IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

JACQUELINE FRANKLIN, ASHLEIGH PARK, LILLY SHEPARD, STACIE ALLEN, MICHAELA DEVINE, KARINA STRELKOVA and DANIELLE LAMAR, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF A CLASS OF SIMILARLY SITUATED INDIVIDUALS,

Appellants,

VS.

RUSSELL ROAD FOOD AND BEVERAGE, LLC,

Respondents.

Case No. 74332

District Court Case Sep 05 2018 10:54 a.m. Elizabeth A. Brown

Appeal from the Eclark Jott Supreme Court District Court, Clark County,

Nevada

JOINT APPENDIX – VOLUME V

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DOCUMENTS		
DESCRIPTION	VOLUME	PAGE
Answer to Amended Complaint	I	8
Answer to Counterclaim	I	38
Appendix of Exhibits to Motion for Summary Judgment		
Pursuant to N.R.C.P. 56	IV-V	697
Appendix of Exhibits to Opposition to Motion for Summary		
Judgment on Employee Status	VI	1126
Defendant's Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Class Cert	I	173
Motion		
Defendant's Supplemental Brief in Support of Summary		
Judgment Against Allen and Moore	III	496
Motion for Class Certification	I	43
Motion for Summary Judgment on Counterclaims	II	234
Motion for Summary Judgment on Employee Status	III	558
Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to N.R.C.P. 56	IV	668
Motion to Dismiss Complaint	II	317
Motion to Strike New Evidence Raised in Reply	I	142
Motion to Strike Renewed Motion for Class Certification	V	1021
Notice of Appeal	XII	2523
Notice of Entry of and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law		
on MSJ on Counterclaims	XII	2380
Notice of Entry of and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law		
on Summary Judgment	XII	2507
Notice of Entry of and Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for		
Class Certification	II	270
Notice of Entry of and Order Granting Motion to Dismiss and		
Motion to Strike Renewed Motion for Class Certification	XII	2502
Opposition to Motion for Class Certification	I	60
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment on Counterclaims	II	276
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment on Employee	VI	1297
Status		
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to		
N.R.C.P. 56	VII-XI	1325
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss	III	546
Opposition to Motion to Strike	I	150
Opposition to Motion to Strike Renewed Motion for Class		1000
Certification	V	1089
Opposition to Renewed Motion for Class Certification	V	1037
Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Summary		53 -
Judgment Against Moore and Allen	III	535
Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief in Support of Class Cert Motion	<u> </u>	158

Plaintiffs' Supplemental Reply Brief in Support of Class Cert	I	210
Motion		
Renewed Motion for Class Certification	III	419
Reply in Support of Motion for Class Certification	I	120
Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss	V	1102
Reply in Support of Motion to Strike Renewed Motion for Class		
Certification	V	1121
Reply in Support of Renewed Motion for Class Certification	V	1078
Reply in Support of Summary Judgment on Counterclaims	II	305
Reply in Support of Summary Judgment on Employee Status	XII	2386
Reply in Support of Summary Judgment Pursuant to N.R.C.P.	XII	2444
56		
Third Amended Complaint	I	1
TRANSCRIPTS		
DESCRIPTION	VOLUME	PAGE
Transcript - August 17, 2017	XII	2481
Transcript - July 11, 2017	XII	2353
Transcript - March 16, 2017	I	217

EXHIBIT 7

In The Matter Of:

FRANKLIN V. RUSSELL FOOD & BEVERAGE

KARINA STRELKOVA January 9, 2017

Lawyer Solutions Group 321 S. Casino Center Blvd, Suite 180 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101



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1
                      IN THE DISTRICT COURT
 2
                       CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
 3
 4
      JACQUELINE FRANKLIN; et
 5
                  Plaintiff,
 6
                                      Case No. A-14-709372-C
      vs.
 7
      RUSSELL ROAD FOOD AND
 8
      BEVERAGE, LLC; et al.,
 9
                  Defendants.
10
11
12
13
14
                   DEPOSITION OF KARINA STRELKOVA
15
                         Las Vegas, Nevada
16
                       Monday, January 9, 2017
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22
23
    Reported by:
    CHRISTY I. ADLER
24
    CCR No. 683
    PAGES 1 - 95
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT
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 2
                       CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
 3
      JACQUELINE FRANKLIN; et
      al,
 4
                  Plaintiff,
 5
                                      Case No. A-14-709372-C
      vs.
 6
      RUSSELL ROAD FOOD AND
 7
      BEVERAGE, LLC; et al.,
 8
                 Defendants.
 9
10
11
12
13
            Deposition of KARINA STRELKOVA, Volume 1,
14
        taken on behalf of Defendants, at 630 South Fourth
15
        Street, Las Vegas, Nevada, beginning at
16
        1:33 p.m. and ending at 3:45 p.m. on Monday,
17
        January 9, 2017, before CHRISTY I. ADLER,
18
        Certified Court Reporter No. 683
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1	Q. Any other sources of income in 2013?
2	A. No.
3	Q. What about in 2014?
4	A. The VIP host.
5	Q. You started doing the VIP host I'm
6	sorry. You said you last performed at Crazy Horse in
7	January 2014, correct?
8	A. Yes.
9	Q. After January 2014 is when you started
10	the VIP host?
11	A. I've been doing it the whole time I've
12	been in Vegas, but I just took it on to a whole other
13	level. I took it on fill time.
14	Q. Did you get income from being a VIP host
15	in 2013?
16	A. I don't remember.
17	Q. What about 2012?
18	A. I don't remember.
19	Q. Do you think you would have records about
20	that?
21	A. I don't know.
22	Q. How did you get into being a VIP host?
23	A. Just the word of mouth. People would
24	come to Vegas. They need to be set up. I'm
25	competent, so I just kind of figured as a source of

1	A.	Correct.
2	Q.	Okay. And is that separate from money
3	paid for en	tertainment?
4	А.	Yes.
5	Q.	We'll come back to that. When you were
6	performing a	at Crazy Horse, did you perform at any
7	other clubs	?
8	Α.	No.
9	Q.	Do you know if you could have?
10	A. .	Never asked.
11	Q.	Okay. Is there any reason why you
12	didn't?	
13	Α.	No. I'm loyal to my clubs. When I work
14	a certain c	lub, I stay there and there only.
15	Q.	Okay. Why is that?
16	A.	It's just the way I am.
17	Q.	Is it easier to build a customer base for
18	yourself if	you stay at one?
19	Α.	I never built a customer base.
20	Q.	Why is that?
21	A.	I didn't need to.
22	Q.	How come?
23	A.	I make good money on a daily basis. I
24	didn't need	repeating customers.
25	Q.	I'm sorry. You said paying customers?

1	A.	Repeating customers.
2	Q.	Did you have any regular customers?
3	A.	I don't think so.
4	Q.	After you started performing at Crazy
5	Horse, were	you assigned certain hours that you were
6	supposed to	be in the club?
7	A.	You have to work a minimum of six hours.
8	Q.	Who told you that?
9	A.	The manager.
10	Q.	Do you recall which manager?
11	A.	No. I think it was during the hiring
12	process.	
13	Q.	Okay.
14	Α.	So it might have been Justin, if that was
15	Justin.	
16	Q.	Were you told certain days of the week to
17	be in the c	lub?
18	A.	No.
19	Q.	Did the club require you to work a
20	minimum numb	per of shifts?
21	A.	No.
22	Q.	Were you assigned a specific shift?
23	A.	No.
24	Q.	You could go in whenever you wanted?
25	A.	Correct.

1	A. Throughout the night obviously it would
2	be multiple hosts.
3	Q. Okay. Was that a requirement of the club
4	that you tip a host 30 percent?
5	A. That's what you should do.
6	Q. But was
7	A. It's expected of you.
8	Q. But it wasn't a rule of the club?
9	A. It wasn't a requirement.
10	Q. Okay. Could you have tipped less than
11	30 percent?
12	A. Yes.
13	Q. You just felt 30 percent was the correct
14	amount for you personally?
15	A. To me this is a business. So I came up
16	to them, I said most girls tip 20 percent or less. I
17	specifically told them, "I tip you 30 percent. Make
18	sure put my all the best clientele."
19	So I didn't have much of a problem
20	working. So they hooked me up.
21	Q. Okay. That makes sense.
22	A. That's the difference between me and all
23	the other girls. I tip 30 percent.
24	Q. Okay. You were pretty much free to
25	determine that in order to make sure that you had a

1	steady stream of clients; is that correct?
2	A. Okay.
3	Q. Did you have a certain goal each time
4	that you started a shift?
5	A. No.
6	Q. Was there a certain time that you're
7	supposed to check in by if you were going to show up
8	for a shift?
9	A. No.
10	Q. You could just come in whenever?
11	A. Correct.
12	Q. Was anyone monitoring what time you
13	decided to come in for a shift?
14	A. No.
15	Q. Would you ever try to reach a certain
16	dollar amount per evening you worked?
17	A. I never thought about it. I would just
18	make money.
19	Q. Okay. What about certain number of
20	customers that you wanted to approach?
21	A. No.
22	Q. Was there a requirement by the club as to
23	how long you could spend talking with a customer?
24	A. No.
25	Q. No minimum amount that you had to spend

1	with a customer?
2	A. No.
3	Q. Any maximum amount?
4	A. No.
5	Q. If you were just sitting there talking
6	with a client, would that be okay?
7	A. Yes.
8	Q. Did you select which days of the week you
9	would perform?
10	A. No.
11	Q. Was that selected for you?
12	A. No.
13	Q. How was that selected?
14	A. I wake up, I feel like going to work, I
15	go to work.
16	Q. You would decide whether or not you felt
17	like going to work on a particular day? Okay. Did
18	you prefer any certain days of the week?
19	A. Obviously weekends.
20	Q. Would you do any research as to Las Vegas
21	events that might make clubs busier?
22	A. No.
23	Q. Any reason for that?
24	A. It was word of mouth. You hear it.
25	Everybody will tell you it's CES or whatever,

	7	
1	concrete co	onvention or cowboys were in town, you kind
2	of would he	ear it in the club.
3	Q.	CES is a busy time in Vegas generally.
4		Do you know if having a Nevada business
5	license was	s a requirement to be a dancer?
6	A.	Yes.
7	Q.	What about the Sheriff's Card?
8	Α.	Yes.
9	Q.	Any other licenses required there?
10	A.	No.
11	Q.	Did you have those prior to going in to
12	Crazy Horse	9?
13	Α.	Yes.
14	Q.	Okay. During 2012 through 2014, did you
15	have any ot	ther business licenses in other states?
16	A.	No.
17	Q.	Any certifications in other states such
18	as a Sherif	f's Card?
19	A.	No.
20	Q.	Do you know if you earned income in any
21	other state	s in 2012?
22	A.	No.
23	Q.	What about 2013?
24	A.	No.
25	Q.	What about January 2014?

1.	А.	No.
2	Q.	Okay. I'm not sure you said. Did you
3	report all	of your income from Crazy Horse in 2012 to
4	the IRS?	
5	A.	I did my taxes in 2012.
6	Q.	What about in 2013?
7	A.	I did my taxes every year.
8	Q.	Okay. Would you take business
9	write-offs?	
10	А.	Yes.
11	Q-	What type of things would you use as a
12	business wr	ite-off?
13	A.	Clothing, accessories, hair, color, cuts
14	or hairpiec	es, makeup, shoes, little pouches to keep
15	my money in	, food and alcohol.
16	Q.	What about house fees?
17	А.	House fees.
18	Q.	Anything else? Vehicle?
19	A.	Yes. I owned a car, correct.
20	Q.	So I have clothing, accessories,
21	hairstyling	or pieces, makeup, shoes?
22	A.	Nails.
23	Q.	Okay. Food and beverage, house fees, and
24	then vehicle	mileage?
25	A.	Correct.

1	Q.	Do you know about how much you would
2	write off :	for clothing?
3	A.	I don't know.
4	Q.	What about accessories?
5	A.	I don't know.
6	Q.	Do you have an estimation for any of
7	these cated	gories?
8	Α.	I don't remember.
9	Q.	And you don't know the overall income you
10	reported fo	or 2012?
11	A.	No.
12	Q.	Or 2013?
13	А.	No.
14	Q.	Do you have an estimate how much overall
15	you made wh	nile performing at Crazy Horse?
16	Α.	No.
17	Q.	What about an estimate in how much money
18	you gave as	s tips while at Crazy Horse to individuals
19	at Crazy Ho	orse?
20	Α.	No. A lot. I don't know.
21	Q.	Okay. Do you have an average as to how
22	much you wo	ould spend per month on clothes?
23	A.	No.
24	Q.	What about hair and makeup?
25	Α.	About 400.

1.	Q. Hair and nails or just makeup? What
2	would the difference be?
3	A. Nails and hair always the same amount.
4	Makeup can vary.
5	Q. Okay. All right. So how much just on
6	nails?
7	A. 150.
8	Q. Per month?
9	A. Per month.
10	Q. What about hair?
11	A. 180.
12	Q. Would you hire someone to do your nails?
13	A. I go to a salon.
14	Q. What about your hair?
15	A. I go to a salon.
16	Q. Did you ever hire anyone to help you
17	style your hair for a shift?
18	A. At Crazy Horse III?
19	Q. Yes.
20	A. I don't remember.
21	Q. What about generally for VIP hosting?
22	A. I don't understand the question.
23	Q. Let me think of how to phrase this.
24	When you do the VIP hosting, do you
25	actually meet with the people that contact you about

1	showed up.	
2	Q.	Okay. So you didn't have to wear
3	anything sp	ecial for them?
4	Α.	No.
5	Q.	Are you aware if Crazy Horse did any
6	promotional	events off the club premises?
7	A.	I don't think so.
8	Q.	Okay. So you wouldn't have gone on any?
9	Α.	No.
10	Q.	Okay. Fair enough. When you started a
11	shift, what	kinds of supplies, if any, would you
12	bring with	you?
13	A.	Clothes, shoes, makeup, hair stuff.
14	Q.	Was that pretty standard?
15	A.	Yeah. Extra outfits just in case I
16	didn't feel	like wearing the first one.
17	Q.	At Crazy Horse, how would you select what
18	outfit you v	vere going wear for an evening?
19	A.	Depending on my mood.
20	Q.	Where there requirements at Crazy Horse
21	had on your	outfit?
22	A.	Nothing that I know of. We just kind of
23	wore what ev	verybody else wore.
24	Q.	You didn't have to get your outfit
25	approved by	anybody?

		
1.	A.	No.
2	Q.	What about your hair and makeup approved
3	by anyone	at Crazy Horse?
4	A.	No.
5	Q.	No?
6	A.	No.
7	Q.	Did you have any signature outfit or
8	signature	accessory that you used?
9	A.	Yes.
10	Q.	What was that?
11	A.	I had a Swavorski earrings I would wear
12	every sinc	ple night of my work.
13	Q.	Okay. Same pair?
14	A.	Same pair.
15	Q.	I am impressed you never lost one.
16	A.	I'm actually surprised. I don't remember
17	where they	are now. I don't know.
18	Q.	Other than that, any signature hairdo or
19	anything l	ike that?
20	A.	No. I would switch up.
21	Q.	Did you have a stage name?
22	A.	Yes.
23	Q.	What was that?
24	A.	Victory Jones.
25	Q.	How did you decide on that name?

1	club. I	lon't know the difference.
2	Q.	What about solicitation?
3	A.	That is a law I know.
4	Q.	Okay.
5	A.	Yes, I'm aware of that one.
6	Q.	Okay. Would you say that you were
7	responsibl	e to abide by that law?
8	A.	Correct.
9	Q.	Okay. Were you ever cited for
10	solicitati	on?
11	A.	No.
12	Q.	What about prior to Crazy Horse?
13	A.	Never.
14	Q.	Never outside of clubs?
15	A.	Never.
16	Q.	Okay. Did you ever perform on stage?
17	A.	Yes.
18	Q.	And would you do any certain style of
19	dance up t	here?
20	A.	I'm not a professional pole dancer, so
21	no.	
22	Q.	Would you use a pole?
23	A.	Just walk around it.
24	Q.	Okay. Did anyone at the club instruct
25	you on a s	pecific way you needed to dance on stage?

1	Α.	No.
2	Q.	Would you say that you had a signature
3	style of da	ncing?
4	A.	Of course.
5	Q.	What would you say that was?
6	A.	I'm sensual. I don't know how to explain
7	that. Very	erotic. I don't know.
8	Q.	Okay. Would you dance with certain type
9	of music?	
10	Α.	I like more hip-hop, definitely not
11	country or	rock. Didn't like any of that.
12	Q.	Okay. Would you request hip-hop be
13	played?	
14	Α.	I would request, yes.
15	Q.	Were there any songs that you
16	specifically	y requested?
17	Α.	Well, I don't remember. I don't
18	remember.	
19	Q.	Could you request songs?
20	A.	Yes, I could request songs.
21	Q.	How would you go about doing that?
22	А.	I would go to the DJ and ask him if he
23	could play	my song.
24	Q.	Okay. Simple enough. I didn't know if
25	you have to	fill out a special form or anything like

1	Q.	Okay. Would you ever buy them drinks?
2	A.	No.
3	Q.	Okay. Would they provide you with
4	drinks?	
5	А.	If they didn't, I wouldn't talk to them.
6	Q.	So did you drink alcohol on shift then?
7	A.	Yes.
8	Q.	Okay. All right. So if someone didn't
9	want to pur	chase you a drink, what would you do?
10	A.	I'm, "Okay, thanks. I'll buy my own."
11	Q.	What if they said, "Okay, sure"?
12	А.	Then I had a drink.
13	Q.	Okay. And then what would happen?
14	A.	I would talk to them.
15	Q.	Okay.
16	А.	While I had my drink.
17	Q.	Would you ever then ask them about lap
18	dance?	
19	A.	They would ask me for a lap dance.
20	Q.	Okay.
21	A.	There's been times where I would say it.
22	Q.	Okay. So how would that work? Can you
23	describe to	me your typical interaction?
24	A.	I mean, it's based on the client. It's
25	varied ever	y single person. I didn't have a written

1	Q. If someone just accepted the \$20 price
2	for the lap dance, who would they pay?
3	A. Pay me.
4	Q. Directly?
5	A. Directly.
6	Q. Would you then report that to anyone at
7	Crazy Horse?
8	A. No.
9	Q. Did you ever you have to get the \$20
10	before you started the dance or at the end of it?
11	A. I believe that you're required to collect
12	the money before the dance. I don't remember which
13	club told me that rule. But that kind of stuck with
14	me.
15	But I never did it. I would get it after
16	unless I felt that the customer wasn't going to give
17	me \$20. So I want it upfront, just in case because I
18	would have a feeling, you know.
19	Q. Okay.
20	A. Sometimes I would take it upfront
21	depending on the customer.
22	Q. You're not sure if Crazy Horse actually
23	had a rule about when you're supposed to collect?
24	A. I'm not sure what I signed in that
25	contract, no.

1	A. I always did myself as well. I would
2	also get them more tips.
3	Q. Okay. Aside from solicitation, were
4	there other requirements on time you spent in the VIP
5	room?
6	A. The requirements are the time that you
7	came in there for.
8	Q. Okay.
9	A. If it's 30 minutes finish, then you have
10	to be there for 30 minutes.
11	Q. Would you have to be dancing the entire
12	time?
13	A. Based on the customer. It depends on the
14	customer.
15	Q. If someone just wanted to talk for 30
16	minutes, they could do that?
17	A. Correct.
18	Q. Okay. After leaving the VIP area, were
19	there other interactions you were supposed to have
20	with the customer?
21	A. No.
22	Q. You would hang out with one customer all
23	night if you wanted to?
24	A. Yes.
25	Q. If you just wanted to dance on stage and

I.	
1	not give any lap dances, would you be able to do
2	that?
3	A. Yes.
4	Q. What about if you didn't want to give any
5	main floor lap dances and only wanted to give lap
6	dances in the VIP area, could you do that?
7	A. Yes.
8	Q. Did Crazy Horse have any requirements on
9	where you were supposed to position yourself in the
10	club?
11	A. Rephrase the question.
12	Q. Just on shift, did they assign you to an
13	area to stay on?
14	A. No.
15	Q. Any requirements on how much you were
16	supposed to be walking around and talking to people?
17	A. No.
18	Q. I'm sorry?
19	A. No.
20	Q. Okay. Let's pause for a couple minutes.
21	(Recess.)
22	BY MS. SMITH:
23	Q. All right. Miss Strelkova, we're back on
24	the record. The oath you took this morning is still
25	in effect going forward, all right?

1	service, could you approach them?
2	A. Of course.
3	Q. What about if you wanted to take a break,
4	what procedure would you have to follow?
5	A. Rephrase.
6	Q. When you wanted to take a break, what
7	would you do?
8	A. From what?
9	Q. Performing?
10	A. If I'm in a VIP room, I can't take a
11	break. That's what rephrase it.
12	Q. Okay. Generally if you're walking around
13	on the main floor and you don't feel like walking
14	around anymore?
15	A. Okay. Any time, I can take a break any
16	time.
17	Q. Would you need to check in with someone
18	and let them know you were taking a break?
19	A. No.
20	Q. What about the number of breaks, is there
21	a restriction on the number of breaks you could take
22	throughout the evening?
23	A. No.
24	Q. What about the length of your breaks?
25	A. No.

1	dances you might give in a shift?
2	A. No.
3	Q. Did you ever pay a fee to go off stage?
4	A. There is a fee to be off stage. I never
5	paid it.
6	Q. Okay.
7	A. I was always on stage.
8	Q. I'm sorry. You said?
9	A. I was always on stage. I didn't mind
10	doing stage. I was in the rotation.
11	Q. Okay. Why didn't you mind doing stage?
12	A. I liked dancing on stage.
13	Q. Okay. When you were on stage, could you
14	accept money?
15	A. Yes.
16	Q. Okay. Did you have to report to someone
17	how much money you obtained when you were on stage?
18	A. No.
19	Q. How about at the end of shift, did you
20	have to tell someone how much money you made on
21	stage?
22	A. No.
23	Q. During the time you were dancing at Crazy
24	Horse, if people asked what you did for a living,
25	what would you tell them?

1	BY MS. SMITH:
2	Q. You don't know?
3	A. No, you can't refuse them.
4	Q. Who said you can't refuse dance dollars?
5	A. I mean, the thing is with dance dollars,
6	don't I want to get paid? How could I refuse them?
7	Restate the question.
8	Q. If you had said to a customer, "I only
9	want cash, I will not accept dance dollars, " could
10	you have done that?
11	A. But I would lose the money, lose the
12	customer.
13	Q. But you could have refused them?
14	MS. CALVERT: Objection. Asked and
15	answered.
16	THE WITNESS: Could I have refused them?
17	Yes, I could refuse them.
18	BY MS. SMITH:
19	Q. Did you ever recall complaining about
20	tipping in the club?
21	A. To myself.
22	Q. Okay. But I think you already testified
23	that it wasn't mandatory?
24	MS. CALVERT: Objection. Misstates prior
25	testimony.

1	THE WITNESS: What do you mean?
2	BY MS. SMITH:
3	Q. Tipping wasn't a required mandatory rule?
4	MS. CALVERT: Objection. Asked and
5	answered.
6	THE WITNESS: I don't understand. Was it
7	written down? Was it in the contract? What are you
8	asking me?
9	BY MS. SMITH:
10	Q. Any of the above. Did you understand it
11	was a required rule that you could get in trouble
12	for?
13	A. I can't get in trouble for not tipping,
14	no, but it would make my job harder.
15	Q. Do you think you were a good entertainer?
16	A. Yes.
17	Q. Do you think you were better than the
18	average?
19	A. Yes.
20	Q. Why is that?
21	A. I'm very good with customers. I have
22	social skills. I work in customer service. You kind
23	of have to.
24	Q. Do you think anyone could be a good
25	entertainer?

1	shouldn't have a schedule and you shouldn't have to
2	have to come in for six hours minimum. And I just
3	want things to change, be different.
4	Q. Okay.
5	A. To be more fair.
6	Q. You said you haven't been a part of any
7	other lawsuits in Nevada?
8	A. No.
9	Q. Did you receive any settlement money from
10	payouts from any other lawsuits?
11	A. No.
12	Q. Do you know if you're a part of any other
13	classes or proposed classes of individuals here in
14	Nevada?
15	A. What do you mean?
16	Q. Are you aware of any other litigation
17	that would apply to you as a dancer in Nevada?
18	A. No.
19	Q. I'm going to back up a little bit. So if
20	didn't want to perform for six hours and you wanted
21	to leave before then, what would happen?
22	A. Nothing. I pretty much leave any time I
23	want.
24	Q. Would you have to check out with anybody?
25	A. I would still have to check out with the

1	and it came out that way. That's incorrect.
2	Q. Okay. Your original answer also states:
3	"Plaintiff would end the shift with a minimum
4	required hours from clock-in had passed."
5	Why did you change that?
6	A. Because that's what we are required to
7	do. We're supposed to work a six-hour minimum. But
8	I would end the shift at any time because I was able
9	to do that. I was allowed to leave after three hours
10	if I wanted to.
11	Q. So did you not have a required six hour
12	minimum?
13	A. Not in particular, no. It didn't apply
14	to me.
15	Q. Okay. So you could perform for however
16	long you wanted?
17	A. Exactly.
18	Q. So you didn't have even like a one hour
19	requirement?
20	A. No.
21	Q. Okay. So your amended answer states:
22	"Plaintiff would end a shift when there was no money
23	to be made."
24	Was that just one when there weren't any
25	customers?

1	A. If I worked late enough where all the
2	customers that potentially could spend money on me
3	would be gone, then I would leave.
4	Q. Okay. So whether or not that was after
5	two hours or 10 hours, you would make that choice
6	then?
7	A. Exactly.
8	Q. Did anyone try to make you ever stay
9	longer than 12 hours?
10	A. Nobody made me do anything.
11	Q. Okay. I think those are all the
12	questions I have for you.
13	EXAMINATION
14	BY MS. CALVERT:
15	Q. I just have two quick followups. It may
16	be I misheard some answers.
17	Do you know if a customer can use dance
18	dollars to purchase alcohol?
19	A. No, they can't.
20	Q. Is there a second entrance in the back
21	for VIP customers?
22	A. Yes, there's a back entrance.
23	Q. How did that work?
24	A. When clients that have more money would
25	know about the VIP entrances, like any other club,

```
1
           CERTIFICATE OF
                                         REPORTER
 2
 3
     STATE OF NEVADA )
                       SS:
    COUNTY OF CLARK )
 4
 5
 6
            I, Christy I. Adler, a Certified Court Reporter
    licensed by the State of Nevada, do hereby certify:
 7
    That I reported the deposition of Karina Strelkova,
    commencing on Monday, January 9, 2017.
 8
            That prior to being deposed, the witness was duly
    sworn by me to testify to the truth; that I thereafter
 9
    transcribed my said stenographic notes into written
10
    form; that the typewritten transcript is a complete,
    true, and accurate transcription of my said stenographic
11
    notes; and that review of the transcript was requested.
12
            I further certify that I am not a relative,
    employee, or independent contractor of counsel or of any
13
    of the parties involved in the proceeding, nor a person
    financially interested in the proceeding, nor do I have
14
    any other relationship that may reasonably cause my
    impartiality to be questioned.
15
           IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand in my
16
    office in the County of Clark, State of Nevada, this
    22nd day of January, 2017.
17
18
19
20
21
          /s/ Christy Adler
22
          Christy I. Adler, CCR #683
23
24
25
```

EXHIBIT 8



Transcript of the Testimony of

Jacqueline Franklin

Date Taken: January 10, 2017

Case: JACQUELINE FRANKLIN v. RUSSELL ROAD FOOD AND BEVERAGE, LLC, et al.

Case No.: A-14-709372-C

Las Vegas Reporting
Phone: 702.509.5001 Fax: 702.974.2242
Email: scheduling@lvreporting.com

Franklin January 10, 2017

Page 1 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA JACQUELINE FRANKLIN, ASHLEIGH PARK, LILY SHEPARD, STACIE ALLEN,) CASE NO.: A-14-709372-C MICHAELA DIVINE, VERONICA) DEPT NO.: 31 VAN WOODSEN, SAMANTHA JONES, KARINA STRELKOVA, LASHONDA STEWART, DANIELLE) LAMAR, and DIRUBIN TAMAYO,) individually, and on behalf) of a class of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, vs. RUSSELL ROAD FOOD AND BEVERAGE, LLC, a Nevada limited Liability company (d/b/a CRAZY HORSE III GENTLEMEN'S CLUB), DOE CLUB OWNER, I-X, ROE CLUB OWNER, I-X, and ROE EMPLOYER, I-X, Defendants. AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS DEPOSITION OF JACQUELINE FRANKLIN Taken at Moran Brandon Bendavid Moran on Tuesday, January 10, 2017 at 1:30 p.m. at 630 South Fourth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Reported by: Trina K. Sanchez, CCR No. 933, RPR

Las Vegas Reporting 702.509.5001 scheduling@lvreporting.com

	Page 14
1	performing at Crazy Horse?
2	A. No.
3	Q. Any particular reason?
4	A. I like just doing one at a time.
5	Q. Okay. Do you know if you could have
6	performed at another club while you were performing
7	at Crazy Horse?
8	A. I believe that would have been
9	acceptable. I choose not to.
10	Q. Okay. But no one said that you couldn't?
11	A. Not that I recall.
12	Q. Okay. During the years that you were at
13	Crazy Horse, did you have any other sources of
14	income aside from
15	A. No.
16	Q. Okay. So while you were with Crazy
17	Horse, did you work with any of the agencies?
18	A. I believe I did party buses.
19	Q. The party buses maybe?
20	A. Occasionally. Yes. I'm sorry about
21	that.
22	Q. No. It's fine. It's hard to remember
23	back.
24	A. Yeah. They just come in so rare.
25	Q. Okay.

	Page 19
1	A. I did.
2	Q. Okay. So did you have things that you
3	brought with you?
4	A. Yes.
5	Q. And do you recall what kinds of things
6	that you brought with you?
7	A. An outfit and a pair of shoes probably.
8	Q. Okay. What is there a particular kind
9	of outfit you would have worn?
10	A. Probably a two-piece outfit. That's
11	generally what I wore.
12	Q. Okay. At that time that you started
13	dancing, were you given any information on days of
14	the week that you could perform at the club?
15	A. I was told I could work any day I wanted.
16	Q. Okay. What about any times you could
17	be
18	A. I was told I could come in any time.
19	Q. Okay. Did anyone tell you there was a
20	minimum amount of days that you had to perform at
21	Crazy Horse?
22	A. Only if I wanted to keep a locker.
23	Q. Okay. What what were you told in
24	respect to that?
25	A. If I was issued a locker, I needed to

Page 28 1 Q. Maybe like a New Year's party or a 2 Christmas party, something to that affect? 3 Well, the club was open 24/7 so if they were having an event like an anniversary party or a 4 featured entertainer, it was still the same as 5 6 working a normal shift. 7 Q. Okay. All right. So there was no additional requirement that you come in for, like, 8 9 holidays or special occasions that they were 10 having? Α. 11 No. Okay. So you mentioned earlier that you 12 Ο. would typically wear a two-piece outfit? 13 Α. Correct. 14 Did Crazy Horse have any requirements on 0. 15 1.6 what kind of outfits you needed to wear while 17 performing? 18 Α. I believe what was in our contract and what was enforced by the house mom was very vague. 19 Such as neat, put together, professional. 20 were kind of vaque words. 21 Do you remember anything specific? 22 Q. Okav. 23 Α. No. I was never told that I needed to 24 change. 25 Okay. Could you have changed if you Q.

Page 29 1 wanted to during a shift? 2 Α. Yes. 3 Q. Okay. What about any requirements on 4 your hair or makeup? 5 Α. Same thing. They would always just tell 6 us we needed to look neat and presentable and 7 professional. 8 Q. Okay. 9 Α. It was usually at the discretion of the 10 house moms. 11 Q. Okav. Did you need to check in with or 12 report to someone about your outfit? 13 Α. No. 14 Q. Okay. What about hair and makeup? No. But if they didn't like it, they 15 Α. could tell you to do something about it. 16 17 Did that ever happen to you? Q. 1.8 Α. Not to me. 19 0. Okay. Any other rules about what you 20 could or couldn't wear? 21 Α. No. 22 Did you have a stage name? Ο. Okay. 23 Α. I used my middle name, Sarah. 24 Well, I don't have to ask you how you Q. 25 came up with that.

Page 31 If they said yes to a VIP room Q. Okav.

- 1
- 2 dance, then what would occur?
- 3 I would generally give them a tour of the
- 4 different rooms that we had to see which one he
- 5 wanted.
- 6 0. Do you remember any pricing or was there
- 7 any pricing?
- 8 Α. Yes. We had three songs for 100. A half
- 9 hour, I believe, was 200-plus some drinks. An hour
- 10 in the same room was 400-plus some drinks. And
- then we had private suites that were, I believe, 11
- 500 --12
- 13 Q. Okay.
- 14 Α. -- for the entertainer and then a pretty
- 15 substantial bar tab or bottle.
- 16 Q. Okay. And how was that paid?
- 17 Α. Either cash from the client or if he paid
- 18 with a credit card, then we got funny money or
- dance dollars. 19
- 20 Okav. When the client had cash, was that 0.
- 21 paid directly to you?
- 22 Α. Yes.
- 23 Q. Okay. And then with the dance dollars,
- 24 how did that work?
- 25 He paid at the cashier cage, and the Α.

Page 34 1 BY MS. SMITH: 2 Okay. Did anyone in particular tell you 3 that? It was in our initial packet of 5 paperwork. 6 Okay. All right. Do you know what would 0. have occurred if you had asked a customer for more 7 8 than \$20 for a lap dance? 9 Α. No. 10 0. What about for more than the dollar 11 amounts you stated for the VIP areas? 12 Α. The host wouldn't allow it. 13 Q. Okay. Okay. Were there any requirements 14 on the number of lap dances you needed to perform during a shift? 15 16 Α. No. 17 Q. What about requirements on the number of 18 individuals Crazy Horse wanted you to approach on a 19 shift? 20 Α. No. There was no number. 21 0. Okay. Were there any requirements on how 22 long you could speak with a quest? 23 Α. No. 24 Q. Okay. Moves, did you ever dance on the 25 stage?

	Page 35
1	A. Yes, I did.
2	Q. Do you have any particular style that you
3	dance on the stage?
4	A. I'm not sure I understand the question.
5	Q. Any particular moves or artistic style
6	that you used while on stage?
7	A. I did what was comfortable for me.
8	Q. Okay.
9	A. Yes.
10	Q. Were there any rules about how you were
11	supposed to be performing on stage?
12	A. Not other than the laws.
13	Q. Okay. What did you understand the laws
14	to be?
15	A. Things like not removing your panties or,
16	you know, touching your genitals and things like
17	that while you danced.
18	Q. Okay.
19	A. It was very simple. Just a couple of
20	things that were laws.
21	Q. Okay. So you mean like State or County
22	laws?
23	A. Correct.
24	Q. Okay. What about rules or restrictions
25	regarding lap dances?

Page 38 1 speculation. 2 THE WITNESS: Yeah. There were VIP hosts 3 that I guess you could say guarded the bottle 4 service area, and they would only let certain girls 5 And, again, it was their discretion. 6 BY MS. SMITH: Did you ever go up to those bottle Q. service areas? 8 9 I would occasionally. Α. Okay. Could you ever hang out by the bar 10 Q. inside of Crazy Horse? 11 12 Α. Occasionally. 13 0. Okay. So could you hang out there during 14 a shift if you wanted? Α. You could. 15 16 Okay. What about breaks? Would you --Q. how would you decide when you wanted to take a 17 break? 18 19 Α. You could take a break whenever you 20 wanted. 21 Q. Okay. Did you have to check out with 22 someone? 23 Α. No. 24 Do you remember any rules about how many 25 breaks you could take during a shift?

	Page 39
1	A. No.
2	Q. Okay. What about how long a break could
3	be? Any rules on that?
4	A. No. But if you got called on stage, you
5	had to go.
6	Q. Okay. Did you ever pay a fee to not
7	dance on stage?
8	A. Yes.
9	Q. So you mentioned I think you called it
10	"funny money" or "dance dollars" earlier.
11	A. Yes.
12	Q. Do you know if you could refuse to accept
13	those from a customer?
14	A. I suppose you could.
15	Q. Did you ever?
16	A. No, because then you wouldn't get paid.
17	Q. Okay. Didn't you didn't ever ask just
18 :	for cash?
19	A. You could ask the customer to go to the
20 2	ATM. But if that wasn't an option, then you had no
21 (choice but to take the funny money or not make
22 r	money.
23	Q. Okay. They would probably just find
24 a	another dancer that would take the dance dollars?
25	A. Right.

Page 52
1 A. I believe that's it.
2 Q. Okay. When you were on the main floor,
3 was anyone monitoring what you were doing?
4 A. I don't think so.
5 Q. Okay. Did you ever have to check in with
6 anyone after you had gotten payment for a lap
7 dance?
8 A. No.
9 Q. Did you need to report to anyone at Crazy
10 Horse how much you earned during a shift?
11 A. Not during a whole shift, no.
Q. When you say "not during a whole shift,"
was there another time you had to report how much
14 you earned?
15 A. If a host introduced you to a customer
and you went off with that customer to make money,
17 they would expect you to report back to them how
18 much you made off that customer.
19 Q. Do you know why they would want that
20 information?
21 A. So that they would get their tip out.
Q. Okay. Did you ever date anyone that you
23 met at Crazy Horse?
24 A. No.
Q. Did you ever leave the premises with

Page 53 1 anyone you met at Crazy Horse? 2 Α. No. 3 0. Did you ever date anyone who worked or 4 performed at Crazy Horse? 5 Α. No. 6 Q. What about arranged to meet someone that 7 you met at Crazy Horse later on after you were done 8 performing? 9 I'm sorry. I don't understand. Α. 10 Q. Did you ever meet any customers, maybe 11 during a shift, that you then arranged to meet 12 later on after you would stop performing? 13 Α. No. 14 Q. Did you have your own customer base? 15 Α. No. 16 Q. Any particular reason why not? 17 Α. It's a very tourist-driven town, so we don't see a lot of the same faces. 18 19 0. Okay. Did you have any regulars? 20 Α. No. 21 Q. Okay. 22 Α. Well, yes, actually. But very, very, 23 very -- in fact, I can only recall one specific 24 local guy at the time who was a regular. 25 Okay. Was that person familiar with your Q.

1	
	Page 55
1	A. Yes.
2	Q. Any restrictions on the term that you had
3	to perform at Crazy Horse?
4	A. As far as how many days or weeks or
5	months you had to work there? Is that what you're
6	asking?
7	Q. Yeah.
8	A. No. No requirement. No minimum.
9	Q. Okay. It wasn't that you only had to
10	dance at Crazy Horse for six months or something
11	like that?
12	A. No.
13	Q. Okay. How did you learn how to dance?
14	A. You learn as you go.
15	Q. Okay. Is that the same with dancing on
16	stage?
17	A. Yes.
18	Q. Would you ever practice dancing on stage?
19	A. No. Only during a shift.
20	Q. Okay. Have you had any plastic surgery?
21	A. Yes, I have.
22	Q. What have you had done?
23	A. I've had my breasts done. I've had my
24	lips and parts of my face injected. I've had
25	cosmetic veneers. That's it.

Page 56 1 Did you get any of those things because 0. 2 you were an adult dancer? 3 Α. That probably had a lot to do with it, 4 yes. 5 Any of those things in particular? Ο. 6 Α. The breasts, at least. 7 Q. Do you recall how much you paid for that? 8 Α. 6,000. 9 Q. Okay. Do you know what year you got that done? 10 11 Α. 2007. Aside from gentlemen's clubs and the 12 Ο. 13 private parties that you mentioned earlier and the 14 party buses that you mentioned earlier, any other 15 places where you could be an adult dancer? 16 Α. Clubs, bachelor parties, and suites 17 and party buses. That's it. 1.8 Q. Okay. What made you choose to dance in 19 gentlemen's clubs over just doing the private 20 parties that you do now? 21 Α. I quess because it was instant when I 22 moved out here. The clubs were available 24 hours 23 It was easier to just go into Spearmint 24 Rhino and start working right away as opposed to 25 trying to work my way into an agency, which can

Page 59 1 promo events? 2 Α. Yes. 3 Okay. Would you ever drink alcohol Q. during your shift? 4 5 Α. No. I don't like alcohol. 6 Would you sell any alcohol or try 0. Okay. 7 to sell any bottles of alcohol? 8 Α. Only in combination of selling a VIP 9 room. 10 0. Okay. Did Crazy Horse have any 11 requirements that you were supposed to sell bottles? 12 13 Α. No. 14 0. Just the VIP minimum that you mentioned earlier, right? 15 16 Α. Correct. If your customer was purchasing 17 a VIP dance with you, he was also required to 18 purchase drinks or a bottle. 19 Q. So that was just sort of tied into Okay. 20 the VIP experience? 21 Α. Yes. 22 Q. Okay. Other than that, did Crazy Horse 23 require you to sell a certain amount of VIP time or 24 VIP experiences? 25 Α. No.

	Page 71
1	supposed to look, I guess, "cute" when we did
2	promotions.
3	Q. Okay. Not rolling out of bed, huh?
4	A. Right.
5	Q. Okay. What made you choose to do
6	promotional events for Crazy Horse?
7	A. I was really struggling for money at the
8	time, so any way I could save money on house fees,
9	I would usually try to do it.
10	Q. Okay. Did you sorry.
11	Do you have an estimate as to how much
12	you would spend on costumes per month while
13	performing at Crazy Horse?
14	A. No. I didn't really buy a lot of
15	costumes at the time because I had so many years
16	worth of outfits I had accumulated by that point.
17	Q. Okay. What about expenditures on hair
18	and makeup?
19	A. I wouldn't keep track of that stuff.
20	Q. Okay. Did you ever hire anyone to help
21	you with your hair and makeup?
22	A. No.
23	Q. Could you have?
24	MS. CALVERT: Objection. Calls for
25	speculation.

	Page 72
1	THE WITNESS: I believe I you mean
2	inside the club or outside the club?
3	BY MS. SMITH:
4	Q. Either or.
5	A. Not inside the club, no. But outside the
6	club, I guess I would have been free to hire
7	whoever I wanted to help me.
8	Q. Was there any set individual that you had
9	to report to during a shift at Crazy Horse?
10	A. The DJ.
11	Q. Was that for your stage sets?
12	A. Yes. When you were ready, you were
13	supposed to let the DJ know that you were ready and
14	available to be called on stage.
15	Q. Okay. What made you decide to stop
16	performing at Crazy Horse?
17	A. I felt like the hosts were rude to me.
18	Q. Any particular host?
19	A. Yes.
20	Q. Do you recall their names?
21	A. Do I have to name?
22	MS. CALVERT: If you remember.
23	THE WITNESS: Yeah. Tommy Van was
24	especially rude to me.
25	////

		Page 95
1	A.	No.
2	Q.	If you had wanted to work every day,
3	could you	have?
4	A.	Yes.
5	Q.	What about if you did not want to perform
6	three day	s in a week?
7	A.	That's fine. I just would have had my
8	locker re	voked, from my understanding.
9	Q.	Did everyone have a locker?
10	Α.	No. It was optional.
11	Q.	Okay. So you chose to have, what, an
12	assigned	locker there?
13	А.	Yes.
14	Q.	Did you bring your own lock for that?
15	А.	I don't remember.
16	Q.	Okay.
17	А.	Probably.
18	Q.	Otherwise, could you have just chosen to
19	bring wha	tever you needed for a shift with you each
20	shift?	
21	А.	Right.
22	Q.	Okay. So the idea was to probably, what,
23	leave som	e cosmetics?
24	A.	Outfits and shoes. The shoes were big.
25	Q.	Do you have an estimate on how much you

Page 96 1 would spend on shoes per month? 2 Shoes would usually last a couple of 3 months. They're about 120. I might get three months out of them. 5 Okay. That's true while you were 6 performing at Crazy Horse? 7 Α. Yes. 8 I'm going to turn your attention to 9 RR0063. It's page 7 of 11. 10 Α. Okay. 11 And, in particular, the entry -- the Q. 12 first entry that's dated 4/19/2014. 13 Do you see that? 14 Α. Yes. 15 It says, "promo minus 375." 0. 16 Do you see that? 17 Α. Yes. 18 Q. Do you understand that to be a credit you 19 were given for a promo? 20 I don't remember why I was given that Α. 21 credit. 22 Do you remember getting that credit? 23 Α. Yeah. I remember not having to pay house 24 fees for a while until it ran out, but I can't 25 remember why I got it.

Page 114 1 MS. CALVERT: And just stop there. 2 THE WITNESS: I answered them, I signed 3 it, and I have not heard anything since then. BY MS. SMITH: 4 5 So like filled out a questionnaire, not 0. 6 filled out a response like the responses I'm having 7 you review right now? 8 Α. Right. He asked me questions, he wrote 9 down my answers, and then I signed the bottom of 10 it. 11 Okay. All right. And I know I asked you 0. 12 this earlier, but no receipts or documents in your 13 possession? 14 Α. No. 15 Q. Maybe hidden away in that safe? 16 Α. No. 17 Okay. What about expense receipts? 0. 18 No. I don't keep those. Α. 19 So you wouldn't keep receipts for clothes Q. 20 or shoes or anything like that? 21 No, because I never filed taxes. Ą. Ι 22 didn't see a purpose for saving receipts. 23 Q. Okay. So I'm going to direct your 24 attention to page 11 of 14, your response to 25 Interrogatory No. 16.

	Page 129
1	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
2	STATE OF NEVADA)
3) SS: COUNTY OF CLARK)
4	I, Trina K. Sanchez, CCR No. 933, RPR
5	declare that I reported the taking of the
6	deposition of the witness, JACQUELINE FRANKLIN,
7	commencing on Tuesday, January 10, 2017, at 1:30
8	p.m.
9	That prior to being examined, the witness
10	was by me duly sworn to testify to the truth, the
11	whole truth, and nothing but the truth;
12	That I thereafter transcribed my said
13	shorthand notes into typewriting and that the
14	typewritten transcript of said deposition is a
15	complete, true, and accurate transcription of said
16	shorthand notes taken down at said time, and that a
17	request has not been made to review the transcript.
18	I further declare that I am not a
19	relative or employee of any party involved in said
20	action, nor a person financially interested in the
21	action.
22	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set
23	my hand in the County of Clark, State of Nevada, this 18th day of January, 2017.
24	
25	Trina K. Sanchez, CCR No. 933, RPR

EXHIBIT 9

In The Matter Of:

FRANKLIN v.
RUSSELL ROAD & FOOD BEVERAGE

ASHLEIGH PARK January 6, 2017

Lawyer Solutions Group 321 S. Casino Center Blvd, Suite 180 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101



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1
                           DISTRICT COURT
 2
                        CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
 3
 4
 5
     JACQUELINE FRANKLIN,
     ASHLEIGH PARK, LILY SHEPHERD,
     STACIE ALLEN, MICHAELA
 6
     DIVINE, VERONICA VAN WOODSEN,
 7
     SAMANTHA JONES, KARINA
     STRELKOVA, LASHONDA, STEWART, )
                                       Case No.
    DANIELLE LAMAR, and DIRUBIN
 8
                                       A-14-709372
    TAMAYO, individually, and on
 9
    behalf of a class of
     similarly situated
10
     individuals,
11
                    Plaintiffs,
12
          VS.
13
    RUSSELL ROAD FOOD AND
    BEVERAGE, LLC, a Nevada
    limited Liability company
14
15
16
17
                   DEPOSITION OF ASHLEIGH PARK
18
                 Taken on Friday, January 6, 2017
19
                       At 1:45 o'clock p.m.
20
                    At 630 South Fourth Street
21
                        Las Vegas, Nevada
22
23
24
25
    Reported by: Helen M. Zamba, CCR #439
```

```
(d/b/a CRAZY HORSE III
 1
     GENTLEMAN'S CLUB), DOE CLUB
 2
     OWNER, I-X, ROE CLUB OWNER,
     I-X, and ROE EMPLOYER, I-X,
 3
                      Defendants.
 4
     AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS
 5
 6
 7
 8
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1	other girls.
2	Q. Okay. And what was the result of your
3	audition?
4	A. I got the job.
5	Q. Okay. Were you assigned to any specific
6	shift or a time you could be in the club?
7	A. No. I was told I could work any time.
8	Q. Okay.
9	A. Any day, any time.
10	Q. Sorry. Any day and time?
11	A. Uh-huh.
12	Q. Okay. Did anyone with Crazy Horse tell you
13	a minimum number of days that you would have to
14	perform?
15	A. I don't know. I don't remember.
16	Q. Okay. A minimum number of days you would
17	need to perform in a month?
18	A. I don't believe so, no.
19	Q. Okay. So if you could go into the club
20	whenever you chose to perform, how would you decide
21	when to go?
22	A. I basically just would whenever I felt
23	like going in, um, whatever worked with my schedule at
24	home at the time.
25	Q. Okay. Were there any specific days that you

1	Q. Did you ever ask to leave the premises after	
2	being there for less than six hours and be told no?	
3	A. No.	
4	Q. Okay. So for those approximately three	
5	times that you can recall being on premises for less	
6	than six hours and by being on premises, I mean	
7	being at the club, if that makes sense, did you get	
8	fined?	
9	A. No.	
10	Q. Okay. Do you know why?	
11	A. No.	
12	Q. Okay. Did	
13	A. No.	
14	Q. Do you recall anyone threatening to fine	
15	you?	
16	A. I was told that if I left, I could be	
17	subject to fine and to not be able to come back to the	
18	club.	
19	Q. Okay. But you don't recall actually being	
20	fined?	
21	A. Correct.	
22	Q. Okay. And were you able to return to the	
23	club?	
24	A. Yes.	
25	Q. Okay. So whenever you would go in to start	

1	a shift, what were your goals during that time?	
2	MS. CALVERT: Objection as to vague. You	
3	can go ahead and answer.	
4	THE WITNESS: To make money.	
5	Q. (BY MS. SMITH) Okay. Did you have like a	
6	certain dollar amount that you would aim to achieve	
7	prior to checking out?	
8	A. No.	
9	Q. How about a number of individuals that you	
10	wanted to talk to?	
11	A. No.	
12	Q. Okay. Did Crazy Horse require you to speak	
13	to a certain number of individuals per shift?	
14	A. Not that I remember, no.	
15	Q. How about perform a certain number of lap	
16	dances?	
17	A. No.	
18	Q. Okay. Did Crazy Horse have any quota for	
19	how many people or parties you could bring to VIP	
20	or that you should be bringing to VIP?	
21	A. No.	
22	Q. Did Crazy Horse ever require you to work	
23	more than 40 hours in a week?	
24	A. No.	
25	Q. Okay. If you had wanted to perform every	

1	day, could you have?
2	A. Yes.
3	Q. Okay. Were there weeks that you didn't go
4	in at all to Crazy Horse?
5	A. Yes.
6	Q. Aside from what you testified to as a
7	six-hour minimum time, who would decide when you would
8	leave?
9	A. Ultimately, I would make that decision.
10	If
11	Q. Okay.
12	A. If I was there for six hours, then I could
13	decide when I when I would leave.
14	Q. Okay. So after the six hours, what would
15	your process be for departing the premises?
16	A. Um, I believe I would go get a slip, and
17	the it had to be signed, basically.
18	And you had to be okayed to leave at that
19	point still by the VIP host and the manager.
20	Sometimes the house mom, but like she wasn't always
21	there.
22	Q. Okay.
23	A. And the DJ. Sorry. I forgot.
24	Q. Okay. And then what would happen?
25	A. Um, I would get my signatures, go and I

1	advertise Crazy Horse?	
2	A. No.	
3	Q. When you would go in to perform on a	
4	shift and again, this is for Crazy Horse	
5	A. Right.	
6	Q what types of supplies would you need?	
7	A. My clothes, my shoes. Uh, makeup, hair	
8	straightener, curling iron.	
9	Q. Do you recall any requirements on outfits	
10	that you could wear to perform?	
11	A. Yes.	
12	Q. And what were those?	
13	A. You had to wear three undergarments, like a	
14	bottom piece and then a middle and then something on	
15	top.	
16	Um, that's what that's what I distinctly	
17	remember.	
18	Q. Okay. So when you say three undergarments,	
19	can you be a little bit more specific?	
20	A. What I was told was I had to wear like a	
21	thong	
22	Q. Okay.	
23	A three three two pair of underwear	
24	and then whatever I was wearing on top, whether that	
25	be a skirt or one piece. It just depended on what I	

7	
1	Q. Okay. Other than the three pieces that you
2	just referenced
3	A. Uh-huh.
4	Q and the lace requirement or I should
5	say ban
6	MS. CALVERT: Yes.
7	Q. (BY MS. SMITH) how would you decide what
8	to wear? Would you choose your own outfits?
9	A. Yes.
10	Q. Okay. When you would commence a shift at
11	Crazy Horse, would you need to get your outfit
12	approved by anyone there?
13	A. Yes.
14	Q. Who?
15	A. The house mom.
16	Q. Okay.
17	A. When she was there. She wasn't always
18	there.
19	So when there was someone in there, at least
20	for me specifically, she would make sure that I was
21	wearing what I was supposed to be wearing.
22	Q. Okay. And how about when she wasn't there?
23	A. No one that I can remember.
24	Q. Okay. Is it your understanding that the
25	house mom is employed by Crazy Horse?

1	Did you have to get your name approved by	
2	anyone at Crazy Horse?	
3	A. I don't remember.	
4	Q. So during your shift, once you were on the	
5	main floor, how would you approach an individual that	
6	came into the club?	
7	A. How would I approach? I would just walk up	
8	to someone and start talking.	
9	Q. Okay. And any specific topics of	
10	conversation that you would use?	
11	A. No.	
12	Q. Okay. What about asking them if they would	
13	like a dance?	
14	A. I what do you mean by the question?	
15	Q. Do you know what a lap dance is?	
16	A. I yes.	
17	Q. What's your understanding of what a lap	
18	dance is?	
19	A. Um, dancing on someone's lap.	
20	Q. Did you ever perform lap dances while you	
21	were performing at Crazy Horse?	
22	A. Yes.	
23	Q. How would you go about doing that?	
24	A. Uh, in conversation with someone, it	
25	obviously comes to a point where someone's there for a	

1	reason.	
2	They're there to get a dance or have	
3	conversation, and you're there to make money. So you	
4	would either they would ask you for a dance or you	
5	would ask them for a dance.	
6	Q. Okay.	
7	A. Ask them if they wanted it.	
8	Q. So if you asked someone if they wanted a	
9	dance and they said yes, what would happen next?	
10	A. Um, for me, I would get my money up front	
11	and do the dance.	
12	Q. Okay. How much money would you get up	
13	front?	
14	A. For a lap dance?	
15	Q. Yes.	
16	A. It's \$20. Um, depending on how they paid.	
17	Q. What do you mean, depending on how they	
18	paid?	
19	A. It \$20 cash. Or if they paid in dance	
20	dollars, then you'd get less than that.	
21	Q. Okay. Did you ever refuse dance dollars?	
22	A. No.	
23	Q. How come?	
24	A. Why would I refuse money? It's something	
25	is better than nothing.	

1	pay.
2	If they were to pay by credit card, they
3	wouldn't pay more than that.
4	Q. Okay. Did you ever ask anyone if you could
5	negotiate for more than that?
6	A. No.
7	Q. Okay. Going back to where you were would
8	come on for a shift, were there any requirements about
9	hair and makeup?
10	A. Yes.
11	Q. What were those?
12	A. There were several. Um, no glitter, no oil.
13	Q. Okay.
14	A. Uh, those were the two biggest that I saw
15	enforced.
16	Q. Okay. Do you know why that those were
17	enforced?
18	A. Um, no.
19	Q. What were other rules that you thought were
20	required with your hair and makeup?
21	A. Nothing that I can recall.
22	Q. Okay. Did you ever get fined for your
23	appearance at Crazy Horse?
24	A. No.
25	Q. Did you ever perform on a stage at Crazy

_	
1	Horse?
2	A. Yes.
3	Q. Okay. How would you decide what song to
4	dance to?
5	A. I I didn't decide that.
6	Q. Okay. How is it decided then?
7	A. Um, the DJ just I just played the
8	music. I I never asked for anything specific.
9	Q. Okay. So you just didn't request a specific
10	genre?
11	A. Uh, I did not.
12	Q. Any specific song?
13	A. No.
14	Q. Okay. Is there any specific sorry. Is
15	there any specific style that you would perform on
16	stage, style of dance?
17	A. Uh, no.
18	Q. Okay. Did anyone at Crazy Horse instruct
19	you in the style of dance you were supposed to be
20	performing?
21	A. I didn't I guess I didn't need
22	instruction. But not not specifically, no.
23	Q. Okay. Would you utilize a pole on stage?
24	A. Yes.
25	Q. Okay. How did you learn how to dance with a

1	A.	No.
2	Q.	How come?
3	A.	You're there to work.
4	Q.	Would someone come and get you out of the
5	dressing	room?
6	. A.	That never happened to me specifically, no.
7	Q.	Okay. Because you would go in and obviously
8	want to t	ry to make money
9	A.	Uh-huh.
10	Q.	correct?
11	A.	Yes.
12	Q.	Okay. Were there any specific areas of the
13	club that	you preferred to hang out in?
14	A.	No.
15	Q.	Would you ever go sit at the bar?
16	A.	Yes.
17	Q.	Would you ever consume alcohol on shift?
18	A.	No.
19	Q.	Did Crazy Horse have any requirements of
20	where you	could approach a customer?
21	A.	No.
22	Q.	Okay. What about how long did Crazy
23	Horse have	any requirements about how long you were
24	supposed t	talk to a single individual?
25	A.	Yes.

1	Um, I mean, you just couldn't hang out
2	anywhere if you I don't know. That's it. You
3	you just couldn't hang out in the VIP areas
4	Q. Okay.
5	A if you didn't have someone there with
6	you.
7	Q. Okay. What about if you wanted to take a
8	break, what would happen?
9	A. You could take a break.
10	Q. Would you need to check in with anybody
11	prior to commencing your break?
12	A. No.
13	Q. What about checking in after you finished
14	taking a break?
15	A. No.
16	Q. What about any requirements by Crazy Horse
17	on how long of a break you could take?
18	A. I believe there was a time limit, but I
19	don't remember the exact time.
20	Q. Okay. What about a limit on how many breaks
21	you could take throughout the evening?
22	A. I don't know.
23	Q. Okay. When you would take a break, did you
24	ever experience someone coming and telling you to stop
25	taking a break?

1	Q. (BY MS. SMITH) Would you ever ask to go on
2	stage?
3	A. Not that I can remember.
4	MS. SMITH: All right. I'm going to just
5	take a brief break right now and just take five.
6	MS. CALVERT: Sounds good.
7	THE WITNESS: Okay.
8	(Short recess taken.)
9	MS. SMITH: All right. Ms. Park, we're back
10	on the record. And the oath that you took earlier
11	today is still in effect. Okay?
12	THE WITNESS: Yes.
13	MS. SMITH: And that's going to carry on
14	throughout the rest of the deposition. If we take
15	another break, I'm sure I'll mention it again.
16	THE WITNESS: Okay.
17	Q. (BY MS. SMITH) Okay. So we were just
18	speaking about your breaks.
19	You identified one instance where a host
20	directed you not to take a break. Other than that,
21	you were free to take breaks?
22	A. Correct.
23	Q. Did anyone at Crazy Horse require you to tip
24	anyone?
25	A. No.

1	Q.	Do you know what I mean by solicitation?
2	A.	Prostitution.
3	Q.	Okay.
4	A.	Yes, I do.
5	Q.	All right.
6	A.	And no, I have not.
7	Q.	Okay. Do you think you were a good
8	entertain	er?
9	A.	Yes.
10	Q.	Why is that?
11	A.	I anything I do, I try to do as well as I
12	can. And	I I'd like to say that I was successful
13	at it.	
14	Q.	Do you think you were better than the
15	average e	ntertainer you knew?
16	A.	No.
17	Q.	Do you think you were worse?
18	A.	No.
19	Q.	Okay. Did you have any specialty dance
20	moves?	
21	A.	No.
22	Q.	Okay. Aside from the pole fitness classes
23	that you	testified to previously, would you practice
24	your danc	ing or your pole dancing?
25	A.	No.

If I went into VIP, I would have to report 1 to the VIP host --2 3 Q. Okay. 4 Α. -- during the shift. Um, I -- I would have 5 to report to the DJ, the VIP host, and the manager 6 during my shift before I could -- before my shift was 7 ended technically, so --8 Okay. So aside from checking in and 9 checking out, I'm just referring to that period of 10 time. 11 Α. No. Okay. Did you have to inform anyone at 12 Q. 13 Crazy Horse the total amount of money you earned during a shift? 14 15 Α. No. 16 Okay. Why did you choose to stop performing Q. 17 at Crazy Horse? 18 Α. A couple of reasons. I got married in late 19 2014. And we decided that it wasn't something I needed to be doing anymore in a marriage. 20 21 And the last time I performed, that kind of 22 sent me over the edge. I was in a private, private 23 room, like an hour-long room. 24 And the other performer I was in there with 25 ended up having sex right in front of me.

1	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
2	STATE OF NEVADA) SS:
3	COUNTY OF CLARK)
4	I, Helen M. Zamba, a Certified Court Reporter and Notary Public for the County of Clark, State of
5	Nevada, do hereby certify:
6	That I reported the taking of the deposition of the witness, Ashleigh Park, commencing on Friday,
7	January 6, 2017, at 1:45 o'clock p.m.
8	That prior to being examined, the witness was by me duly sworn to testify to the truth.
9	
10	That the foregoing transcript is a complete, true and accurate transcription of the stenographic notes of the testimony taken by me in the matter
11	entitled herein to the best of my knowledge, skill and ability.
12	That prior to the completion of the
13 14	proceedings, the reading and signing of the transcript was not requested by the witness or a party.
15	I further certify that I am not a relative or employee of an attorney or counsel of any of the
16	parties, nor a relative or employee of an attorney or counsel involved in said action, nor a person financially interested in the action.
17	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my
18	hand in my office in the County of Clark, State of Nevada, this 10th day of March, 2017.
19	,
20	
21	/s/ Helen Zamba
22	Helen M. Zamba, CCR #439
23	
24	
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EXHIBIT 10

Page -1 of 1

Entertainer Login By Date

Between

Tuesday, November 2, 2010 1:00 pm and Tuesday, September 13, 2016 12:59 pm



Total Time 356.01	Total Payments: \$3,048.00	Total Charges: \$4,270.00	Total Ents.: 1	Total Logins: 43 Total Ents.: 1	
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From: P Page: 4/8 Date: 11/7/2014 2:09:04 PM **Russell Road F** & B

Page 1 01 i

Entertainer Login By Date . Between

Saturday, December 7, 2013 1:00 pm and Saturday, November 8, 2014 12:59 pm

Stage Name	Name	Ent ID	Login Time	Logout Time	Time Worked
Amber-Rose	Ashleigh Fark	3063054	6/12/14 1:34 am	6/12/14 5:07 am	3,55
Amber-Rose	Ashleigh Park	3063054	6/13/14 7:55 pm	6/14/14 3:45 am	7.83
Amber-Rose	Ashleigh Park	3063054	6/15/14 7:34 pm	6/16/14 6:01 ant	10.45
Aniber-Rose	Ashleigh Park	3063054	6/17/14 7:52 pm	6/18/14 2:58 2111	7.10
Amber-Ross	Ashleigh Purk	- 3063054	6/19/14 7:55 pm	6/20/14 4:36 am	8.68
Amber-Rose	Ashleigh Park	3063054	6/23/14 7:54 pm	6/24/14 9:19 mm	13.42
Amber-Rosa	Ashleigh Park	3063054	6/25/14 1:30 am	6/25/14 4:15 aro	2.75
Amber-Rose	Ashleigh Park	3063054	6/25/14 7:55 pai	6/26/14 1:09 am	5.23
Amber-Rose	Ashleigh Park	3063054 .	6/26/14 8:01 pm	6/27/14 7:51 am	11.83
. Amber-Rose	Asildeigh Park	3063054	6/30/14 7:54 pm	7/1/14 4:18 am	8.40
Aniber-Rose	Ashleigh Park	3063054	9/29/14 8:57 pm	9/30/14 3:28 wa	<i>5.</i> 52
Amber-Rosa	Ashielgh Park	3063054	10/4/14 1:17 am	10/4/14 7:36 am	6,32

Total Logins: 12

Total Ents.; 1

Total Time 92.08

Entertainer Login By Date

Between

Tuesday, November 2, 2010 1:00 pm

and

Tuesday, September 13, 2016 12:59 pm

	Name		
21.01	Name	•	
Siller unger on and	Ent ID Torin Time		
Logout time	1		
Time Worked			

	į	l ing	ing	Lina	Lina	Lina	Lina	Lina	Lina	Lina	Lina	Lina	Lina	Lina	Lina	Lina	Lina	Lina	Lina	Lina	Lina	Lina	Lina	Lina	Lina	Lina	T. III			Lipa	Linn	Lina	Lina	Lina	Stage Name
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Total Payments: \$2,325.00	2512902 2/19/14 9:45 pm 2/20/14 1:21 am	2512902 1/31/14 11:00 pm 2/1/14 4:24 am	2512902 1/29/14 10:37 pm 1/30/14 2:27 am	2512902 1/23/14 9:15 pm 1/24/14 1:32 am	/13 5:22 pm 12/16/13 10:05 pm	2512902 12/2/13 5:34 pm 12/3/13 3:53 am	2512902 11/23/13 10:26 pn 11/24/13 4:58 am	/13 10:40 pn 11/22/13 2:56 am	2512902 11/9/13 10:30 pm 11/10/13 12:53 am	2512902 11/7/13 10:51 pm 11/8/13 4:11 am	2512902 11/5/13 11:00 pm 11/6/13 2:49 am	2512902 11/2/13 11:33 pm 11/3/13 3:56 am	2512902 11/1/13 8:50 pm 11/2/13 4:51 am	/13 8:37 pm 10/28/13 2:02 am	11:45 pn 10/25/13	9:47 pm (0/19/13	3:45 pm 10/14/13	5:43 10/14/13		5:50 mm 10/1/13	0.08 cm 0/20/12		11:12 pm 9/26/13	9:31 pm 9/20/13	7:59 pm 9/15/13	10:21 pm 9/14/13	7:16 pm 9/12/13	6:48 pm 9/10/13	3 8:48 pm 9/7/13 4:23 am	3 9:47 pm 9/5/13 2:25 am	13 9:17 pm 8/30/13 2:54 am	13 8:07 pm 8/24/13 3:25 am	2512902 8/21/13 10:19 pm 8/22/13 3:57 am		
Total Time 196,64	3.60	5.40	27	4.28	4 72	10.32	6.53	4.27	2.38	5.33	3.82	4.38	8.02	5.42	5,55	5.82	5.72	5.57	8,45	6.68	6.12	0.33	0.00	0 0 0 0	0.50	8.47	6.18	11.67	7.58	4.63	5,62	7.30	5.63	Time Worked	



Page -1 of I

Entertainer Login By Date

Between

Luesday
,
Vovember 2, 2010 1:00 pm
00 pm
and
Tuesday, Septen
ember 1
3, 2016
tember 13, 2016 12:59 pm

Karina Strelkova Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strelkova	Karina Strclkova	Name
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3:05 am 8/21/13	Karina Strelkova	Victory Jones
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12:34 am	Karina Strelkova	Victory Jones
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3:18 am	Karina Strelkova	Victory Jones
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3045619 5/26/13 9:13 pm 5/27/13 10:18 am	Karina Strelkova	Victory Jones
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	Victory Jones	
Total Logins: 95	Karina Strelkova Karina Strelkova	
Total Ents.: 1		
Total Charges: \$6,135.00	3045619 10/12/1 3045619 10/14/1 3045619 10/17/1 3045619 10/17/1 3045619 10/27/1 3045619 11/2/14/1 3045619 1/7/14 3045619 1/7/14 3045619 1/12/14 3045619 1/12/14 3045619 1/12/14 3045619 1/12/14 3045619 1/12/14	
Total Payments: \$3,840.00	3045619 10/12/13 12:36 an 10/12/13 6:28 am 3045619 10/14/13 12:57 an 10/14/13 6:55 am 3045619 10/17/13 9:06 pm 10/18/13 7:22 am 3045619 10/19/13 2:34 am 10/19/13 11:53 am 3045619 10/12/1/13 8:13 am 10/12/1/13 11:09 am 3045619 10/12/1/13 6:21 am 12/14/13 9:36 am 3045619 11/4/14 4:57 am 11/4/14 11:00 am 3045619 11/1/14 12:10 am 11/7/14 4:51 am 3045619 11/12/14 4:01 am 11/2/14 10:44 am 3045619 11/12/14 4:01 am 11/2/14 10:44 am 3045619 11/12/14 10:15 pm 11/13/14 8:52 am 3045619 11/12/14 10:15 pm 11/13/14 8:50 am 3045619 11/12/14 10:15 pm 11/13/14 8:50 am 3045619 11/12/14 10:15 pm 11/13/14 8:50 am 3045619 11/13/14 5:03 am 11/23/14 10:19 am	
Total Time 671.10	7.87 5.97 10.27 9.32 2.93 3.25 6.05 4.68 7.58 6.72 10.62 7.18	

EXHIBIT 11

PLAINTIFF DANIELLE LAMAR

Entertainer Charge Summary

Between

8/28/06 1:00 pm and 8/29/15 12:59 pm

3045344	Madison-L	-ynn			
DATE		TYPE	REASON	AMOUNT	Running Total
6/7/2013	10:16:20PM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
6/7/2013	10:16:38PM	Adjustment	comp 1st day	\$-75.00	\$0.00
6/7/2013	11:57:46PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$40.00
6/7/2013	11:59:11PM	Adjustment	JL	\$-40.00	\$0.00
6/8/2013	10:46:41PM	Charge	House Fee	\$75,00	\$75.00
6/8/2013	10:46:51PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$115.00
6/8/2013	10:47:04PM	Adjustment	JĹ	\$-250.00	\$-135.00
6/9/2013	4:42:58PM	Adjustment	bottle sale from 6/8/13	\$-55,00	\$-190.00
6/9/2013	4:43:34PM	Adjustment	bottle sale from 6/8/13	\$-28.00	\$-218.00
6/12/2013	9:57:25PM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$-158.00
6/12/2013	9:57:46PM	Adjustment	fri&sat	\$-30.00	\$-188.00
6/12/2013	9:57:51PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$-148.00
6/13/2013	10:57:25PM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	00.88-2
6/13/2013	10:57:34PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	S-48.00
6/13/2013	10:57:41PM	Adjustment	fri&sat	\$-30.00	S-78,00
6/14/2013	10:36:42PM	Charge	House Fee	\$75,00	\$-3.00
6/14/2013	10:36:45PM	Charge	Off Singo Fee	\$40,00	\$37.00
6/15/2013	9:27:09PM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$112.00
6/15/2013	9:27:11PM	Charge	Off Singe Fee	\$40,00	\$152.00
6/20/2013	10:22:35PM	Charge	House Fee	\$60,00	\$212.00
6/20/2013	10:23:02PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$252.00
6/21/2013	4:49:16AM	Adjustment	JL	\$-252.00	00.02
6/23/2013	12:57:51AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
6/23/2013	12:57:S7AM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$115.00
6/23/2013	12:58:12AM	Payment		\$-75.00	\$40.00
6/23/2013	12:58:12AM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$0.00
6/28/2013	8:50:19PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$50.00
6/28/2013	8:50:25PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40,00	00,002
6/28/2013	8:50:27PM	Payment		S-40.00	\$50,00
6/28/2013	8:50;27PM	Payment		\$-50.00	\$0.00
6/30/2013	1:13:14AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
6/30/2013	1:13:22AM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$115.00
6/30/2013	1:13:51AM	Payment		\$-75.00	\$40.00
6/30/2013	1:13:51AM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$0.00
7/4/2013 10	:59:03PM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$60.00

Page 2 of 5

Entertainer Charge Summary

Between

8/28/06 1:00 pm and 8/29/15 12:59 pm

3045344	Madison-Lynn			
DATE	TYP	<u>REASON</u>	<u>AMOUA</u>	IT Running Total
7/4/2013 10:59):22PM Adju	tineni sti&sat	\$-30.0	00.00
7/4/2013 10:59	25PM Charg	e Off Stage Fe	c \$40.(00 \$70.00
7/4/2013 11:00	0:02PM Paym	ent	\$-40.0	00 \$30.00
7/4/2013 11:00	:02PM Paym	ent	\$-30.0	20.00
7/6/2013 1:58:	49AM Charg	e House Fee	\$75.0	0 \$75.00
7/6/2013 1:58:	58AM Charg	e Off Stage Fee	\$40.0	0 \$115.00
7/6/2013 1:59:	10AM Paymo	ent	\$-40.0	0 \$75.00
7/6/2013 1:59:	IOAM Paymo	ent	\$-75.0	0 \$0.00
7/11/2013 8:51	:45PM Charge	House Fee	\$50.0	9 \$50.00
7/11/2013 8:51	:54PM Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.0	0 \$90.00
7/11/2013 8:52	:06PM Paymo	nı	\$-50.0	0 \$40.00
7/11/2013 8:52	:06PM Payme	nt	\$-40.00	00.00
7/13/2013 E:59:	:14AM Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
7/13/2013 1:59:	:19AM Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$115.00
7/13/2013 1:59:	27AM Payme	nt	\$-40.00	\$75.00
7/13/2013 1:59:	27AM Payme	nt	\$- 75. 00	\$0.00
7/18/2013 11:36	:08PM Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$60.00
7/18/2013 11:36	:11PM Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$100.00
7/18/2013 11:36:	:43PM Paymer	nt	\$-60.00	\$40.00
7/18/2013 11:36:	:43PM Paymer	n	S-40.00	\$0.00
7/20/2013 1:34:	28AM Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
7/20/2013 1:34:	39AM Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$115.00
7/20/2013 [:34:4	42AM Paymen	t	\$-75.00	\$40.00
7/20/2013 1:34:4	12AM Paymon	1	\$-40.00	\$0.00
7/21/2013 12:28:	10AM Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
7/21/2013 12:28:	20AM Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$115.00
7/21/2013 12:28:	23AM Paymon	t	\$-75.00	\$40.00
7/21/2013 12:28:	23AM Paymen	T .	\$-40.00	\$0.00
7/21/2013 4:22:1	6PM Adjustm	ent btl credits	\$-67.00	\$-67.00
7/27/2013 1:39:0	4AM Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$8.00
7/27/2013 1:39:1	4AM Payment		S-8.00	\$0.00
7/28/2013 1:07:0	6AM Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
7/28/2013 1:07:2	4AM Payment		\$-75.00	\$0.00
7/30/2013 11:50:5	56PM Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$60.00
7/30/2013 11:51:0	06PM Adjustm	ent ww	S-30.00	\$30.00

Entertainer Charge Summary

Between

8/28/06 1:00 pm and 8/29/15 12:59 pm

3045344 Madison-	Lynn			
DATE	TYPE	REASON	TAUOMA	Running Total
7/30/2013 11:51:13PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$70.00
7/30/2013 11:51:20PM	Payment		\$-30.00	\$40.00
7/30/2013 11:51:20PM	Payment		\$-40,00	\$0.00
8/2/2013 1:37:39AM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$60.00
8/2/2013 1:37:44AM	Adjustment	WW	\$-30,00	\$30.00
8/2/2013 1:37:54AM	Payment		\$-30,00	\$0.00
8/3/2013 12:05:52AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75,00	\$75.00
8/3/2013 12:05:54AM	Payment		\$-75.00	\$0.00
8/4/2013 1:37:18AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
8/4/2013 1:37:21AM	Payment		S-75.00	\$0.00
8/9/2013 8:58:49PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$50,00
8/9/2013 8:58:51PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$90,00
8/9/2013 8;59;02PM	Payment		\$-50,00	\$40.00
8/9/2013 8:59:02PM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$0.00
8/15/2013 11:25:53PM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$60,00
8/15/2013 11:25:55PM	Churge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$100.00
8/15/2013 11:26:12PM	Adjustment	promo 8-15-13	\$-75.00	\$25.00
8/15/2013 11:27:18PM	Payment		S-25.00	\$0.00
8/16/2013 9:58:11PM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
8/16/2013 9:58:25PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$115.00
8/16/2013 9:58:28PM	Payment		S-75,00	\$40.00
8/16/2013 9:58:28PM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$0.00
8/18/2013 12:21:15AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
8/18/2013 12:21:18AM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$115.00
8/18/2013 12:21:30AM	Payment		\$-75.00	\$40.00
8/18/2013 12;21:30AM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$0.00
8/18/2013 8:32:58PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$50.00
8/18/2013 8:33:08PM	Adjustment	MA	\$-25.00	\$25.00
8/18/2013 8:33:15PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$65.00
8/18/2013 8:33:19PM	Payment		S-40.00	\$25.00
8/18/2013 8:33:19PM	Payment		\$-25.00	\$0.00
8/20/2013 8:44:02PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$50.00
8/20/2013 8:44:35PM	Adjustment	W/ V	\$-25,00	\$25.00
8/20/2013 8:44:43PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$65.00
8/20/2013 8:44:48PM	Payment		\$-25,00	\$40.00

Entertainer Charge Summary Between

8/28/06 1:00 pm and 8/29/15 12:59 pm

3045344	Madison-L	ynn			
DATE		TYPE	REASON	AMOUNT	Running Total
8/20/2013	8:44:48PM	Payment		S-40,00	\$0,00
8/22/2013	11:09:39PM	Charge	House Fee	\$60,00	\$60.00
8/22/2013	11:09:43PM	Charge	Off Singe Fee	\$40.00	\$100.00
8/22/2013	11:09:50PM	Adjustment	fri&sat	\$-30,00	\$70.00
8/22/2013	11:09:53PM	Payment		\$-30.00	\$40.00
8/22/2013	11:09:53PM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$0.00
8/24/2013	2:04:49AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
8/24/2013	2:04:55AM	Paymont		S-75.00	\$0.00
8/24/2013	2:05:03AM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$40.00
8/24/2013	2:05:21AM	Payment		2-40.00	00.00
8/24/2013	I 1:36:07PM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
8/24/2013	11:36:09PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$115.00
8/24/2013	H:36:12PM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$75.00
8/24/2013	11:36:12PM	Paymont		\$-75,00	\$0.00
8/31/2013	1:07:53AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
8/31/2013	L:12:24AM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$115.00
8/31/2013	1:13:11AM	Payment		S-40.00	\$75.00
8/31/2013	I:13:11AM	Payment		\$-75.00	20,00
9/22/2013	1:03:51AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
9/22/2013	1:03:57AM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40,00	\$115.00
9/22/2013	I:04:23AM	Payment		\$-75.00	\$40.00
9/22/2013	I:04:23AM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$0.00
9/26/2013	9:49:58PM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$60,00
9/26/2013	0:50:12PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$100.00
9/27/2013	3:13:28AM	Adjustment	9-25 ргото	\$-75.00	\$25,00
9/27/2013	i:38:05AM	Payment		\$-25.00	\$0.00
10/18/2013	10:50:25PM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
10/18/2013	10:50:28PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40,00	\$115.00
10/18/2013	10:50:30PM	Payment		S-75.00	\$40.00
10/18/2013	10:50:30PM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$0.00
11/5/2013 [1:08:28PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$50,00
11/5/2013 1	l:08:33PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$90.00
11/5/2013 1	1:08:42PM	Payment		\$-50.00	\$40.00
11/5/2013 11	:08:42PM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$0.00
12/5/2013 7	:44:02PM	Charge	House Fee	\$30.00	\$30.00

Page 5 of 5

Entertainer Charge Summary

Between

3045344 N	Madison-Lynn			
DATE	TYPE	REASON	AMOUNT	Running Total
12/5/2013 7:44:08	PM Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$70.00
12/5/2013 7:44:121	PM Payment		S-40.00	00.082
12/5/2013 7:44:121	PM Payment		\$-30.00	\$0.00
12/19/2013 9:36:14	IPM Charge	House Fee	\$50,00	\$50.00
12/19/2013 9:37:08	PM Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$90,00
12/19/2013 9:37:12	PM Payment		\$-15.00	\$75.00
12/20/2013 12:51:13	7AM Adjustment	Promo	\$-75.00	\$0.00
2/22/2014 11:01:191	PM Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
2/22/2014 11:01:231	PM Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$115.00
2/22/2014 11:01:26	PM Payment		\$-40.00	\$75.00
2/22/2014 11:01:26F	PM Payment		S-75,00	\$0.00
3/15/2014 [2:04:4]	AM Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
3/15/2014 12:04:43/	AM Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$115.00
3/15/2014 12:04:46/	AM Payment		S-75.00	\$40,00
3/15/2014 12:04:46A	M Payment		\$-40.00	\$0.00
4/14/2014 12:32:40A	M Charge	House Foe	\$50.00	\$50.00
4/14/2014 12:32:47A	M Payment		\$-50.00	\$0.00
6/15/2014 1:40:42A	M Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
6/15/2014 1:41:06Al	M Payment		\$-75.00	\$0.00
		Total I	Due \$0.00	

PLAINTIFF LILY SHEPARD

Entertainer Charge Summary Between

8/28/06 1:00 pm and 8/29/15 12:59 pm

2512902 Lina				
DATE	TYPE	REASON	AMOUNT	Running Total
9/3/2010 10:19:56PM	Charge	House Fee	\$70.00	\$70.00
9/3/2010 10:58:49PM	Adjustment	first night	S-70.00	00.02
9/25/2010 8:34:32PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50,00	\$50.00
9/25/2010 8:34:40PM	Payment		\$-50,00	\$0,00
8/21/2013 10:19:48PM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$60.00
8/21/2013 10:19:59PM	Adjustment	comp 1st day	\$-60.00	20,00
8/21/2013 10:21:14PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	540.00
8/21/2013 10:24:48PM	Adjustment	adjust	S-40.00	\$0.00
8/23/2013 8:07:26PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50,00	\$50,00
8/23/2013 8:07:50PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$90,00
8/23/2013 8:08:00PM	Payment		\$-50,00	\$40.00
8/23/2013 8:08:00PM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$0.00
8/29/2013 9:17:41PM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$60.00
8/29/2013 9:18:03PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$100.00
8/29/2013 9:18:06PM	Payment		\$-60.00	\$40.00
8/29/2013 9:15:06PM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$0.00
9/4/2013 9:47:45PM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$60.00
9/4/2013 9:48:02PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40,00	\$100.00
9/4/2013 9:48:14PM	Payment		\$-60,00	\$40.00
9/4/2013 9:48:14PM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$0.00
9/6/2013 8:48:01PM	Charge	House Fcc	\$50.00	\$50.00
9/6/2013 8:49:49PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$90.00
9/6/2013 8:50:07PM	Payment		S-50.00	\$40,00
9/6/2013 8:50:07PM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$0.00
9/9/2013 6:48:15PM	Charge	House Fee	\$40.00	\$40.00
9/9/2013 6:48:39PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$80.00
9/9/2013 6:48:45PM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$40,00
9/9/2013 6:48:45PM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$0.00
9/11/2013 7:16:35PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$50.00
9/11/2013 7:17:12PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$90.00
9/11/2013 7:19:42PM	Payment		S-40.00	\$50.00
9/11/2013 7:19:42PM	Payment		S-50.00	\$0.00
9/13/2013 10:21:14PM	Charge	House Fee	\$75,00	\$75,00
9/13/2013 10:21:28PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$115.00
9/13/2013 10:23:58PM	Payment		S-75.00	\$40.00

Page 2 of 4

Russell Road F & B

Entertainer Charge Summary

Between

2512902	Lina			
DATE	TYPE	REASON	AMOUNT	Running Total
9/13/2013 10:23:	58PM Payment		\$-40.00	\$0.00
9/14/2013 7:59:	16PM Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$50.00
9/14/2013 7:59:2	27PM Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$90,00
9/14/2013 8:00:0	77PM Payment		\$-50.00	\$40.00
9/14/2013 8:00:0	7PM Payment		S-40.00	\$0.00
9/19/2013 9:31:5	64PM Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$60.00
9/19/2013 9:32:0	2PM Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$100.00
9/19/2013 9:33:2	7PM Adjustment	friæsat	\$-30.00	\$70.00
9/19/2013 9:33:3	IPM Payment		\$-30.00	\$40,00
9/19/2013 9:33:3	1PM Payment		\$-40.00	\$0,00
9/25/2013 11:12:3	66PM Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	560.00
9/25/2013 [1:13:3	33PM Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40,00	00.0012
9/25/2013 11:13:5	7PM Paymont		\$-5.00	\$95.00
9/25/2013 11:13:5	7PM Payment		\$-60.00	\$35.00
9/26/2013 2:28:5	1AM Payment		\$-35.00	\$0.00
9/27/2013 6:47:4	5PM Charge	House Fee	\$40.00	\$40.00
9/27/2013 6:48:24	PM Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40,00	00,082
9/27/2013 6:48:5	IPM Payment		\$-25.00	\$55.00
9/27/2013 6:48:5	IPM Payment		\$-40.00	\$15.00
9/28/2013 12:55:2	2AM Payment		⊊-15.00	\$0.00
9/29/2013 9:08:30	iPM Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	00,002
9/29/2013 9:08:52	PM Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$90.00
9/29/2013 9:09:05	iPM Payment		\$-40.00	\$50,00
9/29/2013 9:09:05	PM Payment		\$-50,00	\$0,00
9/30/2013 5:50:31	PM Charge	House Fee	\$40.00	340.00
9/30/2013 5:50:49	PM Adjustment	MNFB46	\$-90.00	\$-50.00
9/30/2013 5:51:10	PM Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$-10.00
10/9/2013 10:21:20	5PM Charge	House Fee	00.002	\$50.00
10/9/2013 10:21:48	PM Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40,00	00,002
10/9/2013 10:22:23	SPM Payment		\$-25.00	\$65.00
10/10/2013 3:57:1	0AM Payment		S-40.00	\$25.00
10/10/2013 3:57:10	0AM Payment		S-25.00	\$0.00
10/14/2013 5:43:3	1PM Charge	House Fee	\$40.00	\$40,00
10/14/2013 5:43:4:	3PM Adjustment	mnfb46	\$-90,00	\$-50.00
10/14/2013 5:43:49	PPM Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40,00	\$-10.00

Entertainer Charge Summary

Between

2512902	Lina				
DATE		<u>TYPE</u>	REASON	AMOUNT	Running Total
10/18/2013	9:47:27PM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$65.00
10/18/2013	9:47:40PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$105.00
10/18/2013	9:48:06PM	Payment		2-35,00	\$70.00
10/18/2013	9;48;06PM	Payment		S-65.00	\$5.00
10/24/2013	11:45:39PM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$65,00
10/24/2013	11:45:52PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$105.00
10/24/2013	11:46:45PM	Payment		\$-60.00	\$45,00
10/24/2013	11:46:45PM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$5.00
10/24/2013	11:46:45PM	Payment		\$-5.00	\$0.00
10/27/2013	8:37:22PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$50.00
10/27/2013	8:37:39PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$90.00
10/27/2013	8:37:S6PM	Payment		\$-30.00	\$60.00
10/27/2013	8:37:56PM	Payment		\$-50.00	\$10.00
11/1/2013	8:50:37PM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$85.00
11/1/2013	8;50;44PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$125,00
11/1/2013	8:51:33PM	Paymont		\$-10.00	\$115.00
11/1/2013	3:51:33PM	Payment		\$-50.00	\$65.00
11/2/2013	1:51:28AM	Payment		\$-25.00	\$40.00
11/2/2013	I:51:28AM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$0.00
11/2/2013 1	1:33:48PM	Charge	House Fee	\$75,00	\$75,00
11/2/2013 1	1:33:50PM	Charge	Off Singe Fee	\$40.00	\$115.00
11/2/2013 I	1:34:14PM	Payment		\$-60.00	\$55.00
11/5/2013 1	1:00:50PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$105.00
11/5/2013 1	1:01:34PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40,00	\$145.00
11/5/2013 1	1:02:25PM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$105.00
11/5/2013 1	I:02:25PM	Payment		\$-15.00	\$90.00
11/5/2013 1	1:02:25PM	Payment		\$-25.00	\$65.00
11/6/2013 2	:49:51AM	Payment		\$-25.00	\$40.00
11/6/2013 2	:49:51AM	Payment		\$-25.00	\$15.00
11/7/2013 10):51:41PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$65,00
11/7/2013 10):51:47PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$105.00
11/7/2013 10):52:42PM	Payment		S-15.00	\$90.00
11/7/2013 10	:52:42PM	Payment		\$-45,00	\$45.00
11/8/2013 3	:32:42AM	Payment		2-40.00	\$5.00
11/8/2013 3	:52:42AM	Payment		\$-5.00	\$0.00

Entertainer Charge Summary Between

8/28/06 1:00 pm and 8/29/15 12:59 pm

2512902 Li	na				
<u>DATE</u>	TYPE	REASON		AMOUNT	Ruoning Total
11/9/2013 10:30:14F	M Charge	House Fee		\$75.00	\$75.00
11/9/2013 10:30:18P	M Charge	Off Stage Fee		\$40.00	\$115.00
11/9/2013 10:30:24P	M Payment			\$-40.00	\$75.00
11/9/2013 10:30:24P	M Payment			\$-75,00	\$0.00
11/21/2013 10:40:24	PM Charge	House Fee		\$50.00	\$50.00
11/21/2013 10:40:29	PM Charge	Off Stage Fee		\$40.00	\$90.00
11/21/2013 10:40:55	PM Payment			\$-50.00	\$40.00
11/21/2013 10:40:55	PM Payment			S•40.D0	\$0.80
11/23/2013 10:26:56	PM Charge	House Fee		\$75.00	\$75,00
11/23/2013 [0:27:09]	PM Charge	Off Stage Fee		\$40.00	\$115.00
11/23/2013 10:27:271	PM Payment			\$-75.00	\$40.00
11/23/2013 10:27:271	PM Payment			\$-5.00	\$35.00
11/24/2013 4:57:12A	M Payment			\$-35,00	00.02
12/2/2013 5:34:42PN	f Charge	Flouse Fee		\$30.00	\$30.00
12/2/2013 5:35:08PM	f Charge	Off Stage Fee		\$40.00	\$70.00
12/2/2013 10:38:33PN	Adjustment	JL.		\$-70.00	\$0,00
12/3/2013 1:34:10AN	1 Adjustment	MNF		\$-80.00	2-80.00
12/16/2013 5;22:47P	of Charge	House Fee		\$30.00	\$-50.00
12/16/2013 5:22:58Pi	vi Charge	Off Stage Fee		\$40,00	\$-10,00
12/16/2013 7:15:55PI	M Adjustment	रिवता		\$-80.00	\$-90.00
1/23/2014 9:15:44PM	Charge	House Fee		\$50,00	\$-40.00
1/29/2014 10:37:10PN	1 Charge	House Fee		\$50.00	\$10,00
1/29/2014 10:37:19PN	f Payment			\$-10.00	\$0.00
1/31/2014 11:00:38PN	f Charge	House Fee		\$75.00	\$75.00
1/31/2014 11:00:55PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee		\$40.00	\$115.00
1/31/2014 11:00:58PM	f Payment			\$-25.00	\$90.00
2/19/2014 9:45:31PM	Charge	House Fee		\$50.00	\$140.00
2/19/2014 9:45:36PM	Payment			\$-\$0.00	\$90.00
2/19/2014 9:45:36PM	Payment			S-30.00	\$60.00
1/1/2015 1:09:52PM	Adjustment	2015MassClearPerJustin		S-60.00	\$0.00
			Total Due	\$0.00	

PLAINTIFF KARINA STRELKOVA

Entertainer Charge Summary

Between

8/28/06 1:00 pm and 8/29/15 12:59 pm

3045619	Victory Jone	? S			
DATE		TYPE	REASON	AMOUNT	Running Total
9/3/2012	12:35:19AM	Charge	House Fee	00.002	\$60.00
9/3/2012	9:01:38PM	Charge	House Fee	S50.00	\$110.00
9/3/2012	9:01:55PM	Adjustment	COMP MON	\$-60.00	\$50.00
9/7/2012	9;29:32PM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$125.00
9/9/2012	12:07:20AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$200.00
9/11/2012	10:21:47PM	Charge	House Fee	\$60,00	\$260.00
9/11/2012	10:22:04PM	Adjustment	ww	\$-30.00	\$230.00
9/11/2012	10:22:15PM	Payment		\$-20.00	\$210.00
9/11/2012	10;22;15PM	Payment		\$-10.00	\$200.00
9/12/2012	11:58:49PM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$260.0D
9/12/2012	11:59:09PM	Adjustment	fri&sat	S-30.00	\$230.00
9/12/2012	11:59:16PM	Payment		\$-30,00	\$200.00
9/13/2012	12:01:21AM	Adjustment	22	\$-200,00	\$0.00
9/15/2012	1:19:31AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
9/15/2012	1:19:37AM	Payment		\$-75.00	\$0.00
9/15/2012	2:00:18AM	Charge	Missed Stage Call	\$25.00	\$25,00
9/15/2012	2:00:20AM	Charge	Missed Stage Call	\$25,00	\$50.00
9/15/2012	2:00:33AM	Adjustment	ERROR	\$-50.00	\$0.00
9/16/2012	2:58:48AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
9/16/2012	2:58:59AM	Payment		\$-75.00	\$0.00
9/18/2012 1	12:01:03AM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	260-00
9/18/2012	12:01:32AM	Adjustment	WEND	S-30.00	\$30.00
9/18/2012 I	12:01:41AM	Payment	•	\$-30.00	\$0.00
9/19/2012	9:50:32PM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$60.00
9/19/2012	9:50:52PM	Adjustment	fri&sat	\$-30,00	\$30.00
9/19/2012	9:50:55PM	Payment		2-30.00	\$0.00
9/22/2012	2:28:34AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
9/22/2012 3	2:28:39AM	Payment		\$-75.00	\$0.00
9/26/2012 5	9:30:22PM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$60,00
9/26/2012 9):30:34PM	Payment		\$-60,00	\$0.00
9/28/2012 3	1:14:34AM	Charge	House Fee	\$50,00	\$50,00
9/28/2012 3	1:14:53AM	Payment		\$-50.00	00.02
9/29/2012 1	1:58:35PM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	575.00
9/29/2012 1	1:58:43PM	Payment		\$-75.00	\$0.00
10/2/2012 2	:54:06AM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$50.00

Entertainer Charge Summary

Between

8/28/06 1:00 pm and 8/29/15 12:59 pm

3045619	Victory Jon	es			
DATE		TYPE	REASON	AMOUNT	Running Total
10/2/2012	2:54:18AM	Payment		\$-50.00	\$0.00
3/23/2013	5:08:13AM	Charge	House Fee	\$30,00	\$30.00
3/23/2013	5:08:24AM	Payment		5-30,00	\$0,00
3/23/2013	11:46:20PM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
3/23/2013	11:46:27PM	Payment		\$-75.00	\$0.00
3/25/2013	2:04:02AM	Charge	House Fee	\$50,00	\$50.00
3/25/2013	2:04:29AM	Adjustment	wkend	\$-25,00	\$25.00
3/25/2013	2:04:37AM	Payment		\$-25.00	20,00
3/30/2013	12:41:51AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
3/30/2013	12:41:54AM	Payment		\$-75.00	\$0.00
3/30/2013	10:31:10AM	Adjustment	Bil sale Mgr Abel	\$-32,00	\$-32,00
3/31/2013	2:58:24AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$43.00
3/31/2013	2:59:07AM	Payment		\$-43.00	\$0,00
4/1/2013 4	:33:48AM	Charge	House Fee	\$30.00	\$30.00
4/1/2013 4	:34:38AM	Adjustment	wkend	\$-15.00	\$15.00
4/1/2013 4	:34:57AM	Payment		\$-15,00	\$0.00
4/3/2013 12	:29:52AM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$60.00
4/3/2013 12	:29:58AM	Adjustment	WV	\$-30.00	\$30,00
4/3/2013 12	:30:08AM	Payment		\$-30.00	\$0.00
4/13/2013	7:15:52AM	Charge	House Fee	\$30.00	\$30.00
4/13/2013 7	7:15:57AM	Payment		\$-30.00	\$0.00
4/14/2013 2	2:41:06AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
4/14/2013 2	:41:11AM	Payment		\$ -75.00	20.02
4/26/2013 6	:35:52AM	Charge	l·louse Fee	\$30.00	\$30.00
4/26/2013 6	:35:55AM	Payment		\$-10.00	\$20.00
4/26/2013 9	:57:52AM	Payment		\$-20.00	\$0.00
4/28/2013 4	:00:21AM	Charge	House Fcc	\$30.00	\$30,00
4/28/2013 4	:00:28AM	Payment		\$-30.00	\$0.00
4/30/2013 4	:43:45AM	Charge	House Fee	\$30.00	\$30,00
4/30/2013 4	:44:19AM	Payment		\$-30.00	\$0.00
5/1/2013 4:1	6:54AM	Charge	House Fee	\$30.00	\$30,00
5/1/2013 4:1	6:57AM	Payment		\$-30,00	\$0.00
5/5/2013 2:1	0:34AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
5/5/2013 2:1	1:09AM	Payment		\$-75.00	\$0.00
5/11/2013 8:	20:44AM	Charge	House Fee	\$30.00	\$30.00

Page 3 of 8

Entertainer Charge Summary Between

8/28/06 1:00 pm and 8/29/15 12:59 pm

3045619	Victory Jon	es			
DATE		TYPE	REASON	AMOUNT	Running Total
5/11/2013	8:20:49AM	Payment		S-30.00	\$0.00
5/18/2013	12:08:33AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
5/18/2013	12:11:29AM	Payment		\$-75.00	\$0.00
5/18/2013	3:48:02PM	Adjustment	bottle sale from 5/17/13	\$-26.00	\$-26.00
5/18/2013	4:09:04PM	Adjustment	bottle sale from 5/17/13	\$-13.00	\$-39.00
5/18/2013	8:55:00PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$11.00
5/18/2013	8:55:14PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$51.00
5/19/2013	8:36:20AM	Adjustment	MGR Jim	\$-50.00	\$1,00
5/23/2013	2:23;38AM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$51.00
5/23/2013	2:23:51AM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$91.00
5/23/2013	2:23:59AM	Payment		\$-39.00	\$52,00
5/23/2013	2:23:59AM	Payment		\$-1.00	\$51.00
5/23/2013	6:22:08AM	Adjustment	per kewan	\$-51,00	\$0.00
5/24/2013	2:54:33PM	Adjustment	bottle sale from 5/22/13	\$-60,00	\$-60.00
5/24/2013	9:43:38PM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$15.00
5/24/2013	9:45:34PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$55.00
5/25/2013	3:50:11AM	Adjustment	JL	\$-55.00	50,00
5/26/2013	3:02:38AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
5/26/2013	3:02:46AM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$115.00
5/26/2013	3:02:50AM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$75.00
5/26/2013	9:13:20PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$125.00
5/26/2013 1	1:38:10PM	Adjustment	1F	\$-125.00	\$0.00
6/1/2013 2:	37:16AM	Charge	l·louse Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
6/1/2013 2:	37:19AM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$115.00
6/1/2013 2:	37:23AM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$75.00
6/1/2013 7:	01:18AM	Adjustment	p	\$-75.00	\$0.00
6/2/2013 3:	24:36AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75,00	\$75.00
6/2/2013 10:	:55:13AM	Adjustment	Bil sale 5/31 Mgr Abel	\$-50.00	\$25.00
6/3/2013 10:	54:56PM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$85,00
6/3/2013 10:	55:48PM	Adjustment	wkend	\$-30.00	\$55.00
6/3/2013 10:	56:03PM	Payment		\$-20,60	\$35.00
6/5/2013 9:5	56:52PM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$95.00
6/5/2013 9:5	57:04PM	Adjustment	wkend	S-30.00	\$65.00
6/6/2013 to:	47;36AM	Adjustment	promo credits	\$-65.00	\$0.00
6/6/2013 8:5	51:16PM	Adjustment	bottle sale from 6/5/13	\$-30,00	\$-30.00

Entertainer Charge Summary Between

8/28/06 1:00 pm and 8/29/15 12:59 pm

3045619	Victory Jon	es			
DATE		TYPE	REASON	AMOUNT	Running Total
6/8/2013	I:10:40AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$45.00
6/8/2013	1:10:43AM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$85.00
6/8/2013	1;10:47AM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$45.00
6/14/2013	10:56:27PM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$120.00
6/14/2013	10:56:52PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$160.00
6/14/2013	10:57:38PM	Payment		\$-15.00	\$145.00
6/14/2013	10:57:38PM	Payment		\$-5.00	\$140.00
6/14/2013	10:57:38PM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$100.00
6/16/2013	3:39:55AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$175,00
6/16/2013	3:40:28AM	Payment		\$-15.00	\$160.00
6/16/2013	3:40:28AM	Payment		\$-60,00	\$100.00
6/17/2013	7:20:40PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$150.00
6/17/2013	7:20:58PM	Adjustment	per Justin	S-50.00	\$100.00
6/17/2013	7:21:05PM	Payment		\$-20.00	\$80.00
6/18/2013	4:27:59AM	Adjustment	JL	\$-80.00	\$0.00
6/23/2013	12:13:56AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75,00	\$75.00
6/23/20[3	12:13:59AM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$115.00
6/23/2013	12:14:10AM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$75.00
6/25/2013	8:30:37PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50,00	\$125,00
6/25/2013	8:31:10PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40,00	\$165.00
6/25/2013	8:31:38PM	Payment		\$-35.00	\$130.00
6/25/2013	M48E;1E:8	Payment		\$-25.00	\$105.00
6/26/2013	10:48:57PM	Charge	Flouse Fee	\$60.00	\$165.00
6/28/2013	1:41:31AM	Charge	House Fee	00,692	\$225.00
6/28/2013	1:41:35AM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$265.00
6/28/2013	1;41:38AM	Payment		\$-15.00	\$250.00
6/28/2013	1:41:38AM	Payment		\$-15.00	\$235.00
6/28/2013	1:41:38AM	Payment		\$-50.00	\$185.00
6/30/2013	1:31:51AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$260.00
7/6/2013 2:	32:01AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$335.00
7/6/2013 2:	32:08AM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$375.00
7/6/2013 2:	32:11 AM	Payment		\$-25.00	\$350.00
7/6/2013 2:	32:11AM	Payment		S-15.00	\$335,00
7/7/2013 12	:16:15AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$410.00
7/7/2013 12	:16:20AM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$450.00

Entertainer Charge Summary Between

3045619 Victory J	ones			
DATE	TYPE	REASON	AMOUNT	Running Total
7/7/2013 12:16:25AM	Payment		\$-15.00	\$435,00
7/7/2013 12:16:25AM	Payment	•	\$-45.00	\$390.00
7/7/2013 1:06:56PM	Adjustment	bil sale mgr Abel	\$-20.00	\$370.00
7/8/2013 10:28:27PM	Charge	House Fee	00,002	\$430,00
7/8/2013 10:28:53PM	Adjustment	<i>\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\</i>	\$-30.00	\$400.00
7/8/2013 10:29:05PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$440.00
7/8/2013 10:29:14PM	Payment		\$-30,00	\$410.00
7/9/2013 2:32:17AM	Adjustment	JL	\$-410.00	\$0.00
7/9/2013 11:11:34PM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$60.00
7/9/2013 11:11:50PM	Adjustment	WW	\$-30.00	\$30.00
7/9/2013 11:11:57PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.08	\$70.00
7/9/2013 11:12:27PM	Payment		\$-30.00	\$40.00
7/9/2013 11:12:27PM	Payment		\$-10,00	\$30.00
7/12/2013 1:45:09AM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$90,00
7/12/2013 1:45:25AM	Adjustment	ww	S-30.00	\$60.00
7/12/2013 1:45:38AM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	S100.00
7/12/2013 1:45:42AM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$60.00
7/13/2013 3:18:49AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$135.00
7/13/2013 3:18:53AM	Charge	Off Stago Fee	\$40.00	\$175.00
7/13/2013 3:19:20AM	Payment		\$-20,00	\$155.00
7/13/2013 4:50:21AM	Adjustment	ો ા	\$-50.00	\$105.00
7/19/2013 2:41:58AM	Charge	House Fee	00.062	\$155.00
7/19/2013 10:07:57AM	Adjustment	bottle sale from 7/18/13	\$-25.00	\$130.00
7/20/2013 12:34:32AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$205.00
7/22/2013 1:17:57AM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$265.00
7/22/2013 1:18:28AM	Payment		\$-30.00	\$235.00
7/22/2013 8:54:40AM	Payment		\$-10.00	\$225.00
7/22/2013 8:54:40AM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$185.00
7/22/2013 8:54:40AM	Payment		\$-50.00	\$135.00
7/22/2013 8:54:40AM	Payment		S-40.00	\$95.00
7/27/2013 2:28:55AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$170.00
7/28/2013 9:21:33PM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$230.00
7/28/2013 9:21:59PM	Payment		\$-35.08	\$195.00
7/28/2013 9:21:59PM	Payment		\$-35.00	\$160.00
8/2/2013 1:58:11AM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$220.00

Entertainer Charge Summary Between

Victory Jo	nes			
	TYPE	REASON	AMOUNT	Running Total
3 1:58:40AM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$260.00
7:16:29AM	Payment		\$-25.00	\$235.00
7:16:29AM	Payment		\$-55.00	\$180.00
2:31:05AM	Adjustment	bottle sale from 8/1/13	\$-33.00	\$147.00
3 4:37:11AM	Charge	House Fee	\$30.00	\$177.00
3 4:37:16AM	Payment		\$-47.00	\$130.00
3 4:37:16AM	Payment		\$-23.00	\$107.00
3 11:15:02PM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$167.00
3 8:27:52AM	Payment		\$-37.00	\$130,00
3 8:27:52AM	Payment		\$-3,00	\$127.00
3 8:27:52AM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$87.00
3 4:41:22AM	Charge	House Fee	\$30.00	\$117.00
3 4:41:27AM	Payment		2•3,00	\$114.00
3 4:41:27AM	Payment		\$-27,00	\$87.00
8:43:05AM	Payment		\$-50,00	\$37.00
3 2:55:29AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$112.00
2:55:36AM	Payment		\$-30.00	\$82.00
2:55:36AM	Payment		\$-7.00	\$75.00
2:55:36AM	Payment		\$-43,00	\$32.00
9:37:52PM	Charge	House Fee	260.00	\$92.00
9:38:06PM	Adjustment	VVY	\$-30.00	\$62.00
9:38:20PM	Payment		\$-2.00	\$60.00
9:38:20PM	Payment		\$-28,00	\$32,00
12:36:58PM	Adjustment	champ credit	\$-60.00	\$-28.00
3:05:25AM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$22.00
3:06:00AM	Adjustment	WW	\$-25.00	\$-3.00
4:34:32AM	Charge	House Fee	\$30,00	\$27.00
4:34:39AM	Adjustment	KM	\$-15.00	\$12.00
4:34:58AM	Payment		\$-12.00	\$0.00
4:03:14AM	Charge	House Fee	\$30.00	\$30,00
4:03:22AM	Adjustment	WY	\$-15.00	\$15.00
4:03:34AM	Payment		\$-15.00	\$0.00
4:44:54AM	Charge	House Fee	\$30,00	\$30.00
4:45:34AM	Payment		\$-30.00	\$0.00
3:06:41AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
	3 1:58:40AM 3 7:16:29AM 3 7:16:29AM 3 4:37:16AM 3 4:37:16AM 3 4:37:16AM 3 11:15:02PM 3 8:27:52AM 3 8:27:52AM 3 8:27:52AM 3 4:41:27AM 4 4:41:27AM 4 2:55:36AM 2:55:36AM 2:55:36AM 9:37:52PM 9:38:06PM 9:38:20PM 9:38:20PM 12:36:58PM 3:05:25AM 3:05:25AM 3:05:25AM 4:34:39AM 4:34:39AM 4:34:39AM 4:03:14AM 4:03:14AM 4:03:22AM 4:03:34AM 4:03:34AM 4:44:54AM	8 1:58:40AM Charge 8 7:16:29AM Payment 8 7:16:29AM Payment 8 7:16:29AM Payment 8 2:31:05AM Adjustment 3 4:37:16AM Payment 3 4:37:16AM Payment 3 4:37:16AM Payment 3 4:37:16AM Payment 3 8:27:52AM Payment 3 8:27:52AM Payment 3 8:27:52AM Payment 3 4:41:27AM Payment 4 4:41:27AM Payment 4 2:55:29AM Charge 4 2:55:36AM Payment 4 2:55:36AM Payment 4 2:55:36AM Payment 4 2:55:36AM Payment 9:38:20PM Payment 9:38:20PM Payment 12:36:58PM Adjustment 4:34:39AM Charge 4:34:39AM Adjustment 4:03:14AM Charge 4:03:24AM Payment 4:03:34AM Payment	TYPE REASON 1:58:40AM Charge Off Stage Fee 7:16:29AM Payment 2:31:05AM Adjustment bottle sale from 8/1/13 4:37:11AM Charge House Fee 3:4:37:16AM Payment 3:11:15:02PM Charge House Fee 3:8:27:52AM Payment 3:8:27:52AM Payment 3:8:27:52AM Payment 3:8:27:52AM Payment 3:4:41:22AM Charge House Fee 3:4:41:27AM Payment 3:4:41:27AM Payment 3:4:41:27AM Payment 4:2:55:36AM Payment 2:55:36AM Payment 2:55:36AM Payment 2:35:36AM Payment 4:34:32AM Charge House Fee 4:34:39AM Adjustment www 4:34:34:32AM Charge House Fee 4:34:39AM Adjustment www 4:34:35AM Payment 4:03:14AM Charge House Fee 4:03:22AM Adjustment www 4:34:58AM Payment 4:03:14AM Charge House Fee 4:45:34AM Payment 4:44:54AM Charge House Fee 4:45:34AM Payment	TYPE REASON AMCUNT

Entertainer Charge Summary Between

3045619	Victory Jon	ಟ			
DATE		TYPE	REASON	AMOUNT	Running Total
8/31/2013	3:06:52AM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$35.00
8/31/2013	8:18:12AM	Payment		\$-35.00	\$0.00
9/3/2013	11:42:35PM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$60.00
9/5/2013	4:39:58AM	Charge	House Fee	\$30.00	\$90.00
9/5/2013	4:40:01AM	Payment		\$-50.00	\$40.00
9/12/2013	1:01:53AM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$100.00
9/12/2013	1:02:15AM	Payment		\$-30.00	\$70.00
9/12/2013	1:02:15AM	Payment		5-20.00	\$50,00
9/12/2013	1:02:15AM	Payment		\$-10.00	\$40.00
9/13/2013	2:25:22AM	Charge	l-louse Fee	\$50.00	\$90.00
9/13/2013	2;25:51AM	Adjustment	ww	S-25.00	\$65,00
9/13/2013	2:26:02AM	Payment		\$-15,00	\$50.00
9/13/2013	2:26:02AM	Payment		\$-50.00	\$0.00
9/15/2013	12:50:52AM	Charge	House Fee	375,00	\$75.00
9/15/2013	4:29:17AM	Payment		\$-75.00	\$0.00
9/20/2013	1:44:49AM	Charge	House Fee	\$60,00	\$60.00
9/20/2013	1;45:56AM	Payment		\$-50.00	\$10.00
9/29/2013	8:41:28PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50,00	\$60.00
9/30/2013	12:16:37AM	Adjustment	JL.	\$-60.00	\$0,00
10/1/2013	8:55:59PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$50.00
10/1/2013	9:48:48PM	Payment		\$-50.00	\$0.00
10/7/2013	9:11:51PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$50.00
10/8/2013	12:56:18AM	Adjustment	JL	\$-50.00	\$0.00
10/9/2013	2:39:39AM	Charge	House Fee	\$60,00	\$60.00
10/9/2013	2:39:51AM	Payment		\$-60.00	\$0.00
10/10/2013	12:34:24AM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$60.00
10/10/2013	12:34:42AM	Payment		\$-60.00	\$0.00
10/12/2013	12:36;21AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
10/14/2013	12:57:11 AM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$135.00
10/14/2013	12:57:24AM	Payment		\$-75.00	\$60.00
10/14/2013	12:57:24AM	Payment		S-15.00	\$45.00
10/17/2013	9:06:16PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$95.00
10/19/2013	2:34:01AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$170.00
10/27/2013	8:13:42AM	Charge	House Fee	\$30.00	\$200.00
10/27/2013	8:13:52AM	Payment		\$-30,00	\$170.00

Page 8 of 8

Russell Road F & B

Entertainer Charge Summary Between

8/28/06 1:00 pm and 8/29/15 12:59 pm

3045619 Victory Jon	iės				
<u>DATE</u>	TYPE	REASON		AMOUNT	Running Total
12/14/2013 G:21:38AM	Charge	House Fee		\$20.00	\$190.00
12/14/2013 6:21:45AM	Payment			\$-50.00	\$140.00
12/14/2013 6:21:45AM	Payment			\$-15.00	\$125.00
12/14/2013 6:21:45AM	Payment			\$-15.00	\$110.00
1/4/2014 4:57:03AM	Charge	House Fee		\$40,00	\$150,00
1/4/2014 4:57:34AM	Payment			\$-60,00	\$90.00
1/4/2014 4:57:34AM	Payment			\$-5.00	\$85.00
1/7/2014 12:10:26AM	Charge	House Fee		\$50.00	\$135.00
1/7/2014 12:10:50AM	Payment			\$-20.00	\$115.00
1/7/2014 12:10:50AM	Payment			\$-15.00	\$100.00
1/7/2014 12:10:50AM	Payment			\$-25.00	\$75.00
1/7/2014 12:10:50AM	Payment			\$-40.00	\$35,00
1/7/2014 4:44:23AM	Adjustment	bet wo		\$-35.00	\$0.00
1/9/2014 12:49:13AM	Churge	House Fee		\$50.00	\$50.00
1/9/2014 12:50:20AM	Payment			\$-50.00	90,00
1/12/2014 4:01:26AM	Charge	House Fee		\$40.00	\$40.00
1/12/2014 4:01:44AM	Payment			\$-40.00	\$0.00
1/12/2014 10:15:24PM	Charge	I·louse Fee		\$50.00	\$50.00
1/12/2014 10:16:02PM	Payment			\$-50.00	\$0.00
1/[4/2014 11:56:43PM	Charge	House Fee		\$50.00	\$50.00
1/14/2014 11:56:51PM	Payment			\$-50.00	30,00
1/23/2014 5:03:33AM	Charge	House Fee		\$30.00	\$30.00
1/1/2015 11:14:40AM	Adjustment	2015MassClearPerJustin		\$-30.00	\$0.00
			Total Due	\$0.00	

PLAINTIFF JACQUELINE FRANKLIN

Russell Road F & B

Entertainer Charge Summary Between

8/28/06 1:00 pm and 8/29/15 12:59 pm

3030817	Sarah				
DATE		TYPE	REASON	AMOUNT	Running Total
10/6/2013	12:59:28AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
10/6/2013	1:04:12AM	Adjustment	comp 1st day	\$-75,00	\$0.00
10/6/2013	10:04:46PM	Charge	House Fee	00.062	\$60,00
10/6/2013	10:05:15PM	Payment		\$-60.00	\$0.00
10/7/2013	10:09:54PM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$60.00
10/7/2013	10:10:13PM	Payment		\$-60,00	\$0.00
10/15/2013	9:46:54PM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$60,00
10/15/2013	9:47:05PM	Payment		S-60.00	\$0.00
10/17/2013	9:27:36PM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$60.00
10/17/2013	9:27:59PM	Payment		\$-60.00	\$0.00
10/18/2013	7:45:12PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$50.00
10/18/2013	7:45:55PM	Payment		\$-50,00	\$0.00
10/19/2013	9:57:08PM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
10/19/2013	9:57:42PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40,00	\$115.00
10/19/2013	9:58:13PM	Payment		\$-75.00	\$40.00
10/19/2013	9:58:13PM	Payment		\$-40,00	\$0.00
10/20/2013	9:19:30PM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$60.00
10/20/2013	9:19:46PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40,00	\$100.00
10/20/2013	9:19:54PM	Adjustment	WY	\$-30.00	\$70.00
10/20/2013	9:20:09PM	Payment		\$-40,00	\$30.00
10/20/2013	9:20:09PM	Payment		\$-30.00	\$0.00
10/21/2013	10:45:11PM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$60.00
10/21/2013	10:45:41PM	Adjustment	VVV	\$-30.00	\$30.00
10/21/2013	10:45:48PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	240.00	\$70.00
10/21/2013	10:45:58PM	Payment		\$-40.00	930,00
10/21/2013	10:45:58PM	Payment		\$-30,00	\$0.00
10/25/2013	8:38:06PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50,00	\$50.00
10/25/2013	8:38:14PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40,00	\$90.00
10/25/2013	8:38:17PM	Payment		\$-50.00	\$40.00
10/25/2013	8:38:17PM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$0.00
10/26/2013	8:55:42PM	Charge	House Fcc	\$50.00	\$50.00
10/26/2013	8:55:44PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40,00	\$90.00
10/26/2013	8:55:46PM	Payment		\$-50,00	\$40.00
10/26/2013	8:55:46PM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$0.00
10/31/2013	9:43:56PM	Charge	House Fee	\$60.00	\$60,00

Page 2 of 11

Russell Road F & B

Entertainer Charge Summary Between

8/28/06 1:00 pm and 8/29/15 12:59 pm

3030817 Sarah				
DATE	TYPE	REASON	AMOUNT	Running Total
10/31/2013 9:44:04PM	Adjustment	ww	\$-30.00	\$30.00
10/31/2013 9:44:08PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40,00	\$70.00
10/31/2013 9:44:19PM	Payment		S-30.00	\$40,00
10/31/2013 9:44:19PM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$0,00
11/1/2013 8:46:39PM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75,00
11/1/2013 8:46:43PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$115.00
11/I/2013 8:46:46PM	Payment	•	\$-75,00	\$40.00
11/1/2013 8:46:46PM	Payment		S-40.00	\$0.00
11/2/2013 9:51:08PM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
11/2/2013 9:51:28PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$115.00
11/2/2013 9:51:30PM	Payment		S-75.00	\$40.00
11/2/2013 9:51:30PM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$0.00
11/5/2013 8:49:45PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$50,00
11/5/2013 8:50:12PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$90.00
11/5/2013 8:51:03PM	Payment		S-40.00	\$50.00
11/5/2013 8:51:03PM	Payment		\$-50.00	\$0.00
11/6/2013 7:37:04PM	Charge	House Fee	\$30.00	\$30.00
11/6/2013 7:37:07PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$70.00
11/6/2013 7:38:01PM	Payment		\$-30,00	\$40,00
11/6/2013 7:38:01PM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$0.00
11/7/2013 10:43:10PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50,00	\$50.00
11/7/2013 10:43:12PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40,00	\$90.00
11/7/2013 10:43:21PM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$50,00
11/7/2013 10:43:21PM	Payment		\$-50.00	00.02
11/8/2013 8:00;49PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50,00	\$50.00
11/8/2013 8:00:54PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$90.00
11/8/2013 8:00;57PM	Payment		\$-50,00	\$40.00
11/8/2013 8:00:57PM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$0.00
11/9/2013 11:24:35PM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
11/9/2013 11:24:37PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$115,00
11/9/2013 11:24:40PM	Payment		S-40.00	\$75.00
11/9/2013 11:24:40PM	Payment		\$-75,00	\$0.00
11/11/2013 10:10:06PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$50,00
11/11/2013 10:10:10PM	Payment		\$-50,00	\$0.00
11/17/2013 7:33:49PM	Charge	House Fee	\$30,00	\$30.00

Page 3 of 11

Russell Road F & B

Entertainer Charge Summary Between

8/28/06 1:00 pm and 8/29/15 12:59 pm

3030817	Sarah				
DATE		TYPE	REASON	AMOUNT	Running Total
11/17/2013	7:33:52PM	Payment		\$-25,00	\$5.00
11/17/2013	9:32:20PM	Payment		\$-5.00	\$0.00
11/19/2013	7:38:05PM	Charge	House Fee	\$30.00	\$30,00
11/19/2013	7:38:58PM	Payment		\$-30.00	\$0.00
11/22/2013	7:51:19PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$50.00
[]/22/2013	7:51:22PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$90.00
11/22/2013	7:51:25PM	Payment		2-40.00	\$50,00
11/22/2013	7:51:25PM	Payment		\$-50.00	00.02
11/23/2013	9:28:54PM	Charge	House Fcc	\$75.00	\$75.00
11/23/2013	9:28:57PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$115.00
11/23/2013	9:29:11PM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$75.00
11/23/2013	9:29:11PM	Payment		\$-75.00	\$0.00
12/2/2013 1	0:26:04PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$50.00
12/2/2013 1	0:26:15PM	Payment		\$-11,00	\$39.00
12/3/2013 2	:10:16AM	Payment		5-39.00	\$0.00
12/3/2013 1	1:51:07PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$50.00
12/3/2013 1	1:51:35PM	Payment		\$-50.00	20.00
12/6/2013 7	:44:33PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$50.00
12/6/2013 7	:44:4SPM	Payment		\$-50.00	\$0.00
12/7/2013 11	:41:16PM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
12/7/2013 11	:41:25PM	Payment		2-45,00	\$30.00
12/12/2013 [1:23:57PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$80.00
12/12/2013 1	1:23:59PM	Payment		\$-20,00	\$60.00
12/12/2013 1	1:23:59PM	Payment		\$-30,00	\$30.00
12/13/2013	7:59:34PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	.880.00
12/13/2013 8	3:01:02PM	Payment		\$-50,00	\$30.00
12/13/2013 8	8:01:02PM	Payment		\$-30.00	\$0.00
12/14/2013 9	2:44:58PM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	S75.00
12/14/2013 9	;44;59PM	Payment		\$-75.00	\$0,00
12/17/2013 1	I:44:27PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$50.00
12/17/2013 1	l:44:34PM	Payment		\$-50.00	90.00
12/18/2013 12	2:44:17AM	Adjustment	went home sick, so we gave her credit	\$-50.00	S-50.00
12/18/2013 7	:36:54PM	Charge	House Fee	\$30.00	\$-20.00
12/19/2013 9	:08:26PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$30.00
12/19/2013 9	:08:42PM	Payment		\$-10.00	\$20.00

Page 4 of 11

Russell Road F & B

Entertainer Charge Summary Between

8/28/06 1:00 pm and 8/29/15 12:59 pm

DATE	3030817 Sarah				
12/21/2013 12:14:50AM	DATE	TYPE	REASON	AMOUNT	Running Total
12/21/2013 12:14:50AM	12/21/2013 12:14:45AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$95.00
12/22/2013 1:06:13AM	12/21/2013 12:14:50AM	Payment		\$-20.00	\$75.00
12/22/2013 1:06:37AM	12/21/2013 12:14:50AM	Payment		S-20.00	\$55.00
12/22/2013 1:06:37AM	12/22/2013 1:06:13AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$130.00
12/22/2013 1:26:09AM	12/22/2013 1:06:37AM	Payment		\$-55.00	\$75.00
12/22/2013 10:00:13PM	12/22/2013 1:06:37AM	Payment		\$-5.00	\$70.00
12/25/2013 8:28:26PM Churge House Fee \$50.00 \$0.00 12/27/2013 12:06:17AM Charge House Fee \$50.00 \$50.00 12/27/2013 12:47:42AM Adjustment adjust \$-50.00 \$0.00 12/27/2013 10:31:56PM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$75.00 12/27/2013 10:32:01PM Payment \$-75.00 \$0.00 12/28/2013 6:36:06AM Adjustment KEWAN \$-200.00 \$-200.00 12/28/2013 6:36:06AM Adjustment KEWAN \$-200.00 \$-200.00 12/2014 9:56:11PM Charge House Fee \$50.00 \$-150.00 13/2014 10:49:16PM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$-75.00 13/2014 10:49:36PM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$-75.00 13/2014 11:99:49AM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$-75.00 13/2014 11:10:30AM Payment \$-40.00 \$-40.00 13/2014 11:10:3AM Payment \$-40.00 \$-40.00 13/2014 11:10:3AM Payment \$-40.00 \$-75.00 13/2014 10:04:31PM Charge House Fee \$50.00 \$-75.00 13/2014 10:04:33PM Payment \$-50.00 \$-75.00 13/2014 10:04:33PM Payment \$-50.00 \$-75.00 13/2014 11:00:433PM Payment \$-75.00 \$-75.00 13/2014 11:00:439PM Payment \$-75.00 \$-75.00 13/2014 11:00:43PM Charge House Fee \$-75.00 \$-75.00 13/2014 11:00:43PM Payment \$-75.00 \$-75.00 13/2014 11:00:43PM Payment \$-75.00 \$-75.00 13/2014 11:00:43PM Charge House Fee \$-75.00 \$-75.00 13/2014 11:00:43PM Charge House Fee \$-75.00 \$-75.00 13/2014 11:00:43PM Payment \$-75.00 \$-75.00 13/2014 11:00:43PM Charge House Fee \$-75.00 \$-75.00 13/2014 11:00:43PM C	12/22/2013 1:26:09AM	Adjustment	Kewan	\$-170.00	\$-100.00
12/27/2013 12:06:17AM	12/22/2013 10:00:13PM	Chergo	House Fee	\$50.00	\$-50.00
12/27/2013 12:47:42AM	12/25/2013 8:28:26PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50,00	\$0,00
12/27/2013 10:31:56PM	12/27/2013 12:06:17AM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$50.00
12/27/2013 10:32:01PM	12/27/2013 12:47:42AM	Adjustment	តថ្ងៃនេះ	\$-50.00	\$0.00
12/28/2013 6:36:06AM	12/27/2013 10:31:56PM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
	12/27/2013 10:32:01PM	Payment		\$-75.00	\$0.00
1/3/2014 10:49:16PM	12/28/2013 6:36:06AM	Adjustment	KEWAN	\$-200,00	\$-200.00
1/3/2014 10:49:36PM Charge Off Stage Fee \$40.00 \$-35.00 1/5/2014 1:09:49AM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$40.00 1/5/2014 1:10:02AM Charge Off Stage Fee \$40.00 \$80.00 1/5/2014 1:10:13AM Payment \$-40.00 \$0.00 1/5/2014 1:10:13AM Payment \$-40.00 \$50.00 1/5/2014 10:14:08PM Charge House Fee \$50.00 \$50.00 1/8/2014 10:14:08PM Charge House Fee \$50.00 \$50.00 1/9/2014 10:04:31PM Charge House Fee \$50.00 \$50.00 1/9/2014 10:04:33PM Payment \$-50.00 \$0.00 1/10/2014 11:00:45PM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$75.00 1/10/2014 11:00:49PM Payment \$-75.00 \$0.00 1/10/2014 12:46:47AM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$75.00 1/12/2014 12:46:47AM <td< td=""><td>I/2/2014 9:56:11PM</td><td>Charge</td><td>House Fee</td><td>\$50,00</td><td>\$-150.00</td></td<>	I/2/2014 9:56:11PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50,00	\$-150.00
1/5/2014 1:09:49AM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$40.00 1/5/2014 1:10:02AM Charge Off Stage Fee \$40.00 \$80.00 1/5/2014 1:10:13AM Payment \$-40.00 \$40.00 1/5/2014 1:10:13AM Payment \$-40.00 \$50.00 1/8/2014 10:14:08PM Charge House Fee \$50.00 \$50.00 1/8/2014 10:14:10PM Payment \$-50.00 \$50.00 \$50.00 1/9/2014 10:04:31PM Charge House Fee \$50.00 \$50.00 1/9/2014 10:04:33PM Payment \$-50.00 \$0.00 1/10/2014 11:00:45PM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$75.00 1/10/2014 11:00:49PM Payment \$-75.00 \$0.00 1/12/2014 12:46:44AM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$75.00 1/18/2014 9:34:07PM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$75.00 1/18/2014 9:34:10PM Charg	1/3/2014 10:49:16PM	Charge	Flouse Fee	\$75.00	\$-75.00
1/5/2014 1:10:02AM Charge Off Stage Fee \$40.00 \$80.00 1/5/2014 1:10:13AM Payment \$40.00 \$40.00 \$40.00 1/5/2014 1:10:13AM Payment \$40.00 \$0.00 1/8/2014 10:14:08PM Charge House Fee \$50.00 \$50.00 1/8/2014 10:14:10PM Payment \$-50.00 \$50.00 1/9/2014 10:04:31PM Charge House Fee \$50.00 \$50.00 1/9/2014 10:04:33PM Payment \$-50.00 \$0.00 1/10/2014 11:00:45PM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$75.00 1/10/2014 11:00:49PM Payment \$-75.00 \$75.00 \$75.00 1/12/2014 12:46:44AM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$75.00 1/18/2014 9:34:07PM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$75.00 1/18/2014 9:34:10PM Charge Off Stage Fee \$40.00 \$115.00 1/18/2014 9:34	1/3/2014 10:49:36PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40,00	\$-35.00
1/5/2014 1:10:13AM Payment \$-40.00 \$40.00 1/5/2014 1:10:13AM Payment \$-40.00 \$0.00 1/8/2014 10:14:08PM Charge House Fec \$50.00 \$50.00 1/8/2014 10:14:10PM Payment \$-50.00 \$50.00 1/9/2014 10:04:31PM Charge House Fee \$50.00 \$50.00 1/9/2014 10:04:33PM Payment \$-50.00 \$0.00 1/10/2014 11:00:45PM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$75.00 1/10/2014 11:00:49PM Payment \$-75.00 \$0.00 1/12/2014 12:46:44AM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$75.00 1/18/2014 9:34:07PM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$75.00 1/18/2014 9:34:10PM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$75.00 1/18/2014 9:34:17PM Payment \$-75.00 \$0.00 1/18/2014 9:34:17PM Payment \$-40.00 \$0.00 <td>1/5/2014 1:09:49AM</td> <td>Charge</td> <td>House Fee</td> <td>\$75.00</td> <td>\$40.00</td>	1/5/2014 1:09:49AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$40.00
1/5/2014 1:10:13AM Payment \$-40.00 \$0.00 1/8/2014 10:14:08PM Charge House Fee \$50.00 \$50.00 1/8/2014 10:14:10PM Payment \$-50.00 \$0.00 1/9/2014 10:04:31PM Charge House Fee \$50.00 \$50.00 1/9/2014 10:04:33PM Payment \$-50.00 \$0.00 1/10/2014 11:00:45PM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$75.00 1/10/2014 11:00:49PM Payment \$-75.00 \$0.00 1/12/2014 12:46:44AM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$75.00 1/12/2014 12:46:47AM Payment \$-75.00 \$0.00 1/18/2014 9:34:07PM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$75.00 1/18/2014 9:34:17PM Payment \$-75.00 \$40.00 \$115.00 1/18/2014 9:34:17PM Payment \$-40.00 \$0.00 1/19/2014 10:07:17PM Charge House Fee \$50.00	1/5/2014 1:10:02AM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$80.00
1/8/2014 10:14:08PM Charge House Fee \$50.00 \$50.00 1/8/2014 10:14:10PM Payment \$-50.00 \$0.00 1/9/2014 10:04:31PM Charge House Fee \$50.00 \$50.00 1/9/2014 10:04:33PM Payment \$-50.00 \$0.00 1/10/2014 11:00:45PM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$75.00 1/10/2014 11:00:49PM Payment \$-75.00 \$0.00 1/12/2014 12:46:44AM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$75.00 1/12/2014 12:46:47AM Payment \$-75.00 \$0.00 1/18/2014 9:34:07PM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$75.00 1/18/2014 9:34:10PM Charge Off Stage Fee \$40.00 \$115.00 1/18/2014 9:34:17PM Payment \$-40.00 \$0.00 1/19/2014 10:07:17PM Charge House Fee \$50.00 \$50.00	1/5/2014 1:10:13AM	Payment		S-40.00	\$40.00
1/8/2014 16:14:10PM Payment \$-50.00 \$0.00 1/9/2014 10:04:31PM Charge House Fee \$50.00 \$50.00 1/9/2014 10:04:33PM Payment \$-50.00 \$0.00 1/10/2014 11:00:45PM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$75.00 1/10/2014 11:00:49PM Payment \$-75.00 \$0.00 1/12/2014 12:46:44AM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$75.00 1/12/2014 12:46:47AM Payment \$-75.00 \$0.00 1/18/2014 9:34:07PM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$75.00 1/18/2014 9:34:10PM Charge Off Stage Fee \$40.00 \$115.00 1/18/2014 9:34:17PM Payment \$-40.00 \$0.00 1/19/2014 10:07:17PM Charge House Fee \$50.00 \$50.00	1/5/2014 1:10:13AM	Payment		\$-40.00	S0.00
1/9/2014 10:04:31PM Charge House Fee \$50.00 \$50.00 1/9/2014 10:04:33PM Payment \$-50,00 \$0.00 1/10/2014 11:00:45PM Charge House Fee \$75,00 \$75,00 1/10/2014 11:00:49PM Payment \$-75,00 \$0.00 1/12/2014 12:46:44AM Charge House Fee \$75,00 \$75,00 1/12/2014 12:46:47AM Payment \$-75,00 \$0.00 1/18/2014 9:34:07PM Charge House Fee \$75,00 \$75,00 1/18/2014 9:34:10PM Charge Off Stage Fee \$40.00 \$115.00 1/18/2014 9:34:17PM Payment \$-40.00 \$0.00 1/19/2014 10:07:17PM Charge House Fee \$50.00 \$50.00	I/8/2014 10:14:08PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$50.00
1/9/2014 10:04:33PM Payment \$-50.00 \$0.00 1/10/2014 11:00:45PM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$75.00 1/10/2014 11:00:49PM Payment \$-75.00 \$0.00 1/12/2014 12:46:44AM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$75.00 1/12/2014 12:46:47AM Payment \$-75.00 \$0.00 1/18/2014 9:34:10PM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$75.00 1/18/2014 9:34:10PM Charge Off Stage Fee \$40.00 \$115.00 1/18/2014 9:34:17PM Payment \$-75.00 \$40.00 1/18/2014 9:34:17PM Payment \$-40.00 \$0.00 1/19/2014 10:07:17PM Charge House Fee \$50.00 \$50.00	1/8/2014 10:14:10PM	Payment		\$-50.00	\$0.00
1/10/2014 11:00:45PM Charge House Fee \$75,00 \$75,00 1/10/2014 11:00:49PM Payment \$-75,00 \$0,00 1/12/2014 12:46:44AM Charge House Fee \$75,00 \$75,00 1/12/2014 12:46:47AM Payment \$-75,00 \$0.00 1/18/2014 9:34:07PM Charge House Fee \$75,00 \$75,00 1/18/2014 9:34:10PM Charge Off Stage Fee \$40.00 \$115,00 1/18/2014 9:34:17PM Payment \$-75,00 \$40.00 1/18/2014 9:34:17PM Payment \$-40.00 \$0.00 1/19/2014 10:07:17PM Charge House Fee \$50.00 \$50.00	1/9/2014 10:04:31PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$50.00
1/10/2014 11:00:49PM Payment \$-75.00 \$0.00 1/12/2014 12:46:44AM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$75.00 1/12/2014 12:46:47AM Payment \$-75.00 \$0.00 1/18/2014 9:34:07PM Charge House Fee \$75.00 \$75.00 1/18/2014 9:34:10PM Charge Off Stage Fee \$40.00 \$115.00 1/18/2014 9:34:17PM Payment \$-75.00 \$40.00 1/18/2014 9:34:17PM Payment \$-40.00 \$0.00 1/19/2014 10:07:17PM Charge House Fee \$50.00 \$50.00	1/9/2014 10:04:33PM	Payment		\$-50.00	\$0.00
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1/19/2014 10:07:24PM Payment S-50.00 \$0.00		Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$50.00
	I/19/2014 10:07:24PM	Payment		\$-50.00	\$0.00

Entertainer Charge Summary

Between

8/28/06 1:00 pm and 8/29/15 12:59 pm

3030817	Sarah				
DATE		TYPE	REASON	AMOUNT	Running Total
1/21/2014	9:06:07PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$50.00
1/21/2014	9:06:15PM	Payment		\$-50,00	\$0.00
1/22/2014	10:52:16PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$50.00
1/22/2014	10:52:19PM	Payment		\$-50,00	\$0.00
1/24/2014	12:03:46AM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$50.00
1/24/2014	12:03:54AM	Payment		\$-50.00	\$0.00
1/24/2014	9:56:43PM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
1/24/2014	9:57:08PM	Payment		S-75.00	\$0.00
1/25/2014	10:26:10PM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
1/25/2014	10;26:12PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$115.00
1/25/2014	10:26:15PM	Payment		\$-75,00	\$40.00
1/25/2014	10:26:15PM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$0.00
2/6/2014 1	0:12:36PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50,00	\$50,00
2/6/2014 1	0:13:29PM	Payment		S-25.00	\$25.00
2/7/2014 1	:41:47AM	Payment		\$-25.00	\$0.00
2/8/2014 10	0:02:03PM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
2/8/2014 1	0:02:09PM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$115.00
2/8/2014 10	0:02:52PM	Payment		\$-75,00	\$40.00
2/8/2014 10):02:52PM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$0.00
2/9/2014 7	:03:35AM	Adjustment	promo	\$-230.00	S-230.00
2/13/2014	10:11:15PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	00.081-2
2/15/2014	1:48:09AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$-105.00
2/15/2014	1:48:12AM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$-65.00
2/16/2014	2:23;56AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$10.00
2/16/2014	2:24:10AM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$50.00
2/16/2014	2:24:15AM	Payment		\$-40.00	\$10.00
2/16/2014	2:24:15AM	Payment		\$-10,00	SO.0D
2/18/2014	7:46:44PM	Charge	House Fee	\$30.00	\$30.00
2/18/2014	7:46:54PM	Payment		\$-30.00	\$0.00
2/20/2014 I	1:43:31PM	Charge	House Fee	\$50.00	\$50.00
2/20/2014 I	1:43:42PM	Payment		\$-50,00	00.02
2/22/2014 1	2:08:19AM	Charge	House Fee	\$75.00	\$75.00
2/22/2014 1:	2:08:21AM	Charge	Off Stage Fee	\$40.00	\$115.00
2/22/2014 13	2:08:24AM	Payment		\$-40,00	\$75.00
2/22/2014 12	2:08:24AM	Payment		\$-75.00	\$0.00

From: P Page: 4/8 Date: 11/7/2014 2:09:04 PM **Russell Road F & B**

Lage 1 of 1

Entertainer Login By Date .

Between

Saturday, December 7, 2013 1:00 pm and Saturday, November 8, 2014 12:59 pm

Stage Name	Name	Ent ID	Login Time	Logout Time	Time Worked
Amber-Rose	Ashleigh Park	3063054	6/12/14 1:34 am	6/12/14 5:07 am	3,55
Amber-Rose	Asitleigh Park	3063054	6/13/14 7:55 pm	6/14/14 3:45 am	7.83
Amber-Rose	Ashleigh Park	3063054	6/15/14 7:34 рт	6/16/14 6:01 am	10.45
Amber-Rose	Ashleigh Park	3063034	6/17/14 7:52 pm	6/18/14 2:58 am	7.10
Amber-Rose	Ashleigh Purk	· 3063054	6/19/14 7:53 pm	6/20/14 4:36 am	8.68
Amber-Rose	Ashleigh Vark	3063054	6/23/14 7:54 pm	6/24/14 9;19 am	13,42
Amber-Rose	Ashleigh Park	3063054	6/25/14 1:30 am	6/25/14 4:15 aro	2.75
Amber-Rose	Ashielgh Park	3063054	6/25/14 7:55 pm	6/26/14 1:09 am	5.23
Amber-Rose	Ashleigh Park	3063054 .	6/26/14 8:01 pm	6/27/14 7:51 am	11.83
. Amber-Rose	Asideigii Park	3063054	6/30/14 7:54 pm	7/1/14 4:18 am	8.40
Amber-Rose	Ashleigh Park	3063054	9/29/14 8:57 pm	9/30/14 3:28 स्ता	6.52
Amber-Rose	Ashleigh Park	3063054	10/4/14 1:17 am	10/4/14 7:36 am	6.32

Total Logins: 12

Total Ents.: 1

Total Time 92.08

PLAINTIFF ASHLEIGH PARK

8/29/2015

Russell Road F & B

Page 1 of 1

Entertainer Charge Summary Between

8/28/06 1:00 pm and 8/29/15 12:59 pm

3063054	Amber-Rose					
<u>DATE</u>		TYPE	REASON		AMOUNT	Running Total
6/12/2014	1:34:30AM	Charge	House Fee		\$50,00	\$50.00
6/12/2014	9:42:46AM	Adjustment	first night		S-50.00	\$0.00
6/13/2014	7:55:5SPM	Charge	House Fee		\$50.00	\$50.00
6/13/2014	7:56:29PM	Payment			\$-50.00	\$0.00
6/25/2014	1:30:06AM	Charge	House Fee		\$50.00	\$50,00
6/25/2014	1:30:20AM	Payment			\$-50.00	\$0.00
9/29/2014	8:57:09PM	Charge	House Fee		\$50.00	\$50.00
9/29/2014	8:57:22PM	Payment			\$-50.00	00.02
10/4/2014	1:17:23AM	Charge	House Fee		\$75.00	\$75.00
10/4/2014	1:17:32AM	Payment			\$-75.00	\$0.02
				Total Due	S0.00	

EXHIBIT 12

Entertainers Agreement

THIS ENTERTAINMENT AGREEMENT is made and entered into on the date noted on page five (5) of this document, by and between The Crazy Horse III, and the ENTERTAINER below designated and as signatory to this agreement (herein referred to as "Entertainer")

WITNESSETH

WHEREAS, The Crazy Horse III is engaged in business in the County of Clark, State of Nevada;

WHEREAS, Entertainer desired to utilize the facilities of The Crazy Horse III for the purpose(s) of providing for Entertainer's benefit lawful entertainment for persons who are present at The Crazy Horse III facility: and

WHEREAS, The Crazy Horse III agrees to permit to perform Entertainer's act(s) at The Crazy Horse III facility on the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth:

1. LEGAL RELATIONSHIP. The parties intend that the relationship created hereunder will be only that of The Crazy Horse III and Entertainer and not only any other legal relationship of any type or kind. It has been represented, and Entertainer agrees and acknowledges, that The Crazy Horse III is only providing the use of it's facilities to enable Entertainer a location for the performance of Entertainer's act(s). Entertainer acknowledges and agrees that he or she is not an employee or agent of the Crazy Horse III and is not entitled to receive by law or by terms of this agreement any of the benefits or privileges which The Crazy Horse III of Las Vegas may otherwise provide for employees or agents of The Crazy Horse III.

2. NON-EXCLUSIVITY. Entertainer acknowledges that The Crazy Horse III expressly reserves the right to engage and schedule other Entertainers who may also perform his or her act(s) on the same day(s) as Entertainer performs. Similarly, The Crazy Horse III acknowledges that Entertainer may perform at other establishments at any time Entertainer is not scheduled to perform at The Crazy Horse III.

3. LIABILITIES AND RISKS. Entertainer acknowledges, agrees and understands, and so states, that the act(s) to be performed by Entertainer under this agreement shall be performed entirely at Entertainer's risk. Entertainer acknowledges and agrees that Entertainer assumes, without exception, all responsibility and costs for all consequences and/or damages resulting from the act(s) performed by Entertainer under this agreement at the business address of The Crazy Horse III. Further, Entertainer is under a continuing obligation to hold The Crazy Horse III entirely harmless from any and all obligations and/or damages resulting from or caused by Entertainer, the Emertainer assumes all responsibility and cost(s) for the providing of costumes and/or clothing and for the operation of all equipment appearance or devices used by the Entertainer in the performance of his or her act(s).

4. DURATION. The parties understand and agree that this agreement is made effective as of the first day Entertainer performs at The Crazy Horse III facility, even if prior to the execution of this agreement, and all rights and liabilities account hereunder shall be effective as of that date. This agreement, and all rights and liabilities account hereunder shall be effective as of that date. This agreement shall remain in force for a period of one (1)

week only, but shall be automatically renewed for successive seven (7) day terms unless either party communicates, verbally or in writing, with or without cause, to the other party that termination is requested, and, in such event termination of this agreement shall be effective immediately up the date such notice is receives. Upon execution of this

agreement(s), which cover the subject matter herein. . .

5. DUTY OF LEGAL PERFORMANCES. Entertainer agrees not to misrepresent any service of The Crazy Horse III; not to knowingly make any false or mislending statement to anyone. Entertainer acknowledges that said entertainer is aware that "Solicitation or the Act of Solicitation" is a crime. That any form of solicitation or prostitution either initiated by the Entertainer, the customer, or any person whosoever constitutes a crime. That these actions EXCEPTION WHAT SUEVAR WAS the State and the County of Clark, and it's of the facilities of The Crezy Horse III. Entertainer agrees to comply in all respects with the applicable laws, rules and regulations of the United State 4s, the State of Nevada and the County of Clark in order to protect the name, liability, and good public reputation of The Crazy Horse III. Except, as expressly set forth above, The Crazy Horse III shall have no right or authority to determine the nature of the Entertainer's performance, all artistic aspects of the performance to be at the sole discretion of the Entertainer.

A RIGHT OF MONITORING AND INSPECTION. The Crazy Horse III reserves the right 7. UTILIZATION OF THE CRAZY HORSE III OF LAS VEGAS FACILITIES. Entertainer will pay The Crazy Horse III a fee to be determined by The Crazy Horse III as compensation to The Crazy Horse III for Entertainer's use of any and all facilities of The Crazy Horse III utilized by Entertainer during performance of Entertainer's act(s) pursuant Jane Bridge

to this agreement.

8. INDEMNITIES AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK. Entertainer hereby releases holds harmless and indemnities The Crazy Horse III from and against any and all liabilities, cost, domage and expense and afformer's fees resulting from or attributable to any and all acts or omissions of acts of any type of nature by Entertainer hereunder while performing pursuant to this agreement. Further, Entertainer assumes all risk of damages to his or her person and equipment and any other person(s) that result or may result to Entertainer or any other part. This obligation by Entertainer regardless of when damages occur or claims for said damages are made.

9. BINDING EFFECT. This agreement shall be binding upon and shall insure to the benefit of the parties and their respective spouses, heirs, permitted assigns, successors, representatives and agents. This agreement shall constitute the only binding agreement between the parties, and all prior and contemporaheous verbal and or written agreements, correspondence and conversations shall be void.

10. PRIOR EXPERIENCE. Since the ability and quality of the act(s) performed by Entertainer is essential to the economic success of The Crazy Horse III, Entertainer covenants and warrant that he or she is an experienced entertainer who has performed successfully at other entertainment facilities.

11. ASSIGNMENT PROHIBITED. This agreement is personal to each of the parties hereto, and Entertainer may not assign or delegate any of his or her rights of obligations hereunder

without first obtaining the prior written consent of The Crazy Horse III.

12. AMMENDMENTS. No amendments or additions to this agreement shall be binding unless

in writing and signed by each of the parties hereto.

13. NOTICES. Any written notice required or permitted to be given hereunder shall be sufficient if in writing and if said notice(s) is sent by first class mail, postage prepaid, to . Entertainers last known mailing address or to The Crazy Horse III principal office as set forth below, or pursuant to any other notice requirement as set forth in this agreement.

14. RECEIPT OF COPY. The Crazy Horse III and Entertainer each hereby acknowledge that, concurrently with the execution of this agreement, a copy of the same has been received.

15. GOVERNING LAW. Inasmuch as the parties in the Sate of Nevada execute this agreement, and all services are to be performed in the State of Nevada, it is hereby agreed that any and all legal controversies hereunder shall be governed by and constructed in accordance with the laws of the State of Nevada.

NOTICE

THIS IS TO INFORM YOU THAT THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT INCLUDE STATE INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE COVERAGE OR ANY OTHER BENEFITS OR PRIVATE INSURANCE WHATSOEVER.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this agreement.

ENTERTAINER

SIGNATURE:

ADRESS, CYTY, STATE AND ZIP:

NAWE:

TEID-STAZY TOREF III.
W RUSSELL ROAD
. LAS YEGAS, NV 89118

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Release of Liability

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The Crazy Horse III 3525 W Russell Rd. Las Vegas, NV 89118

The Crazy Horse III Gentleman's Club

Entertainer Guidelines

In order to protect our license to serve alcohol and to conduct business as an entertainer venue it is critically important to follow the guidelines below. It is everyone's responsibility to ensure that our privilege to operate and earn our income is safeguarded. Any entertainer, bartender, server, valet, host, hostess, showgirl, manager, etc. that jeopardizes this privilege by committing or allowing the commission of an interaction of the below guidelines will be asked of our team and hospitality professionals.

GUIDELINES AND VIOLATIONS:

I. LEWD AND LASCIVIOUS BEHAVIOR

This definition varies from one court to the next, but refers to the manner in which the entertainer's interact with the guests of the club. It is your responsibility to learn what is permissible and what is not, however, as a general guideline,

DO NOT

Do Not touch your breasts, nipples, buttocks or central area. This may be construed as a lewd and lastivious act as well as potentially an act of prostitution.

Do Not let the guest touch your breasts; nipples, buttock or genital areas. This may be construed as a lewd and lascivious act as well an act of prostitution.

Do Not pull your T- strap. You can adjust it, but you cannot pull on it to expose anything. Showing of pubic hair or your genitalia is illegal.

Do Not place anything in your mouth in a manner which could be described as simulated oral sex.

Do Not permit guests to place fips anywhere except in the side of your T- strap. * Reminder: hold out your T- strap on the side while holding down the front of your T- strap. Never allow the guest to pull out your T- strap to tip for any reason. Never allow the guests hand to touch you while tipping.

Do Not touch the guests anywhere below the shoulders and only use the guests shoulders to keep your distance.

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Always keep at least one (1) of your feet on the floor at all times.

Do Not let anyone (male or female) touch you in a sexual way at any time.

NO GRINDING

Do Not have any contact at anytime and for any reason between yourself and another entertainer or guest of the club, whereby there is contact between either, your or their anatomically sexual areas. In other words, your breast may never touch any part of a guest's body. Your knee may not come in contact with a guest's genital area. This includes body slides.

Do Not simulate any sex act. .

Do Not dance together with another girl in a sexually graphic manner. For example, do not put your head in another entertainer's las area as though you are performing cumullingus. This is strictly prohibited and illegal.

II. PROSTITUTION

Prostitution is defines as any <u>SEXUAL ACT</u> performed for any <u>VALUABLE CONSIDERATION</u> (a valuable consideration may be money, drugs, a car, trip, etc.). If a guest is allowed to touch your buttocks during a dance you may be arrested for prostitution. Rubbing your buttocks does qualify as a sexual act and you are being paid for this act, valuable consideration, hence potential for prostitution charge.

UL SOLICITAION OF PROSTITUTION

Solicitation of prostitution is defines as <u>OPFERING</u> a sexual act for any valuable consideration. Remember, INTENT is not relevant. It does not righter that you did not intend to actually commit an act of prostitution in order to be charged and convicted of the crime.

IV. ASSIGNATION OF PROSTITUTION

This is the <u>PROMISE OR AGREEMENT</u> of meeting someone at a later time to perform a sexual act for valuable consideration, again, regardless of intent to actually meet the individual(s).

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V. ALLOWING NARCOTTC USE BY PATRON

Please understand that the club may lose its liquor license for allowing or for not policing narcotic use by patrons of the club. This includes allowing patrons to arrange for transaction of controlled substances on or off premises, or to knowingly allow patrons or entertainers to engage in conversations about the subject (of narcotics). Please, immediately advise the manager on duty of the suspicion of these transactions.

USE POSSESION, OR BEING UNDER THE INTEUENCE OF A NARCOTIC OR COMPARABLE SUBSTANCES

You may not be under the influences of, possess, distribute, dispense or use any controlled substance on your way to the club, in the club or on company premises (which includes, but is not limited to, the parking lot and the surrounding buildings whether you are dancing that shift or not).

PRESCRIPTION DRUGS

If you are taking prescription medication and you must take it at work, you must inform the club manager upon arrival at the club.

Anyone who is using prescription or over the counter-medication may bring such medication to work with them if the medications are in the original container and the container is clearly labeled as to the contents, Prescription and over the counter-medication must not be mixed together. Each medication must be in its original container. Remember: use of medication by anyone other than the person it was prescribed for is illegal.

VI. RUDENESS TO ANY GUEST.

If a problem arises, it is your responsibility to notify the manager on duty immediately. We expect the entertainers and the staff to treat our guests with respect and courtesy.

Therefore, we can expect the same treatment from our guests. However, should a problem arise, it must be reported to a manager, At no time will anyone attempt to deal with a disorderly or rude guest on their own.

DISHONESTY

Thefi of money or property from the company, the guests, the fellow entertainers or employees is strictly prohibited. This includes the giving away of merchants without prior consent of management, taking money off of the guest's table, or the overcharging of a guest.

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FIGHTING

Fighting or willful acts that may result in injury to others is strictly prohibited (inside the club, on company premises, or on company business). Likewise, harassment arguing, or fighting among the staff is also prohibited.

No guns, firearms, or any other weapons are permitted on any company property, at anytime and for any reason. It is everybody's responsibility to enforce this policy throughout the club. If you have any knowledge or suspect that an individual possesses a firearm, please inform management immediately. Some may tell you that they are licensed to carry a firearm, or that they are law enforcement, nevertheless, they may not drink alcohol and carry a firearm. Please note that everyone is on notice and to always fully cooperate with any Law Enforcement Agency.

VII. HUSTLING (VILATION) DEFINITIONS .

 To dance for a guest without asking him/her if he would like you to dance or fail to inform him/her that each dance is for a \$20,00 fee prior to dancing.

2. To tell a guest that he owes you for more than the set fee's for each dance or that you performed more dances than you did.

3. To charge a fee anytime other than a dance charge, etc. Such as "We have to pay the Champagne Host \$20.00 to leave us alone".

4. To insist or imply that a guest must tip you or another entertainer or employee.

5. To insist a guest must pay for any service or product other than those which are clearly authorized by the club.

When [performing as a Crazy Horse III Entertainer, you will be expected to conduct yourself in a professional, mature manner at all times.

You sincere courtesy friendliness and businesslike attitude will create the type of positive atmosphere in which our guests can relax and enjoy thomselves and that will make them want to return again and again. We should cooperate together as a TEAM to achieve our individual goals.

Your performance is not over until you've personally thanked everyone, invited them back, and said goodbye. Intercept your guests when they are leaving, try not to let anybody you've danced for get out the door without a final thank you and smile.

Your entertainment should have been attentive and intelligent, polished, polite, watchful, prompt, efficient, thoughtful, devoted, sophisticated, friendly, and helpful.

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If you were gracious, personable, adaptable, diplomatic, taciful, cheerful, courteous, sensitive, considerate, and poised then you will get and be able to keep "regular" guests forever.

VIP

When going into VIP areas it is mandatory that you discuss with the guest IN ADVANCE. If your guest has agreed to an hourly rate then the VIP host must be informed of the agreed upon rate IN ADVANCE. Hustling guests by not setting the rate IN ADVANCE will not be tolerated and will result in your termination.

Entertaining guests by talking to them and making them feel comfortable is every bit important as entertaining them by dancing for them. A well rounded entertainer stimulates a guests mind as well as his or her senses. This way you establish a relationship with the guest that keeps him from feeling hustled and makes him want to come back.

#### NON DISCLOSURE

Is an important house policy. At no time are you permitted to disclose any personal information regarding any employee or entertainer to a guest. If a guests asks a specific question, such as , "Is she married?" or "Where does she live?" you should always "play stupid". The appropriate answer would be "I don't know". Disclosing personal information is grounds for immediate termination and other serious ramifications such as a personal lawsuit.

INIT	IAL

#### THE CRAZY HORSE III ENTERTAINER RULES

- Make your stages... Do not be late. Whit for your replacement before leaving the stage. You
  must go down to G- string on stage after first song and leave it off for every song after that.
- 2. The only ways that you can miss your stage are:
- a. if you are in the VIP room. You WILL get called off stage. Alert a Floor Host or Manager if you hear your name being called.
- b. If you pay to go off stage.
  - 3. Hose fees are to be paid before your shift starts. .
  - 4. All entertainers must show their Non-Gaming Sheriff's card when they work.
  - 5. All entertainers must sign in and out.
  - 6. NO GUM. If you chew gum and stick it under the table or on the floor you will be terminated.
  - 7. No cell phones or pagers.
  - 8. Dress code: . . .
- a. Your butt must be covered.
- b. Large tattoos must be covered.
- 9. Drinking by the entertainers is allowed. Being drunk is not. Pace yourself.
- 10. Please do not turn down a drink; it does not have to be alcohol. Order something-water. Never discourage bottle sales or you will be terminated.
- 11. Do not walk around with a cigarette or cell phone.
- 12. When going into the VIP Room, always check in with a Floor Host or Manager. No entertainer may enter VIP without a host escorting you.
- 13. Hustling will not be tolerated, all charges must be legidmade. Do not the tabs on dances. Get paid after every song to avoid confusion.
- 14. Customer service is our top priority. All interaction with guests must be friendly and positive, Rudeness is acceptable. If a guest is rude, be polite and excuse yourself, let a manger know. The manager will handle it for you.
- 15. Booths on the main floor all have minimums. Do not seat guests yourself.
- 16. Dance dollars can be redeemed for each at the front desk: There is a 10% redemption fee.

  Redemption fee and internal club policies are not to be discussed with guests. DO NOT ask guests to reimburse you for the 10% redemption fee.
- 17. No glitter and no oil.
- 18. No smoking in the dressing room or in VIP reception.
- 19. No drinking glasses in the dressing room.
- 20. Never be rude or disrespectful to any staff member.
- 21. If solicited for any kind of sexual act, always say NO. Do not jokingly say yes. Inform a manager immediately.
- 22. Do not complain about club or employees in front of guests. Be supportive of staff at all times. If you have complaints find a manager.
- 23. Respect the instructions of the Floor Hosts. Especially when they correct your dancing. Non-compliance may lead to suspension or termination of your contract.
- 24. DO NOT ever leave the club in a customer's vehicle. DO NOT follow a customer off the property. DO NOT ever meet a customer off the premises. You will be terminated. If your boyfriend or girlfriend is to pick you up be sure to alert VALET and Backdoor personnel of your shift.

NITIAL:	PRICING
GUESTS	
m . Mt	The same of the same of the same
صلحه ماه کورو سفید اکات بروج د یو	cal Driver's License/Identification Card - Free
Out of State: Men and Won	nan - \$30.00 if they arrive by taxi or limo
	ENTERTAINMENT
main floor	
# 1 dames/gong \$20.00	
1 lap dance/song \$20.00	
•	
VIP:	
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3 dances for \$100.00 * One drink minimum	
· Othe differ properties	
•	
VIP BOOTHS-	4 HOUR
30 minutes/ entertainer \$20	nn 00
*One drink minimum	10.00
Olfe attitutation	
•	and the second of the second o
VIP BOOTHS-	1 HOUR
1 hour/entertainer \$400:00	
* 1 drink(s) per hour	
M. managraphy St. am m. 1	
VIP SUITES -	1 FOUR
ATL SOTTES	THOOK
1 hour/entertainer \$500.00 Guest MUST purchase a b	ottle (Liquor, Wine, or Champagne) or \$300.00 drink tab
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RR0054 316

INITIAL


## EXHIBIT 13

#### In The Matter Of:

FRANKLIN v. RUSSELL ROAD FOOD & BEVERAGE

MICHAELA DEVINE
January 4, 2017

Lawyer Solutions Group 321 S. Casino Center Blvd, Suite 180 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101



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1
                           DISTRICT COURT
 2
                        CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
 3
 4
 5
     JACQUELINE FRANKLIN,
     ASHLEIGH PARK, LILY SHEPHERD, )
     STACIE ALLEN, MICHAELA
 6
     DIVINE, VERONICA VAN WOODSEN, )
 7
     SAMANTHA JONES, KARINA
     STRELKOVA, LASHONDA, STEWART, )
                                       Case No.
 8
     DANIELLE LAMAR, and DIRUBIN
                                       A-14-709372
     TAMAYO, individually, and on
 9
     behalf of a class of
     similarly situated
     individuals,
10
11
                    Plaintiffs,
12
          vs.
13
    RUSSELL ROAD FOOD AND
     BEVERAGE, LLC, a Nevada
14
     limited Liability company
15
16
17
                  DEPOSITION OF MICHAELA DEVINE
18
               Taken on Wednesday, January 4, 2017
                       At 9:46 o'clock a.m.
19
                    At 630 South Fourth Street
20
21
                        Las Vegas, Nevada
22
23
24
25
    Reported by: Helen M. Zamba, CCR #439
```

```
1
      (d/b/a CRAZY HORSE III
      GENTLEMAN'S CLUB), DOE CLUB
OWNER, I-X, ROE CLUB OWNER,
 2
      I-X, and ROE EMPLOYER, I-X,
 3
                          Defendants.
 4
      AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS
 5
 6
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1	A. (Witness nodding head.) Okay.
2	Q. Do you have a reason to believe this is
3	inaccurate?
4	A. No.
5	Q. Can you show me on this on these two
6	pages, where it would reflect an early-out fee?
7	A. (Witness reading.) It doesn't have any
8	early-out fees. That's probably because maybe it
9	wasn't six hours, maybe it was four.
10	Because on all of that paperwork, it says
11	four. And I would not pay an early-out fee.
12	Q. When you say all of the paperwork, it says
13	four, what are you referring to?
14	A. My entertainer log log-in. It says at
15	least four hours is what I worked.
16	Q. Okay. Let me just try and clarify what I
17	think you're saying.
18	A. Uh-huh.
19	Q. So you you believe that the minimum
20	required hours might have been four instead of six?
21	A. Yes.
22	MS. CALVERT: And I'll just do the objection.
23	Misstates. Sorry.
24	THE WITNESS: Uh-huh.
25	MS. CALVERT: You can

1	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
2	STATE OF NEVADA ) SS:
3	COUNTY OF CLARK )
4	I, Helen M. Zamba, a Certified Court Reporter and Notary Public for the County of Clark, State of
5	Nevada, do hereby certify:
6	That I reported the taking of the deposition of the witness, Michaela Devine, commencing on
7	Wednesday, January 4, 2017, at 9:46 o'clock a.m.
8	That prior to being examined, the witness was by me duly sworn to testify to the truth.
9	That the foregoing transcript is a complete,
10	true and accurate transcription of the stenographic notes of the testimony taken by me in the matter
11	entitled herein to the best of my knowledge, skill and ability.
12	
13	That prior to the completion of the proceedings, the reading and signing of the transcript was not requested by the witness or a party.
14	
15	I further certify that I am not a relative or employee of an attorney or counsel of any of the
16	parties, nor a relative or employee of an attorney or counsel involved in said action, nor a person
17	financially interested in the action.
18	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand in my office in the County of Clark, State of Nevada, this 23RD day of February, 2017.
19	,,
20	
21	, ,
22	/s/ Helen M. Zamba Helen M. Zamba, CCR #439
23	
24	
25	

#### **ELECTRONICALLY SERVED** 6/26/2017 2:31 PM MTN 1 GREGORY J. KAMER, ESQ. 2 Nevada Bar No. 0270 KAITLIN H. ZIEGLER, ESO. 3 Nevada Bar No. 013625 KAMER ZUCKER ABBOTT 4 3000 W. Charleston Blvd., #3 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 (702) 259-8640 6 JEFFERY A. BENDAVID, ESQ. 7 Nevada Bar No. 6220 8 STEPHANIE J. SMITH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11280 9 MORAN BRANDON BENDAVID MORAN 630 South 4th Street 10 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 11 (702) 384-8424 Attorneys for Russell Road Food and Beverage, LLC 12 DISTRICT COURT 13 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 14 JACQUELINE FRANKLIN, ASHLEIGH PARK, LILY SHEPARD, STACIE ALLEN, 15 MICHAELA DIVINE, SAMANTHA JONES, KARINA STRELKOVA, and DANIELLE 16 Case No.: A-14-709372-C LAMAR, individually, and on behalf of a Dept. No.: 31 17 class of similarly situated individuals, 18 Plaintiffs, DEFENDANT, RUSSELL ROAD FOOD 19 AND BEVERAGE, LLC'S MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED VS. 20 MOTION FOR CLASS RUSSELL ROAD FOOD AND BEVERAGE, CERTIFICATION AND MOTION TO 21 LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability company STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' (d/b/a CRAZY HORSE III GENTLEMEN'S 22 DECLARATIONS ON AN ORDER CLUB), SN INVESTMENT PROPERTIES, SHORTENING TIME 23 LLC, a Nevada limited liability company (d/b/a CRAZY HORSE III GENTLEMEN'S 24 DEPARTMENT XXXI CLUB), DOE CLUB OWNER, I-X, ROE CLUB OWNER, I-X, and ROE EMPLOYER, 25 I-X, 26 Defendants. 27 AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS



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RAN BRANDON DAVID MORAN TTORNEYS AT LAW

630 SOUTH 4TH STREET LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 PHONE: (702) 384-8424 FAX: (702) 384-6568

06-23-17 P06:27

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## DEFENDANT, RUSSELL ROAD FOOD AND BEVERAGE, LLC'S MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION AND MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' DECLARATIONS ON AN ORDER SHORTENING TIME

COMES NOW, Defendant, RUSSELL ROAD FOOD AND BEVERAGE, LLC, a Nevada limited liability, dba CRAZY HORSE III GENTLEMEN'S CLUB, (the "Defendant" or "Russell Road"), by and through its attorney of record, GREGORY J. KAMER, ESQ., and KAITLIN H. ZIEGLER, ESQ., of KAMER ZUCKER ABBOTT, and JEFFERY A. BENDAVID, ESQ., and STEPHANIE J. SMITH, ESQ., of MORAN BRANDON BENDAVID MORAN, and hereby submits its MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS, JACQUELINE FRANKLIN, ASHLEIGH PARK, LILY SHEPARD, STACIE ALLEN, KARINA STRELKOVA, DANIELLE LAMAR, AND MICHAELA MOORE'S (the "Plaintiffs") RENEWED MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION AND MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' DECLARATIONS ON AN ORDER SHORTENING TIME.

DATED this 22nd day of June, 2017.

#### MORAN BRANDON BENDAVID MORAN

/s/ Jeffery A. Bendavid,
JEFFERY A. BENDAVID, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 6220
STEPHANIE J. SMITH, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 11280
630 South 4th Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
(702) 384-8424

#### KAMER ZUCKER ABBOTT

/s/ Gregory J. Kamer

GREGORY J. KAMER, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 0270
KAITLIN H. ZIEGLER, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 013625
3000 W. Charleston Blvd., #3
Las Vegas, Nevada 89102
(702) 259-8640
Attorneys for Defendant

#### **ORDER SHORTENING TIME**

This matter having come before this Court upon the Affidavit of Jeffery A. Bendavid, Esq., in Support of Order Shortening Time and the Court having reviewed all of the papers and pleadings on file herein, and for good cause shown, therefore;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the foregoing MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS,

JACQUELINE FRANKLIN, ASHLEIGH PARK, LILY SHEPARD, STACIE ALLEN,

KARINA STRELKOVA, DANIELLE LAMAR, AND MICHAELA MOORE'S (the

"Plaintiffs") RENEWED MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION AND MOTION TO

STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' DECLARATIONS ON AN ORDER SHORTENING TIME, be heard

on the day of July, at the hour of 9:30 am/p.m. in the above-entitled Court,

or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard. Plaintiff's Renewed Motion

for class Certification will be

DATED this Eday of June, 2017. Heard at 9:30 am with other

Morions.

JOANNA S. KISHNER

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Motion must be filed/served by: 6/26 17 25 pm

Opposition must be filed/served by: #/3/17@5pm

Reply must be filed/served by: 7/6/17. 5pm

Please provide courtesy copies to Chambers upon filing.

MORAN BRANDON BENDAVID MORAN ATTORNEYS AT LAW

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630 South 4th Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Phone:(702) 384-8424 Fax: (702) 384-6568 

## AFFIDAVIT OF JEFFERY A. BENDAVID, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF ORDER SHORTENING TIME AND MOTION TO STRIKE

COUNTY OF CLARK	)
	) ss
STATE OF NEVADA	)

I, JEFFERY A. BENDAVID, ESQ., declare under penalty of perjury that matters set forth herein are true to the best of my knowledge.

- 1. I, the Affiant, am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada.
- 2. I am counsel for Defendant/Counterclaimant, RUSSELL ROAD FOOD AND BEVERAGE, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability company (d/b/a CRAZY HORSE III GENTLEMEN'S CLUB), in the above-referenced matter.
- 3. This Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Declarations on an Order Shortening Time is not brought to harass or annoy, but to promote efficiency and justice, and to prevent any further harm to Russell Road.
- 4. On June 7, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a "Renewed Motion" for Class Certification that is currently set for hearing before this Court on July 11, 2017, at 09:00 a.m.
- 5. Since the time the Court denied Plaintiffs' original Motion for Class Certification, Plaintiffs have not served Russell Road with any additional discovery, have not schedule any additional depositions of witness, and have not disclosed any additional documents supportive of class certification.
- 6. As set forth in detail in Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Declarations on an Order Shortening Time, Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification and the Declarations utilized in support of their Motion is contrary to Nevada law and Nevada's Rules of Civil

Procedure, and therefore, should be struck from the record as a fugitive document or this Court should not consider Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification.

- 7. As a result, setting a hearing in the ordinary course of the Court's business on this Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Declarations would result the Court hearing this motion well after the July 11, 2017 hearing date currently set for Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification.
- 8. Accordingly, Russell Road's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Declarations an Order Shortening Time would be rendered moot as this Court will have already considered on July 11, 2017, the merits of Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification.
- 9. An Order Shortening Time setting the hearing date for Russell Road's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Declarations an Order Shortening Time prior to or at the same date and time as the July 11, 2017 hearing currently set for Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification is warranted to provide Russell Road an opportunity to present to the Court its arguments supporting why this Court should strike and/or not consider Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

FFERY A. BENDAVID, ESQ.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me

this day of June, 2017.

27 28

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RY PUBLIC of and for

said County and State



LEILANI GAMBOA NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF NEVADA Appt. No. 06-109640-1 My Appt Expires May 10, 2019

RAN BRANDON

630 South 4th Street LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 PHONE: (702) 384-8424 FAX: (702) 384-6568

#### 

MORAN BRANDON BENDAVID MORAN

630 SOUTH 4TH STREET LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 PHONE:(702) 384-8424 FAX: (702) 384-6568

#### **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

#### I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

Plaintiffs' Renewed Class Certification is nothing more than Plaintiffs' brazen attempt to have this Court "rehear" Plaintiffs' original Motion for Class Certification. Originally, Plaintiffs sought certification of their proposed class without giving any consideration to Nevada law, the newly enacted Nevada statute that conclusively presumes Plaintiffs are independent contractors, and the clear requirements of Nevada's Rules of Civil Procedure regarding class action. Accordingly, this Court denied Plaintiffs' original Motion for Class Certification.

However, this Court denied Plaintiffs' original Motion for Class Certification "without prejudice," which afforded Plaintiffs an opportunity to file a new motion with new evidence and new arguments that possibly could have convinced the Court to certify Plaintiffs' class. Plaintiffs failed to seize upon the Court's generosity. Plaintiffs did not conduct any additional discovery. Plaintiffs did not disclose any new evidence. Plaintiffs took no action whatsoever prior to the close of the discovery period on May 19, 2017.

Rather than file a new Motion for Class Certification, Plaintiffs, instead, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against Russell Road's Counterclaims, which this Court decided on the merits of this case. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed their attempted Renewed Motion for Class Certification, which consists of nothing more than attaching their prior Motion for Class Certification as support for class certification. Plaintiffs' "renewed" Motion for Class Certification, on its face, fails because this Court has already denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification based on the exact allegations and arguments provided again in Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification. As a result, Nevada's Rules of Civil Procedure and

the local rules for the Eighth Judicial District Court prohibit this Court from considering Plaintiffs' "renewed" motion. As explained in detail below, this Court should grant Russell Road's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Declarations on an Order Shortening Time since:

- 1. EDCR 2.24(a) prohibits the Court from considering Plaintiffs' previously disposed of Motion for Class Certification;
- 2. Plaintiffs failed to file their Renewed Motion for Class Certification within the time required by EDCR 2.24(b); and
- 3. Plaintiffs' Declarations filed in support of Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification fail to meet the requirements of EDCR 2.21(a).

#### II. FACTS

On November 4, 2014, Plaintiffs commenced their action against Russell Road. See Complaint at 1. On April 27, 2016, more than 17 months after Plaintiffs commenced their action, Plaintiffs filed their original Motion for Class Certification. See Motion for Class Certification at 1. Immediately thereafter, Plaintiffs vacated the June 14, 2016 scheduled hearing on their Motion for Class Certification indefinitely. See Stipulation and Order to Vacate Hearing Date dated June 8, 2016. Plaintiffs did not reschedule the hearing on their Motion for Class Certification until January 10, 2017, which was more than 26 months after the commencement of Plaintiffs' action on November 4, 2014, and more than six (6) months from Plaintiffs' vacation of the originally schedule hearing set for June 8, 2016. See Order Denying Motion for Class Certification.

During this six (6) month period, Plaintiffs never amended or altered their Motion for Class Certification. See Id. Plaintiffs simply rescheduled the hearing date on their motion originally filed on June 8, 2016. See Id.

This Court held hearings on Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification on January 10, 2017 and again on March 16, 2017. *See* Id. After hearing the arguments presented and considering the filings made in support of and in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, this Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification without prejudice. *See* Id.

After the Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, Plaintiffs did not serve any additional discovery on Russell Road. *See* supra. Plaintiffs did not schedule or taken any additional depositions of any witness. *See* Id. Plaintiffs did not disclose any additional documents that could support any new motion for class certification. *See* Id. The period for discovery closed on May 19, 2017, without any further activity by Plaintiffs. *See* Stipulation and Order to Extend Discovery.

In the interim, however, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against Russell Road's Counterclaims on April 10, 2017. See Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendant Counterclaims at 1. On April 11, 2017, Russell Road filed its separate Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs, Stacie Allen and Michaela Moore. See Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs, Stacie Allen and Michaela Moore at 1.

On June 1, 2017, this Court heard arguments regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Russell Road's Motion for Summary Judgment. See Minute Order dated June 16, 2017. During that hearing, this Court granted in part and denied in part, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and ordered supplemental briefing regarding Russell Road's Motion for Summary Judgment. See Id. This supplemental briefing was filed on June 15, 2016, and this Court, on June 23, 2017 (in Chambers), will have rendered a

second decision on the merits addressed in Russell Road's Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs' Stacie Allen and Michaela Moore. See Id.

On June 2, Russell Road filed a separate Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject jurisdiction. See Motion to Dismiss at 1. This motion, if granted, will be dispositive the entire matter since as argued therein, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over each remaining Plaintiffs' matter. See Id.

Despite of all of these dispositive motions filed since the Court denied Plaintiffs' original Motion for Class Certification, Plaintiffs did not file their "Renewed Motion for Class Certification" until June 7, 2017, and did so without first moving this Court for leave. See Renewed Motion for Class Certification at 1. Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification contains nothing more than the identical allegations, citations, and arguments provided in their first Motion for Class Certification, which was as an exhibit. See Renewed Motion for Class Certification at 5, and at Exhibit "B."

Since Plaintiffs' June 7, 2017, filing of their Renewed Motion for Class Certification, Plaintiff, Samantha Jones has voluntarily dismissed her complaint against Russell Road. See Stipulation and Order. Additionally on June 19, 2017, Russell Road filed its Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs filed a separate Motion for Summary Judgment against Russell Road. See Russell Road's Motion for Summary Judgment at 1. See also, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 1. Both of which are dispositive of and will be decided on the merits of each case. See Id.

As demonstrated below, Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification should be struck as a fugitive document, or otherwise not heard by this Court since Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification fails to comply with the clear requirements of Nevada's Rules

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of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of the Eighth Judicial District Court and in reality, is an improper motion for reconsideration prohibited by EDCR 2.24 and EDCR 2.20.

#### II. LEGAL STANDARD

In Nevada, Courts have the power to strike or disregard a party's submissions other than pleadings as fugitive documents should such documents not comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure. See e.g., State ex rel. Mathews v. Murray, 70 Nev. 116, 118, 258 P.2d 982, 983 (1953) (granting Motion to Strike supplemental matters as fugitive documents); and Campbell v. Baskin, 68 Nev. 469, 235 P.2d 729 (1951) (striking affidavit from opening brief as a fugitive document and declaring that such documents cannot be regarded as forming any part of the record). See also, EDCR 1.10. See also, e.g., Tagle v. Lieutenant Bean, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75922 at *8-9 (D. Nev. May 18, 2017) (recognizing a court's inherent power over the administration of its business and to enforce rules for the management of litigation, which includes the striking of fugitive documents). A document not permitted by the Rules of Civil Procedure or by Court order is a "fugitive document" and must be stricken from record. See e.g., Tagle, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75922 at *9.

Further, EDCR 2.21(c) permits a court to strike, wholly, or in part, any declaration presented in support of any motion that does not conform with the requirements of EDCR Rule 2.21 and NRCP 56(e). NRCP 56(e) requires that all declarations must set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence and show affirmatively that the declaration is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.

As demonstrated below, Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification should be struck as a fugitive document, or otherwise not heard by this Court since Plaintiffs' Renewed



630 SOUTH 4TH STREET LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 PHONE:(702) 384-8424 FAX: (702) 384-6568

Motion for Class Certification fails to comply with the clear requirements of Nevada's Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of the Eighth Judicial District Court.

#### IV. ARGUMENT

A. Plaintiffs' "Renewed Motion for Class Certification" Must Be Struck From the Record Since EDCR 2.24(a) Prohibits the Renewal of A Previously Disposed of Motion.

EDCR 2.24(a) provides:

No motions once heard and disposed of may be renewed in the same cause, nor may the same matters therein embraced be reheard, <u>unless by leave of</u> the court granted upon motion therefor, after notice of such motion to the adverse parties. (Emphasis Added).

As plainly stated above, EDCR 2.24(a) prohibits the renewal or rehearing of any motion already ruled upon by this Court, unless the renewing party first moves for permission to renew their motion. See supra. Here, Plaintiffs have filed their "Renewed Motion for Class Certification" on June 7, 2017, without first moving this Court for leave to do so. See Renewed Motion for Class Certification at 1. In their renewed Motion, Plaintiffs have not changed a single argument or allegation of fact supposedly demonstrating the need for the certification of a class. See Id. at 1-2. In fact, Plaintiffs have gone as far as to attach their prior Motion for Class Certification incorporating the identical allegations, citations, and arguments provided in their first Motion for Class Certification as an exhibit to their renewed motion supposedly as supporting their renewed motion. See Renewed Motion for Class Certification at 5, and at Exhibit "B." Since Plaintiffs have not filed any new arguments or evidence supporting class certification, Plaintiff "renewed motion," on its face, is simply a Motion to Rehear Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification. As such, Plaintiffs were required by EDCR 2.24(a) to seek leave from this Court to file their "renewed" motion since this Court already heard and disposed of the identical motion and arguments on March 16, 2017. See



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630 South 4th Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Phone:{702} 384-8424 Fax: (702) 384-6568 Order Denying Motion for Class Certification. Plaintiffs never sought any leave from the Court. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification must be struck, or otherwise not heard by the Court.

Of course, Plaintiffs will contend that they had a right to "renew" their Motion for Class Certification because the Court denied their original Motion for Class Certification "without prejudice." Such a contention is incorrect. On March 16, 2017, this Court heard arguments regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification. See Order denying Motion for Class Certification. After considering the briefs on file and the arguments made during this hearing, this Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification "without prejudice." See Id.

The Court's denial of Plaintiffs' original Motion for Class Certification "without prejudice" did not permit Plaintiffs to simply re-file their original Motion for Class Certification at a later date. *Cf.* EDCR 2.24(a). Plaintiffs could only file a new Motion for Class Certification identifying additional facts or asserting additional arguments that somehow could persuade the Court that class certification was warranted. *See* Black's Law Dictionary Free Online Legal Dictionary 2nd Ed. (where a motion is denied "without prejudice" it is meant as a declaration that such denial does not operate as a bar to a subsequent new motion). Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification did not provide any new arguments or evidence and in fact, is only supported by Plaintiffs' previously denied Motion for Class Certification. *See* supra. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification violates EDCR 2.24(a) and must be struck from the record as a fugitive document, or otherwise not heard by the Court.



630 SOUTH 4TH STREET LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 PHONE:(702) 384-8424 FAX: (702) 384-6568 B. Plaintiffs' "Renewed Motion for Class Certification" Must Be Struck From the Record Since Plaintiffs Failed to File Within The Time Provided by EDCR 2.24(b).

Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification also is untimely pursuant to EDCR 2.24(b). EDCR 2.24(a) provides:

A party seeking reconsideration of a ruling of the court, other than any order which may be addressed by motion pursuant to N.R.C.P. 50(b), 52(b), 59 or 60, must file a motion for such relief within 10 days after service of written notice of the order or judgment unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order. (Emphasis Added).

As plainly stated above, EDCR 2.24(b) prohibits the reconsideration of the Court's Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, unless it was filed within 10 days of the Court's written Order. See supra. Here, Plaintiffs have filed their "Renewed Motion for Class Certification" on June 7, 2017, which was far outside the 10 day requirement of EDCR 2.24(b). See Renewed Motion for Class Certification at 1.

In Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification, Plaintiffs have not changed a single argument or allegation of fact supposedly demonstrating the need for the certification of a class. See Id. at 1-2. Plaintiffs also have not provide any new evidence or asserted any new legal arguments justifying class certification. See Id. As a result, Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification is simply a motion for reconsideration requesting that this Court reconsider its Order Denying Plaintiffs' original Motion for Certification based on the same facts and arguments provided in their original Motion for Certification. See Id.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Class Certification is untimely since Plaintiffs did not file their Renewed Motion for Class Certification until June 7. 2017, or sixty-two (62) days after the entry of the Court's Order on April 6, 2017. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification must be struck from the record as a fugitive document.

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## C. Plaintiffs' Declarations Provided In Support of Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification Must Be Struck Since Plaintiffs' Supporting Declarations Fail to Meet the Requirements of EDCR 2.21(a).

EDCR 2.21(a) requires that any factual contentions involved in any pretrial motion must be initially presented upon affidavits, unsworn declarations under penalty of perjury, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file. Where a party utilizes affidavits or unsworn declarations to support the factual contentions asserted in any pretrial motion, such supporting affidavits/declarations must conform with NRCP 56(e) and contain only factual, evidentiary matters. Otherwise, EDCR 2.21(a) permits a court to strike all, or any portion of a supporting affidavit/declaration that is defective. NRCP 56(e) requires that a supporting affidavit/declaration be made on personal knowledge. Also, any supporting affidavit/declaration is required to set forth such facts "as would be admissible in evidence." NRCP 56(e).

As support for Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification, Plaintiffs have attached an unsworn declaration from each of the remaining individual Plaintiffs. See Renewed Motion for Class Certification at Exhibits "A-1" to "A-6." On their face, these declarations are deficient. EDCR 2.21(a) requires that any declaration used to support factual contentions of a pretrial motion must be "under penalty of perjury." Here, each of the Declarations submitted fail to make any statement that each Declarant is making the factual contentions provided in each Declaration "under penalty of perjury." As such, Plaintiffs' Declarations are facially deficient and should be struck from Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification.

Further, Plaintiffs' supporting Declarations should be struck since each Declarations and the contents therein are not admissible. Under Nevada law, the Court has broad discretion

to determine the admissibility of evidence. See State ex. rel. Department of Highways v. Nevada Aggregates, 92 Nev. 370, 376, 551 P.2d 1095, 1098 (1976). Nonetheless, the Court may exclude evidence where "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, . . . confusion of issues, or . . . misleading jury. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 94 Nev. 241, 243, 577 P.2d 1234, 1235 (1978) (quoting NRS 48.035(1)).

Here, Plaintiffs' declarations and the contents thereof should not be admitted as evidence since admission would unfairly prejudice Russell Road. To begin with, Plaintiffs have provided these Declarations and made factual contentions without being under any penalty of perjury. *See* supra. Accordingly, Russell Road has no assurance that the each Declaration was made by the party alleged or that the contents of which are true and accurate under oath.

Next, Plaintiffs' Declarations are asserted as support of factual contentions after the period of discovery closed on May 19, 2017. *See* Id. Plaintiffs never disclosed these Declarations during the period of discovery. *See* Id. As such, these Declarations were never part of the evidentiary record and more importantly, Russell Road never had any opportunity to conduct discovery of the facts asserted therein.

Additionally, each Plaintiff had been deposed under oath previously. *See* supra. Yet, Plaintiffs did not cite to any part of their deposition testimony to support the factual contentions, but instead, provided these "new" Declarations outside the period of discovery without even subjecting themselves to be under a penalty of perjury. *See* Id.

Therefore, Plaintiffs' Declarations supporting their Renewed Motion for Class Certification should not be admitted and further should be struck from the record as fugitive documents. Consequently, Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification should also be

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struck since Plaintiffs failed to comply with the requirements of EDCR 2.20 and 2.21 since Plaintiffs failed to provide any Declarations or other evidence that support their Renewed Motion for Class Certification that comply with the requirements of NRCP 56(e).

#### V. CONCLUSION

Based on the arguments provided above, Russell Road respectfully requests that this Court grant its Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Declarations on an Order Shortening Time.

DATED this 22nd day of June, 2017.

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6/26/2017 3:05 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT OPP 1 GREGORY J. KAMER, ESQ. 2 Nevada Bar No. 0270 KAITLIN H. ZIEGLER, ESQ. 3 Nevada Bar No. 013625 KAMER ZUCKER ABBOTT 4 3000 W. Charleston Blvd., #3 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 (702) 259-8640 6 JEFFERY A. BENDAVID, ESQ. 7 Nevada Bar No. 6220 8 STEPHANIE J. SMITH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11280 9 MORAN BRANDON BENDAVID MORAN 630 South 4th Street 10 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 11 (702) 384-8424 Attorneys for Russell Road Food and Beverage, LLC 12 DISTRICT COURT 13 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 14 JACQUELINE FRANKLIN, ASHLEIGH PARK, LILY SHEPARD, STACIE ALLEN, 15 MICHAELA DIVINE, SAMANTHA JONES, 16 KARINA STRELKOVA, and DANIELLE Case No.: A-14-709372-C LAMAR, individually, and on behalf of a Dept. No.: 31 17 class of similarly situated individuals, 18 DEFENDANT, RUSSELL ROAD FOOD Plaintiffs. AND BEVERAGE, LLC'S 19 OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' VS. 20 RENEWED MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION RUSSELL ROAD FOOD AND BEVERAGE, 21 LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability company (d/b/a CRAZY HORSE III GENTLEMEN'S 22 CLUB), SN INVESTMENT PROPERTIES, 23 LLC, a Nevada limited liability company (d/b/a CRAZY HORSE III GENTLEMEN'S 24 CLUB), DOE CLUB OWNER, I-X, ROE CLUB OWNER, I-X, and ROE EMPLOYER, 25 I-X, 26 Defendants. 27 AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS

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Case Number: A-14-709372-C

**Electronically Filed** 

## DEFENDANT, RUSSELL ROAD FOOD AND BEVERAGE, LLC'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

COMES NOW, Defendant, RUSSELL ROAD FOOD AND BEVERAGE, LLC, a Nevada limited liability, dba CRAZY HORSE III GENTLEMEN'S CLUB, (the "Defendant" or "Russell Road"), by and through its attorney of record, GREGORY J. KAMER, ESQ., and KAITLIN H. ZIEGLER, ESQ., of KAMER ZUCKER ABBOTT, and JEFFERY A. BENDAVID, ESQ., and STEPHANIE J. SMITH, ESQ., of MORAN BRANDON BENDAVID MORAN, and hereby submits its OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS, JACQUELINE FRANKLIN, ASHLEIGH PARK, LILY SHEPARD, STACIE ALLEN, KARINA STRELKOVA, DANIELLE LAMAR, AND MICHAELA MOORE'S (the "Plaintiffs") RENEWED MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION.

DATED this 26th day of June, 2017.

#### MORAN BRANDON BENDAVID MORAN

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#### **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

#### I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs' Renewed Class Certification is nothing more than Plaintiffs' attempt to have this Court "rehear" Plaintiffs' original Motion for Class Certification without demonstrating in any way that their newly proposed "Subclasses" meet the requirements of a class action. Originally, Plaintiffs sought certification of their proposed class without giving any consideration to Nevada law, the newly enacted Nevada statute that conclusively presumes Plaintiffs are independent contractors, and the clear requirements of Nevada's Rules of Civil Procedure regarding class action. Appropriately, this Court denied Plaintiffs' original Motion for Class Certification.

Now, Plaintiffs have filed their 2-page "Renewed" Motion for Class Certification, which literally consists of nothing more than attaching their prior Motion for Class Certification as support for class certification, in the desperate hope that they can somehow overcome Nevada law that conclusively presumes Plaintiffs to be independent contractors. As explained in detail below, Plaintiffs' "renewed" Motion for Class Certification must be denied because this Court has already denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification based on the exact allegations and arguments provided again in Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification and Plaintiffs have not asserted any new evidence or arguments that overcomes their previous denial. Specifically, Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification must be denied since:

- 1. Plaintiffs' proposed Subclasses do not alter in any way the fact that Plaintiffs are not similarly situated to the class they proposed to represent;
- 2. Plaintiffs have not sought leave from the Court to amend their Third Amended Complaint to assert two (2) new Subclasses;

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- 3. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that each newly proposed Subclass independently meets the requirements of a class action;
  - 4. Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification is untimely;
- 5. The Court's Order Denying Plaintiffs' original Motion for Class Certification cannot be altered or amended since decisions on the merits of this case have occurred; and
- 6. The individual Plaintiffs allegedly representing the potential class members of Plaintiffs' newly proposed second Subclass cannot adequately represent such potential class members because Plaintiffs cannot recover on their claim for Unjust Enrichment.

#### II. <u>FACTS</u>

On November 4, 2014, Plaintiffs commenced their action against Russell Road. See Complaint at 1. On April 27, 2016, more than 17 months after Plaintiffs commenced their action, Plaintiffs filed their original Motion for Class Certification. See Motion for Class Certification at 1. Immediately thereafter, Plaintiffs vacated the June 14, 2016 scheduled hearing on their Motion for Class Certification indefinitely. See Stipulation and Order to Vacate Hearing Date dated June 8, 2016. Plaintiffs did not reschedule the hearing on their Motion for Class Certification until January 10, 2017, which was more than 26 months after the commencement of Plaintiffs' action on November 4, 2014, and more than six (6) months from Plaintiffs' vacation of the originally scheduled hearing set for June 8, 2016. See Order Denying Motion for Class Certification.

Plaintiffs allegedly vacated their Motion for Class Certification to conduct discovery and obtain evidence demonstrating the requirements for a class action. However, during this six (6) month period, Plaintiffs never amended or altered their Motion for Class Certification to add any newly discovered evidence. *See* Id. Plaintiffs simply rescheduled the hearing date on their motion originally filed on June 8, 2016. *See* Id.

Nonetheless, this Court held hearings on Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification on January 10, 2017 and again on March 16, 2017. See Id. After hearing the arguments presented and considering the filings made in support of and in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, this Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification without prejudice. See Id. Plaintiffs' original Motion for Class Certification was denied because the Court determined that NRS 608.0155 applied to this matter and the deposition testimony of the individual Plaintiffs demonstrated that Plaintiffs could not adequately represent the members of Plaintiffs' proposed class. See Transcript of Proceedings at 14-15, a copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit "A."

After the Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, Plaintiffs did not serve any additional discovery on Russell Road. See Renewed Motion at 1-2. Plaintiffs did not schedule or taken any additional depositions of any witness. See Id. Plaintiffs did not disclose any additional documents that could support any new motion for class certification. See Id. The period for discovery closed on May 19, 2017, without any further activity by Plaintiffs. See Stipulation and Order Extending Discovery.

In the interim, however, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against Russell Road's Counterclaims on April 10, 2017. See Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendant Counterclaims at 1. On April 11, 2017, Russell Road filed its separate Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs, Stacie Allen and Michaela Moore. See Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs, Stacie Allen and Michaela Moore at 1.

On June 1, 2017, this Court heard arguments regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Russell Road's Motion for Summary Judgment. See Minute Order dated June 16, 2017. During that hearing, this Court granted in part and denied in part,



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630 South 4th Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Phone:(702) 384-8424 Fax: (702) 384-6568 Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and ordered supplemental briefing regarding Russell Road's Motion for Summary Judgment. *See* Id. This supplemental briefing was filed on June 15, 2016, and this Court, on June 23, 2017 (in Chambers), rendered a second decision on the merits and denied Russell Road's Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs' Stacie Allen and Michaela Moore. *See* Minutes dated June 23, 2017.

On June 2, Russell Road filed a separate Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Motion to Dismiss pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3) at 1. This motion, if granted, is dispositive the entire matter since as argued therein, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over each remaining Plaintiffs' matter since Plaintiffs have not asserted facts granting this Court subject matter jurisdiction and to a legal certainty, Plaintiffs' damages cannot meet the minimum threshold required for this Court to have subject matter jurisdiction. See Id.

Despite of all of these motions filed since the Court denied Plaintiffs' original Motion for Class Certification, Plaintiffs did not file their "Renewed Motion for Class Certification" until June 7, 2017, and did so without first moving this Court for leave. *See* Renewed Motion for Class Certification at 1. Plaintiffs are required to obtain leave from the Court because Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification contains nothing more than the identical allegations, citations, and arguments provided in their first Motion for Class Certification, which Plaintiffs literally attached and incorporated as an exhibit and Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification fails to identify any new evidence or new arguments supporting the renewal of Plaintiffs' previously denied. *See* EDCR 2.24(a) and also, Id. at 1-2, and at Exhibit "B."

Since Plaintiffs' June 7, 2017, filing of their Renewed Motion for Class Certification, Plaintiff, Samantha Jones has voluntarily dismissed her complaint against Russell Road. *See* Stipulation and Order. Additionally on June 19, 2017, Russell Road filed its Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs filed a separate Motion for Summary Judgment against Russell Road. *See* Russell Road's Motion for Summary Judgment at 1. *See* also, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 1. Both of which are dispositive of and will be decided on the merits of each case. *See* Id.

As demonstrated below, Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification should be struck as a fugitive document, or otherwise not heard by this Court since Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification fails to comply with the clear requirements of Nevada's Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of the Eighth Judicial District Court.

#### II. <u>LEGAL STANDARD</u>

N.R.C.P. 23 specifies the circumstances under which a case proceeds as a class action. See Shuette v. Beazer Homes Holdings Corporation, 121 Nev. 837, 846, 124 P.3d 530, 537 (2005). Under N.R.C.P. 23, Plaintiffs bear the burden to prove that their case is appropriate for resolution as a class action. See Id. (citing Cummings v. Charter Hospital, 111 Nev. 639, 643, 896 P.2d 1137, 1140 (1995)). Plaintiffs only can meet this burden by demonstrating the four prerequisites; (1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality: and adequacy. See Id. at 846.

As demonstrated below, Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification must be denied since Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification violates Nevada's Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Procedure for the Eighth Judicial District Court and



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Plaintiffs have failed to provide any new evidence or legal arguments that demonstrates this matter is appropriate for resolution as a class action.

#### IV. ARGUMENT

A. Plaintiffs' "Renewed Motion for Class Certification" Must Be Denied Since Plaintiffs' Proposed Subclasses Does Not Alter In Any Manner The Fact That Plaintiffs Are Not Similarly Situated to the Class They Represent.

Plaintiffs' 2-page Renewed Motion for Class Certification proposes two entirely new Subclasses. *See* Renewed Motion for Class Certification at 1-2. The first Subclass pertains only to Plaintiffs' first claim for relief for the alleged violation of the Minimum Wage Amendment and allegedly is comprised of:

All persons who possess a social security number who have worked at the Club as dancers at the Club at any time on or after November 2, 2012 and going forward until the entry of judgment in this matter. Id. at 1.

Plaintiffs' proposed second Subclass pertains only to Plaintiffs' improper second claim for relief for Unjust Enrichment and allegedly is comprised of:

All persons who possess a social security number who have worked at the Club as dancers at the Club at any time on or after November 2, 2010 and going forward until the entry of judgment in this matter. Id. at 1.

Plaintiffs contend in their Renewed Motion for Class Certification that a discrepancy with respect to the tax filing status revealed in deposition testimony was the "only defect" precluding class certification by the Court. *See* Id. at 2. Strangely, Plaintiffs do not reference any portion of the Court's Order that made such a finding. See Id. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs, without any explanation, evidence, or legal support of any kind, declare that their newly proposed Subclasses somehow rectify this discrepancy and the Court's subsequent "concern." *See* Id.



Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification must be denied because the Court had no such "concern" regarding Plaintiffs' tax filing status. See infra. In fact, the Court declared that it was not considering how each Plaintiff treated their taxes. See Id.

Further, the Court did not deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification because of a "discrepancy." Instead, the Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification because the Court found that SB 224, now codified as NRS 608.0155, applied to this case and therefore, the Court had to deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification. See Exhibit "A."

During the hearing for Plaintiffs' original Motion for Certification, the Court explained its decision to deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification. The Court reasoned:

If we're looking at SB 224 [NRS 608.0155] in the totality of the pleadings, then the Court would find that based on the own - potential class representatives' own statements, they in and of themselves would not meet the standard for class representatives[.] Id.

. . . And then even in the absence of SB 224 [NRS 608.0155] the Court's analysis would be the same. While the Court is cognizant of the low threshold with regards to class certification, there has to be something that the representative are already in the category in which they're seeking to represent individuals. And here, at least what I have from excerpts, and I don't have any response that says that these excerpts are incorrect or should be interpreted differently.

Now I am appreciative that part of the oral argument was the fact that the Court shouldn't consider how someone treats their taxes for purposes of analysis. The Court is not looking at how they treat their taxes. The Court is looking at whether or not these individual are considering for their own purposes that they would be similarly situated to the very class that they're seeking to represent, and that information provided in their undisputed deposition testimony shows that they would not. Id. at 14-15. (Emphasis Added).

As provided by the above Court statements, it is clear that Plaintiffs' own, undisputed deposition testimony prevented Plaintiffs from being part of the proposed class, not an alleged "discrepancy" between Plaintiffs' tax filings. See supra. As the Court stated, that reality



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630 SOUTH 4TH STREET LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 PHONE:(702) 384-8424 FAX: (702) 384-6568 would exist regardless of whether NRS 608.0155 applied, but since NRS 608.0155 does apply, it is even clearer that Plaintiffs are not part of the proposed class. *See* Id.

Specifically, the Court found that Plaintiffs' deposition testimony, which included statements about Plaintiffs' taxes, prevented them being part of a proposed class of alleged employees who worked as dancers for Russel Road from November 2, 2010 to the entry of judgment¹. See Id. This is because the application of NRS 608.0155 to Plaintiffs' deposition testimony would result in Plaintiffs being conclusively presumed independent contractors and as a matter of Nevada law, not part of the class of employees proposed by Plaintiffs. See Exhibit "A" at 8-11. As a result, the Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification. See Id. at 15.

Here, Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification must be denied particularly since Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification does not contain any new legal arguments or evidence that was not part of Plaintiffs' original Motion for Class Certification and would alter the Court's reasoning for denying Plaintiffs' original Motion for Class Certification. See Renewed Motion for Class Certification at 1-2 and at Exhibit "B." In fact, Plaintiffs amazingly have done nothing more than literally reattach their already denied Motion for Class Certification as their sole legal and factual support for their "renewed motion²." See Id.

Regardless, nowhere in the Court's actual explanation did the Court declare that the only defect preventing class certification was a "discrepancy with respect to tax filing status" among individual Plaintiffs. See supra. More importantly, the Court never stated that a new

¹ Plaintiffs' originally proposed class. See Exhibit "A" at 8-11.

² Which actually prevents Plaintiffs' Motion from being heard since EDCR 2.24 prohibits the consideration of any previously disposed of motion and any Petition for Rehearing by Plaintiffs must have been filed within 10 days of the Court's April 6, 2017 Order.

definition of the proposed class or any newly defined Subclasses, if provided by Plaintiffs, would result in class certification and the Court certainly never gave Plaintiffs permission to propose any new Subclasses in lieu of filing a new motion for class certification. See Id. Thus, Plaintiffs' proposed new Subclasses do not in any manner "address" the Court's concern or in fact, rectify the Court's actual reasons for denying Plaintiffs' original Motion for Class Certification.

In addition, Plaintiffs' newly "defined" Subclasses do not change in any way the fact that Plaintiffs cannot be a part of the class they attempt to represent. The only actual difference between Plaintiffs' original class definition and Plaintiffs' newly asserted Subclass definitions is that each Subclass now only seeks to include only those persons "who possess a social security number." See Renewed Motion for Class Certification at 1-2. Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification does not offer any explanation as to how possessing a social security number no longer prevents Plaintiffs from being part of a proposed class of alleged employees who worked as dancers for Russel Road. See Id.

The short answer is it does not. Having or not having a social security number does not establish whether an individual is deemed an employee of Russell Road. See e.g., Terry v. Sapphire Gentlemen's Club, 130 Nev. Adv. Rep. 87 at *17-18, 336 P.3d 951, 958 (2014). In fact, having a social security number actually operates to establish further that an individual is conclusively presumed an independent contractor and not an employee under NRS 608.0155 since one of the many factors considered by NRS 608.0155 is whether an individual has applied for a social security number. See NRS 608.0155.

More importantly, Plaintiffs' contention that they have a social security number does not operate to include Plaintiffs as being part of any class of alleged employees. See supra.



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Further, the fact that Plaintiffs have a social security number does not alter or rectify in any way Plaintiffs' deposition testimony demonstrating that Plaintiffs did not meet the standard for class representatives. See Id. See also, Exhibit "A" at 14. Plaintiffs' excerpted deposition testimony relied upon by the Court to deny Plaintiffs' original Motion for Class Certification did not reference or discuss Plaintiffs' social security status and the Court expressly stated that it was not relying on any similar factual specifics to deny Plaintiffs' original Motion for Class Certification. See Exhibit "A" at 7-15 ("The Court is not looking at how they treat their taxes.").

Plaintiffs' original Motion for Class Certification was denied because the Court found that NRS 608.0155 applied and the deposition testimony of Plaintiffs established that Plaintiffs could be part of the proposed class they sought to represent. See supra. Plaintiffs' original Motion for Class Certification was not denied because Plaintiffs did or did not have social security numbers and improperly proposing new Subclasses to include the existence of social security numbers in no way alters the actual reasons for this Court's denial of Plaintiffs' original Motion for Class Certification. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification must be denied.

#### B. Plaintiffs' "Renewed Motion for Class Certification" Must Be Denied Since Plaintiffs Have Not Amended Their Third Amended Complaint to Include Their Newly Proposed Subclasses.

Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification must be denied since Plaintiffs' have attempted to amend the definition of their proposed class asserted in their Third Amended Complaint without leave from the Court. NRCP 15(a) expressly only permits a party to amend its Complaint once as a matter of course or thereafter, only upon leave by the Court. Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint asserts claims against Russell Road individually



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and as part of a single defined class. See Third Amended Complaint at 2. Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint specifically defines Plaintiffs' proposed class as:

The proposed class consists of all persons who work or have worked at the Club as dancers at any time during the time period prescribed by applicable statutes of limitations and going forward until the entry of judgment in this action. Id. at 2, paragraph 10.

Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint then proceeds to allege facts as to how this defined proposed class meets the requirements of NRCP 23(a) and NRCP 23(b)(3). See Id. at 2-4. Absent from Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint are any allegations that define separate Subclasses or that such Subclasses meet the requirements of NRCP 23(a) and NRCP 23(b)(3). See Id. at 2-7.

Since Plaintiffs' proposed class was defined as part of its Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs could only amend the allegations, including their class definition and allegations that Plaintiffs meet the requirements of a class action, asserted in their Third Amended Complaint by leave of the Court. See NRCP 15(a). See also, NRCP 8. Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification attempts to replace Plaintiffs' previously alleged definition of their class with two newly defined Subclasses, which Plaintiffs expressly declare are "amended subclass definitions." See Renewed Motion for Class Certification at 1-2. As a result, Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification must be denied since Plaintiffs did not obtain leave from the Court to amend their Third Amended Complaint to assert these new "amended subclass definitions" and has not amended their Third Amended Complaint in any manner to include these proposed "amended subclass definitions."

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## C. Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification Must Be Denied Since Plaintiffs Have Not Established That Each Newly Defined Subclass Meets the Requirements for a Class Action.

Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification attempts to redefine their proposed class into two (2) Subclasses. *See* Renewed Motion for Class Certification at 1-2. Plaintiffs' attempt fails because Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification demonstrate the requirements of a class action <u>for each proposed Subclass</u>. *See* infra.

It is well established that Plaintiffs bear the burden to prove their case is appropriate for resolution as a class action. *See Shuette v. Beazer Homes Holdings Corporation*, 121 Nev. 837, 846, 124 P.3d 530, 537 (2005) (citing *Cummings v. Charter Hospital*, 111 Nev. 639, 643, 896 P.2d 1137, 1140 (1995)). Plaintiffs only can meet this burden by demonstrating the four prerequisites; (1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality: and (4) adequacy. *See* Id. at 846.

Plaintiffs failed to meet that burden in their first attempt. See Order Denying Motion for Class Certification. Now, Plaintiffs have attempted to create two (2) Subclasses of an already failed proposed class. See Renewed Motion for Class Certification at 1-2.

Under existing class action law, proposed Subclasses "are to be treated as their own class under Rule 23." E.g., Otomo v. Nevada Association Services, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41451 at *4 (D. Nev. 2013). This means that each proposed Subclass must separately and independently meet the requirements of Rule 23. See e.g., Betts v. Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd., 659 F.2d 1000, 1005, (9th Cir. 1981). Therefore, Plaintiffs are required to provide evidence and arguments in their Renewed Motion for Class Certification demonstrating the four prerequisites; (1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality: and (4) adequacy for each of their proposed Subclasses³. See Id.

³ Plaintiffs cannot attempt to "fix" this failure in their Reply brief.

Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification does not provide any such evidence or arguments. *See* Renewed Motion for Class Certification at 1-2. Instead, Plaintiffs only attach and incorporate their original Motion for Class Certification. *See* Id. at Exhibit "B" through "D."

Further, Plaintiffs' prior original Motion for Class Certification cannot be relied upon to demonstrate that each of Plaintiffs' newly defined Subclasses meets the requirements of Rule 23. Plaintiffs' original Motion for Class Certification only asserted arguments supporting a single class; All persons who worked for Russell Road as exotic dancers on or after November 2, 2010⁴. See Id. at Exhibit "B," page 4. Here, Plaintiffs have proposed two (2) separate classes, but failed to provide any actual support demonstrating the requirements for a class action for each. See Id. at 1-2. Plaintiffs cannot rely solely on the incorporation of their prior Motion for Class Certification since that original motion provided evidence and arguments regarding a differently defined class without any subclasses. See Id. at Exhibit "B," page 4.

Additionally, Plaintiffs' original Motion for Class Certification was heard and denied by this Court. *See* Order denying Motion for Class Certification. EDCR 2.24(a) expressly prohibits any rehearing of any motion previously decided. Thus, Plaintiffs cannot rely or reassert any part of their original Motion for Class Certification to support their Renewed Motion for Class Certification. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification must be denied.



⁴ Plaintiffs' action was filed on November 4, 2014. Thus, each of Plaintiffs' proposed Subclasses commencing on November 2, 2010 or November 2, 2012, would include individuals outside of any applicable statute of limitations.

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630 SOUTH 4TH STREET LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 PHONE:(702) 384-8424 FAX: (702) 384-6568 D. Plaintiffs' "Renewed Motion for Class Certification" Must Be Denied Since Plaintiffs Failed to File Within The Time Provided by NRCP 23(c)(1) And Certification of Plaintiffs' Proposed Subclasses Is Prejudicial to Russell Road.

NRCP 23(c)(1) provides that "as soon as possible after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be maintained." Plaintiffs commenced their action on November 4, 2014. See Complaint at 1. Plaintiffs' original Motion for Class Certification was not heard until January 10, 2017, or more than 26 months after Plaintiff commenced this matter. See Order Denying Motion for Class Certification. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' original Motion for Class Certification was in fact, untimely pursuant to NRCP 23(c)(1).

Consequently, Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification is more untimely and contrary to the requirements of NRCP 23(c)(1) than Plaintiffs' original Motion for Class Certification. Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification was not filed until June 7, 2017, which was thirty (32) months after Plaintiffs commenced their action on November 4, 2014, approximately sixty-four (64) days after the denial of Plaintiffs' original Motion for class Certification, and 19 days after the close of the period of discovery on May 19, 2017. See supra. Nothing in the expiration of these periods of time could be deemed as Plaintiffs' moving "as soon as possible" to obtain certification of their class. As such, Plaintiffs' filing of their Renewed Motion for Class Certification is untimely on its face. NRCP 23(c)(1) required Plaintiffs to obtain certification of their class "as soon as possible" after the filing of their Complaint. Plaintiffs' pursuit of class certification 32 months after commencing their action and 19 days after the close of discovery, under any circumstance, cannot be considered sufficient in meeting the "as soon as possible" requirement of NRCP 23(c)(1), and no decision in Nevada, qualifies such a motion filing as meeting such requirement.

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630 SOUTH 4TH STREET LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 PHONE:(702) 384-8424 FAX: (702) 384-6568 Plaintiffs had a clear obligation under NRCP 23(c)(1) to obtain class certification "as soon as possible." Plaintiffs failed to obtain or even pursue such certification in such a manner and Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification, if granted, prejudices Russell Road. See supra. Discovery has closed in this matter. See Id. Allowing Plaintiffs to certify a class at this late date prevents Russell Road from conducting any discovery related to the proposed Subclasses. See Stipulation and Order to Extend Discovery. Russell Road also will not be afforded an opportunity to move to decertify any Subclass, especially since the time for dispositive motion already has expired on June 19, 2017. See Id. Further, Russell Road has already moved to dispose of or otherwise resolve of the cases of individual Plaintiffs that Russell Road may not have acted upon but for the fact that no class was certified in this matter. See supra. Thus, Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification is untimely and prejudicial to Russell Road. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification must be denied.

## E. NRCP 23(c)(1) Prohibits The Court's Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification From Being Altered Or Amended.

Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification also must denied since NRCP 23(c)(1) prohibits any alteration or amendment of any order determining whether a class action is to be maintained once a decision on the merits has occurred. On March 16, 2017, this Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification. See Order Denying Motion for Class Certification at 4. At the time of the Court's decision denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, Plaintiffs had approximately 64 days remaining until the expiration of the discovery period on May 19, 2017, during which Plaintiffs could have served additional written discovery, taken additional depositions, disclosed additional documents and records to support the filing of a new Motion for Class Certification. See Stipulation and Order

Extending Discovery. Plaintiffs, however, took no further action and the period for discovery in this matter expired on May 19, 2017, and Plaintiffs did not file a new Motion for Class Certification. *See* supra.

However, Plaintiffs did file, on April 10, 2017, their Motion for Summary Judgment on Russell Road's Counterclaims, which this Court granted in part, and denied in part. *See* Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendant Counterclaims at 1. *See* Minutes of the Court dated June 1. 2017. On April 11, 2017, Russell Road filed its separate Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs, Stacie Allen and Michaela Moore, which this Court subsequently has denied without prejudice. *See* Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs, Stacie Allen and Michaela Moore at 1. *See also*, Minutes of Court dated June 23, 2017. Both of these motions constitute a decision on the merits⁵ of this case entirely as to Plaintiffs, Stacie Allen and Michaela Moore⁶, and partially as to Russell Road's asserted counterclaims.

As a result, this Court already has rendered a decision on the merits regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment for purposes of NRCP 23(c)(1). See Id. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification must be denied since it seeks the alteration or amendment of the Court's original Order after decision(s) on the merits of this case have occurred as prohibited by NRCP 23(c)(1).



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A decision by a court that is based on the facts presented. See Black's Law Dictionary Free Online Legal Dictionary 2nd Ed.

⁶ Additionally, Russell Road has filed an additional Motion for Summary Judgment on June 19, 2017, which addresses the remaining issues of this matter and if granted, will be dispositive of the entire matter. Russell Road also filed a Motion to Dismiss the remaining Plaintiffs' Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, also which, if granted, will dispose of this case entirely. Plaintiff, Samantha Jones has voluntarily dismissed her Complaint against Russell Road. Plaintiffs also have filed an additional Motion for Summary Judgment on June 19, 2017.

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630 SOUTH 4TH STREET LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 PHONE:(702) 384-8424 FAX: (702) 384-6568 F. Plaintiffs' Second Proposed Subclass Cannot Be Certified Since The Plaintiffs Allegedly Representing the Class Are Prohibited As A Matter of Law From Recovering On Their Claim For Unjust Enrichment.

Plaintiffs' second proposed class is defined as follows:

For Count Two (Unjust Enrichment Claim): All persons who possess a social security number who have worked at the Club as dancers at any time after November 2, 2010 and going forward until the entry of judgment in this matter. Renewed Motion at 2.

Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification contends that Plaintiffs are representative members of this proposed Subclass as well as Plaintiffs' first proposed Subclass, which is based on Plaintiffs' recovery at law for alleged violations of Nevada's Minimum Wage Amendment (the "MWA"). *See* Id. at 1-2. Plaintiffs assert that Plaintiffs, Michaela Moore and Stacie Allen⁷ are only members of their newly proposed second Subclass. *See* Id. at 2.

Plaintiffs cannot be part of Plaintiffs' newly proposed Subclass nor can they be deemed to adequately represent this newly proposed Subclass because none of these Plaintiffs can recover on a claim for Unjust Enrichment. See infra. Under Nevada law, Plaintiffs may not recover in equity where Plaintiffs have a full and adequate remedy at law. See State ex rel. Nenzel v. Second Judicial Dist. Court in & for Washoe County, 49 Nev. 145, 159, 241 P. 317, 322 (1925) (superseded by statute on other grounds). See also, Small v. Univ. Med. Ctr. Of S. Nev., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102508 at *8 (D. Nev. 2016) (Dismissing an unjust enrichment claim in a minimum wage case because federal law provided an adequate legal remedy).

Plaintiffs' "Count Two" of Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint attempts to assert a claim in equity against Russell Road for Unjust Enrichment, but as an alleged violation of the

Plaintiffs, Michaela Moore and Stacie Allen are the subject of Russell Road's Motion for Dismissal for the Court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

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630 SOUTH 4TH STREET LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 PHONE:(702) 384-8424 FAX: (702) 384-6568 MWA. See Third Amended Complaint at 3-4 and at 6⁸. Plaintiffs' second claim for relief specifically alleges that the <u>wages allegedly earned</u> by Plaintiffs but not paid by Russell Road as well any fees, fines, and charges paid by Plaintiffs to Russell Road constituted a benefit conferred on Russell Road by Plaintiffs. See Id. Plaintiffs, therefore, conclude in their second claim for relief that Russell Road has been unjustly enriched by accepting and retaining these "benefits" conferred by Plaintiffs. See Id.

At the same time, Plaintiffs' first claim for relief already asserts a claim under the MWA for the recovery of the "benefits" alleged in Plaintiffs Second Claim for Relief. See Third Amended Complaint at 5. As already provided by the Nevada Supreme Court, the MWA and NRS Chapter 608 provide Plaintiffs with an adequate and full remedy at law to sue and recover the "benefits" allegedly owed Plaintiffs. See Nev. Const., Article XV, Sec. 16(B); and NRS 608.260. See also, Perry v. Terrible Herbst, Inc., 132 Nev. Adv. Rep. 75 at *7, 383 P.3d 257, 260 (2016) (determining that claim for failure to pay Nevada's Minimum Wage under the MWA was in reality a claim for back pay under NRS 608.260 and the method for calculating damages is derived directly from the MWA); and Perry, 132 Nev. at *12 (determining that claim for failure to pay Nevada's Minimum Wage under the MWA is subject to a two (2) year statute of limitation as set forth in NRS 608.260).

Additionally, Plaintiffs repeated attempts to "qualify" their second claim for relief as an equitable claim for Unjust Enrichment that only seeks restitution of fees and fines that Russell Road allegedly extracted from Plaintiffs does not permit Plaintiffs to be part of and adequately representing both newly proposed Subclasses. *See* infra. From the onset of this case, Russell Road has objected to and sought the dismissal of Plaintiffs' second claim for relief for Unjust Enrichment since Plaintiffs' cannot recover in equity where Plaintiffs could

⁸ Plaintiffs' second claim for relief specifically incorporates Plaintiffs' general allegations. See Id. at 6.

recover as a matter of law. See e.g., Russell Road's Motion to Dismiss at 20-21. Since that time, however, Plaintiffs repeatedly have attempted to redefine and newly characterize their second claim for relief as an "independent" claim for relief asserted separately from their first claim for relief. See Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery Responses at 6. See also, Reply in Support of Motion for Certification at 10-11. What Plaintiffs have not attempted is to amend their Third Amended Complaint to allege an independent claim for relief. NRCP 15(b) clearly provides that only issues not raised by the pleadings that are not objected to can be treated as part of any pleadings.

Here, Russell Road never has consented, either expressly or by implication, to Plaintiffs' contentions that their second claim for relief is an independent claim separate from Plaintiffs' first claim for relief. Accordingly, Plaintiffs were required by NRCP 15 to amend by motion their Third Amended Complaint to modify their second claim for relief. Plaintiffs have not moved this Court to amend their Third Amended Complaint and the allotted time for doing so has long expired. *See* Stipulation to Extend Discovery.

As a result, Plaintiffs cannot recover under their asserted second claim for relief for Unjust Enrichment as the "benefits" alleged therein are recoverable as a matter of law under their first claim for relief. *See* supra. Consequently, Plaintiffs cannot be part of Plaintiffs' newly proposed second Subclass and more importantly, cannot be deemed to adequately represent the actual members of this newly proposed Subclass since each has the ability to recover at law for an alleged violation of the MWA under their first claim for relief. *See* Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification at 1. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification must be denied.



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#### G. Russell Road Incorporates Its Previously Filed Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification.

Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification does not provide any new evidence or arguments to support Plaintiffs' newly proposed Subclasses or their Renewed Motion for Class Certification. See Renewed Motion for Class Certification at 1-2. Plaintiffs also do not provide any argument or evidence demonstrating that each of Plaintiffs' newly proposed Subclasses meet the requirements for a class action. See Id.

Plaintiffs' sole support for their Renewed Motion for Class Certification is to attach their previously denied and disposed of Motion for Class Certification. See Id. at 2 and Exhibit "B." Only as a precaution, Russell Road hereby incorporates by reference its Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, its Supplemental Brief and the arguments provided therein as further support in opposition to Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification.

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#### V. CONCLUSION

Based on the arguments provided above, Russell Road respectfully requests that this Court deny Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification.

DATED this 26th day of June, 2017.

#### MORAN BRANDON BENDAVID MORAN

/s/ Jeffery A. Bendavid, JEFFERY A. BENDAVID, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 6220 STEPHANIE J. SMITH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11280 630 South 4th Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 384-8424

#### KAMER ZUCKER ABBOTT

/s/ Gregory J. Kamer

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# Exhibit "A"

**CLERK OF THE COURT** 

TRAN

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

ASHLEIGH PARK, et al, CASE NO. A709372 Plaintiffs, DEPT NO. XXXI vs. CRAZY HORSE III GENTLEMAN'S CLUB AT THE PLAYGROUND, et al, Transcript of Defendants. Proceedings

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOANNA KISHNER, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

#### MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

THURSDAY, MARCH 16, 2017

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: LAUREN D. CALVERT, ESQ.

MICHAEL J. RUSING, ESQ.

JEFFERY A. BENDAVID, ESQ. FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

RECORDED BY: RACHELLE HAMILTON, COURT RECORDER

TRANSCRIBED BY: JULIE POTTER, TRANSCRIBER

#### LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, THURSDAY, MARCH 16, 2017, 9:59 A.M.

(Court was called to order)

THE COURT: So we are calling Park versus Crazy Horse Gentleman's Club Playground, pages 1 through 4, 709372.

Counsel, can I get your appearances.

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MS. CALVERT: Lauren Calvert, Bar No. 10534 for plaintiffs.

MR. RUSING: And Mick Rusing pro hac vice.

MR. BENDAVID: Good morning, Your Honor. Jeff Bendavid appearing on behalf of defendants.

THE COURT: Okay. And I do have all counsel representatives for all parties; right? We're not waiting for anyone?

MR. BENDAVID: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. I want to just make sure. Okay. So let's get to what we have. We have a motion to certify the class, and I have an opposition thereto. And then I have supplements and reply supplements and all sorts of goodies.

So, counsel, you're up first. It's your motion.

MR. RUSING: Yes, may it please the Court, Your Honor. My name is Mick Rusing. I'm from Tucson appearing here pro hac vice. We appeared in front of this Court a couple months ago, I guess, and -- on our motion to certify and the Court requested some additional briefing on Senate Bill 224 and its potential implication in the certification issue.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. RUSING: And that has been done.

THE COURT: Appreciate it.

MR. RUSING: These types of employee misclassification cases have been routinely certified, including dancer cases here and throughout the country. Reported cases suggest that those courts could not find any that were denied anywhere.

In fact, one court has called these the most perfect question for class treatment because the reason is that the status is determined by the objective facts that definitionally will apply to all the workers across the board to everybody in that class. And that's what's been admitted here. The defendants have admitted that during the relevant time period the club treated all dancers equally and applied the same policies equally to all of the dancers. So either they're all employees or their not, and that's the issue and that makes it perfect for class certification.

The Court seemed to make it clear at the last hearing that certification was almost a certainty, certainly be appropriate based on existing precedence, but requested a briefing on the 220 -- Senate Bill 224 to see if that somehow impacted your analysis. Now, as we pointed out, we don't believe Senate Bill 224 applies because we're seeking relief under the constitution and not the wage an hour act, and also to the extent they would try and make it apply, it would be barred

1 by constitutional supremacy.

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But even if we were to apply it, certification would still be appropriate because all 224 does is have some list of factors to consider in determining whether or not the answers are employees or something else. The defense arguments really, which I really don't get, is that the plaintiffs must prove liability before they can get class certification. In other words, we have to prove that the dancers are employees before the case can be properly certified when, in fact, that is the issue to be determined upon certification.

And at this juncture the allegations control in any event, and in no instance does someone moving for class certification have to negate affirmative defenses to obtain certification. We believe we're entitled to win the case as a matter of law and we'll probably be filing our own summary judgments. But if the defense felt that they were entitled as a matter of law to win, they've had a year and a half to file their motion for summary judgment and they don't.

So what the Court should do is grant class certification. And then if they feel they have a slam dunk on liability, file their certification. Indeed, that's what they should want to do because then it would be binding on the entire class and not just the class reps.

But the absurdity of what they're arguing, I think, is illustrated by the last line of their supplemental briefing

where it says based on the arguments provided above, defendant respectfully requests that this Court deny plaintiff's motion for certification and subject plaintiffs to the prior application of NRS 608.0155 to determine if plaintiffs are conclusively presumed to be independent contractors.

So the Court is just supposed to sua sponte undertake its own motion for summary judgment or something like that, some sort of springing thing? That's not how it works. If they think that we're independent contractors, they'd move for summary judgment. They haven't. The Court should certify the class because common law facts and laws predominate.

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not individually applied class-wide, and they're the same type of factors just like under the FLSA economic realities test. And even defendants didn't argue that here are some people that won't be employees and here's some that will be. They take the position all dancers are not employees. We take the position that they are employees based on the same facts, the terms and conditions of employment. And those are uniform, undisputed, and will probably be the subject of cross-motions.

The bottom line is, though, they either are or they are not employees and that needs to be decided, but it needs to be decided after certification. They didn't address unjust enrichment at all, and so that should be certified, too. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Appreciate it. 'Okay. So looks like you reserved two and a half minutes for your response. Is that what you've reserved?

MR. RUSING: I believe so, yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Just a moment. Okay. Counsel.

MR. BENDAVID: Good morning, Your Honor. Let me address a couple of the comments. First of all, I think plaintiff's argument, if I was to sum it up, is to say, look, we do this all the time, this is what happens, we file these complaints and then we ask courts to certify them. And then we ask you just to look at the complaint itself, don't look at anything else. Don't look at the case, don't look at any law that may have come up. These cases are always certified, so just certify them and then we'll move on. Because, hey, we want them all to be employees.

So since we want them all to be employees, then that's all we need to do is file a motion and say, hey, Judge, we want them to all be employees so can you please certify this and we can move on. That's really the summary of their argument.

That's all they're saying. Because if you take a look at their original motion for class certification and their supplemental motion --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. BENDAVID: -- what is the one common theme that is all throughout the brief? It's that they didn't provide any

factual determinations whatsoever for you to review. None. They didn't even ask you to review any.

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So there's deposition testimony of all the named plaintiffs. They provided none of that deposition testimony of their own clients. They didn't provide a single affidavit from one. Not from -- there's 11 of them, Your Honor. Not one affidavit from one single dancer, one single plaintiff that says I can adequately represent this class and that these factors apply to me or these factors don't apply to me or here's how it applies. Why didn't they provide that?

Now, Your Honor, in our original -- in our original opposition we argued the case of Schutt (phonetic). And in Schutt says the Court must do an extensive analysis of the facts to determine certification. How can they ask you to do an extensive analysis of the facts of those cases without providing you a single fact for you to look at? The only fact they're stating is what you just heard today from counsel, and what counsel put on its brief. That's it.

They're asking you because they do this all the time that you can ignore this case and just based on the fact that, oh, we're all asking them to be employees, so that's how class certification works. Books and volumes of statutes and cases over the years ignore all those. Because we want them all to be employees, therefore, you should certify. That's they're only argument.

And, Your Honor, when we argued last time and we talked about 608.0155 and its implications of that. They've now jumped to say it's preempted by the Nevada constitution. Well, first of all, it's not, Your Honor. All right. They cite -- they cite Thomas, and we'll talk about Perry in a second.

In the Thomas decision, Your Honor, the court made a specific, very specific finding in Thomas that said they were looking at whether the exemptions listed in NRS 608.250(2)(e) were wiped out by the Nevada Constitution. That's what Thomas reviewed and held that they were supplanted -- that they were repealed and supplanted by the Nevada Constitution. That's a specific finding on those exemptions. And the basis for that exemption -- I'm sorry, the basis for that decision was is that the Nevada constitutional amendment provided its own exemptions to minimum wage and that they conflicted and then were repealed -- were repealed and supplanted.

In the following case, which is Perry versus Terrible Herbst, the court makes an analysis and says, first of all, 608 was not wiped out by the Nevada Constitution and, in fact, adopts 608.250 in statute of limitation of two years and applies it to the Nevada minimum wage constitutional amendment. So we have the Nevada Supreme Court saying it's not wiped out, the Nevada Supreme Court saying it specifically has to conflict, which NRS 608.0155 doesn't conflict in a bit because it has nothing to do with wages for employees. It is a test for an

independent contract. That's what they seem to ignore.

They have filed their motion for classification and ignored the standing Nevada law on independent contractors. Their actual complaint says they are treated as independent contractors, but they should be employees and we're moving to convert that and have this Court make them employees instead of independent contractors. That's the summary of what this case is.

How could you then ignore the Nevada statute that specifically provides a presumption that NRS 608.0155 says they are independent contractors and here is the test for it and lists out three sections and factors that says -- or, I'm sorry, criteria is what they call them, that says you must -- if you have three of these then you're an independent contractor. But it's not necessarily you need all three or you don't need all five. And it's very specific. In fact, one argument says it doesn't even apply to this.

Well, take a look at Section 7 of SB224, Your Honor. Legislature specifically said the amendment provision of this act applied to an action to recover unpaid wages pursuant to Section 16 of Article 15 of the Nevada Constitution. They literally cite it in Section 7 of SB224 that it applies to the Nevada Constitution and/or NRS 608.250 inclusive. The legislature specifically put it right in the -- in -- in SB224 that it applies to the constitutional amendment and NRS 608. So

how can they possibly argue it doesn't apply?

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So what -- our argument, Your Honor, is this. take a look at -- now, we cited -- we provided you a very brief testimony of two of the named plaintiffs. Just two; right? Karina's deposition testimony, she testified to filing her tax Her answer -- and the question she was asked, did you returns. take business write-offs? She answered yes. What type of business write-off? Clothing, accessories, hair color, cuts, hair pieces, makeup, shoes, little pouches to keep my money in, food, alcohol. What about house fees? Yes, house fees. Anything else, the vehicle? Yes, I own a car, correct. have clothing, accessories, hair styling or pieces, makeup, shoes, nails. Okay. What about food, beverages, house fees, and vehicle mileage? Correct.

So she testifies that she took all those as business expenses, which is what an independent contractor would do.

They're running their own business. They took out -- this is -- now, keep in mind, this is one of the plaintiffs that they want to represent a class of potential employees. Okay. How could she adequately represent employees when she herself does not qualify as an employee.

But if you take that aside for just one second, Your Honor, and take a look at Jaqueline Franklin's testimony. Franklin testified that she didn't even file a tax return. She says what about -- the question was, so you lived in Nevada but

no income or tax filing? She says correct. Okay. So what about expense receipts? No, I don't keep those. No, because I never filed taxes. I didn't see a purpose for saving receipts.

Now, look at the difference between two of the eleven named plaintiffs. Just two. They're saying there's hundreds of dancers that could apply to this class certification process, but two of their own named plaintiffs can't adequately represent each other. How could they possibly adequately represent a class? Your Honor, the law requires that there are -- the factors require that there are common issues of law and fact from -- starting with the named representatives to the class.

THE COURT: Okay. Time. That was the end of your argument? That's what I thought. Okay.

MR. BENDAVID: It is. Yes. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You can see I've got a courtroom. And you came first because you each said you'd keep to it.

MR. BENDAVID: You've got it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RUSING: So after all of that, the only distinction he could find was how one dancer treats taxes versus another. What he didn't argue and what there's no law on is whether a person pays taxes, how they pay them, whether they pay them. Interesting, but not a factor under any of the tests for employee-independent contractor, so totally irrelevant.

What you just heard was Crazy Horse's opening argument

on their yet to be filed motion for summary judgment. It went to liability, not to class certification, and they've cited no cases suggesting why cert should be denied under these circumstances. And they never really argued the class reps being inadequate. And what they critically have not done is cited any cases or any reason why this should be the first court to deny class certification in these type of cases. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you so very much. Okay.

Quick question. And I appreciate the answer may be no. Did

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you so very much. Okay.

Quick question. And I appreciate the answer may be no. Did
either of you have a chance to read the case that came out this
morning, Western Cab Company versus Eighth Judicial District,

133 Adv. Op. 10? It was a petition on the minimum wage statute?

MR. BENDAVID: It came out this morning?

THE COURT: Yeah, it came out this morning.

MR. BENDAVID: No, I did not.

MR. RUSING: I was in a sportsbook.

MR. BENDAVID: I wish I had. No, Your Honor.

MS. CALVERT: Would you give us the citation again, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Sure. 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 10 with today's date. The reason why is the Court first has to take into account, and the only reason I'm citing this case is although it was not specifically argued by either of you, and I can appreciate why, is because the issue there was an issue -- and

I'll cite straight from the discussion.

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The issue we are asked -- and this is the Nevada Supreme Court -- the issue we are asked to address are as follows, one, whether the NLRA preempts the MWA minimum wage amendment, whether ERISA preempts the MWA, whether the MWA is void for vagueness, and, four, whether assuming the MWA is valid, fuel costs should be factored. The last one doesn't matter for your purposes, the fuel costs aspects because it was a cab case.

So the reason why the Court has to look at that first is the Court has to look to make sure that the -- one of the provisions in which it is being asserted in this case, whether or not it's viewed as constitutional or unconstitutional, so since the Nevada Supreme Court has said that -- well, I should read the next sentence. After concluding that our intermediate review is warranted, we exercise our discretion to address the validity of each of these statutes to be declined other than the fuel one.

And so basically it concludes that all three standards haven't met the -- and none of the -- none -- it's not preempted. Minimum wage amendment, alive and well, is not preempted on any of the bases raised in the petition. So the Court a) has to find out what the statute -- excuse me, I said statute, I mean to say constitutional amendment is constitutional, right.

So that's just not for purposes of either of your argument, but if there had been a difference in the Court's ruling then, of course, the Court would have had to, unfortunately, ask you to do additional briefing on the impact of this -- of that ruling in this case. But the Court did not find -- the Court finds that it's consistent with the status of the law as the pleadings are before the Court, and so the Court can now move forward to the merits of the case.

The Court is appreciative of all of the arguments raised by each of the parties. The Court is appreciative of the supplemental briefing provided by this -- these parties. And I will tell you, part of the briefing really, in looking at the deposition testimony of some of the actual specific lead, currently named lead plaintiffs and potential class, the Court is going to have to deny without prejudice the motion for class certification because based on the -- I have to look at SB224. The Court does find that SB224 does apply to this case.

Alternatively, even if SB224 does not apply to this case, the Court's analysis, what I'm about to say, would be the same. But I think SB224 gives me further support, so these are two alternatives. If we're looking at SB224 in the totality of the pleadings, then the Court would find that based on the own — potential class representatives' own statements, they in and of themselves would not meet the standard for class representatives at this juncture, so the Court would deny it

without prejudice.

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And then even in the absence of look at SB224, the Court's analysis would be the same. While the Court is cognizant of the low threshold with regards to class certification, there has to be something that the representatives are already in the category in which they're seeking to represent individuals. And here, at least what I have from excerpts, and I don't have any response that says that these excerpts are incorrect or should be interpreted differently.

Now, I'm appreciative that part of the oral argument was the fact that the Court shouldn't consider how someone treats their taxes for purposes of the analysis. The Court is not looking at how they treat their taxes. The Court is looking at whether or not these individuals are considering for their own purposes that they would be similarly situated to the very class that they're seeking to represent, and that information provided in their undisputed deposition testimony shows that they would not.

So, therefore, the Court will deny without prejudice at this juncture the motion for class certification, and I'm going to ask counsel for defense to please prepare the order, circulate it to all counsels, and provide it back to the Court.

MR. BENDAVID: I will, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. EDCR 7.21, to let you know, 10

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days. Thank you so very much.
              MR. BENDAVID: Thank you, Your Honor.
 2
              MS. CALVERT: Thank you, Your Honor.
 3
              MR. RUSING: Thank you.
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 5
                  (Proceedings concluded at 10:18 a.m.)
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#### CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

### **AFFIRMATION**

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

Julie Potter Kingman, AZ 86402 (702) 635-0301

> JULIE POTTER TRANSCRIBER

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Page 1 of 11

## 1 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED MOTION FOR CLASS **CERTIFICATION** 2 Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, hereby move the 3 Honorable Court for an Order Certifying this Action as a Class Action under NRCP 23(b)(3), 4 5 designating Plaintiffs as the Class Representatives, and Appointing Plaintiffs' Attorneys of Record 6 as Class Counsel. 7 This Reply is based upon the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities and any 8 oral argument this Court may wish to entertain at the hearing of this Motion. 9 DATED this 3rd day of July, 2017. 10 11 MORRIS ANDERSON 12 By: /s/ Lauren Calvert RYAN M. ANDERSON, ESQ. 13 Nevada Bar No.: 11040 LAUREN CALVERT, ESQ. 14 Nevada Bar No.: 10534 15 716 S. Jones Blvd. Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 16 P. ANDREW STERLING, ESQ. 17 Nevada Bar No.: 13769 18 MICHAEL J. RUSING, ESO. AZ Bar No.: 6617 (Admitted Pro Hac Vice) 19 RUSING LOPEZ & LIZARDI, PLLC 6363 N. Swan Road, Ste. 151 20 Tucson, AZ 85718 21 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

### **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

Plaintiffs previously moved this Honorable Court under NRCP 23(a) and 23(b)(3) for class certification. The Court in its April 6, 2017 order denying Plaintiffs' class certification motion without prejudice recognized "the low threshold with regards to class certification" but nevertheless determined that "the potential class representatives' own statements made as part of their individual depositions, in themselves, do not meet the standard for class representation at this juncture." Order at 3:19-20. See also id. at 3:25-4:2 (concluding certain deposition testimony indicates Plaintiffs not "similarly situated to the very class they are seeking to represent."). The Court relied upon excerpts of deposition testimony provided by Defendant in its reasoning. See Transcript, attached to Defendant's Opposition as Exhibit A, at 15. Those excerpts and the oral argument thereon notably, and almost exclusively, concerned income reported or taxes paid or business expense write-offs taken. See id. at 10:2-11:11 and 11:19-24.

Plaintiffs filed their pending Motion for Class Certification, curing the inadequacies the Court identified in the prior motion. Defendants (the Club) raise six arguments in opposition to Plaintiffs' renewed motion for class certification. *See* Oppo. at Sec. IV.A-F. This reply addresses each argument in turn.

#### 1. Basis for Denial of Plaintiffs' Initial Class Certification Motion

The Court denied Plaintiffs' first class certification motion without prejudice because "the potential class representatives' own statements made as part of their individual depositions, in themselves, do not meet the standard for class representation at this juncture." Order at 3:19-20. The Club suggest the Court in this Order meant to deny the certification motion because "Plaintiffs' deposition testimony, which included statements about Plaintiffs' taxes, prevented them from being part of a proposed class of alleged employees. . . because [the testimony] would result in Plaintiffs

being conclusively presumed independent contractors . . . [and] not part of the class of employees proposed by Plaintiffs." Oppo. at 10:3-12.

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, suggest the Court denied the first certification motion because, as the Club argued in opposing that motion, plaintiffs' deposition testimony regarding how they filed taxes while working at the club impacts whether or not a particular dancer would meet the requirements for independent contractor status set forth in NRS 608.0155(1)(a) (asking whether "the person possesses or has applied for an employer identification number or social security number or has filed an income tax return for a business or earnings from self-employment with the Internal Revenue Service in the previous year"). *See* Renewed Cert. Mot. at 4:13-25. Limiting the class definition to holders of social security numbers resolves any Rule 23 issues that might arise in applying NRS 608.0155(a). Because all Plaintiffs possess a social security number, it does not matter if they applied for an EIN or social security number or if they filed an income tax return related to business or self-employment income. Plaintiffs thus are clearly included in the revised class definitions and therefore are adequate representatives of the proposed classes.

Both interpretations are facially plausible, but the Club's interpretation cannot be squared with the fact that the Court denied the motion without prejudice, i.e., with the express understanding that Plaintiffs could cure the defect in the motion and move again for class certification. If the Court believed it was appropriate to deny certification based on an analysis of the merits of the named plaintiffs' claims (i.e., based on a determination Plaintiffs' own sworn deposition testimony established they were independent contractors as a matter of law) then the Court presumably would have denied the certification motion with prejudice, which it did not do.

The Club's interpretation also would be clearly erroneous since no provision of NRS Chapter 608 or the Minimum Wage Amendment suggests the subjective intent of a putative employee is relevant in determining employee status. Nev. Const. Art. 15, § 16; *see also Brennan v. Partida*, 492

F.2d 707, 709 (5th Cir. 1974) (subjective intent of parties irrelevant for determining employee classification under minimum wage statutes). Also, denying class certification on the ground that the putative class representatives were not employees would be an improper merits determination. *See Stockwell v. City & Cty. of San Francisco*, 749 F.3d 1107, 1113–14 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding trial court abused discretion in denying class certification "because of its legal error of evaluating merits questions, rather than focusing on whether the questions presented, whether meritorious or not, were common to the members of the putative class.") (construing analogous federal rule).

The subjective intent of an individual Plaintiff is not determinative of either the central issue of law (employee status) or establishing the existence of fact, and variations in fact patterns or inconsistencies are common and not fatal. *Harris v. Vector Marketing Corp.*, 753 F.Supp.2d 996, 1015 (N.D. Cal. 2010), *quoting Lapin v. Goldman Sachs & Co.*, 254 F.R.D. 168, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).; *Dial Corp.*, 314 F.R.D. at 114 (citations omitted). Indeed, even if a plaintiff believed that Defendant had the right to force her to contractually waive employee status and agree to be an independent contractor, and even if she thought such a contract would be binding, that does not make it so. Plaintiffs cannot waive their minimum wage rights under the Nevada Constitution. Their subjective beliefs on this point are irrelevant. "Defendants' assertion that various class representatives demonstrated an insufficient understanding of the case — regardless of its truth — does not preclude a finding of adequacy." *Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp.*, 222 F.3d 52, 61 (2d Cir. 2000) (disapproving of "attacks on the adequacy of a class representative based on the representative's ignorance").

¹ To the extent that that any class member would rather remain the victim of an unlawful practice, she does not have a recognizable "conflict" with the class representative. *See, e.g., In Re Potash Litig.*, 159 F.R.D. 682, 692–93 (D. Minn. 1995) ("Assuming, as we must, that the allegations in the Plaintiffs' Complaint are true, the fact that an *illegally* controlled potash market tends to favor the long-term interests of several large members of the putative class is not sufficient to prevent class certification. *This is not an interest the law is willing to protect.*") (emphases added). Additionally, in the context of class actions under Rule 23(b)(3), the rule's "opt out" mechanism provides a convincing argument against such attacks on adequacy. *See, e.g., White v. Imperial Adjustment Corp.*, 2002 WL 1809084, at *13 (E.D. La. Aug. 6, 2002) ("[S]ince this is a 23(b)(3) class, dissatisfied class members have a right to opt out of the class").

Deposition testimony alluding to Plaintiffs' believing a lie (that they signed a binding agreement to waive minimum wage) does not alter facts or law, and could not have been the basis of the order denying class certification. There is no requirement that Plaintiffs know every detail of the case and technical argument of counsel. *See Iglesias-Mendoza v. La Belle Farm, Inc.*, 239 F.R.D. 363, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("For the legal underpinnings of their claims, plaintiffs are entitled to rely on the expertise of their counsel."); *Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp.*, 383 U.S. 363, 373 (1966) (Rule 23 was "designed in large part to get away from . . . prevent[ing] unsophisticated litigants from ever having their day in court"). That Defendant hints this Court previously required otherwise is ludicrous.

# 2. The Court's Prerogative to Certify a Class and/or Subclasses is Governed by NRCP 23, Not by the Content of the Complaint

The Club next suggests, oddly, that the Court is bound in making its class certification decision to the class proposed in the complaint. *See* Oppo. at IV.B. Of course, the plain mandate of Rule 23 imposes no such meaningless obstacle to its utilization. *Cf.* NRCP 1 (procedural rules "shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."). To the contrary, NRCP 23 clearly states it applies to all actions, like this one, that are "brought as a class action." NRCP 23(c)(1). Rule 23 also clearly grants the trial court broad discretion to determine how, exactly, the class action shall proceed, including by created subclasses where necessary. *See* NRCP 23(c)(4)(B) (granting court authority divide class into subclasses). *See also* 

Allen v. Holiday Universal, 249 F.R.D. 166, 171 (E.D. Pa. 2008) ("Modifying a class definition is contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1), and a court "is not bound by the class definition proposed in the complaint." (*quoting Robidoux v. Celani*, 987 F.2d 931, 937 (2d Cir.1993); Newberg on Class Actions § 7:27 (noting Rule 23 "simply requires

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that the court, in its certification decision, clearly state the precise contours of the class.") (collecting cases).

## 3. The Rule 23 Certification Requirements Are Satisfied

Plaintiffs in their first certification briefing reviewed at great length why all Rule 23(a) prerequisites were met and why certification was appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3) for both claims. See generally Mot. at Ex. B-D. The Court in its Order identified one and only one problem with the motion: "the potential class representatives' own statements made as part of their individual depositions, in themselves, do not meet the standard for class representation at this juncture." Order at 3:18-20. This specific issue was addressed in the renewed certification motion. The Order identified no problem with any of the Rule 23 prerequisites or Rule 23(b)(3) requirements. Clearly the Court's order should be interpreted according to the fundamental rule of statutory construction that "[t]he mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another." In re Estate of Prestie, 122 Nev. 807, 814, 138 P.3d 520, 524 (2006); see also Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 26, 422 P.2d 237, 246 (1967) ("The maxim 'Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius,' the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another, has been repeatedly confirmed in this State."). If the Court had any issue with the certification motion beyond the one issue specifically identified in its Order, presumably it would have said so. Accordingly, Plaintiffs appropriately incorporated the previous briefing into the extant motion and attached copies for the Court's reference. See Renewed Mot. at 5:13-17.

## 4. The Motion for Class Certification is Timely

The Club correctly notes NRCP 23(c)(1) provides that a determination on class action status is to be made "as soon as possible after the commencement of an action brought as a class action." Oppo. at 16:2-6. But the Club's suggestion that this provision creates a hard time limit for making this determination borders on frivolous. The Club cites no authority in support of this interpretation and suggests no possible rationale as to why this general provision should be so interpreted. In fact,

courts routinely certify classes at all stages of litigation up to a final trial on the merits. *See* Newberg on Class Actions § 7:11 (collecting cases).²

# 5. No final merits determination has been reached because there are pending motions for summary judgment and no final judgment has been entered

As noted in Section D, above, courts do not like to certify classes after entry of a final judgment on the merits to prevent so-called "one-way intervention." But no final judgment has been entered in this case and, in fact, there are cross-motions for summary judgment on the merits currently pending. Plaintiffs' filed the pending renewed class certification motion on June 7, 2017. The parties subsequently filed pending cross-motions for summary judgment several weeks later on June 19, 2017, consistent with the reasonable assumption that the Court will hear and decide the class certification motion before it hears and decides the summary judgment motions. This timetable accords perfectly with the text and policy goals of Rule 23. *See Wallace B. Roderick Revocable Living Trust v. XTO Energy, Inc.*, No. 08-1330-JTM-KMH, 2015 WL 790081, at *2 (D. Kan. Feb. 25, 2015) (deciding, as a matter of efficiency and discretion, to "stay a ruling on plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment until determining pending [contemporaneously-filed] motion for class certification.").

# 6. Merits-based Arguments Against Certification Is Improper

Plaintiffs' complaint alleges two counts: a claim for back wages under the Minimum Wage Amendment and a claim for unjust enrichment. As the Court noted in denying the Club's motion to dismiss the unjust enrichment claim, the complaint "states a claim for unjust enrichment by, inter

² Newburg goes on to note that, while nothing in Rule 23 prohibits post-trial certification, "[c]ourts do not like to certify a class after a trial on the merits because it appears to enable so-called 'one-way intervention' whereby class members are placed in a 'win-win' situation: if the ruling goes against the named plaintiff, then others can 'opt out' of the class and not be bound by that adverse decision, and if the ruling is favorable, then others can 'opt-in' to the class knowing that the defendant's liability has already been established." Newberg on Class Actions § 7:11 (collecting cases).

alia, alleging Defendant improperly imposed various fees and fines on Plaintiffs as a condition of employment, and required Plaintiffs to give money to managers and other employees," June 25, 2015 Order, at 26:17-21. The Club in its opposition brief does not argue this claim fails to meet any requirement imposed by Rule 23, and for good reason: "Where state common law includes an unjust enrichment action like Nevada's, courts have usually granted class certification." Sobel v. Hertz. Corp., 291 F.R.D. 525, 543 (D. Nev. 2013). Rather than focus on the Rule 23 analysis, the Club instead improperly argues that certification should be denied because, in its view, the claim will not succeed on the merits. See Oppo. at 19:15-18 (arguing "none of these Plaintiffs can recover on a claim for unjust enrichment."). This merits argument is appropriately raised in the Club's pending summary judgment motion. See Def. MSJ at pp.26-28. The issue is not appropriately raised in opposition to a class certification motion. See Sargeant v. Henderson Taxi, 394 P.3d 1215, 1219 (Nev. 2017) (noting NRCP 23 "grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage" and that "merits questions may be considered to the extent—but only to the extent—that they are relevant to determine whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.").

### 7. Plaintiffs Did Not Need to Seek Leave Before Filing the Instant Motion

Defendant's Hail Mary attempt premised on EDCR 2.24(a) is unavailing. The initial motion for class certification was denied without prejudice. Plaintiffs brought their current motion for class certification addressing and curing the potential deficiency by creating a sub-class and conceding they meet NRS 608.0155(a)'s criteria in that they all possess social security numbers. This has been evidenced by unsworn declarations attached to Plaintiffs' current motion, as addressed in Plaintiffs' opposition to Defendant's motion to strike. *See* Unsworn Declarations, attached hereto Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike, filed on the same date as this Reply.

### **CONCLUSION**

The only relevant part of the Club's opposition is the section purporting to interpret the scope of this Court's order denying the previous class certification motion without prejudice. No other section raises an argument even remotely supported by the text or policy goals of Rule 23. If, as the Club maintains, this Court denied class certification because the plaintiffs' deposition testimony established conclusively that they have no claim against the Club, the Court should reconsider whether it is appropriate to make such a merits-based determination at the certification stage and, if this is the Court's position, it should deny the renewed certification motion with prejudice. If, as Plaintiffs maintain, the Court denied the certification solely because the proposed class definition was problematic, the Court should certify the proposed revised subclasses and move on to address the merits of the class claims presented, appropriately, in the pending cross-motions for summary judgment.

DATED this <u>3rd</u> day of July, 2017.

### **MORRIS ANDERSON**

By: /s/Lauren Calvert

RYAN M. ANDERSON, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 11040

LAUREN CALVERT, ESQ.

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Las Vegas, Nevada 89107

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE			
2	Pursuant to NRCP 5, NEFCR 9 and EDCR 8.05, I hereby certify that I am an employee of			
3	MORRIS ANDERSON, and on the 3rd day of July, 2017, I served the foregoing <i>REPLY IN</i>			
4	SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION as follows			
5 6	Electronic Service – By serving a copy thereof through the Court's electronic			
7	service system; and/or			
8	U.S. Mail—By depositing a true copy thereof in the U.S. mail, first class postage prepaid and addressed as listed below; and/or			
9	Facsimile—By facsimile transmission pursuant to EDCR 7.26 to the facsimile			
10	number(s) shown below and in the confirmation sheet filed herewith. Consent to service under NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) shall be assumed unless an objection to service by			
11	facsimile transmission is made in writing and sent to the sender via facsimile within 24 hours of receipt of this Certificate of Service.			
12	Gregory J. Kamer, Esq.			
13	KAMER ZUCKER ABBOTT 3000 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite 3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102			
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15	Jeffery A. Bendavid, Esq.			
16	MORAN BRANDON BENDAVID MORAN 630 S. 4th Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101			
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18	Attorneys for Defendants			
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20	/s/ Erickson Finch An employee/agent of MORRIS//ANDERSON			
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Page 11 of 11

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Page 1 of 6

## 1 PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT RUSSELL ROAD FOOD AND BEVERAGE, LLC'S MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED MOTION FOR 2 CLASS CERTIFICATION AND MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' DECLARATIONS ON AN ORDER SHORTENING TIME 3 Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, hereby file their 4 5 Opposition to Defendant Russell Road Food and Beverage, LLC's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' 6 Renewed Motion for Class Certification and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Declarations on Order 7 Shortening Time. This Opposition is based upon the following Memorandum of Points and 8 Authorities and any oral argument this Court may wish to entertain at the hearing of this Motion. 9 DATED this 3rd day of July, 2017. 10 11 MORRIS ANDERSON 12 By: /s/ Lauren Calvert RYAN M. ANDERSON, ESQ. 13 Nevada Bar No.: 11040 LAUREN CALVERT, ESQ. 14 Nevada Bar No.: 10534 15 716 S. Jones Blvd. Las Vegas, Nevada 89107 16 P. ANDREW STERLING, ESQ. 17 Nevada Bar No.: 13769 18 MICHAEL J. RUSING, ESO. AZ Bar No.: 6617 (Admitted Pro Hac Vice) 19 RUSING LOPEZ & LIZARDI, PLLC 6363 N. Swan Road, Ste. 151 20 Tucson, AZ 85718 21 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

### MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

This Court previously denied Plaintiffs' motion for class certification without prejudice and in its order identified, as orders do, specific reasons why the motion was denied. Plaintiffs submitted a renewed class certification motion addressing the concerns raised in the Court's order and, in the interests of efficiency, incorporated by reference the initial class certification motion to re-state for the Court all of the grounds for class certification presented therein. The Club, predictably enough, doesn't think much of Plaintiffs' renewed motion for class certification. The rules of procedure conveniently provide a mechanism for expressing that displeasure in the form of an opposition brief. And, in fact, the Club has filed an opposition brief thus appropriately teeing up the matter (with the soon-to-be-filed reply) for a hearing and, ultimately, the Court's ruling.

But, inexplicably, the Club's counsel also has seen fit to clog this Court's busy docket and waste the parties' time and money with an overly-zealous "motion to strike" Plaintiffs' renewed class certification motion as a "fugitive document." Of course, Plaintiffs' motion is not "fugitive" – it is clearly is authorized by NRCP 23(c). And, more pointedly, the Nevada Supreme Court for good reason "has repeatedly condemned the practice of a motion to strike a motion." *Gull v. Hoalst*, 77 Nev. 54, 57, 359 P.2d 383, 384 (1961); *see also Lux v. Lux*, 66 Nev. 337, 338–39, 210 P.2d 212, 212 (1949) (striking motion to strike a motion and noting, with irritation, "[w]e have repeatedly held that it is bad practice to file a motion to strike a motion.").

Beyond the annoying impropriety of moving to strike a duly-filed motion, the Club's argument is based on the patently incorrect assumption that the renewed motion is identical to the previous motion and, therefore, in reality is a mislabeled and improper motion for reconsideration. See Mot. at sec. IV.A. Of course, the Club here is simply wrong. Plaintiffs have carefully tailored the renewed motion for class certification to address the problems identified by this Court in its previous order denying class certification without prejudice. If the Club disagrees with Plaintiffs'

interpretation of the order or with any other aspect of the renewed motion, the "good practice" is to raise those arguments in its opposition brief (which it has done).

The Club also raises two objections to the declarations submitted in support of the renewed motion. See Mot. to Strike at Sec. IV.C. First, the Club notes that the declarations do not comport with EDCR 2.21(a) because they do not state that they are made "under penalty of perjury." Id. at 14:15-25. This point is well-taken (although it should have been raised in the opposition or, better yet, taken care of with a simple phone call). Revised declarations addressing this clerical oversight are filed herewith. See Revised Declarations, attached hereto as "Exhibit 1."

Second, the Club suggests, oddly and with no citation to legal authority, that a party cannot submit declarations or otherwise offer testimony beyond deposition testimony after discovery has closed. Id. at 15:14-24. Discovery is a time for parties to discover information from the other side. As part of discovery, the Club had the opportunity to depose and did in fact depose each Plaintiff. But the burden is on the party taking the deposition to determine what questions to ask and what topics to cover. A party is under no obligation to offer unsolicited opinions or thoughts at a deposition, nor is a party's testimony limited in any way to the topics covered or statements made during the deposition.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny the Club's "Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Renewed Class Certification Motion" and make clear in its order that a motion to strike a motion is bad practice, plain and simple.

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1	DATED this <u>3rd</u> day of Ju	lly, 2017.
2		MORRIS ANDERSON
3		By: <u>/s/ Lauren Calvert</u>
4		RYAN M. ANDERSON, ESQ.
5		Nevada Bar No.: 11040 <b>LAUREN CALVERT, ESQ.</b>
6		Nevada Bar No.: 10534
7		716 S. Jones Blvd. Las Vegas, Nevada 89107
8		
		P. ANDREW STERLING, ESQ. Nevada Bar No.: 13769
9		MICHAEL J. RUSING, ESQ.
10		AZ Bar No.: 6617 (Admitted Pro Hac Vice) RUSING LOPEZ & LIZARDI, PLLC
11		6363 N. Swan Road, Ste. 151
12		Tucson, AZ 85718
13		Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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1	<u>CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE</u>			
2	Pursuant to NRCP 5, NEFCR 9 and EDCR 8.05, I hereby certify that I am an employee of			
3	MORRIS ANDERSON, and on the <u>3rd</u> day of July, 2017, I served the foregoing <i>PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT RUSSELL ROAD FOOD AND BEVERAGE, LLC'S MOTION</i>			
4				
5	TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION AND			
6				
7	MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' DECLARATIONS ON AN ORDER SHORTENING TIME			
8	as follows:			
9   10	Electronic Service – By serving a copy thereof through the Court's electronic service system; and/or			
11	U.S. Mail—By depositing a true copy thereof in the U.S. mail, first class postage prepaid and addressed as listed below; and/or  Facsimile—By facsimile transmission pursuant to EDCR 7.26 to the facsimile			
12				
13	number(s) shown below and in the confirmation sheet filed herewith. Consent to service under NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) shall be assumed unless an objection to service by facsimile transmission is made in writing and sent to the sender via facsimile within 24 hours of receipt of this Certificate of Service.			
14 15				
16	Gregory J. Kamer, Esq. KAMER ZUCKER ABBOTT			
17	3000 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite 3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102			
18	Jeffery A. Bendavid, Esq. MORAN BRANDON BENDAVID MORAN			
19				
20	630 S. 4th Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101			
21				
22	Attorneys for Defendants			
23	/s/Erickson Finch			
24	An employee/agent of MORRIS//ANDERSON			
25				
26				
27				
28				

# EXHIBIT 1

# **DECLARATION OF KARINA STRELKOVA**

- I, KARINA STRELKOVA, Plaintiff in Case No.: A-14-709372-C, currently before the Eighth Judicial District Court, declare as follows:
  - 1. I possess a social security number.
  - 2. I have worked at the Club as a dancer many times after November 2, 2012.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated this 31 day of May, 2017.

KARINA STRELKOVA

**Electronically Filed** 7/6/2017 3:18 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

**RPLY** 1 JEFFERY A. BENDAVID, ESQ. 2 Nevada Bar No. 6220 STEPHANIE J. SMITH, ESQ. 3 Nevada Bar No. 11280 MORAN BRANDON BENDAVID MORAN 4 630 South 4th Street 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 j.bendavid@moranlawfirm.com 6 s.smith@moranlawfirm.com (702) 384-8424 7 8 GREGORY J. KAMER, ESO. Nevada Bar No. 0270 KAITLIN H. ZIEGLER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 013625 10 KAMER ZUCKER ABBOTT 11 3000 W. Charleston Blvd., #3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 12 (702) 259-8640 Attorneys for Russell Road Food and Beverage, LLC 13 14 **DISTRICT COURT** 15 JACQUELINE FRANKLIN, ASHLEIGH 16

**CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 

PARK, LILY SHEPARD, STACIE ALLEN, MICHAELA DIVINE, SAMANTHA JONES, KARINA STRELKOVA, and DANIELLE LAMAR, individually, and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs,

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RUSSELL ROAD FOOD AND BEVERAGE. LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability company (d/b/a CRAZY HORSE III GENTLEMEN'S CLUB), SN INVESTMENT PROPERTIES, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company (d/b/a CRAZY HORSE III GENTLEMEN'S CLUB), DOE CLUB OWNER, I-X, ROE CLUB OWNER, I-X, and ROE EMPLOYER, I-X,

Defendants.

Case No.: A-14-709372-C

Dept. No.: 31

DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT, RUSSELL ROAD FOOD AND BEVERAGE, LLC'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO N.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) AND N.R.C.P. 12(h)(3)

**Date: July 11, 2017** 

Time: 9:30 a.m.

RAN BRANDON DAVID MORAN ITORNEYS AT LAW

AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS

# <u>DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT, RUSSELL ROAD FOOD AND BEVERAGE, LLC'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO N.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) and N.R.C.P. 12(h)(3)</u>

COMES NOW, Defendant/Counterclaimant, RUSSELL ROAD FOOD AND BEVERAGE, LLC, a Nevada limited liability, dba CRAZY HORSE III GENTLEMEN'S CLUB, (the "Defendant" and/or "Russell Road"), by and through its counsel of record, GREGORY J. KAMER, ESQ., and KAITLIN H. ZIEGLER, ESQ., of KAMER ZUCKER ABBOTT, and JEFFERY A. BENDAVID, ESQ., and STEPHANIE J. SMITH, ESQ. of MORAN BRANDON BENDAVID MORAN, and hereby submits its Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint Pursuant to N.R.C.P. 12 (b)(1) and N.R.C.P. 12(h)(3).

DATED this 6th day of July, 2017

#### MORAN BRANDON BENDAVID MORAN

/s/ Jeffery A. Bendavid,

JEFFERY A. BENDAVID, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 6220

STEPHANIE J. SMITH, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 11280
630 South 4th Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

## KAMER ZUCKER ABBOTT

/s/ Gregory J. Kamer
GREGORY J. KAMER, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 0270
KAITLIN H. ZIEGLER, ESQ.
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# **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

## I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs, JACQUELINE FRANKLIN, ASHLEIGH PARK, LILY SHEPARD, SAMANTHA JONES, KARINA STRELKOVA, STACIE ALLEN, MICHAELA MOORE, and DANIELLE LAMAR (the "Plaintiffs") had the burden of demonstrating with actual evidence that this Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of each of Plaintiffs' Complaints. Instead of meeting this required burden, Plaintiffs' Opposition contains nothing more than an incoherent collection of overturned, misapplied, misconstrued, contradictory, and outright false legal citations and conclusions that have no basis in law or the facts of this case. As explained below, Plaintiffs' Opposition has not refuted a single fact or argument set forth in Russell Road's Motion to Dismiss, let alone demonstrated that this Court has the requisite jurisdiction over any of Plaintiffs' individual matters. As a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Complaint must be dismissed pursuant to N.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) and N.R.C.P. 12(h)(3).

# II. ARGUMENT

A. Only Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint Can Be Considered to Determine Jurisdiction and Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint Fails To Demonstrate That This Court Has Jurisdiction Over the Subject Of This Matter.

The Nevada Constitution provides that district courts <u>do not have</u> original jurisdiction over actions that fall within the original jurisdiction of the justices' courts. *See Nev. Const. art. 6, § 6.* NRS 4.370(1) confers original jurisdiction upon justices' courts over civil actions for damages or fines, if such damages or fines, without interest, do not exceed \$10,000. Thus, Nevada district courts only have original jurisdiction over civil actions for damages and fines that exceed \$10,000. *See* NRS 4.370(1). Consequently, N.R.C.P. 8(a)(2) requires

Plaintiffs to include in their Complaint a demand for damages or relief that is "in excess of \$10,000" in order to demonstrate that this District Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' matter.

Here, Plaintiffs <u>have not demonstrated</u> in their Third Amended Complaint that this Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' matter because Plaintiffs have not asserted any allegations that Plaintiffs are entitled to damages in excess of \$10,000. *See generally*, Third Amended Complaint. Further, Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint has not asserted any other claims or allegations that would provide this Court with subject matter jurisdiction. *See* Id.

Plaintiffs conceded in their Opposition that their Third Amended Complaint does not make this required assertions of subject matter jurisdiction. *See* Opposition at 9. To the contrary, Plaintiffs' Opposition contends that their original Complaint and their First Amended Complaint alleged damages in excess of \$10,000. *See* Id. at 8-9. Plaintiffs, therefore, incorrectly conclude in their Opposition that they sufficiently have established that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction because their Complaint and First Amended Complaint made such allegations. *See* Id.

Plaintiffs' conclusion is incorrect because it is well established Nevada law and the law of other jurisdictions that an amended complaint <u>supersedes</u> an original complaint and any prior amendments thereto, rendering each "nugatory." *Randono v. Ballow*, 100 Nev. 142, 143, 676 P.2d 807, 807 (1984). *See also, e.g., Associated Aviation Underwriters, Inc., v. Vegas Jet, LLC*, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1054 (D. Nev. 2000)) ("The amended complaint is in itself a full, distinct, and complete pleading and <u>entirely supersedes the original</u>."); *Burlington Northern Railroad Company vs. Estates of Red Wolf and Bull Tail*, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23543 at *5

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(D. Mont. 1998) (*quoting Bullen v. De Brettevilee*, 239 F.2d 824, 832 (9th Cir. 1956)) ("an amended pleading supersedes the original, the latter being treated as non-existent"); and *Rasidescu v. Midland Credit Management, Inc.*, 435 F. Supp. 2d 1090, (S.D. Ca. 2006) (*citing King v. Dogan*, 31 F. 3d 344, 346 (4th Cir. 1994)) (once filed an amended complaint supersedes the original; it must stand or fall on its own; <u>jurisdictional and other allegations essential to a claim must be realleged; and the original complaint is rendered irrelevant</u>). Once an amended complaint is filed, it "becomes the only complaint in the action," and the action proceeds as if the prior complaints never existed. *E.g., Shelley v. Shelley*, 688 N.Y.S. 2d 439, 442 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999). *See also, Plaza PH2001 LLC v. Plaza Residential Owner LP*, 947 N.Y.S. 2d 498, 505 (N.Y. App. 2012).

As plainly demonstrated by the numerous legal references above¹, Plaintiffs' original Complaint, their First Amended Complaint, and their Second Amended Complaints were superseded by Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint. See supra. As a result, each was rendered "nugatory" and for purposes of determining subject matter jurisdiction, simply are non-existent and cannot be considered. See Id. Thus, the only complaint of Plaintiffs that exists here is Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint and is, in the language of Plaintiffs' Opposition, the only complaint available for consideration of jurisdiction "at the commencement of Plaintiffs' action." Id.

Russell Road's Motion to Dismiss establishes, and as conceded in Plaintiffs' Opposition, that Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint, on its face, does not assert any claim

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There are dozens and dozens of cases all supporting the same legal tenet. Despite Plaintiffs' burden, Plaintiffs' Opposition fails to acknowledge or reference any of these cases, provide any argument in opposition, or attempt to distinguish the facts of their case against this completely settled law. *See generally*, Plaintiffs' Opposition.

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nor assert any allegation of damages (i.e., "in excess of \$10,000.00") that grants this Court iurisdiction over the subject matter². See generally, Third Amended Complaint. See also, Opposition at 9. Cf. Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 (2006) (jurisdiction properly invoked from Plaintiffs' Complaint and therefore, prevented dismissal because of subsequent events). Thus, Plaintiffs never properly invoked jurisdiction from the commencement of their action and absent such claims or allegations this Court does not have and in fact, never had jurisdiction over the subject matter. See Morrison v. Beach City LLC, 116 Nev. 34, 36-37, 991 P.2d 982, 983 (2000) ("Legal Certainty Test" adopted and applied only where it cannot be determined from the face of the pleading if subject matter jurisdiction exists). See also, Royal Insurance v. Eagle Valley Construction, Inc., 110 Nev. 119, 120, 867 P.2d 1146, 1147 (1994) (dismissed claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because claimed damages were less than jurisdictional amount required); and e.g., Penrose v. Fritsch, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145667, at *3 (D. Nev. 2014) (Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) is appropriate if the complaint fails to allege facts on its face sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction).

Therefore, Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint must be dismissed pursuant to N.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3), since Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint fails on its face to establish that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction.

# B. Nevada Law Prohibits Plaintiffs From Including Any Allegations Of Attorneys' Fees To Establish Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs' Opposition argues that its demand for attorneys' fees should be taken into account in assessing whether this Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter. Opposition at 5 and 10. To support this argument, Plaintiffs cite to a series of federal cases

² Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint also does not incorporate any past claims or allegations. See Id.



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that permit a federal court the discretion to include attorneys' fees in determining the amount in controversy if a statute authorizes an award of attorneys' fees. *See* Id. at 5 (*citing e.g.*, *Goldberg v. CPC International, Inc.*, 678 F.2d 1365, 1367 (9th Cir. 1982).

Plaintiffs' reliance on federal law is misplaced. The federal cases relied upon by Plaintiffs are concerned with establishing the "amount in controversy" in federal diversity actions or state actions being removed to a federal court. *Gibson v. Chrysler Corp.*, 261 F.3d 927, 942-43 (9th Cir. 2001). For purposes of determining the "amount in controversy," federal courts routinely consider the value of the claim of a plaintiff, which may include more than just the alleged damages, to determine whether a plaintiff's complaint exceeds the threshold amount in controversy. *See e.g., Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp.*, 506 F.3d 696, at 700 and at 700 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2007) (recognizing the dispute between total amount of a claim versus only damages in determining amount in controversy).

Plaintiffs' case has no relationship whatsoever to federal cases concerning themselves with removal or diversity jurisdiction. *See generally*, Third Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs' action purely is a Nevada action and as such, jurisdiction over the subject matter is specified by statute *See* NRS 4.370(1). *See also, Kell v. State*, 96 Nev. 791, 792-793, 618 P. 2d 350, 351 (1980) (a court created by statute has only the authority given to it by the statute).

Also, unlike the federal cases incorrectly relied upon by Plaintiffs, Nevada law does not have any dispute over what may be considered to determine whether the required jurisdictional amount has been met. NRS 4.370 expressly limits such consideration only to damages. NRS 4.370, provides that a Nevada district court only has jurisdiction over suits involving more than \$10,000 in damages. Since Nevada district courts are created by statute, they cannot exceed the authority granted NRS 4.370, which in this matter, limits the Court

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from considering anything other than the amount of damages alleged by Plaintiffs. *See Royal Ins.*, 110 Nev. at 120.

Accordingly, the Nevada Supreme Court unequivocally has held that attorneys' fees cannot be included to determine the jurisdictional limit under NRS 4.370³, because attorneys' fees are not damages. *Id.* Thus, clear Nevada law exists that expressly prohibits the inclusion of attorneys' fees and costs in determining the threshold amount for this Court's jurisdiction. *See* Id. Thus, Plaintiffs' reliance on federal case law to contend that their attorneys' fees should be included is without merit, and in reality, improper.

Further, Plaintiffs' reliance on the fact that that Nevada's Minimum Wage Amendment (the "MWA") provides for the recovery of attorneys' fees and costs if Plaintiffs' prevail on their claim for an alleged violation of the MWA in no way demands their inclusion in the determination of the threshold amount required for this Court to maintain jurisdiction. Attorney's fees, including any that Plaintiffs could obtain under a successful MWA claim, are only recoverable in Nevada by "statute, rule, or contract." *Albios v. Horizon Communities, Inc.*, 122 Nev. 409, 417, 132 P.3d 1022, 1028 (2006). Thus, the fact that the MWA grants Plaintiffs an opportunity to recover their attorneys' fees does not require by operation of Nevada law that they be included in the determination of the threshold amount for jurisdiction. *Cf. Liu v. Christopher Homes, LLC*, 130 Nev. Adv. Rep. 17 at *8-10, 321 P.3d 875, 878 (2014). Otherwise, all attorneys' fees that could be obtained through statute would be included in the determination of subject matter jurisdiction. Despite the countless statutes that provide for the recovery of attorneys' fees and costs, which existed before and after the



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Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint does not allege attorneys' fees as special damages in the manner required by NRCP 9. *See generally*, Third Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs' Opposition also does not argue that Plaintiffs' circumstances qualifies as one of the limited situations in Nevada where attorneys' fees are an element of damages. *See generally*, Opposition.

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MWA, the Nevada Supreme Court still has held that attorneys' fees cannot be included in the determination of the threshold amount for this Court to have jurisdiction. *See Royal Ins.*, 110 Nev. at 120. Therefore, it is clear that under Nevada law Plaintiffs' right to recover attorneys' fees under the MWA should they prevail does not require their inclusion in the determination of whether the threshold for this Court's jurisdiction has been met.

Additionally, Plaintiffs further request that this Court should take judicial notice of the docket "to find that that the \$10,000 threshold has been exceeded via attorneys' fees." Id. at 10. Plaintiffs request for judicial notice is ludicrous. Plaintiffs have not cited any case and none exists where this Court may take judicial notice of "how hard Plaintiffs' attorneys' have worked" to deem that Plaintiffs have met the jurisdictional threshold. *See* Id.

To the contrary, Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating subject matter jurisdiction at all times. *See Morrison*, 116 Nev. at 36-7 (citations omitted). Thus, Plaintiffs, when subject matter jurisdiction is challenged, must set forth summary judgment type evidence to meet their burden, and not by judicial notice. *See e.g., Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997). Here, Plaintiffs have not provided a single shred of evidence that remotely could establish the existence of their attorneys' fees, the amount of attorneys' fees, or that their attorneys' fees results in Plaintiffs exceeding the required jurisdictional amount. *See* Opposition at 10-11. *See also, e.g., Sadler v. Ensignal, Inc.*, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82412 at 17-18 (E.D. Ca. May 30, 2017) (refusing to include attorneys' fees in calculation for determining jurisdictional threshold because party failed to present any evidence to determine amount of attorneys' fees).

As such, Plaintiffs' attempt to include attorneys' fees in the determination of whether this Court has jurisdiction additionally fails at Plaintiffs' own hand, or lack thereof. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint must be dismissed pursuant to N.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3).

C. Plaintiffs' Alleged Class Action Does Not Create Original Jurisdiction For This Court And This Court May Not Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Any Plaintiff Or Non-Existent Class That Does Not Meet the Jurisdictional Requirement.

The "Argument" portion of Plaintiffs' Opposition commences with the following unsupported contention:

A putative class action cannot be dismissed prior to the deadline for class certification where the putative class's damages, or at least one class representative's damages, would meet the jurisdictional threshold. Opposition at 8.

Although Plaintiffs' "Argument" commences with this contention, Plaintiffs do not set forth any legal citation or reference that establishes, relies upon, or supports in any manner this assertion. *See* Id. at 8-11. In fact, the entirety of Plaintiffs' "Argument" does not provide a single reference to any statute or any case to support any portion of their so-called "Argument." *See* Id.

Nonetheless, Plaintiffs, as part of their 8 page "Legal Standard" contend that even under a "strict jurisdictional analysis of CAFA [Class Action Fairness Act of 2005]," federal courts may "adjudicate claims for less than \$75,000 as long as at least one class member satisfies the "legal certainty test" at the \$75,000 threshold." Id. at 8. Apparently, to support this contention, Plaintiffs cite to Exxon Mobil, Inc., v. Allapattah Servs. Inc., 545 U.S 546, 559 (2005). See Id. Plaintiffs' reliance on Exxon Mobil is inappropriate and wholly without merit. To begin with, the rule set forth in Exxon Mobil was superseded in several ways by the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA") (28 U.S.C § 1332(d)(2)). See Frisby v. Keith D. Weiner & Assocs. Co., LPA, 669 F. Supp. 2d 863, 871, fn. 3 (N.D. Ohio 2009). This was



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because CAFA was enacted after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Exxon Mobil, and consequently, "had no bearing" whatsoever on the Supreme Court's analysis or decision. See, 545 U.S. at 571-72. Thus, the Supreme Court in Exxon Mobil did not conduct a "stringent jurisdictional analysis under CAFA" as asserted by Plaintiffs. Opposition at 8.

Further, the Supreme Court in Exxon Mobil did not hold that "federal courts may adjudicate claims for less than \$75,000 as long as at least one class member satisfies the legal certainty test at the \$75,000 threshold," as stated by Plaintiffs⁴. Id. See also, 545 U.S. at 549.

Instead, the Supreme Court in Exxon Mobil considered a single question:

[W]hether a federal court in a diversity action may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over additional plaintiffs whose claims do not satisfy the minimum amount-in-controversy requirements, provided the claims are part of the same case or controversy as the claims of plaintiffs who do allege a sufficient amount in controversy. 545 U.S. at 549.

In response to this single question, the Supreme Court held:

[W]here the other elements of jurisdiction are present and at least one named plaintiffs in the action satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement, § 1367 does authorize supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of other plaintiffs in the same Article III case or controversy, even if those claims are for less than the jurisdictional amount specified in the statute setting for the requirement for diversity jurisdiction. Id.

Notwithstanding Plaintiffs' false assertion that the Supreme Court in Exxon Mobil conducted a "stringent analysis under CAFA," Plaintiffs' reliance upon Exxon Mobil is entirely inappropriate and inapplicable to support Plaintiffs' contention. Plaintiffs' case is not in federal court, Plaintiffs are not attempting diversity jurisdiction, this Court and this case is not subject to "§ 1367," Plaintiffs claims are not Article III matters, and Plaintiffs have not





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⁴ The Supreme Court in Exxon Mobil not only did not consider the "Legal Certainty Test," it was not even mentioned in Exxon Mobil. See Id.

met the other elements of jurisdiction since Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint does not allege damages in excess of \$10,000. *See generally*, Third Amended Complaint.

More importantly, this Court, unlike all federal courts, does not have the right to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any party or claim. *See* NRS 4.370. Nevada District Courts are courts of original jurisdiction created by statute and consequently, cannot assert any jurisdiction other than as granted by statute. *See* Id. *See also, Kell,* 96 Nev. at 792-793. No Nevada statute or case exists that permits the Court to assert jurisdiction over any one of the named Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs' proposed class, or any member thereof, unless the jurisdictional threshold is met. *See* Id. Since Plaintiffs, on the face of their Complaint, have not met the jurisdictional requirement, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. *See* supra.

Additionally, no Nevada statute exists, and <u>Plaintiffs certainly have not cited one</u>, that grants this Court original jurisdiction over a class action. Cf. *United Steel v. Shell Oil Company*, 602 F.3d 1087, 190-91, (9th Cir. 2010) (CAFA (28 U.S.C § 1332(d)(2), is a federal statute that grants federal courts original jurisdiction over class actions meeting the statutory requirements of CAFA). This is contrast to Plaintiffs' attempt to declare that their proposed class somehow prevents this Court from dismissing Plaintiffs' case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiffs' have alleged a class action. *See* Opposition at 5-6 (citing to *United Steel*, 602 F.3d at 1091-92, and several other similar federal cases).

Again, Plaintiffs' reliance on federal law is without merit. Each of the federal cases cited and relied upon by Plaintiffs in the "Legal Standard" portion of their Opposition are concerned with CAFA, which expressly grants a federal court original jurisdiction over a class action where the parties are over a 100 in number, are minimally diverse, and the amount in controversy exceeds \$5 million. *See Id.* (citing, e.g., Metz v. Unizan Bank, 649 F.3d 492, 500



2010)). The only issue in the federal cases cited by Plaintiffs was whether jurisdiction over a class action asserted <u>under CAFA</u> commenced at the time of filing or at the time of certification. *See e.g., United Steel,* 602 F.3d at 1091.

These cases all reasoned that since 28 U.S.C. 1332 (d)(1)(B) defined a "class action"

These cases all reasoned that since 28 U.S.C. 1332 (d)(1)(B) <u>defined</u> a "class action" as any civil action "filed under Rule 23 or some other state statute," that original jurisdiction existed at the beginning of the action. *See* Id. ("If Congress meant to divest the district courts of jurisdiction following denial of class certification, it could have said so explicitly").

(6th Cir. 2011); and Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc., 592 F.3d 805, 806-07 (7th Cir.

For the same reason as above, Plaintiffs' reliance on these federal cases is inappropriate. CAFA does not apply to Plaintiffs' case and Plaintiffs' proposed class was not asserted pursuant to CAFA. *See* Third Amended Complaint at 1-3. Additionally, Plaintiffs' case is not a diversity action. *See* Id. Further, Nevada has no statute that defines a "class action" in the manner defined by CAFA (28 U.S.C. 1332(d)) nor does Nevada have a statute that grants original jurisdiction to its district courts over a class action, at any time, or under any definition. *See* NRS 4.370. *Cf.* CAFA (28 U.S.C. 1332 (d)(2)).

Although absent in Plaintiffs' Opposition, federal courts also have considered whether subject matter jurisdiction ever existed or remains over case removed to federal courts where class certification was denied. *See e.g., Salazar v. Avis Budget Grp., Inc.,* 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94610 at *5 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (denial of class certification means there is not and never was a class action triggering subject matter jurisdiction under CAFA). In these cases, federal courts have held that the subsequent denial of class certification prevents the federal court from having jurisdiction over the subject matter. *See e.g., Ratnayake v. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25868 at *20-21 (D. Nev. 2015). This is because subject matter



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jurisdiction must exist at the outset of a case and throughout and the denial of class certification means that there is not, and never was a class, which could grant a federal court subject matter jurisdiction. *See* Id.

As in this line of federal cases, there is not and never was a class in Plaintiffs' case. See Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification. Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification was denied and therefore, no class ever existed. See supra. Thus, this Court does not have and never had subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims because of Plaintiffs' alleged class action. See Id. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint must be dismissed pursuant to N.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3).

# D. Current Law Requires Each Named Plaintiff To Meet Separately the Jurisdictional Requirements.

Plaintiffs' "Legal Standard" portion of their Opposition contends that since Plaintiffs seek to ultimately enforce the MWA it is enough if "their interests collectively equal the jurisdictional amount." Opposition at 7. To support this contention, Plaintiffs cite to the 1916 Supreme Court case of *Pinel v. Pinel*, 240 U.S. 594, 596. *See* Id.

Plaintiffs' reliance on *Pinel* is greatly outdated. Here in the 21st Century, the legal principal espoused by Plaintiffs specifically does not apply to Plaintiffs' minimum wage case. *See e.g., Urbino v. Orkin Servs. Of California, Inc.*, 726 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013).

In *Urbino*, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether a wage and hour class action case, just like Plaintiffs' case, permitted the aggregation of the collective interest of Plaintiffs to meet the jurisdictional amount exactly in the manner that Plaintiffs contend in their Opposition. *See* Id. at 1121-22. *See also*, Opposition at 7. In *Urbino*, the 9th Circuit identified that the traditional rule is that multiple plaintiffs who assert separate and distinct

VEGAS, NEVADA 89101

PHONE:(702) 384-8424 FAX: (702) 384-6568 claims are precluded from aggregating them to satisfy the amount in controversy. See Id. at 1122. However, in *Urbino*, the 9th Circuit recognized that claims of class members can be aggregated to meet the jurisdictional amount requirement only when they "unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have a common and undivided interest." 726 F.3d at 1122 (quotation omitted). This is the same exception to the traditional rule argued for by Plaintiffs and discussed in *Pinel*. See Opposition at 7.

Unlike Plaintiffs' Opposition, the 9th Circuit, in *Urbino*, also set forth the test required to determine whether class members "unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have a common interest." 726 F.3d at 1122. In *Urbino*, the 9th Circuit determined that "[o]nly where the defendant owes an obligation to the plaintiffs as a group and not to the individuals severally will a common and undivided interest be found." Id.

Applying this test in *Urbino*, the 9th Circuit held that in wage and hour cases, like Plaintiffs' case, the rights of the plaintiffs are held individually and each alleged employee "suffers a unique injury that can be addressed without the involvement of the other" alleged employees. 726 F.3d at 1122. The 9th Circuit in *Urbino*, therefore, concluded that since the defendant's obligation in a wage and hour action is to the individual and not the group, the claims of wage and hour class members cannot be aggregated to meet the jurisdictional threshold. *See* Id. *See* also, *Sadler*, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82412 at *7-9 (denying aggregation in a wage class action alleging among other claims a failure to pay wages at the time of termination; just as Plaintiffs' case alleges).

As in *Urbino* and in *Sadler*, Plaintiffs action is wage and hour case. *See Perry v. Terrible Herbst, Inc.*, 132 Nev. Adv. Rep. 75 at *7-8, 383 P.3d 257, 259 (2016) (determining that claim for failure to pay Nevada's Minimum Wage was in reality, a claim for back pay



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under NRS 608.260). Thus, pursuant to *Urbino*, Plaintiffs cannot aggregate their claims to meet the jurisdictional threshold because each Plaintiff suffers a unique injury that can be addressed independently. See supra. As such, each named Plaintiff must meet individually meet the jurisdictional amount. See e.g., Corea v. Kim, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83769 at *2 (D. Nev. 2016). See also, Gibson, 261 F.3d 927, 941 (9th Cir. 2001) (jurisdiction in class actions is only through the named plaintiffs). For the same reasons, Plaintiffs, as they contend in their Opposition, can rely upon the alleged damages of unnamed "class" members to meet the jurisdictional threshold, especially considering the undisputable fact that Plaintiffs' "class" never existed. See supra. See Opposition at 9. Consequently, Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint must be dismissed pursuant to N.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3) since none of the Plaintiffs' have individually met the jurisdictional requirement.

# E. Plaintiffs Cannot Aggregate Their Causes of Action Since Plaintiffs' First Claim For Relief Provides Plaintiffs With An Adequate Legal Remedy.

Plaintiffs' Opposition argues that Plaintiffs are permitted to aggregate their claims for relief to establish the jurisdictional threshold. See Opposition at 7 and at 9-10. Again, Plaintiffs' "Argument" offers no legal support for this contention. See Id. at 9-10. However, Plaintiffs' Opposition cites to El Ranco Inc., v. New York Meat & Provision Co., 88 Nev. 111, 116, 493 P.2d 1318, 1322 (1972) supposedly as support for Plaintiffs' argument. See Id. at 7.

However, the holding in *El Ranco* does not support Plaintiffs' contention. The Nevada Supreme Court held that the respondent could aggregate his individual, separate claims. See, 88 Nev. at 116. However, the claims in *El Ranco* were the same claim asserted 26 times because the respondent had sold meat and meat products 26 separate times. See Id. at 112. Because several of these meat sales were individually less than the jurisdictional amount, the

VEGAS, NEVADA 89101

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Nevada Supreme Court reasoned that these individual sales could be aggregated so that the jurisdiction is obtained. *See* Id. at 116.

This case is distinguishable from this matter because Plaintiffs do not seek to aggregate vertically their claims (*i.e.*, the same meat sale 26 times), as was the case in *El Ranco*. See Opposition at 9-10. Instead, Plaintiffs seek to aggregate horizontally their first claim for relief with their second claim for relief to meet the jurisdictional threshold, which Plaintiffs vehemently insist are wholly separate, independent claims. *See* Id. The Nevada Supreme Court in *El Ranco* never considered such an aggregation as demanded by Plaintiffs. *See*, 88 Nev. at 116.

Plaintiffs also cite to *Hartford Mining Co. v. Home Lumber Coal Co.*, 61 Nev. 19, 21, 114 P.2d 1093, 1093 (1941) as support for Plaintiffs' attempt to aggregate Plaintiffs' claims for relief. *See* Opposition at 7. For the same reasons as in *El Ranco*, this case is distinguishable because in *Hartford Mining Co.*, the two causes of action at issue were both for the sale of goods with the value of each less than the jurisdictional amount. *See*, 61 Nev. at 19. Accordingly, the Nevada Supreme Court held that it was correct to unit these two (2) causes of action to exceed the jurisdictional amount. *See* Id. at 21.

Here Plaintiffs do not seek to aggregate the same cause of action with different amounts. Instead, Plaintiffs seek to aggregate two entirely separate causes of action: one asserted under Nevada law and one asserted in equity. See generally, Third Amended Complaint. Neither of the cases cited by Plaintiff consider the aggregation of wholly separate claims for relief. *See* supra. Plaintiffs have not provided any reference where such an attempted aggregation was permitted to establish jurisdiction. *See* Opposition at 7 and at 9-10.



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Regardless, Plaintiffs' attempt to aggregate their wholly separate causes of action fails because Plaintiffs' cannot recover any amount from Russell Road on their alleged second claim for relief. As provided in Russell Road's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs cannot recover on their second claim for relief for Unjust Enrichment because Plaintiffs' first claim for relief provides an adequate legal remedy upon which Plaintiffs may recover. *See* Motion to Dismiss at 16-17.

Despite Russell Road's extensive argument demonstrating this fact, Plaintiffs' Opposition fails to provide any argument that could demonstrate where Plaintiff could recover in equity where an adequate legal remedy was available to Plaintiffs. *See generally*, Opposition. As a result, Plaintiffs have admitted that they cannot so recover on their second claim for relief. *See* EDCR 2.20(e). *See also, King v. Cartlidge*, 121 Nev. 926, 927-28, 124 P.3d 1161, 1162-63 (2005). Thus, each Plaintiff has only their remaining first claim for relief to rely upon to meet their burden of demonstrating jurisdiction.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs' Opposition fails to provide any legal support or argument demonstrating how Plaintiffs may combine their wholly separate claims for relief. See Opposition at 7-10. Plaintiffs insist that these claims for relief are independent and separate claims for relief. See Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery Responses at 6. See also, Reply in Support of Motion for Certification at 10-11. In fact, Plaintiffs recently have moved this Court to certify two (2) separate Subclasses with each proposed Subclass contrived of their separate claims for relief—one for the legal claim and one for the equitable claim. See Renewed Motion for Class Certification at 1-2. Yet, Plaintiffs have not provided any argument or precedent authorizing them to isolate completely each of their claims for relief in

order to recover twice at law and in equity for the same allegations while at the same time combine the two to meet the jurisdictional threshold. *See* Opposition at 7-10.

As such, Plaintiffs cannot combine two "separate" claims for relief to meet the jurisdictional threshold. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint must be dismissed pursuant to N.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3) since none of the Plaintiffs' have individually met the jurisdictional requirement.

## IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Russell Road respectfully requests that this Court grant its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint Pursuant to N.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) and N.R.C.P. 12(h)(3).

DATED this 6th day of July, 2017.

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CLERK OF THE COURT **RPLY** 1 GREGORY J. KAMER, ESQ. 2 Nevada Bar No. 0270 KAITLIN H. ZIEGLER, ESO. 3 Nevada Bar No. 013625 KAMER ZUCKER ABBOTT 4 3000 W. Charleston Blvd., #3 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 (702) 259-8640 6 JEFFERY A. BENDAVID, ESQ. 7 Nevada Bar No. 6220 8 STEPHANIE J. SMITH, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 11280 9 MORAN BRANDON BENDAVID MORAN 630 South 4th Street 10 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 11 (702) 384-8424 Attorneys for Russell Road Food and Beverage, LLC 12 **DISTRICT COURT** 13 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 14 JACQUELINE FRANKLIN, ASHLEIGH PARK, LILY SHEPARD, STACIE ALLEN, 15 MICHAELA DIVINE, SAMANTHA JONES, 16 KARINA STRELKOVA, and DANIELLE Case No.: A-14-709372-C LAMAR, individually, and on behalf of a Dept. No.: 31 17 class of similarly situated individuals, 18 Plaintiffs, DEFENDANT, RUSSELL ROAD FOOD 19 AND BEVERAGE, LLC'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO VS. 20 MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED MOTION FOR CLASS RUSSELL ROAD FOOD AND BEVERAGE, 21 LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability company CERTIFICATION AND MOTION TO 22 (d/b/a CRAZY HORSE III GENTLEMEN'S STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' CLUB), SN INVESTMENT PROPERTIES, DECLARATIONS ON AN ORDER 23 LLC, a Nevada limited liability company SHORTENING TIME (d/b/a CRAZY HORSE III GENTLEMEN'S 24 CLUB), DOE CLUB OWNER, I-X, ROE **Date: July 11, 2017** 25 CLUB OWNER, I-X, and ROE EMPLOYER, Time: 09:30 a.m. I-X,

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AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS

Defendants.

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# DEFENDANT, RUSSELL ROAD FOOD AND BEVERAGE, LLC'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION AND MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' DECLARATIONS ON AN ORDER SHORTENING TIME

COMES NOW, Defendant, RUSSELL ROAD FOOD AND BEVERAGE, LLC, a Nevada limited liability, dba CRAZY HORSE III GENTLEMEN'S CLUB, ("Russell Road"), by and through its attorney of record, GREGORY J. KAMER, ESQ., and KAITLIN H. ZIEGLER, ESQ., of KAMER ZUCKER ABBOTT, and JEFFERY A. BENDAVID, ESQ., and STEPHANIE J. SMITH, ESQ., of MORAN BRANDON BENDAVID MORAN, and hereby submits its REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS, JACQUELINE FRANKLIN, ASHLEIGH PARK, LILY SHEPARD, STACIE ALLEN, KARINA STRELKOVA, DANIELLE LAMAR, AND MICHAELA MOORE'S (the "Plaintiffs") RENEWED MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION AND MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' DECLARATIONS ON AN ORDER SHORTENING TIME.

DATED this 6th day of July, 2017.

# MORAN BRANDON BENDAVID MORAN

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# **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

# I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

Plaintiffs' Opposition to Russell Road's Motion to Strike contains no actual legal arguments other than to concede that their originally filed supporting Declarations were facially deficient and accordingly, should be struck. Other than this concession, Plaintiffs' Opposition offers no argument or any legal references that remotely could establish that Plaintiffs' "Renewed Motion for Class Certification" is not prohibited by EDCR 2.24 or that the included Declarations of each Plaintiff are admissible under the circumstances. As a result, Russell Road's Motion to Strike should be granted and Plaintiffs' "Renewed Motion for Class Certification" should be struck from the record, or otherwise not heard by this Court.

## II. ARGUMENT

A. Plaintiffs' "Renewed Motion for Class Certification" Must Be Struck From the Record Since EDCR 2.24 Prohibits Plaintiffs From Moving This Court To Rehear Plaintiffs' Previously Denied Motion for Class Certification.

EDCR 2.24(a) expressly prohibits the rehearing of any previously disposed of motion. EDCR 2.24(b) requires that any motion to rehear a previous motion must be filed within 10 days from the entry of an order. Russell Road's Motion to Strike correctly identified that Plaintiffs' "Renewed Motion for Class Certification," which consists of nothing more than Plaintiffs' attachment of its previously denied Motion for Class Certification, violated EDCR 2.24(a) and (b), when it was filed on June 19, 2017, or months after this Court denied Plaintiffs' previous attempt. *See* Motion to Strike at 11-13.

Plaintiffs' Opposition offers no argument as to how their "Renewed Motion for Class Certification" does not violate EDCR 2.24(a) or (b). *See* Opposition at 3. Without even the slightest legal reference or supporting argument, Plaintiffs contend that they have "carefully

27 28 2. EDCR 2.24 clearly prohibits the rehearing, reconsideration, or re-use of the evidence and arguments contained in their previously disposed of Motion for Class Certification to support their "renewed" motion. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification must be struck from the record as a fugitive document, or otherwise not be heard by the Court. B. Plaintiffs' Declarations Provided In Support of Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification Must Be Struck Since Plaintiffs' Supporting Declarations Fail to Meet the Requirements of EDCR 2.21(a). As explained in Russell Road's Motion to Strike, Plaintiffs' supporting Declarations

tailored" (in a page and a half) their "Renewed Motion for Class Certification" to address the

alleged problems identified by the Court in denying their previous Motion for Class

Certification. See Id. Plaintiffs have not done any such tailoring. Instead, Plaintiffs simply

have attached their entire previously considered and denied Motion for Class Certification as

the basis for certifying their improperly proposed new Subclasses. See Renewed Motion at 1-

Under Nevada law, the Court may exclude evidence where "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, ... confusion of issues, or ... misleading jury. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 94 Nev. 241, 243, 577 P.2d 1234,

should be struck because each is deficient, in that none were made under a penalty of perjury

and none are admissible as evidence in the manner required by NRCP 56(e). See Motion to

Strike at 14-15. Plaintiffs' Opposition concedes that their Declarations were facially deficient,

which warrants the striking of each. See Opposition at 4. However, Plaintiffs' Opposition

fails to offer any argument as to how these Declarations or the contents thereof are admissible.

See Id.

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1235 (1978) (quoting NRS 48.035(1)). Here, Plaintiffs' declarations and the contents thereof should not be admitted as evidence since admission would unfairly prejudice Russell Road. Plaintiffs' Declarations were never part of the evidentiary record and more importantly, Russell Road never had any opportunity to conduct discovery of the facts asserted therein. Therefore, Russell Road is severely prejudiced by Plaintiffs' use of these Declarations to support their Renewed Motion for Class Certification. Consequently, Plaintiffs' supporting Declarations are not admissible and should be struck from the record as fugitive documents.

#### III. CONCLUSION

Based on the arguments provided above in reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition, Russell Road respectfully requests that this Court grant its Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Declarations on an Order Shortening Time.

DATED this 6th day of July, 2017.

#### MORAN BRANDON BENDAVID MORAN

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