1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA			
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3	JENNIFER V. ABRAMS; AND THE ABRAMS AND MAYO LAW FIRM		Electronically Fil Nov 08 2017 11	
4	Appellants,		Elizabeth A. Bro	
5	VS.	CASE NO.: 73838	Clerk of Suprem	e Court
6 7	STEVE W. SANSON; AND VETERANS IN POLITICS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,	DISTRICT COURT A-17-749318-C	CASE NO.:	
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9	Respondents.			
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-	PARTIAL OPPOSITION TO NON-PARTY BRANDON PAUL SAITER'S MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE APPEAL NOs. 72819,			
11	73838, AND 72778			
12	Respondents Steven W. Sanson and Veterans In Politics International,			
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14	Inc., by and through their counsel, hereby submit this partial opposition to			
15	non-party Brandon Paul Saiter's motion to consolidate. This partial			
16	opposition is supported by the attached memorandum of points and			
17				
18	authorities.			
19	Dated this 17 th day of October, 2017.			
20				
21	/s/ Margaret A. McLetchie			
22	MARGARET A. MCLETCHIE, NV Bar No. 10931 ALINA M. SHELL, NV Bar No. 11711			
23	MCLETCHIE SHELL LLC			
24	701. E. Bridger Avenue, Suite 520			
	Las Vegas, NV 89101 Counsel for Respondents			
25	Counsel jor Respondentis			
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

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Respondent Steven W. Sanson, the President of Veterans In Politics International, Inc. ("VIPI"), is a court observer and "watchdog" of Nevada's judicial system.¹ The genesis of the instant case (the *Abrams* case) was a series of online postings by Mr. Sanson criticizing Appellant Jennifer V. Abrams, an attorney practicing family law in Las Vegas, for her in-court behavior and litigation. Some of those critical comments pertained to Abrams' actions in non-party Brandon Paul Saiter's divorce case and matters such as whether she sealed too many documents. Appellants filed suit against the VIPI Defendants and others for several causes of action, including defamation and related claims. At the same time, attorney Marshal Willick—who represents Saiter in his divorce appeal and filed the motion to consolidate—also filed suit against the VIPI Defendants based on the same set of facts and alleging similar causes of action (the "Willick case"). Willick also represents Saiter on appeal in his personal divorce case (the "Saiter case")² challenging Family Court Judge Jennifer Elliott's vacation of an order which purported to prohibit the dissemination of case materials by anyone, including by non-parties who had

¹ Sanson and VIPI are collectively referred to herein as the "VIPI Defendants." ² Saiter v. Saiter, Supreme Court Case No. 72819

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no advance notice or opportunity to be heard.

In the *Abrams* case, based on, *inter alia*, the nature of the statements at issue, the VIPI Defendants filed and prevailed on a special anti-SLAPP³ motion to dismiss pursuant to NRS 41.650 in the *Abrams* matter, and Appellants appealed. The district court denied the VIPI Defendants anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the *Willick* case that motion, and the VIPI Defendants appealed. (*See* Nev. S. Ct. Case No. 72778.)

On September 29, 2017, Saiter moved to consolidate his appeal with the *Willick* case and the *Abrams* case. The VIPI Defendants oppose consolidation of this matter with the *Saiter* case because that case should be dismissed. The VIPI Defendants do not oppose consolidation or clustering of the *Willick* and *Abrams* cases for the limited purpose of general background and for legal determination of a legal issue that is at the heart of both appeals: whether criticisms of lawyers' in-court demeanor and litigation practices constitutes an issue "of public concern" under Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes.

II. ARGUMENT

- A. Several Factors Weigh Against Consolidation of this Matter with the *Saiter* Case.
 - 1. Standard for Consolidation

Pursuant to Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure ("NRAP") 3(b)(2),

³ "SLAPP" is an acronym for "strategic lawsuit against public participation."

this Court may join or consolidate separately filed notices of appeals upon its own motion or upon motion of a party. In general, this Court consolidates appeals in cases when the issues raised are identical. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Washoe County, 123 Nev. 128, 130, 159 P.3d 1099, 1101 (2007); O'Guinn v. State, 118 Nev. 849, 850, 59 P.3d 488, 489 (2002). The Court also considers whether the arguments presented below and on appeal are similar and arise from a common set of facts. Levinson v. Second Judicial District Court, 103 Nev. 404, 406, 742 P.2d 1024, 1025 (1987). Finally, judicial economy is also relevant. Jackson v. State, 115 Nev. 21, 22, 973 P.2d 241 (1999).

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Consolidation with the Saiter Case is Inappropriate Because the Challenged Order is Not Appealable.

On October 3, 2017, this Court issued an Order to Show Cause in the Saiter case (Saiter case, Docket # 17-33450.) Saiter is challenging Family Court Judge Jennifer Elliott's vacation of an order which purported to prohibit the dissemination of case materials by anyone, including by non-parties who had no notice or opportunity to be heard. When Sanson, in his capacity as President of VIPI, disseminated a court video transcript he obtained prior to the issuance of the order. The video showed Abrams engaging in a heated exchange with Judge Elliott. Abrams filed a Motion for an Order to Show Cause to have Sanson incarcerated and sanctioned for contempt. The VIPI Defendants opposed that motion via special appearance.

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Judge Elliott both denied the order to show cause and vacated the Order Prohibiting Dissemination as unconstitutional and in violation of Nevada law. Judge Elliott also found that there was no actual harm caused by the dissemination of the video which contained no confidential information.

This Court's jurisdiction to review decisions of the district court is limited to appeals authorized by statute or court rule. See Taylor Constr. Co. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 100 Nev. 207, 209, 678 P.2d 1152, 1153 (1984). "NRAP 3A(b) designates the judgments and orders from which an appeal may be taken, and where no statutory authority to appeal is granted, no right exists." Id. (citing Kokkos v. Tsalikis, 91 Nev. 24, 530 P.2d 756 (1975)). Here, neither the district court's refusal to find Sanson in contempt nor its decision to vacate the Order Prohibiting Dissemination are an "appealable determination" under NRAP 3A(b). As this Court noted in its Order to Show Cause, "a contempt order that is ancillary to another proceeding [such as this one which is ancillary to Saiter's divorce] is not appealable." (Order, p. 1) (citation omitted). Given that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Saiter's appeal, consolidation with that matter is inappropriate.

3.

Consolidation is Not Appropriate Because Saiter Failed to **Perfect His Appeal.**

NRAP 3(d) requires appellants to "serve the notice of appeal on all parties to the action in the district court." When service is not performed

properly "the appellate court acquire[s] no jurisdiction." *Johns-Manville, Inc. v. Lander County*, 48 Nev. 244, 229 P. 387 (1924). "[T]o perfect an appeal, the party desiring to do so should first file his notice of appeal, next serve it." *Brooks v. the Nevada Nickel Syndicate (Limited)*, 24 Nev. 264, 272, 52 P. 575, 576 (1898) (quotation omitted). Saiter failed to perfect his appeal because he has never served Sanson or VIPI with a Notice of Appeal or any other relevant appellate documents. Sanson had specially appeared in the *Saiter* case to challenge the constitutionality of the Order Prohibiting Dissemination, and is the only litigant in the case who is incentivized to oppose the appeal, particularly since the Order Prohibiting Dissemination was entered on stipulation of the parties.

The appeal of the denial of the motion to incarcerate and financially punish Sanson would necessarily have a substantial effect on Sanson's most fundamental rights to liberty and property. The sole reason for the appeal is to allow Saiter to again pursue incarceration or sanctions against Sanson for purportedly violating the Order Prohibiting Dissemination. In his opening brief, Saiter asserts that: "the case should be remanded to the trial court for a hearing on sanctions for the violation of the Order Prohibiting Dissemination of Case Material, as it related to these hearing videos and as requested in the Motion for Order to Show Cause." (*Saiter* Opening Brief, p. 35.) Saiter then

argues for incarceration, sanctions and an injunction against Sanson for purported contempt of the order he is trying to reinstate. (*Id.*, pp. 48-52.)

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that "no person may be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Article I, Section I of the Nevada constitution describes "life and liberty" as "inalienable right(s)." Nevada's Due Process clause is co-extensive with the Due Process clause of the United States Constitution. *Wyman v. State*, 125 Nev. 592, 600, 217 P.3d 572, 578 (2009). The due process clause guarantees an individual's fundamental right to be heard. *Browning v. Dixon*, 114 Nev. 213, 217, 954 P.2d 741, 743 (1998); *accord Knight Piesold & Co. v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Cty. of Elko*, 126 Nev. 731, 367 P.3d 790 (2010) Notably, the failure to give Sanson notice and an opportunity to be heard in the *Saiter* case was one of the reasons Judge Elliott vacated her order:

Again, the Court FINDS as the Order Prohibiting the Dissemination of Case material failed to give notices to any of the "All persons or entities," including Sanson, no one was given any means to challenge the validity of the order. Thus, any non-party, without prior notice, could have been dragged into court unconstitutionally, despite lack of any reasonable connection with the case.⁴

Accordingly, the Saiter case should be dismissed for failure to perfect and for

⁴ See Appellant's Appendix, Vol. 3, p. 523 in Saiter case.

violation of Sanson's constitutional Due Process rights.

4. Consolidation of This Matter With Saiter's Appeal Does Not Promote Judicial Economy.

As noted above, this Court may consolidate appeals in the interest of judicial economy. *Jackson v. State*, 115 Nev. 21, 22, 973 P.2d 241 (1999); *see also Gen. Supply & Servs., Inc. v. Burke & Assocs.*, 128 Nev. 898, 381 P.3d 615 (2012). Consolidation with the *Saiter* case would not serve this important interest because two appeals do not raise any common issues of law, and share only tangentially related facts. In the *Saiter* matter, the central issue on appeal is the lower court's decision to vacate the Order Prohibiting Dissemination. In this case, the Appellants' claims on appeal primarily pertain to whether the district court erred in granting the VIPI Defendants' anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss. (*See* September 21, 2017 Docketing Statement, pp. 6-7.) Given the lack of commonality between the claims, consolidation would not serve judicial economy.

B.

Partial Consolidation with the *Willick* Appeal is Appropriate for the Limited Purpose of Ensuring Uniformity of this Court's Anti-SLAPP case law.

As discussed above, both Abrams and Willick are suing the VIPI Defendants for publishing statements about their respective courtroom demeanor and litigation practices. At the heart of both cases is whether criticisms of attorneys were made "in direct connection with an issue of public interest" as required by NRS 41.635 et seq. for anti-SLAPP protection. This appeal can be consolidated with the Willick case for the limited purposes of general background and clarification of the relevant law in this area or, in the alternative, clustered based on the overlapping legal issues to ensure they are resolved in a consistent and efficient manner. See Supreme Court Internal Operating Procedure 2(c)(2).

The appeals should not, however, be consolidated for purposes of factual analysis. Pursuant to NRS 41.660(3), a defendant seeking anti-SLAPP dismissal bears the initial burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that each of the statements at issue were made in good faith regarding an issue of public concern. Assuming the defendant meets this threshold showing, a court must then "determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim." Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.660(3)(b).

20 In the proceedings below, the district court held the VIPI Defendants 21 satisfied their burden under NRS 41.660(3)(a), and that Appellants had failed 22 to demonstrate a probability of success on their claims. Because Appellants 23 have appealed the district court's findings, the Court must now review each contested statement individually to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in granting the VIPI Defendants' anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss.

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Shapiro v. Welt, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 6, 389 P.3d 262, 266 (2017).

C. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF JUDGE DUCKWORTH'S ORDER IN ANOTHER UNRELATED DIVORCE CASE.

Finally, Saiter's Motion to Consolidate seeks judicial notice of an order issued by Judge Bryce Duckworth in yet another unrelated divorce case, *Ansell v. Ansell*, Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, Case No. D-15-521960-D in which Willick represents the plaintiff (the "Duckworth Order"). The Duckworth Order, however, is not subject to judicial notice.

NRS 47.130(2) requires that facts subject to judicial notice be "(a) [g]enerally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (b) [c]apable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, so that the fact is not subject to reasonable dispute." Duckworth's Order contains a myriad of findings that the VIPI Defendants are somehow involved in corruption. Yet, he made the findings (a) knowing he was disqualified and was going to recuse himself from the case, (b) without any adjudication of the facts underlying the findings, (c) in violation of Sanson and VIPI's Due Process and other rights, and (d) outside the jurisdiction of the family court. The VIPI Defendants attempted unsuccessfully to vacate the order in district court and will shortly seek this Court's assistance to do so. Accordingly, the findings and conclusions are not

"generally known" nor "capable of accurate and ready determination" so that such facts are "not subject to reasonable dispute" as required by NRS 47.130(2). As with the *Saiter* case, Sanson was not a party in the *Ansell* case, and his motion to vacate the order was denied because of his lack of standing. Accordingly, the facts in the Duckworth Order cannot be relied on. Moreover, appellate courts should not take judicial notice of facts raised for the first time on appeal where, as here, it would be procedurally unfair to do so. *In re Indian Palms Assoc.*, 61 F.3d 197, 205 (3d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Respondents respectfully request the Court deny the request to consolidate this matter with the *Saiter* appeal. Alternatively, Respondents request that this Court consolidate or cluster the appeals for the limited purpose of ensuring the overlapping legal issues are resolved in a consistent and efficient manner.

Dated this 17th day of October, 2017.

/s/ Margaret A. McLetchie McLETCHIE SHELL, LLC Margaret A. McLetchie (Bar No. 10931) Alina M. Shell (Bar No. 11711) 701 E. Bridger Ave., Suite 520 Las Vegas, NV 89101

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3	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
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5	I hereby certify that the foregoing PARTIAL OPPOSITION TO NON-		
6	PARTY BRANDON PAUL SAITER'S MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE		
7	APPEAL NOs. 72819, 73838, AND 772778 was filed electronically with the		
8	Nevada Supreme Court on the 17 th day of October, 2017. Electronic service of		
9	Nevada Supreme Court on the 17 day of October, 2017. Electronic service of		
10	the foregoing document shall be made in accordance with the Master Service		
11	List as follows:		
12	Dennis L. Kennedy		
13	Nevada Bar No. 1462		
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27	McLetchie Shell LLC		
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