### **IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA**

WILLIAM LESTER WITTER, Appellant, Electronically Filed Nov 03 2017 11:50 a.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.

Case No. 73444

### MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL

As an alternative to the consolidation motion the State has previously filed in this appeal, the State now also moves to dismiss the instant appeal as Witter is not an "aggrieved" party within the meaning of NRS 177.015 and has no standing to seek appellate review of the Amended Judgment he specifically requested. The instant appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

On July 10, 2017, Witter filed a Notice of Appeal from the Third Amended Judgment of Conviction submitted by the State on June 30, 2017, and signed by the District Court on July 10, 2017. That Third Amended Judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. When compared to the Second Amended Judgment, attached hereto as Exhibit 2, the only change was to remove the following language on page 4: "... with an additional amount [of restitution] to be determined." This change was in Witter's favor as he is now no longer subject to this additional restitution. This change was also made upon the written motion by Witter and at the specific instance

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of his attorney. Exhibit 3. In fact, Witter's motion included a proposed judgment identical to that which he is now appealing. <u>Id</u>.

Although the State had initially requested permission to file the Amended Judgment for its own purposes, the State changed its mind and decided not to submit one. Exhibit 4. In fact, the State filed a written opposition against the filing of the Amended Judgment so as to clarify that such was being requested by Witter, not by the State. <u>Id</u>. Although the State was ultimately ordered to and did in fact submit the Third Amended Judgment, such was done at Witter's specific request and for his benefit. Exhibit 5.

Only an "aggrieved" party may appeal. NRS 177.015. An "aggrieved" party is one whose "personal right or right of property is adversely and substantially affected." Estate of Hughes v. First Nat'l Bank, 96 Nev. 178, 180, 605 P.2d 1149, 1150 (1980). The party who wins below and receives full relief, is not aggrieved and may not appeal. Ford v. Showboat Operating Co., 110 Nev. 752, 757, 877 P.2d 546, 550 (1994) ("A party who prevails in the district court and who does not wish to alter any rights of the parties arising from the judgment is not aggrieved."); see also Dynamic Transit v. Trans Pac. Ventures, 128 Nev. 755, fn2, 291 P.3d 114 (2012); Farnham v. Farnham, 80 Nev. 180, 184, 391 P.2d 26 (1964) (Appellant "won the case below and is not an 'aggrieved party' entitled to appeal"). Nor is there

generally a right to appeal from a judgment to which the party has consented. 69 ALR2d 755.

WHEREFORE, the State respectfully requests that the instant appeal be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Dated this 3<sup>rd</sup> day of November, 2017.

Respectfully submitted,

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565

BY /s/ Steven S. Owens STEVEN S. OWENS Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #004352 Office of the Clark County District Attorney Regional Justice Center 200 Lewis Avenue Post Office Box 552212 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 (702) 671-2750

### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify and affirm that this document was filed electronically with the

Nevada Supreme Court on November 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2017. Electronic Service of the foregoing

document shall be made in accordance with the Master Service List as follows:

ADAM PAUL LAXALT Nevada Attorney General

DAVIDANTHONY Assistant Federal Public Defender

STEVEN S. OWENS Chief Deputy District Attorney

BY /s/ E.Davis Employee, District Attorney's Office

SSO//ed

		Electronically Filed 7/12/2017 2:54 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
1	AJOC STEVEN WOLFSON	Atump. Atum
2	Clark County District Attorney	
3	Nevada Bar No. 001565 STEVEN S.OWENS	
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar No. 004352	
5	200 Lewis Ave. Las Vegas, NV 89155-2212	
6	(702) 671-2500	
7		
8	DISTRICT CLARK COUN	
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	
10	Plaintiff,	Case No. 94C117513 Dept. No. XXIII
11		
12	WILLIAM WITTER, aka William Lester Witter,	
13	Defendant.	
14	THIRD AN JUDGMENT OF	
15	WHEREAS, on the 25th day of Janua	ary, 1994, Defendant, WILLIAM WITTER,
16	aka William Lester Witter, entered a plea	of Not Guilty to the crimes of MURDER
17	WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Fe	elony); ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE
18	OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Felony); ATTER	MPT SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH USE OF
19	A DEADLY WEAPON (Felony); and BURG	LARY (Felony), NRS §200.010, §200.030,
20	§193.165, §193.330, §200.364, §200.366, §20	05.060; and
21	WHEREAS, the Defendant WILLIA	M WITTER, aka William Lester Witter,
22	was tried before a Jury and the Defendant	was found guilty of the crimes of COUNT
23		

I - MURDER OF THE FIRST DEGREE WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON 1 (Felony); COUNT II - ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON 2 3 (Felony); COUNT III – ATTEMPT SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Felony); and COUNT IV - BURGLARY (Felony), in violation of NRS 4  $\mathbf{5}$ §200.010, §200.030, §193.165, §193.330, §200.364, §200.366, §205.060, and the Jury 6 verdict was returned on or about the 28th day of June, 1995. Thereafter, the same 7trial jury, deliberating in the penalty phase of said trial, in accordance with the 8 provisions of NRS §175.552 and §175.554, found that there were four (4) aggravating 9 circumstances in connection with the commission of said crime, to-wit:

101. The murder was committed by a person who was previously convicted of11a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another.

12 2. The murder was committed while the person was engaged in the
13 commission of or an attempt to commit any Burglary.

3. The murder was committed while the person was engaged in the
commission of or an attempt to commit a Sexual Assault.

16
4. The murder was committed to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest or to
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effect an escape from custody.

That on or about the 13th day of July, 1995, the Jury unanimously found,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficient to
outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances, and determined that the
Defendant's punishment should be Death as to COUNT I – MURDER OF THE FIRST

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1DEGREE WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON in the Nevada State Prison located2at or near Carson City, State of Nevada.

3 WHEREAS, thereafter, on the 3rd day of August, 1995, the Defendant being 4 present in court with his counsel, PHILIP J. KOHN, Deputy Public Defender, and 5 KEDRIC A. BASSETT, Deputy Public Defender, and GARY L. GUYMON, Deputy 6 District Attorney, also being present; the above entitled Court did adjudge Defendant  $\mathbf{7}$ guilty thereof by reason of said trial and verdict and, in addition to the \$25.00 8 Administrative Assessment Fee, SENTENCED Defendant, as follows: As to COUNT 9 I – MURDER OF THE FIRST DEGREE WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON. 10 Defendant was sentenced to DEATH by lethal injection; as to COUNT II - ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON, Defendant was sentenced to 11 12TWENTY (20) YEARS in the Nevada Department of Prisons for the ATTEMPT 13MURDER, plus an equal and consecutive TWENTY (20) YEARS in the Nevada 14 Department of Prisons for the USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON; as to COUNT III -ATTEMPT SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON, Defendant 15 16 was sentenced to TWENTY (20) YEARS in the Nevada Department of Prisons for the ATTEMPT SEXUAL ASSAULT, plus an equal and consecutive TWENTY (20) 17 18 YEARS in the Nevada Department of Prisons for the USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON, said sentence imposed in Count III to run consecutive to the sentence imposed in 19 20Count II; as to COUNT IV – BURGLARY, Defendant was sentenced to TEN (10) 21YEARS in the Nevada Department of Prisons, said sentence imposed in Count IV to 22run consecutive to the sentence imposed in Count III. Defendant is to pay

RESTITUTION in the amount of \$2,790.00. Defendant is given 627 days credit for 1  $\mathbf{2}$ time served. 3 THEREFORE, the Clerk of the above-entitled Court is hereby directed to enter this Third Amended Judgment of Conviction as part of the record in the above 4 entitled matter.  $\mathbf{5}$ DATED this \_\_\_\_\_ day of June, 2017. 7-6-17 6 7 8 STEFANY MILEY KS DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 9 10 STEVEN B. WOLFSON 11 DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #001565 12BY STEVEN S. OWENS Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #004352 13 14 15 1617 18 19 2021 $\mathbf{22}$ 234

1	CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC FILING
2	I hereby certify that service of Third Amended Judgment of Conviction, was
3	made this 30 <sup>th</sup> day of June, 2017, by Electronic Filing to:
4	DAVID ANTHONY
5	Email: David_Anthony@fd.org
6	TIFFANY L. NOCON Email: Tiffany_Nocon@fd.org
7	
8	By: Cari
-9	Employee, District Attorney's Office
10	
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13	SŠO//ed
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#### **Eileen Davis**

From:Eileen DavisSent:Friday, June 30, 2017 8:43 AMTo:ecf\_nvchu@fd.org; tiffany\_nocon@fd.orgCc:Steven Owens; Jonathan VanBoskerck; Eileen DavisSubject:William Witter, 94C117513.Attachments:Witter, William, 94C117513, 3rd AJOC..pdf

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#### Third Amended Judgment of Conviction

• This will be submitted to the Judge today, 6/30/17.

1			TLED	
8	DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #001799 200 S. Third Street	Sep 21	5 10 47 AH '9	5
3	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 (702) 455-4711	Le d'art	5 Joeumure OLERK	
4	Attorney for Plaintiff THE STATE OF NEVADA		OLERK	
5				
6				
7	DISTRICT CC	URT		
8	CLARK COUNTY,	NEVADA		
و	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	CASE NO.	C117513	
10	Plaintiff,	DEPT. NO.	IX	,
11	-vs-	DOCKET NO.	W	
12	) WILLIAM WITTER, ) aba William Lastan Witten			
13	aka William Lester Witter, ) #1204227 )			
14	) Defendant.			
15	)	. Internet and an		
16	SECOND AMEN JUDGMENT OF CON	•		

17 WHEREAS, on the 25th day of January, 1994, Defendant, WILLIAM 18 WITTER, aka William Lester Witter, entered a plea of Not Guilty to the crimes of MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Felony); ATTEMPT 19 MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Felony); ATTEMPT SEXUAL ASSAULT 20 WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Felony); and BURGLARY (Felony), NRS 21 \$200.010, §200.030, 22 §193.165, §193.330, §200.364, §200.366, 23 §205.060; and

WHEREAS, the Defendant WILLIAM WITTER, aka William Lester
Witter, was tried before a Jury and the Defendant was found guilty
of the crimes of COUNT I - MURDER OF THE FIRST DEGREE WITH USE OF
A DEADLY WEAPON (Felony); COUNT II - ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A
DEADLY WEAPON (Felony); COUNT III - ATTEMPT SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH USE

1 OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Felony); and COUNT IV - BURGLARY (Felony); in violation of NRS \$200.010, \$200.030, \$193.165, \$193.330, \$200.364, 2 \$200.366, \$205.060, and the Jury verdict was returned on or about 3 4 the 28th day of June, 1995. Thereafter, the same trial jury, deliberating in the penalty phase of said trial, in accordance with 5 the provisions of NRS §175.552 and §175.554, found that there were 6 7 four (4) aggravating circumstances in connection with the 81 commission of said crime, to-wit:

9 1. The murder was committed by a person who was previously
10 convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to
11 the person of another.

12 2. The murder was committed while the person was engaged in13 the commission of or an attempt to commit any Burglary.

14 3. The murder was committed while the person was engaged in15 the commission of or an attempt to commit a Sexual Assault.

16 4. The murder was committed to avoid or prevent a lawful17 arrest or to effect an escape from custody.

18 That on or about the 13th day of July, 1995, the Jury 19 unanimously found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there were no 20 mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating 21 circumstance or circumstances, and determined that the Defendant's 22 punishment should be Death as to COUNT I - MURDER OF THE FIRST 23 DEGREE WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON in the Nevada State Prison 24 located at or near Carson City, State of Nevada.

WHEREAS, thereafter, on the 3rd day of August, 1995, the
Defendant being present in court with his counsel, PHILIP J. KOHN,
Deputy Public Defender, and KEDRIC A. BASSETT, Deputy Public
Defender, and GARY L. GUYMON, Deputy District Attorney, also being

present; the above-entitled Court did adjudge Defendant guilty 1 thereof by reason of said trial and verdict and, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment Fee, SENTENCED Defendant, as з follows: As to COUNT I - MURDER OF THE FIRST DEGREE WITH USE OF A 4 DEADLY WEAPON, Defendant was sentenced to DEATH by lethal 5 injection; as to COUNT II - ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY 6 7 WEAPON, Defendant was sentenced to TWENTY (20) YEARS in the Nevada . 81 Department of Prisons for the ATTEMPT MURDER, plus an equal and consecutive TWENTY (20) YEARS in the Nevada Department of Prisons 9 for the USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON; as to COUNT III - ATTEMPT SEXUAL 10 ASSAULT WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON, Defendant was sentenced to 11 12 TWENTY (20) YEARS in the Nevada Department of Prisons for the ATTEMPT SEXUAL ASSAULT, plus an equal and consecutive TWENTY (20) 13 YEARS in the Nevada Department of Prisons for the USE OF A DEADLY 14 WEAPON, said sentence imposed in Count III to run consecutive to 15 the sentence imposed in Count II; as to COUNT IV - BURGLARY, 16 17 Defendant was sentenced to TEN (10) YEARS in the Nevada Department of Prisons, said sentence imposed in Count IV to run consecutive to 18 the sentence imposed in Count III. Defendant is to pay RESTITUTION 19 20 111 21 /// 111 22 111 23 111 24 111 25

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1 in the amount of \$2,790.00; with an additional amount to be 2 determined. Defendant is given 627 days credit for time served. 3 THEREFORE, the Clerk of the above-entitled Court is hereby 4 directed to enter this Amended Judgment of Conviction as part of 5 the record in the above entitled matter.

DATED this 25 day of September, 1995, in the City of Las 7 Vegas, County of Clark, State of Nevada.

DISTRICT JUDGE

94-117513X/pce LVMPD DR#9311141809 1º MURDER W/WPN - F

Electronically Filed 6/7/2017 3:59 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT بمبتديها

1	NOTM	Atumb.
2	RENE L. VALLADARES Federal Public Defender	
3	DAVID ANTHONY Assistant Federal Public Defender	
4	Nevada State Bar No. 7978 David_Anthony@fd.org	
	TIFFANY L. NOCON	
5	Assistant Federal Public Defender Nevada State Bar No. 14318C	
6	Tiffany_Nocon@fd.org 411 E. Bonneville Avenue, Ste. 250	
7	Las Vegas, NV 89101 (702) 388-6577	
8	(702) 388-0577 (702) 388-5819 (fax)	
9	Attorneys for Petitioner	
10	DISTRIC	COUDT
11	CLARK COUN	
12	WILLIAM WITTER,	
13	Petitioner,	Case No. C117513 Dept. No. XXIII
14	v.	
15	TIMOTHY FILSON, Warden, Ely State	NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR ORDER
	Prison, and ADAM PAUL LAXALT, Attorney General for the State of Nevada.	(Death Penalty Habeas Corpus Case)
16	Respondents.	
17		
18	Petitioner William Witter hereby	moves the Court to enter the attached
19	Proposed Second Amended Judgment of Co	onviction. <u>See</u> Ex. 1. Mr. Witter bases this
20	motion on the attached memorandum of po	ints and authorities, attached Declaration
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	Case Number:	94C117513

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1	of Assistant Federal Public Defender David Anthony, <u>see</u> Ex. 2, and the entire file in
2	this matter.
3	DATED this 7th day of June, 2017.
4	Respectfully submitted,
5	RENE L. VALLADARES Federal Public Defender
6	<u>/s/ David Anthony</u> DAVID ANTHONY
7	Assistant Federal Public Defender
8	/s/ Tiffany L. Nocon
9	TIFFANY L. NOCON Assistant Federal Public Defender
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1 2	NOTICE OF MOTION TO: CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, Attorney for Respondents
3	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the MOTION FOR ORDER filed June 7, 2017,
4	will be heard on the <u>19</u> day of <u>June 2017</u> , at the hour of <u>9:30</u> a.m.
5	in Department 23 of the District Court.
6	DATED this 7th day of June, 2017.
7	Respectfully submitted, RENE L. VALLADARES Federal Public Defender
9	/s/ David Anthony DAVID ANTHONY
10	Assistant Federal Public Defender
11	<u>/s/ Tiffany L. Nocon</u> TIFFANY L. NOCON
12	Assistant Federal Public Defender
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#### MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

#### I. INTRODUCTION

On January 11, 2017, Mr. Witter filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. He explained that this petition was not subject to procedural default because, <u>inter</u> <u>alia</u>, the amended judgment of conviction entered against him on August 11, 1995, was not a final appealable judgment as it failed to specify the amount of restitution. <u>See Whitehead v. State</u>, 128 Nev. \_\_, 285 P.3d 1053 (2012) (en banc); <u>Slaatte v. State</u>, 129 Nev. \_\_, 298 P.3d 1170 (2013) (per curiam).

9 This Court heard argument on Mr. Witter's petition on April 19, 2017. See Ex. 10 3 (Transcript of Proceedings). This Court agreed with Mr. Witter's position regarding 11 the effect of <u>Whitehead</u> and <u>Slatte</u>. See id. at 2-3. This Court expressly found, 12 consistent with <u>Whitehead</u> and <u>Slaate</u>, that the prior amended judgment of conviction 13 was not final because it imposed "an additional amount [of restitution] to be 14 determined at a later date." <u>Id.</u> The Court subsequently denied Mr. Witter's petition 15 on the merits. <u>See id.</u> at 12.

16 The Court then directed the State to prepare an order consistent with its 17 findings, including "the Court's findings on the timing issue." See id. at 13-14. The 18 State represented that it would file an amended judgment of conviction in order to 19 address this Court's finding regarding the non-finality of the earlier amended 20 judgment of conviction:

MR. OWENS: What I would like to do is along with these findings is submit an amended judgment. I guess it would be a second amended judgment but would differ from the last amended judgment in simply striking the language that says something to the effect of 'and an additional amount of restitution to be determined in the future.' If I –

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1	THE COURT: That may be a suggestion if you want to ensure finality given the <u>Whitehead</u> and <u>Slaatte</u> cases.
2	MR. OWENS: You know, I don't agree with the Court that its necessary,
3	but to avoid this issue in the future, and I'm all about doing what we can to avoid problems in the future, it won't help us with this case or this appeal going up, but for the next petition it might start the time bar. If
4	the court later agrees with you that, yeah, the time for – when your time bar never started then I'd like to get it started with an amended judgment so I'll submit that along with the findings.
5	
6	<u>Id.</u> at 14.
7	The State submitted its Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
8	Order to the Court on May 17, 2017, which the Court entered on May 31, 2017 and
9	filed on June 5, 2017. Ex. 4 (Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
10	and Order). Therein, it correctly reflected the Court's findings that the first amended
11	judgment of conviction was a non-final order:
12	This Court finds that the instant petition, which is a fourth petition for a writ of habeas corpus by this Petitioner, is timely filed because the last
13	Judgment of Conviction, although it does set a restitution amount, it also says an additional amount to be determined at a later date. Accordingly, it is not a final judgment and the time and procedural bars in NBS 24 neuron started to run. See Whitehead r. State, 128 Neuron
14	in NRS 34 never started to run. <u>See Whitehead v. State</u> , 128 Nev, 285 P.3d 1053 (2012); <u>Slaatte v. State</u> , 129 Nev, 298 P.3d 1170, 1171 (2013) ("Because the judgment of conviction contemplates restitution in
15	an uncertain amount, it is not final and therefore is not appealable.").
16	<u>See</u> <u>id.</u> at 2.
17	Contrary to its representations to this Court, however, the State did not submit
18	an amended judgment. Mr. Witter, through counsel, inquired about this omission on
19	May 31, 2017, and offered a proposed second amended judgment consistent with the
20	State's intent to "strik[e] the language that says something to the effect of 'and an
21	additional amount of restitution to be determined in the future." See Ex. 1 (Decl. of
22	Assistant Federal Public Defender David Anthony). The next day, June 1, 2017, the
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State responded that it had changed course and no longer intended to file an amended  $\mathbf{2}$ judgment of conviction. Id.

#### п. A SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION MUST BE ENTERED

To ensure proper jurisdiction, this Court must enter the attached Proposed Second Amended Judgment of Conviction, Ex. 3. On the one hand, this Court has entered notice of entry of its order denying his petition, triggering, in the usual case, his obligation to file a notice of appeal within thirty days. See NRAP 4(a)(1). On the other hand, this Court also has found that the operative judgment of conviction in this case "is not a final judgment" and therefore the Nevada Supreme Court is without jurisdiction to consider any appeal of Mr. Witter's case until the deficiency is cured. See Slaatte, 129 Nev. \_\_, 298 P.3d at 1170.

In light of Slaatte and Whitehead, Mr. Witter submits that the only way to give effect to this Court's order denying his petition, and to permit his appeal on the merits of his petition, is to enter the Proposed Second Amended Judgment of Conviction envisioned by the State at the hearing on his petition.

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1	III.	CONCLUSION
2		Mr. Witter requests this Court sign and enter the Proposed Second Amended
3	Judg	ment of Conviction.
4		DATED this 7th day of June, 2017.
5		Respectfully submitted,
6		RENE L. VALLADARES Federal Public Defender
7		<i>/s/ David Anthony</i> DAVID ANTHONY
8		Assistant Federal Public Defender
9		<u>/s/ Tiffany L. Nocon</u> TIFFANY L. NOCON
10		Assistant Federal Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
In accordance with EDCR $7.26(a)(4)$ and $7.26(b)(5)$ , the undersigned hereby	
certifies that on the June 7, 2017, a true and accurate copy of the foregoing NOTICE	
OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR ORDER was filed electronically with the Eighth	
Judicial District Court and served by Odyssey EFileNV, addressed as follows:	
Steven S. Owens	
Chief Deputy District Attorney motions@clarkcountyda.com	
/s/ Stephanie Young	
An Employee of the Federal Public Defender District of Neur Ja	
District of Nevada	
8	

	AJOC RENE L. VALLADARES		
2	Federal Public Defender Nevada Bar No. 11479		
3	DAVID ANTHONY		
t	Assistant Federal Public Defender Nevada Bar No. 7978		
5	David_Anthony@fd.org 411 E. Bonneville, Ste. 250		
	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101		
3	(702) 388-6577 (702) 388-5819 (Fax)		
7	Attorneys for William Witter		
3			
,	DISTRICT COURT		
	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
	THE STATE OF NEVADA, Case No. 117513		
	Plaintiff, Case No. 117515 Dept. No. XXIII		
2	v.		
3	WILLIAM WITTER, aka William Lester Witter,		
1	Defendant.		
5			
3	PROPOSED SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION		
7	WHEREAS, on the 25th day of January, 1994, Defendant, WILLIAM WITTER,		
3	aka William Lester Witter, entered a plea of Not Guilty to the crimes of MURDER		
)	WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Felony); ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE		
	OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Felony); ATTEMPT SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH USE OF		
	A DEADLY WEAPON (Felony); and BURGLARY (Felony), NRS §200.010, §200.030,		
2	§193.165, §193.330, §200.364, §200.366, §205.060; and		

WHEREAS, the Defendant WILLIAM WITTER, aka William Lester Witter, 1  $\mathbf{2}$ was tried before a Jury and the Defendant was found guilty of the crimes of COUNT 3 I – MURDER OF THE FIRST DEGREE WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Felony); COUNT II - ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON 4 (Felony); COUNT III – ATTEMPT SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH USE OF A DEADLY 5 WEAPON (Felony); and COUNT IV - BURGLARY (Felony), in violation of NRS 6 7 §200.010, §200.030, §193.165, §193.330, §200.364, §200.366, §205.060, and the Jury verdict was returned on or about the 28th day of June, 1995. Thereafter, the same 8 trial jury, deliberating in the penalty phase of said trial, in accordance with the 9 provisions of NRS §175.552 and §175.554, found that there were four (4) aggravating 10 11 circumstances in connection with the commission of said crime, to wit:

12 1. The murder was committed by a person who was previously convicted of
13 a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another.

14
2. The murder was committed while the person was engaged in the
15
commission of or an attempt to commit any Burglary.

16 3. The murder was committed while the person was engaged in the
17 commission of or an attempt to commit a Sexual Assault.

18 4. The murder was committed to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest or to
19 effect an escape from custody.

That on or about the 13th day of July, 1995, the Jury unanimously found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances, and determined that the

Defendant's punishment should be Death as to COUNT I – MURDER OF THE FIRST DEGREE WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON in the Nevada State Prison located at or near Carson City, State of Nevada.

WHEREAS, thereafter, on the 3rd day of August, 1995, the Defendant being 4 present in court with his counsel, PHILIP J. KOHN, Deputy Public Defender, and  $\mathbf{5}$ 6 KEDRIC A. BASSETT, Deputy Public Defender, and GARY L. GUYMON, Deputy District Attorney, also being present; the above-entitled Court did adjudge Defendant  $\mathbf{7}$ 8 guilty thereof by reason of said trial and verdict and, in addition to the \$25.00 9 Administrative Assessment Fee, SENTENCED Defendant, as follows: As to COUNT I - MURDER OF THE FIRST DEGREE WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON, 10Defendant was sentenced to DEATH by lethal injection; as to COUNT II - ATTEMPT 11 MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON, Defendant was sentenced to 12TWENTY (20) YEARS in the Nevada Department of Prisons for the ATTEMPT 13MURDER, plus an equal and consecutive TWENTY (20) YEARS in the Nevada 14Department of Prisons for the USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON; as to COUNT III -1516ATTEMPT SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON, Defendant was sentenced to TWENTY (20) YEARS in the Nevada Department of Prisons for the 17ATTEMPT SEXUAL ASSAULT, plus an equal and consecutive TWENTY (20) 18 YEARS in the Nevada Department of Prisons for the USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON, 19 said sentence imposed in Count III to run consecutive to the sentence imposed in 20Count II; as to COUNT IV – BURGLARY, Defendant was sentenced to TEN (10) 2122YEARS in the Nevada Department of Prisons, said sentence imposed in Count IV to

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1	run consecutive to the sentence imposed in Count III. Defendant is to pay		
2	RESTITUTION in the amount of \$2,790.00. Defendant is given 627 days credit for		
3	time served.		
4	THEREFORE, the Clerk of the above-entitled Court is hereby directed to enter		
5	this Third Amended Judgment of Conviction as part of the record in the above		
6	entitled matter.		
7	DATED this day of June, 2017.		
8	District Indro		
9	District Judge		
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#### DECLARATION OF DAVID ANTHONY

I, David Anthony, declare as follows:

1. I am an attorney at law admitted to practice before this Court and employed as an Assistant Federal Public Defender. I represent Petitioner William Witter in this capital case.

I was present at the April 19, 2017, hearing on Mr. Witter's petition, at which time this Court denied Mr. Witter's claims premised on <u>Hurst v. Florida</u>, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), on the merits. The Court instructed Deputy District Attorney Steven S. Owens to prepare a written order to this effect.

3. At the hearing, Mr. Owens represented that he would additionally file with the
Court a second amended judgment of conviction to address this Court's finding that
the previous judgment of conviction, entered August 11, 1995, was a non-final order.
Specifically, Mr. Owens represented that he would remedy this error by submitting
a new judgment "striking the language that says something to the effect of 'and an
additional amount of restitution to be determined in the future."

4. On May 10, 2017, Mr. Owens caused a proposed order denying Mr. Witter's petition to be sent to my office. This proposed order correctly reflected this Court's finding that the August 11, 1995, judgment "is not a final judgment and the time and procedural bars in NRS 34 never started to run," and otherwise accurately reflected the findings this Court made on the record. Accordingly, I lodged no objection to the proposed order, presuming at that time that Mr. Owens would follow through on his stated intent to file an amended judgment of conviction. The proposed order was

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1	delivered to the Court on or about May 17, 2017.
2	5. On May 31, 2017, still not having received any information about the amended
3	judgment of conviction, I e-mailed Mr. Owens inquiring about its status and attached
4 5	a proposed amended judgment of conviction conforming to the change Mr. Owens
6	suggested at the hearing.
7	6. On June 1, 2017, Mr. Owens responded that he did not feel that it was
8	necessary to file an amended judgment of conviction, and did not intend to do so at
9	the present time.
10	I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and this
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12	declaration was executed on June 7, 2017, in Las Vegas, Nevada.
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14	<u>Is/ David Anthony</u>
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1		CLERK OF THE COURT		
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3	DISTRICT COURT			
4	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA			
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6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	7       THE STATE OF NEVADA,       CASE NO.: 9         8       Plaintiff,       DEPT. XXIII         9       vs.       TRANSCRIPT OF         10       WILLIAM L. WITTER,       Defendant.         13	OF PROCEEDINGS		
15				
15		DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS POST-CONVICTION		
17 18	DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO STATE'S RESPONSE AND MOTION TO DISMISS			
19	<sup>19</sup> APPEARANCES:			
20 21 22	For the State: STEVEN S. OW Chief Deputy D	/ENS, ESQ. District Attorney		
23 24	23 For the Defendant: DAVID ANTHO TIFFANY L. NO Assistant Fede	NY, ESQ. DCON, ESQ. ral Public Defenders		
25	RECORDED BY: MARIA L. GARIBAY, COURT RECORDER			
	Page - 1			
	94C117513			

1	LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 19, 2017 at 10:53 A.M.	
2		
3	THE RECORDER: Page 16, C117513; Witter.	
4	THE COURT: All right, so it's State of Nevada its Witter versus State	
5	of Nevada, C you know 117513. It's a motion to dismiss the 4 <sup>th</sup> habeas	
6	petition. There's a petition for habeas corpus and there's a motion to dismiss it	
7	and then I have a reply and opposition as well.	
8	Good morning, everyone; if you want to introduce yourself for the	
9	record.	
10	MR. ANTHONY: Good afternoon, Your Honor, David Anthony from the	
11	Federal Public Defender for William Witter who's in custody.	
12	THE COURT: Okay.	
13	MR, ANTHONY: You want to introduce yourself?	
14	MS. NOCON: Oh, Tiffany Nocon also from the Federal Public Defenders	
15	Office on behalf of Mr. Witter.	
16	MR. OWENS: Your Honor, Steve Owens for the State.	
17	THE COURT: Okay, so there's a couple of claims brought up. One of the	
18	first issues brought up was the timeliness issue. And I know that the State's	
19	position is that it's untimely and that we'd go off the original judgment of	
20	conviction. I'll be frank with you, I went through and I looked at Slaatte versus	
21	<u>State</u> and <u>Whitehead versus State</u> and I would tend to agree with the Defense	
22	that the way those cases are well, the way the holding came out in those	
23	particular cases, that unless there's a JOC that I didn't see, that it would be	
24	timely. It looks like that last judgment of conviction, although it does set a	
25	restitution amount, it also says an additional amount to be determined at a later	
	Page - 2	
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94C117513

date. I don't show where there's been any additional judgments of conviction
 subsequent to that second one.

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MR. OWENS: You know I'll be happy to address that.

4 THE COURT: And the other thing I want to address is I know that the 5 case law says if it appears to be clerical, but I don't think that the -- but I don't 6 think that it's a clerical matter because when you look at the first judgment of 7 conviction it sets forth the sentence on the murder charge. The second 8 judgment of conviction, it not only sets forth the sentence for the murder 9 charge, it also sets forth the sentence on the additional counts on which the 10 Defendant was convicted, so I just don't see where that could be clerical in 11 nature. I mean I understand -- not being there, my guess is probably it was just 12 inadvertently left out. But on its face, I don't think that you can find that its -- I 13 don't think the Court can find that it's clerical in nature. So unless you have 14 something I don't know, it appears that everything is timely by the Defense.

<sup>15</sup> MR. OWENS: I was under the impression that the original judgment had
 <sup>16</sup> sentenced on everything ---

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THE COURT: Let me look at it.

<sup>18</sup> MR. OWENS: -- other than the amended just came in and sentenced - <sup>19</sup> and added some restitution in.

THE COURT: Let me look at it. Judgment of Conviction; the original
 one's '95. No, it doesn't. If you look at it, you go through and there's no -- it
 sentences on the murder. It doesn't sentence on the other ones. Do you see it,
 the August 4<sup>th</sup>, 1995 judgment of conviction?

MR. OWENS: Yeah, I'm looking at the August 4<sup>th</sup> one right now. Well, I
 -- you know I would say that unlike those other cases that the Defense has

Page - 3 94C117513 cited where they were remanded because it was improper to take an appeal
 because the court said those aren't -- that's not a final judgment, it leaves an
 amount uncertain of restitution. Here we had a direct appeal. It was treated as
 a final judgment.

THE COURT: Yeah, and -- but the appeal was obviously subsequent to
the Court's clarification in the <u>Slaatte</u> and the <u>Whitehead</u> case.

MR. ANTHONY: And the other thing that I might add, Your Honor, is is
that really the conduct of the parties can't confer appellate jurisdiction on the
Nevada Supreme Court. That's why they dismissed the appeal in the <u>Slaatte</u>
case is that jurisdiction either exists or it doesn't and it's not something that
can be conferred by the parties, so.

THE COURT: All right, my guess is it was just never raised previously.
 You know it's never been --

MR. OWENS: Well, if the Court's telling me that after this many years
they can go and find a defect like this and it's not procedurally barred, and even
though there was a direct appeal with issuance of a remittitur and you're telling
me that this case was never final all along and we got to redo a capital case,
there's been no other published --

THE COURT: That's not what I'm telling you at all. What I'm telling you
is -- you know honestly, if I read between the lines, my guess is what happened
is -- I don't have access to what happened you know twenty plus years ago;
okay? My guess is probably she -- he was sentenced on everything at the
original hearing date and the judgment of conviction inadvertently did not
include the sentence for all the other counts, but that's just me guessing. All I
can see is I have a judgment of conviction that convicts him -- that sentences --

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1 adjudicates him on the murder charge. Then I have a subsequent judgment of 2 conviction that comes along not too long later and adds a sentence for all the 3 other charges on which the Defendant was convicted. In addition, it adds a 4 restitution amount with the additional *caveat* to be determined; okay? When 5 you look at the subsequent -- the case law that's come along, what, 15, 20 6 years later, I think the Supreme Court was pretty clear that for purposes of 7 determining timing issues, and I say timing issues and that's for 8 post-conviction relief, that if there's an open issue in that judgment of 9 conviction the -- its not final and that doesn't start the timing -- the timing 10 doesn't start to run. That's all I'm saying. I'm not saying you're going to redo 11 this murder case.

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MR. OWENS: Okay.

THE COURT: So, that -- where that comes into play in this case is if
 those cases had not come out I think the State would have a very good
 argument that its time barred. I mean quite simply there's been many, many,
 many years passed since remittitur on the direct appeal, remittitur on the post conviction petition for habeas corpus, but you know those cases came out and I
 don't know any other way to reconcile them.

MR. OWENS: I see what Your Honor is saying now. So, if --

THE COURT: So that would mean we go into the merits.

MR. OWENS: Well, there's still a successive petition bar. This is -there's been -- this is, what, the fourth petition bar? It has nothing to do with
time. It has to do with the number of petitions that have been filed regardless of
whether or not they're still timely and that the one year time bar never started
ticking. This is their fourth habeas petition. Their last one was procedurally

Page - 5 94C117513 <sup>1</sup> barred because it was successive. I don't think that argument gets them around
<sup>2</sup> the successive petition bar and being here today on a fourth. So, I think we still
<sup>3</sup> have bars.

4 But let me jump to the merits on the *Hurst* issue because really, 5 yeah, we have raised procedural bars. Those are mandatory. The Court's got to 6 deal with those. But the merits of the Hurst issue to me is very simple. I don't 7 see how any reasonable attorney can go read the Hurst case and come out of it 8 with the interpretation that the Federal Public Defender has. I guess reasonable 9 minds can disagree about just about anything, but I haven't found any court 10 anywhere in the country that has attributed to it the interpretation that they 11 have.

They've got a case from back east that I've gone and read and,
 yeah, there's a court there and there's a few other courts elsewhere that have
 applied the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to the weighing of aggravating
 and mitigators, but their case -- is it Delaware?

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MR. ANTHONY: Delaware; correct.

MR. OWENS: My reading of that case is that part of their opinion was
not in any way premised upon the <u>Hurst</u> decision 'cause <u>Hurst</u> doesn't say that
and they didn't rely on <u>Hurst</u> for coming up with that part of their ruling. They
based that on Delaware state law and the interpretation of other cases. And
there's a few other jurisdictions that do the weighing beyond a reasonable
doubt but it's not based on <u>Hurst</u>. So, I just fundamentally disagree with them
on <u>Hurst</u>.

If Your Honor wants to reach the merits of that as an alternative
 decision if overcoming the one year time bar, they still have to show prejudice

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1 and Hurst does not give them the relief and remedy that they're looking for if it 2 did. We're talking about almost every death sentence in the country would be 3 overturned. And here we are more than a year since <u>Hurst</u> publication; nobody's 4 interpreted Hurst that way and overturned a death sentence based on Hurst 5 saying that, oh, you didn't use the beyond a reasonable doubt standard on the 6 weighing of aggravating and mitigators. There's tons of federal cases out there 7 that have looked at this issue and said you don't have to do weighing beyond a 8 reasonable doubt. I cited to all these circuits that have looked at this issue and 9 none of those cases were addressed by the court in *Hurst*. None of them were 10 overturned in *Hurst*. The argument they've got, if they're right, it would be 11 astronomically devastating to the death penalty across the country. And the 12 fact that it's not belies that they've got an issue here.

<sup>13</sup> I don't know what else to say on it. I -- they filed this in 20
<sup>14</sup> different death penalty cases here in Clark County and we're going in one by
<sup>15</sup> one and ticking them off. We're [indiscernible]. Judge Cadish has denied this in
<sup>16</sup> two capital cases. You're the third judge to look at this issue as far as I am
<sup>17</sup> aware. Jonathan Vanboskerck might have had it.

THE COURT: You know I actually had this issue on calendar twice today
 in a pending case and in this case.

MR. OWENS: Okay. Well, I obviously don't have them all. I've got 20 of
them myself and you'd be the third one in my stack. The issue's floating around
out there. I'm not aware of anyone granting them relief so far. They may yet
get relief. But that's where we're at with this and if you have further questions
I'll be happy to answer but they -- my brief covers everything else I wanted to
say.

Page - 7 94C117513 THE COURT: I tend to agree with the State upon reading <u>Hurst</u>. I just don't see how you got to the position you have.

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MR. ANTHONY: Could --

THE COURT: I mean <u>Hurst</u> does repeatedly reference <u>Ring</u> which was
many, many years prior. And I just don't -- looking at the facts of <u>Hurst</u> I just
even know how you're applying them to this situation because as in this -- I'm
sorry, I'll let you argue.

MR. ANTHONY: Well, first of all, Your Honor, one of the things that I
 think is unique about the <u>Hurst</u> decision, and I'm looking at section 2 of the
 decision. I'm sure at this point we've all read it probably several times.

THE COURT: Yes.

12 MR. ANTHONY: The court refers to findings plural and they refer to two 13 different sets of findings: one regarding the existence of the aggravating 14 circumstances and one finding regarding the weighing of the aggravating 15 circumstances against the mitigation. Now, the reason that I believe that our 16 reading of *Hurst* is supportable is because that's exactly the reading of *Hurst* 17 that the Florida Supreme Court adopted on remand in the Hurst case. Mr. Owens notes that Delaware also took the same route in the Rauf case. Not 18 19 only did they do that, in the follow up case, in <u>*Powell*</u>, they did apply the 20 reasonable doubt standard exactly the way that we're asking the Court to do so 21 and they completely emptied Delaware's death row. So, if the question is 22 there's no court anywhere that hasn't done this, well there is. There is a state and they completely emptied their death row. There's a very similar situation 23 24 that appears to be occurring in Florida as a result of this as well, so.

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THE COURT: Okay, so obviously the different states can choose to

Page - 8 94C117513 obviously not be inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court but they can go over
 and beyond what's mandated by the U.S. Supreme Court which, --

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MR. ANTHONY: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- in these particular jurisdictions, it sounds like some states
have made that decision to go over and beyond what's mandated by the
Nevada Supreme Court -- I'm sorry, the U.S. Supreme Court. However, there is
-- the State is correct, there is a whole bunch of cases -- I mean it was a whole
bunch of jurisdictions that have not gone over and beyond what was mandated
by the U.S. Supreme Court in <u>Hurst</u> and the cases from those states are not
being overturned as being inconsistent with <u>Hurst</u>.

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MR. ANTHONY: Could I address that aspect --

THE COURT: Yes, please.

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MR. ANTHONY: -- of it, Your Honor?

Again, I think the State has done an admirable job of collecting, you
 know the way that different states have handled this. The one thing that I
 would comment to the Court about that is that it varies state by state.

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THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ANTHONY: And a lot of times -- for example, the State cites to the
 California system but California doesn't have a system where you weigh
 aggravating and mitigating factors. It's not a weighing state. So, the way that
 I would address the Court's concern is that there are state systems that don't
 do this. There are different state systems like in Texas there's no weighing at
 all. You just answer a list of questions. So, I'm not saying that *Hurst* has
 application in every state.

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What I am saying is that in a state like Nevada where you have

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1 what I would consider a three-step process, the first step being the finding of 2 the aggravating circumstances, the second step being the weighing of the 3 aggravating circumstances, and only then can you get to the third step where 4 you can consider other matter evidence or the jury can decide to extend mercy, 5 my argument, Your Honor, is is that if you look at the unique way that the 6 capital sentencing scheme is set up in Nevada that's what differentiates Nevada 7 from a place like California or a place like Arizona where once the jury finds the 8 aggravating circumstance they're basically done as far as finding the Defendant 9 eligible for the death penalty.

10 So, while I agree that the State has definitely cataloged and brought 11 forward a lot of the ways different states have gone, and there are different 12 states that have gone in different directions, my argument is that our system is 13 very, very similar to Florida's which is they have the finding of the aggravators 14 and then the weighing of the aggravators against the mitigators. And so, I 15 would certainly agree with their point that this doesn't have an effect in every 16 state on every capital punishment system but I believe it does in Nevada based 17 upon the way that the Legislature has basically set out this capital sentencing 18 scheme. So, that's the way that I would distinguish the cases that Mr. Owens 19 cited. And a lot of those cases from the federal system also pre-date Hurst.

And so, I think that in light of *Hurst* I think that there is certainly a
movement that I see, the opposite direction, mostly by the Florida Supreme
Court, also by the Delaware Supreme Court. Maybe this is something that
ultimately needs to go to the Nevada Supreme Court obviously to speak to this
because the Nevada Supreme Court decided the *Nunnery* decision which is kind
of what we're kind of up against. That's the difficulty that we face. But that's

Page - 10 94C117513 the same thing that occurred in Delaware and Florida. They had adverse
authority. <u>Hurst</u> came out. They interpreted <u>Hurst</u> to apply to the weighing
stage in their state and we would just ask that that same consideration apply to
Nevada based on the way the statute is set up.

5 6

THE COURT: Okay.

Anything else from the State?

7 MR. OWENS: Well, any time we're dealing with the death penalty it gets 8 real political and I perceive that's what happened in Delaware. Many 9 jurisdictions are looking at the death penalty. The Legislature is looking at the 10 death penalty. But here, Nevada has looked at the issue in terms of what the 11 policy is here in Nevada and whether weighing applies to the aggravating and 12 mitigating circumstances or beyond a reasonable doubt standard applies and 13 they said it doesn't. Granted, they haven't revisited that decision in light of 14 Hurst, but Hurst doesn't give you any reason to overturn that published case 15 law that is against them. The Nevada jurisprudence on the death penalty is 16 whatever the Nevada Supreme Court says it is. And if there's any confusion in 17 the case law it's because of federal counsel coming in and trying to compare us 18 to other jurisdictions like Florida and saying, no, Nevada, this is what your system is. They have no grounds or standing to come in and tell us in Nevada 19 20 what our own death penalty statutes mean and what they don't mean. We're 21 free to interpret them, the Nevada Supreme Court is, any way we want to. We 22 can say black is white. And so they get caught up on these words that, oh, 23 you called this an eligibility factor, you called this a selection. Our Nevada 24 Supreme Court has used those terms in different ways than what federal 25 counsel used to from the U.S. Supreme Court but -- and so we have a

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<sup>1</sup> fundamental disagreement. They don't agree with how Nevada has itself
<sup>2</sup> defined the factors for aggravating and mitigating and selection and how
<sup>3</sup> Nevada has defined its own case law so I have problems even overcoming that.
<sup>4</sup> We're not on the same equal footing when discussing what Nevada law means.
<sup>5</sup> So, I'll just submit it.

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THE COURT: Is there anything else, any other record you want to make? MR. ANTHONY: I don't think so, Your Honor.

8 Just one thing that I would mention that I think I neglected to 9 mention just a moment ago is that the State's brief focuses a lot on the 10 difference between the identity of the fact finder versus the standard of proof. 11 And I just wanted to just make it clear that in <u>Hurst</u> itself and also in the 12 <u>Apprendi</u> case which is the predecessor to <u>Hurst</u> they make it very clear that if 13 you decide something is an element of the offense then it follows that the 14 beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof has to apply to that element. And 15 so, I would disagree with at least what's being said over here that nobody has 16 extended the sixth amendment jurisprudence to the beyond a reasonable doubt 17 standard. I think that's clearly in *Hurst*. Its right at the tip of section 2 and it's 18 also in <u>Apprendi</u> as well. So, that's the only thing that I think that I haven't 19 covered that I wanted to at least talk about 'cause it was in their reply.

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Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, I am going to deny it. I do agree with the State's
position. I am going to adopt the State's position. I do believe that the capital
proceedings in this case are consistent with <u>Apprendi</u>, <u>Ring</u>, and <u>Hurst</u>. First of
all, both the eligibility and suitability were decided by a jury, not by the judge.
And likewise, the Court doesn't find anything in <u>Hurst</u> that mandates that the

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1	second prong likewise be proven beyond or the aggravating, the mitigating
2	weighing that be done beyond a reasonable doubt.
3	I am going to ask the State please prepare an order to be run by the
4	special I'm sorry, the Federal Public Defenders Office for approval.
5	MR. OWENS: Okay. Could I get a transcript from today? Do you want
6	me to submit an order?
7	THE COURT: Yes.
8	MR. OWENS: Okay; will do.
9	THE COURT: And also address the timing issue.
10	MR. OWENS: Yes, in line with you finding that it is or it's timely
11	because the judgment was never final, but are you finding that it's successive
12	and as an alternative basis there's no prejudice because <u>Hurst</u> doesn't mean
13	these things?
14	THE COURT: Well, just basically finding that there's no prejudice. I mean
15	
16	MR. OWENS: No prejudice.
17	THE COURT: prejudice to the
18	MR. OWENS: Okay.
19	THE COURT: State because basically the Court found that the capital
20	scheme is not inconsistent with <i>Hurst</i> , and again, <i>Hurst</i> references Ring which
21	they could have brought that relief several years prior but I just chose to go into
22	the merits of the case because of
23	MR. OWENS: Sure.
24	THE COURT: the time bars. But my suggestion would be to put the
25	Court's findings on the timing issue to put it in the order. That way if you ever
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1	

want to bring it back up in front of the Nevada Supreme Court at least it's
obviously there.

MR. OWENS: Oh, absolutely. They'll want that in there.

THE COURT: Because perhaps they're going to want --

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MR. ANTHONY: We would definitely want to see that in there.

THE COURT: I mean it's kind of weird how it all played out and you
 know perhaps in some other cases the Supreme Court will issue a clarification
 on --

MR. OWENS: What I would like to do is along with these findings is
 submit an amended judgment. I guess it would be a second amended judgment
 but would differ from the last amended judgment in simply striking the language
 that says something to the effect of 'and an additional amount of restitution to
 be determined in the future.' If I --

THE COURT: That may be a suggestion if you want to ensure finality
 given the <u>Whitehead</u> and <u>Slaatte</u> cases.

MR. OWENS: You know, I don't agree with the Court that its necessary,
but to avoid this issue in the future, and I'm all about doing what we can to
avoid problems in the future, it won't help us with this case or this appeal going
up, but for the next petition it might start the time bar. If the court later agrees
with you that, yeah, the time for --- when your time bar never started then I'd
like to get it started with an amended judgment so I'll submit that along with
the findings.

THE COURT: It would be inappropriate for me to put my position there
 but I have a feeling the issue could be -- unless the Supreme Court issues some
 clarification it could be raised, because looking at old judgment of convictions it

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1	seems to happen a lot where it's to be determined on certain things. So I guess
2	there's always the potential for this issue to arise again so perhaps the Supreme
3	Court should address it if they deem it appropriate.
4	MR. ANTHONY: And also, Your Honor, we would agree to the
5	submission of an amended judgment consistent with what Mr. Owens is saying
6	as well.
7	THE COURT: Yeah. Okay; thank you.
8	MR. OWENS: Okay. Thank you.
9	MR. ANTHONY: Thank you, Your Honor.
10	
11	[Proceedings concluded at 11:12 a.m.]
12	* * * *
13	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the
14	audio/video recording in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.
15	Cynthia GEORGILAS
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17	Court Recorder/Transcriber District Court Dept. XVII
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	Page - 15
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EXHIBIT 4

### EXHIBIT 4

	Electronically Filed 6/5/2017 2:33 PM Steven D. Grierson	
	CLERK OF THE COURT	
1	NEO	
2	DISTRICT COURT	
3	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA	
4		
5	WILLIAM WITTER, Case No: 94C117513	
6	Petitioner, Dept No: XXIII	
7	vs.	
8	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	
9	NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT,Respondent,CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER	
10		
11	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 31, 2017, the court entered a decision or order in this matter, a	
12	true and correct copy of which is attached to this notice. You may appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision or order of this court. If you wish to appeal, you	
13	must file a notice of appeal with the clerk of this court within thirty-three (33) days after the date this notice is	
14	mailed to you. This notice was mailed on June 5, 2017.	
15	STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CLERK OF THE COURT	
16	/s/ Amanda Hampton Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk	
17		
18		
19	CERTIFICATE OF E-SERVICE / MAILING	
20	I hereby certify that on this 5 day of June 2017. I served a copy of this Notice of Entry on the following:	
21	☑ By e-mail;	
22	Clark County District Attorney's Office Attorney General's Office – Appellate Division-	
23		
24	<ul> <li>The United States mail addressed as follows:</li> <li>William Witter # 47405</li> <li>Rene L. Valladares, Federal Public Defender</li> </ul>	
25	P.O. Box 1989         411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste 250           Ely, NV 89301         Las Vegas, NV 89101	
26		
20	/s/ Amanda Hampton Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk	
28		
1	-1-	
	Case Number: 94C117513	

њ.,		Electronically Filed 5/31/2017 4:01 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
1	FFCL STEVEN WOLFSON	Aten A. atumo
2	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565	
3	STEVEN S. OWENS	
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #004352	
5	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500	
6	(702) 071-2500	
7	DIST	TRICT COURT
8	CLARK C	COUNTY, NEVADA
9	WILLIAM WITTER,	)
10	Petitioner,	CASE NO: 94C117513
11	-VS-	DEPT NO: XXIII
12	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	
13	Respondent.	
14		)
15	FINDINGS OF FACT, CON	NCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
16		HEARING: 4/19/17 IEARING: 11:00 AM
I7	This Cause having come on for he	aring before the Honorable STEFANY A. MILEY,
18	District Judge, on the 19 <sup>th</sup> day of April, 2 <sup>th</sup>	017, the Petitioner not being present, represented by
19	DAVID ANTHONY and TIFFANY L.	NOCON, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, the
20	Respondent being represented by STE	VEN B. WOLFSON, District Attorney, by and
21	through STEVEN S. OWENS, Chief	Deputy District Attorney, and the Court having
22	considered the matter, including briefs, th	anscripts, arguments of counsel, and documents on
23	file herein, now makes the following find	ings of fact and conclusions of law:
24	FINDINGS OF FACT	AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
25	In 1995, William Witter was con	victed of Murder With Deadly Weapon, Attempt
26	Sexual Assault With Deadly Weapon, a	nd Burglary for assaulting and attempting to rape
27	Kathryn Cox, and then stabbing to death	her husband, James Cox, when he tried to come to
28	his wife's aid. Witter received the de	ath penalty. His convictions and sentence were
	HAP DRIVE DOCS/HUR	ST PETITIONS/WITTER, WILLIAM, 94C117513, FFCL&O, 4-19-17 HRGDOC
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affirmed on direct appeal. Witter v. State, 112 Nev. 908, 921 P.2d 886 (1996). Remittitur issued on December 23, 1996.

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Witter filed a timely first post-conviction petition which was denied by the district court after an evidentiary hearing and then affirmed on appeal by the Nevada Supreme Court in an unpublished order (SC# 36927). Remittitur issued on September 14, 2001. After litigating a federal habeas petition for several years, Witter returned to state court by filing a second state habeas petition on February 14, 2007. That petition was also denied and again affirmed on appeal by the Nevada Supreme Court in an unpublished order (SC# 50447). Witter also filed a third state habeas petition on April 28, 2008, which was also denied and affirmed on appeal (SC# 52964). Remittitur from this third habeas appeal issued on February 14, 2011. On January 11, 2017, Petition filed a fourth state habeas petition which raises a single issue based on <u>Hurst v. Florida</u>, 577 U.S. \_\_, 136 S.Ct. 616 (2016). The State has filed a response and motion to dismiss the petition based on procedural default.

This Court finds that the instant petition, which is a fourth petition for a writ of habeas corpus by this Petitioner, is timely filed because the last Judgment of Conviction, although it does set a restitution amount, it also says an additional amount to be determined at a later date. Accordingly, it is not a final judgment and the time and procedural bars in NRS 34 never started to run. *See* Whitehead v. State, 128 Nev. \_\_\_\_, 285 P.3d 1053 (2012); <u>Slaatte v.</u> <u>State</u>, 129 Nev. \_\_\_\_, 298 P.3d 1170, 1171 (2013) ("Because the judgment of conviction contemplates restitution in an uncertain amount, it is not final and therefore is not appealable"). Therefore, the petition is not procedurally barred.

Turning to the merits of the issue, this Court finds that the capital proceedings in this case are consistent with <u>Apprendi</u>, <u>Ring</u>, and <u>Hurst</u>. See <u>Hurst v. Florida</u>, 577 U.S. \_\_\_\_, 136 S.Ct. 616 (2016). First of all, both the eligibility and suitability were decided by a jury, not by the judge. And likewise, the Court doesn't find anything in <u>Hurst</u> that mandates that the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances be done beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, neither appellate reweighing nor the weighing process implicate <u>Hurst</u>. Because Petitioner has not demonstrated prejudice the petition is denied.

ORDER Based on the foregoing, the fourth petition is timely filed due to the lack of a final Judgment of Conviction, but Hurst is simply an application of Ring and nothing in Hurst requires the weighing process be subject to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. The motion to dismiss the petition is granted and the petition is denied. DATED this / day of May, 2017. S MILEY ĈT JUDGĘ ÐISTR aa STEVEN B. WOLFSON DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #001565 BΥ STEVEN S. OWENS Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #004352 HAP DRIVE DOCSHURST PETITIONS/WITTER, WILLIAM, 94C117513, FFCL&O, 4-19-17 HRG. DOC

5	
1	CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC FILING
2	I hereby certify that service of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, was
.3	made this 10 <sup>th</sup> day of May, 2017, by Electronic Filing to:
4	DAVID ANTHONY
5	Email: David_Anthony@fd.org
6	TIFFANY L. NOCON Email: Tiffany_Nocon@fd.org
7	
8	
9	
10	By: Extruis
11	Employee, District Attorney's Office
12	
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18	SSO//ed
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#### **Eileen Davis**

From:	Eileen Davis
Sent:	Wednesday, May 10, 2017 10:24 AM
То:	david_anthony@fd.org; tiffany_nocon@fd.org
Cc:	Steven Owens; Eileen Davis
Subject:	William Witter, 94C117513.
Attachments:	Witter, William, 94C117513, FFCL&O.,pdf

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.

The attached Findings will be submitted to the Judge on May 17, 2017.

### EXHIBIT 4

# EXHIBIT 4

:	Electronically Filed 6/23/2017 1:39 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT		
1	OPPM Atumb. The	****	A
2	STEVEN WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565		
3	STEVEN S. OWENS Chief Deputy District Attorney		
4	Nevada Bar #004352 200 Lewis Avenue		
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500		
6 7	DISTRICT COURT		
-			
8	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
9	WILLIAM WITTER,		
10	Petitioner, CASE NO: 94C117513		
11	-vs- { DEPT NO: IV		
12	THE STATE OF NEVADA,		
13	Respondent.		
14	OPPOSITION TO MOTION		
15	COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by STEVEN WOLFSON, District Attorney	у,	
16	through STEVEN S. OWENS, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and hereby submits this	is	
17	Opposition to Motion.		
18	This opposition is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, th	ie	
19	attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing,	if	
20	deemed necessary by this Honorable Court.		
21	POINTS AND AUTHORITIES		
22	In his motion filed on June 7, 2017, Witter requests entry of an amended judgment of	of	
23	conviction in connection with his recently denied habeas petition. Written findings denyin	g	
24	the habeas petition have already been signed and were filed on May 31, 2017. When the	le	
25	habeas petition was argued in court on April 19, 2017, this court held that the time bars di	d	
26	not apply because the prior judgment of conviction had ordered restitution in an uncertai	n	
27	amount. This court went on to deny the petition on the merits and asked the State to prepar	e	
28	the findings. In response, it was the State's prosecutor, not Witter's counsel, who requeste	d	
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permission to submit an amended judgment curing the alleged defect by striking the uncertain restitution order so as to start the time bars for future habeas filings in light of the court's ruling. The court agreed, "that may be a suggestion if you want to ensure finality given the Whitehead and Slatte cases." Transcript, 4/19/2017, p. 14.

However, after having drafted the findings to deny the habeas petition, the State's 5 prosecutor no longer believes an amended judgment is necessary to start the time bars or to 6 procedurally bar future habeas filings. This court's reasoning and determination regarding the 7 8 nonfinality of the prior judgment with its uncertain restitution award, is fully set forth in the 9 written findings and the issues are preserved for appeal. Accordingly, the State did not prepare or submit an amended judgment as it had requested permission to do. The transcript from 10 April 19, 2017, shows that the amended judgment was merely permissive at the State's request 11 and for the State's unique purpose, and had not been affirmatively "ordered" by the court or 12 requested by the defense as part of any kind of habeas relief as is now asserted. At most, 13 Witter's counsel simply agreed to the submission of an amended judgment, "consistent with 14 what Mr. Owens is saying." Id., at p. 15. But at no time in his petition, in his pleadings, or at 15 16 argument did Witter's counsel request the remedy of an amended judgment to cure the restitution defect. 17

18 Now in the instant motion, Witter's counsel for the first time is demanding the entry of an amended judgment of conviction for his own purposes in addition to the written findings 19 20 already filed. Witter claims that the Nevada Supreme Court is "without jurisdiction to consider any appeal of Mr. Witter's case until the deficiency is cured." Motion, p. 6. That's utter 21 22 nonsense. In Whitehead, the restitution defect in the judgment did not mean there was no jurisdiction for the subsequent habeas appeal, but rather that the district court was required to 23 reach the merits of the habeas petition rather than applying the procedural bars. Whitehead v. 24 State, 128 Nev. , 285 P.3d 1053 (2012). That is exactly what this court has done. Although 25 the Court in <u>Slaatte</u> may have dismissed the appeal in that case for lack of jurisdiction, that 26 was an appeal directly from the nonfinal judgment of conviction pursuant to a guilty plea, not a habeas appeal as in the present case. See Slaatte v. State, 129 Nev. , 298 P.3d 1170, 1171 28

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(2013). In a habeas appeal the final judgment being appealed is the Findings of Fact and
 Conclusions of Law, not the judgment of conviction. NRS 34.575. No amended judgment is
 necessary for Witter to pursue his appeal.

Just as the State has reconsidered its position regarding its need for an amended 4 judgment, the defense apparently has also thought about it and decided an amended judgment 5 would benefit them. There is probably some kind of tolling or restarting of the federal habeas 6 bars that works to the defendant's advantage should an amended judgment be entered, even if 7 that amended judgment is later vacated as unnecessary. An amended judgment can always be 8 entered following Witter's appeal if the Nevada Supreme Court agrees that the habeas time 9 bars never started running due to the defect in the judgment. But if an amended judgment is 10 entered now before the Nevada Supreme Court has had an opportunity to review the issue, it 11 may have irreversible consequences rendering all prior rulings in this case for the past 20 years 12 a nullity. Because the defense did not ask for such relief in their petition and the petition has 13 already been denied by a final written order, there is no authority for belatedly granting the 14 defense such relief now by way of motion. 15

WHEREFORE, the State respectfully requests that the motion be denied. Dated this 24<sup>th</sup> day of June, 2017.

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Respectfully submitted,

STEVEN WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565

BY /s/ Steven S. Owens STEVEN S. OWENS Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #004352 Office of the District Attorney Regional Justice Center 200 Lewis Avenue Post Office Box 552212 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 (702) 671-2750

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1	<b>CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC FILING</b>
2	I hereby certify that service of Opposition to Motion, was made this 24 <sup>th</sup> day of June,
3	2017, by Electronic Filing to:
4	MICHAEL PESCETTA
5	DAVID ANTHONY Email: <u>ecf_nvchu@fd.org</u>
6	TIFFANY L. NOCON Email: <u>Tiffany_Nocon@fd.org</u>
7 8	Email: <u>Tiftany_Nocon(<i>a</i>fd.org</u>
9	
10	By: /s/ E.Davis
11	Employee, District Attorney's Office
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## EXHIBIT 5

# EXHIBIT 5

1	RTRAN	Electronically Filed 7/7/2017 2:17 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
2		
3		
4	DISTRIC	T COURT
5	CLARK COUI	NTY, NEVADA
6		
7	STATE OF NEVADA,	
8	Plaintiff,	CASE NO. 94C117513
9	vs.	DEPT. NO. XXIII
10	) WILLIAM L. WITTER,	
11	Defendant.	
12		
13		
14 15	BEFORE THE HONORABLE STEFAN	Y A. MILEY, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
16	WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, 2017	
17		
18	DEFENDANT'S MC	DTION FOR ORDER
19	APPEARANCES:	
20	For the Plaintiff:	JONATHAN VAN BOSKERCK, ESQ.
21		Deputy District Attorney
22	For the Defendant:	TIFFANY L. NOCON, ESQ. DAVID S. ANTHONY, ESQ.
23		Deputy Federal Public Defenders
24		
25	RECORDED BY: MARIA L. GARIBAY, CO	
		1
	Case Number: 94C1	17513

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#### WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, 2017, 9:35 A.M.

THE MARSHAL: Top of page 1, C117513, Witter.

THE COURT: Hi. Hi, you guys.

MR. VAN BOSKERCK: Good morning, Your Honor, Jonathan Van Boskerck for the State.

MR. ANTHONY: David Anthony from the Federal Public Defender's Office for Mr. Witter who's in custody and we will waive his appearance for the purpose of this hearing.

THE COURT: Okay, so --

MS. NOCON: Tiffany Nocon from the Federal Defender's Office.

THE COURT: Good morning. I guess I don't understand the why. It's just why a JOC is not being done. I mean legally why?

MR. VAN BOSKERCK: First off, Judge, Mr. Owens asked me to apologize to you that he is not here. He's speaking at the bar convention or he'd be here himself, so that's why you have me. But to answer your question, the reason Mr. Owens decided that he didn't want to adopt what you described as his suggestion of filing an Amended JOC, there's two reasons. Number one, we have real concerns that on appeal *Whitehead* and *Slaatte* will not be found to be retroactive. So we don't necessarily -- we still believe the petition will be filed untimely in the end. But our ultimately concern, that is, when it comes to --

THE COURT: But you can still raise that issue.

MR. VAN BOSKERCK: But ultimately our real concern is whether the
 petition, whether it's timely or not. If we file an Amended JOC at this point without
 waiting for the Nevada Supreme Court, they will argue in federal court that we have

1	waived all of the procedural bars by filing a new JOC. So we felt that it would be
2	more prudent to wait until we have a decision from the Nevada Supreme Court
3	'cause we

THE COURT: Okay.

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5 MR. VAN BOSKERCK: -- don't have to waive the procedural bars in federal
6 court.

7 THE COURT: Well, I guess Mr. Owens misunderstood the distinction between leaving it in the State's discretion versus an order from the Court. And 8 perhaps it's the way I phrased it. I recognize that you're trying to preserve issues on 9 appeal but many of those issues are already in the record and certainly they will be 10 contained within the record should this case go forward into other courts for further 11 relief, but there needs to be a JOC. And I did not intent to make it a suggestion that 12 the State could choose to comply or not comply with. So it is now, if everyone's 13 clear, an order. Okay. Thank you. 14 15 MR. ANTHONY: Thank you, Your Honor. PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 9:37 A.M. 16 \* \* \* \* \* 17 ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the 18 audio/video recording in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability. 19 20 Maria J. Garibay MARIA L. GARIBAY 21 Court Recorder/Transcriber 22 23