1	IN THE SUPREME C	OURT O	F THE STATI	E OF NEVADA
2				-
3	KEANDRE VALENTINE,)	No. 74468	
4 5	Appellant,)))		Electronically Filed Aug 08 2018 03:06 p.m. Elizabeth A. Brown
6	v.)		Clerk of Supreme Court
7	THE STATE OF NEVADA,)))		
8	Respondent.)		
9	APPELLANT'S APPEN) JDIX VO	I IIMF YIII P	A CFS 2770-2989
10	ATTELLANT SATTEN	IDIA VO	LUNIE AIII I	AGES 2110-2707
11	PHILIP J. KOHN		STEVE WOL	FSON
12 13	Clark County Public Defender 309 South Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2610		200 Lewis Av Las Vegas, N	District Attorney venue, 3 rd Floor evada 89155
14	Attorney for Appellant		ADAM LAX	ALT
15			Attorney Gen 100 North Ca	eral rson Street
16			Carson City, 1 (702) 687-353	Nevada 89701-4717 38
17			Counsel for R	espondent
18				
19				
20				
21				
22				
23				
24				
25				
26				
27				
28				

INDEX KEANDRE VALENTINE Case No. 74468

2	Case No. 74468	PAGE NO
3	Amended Jury List filed 07/28/17	657
4	Amended Notice of Department Reassignment filed 09/20/17	825-826
5	Court's Exhibit 1 dated 07/24/17	
6	Court's Exhibit 2 dated 07/24/17	3081
7	Court's Exhibit 3	3082
8	Court's Exhibit 4	3083
9	Court's Exhibit 5	3084
10	Court's Exhibit 6 dated 07/31/17	3085
11	Court's Exhibit 7 dated 07/31/17	3086
12	Court's Exhibit 8 dated 07/31/17	3087
13	Court's Exhibit 9 dated 07/31/17	3088-3091
14	Court's Exhibit 10 dated 07/31/17	3092-3093
15	Court's Exhibit 11 dated 07/31/17	3094-3103
16	Court's Exhibit 12 dated 07/31/17	3104-3107
17	Court's Exhibit 13	3108
18	Court's Exhibit 14 dated 08/01/17	3109
19	Court's Exhibit 15 dated 08/01/17	3110
20	Court's Exhibit 16 dated 08/01/17	3111
21	Court's Exhibit 17 dated 08/01/17	3112
22	Court's Exhibit 18 dated 08/01/17	3113-3114
23	Court's Exhibit 19 dated 08/01/17	3115
24	Court's Exhibit 20 dated 08/01/17	3116
25	Court's Exhibit 21 dated 08/01/17	3118-3122
26	Court's Exhibit 22 dated 08/02/17	3123-3125
27	Court's Exhibit 23 dated 08/02/17	3117
28	Court's Exhibit 24	3126-3131

1	Court's Exhibit 25 dated 08/03/17	3132-3138
2	Court's Exhibit 26 dated 08/03/17	3139
3	Court's Exhibit 27 dated 08/03/17	3140
4	Court's Exhibit 28 dated 08/04/17	3141-3142
5	Court's Exhibit 29 dated 08/04/17	3159-3229
6	Defendant's Exhibit A dated 07/27/17	3232-3233
7	Defendant's Exhibit A dated 07/27/17	
8	Defendant's Exhibit B dated 07/27/17	3143-3144
9	Defendant's Exhibit C dated 07/27/17	3145-3146
10	Defendant's Exhibit D dated 07/27/17	3147-3148
11	Defendant's Exhibit F dated 07/31/17	3149-3150
12	Defendant's Exhibit G dated 07/31/17	3151-3152
13	Defendant's Exhibit H dated 07/31/17	3153-3154
14	Defendant's Exhibit I dated 07/31/17	3155-3156
15	Defendant's Exhibit J dated 07/31/17	3157-3158
16	Defendant's Motion to Reconstruct the Record Date of Hrg: 07/02/18	3253-3310
17	Defendant's Notice of Alibi Witness filed 07/14/17	518-625
18	Defendant's Notice of Expert Witnesses filed 06/30/17	265-293
19 20	Defendant's Notice of Non-Opposition to State's Motion to Compel Reciprocal Discovery filed 07/17/17	641-642
21	Defendant's Notice of Witnesses filed 07/13/17	516-517
22	District Court Minutes dated 07/02/18	3252
23	District Court Minutes from 06/29/16 through 09/28/17	841-881
24	Ex Parte Motion and Order for Release of Evidence filed 12/01/17	837-838
25	Ex Parte Motion and Order for Release of Evidence filed 12/08/17	839-840
26	Judgment of Conviction filed 10/16/17	827-831
27	Jury List filed 07/25/17	656
28	Indictment filed 06/29/16	1-6

1	Indictment Warrant Return filed 06/30/16	7-8
2	Instructions to the Jury filed 08/04/17	770-818
3 4	Media Request and Order for Camera Access to Court Proceedings filed 07/11/16 Motion for Production of Discovery Date of Hrg: 09/01/16	
5	Notice of Appeal filed 11/06/17	832-836
6	Notice of Court Exhibits Added to the Trial Record filed 07/10/18	
7	Notice of Department Reassignment filed 09/19/17	823-824
8	Notice of Intent to Seek Punishment as a Habitual Criminal filed 01/27/17	251-252
9 10	Notice of Motion and Motion Outlining State's Discovery Compliance Date of Hrg: 02/21/17	253-261
11	Notice of Motion and Motion to Compel Reciprocal Discovery Procedural History Date of Hrg: 08/03/17	635-640
12 13	Notice of Motion and Motion to Exclude Eyewitness Expert Testimony Date of Hrg: 07/20/17	294-331
14 15	Notice of Motion and Motion to Strike Alibi Notice Date of Hrg: 08/03/17 Notice of Motion and Motion to Strike Defendant's	643-647
16 17	Supplemental Notice of Expert Witnesses Date of Hrg: 08/03/17	626-630
18	Notice of Rebuttal Alibi Witness filed 07/24/17	654-655
19	Notice of Witnesses and/or Expert Witnesses filed 07/28/16	116-119
20	Opposition to State's Motion to Exclude Eye-Witness Expert Testimony filed 07/19/17	332-515
21	Opposition to State's Motion to Strike Alibi Notice filed 07/18/17	648-653
22 23	Opposition to State's Motion to Strike Defendant's Supplemental Notice of Expert Witnesses Date of Hrg: 07/20/17	631-634
24	Order filed 07/25/18	
25	Proposed Exhibit K	
26	Proposed Exhibit L	
27	Proposed Exhibit U	
28	Receipt of Copy: List of Discovery Items	

1	Provided to Defense filed 06/06/17	262-264
2	Second Amended Jury List filed 08/03/17	769
3 4	Second Supplemental Notice of Witnesses and/or Expert Witnesses filed 09/20/16	237-242
•	State's Exhibit 13 dated 07/26/17	3230-3231
5	State's Exhibit 33 dated 07/26/17	3232-3233
6	State's Exhibit 48 dated 07/26/17	3343-3344
7	State's Exhibit 52 dated 07/26/17	3000-3001
8 9	State's Exhibit 52 dated 07/26/17	3234-3235
	State's Exhibit 54 dated 07/26/17	2990-2991
10	State's Exhibit 57 dated 07/26/17	3236-3237
11	State's Exhibit 171 dated 07/26/17	3002-3014
12	State's Exhibit 172 dated 07/26/17	3015-3026
13	State's Exhibit 175 dated 07/22/17	3027-3037
14	State's Exhibit 182 dated 07/28/17	3038-3047
15	State's Exhibit 183 dated 07/31/17	3335-3336
16 17	State's Exhibit 184 dated 07/31/17	3337-3339
	State's Exhibit 185 dated 07/31/17	3340-3342
18	State's Exhibit 186 dated 07/31/17	3048-3049
19 20	State's Exhibit 187 dated 07/31/17	3050-3051
	State's Exhibit 188 dated 07/31/17	3238-3239
21	State's Exhibit 192 dated 08/01/17	3240-3242
22	State's Exhibit 193 dated 07/31/17	3055-3057
23	State's Exhibit 194 dated 07/31/17	3052-3054
24	State's Exhibit 195 dated 07/31/17	3058-3063
25	State's Exhibit 196 dated 08/02/17	3242-3243
26	State's Exhibit 197 dated 08/02/17	2992-2993
27 28	State's Exhibit 198 dated 08/02/17	2994-2995
/X		

1	State's Exhibit 199 dated 08/02/17
2	State's Exhibit 200 dated 08/02/17
3	State's Motion in Limine to limit Testimony of Dr. Steven Smith Date of Hrg: 07/31/17
5	State's Response to Defendant's Motion for Production of Discovery Date of Hrg: 09/01/16
6	Supplemental Notice of Witnesses and/or Expert Witnesses filed 08/12/16
7 8	Third Supplemental Notice of Witnesses and/or Expert Witnesses filed 01/26/17
9	Verdict filed 08/04/17
10	
11	<u>TRANSCRIPTS</u>
12	Recorder's Transcript JURY TRIAL DAY 1
13	Date of Hrg: 07/24/17
14	Recorder's Transcript JURY TRIAL DAY 2 Date of Hrg: 07/25/17
15	Recorder's Transcript
16	JURY TRIAL DAY 3 Date of Hrg: 07/26/17
17 18	Recorder's Transcript JURY TRIAL DAY 4
19	Date of Hrg: 07/27/17
20	JURY TRIAL DAY 5 Date of Hrg: 07/28/17
21	Recorder's Transcript
22	JURY TRIAL DAÝ 6 Date of Hrg: 07/31/17
23	Recorder's Transcript JURY TRIAL DAY 7
24	Date of Hrg: 08/01/17
25	Recorder's Transcript JURY TRIAL DAY 8
26	Date of Hrg: 08/02/17
27	Recorder's Transcript JURY TRIAL DAY 9
28	Date of Hrg: 08/03/17

1 2	Recorder's Transcript JURY TRIAL DAY 10 Date of Hrg: 08/04/17
3	Recorder's Transcript
4	Calendar Call Date of Hrg: 02/16/17
5	Recorder's Transcript Calendar Call and Defendant's Motion for Production of Discovery
6	Date of Hrg: 09/01/16
7 8	Recorder's Transcript Defendant's Motion for Setting of Reasonable Bail Date of Hrg: 10/04/16
9	Recorder's Transcript
10	Defendant's Request Re: Stipulated Status Check-Trial Setting Date of Hrg: 06/06/17904-911
11	Recorder's Transcript
12	Grand Jury Return Date of Hrg: 06/29/16
13	Recorder's Transcript Initial Arraignment and Indictment Warrant Return
14	Initial Arraignment and Indictment Warrant Return Date of Hrg: 07/07/16
15	Recorder's Transcript Motion Outlining State's Discovery Compliance and Status Check: Trial Setting
16	Date of Hrg: 02/21/17
17	Recorder's Transcript Sentencing
18	Date of Hrg: 09/28/17
19	Recorder's Transcript State's Motion to Exclude Eyewitness Expert Testimony and Calendar Call
20	Date of Hrg: 07/20/17912-921
21	Recorder's Transcript State's Motion to Exclude Eyewitness Expert Testimony,
22	State's Motion to Strike Alibi Notice, and State's Motion to Strike Defendant's Supplemental Notice of Expert Witnesses
23	Date of Hrg: 07/24/17929-936
24	Recorder's Transcript State's Motion to Exclude Eyewitness Expert Testimony;
25	State's Motion to Strike Alibi Notice and State's Motion to Strike Defendant's Supplemental Notice of Expert Witnesses; Overflow
26	Date of Hrg: 07/21/17922-928
27	Reporter's Transcript Grand Jury
28	Date of Hrg: 06/28/16

MR. GASTON: I don't know whether they --

THE COURT: -- at this precise point in time.

MR. GASTON: I don't know whether they intentionally did it or not.

THE COURT: That they wouldn't have to let you know about it, but they still had it in time to use it for their rebuttal.

MR. GASTON: I don't know whether they intentionally did it or not, and I don't really get how we can ever figure it out. She's going to say she didn't do the search until recently. I believe she didn't do the search until recently.

Whether she planned on waiting until trial to do that, whether she did it before, no one really knows, except Ms. Lexis. And I don't think that's the proper venue for the court, because nobody really knows the answer.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GASTON: But the fact is, there's also an additional requirement on why the State has to do due diligence before. Not getting to the discovery statute yet. There's also another case in Nevada, and I don't have the citation, because I obviously haven't had the opportunity to do the research, but I believe that there was another case in Nevada that talks about how if evidence -- that they used in rebuttal, if that evidence could have been and should have been used in its case in chief, it must have been.

And I would argue, assuming I'm not just making up this case, that if that principle of law really exists, then that directly applies here, because --

THE COURT: Probably a case I need to see, right?

MR. GASTON: And I can give it -- obviously, I can give it to the court -- if -- if it exists, I'll find it and I'll send it to the court. I don't think I'm making up law here.

The position would be that this is evidence that could have been -and -- and Ms. Machnich is on Westlaw, she's trying to find it as we speak.

MS. MACHNICH: I'm trying. But --

MR. GASTON: But with respect to the State's position, they could have done this lead search anytime in the last 14 to 16 months.

THE COURT: Right. You already said that point and since you're going circular now, I'm getting close to cutting you off.

MR. GASTON: I'm sorry. But this is the point I'm trying to make. The evident -- the fact is the evidence -- if they had exercised due diligence, this is evidence that could have been done prior to -- it could have used in their case in chief.

Just because they didn't do the lead search until after the case in chief had already started or we had started our case in chief, doesn't somehow mean that evidence couldn't have been used in their case in chief, because they could have done the lead search earlier, anytime earlier, and used it in their case in chief.

And then as a -- as the second prong of the rule of law that I cited should have been used in their case in chief, if they had this evidence before, it should have been used in their case in chief. They can't sand -- the -- the whole point of that case is to prevent exactly what happened here -- sandbagging -intentional, unintentional, whatever. The effect is sandbagging a critical piece of evidence.

Then I segue into the argument I made earlier -- I'll just use it by reference -- you know, not -- not go into detail again, just make sure I'm stating everything here, is I interpret the discovery statutes to impose a requirement that

the State must act -- must exercise due diligence in gathering materials, and they must disclose those materials to the State. If -- or to the defense.

If they had exercised due diligence, they would have had the information in advance of trial and been required to disclose it. They couldn't have then decided to use it in their rebuttal case and that violates the same principles of happiness, sunshine, fairness, and the Constitution that I earlier cited.

With respect to another -- another point, staying with the sandbagging case -- I believe that this is probably the same case that I was citing without the name, but I -- I recall another principle of law -- and I'll try to find the case name, where, again, talking about sandbagging -- it talks about how the State can't intentionally hold back evidence, let the -- let the defense put on a case or say stuff to the jury or whatever, and then bring in the evidence that causes the defense to lose all credibility to the jury, because then we look like incompetent buffoons. And they can't intentionally make us look like incompetent buffoons. They can maybe unintentionally do so, but they can't intentionally do so or negligently do so, which I argue is what they did here.

And then with respect to the hearsay argument that I was trying to flesh out earlier, and I -- I think this is my final point -- obviously, it is hearsay. They laid the business records exception. And so it was admitted.

But then we pivot to the confrontation clause. And I guess the confrontation clause applies to two people here. It for sure applies -- I mean, it certainly applies to the person who actually input this evidence into the card. This was the manager who was testifying about general business records with the pawnshop, et cetera. She is not the individual who specifically input -- that -- who

did this sale of items from Omara McBride and input the evidence in.

So we are not able to cross-examine the person who actually entered the hearsay, and inquire into the many things that we want to -- would have asked her, was she tired? Was she -- how long had she been working on a shift? Et cetera. And basically argue that she didn't do a very good job of checking ID against the person or any other area of cross-examination that we would have thought relevant.

The cross-examination has been cited forever as the pillar -- that sword of truth, et cetera, and the crucible of fire that leads out the truth. We weren't able to use that because we weren't have -- we were deprived -- we were deprived of our opportunity to confront the person actually making the out-of-court statement.

Just because they can lay business records -- records exception through a custodian of records, doesn't mean they can get around the confrontation clause requirement.

So at a minimum, they should have been required to bring in the person who actually input the data that is -- that contains the out-of-court statement.

The second confrontation clause issue would apply to Omara McBride herself, potentially, depending on how the out-of-court statement actually ended up going, because it seems like first level of hearsay is the actual document that got admitted into evidence. Second level of hearsay or the person inputting that hearsay is the person who actually wrote that information in. The third level of hearsay or the next level of hearsay would be Omara McBride, either through a driver's license, through her words, or both, representing to that person that she

is, in fact, Omara McBride.

That is another out-of-court statement which is hearsay, and, A, pivoting back to the hearsay requirement, that did not come in through any hearsay requirements. But even if we want to put that within the business record exception, we still have the second issue, which is confrontation clause. We were not able to confront Omara McBride about her -- because the State didn't call her. We were not able to confront Omara McBride regarding her actually inputting -- or actually going to this pawnshop to pawn these items. We can't ask --

THE COURT: There's no statement of Omara McBride that was introduced in this trial, so the confrontation clause --

MR. GASTON: My -- my position is --

THE COURT: -- is not implicated with respect to her.

MR. GASTON: My position is the statements that -- that was Introduced is, in fact, stemming from Omara McBride because Omara McBride is the person who represented herself to be Omara McBride through her driver's license and her actual statement in the pawnshop of being Omara McBride.

So there is an out-of-court statement stemming from Omara McBride.

If we take this evidence at face value, the person pawning the item is representing themselves to be Omara McBride. How else would the pawnshop person know to input that information unless they receive it from the person actually making the pawn -- making the sale. Right? So that's that second level of hearsay. So Omara McBride did make an out-of-court statement.

Either the person who pawned this is not Omara McBride or she is and Omara McBride made the out-of-court statement that she is Omara McBride, which is exactly the evidence that's being introduced as the truth of the matter

4

5

6 7

8

9

10

11 12

13

14

15 16

17

18

19 20

21

22

23

24

25

asserted.

The evidence on the pawnshop ticket being introduced to show that the person actually saying -- or pawning the item is Omara McBride. So there's -- there's two levels of hearsay there -- two or three levels of hearsay there depending how you look at it. And so there's two aspects of confrontation clause.

THE COURT: All right. What about the fact that it's a nontestimonial statement by Omara McBride?

MR. GASTON: Well, I guess is it a nontestimonial statement?

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GASTON: I don't think that's a fact that we're talking --

THE COURT: Yeah. Was it -- yeah. Going to the pawn shop and saying I am who I say is not -- is not a testimonial statement. It's not a deposition, not an affidavit. It's not investigation. It's not something that's being given for purposes of preserving testimony. I think -- what is it, *Crawford* -- would -- would suggest that --

MR. GASTON: I believe it would be Bryan --

THE COURT: -- that once you satisfy hearsay and -- and then you establish that it's not testimonial, I don't think you have a Sixth Amendment confrontation clause issue here.

MR. GASTON: That would be correct. If -- if that were correct.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GASTON: Or, I -- I mean the -- the analysis of law is correct.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GASTON: I don't believe it applies here though, because I believe they would be testimonial, and that was the second point I was pivoting to.

	1
	2
	3
	4
	5
	6
	7
	8
	9
1	0
1	1
1	2
1	3
1	4
1	5
1	6
1	7
1	8
1	9
2	0
2	1
2	2
2	3
2	4

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GASTON: The -- I'm sorry. I'm just trying to make my full record.

THE COURT: That's the one that's been in my mind for the last --

MR. GASTON: Right. The testimonial aspect of it.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GASTON: Because I do think it is testimonial.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GASTON: Stuff you put in a deposition isn't just testimonial. It is a record that she is giving them. She has to sign her name. She has to show her ID. She has to give information to the pawnshop. She sees them recording it. She knows this is literally being recorded for later use. That is in essence testimonial. That is not a conversation for an -- an investigation. That is not casual conversation. That is not chatting among a friend. That is giving information for the official purpose of having it recorded and being used later for multiple purposes.

I believe that evidence is testimonial.

And what's certainly testimonial is the evidence of the second hearsay person, the person actually inputting the information into the pawnshop ticket.

THE COURT: All right. I -- I've got to cut you off.

MR. GASTON: Can I respond to the court's earlier --

THE COURT: You have one more minute.

MR. GASTON: Yeah. The court earlier discussion made a point that since we have the opportunity to call witnesses ourselves, that there's no confrontation clause issue, because I could have called Omara McBride, I could have called the person who actually input this information.

And my position is I don't think that's how the confrontation clause works. If the State is the one introducing a statement, they must provide the accuser for us to cross-examine. We are not required to go out and try to find the person and procure their presence so that we have the opportunity to satisfy our own Constitutional right.

So to the point that the -- to the fact that the -- or to the extent that the court was relying on --

THE COURT: I agree. I agree with that point.

MR. GASTON: Okay. Well, that's it for me, then.

THE COURT: And -- I wasn't relying on it. I was just saying, well, why couldn't you go.

MR. GASTON: Make sure I didn't forget anything. I don't think I did.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GASTON: I'm just objecting to being unfair, as well, if I didn't say that.

THE COURT: Okay. That's good.

MS. LEXIS: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Do you want to respond to any of that?

MS. LEXIS: I won't to the ones that the court has already addressed.

I just would also like to make a clear record.

I find it ironic that Mr. Gaston is now arguing so vehemently against a business record coming in, when they got a valet ticket in and also California registration authenticated as a business record.

When we objected and indicated we could not cross-examine the actual person who inputted this information --

THE COURT: I let it all in.

MS. LEXIS: -- you let it all in, because it met the -- and -- and one of those business records actually had Omara McBride's information on it. Okay. So there was no objection.

The rules only apply when it's bad for them, you know.

MS. MACHNICH: Okay. That's inappropriate. That's absolutely inappropriate.

MS. LEXIS: And so --

THE COURT: Just let her make her argument. She's not disparaging you.

MS. LEXIS: So I think --

MS. MACHNICH: She -- she is. That -- that last statement was.

THE COURT: All right. I'll make -- I'll make that decision. Sit quietly, please.

Go ahead.

MS. LEXIS: And so I just -- the rules are, as the court has already indicated, this is business record. She is a custodian of records. There was no confrontation issue, if you even bought the argument that it's testimonial, which we are saying it absolutely is not, because it was not prepared or stated for the purpose of prosecution or an investigation.

I vehemently -- or I --

THE COURT: Would you hold back an investigation to -- for -- to orchestrate the timing of this?

MS. LEXIS: No. Not at all. I mean, I -- I find that actually rather offensive --

1	THE COURT: Well
2	MS. LEXIS: because as the court indicated earlier, the more
3	evidence the better. We have the burden. We have the absolute burden.
4	THE COURT: You have the burden.
5	MS. LEXIS: And should have should the detective done have
6	done this? Yes. But to the also to speak on the detective, maybe he did a
7	pawn maybe he did a pawn request for Keandre Valentine and nothing came
8	up. You know, maybe that was the case.
9	But who knew that Omara McBride was going to play such a key role
10	in the car and being with the defendant.
11	Which brings me to my next point.
12	THE COURT: All right. Make sure one of your points is whether this
13	was beyond the scope.
14	MS. LEXIS: Oh, yes, Your Honor.
15	THE COURT: All right.
16	MS. LEXIS: I think we should do a playback of Mr. Gaston
17	reserving
18	THE COURT: We don't need to do that.
19	MS. LEXIS: Okay.
20	THE COURT: I'll do that.
21	MS. LEXIS: Okay.
22	THE COURT: You guys don't need to worry about that.
23	MR. DICKERSON: Waiving.
24	MS. LEXIS: Waiving that. Okay.
25	But concerning the scope
	250

1	THE COURT: So suppose he didn't waive it.
2	MS. LEXIS: Okay.
3	THE COURT: Suppose he didn't waive it. Why what were you
4	rebutting?
5	MS. LEXIS: Yes, Your Honor.
6	THE COURT: What were you rebutting?
7	MS. LEXIS: They have placed identification at issue in this particular
8	case. And so I think really that runs the gamut of anything to prove that the
9	defendant committed the crime.
10	Here, Omara, his girlfriend, the individual he came to Las Vegas with,
11	is pawning items, one one hour and a half after he committed the robbery with
12	Marvin Bass.
13	THE COURT: Oh.
14	MS. LEXIS: There was also testimony from Chanise Williams, if you'l
15	recall, just minutes before, that Mr. Valentine and Omara just got here Friday
16	afternoon, when they all went out Friday afternoon being the 27th, somewhat
17	alibiing Mr. Valentine for the 26th incident, and kind of to imply that he, Omara,
18	the car, didn't didn't arrive to Las Vegas until Friday night, the night of the 27th.
19	THE COURT: All right. I get it. So it goes to identification.
20	MS. LEXIS: So absolutely.
21	THE COURT: She's saying she's rebutting your evidence on
22	identification.
23	MR. GASTON: What evidence on identification?
24	MS. LEXIS: And timing.
25	MR. GASTON: Which evidence did I present on identification,

though? What because the our eyewitness identification expert couldn't
testify about identification. He just talked about it in general terms of nothing
nothing he said rebuts the ID expert.

THE COURT: Well, he raised the whole issue that it was an invalid identification.

MR. GASTON: But then doesn't that allow them to rebut -- do whatever they want in rebuttal? Because our defense is identification --

THE COURT: No.

MR. GASTON: -- so I put on a case in chief, that -- that's what I said they're doing.

And I'm not trying to cut off their argument. Again, it's 15 seconds, caps. My -- I get it, but 15 second --

THE COURT: You like to monopolize all the time, don't you? It's not quite fair, but go ahead.

MR. GASTON: I won't make the argument, then.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. I will -- is it a new argument that you want to put on the argument that you haven't made yet?

MR. GASTON: It was in response to your question.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GASTON: You -- you said you find that their rebuttal evidence was with respect to identification. My position is --

THE COURT: Well, I -- I was repeating what she said. I wanted to make sure you heard that.

MR. GASTON: Oh, I thought you were asking me to -- well, that was my 10-second response is I don't think that evidence -- yes, I get it -- the

evidence that he did it or his girlfriend pawned the items or the girl he came in with pawned the items shows that he did the crime more likely than not. I get the relevant -- I get the relevance.

But it doesn't rebut anything we said. Our case in chief is designed to show he didn't to the crime, yes, because we're putting on a defense.

But we have to actually say something or put on some evidence that she rebuts. There's nothing she's rebutting. Our ID expert isn't talking about whether he did it or not.

THE COURT: Well, let's see what her position is, then. I'm anxious to find out her position on that.

What were you rebutting?

MS. LEXIS: Their claim of lack of identification. But specifically, the testimony of Chanise Williams indicating that the defendant did not arrive here with Omara McBride until the night of Friday, May 27th, 2016. These pawn items, with Omara -- with Omara's -- Omara is his girlfriend. They arrived here together. That's -- that's the state of testimony right now.

They didn't arrive here until the 27th, the night of, when this clearly shows, Your Honor, that -- that he had the -- the motive and time and the opportunity to have committed the robbery against Mr. Bass on the 26th, and that these pawn certificates were -- were transacted about an -- an hour, hour and a half after the robbery. It was at 12:58 p.m.

Shortly thereafter, Omara McBride, who came here with the defendant, who shares a car with the defendant, is out pawning items which just happen to match the immediate description or the exact description of the items taken from Mr. Bass.

Also, Your Honor, their expert -- their identification expert specifically noted, out of everything that we could get out from this expert, it was that the importance of corroborating evidence is -- is crucial.

And this is yet another piece of corroborating evidence, specifically to rebut whether he was even in town on the 26th, whether he could have committed this crime, whether he was with Omara, the individual who pawned it. So I think it absolutely rebuts.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else?

MS. LEXIS: Nope.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. MACHNICH: And Your Honor, just briefly, those last two things she just said --

THE COURT: Yeah. Okay.

MS. MACHNICH: -- about corroborating evidence and hammering on corroborating evidence, hammering on the timing, that was all done on her cross, for both of those witnesses.

So I -- and I even clarified with her, when I was -- and, of course, I can't lead her on direct. What I'm saying is, you know, in even saying when it first came out, my understanding was she wasn't entirely clear on the day.

I guess Ms. Lexis got her to -- after putting words in her mouth on cross -- which is what you're allowed to do on cross, but she's the one who locked her into that day.

So how could she now say, well, she said that day? Okay. Because you told her to say that day. I was the one who was try -- on -- on direct, she was, like, it was either the day before or that day, I'm not entirely sure exactly what day

it was. And then I even tried to clarify, you don't know exactly what day they got into town. She's the one who hammered into that day. So she created the issue that she's now rebutting. And the same thing with our expert. Everything single time he was saying corroborating evidence, corroborating evidence.

THE COURT: So --

MS. MACHNICH: She hammered it over and over.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. MACHNICH: She create her own rebuttal.

THE COURT: I appreciate that. I -- I wanted you make sure everybody had a chance to make the record.

MS. MACHNICH: Okay.

THE COURT: I'm denying the Motion for a Mistrial. I find that the court properly admitted the evidence, that the evidence -- that the evidence submitted during the rebuttal stage of the State's case was within the proper scope of rebuttal. The evidence was properly admitted as a business record. The court properly considered the probative value versus the prejudicial impact, allowed the evidence to come in. Didn't violate the hearsay rule. The evidence doesn't violate the confrontation clause. The proposed evidence was nontestimonial in nature.

The State -- the defense has not demonstrated to the court that there was any bad faith motive by the part of the State. And the court also finds that the State did not violate any duty to more timely disclose the pawnshop evidence that it had obtained. All right.

Now --

MS. MACHNICH: And just to be perfectly clear, we're not waiving the

1	THE COURT: When did it get a	set?
2	2 MR. GASTON: Your Honor, is it	possible to step in the back and just
3	make a copy of this real quick for the State?	And then we can both just do it
4	4 tonight.	
5	THE COURT: Do whatever you	got to do. I I don't make I don't
6	6 make copies.	
7	7 MR. GASTON: No. I mean, I'm	not asking you to make a copy. I car
8	go to it.	
9	9 THE COURT: If you want to do	t.
10	MR. GASTON: If you'll okay.	
11	THE CLERK: I I don't think the	e copy machine on this floor is
12	working.	
13	THE COURT: You don't think it	is or it isn't?
14	THE CLERK: No. I don't think it	is working, the copy machine on this
15	15 floor.	
16	THE COURT: Did you hear that	? Where did she
17	Well, then, we can't do jury instru	uctions. Well, let me just tell you my
18	tentatives.	
19	MS. LEXIS: Okay.	
20	MS. MACHNICH: Okay.	
21	THE COURT: This is really, real	ly frustrating.
22	MS. MACHNICH: Can we let's	s if this is your only copy, we can
23	there's probably not a whole lot of objections	to the State's.
24	MR. GASTON: We can hand it it	back and forth, Judge.
25	MS. MACHNICH: We can look a	at it together, if we start with the

State's, and then we can sit down, because I shut the --

MR. GASTON: Your Honor, the clerk said -- or she can actually just print a copy for us so we have a copy ready to go.

THE COURT: Oh, my God.

MR. GASTON: Just trying to get it done today.

MS. MACHNICH: But I -- I think we can start these, because some of these are standard.

THE COURT: How -- how could I -- how can the State get me a copy without getting the defense a copy? How can that happen?

MS. LEXIS: We didn't give a -- we didn't get a copy of theirs, either. I mean, they -- they just -- we just finished them.

THE COURT: Nothing should go to the court without opposing party getting it.

MS. MACHNICH: We provided them to the State.

THE COURT: Why did the defense get me a copy without getting it to the State?

MS. MACHNICH: I e-mailed it --

THE COURT: And don't you guys know for -- for valid settling of jury instructions, you each need to have a full set?

MS. MACHNICH: And, Your Honor, I printed a copy for every single person involved in this case and they're sitting on the desk. So they do have copies of our instructions in front of them right now. To this day, I do not have a copy of theirs. They have ours. I printed them and brought them, because I thought we were settling them at lunch.

MR. DICKERSON: And we apologize, Your Honor. That was just an 258

1	oversight on our part.
2	THE COURT: Okay.
3	MR. DICKERSON: We're very sorry about that.
4	THE COURT: I do appreciate that. All right.
5	MS. MACHNICH: But I'm happy to move on with them.
6	MR. GASTON: I don't it prejudices either side. I'm pretty sure we can
7	just go forward with it.
8	MS. MACHNICH: We can do it.
9	THE COURT: Let's just share.
10	MS. MACHNICH: Yeah, it's fine. I'll stand here. I'm sure a lot of
11	these are going to be standard, so we can
12	MS. LEXIS: Well, bring your chair, so you don't have to stand in
13	heels.
14	THE COURT: All right. Things go long sometimes in trial, and that's
15	why it's very refreshing when people say, rather than getting indignant about the
16	court pointing out something that's wrong, to actually acknowledge, gee, I'm sorry
17	something went wrong. All right. Not to get all pissy about when something is
18	pointed out.
19	MS. MACHNICH: Okay. Are we beginning with the State's
20	instructions or the defense?
21	THE COURT: I'm looking at the State's instructions here.
22	MS. MACHNICH: Okay.
23	THE COURT: Any any objection to Instruction No. 1?
24	MS. MACHNICH: No.
25	THE COURT: I'm asking my points or my questions are directed to

1	the defense now.
2	MS. MACHNICH: Okay.
3	THE COURT: Any objection to Instruction No. 2, which begins, If in
4	these instructions?
5	MS. MACHNICH: No.
6	THE COURT: It's accepted.
7	Any objection to the instruction regarding the indictment?
8	MS. MACHNICH: No.
9	THE COURT: Any objection to the instruction regarding to constitute
10	the crime charged?
11	MS. MACHNICH: No.
12	THE COURT: Any objection to the instruction that begins, The
13	defendant is presumed innocent?
14	MS. MACHNICH: Yes. And we've provided a different wording for
15	THE COURT: And I saw you want unless I my philosophy on
16	that has changed. I like what the State's doing here, because it's until. The
17	presumption of innocence always exists until the contrary is proved.
18	If you say unless, it's an incorrect statement of the law that suggests
19	that the presumption may not exist. And and I think it's incorrect. Until is the
20	right type of word to use there. So we're sticking with until.
21	So your objection is noted. I'm not giving the defense proposed.
22	MS. MACHNICH: Okay.
23	THE COURT: All right. So that is State's Proposed page 3 is not
24	given.
25	MS. MACHNICH: Defense's proposed page 3?

Shawna Ortega CET-562 • 602.412.7667

24

25

1	THE COURT: The defense
2	MS. MACHNICH: Okay. Th
3	THE COURT: Take that one
4	What about the State's next
5	guilt or innocence?
6	MS. MACHNICH: They're no
7	They're here to determine whether defer
8	propose a different wording. That's our p
9	innocence. They are not here to determ
0	THE COURT: State's wha
1	MS. LEXIS: Court's brief ind

proposed.

at's fine.

e and put it to the record.

proposed, You are here to determine the

ot here to determine the innocence. ndant is guilty or not guilty. We did page 2. And we would object to guilt or ine the innocence.

at's State's position?

lulgence.

THE COURT: Theirs is page 2.

MS. LEXIS: I'm okay with that, Your Honor. We can the change it to what they -- they said. I think it's still correct.

THE COURT: All right. Very good. The State's instruction will be deemed withdrawn and defense instruction that begins, You are here to determine -- I'll read the whole thing. This is the one that will be given.

You are here to determine whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty from the evidence in this case. You are not called upon to return a verdict as to the guilt of any other person. So if the evidence in the case convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, you should so find, even though you may believe one or more persons are also guilty.

That will be given. All right. Thank you.

MS. MACHNICH: Yes. Okay.

THE COURT: Next instruction on, The evidence which you are to

1	MS. MACHNICH: We we would actually request that that be
2	removed now that that has not come out. So we would still request ours insofar
3	as it's gender neutral.
4	MS. LEXIS: That's fine.
5	MS. MACHNICH: Given the witnesses that have testified.
6	MS. LEXIS: That's fine. I think that his or her is fine. The gender
7	make it gender neutral.
8	THE COURT: Yeah. So use the
9	MS. LEXIS: Yeah.
10	THE COURT: defense proposed on page 5 without the last
11	paragraph, because it's gender neutral.
12	MS. MACHNICH: Okay.
13	THE COURT: And the State proposed on believability will be deemed
14	withdrawn.
15	MS. MACHNICH: Okay.
16	THE COURT: Okay?
17	MS. MACHNICH: Thank you.
18	THE COURT: All right. The next State proposed is, A witness who
19	has special knowledge; you okay with that one?
20	MS. MACHNICH: Yes.
21	THE COURT: All right. That will be given.
22	Next State instruction, The elements of an intent to commit a crime
23	are; any objection?
24	MS. MACHNICH: No, no objection.
25	THE COURT: Next instruction, In determining whether or not such ar

1	act was done.
2	MS. MACHNICH: That appears to be a correct statement of the law,
3	so we have no objection.
4	THE COURT: That will be given.
5	Next instruction, When a person has once done things which
6	constitute an attempt; any objection?
7	MS. MACHNICH: No.
8	THE COURT: All right. That will be given.
9	Next instruction, As used in these instructions a deadly weapon
10	means.
11	MS. MACHNICH: I as long as that is a correct statement of the law
12	I'm not familiar with the loaded or unloaded, operable or inoperable. If that is out
13	of the statute, we have no objection.
14	MS. LEXIS: Berry vs. State.
15	THE COURT: Very good. That will be given.
16	Next instruction, The State is not required to have recovered.
17	MS. MACHNICH: Accurate statement.
18	THE COURT: That will be given.
19	The next instruction, In order to use a deadly weapon.
20	MS. MACHNICH: No objection.
21	THE COURT: All right. Next instruction, Robbery is the unlawful
22	taking.
23	MS. MACHNICH: No objection.
24	THE COURT: All right. Next instruction, It is not necessary to prove
25	both violence and intimidation?

1	MS. MACHNICH: No objection.
2	THE COURT: Next instruction, You are instructed that if you find the
3	defendant guilty of an attempt.
4	MS. MACHNICH: No objection.
5	THE COURT: Next instruction, You are instructed that if you find a
6	defendant guilty of robbery.
7	MS. MACHNICH: Yeah. With or without deadly weapon. Yeah. No.
8	It's it's a breakdown. I I don't have a problem with it.
9	THE COURT: Okay. Very good. Next so that one will be given.
10	Next instruction, A person who a person who by day or night enters
11	any house.
12	MS. MACHNICH: I I believe there is a typo in that one.
13	MR. GASTON: No, they're saying that the robbery is the underlying
14	offense that they're intending to enter when they enter them.
15	MS. MACHNICH: No, no, no. A person who a person who by day
16	or night.
17	MS. LEXIS: Oh, she's right.
18	MS. MACHNICH: I believe it just restates the first three words.
19	MS. LEXIS: It's a
20	MS. MACHNICH: It's there's a typo.
21	THE COURT: All right. Well, the typo will fixed, so that will be given
22	without objection. Correct?
23	MS. MACHNICH: Correct.
24	THE COURT: Next one, Larceny is defined as the stealing.
25	MS. MACHNICH: I don't entirely see why that's relevant, but maybe

23

24

25

I've missed something.

MS. LEXIS: Well, it's just because with the burglary, we pled it as -- to commit a larceny, assault, or battery on any person or -- or a felony.

MS. MACHNICH: And then in the State of Nevada the crime of robbery is a felony. I -- I mean, larceny is not surcharged in the case, so I don't think it's relevant on the grounds, I'll object. Otherwise, I will submit.

MS. LEXIS: We just pled it that way, Your Honor. It's an and/or on the burglary. So whether it was just to steal something or place --

THE COURT: Where is burglary defined?

MS. LEXIS: It was in --

MR. DICKERSON: In our first couple pages.

MS. LEXIS: It was in the first -- it's actually the one right before that, a person who by day or night enters any house, vehicle -- it's the one right before that, Your Honor. With the intent to commit larceny --

THE COURT: Oh, larceny is one of the predicates for --

MS. LEXIS: Right.

MR. DICKERSON: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- for -- for burglary, so I'll allow that. So you -- the State's larceny instruction is given over the objection of the State -- or over the objection of the defense.

Next, Assault is defined as.

MS. MACHNICH: Again, I think it's confusing, because that's not relevant in the case, but I'll submit.

THE COURT: All right. So that's -- assault instruction will be given over the objection of the defense.

1	Next, Battery is defined as; same thing?
2	MS. MACHNICH: Same thing, submit.
3	THE COURT: All right. That will be given over the objection of the
4	defense.
5	Next instruction, It is not necessary that the State prove the defendant
6	actually committed a larceny.
7	MS. MACHNICH: I have no objection to that. That appears to be
8	correct law.
9	THE COURT: All right. That will be given. Thank you.
10	Next instruction, The intention which with which entry was made is a
11	question of fact.
12	MS. MACHNICH: Yes, that's fine.
13	THE COURT: That'll be given.
14	Next instruction, The mere fact that a person was in conscious
15	possession of stolen property, et cetera.
16	MS. LEXIS: I put that for the defense. I mean, I because he
17	conceded in opening that he had possession of that stolen property, I put that in
18	there for them, but
19	MR. GASTON: Is that a lesser or is that a lesser going to be a
20	lesser included?
21	MS. LEXIS: No.
22	MR. GASTON: Or a lesser offense?
23	MS. MACHNICH: I I in ours, we have it requested. But
24	MR. GASTON: Obviously, if the court gives the lesser offense, then
25	we think the instruction should be given.

1	MS. LEXIS: It's up to you guys, but
2	THE COURT: You don't want it? We'll take it out. I need I need an
3	answer.
4	MS. MACHNICH: Your Honor, this is the first time I'm looking at it. I
5	just need to think about it for a second. I I'm really sorry.
6	THE COURT: Okay.
7	MS. MACHNICH: I haven't seen this specific instruction before, so.
8	MS. LEXIS: I guess while she's doing that, it kind of brings up this
9	whole point of when you opened, you made certain admissions. And so when I
0	prepared when I was thinking and putting these jury instructions together, I had
1	that in mind. But none of that's been proven, really.
2	MR. GASTON: I think the last
3	MS. LEXIS: Because there's no admission in terms of evidence that
4	he possessed anything, but.
5	MR. GASTON: I think the lesser should be on I mean, my position
6	would be the lesser should be on the verdict form and the then we should
7	define what the lessers are. That would be my position.
8	MS. MACHNICH: Well, let's get to those, because they're ours.
9	MR. GASTON: It answers this question.
20	MS. MACHNICH: It does. Can we can we come back to this,
21	Your Honor?
22	MR. GASTON: I think we should make it conditional, I mean
23	THE COURT: All right. Question mark on this one.
24	MS. MACHNICH: Thank you.
25	THE COURT: All right. Next instruction, An entry is deemed

1	complete when.
2	MS. MACHNICH: No objection.
3	THE COURT: All right. That will be given.
4	Next instruction, To prove an entry in establishing the crime of
5	burglary.
6	MS. MACHNICH: I feel like there's a lot of burglary ones, but that is a
7	correct statement of law. So.
8	THE COURT: Okay. It'll be given.
9	Next, Every person who commits the crime of burglary who has in his
10	possession or gains possession.
11	MS. MACHNICH: We have no objection to that one.
12	THE COURT: That one will be given. Thank you.
13	Next one, Any person who possesses a credit card without consent.
14	MS. MACHNICH: No objection.
15	THE COURT: That will be given.
16	Next instruction, In a criminal prosecution for possession of a credit
17	card.
18	MS. LEXIS: The first paragraph is statutory. I added the the
19	second paragraph for in favor of the defense, so that they'd know that I we
20	have to prove all of the other evidence before the inference can be drawn.
21	MS. MACHNICH: Let me just read that. Is it two or more or more
22	than two?
23	MS. LEXIS: It's two or more.
24	MS. MACHNICH: I mean, I'm I'm reading this as two or more, but
25	I

1	MS. LEXIS: I I can pull up the statute, but it's two or more.
2	MS. MACHNICH: I would like a chance to review the statute on that
3	one.
4	THE COURT: You can review it and raise any new objection
5	tomorrow. I'm inclined I'm for the record, though, I'm giving this one. So in a
6	criminal prosecution, it is being given.
7	Next one, A person
8	MS. MACHNICH: Your Honor, I've been clarified. It's fine.
9	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
0	MS. MACHNICH: Yep.
1	THE COURT: Next so it is given.
2	Next one, A person who possesses, sells, or transfers.
3	MS. LEXIS: That one's straight out of the statute.
4	MS. MACHNICH: I'm just reading it. No objection.
5	THE COURT: Great. That will be given.
6	Next one, You are here to determine the guilt or innocence of the
7	defendant.
8	Oh, wait, this is a duplicate.
9	MS. MACHNICH: Wait.
20	THE COURT: So let let's I'm asking the State to withdraw this.
21	This is an exact duplicate of one that you have earlier.
22	MS. LEXIS: Okay. I apologize. Sorry about that.
23	THE COURT: Next one, Portions of the defendant's statements to
24	police have been admitted in this case. Basically, telling them that some have not

been given. And they're not to speculate on what's not in the portions that were

	2
	3
	4
	5
	6
	7
	8
	9
1	0
1	1
1	2
1	3
1	4
1	5
1	6
1	7
1	8
1	9
2	0
_	_
2	1
2	2
2	3

25

given.
MS. MACHNICH: I mean, are we talking about the jail calls? Are
we I mean, are they intending to bring in the statement
THE COURT: Well, it says statements to police, not jail call. This
isn't dealing with the jail calls.
MS. MACHNICH: Okay.

The next one, The flight of a person immediately after the commission of a crime. I think the defense had an alternate flight instruction.

MS. MACHNICH: We -- and yes we have --

THE COURT: All right. So this will be given.

THE COURT: But the --

MS. MACHNICH: We have a reverse flight instruction, as well.

THE COURT: Yeah. Hold on. Let me see. The defense flight instruction is -- is pertaining to flight after defendant is accused of a crime. The State flight instruction pertains to flight after the commission of a crime.

MS. MACHNICH: I -- I mean, I think they'd be appropriately given together.

MR. GASTON: Your Honor -- Your Honor, with respect to the State's flight instruction, Nevada is pretty clear, and I'm sure it's the -- I don't have the citation version.

THE COURT: I got them all.

MR. GASTON: But I'm sure it's what the citations are. The Nevada law is pretty clear in the federal circuit -- all the cases that deal with flight instructions is that it's not automatically given. There must instead -- it's -- it's similar to *Sanborn*, in that there must be predicates that are met. Specifically, the

State must show, in order to warrant a flight instruction, they must show a nonbroken chain of inferences from the flight -- from the -- from the flight to the defendant to consciousness of guilt.

And in this case, the defendant, specifically -- it's not that the robber fled after committing a robbery. They have to show that the defendant fled, and that shows consciousness of guilt. The defendant didn't flee anything. The defendant was in the apartment, pretended to be asleep, and then got arrested. So there's no -- there's no evidence of flight of the defendant.

There's evidence that the robber fled or the robber finished a robbery and went on to do more robberies and they've identified that as being Keandre. But that's not the same thing as giving a flight instruction. Because otherwise, why wouldn't you just give a flight instruction every single case ever, where the defendant did something and then left. That's not how it works.

You must show a nonbroken chain of inferences from flight to consciousness of guilt. And in this case the defendant didn't even flee, which is why we proposed a reverse flight instruction, because we think that there could be an inference from the fact that the defendant didn't flee to -- to the other argument.

I'm not trying to get into that argument and justifying that. Tegan can do that if she wants.

But with the State's flight instruction, I don't think they met the sufficient evidence to warrant giving a flight instruction.

THE COURT: So does the State have an argument as to whether the evidence shows consciousness of guilt, based on him going back to the apartment?

The State of Nevada, Plaintiff, vs. Keandre Valentine, Defendant.

Case No. C-16-316081-1 [Jury Trial Day 8 of 10]

Next one, In your deliberation, you may not discuss or consider the

25

subject of punishment.

MS. MACHNICH: No objection. Oh, actually, I do have an edit on this one. I may have proposed it. It's your -- your duty is confined to the determination of -- and we believe the correct law would be whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty.

THE COURT: Didn't we already say that a million times?

What's the State's position?

MS. LEXIS: I'm okay with adding -- I mean, with -- with it changing to the whether he's guilty or not guilty. That's fine.

THE COURT: Okay. So the --

MR. DICKERSON: Defense.

MS. MACHNICH: Defense 4, page 4.

THE COURT: -- defense page 4 will be given. All right.

All right. The next State proposed instruction, During the course of this trial and in your deliberations, you are not to. I'm not going to give this, because I think it's confusing and not accurate.

MS. LEXIS: Okay.

THE COURT: A lot of these things they're supposed to do.

MS. LEXIS: Okay.

THE COURT: So please will State just withdraw this one?

MS. LEXIS: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Next instruction, When you retire to consider your verdict. Can we give that without objection?

MS. MACHNICH: Of course.

1	THE COURT: Okay. Next instruction, If during your deliberations.
2	This the one dealing with read backs should be withdrawn and we'll give the
3	next one on playbacks, is that okay?
4	MS. MACHNICH: Yes.
5	MS. LEXIS: Yes, Your Honor.
6	THE COURT: So this is withdrawn.
7	Next instruction, If during your deliberation, et cetera, on playbacks.
8	That will be given without objection?
9	MS. MACHNICH: Yes.
10	THE COURT: Next instruction, Now you will listen to the arguments
11	of counsel. Given without objection?
12	MS. MACHNICH: Yes.
13	THE COURT: Next instruction or there is no more instructions.
14	Let's look at some of the let's look at the defense right away. Okay
15	MS. MACHNICH: Okay.
16	THE COURT: Okay. Defense proposed instruction, circumstantial
17	evidence, page 6, Before you may arrive at circumstantial evidence, et cetera.
18	What do you guys want to say on that? Does the State object to that?
19	MS. LEXIS: Court's brief indulgence.
20	I haven't had a chance to look at this particular
21	THE COURT: I've seen it many times.
22	MS. LEXIS: case.
23	THE COURT: So I don't think this is a circumstantial evidence case,
24	but you guys tell me what you think.
25	MR. DICKERSON: No. And Your Honor, we object to it given the fac

12

14

17

19

21

23

24

25

that it's misleading to the jury. This two reasonable interpretations type of Sopranovich [phonetic] instruction would lead a person to believe that they need to consider each piece of circumstantial evidence in a vacuum. And when, in reality, that's the misleading part. In reality they can consider all circumstantial evidence together to show and prove that the person is, in fact, guilty.

So it -- it leads a jury to try to compartmentalize circumstantial evidence, instead of considering everything as a whole under the totality of the circumstances analysis that they are here to do.

THE COURT: This side?

MR. GASTON: Your Honor, with respect to Mr. Dickerson's position, the Nevada Supreme Court disagrees. And this -- this Sopranovich case kind of came from a situation where our office, in a murder case, kind of cherry picked the language we like from this instruction, submitted it, got it approved. The State appealed it, and the Supreme Court struck us down -- or struck that court's ruling down, and found that the cherry picked instruction isn't fair. It's misleading, it's confusing.

What they said was two points. Number one, they put the specific instruction -- we have taken that word for word from the *Sopranovich* case. They said if the instruction is going to be given, it needs to be given in this form, that we can't just cherry pick our favorite line from it. And we get that. That's why we've included the instruction as a whole. They said this is a correct statement of the law. If it's going to be given, this is the one that should be given.

They also said a second point, that it's discretionary and it's up to the court. They didn't say you can't. They didn't say you have to. My position would be, personally -- so with respect to the misleading aspect, that's what I meant by

the Nevada Supreme Court disagrees. This is a correct statement of law. It's the one they formulated.

With respect to the discretionary point and the court's question about circumstantial evidence, this case is all circumstantial evidence. We have the identifications based on various circumstances, and we have put on a lot of evidence to -- to contest those.

But there is circumstantial evidence. He's found in the stolen property. Omara McBride pawned these items, and blah, blah, blah. Everything in this case is circumstantial, other than arguably the identifications, which we're contesting largely based on various things.

But because a lot of the evidence, the corroborating evidence, so to speak, that the State's going to make a big deal of, is circumstantial evidence, we think that is critically important in this case.

And also, furthermore, it's not a rule of law that's somewhat obviously apparent. I was surprised when I read it, and then I thought about it, and I get it.

It's just from knowing reasonable doubt and presumption of innocence. It doesn't -- this isn't a -- this isn't a new principle of law, so to speak, as it is an -- unusual or nonobvious extrapolation, which makes it not cumulative. It's not cumulative. It is a separate point that it is making.

And the point is, if there are two reasonable conclusions, it is your duty as a matter of law to adopt the one that's based on not guilty. And I don't think so that's a very obvious point from the other instructions. And it's critically important, especially in a case like this, where there are literally two hypotheses putting forth to the jury. Keandre did it; Bobby did it.

If both are reasonable, it is their duty to adopt the one that points to

not guilty. And I don't think that's a very obvious point from the other instructions, and I think it's critically important in a case like this.

THE COURT: I -- I think it's completely unnecessary. The jury's already instructed properly on reasonable doubt, and so I'm not going to give it. And I'm relying on the *Troy Donahue* case, May 31, 2016, No. 68, 398 is pretty instructive in this case. And I -- I don't think circumstantial evidence is a big part of this case. So I'm not going to give that one. I marked it rejected and I'll give it to the court clerk.

The next one is the jail calls. We are going to give this one, right? Page 9?

MR. GASTON: We are or are not.

THE COURT: We are. Right? The State?

MS. LEXIS: Yes, that's fine.

THE COURT: That -- that'll be given. Page 9.

Next one is page 10, State failed to present the -- preserve the video.

Anything more you wanted to say on that one?

MR. GASTON: On our next instruction, I want to talk more about the gross negligence. But on this one, I'm going to submit largely on the evidence that he collected this video that would have showed the car, could have shown the face of the person, it could have shown things that could be exculpatory. He received video. It was in working condition when he received it. We know this from the testimony of the position of the witness we called in our case in chief. We know he did receive it, because he put it in his police report. And we also know that it no longer exists, because it was never disclosed to us and never seen it. And the State has told us it no longer exists.

1	THE COURT: All right. I'm rejecting No. 10 based on the prior
2	comments in the record, but without waiver of your right to to make your
3	argument after trial.
4	MR. GASTON: [Indiscernible.]
5	THE COURT: Page 11 is the State failed to preserve show up
6	identification form based on prior discussions. I'm also rejecting that one
7	MR. GASTON: Your Honor, may I ask
8	THE COURT: Hold on. I'm talking. All right.
9	MR. GASTON: Oh, I'm sorry.
0	THE COURT: I'm rejecting that one, as well, based on the record that
1	we already have. You can make a further record on that after trial, if you want to.
2	Or right now, if you want to.
3	MR. GASTON: I'd like to do it now, since we're here doing jury
4	instructions.
5	THE COURT: But stick stick to a minute.
6	MR. GASTON: Sure. On the last the last point I was trying to make
7	on the instruction we just passed is also the State implied during
8	cross-examination that perhaps the video was lost during an error, and that was
9	not substantiated by the detective's testimony. So we do think that rises to the
0	level of gross negligence.
1	With respect
2	THE COURT: Are you sure that he said
3	MR. GASTON: Yeah. He said he said he doesn't remember any
4	file being corrupted

THE COURT: He said he -- well, he didn't know -- he didn't know how

it could have been --

MR. GASTON: He says -- he says he doesn't remember any file being corrupted. That was the answer. I mean, the record speaks for itself, but --

THE COURT: It does speak for itself. Well, since -- well, does the State want to have anything in the record on the jury instructions on this point?

MR. DICKERSON: Absolutely. We oppose the proposed instructions, Your Honor. This would -- if any --

THE COURT: I don't know. I just don't think it rises to the level of gross negligence.

MR. DICKERSON: Right.

THE COURT: I mean, there's -- there might have been some negligence here. I don't think there's evidence of gross negligence.

MR. DICKERSON: Right. And, Your Honor, I -- I do actually have a bench memo on this topic. But the whole issue would come down to the fact that this, first of all, was not bad faith. And second of all, if the only other way to get there would be if it was the apparent value of it -- of this material was realized, the exculpatory value was realized at the time it was destroyed, and the defense is prejudiced by that.

In fact, we have corroborating evidence through Ms. Lexis herself that could tell you how everything happened and that there are e-mails to -- to back up the fact that it was a corrupted file.

THE COURT: Well, if they file a motion after trial --

MR. GASTON: That's not --

MS. MACHNICH: Wait. We haven't seen that.

THE COURT: -- we might have to do an evidentiary hearing, which is

what -- which is a remedy that the court might allow.

MR. DICKERSON: And based on the fact that it -- if anything, it's not failure to collect. It's a -- it would be a failure to preserve. So there's no bad faith. And there's no prejudice and no apparent exculpatory value that was realized at the time.

So without those, Your Honor, it has to be denied.

MR. GASTON: And Your Honor, I don't think I made my initial record on the -- the second instruction with respect to gross negligence.

THE COURT: Go ahead. No, you didn't. Go ahead.

MR. GASTON: If the -- I'm arguing --

THE COURT: There's the showup form.

MR. GASTON: The showup form is what I'm talking about.

THE COURT: Yeah. And I -- I -- I think I made my record clear, so I didn't need to say anything more on that.

MR. GASTON: No. I get that. I -- I just want to -- after he testified, I want to talk about why there's gross negligence.

Previously, we addressed why I thought it was material and exculpatory value. I don't think I need to reiterate those. I think that's pretty obvious.

I'm not arguing bad faith. I'm arguing gross negligence.

His testimony at trial as to why he lost this form is literally, I don't know. I don't know what else I possibly could have brought out, if we were designing the fact pattern for a law school first-year essay that could have shown gross negligence? What else facts -- other than maybe he brought it home with him and left it in the toilet. I don't know what I could possibly bring out in facts that

16

17

18

19 20

21

22

23

24 25 would show gross negligence that didn't already come out.

He has something that's clearly of value, in a big robbery case, decades in prison, potentially. He has it. He lost it. And the fact -- even if the court denies -- the court did deny my previous instruction with respect to the video, it still all goes together.

Detective Majors' involvement in this case as the lead detective, he collected two pieces of evidence that we know of; a showup form from Darrell Faulkner and a video from EZPAWN. Both of these items were lost.

This is a guy who exercised absolutely no care whatsoever with critical pieces of evidence, thereby depriving us of opportunity from ever seeing it. I don't understand how that's not gross negligent.

THE COURT: And so you have to excuse me, sir, because I have to go. So I'm -- the rest -- the rest of these instructions -- I'm planning -- I'm planning to let the State's 12, 13, and 14 go in. And -- but not the rest of them.

I -- you guys, I have to go. We'll be back here tomorrow at -- what time? Tell them what time. 1:00. I'm late for an appointment.

MR. GASTON: Okay.

THE COURT: 1:00 tomorrow, you can have more time to put on more records.

I'm asking the State to have compiled the final jury instructions based on everything I've said.

MR. DICKERSON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. And I'll get the -- the clerk the other ones that are not admitted later.

[Court recessed at 5:43 p.m., until August 3, 2017, at 11:06 a.m.]

ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability. Shawna Ortega, CET*562

Electronically Filed 1/29/2018 7:45 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

RTRAN

VS.

THE STATE OF NEVADA.

Plaintiff,

KEANDRE VALENTINE,

Defendant.

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

4

1

2

3

5 |

6 7

8

9

10

11 12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20 21

22

24

25

CASE NO. C-16-316081-1

DEPT. NO. II

BEFORE THE HONORABLE RICHARD SCOTTI, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

THURSDAY, AUGUST 3, 2017

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: AGNES M. LEXIS, ESQ.

Chief Deputy District Attorney MICHAEL DICKERSON, ESQ.

Deputy District Attorney

For the Defendant: TEGAN C. MACHNICH, ESQ.

Deputy Public Defender TYLER GASTON, ESQ. Deputy Public Defender

RECORDED BY: DALYNE EASLEY, COURT RECORDER

1	INDEX	
2		Page No.
3	Closing argument by the Plaintiff	38
4	Rebuttal closing argument by the Defendant Surrebuttal closing argument by the Plaintiff	62 94
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
	2	

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	r
6	ŀ
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	İI
12	
13	r
14	
15	b
16	it
17	t
18	Ç
19	
20	

22

23

24

25

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, THURSDAY, AUGUST 3, 2017

[Case called at 11:06 a.m.]

[Outside the presence of the jury.]

THE COURT: Thank you for accommodating my schedule. I had to run -- kind of run out of here in a hurry last night. I had a 6:30 appointment in Henderson I couldn't be late for.

MS. LEXIS: Of course.

THE COURT: So thank you.

MS. LEXIS: Thank you.

THE COURT: And I'd be available now to finish discussing jury instructions, I appreciate that. Thank you.

MR. GASTON: Were -- were you in a hurry, Judge? We didn't even notice. I -- I --

THE COURT: It was nothing to do with you guys. I had to -- I had to be out of here. So all right. So let's finish where -- wherever we left off. I think -- it looks like the State gave me the revised set. And -- and let's go to -- I'm trying to think. Let's go -- we've got assault -- well, we finished all the State's set. Let's go to --

MS. LEXIS: Your Honor, may we -- I'm so sorry.

THE COURT: No, no. However you want to do this.

MS. LEXIS: We have horrible -- we have a horrible computer problems at the DA's office.

THE COURT: Oh.

MS. LEXIS: It's, like, office wide. So I -- the copy that I printed was the wrong one that I sent you. So I don't have a current version and neither does

1	Mr. Gaston.
2	MR. GASTON: That was the same copy I got, was the original copy.
3	THE COURT: Oh, could
4	MS. LEXIS: Could we please get a copy?
5	THE COURT: Oh, of what I have now?
6	MS. LEXIS: Yes.
7	THE COURT: So you don't have this one?
8	MS. LEXIS: I don't have that one that I last e-mailed to Stephanie.
9	THE COURT: I have all these tab Post-Its on it now.
10	MS. LEXIS: Can you print another
11	THE COURT: Well
12	MS. LEXIS: one, Stephanie?
13	THE COURT: Yeah. Do you know how to print this?
14	THE CLERK: Yeah, I printed it for you.
15	THE COURT: Can you well, can you get it to them? Do you
16	need do you need this to print it?
17	THE CLERK: No. It will just take me longer to print than to copy. So
18	it might be a couple minutes.
19	THE COURT: Okay.
20	MS. LEXIS: I'm I'm sorry, Your Honor. It was the wrong copy.
21	MR. GASTON: I think I had just if I remember right, I just finished
22	making a record on why I felt that it was gross negligence. The court denied it
23	and then left. I think he gave tentative rulings on the last
24	MS. LEXIS: He did.
25	MR. GASTON: few instructions.

23

24

25

THE COURT: So let's go to, like, the defense proposed -- well, let's at least discuss them --

MS. LEXIS: Okay.

THE COURT: -- while you're waiting for the copies. I'm just going to bring one up, page 12 of the defense proposed. You guys probably have all of that from yesterday.

MS. LEXIS: Yes.

THE COURT: Oh, Mr. Gaston --

MR. GASTON: No. I know -- I know what we're talking about.

THE COURT: I'll read it into the record. It says:

If the State --

Basically, it's like a counterinstruction.

If the State fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant personally committed the robberies and burglaries charged in Counts 1 through 11, then you must find the defendant not guilty of those charges.

It's basically saying, you know, if you -- if the State doesn't meet its burden, then they're not guilty. I think it's a correct statement of the law. But I needed to hear from the State on that.

MS. LEXIS: I understand, Your Honor. I included it in the revised packet, knowing the court was ruling that way.

THE COURT: I'm inclined to give it, yeah.

MS. LEXIS: That's no problem.

THE COURT: All right. But -- but -- all right. Anything -- any other record you want to make on that?

9

10

11

12 13

14

15 16

17

18

19

20

22

21

2324

25

MS. LEXIS: No.

THE COURT: Okay. Page 13, also -- it's the same thing, it's -- it's one that, If the State fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt instruction. My tentative is to include that.

Do you want to make a record or just submit it?

MS. LEXIS: Submit it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And then page 14 was one that says, again:

If the State fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the driver's license.

Et cetera --

MS. LEXIS: Submit.

THE COURT: Okay. Submit. All right.

Let's see. Page 15 from the defense set:

A person commits an offense involving stolen property. If the person for his or her own gain or to prevent the owner from again possessing the owner's property, buys, receives, possesses, or withholds property, knowing that it is stolen property or under such circumstances as should have caused a reasonable person to know that it is stolen property.

This one I wasn't sure about. I guess I'm leaning towards allowing it, but I -- but it -- but it seems to me to be the definition of the crime of possessing stolen property, which I don't think was charged here.

MS. LEXIS: That's correct.

THE COURT: So I -- I wasn't sure why the defense included it. But let's first hear from the State if they have any opposition to it.

MS. LEXIS: I do have an opposition to it, only because there's been

24

25

absolutely no evidence, particularly possession of stolen property isn't charged. There hasn't been any allegation that he just possessed stolen property. It's not -it's not a crime that we've charged here.

I understand from the defense point of view that Mr. Gaston, when he opened, made admissions about the defendant being guilty of possession of stolen property and obstructing, and all of these things. But evidence involving those admissions made by the defense during opening never came in, so.

THE COURT: That -- that he -- did -- did -- is -- is possession of the property an element of any of the offenses that are charged?

MS. LEXIS: No.

THE COURT: Because if possession was an element, then this might -- it might make this a lesser-included offense.

MS. LEXIS: It is not. It is not, Your Honor. It's robbery with use of a deadly weapon, which doesn't even necessitate possession for any given point in time. It's stealing an item. Doesn't necessarily mean the afterwards of continuing to possess it as charged in this particular case, because as it -- it pertains to the credit cards and the phones and things like that. I don't think that that necessarily carries over.

For instance, in gun crimes, I don't charge robbery with use of a deadly weapon and then the defendant for possessing the stolen property, because I feel like it's part of one incident. And in order to have taken the property, he possessed it at some point, whether it's at the time that he stole it or at that time that it was recovered, if it -- if it is, in fact, recovered.

THE COURT: Right. Well, but you do -- let's see, you do have possession of credit or debit card. So --

2	charges.
3	THE COURT: Well, a lesser included is just is basically any any
4	crime that has a subset an exact subset of the elements of another crime.
5	MS. LEXIS: Mr. Dickerson was so kind to put together a bench
6	memorandum on lesser included. May I approach?
7	THE COURT: Yes.
8	MS. LEXIS: Thank you. And I'll give Mr. Gaston a copy, as well.
9	THE COURT: Yeah. Thank you.
0	MS. LEXIS: Thank you, Your Honor.
1	I think it pretty succinctly points out the analysis.
2	MR. GASTON: Trouble with the bench memo, it doesn't seem to
3	state a different set of law than what the court just said.
4	THE COURT: Okay.
5	MR. GASTON: It's it's a lesser included if it has if it's a subset.
6	MS. LEXIS: And I have
7	THE COURT: So so I mean, generally, what I do because I have
8	these lesser-includeds come up, I usually, like, on the left side right down the
9	elements of what's charged.
0	MS. LEXIS: Right.
1	THE COURT: And on the right side, I write down the elements of the
2	alleged lesser-included. And if you know, if what's on the right is a subset of
3	what's on the left, then then I find that it's a lesser-included. I mean, you

MS. LEXIS: I don't think it's a lesser of anything, of any of the

know -- now, the lesser-related, I don't give that. A lesser-included, you know,

generally if the evidence -- if there's evidence introduced to support the

23

24

25

lesser-included, then I give the lesser-included.

MS. LEXIS: So what offense is the court considering giving this?

THE COURT: Well, no, it's not burden to -- for you guys to prove to me if -- if the -- if the plaintiff -- if the defense wants to show that it's lesser-included, they've got to -- they've got to prove to me what are the elements on the left side and what are the elements on the right side, and prove that there exists -- there -- it's a subset.

So no one's proved to me yet that it's lesser-included. So.

MS. LEXIS: Okay.

THE COURT: I'm -- I'm not doing your homework for you.

MR. GASTON: No. I didn't -- I was just waiting -- I was waiting my turn. I was --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GASTON: I believe it is a lesser-included, especially if specifically we can focus on possession, for example, of credit cards without cardholder's consent. Because the elements of that is you have credit cards that belong to someone else and you intend to use them fraudulently. And if you have over two, there's a presumption that you do intend it.

THE COURT: So -- so --

MR. GASTON: Because someone --

THE COURT: Possession and intent to use it?

MR. GASTON: Yep.

THE COURT: Possession, cards of another, intent to use them?

MR. GASTON: Yep. And --

THE COURT: Those are the three elements? All right. All right.

1	Well, hold on. Let me just write those down.
2	MS. LEXIS: Do you want to do that? I mean, PSP is a C.
3	MR. GASTON: No. It it's a
4	MS. LEXIS: Well, you're trying to go for the misdemeanor?
5	MR. GASTON: Yeah. Possession of stolen property, it's only a C if it
6	has a value over something, right?
7	THE COURT: All. Right. So possession, cards of another, and intent
8	to use. And why and what are what are you what's the lesser-included?
9	MR. GASTON: Possession, cards of another. So it's it's,
10	essentially, the same crime. You're possessing property
11	THE COURT: You just don't need to show the intent to use the you
12	don't need to show the intent to do something with that stolen property in the
13	future?
14	MR. GASTON: Correct. And obtaining it or or whatever the other
15	one was, possessing personal identifying information of another, I would argue
16	same same premise, lesser-included there, too.
17	THE COURT: Won't it be confusing to the jury to have a
18	lesser-included instruction for a count that's not on the verdict form?
19	MR. GASTON: Well, I want the count to be on the verdict form.
20	I don't think it I don't know if Tegan submitted a verdict form. But if
21	she didn't, I'm going to make the executive decision here. We want the that
22	that's the whole point here. We I mean, I don't really see a point of
23	THE COURT: Well, can you interrupt or can you excuse me one
24	second. I need to ask my law clerk a question. All right?
25	There's a file I want you to get. It's it's in my credenza, lower, lower

lateral. It's called lesser-included/lesser-related. It's a file. Will you go get it?

Thank you. All right.

MR. GASTON: And I'm -- I'm asking for that to be on the verdict form, possession of stolen property, as a misdemeanor. We don't call it a misdemeanor, you know, we don't -- we don't label it or whatever, but --

THE COURT: No. You don't label it.

MR. GASTON: -- possession of stolen property. I feel it's a lesser-included of possession of those specific items with intent to defraud. So.

THE COURT: Well, Ms. Lexis, there is evidence that there are stolen goods or -- or purportedly -- there is evidence that the goods that were found in Apartment 218 --

MS. LEXIS: 218. Good memory, Judge.

THE COURT: -- 218 were -- were, in fact, stolen. And there's argument that -- that they were perhaps in the possession, custody, or control of the defendant, given that -- given that he had -- well, he acknowledged touching the gun and -- and taking it apart.

MS. LEXIS: But that wasn't proven at trial. That was only in opening. MR. GASTON: We don't have to prove anything. We just have to -- MS. LEXIS: He hasn't acknowledged anything.

THE COURT: I think -- you put on that evidence of the jail calls. He said in the jail calls that he took the guns apart and hid them around the apartment. That was your evidence.

MS. LEXIS: Well, the gun. The gun.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. LEXIS: But that -- the gun's not stolen, that we know of.

1	THE COURT: Oh, the gun wasn't stolen. Okay.
2	MS. LEXIS: He didn't acknowledge moving anything else in the jail
3	calls. He didn't talk about the credit cards, the ID, the phones. He didn't talk
4	about any of that, just the gun.
5	THE COURT: So he didn't admit he possessed them. But you're
6	saying there's no evidence
7	MS. LEXIS: Yes.
8	THE COURT: that he possessed them?
9	MS. LEXIS: I mean, technically, because when Mr. Gaston
0	THE COURT: I mean, you're that hold on for a second.
1	You're not suggesting that this the defense only gets a
2	lesser-included if it puts on the evidence that it it committed the
3	lesser-included?
4	MS. LEXIS: No, not at all.
5	THE COURT: All right. But if there's any evidence in the record that
6	would support a lesser-included, I should consider giving it.
7	MS. LEXIS: Yes, of course.
8	THE COURT: So
9	MS. LEXIS: And if it falls within Blockburger and and you know
0	other cases, where it where it meets the definition, yes.
1	THE COURT: Okay. And so you're saying that there that there's
2	no evidence for which a jury could infer that he was in possession of the stolen
3	goods?
4	MS. LEXIS: There is absolutely evidence of it. But, I mean, we're

arguing that it's our corroborating evidence that he was in possession of the

1	stolen property.
2	THE COURT: So there is evidence
3	MS. LEXIS: And that there is
4	THE COURT: for that the jury could believe that he was in
5	possession of stolen goods.
6	MS. LEXIS: Right. I I'm sorry. I was just correcting the court in
7	terms of what he had admitted. He didn't admit that.
8	THE COURT: Oh, oh, yeah.
9	MS. LEXIS: Yeah.
10	THE COURT: He he only admitted it as to the gun.
11	MS. LEXIS: Yes. Yes, Your Honor.
12	THE COURT: Yeah. But I'm but I'm thinking, couldn't isn't it a
13	reasonable inference that if if the stuff was in his apartment
14	MS. LEXIS: Uh-huh.
15	THE COURT: and he admitted having the gun, he admitted taking
16	the gun apart. I think the jury could infer that he had possession of the stolen
17	goods.
18	MS. LEXIS: Your Honor, as it pertains to the possession of credit
19	card or possession of ID, I'll submit to the court in whether insofar as whether
20	the possession of stolen property is a lesser-included. But I just don't think it's
21	appropriate it's an appropriate lesser-included for robbery or burglary.
22	THE COURT: Oh.
23	MR. GASTON: It doesn't matter. I I just want it on the verdict form
24	possession of stolen property, specific to those items.

THE COURT: Well, we don't tell the jury what -- I mean, we don't tell

1	the jury it's one or the other. We just give them the options, and let them decide
2	based on the evidence.
3	MR. GASTON: So it would be it would be a lesser-included
4	MS. LEXIS: Well, I'm sorry.
5	MR. GASTON: under those specific charges, the possession of
6	MS. LEXIS: Yes. That's that's what I'm saying.
7	THE COURT: Oh, you wanted lesser-included under under
8	everything, and she says it should only be lesser-included to possession of the
9	stolen credit cards?
10	MR. GASTON: Well, I mean, I agree with Ms. Lexis on possession of
11	stolen property. It's a lesser-included of the of the possession
12	MS. LEXIS: Of the credit card and ID.
13	THE COURT: The credit card drives.
14	MR. GASTON: Right. I think we're saying the same thing.
15	MS. LEXIS: We are.
16	MR. GASTON: We're on the same page.
17	MS. LEXIS: But not as it pertains to the burglary or the robbery with
18	use.
19	MR. GASTON: And so it's like one count maybe one count of
20	possession of stolen property or it would be a count for every item.
21	MS. LEXIS: One.
22	MR. GASTON: I think it's one count. Yeah. It's just it's just a
23	separate verdict.
24	THE COURT: It's not one for each credit card.
25	MC LEVIC: No

'	MR. GASTON: It's just a separate It's It's not under anything on
2	the verdict form. It would just be Count 15, possession of stolen property. Right?
3	MS. LEXIS: No. If if you're saying it's a lesser-included
4	MR. GASTON: Well, then, how do you put that without putting it
5	under
6	MS. LEXIS: it needs to go underneath the possession of credit card
7	without debit on that part of the verdict form.
8	THE COURT: Give me a second to find it.
9	MS. LEXIS: On that part of the verdict form.
10	MR. GASTON: I think it would go under each of the it would go
11	under each of the verdicts that it's a lesser-included.
12	MS. LEXIS: Right.
13	MR. GASTON: Each of the counts that it's a lesser-included for.
14	MS. LEXIS: Correct.
15	MR. GASTON: And then just later, if if that's what they come back,
16	it's not that he has three convictions of possession of stolen property, just one.
17	MS. LEXIS: Correct. One per count.
18	THE COURT: So
19	MR. GASTON: Yeah. That's what yes. We're saying the same
20	thing.
21	THE COURT: on the verdict form that I'm looking at proposed by
22	the State, it looks like this wouldn't affect Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.
23	But when I get to Count 12, Count 12 is possession of document or personal
24	identifying information. Are you saying that that it would be referenced under
25	that?

1	MS. LEXIS: Yes.
2	THE COURT: So the one option would be guilty of possession of
3	document or personal identifying information.
4	The next then we would have another add another box above not
5	guilty, which would be
6	MS. LEXIS: PS possession of stolen property, and then not guilty.
7	MR. GASTON: Correct.
8	MS. LEXIS: We can do that.
9	MR. GASTON: And then the same same principle for the other
10	possession counts.
11	THE COURT: For 13 and 14?
12	MS. LEXIS: Correct.
13	THE COURT: All right. That will be the court's order. I am inclined
14	to I I am going to give the I am going to allow the possession of stolen
15	property instruction as requested by the defense, which is page 15.
16	MR. GASTON: Thank you.
17	THE COURT: So would the State please add that?
18	MS. LEXIS: Yes, Your Honor.
19	MR. GASTON: Thank you.
20	THE COURT: All right. Next the next instruction what about this
21	page 16:
22	Every person who after the commission of a felony destroys or
23	conceals or aids in the destruction or concealment of material evidence.
24	Does the State have an opposition to that?
25	I don't think I made a ruling on that one. Or at least my my tentative

1	was not to give that one yesterday, when I was
2	MS. LEXIS: Yes. There's been absolutely no evidence of the
3	defendant doing any of this.
4	THE COURT: Is this referring to the video again? And the the
5	showup form? I think that's what this relates to.
6	MS. LEXIS: No.
7	MR. GASTON: Or to accessory after the crime definition.
8	MS. LEXIS: This is their accessory after the crime.
9	MR. GASTON: Yeah.
0	MS. LEXIS: He's not charged with that. There's no evidence that he
1	did any of that. This goes back to I mean, they claimed in opening statement,
2	which is not evidence, that, you know, he saw the police, he panicked, Bobby just
3	dropped off all the stuff. And and in his panic, he committed the crime of
4	accessory after the fact, because he did X, Y, or Z. You know, he
5	THE COURT: Oh, he hid the he hid the evidence.
6	MS. LEXIS: Right. But that's not evidence. That didn't come out
7	during trial at all.
8	THE COURT: What didn't come out at trial?
9	MS. LEXIS: That he did any of that.
20	THE COURT: Well, the gun's evidence.
21	MS. LEXIS: That's that's true. The gun is evidence.
22	THE COURT: And he hid and he hid the gun.
23	MS. LEXIS: That's true.
24	THE COURT: So
25	MS. LEXIS: But he's not charged with an accessory.

1	THE COURT: Okay. I I understand your is this another case
2	where it's a lesser-included?
3	MS. LEXIS: I don't think so.
4	THE COURT: Let's see.
5	MS. LEXIS: No, it's absolutely not. Because
6	THE COURT: Well, no, because it's a different it's a whole differen
7	element.
8	MS. LEXIS: It's a whole different crime.
9	MR. GASTON: It's a different crime.
10	THE COURT: It's a whole different crime.
11	MS. LEXIS: Right.
12	THE COURT: He wasn't charged with this?
13	MR. GASTON: Correct.
14	THE COURT: Why do you want a an instruction on a crime he
15	wasn't charged with, it's not even lesser-included?
16	MR. GASTON: Two distinct two distinct issues.
17	THE COURT: Okay.
18	MR. GASTON: First, go ahead and make my brief request. I'm
19	asking that the court give, as a lesser-related, on the verdict form of accessory to
20	the crime.
21	THE COURT: Oh.
22	MR. GASTON: It is a separate felony crime. It's not like aiding and
23	attempting where liability is imputed through some vicarious it's just a separate
24	crime. I think it is a lesser
25	THE COURT: So that is a separate crime?

MR. GASTON: Accessory to a felony. Or accessory after the fact.

Actually, I don't know the exact title, but I can get it. But it -- it's the definition of --

THE COURT: Well, whatever the -- it might make a difference,

because I need to know the elements.

MR. GASTON: It's the elements that's defined right there in the -- in the jury instruction.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay.

MR. GASTON: That defines the crime. That's from the statute.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GASTON: And, basically, you help after the fact. So it wasn't -- it's different than aiding and abetting, because it's not like you intended from the outset to complete the crime. It's Joe commits the crime, goes to Bob's house, and Bob helps him cover it up. Bob is guilty not of the initial crime, but he's guilty of a separate crime, a C felony, one to five years in prison.

So I'm asking first the instruction should be given, because I'm asking for this on the verdict form, as well, of as a separate felony, because I believe it's a lesser-related.

Under *Peck*, I think it's pretty clear that the court has to -- can -- it's not maybe the most favored instructions and kind of things to do. But I still think the court has the discretion. They're really worried about notice issues. It's not fair that we can kind of sandbag the State with different felony instructions or felony charges they didn't know they had to prove.

In this case, the trial's been going on for 9, 10 days, I don't think they're sandbagged. I don't think the same notice issues that the supreme court talked about in that case.

So I guess as my first request, I think the instruction should be given to support our lesser-related crime, if the court determines that that should be given.

And with response to the brief, it's the theory of our defense -- it is the

And with response to the brief, it's the theory of our defense -- it is the theory of our defense he's an accessory. It's helpful to the jury to know that. And there is evidence to support it, because if the jury comes back -- I mean, there's evidence to support it.

The inference could be exactly what we've been doing our entire defense around. So that there is evidence to support our theory. And it can be only -- it doesn't matter how much of it, it's just is there some evidence, no matter how slight or marginal. So I think we've met our burden, and if the court is inclined to give the lesser-related before I get to my second argument -- if the court is inclined to give the lesser-related, then it should give this jury instruction to define it obviously, as well.

THE COURT: I'm just trying to refamiliarize myself with some of the authorities here. I know, my recollection is *Peck* stood for the proposition that not only are courts not required to give lesser-related instructions, they should not do so if the State has not charged or attempted during trial to prove the lesser-related offense.

And I don't think in this case there's anything to suggest, either in opening statements or any of the questioning, that the State has attempted to prove the lesser related crime of -- of accessory after the fact or -- or, you know, whatever is the crime demonstrated by the elements on page 16.

Now, I notice that *Peck* was limited to some extent by the *Rosas v*State case, 122 Nev. 1258 (2006). I think that was only to the -- with respect to

lesser-included offenses. I don't think *Rosas* has changed the *Peck* ruling on lesser-related offenses. That's my recollection, but I've got to read some of my notes --

MS. LEXIS: That's mine, as well.

THE COURT: -- on Rosas right now.

MS. LEXIS: That's mine as well.

MR. GASTON: No. I -- I agree with what you're saying --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GASTON: -- with respect to that. My only difference would be the interpretation of *Peck* and the [indiscernible] relateds. It says courts -- should tend not to do it because of A, B, and C. And if the -- and my position would be that if those reasons as to why they shouldn't be given aren't present, then we should go back to where we were originally, and they should be given.

And reasons I remember *Peck* talking about are, you know, the surprise to the State. It -- they -- they're -- they get the right to decide what they're going to choose to charge. We shouldn't be able to let them, last second, force them to scramble to try to prove this other case. And I don't think we've done that.

So largely, I believe the issues were notice issues, which aren't necessarily present here.

MS. LEXIS: I completely disagree. I -- my understanding of *Peck* is exactly as the court articulated it. We have not ever -- this is not a charged offense. We have never asserted it. We have never attempted to prove this during trial.

I disagree with his analysis completely. My understanding of *Peck* is you do -- you are not to give lesser-related instructions. It is disfavored for the

very reasons that Mr. Gaston has indicated. The -- the State makes the charging decisions. And so when we come into trial, we come into trial knowing what our burden is. And I don't think the -- the defense gets the opportunity to say, hey, this is lesser-related, so we want this on the jury form. Never mind the fact, State, that, one, the charging entity, you, never even bothered to charge it; or two, didn't try proving this particular offense at trial; or three, this is kind of what we argued in closing, but we didn't really give evidence to. I just think that's completely unfair.

THE COURT: I can't -- I'm going to go along with -- with what I think is *Peck*. And here's -- here's the reasons why I think that the supreme court has been gravitating towards a more bright line approach on lesser-related. Eventually they're going to say, you know, the courts don't have the discretion to give them, I think.

But, you know, we have *Peck* and then we have -- we have *Barton v State*, 2001, which was it reported, unreported, I don't know. I have that. But it did say after some dialogue:

This is consistent with our recent decision in *Peck*, to extinguish the use of lesser-related offense instructions, as an attempt to rectify what has become an abyss of confusion for district courts in determining what instructions they are to give."

That's *Barton* in 2001.

And then we have 2015, it's unpublished, but at least it -- it lets me see what three of the judges were thinking on the supreme court in -- in a footnote, saying *Peck* stands for the proposition that, you know, district courts are not required to give instructions on lesser-related offenses, and should not do so if the State has not charged or attempted to prove the lesser-related.

13

16

20

23

24 25

I -- I understand the distinction that you're making, Mr. Gaston, that -that perhaps that should be limited to those situations where the State has not had sufficient notice of the particular lesser-related crime, and is somehow prejudiced in their ability to defend against it -- or ability to promote it.

I don't want to draw that distinction. I -- under the circumstances here where the State has not attempted to prove the lesser-related and didn't argue it and didn't charge it, I'm not going to give it.

MR. GASTON: With respect to the State's second argument that there was no evidence to support it, are we considering that issue or we don't have to because you already independently --

THE COURT: I -- I think there is some evidence to support it. I will put that on the record. I -- I think there is some -- some evidence to support the lesser-related charge. But that's not the charge that they elected to proceed on. And so I think, under the circumstances, the current state of the law, the court should not give a lesser-related instruction.

MR. GASTON: So with respect to a second argument for the jury instruction, not the lesser-related charge --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GASTON: -- but -- so court's denied the appearing on the verdict form, I still think independently from that the instruction should be given, in connection with another instruction I'm assuming Tegan put in there. And if she didn't, I'm asking for it now.

But we have -- our entire theory is that it was an accessory after the felony -- or accessory after the fact. I just think it should be clear to the jury that being an accessory after the fact does not make you liable for the original crime.

Everyone watches TV. Everyone knows in their head the conspiracy theories in aiding and abetting. And I don't want them to get the wrong idea of that if they believe or if they have a doubt as to whether our version of events happened or didn't happen, that that somehow doesn't matter, because he's still guilty of robbery.

Like, that would kill me if the jury came back and said, hey, no, we believe you, that Bobby did it. And that your guy just helped cover up the evidence after that fact. But doesn't that make him just as guilty? That's why we found him guilty. That would kill me.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. GASTON: So I just think independently we should give an instruction to finding accessory after the fact, and another instruction, if it's not already in there, saying being an accessory after the fact does not make you liable for the crimes.

THE COURT: You can argue that. He hasn't, but you can certainly argue that he hasn't been charged with being an accessory after the fact. The State had -- you know, the State hasn't argued that he's an accessory after the fact. It is the State's burden to prove the elements of what he was charged with, and looking at those elements, he didn't -- he -- you know, there's insufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that he did those things. You can make all those arguments. I don't think we need a -- I'm not going to have a jury instruction on the accessory, because I think it'll confuse the jury.

MR. GASTON: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right. But I'm allowing you to make the argument that he was not charged as an accessory, and even if he was an accessory, that

doesn't meet the burden that the State has to -- that doesn't satisfy the elements that the -- that the State has to prove for what he was charged with.

MR. GASTON: Thank you.

THE COURT: You can make those arguments. All right. But we don't -- I don't want another jury instruction.

So 15 is not given. I'm going to mark on here rejected and give it to the court clerk, so you have a record of what I refused. Okay.

That's 15 and 16 are -- it looks like they're identical. I don't know the difference between 15 and 16. But they both begin, Every person who after the commission of a felony displays or conceals.

MR. GASTON: Okay.

THE COURT: I'm rejecting both of those. One's --

Oh, can I have that one back, please?

MS. LEXIS: And No. 17, as well?

THE COURT: Well, I'm not there yet.

MS. LEXIS: Oh, okay.

[Pause in proceedings.]

THE COURT: So go back to -- so 16 was not given. That's the one we were talking about.

What -- what did we decide on 15? Did we -- 15 is the one that says -- is this the lesser-included, A person who commits an offense involving stolen property, if the person, for his or her own gain or to prevent the owner from again possessing the owner's property, buys, receives, possesses, or withholds property knowing that it is stolen property or under such circumstances as should have caused a reasonable person to know that it is stolen property.

	1
	2
	3
	4
	5
	6
	7
	8
	9
1	0
1	1
1	2
1	3
1	4
1	5
1	6
1	7
1	8
1	9
2	0
2	1
2	2
2	3
_	

1	MR. GASTON: I think that was the lesser.
2	MS. LEXIS: You allowed this one.
3	THE COURT: So that's the lesser-included?
4	MS. LEXIS: Yeah. You allowed that one.
5	THE COURT: Yeah. So that one's okay.
6	MS. LEXIS: I'll add I'll add it.
7	THE COURT: All right. Thank you. I appreciate that.
8	So then, let's go to 17. Yeah, 17, I'm rejecting based on prior
9	discussions. Your objection is noted for the record and incorporated herein. You
0	can make any further comment, if you wanted to.
1	MR. GASTON: No. I'm I'm good on that. I I don't believe the
2	defense submitted any instructions in paper. I would just, while I'm here, go
3	ahead and request orally that the State would give or that the court gives two
4	other lesser-related offenses for the same reasons I talked about earlier.
5	THE COURT: Go ahead.
6	MR. GASTON: Specifically, obstructing a public officer and providing
7	a false statement to the police officers. I believe the evidence came out sufficient
8	to support those. It is our theory of the case, and I just renew my argument earlier
9	about why I think the lesser-related should be given.
0	MS. LEXIS: And I renew my objection for the same analysis as what
1	we've just been talking about.
2	THE COURT: All right. I'm going to deny the request on the grounds
3	that it's the court's view that it should not give lesser-related where the State has

not charged them or sought to prove them in this case. And the court finds that

the State has not sought to prove those lesser-related offenses in this trial, as of

1	yet.
2	MR. GASTON: Thank you, Your Honor.
3	THE COURT: Okay. But your objection is noted for the record.
4	MR. GASTON: Okay.
5	MS. LEXIS: Thank you.
6	THE COURT: Are there any other jury instructions that the State
7	wishes to to give or wishes the court to consider?
8	MS. LEXIS: No, Your Honor.
9	THE COURT: Are there any additional objections that the State
10	wishes to put on the record?
11	MS. LEXIS: No, Your Honor. Thank you for your indulgence.
12	THE COURT: All right. Are there any additional instructions that the
13	defense would like to propose?
14	MR. GASTON: No, Your Honor.
15	THE COURT: Are there any additional objections that you would like
16	to place on the record?
17	MR. GASTON: No. This is probably a dumb question. All of the
18	proposals that we just gave you, we always submit those as court exhibits, right?
19	So the actual paper instructions are there?
20	THE COURT: The ones that I reject
21	MR. GASTON: Because I don't think we read that one
22	THE COURT: I I mark rejected and give to the court clerk.
23	MR. GASTON: Okay.
24	THE COURT: But but the ones there's some that you guys agree
25	to, in which case I don't mark it. There's some if you want it if you want

everything you submitted to be part of the record, you've got to ask the clerk to mark that.

MR. GASTON: No, that's not -- the rejected ones -- are the ones that --

THE COURT: Yeah. Let's just make sure that all the rejected ones -- the only one that I didn't give, the instruction that said:

The defendant is presumed not guilty.

You wanted it change to unless. I didn't give that one to the court clerk. I'll give that one right now to mark that as rejected.

I think all the others --

MR. GASTON: I think that's all I've got.

THE COURT: The one on circumstantial evidence with the two or more reasonable conclusions, I'm not sure if I gave that to the court clerk, so I'm giving her another copy right now --

MR. GASTON: Okay.

THE COURT: -- marked rejected. Okay.

MR. GASTON: Okay.

THE COURT: Now, what about the -- the stipulations that we reached? There's one on jail calls. I saw that Tegan sent me an e-mail with the language that -- for the instruction that she was going to include, and that instruction reads:

This court has ordered that the jail calls presented to the jury in this case be redacted. You are not to speculate as to the contents of the redactions.

You'll -- both parties agree to that instruction?

24

25

1

MS. LEXIS:	Yes.	And	I believe	I include	ed it in tl	nis packet.	Did I	not?
THE COURT	: Oka	ay. \	√ery good	d.				

MR. GASTON: We also got another -- that doesn't replace the earlier limiting instruction the court said it's going to give, right, on -- not to assume -absent other evidence, not to assume they did anything wrong?

MS. LEXIS: No. That's not in place of -- it's both.

MR. GASTON: Okay. Okay.

THE COURT: Oh, okay. And the instruction on showup identification, irrebuttable presumption, I marked rejected, not given. In this case I didn't give it to the clerk yesterday, that's on page 11 of your set, I'm handing it to her now. And I think you had one more irrebuttable presumption instruction, and I wanted to make sure --

MR. GASTON: Page 10, page 10 in the --

MS. LEXIS: Yes. It was page 10.

THE COURT: Page 10. Will you help me look for page 10 through all that stuff and that stuff? I just want to make sure that -- oh [indiscernible] page 10. And I have it here. Give me a moment. I want to make sure that page 10 gets marked.

THE CLERK: I have it.

THE COURT: You have it? Can you -- let's mark that rejected so he preserves his -- there it is. So everything has been marked now.

MR. GASTON: Thank you.

MS. LEXIS: And also flight, you rejected for both the State. So I think that was in there.

THE COURT: Oh, did you want that marked?

1	MS. LEXIS: Oh, I don't no.
2	THE COURT: I thought there was a stipulation not to give flight.
3	MR. GASTON: No. We we objected to their flight instruction, you
4	agreed not to give theirs. They objected to ours, you agreed not to give ours. But
5	that was the court's ruling, not a stipulation.
6	THE COURT: Okay, then. Then we'll go ahead and submit those, as
7	well.
8	MS. LEXIS: Perfect.
9	THE COURT: Do you happen to remember the number?
10	MS. LEXIS: Their flight instruction was it was their No. 8.
11	THE COURT: Their No. 8. Will you find that for me, please.
12	Everything got mixed up.
13	MS. LEXIS: Their No. 8 and our I'm sorry, ours doesn't have page
14	numbers. It's towards the end of the original. But I I already took it apart.
15	MR. GASTON: You trying to say in terms of the court's exhibit?
16	MS. LEXIS: I already took it out of your copy, because or the new
17	copy that I sent you.
18	THE COURT: Oh, yeah, the clerk already has it.
19	MS. LEXIS: Okay.
20	THE COURT: Already has their page 8. And your proposed flight
21	instruction, we need to give it to the clerk.
22	MS. LEXIS: You want it?
23	THE COURT: Yeah.
24	MS. LEXIS: Okay.
25	THE COURT: It needs to be marked rejected.
1	3.0

Madam Clerk, you can mark that rejected.

Thank you. All right. Very good. Then we'll see you guys back

MS. I FXIS: I'll e-mail.

at 1:00. All right.

THE COURT: This concludes the settling of the jury instructions. I'll ask the State to please put -- make sure you prepare a complete set.

MS. LEXIS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: We don't need -- we don't usually in this department give one set to each of the jurors.

MS. LEXIS: Okay.

THE COURT: We just give one for the foreman, one for the court clerk, and then -- and then one for each of you.

MS. LEXIS: Okay.

MR. GASTON: And -- and it is my hope that we finish our surrebuttal case by Friday, so I'm hoping we can close by Monday.

MS. LEXIS: Stop -- stop messing around, Tyler. You just --

MR. GASTON: I think we're closing today. I was joking.

THE COURT: Why do you scare me?

MR. GASTON: I was just joking.

MS. LEXIS: He -- he does that, you know. He's a pain.

Your Honor, so the instructions that Tegan e-mailed concerning the stipulations or the limiting instructions, would you like those all incorporated into the original instructions? Or were they going to be exhibits? What are we doing with that?

THE COURT: Put those in the -- in the set of jury instructions --

1	MS. LEXIS: Okay.
2	THE COURT: so I can read them again to the jurors.
3	MS. LEXIS: Okay.
4	MR. GASTON: Thank you.
5	THE COURT: All right.
6	MS. LEXIS: I'll include them.
7	THE COURT: Thank you. Thanks. Have a have a good day. I'll
8	see you back at 1:00.
9	MS. LEXIS: See you at 1:00.
10	THE COURT: All right.
11	[Court recessed from 11:41 a.m., until 1:10 p.m.]
12	[Outside the presence of the jury.]
13	THE COURT: Hi. State vs. Valentine, C-316081.
14	The State may call its next rebuttal witness.
15	MS. LEXIS: We're not going to be calling a rebuttal witness. We're
16	ready to rest.
17	THE COURT: Oh.
18	MS. LEXIS: Yesterday after court, I sent Ms. Machnich well, I told
19	her I would send her the transcript of the redactions on the jail call that was at
20	issue yesterday. I did that at 5:00 a.m. this morning, as soon as I could type it up
21	because I manually type it up myself.
22	I sent it to Ms. Machnich and just asked her if she could get me her
23	thoughts or additions or deletions as soon as possible, so that I can give them to
24	IT, so they can do the actual clip of the audio.
25	Ms. Machnich, I don't think she had an opportunity to look through or

25

look through the redactions or anything like that.

Our office also had extreme technical issues this morning. No one had access to their computers. So at this point, the State is not going to be moving to play or admit the jail call at issue from yesterday.

THE COURT: Oh, good.

MS. LEXIS: I did ask Ms. Machnich if she wanted it played for some reason, and she indicated that she did not.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, that simplifies a lot of things.

MS. LEXIS: It does. And so that's, I guess, a nonissue at this point. So we're not -- we're resting.

THE COURT: Is there -- so you rest? All right.

Any surrebuttal from the defense?

MS. MACHNICH: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Very good. Are we going to bring the jury in and let them know that both sides have rested and we can move forward with reading the instructions and doing closing arguments.

I have the final form of jury instructions and the final verdict form has been presented to me.

How did I get it?

MS. LEXIS: It was e-mailed to me and I printed it for you.

THE COURT: Very good. So it's been e-mailed to the Court. Who e-mailed it?

MS. LEXIS: My secretary, Laura Mollinox [phonetic].

THE COURT: All right. I have just have juror questions.

MS. LEXIS: I did not have access to e-mail, so --

1	THE COURT: So your secretary the State secretary e-mailed it.
2	MS. LEXIS: Yes.
3	THE COURT: Did the State secretary include the defense on the
4	same e-mail?
5	MS. LEXIS: Yes.
6	MS. MACHNICH: Yes.
7	THE COURT: All right. So now, let me ask the defense, has the
8	defense had a chance to review that e-mail to confirm that the form of the that
9	the jury instructions and the form of the verdict is consistent with our our
10	dialogue?
11	MR. GASTON: Yes, sir.
12	THE COURT: Okay. Very good. Thank you.
13	MS. MACHNICH: Yes.
14	THE COURT: All right. Then I have the final set, and so it's
15	consistent, we can move forward.
16	Let's bring the jury in.
17	The set that I have is the final agreed-upon set well, agreed, subjec
18	to your discussion. That's what I'm going to read to the jury. So I just wanted to
19	make sure oh, wait, wait. It hasn't been numbered yet.
20	I've got to number I'm going to, here, give this to my law clerk.
21	She's going to number this for me, 1 through whatever note that page 1 is
22	number 1.
23	MS. LEXIS: Okay.
24	THE COURT: Okay. Do you guys each have your own set to follow
25	along?

1	MS. LEXIS: Yes.
2	THE COURT: All right.
3	MS. LEXIS: It took a lot it took a while, but.
4	THE COURT: No. Thank you for getting all that work done. I
5	appreciate it.
6	MS. LEXIS: That's okay.
7	THE COURT: I know how hard that is. Well, your set's not going to
8	be numbered, but
9	MS. LEXIS: We can I'll number it.
10	THE COURT: Just fill in the numbers as you go along.
11	MS. LEXIS: Okay.
12	THE COURT: So we can make sure we all have the same page.
13	MS. LEXIS: I only printed one copy, Mike.
14	[Jury reconvened at 1:14 p.m.]
15	THE COURT: All right. Please be seated, everybody.
16	Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, since we've seen you, a lot's been
17	figured out. At this point, I I asked the State if they have an additional rebuttal
18	witness, and they said no, that they now have rested.
19	Is that correct?
20	MS. LEXIS: That is correct. We rest.
21	THE COURT: All right. And then I have asked the defense if they
22	have any further witnesses, and they rest also.
23	Correct?
24	MR. GASTON: Yes, sir.
25	THE COURT: All right. Very good. So that concludes the evidence

1	MS. MACHNICH: Thank you.					
2	[End of bench conference.]					
3	THE COURT: This is the right one.					
4	[Jury instructions read (cont.)]					
5	THE COURT: Can you guys approach?					
6	[Bench conference transcribed as follows.]					
7	THE COURT: That should should the					
8	MR. GASTON: The jury shouldn't be in there.					
9	THE COURT: Should the jury be stricken?					
10	MS. MACHNICH: Yes.					
11	THE COURT: Okay. Okay. Thank you. I'll just strike that.					
12	[End of bench conference.]					
13	THE COURT: Okay. Let me start over. There was a typo my					
14	catch.					
15	[Jury instructions read (cont.)]					
16	THE COURT: Counsel, any comments regarding the instructions to					
17	be put on the record?					
18	MS. LEXIS: Not from the State.					
19	MS. MACHNICH: No, Your Honor.					
20	THE COURT: All right. I am providing the original jury instructions					
21	now to the court clerk.					
22	Was there a set that I can use to follow along with during closing					
23	statements closing arguments?					
24	You know, what, I'm going to keep I'm going to keep hold of the					
25	original jury instructions just for reference during closing arguments. And the					

verdict form is now being handed to the court clerk.

The State may now present its closing argument to the jury.

MR. DICKERSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. DICKERSON: Ladies and gentlemen, over the past two weeks, in this courtroom, the evidence has become clear. It's become so clear, in fact, that it tells us exactly what the defendant was doing here in Las Vegas, Nevada, from May 26, 2016, to May 28, 2016; he was robbing every single victim that got on the stand.

Ladies and gentlemen, in a criminal case, this one included, the State must prove two things: That a crime was committed, that the defendant committed it.

Here, we look to the crimes. We have a number of crimes charged, including robbery with the use of a deadly weapon -- seven counts, one for each victim of that robbery. The first being Marvin Bass, Darrell Faulkner, Deborah Faulkner, Jordan Alexander, Santiago Garcia, Lazaro Bravo-Torres, and Mrs. Rosa Vazkuez Ramirez. Additionally the defendant is charged with attempt robbery with use of a deadly weapon for his action in attempting to rob Juan Carlos Campos Torres, bringing him down from the roof that fateful day.

Additionally, he's charged with burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon. That's reference the acts going into Mr. Marvin Bass's car to rob him; going into the Faulkners' garage to rob them; and entering the vehicle of Lazaro Bravo-Torres, to rob him and his wife.

Additionally, he's charged with possession of a document or personal identifying information of another, for having the Nevada identification card of

Jordan Alexander in his possession at the time of his arrest.

And finally two counts of possession of a credit card or debit card without cardholders' consent. Those are for having Jordan Alexander's Visa card and Mrs. Rosa Vazkuez Torres -- or Rosa Vazkuez Ramirez's credit card, as well.

Now, first, we'll look to the crimes of robbery with a deadly weapon or attempt robbery with a deadly weapon and burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon. All three of those crimes include the deadly weapon. So let's talk about that first.

You are instructed here what a deadly weapon is, any instrument that's used in the ordinary manner contemplated, which was likely to cause substantial bodily harm or death; that's a deadly weapon. Or anything that's used under the circumstances that could cause such damage is a deadly weapon.

But, specifically, here, in this case and under the law, you are instructed that a firearm is, in fact, a deadly weapon. It's that easy.

Now, you've heard evidence of the firearm here and the use of that firearm under the robbery, the -- in order to use a deadly weapon, it need not be actually produced to cause harm, but only conduct which produces fear of harm. All right. And I think that it's very clear that we have that here; in every single instance, we have that use of the deadly weapon, because that gun was used to produce a fear of harm.

And without a doubt, we have the deadly weapon. You heard from every single victim who told you varying accounts how they described the gun. Multiple victims describing it as a Glock, which it is; multiple victims describing it as a small, black, semiautomatic handgun, which it is. This is, in fact, a firearm. This is a deadly weapon, ladies and gentlemen.

Based on that, you can also consider the fact that the State does not need to recover the weapon. So the mere testimony of these witnesses telling you what they saw, that gun that they felt pressed against them, the gun that was shoved in their face, seeing it, knowing what it was, that establishes the fact that it's a deadly weapon. We've met that element and that will carry on into the next three crimes that we'll talk about.

Robbery with use of a deadly weapon, the seven counts that we have charged is the first crime that we need to talk about. You heard the instructions from the judge, but we need to go over them carefully again. So robbery is the unlawful taking of personal property from the person of another or in that person's presence.

Now, pay no attention to the pronouns used here. They're interchangeable. It's a crime against a person, man or woman. And here it's either in their presence or from their person; against their will by means of force or violence; fear of injury, immediate or future; to his person or property or the person or property of a member of his or her family. That's important, as well, because we know we have two husbands and wives in this case.

That force or fear used is enough to overcome the resistance to the taking of the property. Just that degree of force is immaterial, as long as it overcomes resistance. Consider that, consider the force used by a gun being pointed in their faces in this case, and how it all comes into play with overcoming a victim's resistance.

Now, it's not necessary to prove both violence and intimidation. If the fact be attended to the -- with the circumstances of threatening word or gesture, as is in common experience, and is likely to create an apprehension of danger

and induce a man or woman to part with his or her property for the safety of that person, it's a robbery.

And there's no doubt we have any of that force here. Absolutely every single situation is enough to make any reasonable person fear not only for their safety, but the safety of their loved ones that are also involved in these circumstances.

We first look to Marvin Bass's robbery that happened just after noon on May 26, 2016. There, at the Rancho Discount Mall at 2901 West Washington, you heard that -- where that red circle is approximately where Mr. Bass had parked. He had gone in and he had gotten himself a new outfit to wear out to a concert that evening.

It was when he got back into his car, he sees a white, small four-door unregistered vehicle pull up right behind him. The driver, the defendant, get out, start walking towards him. Marvin Bass thinking, do I know this guy? Rolls down his window.

Give me your gold, give me your wallet, or I'll shoot your fat ass. That's what he gets. In his hand, described as a Glock handgun.

What does he get? He gets the gold with the diamond-encrusted cross pendant, he gets the gold necklace with the dragon pendant, and he gets Mr. Bass's wallet. The defendant takes all those things. He rips those chains with -- chains with those pendants off Mr. Bass's neck and he takes his wallet right from his person, all while possessing a firearm.

Pulling this firearm out, putting it into the car, reaching into the car, patting Mr. Bass down, without a doubt the use of force and fear of injury to Mr. Bass to get all that property.

24

25

Without telling Mr. Bass, I'm going to shoot you, without pulling out that gun, without his immediate force used upon Mr. Bass rolling down that window, immediately taking his right hand and grabbing those two chains right off his neck. So hard, in fact, that it broke both the clasps, as we learned later. That was a robbery with a deadly weapon, the first one.

The next one, Mr. Jordan Alexander, the first -- the second robbery that occurred on May 28th, 2016. Mr. Alexander was outside of his home at approximately 7:01, probably about two minutes before that, maybe 6:59, 7:00, putting a car seat, and his mother and his fiancee's purses into the vehicle so they can get ready to go out of town and to his auntie's funeral.

That's when unregistered white Mazda 3, with a very specific SKYACTIV symbol on the back in a black placard, pulls up right behind his car.

Defendant gets out, walks around him, pulls out a gun. Once again, Where the money? Where the purses? Give me everything -- using that firearm the entire time to signify exactly what he's going to do if he doesn't get what he wants: Going to get shot.

Mr. Alexander describes it as a small, black semiautomatic handgun. What does he get? The defendant takes Mr. Alexander's wallet, which among other things in that wallet contains these two items: Mr. Alexander's Nevada identification card and this Visa debit card, ending in numbers 8220, items that we know are later found. That is, in fact, a robbery with a deadly weapon. Everything about this shows that the defendant came upon Mr. Alexander, used force, and the fear of violence, to take this property from Mr. Alexander.

The next robbery we look at is robbery with use of a deadly weapon of Santiago Garcia, which occurred at 7:08 a.m., approximately, on May 28th, 2016,

there on Nye Street. As Mr. Garcia was doing landscaping with Mr. Campos

Torres, getting ready to cut down that tree, they see a white unregistered small
sports-type vehicle, pull down the street, pass the house, park about three houses
down.

And then they see the defendant get out of that vehicle and make his way right over to the house where they're working. Mr. Garcia, there, at the bottom of the ladder, Mr. Campos Torres on the roof. The defendant pulls out that firearm. Give me your fucking money. He puts that gun within inches of Mr. Garcia's chest, indicating nothing more to Mr. Garcia than this is serious, you might die.

Mr. Garcia described that as a black handgun, and in fact, the defendant at that time takes approximately \$500 in cash and an iPhone with a black case from Mr. Garcia.

Mr. Bravo-Torres and Ms. Vazkuez Ramirez here at their house over on Leonard Street, approximately 7:15 a.m., they too are getting ready to go to work and work as landscapers that day. They've loaded up their truck, they have their trailer attached, and they're pulling out of driveway, when the defendant comes up to them on foot and asks, Hey, which way is Martin Luther King? Mr. Bravo-Torres, in what he could in English, describing where Martin Luther King is.

In the next split second, we know what happens. The defendant again pulls his gun and robs these two individuals. Mr. Bravo-Torres, he tells him don't move, or I'll shoot. And he goes on to tell his wife, Ms. Vazkuez Ramirez, you want me to kill him? In the process, it's noticed that this is a Glock handgun by Mr. Bravo-Torres, and the defendant then goes into their vehicle and he takes

a purse out of the center console, which contains a Samsung phone, a Visa debit card, the identification card of Rosa, and \$40 to \$50 approximately. That Visa -- that -- excuse me -- that Visa debit card, we all know, later found.

Now, the Faulkners occurs first. And there was -- it was supposed to be on here. Here's the thing, the Faulkners occurred at approximately 6:53 a.m. And it's very important to note these times, because what we're seeing between each one of these incidents, each one of these incidents that occur within less than a two-mile area, as testified to by Detective Majors, occur no more than seven to eight minutes apart, one after another.

Darrell and Deborah Faulkner were there in their garage getting ready to move, packing. The first of all the victims that day. Who knows why? Who knows why it started? But they're just there, talking as husband and wife do, in a garage full of boxes.

Next thing we know, the defendant walks up their driveway. Deborah looks at Darrell and says, Hey, someone's here for you. Defendant pulls out his gun as he comes into the garage, and he makes them both get down onto the ground. It's there where he forces Mrs. Faulkner to pour out her purse, rummaging through it for anything valuable, which she doesn't have.

Mr. Faulkner, angry as all hell, staring, just staring at the defendant's face, memorizing it. Memorizing it more than anything else. He too described the gun as a Glock, double-large frame. It submit to you that's because he spent all his time, every second he could, studying the defendant's face. In an effort to de-escalate this situation, Mr. Faulkner pulled out his wallet, kept it to himself, and handed the defendant a hundred dollars, there in their garage. The defendant no doubt took that money and he took that money by force or fear of injury to both

Mr. Faulkner and Mrs. Faulkner. So robbery from both of them. They're a married couple. That's their hundred dollars, just as the debit cards and the property that exist in that vehicle of Vazkuez Ramirez and Mr. Bravo-Torres is, in fact, their property.

The fear that both these couples felt for themselves and their spouses goes to the heart of these robberies. That is why the statute and the law reads the way it does. It's not that you have to be the only one to feel fear for your own life, because we all know that sometimes the scariest thing that could ever happen is the fear of losing a loved one right in front of you. And that's exactly what Darrell Faulkner felt. That, too, was a robbery with a deadly weapon, both Darrell and Deborah Faulkner.

The elements for all those crimes have been met.

We go on to the attempt robbery with use of a deadly weapon of Juan Carlos Campos Torres.

Now, an attempt has general elements. That's the intent to commit the crime being one -- the number one. Number two, the performance of some act towards that commission of the crime. And three, the failure to consummate that crime.

Once a person has started the act, the attempt to commit a crime, they cannot avoid being guilty of an attempt, simply because they were prevented or interfered with from committing that crime. That's what you're instructed here in this instruction.

Mr. Juan Carlos Campos Torres, working for Santiago Garcia on May 28th, 2016, was already on the roof. He was on the roof when the defendant came up and tried to rob him. What did the defendant say? What did Mr. Garcia

tell you? Get down. Gun pointed up, get down. We know what the defendant's intent was, because he'd been acting it out all morning, and he continued to act it out right there with Santiago Garcia, robbing him of his money and his phone.

Now, his efforts to try to get Mr. Juan Carlos Campos Torres down from the roof was, in fact, to rob him. The intent is clear. It was an intent to rob Mr. Juan Carlos Campos Torres in addition to Santiago Garcia. There, too, he had the firearm and he used it in the process. That's why he's charged with this crime and that's why he's guilty of that crime; attempt robbery with use of a deadly weapon.

Now, looking to the burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon, touched on it briefly, this is a crime about entry into a structure or a vehicle. Here, we have one structure and two vehicles. We'll go through all three of them. Like we talked about the deadly weapon, as it's been in robbery with a deadly weapon and attempt robbery with a deadly weapon, it's the same, except as you'll hear it's not a matter of use, it's a matter of possession.

So a person who by day or night enters any house, vehicle, or other building with the intent to commit larceny, assault, battery, or any felony is guilty of burglary. In the State of Nevada, the crime of robbery as charged here, as committed against these victims, is a felony.

So it could be larceny, assault, battery, or robbery. And that's what it is. With the intent to commit any of those, the entry renders it burglary.

Every person who commits a crime of burglary, who has in his possession or gains possession of a firearm or deadly weapon during any time during that commission of the crime at any time before leaving the structure or upon leaving the structure, is guilty of burglary while in possession of a deadly

weapon.

So the crime is so specific that if at any point in time, there is a deadly weapon involved or, as in this case, a firearm, that's burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon.

So someone could enter a home with a gun, that's burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon. Someone could enter a home without a gun and get a gun inside a home, that's burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon. Simply having a deadly weapon involved in that person's possession makes it this crime.

Now, as you were instructed, a firearm is a deadly weapon. It's not necessary for us to show that the defendant actually committed a robbery or a larceny or an assault or a battery inside that house, though we have. The -- the gist of the crime, it says here, is the entry -- with that criminal intent. Therefore, a burglary is committed if the defendant entered a house, a vehicle, or other building with the intent to commit, here, robbery; here, assault; here, battery; here, larceny. That entry with the intent makes it a burglary.

The intention with which the entry is made is a question of fact to be inferred by all the conduct that the defendant displays in this case and all circumstances that the evidence shows.

So we don't have to somehow magically peer into the mind of the defendant and say, what were you thinking at that time? Because the evidence shows us. The evidence does it for us, peers into the mind and says, what was he thinking? Well, we know. Because he was doing it all morning and the day before, victim after victim, committing robberies. His intent when he entered all three of the structures that we'll talk about, was no doubt to continue to do the

23

24

25

same. And the reason for that entry was to further his efforts to rob these people.

Very important, an entry is deemed completed when however slight any portion of the intruder's body penetrates a space within the house, vehicle, or building. Any portion. Here, we need to consider this. Now, it's -- the entry is the entry of any portion of that person's body. The firearm possession occurs at the same time, but it's not necessarily that that firearm also has to enter. All right.

Now, an entry being breaking that threshold. My hand crossed through there, that's a portion of my body, that's an entry. If I had the criminal intent to commit a robbery when I made that entry through that door, through that threshold, that would be a burglary.

Here we look to the first. Back to Marvin Bass, on May 26, 2016, there at the Rancho Discount Mall. You heard from Mr. Bass how the robbery took place, that the defendant reached into his car, ripped the necklaces off his neck. The defendant had the gun in his possession at that time. The defendant then shoved the gun actually through the open window, which, though it makes it extremely clear, is not necessary for burglary with a deadly weapon that he put that gun through the window. But, again, we had it on the first, him ripping the chains off his neck while in possession of a firearm, and now we have it again, shoving his hand through the window of Mr. Bass's car.

And then, again, the defendant reaches in, still holding the firearm in his other hand, and pats Mr. Bass down while he's seated inside his vehicle. Very clear. The first entry, his hand through the window to grab those chains and rip them off Mr. Bass's neck. There's only one intent you could have, to further your robbery to commit that larceny.

Next, shoving the gun through the window, your intent is extremely

clear. It goes without saying, to further that robbery, commit that larceny, do what you're doing.

And, finally, patting down Mr. Bass' legs, making sure that he's got everything that he can out of this robbery, clearly, his intent when he made that third entry was also to commit robbery.

Now, we look to the Faulkners, Mr. and Mrs. Faulkner. They're here in their garage at 2605 Rising Legend Way. There they were, standing inside their garage, as they told you. Defendant walks up, pulls out the gun. Mr. Faulkner tells you that by the time Mrs. Faulkner told him, Hey, there's somebody here for you, and he turns around, the gun's out. The gun's out. That's when the entry is made into the garage. At that point in time, it's extremely clear this guy came up to the house with the gun and walked right in. He's not here to see you, Mr. Faulkner. He's here to rob you.

Defendant stood here, approximately, according to the Faulkners, inside the garage. This is the area where he stood, holding the firearm, and approximately in the area of Mrs. Faulkner's head. The easiest way to gain control of Mr. Faulkner was, in fact, doing that. Because Mr. Faulkner seems to be a man that has more fear for the safety of his wife than he does for himself, rightfully so, and that's what happens. Defendant standing there, puts both of them on the ground, and proceeds to rob them.

Now, we take a look, these green lines demonstrate the threshold of their garage. You can see that clearly, the area where the defendant stood is within the threshold of their garage, which is part of their home. It is a building; it is a structure. It is a burglary. Bottom line, he made entry into that garage. He made that entry with the clear intent, as demonstrated by his action a day earlier

and his separate actions following this, as well as the very clear fact that he pulled that firearm out before entering that garage, that he entered with the intent to commit robbery. Again, the defendant is guilty of burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon for the entry into the Faulkners' garage.

Now, we have Mr. Bravo-Torres and Ms. Vazkuez Ramirez here, again, in their vehicle. In the center console, that's where the defendant found the proceeds of his crime and he, in fact, went in to get them. He broke the threshold of their vehicle, coming in through the driver's side door, leaning across that door -- across that seat, and reaching into the center console, all while possessing a firearm. We know that. We know the firearm was already out. It was already pointed at Mr. Bravo-Torres. And that's where he ends up taking Mrs. Vazkuez Ramirez's purse, containing all the items that we later found, and some that he apparently disposed of.

That being so, the defendant is guilty. He's guilty of all seven counts of robbery with a deadly weapon. He's guilty of attempt robbery with use of a deadly weapon. He's guilty of all three counts of burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon.

So we look to the possession of documents or personal identifying information of another. This is the charge that's charged for Mr. Alexander's Nevada identification card. Here it says:

A person who possesses, sells, or transfers any document or personal identifying information for the purpose of establishing a false status, occupation, membership, license, or identity for himself or herself or any other person is guilty of possession of a document or personal identifying information.

Here, we, in fact, find that Nevada identification card in the drawer right next to where the defendant is pretending to be asleep.

Now, important that there is an intent element here in this crime. It's not mere possession alone that's a crime, because we have to have some reason to believe that we're going to want to do something nefarious here. And I think it calls in the fact that we need to look at the following two charges to really consider what we're looking at. And we have the possession of a credit card or debit card without cardholder's consent. These are charged for the two other items that we have there -- the two debit cards. Ms. Rosa Vazkuez Ramirez and Mr. Jordan Alexander's, both of them.

So and that says:

Any person who possesses a credit card without the consent of the cardholder and with the intent to circulate, use, sell, or transfer the credit cards with the intent to defraud is guilty of possession of a credit card without cardholder's consent. A credit card includes a number, identifying information of a credit card, or credit account.

These are both Visa cards, absolutely qualify. That's satisfied.

The fact of the matter is that where an individual under the law has two or more cards issued in the name of another person, then you may infer that that person who has -- they are required to do so, that they've obtained and possessed the credit cards with the knowledge that they have been stolen, and with the intent to circulate, use, sell, or transfer them with the intent to defraud.

So you may infer, just from the fact that he has those two cards, that he intends to use them in a nefarious way, as required under the law. This is important. This is very important, especially considering the fact that we find

these two cards and we find Jordan Alexander's identification card along with them. The possession of that identification card in conjunction with these cards goes to show one thing, it's used to establish a false identity. Used likely to establish a false identity to go along with that card, that card that we know and you have the inference that he's going to use, circulate, in an -- with an intent to defraud.

That being so, there's only one purpose to keep the identification cards.

That being so, there's only one purpose to keep the identification card around, when we see so many other innocuous items that were stolen during these robberies gone, things like other cards, health cards you heard about, things that really don't mean anything.

Now, we have this Nevada identification card being the only young black male victim of these crimes. The only one that could possibly pass for anybody. Right? So it's an easy sell. There's reason to keep the card. It's one thing to use it, hopefully, to try to pass that debit card before it's closed.

So for that reason, the possession of all three of those items is, in fact, criminal. The possession of those cards is criminal because the only reason to keep them after committing those robberies, especially considering one important thing, is to use them to defraud. And the thing I want you to consider is that Jordan Alexander sat up here and he told you that he told the defendant, Hey, I don't have any money, all I have is a card. And the defendant told him, give it to me. So it goes without saying that you don't have the money, but you have the card, give it to me. Well, I'm taking it, because that's just as good, I want to use that.

So all three of those, as well. That makes the defendant guilty of all three -- or all crimes charged here, that being robbery with use of a deadly

weapon, attempt robbery with use of a deadly weapon, three counts of burglary while in possession of a firearm, the possession of a document or personal identifying information of another, and possession of a credit card or debit card without cardholder's consent, two counts of that.

So we've shown that these crimes have, in fact, being committed.

Now, the second thing that the State needs to show in every criminal prosecution, that the defendant, in fact, committed these crimes. Well, we know who committed these crimes. We know through two weeks of evidence that it was, in fact, the defendant who committed all of these crimes.

How do we know this? Well, we know it, because the defendant's been identified -- first by Marvin Bass identifying the defendant saying, I'm very sure the suspect I identified in the photo lineup is him, 100 percent. He was very close to me when he robbed me at gunpoint. That's what Mr. Bass said when he was shown that photo lineup. He was shown that photo lineup only a few days later, on June 1st, 2016. It's right there, 10:00 a.m. Mr. Bass no doubt recognized this guy, no doubt saw the defendant and said, Yeah, that's him, I know it's him, 100 percent.

Mr. Bass then comes in and testifies here in court and tells you, right here, having another opportunity -- his first opportunity since May 26, 2016, to see the defendant. Once again, and look at him and say, Yeah, that's him. That's the guy who robbed me. Again, Mr. Bass identified the defendant, no doubt, as being the individual who robbed him.

Defendant's further identified right after these crimes in the showup, identified by Darrell Faulkner, at approximately 9:17 a.m. The importance of that is key. Mr. Faulkner identifies him only two hours and 20 minutes after being

14

16

17

19

20

22

23

24

25

robbed by him. Two hours and 20 minutes, 100 percent positive. Mr. Faulkner came in this courtroom. He again had an opportunity for the first time since May 28th, 2016, to see the defendant. And he told you, once again, absolutely positive, that's the man who robbed me.

Deborah Faulkner, you heard, she had not seen the defendant nor been asked to identify the defendant since the crime on May 28th, 2016. She came into this courtroom. She sat right here. She looked right over there. And she said, I'm a thousand percent positive that that is the man who robbed me. Once again, the defendant is identified.

Again, Jordan Alexander, we heard, as you can see these videos that -- everything that's been admitted will go back with you. You can review it all again. You can listen to exactly what he said again. The body cam footage of him going to do his showup. He sees the defendant right there. He says he is 100 percent -- a thousand percent, honestly, wow, wow, wow. He then proceeds to write his statement about what he saw, about his showup. He says, I am 100 percent sure that that -- it was that man, because the build of his body, because the hair for sure, the face gave me goose bumps seeing him again. The fact that we were face to face when he took my wallet made me positive that it was him. That was on May 28th, at 9:13 a.m. That's one hour and 54 minutes after Jordan Alexander was robbed by the defendant. Jordan Alexander, too, came in this courtroom and he told you, I'm absolutely positive that is the man who robbed me. Again, the defendant was identified.

And again, by Santiago Garcia -- excuse me -- by Santiago Garcia. Santiago Garcia shows up, sees the defendant, says, Yeah, that's him. I believe that's the guy that the officers had in custody is the guy that robbed me.

16

17

19

21

23

24

25

I 100 percent recognize his facial features. Though you heard that Santiago Garcia can't write. You heard that this is what he instructed the officer to write for him, that this was his statement, that he believed 100 percent it was the defendant who robbed him. And that was at 9:50 a.m. That's two hours and 42 minutes after the defendant robbed him. Again, the defendant was identified.

And again, Rosa Vazkuez Ramirez, she says, I believe that that is him, because the height, his hair, his face. Only he didn't have the same clothes, but I'm 95 percent that, yes, it is him, in Spanish, translated here in court.

Now, Rosa Vazkuez Ramirez, some extremely interesting testimony on identification. Rosa Vazkuez Ramirez sat here, got up, walked over here, clearly, clearly frightened. As the defendant stands up, she gets scared. She says, I don't know. But she still wants something to say. And what happens? She still wants to say something. What do we do? You guys come back in. She's back on the stand. The judge asks her, Tell us what you told us on the break. She said it's -- that's him. Yeah, that's him. It's been a long time, but, yeah, I'm positive that that's him.

Her husband testified, as well, Lazaro Bravo-Torres. He gives a statement upon seeing him at the showup. I saw him, the face is him, the height is him, the skinniness. I don't see the same hair, like he combed it or he cut it around a bit. And the clothes, this one is in shorts and the man had on all his clothes, a black T-shirt and pants, but 90 percent that's him. Once again, Lazaro Bravo-Torres comes in here, he testifies. He testifies that, in fact, it is the defendant who robbed him.

Now, we look to other evidence to see where's the corroboration?

What are we doing? It's clear. It's clear as day, based on those identifications. Based on those identifications of all these people, most of whom, if they aren't husband and wife, don't know each other from Adam, never seen each other except for maybe in passing after this, identify this man, the defendant, Keandre Valentine as being the person who robbed them.

Well, what does Keandre Valentine have for us? Well, he has the victims' property. He has those two cards, Rosa Vazkuez Ramirez's debit card and Jonathan Alexander -- Jordan Alexander's debit card, as well. Both Visa and Jordan Alexander's ID.

Additionally, he has the phones, Rosa Vazkuez Ramirez's Samsung and Santiago Garcia's iPhone with the black case. Additionally, his girlfriend, who it's been clearly established they came here together, they have a relationship, is found to be pawning Marvin Bass's gold necklace with diamond-encrusted cross pendant and his gold necklace with a dragon pendant.

She's pawning these items on May 26th, 2016, at 2-approximately-46 is the first pawning. That is about less than two hours after his approximately 1:00 p.m. robbery of Mr. Bass. That, too, I submit to you, the defendant was in possession of Marvin Bass's items and this is evidence of it. These were sold -- the first one at 2:46 p.m. A total sale of \$775 for all four pieces of jewelry that day. Chanise did tell us that Omara [phonetic] had some cash on her, didn't she? I recall something like that.

Now, the defendant also had the gun. Here, the gun found in two different places in the home, clearly a Glock handgun.

You heard about the DNA evidence in this case. Now, the scientist came in. She told you she could not make any results. The results that she had

for the swab of the gun were below the threshold. But we went through every single one. And that's something you need to also take a look at when you go back there, just to see what you think for yourself.

When we went through and looked at the items below the 200 threshold, but above the 40 threshold, this is what we found. We found that the swab of the handgun revealed a 12 and a 13 allele. Mr. Valentine, a 12 and a 13 allele. The swab also a 28 allele on the next locus. A 28 allele on that same locus for Mr. Valentine.

MS. MACHNICH: Your Honor, I'm going to object. Their own expert said that this is improper.

MR. DICKERSON: And I think that's fair argument.

THE COURT: He's arguing the evidence. The expert said that the data is unreliable if there is less than a 200 threshold. And -- and I don't think I've heard anything from Mr. Dickerson that -- that contradicts that. At this point, he's merely arguing that there should be some weight to be given to this evidence. All right. It's up to the jury to decide what weight. All right.

MS. MACHNICH: And I respect that, Your Honor. It's just that their own expert said that this is unreliable and cannot be determined.

THE COURT: Well, and you can argue that when you get back up and argue to the jury so they can remember exactly what she said.

MR. DICKERSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. DICKERSON: Again, ladies and gentlemen, it's worth taking into consideration. You are here for two weeks. Look at all the evidence. This is part of the evidence. You heard that under each locus there is a number of alleles.

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

And h	ere, though,	yeah,	maybe	the thres	shold is	under 2	200, t	here's	someth	ing
here.	But just con	sider f	or yours	self.						

Next, we have the locus on the swab of the handgun, 15 and 16. Mr. Valentine also at 15 and 16. Next locus at 7; Mr. Valentine also at 7. Next locus at 12 and 13; Mr. Valentine also at 12 and 13. So on and so forth, matching.

Now, as you heard here, it was a mixture. No person can have three unless it's some extreme mutation. We have on the locus D19S433; under the handgun, alleles 13, 13.2, and 14. We know one of those had to come from somewhere else. And under Mr. Valentine, we have 13 and 13.2.

Ladies and gentlemen, it's just worth considering. Take a look at it. See what you think. Make your own determination.

But really, it becomes extremely clear when we listen to the defendant in those calls and the defendant says this, he says:

They got all the pieces to the 27?

That being the Glock 27 that we all heard was impounded. That being this firearm right here, a Glock 27.

The female says:

I don't know, you put them all over the place?

He says:

Yeah. Where did they go, just in the room?

He says:

In the gray bin, so get that -- get it out of there, in the closet, and one piece is on top of the side of the closet in the shoes. Get that out of there, too. You heard me? Did you hear me?

	1
	2
	3
	4
	5
	6
	7
	8
	9
1	0
1	1
1	2
1	3
1	4
1	5
1	6
1	7
1	8
	9
	0
2	
2	
2	
2	4

Female said:

What did you say?

He said:

I said one piece is in the closet in the gray bin, so get that out of there, and one piece, them shoes still up in the top part of the closet, get them out of there.

Where was -- where were the pieces of the gun found? The box and in that gray bin. Defendant's car --

THE COURT: So Mr. Dickerson, I hate to interrupt your presentation. We've been going about, like, an hour and -- over an hour and 40 minutes. Do you think anyone -- I wonder if anyone needs to use the restroom yet, take a quick break? Or should we -- should we finish your presentation?

Raise your hand if you urgently need to take a break, otherwise we're going to keep going. All right. With no hands.

MR. DICKERSON: Thank you.

THE COURT: Keep going, then, sir. Thank you.

MR. DICKERSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

Mazda 3, seen by so many of the victims. Some would think it would be a good idea to go commit a crime in a nonregistered vehicle. But it turns out, having no license plate and having a -- the dealership placard is extremely recognizable. And so what do we have? We have ample evidence from many different sources showing defendant's connection to this vehicle.

We see that the defendant was interviewed. He tells the police, he and Omara bought the car, but he says he only sat in it at the dealership, just to test it out. And then we have calls where the defendant says he paid cash for the

car. He says he -- approximately 1500 he dropped on that; that he also got all the windows tinted in Las Vegas. And, most tellingly, Ain't nobody driving my car. We heard the defendant say that. He says that on one of those phone calls. Ain't nobody driving my car.

This is corroborated by additional evidence, as much as we can believe her, Chanise. She also says that this car arrives in Las Vegas without tint. Ultimately it gets tint. This is ultimately seen when we take a look at the vehicle itself. We can see it's newly tinted. We see that sticker saying, do not roll down, indicative of the tint. You heard from the CSA with experience in vehicles and fingerprinting vehicles, tint on the inside of the window.

And then we hear that that print that was on the inside of the window, the newly tinted window comes back to none other than Keandre Valentine. A vehicle that came to Las Vegas from a dealership in California, without tint, arrived here. He says he got it tinted. He says he only sat in the vehicle, in California, at the dealership, and his fingerprints are yet on that tint. It's the defendant's vehicle, ladies and gentlemen. It's the same car used in all these crimes.

He arrived in Las Vegas with Omara McBride in that car. We know that. It's become clear over the last two weeks. On May 26, 2016, at approximately 2:16 p.m., Omara McBride who he arrived with, his girl who he got this car with, she pawns the stolen items from Mr. Bass, here in Las Vegas.

Phone call, May 29, 2016, at 8:27 a.m., shortly after his arrest, female says:

Dame and Bobby were in the house, too, but they just put it all on you?

Mr. Valentine says:

Dame -- Dame. They let Dame go. They let Dame alone, because he didn't fit the description.

But Bobby's been left two days ago.

Ladies and gentlemen, you heard from both Marvin Bass and Jordan Alexander who came in here and told you, looking at that picture, Bobby McCoy, that ain't him. That's him. Defendant Keandre Valentine, that's the man who is guilty for all these crimes.

Ladies and gentlemen, that's what we've shown. We've shown that the defendant committed these crimes, and because of that, we're asking you to find the defendant guilty on all counts.

Thank you very much.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Dickerson.

We'll go ahead and take our break.

Ladies and gentlemen, we're going to take a 15-minute recess.

During this recess, you are admonished, do not communicate among yourselves or with anybody else about this trial or the subject matter of this trial; do not communicate at all with any of the parties, attorneys, or witnesses involved in this trial; do not seek or obtain any information or comments about the case from my source, including newspapers, television, radio, Internet, e-mail, cell phones, or any other electronic device; do not read, watch, or listen to any report of or commentary about the case; do not perform any research or investigation; do not form any -- or express any opinion on any subject connected with this trial until the case is finally submitted to you.

You are directed to return to the hallway outside this courtroom for

1	further deliberations for further proceedings at 3:03. All right. 3:03. Thank you	
2	[Jury recessed at 2:46 p.m.]	
3	THE COURT: Okay. We're outside the presence of the jury. Is there	
4	anything to put on the record?	
5	MS. LEXIS: Not by the State.	
6	MS. MACHNICH: I don't believe so, Your Honor.	
7	THE COURT: All right. I'll see you back at 3:03.	
8	[Court recessed from 2:46 p.m., until 3:03 p.m.]	
9	[Outside the presence of the jury.]	
10	THE COURT: All right. Marshal, why don't you bring the jurors in,	
11	please.	
12	[Jury reconvened at 3:05 p.m.]	
13	THE COURT: All right. At this time the State is invited to present	
14	their closing arguments to the jury.	
15	MS. MACHNICH: Defense.	
16	THE COURT: Or the defense. I've done that a couple times.	
17	Ms. Machnich, I apologize.	
18	MS. MACHNICH: That's okay.	
19	THE COURT: Ms. Machnich, you may present your closing	
20	arguments to the jury.	
21	MS. MACHNICH: Thank you, Your Honor.	
22	THE COURT: All right.	
23	MS. MACHNICH: Faces are complicated. Height isn't. At the	
24	beginning of this trial, nine trial days ago, Mr. Gaston came up before you and he	
25	said those words, because this is a case about identification.	

The State just came up before you and went through elements of every single crime that they intend to prove in this case, check, check, check.

And you know what? Robberies occurred; a gun was used. Burglaries occurred; a gun was used. You saw victims; they were victims. Their things were taken.

That all happened.

But Keandre Valentine didn't do it. Bobby McCoy did.

The only three counts before you, where Mr. Valentine has any culpability, where he should be found guilty of anything, relate to the final three counts, 12, 13, and 14. There's a charge on there for possession of stolen property. And we will come up here and concede to you that he is guilty of those charges, because as Mr. Gaston said at the beginning of this trial, he was aware that there was a gun in the apartment. He was aware there was stolen property. He was aware that things had been going on. Those have never been contested.

So, yes, on Counts 12, 13, and 14, possession of stolen property, you can find Mr. Valentine guilty of those. But not the rest.

So why does height matter? We keep coming back to it over and over again in this case. It seems like one small element in so many pieces over nine days of trial. Well, here's why. Keandre Valentine is 6-foot-3 or 6-foot-2 and three-quarters to 6-foot-3, based upon the evidence that you heard.

Marvin Bass is 6-2. What he told you is the robber is shorter than I am. He gave multiple different heights. Yes, it did vary. He gave a range. But in the end, what he said was, The robber is shorter than I am. Mr. Valentine is not.

Next, we have Jordan Alexander. He's 5-7. And what did he testify to? The robber is a little bit taller than I am. And he gave amounts of 5-8 to 5-10, a little bit taller. Mr. Valentine isn't. He's significantly taller.

	Next we have Santiago Garcia, The robber is 5-10. M	1r. Valentine
isn't.		

We've heard about a Juan Campos Torres, he's named as a victim in one of the counts. We have no idea, because we didn't hear from him. We'll talk about him later.

The Faulkners made no mention of height, and as far as we know, never had an opinion as to height. From the evidence you've heard, it's never been mentioned.

Then we have Lazaro Bravo-Torres, who said he was 5-feet tall, and he said the robber was a little bit taller than I am. Okay. Do we know exactly where that is now? But what we can say is, someone who is 15 inches taller is not a little bit taller.

And then we have Rosa Vazkuez. This man is much, much taller than the man who robbed me. Much, much taller.

So let's put Bobby McCoy into this, because you've heard evidence that he was associated with the car and other various associations with the apartment and the people involved. Bobby McCoy is 5-10.

Marvin Bass, let's put Bobby McCoy in. Hmm.

Jordan Alexander -- whoa -- technology fail. Okay.

Santiago Garcia -- that happened again, there we go. Put Bobby McCoy in.

Lazaro Bravo-Torres, with Bobby.

And Rosa Vazkuez, with Bobby.

That is why height is important.

Now, let's talk about the law enforcement in this case because you did

hear from several detectives and at least one patrol officer and several other employees of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department.

You heard from Detective Ludwig. He seems like a really good guy. He seems really thorough. He was not in charge in this case. They was not the decision-maker in this case. He did not choose what got fingerprinted, what got ran for DNA, what witnesses were recorded and talked to, what evidence actually made it in to storage so that it could be brought before the jury. He just didn't do that. It wasn't his job in this case.

Detective Majors, he was in charge in this case. He testified and he remembers virtually nothing. Every single step along the way, almost every single question that was posed, his recollection had to be refreshed by either the State or the defense, because he just doesn't have any knowledge of this. That's how important it is to him. And the same detective lost evidence. You heard testimony that there was a showup form done by Darrell Faulkner and that he was there witnessing that form. We don't know what's on that form, because it just disappeared.

Similarly, you heard testimony that he went and retrieved a video from the EZPAWN. We brought in the manager of the EZPAWN, who testified that the video system was working. He doesn't remember this exact instance, but he knows that if I detective came in, asked for video, that he would leave with something relevant if he took something, and, oh, yeah, that it would work when he left EZPAWN.

So what happened to the video? We don't know.

Also, Detective Majors, what didn't he do? He did not record the lineup interaction he had with Marvin Bass. Why is that important? Because

there's been a lot to do and say about the procedures in the lineup that we will cover in a few minutes, and we don't actually know what exactly happened that day. We don't know exactly what he said and didn't say, because we don't have a recording. And we know he takes a tape recorder with him every single day on the job, just like he had one with him the day that he recorded Marvin Bass's statement. He had it and he chose not to use it, and his explanation was, I didn't have to. Is that good enough?

Okay. And then we have Officer Wise. He is the one who was involved in detaining Omara. He did say that she would have been patted down before she went in the police vehicle and she was detained by police. And we discussed with him that this pat-down that occurred at -- on someone who was wearing what he said was tight clothes, this pat-down had to have been thorough enough to make sure that there were no weapons on her of any type -- knife, gun, et cetera, and officer safety and well being every single day on the job relies upon thorough and complete pat-downs. It's for officer safety there.

She didn't have some large items on her in her pocket. They would have felt that in a pat-down. They didn't.

Additionally, he explained how body cameras work, and how they can be flipped on and flipped off by the officer who is wearing them. We will [indiscernible].

Now, let's talk about the other law enforcement-related people who testified. The crime scene analysts, they did their job. They came, they photographed, they impounded evidence they were told to impound. I don't think we can take any issue with what they did. They did what they were told. But again, they were not the deciders in this case. They didn't decide what to -- what

phone to take, what clothes to take, what -- they didn't decide any of that. They followed, just as their job states, what the officers told them to do. And they did it well.

The DNA analyst, she seemed to really know her stuff. State's expert. They put her on. What did she testify to? Well, she testified to a lot with the State and she looked extremely uncomfortable, which was clarified on cross that, a lot of this, well, the peaks, there's a little bit of peak that sort of matches him. She was very uncomfortable about that because as she said on cross, that's not how it works. It's not reliable under a certain level. They can't say inside -- for scientific certainty that it's even possible. It's even plausible, because they might get totally different results if they run it again. That's why she was uncomfortable testifying to that.

The State tried to force that through, tried to cherry pick that evidence. And you know what, in the end, probably not really at issue in this case, is it, because we've acknowledged that Keandre Valentine has handled that gun, so his DNA could be on there.

But what's important is there was a mixed sample. So what she said was at -- two people held that gun at least, and at least one of those people was male, that means both of those people could have been male.

Fingerprint analyst -- again, she seemed to know her stuff. She got up here. She talked about her whole procedure. She talked about collecting the prints. And yes, she found Keandre Valentine's prints associated with the white car. She did. And he's never contested he was associated with the white car. Additionally, she found Bobby McCoy's fingerprint on that car. And we also addressed with her and the crime scene analyst that fingerprints that are taken off

of things are not the entire universe of all the people who have ever touched the thing. Because we know that Omara McBride drove the white car. We know that Chanise Williams was in the white car. And various other people, as well. And their fingerprints weren't on the white car. So different people can be in different locations, sitting in different seats.

But what we know for sure is between May 25th, when the car was purchased, and May 28th, when the police were involved in this, Bobby McCoy and Keandre Valentine were both associated with the white car. She did her job. She did a good job. And again, she followed what she was told to look for by the officers.

So let's get on to some of the identifications in this case because as I already stated and as we've made clear throughout this entire process, this is a case about identification. Let's start with Deborah Faulkner. Suggestive identification, at best.

This woman got on the stand and supposedly had never been shown a picture or a lineup, had never seen -- I put to you she's never seen Keandre Valentine before, ever, but she supposedly -- and she testified, and I'm sure she did, see the actual robber. But we're talking about 14, 15 months ago. The first time -- so her testimony, the first time she's seen Keandre Valentine is sitting at a table with the word defendant on it, next to two lawyers. She knows who she's supposed to identify. Additionally, she knows why she came to testify here, and she knows that her husband has identified someone in this case. It doesn't take a genius.

And then we have Deborah Faulkner on the stand. Judge her by her demeanor, because we all judge everyone by their demeanor in their testimony.

That's how we judge whether they're telling the truth, whether they're not.
Whether they're being fully forthcoming, whether they're not. That woman got up
on the stand and started yelling about the eyes the eyes, the eyes, the eyes.
We know that she does take prescribed narcotics, and that they affect her ability
to do certain things, including remember, communicate

MS. LEXIS: Your Honor, I object. This was not the actual testimony of Mrs. Faulkner. Actually, she testified that it was -- it did not affect her during cross-examination. These are facts not in evidence, and actually misstatement of the -- the facts, as shown.

MS. MACHNICH: And Your Honor, I don't recall that being the case, but I believe that is in the province of the jury.

THE COURT: Well, I think she was questioned -- I think the lack of communication was in the question, not in the answer. And so the jury is directed to search their memories to -- and their notes and try to recall what specifically -- what was said with respect to whether any of the medications that the witness is taking has affected her ability to perceive or recall or testify. And if you think it's important or material for your deliberations, you can request a playback. Okay. Thank you.

And you may continue.

MS. MACHNICH: Thank you, Your Honor.

Additionally, I will say, you also heard from Detective Majors, who was the one who decided not to take her statement that day, because she was on narcotics, because he had those concerns. So Deborah Faulkner, we're talking about the eyes, the eyes, the eyes. Who am I?

George W bush, right? That's what it looks like. The eyes. No.

So the eyes aren't everything. And -- well, we'll just let you judge Ms. Faulkner by her demeanor.

Darrell Faulkner, he had all the details that were wrong. Yes, he cried. He certainly did. And he gave a -- what he believed to be a thorough description of the man involved in this, and he described light blue jeans, a blue belt, a black shirt with a white shirt under it, and blue shoes. He also described no tattoos.

None of those -- well, none of the description of the clothing matches any other victim that's testified whatsoever. So we're saying these are all related robberies. I would put to you that they seem like they really are related, as in they're the same person. Is it really possible that the robber changed clothes?

No. Changed clothes for one and then the rest of them he didn't. That doesn't make any sense.

Mr. Faulkner perceived wrong. He perceived details incorrectly. And you heard about how stressful situations can affect memory and affect those details. Again, we'll come back to no tattoos later, but he said he was studying every aspect of the robber, but did not match any of the tattoos.

Next, he said that he saw a large-frame gun, also, I believe, with night sights at some point. And he says he knows guns, and he was sure. And it was not a large-frame gun. Nobody else describes a large-frame gun. And at least as far as what the State has presented to you, the gun involved, from their perspective, is a small-frame gun. So he's not trying to lie. He's not trying to make stuff up. But his memory just isn't all there on it, because it's stressful.

And again, this goes to suggestivity. At grand jury he changes his testimony to black pants, and this is after speaking with people from the District

Attorney's Office.

And I put to you that it's reasonable to infer that that's because everybody else said black pants and he was told everybody else said black pants. He changed. And that's how memory works. You can adopt new memories as it goes forward, as time passes, as things are suggested to you by people that you respect or people you rely upon, like law enforcement or the District Attorney's Office, sort of an arm of law enforcement.

He testified that he has memory loss. So how much of his actual testimony here is from his actual memory at this point and not just refreshed by reading other things and preparing and talking to the district attorney's in preparing? I don't think any of us know for sure, because he said he's absolutely certain he has memory loss and he expressed that on the stand. And, unfortunately, it's because he's had health concerns. So nobody's faulting him for that, but do we actually know what's in his memory at this point?

And after all that, when he was asked to identify Mr. Valentine, he said, Oh, yeah, that's the guy -- or whatever specific language he used. But the first thing he said was, I'm pretty positive. And then there was a little bit, and then he said, Oh, yeah, he remembers that. I'm pretty positive. Do we know if pretty positive was the first thing he said at the same time when he was doing the original ID? What was he looking at at the time of the original ID? Was it the hair, like some of the other witnesses? We don't know that, because the detective who has been on the force for, if I'm remembering correctly, 16 years. If I'm wrong, forgive me.

The detective, Detective Majors lost the showup form, so we don't even know what's on it. We don't know what he identified when he originally saw

Keandre Valentine and said that he was or presumably said that he was the robber.

And, finally, vision. I'm not asking you to *12 Angry Men* this case, but you saw that his glasses came on and off several times during his testimony, and that was never specifically addressed. But do we really know how good his vision was at the time and if he was wearing his glasses or if he should have been wearing his glasses at the distance? We -- we don't know.

Marvin Bass -- six- to eight-inch window. Marvin Bass, on cross-examination, right after the State had gotten up next to the witness stand and gone through the distance between him and the robber, I also went up there to speak with him to get an idea of how much distance there was and what his view would have been. And he admitted that the window was about halfway down, six to eight inches open. Six- to eight-inch window. That is what he had as a view of the robber. And then a sedan, you'd have to be looking up to see a face, which is then blocked, I would argue, by the roof of the sedan. So this great view he had is actually not a great view.

He testified that the robber is shorter than him. Yes, he was sitting down, but he did see him in relation to vehicles and at a distance, walking there. Is it everything? No. But is it something? Yes. He described a two-door Kia-type or Fiat, and then he changed it to a four-door, after speaking with the district attorney or the detectives, the law enforcement. Again, this goes to suggestivity. He's not trying to lie. But it can be suggested to someone that something isn't what they observed if someone in a position of control, a position of authority tells them, Oh, but it's really this, isn't it? I mean, it's this. This is what you saw.

He also saw a red-and-white paper over the dealer plates. Not trying to say it's a different car, ladies and gentlemen of the jury. All I'm saying is memory isn't perfect and what you observe and what is in real life are not always the same thing.

He reported no tattoos on the arms or the neck. We'll come back to the neck in a second. But you will see -- and you have seen in State's Exhibit 59, that Mr. Valentine has a tattoo prominently on his arm, and you can actually see on his opposite wrist, as well. There are more pictures in evidence. Feel free to take a look at them. He mentioned none of this.

And then we have the suggestive lineup. We're going to specifically address that.

When Marvin Bass was called back on rebuttal, the State only called two of the victims to actually take a look at Bobby. And why they didn't call the rest, we don't know for sure. Maybe they got it wrong. But they put it back up there --

MS. LEXIS: Objection, Your Honor. I object to that statement.

That -- that --

THE COURT: Maybe -- maybe -- maybe who got it wrong?

MS. MACHNICH: The people who weren't recalled, Your Honor.

MS. LEXIS: That is not a fair inference. That's actually quite misstating the law, arguing facts not evidence. I -- I --

THE COURT: But maybe that -- the witnesses might have gotten something wrong, I think it goes -- the jury's responsibility to judge credibility. Overruled.

Keep going.

MS. MACHNICH: Thank you.

They did put on Marvin Bass, however. And in rebuttal, when asked why the picture of Bobby McCoy looked different from the robber, he said, Well, the picture of Bobby McCoy, his hair is shorter. Because remember, in his original report to police, he said that the robber had a short afro. This man is clearly very focused on hair. That's a characteristic he looks at first.

The hair is shorter. Well, the picture of Bobby McCoy that we have in evidence, as His Honor informed you, is from December 2016. And as you heard from Chanise, Bobby McCoy, at the time that these robberies were occurring, he had a short afro or some length of afro that wasn't huge. She didn't know exactly the length. But he had longer hair than a smooth shave. So if we're looking at the hair.

Now, let's look at this lineup. Marvin Bass's line up. This is not the best copy. In fact, the best copy in evidence is the replication from Defendant's Exhibit J, which is from the Grand Jury Exhibit 7. So you're looking, specifically, for the tag Defendant's Exhibit J. But we'll use this for demonstration.

These three gentlemen do not fit the description at all of the person who was robbed, because they don't have an afro. That's what Detective Majors was putting in this lineup. That -- obviously you see that's something that Marvin Bass is drawn to. Those three people, not even close to having an afro.

Now, let's look at No. 2. He said, remember, he described the man being in his lower 20s. That man -- and Marvin Bass agreed with me -- looks like he's about 40. So he doesn't look anything like the description that was given, either.

And then let's look at No. 5. And I put to you, you can't see it at all in

this, and you possibly can't see it that well in the State's exhibit, but if you look at the defense exhibit, which was the version most closely replicated as Detective Majors indicated for the one that he actually showed to Mr. Bass that day, you can clearly see Person 5 as a visible neck tattoo.

Marvin Bass didn't report any neck tattoos. So even if we can say that No. 5 has an afro, and I -- I put to you that he doesn't, but even if he did and you can make that argument, he also has a very distinctive feature that was never -- never mentioned. So it's very clear, and it was very clear to Marvin Bass that he was not to pick that person.

And then finally, we're left with Mr. Valentine, who is the only remaining person in the lineup. And do we know what process of elimination, if any, Marvin Bass took when he was doing this lineup? Did he do that analysis? Did he do it out loud? Did he do it in his head? Did he point to anything? Did he ask any questions? We don't know, because we don't have that recording.

So there's Jordan Alexander. He specifically stated the hair and thin build is really why I recognized him. He did not report any arm tattoos. Being very specific, remember, and he didn't report any obvious arm tattoos? You heard no testimony of that. His wallet is still missing. It's gone. Was it dumped? Was it kept by the real robber? We can't know.

But we do know that Jordan Alexander identified Keandre Valentine from around 77 or more feet away. And how do we know that? We have a body cam, and that's the only body camera we have from any of the identifications, even though we know other officers were wearing them. It's the only one from any of the identifications that show what the person said and where the identification took place.

No wonder his hair and his build were what was recognized. That was the only thing that he could see from that distance.

And I'll turn your attention to Defendant's Exhibit A, which is a still from that body camera. I believe the actual body camera footage is also in -- in evidence, so if you want to take a look at that, go ahead. But this is the distance. Yeah, a camera is not going to be as clear as a human eye. But that's really far.

You saw the demonstration in court. We were at 65 feet when we hit the window outside the courtroom from the witness. The only thing he could tell was the hair and the build of the person. He didn't look at the face. All he could tell was the relative height difference between Damian, the shorter man who was in the lineup, and Keandre Valentine. So he picked the taller one.

And then, remember, he was also the other person who got called in rebuttal. And he said that Bobby isn't him. And then he also said the hair isn't the same. Again, he's looking at the hair, because he looked at the hair that day during his identification. He was so excited they found the guy, and from 77 feet away, he says, Yeah, that guy looks like him. Hair and build and his body.

Also, and I really ask you to note this one, when he was up on rebuttal and this [indiscernible] really quick, he commented on the goatee in the photo, the goatee on Bobby McCoy. And he said the robber had a mustache only. He didn't have a goatee. He just had upper, you know, a mustache. No need to define that.

Well, we don't know exactly what facial hair Bobby McCoy had at the time in May, because we don't have a photo from that time period. Nothing was presented into evidence on that. But I put to you what we do have in evidence is -- well, we have many pictures of Keandre Valentine in May 2016. And what

does Keandre Valentine have? Hair on his chin. So the robber only had a mustache. It's not Keandre.

Lazaro Bravo-Torres. He was 90 percent. The best he ever got to was 90 percent. He specifically stated in his ID showup, and this is in evidence, as well, that it looked like the robber had cut and styled his hair. When would that have happened exactly? Because we have photographs -- first of all, you've heard testimony and the State has emphasized, this was a very tight timeline; robbery, robbery, robbery, car, apartment, arrest, lineup -- or showups. Very quick timeline.

When did Keandre have time to cut his hair? And where? And how? These are photographs. I'm showing you State's Exhibit 71 and 94, which there are many more of the inside of that apartment. Where did he cut his hair? He didn't. Because it wasn't him.

There's no way the robber was 15 inches taller, if he's described him as a little bit taller. And remember, he knew and his wife told him the man -- the man they caught had her things. So that was told -- I -- do we know exactly when? Probably not. Was it after the original ID? It might have been. But before he came in here on the stand and testified, he had heard from his wife, if not from multiple other people -- the State, detectives -- that they had the things. And you -- you all heard how much Rosa Vazkuez put -- how much weight she put on knowing that Keandre Valentine had her things. And I put that in quotation marks, because again, they weren't on his person. They were in the apartment.

Santiago Garcia. We talked a lot about an iPhone. A lot. And I put to you that it's not about an iPhone. It doesn't matter if the police impounded the right iPhone. It just doesn't matter. I mean, they don't have to do that in order to

 prove the case. That's not really the issue here.

The issue is that when the State got on the stand and handed Mr. Garcia 37A, the -- it looked like an iPhone 6 or 7 body style, iPhone 6 body style, gray, like, steel gray iPhone. He said that that was his iPhone. And so, actually, the specific statement that was made -- because this was an issue and he wasn't answering as many questions on cross, and I put to that that was because he wasn't interested in answering questions for the defense, only for the State.

But when the State showed him that iPhone, this is what happened.

I'm showing you here what's been marked as State's 37 --

Exhibit 37A; do you recognize this?

Answer: Yes.

Question: What is that?

Answer: That's my phone.

Question: Is this your phone?

Answer: Yes.

Response: Thank you.

Now, after that, we had a lot of talk about whether that was the phone, whether it had a case, and did it have a black case, did he think they took the black case off. It went on from there.

But what he did was took what the State said at face value. They presented him with this phone. It's his phone. And I put to you it's not the same phone that he identified in the picture. And it's not identified in the -- the same picture when he testified at grand jury a month after. So he's now identified two phones.

It's not about the phone, insofar as it does not matter if they have the right phone in evidence. But what matters is that he is taking what the State says, what law enforcement is saying to be true, and adopting it. And, obviously, he does not feel that way about defense counsel. But that's fine. Now, he's clearly going to tell the State what they want to hear.

And now we have the question of what -- what really happened at his original showup, because we have the statement that he didn't write. We know he didn't write it. He doesn't write in English. So the officer wrote it. This is not a huge deal. I mean, yeah, the -- he first was taken to the ID of the car. And you'll -- you'll have the body cam in -- in evidence on that.

The State showed you the little snippet where there was the actual talking about the car, and yeah, I think that's the car. 90 percent. Then they have more discussion.

But I put to you what is important is the defense exhibit extension of that, which was the next little snippet of body camera, when they went back to have the statement written. And in the statement, the officer just dictates the statement, and he does not say what Mr. Garcia said. He does not put in that information. He just dictates what he wants in there. He doesn't even want Mr. Garcia to be dictating it to the -- I believe it's the client that he said who was writing it.

So I put to you the fact that the body camera was then turned off, and this is a conscious effort by a police officer to turn it off, and then he was taken for a showup, we don't know how far away he identified Mr. Valentine. We don't know what was said at the time of that identification. And, frankly, we don't know what his real words were at all, because that officer was going to write whatever

he wanted to write, as demonstrated by the prior body cam.

We have Juan Campos Torres. He's not here. Again, did he get it wrong? Did he get the ID wrong? What happened to him? He didn't testify. We don't know.

And Rosa Vazkuez. Her showup was 95 percent. But she said it looked like he had cut his hair and styled it. Again, we don't have any evidence that any of that was done by Mr. Valentine, because he's not the robber.

Most importantly, she stood -- she came down here off the stand, where she was saying -- because she couldn't see well enough from here. She was within 25 feet, because that's -- that's about 25 feet to counsel table. She came closer. And she walked around. And just as the State said, she came and she stood right about here, in front, 8 to 10 feet.

The court asked Mr. Valentine to stand up. All the air was sucked out of the room as we waited for the answer. And what did she say? It's not the man who robbed me. This man is much, much taller than the man who robbed me. She did get on the stand later and she did explain, Well, they told me he had my stuff. No one else could have had the stuff. So it must be the man. Yeah, it's the man.

Well, what did she do when she was standing 8 to 10 feet away? She said it wasn't him. And she's the only person who ever had that opportunity.

Today -- not today -- this week, this last week, last year, ever. She said it wasn't him.

So we're talking about height. She is why height matters.

And we talked about she backed off because the police had told her that the items were found on Mr. Valentine and no one else could have had them.

And, of course, we all know that's mistaken; there were many other people who had access to that apartment. All right.

What is the common thread between all these victims? You heard the State ask multiple victims do they know all the rest of the victims? And they did this with several of them. I -- I'll put to you I don't recall them doing it with every single one, but they certainly did it with a lot of them. And they said, Oh, I don't know them. Okay, they don't know them. There was not some grand conspiracy between all of these victims to make this up.

However, the common thread is police. And it's not that the police were out to get someone, necessarily. But they found the man that they said did it, and they never looked back. They went full steam ahead in all of their procedures from then on, implicated one man, because that's how their procedures were working. That's what they did. They took actions to make sure that their man, the man that they said did it, ended up here before you.

We heard from Chanise Williams in this case. She testified Omara, Bobby, Keandre, and another woman arrived at her house around the 27th. She said she didn't really remember the date. It was that Friday. The State pressed her, well, did they come straight from California? And she said she thought that they had. But remember, she doesn't know what they did before they got to her house. Ultimately, she knows what happened -- she knows when they got there. So we don't really know when they got into town. She doesn't have that knowledge.

She testified the girls went out, the boys stayed in. We showed you a valet ticket, demonstrating that. It also demonstrated that she was in that car and she said she was in that car. That's a fact. And remember, her fingerprints

weren't found on the car, which supports the idea that just because someone's fingerprints aren't on there doesn't mean they've never been associated with it.

So saying that Bobby's fingerprint was only on the passenger-side door and it wasn't in the driver's side, well, Omara's fingerprint wasn't on the driver's side either, but we know she drove it. So maybe that's not quite as relevant. It does still put them all associated with the vehicle.

She said on Saturday morning she woke up to the police officers being downstairs, her neighbors saying there are cops, they're messing with Omara's car. She said she didn't want to be in court. She looked like she didn't want to be in court. I put to you, she seemed very uncomfortable to be here.

And as the court noted, nothing was done wrong, as the State had insinuated, with her testimony between her and Mr. Valentine.

In fact, the jury instruction that he specifically read, you've heard in reference to the jail call that the State brought up, absent evidence proving otherwise, there has been no other evidence with regard to that. You are to assume -- you are not to assume anything said by Mr. Valentine, Defendant, during his call was wrong or that he tried to convince the witness to lie. And that is a matter of law that you must accept as a matter of law given by the court.

Let's talk about the jail calls. Yes, you all heard them. We heard one that's talking about you all supposed to leave before they even came upstairs. When I see them outside, I didn't know what they were outside for. Okay. So we have two here. She's -- and we have Chanise adopting this statement, this jail call as being hers. And she explained that they were supposed to leave before they got there. They were supposed to be gone. She explained that partially in that they were supposed to be gone. They weren't supposed to have even stayed

there. She's very frustrated that the police were even involved in a home with kids, this shouldn't have ever happened at all. Yeah. She was very rightfully concerned about that.

And I put to you, you can probably also infer that there was time for people to leave that apartment after she left to go downstairs to speak with the officers before the officers went upstairs. And she probably thought, they should have all just left. And I put to you, many of them did. For example, Bobby; Bobby left. Why did he leave? Because he knew why they were there. Keandre, not so much. When I seen them outside, I didn't know what they were outside for. That's why it's an explanation of why he didn't leave. You can take it for whatever it's worth. But that does explain why she was saying this.

I think you can also infer from her behavior, the jail calls in general, and what the police officer said about their discussions with Keandre, that this might not be a family/group of friends, I don't want to say associates -- but associates who maybe don't have a great view of police officers, and maybe they don't enjoy interacting with them on a daily basis.

Jail calls. Yep, Keandre knows where pieces of the gun are. You heard in opening that was not going to be an issue. He did know that. He explains the charges, but you heard from the State that their officers or detectives had spoken with him at length about those charges. It's not that he had knowledge of crimes. He had knowledge of the charges and what they were trying to put on him.

Bobby's been left, two days ago. He's been covering for Bobby since the beginning. He knew Bobby came back with something. He -- we know he hid the pieces of the gun. It's reasonable to infer he knew the other stolen property

that was in that apartment was there. Again, it does not take a genius to find out what possibly happened with Bobby and what Bobby would have done. He's been covering for him since he first got into jail. He was covering for him that day, because he didn't say, hey, not my stuff. It's Bobby's. He does not come from a family, friends, associates, that snitch people out to cops.

Jail calls. Who owns the car? There's a lot of talk about whose car -whose car, my car, your car, her car, my car, no one drives my car. They're
probably all talking about the same car. It's probably the white car. Does it really
matter? Because what matters is access to this car. We know multiple people
have driven this car.

Omara McBride. She knows Bobby and Keandre. We've heard testimony about that. This is not some pull Bobby's name out of a hat, let's put this on some other stranger that no one ever knows and has no association. That's not what's going on here. Omara knows Bobby and Keandre, because you heard testimony that she drove into town with both of those gentlemen.

Her car. Again, her car, his car, their car, my car, no one drives my car. Who knows? She has access to the car. It's registered to her.

She pawned the gold chains. You heard that evidence. She pawned the gold chains. But does it really make it any more likely that it was Bobby than Keandre, Keandre than Bobby? Could it have been payback for letting Bobby use the car? We don't know. Wouldn't it have been great to hear from her? It's the State's burden to bring witnesses in this case.

So let's turn our attention to eyewitness identification, because that is the basis of this entire challenge to these State's charges. This is a case about identification. It is a case about eyewitnesses being able to observe, remember,

communicate what they remember, and identify the right person.

We heard from Dr. Smith. He was on the stand for a whole day. The State had -- in my count, two and a half hours to speak with him, as well as our direct and redirect. He has a Ph.D. in psychology. He's authored over a hundred books, articles, and chapters. Been a professor for 37 years. He attends conferences every year. He's specifically studied the science of eyewitness identification and memory.

Now, is the study of eyewitness identification science? Because it -there were some questions suggesting this is not science. This is -- this is made
up. This is a theory, if that's, perhaps, I put to you what the State was trying to get
at and what the State might argue on rebuttal. Yes, it's science. How do we
know? Because it's subject to the scientific method. And it's continually
challenged. It's continually tested. And it's continually reassessed. And it always
needs more research.

And I put to you the State's questions suggested that the fact that it needs more research might make you consider that it's not good science. It's not -- you know, it's not valid. You shouldn't consider it. I put to you that medical doctors also feel that their fields need more research. And we would all want our doctors to continue researching. We would also want them to apply the science they have now in treating us.

Eyewitness identification. In the very best world, in the very perfect conditions, 78 to 80 percent accurate. Best controlled conditions. That's without any exterior influences and without any negatives driving it down. Under perfect circumstances, false identifications occur 10 to 15 percent of the time.

Other nonsuggestive factors ease or mitigate the suggestiveness

back to these levels. What does this mean? You don't get to add all of these things up and say we've done a good job. Taking away all of the bad things just gets them back to the 70 to 80 percent. That's the best-case scenario.

So in eyewitness identification, we have three areas of concern: Systemic, suggestibility, similarities.

Systemic: It applies to every eyewitness -- stress and anxiety, weapons, focus. You've heard testimony, you've heard comments in closing. Those victims were scared. We're never going to say they weren't scared. There was a high level of stress. They were very unhappy. They were frightened for their life. And there was a weapon involved. And those things, as Dr. Smith explains, do not help you make your memory better. At that high level of stress, remember, it gets worse.

As to this, he also testified that there's no consensus on a degree of confidence and accuracy being correlated. So the fact that someone says a thousand percent does not make it 1000 percent. It doesn't mean that they're more likely to be accurate. They just like to use a thousand percent instead of a hundred, which is the maximum.

Stress and anxiety weapons focus. Again, heightened anxiety stress is good. Highest anxiety stress is bad. And I put to you that in a situation where a gun is pointed at you or your spouse or your friend or yourself, that is the highest level of stress that you can get, because that is scary. And there was a weapon involved in every single one of these robberies. Never contested that, but we point to that to say that's where everyone would be focused.

Attention and memory is like money. Each person only has so much money to spend. Dr. Smith said that. You can't pay all the attention to

everything. You're going to describe the clothes. You're going to describe the weapon. You're going to try to describe the person or features that stand out to you. You're going to remember those features that stand out to you. Maybe not all the features, maybe some of the features. You're going to remember every single step of every single thing that happened.

Those victims got up on the stand and they recounted every single point of what happened in those crimes. And then I got out of my truck and then I stood there. And I had one leg up on the truck. And then he was reaching here and he reached with this arm and he did exactly this. They had a lot of details. I put to you those details don't mean they were paying more attention generally. Those details mean they were paying attention to the whole situation and spending their memory currency on that.

Suggestibility, the second issue. We have the photo spread line- up and we have the showups.

Line up: You can't tell height in a line up. And never was that illustrated to be more important and more apropos to a situation then when you saw Rosa Vazkuez stand within 10 feet of Keandre Valentine and say this isn't the man, he is much, much taller than the robber. Much, much taller, because she was able to stand next to him. In a lineup, you can't tell how tall these men are. They could be 5-3. They could be 7-3. We would have no way of knowing that.

You heard the State say on cross, it's not a hair line up. Clever, except it is if hair is what you're focusing on. And the purpose of putting together a line up is to put together photographs that otherwise are similar to the description and to the suspect so that there isn't a misidentification. But that didn't happen, because -- and again, this is a really bad photo of the lineup, and you'll

19

21

22 23

24

25

have much clearer versions back in the room with you.

But when -- if you do look at hair, which is a very distinguishable feature and something mentioned by multiple witnesses in this case, the only person with a noticeable afro is Mr. Valentine. And that's what was described.

And also we know in the lineup that Detective Majors didn't turn on the recorder. Why didn't he?

What we do not know. We don't know if he was actually read that full paragraph, that long paragraph of those great conditions saying this person might not be the person. The State went over it a whole bunch with Mr. Smith -- or Dr. Smith. They went over it a bunch of times with Mr. Bass and with Detective Majors. This great paragraph of this great language. We have no idea if Mr. Bass fully read and understood that. We have no idea if Detective Majors read it to him. We have no idea if Detective Majors emphasized part of it if he did read it to him.

We do know Detective Majors made the lineup and know who the suspect -- and knew who the suspect was. But we don't know if he said anything verbal or nonverbal to indicate who the suspect would be, more so than the fact that the line up itself has one person with an afro.

Why was it not recorded? He had the recorder with him. Because he didn't have to or because he didn't want to?

Why is hair such a big deal? We just discussed that, because it keeps coming up in this case, over and over again.

We'll go to the showup. It's a suggestive situation from the beginning. Dr. Smith was clear -- I believe that it might have even been suggested by the State at one point and then those factors, then, are mitigated.

It's a suggestive situation because, one, in the -- or in this case, two people are standing in front of a bunch of police cars with a bunch of police officers with handcuffs on, and they're going, Is this the guy? It's suggestive. The whole situation suggests that they found the guy and that you're to identify the guy.

They said that witnesses can move closer. Well, really, all we heard that from -- the only person we heard that from -- from an officer, really -- is Detective Ludwig, who again, seemed like he was totally doing his job. He did a great job. And he dealt with -- if -- from my recollection, and -- and I put to you that if you have a different recollection, go with that. But I put to you that he only really worked with Rosa Vazkuez and Lazaro. He only worked with those two, because he was translating for them at the time, and he said he only translated for those two. So he was the one who was giving them the option to move up or move closer or move back.

There's only the one showup on body camera. We -- the only one we have, he certainly didn't move up. He was way far back. And one showup was specifically not on body camera, after the quasi idea of the car or the idea of the car when they finally talked it through, and then the statement that was written by the client, and that was on Santiago Garcia. That was -- specifically, the -- the officer made the choice not to record that, because he had to have flipped off his body camera to not record that.

And we have the situation, again, with the exhibit, looking at the distance, 77-plus feet away.

We see the relative difference in height, the body, the build, and you can see the hair.

Where are the rest of the showup videos? Faulkner, don't have one. Vazkuez, don't have one. Bravo-Torres, don't have one. Juan -- we don't know what happened with Juan. Santiago Garcia, don't have one.

So let's talk about building blocks. The State has alluded both in their cross with Dr. Smith, and I would anticipate also on rebuttal, that all of the things that they did in the showup, all the things they did right, like having the admonishment, if we're to assume that everybody read it and took it to heart, maybe they did -- even assuming they did, they did that, they did the showups close to the time, they did -- they did every -- they're going to build up this tall pile of blocks, and but we did all these -- these things right. It had to have been okay.

But that's not the case. Because no amount of lighting conditions or quick IDs or admonishments are going to fix the situation. Because as Dr. Smith explained, eyewitness identification is more like a cake. You can have everything perfect, everything measured perfectly, the cake decorated perfectly, everything can be ideal. But if you put salt instead of sugar in that cake, I don't want to eat your cake.

The police involvement in this case was like that salt. The showups, the lineup, they were tainted by that salt.

And then we have similarity. The similarity between the robber and the suspect. There we go. Bobby and Keandre. Are they identical? By absolutely no means are they identical, and no one is saying that they are. Are they similar? I put to you they are similar in some ways. So first of all, we have the statistics, 5-10, 145, December from -- photo from December 2016; 6-3, 160, photo from May 2016. Are they identical? No.

But we also don't know the exact lighting conditions. We know that --

and -- and you can take a look at the photos that are in evidence. But Bobby's photo appears to be taken inside with some sort of indoor lighting. Keandre's photo was taken outside.

We know that about seven months went by between these photographs. It is -- I think it would be reasonable to assume that Keandre is in the same form that the robber would have been in that day, because it's the same day. But Bobby, most likely not. Or very likely not. And we've heard testimony that things have changed about Bobby, specifically, he's cut his hair significantly in that photograph.

I put to you that they look similar. And when you're talking about suggestive IDs, and you're talking about people who have been shown photos, and photos, and in-person, and police officers suggesting that these are the people and the conditions under which those suggestions were done, you've noticed what? The actual witnesses, the actual victims in this case point it out. They pointed out the hair and facial hair.

But also, don't let the State say, it was both a good lineup and that Bobby does not look similar to Keandre. So I'm going to show you something. There's a lineup. There's Bobby in the lineup.

There is no evidence that Keandre did this over Bobby.

I'm going to parse this out, because I believe this will be part of the State's rebuttal. Yes, Keandre was there lying in that bed. I put to you that that does not suggest Keandre did this more than Bobby. It actually suggests he did it less, because he didn't leave. You know that you've robbed multiple people, and you know cops are downstairs, you leave. Keandre didn't leave.

We know Keandre did not snitch on Bobby. That's clear. At no point

has he said Bobby did this. Because he's not going to snitch on Bobby. He's not going to snitch on his friend.

And this is not a balancing of who more likely did it. This isn't stack the things up for Bobby, stack the things up for Keandre, and see which one tilts more.

The standard here is beyond a reasonable doubt. I put to you, if you're getting to the point where you're saying which side of the scale is heavier, you have at least one humongous reasonable doubt, if not many, because you've been doing that balancing.

The judge rode you -- or read you a series of jury instructions. The State went over them very completely in their closing. And you'll have a copy with you there. But we'll be very, very clear. If the State has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Keandre Valentine was the robber, not that he possessed things, not that he knew where the gun was, that he was the robber beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find him not guilty of Counts 1 through 11. You'll also see the jury instruction on the call mentioned between Mr. Valentine and Ms. Williams, and many other very important points of law.

The State's rebuttal. They get to come up here again. And that illustrates again how heavy the burden is on the State. They even get to come up here and pick apart everything I said and talk to you yet again, and say their point of view yet again, and go through their evidence yet again, to try to convince you. And that speaks towards the fact that beyond a reasonable doubt is the highest standard under law. The definition of beyond -- of reasonable doubt is in your jury instructions.

The State is also going to come up before you, we believe, and state

that Dr. Smith said corroborating evidence is important. And there is so much corroborating evidence in this case, that's what bolsters the IDs. You would anticipate that. I -- I don't know, I can't read Ms. Lexis's mind, but we would anticipate that.

Why is there not corroborating evidence in this case? Because all of the evidence back at the apartment is just as likely, if not more likely, Bobby. Just as likely Bobby. It could have been Bobby. So it doesn't actually corroborate the identifications in the way that they say it does.

What is corroborating evidence? What could have been corroborating evidence in this case that would have linked Keandre Valentine to the crime, if it was him? Well, that would have been a fingerprint at the crime scenes. If his fingerprint was at the crime scenes, this would be a whole different case. DNA at the crime scenes. Perhaps even if the stolen property was found in his pocket and he was found walking somewhere. But that's not the case here.

The corroborating evidence doesn't point towards Keandre Valentine alone. And therefore, I put to you, it is not legitimately corroborating evidence in this case.

I would anticipate that the State is going to get up here and say a lot of things: That height isn't that important; that the IDs were clear; that there were lots of IDs. Just because there's lots of people who are put in suggestive situations and choose the wrong person because of the suggestive situations, just because there's a lot of them doesn't make it right.

It doesn't mean that a man who was not involved in robberies should be found guilty for something he didn't do.

And reasonable doubt. You can't define it. But I will put forward an

analogy for you. Imagine you have a cat and a mouse in a box. You put the box in a room and you tie the box up with a ribbon. You walk out and you come back 15 minutes later, open up the box. The cat is there; the mouse isn't. The cat's looking happy. You can infer, by circumstantial evidence, you can infer by the attendant circumstances what happened to that mouse. The cat ate the mouse. Cat's guilty.

But here's another situation. Similar. Put the cat and the mouth -- the mouse in that box, same box. It can be the same box. You tie it up with a ribbon. You walk out of the room. You come back 15 minutes later. Again, you open it, and that cat is in that box and that mouse is gone. Cat's looking happy. But this time -- this time, there's a hole in the corner of the box, just big enough for the mouse to get out. I put to you that that hole is reasonable doubt. We can't tell you exactly how big it needs to be, but there need only be one reasonable doubt to find a defendant not guilty.

And in this case, we have given you many reasons to doubt and many reasonable doubts to hang that verdict on. None, none more than the moment illustrated by Rosa Vazkuez being the only person who was ever asked to stand on even ground with Keandre Valentine and to look at him at close range, assess his height, and asked, is that the guy? Because what did she say? That's not the man who did this. That man is much, much taller.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Machnich.

Okay. Ms. Lexis, you may address the jury one last time.

MS. LEXIS: Thank you.

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, Keandre Valentine, the defendant in

this case, must be the unluckiest man in the world.

What are the chances that seven victims who live in the same neighborhood, the same neighborhood that the defendant was found in -- what are the chances these victims, all robbed, all burglarized -- what are the chances that each of these victims -- Marvin Bass, Darrell Faulkner, Deborah Faulkner, Jordan Alexander, Santiago Garcia, Lazaro Bravo-Torres, and Rosa Vazkuez Ramirez -- what is the chance people who don't know each other, people who have never met before -- what are the chances that they all get robbed the very same morning, in the exact same way, and they pick Keandre Valentine as the person who robbed them?

Chances of getting struck by lightning, like, one in 700,000. Chances of winning Powerball, one in four -- like four million -- 400 million -- astronomical.

The chances of the defendant being picked out at the scene, during a photo lineup, and then in court, and it be mistaken and that these identifications are false? Slim to none.

He just must be the unluckiest man in the world.

Let's get to the easy stuff first. Ms. Machnich talked to you about how, yes, he's conceding that he possessed stolen property -- Jordan's ID card, Jordan's credit card, Rosa Vazkuez Ramirez's credit card, but that he should only be found guilty of possession of stolen property.

Well, as diligent jurors, you will get a copy of the jury instructions, and you'll have the opportunity to read it. And if you look at the elements of the crime charged, for instance, Count 12: Possession of document or personal identifying information, okay, you're going to see that the evidence that we presented, because in this particular case, this personal identification information of another

happens to be Jordan Alexander's ID card. It's not just property. It's a specific type of property. In this particular case, it's an identifying -- it's a document with personal identifying information, his ID card.

The correct verdict is what meets what we've proven. Even what meets what they've conceded. They've conceded he had the ID card.

MS. MACHNICH: Objection, Your Honor. That misstates the law. There's an additional intent requirement.

THE COURT: Her statement was they conceded he possessed the ID card. As so that -- that statement, I think that's an accurate statement of what you said.

MS. MACHNICH: That is absolutely an accurate statement. But she is inferring that that's all that they have to show.

THE COURT: I -- I didn't gather that referral. The jury will look at the jury instructions -- the jury instructions outline exactly what you need to -- to find beyond a reasonable doubt to find the defendant either guilty or not guilty of each of these possibilities under Count 12. So look at the jury instructions. All right.

Go ahead.

MS. LEXIS: That's exactly what I'm asking you to do. Look at the jury instructions. Look at what they've conceded. He has -- he has talked to you or he has conceded -- defense counsel has conceded that he possessed these items. These items are just -- not just any items. They're actually an identifying document -- an ID card with information, and it's also a credit or debit card. Jordan's debit card. Rosa's debit card. It's not just any kind of stolen property. Okay. If you look at the elements, it's a specific type of property, and in this particular case, a credit card.

So the just verdict, as to Count 13, would be guilty of possession of credit or debit card --

MS. MACHNICH: I -- I've got to object.

MS. LEXIS: -- without cardholder consent.

MS. MACHNICH: Your Honor, objection. Again, she's implying that there's not an intent element.

THE COURT: All right. Well, the jury is instructed that mere possession by itself is not enough. You've got to have an intent element. These instructions are here for, you know, it's -- hold on a second. Let me tell them which instruction they need to look at.

Well, the -- the instruction for the middle one, possession of stolen property, is 33. And possession of credit or debit card without cardholder's consent, that's 32. And that instruction, you've already heard. And I'll just -- since it's brought up, everyone's focusing on that right now, I'll go ahead and reread it, since there's some issue as to whether the State is properly identifying the elements. I want you to hear it for yourself.

It says:

The person who possesses, sells, or transfers any document or personal identifying information for the purpose of establishing a false status, occupation, membership, license, or identity for himself or herself or any other person is guilty of possession of document or personal identifying information.

So it's not enough that you merely possess; you've got to possess it for the purpose of what it says here. Okay. Keep in mind. There's a distinction between the first checkmark, which is possession with a specific purpose, and the middle one, which is just -- which is possession, again, with another purpose of

you're withholding it from -- here, 33 is:

A person commits an offense involving stolen property of the person for his or her own gain or to prevent the owner from again possessing the property.

So you have to possess with the intent to keep it or to deprive the person -- the proper owner of it. All right. So that's the distinction. And you now are experts on -- in this area of law.

Let's continue.

MS. LEXIS: Same instruction for Count No. 14. Okay. Mr. Dickerson went through all of the elements of each of these crimes. What I was intending to point out to you is that -- draw your attention to the type of stolen property it is, and not just merely that it's just any kind of stolen property.

Ms. Machnich talked about Detective Majors, talked about how Detective Majors failed or couldn't find a showup -- showup form, and that he failed to or lost a video. Okay.

But I submit to you, that even without that evidence, we've proven this case to you beyond a reasonable doubt. We'll talk about reasonable doubt in a minute. Okay.

Ms. Machnich also pointed out, and I think she and Mr. Gaston, actually, during trial, pointed out a lot of what Detective Majors didn't test or didn't print. Oh, did you test these phones? Did you test the gun? Did you test the -- did you test the credit cards and identification cards?

Well, I mean, Ms. Machnich already said it. I mean, at this point, he's admitted to having or touching these items. So DNA and fingerprints would have done absolutely nothing, so.

24

25

Ms. Machnich also, I guess, because what really ties the defendant to this particular crime also is this car. Right? There were also car identifications. Okay. By Marvin Bass, by Jordan -- by Jordan Alexander, and also by Santiago Garcia. They all saw a white four-door car near or with the defendant. Okay. Or with the robber.

And I guess the defense wants you to believe that at some point while Bobby and Keandre -- or while Keandre lay asleep, you know, Bobby -- and we'll talk about him a lot more -- took his car. Now, Bobby took his car and went on a -- on a spree.

But what they didn't tell you is that, really, the testimony is Chanise had the car last -- or excuse me -- Omara McBride had the car last. Okay.

There's been absolutely no testimony that Bobby had access to this car. There's been absolutely no testimony that Bobby got in this car. Remember, his fingerprints were found on the outside, on the passenger side door of the front of the outside of the car. Okay. So there's been absolutely no evidence that Bobby drove this car.

What there is evidence of, though, is that this car belongs to the defendant. The defendant drives it. He bought it with his girlfriend. This car is linked to him. It's his car. It's their car. Okay. It's the same car they rode together to come to Las Vegas. When, we'll talk about in a minute. Okay.

Credit cards, okay, this particular card -- I put the slide up here, because Ms. Machnich pointed out during -- during her -- during her closing arguments that we don't have to prove corroborating evidence. Okay. That the corroborating evidence here means nothing.

MS. MACHNICH: Your Honor, that's -- that's not what I said.

THE COURT: She didn't -- she didn't say that they don't have to prove corroborating evidence. She says that she doesn't believe corroborating evidence exists. Right?

MS. MACHNICH: Yes.

MS. LEXIS: Corroborating evidence doesn't exist. Excuse me.

THE COURT: Okay. Correct.

MS. LEXIS: I'll point you to the debit card. Okay. Jordan Alexander who happens to be a robbery victim. His ID card happens to be a robbery victim. Rosa Vazkuez Ramirez happens to be a robbery victim. Phones that were identified by the victims all found in the same room or in the same apartment as the defendant. Okay.

And then you have SuperPawn receipts. This is corroborating evidence that the defendant committed the crime against Marvin Bass.

Mr. Dickerson's talked about it. But it's not a coincidence that Omara McBride, his girlfriend, is pawning items or the items stolen from Mr. Bass about an hour and an hour and a half after the robbery. That is not a coincidence. Okay. Again, he's not the unluckiest man in the world.

So pawn receipt after pawn receipt all showing that they were both here, May 26th, 2016, pawning items that had just been taken from a -- from a robbery. This is corroborating evidence.

MS. MACHNICH: Your Honor, I'm going to object as to facts not in evidence. This doesn't actually say anything about Keandre Valentine being here, pawning anything.

MS. LEXIS: It's an inference.

THE COURT: It's an inference. Overruled. It's -- it's argument. I'll let

her argue it.

MS. LEXIS: Ms. Machnich makes a good point. Right? This pawn receipt doesn't actually prove that they were here together, right, that Keandre Valentine were here together, and Omara McBride.

But Marvin Bass, the victim of this particular robbery, identified Mr. Valentine. Mr. Bass also identified the white car that belongs to the defendant. We know from testimony, even from his own jail calls, that Mr. -- Mr. Valentine and Omara McBride, his girlfriend, or some girl that he was seeing, bought a car together and drove out here to Las Vegas together. That's what we know. That's why this is corroborating evidence, okay, that Keandre Valentine committed the crime against Marvin Bass on May 26th, 2016, approximately an hour and a half before his girlfriend pawned the items.

Defense counsel, during their case in chief or when they provided information to you all, put up a registration certificate. Okay. It's not disputed that Omara, okay, the card was under her name, that there's jail calls saying that Keandre gave her money for it. Okay. And so they both have an owner -- they both had an ownership stake in the car.

I want to talk to you a little bit about Dr. Steven Smith, their ID expert, or as I'll call him, the forgetful doctor -- the forgetful expert. Okay. He testified, okay, as a paid defense expert. And you heard him say he gave the County a discount. And you know, Mr. Gaston either -- even admitted his -- his CV, okay, that you can look at. And what that CV will show you, probably towards the latter portions of this, you know, 30-something-page document, is that this man has made a lot of money testifying as a defense expert.

MS. MACHNICH: Objection. Misstates evidence. He actually didn't

2	MS. LEXIS: It's
3	MS. MACHNICH
4	THE COURT: V
5	to the jury. All right.
6	MS. MACHNICH
7	THE COURT: Y
8	and you can't remember from
9	ask for playback. All right.
10	Keep going. Let
11	I mean, I'm not r
12	MS. LEXIS: Tha
13	THE COURT: I
14	MS. LEXIS: Tha
15	THE COURT: I
16	MS. LEXIS: Tha
17	THE COURT: G
18	MS. LEXIS: You
19	at defense conferences, how
20	payment, for money. Okay.
21	he's a paid defense expert.
22	And I submit to y
23	whatever opinion he rendere
24	case materials. You know th
OE	

testify to that.

in his curriculum vitae.

H: Right. But that's not --

Vell, I don't remember. So we're going to leave it up

H: That's fine.

ou guys, again, if you think it's an important issue, m your notes and your own memory on what's what,

's get this over with.

ushing you.

ank you. Thank you.

mean, let's -- let's continue. Sorry.

ank you.

didn't mean to imply that you're taking too much time.

ank you.

o ahead.

u'll see in his -- in his CV how he's been paid to speak v he's only always only testified for the defense, for He does this for the science, he says. Okay. But

ou that this paid defense expert, when he rendered ed on the stand, he hadn't reviewed all of the relevant hat. He didn't look at the body cam. He hadn't heard the 911 calls. He didn't know any of that stuff. Okay. I mean, in the 14 hours that

24

25

he prepared for this case and in the hours that he was on the stand, this man paid so much attention to this particular case that he didn't know when calls were made. He hadn't even reviewed 911 calls. Hadn't looked at body camera footage, which by -- which, by the way, one of those body camera footage actually captured an actual showup.

You watched it. Jordan Alexander being read the instructions, okay, by a police officer, captured on her body camera. Her going through each instruction, having him sign, then driving him over. And what you'll see from that -- that body camera footage is immediately upon making that turn towards that alley, Jordan, as Mr. Dickerson pointed out, got super excited, exclaimed out loud, that's him, that's him. I'm 100 percent, I'm a thousand percent positive. Okav.

I mean, he hadn't reviewed any of that when he rendered an opinion in this particular case. All right. So how much weight can you really give the testimony of an individual who didn't prepare much for the testimony to begin with?

He testified a lot about showups. Okay. And I submit to you that really what doctor -- or you know, our forgetful doctor testified about is basically common sense. Okay. It's common sense. You didn't need or the County didn't need to pay \$8,000 or \$6,000 for him to tell you what you, as people with common sense, already know. Okay.

What do you know? Well, an identification is better if you actually good -- get a good look at the perpetrator. Common sense, right? You get a good look, you can ID. You make -- you get a good look, but you're not too far. Again, common sense, common sense. Okay. Get a good look, not too far.

What else did he tell you? Well, in an ideal case, full light. Okay. Common sense. Common sense.

The victims interviewed quickly. We went through that, as painful as it was. Each of these victims were interviewed very quickly after the offense. Okay. You heard their 911 calls made minutes after this. And they did give descriptions of this individual who robbed them violently at gunpoint, in their homes, in their cars -- in their garages, in their cars. Okay.

And he says there's no cross-racial issue. Okay. In this particular case, there really isn't a cross-racial issue, is it, at least as it pertains to Marvin Bass and Jordan Alexander, because they just happen to be the same race as the defendant.

And Dr. Steven Smith told you that people of the same race can identify people within their own race a lot better. Okay. So let's talk about as much weight as you'll give that testimony, okay, I submit to you -- as much weight as you'll give that testimony. Because, I mean, you can take your everyday common sense and experience as well, your experience as people who have lived in a very diverse town, such as Las Vegas, okay, and you can use your common sense, okay, when you test it against what this man testified to, this doctor. Okay.

But concerning Mr. Bass and Jordan Alexander, there wasn't a cross-racial issue, so let's just use them as an example. Okay. That would be the ideal case, right, no special circumstances, that's the ideal case.

What did Marvin Alexander -- or what did Marvin Bass do? When being presented a photo lineup, a couple days, a few days after he was robbed at gunpoint, positively identified the defendant. Okay. 100 percent sure that was

the defendant. When he got on the stand, positively identified the defendant.

Jordan Alexander, positively identified the defendant at a showup, positively, 1,000 percent identified him in court. Okay.

You take that -- their identifications are more reliable, as much weight as you'll give that, that those are good IDs. Right? That's the ideal case. Those identifications, according to these factors, are reliable.

No special circumstances, and we'll talk about that in a minute.

He talks about weapons focus. Again, common sense. Okay. Someone shoves a gun in your face, you're not expecting it, you're in the garage, you're putting a baby seat in the car. Okay. You're just sitting in the car, waiting to go to work. Okay. Yeah, you're going to be scared and you're going to notice the weapon. But noticing a weapon doesn't preclude you from identifying your assailant. Okay. It doesn't mean that you only look at this particular weapon and not see anything else.

And Darrell Faulkner was the best example of that, because how many times did this defendant, Keandre Valentine, have to tell him, Stop looking at me. Stop looking at me or I'm going to fucking shoot you. Darrell Faulkner who positively 100 percent identified the defendant during a showup, who 100 percent positively identified him here in court, got a good, good look at this man. Got such a good look and was willing to keep looking, even though he was facing himself -- or putting himself and his wife in great danger. Okay.

Remember he told you, Go ahead and fucking shoot me then, because he wanted to keep looking. He was not going to be a victim in his own garage. Okay. He got such a good look at this man, such a good look.

Weapon? Yes, he noticed the weapon. He was the only one who

said it was a large-frame gun. You know, everyone else said it was small. But in this particular case, it was kind of like a different kind of focus. He noticed the weapon, but he really focused on his face. Really focused on his face.

Dr. Steven Smith talked about the suggestibility of a showup. Okay.

But I submit to you, he testified, this is alleviated by that admonishment, you know, being read instructions, particularly being told the individual who committed this crime against you may or may not be the person that we presented.

You want to know evidence that this admonishment actually worked? Or that this -- these instructions actually worked? There's body camera footage of Santiago Garcia being presented another individual shortly after the crime, found in the same area, okay, within a block or two of where he was robbed at his client's house. And he looked at the man, nope, that's not him. Okay.

These are not people who have any motivation to pick out the wrong person. Okay. These are people who have been victimized violently, in places where they deserve to be safe. Okay. Their motivation for doing the right thing out on the field, during the showup, their motivation for picking out and doing the right thing in court, is to make sure the individual who committed these heinous crimes against them are held responsible.

These are not people who are going to just willy-nilly pick out the wrong person. Did you get that impression of these people? As you watched each of them testify, one by one, as they were brought here into court, did you get that impression? Did you get the impression that these people were just trying to put the wrong man away?

Our forgetful doctor also talked about this biased photo spread. Okay.

And in particular, he took issue with the fact that the suspect in the photo lineup

12

14

17

19

20

21 22

23

24

25

looked similar to the actual perpetrator. And I think Judge Scotti was the one who pointed out something about this, you know. I mean, duh, isn't that the point? I mean, when you put together a photo lineup, one of the individuals is going -- is going to be the person that they think it is. Right? And the others are meant to look somewhat like them, but we don't have twins. Okay.

In a perfect showup, okay, we would have people who looked exactly the same. But that's -- how do you pick anybody out in that case? Okay. You look -- you put people who are similar looking and you put it upon this victim to make a -- an -- an identification, if they can. There's nothing biased about particularly this lineup. And we'll talk about that in a little bit. There's nothing biased about it.

Marvin Bass picked him out. He told you he got a good look at this person. And that's it. Did Marvin Bass give you the impression that he was trying to put the wrong man away?

Dr. Steven Smith also told you that showups are bad, you know. They're inherently suggestive. Right? You put someone up in handcuffs in front of, you know, these people, and oh, no, no, no, that's not supposed to happen. Okay. He told you photo lineups are bad too. Okay. They're biased, because, oh, my goodness, you know, people who look like the suspect are actually going to be on the lineup.

MS. MACHNICH: Objection, Your Honor. That's not what he stated, that that's --

THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead.

MS. LEXIS: So I ask you, okay, taking into account everything that the forgetful doctor told you, okay, what are the police supposed to do? You can't

present photo lineups. Showups are bad, too. What? Do they just stop catching criminals? Should they stop presenting criminals and suspects to victims?

Showups and photo lineups are used widely in our country. They are a means of investigation used by law enforcement agencies all over the world. I agree, it shouldn't be suggestive. Okay. You can't have a photo lineup where one person has black background, you know, and everybody else has blue. Okay. You can't have people who look so dissimilar that it causes a misidentification.

I ask you to look at this lineup. It's in evidence. Look at it. Does it look biased to you?

Dr. Steven Smith also told you that, you know, identification he had -you know, this whole field of research, cognitive memory, cognitive psychology,
identification, misidentifications, that that's a science. Okay. And I specifically
asked him to compare it to DNA and fingerprints. Because what's not heard, what
you didn't hear from our DNA analyst, okay, Beata Vida, you didn't say, Hey,
before I can draw a conclusion that's like accepted in the field, I have to go do
more research. Okay.

You didn't hear from our fingerprint analyst, Gayle Johnson, Hey, you presented me with this -- with this fingerprint, or these fingerprints, but I can't make a determination. The research is conflicting. So I'm going to have to do more research. Okay.

What's also different between, you know, what Dr. Smith does and what DNA and fingerprints -- actual forensic science does, is they have controlled variables. Okay. They have, we're talking about the sign disk method. They have a process. It's a controlled environment. The tests can be replicated.

Okay. The variables remain the same. You have an exemplar print, compared against a print that you lift. You get a DNA swab or a sample, compared against the DNA swab taken from another individual. Okay.

But what you have with these identification experts, as he's told you is, people doing mock crimes, Dr. Smith doing a demonstration for a psychology class, and then measuring how people behave. I submit to you people behave differently when they are in a college psychology class than they would when they have a gun pointed at them, someone screaming at them, someone pointing a gun at their wife. Okay.

These things can't be measured that way. And these experiments can't be replicated. And I submit to you, for that reason, they can't be trusted. It's unethical to get participants and subject them to the kind of fear that these victims went through. And I think that's one thing that shouldn't be lost. That fear cannot be duplicated, it cannot be replicated. What is seared in their mind forever can't be replicated by a study.

His opinion, oh, the ideal showup is let's get the victims right next to people who just robbed them at gunpoint. That would be ideal. Does that make sense to you? Is there a reason that people who are doing showups are held so far back in a patrol car in the back so they're not seen?

Rosa Vazkuez Ramirez. Rosa Vazkuez Ramirez was the only victim who had to get so close to the defendant. Okay. She is the only victim who after a year had the opportunity to stand so close to him. Okay.

You ever have a memory or a nightmare that just reoccurs or that saying the memories just flooded, just rushed back in, and it was so real it was almost like you were back at that moment where you were -- think of the most

24

25

3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21		2
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20		3
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20		4
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20		5
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20		6
9 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 220		7
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19		8
111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 220		9
112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 220	1	0
13 14 15 16 17 18 19	1	1
114 115 116 117 118 119 20	1	2
115 116 117 118 119	1	3
16 17 18 19	1	4
17 18 19 20	1	5
18 19 20	1	6
19 20	1	7
20	1	8
	1	9
21	2	0
	2	1

fearful experience of your life. And that memory floods back, rushes back in. You all had the opportunity to observe this woman. You heard her 911 call. You saw how scared she was.

As you saw her walk over, this scared woman, standing so close to him, and to have this man stand up, what do you think -- what's the common sense here? She felt overpowered by his height. And once she was -- she had taken her step back, back at her -- at the witness stand, she immediately said, Oh, I -- Judge, I have something to tell you. I really have something to tell you. We rushed you out of here. The judge heard what she had to say. She told you what she told you guys --

MS. MACHNICH: Your Honor, I'm going to object to this talking about inferences from a bench conference and what may or may not have taken out -taken place outside --

THE COURT: I think you started it in your --

MS. MACHNICH: No. Outside the presence of the jury, I absolutely did not talk about anything outside the presence.

THE COURT: Well, and she -- she hasn't yet. You don't -- weren't -you guys are both just talking about inferences to derive from the portions of the trial that the jury saw. So I think that's -- I think that's acceptable.

MS. MACHNICH: Okay. I -- she started saying that the jury had to be rushed out of here.

THE COURT: She's not going to talk --

MS. MACHNICH: And -- and that was very concerning to the defense.

THE COURT: Yeah. She said she rushed. We talked. And then she

came back in and more things happened. I don't want anyone saying what happened, you know, outside the presence of the jury.

MS. MACHNICH: Right.

THE COURT: And -- and the jury knows that we talked to the witness. That's -- that's all they should know. But what was said, what was discussed, you know, none of that -- it should come to the jury.

MS. MACHNICH: Absolutely. That's our position.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you.

MS. LEXIS: When you all were allowed back in, she told you what she wanted to tell Judge Scotti, what she was trying to get her attention, when she returned to that witness stand. And it was: It was a year ago; I do recognize him. That is the man who robbed us. Okay.

But you don't even have to take just Rosa's -- just Rosa's testimony.

Okay. She positively identified him back then.

But, you know what, her husband, Lazaro Bravo-Torres, was with her.

Okay. He positively identified the defendant during the show up. And guess what? Upon defense questioning, Lazaro Bravo-Torres positively identified Keandre Valentine as the person who robbed him and his wife.

Corroborating evidence? Strength in numbers.

Dr. Steven Smith also gave his opinion, Damian Traylor met the -was closer to the description given by the victims -- and one of you had a question
on this. Okay. If that was the case, okay, you all asked -- one of you asked -why is it if Damian Traylor, the person that he was presented with, the defendant
was made to stand next to during a showup, if Damian looked closer, matched the
description of the robber more --

1	
2	
3	
4	t
5	t
6	
7	
8	I
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	\
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	(
23	t
24	1

MS. MACHNICH:	Your Honor,	I'm go	ing to	object.
---------------	-------------	--------	--------	---------

MS. LEXIS: -- why didn't everybody pick --

MS. MACHNICH: Your Honor, I'm going to object. That's not what he testified to. He testified that the height was closer, and that he was standing next to him in relative.

THE COURT: Okay. So --

MS. MACHNICH: She's saying that his description otherwise matched closer. And that isn't -- that's just not what he said.

THE COURT: Part -- height's part of a description, right?

MS. MACHNICH: Height is part of it. But that is not what she was saying.

THE COURT: All right. So what do you want me to do about it?

MR. GASTON: Objecting.

MS. MACHNICH: I -- I just --

MS. LEXIS: Your Honor, we can do a playback. I wrote this word for word in my notes.

THE COURT: Well, I'm -- but we're not going to take a -- do a playback now --

MS. MACHNICH: Well --

MS. LEXIS: Okay.

THE COURT: -- until after we're all done. All right. And so the objection is taken under advisement by the jury. If the jury believes it's important to -- to -- this -- this point is important to them, they can ask for a playback. All right.

Go ahead.

MS. LEXIS: One of you asked this question. You heard the same thing I did. His opinion was Damian Traylor matched the description, was closer to the description given by the victims.

And the question is, if that was the case, why did everyone pick the person standing next to him, the real robber?

Dr. Smith also gave an opinion. Okay. He said he looked at a photo of Bobby McCoy. He looked at a photo of Keandre Valentine. And they're not identical. They're just lookalikes. Okay. Take a look. Everyone picked him. Okay.

So let's talk about descriptions. I kind of gave away my next slide. If I were to tell you, and this is how descriptions are just inherently general, and I'll explain to you why I think that. Okay. Because there's been a big deal made about, oh, they just -- everybody's descriptions are wrong. Okay.

If I were to describe a white male adult, okay, with a really nice blond -- light-blond hair stale, okay, that could be Mr. Dickerson. Okay. But that could also be Brad Pitt. Okay. White male adult, nice blond hair. That's how vague descriptions are. Just with that description, you don't know until you recognize the face. Okay.

Identifications are about recognition. These people picked Keandre Valentine out because they recognized him as the robber. Okay.

There's been some talk about facial features and details, you know, and some details being different. Okay. And I'll submit to you memory isn't perfect, as Ms. Machnich said. Right? We don't remember everything. But does the fact that you can't remember a single one thing about that person's face, whether it be facial hair or -- or eyes or something, you know, does that discount

4 5

6 7

8 9

10

11

12

13 14

15

16

17 18

19

21

20

22 23

24

25

your recognition of a person?

Let me ask you this, okay, how many of you are familiar with Cindy Crawford? She has a mole. Which side? Does the fact that you can't remember what side her mole is prevent you from being -- being able to identify Cindy Crawford? You recognize her.

Let's talk about hair. There's been much ado about this hair. Was it a small 'fro? Was it a medium 'fro? Was it a Jheri curl? Whatever. Okay. Even though the instructions say don't take hair into account, you know, when you're looking and making identifications, don't take those into account, okay, there's been much ado about it. Okay.

It's about recognition. It's about facial recognition. Jim Carrey with long hair. Jim Carrey with medium hair. Jim Carrey with short hair. No matter which picture, no matter which hair style, that's Jim Carrey.

Facial hair. Goatee, mustache, whatever. Right? Bushy, whatever. Slim goatee. George Clooney, clean shaven. George Clooney with a goatee and mustache, full beard, still George Clooney. Still recognized as George Clooney.

The height descriptions. Ah, this is just -- this is what's going to break this case wide open. Okay. The difference in heights. Okay. Because the heights don't match, he's not guilty. That's -- that's what they want you to believe. That's actually what they're expecting you to believe. Okay.

Chanise Williams. She testified, their witness. And I asked her, you've been around Omara McBride, right? How tall is she? What did she tell you? She's shorter than me. I'm 5-8. Shorter than me. And she -- she went like this with her hand, if you remember. She's like, she's short, she's -- she's just short. I said, well, if you were to guess? She's, like, 5-6. Well, we know from the

pawn slips, okay, Omara McBride, I take -- information taken from her driver's license, okay, 5-4.

This whole thing about faces are complicated -- or faces are not complicated, height is.

MS. MACHNICH: That is actually the opposite of what we said.

MS. LEXIS: I mean, let me see what it is exactly that you all said.

Faces are complicated; height is not.

THE COURT: I mean, it's not evidence. All right. So she can characterize your argument however she wants. All right.

Go ahead.

MS. LEXIS: Faces are -- oh, sorry, Judge.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MS. LEXIS: Faces are complicated; height is not. Their own witness just proved height's a little bit harder to distinguish, plus or minus a couple inches. Faces are not.

This was the photo lineup. And I asked you when you get back to the deliberation room, take a look at it. Is it so biased when the instructions tell you to focus on the face? Is it so unbiased that this can't -- this can't be reliable?

Santiago Garcia, identifying the phone that was there. And then this picture, the phone with the cover. Does it even matter? No, it doesn't. Because had he identified the wrong phone, it doesn't -- it doesn't mean he wasn't robbed. Okay. It doesn't want mean he wasn't robbed at gunpoint. Doesn't mean money wasn't taken from him. Okay. He misidentified the phone. And what he did tell you, after more questioning and after he saw this picture, okay, what he kept telling you was, My phone had a case. I don't know -- I guess I don't know

13

12

14 15

16

17 18

19

21

22

23 24

25

20

because this doesn't have a case. My phone has a case. Okay.

Does it even matter? No. Does he have a reason to lie about that? No.

A lot of what's happened or a lot of the evidence that we've presented, okay, not only shows guilt, but it shows actions by the defendant that are inconsistent with innocence. Okay. People who have nothing to do with a crime don't make calls like this, don't say things like this. Okay. And I submit to you that when the defendant made these calls, it wasn't to the police where he would have gotten his friend in trouble. Okay. This was after he had already been charged with a crime, charged with various crimes, okay, and taken into custody at the detention center.

And when he's talking to his girlfriend, someone he doesn't have to, like, lie to, someone he doesn't have to shade the truth with, okay. Or when he's talking to his cousin, okay, what does he tell you? Well, when he is talking to his girlfriend, he tells her, In the gray bin, so get that and get it out of there. In the closet, and one piece is on top. Okay. He talks about the gun. Okay. It's not his. And he didn't use it to do something bad, why does -- why does she have to get rid of it?

It's just inconsistent with innocence.

Then, when he actually talks to his cousin Chanise, he said I should --I said I should went Mad Dog's house. And she says:

That's what -- or when I wanted you to know they were coming and you -- and what you would have call it, supposed to be gone.

Okay.

Remember Chanise testified about how, oh, my gosh, she didn't know

who was in the apartment? She just woke up and didn't even check. But the police were out there, so she was trying to see what her guest's car was up to or whatever it was. All right. I submit to you that this conversation, reported conversation with Chanise Williams and the defendant, okay, is actually talking about that very thing. Okay.

Chanise was supposed -- went down, okay, she then let him know, I wanted you to know they were coming, and you were supposed to have already been gone.

Why would he have needed to have been gone?

Credibility. This is an actual instruction. You've heard it a little bit.

The credibility or believability of a witness should be deemed -- determined by his or her manner upon the stand; his or her relationship to the parties; his or her fears, motives, interests, or feelings; his or her opportunity to have observed the matter to which he or she testified; the reasonableness of his or her statements; and the strength or weakness of his or her recollections.

If you believe that a witness has lied about any material fact in the case, you may disregard the entire testimony of that witness or any portion of his testimony which is not proved by other evidence.

You get to be the judges of credibility. We talked about that a lot during jury selection. Okay. And these are the things that you can take into consideration.

But I draw your attention to the second paragraph of this instruction:

If you find that a witness has materially -- has lied about any material fact in this case you may disregard the entire testimony of that witness.

Let's talk about Chanise Williams, okay, because she provided you

some information. As a matter of fact, she was the only piece of information that puts Bobby McCoy in that apartment with the defendant and his girlfriend, okay, the morning of the robberies. She is the only person to have provided that information.

So what does Chanise -- what does actually the defendant tell Chanise, okay, during a jail call?

They was searching from house to house. They were looking. They seen my car parked outside and they --

Oh, no, I'm sorry. This was when Keandre Valentine was talking to his girlfriend. Okay.

They were searching from house to house. They were looking. They seen my car parked outside and they went house to house looking to see who drived that car. So I sent somebody out. I sent -- I sent Chanise outside to look, so they wouldn't tow my car. They talking about --

Didn't Chanise tell you that she awoke, she hadn't talked to anybody, she didn't know if Keandre Valentine, the defendant, was still in the house? She knew that when she went to bed, he was in her bedroom, but she had no idea, right? No idea who else was in the house. She just went straight to the door and found out what the police were looking at. She couldn't tell you who was in her house. Okay.

But this jail call made by the defendant to his girlfriend specifically contradicts what Chanise testified to. I sent Chanise outside to look.

If you find that a witness has lied about a material fact in this case, you can disregard their entire testimony.

Chanise Williams also testified that Keandre Valentine, Bobby McCoy,

24

25

and Omara McBride, and some other girl, arrived in Las Vegas the day that they went out -- or the night that they went out. Okay. She testified that way on direct. She testified that way on cross. Okay. She's kind of started changing her mind during redirect. Okay. But that's what she told you. The night that we went out, us girls, that's when they got to Vegas. Okay.

And, well, they went out. 1:29 a.m. they parked that car at that valet parking, you know, to go to the Gold Spike and the D. So they arrived the night before the 27th, that Friday night. Okay. I mean, that's -- that -- that was the testimony.

But, you have evidence to the contrary. Right. You have those pawn slips. You have those pawn slips from Omara, the same person who the defendant told the detectives during a taped interview, okay, he said I came to Las Vegas with Omara, in that car. Okay. We bought a car. I gave her money. We drove to Las Vegas together. So he's -- finger's pointed at him for robbery with Marvin Bass. An hour and a half later Omara is pawning Mr. Bass's chains and pendant. Okay.

What does that piece of evidence tell you? Keandre Valentine was in Las Vegas, May 26, 2016, with Omara, with their car, with some stolen jewelry.

If you believe that a witness has lied about any material fact in this case, you may disregard the testimony of that witness.

So Chanise also testified about how the last time the last person who would have had the car keys, okay, was Omara, because Omara was driving when they went out on their girls' night. Right? She was in the passenger seat. They were with another girl. Okay.

And for all intents and purposes, that car was parked in the exact

same place that she and the girls left it in. Okay. So the police -- there's a crime scene analyst who testified that she -- they took these pictures shortly after they got into that car. Okay. Or they -- they noticed this car. They had a crime scene analyst look.

So I ask you, take a good look at this picture. I'd like to just draw your attention to how far back the seat is. So far back, as a vertically-challenged person myself, I know the importance of this. Okay. Omara McBride, all 5-foot-4, was not driving that car last.

Someone a lot taller, you know, the other person who had access to the car. The car was back by 1:30, or by Chanise's testimony, 3:30, okay, in that apartment complex, in that -- in that parking lot, giving Mr. Valentine plenty of time and opportunity to commit the four robberies right before he was apprehended.

Okay. And I submit to you, he was the last person driving that car, all 6-foot-2 and -- 2 and three-fourth inches.

Statements and arguments and opinions of counsel are not evidence in this case. That's already been made so clear, I hope, you know. But I bring it up because during opening statements -- and certainly I'll acknowledge, okay, the State has the burden of proving each and every element of each offense in this case beyond a reasonable doubt. That's the only way you can find the defendant guilty. Okay. We have the burden. We'll talk about that in a minute.

But if you'll recall, during opening arguments, Mr. Gaston told you a little bit about what happened with the defendant that morning before he was caught, things that he did, okay, from a first-person point of view.

He saw the police. He panicked. He did this. He hid this. He did that. Bobby had been there. Bobby left. Left him holding the bag. Remember

that? That's not evidence. Okay. You know why it can't be considered by you? One, because statements and arguments and opinions of counsel are not evidence in this case. But number two, and, more importantly, none of that was ever proven.

MS. MACHNICH: Objection, Your Honor. This is burden shifting.

Just because she says it's not, doesn't make it not burden shifting.

THE COURT: So -- so there -- there -- you make a valid point, that the State has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all elements of the crime, and that is stated in the Jury Instruction No. 5. The court would encourage you to reread that when you're back there.

The defense never has to prove anything. I'm assuming what the State was intending to say is that there's been no evidence presented as to -- as to the points made in Mr. Gaston's argument.

MS. LEXIS: Absolutely.

THE COURT: And -- but I -- as to the -- which is fine argument.

Just -- just as long as the jury understands the defense never has the burden to prove anything. Okay.

But the point that the State is making is -- is that there is no evidence to -- to -- consistent with the argument made. All right. We'll just leave it at that.

Let's -- let's move on.

MS. LEXIS: Since that's not evidence, you can't consider that. You cannot consider the rendition given in opening statements. That is not evidence, that has not been testified to. Not in this case.

MS. MACHNICH: Okay. Your Honor, she's saying that inferences can't be considered in a case. And that it -- that's what it appears --

1	THE COURT: Well, she's making the argument
2	MS. MACHNICH: That inference
3	THE COURT: which is not evidence in itself
4	MS. MACHNICH: Right.
5	THE COURT: that the jury should not consider your argument,
6	because you didn't present any evidence to support your argument. It's her
7	argument.
8	MS. MACHNICH: But but that
9	THE COURT: This is all argument, of course. And the argument is
0	not evidence. What the attorneys are just doing in in this last two hours is
1	very leading you to different propositions that they want you to make. All right.
2	It's up to you to determine whether you can draw any reasonable
3	inferences from the evidence that's been presented. If you could draw a
4	reasonable inference that Bobby McCoy was was at the apartment, you know,
5	that's up for you to decide. Okay. All right. Let's leave it at that.
6	MS. MACHNICH: Thank you, Your Honor.
7	MS. LEXIS: What has been proven by other evidence is that the

There's no evidence -- I submit to you there's no evidence that the defendant has been covering for Bobby this whole time.

Apartment No. 218. Okay. We know that because there's a jail call that says it.

defendant did handle this gun that was taken apart and found in

Okay. He knew about it; he put it there.

We're going to -- let's talk about that. Bobby McCoy, 5-10, 145 pounds, Bobby McCoy, the defendant's friend, that one that he allegedly does not want to snitch on. Okay. No evidence of snitching, okay, at

all. No evidence that he doesn't have a reason to snitch. No evidence of snitching presented in this case. No evidence presented as to why he would not want to or why he would. Okay.

So what do we know about Bobby McCoy and who places Bobby McCoy in this particular case? Okay. Chanise Williams. Evidence or the arguments or the statements by counsel during opening statements, not evidence. You received evidence from Chanise Williams. She is the only person who gave you direct evidence or direct testimony of Bobby being there that morning, May 28th, 2016. She's the only person that puts Bobby there. Okay.

But Chanise's lackluster testimony, okay, the same testimony that we've already proven to be inaccurate and inconsistent with other evidence, okay, is also belied or contradicted by the defendant's own statement. And you've heard this time and time again. Okay.

So Dame and Bobby were in the house, too, but they put it all on you.

Okay. They're talking about the morning of May 28th, 2016. Okay.

What does the defendant say?

Dame, Dame -- they -- they let -- they let Dame alone, because that he didn't fit the description. Bobby's been left two days ago.

He made this call shortly after he was booked in the Clark County

Detention Center on May 28th, 2016. Two days ago, okay, would have brought it
to Friday. Bobby McCoy was not here, by the defendant's own statements, during
the robberies. He could not have committed these robberies, by the defendant's
own words. And they're directly talking during this jail call, if you look at what
they're talking about, they're talking about that morning, and why it is that Keandre
got picked out, why is it Keandre was there, why they let Dame go, who was also

there. He was the guy standing next to him in the -- in the showups. But why Bobby didn't get in trouble.

And again, these are statements where he -- the defendant, had no incentive to make anything up. He wasn't in any danger by Bobby. Bobby wouldn't have known he made these statements. Right? Okay. Bobby's been gone two days ago. Bobby was not here. That's the evidence.

We know the defendant was here, May 26, 2016. We've gone over that. So let me bring your attention to this, and during jury selection we talked endlessly about this reasonable doubt. Okay. Just reasonable doubt. What is it? Well, it's defined for you, actually. Okay.

The defendant is presumed innocent until the contrary is proven. The presumption places upon the State the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime charged, and that the defendant is the person who committed the offense. A reasonable doubt is based on reason -- is one based on reason. It is not mere possible doubt, but it is such a doubt as would govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs of life.

If the minds of the jurors, after the entire comparison and consideration of all evidence, are in such a condition that they can say they feel an abiding conviction as to the truth of the charge, there is not a reasonable doubt.

If the minds of the jurors, after the entire comparison and consideration of all of the evidence, are in such a condition that you can say you have an abiding conviction as to the truth of these charges, there is not reasonable doubt.

Doubt, to be reasonable, must be actual. Not mere possibility or speculation.

Not coulda, woulda, shoulda. Okay. It has to be actual doubt. Okay. Not speculation.

There's another instruction that says -- that actually tells you use your common sense, believe it or not. Okay.

Although you are to consider only the evidence of this case in reaching a verdict, you must bring the consideration of the evidence your everyday common sense and judgment as reasonable men and women. Thus, you are not limited solely to what you see and hear as the witnesses testify. You may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence which you feel are justified in the light of common experience, keeping in mind that such inferences should not be based on speculation or guess.

A verdict may never be influenced by sympathy.

So on and so forth. Okay. But you are allowed to use your common sense. When you walk through the doors and you -- you get put on a jury, you're not expected to put your common sense at the door. That's actually the test upon which you should measure the evidence. With common sense, as a reasonable person.

So the defense wants you to believe this is just -- this is a case of misidentification. Okay. All of the evidence, they say, points to Bobby McCoy doing this. I submit to you, after you look at all of the evidence, that's absolutely not the case. Okay. Let's talk about it a little more. Let me address this before, though.

Ms. Machnich talked about Juan Campos Torres, and about how you

didn't hear from him. I submit to you that there was ample and sufficient testimony for you to consider and to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Keandre Valentine also committed an attempt robbery with use of a deadly weapon as to Juan Carlos Torres. Okay. You heard from Santiago Garcia, who was right there with him on that ladder, who saw the defendant point a gun at Juan Carlos Torres up on that roof and told him to get down.

Juan Carlos Torres hid. Okay. Do you remember that testimony from Santiago? Okay. If you believe Santiago's testimony about Juan Carlos Campos Torres being there, about the defendant pointing the gun at him, about him hiding in fear, okay, and then the defendant robbing Santiago Garcia, because he couldn't hide, that's beyond a reasonable doubt, that an attempt robbery with use of a deadly weapon was committed against Juan Campos Torres.

Rosa Vazkuez Ramirez. Ms. Machnich talked about how, oh, she picked him out, because the police told -- told her that they found that stuff in there. Okay. That they found her stolen stuff in there. That's not true. Okay. The evidence has shown that the search of that apartment was done after the showups.

If you recall with Detective Majors, who went through a timeline of when the show ups were done, and immediately, 9:41, okay, like, five -- five, 10 minutes after the last showup, they executed that search warrant and searched the house and began finding items.

Rosa Vazkuez Ramirez, Lazaro Bravo-Torres had already completed their showups and had already picked up -- picked out the defendant as the person who robbed them. When they made that -- that identification, they did not know that that information, the cards, the phone, was found in -- in that apartment

where he was pulled from. Okay.

We admitted the grand jury testimony, and you'll see we showed them pictures, and that's when they identified their items. They were not taken into the apartment. These victims were not taken into the apartment to do a, you know, personal goods lineup. Okay. Is this your phone? Is this your card? Is this, this? They were -- they were not doing that.

The fact of the matter in this particular case is while we have a lot of corroborating evidence, okay, if you believe the victims, okay, if you believe Marvin Bass, Darrell Faulkner, Deborah Faulkner, Jordan Alexander, Santiago Garcia, Lazaro Bravo-Torres, Rosa Vazkuez Ramirez, if after consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you, as reasonable men and women exercising common sense and judgment, if you feel an abiding conviction as to the truth of the charge, they were robbed with guns, in cars, in garages, okay, if you feel an abiding conviction as to the truth of that charge, you find him guilty.

Even if you -- even if none of that other evidence existed, none of that corroborating evidence, okay, if you believe these victims, you find him guilty.

The other stuff is just icing on the cake. The car linked to him. Okay. The BS story about Bobby McCoy. Okay. Bobby not being here, proving that. Cards being found, IDs being found, SuperPawn receipt after SuperPawn receipt, that -- you don't even need that.

If you believe the victims, you find him guilty. Icing on the cake.

We have proven each and every count, each and every charge in this case to you beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant, Keandre Valentine, is the person who committed these robberies against each of these -- each of these victims. Okay. He is not the unluckiest man in the world. He is not the victim of

seven false identifications. He's the one who did it. We ask you to find him guilty.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Lexis.

All right. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, at this time this matter is now submitted to you.

Let's see what we're going to do. It's 5:15. I'm going to first have the court clerk swear in the officers who will take charge of the regular jurors and the alternate. But before I do that, let me -- let me -- I think what I'm going to have you guys do is go back to the jury deliberation room and begin the -- your process.

You'll -- you'll have, you know, the exhibits. You'll have the jury instructions. You'll have the verdict form. You'll have to select a foreperson, like we indicated.

The first thing we want to hear from you is how long you want to deliberate tonight. I'll leave that up to you. All right.

So I'm going to ask the attorneys to stick around and you guys to -- to send us a note indicating how long you want to stay tonight. If you wish to deliberate a while, I can -- can staff stay and how long? Can -- can you stay till -- or who -- who would stay for -- for the court clerk? Or would we have someone on call? Let me ask. Do you know how that works?

THE CLERK: [Indiscernible] has to be on call.

THE COURT: All right. Is it too late to -- oh, so you would have to be the person? I see. Okay. Well, I don't want to put you on the spot. Do you have any --

THE CLERK: [Indiscernible.]

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	

23

24

25

-	THE COURT:	I was thinking	of giving th	nem until	well, I	was
thinking 7:30), giving them t	wo hours.				

THE CLERK: Okay.

THE COURT: Is that -- is that going to be too much of a burden? I don't want to -- 7:00, do you think? Let's -- let's say 7:00. All right. You're okay to 7:00? All right.

So if you guys -- I'm going to let you decide. If you decide we want to go home now and -- and deliberate tomorrow, beginning at 9:00, send us a note and let us know that. If you want to stay until 7:00 and see how far you can get, let me know that, as well. All right.

And maybe you guys -- you decide to stay until 7:00 and you don't finish and you want to come back at 9:00 tomorrow, too. I'm going to leave it up to you. Just make it very crystal clear what you want. All right. If you want to stay until 7:00, you can do that. All right. All right.

Now, please swear in, Madam Clerk, the parties to serve as the jury officers.

[Jury officers sworn.]

THE COURT: Is there -- first of all, is there any objection to -- to me asking the jury to send us a note on how long they would like to stay?

MS. MACHNICH: Sounds like a good plan.

MS. LEXIS: No.

THE COURT: Okay. Good. So you guys -- why don't you stick around.

MS. MACHNICH: Tomorrow's fine.

THE COURT: I don't want to put any undue pressure on the jury. But

if you would send us a note as soon as it's -- you're able to conveniently do that, we'd appreciate that. All right.

Madam Clerk, will you please identify the person who was designated -- who is designated as the alternate in this case?

THE CLERK: Juror No. 14, Timothy Duerson.

THE COURT: 15, Timothy Duerson.

THE CLERK: 14.

THE COURT: 14. 14, is that correct, counsel?

MS. LEXIS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Duerson, raise your hand.

Sir, you are the alternate. You still need to be on call in the event that the jurors need to deliberate into tomorrow and something happens to somebody and they're aren't able to -- so you'll be instructed not to -- let me go ahead and give you this admonishment.

And this admonishment applies to the jurors tonight, if they go home.

Do not communicate among yourselves or with anybody else about this trial or the subject matter of this trial, except to the extent you're allowed to do so during deliberations; do not communicate at all with any of the parties, attorneys, or witnesses involved with the trial; do not seek or obtain any information or comments about the case from any source, including newspapers, television, radio, Internet, e-mail, cell phones, or any other electronic device; do not read, watch, or listen to any report of or commentary about the case; do not perform any research or investigation; do not form or express any opinion on any subject connected with the trial until the case is finally submitted to you for deliberations.

25

You are directed to -- well, these instructions apply to the alternate who is not supposed to do anything pending further notification.

The jurors are allowed to begin their deliberations now. All right.

Madam Clerk, will you please -- well, let's -- Melody Howard and marshal, will you please excuse the jurors to the deliberation room, and the alternate to go home as appropriate.

Thank you.

Take you notepads this time. Everyone takes their notepads, with the exception of the alternate, who hands the notepad over to the officer.

[Jury recessed to deliberate at 5:17 p.m.]

THE COURT: All right. Please be seated, everybody. All right.

You guys had a lot -- bunch of objections there. I just wanted to give everyone a full opportunity if there's anything more -- I think you all made your objections pretty clear. Is there anymore that you want to put on the record? This is a -- a fair chance of doing that.

MS. LEXIS: Not from the State.

MR. GASTON: Your Honor, I think at the time we were able to make most of our objections and -- and flesh them out. But I do want to focus on one that I thought was a big deal that didn't get the attention I thought --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GASTON: -- it might have deserved, was the -- the objection about burden shifting.

That whole section of closing, the -- the State -- and you could tell they knew they -- they were approaching a sensitive subject, because they started with we have the burden. Right. But despite the disclaimer, it's still burden

shifting. Any the State is not allowed, period, to ask the jury to draw any
inference or lack of inference from the absence of evidence. That is burder
shifting, period.
Because that implies that we had some obligation to put forth the

Because that implies that we had some obligation to put forth that evidence in order to -- for them to draw that inference or in order for them to not draw an inference, however way you're spinning it. But it -- at any time the State --

THE COURT: What's up?

MR. GASTON: I was just waiting. I didn't know if the jury was right outside or not. I didn't want to --

THE COURT: Oh, okay. Yeah.

MR. GASTON: Anytime the State is asking a jury to draw or not draw an inference from the absence of evidence, that is pure burden shifting, period. Unless, of course, the burden is actually on us to provide some evidence, like something --

THE COURT: How else could I have attempted to mitigate your concern besides what I did?

MR. GASTON: Told them not to do it. Because what did happen was the court instructed the jury --

THE COURT: Oh, well --

MR. GASTON: Well, the court instructed the jury about the burdens, but then the State then proceeded to go on, point, point, point, about all the lack of evidence. There's no evidence of the snitching. There's no evidence of this.

The burden isn't -- the question for the jury is not did the defense put sufficient evidence for you to draw an inference that Bobby was in the apartment?

That's what they argued. The question is, did the State present sufficient
evidence for you to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Bobby was not
the one who did it, not the one who's not in the apartment? And that period of
that period of argument in the closing was them asking the jury to not draw the
inference we asked them to from the absence of evidence. That is burden
shifting. Full stop.

THE COURT: All right. I understand your -- your position. I'll let -- does the State want to respond to that?

MS. LEXIS: Yes. I would just like to add, absent my -- my response, I absolutely -- there was absolutely no burden shifting in this particular case.

I don't think the defense is allowed to open, Your Honor, and say this, like, first-hand account, as if the defendant himself was going to testify about the things that he did and why he did what he did, and I not be allowed on rebuttal, okay, to -- the -- the slide actually said statements and opinions and arguments by counsel are not evidence. I just wanted to make it very clear to the jury that what Mr. Gaston told them, the story that he told them during opening, was not supported by evidence -- any evidence. Okay.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. LEXIS: Any evidence in this particular case.

THE COURT: Yeah. No, I understand. And I -- and I -- I don't -- I didn't -- I never viewed that as burden shifting. If it is, I guess I'll -- I'll learn that.

I -- I always thought that if a party says, you know, I intend to prove X, Y, and Z, and then put no evidence of X, Y, and Z, then the opposing party could say, they said they were going to put in evidence of X, Y, and Z, and they didn't put on any evidence of X, Y, and Z. And just to point out that -- that disparity

between the opening statement and the actual evidence. I never viewed that as burden shifting.

It sounds like the defense is contending that, at least under the circumstances as we had here in this case, that it was burden shifting. I don't know what to do about that.

MR. GASTON: I'll respond. 30 seconds or so.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GASTON: Brief -- briefly, I think in that situation it's still burden shifting. But that's definitely than what happened here, because the opening was based on the evidence that was going to come out at trial and an inference that could be made, pretty much the entire theory of the case.

The State's response -- and they actually didn't even just say it's not a strong point because of the lack of evidence. I mean, that would just be a lot of baseline burden shifting. They went further and told the jury that you are not allowed to consider that inference because there was no evidence to support it.

THE COURT: I --

MR. GASTON: That is literally burden shifting.

THE COURT: I -- I see it. You know, I recently just -- I recently read some Ninth Circuit cases on burden shifting in some California cases. We were discussing burden shifting just a couple days ago. And, actually, it seems to be the trend is to allow the State to actually argue the lack of evidence to support different points, as long as you make it clear that, ultimately, that the State has the full burden and -- and defense has no burden.

So anyway, I think you made a good record.

MR. GASTON: Thanks, Judge.

Electronically Filed 1/29/2018 7:45 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

RTRAN

1

2

3

4

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

5 | THE OT

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

VS.

KEANDRE VALENTINE,

Defendant.

Plaintiff,) CASE NO. C-

CASE NO. C-16-316081-1

DEPT. NO. II

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JERRY A. WIESE, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

FRIDAY, AUGUST 4, 2017

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: AGNES M. LEXIS, ESQ.

Chief Deputy District Attorney MICHAEL DICKERSON, ESQ.

Deputy District Attorney

For the Defendant: TEGAN C. MACHNICH, ESQ.

Deputy Public Defender TYLER GASTON, ESQ. Deputy Public Defender

RECORDED BY: DALYNE EASLEY, COURT RECORDER

1

1	<u>INDEX</u>	
2		<u>Page No</u> .
3	Verdict read	3
4		
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
	2	

The State of Nevada, Plaintiff, vs. Keandre Valentine, Defendant.

Case No. C-16-316081-1 [Jury Trial Day 10 of 10]

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, FRIDAY, AUGUST 4, 2017

[Case called at 1:22 p.m.]

[In the presence of the jury.]

THE COURT: Welcome back, ladies and gentlemen. We're back on the record in Case No. C-316081.

Parties stipulate to the presence of the jury?

MS. LEXIS: Yes, Your Honor.

MS. MACHNICH: Yes.

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, I'm obviously not Judge Scotti.

My name's Jerry Wiese. I'm the judge in Department 30. I was just asked to come and take the verdict for Judge Scotti, because he's unavailable.

Has our jury reached a verdict?

JUROR NO. 7: We have, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And has somebody been selected as a foreperson. What's your name, ma'am?

JUROR NO. 7: Kelly Day.

THE COURT: Ms. Day, can you hand the verdict to the marshal, please. All right.

I'll hand this to the clerk and have the clerk read the verdict out loud, please.

THE CLERK: District Court, Clark County, Nevada, the State of Nevada, Plaintiff, vs. Keandre Valentine, Defendant, Case No. C-16316081-1, Department 2, Verdict.

We, the jury, in the above-entitled case find the Defendant Keandre Valentine as follows:

1	Count 1: Robbery with use of a deadly weapon; guilty of robbery with
2	the use of a deadly weapon.
3	Count 2: Burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon; guilty of
4	burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon.
5	Count 3: Robbery with use of a deadly weapon; guilty of robbery with
6	use of a deadly weapon.
7	Count 4: Robbery with use of a deadly weapon; guilty of robbery with
8	use of a deadly weapon.
9	Count 5: Burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon; guilty of
0	burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon.
1	Count 6: Robbery with use of a deadly weapon; guilty of robbery with
2	use of a deadly weapon.
3	Count 7: Robbery with use of a deadly weapon; guilty of robbery with
4	use of a deadly weapon.
5	Count 8: Attempt robbery with use of a deadly weapon; guilty of
6	attempt robbery with use of a deadly weapon.
7	Count 9: Robbery with use of a deadly weapon; guilty of robbery with
8	use of a deadly weapon.
9	Count 10: Burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon; guilty of

burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon.

Count 11: Robbery with use of a deadly weapon; guilty of robbery with use of a deadly weapon.

Count 12: Possession of document or personal identifying information; guilty of possession of document or personal identifying information.

Count 13: Possession of credit or debit card without cardholder's

1	consent; guilty of possession of credit or debit card without cardholder's consent
2	Count 14: Possession of debit credit or debit card without
3	cardholder's consent; guilty of possession of credit or debit card without
4	cardholder's consent.
5	Dated this 4th day of August, 2017, Kelly Day.
6	THE COURT: Thank you.
7	Do either of the parties wish that the jury to be polled?
8	MS. MACHNICH: Yes, Your Honor.
9	THE COURT: Okay. So what's going to happen now, folks, is the
10	clerk's going to ask each of you, is this your is this your verdict as read? So if
11	if you didn't agree with the verdict, you would say no. If you agreed with the
12	verdict, you would say yes.
13	THE CLERK: Mr. Winterbourne, are these your verdicts as read?
14	JUROR NO. 1: Yes.
15	THE CLERK: Mr. Lee, are these your verdicts as read?
16	JUROR NO. 3: Yes.
17	THE CLERK: Mr. Vandenboom, are these your verdicts as read?
18	JUROR NO. 5: Yes.
19	THE CLERK: Mr. Grusinski, are these your verdicts as read?
20	JUROR NO. 6: Yes.
21	THE CLERK: Ms. Day, are these your verdicts as read?
22	JUROR NO. 7: Yes.
23	THE CLERK: Ms. Smallwood, are these your verdicts as read?
24	JUROR NO. 4: Yes.
25	THE CLERK: Ms. Ward, are these your verdicts as read?
	5

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	

25

JUROR NO. 8: Yes.

THE CLERK: Mr. Armanious, are these your verdicts as read?

JUROR NO. 9: Yes.

THE CLERK: Mr. Muhlestein, are these your verdicts as read?

JUROR NO. 10: Yes.

THE CLERK: Ms. Garity -- McGarity, are these your verdicts as read?

JUROR NO. 11: Yes.

THE CLERK: Ms. Jones, are these your verdicts as read?

JUROR NO. 12: Yes.

THE CLERK: And Mr. Maurer, are these your verdicts as read?

JUROR NO. 13: Yes.

THE CLERK: Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Folks, appreciate your time. I understand that this case was supposed to go a week and went two weeks. We appreciate your patience in being here. I know I wasn't here, but I know you folks were here, and as the court system, we appreciate the service that you've rendered.

You're going to be excused and you're going to have the opportunity at this point -- some of you may wonder, can -- you know, we've been admonished throughout the trial that we can't talk to anybody about what's been going on. You may wonder, once you're discharged, can you talk to people about what happened? And you can. You're not obligated to talk to anybody. So if somebody wants to talk to you against your wishes, and they won't leave you alone, let us know and we'll take care of that. But you're welcome to tell anybody whatever you remember or what you did or what you thought.

Oftentimes the lawyers like to talk to the jurors after a trial, because

that's how they learn how to be better lawyers, that's how they learn what witnesses you liked or didn't like or -- sometimes, you know, what it was about the case that you liked or didn't like, things like that. And I can tell you as a practicing lawyer, before I became a judge, that was sometimes part -- the best part of the trial is finding out why a jury did what they did and what they thought about how I presented the case or how the other side presented the case. It's very -- very informative and helpful to them. So I would encourage you to talk to them, if you so desire, but you don't have to.

Wes, their vouchers are probably downstairs still?

THE MARSHAL: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Okay. So do you just want to talk to them here or downstairs? Preference?

MR. GASTON: Do you mind -- do you mind if we use the deliberation room in the back? Or we can --

THE COURT: We don't usually use the deliberation room. I'll -- I can bring them back out here if you'd like, or we can have them meet with you in the hallway or down on the third floor.

MR. DICKERSON: We'd appreciate it here, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So here's what I'm going to do. I'm going to excuse you here for a minute and I'm going to have you step back in the back room. If you have stuff back there, you can grab that. In about two or three minutes, we'll bring you back out here. For those of you that want to stay, you can stay and talk to the lawyers. If you don't want to stay, Wes will show you how to get down to the third floor and you can go down and get your vouchers and take off.

24

25

Okay. But we do appreciate your time. The system doesn't work without jurors. And I know sometimes you're -- you're here for longer than you want and it's against your will, some of you, but we do appreciate you being here and -- and you're thanked and excused with -- with the appreciation of the court for vour service.

[Jury dismissed at 1:28 p.m.]

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead and be seated. We're still on the record. We're outside the presence of the jury.

Mr. Valentine will be remanded into the custody of Clark County Detention Center to await sentencing. And how -- how far out do you [indiscernible] your sentencing date?

THE CLERK: September 21st.

MS. LEXIS: Your Honor, also the State has a motion.

If -- I -- I don't know what his bail is at right now. I think it's 500,000. At this point the State would ask that he be remanded, no bail. He's a three-time convicted felon. He's been convicted of several -- 14 counts, many of which are robbery with use of a deadly weapons. I would ask that he be remanded, no bail.

THE COURT: Do you want to say anything?

MR. GASTON: Your Honor, he's 23 years old. He's an indigent client. We're from the Public Defender's Office. He's still here. He's been in custody for 16 months at half a million dollar bail. I don't really get the posture of changing it from no bail to -- or from half a million dollar bail to no bail. I think half a million dollar bail is more than appropriate, given his young age and financial circumstances.

THE COURT: Well, if he couldn't bail out at a half a million dollars, he

ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability. ShauraOrtega Shawna Ortega, CET*562

Electronically Filed 12/14/2017 8:44 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

RTRAN 1 2 3 4 DISTRICT COURT 5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 7 8 CASE #: C-16-316081-1 THE STATE OF NEVADA, DEPT. 9 Ш Plaintiff, 10 VS. 11 KEANDRE VALENTINE, 12 Defendant. 13 14 15 BEFORE THE HONORABLE RICHARD SCOTTI, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 2017 16 17 RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS: **SENTENCING** 18 19 APPEARANCES: 20 AGNES M. LEXIS, ESQ. For the State: Chief Deputy District Attorney 21 22 For the Defendant: TEAGAN C. MACHNICH, ESQ. Deputy Public Defender 23 24 25 RECORDED BY: DALYNE EASLEY, COURT RECORDER

Page 1

them on May 26th and May 28th of 2016.

24

25

Page 2 2959

Your Honor, the Defendant is twenty -- I think he's twenty-six --

1 | t | 2 | C | 3 | \ 4 | t | 5 | 6 | V | 7 | V

twenty-three years old. And I understand that Ms. Machnich did her due diligence and submitted some photographs and some letters from Mr. Valentine's family but I submit to you, and I read the letters, that the person that these individuals are talking about, that his family members and his friends are talking about, is not the same person. I don't think they know him very well at all because that's not the same person who committed these very, very violent and offensive robberies, armed robberies, on two separate days against all of the victims that you heard from during court.

He victimized, in his twenty-three years of life, he's victimized people in two different states, California and also Nevada. He's engaged law enforcement in two different states, California and Nevada. I tried to think and as I was going through the Presentence Investigation Report about all the things that the Defendant could tell you or argue in mitigation. For instance, the Presentence Investigation Report says he has a drug problem, okay? Codeine, marijuana, whatever it is. But I submit to you that drug use, just like robbing people with a gun, that's a choice. It's a choice being made over and over repeatedly by the same person. And I submit to you that that's what Mr. Valentine has done in this particular case. I'll talk more in detail about it but the Defendant already has three prior felony convictions before he even started trial before Your Honor a few months ago.

During those times he was given probation. So, he was being supervised, though not for very long, and I'll go into more detail about that in a minute, in California. At that point, that should have been the bulb that goes off in Mr. Valentine's head that he needs to not live life as a criminal. He would have been given the opportunity on probation to address his substance abuse

Page 3 2960

1 2 3

issues, to, perhaps, get his GED, to get a job and become a productive member of society. But, while he didn't take those opportunities, and I'll go through that in more length in a minute, he also did take that opportunity to address this drug problem that he talked about during the Presentence Investigation Report.

Another thing, the letters submitted by Mr. Valentine's family talks about is that he has kids. And, you know, they submitted photographs of Mr. Valentine with his children. And I submit to you, Your Honor, that Mr. Valentine, if the argument is, that you know, he needs to get a lenient sentence so he can be there for these children, he wasn't there before. He was too busy out committing crimes.

You heard during trial or you heard, yes, you did, you heard jail calls where his baby's mother talked at length about how wasn't there for his children, how he disappeared from California, how he has not taken care of them. Instead, he's doing God-knows-what in Las Vegas or wherever it is after they lost contact. So he first starts contacting his baby's mother to check on the children and also to get money and help while he's in custody at the Clark County Detention Center. So, he was not there for them before. I submit to you that wanting to get him a lenient sentence for them, I just don't think that's a rightful justification.

As I indicated, the Defendant, before he even stepped foot on the first day of trial before Your Honor, is already a three-time convicted felon. I have given the judgments of convictions and all of the accompanying documents to Defense Counsel.

In 2013 the Defendant was convicted of burglary, first degree residential burglary, and that's shown in the Presentence Investigation Report

on page four. And so, part of the judgments of convictions and the accompanying items that I submitted to defense counsel included in that packet was an arrest report specifying exactly what it was that caused this conviction for burglary, first degree residential.

Well, a resident from a home in California reported to the police a possible break in. And there was a --

MS. MACHNICH: Your Honor? Excuse me. We've never received any of this information.

MS. LEXIS: Yes, you did.

MS. MACHNICH: From the specifics of the offense?

MS. LEXIS: Yes, you did. Here you go. It's all Bates stamped. It's in the back of each of these.

THE COURT: When was that provided?

MS. LEXIS: January 25, 2017. Ms. Machnich signed judgments of -excuse me, receipts of copies. And also Bates stamp, for instance, page Bates
stamp one-thirty-nine is the County of Alameda holdover declaration and
determination probable cause for warrantless arrest.

MS. MACHNICH: Okay, it is an alleged warrant out of there. By the way, the signing of receipts of copy were all -- there was a lot of contention about that. That's for another time. I honestly haven't looked at -- I mean, this is not something that was provided in preparation for sentencing. So, it was deep in the depths of thousands of pages of discovery. So, we'll submit to the State but.

THE COURT: You can argue it when it's your turn.

MS. MACHNICH: Of course. And now that I've seen that it was in the

Bates stamped copies, it is what it is.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. LEXIS: And so, a resident in Alameda County, California called the police indicating a potential break-in at this particular resident's home. The police showed up and they saw that a rear door window or the rear window was smashed in; the interior of this particular home was ransacked. The Defendant and the coconspirator were seen evading or leaving that particular residence, that area. Neighbors called it in. There was a description of a car given. The Defendant was with a coconspirator.

The Defendant and this particular coconspirator evaded police first in the vehicle and then by foot. At some point during this chase or during neighbors reporting, they had this residence's flat screen TV hanging from the passenger side of their door. The TV -- they finally ditched the vehicle and the TV and jewelry were recovered from inside of the vehicle. I believe this particular vehicle was a 1989 Ford T-Bird, and a citation issued to Mr. Valentine was found in the vehicle. And he was subsequently arrested and convicted of burglary, first degree residential, and sentenced to five years of probation with six months in jail.

So he was placed on probation in California on May 2, 2013. And the times make a big difference because that was the first time that he was effectively placed on probation: May 2, 2013, in California.

Well, I would say about four months later the Defendant had picked up his next case in California while at the very beginning, early stages of his probation on the residential burglary. So, by September 5, 2013 he had been arrested again. While on probation for the residential burglary, he was arrested

Page 6 2963

for taking a vehicle without owner's consent, equivalent of a possession of 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

stolen vehicle or grand larceny auto in Nevada, and evading a police officer with disregard for the safety of others. The arrest report or the warrantless declaration was also included in discovery and in that it tells you that the Defendant led the police on a high-speed chase through the streets of Alameda County. He ditched the vehicle, forgot to put it on park, hit a fire hydrant after this very high speed chase, and he left his phone in the vehicle. And the police ultimately tracked the phone to Mr. Valentine.

At that time they saw that he had an outstanding warrant out for the residential burglary and I don't know if it was a violation or not but they subsequently took him into custody in November, November 6, 2013; about a month later. In that particular case he was sentenced to five years of probation and three hundred sixty-five days of jail.

So now he's on probation in two different cases in California. He picked up the second one within months of being placed on probation for the residential burglary. Well, the PSI notes that he had a probation violation in the 2014 California case dated August 9, 2014. That is when he absconded from probation from the California cases. And the next arrest that you see is, guess where? Here in Las Vegas. So, he is noted as an absconder 8-9-2014 and a little less than a year later he's in Nevada. And this particular case, the arrest from July 28, 2015, was actually an open case while he went to trial before you for the instant offenses.

So in that particular case, he attempted to rob a woman at gunpoint. He took the gun, racked the slide of the handgun as if he was loading a bullet into the chamber as he demanded that this woman give him her

> Page 7 2964

property. The woman put her hands up and said look, I don't have anything to give you and at some point, thankfully, he believed her and he ran off, told her you never saw me, you never saw me. The police ultimately find him. The woman does a show up and she positively identifies him as the person who just put a gun to her head, racked it and demanded money.

A preliminary hearing was held. He was bound over in District Court and set for trial before Judge Togliatti. Somehow or another he was released from custody. And while he was awaiting trial in that attempt robbery, burglary case he picked up the case before Your Honor. And I know that it was a lengthy trial and you heard a lot of testimony so I'm just gonna briefly summarize it.

So, by May 26, 2016, with a violent case pending in Nevada, with absconder cases from California, on May 26, 2016 you'll recall the older African American gentleman, Marvin Bass, was in his vehicle after he had just gone shopping at that swap meet or store over at the Rancho Discount Mall. He had the unfortunate luck to run into Mr. Keandre Valentine, the Defendant, where the Defendant put a gun to his face, ripped off his gold chains and took off running. You heard from Mr. Bass during trial, this was not a good experience for Mr. Bass. He relayed he was in fear for his life and that this was the first time this had ever happened to him.

But it didn't stop there. Two days later he commits four other robberies. The first event on that particular morning, because it was a series of robberies over several minutes apart, involved Darrell and Deborah Faulkner. They were the couple who had moved to Waco Texas or who were in their garage packing up their belongings because they were moving to Waco Texas.

Page 8 2965

You heard Mr. Faulkner and Mrs. Faulkner testify. You heard the 911 call placed by Mr. Faulkner where you could hear Mrs. Faulkner unraveling in the background. And I think she testified before Your Honor that she couldn't even do a show up, she couldn't talk to the police because she had taken two valiums, or something to that affect, just to calm her down.

You also heard from Mr. Faulkner who is, you know, he's a strong, defensive type of man but he talked to you about how during that whole time when Mr. Valentine threatened to shoot them, threatened to kill them when Mr. Valentine had Mrs. Faulkner get on her knees and get on the ground. And when Mr. Valentine pointed the gun at Mrs. Faulkner how Mr. Faulkner, all he could think about was how to get them out of this particular situation because he feared that the Defendant would do exactly what he threatened to do, which was pull the trigger and kill this woman that he had been married to for years on end, right before his eyes. I mean, I think it goes without saying that the fact that this happened in their garage in the early morning hours, how he threatened this particular couple with death to obtain I think it was a hundred dollar bill from a wallet, it's so offensive and it really adds to the violent offensive nature of that particular crime.

The next victim was Jordan Alexander. He was the young African American boy who was outside of his residence where he lived with his mom, his fiancé and his baby. They were on their way to a funeral in California. He was tasked with putting the car seat, or transferring the car seat in his mother's vehicle so they could make their way to California for this funeral when he had the unfortunate luck of just being there and Keandre Valentine saw him as an easy target.

Page 9 2966

You heard Jordan. He came twice, actually, to testify at trial. You heard Jordan tell you that he was very, very afraid and he wanted to just comply with what the Defendant was demanding and forcing and requesting that he give because his baby, fiancé and his mother were in the home getting ready to come out. So he did everything he could to appease Mr. Valentine and have him leave as soon as possible because he felt his family inside the home, were also in danger. You saw the body camera footage where Mr. Alexander positively identified Mr. Valentine, how excited he was at that time.

Mr. Alexander is the exact opposite of Mr. Valentine. Here's a kid who is hard working, who is actually providing for his family, trying to keep his family safe, you know, doing what he needs to do as a young man to be a productive member of society. And I thought it ironic that someone like Mr. Valentine, who doesn't work, who feels his job is really just to victimize people, innocent, hardworking members of our community that he actually targeted Mr. Alexander. They're just the complete opposite. And I think Mr. Alexander shows what Mr. Valentine could have been had he made the right choices. And it's about choices, early on.

The next victim, Your Honor, on that particular day was Santiago Garcia; he's the roofer or tree cutter, the landscaper who was, you know, just there with his employee cutting trees at this woman's house and Keandre Valentine decided look, here's some easy targets. And he points a gun at them, demands phones, money.

This is the one where the friend or the worker on the roof hid while Santiago Garcia dealt with the Defendant. The Defendant threatened him as well with the firearm each time; threatened harm to him if he didn't comply. He

Page 10 2967

1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |

gave him his phone. This is the same man when I talk about hardworking good people of our community, at 7:00 in the morning -- this is someone who in between show ups and being taken by police to and from locations was found at different jobs because he was trying to complete his day. He was trying to complete his day so he could make money so he could provide for his family the right way. These are people, by the way, who missed days of work so they could come to trial and testify to make sure justice happened.

The last set of victims, Your Honor, was another couple, Lazaro Bravo-Torres. He was the man in the landscaper truck, the one who couldn't read but who, by the way, found a way to make a living for his family; to provide for his family. His wife Rosa Vazquez-Ramirez was the one shutting the gate and on her way to the truck, which was parked outside on the street in front of their home, when the Defendant put a gun to his chest and demanded his money; threatened to kill him in front of his wife, Rosa Vazquez-Ramirez.

You saw both of these people testify, Your Honor, and particularly Rosa Vazquez-Ramirez. You saw the fear in this woman's face, in her demeanor, in her actions when she had to get off the stand and identify this Defendant. And it played out before you, before the jury. How it all came coming back to her, how the look on her face as I sat here watching, the look on her face, the fear in her eyes; it's actually heart breaking. It's heart breaking because these are people who did not deserve to have something like this happen to them.

So, we're talking about the case before Your Honor. We have seven victims and five events. To say that this is a crime spree by the Defendant is an understatement, I think, because within two days he managed

Page 11 2968

to pull off five different robberies and victimize seven members of our 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

community. To say that it's violent and offensive and egregious would also be an understatement. I frankly can't find the words to describe his conduct. Four out of the five events involved crime in the driveway, in the garage, or directly outside of people's homes and I think that has to be something that should also be taken into account because there's something about feeling safe in your own home. And the fact that this happened so close to their home, I think it further victimized these people, with the exception of the Faulkners since they moved to Waco shortly after this incident.

Jordan Alexander, Lazaro and Rosa, I think it's safe to say that they lived in fear and no longer felt as safe, and neither did Jordan Alexander, in their homes knowing that they be so easily victimized by someone like the Defendant.

You heard over and over again that this wasn't a robbery where it's just you brandish a firearm, not that you just brandish a firearm but this is someone who pointed firearms in people's faces, at their heads, at their chests, and threatening to kill them. It's not just a, hey, give me your money, the guns enough, this is someone who repeatedly said, particularly to Mr. Faulkner, stop looking at me or I'm gonna fucking kill you. I'm gonna fucking shoot you. This is something that he told a majority of our victims in order to get them to comply with what he said.

You know, that person that you heard about that these victims testified about is not the same person that these letters are talking about. These people do not know him. His true character is found in the testimony of those witnesses and in the verdicts rendered by this particular jury in this case.

> Page 12 2969

He is violent. He is a continuous offender as well.

P&P, Your Honor, recommended forty-two to a hundred and forty years in the Nevada Department of Corrections. I don't take P&P's recommendation lightly. And I saw what P&P did in that they did exactly what I'm gonna ask Your Honor to do in that they counted a sentence for each victim of the robbery. I think to do less than that would be an injustice in this particular case. Each victim deserves justice in their own way. And, you know, being in the gun crimes unit we deal with a lot of robbery series. We're faced with this issue of -- you know, it's like is it Costco where you get a discount for buying in bulk, you know? Because he committed crime in bulk he should not escape responsibility or liability for each of these victims. I think they need to be treated separately and they need to be treated accordingly. They need to each get their justice.

I am asking Your Honor for an aggregate sentence of twenty-five to seventy-five years. It's less than P&P but how I arrived at this particular number is five years per robbery incident. So there are five incidents, five years per robbery incident. With that, I already took into account a discount because, you know, some of the robberies had multiple victims that should receive more time. But I thought twenty-five to seventy-five years was appropriate.

So, as to Count 1, I am asking, that's the robbery concerning Marvin Bass, for the robbery I'm asking three to ten years, and two to five years consecutive for the deadly weapon enhancement.

As to Count 3, that involves the Fauklner's robberies, I'm asking three to ten years for the robbery, and two to five years for the deadly weapon enhancement.

Page 13 2970

As to Count 6 for Jordan Alexander, three to ten years for the robbery, two to five years for the deadly weapon enhancement, to run consecutive to Count 1 -- excuse me, to run consecutive to Count 3. So, everything I'm that I'm saying I'm asking to run consecutive, obviously.

As to Count 7 concerning Santiago Garcia, I'm asking for three to ten years for the robbery, and two to five years on the with use of a deadly weapon, to be run consecutive to Count 6.

And as to Count 9 for Lazaro Bravo-Torres and Rosa Vazquez-Ramirez, I'm asking for three to ten years on the robbery, and two to five years with a deadly weapon enhancement, consecutive to Count 7.

THE COURT: So basically, three to ten for each of the robberies, and two to five enhancement for each of the robberies. That's five to fifteen times five which gives you the twenty-five to seventy-five?

MS. LEXIS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. LEXIS: And it's for each of the robbery events, not each victim.

THE COURT: Right, I understand that.

MS. LEXIS: Thank you.

Your Honor, I think this is a fair sentence. I know a lot of times defense attorneys will come in and say oh, this is worse than a murderer, you know? Murderers don't get this much time. Well, that's not what we're talking about. It's a whole different kind of equation because in each particular robbery the statute, the Nevada legislatures, they all account for a certain sentence. And when you commit more than one of these mandatory prison-type crimes you deserve to get a sentence for each of those occurrences for each of those

acts, to be run consecutive to each other. And it's not the legislature's fault, it's not the victim's fault, it's not the Court's fault, it's not my fault that he committed all of these robberies, its Mr. Valentine's fault. And so he's the one that's gonna have to reap the consequences of his actions.

This is not an individual, Your Honor, where sometimes it's someone who doesn't have a criminal record standing before Your Honor, so leniency is proper. Again, he was a three time convicted felon on probation in two different cases, had committed another armed robbery, or attempted armed robbery in Nevada when long before he even faced you. He has shown through his criminal history, through the crimes he committed here in Nevada, a propensity for committing crime after crime after crime. And we're talking brazen crimes. Evading the police, residential burglaries, putting guns in people's faces, racking slides telling them he's gonna shoot them. We're not talking about someone who has an angel halo on his head. He has been given two prior opportunities to change his life. He was given probation in his first two felonies. He didn't take that opportunity.

Again, I ask you please don't forget that he victimized seven people. Each one of them deserves justice. And, I would also be requesting restitution in the amount as set forth in P&P's recommendation.

THE COURT: Alright, thank you.

MS. LEXIS: Thank you.

THE COURT: Alright, Ms. Machnich, it's your turn.

MS. MACHNICH: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And your client has the opportunity to speak also. You can decide whether he's gonna speak first or last.

Page 15 2972

MS. MACHNICH: Your Honor, to start, I've advised him not to speak at sentencing in this case. He originally did want to. He wanted to be able to tell Your Honor how sorry he was that this got to this point, that this happened. And I'm gonna go into a lot of this later but I've advised him not to make any statements to the Court because there will be an appeal in this case and it was an ID case, and obviously statements that a Defendant makes could potentially be used against them. So, I've advised him not to say anything but he did want Your Honor to know that he is sorry and he does take responsibility for his actions.

THE COURT: Alright, I understand that. And I've also read all the letters that were submitted.

MS. MACHNICH: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So, please provide some context and recommendation.

MS. MACHNICH: Of course, Your Honor.

So, we'll just start out with the recommendation and then my explanation of why that's what we're doing.

The individual offenses, obviously there are more than one charged offense in this case and we're interested in the aggregate because that is the amount of time that Mr. Valentine will be sitting behind bars. And because these are violent B felonies we are looking at him doing the entire bottom number. He's not gonna get any good time off of that. So he'll do every day of that time.

So we're asking Your Honor for a sentencing range between eight and ten years on the bottom. And I'm now gonna go into why. For the top end we understand that Your Honor would potentially be inclined to give him a

Page 16 2973

higher top end because of the circumstances and also for additional supervision. However, we don't believe that the State's recommendation is appropriate given the circumstances.

And the State had mentioned at one point that some defense counsel argue that well, murderers get less time. And that's absolutely true. And the thing that differentiates everything that happened in this case with a murder is that no one got shot and no one got killed and no one is dead, no one is away from their family, no one is missing a brother, sister, mother, father, child. No one is missing any of those people because what didn't happen in this case Your Honor is that no gun was ever fired. No one was ever injured. No one went to the hospital to seek medical care for a stab wound, a gunshot wound. Not one of them.

So, while there's certainly, and I will not downplay the seriousness of a robbery in general, and the fact that this was robbery with use and there was a gun that they testified about, that gun never fired a bullet and no one got hit. So, we're not talking about a situation where there's an injured party who was physically injured and hurt where there was a chance that they could die.

I'm not trying to say that any of this was a good decision. And as Your Honor read in the Presentence Investigation Report, my client has had ongoing drug issues. Now, the State seems to think addiction works that every single time you take a drug you're making that decision to make [sic] that drug. But the State obviously misunderstands how addiction works because that's not how addiction works. It's not a conscious decision each and every time. At one point, yes. At one point there was no addiction and there were circumstances that led to drugs being taken but that became an addiction and

Page 17 2974

that became a controlling factor in Keandre's life.

And so that absolutely was at play here throughout the offenses that we've talked about in this case. And you've heard lengthy, lengthy testimony about this trial, it went two weeks. So, Your Honor's well aware of the facts. But drugs were at play. And while the State seems to think that was his decision I believe that it is a mitigating factor here. Not that it's a good idea to take drugs nor would I ever advocate for that but that it happens and addiction happens. And at some point people need to get help for that. And that's obviously something that Keandre will have to do while he's in prison because -- and the one thing that I believe the State is right on, this is non-probational. He's not probation eligible.

So, we heard a lot about Mr. Valentine's priors and things that happened but these cases all resolved to less than six months or less in jail. There was probationary periods, yes, because in California they do half time. So he's never done more than six months in jail before this time waiting for trial and pending sentencing. Six months. That's not as big of a wakeup call as most of us with the six months in California prison. And now we're in a totally different circumstance. And we're talking -- what? Oh, and county jail; he corrected me. It was six months in county jail. So he's already going on tripling that time just pending sentencing, not quite but he's more than doubled that time in custody.

We're not asking for a minimum in this case. We're not saying this case is worth a three to eight although, that would be many, many times the amount of time he has ever done before. It's not worth the three to eight. We understand that there were multiple victims and things were stolen and we

Page 18 2975

7

10 11

13 14

12

15 16

17 18

19 20

21

22

23 24

25

don't want to downplay that because Your Honor did see the witnesses. And we're not asking for this level of leniency that suggests that he should walk free in a year or two. He knows he's not going to.

But when we come down to it, no one got hurt, no one got shot, no one got killed. And Mr. Valentine is a person with family members who love him. So the State seems to think that his family doesn't love him but I actually put to Your Honor that it's not that his family doesn't know him it's that the actions that he's taken during his short adult life, because he's only been an adult for five years, during that time, those are out of character for him. His family has known him much longer than that. And they're gonna miss him and he's gonna miss them.

The State made these comments about him never taking care of his kids and not being around them but that's not true. Keandre used to live with his kids. He saw them the day before he came out to Las Vegas. Yes, he's not there twenty-four seven but he was there routinely, regularly, with the mother of his children, with his children. And he has these kids who are three and five and we provided some pictures to Your Honor because this shows his humanity and the fact that he's a person too who has the capacity for love and gentleness and compassion. And he knows that because of this trial, because of what happened here, and because of his actions he's gonna miss their entire childhood. If Your Honor gives him ten years on the bottom his youngest child will be around thirteen, twelve, thirteen when he is first eligible for parole.

And there's no guarantee he's making parole on the first shot either. The State's right, he doesn't have a clean record and so he may not make parole on the first shot but he'll do every day of that bottom number.

> Page 19 2976

And he's already, because of his actions, forfeited raising his children. They'll be teenagers by the time he gets out at best; at best.

Now, the State was saying all of these things about the other cases in the other state and, obviously, the State of California did not find them serious enough to give him prison time. So I do put that before Your Honor as we're left with that. What police reports say and what actually happens in cases, not always the same thing. There are different gradations and that's why they resolve lower. And so, these prior cases of probation and then minimal time in county jails while, again, I don't want to downplay any criminal offense to say that it was petty or something very small but they certainly have the very potential for not being as major as the State makes them out to be.

I think that they do demonstrate that he's not probation eligible. He obviously is not in a place in his life where he can be under supervision. But that's not even an issue here because we're not talking about a case that can end in probation at all.

And when we're talking about the other case that was here in Las Vegas, I don't know where the State was getting their information about everything but the reason he was released, to my understanding having spoken with my client, is that there was a real issue with the ID. And it wasn't as strong of a case as the State makes it out to be. So, that case was going to be fought. That was originally the reason he was coming back to Las Vegas. Poor decisions were made once he got here, but that was originally the reason he was coming back out was to get that warrant quashed and to get the case taken care of. That never happened. Other things happened and bad decisions were made. But it wasn't the cut and dry case that the State makes it out to

Page 20 2977

be.

And yes, at this point he has pled in that case and that's before another judge, Judge Togliatti, I believe, will be making the decision on the sentencing in that matter. And he pled in that one because, you know, it's the opportunity to get cases wrapped up when we're talking about what he understands will be a hefty sentence in this case. Because, frankly, anything over six months is a hefty sentence for Keandre, it's something he's never experienced before. And we're many, many, many times multiples of that. And he knows it and he accepts that based on what's happened.

Keandre's not a bad person. He's not this horrible human being who has been on a crime spree for his whole life. He's young. And people make bad decisions when they're young. Some people make bad decisions when they're a lot older as we see by a lot of -- I see through a lot of my clients. But, he has always wanted to take responsibility but the time is just so great.

And I believe we put on the record at the beginning of this case; we were looking at such a substantial amount of time to deal this case that it had to go to trial. I mean, with that volume it's not that he wanted to put the Court and the State and everyone, the victims through a two-week trial. He never wanted to do that. But twelve to thirty years is a lot of time to stick to. It's a lot of time. And I know we had put that on the record before but like that's just a lot of time to commit to with no appellate rights. And, unfortunately, we weren't able to resolve it because of that. But he never wanted this to get to this point. And it's a lot of his life and a lot of his time.

And you see behind me, Your Honor, we have numerous family

Page 21 2978

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

members: his mom and his dad, they're here to support him because they love him. And they love him despite what's happened in this case and in prior cases and they've been there for him. And, unfortunately drugs got the best of him and despite a very good upbringing he chose to make very poor decisions in taking drugs and letting them control him. And so hopefully, and I will urge him to get help for that while he's in prison and he'll have substantial time to turn his life around.

But, Your Honor, there was just a sentencing on yesterday that I heard about on the news last night where during a robbery, an armed robbery

MS. LEXIS: Your Honor, I would object. The Court is not to take other sentencings into account. This is solely at your discretion. That's improper.

THE COURT: Yea, I don't want to hear what other judges have done in different situations because each case is unique and I think it would be err for me to even consider what happened in another case.

MS. MACHNICH: Okay.

THE COURT: Because I don't know all the background and circumstances.

MS. MACHNICH: Of course, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I don't have the letters of the family. I don't have the criminal record of the other person. I mean, there's so many things.

MS. MACHNICH: That's fair.

THE COURT: It would be too random for me to have to rely on that.

MS. MACHNICH: I'll be more generic then.

THE COURT: Okay.

Page 22 2979

MS. MACHNICH: Numerous, numerous times people get shot during robberies, get shot during confrontations and conflicts and defendants get substantially less time; substantially, substantially less time. And I keep coming back to that and the State brought this up in their sentencing that we always argue that there are people who kill people who get less time. That's precisely why we argue that because no one died here.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know that I've had a case where someone intentionally shot another person and they got less time. I've had some involuntary manslaughter cases where maybe they got close to or less than what the State was asking for but not an intentional murder.

MS. MACHNICH: I --

THE COURT: Maybe you've seen them.

MS. MACHNICH: Again, at this point I don't want to go into specific other cases.

THE COURT: That's fine. That's okay.

MS. MACHNICH: But it's, I mean, it does happen. And it's usually on negotiations, it's not a trial.

THE COURT: Okay, yea.

MS. MACHNICH: Because we like to try to negotiate cases to something that's fair and we just weren't able to here.

THE COURT: Well, and I don't punish a defendant for exercising his Constitutional right to go to trial. So, but I have to take into account the facts that I see them and not any offer that was made prior to trial because that involves a lot of different factors.

MS. MACHNICH: Of course.

THE COURT: So, but, go ahead.

MS. MACHNICH: But part of it was, Your Honor, is he didn't want -- he doesn't want the Court to think that he necessarily wanted to go through a trial and take up all this time and resources and do that. He did want to resolve. So, it wasn't for lack of trying. And we are where we are now and here we are.

But there are many, many cases where people get at least seriously injured, if not killed, and they get less time than twelve or sixteen years on the bottom. They don't get substantially less and I'm not asking for that in this case. Again, I'm not asking for three, four, five, six on the bottom; I'm not. Cases get dealt for that and that's not the case here. And I won't go into specifics but they're out there and they happen all of the time.

But he never pulled a trigger. It wasn't that there were shots fired and they missed. There were never shots fired. No one, no one got pistol whipped, no one got shot, no one got -- there was no knife but there was no stabbing, there was no injury. And that is an important factor because while these are certainly violent offenses it's a different level of violence to actually cause harm to someone, because robbery encompasses force or fear of force or, you know, you could put someone in fear. Armed robbery is an armed robbery if you fire a shot at someone and hit them, I mean, there may be other offenses involved as well, but it's still an armed robbery. That didn't happen here though. No shots were fired because no one's life was put at risk in that way. And, bad decisions were made but a decision that bad was not made.

So that's why we're asking for eight to ten years on the bottom, which again, an extremely substantial amount of time for Keandre Valentine

Page 24 2981

given that he has not done time in custody for any -- for even a year. He hasn't -- I mean, this is the first time he's been in custody straight for a year in his entire life. And he understands he's going to be in custody for many years to come. But when it comes down to what's fair for the offenses I know the State focuses on each victim having their own chunk of flesh, I guess, but I think that we should look at what is just for Keandre Valentine to be sentenced to overall. And what will affect -- I mean, obviously, there's a retribution point in the criminal justice system, an element, but there's also rehabilitation and making not necessarily an example out of him but also stopping him from continuing this train in his life. And this is the stop in that train.

And again, we're not asking for a minimum amount of time in this because we understand that it is serious and there is a gravity to this situation. But is the gravity twenty-five to seventy-five years? No. Not in a case where no one got hurt. Not in a case where no one got killed. Not in a case where, I mean, he's not fifty-five with a bunch of violent felonies before him, he has two prior cases and they were when he was very young. Not, that he's much older now but he will be much older when he gets out.

And he's missing something that's possibly the most dear which is his children's childhood; all of it. He'll miss all of their childhood. And he's never gonna get that back.

And with that, Your Honor, we'll submit on the issue of sentencing. With the issue of restitution, the State's never provided us anything on the chains. We had that little ambush at trial. We never received copies of anything. I don't know if they were actually pawned. If they were pawned I don't know what they were pawned for, what they were valued for at the

Page 25 2982

pawn store. We just never got any of the documents. And so, I think it's a little disingenuous to say that they want two thousand. That's just what the victim said they were --

THE COURT: We had testimony of that at trial.

MS. MACHNICH: I don't believe we had any testimony of what they were pawned for or if they were pawned. It was the person who pawned them.

THE COURT: Oh, I --

MS. LEXIS: We did.

THE COURT: I'm thinking.

MS. MACHNICH: I don't know. I don't have any paperwork to refer to.

THE COURT: I remember testimony regarding the value.

MS. MACHNICH: Honestly, without the paperwork that we should have been provided, it's hard to say for sure what that is because that's not what they're basing it on here. It's a small factor compared to the sentencing. Obviously, we're most interested in the sentencing in this case but that's an issue.

Also, I'll note, victim number five, which I believe is the gentleman who was on the ladder, he lied on the stand about how much money was taken. So, I would like to put that out there that he was trying to make money off of the situation versus what was submitted to the State and what was submitted in this report, and also in the police report. And he has not followed up or changed that.

MS. LEXIS: Actually, he is requesting no restitution.

MS. MACHNICH: Right.

Page 26 2983

23

24

25

MS. LEXIS: Okay.

MS. MACHNICH: But even in here he said there was twenty taken.

MS. LEXIS: I don't understand how he's trying to make money off it

THE COURT: Well, my --

MS. LEXIS: -- if he's not --

MS. MACHNICH: Well, originally he said there was substantially more taken.

MS. LEXIS: -- asking for restitution.

MS. MACHNICH: Well.

MS. LEXIS: So.

THE COURT: I understand.

MS. MACHNICH: Maybe he realizes that making that representation at that point was not appropriate, but.

MS. LEXIS: I would just object to the speculation, but.

MS. MACHNICH: Well, you know what? She got to talk about their testimony, so.

THE COURT: You know what? I heard the trial and I see the P&P report. Let me just rely on that, those things; okay?

MS. MACHNICH: There's just several questions with regard to some of these statements: a wallet being returned when we never received information on a wallet being returned; all the supporting documentation for the pawned situation in which we never received, even after the fact. It just raises a lot of questions but I guess that those can be left for appeal.

And I guess, only to note that the demeanor of the witness on the stand when the State was saying that one of the witnesses was so scared

Page 27 2984

1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |

when she was identifying. We'll note that she did not identify him and she ended up stating that they told her he had her stuff. So, she couldn't even identify him. So, yea, the situation was stressful for her but it's a little bit of a misstatement by the State to say that that woman was so scared in doing that part because it was Keandre. She at that point said it wasn't him. He was much taller than the man who did it. Again, that's, an aside. It was Rosa Vazquez, I believe, and that's aside.

THE COURT: ID is, perhaps, an issue on appeal.

MS. MACHNICH: And, obviously, we will bring that up but when the State's making blanket statements that she's this -- anyway.

MS. LEXIS: You had the opportunity to observe her.

MS. MACHNICH: Yes, and also --

THE COURT: Last word to the defense though, okay? Thanks.

MS. MACHNICH: As a community, as a state, we're all paying to put him behind bars. And eight to ten years is not only enough retribution and rehabilitation but it's enough time for us to pay to keep him in jail, keep him in prison when he may not even make parole on the first try. So it could be substantially more than the bottom end.

I'll submit. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. I appreciate the argument from both counsel, which I have considered very carefully. In determining the appropriate sentence I must make sure that the sentence is commensurate with the type of crime and the seriousness of the crime, the fear experienced by the victims, the risk of continued criminal activity, the possibility of future harm to the public and Defendant's background, and the possibility of rehabilitation over time. I've

Page 28 2985

1

6

11

9

17

19

21

25

considered all that.

I think this is a situation where there has to be some degree of time for each of the major robberies here with deadly weapon. And the State actually sees five but I'm also concerned with the forcing of the one person on the ground in their garage, and I think that warrants counting it as an additional incident. So I think there's basically six different incidents that warrant time.

So, what I'm gonna do here is, here's my sentence. As to Count 1, I'm imposing a sentence of two to five years on underlying crime, and one to three years for the enhancement. So that's a total of three to eight years as to Count 1.

As to Count 2, I'm imposing three to eight years, that's burglary while in the possession, but Count 2 will run concurrent with Count 1.

Count 3, robbery with use of a deadly weapon, two to five years for the underlying crime, one to three years for the enhancement. So that's a total of three to eight years. Count 3 to run consecutive to Count 1.

Count 4, two to five years for the underlying crime, one to three years for the enhancement for a total of three to eight years. Count 4 to run consecutive to Count 1 and 3.

Count 5, burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon, three to eight years to run concurrent with the other Counts.

Count 6, robbery with use of a deadly weapon, two to five years for the underlying crime, one to three years for the enhancement for a total of three to eight years. Count 6 to run concurrent -- I'm sorry, consecutive to Counts 1, 3, and 4.

Count 7, two to five years for the underlying and one to three for

the enhancement for a total of three to eight; that to run consecutive to Counts 1, 3, 4, and 6.

And then Count 8, attempt robbery with use of a deadly weapon, three to eight years but that to run concurrent with Counts -- with all the prior Counts.

Count 9, this would be like the sixth event for which the Court wants to impose a separate penalty. The Court imposes two to five years for the underlying and one to three years for the enhancement. So that's a total of three to eight years to run consecutive to Counts 1, 3, 4, 6, and 7.

Count 10, burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon, Court imposes a sentence of three to eight years to run concurrent with all the prior Counts.

Count 11, robbery with use of a deadly weapon, two to five years for the underlying, one to three years for the enhancement for a total of three to eight years. And this one will run concurrent with all the other Counts. And I'm specifically saying concurrent on that one with the intent to do that.

Count 12, possession of document or personal identifying information, one to three years to run concurrent with all prior Counts.

Count 13 and 14, on each of those, one to three years. That's possession of credit or debit card without a cardholder's consent. Each of those again, one to three to run concurrent with all prior Counts.

The total sentence then, basically for each of the Counts 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 9 that's three to eight years but that's six instances. So that's eighteen to forty-eight years total is the total aggregate sentence that I'm imposing in this case.

Page 30 2987

1	Fees: twenty-five dollar administrative assessment, three dollars
2	DNA administrative fee, one hundred and fifty is it two hundred and fifty for
3	indigent defense fund fee? Two-fifty, I believe.
4	MS. MACHNICH: We would waive it if we could. We don't collect but,
5	it's two fifty.
6	THE COURT: I'll waive the indigent defense fund fee and one thousand
7	dollars in restitution.
8	MS. LEXIS: Thank you, Your Honor.
9	THE COURT: Alright, that's the Court's sentence. The JOC will be
10	prepared and Court is adjourned.
11	MS. LEXIS: Your Honor, I'm sorry, just so the record is clear.
12	THE COURT: Yes.
13	MS. LEXIS: With the deadly weapon enhancement, the Court considered
14	the factors listed in 193.165?
15	THE COURT: Yes, I did. I did consider those factors.
16	MS. LEXIS: Thank you, Your Honor.
17	THE COURT: Thank you for putting that on the record.
18	MS. MACHNICH: And we would just ask that the aggregate be reflected
19	in the JOC.
20	THE COURT: The aggregate of yes.
21	MS. MACHNICH: Yes.
22	THE COURT: The aggregate of eighteen to forty-eight will be reflected in
23	the JOC.
м	MS MACHNICH: Thank you

MS. LEXIS: Credit for time served is?

25

Page 31 2988

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	

MS. MACHNICH: Four hundred and eighty-nine days. THE COURT: Alright, the Court will give credit for time served of four hundred and eighty-nine days. MS. MACHNICH: Okay, thank you. THE COURT: Alright, thank you. Court is adjourned. [Proceedings concluded, 12:10 A.M.] ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability. Court Recorder

1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA			
2				
3	KEANDRE VALENTINE,)	No. 74468	
4	Appellant,)		
5	vi.)		
6)		
7	THE STATE OF NEVADA,)		
8	Respondent.)		
9	ADDELL ANTES ADDEN) DIV V/	OI LIME VIII DACES 2770 2000	
10	PHILIP J. KOHN	DIA V	OLUME XIII PAGES 2770-2989 STEVE WOLFSON	
11	Clark County Public Defender 309 South Third Street		Clark County District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue, 3 rd Floor	
12	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2610		Las Vegas, Nevada 89155	
13	Attorney for Appellant		ADAM LAXALT Attorney General 100 North Carson Street	
14 15			100 North Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717 (702) 687-3538	
16	CERTIF	TICAT	Counsel for Respondent E OF SERVICE	
17	I hereby certify that this document was filed electronically with the Nevada			
18	Supreme Court on the 2 day of August, 2018. Electronic Service of the foregoing			
19	document shall be made in accordance with the Master Service List as follows:			
20	ADAM LAXALT		SHARON G. DICKINSON	
21	STEVEN S. OWENS I further certify that I ser	rved a c	HOWARD S. BROOKS copy of this document by mailing a true and	
22	correct copy thereof, postage pre-paid, addressed to:			
23	KEANDRE VALENTINE, #1187170			
24	ELY STATE PRISON P.O. BOX 1989			
25	ELY, NV 89301			
26			ounty Public Defender's Office	
27 l		J U		