EXHIBIT 10

EXHIBIT 10

Docket 72965 Document 2017-17933

Case No.15-10DC-0876 1 2 Dept. No. I The undersigned hereby affirms that 3 this document does not contain the social security number of any person 4 5 JUSTINM. TOWNSEND, Esq. 6 7 IN THE TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 8 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CHURCHILL 9 10 SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES, an individual. 11 Plaintiff, 12 Telephone: (775) 687-0202 Fax: (775) 882-7918 vs. E-Mail Address: law@allisonmackenzie.com 13 ELIZABETH C. HOWARD, an individual; and DOES I through 14 XX, inclusive. 15 Defendants. 16 17 NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER REGARDING AMOUNT OF SANCTIONS 18 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 24th day of April, 2017, the Court duly 19 entered an Order Regarding Amount of Sanctions in the above-entitled matter. A copy of said Order 20 is attached hereto as Exhibit "1". 21 DATED this 25th day of April, 2017. 22 23 ALLISON MacKENZIE, LTD. 402 North Division Street Carson City, NV 89703-4168 24 25 By: 26 JUSTIN M. TOWNSEND, ESO. Nevada State Bar No. 12293 27 Attorneys for Plaintiff, SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES 28 1

402 North Division Street, P.O. Box 646, Carson City, NV 89702

ALLISON MacKENZIE, LTD.

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	1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
	2	Pursuant to NRCP Rule 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee of ALLISON,		
	3	MacKENZIE, LTD., Attorneys at Law, and that on this date, I caused the foregoing document to be		
	4	served on all parties to this action by:		
	5 6	X Placing a true copy thereof in a sealed postage prepaid envelope in the United States Mail in Carson City, Nevada [NRCP 5(b)(2)(B)]		
	7	Hand-delivery - via Reno/Carson Messenger Service [NRCP 5(b)(2)(A)]		
	8	Electronic Transmission		
	9	Federal Express, UPS, or other overnight delivery		
	10	E-filing pursuant to Section IV of District of Nevada Electronic Filing Procedures [NRCP 5(b)(2)(D)]		
702	11	fully addressed as follows:		
NV 89 18	12	CHARLES R. KOZAK, ESQ. KOZAK LUSIANI LAW, LLC 3100 Mill Street, Suite 115		
LTD. Carson City, NV (775) 882-7918 tokenzie.com	13	3100 Mill Street, Suite 115 Reno, NV 89502		
LTD. Carson (775) 8 ackenzi	14	DATED this 25 th day of April, 2017.		
4ZIE, 646, C Fax: (sonma	15	$\hat{\boldsymbol{C}}$		
ALLISON MacKENZIE, LTD. Division Street, P.O. Box 646, Carson City, NV 89702 elephone: (775) 687-0202 Fax: (775) 882-7918 E-Mail Address: law@allisonmackenzie.com	16	Nancy Fontenot		
4 9	17	NANCY FOMENOT		
n Stree (775 Addree	18	4849-5653-7671, v. 1		
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1	Case No. 15-10DC-0876 FILED	
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8	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CHURCHILL	
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11	SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES, an individual,	
12	Plaintiff, ORDER REGARDING AMOUNT OF	
13	vs. <u>SANCTIONS</u>	
14	ELIZABETH C. HOWARD, an individual, et al.,	
15	Defendants.	
16	This Matter came before the Court on Plaintiff SHAUGHNAN HUGHES' (hereinafter	
17	"Mr. Hughes") Motion for Sanctions, filed August 26, 2016. Mr. Hughes is represented by Justin	
18	Townsend, Esq. ELIZABETH HOWARD (hereinafter "Ms. Howard") opposed the Motion for	
19	Sanctions on September 14, 2016. Ms. Howard is represented by Charles Kozak, Esq. On March	
20	1, 2017, this Court entered an Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Sanctions	
21	(hereinafter "Order for Sanctions").	
22	The Order directed counsel for Mr. Hughes, Justin Townsend, Esq., to file an affidavit	
23	establishing the cost of attorney's fees pertinent to the awards set forth in the Order for Sanctions.	
24	The Court has reviewed the affidavit along with Ms. Howard's Opposition and makes the	
- 1	following findings and conclusions.	
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1 As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that, on March 27, 2017, Ms. Howard filed a Notice of Appeal regarding the "Order After February 6, 2017 Hearing." In general, a timely 2 notice of appeal "divests the district court of jurisdiction to act." Mack-Manley v. Manley, 122. 3 Nev. 849, 855 (2006). However, "the district court retains jurisdiction to enter orders on matters 4 that are collateral to and independent from the appealed order, i.e., matters that in no way affect 5 the appeal's merits." Id. Here, the pending issue applies to the Order Granting in Part and Denying 6 in Part Motion for Sanctions, entered March 1, 2017 (hereinafter "Order for Sanctions"). This 7 Order is separate and distinct from the order appealed from. The Order for Sanctions in no way 8 affects the appeal's merits. Therefore, this Court retains jurisdiction to address the issue of 9 reasonable attorney's fees. 10

11 "In determining the amount of fees to award, the [district] court is not limited to one specific approach; its analysis may begin with any method rationally designed to calculate a 12 reasonable amount, so long as the requested amount is reviewed in light of the' Brunzell factors." 13 Logan v. Abe, 131 Nev., Adv. Rep. 31, 350 P.3d 1139, 1143 (2015) (quoting Haley v. Eighth Jud. 14 Dist. Ct., 128 Nev., Adv. Op. 16, 237 P.3d 855, 860 (2012); citing Brunzell v. Golden Gate 15 National Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349 (1969)). In factors set forth in Brunzell include: "(1) the qualities 16 of the advocate," "(2) the character of the work to be done," "(3) the work actually performed by 17 the lawyer," and "(4) the result." Brunzell, 85 Nev. at 349. 18

The Court has considered the factors and finds that Mr. Townsend's ability, training and
education facilitated his ability to achieve a favorable result for his client. As this Court has
previously noted, Mr. Townsend carried the unanticipated burden of having to compensate for
Mr. Kozak's lack of preparation and diligence on several occasions. Throughout the life of the
case, Mr. Townsend was diligent in preserving his client's interests.

The Court finds that Mr. Townsend's affidavit represents reasonable attorney's fees for
 the work attested to. However, the Court notes that a few of the itemized categories are outside
 the scope of the Order for Sanctions.¹ Upon review of the affidavit and the opposition, the court
 finds that the reasonable value of attorney's fees pertinent to the awards set forth in the Order for
 Sanctions is \$16,500.

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GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

 Mr. Townsend is awarded attorney's fees in the sum of \$16,500, which shall be paid by Mr. Kozak.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this _____day of April 2017.

THOMAS L. STOCKARD DISTRICT JUDGE

¹ The Court specifically notes, for example, the fees attested to in paragraph 5 of the Affidavit, which pertain to work performed prior to Mr. Kozak's misconduct.

1 CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 2 The undersigned, an employee of the Tenth Judicial District Court, hereby З certifies that I served the foregoing ORDER REGARDING AMOUNT OF SANCTIONS on 4 the parties by depositing a copy thereof in the U.S. Mail at Fallon, Nevada, postage prepaid, as 5 follows: 6 Justin M. Townsend, Esq. 7 Allison MacKenzie, Ltd. 8 402 North Division Street Carson City, NV 89703-4168 9 Charles R. Kozak, Esq. 10 Kozak Lusiani Law, LLC 3100 Mill Street, Suite 115 11 Reno, NV 89502 DATED this <u>24</u> day of <u>April</u> 12 .2017. 13 14 Sue Sevon, Court Administrator Subscribed and sworn to this 15 16 day of Milli , 2017. 17 18 Notary Public 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4

EXHIBIT 9

EXHIBIT 9

Docket 72965 Document 2017-17933

1 2 3 4	Case No. 15-10DC-0876 Dept. I	SUE SEVON COURT CLERK	2017 APR 20 AM 11: 04	FILED
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6	IN THE TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NET	VADA	L	
7	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CHURCHILL			
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9 10				
11	SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES, an individual,			
12	Plaintiff,	ION		
13	vs. FOR RECONSIDERATI	<u>on</u>		
14	ELIZABETH C. HOWARD, an individual, et al.,			
15	Defendants/			
16	This matter is before the Court on ELIZABETH HOWARD's (hereinafter "Ms	. Howa	ard")	
17	Amended Motion for Reconsideration of Order in Part Granting Sanctions, filed Marc		ŕ	
18	SHAUGHNAN HUGHES (hereinafter "Mr. Hughes") opposed the Motion on April	10, 201	7.	i i
19	As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that, on March 27, 2017, Ms. How	vard fil	led a	
20	Notice of Appeal regarding the "Order After February 6, 2017 Hearing." In genera	al, a ti	mely	
21	notice of appeal "divests the district court of jurisdiction to act." Mack-Manley v. M	lanley,	, 122	
22	Nev. 849, 855 (2006). However, "the district court retains jurisdiction to enter orders	on ma	atters	
23	that are collateral to and independent from the appealed order, i.e., matters that in no	way a	ffect	
24	the appeal's merits." Id. Here, the Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part	Motio	n for	
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Sanctions, entered March 1, 2017 (hereinafter "Order for Sanctions"), is separate and distinct
 from the order appealed from. The Order for Sanctions in no way affects the appeal's merits.
 Therefore, this Court retains jurisdiction to consider Ms. Howard's motion for reconsideration.

Reconsideration of motions is governed by various rules and doctrines. Distilled to their
essence, those rules and doctrines permit a court to exercise its discretion and reconsider motions,
subject to limitations of time and substance. There is no right to have a matter reconsidered.
However, a court has the inherent authority to reconsider its prior orders. *Trail v. Faretto*, 91 Nev.
401 (1975) ("a court may, for sufficient cause shown, amend, correct, resettle, modify or vacate,
as the case may be, an order previously made and entered on the motion in the progress of the
cause or proceeding").

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that a motion for rehearing should be granted "[o]nly
in rare instances in which new issues of fact or law are raised supporting a ruling contrary to the
ruling already reached." *Moore v. Las Vegas*, 92 Nev. 402, 405 (1976). Furthermore, "[a] district
court may reconsider a previously decided issue if substantially different evidence is subsequently
introduced or the decision is clearly erroneous." *Masonry & Tile Contrs. v. Jolley, Urga & Wirth Ass 'n*, 113 Nev. 737, 741 (1997). In other words, this avenue of relief is remedial in nature and
enables the court to correct an error in a previous ruling.

The Court has reviewed Ms. Howard's motion, the Order for Sanctions, and the applicable
law. The Court does not find sufficient cause to amend, modify or otherwise alter the March 1,
2017 Order for Sanctions.

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GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

1. Ms. Howard's Amended Motion for Reconsideration of Order in Part Granting Sanctions

is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this 20^{+1} day of April 2017.

THOMAS L. STOCKARD DISTRICT JUDGE

1	CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
2	The undersigned, an employee of the Tenth Judicial District Court, hereby
3	certifies that I served the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
4	RECONSIDERATION on the parties by depositing a copy thereof in the U.S. Mail at Fallon,
5	Nevada, postage prepaid, as follows:
6	
7	Justin M. Townsend, Esq. Allison MacKenzie, Ltd.
8	402 North Division Street Carson City, NV 89703-4168
9 10	Charles R. Kozak, Esq.
11	Kozak Lusiani Law, LLC 3100 Mill Street, Suite 115
12	Reno, NV 89502
13	DATED this <u>20</u> day of <u>April</u> , 2017.
14	Sue fevr
15	Subscribed and sworn to this
16	20 day of April, 2017.
17	Shellie Apoter
18	Notary Public/Clerk
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
EXHIBIT 8

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EXHIBIT 8

Docket 72965 Document 2017-17933

1 Case No.15-10DC-0876	FILED
2 Dept. No. 1 2	017 MAR - 3 PM 12: 43
The undersigned hereby affirms that this document does not contain the	
4 social security number of any perion.	SUE SEVON COURTCLERK
5 JUSTIN M. TOWNSEND, Esg.	YLANGOLGANDEPUTY
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7 IN THE TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STA	ATE OF NEVADA
8 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CHURCHII	L
9	
10 SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES, an individual,	
$ \begin{array}{c} 11 \\ 12 \\ 8 \\ 12 \end{array} $ Plaintiff.	
× 12 N ≈ VS. ×6 € 13	
VX 132 VS. 13 14 14 14 15 15 15 14 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15	
XX, inclusive.	
COLOR 11 Plaintiff, 12 VS. 13 CLIZABETH C. HOWARD, an individual; and DOES I through XX, inclusive. 15 16 Defendants. NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER GRANTING IN NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER GRANTING IN	
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 1 st day of M	larch, 2017, the Court duly
entered an Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for San	nctions in the above-entitled
효율값 20	
21 DATED this 2^{nd} day of March. 2017.	
ALLISON MacKEN 23 402 North Division S	ZIE, LTD. Street
Carson City, NV 89	703-4168
25 By:	
JUSIAN M. TOWNS 26 Nevada State Bar No	SEND, ESQ. 5. 12293
27 Attorneys for Plaintit SHAUGHNAN L. H	ff. Il Glues
28 SHAUGHNAN L. H	UMHEƏ
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EXHIBIT "1"

EXHIBIT "1"

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1	1 Case No. 15-10DC-0876	_ED
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6	6 IN THE TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVAD	A
7	7 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CHURCHILL	
8	8	
9	9	
10	SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES,	
11		
12	2 vs. <u>DENVING IN PART MOTION F</u> <u>SANCTIONS</u>	<u>OR</u>
13		
14		
15		
16	5 This Matter is before the Court on Plaintiff SHAUGHNAN HUGHES' (hereinafte	r "Mr.
17	Hughes") Motion for Sanctions, filed August 26, 2016, and Motion for Order to Show	Cause,
18	filed November 4, 2016. Mr. Hughes is represented by Justin Townsend, Esq. ELIZA	BETH
19	HOWARD (hereinafter "Ms. Howard") opposed the Motion for Sanctions on Septemb	per 14,
20	2016, and opposed the Motion for Order to Show Cause on November 22, 2016. Ms. How	vard is
21	represented by Charles Kozak, Esq.	
22	The factual background in this case is summarized in the Order After February 6	, 2017
23	Hearing. In short, the Complaint in this matter seeks an accounting of the parties' resp	ective
24	interests in a piece of real property, which they hold as joint tenants.	

Mr. Hughes' Motion for Sanctions alleges that Ms. Howard and her attorney, Mr. 1 Kozak, are subject to sanction because they repeatedly violated the Nevada Rules of Civil 2 Procedure, District Court Rules and Tenth Judicial District Court Rules. Mr. Hughes notes 3 especially the following violations: (1) Ms. Howard failed to timely file a responsive pleading to 4 Mr. Hughes' Complaint;¹ (2) Ms. Howard failed to timely oppose Mr. Hughes' Motion to 51 Dismiss Ms. Howard's Counterclaim; (3) Mr. Kozak did not participate in the early case 6 conference in the manner contemplated in NRCP 16.1(b)(1);² (4) Mr. Kozak failed to timely 7 respond to discovery requests;³ (5) Mr. Kozak failed to timely file his Case Conference Report;⁴ 8 (6) Mr. Kozak insisted he had actually filed his Case Conference Report at the pre-trial hearing 9 on May 17, 2016;5 (7) Mr. Kozak's conduct with respect to the Motion to Set Aside Dismissal 10 of Counterclaim was sanctionable under NRCP 11; (8) Mr. Kozak did not participate in the May 11 17, 2016 Pre-Trial conference in good faith; (9) Ms. Howard's Motion for Summary Judgment 12 was not supported by existing law and was brought only for purposes of delay; and (10) Ms. 13 Howard's delay in filing the Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim was filed belatedly 14 and for the purpose of delay. Due to the above allegations, Mr. Hughes argues that he incurred 15 unnecessary attorney's fees, and he requests an award of such attorney's fees. 16

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¹Pursuant to an Order Granting Publication of Summons, the Complaint in this case was published in the Lahontan Valley News with a last date of publication on October 21, 2015. Thus, the Answer was due on November 10, 2015. The Answer was not filed until November 24, 2015.

² Specifically, Mr. Townsend alleges that Mr. Kozak stated he had not read the applicable law prior to the conference.

³ Initial disclosures were due by March 1, 2016. After Mr. Kozak failed to timely comply with this requirement, the Court directed Mr. Kozak to send the initial disclosures to Mr. Townsend's office by no later than May 19, 2016, they were delivered May 20, 2016.

⁴ The parties participated in an early case conference on February 16, 2016. Pursuant to NRCP 16.1(c), the Early Case Conference Reports were due by no later than March 17, 2016. Mr. Kozak did not file his Early Case Conference Report until January 4, 2017.

^{23 &}lt;sup>5</sup> At the May 17, 2016 hearing, Mr. Kozak specifically stated that he could provide proof of a file-stamped copy of his early case conference report even though the Court did not have an original in the file. Mr. Kozak's office

²⁴ submitted a faxed version of a (non-file-stamped) case conference report, which was lodged in the file in anticipation of him sending the original in accordance with 10JDCR 18. The Court did not receive the original until January 4, 2017, and the Court notes that the faxed document from May 17, 2016 is not identical to the subsequently submitted "original."

As a preliminary matter, Ms. Howard argues that Mr. Hughes' Motion for Sanctions
should be denied because he did not abide by the 21-day safe-harbor rule under NRCP
11(c)(1)(A). Specifically, NRCP 11(c)(1)(A) provides:

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A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners, associates, and employees.

9 (emphasis added). Here, Ms. Howard argues that she was not served with the Motion before it
10 was filed by Mr. Hughes. Mr. Hughes argues that he has complied with the requirements of
11 NRCP 11(c)(1)(A) because his Motion was not "presented to the court" until more than 21 days
12 after service.

The Court finds that Mr. Hughes substantially complied with the 21-day requirement under NRCP 11 and that even if he did not, Ms. Howard was not prejudiced by any failure to strictly comply with the technical requirements of NRCP 11(c)(1)(A). First, the Court notes that much of the complained-of conduct in the Motion for Sanctions refers to Mr. Kozak's lack of candor regarding his receipt and delivery of documents.⁶ Because of Mr. Kozak's conduct, Mr. Hughes was left with limited options of ensuring that there was a clear record of him sending the Motion for Sanctions to Mr. Kozak.

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Second, although Mr. Kozak states that he had no prior notice of the Motion, the record is clear that Mr. Kozak had prior notice of many of Mr. Hughes' claims of sanctionable conduct.

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⁶ As noted previously, Mr. Kozak claimed that he filed an Opposition to Mr. Hughes' Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim in a timely fashion (for which there is no record), Mr. Kozak stated that he could produce a file-stamped copy of the Opposition (which he has not), Mr. Kozak stated that Mr. Townsend told him he had received the Opposition (Mr. Townsend disputes this), Mr. Kozak stated that he had submitted his case conference report (for which there is no record). In the Order Denying Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment And Denying Defendant's Motion To Set Aside Dismissal Of Counterclaim, the Court specifically noted its concern regarding Mr. Kozak's lack of candor regarding the opposition to the motion to dismiss counterclaims.

In fact, the issues related to Ms. Howard's counterclaims, discovery, and the early case 1 conference report were raised at the May 17, 2016 hearing. Nevertheless, Mr. Kozak failed to 2 cure the defects in the months between the hearing and the date on which the Motion was filed.⁷ 3 Finally, even after Mr. Hughes filed the Motion for Sanctions, Mr. Kozak did not take 4 steps to cure his sanctionable conduct within 21 days. It is almost inexplicable that even after 5 the Motion for Sanctions was filed on August 26, 2016, Mr. Kozak did not remedy his failure to 6 file a case conference report. In light of Mr. Kozak's failure to correct the simple task of filing 7 his case conference report after the Motion was filed, it is evident that Mr. Kozak's conduct 8 would not have been any different even if Mr. Hughes would have waited to file the Motion 21 9 days after serving it. Thus, the Court will consider the merits of Mr. Hughes' Motion for 10

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11 Sanctions.

12 Ms. Howard's Motion for Summary Judgment

Mr. Hughes argues that Ms. Howard should be sanctioned because her Motion for
Summary Judgment was without merit and was filed for the purpose of delay. The Court has
previously entered an Order ruling on the merits of the Motion on September 9, 2016. Although
Ms. Howard did not prevail on her Motion, her arguments were based upon applicable law and
the Court does not find that it was presented for an improper purpose. Thus, to the extent that
Mr. Hughes' Motion for Sanctions pertains to the Motion for Summary Judgment, it is Denied.

19 Ms. Howard's Counterclaims

Regarding Ms. Howard's Counterclaims, the Court the Court finds as follows: to the
extent that Mr. Hughes' Motion for Sanctions pertains to Ms. Howard's original Answer and
Counterclaim, it is Denied; to the extent that Mr. Hughes' Motion for Sanctions pertains to Mr.
Kozak's conduct following the Dismissal of Counterclaims, it is Granted.

⁷ Again, the Court specifically notes that Mr. Townsend raised the issue of Mr. Kozak's failure to file an early case conference report in May. Mr. Kozak did not "cure" this defect until more than 6 months later, on January 4, 2017.

With respect to the original Counterclaims, Ms. Howard argued that she had various
claims for relief against Mr. Hughes. Pursuant to NRCP 13(b) "[a] pleading may state as a
counterclaim any claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim." Although the
Counterclaims were dismissed in an Order entered on January 7, 2016, Ms. Howard's initial
pleading does not rise to the level of sanctionable conduct.

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7 Regarding Mr. Kozak's subsequent conduct, the Court previously noted its concern regarding Mr. Kozak's lack of candor.⁸ Mr. Kozak informed the Court that he had timely filed 8 an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss and that he could produce a file stamped copy thereof. 9 To date, Mr. Kozak has not produced such a copy. Mr. Kozak also informed the Court that Mr. 10 Townsend told Mr. Kozak that he had received a copy of the opposition. At the May 17, 2016 111 hearing, Mr. Townsend informed the Court that he had not received a copy of the opposition. 12 The Court finds Mr. Kozak's representation that Mr. Townsend told him he had previously 13 received a copy of the opposition to lack the candor due under the rules of professional 14 conduct.9 Additionally, the Court finds that Mr. Kozak's incredible delay in addressing the 15 dismissed counterclaims caused unnecessary delay and needlessly increased the cost of 16 litigation.¹⁰ Thus, the to the extent that Mr. Hughes' Motion for Sanctions pertains to Mr. 17

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⁸ See Order Denying Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment And Denying Defendant's Motion To Set Aside Dismissal Of Counterclaim at p. 4, entered September 7, 2016. ⁹ See NRPC 3.3.

^{21 &}lt;sup>10</sup> Specifically, the Opposition was due on December 29, 2015. Noting the absence of an opposition, the Court entered an Order Dismissing Counterclaims on January 7, 2016. On May 17, 2016, Ms. Howard filed a Notice of Motion to set aside dismissal of counterclaim on the morning of the pre-trial hearing. Due to Mr. Kozak's assertion

²² that he had attempted to timely file an Opposition, the Court directed Mr. Kozak to supplement his Motion with information supporting his assertion. On June 20, 2016, Mr. Kozak filed "Elizabeth Howard's Opposition to Motion

²³ to Dismiss; Motion to Strike." After speaking with Mr. Townsend, Mr. Kozak withdrew this document and filed a Supplement to Elizabeth Howard's Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim filed May 17, 2016" on July 8.

^{24 2016.} Mr. Townsend then filed an Opposition to the Motion to Set Aside on July 28, 2016. In sum, the issue of Ms. Howard's Counterclaims came before the Court for a decision in January 2016. Because Mr. Kozak failed to oppose the original Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim in a timely fashion, and because of his subsequent lack of candor, Mr. Hughes incurred substantial additional attorney's fees.

Kozak's delay in addressing the dismissed counterclaims, it is Granted. Mr. Kozak shall
 personally pay attorney fees incurred as a result of the delayed opposition.

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3 Early Case Conference & Pre-Trial Conference

Regarding Mr. Hughes' allegation that Mr. Kozak did not adequately participate in the
early case conference or pre-trial conference, the Court does not find that Mr. Kozak's conduct
rises to the level of sanctionable conduct (except as specifically noted above). Thus, to the
extent that Mr. Hughes' Motion pertains to these defects, it is Denied.

8 Case Conference Report

9 Mr. Hughes alleges that Ms. Howard failed to provide discovery in accordance with NRCP 16.1(a)(1) or file his Early Case Conference Report. The attorneys participated in an 10 early case conference on February 16, 2016. Thus, Ms. Howard's Case Conference Report was 11 due on March 17, 2016. At the May 17, 2016 hearing, the Court noted the absence of the Case 12 Conference Report. At the time Mr. Hughes filed the Motion for Sanctions on August 26, 2016, 13 Ms. Howard's early case conference report was still outstanding. This fact is especially 14 troubling because Trial was set to begin in this matter on October 3, 2016. Although the trial 15 was ultimately continued, Defendant's failure to file a case conference report caused delays in 16 discovery and caused Mr. Hughes to incur additional attorney's fees by preparing and filing the 17 18 Motion for Sanctions to address this issue. Thus, to the extent Mr. Hughes' Motion for Sanctions pertains to Mr. Kozak's failure to file an early case conference report, it is granted. 19 Mr. Kozak shall personally pay attorney's fees incurred by Mr. Hughes between March 17, 20 2016 and August 26, 2016 due to Mr. Kozak's failure to file the case conference report. 21

22

Motion for Order to Show Cause

In his Motion for Order to Show Cause, Mr. Hughes seeks an Order directing Ms.
Howard to appear and show cause as to why she should not be held in contempt of Court for her

failure to comply with the Court's September 27, 2016 Order Continuing Trial. Specifically
Mr. Hughes alleges that Ms. Howard's attorney, Mr. Kozak was not cooperative in allowing an
appraiser to access their property because he provided inaccurate contact information for Ms.
Howard and failed to correct the inaccurate information in a timely fashion.

Pursuant to NRS 22.010(3), an act of contempt includes "disobedience or resistance to
any lawful writ, order, rule or process issued by the court or judge at chambers." "An order on
which a judgment of contempt is based must be clear and unambiguous, and must spell out the
details of compliance in clear, specific and unambiguous terms so that the person will readily
know exactly what duties or obligations are imposed on him." Cunningham v. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court, 102 Nev. 551, 559-560 (1986).

Here, the Court's September 27, 2016 Order states "Ms. Howard shall cooperate with
Mr. Hughes to allow an appraiser to inspect the property by no later than October 27, 2016."
Although Mr. Kozak's conduct is not ideal, the Court does not find that the September 27 Order
was sufficiently specific to hold Mr. Kozak or Ms. Howard in contempt for their alleged
conduct. Thus, Mr. Hughes Motion for Order to Show Cause is Denied.

The Court reviews Mr. Kozak's conduct throughout the history of this case in the greater 16 context of the administration of our adversarial legal system. While the Court generally 17 anticipates legal positions that are disparate from one another, it expects litigants to adhere to 18 the guidelines that shape our legal system. Our legal system is governed by such authorities as 19 the Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of Professional Conduct, and local court rules to ensure that 20 21 our adversarial proceedings remain civil. When one party (or counsel for one party) disregards the guidelines, they place an unfair burden on the other party. Here, it is clear that Mr. Kozak 22 not only disregarded the rules, but also minimized the significance of his non-compliance on 23

multiple occasions.¹¹ This attitude frustrates the legal process and has, in this case, caused Mr. 1 Hughes to incur substantial fees for the work his attorney performed to compensate for Mr. 2 3 Kozak's lack of diligence. 4 GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 5 1. Mr. Hughes Motion for Order to Show Cause is DENIED. 6 2. To the extent that Mr. Hughes' Motion for Sanctions pertains to Ms. Howard's Motion 7 for Summary Judgment or her originally pled counterclaims, it is DENIED. 8 3. To the extent that Mr. Hughes' Motion for Sanctions pertains to Mr. Kozak's belated 9 filing of a Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim and his supplemental filings, 10 Mr. Hughes' Motion is Granted. a. Mr. Kozak shall personally pay Mr. Hughes for the attorney fees incurred in 11 12. response to Mr. Kozak's delayed Motion and subsequent filings. 4. To the extent that Mr. Hughes' Motion for Sanctions pertains to Mr. Kozak's failure to 13 14 timely file an Early Case Conference Report, it is Granted. 15 a. Mr. Kozak shall personally pay Mr. Hughes for the attorney fees incurred as a 16 result of Mr. Kozak's failure to file the Report until January 4, 2017. 17 /// 18 /// 19 /// 20 /// 21 ///

22 ///

^{24 &}lt;sup>11</sup> In addition to the previously noted conduct, the Court notes that, in his opposition to the motion for sanctions, Mr. Kozak argued that his Answer was only served 9 minutes late. He served the Answer upon Mr. Townsend at 9 minutes past midnight on the day it was due (it was not received or filed by the court until several days later).

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1	5. By no later than March 17, 2017, Mr. Townsen	d shall submit an affidavit establishing
2	the cost of attorney fees pertinent to the awards s	et forth above.
3	a. Mr. Kozak may file a response to the req	uested amount by no later than April 3,
4		
5	b. Thereafter, the Court will enter an Order	establishing the amount of attorney fees
6		
7	IT IS SO ORDERED.	,
8	Dated this $1^{5^{\dagger}}$ day of March 2017.	CECH
9	2 i	J. VV
10		THOMAS L. STOCKARD DISTRICT JUDGE
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1	CERTIFICATE OF	MAILING
2	The undersigned, an employee of the T	Fenth Judicial District Court, hereby
3	certifies that I served the foregoing ORDER GRAN	FING IN PART AND DENYING IN
4' 5.	PART MOTION FOR SANCTIONS on the parties	by depositing a copy thereof in the U.S.
6	Mail at Fallon, Nevada, postage prepaid, as follows:	
7	Justin Townsend, Esq.	
8	Allison MacKenzie, Ltd. 402 North Division Street	
9	Carson City, NV 89703-4168	
10	Charles R. Kozak, Esq. Kozak Lusiani Law, LLC	
11	3100 Mill Street, Suite 115 Reno, NV 89502	
12 13	DATED this 1 ^{6t} day of March	, 2017.
14	l l	l
15		on, Court Administrator
16	Subscribed and sworn to this	
17	$\frac{1^{2'}}{day of March}, 2017.$	
18	Mocenter Notary Public/Clerk	
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EXHIBIT 7

EXHIBIT 7

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Docket 72965 Document 2017-17933

	received	
1	Case No. 15-10DC-0876 FILED	
2	Dept. I 2017 MAR - 1 AM	g: 52
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4	COURT CLERI BRAJOCEPHO	EPUTY
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6	IN THE TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA	
7	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CHURCHILL	
8		
9		
10	SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES,	
11	Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND	
12	vs. <u>DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR</u> <u>SANCTIONS</u>	
13	ELIZABETH C. HOWARD, an individual; and DOES I through XX, inclusive,	
14	Defendants.	
15		
16	This Matter is before the Court on Plaintiff SHAUGHNAN HUGHES' (hereinafter "Mr.	
17	Hughes") Motion for Sanctions, filed August 26, 2016, and Motion for Order to Show Cause,	
18	filed November 4, 2016. Mr. Hughes is represented by Justin Townsend, Esq. ELIZABETH	
19	HOWARD (hereinafter "Ms. Howard") opposed the Motion for Sanctions on September 14,	
20	2016, and opposed the Motion for Order to Show Cause on November 22, 2016. Ms. Howard is	
21	represented by Charles Kozak, Esq.	
22	The factual background in this case is summarized in the Order After February 6, 2017	
23	Hearing. In short, the Complaint in this matter seeks an accounting of the parties' respective	
24	interests in a piece of real property, which they hold as joint tenants.	

Mr. Hughes' Motion for Sanctions alleges that Ms. Howard and her attorney, Mr. 1 2 Kozak, are subject to sanction because they repeatedly violated the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, District Court Rules and Tenth Judicial District Court Rules. Mr. Hughes notes 3 especially the following violations: (1) Ms. Howard failed to timely file a responsive pleading to 4 Mr. Hughes' Complaint;¹ (2) Ms. Howard failed to timely oppose Mr. Hughes' Motion to 5 Dismiss Ms. Howard's Counterclaim; (3) Mr. Kozak did not participate in the early case 6 conference in the manner contemplated in NRCP 16.1(b)(1);² (4) Mr. Kozak failed to timely 7 respond to discovery requests;³ (5) Mr. Kozak failed to timely file his Case Conference Report;⁴ 8 (6) Mr. Kozak insisted he had actually filed his Case Conference Report at the pre-trial hearing 9 on May 17, 2016;5 (7) Mr. Kozak's conduct with respect to the Motion to Set Aside Dismissal 10 of Counterclaim was sanctionable under NRCP 11; (8) Mr. Kozak did not participate in the May 11 17, 2016 Pre-Trial conference in good faith; (9) Ms. Howard's Motion for Summary Judgment 12 was not supported by existing law and was brought only for purposes of delay; and (10) Ms. 13 Howard's delay in filing the Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim was filed belatedly 14 and for the purpose of delay. Due to the above allegations, Mr. Hughes argues that he incurred 15 16 unnecessary attorney's fees, and he requests an award of such attorney's fees.

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 ¹ Pursuant to an Order Granting Publication of Summons, the Complaint in this case was published in the Lahontan Valley News with a last date of publication on October 21, 2015. Thus, the Answer was due on November 10, 2015. The Answer was not filed until November 24, 2015.

^{20 &}lt;sup>2</sup> Specifically, Mr. Townsend alleges that Mr. Kozak stated he had not read the applicable law prior to the conference.

³ Initial disclosures were due by March 1, 2016. After Mr. Kozak failed to timely comply with this requirement, the Court directed Mr. Kozak to send the initial disclosures to Mr. Townsend's office by no later than May 19, 2016, they were delivered May 20, 2016.

^{22 &}lt;sup>4</sup> The parties participated in an early case conference on February 16, 2016. Pursuant to NRCP 16.1(c), the Early Case Conference Reports were due by no later than March 17, 2016. Mr. Kozak did not file his Early Case Conference Report until January 4, 2017.

^{23 &}lt;sup>5</sup> At the May 17, 2016 hearing, Mr. Kozak specifically stated that he could provide proof of a file-stamped copy of his early case conference report even though the Court did not have an original in the file. Mr. Kozak's office

²⁴ submitted a faxed version of a (non-file-stamped) case conference report, which was lodged in the file in anticipation of him sending the original in accordance with 10JDCR 18. The Court did not receive the original until January 4, 2017, and the Court notes that the faxed document from May 17, 2016 is not identical to the subsequently submitted "original."

As a preliminary matter, Ms. Howard argues that Mr. Hughes' Motion for Sanctions 1 should be denied because he did not abide by the 21-day safe-harbor rule under NRCP 2 3 11(c)(1)(A). Specifically, NRCP 11(c)(1)(A) provides: 4 A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall 5 not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may prescribe), 6 the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and 7 attorney's fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly responsible for 8 violations committed by its partners, associates, and employees. (emphasis added). Here, Ms. Howard argues that she was not served with the Motion before it 9 was filed by Mr. Hughes. Mr. Hughes argues that he has complied with the requirements of 10 NRCP 11(c)(1)(A) because his Motion was not "presented to the court" until more than 21 days 11 12 after service. The Court finds that Mr. Hughes substantially complied with the 21-day requirement 13 under NRCP 11 and that even if he did not, Ms. Howard was not prejudiced by any failure to 14 strictly comply with the technical requirements of NRCP 11(c)(1)(A). First, the Court notes 15 that much of the complained-of conduct in the Motion for Sanctions refers to Mr. Kozak's lack 16 of candor regarding his receipt and delivery of documents.⁶ Because of Mr. Kozak's conduct, 17 Mr. Hughes was left with limited options of ensuring that there was a clear record of him 18 19 sending the Motion for Sanctions to Mr. Kozak. Second, although Mr. Kozak states that he had no prior notice of the Motion, the record 20 is clear that Mr. Kozak had prior notice of many of Mr. Hughes' claims of sanctionable conduct. 21

⁶ As noted previously, Mr. Kozak claimed that he filed an Opposition to Mr. Hughes' Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim in a timely fashion (for which there is no record), Mr. Kozak stated that he could produce a file-stamped copy of the Opposition (which he has not), Mr. Kozak stated that Mr. Townsend told him he had received the Opposition (Mr. Townsend disputes this), Mr. Kozak stated that he had submitted his case conference report (for which there is no record). In the Order Denying Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment And Denying Defendant's Motion To Set Aside Dismissal Of Counterclaim, the Court specifically noted its concern regarding Mr. Kozak's lack of candor regarding the opposition to the motion to dismiss counterclaims.

In fact, the issues related to Ms. Howard's counterclaims, discovery, and the early case
conference report were raised at the May 17, 2016 hearing. Nevertheless, Mr. Kozak failed to
cure the defects in the months between the hearing and the date on which the Motion was filed.⁷

4 Finally, even after Mr. Hughes filed the Motion for Sanctions, Mr. Kozak did not take 5 steps to cure his sanctionable conduct within 21 days. It is almost inexplicable that even after the Motion for Sanctions was filed on August 26, 2016, Mr. Kozak did not remedy his failure to 6 file a case conference report. In light of Mr. Kozak's failure to correct the simple task of filing 7 8 his case conference report after the Motion was filed, it is evident that Mr. Kozak's conduct would not have been any different even if Mr. Hughes would have waited to file the Motion 21 9 days after serving it. Thus, the Court will consider the merits of Mr. Hughes' Motion for 10 11 Sanctions.

12 Ms. Howard's Motion for Summary Judgment

Mr. Hughes argues that Ms. Howard should be sanctioned because her Motion for
Summary Judgment was without merit and was filed for the purpose of delay. The Court has
previously entered an Order ruling on the merits of the Motion on September 9, 2016. Although
Ms. Howard did not prevail on her Motion, her arguments were based upon applicable law and
the Court does not find that it was presented for an improper purpose. Thus, to the extent that
Mr. Hughes' Motion for Sanctions pertains to the Motion for Summary Judgment, it is Denied.

19 Ms. Howard's Counterclaims

Regarding Ms. Howard's Counterclaims, the Court the Court finds as follows: to the
extent that Mr. Hughes' Motion for Sanctions pertains to Ms. Howard's original Answer and
Counterclaim, it is Denied; to the extent that Mr. Hughes' Motion for Sanctions pertains to Mr.
Kozak's conduct following the Dismissal of Counterclaims, it is Granted.

⁷ Again, the Court specifically notes that Mr. Townsend raised the issue of Mr. Kozak's failure to file an early case conference report in May. Mr. Kozak did not "cure" this defect until more than 6 months later, on January 4, 2017.

With respect to the original Counterclaims, Ms. Howard argued that she had various 1 claims for relief against Mr. Hughes. Pursuant to NRCP 13(b) "[a] pleading may state as a 2 counterclaim any claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or 3 occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim." 4 Although the Counterclaims were dismissed in an Order entered on January 7, 2016, Ms. Howard's initial 5 pleading does not rise to the level of sanctionable conduct. 6

7 Regarding Mr. Kozak's subsequent conduct, the Court previously noted its concern regarding Mr. Kozak's lack of candor.⁸ Mr. Kozak informed the Court that he had timely filed 8 an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss and that he could produce a file stamped copy thereof. 9 To date, Mr. Kozak has not produced such a copy. Mr. Kozak also informed the Court that Mr. 10 Townsend told Mr. Kozak that he had received a copy of the opposition. At the May 17, 2016 11 hearing, Mr. Townsend informed the Court that he had not received a copy of the opposition. 12 The Court finds Mr. Kozak's representation that Mr. Townsend told him he had previously 13 received a copy of the opposition to lack the candor due under the rules of professional 14 conduct.9 Additionally, the Court finds that Mr. Kozak's incredible delay in addressing the 15 dismissed counterclaims caused unnecessary delay and needlessly increased the cost of 16 litigation.¹⁰ Thus, the to the extent that Mr. Hughes' Motion for Sanctions pertains to Mr. 17

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⁸ See Order Denying Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment And Denying Defendant's Motion To Set Aside 20 Dismissal Of Counterclaim at p. 4, entered September 7, 2016. ⁹ See NRPC 3.3.

¹⁰ Specifically, the Opposition was due on December 29, 2015. Noting the absence of an opposition, the Court 21 entered an Order Dismissing Counterclaims on January 7, 2016. On May 17, 2016, Ms. Howard filed a Notice of Motion to set aside dismissal of counterclaim on the morning of the pre-trial hearing. Due to Mr. Kozak's assertion

that he had attempted to timely file an Opposition, the Court directed Mr. Kozak to supplement his Motion with 22 information supporting his assertion. On June 20, 2016, Mr. Kozak filed "Elizabeth Howard's Opposition to Motion

to Dismiss; Motion to Strike." After speaking with Mr. Townsend, Mr. Kozak withdrew this document and filed a 23 Supplement to Elizabeth Howard's Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim filed May 17, 2016" on July 8,

^{2016.} Mr. Townsend then filed an Opposition to the Motion to Set Aside on July 28, 2016. In sum, the issue of Ms. 24 Howard's Counterclaims came before the Court for a decision in January 2016. Because Mr. Kozak failed to oppose the original Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim in a timely fashion, and because of his subsequent lack of candor, Mr. Hughes incurred substantial additional attorney's fees.

1 Kozak's delay in addressing the dismissed counterclaims, it is Granted. Mr. Kozak shall
2 personally pay attorney fees incurred as a result of the delayed opposition.

3 Early Case Conference & Pre-Trial Conference

Regarding Mr. Hughes' allegation that Mr. Kozak did not adequately participate in the
early case conference or pre-trial conference, the Court does not find that Mr. Kozak's conduct
rises to the level of sanctionable conduct (except as specifically noted above). Thus, to the
extent that Mr. Hughes' Motion pertains to these defects, it is Denied.

8 Case Conference Report

9 Mr. Hughes alleges that Ms. Howard failed to provide discovery in accordance with NRCP 16.1(a)(1) or file his Early Case Conference Report. The attorneys participated in an 10 early case conference on February 16, 2016. Thus, Ms. Howard's Case Conference Report was 11 due on March 17, 2016. At the May 17, 2016 hearing, the Court noted the absence of the Case 12 Conference Report. At the time Mr. Hughes filed the Motion for Sanctions on August 26, 2016, 13 Ms. Howard's early case conference report was still outstanding. This fact is especially 14 troubling because Trial was set to begin in this matter on October 3, 2016. Although the trial 15 was ultimately continued, Defendant's failure to file a case conference report caused delays in 16 discovery and caused Mr. Hughes to incur additional attorney's fees by preparing and filing the 17 Motion for Sanctions to address this issue. Thus, to the extent Mr. Hughes' Motion for 18 Sanctions pertains to Mr. Kozak's failure to file an early case conference report, it is granted. 19 Mr. Kozak shall personally pay attorney's fees incurred by Mr. Hughes between March 17, 20 2016 and August 26, 2016 due to Mr. Kozak's failure to file the case conference report. 21

22

Motion for Order to Show Cause

In his Motion for Order to Show Cause, Mr. Hughes seeks an Order directing Ms.
Howard to appear and show cause as to why she should not be held in contempt of Court for her

failure to comply with the Court's September 27, 2016 Order Continuing Trial. Specifically
 Mr. Hughes alleges that Ms. Howard's attorney, Mr. Kozak was not cooperative in allowing an
 appraiser to access their property because he provided inaccurate contact information for Ms.
 Howard and failed to correct the inaccurate information in a timely fashion.

Pursuant to NRS 22.010(3), an act of contempt includes "disobedience or resistance to
any lawful writ, order, rule or process issued by the court or judge at chambers." "An order on
which a judgment of contempt is based must be clear and unambiguous, and must spell out the
details of compliance in clear, specific and unambiguous terms so that the person will readily
know exactly what duties or obligations are imposed on him." *Cunningham v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court*, 102 Nev. 551, 559-560 (1986).

Here, the Court's September 27, 2016 Order states "Ms. Howard shall cooperate with
Mr. Hughes to allow an appraiser to inspect the property by no later than October 27, 2016."
Although Mr. Kozak's conduct is not ideal, the Court does not find that the September 27 Order
was sufficiently specific to hold Mr. Kozak or Ms. Howard in contempt for their alleged
conduct. Thus, Mr. Hughes Motion for Order to Show Cause is Denied.

16 The Court reviews Mr. Kozak's conduct throughout the history of this case in the greater context of the administration of our adversarial legal system. While the Court generally 17 anticipates legal positions that are disparate from one another, it expects litigants to adhere to 18 the guidelines that shape our legal system. Our legal system is governed by such authorities as 19 the Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of Professional Conduct, and local court rules to ensure that 20 our adversarial proceedings remain civil. When one party (or counsel for one party) disregards 21 the guidelines, they place an unfair burden on the other party. Here, it is clear that Mr. Kozak 22 not only disregarded the rules, but also minimized the significance of his non-compliance on 23

1	
1	This attitude frustrates the legal process and has, in this case, course late
3	Kozak's lack of diligence.
4 5	GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
6	 Mr. Hughes Motion for Order to Show Cause is DENIED. To the extent that Mr. Hughes a second sec
7	 To the extent that Mr. Hughes' Motion for Sanctions pertains to Ms. Howard's Motion for Summary Judgment or her originally pled counterclaims, it is DENIED.
8	3. To the extent that Mr. Hughes' Motion for Sanctions pertains to Mr. Kozek's helded
9 10	filing of a Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim and his supplemental filings, Mr. Hughes' Motion is Granted.
11 12	a. Mr. Kozak shall personally pay Mr. Hughes for the attorney fees incurred in response to Mr. Kozak's delayed Motion and subsequent filings.
13	4. To the extent that Mr. Hughes' Motion for Sanctions pertains to Mr. Kozak's failure to
14 15	timely file an Early Case Conference Report, it is Granted.
16	a. Mr. Kozak shall personally pay Mr. Hughes for the attorney fees incurred as a result of Mr. Kozakie 6 it
17 //	result of Mr. Kozak's failure to file the Report until January 4, 2017.
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24	n addition to the previously noted conduct, the Court notes that, in his opposition to the motion for sanctions, Mr. zak argued that his Answer was only served 9 minutes late. He served the Answer upon Mr. Townsend at 9 utes past midnight on the day it was due (it was not received or filed by the court until several days later). 8

, 1	5. By no later than March 17, 2017, Mr. Townsend shall submit an affidavit establishing
2	the cost of attorney fees pertinent to the awards set forth above.
3	a. Mr. Kozak may file a response to the requested amount by no later than April 3,
4	2017.
5	b. Thereafter, the Court will enter an Order establishing the amount of attorney fees
6	owing.
7	IT IS SO ORDERED.
8	Dated this 15t day of March 2017.
9	THOMAS L. STOCKARD
10	DISTRICT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

2 The undersigned, an employee of the Tenth Judicial District Court, hereby 3 certifies that I served the foregoing ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN 4. PART MOTION FOR SANCTIONS on the parties by depositing a copy thereof in the U.S. 5. Mail at Fallon, Nevada, postage prepaid, as follows: 6 Justin Townsend, Esq. 7. Allison MacKenzië, Ltd. 8 402 North Division Street Carson City, NV 89703-4168 9 Charles R. Kozak, Esq. 10 Kozak Lusiani Law, LLC 3100 Mill Street, Suite 115 11 Reno, NV 89502 12 DATED this day of March 2017. 13 14 Sue Sevon, Court Administrator 15 Subscribed and sworn to this 16 day of March :2017 17 18 Notary Public/Clerk 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10

EXHIBIT 6

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
EXHIBIT 6

Docket 72965 Document 2017-17933

FILED Case No.15-10DC-0876 1 2 Dept. No. 1 AH 10: 43 2017 HAR - 1 The indersigned hereby affirms that 3 this document does not contain the ulaHastin social security number of any person, 4 5 TOWNSEND, Esq JUSIZN M 6 IN THE TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 7 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CHURCHILL 8 9 SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES, an 10 individual. 11 402 North Division Street, P.O. Box 646, Carson City, NV 897n2 Plaintiff. 12 vs. Telephone: (775) 687-0202 Fax: (775) 882-7918 E-Mail Address: law/a allisonmackenzie.com 13 ELIZABETH C. HOWARD, an individual; and DOES I through 14 XX, inclusive. 15 Defendants. 16 NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER AFTER FEBRUARY 6, 2017 HEARING 17 18 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 27th day of February, 2017, the Court duly 19 entered an Order After February 6, 2017 Hearing in the above-entitled matter. A copy of said 20Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "1". 21DATED this 28th day of February, 2017. 22 ALLISON MacKENZIE, LTD. 402 North Division Street 23 Carson City, NV 89703-4168 24By: 25JUSTIN M. TOWNSEND, ESQ. Nevada State Bar No. 12293 26 Attorneys for Plaintiff, 27 SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES 281

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ALLISON MacKENZIE, LTD.



402 North Division Street, P.O. Box 646. Carson City, NV 89702

ALLISON MacKENZIE, LTD.





EXHIBIT "1"

EXHIBIT "1"

1	Case No. 15-10DC-0876	
2	Case No. 15-10DC-0876	<u>п</u>
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4	Benninghyo	
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6	IN THE TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA	
7	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CHURCHILL	
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10	SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES,	
11	Plaintiff, ORDER AFTER FEBRUARY 6, 2017	
12	vs. HEARING	
13	ELIZABETH C. HOWARD, an individual; and DQES I through XX, inclusive.	
14	Defendants.	
15		
16	On February 6, 2017, this Matter came before the Court for a Trial on SHAUGHNAN	
17	HUGHES' (hereinafter "Mr. Hughes") Civil Complaint. At the trial, Mr. Hughes was present	
18	and was represented by Justin Townsend, Esq. ELIZABETH HOWARD (hereinafter "Ms.	
19	Howard") was also present and was represented by Charles Kozak, Esq.	
20	At the trial, Mr. Hughes, Ms. Howard, John Hughes, and Fallon Hughes were each placed	
21	under oath and offered testimony. No other witnesses were called. Based upon the evidence	
22	provided, the Court makes the following findings and conclusions. ¹ Mr. Hughes has also filed	
23		
24	¹ The Court made its factual findings in this case after considering the totality of evidence. It considered carefully the testimony of the parties and witnesses, as well as the documentary evidence. The Court determined the credibility of each witness and the weight to be given their testimony, especially in light of contradictory evidence and testimony presented during the hearing.	

an Application for Order to Show Cause and a Motion for Sanctions, both of which will be
addressed in a separate Order.

3

I. Factual and Procedural Background

4 Mr. Hughes and Ms. Howard were involved in a romantic relationship in the years leading 5 up to the filing of the Complaint in this case. The couple began dating in the fall of 2009 after 6 Ms. Howard sold a number of coins to Mr. Hughes in his capacity as a buyer for Gold Star Coin. $\overline{7}$ Although both Mr. Hughes and Ms. Howard were living in California, they decided to move to 8 Fallon, Nevada in the summer of 2010. Together, they leased property on Melanie Drive for 9 approximately one year.² The couple then moved to another leased property on Stillwater Road.³ 10 While living in Fallon, the parties sought a piece of property to purchase in the area. They 11 each applied for financing, but encountered a hurdle do to an IRS debt owed by Ms. Howard, 12 Then, Ms. Howard obtained a third party settlement in the approximate amount of Three Hundred 13 and Ninety Thousand Dollars (\$390,000), stemming from a workplace injury.⁴

In June of 2012, using funds from the third party settlement, Ms. Howard purchased a
parcel of real property in Churchill County, Nevada (hereinafter "Fulkerson property") for SixtySeven Thousand Dollars (\$67,000.00).⁵ The property was conveyed to Ms. Howard by way of
Special Warranty Deed. Several days later, on July 11, 2012, Ms. Howard conveyed the
Fulkerson property by way of Quitclaim Deed to herself and Mr. Hughes as Joint Tenants.⁶

The property was originally in a dilapidated condition and required extensive
 rehabilitation. The parties made a number of improvements, including: installing a fence; causing

21 22

See Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.

² Both Mr. Hughes and Ms. Howard were listed on the lease.

²³ Again, both Mr. Hughes and Ms. Howard were listed on the lease.

 ⁴ Based upon Ms. Howard's testimony and Mr. Hughes' testimony, the amount that Ms. Howard actually received was approximately One Hundred and Fifty-Three Thousand Dollars (\$153,000). Recording of Ms. Howard's Testimony, at 1:43:00 p.m.
 ⁵ Recording of Ms. Howard's Testimony, at 1:42:39 p.m.

an accessory dwelling to be built on the property; erecting a garage and workshop area; pouring 1 2 a new concrete slab in front of the garage; rehabilitating a preexisting aircraft hangar; building a 3 series of retaining walls, an aviary, and a dog house; and making other landscaping improvements. 4 Ms. Howard contributed in excess of One Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$100,000) to the improvements on the Fulkerson Property.⁷ For his part, Mr. Hughes and his daughter, Savannah 5 6 Hughes, completed much of the physical labor involved in the improvements. Mr. Hughes 7 testified that his financial contribution to the property was approximately Twenty Thousand 8 Dollars (\$20,000). Mr. Hughes' father also contributed to the improvement efforts by purchasing 9 a tractor and transferring funds from his checking account to Ms. Howard's checking account.8

With regard to regular expenses on the property, both parties testified that they had an agreement whereby Ms. Howard was generally responsible for paying the property insurance while Mr. Hughes was responsible for paying the property taxes.⁹ The parties noted only a few exceptions when Mr. Hughes also paid monthly insurance premiums. Neither party presented evidence regarding the payment of other regular expenses for the property.

Notably, the parties have provided several receipts for their purchases, but they have
limited documentation regarding the flow of money between themselves and between them and
their parents. Mr. Hughes maintained a safe with substantial cash reserves and several high-value
items, which he sold throughout the Fulkerson construction process. At times, the safe contained
cash belonging to Ms. Howard or her mother.¹⁰ Ms. Howard specifically testified that she

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^{21 &}lt;sup>7</sup> Based upon the testimony, there is some ambiguity as to whether Ms. Howard personally contributed this entire amount or if her mother contributed a portion of these funds. *See, e.g.* Recording of Ms. Howard's Testimony at 1:50:16 p.m. In any event some combination of Ms. Howard and her mother contributed in excess of \$100,000.

^{22 &}lt;sup>8</sup> There was conflicting testimony regarding one substantial transfer of \$5000 form John Hughes to Ms. Howard. John Hughes testified that the funds were intended for improvements related to the garage. Ms. Howard testified

²³ that \$3500 was a reimbursement for a truck that she purchased for Mr. Hughes. Upon review of the testimony, the Court finds John Hughes' testimony more credible and finds that he contributed at least \$5000 toward the improvements.
24 Is a second se

²⁴ See, e.g. Recording of Ms. Howard's Testimony at 2:03:00 p.m.

¹⁰ There is no testimony as to whether the cash was stored separately from Mr. Hughes' funds or whether Ms. Howard or her mother had independent access to the safe.

obtained her third party settlement in the form of money orders, which she placed in an envelope 1 in the safe. She later cashed several of the money orders and placed the cash in the safe as well.¹¹ 2 Meanwhile, Mr. Hughes' father would transfer funds directly to Ms. Howard's checking account. 3 Although there is conflicting testimony regarding John Hughes' intent for the funds, it is clear 4 that there was never any kind of written or formal agreement regarding the funds. The funds were 5 simply transferred to Ms. Howard for the benefit of the family. Additionally, although Ms. 6 Howard paid for a majority of the materials on the home, many of the materials were specifically 7 intended for the projects on which Mr. Hughes was working. It is clear that the parties jointly 8 pursued each of the improvements and contributed some level of effort or funds toward their 9 completion. There was never any kind of formal agreement between the parties regarding how 10 much money either party would spend, how much time either party would spend, or what interest 11 either party would have after completion. In fact, at Trial, neither party was able to articulate, 12 with any degree of certainty, how much time or money either of them had dedicated to this 13 14 property.

Sometime around March of 2015 the relationship between the parties deteriorated. Ms.
Howard sought a Protection Order against Mr. Hughes from the New River Township Justice
Court, but her application was denied. Nevertheless, Ms. Howard replaced locks on the property
to prevent Mr. Hughes from accessing the property.¹² Thereafter, Mr. Hughes initiated this action
by filing his Complaint on July 27, 2015.

In his Complaint, Mr. Hughes seeks an accounting of his interest in the Fulkerson
 Property. He further seeks an order directing the sale of the Fulkerson property and an equitable
 division of the proceeds thereof between the parties. On November 24, 2015, Ms. Howard filed

 ¹¹ Ms. Howard specifically stated that *she* put the cash in the safe because she did not know what else to do with it.
 Recording of Ms. Howard's Testimony at 1:43:00 p.m.
 ¹² See Recording of Ms. Howard's Testimony at 2:02:00 p.m.

an Answer and Counterclaim requesting an order directing Mr. Hughes "to specifically perform
the action required to give 100% sole ownership of the property to [Ms. Howard]." In an Order
entered January 7, 2016, Ms. Howard's Counterclaims were dismissed.¹³

During the course of litigation, the parties obtained an appraisal for the Fulkerson property
and they have stipulated to a current value of Two Hundred and Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars
(\$225,000).

II. Analysis

Mr. Hughes asks the Court to determine the parties' respective rights to a parcel of real property, which they own as joint tenants. A joint tenancy in real property may be created "by transfer from a sole owner to himself or herself and others." Nev. Rev. Stat. 111.065(1) (2015). Once a joint tenancy is established, it may be partitioned at the request of a joint tenant in accordance with Chapter 39 of the Nevada Revised Statutes. The Court must then determine the respective interests of the parties in the real property. See Nev. Rev. Stat. 39.080 (2015).

The fractional shares held by joint tenants are presumed to be equal. See *Sack v. Tomlin*, 15 110 Nev. 204, 213 (1994)¹⁴ (citing *Sandars v. Knapp*, 674 P.2d 385 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) 16 (holding that "[i]t is presumed that the shares of co-tenants are equal, whether they be tenants in 17 common or joint tenants"). "[U]nequal contributions toward acquisition of property by co-18 tenants who are not related and show no donative intent can rebut the presumption of equal 19 shares." *Id.* (quoting *Williams v. Monzingo*, 235 Iowa 434, 16 N.W.2d 619 (Iowa 1944)). When 20 there is a showing that the parties unequally contributed to the purchase price, a new presumption 21

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²³ ¹³ Ms. Howard's subsequent Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim pursuant to NRCP 60(b)(1) was denied in an order entered September 7, 2016.

²⁴ ¹⁴ The Court notes that the ruling in Sack was specific to land held as a tenancy in common, however the court in Langevin found the precedent applicable to property owned as a joint tenancy. Langevin v. York, 111 Nev. 1481, 1485 (1995).

donee's acceptance of the gift" Monzo v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev. (In re Irrevocable
Trust Agreement of 1979), 331 P.3d 881, 885 (Nev. 2014). "Determining a donor's donative intent
and beliefs is a question for the fact-finder." Id. at 888.

4 Mr. Hughes presented overwhelming and largely uncontroverted evidence regarding Ms. 5 Howard's donative intent. Mr. Hughes testified that the parties jointly sought a piece of б investment property in Fallon. Both parties initially sought financing for the property, but altered 7 course when Ms. Howard obtained the third party settlement. The parties discussed putting both 8 names on the deed on several occasions and they ultimately went to the County Recorder's office 9 together to execute the quitclaim deed. Mr. Hughes testified that, at the time the deed was 10 executed, he paid the transfer tax of Two Hundred and Thirty Seven Dollars (\$237) after Ms. 11 Howard told him that she had "already paid her half" and that the transfer tax constituted his 12 half.¹⁵ Mr. Hughes also testified that Ms. Howard joked with him, saying, "when was the last 13 time you paid Two Hundred and Thirty-Seven Dollars for a Thirty-Seven Thousand Dollar coin."16 The Court finds Mr. Hughes' testimony credible. Ms. Howard's statements at the time 14 15 of the transfer show that she intended to bestow unto Mr. Hughes a one-half interest in the 16 Fulkerson property.

Additionally, both Mr. Hughes and Ms. Howard testified that they had an informal
agreement whereby Ms. Howard paid the property insurance while Mr. Hughes paid the property
tax.¹⁷ In general, co-owners are responsible for their proportionate share of the expenses in a joint

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¹⁵ See Recording of Mr. Hughes' Testimony at 9:25:10 a.m.

 ¹⁶ See Recording of Mr. Hughes' Testimony at 9:25:30 a.m. This statement is significant, because it refers to the history of coin exchanges between the parties. As noted previously, Mr. Hughes and Ms. Howard's relationship began with Ms. Howard selling coins to Mr. Hughes, and Mr. Hughes continued to work as a coin buyer for the first few years of their relationship. Although the math does not equate to exactly one-half of the original purchase price, the numbers are close enough to demonstrate donative intent.

¹⁷ Recording of Ms. Howard's Testimony at 2:02:40 p.m.

arises: that the parties intended to share in proportion to their contribution to the purchase price.
Id. See also Langevin v. York, 111 Nev. 1481, 1485 (1995).

In this case, the parties agree that they own the Fulkerson property in joint tenancy. Thus,
the Court begins with the presumption that Mr. Hughes and Ms. Howard's shares in the tenancy
are equal. The evidence regarding the parties' interests can be divided into two categories:
evidence pertaining to the initial formation of the joint tenancy and evidence pertaining to the
improvements on the property.

8 (a) Initial Formation

9 With respect to the initial formation, Ms. Howard argues that the parties' unequal 10 contribution to the purchase price of the real property rebuts the presumption of equal ownership. Pursuant to Langevin, "there is a presumption that where co-tenants unequally share in the 11 purchase price of property, 'the co-tenants intended to share in proportion to the amount 12 13 contributed to the purchase price." 111 Nev. at 1485 (citing Sack, 110 Nev. at 210). Here, Mr. Hughes does not dispute that Ms. Howard originally paid the entire purchase price of Sixty-Seven 14 Thousand Dollars (\$67,000) for the property, and that she was the sole owner of the property. 15 16 Within a few days, Ms. Howard executed the Quitclaim Deed, transferring title to herself and Mr. Hughes as joint tenants. Thus, the Court finds, that Ms. Howard rebutted the initial presumption 17 18 of equal ownership.

However, Mr. Hughes has provided clear and convincing evidence of Ms. Howard's donative intent at the time of the transfer—thereby rebutting the secondary presumption. Specifically, Mr. Hughes argues that Ms. Howard intended to gift him an equal share in the joint tenancy when she executed the quitclaim deed. "In Nevada, a valid inter vivos gift or donative transfer requires a donor's intent to voluntarily make a present transfer of property to a donee without consideration, the donor's actual or constructive delivery of the gift to the donee, and the

tenancy,¹⁸ Here, the parties had an agreement in which each of them paid comparable expenses.¹⁹ 1 $\overline{2}$ The parties continued to follow this agreement even after their relationship deteriorated and Ms. Howard replaced the locks to prevent Mr. Hughes from entering the property.²⁰ This arrangement 3 4 supports a finding that both parties intended to share the property equally.

5 To controvert Mr. Hughes' evidence, Ms. Howard testified only that she had no memory of purchasing the home or executing the quitclaim deed.²¹ By contrast, Ms. Howard was able to 6 7 testify in detail about conversations she had with Mr. Hughes before she purchased the property. Ms. Howard also testified in detail about improvements that the parties made to the property after 8 they purchased it.²² Ms, Howard also recalled driving between Fallon and Western California on 9 a regular basis in the weeks before and after executing the deed.23 10

Mr. Hughes and his father, John Hughes, each also testified that Ms. Howard was alert 11 and lucid during the timeframe of the quitclaim deed.²⁴ John Hughes testified that he had a 12 telephone conversation with Ms. Howard shortly after she executed the quitclaim deed in which 13 she stated that she put Mr. Hughes on the deed to protect him in the event that something happened 14

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24 Recording of Mr. Hughes' Testimony at 9:25:05 a.m.; Recording of John Hughes' Testimony at 11:47:00 a.m.

¹⁸ See, elg. 17 Amer. & Eng. Ency. Law, p. 686 (1900) (stating that "[t]he general rule is that all the co-tenants are liable in proportion to their respective interests for the necessary expenses connected with the protection and 17

preservation of the common property") ¹⁹ Based upon Plaintiff's Exhibits 2 and 3, the insurance costs were approximately \$150 per month or \$1800 per year 18 from 2015 forward. The property taxes went from \$800 for tax year 2013-2014 to \$1943 for tax year 2014-2015 and \$2042 for tax year 2015-2016. There is no evidence regarding the property insurance cost prior to 2015. Based upon

¹⁹ the comparable cost for the 2014-2016 period, the Court finds that the parties intended to share the expenses approximately equally. ²⁰ In fact, Mr. Hughes not only continued to pay the property taxes after he moved from the property, but also paid

²⁰ at least one monthly payment for the property insurance.

²¹ See Recording of Ms. Howard's Testimony at 1:38:53 p.m. (Ms. Howard's testimony regarding the initial 21 purchase) & 1:39:22 p.m. (Ms. Howard's testimony regarding execution of the quitclaim deed)

²² The Court specifically notes Ms. Howard's ability to recall that she hired Hotwire to perform the electrical work necessary to put a lamp in the living room, and that she hired Shawn Thursten from SRT Construction to put locks 22 on the front and rear doors of the home. She was also able to recall purchasing a water heater, toilet, and faucet for

the restroom. She also recalled purchasing a washer and dryer for the home, the receipt for which was dated the 23 same day as the quitclaim deed. See Recording of Ms. Howard's Testimony at 1:41:34 p.m.

²³ Ms. Howard testified that, in retrospect, she did not believe it was safe for her to be operating a motor vehicle 24 during this timeframe. Nevertheless, she did operate a motor vehicle and at the time of the Trial, she recalled having operated the motor vehicle.

to her.²⁵ Upon review of the evidence, the Court does not find Ms. Howard's testimony—that
she simply cannot recall executing the quitclaim deed—credible. The Court finds that Ms.
Howard knowingly executed the deed with the intent to transfer an equal interest in the property
to Mr. Hughes.²⁶

5 In light of the evidence of Ms. Howard's donative intent at the time of transfer, Mr. 6 Hughes has rebutted the secondary presumption that the joint tenants intended to share in the 7 tenancy in proportion to their respective contributions to the purchase price. Thus, the Court finds 8 that the parties have equal interests in the joint tenancy.

(b) Improvements and Increased Value

10 The parties agree that the property was in an extremely dilapidated condition before they began improving it. Both Mr. Hughes and Ms. Howard contributed substantially toward 111 12 improvements on the property in the years following the initial transfer. Based upon the stipulated current property value of Two Hundred and Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars (\$225,000), the 13 property value increased by One Hundred and Fifty-Eight Thousand Dollars (\$158,000). In 14 15 general if one co-tenant improves property held in joint tenancy, that tenant may be entitled to reimbursement upon partition. See Collier v. Collier, 73 Ariz. 405, 413; 242 P.2d 537 (Ariz. 16 17 [1952]; Denton v. Lazenby, 255 Kan. 860, 863-64 (1994); Milian v. De Leon, 181 Cal. App. 3d 18 || 1185 (1986); see generally Sack v. Tomlinson, 110 Nev. 204 (1994); McKissick v. McKissick, 93 Nev. 139 (1977). The entitlement to contribution for improvements arises from principles of 19 equity, and one purpose is to ensure that the efforts of one co-tenant do not unjustly enrich another. 20

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 ²⁵ See Recording of John Hughes' Testimony at 11:46:40 a.m. Specifically, John Hughes stated that Ms. Howard was worried that her family might interfere with Mr. Hughes' interest in the property if Ms. Howard died. The Court finds John Hughes' testimony credible and notes that Ms. Howard's statement indicates that she was cognizant of the right of survivorship in a joint tenancy. This further supports a finding that Ms. Howard intended to create a joint tenancy when she executed the deed.

^{24 &}lt;sup>26</sup> The parties did not provide any evidence to suggest that the property value changed between the time that Ms. Howard initially purchased the property and when she executed the quitclaim deed. Because the transfers were only several days apart, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Court finds that the value was \$67,000 at the time of transfer.

See Denton, 255 Kan. at 863; Janik v. Janik, 474 N.E.2d 1054, 1057 (Ind. App. 1985); Capogreco
v. Capogreco, 378 N.E.2d 279 (Ill. App. 1978); Clift v. Clift, 10 S.W. 338, 341 (Tex. 1888). In
some instances, the value of an improvement is higher or lower than its cost. In such cases, it is
equity that guides the Court's determination of the appropriate value for reimbursement.²⁷ In any
event, in order to receive a reimbursement, a tenant who funds improvements must affirmatively
seek such reimbursement at the time of partition. See Sack v. Tomlinson, 110 Nev. 204 (1994).

7 Here, the parties each testified regarding their monetary and in-kind contributions to the 8 improvements on the property. Ms. Howard did not argue that she was entitled to a 9 reimbursement for any contribution, however she argued that the court should apportion the parties' ownership interests in proportion to their expenses. Because the Court has found that the 10 11 parties are equal co-tenants, it will consider the issue of reimbursement to address Ms. Howard's 12 argument that she is entitled to more than a one-half interest in the property. Although Ms. Howard argues that she expended in excess of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$200,000) toward 13 14 the improvements on the property, many of the expenses were paid in cash, and there are no records showing the source of the cash.²⁸ Further, neither party maintained sufficiently detailed 15 16 records to confirm their exact contributions. For example, it is undisputed that the single most costly improvement on the property is the accessory dwelling, which the parties built as a 17 18 residence for Ms. Howard's mother. Even for this significant improvement, neither party 19 presented clear testimony or other evidence regarding their respective interests.

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 ^{23 &}lt;sup>27</sup> For example, if one co-tenant does not consent to an improvement and the cost of the improvement is substantially higher than the resulting increase in value, the un-consenting co-tenant may not be responsible for his share of the cost but rather his share of the increase in value.
 24 ²⁴ The court specifically notes that the evidence reveals that both Ms. Howard's mother and Mr. Hughes' father

^{24 &}lt;sup>24</sup> The court specifically notes that the evidence reveals that both Ms. Howard's mother and Mr. Hughes' father contributed funds toward the improvements on the property. Because the parties operated primarily in cash, there are very limited records pertaining to large transactions.

To begin, the evidence regarding the increase in property value attributable to the accessory dwelling is limited.²⁹ Each party testified that the cost of the accessory dwelling was likely in excess of One Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$100,000), however neither party was able to narrow the cost to a more precise number. Of greater significance is the fact that the parties provided conflicting testimony regarding the source of funds for the accessory dwelling.³⁰ Because the Court has no reliable evidence regarding who actually paid for the improvement, it cannot find that Ms. Howard is entitled to a reimbursement.³¹

Further, it is clear that the parties jointly sought the construction of the accessory dwelling.³² Each party testified that both parties were involved in procuring and directing the contractors on this project. While each party testified that the majority of the labor performed on the accessory dwelling was contracted, there is no dispute that Mr. Hughes performed site preparation and clean-up services and worked with Ms. Howard to complete several improvements to the interior.³³ Absent any evidence that either party is entitled to reimbursement, the Court finds that the parties are entitled to equal shares of the resulting increased value.³⁴

^{16 &}lt;sup>29</sup> The primary reference to the attributable increase in value appears in Defendant's Exhibit J, which is an Appraisal of the property. The appraisal estimates a value attributable to the accessory dwelling that is \$76 per square foot or \$76,000, total (the appraisal lists the square footage of the accessory dwelling at 1000 square feet). Plaintiff's Exhibit

^{17 14} is an Assessor's Improvement List for the property, it values the replacement cost of the Accessory Dwelling Unit as \$118,486. There is no evidence establishing how this number was generated.

 ^{18 &}lt;sup>30</sup> Mr. Highes does not dispute that he did not contribute financially to the dwelling, but it is not clear whether the funds came from Ms. Howard or her mother (who has no cognizable ownership interest in the property whatsoever).
 19 See Recording of Ms. Howard's Testimony at 1:50:16 p.m. (Ms. Howard's testimony that she paid all of the contractors in cash from a box in which her mother had all of her money).

Notably, Ms. Howard's counsel argued during closing arguments that a combination of Ms. Howard and Ms. Howard's mother had paid in excess of \$200,000. He argued that Ms. Howard's interest in the property should be reflective of both her and her mother's contributions. In other words, he argued that the improvement had been a

²¹ gift to Ms. Howard from her mother and that Ms. Howard was entitled to the full benefit thereof. However, at Trial, Ms. Howard presented no evidence whatsoever regarding her mother's intent when funding various improvements.

²² Thus, the Court has no basis for a finding that Ms. Howard has a greater interest in the improvements that Mr. Hughes, 22 Specifically, Ms. Howard completed the initial Special Use Permit Application, Mr. Hughes completed the

Building Permit Application, and both parties completed the Owner Acknowledgment for the Special Use Permit. 23 See Plaintiff's Exhibits 9-11.

³³ Specifically, Mr. Hughes testified that they installed some subflooring and various fixtures.

^{24 &}lt;sup>34</sup> A similar analysis is applicable to the garage/workshop structure: each party contributed financial resources (Ms. Howard contributed approximately \$20,000, which included approximately \$5,000 in funds from Mr. Hughes' father; meanwhile, Mr. Hughes funded electrical work and the pouring of a concrete pad); Mr. Hughes also conducted site preparation and cleanup. The parties clearly endeavored to complete this improvement together; each of them

1 With respect to Ms. Howard's other expenditures, almost every receipt offered into 2 evidence corresponds to a project on which Mr. Hughes was working. Ms. Howard primarily 3 provided the funds necessary to purchase tools and equipment while Mr. Hughes and his daughter completed the vast majority of the labor for the improvements.³⁵ Mr. Hughes also alleges that he 4 5 expended approximately Twenty Thousand Dollars (\$20,000) in cash toward improvements, but 6 he has provided only one receipt for electrical work in the approximate amount of One Thousand Dollars (\$1,000).³⁶ Although it is unusual to spend almost Twenty Thousand Dollars (\$20,000) 7 8 without records thereof, it is not inconsistent with the parties' general approach to this project.³⁷ 9 Throughout the entire construction process, each party contributed significant resources 10 toward improving the property, but neither of them maintained any records showing a running 11 balance of the value of their respective contributions. Their lackadaisical approach to record

12 keeping tends to show that the parties were jointly working toward a common goal of increasing

13 the value of the property with an intent to share equally in the benefits.³⁸

14 Upon review of the testimony and other evidence presented at Trial, the Court finds that each party is entitled to an equal share of the property. Based upon the property appraisal in 15 16 Defendant's Exhibit J, the vast majority of the property value is centralized in the building 17 structures, thus there is no practical way of conducting a partition. Because Ms. Howard is in possession of the property and has denied Mr. Hughes access, she shall be directed to pay Mr. 18

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their plans never came to fruition. Nevertheless, Ms. Howard's testimony indicates that at the time of the construction, the parties discussed marriage and even she believed that they would be equal co-tenants in the future.

contributed resources toward the improvement with no formal bookkeeping or agreement regarding the value of their 20 contributions. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the parties are each entitled to share in the increased value resulting from this improvement.

³⁵ By way of example, Ms. Howard purchased hundreds of railroad ties, which Mr. Hughes and his daughter used in 21 the construction of various retaining walls. See Defendant's Exhibit L, Bates Stamp EHTRIAL000520 (receipt for 256 Railroad Ties).
36 See Recording of Mr. Hughes' Testimony at 11:32:27 a.m.

³⁷ The parties almost entirely operated in cash, as exemplified by the fact that Ms. Howard obtained a \$137,000.00 settlement in cashier's checks, which she subsequently cashed and maintained in a safe. ³⁷ Regarding the parties' intent to share in the benefits, the Court also notes that Ms. Howard testified that she intended 23

for Mr. Hughes to be an equal co-tenant after the parties were married. Recording of Ms. Howard's Testimony at 24 2:03:45 p.m. Both parties testified that they discussed marriage throughout most of the construction process, but

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1	Hughes his one-half share of Two Hundred and Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars (\$225,000), less
2	his one-half share of closing costs, fees and standard realtor commission by no later than July 1,
3	2017.
4	GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
5	1. By no later than June 1, 2017, Ms. Howard shall buy-out Mr. Hughes' share in the property
6	by paying him his one-half share of Two-Hundred and Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars
7	(\$225,000), less his one-half share of standard fees and costs associated with the sale of
8	real property.
9	a. Ms. Howard shall transfer Mr. Hughes' payment to Mr. Hughes' attorney's trust
10	account, where it shall remain until Mr. Hughes executes the documents necessary
11	to transfer his interest in the joint tenancy to Ms. Howard.
12	2. If, by June 1, 2017, Ms. Howard declines to exercise the option of buying-out Mr. Hughes,
13	the parties shall immediately list the property for sale with a mutually agreeable Realtor
14	who regularly conducts business in Churchill County, Nevada. If the parties cannot agree
15	upon a realtor, they shall file an application for setting to put this matter on calendar for
16	the Court to designate a realtor.
17	IT IS SO ORDERED.
18	Dated this 27^{th} day of February 2017. 5.50
19 20	THOMAS L. STOCKARD
20	DISTRICT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING The undersigned, an employee of the Tenth Judicial District Court, hereby certifies that I served the foregoing ORDER AFTER FEBRUARY 6, 2017 HEARING on the parties by depositing a copy thereof in the U.S. Mail at Fallon, Nevada, postage prepaid, as follows; Justin Townsend, Esq. Allison MacKenzie, Ltd. 402 North Division Street Carson City, NV 89703-4168 Charles R. Kozak, Esq. Kozak Lusiani Law, LLC B100 Mill Street, Suite 115 Reno, NV 89502 DATED this 27th day of february 2017. Sue Sevon, Court Administrator Subscribed and sworn to this 27 day of February 2017. Notary Public/Clerk

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EXHIBIT 5

EXHIBIT 5

Docket 72965 Document 2017-17933

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6	IN	N THE TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NE	EVÁDA		
7		IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CHURCHILL			
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10	SHAU	JGHNAN L. HUGHES,			
11		Plaintiff, HEARING	<u>Y 6, 20</u>	<u>17</u>	
12		vs.			
13		ABETH C. HOWARD, an individual; OES I through XX, inclusive,			
14		Defendants.			
15		/.			
16		On February 6, 2017, this Matter came before the Court for a Trial on SH	IAUGH	NAN	
17	HUGH	HES' (hereinafter "Mr. Hughes") Civil Complaint. At the trial, Mr. Hughes	s was pr	esent	
18	and w	vas represented by Justin Townsend, Esq. ELIZABETH HOWARD (here	einafter	"Ms.	
19	Howar	rd") was also present and was represented by Charles Kozak, Esq.			
20		At the trial, Mr. Hughes, Ms. Howard, John Hughes, and Fallon Hughes wer	e each p	laced	
21	under	oath and offered testimony. No other witnesses were called. Based upon	the evi	dence	
22	provid	ded, the Court makes the following findings and conclusions. ¹ Mr. Hughes	has also) filed	
23					
24	the testi of each	Court made its factual findings in this case after considering the totality of evidence. It cons timony of the parties and witnesses, as well as the documentary evidence. The Court determine in witness and the weight to be given their testimony, especially in light of contradictory evidence ted during the hearing.	ed the cre	dibility	

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1 an Application for Order to Show Cause and a Motion for Sanctions, both of which will be 2 addressed in a separate Order.

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I. Factual and Procedural Background

4 Mr. Hughes and Ms. Howard were involved in a romantic relationship in the years leading 5 up to the filing of the Complaint in this case. The couple began dating in the fall of 2009 after 6 Ms. Howard sold a number of coins to Mr. Hughes in his capacity as a buyer for Gold Star Coin. 7 Although both Mr. Hughes and Ms. Howard were living in California, they decided to move to 8 Fallon, Nevada in the summer of 2010. Together, they leased property on Melanie Drive for 9 approximately one year.² The couple then moved to another leased property on Stillwater Road.³ 10 While living in Fallon, the parties sought a piece of property to purchase in the area. They 11 each applied for financing, but encountered a hurdle do to an IRS debt owed by Ms. Howard. 12 Then, Ms. Howard obtained a third party settlement in the approximate amount of Three Hundred 13 and Ninety Thousand Dollars (\$390,000), stemming from a workplace injury.⁴

In June of 2012, using funds from the third party settlement, Ms. Howard purchased a
 parcel of real property in Churchill County, Nevada (hereinafter "Fulkerson property") for Sixty Seven Thousand Dollars (\$67,000.00).⁵ The property was conveyed to Ms. Howard by way of
 Special Warranty Deed. Several days later, on July 11, 2012, Ms. Howard conveyed the
 Fulkerson property by way of Quitclaim Deed to herself and Mr. Hughes as Joint Tenants.⁶

The property was originally in a dilapidated condition and required extensive
 rehabilitation. The parties made a number of improvements, including: installing a fence; causing

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² Both Mr. Hughes and Ms. Howard were listed on the lease.

^{23 || &}lt;sup>3</sup> Again, both Mr. Hughes and Ms. Howard were listed on the lease.

⁴ Based upon Ms. Howard's testimony and Mr. Hughes' testimony, the amount that Ms. Howard actually received was approximately One Hundred and Fifty-Three Thousand Dollars (\$153,000). Recording of Ms. Howard's Testimony, at 1:43:00 p.m.

⁵ Recording of Ms. Howard's Testimony, at 1:42:39 p.m. ⁶ See Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.

an accessory dwelling to be built on the property; erecting a garage and workshop area; pouring 1 2 a new concrete slab in front of the garage; rehabilitating a preexisting aircraft hangar; building a series of retaining walls, an aviary, and a dog house; and making other landscaping improvements. 3 Ms. Howard contributed in excess of One Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$100,000) to the 4 improvements on the Fulkerson Property.⁷ For his part, Mr. Hughes and his daughter, Savannah 5 6 Hughes, completed much of the physical labor involved in the improvements. Mr. Hughes testified that his financial contribution to the property was approximately Twenty Thousand 7 Dollars (\$20,000). Mr. Hughes' father also contributed to the improvement efforts by purchasing 8 a tractor and transferring funds from his checking account to Ms. Howard's checking account.8 9

With regard to regular expenses on the property, both parties testified that they had an agreement whereby Ms. Howard was generally responsible for paying the property insurance while Mr. Hughes was responsible for paying the property taxes.⁹ The parties noted only a few exceptions when Mr. Hughes also paid monthly insurance premiums. Neither party presented evidence regarding the payment of other regular expenses for the property.

Notably, the parties have provided several receipts for their purchases, but they have
limited documentation regarding the flow of money between themselves and between them and
their parents. Mr. Hughes maintained a safe with substantial cash reserves and several high-value
items, which he sold throughout the Fulkerson construction process. At times, the safe contained
cash belonging to Ms. Howard or her mother.¹⁰ Ms. Howard specifically testified that she

^{21 &}lt;sup>7</sup> Based upon the testimony, there is some ambiguity as to whether Ms. Howard personally contributed this entire amount or if her mother contributed a portion of these funds. *See, e.g.* Recording of Ms. Howard's Testimony at 1:50:16 p.m. In any event some combination of Ms. Howard and her mother contributed in excess of \$100,000.

²² ⁸ There was conflicting testimony regarding one substantial transfer of \$5000 form John Hughes to Ms. Howard. John Hughes testified that the funds were intended for improvements related to the garage. Ms. Howard testified

that \$3500 was a reimbursement for a truck that she purchased for Mr. Hughes. Upon review of the testimony, the Court finds John Hughes' testimony more credible and finds that he contributed at least \$5000 toward the improvements.

²⁴ 9 See, e.g. Recording of Ms. Howard's Testimony at 2:03:00 p.m.

¹⁰ There is no testimony as to whether the cash was stored separately from Mr. Hughes' funds or whether Ms. Howard or her mother had independent access to the safe.

obtained her third party settlement in the form of money orders, which she placed in an envelope 1 2 in the safe. She later cashed several of the money orders and placed the cash in the safe as well.¹¹ 3 Meanwhile, Mr. Hughes' father would transfer funds directly to Ms. Howard's checking account. Although there is conflicting testimony regarding John Hughes' intent for the funds, it is clear 4 5 that there was never any kind of written or formal agreement regarding the funds. The funds were simply transferred to Ms. Howard for the benefit of the family. Additionally, although Ms. 6 7 Howard paid for a majority of the materials on the home, many of the materials were specifically intended for the projects on which Mr. Hughes was working. It is clear that the parties jointly 8 9 pursued each of the improvements and contributed some level of effort or funds toward their 10 completion. There was never any kind of formal agreement between the parties regarding how much money either party would spend, how much time either party would spend, or what interest 11 12 either party would have after completion. In fact, at Trial, neither party was able to articulate, with any degree of certainty, how much time or money either of them had dedicated to this 13 14 property.

Sometime around March of 2015 the relationship between the parties deteriorated. Ms.
Howard sought a Protection Order against Mr. Hughes from the New River Township Justice
Court, but her application was denied. Nevertheless, Ms. Howard replaced locks on the property
to prevent Mr. Hughes from accessing the property.¹² Thereafter, Mr. Hughes initiated this action
by filing his Complaint on July 27, 2015.

In his Complaint, Mr. Hughes seeks an accounting of his interest in the Fulkerson
Property. He further seeks an order directing the sale of the Fulkerson property and an equitable
division of the proceeds thereof between the parties. On November 24, 2015, Ms. Howard filed

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 ¹¹ Ms. Howard specifically stated that *she* put the cash in the safe because she did not know what else to do with it. Recording of Ms. Howard's Testimony at 1:43:00 p.m.
 ¹² See Recording of Ms. Howard's Testimony at 2:02:00 p.m.

an Answer and Counterclaim requesting an order directing Mr. Hughes "to specifically perform
the action required to give 100% sole ownership of the property to [Ms. Howard]." In an Order
entered January 7, 2016, Ms. Howard's Counterclaims were dismissed.¹³

During the course of litigation, the parties obtained an appraisal for the Fulkerson property and they have stipulated to a current value of Two Hundred and Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars (\$225,000).

II. Analysis

Mr. Hughes asks the Court to determine the parties' respective rights to a parcel of real
property, which they own as joint tenants. A joint tenancy in real property may be created "by
transfer from a sole owner to himself or herself and others." Nev. Rev. Stat. 111.065(1) (2015).
Once a joint tenancy is established, it may be partitioned at the request of a joint tenant in
accordance with Chapter 39 of the Nevada Revised Statutes. The Court must then determine the
respective interests of the parties in the real property. See Nev. Rev. Stat. 39.080 (2015).

The fractional shares held by joint tenants are presumed to be equal. See *Sack v. Tomlin*, 15 110 Nev. 204, 213 (1994)¹⁴ (citing *Sandars v. Knapp*, 674 P.2d 385 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) 16 (holding that "[i]t is presumed that the shares of co-tenants are equal, whether they be tenants in 17 common or joint tenants")). "[U]nequal contributions toward acquisition of property by co-18 tenants who are not related and show no donative intent can rebut the presumption of equal 19 shares." *Id.* (quoting *Williams v. Monzingo*, 235 Iowa 434, 16 N.W.2d 619 (Iowa 1944)). When 120 there is a showing that the parties unequally contributed to the purchase price, a new presumption 131

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¹³ Ms. Howard's subsequent Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim pursuant to NRCP 60(b)(1) was denied in an order entered September 7, 2016.

²⁴ ¹⁴ The Court notes that the ruling in *Sack* was specific to land held as a tenancy in common, however the court in *Langevin* found the precedent applicable to property owned as a joint tenancy. *Langevin v. York*, 111 Nev. 1481, 1485 (1995).

arises: that the parties intended to share in proportion to their contribution to the purchase price.
 Id. See also Langevin v. York, 111 Nev. 1481, 1485 (1995).

In this case, the parties agree that they own the Fulkerson property in joint tenancy. Thus,
the Court begins with the presumption that Mr. Hughes and Ms. Howard's shares in the tenancy
are equal. The evidence regarding the parties' interests can be divided into two categories:
evidence pertaining to the initial formation of the joint tenancy and evidence pertaining to the
improvements on the property.

(a) Initial Formation

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9 With respect to the initial formation, Ms. Howard argues that the parties' unequal 10 contribution to the purchase price of the real property rebuts the presumption of equal ownership. 11 Pursuant to Langevin, "there is a presumption that where co-tenants unequally share in the 12 purchase price of property, 'the co-tenants intended to share in proportion to the amount 13 contributed to the purchase price." 111 Nev. at 1485 (citing Sack, 110 Nev. at 210). Here, Mr. 14 Hughes does not dispute that Ms. Howard originally paid the entire purchase price of Sixty-Seven 15 Thousand Dollars (\$67,000) for the property, and that she was the sole owner of the property. 16 Within a few days, Ms. Howard executed the Quitclaim Deed, transferring title to herself and Mr. Hughes as joint tenants. Thus, the Court finds, that Ms. Howard rebutted the initial presumption 17 18 of equal ownership.

However, Mr. Hughes has provided clear and convincing evidence of Ms. Howard's
donative intent at the time of the transfer—thereby rebutting the secondary presumption.
Specifically, Mr. Hughes argues that Ms. Howard intended to gift him an equal share in the joint
tenancy when she executed the quitclaim deed. "In Nevada, a valid inter vivos gift or donative
transfer requires a donor's intent to voluntarily make a present transfer of property to a donee
without consideration, the donor's actual or constructive delivery of the gift to the donee, and the

donee's acceptance of the gift" Monzo v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev. (In re Irrevocable
Trust Agreement of 1979), 331 P.3d 881, 885 (Nev. 2014). "Determining a donor's donative intent
and beliefs is a question for the fact-finder." Id. at 888.

Mr. Hughes presented overwhelming and largely uncontroverted evidence regarding Ms. 4 Mr. Hughes testified that the parties jointly sought a piece of 5 Howard's donative intent. investment property in Fallon. Both parties initially sought financing for the property, but altered 6 course when Ms. Howard obtained the third party settlement. The parties discussed putting both 7 names on the deed on several occasions and they ultimately went to the County Recorder's office 8 together to execute the quitclaim deed. Mr. Hughes testified that, at the time the deed was 9 executed, he paid the transfer tax of Two Hundred and Thirty Seven Dollars (\$237) after Ms. 10 11 Howard told him that she had "already paid her half" and that the transfer tax constituted his 12 half.¹⁵ Mr. Hughes also testified that Ms. Howard joked with him, saying, "when was the last time you paid Two Hundred and Thirty-Seven Dollars for a Thirty-Seven Thousand Dollar 13 coin."¹⁶ The Court finds Mr. Hughes' testimony credible. Ms. Howard's statements at the time 14 of the transfer show that she intended to bestow unto Mr. Hughes a one-half interest in the 15 Fulkerson property. 16

Additionally, both Mr. Hughes and Ms. Howard testified that they had an informal agreement whereby Ms. Howard paid the property insurance while Mr. Hughes paid the property tax.¹⁷ In general, co-owners are responsible for their proportionate share of the expenses in a joint

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¹⁵ See Recording of Mr. Hughes' Testimony at 9:25:10 a.m.

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 &</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> See Recording of Mr. Hughes' Testimony at 9:25:30 a.m. This statement is significant, because it refers to the history of coin exchanges between the parties. As noted previously, Mr. Hughes and Ms. Howard's relationship began with Ms. Howard selling coins to Mr. Hughes, and Mr. Hughes continued to work as a coin buyer for the first few years of their relationship. Although the math does not equate to exactly one-half of the original purchase price, the numbers are close enough to demonstrate donative intent.

¹⁷ Recording of Ms. Howard's Testimony at 2:02:40 p.m.

tenancy.¹⁸ Here, the parties had an agreement in which each of them paid comparable expenses.¹⁹
 The parties continued to follow this agreement even after their relationship deteriorated and Ms.
 Howard replaced the locks to prevent Mr. Hughes from entering the property.²⁰ This arrangement
 supports a finding that both parties intended to share the property equally.

To controvert Mr. Hughes' evidence, Ms. Howard testified only that she had no memory
of purchasing the home or executing the quitclaim deed.²¹ By contrast, Ms. Howard was able to
testify in detail about conversations she had with Mr. Hughes before she purchased the property.
Ms. Howard also testified in detail about improvements that the parties made to the property after
they purchased it.²² Ms. Howard also recalled driving between Fallon and Western California on
a regular basis in the weeks before and after executing the deed.²³

Mr. Hughes and his father, John Hughes, each also testified that Ms. Howard was alert
and lucid during the timeframe of the quitclaim deed.²⁴ John Hughes testified that he had a
telephone conversation with Ms. Howard shortly after she executed the quitclaim deed in which
she stated that she put Mr. Hughes on the deed to protect him in the event that something happened

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^{17 &}lt;sup>18</sup> See, e.g. 17 Amer. & Eng. Ency. Law, p. 686 (1900) (stating that "[t]he general rule is that all the co-tenants are liable in proportion to their respective interests for the necessary expenses connected with the protection and preservation of the common property")

^{18 &}lt;sup>19</sup> Based upon Plaintiff's Exhibits 2 and 3, the insurance costs were approximately \$150 per month or \$1800 per year from 2015 forward. The property taxes went from \$800 for tax year 2013-2014 to \$1943 for tax year 2014-2015 and \$2042 for tax year 2015 2016. There is no avidence reporting the report insurance to \$1943 for tax year 2014-2015 and

^{19 \$2042} for tax year 2015-2016. There is no evidence regarding the property insurance cost prior to 2015. Based upon the comparable cost for the 2014-2016 period, the Court finds that the parties intended to share the expenses approximately equally.

^{20 &}lt;sup>20</sup> In fact, Mr. Hughes not only continued to pay the property taxes after he moved from the property, but also paid at least one monthly payment for the property insurance.

^{21 &}lt;sup>21</sup> See Recording of Ms. Howard's Testimony at 1:38:53 p.m. (Ms. Howard's testimony regarding the initial purchase) & 1:39:22 p.m. (Ms. Howard's testimony regarding execution of the quitclaim deed)

^{22 &}lt;sup>22</sup> The Court specifically notes Ms. Howard's ability to recall that she hired Hotwire to perform the electrical work necessary to put a lamp in the living room, and that she hired Shawn Thursten from SRT Construction to put locks on the front and rear doors of the home. She was also able to recall purchasing a water heater, toilet, and faucet for

the restroom. She also recalled purchasing a washer and dryer for the home, the receipt for which was dated the same day as the quitclaim deed. See Recording of Ms. Howard's Testimony at 1:41:34 p.m.

^{24 &}lt;sup>23</sup> Ms. Howard testified that, in retrospect, she did not believe it was safe for her to be operating a motor vehicle during this timeframe. Nevertheless, she did operate a motor vehicle and at the time of the Trial, she recalled having operated the motor vehicle.

²⁴ Recording of Mr. Hughes' Testimony at 9:25:05 a.m.; Recording of John Hughes' Testimony at 11:47:00 a.m.

to her.²⁵ Upon review of the evidence, the Court does not find Ms. Howard's testimony—that
she simply cannot recall executing the quitclaim deed—credible. The Court finds that Ms.
Howard knowingly executed the deed with the intent to transfer an equal interest in the property
to Mr. Hughes.²⁶

In light of the evidence of Ms. Howard's donative intent at the time of transfer, Mr. Hughes has rebutted the secondary presumption that the joint tenants intended to share in the tenancy in proportion to their respective contributions to the purchase price. Thus, the Court finds that the parties have equal interests in the joint tenancy.

9 (b) Improvements and Increased Value

The parties agree that the property was in an extremely dilapidated condition before they 10 11 began improving it. Both Mr. Hughes and Ms. Howard contributed substantially toward improvements on the property in the years following the initial transfer. Based upon the stipulated 12 13 current property value of Two Hundred and Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars (\$225,000), the 14 property value increased by One Hundred and Fifty-Eight Thousand Dollars (\$158,000). In general, if one co-tenant improves property held in joint tenancy, that tenant may be entitled to 15 reimbursement upon partition. See Collier v. Collier, 73 Ariz. 405, 413; 242 P.2d 537 (Ariz. 16 1952); Denton v. Lazenby, 255 Kan. 860, 863-64 (1994); Milian v. De Leon, 181 Cal. App. 3d 17 1185 (1986); see generally Sack v. Tomlinson, 110 Nev. 204 (1994); McKissick v. McKissick. 93 18 Nev. 139 (1977). The entitlement to contribution for improvements arises from principles of 19 equity, and one purpose is to ensure that the efforts of one co-tenant do not unjustly enrich another. 20

^{22 &}lt;sup>25</sup> See Recording of John Hughes' Testimony at 11:46:40 a.m. Specifically, John Hughes stated that Ms. Howard was worried that her family might interfere with Mr. Hughes' interest in the property if Ms. Howard died. The Court finds John Hughes' testimony credible and notes that Ms. Howard's statement indicates that she was cognizant of

²³ the right of survivorship in a joint tenancy. This further supports a finding that Ms. Howard intended to create a joint tenancy when she executed the deed.

^{24 &}lt;sup>26</sup> The parties did not provide any evidence to suggest that the property value changed between the time that Ms. Howard initially purchased the property and when she executed the quitclaim deed. Because the transfers were only several days apart, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Court finds that the value was \$67,000 at the time of transfer.

See Denton, 255 Kan. at 863; Janik v. Janik, 474 N.E.2d 1054, 1057 (Ind. App. 1985); Capogreco
v. Capogreco, 378 N.E.2d 279 (Ill. App. 1978); Clift v. Clift, 10 S.W. 338, 341 (Tex. 1888). In
some instances, the value of an improvement is higher or lower than its cost. In such cases, it is
equity that guides the Court's determination of the appropriate value for reimbursement.²⁷ In any
event, in order to receive a reimbursement, a tenant who funds improvements must affirmatively
seek such reimbursement at the time of partition. See Sack v. Tomlinson, 110 Nev. 204 (1994).

7 Here, the parties each testified regarding their monetary and in-kind contributions to the 8 improvements on the property. Ms. Howard did not argue that she was entitled to a 9 reimbursement for any contribution, however she argued that the court should apportion the parties' ownership interests in proportion to their expenses. Because the Court has found that the 10parties are equal co-tenants, it will consider the issue of reimbursement to address Ms. Howard's 11 argument that she is entitled to more than a one-half interest in the property. Although Ms. 12 Howard argues that she expended in excess of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$200,000) toward 13 the improvements on the property, many of the expenses were paid in cash, and there are no 14 records showing the source of the cash.²⁸ Further, neither party maintained sufficiently detailed 15 records to confirm their exact contributions. For example, it is undisputed that the single most 16 costly improvement on the property is the accessory dwelling, which the parties built as a 17 18 residence for Ms. Howard's mother. Even for this significant improvement, neither party 19 presented clear testimony or other evidence regarding their respective interests.

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^{23 &}lt;sup>27</sup> For example, if one co-tenant does not consent to an improvement and the cost of the improvement is substantially higher than the resulting increase in value, the un-consenting co-tenant may not be responsible for his share of the cost but rather his share of the increase in value.
24 cost but rather his share of the increase in value.

²⁴²⁸ The court specifically notes that the evidence reveals that both Ms. Howard's mother and Mr. Hughes' father contributed funds toward the improvements on the property. Because the parties operated primarily in cash, there are very limited records pertaining to large transactions.

To begin, the evidence regarding the increase in property value attributable to the accessory dwelling is limited.²⁹ Each party testified that the cost of the accessory dwelling was likely in excess of One Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$100,000), however neither party was able to narrow the cost to a more precise number. Of greater significance is the fact that the parties provided conflicting testimony regarding the source of funds for the accessory dwelling.³⁰ Because the Court has no reliable evidence regarding who actually paid for the improvement, it cannot find that Ms. Howard is entitled to a reimbursement.³¹

Further, it is clear that the parties jointly sought the construction of the accessory dwelling.³² Each party testified that both parties were involved in procuring and directing the contractors on this project. While each party testified that the majority of the labor performed on the accessory dwelling was contracted, there is no dispute that Mr. Hughes performed site preparation and clean-up services and worked with Ms. Howard to complete several improvements to the interior.³³ Absent any evidence that either party is entitled to reimbursement, the Court finds that the parties are entitled to equal shares of the resulting increased value.³⁴

^{16 &}lt;sup>29</sup> The primary reference to the attributable increase in value appears in Defendant's Exhibit J, which is an Appraisal of the property. The appraisal estimates a value attributable to the accessory dwelling that is \$76 per square foot or \$76,000,total (the appraisal lists the square footage of the accessory dwelling at 1000 square feet). Plaintiff's Exhibit

^{17 14} is an Assessor's Improvement List for the property, it values the replacement cost of the Accessory Dwelling Unit as \$118,486. There is no evidence establishing how this number was generated.

 ³⁰ Mr. Hughes does not dispute that he did not contribute financially to the dwelling, but it is not clear whether the funds came from Ms. Howard or her mother (who has no cognizable ownership interest in the property whatsoever).
 See Recording of Ms. Howard's Testimony at 1:50:16 p.m. (Ms. Howard's testimony that she paid all of the

¹⁹ contractors in cash from a box in which her mother had all of her money). ³¹ Notably, Ms. Howard's counsel argued during closing arguments that a combination of Ms. Howard and Ms.

²⁰ Howard's mother had paid in excess of \$200,000. He argued that Ms. Howard's interest in the property should be reflective of both her and her mother's contributions. In other words, he argued that the improvement had been a

²¹ gift to Ms. Howard from her mother and that Ms. Howard was entitled to the full benefit thereof. However, at Trial, Ms. Howard presented no evidence whatsoever regarding her mother's intent when funding various improvements.

²² Thus, the Court has no basis for a finding that Ms. Howard has a greater interest in the improvements that Mr. Hughes. ³² Specifically, Ms. Howard completed the initial Special Use Permit Application, Mr. Hughes completed the Building Permit Application, and both parties completed the Owner Acknowledgment for the Special Use Permit.

²³ See Plaintiff's Exhibits 9-11.

³³ Specifically, Mr. Hughes testified that they installed some subflooring and various fixtures.

^{24 &}lt;sup>34</sup> A similar analysis is applicable to the garage/workshop structure: each party contributed financial resources (Ms. Howard contributed approximately \$20,000, which included approximately \$5,000 in funds from Mr. Hughes' father; meanwhile, Mr. Hughes funded electrical work and the pouring of a concrete pad); Mr. Hughes also conducted site preparation and cleanup. The parties clearly endeavored to complete this improvement together; each of them

With respect to Ms. Howard's other expenditures, almost every receipt offered into 1 2 evidence corresponds to a project on which Mr. Hughes was working. Ms. Howard primarily provided the funds necessary to purchase tools and equipment while Mr. Hughes and his daughter 3 completed the vast majority of the labor for the improvements.³⁵ Mr. Hughes also alleges that he 4 expended approximately Twenty Thousand Dollars (\$20,000) in cash toward improvements, but 5 6 he has provided only one receipt for electrical work in the approximate amount of One Thousand Dollars (\$1,000).³⁶ Although it is unusual to spend almost Twenty Thousand Dollars (\$20,000) 7 8 without records thereof, it is not inconsistent with the parties' general approach to this project.³⁷ 9 Throughout the entire construction process, each party contributed significant resources 10 toward improving the property, but neither of them maintained any records showing a running balance of the value of their respective contributions. Their lackadaisical approach to record 11 keeping tends to show that the parties were jointly working toward a common goal of increasing 12 13 the value of the property with an intent to share equally in the benefits.³⁸ 14 Upon review of the testimony and other evidence presented at Trial, the Court finds that each party is entitled to an equal share of the property. Based upon the property appraisal in 15 Defendant's Exhibit J, the vast majority of the property value is centralized in the building 16

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structures, thus there is no practical way of conducting a partition. Because Ms. Howard is in

possession of the property and has denied Mr. Hughes access, she shall be directed to pay Mr.

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²⁰ contributed resources toward the improvement with no formal bookkeeping or agreement regarding the value of their contributions. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the parties are each entitled to share in the increased value resulting from this improvement.

^{21 &}lt;sup>35</sup> By way of example, Ms. Howard purchased hundreds of railroad ties, which Mr. Hughes and his daughter used in the construction of various retaining walls. *See* Defendant's Exhibit L, Bates Stamp EHTRIAL000520 (receipt for 256 Railroad Ties).

^{22 36} See Recording of Mr. Hughes' Testimony at 11:32:27 a.m.

 ³⁷ The parties almost entirely operated in cash, as exemplified by the fact that Ms. Howard obtained a \$137,000.00
 23 settlement in cashier's checks, which she subsequently cashed and maintained in a safe.

^{24 &}lt;sup>38</sup> Regarding the parties' intent to share in the benefits, the Court also notes that Ms. Howard testified that she intended for Mr. Hughes to be an equal co-tenant after the parties were married. Recording of Ms. Howard's Testimony at 2:03:45 p.m. Both parties testified that they discussed marriage throughout most of the construction process, but their plans never came to fruition. Nevertheless, Ms. Howard's testimony indicates that at the time of the construction, the parties discussed marriage and even she believed that they would be equal co-tenants in the future.

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1	Hughes	his one-half share of Two Hundred and Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars (\$225,000), less
2	his one	-half share of closing costs, fees and standard realtor commission by no later than July 1,
3	2017.	
4	GOOD	CAUSE APPEARING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
5	1.	By no later than June 1, 2017, Ms. Howard shall buy-out Mr. Hughes' share in the property
6		by paying him his one-half share of Two-Hundred and Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars
7		(\$225,000), less his one-half share of standard fees and costs associated with the sale of
8		real property.
9		a. Ms. Howard shall transfer Mr. Hughes' payment to Mr. Hughes' attorney's trust
10		account, where it shall remain until Mr. Hughes executes the documents necessary
11		to transfer his interest in the joint tenancy to Ms. Howard.
12	2.	If, by June 1, 2017, Ms. Howard declines to exercise the option of buying-out Mr. Hughes,
13		the parties shall immediately list the property for sale with a mutually agreeable Realtor
14		who regularly conducts business in Churchill County, Nevada. If the parties cannot agree
15		upon a realtor, they shall file an application for setting to put this matter on calendar for
16		the Court to designate a realtor.
17		IT IS SO ORDERED.
18		Dated this 27^{m} day of February 2017. \sim
19		THOMAS L. STOCKARD
20		DISTRICT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING The undersigned, an employee of the Tenth Judicial District Court, hereby certifies that I served the foregoing ORDER AFTER FEBRUARY 6, 2017 HEARING on the parties by depositing a copy thereof in the U.S. Mail at Fallon, Nevada, postage prepaid, as follows Justin Townsend, Esq. Allison MacKenzie, Ltd. 402 North Division Street Carson City, NV 89703-4168 Charles R. Kozak, Esq. Kozak Lusiani Law, LLC 3100 Mill Street, Suite 115 Reno, NV 89502 DATED this 27th day of February, 2017. Sue Sevon, Court Administrator Subscribed and sworn to this The day of tebruary 2017. MIMA Notary Publie/Clerk



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EXHIBIT 4

EXHIBIT 4

Docket 72965 Document 2017-17933

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Telephone: (775) 687-0202 Fax: (775) 882-7918 E-Mail Address: law@allisonmackenzie.com	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 22 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28	Case No.15-10DC-0876 Dept. No.1 The andersigned leady affirms that indiverses and constant the social security number of any period JPTIN M TOWNSISME Fag IN THE TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CHURCHILL SILAI (GIINAN L. HUGHES, an individual. Plaintiff, vs. ELZABETHI C. HOWARD, an individual. Defendants. NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER DENVING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENVING DEFENDANT'S MOTION NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER DENVING DEFENDANT'S MOTION SET ASIDE DISMISSAL OF COUNTERCLAIM NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 7 th day of September. 2016, the Court day entered an Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside dismissal of Commercialm in the above-entitled matter. A copy of said Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "1". <i>LETIMENTICE</i>
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ALLISON MacKENZIE, LTD. 402 North Division Street, P.O. Box 646. Carson City, NV 89702

AND AND ADDRESS AND ADDRESS ADDRES

ALLISON MacKENZIE, LTD. 402 North Division Street, P.O. Box 646, Carson City. NV 89702 Telephone: (775) 687-0202 Fax: (775) 882-7918

E-Mail Address: law@allisonmackenzic.com



DATED this 9th day of September, 2016.

ALLISON MacKENZIE, LTD. 402 North Division Street Carson City, NV 89703-4168 By: JUSTIN M. TOWNSEND, ESQ. Nevada State Bar No. 12293

Attorneys for Plaintiff, SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES




EXHIBIT "1"

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1	Case No. 15-10DC-0876
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6	IN THE TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
7	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CHURCHILL
8	
9	
10	SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES,
11	Plaintiff, Plaintiff, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
12	vs. <u>AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S</u>
13	ELIZABETH C. HOWARD, an individual; MOTION TO SET ASIDE DISMISSAL
14	and DOES I through XX, inclusive, OF COUNTERCLAIM
15	Defendants. /
16	This matter came before the Court on ELIZABETH HOWARD's (hereinafter "Ms.
17	Howard") Motion for Summary Judgment filed June 28, 2016, and her Motion to Set Aside
18	Dismissal of Counterclaim, filed May 17, 2016. Ms. Howard is represented by Charles Kozak,
19	Esq. SHAUGHNAN HUGHES (hereinafter "Mr. Hughes"), who is represented by Justin
20	Townsend, Esq., has opposed both Motions. The Motions have been fully briefed by both
21	parties.
22	I. Factual and Procedural Background
23	Mr. Hughes and Ms. Howard were involved in a romantic relationship in the years
24	leading up to the filing of the Complaint in this case. In June of 2012, a parcel of real property
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in Churchill County, Nevada (hereinafter "Fulkerson property"), was purchased by and
conveyed to Ms. Howard by way of Special Warranty Decd.¹ Several days later, in July of
2012, Ms. Howard conveyed the Fulkerson property by way of Quitclaim Deed to herself and
Mr. Hughes as Joint Tenants.² The parties subsequently made a number of improvements to the
property, the details of which remain in dispute. What is not disputed is that Ms. Howard paid
for a number of materials used in the improvement of the land and that Mr. Hughes paid
property taxes on the land.³

8 Sometime around March of 2015 the relationship between the parties deteriorated. Ms.
9 Howard sought a Protection Order against Mr. Hughes from the New River Township Justice
10 Court, but was ultimately denied. Thereafter, Mr. Hughes initiated this action by filing his
11 Complaint on July 27, 2016.

In his Complaint, Mr. Hughes seeks an accounting of his interest in the Fulkerson
Property. He further seeks an order directing the sale of the Fulkerson property and an equitable
division of the proceeds thereof between the parties. On November 24, 2015, Ms. Howard filed
an Answer and Counterclaim requesting an order directing Mr. Hughes "to specifically perform
the action required to give 100% sole ownership of the property to [Ms. Howard]." Further, in
her Counterclaim, Ms. Howard alleges Fraud, Conversion, Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress, and Specific Performance; she asks for an award of damages and special damages.

On December 11, 2015, Mr. Hughes moved to dismiss Ms. Howard's Counterclaims and
strike certain allegations contained in the Counterclaim pursuant to NRCP 9(b), 12(b)(5), and
12(f). This motion remained unopposed, and on January 7, 2016 this Court entered an Order
granting the requested relief.

 ¹ See Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 5.
 ² See Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 1.
 ³ See, e.g. Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 3.

On May 17, 2016, Ms. Howard filed a Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim
pursuant to NRCP 60(b)(1). Specifically, Mr. Kozak (Ms. Howard's Attorney) stated that the
opposition to Mr. Hughes' Motion "perhaps due to post office mistake or being misplaced
somewhere at the Court, ... was never filed by this Court."

Also on May 17, 2016, the court held a Pre-Trial Conference at which point the case was
scheduled for a Settlement Conference on July 29, 2016 and set for Trial on October 3, 2016 at
9:00 a.m. Ms. Howard was given until July 8, 2016 to file a supplement to her Motion to Set
Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim.

On June 20, 2016, Ms. Howard filed an Opposition to Motion to Dismiss; Motion to
Strike, however this Opposition was subsequently withdrawn on July 8, 2016. And, in its place
on July 8, 2016, Ms. Howard filed her "Supplement to Elizabeth Howard's Motion to Set Aside
Dismissal of Counterclaim Filed May 17, 2016."

Meanwhile, on June 28, 2016 Ms. Howard filed her Motion for Summary Judgment.
Both the Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim
were opposed by Mr. Hughes on July 20, 2016 and July 28, 2016, respectively, and come now
before the Court for consideration.

II. Analysis

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(a) Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim

"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." N.R.C.P. 60(b). "This is in the nature of
a remedial statute; its object [is] to relieve litigants who through some inadvertence, such as is
common to mankind, might be deprived of a hearing upon the merits through their unintentional
failure to bring themselves within a rule." *Whise v. Whise*, 36 Nev. 16, 20 (1913). Further, "the

1 court must give due consideration to the State's underlying basic policy of resolving cases on
2 their merits whenever possible." Id.

The Nevada Supreme Court has held "that the presence of the following factors indicates that 60(b)(1) has been satisfied: (1) a prompt application to remove the judgment; (2) the absence of an intent to delay the proceedings; (3) a lack of knowledge of procedural requirements; and (4) good faith." *Yochum v. Davis*, 98 Nev. 484, 487 (1982) (citing *Hotel Last Frontier v. Frontier Prop.*, 79 Nev. 150 (1963)).

When considering if a Motion is prompt, the court generally looks to Rule 60(b), stating 8 9 that "[t]he motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reason (1), ... not more than 6 months after the proceeding was taken or the date that written notice of entry of the judgment 10 or order was served." N.R.C.P. 60(b). However, there are circumstances in which filings within 11 the six month period are nevertheless not prompt. See, e.g. Kahn v. Orme, 108 Nev. 510, 514 12 (1992) (finding that a filing to set aside default was not prompt even when it was filed within 13 the six month period, because the moving party was aware of default and failed to take action 14 for over five months). See also Union Petrochemical Corp. v. Scott, 96 Nev. 337, 339 (1980) 15 (noting that six months is the outer limit, but that "want of diligence in seeking to set aside a 16 judgment is ground enough for denial of such a motion"). 17

Preliminarily, the Court is concerned by the lack of Mr. Kozak's candor regarding the Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. On May 17, 2016, Ms. Howard filed her initial Motion to set aside the Order. In this Motion, Mr. Kozak indicated that his office properly prepared, and placed in the mail, copies of Ms. Howard's opposition. Mr. Kozak further stated that Mr. Townsend told Mr. Kozak that he had received a copy of the opposition. At the Pre-Trial hearing on May 17, 2016, the Court questioned Mr. Kozak about these statements. Ultimately, the record indicates that neither Mr. Townsend nor the Court ever received an Opposition to the In the present case, Mr. Kozak's neglect is not excusable. Not only did Mr. Kozak fail to file an
opposition or serve it on the opposing party, but he also delayed addressing the issue, and
ultimately addressed it with a questionable level of candor.

Although the court recognizes the State's general preference of resolving issues on the
merits, there is a limit to the deviations from procedural requirements that the court will tolerate.
Mr. Kozak's conduct has exceeded that limit. Therefore, Ms. Howard's Motion to Set Aside
Dismissal of Counterclaim is DENIED.

(b) <u>Summary Judgment</u>

8

Ms. Howard has also moved the Court for Summary Judgment against Mr. Hughes with
respect to his Complaint. Summary judgment is proper only when "the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
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judgment as a matter of law." N.R.C.P. 56(c). "A factual dispute is genuine when the evidence
is such that a rational trier of fact could return a verdict for the nonmoving Party." *Wood v. Safeway, Inc.*, 121 Nev. 724, 731 (2005). Summary judgment may not be granted "if a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." *Sprague v. Lucky Stores*, 109
Nev. 247, 249 (1993) (citing *Oehler v. Humana, Inc.*, 105 Nev. 348, 350 (1983)).

When deciding a summary judgment motion, all evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. *Wood*, 121 Nev. at 729. However, once a party has moved for summary judgment, the non-moving party must "set forth specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial or have summary judgment entered against him." *Sprague*, 109 Nev. at 250.

In the present case, Mr. Hughes has filed a complaint asking for the Court to determine
the parties' respective rights to a parcel of real property which they own as joint tenants. A joint

Motion to Dismiss. Nevertheless, Mr. Kozak indicated that he could provide a file stamped copy of the Opposition from his records. Mr. Kozak has yet to produce such a copy.

The question remains as to whether Ms. Howard's Motion to Set Aside Dismissal was timely. Mr. Hughes filed a Motion to Dismiss Ms. Howard's counterclaims on December 11, 2015. Ms. Howard failed to respond in a timely fashion. Thus, upon Mr. Hughes' Reply and Request for Submission, the Court entered the Order dismissing Ms. Howard's Counterclaim on January 7, 2016. Mr. Hughes filed a notice of entry regarding this Order on January 12, 2016.⁴

8 Ms. Howard took no action whatsoever regarding the Order until over five months after 9 it was entered. The most generous interpretation of the facts would lead the Court to find that Mr. Kozak prepared the Opposition in a timely manner, that his assistant placed two copies of 10 the opposition in the mail, and that the post office inexplicably lost or mis-delivered both 11 envelopes. However, Mr. Kozak's failure to take action when he received Mr. Hughes' Reply, 12 filed December 30, 2015, or the Notice of Entry, filed January 12, 2016 is inexcusable. Both of 13 these filings put Mr. Kozak on notice that no one had received the Opposition. Nevertheless. 14 Mr. Kozak waited until May 17, 2016, the day of the Pre-Trial Hearing, to raise the issue for the 15 first time. Mr. Kozak's delay in raising the issue had the potential to significantly prejudice the 16 opposing party who arrived for the Pre-Trial Hearing with the understanding that the 17 Counterclaims had been resolved.⁵ Thus, although his filing was within the six month period 18 contemplated in N.R.C.P. 60(b), his actions do not constitute a "prompt application." 19

Further, the Court further finds that Mr. Kozak's conduct rises above the level of "inadvertence" contemplated in Whise. Whise, 36 Nev. 16, see also Sherman v. Sothern Pacific Co., 31 Nev. 285, 291 (1909) (noting that the purpose of the court's discretion is to prevent injustice that arises from excusable neglect and leads to an application of form over substance).

 ⁴ There is no indication or allegation that Ms. Howard did not receive a copy of this notice of entry by mail.
 ⁵ The Court also notes that there is no mention of the counterclaims in the Plaintiff's Case Conference Report, filed March 15, 2016. This is the only case conference report in the record.

tenancy in real property may be created "by transfer from a sole owner to himself or herself and
others." Nev. Rev. Stat. 111.065(1) (2015). Once a joint tenancy is established, it may be
partitioned, at the request of a joint tenant, in accordance with Chapter 39 of the Nevada
Revised Statutes. The Court must then determine the respective interests of the parties in the
real property. See Nev. Rev. Stat. 39.080 (2015).

Where unmarried persons acquire a parcel of real property as joint tenants, the 6 apportionment should be in proportion to their respective contributions. Langevin v. York, 111 7 Nev. 1481, 1485 (1995). Ms. Howard argues that the Nevada Supreme Court has stated that 8 "there is a presumption that where cotenants unequally share in the purchase price of property, 9 'the cotenants intended to share in proportion to the amount contributed to the purchase price.'" 10 ld. (quoting Sack v. Tomlin, 110 Nev. 204, 210 (1994)).⁶ However, Langevin is distinguishable 11 from the present case because the parties not only made unequal contributions to the purchase 12 price, but the party which did not contribute to the purchase price also provided no contribution 13 14 to improvements or maintenance of the property thereafter. See 111 Nev. at 1485-86. In Sack, while the court started by looking at the contributions to the purchase price, it ultimately 15 adjusted the percentage based upon their subsequent contributions using the "Kershman 16 17 formula." Sack, 110 Nev. at 211. Specifically, the court favorably cited Kershman v. Kershman, which found that a joint tenant's share should be the percentage of their contribution to the 18 value of the property-including contributions toward improvements after the initial purchase. 19 20 192 Cal. App. 2d 23, 28-29 (1961) (cited by Sack, 110 Nev. at 210).

In the present case, Ms. Howard deeded the property to herself and Mr. Hughes as joint
tenants. Mr. Hughes alleges that Ms. Howard intended to gift him an equal share in the

23

⁶ Although the dispute in *Sack* was centered around property owned as a tenancy in common, the court in *Langevin* found the precedent applicable to property owned as a joint tenancy. *Langevin*, 111 Nev. at 1485.

property. He has minimally supported this allegation with declarations in his Affidavit.⁷ Mr. 1 2 Hughes further provided receipts indicating that he paid property taxes for the Fulkerson Property in an amount exceeding \$2,000.00.⁸ Mr. Hughes further alleges that he paid for certain 3 4 electrical work conducted on the Fulkerson Property's detached garage. He states that this 5 assertion is supported by an invoice provided in Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,⁹ Additionally, Mr. Hughes alleges that he contributed toward some of the items purchased for 6 7 the improvement for the property. Finally, Mr. Hughes alleges that he contributed to the value 8 of the property by personally completing some of the improvements.

9 Although Ms. Howard disputes the degree to which Mr. Hughes contributed to the cost
10 of improvements on the property, when viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Hughes, there
11 is an issue of material fact with respect to the parties' respective contributions.

Because Mr. Hughes has provided specific allegations regarding his financial contribution to the value of the property, and because the value of his contribution is a material fact for the court to consider in apportioning the parties' interests in a partition, Summary Judgment is not appropriate at this point. Therefore, Ms. Howard's Motion for Summary Judgment is Denied.

17 GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

18 1. Ms. Howard's Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaims is hereby DENIED.

19 2. Ms. Howard's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED.

20 IT IS SO ORDERED.

21

22

23

Dated this day of September 2016.

THOMAS L. STOCKARD DISTRICT JUDGE

⁷ See Affidavit of Shaughnan L. Hughes, filed July 20, 2016
 ⁸ See Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 3.
 ⁹ See Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 19A.

·	
1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	The undersigned, an employee of the Tenth Judicial District Court, hereby certifies that I
3	served the foregoing ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
4	JUDGMENT AND DENVING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DISMISSAL OF
5	COUNTERCLAIM on the parties, by depositing a copy thereof as shown below.
6	Justin M. Townsend, Esq.
7	Allison MacKenzie, Ltd. 402 N. Division Street
8	Carson City, NV 89703-4168
10	Charles R. Kozak, Esq. Kozak Lusiani Law, LLC
11	3100 Mill Street, Suite 115 Reno, NV 89502
12	
13	DATED this day of September, 2016.
14	ALLE BOATOM
15	Subscribed and sworn to this
16	1 day of Sentember, 2016.
17	Ala 10 lin contin
18	Deputy Court Clerk
19	
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22 23	
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EXHIBIT 3

EXHIBIT 3

Docket 72965 Document 2017-17933

1	Case No. 15-10DC-0876 Dept. I	
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3		1)
4	AM 10: 46	
5		
6	IN THE TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA	
7	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CHURCHILL	
8		
9		
10	SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES,	
11	Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT	
12	vs. <u>AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S</u>	
13	ELIZABETH C. HOWARD, an individual; and DOES I through XX, inclusive, OF COUNTED OF AND	
14	Defendants.	
15	/	
16	This matter came before the Court on ELIZABETH HOWARD's (hereinafter "Ms.	
17	Howard") Motion for Summary Judgment filed June 28, 2016, and her Motion to Set Aside	
18	Dismissal of Counterclaim, filed May 17, 2016. Ms. Howard is represented by Charles Kozak,	
19	Esq. SHAUGHNAN HUGHES (hereinafter "Mr. Hughes"), who is represented by Justin	
20	Townsend, Esq., has opposed both Motions. The Motions have been fully briefed by both	
21	parties.	
22	I. Factual and Procedural Background	
23	Mr. Hughes and Ms. Howard were involved in a romantic relationship in the years	
24	leading up to the filing of the Complaint in this case. In June of 2012, a parcel of real property	
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in Churchill County, Nevada (hereinafter "Fulkerson property"), was purchased by and
conveyed to Ms. Howard by way of Special Warranty Deed.¹ Several days later, in July of
2012, Ms. Howard conveyed the Fulkerson property by way of Quitclaim Deed to herself and
Mr. Hughes as Joint Tenants.² The parties subsequently made a number of improvements to the
property, the details of which remain in dispute. What is not disputed is that Ms. Howard paid
for a number of materials used in the improvement of the land and that Mr. Hughes paid
property taxes on the land.³

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8 Sometime around March of 2015 the relationship between the parties deteriorated. Ms.
9 Howard sought a Protection Order against Mr. Hughes from the New River Township Justice
10 Court, but was ultimately denied. Thereafter, Mr. Hughes initiated this action by filing his
11 Complaint on July 27, 2016.

In his Complaint, Mr. Hughes seeks an accounting of his interest in the Fulkerson
Property. He further seeks an order directing the sale of the Fulkerson property and an equitable
division of the proceeds thereof between the parties. On November 24, 2015, Ms. Howard filed
an Answer and Counterclaim requesting an order directing Mr. Hughes "to specifically perform
the action required to give 100% sole ownership of the property to [Ms. Howard]." Further, in
her Counterclaim, Ms. Howard alleges Fraud, Conversion, Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress, and Specific Performance; she asks for an award of damages and special damages.

On December 11, 2015, Mr. Hughes moved to dismiss Ms. Howard's Counterclaims and
strike certain allegations contained in the Counterclaim pursuant to NRCP 9(b), 12(b)(5), and
12(f). This motion remained unopposed, and on January 7, 2016 this Court entered an Order
granting the requested relief.

 ¹ See Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 5.
 ² See Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 1.
 ³ See, e.g. Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 3.

On May 17, 2016, Ms. Howard filed a Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim
 pursuant to NRCP 60(b)(1). Specifically, Mr. Kozak (Ms. Howard's Attorney) stated that the
 opposition to Mr. Hughes' Motion "perhaps due to post office mistake or being misplaced
 somewhere at the Court, ... was never filed by this Court."

Also on May 17, 2016, the court held a Pre-Trial Conference at which point the case was
scheduled for a Settlement Conference on July 29, 2016 and set for Trial on October 3, 2016 at
9:00 a.m. Ms. Howard was given until July 8, 2016 to file a supplement to her Motion to Set
Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim.

9 On June 20, 2016, Ms. Howard filed an Opposition to Motion to Dismiss; Motion to
10 Strike, however this Opposition was subsequently withdrawn on July 8, 2016. And, in its place
11 on July 8, 2016, Ms. Howard filed her "Supplement to Elizabeth Howard's Motion to Set Aside
12 Dismissal of Counterclaim Filed May 17, 2016."

Meanwhile, on June 28, 2016 Ms. Howard filed her Motion for Summary Judgment.
Both the Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim
were opposed by Mr. Hughes on July 20, 2016 and July 28, 2016, respectively, and come now
before the Court for consideration.

II. Analysis

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(a) Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim

"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." N.R.C.P. 60(b). "This is in the nature of
a remedial statute; its object [is] to relieve litigants who through some inadvertence, such as is
common to mankind, might be deprived of a hearing upon the merits through their unintentional
failure to bring themselves within a rule." *Whise v. Whise*, 36 Nev. 16, 20 (1913). Further, "the

1 court must give due consideration to the State's underlying basic policy of resolving cases on
2 their merits whenever possible." *Id.*

The Nevada Supreme Court has held "that the presence of the following factors indicates that 60(b)(1) has been satisfied: (1) a prompt application to remove the judgment; (2) the absence of an intent to delay the proceedings; (3) a lack of knowledge of procedural requirements; and (4) good faith." *Yochum v. Davis*, 98 Nev. 484, 487 (1982) (citing *Hotel Last Frontier v. Frontier Prop.*, 79 Nev. 150 (1963)).

8 When considering if a Motion is prompt, the court generally looks to Rule 60(b), stating 9 that "[t]he motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reason $(1), \ldots$ not more than 6 months after the proceeding was taken or the date that written notice of entry of the judgment 10 or order was served." N.R.C.P. 60(b). However, there are circumstances in which filings within 11 the six month period are nevertheless not prompt. See, e.g. Kahn v. Orme, 108 Nev. 510, 514 12 (1992) (finding that a filing to set aside default was not prompt even when it was filed within 13 the six month period, because the moving party was aware of default and failed to take action 14 for over five months). See also Union Petrochemical Corp. v. Scott, 96 Nev. 337, 339 (1980) 15 (noting that six months is the outer limit, but that "want of diligence in seeking to set aside a 16 judgment is ground enough for denial of such a motion"). 17

Preliminarily, the Court is concerned by the lack of Mr. Kozak's candor regarding the Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. On May 17, 2016, Ms. Howard filed her initial Motion to set aside the Order. In this Motion, Mr. Kozak indicated that his office properly prepared, and placed in the mail, copies of Ms. Howard's opposition. Mr. Kozak further stated that Mr. Townsend told Mr. Kozak that he had received a copy of the opposition. At the Pre-Trial hearing on May 17, 2016, the Court questioned Mr. Kozak about these statements. Ultimately, the record indicates that neither Mr. Townsend nor the Court ever received an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. Nevertheless, Mr. Kozak indicated that he could provide a file stamped
copy of the Opposition from his records. Mr. Kozak has yet to produce such a copy.

The question remains as to whether Ms. Howard's Motion to Set Aside Dismissal was timely. Mr. Hughes filed a Motion to Dismiss Ms. Howard's counterclaims on December 11, 2015. Ms. Howard failed to respond in a timely fashion. Thus, upon Mr. Hughes' Reply and Request for Submission, the Court entered the Order dismissing Ms. Howard's Counterclaim on January 7, 2016. Mr. Hughes filed a notice of entry regarding this Order on January 12, 2016.⁴

Ms. Howard took no action whatsoever regarding the Order until over five months after 8 it was entered. The most generous interpretation of the facts would lead the Court to find that 9 Mr. Kozak prepared the Opposition in a timely manner, that his assistant placed two copies of 10the opposition in the mail, and that the post office inexplicably lost or mis-delivered both 11 12 envelopes. However, Mr. Kozak's failure to take action when he received Mr. Hughes' Reply, filed December 30, 2015, or the Notice of Entry, filed January 12, 2016 is inexcusable. Both of 13 14 these filings put Mr. Kozak on notice that no one had received the Opposition. Nevertheless, Mr. Kozak waited until May 17, 2016, the day of the Pre-Trial Hearing, to raise the issue for the 15 first time. Mr. Kozak's delay in raising the issue had the potential to significantly prejudice the 16 opposing party who arrived for the Pre-Trial Hearing with the understanding that the 17 Counterclaims had been resolved.⁵ Thus, although his filing was within the six month period 18 19 contemplated in N.R.C.P. 60(b), his actions do not constitute a "prompt application."

Further, the Court further finds that Mr. Kozak's conduct rises above the level of "inadvertence" contemplated in *Whise*. *Whise*, 36 Nev. 16, see also Sherman v. Sothern Pacific *Co.*, 31 Nev. 285, 291 (1909) (noting that the purpose of the court's discretion is to prevent injustice that arises from excusable neglect and leads to an application of form over substance).

 ⁴ There is no indication or allegation that Ms. Howard did not receive a copy of this notice of entry by mail.
 ⁵ The Court also notes that there is no mention of the counterclaims in the Plaintiff's Case Conference Report, filed March 15, 2016. This is the only case conference report in the record.

In the present case, Mr. Kozak's neglect is not excusable. Not only did Mr. Kozak fail to file an
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 ultimately addressed it with a questionable level of candor.

Although the court recognizes the State's general preference of resolving issues on the
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Mr. Kozak's conduct has exceeded that limit. Therefore, Ms. Howard's Motion to Set Aside
Dismissal of Counterclaim is DENIED.

(b) <u>Summary Judgment</u>

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Ms. Howard has also moved the Court for Summary Judgment against Mr. Hughes with
respect to his Complaint. Summary judgment is proper only when "the pleadings, depositions,
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the parties' respective rights to a parcel of real property which they own as joint tenants. A joint

tenancy in real property may be created "by transfer from a sole owner to himself or herself and
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Where unmarried persons acquire a parcel of real property as joint tenants, the 6 apportionment should be in proportion to their respective contributions. Langevin v. York, 111 7 Nev. 1481, 1485 (1995). Ms. Howard argues that the Nevada Supreme Court has stated that 8 "there is a presumption that where cotenants unequally share in the purchase price of property, 9 'the cotenants intended to share in proportion to the amount contributed to the purchase price."" 10 Id. (quoting Sack v. Tomlin, 110 Nev. 204, 210 (1994)).⁶ However, Langevin is distinguishable 11 from the present case because the parties not only made unequal contributions to the purchase 12 price, but the party which did not contribute to the purchase price also provided no contribution 13 to improvements or maintenance of the property thereafter. See 111 Nev. at 1485-86. In Sack, 14 while the court started by looking at the contributions to the purchase price, it ultimately 15 adjusted the percentage based upon their subsequent contributions using the "Kershman 16 formula." Sack, 110 Nev. at 211. Specifically, the court favorably cited Kershman v. Kershman, 17 which found that a joint tenant's share should be the percentage of their contribution to the 18 value of the property-including contributions toward improvements after the initial purchase. 19 20 192 Cal. App. 2d 23, 28-29 (1961) (cited by Sack. 110 Nev. at 210).

In the present case, Ms. Howard deeded the property to herself and Mr. Hughes as joint
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Although Ms. Howard disputes the degree to which Mr. Hughes contributed to the cost
of improvements on the property, when viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Hughes, there
is an issue of material fact with respect to the parties' respective contributions.

Because Mr. Hughes has provided specific allegations regarding his financial contribution to the value of the property, and because the value of his contribution is a material fact for the court to consider in apportioning the parties' interests in a partition, Summary Judgment is not appropriate at this point. Therefore, Ms. Howard's Motion for Summary Judgment is Denied.

17 GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

18 1. Ms. Howard's Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaims is hereby DENIED.

2. Ms. Howard's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated this ______ day of September 2016.

THOMAS L. STOCKARD DISTRICT JUDGE

⁷ See Affidavit of Shaughnan L. Hughes, filed July 20, 2016
 ⁸ See Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 3.
 ⁹ See Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 19A.

		ŀ
1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
2	The undersigned, an employee of the Tenth Judicial District Court, hereby certifies that I	
3	served the foregoing ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY	
4	JUDGMENT AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DISMISSAL OF	
5	COUNTERCLAIM on the parties, by depositing a copy thereof as shown below.	
6 7	Justin M. Townsend, Esq.	
8	Allison MacKenzie, Ltd. 402 N. Division Street Carson City, NV 89703-4168	
9	Charles R. Kozak, Esq.	
10	Kozak Lusiani Law, LLC 3100 Mill Street, Suite 115	
11	Reno, NV 89502	
12	DATED this day of <u>September</u> , 2016.	***
13	DATED uits uay of, 2010.	
14 15	sue Sevon, Court Administrator	
15	Subscribed and sworn to this	
17	day of September, 2016.	
18	Deputy Court Clerk	
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EXHIBIT 2

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EXHIBIT 2

Docket 72965 Document 2017-17933

	¹ Case No. <u>15-10DC-0876</u> ² Dept. No. <u>I</u>
	The undersigned hereby affirms that this document does not contain the
	social security number of any person.
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5	INT THE TRANSPORT TO THE ACT OF A TAXABLE AND A STATE
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9	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CHURCHILL
10	SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES, an individual,
11	Plaintiff, <u>ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM</u>
12	
13	
14	ELIZABETH C. HOWARD, an individual; and DOES I through
15	XX, inclusive,
16	Defendants
17	
18	ELIZABETH C. HOWARD, an individual,
19	Counterclaimant,
20	vs.
21	SHAUGHAN L. HUGHES, an
22	individual; and DOES 1 through XX, inclusive,
23	<u>Counterdefendants</u> /
24 25	
25	ANSWER
20	ELIZABETH HOWARD, an individual (hereinafter "Defendant/Counterclaimant"), by
28	and through her attorney of record, Charles R. Kozak, Esq., answers SHAUGHAN L.

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1	HUGHES', an individual (hereinafter "Plaintiff/Counterdefendant"), Complaint as follows:
2	
3	Defendant are recorded as joint owners of the property described in Paragraph 1 but derive
4	Plaintiff is in fact antitlad to any interest is d
6	
7	
8	property but denies Plaintiff has any interest in said improvements;
9	Answering Paragraph 4, Defendant admits the allegations contained therein;
10	
11 12	Answering Paragraph 5, Defendant admits there was romantic involvement for a time, but was substantially less than six years.
13	
14	Answering Paragraph 6, Defendant admits the allegations contained therein;
15	Answering Paragraph 7, Defendant admits the allegations contained therein.
16	Answering Paragraph 8, Defendant admits the allegations contained therein.
17	Answering Paragraph 9, Defendant denies the allegations therein;
18	Answering Paragraph 10, Defendant admits the allegations contained therein;
19	Answering Paragraph 11, Defendant admits the allegations contained therein;
20 21	Answering Paragraph 12, Defendant admits the allegations contained therein;
22	Answering Paragraph 13, Defendant denies the allegations contained therein;
23	Answering Paragraph 14, Defendant denies the allegations contained therein;
24	Answering Paragraph 15, Defendant admits the allegations contained therein;
25	Answering Paragraph 16, Defendant admits the allegations contained therein;
26	Answering Paragraph 17, Defendant admits the allegations contained therein; and
27	Answering Paragraphs 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25, Defendant denies the
28	The room of the range april 10, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 23, Detendant denies the

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1	allegations contained therein.
2	COUNTERCLAIM
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5	
6	Fairfield, California from September 2007 until August 2008. On July 23, 2008,
7	Defendant/Counterclaimant was seriously injured on the job in San Francisco, California, and
8 9	thus is disabled from that accident.
10	2. Defendant/Counterclaimant was forced to sell precious metals and jewelry to make ends
11	meet after her worker's compensation was stalled and she was waiting for a third party personal
12	injury settlement.
13	3. Defendant/Counterclaimant met the Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, Shaughnan L. Hughes,
14	who was employed by a precious metal buying company when she sold her coins to him. At the
15	time, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant seemed very friendly and eager to help her.
17	4. Eventually a relationship developed between Defendant/Counterclaimant and
18	Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, and Defendant and they decided to move to Fallon, Nevada in
19	August of 2010, after dating for almost a year. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant requested that
20	Defendant/Counterclaimant give him all her jewelry and extra money from her worker's comp
21	-
22	check and state disability payment so they could rent a place in Fallon, Nevada.
23	5. On November 2, 2010, Defendant/Counterclaimant received \$4,489.14 as a settlement
24	for her dog bite case. Defendant/Counterclaimant used part of her settlement being \$2,500 to
25	purchase one-half interest in a 1995 Toyota 4-runner with the Plaintiff/Counterdefendant.
26	Plaintiff/Counterdefendant also insisted Defendant/Counterclaimant purchase a bed for \$1500
27 28	for Defendant/Counterclaimant and Plaintiff/Counterdefendant to sleep on since they were

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¹ || sleeping on a sponge on the floor.

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6. In April 2011, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant took a cut in pay to avoid going on the road
for his company and was reduced to answering prospective customers' questions on the phone.
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant spent most of his \$15 dollar per hour earnings on bullets, projectiles,
casings and firearms.

7 7. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant also had child support obligations for his two daughters
 8 which he resented paying.

In September 2011, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's ex-wife was going to move to Indiana 8. 10 and take Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's two daughters with her, and Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's 11 father did not want to lose contact with his granddaughters, so Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's 12 13 father hired an attorney to help Plaintiff/Counterdefendant fight for custody of his two girls. 14 Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's ex did not want to wait a year before moving, so the ex-wife called 15 Plaintiff/Counterdefendant and told him that he had ruined her life again and to come and get 16 the girls. Defendant/Counterclaimant accompanied Plaintiff/Counterdefendant to all court cases 17 involving his children, including picking up the girls and bringing them back to Fallon, to the 18 19 small two bedroom, two bath manufactured home on one acre which Plaintiff/Counterdefendant 20 and Defendant/Counterclaimant rented when they first moved.

²²
⁹. Life at home became extremely stressful as Savannah (the eldest daughter) was
²³ becoming mentally unstable. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant was ill-prepared to be around his
²⁴ children full time, and vented his frustration on the Defendant/Counterclaimant. His children
²⁵ were and are habitual liars and Plaintiff/Counterdefendant would constantly yell at
²⁶ Defendant/Counterclaimant over things his children had done. As a result,
²⁸ Defendant/Counterclaimant threatened to leave Plaintiff/Defendant.

Eventually, Defendant/Counterclaimant received her settlement check in the amount of 1 10. 2 \$156,000 on June 13, 2012. With the proceeds, Defendant/Counterclaimant purchased the 3 property located at 11633 Fulkerson Road in Fallon, Nevada. 4 Plaintiff/Counterdefendant insisted that Defendant/Counterclaimant put numerous 11. 5 improvements on the property all of which she paid for. They included a \$25,000 garage, a few 6 thousand dollars of base rock, and about 700 railroad ties for retaining walls and fence posts. 7 8 Plaintiff/Counterdefendant exerted undue influence on Defendant/Counterclaimant to 12. 9 quit claim Plaintiff/Counterdefendant on the deed to her residence five (5) days after she closed 10 the sale. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant represented that if she should die on one of her many trips 11 to her work comp doctors' appointments in San Francisco, California, that he and his children 12 13 would be out in the street, and brow beat her until she complied with his demands. 14 Plaintiff/Counterdefendant also took Defendant/Counterclaimant to an attorney in Fernley. 15 Nevada and wanted Plaintiff/Counterdefendant to make out a living will to him and his children 16 so they could inherit her things in case Defendant/Counterclaimant passed away. 17 Defendant/Counterclaimant was under a doctor's care and on heavy medication at that 13. 18 19 time due to her injuries, and does not have a clear recollection as to the circumstances 20 surrounding her execution of the quit claim deed. 21 Plaintiff/Counterdefendant began introducing Defendant/Counterclaimant as his "wife" 14. 22 to all of their friends and Defendant/Counterclaimant was very afraid because she truly couldn't 23 24 remember if they had married. 25 Plaintiff/Counterdefendant took Defendant/Counterclaimant and her mother to Virginia 15. 26 City, Nevada, in or around March of 2013, to show Defendant/Counterclaimant's mother 27 around. While there, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant showed Defendant/Counterclaimant and her 28

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1	mother "Verda" where he would like to get married to Defendant/Counterclaimant, in a little	
2	church setting in a bar in Virginia City.	
3	16. At this time, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant had demanded that Defendant/Counterclaimant	
4 5	put all her money in cash in his safe and stated that "if you die, your family will get it all and I	
6	won't be able to afford to live here. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant was constantly using	
7	intimidation, coercion and guilt tactics to convince Defendant/Counterclaimant to put her assets	
8	under his control.	
9	17. In January of 2013, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant was fired from his job. He never	
10	obtained further employment because he didn't want to take any jobs that the EDD wanted him	
11		
12	to interview for. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant never obtained further employment and	
13	Defendant/Counterclaimant was forced to pay all the bills and buy food.	
14	Defendant/Counterclaimant did so under duress; and if she complained,	
15 16	Plaintiff/Counterdefendant would yell, "I don't have a job, and you have a paycheck, you're	
17	loaded". Defendant/Counterclaimant was existing on a \$912 per month social security	
18	disability check, and Defendant/Counterclaimant's mother "Verda" was also chipping in over	
19	\$200 a month.	
20	18. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant started driving Defendant/Counterclaimant's because he	
21	totaled his own and couldn't afford to buy another one, and he complained that the Toyota was a	
22 23	gas hog and couldn't afford to put gas in it.	
24	19. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant began a campaign of terror, control and isolation over the	
25	Defendant/Counterclaimant. He berated her in front of his daughters who as a result lost	
26		
27	complete respect for Defendant/Counterclaimant. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant constantly yelled	
28	at her that she was crazy and needed to see a psychiatrist. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant never shut	
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·	1 up.
	² 20. When Defendant/Counterclaimant was on the phone with anyone,
	³ Plaintiff/Counterdefendant would drop what he was doing and come running in and stort tollains
	to Defendant/Counterclaimant and grabbing her breasts and pulling his pants down and
	spreading his butt cheeks in her face and try to hit her in the face with his penis while giggling
	and laughing in an idiotic manner. This was a daily occurrence.
4	
9	a
10	
11	s sounder elamant s mother
12	is sold to ben not notice of or years in the Day area, and to move to Fallon, Nevada by
13	repeatedly stating to her that "we will have so much fun!".
14	23. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant insisted that instead of buying a home in town, she should
16	build one on the property behind the main house because Plaintiff/Counterdefendant didn't want
17	Defendant/Counterclaimant to be going to her mother's all the time.
18	Defendant/Counterclaimant's mother "Verda" is also disabled and needs constant help and
19	that Defendant/Counterclaimant could take care of him and his children as well as her mother at
20	the same time. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant told Defendant/Counterclaimant that her job was to
21	take care of him and his children first.
22	
23	24. Defendant/Counterclaimant's mother purchased a fifth wheel to sleep in while her home
24 25	was being built on the property.
25	25. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant insisted that Defendant/Counterclaimt's mother "Verda" keep
27	all her cash in his safe and stole thousands of dollars from her. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
28	incurred unauthorized expenses purportedly for her home so that she was unable to complete

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¹ || her home.

2 After Plaintiff/Counterdefendant had depleted all of Defendant/Counterclaimant and her 26. 3 mother's assets, he did not feel the need to be civil to them. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant never 4 mentioned getting married again; and if Defendant/Counterclaimant brought it up, 5 Plaintiff/Counterdefendant would say, "why would you want to get married to someone that 6 7 isn't working?", then Plaintiff/Counterdefendant would say "I consider us married". 8 Plaintiff/Counterdefendant became very distant and angry and found fault with 27. 9 everything Defendant/Counterplaintiff did. On November 1, 2013, Defendant/Counterclaimant 10 was cut off from all medical help as worker's comp insisted Defendant/Counterclaimant could 11 pay for her own medical through Medicare, and Defendant/Counterclaimant went into severe 12 13 withdrawals. 14 In August of 2014, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, Defendant/Counterclaimant and the kids 28. 15 were in the car coming from Fernley, and Plaintiff/Counterdefendant decided to start berating 16 Defendant/Counterclaimant in the car in front of his kids until he had 17 Defendant/Counterclaimant in tears. Upon arriving at home, Defendant/Counterclaimant got 18 19 out of the car, walked up to the trees they planted a few months earlier and was crying, when 20 Plaintiff/Counterdefendant decided to come up and start ridiculing Defendant/Counterclaimant 21 for no reason until Defendant/Counterclaimant told him she was tired of watching 22 Plaintiff/Counterdefendant wrestle with his two teenagers and putting his hands where they 23 don't belong right in front of Defendant/Counterclaimant's mother and company. Afterwards, 24 25 Plaintiff/Counterdefendant stepped back and blasted Defendant/Counterclaimant with calling 26 him a pedophile, at which time Defendant/Counterclaimant said "it doesn't look right!", and 27 Plaintiff/Counterdefendant started yelling at Defendant/Counterclaimant telling her that "why 28

:	doesn't she just hurry up and die and leave them alone, and then he started running back to the
2	house yelling at his daughters "did you see that, she's gonna kill me, she's gonna kill us!, over
3	and over, screaming like a girl, yelling for them to call 911 Plaintiff/Counterdefent
4	the house and hid haking this 12 and 11 the sure of the second
6	
7	
8	over Defendant/Counterclaimant. Defendant/Counterclaimant's mother had just left that
9	
10	morning to stay with Defendant/Counterclaimant's youngest sister in La Pine Oregon, and wasn't there to be a witness.
11 12	
12	and the method of the method o
14	Defendant/Counterclaimant in her own home by constantly berating her in front of his teenage
15	daughters and was intent on getting rid of Defendant/Counterclaimant and her mother at all
16	costs. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's father even confronted Defendant/Counterclaimant at her
17	home in 2015 demanding that Defendant/Counterclaimant put her mother in a rest home, at
18	which time Defendant/Counterclaimant told Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's father that her mother
19	"Verda" wasn't sick enough to be put in a rest home and what did he want her to do, throw her
20 21	mother into the street? After that, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's father "John" yelled "YES!",
22	because he wanted to move into her home.
23	30. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant paid no bills or expenses with the exception of the property
24	taxes and guns and ammo for his business since January 2013. Defendant/Counterclaimant
25	applied for and received a food stamp card because Plaintiff/Counterdefendant would not do it
26	and complained that he wasn't going to sit in that office with all those low lives. So
27	Defendant/Counterclaimant sat in there and was able to get a food card for the four of them, and
20	and was able to get a lood card for the four of them, and

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1	when Defendant/Counterclaimant got home and Plaintiff/Counterdefendant found out that
2	
3	Defendant/Counterclaimant and wouldn't let her have it back, proclaiming that he was better at
4	
5	buying food than her. All Plaintiff/Counterdefendant bought was breakfast food telling
6	Defendant/Counterclaimant that if she wanted dinner stuff, then she could buy it with her own
7	money.
8 9	31. In December of 2014, Defendant/Counterclaimant had helped her mother sell the fifth
10	wheel since now Defendant/Counterclaimant's mother was able to move into the home that was
11	built and Plaintiff/Counterdefendant was helping Defendant/Counterclaimant to flush the septic
12	out, but Defendant/Counterclaimant had a very bad dizzy spell and woke up on the dirt by the
13	fifth wheel, and Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's daughters were kneeling beside
14 15	Defendant/Counterclaimant and when Defendant/Counterclaimant saw
15	Plaintiff/Counterdendant, he was standing about 6-7 feet behind his daughters and said in a very
17	nasty tone to Defendant/Counterclaimant "do you need an ambulance?", but
18	Defendant/Counterclaimant doesn't remember answering him. The
19	Plaintiff/Counterdfefendant's two daughters stood Defendant/Counterclaimant up and walked
20 21	her to the house. When Defendant/Counterclaimant said she thought she broke her nose,
22	Plaintiff/Counterdefendant was caustic and told her that nothing was wrong with her, and
23	Defendant/Counterclaimant had to beg Plaintiff/Counterdefendant to take her to the ER, which
24	made Plaintiff/Counterdefendant mad. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant dumped
25	Defendant/Counterclaimant off at Banner Hospital and told Defendant/Counterclaimant to call
26	him when she was done, that he was going to take his daughter (Savannah) shopping, and
27	
28	Plaintiff/Counterdefendant and his daughter sped off. Defendant/Counterclaimant was taken by

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ambulance to Renown and kept for a week at which time Defendant/Counterclaimant had a 1 2 discectomy and fusion on her C-5 and 6. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant never called her to see how 3 she was and only came by once at Defendant/Counterclaimant's request to bring her some 4 toiletries. 5 6 COUNT I 7 FRAUD 8 Defendant/Counterclaimant re-alleges and reincorporates each and every allegation 32. 9 contained in Paragraphs 1 through 31 inclusive, as set forth in full herein. 10 Plaintiff/Counterdefendant exerted undue influence on Defendant/Counterclaimant to 33. 11 quit claim Plaintiff/Counterdefendant on the deed to her residence five (5) days after she closed 12 13 the sale. 14 Defendant/Counterclaimant has suffered damages as a proximate result of 34. 15 Plaintiff's/Counterdefendant's actions because she has been deprived of a peaceful and safe 16 place for her and her relatives to reside. 17 18 COUNT II 19 CONVERSION 20 Defendant/Counterclaimant re-alleges and reincorporates each and every allegation 35. 21 contained in Paragraphs 1 through 34 inclusive, as set forth in full herein. 22 Plaintiff/Counterdefendant knew that certain income and medical/disability payments 36. 23 24 were for exclusively for Defendant/Counterclaimant. 25 Plaintiff/Counterdefendant also knew that the cash and monies of "Verda" belonged to 37. 26 her and that he knowingly stole her money by manipulating her to put it in his safe. 27 38. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant knowingly took the food stamp benefits of 28

1 Defendant/Counterclaimant for his use and benefit. 2 **COUNT III** 3 INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 4 Defendant/Counterclaimant re-alleges and reincorporates each and every allegation 39. 5 contained in Paragraphs 1 through 38 inclusive, as set forth in full herein. 6 7 For a period from 2010 to the present, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant has carried out a 40. 8 carefully executed plan of inflicting emotional stress upon the Defendant/Counterclaimant. 9 This conduct constituted berating and belittling the Defendant/Counterclaimant in front 41. 10 of others. 11 As a direct result of this repeated behavior, Defendant/Counterclaimant was forced to 42. 12 13 seek medical attention which resulted in hospitalization. 14 Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's threatening and wrongful behavior resulted in abusive 43. 15 mental anguish and anguish to the Defendant/Counterclaimant, and such was the 16 Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's malicious intent. 17 18 **COUNT IV** 19 SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 20 44. Defendant/Counterclaimant re-alleges and reincorporates each and every allegation 21 contained in Paragraphs 1 through 43 inclusive, as set forth in full herein. 22 Defendant/Counterclaimant should not be placed in the position of having to partition 45. 23 24 the Property and to sell the property as the Plaintiff/Counterdefendant has no legal equitable 25 investment in the property. 26 The only adequate remedy is have the Court Order the Plaintiff/Counterdefendent to 46. 27 execute the proper documents for Defendant/Counterclaimant to have sole ownership of the 28

1	property.

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2		WHEREFORE, Defendant/Counterclaimant ELIZABETH C. HOWARD, by and	
3	through her Attorney of Record, CHARLES R. KOZAK, ESQ. of KOZAK LAW FIRM, prays		
4	that the Court:		
6	1.	Award her damages in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars (\$10,000.00):	
7	2.		
8		1 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	
9	3.	Award her special damages according to proof in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars	
10		(\$10,000.00);	
ıi	4.	Award her reasonable attorney's fees in excess of Five Thousand Dollars (\$5,000.00);	
12		and	
13	5.	Issue an Order requiring the SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES to specifically perform the	
14		action required to give 100% sole ownership of the property to ELIZABETH C.	
15		HOWARD.	
16		nowned.	
17			
18	DATE	D this 20 day of November 2015.	
19		Charle M/ligaz	
20		CHARLES R. KOZAK, ESQ.	
21		KOZAK LAW FIRM Nevada State Bar #11179	
22		3100 Mill Street, Suite 115 Reno, Nevada 89502	
24		Phone (775) 322-1239	
25		Facsimile (775) 800-1767 <u>chuck@kozaklawfirm.com</u>	
26		Attorney for Elizabeth C. Howard	
27			
28			
		. 13	
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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I certify that I am an employee working for Kozak Law Firm and am a citizen of the
3 4	
÷ 5	United States, over twenty-one years of age, and not a party to the within action. My business
6	address is 3100 Mill Street, Suite 115, Reno, Nevada 89502.
7	On the 20th day of November 2015, I caused to be delivered via facsimile and U.S.
8	Mail, postage fully prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document: ANSWER
9	AND COUNTERCLAIM, in Case No. 15-10DC-0876, Dept. I, to the following party(ies):
10	
11	Justin M. Townsend, Esq. Allison MacKenzie, Ltd.
12	Nevada State Bar No. 12293 402 N. Division Street
13	P. O. Box 646
14	Carson City, Nevada 89702 Phone (775) 687-0202
15	Facsimile (775) 882-7918 Attorney for Plaintiff
16	
17 18	DATED this 26th day of November 2015.
19	
20	Man Adams
21	Employee of Kozak Law Firm
22	
23	
24	
25	
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EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 1

Docket 72965 Document 2017-17933

· · · -					
· · · · · ·					
	1	Case No. 15-1000-0876 FILED Dept. No. 1 7015 111 27 DM 2: 1.9			
	2	Dept. No 2015 JUL 27 PM 2: 48			
	3	The undersigned hereby affirms that			
	4	this document does not contain the SUE SEVON social security number of any person.			
		BY Step of A DEPOTY			
	5	JUSTIN M. TOWNSEND, Esq.			
	6				
	7	IN THE TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA			
	8	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CHURCHILL			
	9				
	10	SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES, an individual,			
32	11				
, LTD. Carson City, NV 89702 (775) 882-7918 ackenzie.com	12	Plaintiff,			
y, NV 7918 m	13	vs. <u>COMPLAINT</u> (Exempt from arbitration)			
IZIE, LTD. 646, Carson City, NV Fax: (775) 882-7918 onmackenzie.com	14	ELIZABETH C. HOWARD, an individual; and DOES I through			
, LTD. Carsol (775) ackenz	15	XX, inclusive.			
		Defendants.			
ALLISON MacKENZIE, on Street, P.O. Box 646, (e: (775) 687-0202 Fax: Address: law@allisonme	16				
N MacKI I, P.O. Bo 687-0202 s: law@al	17	COMES NOW, Plaintiff, SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES, by and through his counsel,			
LLISC Street (775) ddress	18	ALLISON MacKENZIE, LTD., and hereby complains and alleges against Defendants as follows:			
ALLISON MacKENZIE, LTD. Division Street, P.O. Box 646, Carson City, lephone: (775) 687-0202 Fax: (775) 882-79 E-Mail Address: law@allisonmackenzie.com	19	GENERAL ALLEGATIONS			
ALLISO th Division Street Telephone: (775) E-Mail Address	20	1. Plaintiff and Defendant, ELIZABETH C. HOWARD, own, in joint tenancy,			
ALLISON MacKENZIE 402 North Division Street, P.O. Box 646, Telephone: (775) 687-0202 Fax: E-Mail Address: law@allisonrr	21	an undivided one hundred percent (100%) interest in and to that certain real property situated in			
40	22	Churchill County, State of Nevada, commonly referred to as 11633 Fulkerson Road, Fallon, Nevada			
	23	89406 (the "Property") and more particularly described as follows:			
	24	PARCEL 2 AS SHOWN ON THE PARCEL MAP FOR AMMERCON ENTERPRISES, RECORDED IN THE OFFICE OF THE CHURCHILL			
	25	COUNTY RECORDER'S OFFICE ON DECEMBER 28 TH , 2000 AS FILE NO. 333468, OFFICIAL RECORDS.			
	26	FILE NO. 555400, OFFICIAL RECORDS.			
	27	2. There may exist additional Defendants, whose true names and capacities,			
	28	whether individual, corporate, associate, or otherwise are unknown to Plaintiff, and are therefore			

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sued by fictitious names, DOES I through XX, inclusive. Plaintiff will seek leave of this Court to 1 amend this Complaint if and when the true identities of these Defendants become known to Plaintiff. 2 Plaintiff is informed and believes and alleges that each of Defendants, DOES I through XX, inclusive, may have cognizable interests in the Property.

The Property consists of approximately 11.09 acres upon which exist several 3. improvements including but not limited to a single family residence, a hangar, other buildings and certain improvements erected by Plaintiff at significant cost, in terms of time and money, to Plaintiff.

4. Plaintiff is informed and believes that there are no liens or interests in the Property other than the joint tenancy interests of Plaintiff and Defendant.

The Property was deeded to Plaintiff and Defendant as joint tenants by 5. quitclaim deed recorded in the official records of Churchill County on July 11, 2012 as Document No. 428132.

6. Plaintiff and Defendant were romantically involved for a period of approximately six (6) years until March 2015.

On or about March 16, 2015, Defendant filed an application for protective 7. order.

8. A hearing was held on Defendant's application for protective order on March 23, 2015 at which time New River Township Justice of the Peace, Michael D. Richards, denied Defendant's application and ordered her to allow Plaintiff access to the Property to retrieve his belongings.

9. On April 3, 2015, Plaintiff, accompanied by a Churchill County Sheriff's 21 Deputy, went to the Property to retrieve his personal belongings, but was denied access to the 22 Property by Defendant. 23

10. Defendant has added a padlock to the entry gate to the Property such that 24 Plaintiff is denied access to the Property. 25

11. On May 3, 2015, with the assistance of the Churchill County Sheriff's Office, 26 Plaintiff was able to retrieve his personal belongings from the Property. 27

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	1	23. Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment quantifying the parties' interests in the
	2	Property and ordering a sale thereof on terms equitable to the parties.
	3	24. This matter is exempt from the District Court Arbitration Program under NRS
	4	Chapter 38 as Plaintiff is seeking equitable relief.
	5	25. Plaintiff has been forced to incur fees and costs in pursuit of this action, for
	6	which it is entitled to recover pursuant to NRS 39.170.
	7	WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES, prays for judgment as
	8	follows:
	9	1. For entry of judgment identifying the parties' respective interests and shares
	10	in the Property;
702	11	2. For entry of judgment ordering partition of the Property by sale on terms
4V 89 18	12	equitable to the parties;
City, 1 32-791	13	3. For attorneys' fees and costs of suit;
LTD. Carson (775) 88 ckenzie	14	4. For such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
	15	DATED this 27 th day of July, 2015.
N MacKENZIE, , P.U. Box 646, (687-0202 Fax: : law@allisonme	16	ALLISON MacKENZIE, LTD.
N MacKH , P.O. Bo 687-0202 s: law@al	17	7-70
ALLISO on Street e: (775) Address	18	By: FUSTIN M. TOWNSEND, ESQ. Nevada State Bar No. 12293
ALLISO th Division Street Telephone: (775) E-Mail Address	19	402 N. Division St.
Telep E-h	20	PO Box 646 Carson City, NV 89702
ALLISO 402 North Division Street Telephone: (775) E-Mail Address	21	
4	22	Attorneys for Plaintiff, SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES
	23	
	24	4841-6064-2854, v. 2
	25	4841-0004-2834, V. 2
	26	
	27	
	28	
		4

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

INDICATE FULL CAPTION:

ELIZABETH C. HOWARD, an individual,

Appellant,

vs.

SHAUGNHAN L. HUGHES,

Respondent.

No.	72965	Electronically Filed May 30 2017 11:30 a.m.
	DOCKET	Elizabeth A. Brown
	CIV	IL APPEALS

GENERAL INFORMATION

+

Appellants must complete this docketing statement in compliance with NRAP 14(a). The purpose of the docketing statement is to assist the Supreme Court in screening jurisdiction, identifying issues on appeal, assessing presumptive assignment to the Court of Appeals under NRAP 17, scheduling cases for oral argument and settlement conferences, classifying cases for expedited treatment and assignment to the Court of Appeals, and compiling statistical information.

WARNING

This statement must be completed fully, accurately and on time. NRAP 14(c). The Supreme Court may impose sanctions on counsel or appellant if it appears that the information provided is incomplete or inaccurate. *Id.* Failure to fill out the statement completely or to file it in a timely manner constitutes grounds for the imposition of sanctions, including a fine and/or dismissal of the appeal.

A complete list of the documents that must be attached appears as Question 27 on this docketing statement. Failure to attach all required documents will result in the delay of your appeal and may result in the imposition of sanctions.

This court has noted that when attorneys do not take seriously their obligations under NRAP 14 to complete the docketing statement properly and conscientiously, they waste the valuable judicial resources of this court, making the imposition of sanctions appropriate. *See* <u>KDI Sylvan</u> <u>Pools v. Workman</u>, 107 Nev. 340, 344, 810 P.2d 1217, 1220 (1991). Please use tab dividers to separate any attached documents.

1. Judicial District 10th	Department I
County Churchhill	Judge Thomas L. Stockard
District Ct. Case No. <u>15-10DC-0876</u>	
a Attainer filing this destrating statemen	*•
2. Attorney filing this docketing statemen	
Attorney Charles R. Kozak, Esq.	Telephone <u>775-322-1239</u>
Firm Kozak Lusiani Law, LLC	
Address 3100 Mill Street, Suite 115 Reno, Nevada 89502	
Heno, Nevada 00001	
Client(s) ELIZABETH C. HOWARD	
If this is a joint statement by multiple appellants, add t the names of their clients on an additional sheet accomp filing of this statement.	he names and addresses of other counsel and panied by a certification that they concur in the
3. Attorney(s) representing respondents(s	s):
Attorney Justin M. Townsend, Esq.	Telephone <u>775-687-0202</u>
Firm Allison MacKenzie, Ltd.	
Address 402 N. Division Street	
PO Box 646 Carson City, Nevada 89702	
Client(s) SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES	
Attorney	Telephone
Firm	
Address	

Client(s)

4. Nature of disposition below (check all that apply):

🖂 Judgment after bench trial	🗌 Dismissal:	
🗌 Judgment after jury verdict	🗌 Lack of jurisdic	tion
🗌 Summary judgment	🗖 Failure to state	a claim
🗌 Default judgment	🗌 Failure to prose	ecute
□ Grant/Denial of NRCP 60(b) relief	□ Other (specify):	
□ Grant/Denial of injunction	Divorce Decree:	
□ Grant/Denial of declaratory relief	🗌 Original	\Box Modification
\square Review of agency determination	\Box Other disposition ((specify):

5. Does this appeal raise issues concerning any of the following?

□ Child Custody

🗌 Venue

□ Termination of parental rights

6. Pending and prior proceedings in this court. List the case name and docket number of all appeals or original proceedings presently or previously pending before this court which are related to this appeal:

Howard v. Hughes Case No. 72879

7. Pending and prior proceedings in other courts. List the case name, number and court of all pending and prior proceedings in other courts which are related to this appeal (*e.g.*, bankruptcy, consolidated or bifurcated proceedings) and their dates of disposition: SHAUGHNAN L. HUGHES v. ELIZABETH C. HOWARD, 15-10DC-0876, Tenth Judicial District Court for the County of Churchill, February 6, 2017.

8. Nature of the action. Briefly describe the nature of the action and the result below:

On March 1, 2017, this Court entered an Order Granting and Part and Denying in Part Motion for Sanctions. The Court denied Mr. Hughes' Motion for Order to Show Cause and Mr. Hughes' Motion for Sanctions as it pertained to Ms. Howard's Motion for Summary Judgment and her originally pled counter claims. The Motion for Sanctions was only granted as it relates to two areas, belated filing of a Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Courntclaim and supplemental filings and failure to file and Early Case conference report. On March 1, 2017 the Court issued its Order in Part Granting Sanctions in the amount of \$16,500.00 for the above two listed issues. Appellant asks the court to review this award based on the basis that Mr. Hughes failed to comply with the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11, Safe Harbor provisions prior to filing the Motion for Sanctions, that the filing of the Motion to Set Aside was timely and that Ms. Howard's counsel Case Conference Report and Initial Disclosure were provided to the Court and opposing counsel by May 17, 2017, according to Plaintiff's Motion so that Mr. Hughes was not disadvantaged.

9. Issues on appeal. State concisely the principal issue(s) in this appeal (attach separate sheets as necessary):

1. Service of the Case Conference Report did not delay in Discovery or disadvantage Respondent.

2. Failure to comply with the Safe Harbor Provision of NRCP 11 warrants denial of Respondent's Motion for Sanctions.

10. Pending proceedings in this court raising the same or similar issues. If you are aware of any proceedings presently pending before this court which raises the same or similar issues raised in this appeal, list the case name and docket numbers and identify the same or similar issue raised: **11. Constitutional issues.** If this appeal challenges the constitutionality of a statute, and the state, any state agency, or any officer or employee thereof is not a party to this appeal, have you notified the clerk of this court and the attorney general in accordance with NRAP 44 and NRS 30.130?

🛛 N/A

🗆 Yes

🗆 No

If not, explain:

12. Other issues. Does this appeal involve any of the following issues?

□ Reversal of well-settled Nevada precedent (identify the case(s))

An issue arising under the United States and/or Nevada Constitutions

 \Box A substantial issue of first impression

 \Box An issue of public policy

 \Box An issue where en banc consideration is necessary to maintain uniformity of this court's decisions

□ A ballot question

If so, explain:

13. Assignment to the Court of Appeals or retention in the Supreme Court. Briefly set forth whether the matter is presumptively retained by the Supreme Court or assigned to the Court of Appeals under NRAP 17, and cite the subparagraph(s) of the Rule under which the matter falls. If appellant believes that the Supreme Court should retain the case despite its presumptive assignment to the Court of Appeals, identify the specific issue(s) or circumstance(s) that warrant retaining the case, and include an explanation of their importance or significance:

This case should be retained by the Supreme Court as the proceedings invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court pursuant to NRAP 17(a)(1).

14. Trial. If this action proceeded to trial, how many days did the trial last? 1

Was it a bench or jury trial? Bench Trial

15. Judicial Disqualification. Do you intend to file a motion to disqualify or have a justice recuse him/herself from participation in this appeal? If so, which Justice? N/A.

TIMELINESS OF NOTICE OF APPEAL

16. Date of entry of written judgment or order appealed from April 24, 2017

If no written judgment or order was filed in the district court, explain the basis for seeking appellate review:

17. Date written notice of entry of judgment or order was served April 25, 2017

Was service by:

Delivery

🛛 Mail/electronic/fax

18. If the time for filing the notice of appeal was tolled by a post-judgment motion (NRCP 50(b), 52(b), or 59)

(a) Specify the type of motion, the date and method of service of the motion, and the date of filing.

□ NRCP 50(b)	Date of filing	
□ NRCP 52(b)	Date of filing	

□ NRCP 59 Date of filing

NOTE: Motions made pursuant to NRCP 60 or motions for rehearing or reconsideration may toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. *See <u>AA Primo Builders v. Washington</u>, 126 Nev. ____, 245 P.3d 1190 (2010).*

(b) Date of entry of written order resolving tolling motion

(c) Date written notice of entry of order resolving tolling motion was served

Was service by:

Delivery

🗌 Mail

19. Date notice of appeal filed May 8, 2017

If more than one party has appealed from the judgment or order, list the date each notice of appeal was filed and identify by name the party filing the notice of appeal:

20. Specify statute or rule governing the time limit for filing the notice of appeal, *e.g.*, NRAP 4(a) or other

NRAP 4(a)(1)

SUBSTANTIVE APPEALABILITY

21. Specify the statute or other authority granting this court jurisdiction to review the judgment or order appealed from:

(a)

🖾 NRAP 3A(b)(1)	□ NRS 38.205	
□ NRAP 3A(b)(2)	⊠ NRS 233B.150	
□ NRAP 3A(b)(3)	□ NRS 703.376	
\Box Other (specify)		

(b) Explain how each authority provides a basis for appeal from the judgment or order:

NRAP 3A(b)(1) Provides that an appeal my be taken from the judgment when the final judgment entered in an action or proceeding commenced in the court in which the judgment is rendered.

NRS 233B.150 Provides that an aggrieved party may obtain a review of any final judgment of the district court by appeal to the appellate court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to the rules fixed by the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 4 of Article 6 of the Nevada Constitution. The appeal shall be taken as in other civil cases. 22. List all parties involved in the action or consolidated actions in the district court: (a) Parties:

Elizabeth C. Howard and Shaughnan L. Hughes

(b) If all parties in the district court are not parties to this appeal, explain in detail why those parties are not involved in this appeal, *e.g.*, formally dismissed, not served, or other:

23. Give a brief description (3 to 5 words) of each party's separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, or third-party claims and the date of formal disposition of each claim.

Appellant asserts that Respondent failed to adhere to the Safe Harbor Provision of NRCP 11 and that the amount of sanctions exceed reasonable fees and costs. Respondent feels that delays warrant sanctions.

24. Did the judgment or order appealed from adjudicate ALL the claims alleged below and the rights and liabilities of ALL the parties to the action or consolidated actions below?

🛛 Yes

🗆 No

25. If you answered "No" to question 24, complete the following:

(a) Specify the claims remaining pending below:

(b) Specify the parties remaining below:

(c) Did the district court certify the judgment or order appealed from as a final judgment pursuant to NRCP 54(b)?

🗌 Yes

🛛 No

(d) Did the district court make an express determination, pursuant to NRCP 54(b), that there is no just reason for delay and an express direction for the entry of judgment?

🗌 Yes

🛛 No

26. If you answered "No" to any part of question 25, explain the basis for seeking appellate review (e.g., order is independently appealable under NRAP 3A(b)): Order is independently appealable under NRAP 3A(b).

27. Attach file-stamped copies of the following documents:

- The latest-filed complaint, counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party claims
- Any tolling motion(s) and order(s) resolving tolling motion(s)
- Orders of NRCP 41(a) dismissals formally resolving each claim, counterclaims, crossclaims and/or third-party claims asserted in the action or consolidated action below, even if not at issue on appeal
- Any other order challenged on appeal
- Notices of entry for each attached order

VERIFICATION

I declare under penalty of perjury that I have read this docketing statement, that the information provided in this docketing statement is true and complete to the best of my knowledge, information and belief, and that I have attached all required documents to this docketing statement.

ELIZABETH C. HOWARD Name of appellant

CHARLES R. KOZAK Name of counsel of record

Signature of counsel of record

May 30, 2017 Date

Nevada, County of Washoe State and county where signed

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the 30 day of May ,<u>2017</u>, I served a copy of this

completed docketing statement upon all counsel of record:

□ By personally serving it upon him/her; or

🛛 By mailing it by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address(es): (NOTE: If all names and addresses cannot fit below, please list names below and attach a separate sheet with the addresses.)

Justin Townsend, Esq. Allison MacKenzie, Ltd. PO Box 646 Carson City, Nevada 89703-4168 Attorney for Respondent

Jonathan L. Andrews 14300 Poleline Road Reno, Nevada 89511 Settlement Judge

Dated this 30

day of May

2017

Wara Some

Exhibit No.	Document	No. Pages
1	Complaint	4
2	Answer and Counterclaim	15
3	Order Denying Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Dismissal of Counterclaim	10
4	Notice of Entry of Order	14
5	Order After February 6, 2017 Hearing	15
6	Notice of Entry of Order	18
7	Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Sanctions	11
8	Notice of Entry of Order	14
9	Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration	5
10	Notice of Entry of Order Regarding Amount of Sanctions and Order regarding Amount of Sanctions	8

EXHIBIT LIST