAUD**

- 32. Defendant/Counterclaimant re-alleges and reincorporates each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 1 through 31 inclusive, as set forth in full herein.
- 33. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant exerted undue influence on Defendant/Counterclaimant to quit claim Plaintiff/Counterdefendant on the deed to her residence five (5) days after she closed the sale.
- 34. Defendant/Counterclaimant has suffered damages as a proximate result of Plaintiff's/Counterdefendant's actions because she has been deprived of a peaceful and safe place for her and her relatives to reside.

#### **COUNT II**

#### CONVERSION

- 35. Defendant/Counterclaimant re-alleges and reincorporates each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 1 through 34 inclusive, as set forth in full herein.
- 36. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant knew that certain income and medical/disability payments were for exclusively for Defendant/Counterclaimant.
- 37. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant also knew that the cash and monies of "Verda" belonged to her and that he knowingly stole her money by manipulating her to put it in his safe.
- 38. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant knowingly took the food stamp benefits of

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Defendant/Counterclaimant for his use and benefit.

#### COUNT III

#### INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

- 39. Defendant/Counterclaimant re-alleges and reincorporates each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 1 through 38 inclusive, as set forth in full herein.
- 40. For a period from 2010 to the present, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant has carried out a carefully executed plan of inflicting emotional stress upon the Defendant/Counterclaimant.
- 41. This conduct constituted berating and belittling the Defendant/Counterclaimant in front of others.
- 42. As a direct result of this repeated behavior, Defendant/Counterclaimant was forced to seek medical attention which resulted in hospitalization.
- 43. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's threatening and wrongful behavior resulted in abusive mental anguish and anguish to the Defendant/Counterclaimant, and such was the Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's malicious intent.

#### **COUNT IV**

#### SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

- 44. Defendant/Counterclaimant re-alleges and reincorporates each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 1 through 43 inclusive, as set forth in full herein.
- 45. Defendant/Counterclaimant should not be placed in the position of having to partition the Property and to sell the property as the Plaintiff/Counterdefendant has no legal equitable investment in the property.
- 46. The only adequate remedy is have the Court Order the Plaintiff/Counterdefendent to execute the proper documents for Defendant/Counterclaimant to have sole ownership of the

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WHEREFORE, Defendant/Counterclaimant ELIZABETH C. HOWARD, by and through her Attorney of Record, CHARLES R. KOZAK, ESQ. of KOZAK LAW FIRM, prays that the Court:

- 1. Award her damages in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars (\$10,000.00);
- 2. Award her punitive damages in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars (\$10,000.00);
- 3. Award her special damages according to proof in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars (\$10,000.00);
- 4. Award her reasonable attorney's fees in excess of Five Thousand Dollars (\$5,000.00); and
- 5. Issue an Order requiring the SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES to specifically perform the action required to give 100% sole ownership of the property to ELIZABETH C. HOWARD.

DATED this 20 day of November 2015.

CHARLES R. KOZAK-ESO.

**KOZAK LAW FIRM** 

Nevada State Bar #11179

3100 Mill Street, Suite 115

Reno, Nevada 89502

Phone (775) 322-1239

Facsimile (775) 800-1767

chuck@kozaklawfirm.com

Attorney for Elizabeth C. Howard

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#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I certify that I am an employee working for Kozak Law Firm and am a citizen of the United States, over twenty-one years of age, and not a party to the within action. My business address is 3100 Mill Street, Suite 115, Reno, Nevada 89502.

On the 20th day of November 2015, I caused to be delivered via facsimile and U.S. Mail, postage fully prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document: ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, in Case No. 15-10DC-0876, Dept. I, to the following party(ies):

Justin M. Townsend, Esq. Allison MacKenzie, Ltd. Nevada State Bar No. 12293 402 N. Division Street P. O. Box 646 Carson City, Nevada 89702 Phone (775) 687-0202 Facsimile (775) 882-7918 Attorney for Plaintiff

DATED this 26th day of November 2015.

Employee of Kozak Law Firm

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402 North Division Street, P.O. Box 646. Carson City, NV 89702 Telephone: (775) 687-0202 Fax (775) 882-7918 ALLISON MacKENZIE, LTD.

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SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES, an individual,	
Plaintiff,	
vs.	
ELIZABETH C. HOWARD, an individual; and DOES I through XX, inclusive.	
Defendants.	
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## ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM; MOTION TO STRIKE

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim; Motion to Strike. The Court having read the papers and the law applicable to the issues raised; and considered the merits of the matter; and good cause appearing therefor; and Defendant's failure to oppose the Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim; Motion to Strike,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim and Motion to Strike are GRANTED in their entirety.

DATED this 7th day of January

ALLISON MacKENZIE, LTD.
402 North Division Street, P.O. Box 646, Carson City, NV 89702
Telephone: (775) 687-0202 Fax: (775) 882-7918
E-Mail Address: law@aliisonmackenzie.com

Respectfully submitted by:

ALLISON MacKENZIE, LTD. 402 North Division Street Carson City, NV 89703-4168

By:

JUSTIN M. TOWNSEND, ESQ. Nevada State Bar No. 12293

Attorneys for Plaintiff, SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES

4833-9421-8284, v. 1

## 1 **ORIGINAL** 2 3 IN THE TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF 4 5 NEVADA 6 IN AND FOR CHURCHILL COUNTY 7 8 -000-9 SEAN HUGHES, 10 Plaintiff, 11 VS. : Case No. 15-0876 ELIZABETH HOWARD, 12 : Dept No. 13 Defendant. 14 15 16 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 17 Hearing 18 May 17, 2016 19 Fallon, Nevada 20 21 22 23 SUNSHINE LITIGATION SERVICES TRANSCRIBED FROM JAVS CD 24 Transcribed By: GAIL R. WILLSEY, CSR #359, CA CSR #9748

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6	APPEARANCES
7	N I I L N K A N C L C
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9	FOR THE PLAINTIFF: ALLISON MACKENZIE, LTD.
10	By: JUSTIN TOWNSEND, ESQ. 402 N. Division St.
11	Carson City, Nevada 89701
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15	FOR THE DEFENDANT:
16	KOZAK LUSIANI LAW LLC By: CHARLES KOZAK, ESQ.
17	3100 Mill St., #115 Reno, Nevada 89502
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MR. TOWNSEND: Correct.

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Conference Report?

THE COURT: Mr. Kozak, have you filed yours?

MR. KOZAK:

I believe we did.

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THE COURT:

scheduled.

some of them.

Have you received a copy?

We did one. I thought it

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MR. TOWNSEND:

MR. KOZAK:

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THE COURT: The court has not either.

was because the difference is that the conference was

THE COURT: One of the things that I want to

Ms. Howard called the court on 2/6 and talked

No.

Okay.

start with is -- and I'm not going do deal with it

today but you filed a motion just recently to set

on today's date. I want to go through some of the

to one of our court clerks by the name of Julie and

then on 2/3, she talked to another one of our court

clerks named Tiffany inquiring about a document that

aside the dismissal of the counterclaim that was filed

courts' history and then I'm going to have you explain

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MS. HOWARD: Yes, your Honor.

remember having those two conversations?

was allegedly filed that we did not have; do you

THE COURT OF YOUR TORSES IN

THE COURT: So you personally called and talked to our court staff?

MS. HOWARD: Yes.

THE COURT: The missing document -- well, then Tiffany from our office called the attorney and asked if they had a file stamped copy of the missing document, said that they talked to you, Mr. Kozak, and you stated that you did and that you would fax it to us, a file stamped copy of the document which would be this opposition. As of 2/9 when this note was generated, that did not happen. The fax was not sent. They then e-mailed you and asked for the missing document that was to be faxed to us.

Now, you have -- the court just on today's date, received a fax at 3:13 or 1313, 1:13 an opposition to a motion to dismiss and opposition motion to strike that purports to have been drafted on December 30th, at least your staff -- my staff believes your staff or you indicated that you actually had a file stamped copy from this court.

MR. KOZAK: No, your Honor, that's a misunderstanding. We didn't have a file stamped copy, we just had a copy. So we did e-mail that on two occasions to the court. I talked to Tiffany personally and told her.

THE COURT: Do you have proof of that that it was e-mailed the actual --

MR. KOZAK: Yes, I think so, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

Did you receive a copy of the opposition?

MR. TOWNSEND: No. I've never received a copy of the opposition. In fact, he says in that motion that he filed today that I told him that I had received a copy of the opposition and that's not true and I told him that that I had never received a copy of the opposition.

THE COURT: What I'm going to do is I'm going to allow you time -- the first that this court files shows was at 1:13 this afternoon, 1313 hours was a faxed copy.

I will note that what's attached I briefly looked at the notice of the motion that was filed today and I looked at the exhibits which I did note that the opposition wasn't attached to which I was surprised. There's a declaration by Mr. Kozak and a declaration by Nan Adams and then there's a postage receipt. I readily admit that I'm no expert in postage things, but I'm not sure what this purports, it shows \$5 that was -- a \$5 postage that was purchased on 12/30/2015, but I don't know what this is to purport to me.

that?

MR. KOZAK: Your Honor, that is the package that the opposition memorandum was placed in and mailed to this courthouse.

THE COURT: But how am I to know that from

MR. KOZAK: Well, I think that my secretary has in an affidavit that's what she bought at the post office?

THE COURT: So one of the things I'm going to allow you to supplement your opposition but I think one of the things you need to wrestle with in that is there's a Case Conference Report that you've just told me that you filed with the court that the court file doesn't have. There's a -- plaintiff's counsel told me they don't have.

So if you're generating these documents and you're mailing them to the court and to plaintiff's counsel and they're not receiving them, we either have a serious problem with the postal service from your office or some other thing and I think you'll need to be able to explain that if you're going to want me to give weight to the allegation.

As I review this file, I sense the plaintiff's frustration. I also sense your client's

frustration in the context with our court. It may be totally explainable and I'm going to give you a chance -- I'm going to give this whole -- I want it to be brief. The motion was just filed today; have you received it?

MR. TOWNSEND: I received it yesterday afternoon.

THE COURT: So I'm going to give you a chance
-- do you use Reno/Carson Messenger Service?

MR. KOZAK: Yes, we do.

THE COURT: But you wouldn't have used them to file the documents here, that's typically what people do but I mean the mail is an appropriate way but I don't have a Case Conference Report that you say you've generated and filed.

MR. KOZAK: I'll check on that, your Honor.

THE COURT: And I don't have the opposition until it was faxed today. So if you do have the proof of the e-mails to Tiffany where the oppositions were attached, I would like those proofs too, then I can deal with it internally here. If it's a problem here, I want to deal with it.

Do you understand from my perspective why I may have some questions?

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MR. KOZAK: Well, I do but when I talked to Tiffany, she said that they were very concerned that that had been misplaced so that's why we faxed down a copy immediately when we learned --

THE COURT: Well, you didn't fax one down immediately, we don't have one. You said you e-mailed it?

MR. KOZAK: No. I think she asked us to fax it but I'll check on that.

THE COURT: The note says she asked you to fax it, but I think what you told me and I guess I can look on the record and maybe counsel, did he say e-mail or fax?

MR. TOWNSEND: I heard e-mail first.

THE COURT: Okay, that's what I heard and there definitely would be a record of e-mail.

Depending on how your fax machine is set up, there may be a record.

MR. KOZAK: I think we have that record.

THE COURT: Okay but do you understand --

MR. KOZAK: I do.

THE COURT: The first record I show this opposition it hasn't been filed and it was faxed, it's not even an original opposition happened at 1:13

today. And so we're going to need -- there's a Case Conference Report that this file doesn't have that you say has been completed that was due sometime ago.

MR. TOWNSEND: Your Honor, if I may?
THE COURT: Yes.

MR. TOWNSEND: We haven't received an initial production of documents or witnesses either, despite his secretary promised them on March 8th. I followed up, nothing.

THE COURT: Okay, and is that why one of the reasons why you asked for this to be set today?

MR. TOWNSEND: This is a pattern going back a long time.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, that doesn't tell me anything.

MR. TOWNSEND: So we filed our Complaint in June I believe. The Sheriff's Office attempted to serve it numerous time on Ms. Howard. She wouldn't answer her door, wouldn't accept service, it happens. So we had to serve by publication.

After service had been published, I received a call from an attorney. I believe the attorney was down in Las Vegas. The attorney claimed to be representing Ms. Howard, asked me for a copy of the

Complaint. I said file an appearance and "Let's get this thing going." That was the last time I heard from that attorney.

A couple of weeks later, I heard from Mr.

Kozak who told me the same thing. I said, "Let's get this thing going." He didn't file a notice of appearance and then didn't file an answer in the time prescribed for filing an answer. So I served him with a notice of intent to take default. I gave him the statutory three days to file an answer. The deadline for that was Friday, September -- or I guess it was not -- Friday, November 20th. On midnight of Friday November 20, Mr. Kozak faxed to me an answer and counterclaim. I don't know when it was filed. I assume it wasn't filed until the following Monday.

THE COURT: Can I interrupt you for a second?

MR. TOWNSEND: Yes.

THE COURT: You have a Case Conference Report that you've completed; is that correct?

MR. KOZAK: I believe we do, yes, sir.

THE COURT: I believe we do or we do?

MR. KOZAK: Well, I drafted it so I'm sure we

23 do.

THE COURT: Because why don't we do this, I

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want to let you continue but could you contact your office immediately and have them -- they just faxed us for the first time, the motion -- the opposition to the motion to dismiss and motion to strike, have them fax that Case Conference Report. We'll make a copy and we'll get that to defense counsel and that way we can answer definitively because they ought to be able to do that in minutes is fax this completed Case Conference Report and then we can continue on.

I'm going to check with Tiffany. I'm going to follow up -- and maybe she could fax also the proofs of either the e-mail or the faxes of the oppositions that were filed or sent to us when would you estimate in the month of February?

MR. KOZAK: Yeah, it was right after we got the call from Tiffany.

THE COURT: Okay.

So let's follow up and get all that information and then we can kind of -- would a 10-minute recess be enough time for that? I mean, if it's done. Then what I'm going to ask you to do, I'm going to let you continue but I want counsel to meet for a few minutes and talk about a plan on how we're going to get this case moving forward because I want

to make sure that both Ms. Howard and Mr. Hughes have their game cord but I want to do it in a way that minimizes the cost but expedites a decision. motion is going to have to play out depending -- I'm going to give you 10 days to supplement that and then I'll let you oppose it when someone submits it or I'll make a decision or have a hearing based on that evidence. The first thing I want you to do is call your office. I want the Case Conference Report faxed here and the proof of the previous e-mails of the opposition faxed here. Then while we're waiting for that, if counsel could meet and you could use the jury room to map out a way going forward. Then we'll go back on the record. As soon as we have the copies, I'll provide a copy to you and the copy for the court file; is that agreeable, Mr. Kozak?

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MR. KOZAK: Yes, that's fine?

THE COURT: Is that agreeable?

MR. TOWNSEND: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Very well. We'll be in recess.

(A recess was taken.)

THE COURT: Please be seated.

We're back on the record in Case Number

15-0876, Hughes V Howard. We took a brief recess.

Mr. Kozak, where are we at on getting the Case Conference Report?

MR. KOZAK: I had my secretary send it down here so did it come through?

THE COURT: Would you check and see; did she fax it?

MR. KOZAK: Yes.

THE COURT: Go check on the fax machine. Did anything come through on the fax machine?

THE CLERK: No. The only thing we received was an e-mail of the opposition that we previously received through fax. So something was e-mailed but nothing has been faxed.

THE COURT: Would you bring that in and give that to Mr. Kozak?

I just want to make sure. One of the things I'm always deeply concerned from an access of justice standpoint is that if there's something our court is doing -- so we're going to spend a little bit of time on this and I hope each side will bear with me to explore to determine if we're doing everything right from the court's perspective; any opposition to that?

MR. TOWNSEND: None.

THE COURT: Okay.

Mr. Kozak, any opposition to that? Any opposition to the court exploring this a little bit further?

MR. KOZAK: Oh no, not at all.

THE COURT: Mr. Kozak, so I'm clear, what did you ask is it Nan from your office?

MR. KOZAK: Yes. I asked her to e-mail or fax the opposition which we did fax down to the court.

THE COURT: At 1:13 today?

MR. KOZAK: Yes and also the Case Conference Report that we filed with the court.

THE COURT: Okay. All we got was --

THE CLERK: That's an e-mail of the opposition that was faxed at 1:13.

THE COURT: I'll go through this.

So there's an e-mail from Nan on today's date in response to an e-mail that was sent on February 9th directly to you, Mr. Kozak. There's no intervening e-mails. Then attached is the opposition that purports to have been signed and drafted and mailed on December 30th and with a Certificate Of Service that it was mailed on December 30th but there is no Case Conference Report.

So there is -- so it looks like Tiffany

Joseph who is the Deputy Court Clerk here on

February 9th e-mailed you directly, Mr. Kozak, and
said what it purports to say and I may call her as a
witness in a minute. It says, "Per our conversation
last week, you indicated you would be faxing a file
stamped copy of your opposition to the motion to
dismiss. As of this time, we have not received the
fax from your office. That same evening, Ms. Howard
called us asking us if we had found the document."

Ms. Howard, do you remember doing that?

MS. HOWARD: No, in the evening?

THE COURT: But does it sound familiar?

MS. HOWARD: Yes.

THE COURT: "Called us asking us if we had found the document. I informed her that you were going to be sending us a copy. We are reaching out to you because we are concerned that you may have faxed it and we did not receive it. If it's more convenient, you can e-mail me the document. We are staying on top of this because we are concerned we have misfiled the document, at least that's what's been represented to us and this is a high priority for this office to avoid. Your cooperation is

appreciated."

So that happened on February 9th, and very quickly you just this e-mail chain that I'm saying e-mailed Nan and who is Nan?

THE WITNESS: My secretary.

THE COURT: You said, "We need to e-mail this to Tiffany right away might as well fax it too."

Then the very next e-mail in the chain is on May 17th from Nan to Tiffany and let's see what it is. Yeah and it's the opposition motion to dismiss, not a file stamped copy but just the opposition that was faxed at 1:15, but there's no copy of the Case Conference Report.

So what we have before us and I'm going to ask you again to ask her to specifically send us today the Case Conference Report so we can see when that was filed because opposing counsel doesn't have it and the court doesn't have it but you're sending it, at least that's what you're representing to me.

MR. KOZAK: Yeah. In fact, I have my draft right here that I made the corrections on.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KOZAK: And so.

THE COURT: Do you see how this might cause

the court concern when it's repeated that we've had this experience with the opposition to the motion to dismiss where counsel has not received it. The court has not received it, and the court has reached out and e-mailed you and still hasn't received it until today.

So there seems to be at least a potential pattern that we're either really messing up as a court, that opposing counsel is messing up or there may be some other explanation and that's what I'm trying to identify. I'm deeply concerned about where we're at.

So I'll stay here on the bench but would you please reach out to your office and have them fax us immediately the Case Conference Report?

MR. KOZAK: I will.

THE COURT: Okay. We'll wait.

MR. KOZAK: Okay.

(A recess was taken.)

THE COURT: And will you have one of the court clerks bring it in as soon as it comes.

Then the third thing I had asked for was proof of the faxes. You had indicated that sometime in the February to March timeframe, that the opposition has been faxed to our office and that you

were going to provide proof of that and that was not included in this e-mail to us; did you ask Nan to provide that to us?

MR. KOZAK: I did but I think in the rush to get the rest of this stuff, she probably didn't remember it but I can ask her to get that too.

THE COURT: Well, let's get this one and we'll maybe do the same thing and get the next one because I think it's important that we do this today for both Ms. Hughes and Mr. Howard.

Mr. Kozak, have you had this experience in any other cases?

MR. KOZAK: No.

THE COURT: Where it -- never in your -- how long have you been practicing?

MR. KOZAK: We must have 50 cases that I've had not one icta of this kind of problem with any of them. We know the rules and we abide by them. We sent that 16.1 discovery on a disk to the address that we thought was the proper address. So this is mystifying to me.

THE COURT: Was it returned?

MR. KOZAK: No. We sent a disk with all of our documents.

THE COURT: If you were sitting in my chair right now and these were the facts before you, would you -- would it seem strange to you where you have first the opposition that wasn't received by the court and wasn't received by opposing counsel. Then you have a Case Conference Report that wasn't received by the court, wasn't received by opposing counsel and you have opposing counsel filing motions saying we can't get it done so would you please set it.

I would call this pretrial conference an extraordinary -- it's not a normal remedy and then we have the discovery C D that would not have been sent to the court but would have been sent to defense counsel and none of these have been returned. At least according to you, right? None of these documents have been returned to you as undeliverable. If you were sitting in my chair, what would your assessment of that be?

MR. KOZAK: This has been the subject of a lot of discussion in our office as to what's going on with this case and why these things aren't being filed that are sent down here and why counsel is not getting -- which we just found out today, the 16.1 discovery which we mailed to his mailing address. We're

baffled.

THE COURT: And you said you use Reno/Carson Messenger Service and just so the record is clear if this is ever appealed, what is that service?

MR. TOWNSEND: It's a runner service?

THE COURT: It's a runner service that provides human delivery and it's an accepted method of service. The mail -- and I don't know, I mean it's extraordinary I would say.

MR. KOZAK: It is, I agree, very frustrating to us and from now on, we do use Reno/Carson. We subscribe to their service and we'll use them exclusively in this case, I promise you.

MR. TOWNSEND: If I could just add to that too, your Honor, if the frustration is there on their side, how come there's no communication with us?

THE COURT: There's what?

MR. TOWNSEND: There's no communication with us about any of these issues. I have e-mails here and I just spoke with Mr. Kozak. I've never had an answer to a single e-mail to his office. I've e-mailed his office both Mr. Kozak and his secretary and I've never had a response to a single e-mail.

So that the communication where they're

saying that they're filing these things and they know 1 2 that we haven't received them, why aren't they 3 communicating with us to try and figure this out. 4 Months and months go by. 5 THE COURT: And I'm going to -- Ms. Hughes, 6 I'm going to ask you to stand and raise your right arm to take the oath of a witness. I'm going to ask you 7 8 some questions about your experience. 9 I'm sorry, Ms. Howard I apologize. 10 (The witness was sworn.) 11 THE COURT: Thank you and I'm confused. 12 Normally the plaintiff sits next to the jury box and 13 so I'm just, I'm in that mode. 14 Ms. Hughes, would you explain to the court 15 your experience in coming to the courthouse. You've 16 had some interaction with our court clerks, tell me 17 about that. MS. HUGHES: The court clerks at the other 18 I've never been in here before but the ones that 19 20 I dealt with. THE COURT: What's the other one? 21 22 MS. HUGHES: Oh, I'm sorry, at the 23 courthouse, the other courthouse.

THE COURT: The Justice Court?

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THE WITNESS: Once that Nan said that they

THE COURT: What papers were you looking for?

to drive all the way to Reno to get them from --

had filed. 1 2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 And so what did Ms. Joseph tell you? MS. HUGHES: She said, "We don't have them." 4 5 THE COURT: And what had Nan told you about 6 those documents; did she say that she had a copy of 7 them? MS. HUGHES: 8 She did and she said that they 9 had sent them. I said, "Well, they said they didn't 10 get them." THE COURT: 11 Because at least the e-mail of 12 Ms. Joseph or her notes in our case management 13 indicate that you believed that their office had a 14 file stamped copy of the documents; is that correct? 15 MS. HUGHES: That's what Nan said that they sent it. I don't recall what she said how they sent 16 it but she said, "We filed it and it should have been 17 18 there," and that's when I panicked because I said I 19 don't know what could have gone on. THE COURT: So that happened in February; is 20 21 that correct? MS. HUGHES: Yes. 22 23 THE COURT: Then what did you do when we

told you that we didn't or what did the court clerks

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1 tell you, I guess? 2 MS. HUGHES: Not much except that they were 3 waiting on a fax. 4 THE COURT: Okay. 5 So what did you do as a result of that? MS. HUGHES: I didn't do anything. I just 6 7 called Nan and said that --8 THE COURT: Well, that's something. 9 want the record to be clear so I want to be precise 10 with our language. 11 So we told you we didn't have what they told 12 you we should have? 13 MS. HUGHES: Yes. 14 THE COURT: So you called Nan? 15 MS. HUGHES: I called Nan and told her, and she said, "Okay, we'll fax it, you know, if we haven't 16 already." She said, "I know we faxed it." I said, 17 "0kay," 18 19 I was just trying to save them money by doing 20 it myself coming down here and just picking the papers 21 up. So that was 120 days ago roughly, 22 THE COURT: 130 days ago, have you done anything else to make sure 23 24 that we received it?

MS. HUGHES: No, I forgot about it.

THE COURT: You forgot about it, okay.

Mr. Bailiff, can we check and see if that's been faxed?

How long would it be reasonable for us to expect a document that's already been generated that's sitting in your office for it to be faxed to our office?

MR. KOZAK: I mean, I can give her another call --

THE COURT: I understand that but I'm just asking you to tell me what a reasonable time period would be, it's been about 15 minutes?

MR. KOZAK: Well, if we could have maybe eight hours so when I get back to my office, I can make sure that we get that proper document and get it sent down here.

THE COURT: No. You've represented to me, as an officer of the court, that the document is completed and should be in my court file. All I'm asking is for that document that is already completed in your file that you believe has been sent to opposing counsel and to the court be faxed to us.

So the document exists and I'm asking you,

you called 15 minutes ago and asked them to fax it to us.

MR. KOZAK: I really --

THE COURT: What is a reasonable time period?

MR. KOZAK: I don't know. This is a very extraordinary situation. I don't know if Nan has found it going through the file or what, so I really can't answer that question.

THE COURT: Well, you have the file though, right?

MR. KOZAK: I have some of the file here. I didn't bring the whole file. I have my draft of our Joint Case Conference Report right here and so I drafted it so it was filed.

MR. TOWNSEND: There was a Joint Case Conference Report that was circulated, if that's what he's got there. I circulated an initial draft of a Joint Case Conference Report. He responded with some changes and I responded back to him accepting some of his changes and explaining why I couldn't accept a couple of his other changes and that's the last I heard.

THE COURT: Is that the document that you're talking about there?

MR. KOZAK: Yeah.

THE COURT: That's -- do you remember when the process broke down -- broke down, I mean, it's anticipated within the rule, they filed an individual Case Conference Report and then what is your understanding of your obligation under the rules when that happens?

MR. KOZAK: That we would file our own which we did which so far as I know. Now, when I finished this draft and signed off on it --

THE COURT: Is that your draft or is that the joint?

MR. KOZAK: That's his draft but I made the changes in it.

MR. TOWNSEND: It's a different document.

MR. KOZAK: The one I sent to him was not acceptable so I told my secretary at that point we're going to go ahead and file our own with the changes that I made.

THE COURT: Would it be fair for me to conclude that if we haven't received it by now, that we're not going to receive it today?

MR. KOZAK: Today, yes, but we can certainly supply it by tomorrow.

THE COURT: I mean, you can conclude what your obligations are and I would agree.

I'm going to speak very candidly to you, Mr. Kozak. I don't know you and I'm very, very concerned about what's happened in this case so far. I'm going to let this motion play out. I'm going to give you 10 days to file an additional motion and provide whatever information. I'll then allow you the statutory time to oppose it, if you do, or tell me that's meritorious, whatever you decide to do. Then you can reply and submitted to the court.

I think, in all likelihood, I'm going to want an evidentiary hearing on this issue, and I would expect that Nan will be here. Ms. Joseph will probably testify also. I'm not going to make any conclusions, but I'm deeply concerned and I would expect greater attention to whether things are being received than has been demonstrated so far in this case.

Now, let's talk about moving forward. So you have a C D that -- so when can you get that?

MR. KOZAK: We'll have that delivered by Reno/Tahoe tomorrow.

THE COURT: Reno/Carson Messenger Service.

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      So you can expect to receive it by Reno/Carson, They
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      do the route so it might be --
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               MR. TOWNSEND: It might be two days.
               THE COURT: So no later than say Thursday; is
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      that a reasonable expectation?
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               MR. KOZAK: That's very reasonable.
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               THE COURT:
                           Now, this is a -- let's talk
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     about.
              MR. TOWNSEND: Can I ask a clarifying
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     question about your previous statement. Are you
     asking him to file a motion that would replace this
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     motion to set aside?
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              THE COURT: Yes.
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              MR. TOWNSEND: Okay, I just want to make
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     sure.
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              THE COURT: For example, the opposition that
     you purport was filed isn't even attached.
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                                                  I'm
    asking, for example, and maybe you can explain it to
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    me because I really don't know what it is.
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    exhibit that shows that something was mailed.
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             MR. TOWNSEND:
                             It's the last page I think.
             THE COURT: Is it the last page?
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             MR. TOWNSEND: Yes.
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             THE COURT: So you know what I'm talking
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about, the mail but it's the --

MR. TOWNSEND: It's this, your Honor, right?

THE COURT: Yes, that to me -- I don't know what that's -- how I'm supposed to tell that that's related to this case. So I want you to wrestle with that --

MR. KOZAK: Well, I think the affidavit of my secretary saying that's the receipt she got when she mailed that to the court.

MR. TOWNSEND: This appears to be the corner of the envelope so why not produce the entire envelope?

THE COURT: Yeah, and I guess that's my question, you know, that normally when you have a photocopy of the postage which is basically what that is, you would have the whole envelope that would show where it was actually mailed because that could be a corner of an envelope that was actually mailed to -- there may be a way to code the --

MR. TOWNSEND: This little thing here.

THE COURT: Yeah, what's that called?

MR. TOWNSEND: Q R Code.

THE COURT: Yeah, Q R Code. I don't know but the fact that you have -- it's like a picture of a 49

cent stamp, that is equivalent to postage but I mean why wouldn't we have the whole envelope; do you understand what I'm saying?

MR. KOZAK: I do but wouldn't the envelope have been sent?

THE COURT: But why would you only take a photocopy of the Q R Code, the postage?

MR. KOZAK: Well, that was my secretary's judgment so I don't know what was going through her mind. I guess she thought --

THE COURT: But I mean, I guess make the argument if I were to -- I'm not saying you did because I'm going to look at the evidence but if I wanted to defraud the court, what would I do. I could go find postage that was mailed on that day in the amount of \$5 and just take a picture of that when I very easily could have photocopied the whole thing and that would answer the question, right?

Do you understand what I'm saying?

MR. KOZAK: I do.

THE COURT: So I think you have some work ahead on that issue whether we're going to consider reviving.

MR. TOWNSEND: Your Honor, if I could add one

thing there too. This is something that we would include in our opposition to this motion. The opposition was due December 28th, not December 30th. So even if they filed it December 30th, it was late.

THE COURT: So you can address that however you want. I haven't done the math on the dates so I don't know. I know the court didn't rule until well after the time but let's talk about moving forward.

This case is going to move forward in one way or the other. You'll get the discovery by Thursday. What about -- what else can we -- how can the court be of assistance to both parties?

MR. TOWNSEND: Right now, your Honor, as this case stands, this is an action for partition.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. TOWNSEND: Which is governed by statute, it's relatively straightforward what needs to happen.

So we would like to set a tentative date for a bench trial on the action for partition with the understanding that there's a chance that there's going to be some additional claims brought in for which we would need to do discovery and that date might need to be pushed back.

THE COURT: How would you feel about because

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      the case is what it is right now and it could change
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      depending on how the next few weeks play out but would
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      you be opposed to setting a date now?
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               MR. KOZAK:
                           No.
                                If you want to set a date
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     four months down the road, that would be okay with us.
              MR. TOWNSEND: That's the date we discussed
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  7
     was about four months out.
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              THE COURT: How long do you need?
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              MR. TOWNSEND:
                              I think we should probably set
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     it for a full day but I would expect a half day.
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              THE COURT: Would you agree with that?
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              MR. KOZAK:
                          I would say a full day.
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
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              So let's see, is June 27, 28 or 29th too
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     soon?
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              MR. TOWNSEND:
                             Depending on what we get in
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     discovery.
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              THE COURT: Yeah, I guess that's the problem.
              Would you see if the Court Administrator, she
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    usually goes to lunch on the 2:00 o'clock hour but let
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    me just see if she's available.
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             MR. TOWNSEND:
                             I would be okay with maybe
    setting a date. Well, I guess you would want to look
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    at --
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THE COURT: I think the problem is the posture could change depending on --

THE CLERK: She's on the phone but she said she'll step in.

> THE COURT: Okay.

MR. TOWNSEND: Another option might be to, pardon me using this word again, but to partition the this lawsuit where if there's a claim -- if there's additional claims, that they be heard separate and apart from the partition action. I'm not sure they're related.

THE COURT: My preference is this was taken care of as a whole; would you agree with that Mr. Kozak?

MR. KOZAK: Yes.

MR. TOWNSEND: And I'm fine with that too.

THE COURT: How else can the court be of assistance other than setting the date? My intention would be to hold that date absent some dramatic change in the procedural and expect counsel to move forward because I think this case, just looking at it, has dragged on longer than I would like not from filing to completion but just there seems to have been -- it hasn't been steadily moving forward.

MR. TOWNSEND: Right.

Your Honor, it has been our intention, it was our intention today to ask for sanctions for the rule -- for their failures to comply with the rules but I understand you want to have an evidentiary hearing on that so we can wait on that.

THE COURT: I think we do. I mean, I'll entertain if I make findings that would support it and I don't and --

MR. TOWNSEND: Because we agree that this is something that should have been resolved or it could have been resolved much quicker.

THE COURT: A one-day trial about four months out.

THE CLERK: A one day, October 3rd at 9:00 o'clock.

THE COURT: Would that work with your calendar?

MR. KOZAK: Yes, it will.

THE COURT: Would that work with your calendar?

MR. TOWNSEND: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: We'll, just set that whole day.

Is there any appetite from counsel to set

this for a mediation or a settlement conference with another judge?

MR. TOWNSEND: I would love to do that.

THE COURT: How would you feel about that?

MR. KOZAK: We always like mediations, your Honor. We've settled many cases that way.

THE COURT: And, you know, we're a single-judge district so it gets a little hard. Is there a judge you have in mind that I can reach out to and see if they would be willing to. I know Judge Russell in Carson City does a good job. Judge Hardy in Reno, he's a little harder to get into.

MR. TOWNSEND: Either of those would be great for us.

THE COURT: How would you feel about Judge Russell if he was willing to do it?

MR. KOZAK: I don't know Judge Russell. I do know Judge Satler and Judge Hardy up in Reno. I've settled cases with both of those judges. I would be perfectly happy with either one of them. They are very good settlement judges.

THE COURT: Is this case -- I mean are the positions of the parties -- sometimes you just need someone to decide or is this a case where there's some

flexibility? 1 2 I mean, I can tell you if the procedural 3 posture of this case doesn't change, it's a fairly simple case potentially. If the -- if it does change, 4 it could become more -- and sometimes that uncertainty 5 6 creates flexibility. I guess I'll start with you, Mr. Kozak, do 7 8 you think this is a case that could be successful in 9 mediating? The other idea what about someone like 10 Judge Whitehead. I don't know how much money is involved in this case. He's not the least expensive 11 12 mediator out there but he's good. MR. TOWNSEND: I don't know him. 13 14 THE COURT: How much is this property worth 15 roughly? 16 MR. TOWNSEND: 180. 17 THE COURT: Are there any encumbrances on it? 18 MR. TOWNSEND: Not that I know of, no. 19 THE COURT: Have either of you had any 20 experience with private mediators? 21 MR. TOWNSEND: Yes. 22 THE COURT: And who have you used in the 23 past? 24 MR. TOWNSEND: I'm really bad with names but

if you give me a minute, I might be able to come up with it, it wasn't a judge though.

THE COURT: What about you?

MR. KOZAK: Yes. We used, Mr. Enzenberger up in Reno, excellent private mediator. We would be very happy with him. We settled a case with him. He's excellent.

MR. TOWNSEND: What was his name?

THE COURT: Bob Enzenberger. I guess I'm just looking for do you guys want -- if you go to a private mediation, you guys are going to be splitting the cost. Maybe we can get a senior judge in here mediation, that might be our best bet. You would probably have to take whoever is assigned; would the parties be willing to do that?

MR. TOWNSEND: We would prefer a judicial settlement.

THE COURT: Okay.

So Court Administrator, why don't we ask the Supreme Court to assign a senior judge to mediate this case and can we agree on a date where the parties will be available and we'll just put in that -- well, you know, why don't we have Judge Estes mediate it on -- he's going to be here on June 27; right?

1 THE CLERK: He is, your Honor. 2 THE COURT: We don't have anything set right 3 now? THE CLERK: We do not have anything set. 4 THE COURT: 5 That will be -- if you guys any objection to having a senior Judge Robert Estes? 6 7 THE CLERK: Your Honor, give me one second. 8 I noticed just as I was coming in that Judge Estes just sent me an e-mail in regard to that week so let 9 10 me verify what that says. 11 MR. TOWNSEND: I've dealt with Judge Estes 12 and he would be okay too. 13 I'm supposed to be out of town THE COURT: that week, and he's just covering here so that would 14 15 be the simplest. 16 THE CLERK: Your Honor, Judge Estes has just 17 set something that week in Yerington for July 1st, but 18 he's indicated either June 29th or June 30th in addition to the law and motion day, he will be 19 20 available. 21 THE COURT: What day is the law and motion day? 22 23 THE CLERK: June 28th. 24 THE COURT: Okay.

So should we do the June 29th, would that work with your schedule?

MR. KOZAK: That will work with us.

MR. TOWNSEND: Can you tell me what day of the week that is?

THE COURT: It's a Wednesday.

MR. TOWNSEND: Yeah, that should be fine.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's set it for 9:00 in the morning, and we'll give you -- should we give him the whole day and that way -- I don't think it will take the whole day but I won't set anything else that day.

I would encourage -- litigation is expensive. Litigation can get really expensive if you -- depending on if you're paying just for yourself or one of the parties ended up having to pay for the other side. So I would encourage you to come with open minds and try to resolve this if you can. Judge Estes will come out fresh. He won't have any experience with the case.

So I'm going to ask each counsel to file a Confidential Settlement Statement the Monday before the mediation. So the mediation is set on the 29th; is that correct?

THE CLERK: That's correct, it would be June 20th, your Honor, is the Monday that is a full week before.

THE COURT: It's June 20th, no later than June 20th and just file that with the court here, it won't be shared with opposing counsel.

MR. TOWNSEND: Do you want any page limits on that?

THE COURT: I'll leave it to counsel's discretion. I can tell you I know Judge Estes and he would prefer -- yeah, I'm going to put a five-page limit on it just knowing Judge Estes. He might self impose a five-page limit.

MR. TOWNSEND: Right.

THE COURT: So we'll do that.

Is there anything that should take place between now and then to put the parties in a better position -- is there any questions as to the value of the property that might -- I mean, we could get a broker evaluation, it wouldn't necessarily be binding on trial but at least you guys could come into it with an idea of what a realtor here in town thought the property might be worth.

Mr. Kozak, what are your thoughts on that?

theirs and we have ours, that would be perfectly

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agreeable to us.

THE COURT: Is that a local realtor?

MR. KOZAK: No. He's up in Reno but he does a lot of work down here in Fallon.

THE COURT: Okay.

So then what we'll do is we won't use a mutually agreeable one but you can get yours and you can get yours and provide it for whatever assistance Judge Estes can use it for.

So we have a trial date. We have a mediation date. Let me ask, I mean I expect that the Case Conference Report will be filed before then. Do we want to burn a ton of money in attorney's fees litigating the issue that -- on the dismissed cases or do we want to wait for the mediation see if it resolves and then move forward? I guess I'm asking both counsel. I guess there's an argument for both approaches. We can put it aside for a month and I can give you a deadline sometime after to brief it and hold the evidentiary hearing or we can -- I don't know that we would get it decided by then anyway.

I'm just wondering what your thoughts are because that might be attorney's fees money that could be better spent toward settling the case. Counsel.

what are your thoughts?

MR. KOZAK: My thought is to put it over until after the mediation. Since we're going

June 29th not that far off, I think decisions on any motions should be after the mediation.

THE COURT: What about the actual briefing of the motions? What about the actual briefing of the motions?

MR. KOZAK: Oh, are you talking about the new motion we're going to file?

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. KOZAK: Yeah. If you could give us 15 days on that.

THE COURT: I guess my question is: Do you want to burn all the attorney's fees before the mediation or do you want to wait and see if you can settle it and if you can't settle it, then I'll give you some deadlines after that.

MR. KOZAK: Yeah, that would be fine.

THE COURT: What about you?

MR. TOWNSEND: That's what we would prefer as well too to is to set it after.

THE COURT: So the mediation is on June 29th.

If there's going to be -- if it doesn't settle, then

 my previous order about how the current motion is going to be resubmitted, I'm going to give you a deadline of July 8th to file that.

Then Mr. Hughes, you'll have just the statutory time after July 8th and then Ms. Howard, you'll have the statutory time to reply and at that point, the court will set an evidentiary hearing. I would just encourage you guys to really try to make as good of effort as you can to try to settle this case at that mediation or settlement conference.

Is this the Case Conference Report?

THE CLERK: Yeah, this just came in.

THE COURT: There is a Defendant's Case

Conference Report, it purports to have been signed on

March 10, 2016 by you, Mr. Kozak, and then it has a

signature that you can tell me -- the court hasn't

received this and it purports that it was mailed on

the 10th day of March 2016 to Mr. Townsend at 402

North Division Street, PO Box 646, Carson City, Nevada

89702, so and that was e-mailed to us?

THE CLERK: Yes, it just came over Ms.

Joseph's e-mail just about two minutes ago.

THE COURT: Okay.

How do you want to handle this, counsel, do

because there's no way for the court to know. certificate of mailing doesn't require to say that it was mailed to the court. The court received it when it receives it and then files it in. When would that have been mailed to the court?

I'd like to see a copy, yeah.

MR. KOZAK: I presume the day that I signed it.

> THE COURT: Did you sign that document?

MR. KOZAK: I believe I did.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KOZAK: I don't think we can electronic file down here. I think I have to sign those.

THE COURT: I guess my question is: Is there -- in your office, is there anyone -- is there a stamp where someone could stamp your signature or?

> MR. KOZAK: No.

THE COURT: I've seen some attorneys who have a stamp or sometimes people in the office get a little -- I mean, they sign the attorney's signature.

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MR. KOZAK: We don't do that. 1 2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 Why would it have been completed so late, 4 that's only a week ago, right? It was March 10th. 5 I guess it was -- it was two months ago, that's still late, it was due I think at the end of December. 6 7 MR. TOWNSEND: No, that one was due -- I think we filed ours March 11th. 8 9 THE COURT: March 11th, okay. 10 So since these aren't originals, I'm not 11 going to file them in as court documents. I'll let 12 you file originals in, but I just want to have them in the court record for -- is that your signature? 13 14 MR. KOZAK: Yes, it is. 15 THE COURT: Is there anything else, counsel? 16 MR. TOWNSEND: I don't think so right now. 17 THE COURT: Anything else from you? 18 MR. KOZAK: No, your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Then we'll have our settlement 20 conference. We'll then see where we are from there 21 and we have a trial date to work towards. I want to thank counsel and I want to thank 22

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So

typically do this at this stage of the proceedings but

the parties for coming in. Like I said, we don't

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it is allowed under the rules to try to get -- if the
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      court deems it's necessary, and just upon Mr. Hughes'
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      application, the court determined that it would have
      been helpful in this case so that's why we did it. So
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      let's see where we go.
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               Thank you.
                              Thank you, your Honor.
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               MR. TOWNSEND:
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               MR. KOZAK:
                           Thank you.
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               THE COURT: Court is in recess.
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               (The proceedings were concluded.)
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STATE OF NEVADA 1 ) 2 )SS. 3 COUNTY OF WASHOE 4 5 6 I, GAIL R. WILLSEY, do hereby certify: 7 That I was provided a JAVS CD and that said CD was transcribed by me, a Certified Shorthand 8 9 Reporter, in the matter entitled herein; 10 That said transcript which appears hereinbefore was taken in stenotype notes by me from 11 the CD and thereafter transcribed into typewriting as 12 herein appears to the best of my knowledge, skill and 13 14 ability and is a true record thereof. 15 16 17 18 GAIL R. WILLSEY, CSR #359 19 20 21 22 23 24

Case No. 15-10DC-0876

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Dennighors-

# IN THE TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CHURCHILL

10 SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES,

Plaintiff,

VS.

ORDER AFTER PRETRIAL
CONFERENCE

ELIZABETH C. HOWARD, an individual; and DOES I through XX, inclusive,

Defendants.

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This matter came before the Court for a Pretrial Conference pursuant to NRCP 16 on May 17, 2016. Having heard from the parties and considered the issues presented at the Pretrial

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Conference, and GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

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1. This case has been set for a bench trial of one (1) day, to commence on October 3, 2016 at 9:00 a.m.

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2. A settlement conference has been set for June 29, 2016 at 9:00 a.m. with one day allocated for the settlement conference.

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- Each party shall file a confidential settlement statement no later than June 20, 2016.
   Each party's confidential settlement statement shall contain a maximum of five (5) pages.
- 4. ELIZABETH C. HOWARD shall have until July 8, 2016 to file a supplement to her Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim filed on May 17, 2016. SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES shall have until July 27, 2016 to file an opposition. ELIZABETH C. HOWARD shall have until August 5, 2016 to file a reply. After August 5, 2016, the Court will determine whether or not a hearing regarding the Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim is necessary or if the Court can rule on the merits of the Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim without a hearing.
  IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this  $\sqrt{2}^{n_j}$  day of May 2016.

THOMÁS L. STOCKARD DISTRICT JUDGE

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

The undersigned, an employee of the Tenth Judicial District Court, hereby certifies that I served the foregoing **ORDER AFTER PRETRIAL CONFERENCE** on the parties, by depositing a copy thereof as shown below.

Justin M. Townsend, Esq. Allison MacKenzie, Ltd. P.O. Box 646 Carson City, NV 89702

Charles R. Kozak, Esq. Kozak Lusiani Law, LLC 3100 Mill Street, Suite 115 Reno, NV 89502

DATED this 19th day of May, 2016

Sue Sevon, Court Administrator

Subscribed and sworn to this

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1911 day of May, 2016.

Deputy Court Clerk

J.

Case No. 15-10DC-0876

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# IN THE TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CHURCHILL

SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES,

Plaintiff,

VS.

ELIZABETH C. HOWARD, an individual; and DOES I through XX, inclusive,

Defendants.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S

MOTION TO SET ASIDE DISMISSAL
OF COUNTERCLAIM

This matter came before the Court on ELIZABETH HOWARD's (hereinafter "Ms. Howard") Motion for Summary Judgment filed June 28, 2016, and her Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim, filed May 17, 2016. Ms. Howard is represented by Charles Kozak, Esq. SHAUGHNAN HUGHES (hereinafter "Mr. Hughes"), who is represented by Justin Townsend, Esq., has opposed both Motions. The Motions have been fully briefed by both parties.

### I. Factual and Procedural Background

Mr. Hughes and Ms. Howard were involved in a romantic relationship in the years leading up to the filing of the Complaint in this case. In June of 2012, a parcel of real property

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in Churchill County, Nevada (hereinafter "Fulkerson property"), was purchased by and conveyed to Ms. Howard by way of Special Warranty Deed.<sup>1</sup> Several days later, in July of 2012, Ms. Howard conveyed the Fulkerson property by way of Quitclaim Deed to herself and Mr. Hughes as Joint Tenants.<sup>2</sup> The parties subsequently made a number of improvements to the property, the details of which remain in dispute. What is not disputed is that Ms. Howard paid for a number of materials used in the improvement of the land and that Mr. Hughes paid property taxes on the land.<sup>3</sup>

Sometime around March of 2015 the relationship between the parties deteriorated. Ms. Howard sought a Protection Order against Mr. Hughes from the New River Township Justice Court, but was ultimately denied. Thereafter, Mr. Hughes initiated this action by filing his Complaint on July 27, 2016.

In his Complaint, Mr. Hughes seeks an accounting of his interest in the Fulkerson Property. He further seeks an order directing the sale of the Fulkerson property and an equitable division of the proceeds thereof between the parties. On November 24, 2015, Ms. Howard filed an Answer and Counterclaim requesting an order directing Mr. Hughes "to specifically perform the action required to give 100% sole ownership of the property to [Ms. Howard]." Further, in her Counterclaim, Ms. Howard alleges Fraud, Conversion, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and Specific Performance; she asks for an award of damages and special damages.

On December 11, 2015, Mr. Hughes moved to dismiss Ms. Howard's Counterclaims and strike certain allegations contained in the Counterclaim pursuant to NRCP 9(b), 12(b)(5), and 12(f). This motion remained unopposed, and on January 7, 2016 this Court entered an Order granting the requested relief.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 1.

See, e.g. Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 3.

On May 17, 2016, Ms. Howard filed a Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim pursuant to NRCP 60(b)(1). Specifically, Mr. Kozak (Ms. Howard's Attorney) stated that the opposition to Mr. Hughes' Motion "perhaps due to post office mistake or being misplaced somewhere at the Court, . . . was never filed by this Court."

Also on May 17, 2016, the court held a Pre-Trial Conference at which point the case was scheduled for a Settlement Conference on July 29, 2016 and set for Trial on October 3, 2016 at 9:00 a.m. Ms. Howard was given until July 8, 2016 to file a supplement to her Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim.

On June 20, 2016, Ms. Howard filed an Opposition to Motion to Dismiss; Motion to Strike, however this Opposition was subsequently withdrawn on July 8, 2016. And, in its place on July 8, 2016, Ms. Howard filed her "Supplement to Elizabeth Howard's Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim Filed May 17, 2016."

Meanwhile, on June 28, 2016 Ms. Howard filed her Motion for Summary Judgment. Both the Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim were opposed by Mr. Hughes on July 20, 2016 and July 28, 2016, respectively, and come now before the Court for consideration.

### II. Analysis

### (a) Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim

"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." N.R.C.P. 60(b). "This is in the nature of a remedial statute; its object [is] to relieve litigants who through some inadvertence, such as is common to mankind, might be deprived of a hearing upon the merits through their unintentional failure to bring themselves within a rule." Whise v. Whise, 36 Nev. 16, 20 (1913). Further, "the

court must give due consideration to the State's underlying basic policy of resolving cases on their merits whenever possible." *Id.* 

The Nevada Supreme Court has held "that the presence of the following factors indicates that 60(b)(1) has been satisfied: (1) a prompt application to remove the judgment; (2) the absence of an intent to delay the proceedings; (3) a lack of knowledge of procedural requirements; and (4) good faith." *Yochum v. Davis*, 98 Nev. 484, 487 (1982) (citing *Hotel Last Frontier v. Frontier Prop.*, 79 Nev. 150 (1963)).

When considering if a Motion is prompt, the court generally looks to Rule 60(b), stating that "[t]he motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reason (1), . . . not more than 6 months after the proceeding was taken or the date that written notice of entry of the judgment or order was served." N.R.C.P. 60(b). However, there are circumstances in which filings within the six month period are nevertheless not *prompt. See, e.g. Kahn v. Orme*, 108 Nev. 510, 514 (1992) (finding that a filing to set aside default was not prompt even when it was filed within the six month period, because the moving party was aware of default and failed to take action for over five months). *See also Union Petrochemical Corp. v. Scott*, 96 Nev. 337, 339 (1980) (noting that six months is the outer limit, but that "want of diligence in seeking to set aside a judgment is ground enough for denial of such a motion").

Preliminarily, the Court is concerned by the lack of Mr. Kozak's candor regarding the Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. On May 17, 2016, Ms. Howard filed her initial Motion to set aside the Order. In this Motion, Mr. Kozak indicated that his office properly prepared, and placed in the mail, copies of Ms. Howard's opposition. Mr. Kozak further stated that Mr. Townsend told Mr. Kozak that he had received a copy of the opposition. At the Pre-Trial hearing on May 17, 2016, the Court questioned Mr. Kozak about these statements. Ultimately, the record indicates that neither Mr. Townsend nor the Court ever received an Opposition to the

Motion to Dismiss. Nevertheless, Mr. Kozak indicated that he could provide a file stamped 2 copy of the Opposition from his records. Mr. Kozak has yet to produce such a copy.

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The question remains as to whether Ms. Howard's Motion to Set Aside Dismissal was timely. Mr. Hughes filed a Motion to Dismiss Ms. Howard's counterclaims on December 11. 2015. Ms. Howard failed to respond in a timely fashion. Thus, upon Mr. Hughes' Reply and Request for Submission, the Court entered the Order dismissing Ms. Howard's Counterclaim on January 7, 2016. Mr. Hughes filed a notice of entry regarding this Order on January 12, 2016.4

Ms. Howard took no action whatsoever regarding the Order until over five months after it was entered. The most generous interpretation of the facts would lead the Court to find that 10|| Mr. Kozak prepared the Opposition in a timely manner, that his assistant placed two copies of the opposition in the mail, and that the post office inexplicably lost or mis-delivered both envelopes. However, Mr. Kozak's failure to take action when he received Mr. Hughes' Reply, filed December 30, 2015, or the Notice of Entry, filed January 12, 2016 is inexcusable. Both of these filings put Mr. Kozak on notice that no one had received the Opposition. Nevertheless, Mr. Kozak waited until May 17, 2016, the day of the Pre-Trial Hearing, to raise the issue for the first time. Mr. Kozak's delay in raising the issue had the potential to significantly prejudice the opposing party who arrived for the Pre-Trial Hearing with the understanding that the Counterclaims had been resolved.<sup>5</sup> Thus, although his filing was within the six month period contemplated in N.R.C.P. 60(b), his actions do not constitute a "prompt application."

Further, the Court further finds that Mr. Kozak's conduct rises above the level of "inadvertence" contemplated in Whise. Whise, 36 Nev. 16, see also Sherman v. Sothern Pacific Co., 31 Nev. 285, 291 (1909) (noting that the purpose of the court's discretion is to prevent injustice that arises from excusable neglect and leads to an application of form over substance).

There is no indication or allegation that Ms. Howard did not receive a copy of this notice of entry by mail.

The Court also notes that there is no mention of the counterclaims in the Plaintiff's Case Conference Report, filed March 15, 2016. This is the only case conference report in the record. AA0082

In the present case, Mr. Kozak's neglect is not excusable. Not only did Mr. Kozak fail to file an opposition or serve it on the opposing party, but he also delayed addressing the issue, and ultimately addressed it with a questionable level of candor.

Although the court recognizes the State's general preference of resolving issues on the merits, there is a limit to the deviations from procedural requirements that the court will tolerate. Mr. Kozak's conduct has exceeded that limit. Therefore, Ms. Howard's Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim is DENIED.

#### (b) Summary Judgment

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Ms. Howard has also moved the Court for Summary Judgment against Mr. Hughes with respect to his Complaint. Summary judgment is proper only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." N.R.C.P. 56(c). "A factual dispute is genuine when the evidence is such that a rational trier of fact could return a verdict for the nonmoving Party." Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 731 (2005). Summary judgment may not be granted "if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Sprague v. Lucky Stores, 109 Nev. 247, 249 (1993) (citing Oehler v. Humana, Inc., 105 Nev. 348, 350 (1983)).

When deciding a summary judgment motion, all evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Wood, 121 Nev. at 729. However, once a party has moved for summary judgment, the non-moving party must "set forth specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial or have summary judgment entered against him." Sprague, 109 Nev. at 250.

In the present case, Mr. Hughes has filed a complaint asking for the Court to determine 24 the parties' respective rights to a parcel of real property which they own as joint tenants. A joint tenancy in real property may be created "by transfer from a sole owner to himself or herself and others." Nev. Rev. Stat. 111.065(1) (2015). Once a joint tenancy is established, it may be partitioned, at the request of a joint tenant, in accordance with Chapter 39 of the Nevada Revised Statutes. The Court must then determine the respective interests of the parties in the real property. See Nev. Rev. Stat. 39.080 (2015).

Where unmarried persons acquire a parcel of real property as joint tenants, the apportionment should be in proportion to their respective contributions. Langevin v. York, 111 Nev. 1481, 1485 (1995). Ms. Howard argues that the Nevada Supreme Court has stated that "there is a presumption that where cotenants unequally share in the purchase price of property. 10|| 'the cotenants intended to share in proportion to the amount contributed to the purchase price.'" Id. (quoting Sack v. Tomlin, 110 Nev. 204, 210 (1994)). However, Langevin is distinguishable from the present case because the parties not only made unequal contributions to the purchase price, but the party which did not contribute to the purchase price also provided no contribution to improvements or maintenance of the property thereafter. See 111 Nev. at 1485–86. In Sack, while the court started by looking at the contributions to the purchase price, it ultimately adjusted the percentage based upon their subsequent contributions using the "Kershman formula." Sack, 110 Nev. at 211. Specifically, the court favorably cited Kershman v. Kershman, which found that a joint tenant's share should be the percentage of their contribution to the value of the property—including contributions toward improvements after the initial purchase. 192 Cal. App. 2d 23, 28–29 (1961) (cited by Sack, 110 Nev. at 210).

In the present case, Ms. Howard deeded the property to herself and Mr. Hughes as joint tenants. Mr. Hughes alleges that Ms. Howard intended to gift him an equal share in the

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Although the dispute in Sack was centered around property owned as a tenancy in common, the court in Langevin found the precedent applicable to property owned as a joint tenancy. Langevin, 111 Nev. at 1485.

property. He has minimally supported this allegation with declarations in his Affidavit. Mr. Hughes further provided receipts indicating that he paid property taxes for the Fulkerson Property in an amount exceeding \$2,000.00.8 Mr. Hughes further alleges that he paid for certain electrical work conducted on the Fulkerson Property's detached garage. He states that this assertion is supported by an invoice provided in Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Additionally, Mr. Hughes alleges that he contributed toward some of the items purchased for the improvement for the property. Finally, Mr. Hughes alleges that he contributed to the value of the property by personally completing some of the improvements.

Although Ms. Howard disputes the degree to which Mr. Hughes contributed to the cost of improvements on the property, when viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Hughes, there is an issue of material fact with respect to the parties' respective contributions.

Because Mr. Hughes has provided specific allegations regarding his financial contribution to the value of the property, and because the value of his contribution is a material fact for the court to consider in apportioning the parties' interests in a partition, Summary Judgment is not appropriate at this point. Therefore, Ms. Howard's Motion for Summary Judgment is Denied.

#### GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

- 1. Ms. Howard's Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaims is hereby DENIED.
- 2. Ms. Howard's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated this \_\_\_\_\_day of September 2016.

THOMAS L. STOCKARD DISTRICT JUDGE

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> See Affidavit of Shaughnan L. Hughes, filed July 20, 2016

<sup>8</sup> See Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> See Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 19A.

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

The undersigned, an employee of the Tenth Judicial District Court, hereby certifies that I

served the foregoing ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

#### JUDGMENT AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DISMISSAL OF

COUNTERCLAIM on the parties, by depositing a copy thereof as shown below.

Justin M. Townsend, Esq. Allison MacKenzie, Ltd. 402 N. Division Street Carson City, NV 89703-4168

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Charles R. Kozak, Esq. Kozak Lusiani Law, LLC 3100 Mill Street, Suite 115 Reno, NV 89502

Sue Sevon, Court Administrator

Subscribed and sworn to this

1 day of September, 2016

Deputy Court Clerk

Case No. 15-10DC-0876

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# IN THE TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CHURCHILL

SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES,

Plaintiff,

VS.

#### ORDER CONTINUING TRIAL

ELIZABETH C. HOWARD, an individual; and DOES I through XX, inclusive,

Defendants.

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This matter came before the Court on Plaintiff SHAUGHNAN HUGHES' (hereinafter "Mr. Hughes") Motion for Continuance, filed September 20, 2016. Mr. Hughes is represented by Justin Townsend, Esq. Defendant, ELIZABETH HOWARD (hereinafter "Ms. Howard") filed an Opposition to Continuance in Part on September 23, 2016. Ms. Howard is represented by Charles Kozak, Esq.

In his Motion, Mr. Hughes alleges that he requires an appraisal of the property at issue in this case and that the parties have been unable to arrange such an appraisal. Mr. Hughes further alleges that Ms. Howard is in possession of certain photographs that would be beneficial

to his case. Ms. Howard has opposed the motion in part, stating that an appraisal is unnecessary, and that she is willing to provide her laptop for inspection in the near future.

#### GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

- The Trial in this matter, which is currently set for October 3, 2016 is hereby continued to February 6, 2017 at 9:00 a.m.
- 2. If, as part of his discovery, Mr. Hughes wishes to complete an appraisal of the property, he shall bear any and all costs associated therewith.
- 3. Ms. Howard shall cooperate with Mr. Hughes to allow an appraiser to inspect the property by no later than October 27, 2016.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this  $27^{th}$  day of September 2016.

THOMAS L. STOCKARD DISTRICT JUDGE

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

The undersigned, an employee of the Tenth Judicial District Court, hereby certifies that I served the foregoing ORDER CONTINUING TRIAL on the parties, by depositing a copy thereof as

shown below.

Justin M. Townsend, Esq. Allison MacKenzie, Ltd. 402 N. Division Street Carson City, NV 89703-4168

Charles R. Kozak, Esq. Kozak Lusiani Law, LLC. 3100 Mill Street, Suite 115 Reno, NV 89502

DATED this 27th day of September, 2016.

Sue Sevon, Court Administrator

Subscribed and sworn to this

27th day of September, 2016.

Deputy Court Clerk

Case No. 15-10DC-0876

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## IN THE TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CHURCHILL

SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES,

Plaintiff,

VS.

ORDER REGARDING PROPERTY

ELIZABETH C. HOWARD, an individual; and DOES I through XX, inclusive,

APPRAISAL

Defendants.

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Kozak, Esq.

GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

1. Upon a minimum of a 24-hour notice by Tom Riggins, Ms. Hughes shall make the property and associated structures available for inspection and appraisal.

In an Order entered September 27, 2016, this Court required the parties to cooperate to

obtain an appraisal of the Property at issue in this case by no later than October 27, 2016. On

the logistics of obtaining the appraisal. Ultimately, the parties agreed to obtain the appraisal from

Tom Riggins, who will be escorted onto the property by Dedra L. Sonne, paralegal to Charles

18 November 16, 2016 counsel for both Plaintiff and Defendant conferred with the Court regarding

a. Charles Kozak, Esq. shall ensure that Dedra L. Sonne is available and present to escort Tom Riggins onto the property.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this  $2^{nd}$  day of December 2016.

THOMAS L. STOCKARD DISTRICT JUDGE

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

The undersigned, an employee of the Tenth Judicial District Court, hereby certifies that I served the foregoing ORDER REGARDING PROPERTY APPRAISAL on the parties, by depositing a copy thereof as shown below.

Justin M. Townsend, Esq. Allison MacKenzie, Ltd. P.O. Box 646 Carson City, NV 89702

Charles Kozak, Esq. Kozak Lusiani Law, LLC 3100 Mill Street, Suite 115 Reno, NV 89502

DATED this 2nd day of Olumber, 2016.

Sue Sevon, Court Administrator

Subscribed and sworn to this

and day of <u>lecepter</u>, 2016.

Deputy Court Clerk

Case No. 15-10DC-0876

Case No. 13-10DC-0670

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# IN THE TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CHURCHILL

SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES,

Plaintiff,

ORDER REGARDING MOTION IN
LIMINE AND MOTION TO AMEND
ANSWER

vs.

ELIZABETH C. HOWARD, an individual; and DOES I through XX, inclusive,

Defendants.

Defendants.

This Matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES's (hereinafter "Mr. Hughes") Motion in Limine, filed January 9, 2017. ELIZABETH HOWARD (hereinafter "Ms. Howard") filed an Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion in Limine or in the Alternative Motion for Leave to Amend Answer on January 20, 2017. This Matter is set for a one-day bench trial on February 6, 2017.

The Court has set forth the factual and procedural background of this case in an Order entered September 7, 2016.<sup>2</sup> In short, Mr. Hughes filed a Complaint seeking the sale and equitable

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Trial was originally set for October 3, 2016 but was continued to February 6, 2017 in an Order entered September 27, 2016.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Specifically, the Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim.

division of proceeds of real property held by the parties in joint tenancy. Ms. Howard subsequently filed an Answer and Counterclaim. The Counterclaim was dismissed in an Order entered January 7, 2016.<sup>3</sup>

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On February 16, 2016, the parties held an early case conference. Mr. Hughes submitted his separate case conference report on March 15, 2016. The Court held various hearings and 6 conducted a Settlement Conference. The matter was set for a trial on October 3, 2016; trial was continued until February 6, 2017. On January 4, 2017—almost ten months late—Ms. Howard filed her separate case conference report.

In Ms. Howard's case conference report, she includes her brief description of the nature of the action. Ms. Howard states in pertinent part:

> B. Defendant should not be placed in a position of having to partition the property to sell the property as the Plaintiff has no legal equitable investment in the property.<sup>5</sup>

> C. Plaintiff exerted undue influence on Defendant to quit claim on the deed five (5) days after she closed the sale when she solely purchased the property with her own funds.

> D. Plaintiff used Conversion as he knew the monies had by Defendant were for herself and Defendant's mother.

> E. Plaintiff's threatening and wrongful behavior resulted in abusive mental anguish to the Defendant, and such was the Plaintiff's malicious intent.

Defendant's Case Conference Report, p. 2; (hereinafter "Paragraphs B-E").

Mr. Hughes filed a Motion in Limine seeking an Order that limits "the introduction of evidence at trial to matters pertinent to an equitable action for partition and restricting any evidence in support of improperly pleaded affirmative defenses." Plaintiff's Motion in Limine, p.

4.6 Ms. Howard opposed the motion in limine, arguing that Paragraphs B-E do not amount to

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<sup>3</sup> The Court considered and denied Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim in the Order entered September 7, 2016.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The Court notes that Senior Judge Robert Estes conducted the Settlement Conference in this Matter.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Regarding Section B, this is Ms. Howard's position as to the relative interests in the property. This statement does not appear to raise any affirmative defenses and also mirrors the language of her denials within her Answer.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The Court also notes that Plaintiff objected to portions of Defendant's case conference report, which appeared to request a 4-day jury trial in this Matter, however Defendant's Opposition explains that the jury trial request was in error.

affirmative defenses. In the alternative, Ms. Howard moved to amend her answer to include the affirmative defenses.

#### Motion in Limine

In general, relevant evidence is admissible. NRS 48.025. Evidence is relevant if it has

"any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the

action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence." NRS 48.015. Even if

evidence is relevant, "evidence is not admissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed

by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues or of misleading the jury." NRS

48.035. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it "appeal[s] to the 'emotional and sympathetic

tendencies of a jury, rather than the jury's intellectual ability to evaluate evidence." State v.

Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 267 P.3d 777, 781 (2011) (citing Krause Inc. v. Little, 117 Nev. 929

(1996).

Here, Mr. Hughes specifically notes that Paragraphs B–E appear to call for evidence that would only be relevant to an affirmative defense. Mr. Hughes argues that Defendant failed to plead any affirmative defenses and that evidence pertaining to any such defenses should be barred at trial. While the parties agree that Ms. Howard did not explicitly plead any affirmative defenses within her answer, Ms. Howard disputes that Paragraphs B–E amount to affirmative defenses.

Thus, the first question is whether Paragraphs B–E are affirmative defenses.

Affirmative defenses are defined in N.R.C.P. 8, which provides both a list of defenses that a party must affirmatively plead and a catchall for "any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense." With respect to the catchall, "[a]llegations must be pleaded as affirmative defenses if they raise 'new facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiff's . . . claim, even if all allegations in the complaint are true." Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Richardson Constr., 123 Nev. 382, 393 (2007) (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Saks v.

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Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 350 (2d Cir. 2003)). Failure to plead an affirmative defense is generally considered waiver thereof, because the other party "is not given reasonable notice and an opportunity to respond." Williams v. Cottonwood Cove Dev. Co., 96 Nev. 857, 860 (1980) (citing Schwartz v. Schwartz, 95 Nev. 202, 204 (1979)).

As noted above, Paragraphs C-E allege undue influence, conversion, and "threatening and wrongful behavior." Beginning with undue influence, the argument is that Mr. Hughes unduly influenced Ms. Howard into signing a deed that lists the parties as joint tenants. Mr. Hughes has alleged that Plaintiff intended to gift him an equal share in the property when she signed the deed. Thus, the issue of whether the transfer was a gift is likely to be a question of fact at trial. Based upon the limited information provided, it is conceivable that Ms. Howard's evidence is relevant for a purpose other than an affirmative defense.8

With respect to conversion, Ms. Howard argues: "Plaintiff used Conversion as he knew the monies had by Defendant were for herself and Defendant's mother." The parties have provided no other information regarding this category of evidence. Similarly, with respect to Ms. 15 Howard's final category, she states, "Plaintiff's threatening and wrongful behavior resulted in abusive mental anguish to the Defendant, and such was the Plaintiff's malicious intent." Again, neither party has elaborated on this statement.9

Although the Court is empowered to make preliminary determinations regarding the admissibility of evidence, it is unable to do so when there is insufficient context from which to base such a determination. Paragraphs D-E could be interpreted as affirmative defenses, but there 21 is insufficient information for the Court to determine if there is another relevant purpose for the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> See, e.g. Affidavit of Shaughnan L. Hughes, filed July 20, 2016.

Based upon the brevity of the case conference report, the Court is unable to speculate as exact nature of Ms. Howard's evidence and argument. In the event that Ms. Howard seeks to introduce evidence that is only relevant to an affirmative defense, Mr. Hughes may renew his motion.

<sup>9</sup> Notably, Mr. Hughes had limited ability to elaborate on these statements because he was only alerted to Ms. Howard's position after she filed her case conference report 11 months late and 33 days before trial.

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admission of evidence under these categories. Absent any information regarding the nature of the evidence that Ms. Howard seeks to introduce and Mr. Hughes seeks to exclude, the Court will reserve determinations as to the admissibility of the evidence for trial.

#### Motion to Amend Answer

Ms. Howard has also filed an alternative motion to amend her answer. The Court notes that Ms. Howard's Motion for leave to amend her answer was filed less than 20 days before Trial. Further, her certificate of service indicates that she served Mr. Hughes by mail on January 20, 2017. Ms. Howard did not accompany her Motion with a request to shorten time. Despite the fact that Mr. Hughes' opposition was not due until after Trial, he filed his opposition on January 10 25, 2017.

As a preliminary matter, Ms. Howard's alternative motion hinges on the Court's determination as to whether Paragraphs B-E are affirmative defenses. Notably, Ms. Howard is in the best position to determine whether she intends to raise any affirmative defenses. Ms. 14|| Howard specifically alleges that she is not raising any affirmative defenses. As the Court set forth 15|| above, the limited language in the case conference report provides little insight into Ms. Howard's claim. Nevertheless, to the extent that Ms. Howard requests leave from the Court to amend her answer, the Court makes the following findings and conclusions:

Ms. Howard did not plead any affirmative defenses in her Answer. In general, failure to plead an affirmative defense is considered waiver thereof. See Williams, 96 Nev. at 860. "Under Rule 15 the district court may and should liberally allow an amendment to the pleadings if prejudice does not result." Schwartz v. Schwartz, 95 Nev. 202, 205 (1979). "The liberal policy provided in Rule 15(a) 'does not mean the absence of all restraint. Were that the intention, leave of court would not be required. The requirement of judicial approval suggests that there are

instances where leave should not be granted." State v. Sutton, 120 Nev. 972, 988 (2004) (quoting Ennes v. Mori, 80 Nev. 237, 243 (1964)).

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To the extent that Ms. Howard requests leave to amend her pleadings, that request is dilatory. "Sufficient reasons to deny a motion to amend a pleading include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motives on the part of the movant." Kantor v. Kantor, 116 Nev. 886, 891 (2000) (finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion for leave to amend her answer because defendant was dilatory and did not file the motion until the "eve" of trial). Here, Ms. Howard's counterclaims were dismissed in January 2016, over one year prior to her request to amend her answer. Nevertheless, Ms. Howard made no effort whatsoever to amend her answer until she filed her alternative motion less than 20 days before trial.

Not only is Ms. Howard's delayed request dilatory, but an amendment at this stage would 12 | also be prejudicial to Mr. Hughes. Prejudice may result if the opposing party is "deprived of reasonable, prior notice of [the] particular issue [or is] denied the opportunity to develop facts and confront the issue." Ivory Ranch v. Quinn River Ranch, 101 Nev. 471, 473 (1985). Here, Ms. Howard did not plead any affirmative defenses. Although Ms. Howard originally pled a series of counterclaims (which included fraud, conversion and intentional infliction of emotional distress), the counterclaims were dismissed in an order entered January 7, 2016. 10

Throughout the entire discovery process, Mr. Hughes has only been on notice of the issues raised in his own complaint. Mr. Hughes has not been on notice of any affirmative defenses or counterclaims. 11 As a consequence, Mr. Hughes would suffer prejudice if the Court were to grant

<sup>16</sup> This was before the parties' early case conference and before Mr. Hughes filed his early case conference report. In other words, pursuant to N.R.C.P. 26(a), the counterclaims were dismissed prior to discovery beginning.

<sup>11</sup> Although Ms. Howard argues that the factual recitation within her counterclaims should have put Mr. Hughes on notice of her (potential) affirmative defenses, this argument is illogical since her counterclaims were dismissed prior to the start of discovery. Ms. Howard was on notice of the counterclaims' dismissal in January 2016. In September 2016, the Court denied Ms. Howard's Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaims.

a motion to amend the answer, because Mr. Hughes had no opportunity to develop facts or confront the issues now raised by Ms. Howard. 12

Upon review of Ms. Howard's motion and the relevant law, to the extent that Ms. Howard seeks to amend her answer to include an affirmative defense, her request is DENIED.

## GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

- 1. Mr. Hughes' Motion in Limine is DENIED without prejudice.
- 2. Ms. Howard's alternative Motion for Leave to Amend Answer is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated this 27 day of January 2017.

THOMAS L. STOCKARD DISTRICT JUDGE

<sup>21 12</sup> Notably, Ms. Howard filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on June 28, 2016, wherein she references the arguments in Paragraphs B-E. For temporal context, she filed her Opposition to Motion to Dismiss; Motion to Strike (which she later withdrew) on June 20, 2016 and she filed her Supplement to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim on July 6, 2016. In other words, in the weeks before and after she filed her Motion for Summary Judgment, Ms. Howard also filed documents in support of her position that her counterclaims should not be dismissed.

Mr. Hughes' opposition to the motion for summary judgment argued that Ms. Howard inappropriately referenced her dismissed counterclaim and that the motion should be dismissed on those grounds alone. When Ms. Howard referenced her counterclaims in the Motion for Summary Judgment at the same time she was attempting to have the dismissal of her counterclaims set aside, it did not put Mr. Hughes on notice that she was separately pursuing an affirmative defense.

#### **CERTIFICATE OF MAILING**

The undersigned, an employee of the Tenth Judicial District Court, hereby

certifies that I served the foregoing ORDER REGARDING MOTION IN LIMINE AND

MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER on the parties by depositing a copy thereof in the U.S. Mail

at Fallon, Nevada, postage prepaid, as follows:

Justin Townsend, Esq. Allison MacKenzie, Ltd. P.O. Box 646 Carson City, NV 89702

Charles R. Kozak, Esq. Kozak Lusiani Law, LLC. 3100 Mill Street, Suite 115 Reno, NV 89502

DATED this 77th day of Jauray, 2017.

Sue Sevon, Court Administrator

Subscribed and sworn to this

27th day of January, 2017.

Notary Public/Clerk

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