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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Nevada Bar #0824 CLARK W. PATRICK Deputy Special Public Defender Nevada Bar #9451 ALZORA B. JACKSON Deputy Special Public Defender Nevada Bar #2255 330 So. Third Street, Suite #800 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 (702) 455-6265 FAX: (702) 455-6273 E-MAIL: cpatrick@clarkcountynv.gov E-MAIL: ajackson@clarkcountynv.gov		LERK OF THE COURT
10	DIS	STRICT COURT	
11	CLARK	COUNTY, NEVADA	
12 13) CASE NO. C-12-283700) DEPT. NO. 25)-2
14151617	JOSE A. GONZALES, ID 2636822, Defendant.		
18	MOTION TO	CONTINUE TRIAL DATE	
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28	Date: Time: COMES NOW, Defendant, Jose Gonzales, by and through his attorneys, David M. Schieck, Special Public Defender, Clark W. Patrick, Deputy Special Public Defender, and Alzora B. Jackson, Deputy Special Public Defender, and respectfully requests that this Honorable Court continue the trial date in this matter which is currently scheduled for June 23, 2014. This Motion is made and based upon the papers and pleadings on file herein, the Points and Authorities herein, and the Declaration attached hereto, and any oral argument as may be		

SPECIAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER

CLARK COUNTY NEVADA

NOTICE OF MOTION

TO: The State of Nevada, Plaintiff; and

TO: The Clark County District Attorney, Attorney for Plaintiff:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will bring on the above and foregoing **Motion** to Continue Trial Date on 4-21-14 at the hour of 9:00 a.m., in Department No. 25 of the above-entitled Court, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

A. Mr. Gonzales has the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel

Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel. This is especially important when the State is requesting the imposition of the death penalty. The ABA has set forth guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Capital Cases. The objective of the guidelines is to set forth a national standard of practice for the defense of capital cases in order to ensure high quality legal representation for all persons facing the possible imposition or execution of a death sentence in any jurisdiction. The ABA states that in order to effectively represent a capital defendant during the guilt portion of his trial, defense counsel must, "independently investigate the circumstance of the crime and all evidence - whether testimonial, forensic - or otherwise - purporting to inculpate the client." See ABA Guideline 1.1.

These guidelines are not aspirational. Instead they embody the current consensus about what is required to provide effective defense representation in capital cases.

The United States Supreme Court has held counsel as being ineffective when counsel's conduct "fell short of the standards for capital defense work articulated by the ABA standard to which we have long referred as guides to determining what is reasonable." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003).

At the core of the ABA Guidelines is the need to perform a complete and detailed investigation into all aspects of the case, both at the guilt phase and the penalty phase. At every stage of the proceedings, counsel has a duty to investigate the case thoroughly. This duty is intensified (as are many duties) by the unique nature of the death penalty, has been emphasized by recent statutory changes, and is broadened by the bifurcation of capital trials. See ABA Guideline 10.7. "The ABA Guidelines provide that investigations into mitigating evidence should comprise efforts to discover all reasonable available

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mitigation evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravation evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor." Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, n. 7 (2005).

Because the sentencer in a capital case must consider in mitigation, "anything in the life of a defendant which might mitigate against the appropriateness of the death penalty for that defendant." Brown v. State, 526 So. 2d 903, 908 (Fla. 1988) (citing Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 394 (1987)); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-15 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978); infra text accompanying note 277. "Penalty phase preparations requires extensive and generally unparalleled investigation into personal and family history." In the case of a client facing the death penalty, this begins with the moment of conception. In addition to any prenatal problems the parents may have caused the child, counsel must explore a complete:

- 1.
- Medical History Family and Social History
- Educational History
- Military Service
- 5.
- Employment and Training History Prior Juvenile and Adult Correctional Experience. 6.

ABA Standard 10.7. See also, The Nevada Indigent Defense Standards of Performance for Capital Case Representation, (further affirming that mitigation investigation begins from conception and continues to the time of sentencing.) ADKT No. 411 Standard 14, Order November 2007.

In Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 1001 (9th Cir. 2005), the Court citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984), held "counsel's untimely, hasty, and incomplete investigation of potential mitigation evidence for the penalty phase fell outside the range of reasonable professional assistance.

The California Supreme Court held that trial counsel's "failure to investigate petitioner's early social history was not consistent with norms that directed counsel in death penalty cases to conduct a reasonably thorough independent investigation of the defendant's social history as reflected in the ABA standards relied upon by the court in the Wiggins case." In re Larry Douglas Lucas, 94 P.3d 477, 504 (Cal. 2004).

Summing up the need to thoroughly investigate all evidence and mitigating factors in a capital case, "counsel's failure to inquire into an area specifically mentioned in the ABA Guidelines is a good indicator that his performance was constitutionally deficient." <u>Kandies v. Polk</u>, 385 F.3d 457, 479 (4th Cir. 2004).

In the instant case, the defense team has been diligently investigating and preparing a mitigation case for Jose. However, there are still many of Jose's family members and other people who have been intimately involved in his life to be interviewed.

At this time, counsel has not completed the mitigation investigation that is required prior to counsel being prepared to take this matter to trial. Until the mitigation investigation is complete and in compliance with the ABA Guidelines as discussed in <u>Wiggins</u> and ADKT 411, counsel for Jose Gonzales would be per se ineffective during a penalty phase of a capital murder trial. Therefore, counsel must be allowed the appropriate amount of time to finish the mitigation investigation.

B. Thorough and Independent Investigation is Good Cause for Delay

The Eighth Judicial District Court Rule 7.30 states in pertinent part that "Any party may, for good cause, move the court for an order continuing the date set for trial....."

In the instant case, Mr. Gonzales waived his right to a speedy trial and has been made fully aware of the on-going investigation and need for more time to complete the mandatory work. He has been fully cooperative with his defense team and agrees with this request for a continuance of his trial date.

As set forth above, the United States Supreme Court has cited to the ABA Guidelines as the standard for representation in capital cases. In order to comply with those guidelines and provide Mr. Gonzales with reasonably competent representation as he faces death, counsel must be given the appropriate amount of time to thoroughly and independently investigate all aspects of the allegations in the case and Mr. Gonzales' life.

Moreover, this Honorable Court has a vested interest in Mr. Gonzales having a firm and constitutionally sound death penalty trial. Death is qualitatively different from another other punishments that can be imposed by the State. See, e.g. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 US 399, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2603 (1986); California v. Ramos, 463 US 992, 998-99, 103 S. Ct. 3446 (1983). This difference necessitates heightened scrutiny to assure that the capital sentencing decision does not violate the Eight Amendment prohibition against cruel and

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unusual punishment. Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d. 1477, 1483 (10th Cir. Okla 1987). 2 **CONCLUSION** Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully requested that the trial date of June 23, 3 2014 be vacated and reset. 4 DATED this 9th day of April, 2014. 5 6 7 SUBMITTED BY: DAVID M. SCHIECK 8 SPECIAL PUBLIC DEFENDER 9 10 /s/ CLARK W. PATRICK 11 12 CLARK W. PATRICK 13 Alzora B. Jackson Attorneys for Gonzales 14 15 **DECLARATION OF CLARK W. PATRICK** 16 Clark W. Patrick, makes the following declaration: 17 I am the Deputy Special Public Defender representing Mr. Gonzales along with co-18 counsel Alzora B. Jackson, mitigation specialist, Maribel Yanez and investigator, Steven 19 Simmons. Mr. Gonzales' capital trial is set for June 23, 2014. 20 I make this Affidavit based upon my own knowledge except as to those matters stated 21 upon information and belief. The underlying incident occurred on April 26, 2012, the 22 Information was not filed until August 27, 2012, and the Notice of Intent to Seek Death 23 Penalty was filed on September 25, 2012. As such this case is still, by comparison to other 24 capital cases in this jurisdiction, not old or unnecessarily delayed in proceeding toward a trial 25 date. 26 Every reasonable effort is being made to prepare this case for trial and penalty hearing 27 in a timely fashion, but at the same time, proceeding to trial before the case is ready only

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leads to decades of litigation over what was or what could have been presented at trial.

In order to properly investigate both the guilt portion and penalty portion of this case in accordance with the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases and ADKT 411 Standards for Capital Cases it is required that considerable time be spent locating and collecting records from schools, medical providers. Law enforcement and courts as well as the other matters discussed herein below.

Jose was born in California, spent time in Mexico as a child and later moved to Clark County with his mother and siblings.

An investigative trip to California has been completed. While a great deal was accomplished, the defense team discovered new mitigation information that was not anticipated prior to the trip. This newly discovered information necessitates further mitigation investigations in Mexico, Florida and a possible second trip to California.

Affiant is submitting, under seal, a second affidavit which contains specific information that is not discoverable to the State at this time. This information pertains to possible defense theories that are confidential and privileged from disclosure to the State unless the evidence is going to be offered at trial.

Mr. Gonzales is aware of and has consented to this Motion to Continue Trial.

Counsel for Co-Defendant and the State have been informed that we are filing a motion to continue.

I declare that I make this request in good faith and not for purposes of delay.

/s/ CLARK W. PATRICK

CLARK W. PATRICK

CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC FILING I hereby certify that service of the foregoing Motion was made on April 9, 2014, by Electronic Filing to: DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE email: motions@clarkcountyda.com courtesy copy to Michael Staudaher at Michael.Staudaher@clarkcountyda.com And Patricia Erickson, Esq. pme@pmericksonlaw.com CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION I hereby certify that service of the foregoing Motion was made this 3rd day of July, 2013 by facsimile transmission to: BRET WHIPPLE, ESQ., attorney for co-defendant Ivonne Cabrera at Fax 974-4008. /s/ Kathleen Fitzgerald Legal Executive Assistant for Special Public Defender

SPECIAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER
CLARK COUNTY

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1	OPPS	Alexa D. Column
2	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney	CLERK OF THE COURT
3	Nevada Bar #001565 MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER	
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #008273	
5	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212	
6	(702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff	
7		
8	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA	
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	
10	Plaintiff,	
11	-VS-	GAGENIO G 10 202700 2
12	JOSE GONZALES aka	CASE NO: C-12-283700-2
13	Jose Alejandro Gonzales,#2636822	DEPT NO: XXV
14	Defendant.	
15	STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFEND.	ANT'S MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL
16	DATE	
17	DATE OF HE	ARING: 4/21/14
18	TIME OF HEA	RING: 9:00 A.M.
19	COMES NOW, the State of Nevada	a, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County
20	District Attorney, through MICHAEL V. STA	AUDAHER, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and
21	hereby submits the attached Points and Auth	norities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
22	Continue Trial Date.	
23	This Opposition is made and based upo	on all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the
24	attached points and authorities in support her	eof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if
25	deemed necessary by this Honorable Court.	
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27	//	34
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On April 26, 2012, North Las Vegas officers and detectives responded to 2039 Webster in reference to a possible gunshot victim. Initial responding officers on scene discovered two gunshot victims. Police first located victim, Melissa Marin, at the gateway entrance to the apartment complex, and later discovered victim, Ashley Wantland, at the front door of apartment C. Both victims were conscious.

Officers asked Marin who had shot them and she responded that a subject known to her as "Smokey" had done it. Officers then spoke with victim Ashley Wantland who stated that she and her boyfriend had been shot and that her boyfriend was still inside the residence. Both females were subsequently transported to University Medical Center (UMC) for treatment of their multiple gunshot wounds.

Officers then went inside the residence to check for additional victims and located the two deceased victims, later identified as Erik Quezada-Morales and James Headrick, in separate bedrooms within the residence. During the initial sweep of the residence, officers noticed that the bathroom window was open and various bathroom items had been knocked onto the floor. Officers further noted that footprints were located inside the bathtub and that it appeared that someone may have entered the residence through the bathroom window. Officers also saw several shell casings in the bedrooms, as well as the hallway and living room area.

The residence was subsequently sealed while detectives obtained a search warrant for the 2039 Webster, Apartment C location. It was later determined that victim Morales was in the southeast bedroom and deceased victim Headrick was on the floor in the northeast bedroom. Both victims appeared to have suffered numerous gunshot wounds. In the bathroom, police observed that the shower curtain had been knocked down and additionally they located a crowbar on the floor of the bathroom. Crime scene personnel processed the scene for prints and DNA and recovered other evidence.

...

While at the scene, detectives learned that Marin was able to talk and was giving information to officers at UMC. Detectives responded to UMC and interviewed Marin. Marin told detectives that two suspects came into her residence: a Hispanic male known to her as "Smokey" and a female known to her as "Chinola." Marin recalled that earlier in the morning she heard knocking at her bedroom door. Marin said she recognized Chinola's voice and that Chinola asked her to open the door. At about the same time, her boyfriend, Morales, got up to answer the door and she heard several gunshots. Marin said she told her boyfriend not to open the door. The door was then forced open and she saw Smokey with a gun pointed at them. Marin pleaded with Smokey not to shoot them, but he proceeded to shoot both Morales and her several times. Marin then saw Smokey and Chinola flee out of the front door of the residence.

Marin stated that despite her injuries, she was able to go into Wantland's and Headrick's bedroom, where she saw Headrick laying on the floor and Wantland laying in the bed – both with apparent gunshot wounds. Marin said she was able to get Wantland up from the bed and get out of the residence.

Detectives asked Marin if she knew why Smokey and Chinola shot them. Marin responded that they let Chinola use their vehicle and Chinola failed to bring it back. Marin said Morales had called Chinola and left a message, asking them to return the vehicle. Marin said that started some type of verbal altercation and she believed that is the reason why Smokey and Chinola came over and shot them.

Marin was able to give police directions to Chinola's residence, which was located at 1927 Bassler in North Las Vegas. With the names supplied by Marin, police were able to identify Ivonne Cabrera as a possible female suspect who used the name Chinola. Police obtained and then showed Marin a picture of Cabrera. Marin positively identified Cabrera as the suspect who entered Marin's apartment and shot both her and Morales.

At approximately 11:00 p.m., on the same day, police, who were watching the Bassler location, observed Cabrera get in a vehicle with several other subjects. Police saw Cabrera packing numerous items into the trunk of a vehicle before leaving. Police subsequently

stopped Cabrera's vehicle and detained her. Police were able to locate a large amount of Cabrera's clothing in the trunk, which was consistent with the clothing that the witnesses had described Cabrera wearing at the time of the shooting. It appeared as though Cabrera was trying to escape before being apprehended.

Detectives then responded to the location where Cabrera was being detained and took her into custody. Detectives transported Cabrera to the Detective Bureau, where she was questioned after being advised of her Miranda rights. During the taped interview of Cabrera, she initially denied any involvement in the shooting. Later, however, Cabrera admitted to going to the victim's residence with Smokey. Cabrera said she knew Smokey had a gun at the time. Cabrera said that Smokey climbed through the bathroom window and then let her into the apartment through the front door. Cabrera admitted to knocking on the bedroom doors and asking the victims to let them into the rooms. Cabrera said that Smokey shot about nine times at the victims. Cabrera further stated that they both fled from the residence following the shooting, leaving in the grey Dodge Intrepid they had borrowed from Morales.

Cabrera said they later abandoned the vehicle on Bonanza Road and that they were picked up by Smokey's sister. Cabrera said Smokey told her that he was only going to scare them. Cabrera told police that she did it because she was scared. After the shooting, however, Cabrera made no attempts to contact the police. Cabrera was then questioned as to why she and Smokey went to the apartment and shot the victims. Cabrera would only respond that there was some type of problem between them.

INJURIES TO LIVING VICTIMS:

According to the nurses at UMC, Marin suffered bullet "grazes" to her right buttock and her right arm. Marin also had gunshot wounds to her left shoulder, right arm, back and right breast. Marin had to have a tube inserted into her chest cavity to drain the blood which had collected around her lungs. It also appeared as though she suffered several broken bones.

Wantland also suffered multiple gunshot wounds: two to her right arm; at least two in her chest; and one at the base of her chin underneath her jaw. According to the nurses, at the time of her initial hospitalization, there were still two bullets inside Wantland's body (one had

lodged in her tongue and one was near her right breast). Wantland also had to have a chest tube inserted to drain blood from around her lungs.

AUTOPSY:

On April 27, 2012, Dr. Gary D. Telgenhoff conducted an autopsy of Morales and Headrick. Dr. Telgenhoff determined that cause of death for both victims was multiple gunshot wounds and that the manner of death was homicide.

FOLLOW UP INVESTIGATION:

On April 28, 2012, police identified Jose Alejandro Gonzales as a possible suspect who went by the name of "Smokey." Gonzales fit the description of the suspect given by the victims. Armed with this information, police obtained a photo of Gonzales and took that photo to the North Las Vegas Jail where Cabrera was being detained. Police showed Cabrera the photograph of Gonzales and she identified him as the suspect who went into the residence with her and shot the victims. Cabrera wrote on the edge of the picture, "this is the guy that shot the individuals," and signed her name. Cabrera further told police that she and Gonzales were the only ones who entered the residence on the night of the shooting.

Police later went to UMC and contacted victims Marin and Wantland. Because the victims personally knew both Smokey and Chinola, police showed them the photographs of Cabrera and Gonzales. Marin positively identified Gonzales as the person who shot both her and Morales. Wantland also viewed the photograph of Gonzales and positively identified him as the person who shot both her and Headrick. Wantland also identified Cabrera as the other suspect.

On April 26, 2012, crime scene investigators processed the following shooting scenes at 2039 Webster St "C" for fingerprints: the exterior of the northeast bedroom window, the exterior and interior of the bathroom window, the exterior of the sliding glass door, the exterior of the living room window, and the bathtub/shower walls. All recovered latent lifts suitable for comparison purposes were compared to Jose Gonzales and Ivonne Cabrera. The results of those comparisons revealed that a latent lift recovered from the bathtub edge opposite the

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bathroom window of the residence was a positive match to the left middle finger of Jose Gonzales.

SUBSEQUENT APPREHENSION OF JOSE GONZALES:

On June 11, 2012, at approximately 1:33a.m., the primary operator of the Z portal at the Otay Mesa Port of Entry (OTM POE), processed a grey Chevrolet Impala (NVUS/4PEG102) driven by Marsha Darlene Miller as it attempted to enter the United States. As the Impala moved through the Z portal at the port of entry, the vehicle underwent an X-ray examination. The Z portal operator observed X-ray anomalies in the trunk area of the vehicle.

As Miller applied for entry as the driver of the silver Chevy Impala, she presented a Nevada State Driver's License as her only form of identification, and declared herself to be a United States Citizen. Miller appeared to be abnormally talkative and her hands were shaking as she presented her documents. Miller stated that she was in Mexico "for fun" and presented two negative declarations.

The passenger in the vehicle was Crystal Hoag (the girlfriend of Jose Alejandro Gonzales). Hoag also presented an identification card from Nevada and declared that she was a United States Citizen. When the customs agent queried Hoag's name on her computer, she received a computer generated alert from the FBI. The agent then referred the vehicle and occupants to the vehicle secondary lot for further inspection.

The Otay Mesa Port of Entry Port Enforcement Team inspected the Impala and subsequently discovered – concealed in the truck of the Impala – an individual who was attempting to elude Customs and Border Protection (CPB) inspection. That individual was identified at Jose Alejandro Gonzales (aka Jose Alex Gonzales). The San Ysidro Port of Entry Criminal Enforcement Unit was immediately contacted and later confirmed that there was an active arrest warrant for Jose Gonzales for the double homicide from the State of Nevada. Gonzales was then referred to the aforementioned CBP Enforcement Unit for further processing and disposition and was subsequently extradited back to Las Vegas, Nevada to answer to the charges against him.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On August 27, 2012, Defendant and his co-defendant, Ivonne Cabrera, were charged by way of Information with Count 1 – Conspiracy to Commit Murder; Count 2 – Burglary While in Possession of Deadly Weapon; Count 3 – Murder With a Deadly Weapon; Count 4 – Attempt Murder With a Deadly Weapon; Count 5- Murder With a Deadly Weapon; and Count 6 – Attempt Murder With a Deadly Weapon. Following several status checks on a trial setting, this Court set a trial date of October 7, 2013 over Cabrera's objections. Cabrera's counsel, Ms. Patricia Erickson, objected to the trial date on the basis that her client had invoked her right to a speedy trial and wished for an earlier trial date. The Court overruled the objection, stating there were grounds to pursue a later trial date.

On July 3, 2013, Defendant filed a Motion to Continue Trial Date stating his attorneys needed more time to investigate and prepare a mitigation case. Amongst his reasons for requesting a continuance, Defendant claimed his attorneys still needed to interview his family members, friends, and teachers.

On July 24, 2013, Cabrera and her attorneys objected to Defendant's request for a continuance, claiming Defendant's attorneys had this case for over a year and the reason for their request for a continuance had nothing to do with the guilt phase. The State indicated it would agree to a continuance only if both defendants' cases were continued. Following arguments from all parties, this Court denied Defendant's motion.

On July 31, 2013, Defendant filed a Renewed Motion to Continue Trial Date. On August 19, 2013, Cabrera joined in Defendant's motion to continue the trial based upon a conflict with her attorney's trial schedule. Trial was reset for June 23, 2014.

On April 9, 2014, Defendant again filed a Motion to Continue Trial Date. The State's Opposition follows.

ARGUMENT

The State is ready to proceed to trial on June 23, 2014 and opposes Defendant's request for a continuance. Defendant has had almost two (2) years to conduct all necessary investigations and prepare for trial in this case. In Defendant's 2013 Motion to Continue Trial, the defense indicated it needed more time to investigate mitigating evidence. In the instant

motion, the defense is now claiming they need additional time to investigate "new mitigation information." At the last trial setting, the defense represented that they would need to make a trip to Mexico to gather mitigation evidence. Nine months later, the defense is still saying they need to go to Mexico. The defense has not provided an explanation for the delay in conducting their investigation.

Furthermore, if co-defendant Cabrera announces ready for this trial setting, and the Court grants Defendant's current request for a continuance, this would in essence de facto sever the State's cases against the defendants. Absent a compelling reason to further delay these proceedings, the State opposes Defendant's request for a continuance.

CONCLUSION

Wherefore, the State respectfully requests that Defendant's Motion to Continue Trial Date be DENIED.

DATED this / day of April, 2014.

Respectfully submitted,

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565

BY

MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER
Chief Deputy District Attorney

Nevada Bar #008273

CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION AND/OR ELECTRONIC MAIL I hereby certify that service of State's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Continue day of April, 2014, by facsimile transmission to: Trial Date, was made this CLARK W. PATRICK, Deputy Special Public Defender E-Mail: cpatrick@clarkcountynv.gov ALZORA B. JACKSON, Deputy Special Public Defender E-Mail: ajackson@clarkcountynv.gov KATHLEEN FITZGERALD, Legal Executive Assistant E-Mail: kfitzger@clarkcountynv.gov BY: Secretary for the District Attorney's Office

12FN0864B/HW/jr/MVU

Electronically Filed 6/11/2017 8:02 PM Steven D. Grierson **CLERK OF THE COURT** DISTRICT COURT 1 2 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 3 4 5 6 THE STATE OF NEVADA,) Case No: C-12-283700-2 7 Plaintiff, 8 Dept. No: 25 vs. 9 JOSE GONZALES, Defendant. 10 11 12 13 14 15 BEFORE THE HONORABLE KATHLEEN DELANEY 16 APRIL 21, 2014, 9:00 A.M. 17 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF 18 PROCEEDINGS 19 20 **APPEARANCES:** 21 (See separate page) 22 23 24 25 REPORTED BY: BRENDA SCHROEDER, CCR NO. 867 1

1	APPEARANCES:	
2	For the Plaintiff:	
3	HETTY WONG, ESQ. Chief Deputy District Attorney	
4	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155	
5	las vegas, Nevada 07100	
6	For Defendant JOSE GONZALES:	
7	CLARK W. PATRICK, ESQ. Deputy Special Public Defender	
8	330 S. Third Street, Suite 800 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155	
9	ALZORA B. JACKSON, ESQ.	
10	Deputy Special Public Defender 330 S. Third Street, Suite 800	
11	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155	
12	For Defendant IVONNE CABRERA:	
13	PATRICIA M. ERICKSON, ESQ.	
14	601 S. Tenth Street, Suite 108 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101	
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1 LAS VEGAS, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 2 WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 2014, 9:00 A.M. 3 **PROCEEDINGS** THE COURT: Calling the State of Nevada versus 5 Jose Gonzales. 6 MS. WONG: Hetty Wong for the State. 7 THE COURT: On calendar this morning we have a 8 motion filed by the defendant -- one of the defendants --9 10 to continue the trial date. The specifics of it are 11 there was an authorization to -- well, technically, on 12 the calendar is a Motion to File Under Seal, which just got set on the same calendar date that the Court is 13 14 seeking that information and that would not be 15 appropriate to be shared with the other side. 16 I have reviewed it and the Motion to File Under 17 Seal is granted and we'll take care of the particular 18 filing after today's date. But for consideration the Motion to Continue 19 20 Trial Date, obviously, there has been quite a bit of 21 discussion about this issue in the case already. 22 I also do want to note, of course, that 23 Mr. Gonzales is present in custody. Do we have Ms. Cabrera? 24 25 MS. ERICKSON: No, we don't, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Well, let me first get the position of the folks in terms of have there been any developments since this matter was filed?

MS. ERICKSON: No.

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MR. PATRICK: No, Your Honor. And since we filed the two motions to comply with Howard, I thought maybe the Court would like to grant the Motion to File Under Seal; that is let us file our affidavit and give the Court a chance to review it before the Court ruled on any motion to continue, or would the Court like to do all of that today?

THE COURT: Let me just double check something.

Okay. I certainly think that we obviously want to give due consideration to everything that needs to be considered, and as I said, I wanted to address the Motion to File Under Seal first and grant that and have that done.

But we need to get this done quickly and -- are we going to have Ms. Cabrera present in the future matter because depending on the ruling, I am not necessarily saying we need to hear from her, but I don't know if you want to make representations today at this point or not.

MS. ERICKSON: I am ready to make representations, Judge, but if the Court is considering granting it I think my client has to be here.

1 THE COURT: I think we need to have everybody 2 present first and foremost; that is one of my concerns 3 and that is what I thought right out of the gate when she wasn't here. Certainly, I have the gist of and have an 5 understanding of what is necessitating the additional 6 7 time frame, but the specifics of it obviously need to be fully considered before any determination is made. 8 What is the State's position on a brief 9 10 continuance? And what date works for everybody because 11 these are folks that are not typically here so I 12 definitely need your schedule. 1.3 MS. ERICKSON: I know I'll agree to a brief 14 continuance. 15 THE COURT: All right. 16 MR. PATRICK: Judge, we can have the affidavit 17 filed today, so whatever the Court's pleasure. Ms. Jackson and I will be available. 18 19 THE COURT: Well, we have Monday's and 2.0 Wednesday's calendars. And I don't think we need to 21 necessarily offset it in any way but we want to make sure 22 that it fits with everybody's schedule. 23 We could come back Monday -- oh, no. We can't. 24 I'm sorry. We don't have calendar on Monday because

there is the civil court judges' conference and we will

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1	be dark on Monday, so it will have to be either the next
2	Monday or Wednesday.
3	MR. PATRICK: Monday is fine, Your Honor.
4	MS. ERICKSON: Monday is fine, Judge.
5	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. We will see you
6	all Monday.
7	And we need to make sure that we get Ms. Cabrera
8	here as well so we'll make sure that is noted. It looks
9	like the officer is writing that down, too, so we'll have
10	both defendants here.
11	MR. PATRICK: Thank you.
12	MS. ERICKSON: Thank you.
13	THE CLERK: That will be April 28th at 9:00 a.m.
14	(Proceedings were concluded.)
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1	
2	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
3	
4	STATE OF NEVADA)
5	COUNTY OF CLARK)
6	
7	I, BRENDA SCHROEDER, a certified court reporter
8	in and for the State of Nevada, do hereby certify that
9	the foregoing and attached pages 1-8, inclusive, comprise
10	a true, and accurate transcript of the proceedings
11	reported by me in the matter of THE STATE OF NEVADA,
12	Plaintiff, versus JOSE GONZALES, Defendant, Case No.
13	C283700-2, on December 16, 2015.
14	
15	
16	
17	Dated this 11th day of June, 2017.
18	
19	/s/ Brenda Schroeder BRENDA SCHROEDER, CCR NO. 867
20	BILLIUDII BEIIIKOLDEIK, COK IKO.
21	
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	Electronically Filed
1	TRAN 06/25/2014 10:41:22 PM
2	IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
3	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA CLERK OF THE COURT
4	
5	THE STATE OF NEVADA,
6	Plaintiff,)
7	vs.) CASE NO.
8	JOSE ALEJANDRO GONZALES and) C-12-283700-2
9	IVONNE CABRERA,) DEPT. NO. 25
10	Defendants.)
11)
12	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
13	BEFORE THE HONORABLE KATHLEEN E. DELANEY
14	MONDAY, APRIL 28, 2014
15	
16	APPEARANCES:
17	For the State:
	HETTY WONG, DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
18	
19	For the Gonzales Defendant:
20	ALZORA JACKSON, ESQ. CLARK PATRICK, ESQ.
21	For the Cabrera Defendant:
22	PATRICIA ERICKSON, ESQ.
23	BRET O. WHIPPLE, ESQ.
24	
25	REPORTED BY: DANA J. TAVAGLIONE, RPR, CCR No. 841

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LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, MONDAY, APRIL 28, 2014
1
                            * * * * *
2
3
              THE COURT: Back to the matter on page 4.
4
     State of Nevada vs. Ivonne Cabrera and Jose
 5
6
     Gonzales.
              MR. WHIPPLE: Your Honor, with the Court's
7
     permission, I spoke with Mr. Turner. Ms. Holthus is
8
     here on one other case of mine, and she's running to
9
     another hearing.
10
              Is it possible to call that one first?
11
              THE COURT:
                          That's fine.
12
              MS. HOLTHUS: I am so sorry, Judge.
13
                                                     But
     it's the only thing on calendar, and so --
14
              THE COURT: I don't have a problem.
15
              I'm just calling them in the order which
16
     you signed in. But you can make your apologies to
17
     everybody else later.
18
19
              MR. WHIPPLE: Page 13.
                   (Pause in the proceedings.)
20
              THE COURT: Now, re-calling page 4,
21
22
     Cabrera and Gonzales.
23
              MR. PATRICK: Good morning, Your Honor.
              Clark Patrick and Alzora Jackson for
24
25
     Mr. Gonzales.
```

Thank you. THE COURT: 1 2 And I do want to note now that I do have both the defendants present. We had Mr. Gonzales, 3 but we needed to get Ms. Cabrera present to fully 4 entertain the motion and, you know, to make sure 5 everybody was aware at the time of what the outcome 6 7 was. Let me go ahead though and just take a 8 I had one appearance stated. I apologize. 9 moment. I keep forgetting because I do have somebody 10 covering for the court reporter today, and I need 11 all the appearances. 12 So let's start with the State. 13 14 MS. WONG: Hetty Wong on behalf of the 15 Bar Number 11324. State. THE COURT: You can just do it again, 16 17 Counsel. MR. PATRICK: Sure. Clark Patrick and 18 Alzora Jackson for Mr. Gonzales. 19 20 THE COURT: Thank you. 21 MS. ERICKSON: Patricia Erickson and Bret 22 Whipple for Ms. Cabrera, who's present in custody. 23 THE COURT: All right. Thank you so much. And we obviously had this on the calendar 24 25 before in terms of what the general arguments were,

but we needed to take a chance -- take the time, sorry -- to look at what was filed under seal and the circumstances that are set forth there. I appreciate that we cannot or will not have on the record any specific discussion. I just want to assure you that the Court has reviewed all the circumstances.

Do you have any additional generalized statement you'd like to make to the Court?

And then I'll hear from you.

MR. PATRICK: The only thing, Your Honor, is in the State's opposition, they mentioned that we had talked about going to Mexico previously and that we haven't in the preceding nine months. As the Court is well aware, these mitigation things are very fluid.

At one point, we thought we may not need to go. But after the new information that we've received, we know it's absolutely imperative that we go before trial. And as someone who has done international travel for litigation trips, I can assure the Court that there's a lot of levels that it needs to go through for approval to get this done.

The only other thing I would add, that I

did not put in the affidavit -- my apologies to the 1 Court -- but I do also have a capital case starting 2 June 2nd, which is older than this and will go. 3 THE COURT: Which department, just for our 4 record, is that one? 5 What case number is that one? 6 MR. PATRICK: It's Mr. Park, and it is in 7 Department 11, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: Case number? 9 MR. PATRICK: I'm sorry, Judge. I don't 10 have that available. 11 THE COURT: That's okay. No problem. 12 Just checking to see --13 But you're sure it's going to go? 14 15 MR. PATRICK: It is, Your Honor. It's considerably older than this case. We are going. 16 Judge Gonzales understands that it's going. There's 17 no doubt. 18 THE COURT: Let me hear from counsel for 19 Ms. Cabrera first, and then we'll hear from the 20 State, and then we'll give any opportunity. 21 22 MS. ERICKSON: Judge, you well know we 23 invoked from the beginning. We've objected to every continuance. We only had to agree to the last one 24 because Judge Earl set a federal trial at the same 25

time that the September hearing was, the September trial in this case was set. So we did join at that point. But at this point, we're ready to go. We've been ready to go.

We want to go. So we ask that you consider severing this again, which the Court has already heard. But we have a right, you know, to ask you to think about that again. And should the Court be thinking of doing, of continuing the case -- because I have no idea what's in the affidavit -- I would suggest that the Court also consider perhaps bifurcating the guilt phase from the penalty phase.

It's not done nearly as much now as it has been in the past. But I was involved in a capital case that was trialed in June and the penalty phase was in October, which gave me five-and-a-half months to do more investigation for the penalty phase, and that's the only thing that counsel is saying they need to do is penalty phase. And so I think that that is an alternative remedy to just continuing our trial.

MS. JACKSON: And, for the record, we would ask the Court to not consider bifurcation in our case that opposing counsel -- that is not our request, and that is not something that we would ask

the Court to consider on behalf of Mr. Gonzales.That is not an option.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. WONG: And, Your Honor, the State would also oppose bifurcating the guilt phase from the penalty phase.

The State's opposition to the defense's motion to continue is really twofold. The first one is potential witness issues. This case is already two years old. We had problems getting our two victims to the preliminary hearing. The State had previously filed a motion to take their video depositions, which the Court denied. Our concern is if the case continues again, it's going to be more difficult to locate these witnesses.

But more importantly, obviously, the co-defendant, Ms. Cabrera, is insisting on going to trial. So if the Court grants Mr. Gonzales's motion to continue, it would in essence, de facto, sever the State's cases. And so we would oppose the continuance on that basis.

THE COURT: Just on that last point, again, because, as we know, we already had one argument for bifurcation. The Court denied that argument but still, nevertheless, put the matter out beyond what

would be any invoked time frame.

And the Court, I believe -- and I have not looked at this recently, but I did look at it back contemporaneous with the prior motion -- that the Court still, nevertheless, maintains the discretion, especially in the circumstance of a case such as this, to determine what the trial date shall be and that it wouldn't necessarily mandate bifurcation.

And I just want to make sure I'm clear on what you're arguing. So you oppose certainly the bifurcation of the guilt and the penalty phases.

But are you indicating that you think, by operation of law, that cases have to be severed if the Court were to continue?

MS. WONG: No. I'm asking the Court not to grant the defendant's invalid motion to continue.

THE COURT: I understand.

MS. WONG: So that does not sever the State's cases.

THE COURT: But if the Court does grant the motion to continue, is it your argument that, by operation of law, it would automatically sever the cases?

MS. WONG: No, no.

The Court has discretion to sever the cases

if Ms. Cabrera insists on going to trial and Mr. Gonzales cannot. The State's position is we're asking the Court not to do that.

THE COURT: I understand. Okay. No, I appreciate the clarification. That's why I asked.

Anything further from either of the defendants' counsel? Let me start with Ms. Cabrera's counsel, and I'll let you finish, Ms. Jackson.

MS. JACKSON: Certainly.

MS. ERICKSON: Judge, with regard to the severance issue, you previously ruled that the Court retains the right to grant a trial after -- over the, you know, the invocation, and we did that, and it was set in September of 2013.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. ERICKSON: I think that, while the Court may still retain the jurisdiction to do that, the more that we do this, the more likely it is that that's going to be an error on our part because we have been ready each and every time. We have not requested a continuance.

We are ready to go, and we want, you know, we want to go to trial. And we're asking the Court -- you know, I think that if you're thinking of granting it, I think you have to also consider,

strongly consider severing it because I think that 1 we are building in an issue should Ms. Cabrera be 2 convicted. 3 THE COURT: Thank you. 4 MR. PATRICK: Judge -- I'm sorry, 5 Your Honor. The only thing I would add is that I 6 have a client that's been waiting six years to go to We've also announced every time that we are trial. 8 But because the capital co-defendant keeps requesting continuances, we're drug right along with 10 So there is precedence to -- if the Court is 11 not willing to the sever these cases --12 THE COURT: But you would agree, that's not 13 an ideal situation, Counsel. 14 15 MR. PATRICK: I agree, Your Honor. believe me, I've been making the same argument that 16 Ms. Cabrera's counsel has been making for six years. 17 And the Court just says, "Go on. We're going to 18 continue this" because they know the importance of 19 being ready in capital cases. 20 21 MS. JACKSON: Your Honor, if I may. 22 You may. THE COURT: Sure. 23 MS. JACKSON: Having done a few of these, the co-defendant is capital. If one complies with 24 the cases we've cited in our motion, if one complies 25

with Rule 250, these cases typically -- to go to 1 Mexico has to be approved by a lead county manager. 2 It has to be done in a very unique fashion. 3 just difficult for -- these cases happened just a 4 few years ago; this case happened a few years ago. 5 This case is not at all in a posture --6 THE COURT: It's dragging around. been hanging around. 8 MS. JACKSON: It's in a posture where 9 counsel needs to come in and, and -- and I just 10 don't think that based upon, you know, my 11 experience, that it's just impossible -- I mean, 12 Mr. Patrick went to Korea on Parks. Parks is five 13 years old. It just takes time in order to comply 14 with the requirements that we have to adhere to as 15 capital defenders. 16 17 Just one more thing. MS. ERICKSON: THE COURT: Go ahead. 18 MS. ERICKSON: I went over the transcripts, 19 and the last time that we continued with the trial, 20 Ms. Alzora Jackson made the statement that she 21 22 wanted the Court to recognize that they had asked 23 for a trial September in the spring of 2014 and that it's based on her experience that they would be 24 25 ready to go at that time.

And here we are again with them saying that 1 they didn't go to Mexico in the last nine months 2 because maybe it wasn't necessary the first time but 3 now it absolutely is. So we are in the place where 4 they said they wanted to be -- we're farther along 5 than that with June 23rd. That's not spring. 6 That's the beginning of summer. 7 We'd ask that we be severed and that we go 8 to trial on June 23rd. 9 MS. JACKSON: And as co-counsel stated, 10 Your Honor, we're trying to avoid the Mexico trip. 11 But based upon our investigation --12 I've seen that. 13 THE COURT: MS. JACKSON: -- we uncovered documents. 14 And I would suggest to the Court that 15 Ms. Cabrera is also of Mexican descent and that if 16 she were my client, I probably would be interested 17 in going to Mexico on her behalf as well. 18 THE COURT: Well, I mean, we can go back 19 and forth on this all day. 20 But Mr. Whipple, I'm not going to cut you 21 off. 22 Go ahead. 23 MR. WHIPPLE: And I appreciate that, Your Honor. You know, just a couple things to point 24 Death is different. We always say that. 25 out.

This is a death case, and we're just asking for severance. They have their own case to try, and they have their own background and their own reasons. We're now at the two-year mark. When a person is taken into custody, they lose most of their rights, but one of the rights they retain is the right to a speedy trial.

And my client invoked that right, and that right was violated or breached for various reasons. So we may, one day, have to deal with it. But it's now two years, two years. If not now, when?

Because it's the same thing.

We respect our co-defendants. I've been to that office. I've tried cases with both of those individuals. We respect them immensely. But they have their job and we have our job, and those jobs are different now. They were different before. This case cries for severance. It's not that much more work to do this case twice. Let them do their job. Let us do our job. I'm just asking that the court sever it and allow us to do our job.

THE COURT: Let me conclude the arguments there and say, "If not, when?" I'll tell you unfortunately when. I am privy and obviously counsel for Mr. Gonzales is privy to the circumstances.

Nobody really has addressed what Mr. Patrick kind of threw in here at the last minute which result though with potential conflict in this case is. But at the end of the day, I believe it's -- what has been brought to the Court's attention does warrant some continuance, not a significant one, from the Court's perspective.

Although, I very much appreciate from Ms. Cabrera and her counsel's perspective and from the State's perspective as well, it may seem significant. But I am going to put this case at the last stack available in this year, and it is going to go. And that may not give all the time in the world to Mr. Gonzales' counsel, but it should be enough.

I will be honest with you -- and, again,

I'm not going to go into the details -- some of the

items listed, to me, would warrant the continuance;

others would not. I'm not going to specify which,

but you'll have to prioritize and focus if the time

frame is difficult to manage. But, nevertheless, I

trust you'll be able to complete what you need to

complete.

Our last stack of the year of calendar call and trial dates that you'll be given -- and, again,

we will go at that time, regardless of where we are 1 positioned, because I do believe we have, yes, 2 brought this out to the point where we are -- we 3 should be sufficiently prepared to go. 4 Go ahead. Here's your date. 5 THE CLERK: Calendar call November 3rd at 6 7 9:30. MS. JACKSON: Your Honor, for the record, 8 I have State vs. Michael Rodriguez at November 3rd. 9 I don't have the case number. It's a capital case 10 in front of Judge Herndon that happened in 2010. 11 MS. ERICKSON: And, Judge, I have trial in 12 front of Judge Silver that starts on September 15th. 13 14 That may go two weeks. 15 THE COURT: We have a stack that runs through December 8th. So tell me as well what time 16 frame we think this trial is going to take, if we 17 have any estimate of that at this point. 18 MS. ERICKSON: I can go anytime -- that 19 trial is the last two weeks of September. So I need 20 two weeks or more to get ready. So that's all I'm 21 22 asking. 23 MR. WHIPPLE: For the record, Your Honor, I have a firm murder case set for December 8th. 24 That's the last week of the 25 THE COURT:

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stack.
1
              MR. WHIPPLE: November is good. November
2
3
     is open.
              THE COURT: How much time do we think the
4
     trial will take? If anybody can give me ballpark
 5
6
     estimate on that.
              MS. JACKSON: This case --
7
              MS. ERICKSON: With penalty or without?
8
              THE COURT: At this point, it's not the
9
     Court's intention to sever either of the parties,
10
     nor the guilt or penalty.
11
              MS. ERICKSON: No, I'm just asking if you
12
     want the entire trial.
13
              THE COURT: Yeah, no. I'm saying we're not
14
15
     severing anything.
              MR. WHIPPLE: Two weeks, Your Honor.
16
17
                            No, no.
              MS. JACKSON:
              MS. ERICKSON: I would say three weeks.
18
19
              MS. JACKSON: Given the adverse nature of
     the co-defendants and two, four, six attorneys, it's
20
     going to go three weeks.
21
22
              MS. ERICKSON: Three weeks.
23
              THE COURT: Ms. Wong.
24
              MS. WONG: I agree.
25
              THE COURT: Tell us the rest of your
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schedule, Ms. Jackson. 1 Your trial, your case is when? 2 MS. JACKSON: November 3rd, 2014. 3 Department 3, State vs. Rodriguez. 4 THE COURT: All right. And how long is 5 that one expected to take? 6 MS. JACKSON: That is a severed capital 7 case. Two and a half weeks, perhaps. 8 THE COURT: Give me some more information, 9 folks. The stack is a five-week stack from 10 November 10th to December 8th. 11 What's your other case on the 8th? 12 MR. WHIPPLE: It's a murder case. It's 13 called "Joshua," District Court 6, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: What's the time frame on that 15 16 When did that one arise? one? 17 MR. WHIPPLE: What was the date of the incident? 18 THE COURT: What's your priority in terms 19 of age, the case? 20 MR. WHIPPLE: That one is older. I have to 21 22 double-check. 23 MS. WONG: Your Honor, may I recommend 24 something? I actually don't have Mr. Staudaher's schedule anyways. Would the Court mind maybe 25

setting it on a status check two weeks. That way we can all coordinate and come back with a date for the Court.

THE COURT: That seems to be the best way to proceed at this point. Again, the Court is denying any request to sever the parties or to sever guilt versus penalty phase.

But the Court does want this set before the end of the year and will look at reasonable opportunities where it might be able to also fit in beginning somewhere around the criminal stack and trailing into the civil stack, if need be -- not ideal, but we'll figure it out. And so you know our stack ranges, and you can contact chambers maybe for additional information.

Two week status check.

THE CLERK: May 12th at 9:30.

MS. WONG: I'm sorry, Your Honor. Can you tell me what the last criminal stack is again, the dates for the criminal stack.

THE COURT: Runs from November 10th through December 8th.

I'm sorry. Ms. Jackson, were you concerned about your status check date?

MS. JACKSON: Yes, Your Honor. I will not

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be in the jurisdiction on May 12th.
1
2
                          May 14th at 9:30.
               THE CLERK:
               THE COURT: Is that fine, Ms. Jackson?
 3
               MS. JACKSON: Yes, ma'am. Thank you so
4
     much, Your Honor.
 5
               THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
6
               See you all then.
7
8
             (The proceedings concluded at 9:55 a.m.)
9
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                               -000-
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1	<u>CERTIFICATE</u>
2	
3	STATE OF NEVADA)
4)SS: COUNTY OF CLARK)
5	
6	I, Dana J. Tavaglione, RPR, CCR 841, do
7	hereby certify that I reported the foregoing
8	proceedings; that the same is true and correct as
9	reflected by my original machine shorthand notes
LO	taken at said time and place before the
L1	Hon. Kathleen E. Delaney, District Court Judge,
L2	presiding.
L3	Dated at Las Vegas, Nevada, this 25th day
L4	of June 2014.
L5	
L6	/S/Dana J. Tavaglione
L7	Dana J. Tavagirone Dana J. Tavaglione, RPR, CCR NO. 841
L8	Certified Court Reporter Las Vegas, Nevada
L9	Las vegas, Nevaua
20	
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22	
23	
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1	MCNT	Alm D. Chum
$_{2}$	DAVID M. SCHIECK SPECIAL PUBLIC DEFENDER	CLERK OF THE COURT
3	Nevada Bar #0824 CLARK W. PATRICK	
4	Deputy Special Public Defender Nevada Bar #9451	
	ALZORA B. JACKSON	
5	Deputy Special Public Defender Nevada Bar #2255	
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7	(702) 455-6265 FAX: (702) 455-6273	
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9	Attorneys for GONZALES	
10	DIS	STRICT COURT
11	CLARK	COUNTY, NEVADA
12	THE STATE OF NEVADA,) CASE NO. C-12-283700-2
13	Plaintiff,) DEPT. NO. 25)
14	vs.	
15	JOSE A. GONZALES, ID 2636822,)
16	Defendant.) Date:
17) Time:
18		N TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATE CLARATION IN SUPPORT UNDER SEAL
19	COMES NOW, Defendant, Jose	Gonzales, by and through his attorneys, David M.
20	Schieck, Special Public Defender, Clark	W. Patrick, Deputy Special Public Defender, and
21	Alzora B. Jackson, Deputy Special Publ	lic Defender, and respectfully requests that this
22	Honorable Court continue the trial date	in this matter which is currently scheduled for
23	October 7, 2013.	
24	This Motion is made and based u	ipon the papers and pleadings on file herein, the
25	Points and Authorities herein, and the D	Declaration of Counsel which is submitted herewith.
26	Mr. Gonzales is not required to r	eveal any possible defenses and/or strategy available
27	to him at trial, therefore, Mr. Gonzales 1	requests that the Declaration be filed under seal, or in
28	the alternative an ex parte hearing in car	mera be held, and any oral argument as may be

SPECIAL PUBLIC DEFENDER

adduced at the time of the hearing of this matter.

NOTICE OF MOTION

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will bring on the above and foregoing

TO:

The State of Nevada, Plaintiff; and

45

3

TO: The Clark County District Attorney, Attorney for Plaintiff:

6

Motion to Continue Trial Date on 08/19/2013 at the hour of 9:00 a.m., in

7

Department No. 25 of the above-entitled Court, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be

8

heard.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

10

9

The Eighth Judicial District Court Rule 7.30 states in pertinent part that "Any party may, for good cause, move the court for an order continuing the date set for trial....."

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11

Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel. This is especially important when the State is

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13

requesting the imposition of the death penalty. The ABA has set forth guidelines for the

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Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Capital Cases. The objective of the

16

guidelines is to set forth a national standard of practice for the defense of capital cases in

17

order to ensure high quality legal representation for all persons facing the possible imposition

18

19

These guidelines are not aspirational. Instead they embody the current consensus

or execution of a death sentence in any jurisdiction. See ABA Guideline 1.1.

20

about what is required to provide effective defense representation in capital cases.

22

21

The United States Supreme Court has held counsel as being ineffective when counsel's conduct "fell short of the standards for capital defense work articulated by the ABA standard to which we have long referred as guides to determining what is reasonable."

24

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003).

25

26

At the core of the ABA Guidelines is the need to perform a complete and detailed investigation into all aspects of the case, both at the guilt phase and the penalty phase. At

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every stage of the proceedings, counsel has a duty to investigate the case thoroughly. This

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duty is intensified (as are many duties) by the unique nature of the death penalty, has been

NEVADA

emphasized by recent statutory changes, and is broadened by the bifurcation of capital trials. See ABA Guideline 10.7. "The ABA Guidelines provide that investigations into mitigating evidence should comprise efforts to discover all reasonable available mitigation evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravation evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor." Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, n. 7 (2005).

Because the sentencer in a capital case must consider in mitigation, "anything in the life of a defendant which might mitigate against the appropriateness of the death penalty for that defendant." Brown v. State, 526 So. 2d 903, 908 (Fla. 1988) (citing Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 394 (1987)); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-15 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978); infra text accompanying note 277. "Penalty phase preparations requires extensive and generally unparalleled investigation into personal and family history." In the case of a client facing the death penalty, this begins with the moment of conception. Counsel needs to explore:

- 1. Medical History
- 2. Family and Social History
- 3. Educational History
- 4. Military Service
- 5. Employment and Training History
- 6. Prior Juvenile and Adult Correctional Experience.

ABA Standard 10.7.

In <u>Allen v. Woodford</u>, 395 F.3d 979, 1001 (9th Cir. 2005), the Court citing <u>Strickland v. Washington</u>, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984), held "counsel's untimely, hasty, and incomplete investigation of potential mitigation evidence for the penalty phase fell outside the range of reasonable professional assistance.

The California Supreme Court held that trial counsel's "failure to investigate petitioner's early social history was not consistent with norms that directed counsel in death penalty cases to conduct a reasonably thorough independent investigation of the defendant's social history as reflected in the ABA standards relied upon by the court in the <u>Wiggins</u> case." <u>In re Larry Douglas Lucas</u>, 94 P.3d 477, 504 (Cal. 2004).

Summing up the need to thoroughly investigate all evidence and mitigating factors in

NEVADA

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a capital case, "counsel's failure to inquire into an area specifically mentioned in the ABA Guidelines is a good indicator that his performance was constitutionally deficient." <u>Kandies</u> v. Polk, 385 F.3d 457, 479 (4th Cir. 2004).

Further, the ABA Guidelines provide that investigations into mitigating evidence should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigation evidence and any evidence to rebut aggravation evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005). In Rompilla, the United States Supreme Court specifically held that counsel was required to review the record of the Defendant's previous conviction when they had been put on notice by the prosecution that these priors would be introduced as aggravating evidence during any possible penalty phase. Rompilla further provides:

Counsel must investigate prior convictions that could be used as aggravating circumstances or otherwise come into evidence. If a prior conviction is legally flawed, counsel should seek to have it set aside. Counsel may also find extenuating circumstances that can be offered to lessen the weight of a conviction.

Id at pg. 8.

The ABA Guideline 1.1 further provides that:

Defense counsel must comprehensively investigate together with a defense investigator a mitigation specialist any other members of the defense team, the defendant's behavior and the circumstances of the conviction. Only then can counsel protect the accused Fourteenth Amendment right to deny or rebut factual allegations made by this prosecution in support of a death sentence and the client's Eighth Amendment right not to be sentenced to death based on prior convictions obtained in violation of his constitutional rights.

ABA Guideline 1.1.

In the instant case, the Notice of Intent to Seek Death alleges two prior convictions for "A felony involving the use of threat of violence to the person of another." (**Exhibit "A"**) One from an incident in 2007 and the other from an incident in 2009. Therefore, counsel in this case will have to retain the services of a panel of experts to assist defending Mr. Gonzales in this capital case. The prior convictions, being used as aggravators must be fully and completely investigated just as if counsel were defending those cases, together with the extensive criminal history Mr. Gonzales.

In the instant case, the defense team has been diligently investigating and preparing a

CLARK COUNTY

NEVADA

mitigation case for Jose. However, there are still many of Jose's family members, friends and teachers to be interviewed. During his youth, Jose had health issues and accidents that must be investigated in order to complete the "extensive and generally unparalleled investigation into personal and family history," that is required by the ABA Guidelines and the United States Supreme Court.

At this time, counsel has not completed the mitigation investigation that is required prior to counsel being prepared to take this matter to trial. Until the mitigation investigation is complete counsel for Jose Gonzales would be per se ineffective during a penalty phase of a capital murder trial. The current trial date of October 7, 2013 was set at a hearing on October 17, 2012. At that hearing, counsel for Mr. Gonzales stated that the earliest reasonable trial date would be in the Spring of 2014. (Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, October 17, 2012, pg. 5.) (Exhibit "B")

Mr. Gonzales is aware of and has consented to this Renewed Motion to Continue Trial.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Gonzales requests that the trial date of October 7, 2013 be vacated and reset.

In addition, as Mr. Gonzales is not required to reveal any possible defenses and/or strategy available to him at trial, and due to the sensitive information contained in the Declaration, Defendant's requests that the Declaration in Support of the Renewed Motion to Continue Trial be filed under seal, or in the alternative an exparte hearing in camera be held.

DATED this 31st day of July 2013.

SUBMITTED BY:

/s/ CLARK W. PATRICK

Clark W. Patrick Alzora B. Jackson Attorneys for Gonzales

NEVADA

CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC FILING I hereby certify that service of the foregoing Motion was made on July 31, 2013, by Electronic Filing to: DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE email: <u>pdmotions@ccdanv.com</u> courtesy copy to Michael Staudaher at Michael.Staudaher@ccdanv.com /s/ Kathleen Fitzgerald Legal Executive Assistant for Special Public Defender CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned does hereby certify that service of the foregoing Motion was made this 31st day of July, 2013 by facsimile transmission to the attorneys for Co-Defendant Cabrera as follows: BRET WHIPPLE, ESQ., Fax 974-4008; and Patty Erickson by electronic mail at PME@pmericksonlaw.com. /s/ Kathleen Fitzgerald Legal Executive Assistant for Special Public Defender

SPECIAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER

CLARK COUNTY
NEVADA

EXHIBIT] A

1 NOTC STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #008273 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 5 (702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff 6 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 10 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 11 Plaintiff, CASE NO: C-12-283700-2 12 -VS-DEPT NO: XXV 13 JOSE GONZALES, aka Jose Alejandro Gonzales, #2636822 14 Defendant. 15 16

NOTICE OF INTENT TO SEEK DEATH PENALTY

COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, through STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, by and through MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER, Chief Deputy District Attorney, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 250, NRS 175.552 and NRS 200.033, and declares its intention to seek the death penalty at a penalty hearing for a conviction on Count 3 and/or Count 5. Furthermore, the State of Nevada discloses that it will present evidence of the following aggravating circumstances:

- 1. The murder was committed by a person who, at any time before a penalty hearing is conducted for the murder pursuant to NRS 175.552, is or has been convicted of:
- (a) Another murder and the provisions of subsection 12 do not otherwise apply to that other murder; or

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(b) A felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another and the provisions of subsection 4 do not otherwise apply to that felony.

That on or about April 26, 2012, Defendants IVONNE CABRERA and JOSE GONZALES did then and there wilfully, feloniously, without authority of law, and with premeditation and deliberation, and with malice aforethought, kill JAMES HEADRICK, a human being, by shooting at the said JAMES HEADRICK multiple times, with a deadly weapon, to-wit: firearm; Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales directly committing said crime, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera aiding or abetting by counsel and encouragement and by accompanying Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to JAMES HEADRICK'S residence and knocking on doors to and within JAMES HEADRICK'S apartment to allow Defendant JOSE GONZALEZ, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to gain access to JAMES HEADRICK to facilitate shooting him, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera also being criminally liable as a co-conspirator vicariously in that said crime was a foreseeable act of the conspiracy. (See NRS 200.033(2)(a))

That on or about September 9, 2012, Defendants were charged by way of an Information in the Eighth Judicial District Court, case number C283700, in Count 3 with MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON. The State anticipates that both defendants may be convicted of such charge prior to any penalty hearing in the instant case. If such conviction occurs for First or Second Degree Murder, the conviction would qualify as an aggravating circumstance under NRS 200.033(2)(a). If such conviction occurs for any lesser offense, the conviction would qualify as an aggravating circumstance under NRS 200.033(2)(b).

The evidence upon which the State will rely is the testimony of the witnesses, the pleadings, transcripts, judgment of conviction, court minutes in C283700, as well as the police

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reports, statements, photographs, and/or physical evidence from North Las Vegas Police 2 Department Event Number 120426007466.

- The murder was committed by a person who, at any time before a penalty hearing is conducted for the murder pursuant to NRS 175.552, is or has been convicted of:
- (c) Another murder and the provisions of subsection 12 do not otherwise apply to that other murder; or
- (d) A felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another and the provisions of subsection 4 do not otherwise apply to that felony.

That on or about April 26, 2012, Defendants IVONNE CABRERA and JOSE GONZALES did then and there wilfully, feloniously, without authority of law, and with premeditation and deliberation, and with malice aforethought, kill ERIK QUEZADA MORALES, a human being, by shooting at the said ERIK QUEZADA MORALES multiple times, with a deadly weapon, to-wit; firearm; Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales directly committing said crime, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera aiding or abetting by counsel and encouragement and by accompanying Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to LRIK QUEZADA MORALES' residence and knocking on doors to and within ERIK QUEZADA MORALES' apartment to allow Defendant JOSE GONZALEZ, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to gain access to ERIK QUEZADA MORALES to facilitate shooting him, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera also being criminally liable as a co-conspirator vicariously in that said crime was a foreseeable act of the conspiracy. (See NRS 200.033(2)(a))

That on or about September 9, 2012, Defendants were charged by way of an Information in the Eighth Judicial District Court, case number C283700, in Count 5 with MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON. The State anticipates that both defendants may be convicted of such charge prior to any penalty hearing in the instant case. If such conviction occurs for First or Second Degree Murder, the conviction would qualify as an aggravating circumstance under NRS 200.033(2)(a). If such conviction occurs for any

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lesser offense, the conviction would qualify as an aggravating circumstance under NRS 200.033(2)(b).

The evidence upon which the State will rely is the testimony of the witnesses, the pleadings, transcripts, judgment of conviction, court minutes in C283700, as well as the police reports, statements, photographs, and/or physical evidence from North Las Vegas Police Department Event Number 120426007466.

- 3. The murder was committed by a person who, at any time before a penalty hearing is conducted for the murder pursuant to NRS 175.552, is or has been convicted of:
- (e) Another murder and the provisions of subsection 12 do not otherwise apply to that other murder; or
- (f) A felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another and the provisions of subsection 4 do not otherwise apply to that felony.

That on or about April 26, 2012, Defendants IVONNE CABRERA and JOSE GONZALES did then and there, without authority of law, and malice aforethought, willfully and feloniously attempt to kill ASHLEY WANTLAND, a human being, by shooting at the said ASHLEY WANTLAND multiple times, with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm; Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales directly committing said crime, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera aiding or abetting by counsel and encouragement and by accompanying Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to ASHLEY WANTLAND'S residence and knocking on doors to and within ASHLEY WANTLAND'S apartment to allow Defendant JOSE GONZALEZ, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to gain access to ASHLEY WANTLAND to facilitate shooting her, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera also being criminally liable as a co-conspirator vicariously in that said crime was a foreseeable act of the conspiracy. (See NRS 200.033(2)(b))

That on or about September 9, 2012, Defendants were charged by way of an Information in the Eighth Judicial District Court, case number C283700, in Count 4 with ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON. The State anticipates that

both defendants may be convicted of such charge prior to any penalty hearing in the instant case. If such conviction occurs for Attempt Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon or or any lesser offense, the conviction would qualify as an aggravating circumstance under NRS 200.033(2)(b).

The evidence upon which the State will rely is the testimony of the witnesses, the pleadings, transcripts, judgment of conviction, court minutes in C283700, as well as the police reports, statements, photographs, and/or physical evidence from North Las Vegas Police Department Event Number 120426007466.

- 4. The murder was committed by a person who, at any time before a penalty hearing is conducted for the murder pursuant to NRS 175.552, is or has been convicted of:
- (g) Another murder and the provisions of subsection 12 do not otherwise apply to that other murder; or
- (h) A felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another and the provisions of subsection 4 do not otherwise apply to that felony.

That on or about April 26, 2012, Defendants IVONNE CABRERA and JOSE GONZALES did then and there, without authority of law, and malice aforethought, willfully and feloniously attempt to kill MELISSA MARIN, a human being, by shooting at the said MELISSA MARIN twice, with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm; Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales directly committing said crime, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera aiding or abetting by counsel and encouragement and by accompanying Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to MELISSA MARIN'S residence and knocking on doors to and within MELISSA MARIN'S apartment to allow Defendant JOSE GONZALEZ, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to gain access to MELISSA MARIN to facilitate shooting him, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera also being criminally liable as a co-conspirator vicariously in that said crime was a foreseeable act of the conspiracy. (See NRS 200.033(2)(b))

That on or about September 9, 2012, Defendants were charged by way of an Information in the Eighth Judicial District Court, case number C283700, in Count 6 with ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON. The State anticipates that both defendants may be convicted of such charge prior to any penalty hearing in the instant case. If such conviction occurs for Attempt Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon or any lesser offense, the conviction would qualify as an aggravating circumstance under NRS 200.033(2)(b).

The evidence upon which the State will rely is the testimony of the witnesses, the pleadings, transcripts, judgment of conviction, court minutes in C283700, as well as the police reports, statements, photographs, and/or physical evidence from North Las Vegas Police Department Event Number 120426007466

- 5. The murder was committed by a person who, at any time before a penalty hearing is conducted for the murder pursuant to NRS 175.552, is or has been convicted of:
- (i) Another murder and the provisions of subsection 12 do not otherwise apply to that other murder; or
- (j) A felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another and the provisions of subsection 4 do not otherwise apply to that felony.

On December 31, 2007, in case number C239888, Defendant pled guilty to Stop Required on Signal of a Police Officer in Department 2 of the Eighth Judicial District Court. Defendant was sentenced to 12-36 months in the Nevada Department of Corrections. The charges stemmed from an incident where the defendant was driving at speeds in excess of posted limits and reaching 80 to 90 miles per hour, colliding with numerous vehicles and driving on U.S. 95 at Flamingo in the direction opposite the flow of traffic.

The evidence upon which the State will rely is the testimony of the witnesses, the pleadings, transcripts, judgment of conviction, court minutes in C239888, as well as the police reports, statements, photographs, and/or physical evidence from Las Vegas Metropolitain Police Department Event Number 071202-3217.

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The murder was committed by a person who, at any time before a penalty hearing is conducted for the murder pursuant to NRS 175.552, is or has been convicted of:

- (k) Another murder and the provisions of subsection 12 do not otherwise apply to that other murder; or
- (1) A felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another and the provisions of subsection 4 do not otherwise apply to that felony.

On July 16, 2009, in case number C256027, Defendant pled guilty to Assault with a Deadly Weapon in Department 21 of the Eighth Judicial District Court. Defendant was sentenced to 14-48 months in the Nevada Department of Corrections. The charges stemmed from an incident where the defendant drove his vehicle at Las Vegas Metropolitain Police Department Sergant W. Wilson intending to strike him. In addition, the plea to assault with a deadly weapon is a plea to a crime of violence as the crime of assault inherently involves the use or threat of violence. Furthermore, the defendant had possession of a 45 caliber Hi-Point firearm at the time despite his status as an ex-felon.

The evidence upon which the State will rely is the testimony of the witnesses, the pleadings, transcripts, judgment of conviction, court minutes in C256027, as well as the police reports, statements, photographs, and/or physical evidence from Las Vegas Metropolitain Police Department Event Number 090623-1741.

The murder was committed by a person who knowingly created a great risk of death 7. to more than one person by means of a weapon, device or course of action which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person.

On the date of this double homicide, April 26, 2012, the location where the shooting took place was occupied by four individuals who were sleeping in their beds. After breaking into the victims' home, the defendant shot at and into the bodies of all four occupants, killing two and severely injuring two others. The defendant fired at least nine rounds from his weapon at these victims and struck each victim multiple times.

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- 8. The murder was committed while the person was engaged, alone or with others, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, arson in the first degree, burglary, invasion of the home or kidnapping in the first degree, and the person charged:
 - (a) Killed or attempted to kill the person murdered; or
 - (b) Knew or had reason to know that life would be taken or lethal force used.

On the date of this double homicide, April 26, 2012, the location where the shooting took place was occupied by four individuals who were sleeping in their beds. The defendants not only broke into the victims' home, but they also forcibly entered each of the victims' bedrooms. This entry was made while in possession of a firearm and for the express purpose of shooting and killing the victims residing therein. The defendants knew that life would be taken and that lethal force would be used after entering the bedrooms of the victims.

9. The murder was committed upon one or more persons at random and without apparent motive.

Although there may have initially been some type of disagreement between one of the victims and Defendant Cabrera, there does not appear to be any motive for the shooting and killing of the remaining victims. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Defendant Gonzales was part of any dispute with any of the victims.

Defendant Cabrera had borrowed a vehicle from one of the victims and that victim wanted the vehicle returned, which Defendant Cabrera had refused to do. The victims did not confront or threaten Defendants Cabrera or Gonzales yet despite that fact, the defendants broke into the victim's home while they slept and shot everyone inside.

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1	Regardless of whether or not there was any legitimate dispute between the defendants
2	and one or two of the victims, there is no evidence that all of the victims had even interacted
3	with the defendants prior to the shooting.
4	DATED this <u>25th</u> day of September, 2012.
5	Respectfully submitted,
6	STEVEN B. WOLFSON
7	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565
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9	M. Took Alex
10	BY //WWW.
11,	MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #008273
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16	CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
1.7	I hearby certify that service of Notice of Intent to Seek Death Penalty, was made this
18	25th day of September, 2012, by facsimile transmission to:
19	SPD - CLARK FAX: 455-6273
20	1 2 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3 7 3
21	BY (MUM)
22:	Employee of the District Attorney's Office
23	
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27	12FN0864A/sam-MVU
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EXHIBIT B

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1	DISTRICT COURT
2	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
3	ADICINAL-N
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5	THE STATE OF NEVADA,
6	Plaintiff,) Case No: C-12-283700-2
7	vs.) Dept No: XXV
8	JOSE ALEJANDRO GONZALES,
9	Defendant.)
10	<u> </u>
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13	BEFORE THE HONORABLE KATHLEEN DELANEY
14	OCTOBER 17, 2012, 9:00 A.M.
15	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF
16	PROCEEDINGS
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19	APPEARANCES:
20	(See separate page)
21	**
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25	REPORTED BY: BRENDA SCHROEDER, CCR NO. 867
	1

1	APPEARANCES:
2	For the Plaintiff:
3	MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER, ESQ.
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
6	For the Defendant JOSE GONZALES:
7	CLARK W. PATRICK, ESQ. Deputy Special Public Defender
8	330 S. Third Street, Suite 800 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
9	ALZORA B. JACKSON, ESQ.
10	Deputy Special Public Defender 330 S. Third St., Ste. 800
11	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
12	For the Defendant IVONNE CABRERA:
13	PATRICIA ERICKSON, ESQ.
14	601 S. Tenth Street, Suite 206 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
15	Las rogas, nordad or los
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1	LAS VEGAS, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
2	WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 2013, 9:00 A.M.
3	PROCEEDINGS
4	* * *
5	THE COURT: Call the matter on page 10, State of
6	Nevada versus Ivonne Cabrera and Jose Gonzales.
7	MR. PATRICK: Good morning, Your Honor. Clark
8	Patrick and Alzora Jackson for Mr. Gonzales.
9	THE COURT: Thank you.
10	MS. ERICKSON: Good morning, Your Honor.
11	Patricia Erickson on behalf of Ivonne Cabrera.
12	THE COURT: Thank you.
13	And I think we put this matter on for status
14	check to make a determination on trial setting. But I
15	also have State's motion to correct the file with regard
16	to Notice of Intent to Seek Death Penalty.
17	MS. ERICKSON: Judge, I informed Mr. Staudaher
18	that I was out of the jurisdiction since the 5th and I
19	got back on the 15th. Just to let everyone know, I am
20	going to be responsible for pleadings and discovery
21	issues, so if the Court would give me a week to file an
22	opposition, I would appreciate that.
23	THE COURT: Any objection, Mr. Staudaher?
24	MR. STAUDAHER: No, Your Honor.
25	THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. You'll file by

next week and then have it reset to --1 2 MR. STAUDAHER: The following week. 3 That would be fine, Judge. MR. ERICKSON: 4 THE CLERK: That will be October 31st for the hearing, and then you have until October 24th to file the 5 6 response. 7 MS. ERICKSON: October 31st? 8 THE CLERK: Yes. 9 THE COURT: That will be the hearing date. filing date would be the 24th. 10 11 MS. ERICKSON: Thank you, Judge. 12 And then as to the trial setting. I THE COURT: 13 don't know that we ever resolved the fact that we had split, for lack of a better term here, with one invoking 14 15 and one not invoking --16 MR. STAUDAHER: It is not been dealt with yet. I think one of the issues was that because it was a death 17 18 penalty case in this other matter and I don't know if 19 Mr. Whipple, who now has Ms. Erickson because it's a 20 death penalty case, was still under the impression of --21 if I'm not misquoting counsel -- that they were ready to 22 go forward within 60 days on the death case, so that's 23 where we stand right now. 24 Judge, if I remember correctly, MR. PATRICK:

the last time we were in court I believe the Court said

that you were going to find that under the law that you had good cause to not follow the rule with regard to my client. I spoke to Mr. Whipple, we would have been ready for a 60 day trial. We have our witnesses. We are working furiously on the case, so we would like the trial set as soon as possible for the first availability in the month of May this year. And we would ask for any date close to that.

MR. PATRICK: Your Honor, we still have a wildly different opinion on this, being this is a death penalty case, looking at Rule 250, the ABA standards and how the Supreme Court handles the ABA standards in the Wiggins and Rofilla case. There is a great deal of information we need to get as far as mitigation before we're prepared to go with a death penalty case.

Ms. Jackson and I do almost primarily death penalty work and we know how much time it takes to put one of these together. In our opinion, if you want a trial date that is going to be reasonable to shoot at to have a one trial setting on this we'd be looking at sometime in the spring of 2014.

If the Court does not want to go out that far, the earliest we would be prepared to even think about a trial date would be October of next year. And we'll make the representation at this time that if the Court wishes

to set that October date we will not guarantee that we will be ready. We'll have a way better shot sometime late in spring of 2014 to have a one trial date setting in this case.

MR. ERICKSON: And, Judge, just for the record, both Mr. Whipple and I have done multiple death penalty cases. We do know all of the rules, Wiggins and 250. We are very responsible about that.

Our clients between the defendants are in very different positions. Ms. Cabrera has no prior criminal history. Their client does. So therefore, they may have different ideas of what they need to do. It takes much longer than what we need. So I am saying that we will be ready as of May.

THE COURT: I appreciate that. All right. I am going to do a trial setting that I think from the information that I have available to me, and I am also familiar, although, I have not overseen the case, I certainly have become familiar with our settings and our needs. I appreciate everybody's statements today in terms of readiness and preparation and time, and I don't know what's going to transpire between now and then.

I obviously did not grant the motion to sever and there may be differences that would impact time in preparing this, but I am going to set it in our stack

next August and split the difference a little bit, 1 perhaps, in what's being requested, although that is much 2 3 shorter than, and I appreciate representations by counsel for Mr. Gonzales regarding readiness, but I think that is a fair amount of time for us to get this case moving. And then, of course, who knows what will transpire 6 between now and --7 MR. PATRICK: Your Honor, if I may. THE COURT: 9 Yes. MR. PATRICK: On August 19th I have an older death penalty case that has no hope of resolving and we 11 are set to go on that. I fact, we're going on a trip to 12 13 the Philippines in January to get ready for that case, so I would hate to put something over the top of that knowing that one will have to go because it is much older

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than this one.

The stack is very early in the month THE COURT: so obviously I do not necessarily want to force you to be on back to back death penalty cases either.

MR. PATRICK: Could we go July, then, Your Honor?

THE COURT: It's my civil stack and the last two weeks in July are not available at all.

MR. PATRICK: Could we go in to that early September date you mentioned?

Mosley did not have one but we do. Now, I certainly would be willing to accommodate, and I think we could make -- my civil stack is actually quite small compared to others. For instance, we are in one right now and I don't have one single trial that was ready to go.

I am going to go ahead and put it in October. I don't want to risk that we sometimes pick up firm settings for med medical or who knows what, and I don't want to risk that stack. And I appreciate that we were going to try to go earlier, but there was also some mention in October that could also work for both sides on the defense side of the table, so let's just go to October and we will expect it to move then.

THE CLERK: Your calendar call will be September 30th at 9:30 with a trial date of October 7th at 10:30.

THE COURT: Hopefully that will meet everybody's needs. I appreciate it is longer than what counsel for Ms. Cabrera was asking, but I think in the grand scheme of things that is the right thing to do and not to compromise our civil stack just in case.

MR. PATRICK: Thank you.

MS. ERICKSON: Thank you. Just for the record, Judge, we do have a continuing objection to this as we have invoked.

THE COURT: And I will note for the record that you did invoke and that the Court has what appears to be grounds to pursue past that date, and I appreciate your representations for readiness in May.

MS. ERICKSON: Thank you, Judge.

MR. STAUDAHER: And I just want to make sure to put on the record that I was informed by counsel that there was a misplacement or that discovery was lost, I think on Mr. Whipple's side, and I made that available to both — actually because of that, and I don't think that counsel for Mr. Gonzales has an issue, but there was a few additional items that have been produced.

We put discovery at the DA reception which contains all the previous discovery produced as well as some new items. Both of those items are available for respective counsel at the reception. They were placed there yesterday and I don't know if your runners picked them up yet or not. I wanted to make sure that counsel knew that that was available.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's make sure we get that and notify counsel for some reason if you don't --

MR. PATRICK: I believe we were notified, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PATRICK: One last thing. The last time we

were in Court or the time before the Court granted our motion for the juvenile records of our client. I have the order. May I approach for signature? THE COURT: Sure. Do you want the clerk to file as well? б MR. PATRICK: That would be great. THE COURT: Since we have that option in criminal. All right. Thank you everyone. (End of proceedings.)

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE STATE OF NEVADA SS. COUNTY OF CLARK I, BRENDA SCHROEDER, a certified court reporter in and for the State of Nevada, do hereby certify that the foregoing and attached pages 1-11, inclusive, comprise a true, and accurate transcript of the proceedings reported by me in the matter of THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff, versus JOSE GONZALES, Defendant, Case No. C-12-283700-2, on October 17, 2012. Dated this 22nd day of July, 2013. Brinda Schroeder

1	DISTRICT COURT
2	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
3	Original
4	COPY
5	THE STATE OF NEVADA,
6	Plaintiff,) Case No: C-12-283700-2
7	vs.) Dept No: XXV
8	JOSE ALEJANDRO GONZALES,
9	Defendant.)
10)
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13	BEFORE THE HONORABLE KATHLEEN DELANEY
14	AUGUST 19, 2013, 9:00 A.M.
15	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
16	OF PROCEEDINGS
17	
18	**
19	APPEARANCES:
20	(See separate page)
21	
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23	
24	
25	REPORTED BY: BRENDA SCHROEDER, CCR NO. 867

1	APPEARANCES:
2	For the Plaintiff:
3	HETTY WONG, ESQ.
4	Deputy District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
5	Las vegas, Nevada 69133
6	For the Defendant JOSE GONZALES:
7	DAVID SCHIECK, ESQ. Special Public Defender
8	330 S. Third Street, Suite 800 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
9	ALZORA B. JACKSON, ESQ.
10	Deputy Special Public Defender 330 S. Third St., Ste. 800
11	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
12	For the Defendant IVONNE CABRERA:
13	PATRICIA ERICKSON, ESQ.
14	601 S. Tenth Street, Suite 206 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
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MONDAY, AUGUST 19, 2013

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LAS VEGAS, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

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PROCEEDINGS

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THE COURT: State of Nevada versus Jose

Gonzales. Seeing Mr. Gonzales present in custody. This
is on calendar styled as Defendant's Renewed Motion to

Continue Trial Date and Motion to File Declaration In
Support Under Seal, which I understand this matter was
heard by Judge Bonaventure in my absence and I see what

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Let me go ahead and hear from the defense and then we will hear from the State as well.

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MS. JACKSON: Good morning, Your Honor. And for the record, Mr. David Schieck is here with myself, Alzora Jackson, on behalf of Jose Gonzales who is here in

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custody.

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Codefendant that they now are joining the Motion to

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Continue. I have had ongoing discussions with the State

Your Honor, it is our understanding from the

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and they have never opposed our motion.

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since this has come up before, I just want to make sure

THE COURT: I'm sorry to interrupt you, but

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we address this on the record; I note that Ms. Cabrera

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does not appear to be here.

has been further argued.

Now we don't actually have a joinder to the motion in the record that I'm aware of, and in that respect I would think it would be understood that the Detention Center would not know to transport Ms. Cabrera here. So I don't know if that's an issue with going forward today or if you are seeking to waive her presence and want to go ahead and continue to argue.

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MS. ERICKSON: I had hoped that she would be here, Judge. Our position on this hearing changed on Wednesday, but Mr. Whipple's Federal Court Judge Pro ordered him to begin a five-week trial on September 16th last Wednesday, so we then had to agree that we would have to move the trial date on the capital case. I can't do it by myself and I can't get somebody up to speed fast enough to continue on in this case. So whatever the Court's pleasure is. I know Ms. Cabrera wants her trial as soon as possible. We have talked to your clerk about different dates.

We would be available in February but it won't work for the codefendants. But if you want her present, fine. I know her position, and she does not want to lose counsel.

THE COURT: Forgive me in this one if I don't recall. This one was not a -- we have already had a waiver of the speedy trial or was this one forced upon --

1 MS. ERICKSON: Yes. This is the one that was 2 forced upon us. That is why the last hearing we were 3 objecting saying we were ready to go and we were not agreeing.

> THE COURT: And I recall that is why I used that language so that you wouldn't have to. But in that respect then my belief is that if we are going to have this discussion and if we are going to make that determination then we need all the parties present for that discussion. I just do not feel that would be appropriate without Ms. Cabrera here.

> And, again, I don't think there is any fault in Ms. Cabrera not being here because the only thing technically on the calendar was for Mr. Gonzales, so I am happy to move this over to Wednesday if that works with everybody's schedule, and if not, whatever most convenient date we can to get all the parties present.

> MS. WONG: Your Honor, is it possible to move it to Monday?

That's fine with me if it works for THE COURT: everybody else.

MS. JACKSON: Well, Monday the 26th Mr. Patrick and I actually have a mitigation trip planned on this matter. Your Honor, if I may -- -

THE COURT: Go ahead.

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1 MS. JACKSON: We are prepared to go forward on 2 our motion. It's not our responsibility to get Ms. 3 Cabrera here. We have spoken with your clerk and with the State, Mr. Staudaher indicated that he had advised 5 Ms. Wong of his position. 6 Part of what takes so much time is coming back. 7 We would like to be in California investigating mitigation so that when we set the next date we can be 8 9 ready. 10 THE COURT: When are you guys leaving for 11 California? 12 MS. JACKSON: At 8:00 a.m. we are headed down to 13 Southern California. We have a whole host of relatives, 14 some coming in from Mexico who have agreed to rendezvous 15 with us on this particular --16 THE COURT: Can you come back on Wednesday? 17 MS. JACKSON: Sure. 18 THE COURT: Ms. Wong, can you get someone to 19 cover? 20 MS. WONG: Yes. 21 THE COURT: We will see you on Wednesday. 22 THE CLERK: August 21st at 9:00 a.m. 23 MS. JACKSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 24 (Proceedings were concluded.)

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1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE		
2			
3	STATE OF NEVADA		
4	COUNTY OF CLARK) ss.		
5			
6	I, BRENDA SCHROEDER, a certified court reporter		
7	in and for the State of Nevada, do hereby certify that		
8	the foregoing and attached pages 1-7, inclusive, comprise		
9	a true, and accurate transcript of the proceedings		
10	reported by me in the matter of THE STATE OF NEVADA,		
11	Plaintiff, versus JOSE GONZALES, Defendant, Case No.		
12	C283700 on August 19, 2013.		
13			
14			
15			
16	Dated this 20th day of August, 2013.		
17			
18	Brende Schweder Brenda Schroeder, CCR NO. 867		
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1	DISTRICT COURT		
2	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
3	97		
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6	THE STATE OF NEVADA,)	
7	Plaintiff,) Case No: C-12-283700-2	
8	vs.) Dept No: XXV	
9	JOSE ALEJANDRO GONZALES,)	
10	Defendant.)	
11)	
12			
13			
14		¥	
15	BEFORE THE HONORABLE		
16	AUGUST 21, 2013		
17	REPORTER'S T OF		
18	PROCEEDI	INGS	
19			
20	APPEARANCES:		
21	(See separate page)		
22			
23			
24			
25	REPORTED BY: BRENDA SCHROEDER,	CCR NO. 867	
		1	

1	APPEARANCES:
2	For the Plaintiff:
3	HETTY WONG, ESQ.
4	Deputy District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
5	Las vegas, Nevada 09133
6	For Defendant JOSE GONZALES:
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15	BRETT O. WHIPPLE, ESQ.
16	JUSTICE LAW CENTER 1100 S. Tenth Street
17	Las Vegas, Nevada 89104
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1 LAS
2 WEDNES
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5 THE COURT
6 Cabrera and Jose G
7 present in custody
8 MS. ERICK
9 THE COURT
10 to Continue Trial
11 and a joinder by M
12 MR. PATRI

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LAS VEGAS, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 21, 2013, 9:00 A.M.

PROCEEDINGS

* * *

THE COURT: The State of Nevada versus Ivonne Cabrera and Jose Gonzales. Do we have both defendants present in custody today?

MS. ERICKSON: Yes.

THE COURT: This matter is on for Renewed Motion to Continue Trial Date filed on behalf of Mr. Gonzales and a joinder by Ms. Cabrera.

MR. PATRICK: Good morning, Your Honor.

Your Honor, the parties have talked and we talked with your clerk and have come up with a date of June 23rd for the trial.

aware of this date and the circumstances, that was the main reason we obviously wanted to have everybody here. I think under the circumstances I didn't previously explain that the continuation was going to be necessary, there really wasn't any, I think, significant dispute to that and the Court was amenable but we wanted to make sure the parties were present and could acknowledge that they were aware.

Okay. I am seeing a nod of the head from the

defendants who are present in custody that they are aware of that date.

MS. ERICKSON: Just for the record, we were going to be ready but Mr. Whipple had to go to trial. You had an end of February date that we would have preferred but co-defense counsel already had cases that were set later on that would have impeded so we are agreeing to the June date as long as we can have it be a firm date because we don't want anybody to come in and say, Oh, by the way, we have another date that happened to be missed or something. We would like to sort of have it be a firm date so that we aren't put in the position of someone coming in again, unless it is something unexpected, of course.

THE COURT: I will state for the record, of course, you had mentioned Mr. Whipple's schedule and we do appreciate that counsel's schedule has to be accommodated as well. I will state for the record that as long as everybody at this point in time thinks that their schedules will accommodate, the Court does always consider any trial date to be firm and only absent some extraordinary circumstances and I can tell from argument made last time on Monday that counsel is diligently pursuing the investigation and there are things that are occassioned needing additional time, so I don't see any

reason why we wouldn't be able to maintain that date.

1.2

MR. PATRICK: That's fine, Your Honor. As far as Mr. Gonzales is concerned, as the Court is aware, we forwarded to the Court under seal what he had left to do and we are diligently working on that; however, we would be remiss in saying that while we believe this is a firm date, while we believe we will be ready, we are certainly not going to be expected to be held to that should something come up because this is a capital case and capital cases we need to be ready.

anything that anybody disagrees with. I think little less a year from now and even when we have required that the day by pushed out even with an objection and an invocation that time frame usually fits. So that's my hope we'll keep this and deal with whatever comes in the meantime.

For the record, say again the calendar call and trial date.

THE CLERK: Calendar call June 16th at 9:30, with a trial date of June 23rd at 10:30.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MS. JACKSON: Your Honor, may the record reflect October 17th, 2012 is when we first talked about a trial date. We actually stood here and told the Court at that

time that the date that we were looking for would be
towards mid or late 2014. It is my practice to evaluate
a case based upon my experience to determine how much
time it will take. And typically when I am given the

THE COURT: Thank you for that additional representation.

date that I asked for I am ready. Thank you.

Ms. Wong.

MS. WONG: If the Court can just ask the defendant whether or not she is waving her right to a speedy trial.

THE COURT: I did ask -- well, I believe I asked. I asked if she was aware. I did not use the exact language that we actually asked for and obtained a waiver at this time. And I think by the acknowledgements here she understands the circumstances of why we are setting it in June of next year.

But let me ask at this time -- Mr. Gonzalez has already officially stated in the record -- Ms. Cabrera, do you at this time waive the right to a speedy trial for that date?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: I appreciate the initial waiver, if you will, was not at your choosing and it was at the Court's direction. But at this time I do appreciate your

acknowledgement for the record that you do waive. Thank you, Ms. Wong. Thank you, Ms. Jackson. MS. JACKSON: Thank you, Your Honor. MS. WONG: Thank you, Your Honor. (Proceedings were concluded.)

1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
2	
3	STATE OF NEVADA)
4	COUNTY OF CLARK)
5	
6	I, BRENDA SCHROEDER, a certified court reporter
7	in and for the State of Nevada, do hereby certify that
8	the foregoing and attached pages 1-8, inclusive, comprise
9	a true, and accurate transcript of the proceedings
10	reported by me in the matter of THE STATE OF NEVADA,
11	Plaintiff, versus JOSE GONZALES, et al., Defendants, Case
12	No. C283700-2, on August 21, 2013.
13	
14	
15	
16	Dated this 22nd day of August, 2013.
17	
18	Brinda Schroeder BRENDA SCHROEDER, CCR NO. 867
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Electronically Filed 10/04/2012 04:35:52 PM

1	МОТ		Alexa D. Column
2	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney		CLERK OF THE COURT
3	Nevada Bar #001565 MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER		
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #008273		
5	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212		
6	(702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff		
7		CT COURT	
8		NTY, NEVADA	
9)	
10	THE STATE OF NEVADA,		
11	Plaintiff,		C 12 202700 1
12	-VS-	}	C-12-283700-1
13	IVONNE CABRERA, aka) DEPT NO:	XXV
14	Yvonne Cabrera, #1617623		
15	Defendant.	}	
16	NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTIO		
17	INTENT TO SEEK T	HE DEATH PENA	LIY
18	DATE OF HEARI	NG: October 17, 201 RING: 9:00 A.M.	12
19		MING. 9.00 A.M.	
20	COMES NOW, the State of Nevada,	by STEVEN B. WO	LFSON, District Attorney,
21	through MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and files this Notice		
22	of Motion and Motion to File Corrected Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty.		
23	This Motion is made and based upon	all the papers and pl	leadings on file herein, the
24	attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, in		
25	deemed necessary by this Honorable Court.		
26	///		
27	///		
28			

NOTICE OF HEARING

YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will bring the foregoing motion on for setting before the above entitled Court, in Department XXV thereof, on Wednesday, the 17th of October, 2012, at the hour of 9:00 o'clock AM, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard.

DATED this ____ 4th ___ day of October, 2012.

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STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565

BY /s/MICHAEL STAUDAHER MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #008273

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On September 20, 2012, defense counsel's met with and presented potential mitigation evidence in the instant matter to the Clark County District Attorney's Office death penalty assessment committee. Following the committee meeting, the State informed defense counsel that it would be seeking the death penalty for Defendant Cabrera. (See Exhibit 1) Defense counsel subsequently appeared with and informed the Court at an October 1, 2012 hearing that Attorney Patricia Erickson had been appointed to the case because the State was seeking the death penalty.

On September 25, 2012, within the 30 day requirement delineated by Supreme Court Rule 250, that the State filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty which was, because of a clerical error, mistitled as a "Notice of Evidence in Support of Aggravating Circumstances."

///

On October 4, 2012, the State subsequently received a telephone call from Drew Christiansen at the office of appointed counsel. In that call, Mr. Christiansen asked the State for confirmation that it was seeking the death penalty as to Defendant Cabrera. Mr. Christiansen stated that although he had seen the Notice of Intent to Seek Death which was filed for Co-Defendant Gonzales, he had not seen a similarly entitled filing for Defendant Cabrera. The State informed Mr. Christensen that the State was seeking the death penalty as to both Defendant Gonzales and Defendant Cabrera and that it was the State's understanding and belief that notices of intent to seek death has been filed for both defendants at the same time.

The State then looked in Odyssey, the court filing system, and confirmed that notices for both defendants had been filed, but due to a clerical error, the notice for Defendant Cabrera had been mistitled as a Notice of Evidence in Support of Aggravating The State then immediately contacted Defense Counsels Erickson and Circumstances. Whipple via email and later that same day spoke with Defense Counsel Erickson via phone about this issue.

Based on the State's communication with defense counsel the State is now bringing this motion to file a corrected notice to reflect the proper titling of the notice and also to clearly specify within the body of the notice that the State is seeking the death penalty for Defendant Cabrera. It should be noted that the proposed corrected notice **does not** allege any new aggravators.

While it is the State's position that timely notice of the State's intent to seek death was provided to Defendant Cabrera, despite a clerical error in the title of the filing, out of an abundance of caution and in adherence to the requirements of SCR 250(4)(d) the State now brings the instant motion. This correction, therefore, is being filed to remedy clerical errors in the original notice and not as the primary filing of notice. The original aggravators in this correction remain the same as in the previous notice.

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ARGUMENT

The Nevada Supreme Court Rules (SCR) outline the notice requirements in a first degree murder case when the State is seeking the death penalty as a form of punishment. Specifically, SCR 250(4)(c), which governs the notice requirement and SCR 250(4)(d), which governs late notice, state that:

- later than 30 days after the filing of an information or (c) indictment, the state must file in the district court a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. The notice must allege all aggravating circumstances which the state intends to prove and allege with specificity the facts on which the state will rely to prove each aggravating circumstance.
- good cause, the district court may grant a (d) Upon a showing of motion to file a late notice of intent to seek the death penalty or amended notice alleging additional aggravating circumstances. The state must file the motion within 15 days after learning of the grounds for the notice or amended notice. If the court grants the motion, it shall also permit the defense to have a reasonable continuance to prepare to meet the allegations of the notice or amended notice. The court shall not permit the filing of an initial notice of intent to seek the death penalty later than 30 days before trial is set to commence.

(emphasis added)

While it is the State's position that because this proposed corrected notice is not the primary notice to Defendant Cabrera and because the corrected notice does not allege any new aggravators, the State submits that the provisions of SCR 250(4)(d) do not apply and that this correction is sufficient to perfect the original notice as required in SCR 250(4)(c). Out of an abundance of caution, however, the State is formally bringing this motion pursuant to SCR 250(4)(d) within 15 days of learning of its clerical error.

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CONCLUSION

Defendant Cabrera has had notice of the State's intent to seek the death penalty against Defendant Cabrera since at least September 20, 2012. See Exhibit 1. In addition, Defendant Cabrera has had notice of the aggravators that the State intends to use in this case since at least September 25, 2012, as evidenced by the State's filing of that notice. Because both the notice to seek the death penalty, as well as the aggravators the State intends to used against Defendant Cabrera were provided to her within the 30 day requirement of SCR 250 (4)(c), the State seeks leave of this Court to file a corrected Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty which reflects these facts.

Since the State submits that it has met, in both spirit and in substance, the requirements of SCR 250 (4)(c) and asserts that good cause has been shown, the State respectfully requests that the Court grant the State's request to file an amended notice of intent to seek the death penalty.

DATED this ____ 4th____ day of October, 2012.

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565

BY /s/MICHAEL STAUDAHER
MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER
Chief Deputy District Attorney
Nevada Bar #008273

CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

I hereby certify that service of the State's Corrected Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty, was made this __4th___ day of October, 2012, by facsimile transmission to:

BRET WHIPPLE, ESQ. FAX: 974-4008

PATRICIA M. ERICKSON, ESQ. FAX: 384-3664

BY /s/S. Munoz

Employee of the District Attorney's Office

12FN0864A/sam-MVU


Staudaher, Michael

From: Michael Staudaher

Sent: Thursday, September 20, 2012 5:46 PM
To: Bret Whipple; Clark Patrick; Jackson, Alzora

Subject: Gonzales/Cabrera

Just to let you know, the committee voted to seek the death penalty on both Gonzales and Cabrera.



Michael V. Staudaher
Chief Deputy District Attorney
Office of the District Attorney
Major Violators Unit
301 East Clark Place, 10th Floor
80x 552212
Las Vegas, NV 89155-2212

E-mail: Michael Staudaher@clarkcountyda.com

Office: (702) 671-2600 Fax: (702) 477-2994



FILED IN OPEN

1	APPEARANCES:
2	For the Plaintiff:
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4	Chief Deputy District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
6	For the Defendant JOSE GONZALES:
7	CLARK W. PATRICK, ESQ.
8	Deputy Special Public Defender 330 S. Third Street, Suite 800
9	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
10	ALZORA B. JACKSON, ESQ. Deputy Special Public Defender
11	330 S. Third St., Ste. 800 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
12	The the Defendant TYONNE CARDEDA.
13	For the Defendant IVONNE CABRERA:
14	PATRICIA ERICKSON, ESQ. 601 S. Tenth Street, Suite 206
15	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
16	
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24	X
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1	LAS VEGAS, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
2	WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 2013, 9:00 A.M.		
3	PROCEEDINGS		
4	* * *		
5	THE COURT: Call the matter on page 10, State of		
6	Nevada versus Ivonne Cabrera and Jose Gonzales.		
7	MR. PATRICK: Good morning, Your Honor. Clark		
8	Patrick and Alzora Jackson for Mr. Gonzales.		
9	THE COURT: Thank you.		
10	MS. ERICKSON: Good morning, Your Honor.		
11	Patricia Erickson on behalf of Ivonne Cabrera.		
12	THE COURT: Thank you.		
13	And I think we put this matter on for status		
14	check to make a determination on trial setting. But I		
15	also have State's motion to correct the file with regard		
16	to Notice of Intent to Seek Death Penalty.		
17	MS. ERICKSON: Judge, I informed Mr. Staudaher		
18	that I was out of the jurisdiction since the 5th and I		
19	got back on the 15th. Just to let everyone know, I am		
20	going to be responsible for pleadings and discovery		
21	issues, so if the Court would give me a week to file an		
22	opposition, I would appreciate that.		
23	THE COURT: Any objection, Mr. Staudaher?		
24	MR. STAUDAHER: No, Your Honor.		
25	THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. You'll file by		

1 next week and then have it reset to --2 MR. STAUDAHER: The following week. 3 MR. ERICKSON: That would be fine, Judge. 4 THE CLERK: That will be October 31st for the 5 hearing, and then you have until October 24th to file the 6 response. 7 MS. ERICKSON: October 31st? THE CLERK: 8 Yes. 9 That will be the hearing date. THE COURT: 1.0 filing date would be the 24th. 11 MS. ERICKSON: Thank you, Judge. 12 THE COURT: And then as to the trial setting. I 13 don't know that we ever resolved the fact that we had 14 split, for lack of a better term here, with one invoking 15 and one not invoking --16 MR. STAUDAHER: It is not been dealt with yet. 17 I think one of the issues was that because it was a death 18 penalty case in this other matter and I don't know if 19 Mr. Whipple, who now has Ms. Erickson because it's a 20 death penalty case, was still under the impression of --21 if I'm not misquoting counsel -- that they were ready to go forward within 60 days on the death case, so that's 22 23 where we stand right now. 2.4 MR. PATRICK: Judge, if I remember correctly, 25 the last time we were in court I believe the Court said

that you were going to find that under the law that you had good cause to not follow the rule with regard to my client. I spoke to Mr. Whipple, we would have been ready for a 60 day trial. We have our witnesses. We are working furiously on the case, so we would like the trial set as soon as possible for the first availability in the month of May this year. And we would ask for any date close to that.

MR. PATRICK: Your Honor, we still have a wildly different opinion on this, being this is a death penalty case, looking at Rule 250, the ABA standards and how the Supreme Court handles the ABA standards in the Wiggins and Rofilla case. There is a great deal of information we need to get as far as mitigation before we're prepared to go with a death penalty case.

Ms. Jackson and I do almost primarily death penalty work and we know how much time it takes to put one of these together. In our opinion, if you want a trial date that is going to be reasonable to shoot at to have a one trial setting on this we'd be looking at sometime in the spring of 2014.

If the Court does not want to go out that far, the earliest we would be prepared to even think about a trial date would be October of next year. And we'll make the representation at this time that if the Court wishes

to set that October date we will not guarantee that we will be ready. We'll have a way better shot sometime late in spring of 2014 to have a one trial date setting in this case.

MR. ERICKSON: And, Judge, just for the record, both Mr. Whipple and I have done multiple death penalty cases. We do know all of the rules, Wiggins and 250. We are very responsible about that.

Our clients between the defendants are in very different positions. Ms. Cabrera has no prior criminal history. Their client does. So therefore, they may have different ideas of what they need to do. It takes much longer than what we need. So I am saying that we will be ready as of May.

THE COURT: I appreciate that. All right. I am going to do a trial setting that I think from the information that I have available to me, and I am also familiar, although, I have not overseen the case, I certainly have become familiar with our settings and our needs. I appreciate everybody's statements today in terms of readiness and preparation and time, and I don't know what's going to transpire between now and then.

I obviously did not grant the motion to sever and there may be differences that would impact time in preparing this, but I am going to set it in our stack

next August and split the difference a little bit, perhaps, in what's being requested, although that is much shorter than, and I appreciate representations by counsel for Mr. Gonzales regarding readiness, but I think that is a fair amount of time for us to get this case moving. And then, of course, who knows what will transpire between now and --

MR. PATRICK: Your Honor, if I may.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. PATRICK: On August 19th I have an older death penalty case that has no hope of resolving and we are set to go on that. I fact, we're going on a trip to the Philippines in January to get ready for that case, so I would hate to put something over the top of that knowing that one will have to go because it is much older than this one.

THE COURT: The stack is very early in the month so obviously I do not necessarily want to force you to be on back to back death penalty cases either.

MR. PATRICK: Could we go July, then, Your Honor?

THE COURT: It's my civil stack and the last two weeks in July are not available at all.

MR. PATRICK: Could we go in to that early September date you mentioned?

THE COURT: Also a civil stack. I know Judge
Mosley did not have one but we do. Now, I certainly
would be willing to accommodate, and I think we could
make -- my civil stack is actually quite small compared
to others. For instance, we are in one right now and I
don't have one single trial that was ready to go.

I am going to go ahead and put it in October. I don't want to risk that we sometimes pick up firm settings for med medical or who knows what, and I don't want to risk that stack. And I appreciate that we were going to try to go earlier, but there was also some mention in October that could also work for both sides on the defense side of the table, so let's just go to October and we will expect it to move then.

THE CLERK: Your calendar call will be September 30th at 9:30 with a trial date of October 7th at 10:30.

THE COURT: Hopefully that will meet everybody's needs. I appreciate it is longer than what counsel for Ms. Cabrera was asking, but I think in the grand scheme of things that is the right thing to do and not to compromise our civil stack just in case.

MR. PATRICK: Thank you.

MS. ERICKSON: Thank you. Just for the record, Judge, we do have a continuing objection to this as we have invoked.

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THE COURT: And I will note for the record that you did invoke and that the Court has what appears to be grounds to pursue past that date, and I appreciate your representations for readiness in May.

MS. ERICKSON: Thank you, Judge.

MR. STAUDAHER: And I just want to make sure to put on the record that I was informed by counsel that there was a misplacement or that discovery was lost, I think on Mr. Whipple's side, and I made that available to both — actually because of that, and I don't think that counsel for Mr. Gonzales has an issue, but there was a few additional items that have been produced.

We put discovery at the DA reception which contains all the previous discovery produced as well as some new items. Both of those items are available for respective counsel at the reception. They were placed there yesterday and I don't know if your runners picked them up yet or not. I wanted to make sure that counsel knew that that was available.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's make sure we get that and notify counsel for some reason if you don't --

MR. PATRICK: I believe we were notified, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PATRICK: One last thing. The last time we

were in Court or the time before the Court granted our motion for the juvenile records of our client. I have the order. May I approach for signature? THE COURT: Sure. Do you want the clerk to file as well? MR. PATRICK: That would be great. THE COURT: Since we have that option in criminal. All right. Thank you everyone. (End of proceedings.)

1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
2	
3	STATE OF NEVADA
4	COUNTY OF CLARK)
5	
6	I, BRENDA SCHROEDER, a certified court reporter
7	in and for the State of Nevada, do hereby certify that
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9	comprise a true, and accurate transcript of the
10	proceedings reported by me in the matter of THE STATE OF
11	NEVADA, Plaintiff, versus JOSE GONZALES, Defendant, Case
12	No. C-12-283700-2, on October 17, 2012.
13	
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15	
16	Dated this 22nd day of July, 2013.
17	
18	Brinda Schroeder Brenda schroeder, ccr no. 867
19	BREADIT BOINGEBERY GOR NO. GOT
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1 2 3 4	Bret O. Whipple, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 6168 JUSTICE LAW CENTER 1100 South Tenth St. Las Vegas, NV 89101 (702) 731-0000 admin@justice-law-center.com		CLERK OF THE COURT
56789	Patricia M. Erickson, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 3506 601 South Tenth Street, Suite 206 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 388-1055 pme@pmericksonlaw.com Counsel for Defendant: IVONNE CABRERA		
10	DISTR	RICT COURT	
11	COUNTY OF CLARK, NEVADA		
12	THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff,) Case No.:) Dept. No.:)	C283700 XXV
14	VS.		
15	IVONNE CABRERA,		
16	Defendant.		
17 18	OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION TO SEEK THE	TO FILE CORRECTE E DEATH PENALTY	ED NOTICE OF INTENT
19		e: October 31, 2012 e: 9:00 a.m.	
20	COMES NOW, Bret O. Whipple, E	Esq. and Patricia M. E	Erickson, Esq., counsel for
21	Defendant, IVONNE CABRERA, and	submits the follow	ing as Ms. CABRERA's
$\begin{bmatrix} 22 \\ 32 \end{bmatrix}$	Opposition to the State's Motion to File	Corrected Notice of	Intent to Seek the Death
23 24	Penalty.		
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States Constitution, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities and any oral argument, at the time of the hearing on the State's Motion, deemed necessary by this court. DATED this 24th day October, 2012.

This motion is made and based upon Ms. CABRERA's federal constitutional right

to due process as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United

Respectfully Submitted,

Patricia M. Erickson /s/ Patricia M. Erickson, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 3506 601 South Tenth St., Suite 206 Las Vegas, NV 89101 (702) 388-1055 Counsel for Defendant: IVONNE CABRERA

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Statement of Facts

On August 27, 2012, the state filed the Information underlying the case at bar. Thereafter, on September 25, 2012, the state filed a pleading entitled Notice of Evidence in Support of Aggravating Circumstances; the state failed to file a Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty.

On October 4, 2012, counsel for the state learned that he had failed to file the appropriate Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty and filed a pleading entitled Motion to File Corrected Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty. The state's motion clearly enunciates that the failure to file the required Notice of Intent is based upon a "clerical error" which resulted in the Notice of Intent being "mistitled" Notice of Evidence in Support of Aggravating Circumstances. Unfortunately for the state, its Motion completely fails to enunciate any facts that establish "good cause" for this Court to permit the late filing of the required Notice of Intent.

]

<u>Argument</u>

Nevada Supreme Court Rule 250(4)(c) specifies that "no later than 30 days after the filing of an information..., the state must file in the district court a notice of intent to seek the death penalty" which alleges all of the aggravating circumstances which the state intends to prove at a potential penalty phase. In the case at bar, it is clear that the state has completely failed to file the mandatory notice of intent to seek the death penalty within thirty days of August 27, 2012.¹

Given the state's failure to file any notice of intent, pursuant to Rule 250(4)(d), the state is permitted to request permission to late file the notice of intent in the case at bar because it filed the mistitled Motion to File Corrected Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty within 15 days of learning of the grounds for the filing of the notice. However, this Honorable Court may permit the late filing of the required Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty **only** if this Court finds that the state's pending motion enunciates facts that establish "good cause" for the state's failure to timely file the mandatory notice of intent.²

It is submitted that "clerical error" and the supposed mistitling of the filed pleading can not be found to be good cause. In <u>State v. Second Judicial District Court (Marshall)</u>, the Nevada Supreme Court specifically discussed the "good cause" requirement of Rule 250(4)(d). In <u>Marshall</u>, it was undisputed that the prosecutor failed to timely file the Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty.⁴ The state's motion to permit the late filing of the notice specified that the failure to timely file the notice was based upon the facts that (1) the state had been gathering information regarding the prior convictions of the

Given this fact, it is submitted that the state's pending Motion is mistitled and requests an inappropriate remedy from this Court. A Notice of Intent has not been filed in the case at bar, therefore, a corrected Notice cannot be filed. Rather, the state should be requesting permission to late file an initial Notice of Intent.

² See Rule 250(4)(d).

³ 116 Nev. 953 (2000).

Marshall at 964.

defendant and (2) during the time within which the notice should have been filed, the prosecutor had been involved in the prosecution of a two (2) separate co-defendant murder trials, one of which was a retrial that required review of more than two thousand pages of trial transcripts.⁵ The district court found that the enunciated facts for the failure to timely file did **not** establish the required good cause. In reviewing this conclusion, the Nevada Supreme Court found that the district court "reasonably determined that the workload of the prosecutor and the complexity of the case did not constitute good cause." Further, the Supreme Court specifically recognized that,

the district court correctly concluded that mere oversight on the part of a prosecutor does not constitute good cause. The reason for the late filings in this case was simply that the prosecutor overlooked the deadline. 'When I discovered that I had failed to file the notice, I filed it that day.' ... <u>An attorney's inadvertence alone does is not good cause.</u>

In the case at bar, the state has clearly stated that the failure to timely file the mandatory notice of intent was due to the prosecutor's "clerical error" which lead to the mistitling of the pleading that was actually filed on September 25, 2012. Such a "clerical error" is no more "good cause" than the oversight on the part of the prosecutor in Marshall. A "clerical error" cannot be distinguished from "an attorney's inadvertence" thus good cause has not been established to permit the late filing of the notice of intent in the case at bar.⁸

Marshall at 963.

Marshall at 966.

Marshall at 966-67.

All of the other facts enunciated in the state's motion - death penalty committee hearing, oral notice of intent to seek death, appointment of second counsel and informing defense counsel of issue on day it was discovered - can only be viewed as an argument that Ms. CABRERA will not be prejudiced by the late filing of the notice of intent. Unfortunately for the state, in Marshall, the Nevada Supreme Court clearly found that "nothing in the [notice of intent] rule suggests that lack of prejudice to the defendant can supplant the express requirement of a showing of good cause before the district court may grant a motion to file a late notice of intent to seek death." Nunnery v. State, 127 Adv. Op. 69, 263 P.3d 235, 246 (2011); accord Bennett v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 121 Nev. 802, 810 (2005).

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In the only other case discussing the "good cause" prong of Supreme Court Rule 250(d)(4), the Nevada Supreme Court noted that in the Marshall decision, it had set the ceiling and the floor of what may and may not constitute good cause permitting the late filing of a notice of intent. Thus, good cause contemplates discovery of formerly unknown evidence of aggravating circumstance(s) but is not established due to mere oversight on the part of the prosecutor. In the Bennett case, the Court ultimately held that good cause for the late filing of the notice of intent was not established even when the basis for the late filing is a new Supreme Court decision which announced a fundamental departure from death penalty precedent. "Good cause requires something more." ¹⁰

If the "good cause" prong of Rule 250(4)(d) cannot be based upon a new rule of law which announces a fundamental departure from death penalty precedent existing at the time that the notice of intent should be filed, it is clear that "clerical error" - which is **not** a fact external to the prosecutor for the failure to serve notice¹¹ - is also not "good cause" permitting the late filing of the mandatory Notice of Intent to Seek Death Penalty.¹²

Bennett, supra at 811.

10 <u>ld.</u>

Nunnery, supra at 245 (citing Marshall, 116 Nev. 953, 968).

The fact that the proposed "correction" to the Notice of Intent does not add any new aggravating circumstances is a vain attempt by the state to rely, without citation, upon the holding of the Nevada Supreme Court in <u>Hidalgo v. Eighth Judicial District Court</u>, 124 Nev. 330, 341 (2008). In <u>Hidalgo</u>, the Court distinguished <u>Marshall</u> based upon the fact that the state was not seeking to amend its notice of intent to allege new aggravating circumstances but was rather seeking to clarify the factual allegation supporting an aggravator which was alleged in a <u>timely</u> notice of intent. <u>Id.</u> As the state completely failed to file a timely notice of intent in the case at bar, the fact that the proposed correction doesn't add any new aggravating circumstances does not permit the state to "amend" the notice as was found appropriate in <u>Hidalgo</u>.

As the state has completely failed to establish good cause for its failure to timely file the notice of intent, it is submitted that this Honorable Court must deny the state's mistitled Motion to File Corrected Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty.

DATED this 24th day October, 2012.

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Patricia M. Erickson
Patricia M. Erickson, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 3506
601 South Tenth St., Suite 206
Las Vegas, NV 89101
(702) 388-1055
Counsel for Defendant:
IVONNE CABRERA

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 24th day of October, 2012, a true and correct copy of the copy of the forgoing **OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION TO FILE CORRECTED** NOTICE OF INTENT TO SEEK THE DEATH PENALTY was served by sending an email, to which the **OPPOSITION** was attached in pdf. format, to the following email address: Michael.Staudaher@ccdanv.com

/s/ Patricia M. Erickson Patricia M. Erickson

- 7 -

Electronically Filed 10/29/2012 07:53:11 AM

1	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney	•
2	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 CLERK OF THE COURT	
3	MICHAEL STAUDAHER Chief Deputy District Attorney	
4	Nevada Bar #008273 200 Lewis Avenue	
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500	: 4
	Attorney for Plaintiff	
6	DISTRICT COURT	
	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA	
8) CASE NO: C-12-283700-1	
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA, DEPT NO: XXV	
10	Plaintiff, \{ \begin{align*} \text{DETTION 721V} \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\	
11	-vs-	
12	IVONNE CABRERA, aka,	
13	Yvonne Cabrera, #1617623, JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales #2636822	
14	1	
15	Defendant.	
16		
17	RECEIPT OF COPY	
18	RECEIPT OF COPY of the following attached listing of documents in Case N	
19	12FN0864A-B, DEFENDANT IVONNE CABRERA is hereby acknowledged the	nis
	day of October, 2012.	
20	BRET O. WHIPPLE, ESQ., ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT	
21	IVONNE CABRERA	
22	BY asserah kahlmen for sones	lega
23		J
24	PREPARED BY: STEVEN B. WOLFSON	
25	District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565	
26		
27	BY Mutae & Jauth 21. H. 15	
28	MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #008273	

1	Produced on May 7, 2012:				
2	Original Har	dcopy Discovery – Complaint and Police Reports – 136 pgs			
3 4	Produced on May 16, 2012:				
5	(1) DVD Containing the following:				
6	1.	Discovery Designated "DA-Gonzales/Cabrera" Bates numbers "1 → 136" (Inclusive) - (Original Discovery Produced on May 7, 2012 − Now Bates Numbered)			
7 8	2.	Discovery Designated "DA-Gonzales/Cabrera" Bates numbers "137 → 151" (Inclusive) - (JOC - Cabrera)			
9	3.	Discovery Designated "DA-Gonzales/Cabrera" Bates numbers "152 → 158" (Inclusive) - (Search Warrant – Telephonic Application – (4-30-12))			
10 11	4.	Discovery Designated "DA-Gonzales/Cabrera" Bates number "159" (Booking Photo - Cabrera)			
12	5.	Crime Scene Photos – 408 Images - (Color)			
13	6.	Audio Recordings of the following:			
14		- Interview – Ashley Wantland			
15		- Interview - Melissa Marin			
16		- Interview – Christina Sanjuan			
17		- Interview – Ivonne Cabrera – 1 st (In four subparts)			
18		- Interview – Ivonne Cabrera – 2nd			
19	7.	Transcribed Statements of the following:			
20		- Interview – Ashley Wantland			
21		- Interview – Melissa Marin			
22		- Interview – Christina Sanjuan			
23		- Interview – Ivonne Cabrera – 1st – April 27, 2012			
24		- Interview – Ivonne Cabrera – 2 nd – May 1, 2012			
25					
26	8.	Discovery Designated "DA-Gonzales/Cabrera" Bates number "160" (Consent to Search)			
27					

1	Produced on June 26, 2012:			
2	(1) DVD Containing the following:			
3	1.	Autopsy Photographs of Erik Quezada Morales - #12-3895 - 142 images		
4	2.	Discovery Designated "DA-Gonzales/Cabrera" Bates numbers "161 —		
5	9	177" (Inclusive) - (Autopsy Report for Erik Quezada Morales - #12-3895)		
6	3.	Transcribed Interview of Jose Gonzales – (6-13-12)		
7	Produced on July 24, 2012:			
8	(1) CD-ROM Containing the following:			
9	1.	Discovery Designated "DA-Gonzales/Cabrera" Bates numbers "178 — 454" (Inclusive) - (UMC Medical Records – Victim - Ashley Wantland)		
11	2.	Discovery Designated "DA-Gonzales/Cabrera" Bates numbers "455 — 822" (Inclusive) - (UMC Medical Records – Victim – Melissa Marin)		
12	3.	Discovery Designated "DA-Gonzales/Cabrera" Bates numbers "823 — 831" (Inclusive) - (Latent Print Report)		
13 14	4.	Autopsy Photographs of James Jay Headrick - #12-3896 – 156 images		
15	5.	Discovery Designated "DA-Gonzales/Cabrera" Bates numbers "832 — 848" (Inclusive) - (Autopsy Report for James Jay Headrick - #12- 3896)		
16	Produced on August 10, 2012:			
17 18	1.	Discovery Designated "DA-Gonzales/Cabrera" Bates numbers "849' (Color Booking Photo – Gonzales)		
19	2.	Discovery Designated "DA-Gonzales/Cabrera" Bates numbers "850 - 870" (Inclusive) - (Certified JOCs for Gonzales)		
20	3.	Discovery Designated "DA-Gonzales/Cabrera" Bates numbers "871 —		
21		875" (Inclusive) - (Color Photos Shown to Victims)		
22	Produced on August 21, 2012:			
23	1.	Crime Scene Diagrams and Notes – 13 pgs		
24	2.	Transcript – (non-translated) – 911 recording – 3 pgs		
25	///			
26	///	C4C		
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Produced on October 16, 2012:

- (1) DVD Containing all previous discovery produced to date (as outlined above). In addition to the previously produced discovery, the State is also producing the following:
 - 1. BMP converted files for all Crime Scene Diagrams
 - 2. Discovery Designated "DA-Gonzales/Cabrera" Bates numbers "876 → 881" (Inclusive) (911 Call (Full Translation) _
 - 3. Discovery Designated "DA-Gonzales/Cabrera" Bates numbers "882 → 891" (Inclusive) − (Search Warrant − Buccal Swabs)
 - 4. Discovery Designated "DA-Gonzales/Cabrera" Bates numbers "892 → 893" (Inclusive) (Trace Evidence Report Gun Shot Residue)

Please Note: The State formally invites the defense to review the State's case file in the instant matter. This invitation is ongoing and is intended to make all discovery in the State's possession available and accessible to the defense. In addition, the State, at the request of the defense, will facilitate a review of the case file information housed at the North Las Vegas Police following (NLVPD) under Department event the #120426007466. In addition, the State, at the request of defense counsel, will also facilitate access to all evidence at the evidence vault which has been impounded under event number: #120426007466. It is the desire of the State to provide the defense with full access to all discovery in the possession of the State. That access is available now.

The State acknowledges that its discovery obligations are continuing and the State will make all subsequent discovery received, if any, available to the defense in compliance with the requirements of NRS 174.235, as well as Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).

The State also takes this opportunity to formally request reciprocal discovery from the defense and for the defense to provide timely access to any discovery that it intends to use at trial.

NOTC 1 STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #008273 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 9 Plaintiff. 10 CASE NO: 11 -VS-DEPT NO: 12 IVONNE CABRERA, aka Yvonne Cabrera, #1617623 13 Defendant. 14 15 CORRECTED NOTICE OF INTENT TO SEEK DEATH PENALTY ' 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT

OCT 3 1 2012

C-12-283700-1

Notice of Intent to Seek Death Penalty

C-12-283700-1

XXV

COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, through STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, by and through MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER, Chief Deputy District Attorney, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 250, NRS 175.552 and NRS 200.033, and declares its intention to seek the death penalty at penalty hearing for a conviction on COUNT 3 and/or COUNT 5. Furthermore, the State of Nevada discloses² that it will present

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On September 25, 2012, within the thirty (30) day requirement delineated by Supreme Court Rule 250, that the State filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty which was, because of a clerical error, mistitled as a "Notice of Evidence in Support of Aggravating Circumstances." The State is now, therefore, filing a corrected notice to reflect the proper titling of the notice and also to clearly specify within the body of the notice that the State is seeking the death penalty for Defendant Cabrera. It should be noted that this corrected notice does not allege any new aggravators.

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² On September 20, 2012, following the defense presentation to the death penalty assessment committee, the State informed defense counsel that the State would be seeking the death penalty in this case. (See Exhibit 1) In addition, Defense counsel was aware of the State's intent to seek the death penalty since counsel appeared with and informed the Court at an October 1, 2012 hearing that Attorney Patricia Erickson had been appointed to the case because the State was seeking the death penalty. This correction, therefore, is being filed to remedy clerical errors in the original notice and not as the primary filing of notice. The original aggravators in this correction remain the same as in the previous notice.

 evidence of the following aggravating circumstances:

- 1. The murder was committed by a person who, at any time before a penalty hearing is conducted for the murder pursuant to NRS 175.552, is or has been convicted of:
 - (a) Another murder and the provisions of subsection 12 do not otherwise apply to that other murder; or
 - (b) A felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another and the provisions of subsection 4 do not otherwise apply to that felony.

That on or about April 26, 2012, Defendants IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera and JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales did then and there wilfully, feloniously, without authority of law, and with premeditation and deliberation, and with malice aforethought, kill JAMES HEADRICK, a human being, by shooting at the said JAMES HEADRICK multiple times, with a deadly weapon, to-wit: firearm; Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales directly committing said crime, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera aiding or abetting by counsel and encouragement and by accompanying Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to JAMES HEADRICK'S residence and knocking on doors to and within JAMES HEADRICK'S apartment to allow Defendant JOSE GONZALEZ, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to gain access to JAMES HEADRICK to facilitate shooting him, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera also being criminally liable as a co-conspirator vicariously in that said crime was a foreseeable act of the conspiracy. (See NRS 200.033(2)(a))

That on or about September 9, 2012, Defendants were charged by way of an Information in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Case Number C283700, in **COUNT 3** with

It should be noted that the State learned of this clerical error on October 4, 2012, when the State received a telephone call from Drew Christiansen at the office of appointed counsel. In that call, Mr. Christiansen asked for confirmation that the State was seeking the death penalty as to Defendant Cabrera. Mr. Christiansen stated that although he had seen the Notice of Intent to Seek Death which was filed for Defendant Gonzales, he had not seen a similarly entitled filing for Defendant Cabrera. The State informed Mr. Christensen that the State was seeking the death penalty as to both Defendant Gonzales and Defendant Cabrera and that it was the State's understanding and belief that notices of intent to seek death were filed for both defendants at the same time. The State then looked in Odyssey, the court filing system, and confirmed that notices for both defendants had been filed, but due to a clerical error, the notice for Defendant Cabrera had been mistitled as a Notice of Evidence in Support of Aggravating Circumstances. The State, therefore, immediately filed a motion with the district court for leave to file this correction. Because this notice is not the primary notice to Defendant Cabrera and because the corrected notice does not allege any new aggravators, it is the State's position that the provisions of SCR 250(4)(d) do not apply and that this correction is sufficient to perfect the original notice as required in SCR 250(4)(c). Out of an abundance of caution, however, the State is following the provisions of SCR 250 (4)(d) in its attempt to comply with the notice requirements.

MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON. The State anticipates that both defendants may be convicted of such charge prior to any penalty hearing in the instant case. If such conviction occurs for First or Second Degree Murder, the conviction would qualify as an aggravating circumstance under NRS 200.033(2)(a). If such conviction occurs for any lesser offense, the conviction would qualify as an aggrevating circumstance under NRS 200.033(2)(b).

The evidence upon which the State will rely is the testimony of the witnesses, the pleadings, transcripts, judgment of conviction, court minutes in Case Number C283700, as well as the police reports, statements, photographs, and/or physical evidence from North Las Vegas Police Department Event Number 120426007466.

- 2. The murder was committed by a person who, at any time before a penalty hearing is conducted for the murder pursuant to NRS 175.552, is or has been convicted of:
 - (c) Another murder and the provisions of subsection 12 do not otherwise apply to that other murder; or
 - (d) A felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another and the provisions of subsection 4 do not otherwise apply to that felony.

That on or about April 26, 2012, Defendants IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera and JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales did then and there wilfully, feloniously, without authority of law, and with premeditation and deliberation, and with malice aforethought, kill ERIK QUEZADA MORALES, a human being, by shooting at the said ERIK QUEZADA MORALES multiple times, with a deadly weapon, to-wit: firearm; Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales directly committing said crime, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera aiding or abetting by counsel and encouragement and by accompanying Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to ERIK QUEZADA MORALES' residence and knocking on doors to and within ERIK QUEZADA MORALES' apartment to allow Defendant JOSE GONZALEZ, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to gain access to ERIK QUEZADA MORALES to facilitate shooting him, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera also being criminally liable as a co-conspirator vicariously in that said crime was a foreseeable act of the conspiracy. (See NRS 200.033(2)(a)).

That on or about September 9, 2012, Defendants were charged by way of an Information in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Case Number C283700, in COUNT 5 with MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON. The State anticipates that both defendants may be convicted of such charge prior to any penalty hearing in the instant case. If such conviction occurs for First or Second Degree Murder, the conviction would qualify as an aggravating circumstance under NRS 200.033(2)(a). If such conviction occurs for any lesser offense, the conviction would qualify as an aggrevating circumstance under NRS 200.033(2)(b).

The evidence upon which the State will rely is the testimony of the witnesses, the pleadings, transcripts, judgment of conviction, court minutes in Case Number C283700, as well as the police reports, statements, photographs, and/or physical evidence from North Las Vegas Police Department Event Number 120426007466.

- 3. The murder was committed by a person who, at any time before a penalty hearing is conducted for the murder pursuant to NRS 175.552, is or has been convicted of:
 - (e) Another murder and the provisions of subsection 12 do not otherwise apply to that other murder; or
 - (f) A felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another and the provisions of subsection 4 do not otherwise apply to that felony.

That on or about April 26, 2012, Defendants IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera and JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales did then and there, without authority of law, and malice aforethought, willfully and feloniously attempt to kill ASHLEY WANTLAND, a human being, by shooting at the said ASHLEY WANTLAND multiple times, with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm; Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales directly committing said crime, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera aiding or abetting by counsel and encouragement and by accompanying Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to ASHLEY WANTLAND'S residence and knocking on doors to and within ASHLEY WANTLAND'S apartment to allow Defendant JOSE GONZALEZ, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to gain access to ASHLEY WANTLAND to facilitate shooting her, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera also being criminally liable as a co-conspirator vicariously in that said

crime was a foreseeable act of the conspiracy. (See NRS 200.033(2)(b)).

That on or about September 9, 2012, Defendants were charged by way of an Information in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Case Number C283700, in **COUNT 4** with ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON. The State anticipates that both defendants may be convicted of such charge prior to any penalty hearing in the instant case. If such conviction occurs for Attempt Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon or or any lesser offense, the conviction would qualify as an aggrevating circumstance under NRS 200.033(2)(b).

The evidence upon which the State will rely is the testimony of the witnesses, the pleadings, transcripts, judgment of conviction, court minutes in Case Number C283700, as well as the police reports, statements, photographs, and/or physical evidence from North Las Vegas Police Department Event Number 120426007466.

- 4. The murder was committed by a person who, at any time before a penalty hearing is conducted for the murder pursuant to NRS 175.552, is or has been convicted of:
 - (g) Another murder and the provisions of subsection 12 do not otherwise apply to that other murder; or
 - (h) A felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another and the provisions of subsection 4 do not otherwise apply to that felony.

That on or about April 26, 2012, Defendants IVONNE CABRERA and JOSE GONZALES did then and there, without authority of law, and malice aforethought, willfully and feloniously attempt to kill MELISSA MARIN, a human being, by shooting at the said MELISSA MARIN twice, with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm; Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales directly committing said crime, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera aiding or abetting by counsel and encouragement and by accompanying Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to MELISSA MARIN'S residence and knocking on doors to and within MELISSA MARIN'S apartment to allow Defendant JOSE GONZALEZ, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to gain access to MELISSA MARIN to facilitate shooting him, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera also being criminally liable as a co-conspirator vicariously in that said crime was a foreseeable act of the conspiracy. (See. NRS

200.033(2)(b)).

That on or about September 9, 2012, Defendants were charged by way of an Information in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Case Number C283700, in **COUNT 6** with ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON. The State anticipates that both defendants may be convicted of such charge prior to any penalty hearing in the instant case. If such conviction occurs for Attempt Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon or or any lesser offense, the conviction would qualify as an aggrevating circumstance under NRS 200.033(2)(b).

The evidence upon which the State will rely is the testimony of the witnesses, the pleadings, transcripts, judgment of conviction, court minutes in Case Number C283700, as well as the police reports, statements, photographs, and/or physical evidence from North Las Vegas Police Department Event Number 120426007466.

5. The murder was committed by a person who knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person by means of a weapon, device or course of action which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person.

On the date of this double homicide, April 26, 2012, the location where the shooting took place was occupied by four (4) individuals who were sleeping in their beds. After breaking into the victims' home, the defendant shot at and into the bodies of all four (4) occupants, killing two (2) and severely injuring two (2) others. The defendant fired at least nine (9) rounds from his weapon at these victims and struck each victim multiple times.

- 6. The murder was committed while the person was engaged, alone or with others, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, arson in the first degree, burglary, invasion of the home or kidnapping in the first degree, and the person charged:
 - (a) Killed or attempted to kill the person murdered; or
 - (b) Knew or had reason to know that life would be taken or lethal force used.

On the date of this double homicide, April 26, 2012, the location where the shooting took place was occupied by four (4) individuals who were sleeping in their beds. The defendants not only broke into the victims' home, but they also forcibly entered each of the victims' bedrooms. This entry was made while in possession of a firearm and for the express purpose of shooting and killing the victims residing therein. The defendants knew

1	that life would be taken and that lethal f	
2	the victims.	
3	7. The murder was committed upo	
4	apparent motive.	
5	Although there may have initially	
6	victims and Defendant Cabrera, there do	
7	killing of the remaining victims. Further	
8	was part of any dispute with any of the vi	
9	Defendant Cabrera had borrowed	
10	wanted the vehicle returned, which Defe	
11	not confront or threaten Defendants Cabr	
12	broke into the victim's home while they s	
13	Regardless of whether or not there	
14	and one (1) or two (2) of the victims, the	
15	interacted with the defendants prior to the	
16	DATED this <u>5</u> day of Octo	
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force would be used after entering the bedrooms of

on one or more persons at random and without

been some type of disagreement between one of the es not appear to be any motive for the shooting and more, there is no evidence that Defendant Gonzales ctims.

a vehicle from one (1) of the victims and that victim endant Cabrera had refused to do. The victims did era or Gonzales yet despite this fact, the defendants slept and shot everyone inside.

e was any legitimate dispute between the defendants here is no evidence that all of the victims had even e shooting.

ber, 2012.

Respectfully submitted,

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565

Chief Deputy District Attorney

Nevada Bar #008273

Staudaher, Michael

From:

Michael Staudaher

Sent: To: Thursday, September 20, 2012 5:46 PM Bret Whipple; Clark Patrick; Jackson, Alzora

Subject:

Gonzales/Cabrera

Just to let you know, the committee voted to seek the death penalty on **both** Gonzales and Cabrera.



Michael V. Staudaher
Chief Deputy District Attorney
Office of the District Attorney
Major Violators Unit
301 East Clark Place, 10th Floor
Box 552212

Las Vegas, NV 89155-2212

E-mail: Michael.Staudaher@clarkcountyda.com

Office: (702) 671-2600 Fax: (702) 477-2994

EXHIBIT "1"

DISTRICT COURT 1 FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA CLERK OF THE COURT 2 NOV 0 1 2012 3 4 BY,____ 5 PHYLLIS IRBY THE STATE OF NEVADA, 6 7 Plaintiff,) Case No: C-12-283700-1 8) Dept No: XXV vs. 9 IVONNE CABRERA, Defendant. 10 11 12 13 14 BEFORE THE HONORABLE KATHLEEN DELANEY 15 OCTOBER 31, 2012, 9:00 A.M. REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 16 OF 17 STATE'S MOTION TO FILE CORRECTED NOTICE OF INTENT TO SEEK 18 THE DEATH PENALTY 19 20 21 **APPEARANCES:** (See separate page) 22 23 24 25 REPORTED BY: BRENDA SCHROEDER, CCR NO. 867

1	APPEARANCES:
2	For the Plaintiff:
3	MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER, ESQ.
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
6	For Defendant:
7	BRET O. WHIPPLE, ESQ. JUSTICE LAW CENTER
8	1100 South Tenth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
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10	PATRICIA M. ERICKSON, ESQ. 601 South Tenth Street, Suite 206 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
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LAS VEGAS, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 31, 2012

9:00 A.M.

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Call the matter on page 8, The State THE COURT: of Nevada versus Ivonne Cabrera. Seeing Ms. Cabrera present in custody. This matter is on for the State's Motion to File Corrected Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty.

> MR. STAUDAHER: That is correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And I have read the pleadings and I have looked at several cases, some of which were cited, perhaps some that were not, but I wanted to make sure that I covered everything in these matters.

I would like at this time to have full argument as well. Whatever you would like to put on the record.

Is there anything, Mr. Whipple? I'm sorry. is the State's motion.

Mr. Staudaher.

MR. STAUDAHER: Your Honor, I think I put in there what the issues were. And obviously, from the State's perspective the spirit, not only the spirt but the literal requirements of Rule 250(4)(d) and (c), and in this particular case require if there is an issue with the notice that we bring formal motions, so that is why

we have done that.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. STAUDAHER: As far as this case is concerned, counsel had both constructive notice and actual notice before that. What's in written form as far as the Notice of Intent to Seek Death prior to the expiration of 30 days; however, the Notice of Aggravating, which is the reason why there is the requirements so that they are aware of what aggravators there are, the State intends to use was also provided in a timely fashion before that time.

In fact, I believe what I attached to the motion was the e-mail that I sent following the death penalty substance committee meeting to both counsel, including Mr. Whipple, indicating that the State was seeking the death penalty for both defendants. You have that.

In response to that, obviously, he contacted the office of appointed counsel and had Ms. Erickson appointed to the case because it was a death case. On the 1st of October he came to the court and said that Ms. Erickson was now on the case because it was a death case. So at this point everybody was believing that was the case.

We filed the notices. Actually the one for Mr. Gonzalez is entitled correctly, but when

Mr. Christensen called my office on, I think it was the 4th of October, and asked if we were seeking the death penalty for Ms. Cabrera because he appointed Ms. Erickson to the case, that he said he didn't see a document entitled that. I sent both of them. I believe have been filed. I looked on Odyssey immediately and found out that in fact the document which was the Notice of Intent was mistitled as Notice of Aggravators, essentially, in this case. The same aggravators that are in the corrected version. It is essentially the title of the document that is different.

Counsel obviously has had notice and also has had the aggravators well within the 30 days, which is the main crux of the requirements. It was a clerical error in our office. I think that that is good cause to show that they were (1) knowledgeable of the fact that there was an intent to seek the death penalty and they were provided with the statutory required aggravators within a 30 day period of time.

The titling of the document, I think it speaks really to a clerical issue and wanted to make sure that it was correct.

I know that they are opposing this change but I believe the State has met both the spirit and the substance of the requirements under 250.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Staudaher.

Ms. Erickson.

MS. ERICKSON: Judge, I couldn't disagree more.

First off, there has been no Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty filed. That has not been filed. That document has not been filed.

THE COURT: A document with that title has not been filed.

MS. ERICKSON: Correct. So therefore, that document has not been filed.

The secondary part of what the State has to do under 250, which is the Notice of Evidence in Support of Aggravating Circumstances. Therefore, this is not a case where we get to amend a Notice of Intent because there is no Notice of Intent.

As there is no Notice of Intent the only thing -- the Court can certainly allow them to file a late Notice of Intent, but they must establish good cause.

The Nevada Supreme Court has discussed in several cases, Marshall being the first, where they said attorney inadvertence is not good cause. A clerical error cannot be distinguished from attorney inadvertence. It is exactly the same thing; it is not good cause.

In Bennett the State requested to file additional aggravating circumstances late because it was

based on the Supreme Court's new decision of -- I can't think of the name -- but it was making the felony murder aggravators inapplicable to a case where felony murder was the underlying basis for the first degree murder.

1.0

The Nevada Supreme Court specified in that case, which it was new precedent, different from all the other cases that they've held, that even that was not good cause. Certainly, clerical error does not even rise to the status of a new case that distinguishes how we deal with procedural issues in death penalty cases.

But finally, the Nunnery case, even though that is a case where the issue was requesting additional aggravating evidence that had not been enunciated in a timely manner. The Supreme Court discussed good cause with regard to the notice of intent as a comparison to what was required with regard to filing new or late notice of aggravating circumstances.

And in Nunnery the Supreme Court specified very clearly that everything that the State has said, that there was a hearing in front of the committee, that there was notice given, that the death penalty was going to be sought, that counsel has been appointed, that everybody thought this was a death penalty case, that would be okay under filing a late or changed evidence of aggravating circumstances.

It is not good cause because that is an argument that we're not prejudiced. There is no prejudice for filing this new document or changed document or whatever they want to call it, but that has no applicability in decision on good cause for filing a notice of intent.

The Supreme Court has said it in numerous cases. It said it in Marshall. It clarified it in Bennett and it specified it in Nunnery.

In Nunnery they state that 250(4)(d) provides a bright-line rule that in no event can an initial notice of intent be filed later than 30 days before trial.

Based in part on that provision we defined in Marshall to allow a good cause showing under Supreme Court 250(4)(d) to be based on lack of prejudice.

The bright-line rule and restriction from lack of prejudice to establish good cause serve the purpose of this notice by requiring accountability and diligence by the State when deciding what aggravators to pursue in the first instance.

In Nunnery the Court even went further and clarified that what they meant in Marshall by good cause is that it has to be a fact external to the prosecutor. Now that's the same kind of language that we use in postconviction for cause and prejudice. But what's the other language; good cause external to the defense. The

Nevada Supreme Court has discussed in evidence in 2001 what that meant under that statute under those provisions, and good cause there was the fact that the Federal Court had overruled their determination. That is external to the defense.

So external to the prosecutor cannot be clerical error. It can't be inadvertent. It can't be based on his misunderstanding. It can't be based on anything that is in the thought process of the prosecutor.

If this Court allows the filing of a Notice of Intent based solely on their statement that it was a mistitled document that opens the floodgates for them not to fulfill the bright-line rule that's established by Rule 250(d). And that would be our submission.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. STAUDAHER: And I will follow up, Your Honor, if I may.

First of all, we are really getting into semantics here, but it is important in a case like this obviously. But whether it is a corrected notice or a late notice the fact of the matter is that the document was filed. It is in substance not changed but essentially the change is the title of the document.

Counsel was fully aware that this was a death case and postured the case themselves in that realm. So

it's not that there is a prejudice in the sense that they believe they were not going to be facing that. There's no punishment essentially to Defendant for that, but in fact they were aware of that and is why they have second counsel appointed to this case.

The issue with regard to all the cases that have been cited essentially have dealt with aggravators. Whether there has been new evidence that has come forward to add an aggravator or to change the aggravators that the defendant may be facing, we do not have that here. The aggravators have not changed. They are the same as when they were filed initially as they are today. There is no new addition. The State is not asking for any additional change to that.

So the substance of the Notice is essentially what it was with the correction to the fact that it is a Notice of Intention to Seek Death versus a Notice of Aggravators that was filed initially. So I do not believe that the prejudice issue even comes into play because we are not changing anything from what has been done before with exception of the title.

And counsel was aware of that so they cannot be prejudiced based on their acknowledgment that this was a death case. The notice to them beforehand and the fact that we are essentially asking to correct the record, we

have to bring the motion under 250(4)(c)(d) to bring this issue before the Court, ask leave to do it, whether the Court wishes us to entitle it "late notice of filing" or "corrected notice of filing" that is really a semantic issue as far as the State is concerned.

But we do believe we did give the appropriate notice within the time frame. We are not asking for any additional aggravators for this Court to be ruling on and the defense obviously knew that we were doing this initially so they cannot be prejudiced.

THE COURT: Thank you. I have read everything.

I have looked at all the cases, obviously, in a situation like this we have to give the most care and consideration to the circumstances, and we also would hope that the same is happening in the offices respectfully that have pleadings to file.

But what I have to look at here and what I think does distinguish this case from Marshall and from Bennett and from Nunnery is that the substance of the document that was filed is the one that was required to be filed. I do not believe that the fact that the title is not indicating that the document is what it is in fact is, it is sufficient grounds to find that the Notice was not filed timely, and I do believe that this is tantamount to asking to correct the record to have the correct title of

the document, but the substance of the document is clear.

The subsequent actions of the party make it clear to the Court that the substance was clear. I do not believe that this is a situation that is requiring good cause to show for a late filing. Marshall is clearly distinguishable in that circumstance that the filing hadn't occurred within 30 days; this filing did occur.

Bennett also is distinguishable for a number of reasons as well. It indicates including that there had been an attempt to change or add aggravators that previously had been not considered or not added. And, of course, Nunnery does go into the prejudice issue.

I do have the same reading that this prejudice is not the issue that we're looking at here, but I do not think that this is a matter of allowing a late filing because of a clerical error. I do believe that this was a filing that was done timely and that the Court is being asked to allow the record to be corrected, and is going to grant the motion to allow the record to be corrected. And on those grounds argued by the State the Motion is granted.

MR. STAUDAHER: Thank you, Your Honor. And I do have the corrected Notice of to Intent Seek Death that -THE COURT: The Court will allow that to be

filed to supplement the record and allow the record to be corrected.

MR. STAUDAHER: Thank you.

THE COURT: In the order that the State prepares to reflect that this is the basis upon which the Court has made this decision so we do not have -- should this matter be challenged -- that we do not have any indication of the Court in finding that this was a clerical error that warrants for late filing or that there is a prejudice issue involved here.

I am distinguishing these matters from Marshall and Bennett because I do believe that it was filed, and that we simply have a title that needs to be corrected.

MS. ERICKSON: And Judge, we will be doing a writ of mandamus so we would request that the order be filed as quickly as possible so that we can take care of this issue in a timely manner before our trial date.

And then we also had a question about the trial date because when I first looked online the calendar call date that we have been given was different. And then when I got an e-mail from the clerk saying that the dates we got were really appropriate and I don't know if we resolved that yet.

THE COURT: I know my clerk has been working on it. The dates that were given when we tried to sort of

in August as we know the defense was looking, but not quite as late as the State perhaps had looked at as well, happens to be our civil stack in our trial stacks. It is an error. It does not mean that we couldn't leave it there, but given perhaps that we are talking about next year, we thought perhaps we could adjust it. And I think we ended up adjusting it to just a week prior to correct that.

So we do have dates that we can give now that would clarify what those dates are and it would probably be helpful to do that now.

MS. ERICKSON: Yes, if we could. That would be great.

THE COURT: I know that the other counsel is not here but we need to make sure everybody is aware and we can do that through the minutes.

MS. ERICKSON: And I will also send an e-mail to Ms. Jackson and Mr. Patrick.

THE COURT: I appreciate that.

THE CLERK: The calendar call date will be September 23rd at 9:30 with a trial date of September 30th at 10:30.

THE COURT: And I do think that it is important that the State get that order to us so that we can in

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turn, turn it around and allow the opportunity for that challenge to take place. And of course the Court wants to have the opportunity to review the language to make sure it comports with what we discussed here today.

MR. STAUDAHER: In that regard, Your Honor, I am going to have my secretary send over an order for transcript so that we can make sure that we have what the Court's ruling is.

THE COURT: I'm sure my reporter can turn it around very quickly, so we'll do that. And as soon as we see it we'll get it right back to you.

MS. ERICKSON: It is a capital case so it does require without order that the daily transcripts be done.

> THE COURT: Okay. Good.

MR. WHIPPLE: And also I just want to confirm I was not present at the last date when we set the trial I'm just curious how we got the September date of next year. Is that the ordinary course or is that the first opening?

It wasn't the ordinary course. THE COURT: Ιt wasn't what was requested by the defense. It was what the Court determined was an appropriate amount of time. We could not proceed -- the Court did not feel it would be appropriate in the circumstances to proceed with it being invoked in that circumstance and there was a lot of

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discussion at the time, which I am not going to try to recall now and misstate anything, but we came up with that date as what we felt was a fair balance in doing this case as expeditiously as possible given the request to invoke, but on the other hand, to make sure that everybody was fully prepared in the appropriate time span.

For the record, of course, because MR. WHIPPLE: everything will be looked at later, it was clear that my client never waived their right to trial within 60 days.

> THE COURT: That was definitely done.

MR. WHIPPLE: Okay.

Your Honor, there are two things MR. STAUDAHER: on the record now related to that issue and because if it does become an issue later I want it to be clear. informed and requested at the last court date, which was the 17th, that counsel for the defendant Ms. Cabrera had either lost, misplaced or did not have discovery. Thev asked me to reproduce the discovery, which I did. think it is disingenuous for them to indicate that they would be ready and willing to go to trial in 60 days when they don't in fact have possession of or have lost their discovery.

Secondly, Ms. Erickson has also indicated that they are going to appeal the decision of this Court to

the Nevada Supreme Court on a writ of mandamus, which would further, as the Court knows, the Supreme Court doesn't turn things around typically in a rapid manner as far as a few days or anything, so I will indicate that that also is another cog in the wheel from the defense side.

The State had no sort of stave. We just stood off to the side with regard to the setting of the trial. It was not our decision related to that. It was both counsel for Ms. Cabrera and counsel for Mr. Gonzalez who were working back and forth trying to come up with a date that the Court finally set.

The State would have been fine with any date that the Court set. But again, based on the procedural posture of this case thus far the 60-day window was not something that was doable. And also that we believe that that is something that is essentially asking for defense's severance and is the only reason that it was brought by the defense.

THE COURT: And again, I believe we discussed the numerous reasons why we had the date that we set. But it was clear that Ms. Cabrera had not waived.

MS. ERICKSON: Judge, just for the record, that is not a correct statement of the missing discovery. The missing discovery was two CDs that had a minimal amount

of it was a few reports, so therefore, that is a disingenuous statement.

of documentation on it. One of it was pictures and one

We had all of the written reports, voluntarily statement, all of the things that we needed to go forward with the trial. We would have been ready within 60 days, and the State can't decide for us whether we're ready or not.

And Mr. Staudaher did argue against the 60 days because he said we couldn't be prepared, which he had no right to say. But I wanted to clarify what we were missing.

THE COURT: In these cases, again, it is very important that we have a complete record. I understand different ways to view the record.

The Court is not making any comment on or judgment on whether or not the defendant would have been ready to go or not. The defendant did invoke; did not waive that. The Court did, however, determine what was appropriate for this case, as I believe was in the Court's discretion to set the trial date when it did and that's what it chose to do. I'm clarifying that for the record.

MS. ERICKSON: Thank you, Judge.

MR. STAUDAHER: And the last thing, Your Honor,

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just so we are clear on the record --

THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Staudaher.

MR. STAUDAHER: I was requested to produce all of the discovery that had been produced thus far and that is what I did produce. In fact, it is contained in the receipt of copy that counsel picked up the discovery for. It was not the last two CDs. It was not a certain segment. It was all of the discovery. So that was indeed copied and was indicative of what was requested of the State when the State did produce, just so we're clear on that.

MS. ERICKSON: No. No. We are not clear. sent the e-mail and I said specifically that the two CDs that were misplaced were the last ones that were disclosed, as set forth in the ROC before the one that we I did not request all of the discovery. just got. submit the e-mail that I specified completely that it was two CDs and it was not all of the discovery.

THE COURT: Well, I will tell you what I recall being stated when we were last here in court, and I don't remember the exchange that we are having now, was that discovery was being replaced in its entirety.

Whatever the truth of that is or is not, if somebody feels that that is something that is going to be relevant, then at the time you are doing your briefing on

whatever issue may arise then you can clarify. But at this point in time the Court made its decision based on a lot of factors and a lot of circumstances, and what it felt was appropriate and within its exercise of discretion of when to set this trial date and had already made the determination not to sever, and so independent I believe of those circumstances the Court made its decision.

So we'll have the agree-to-disagree record on the discovery issue should that become an issue you will each have your communications and your position on that.

But for now I am not sure that it is an issue and Mr. Whipple asked to clarify and I did clarify that at no time was I of the opinion, nor did I hear that Ms. Cabrera was waving any of these rights. The Court set the date it set because it felt it was appropriate.

MS. ERICKSON: Thank you, Judge.

MR. WHIPPLE: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. STAUDAHER: Thank you, Your Honor.

* * *

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE STATE OF NEVADA ss. COUNTY OF CLARK I, BRENDA SCHROEDER, a certified court reporter in and for the State of Nevada, do hereby certify that the foregoing and attached pages 1-24, inclusive, comprise a true, and accurate transcript of the proceedings reported by me in the matter of THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff, versus IVONNE CABRERA, Defendant, Case No. C-12-283700-1, on October 31, 2012. Dated this 31st day of October, 2012. Brenda Schroeder RENDA SCHROEDER, CCR NO. 867

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CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

IVONNE CABRERA,

Petitioner,

VS.

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent,

Case No: C-12-283700-1

Dept No: XXV

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on November 13, 2012, the court entered a decision or order in this matter. a true and correct copy of which is attached to this notice.

You may appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision or order of this court. If you wish to appeal, you must file a notice of appeal with the clerk of this court within thirty-three (33) days after the date this notice is mailed to you. This notice was mailed on December 3, 2012.

STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CLERK OF THE COURT

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on this 3 day of December 2012, I placed a copy of this Notice of Entry of Decision and Order in:

The bin(s) located in the Office of the District Court Clerk of: Clark County District Attorney's Office Attorney General's Office - Appellate Division

☑ The United States mail addressed as follows:

Ivonne Cabrera # 1617623 330 S. Casino Center Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89101

Bret O. Whipple, Esq. 1100 S. Tenth St. Las Vegas, NV 89104

1	FOF		Alun to Chum
2	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565		CLERK OF THE COURT
3	MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER		
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #008273		
5	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500		
6	Attorney for Plaintiff		
7	1	ICT COURT	
8	CLARK CO	UNTY, NEVADA	
9	STATE OF NEVADA	}	C-12-283700-1
10	Plaintiff,) Case No.	
11	vs.) Dept No.	XXV
12	IVONNE CABRERA, aka	}	
13	Yvonne Cabrera, #1617623 JOSE GONZALES, aka,	}	
14	Jose Alejandro Gonzales, #2636822,		
15	Defendants.	}	
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FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

DATE OF HEARING: 10/31/12 TIME OF HEARING: 9:00 A.M.

THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable KATHLEEN DELANEY, District Judge, on the 31st day of October, 2012, the Defendant being present and represented by BRET O. WHIPPLE, ESQ. and PATRICIA M. ERICKSON, ESQ. and the State being represented by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, District Attorney, by and through MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and the Court having considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, arguments of counsel, testimony and documents on file herein, now therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Court has reviewed the briefs filed by the parties, has heard argument from the parties and has also reviewed the applicable law including State v. Dist. Ct. (Marshall), 116 Nev. 953, 11 P.3d 1209 (2000), Bennett v District Court, 121 Nev. 802, 121 P.3d 605 (2005) and Nunnery v. State, 263 P.3d 235, 127 Nev. Ad. Op. 69 (2011).

The Court finds from the records on file that the substance of the required notice of intent to seek death was timely filed by the State and the fact that the titling of that document was incorrect is not sufficient grounds to find that said notice was not timely filed. The Court also finds that subsequent actions by defense counsel shows that the substance of the original filing was clear to the defense. The Court further finds that correcting the title to the notice does not require a showing of good cause since the notice was timely filed.

The Court finds that the situation at bar is distinguishable from Marshall, Bennett and Nunnery for a number of reasons including the fact that there was no attempt by the State to add any aggravators to the original filing and that there was no request for leave to file the notice late because of a clerical error. The Court further finds that the original notice was timely filed and the Court is simply granting the State leave to allow the record to be corrected. The Court further finds that there is no prejudice to the defendant in allowing the State to file a corrected notice of intent to seek death.

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1	<u>ORDER</u>
2	1. THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the State's Motion to File
3	Corrected Notice of Intent to Seek Death is granted.
4	DATED this 220 day of November, 2012.
5	$\sqrt{\alpha}$
6	Xall Wille
7	DISTRICT JUDGE
8	
9	STEVEN B. WOLFSON
10	DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #001565
11	To a state of
12	BY MICHAEL V. STAUDWHER
13	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #008273
14	Nevada Bai #0002/3
15	
16	
17	
18	CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
19	i ati
20	I hereby certify that service of the above document, was made this day of
21	November, 2012, by facsimile transmission to:
22	BRET O. WHIPPLE, ESQ. FAX #974-4008
23	PATRICIA M. ERICKSON, ESQ.
24	FAX #384-3664
25	
26	Secretary for the District Attorney's Office
27	
28	12FN0864A/MVS/sam-MVU

1	MCNT		Alm X. Ehren
2	DAVID M. SCHIECK SPECIAL PUBLIC DEFENDER		CLERK OF THE COURT
_	Nevada Bar #0824		
3	CLARK W. PATRICK		
4	Deputy Special Public Defender Nevada Bar #9451		
	ALZORA B. JACKSON		
5	Deputy Special Public Defender Nevada Bar #2255		
6	330 So. Third Street, Suite #800		
_	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155		
/	(702) 455-6265 FAX: (702) 455-6273		
8	E-MAIL: cpatrick@clarkcountynv.gov		
9	E-MAIL: ajackson@clarkcountynv.gov Attorneys for GONZALES		
9	Attorneys for GONZALES		
10	DIS	STRICT COURT	
11	CLARK	COUNTY, NEVADA	
12	THE STATE OF NEVADA,) CASE NO. C-12-	283700-2
13	Plaintiff,) DEPT. NO. 25	
	1 141114111,)	
[4	VS.		
15	JOSE A. GONZALES, ID 2636822,		
16	Defendant.		
_)	
17			
18 l	MOTION TO	CONTINUE TRIAL DA	TE

Date: 7 - 25 - 13Time: 9:00 a m

COMES NOW, Defendant, Jose Gonzales, by and through his attorneys, David M. Schieck, Special Public Defender, Clark W. Patrick, Deputy Special Public Defender, and Alzora B. Jackson, Deputy Special Public Defender, and respectfully requests that this Honorable Court continue the trial date in this matter which is currently scheduled for October 7, 2013.

This Motion is made and based upon the papers and pleadings on file herein, the Points and Authorities herein, and the Declaration attached hereto, and any oral argument as may be adduced at the time of the hearing of this matter.

SPECIAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER

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CLARK COUNTY
NEVADA

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NOTICE OF MOTION

TO: The State of Nevada, Plaintiff; and

TO: The Clark County District Attorney, Attorney for Plaintiff:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will bring on the above and foregoing **Motion to Continue Trial Date** on $\underline{July 15}$, $\underline{2013}$ at the hour of 9:00 a.m., in Department No. 25 of the above-entitled Court, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

The Eighth Judicial District Court Rule 7.30 states in pertinent part that "Any party may, for good cause, move the court for an order continuing the date set for trial....."

Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel. This is especially important when the State is requesting the imposition of the death penalty. The ABA has set forth guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Capital Cases. The objective of the guidelines is to set forth a national standard of practice for the defense of capital cases in order to ensure high quality legal representation for all persons facing the possible imposition or execution of a death sentence in any jurisdiction. See ABA Guideline 1.1.

These guidelines are not aspirational. Instead they embody the current consensus about what is required to provide effective defense representation in capital cases.

The United States Supreme Court has held counsel as being ineffective when counsel's conduct "fell short of the standards for capital defense work articulated by the ABA standard to which we have long referred as guides to determining what is reasonable." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003).

At the core of the ABA Guidelines is the need to perform a complete and detailed investigation into all aspects of the case, both at the guilt phase and the penalty phase. At every stage of the proceedings, counsel has a duty to investigate the case thoroughly. This duty is intensified (as are many duties) by the unique nature of the death penalty, has been emphasized by recent statutory changes, and is broadened by the bifurcation of capital trials. See ABA Guideline 10.7. "The ABA Guidelines provide that investigations into mitigating evidence

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should comprise efforts to discover all reasonable available mitigation evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravation evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor." Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, n. 7 (2005).

Because the sentencer in a capital case must consider in mitigation, "anything in the life of a defendant which might mitigate against the appropriateness of the death penalty for that defendant." Brown v. State, 526 So. 2d 903, 908 (Fla. 1988) (citing Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 394 (1987)); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-15 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978); infra text accompanying note 277. "Penalty phase preparations requires extensive and generally unparalleled investigation into personal and family history." In the case of a client facing the death penalty, this begins with the moment of conception. Counsel needs to explore:

- 1. Medical History
- 2. Family and Social History
- 3. Educational History
- 4. Military Service
- 5. Employment and Training History
- 6. Prior Juvenile and Adult Correctional Experience.

ABA Standard 10.7.

In <u>Allen v. Woodford</u>, 395 F.3d 979, 1001 (9th Cir. 2005), the Court citing <u>Strickland v.</u> Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984), held "counsel's untimely, hasty, and incomplete investigation of potential mitigation evidence for the penalty phase fell outside the range of reasonable professional assistance.

The California Supreme Court held that trial counsel's "failure to investigate petitioner's early social history was not consistent with norms that directed counsel in death penalty cases to conduct a reasonably thorough independent investigation of the defendant's social history as reflected in the ABA standards relied upon by the court in the <u>Wiggins</u> case." <u>In re Larry Douglas Lucas</u>, 94 P.3d 477, 504 (Cal. 2004).

Summing up the need to thoroughly investigate all evidence and mitigating factors in a capital case, "counsel's failure to inquire into an area specifically mentioned in the ABA Guidelines is a good indicator that his performance was constitutionally deficient." <u>Kandies v.</u>

NEVADA

Polk, 385 F.3d 457, 479 (4th Cir. 2004).

In the instant case, the defense team has been diligently investigating and preparing a mitigation case for Jose. However, there are still many of Jose's family members, friends and teachers to be interviewed. During his youth, Jose had health issues and accidents that must be investigated in order to complete the "extensive and generally unparalleled investigation into personal and family history," that is required by the ABA Guidelines and the United States Supreme Court.

At this time, counsel has not completed the mitigation investigation that is required prior to counsel being prepared to take this matter to trial. Until the mitigation investigation is complete counsel for Jose Gonzales would be per se ineffective during a penalty phase of a capital murder trial.

Mr. Gonzales is aware of and has consented to this Motion to Continue Trial.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully requested that the trial date of July 30, 2012 be vacated and reset.

DATED this 3rd day of July 2013.

SUBMITTED BY:

DAVID M. SCHIECK SPECIAL PUBLIC DEFENDER

/s/ CLARK W. PATRICK

CLARK W. PATRICK Alzora B. Jackson Attorneys for Gonzales

DECLARATION OF CLARK W. PATRICK

Clark W. Patrick, makes the following declaration:

I am the Deputy Special Public Defender representing Mr. Jeremias along with cocounsel Alzora B. Jackson in the instant case. Mr. Gonzales' capital trial is set for October 10, 2013.

A full mitigation investigation is necessary to prepare for a penalty phase. It is the considered opinion of both attorneys for Mr. Gonzales that it would be grounds for an automatic ineffective assistance of counsel claim for them to proceed to trial without completing this investigation.

Under Nevada Supreme Court Rule 250 (1) the Court "places the highest priority on diligence in the discharge of professional responsibility in capital cases...The purpose of this rule is to ensure that capital defendants receive fair trials...to minimize the occurrence of error in capital cases and to recognize and correct promptly any error that may occur..."

The following cases impose an absolute minimum standard of care on capital defense attorneys conduct in mitigation investigations: Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).

The attorneys for Mr. Gonzales will have failed in the discharge of their duties under Rule 250 and the foregoing cases if this case proceeds to trial as scheduled.

Mr. Gonzales is aware of and has consented to this Motion to Continue Trial. Counsel for Co-Defendant has been informed that we are filing a motion to continue.

I declare that I make this request in good faith and not for purposes of delay

/s/ CLARK W. PATRICK

CLARK W. PATRICK

SPECIAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER

CLARK COUNTY

NEVADA

CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC FILING I hereby certify that service of the foregoing Motion was made on July 3, 2013, by Electronic Filing to: DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE email: pdmotions@ccdanv.com courtesy copy to Michael Staudaher at Michael.Staudaher@ccdanv.com /s/ Kathleen Fitzgerald Legal Executive Assistant for Special Public Defender CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION I hereby certify that service of the foregoing Motion was made this 3rd day of July, 2013 by facsimile transmission to: BRET WHIPPLE, ESQ., attorney for co-defendant Ivonne Cabrera at Fax 974-4008. /s/ Kathleen Fitzgerald Legal Executive Assistant for Special Public Defender

SPECIAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER
CLARK COUNTY

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DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff,) Case No: C-12-283700-2) Dept No: XXV vs. JOSE ALEJANDRO GONZALES, Defendant. BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOSEPH BONAVENTURE JULY 24, 2013, 9:00 A.M. REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATE APPEARANCES: (See separate page) REPORTED BY: BRENDA SCHROEDER, CCR NO. 867

1	APPEARANCES:
2	For the Plaintiff:
3	MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER, ESQ.
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
6	For the Defendant JOSE GONZALES:
7	CLARK W. PATRICK, ESQ. Deputy Special Public Defender
8	330 S. Third Street, Suite 800 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
9	ALZORA B. JACKSON, ESQ.
10	Deputy Special Public Defender 330 S. Third St., Ste. 800
11	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
12	For the Defendant IVONNE CABRERA:
13	PATRICIA ERICKSON, ESQ.
14	601 S. Tenth Street, Suite 206 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
15	BRET O. WHIPPLE, ESQ.
16	Justice Law Center 1100 S. Tenth Street
17	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
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1	LAS VEGAS, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
2	WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 2012
3	PROCEEDINGS
4	* * *
5	THE COURT: State of Nevada versus Ivonne
6	Cabrera and Jose Gonzales.
7	MS. ERICKSON: Good morning, Your Honor.
8	Patricia Erickson and Bret Whipple appearing on behalf of
9	Ivonne Cabrera.
10	MR. PATRICK: Clark Patrick and Alzora Jackson
11	for Mr. Gonzales, Judge.
12	MR. STAUDAHER: Michael Staudaher on behalf of
13	the State, Your Honor.
14	THE COURT: You filed a Motion to Continue; is
15	that correct?
16	MR. PATRICK: Yes, Your Honor. This is our
17	Motion to Continue.
18	THE COURT: Do you agree?
19	MS. ERICKSON: No, Judge, we oppose. We invoked
20	our 60 days.
21	THE COURT: Go ahead.
22	MR. PATRICK: Well, Judge, the simple fact of
23	the matter is this is a death penalty case and under Rule
24	250 and the Supreme Court cases Wiggens and Rompella we
25	have not completed our necessary mitigation

investigation, and should we be forced to go trial at this time, or in September on our trial date, Ms. Jackson and I would be per se ineffective. Any trial would not stand by any means through any appellate review. We need to do mitigation, and until mitigation is done we cannot go to trial.

I understand that codefendant may feel that they are ready, but we're not. And if we are forced to go to trial it will be for naught because the conviction, if there is one, will be overturned.

THE COURT: Wasn't it bifurcated -- or you might be ready for trial but you are not ready for the penalty phase?

MR. PATRICK: Well, Judge --

THE COURT: The judge gives you plenty of time for the penalty phase.

MR. PATRICK: Well, that's not how it works in Nevada, Judge, you know that.

THE COURT: I was just asking you. Bifurcate and then after the trial, if he's convicted, then you have a penalty phase. Why doesn't it work like that?

MR. PATRICK: The penalty phase starts the next day, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, sometimes. I mean, it doesn't have to start the next -- there's no law saying it has to

be. Is there a statute saying that the penalty phase has to be done the next day? It could be a week later or two weeks later.

MR. PATRICK: Yes, Judge. And I filed many motions for bifurcating trial phases like that and they have never been granted in the 8th Judicial District Court.

THE COURT: Well, the problem with this is you have a codefendant that is not agreeing to the continuance of the trial.

What does the State have to say? And then I'll hear from you.

MR. STAUDAHER: Well, the State, obviously, they initially brought a motion to sever, which was denied by the Court. And it is the State's position that this is a ploy to get a de facto severance. We are opposed to any continuance if both parties are not in the case. If they are both in the case then we don't oppose a continuance, for the reason that they have this was originally set out a year from the actual date for both parties to be able to get ready for trial.

So at this stage, the State would oppose a continuance unless both of the defense parties agree to the continuance.

THE COURT: Well, they say, you know, that it's

ineffective assistance of counsel. That's what he's saying.

MR. STAUDAHER: It's the same for both, Your Honor. We feel that we don't want to sever the case. So if they both are in agreement for the continuance --

THE COURT: Well, they're not. They are not both in agreement, so now we have to take it as it is. They are not both in agreement.

So is that going to affect the State's case if the Court denies the Motion to Continue, wouldn't that be ineffective assistance of counsel?

MR. STAUDAHER: Well, I think we are in the same position. If we are going to try it once or twice, depending on what's going on. I mean, the Court initially set this case out a year for both parties to get ready. So whether a year is enough time to get ready in a case of this type would be something that the Supreme Court would have to review. But at this stage the State would oppose a continuance unless both parties are in agreement.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PATRICK: Judge, if I may, one more thing.

THE COURT: Yes. Make your record.

MR. PATRICK: And I understand the Court's position and I understand that this Court doesn't

necessarily care about what other courts in the 8th
Judicial District do, but I can tell you that I have a
client that has been waiting to go to trial for five
years because the codefendant keeps saying that they are
not ready to do the penalty phase and it would be
ineffective assistance of counsel to make us go to trial.
Well, we've been ready for five years but we don't get
our trial date because the codefendant is not ready.

And I know that it was not Judge Delaney's court or your court, but if my client has to wait for five years because codefendant is not ready, I don't see the difference here where I'm saying I'm not ready and it will be ineffective assistance of counsel, which I will be more than happy to give Mr. Gonzales an affidavit at the end of September's trial saying that I was per se ineffective just because they are trying to get a de facto severance on this issue.

MS. ERICKSON: Judge, we are not trying to get a de facto severance. We've been ready. We announced ready at the first arraignment on September 6th. We announced ready again on September 12th. We filed a Motion to Sever on September 21, within nine days of invoking.

That motion was denied on the 1st of October, and the State filed a motion to correct the Notice of

Intent on October 4th. On October 17th the trial date was set over our objection for September 30th. We explained why we were objecting, that we were ready to go and we would be ready to go. The trial would have been in November and it was continued over our objection.

At this time we are ready to go. We're not asking -- I'm renewing my motion for severance, obviously, but we are not seeking a de facto. We are ready to go.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MR. STAUDAHER: No, Your Honor.

MR. PATRICK: Your Honor, if I may just very briefly. The first two times that co-counsel announced ready we had not even received all of the discovery in this case.

MS. ERICKSON: The discovery that we received after that date was minimal. It was pictures. We have not received anything of substance.

THE COURT: The Court reviewed this. You have had over a year to get ready on this. Again, this has nothing to do with the trial phase, perhaps with the penalty phase, but the trial judge could take care of it. I am going to deny the Motion to Continue.

MS. JACKSON: Your Honor, if I may.

THE COURT: I am going to deny the Motion to

Continue. Now, if you are going to try to change my mind, I'm not going to change my mind. If you want to make a quick record, make a record.

MS. JACKSON: I do.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. JACKSON: In all the years I have been trying capital cases I have never had the opportunity to go out of the country between a first phase and a second phase. Mr. Gonzales is from Mexico and we have not been able to go out there with our calendars. A year, I've never been able to try a capital case within a year, and the record will so reflect.

> THE COURT: Thank you.

(End of proceedings.)

1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
2	
3	STATE OF NEVADA)) ss.
4	COUNTY OF CLARK)
5	
6	I, BRENDA SCHROEDER, a certified court reporter
7	in and for the State of Nevada, do hereby certify that
8	the foregoing and attached pages 1-10, inclusive,
9	comprise a true, and accurate transcript of the
10	proceedings reported by me in the matter of THE STATE OF
11	NEVADA, Plaintiff, versus JOSE GONZALES, Defendant, Case
12	No. C283700-2, on July 24, 2013.
13	
14	
15	
16	Dated this 26th day of July, 2013.
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18	Brenda Schroeder Brenda Schroeder, CCR NO. 867
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IVONNE CABRERA, Appellant,	Electronically Filed Aug 02 2018 10:26 a.m Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court Case No. 74341
VS.)
THE STATE OF NEVADA,)
Respondent.))
	/

APPENDIX TO APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF VOLUME I

Appeal from Judgment of Conviction Eighth Judicial District Court

Patricia M. Erickson, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 3506 601 South Tenth St., Suite 108 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 388-1055 pme@pmericksonlaw.com

Attorney for Appellant

Steven B. Wolfson Nevada Bar No. 1565 Clark County District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue, Third Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 (702) 671-2500

Attorney for Respondent

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Transcript Hearing on 12.21.2015	III 702 - 712

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Transcript Hearing for Jose Gonzales on 04.12.2017	IV 787 - 802
Transcript Hearing for Jose Gonzales on 05.22.2017	IV 813 - 877
Transcript Preliminary Hearing on 08.21.2012	I 5 - 16

AS VEGAS TOWNSHIP CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

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-vs-

IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera #1617623, JOSE GONZALES, aka,

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2012 MAY -2 P 1:47

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

CASE NO:

DEPT NO:

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

Jose Alejandro Gonzales #2636822.

The Defendants above named having committed the crimes of CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER (Category A Felony - NRS 199.480, 200.010, 200.030); BURGLARY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony - NRS 205.060); MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category A Felony - NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.165) and ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony - NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.330, 193.165), in the manner following, to-wit: That the said Defendants, on or about the 26th day of April, 2012, at and within the County of Clark, State of Nevada,

COUNT 1 - CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER

Plaintiff.

Defendants.

did then and there meet with each other and between themselves, and each of them with the other, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously conspire and agree to commit a crime. to-wit: murder, and in furtherance of said conspiracy, Defendants did commit the acts as set forth in Counts 2-6, said acts being incorporated by this reference as though fully set forth herein.

COUNT 2 - BURGLARY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A DEADLY WEAPON

did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously enter with intent to commit a felony, to-wit: murder, that certain building occupied by ERIK QUEZADA MORALES and/or JAMES HEADRICK and/or MELISSA MARIN and/or ASHLEY WANTLAND, located at 2039 Webster, Apartment No. C, North Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, the Defendant did possess and/or gain possession of a deadly weapon consisting of a firearm during the commission of the crime and/or before leaving the structure.

COUNT 3 - MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

did then and there wilfully, feloniously, without authority of law, and with premeditation and deliberation, and with malice aforethought, kill JAMES HEADRICK, a human being, by shooting at the said JAMES HEADRICK multiple times, with a deadly weapon, to-wit: firearm; Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales directly committing said crime, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera aiding or abetting by counsel and encouragement and by accompanying Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to JAMES HEADRICK'S residence and knocking on doors to and within JAMES HEADRICK'S apartment to allow Defendant JOSE GONZALEZ, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to gain access to JAMES HEADRICK to facilitate shooting him, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera also being criminally liable as a co-conspirator vicariously in that said crime was a foreseeable act of the conspiracy set forth in Count 1 hereinabove.

<u>COUNT 4</u> - ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

did then and there, without authority of law, and malice aforethought, willfully and feloniously attempt to kill ASHLEY WANTLAND, a human being, by shooting at the said ASHLEY WANTLAND multiple times, with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm; Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales directly committing said crime, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera aiding or abetting by counsel and encouragement and by accompanying Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to ASHLEY WANTLAND'S residence and knocking on doors to and within ASHLEY WANTLAND'S apartment to allow Defendant JOSE GONZALEZ, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to gain access to ASHLEY WANTLAND to facilitate shooting her, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera also being criminally liable as a co-conspirator vicariously in that said crime was a foreseeable act of the conspiracy set forth in Count 1 hereinabove.

COUNT 5 - MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

did then and there wilfully, feloniously, without authority of law, and with premeditation and deliberation, and with malice aforethought, kill ERIK QUEZADA MORALES, a human being, by shooting at the said ERIK QUEZADA MORALES multiple times, with a deadly weapon, to-wit: firearm; Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales directly committing said crime, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera aiding or abetting by counsel and encouragement and by accompanying Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to ERIK QUEZADA MORALES' residence and knocking on doors to and within ERIK QUEZADA MORALES' apartment to allow Defendant JOSE GONZALEZ, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to gain access to ERIK QUEZADA MORALES to facilitate shooting him, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera also being criminally liable as a co-conspirator vicariously in that said crime was a foreseeable act of the conspiracy set forth in Count 1 hereinabove.

COUNT 6 - ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

did then and there, without authority of law, and malice aforethought, willfully and feloniously attempt to kill MELISSA MARIN, a human being, by shooting at the said MELISSA MARIN twice, with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm; Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales directly committing said crime, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera aiding or abetting by counsel and encouragement and by accompanying Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to MELISSA MARIN'S residence and knocking on doors to and within MELISSA MARIN'S apartment to allow Defendant JOSE GONZALEZ, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to gain access to MELISSA MARIN to facilitate shooting him, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera also being criminally liable as a co-conspirator vicariously in that said crime was a foreseeable act of the conspiracy set forth in Count 1 hereinabove.

All of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of Statutes in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Nevada. Said Complainant makes this declaration subject to the penalty of perjury.

5/2/2012

12FN0864A-B/cb NLVPD EV# 1207466 (TK2)

ORIGINAL

DEPARTMENT 3 1/ Electronically Filed 01/31/2013 04:38:54 PM 2 DISTRICT COURT CASE NO. C283700-1. C283700-2 3 IN THE JUSTICE'S COURT OF NORTH LAS VEGAS TOWN **CLERK OF THE COURT** 4 CLARK COUNTY, STATE OF NEVADA 5 6 7 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 8 Plaintiff, 9 VS. CASE NO. 12FN0864A, 12FN0684B 12CRN000826-0001, 0002 10 IVONNE CABRERA, JOSE ALEJANDRO GONZALES. 11 12 Defendants. 13 RECORDED TRANSCRIPT 14 OF 15 UNCONDITIONAL WAIVER OF PRELIMINARY HEARING BEFORE TERA K. AMES, 16 JUSTICE OF THE PEACE PRO TEM 17 TUESDAY, AUGUST 21, 2012, 9:00 A.M. 18 APPEARANCES: 19 For the State: MICHAEL STAUDAHER, ESQ. 20 Deputy District Attorney 21 For the Defendant Cabrera: BRET WHIPPLE, ESQ. 22 For the Defendant Gonzales: ALZORA JACKSON, ESQ. 23 CLARK PATRICK, ESQ. RECEIVED Deputy Special Public Defenders TRANSCRIBED BY: NORMA JEAN SILVERMAN, COURT RECORDER

NORTH LAS VEGAS, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA TUESDAY, AUGUST 21, 2012, 9: 00A.M.

PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: THE COURT: 12FN0864A and B, State of Nevada versus Ivonne Cabrera and Jose Gonzales.

Morning.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Good morning, your Honor.

THE COURT: This is the time set for the preliminary hearing in this

matter?

MR. WHIPPLE: Yes, your Honor.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Correct, judge.

THE COURT: All right. Are you read to proceed?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes, your Honor, we're not. And the problem we have, judge, is we've been having some discovery issues that on July 23^{rd} we subpoenaed the North Las Vegas Police Department for the crime scene diagrams and 911 tapes. They sent us back a letter saying they were not gonna honor our subpoena, and the really strange thing about this letter, judge, is it's word for word the exact wording that Metro's done (indiscernible) within the last several months to refuse our subpoenas which leads us to believe that this is not coming from the city of North Las Vegas or Metro.

This coming straight from the District Attorney's Office. So the District

Attorney's Office -- and I'm not saying it's Mr. Staudaher. It's somebody in the District Attorney's Office -- has decided it's to play games with discovery in double homicide cases.

The letter we got back from North Las Vegas didn't come 'til weeks later approximately on August 8th saying (indiscernible) you don't get this stuff unless you get it from the D.A. I immediately emailed Mr. Staudaher and asked him for both the 911 calls and the crime scene diagram on August 9th.

And I mentioned in my email that this was important discovery and that prelim is less than two weeks away.

Today this morning about ten minutes ago we got crime scene diagrams. It's a dozen pages. It's very disjointed. It's very hard to read. It looks like a puzzle you have to put together to see what's going on with it.

Our position is very clear that we'd asked for this stuff over a month ago to be ready for preliminary hearing. We feel that this crime scene diagram is very important in a double homicide case because it lays out where the people were, where the bodies were found and where the evidence was discovered.

Now, normally in a case we would go to the crime scene and try to do this ourselves; however, in this case as the court may or may not be aware it was several weeks from the time of the incident until Mr. Gonzales was arrested so the crime scene was of no use to us. We couldn't go see it. Everything was gone.

So our position is today we cannot go forward 'cause we have to disseminate this discovery, see what it means, see how it works into our case before we're ready to proceed, and had it been provided to us when we asked then we would not need this delay, but since somebody in the District Attorney's Office and the North Las Vegas Police Department decided on playing games with our

discovery we have no choice but to ask for this continuance.

THE COURT: (Indiscernible)?

MR. WHIPPLE: Your Honor, (indiscernible).

THE COURT: The State?

MR. STAUDAHER: First of all, it probably should be -- I'm sure the court's aware, defense actually has no right to discovery (indiscernible). What they are entitled to is whatever the State has physically in its possession. While (indiscernible) constructive possession, what it actually has which counsel does have.

I actually have signed receipts a copy of this case actually two different productions of the discovery, original discovery, which was produced at the time of initial arraignment (indiscernible) and then again on July 24th, discovery which would have allowed defendants be prepared to proceed today was provided to (indiscernible), and I will (indiscernible) the court -- this is -- these are all filed with the court. I just wanna make sure the court's aware (indiscernible). (Indiscernible) none of 'em, the audio (indiscernible) all the interviews, all the transcribed statements of those interviews, the original discovery which included all the police reports, the booking photos of both defendants, the autopsy reports of both deceased victims in this case, all of that (indiscernible), all of the medical records for (indiscernible) victims in this case which is an unusual thing for them to have in advance of preliminary hearing (indiscernible) as far as they have had it.

In addition the consent to search, the autopsy photographs, the autopsy reports again themselves, latent print report that was provided, all the photographs that were present regarding the crime scene itself which would allow them to look at the crime scene and see different things on it.

That's -- that's what they have, they have all that information. The only two pieces of information that they have subsequently received after the July 24th date was at the request of counsel I did get an email from him on 8-10 of 2012 requesting some additional items. One of those was the color booking photo of Mr. Gonzales which was provided actually on that day.

Certified Judgments of Conviction for Mr. Gonzales, previously Certified Judgments of Conviction for Mr. Cabrera, had been provided to both counsel, color photographs shown to the victims, that was (indiscernible) that they had requested, those were provided. So those were all provided on the 10th.

We come to the 21st. The only items that they received since that time are the crime scene diagram which they requested which was provided by Mr. -- or Detective Prieto and (Indiscernible) as well as a transcript of the 911 call, it's relatively short, about half the transcript says Spanish speaking, apparently it was not completely translated.

I've indicated to counsel that (indiscernible) the recording completely translated at this point. I do have a copy of the recording. I can't physically make a copy of it (indiscernible) it's not important for that to be introduced necessarily to go forward with the preliminary hearing.

They have much more discovery than would normally be present at a preliminary hearing in a homicide case and they've had it well in advance. Never was there a request for a continuance until this morning to come in and say because we don't have a diagram we can't go forward.

They know what the situation is, that we have victims in this case, two (indiscernible) victims who are both very reluctant to come. I have subpoenas that have been served upon them. We had to go to great lengths to get one of those

victims here this morning. The other one although she said that she would be here, gave us a promise to appear, was aware of the court date, is not here.

It's not to say I can't proceed without that witness present, there are other ways for me to get the information in, but needless to say it's a very difficult case to put on and delay and delay for whatever reason. Again, the big point here is that they're not entitled to send out discovery and have discovery before the preliminary hearing to the extent that they wish to have it.

The things that they sent to North Las Vegas Police Department were not legally sufficient to provide that. That's why they received the letters from them.

We don't get the letters to North Las Vegas to give to them. That's their legal counsel. Same thing with Metro. What they typically do in the request for discovery is they had a (indiscernible) amount of discovery, they were asking for all D.N.A. forensics. That all has not even -- it has been submitted, it's certainly not that (indiscernible). They're not entitled to have all that before we go to a preliminary hearing.

When they say that they want all this stuff and they get a date to do it, it has to be a court date. It has to be something where there is -- there's something present for them to appear to provide that. They are not legally entitled to have that information from those entities provided to them in lieu of appearance. That's not the way discovery statutes work, that's not the way it works for a preliminary hearing.

So because of that, um, the State submits that they have every legally available sufficient piece of information to go forward with the preliminary hearing today which there's no reason for delay and we would like to proceed.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Your Honor, if I may. I'd like -- I'll start at

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the end.

Mr. Staudaher said that we sent out blanket subpoenas. This would be very specific. It says crime scene diagram created by C.S.I. (Indiscernible), P No. 1915 in reference to North Las Vegas Event No. 120426-7466 and that's all that's on that subpoena. That is not a blanket subpoena. That's a request for some very specific information that defense team knew was important to proceed to preliminary hearing.

Um, now the question here is not what we did get from Mr. Staudaher because he is correct, on all the things that he said we got we got. That's not -- that is not what's important here today. What's important is what we do not have, and it is not true that we don't have full files in discovery when we go to preliminary hearing.

When -- every case we do we have everything in discovery and half the time in discovery before prelim we've talked to all the witnesses and we've done a full investigation because we have all the discovery, not bits and pieces and not important parts in a double homicide that we need.

And, you know, the fact that Mr. Staudaher may or may not have -- and, you know, the fact that Mr. Staudaher may or may not have witness problems is not an excuse to not give us the discovery that we need and the tools that we need to properly defend Mr. Gonzales today.

And, you know, should -- I'm representing to the court that right now without this information disseminated and knowing what's in it we are not prepared to go forward with this preliminary hearing.

Should we be forced to go then I will be happy to write Mr. Gonzales an affidavit to tell anybody that wants to know that I was ineffective today because I

1	was forced to go to a prelim when I was not prepared to do so.				
2	THE COURT: All right. But certainly reviewed all the other discovery				
3	that's been provided to you; is that correct?				
4	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes, your Honor.				
5	THE COURT: All right. And the crime scene report was something tha				
6	the State received this morning as well?				
7	MR. STAUDAHER: That's correct, your Honor.				
8	THE COURT: And that both of you received it this morning as well?				
9	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That's correct, your Honor.				
10	THE COURT: All right. And is the State introducing that crime scene				
11	report into evidence today having testimony (indiscernible) about that today?				
12	MR. STAUDAHER: The State was not going to put this (indiscernible),				
13	but if counsel wishes and I don't have no objection to its admission.				
14	THE COURT: All right. think				
15	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I'm sorry, your Honor. I didn't hear what				
16	the prosecutor said.				
17	MR. STAUDAHER: I said was not intending to, but if counsel wishes to				
18	have it introduced I would not object to its admission (indiscernible) for whatever				
19	questioning they wish to do.				
20	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: But, judge, whether or not				
21	THE COURT: But the crime scene analyst isn't on the list of witnesses				
22	for today; is that correct?				
23	MR. STAUDAHER: That's correct, judge.				
24	THE COURT: All right.				
25	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Judge, whether or not it's admitted it gives				
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us inquiry and ideas of what we can use for cross-examination of some of the witnesses that Mr. Staudaher will call. I mean, whether or not it's admitted doesn't prevent us from using it to properly cross-examine the witnesses that he intends to call today.

THE COURT: All right. And I understand that. I also know that the -in a preliminary hearing the finding of the court is only for slight or marginal evidence
that crimes have been committed and that the individuals charged have committed
said crimes.

What I am willing to do is if you wanna take a brief recess so that you can review that crime scene report we can take a break for a half hour, hour, however long you need to do that and come back, but I think we will go forward with the preliminary hearing today. So if you would like some time to talk with your client about the crime scene diagram, we can take a recess for a half hour so that you can review that document and Mr. Whipple can do the same with his client and then we'll resume in a half hour.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That'll be fine, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

THE BAILIFF: Court is in recess.

(Recess taken.)

THE COURT: All right. Recalling 12FN0864A and B, State of Nevada versus Ivonne Cabrera and Jose Gonzales.

Are there any other preliminary matters before we begin?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes, your Honor. For the record we have discussed with Mr. Gonzales the new discovery that we just received today and we discussed the importance of it and we discussed with him the fact that we are not

1	ready to proceed (indiscernible) we asked for over a month ago. Because we're				
2	being forced to go into this prelim unprepared we feel we have no (indiscernible) but				
3	to unconditionally waive and ask that this be sent up to district court.				
4	THE COURT: All right. Mr. Whipple?				
5	MR. WHIPPLE: Well, (indiscernible) position (indiscernible).				
6	THE COURT: So your client would like to unconditionally waive that				
7	preliminary hearing?				
8	MR. WHIPPLE: Yes, your Honor.				
9	THE COURT: All right. Would your clients please stand.				
10	All right. Mr. Gonzales, you understand that you have the right to have				
11	a preliminary hearing today?				
12	THE DEFENDANT GONZALES: Yes, your Honor.				
13	THE COURT: You understand that you have a right to confront the				
14	witnesses that the State would have presented against you?				
15	THE DEFENDANT GONZALES: Yes, your Honor.				
16	THE COURT: You understand that you would have had the right to				
17	present any evidence or witnesses that you wanted on your behalf?				
18	THE DEFENDANT GONZALES: Yes, your Honor.				
19	THE COURT: You understand that by unconditionally waiving this right				
20	to a preliminary hearing you're giving up those rights and you cannot come back				
21	here for a preliminary hearing?				
22	THE DEFENDANT GONZALES: Yes, ma'am.				
23	THE COURT: All right. And Mr er, I'm sorry Ms. Cabrera, you				
24	understand that you have a right to a preliminary hearing in this matter?				
25	THE DEFENDANT CABRERA: Yes.				

1	THE COURT: You understand that you have a right to hear the			
2	testimony of the witnesses that the State would have presented against you?			
3	THE DEFENDANT CABRERA: Yes.			
4	THE COURT: And that your attorney could cross-examine those			
5	witnesses?			
6	THE DEFENDANT CABRERA: (Indiscernible).			
7	THE COURT: You understand that you also could present witnesses in			
8	your defense and that you yourself could testify?			
9	THE DEFENDANT CABRERA: (Indiscernible).			
10	THE COURT: You understand you're giving up these rights in order to			
11	unconditionally waive your right to the preliminary hearing?			
12	THE DEFENDANT CABRERA: (Indiscernible).			
13	THE COURT: All right. And it's still your desire to waive your right to a			
14	preliminary hearing?			
15	THE DEFENDANT CABRERA: (Indiscernible).			
16	THE COURT: All right. Then it appears to me from the Amended			
17	Criminal Complaint on file that the crimes of conspiracy to commit murder, burglary			
18	while in possession of a deadly weapon, murder with use of a deadly weapon, and			
19	attempt murder with use of a deadly weapon, have been committed and that said			
20	defendants Ivonne Cabrera and Jose Gonzales have committed these crimes.			
21	I'll hold you to answer for these crimes in the Eighth Judicial District			
22	Court on			
23	THE CLERK: September 4 th , 10:30 a.m., lower level arraignment court			
24	to be tracked to Department 25.			
25	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Thank you.			

THE COURT: Thank you.

ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audiovideo recording of this proceeding in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.

NORMA JENN SILVERMAN Court Recorder/Transcriber

Electronically Filed 08/27/2012 08:35:32 AM

1	INFM		Alm J. Comm
2	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney		CLERK OF THE COURT
3	Nevada Bar #001565 MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER		
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #008273		
5	200 Lewis Avenue		
6	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff		
7	I.A. 09/04/2012 DISTRICT	ΓCOURT	
8	10:30 AM CLARK COUN WHIPPLE/SPD		
9			
10	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	CASE NO:	C-12-283700-1
11	Plaintiff,		
12	-VS-	DEPT NO:	XXV
13	IVONNE CABRERA, aka		
14	Yvonne Cabrera, #1617623 JOSE GONZALES, aka	INFO	RMATION
15	Jose Alejandro Gonzales, #2636822		
16	Defendants.		
۱7			
18	STATE OF NEVADA) ss.		
19	COUNTY OF CLARK		
20	STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark Cou	ınty District Attorne	y within and for the County
21	of Clark, State of Nevada, in the name and by the authority of the State of Nevada, informs		
22	the Court:		
23	That IVONNE CABRERA, aka Yvonne Cabrera and JOSE GONZALES, aka Jose		
24	Alejandro Gonzales, the Defendant(s) above named, having committed the crimes of		
25	CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER (Category A Felony - NRS 199.480, 200.010,		
26	200.030); BURGLARY WHILE IN F	POSSESSION OF	A DEADLY WEAPON
27	(Category B Felony - NRS 205.060); MUF	RDER WITH USE	OF A DEADLY WEAPON
$_{28}$	(Category A Felony - NRS 200.010, 200.03	30, 193.165) and AT	TEMPT MURDER WITH

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-

USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony - NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.330,

193.165), on or about the 26th day of April, 2012, within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, contrary to the form, force and effect of statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Nevada,

COUNT 1 - CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER

did then and there meet with each other and between themselves, and each of them with the other, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously conspire and agree to commit a crime, to-wit: murder, and in furtherance of said conspiracy, Defendants did commit the acts as set forth in Counts 2-6, said acts being incorporated by this reference as though fully set forth herein.

COUNT 2 - BURGLARY WHILE IN POSSESSION OF A DEADLY WEAPON

did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously enter with intent to commit a felony, to-wit: murder, that certain building occupied by ERIK QUEZADA MORALES and/or JAMES HEADRICK and/or MELISSA MARIN and/or ASHLEY WANTLAND, located at 2039 Webster, Apartment No. C, North Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, the Defendants did possess and/or gain possession of a deadly weapon consisting of a firearm during the commission of the crime and/or before leaving the structure.

COUNT 3 - MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

did then and there wilfully, feloniously, without authority of law, and with premeditation and deliberation, and with malice aforethought, kill JAMES HEADRICK, a human being, by shooting at the said JAMES HEADRICK multiple times, with a deadly weapon, to-wit: firearm, and/or by the killing occurring in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a Burglary; Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka Jose Alejandro Gonzales directly committing said crime, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka Yvonne Cabrera aiding or abetting by counsel and encouragement and by accompanying Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka Jose Alejandro Gonzales to JAMES HEADRICK's residence and knocking on doors to and within JAMES HEADRICK's apartment to allow Defendant JOSE GONZALEZ, aka Jose Alejandro Gonzales to gain access to JAMES HEADRICK to

facilitate shooting him, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka Yvonne Cabrera also being criminally liable as a co-conspirator vicariously in that said crime was a foreseeable act of the conspiracy set forth in Count 1 hereinabove.

COUNT 4 - ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

did then and there, without authority of law, and malice aforethought, willfully and feloniously attempt to kill ASHLEY WANTLAND, a human being, by shooting at the said ASHLEY WANTLAND multiple times, with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm; Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka Jose Alejandro Gonzales directly committing said crime, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka Yvonne Cabrera aiding or abetting by counsel and encouragement and by accompanying Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka Jose Alejandro Gonzales to ASHLEY WANTLAND's residence and knocking on doors to and within ASHLEY WANTLAND's apartment to allow Defendant JOSE GONZALEZ, aka Jose Alejandro Gonzales to gain access to ASHLEY WANTLAND to facilitate shooting her, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka Yvonne Cabrera also being criminally liable as a coconspirator vicariously in that said crime was a foreseeable act of the conspiracy set forth in Count 1 hereinabove.

COUNT 5 - MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

did then and there wilfully, feloniously, without authority of law, and with premeditation and deliberation, and with malice aforethought, kill ERIK QUEZADA MORALES, a human being, by shooting at the said ERIK QUEZADA MORALES multiple times, with a deadly weapon, to-wit: firearm, and/or by the killing occurring in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a Burglary; Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka Jose Alejandro Gonzales directly committing said crime, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka Yvonne Cabrera aiding or abetting by counsel and encouragement and by accompanying Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka Jose Alejandro Gonzales to ERIK QUEZADA MORALES' residence and knocking on doors to and within ERIK QUEZADA MORALES' apartment to allow Defendant JOSE GONZALEZ, aka Jose Alejandro Gonzales to gain access to ERIK QUEZADA MORALES to facilitate shooting him, Defendant IVONNE

1	CABRERA, aka Yvonne Cabrera also being criminally liable as a co-conspirator vicariously				
2	in that said crime was a foreseeable act of the conspiracy set forth in Count 1 hereinabove.				
3	COUNT 6 - ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON				
4	did then and there, without authority of law, and malice aforethought, willfully and				
5	feloniously attempt to kill MELISSA MARIN, a human being, by shooting at the said				
6	MELISSA MARIN twice, with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm; Defendant JOSE				
7	GONZALES, aka Jose Alejandro Gonzales directly committing said crime, Defendant				
8	IVONNE CABRERA, aka Yvonne Cabrera aiding or abetting by counsel and				
9	encouragement and by accompanying Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka Jose Alejandro				
10	Gonzales to MELISSA MARIN'S residence and knocking on doors to and within MELISSA				
11	MARIN'S apartment to allow Defendant JOSE GONZALEZ, aka Jose Alejandro Gonzales				
12	to gain access to MELISSA MARIN to facilitate shooting him, Defendant IVONNE				
13	CABRERA, aka Yvonne Cabrera also being criminally liable as a co-conspirator vicariously				
14	in that said crime was a foreseeable act of the conspiracy set forth in Count 1 hereinabove.				
15	STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clork County District Attornoy				
16	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565				
17	BY /s/MICHAEL STAUDAHER				
18	MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER				
19	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #008273				
20					
21					
22	Names of witnesses known to the District Attorney's Office at the time of filing this				
23	Information are as follows:				
24	NAME ADDRESS				
25					
26	BUTLER, MATTHEW DA INVESTIGATOR				
27	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS CLARK COUNTY CORONER				
28	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS NLV PD COMMUNICATIONS				

1	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS	NLV PD CRIME LAB
2	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS	NLV PD RECORDS
3	HEADRICK, JAMES	ADDRESS UNKNOWN
4	MARIN, MELISSA	4313 Jade Stone Ave, LVN
5	PRIETO, JESUS JR	NLV PD #674
6	TELGENHOFF, DR GARY	CLARK COUNTY CORONER
7	WANTLAND, ASHLEY	3768 Garden South Dr, LVN
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TRAN 1 **CLERK OF THE COURT** 2 3 4 5 DISTRICT COURT 6 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 7 8 THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff, 9 CASE NO. C-12-283700-1 VS. CASE NO. C-12-283700-2 10 IVONNE CABRERA, aka, DEPT. XXV 11 Yvonne Cabrera, (ARRAIGNMENT HELD IN DEPT. LLA) 12 JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales, 13 Defendants. 14 BEFORE THE HONORABLE MELISA DE LA GARZA, HEARING MASTER 15 THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 2012 16 RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING RE: 17 **ARRAIGNMENT CONTINUED** 18 **APPEARANCES**: 19 LYNN M. ROBINSON, ESQ., For the State: 20 Chief Deputy District Attorney 21 BRET O. WHIPPLE, ESQ., For the Defendant [Cabrera]: 22 Attorney at Law CLARK W. PATRICK, ESQ., For the Defendant [Gonzales]: 23 Deputy Special Public Defender, 24 25 RECORDED BY: KIARA SCHMIDT, COURT RECORDER

1 THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 2012 2 3 PROCEEDINGS 4 5 THE COURT: Top of ten, State of Nevada versus Ivonne Cabrera, Gonzales. 6 And it looked -- oh, Jose Gonzales. I'm sorry. This is C283700-1 and C283700-2. They are both present in custody. Counsels, if you would state your appearances. 7 8 MR. WHIPPLE: Good morning, your Honor. Bret Whipple, Bar No. 6168, on 9 behalf of Ivonne Cabrera. 10 MR. PATRICK: Good morning, your Honor. Clark Patrick, 9451, on behalf of 11 Mr. Gonzales. 12 THE COURT: All right. And they're Informations or amended Informations? 13 MR. PATRICK: They're Informations, your Honor. We have received them. 14 Mr. Gonzales will waive the reading. He's going to plead not guilty to all the charges 15 today, and he is going to waive his right to a speedy trial. 16 THE COURT: Is the same true for Ms. Cabrera? 17 MR. WHIPPLE: No --18 THE COURT: Is she invoking? 19 MR. WHIPPLE: She is, your Honor. 20 THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Cabrera, please stand to that microphone. Did you 21 receive a copy of the Information stating the charges against you? 22 THE DEFENDANT [Cabrera]: Yes, ma'am. 23 THE COURT: Did you read through it and understand it? THE DEFENDANT [Cabrera]: Yes, ma'am. 24

THE COURT: Do you want to waive a formal reading of the charges?

1	THE DEFENDANT [Cabrera]: Correct.			
2	THE COURT: How do you plead?			
3	THE DEFENDANT [Cabrera]: Not guilty.			
4	THE COURT: You do have a right to a trial within 60 days. It's my			
5	understanding that you want to invoke that right; is that correct?			
6	THE DEFENDANT [Cabrera]: Yes, ma'am.			
7	THE COURT: Speedy trial.			
8	Then as to Mr. Gonzales, would you please state stand to that			
9	microphone. Did you receive a copy of the Information stating the charges against			
10	you?			
11	THE DEFENDANT [Gonzales]: Yes, I did.			
12	THE COURT: Did you read through it?			
13	THE DEFENDANT [Gonzales]: Yes.			
14	THE COURT: Did you understand it?			
15	THE DEFENDANT [Gonzales]: Yes.			
16	THE COURT: Do you want to waive a formal reading of the charges?			
17	THE DEFENDANT [Gonzales]: Yes.			
18	THE COURT: How do you plead?			
19	THE DEFENDANT [Gonzales]: Not guilty.			
20	THE COURT: You do have a right to a trial within 60 days. It's my			
21	understanding you want to waive that right; is that correct?			
22	THE DEFENDANT [Gonzales]: Yes, ma'am.			
23	THE COURT: Speedy trial as to both.			
24	MR. PATRICK: Your Honor, could we just get a status check date next week			
25	upstairs?			

1	THE COURT: Okay. Status check, one week, for trial setting.
2	THE CLERK: That one-week date will be September 12 th at nine a.m. in
3	District Court 25.
4	THE COURT: All right.
5	MR. PATRICK: Thank you, Judge.
6	THE COURT: Thank you.
7	MR. WHIPPLE: What day of the week is the 12 th , your Honor?
8	THE COURT: September 12 th is
9	THE CLERK: Is a Wednesday.
10	THE COURT: Wednesday.
11	MR. WHIPPLE: Okay. Good enough, your Honor. Thank you.
12	MR. PATRICK: Great. Thank you.
13	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
14	(Whereupon, the proceedings concluded.)
15	* * * *
16	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the
17	audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.
18	1 Schmidt
19	Kiara Schmidt, Court Recorder/Transcriber
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23	

1	DISTRICT COURT		
2	CLARK COUNTY	Y, NEVADA	FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT
3			JUL 2 4 2013
4	COF		KRISTEN BROWN
5		8	Y. KRISTEN BROWN, DEPUTY
6	THE STATE OF NEVADA,)	
7	Plaintiff,	Case No:	C-12-283700-2
8	vs.	Dept No:	XXV
9	JOSE ALEJANDRO GONZALES,		
10	Defendant.		
11	***************************************)	
12			
13			
14	BEFORE THE HONORABLE KATHLEEN DELANEY		
15	SEPTEMBER 12, 2012, 9:00 A.M.		
16	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT		
17	OF PROCEEDINGS		
18			
19			
20	APPEARANCES:		
21	(See separate page)		
22			
23			
24			
25	REPORTED BY: BRENDA SCHROEDER,	CCR NO. 80	67
			1

1	APPEARANCES:
2	For the Plaintiff:
3	MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER, ESQ.
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
6	For Defendant JOSE GONZALES:
7	CLARK W. PATRICK, ESQ. Deputy Special Public Defender
8	330 S. Third Street, Suite 800 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
9	ALZORA B. JACKSON, ESQ.
10	Deputy Special Public Defender 330 S. Third Street, Suite 800
11	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
12	For Defendant IVONNE CABRERA:
13	BRET O. WHIPPLE, ESQ.
14	Justice Law Center 1100 S. Tenth Street
15	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
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LAS VEGAS, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 2013, 9:00 A.M.

PROCEEDINGS

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THE COURT: State of Nevada versus Ivonne Cabrera and Jose Gonzales. This matter is on for status check and trial setting. And we have Mr. Whipple.

I understand as the arraignments took place on the 6th and the defendants invoked that we needed to get this set for status check and trial setting.

MR. PATRICK: Excuse me, Your Honor. Gonzales waived and because this is a double homicide, as the Court is aware, it is going to be impossible for the person that they are alleging as the shooter to be ready within 60 days. The fact that Mr. Whipple's client invoked we have to deal with because there is no way that we can be ready within 60 days.

The next thing we have to be concerned about is that the State has not given us notice whether or not they are taking Mr. Gonzales to the Death Review Should they do that and should by some chance Committee. they come back with wanting to seek the death penalty then, again, as the Court is aware that adds a whole new dimension to this and we would be grossly inadequate should we even attempt to do a death penalty case within

60 days.

THE COURT: I do not disagree with anything you said, Counsel, however, my information coming in is that they both had invoked.

Mr. Staudaher, do you have representations to make with regard to what the State's position is at this time as far as the Death Review Committee?

MR. STAUDAHER: Well, obviously, there has not been a submission and the committee has not reviewed anything else. It is my intention to submit on both defendants for that and so I would anticipate that that would occur and there would be a meeting on that.

As the Court is aware, I cannot predict how that will come out, but certainly the concerns raised by counsel are now --

THE COURT: What is the expectation on trial in terms of setting a status check?

MR. STAUDAHER: We have 30 days to get it essentially filed with the court, so we have that time frame from the time of arraignment.

THE COURT: We are going to need to set a status check to see where we are.

Mr. Whipple.

MR. WHIPPLE: Your Honor, we've invoked. We're ready to go. I had 20 family members in our office

yesterday preparing for trial. It is unusual to do a

speedy trial on a murder case, however, I -
THE COURT: It is highly unusual, Mr. Whipple.

MR. WHIPPLE: -- have having said that, if you

look back at the prelim, I continued the prelim on one

look back at the prelim, I continued the prelim on one occasion just so that I could be prepared to do the trial in a speedy matter. And to be honest with you -- I don't want to argue the facts of the case -- but to be honest with you, it really comes down to he said, she said. There are two individuals out there. It's going to be straight forward.

I don't think my client by any means will be subject to a capital punishment or the death penalty. I don't think that that really is an issue. What it really comes down to is a he said, she said.

We will be filing a motion to sever -
THE COURT: And my suggestion would be then you

need to be following up with a motion based on what you're citing.

MR. WHIPPLE: Sure.

THE COURT: I am not sure how they're going to pan out. But I think at this point the status check and see that the motion is filed and give that in the normal course as well.

Mr. Staudaher, recommendation for status check

date in light of your office filing in the time frame?

MR. STAUDAHER: I would say probably within 30 days or give the Court 30 days from now.

THE COURT: We are going to be pushing us tight against what's been invoked but we are going to have to take a very close look at this. And, Mr. Whipple, you will have to be prepared to address all the concerns.

MR. WHIPPLE: Sure.

THE COURT: 30-day status check on trial setting.

THE CLERK: October 10th at 9:00 a.m.

MR. STAUDAHER: Your Honor, just in light of that whole process, and certainly I will let counsel know what the status of that is whether it goes forward, what date it is and so forth. But if it turns out that is around that time or a little thereafter, would the Court entertain, with the approval of counsel, obviously, of moving that date by a few days or so.

THE COURT: If you will let the chambers know we will certainly accommodate and make sure that everybody's on board if that is the case, otherwise, if we could expedite things we would appreciate it.

MR. PATRICK: We would have no objection to not having the status check until after the Death Committee meets, if they are, on this case because that will drive

1 the whole --

THE COURT: And I'm sure Mr. Whipple will feel otherwise, or he can at least --

MR. WHIPPLE: Actually, I will be filing a motion right away, a motion to sever I think very, very quickly and that will be earlier than these other hearing dates.

My only concern is can you give me an anticipated if we had a speedy trial what date that would be because I have other -- I would like to plan that as quickly as possible because my intent is to do this within a 60 day time period.

THE CLERK: The earliest is October 1st. One week is November 13th and they would have to waive a week.

THE COURT: My clerk was explaining, unlike

Judge Mosley, we have a civil stack as well and that

speedy trial date would fall on our civil stack, so a

brief waiver to get to this next trial stack for criminal
would be November 13th.

MR. WHIPPLE: Okay, Judge. That's fine.

MR. PATRICK: Your Honor, for the record, on the 13th Ms. Jackson has a trial in another court and I have a trial in another court already set.

THE COURT: I have a hunch that we are going to

address all of these details when we are here on the motion to sever --MR. WHIPPLE: Thank you. THE COURT: -- and we will discuss some of that timing then. But let's go ahead and have a 30-day date for the continuation of this status check for trial setting and we will deal with Mr. Whipple's motion in the normal course. MR. WHIPPLE: Thank you, Your Honor. MR. PATRICK: Thank you, Your Honor. THE CLERK: October 10th. THE COURT: We'll see you all then. (End of proceedings.)

1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
2	
3	STATE OF NEVADA
4	COUNTY OF CLARK)
5	
6	I, BRENDA SCHROEDER, a certified court reporter
7	in and for the State of Nevada, do hereby certify that
8	the foregoing and attached pages 1-9, inclusive, comprise
9	a true, and accurate transcript of the proceedings
10	reported by me in the matter of STATE OF NEVADA,
11	Plaintiff, versus JOSE GONZALES, Defendant, Case No.
12	C283700, on September 12, 2012.
13	
14	
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16	Dated this 19th day of July, 2013.
17	Brank Schools
18	Brenda Schroeder Brenda Schroeder, CCR NO. 867
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CLERK OF THE COURT

MOT Bret O. Whipple, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 6168 JUSTICE LAW CENTER 1100 South Tenth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89104 Tel: (702) 731-0000 Fax: (702) 974-4008 Attorney for Defendant Ivonne Cabrero	FILED SEP 21 8 58 AM '12 ON GUART CLESS OF THE COURT A	
	DISTRICT COURT	
THE STATE OF NEVADA Plaintiff, vs. IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera #1617623, JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales #2636822,)) Case No.: C28) Dept. No.: XX)))	33700 V
Defendants.))	

DEFENDANT IVONNE CABRERA'S MOTION FOR SEVERANCE

COMES NOW, Defendant, IVONNE CABRERA, by and through his counsel of record, BRET O. WHIPPLE, ESQ., and hereby files this MOTION FOR SEVERANCE.

This motion is made and based on the pleadings and papers on file, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities attached hereto as well as any arguments as may be heard at the hearing of this motion.

> C-12-283700-1 MSVR Motion to Sever

1100 South Tenth Street, Las Vegas NV 89104 Tel (702) 731-0000 Fax (702) 974-4008 JUSTICE LAW CENTER

1	DATED this day of September, 2012.
2	
3	
4	JUSTICE LAW CENTER
5	
6	
7	Bret O. Whipple, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 6168
8	1100 S. Tenth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89104
9	Las vegas, revada 67104
10	NOTICE OF MOTION
11	NOTICE OF MOTION
12	TO: THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff; and
13	TO: STEVEN B. WOLFSON, District Attorney, Attorney for Plaintiff
14	YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will bring or foregoing MOTION FOR SEVERANCE on the day of 2012,
15	
16	m., in Department No. XXV of the above-entitled Court, or as soon
17	counsel may be heard. DATED this 21 day of September, 2012.
18	DATED this _Z_1 day of September, 2012.
19	JUSTICE LAW CENTER
20	
21	
22	Bret O. Whipple, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 6168
23	1100 S. Tenth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89104
24	Las vegas, ivevada 69104
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bring on the above and (12012, at the hour ofor as soon thereafter as

NTER

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

On or about April 26, 2012, Jose Gonzales (hereinafter "Smokey") entered the home of Melissa Marin (hereinafter "Marin") and Ashley Wantland (hereinafter "Ashley") and opened fire on four (4) individuals sleeping inside the home. (Voluntary Statement of Melissa Marin dated 4/27/12 pg 2, ll 40-57). Marin stated Ivonne Cabrera (hereinafter "Ivonne") was present while the shootings were taking place, but that Ivonne had no gun and fled shortly after Smokey began opening fire. (Marin's Statement pg. 2, ll 62). Specifically, Marin stated that Ivonne had knocked on the door and said she was outside. Subsequently, Smokey kicked the bedroom doors in and fatally shot Marin's boyfriend Eric Quezada and Ashley's boyfriend James Headrick while severely wounding both Ashley and Marin in the process. *Id.* The reasons for the shooting are unknown, but Marin believes it to have something to do with text messages exchanged between Smokey and Eric involving a dispute over a car that was borrowed by Ivonne and a dispute over an unemployment debit card. (Marin's Statement pg. 5, ll 139-52). Marin considers Ivonne a friend and stated that there was no tension between them before the night of the shooting. (Marin's Statement pg. 4, ll 93-94).

Formal charges were brought against Ivonne on August 27, 2012, and she was arraigned on September 4, 2012. The charges brought against her are one (1) count of Conspiracy to Commit Murder, one (1) count of Burglary While in Possession of a Deadly Weapon, two (2) counts of Murder with a Deadly Weapon and two (2) counts of Attempted Murder with use of a

Deadly Weapon. A status check is scheduled for October 10, 2012 in order to set a date for a Calendar Call and Trial Date.

This motion now follows.

II.

ARGUMENT

A. In Order To Protect Ivonne Cabrera From Unfair Prejudice, This Court Must Sever Cabrera's Case From Her Co-Defendant's Case For Separate Trials.

NRS 174.165(1) provides in pertinent part relief from prejudicial joinder:

If it appears that a defendant or the State of Nevada is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information, or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires.

NRS 174.165 allows the Court to order separate trials where joinder will unjustly prejudice one of the parties. There is a preference for joint trials. Nevertheless, severance is mandatory if joinder violates a Defendant's substantive rights, i.e., unavailability of full cross-examination, lack of opportunity to present an individual defense, denial of Sixth Amendment confrontation rights, lack of separate counsel among defendants with conflicting interests, or failure to properly instruct the jury on the admissibility of evidence as to each defendant. See: Marshall v. State, 118 Nev. 642, 56 p.3d 376 (2002); United States v. Escalante, 637 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1980).

In the case where a co-defendant in a joint trial has made a confession implicating another co-defendant and the prosecution seeks to use the confession, the non-confessing defendant has the right to exclusion of the confession, severance, or redaction of the confession.

The co-defendant's confession violates the co-defendant's Sixth Amendment right of

confrontation and cross-examination, and as a result is inadmissible. SEE Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).

In *Bruton*, (Id) the Supreme Court held that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront the witness against him was violated when the prosecution entered into evidence the confession of a co-defendant implicating both the confessing defendant and Bruton. The Supreme Court held that Bruton's Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses was violated.

Cases after the *Bruton* decision suggested that redaction of the statements, including the names from statements raising *Bruton* issues could serve to cure any prejudice obviating the need for a severance. See for example *Richardson v. Marsh*, 481 U.S. 200, 95 L.Ed.2d 176, 107 S.Ct. 1702 (1987). The United States Supreme Court recently had the opportunity to revisit and revise the issues raised in *Richardson* and *Bruton* in the case of *Kevin Gray v. Maryland*, 523 U.S. 185 (1998)

In *Gray*, (Id) the Supreme Court limited the holding in *Richardson vs. Marsh*. (Supra). Specifically, the *Gray* court found the redacted confession still obviously referred directly to someone, obviously *Gray*. Thus, Gray's confessions fell squarely within *Bruton*. The Supreme Court found that redacting references to a co-defendant in a confession does not adequately protect that defendant's constitutional rights. This is especially the case when the redacted version obviously refers to another individual, usually the co-defendant.

The Nevada Supreme Court addressed the issue of co-defendants statements in joint trials in the case of *Ronald Ducksworth v. Nevada* 113 Nev. 780; 942 P2.d 157 (1997); where

the Court held that the district court abused its discretion in failing to grant a severance. The Court reversed the conviction and remanded the matter to the district court for a new trial.

In the case of *Ronald Ducksworth*, Defendant and Codefendant were convicted of two counts of murder. The Codefendant made a confession to persons who later testified. The Court concluded that because the Codefendant did not testify, the introduction of his confession, which probably inculpated the Defendant, violated the Defendant's right of cross examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Stevens v. State, 97 Nev. 443, 444–45, 634 P.2d 662, 663–64 (1981) (citing Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 1622–23, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968)). Ducksworth v. State, 113 Nev. 780, 795, 942 P.2d 157, 167 (1997).

Here, Ivonne has presented statements that incriminate Smokey as being the sole perpetrator of the shooting. Ivonne claims that she was forced from her home and brought with Smokey to assist him. The victims have given statements that collaborate her theory in that neither of them saw her with a gun and that Smokey kicked in the door himself and opened fire on the victims. Like the case in *Ducksworth*, the introduction of her statement, which severely inculpates her co-defendant, violates the Co-Defendant's right of cross examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Furthermore, it is unclear at this time as to what type of defense Smokey will present at trial, however it is likely that he will attempt to inculpate Ivonne by offering evidence that may otherwise been excluded from her trial. Thus, a failure to sever the trials of the defendants in this matter would result in a violation of the constitutional trial rights of both defendants.

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B. Mutually Antagonistic Defenses Will Prejudice The Co-Defendants

"Conflicting defenses may cause prejudice warranting severance if the defendant seeking severance shows that the codefendants have 'conflicting and irreconcilable defenses and that there is a danger that the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone demonstrates that both are guilty." Chartier v. State, 2008 Nev. LEXIS 73, 8-9, 191 P.3d 1182, 1185 (2008) (citing Marshall v. State, 118 Nev. 642, 646, 56 P.3d 376, 378 (2002) (quoting Jones v. State, 111 Nev. 848, 854, 899 P.2d 544, 547 (1995)). A defense is mutually antagonistic where acceptance of a co-defendant's defense precludes acquittal of the other co-defendant. Marshall at 545-46, 56 P.3d at 378. In Zafiro, the United States Supreme Court recognized that "mutually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial per se." 506 U.S. 534, 538, 113 S.Ct. 933, 938 (1993). Also see Chartier, 2008 Nev. LEXIS at 11, 191 P.3d at 1186 (citing Marshall, 118 Nev. At 648, 56 P.3d at 379). A defendant must show that the joint trial compromised a specific trial right or prevented the jury from making a reliable judgment regarding guilt or innocence. Marshall, 118 Nev. At 647, 56 P.3d at 379 (citing Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539); Also see Chartier at 8, 191 P.3d 1185.

In *Chartier v. State*, the Nevada Supreme Court recently considered the issue of mutually antagonistic defenses. 2008 Nev. LEXIS at 73, 191 P.3d at 1182. In that case, defendant argued that the district court should have severed his trial from his co-defendant's because his defense was antagonistic to his co-defendant's defense, his ability to present his theory of defense was impaired by the joinder and the cumulative effect of these issues resulted in prejudice to him and an unfair trial. Id. at 7, 191 P.3d at 1185. In *Chartier*, the co-defendant's counsel essentially became a second prosecutor arguing that Chartier was present at the scene

and was the murderer although that was not the State's theory. Therefore, Chartier was not as strong as the evidence against his co-defendant and the defendants had different approaches and concerns in jury selection.

While recognizing that antagonistic defenses alone may not be sufficient grounds for severance, the Nevada Supreme Court confirmed it is clearly a relevant consideration. *Chartier* at 11, 191 P.3d at 1186 (citing *Marshall* at 646, 59 P.3d at 378). The Court found that the codefendant's defenses were in fact mutually antagonistic, Id. at 12, 191 P.3d at 1186, and partly relied on this factor when reversing the district court and holding that the cumulative effect of the joinder rendered the trial unfair. Id. at 14, 191 P.3d at 1187.

In the instant case, Ivonne's entire theory is dependent on the fact that she was forced to go along with Smokey. Ivonne had no knowledge of Smokey's intentions to kill the victims and played no role in the shooting. Although it is unclear what Smokey's attorney will offer at trial, it is likely that his theory will involve Ivonne and her alleged involvement in the case. Like in *Chartier*, Smokey would essentially become a second prosecutor against her in this case by stating that she was involved and had intentions to harm the victims. Furthermore, Ivonne's entire defense is to blame Smokey for the shootings and that he forced her to go along. This is severely prejudicial towards Smokey and would greatly violate his trial rights. Thus, a severance is warranted because of the mutually antagonistic defenses present in this case.

C. Disparity In Evidence Will Unfairly Prejudice Ivonne At A Joint Trial.

Joinder of defendants for the purpose of obtaining the overlapping consideration of evidence or use of innuendo based on the strength of one case is fundamentally unfair. The Courts have recognized that "a great disparity in the amount of evidence introduced against

joined defendants may, in some cases, be grounds for severance." *United States v. Douglass*, 780 F.2d 1472, 1479 (9th Cir. 1986); *United States v. Patterson*, 819 F.2d 1495, 1503 (9th Cir. 1987). Severance may be mandated in those instances where a weak evidentiary case and a strong one are joined in the hope that an overlapping consideration of the evidence would lead to conviction on both cases. *Amen*, 106 Nev. at 755, 801 P.2d at 1358-59 (concluding that joinder was not error where evidence against the codefendants would have been cross-admissible at separate trials, the evidence against one was not disproportionate to the evidence against the other so as to create an unfair overlapping effect, and the defenses were not mutually exclusive). In other words, the prejudice due to a "spillover" effect may warrant severance.

"The 'spillover' or 'rub-off' theory involves the question of whether a jury's unfavorable impression of [one] defendant against whom the evidence is properly admitted will influence the way jurors view the other defendant." *Lisle v. State*, 113 Nev. 679, 689, 941 P.2d 459, 466 (1997) (quoting *State v. Rendon*, 148 Ariz. 524, 715 P.2d 777, 782 (Ariz. App. 1986)). "The test as far as the 'rub off' theory is concerned is whether the jury can keep separate the evidence that is relevant to each defendant and render a fair and impartial verdict as to him." *Redon*, 715 P.2d at 782; *Lisle*, 113 Nev. at 689, 941 P.2d at 466 ("the ultimate issue is 'whether a jury can reasonably be expected to compartmentalize the evidence as it relates to separate defendants.") (quoting *Jones v. State*, 111 Nev. 848, 854, 899 P.2d 544, 547 (1995). "[A] defendant is entitled to separate trial if he presents a sufficient showing of facts demonstrating substantial prejudice would result in a joint trial." *Lisle*, 113 Nev. At 689, 941 P.2d at 466 (citing *Amen*, 106 Nev. at 755, 801 P.2d at 1358). When defendants are tried together in a complex case and they have markedly different degrees of culpability, this risk of prejudice is

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heightened. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540, 113 S.Ct. at 938. Where there is disparity in the evidence, or the evidence is admissible as to one defendant and inadmissible as to a co-defendant, the jury cannot reasonably be expected to compartmentalize the evidence as it related to the separate defendant.

In the instant case, the evidence that the State possesses against Smokey is incredibly strong. There is evidence of text messages between Smokey and Eric Quezada, Smokey was positively identified by both victims, it was clear that Smokey wanted the unemployment debit card from the victims and both of the surviving witnesses have testified that Smokey was the one that kicked in the bedroom doors and opened fire on the four victims. The only evidence that has been collected against Ivonne was the testimony that Ivonne was present during the shooting. However, neither of the victims can testify to her involvement with the crime or whether she was there willfully or on her own free will. In fact, it was stated by the victim that she was a friend of Ivonne's. As discussed in Zafiro, this case involves two co-defendants that have remarkably different degrees of culpability and the jury cannot be reasonably expected to compartmentalize the evidence as it relates to Ivonne. Thus, because of the incredibly significant disparity of evidence against Smokey and Ivonne, a severance is warranted to protect the trial rights of both defendants.

D. Joinder Of Trials May Unfairly Prevent Ivonne From Presenting A Theory Of Defense And Force Her To Defend Against Evidence Not Admissible Against Him At A Separate Trial.

Severance of defendants may be required when evidence that the jury should not consider against a defendant and that would not be admissible if a defendant were tried alone is admissible in a joint trial or when essential exculpatory evidence that would be available to a

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defendant tried alone were unavailable in a joint trial, handicapped a defendant in presenting a theory of defense. See Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540, 113 S.Ct. at 938. See also Bluff v. State, 114 Nev. 1237, 970 P.2d 564 (1998) (district court erred in denying a motion for severance which resulted in the defendant being precluded from offering exculpatory evidence in the form of his co-defendant's statement as a statement against his interest; "the district court should have severed the joining trial so as to diminish the possibility of prejudice to either defendant in proving their theory of the case"). See also Chartier v. State, 2008 Nev. LEXIS 73, 191 P.3d 1182 (2008) (district court erred in denying the motion for severance which resulted in precluding defendant from introducing evidence of recorded conversations between him and his co-defendant in which the co-defendant made inculpatory statements that supported defendant's theory of defense).

In the instant case, severance is warranted to protect Ivonne's right to present evidence against her co-defendant that may not be admissible in a joint trial and challenge the State's theory that she was involved in the shooting of the four victims. For example, Ivonne intends to present evidence of Smokey's violent nature (this includes prior acts of violence) as a person and his affiliation with violent gangs. This all goes towards the theory that Ivonne was intimidated by Smokey and was brought to the scene against her own will.

This type of evidence pertaining to the co-defendant would be evidence that Ivonne, would seek to admit as part of the theory of her case. However, character evidence of this type would be generally inadmissible against Smokey. Thus, severance must be granted to protect Ivonne's right to present her theory of the case while at the same time, protecting her co-

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defendant from being unconstitutionally prejudiced by having to defend against Ivonne's use of evidence that would be inadmissible against them in a separate trial.

III.

CONCLUSION

Because of the substantial prejudice to the trial rights of Ivonne, as well as constitutional violations, she respectfully requests that this Court sever the trials of the co-defendant so that she may be tried alone, and her rights protected.

DATED this 21 day of September, 2012.

JUSTICE LAW CENTER

Bret O. Whipple, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 6168
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6	Attorney for Defendant Ivonne Cabrera					
7	DISTRICT COURT					
8	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA					
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA)					
10) Plaintiff,)					
11	vs.) Case No.: C283700					
12) Dept. No.: XXV IVONNE CABRERA, aka,)					
13	Yvonne Cabrera #1617623,) JOSE GONZALES, aka,)					
14	Jose Alejandro Gonzales #2636822,					
15) Defendants.)					
16	<u> </u>					
17	RECEIPT OF COPY					
18	RECEIPT OF COPY of the foregoing MOTION FOR SEVERANCE is acknowledged					
19	this day of September, 2012.					
20	D _{vv}					
21	By: District Attorney Representative					
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23						
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27						
28	13					

1 2 3 4 5 6	NOTC STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #008273 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff		CLERK OF THE COURT	
7 8	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA			
9)		
10	THE STATE OF NEVADA,			
11	Plaintiff,)	C 12 202700 1	
12	-VS-		C-12-283700-1	
13	IVONNE CABRERA, aka Yvonne Cabrera, #1617623) DEPT NO:	XXV	
14				
15	Defendant.			
16	NOTICE OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF			
17	AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES			
18	COMES NOW the State of Newada	through CTEVEN D	WOLESON Clark Co	

COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, through STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, by and through MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER, Chief Deputy District Attorney, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 250, NRS 175.552 and NRS 200.033, and declares its intention to present the following evidence in support of aggravating circumstance at a penalty hearing:

- 1. The murder was committed by a person who, at any time before a penalty hearing is conducted for the murder pursuant to NRS 175.552, is or has been convicted of:
- (a) Another murder and the provisions of subsection 12 do not otherwise apply to that other murder; or
 - (b) A felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another and the provisions of subsection 4 do not otherwise apply to that felony.

That on or about April 26, 2012, Defendants IVONNE CABRERA and JOSE GONZALES did then and there wilfully, feloniously, without authority of law, and with premeditation and deliberation, and with malice aforethought, kill JAMES HEADRICK, a human being, by shooting at the said JAMES HEADRICK multiple times, with a deadly weapon, to-wit: firearm; Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales directly committing said crime, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera aiding or abetting by counsel and encouragement and by accompanying Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to JAMES HEADRICK'S residence and knocking on doors to and within JAMES HEADRICK'S apartment to allow Defendant JOSE GONZALEZ, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to gain access to JAMES HEADRICK to facilitate shooting him, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera also being criminally liable as a co-conspirator vicariously in that said crime was a foreseeable act of the conspiracy. (See NRS 200.033(2)(a))

That on or about September 9, 2012, Defendants were charged by way of an Information in the Eighth Judicial District Court, case number C283700, in Count 3 with MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON. The State anticipates that both defendants may be convicted of such charge prior to any penalty hearing in the instant case. If such conviction occurs for First or Second Degree Murder, the conviction would qualify as an aggravating circumstance under NRS 200.033(2)(a). If such conviction occurs for any lesser offense, the conviction would qualify as an aggravating circumstance under NRS 200.033(2)(b).

The evidence upon which the State will rely is the testimony of the witnesses, the pleadings, transcripts, judgment of conviction, court minutes in C283700, as well as the police reports, statements, photographs, and/or physical evidence from North Las Vegas Police Department Event Number 120426007466.

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- 2. The murder was committed by a person who, at any time before a penalty hearing is conducted for the murder pursuant to NRS 175.552, is or has been convicted of:
- (c) Another murder and the provisions of subsection 12 do not otherwise apply to that other murder; or
- (d) A felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another and the provisions of subsection 4 do not otherwise apply to that felony.

That on or about April 26, 2012, Defendants IVONNE CABRERA and JOSE GONZALES did then and there wilfully, feloniously, without authority of law, and with premeditation and deliberation, and with malice aforethought, kill ERIK QUEZADA MORALES, a human being, by shooting at the said ERIK QUEZADA MORALES multiple times, with a deadly weapon, to-wit: firearm; Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales directly committing said crime, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera aiding or abetting by counsel and encouragement and by accompanying Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to ERIK QUEZADA MORALES' residence and knocking on doors to and within ERIK QUEZADA MORALES' apartment to allow Defendant JOSE GONZALEZ, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to gain access to ERIK QUEZADA MORALES to facilitate shooting him, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera also being criminally liable as a co-conspirator vicariously in that said crime was a foreseeable act of the conspiracy. (See NRS 200.033(2)(a))

That on or about September 9, 2012, Defendants were charged by way of an Information in the Eighth Judicial District Court, case number C283700, in **Count 5** with MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON. The State anticipates that both defendants may be convicted of such charge prior to any penalty hearing in the instant case. If such conviction occurs for First or Second Degree Murder, the conviction would qualify as an aggravating circumstance under NRS 200.033(2)(a). If such conviction occurs for any lesser offense, the conviction would qualify as an aggravating circumstance under NRS 200.033(2)(b).

The evidence upon which the State will rely is the testimony of the witnesses, the pleadings, transcripts, judgment of conviction, court minutes in C283700, as well as the police reports, statements, photographs, and/or physical evidence from North Las Vegas Police Department Event Number 120426007466.

- 3. The murder was committed by a person who, at any time before a penalty hearing is conducted for the murder pursuant to NRS 175.552, is or has been convicted of:
- (e) Another murder and the provisions of subsection 12 do not otherwise apply to that other murder; or
- (f) A felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another and the provisions of subsection 4 do not otherwise apply to that felony.

That on or about April 26, 2012, Defendants IVONNE CABRERA and JOSE GONZALES did then and there, without authority of law, and malice aforethought, willfully and feloniously attempt to kill ASHLEY WANTLAND, a human being, by shooting at the said ASHLEY WANTLAND multiple times, with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm; Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales directly committing said crime, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera aiding or abetting by counsel and encouragement and by accompanying Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to ASHLEY WANTLAND'S residence and knocking on doors to and within ASHLEY WANTLAND'S apartment to allow Defendant JOSE GONZALEZ, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to gain access to ASHLEY WANTLAND to facilitate shooting her, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera also being criminally liable as a coconspirator vicariously in that said crime was a foreseeable act of the conspiracy. (See NRS 200.033(2)(b))

That on or about September 9, 2012, Defendants were charged by way of an Information in the Eighth Judicial District Court, case number C283700, in **Count 4** with ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON. The State anticipates that both defendants may be convicted of such charge prior to any penalty hearing in the instant case. If such conviction occurs for Attempt Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon or or any

lesser offense, the conviction would qualify as an aggravating circumstance under NRS 200.033(2)(b).

The evidence upon which the State will rely is the testimony of the witnesses, the pleadings, transcripts, judgment of conviction, court minutes in C283700, as well as the police reports, statements, photographs, and/or physical evidence from North Las Vegas Police Department Event Number 120426007466.

- 4. The murder was committed by a person who, at any time before a penalty hearing is conducted for the murder pursuant to NRS 175.552, is or has been convicted of:
- (g) Another murder and the provisions of subsection 12 do not otherwise apply to that other murder; or
- (h) A felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another and the provisions of subsection 4 do not otherwise apply to that felony.

That on or about April 26, 2012, Defendants IVONNE CABRERA and JOSE GONZALES did then and there, without authority of law, and malice aforethought, willfully and feloniously attempt to kill MELISSA MARIN, a human being, by shooting at the said MELISSA MARIN twice, with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm; Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales directly committing said crime, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera aiding or abetting by counsel and encouragement and by accompanying Defendant JOSE GONZALES, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to MELISSA MARIN'S residence and knocking on doors to and within MELISSA MARIN'S apartment to allow Defendant JOSE GONZALEZ, aka, Jose Alejandro Gonzales to gain access to MELISSA MARIN to facilitate shooting him, Defendant IVONNE CABRERA, aka, Yvonne Cabrera also being criminally liable as a co-conspirator vicariously in that said crime was a foreseeable act of the conspiracy. (See NRS 200.033(2)(b))

That on or about September 9, 2012, Defendants were charged by way of an Information in the Eighth Judicial District Court, case number C283700, in **Count 6** with ATTEMPT MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON. The State anticipates that

both defendants may be convicted of such charge prior to any penalty hearing in the instant case. If such conviction occurs for Attempt Murder with Use of a Deadly Weapon or any lesser offense, the conviction would qualify as an aggravating circumstance under NRS 200.033(2)(b).

The evidence upon which the State will rely is the testimony of the witnesses, the pleadings, transcripts, judgment of conviction, court minutes in C283700, as well as the police reports, statements, photographs, and/or physical evidence from North Las Vegas Police Department Event Number 120426007466.

5. The murder was committed by a person who knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person by means of a weapon, device or course of action which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person.

On the date of this double homicide, April 26, 2012, the location where the shooting took place was occupied by four individuals who were sleeping in their beds. After breaking into the victims' home, the defendant shot at and into the bodies of all four occupants, killing two and severely injuring two others. The defendant fired at least nine rounds from his weapon at these victims and struck each victim multiple times.

- 6. The murder was committed while the person was engaged, alone or with others, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, arson in the first degree, burglary, invasion of the home or kidnapping in the first degree, and the person charged:
 - (a) Killed or attempted to kill the person murdered; or
 - (b) Knew or had reason to know that life would be taken or lethal force used.

On the date of this double homicide, April 26, 2012, the location where the shooting took place was occupied by four individuals who were sleeping in their beds. The defendants not only broke into the victims' home, but they also forcibly entered each of the victims' bedrooms. This entry was made while in possession of a firearm and for the express purpose of shooting and killing the victims residing therein. The defendants knew that life would be taken and that lethal force would be used after entering the bedrooms of the victims.

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CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION I hearby certify that service of Notice of Evidence in Support of Aggravating Circumstances, was made this <u>25th</u> day of September, 2012, by facsimile transmission to: BRET WHIPPLE, ESQ. FAX: 974-4008 BY /s/S. Munoz Employee of the District Attorney's Office 12FN0864A/sam-MVU C:\PRORRAM FILES\NEEVIA.COM\DOCUMENT CONVERTER\TEMP\3447583-4066016.DOC

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the & Chin **OPPM** 1 STEVEN B. WOLFSON **CLERK OF THE COURT** Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #008273 4 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 5 Attorney for Plaintiff 6 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 10 Plaintiff, 11 CASE NO: C-12-283700-1 DEPT NO: XXV 12 -VS-IVONNE CABRERA, aka 13 Yvonne Cabrera #1617623, JOSE GONZALES, aka 14 Jose Alejandro Gonzales, #2636822 15 Defendants. 16 STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT CABRERA'S MOTION TO SEVER 17 DATE OF HEARING: 10/01/2012 18 TIME OF HEARING: 9:00 AM 19 COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County 20 District Attorney, through MICHAEL V. STAUDAHER, Chief Deputy District Attorney, 21 and hereby submits the attached Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant Cabrera's 22 Motion To Sever. 23 This Opposition is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, 24 the attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of 25 hearing, if deemed necessary by this Honorable Court. 26 /// 27 /// 28

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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

FACTS

On April 26, 2012, North Las Vegas Detectives responded to 2039 Webster apartment C in North Las Vegas, in reference to a possible gunshot victim. When the detectives arrived, they learned that the initial responding officers on scene had come in contact with two gunshot victims. Police located one of these victims, Melissa Marin (hereinafter "Marin"), at the gateway entrance to the apartment complex and the other, Ashley Wantland (hereinafter "Wantland"), at the front door of apartment C. Both victims were conscious.

Officers asked Marin who had shot them and she responded that a subject known to her as "Smokey" had done it. Officers then spoke with Wantland who told officers that she and her boyfriend had been shot and that her boyfriend was still inside the residence. Both Marin and Wantland were subsequently transported to University Medical Center (UMC) for treatment of their multiple gunshot wounds.

Officers then went into the residence to check for additional victims and located two deceased victims in separate bedrooms who were later identified as Erik Quezada-Morales (hereinafter "Morales") and James Headrick (hereinafter "Headrick"). During the protective sweep of the residence, officers noticed that a bathroom window was open and various bathroom items apparently knocked to the floor. Officers also noted that there were foot prints inside the bath tub and it appeared as though someone may have entered the residence through the bathroom window. Officers also saw several cartridge shell casings in the bedrooms, as well as the hallway and living room.

Police then sealed the residence while Detectives obtained a search warrant. Justice of the Peace Tyrrell approved the search warrant and the subsequent search revealed numerous expended shell casings in addition to deceased victim Morales in the south east bedroom and deceased victim Headrick in the north east bedroom. Both victims appeared to have suffered numerous gunshot wounds.

Police also found the bathroom in disarray with the shower curtain knocked down and a crowbar on the floor. Crime scene personnel took photographs, recovered evidence and processed the scene for prints and DNA.

While at the scene, detectives learned that Marin was able to talk and was providing information to officers at UMC. Detectives responded to UMC and interviewed Marin. Marin told detectives that two suspects came into her residence, a Hispanic male known to her as "Smokey" and a female known to her as "Chinola." Marin stated that earlier in the morning she heard knocking at her bedroom door. Marin said she recognized Chinola's voice and that Chinola asked her to open the door. Marin said that at about the same time her boyfriend, Morales, got up to answer the door and she heard several gunshots. Marin said she told her boyfriend not to open the door. Marin said the door was then forced open and she saw Smokey with a gun pointed at them. Marin said she pleaded with Smokey not to shoot them, but he proceeded to shoot both she and Morales several times. Marin said that she then saw Smokey and Chinola flee together out of the front door of the residence.

Marin stated that despite her injuries, she was able to go into Wantland and Headrick's room where she saw Headrick lying on the floor and Wantland lying in the bed, both with apparent gunshot wounds. Marin said Wantland was still alive and she was able to get Wantland up from the bed and get out of the residence.

Detectives asked Marin if she knew why Smoky and Chinola shot them. Marin responded that they let Chinola use their vehicle and Chinola failed to bring it back. Marin said, Morales had called Chinola and left a message, asking her to return the vehicle. Marin said this exchange started some type of verbal altercation and she believes that was the reason why Smokey and Chinola came over and shot them.

Marin was able to give police directions to Chinola's residence which was located at 1927 Bassler in North Las Vegas. With the names supplied by Marin, police were able to identify Ivonne Cabrera as a possible female suspect who used the name Chinola. Police obtained and showed Marin a picture of Cabrera and Marin positively identified Chinola as the suspect who entered Marin's apartment and shot both her and Morales.

At approximately 11:00 p.m., on the same day, police, who were watching the Bassler location, observed Cabrera get in a vehicle with several other subjects. Police saw Cabrera packing numerous items into the trunk of the vehicle before leaving. Police subsequently stopped Cabrera's vehicle and detained her. Police located a large quantity of Cabrera's clothing in the trunk of the vehicle, some of which were consistent with the clothing that the witnesses had described Cabrera wearing at the time of the shooting. It appeared as though Cabrera was trying to escape before being apprehended.

Detectives then responded to the location where Cabrera was being detained and took her into custody. Detectives transported Cabrera to the Detective bureau where she was questioned after being advised of her Miranda rights.

During Cabrera's taped interview, she initially denied any involvement in the shooting. Later, however, Cabrera admitted to going to the victim's residence with Smokey. Cabrera said she knew Smokey had a gun at the time. Cabrera said that Smokey climbed through the bathroom window and then let her into the apartment through the front door. Cabrera admitted to knocking on the bedroom doors and asking the victims to let them into the rooms. Cabrera said that Smokey fired his gun at the victims about nine times. Cabrera further stated that they both fled from the residence following the shooting, leaving in the gray Dodge Intrepid they had borrowed from Morales.

Cabrera said they later abandoned the vehicle on Bonanza Road and that they were picked up by Smokey's sister. Cabrera said Smokey told her that he was only going to scare the victims. Cabrera told police that she did it because she was scared. After the shooting, however, Cabrera made no attempt to contact the police. Cabrera was then questioned as to why she and Smokey went to the apartment and shot the victims. Cabrera would only respond that there was some type of problem between them.

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INJURIES TO LIVING VICTIMS:

According to medical personnel at UMC, Marin suffered bullet "grazes" to her right buttock and her right arm. Marin also suffered gunshot wounds to her left shoulder, right arm, back and right breast. Marin had to have a tube inserted into her chest cavity to drain the blood which had collected around her lungs. It also appeared as though she suffered some broken bones from the gunshots.

Wantland also suffered multiple gunshot wounds: two to her right arm; at least two in her chest; and one at the base of her chin underneath her jaw. According to the nurses, at the time of her initial hospitalization there were two bullets still inside Wantland's body (one had lodged in her tongue and one was near her right breast). Wantland also had to have a chest tube inserted to drain blood from around her lungs.

AUTOPSY:

On April 27, 2012, Dr. Gary D. Telgenhoff conducted an autopsy of Morales and Headrick. Dr. Telgenhoff determined that cause of death for both victims was multiple gunshot wounds and the manner of death was homicide.

FOLLOW UP INVESTIGATION:

On April 28, 2012, Police identified Jose Alejandro Gonzales as a possible suspect who went by the name of "Smokey." Gonzales fit the description of the suspect given by both of the surviving victims. Armed with this information, police obtained a photo of Gonzales and took that photo to the North Las Vegas Jail where Cabrera was being detained. Police showed Cabrera the photograph of Gonzales and she identified him as the suspect who went into the residence with her and shot the victims. Cabrera wrote on the edge of the picture, "this is the guy that shot the individuals," and signed her name. Cabrera further told police that Gonzales and she were the only ones who entered the residence on the night of the shooting.

Police later went to UMC and contacted victims Marin and Wantland. Based on the fact that the victims both knew Smokey and Chinola police showed them the photographs of Cabrera and Gonzales. Marin positively identified Gonzales as the person who shot both her

and Morales. Wantland had previously told police that she had met Gonzales before and she could identify him from a picture. When Wantland viewed the picture of Gonzales she positively identified him as the person who shot both her and Headrick. Wantland also identified Cabrera as the other suspect.

On April 26, 2012, crime scene investigators processed the exterior of northeast bedroom window, exterior and interior of bathroom window, exterior of sliding glass door, exterior of the living room window and bath tub/shower walls of the shooting scene at 2039 Webster St "C" for fingerprints. All recovered latent lifts suitable for comparison purposes were compared to Jose Gonzalez and Ivonne Cabrera. Of particular interest were the latent lifts collected from the bath tub edge opposite of the bathroom window, the apparent entry point for the perpetrators. The results of the comparisons of the latent prints collected from that location showed a positive match to Jose Alejandro Gonzalez, specifically his left middle finger.

SUBSEQUENT APPREHENSION OF JOSE GONZALES:

On June 11, 2012, at approximately 0133 hours, the primary operator of the Z portal at the Otay Mesa Port of Entry boarder crossing near San Diego, California, processed a gray Chevrolet Impala (NVUS/4PEG102) driven by Marsha Darlene Miller (hereinafter "Miller") as it attempted to enter the United States. As the Impala went thru the Z portal for X ray examination, the operator observed anomalies in the trunk area of the vehicle.

As Miller applied for entry into the United States as the driver of the silver Chevy Impala, she presented a Nevada State Driver's License as her only form of identification, and declared herself to be a US Citizen. Miller was abnormally talkative and her hands were shaking as she presented her documents. Miller stated that she was in Mexico "for fun" and presented two negative declarations.

The passenger in the vehicle was Crystal Hoag (hereinafter "Hoag" - the girlfriend of Jose Alejandro Gonzales). Hoag also presented an identification card from Nevada and declared that she was a US Citizen. When the customs agent at the port of entry queried Hoag's name in her computer she received a computer generated alert from the Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The customs agent then referred the vehicle and its occupants into the vehicle secondary lot for further inspection.

The Otay Mesa Port of Entry Port Enforcement Team who received the Impala for further inspection discovered an individual concealed in the truck of the Impala who was attempting to elude Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspection. That individual was identified at JOSE ALEJANDRO GONZALES (aka Jose Alex Gonzales). The San Ysidro Port of Entry Criminal Enforcement Unit was then immediately contacted at approximately 0215 hours with an immediate response and confirmation on Gonzales' warrant of arrest for double homicide from the State of Nevada. Subject was referred to the aforementioned CBP enforcement Unit for further processing and disposition. Defendant Gonzales was later transported back to Clark County, Nevada.

ARGUMENT

I. THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SEVER SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE THE COMBINED ACTIONS OF THE DEFENDANT AND HER CO-DEFENDANT ARE AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE

Defendant Cabrera moves this Court to sever the forthcoming trial with her codefendant based on NRS 174.165. The defendant claims that severance should be granted because she was supposedly not involved in the alleged criminal activity and because she was supposedly forced at gun point to accompany Defendant Gonzales to the shooting location. NRS 174.165 provides that severance may be granted when there is likelihood of prejudice to either the defendant or the State if the trial is not severed. However, "[m]erely having a better chance at acquittal if the defendants are tried at separate trials is not sufficient to establish prejudice." Lisle v. State, 113 Nev. 679, 689-90 (1997). The joinder of defendants is within the discretion of the trial court and its decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Lisle, 113 Nev. at 689; see also Jones v. State, 111 Nev. 848, 853 (1995). "While making this decision, a court must consider not only the possible prejudice to the defendant but also the possible prejudice to the Government resulting from two time-consuming, expensive and duplicitous trials." Lisle, 113 Nev. at 689. The possibility of prejudice may be cured by the issuance of a limiting instruction to

the jury mandating them to consider the evidence only against the confessing party. <u>Id.</u> The ultimate test of whether severance is required is "whether the jury can reasonably be expected to compartmentalize the evidence as it relates to the separate defendants." <u>Jones</u>, 111 Nev. at 854.

In fact both our Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have held that severance is not necessary even in situations where there are statements or confessions by one defendant implicating another defendant. <u>Lisle v. State</u>, 113 Nev. 679, 941 P.2d 459, (1997); <u>Stevens v. State</u>, 97 Nev. 443, 634 P.2d 662 (1981); <u>U.S. v. Enriquez-Estrada</u>, 999 F.2d 1355 (1993); and <u>Richardson v. Marsh</u>, 481 U.S. 200 (1987).

In the case of <u>Chartier v. State</u>, 191 P.3d 1182 (2008), however, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the cumulative affect of a joint trial was so prejudicial that it did warrant severance. <u>Id.</u> at 1186. The <u>Chartier</u> case involved two defendants where one, Chartier, claimed that he was not present at the scene of the murders while the co-defendant claimed that Chartier was the mastermind and killer. <u>Id.</u> at 1184. In addition, Chartier argued that because of the joinder of the defendants in one trial, that "his ability to prove his theory of the defense was impaired by the joinder." <u>Id.</u> at 1185. The Court subsequently ruled that the antagonistic defenses, the diminished ability to present a theory of defense and the cumulative affect of the joint trial warranted severance. <u>Id.</u> at 1186-87.

In the instant case, the type of situation described in <u>Chartier</u> does not exist. Both defendants were not only present at the scene, but both actively participated in the crimes. In addition, both fled together after the shooting and later separated in their attempts to escape. While it is true that Defendant Cabrera was captured early on in the investigation, it is clear from the circumstances of her arrest that she was attempting to flea the jurisdiction. Furthermore, she was the one who waited outside the residence while Defendant Gonzales broke into the house and it was she who yelled to the occupants to open their doors, all the while knowing that Gonzales had a weapon.

Although the defense claims that there are antagonistic defenses in this case the facts and evidence belie those claims. As described *supra*, Defendant Cabrera actively

participated in all aspects of these crimes, she attempted to flea immediately afterward and she failed to even attempt to call 911 or the police after separating from Defendant Gonzales. It should be noted that the Court in <u>Chartier</u> specifically stated that antagonistic defenses are not sufficient grounds standing alone to warrant severance. <u>Id.</u> at 1186. In fact the Court reiterated this position by referencing its prior holdings and stating that "[t]o establish that joinder was prejudicial requires more than simply showing that severance made acquittal more likely; misjoinder requires reversal only if it has a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict." <u>Id.</u> at 1185.

The defendant's motion to sever is completely devoid of any showing that severance is warranted. It is clear from even the latest cases addressing this issue that severance is required only in situations where a defendant is denied her right to a fair trial because the jury is prevented from making a reliable judgment as to her guilt or innocence.

In the instant case, the proof against both defendants consists of both direct and circumstantial evidence which does not rely on any statement made by any co-defendant. The charges against Defendant Cabrera are a direct result of her actions as either an individual or in conjunction with Defendant Gonzales.

Since the evidence against these defendants is strong and consists of both direct and circumstantial evidence, Defendant Cabrera's motion to sever should be denied. A limiting instruction should, however, be given to the jury instructing them to only use the evidence against each defendant individually. Such a procedure balances both the defendant's right to a fair trial and the community's interest in an efficiently run judicial system. It also comports with the decisions in <u>Lisle, Enriquez-Estrada</u> and <u>Richardson</u>.

II. DEFENDANT ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN THE CRIMES CHARGED AND, THEREFORE, THE SPILLOVER DOCTRINE DOES NOT REQUIRE SEVERANCE.

Courts have universally held that where conspiracy as a theory of criminal liability is charged a joint trial is particularly appropriate. <u>United States v. Polizzi</u>, 500 F.2d 856, 901 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1120; <u>Davenport v. United States</u>, 260 F.2d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 1958). See also, <u>United States v. Cirard</u>, 601 F.2d 69, 72 (2nd Cir. 1979), cert.

denied 444 U.S. 871.

The fact that some evidence may be admissible against only one defendant does not constitute such prejudice as to require severance. <u>United States v. Nace</u>, 561 F.2d 763, 769 (9th Cir. 1977); <u>Opper v. United States</u>, 248 U.S. 84, 75 S.Ct. 158 (1954). Speaking to this issue, the Court in <u>United States v. Kennedy</u>, 564 F.2d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir. 1977) cert. den. 435 U.S. 994 stated:

"Here the claim of prejudice is based upon the fact that because a conspiracy was charged (Kennedy was not specifically named as a conspirator), much hearsay evidence could be expected to be admitted. Likewise, he pointed out that great portions of the evidence admitted to prove the numerous counts would be inapplicable to him, but would have a prejudicial effect. He contends that the government's ploy was to infect each defendant with the acts and transgressions of the other defendants, and that a parade of horribles would be admitted against the only conspirator on trial (Carlson) which would never come to the attention of the jury if he were tried alone. It is not surprising that a defendant might prefer to be tried separately so that only evidence admissible strictly against him would be heard by the jury. However, if this formed the only basis for prejudice required for severance, the consequent volume of separate trials of multiple actions in a series of similar and connected illegal transactions would create an intolerable burden on the trial courts."

The fact that evidence against one defendant is more damaging to one than to others is also not grounds for severance. <u>United States v. Escalante</u>, 637 F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1980); <u>United States v. Brady</u>, 579 F.2d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074; see also <u>United States v. Anderson</u>, 626 F.2d 1358, 1373 (8th Cir. 1980).

In Lisle v. State, 113 Nev. 679, 689, 941 P.2d 459, 466 (1997), the Court held:

Severance of defendants will not be granted if based on "guilt by association" alone. <u>United States v. Boffa</u>, 513 F.Supp. 444, 487 (D. Del 1980). Merely having a better chance at acquittal if the defendants are tried at separate trials is not sufficient to establish prejudice. <u>United States v. Baker</u>, 10 F.3d 1374, 1388 (9th Cir. 1993), <u>cert denied</u>, 513 U.S. 934 (1994). In addition, a defendant is not entitled to a severance merely because the evidence is admissible against a co-defendant is more damaging than the moving party.

<u>Id</u>.

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Any potential prejudice may be cured by a limiting instruction to the jury and the jury is expected to follow the instruction in limiting it's review of the evidence. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 562, 87 S.Ct. 648 (1967).

Defendant Cabrera complains that she will be prejudiced by being tried with Defendant Gonzales. The State has great confidence in the jury system. The prosecution believes the jury will base their verdict on the facts adduced at trial. There is no doubt jurors will abide by the courts instructions and render a fair and just verdict.

Defendant Cabrera also argues that she will be a victim of spill-over prejudice if she is tried alongside Defendant Gonzales. Defendant Cabrera's argument is flawed in several respects.

First, severance will not be granted based on "guilt by association" alone. Lisle v. State, 113 Nev. 679, 689, 941 P.2d 459, 466 (1997). A defendant cannot establish prejudice merely by showing that he would have had a better chance at acquittal if tried alone. Id. at 689-90. Moreover, a defendant is not entitled to a severance simply because the evidence against his co-defendant is more damaging than that admissible against him. Id. at 690. Indeed, Defendant Cabrera is not entitled to severance simply because her co-defendant may be the one who actually did the shooting. Defendant Gonzales' connection to these victims is through Defendant Cabrera. Although the victims knew who Defendant Gonzales was, it was Cabrera's car that was borrowed and she who the victims interacted with prior to the shooting. The disagreement at issue appears to have been between the victims and Defendant Cabrera, not Defendant Gonzales. As such, Defendant Cabrera's involvement is integral to and the reason why she brought Defendant Gonzales to the victim's home that night. Although he was the one who possessed the gun, Defendant Cabrera used him as her weapon that night.

Second, Defendant Cabrera misconstrues the doctrine of "spill-over prejudice." According to Cabrera, she will be prejudiced because much of the evidence related to the various charges will be raised during her joint trial. What Defendant Cabrera neglects to address, however, is the fact that virtually <u>all</u> of this evidence would be admissible even in a

severed trial with her alone.

The "spillover" theory "involves the question of whether a jury's unfavorable impression of [one] defendant against whom the evidence is properly admitted will influence the way the jurors view the other defendant." <u>Id.</u> at 689, 941 P.2d at 466. In <u>Lisle</u>, the defendant claimed that because his co-defendant was adorned with visible tattoos, was involved in the drug trade, and had an abundance of evidence presented against him, he was found guilty based on his association with the co-defendant. <u>Id.</u> at 689. In rejecting the defendant's claim, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the defendant's argument amounted to nothing more than he would have had a better chance at acquittal in a separate trial. <u>Id.</u> at 690.

Here, Defendant Cabrera fails to allege what evidence would be admissible against Defendant Gonzales and would not be admissible against her. She additionally fails to show how such potential evidence would unfairly influence the way jurors view her. As in <u>Lisle</u>, Defendant Cabrera's argument constitutes nothing more than she would have had a better chance at acquittal if Defendant Gonzales were not sitting with her at the defense table. It was Defendant Cabrera who chose to associate with Defendant Gonzales and participate in the alleged crimes. Defendant Cabrera played an integral role in the execution of the various crimes and it was her direct actions which resulted in the deaths of Morales and Headrick, as well as the injuries to the surviving victims. Her involvement in all aspects of the criminal acts perpetrated in this case is pervasive.

Defendant Cabrera actively participated in these crimes and cannot now claim prejudice by being tried alongside her confederate. Her involvement with Defendant Gonzales was of her own doing – not of the State's. Defendant Cabrera could have decided not to go to the house that night and she could have walked away when Defendant Gonzales was breaking in through the bathroom window. There is no evidence from the victim witnesses that Defendant Gonzales aimed his gun at anyone but them that night. There is no evidence that Defendant Gonzales held a gun to Defendant Cabrera's head or that he forced her in any way. Defendant Cabrera also, was able to separate from Defendant Cabrera after

the shooting and did not suffer any injuries herself as a result. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to sever should be denied.

III. DEFENDANT CABRERA HAS FAILED TO SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISH THAT HER DEFENSE IS ANTAGONISTIC TO THAT OF HER CODEFENDANT

Defendant Cabrera does not adequately address the issues of antagonistic or mutually exclusive defenses and such a showing must be made to justify severance. Severance is not warranted or justified simply because each defendant seeks to blame the other for the crime. Marshall v. State, 118 Nev. 642, 56 P.3d 376 (2002). In Marshall, co-defendants Marshall and Currington were tried and convicted together of first degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery. At trial, Marshall's strategy was to exclusively blame Currington; Currington's strategy was to blame Marshall. Id. at 644-45, 56 P.3d at 377-78.

On appeal, Marshall claimed that the district court erred in not severing his trial from Currington's. <u>Id.</u> at 645, 56 P.3d at 378. He maintained that he and Currington had "antagonistic defenses" in that each argued that the other was responsible for the murder. <u>Id.</u>, 56 P.3d at 378. Marshall relied on the standard the Nevada Supreme Court articulated in <u>Rowland v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 31, 39 P.3d 114 (2002). In <u>Rowland</u>, the Nevada Supreme Court stated that "defenses must be antagonistic to the point that they are 'mutually exclusive' before they are to be considered prejudicial," and necessitate severance. <u>Id.</u> at 45, 39 P.3d at 122. The court further noted in <u>Rowland</u> that defenses are mutually exclusive when the core of the co-defendant's defense is so irreconcilable with the core of the defendant's own defense that the acceptance of the co-defendant's theory by the jury precludes acquittal of the defendant. <u>Id.</u> at 45, 39 P.3d at 123.

In <u>Marshall</u>, the Nevada Supreme Court expressed concern that the <u>Rowland</u> decision implied severance was justified in too broad of circumstances. The court explained the <u>Rowland</u> holding and limited the standard under which severance is appropriate. It stated:

To the extent that this language suggests that prejudice requiring severance is presumed whenever acceptance of one defendant's defense theory logically compels rejection of another defendant's theory, it is too broadly stated. As we have explained elsewhere, where there are situations in which inconsistent defenses may

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support a motion for severance, the doctrine is a very limited A defendant seeking severance must show that the codefendants have conflicting and irreconcilable defenses and that there is a danger that the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone demonstrates that both are guilty. We take this opportunity to further clarify this issue.

<u>Id.</u> at 646, 56 P.3d at 378. The Court then explained the standard for severance.

The decisive factor in any severance analysis remains prejudice to the defendant. NRS 174.165(1) provides in relevant part: "If it appears that a defendant . . . is prejudiced by a joinder . . . of defendants . . . for trial together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires." Nevertheless, prejudice to the defendant is not the only relevant factor: a court must consider not only the possible prejudice to the defendant but also the possible prejudice to the State resulting from expensive, duplicative trials. Joinder promotes judicial economy and efficiency as well as consistent verdicts and is preferred as long as it does not compromise a defendant's right to a fair trial. Despite the concern for efficiency and consistency, the district court has a continuing duty at all stages of the trial to grant a severance if prejudice does appear. Joinder of defendants is within the discretion of the district court, and its decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. To establish that joinder was prejudicial requires more than simply showing that severance made acquittal more likely; misjoinder requires reversal only if it has a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict.

Marshall, 118 Nev. at 646-47, 56 P.3d at 378-79 (citations omitted).

Significantly, the Nevada Supreme Court specifically has held that antagonistic defenses are a factor, but not, in themselves, sufficient grounds upon which to grant severance of defendants. Indeed, in Marshall, even though the defenses offered by Marshall and co-defendant Currington were antagonistic, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the joinder of the defendants at trial was proper. <u>Id.</u> at 648, 56 P.3d at 378. Finding Marshall's assertion that his and Currington's defenses were prejudicial by virtue of their antagonistic nature unpersuasive, the court explained that to prevail on the ground that severance was warranted, Marshall had to show that the "joint trial compromised a specific trial right or prevented the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence." <u>Id.</u> at 648, 56 P.3d at 380. The court also noted that the State's case was not dependent on either defendant's statement and did not use joinder to unfairly bolster a marginal case. <u>Id.</u>, 56

P.3d at 380. Moreover, the State argued both defendants were guilty and presented evidence to establish their separate guilt. <u>Id.</u>, 56 P.3d at 380. The court affirmed Marshall's conviction.

The United States Supreme Court conducted a similar analysis in Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 113 S. Ct. 933 (1993). In that case, petitioners contended that it was prejudicial whenever two defendants each claim innocence and accuse the other of the crime. 506 U.S. at 538, 113 S. Ct at 938. The United States Supreme Court rejected this contention, holding that "mutually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial per se." Id., 113 S. Ct. at 938. The Court explained that severance should only be granted if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. Id. at 539, 113 S. Ct. at 938. It is not prejudicial for a co-defendant to introduce relevant, competent evidence that would be admissible against defendant at a severed trial. Id. at 540, 113 S. Ct. at 938. The Court also noted that the trial court can cure any potential of prejudice by properly instructing the jury that it must consider the case against each defendant separately. See id. at 540-41, 113 S. Ct. at 939.

Since the defendant has not adequately addressed the issue of her defense being antagonistic and mutually exclusive to her co-conspirator's defense there is no showing of prejudice by the defense and no basis, therefore, to mandate a separate trial.

IV. JUDICIAL ECONOMY REQUIRES A JOINT TRIAL.

Separate trials will be financially costly to all involved. Moreover, almost all of the very same witnesses who would testify in a trial involving Defendant Cabrera would also be called by the State in a case involving Defendant Gonzales. Multiple trials are only required when a defendant can show substantial prejudice. Defendant has failed to meet her burden in this case. Accordingly, defendant's motion to sever should be denied.

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1	CONCLUSION	
2	Based on the forgoing arguments, the State, therefore, requests that this Honorable	
3	Court deny the defense Motion for Severance.	
4	DATED this 25th day of September, 2012.	
5	Respectfully submitted,	
6	STEVEN B. WOLFSON	
7	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565	
8		
9	BY /s/MICHAEL STAUDAHER	
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16	CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION	
17	I hereby certify that service of State's Opposition to Defendant Cabrera's Motion To	
18	Sever was made this25th day of September, 2012, by facsimile transmission to:	
19	BRET WHIPPLE, ESQ. FAX#: 974-4008	
20	FAX#: 9/4-4008	
21	BY: /s/S. Munoz	
22	Employee of the District Attorney's Office	
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28	12FN0864A/MVS/sam-MVU	

FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT

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1	DISTRICT COURT		
2	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA KRISTEN BROWN, DEPUTY		
3	THO TELEBRIO VIIV, DEPUTY		
4	COPY		
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6	THE STATE OF NEVADA,		
7	Plaintiff,) Case No: C-12-283700-2		
8	vs.) Dept No: XXV		
9	JOSE ALEJANDRO GONZALES,)		
10	Defendant.)		
11	j		
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14	BEFORE THE HONORABLE KATHLEEN DELANEY		
15	OCTOBER 01, 2012, 9:00 A.M.		
16	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT		
17	OF PROCEEDINGS		
18			
19	APPEARANCES:		
20			
21	(See separate page)		
22	rt.		
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25	REPORTED BY: BRENDA SCHROEDER, CCR NO. 867		
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LAS VEGAS, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 01, 2012

PROCEEDINGS

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THE COURT: State of Nevada versus Ivonne Cabrera, and then we also have Gonzales as a separate matter on the calendar having to do with a motion for records.

MR. WHIPPLE: Good morning, Your Honor. THE COURT: And seeing Ms. Cabrera present in custody. This matter is on for Defendant's Motion to Sever. And we did anticipate this forthcoming when we had prior hearing on this matter. We have seen the subsequent filings from the State's office in terms of their intention on how they intend to proceed.

I obviously have the motion, the opposition and have reviewed all of the arguments. But, of course, this is important argument to be made today, so if you have anything you want to further add or flush out for the record, I am happy to hear it.

MR. WHIPPLE: I would, Your Honor. I'd appreciate it, Your Honor. First, I would like to introduce Ms. Erickson. She has also been appointed to this case because of the capital status, so the two of us will be going forward at this time.

MR. STAUDAHER: Your Honor, I am going to object to the nature of him introducing polygraph information. This was done by his own polygraph person with selected questions. If he wishes to subject his client to a Metro polygraph, we can talk about it. But I would ask that that not by introduced at this level.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Whipple, I think Mr. Staudaher's point is well taken. I see what you are saying. And why don't we, just for the purposes of the State's argument, take at face value that you have pulled together some information that you think is relevant or loosely relevant as to what was going on with Ms. Cabrera at the time. But for purposes of today, I don't know that we need to go into the details of the polygraph. It's probably best that we don't.

MR. WHIPPLE: That's fine, Your Honor. Obviously, for evidentiary purposes at trial there is a whole criteria with regard to matters coming before the court. My understanding is it is certainly free to argue.

THE COURT: I am not sure that that kind of substance is perhaps something that at the tail end of the argument if we needed it to be flushed out or if I had a question that might be valuable.

But what I am really looking for you to advise

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. WHIPPLE: Your Honor, I am going to try to be pretty quick. This past April 26th, Mr. Gonzales killed two people. The factual issue in this case is whether Ms. Cabrera intended to be part of that killing. It is uncontested that she was present. It is uncontested that they both returned in the same car. The factual issue is why she did that.

The State is taking the position that she did it at her own free will. They suggested that she actually participated and that she chose to be with people like Mr. Gonzales.

Your Honor, we are going to provide evidence that is 180 degrees contrary to that. The evidence that they have is simply what they refer to as circumstantial evidence. They have the two individuals that were in the room that heard my client's voice say something about get up, or can you open the door. That is the extent of the evidence that I am aware of that they have.

Whether she was actively involved or not is clearly something that only she knows what her personal state of mind is with that issue. We have a polygraph examination that she took specifically to those issues.

If I could just very briefly, she was asked, Before you got to that apartment --

me on and get to the point of how these defendants are so mutually antagonistic that they cannot simply be held together. And other aspects, obviously, of what we would need to consider of whether or not severance would be appropriate because it's not automatically mutual.

MR, WHJPPLE: Sure. I understand, Your Honor.

Your Honor, it's mutually antagonistic because my client was present. Not just present because she was forced to be present but she observed the entire shooting. She is going to be able to point a finger at Mr. Gonzales and explain to you exactly how he painstakingly killed two people and wounded two other individuals. She was there. There is no question about that.

She will point the finger at him and say, He's the one who did it. I saw him go into the room. I heard the shooting. He came back; he told me he did it. He called his mother on the phone; asked her to pray for him. And she was firsthand present there. It couldn't be more mutually antagonistic in my opinion.

Now the other issue is what other injurious evidence would come in. The fact of the matter is she is going to testify that the reason she was forced to go along or the reason she went with him is because she was scared of him, because she knew of his character. She

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1 knew of his prison record. She knew the gangs that he

was involved with. She was afraid of him. She heard of

3 the violence he had been involved with. There's a reason

4 she told the officers after this that she was scared.

5 Because she was scared. She was scared of this

6 individual. She was forced to go along at his request,

7 his demand. And the reason she did that is because she

8 knew of his history. She knew that she could be beaten

9 up and she could be the next victim if she didn't do

exactly what she was told to do.

So in order for us to come in and present defense, we are going to bring in all kinds of character evidence, all kinds of prior bad acts that normally would not be brought in. So this is mutually antagonistic. We are going to bring in all types of evidence that otherwise would not normally be brought up. And we have a right to do that because that was why she was there.

It goes to the very heart of what was in her state of mind. The one factual issue in this case: What was she thinking and why did she do it. And she is going to take the stand and she is going to tell you that she did it because she's afraid of Mr. Gonzales.

MS. ERICKSON: And, Judge, with regard to the case law with regard to severance, State always argues that mutually antagonistic offenses is that it is really

incorrect in that there is only circumstantial evidence
 involved in this case that shows Ms. Cabrera's
 involvement, her acquiescence, acknowledgment and

4 participation in this crime.

I mean she was the one to have the beef, if there was one between the victim or victims, in this case. And there were four ultimate victims. Two which end up dead and two which end up being shot multiple times in the chest and body when they were basically at their weakest.

That's the ultimate end to the victims in this case; however, the issue, the dispute arose between Ms. Cabrera and these victims over a car that the victims had loaned them. Mr. Gonzales is not directly involved in this. They know who he is but they don't know -- they don't have any specific relationship with him. The only way he comes into the picture is through her.

So initially whether she is using him as a weapon or for enforcement or to get back at some slight, she is actively using him. I mean that's part of the evidence.

Now take it beyond that and we go to the event that occurred that night. When it happens that night she is far from having a gun held to her head. As a matter of fact there is evidence that the victims who were still

hard for us to show. But it's not. If you look at the Chartier case, they cite the Marshall case and discuss the fact that in that case the codefendant took the stand and testified exculpatory to himself and inculpatory to the codefendant. The Nevada Supreme Court in Chartier recognized that in Marshall that was mutually antagonistic.

The only reason they didn't find severance was required was because the State didn't use any of that evidence against the defendants. They said that they were significant enough evidence apart from the testimony of the defendant to convict the defendant.

And in this case I don't think that's the same. And the 9th Circuit has also found the same thing in the Toothlittle case. They said, basically, when one person is asserting that they are innocent and the other person is guilty that is enough for antagonistic defenses.

It is not this superstructure high level of evidence that the State always wants to argue. And this case law is very clear on that and I just wanted to point that out for the Court.

THE COURT: I appreciate that and I have looked at length at Chartier and Marshall and the others.

Mr. Staudaher.

MR, STAUDAHER: Yes, Your Honor. Counsel is

living saw Ms. Cabrera and heard Ms. Cabrera and saw how she participated, and there was no indication that there was a gun held to her head or she was forced into a room, she was actively asked to participate in any way.

Counsel mentions that she flees and that Mr. Gonzales runs to her and tells her what he did. That's not what the evidence is going to show. The direct evidence from the victims in this case is that she was present at both doorways.

The Court has to realize the way that this house is set up there are two bedrooms with locked doors and behind those bedroom doors are two individual couples. Two in each bedroom. And they are the ones that get shot in two different rooms. She's present after shooting one. She's present after shooting two. They both then flee together.

Upon entering, he enters through a bathroom window with a crowbar, breaks into the bathroom window and then comes and lets her in. Far from her being held at gunpoint at anytime. And even if that was the case there is no defense of duress to murder that you are then essentially forced to help kill someone and that is not an issue.

All of the evidence even if you exclude completely her statements in this case it's going to be

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not only cross-admissible between the two of them but
virtually all of it will come in for both trials. That
is one of the key things related to the Chartier and the
Marshall decisions that were made is the fact that you
have someone who was not participating, not present who
this evidence is coming forth to convict and that's why
severance was maybe important there; however, that is not
the case here.

She's actively participating in the crime from the get go. Her involvement relates to the dispute initially with these individuals bringing Mr. Gonzales in. And then when they are at the scene, when they are at the house that night she is every bit a participant. She is the one who was at the door of the bedrooms after they had broke into the apartment.

And with her own statement, not implicating him in the sense, but she knew that he had a gun. So according to counsel she is in fear of her life because she knows of his history. She knows what he is capable of. She knows what he will do and that he has a gun and breaking into a home that night to confront individuals in their bedrooms while they are sleeping there is no question that she at least should have known what was about to go down or could have gone down.

The fact that afterward she's not injured in any

standpoint that would warrant the cases being handledseparately. Do you want to address that.

MR. STAUDAHER: Well, since we have filed notice of intent to seek death on both defendants that wasn't the situation the last time we were here. I don't know if that is what they intend to continue for and proceed on at this point.

I think that that would be potentially problematic in the sense that there are two attorneys now that have been appointed to represent Ms. Cabrera in a capital case with an invoke for 60 days -- I tried a case this year where that same thing happened. Ultimately, we tried the case within about I think six months. It's completely up to them. They don't get to gain the system to get a de facto severance so that we can go forward.

The Court can set for, you know, the Court's reasons, for judicial reasons to set the trial out to a reasonable time with the idea that the defendant wishes to have his trial in a speedy manner. But counsel has already indicated that there is information that they are going to be looking into the bad acts stuff, things that they are going to be bringing in. Whether or not they can be ready in this window of 60 days is another matter.

I would submit to the Court that if they are ready to go forward that we have to go forward. But if

way. She didn't have to suffer any battery or any shooting herself to get away from Mr. Gonzales. They separate. Mr. Gonzales flees to Mexico. He is eventually caught reentering the country.

But Ms. Cabrera she's the one who actually goes home, gathers her clothes and is taking off. She doesn't call the police. She doesn't call 911. She doesn't do any of those things.

All of the evidence points to her being not only an active participant but every bit as important of a participant as Mr. Gonzales based on the fact that that is the case that she actively participated in all aspects of the crime, was present during the commission of the crime and participated at that level, I don't think shows that Chartier is even applicable here.

So as far as that's concerned, Your Honor, we believe that the evidence shows that there is both direct and circumstantial evidence that ties both defendants to the crime and that they should be tried together.

THE COURT: One thing that wasn't mentioned in the motion necessarily but did come up the last time we were court, and I will ask you, Mr. Staudaher, to address it and then I will ask counsel for the last word, is this idea that one of the defendants has invoked and the other has not and that there might be some basis from that

in fact they are not that is not a reason to sever.

Essentially, in the State's opinion in a capital case forcing a trial within 60 days knowing what they have to go through for both mitigation and so forth is probably not a responsible way to proceed. But of course that is their decision.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Anything you want to add, obviously, final
rebuttal then, Mr. Whipple.
MR, WHIPPLE: Yes. With the Court's per

MR. WHIPPLE: Yes. With the Court's permission, can both Ms. Erickson and I speak to the issue?

THE COURT: You may.

MR. WHIPPLE: I appreciate it.

Again, I just want to speak to the factual issue and that is the issue of she actively participated. We believe that everything that they suggest will show 180 degrees the opposite. In other words, the reason she was there is because she wasn't afraid. She didn't know any shooting was going to happen and she was told to come along. And at the conclusion she was held against her will, you're going to hear testimony, in the apartment for over ten hours.

So everything that they can suggest one way we can show the other. So it really comes down to what was she thinking and that is why it's so important that she

1 is going to take the stand and explain to you and give2 all this information.

 Now with regard to character evidence, we do not have to do any investigation. We don't even know if it's true or not. It really doesn't matter. What's factual is that she believed it was true and she believed these things were true and that is why she was afraid and that's why she was scared and that's why she went along.

We are going to bring in the fact that he was in prison. That she was told by his sister that he was in a gang. All this information that we have a right to produce to show why she did what she did. So that there is the issue.

With regard to our desire to have a speedy trial, Ms. Cabrera spoke to me at the very beginning and she wanted to get to trial as quickly as possible because she did not do anything wrong. We continued the preliminary hearing the first time so that we could when the time of arraignment comes invoke the right to a speedy trial. I have hired Dr. Consort, that was the last thing that I had to do to find an expert for mitigation purposes that could work with us within the 60-day window. We are ready to go. We are planning to go, and we are going, Your Honor.

MS. ERICKSON: And, Judge, just with regard to

I don't know if they have been informed of the motion but every time I have been in this situation where we become the second prosecutor, which is basically what we will be doing, saying the codefendant did everything, we didn't do anything. There was nothing we could do about it.

They have joined in the motion for severance recognizing that they are in a situation where it is much worse for them because evidence is going to be coming in against them that they don't want and we can't be precluded in a capital case from putting forth our defense just because this is a codefendant who is objecting to it.

MR. WHIPPLE: Your Honor, I will be very brief. And that is I'm kind of going full circle where I started. It comes down to her state of mind. We put her on direct examination and I have the information that we believe is viable and important to this court of her before trial. This is certainly something that this court can take into consideration. I will be more than happy to provide it to you.

THE COURT: Thank you. I appreciate the additional argument here today and I have had the opportunity to read the motion and the opposition and to review the cases, and it is my determination at this time

the facts, you will see that in the setup of the
apartment the two rooms that were broken into were across
the hall from each other. The statements of the victims
do not say that they saw Ms. Cabrera doing anything.
They say they saw her in the hallway. She did not enter
either room. And it is very unclear as to whether she
knocked on one door and both sets heard it or whether she
knocked on both doors. There is no evidence, at least as
far as I know, that he went in through a broken window.

There is only evidence that she was there.

And then her statement is taken by a North Las Vegas police detective, who doesn't really want to hear about why she was doing this and what she thought at the time. He cuts her off and he verbally says, you know, that's not true. You can't do this. And we go from there. So the statement itself is not that indicative of what was going on in her mind because the police officer was acting in the matter that he did.

So I think, as Mr. Whipple said, there are very different factual scenarios going on from the State and from the defendant. But the thing that is really important the evidence that we are going to admit is not admissible against a codefendant. They are going to be objecting vociferously that that cannot come in front of their jury.

to deny the motion for severance. I do not believe from what has been argued -- I think that there are not necessarily different factual scenarios. I think there

4 is different interpretations, obviously, of what the

5 evidence will show us. But I do not see mutually and6 antagonistic defenses of the level that would be

antagonistic defenses of the level that would berequired.

I do not disagree, by the way, Counsel, Chartier is not some hurdle to overcome and that it is so high that it is hardly ever overcome, I just don't see it as applicable in this case. I think closest that you potentially come is with the second prong in the idea that perhaps there would be some comprise to the ability to put on your defense.

But as Mr. Whipple himself argued, it's what was potentially in the state of mind of Ms. Cabrera not necessarily the factual existence of these things, which then would be potentially difficult if and when they are going to come in.

I think as Mr. Staudaher pointed out that basically there is going to be a lot of evidence potentially argued to come in on both defendants. But what I don't see here, it is honestly not even that close a call for me, when I really boil down what the arguments are and what we see here, it's just because we have a

couple of defendants who one might be pointing the finger at the other and/or one seeking to defend based on the behavior of the other. That is enough here in this case 3 to warrant severance.

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The last issue that we however talked about was the right to speedy trial to be invoked. We do have some case law that gives us guidance on this point and as long as the non-invoking party is not unreasonably requesting continuances that work to the prejudice against the defendant, the fact that one has invoked and one has not alone is not enough to sever.

And I think it is possible to set this trial within a reasonable time frame to meet the needs of everybody and the Court does have the discretion to make those decisions. And I think ultimately that alone also is not a basis to sever even in the totality of the circumstances.

I don't see that Chartier, Marshall or the facts of this case warrants severance at this time. I am going to deny the motion based on those reasons and I will ask Mr. Staudaher to please prepare the order and run it by defense counsel so we have that order for our record.

And do address as well the speedy trial issue that was raised here today even though, again, it was not necessarily specifically highlighted in the motion or the

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point, and in fact we might need a status check to look 2 at that.

3 MR. STAUDAHER: Your Honor, I believe we have a status check date set for the 10th. 4

THE COURT: I thought we had one coming up.

6 MR. STAUDAHER: And it is for that issue.

7 THE COURT: I don't think that is realistic in 8 these circumstances to consider that that November date 9 will be our date. But I think when we have that status 10 check coming up it is one of the things that we will look 11 at at that time.

MR. WHIPPLE: Your Honor, we set the status check before Ms. Erickson was on board. She just whispered to me that she is not available on the 10th.

THE COURT: We can reset it.

MS, ERICKSON: Just one week. I am out of the jurisdiction that week.

THE COURT: That's fine. Let's go out one week from the date that we had originally set the status check for trial setting and other matters at that time.

THE CLERK: It will be October 17th for the status check.

23 MS. ERICKSON: That's fine.

24 MR. WHIPPLE: That's fine.

25 THE COURT: The other matter that was on

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opposition, because we had addressed it the last time we were here and because I wanted to have argument on it today I did not want that included in the order.

MR. WHIPPLE: All right.

With regard to the speedy trial issue, Your Honor, I'm just curious, in the order itself just the fact that it was raised and discussed.

THE COURT: Just the fact that the Court believes that it would have the discretion to set the trial in an appropriate time frame, it may not necessarily be 60 days but would be a reasonable time frame set. And, again, as long as the defense is not the non-invoking defense -- sorry -- the party is not requesting continuances that might prejudice the codefendant that we have the ability to do things in the appropriate course of action. We still equate in these circumstances in this type of case what would equate to a speedy trial, but not necessarily, again, the 60 days.

The Court does intend to as we proceed to structure this case appropriately in a speedy way but does not believe it warrants severance for that reason alone.

> MR. WHIPPLE: We understand, Your Honor. So at this point the trial date --THE COURT: We haven't really set a date at this

calendar related to this case was the Defendant's Motion 2 for Juvenile Records that Mr. Gonzales filed. 3

MR. WHIPPLE: I assumed that was for their own client's juvenile records.

5 MR. PATRICK: Yes.

6 THE COURT: Correct, Yes. For Mr. Gonzales' 7 own records. And he doesn't seem to be aware that it has 8 been requested; however, it has been requested. It was 9 included with the Brady motion and then juvenile criminal 10 history records, any guardianship proceedings and 11 otherwise. And I have not seen any opposition,

MR. STAUDAHER: There was no opposition.

13 THE COURT: Okay. So I will go ahead and grant 14 that motion with the understanding that Brady motions are early days but the State knows their obligations and then these juvenile records will enable those to be provided.

MR. WHIPPLE: Thank you, Your Honor.

MS. ERICKSON: Thank you, Judge.

19 MR. STAUDAHER: So, Your Honor, do I have to appear for that June motion. I assume that was going to 20 be the day as well. 21

THE COURT: Yes. You mean to return to --MR. STAUDAHER: Yes.

24 THE COURT: I have your non-opposition on the record so we will not require that.

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MR. STAUDAHER: Okay. Thank you.
             THE COURT: I don't know where the Special
     Public Defender is but when they are here we will call it
     again.
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             MR. STAUDAHER: All right. Thank you, Your
     Honor.
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             (End of proceedings.)
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                      REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
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             I, BRENDA SCHROEDER, a certified court reporter
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     in and for the State of Nevada, do hereby certify that
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     the foregoing and attached pages 1-28, inclusive,
 9
    comprise a true, and accurate transcript of the
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    proceedings reported by me in the matter of THE STATE OF
    NEVADA, Plaintiff, versus JOSE GONZALES, Defendant, Case
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    No. C-12-283700-2, on October 1, 2012.
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     Dated this 23rd day of July, 2013.
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