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CODE: 3550 1 TIMOTHY E. ROWE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 1000 2 LISA M. WILTSHIRE ALSTEAD, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 10470 3 McDonald Carano Wilson LLP. P. O. Box 2670 4 Reno, Nevada 89505-2670 5 775-788-2000 Attorneys for Petitioner 6 CITY OF RENO

> IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE

> > * * * * *

CITY OF RENO,

Petitioner.

Case No:

VS.

Department No:

JODY YTURBIDE, and the **NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF** ADMINISTRATION APPEALS OFFICER,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

The Petitioner, the CITY OF RENO, by and through its attorneys, Timothy E. Rowe, Esq. and Lisa M. Wiltshire Alstead of McDonald Carano Wilson LLP, in accordance with NRS 233B.130, hereby petitions this Court for judicial review of the Decision rendered and filed by the Department of Administration Appeals Officer on December 16, 2016 on Claim No. 14853E248257, Appeal No. 1700698-LLW. A copy of the Decision is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.

The grounds upon which this review is sought are:

- 1. The Decision rendered by the Appeals Officer prejudices substantial rights of the Petitioner because it is:
 - a. affected by error of law;

1	b. clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial				
2	evidence on the whole record; and				
3	c. arbitrary and capricious and based upon an abuse of discretion by the				
4	Appeals Officer.				
5	WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays as follows:				
6	1. The court grants judicial review of the Decision filed on December 16, 2016				
7	by the Department of Administration Appeals Officer;				
8	The court vacate and set aside the Decision issued by the Appeals Officer;				
9	and				
10	For such other and further relief as the court deems just and proper.				
11	Dated this day of January, 2017.				
12	McDONALD CARANO WILSON LLP				
13	D. 18/1/11 1				
14	By: AS WILLIAM HEROD				
15	TIMOTHY E. ROWE, ESQ. LISA M. WILTSHIRE ALSTEAD, ESQ.				
16	P. O. Box 2670 Reno, NV 895005-2670				
17	Attorneys for the Petitioner CITY OF RENO				

AFFIRMATION

Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW filed in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada does not contain the social security number of any person.

- I MI () I V I V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V						
Timothy E. Rowe, Esq.						
Lisa M. Wiltshire Alstead, Esq.						
Attorney for Petitioner						
CITY OF RENO						

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee of McDonald Carano Wilson LLP, and that on the on the 13th day of January, 2017, I served the preceding PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW by placing a true and correct copy thereof in a sealed envelope and requesting a runner from McDonald Carano Wilson LLP to hand-deliver said document to the following parties at the addresses listed below:

> Appeals Officer Department of Administration 1050 E. William Street, Suite 450 Carson City, Nevada 89701

Attorney General Office of the Attorney General 100 North Carson Street Carson City, NV 89701

A true and correct copy of the within document was also served via U.S. Mail at Reno, Nevada, on the parties/address referenced below:

> Jason Guinasso, Esq. Reese Kintz Guinasso, LLC 190 West Huffaker, Suite 402 Reno, NV 89511 Counsel for Jody Yturbide

City of Reno Attn: Kelly Leerman 1 East First St. 9th Fl. Reno, NV 89501

Lisa Jones CCMSI P.O. Box 20068 Reno, NV 89515-0068

Kathleen L. Morris

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INDEX OF EXHIBITS Description Exhibit # **Decision of the Appeals Officer** Exhibit 1

of Pages

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EXHIBIT 1

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100 WEST LIBERTY STRET. 10." HLOOR. * RENO. NEXADA 89501
PRIONE 775-738-2000 • FAX 775-789-2020

EXHIBIT 1

Carano Wilson LLP

of

JODY YTURBIDE

SPARKS, 89441

9732 PYRAMID WAY, #368

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NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION

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BEFORE THE APPEALS OFFICER

APPEALS OFFICER

In the Matter of the Industrial Insurance Claim

Claim No.:

14853E248257

Hearing No.:

1700074-JL

Appeal No.:

1700698-LLW

Employer:

CITY OF RENO

PO BOX 1900

RENO, NV 89505

TPA:

CCMSI

PO BOX 20068

RENO, NV 89515-0068

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DECISION AND ORDER OF THE APPEALS OFFICER

This decision addresses Appeal No. 1700698-LLW brought by Cannon Cochran Management Services (hereinafter "CCMSI") and City of Reno, appealing an August 11, 2016, Hearing Officer Decision and Order under Hearing No. 1700074-JL reversing and remanding CCMSI's July 1, 2016 determination offering 18% of her 33% permanent partial disability rating in lump sum and the remaining 15% in monthly installments. In this regard, the Hearing Officer concluded:

"On July 1, 2016, the Insurer offered the Claimant a 33% PPD award. The claimant was further advised that he was entitled to a one time lump sum payment of 18%, and the remaining 15% in monthly installments, the instant appeal. Having reviewed the submitted evidence and in consideration of the representations made at today's hearing, the Hearing Officer finds the Insurer errored in its 18% one time lump sum offering. As such, the Hearing Officer finds the Claimant is entitled to a one time lump sum offering of 25%, with the remaining 8% to be paid in monthly installments, pursuant to NAC 616C.498. Therefore, the Insurer shall recalculate the 33% PPD award based on a lump sum offering of 25%, and upon completion, render a new determination with appeal rights accordingly."

The Claimant, Mrs. Jody Yturbide, was represented by Jason D. Guinasso, Esq., and the law offices of Reese, Kintz, Guinasso, LLC.

Reese Kintz, Guinasso 23

Reese Kintz, Guinasso 190 W Huffaker Ln Suite 402 Reno, NV 89511 (775) 853-8746

Reese Kintz, 23
Guinasso 23
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Sulte 402
Reno, NV 89511
775) 853-8746

The Employer, City of Reno, and Third-Party Administrator, CCMSI, were represented by Lisa Wiltshire Alstead, Esq., and the law offices of McDonald Carano Wilson.

The administrative hearing before the Appeals Officer in this contested workers' compensation matter was conducted November 21, 2016, pursuant to Nevada's Administrative Procedure Act under Chapter 233B of the Nevada Revised Statutes ("NRS"); the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act ("NIIA") NRS Chapters 616CA through 616D, and related regulations.

ISSUES PRESENTED

- 1. Whether CCMSI's July 1, 2016 determination offering 18% of her 33% permanent partial disability rating in lump sum and the remaining 15% in monthly installments is supported by the evidence and Nevada law.
- Whether CCMSI should have offered Mrs. Yturbide 25% of her 33% permanent partial disability rating in lump sum and the remaining 8% in installments in accordance with NRS 616C.495(d) and NAC 616C.498.

CONCLUSION

The August 11, 2016, Decision and Order of the Hearing Officer under Hearing No. 1700074 is affirmed. The Appeals Officer finds that CCMSI's July 1, 2016, determination to limit Mrs. Yturbide's right to receive a lump sum of her 33% permanent partial disability ("PPD") award to 18% is not supported by the evidence or Nevada law. Mrs. Yturbide should have been offered 25% lump sum of her 33% PPD under NRS 616C.495(d) and NAC 616C.498.

Having reviewed the documents submitted as evidence as Exhibits 1 through 2, and considered the arguments of counsel for the parties, the Appeals Officer has carefully

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Reese Kintz, Guinasso 190 W Huffaker Ln Suite 402 Reno, NV 89511 (775) 853-8746 considered and applied the requirements of the governing law and hereby makes the following findings and conclusions:

FINDINGS OF FACT

- 1. On May 16, 2016, CCMSI issued a determination informing Mrs. Yturbide that she had been scheduled for a Permanent Partial Disability evaluation with Katharina C. Welborn, D.C. Exhibit 2 at Yturbide0001-3.
- 2. Chiropractor Welborn completed her evaluation and then issued her findings on June 19, 2016, wherein she concluded that Mrs. Yturbide had sustained a 33% whole person impairment for injuries to her cervical spine. Exhibit 2 at Yturbide0005-11.
- 3. On July 1, 2016, CCMSI issued a determination offering 18% of Mrs. Yturbide's 33% permanent partial disability rating in lump sum and the remaining 15% in monthly installments. In this regard, Mrs. Yturbide was informed that she was only entitled to 18% in a lump sum due to the fact that she had received prior impairment ratings of 2% and 5%. Exhibit 2 at Yturbide0012-26.
- 4. On or about September 17, 2009, Mrs. Yturbide had received a 5% PPD rating for carpel tunnel syndrome in her right wrist. Exhibit 1 at 57.
- 5. Thereafter, on or about April 5, 2013, Mrs. Yturbide had received a 2% PPD rating for injuries to her left elbow. **Exhibit 1 at 67**.
- 6. Mrs. Yturbide contended that she should have been offered 25% of her 33% permanent partial disability rating in lump sum and the remaining 8% in installments in accordance with NRS 616C.495(d) and NAC 616C.498.
- 7. The Hearing Officer agreed with Mrs. Yturbide and rendered a Decision and Order under Hearing No. 1700074-JL reversing and remanding CCMSI's July 1, 2016 determination, which has given rise to the present appeal.

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Reese Kintz, Guinasso 190 W Huffaker Ln Suite 402 Reno, NV 89511 (775) 853-8746

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Under the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act ("NIIA"), the burden of proving a case beyond speculation and conjecture is on the claimant. See NRS 616C.150; NRS 616A.010. In this regard, Mrs. Yturbide must establish the work-connection of her injuries, the causal relationship between a work-connected injury and her disabilities, the extent of her disabilities, the work-related necessity for medical treatment and care, and all other facets of her claim by a preponderance of the evidence; he cannot prevail if the evidence is merely evenly balanced. See, A. Larson and L. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law Vol. 8 A., Section 130.06[3][a] (2003); see also, NRS 616C.150; NRS 616A.010.

NRS 616C.495(1)(d) provides:

Any claimant injured on or after July 1, 1995, may elect to receive his or her compensation in a lump sum in accordance with regulations adopted by the Administrator and approved by the Governor. The Administrator shall adopt regulations for determining the eligibility of such a claimant to receive all or any portion of his or her compensation in a lump sum. Such regulations may include the manner in which an award for a permanent partial disability may be paid to such a claimant in installments. Notwithstanding the provisions of NRS 233B.070, any regulation adopted pursuant to this paragraph does not become effective unless it is first approved by the Governor.

(Emphasis supplied).

NAC 616C.498 is the regulation adopted by the Administrator and approved by the Governor. This regulation provides:

An employee injured on or after July 1, 1995, who incurs \underline{a} permanent partial disability that:

- 1. Does not exceed 25 percent may elect to receive compensation in a lump sum.
- 2. Exceeds 25 percent may elect to receive compensation in a lump sum equal to the present value of an award for a disability of 25 percent. If the injured employee elects to receive compensation in a lump sum pursuant to this subsection, the insurer shall pay in installments to the injured employee that portion of the injured employee's disability in excess of 25 percent.

(emphasis supplied).1

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The Appeals Officer has considered and analyzed the foregoing requirements of the governing law, evaluated the evidence and argument proffered by the parties at the hearing, and has concluded as a matter of law:

- 1. CCMSI's July 1, 2016, determination to limit and reduce Mrs. Yturbide's right to receive a lump sum of her 33% permanent partial disability ("PPD") award to 18% is not supported by the evidence or Nevada law.
- 2. Mrs. Yturbide should have been offered 25% lump sum of her 33% PPD under NRS 616C.495(d) and NAC 616C.498.
- 3. NAC 616C.498 explicitly allows an injured worker who receives a PPD rating in up to and in excess of 25% to elect to receive compensation in a lump sum equal to the present value of an award for a disability of 25% and installments payments for that portion of the injured employee's disability in excess of 25%.
- 4. A injured worker's right to receive up to 25% of their PPD rating in lump sum applies to each and every permanent partial disability an injured worker incurs as clearly specified by the plain language of the regulation which attaches the injured workers right to "a" permanent partial disability that meets the criteria of section (1) and (2) of the regulation.
- 5. NAC 616C.498 and NRS 616C.495(1)(d) do not in any way limit or otherwise require a reduction of the lump sum award an injured worker is entitled to receive where an injured worker has multiple claims with injuries to separate body parts.
- Contrary to CCMSI and the City of Reno's assertions, the Nevada Supreme
 Court has never held nor inferred that an injured worker is limited to a 25% lump sum PPD

Reese Kintz, Guinasso 190 W Huffaker Ln Suite 402 Reno, NV 89511 (775) 853-8746

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¹ Contrary to Claimant's assertions, NAC 616C.490 is not applicable to this appeal as there has been no apportionment of the PPD award by the Insurer in the July 1, 2016 determination letter.

Page 5 of 7

1 in situations involving more than one claim and distinct injuries resulting in disabilities to separate body parts. In Eads v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 109 Nev. 733, 736, 857 P.2d 13, 15 2 3 (1993), Eads' PPD award increased from nineteen percent to thirty-five percent "for the same disability;" therefore, the Court held that the lump sum payment available to Eads may 4 5 not exceed the twenty-five percent limit specified in the statute at that time. In this case, the Court concluded that where "an injured worker's case is reopened for further treatment and 6 7 evaluation of the original disability . . . " the statute, ". . . applies to the combined disability allowance and limits any lump sum payments to a total of twenty-five percent." 9 /// 10 111 11 /// 12 111 13 /// 14||/// 15 | /// 16 17 111 18 /// 19 | /// 20 21 /// 22 23 24

DECISION

In accordance with the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the August 11, 2016, Decision and Order of the Hearing Officer under Hearing No. 1700074-JL is AFFIRMED. The Appeals Officer finds that CCMSI's July 1, 2016, determination to limit Mrs. Yturbide's right to receive a lump sum of her 33% permanent partial disability ("PPD") award to 18% is not supported by the evidence or Nevada law and is hereby REVERSED and REMANDED. Mrs. Yturbide shall be offered 25% of her 33% permanent partial disability rating in lump sum and the remaining 8% in installments in accordance with NRS 616C.495(d) and NAC 616C.498.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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DATED this 16th day of December, 2016

APPEALS OFFICER

LORNA L. WARD, ESO

NOTICE: Pursuant to NRS 233B.130, if any party desires to appeal this final decision of the Appeals Officer, petition for judicial review must be filed with the District Court within thirty (30) days after service of this final decision.

Submitted By:

Jason D. Guinasso, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 8478 Reese Kintz Guinasso, LLC 190 W. Huffaker Lane Suite 402

Reno, NV 89511

Attorney for Jody Yturbide

RKG

Reese Kintz, Guinasso 190 W Huffaker Ln Suite 402 Reno, NV 89511 (775) 853-8746

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

The undersigned, an employee of the State of Nevada, Department of Administration, Hearings Division, does hereby certify that on the date shown below, a true and correct copy of the foregoing **DECISION AND ORDER** was duly mailed, postage prepaid **OR** placed in the appropriate addressee runner file at the Department of Administration, Hearings Division, 1050 E. William #450, Carson City, Nevada, to the following:

JODY YTURBIDE 9732 PYRAMID WAY #368 SPARKS, NV 89441

JASON GUINASSO, ESQ
REESE KINTZ GUINASSO, LLC
190 WEST HUFFAKER SUITE 402
RENO NV 89511

12 CITY OF RENO
ATTN: KELLY LEERMAN
1 EAST FIRST ST 9th FLOOR
RENO, NV 89501

LISA M WILTSHIRE ALSTEAD ESQ 100 W LIBERTY ST 10TH FLOOR RENO NV 89505

7 CCMSI PO BOX 20068 RENO, NV 89515-0068

Dated this day of December, 2016.

Kristi Fraser, Legal Secretary II Employee of the State of Nevada

ATTACHMENT 2

ATTACHMENT 2

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9 CITY OF RENO,

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Petitioner,

Case No.:

CV17-00065

Dept. No.:

vs.

12 JODY YTURBIDE,

Respondent.

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ORDER

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE

Currently before the Court is Petitioner CITY OF RENO's (hereinafter "Petitioner") Petition for Judicial Review, filed on January 13, 2017. Petitioner seeks review of the Decision rendered by the Department of Administration Appeals Officer on December 16, 2016. Petitioner's Opening Brief was filed on March 27, 2017. On April 25, 2017, Respondent JODY YTURBIDE (hereinafter "Respondent") filed her Answering Brief. On May 25, 2017, Petitioner filed their Reply Brief, and requested oral argument on May 26, 2017. Oral argument was heard on the matter on July 21, 2017.

Factual Background

Respondent was employed by Petitioner as a Public Safety Dispatcher in the Reno Emergency Communications Division. On May 23, 2014, Petitioner filed a claim for injuries to her right shoulder, forearm, elbow, wrist, and fingers related to severe pain and numbness and loss of sensation in two to three fingers. The date of the injury

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was May 22, 2014. The cause of the injury was attributed to non-stop typing and answering of phones. Respondent sought treatment for her injuries and thereafter, she was rated for her conditions. On June 19, 2016, Respondent's Permanent Partial Disability (PPD) evaluation was performed by Dr. Katharine Welborn. Dr. Welborn recommended claim closure with a 33% whole person impairment related to the body part of the cervical spine. Respondent had previously received a 5% PPD rating in September 2009 for carpel tunnel syndrome and a 2% PPD in April 2013 for injuries to her elbow.

On July 1, 2016, the insurer issued a determination offering 18% of the Respondent's 33% PPD rating in lump sum and the remaining 15% in monthly installments. This was based on Respondent having received prior PPD ratings of 2% and 5%. On July 8, 2016, Respondent sought review of the insurer's July 1, 2016 determination letter. A hearing was held on August 3, 2016, before the Hearing Officer. On August 11, 2016, the Hearing Officer reversed and remanded the insurer's July 1, 2016 determination, finding that the Respondent is entitled to a one time lump sum offering of 25% with the remaining 8% to be paid in monthly installments. The Appeals Officer affirmed the Hearing Officer's decision on December 16, 2016 (hereinafter "Appeals Officer Decision").

Issues Presented

- 1. Does the Appeals Officer Decision contain errors of law by: (a) failing to subtract Claimant's prior PPD awards from the 25% cap on the amount of a PPD award that can be paid in lump sum form for the instant claim; and (b) by limiting the 25% cap on lump sum payments to the same claim or body part?
- 2. Is the Appeals Officer Decision concluding that the Respondent is entitled to have 25% of the 33% PPD award paid in a lump sum amount supported by the substantial evidence where the record contains evidence that Respondent has received two prior PPD awards totaling 7%?

Standard of Review

In reviewing an administrative agency decision, the court is to review the evidence presented to the agency in order to determine whether the agency's decision was arbitrary or capricious and was thus an abuse of the agency's discretion. A district court may not substitute its judgment in the place of an administrative agency's judgment when reviewing findings of fact and must limit their review to whether or not the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Pure questions of law are reviewed de novo, however "an agency's conclusions of law that are closely related to the agency's view of the facts are entitled to deference and should not be disturbed if they are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is defined as "that quantity and quality of evidence which a reasonable [person] could accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

Discussion

This matter essentially rests on the determination of whether Respondent's two prior PPD determinations have an effect on the application of the 25% cap on the lump sum payments for a current PPD determination. Petitioner argues that because Respondent has already received a 7% lump sum payment based on the two prior PPDs, that the 7% should be subtracted from the 25% cap. Therefore, Petitioner argues that the Appeals Officer Decision finding that the lump sum payment of 25% was appropriate with the remaining payments to be paid in installments, was an error of law. Further, Petitioner argues that the Appeals Officer Decision was not supported by substantial evidence because it failed to take into consideration the prior PPD lump sum payments when determining payments for the current PPD determination. Thus, Petitioner argues that Respondent should only receive an 18% lump sum payment and the remaining 15% in installments.

¹ Clements v. Airport Auth. of Washoe Cty., 111 Nev. 717, 721, 896 P.2d 458, 460 (1995)

² Id. at 721.

³ Id. at 722 (citing SIIS v. Swinney, 103 Nev. 17, 20 (1987))

⁴ Id. (quoting State, Emp. Security v. Hilton Hotels, 102 Nev. 606, 608 n.1 (1986) (alteration original)).

Respondent argues that the Appeals Officer Decision was not affected by an error of law and was supported by substantial evidence. Respondent argues that the 25% cap is not a cumulative determination, meaning that for each and every PPD determination that exceeds 25%, the person should be entitled to collect 25% in a lump sum payment.

I. Application of the Relevant Statutes on the 25% Cap on Lump Sum Payments

Under NRS 616C.495(1)(d), an award for a permanent partial disability may be paid in a lump sum under the following conditions:

- (d) Any claimant injured on or after July 1, 1995, and before January 1, 2016, who incurs a disability that:
- (2) Exceeds 25 percent may elect to receive his or her compensation in a lump sum equal to the present value of an award for a disability of 25 percent. If the claimant elects to receive compensation pursuant to this sub-subparagraph, the insurer shall pay in installments to the claimant that portion of the claimant's disability in excess of 25 percent.

Additionally, under NAC 616C.498:

- 1. An employee injured on or after July 1, 1995, but before January 1, 2016, who incurs a permanent partial disability that:
 - (b) Exceeds 25 percent may:
- (1) Elect to receive compensation in a lump sum equal to the present value of an award for a disability of 25 percent. If the injured employee elects to receive compensation in a lump sum pursuant to this subparagraph, the insurer shall pay in installments to the injured employee that portion of the injured employee's disability in excess of 25 percent.

As stated by the parties, the Nevada Revised Statutes and Nevada Administration Code are silent as to the application of the 25% cap on lump sum payments when there has been multiple PPD determinations stemming from multiple injuries. In Eads v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 109 Nev. 733, 857 P.2d 13 (1993), the Nevada Supreme Court addressed the application of the 25% cap on lump sum payments when there were multiple PPD determinations. There, the plaintiff suffered a single injury with

an initial PPD rating of 19%.⁵ However, subsequent to the first rating, the plaintiff received an additional 16% rating, which brought his total PPD rating to 35%.⁶ The Nevada Supreme Court held that the 25% cap applied to the lump sum payment even when there were multiple PPD determinations due the PPD determinations being made on the same injury.⁷ The present action is distinguishable from Eads v. State Indus. Ins. Sys, due to Respondent's PPD ratings being the result of multiple injuries. If there is a literal reading of the holding in Eads, it would appear the 25% cap on the lump sum payment would only apply to individual injuries, not a combination of multiple injuries.

However, Petitioner argues that the Appeals Officer Decision's reliance on Eads in determining that the 25% cap only applies to a single injury was an error of law. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that if the Nevada Legislature's intent was to limit the application of the 25% cap on PPD determinations to those involving a single injury, it would have done so by codifying Eads.8 The Court does not agree. In reading NRS 616C.495 and NAC 616C.498, there is nothing in the text that would result in an application that is inconsistent with the holding in Eads. Under both NRS 616C.495 and NAC 616C.498, if a claimant received a PPD rating in excess of 25%, the claimant "may elect to receive his or her compensation in a lump sum equal to the present of an award for a disability of 25 percent." There is nothing in the language of the Nevada Revised Statutes or the Nevada Administrative Code that would lead to a different result than the one reached in Eads. The Eads case reaffirmed the appropriate application of the 25% cap on a PPD determination that exceeds 25% when it is based on a single injury. Therefore, the Court does not find the Appeals Officer Decision was affected by an error of law due to the reliance on Eads.

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⁵ Eads v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 109 Nev. 733, 857 P.2d 13, (1993).

⁶ Id. at 15.

⁷ *Id*.(emphasis added).

⁸ See, In re Christensen, 122 Nev. 1309, 1320, 149 P.3d 40, 47 (2006).

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II. Workers' Compensation Statutes Next, Petitioner argues that the failure of the Appeals Officer Decision to

consider the workers' compensation statutes as a whole, specifically NRS 616C.495(1)(g) and NRS 616C.490(9), resulted in a decision that was affected by an

error of law. Under NRS 616C.495(1)(g):

If the permanent partial disability rating of a claimant seeking compensation pursuant to this section would, when combined with any previous permanent partial disability rating of the claimant that resulted in an award of benefits to the claimant, result in the claimant having a total permanent partial disability rating in excess of 100 percent, the claimant's disability rating upon which compensation is calculated must be reduced by such percentage as required to limit the total permanent partial disability rating of the claimant for all injuries to not more than 100 percent.

Petitioner argues that this reaffirms their position that when calculating compensation for a PPD rating, the prior PPD ratings must be factored in. Furthermore, under NRS 616C.490(9):

[ilf there is a previous disability, as the loss of one eye, one hand, one foot, or any other previous permanent disability, the percentage of disability for a subsequent injury must be determined by computing the percentage of the entire disability and deducting therefrom the percentage of the previous disability as it existed at the time of the subsequent injury.

Again, Petitioner argues that the requirement that the rating physician factor in the prior PPD ratings for the purposes of apportionment, reaffirms their position that the calculation of payments must also consider the prior PPD ratings.

After review, the Court does not find Petitioner's arguments persuasive. Again, there is nothing in the text of the statutes that support their argument that the prior PPD ratings must be subtracted from the 25% cap on lump sum payment and instead be paid in installments. Both statutes referenced above apply only to the application of prior PPD ratings as it relates to a PPD rating of a claimant as a whole. It is an extraordinary leap to apply the reduction of the prior PPD ratings as it relates to a

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whole person PPD rating, to a reduction of prior PPD ratings as it relates to right to a lump sum payment. Although the Court agrees that the workers' compensation statutes should be considered as a whole, the Court does not find that either of the statutes proffered by Petitioner support a finding that the Appeals Officer Decision was affected by an error of law for failing to consider those statutes.

III. AMA Guides

Petitioner's next argument is similar to the one addressed above. Petitioner argues that the Appeals Officer Decision was affected by an error of law for failing to consider the AMA Guides approach to whole person impairment. Specifically, the requirement that impairment from different regions be combined to determine whole person impairment. After review, the Court does not find that the AMA Guides dictate that a prior PPD rating must be subtracted from the 25% cap on the lump sum payment under NRS 616C.495 and NAC 616C.489. Rather, the AMA Guides focus on the appropriate method in which to ensure that a claimant's PPD rating does not exceed 100%. This is analogous to the statutes referenced above. In an attempt to prevent a PPD rating exceeding 100%, AMA Guides and the statutes referenced above attempt to reduce the current PPD rating by taking into account any prior PPD ratings. For example, if a claimant has two prior PPD ratings of 2% and 5% and subsequently receives a 33% PPD rating, the 7% should theoretically be subtracted from the current 33% PPD rating leaving the claimant with a current PPD rating of 26% for the purposes of disability payments. Therefore, leaving the claimant with a 25% lump sum payment and 1% of installment payments. Under this logic, it would appear that the AMA Guides and applicable Nevada Revised Statutes are designed to address the concern of exceeding a 100% PPD rating, not the reduction of the 25% cap on lump sum payments.

Again, the Court does not find that the Appeals Officer Decision was affected by an error of law for failing to consider the AMA *Guides* approach to whole person impairment. The approach to whole person impairment relates solely to the

determination of a whole person PPD rating, not a calculation of the payments for the purposes of the 25% cap on lump sum payments under NRS 616C.495(1)(d) and NAC 616C.498.

IV. Appeals Officer Decision Was Not Supported by Substantial Evidence

Lastly, Petitioner argues that the Appeals Officer Decision was not supported by substantial evidence because the decision ignores the prior PPD ratings and fails to subtract those prior ratings from the 25% cap on lump sum payments. It is undisputed that Respondent received two prior PPD ratings. Further, it is undisputed that Respondent received payments pursuant to those ratings via lump sum. However, there is nothing in the Nevada Revised Statutes or the Nevada Administrative Code that requires the reduction of the 25% cap on lump sum payments based on prior PPD ratings. Furthermore, the limited case law on the issue stands for the proposition that the cap on a lump sum payment applies only in the context of a single injury. Thus, the Court finds that the Appeals Officer Decision was supported by substantial evidence because it was not required to subtract the prior PPD ratings from the 25% cap on the current PPD rating.

Conclusion

Having fully reviewing the briefing submitted and considering the arguments of counsel, the Court finds that the Appeals Officer Decision was not affected by an error of law and was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, and good cause appearing, the December 16, 2016, *Decision and Order of the Appeals Officer* is **AFFIRMED**.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this ______ day of August, 2017.

Patrick FLANAGAN District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee of the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, County of Washoe; that on this day of August, 2017, I electronically filed the following with the Clerk of the Court by using the ECF system which will send a notice of electronic filing to the following:

Jason D. Guinasso, Esq., attorney for Respondent; and Lisa Wiltshire Alstead, Esq., attorney for Petitioner.

Jathy Jino

ATTACHMENT 3

ATTACHMENT 3

FILED Electronically CV17-00065 2017-09-07 02:20:44 PM Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court Transaction # 6288062

CODE: 2540 Timothy E. Rowe, Esq., Nevada State Bar No. 1000 Lisa Wiltshire Alstead Nevada State Bar No. 10470 McDonald Carano LLP P.O. Box 2670 Reno, NV 89505-1670 775-788-2000 Attorneys for City of Reno

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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE

CITY OF RENO,

VS.

Petitioner,

Case No. CV17-00065

Dept. No. 7

JODY YTURBIDE, and the NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION APPEALS OFFICER,

Respondents.

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the 8th day of August, 2017, an Order was entered in the above-captioned case affirming the Appeals Officer's Decision and Order, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.

AFFIRMATION

The undersigned does hereby affirm that pursuant to NRS 239B.030, the preceding document does not contain the social security number of any person.

Dated: September 7, 2017.

McDONALD CARANO LLP

Timothy E. Rowe

Lisa Wiltshire Alstead

P.O. Box 2670

Reno, NV 89505-2670

Attorneys for City of Reno

MCDONALD (M. CARANO

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of McDONALD CARANO LLP and that on September 7, 2017, I caused to be electronically filed the NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF system, which will automatically e-serve the same on the attorney of record set forth below:

> Jason Guinasso, Esq. Reese Kintz Guinasso 190 W. Huffaker Lane, Suite 402 Reno, NV 89511

Additionally, I served the below parties by placing a true copy of the NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage prepaid thereon in the United States Post Office mail at 100 West Liberty Street, 10th Floor, Reno, Nevada 89501 addressed as follows:

> Jason Guinasso, Esq. Reese Kintz Guinasso 190 W. Huffaker Lane, Suite 402 Reno, NV 89511

> Appeals Officer Department of Administration 1050 E. William Street, Suite 450 Carson City, NV 89701

I am familiar with the firm's practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. The envelopes addressed to the above parties were sealed and placed for collection by the firm's messengers and will be deposited today with the United States Postal Service in the ordinary course of business.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on September 7, 2017 at Reno, Nevada.

An Employee of McDonald Carano LLP

McDONALD CARANO 100 WEST LIBERTY STREET, TENTH FLOOR • RENO, NEVADA 89501 PHONE 775.788, 2000 • FAX 775,788,2020

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Jacqueline Bryant
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 6288062

EXHIBIT 1



EXHIBIT 1

FILED Electronically CV17-00065 2017-08-08 12:09:56 PM Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court Transaction # 6237618

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CITY OF RENO.

VS.

JODY YTURBIDE,

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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE

Case No.:

CV17-00065

Petitioner,

Respondent.

Dept. No.:

ORDER

Currently before the Court is Petitioner CITY OF RENO's (hereinafter "Petitioner") Petition for Judicial Review, filed on January 13, 2017. Petitioner seeks review of the Decision rendered by the Department of Administration Appeals Officer on December 16, 2016. Petitioner's Opening Brief was filed on March 27, 2017. On April 25, 2017, Respondent JODY YTURBIDE (hereinafter "Respondent") filed her Answering Brief. On May 25, 2017, Petitioner filed their Reply Brief, and requested oral argument on May 26, 2017. Oral argument was heard on the matter on July 21, 2017.

Factual Background

Respondent was employed by Petitioner as a Public Safety Dispatcher in the Reno Emergency Communications Division. On May 23, 2014, Petitioner filed a claim for injuries to her right shoulder, forearm, elbow, wrist, and fingers related to severe pain and numbness and loss of sensation in two to three fingers. The date of the injury

was May 22, 2014. The cause of the injury was attributed to non-stop typing and answering of phones. Respondent sought treatment for her injuries and thereafter, she was rated for her conditions. On June 19, 2016, Respondent's Permanent Partial Disability (PPD) evaluation was performed by Dr. Katharine Welborn. Dr. Welborn recommended claim closure with a 33% whole person impairment related to the body part of the cervical spine. Respondent had previously received a 5% PPD rating in September 2009 for carpel tunnel syndrome and a 2% PPD in April 2013 for injuries to her elbow.

On July 1, 2016, the insurer issued a determination offering 18% of the Respondent's 33% PPD rating in lump sum and the remaining 15% in monthly installments. This was based on Respondent having received prior PPD ratings of 2% and 5%. On July 8, 2016, Respondent sought review of the insurer's July 1, 2016 determination letter. A hearing was held on August 3, 2016, before the Hearing Officer. On August 11, 2016, the Hearing Officer reversed and remanded the insurer's July 1, 2016 determination, finding that the Respondent is entitled to a one time lump sum offering of 25% with the remaining 8% to be paid in monthly installments. The Appeals Officer affirmed the Hearing Officer's decision on December 16, 2016 (hereinafter "Appeals Officer Decision").

<u>Issues Presented</u>

- 1. Does the Appeals Officer Decision contain errors of law by: (a) failing to subtract Claimant's prior PPD awards from the 25% cap on the amount of a PPD award that can be paid in lump sum form for the instant claim; and (b) by limiting the 25% cap on lump sum payments to the same claim or body part?
- 2. Is the Appeals Officer Decision concluding that the Respondent is entitled to have 25% of the 33% PPD award paid in a lump sum amount supported by the substantial evidence where the record contains evidence that Respondent has received two prior PPD awards totaling 7%?

Standard of Review

In reviewing an administrative agency decision, the court is to review the evidence presented to the agency in order to determine whether the agency's decision was arbitrary or capricious and was thus an abuse of the agency's discretion. A district court may not substitute its judgment in the place of an administrative agency's judgment when reviewing findings of fact and must limit their review to whether or not the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Pure questions of law are reviewed de novo, however "an agency's conclusions of law that are closely related to the agency's view of the facts are entitled to deference and should not be disturbed if they are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is defined as "that quantity and quality of evidence which a reasonable [person] could accept as adequate to support a conclusion. "4

Discussion

This matter essentially rests on the determination of whether Respondent's two prior PPD determinations have an effect on the application of the 25% cap on the lump sum payments for a current PPD determination. Petitioner argues that because Respondent has already received a 7% lump sum payment based on the two prior PPDs, that the 7% should be subtracted from the 25% cap. Therefore, Petitioner argues that the Appeals Officer Decision finding that the lump sum payment of 25% was appropriate with the remaining payments to be paid in installments, was an error of law. Further, Petitioner argues that the Appeals Officer Decision was not supported by substantial evidence because it failed to take into consideration the prior PPD lump sum payments when determining payments for the current PPD determination. Thus, Petitioner argues that Respondent should only receive an 18% lump sum payment and the remaining 15% in installments.

¹ Clements v. Airport Auth. of Washoe Cty., 111 Nev. 717, 721, 896 P.2d 458, 460 (1995)

³ Id. at 722 (citing SIIS v. Swinney, 103 Nev. 17, 20 (1987))

⁴ Id. (quoting State, Emp. Security v. Hilton Hotels, 102 Nev. 606, 608 n.1 (1986) (alteration original)).

Respondent argues that the Appeals Officer Decision was not affected by an error of law and was supported by substantial evidence. Respondent argues that the 25% cap is not a cumulative determination, meaning that for each and every PPD determination that exceeds 25%, the person should be entitled to collect 25% in a lump sum payment.

I. Application of the Relevant Statutes on the 25% Cap on Lump Sum Payments

Under NRS 616C.495(1)(d), an award for a permanent partial disability may be paid in a lump sum under the following conditions:

- (d) Any claimant injured on or after July 1, 1995, and before January 1, 2016, who incurs a disability that:
- (2) Exceeds 25 percent may elect to receive his or her compensation in a lump sum equal to the present value of an award for a disability of 25 percent. If the claimant elects to receive compensation pursuant to this sub-subparagraph, the insurer shall pay in installments to the claimant that portion of the claimant's disability in excess of 25 percent.

Additionally, under NAC 616C.498:

- 1. An employee injured on or after July 1, 1995, but before January 1, 2016, who incurs a permanent partial disability that:
 - (b) Exceeds 25 percent may:
- (1) Elect to receive compensation in a lump sum equal to the present value of an award for a disability of 25 percent. If the injured employee elects to receive compensation in a lump sum pursuant to this subparagraph, the insurer shall pay in installments to the injured employee that portion of the injured employee's disability in excess of 25 percent.

As stated by the parties, the Nevada Revised Statutes and Nevada Administration Code are silent as to the application of the 25% cap on lump sum payments when there has been multiple PPD determinations stemming from multiple injuries. In Eads v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 109 Nev. 733, 857 P.2d 13 (1993), the Nevada Supreme Court addressed the application of the 25% cap on lump sum payments when there were multiple PPD determinations. There, the plaintiff suffered a single injury with

an initial PPD rating of 19%.5 However, subsequent to the first rating, the plaintiff received an additional 16% rating, which brought his total PPD rating to 35%.6 The Nevada Supreme Court held that the 25% cap applied to the lump sum payment even when there were multiple PPD determinations due the PPD determinations being made on the same injury. The present action is distinguishable from Eads v. State Indus. Ins. Sys, due to Respondent's PPD ratings being the result of multiple injuries. If there is a literal reading of the holding in Eads, it would appear the 25% cap on the lump sum payment would only apply to individual injuries, not a combination of 8 9 multiple injuries.

However, Petitioner argues that the Appeals Officer Decision's reliance on Eads in determining that the 25% cap only applies to a single injury was an error of law. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that if the Nevada Legislature's intent was to limit the application of the 25% cap on PPD determinations to those involving a single injury, it would have done so by codifying Eads.8 The Court does not agree. In reading NRS 616C.495 and NAC 616C.498, there is nothing in the text that would result in an application that is inconsistent with the holding in Eads. Under both NRS 616C.495 and NAC 616C.498, if a claimant received a PPD rating in excess of 25%, the claimant "may elect to receive his or her compensation in a lump sum equal to the present of an award for a disability of 25 percent." There is nothing in the language of the Nevada Revised Statutes or the Nevada Administrative Code that would lead to a different result than the one reached in Eads. The Eads case reaffirmed the appropriate application of the 25% cap on a PPD determination that exceeds 25% when it is based on a single injury. Therefore, the Court does not find the Appeals Officer Decision was affected by an error of law due to the reliance on Eads.

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⁵ Eads v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 109 Nev. 733, 857 P.2d 13, (1993). 26 6 Id. at 15.

⁷ *Id*.(emphasis added).

⁸ See, In re Christensen, 122 Nev. 1309, 1320, 149 P.3d 40, 47 (2006).

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Workers' Compensation Statutes П.

Next, Petitioner argues that the failure of the Appeals Officer Decision to consider the workers' compensation statutes as a whole, specifically NRS 616C.495(1)(g) and NRS 616C.490(9), resulted in a decision that was affected by an error of law. Under NRS 616C.495(1)(g):

If the permanent partial disability rating of a claimant seeking compensation pursuant to this section would, when combined with any previous permanent partial disability rating of the claimant that resulted in an award of benefits to the claimant, result in the claimant having a total permanent partial disability rating in excess of 100 percent, the claimant's disability rating upon which compensation is calculated must be reduced by such percentage as required to limit the total permanent partial disability rating of the claimant for all injuries to not more than 100 percent.

Petitioner argues that this reaffirms their position that when calculating compensation for a PPD rating, the prior PPD ratings must be factored in. Furthermore, under NRS 616C.490(9):

[i]f there is a previous disability, as the loss of one eye, one hand, one foot, or any other previous permanent disability, the percentage of disability for a subsequent injury must be determined by computing the percentage of the entire disability and deducting therefrom the percentage of the previous disability as it existed at the time of the subsequent injury.

Again, Petitioner argues that the requirement that the rating physician factor in the prior PPD ratings for the purposes of apportionment, reaffirms their position that the calculation of payments must also consider the prior PPD ratings.

After review, the Court does not find Petitioner's arguments persuasive. Again, there is nothing in the text of the statutes that support their argument that the prior PPD ratings must be subtracted from the 25% cap on lump sum payment and instead be paid in installments. Both statutes referenced above apply only to the application of prior PPD ratings as it relates to a PPD rating of a claimant as a whole. It is an extraordinary leap to apply the reduction of the prior PPD ratings as it relates to a

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whole person PPD rating, to a reduction of prior PPD ratings as it relates to right to a lump sum payment. Although the Court agrees that the workers' compensation statutes should be considered as a whole, the Court does not find that either of the statutes proffered by Petitioner support a finding that the Appeals Officer Decision was affected by an error of law for failing to consider those statutes.

III. AMA Guides

Petitioner's next argument is similar to the one addressed above. Petitioner argues that the Appeals Officer Decision was affected by an error of law for failing to consider the AMA Guides approach to whole person impairment. Specifically, the requirement that impairment from different regions be combined to determine whole person impairment. After review, the Court does not find that the AMA Guides dictate that a prior PPD rating must be subtracted from the 25% cap on the lump sum payment under NRS 616C.495 and NAC 616C.489. Rather, the AMA Guides focus on the appropriate method in which to ensure that a claimant's PPD rating does not exceed 100%. This is analogous to the statutes referenced above. In an attempt to prevent a PPD rating exceeding 100%, AMA Guides and the statutes referenced above attempt to reduce the current PPD rating by taking into account any prior PPD ratings. For example, if a claimant has two prior PPD ratings of 2% and 5% and subsequently receives a 33% PPD rating, the 7% should theoretically be subtracted from the current 33% PPD rating leaving the claimant with a current PPD rating of 26% for the purposes of disability payments. Therefore, leaving the claimant with a 25% lump sum payment and 1% of installment payments. Under this logic, it would appear that the AMA Guides and applicable Nevada Revised Statutes are designed to address the concern of exceeding a 100% PPD rating, not the reduction of the 25% cap on lump sum payments.

Again, the Court does not find that the Appeals Officer Decision was affected by an error of law for failing to consider the AMA *Guides* approach to whole person impairment. The approach to whole person impairment relates solely to the

determination of a whole person PPD rating, not a calculation of the payments for the purposes of the 25% cap on lump sum payments under NRS 616C.495(1)(d) and NAC 616C.498.

IV. Appeals Officer Decision Was Not Supported by Substantial Evidence

Lastly, Petitioner argues that the Appeals Officer Decision was not supported by substantial evidence because the decision ignores the prior PPD ratings and fails to subtract those prior ratings from the 25% cap on lump sum payments. It is undisputed that Respondent received two prior PPD ratings. Further, it is undisputed that Respondent received payments pursuant to those ratings via lump sum. However, there is nothing in the Nevada Revised Statutes or the Nevada Administrative Code that requires the reduction of the 25% cap on lump sum payments based on prior PPD ratings. Furthermore, the limited case law on the issue stands for the proposition that the cap on a lump sum payment applies only in the context of a single injury. Thus, the Court finds that the Appeals Officer Decision was supported by substantial evidence because it was not required to subtract the prior PPD ratings from the 25% cap on the current PPD rating.

Conclusion

Having fully reviewing the briefing submitted and considering the arguments of counsel, the Court finds that the Appeals Officer Decision was not affected by an error of law and was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, and good cause appearing, the December 16, 2016, *Decision and Order of the Appeals Officer* is **AFFIRMED**.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this _____ day of August, 2017.

District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Jason D. Guinasso, Esq., attorney for Respondent; and Lisa Wiltshire Alstead, Esq., attorney for Petitioner.

Judicial Assistant

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

INDICATE FULL CAPTION:

CITY OF RENO		No.	73971	Oct 03 2017	02:50 p.m.
	Appellant,		DOCKETING CIVIL A	STIZABATA A	Brown
vs.					
JODY YTURBIDE					
	Respondent.				

GENERAL INFORMATION

Appellants must complete this docketing statement in compliance with NRAP 14(a). The purpose of the docketing statement is to assist the Supreme Court in screening jurisdiction, identifying issues on appeal, assessing presumptive assignment to the Court of Appeals under NRAP 17, scheduling cases for oral argument and settlement conferences, classifying cases for expedited treatment and assignment to the Court of Appeals, and compiling statistical information.

WARNING

This statement must be completed fully, accurately and on time. NRAP 14(c). The Supreme Court may impose sanctions on counsel or appellant if it appears that the information provided is incomplete or inaccurate. *Id.* Failure to fill out the statement completely or to file it in a timely manner constitutes grounds for the imposition of sanctions, including a fine and/or dismissal of the appeal.

A complete list of the documents that must be attached appears as Question 27 on this docketing statement. Failure to attach all required documents will result in the delay of your appeal and may result in the imposition of sanctions.

This court has noted that when attorneys do not take seriously their obligations under NRAP 14 to complete the docketing statement properly and conscientiously, they waste the valuable judicial resources of this court, making the imposition of sanctions appropriate. *See* <u>KDI Sylvan Pools v. Workman</u>, 107 Nev. 340, 344, 810 P.2d 1217, 1220 (1991). Please use tab dividers to separate any attached documents.

1. Judicial District Second	Department 7
County Washoe	Judge Honorable Patrick Flanagan
District Ct. Case No. CV17-00065	
2. Attorney filing this docketing statemen	t:
Attorney Timothy E. Rowe; Lisa Wiltshire Als	tead Telephone 775-788-2000
Firm McDonald Carano, LLP	
Address 100 W. Liberty Street, 10th Floor P.O. Box 2670 Reno, Nevada 89505-2670	
Client(s) City of Reno	
If this is a joint statement by multiple appellants, add the names of their clients on an additional sheet accompfiling of this statement.	
3. Attorney(s) representing respondents(s):
Attorney Jason Guinasso	Telephone (775) 853-8746
Firm Reese Kintz Guinasso, LLC	
Address 916 Southwood Blvd., Suite 3A Incline Village, Nevada 89451	
Client(s) <u>Jody Yturbide</u>	
Attorney N/A (Not a participating party)	Telephone (775) 687-8420
Firm	
Address 1050 E. William Street, Suite 450 Carson City, NV 89701	
Client(s) State of Nevada Department of Admi	nistration, Appeals Officer

(List additional counsel on separate sheet if necessary)

4. Nature of disposition below (check all that apply):		
☐ Judgment after bench trial	☐ Dismissal:	
☐ Judgment after jury verdict	☐ Lack of jurisdiction	
☐ Summary judgment	☐ Failure to state a claim	
☐ Default judgment	☐ Failure to prosecute	
☐ Grant/Denial of NRCP 60(b) relief	☐ Other (specify):	
☐ Grant/Denial of injunction	☐ Divorce Decree:	
\square Grant/Denial of declaratory relief	☐ Original ☐ Modification	
	☐ Other disposition (specify):	
5. Does this appeal raise issues conce	erning any of the following?	
☐ Child Custody		
☐ Venue		
☐ Termination of parental rights		
	this court. List the case name and docket number sently or previously pending before this court which	

7. **Pending and prior proceedings in other courts.** List the case name, number and court of all pending and prior proceedings in other courts which are related to this appeal (e.g., bankruptcy, consolidated or bifurcated proceedings) and their dates of disposition: None.

8. Nature of the action. Briefly describe the nature of the action and the result below:

This appeal arises from a District Court Order denying the City of Reno's Petition for Judicial Review of an Appeals Officer Decision and Order affirming the reversal and remand of the insurer's July 1, 2016 determination. The underlying dispute involves a workers' compensation claim and the distribution of Jody Yturbide's 33% permanent partial disability ("PPD") award. Specifically, the parties dispute whether the calculation of the lump sum payment owed to Jody Yturbide for the instant 33% PPD award must subtract her prior PPD awards of 7% for different claims and disabilities to comply with the 25% statutory cap on lump sum payments under NRS 616C.495 and NAC 616C.498. This is a legal issue and involves a matter of first impression.

- **9.** Issues on appeal. State concisely the principal issue(s) in this appeal (attach separate sheets as necessary):
- 1. Should the District Court have reversed the Appeals Officer Decision which contain errors of law by: (a) failing to subtract Claimant's prior PPD awards, as required by NRS 616C.495 (d) and NAC 616C.498, from the 25% cap on the amount of a PPD award that can be paid in lump sum form for the instant claim; and (b) by limiting the 25% cap on lump sum payments to the same claim or body part which is contrary to the plain language of NRS 616C.495(d) and NAC 616C.498?
- 2. Should the District Court have reversed the Appeals Officer Decision which is unsupported by the substantial evidence because the Appeals Officer concluded that the Claimant is entitled to have 25% of the 33% PPD award paid in a lump sum amount thereby ignoring the substantial evidence in the record establishing that Claimant has received two prior PPD awards totaling 7%?
- 10. Pending proceedings in this court raising the same or similar issues. If you are aware of any proceedings presently pending before this court which raises the same or similar issues raised in this appeal, list the case name and docket numbers and identify the same or similar issue raised:

None.

the state, any state agency, or any officer or employee thereof is not a party to this appeal, have you notified the clerk of this court and the attorney general in accordance with NRAP 44 and NRS 30.130?		
⊠ N/A		
☐ Yes		
□ No		
If not, explain:		
12. Other issues. Does this appeal involve any of the following issues?		
Reversal of well-settled Nevada precedent (identify the case(s))		
☐ An issue arising under the United States and/or Nevada Constitutions		
☑ A substantial issue of first impression		
☐ An issue of public policy		
\square An issue where en banc consideration is necessary to maintain uniformity of this court's decisions		
\square A ballot question		
If so, explain: This appeal involves a substantial issue of first impression regarding statutory interpretation of workers' compensation statute NRS 616C.495 (d) and regulation NAC 616C.498 and their application to multiple claims and multiple disabilities. This statute and regulation have only been interpreted by case law with respect to one claim and one disability in Eads v. State Indus. Ins. System, 109 Nev. 733, 857 P.2d 13 (1993).		

set forth whether the matter is presumptively retained by the Supreme Court or assigned to the Court of Appeals under NRAP 17, and cite the subparagraph(s) of the Rule under which the matter falls. If appellant believes that the Supreme Court should retain the case despite its presumptive assignment to the Court of Appeals, identify the specific issue(s) or circumstance(s) that warrant retaining the case, and include an explanation of their importance or significance:
As this is an appeal from an administrative agency, the case is presumptively assigned to the Court of Appeals pursuant to NRAP 17(b)(4).
14. Trial. If this action proceeded to trial, how many days did the trial last?

13. Assignment to the Court of Appeals or retention in the Supreme Court. Briefly

15. Judicial Disqualification. Do you intend to file a motion to disqualify or have a justice recuse him/herself from participation in this appeal? If so, which Justice? No.

Was it a bench or jury trial? N/A

TIMELINESS OF NOTICE OF APPEAL

16 .	. Date of entry of	written judgment or order appealed from August 8, 2017
	If no written judg seeking appellate	ment or order was filed in the district court, explain the basis for review:
	N/A	
17	. Date written no	otice of entry of judgment or order was served September 7, 2017
	Was service by:	
	\square Delivery	
	⊠ Mail/electronic	e/fax
	. If the time for fi RCP 50(b), 52(b),	iling the notice of appeal was tolled by a post-judgment motion or 59)
	(a) Specify the the date of f	type of motion, the date and method of service of the motion, and filing.
	□ NRCP 50(b)	Date of filing N/A
	□ NRCP 52(b)	Date of filing N/A
	□ NRCP 59	Date of filing N/A
N		pursuant to NRCP 60 or motions for rehearing or reconsideration may toll the a notice of appeal. <i>See AA Primo Builders v. Washington</i> , 126 Nev, 245 D).
	(b) Date of enti	ry of written order resolving tolling motion N/A
	(c) Date written	n notice of entry of order resolving tolling motion was served N/A
	Was service	by:
	☐ Delivery	
	☐ Mail	

19. Date notice of app	eal filed September 7, 2017
-	arty has appealed from the judgment or order, list the date each as filed and identify by name the party filing the notice of appeal:
N/A	
20. Specify statute or e.g., NRAP 4(a) or oth	rule governing the time limit for filing the notice of appeal, er
NRAP 4(a)(1)	
	SUBSTANTIVE APPEALABILITY
21. Specify the statute the judgment or order (a)	e or other authority granting this court jurisdiction to review r appealed from:
	☐ NRS 38.205
☐ NRAP 3A(b)(2)	⊠ NRS 233B.150
☐ NRAP 3A(b)(3)	☐ NRS 703.376
☐ Other (specify)	

(b) Explain how each authority provides a basis for appeal from the judgment or order: NRS 233B.150 provides for an appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court by an aggrieved party from a final judgment of a District Court in a case filed pursuant to Chapter 233B of the Nevada Revised Statutes. The City of Reno's Petition for Judicial Review was governed by NRS Chapter 233B.

22. List all parties involved in the action or consolidated actions in the district court: (a) Parties: City of Reno; Jody Yturbide; and, Nevada Department of Administration (named as required by NRS Chapter 233B but did not participate).
 (b) If all parties in the district court are not parties to this appeal, explain in detail why those parties are not involved in this appeal, e.g., formally dismissed, not served, or other: The Nevada Department of Administration ("Department") did not participate in any of the briefing or oral arguments which led to the District Court's final decision, therefore the Department is not an active party to this appeal.
23. Give a brief description (3 to 5 words) of each party's separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, or third-party claims and the date of formal disposition of each claim. City of Reno's Petition for Judicial Review of the Appeals Officer's December 16, 2016 Decision - affirmed by the District Court on August 8, 2017.
24. Did the judgment or order appealed from adjudicate ALL the claims alleged below and the rights and liabilities of ALL the parties to the action or consolidated actions below? □ Yes □ No
25. If you answered "No" to question 24, complete the following:(a) Specify the claims remaining pending below:N/A

(b) Specify the parties remaining below:	
N/A	
() TS: 1 (1	
pursuant to NRCP 54(b)?	ent or order appealed from as a final judgment
☐ Yes	
□ No	
(d) Did the district court make an express there is no just reason for delay and an ex	determination, pursuant to NRCP 54(b), that press direction for the entry of judgment?
☐ Yes	
□ No	
26. If you answered "No" to any part of q appellate review (e.g., order is independent	uestion 25, explain the basis for seeking lently appealable under NRAP 3A(b)):
N/A	

27. Attach file-stamped copies of the following documents:

- The latest-filed complaint, counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party claims
- Any tolling motion(s) and order(s) resolving tolling motion(s)
- Orders of NRCP 41(a) dismissals formally resolving each claim, counterclaims, crossclaims and/or third-party claims asserted in the action or consolidated action below, even if not at issue on appeal
- Any other order challenged on appeal
- Notices of entry for each attached order

VERIFICATION

I declare under penalty of perjury that I have read this docketing statement, that the information provided in this docketing statement is true and complete to the best of my knowledge, information and belief, and that I have attached all required documents to this docketing statement.

City of Reno Name of appellant	Lisa Wiltshire Alstead, Esq. Name of counsel of record		
October 3, 2017 Date	Signature of counsel of record		
Washoe County, Nevada State and county where signed			
CERTIFICAT	E OF SERVICE		
completed docketing statement upon all couns ☐ By personally serving it upon him/her; ☒ By mailing it by first class mail with so	or ufficient postage prepaid to the following addresses cannot fit below, please list names		
Jason Guinasso, Esq. Reese Kintz Guinasso 916 Southwood Blvd., Suite 3A Incline Village, Nevada 89451 Appeals Officer Department of Administration 1050 E. William Street, Suite 450 Carson City, NV 89701	David Wasick Settlement Judge P.O. Box 658 Glenbrook, NV 89413		
Dated this 3rd day of October	Signature, 2017		