#### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

VEGAS UNITED INVESTMENT SERIES 105, INC., a Nevada Domestic Corporation

Appellant,

v.

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CELTIC BANK CORPORATION, Successor-in-Interest to SILVER STATE BANK by acquisition of assets from the FDIC as Receiver for SILVER STATE BANK, a Utah Banking Corporation organized and in good standing with the laws of the State of Utah,

Respondent.

Electronically Filed
Supreme Court No. 1451/6320 2018 07:55 a.m.
Elizabeth A. Brown
District Court Case N6.1647828253upreme Court

RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY MOTION UNDER NRAP 27(e) NRAP 8 MOTION FOR INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL

\*\*\*ACTION REQUIRED BY NOVEMBER 21, 2018\*\*\*

Respondent, CELTIC BANK CORPORATION, ("Respondent"), by and through its attorney, Allyson R. Noto, Esq. of the law firm of Sylvester & Polednak, Ltd., respectfully submits this Response to Emergency Motion Under NRAP 27(e) NRAP 8 Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal ("Motion").

#### I. INTRODUCTION

This case arises from Respondent's exercise of its rights pursuant to its first priority Deed of Trust recorded against a <u>commercial</u> property located at 181 N.

Gibson Road, Henderson, Nevada (the "Property"). Appellant purchased the Property for \$30,000 at an Owner's Association foreclosure sale ("Association Sale"). Respondent argued that the Association Sale did not extinguish Respondent's first priority Deed of Trust recorded against the commercial property. The trial court agreed.

After trial, the court ordered that Respondent could judicially foreclose upon the Property.

The trial court then denied Appellant's request for injunction finding that Appellant failed to meet its burden regarding the requisite elements to obtain an injunction pending appeal.

The trial court based its decision, in part, due to Appellant's continued lack of interest in protecting the Property from third-party claims. The trial court considered all the factors enumerated in *Mikohn Gaming Corp. v. McCrea*, 120 Nev. 248 (2004)(citing *Fritz Hansen A/S v. District Court*, 116 Nev. 650, 659 (2000)). The trial court was concerned about the irreparable harm to the Respondent if Appellant's stay is granted. Further, the trial court found that Appellant did not enjoy a likelihood of success on the merits. Thus, two of the factors weighed heavily in favor of Respondent and the injunction was denied.

The foreclosure sale occurred on November 21, 2017.

Court did not previously determine "Vegas United presently possesses a right of redemption until November 21, 2018" but rather noted "NRS 21.200 and 21.210 may be applicable to this case." Notwithstanding, Appellant does not fall into the category of persons entitled to a right of redemption as Appellant is not a judgment debtor or judgment debtor's successor in interest nor a judgment creditor as enumerated in NRS 21.200 or NRS 21.210. Even if Appellant is entitled to a right of redemption, which Respondent vehemently denies, the instant emergency Motion is unnecessary and a waste of judicial resources as Appellant could simply post a bond to prevent further transfer of the Property.

#### **II. LEGAL ARGUMENT**

Respondent agrees with the factors this Court must address in determining whether an injunction pending appeal should be granted. Those factors are: (1) whether the object of the appeal will be defeated if the stay is denied, (2) whether appellant will suffer irreparable or serious injury if the stay is denied, (3) whether respondent will suffer irreparable or serious injury if the stay is granted, and (4) whether appellant is likely to prevail on the merits in the appeal. This Court has not indicated that any one factor carries more weight than the others, although if one or two factors are especially strong, they may counterbalance other weak factors. *Mikohn Gaming Corp. v. McCrea*, 120 Nev. 248 (2004)(citing *Fritz Hansen A/S v. District Court*, 116 Nev. 650, 659 (2000)).

### 1. An Injunction is Not Appropriate Based Upon the Relevant Factors.

#### A. Object of the Appeal.

Respondent does not dispute the one year right of redemption period following the judicial foreclosure expires on November 21, 2018. Accordingly, Respondent agrees that this factor weighs in favor of a stay. However, this Court must consider <u>all</u> factors and if a stay is granted, an appropriate amount of the bond must be set.

#### B. Irreparable or Serious Harm.

Respondent also agrees with Appellant that this Court has held that the loss of a property right is generally irreparable. This is where the inquiry in this case becomes particularly important as recognized by the trial court. This Court must look to the serious injury to each side when determining whether to grant or deny the relief requested. Notably, this Appeal has been pending since September 28, 2017 and due to Appellant's dilatory conduct Appellant's Opening Brief was only recently filed on November 2, 2018. The following is the pertinent timeline of events:

## **Timeline of Events:**

09.05.17 - Notice of Entry of Finding of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment Entered by trial court

09.28.17 – Notice of Appeal

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judicial foreclosure expires on <u>November 21, 2018</u>. Since the foreclosure sale, Respondent has incurred the "carrying costs" associated with protecting its interest in the Property while awaiting the expiration of the right of redemption.

Should this Court stay any sale or transfer of the Property, Respondent would be required to continue to pay to protect its interest in the Property well after the redemption period contemplated under Nevada law, to Respondent's detriment.

Further, as explained above, contrary to Appellant's assertion, this Court has not determined Appellant "possesses a right of redemption" but rather noted in its previous denial of Appellant's request for injunction that NRS 21.200 and NRS 21.210 may apply. Here, Appellant will not suffer irreparable harm upon the expiration of the redemption period because Appellant does not fall within the category of persons entitled to redeem the Property under Nevada law. Appellant is not the Borrower under Respondent's first priority deed of trust. Accordingly, this factor weighs heavily in favor of Respondent.

#### C. Likelihood of Success on the Merits.

Appellant does not have a likelihood of success on the merits of this case. In order to prevail on appeal, this Court must find that the trial court abused its discretion. Based upon all of the evidence, the trial court found:

NRS Chapter 116 codifies the Uniform Common-Interest Ownership Act or UCIOA, and applies to all common-interest communities created within the State of Nevada, subject to certain exceptions. *See* NRS 116.1201(I). One of those exceptions is set forth in NRS 116.1201(2)(b). It states NRS Chapter 116 does not apply to "[a]

planned community in which all units are restricted exclusively to nonresidential use unless the declaration provides that this chapter or a part of this chapter does not apply to that planned community pursuant to NRS 116.12075."

Clearly, as set forth in NRS 116.1201 and 116.12075, NRS Chapter 116 does not apply to non-residential common-interest communities *except* to the extent set forth by their CC&Rs. In this case, there is no question the subject property is non-residential and located within a business or industrial park. The trial court considered the terms set forth in the CC&Rs in determining whether exceptions exist for NRS Chapter 116 applied.

The trial court recognized that there are two separate declarations of covenants, conditions and restrictions recorded against the property. The first CC&Rs, referred to as the 1989 Master CC&Rs was recorded over two years before NRS Chapter 116 was enacted on December 31, 1991. Neither the 1989 Master CC&Rs nor its 1994 First Amendment mentions NRS Chapter 116, much less indicates this statutory scheme, or any part thereof, applies to the subject property. Further, there is no language contained within the 1989 Master CC&Rs and its First Amendment to suggest a lien for delinquent association assessments has priority over first security interest. While the 2004 CC&Rs does mention NRS Chapter 116, it also specifies "[t]he Real Property shall not be subject to the provisions of the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act, codified in Chapter 116 of the Nevada Revised Statutes ('NRS') except to the extent permitted under NRS 278A.170." (Emphasis added)

As argued by Respondent and adopted by the trial court, NRS 278A.170

outlines the *procedures* for enforcing assessment payments for the maintenance of "common open space" provided in NRS 116.3116 to 116.31168, it does not state, substantively, the priority of the encumbrances upon the property and the exceptions thereto outlined in NRS 116.3116 are to be applied. NRS 278A.170 does not state the association's assessments' lien charged for the nine-month period immediately preceding the action is prior to any first-security interest. The trial court found that while NRS 278A.170 provides, procedurally, the association's assessments shall be enforced as provided in NRS 116.3116 to 116.31168, it does not state the assessments, or any part thereof, shall take priority over any other liens.

In addition, the CC&Rs also contain clauses which protect certain encumbrances, which include mortgages and deeds of trust. Specifically, "[n]o violation of any provision of this Declaration, nor any remedy exercised hereunder, shall defeat or render invalid the lien of any Mortgage made in good faith and for failure upon any portion of the Project, nor shall any Lien created hereunder be superior to any such Mortgage unless such Lien shall have been recorded in the Public Records prior to the recordation... of such Mortgage." Further, "[n]o violation or breach of, or failure to comply with, any provision of this Declaration, and no action to enforce any such provision, shall affect, defeat, render invalid or impair the lien of any mortgage, deed of trust or other lien on any Lot or part of the Premises taken in good faith and for value; nor shall any violation, breach, failure to comply or action to enforce affect, defeat, render invalid or impair the title or interest of the holder of any such mortgage, deed of

trust or other lien or title or any interest acquired by any purchaser upon foreclosure of any such mortgage, deed of trust or other lien;..." In short, except to the extent the Association can utilize the procedures set forth in NRS 116.3116 to 116.31168 for collecting its assessment lien against a delinquent property owner, NRS Chapter 116 does not apply with respect to establishing the priority of such debt, or any part thereof, over the first-security interest held by Respondent. The trial court determined that as NRS Chapter 116 does not apply, the statutory scheme does not render invalid any provision of the two governing documents. *Cf.* NRS 116.2103(1).

After trial and reviewing all the evidence, the trial court held that the Respondent is entitled to judicially foreclose given its first-security interest recorded against the property. It is submitted that based upon the foregoing, Appellant is not likely to prevail on the merits of its appeal.

# 2. <u>If an Injunction is Granted Appellant Must Post an Appropriate</u> Bond.

District courts have the authority to stay judgment pending appeal. See NRCP 62(d); NRAP 8(a)(1)(A). "The purpose of security for a stay pending appeal is to protect the judgment creditor's ability to collect the judgment if it is affirmed by preserving the status quo and preventing prejudice to the creditor arising from the stay." Nelson v. Heer, 121 Nev. 832, 835, 122 P.3d 1252, 1254 (2005 See also; Liu Jui-Kwa Chen v, Eighth Judicial District Court, 390 P.3d 166 (2017).

In *Liu Jui-Kwa Chen*, this Court recognized that a bond is appropriate in cases in which real property is at issue and no monetary damages have been awarded. In the instant matter, the bond necessary to protect Respondent includes the value of the property which it may lose if a stay is granted. If a stay is granted, in order to preserve the status quo and prevent prejudice to Respondent arising from the stay, Appellant must post bond in the amount of \$660,000 (which is the value of the property) plus remove all encumbrances now existing on the property and agree to pay all property taxes and assessments pending appeal.

DATED this 19<sup>th</sup> day of November, 2018.

SYLVESTER & POLEDNAK, LTD.

By

Allyson R. Noto, Esq.

1731 Village Center Circle

Las Vegas, NV 89134 Attorneys for Respondent