IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

TRUDI LEE LYTLE; AND JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, AS TRUSTEES OF THE LYTLE TRUST,

Appellant,

v.

MARJORIE B. BOULDEN, TRUSTEE OF THE MARJORIE B. BOULDEN TRUST; LINDA LAMOTHE; AND JACQUES LAMOTHE, TRUSTEES OF THE JACQUES & LINDA LAMOTHE LIVING TRUST,

Respondents.

Supreme Court No.: 73039
District Court Case No.: A16,7478,00,C
Jan 24 2018 02:13 p.m.
Elizabeth A. Brown
Clerk of Supreme Court

APPEAL

FROM THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, CLARK COUNTY THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY WILLIAMS, JUDGE DISTRICT COURT CASE NO. A-16-747800-C

APPELLANT'S APPENDIX VOLUME 3

RICHARD E. HASKIN, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 11592

GIBBS, GIDEN, LOCHER, TURNER, SENET & WITTBRODT LLP

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Las Vegas, Nevada 89144

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- 5. Notice of Entry of Order Granting Motion to Alter or Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (AA000548 AA000556)

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MRCN 1 Richard E. Haskin, Esq. Nevada State Bar # 11592 2 Timothy P. Elson, Esq. Nevada State Bar # 11559 3 GIBBS GIDEN LOCHER TURNER SENET & WITTBRODT LLP 1140 N. Town Center Drive, Suite 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144-0596 5 Telephone: (702) 836-9800 Facsimile: (702) 836-9802 6 E-Mail: rhaskin@gibbsgiden.com 7 Attorneys for Defendants TRUDI LEE LYTLE, JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, 8 & THE LYTLE TRUST 9 10 11 12 DISTRICT COURT 13 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 14 15 A-16-747800-C Case No.: MARJORIE B. BOULDEN, TRUSTEE OF THE Dept.: XVI 16 MARJORIE B. BOULDEN TRUST, LINDA LAMOTHE AND JACQUES LAMOTHE, DEFENDANTS TRUDI LEE LYTLE, TRUSTEES OF THE JACQUES & LINDA 17 JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, AND THE LYTLE LAMOTHE LIVING TRUST TRUST'S MOTION FOR 18 RECONSIDERATION OR, IN THE Plaintiff, ALTERNATIVE, MOTION TO ALTER OR 19 AMEND JUDGMENT 20 TRUDI LEE LYTLE, JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, THE LYTLE TRUST, DOES I through X, [EDCR 2.24(b); NRCP 60(b)(1);21 inclusive, and ROE CORPORATIONS I through NRCP 59(e)] 22 Defendants. 23 Pursuant to EDCR 2.24(b), NRCP 60(b), and/or NRCP 59(e) Defendants TRUDI LEE 24 LYTLE, JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, and THE LYTLE TRUST (the "Lytles") move this court for an 25 order reconsidering and modifying its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting 26 Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (the "Order") to deny the Plaintiffs' motion with 27 respect to Marjorie Boulden's claim for slander of title. The Lytles base this motion on the 28

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AA000380

1	following memorandum of points and authorities, the exhibits thereto, and any oral argument this
2	Court may entertain.
3 4	DATED: May 15, 2017 GIBBS GIDEN LOCHER TURNER SENET & WITTBRODT-LLP
5	
6	Ву:
7	Richard F. Haskin, Esq. Nevada State Bar # 11592
8	Timothy Elson, Esq. Nevada State Bar # 11559 1140 N. Town Center Drive, Suite 300
9	Las Vegas, Nevada 89144-0596 Attorneys for Defendants TRUDI LEE LYTLE, JOHN ALLEN
10	LYTLE, & THE LYTLE TRUST
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14	NOTICE OF MOTION
15	TAKE NOTICE that the Lytles will bring the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration or, in
16	the Alternative, Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment before the above-captioned Court on the 15
17	day of JUNE, 2017 at 9:00A
18	DATED: May 15, 2017 GIBBS GIDEN LOCHER TURNER SENET & WITTBRODT LLP
19	
20	Ву:
21	Richard E. Haskin, Esq. Neyada State Bar # 11592
22	Timothy Elson, Esq. Nevada State Bar # 11559
3	1140 N. Town Center Drive, Suite 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144-0596
24	Attorneys for Defendants TRUDI LEE LYTLE, JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, & THE LYTLE TRUST
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

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After many years of litigation, the Lytles finally prevailed in their dispute with the Rosemere Estates Property Owners' Association (the "Association"). As a result, the Lytles were awarded judgment against the Association for their attorneys' fees and costs. In connection with their efforts to enforce the judgment, with the advice and assistance of counsel, the Lytles recorded abstracts of judgment against the units of the Association. The Plaintiffs then commenced the instant action challenging the validity and legal effect of the abstracts of judgment. In ruling on the parties' competing motions for partial summary judgment, this Court concluded as a matter of law that the Lytles could not claim a lien against the Plaintiffs' respective properties in connection with the judgment. Based on this conclusion, the Court entered summary judgment in the Plaintiffs' favor on all claims, including Marjorie Boulden's claim for slander of title. However, the Court's legal conclusion that the Lytles' did not have a right to record the abstracts of judgment against the property does not, on its own, support a determination that the Lytles committed slander of title. Malice is an essential element of the claim, and there is no evidence in the record showing the Lytles acted maliciously. Accordingly, the Lytles respectfully request that the Court amend the Order to deny the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with respect to Boulden's claim for slander of title.

II. ARGUMENT

A. <u>Legal Standards</u>

EDCR 2.24(b) permits a party, upon leave of the court, to seek reconsideration of a prior motion after being served with notice of the order on that motion. A district court is empowered to reconsider a motion any time before entry of final judgment when it finds that a prior ruling was clearly erroneous. See Masonry & Tile Contractors Ass'n of S. Nev. v. Jolley, Urga & Wirth, Ltd., 113 Nev. 737, 741, 941 P.2d 486, 489 (1997); Insurance Co. of the West v. Gibson Title Co., Inc., 122 Nev. 455, 466, 134 P.3d 698, 705 (2006) (Maupin, J. concurring). Whether to grant reconsideration is within the sound discretion of the district court. See Moore v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 402, 405, 551 P.2d 244, 246 (1976).

Similarly, under NRCP 60(b), the court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding based on, among other things, mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. See NRCP 60(b)(1).

In addition, to the extent that the Order is an appealable order or final judgment, NRCP 59(e) also allows for a motion to alter or amend.

B. Boulden is not entitled to summary judgment on her claim for slander of title, as there is no evidence of malice.

To prevail on her claim for slander of title, Marjorie Boulden ("Boulden") must establish that the Lytles falsely and maliciously recorded the abstract of judgment against Boulden's property, and in so doing disparaged Boulden's title to the property and caused special damages. See Higgins v. Higgins, 103 Nev. 443, 445, 744 P.2d 530, 531 (1987). "In order to prove malice it must be shown that the defendant knew that the statement was false or acted in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. Where a defendant has reasonable grounds for belief in his claim, he has not acted with malice. Additionally, evidence of a defendant's reliance on the advice of counsel tends to negate evidence of malice." See Rowland v. Lepire, 99 Nev. 308, 313, 662 P.2d 1332, 1335 (1983) (internal citations omitted).

In Rowland, supra, an appeal was taken from a judgment in favor of homeowner plaintiffs in an action against a developer for slander of title. See generally Rowland, 99 Nev. 308. The Nevada Supreme Court found that the trial court properly concluded that there was a cloud on title from the developer in that a lien included moneys not owed by the plaintiffs to the developer, so this constituted a "false statement." Id. at 313. However, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that there was no evidence to support the element of malice in a slander of title claim. Id.

Citing a wealth of authority, the Rowland court found that "[i]n order to prove malice it must be shown that the defendant knew that the statement was false or acted in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. [citations omitted] Where a defendant has reasonable grounds for belief in his claim, he has not acted with malice. [citations omitted] Additionally, evidence of a defendant's reliance on the advice of counsel tends to negate evidence of malice." Rowland, 99 Ney. at 313.

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In the present case, there is no evidence that the Lytles acted with malice, or with reckless disregard for the veracity of their claim. There are no affidavits or facts admitted as evidence, contested or uncontested, to even support this claim. Indeed, this Court should examine the "Statement of Facts" within Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, beginning on page 3 of that Motion. There is not a single fact relative to the Lytles' conduct in recording the Abstracts of Judgment. Indeed, there are no affidavits in support of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, not one. Rather, Plaintiffs attach several court filings and recorded documents including governing documents, judgments and record abstracts of judgments that merely substantiate that the abstracts at issue were, indeed, recorded by the Lytles. However, what is lacking any evidence is the Lytles' intent, or mal-intent as it need be.

The Order itself is evidence enough that there are no findings to support any form of malice, oppression or fraud. There is not a single finding in this regard.

This case is strikingly similar to *Rowland*. Here, this Court concluded as a matter of law that the Lytles improperly recorded the abstract of judgment against Boulden's property, *i.e.* the alleged false statement. However, this Court did not make any finding that the Lytles acted maliciously, and no evidence was presented on summary judgment that would support such a conclusion. *See generally* Order; Pl.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (Feb. 24, 2017). Indeed, there was no evidence before this Court to support such a finding.

To the contrary, as set forth in the Lytles' extensive briefs and argument before the Court, the Lytles believed (and continue to believe) they had legal grounds for recording the abstracts of judgment against the units in the Association. Moreover, the Lytles recorded the abstracts with the advice and assistance of counsel. In short, the evidence shows that the Lytles acted in good faith, and absent proof of malice, Boulden's claim for slander of title must fail. See Rowland, 99 Nev. at 313, 662 P.2d 1332.

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As set forth in Judge Leavitt's Order Granting the Lytles' Motion for Summary Judgment (Exhibit 1), judgment was granted in favor of the Lytles and against the Association. The Lytles then set forth their good faith basis for recording the abstracts at issue against the properties. See Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 2. While the Court disagreed with the rationale, the legal basis is sound.

C. The Lytles seek clarification of this Court's Order with respect to the Court's injunction against "recording and enforcing" the Judgment against Plaintiffs' real property in Rosemere Estates

In its Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment, the Court stated as follows:

"IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that Defendants are permanently enjoined from recording and enforcing
the Final Judgment from the Rosemere LPA Litigation or any abstracts
related thereto against the Boulden or Lamothe Property."

This provision has since become a controversy amongst the parties. As this Court may be aware, the Lytles filed a Notice of Appeal of the Court's Order (after concession by Plaintiffs that they are foregoing seeking damages in this litigation). The Lytles also, to that end, filed and recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens in order to provide notice of the pendency of the action. Plaintiffs have alleged that such Notice of Lis Pendens violates the cited provision of this Court's Order. The Lytles deny such a claim.

"The doctrine of lis pendens provides constructive notice to the world that a dispute involving real property is ongoing." Weddell v. H2O, Inc., 271 P.3d 743, 751 (citing NRS 14.010(3)). Once the appeal was filed, as it was, Plaintiffs are under an obligation to disclose this lawsuit to any potential purchasers of the properties regardless of the lis pendens. While this Court certainly disagrees with the Lytles' legal position in this case, the action against the property subject to this litigation passes with the title. In other words, any subsequent purchaser of the properties will be necessary parties to this action (and the appeal).

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Once more, a lis pendens is not a lien against property. Rather, it is simply a notice of the pendency of an action – nothing more. Hence, there is no violation of the Court's order.

HI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Lytles respectfully request that the Court grant the Motion and amend the Order to deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Boulden's claim for slander of title.

DATED: May 15, 2017

Respectfully Submitted,

GIBBS GIDEN LOCHER TURNER-SENET & WITTBRODT LTP

By:

Richard E. Haskin, Esq. Nevada State Bar # 11592 Timothy Elson, Esq.

Nevada State Bar # 11559

1140 N. Town Center Drive, Suite 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144-0596

Attorneys for Defendants

TRUDI LEE LYTLE, JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, & THE LYTLE TRUST

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Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

The undersigned, an employee of the law firm of GIBBS GIDEN LOCHER TURNER
SENET & WITTBRODT LLP, hereby certifies that on May 15, 2017, she served a copy of the
foregoing DEFENDANTS TRUDI LEE LYTLE, JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, AND THE LYTLE
TRUST'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION
TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT by electronic service through the Regional Justice Center
for Clark County, Nevada's ECF System:
DANIEL T. FOLEY, ESQ. FOLEY & OAKS 626 S. 8th Street

Shan Benz An employee of Gibbs Giden Locher Turner Senet & Wittbrodt LLP

EXHIBIT "1"

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CLERK OF THE COURT

ORD Richard E. Haskin, Esq. Nevada State Bar # 11592 GIBBS GIDEN LOCHER TURNER

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GIBBS GIDEN LOCHER TURNER SENET & WITTBRODT LLP

SENET & WITTBRODT LLP 1140 N. Town Center Drive, Suite 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144-0596 (702) 836-9800

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Counterdefendants JOHN ALLEN LYTLE and TRUDI LYTLE

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

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JOHN ALLEN LYTLE and TRUDI LYTLE, as Trustees of the Lytle Trust,

Plaintiffs,

٧.

ROSEMERE ESTATES PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, a Nevada non-profit corporation; and DOES I through X, inclusive,

Defendants.

ROSEMERE ESTATES PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, a Nevada non-profit corporation; and DOES I through X, inclusive,

Counterdefendants.

Counterclaimants,

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JOHN ALLEN LYTLE and TRUDI LYTLE, as Trustees of the Lytle Trust, 23

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CASE NO. A-10-631355-C Dept.: XXXII

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF JOHN ALLEN LYTLE AND TRUDI LEE LYTLE'S, AS TRUSTEES OF THE LYTLE TRUST, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on November 8, 2016, the Court heard Plaintiffs JOHN ALLEN LYTLE and TRUDI LYTLE, as Trustees of the Lytle Trust (hereinafter "Plaintiff" or the "Lytles") MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT in the above-captioned matter, filed on September 14, 2016. After considering the First Amended Complaint, deemed filed by Order of this Court on June 1, 2016, the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Declaration of Trudi Lytle, and evidence submitted therewith, and hearing oral argument, and no opposition having been filed by Defendant and Counterclaimant ROSEMERE ESTATES PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION ("Defendant"), the Court grants Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.

FINDINGS OF FACT

- On January 4, 1994, Baughman & Turner Pension Trust (the "Developer"), as the 1. subdivider of a cul-de-sac to be made up of nine (9) residential lots on a street known as Rosemere Court in Las Vegas, Nevada, recorded with the Clark County Recorder's Office a Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions ("Original CC&Rs.).
- The Original CC&Rs consist of four (4) pages and 25 paragraphs, with no bylaws 2.. annexed, no amendment provision, and no homeowners association, as defined by Chapter 116.
- The Original CC&Rs create a "property owners' committee" with very limited 3. maintenance duties over specific common area items (exterior walls and planters, entrance way and planters, entrance gate, and the private street), which are specifically set forth in Paragraph 21 of the Original CC&Rs.
- The Developer then sold the nine (9) undeveloped lots between May 1994 and July 4. 1996.
- The first of the lots was conveyed by the Developer under the Original CC&Rs on 5. May 19, 1994.
- Plaintiff's trustees, John Allen Lytle and Trudi Lee Lytle (the "Lytles"), purchased a 6. Rosemere Estates property, assessor's parcel number ("APN") 163-03-313-009 ("Plaintiff's Property"), on November 6, 1996, from the original buyer who first purchased it from the Developer on August 25, 1995.
 - The Lytles later transferred Plaintiff's Property to Plaintiff. 7.

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- In another action by Plaintiff against the Association before this Court, the Court 8. found, as a matter of law, as follows:
 - The Association is a limited purpose association under NRS 116,1201 and not a. a unit-owners' association, as that term is defined by Chapter 116. In making this finding, the District Court specifically found: (1) "the Association did not have any powers beyond those of the "property owners committee" designated in the Original CC&Rs--simply to care for the landscaping and other common elements of Rosemere Estates as set forth in Paragraph 21 of the Original CC&Rs;" (2) that the Association was "created for the limited purpose of maintaining. . . "[t]he landscape of the common elements of a common interest community...;" and (3) the Association "cannot enforce "any restrictions concerning the use of units by the units' owners . . . "
- The Amended CC&Rs were not properly adopted or recorded, that the b. Amended CC&Rs are invalid, and that the Amended CC&Rs have no force and effect.
- The Court's Judgment was affirmed by the Nevada Supreme Court, Docket No. 9. 63942.
- On September 15, 2008, at an Executive Board meeting of the Association, on a 5-3 10. vote, the membership voted to approve an Executive Board proposal that, first, each member of the Association should be assessed \$10,000.00 "in conjunction with [Plaintiff's] actions" in bringing the NRED I litigation and in pursuing litigation against Plaintiff for unarticulated and nebulous reasons, and, second, that "the Association should bring foreclosure proceedings against any lots with outstanding assessments due the Association."
- On July 20, 2009, the Association, through a collection agency, NAS, caused to be 11. recorded a Notice of Delinquent Assessment Lien in the Clark County Recorder's Office in the amount of \$12,500.00 (stated as including late fees, collection fees and interest in the amount of \$2,379.00) against Plaintiff's property within Rosemere Estates. The July 20, 2009 lien shall be referred to herein as the "First Lien."

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	12.	Plaintiff immediately objected to validity of the First Lien and assessments to the
Assoc	iation a	nd the collection agency because the validity of the Amended CC&Rs was the subject
of litig	gation a	nd the fact that Plaintiff had bonded around the lien. Further, the assessment, at least in
	-	art, is for legal fees that Plaintiff would have to pay to sue itself. This lien remains
record	led agai	nst Plaintiff's Property.

- 13. Plaintiff never received notice of the assessment or notice of an intent to lien as required by NRS 116.31162(1)(a), which requires a notice of the delinquent assessment stating the amount of the assessment and additional costs. This must be mailed by the Association, or its agent, to Plaintiff prior to recording any lien. And this was not done.
- 14. On or about November 19, 2009, the Association (through its collection agency) notified Plaintiff that the payoff amount had increased to \$21,045.00. Lytle Decl., ¶ 26. Plaintiff objected at every instance to the First Lien. Id. at ¶ 27.
- 15. After a Nevada Real Estate Division ("NRED") arbitration of the validity of the Amended CC&RS, the arbitrator wrongfully ruled in favor of the Association and awarded the Association \$45,000.00 in legal fees and \$7,255.19 in costs. Plaintiff immediately filed a trial de novo in District Court, the NRED 1 case, and posted a supersedeas bond with the Clerk in the amount of \$52,255.19, covering the foregoing fees and costs.
- 16. On November 18, 2009, the Association, through its attorney Gerry G. Zobrist, the son of Board President Gerry Zobrist, recorded a Judgment dismissing the NRED 1 case against Plaintiff's Property, which also included a \$52,255.19 attorney fee and cost award, against Plaintiffs' Property. The recorded Judgment shall be referred to herein as the "Second Lien."
- 17. The Association recorded the Second Lien ten (10) days after Plaintiff posted a bond to cover the \$52,255.19 monetary judgment which the Association deemed good and sufficient.
- 18. The purpose for recording the Second Lien (Judgment) was simply to slander title to Plaintiff's Property. The NRED 1 dismissal and monetary award was overturned by the Nevada Supreme Court on September 29, 2011 in Docket No. 54886.
 - 19. The Second Lien was released on November 14, 2012.

- 20. On or about November 19, 2009, the Association (through its collection agency) notified Plaintiff that the payoff amount on the First Lien had increased to \$21,045.00 and that the Association was going to foreclose on the property. The increase in the lien amount included a \$1,000.00 late fee, when only \$10.00 was permissible pursuant to the Amended CC&Rs. Also; the Association demanded a special assessment interest amount of \$900.00 at 12% interest per annum, when the allowable interest rate is 3.25% per NRS 99.040(1) on this date.
- 21. On or about March 16, 2010, Plaintiff filed a second arbitration action with NRED against the Association disputing the validity of the assessment and related penalties, interest and collection fees.
- While the arbitration matter was pending and five (5) days after the Complaint was filed in this action, the Association recorded yet another lien against Plaintiff's property on March 22, 2010, in the amount of \$136,583.00, without any justification for doing so. The March 22, 2010 lien shall be referred to as the "Third Lien."
- 23. The Third Lien was released by the Association on September 27, 2010, only after Plaintiff discovered it had been recorded.
- 24. The Third Lien includes the amounts from the First and Second Liens, which already were recorded against Plaintiff's Property.
- 25. The three liens, which were all recorded at the same time, totaled \$209,883.19. The only amount that had been adjudicated was \$52,255.19, and there was a bond posted in that amount which was deemed, by the Association, as good and sufficient.
- 26. For the reasons set forth in this Order, the Association did not have a right to have any of these liens recorded against Plaintiff's Property.

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Summary Judgment Standard

1. Summary judgment shall be rendered in favor of a moving party if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. NRCP Rule 56(c).

2.	"Summary Judgment is appropriate and shall be rendered forthwith when the
pleadings and	other evidence on file demonstrate that no 'genuine issue as to any material fact
	that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Wood v. Safeway
- 121 Nev. Adv	Op. 73, 121 P.3d, 1026, 1029 (2005)(quoting NRCP 56(c)).

- Nevada's prior summary judgment jurisprudence, Id. at 1037, and adopted the summary judgment standard which had been articulated by the United States Supreme Court in its 1986 Trilogy:

 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); and Matsushita Electrical Industrial Company v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The application of the standard requires the non-moving party to respond to the motion by "Set[ting] forth specific facts demonstrating existence of a genuine issue for trial." Wood, 121 p.3d at 1031. This obligation extends to every element of every claim made, and where there is a failure as to any element of a claim, summary judgment is proper. Barmettler v. Reno Air, Inc., 114

 Nevada 441, 447, 956, P2d. 1382, 1386 (1998). In this case, the Association failed to oppose the Motion for Summary Judgment and failed to appear for the hearing thereon, which was a general failing to present any facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial.
- 4. The Nevada Supreme Court held that "Rule 56 should not be regarded as a "disfavored procedural shortcut" but instead as an integral important procedure which is designed "to secure just, speedy and inexpensive determination in every action." Wood, 121, p.3d at 1030 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327). In Liberty Lobby, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that:

"Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.

Id. (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 247-48)

- B. Summary Judgment Is Proper As To Plaintiff's Declaratory Relief Cause of Action
- 5. A declaratory relief cause of action is proper where a conflict has arisen between the litigating parties, and the action is brought to establish the rights of the parties. 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments § 1.

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- The Lytles' Seventh Cause of Action seeks Declaratory Relief and assumes, therein, ó, that the Amended CC&Rs are void ab initio, as they indeed are. See First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), ¶¶ 32-39. Specifically, the Lytles seek this Court to declare that the Liens based on the assessments at issue are invalid because they were based on the Amended CC&Rs, which were void ab initio - meaning that there was never any right prescribed by the Amended CC&Rs as they were void from their inception and recording.
- Void ab initio means that the documents are of no force and effect., i.e. it does not 7. legally exist. Washoe Medical Center v. Second Judicial Dist. Court of State of Nev., 122 Nev. 1298, 1304, 148 P.3d 790, 794 (2006); see also Black's Law Dictionary, 2d ed.. The phrase ab initio comes from Latin and has the literal translation "from the start" or "from the beginning." If a court declares something void ab initio, it typically means that the court's ruling applies from the very beginning, from when the act occurred. In other words, the court declares the documents, in this case, the Amended CC&Rs, invalid from the very inception.
- Here, this Court has declared the Amended CC&Rs void ab initio, meaning that they 8. never had any force and effect. The liens in questions are all based on assessments that were levied pursuant to the Amended CC&Rs. As a result, the assessments and resulting liens are invalid and must be similarly declared void ab initio

C. Summary Judgment Is Granted As To The Quiet Title Cause Of Action

- A plaintiff may bring a quiet title cause of action and must allege (1) the plaintiff has 9. an interest in real property, and (2) the defendant claims an interest adverse to that of plaintiff. Twain Harte Homeowners Assn. v. Patterson, 239 Cal. Rptr. 316 (1987), South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen, 38 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1964), Thornton v. Stevenson, 8 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1960).
- The Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action is for Quiet Title and alleges that the liens 10. described herein "were recorded without any right and for invalid reasons as set forth herein, and the lien presently recorded against the property impairs and clouds Plaintiff's title to Plaintiff's Property."

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Plaintiff believes that a determination as to the Seventh Cause of Action first, which alleges that the liens are void ab initio and must be revoked because the District Court already has determined that the Amended CC&Rs are void ab initio is the appropriate starting point for the Court's determination of this matter.

1	11.	"A cloud on title is described as any outstanding instrument, record, claim, or
encumb	ranc	e which is actually invalid or inoperative but which may nevertheless impair the title to
		53 Cal. Jur. 3d Quieting Title § 15. "Actions to determine the continuing validity of a
		ovenant are normally brought either as an action for a declaratory judgment or an action
to quiet	title	

- 12. Where the action is one to quiet title, it is necessary to show that the plaintiff holds title to the property in question and that there is 'cloud' upon the title, or, in other words, that a hostile claim is outstanding. 27 Causes of Action 203, §§ 5, 25 (2012), see also Cortese v United States, 782 F.2d 845 (9th Cir Cal 1986); Garnick v Serewitch, 39 NJ Super 486, 121 A.2d 423 (1956); 65 Am. Jur. 2d, Quieting Title and Determination of Adverse Claims §§ 9-17; C.J.S., Quieting Title §§ 58-66.
- 13. As set forth above in this Order, the Amended CC&Rs and the liens based thereon are all void *ab initio*. The recording of the Amended CC&Rs and the liens all were a cloud on title, and summary judgment granting Plaintiff's Quiet Title cause of action is warranted and granted.

D. Summary Judgment Is Granted As To The Injunctive Relief Cause Of Action

- 14. Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action alleges that "Plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary and permanent mandatory injunction ordering the Association not to foreclose on the first lien recorded on Plaintiff's Property on July 20, 2009, pending final resolution of the within litigation."
- 15. As set forth above, all liens, including the first lien, are void ab initio and are illegitimate. Therefore, no foreclosure action may be pursued to enforce the liens, and summary judgment is proper as to Fifth Cause of Action for Injunctive relief.

E. Summary Judgment Is Granted As To The Slander Of Title Cause Of Action

- 16. "Slander of title involves false and malicious communications that disparage a person's title in land and cause special damages." <u>Higgins v. Higgins</u>, 103 Nev. 443, 445, 744 P.2d 530, 531 (1987).
- 17. An award of expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred in removing a cloud on title is proper. Summa Corp. v. Greenspun, 98 Nev. 528, 532, 655 P.2d 513, 515 (1982).

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- 18. "Malice" has been defined as "knowledge that it [a statement] was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false of not." New York Times Co. v. Sutlivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). Reckless disregard means that the publisher of the statement acted with a "high degree of awareness of ... [the] probable falsity" of the statement or had serious doubts as to the publication's truth." *Id.* at 280.
- 19. Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action alleges stander of title against the Association as a result of the Association's recording the First and Second Liens.
- 20. The Association knew or should have known that it had no right to issue assessments against Plaintiff and knew or should have known that the bond posted by Plaintiff adequately covered the Association's lien on Plaintiff's Property and therefore the Association acted maliciously or in reckless disregard of the falsity of the lien by recording the lien on the Property and refusing to remove the same up through the present date.
- 21. Further, the recordation by the Association of the Third Lien constitutes slander of title to Plaintiff's Property as the Association and its Board members knew or should have known that they had no legal right to record the lien as the amount of lien had not been adjudicated by any court, arbitrator or arbiter and therefore the Association and/or its Board members acted with malice and/or with reckless disregard of the falsity of the lien.
- 22. This Court already found that the Association had no lawful right to record and enforce the Amended CC&Rs. As such, the Amended CC&Rs were declared void ab initio.

 Similarly, the First and Second Liens, and all other liens recorded against Plaintiff's Property are void ab initio because they were born from the Amended CC&Rs. Thus, the falsity of the liens is clearly established.
- 23. In addition to being false, the Association's actions were malicious because the Association recorded the liens with reckless disregard for the integrity of those liens.
- 24. The July 2007 amendment meeting and the actions that preceded that meeting to perpetrate the fraud of the Amended CC&Rs and post-meeting actions in recording the Amended CC&Rs were fraudulent. The Association's Board, at that time, pushed the Amended CC&Rs through an improperly noticed meeting wherein homeowners were provided with written

misrepresentations, insufficient time to consider and debate the proposed amendment, and then,
despite all of these problems, the Association's Board still recorded the Amended CC&RS without
the required unanimous consent. The process was reckless and malicious and aimed at the Lytles,
who were the only undeveloped lot at the time, from building their dream home.

- 25. Once the Amended CC&Rs were improperly recorded, the Association, again acting in disregard for Plaintiff's rights, recorded liens against Plaintiff's Property and swiftly moved to foreclose against the First Lien.
- 26. As a result of the Association's actions, as set forth herein and as established by the record in Case No. A-09-593497-C, the Association's actions were malicious.
- 27. Therefore, summary judgment as to Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action for Slander of Title is appropriate.
 - F. The Liens Are Invalid Because The Association Did Not Adopt An Annual Budget
- 28. The Association's Board failed to adopt an annual budget in violation of NRS § 116.3115. Assessments may not be imposed if they are not done so based on an annual budget prepared by the Board. NRS 116.3115, see also Bylaws, Sections 8.1 and 8.2.
- 29. The Association failed to adopt a budget in either 2009 or 2010, as required under Article 10, Section 10.4 of the Amended CC&Rs and Article VIII, Section 8.1 and 8.2 of the Bylaws.
- 30. As set forth in NRS 116.3115 and in the Association's own amended governing documents (since revoked but in place at the time of the assessments in question), an annual budget is required in order to impose assessments.

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2	And A Hearing Prior To Levying The Assessments And Recording The Liens
3	Against The Property
4	31. NRS 116,31162(1)(2) provides as follows:
5	 Except as otherwise provided in subsection 5, 6 or 7, in a condominium, in a planned community, in a cooperative where the owner's interest in a unit is real estate under NRS 116.1105, or in a
7	NRS 116.1105 and the declaration provides that a lien may be foreclosed under NRS 116.31162 to 116.31168, inclusive, the association may
8	foreclose its lien by sale after all of the following occur:
9	(a) The association has mailed by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, to the unit's owner or his or her successor
10	in interest, at his or her address, if known, and at the address of the unit, a notice of delinquent assessment which states the amount of
11	the assessments and other sums which are due in accordance with subsection 1 of NRS 116.3116, a description of the unit against
12	which the lien is imposed and the name of the record owner of the unit.
13	
14	32. Plaintiff never received any required statutory notice from the Association or anyone
15	acting on its behalf of the delinquent assessment and other sums allegedly due that served as the
16	basis for the First Lien.
17	33. Thus, the First Lien, even if the basis for that lien were valid, which they are not, is
18	procedurally defective.
19	H. The Association's Collection Agency Was Never Properly Authorized
20	34. NRS 116.31086 requires the Association to obtain three (3) bids before hiring a
21	collection agent, in this case NAS.
22	35. No bids were collected, and no meeting took place during which NAS was appointed
23	as the Association's collection agent.
24	36. Yet, despite not being lawfully engaged and authorized, NAS recorded the First Lien
25	on the Lytle Property and pursued collection and foreclosure. This was improper.
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28	<i>III</i>

G. The Liens Are Invalid Because The Association Failed To Provide Requisite Notice

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I. Plaintiff Suffered Damages

- 37. NRS 116.1183 provides as follows:
 - 1. An executive board, a member of an executive board, a community manager or an officer, employee or agent of an association shall not take, or direct or encourage another person to take, any retaliatory action against a unit's owner because the unit's owner has:
 - (a) Complained in good faith about any alleged violation of any provision of this chapter or the governing documents of the association:
 - (b) Recommended the selection or replacement of an attorney, community manager or vendor; or
 - (c) Requested in good faith to review the books, records or other papers of the association.
 - In addition to any other remedy provided by law, upon a violation of this section, a unit's owner may bring a separate action to recover:
 - (a) Compensatory damages; and
 - (b) Attorney's fees and costs of bringing the separate action.

[Emphasis added].

- 38. Plaintiff presented adequate evidence that it suffered damages as a result of the Board's retaliatory actions.
- 39. Plaintiff planned to build a dream home in the community, and the actions taken by the Board were intentionally and directly targeted at Allen and Trudi Lytle in order to prevent them from ever moving into the community.
- 40. Once more, Plaintiff underwent financial hardship in posting the various bonds in order to appeal this action (and other actions).
- 41. This matter commenced with the unlawful amendment in July 2007 and did not conclude until the Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's ruling that the Association's conduct was, indeed, unlawful and in violation of the Lytles' rights as homeowners.
- 42. Finally, the Association suspended the Plaintiff's voting rights, the right to run for the Board, blocked Plaintiff's attendance at meetings, and suspended membership privileges, all without complying with Article 12, Section 1.2(d) of the Amended CC&Rs and NRS 116.31041(2).

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The Association's retaliatory actions cost the Lytles their dream home. These actions 43. further entitle Plaintiff to attorneys' fees incurred in this action, the underlying arbitration, and appeal in this action. J. Plaintiff Is Entitled To Punitive Damages

- A wronged plaintiff may recover punitive damages in an action for slander of title. 44. Summa Corp. v. Greenspun, 98 Nev. 528, 655 P.2d 513 (1982).
- Once more, the plaintiff need not show that the land was adversely affected. Id, at 45. 531. Actual damages in the form of costs to remove the cloud on title, such as attorneys' fees, is sufficient. Id.
- The Association, through its Board, recorded three (3) improper and unlawful liens 46. against Plaintiff's Property. Once more, each lien incorporated the prior lien amount, reaching a total of \$209,883.19, when the only amount that had been adjudicated was \$52,255.19, when there was a bond posted in that amount which was deemed, by the Association, as good and sufficient.
- The Court finds that the Association did not have a right to have any of these liens 47. recorded against Plaintiff's Property.
- The totality of the liens made it impossible for Plaintiff to sell the Property, even 48. though a good and sufficient bond had been deposited.
- The Association's actions were taken in order to prevent the Lytles from building 49. their dream home in the community.
- Pursuant to the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages in an amount to be 50. determined after a prove-up hearing on damages.

K. Plaintiff Is Entitled To An Award Of Damages Equal To Its Costs And Attorneys' Fees Incurred In Removing The Cloud On Title

- A plaintiff can recover its costs and attorneys' fees as damages in an action for 51. slander of title. See generally Summa Corp., 98 Nev. 528, 655 P.2d 513.
- Plaintiff is directed to submit a memorandum of costs and application for attorneys' 52. fees.

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L. Summary Judgment Is Granted Against The Associations' Counterclaim

53. The Association's Counterclaim merely seeks to enforce actions taken against the Lytles via the Amended CC&Rs, which are *void ab initio* as set forth herein. For the reasons set forth herein and the legal authority cited, all fines, assessments and liens are void *ab initio* and should be declared as such.

III. JUDGMENT

IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

- 1. All liens recorded by the Association against Plaintiff's Property are invalid and have no force and effect. This Order may be recorded in the Office of the Clark County Recorder's Office by any party, and, once recorded, shall be sufficient notice of the same.
- 2. The Association is hereby ordered to release any and all liens recorded against the Property within sixty (60) days of the date of service of this Order on the Association, including (a) the Notice of Delinquent Assessment Lien, Book/Instr. No. 20090720-001631, and (b) the Judgment, Book/Instr. No. 200911180005345.
 - The Association's Counterclaim is dismissed.
- 4. Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action. Plaintiff is directed to prepare, file and serve a Memorandum of Costs.

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	1	5. Plaintiff is deemed the prevailing party in this action. Any motion for attorneys' fees
	2	will be addressed separately by the Court.
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	4	IT IS SO ORDERED this day of November, 2016.
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	6	HONORABLE ROB BARE
	7	District Court Judge, Dept. XXXII
	8	Hor bare Judge, district court, department of
	9	
	10	DATED: November 10, 2016 GIBBS GIDEN LOCHER TURNER SENET & WITTBRODT LLP
	11	+12490
	12	Richard E. Haskin, Esq.
	13	Nevada State Bar # 11592
	14	Las Vegas, Nevada 89144-0596 Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Counterdefendants JOHN ALLEN LYTLE and TRUDI LYTLE
	15	JOHN ALLEN LYTLE and TRUDI LYTLE
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EXHIBIT "2"

CLERK OF THE COURT

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OPPC
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(702) 836-9800

Attorneys for Defendants TRUDI LEE LYTLE, JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, & THE LYTLE TRUST

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

MARJORIE B. BOULDEN, TRUSTEE OF THE MARJORIE B. BOULDENR TRUST, LINDA LAMOTHE AND JACQUES LAMOTHE, TRUSTEES OF THE JACQUES & LINDA LAMOTHE LIVING TRUST

Plaintiff,

V.

TRUDI LEE LYTLE, JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, THE LYTLE TRUST, DOES I through X, inclusive, and ROE CORPORATIONS I through X,

Defendants.

Case No.: A-16-747800-C Dept.: XVI

DEFENDANTS TRUDI LEE LYTLE, JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, THE LYTLE TRUST OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND COUNTERMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Hearing Date: March 28, 2017

Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.

COMES NOW Defendants TRUDI LEE LYTLE, JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, and THE LYTLE TRUST (the "Lytles"), by and through their counsel of record, Richard E. Haskin, Esq., and Timothy Elson, Esq., of the law firm of GIBBS, GIDEN, LOCHER, TURNER, SENET & WITTBRODT, LLP, and hereby files the Lytles' Opposition to Plaintiffs MARJORIE B. BOULDEN, TRUSTEE OF THE MARJORIE B. BOULDEN TRUST; and LINDA LAMOTHE AND JACQUES LAMOTHE, TRUSTEES OF THE JACQUES & LINDA LAMOTHE LIVING TRUST's (collectively "Plaintiffs") Motion for Summary Judgment and Countermotion for Summary Judgment.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs MARJORIE B. BOULDEN, TRUSTEE OF THE MARJORIE B. BOULDEN TRUST ("Boulden") and LINDA LAMOTHE AND JACQUES LAMOTHE, TRUSTEES OF THE JACQUES & LINDA LAMOTHE LIVING TRUST's ("Lamothe") bring the instant lawsuit and Motion for Summary Judgment in an effort to erase Defendant TRUDI LEE LYTLE and JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, TRUSTEES OF THE LYTLE TRUST (the "Lytles") lawfully recorded Abstracts of Judgment. Boulden and Lamothe portray themselves as unwitting victims, now anchored by a judgment lien obtained by the Lytles. The reality of this case, however, betrays Plaintiffs' self-victimization.

The amount included in the Abstract of Judgment at issue includes a judgment, costs and attorneys' fees awarded to the Lytles in a lengthy and costly litigation between the Rosemere Estates Property Owners' Association (the "Association") and the Lytles wherein the Lytles defended themselves (and their property) against foreclosure while successfully seeking the Court's declaration that amended governing documents were unlawfully adopted and recorded against all properties within the Association. The Lytles, retirees of the Clark County School District and Southwest Gas Corporation, were forced into this litigation by virtue of the Board's unconscionable actions and the homeowners' acquiescence of the Board's actions and subsequent funding of the litigation.

Ultimately, however, the law permits the recording of the Abstracts of Judgment on each property within the Association, as fully briefed herein. The Lytles simply ask this Court to apply the law to the instant case.

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II. BRIEF STATEMENT OF MATERIAL AND UNDISPUTED FACTS

The essential facts in this case are undisputed. Thus summary judgment is appropriate.

A. Rosemere Estates

On January 4, 1994, Baughman & Turner Pension Trust (the "Developer"), as the subdivider of a cul-de-sac to be made up of nine (9) residential lots on a street known as Rosemere Court in Las Vegas, Nevada, recorded with the Clark County Recorder's Office a Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions ("Original CC&Rs"). Original CC&Rs, Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN"), Exhibit A. The Lytles purchased their property, Lot 163-03-313-009 (the "Lytle Property") on November 6, 1996, from the original buyer who first purchased it from the Developer on August 25, 1995.

Of note to the instant controversy, the Original CC&Rs, in the first paragraph, defines Rosemere Estates as "Lots I through 9 of Rosemere Court, a subdivision..." Original CC&Rs, RJN, Exhibit A. The document adds that "it is the desire and intention of the Subdivider to sell the land described above and to impose on it mutual, beneficial, covenants, conditions and restrictions under a general plan or scheme of improvement for the benefit of all of the land described above and the future owners of the lots comprising said land." *Id.* Thus, the Association includes each and every lot.

Sometime after the Lytles purchased their property, a group of homeowners formed the Association. In 1997, Plaintiffs Linda Lamothe and Marge Boulden, acting on behalf of all owners, filed Non-Profit Articles of Incorporation (the "Articles") pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes ("NRS") 82, which formalized the property owners' committee and named it "Rosemere Estates Property Owners Association." Articles of Incorporation, RJN, Exhibit B.

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B. The Underlying Litigation

In 2007, the Lytles filed an NRS 38.310 mandated non-binding arbitration before the Nevada Real Estate Division ("NRED"), naming the Association as respondent. The underlying dispute arose out of the Amended Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (the "Amended CC&Rs") which were unlawfully recorded on July 3, 2007, and improperly enforced by the Association against the Lytles, and the Lytle Property. The Lytles sought to un-cloud title to their property by the revocation of the Amended CC&Rs.

After the arbitrator found in favor of the Association, the Lytles filed for a trial de novo in this District Court, case number A-09-593497-C, which was assigned to Judge Michelle Leavitt in Department XII. After the matter was initially dismissed, the Lytles appealed to the Supreme Court, prevailed, and the matter was then remanded back to the District Court.

The Lytles ultimately prevailed, entirely, in the litigation, and the Court granted the Lytles summary judgment on July 29, 2013. Order Re Summary Judgment, RJN, Exhibit C.

The matter was once again appealed, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's Order granting the Lytles summary judgment. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the District Court for redetermination of costs, attorneys' fees and damages on October 19, 2015. Supreme Court Order, RJN, Exhibit D.

On May 25, 2016, after hearing the Lytles' motion for attorneys' fees, the Court awarded the Lytles \$297,072.66 in attorneys' fees pursuant to the Original CC&Rs and the Amended CC&Rs. Order Awarding Attorneys' Fees, RJN, Exhibit E.

On June 17, 2016, the Court awarded the Lytles damages, after a prove-up hearing, in the amount of \$63,566.93. Order Awarding Damages, RJN, <u>Exhibit F</u>. These damages included amounts expended by the Lytles in the design, engineering, and other costs associated with the construction of their home for Rosemere Estates, all of which were now stale and useless.

Finally, on July 22, 2016, the Court awarded the Lytles costs in the amount of \$599.00.

Order Awarding Costs, RJN, Exhibit G.

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 On September 2, 2016, the Lytles recorded Abstracts of Judgment against each property within the Association pursuant to the law set forth herein. Abstracts of Judgment, RJN, Exhibit H.

C. The Financial Burden of the Litigation Against the Association

While Boulden and Lamothe wish to paint themselves as the victims in this case, quite the opposite is true. Allen Lytle, now retired from Southwest Gas, and Trudi Lytle, a retired school teacher, were forced to bear a tremendous financial and emotional burden in fighting the Association for over seven (7) years. The fight was necessitated by the Association's unwillingness to revoke the illegally recorded Amended CC&Rs as well as the Association's unconscionable threats and actions to forcelose against the Lytle Property when the Lytles dared not to pay a special assessment to fund litigation against them.

The Lytles' legal fight was necessary because, as the District Court found in the underlying litigation

- the Amended CC&Rs created unreasonable restrictions on construction that made it
 impossible for the Lytles to build their home. Order Re Summary Judgment,
 Findings of Fact ("FOF") Nos. 28-30, RJN, <u>Exhibit C</u>.
- the Board for the Association took unlawful steps to amend the CC&Rs, which
 included the failure to obtain unanimous consent of the homeowners. Order Re
 Summary Judgment, Conclusions of Law, Nos. 22, 23, RJN, Exhibit C.
- the promotion and purported adoption of the Amended CC&Rs was procedurally unconscionable in as much as the Board forced the Amended CC&Rs to a vote with no advance notice or discussion. Order Re Summary Judgment, FOF, Nos. 23, 24, 32, 33, RJN, Exhibit C.

Meanwhile, Lamothe and Boulden contributed heartily to the legal fund against the Lytles (by way of payment of special assessments). Lamothe and Boulden also testified on the Association's behalf and were represented by the Association's counsel at deposition in the underlying litigation against the Lytles.

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Interestingly, Lamothe and Boulden both refused, initially, to approve the Amended CC&Rs, declining to sign in favor on the day of the adoption meeting. Lamothe sought legal counsel with the Lytles to file suit against the Association but ultimately refused to join the fight for fear of retribution. Years later, during deposition, Lamothe and Boulden, now testifying on the Association's behalf, recanted their objection to the Amended CC&Rs and testified that they approved of the Amended CC&Rs after further thought. Declaration of Richard E. Haskin ("Haskin Decl."), ¶3, Lamothe Deposition Transcript, Exhibit J; see also Letter from Marge Boulden dated August 9, 2007, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit K (Boulden stating "we would like to make it clear that we fully support our Association and its leadership. We do not support the demands made by . . . the Lytles.") (emphasis in original).

The Lytles now seek to recover the funds they lost as a result of the Association's actions, which amounts were awarded by this District Court. Lamothe and Boulden contributed to the burdens against the Lytles by persistently funding the litigation when called upon to do so and then testifying on the Association's behalf to support an unlawfully recorded document. The Court should not be confused in this case as to who the real victims are.

III. LEGAL ARGUMENT

As set forth below, the Lytles rightfully recorded the abstracts of judgments, including those against Lamothe and Boulden, pursuant to the Original CC&Rs and/or the Amended CC&Rs.² A lien against the Association is *automatically* a lien against each lot ("Lots 1 through 9") within the Association

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The Lytles further understand that Boulden is an absentee owner and has not resided in the house for several years. This is not the Boulden's personal residence as Plaintiffs allege.

² Plaintiffs do not appear to dispute that such a recording would be appropriate pursuant to the Amended CC&Rs.

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A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment shall be rendered in favor of a moving party if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. NRCP Rule 56(c). "Summary Judgment is appropriate and shall be rendered forthwith when the pleadings and other evidence on file demonstrate that no 'genuine issue as to any material fact [remains] and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Wood v. Safeway, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 73, 121 P.3d, 1026, 1029 (2005)(quoting NRCP 56(c)). In Wood, the Nevada Supreme Court rejected the "slightest doubt" standard from Nevada's prior summary judgment jurisprudence, Id. at 1037, and adopted the summary judgment standard which had been articulated by the United States Supreme Court in its 1986 Trilogy: Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); and Matsushita Electrical Industrial Company v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The application of the standard requires the non-moving party to respond to the motion by "Set[ting] forth specific facts demonstrating existence of a genuine issue for trial." Wood, 121 p.3d at 1031. This obligation extends to every element of every claim made, and where there is a failure as to any element of a claim, summary judgment is proper. Barmettler v. Reno Air, Inc., 114 Nevada 441, 447, 956, P2d. 1382, 1386 (1998).

The Nevada Supreme Court held that "Rule 56 should not be regarded as a "disfavored procedural shortcut" but instead as an integral important procedure which is designed "to secure just, speedy and inexpensive determination in every action." Wood, 121, p.3d at 1030 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327). In Liberty Lobby, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that:

"Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.

Id. (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 247-48).

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Summary Judgment Should Be Granted In Favor Of The Lytles Because They B. Rightfully Recorded Their Abstracts of Judgment Against Lamothe and Boulden's Properties Pursuant To The Original CC&Rs Because The

Association Includes Each Lot/Unit Therein

The Lytles were awarded all monetary amounts under the judgment pursuant to the Original CC&Rs.3 Order Awarding Attorneys' Fees, RJN, Exhibit E at 2:1-15. The clear and unambiguous language of the Original CC&Rs permits liens against Plaintiffs' properties, as well as the court's prior order pertaining to the operation of the Association under the Original CC&Rs.

The Original CC&Rs Defines The Association As Including Each Lot 1. Therein

Pursuant to the Original CC&Rs, a lien or judgment against the Association established under the Original CC&Rs attaches to each lot within the Association. As a result, the individual property of the owners within the Association, defined as Lots 1 through 9, is subject to lien.

The Original CC&Rs provide as follows:

WHEREAS, it is the desire and intention of Subdivider to sell the land described above and to impose on it mutual, beneficial covenants, conditions and restrictions under a general plan or scheme of improvement for the benefit of all the land described above and the future owners of the lots comprising said land.

RJN, Exhibit A at 1, ¶2 (referring to the "Lots 1 through 9 of Rosemere Court" in the definition above, thereby including Plaintiffs lots, which Plaintiffs do not dispute).

A breach or violation of these CC&R's or any re-entry by reason of such breach or any liens established hereunder shall not defeat or render invalid or modify in any way the lien of any mortgage or deed of trust made in good faith and for value as to said lots or PROPERTY or any part thereof; that these CC&R's shall be binding and effective against any owner of said PROPERTY whose title thereof is acquired by foreclosure, trustee's sale or otherwise.

Id. at 1, ¶4 (emphasis added).

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3 It is also important to note that this judgment is not on appeal or appealable, i.e., it is valid and enforceable without any risk of reversal.

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The Original CC&Rs were recorded against each of the nine (9) lots within the Association, and each owner, or prospective owner, including Plaintiffs, purchased property with record and actual notice of the foregoing rights and remedies.⁴ Under the Original CC&Rs, there are no common or individual elements, only the Association's property, defined as "Lots 1 through 9 of Rosemere Court." The Association is comprised of all of this property, *i.e.*, Lots 1 through 9. The fact that those lots were later subdivided and sold to individual owners does not change the fact that the Association includes all lots therein.

The second provision cited above specifically attaches liens established under the Original CC&Rs "to said lots or Property." Here, it also is not disputed that the Lytles' lien or judgment is established under the Original CC&Rs. The attorneys' fee award specifically finds that the Lytles' lien or judgment is established under the Original CC&Rs. RJN, Exhibit E at 2:1-15. If liens under the CC&Rs did not attach to the lots, there would be absolutely no need to include this provision. There would be no need for the CC&Rs to state that such a lien could not extinguish the first deed of trust or any other mortgage. Again, the Association has no property to even secure any loan as the only property that exists is Lots 1 through 9, which includes Plaintiffs' lots. Nowhere in the Original CC&Rs is any definition for property owned by the Association or subject to the Original CC&Rs other than the initial definition, i.e., Lots 1 through 9. To find against the Lytles, i.e., that a lien against the Association does not attach to Lots 1 through 9, would render these provisions meaningless. Phillips, 94 Nev. at 282, 597 P.2d at 176.

Nothing under this provision distinguishes the Lytles' lien or judgment pursuant to the attorneys' fees provision from any other provision or lien or judgment in the Original CC&Rs. The Original CC&Rs simply state "any liens established hereunder." This necessarily includes the Lytles' liens.

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While CC&Rs are a restrictive covenant, the CC&Rs are interpreted like a contract. See, e.g., Diaz ν. Ferne, 120 Nev. 70, 73, 84 P.2d 664, 665-66 (2004) (stating that the CC&Rs are a restrictive covenant, which is interpreted like a contract); see also Lee ν. Savalli Estates Homeowners Ass'n, 2014 WL 4639148 (Nev. Sept. 16, 2014) (affirming Diaz that the rules of construction governing contracts apply to the CC&Rs). "A court should not interpret a contract so as to make meaningless its provisions." Phillips ν. Mercer, 94 Nev. 279, 282, 597 P.2d 174, 176 (1978).

2. General Common Interest Community Principles Define The Association As Including Each Lot Or Unit Therein, Regardless Of Ownership

The language of the Original CC&Rs, as set forth above, tracks NRS Chapter 116, the Common Interest Ownership Act. NRS 116.021 defines a "common interest community" as all "real estate described in a declaration with respect to which a person, by virtue of the person's ownership of a unit, is obligated to pay for a share of real estate taxes, insurance premiums, maintenance or improvement of, or services or other expenses related to, common elements, other units or other real estate described in that declaration." NRS 116.093 defines a "unit" as the "physical portion of the common-interest community designated for separate ownership or occupancy..." Thus, the association, or common interest community, includes each and every unit in the community, including those owned by third parties.

The Nevada Supreme Court has concluded as much in granting standing to homeowners associations to file claims on behalf of unit owners in construction defect cases. In D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 125 Nev. 449, 215 P.3d 697 (2009), the Supreme Court held that "provisions of NRS Chapter 116, among other sources, demonstrate that a common-interest community includes individual units..." Id., 125 Nev. at 451, 215 P.3d at 699. Thus, the Court concluded that a homeowners association has standing to file representative actions on behalf of its members for construction defects of units.

Further, NRS 116.3117, merely clarifies that a judgment may be recorded against each and every unit. This is not a special rule of any sort, rather it is merely a restatement of the obvious – a judgment against the common-interest community can be recorded against all property within that community, including the units that are defined as being included in the community. These definitions are echoed in the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act, under Section 1-203(9) and 1-203(35).

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Summary Judgment Should Be Denied As To Plaintiffs And Granted In Favor C. Of The Lytles Because They Rightfully Recorded The Abstracts of Judgment Against Lamothe and Boulden Pursuant To NRS 116,3117

The Lytles were also awarded judgment pursuant to the Amended CC&Rs. Order Awarding Attorneys' Fees, RJN, Exhibit E, at 2:15-25. The Court should note the context of the underlying litigation, specifically that when the Lytles filed suit and the Association responded, the Amended CC&Rs were the Court validated enforceable governing documents at issue. Therefore, and properly so, the Court awarded attorneys' fees and costs to the Lytles, the prevailing party, pursuant to the provisions of the Amended CC&Rs. In doing so, the Court refused to allow the Association to use the Amended CC&Rs as a sword to defeat the Lytles, but then as a shield when they were proclaimed invalid.

Applying the foregoing context, the Amended CC&Rs essentially adopt Chapter 116 of the Nevada Revised Statutes. Amended CC&Rs, RJN, Exhibit I at Article I. The Amended CC&Rs define the association pursuant to the Uniform Common-Interest Ownership Act. Id. at 1.1. The Amended CC&Rs routinely reference Chapter 116 of the Nevada Revised Statutes. See, e.g., id. at 1.13, 1.14, 1.30, 8.1, 10.3 (referring to the lien statutes codified in Chapter 116). The Association alleged that Plaintiff's were part of a unit-owners association and subject to the provisions of Chapter 116.5

NRS 116.3117 provides the express mechanism of foreclosure against Plaintiffs via a lien or judgment against the Association. It states as follows:

- 1. In a condominium or planned community:
- (a) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b), a judgment for money against the association, if a copy of the docket or an abstract or copy of the judgment is recorded, is not a lien on the common elements, but is a lien in favor of the judgment lienholder against all of the other real property of the association and all of the units in the common-interest community at the time the judgment was entered. No other property of a unit's owner is subject to the claims of creditors of the association.

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⁵ Furthermore, the Association is a small planned community subject to, among other provisions, NRS 116.3117. See NRS 116.1203(3) ("[7]he provisions of NRS 116.3101 to 116.350, inclusive, and the definitions set forth in NRS 116.005 to 116.095, inclusive, to the extent that such definitions are necessary in construing any of those provisions, apply to a residential planned community containing more than 6 units.") 11

NRS 116.3117. Moreover, to the extent there can be any doubt as to the operation of NRS 116.3117, the comments to Section 3-117 of the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (1982) — the uniform act upon which NRS Chapter 116 is based — reinforce that which is already clear from the plain language of the statute: "the Act makes the judgment lien a direct lien against each individual unit...." See UCIOA § 3-117, cmt. 2. See also, e.g., Ensberg v. Nelson, 320 P.3d 97, 102 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) ("[B]y statute, a condominium association is a lien in favor of the judgment tienholder against all of the units in the condominium."); Summit House Condominium v. Com., 523 A.2d 333, 336 (Pa. 1987) ("[A] judgment against the Council would have constituted a lien against each individual condominium unit owner."); Interlaken Service Corp. v. Interlaken Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 588 N.W.2d 262, 266 (Wisc. 1998) ("[A]ny money judgment obtained by [the plaintiff as against the association] would result in a lien against each of the condominium units."). Consequently, the Lytles properly recorded their judgment lien against the Plaintiffs' property.

The lien and judgments were created under the Amended CC&Rs, and the Lytles have the right to collect under the lien and judgment pursuant to the Amended CC&Rs. Exhibit E at 2:15-25 (citing Mackintosh v. Caltfornia Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 113 Nev. 393, 405-06,935 P.2d 1154, 1162 (1997)). Plaintiffs cite no case law that contradict the Lytles' right or ability to collect under the Amended CC&Rs given that the judgment was obtained pursuant to the Amended CC&Rs.

It is worth noting that, while the Plaintiffs strenuously argue that NRS 116.3117 should not apply, NRS 116.3117 operates to *limit* the extent of the individual unit-owners' liability for a judgment against an association where, as here, the association is not incorporated. See UCIOA § 3-117, cmt. 1 ("[1]f the association is organized as an unincorporated association, under the law of most states each unit owner would have joint and several liability on the judgment. This Act strikes a balance between the two extremes."); see also Nevada Secretary of State Entity Detail for Rosemere Estates Property Owners Association (accessed Mar. 21, 2017), RJN, Exhibit J. In particular, although NRS 116.3117 provides that a judgment against the Association may be recorded as a lien against all units in the association, NRS 116.3117 further provides that the judgment creditor has no claim to any other property of the unit-owners. If this Court concludes NRS 116.3117 does not apply, then Plaintiffs may face joint and several liability for the judgment without limitation as to what property the Lytles could pursue under the law governing unincorporated associations. See, e.g., Pandolfo v. Bank of Benson, 273 F. 48, 50 (9th Cir. 1921) ("The members of an unincorporated association are liable in their collective capacity for tort...").

GIBBS GIDEN LOCHER TURNER SENET & WITTBRODT LLP

IV. CONCLUSION

The Lytles rightfully recorded their abstracts of judgment against Lamothe and Boulden pursuant to both the Original CC&Rs or the Amended CC&Rs. A lien against the Association is automatically and by definition a lien against Lots 1 through 9 therein. For the reasons set forth herein, summary judgment should be denied as to Plaintiffs and granted in favor in the Lytles.

DATED: March 24, 2017

Respectfully Submitted,

GIBBS GIDEN LOCHER TURNERS SENET & WITTBRODTTLP

By:

Richard E. Haskin, Esq. Nevada State Bar # 11592 Timothy Elson, Esq.

Neyada State Bar # 11559

Las Vegas, Nevada 89144-0596

Attorneys for Defendants

TRUDI LEE LYTLE, JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, & THE

LYTLE TRUST

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GIBBS GIDEN LOCKIER TURNER SENET & WITTBRODT ILP

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

	The undersigned, an employee of the law firm of GIBBS GIDEN LOCHER TURNER
SEN	ET & WITTBRODT LLP, hereby certifies that on March 24, 2017, she served a copy of the
	oing DEFENDANTS TRUDI LEE LYTLE, JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, THE LYTLE
_	ST OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
	INTERMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by electronic service through the Regiona
	ce Center for Clark County, Nevada's ECF System:
	IIBL T. FOLEY, ESQ.

DANIEL T. FOLEY, ESQ FOLEY & OAKS 626 S. 8th Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

An employee of
Gibbs Giden Locher Turner
Senct & Wittbrodt LLP

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Electronically Filed 6/1/2017 4:50 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT **OPP** DANIEL T. FOLEY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 1078 FOLEY & OAKES, PC 3 626 S 8th Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Tel.: (702) 384-2070 Fax: (702) 384-2128 5 Email: dan@foleyoakes.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 MARJORIE B. BOULDEN, TRUSTEE OF) 9 THE MARJORIE B. BOULDEN TRUST, LINDA LAMOTHE AND JACQUES 10 LAMOTHE, TRUSTEES OF THE 11 JACQUES & LINDA LAMOTHE LIVING TRUST 12 Plaintiff, Case No. A-16-747800-C 13 Dept. No. XVI 14 $\mathbf{V}_{\mathbf{k}}$ 15 TRUDI LEE LYTLE, JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, THE LYTLE TRUST, DOES I 16 through X; and ROE CORPORATIONS I through X. 17 Defendants. 18 OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 19 COMES NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, Foley & Oakes, PC, and 20 21 Oppose Defendants Trudi Lee Lytle and John Lytle, the Trustees of the Lytle Living Trust's 22 (collectively the "Lytles") Motion for Reconsideration. 23 III24 III25 26 III

Case Number: A-16-747800-C

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Page 1 of 10

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. OVERVIEW

The Lytles and all three of their different attorneys who represented them in the underlying case, failed to file suit directly against the Plaintiffs herein as prescribed by the CC&Rs. The Lytles, with the assistance of all three law firms, pursued only the "Association" and obtained a judgment against only the "Association".

In June 2016, after obtaining the Attorneys Fees Judgment, the Lytles and their counsel realized that the Attorneys' Fees Judgment they had obtained would be difficult, if not impossible, to collect on, since the "Association" was really only a "Committee" as per the CC&Rs and its resources were limited to gate repair and shrubbery maintenance.

The Lytles and their counsel, in an effort to collect on this worthless judgment, then devised a plan to collect the Attorneys' Fee Judgment from non-parties to the underlying case that were not listed as parties on the Attorneys' Fee Judgment. The plot devised by the Lytles and their attorney was to record Abstracts of Judgment with the Clark County Recorder and simply list the Plaintiffs' parcel numbers on the recordings.

This plot was conceived and carried out maliciously and with full knowledge that the Attorneys' Fee Judgment had no application whatsoever to the Plaintiffs or their property.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

These are all undisputed facts.

- In 2007, the Lytles filed an NRS 38.310 action with the Nevada Real Estate
 Division ("NRED") against the Rosemere Estates Property Owners Association.
- The NRED action arose out of action by a number of the property owners within the Rosemere Court Subdivision seeking to amend the CC&R's of the Rosemere Court Subdivision.

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3. Despite the specific language in the CC&Rs that prevent a homeowner from suing or seeking protection from the Rosemere Court Subdivision or its CC&Rs and instead provided each homeowner with the right to independently enforce the CCR's against one another, the Lytles chose not to assert claims against the individual homeowners, including the Plaintiffs herein.

- The NRED ruled against the Lytles.
- 5. Thereafter in 2009, the Lytles sued the Rosemere Estates Property Owners Association in the Eighth Judicial District Court, case # A-09-593497-C (the "Rosemere Litigation").
- Again, the Lytles chose not to sue the Plaintiffs or the other homeowners individually.
- 7. Mrs. Boulden and Mr. and Mrs. Lamothe were never parties to the Rosemere Litigation. A copy of the Lytles Complaint filed in the Rosemere Litigation is attached hereto as Exhibit "1".
- 8. The Lytles alleged, among other things, that the owners of the residences within the Rosemere Court Subdivision had improperly amended the CC&Rs and attempted to convert the simple 9 residence Rosemere Court Subdivision into a full-fledged home owners' association. Exhibit "1".
- 9. The Lytles obtained a Summary Judgment from the District Court against Rosemere Estates Property Owners Association, determining and declaring that the Rosemere Estates Property Owners Association and/or the "Committee" established in the CC&Rs was not a full-fledged home owners' association under NRS 116. See paragraph 19 on page 9 of the Order Granting Summary Judgment a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "2".

10	. The	Lytles filed	i a Motio	n for Attorney	s' Fe	es and Costs a	ınd ag	ainst the Rose	emere
Estates Pr	operty Ov	vners Asso	ciation ar	nd a Judgment	was	entered in the	Lytle	s' favor again	st the
Rosemere	Estates	Property	Owners	Association	for	\$361,238.59	(the	"Attorneys'	Fees
Judgment'	").								

- 11. After obtaining the Attorneys' Fees Judgment, on August 16, 2016, the Lytles recorded three (3) different Abstracts of Judgement against the Plaintiffs' properties.
- 12. On April 27, 2017, this Court's Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was entered. A copy of this Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit "3".
- 13. In this Court's Order, the Court made findings and judicially declared, among other things, that the Lytles' Three Abstracts of Judgment recorded against the Boulden Property and the Lamothe Property were improperly recorded and constituted clouds on the Boulden Property and the Lamothe Property. Exhibit "3".
- 14. In this Court's Order, the Court made findings and judicially declared, among other things, that the Lytles' had "slandered" Mrs. Boulden's title to her property. Exhibit "3".
- 15. The Lytles readily admit that the Attorneys' Fees Judgment is not against the Plaintiffs.
- 16. The Lytles readily admit that they could have, but never did, file suit against the Plaintiffs.

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III. LEGAL ARGUMENT

A. The Lytles' And Their Counsel's Recording Of The Abstracts Of Judgment Were Knowingly And Maliciously False Efforts To Cloud Titles For Purpose Of Extortion

The actions of the Lytles and their attorney were calculating, deliberate, and intended to cloud the non-party Plaintiffs' properties in an effort to extort money from them.

The listing of the Plaintiffs' parcel numbers on the recorded Abstracts of Judgment was knowingly false. The Lytles at all times knew they had never sued the Plaintiffs.

The recording of the Abstracts of Judgment against non-parties to the underlying suit was in reckless disregard of the obvious truth that Plaintiffs were not parties to the underlying suit.

If the Lytles' counsel advised them to record the Abstracts of Judgment against a non-party to the underlying suit, then counsel's advice was equally false and in knowing disregard of the truth.

The Lytles and their counsel's conduct was malicious and has continued through their ongoing and renewed effort to slander and cloud the Plaintiffs' titles with the recorded *lis* pendens.

Quite frankly, consistent with this Court's ruling that the Lytles clouded and slandered the title to Marjorie Boulden's property, there is really no question that the Lytles, with or without the advice of their counsel, recorded false abstracts of Judgment in reckless disregard of the truth. The Lytles efforts were done strictly for purposes of extorting money from the Plaintiffs who the Lytles had never pursued in Court. Accordingly, the Lytles and their counsel acted maliciously.

B. This Matter Is Neither Complex Nor Is It Even A Close Call On The Merits

The Lytles argue to this Court that they acted with a good faith belief that they had a meritorious right to cloud the titles of non-parties to their suit. The Lytles argue that because this Court spent 20 to 30 minutes forcing their counsel to admit that his arguments were not

FOLEY₂₈ & OAKES supported by the CC&Rs, NRS 116, or any concepts of equity, that somehow 30 minutes of a scrambling futile effort constitutes good faith.

Nothing could be further from the truth. This case is not complicated as evidence by the fact that Summary Judgment was granted four months after the Complaint was filed without any discovery being taken.

The Lytles and their counsel certainly put up a fight and lodged multiple arguments; however, the arguments were baseless. This Court repeatedly begged counsel for explanations of his indefensible arguments and counsel was completely unable to meritoriously respond.

The Lytles' counsel argued initially that the "Association" was a full blown association when the CC&R's were amended and therefor NRS 116 fully applied. However, this Court, after a moderate effort, finally got counsel to admit that he knew full well that the Original CC&Rs were never properly amended and the underlying court declared the Amended CC&RS to be void *ab initio*. See pages 5 – 12 of the transcript of the hearing before this Court held April 13, 2017 attached hereto as Exhibit "4".

The Lytles' counsel then argued that the mortgage savings clause in the CC&Rs somehow established the ability for the Lytles to record the Judgment against non-parties. Again, counsel's argument could not withstand questioning by the Court and counsel agreed that the subject clause did not establish any right for his clients but instead was just a mortgage savings clause. See pages 12 – 13 of Exhibit "4".

The Lytles' counsel then quarreled with the Court but finally admitted that the "losing party" attorneys' fee provision in the CC&Rs did not support the Lytles' claim as the Plaintiffs were not "parties" nevertheless "losing parties" in the underlying case. See pages 15, and 30 - 33 of Exhibit "4".

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The Lytles' counsel finally argued at length the ridiculous claim that because the "Association" owned all of the property in the subdivision, that the Judgment could be recorded against all of the property. It took the Court several minutes to completely discredit the arguments and to finally get the Lytles' counsel to admit that his initial statement that the "Association" owned all of the property was false and forced. A recitation of that painful/shameful effort by counsel is set forth below quoting directly from pages 19 – 25 of Exhibit "4".

MR. HASKIN: I have a judgment against all property owned by the association. A unit is owned by the association pursuant to both the recitals in the – original CC&Rs say that.

THE COURT: Show me where a unit is owned by the association in here.

MR. HASKIN: The original CC&R's state that this association includes Lots 1 through 9 of Rosemere Court. There are nine lots in this community.

THE COURT: But the unit - but they don't own it.

THE COURT: Where does it say that the association owns the properties fee simple?

THE COURT: Just tell me where to look. What page?

MR. HASKIN: It's the recitals, page 1.

THE COURT: But wait, wait, wait. --- that sets forth who the declarant is.

THE COURT: Tell me where it says. Because at the end of the day whatever ownership rights any association would have – and I've read enough CC&Rs. For example they'll tell you what the HOA owns. They'll set forth the common areas that are owned and controlled and maintained by the HOA. Very common in the CC&Rs, you know.

And they'll – they'll discuss specifically what the burdens are as far as the unit owners are concerned. But go ahead and tell me where does it say that the HOA in this – under these declarations of covenant, conditions, and restriction own the property.

MR. HASKIN: Well, that --- that by virtue - 1 guess, we're in disagreement there, your Honor.

1	THE COURT: No, no. I'm asking.	
2	MR. HASKIN: And I'm answering.	
3	THE COURT: I'm listening.	
4	MR. HASKIN: Because –	
5	THE COURT: Just point to a provision I can look at, and maybe I'll agree with	
6	you.	
7	MR. HASKIN: Okay. Well, I pointed that one, but I'm reading in conjunction with NRS116.021.	
8		
9	THE COURT: So we agree that there's no provision under the CC&Rs that sets forth ownership by the HOA of the units?	
10	MR. Haskin: No. I don't agree with that, your Honor.	
11	THE COURT: Then – where is it then?	
12		
13	THE COURT: So for the record, it's your position that the simple introductory language as it relates to the declaration and the subdivision of the property stands for the proposition that the HOA owns the property.	
14	ior the proposition that the HOA owns the property.	
15	THE COURT: Okay. Let me look at that with you.	
16	THE COURT: but I notice you didn't say that the association owned lots I through 9.	
17	THE COURT: Okay. So you agree it's not in the CC&Rs.	
18		
19	MR. HASKIN: Well, if you read it – your Honor, I've read a lot of CC&R's too. I don't know any CC&Rs that say, We own your house. They don't.	
20		
21	THE COURT: No, no. They say specifically what's owned by the HOA and they'll say specifically what owned by the unit owners. Like in condominiums,	
22	for an example, they'll have the interior walls that are owned by the unit owners. I mean, let's not be quibble here. And let's not be facetious. I know what they	
23	say.	
24	MR. HASKIN: It's obvious that a home owners association doesn't own your	
25	house.	
26	Six pages of facetious quibbling from Mr. Haskin going from "a unit is owned by the	
27	association" to "It's obvious that a home owners association doesn't own you house" is not a	

FOLEY₂₈ & OAKES good faith meritorious argument that allowed the Lytles and their counsel to cloud the Plaintiffs' titles without repercussions.

Again, false and forced arguments that are ultimately withdrawn do not make a case complex or meritorious. Rather proffering arguments that do not withstand basic questioning is intentionally misleading. Absent a good faith right to cloud the title, the clouding was malicious and done in reckless disregard of the truth and this Court has more than enough evidence to so find. Rowland v Lepire, 99 Nev. 308, 662 P.2d 1332 (1983)

IV. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court make a specific finding of malice or reckless disregard of the truth against the Lytles and/or their counsel.

Dated this 1st day of June 2017

Respectfully Submitted,

FOLEY & OAKES, PC

/s/Daniel T. Foley
Daniel T. Foley, Esq.

Nevada Bar No. 1078 626 So. 8th Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorney for Plaintiffs

OAKES

Page 9 of 10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NEFCR 9, N.R.C.P. 5(b) and EDCR 7.26, I hereby certify that I am an employee of Foley & Oakes, PC, and that on the 1st day of June, 2017, I served the following document(s):

OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

I served the above-named document(s) by the following means to the person s as listed below: [x] By Electronic Transmission through the Odyssey eFileNV system:

Richard E. Haskin, Esq. GIBBS, GIDEN, LOCHER, TURNER, SENET & WHITTBRODT, LLP 1140 N. Town Center Drive, Suite 300 Las Vegas, NV 89144

I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

/s/ Maren Foley
An employee of FOLEY & OAKES


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Page 10 of 10

EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 1



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COMP WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP

MICHAEL J. LEMCOOL, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 07061 3556 E. Russell Road, 2nd Floor

Las Vegas, NV 89120 Telephone: (702) 341-5200 Facsimile: (702) 341-5300

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Attorneys for Plaintiff, John Allen Lytle & Trudi Lee Lytle, as Trustees of the

A-09-593497-C 205801

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA



JOHN ALLEN LYTLE & TRUDI LEE LYTLE, AS TRUSTEES OF THE LYTLE TRUST,

Plaintiff,

VS.

ROSEMERE ESTATES PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive

Defendants.

Case No .:

Dept. No.:

COMPLAINT FOR TRIAL DE NOVO PURSUANT TO NRS 38.330; DECLARATORY RELIEF; AND FOR A PERMANENT INJUNCTION

ARBITRATION EXEMPT (Appeal from Arbitration; Declaratory Relief Requested)

COMES NOW Plaintiff, the LYTLE TRUST, by and through its Trustees, John Allen Lytle and Trudi Lee Lytle, herein by and through their attorneys, WOLF, RIFKIN, SHAPIRO, SCHULMAN & RABKIN, LLP, by Michael J. Lemcool, Esq., and for its Complaint against ROSEMERE ESTATES PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION (hereinafter, the "Association"), and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, states unto this Court as follows:

That Plaintiff, the Lytle Trust, is the current owner of real property located in Clark County, Nevada, APN 163-03-313-009, and described as:

Lot Nine (9) of Rosemere Court, as shown by map thereof on file in Book 59, of Plats, Page 58, in the Office of the County Recorder of Clark County, Nevada. Said property was previously owned by J. Allen Lytle and Trudi L. Lytle, the current Trustees of the Lytle Trust, having been purchased by deed recorded November 15, 1996. A true copy of said

COMPLAINT FOR TRIAL DE NOVO PURSUANT TO NRS 38.330

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1 deed

deed is attached hereto, and incorporated herein, as Exhibit "1".

- 2. That Defendant, the Association, at all times herein mentioned is comprised of nine (9) owners of single family lots all as more particularly described in the recorded Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions ("CC&Rs") for the Association as recorded in the official records of the Clark County Nevada Recorder's office. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges, that the original CC&Rs were recorded on January 4, 1994, before title to any lot within the Association was conveyed by deed, and are referenced in the deeds to all 9 properties located within the Association. A true copy of said recorded CC&Rs is attached hereto, and incorporated herein, as Exhibit "2". A true copy of said recorded map for Rosemere Court is attached hereto, and incorporated herein, as Exhibit "3".
- 3. The true names and capacities of Defendants sued herein as DOES 1-10, inclusive, and each of them, are presently unknown to Plaintiff, and, therefore, they are sued herein under fictitious names, and when the true names are discovered, Plaintiff will seek leave to amend this Complaint and proceedings herein to substitute the true names of said Defendants. Plaintiff is informed and believes and based thereon alleges that each of the Defendants designated herein as a DOE is negligent or responsible in some manner for the events herein referred to and negligently, carelessly, recklessly and in a manner that was grossly negligent and willful and wanton, caused damages proximately thereby to the Plaintiff as herein alleged.
- 4. That Plaintiff is, and at all times herein mentioned was, and continues to be, the record owner of the property located at 1930 Rosemere Court, Las Vegas, Nevada, which is located within the boundaries of the Association.
- 5. That since the Association is comprised of only 9 units, the Association is classified as a small planned community pursuant to NRS 116.1203, and is exempt from many of the provisions of NRS Chapter 116.
- 6. By the terms of the CC&Rs, and as a result of the mutuality of restrictive covenants running with the land for each of the 9 property owners, approval by 100% of the unit owner is required to amend the terms of the CC&Rs.
 - That on or about July 2, 2007, an Amended and Restated CC&Rs were proposed

-2-

to the members of the Association. The proposed amended CC&Rs increased the complexity, and size of the document, from 4 pages to 36 pages, and contained numerous additional restrictions upon the members.

- 8. That the proposed amended CC&Rs were not agreed to by all owners, in fact less than 67% thereof, with at least 3 owners specifically objecting to the proposed changes. A true copy of the consent signature page is attached hereto as Exhibit "4".
- 9. That despite the failure to obtain the required unanimous approval for changing the CC&Rs, the Association proceeded, on July 3, 2007, to record in the office of the Recorder for Clark County, Nevada, the Amended and Restated CC&Rs. A true copy of the Certificate of Officers used for recording said amended CC&Rs is attached hereto, and incorporated herein, as Exhibit "5".
- 10. That the Association has threatened to apply the amended CC&Rs and their restrictions against Plaintiff and its property, all to the detriment of Plaintiff.
- 11. That on or about September 26, 2008, Plaintiff brought a claim against the Association regarding the interpretation, application and enforcement of the Association's amended CC&Rs with the Nevada Real Estate Division ("NRED") as required by NRS 38.310.
- 12. That said dispute was arbitrated upon written stipulation of facts, documents, and briefs of the parties, with the non-binding decision by the Arbitrator issued on or about May 4, and June 1, 2009, and the Completion Certificate, required for filing this action, issued by the NRED on June 4, 2009. A true copy of the Completion Certificate issued June 4, 2009 is attached hereto, and incorporated herein, as Exhibit "6".
- 13. That said decision was erroneous in that, *inter alia*, it is contrary to Nevada law regarding covenants recorded against and running with the land, contrary to the terms of the originally recorded CC&Rs and, relied upon the authority to amend an Association's bylaws, pursuant to NRS 116.3102, as granting the Association the inherent authority to amend the CC&Rs upon a majority vote.
- 14. That there exists a controversy between Plaintiff and Defendant regarding the interpretation, application and enforcement of the Association's CC&Rs and the Association's

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Thousand Dollars, the exact amount to be established at trial.

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
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EXHIBIT 1

RPYT # 128.05



	That Justin A. Englert, in seneraled years
A VALUABLE CONSIDERATION,	the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, de hereby Grant, Sargain, the and Trudi L. Lytle, husband and wife
as joint tenants	FOR the season of all seals and
	County of Chark
thet real property ritualed in the to of Novado, bounded and describe	
See Enhible "A" attached here	eto and by reference made a part horses
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LEGAL DESCRIPTION 96115.02307

LOT NINE (9) OF ROSEMERE COURT, AS SHOWN BY MAP THEREOF ON FILE IN BOOK 59, OF PLATS, PAGE 58, IN THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER OF CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA.

TOGETHER WITH AND RESERVING THEREFROM AN RASEMENT FOR INGRESS AND BUBLIC UTILITY EASEMENT AS SHOWN ON SAID MAP OF ROSEMERE COURT.

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA JUDITH A. VANDEVER, RECORDER RECORDED AT REQUEST OF: NEVADA TITLE COMPANY 11-15-96 16:24 DB1 SELLY SPICIAL RECORDS NST. 02307 128.65

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EXHIBIT 2

94510-01241



DECLARATION OF COVENANTS, CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS (CC and R's)

This Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions made this Ath Day of Jan. 1974 by Baughman & Turner Pension Trust horeinafter referred to as "Subdivider", owner in fee simple of the tand situated in the City of Las Vogas, County of Clark, State of Nevada, described as follows:

Lots 1 through 9 of Rosemere Court, a subdivision, recorded in Book 59 of Pints, Page 58, Clark County Records, Novada.

WHEREAS, it is the desire and intention of Subdivider to sell the land described above and to impose on it mutual, beneficial covenants, conditions and restrictions under a general plan or scheme of improvement for the benefit of all the land described above and the future owners of the lots comprising said land.

NOW, THEREFORE, Subdivider bereby declares that all of the land described above is held and shall be held, conveyed, hypothecated or encumbered, leased, rented, used, occupied and improved subject to the following covenants, conditions and restrictions, all of which are declared and agreed to be in furtherance of a plan for the subdivision, improvement and sale of suid land and are established and agreed upon for the attractiveness of said land and lots and every part thereof. All of such covenants, conditions and restrictions shall run with the land and shall be binding on the Subdivider and on all of its heirs, successors and assigns and on all other parties having or occupying any right, title, or interest in the described land or any part thereof, and on all of their heirs, successors and assigns.

A breach or violation of these CC & R's or any re-entry by reason of such breach or any liens established hereunder shall not defeat or render invalid or modify in any way the lien of any mortgage or deed of trust made in good faith and for value as to said lots or PROPERTY or any part thereof; that these CC & R's shall be binding and effective against any owner of said PROPERTY whose title thereof is acquired by foreclosure, trustee's sale or otherwise.

- Lots shall be used for private one-family residential purposes exchalvely.
 Castomery out-buildings including guest house, hobby house, private garages or carports may be exected or maintained therein, consistent with City of Lie Vegus Zouing Ordinances.
- All leverories and tolless shall be built indoors and be connected with the calcular savet system;
- 3. No antennas or other device for the transmission or reception of television or radio signals or any other form of electromagnetic radiation shall be erected, used or maintained on the roof of any structure within subdivision. In addition, no cooling or heating units shall be visible on the roof of any structure within subdivision.

- 4. No rubbish, brush, weeds, undergrowth or debris of any kind or character shall ever be placed or permitted to accumulate upon said lots so as to render said premises a fire hazard, unsanitary, unsightly, offensive or detrimental to any other property in the vicinity or the occupants thereof. Trash containers shall be visible on days of trash pick-up only. The Owner of the lot, for himself, his successors and assigns agrees to care for, cultivate, prune and smalntain in good condition any and all trees, lawns and shrubs.
- 5. No odors shall be permitted to arise therefrom so as to render any such lot unsanitary, unsightly, offensive or detrimental to any other lot and no nuisance shall be permitted to exist or operate upon any lot so as to be offensive or detrimental to any other lot or to the occupants thereof; and without limiting the generality of any of the foregoing provisions, no horns, whistles, bells or other sound devices, except devices used exclusively for security purposes, shall be located, used or placed upon any lots. Stereo speakers may be used at regsonable volume levels.
- 6. No structure (including but not limited to dwelling units, garages, carports, walls and fences) shall be permitted to fall into disrepair and all structures shall at all times be kept in good condition and repair and adequately painted or otherwise finished. Any and all repairs, redecorations, modifications or additions, interior and exterior, shall fully comply with all restrictions.
- No owner shall permit any thing or condition to exist upon any lot which shall induce, breed or harbor infectious plant disease or nonlow lessets.
- 8. For continuity of the neighborhood appearance, every single-family twelling erected shall be of Spanish, Moorish, Mediterranean or similar-tyle architecture, and shall have a tile roof, face into the cul-de-sac and contain not less than 3,000 square feet of floor space for one-story homes and 3,500 square feet of floor space for two-story homes, exclusive of basements, porches, patios, garages, carports, guest or hobby houses.
- 9. Driveways for Lots 1 and 9 must enter the cul-de-sac and not the entrance street.
- Building plans of residences to be eracted shall be approved by Subdivider prior to start
 of construction.
- 11. Easements for installation and maintenance of utilities and drainage facilities have been conveyed as shown on the recorded subdivision plat and otherwise of record.
- 12. No billboards, signs, or advertising of any kind excepting a conventional for sale or for rent sign not larger than two feet by two feet shall be erected or maintained upon any of said lots without the written consent of Subdivider.
- 13. No animals or fowl, other than household pets, shall be kept or maintained on said property or any portion thereof. At any one time the total number of household pets shall not exceed four. No horses shall be allowed within the subdivision at any time.
- 14. Each Owner of a lot agrees for himself and his successors and assigns that he will not in any way interfere with the natural or established drainage of water over his lot from adjoining or other lots in said subdivision, or that he will make adequate provisions for proper drainage in the event it is necessary to change the natural or established flow of water drainage over his iot. For the purpose hereof, "natural" drainage is defined as the drainage which occurred or which would occur at the time the overall grading of said subdivision, including the finish grading of each lot in said parcel was completed by the Subdivider.

- 15. Landscaping in front of a residence shall be completed within three (3) months from completion of countraction of that residence. Landscaping shall meet or surpass VA and FHA standards.
- 16. No clothestines shall be placed nor shall any clothes be hung in any manner whatsoever on any lot in a location visible from a public street.
- 16. No boat, trailer, mobile home, camper or commercial vehicles may be parked at any time within the private drive (street) area. In addition, no automobile, camper, mobile home, commercial vehicle, truck, boat or other equipment may be dismantled on any lot in an area visible from an adjoining property or the street area.
- 17. No boat, trailer, mobile home, comper, or commercial vehicle may be parked or stored at any time on any lot in an area visible from adjoining properties or streets. Additionally, no automobile, camper, mobile home, commercial vehicle, truck, boat or other equipment may be dismantled or stored on any lot in an area visible from adjoining properties or streets.
- 18. No commercial tools, equipment, commercial vehicles, structures or other commercial appartenances shall be stored at any time on any lot.
- 19. Parchaetts/Owners shall on se equal sture basis, associe responsibility to maintain my and all off-site improvements which have been installed by Subdivider.
- 20. Purchasers/Owners or their successors in interest shall assume responsibility to maintain walls erected by Subdivider. Side and front walls shall be of the same type and color as presently installed and shall be erected within three months from completion of construction of house on said lot. Cost of side walls shall be agreed upon and equally shared by adjoining property owners. In the event side walls are already erected at time of purchase of lot, the Purchaser of that lot shall pay the adjoining lot owner who previously erected said wall one half (1/2) the cost as proven by his paid receipts. Payment shall be made within sixty (60) days from date of purchase of said lot.
- 21. A preparty owners committee shall be astablished by all owners of loss within the subdivision.
 - a. The committee shall determine the type and cost of landscaping on the four (4) exterior wall planters, and the entrance way planters. The committee shall also determine the method and cost of vatering and maintaining planters. All costs shall be equally shared by all owners of lots within the subdivision. In the event of any disagreement, the majority shall rule.
 - b. The exterior perimeter wall along the Oakey, Tenaya and El Parque frontaga shall be maintained and/or repaired when appropriate, under the direction of the praperty owners committee. The costs to be equally shored by all 9 lot owners.
 - c. The Entrante Gate and it's related methanical and electrical systems shall be maintained and/or repeked on an equal starre basis by all lot owners.
 - d. The Private Drive (the interior street) used for ingress and egress purposes by all tot owners and the private sewer system within the Private Drive and easement area shall be maintained and/or repaired on an equal share basis by all owners of lois within the subdivision.
- 22. Construction trailers or mobile homes will not be permitted on any lot within the

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- 23. Each of the provisions of these covenants, conditions and restrictions shall be deemed independent and severable and the invalidity or partial invalidity of any provision or portion thereof, shall not effect validity or enforceability of any other provision.
- 24. Except as otherwise provided berein, Subdivider or any owner or owners of any of the tots shall have the right to enforce any or all of the provisions of the covenants, conditions and restrictions upon any other owner or owners. In order to enforce sald provision or provisions, any appropriate judicial proceeding in law or in equity may be initiated and prosecuted by any such lot owner or owners against any other owner or owners.
- 25. Attorney's Fees: In any legal or equitable proceeding for the enforcement of or to restrain the violation of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions or any provision thereof, the losing party or parties shall pay in such amount as may be fixed by the court in such proceeding.

IN WITNESS WHERBOT, said Owner/Subdivider Bay Nevada, has beresses affixed their algressess.	gissan & Turner Pension Trust of
Date: 1-4-94 Stanker F. Turn Owner/Subdivider/Trustee Stanker F. Turn Date: 1-4-94 Richard 3. Baughr Owner/Subdivider/Trustee Richard 3. Baughr On this 4th day of January 1994, before me, the understand a Notice Public In	ughana-
Stephen F. Turner & Richard J. Baco Liana Syn Schully Notary Public in and for said County and State	(this area for official seal) When Becorded Mail To: Baughman & Turner, Inc. 1216 Hinson Street Las Vogan, NV 89102
4- c/-4	CLARK COUNTY, MEVADA JOAN L' SYNFT, RECORDER RECORDEDAT REQUEST OF: RUGMPH & TURNER INC 101-04-94 14189 PDR OFFICIAL RECORDS

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EXHIBIT 4

· IN WITNESS HEREOF, the owners of record of lots 1thru 9 of the Property, have affixed their signatures to the Rosemere Estates Property Owners Association AMENDMENT TO DECLARATION OF COVENANTS, CONDITIONS, AND RESTRICTIONS AND RESERVATIONS OR EASEMENTS: Kandla Co 1. 1860 Rosemere Ct. Ray/Evelyn Sandoval 2. 1830 Rosemere Ct. Jacques/Linda Lamothe 3. 1831 Rosemere C 4. 1861 Rosemere C 1901 Rosemere Ct. 6. 1931 Rosemere Ct. date: 72 07 7. 1961 Rosemere Ct. Orville/Johnnie McCumber date: 8. 1960 Rosemere CL Carl Cantor/Marge Boulden date: 9. 1930 Rosemere Ct. Allen/Trudi Lytle State of Nevada, County of Clark On this 2ndof July , 2007, personally appeared before me, a Notary Public in and for the County of Clark, State of Nevada, duly Commissioned and sworn, the owners of lots 1 thru 9 as indicated, personally known (or proved) to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the above instrument, and who acknowledged to me that he/she executed the same freely and voluntarily and for the uses and purposes therein mentioned. Notary Public 33 LAURIE A: ZWEIGER NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF NEVADA o Appointment Exp. 09-29-2009 Curtificate No. 05-100065-1 CORNEL S. MARCH

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CERTIFICATE OF OFFICERS

We, the undersigned, hereby certify as follows:

- 1. We are the duly elected and acting President and Secretary for ROSEMERE ESTATES PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, a Nevada non-profit corporation.
- 2. The foregoing Amended and Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Rosemere Estates, duly adopted by the members of the Association on <u>July</u>, 2007.
- 3. Members representing more than sixty-seven percent (67%) of the voting power of the Members of the Association voted in favor of the First Amendment.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Declarant has caused this Declaration to be executed as of this 2nd day of 1014, 2007.

ROSEMERE ESTATES PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION

By: Sen Blind

Its: President

By: Shuman F. Kearl

Its: Secretary

STATE OF NEVADA)

COUNTY OF CLARK

On this _____ day of ______, 2007, before me the undersigned Notary Public, in and for said County and State, personally appeared Gerry _______, Sharman known or proved to me to be the President of Rosemere Estates Property Owners Association, who executed the foregoing instrument, and who acknowledged to me that he did so freely and voluntarily and for the uses and purposes therein provided.

NOTARYPUBLIC

NIKKI GUO
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF NEVADA
APPT. No 83-84535-1
MY APPT. EXPIRES SEPT. 86, 8607

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JIM BIRGONS GOVERNOR

UNDSAY WAITE

STATE OF NEVADA

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY

REAL ESTATE DIVISION

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FOR OWNERS IN COMMON-INTEREST COMMUNITIES AND CONDOMINIUM HOTELS

GICOmbudeman@red.state.nv.us

http://www.red.state.riv.us COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

June 4, 2009

Thomas D. Harper, Esq. 606 South Ninth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Jason D. Smith, Esq. 400 South Fourth Street 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

DIANNE CORNWALL
Director

GAIL J. ANDERSON

Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Control # 09-33 Non-Binding Arbitration
Claimant(s): Lytle Trust, John Allen Lytle & Trude Lee Lytle, Trustees c/o Thomas D. Harper, Esq.
Respondent(s): Rosemere Estates Property Owners' Association c/o Jason D. Smith, Esq.

This notarized document will serve as a certificate for the Claimant(s) certifying they have completed the Alternative Dispute Resolution process as required by NRS 38.

Gordon Milden
Administrative Assistant III

CC: Ara H. Shirmian, Esq., Arbitrator

STATE OF NEVADA COUNTY OF CLARK

On June 4, 2009, Gordon Milden, who is personally known to me or proven to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to this instrument, appeared before me acknowledging that he executed same.

Victoria G. Broadbent
Notary Public, State of Nevada

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:

6/1/10

2501 E. Sehara Avenue, Suite 202 • Las Vegas, Nevada 89104-4137 (702) 496-4480 • Fax (702) 486-4520 • Toll Free 1-877-829-9907

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EXHIBIT 2

EXHIBIT 2

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CLERK OF THE COURT

OGSJ
Richard E. Haskin, Esq.
Nevada State Bar # 11592
GIBBS GIDEN LOCHER TURNER
SENET & WITTBRODT LLP
7450 Arroyo Crossing Parkway, Suite 270
Las Vegas, Nevada 89113-4059
(702) 836-9800

Attorneys for Plaintiff
JOHN ALLEN LYTLE and
TRUDI LEE LYTLE
as Trustees of the Lytle Trust

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

JOHN ALLEN LYTLE and TRUDI LEE LYTLE, as Trustees of the Lytle Trust,

Plaintiffs,

ROSEMERE ESTATES PROPERTY OWNERS' ASSOCIATION; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

CASE NO. A-09-593497-C Dept.: XII

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS JOHN ALLEN LYTLE AND TRUDI LEE LYTLE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on April 1, 2013, the Court heard Plaintiffs JOHN ALLEN LYTLE and TRUDI LYTLE, as TRUSTEES OF THE LYTLE TRUST's ("Plaintiff"), Motion for Summary Judgment, and ROSEMERE ESTATES PROPERTY OWNERS' ASSOCIATION's (the "Association") Motion for Summary Judgment. After considering the motions, oppositions and replies thereto, the declarations, affidavits, and evidence submitted therewith, and hearing oral argument thereon, the Court grants Plaintiffs JOHN ALLEN LYTLE AND TRUDI LEE LYTLE, as TRUSTEES OF THE LYTLE TRUST's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court further denies ROSEMERE ESTATES PROPERTY OWNERS' ASSOCIATION's Motion for Summary Judgment.

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Pursuant to NRCP 56(c), the Court's findings with respect to the undisputed material facts and legal determinations on which the court granted summary judgment are set forth herein and as follows:

FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

- 1. On January 4, 1994, Baughman & Turner Pension Trust (the "Developer"), as the subdivider of a cul-de-sac to be made up of nine (9) residential lots on a street known as Rosemere Court in Las Vegas, Nevada, recorded with the Clark County Recorder's Office a Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions ("Original CC&Rs.)
- 2. The Original CC&Rs consist of four (4) pages and 25 paragraphs, with no bylaws annexed, no amendment provision, and no homeowners association, as defined by Chapter 116.
- 3. The Original CC&Rs create a "property owners' committee" with very limited maintenance duties over specific common area items (exterior walls and planters, entrance way and planters, entrance gate, and the private street), which are specifically set forth in Paragraph 21 of the Original CC&Rs.
- The Original CC&Rs then grant each homeowner, and not any homeowners' association, the power to enforce the Original CC&Rs against one another.
- Among other things, there are no rental or pet restrictions or construction deadline in the Original CC&Rs.
- The Developer then sold the nine (9) undeveloped lots between May 1994 and July
 1996.
- The first of the lots was conveyed by the Developer under the Original CC&Rs on May 19, 1994.
- 8. Plaintiff's trustees, John Allen Lytle and Trudi Lee Lytle (the "Lytles"), purchased a Rosemere Estates property, assessor's parcel number ("APN") 163-03-313-009 ("Plaintiff's Property"), on November 6, 1996, from the original buyer who first purchased it from the Developer on August 25, 1995.
 - 9. The Lytles later transferred Plaintiff's Property to Plaintiff.

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	 The Lytles purchased the property with the sole purpose of building a custom home 				
	thereon.				
	11. The primary reasons that the Lytles selected the property were the limited restrictions				
l	contained in the Original CC&Rs and the lack of a "unit-owners association," as that term is legally				
	defined by Chapter 116 of the Nevada Revised Statutes ("NRS").				
	12. Further, the Lytles could not meet any restrictive deadline on construction, so				
1	Plaintiff purposefully selected in a community with no construction deadline.				
	13. Plaintiff undertook the design of the new custom built home, and by 2006, Plaintiff				
	had developed preliminary plans that were approved by the Developer.				
	14. Sometime after Plaintiff purchased its property, a group of property owners formed				
	the Rosemere Estates Property Owners Association (the "Association"), with the sole purpose				
	maintaining those common areas designated by Paragraph 21 of the Original CC&Rs.				
	15. In 1997, two owners, acting on behalf of all owners, filed Non-Profit Articles of				
١	Incorporation (the "Articles") pursuant to NRS 82, which formalized the property owners'				
	committee and named it "Rosemere Estates Property Owners Association."				
l	16. The property owners recognized that the Association did not have powers granted to				
	it other than those granted by the Original CC&Rs. For example, the Association had no power t				
	assess, fine, issue rules and regulations, or undertake other actions commonly reserved for				
	homeowners' associations.				
	17. In 1997, some of the property owners prepared and distributed a proposed set of				
	amended CC&Rs, which proposed to empower the Association and drastically increase the scope of				
	the Original CC&Rs.				
	18. The property owners determined that unanimous consent was required to amend the				
	Original CC&Rs. Due to a failure to obtain unanimous consent, as required, the proposed CC&Rs				
	were not adopted.				
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- At a February 23, 2004 Association meeting, two Board members presented a set of proposed, amended CC&Rs. The newly proposed CC&Rs included various restrictions not within the Original CC&Rs, including animal restrictions, exterior maintenance and repair obligations, prohibitions against "unsightly articles," and other use restrictions and obligations.
- The proposed amended CC&Rs were not unanimously approved at the February 23, 2004 meeting and, therefore, not adopted.
- Without warning, consultation or advisement to the Rosemere property owners, on or 21. about July 2, 2007, Amended and Restated CC&Rs were again proposed to the property owners by the Board.
- This third set of proposed amended CC&Rs increased the complexity, scope, and size 22. of the CC&Rs, from 4 pages to 36 pages, and contained numerous additional restrictions upon the property owners.
- At the July 2, 2007 homeowners' meeting, the Association's Board presented the 23. property owners with a binder that contained the following: (1) new Articles of Incorporation, dated June 6, 2007, which articles were never filed although represented to be as set forth herein; (2) a letter from the Board to the Association members; (3) a Corporate Charter referencing the February 25, 1997 and June 6, 2007 Articles of Incorporation; (4) a section entitled "Governing Documents" referencing the June 6, 2007 Articles of Incorporation; (5) the "First Statutorily Mandated Amendment to the Bylaws of the Rosemere Estates Homeowners Association," containing the recital "WHEREAS, the Declaration was recorded in the Office of Clark County Recorder on January 4, 1994, which Declaration provides for a method to make amendments to the Declaration and Bylaws...;" (6) the proposed Amended and Restated Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions ("Amended CC&Rs"). Bylaws did not exist prior to 2007.
- The binders containing all of the foregoing documents were presented to each homeowner together with the following misrepresentations: (1) the June 6, 2007 Articles of Incorporation were filed with the Secretary of State, (2) the original CC&Rs provided a method for amendment, (3) the CC&Rs could be amended without unanimous consent, (4) the 1999 Nevada Legislature, through adoption of Senate Bill 451, "mandated" that the original CC&Rs be changed

to conform to NRS Chapter 116 "without complying with the procedural requirements generally applicable to the adoption of an amendment...," and (5) all of the changes made were under NRS 116.2117.

- 25. The proposed Amended CC&Rs were far more restrictive than the Original CC&Rs and changed the very nature of property ownership within Rosemere Estates. The Amended CC&Rs contained numerous and onerous new use restrictions including the drastic expansion of the powers, rights, and duties of the Association, a section entitled "Restrictions on Use, Alienation, and Occupancy," pet restrictions, parking restrictions, lease restrictions, the establishment of a Design Review Committee with unfettered discretion, and a new and expansive definition of "nuísance."
 - 26. The Amended CC&Rs also contained a morality clause, providing as follows:

 No use that is reasonably deemed immoral, improper,

 offensive, or unlawful by the Board of Directors may be
 made of the Property or any portion thereof.
- 27. The Amended CC&Rs also contained a pet restriction that permits any animal found off a leash to immediately be turned over to animal control, and any animal causing a "nuisance," a vague and undefined term, to be permanently removed from Rosemere Estates upon three days written notice and hearing before the Board.
- 28. Finally, the proposed Amended CC&Rs contained a construction timeline that would require Plaintiff to complete the construction of the custom home on the lot within a mere 60 days of receipt of approval from the proposed Design Review Committee—something never envisioned in the Original CC&Rs and impossible to adhere to.
- 29. Plaintiff's property is the only Property subject to this restriction as Plaintiff's Property was the only undeveloped lot at the time of amendment.
- 30. Further, the 60 day deadline is impossible to satisfy, and the homeowner is fined \$50.00 per day for failure to comply with this impossible deadline.

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- 31. Pursuant to the Amended CC&Rs, approval for a home design was (1) entirely within the Board's discretion, (2) based on Design Review Guidelines that have never been published, and (3) not subject "to any objective standards of reasonableness."
- 32. After the Board presented the proposed Amended CC&Rs to the owners, together with the written misrepresentations set forth above, the Board did not provide the owners with a reasonable time to review or discuss the lengthy pack of legal documents, or to seek legal advice. Rather, the Board insisted that the amendment was "a done deal."
- 33. Despite the misrepresentations introducing the governing documents, the vast expansion of the Original CC&Rs, the lack of any review time or discussion, and the insistence that the amendment was a "done deal," the Board asked the property owners to sign documents acknowledging their approval, with a notary retained by the Board present to verify signatures.
- 34. The Amended CC&Rs were not agreed to by all property owners at the July 2, 2007 meeting. In fact, only five of the property owners approved, with three property owners who refused to sign the amendment. A fourth homeowner submitted a disputed proxy that was not counted by the Board.
- 35. Despite the failure to obtain the required unanimous approval for amending the Original CC&Rs, the Association proceeded, on July 3, 2007, to record the Amended CC&Rs in the office of the Recorder for Clark County, Nevada.

II. LEGAL DETERMINATIONS

A. Summary Judgment Standard

- 1. Summary judgment shall be rendered in favor of a moving party if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. NRCP Rule 56(c).
- 2. "Summary Judgment is appropriate and shall be rendered forthwith when the pleadings and other evidence on file demonstrate that no 'genuine issue as to any material fact [remains] and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Wood v. Safeway, 121 Nev. 724, 731, 121 P.3d 1026, 1031 (2005) (quoting NRCP 56(c).)

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3. The Nevada Supreme Court held that "Rule 56 should not be regarded as a disfavored procedural shortcut" but instead as an integral important procedure which is designed "to secure just, speedy and inexpensive determination in every action." *Wood*, 121 Nev. at 730, 121 P.3d at 1030 (internal citation omitted).

B. Plaintiff Is Entitled To Summary Judgment In Its Favor

- 4. A declaratory relief cause of action is proper where a conflict has arisen between the litigating parties, and the action is brought to establish the rights of the parties. 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments § 1.
- 5. Plaintiff's Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief seeks (1) a declaration from the Court that the Amended CC&Rs were not properly adopted by the members of the Association and were improperly recorded against Plaintiff's Property, and (2) a permanent injunction against the Association from adopting further amendments without unanimous consent.
- 6. Summary judgment as to the Declaratory Relief Cause of Action is warranted based on the Court's finding that the Amended CC&Rs were not adopted with unanimous consent, as required, and were, therefore, improperly recorded against Plaintiff's Property.
 - C. Rosemere Is A Limited Purpose Association Under NRS 116.1201 And Not A

 Unit-Owners' Association Within The Meaning Of NRS, Chapter 116
- 7. In order to create a valid unit-owners' association, as defined by Chapter 116, certain formalities "must" be followed. NRS 116.3101 provides, in pertinent part,

Organization of unit-owners' association.

- 1. A unit-owners' association must be organized no later than the date the first unit in the common-interest community is conveyed....
- 8. The purpose of Section 3101 is to provide the purchaser record notice that he/she/it is purchasing a property that is governed by a homeowners association and will be bound by Chapter 116, et seq.

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- 9. There is a strong public policy in protecting property owners in common-interest communities against any alteration of the burdens of character of the community. Rest. 3d, Property Servitudes, § 6.10, Comments.
- 10. A buyer is said to have "record notice" of the recorded covenants, conditions and restrictions on the property, thus the mandate that the homeowners' association be formed prior to conveyance of the first unit in the community, together with the requirement that the CC&Rs be recorded. NRS 116.3101.
- 11. Here, no Chapter 116 unit-owners' association was formed because no association was organized prior to the date the first unit was conveyed. The Association was not formed until February 25, 1997, more than three years after Rosemere Estates was formed and the Original CC&Rs were recorded.
- 12. Further, the Association did not have any powers beyond those of the "property owners committee" designated in the Original CC&Rs—simply to care for the landscaping and other common elements of Rosemere Estates as set forth in Paragraph 21 of the Original CC&Rs.
- 13. The Original CC&Rs provide for the creation of a "property owners' committee," which is a "limited purpose association," as defined by the 1994 version of NRS 116.1201, then in effect. That provision provided that Chapter 116 did not apply to "Associations created for the limited purpose of maintaining... "[t]he landscape of the common elements of a common interest community...."
- 14. In 1997, Rosemere Estates' owners formed the Association for the express and limited purpose of (1) tending to the limited matters set forth in Paragraph 21 of the Original CC&Rs, (2) holding a bank account in which to deposit and withdraw funds for the payment of the limited common area expenses assigned to the Owners Committee, and (3) purchasing liability insurance. The intent was never to form a unit-owners' association within the meaning of Chapter 116.

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¹ "Property owners in common-interest communities are protected against amendments that unfairly change the allocation of burdens in the community or change the character of the community." Rest. Law 3d, Property – Servitudes, § 6.10, Comments.

- 15. A limited purpose association cannot enforce "any restrictions concerning the use of units by the units' owners, unless the limited-purpose association is created for a rural agricultural residential common-interest community." NRS 116.1201(2)(a)(5). There is no question that Rosemere Estates was not "created for a rural agricultural residential common-interest community," hence the Association cannot enforce "any restrictions concerning the use of units by the units' owners...."
- 16. In reviewing the language of the Original CC&Rs, the Court must strictly construe the covenants thereto and any "doubt will be resolved in favor of the unrestricted use of the property...." Dickstein v. Williams, 93 Nev. 605, 608, 571 P.2d 1169 (1977); see also, e.g., South Shore Homes Ass'n v. Holland Holidays, 549 P.2d 1035, 1043 (Kan. 1976); Duffy v. Sunburst Farms East Mutual Water & Agricultural Company, Inc., 604 P.2d 1124 (Ariz. 1980); Bordleon v. Homeowners Ass'n of Lake Ramsey, 916 So.2d 179, 183 (La. Ct. App. 2005); Cummings v. Dosam, 159 S.E.2d 513, 517 (N.C. 1968); Long v. Branham, 156 S.E.2d 235, 236 (N.C. 1967).
- 17. In keeping with this well-settled and general principle, the Court construes the Original CC&Rs pursuant to the plain meaning of the language therein. Nowhere is there reference in the Original CC&Rs to a "unit-owners' association" or "homeowners association." Rather, the Developer created a 116.1201 limited purpose association termed a "property owners' committee," and the Developer provided that committee with limited, rather than comprehensive, duties and powers.
- 18. Consistent with the absence of a governing body, e.g. unit-owners' association, delegated with the duty to enforce the Original CC&Rs, the Developer provided each homeowner the right to independently enforce the Original CC&Rs against one another.
- 19. The Association is a limited purpose association under NRS 116.1201, is not a Chapter 116 "unit-owners' association," and is relegated to only those specific duties and powers set forth in Paragraph 21 of the Original CC&Rs and NRS 116.1201.

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The CC&Rs Can Only Be Amended By Unanimous Consent of All Property D. Owners

- Because Rosemere Estates is a limited purpose association under NRS 116.1201, 20. NRS 116.2117, the statutory provision typically governing amendments to the CC&R's, does not apply here.
- The Original CC&Rs are mutual and reciprocal among all of the Rosemere Estates 21. property owners. The Original CC&Rs "touch and concern" (and thus "run with") the land. Accordingly, under long-standing and well-established common law, the Original CC&Rs are binding, and not subject to amendment, absent a new conveyance properly executed by all Rosemere property owners and in conformance with all of the other legal requirements for a valid transfer of an interest in real property. In short, there can be no valid amendment of the Original CC&Rs absent, at a minimum, the unanimous consent of all Rosemere property owners.
- There has never been unanimous consent to amend the Original CC&Rs and there has 22. never been a valid conveyance of Plaintiff's interest in the Original CC&Rs. Specifically, unanimous consent was not received in 2007, when the invalid Amended CC&Rs were wrongfully recorded by the Association.
- Even if the provisions related to amendment within Chapter 116 were to apply, the Amended CC&Rs would still be invalid, and wrongly recorded, because NRS 116.2117 required unanimous consent under these circumstances. NRS 116.2117 specifies the kinds of amendments that require unanimous unit owner approval (as opposed to majority or supermajority approval). In particular, a "change of use" always requires unanimous approval.

NRS 116.2117 provides, in pertinent part:

1. ... the declaration, including any plats, may be amended only by vote or agreement of units' owners of units to which at least a majority of the votes in the association are allocated, unless the declaration specifies a different percentage for all amendments or for specified subjects of amendment. If the declaration requires the approval of another person as a condition of its effectiveness, the amendment is not valid without that approval.

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	5	(Emphasis added.)			
	6	24.	For the reasons set forth above, the Association's cour		
	7	judgment is without merit.			
L	8	III. <u>JUD</u>	UDGMENT		
ROD	9	IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED AND DECREED:			
(TIB	10	A.	Declaration		
₹ }	11	25.	Pursuant to the foregoing, this Court declares and orders th		
Gibbs Giden Locher Turner Senet & Wittbrodt	12	were not properly adopted or recorded, that the Amended CC&Rs are inval			
EE S	13	CC&Rs have no force and effect. This Order, may be recorded in the Of			
[GR	14	Recorder's Office by any party and, once recorded, shall be sufficient notice			
Ħ	15	B.	Injunctive Relief		
3	16	26.	The Association is permanently enjoined from recording and		
IDEN	17	CC&Rs. The Association is hereby ordered to release the Amended CC			
BS G	18	20070703-0001934, recorded with the Clark County Recorder on July 3, 20			
3	19	days after the date of Notice of Entry of this Order.			
	20	c.	Plaintiff's Monetary Damages		
	21	27.	Plaintiff's monetary damages are subject to a prove-up her		
	22	submit a separate motion regarding the same.			
	23	D.	The Association's Motion For Summary Judgment		
	24	28.	The Association's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.		
	25	E.	Costs		
	26	29.	Plaintiff is deemed the prevailing party in this action. Plaint		

chapter, no amendment may change the boundaries of any unit, change the allocated interests of a unit or change the uses to which any unit is restricted, in the absence of unanimous consent of only those units' owners whose units are affected and the consent of a majority of the owners of the remaining units.

4. Except to the extent expressly permitted or required by other provisions of this

ntermotion for summary

at the Amended CC&Rs id, and that the Amended ffice of the Clark County e of same.

d enforcing the Amended &Rs. Document Number 007, within ten (10) court

aring, and Plaintiff is to

iff is directed to prepare, file and serve a Memorandum of Costs.

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F. Attorneys' Fees

Plaintiff is deemed the prevailing party in this action. Any motion for attorney fees 30. will be addressed separately by the Court.

Prepared and submitted by:

Richard E. Haskin, Esq.

Gibbs, Giden, Locher, Turner, Senet & Wittbrodt LLP

7450 Arroyo Crossing Parkway, Suite 270

Las Vegas, Nevada 89113

Attorney for Plaintiff

JOHN ALLEN LYTLE and TRUDI LEE LYTLE

as Trustees of the Lytle Trust

EXHIBIT 3

EXHIBIT 3

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1 FFCL
DANIEL T. FOLEY, ESQ.
2 Nevada Bar No. 1078
FOLEY & OAKES, PC
3 626 S 8th Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Tel.: (702) 384-2070
Fax: (702) 384-2128
Email: dan@foleyoakes.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

MARJORIE B. BOULDEN, TRUSTEE OF)
THE MARJORIE B. BOULDEN TRUST,)
LINDA LAMOTHE AND JACQUES)
LAMOTHE, TRUSTEES OF THE)
JACQUES & LINDA LAMOTHE)
LIVING TRUST)

Plaintiff,

Defendants.

Case No. A-16-747800-C Dept. No. XVI

TRUDI LEE LYTLE AND JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, AS TRUSTEES OF THE LYTLE TRUST, DOES I through X; and ROE CORPORATIONS I through X,

Date of Hearing: April 13, 2017 Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m.

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FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendants' Counter Motion for Summary Judgment having come on for hearing before this Court on the 13th day of April 2017, Plaintiffs Marjorie Boulden and Linda Lamothe appeared with their counsel, Daniel T. Folcy, Esq. and Defendants John Allen Lytle and Trudi Lee Lytle, as Trustees of the Lytle Trust, appearing with their counsel, Richard Haskin, Esq. The Court having reviewed the Plaintiffs' Motion, the Defendants' Opposition and Counter-Motion and the Plaintiffs' Reply and all

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& 20 OAKES Page 1 of 7

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FOLEY₂₈ & OAKES documents attached thereto or otherwise filed in this case, and good cause appearing therefore, makes these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

To the extent any Findings of Fact also contain Conclusions of Law said Conclusions of Law should be considered as such. To the extent that any Conclusions of Law also contain Findings of Fact said Findings of Fact should be considered as such.

FINDINGS OF FACT

- 1. Mrs. Boulden is trustee of the Marjorie B. Boulden Trust (hereinafter "Mrs. Boulden") which owns that residential property known as parcel number 163-03-313-008 also known as 1960 Rosemere Ct., Las Vegas, NV 89117 ("the Boulden Property").
- 2. Mr. and Mrs. Lamothe are the trustees of the Linda Lamothe and Jacques Lamothe Living Trust (hereinafter "Mr. and Mrs. Lamothe") which owns that certain residential property known as parcel number 163-03-313-002 also known as 1830 Rosemere Ct., Las Vegas, NV 89117 (the "Lamothe Property").
- The Boulden Property and the Lamothe Property are located in the Rosemere Court subdivision and are subject to the CC&Rs recorded January 4, 1994 (the "Original CC&Rs").
- 4. John Allen Lytle and Trudi Lee Lytle are the Trustees of the Lytle Trust (collectively the "Defendants") which owns that certain residential property known as parcel number 163-03-313-009 (the "Lytle Property").
- In 2009, the Defendants sued the Rosemere Estates Property Owners Association
 (the Association") in the Eighth Judicial District Court, case # A-09-593497-C (the "Rosemere LPA Litigation").
 - 6. None of the Plaintiffs were ever parties in the Rosemere LPA Litigation.

- None of the Plaintiffs were a "losing party" in the Rosemere LPA Litigation as that term is found in Section 25 of the Original CC&Rs.
- 8. The Defendants obtained a Summary Judgment for Declaratory Relief from the District Court in the Rosemere LPA Litigation, which found and ruled as follows:
 - a. The Association is a limited purpose association under NRS 116.1201, is not a Chapter 116 "unit-owners' association," and is relegated to only those specific duties and powers set forth in Paragraph 21 of the Original CC&Rs and NRS 116.1201.
 - b. The Association did not have any powers beyond those of the "property owners committee" designation in the Original CC&Rs simply to care for the landscaping and other common elements of Rosemere Estates as set forth in Paragraph 21 of the Original CC&Rs.
 - c. Consistent with the absence of a governing body, the Developer provided each homeowner the right to independently enforce the Original CC&Rs against one another.
 - d. The Amended and Restated CC&Rs recorded with the Clark County Recorder's Office as Instrument #20070703-0001934 (the "Amended CC&Rs") are invalid, and the Amended CC&Rs have no force and effect.
- 9. Pursuant to NRS 116.1201(2) most of NRS Chapter 116 does not apply to the Association because it is a limited purpose association that is not a rural agricultural residential community.
- Defendants filed a Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs against the Association, and conducted a prove-up hearing on damages. After hearing all matters, a Final Judgment was entered in the Defendants' favor against the Association for \$361,238.59, which includes damages, attorneys' fees and costs (the "Final Judgment").
- 11. After obtaining the Final Judgment, the Defendants, on August 16, 2016, recorded with the Clark County Recorder's office an Abstract of Judgement referencing the Final Judgment

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against the Association, recorded as Instrument #20160818-0001198 (the "First Abstract of Judgment").

- 12. In the First Abstract of Judgment, the Defendants listed the parcel numbers of the Boulden Property and the Lamothe Property as properties to which the First Abstract of Judgment and Final Judgment was to attach.
- 13. On September 2, 2016, the Defendants recorded with the Clark County Recorder's office an Abstract of Judgement referencing the Final Judgment against the Association, recorded as Instrument #20160902-0002684 (the "Second Abstract of Judgment"). The Second Abstract of Judgment listed the parcel number of the Larnothe Property only as the property to which the Final Judgment was to attach.
- 14. On September 2, 2016, the Defendants recorded with the Clark County Recorder's office an Abstract of Judgement referencing the Final Judgment against the Association, recorded as Instrument #20160902-0002690 (the "Third Abstract of Judgment"). The Third Abstract of Judgment listed the parcel number of the Boulden Property only as the property to which the Final Judgment was to attach."

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

- The Association is a "limited purpose association" as referenced in NRS 116.1201(2).
 - As a limited purpose association, NRS 116.3117 is not applicable to the Association.
- 3. As a result of the Rosemere LPA Litigation, the Amended CC&Rs were judicially declared to have been improperly adopted and recorded, the Amended CC&Rs are invalid and have no force and effect and were declared void ab initio.
 - 4. The Plaintiffs were not parties to the Rosemere LPA Litigation.

5.	The Plaintiffs were not	"losing parties"	in the Rosemere	LPA Litigation	as per
Section 25 of	f the Original CC&Rs.				

- 6. The Final Judgment in favor of the Defendants is not against, and is not an obligation of, the Plaintiffs.
- The Final Judgment against the Association is not an obligation or debt owed by the Plaintiffs.
- 8. The First Abstract of Judgment recorded as Instrument #20160818-0001198 was improperly recorded against the Lamothe Property and constitutes a cloud against the Lamothe Property.
- 9. The First Abstract of Judgment recorded as Instrument #20160818-0001198 was improperly recorded against the Boulden Property and constitutes a cloud against the Boulden Property.
- 10. The Second Abstract of Judgment recorded as Instrument #20160902-0002684 improperly recorded against the Lamothe Property and constitutes a cloud against the Lamothe Property.
- 11. The Third Abstract of Judgment recorded as Instrument #20160902-0002690 was improperly recorded against the Boulden Property and constitutes a cloud against the Boulden Property.

ORDER

Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law above, and good cause appearing therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the

Defendants improperly clouded the title to the Boulden Property.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendants improperly clouded the title to the Lamothe Property.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendants slandered the title to the Boulden Property.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the First

Abstract of Judgment recorded as Instrument #20160818-0001198 in the Clark County

Recorder's Office is hereby expunged and stricken from the records of the Clark County

Recorder's Office.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Second Abstract of Judgment recorded as Instrument #20160902-0002684 in the Clark County Recorder's Office is hereby expunged and stricken from the records of the Clark County Recorder's Office.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Third Abstract of Judgment recorded as Instrument #20160902-0002690 in the Clark County Recorder's Office is hereby expunged and stricken from the records of the Clark County Recorder's Office.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendants are permanently enjoined from recording and enforcing the Final Judgment from the Rosemere LPA Litigation or any abstracts related thereto against the Boulden Property or the Lamothe Property.

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IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 1 Defendants are permanently enjoined from taking any action in the future against the Plaintiffs or 2 3 their properties based upon the Rosemere LPA Litigation. IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 4 5 Defendants are hereby ordered to release the First Abstract of Judgment, the Second Abstract of 6 Judgment, and the Third Abstract of Judgment recorded with the Clark County Recorder within 7 ten (10) days after the date of Notice of Entry of this Order. 8 9 DATED this ___ day of _____ 2017 10 11 12 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 13 Submitted by: 14 **FOLEY & OAKES** 15 16 Daniel Toley, Esq. 626 Sen St. 17 Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorney for Plaintiffs 18 Approved as to form: 19 20 Richard E. Haskin, Esq. 21 Gibbs Olden Locker Turner Senet & Wittbrodt LLP 1140 N. Town Center Dr., Ste. 300 22 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 Attorney for Defendants 23 24 25 26 27 Page 7 of 7

RECORDING REQUESTED BY

GIBBS GIDEN LOCHER TURNER SENET & WITTBRODT LLP

AND WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO

Richard E. Haskin, Esq. GIBBS GIDEN LOCHER TURNER SENET & WITTBRODT LLP 7450 Arroyo Crossing Pkwy., Ste. 270 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113

Inst #: 20160818-0001198

Feee: \$19.00 N/C Fee: \$0.00

08/18/2015 11:51:34 AM Receipt #: 2848915

Requestor:

NATIONWIDE LEGAL Recorded By: ANI Pgs: 3

CLARK COUNTY RECORDER

THIS SPACE FOR RECORDER'S USE (DEBBIE CONWAY

APN No.: 163-03-313-001 APN No.: 163-03-313-002 ←

APN No.: 163-03-313-003 APN No.: 163-03-313-004 APN No.: 163-03-313-005 APN No.: 163-03-313-006 APN No.: 163-03-313-007 APN No.: 163-03-313-008

ABSTRACT OF JUDGMENT

THIS PAGE ADDED TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE SPACE FOR RECORDING INFORMATION (Govt. Code 27361.6) (Additional recording fee applies)

Description: Clark, NV Document-Year. Date. DocID 2016.818.1198 Page: 1 of 3 Order: Judgment Comment:

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CLERK OF THE COURT

١ Richard B. Haskin, Esq. Nevada State Bar # 11592 2 Timothy P. Elson, Esq. Nevada State Bar # 11559 GIBBS GIDEN LOCKER TURNER 3 SENET & WITTBRODT LLP 7450 Arroyo Crossing Parkway, Suite 270 4 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113-4059 (702) 836-9800 5 Attorneys for Plaintiff 6 JOHN ALLEN LYTLE and 7 TRUDI LEE LYTLE

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

JOHN ALLEN LYTLE and TRUDI LEE LYTLE, A-09-593497-C CASE NO. Dept.: XII as Trustees of the Lytle Trust, ABSTRACT OF JUDGMENT Plaintiff, ROSEMERE ESTATES PROPERTY OWNERS' ASSOCIATION; and DOES I through 10, inclusive, Defendanta.

In the District Court of Clark County, State of Nevada, on July 29, 2013, a Judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiffs JOHN ALLEN LYTLE and TRUDI LEE LYTLE, as Trustees of the Lytle Trust ("Plaintiffs") and against Defendant ROSEMERE ESTATES PROPERTY OWNERS' ASSOCIATION ("Defendant").

On May 25, 2016, the District Court entered an Order Awarding Attorneys' Fees in the amount of \$297,072.66 in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant.

On June 17, 2016, the District Court entered an Order Awarding Plaintiffs' Damages Following Prove-Up Hearing against Defendant in the amount of \$63,566.93.

Finally, on July 22, 2016, the District Court entered and Order Awarding Plaintiffs' Costs against Defendant in the amount of \$599.00. RECEIVED

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Order: Judgment Comment:

Pursuant to the foregoing, the total amount of the Judgment, plus attorneys' fees and costs is 1 \$361,238.59. In addition, Plaintiff is due post-judgment interest at the Nevada legal rate annually 2 until the Judgment is satisfied. 3 I certify that the foregoing is a correct abstract of the judgment rendered in the above action 4 5 in my Court. 6 7 8 GIBBS GIDEN LOCHER TURNER SENET & WITTBRODT LLP 9 10 Respectfully requested by: 11 GIBBS GIDEN LOCHER TURNER SENET & WITTBRODT LLP 12 13 14 By: Richard E. Haskin, Esq. Nevada State Bar # 11592 15 16 Timothy P. Elson, Esq. Nevada State Bar # 11559 7450 Arroyo Crossing Parkway, Suite 270 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113-4059 17 18 Attorneys for Plaintiff JOHN ALLEN LYTLE and TRUDI LEE 19 LYTLE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

EXHIBIT 4

EXHIBIT 4

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1 CASE NO. A747800
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                        DISTRICT COURT
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                    CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
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  MARJORIE B. BOULDEN TRUST,
             Plaintiff,
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11
        VB.
12 LYTLE TRUST,
              Defendant.
13
14
                    REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
                             OF
15
    MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DEFENDANTS TRUDI
  LEE LYTLE, JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, THE LYTLE TRUST OPPOSITION
16
    TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND COUNTERMOTION FOR
                       SUMMARY JUDGMENT
17
18
        BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDGE TIMOTHY C. WILLIAMS
19
                    DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
20
21
               DATED THURSDAY, APRIL 13, 2017
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24
   REPORTED BY: PEGGY ISON, RMR, NV CCR #541
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1	LAS VEGAS, NEVADA; THURSDAY, APRIL 13, 2017		
2	9:07 A.M.		
3	PROCEEDINGS		
4	* * * * * *		
5			
6	THE COURT: Okay. We're going to move on to		
7	the contested calendar. Next up page 12. Marjoria B.		
8	Boulden Trust versus the Lytle Trust.		
9	MR. HASKIN: Yes.		
09:07:08 10	THE COURT: All right. Good morning.		
11	MR. FOLEY: Good morning, your Honor.		
12	THE COURT: Let's go ahead and note our		
13	appearances for the record.		
14	MR. FOLEY: Dan Foley on behalf of the		
09:07:20 15	plaintiffs.		
16	MR. HASKIN: Good morning, your Honor.		
17	Richard Haskin on behalf of the Lytle Trust.		
18	THE COURT: Okay. It's my understanding this		
19	is the motion for partial summary judgment. And we had		
09:07:32 20	a countermotion; is that correct?		
21	MR. FOLEY: Yes, your Honor.		
22	MR. HASKIN: Correct, your Monor.		
23	THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Foley, sir.		
24	MR. FOLEY: Yes, your Honor. We were here a		
09:07:38 25	couple of months ago on a TRO. And I'm I remember		

the Court familiarized itself pretty well with the 09:07:41 1 case. We don't have any disputed facts. 3 THE COURT: Okay. MR. FOLEY: And basically, what the issue is 09:07:52 6 here is that judgments have been recorded against my 7 |clients' property in a judgment that was obtained in a case that my clients weren't parties to. They didn't hire an attorney to represent 09:08:06 10 them. And the judgment is against the homeowners 11 association. The theory --12 THE COURT: And it's -- I mean, I wondered was 13 there a homeowners association; right? I mean ... MR. FOLEY: And it's a good question because 09:08:18 15 16 | it really isn't. There's a committee. THE COURT: Right. 17 MR. FOLEY: And so a lot of the -- what the 18 problem that has arisen here really goes back to this underlying case and how it was pled. 09:08:29 20 THE COURT: Right. 21 MR. FOLEY: And the parties in that case 22 pursued the case extensively even up to the Supreme Court and back, but just with this committee. So the Lytles have recorded this judgment 09:08:42 25

09:08:51 1 presumably under NRS 116.3117, which allows a judgment against a homeowners association to attach to the real 3 property of the members of the association. However, what the Lytles have done, and what 09:09:08 5 the entire support really for our case is, is based on 6 the summary judgment that the Lytles obtained in the underlying case. Which specific, sought declaratory 8 |relief from the Court and were granted declaratory relief, which provided, you know, a number of things 09:09:28 10 |including the fact that this is not a homeowners association that's governed by NRS 116. 11 THE COURT: Right. 12 MR. FOLEY: It's a limited purpose 13 association. That is what the Lytles sought. what they obtained. Now, they want to come back and 09:09:45 15 16 say exactly the opposite. And just -- I think my reply 17 brief, your Honor, really summarizes it perhaps best and cites to all of the different substantive 19 provisions in the summary judgment that provide most significantly -- provide everything most significantly. 09:10:07 20 The CC&Rs that were drafted specifically 21 provide that homeowners don't have a right to either --22 to sue either -- to sue the association nor do they 23 have a right to rely on the association and what is a

09:10:26 25 committee to enforce the CC&Rs.

09:10:28 1

09:10:43 5

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In fact, the CC&Rs specifically state if one homeowner thinks another homeowner has violated it, then it's an individual cause of action that they have against that homeowner. So my clients could have been sued. They were not.

As your Honor pointed out, the summary judgment motion -- summary judgment order specifically 8 is right. This is not an owners' association. that this is simply a committee with extremely limited 09:10:59 10 powers which include, you know, some landscaping and some issues with the front gate and some perimeter 12 walls. And that's it.

And we've cited the Court to NRS 116.1201 14 which provides that with respect to a limited purpose 09:11:19 15 association, which the Lytles obtained declaratory 16 relief saying that's what this is, that the rest of the 17 116 is inapplicable.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. FOLEY: So based on that, your Honor, we'd 09:11:29 20 ask for summary judgment ordering the abstracts of judgment that have been recorded to be expunged. The only reason it's not a motion for full summary judgment is we need to come back in and present to the Court evidence of what our damages are for clouding the title 09:11:47 25 and slandering the title.

Otherwise, if your Honor has any questions, 09:11:49 1 I'd be happy to address them. THE COURT: I don't. 3 MR. FOLEY: Thank you, your Honor. MR. HASKIN: Good morning, your Honor. 09:11:54 6 Addressing first some of the points that were raised in the oral argument, I think that we have to -- and I 8 don't want to go back over all the history, but the 9 history is that the Lytles sued the association because 09:12:11 10 the association passed amended CC&Rs that, for right or 11 wrong, at one point in time there was a full-blown 12 homeowners association pursuant to the amended CC&Rs, 13 which were recorded by the board of directors. THE COURT: But, I mean, was it truly a 14 09:12:25 15 |full-blown association? Because it's my understanding 16 that they never got unanimous agreement by the 17 association -- I'm sorry by the homeowners that would 18 agree to changing the existing CC&Rs, adopting a declaration, and agreeing to becoming a Chapter 116 19 homeowners association. 09:12:49 20 And the reason why I say that, I took a look. 21 22 And I read all the exhibits for the record. And I went 23 back, and I looked at the -- I think it's Exhibit 4. I'm sorry. Let me get the correct number. It was the 09:13:03 25 exhibit where the, I guess, two parties refused to sign 09:13:11 1 off on the amendment to the declarations of covenants 2 |conditions, and restrictions back in 2007. And, I 3 guess, one would be the owner of the property at 1830 Rosemere Court and, I guess, at 1960 Rosemere Court. So I'm looking at that. And it was -- there 09:13:30 5 6 was an attempt to have a Chapter 116 homeowners association. But it appears to me that attempt was never realized. MR. HASKIN: Your Honor, first of all, your 09:13:54 10 recognition of the facts is good. It's perfect. THE COURT: Right. 11 MR. HASKIN: I wish you were the judge in our 12 13 |first action. It would have ended a lot sooner. But the fact is in 2007 they rammed these amended CC&Rs 09:14:06 15 down the throat of every single homeowner in the 16 association. THE COURT: I understand that. I do. 17 MR. HASKIN: But, your Honor, it goes a little 18 further than that. It's one thing to say, you're 19 They were not a homeowners 09:14:16 20 | right, your Honor. association. They weren't. And it took several years 21 up to 2012 for this Court to recognize the fact that they weren't a homeowners association, and that action 23 was brought by the Lytles. But between 2007 and 2012, whether anybody 09:14:28 25

09:14:32 1 liked it or not, this was a full-blown homeowners association enacted as such --THE COURT: Well --3 MR. HASKIN: -- in every possible way. THE COURT: Wait a second here. But if it was 09:14:38 6 a full-blown homeowners association, then the trial 7 court in the companion matter would have entered 8 declaratory relief, set forth the fact that it was a 9 [full-blown homeowners association. And they would have 09:14:53 10 been affirmed on that issue on the appeal before the 11 Nevada Supreme Court; right? Because let's face it, they can act -- just 12 13 because you act like you're a homeowners association pursuant to the statute, doesn't mean you're one; 09:15:06 15 |right? MR. HASKIN: Correct, your Honor. Except in 16 17 this circumstance there is a sword and shield argument 18 to be made. And the fact is they did act like a 19 |full-blown homeowners association. And just by way of 09:15:17 20 example --THE COURT: I'll give you a question. 21 22 out and act like a corporation, does that mean I'm a corporation? Right? I mean, really. I can go out and 23 say, Look. I can go down and get a charter. Don't 09:15:29 25 register with the Secretary of State. I can have

09:15:31 1 |letterhead saying Timothy Williams, PC, Professional Corporation. But unless I go through the steps mandated as a matter of law, I'm not a professional corporation; right? I can hold myself out as one. And 09:15:45 5 as a result, I don't get the benefits of being a professional corporation. MR. HASKIN: But in this case they did, and 7 that's the distinguishing characteristic. THE COURT: How do they do --MR. HASKIN: Because they filed a counter suit 09:15:54 10 11 as -- and Mr. Poley was correct. He raised the point. The limited purpose association is not allowed to bring 13 an action against a homeowner. Under NAC 116.090, 14 that's, in fact, one of the definitions of a limited 09:16:09 15 purpose association. However, in this case not once, 16 but twice this homeowners association between 2007 and 17 2012 maintained an action against the Lytles. And I agree with your Honor. If --18 THE COURT: But if they -- I mean, I could sue 19 09:16:23 20 on behalf of -- I could file a lawsuit -- I'm just 21 using this as a hypothetical -- that Timothy C. 22 Williams Professional Corporation, right, but unless it's registered with the Secretary of State of the State of Nevada and all of the appropriate legislative 09:16:37 25 mandates that followed, would that be a proper lawsuit,

09:16:41 1 right? MR. HASKIN: It would be an improper lawsuit. 2 THE COURT: Exactly. 3 MR. HASKIN: But, your Honor, when it was --09:16:46 5 but it was finally dismissed and adjudicated in favor 6 the other party. You would not be able to proclaim all 7 of the benefits but none of the burdens that came with 8 you pretending to be a corporation. And that's exactly 9 | what is happening here. But I want --THE COURT: No. I would get no benefits. 09:17:02 10 11 would be probably personally responsible if they pierced the corporation veil and all those wonderful 12 things because I wouldn't have any protection. 13 MR. HASKIN: But, your Honor, let's take your 14 09:17:12 15 hypothetical. Let's pretend pursuit to the corporate 16 charter, whether it's 82 Or 83, whatever it may be, that pursuant to that corporate charter there as an 17 attorney fee provision inside the statute, and the 18 statute provided for attorney's fees, and you sued as the corporation, would you have the benefits of the 09:17:26 20 .on? No. Do we have that here? THE COURT: 22 MR. HASKIN: We did in this case. 23 THE COURT: Was --24 MR. HASKIN: Michelle Leavitt, who was the 09:17:33 25

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09:17:33 1 judge in this case in our attorney fee award, ordered
           that they are not a full-blown homeowners association;
           however, they sued pursuant to there. Therefore, the
           statute that applies attorney's fees to full-blown
           homeowners associations under 116 and pursuant to the
09:17:44 5
           amended CCERs, which were declared revoked, they don't
           get to use that as a sword and a shield.
                    THE COURT: But, I mean --
         8
                    MR. HASKIN: And that's exactly the case we
09:17:57 10
           had here.
                     THE COURT: But you can't have it -- you can't
        11
           be -- you can't have it both ways.
        13
                    MR. HASKIN: I agree.
                    THE COURT: Really and truly. Because, I
           mean, I looked at one of the provisions you relied upon
09:18:03 15
           in the declaration of covenants, conditions, and
        16
           restrictions. And it's my understanding you
        17
           specifically -- and that's on -- that's Exhibit 2 to
           the motion for partial summary judgment, page 1. And
           it would be paragraph -- I guess, the first paragraph
09:18:20 20
        21
           before paragraph 1.
                     And I read that specifically when it talked
        22
           about the breach or violation of the CCERs or any
        23
           reentry by reason of such breach or any lien
09:18:37 25 established hereinunder shall not defeat or render
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09:18:43 1 invalid or modify in any way the lien of any mortgage
           or deed of trust made in good faith, and so on.
                     I read that. That's simply a mortgage savings
         3
           clause pursuant to the CC4Rs. That's what that is.
09:18:55 5
                    MR. HASKIN: You're right, your Honor. And
         6 that's -- it was just cited for the belief -- it was
           cited for the mere fact that the original CC&Rs
           contemplated that liens could be placed.
         9 mortgage savings clause. No doubt.
09:19:06 10
                     THE COURT: That's all it is; right?
                    MR. HASKIN: But it says in case other liens
        11
           are placed. Because the plaintiffs in this case have
        13 an argument that there's no contemplation a lien can
           ever be placed on the property.
                     THE COURT: You know what's fascinating about
09:19:15 15
        16 this, I thought about this in light of the SFR case,
           potentially this mortgage savings clause would be
        17
           effective.
        18
                     MR. HASKIN: I saw the same thing.
        19
           actually not fully drafted.
09:19:25 20
                     THE COURT: I mean, but that would be
        21
           effective because it's not controlled by Chapter 116.
                     MR. HASKIN: Correct. Well, your Honor --
        23
                     THE COURT: Right?
        24
09:19:33 25
                     MR. HASKIN: -- I disagree with that.
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THE COURT: No. But SFR said you can't have 09:19:35 1 everything contrary to Chapter 116. But this is not a 2 Chapter 116 HOA. MR. HASKIN: But it's still a Chapter 116 LPA. 09:19:44 THE COURT: Yeah. MR. HASKIN: And I think we have to go there next, your Honor. Because with respect to the other 7 argument we're making, we're really making a common sense argument that applies to all homeowners 09:19:54 10 associations, whether it's a limited purpose association or not. 11 A homeowners association consists of the units 12 13 within the homeowners association, whether that's an 14 LPA or a full-blown unit owners association under 09:20:06 15 Chapter 116. And LPA is a Chapter 116 created device. THE COURT: I got a question for you. When it 16 17 comes to the enforcement to the assessment of the 18 attorney's fees pursuant to the controlling declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions, which 09:20:30 20 appear to be executed back in January of 1994, what provision -- and that's controlling in this case; 21 that's the declaration -- what provision of the 22 homeowners association would be the basis for the 23 assessment of attorney's fees and costs against the 09:20:52 25 Boulden Trust, Lamothe --

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MR. HASKIN: Sure.
09:20:56 1
                    THE COURT: -- and their trust?
                    MR. HASKIN: Okay. Your Honor, and I'll go
         3
            there next. This is Exhibit E to the request for
        5 | judicial notice that we filed. The attorney's fees
09:21:03
         6 were awarded to -- pursuant to three separate
         7 provisions. First was pursuant to the original CC&Rs.
         8 This is Judge Leavitt's order, which was challenged on
         9 appeal and it was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
09:21:16 10 what they said was that attorney's fees under
        11 paragraph 25 apply.
                     THE COURT: Wait, wait. But listen to me.
        12
        13 Yes, attorney's fees were assessed, but I'm talking
        14 about specifically assessing attorney's fees to, No. 1,
09:21:28 15 a nonparty to the lawsuit. Because I looked at the
        16 complaint, and the plaintiffs in this case were never a
           party to the lawsuit; right?
        17
                     MR, HASKIN: But --
        18
                     THE COURT: They were never -- I mean, were
        19
           they named as a plaintiff and/or a defendant in the
09:21:39 20
        21
            lawsuit?
                     MR. HASKIN: Your Honor, can I address that
        22
           point?
        23
                     THE COURT: Absolutely.
         24
                     MR. HASKIN: While we're on that? Okay.
09:21:45 25
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09:21:45 1 That's a misnomer. Under the D.R. Horton case versus
           Eighth Judicial Court, the homeowners -- the unit
           owners were not parties to that lawsuit ever, at any
           point in time. And under the D.R. Horton case, the
           Supreme Court of Nevada said that the units -- the
09:21:58 5
           units within an association are part of the association
           and subject to an order against the association.
                     THE COURT: But wait a second.
         8
                    MR. HASKIN: That's what we have here.
                    THE COURT: I got a question for you. And I'm
09:22:10 10
           quite sure I know the answer to this. But in the
        11
           D.R. Horton case, I would anticipate that the claim was
           for common areas; right?
        13
                    MR. HASKIN: It was for common, and it was for
        14
           units. That's not --
09:22:21 15
        16
                     THE COURT: No, no, no, no.
                    MR. HASKIN: It's for both, your Honor.
        17
                     THE COURT: If you take a look at the Nevada
        18
           Supreme Court as far as unit owners, the HOA is very
           limited in being able to file a claim on behalf of unit
09:22:29 20
        21
            owners.
                     MR. HASKIN: Well, your Honor -- okay.
        22
        23
           go back a second.
                     THE COURT: I'm not being real clear.
        24
                     MR. HASKIN: No. I understand. And I'm
09:22:38 25
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09:22:39 1 trying to answer real clear. THE COURT: We do construction defect in this 2 department. MR. HASKIN: I understand. But then that's where the D.R. Horton case is. That's why you have to 09:22:43 do --I know that. That's why I'm THE COURT: bringing it up because it's my recollection the D.R. Horton -- it's a different scenario. Say, 09:22:51 10 hypothetically, in this case the attorney's fees were awarded specifically regarding -- or there was an issue as it related to the gate, and the wall, and all those things that were specifically set forth in the CC&Rs 13 that would be the specific obligations of the property lowners committee -- right? -- that's contained in the 09:23:11 15 16 CCERs. I mean, I read that. I mean, I read all the I always do. documents. 17 So I'm trying to figure out what -- because I 18 think this is important to point out. There's a difference between awarding attorney's fees first and 09:23:24 20 foremost versus assessment of attorney's fees against 21 nonparties to the action. 22 MR. HASKIN: Completely different. But let's 23 go with back and use the hypothetical. And let's just assume. And we'll go backwards on this that this was a 09:23:37 25

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09:23:40 1 full-blown homeowners association. So we can all agree
           that 116.3117 applies. We can also agree that
           attorney's fees are included within a judgment. Okay,
           116.3117 contemplates that a unit owner is not going to
09:23:56 5 be a party to a judgment. That's what 116.3117 does.
           It knows that a homeowner is not going to be a party to
           a judgment. And what it says is: If you get a
           judgment against the association, you can record that
           judgment against each and every unit within the
           association even though they weren't individually named
09:24:12 10
           as parties. That's what 3117 says. It contemplates
        11
        12
            that exact scenario.
                     THE COURT: But this is not one of those types
        13
           of associations; right?
                     MR. HASKIN: True. But it's a limit --
09:24:25 15
                     THE COURT: Okay.
                                       I mean --
        16
                     MR. HASKIN: The bulk -- your Honor, you got
        17
            to let me finish.
        18
        19
                           (Court Reporter interrupts)
09:24:28 20
                     THE COURT: It's like a little bit pregnant.
        21
            It's not one of those associations.
                     MR. HASKIN: I was answering your
        23
           hypothetical. We keep going backwards.
                     Why does 3117 say that? It mays that because
09:24:37 25
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09:24:41 1 within the definitions provided under 3116, a unit is
            contained in the association. 3117 merely states the
           obvious. If I have a judgment against the association,
           I have a judgment against all property within the
           association. Whether it's an LPA or a unit owners
09:24:57
            association, it doesn't matter. I have a judgment
            against all property owned by the association. A unit
           is owned by the association pursuant to both the
           recitals in -- the original CC&Rs say that.
                     THE COURT: Show me where a unit is owned by
09:25:13 10
            the association in here.
                     MR. HASKIN: The original CCERs state that
        12
            this association includes Lots 1 through 9 of Rosemere
           Court. There are nine lots in this community.
        14
                     THE COURT: But the unit -- but they don't own
09:25:26 15
        16 lit.
                     MR. HASKIN: The association --
        17
                     THE COURT: I mean, when I see -- the only
        18
           time you really see any issues, and even they then
09:25:36 20 don't own it, the units. I mean, we're not talking
            about a co-op; right? We're talking about a --
                     MR. HASKIN: Correct.
        22
                     THE COURT: We're talking about -- here,
        23
           specifically, this is a limited purpose association.
09:25:47 25 Where does it say that the association owns the
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09:25:52 1 properties fee simple?
                    MR. HASKIN: Okay, your Honor. The two
         3 provisions are the original CC&Rs.
                    THE COURT: I have them right here. Just tell
09:25:59 5 me where to look. What page?
                    MR. HASKIN: It's the recitals, page 1.
                    THE COURT: Okay.
         7
                    MR. HASKIN: It states: If the Baughman,
         8
         9 Turner Pension Trust, hereinafter referred to as the
09:26:11 10 subdivider, owner in fee simple of the land situated in
        11 the City of Las Vegas, State of Nevada describes as
        12 follows: Lots --
                    THE COURT: Which paragraph?
        13
                    MR. HASKIN: I'm sorry. It's the recitals,
        14
09:26:20 15 your Honor. The very first paragraph in the indent
        16 right underneath it on page 1 of the original CC&Rs.
                     THE COURT: Is that the declarations,
        17
        18 |covenants, and restrictions?
                    MR. HASKIN: Yes, your Honor.
        19
                     THE COURT: Okay. All right. I got you.
09:26:28 20
                     MR. HASKIN: Okay. So the association is
        21
           defined as including lots 1 through 9. That's
           consistent with Chapter 116. 116.021, and these are
        23
           just definitions. This isn't a unit owners
09:26:43 25 association. This is LPA. This is definitions.
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09:26:45 1
                     THE COURT: All that's defining is who the
           declarant is; right?
         2
                     MR. HASKIN: Well, yeah. But it also defines
           what the association is.
                     THE COURT: But wait, wait, wait, wait.
09:26:50
         6 Doesn't that declare who -- that sets forth who the
           declarant is. I'm reading here. It says the
         8 declaration and covenants, conditions, and restrictions
         9 made on the 4th day of January, 1994, by the Baughman
09:27:05 10 and Turner Trust, hereinunder referred to as
        11 subdivider, owner in fee simple of the land situated in
        12 Las Vegas, County of Clark, State of Nevada described
           as follows. And they're the declarants, and they
        13
           described the lots. And so they're the ones
09:27:22 15 subdividing the property.
                     MR. HASKIN: And this is going to be all
        16
           included within this subdivision.
        17
                     THE COURT: Right, but that --
        18
                     MR. HASKIN: Right.
        19
09:27:28 20
                     THE COURT: But then they sell them off --
                     MR. HASKIN: Well, your Honor --
        21
                     THE COURT:
                                 -- each lot.
        22
                     MR. HASKIN: -- if I continue.
        23
                     THE COURT: Show me.
        24
                     MR. HASKIN: I don't believe that's true.
                                                                Ιf
09:27:32 25
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09:27:33 1 I can continue. You have to read it in conjunction
           with Chapter 116 in the provisions --
                    THE COURT: Tell me --
         3
                     MR. HASKIN: -- that do apply to LPS.
                     THE COURT: Tell me where it says. Because at
09:27:40
         6 the end of the day whatever ownership rights any
         7 association would have -- and I've read enough CC&Rs.
         8 For example, they'll tell you what the HOA owns.
         9 They'll set forth the common areas that are owned and
09:27:54 10 |controlled and maintained by the HOA. Very common in
        11 CCERs, you know.
                     And they'll -- they'll discuss specifically
        12
        13 what the burdens are as far as the unit owners are
        14 concerned. But go ahead and tell me where does it say
09:28:09 15 that the HOA in this -- under these declarations of
            covenants, conditions, and restrictions own the
        16
        17
           property.
                     MR. HASKIN: Well, that -- that by virtue -- I
        18
            guess, we're in disagreement there, your Honor.
        19
09:28:20 20
                     THE COURT: No, no.
                                          I'm asking.
                     MR. HASKIN: And I'm answering.
        21
                     THE COURT: I'm listening.
        22
                     MR. HASKIN: Because --
        23
                     THE COURT: Just point to a provision I can
        24
09:28:25 25 | look at, and maybe I'll agree with you.
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MR. HASKIN: Okay. Well, I pointed that one,
09:28:27 1
         2 but I'm reading in conjunction with NRS 116.021.
                     THE COURT: So we agree that there's no
         3
           provision under the CC&Rs that sets forth ownership by
           the HOA of the units?
09:28:35 5
                     MR. HASKIN: No. I don't agree with that,
         7
           your Honor.
                     THE COURT: Then -- where is it then?
         8
                    MR. HASKIN: Right here, your Honor.
09:28:43 10 describes the declaration of CC&Rs.
                     THE COURT: Okay.
        11
                     MR. HASKIN: Applies to these lots 1 through
        12
        13
           9.
                     THE COURT: Okay. So --
        14
                     MR. HASKIN: This is the association.
09:28:48 15
                     THE COURT: So for the record, it's your
        16
        17 position that the simple introductory language as it
        18 relates to the declaration and the subdivision of the
           property stands for the proposition that the HOA owns
09:29:00 20
           the property.
                     MR. HASKIN: It says that the HOA consists of
        21
            this property. And then if you go down to paragraph 21
        22
            that establishes this property owners --
        23
                     THE COURT: Okay. Let me look at that with
        24
09:29:10 25
           you.
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09:29:10 1 MR. HASKIN: Sure. THE COURT: All right. I'm with you. 2 MR. HASKIN: Okay. A property owners 3 committee shall be established by all owners of lots 09:29:17 5 within the subdivision. What's the subdivision? 6 1 through 9. And it talks about the power of the unit owners association, which is what the Lytles fought to enforce all along. Okay. So it's my reading of this that the 09:29:32 10 association consists of lots 1 through 9 of Rosemere 11 Court, and the owners committee, which is created, is created to enforce the provisions of these original 12 CCERs with respect to those subdivisions. 13 THE COURT: But I notice you didn't say that 14 09:29:44 15 the association owned lots 1 through 9. MR. HASKIN: Well, then I go to Chapter 116, 16 17 your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. So you agree it's not in 18 19 the CC&Rs. MR. HASKIN: Well, if you read it -- your 09:29:50 20 Honor, I've read a lot of CCERs, too. I don't know any CCERs that say, we own your house. They don't. 22 THE COURT: No, no. They say specifically 23 24 what's owned by the HOA and they'll say specifically 09:30:04 25 | what's owned by the unit owners. Like in condominiums,

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09:30:07 1 | for an example, they'll have the interior walls that
         2 are owned by the unit owners. I mean, let's not
           quibble here. And let's not be facetious. I know what
           they say.
                    MR. HASKIN: No. And I'm not being facetious,
09:30:15 5
         6 your Honor. I -- it's -- I think we're getting hung up
         7 on the word "ownership". Because it's not whether it's
         s ownership or not because it's obvious that a homeowners
         9 association doesn't own your house. However, your
09:30:28 10 house is part of the association, and that's what
            subjects it to, frankly, the judgments under 3117.
                     THE COURT: All right.
        12
                     MR. HASKIN: And, again, it's just a reading
        13
        14 of, in my view, of the definitions. And if we go to
09:30:42 15 NRS 116.021, common-interest community is all real
        16 estate described in the declaration with respect to
        17 | which a person, by wirtue of one's ownership of a unit,
        18 is obligated to pay for.
                     Okay. So common-interest community includes
        19
09:30:58 20 all the real estate -- all of the real estate described
           in the declaration.
                     So if I go back to the declaration, we're
        22
           talking about lots 1 through 9. That's the
        23
           association.
                          It includes all of the real estate
09:31:10 25 described in the declaration. That's lots 1 through 9.
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THE COURT: So are you taking a position that 09:31:21 1 2 | the CCERs that have been prepared in this case meet the requirement of a common-interest community under NRS 116.021? MR. HASKIN: No. As an LPA, a limited purpose 09:31:33 association under Chapter 116. THE COURT: Okay. 7 MR. HASKIN: I think there's this -- Chapter 8 9 116 creates a unit owners association. It also does 09:31:45 10 create a limited purpose association. It also creates 11 a small planned community. There are several different 12 aspects to 116. It's -- and going further, your Honor. 13 14 116.093, unit is defined as the physical portion of the 09:32:03 15 common-interest community designated for separate 16 ownership or occupancy. Again, it defines a unit as a 17 | physical portion of the common-interest community. Your Honor, it's not my contention that by 18 19 looking at one document you could fully define this 09:32:19 20 case. It's my contention you have to read the original 21 CCaRs in conjunction with the definitions under 116. And also even if you -- even if you say 116.3117 does not apply, it's our belief that 3117 is merely a 23 recitation of the obvious, that a unit owner -- that a 09:32:44 25 unit is contained within the association. I have a

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09:32:45 1 judgment against the association. I can record the
           judgment against all real estate described in the
           declaration.
                    THE COURT: What application --
                    MR. HASKIN: And that's lots 1 through 9.
09:32:53 5
                     THE COURT: What application does, let me see
         7 here, does NRS 11.1201 (sic) have in this case?
                    MR. HASKIN: 11.1201? Is that the limited
         8
         9 purpose association statute, your Honor?
09:33:14 10
                    THE COURT: Yes.
                    MR. HASKIN: I'm pulling it up right now, your
        11
           Honor.
        12
                     THE COURT: Because if you look at 11.1201,
        13
           paragraph 2 it says, This chapter does not apply to a
09:33:34 15
           limited purpose association.
                    MR. FOLEY: You've been saying 11.
                                                        It's 116.
        16
                     THE COURT: I'm sorry, 116.
        17
                     MR. HASKIN: Yeah.
        18
                     THE COURT: 116.1201. I was just -- I don't
        19
09:33:45 20 know why I said 11, but it's 116.
                     MR. FOLEY: Just thought you jumped to a
        21
            statute of limitations.
        22
                     THE COURT: No.
        23
                     MR. HASKIN: That's a whole different problem.
        24
                     THE COURT: Yeah. But, no. I mean, I'm
09:33:53 25
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09:33:54 1 looking here. It says, it's talking specifically about the applicability regulations. And it's my understanding when it comes to issues as to statutory construction, you can look at the title to determine the intent of the statute. 09:34:09 5 And so it says here it doesn't apply to a limited purpose association. So what do I do with that? Why should I apply the specific provision you want me to apply in this case? MR. HASKIN: Well, your Honor, I think there's 09:34:24 10 11 no disagreement by the parties that 3117, which is a judgment provision, does not apply. I think that's --12 that's -- you know, our argument is that it applies by 13 14 virtue of the sword and shield doctrine. And we've already discussed that, your Honor, so I won't 09:34:38 15 elaborate any further. 16 But with respect to the unit owners 17 association, I'm merely reading the original CC&Rs, 18 your Honor, in conjunction with the definitions set forth in 116. I'm not going to argue that we're not a 09:34:50 20 limited purpose association. We are. And a limited 21 purpose association is subject to very few provisions of Chapter 116. But it is still a Chapter 116-created 23 entity. It exists by virtue of 116. It just simply 09:35:07 25 limits the provisions such as budgets, and board

09:35:14 1 voting, and those sorts of things. But it's still a Chapter 116 entity. And again, your Honor, I think my argument --THE COURT: So what provisions, if any, should 5 | I apply to support your position if the statute stands 09:35:22 for the proposition that Chapter 116 of the provisions don't apply to a limited purpose association? MR. HASKIN: I think the definitions, your Honor, in conjunction with the original CCERs that 09:35:41 10 define what the -- what the association consists of. 11 think if you read those two provisions in conjunction with one another, you have -- you have an association that consists of the lots. It consists of all of the 13 property within the association. The benefit here, your Honor, for Chapter 09:35:57 15 16 |116.3117 and why 3117 was created was ordinarily you would have joint and several liability against 17 18 homeowners. 3117 creates a several liability rather than joint and several liability. In other words, the 19 09:36:16 20 provision was meant to benefit homeowners. 21 |wasn't -- it was meant to, Hey, ordinarily, you would 22 be subject to joint and several liability, but because you're in a unit owners association, we're going to create this statutory mechanism by which it's only 24 09:36:30 25 going to be several liability. So if you have nine

09:36:32 1 lots, you're subject to 1/9th of the judgment. It limits the -- it limits the liability of each and every unit owner. But it doesn't change the fact, your Honor, that our reading under the original CCERs in conjunction with the definition section of 09:36:45 5 Chapter 116 is that the unit -- that the common-interest community -- this is a limited purpose common-interest community. Still a common-interest community. There's no argument a limited purpose association isn't a common-interest community. It is. 09:37:01 10 It's just not a unit owners committee by definition. 11 THE COURT: I got another question for you. 12 MR. HASKIN: Sure. 13 THE COURT: I took -- I read Chapter -- I'm 14 sorry, paragraph 25 to the CC&Rs as it relates to 09:37:11 15 attorney's fees. What impact does this have in a case? 16 Because the provision pursuant to the CCERs sets forth 17 as follows: 18 Attorney's fees: In any legal or equitable 19 proceeding for the enforcement of or to 09:37:29 20 restrain the violations of the declaration of 21 covenants, conditions, and restrictions, or any 22 provisions thereof, the losing party or parties 23 shall pay by such amount as may be affixed by 24 the Court in such proceedings. 09:37:51 25

And the reason why I bring that up, it talks 09:37:53 1 about -- it talks about two things. No. 1, any legal or equitable proceeding for enforcement of the -- for violations or restraint of the CCERs. It appeared to 09:38:13 5 me the prior case didn't involve specifically enforcement of these CCERs, but a new proposed CC&Rs which didn't meet the mandate under Chapter 116. Number one. No. 2, the CCERs that controlled and have always controlled this case, specifically talks about 09:38:36 10 the assessment of attorney's fees pursuant to the CC&Rs 11 as to losing party or parties. 12 And so in order to enforce the CC4Rs as it 13 relates to attorney's fees in this case, I guess, two things have to be addressed: 09:38:55 15 No. 1, were the Bouldens and Lamothes parties? 16 And No. 2, were they losing parties pursuant 17 to the CC&Rs? 18 What do I do with that? 19 MR. HASKIN: Well, your Honor --09:39:10 20 THE COURT: Do I just ignore it? Or what? 21 MR. HASKIN: Are we talking about the original 22 action, your Honor? I apologize. 23 I'm not talking about -- I'm 24 THE COURT: reading the CCERs that would be on the -- pursuant to 09:39:17 25

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09:39:21 1 the limited purpose association that apparently is
         2 still in force and affect after years of litigation.
         3 and that would be the basis for the attorney's fees
         4 being awarded in any case as to any member of the
09:39:38 5 limited purpose association.
                     And it appears to me that the CC&Rs are
         7 particular as to upon what circumstances attorney's
         8 fees and costs can be awarded. And it has to be,
         9 No. 1, you have to be -- it says here, have to be a
09:39:58 10 losing party, basically. That's what it says.
                     So this provision -- can't we say -- is this
        11
            true this provision wouldn't be the basis for the award
        12 l
        13 of attorney's fees against the Bouldens and the
        14 Lamothes because they weren't losing parties to any
09:40:17 15 |litigation; right? Or should I just ignore that?
                     MR. HASKIN: Your Honor, the -- I'm a little
        16
        17 perplexed how to address it. Maybe your Honor could
        18 |clarify. But the prior Court's ruling in this case did
           enforce the attorney's fees provision pursuant to,
09:40:38 20 again, three provisions. That the provision Chapter
           116, the attorney's fees provision pursuant to Chapter
           116, and the amended CCERS.
                     THE COURT: Well, I'll clarify it for you.
        23
           understand that. But the award of attorney's fees, I
09:40:53 25 mean, I'm looking at it from this perspective, the
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09:40:57 1 plaintiffs in this case weren't named parties in the 2 underlying litigation; right? MR. HASKIN: They weren't named parties in the 4 underlying litigation. 09:41:07 5 THE COURT: Okay. MR. HASKIN: Correct. The argument in the 7 other action, your Honor -- I forget what department 8 now it is, but it was before Michelle Leavitt. 9 argument in that action, your Honor, was that, 09:41:19 10 essentially, the association served as a group of all 11 of the homeowners in that action in order to promote the rights of all the homeowners against the Lytles in 12 that case. 13 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else, sir? 14 MR. HASKIN: Nothing else, your Honor. 09:41:35 15 THE COURT: Mr. Foley, sir. 16 MR. FOLRY: Yeah. Just get back to, your 17 18 Honor, the fact that there is a lot of res judicata in this case based on the summary judgment and the 09:41:49 20 declaratory relief that they obtained. And I would reference the Court to, on this issue of the CCERs, to 21 on page 11 of the summary judgment. It says Judgment pursuant to the foregoing, this Court declares and orders that the amended CCERs are invalid and the amended CCERs have no force and effect. 09:42:03 25

09:42:06 1 THE COURT: Okay. This issue has come up about this MR. FOLEY: 2 3 being a Chapter 116 limited purpose association. There is no such thing. Just because the word limited 5 purpose association is found there in 1201, and it says 09:42:19 that this chapter doesn't apply, that doesn't create a vehicle. And, in fact, on page 8 of the findings, the Court --THE COURT: I've seen that. It was --09:42:33 10 actually starts on page 7 with the Section C. Right 11 there in the order. I read it. MR. FOLEY: Yeah. 12 THE COURT: And it goes through it. 13 stands for the proposition that Rosemere is a limited purpose association under NRS 116.1201 and not a unit 09:42:45 15 owners association with the meaning of NRS Chapters 16 116. It's right there in the order. 17 MR. FOLEY: Yeah. Well, and number -- and 18 19 number 11 on page 8 says here, no Chapter 116 unit 09:43:02 20 owners association was formed because no association 21 was organized prior to the date of the first -- that the first unit was conveyed. 22 THE COURT: I see that. 23 MR. FOLEY: And throughout paragraph 13, 24 09:43:19 25 paragraph 14, again, 14 states the intent was never to

form a unit owners association within the meaning of 09:43:25 1 Chapter 116. 2 And paragraph 17 on page 9 says -- nowhere is there reference in the original CC&Rs to a unit owners association or a homeowners association. So it's not 09:43:38 5 even a reference to it. Again, as your Honor pointed out, it was just this committee. And then, you know, on page 9, paragraph 19 it R states that the association is a limited purpose 09:43:54 10 association. Under 116.1201 is not a Chapter 116 unit owners association. Is relegated to only those specific duties and powers set forth in paragraph 21 of 12 the original CC&Rs and NRS 116.1201, which talks about 13 14 the agricultural purpose. So all of these arguments that are being made 09:44:16 15 16 are really being made against and contrary to the declaratory judgment that they obtained. I understand 17 they found themselves in a bit of a pickle here that 18 they prevailed, and they prevailed mightily in the underlying case. But that doesn't allow them to now 09:44:35 20 convert this award of attorney's fees into a judgment 2.1 against nonparties to the litigation, the only support for which would be under 116.3117. 23 And they can't -- having prevailed, they can't 24

just walk away from it and now completely ignore and

09:44:56 25

09:45:00 1 argue contrary to the declaratory judgment regarding this particular association. THE COURT: Now, I got one question for you, 3 Mr. Foley. And, counsel, you can, of course, address 09:45:09 this. Because I'm looking at the findings of facts and conclusions of law. I've read those as it related to the motion for summary judgment. And then I looked 09:45:25 10 at the order on attorney's fees and costs that were awarded to the plaintiffs in the underlying action. 11 And I'm reading this, and I'm trying to figure 12 out. And then I look at the abstract of adjustment. 13 And I'm trying to figure out what would be the basis, 09:45:40 15 | if any, to file a lien on the Boulden and Lamothes' properties. Because I don't know if I see it. 16 MR. FOLEY: The only basis would be 3117 under 17 NRS 116. 18 THE COURT: Because there's nothing 19 specifically in Judge Leavitt's order and/or as far 09:45:56 20 as -- when I say order, now I'm talking about the order on plaintiff John Allen Lytle and Trudi Lee, I guess, 22 Lytle's motion for attorney's fees. And then looking 23 at the abstract of judgment. MR. FOLEY: Right. 09:46:12 25

THE COURT: It's my impression in just looking 09:46:13 1 at those documents in and of itself, I don't see anything that specifically sets forth the basis for liening the properties of the plaintiffs in this case. 09:46:25 5 MR. FOLEY: No. There's nothing. THE COURT: I just want to make sure. The reason I'm asking the question, I just want to make 7 sure I'm not overlooking something. MR. FOLEY: No. They just unilaterally, when 09:46:34 10 they recorded the abstract of judgment, typed in all of 11 these parcel numbers so that it attached. That wasn't 12 done by the Court. There's nothing in the order that would in any way support an argument from the order 13 14 itself that this judgment would somehow apply to 09:46:51 15 nonparties to the litigation. Nothing. The only thing they can ever get to on that, I 16 think, again, is 3117. And we've beaten that up pretty 17 good that it just absolutely has no application to this association. 19 09:47:07 20 THE COURT: Sir, is there anything I need to look at as far as the order and/or abstract of judgment 22 issue? MR. HASKIN: Your Honor, no. Not -- well, 23 yes. Yes and no. I mean, the order -- all the orders 09:47:18 25 |in this case grant the Lytles a judgment against the

association. And, your Honor, I --09:47:21 1 THE COURT: I understand. 2 MR. HASKIN: I've been here long enough. fully understand which way you're heading. But our 09:47:27 5 contention, again, just for the record, is fairly clear, I believe. And not to beat it to death, but, 7 again, it's the original CCERs themselves that define 8 lots 1 through 9 as the subdivision together in |conjunction with Chapter 116's definitions that state 09:47:45 10 that the association -- a common-interest community --11 it doesn't say a unit owners association. It doesn't say a limited purpose association. It says a 12 13 |common-interest community, of which there's no question this is one, includes all real estate, including units, 09:48:01 15 within that association. This is -- there are no facts in dispute. These are two units. 16 So what gave the Lytles the power, we contend, 17 to record the abstracts of judgment? These are units. 18 They're included within the association. We have a judgment against the association. A judgment could be 09:48:18 20 recorded against all property within the association. 21 THE COURT: I understand. Okay. Gentlemen, 22 this is what I'm going to do: Regarding the motion for 23 24 partial summary judgment, I'm going to grant that. 09:48:40 25 | I think we have a fairly, fairly good record, you know.

09:48:48 1 Because we've had a lot of discussion as far as this issue is concerned. No. 1, the basis of my decision is focusing 3 primarily on: No. 1, that the association at issue is 09:49:06 5 a limited purpose association and, as a result, 6 pursuant to NRS 116.1201 that deals with the applicability of the statute and regulations sets forth in paragraph No. 2, this chapter does not apply to limited purpose associations. Secondly, the plaintiffs in this case weren't 09:49:29 10 11 parties to the underlying litigation. They weren't. They were never named. It was a limited purpose 12 association. 13 I guess, also it's important. I think, 14 09:49:46 15 Mr. Foley, what I want you to do is, you know, look at 16 the record we've made. And because I think the application of the CCERs are very, very important. 18 Because even if you look at the attorney's fees 19 provision under paragraph 25, any assessment of 09:50:07 20 attorney's fees pursuant to the controlling limited 21 purpose CCERs specifically regard any legal and/or 22 equitable proceedings for the enforcement of or restrain violations of the CCERs or declarations, 23 covenants, conditions, and restrictions that were put 09:50:33 25 in effect back from 1994. But more importantly, there

09:50:36 1 has to be a party that lost. And so the plaintiffs in 2 this case weren't a party, and they didn't lose. And 3 |so that's my decision. Plus -- when you -- I read everything. And so, you know, just prepare a proposed 09:50:49 5 6 findings of fact conclusions of law. And make sure counsel gets an opportunity to review that. And then 8 | if you can't agree, submit your own. All right. MR. FOLEY: Thank you, your Honor. MR. HASKIN: Thank you, your Honor. 09:51:00 10 THE COURT: Okay. Gentlemen, enjoy your day. 11 MR. HASKIN: You too. 12 13 (Proceedings were concluded.) 14 09:51:04 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

09:51:04	1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
	2	STATE OF NEVADA) :SS
	3	COUNTY OF CLARK)
	4	I, PEGGY ISOM, CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER DO
09:51:04	5	HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I TOOK DOWN IN STENOTYPE ALL OF THE
	6	PROCEEDINGS HAD IN THE BEFORE-ENTITLED MATTER AT THE
	7	TIME AND PLACE INDICATED, AND THAT THEREAFTER SAID
	8	STENOTYPE NOTES WERE TRANSCRIBED INTO TYPEWRITING AT
	9	AND UNDER MY DIRECTION AND SUPERVISION AND THE
09:51:04	10	FOREGOING TRANSCRIPT CONSTITUTES A FULL, TRUE AND
	11	ACCURATE RECORD TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY OF THE
:	12	PROCERDINGS HAD.
	13	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SUBSCRIBED
	14	MY NAME IN MY OFFICE IN THE COUNTY OF CLARK, STATE OF
09:51:04	15	NEVADA.
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	18	PEGGY ISOM, RMR, CCR 541
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1		ACCURATE [1]	25/20 25/24 27/2	application [4]
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116.093 [1] 26/14	836-9800 [1] 2/13	after [1] 32/2	another [3] 6/2	argue [2] 28/20
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			(1)	MR. FOLEY: - assessing

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CLERK OF THE COUR MRCN 1 Richard E. Haskin, Esq. Nevada State Bar # 11592 Timothy P. Elson, Esq. Nevada State Bar # 11559 3 GIBBS GIDEN LOCHER TURNER SENET & WITTBRODT LLP 4 1140 N. Town Center Drive, Suite 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144-0596 Telephone: (702) 836-9800 Facsimile: (702) 836-9802 5 6 E-Mail: rhaskin@gibbsgiden.com 7 Attorneys for Defendants TRUDI LEE LYTLE, JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, 8 & THE LYTLE TRUST 9 10 11 12 DISTRICT COURT 13 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 14 15 A-16-747800-C MARJORIE B. BOULDEN, TRUSTEE OF THE Case No.: Dept.: XVI MARJORIE B. BOULDEN TRUST, LINDA 16 LAMOTHE AND JACQUES LAMOTHE, DEFENDANTS TRUDI LEE LYTLE, 17 TRUSTEES OF THE JACQUES & LINDA JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, AND THE LYTLE LAMOTHE LIVING TRUST TRUST'S REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO 18 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR, Plaintiff, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION TO 19 ٧. ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT 20 TRUDI LEE LYTLE, JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, THE LYTLE TRUST, DOES I through X, Hearing Date: June 29, 2017 21 inclusive, and ROE CORPORATIONS I through Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m. 22 Defendants. 23 Defendants TRUDI LEE LYTLE, JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, and THE LYTLE TRUST (the 24 "Lytles") submit the following Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration. 25 26 27 28

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION

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There is no question that this Court did not consider, and no evidence was presented, that the Lytle Trust committed slander of title. No evidence was presented either at the hearing of this matter or prior thereto in any pleading to evidence the essential elements of malice. Accordingly, the Lytle Trust respectfully requests that the Court amend the Order to deny the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with respect to Plaintiffs' claims for slander of title.

A bullet point examination of the facts (and evidence) provide that the Lytle Trust had a reasonable, and certainly no malicious or harassing, basis for recording the abstracts of judgment at issue in this matter:

- 1. On July 3, 2007, Rosemere Property Owners' Association (the "Association") recorded the Amended CC&Rs on the Lytle Trust's property.
- 2. The Lytle Trust, as required by NRS 38.310, then filed an arbitration demand to remove the Amended CC&Rs and quiet title to its property.
- 3. On May 4, 2009, the arbitrator in that matter ruled against the Lytle Trust, and declared the Amended CC&Rs valid and enforceable.
- 4. On June 26, 2009, the Lytle Trust filed an action for trial de novo in District Court, seeking again to quiet title and declare the Amended CC&Rs invalid.
- 5. The Lytle Trust filed this action against the Association, not the individual owners, per Article 16.1 of the Amended CC&Rs, which provided:
 - 16.1 Enforcement: The Association and any Owner shall have the right to enforce by any proceedings at law or in equity, each covenant, condition, restriction and reservation now or hereafter imposed by the provisions of the Governing Documents. Each Owner shall have a right of action against the Association for any failure by the Association to comply with the provisions of the Governing Documents. Failure by the Association or any Owner to enforce any covenant, condition, restriction or reservation contained herein shall not be deemed a waiver or the right to do so thereafter. [Emphasis added.]
- 6. On July 30, 2013, Judge Leavitt ruled in the Lytle Trust's favor and declared the Amended CC&Rs void and declared the Lytle Trust as the prevailing party.

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- 7. The Association appealed Judge Leavitt's Order.
- 8. On November 20, 2015, the Supreme Court affirmed Judge Leavitt's Order.
- 9. Thereafter, Judge Leavitt awarded the Lytle Trust damages, costs and attorneys' fees in the sum of \$361,238.59, pursuant to Original CC&Rs, the Amended CC&Rs, and statute. See Order Re Attorneys' Fees, Exhibit 1.
- 10. The Lytle Trust recorded its abstracts of judgment pursuant to the Amended CC&Rs as well as those provisions within NRS Chapter 116 that apply to limited purpose associations.

II. ARGUMENT

The Amended CC&Rs Provided The Lytle Trust With A Basis To Record The Α. Abstracts Of Judgment

Judge Leavitt, in her award of attorneys' fees, properly found that the Lytle Trust could look to the Amended CC&Rs as basis for such an award, even though the document had been declared void ab initio. Indeed, this matter was thoroughly briefed before Judge Leavitt.

The Nevada Supreme Court in Mackintosh v. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 13 Nev. 393, 405-406, 935 P.2d 1154, 1162, and citing a Florida Supreme Court case, Katz v. Van Der Noord, 546 So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 1989), states as follows:

> "We hold that when parties enter into a contract and litigation later ensues over that contract, attorney's fees may be recovered under a prevailing-party attorney's fee provision contained therein even though the contract is rescinded or held to be unenforceable. The legal fictions which accompany a judgment of rescission do not change the fact that a contract did exist. It would be unjust to preclude the prevailing party to the dispute over the contract which led to its rescission from recovering the very attorney's fees which were contemplated by that contract."

The Lytle Trust, in filing the underlying lawsuit, followed the mandates of Section 16.1 of the Amended CC&Rs (cited above), and the Association fought steadfastly to maintain the sanctity of that document. Hence, the Court found that the Lytle Trust was due its attorneys' fees under the Amended CC&Rs. See Order Re: Attorneys' Fees, Exhibit 1.

The Amended CC&Rs adopt Chapter 116 of the Nevada Revised Statutes. See Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Amended CC&Rs, RJN, Exhibit I at Article I. The Amended CC&Rs define the association pursuant to the Uniform Common-Interest Ownership Act. Id. at 1.1.

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The Amended CC&Rs routinely reference Chapter 116 of the Nevada Revised Statutes. See, e.g., id. at 1.13, 1.14, 1.30, 8.1, 10.3 (referring to the lien statutes codified in Chapter 116).

NRS 116,3117, in turn, provides the express mechanism of foreclosure against Plaintiffs via a lien or judgment against the Association. It states as follows:

1. In a condominium or planned community:

(a) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b), a judgment for money against the association, if a copy of the docket or an abstract or copy of the judgment is recorded, is not a lien on the common elements, but is a lien in favor of the judgment lienholder against all of the other real property of the association and all of the units in the common-interest community at the time the judgment was entered. No other property of a unit's owner is subject to the claims of creditors of the association.

NRS 116.3117.

The lien and judgments were created under the Amended CC&Rs, and the Lytle Trust had the right to collect under the lien and judgment pursuant to the Amended CC&Rs, in the same manner that the Lytle Trust was awarded that very same judgment. Hence, the totality of Chapter 116 was and remains available as an avenue for collection.

Further, the Amended CC&Rs utilize their own definitions that would make the Plaintiffs' property subject to abstracts of judgment. Section 1.30 provides the definition of "Lot," which, by definition, includes all real property in the Association, including individual lots, residences, and any improvements constructed thereon. See Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Amended CC&Rs, RJN, Exhibit I at Section 1.30. Section 1.38 of the Amended CC&Rs defines "Property" as including all property within the Association. Id. at 1.38.

As set forth in MacKintosh, "the legal fictions which accompany a judgment of recession do not change the fact that a contract did exist." In this case, the Amended CC&Rs existed and were in full force and effect from July 2007 through 2013. Lamothe and Boulden supported the Amended CC&Rs and supported the Association's nearly \$500,000.00 defense of the Amended CC&Rs against the Lytle Trust's meritorious challenge by contributing over \$90,000.00 to the cause. It was not until 2013 when the Association ceased as a full blown unit owners' association and was declared a limited purpose association. During the time when the Amended CC&Rs were recorded,

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the Association was a unit owners' association, and the Lytle Trust was subject to the entirety of The Uniform Common Interest Development Act (NRS Chapter 116) and the Amended CC&Rs. The Lytle Trust was then awarded a judgment, with fees and costs, pursuant to the Amended CC&Rs and should also be able to collect the judgment pursuant to the Amended CC&Rs. Had the Lytle Trust not prevailed, the Amended CC&Rs would still be in place and the Association would still be a full blown unit owners' association.

Those Provisions Of Chapter 116 Applicable To Limited Purpose Associations B. Provided The Lytle Trust With A Reasonable Basis To Record The Abstracts Of <u>Judgment</u>

While we do not wish to burden this Court with a re-litigation of the issues, the Lytle Trust steadfastly maintains that the language of Chapter 116 applicable to limited purpose associations (as well as all other types of common interest communities) provides basis for the recording of the abstracts of judgment. Within the definition section of Chapter 116, NRS 116.021 defines a "common interest community" as all "real estate described in a declaration with respect to which a person, by virtue of the person's ownership of a unit, is obligated to pay for a share of real estate taxes, insurance premiums, maintenance or improvement of, or services or other expenses related to, common elements, other units or other real estate described in that declaration."

A limited purpose association is a type of common interest community, thus its inclusion within Chapter 116.

Further, NRS 116.093 defines a "unit" as the "physical portion of the common-interest community designated for separate ownership or occupancy..." Rosemere Estates, like every other common interest community, has units - in this case nine (9) units. The association, or common interest community, includes each and every unit in the community, including those owned by third parties, such as Plaintiffs.

Based on the foregoing, the Lytle Trust certainly had reasonable grounds for recording the abstracts of judgment, and indeed, the Lytle Trust has never wavered from its dedication to this reasoning.

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C. There Is No Evidence Of Malice In This Case.

As set forth above and with all respect to this Court, the Lytle Trust had reasonable grounds to record the abstracts of judgments. Plaintiffs wish to convince this Court that a finding of cloud of title is akin to slander of title, and this is simply not true. There is a much higher level of culpability, specifically a finding that the Lytle Trust acted maliciously.

To prevail on her claim for slander of title, Plaintiffs must establish that the Lytle Trust falsely and maliciously recorded the abstract of judgments. See Higgins v. Higgins, 103 Nev. 443, 445, 744 P.2d 530, 531 (1987), see also Rowland v. Lepire, 99 Nev. 308, 313, 662 P.2d 1332, 1335 (1983) (internal citations omitted).

The Rowland case, discussed in detail in the Lytle Trust's moving papers, is directly on point for this Court' analysis. Therein, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed a District Court's ruling finding slander of title where there was no evidence to support the element of malice in a slander of title claim, even though cloud of title was present. Rowland. 99 Nev. at 313. The Rowland court found that the defendant must act with reckless disregard as to truth or falsity of a claim and must have no reasonable basis to make such claim. Id.

Here, there is no evidence that the Lytle Trust acted with malice. There are no affidavits or facts admitted as evidence, contested or uncontested, to even support this claim. Not a single fact was provided to this Court to even analyze whether malice was really an issue at all in this case. In fact, the issue was never presented at the hearing or before. It simply was never an issue in this case.

The Order itself is evidence enough that there are no findings to support any form of malice, oppression or fraud. There is not a single finding in this regard.

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III. **CONCLUSION**

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For the foregoing reasons, the Lytle Trust respectfully requests that the Court grant the Motion and amend the Order to deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs claim for slander of title.

5 DATED: June 23, 2017

Respectfully Submitted,

GIBBS GIDEN LOCHER TURNER SENET & WITTBRODT LLP

By: Richard E. Haskin, Esq. Nevada State Bar # 11592 Timothy Elson, Esq. & Nevada State Bar # 11559 1140 N. Town Center Drive, Suite 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144-0596 Attorneys for Defendants TRUDI LEE LYTLE, JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, & THE LYTLE TRUST

The undersigned, an employee of the law firm of GIBBS GIDEN LOCHER TURNER
SENET & WITTBRODT LLP, hereby certifies that on June 23, 2017, she served a copy of the
foregoing DEFENDANTS TRUDI LEE LYTLE, JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, AND THE LYTLE
TRUST'S REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR, IN
THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT by electronic service
through the Regional Justice Center for Clark County, Nevada's ECF System:
DANIEL T. FOLEY, ESQ. FOLEY & OAKS 626 S. 8 th Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Oham Berry An employee of Gibbs Giden Locher Turner Senet & Wittbrodt LLP

EXHIBIT "1"

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CLERK OF THE COURT

ORDR Richard E. Haskin, Esq. Novada State Bar # 11592 Bryan M. Gragg, Esq. Nevada State Bar # 13134 GIBBS GIDEN LOCHER TURNER SENET & WITTBRODT LLP 7450 Arroyo Crossing Parkway, Suite 270 Las Vegas, Nevada 89113-4059 (702) 836-9800

Attorneys for Plaintiff JOHN ALLEN LYTLE and TRUDI LEE LYTLE

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

JOHN ALLEN LYTLE and TRUDI LEE LYTLE, as Trustees of the Lytle Trust,

Plaintiffs,

ROSEMERE ESTATES PROPERTY OWNERS' ASSOCIATION; and DOES I through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

A-09-593497-C CASE NO. Dept.: XII

ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS JOHN ALLEN LYTLE AND TRUDI LEE LYTLE'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES

On May 2, 2016, Plaintiffs John Allen Lytle and Trudi Lee Lytle ("Plaintiffs") Motion for Attorneys' Fees came on regularly for hearing, the Honorable Michelle Leavitt presiding. Plaintiffs appeared through counsel, Richard E. Haskin of Gibbs, Giden, Locher, Turner, Senet & Wittbrodt, LLP. There was no appearance for Defendant Rosemere Estates Property Owners' Association ("Defendant"). Defendant did not file an opposition to the Motion and did not make an appearance at the hearing.

Having considered the moving papers, the affidavits and declarations filed concurrently therewith, and the exhibits attached thereto, the Court finds that as the prevailing party, Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorney fees under the Original CC&Rs, the Amended CC&Rs and NRS PECHUED § 116.4117.

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1	The plain terms of the Original CC&Rs authorize an award of fees in favor of Plaintiffs. As
2	the Original CC&Rs provide, in pertinent part:
3	 Except as otherwise provided herein, Subdivider or any owner or owners of any of the lots shall have the right to enforce any or all of the
4	provisions of the covenants, conditions, and restrictions upon any other
5	appropriate judicial proceeding in law or in equity may be initiated and prosecuted by any lot owners or owners against any other owner or
6	owners.
7	25. Attorney's Fees: In any legal or equitable proceeding for the enforcement of or to restrain the violation of the Declaration of Covenants,
8	Conditions and Restrictions or any provision thereof, the losing party or parties shall pay in such amount as may be fixed by the court in such

See Original CC&Rs, ¶ 24, 25. Plaintiffs prevailed in enforcing the Original CC&Rs (by obtaining a declaration from this Court that that the Amended CC&Rs are invalid and that Defendant did not have the powers it claimed to have) and prevailed in restraining the violation of the Original CC&Rs (by obtaining injunctive relief prohibiting Defendant from enforcing the Amended CC&Rs and requiring public notice of their revocation). According, Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorney fees, pursuant to the terms of the Original CC&Rs.

Further, the Amended CC&Rs also contain a mandatory fee shifting provision entitling Plaintiffs to an award of attorney fees. As provided in the Amended CC&Rs, Section 16.1(a):

16.1(a) In the event the Association, or any Owner shall commence litigation or arbitration to enforce any of the covenants, conditions, restrictions or reservations contained in the Governing Documents, the prevailing party in such litigation or arbitration shall be entitled to costs of suit and such attorney's fees as the Court or arbitrator may adjudge reasonable and proper.

See Amended CC&Rs, § 16.1(a).

proceeding.

A litigant can recover attorneys' fees when a contract, such as the Amended CC&Rs, is held unenforceable. *Mackintosh v. California Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n* (1997) 113 Nev. 393, 405-406, 935 P.2d 1154, 1162.

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Finally, Plaintiff are also entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to NRS 116.4117. NRS 116.4117 provides as follows: 1. Subject to the requirements set forth in subsection 2, if a declarant,

- community manager or any other person subject to this chapter fails to comply with any of its provisions or any provision of the declaration or bylaws, any person or class of persons suffering actual damages from the failure to comply may bring a civil action for damages or other appropriate relief. . .
- 4. The court may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party.

The term "damages" in the phrase "suffering actual damages" refers to damages in the general sense of specifically provable injury, loss, or harm rather than the specific sense of economic damages. Whether quantifiable as a monetary loss or not, Plaintiffs suffered an injury, loss or barm as a result of the Association's actions. Accordingly, under the statute they had the right to bring a civil action for damages or other appropriate relief and, having, prevailed thereon may be awarded their reasonable attorney fees as the prevailing party.

Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, as set forth in the Motion, satisfy the factors set forth in Brunzell v. Golden gate Nat'l Bank (1969) 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33. The Court considered all of the factors and applied them to Plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees. Specifically, the Court considered and applied:

> The qualities of the advocate, i.e. his ability, training and experience; 1.

The character of the work done, it's difficulty, intricacy, importance, time and 2. skill required,;

The work actually performed by the attorneys; 3.

The result, i.e. whether the attorney was successful in achieving a result of the 4. client.

The Court applied each of the foregoing Brunzell factors to the work performed by Plaintiffs' attorneys, as set forth in the various affidavits and declarations presented to this Court with the moving papers. The Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of \$297,072.66 in attorneys' fees as the prevailing party in this action, having achieved the revocation of the Amended CC&Rs and removing the cloud on title to their property.

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14 15 Therefore, the Court orders as follows:

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees is granted, and Plaintiffs are awarded \$297,072.66 in attorneys' fees.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 25 day of May, 2016.

HONORABLE MICHELLE LEAVITT

District Court Judge, Dept. XII QL

DATED: May 19, 2016

GIBBS GIDEN LOCHER TURNER

SENET & WITTBROOT LLP

By:

Richard E. Haskin, Esq.
Nevada State Bar # 11592
7450 Arroyo Crossing Parkway, Suite 270
Las Vegas, Nevada 89113-4059
Attorneys for Plaintiff
JOHN ALLEN LYTLE and TRUDI LEE LYTLE

CLERK OF THE COUR 1 ORDR Richard E. Haskin, Esq. 2 Nevada State Bar # 11592 Timothy P. Elson, Esq. 3 Nevada State Bar # 11559 GIBBS GIDEN LOCHER TURNER 4 SENET & WITTBRODT LLP 1140 N. Town Center Drive, Suite 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144-0596 5 (702) 836-9800 6 Attorneys for Defendants TRUDI LEE LYTLE, JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, 7 & THE LYTLE TRUST 8 DISTRICT COURT 9 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 10 11 A-16-747800-C MARJORIE B. BOULDEN, TRUSTEE OF THE Case No .: 12 XVI MARJORIE B. BOULDEN TRUST, LINDA Dept.: LAMOTHE AND JACQUES LAMOTHE, 13 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO TRUSTEES OF THE JACQUES & LINDA ALTER OR AMEND FINDINGS OF FACT 14 LAMOTHE LIVING TRUST AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Plaintiff, 15 Hearing: June 29, 2017 16 TRUDI LEE LYTLE, JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, 17 THE LYTLE TRUST, DOES I through X, inclusive, and ROE CORPORATIONS I through 18 19 Defendants. 20 Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendants' Counter Motion for 21 Summary Judgment having come on for hearing before this Court on of April 13, 2017. Plaintiffs 22

Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendants' Counter Motion for Summary Judgment having come on for hearing before this Court on of April 13, 2017. Plaintiffs Marjorie Boulden and Linda Lamothe appeared with their counsel, Daniel T. Foley, Esq. and Defendants John Allen Lytle and Trudi Lee Lytle, as Trustees of the Lytle Trust, appeared with their counsel, Richard Haskin, Esq. After hearing, the Court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and entered an Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on April 25, 2017.

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On June 29, 2017, Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration or, in the Alternative, Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, came on for hearing. Plaintiffs Marjorie Boulden and Linda Lamothe appeared with their counsel, Daniel T. Foley, Esq. and Defendants John Allen Lytle and Trudi Lee Lytle, as Trustees of the Lytle Trust, appeared with their counsel, Richard Haskin, Esq.

The Court having reviewed the Defendants' Motion, Plaintiff's Opposition and the Defendants' Reply, all documents attached thereto or otherwise filed in this case, and good cause appearing therefore, grants Defendants' Motion to Alter and Amend Judgment pursuant to EDCR 2.24(b), and the Court makes the following Amendment Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

FINDINGS OF FACT

- 1. Mrs. Boulden is trustee of the Marjorie B. Boulden Trust (hereinafter "Mrs. Boulden") which owns that residential property known as parcel number 163-03-313-008 also known as 1960 Rosemere Ct., Las Vegas, NV 89117 ("the Boulden Property").
- 2. Mr. and Mrs. Lamothe are the trustees of the Linda Lamothe and Jacques Lamothe Living Trust (hereinafter "Mr. and Mrs. Lamothe") which owns that certain residential property known as parcel number 163-03-313-002 also known as 1830 Rosemere Ct., Las Vegas, NV 89117 (the "Lamothe Property").
- 3. The Boulden Property and the Lamothe Property are located in the Rosemere Court subdivision and are subject to the CC&Rs recorded January 4, 1994 (the "Original CC&Rs").
- 4. John Allen Lytle and Trudi Lee Lytle are the Trustees of the Lytle Trust (collectively the "Defendants") which owns that certain residential property known as parcel number 163-03-313-009 (the "Lytle Property").
- 5. In 2009, the Defendants sued the Rosemere Estates Property Owners Association (the Association") in the Eighth Judicial District Court, case # A-09-593497-C (the "Rosemere LPA Litigation").
 - None of the Plaintiffs were ever parties in the Rosemere LPA Litigation.
- 7. None of the Plaintiffs were a "losing party" in the Rosemere LPA Litigation as that term is found in Section 25 of the Original CC&Rs.

- 8. The Defendants obtained a Summary Judgment for Declaratory Relief from the District Court in the Rosemere LPA Litigation, which found and ruled as follows:
 - a. The Association is a limited purpose association under NRS 116.1201, is not a Chapter 116 "unit-owners' association," and is relegated to only those specific duties and powers set forth in Paragraph 21 of the Original CC&Rs and NRS 116.1201.
 - b. The Association did not have any powers beyond those of the "property owners committee" designation in the Original CC&Rs simply to care for the landscaping and other common elements of Rosemere Estates as set forth in Paragraph 21 of the Original CC&Rs.
 - c. Consistent with the absence of a governing body, the Developer provided each homeowner the right to independently enforce the Original CC&Rs against one another.
 - d. The Amended and Restated CC&Rs recorded with the Clark County Recorder's Office as Instrument #20070703-0001934 (the "Amended CC&Rs") are invalid, and the Amended CC&Rs have no force and effect.
- 9. Pursuant to NRS 116.1201(2) much of NRS Chapter 116 does not apply to the Association because it is a limited purpose association that is not a rural agricultural residential community.
- 10. After obtaining Summary Judgment in the Rosemere LPA Litigation, the Defendants filed a Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs against the Association, and conducted a prove-up hearing on damages. After hearing all matters, a Final Judgment was entered in the Defendants' favor against the Association for \$361,238.59, which includes damages, attorneys' fees and costs (the "Final Judgment").
- 11. After obtaining the Attorneys' Fees Judgment, the Defendants, on August 16, 2016, recorded with the Clark County Recorder's office an Abstract of Judgement referencing the Final Judgment against the Association, recorded as Instrument #20160818-0001198 (the "First Abstract of Judgment").
- 12. In the First Abstract of Judgment, the Defendants listed the parcel numbers of the Boulden Property and the Lamothe Property as properties to which the First Abstract of Judgment and Final Judgment was to attach.

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1	13. On September 2, 2016, the Defendants recorded with the Clark County Recorder's
2	office an Abstract of Judgement referencing the Final Judgment against the Association, recorded as
3	Instrument #20160902-0002684 (the "Second Abstract of Judgment"). The Second Abstract of
4	Judgment listed the parcel number of the Lamothe Property only as the property to which the
5	Judgment was to attach.
6	14. On September 2, 2016, the Defendants recorded with the Clark County Recorder's
7	office an Abstract of Judgement referencing the Final Judgment against the Association, recorded as
8	Instrument #20160902-0002690 (the "Third Abstract of Judgment"). The Third Abstract of
9	Judgment listed the parcel number of the Boulden Property only as the property to which the
10	Judgment was to attach.
11	CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

- 1. The Association is a "limited purpose association" as referenced in NRS 116.1201(2).
- 2. As a limited purpose association, NRS 116.3117 is not applicable to the Association.
- 3. As a result of the Rosemere LPA Litigation, the Amended CC&Rs were judicially declared to have been improperly adopted and recorded, the Amended CC&Rs are invalid and have no force and effect and were declared void ab initio.
 - 4. The Plaintiffs were not parties to the Rosemere LPA Litigation.
- 5. The Plaintiffs were not "losing parties" in the Rosemere LPA Litigation as per Section 25 of the Original CC&Rs.
- 6. The Final Judgment in favor of the Defendants is not against, and is not an obligation of, the Plaintiffs.
- The Final Judgment against the Association is not an obligation or debt owed by the Plaintiffs.
- 8. The First Abstract of Judgment recorded as Instrument #20160818-0001198 was improperly recorded against the Lamothe Property and constitutes a cloud against the Lamothe Property.

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9.	The F	irst Abst	ract	of Judg	ment reco	r de d	as Instrum	ien	it #201	160818-0	0001	198	was
improperly	recorded	against 1	the	Boulden	Property	and	constitutes	a	cloud	against	the	Boul	lden
Property.													

- 10. The Second Abstract of Judgment recorded as Instrument #20160902-0002684 improperly recorded against the Lamothe Property and constitutes a cloud against the Lamothe Property.
- 11. The Third Abstract of Judgment recorded as Instrument #20160902-0002690 was improperly recorded against the Boulden Property and constitutes a cloud against the Boulden Property.
- 12. The Court does not make any findings that the Defendants slandered title to Plaintiffs' properties, and this issue is left to trier of fact.

<u>ORDER</u>

Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law above, and good cause appearing therefore.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs' claims and causes of action for quiet title and declaratory relief, the Second and Third Causes of Action in Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendants improperly clouded the title to the Boulden Property.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendants improperly clouded the title to the Lamothe Property.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the First Abstract of Judgment recorded as Instrument #20160818-0001198 in the Clark County Recorder's Office is hereby expunged and stricken from the records of the Clark County Recorder's Office.

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Abstract of Judgment recorded as Instrument #20160902-0002684 in the Clark County Recorder's 2 Office is hereby expunged and stricken from the records of the Clark County Recorder's Office. 3 IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Third 4 Abstract of Judgment recorded as Instrument #20160902-0002690 in the Clark County Recorder's 5 Office is hereby expunged and stricken from the records of the Clark County Recorder's Office. 6 7 /// 8 111 9 /// 10 /// /// 11 12 /// 13 111 14 III15 111 16 111 17 /// 18 /// 19 111 20 111 21 /// 22 /// 23 III24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 ///

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IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Second

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IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Defendants are permanently enjoined from recording and enforcing the Final Judgment from the
Rosemere LPA Litigation or any abstracts related thereto against the Boulden Property or the
Lamothe Property.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Defendants are permanently enjoined from taking any action in the future against the Plaintiffs or
their properties based upon the Rosemere LPA Litigation.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the

Defendants are hereby ordered to release the First Abstract of Judgment, the Second Abstract of Judgment, and the Third Abstract of Judgment recorded with the Clark County Recorder within ten (10) days after the date of Notice of Entry of this Order.

DATED this 19 day of Guly 2017

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Submitted by: FOLEY & OAKES, P

11/01

Daniel T. Feley, Esq. 626 S. 8th St.

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorney for Plaintiffs

Approved to form:

Richard E, Haskin, Esq.

25 Sibbs Giden Locker Turner Senet & Wittbrodt LLP

1140 N. Town Center Dr., Ste. 300

26 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 Attorney for Defendants

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CLERK OF THE COURT 1 NEOJ Richard E. Haskin, Esq. 2 Nevada State Bar # 11592 Timothy P. Elson, Esq. Nevada State Bar # 11559 3 GIBBS GIDEN LOCHER TURNER 4 SENET & WITTBRODT LLP 1140 N. Town Center Drive, Suite 300 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144-0596 (702) 836-9800 6 Attorneys for Defendants TRUDI LEE LYTLE, JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, 7 & THE LYTLE TRUST 8 DISTRICT COURT 9 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 10 A-16-747800-C Case No.: MARJORIE B. BOULDEN, TRUSTEE OF THE 11 XVI Dept.: MARJORIE B. BOULDEN TRUST, LINDA LAMOTHE AND JACQUES LAMOTHE, 12 NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER TRUSTEES OF THE JACQUES & LINDA GRANTING MOTION TO ALTER OR LAMOTHE LIVING TRUST 13 AMEND FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 14 Plaintiff, 15 TRUDI LEE LYTLE, JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, 16 THE LYTLE TRUST, DOES I through X, inclusive, and ROE CORPORATIONS I through 17 Χ, Defendants. 18 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 25th day of July, 2017, an ORDER GRANTING 19 MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was 20 entered in the above-entitled matter, a copy of which is attached hereto. 21 GIBBS GIDEN LOCHER TURNER DATED: July 25, 2017 22 SENET & WITTBRODT LLP 23 24 By: /s/ Richard E. Haskin 25 Richard E. Haskin, Esq. Nevada State Bar # 11592 26 1140 N. Town Center Drive, Suite 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144

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Case Number: A-16-747800-C

Attorneys for Defendants

LYTLE TRUST

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TRUDI LEE LYTLE, JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, & THE

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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

CERTIFICALI	S OF MAIDING
The undersigned, an employee of the law f	irm of GIBBS GIDEN LOCHER TURNER
SENET & WITTBRODT LLP, hereby certifies th	at on July 25, 2017, she served a copy of the
foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER G	RANTING MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS	OF LAW by electronic service through the
Regional Justice Center for Clark County, Nevada	
DANIEL T. FOLEY, ESQ. FOLEY & OAKS 626 S. 8 th Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101	Attorneys for Plaintiffs MARJORIE BOULDEN, TRUSTEE OF THE MARJORIE B. BOULDEN TRUST, ETAL.

Tel: (702) 384-2070 Fax: (702) 384-2128 Email: dan@foleyoakes.com

Sham Berry An employee of Gibbs Giden Locher Turner

Senet & Wittbrodt LLP

Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT ORDR 1 Richard E. Haskin, Esq. Nevada State Bar # 11592 2 Timothy P. Elson, Esq. Nevada State Bar # 11559 3 GIBBS GIDEN LOCHER TURNER 4 SENET & WITTBRODT LLP 1140 N. Town Center Drive, Suite 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144-0596 5 (**7**02) **8**36-9800 б Attorneys for Defendants TRUDI LEE LYTLE, JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, 7 & THE LYTLE TRUST 8 DISTRICT COURT 9 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 10 11 MARJORIE B. BOULDEN, TRUSTEE OF THE A-16-747800-C Case No.: 12 MARJORIE B. BOULDEN TRUST, LINDA Dept.: LAMOTHE AND JACQUES LAMOTHE, 13 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO TRUSTEES OF THE JACQUES & LINDA ALTER OR AMEND FINDINGS OF FACT LAMOTHE LIVING TRUST 14 AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 15 Plaintiff. v. Hearing: June 29, 2017 16 TRUDI LEE LYTLE, JOHN ALLEN LYTLE, THE LYTLE TRUST, DOES I through X, 17 inclusive, and ROE CORPORATIONS I through 18 Х, 19 Defendants. 20

Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendants' Counter Motion for Summary Judgment having come on for hearing before this Court on of April 13, 2017. Plaintiffs Marjorie Boulden and Linda Lamothe appeared with their counsel, Daniel T. Foley, Esq. and Defendants John Allen Lytle and Trudi Lee Lytle, as Trustees of the Lytle Trust, appeared with their counsel, Richard Haskin, Esq. After hearing, the Court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and entered an Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on April 25, 2017.

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On June 29, 2017, Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration or, in the Alternative, Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, came on for hearing. Plaintiffs Marjorie Boulden and Linda Lamothe appeared with their counsel, Daniel T. Foley, Esq. and Defendants John Allen Lytle and Trudi Lee Lytle, as Trustees of the Lytle Trust, appeared with their counsel, Richard Haskin, Esq.

The Court having reviewed the Defendants' Motion, Plaintiff's Opposition and the Defendants' Reply, all documents attached thereto or otherwise filed in this case, and good cause appearing therefore, grants Defendants' Motion to Alter and Amend Judgment pursuant to EDCR 2.24(b), and the Court makes the following Amendment Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

FINDINGS OF FACT

- 1. Mrs. Boulden is trustee of the Marjorie B. Boulden Trust (hereinafter "Mrs. Boulden") which owns that residential property known as parcel number 163-03-313-008 also known as 1960 Rosemere Ct., Las Vegas, NV 89117 ("the Boulden Property").
- 2. Mr. and Mrs. Lamothe are the trustees of the Linda Lamothe and Jacques Lamothe Living Trust (hereinafter "Mr. and Mrs. Lamothe") which owns that certain residential property known as parcel number 163-03-313-002 also known as 1830 Rosemere Ct., Las Vegas, NV 89117 (the "Lamothe Property").
- 3. The Boulden Property and the Lamothe Property are located in the Rosemere Court subdivision and are subject to the CC&Rs recorded January 4, 1994 (the "Original CC&Rs").
- 4. John Allen Lytle and Trudi Lee Lytle are the Trustees of the Lytle Trust (collectively the "Defendants") which owns that certain residential property known as parcel number 163-03-313-009 (the "Lytle Property").
- 5. In 2009, the Defendants sued the Rosemere Estates Property Owners Association (the Association") in the Eighth Judicial District Court, case # A-09-593497-C (the "Rosemere LPA Litigation").
 - 6. None of the Plaintiffs were ever parties in the Rosemere LPA Litigation.
- 7. None of the Plaintiffs were a "losing party" in the Rosemere LPA Litigation as that term is found in Section 25 of the Original CC&Rs.

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	8.	The	Defendants	obtained a	Summary	Judgment	for	Declaratory	Relief	from	the
Dist	trict Court	in the	Rosemere I	PA Litigati	on, which f	ound and n	aled	as follows:			

- a. The Association is a limited purpose association under NRS 116.1201, is not a Chapter 116 "unit-owners' association," and is relegated to only those specific duties and powers set forth in Paragraph 21 of the Original CC&Rs and NRS 116.1201.
- b. The Association did not have any powers beyond those of the "property owners committee" designation in the Original CC&Rs simply to care for the landscaping and other common elements of Rosemere Estates as set forth in Paragraph 21 of the Original CC&Rs.
- c. Consistent with the absence of a governing body, the Developer provided each homeowner the right to independently enforce the Original CC&Rs against one another.
- d. The Amended and Restated CC&Rs recorded with the Clark County Recorder's Office as Instrument #20070703-0001934 (the "Amended CC&Rs") are invalid, and the Amended CC&Rs have no force and effect.
- 9. Pursuant to NRS 116.1201(2) much of NRS Chapter 116 does not apply to the Association because it is a limited purpose association that is not a rural agricultural residential community.
- 10. After obtaining Summary Judgment in the Rosemere LPA Litigation, the Defendants filed a Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs against the Association, and conducted a prove-up hearing on damages. After hearing all matters, a Final Judgment was entered in the Defendants' favor against the Association for \$361,238.59, which includes damages, attorneys' fees and costs (the "Final Judgment").
- 11. After obtaining the Attorneys' Fees Judgment, the Defendants, on August 16, 2016, recorded with the Clark County Recorder's office an Abstract of Judgement referencing the Final Judgment against the Association, recorded as Instrument #20160818-0001198 (the "First Abstract of Judgment").
- 12. In the First Abstract of Judgment, the Defendants listed the parcel numbers of the Boulden Property and the Lamothe Property as properties to which the First Abstract of Judgment and Final Judgment was to attach.

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13. On September 2, 2016, the Defendants recorded with the Clark County Recorder
office an Abstract of Judgement referencing the Final Judgment against the Association, recorded a
Instrument #20160902-0002684 (the "Second Abstract of Judgment"). The Second Abstract of
Judgment listed the parcel number of the Lamothe Property only as the property to which th
Judgment was to attach.
14. On September 2, 2016, the Defendants recorded with the Clark County Recorder
office an Abstract of Judgement referencing the Final Judgment against the Association, recorded a
Instrument #20160902-0002690 (the "Third Abstract of Judgment"). The Third Abstract of
Judgment listed the parcel number of the Boulden Property only as the property to which th
Judgment was to attach.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

- The Association is a "limited purpose association" as referenced in NRS 116.1201(2). 1.
- As a limited purpose association, NRS 116.3117 is not applicable to the Association. 2.
- As a result of the Rosemere LPA Litigation, the Amended CC&Rs were judicially 3. declared to have been improperly adopted and recorded, the Amended CC&Rs are invalid and have no force and effect and were declared void ab initio.
 - The Plaintiffs were not parties to the Rosemere LPA Litigation. 4.
- The Plaintiffs were not "losing parties" in the Rosemere LPA Litigation as per 5. Section 25 of the Original CC&Rs.
- The Final Judgment in favor of the Defendants is not against, and is not an obligation б. of, the Plaintiffs.
- The Final Judgment against the Association is not an obligation or debt owed by the 7. Plaintiffs.
- The First Abstract of Judgment recorded as Instrument #20160818-0001198 was 8. improperly recorded against the Lamothe Property and constitutes a cloud against the Lamothe Property.

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	improperly recorded against the Boulden Property and constitutes a cloud against the Boulden
	Property.
	 The Second Abstract of Judgment recorded as Instrument #20160902-0002684
	improperly recorded against the Lamothe Property and constitutes a cloud against the Lamothe
	Property.
	11. The Third Abstract of Judgment recorded as Instrument #20160902-0002690 was
	improperly recorded against the Boulden Property and constitutes a cloud against the Boulden
	Property.
	12. The Court does not make any findings that the Defendants slandered title to
l	Plaintiffs' properties, and this issue is left to trier of fact.
	ORDER
	Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law above, and good cause appearing
	therefore,
	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs' Motion for
	Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs' claims and causes of action for quiet title
	and declaratory relief, the Second and Third Causes of Action in Plaintiffs' First Amended
١	Complaint.
	IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants'
	Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
	IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
	Defendants improperly clouded the title to the Boulden Property.
	IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
	Defendants improperly clouded the title to the Lamothe Property.
	IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the First
	Abstract of Judgment recorded as Instrument #20160818-0001198 in the Clark County Recorder's
	Office is hereby expunged and stricken from the records of the Clark County Recorder's Office.
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The First Abstract of Judgment recorded as Instrument #20160818-0001198 was

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Second Abstract of Judgment recorded as Instrument #20160902-0002684 in the Clark County Recorder's Office is hereby expunged and stricken from the records of the Clark County Recorder's Office.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Third Abstract of Judgment recorded as Instrument #20160902-0002690 in the Clark County Recorder's Office is hereby expunged and stricken from the records of the Clark County Recorder's Office.

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27 20 Defendants are permanently enjoined from recording and enforcing the Final Judgment from the Rosemere LPA Litigation or any abstracts related thereto against the Boulden Property or the Lamothe Property. IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendants are permanently enjoined from taking any action in the future against the Plaintiffs or their properties based upon the Rosemere LPA Litigation. IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendants are hereby ordered to release the First Abstract of Judgment, the Second Abstract of Judgment, and the Third Abstract of Judgment recorded with the Clark County Recorder within ten (10) days after the date of Notice of Entry of this Order. DATED this 19 day of Gely____ Submitted by: FOLEY & OAKES, I Daniel T. Foley, Esq. 626 S. 8th St. Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorney for Plaintiffs Approved to form Richard E. Maskin, Esq. Libbs Giden Locker Turner Senet & Wittbrodt LLP 1140 N. Town Center Dr., Ste. 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89144 Attorney for Defendants

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the