#### Case No. 74532

#### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company,

Appellant,

VS.

U.S. BANK, N.A., a national banking association as Trustee for the Certificate Holders of Wells Fargo Asset Securities Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR4; and NV WEST SERVICING, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, as Trustee for Nashville Trust 2270,

Respondents.

Electronically Filed May 22 2018 08:16 a.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

#### **APPEAL**

from the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada The Honorable JOANNA S. KISHNER, District Judge District Court Case No. A-13-678814-C

### **APPELLANT'S APPENDIX VOLUME 5**

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Attorneys for Appellant SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC

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# PROOF OF SERVICE OF DOCUMENT

I am over the age of 18 and not a party to this bankruptcy case or adversary proceeding. My business address is: 11766 Wilshire Blvd. #1170, Los Angeles, CA 90025

A true and correct copy of the foregoing document entitled: **NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 362 (with supporting declarations) (REAL PROPERTY)** will be served or was served (a) on the judge in chambers in the form and manner required by LBR 5005-2(d); and (b) in the manner stated below:

or was served (a) on th stated below:	e judge in chambers in the form and n	nanner required by LBR 5005-2(d); and <b>(b</b> ) in the manner
Orders and LBR, the fo	regoing document will be served by the complete the complete the complete the complete regions.	CTRONIC FILING (NEF): Pursuant to controlling General ne court via NEF and hyperlink to the document. On (date) of the court of adversary proceeding and determined that the seive NEF transmission at the email addresses stated below:
		Service information continued on attached page
case or adversary proc first class, postage prep	_, I served the following persons and/oeeding by placing a true and correct c	or entities at the last known addresses in this bankruptcy opy thereof in a sealed envelope in the United States mail, g the judge here constitutes a declaration that mailing to the ment is filed.
see attached list		
		Service information continued on attached page
for each person or entite following persons and/o such service method), l	<u>ry served)</u> : Pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 5 a or entities by personal delivery, overnic by facsimile transmission and/or email	L, FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION OR EMAIL (state method nd/or controlling LBR, on (date) 1/24/2017, I served the ght mail service, or (for those who consented in writing to as follows. Listing the judge here constitutes a declaration be completed no later than 24 hours after the document is
GSO Overnite for delivered Hon. Theodor Albert, U	•	
	411 W. Fourth Street, #5-097, Santa	Ana, CA 92701
		Service information continued on attached page
I declare under penalty	of perjury under the laws of the United	d States that the foregoing is true and correct.
1/24/2017 Date	David I. Brownstein  Printed Name	/s/ David I. Brownstein Signature

This form is mandatory. It has been approved for use by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California.

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US Bank, NA 60 Livingston Ave. St Paul, MN 55107

Prior Counsel for US Bank, NA, Trustee in this Case

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UNITED RECOVERY SYSTEMS 5800 NORTH COURSE DRIVE **HOUSTON TX 77072** 

# EXHIBIT 6

```
DISTRICT COURT
                CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, a
Nevada limited liability company,
          Plaintiff,
                                     CASE NO: A-13-678814-C
                                   ) CONSOLIDATED WITH
     VS.
                                   ) CASE NO: A-13-688734-C
US BANK, N.A., a national banking
                                   ) DEPT NO: XXXI
association as Trustee for the
Certificate Holders of Wells Fargo )
Asset Securities Corporation,
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,)
Series 2006-AR4 and LUCIA PARKS,
an individual, DOES I through X,
and ROE CORPORATIONS I through X,
inclusive,
          Defendants.
SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, a
                                   ) DEPOSITION OF:
Nevada limited liability company,
                                  ) ROBERT FERGUSON
                                   ) PURSUANT TO NRCP 30(B)(6)
          Plaintiff,
                                   ) PERSON MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE
                                   ) U.S. BANK
     VS.
US BANK, N.A., a national banking ) Taken at:
association as Trustee for the
                                   ) The Law Offices of
Certificate Holders of Wells Fargo ) Kim Gilbert Ebron
Asset Securities Corporation,
                                   ) Suite 110
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,) 7625 Dean Martin Drive
Series 2006-AR4; NV WEST SERVICING,) Las Vegas, Nevada 89139
LLC, a Nevada limited liability
company, as Trustee for NASHVILLE
                                     on Wednesday,
TRUST 2270; DOES I-X;
                                     February 10, 2016
and ROES 1-10, inclusive
                                     at 3:21 p.m.
          Defendants.
```

NV WEST SERVICING, LLC, a Nevada
limited company, as Trustee for
NASHVILLE TRUST 2270,
Cross-Claimant,

vs.

NATIONAL DEFAULT SERVICING
CORPORATION, an Arizona
Corporation; DOES XI through XX,
inclusive,

DEPOSITION OF ROBERT FERGUSON
PURSUANT TO NRCP 30(B)(6)
PERSON MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE
U.S. BANK

Taken at The Law Offices of Kim Gilbert Ebron
7625 Dean Martin Drive
Suite 110
Las Vegas, Nevada

on Wednesday, February 10, 2016 3:21 p.m.

Job No. 21227

Depo International - Las Vegas

Reported by: Andrea Martin, CSR, RPR, NV CCR 887

Certified Realtime Reporter

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     Also Present:
```

Did you ever ask for that proof from the 1 Q 2 borrower? 3 Α Not that I can see. Did U.S. Bank ever communicate with the 4 Q association about this property? 5 6 A No. 7 Did U.S. Bank ever communicate with NAS Q about this property before the date of the 8 association foreclosure sale? 9 10 A No. Did U.S. Bank ever communicate with the 11 Q 12 borrower about association dues, besides the planned unit development rider that's included in the deed 13 of trust? 14 15 That wouldn't have been U.S. Bank; that would have been Wells Fargo. 16 So back to the original question. 17 18 Not --Α 19 Did U.S. Bank ever communicate with them? Q 20 Not that I saw. A Did Wells Fargo ever communicate with 21 0 22 U.S. Bank about the association lien or association foreclosure? 23 24 A No. 25 Are there any other entities besides Q

U.S. Bank that claim an interest in the first deed 1 of trust? 2 3 A No. Are there any other entities besides 4 Q U.S. Bank that claim an interest in the promissory 5 6 note? 7 No. A 8 Q Does Fannie Mae have an interest in this 9 loan? 10 A No. Does Freddie Mac have an interest in this 11 Q 12 loan? 13 A No. Is this loan FHA insured? 14 Q 15 A It is not. 16 Is there any references to SFR Investments Q Pool 1, LLC, in your file before the date of 17 litigation? 18 19 Before the date of the foreclosure sale or A 20 litigation? Before litigation. 21 0 22 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Scope. 23 Not that I can remember. A 24 BY MS. EBRON: 25 Did U.S. Bank make any payments to the Q

association on behalf of this property? 1 2 A No. 3 Q Did U.S. Bank attend or participate in the association foreclosure sale? 4 5 Α No. Did U.S. Bank participate in any civil or 6 Q administrative action challenging the association 7 lien or association foreclosure sale before the date 8 9 of the association foreclosure sale? 10 A No. Were there any internal communications 11 Q that mentioned the association's lien, what 12 13 association assessments, or association foreclosure 14 sale as it relates to the property before the date of the association foreclosure sale? 15 16 The one letter indicating the borrower was Α past due on their dues. 17 18 Has U.S. Bank ever communicated with the Q FHFA regarding this loan? 19 20 A No. 21 0 What is U.S. Bank's factual basis for its 22 allegation that the deed of trust was not extinguished by the association foreclosure sale? 23 That the first deed of trust was recorded 24 Α 25 in first position at the time of origination and

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remains there to date.
 1
               Anything else?
 2
          Q.
 3
          A
               No.
               MS. EBRON: Counsel, do you want to ask
 4
     questions?
 5
               MR. VILKIN: Are you done?
 6
 7
               MS. EBRON: I believe I am.
 8
               MR. VILKIN: Okay. So I have --
 9
               MS. EBRON:
                           I might have follow-ups.
10
               MR. VILKIN: Can we go off the record for
11
     a second?
12
               (Recess taken.)
13
               MR. DELIKANAKIS: This is
     John Delikanakis. We've had a conversation amongst
14
     counsel to continue this deposition, and what's been
15
16
     proposed and agreed upon by counsel is that we will
17
     look at two dates when the PMK deponent is supposed
18
     to be in Las Vegas, March 25th of 2016 and
     April 8th of 2016.
19
20
               I will check with the client and our
     scheduling and see if he's, in fact, available to
21
22
     take another -- what? -- two-and-a-half, two hours
     of deposition?
23
24
               Is that correct, Counsel?
25
               MR. VILKIN:
                            Yes.
```

1	STATE OF NEVADA )
2	COUNTY OF CLARK )
3	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
4	I, Andrea N. Martin, a duly commissioned and
5	licensed court reporter, Clark County, State of
6	Nevada, do hereby certify:
7	That I reported the taking of the deposition of
8	Robert Ferguson, commencing on Wednesday, February
9	10, 2016, at the hour of 3:21 p.m.; that the witness
10	was, by me, duly sworn to testify to the truth and
11	that I thereafter transcribed my said shorthand
12	notes into typewriting, and that the typewritten
13	transcript of said deposition is a complete, true,
14	and accurate transcription of said shorthand notes;
15	that I am not a relative or employee of any of the
16	parties involved in said action, nor a relative or
17	employee of an attorney involved in nor a person
18	financially interested in said action; further, that
19	the reading and signing of the transcript was
20	requested.
21	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
22	in my office in the County of Clark, State of
23	Nevada, this 19th day of February, 2016.
24	nevada, this isth day of residually, 2010.  CORREST - LST  THERE IS MARRIED COR NO. 207
25	ANDREA N. MARTIN, CRR, CCR NO. 887

# **TAB 24**

Richard Vilkin, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 8301 Law Offices of Richard Vilkin, P.C. 1286 Crimson Sage Ave. Henderson, NV 89012 Phone: (702) 476-3211 Email: richard@vilkinlaw.com Attorney for third-party defendant Nevada Association Services, Inc. 5 6 STATE OF NEVADA 7 8 SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, 10 Plaintiff, 11 VS. 12 U.S. BANK, N.A., a national banking 13 association as Trustee for the Certificate Holders of U.S. Bank Asset Securities 14 Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through 15 Certificates, Series 2006-AR4, a Nevada nonprofit corporation and LUCIA PARKS, an 16 individual; DOES I through X; and ROE CORPORATIONS I through X, inclusive, 17 18 Defendants. 19 SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, a 20 Nevada limited liability company, 21 Plaintiff, 22 VS. 23 U.S. BANK, N.A., a national banking 24 association as Trustee for the Certificate Holders of U.S. Bank Asset Securities 25 Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through 26 Certificates, Series 2006-AR4, NV West Servicing, LLC, a Nevada limited liability 27 company as Trustee for NASHVILLE TRUST 2270; DOES I through X; and ROE 28 CORPORATIONS I through X, inclusive,

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**CLERK OF THE COURT** 

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### EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

Case No.: A-13-678814-C (consolidated with

A-13-688734-C)

Dept.: XXXI

JOINDER OF NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC. TO OPPOSITIONS OF SFR INVESTMENT POOL 1, LLC AND COPPER RIDGE HOA TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY U.S. BANK (PART 2 OF OPPOSITION)

1	Defendants.
- 3	
4	U.S. BANK, N.A., a national banking association as Trustee for the Certificate
- 5	Holders of U.S. Bank Asset Securities
5 6	Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR4,
7	Counterclaimant,
8	vs.
9	SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company,
10	Counter Defendant.
11	
12	U.S. BANK, N.A., a national banking
13	association as Trustee for the Certificate
1.4	Holders of U.S. Bank Asset Securities ) Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through )
15	Certificates, Series 2006-AR4,
16	Third-Party Plaintiff,
17	vs.
18	NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC.,
19	a Nevada corporation; COPPER RIDGE
20.	COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, a Nevada ) non-profit corporation;
21	Third-Party Defendants.
22	Amid Larry Defendants.
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# JOINDER OF NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC. TO OPPOSITIONS OF SFR INVESTMENT POOL 1, LLC AND COPPER RIDGE HOAD TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY U.S. BANK (PART 2 OF OPPOSITION)

Third-party defendant Nevada Association Services, Inc., ("NAS") hereby provides Part 2 of its Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Third-Party plaintiff U.S. Bank by joining in the Oppositions of SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC and Copper Ridge Community Association (both filed February 13, 2017) to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by U.S. Bank. NAS previously filed Part 1 of its Opposition on February 3, 2017.

Date: February 14, 2017

LAW OFFICES OF RICHARD VILKIN, P.C.

By:

Richard Vilkin, Esq.
Nevada Bár No. 8301
1286 Crimson Sage Ave.
Henderson, NV 89012
Attorneys for third-party defendant Nevada
Association Services, Inc.

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# Certificate of E-Service

I hereby certify that on February 14, 2017, I caused to be served electronically a copy of the foregoing JOINDER OF NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC. TO OPPOSITIONS OF SFR INVESTMENT POOL 1, LLC AND COPPER RIDGE HOA TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY U.S. BANK (PART 2 OF OPPOSITION) when filing said document on the court's Wiznet electronic filing system and requesting therein that it be E-Served to all persons who are listed for E-Service on that system for this case as follows:

Alverson Taylor Mortensen & Sanders		
Name	Email	Select ☑ —
Adam Knecht:  Kurt R. Bonds  Kurt R. Bonds  Trevor R. Waite	<u>aknecht@alversontaylor.com</u> <u>efile@alversontaylor.com</u> <u>kbonds@alversontaylor.com</u> <u>twaite@alversontaylor.com</u>	
Kim Gilbert Ebron Name	Email	Select
Diana Cline Ebron		Y Z
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E-Service for Kim Gilbert Ebron Michael L. Sturm	eservice@kgelegal.com mike@kgelegal.com	

1	Richard Vilkin	richard@vilkinlaw.com	
2			
3	NAS		
4	Name	Email	Select ☑
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6	Susan E. Moses	susanm@nas-inc.com	
7			
8	Snell & Wilmer L.L.P.		
9	Name	Email	Select
10	Candy Charlet - Legal Secretary	<u>ccharlet@swlaw.com</u>	
11	Daniel Ivie	<u>divie@swlaw.com</u>	
12	Docket	<u>Docket: LAS@swlaw.com</u>	
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16	Maricris Williams	mawllliams@swlaw.com	
17	Richard C. Gordon	rgordon@swlaw.com	
18	Robin Perkins	rperkins@swlaw.com	
19			

Executed this 14th day of February, 2017 at Henderson, NV. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct.

Richard Vilkin

# **TAB 25**

Alm & Column

**CLERK OF THE COURT** 

1 **RIS** DIANA CLINE EBRON, ESQ. 2 Nevada Bar No. 10580 E-mail: diana@KGElegal.com 3 JACQUELINE A. GILBERT, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 10593 4 E-mail: jackie@KGElegal.com KAREN L. HANKS, ESQ. 5 Nevada Bar No. 9578 E-mail: karen@KGElegal.com 6 KIM GILBERT EBRON 7625 Dean Martin Drive, Suite 110 7 Las Vegas, Nevada 89139 Telephone: (702) 485-3300 8 Facsimile: (702) 485-3301 Attorneys for SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC 9 10 11 SFR INVESTMENTS POOL1, LLC a Nevada 12 limited liability company, 13 Plaintiff, VS. 14 US BANK, N.A., a national banking 15 association as Trustee for the Certificate Holders of Wells Fargo Asset Securities 16 Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR4 and LUCIA 17 PARKS, an individual, DOES I through X; and ROE CORPORATIONS I through X, 18 inclusive, Defendants. 19 SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, 20 Plaintiff, 21 VS. 22 U.S. BANK, N.A., a national banking association, as Trustee for the Certificate 23 Holders of Wells Fargo Asset Securities Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through 24 Certificates, Series 2006-AR4; NV WEST SERVICING, LLC, a Nevada limited liability 25 company, as Trustee for NASHVILLE TRUST 2270; DOES I-X; and ROES 1-10, inclusive, 26 Defendants. 27 NV WEST SERVICING, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, as Trustee for 28

NASHVILLE TUST 2270,

**DISTRICT COURT** 

# **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Case No. A-13-678814-C Consolidated with Case No. A-13-688734-C

Dept. No. XXXI

SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(702) 485-3300 FAX (702) 485-3301

Cross-Claimant,

VS.

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NATIONAL DEFAULT SERVICING CORPORATION, an Arizona Corporation; DOES XI through XX,

Third Party Defendant.

SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC ("SFR") files its Reply in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. This reply is based on the papers and pleadings on file herein, the following memorandum of points and authorities, and any oral argument this Court entertains.

# **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

#### I. **ARGUMENT**

# A. The Foreclosure Did not Violate the Automatic Bankruptcy Stay.

The Bank has made the same argument in its Motion for Summary Judgment as it makes in its Opposition to SFR's Motion for Summary Judgment. See Bank's MSJ at 6-7; See also Bank's Opp. at 4-5. Therefore, SFR incorporates the response to this argument from its Opposition to the Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment. See SFR's Opp. at 5. SFR notes, however, that the hearing in the Bankruptcy Court to retroactively annul the stay has been continued until March 28, 2017. To the extent this Court deems this to be a dispositive issue, SFR would request that this Court defers it ruling until the Bankruptcy Court decides the issue.

# B. SFR Can Rely On The Foreclosure Deed.

SFR can rely on the foreclosure deed and the conclusive nature of the document. Shadow Wood affirmed that deed recitals are conclusive to the matters recited pursuant to NRS 116.31166(1). Shadow Wood Homeowners Ass'n., Inc., v. New York Comm. Bancorp, Inc., 132 Nev. \_\_\_\_, 366 P.3d 1105, 1110 (2016) (The [appellant's] trustee's deed contains recitals that NRS 116.31166 deems "conclusive," to wit: "Default" occurred; and, "All requirements of law regarding the mailing of copies of notices and the posting and publication of the copies of the Notice of Sale have been complied with."). However, Shadow Wood has provided a means to challenge these recitals, but it is the Bank's burden to provide some admissible evidence allowing this Court to overcome the presumptions to even allow this Court to make a ruling in equity. <u>Id</u>. at 1112. In this case, the Bank has not.

# KIM GILBERT EBRON

# 7625 DEAN MARTIN DRIVE, SUITE 110 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89139 (702) 485-3300 FAX (702) 485-3301

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# C. The Bank Has Not Rebutted the Presumption That the Foreclosure Notices Were Not Received. 1

The Bank has not been able to rebut that the notices were both sent to and received by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., U.S. Bank or its foreclosure trustee, National Default Servicing Corp. NRS 47.250(13) states that a disputable presumption exists "that a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail." "A presumption,..., imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence." NRS 47.180(1). If direct evidence is proffered against the presumed fact, the NRS provides the following guidance:

NRS 47.200 Determination on evidence of presumed fact: Where basic facts established. When reasonable minds would necessarily agree that the evidence renders the existence of the basic facts more probable than not, but direct evidence is introduced contrary to the existence of the presumed fact, the question of the existence of the presumed fact is determined as follows:

- 1. If reasonable minds would necessarily agree that the direct evidence renders the nonexistence of the presumed fact more probable than not, the judge shall direct the jury to find against the existence of the presumed fact.
- 2. If reasonable minds would necessarily agree that the direct evidence does not render the nonexistence of the presumed fact more probable than not, the judge shall direct the jury to find in favor of the presumed fact.
- 3. If reasonable minds would not necessarily agree as to whether the direct evidence renders the nonexistence of the presumed fact more probable than not, the judge shall submit the matter to the jury with an instruction to find in favor of the existence of the presumed fact unless they find from the direct evidence that its nonexistence is more probable than its existence, in which event they should find against its existence.

NRS 47.200. Thus, even if this Court finds that a party has provided some evidence to rebut a presumption, as a matter of law, this Court can still instruct a jury to find in favor of the presumed fact. In other words, as a matter of law, this Court can rely on this fact as true in regards to a Motion for Summary Judgment if reasonable minds would agree that in light of all the evidence, the presumed fact is more likely probable than not.

SFR is entitled to the presumption that the NOD and the NOS were mailed as addressed. In the Bank's purported First Deed of Trust, Wells Fargo Bank listed its address as "P.O. Box 10304, Des Moines, IA 503060304". See SFR's MSJ Exhibit D at USB000002. The NOD was


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> As a preliminary matter, the Deposition of U.S. Bank, N.A. in this case is attached as Exhibit 3 to SFR's Opp. and attached herein as Exhibit 1. The Deposition attached to SFR's Motion for summary Judgement as Exhibit 3 was attached in error. SFR does not dispute that the Bank claims to have not received the NOD or NOS. See Bank's Opp. at 6:21-22.

# 7625 DEAN MARTIN DRIVE, SUITE 110 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89139


(702) 485-3300 FAX (702) 485-3301

sent to this address by Nevada Association Services (NAS), agent to the Association. In fact, NAS mailed a copy of this document both certified mail and first class to the above address. See SFR's MSJ Exhibit 1-J. On June 7, 2012, an Assignment of Mortgage was recorded in which the document stated that Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. conveyed to U.S. Bank, N.A. as trustee, the subject Deed of Trust. This document listed U.S. Bank, N.A., as trustee's address as "60 LIVINGSTON AVE, ST. PAUL, MN 55107" SFR's MSJ Exhibit 1-H.

After this assignment, NAS mailed its NOS to multiple parties including U.S. Bank N.A. as trustee and National Default Servicing Corp. as shown below:



### SFR's MSJ Exhibit 1-K.



Id. As shown in these receipts, both U.S. Bank, N.A. and National Default Servicing Corp. signed for the receipt of the NOS on February 11, 2013, and February 8, 2013, respectively.

# KIM GILBERT EBRON

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The multiple receipts of mailings are evidence that the NOD and NOS were, more probably than not, sent to its duly directed destinations. As such, the burden switches to the Bank to establish that the mailings did not occur or were not received.

In its attempt to defeat this presumption, the Bank has stated that it has not received a NOS prior to the foreclosure. Other than this self-serving statement, the Bank has not come forward with any other evidence rebutting the mailings provided in SFR's MSJ. Despite the Bank's denial of receipt of the notices, reasonable minds would still find that the mailings were, more probably than not, sent to its intended location and received. Therefore, this Court can consider as a matter of law that the mailings were sent and received.

However, to the extent, that any doubt remains regarding the mailings, in U.S. Bank, N.A.'s deposition, 30(b)(6) designee Robert Ferguson stated that it did not find a NOD or NOS in the loan file. When Mr. Ferguson was asked what he reviewed for his deposition he answered as follows:

I reviewed every document that was in our imaging system from the date **A**: of the loan origination to March 1st -- actually, March 5th of 2013. I reviewed the origination -- that included the origination documents, electronic versions of those. I reviewed the loan servicing platform, the foreclosure process notes, loss mitigation process notes, and loan pay history. I also reviewed the delinquency history on the mortgage as well.

Anything else? Q:

That's all I can remember. A:

Deposition of US Bank's 30(b)(6) designee, Robert Ferguson p. 46:19-47:5 attached as Exhibit 1. The problem is that while Mr. Ferguson's reviewed the loan servicing platform, including the imaging system, this loan servicing platform was controlled and maintained by Wells Fargo Bank,  $N.A.^2$ 

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<sup>2</sup> <u>Id.</u> at 91:21-23.

Q:	And you are	what's your	relationship t	o Wells	Fargo, i	in terms	of this
proper	ty or this loan?	_	-				

A: I work for Wells Fargo. I'm not sure of your question. Typically, do you mean in relationship to U.S. Bank.

Q: To U.S. Bank. Sorry.

A: Wells Fargo Bank is the servicer on behalf of U.S. Bank, as trustee for the pool of loans that contain the Parks' loan.

Q: So the loan servicing platform is maintained and controlled by Wells Fargo?

A: That's correct.

<u>Id</u>. at 91:10-23.

However, Mr. Ferguson, as an employee of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. was unable to testify to how U.S. Bank handles its incoming mail:

Q: Well, if a party sent the notice to 60 Livingston Avenue, would it have ended up in your servicing platform and imaging system -- or should it have, I guess is the proper way to say it?

# A: I'm unsure what U.S. Bank's processes were for dealing with mail.

<u>Id.</u> at 93:1-6 (emphasis added). In other words, in the deposition of U.S. Bank, U.S. Bank could not testify regarding its own processes for dealing with mail.

Thus, it can be seen that Mr. Ferguson cannot possibly testify that the NOS was not mailed to U.S. Bank, N.A. He simply did not have the knowledge to testify to such at his deposition. As a result, the Bank denies that it received the NOS but has failed to provide any evidence that it even looked for the NOS in U.S. Bank's records. This cannot defeat SFR's presumption that the NOS was mailed to U.S. Bank.

It is likely that the Bank will argue that the NOS was not mailed to its Servicer, Wells Fargo Bank N.A.'s, correct address which listed a change of address on the Assignment of the Mortgage. See SFR's MSJ Exhibit 1-H. However, this is not grounds to overturns the sale. First, NAS did send a NOS to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. to its previously recorded address located in the originating Deed of Trust. But more importantly, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. was no longer the

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116.31163, 116.311635, 116.31168 and 107.090(3)-(4) require that only junior interest holders

receive notices pursuant to statute unless a party otherwise requests it.<sup>3</sup> However, if a servicer such

a Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. sought to receive such notices, NRS has expressly prescribed a way to

do such a thing. Under NRS 116.31163(1) and 116.311635(b)(1), a person may formally request

notice even if it does not have a lien interest in the property, such as a loan servicer who want to

stay on top of developments as to its collateral. Under NRS 116.31163(2) and 116.311635(b)(2)

those persons who are holders of a recorded security interest but not necessarily the beneficiary of

record can notify the association of their interest and receive notice. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. was

neither a junior interest holder of record nor party who requested notice pursuant to NRS

116.31163(1) or notified the Association as a non-recorded holder under 116.31163(2). As such,

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. was not entitled to receive the NOS.

# D. The Foreclosure Sale Was Commercially Reasonable.

The Bank makes the same substantive argument in its Motion for Summary Judgment as its Opposition for Summary Judgment. Thus, SFR incorporates its argument that the price was commercially reasonable from SFR's Opp. to MSJ at p.6-11. However, the Bank further argues that the notices did not provide an adequate warning that the Bank's Deed of Trust could be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> In SFR, all seven Nevada justices construed NRS 116.3116 et seq. as requiring notice to junior lienholders like the Bank. 334 P.3d at 411, 418, 422 (emphasis added). Such a construction was, in part, based on NRS 116.31168(1), which stated:

The provisions of NRS 107.090 apply to the foreclosure of an association's lien as if a deed of trust were being foreclosed. The request must identify the lien by stating the names of the unit's owner and the common-interest community.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>334</sup> P.3d at 411. The majority again referenced NRS 107.090(3)(b) and (4), noting these sections require the "notice of default and notice of sale [be sent to] 'each other person with an interest whose interest or claimed interest is subordinate to the deed of trust." *Id.* Based on this interpretation, the *dissent* noted, "[a]s the majority points out, by incorporating certain notice provisions from Chapter 107, Chapter 116 appears to mandate that the association mail the notice of default and notice of sale to the first security holders who have recorded their interest when the association is foreclosing on its lien." SFR, 334 P.3d at 422 (Gibbons, C.J., dissenting). All seven justices determined that incorporation of NRS 107.090 required notice to junior lienholders, like the Bank.

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extinguished in the Association's foreclosure. Bank's Opp. to MSJ at p.12:15-22. This is clearly false and is an argument that the Bank has had expressly rejected by the Nevada Supreme Court.

SFR has made it clear that an association's notice containing the entire lien amount is sufficient to give notice to the Bank of an association's superpriority lien. SFR held the following regarding contents of notices:

U.S. Bank further complains about the content of the notice it received. It argues that due process requires specific notice indicating the amount of the superpriority piece of the lien and explaining how the beneficiary of the first deed of trust can prevent the superpriority foreclosure sale. But it appears from the record that specific lien amounts were stated in the notices, ranging from \$1,149.24 when the notice of delinquency was recorded to \$4,542.06 when the notice of sale was sent. The notices went to the homeowner and other junior lienholders, not just U.S. Bank, so it was appropriate to state the total amount of the lien.

*SFR*, 130 Nev. \_\_\_\_, 334 P.3d at 418(emphasis added).

Here the NOD and NOS, warned of the impending foreclosure proceedings, including the possibility of a sale. The Notice of Default read, "WARNING! IF YOU FAIL TO PAY THE AMOUNT SPECIFIED IN THIS NOTICE, YOU COULD LOSE YOUR HOME, EVEN IF THE AMOUNT IS IN DISPUTE!" (SFR MSJ at Exhibit 1-I) and,

WARNING! A SALE OF YOUR PROPERTY IS IMMINENT! UNLESS YOU PAY THE AMOUNT SPECIFIED IN THIS NOTICE BEFORE THE SALE DATE, YOU COULD LOSE YOUR HOME, EVEN IF THE AMOUNT IS IN DISPUTE. YOU MUST ACT BEFORE THE SALE DATE. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, PLEASE CALL NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERVICES, INC. AT (702) 804-8885. IF YOU NEED ASSISTANCE, PLEASE CALL THE FORECLOSURE SECTION OF THE OMBUDSMAN'S OFFICE, NEVADA REAL ESTATE DIVISION, AT 1-877-829-9907 IMMEDIATELY.

SFR MSJ at Exhibit 1-K. These warnings are the exact warnings required by NRS 116.31162. Additionally, the NOD and the NOS were recorded within the allowable timeframes established by NRS 116.33162<sup>4</sup> and mailed to all junior interest holder as required by NRS 116.3116(8). The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> NRS 116.31162(1)(b) reads:

Not less than 30 days after mailing the notice of delinquent assessment pursuant to paragraph (a), the association or other person conducting the sale has executed and caused to be recorded, with the county recorder of the county in which the common-interest community or any part of it is situated, a notice of default and election to sell the unit to satisfy the lien which must contain the same information as the notice of delinquent assessment and which must also comply with the following:

<sup>(1)</sup> Describe the deficiency in payment.

<sup>(2)</sup> State the name and address of the person authorized by the association to enforce the lien by

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Bank cannot claim that these notices do not provide adequate notice that its property interest was at stake.

### E. The Risk of Litigation Does Not Defeat SFR's Status as a BFP.

A BFP is a purchaser of real property: (i) for value; and (ii) without notice of a competing or superior interest in the same property. Berge v. Fredericks, 95 Nev. 183, 185, 591 P.2d 246, 247 (1979).

Notice by a potential purchaser that an association is conducting a sale pursuant to NRS 116, and that the potential exists for challenges to the sale "post hoc[,]" does not preclude that purchaser from BFP status. Shadow Wood, 366 P.3d at 1116. Thus, knowledge of a Deed of Trust would have only let SFR know that the Bank may have a "post hoc" challenge.

SFR's acknowledgment that litigation was a burden that came with the purchase of NRS 116 foreclosure properties does not defeat SFR's BFP status. Berge states that a BFP is one who purchases real property "without notice of a competing or superior interest." After the foreclosure, the Bank's interest in the property was extinguished meaning that SFR was not aware that the Bank had a surviving superior or competing interest. However, SFR understood that the Banks were likely to contests the sales in court. This Court can appreciate that the ability to bring a lawsuit and the merits of a lawsuit are two separate things. Nothing in this case shows that SFR was aware of any surviving superior or competing interest of the Bank.

If this Court were to weigh equities, it "must consider the entirety of the circumstances that bear upon the equities." Shadow Wood, 366 P.3d at 1114. These would include not only any irregularities in the sale process by the Association or Association's agents, but the actions or (in)actions by the Bank and SFR's BFP status. Id. As the Shadow Wood court noted, '[c]onsideration of harm to potentially innocent third parties is especially pertinent here where [the Bank] did not use the legal remedies available to it to prevent the property from being sold

sale.

<sup>(3)</sup> Contain, in 14-point bold type, the following warning: WARNING! IF YOU FAIL TO PAY THE AMOUNT SPECIFIED IN THIS NOTICE, YOU COULD LOSE YOUR HOME, EVEN IF THE AMOUNT IS IN DISPUTE!

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to a third party. . . . " Id. at 1115, n.7. The Bank has no evidence to suggest that the NOS was not mailed to U.S. Bank or National Default Servicing Corporation. SFR's MSJ at Ex. 1-K. The Bank's mere allegation that Wells Fargo, N.A., as a servicer, did not receive the NOS until four days after the Association's sale does not prove that U.S. Bank did not receive the NOS. And further, SFR would have had no way of knowing such information, if, in fact, it was true. However, the Bank's poor document handling cannot be weighed in a way that could displace SFR's interest in the property as a BFP.

In further weighing of the equities, between the dates the NOD was recorded and the date of the foreclosure sale the Bank never recorded a lis pendens or other document alleging any problems with the foreclosure process or the foreclosure sale. SFR's MSJ Exhibit 2, ¶ 18. Additionally, SFR has no relationship with the Association or the Association's Agent, except as a purchaser of Property. SFR's MSJ Exhibit 2, ¶¶ 16, 17. the Bank did not (1) pay or attempt to pay the lien, (2) contact the Association or the Association's agent prior to the sale, (2) attend the sale, or (3) seek judicial intervention to enjoin the sale. See SFR's Opp. to MSJ at Exhibit 6 p. 67-69. The Bank knew that without taking action to stop the sale, the Association's foreclosure would extinguish all junior interests in the Property. By allowing the sale to go forward, the Bank must have intended this consequence. NRS 47.250(2). On the other hand, SFR merely attended a publicly noticed, publicly held foreclosure sale, and placed the winning bid at the auction. The Bank is seeking yet another bailout for its poor business decisions. The Bank has not provided any reason for this Court to even weigh equities. Title should be quieted in SFR's name and the Bank enjoined from taking any further action to enforce its extinguished lien against the Property or further clouding SFR's title.

### The Bank is Not Entitled to an Equitable Remedy as the Bank's Remedy is For Money Damages.

To the extent an Association wrongly forecloses, a Bank's remedy is against the parties who harmed it, in lieu of displacing an innocent third-party purchaser.

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A Bank's right to recover money damages from a wrongful association foreclosure is consistent with this Court's precedent in Swartz v. Adams after it found that a homeowner was denied the constitutionally required notice of the foreclosure of its home. Swartz stated that:

Since the execution sales were conducted so as to deny the owners of the property due process of law, the ideal remedy would be to return that property to the former owner pending constitutionally sufficient proceedings. Unfortunately, this may no longer be done without injury to innocent third parties who are bona fide purchasers of the property. However, Violet has also sought compensatory relief in her complaint. We therefore reverse and remand the case to the court below for appropriate proceedings consistent with this opinion.

93 Nev. 240, 245-46, 563 P.2d 74, 77 (1977).

This is also consistent with the Restatement's commentary regarding those non-judicial foreclosure jurisdictions where price alone is not enough to set aside a sale: the wronged junior lienholder must seek a remedy from someone other than the purchaser. See Restatement (Third) Property: Mortgages, §8.3, Comment b.

Other courts have consistently found that a BFP is protected even in cases where the conduct is as extreme as the wrongful rejection of tender. Moeller v. Lien, 25 Cal. App. 4th 822, 831–32, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 777, 783 (1994) ("[t]he conclusive presumption precludes an attack by the trustor on the trustee's sale to a bona fide purchaser even where the trustee wrongfully rejected a proper tender of reinstatement by the trustor"). See also Melendrez v. D & I Investments, Inc., 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 413, 431-432 (2005) ("courts have sustained a number of foreclosure sale challenges where the actions have been brought before the transfer of the trustee's deed to the buyer[]" but not after delivery of the trustee's deed) (internal citations omitted)).

Given that the Bank simply has a collateral interest in the property, a remedy for monetary damages is a perfect substitute. Munger v. Moore. 11 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7, 89 Cal. Rptr. 323 (Ct. App. 1970)("a trustee or mortgagee may be liable to the trustor or mortgagor for damages sustained where there has been an illegal, fraudulent or willfully oppressive sale of property under a power of sale contained in a mortgage or deed of trust") (citing Davenport v. Vaughn, 193 N.C. 646 [137] S.E. 714, 716]); Sandler v. Green, 287 Mass. 404 [192 N.E. 39, 40]; Edwards v. Smith (Mo.) 322 S.W.2d 770, 776; <u>Dugan v. Manchester Federal Sav. & Loan Assn.</u>, 92 N.H. 44 [23 A.2d 873, 876]; Harper v. Interstate Brewery Co., 168 Ore. 26 [120 P.2d 757, 764]; Black v. Burd (Tex. Civ.

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App.) 255 S.W.2d 553, 556; Holman v. Ryon (D.C. App.) 56 F.2d 307, 310-311; Royall v. Yudelevit, 268 F.2d 577, 580 [106 App. D.C. 1].

Allowing the Bank to seek monetary damages against an association inherently keeps the liability on the parties who created the problems with the foreclosure. In contrast, by forcing a BFP to lose its ownership interest in the property due to actions not known by the BFP, only punishes the BFP. Moreover, by protecting a BFP in this regard, and holding the trustee accountable, this also affords an adequate remedy to the complaining party.

Here, as in Swartz, the Bank is not prevented from seeking monetary damages from the Association and its trustee, the proper remedy is for compensatory damages and not the overturning of a foreclosure sale. Any other result would cause prejudice to an innocent third party purchaser. Ultimately, if this Court wants to protect the foreclosure process through the NRS 116 statutory schemes and create accountability on the proper parties, while protecting BFPs, it can easily do so by requiring the Bank, a lien holder, to seek compensatory damages from the foreclosing association.

### G. SFR is Entitled to Summary Judgment on the Bank's Claim for Intentional Interference with a Contract.

Under Nevada law, to prove a claim for intentional interference with a contract, a party must show: (1) a valid and existing contract; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the contract; (3) intentional acts intended or designed to disrupt the contractual relationship; (4) actual disruption of the contract; and (5) resulting damage. J.J. Indus., LLC v. Bennett, 119 Nev. 269, 274, 71 P.3d 1264, 1267 (2003). The Bennett Court elaborated on the intent element, and held that "because the action involves an intentional tort, the inquiry usually concerns the defendant's ultimate purpose or the objective that he or she is seeking to advance. Thus, mere knowledge of the contract is insufficient to establish that the defendant intended or designed to disrupt the plaintiff's contractual relationship; instead, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant intended to induce the other party to breach the contract with the plaintiff. Accordingly, the plaintiff must inquire into the defendant's motive." Id. at 275, 1268.

Thus, the Bank's analysis falls flat for two reasons. First, the Bank has failed to present

7625 DEAN MARTIN DRIVE, SUITE 110 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89139 (702) 485-3300 FAX (702) 485-3301 1

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evidence that SFR was even was aware of the contract between the Bank and its borrower. While the Bank is correct in asserting that the recording of the Deed of Trust made SFR "constructively aware" of the recorded copy of the deed of trust, to prove intentional interference with a contract, the Bank must prove that SFR was actually aware. That Bank has not provided any evidence to that regard and instead relies on SFR's constructive notice of the deed of trust. See Bank's Opp. at 15:22-28.

The Bank has not provided a shred of evidence that SFR's actions were done with the motive to breach the Bank's contract. Therefore, the Bank cannot establish that SFR's actions were "intentional acts intended or designed to disrupt the contractual relationship." Bennett, 119 Nev. at 274, 71 P.3d at 1267. SFR purchased this property at an NRS 116 foreclosure property with the obvious intention to prevail at the auction and obtain title to the property; not out of spite to the Bank or to cause harm to the Bank. Simply put, SFR had no hand in what transpired between the homeowner/borrower and the Association, and between the homeowner/borrower and the Bank, prior to the Association sale; the homeowner/borrower's failure to pay his/her assessments was the homeowner/borrower's own doing. Because the Bank cannot show that SFR's intention was to break the Contract between the Bank and the borrower, the Bank's claim for intentional interference with contract fails as a matter of law, and summary judgment in favor of SFR is warranted.

### II. **CONCLUSION**

Based on the above, the Court should Grant the SFR's Motion for Summary Judgment. To the extent it believes that the bankruptcy issues may be dispositive, which it should not due to the Bank's lack of standing to raise the issue, then SFR requests this Court defer ruling on summary judgment until after the March 28, 2017 hearing in bankruptcy court on SFR's motion to retroactively annul the stay.

DATED this 17th day of February 2017.

### KIM GILBERT EBRON

/s/ Jaqueline A. Gilbert, Esq. JACOUELINE A. GILBERT, ESO. Nevada Bar No. 10593

# KIM GILBERT EBRON 7625 DEAN MARTIN DRIVE, SUITE 110 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89139

(702) 485-3300 FAX (702) 485-3301

### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17th day of February 2017, pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I served via the Eighth Judicial District Court electronic filing system the foregoing SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, to the following parties.

	<u> Sek</u>	ect All <u>Select None</u>	
Alve	rson Taylor Mortensen & Sande Name	rs Enwil	Select
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	Kust R. Bords	efile@alversontaylor.com	<b>y</b>
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Kim	Gilbert Ebron		
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	Tomas Valerio	<u>staff@kqelegal.com</u>	
Law	Offices of Richard Vilkin, P.C. Name	Email	Select
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	Karigis Williams	<u>ntawilliants@swlaw.com</u>	
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	Richard C. Gordon Robin Perkins	<u>rcerton (Esselaw.com)</u> rperkins (Esselaw.com)	

/s/ Zachary Clayton
An employee of Kim Gilbert Ebron

# 7625 DEAN MARTIN DRIVE, SUITE 110 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89139 (702) 485-3300 FAX (702) 485-3301

### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17th day of February 2017, pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I served via SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, to the following parties, via USPS priority mail:

MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ. Law Offices of Michael F. Bohn, Esq., Ltd. 376 East Warm Springs Road Suite 140 Las Vegas, NV 89119

> /s/ Tomas Valerio An employee of Kim Gilbert Ebron

# EXHIBIT 1

```
DISTRICT COURT
                CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, a
Nevada limited liability company,
          Plaintiff,
                                     CASE NO: A-13-678814-C
                                   ) CONSOLIDATED WITH
     VS.
                                   ) CASE NO: A-13-688734-C
US BANK, N.A., a national banking
                                   ) DEPT NO: XXXI
association as Trustee for the
Certificate Holders of Wells Fargo )
Asset Securities Corporation,
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,)
Series 2006-AR4 and LUCIA PARKS,
an individual, DOES I through X,
and ROE CORPORATIONS I through X,
inclusive,
          Defendants.
SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, a
                                   ) DEPOSITION OF:
Nevada limited liability company,
                                  ) ROBERT FERGUSON
                                   ) PURSUANT TO NRCP 30(B)(6)
          Plaintiff,
                                   ) PERSON MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE
                                   ) U.S. BANK
     VS.
US BANK, N.A., a national banking ) Taken at:
association as Trustee for the
                                   ) The Law Offices of
Certificate Holders of Wells Fargo ) Kim Gilbert Ebron
Asset Securities Corporation,
                                   ) Suite 110
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,) 7625 Dean Martin Drive
Series 2006-AR4; NV WEST SERVICING,) Las Vegas, Nevada 89139
LLC, a Nevada limited liability
company, as Trustee for NASHVILLE
                                     on Wednesday,
TRUST 2270; DOES I-X;
                                     February 10, 2016
and ROES 1-10, inclusive
                                     at 3:21 p.m.
          Defendants.
```

NV WEST SERVICING, LLC, a Nevada ) limited company, as Trustee for ) NASHVILLE TRUST 2270, (Cross-Claimant, ) vs. (Cross-Claimant, ) NATIONAL DEFAULT SERVICING (CORPORATION, an Arizona (Corporation; DOES XI through XX, inclusive, )

DEPOSITION OF ROBERT FERGUSON
PURSUANT TO NRCP 30(B)(6)
PERSON MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE
U.S. BANK

Taken at The Law Offices of Kim Gilbert Ebron
7625 Dean Martin Drive
Suite 110
Las Vegas, Nevada

on Wednesday, February 10, 2016 3:21 p.m.

Job No. 21227

Depo International - Las Vegas

Reported by: Andrea Martin, CSR, RPR, NV CCR 887

Certified Realtime Reporter

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1
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                  Las Vegas, Nevada 89139
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     Association:
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                  E-mail:
25
                     Brian O'Laughlin
     Also Present:
```

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Las Vegas, Nevada; Wednesday, February 10, 2016
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               (In an off-the-record discussion held
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               prior to the commencement of the
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               proceedings, counsel agreed to waive the
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               court reporter's requirements under Rule
               30(b)(4) of the Nevada Rules of Civil
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               Procedure.)
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                       ROBERT FERGUSON,
     having been first duly sworn by the court reporter
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     to testify to the truth, the whole truth, and
     nothing but the truth, was examined and testified
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     under oath as follows:
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                           EXAMINATION
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     BY MS. EBRON:
               Good afternoon. I'm Diana Cline Ebron. I
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          Q
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     represent SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC, in this
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     matter, as well as the last one.
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               Can you please state your name for the
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     record.
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               Robert Ferguson, F-E-R-G-U-S-O-N.
          A
               And you're employed by Wells Fargo Bank,
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          Q
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     N.A.?
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               I am.
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MS. EBRON: I'm going to let counsel go 1 ahead and represent themselves so we know who all is 2 3 here. 4 MR. WAITE: Trevor Waite on behalf of Third-Party Defendants Copper Ridge Community 5 Association. 6 7 MR. VILKIN: Richard Vilkin on behalf of Third-Party Defendant, Nevada Association Services, 8 9 Inc. SPEAKER1: Brian O'Laughlin, in-house with 10 Wells, Fargo. 11 12 MR. DELIKANAKIS: John Delikanakis with 13 Snell & Wilmer on behalf of U.S. Bank. BY MS. EBRON: 14 Before we started today, we discussed with 15 Q 16 counsel that we would incorporate background information, your employment history, that type of 17 18 thing, from a deposition taken on March 24th, 19 2015, Case No. A-13-686489-C. 20 Are you okay with that? 21 A Yes. 22 Is there anything you wanted to update? Q In the deposition transcript you just 23 A referenced, I used to be a notary with the state of 24 25 Oregon, and I did not renew that, so I'm no longer a

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notary.
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               Thank you.
          Q.
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               (Deposition Exhibit 1 was marked for
               identification.)
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     BY MS. EBRON:
               Can you please take a look at what's been
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     marked as Exhibit 1.
               Okay.
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          A
               Do you recognize this document?
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          Q
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               I do.
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          Q
               What is it?
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               This is a notice of deposition for today's
          A
     deposition.
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          Q
               This is for the deposition of U.S. Bank,
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     N.A., a National Banking Association, as Trustee for
     the Certificate Holders of Wells Fargo, Asset
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     Securities Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through
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     Certificate, Series 2006-AR4.
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               Whenever I refer to "U.S. Bank," I'm going
     to be referring to it as "the trustee." Okay?
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          A
               Okay.
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               If I refer to "the trust," I'll be
          Q
     referring to the trust known as Wells Fargo Asset
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     Securities Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through
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     Certificate, Series 2006-AR4.
                                     Okay?
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Okay.
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          A
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               In addition, there's some other
          Q
     definitions. On Page 3, there's a definition of
 3
     "property." It's the real property located at
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     2270 Nashville Avenue, Henderson, Nevada 89052,
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     Parcel No. 178-19-712-012.
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               For the purposes of this deposition,
     whenever I talk about "the property," I'm referring
 8
     to the one on Nashville Avenue. Okay?
 9
               Okay.
10
          A
               In addition, there's a definition of
11
          Q
     "association," referring to Copper Ridge Community
12
     Association. So unless otherwise specified, when I
13
     talk about "the association," I'm referring to the
14
     Copper Ridge Community Association. Okay?
15
16
               Okay.
          \mathbf{A}
17
          Q
               There's also a reference to "the
     association foreclosure sale." When I talk about
18
     that, I'm talking about the auction held on
19
20
     March 1st, 2013, by Nevada Association Services,
21
     Inc., on behalf of the association. Okay?
22
               Okay.
          A
               From time to time during the deposition, I
23
          Q
24
     may refer to Nevada Association Services as NAS.
25
     All right?
```

1	A Okay.
2	Q There are topics that start on Page 3 and
3	go to Page 23. Have you had a chance to review
4	those before today?
5	A I've reviewed the 23 topics.
6	Q And are you the person that U.S. Bank has
7	designated to testify on its behalf for these
8	topics?
9	A Yes.
10	Q What is the relationship between U.S. Bank
11	and Wells Fargo such that you would be designated as
12	the witness?
13	A Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., is the servicer
14	for the loans on behalf of the trustee, which is
15	U.S. Bank.
16	(Deposition Exhibit 2 was marked for
17	identification.)
18	BY MS. EBRON:
19	Q Can you please look at what's been marked
20	as Exhibit 2.
21	A (Complies.) Okay.
22	Q Do you recognize this document?
23	A I do.
24	Q What is it?
25	A This is a note the borrower executed on

December 30th, 2005. 1 2 When you talk about "the borrower," are Q. you referring to Lucia Parks? 3 4 A I am. 5 Do you know what information was redacted Q from the top left-hand corner of the first page of 6 the note? 7 8 A mortgage loan number. A 9 Do you know what this stamp at the bottom Q. right-hand corner that says "Exhibit 1" is referring 10 11 to? 12 MR. DELIKANAKIS: (Indicating.) 13 I do not. A 14 BY MS. EBRON: 15 Did you have a chance to look at the Q 16 original wet-ink signature note? I did not. 17 Α 18 Do you know where that note is located? Q 19 This note is in our vaults in Minneapolis, A 20 Minnesota. 21 How do you know that? Q 22 I looked in our servicing platform and A 23 determined that the custodian of the collateral 24 documents was Wells Fargo Bank and that the address 25 of the particular vault that this loan -- these loan

documents are housed is in is in Minneapolis. 1 2 Do you know who input that information Q. 3 into the place that you looked? 4 The data would have been input into our A system of record by someone who worked while 5 onboarding this loan into our loan servicing 6 platform. 7 8 When was this loan onboarded into your Q servicing platform? 9 At the time of origination in December of 10 A 2005. 11 12 (Deposition Exhibit 3 was marked for identification.) 13 BY MS. EBRON: 14 15 Can you look at what has been marked as Q 16 Exhibit 3, please. (Complies.) Okay. 17 Α 18 Do you recognize this document? Q I do. 19 A 20 Q. What is it? This is a deed of trust regarding the 21 A 22 property in question in this matter, with the 23 borrower of Lucia Parks. And is this the deed of trust that was 24 Q 25 executed to secure the note that we marked as

Exhibit 2? 1 2 A It is. 3 Who originated this loan? Q. Wells Fargo Bank. 4 Α 5 When did U.S. Bank obtain an interest in Q. this loan? 6 7 This loan was sold to -- shortly after A origination, I would say within four or five months 8 of origination, back in 2006. 9 10 0 Are there documents that evidence the transfer from Wells Fargo to U.S. Bank? 11 12 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Objection: Form of the question. 13 14 Α This loan was included in a pool of loans that was securitized, and U.S. Bank was named the 15 16 trustee of the pool of loans. 17 MS. EBRON: Off the record. 18 (Pause in proceedings.) 19 MS. EBRON: Back on the record. 20 BY MS. EBRON: 21 0 Do you know how much the trust paid to 22 purchase the loan? 23 The practice would be for the transaction A to include nearly dollar for dollar for the 24 25 principal balance of the loan at the time the loan

was transferred to the trust. 1 How do you know that? 2 Q. 3 A Just the general banking practice of transactions such as these. 4 5 In Exhibit 3, can you look at the page Q that's Bates Stamped USB000021. 6 7 (Complies.) Okay. A Do you recognize this? 8 Q I do. 9 Α 10 Q What is it? It's a planned unit development rider. 11 A 12 Q Why did Wells Fargo include it in the deed of trust? 13 14 Α It informs the borrowers of their responsibility to keep in compliance and current 15 16 with their requirements under the PUD. 17 Q Is it fair to say that Wells Fargo was 18 aware of the homeowners association when it 19 originated this loan? 20 Objection: Form of the MR. DELIKANAKIS: question; also calls for a legal conclusion. 21 22 Wells Fargo was aware that the loan was --A that the property was located within a PUD. 23 (Deposition Exhibit 4 was marked for 24 25 identification.)

1 BY MS. EBRON: Can you look at what's been marked as 2 Q. 3 Exhibit 4, please. (Complies.) 4 A I'm going to represent to you that this is 5 just a portion of the Declaration of Covenants, 6 Conditions, and Restrictions for Copper Ridge 7 Community, with the title page and the Table of 8 Contents, because the entire document is voluminous. 9 Have you seen this document before? 10 I have not. 11 A 12 Do you know if this is something that is Q 13 contained in U.S. Bank's business records? 14 Α I did not see this within their records. (Deposition Exhibit 5 was marked for 15 16 identification.) 17 BY MS. EBRON: 18 Look at what has been marked as Exhibit 5, 19 please. (Complies.) Okay. 20 A 21 Do you recognize this document? 0 22 I do. A 23 What is it? Q 24 It is a grant, bargain, sale deed between A 25 Albert and Mary Brandelli and the borrower of the

```
loan we originated, Lucia Parks.
 1
          Q.
               Is this something that's part of
 2
     U.S. Bank's business records?
               I'm not sure if the copy that I've seen
 4
          Α
     has -- is the recorded copy of this document or not.
 5
               Is there a copy that is not recorded in
 6
          Q
     U.S. Bank's business records?
 8
               I believe there is.
          Α
 9
               (Deposition Exhibit 6 was marked for
               identification.)
10
     BY MS. EBRON:
11
12
               Can you look at what has been marked as
          Q
13
     Exhibit 6.
               (Complies.)
14
          A
15
               Do you recognize this document?
          Q
               I don't respect -- I don't specifically
16
          A
     recognize this document. I don't remember seeing
17
18
     it.
19
               (Deposition Exhibit 7 was marked for
20
               identification.)
21
     BY MS. EBRON:
22
          Q
               Can you look at what's been marked as
     Exhibit 7, please.
23
               Okay.
24
          A
25
               Do you recognize this document?
          Q
```

```
1
          Α
                I do not.
                (Deposition Exhibit 8 was marked for
 2
                identification.)
 3
     BY MS. EBRON:
 4
 5
          Q
                Take a look at what has been marked as
     Exhibit 8, please.
 6
 7
                (Complies.) Okay.
          A
 8
               Do you recognize this document?
          Q
                I do not.
 9
          A
                (Deposition Exhibit 9 was marked for
10
                identification.)
11
12
     BY MS. EBRON:
               Look at what has been marked as Exhibit 9.
13
          Q
                (Complies.) Okay.
14
          A
               Do you recognize this document?
15
          Q
16
          A
                I do not.
                (Deposition Exhibit 10 was marked for
17
18
                identification.)
     BY MS. EBRON:
19
20
                Can you please look at what has been
          Q
     marked as Exhibit 10.
21
                (Complies.)
22
          A
               Do you recognize this document?
23
          Q
                I do.
24
          A
25
          Q
               What is it?
```

It is a notice of default and election to 1 Α sell regarding the first deed of trust, what was 2 Exhibit 3. 3 Who is National Default Servicing 4 0 Corporation? 5 They are the trustee for the deed of 6 A 7 trust. 8 Q If you look on the page that is Bates Stamped USB000039 --9 Okay. 10 A -- the second paragraph from the bottom 11 Q discusses the failure to pay. 12 13 Do you see that? 14 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Can you point which 15 section you're looking at? What sentence does it begin with? 16 MS. EBRON: Starts with, "That a breach 17 18 of, and default in, the obligations for which such Deed of Trust security has occurred in that payment 19 has not been made of: Failure to pay the 20 installments of principal interest and impounds 21 22 which became due on November 1st, 2009." I see that. 23 A 24 BY MS. EBRON: 25 Do you know if Lucia Parks made any Q

payments on the loan after November 1st, 2009? 1 2 Not without looking at the payment A history, but I believe she did. 3 4 (Deposition Exhibit 11 was marked for 5 identification.) BY MS. EBRON: 6 7 Can you look at what has been marked as Q Exhibit 11. 8 9 (Complies.) A Do you recognize this document? 10 Q I don't remember reviewing this in 11 Α 12 preparation for today. (Deposition Exhibit 12 was marked for 13 identification.) 14 15 BY MS. EBRON: 16 Q Can you look at what has been marked as 17 Exhibit 12. (Complies.) 18 A Do you recognize this document? 19 Q 20 A Yes. 21 Q What is it? 22 It's an assignment of deed of trust. A Who is it from and who is it to? 23 Q It is assigning to -- from Wells Fargo to 24 Α 25 the U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for

Wells Fargo Asset Securities Corporation, Mortgage 1 Pass-Through Certificate, Series 2006-AR4. 2 3 Q. When was this executed? July 1st of 2010. 4 A 5 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Just to note for the record, there's actually two executions on this 6 document. 7 8 BY MS. EBRON: 9 Here? Q. It appears to be a --10  $\mathbf{A}$ 11 MR. DELIKANAKIS: -- a notary. 12 THE WITNESS: -- signature and a notary. 13 MR. DELIKANAKIS: A notary. 14 MS. EBRON: Oh, okay. 15 MR. DELIKANAKIS: A notary signed that, 16 executed by the president. 17 MS. EBRON: What am I missing? 18 MR. DELIKANAKIS: It's okay. 19 BY MS. EBRON: 20 Do you know who Olivia A. Todd is? Q. I do not. 21 Α 22 Above the signature line, it says, Q. "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Successor by Merger to 23 24 Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., by its attorney in fact National Default Servicing Corporation." 25

Do you see that? 1 2 A I do. 3 Q Is National Default Servicing Corporation Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s attorney in fact? 4 5 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Objection: Form of the question; calls for a legal conclusion. 6 7 For this specific assignment, so National A Default Servicing Corporation had the ability to 8 sign this particular document as Wells Fargo Bank, 9 N.A.'s attorney in fact. 10 (Deposition Exhibit 13 was marked for 11 12 identification.) 13 BY MS. EBRON: 14 Q Can you please look at what has been marked as Exhibit 13. 15 16 (Complies.) Okay. A Do you recognize this document? 17 Q 18 I do. A 19 What is it? Q. 20 It is a notice of trustee's sale. A 21 0 Does this notice of trustee's sale relate 22 to the deed of trust marked as Exhibit 3? 23 It does. A 24 Was it National Default Servicing Q 25 Corporation that caused this to be recorded?

1 Yes. A 2 Was that on behalf of U.S. Bank? Q 3 A Correct. I should say on behalf of U.S. Bank as 4 Trustee for the pool. 5 Right. Thank you. 6 Q 7 Can you look at the page Bates Stamped USB000044, the paragraph that starts, "Said sale 8 will be made, in 'as is' condition, without covenant 9 or warranty, expressed or implied, regarding title, 10 possession or encumbrances to satisfy the 11 12 indebtedness" of the -- sorry -- "indebtedness secured by said Deed of Trust." 13 14 Do you see that? 15 Α I see -- I do. 16 Q Do you know why that was included in this 17 notice of sale? 18 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Objection: Form of the question calls for a legal conclusion. 19 20 I can only see the words that you just A read out into the record exists on this document as 21 22 you read them. 23 BY MS. EBRON: Have you seen other notices of trustee's 24 Q 25 sales that relate to deeds of trust?

```
MR. DELIKANAKIS: Objection: Scope.
 1
 2
          A
                I have.
 3
     BY MS. EBRON:
               Do you know if that language is generally
 4
          Q
     included --
 5
 6
               MR. DELIKANAKIS: Same --
 7
     BY MS. EBRON:
 8
          Q
                -- in notices of trustee's sale?
 9
               MR. DELIKANAKIS: Same objection:
                                                     Scope.
               I believe it is a typical language used.
10
          Α
                (Deposition Exhibit 14 was marked for
11
               identification.)
12
13
     BY MS. EBRON:
14
          Q
               Can you look at what's been marked as
15
     Exhibit 14, please.
16
                (Complies.)
          \mathbf{A}
               Do you recognize this document?
17
          Q
               I do.
18
          A
19
               What is it?
          Q.
20
               It's the substitution of trustee.
          A
               Is this something that is contained in
21
          0
22
     U.S. Bank's business records?
23
               Yes.
          A
24
               Do you know if there was a different
          Q
25
     substitution of trustee executed before the date on
```

```
this one?
 1
               MR. DELIKANAKIS: Objection: Form of the
 2
     question.
 3
 4
               Do you understand the question?
 5
               THE WITNESS: I think I do.
               I can't recall seeing a different
 6
          Α
 7
     substitution of trustee prior to this one, in my
     review.
 8
 9
     BY MS. EBRON:
10
               Going back to Exhibit 13 --
          Q
               Okay.
11
          A
12
               -- the paragraph that begins, "Notice is
          Q
     hereby given."
13
14
               On which exhibit?
          A
               Sorry. On 13.
15
          Q
16
               Okay.
          A
17
          Q
               It states that it will sell on
18
     August 3rd, 2010, at 10 a.m.
19
               Do you see that?
20
               I do.
          A
               Did the sale go forward on that date?
21
          Q
22
               It did not.
          A
               Do you know why not?
23
          Q
               I believe the borrower filed for
24
          A
     Chapter 11 bankruptcy, causing a stay.
25
```

Is there a document that you reviewed that 1 0 makes you believe that? 2 3 A The -- yes. There's bankruptcy documents in our imaging system related to Parks' bankruptcy 4 filing. 5 Do you know when the bankruptcy stay was 6 Q lifted or was no longer in effect? 7 Not off the top of my head. I can't 8 A recall the date. 9 10 (Deposition Exhibit 15 was marked for identification.) 11 12 BY MS. EBRON: Look at what has been marked as 13 Q 14 Exhibit 15, please. (Complies.) Okay. 15 A 16 Q Do you recognize this document? I specifically don't recall this exact 17 A 18 document, but I did see notices of trustee's sale in our file. 19 20 In that second paragraph, where it says it Q. will sell on July 19th, 2011, at 10 a.m., do you 21 22 see that? 23 I do. A Did the sale go forward on that date? 24 Q 25 I don't believe so. A

Do you know why not? 1 Q 2 MR. DELIKANAKIS: I'll caution the witness 3 not to speculate. Yeah, not without looking at the business 4 A 5 records to determine. 6 BY MS. EBRON: 7 What business records would you look at to Q determine why the sale did not go forward on 8 July 19th, 2011? 9 10 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Objection: Form of the 11 question. 12 I would look at the foreclosure process A notes and the bankruptcy process notes and the loss 13 14 mitigation process notes. 15 BY MS. EBRON: 16 Do you know if the bankruptcy stay was Q either lifted or no longer in effect when this 17 18 notice of trustee's sale was recorded? Not without looking at the order granting 19 A 20 the relief from stay to be able to tell what the 21 time period was. 22 On the next page Bates Stamped USB000049, Q do you see that same language about, 'as is' 23 24 condition without covenant or warranty, expressed or implied," as we did in the last notice of sale? 25

```
Yes, I see the same language.
 1
          A
 2
                (Deposition Exhibit 16 was marked for
               identification.)
 3
 4
     BY MS. EBRON:
 5
               Can you look at what has been marked as
          Q
     Exhibit 16, please.
 6
 7
               (Complies.)
          A
 8
               Do you recognize this document?
          Q
 9
          A
               I don't believe I have seen this before.
10
               (Deposition Exhibit 17 was marked for
               identification.)
11
12
     BY MS. EBRON:
13
               Would you please look at what has been
          Q
     marked as Exhibit 17.
14
15
               MR. VILKIN: I'm sorry. Which one are you
16
     on: 17?
17
               MS. EBRON: Seventeen. It's Bates Stamped
18
     USB --
19
               MR. VILKIN: Yeah.
20
               MS. EBRON:
                            -- 000053.
21
               MR. VILKIN:
                             Thank you.
22
               Okay.
          A
     BY MS. EBRON:
23
               Do you recognize this document?
24
          Q
25
               Looks to be an assignment of mortgage.
          A
```

1 When was this executed? Q June 7th of 2012. 2 A 3 Who is this from and who is it to? Q Wells Fargo Bank to the U.S. Bank National 4 A Association as Trustee for the pool of loans. 5 Do you know why the deed of trust was 6 Q assigned from Wells Fargo Bank to U.S. Bank two 7 times, like the one here in Exhibit 17 and then also 8 in Exhibit 12? 9 10 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Objection: Form of the question. 11 12 No, I do not. A (Deposition Exhibit 18 was marked for 13 14 identification.) 15 BY MS. EBRON: 16 Look at what has been marked as 17 Exhibit 18. 18 (Complies.) Okay. A 19 Do you recognize this document? Q 20 I apologize. I've reviewed so many A documents, I can't remember if I specifically have 21 22 seen this before today or not. In your review of the file, you looked for 23 foreclosure notices; correct? 24 I did. 25 A

Do you recall seeing any foreclosure 1 Q 2 notices from homeowners associations? 3 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Objection to the form of the question. 4 Are you -- do you understand the scope of 5 foreclosure notices? 6 7 MS. EBRON: Okay. 8 BY MS. EBRON: Foreclosure notices, including a notice of 9 Q default or notice of sale from a homeowners 10 association --11 12 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Thank you, Counsel. 13 BY MS. EBRON: 14 Q -- in relation to this property. And I'm 15 looking for ones that would have been included in 16 U.S. Bank's business records, not ones provided by counsel or through litigation. 17 18 I did see -- I believe it was a notice of sale and then a -- another notice regarding -- but I 19 20 don't know if it was a recorded document that was 21 sent to Wells Fargo. 22 I do want to say that the notice of sale was received -- or in our imaging system 23 March 5th, so -- what? -- four days after the HOA 24 25 foreclosure sale.

March 5th of 2013? 1 Q 2 Correct. A 3 Q What about the other notice you mentioned? Do you know when that was uploaded to your imaging 4 system? 5 I can't recall the date that the other one 6 Α was uploaded. 7 Did you review servicing notes in 8 preparation for your deposition? 9 I did. 10 A And in the servicing notes, was there a 11 Q 12 corresponding note to the imaged notice of sale received -- or imaged on March 5th, 2013? 13 14 A Right. And just so the record's clear, the document that we received on March 5th, 2013, 15 16 it is either a notice of sale or a notice of default 17 and election to sell. As I sit here today, I can't tell -- I 18 can't remember which one was which. 19 20 Q Okay. So to answer your question, yes, there is 21 A 22 a corresponding business record on the 5th of March, 2013, from the trustee that indicates the 23 24 document was sent to Wells Fargo for upload into our 25 system.

```
When you say "from the trustee," who is
          Q
 1
 2
     the trustee?
 3
          A
               National Default.
               Okay. So the entity that was conducting
 4
          Q
     the foreclosure sale of the deed of trust?
 5
 6
          Α
               Correct.
 7
               (Deposition Exhibit 19 was marked for
               identification.)
 8
 9
     BY MS. EBRON:
10
          Q
               Can you look at what has been marked as
     Exhibit 19.
11
12
               MR. VILKIN: 19?
               MS. EBRON: Yes.
13
               (Complies.) Okay.
14
          Α
     BY MS. EBRON:
15
16
          Q
               Do you recognize this document?
               I do not.
17
          Α
18
               (Deposition Exhibit 20 was marked for
19
               identification.)
20
     BY MS. EBRON:
21
          0
               Can you look at what has been marked as
     Exhibit 20, please.
22
                (Complies.)
23
                             Okay.
          A
24
               Do you recognize this document?
          Q
25
               I do not, and I'm -- I'm just going to say
          A
```

- 1 right now it looks like the recorded date of this
- 2 document was 3/6/2013, which is after the date of
- 3 the HOA foreclosure sale.
- 4 So the review of my system of record and
- 5 the reviewing of the imaged documents contained in
- 6 our system, our image system, I conducted that
- 7 review from originations to the HOA foreclosure
- 8 sale. So a lot -- any of the documents that are
- 9 dated after that I probably have not looked at.
- 10 MR. DELIKANAKIS: It's outside the scope
- 11 of the deposition anyway. I mean, if you want to --
- 12 you're just trying to authenticate documents. I'm
- 13 not sure what the purpose of the exercise is for
- 14 these events after the sale.
- 15 MS. EBRON: I am just seeing what he
- 16 recalls seeing in the file.
- 17 MR. DELIKANAKIS: The objection will be
- 18 that it's outside the scope of the deposition.
- 19 (Deposition Exhibit 21 was marked for
- identification.)
- 21 BY MS. EBRON:
- 22 Q Can you look at what has been marked as
- 23 Exhibit 21.
- 24 A (Complies.) Okay.
- 25 Q Do you recognize this document?

1 A I do not. 2 Is this another notice of trustee's sale Q. that relates to the deed of trust marked as Exhibit 3? 4 5 It is referencing the deed of trust that is marked as Exhibit 3, yes. 6 7 Do you know if a foreclosure sale took Q place on April 1st, 2013? 8 9 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Objection: Scope. Not as I sit here today. I'd have to look 10 Α at our servicing records in and around that time. 11 12 (Deposition Exhibit 22 was marked for identification.) 13 BY MS. EBRON: 14 15 Q Can you look at what has been marked as 16 Exhibit 22. MR. DELIKANAKIS: Same objection: Outside 17 18 the scope. (Complies.) Okay. 19 Α 20 BY MS. EBRON: 21 0 Do you recognize this document? 22 I do not. A (Deposition Exhibit 23 was marked for 23 identification.) 24 25 BY MS. EBRON:

Can you look at what has been marked as 1 Q Exhibit 23. 2 (Complies.) 3 A MS. EBRON: Just note there's -- on the 4 last page of that, Bates Stamp USB00076, should not 5 be included. 6 7 A Okay. MR. VILKIN: I'm sorry. I'm a 8 little confused. 9 10 Twenty-three is what: Trustee deed? MS. EBRON: It is the trustee's deed upon 11 12 sale --13 MR. VILKIN: Okay. Thank you. MS. EBRON: -- and it relates to the deed 14 of trust. 15 BY MS. EBRON: 16 17 Q Have you seen this document before? 18 I have not. A 19 (Deposition Exhibit 24 was marked for 20 identification.) 21 BY MS. EBRON: 22 Q Can you look at what has been marked as Exhibit 24. 23 (Complies.) Okay. 24 A 25 Do you recognize this document? Q

1 Α I do not. 2 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Objection: Outside the 3 scope. (Deposition Exhibit 25 was marked for 4 identification.) 5 6 BY MS. EBRON: 7 Can you look at what has been marked as Q Exhibit 25. 8 9 (Complies.) A 10 Q. This is a document that was produced separately by U.S. Bank, outside of recorded 11 12 documents. 13 Have you seen this before? I don't believe I've seen this before. 14 Α Do you know where this was -- like, what 15 Q 16 portion of U.S. Bank's business records this came 17 from or if it came from U.S. Bank's business 18 records? It did not come from the business records 19 A 20 from U.S. Bank from the origination of the -- from the date of the origination of the original deed of 21 22 trust to the date of the HOA foreclosure sale, 23 because I looked at every one of those documents, 24 and this was not one of those. 25 So if it did come from U.S. Bank's

records, it would have been a document that we 1 received after the date of the foreclosure, if that 2 3 makes sense. (Deposition Exhibit 26 was marked for 4 identification.) 5 6 BY MS. EBRON: 7 Q Look at what has been marked as Exhibit 26. 8 9 (Complies.) Okay. A 10 Do you recognize this document? Q I do. 11 A 12 Q What is it? 13 It's a letter to Wells Fargo from A Green Valley Ranch Community Association. 14 15 And was this something that was received Q 16 by U.S. Bank? Yes. It was -- just to clarify the 17 A record, it was received by Wells Fargo Bank as 18 Servicer on behalf of U.S. Bank. 19 20 Do you know when it was received by Q 21 Wells Fargo? 22 I think it was received in July of 2012. A But, actually, I'm going to walk that 23 24 I'm -- without looking at our imaging system, 25 I can't tell you an exact date, but I do know that

1	we received this.
2	Q Towards the bottom of the letter on the
3	first page Bates Stamped USB000111, there is a
4	reference to an enclosure.
5	Do you see that?
6	A Okay.
7	Q And it says "Notice of Default and
8	Election to Sell (copy.)"
9	A Okay.
10	Q Do you know if the document marked as
11	Exhibit 25 was received with this letter that's
12	marked as Exhibit 26?
13	A I believe it was.
14	Q Were there any corresponding notes in the
15	servicing records about when this was received?
16	A And you say "this." Exhibit 26
17	Q Exhibit 26. Thank you.
18	A and 25 or just 26?
19	Q Either or both.
20	A I can't remember the exact date that we
21	received this. The borrower's loan was in our
22	foreclosure process, so we would have anticipated
23	paying any type of delinquencies from the HOA out of
24	the proceeds of our foreclosure sale at this point.
25	Q I understand if you don't remember the

exact date, but do you remember if there was a 1 servicing note about receipt of the letter? 2 I don't recall a servicing note specific 3 Α to this letter. (Deposition Exhibit 27 was marked for 5 identification.) 6 7 BY MS. EBRON: Can you look at what has been marked as 8 Q Exhibit 27. It's Bates Stamped USB000112. And, 9 again, this was disclosed right after the letter 10 that was in Exhibit 26 and separate from the 11 12 recorded documents. When you say "disclosed," I guess I don't 13 Α 14 understand that. 15 Sorry. Disclosed by your counsel in that Q 16 order. 17 A Okay. 18 And since I don't have the originals, I Q. can't tell how they were put together or where they 19 20 came from. Do you know where this came from? 21 22 Exhibit 27? A 23 Yes. Q 24 Right, and I think I briefly spoke about A 25 this earlier in the deposition. This showed -- and

when I'm saying "this," I'm going to say Exhibit 27 1 shows up in our imaging system as of March 5th, 2 3 2013. There is a corresponding note in our 4 foreclosure processing platform identifying the 5 receipt of this notice of foreclosure sale. 6 7 Who would have input that note? Q. The note was input via our LPS system, 8 A 9 which is the interface that the trustees use to communicate with Wells Fargo, and the trustees would 10 be the trustees responsible for conducting the 11 12 nonjudicial foreclosure sales. 13 In this case, that would have been Q 14 National Default Servicing Corporation? 15 At that time, that is correct, yes. A 16 Q So is it your understanding that this notice of foreclosure sale was received by National 17 18 Default Servicing Corporation and a note was made 19 about it in LPS? 20 On March 5th, 2013, a note was entered A 21 into our mortgage service platform via LPS by the 22 trustee. So the note was from March 5th, 2013. 23 Q Was the image saved on that same date? 24 25 Yes. A

Where did it -- how did the image come to 0 1 Wells Fargo or U.S. Bank? 2 3 A There is a section in LPS that allows the trustees to upload documents, and that was the 4 vehicle in which the document was sent from the 5 trustee to Wells Fargo. And it was just a one-page 6 document this -- as it appears here, on Exhibit 27. 7 And so it didn't include any envelope or 8 Q fax cover sheet or anything like that? 9 It was just a one-page document. 10 A No. (Deposition Exhibit 28 was marked for 11 12 identification.) 13 BY MS. EBRON: 14 Q Can you look at what has been marked 15 Exhibit 28. 16 (Complies.) Okay. A 17 Q Do you recognize these documents -- well, 18 this -- I think this may be several different screen 19 shots or notes, but I'm not sure. 20 I think they're maybe in reverse A chronological order. The dates are weird 21 22 because -- I --23 Okav. To answer your question, yes, this is a screen capture from our loss mitigation process 24 note section of MSP. 25

So on the page that is Bates Stamped 1 Q USB000113, that is something from loss mitigation? 2 3 A Yes. Are there any references to the 4 Q association on this page? 5 There's not. A 6 7 Do you know when this was generated? Q. MR. DELIKANAKIS: Are we referring to 8 9 USB113? 10 MS. EBRON: Yes. MR. DELIKANAKIS: Okay. 11 12 This particular screen capture was printed A on November 26th, 2013, and shows notes on -- from 13 February 26, 2010, to March 3rd, 2010, in our loss 14 mitigation process section of our servicing 15 16 platform. 17 BY MS. EBRON: 18 On the second line, it starts "L. Parks." Is that referring to the borrower? 19 20 It is. A And then do you know what "ODD INV." 21 0 22 stands for? 23 I do not. A Do you know what "S/S" stands for? 24 Q 25 That would be "short sale." A

What about "MKWLE"? 1 Q 2 Do not know. A 3 Do you know what this date is referring Q to, 12/1/09? 4 5 Do not. Α 6 Q Can you look at the page Bates stamped 7 USB000114. (Complies.) Okay. 8 A Do you know what screen capture this is 9 Q from? 10 This is from our bankruptcy process notes. 11 A It was printed again on November 26, 2013, and shows 12 notes from the bankruptcy process platform between 13 14 May 30th, 2012, and June 4th, 2012. Do you know if there's any reference to 15 Q the association or association lien on this page? 16 17 Α There's not. 18 Do you know who Pite Duncan, LLP, is? Q 19 The firm Wells Fargo engaged related to A 20 the bankruptcy. Is there anything on this page that tells 21 0 22 you when or if the bankruptcy stay was lifted or no longer in effect? 23 24 A No. 25 Does Wells Fargo allege that the Q

foreclosure, the association foreclosure, was 1 invalid because of a bankruptcy stay? 2 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Objection: Form of the 3 question; calls for a legal conclusion. 4 He's here as a fact PMK, not to testify as 5 to allegations or claims or defenses, legal claims 6 and legal defenses. 7 And your question again? 8 A (Record read by reporter.) 9 MR. DELIKANAKIS: I'm going to direct him 10 not to answer that question. 11 12 MS. EBRON: Why? 13 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Because it's a legal conclusion. He's here as a PMK witness. It's 14 outside the scope of the deposition notice. 15 16 MR. VILKIN: She's not asking for a 17 conclusion. 18 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Let me finish my objection. She asked me a question. I'm going to 19 20 answer it. She's asking what Wells Fargo is alleging. 21 22 Now, if you want to know facts that might underpin that allegation, go ahead and ask the facts 23 24 you want. If you are asking for a conclusion, which 25

- 1 is what an allegation is, I'm directing him not to
- 2 answer.
- 3 MR. VILKIN: An allegation is not a
- 4 conclusion. An allegation is a claim that's made.
- 5 She's not asking for a legal conclusion. She's not
- 6 asking for his opinion, legal opinion, about the
- 7 legal effect of certain facts. She's just asking
- 8 what claims or claim is being made.
- 9 It's an improper instruction, and I think
- 10 we should call the discovery commissioner if we
- 11 can't get it resolved.
- MR. DELIKANAKIS: That sounds good. Why
- 13 don't we do that.
- MS. EBRON: Are you alleging that? I
- 15 mean, it's one of the --
- MR. DELIKANAKIS: I'm not the one on
- 17 deposition here.
- MS. EBRON: It is Topic No. 22.
- 19 BY MS. EBRON:
- 20 Q Let me ask it this way: Is there anything
- in U.S. Bank's business records that show that there
- 22 was a bankruptcy stay in place at the time of the
- 23 association foreclosure sale?
- 24 A As I sit here today, I can't answer that
- 25 question. I would need to look at the entire

bankruptcy process notes and cross-reference that to 1 the date of the HOA's foreclosure sale, to see if 2 3 there was a stay or not. But it wasn't something that you looked at 4 0 in preparation for your deposition today? 5 It was not. 6 A 7 What did you do to prepare for Q Topic No. 22? 8 I looked at the origination documents, the 9 A note, the deed of trust, and the title policy that 10 was issued at the time of the origination of the 11 12 mortgage. 13 Anything else? Q 14 I also re- -- well, specific to that A 15 question, I think that would be all that I reviewed. 16 Q What other documents did you review in 17 preparation for your deposition, not just for that 18 but for the whole... 19 A I reviewed every document that was in our 20 imaging system from the date of the loan origination to March 1st -- actually, March 5th of 2013. 21 22 reviewed the origination -- that included the 23 origination documents, electronic versions of those. I reviewed the loan servicing platform, 24 25 the foreclosure process notes, loss mitigation

process notes, and loan pay history. 1 reviewed the delinquency history on the mortgage as 2 3 well. Anything else? 4 Q 5 That's all I can remember. A Did you speak to anyone in preparation for 6 Q your deposition besides your attorney? 7 8 Just the attorneys. A Did you e-mail with anyone to find 9 Q. information in preparation for your deposition? 10 I did not. 11 Α 12 Did you communicate in any other way, Q besides speaking and e-mailing, with anyone in 13 preparation for your deposition? 14 I'll just say that all of the 15 A No. 16 communications I've had in preparation for this deposition was in the presence of Wells Fargo 17 18 counsel, both in and out -- in and -- inside counsel and Snell & Wilmer. 19 20 You're saying "in the presence of," Q. meaning you spoke with other people but your counsel 21 22 was there? 23 All the communications that we've had A No. regarding the deposition was solely in the presence 24 25 of counsel, without any other party.

So you had conversations with your counsel Q 1 and in the presence of other counsel? I'm just 2 3 not --4 A No. Just ---- understanding by the way you're 5 Q answering. 6 7 Just to be clear, in preparation for this A deposition, I personally, on my own, reviewed all 8 the documents I previously stated in my response. 9 And in addition to that, I've met with our counsel 10 to discuss this deposition, both internal counsel 11 12 for Wells Fargo and outside counsel, Snell & Wilmer, 13 and that's it. 14 Q Okay. At any of those meetings with 15 counsel, was there anyone who was not your counsel 16 present? 17 Α No. 18 Did you speak to anybody at U.S. Bank in Q preparation for your deposition? 19 20 No, I did not. A 21 0 Does U.S. Bank know that you are here on 22 its behalf? Objection: Form of the 23 MR. DELIKANAKIS: question; speculative. 24 25 I do not know. A

1 BY MS. EBRON: How do you know that you are the one who 2 Q. 3 has been designated by U.S. Bank if you have not spoken with anyone from U.S. Bank? 4 Wells Fargo is the servicer of this 5 A mortgage. Our duties of servicer include responding 6 to and appearing at depositions that involve loans 7 8 that are within this trust. 9 How do you know that? We're the responsible party, as outlined 10 Α in the agreement between U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo. 11 12 What agreement? Q 13 The pooling and servicing agreement. A 14 Q Did you review the pooling and servicing 15 agreement in preparation for the deposition? 16 A I did. 17 MS. EBRON: Counsel, is that something 18 that's been produced? 19 MR. DELIKANAKIS: No. 20 MS. EBRON: Are you going to produce it? 21 MR. DELIKANAKIS: No. 22 MS. EBRON: Why? It's irrelevant. If you 23 MR. DELIKANAKIS: submit a request, I can give you more detailed 24 25 reasons --

1 MS. EBRON: I have. 2 MR. DELIKANAKIS: -- why it's irrelevant. 3 MS. EBRON: I have. MR. DELIKANAKIS: It's not going to be 4 produced. If you want to ask some foundational 5 questions, I think you'll realize it's irrelevant. 6 7 BY MS. EBRON: In the pooling and servicing agreement, 8 Q does it contain any references to how Wells Fargo 9 10 should handle association liens? 11 Α Yes. 12 Q What does it say? 13 There is a section in the servicing Α 14 agreement that says Wells Fargo should keep records when properties are in REO process for amounts we 15 16 pay to associations for dues. Anything else? 17 Q. 18 A No. 19 Is there any information in that agreement Q that discusses what type of information -- strike 20 21 that. 22 Is there anything in that agreement that contains other references to associations? 23 24 Other references to associations? A 25 Yeah, homeowners associations. Q

I only studied the servicing agreement as 1 A it pertained to association dues. So there may be 2 3 other things in the servicing agreement that have to do with insurance requirements, for an example. 4 Why didn't you look at anything else 5 Q related to associations besides dues? 6 7 I did. I reviewed the document for every Α instance for the word "association," every instance 8 of the combination of "association" and "dues," 9 "homeowners," and similar terms, and the only 10 instance that it brings up specifically "homeowners 11 12 dues" is in the section governing how Wells Fargo has to handle REO properties. 13 14  $\circ$ Well, what about the other sections that 15 you mentioned that were not just relating to dues? 16 What were those? 17 There were requirements for the types of A 18 insurance that would have to be proven to be on the property in HOAs, loss insurance. 19 Anything else? 20 Q 21 Α Not that I can remember. 22 Does the pooling and servicing agreement Q. contain any reporting requirements for Wells Fargo 23 to report information to U.S. Bank? 24 25 A Yes.

What type of reporting is done from 1 Q Wells Fargo to U.S. Bank? 2 The reporting is around the performance of 3 A the pool of loans in terms of delinquencies and 4 foreclosures and the like. 5 Do you know if the pooling and servicing 6 Q agreement is something that was provided to the SEC? 7 8 I did not check the SEC to see if the Α agreement is listed there. 9 Is that something that's common for these 10 Q. types of pools? 11 12 A Yes. 13 So it's not a confidential document? Q 14 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Objection: Form of the question; calls for a legal conclusion. 15 It could be, but, generally, the SEC will 16 A have a copy of the agreement. 17 18 BY MS. EBRON: 19 Those are generally posted on the website? Q 20 On the SEC's website, correct. A 21 0 Can you look at the page in Exhibit 28 22 that is Bates Stamped USB000115. (Complies.) 23 Okay. A Do you recognize this document? 24 Q 25 This is a screen capture from our loss A

mitigation process notes printed on November 26, 1 2 2013. 3 Q. Is there any reference to associations on this page? 4 5 There is not. Α Right under the part that says "Process 6 Q Notes" it says "01/29/13, 17:25:04." 7 Do you know what that "Q8B" stands for? 8 That is the team member that entered that 9 A 10 notation. Okay. So the same person would have 11 Q entered that note on January 29th, 2013, as on 12 December 21st, 2012? 13 14 Α That's correct. And then those other -- each of the other 15 Q 16 ones on that page refer to someone else? 17 Α Yes. Is there a way to find out the actual 18 Q identity of the person from that code? 19 20 The codes are sometimes recycled, because A there's only three digits, and there's several 21 22 thousand servicing team members. So I can't be 100 percent sure if today's Q8B, Bravo, would be the 23 24 same as the Q8B that's entered the note on January 25 of 2013, but, yes, I can look up the code.

Okay. And do you know what it means Q 1 2 "A3P"? 3 "Authorized third party." A What is that? 4 Q 5 The borrower has sent in written Α authorization that the person they designate can 6 speak to Wells Fargo regarding the mortgage loan. 7 So it requires -- if somebody were to call 8 in to get information about the loan, it would have 9 to either be the borrower or someone who the 10 borrower has authorized in writing? 11 12 A Yes. What does "liquidation loss mitigation" 13 Q 14 mean? This is a loan that's being reviewed for 15 A 16 short sale, and it's in loss mitigation, so the liquidation would be a review for something that, at 17 18 the end of it, the borrower will no longer own the property, so a deed in lieu or a short sale or a 19 short payoff. 20 21 0 In the note that's 1/15/13, that same one, a couple lines down, the "A3P" is "authorized third 22 party, " so that would refer to Brian Goodman; right? 23 Correct. 24 A 25 Calls for a status update, and then does Q

ADVS means that the person "M6M" advised Mr. Goodman 1 that file -- I don't know what that says -- that 2 3 file reviewed and also advise -- something about a BPO. 4 Is that "broker's price opinion"? 5 Yes. 6 A 7 And then, "Advised authorized third party Q to call back for follow-up"? 8 9 A That's correct. 10 MS. EBRON: Okay. MR. VILKIN: Very good. 11 12 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Off the record. (Discussion held off the record.) 13 BY MS. EBRON: 14 15 Do you know what -- in the next note it Q 16 says, "Working PROC Project." 17 Do you know what that is? 18 I do not. A Do you know what -- in the note for 19 Q 20 1/7/13, what "PAS-DB" means? It means that the vendor has completed the 21 Α 22 BPO for us as of 1/5/13, and the value was -- is listed there. 23 24 So a BPO completed on January 5th of Q 25 2013 valued the property at \$187,050?

```
1
          A
               Yes.
 2
               Do you know if there are any other
          Q.
 3
     valuations that were done on the property?
               MR. DELIKANAKIS: Objection:
 4
               MS. EBRON: Well, and if you want, I can
 5
     ask the other question first.
 6
 7
               MR. DELIKANAKIS: Yeah.
 8
     BY MS. EBRON:
               Does U.S. Bank allege that the price paid
 9
          Q
     at the association foreclosure was not commercially
10
11
     reasonable?
12
               MR. DELIKANAKIS: Objection: Form of the
     question; calls for a legal conclusion.
13
     BY MS. EBRON:
14
               I'm looking at Topic No. 19. Do you want
15
          Q
16
     to go back to the --
17
               Do you know if U.S. Bank is alleging the
18
     price paid by SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC, was
     inadequate?
19
20
               I believe that those arguments are made in
          A
     the complaint or in the pleadings.
21
22
               Are you aware of any other BPOs besides
          Q.
     the one referenced here on the page Bates Stamped
23
     USB000115?
24
25
                                 Objection:
               MR. DELIKANAKIS:
                                              Scope.
```

MS. EBRON: It's in Topic 19. 1 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Scope as to the form of 2 3 the question; in other words, what time frame are you speaking of? 4 5 There was not another valuation done after A January 7th, 2013, and before the foreclosure sale 6 on March 1st, 2013. 7 8 BY MS. EBRON: Were there any done before this BPO that 9 Q 10 was completed on January 5th, 2013? There would have been the originations 11 A 12 valuation, and as I sit here today, I do not know if there was an additional valuation done before 13 14 January 7th, 2013. 15 Do you know what the valuation was at Q 16 origination? 17 Α I would have to look at the -- it's part of the mortgage file, but I don't know sitting here 18 today. I'll just -- just to -- I will say that it 19 20 would have been more than \$331,500. 21 0 Thank you. 22 Back in Exhibit 28, looking at the page Bates Stamped USB000116, do you recognize this? 23 24 Again, this is a screen print from our A 25 loss mitigation process section of our servicing

```
platform on November 26, 2013.
 1
 2
               Is there any reference to associations on
          Q
 3
     this page?
 4
               There's not.
          Α
               In the first note -- well, the note dated
 5
     2/6/13, it says "working select short task in
 6
 7
     equator."
 8
               Do you know what that means?
               "Equator" is the means by which
 9
          A
     Wells Fargo communicates with outside real estate
10
     agents involved in short sales.
11
12
               What's a "select short sale task"?
          0
               I do not know.
13
          A
14
               And the next note says "working HAFA
          Q
     filter report."
15
16
               Do you know what that means?
               It's the government short sale program,
17
          Α
18
     HAFA.
               Do you know what "HAFA" -- "filter
19
          Q.
     complete bankruptcy denied HAFA" means?
20
21
          Α
               This loan was not approved for a HAFA.
22
               Does it mean that it was not approved
          Q.
     because there had been a bankruptcy?
23
               I don't know.
24
          A
25
               In the next note, on that same day,
          Q
```

February 5th, 2013, is this another PBO that was 1 different than the one we looked at on the previous 2 3 page? Α Yes. 4 Do you know why it jumped from 187.050 to 5 200,000 in a month? 6 7 I do not know. Α In your review of the records, did you see 8 Q the actual BPO or just reference in the notes? 9 I saw the BPO, but I didn't look through 10 A the BPO, aside from looking at what value was 11 12 assigned. (Deposition Exhibit 29 was marked for 13 identification.) 14 15 BY MS. EBRON: 16 Q Can you look at what has been marked as Exhibit 29, please. 17 18 (Complies.) Okay. A 19 Do you recognize this document? Q 20 I do. A 21 Q What is it? 22 It is a trustee's sale guarantee. A Is this something that you've seen in 23 Q U.S. Bank's business records? 24 For this particular loan, I do not recall 25 A

```
seeing TSG...
 1
 2
               I'll represent to you that this is a
          0
     document that I received pursuant to a subpoena to
 3
     National Default Servicing Corporation, so it wasn't
 4
     produced by your counsel.
 5
               I'm wondering -- we were talking about LPS
 6
     before and the interface that you have with the
 7
     trustees, including National Default Servicing.
 8
               Is a trustee's sale guarantee something
 9
     that the trustee would normally upload to the
10
11
     system?
12
               I have seen them in our imaging system
          A
     before.
13
14
          Q
               Does U.S. Bank dispute that it had actual
     notice of the association foreclosure before the
15
     date of the association foreclosure sale?
16
               MR. DELIKANAKIS: I'm going to make the
17
18
     same objection. It's asking for a legal conclusion.
19
               If you're asking factually if he's aware
     of any notice being received, that's why he's here
20
     is testify, as to the facts that you outlined in
21
22
     there.
23
               MS. EBRON:
                           That's what I asked.
24
                                 That isn't what you
               MR. DELIKANAKIS:
25
     asked.
```

1 BY MS. EBRON: 2 Do you dispute having notice of the sale 0 3 before the date of the association foreclosure sale? We received what's already an exhibit 4 Α here, so -- we received Exhibit 26 prior to the HOA 5 foreclosure sale, so that specific document was 6 received by Wells Fargo prior to the sale of the 7 property by the HOA. 8 What I'm asking is not that. 9 I'm asking if Wells Fargo knew, from 10 any -- from any document, phone call, any type of 11 12 notification, not just receipt of a notice from -directly from the association, did you know about 13 14 the association foreclosure sale before the date of the association foreclosure sale? 15 16 A No. 17 Q Did Wells Fargo know about the CC&Rs 18 before the date of the association foreclosure sale? 19 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Objection: Form of the 20 question. 21 Do you understand the question? 22 A The CC&Rs -- we were aware there were 23 CC&Rs related to the property upon origination of the loan. 24 25 BY MS. EBRON:

Was Wells Fargo -- or, sorry -- U.S. Bank 1 Q aware that the association had a lien against the 2 3 property before the date of the association foreclosure sale? 4 5 Α No. 6 Q Did U.S. Bank know that the homeowner was not paying association dues before the date of the 7 association foreclosure sale? 8 We received a letter indicating the 9 A 10 borrower was past due on their homeowners association dues prior to the sale. 11 Once that letter was received, did 12 Q. U.S. Bank take any action to either encourage the 13 14 borrower to pay association dues or to pay them 15 itself? The loan was -- at the time of receipt of 16 A 17 the letter indicating the borrower was behind on the 18 association dues, the borrower was in the process of Wells Fargo's own foreclosure process. So 19 20 Wells Fargo would have expected to pay any past-due 21 amount required through the proceeds of our 22 foreclosure sale. 23 How long was the borrower in default Q before the date of the association foreclosure sale? 24 25 I don't know exactly the level of default A

as of March 1st, 2013. 1 How long -- or when did the borrower --2 0 3 when was the borrower first put into the foreclosure process under the deed of trust? 4 Back in 2010. 5 Α So it was Wells Fargo's or U.S. Bank's 6 Q position that it would not pay and not encourage the 7 borrower to pay for those three years, or as the 8 association goes? 9 10 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Object to the form of the question. 11 12 Do you understand what she's asking? The -- Wells Fargo's process or practice 13 Α was to anticipate paying HOA delinquency issues out 14 of the proceeds of our foreclosure sale. 15 16 The -- between the borrower's initial entry into Wells Fargo's foreclosure process in 17 18 2010, there was a subsequent bankruptcy filing, and then there was also a loss mitigation process that 19 was ongoing with the borrower regarding her attempt 20 to short sell the property. 21 22 So that's what Wells Fargo was doing between first initiating foreclosure in 2010 and 23 24 when the HOA foreclosed on the property in March of 25 2013.

Did any of the documents that went back 1 0 and forth between U.S. Bank or Wells Fargo, as the 2 3 servicer, and the borrower during that loss mitigation process or short sale process include 4 references to the association? 5 I do not know if any of the loss 6 A mitigation documents specifically mention the HOA 7 delinquency. 8 Do any of them request information from 9 the borrower about delinquencies for the 10 association? 11 12 A request for mortgage assistance has a A section in it that asks for delinquencies/issues. 13 14 Q And did any of the information provided by 15 the borrower in those forms include information 16 about delinquencies to the association? 17 Α Not that I recall. 18 Was there documentation required for the Q. borrower's application for the HAFA we looked at 19 before in Exhibit No. -- what was that? -- 28? 20 21 There was a reference to a HAFA denial. Maybe I'm 22 saying that wrong. Yes, on the page Bates Stamped USB000116, Exhibit No. 28. 23 So what's your question? 24 I'm sorry. A 25 Did the documentation required for that Q

application of HAFA include anything about 1 2 homeowners associations? 3 A That would be included on the request for mortgage assistance, which would be part of a HAFA 4 review. 5 In your preparation for the deposition, 6 Q did you look for a trustee's sale guarantee? 7 I did. 8 Α And you didn't find one? 9 Q I did not. 10 Α Q When Wells Fargo originated this loan, did 11 12 it request or find out the amount of the association dues before funding the loan? 13 That information would have been provided 14 Α on the mortgage application by the borrower. 15 16 Q Is that a "yes"? 17 Α Yes. 18 So at that time, Wells Fargo would have Q. been aware of the amount of the association dues? 19 20 That would have been disclosed to A Wells Fargo as part of the borrower's application 21 22 for a mortgage. Is that a "yes"? 23 Q I believe so. 24 A 25 Did Wells Fargo create an escrow for taxes Q

and insurance for this property? 1 2 A I don't recall if the taxes and insurance 3 were impounded or not. 4 Were the homeowners association dues? 0 5 No. Α Do you know why not? 6 Q Not standard practice to impound those. 7 A Back in the loss mitigation efforts, was 8 Q there ever a requirement to get information directly 9 from the homeowners association about delinquencies, 10 like a certificate or anything like that? 11 12 At times, there's requirements that the A borrower provide proof of payment, canceled checks 13 14 and the like, to show that they've paid association dues. 15 16 What do you mean "at times"? Q 17 Α If they are past due and need to be brought current. 18 19 So if the dues are past due and need to be Q. 20 brought current, then the borrower would be required to provide proof that they paid? 21 22 In some cases, yes. A 23 What about in this case? Q 24 We did not ever receive that proof from A 25 the borrower.

Did you ever ask for that proof from the 1 Q 2 borrower? 3 Α Not that I can see. Did U.S. Bank ever communicate with the 4 Q association about this property? 5 6 A No. 7 Did U.S. Bank ever communicate with NAS Q about this property before the date of the 8 association foreclosure sale? 9 10 A No. Did U.S. Bank ever communicate with the 11 Q 12 borrower about association dues, besides the planned unit development rider that's included in the deed 13 of trust? 14 15 That wouldn't have been U.S. Bank; that would have been Wells Fargo. 16 So back to the original question. 17 18 Not --Α 19 Did U.S. Bank ever communicate with them? Q 20 Not that I saw. A Did Wells Fargo ever communicate with 21 0 22 U.S. Bank about the association lien or association foreclosure? 23 24 A No. 25 Are there any other entities besides Q

U.S. Bank that claim an interest in the first deed 1 of trust? 2 3 A No. Are there any other entities besides 4 Q U.S. Bank that claim an interest in the promissory 5 6 note? 7 No. A 8 Q Does Fannie Mae have an interest in this 9 loan? 10 A No. Does Freddie Mac have an interest in this 11 Q 12 loan? 13 A No. Is this loan FHA insured? 14 Q 15 A It is not. 16 Is there any references to SFR Investments Q Pool 1, LLC, in your file before the date of 17 litigation? 18 19 Before the date of the foreclosure sale or A 20 litigation? Before litigation. 21 0 22 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Scope. 23 Not that I can remember. A 24 BY MS. EBRON: 25 Q Did U.S. Bank make any payments to the

association on behalf of this property? 1 2 A No. 3 Q Did U.S. Bank attend or participate in the association foreclosure sale? 4 5 Α No. Did U.S. Bank participate in any civil or 6 Q administrative action challenging the association 7 lien or association foreclosure sale before the date 8 9 of the association foreclosure sale? 10 A No. Were there any internal communications 11 Q that mentioned the association's lien, what 12 13 association assessments, or association foreclosure 14 sale as it relates to the property before the date of the association foreclosure sale? 15 16 The one letter indicating the borrower was Α past due on their dues. 17 18 Has U.S. Bank ever communicated with the Q FHFA regarding this loan? 19 20 A No. 21 0 What is U.S. Bank's factual basis for its 22 allegation that the deed of trust was not extinguished by the association foreclosure sale? 23 24 That the first deed of trust was recorded Α 25 in first position at the time of origination and

```
remains there to date.
 1
               Anything else?
 2
          Q.
 3
          A
               No.
               MS. EBRON: Counsel, do you want to ask
 4
     questions?
 5
               MR. VILKIN: Are you done?
 6
 7
               MS. EBRON: I believe I am.
 8
               MR. VILKIN: Okay. So I have --
 9
               MS. EBRON:
                           I might have follow-ups.
10
               MR. VILKIN: Can we go off the record for
11
     a second?
12
               (Recess taken.)
13
               MR. DELIKANAKIS: This is
     John Delikanakis. We've had a conversation amongst
14
     counsel to continue this deposition, and what's been
15
16
     proposed and agreed upon by counsel is that we will
17
     look at two dates when the PMK deponent is supposed
18
     to be in Las Vegas, March 25th of 2016 and
     April 8th of 2016.
19
20
               I will check with the client and our
     scheduling and see if he's, in fact, available to
21
22
     take another -- what? -- two-and-a-half, two hours
     of deposition?
23
24
               Is that correct, Counsel?
25
               MR. VILKIN:
                            Yes.
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1 MR. DELIKANAKIS: About two hours of deposition so we can finish this PMK deposition. 2 3 I'll report back to counsel his availability and see if that works. 4 5 MR. VILKIN: And if it doesn't work, we discussed the possibility of finishing the depo by 6 telephone. 7 8 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Agreed. 9 MS. EBRON: Agreed. MR. WAITE: That's fine. 10 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 11 12 THE REPORTER: And for your copies, Counsel, do you prefer electronic or hard copy? 13 14 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Electronic. 15 THE REPORTER: Just electronic? 16 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Right now, electronic. THE REPORTER: And yours? 17 18 MR. VILKIN: Well, I hadn't ordered one 19 yet, but I will, yes. 20 THE REPORTER: Electronic? 21 MR. VILKIN: Thank you. Yes. 22 THE REPORTER: And yours? I don't think we're ordering 23 MR. WAITE: 24 one. 25 THE REPORTER: Okay.

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1
                             Actually, you know what?
               MR. VILKIN:
     I'll take a hard copy as well.
 2
                (Discussion held off the record.)
 3
               MR. DELIKANAKIS: Send me a hard copy as
 4
     well, E-Tran, disc.
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               THE REPORTER: Read and sign through your
 6
     office?
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               MR. DELIKANAKIS: Yes.
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               THE REPORTER:
                               Thank you.
               (Proceedings concluded at 5:13 p.m.)
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. 9	hereby cer	I, Robert Ferguson, Detify and declare under	
20		and foregoing transcr in said action; that	<del>-</del>
1		and do hereby affix m , under penalty of per	
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3		Robert Fergu	son, Deponent
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1	STATE OF NEVADA ) COUNTY OF CLARK )	
2	COUNTY OF CLARK )	
3	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER	
4	I, Andrea N. Martin, a duly commissioned and	
5	licensed court reporter, Clark County, State of	
6	Nevada, do hereby certify:	
7	That I reported the taking of the deposition of	
8	Robert Ferguson, commencing on Wednesday, February	
9	10, 2016, at the hour of 3:21 p.m.; that the witness	
10	was, by me, duly sworn to testify to the truth and	
11	that I thereafter transcribed my said shorthand	
12	notes into typewriting, and that the typewritten	
13	transcript of said deposition is a complete, true,	
14	and accurate transcription of said shorthand notes;	
15	that I am not a relative or employee of any of the	
16	parties involved in said action, nor a relative or	
17	employee of an attorney involved in nor a person	
18	financially interested in said action; further, that	
19	the reading and signing of the transcript was	
20	requested.	
21	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand	
22	in my office in the County of Clark, State of	
23	Nevada, this 19th day of February, 2016.	
24	nevada, this isth day of residually, 2010.  CORBET - LST  NEDEL N. MAREIN CRR CCR NO. 207	
25	ANDREA N. MARTIN, CRR, CCR NO. 887	

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DISTRICT COURT
                CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, a
Nevada limited liability company,
          Plaintiff,
                                     CASE NO: A-13-678814-C
                                    ) CONSOLIDATED WITH
     VS.
                                    ) CASE NO: A-13-688734-C
US BANK, N.A., a national banking
                                   ) DEPT NO:
                                                XXXI
association as Trustee for the
Certificate Holders of Wells Fargo )
Asset Securities Corporation,
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,)
Series 2006-AR4 and LUCIA PARKS,
an individual, DOES I through X,
and ROE CORPORATIONS I through X,
inclusive,
          Defendants.
SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, a
                                   ) DEPOSITION OF:
Nevada limited liability company,
                                  ) ROBERT FERGUSON
                                   ) PURSUANT TO NRCP 30(B)(6)
          Plaintiff,
                                    ) PERSON MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE
                                   ) U.S. BANK
                                     Volume II, Page 75 to 107
     VS.
US BANK, N.A., a national banking ) Taken at:
association as Trustee for the
                                   ) The Law Offices of
Certificate Holders of Wells Fargo ) Kim Gilbert Ebron
Asset Securities Corporation,
                                   ) Suite 110
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,) 7625 Dean Martin Drive
Series 2006-AR4; NV WEST SERVICING,) Las Vegas, Nevada 89139
LLC, a Nevada limited liability
company, as Trustee for NASHVILLE
                                     on Wednesday,
TRUST 2270; DOES I-X;
                                     March 23, 2016
and ROES 1-10, inclusive
                                      at 8:38 a.m.
          Defendants.
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NV WEST SERVICING, LLC, a Nevada )
limited company, as Trustee for )
NASHVILLE TRUST 2270, )
Cross-Claimant, )
vs. )
NATIONAL DEFAULT SERVICING )
CORPORATION, an Arizona )
Corporation; DOES XI through XX, )
inclusive, )

DEPOSITION OF ROBERT FERGUSON
PURSUANT TO NRCP 30(B)(6)
PERSON MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE
U.S. BANK
(Volume II, Pages 75 to 107)

Taken at The Law Offices of Kim Gilbert Ebron
7625 Dean Martin Drive
Suite 110
Las Vegas, Nevada

on Wednesday, March 23, 2016 8:38 a.m.

Job No. 21962
Depo International - Las Vegas
Reported by: Andrea Martin, CSR, RPR, NV CCR 887
Certified Realtime Reporter

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1	I N D E X	
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3	EXAMINATION:	PAGE
4	EXAMINATION BY MR. VILKIN EXAMINATION BY MR. WAITE	80 103
5	EXAMINATION DI MI. WATTE	105
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1		EXHIBITS		
2	MARKED	DESCRIPTION	PAGE	
3	EXHIBIT 30	First Amended Notice of Continued	81	
4		30(b)(6) Deposition of U.S. Bank		
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1	Las Vegas, Nevada; Wednesday, February 10, 2016	
2	8:38 a.m.	
3	-000-	
4	(In an off-the-record discussion held	
5	prior to the commencement of the	
6	proceedings, counsel agreed to waive the	
7	court reporter's requirements under Rule	
8	30(b)(4) of the Nevada Rules of Civil	
9	Procedure.)	
10	ROBERT FERGUSON,	
11	having been first duly sworn by the court reporter	
12	to testify to the truth, the whole truth, and	
13	nothing but the truth, was examined and testified	
14	under oath as follows:	
15	EXAMINATION	
16	BY MR. VILKIN:	
17	Q Can you state your name for the record.	
18	A Robert Ferguson, F-E-R-G-U-S-O-N.	
19	Q Mr. Ferguson, good morning.	
20	My name is Richard Vilkin, and I represent	
21	Third Party Defendant, Nevada Association Services,	
22	Inc., trustee for the homeowners association for	
23	closing on the property that's at issue in this	
24	case.	
25	We appreciate you being here today.	

MR. VILKIN: First, I'd like to get 1 straight how we're going to be handling the 2 3 exhibits, because we don't have the originals here. However, Ms. Ebron has made a full set of copies 4 that have been distributed to everyone. 5 And do we have agreement of all counsel 6 that when we refer to those exhibits, we are 7 referring to what is contained in the originals? 8 9 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Yes. 10 MS. EBRON: Yes. And that's Exhibits 1 through 29 from the deposition that we began on 11 12 February 10th, 2016, at 3 p.m. 13 MR. VILKIN: Thank you. 14 BY MR. VILKIN: And we're going to add one exhibit, which 15 Q will be Exhibit 30, which is the First Amended 16 Notice of Continued 30(b)(6) Deposition of U.S. Bank 17 18 prepared by Ms. Ebron's office and dated 19 March 18th, 2016. 20 (Deposition Exhibit 30 was marked for identification.) 21 22 BY MR. VILKIN: Mr. Ferguson, at the first session of your 23 Q deposition, you were allowed to review Exhibit 1, 24 25 which I'm going to give to you again. As I recall

your testimony, you stated you had reviewed that 1 document prior to the first session of your 2 3 deposition and that you were the person designated to testify to those topics; is that correct? 4 5 A That's correct. And I'll give you Exhibit 30, which I 6 Q believe contains the exact same topics. The only 7 change in that document is the date upon which the 8 second session of your deposition is occurring. 9 I just ask you again: Are you designated 10 to testify to the topics in Exhibit 30? 11 12 A Yes. 13 Okay. Thank you. Q Now, the transcript of your first -- the 14 first session of your deposition that was taken on 15 16 February 10th, 2016 has been prepared. Have you had a chance to review that yet? 17 18 Α I have. 19 Have you signed it or made any changes to 0 20 it? I haven't signed it, and I don't plan on 21 Α making any changes to the testimony. 22 So is it fair to say that after review of 23 Q the transcript, there's nothing in there that you 24 25 would change as of the beginning of this deposition

here today? 1 2 No, there's nothing I would change. Α 3 Q. Okay. Thank you. And at the beginning of the first session 4 of your deposition, Ms. Ebron went through a series 5 of explanations of how a deposition works and the 6 ground rules, and we generally call them 7 "admonitions." 8 9 Would you like me to repeat those, or can 10 you recall those from the first session of your deposition? 11 12 I can recall them from my first session. A 13 Okay. Thank you. Q 14 So let's get to some real questions. In the first session of your deposition, 15 16 you were referring to a loan servicing platform. I'd just like to get some more information on that 17 18 from you. 19 Is that a computer program that's 20 maintained to collect information about the 21 promissory note and deed of trust concerning the 22 property in this case? Yes, it contains information from the note 23 A 24 and the deed of trust. That's correct. And am I correct that the loan servicing 25 Q

platform is then used to record information 1 subsequent to the promissory note and deed of trust 2 3 concerning those documents or related to those documents? 4 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Objection to the form of 5 6 the question. 7 The servicing platform contains Α information related to the servicing of the note and 8 the deed of trust. 9 10 BY MR. VILKIN: And so, for example, if your company was 11 Q to receive information related to those -- related 12 to the servicing of those promissory notes and deeds 13 of trust, you would expect that information to be 14 recorded in one form or another in your loan 15 servicing platform? 16 17 Α Yes. 18 Let's just say, for example, you were to Q get a notice of foreclosure sale relative to the 19 20 property involved with that promissory note and deed of trust. 21 22 Does the loan servicing platform record the date that document was received by your company? 23 It would. 24 A 25 Does it also record separately the date Q

upon which that information was entered into the 1 loan servicing platform, if that makes sense to you? 2 3 I can explain a little more, if you'd like. Maybe is it -- rephrase it. 4 Α What I'm trying to find out: Does the 5 Q. loan servicing platform distinguish between the date 6 a document is physically received at your company, 7 as opposed to the date the information is entered 8 into the loan servicing platform? 9 If there's any variance in those dates, it 10 A 11 would be noted in the loan servicing platform. 12 Typically, when is it -- let's just say Q. you receive a notice of foreclosure sale. 13 14 Typically, how long should it take between when the document is physically received at your company when 15 16 the information is entered into the loan servicing platform? 17 18 Within a business day of receipt. A loan is able to be -- if the document is able to be 19 identified as belonging to a specific loan, that 20 21 information should be notated within a business day 22 of receipt on that loan. 23 And if there's some problem identifying Q which loan it is, it could take an unknown amount of 24

time, as long as it takes to figure out which loan

25

it pertains to? Is that what you're communicating? 1 2 A Yes. 3 Q Now, if someone were to request a copy of a document from your company and you were to --4 could you print it out from the loan servicing 5 platform? 6 7 A What would be housed in the loan servicing platform would be the notation of the receipt of the 8 document. The copy of the document would be housed 9 in a different system. 10 11 What system was that? Q 12 Our loan imaging system. A 13 Q And is there some sort of coding or 14 linkage between the loan servicing platform and the 15 imaging system to allow you to find something? 16 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Objection to the form of the question. 17 18 If you understand what he's asking. There's a common loan number associated A 19 with both systems, so the same loan number you would 20 21 use to look up the loan in our loan servicing 22 platform would be the same number you would use to look up the loan in the loan imaging system. 23 24 BY MR. VILKIN: 25 So if I wanted to find out the date upon Q

which a document was received, would you advise me 1 to ask for a printout of the information pertaining 2 to that document in the loan servicing platform or 3 the imaging platform or both? 4 The -- both. 5 A And what information -- let's just start 6 Q with the loan servicing platform. 7 Do I understand your prior testimony to 8 be -- correct me if I'm wrong -- that if a document 9 like a notice of sale was received and assuming it 10 could be immediately identified to match up with one 11 12 of your loan numbers, there would be some sort of documentation or notation in the loan servicing 13 platform indicating the date received of that 14 document? 15 16 A Yes. 17 Q And can you tell me how that -- what sort 18 of information would be in the loan servicing platform relative to that document? 19 A general description of what was 20 A received, and then there would be the date on which 21 22 the note was entered. 23 That would be on the loan servicing Okay. Q platform; right? 24 25 Correct. A

Is there any language that says when it 1 0 was received? 2 3 A There could be, if the rep notating receipt of the document took the time to further 4 detail their note. It would be up to the individual 5 user, as to what they input. 6 7 If there was some problem when a document Q. was received, in terms of identifying it or 8 connecting it to a loan number, would you expect 9 10 there to be a notation in the loan servicing platform to that effect? For example, you know, it 11 12 took us two weeks to figure this one out and 13 determine which loan number this is. 14 A I haven't seen a notation such as that, so I'm not sure if that would be typical. 15 16 What you normally see is identification of a document, the date that -- date and time stamp 17 18 when the entry was made, and then there will be a corresponding document in the imaging system, and 19 the imaging -- the image of that document would 20 21 contain more specifics, if there was a date stamp or 22 anything like that was placed on the document, you would see it in there. 23 24 When you say "if there was a date stamp," Q 25 are you talking about a date stamp applied to the

document when received by your company? 1 2 A Correct. 3 Is that a common practice of your company, Q to date stamp documents with a stamp the date they 4 5 are received? Yes, in most areas, that's common for a 6 A stamp to be placed on it or some other type of 7 notation that the bank has identified the loan. 8 Some departments use a stamp; some don't. 9 Some will write on the document; some don't. 10 If you could take a look at Exhibit 16. 11 Q 12 Did this document come from your imaging system? 13 I believe it did not come from our imaging A 14 system. 15 And why do you believe that? Q 16 I reviewed the documents in the imaging A system dated from origination to the date of the 17 foreclosure sale, and I did not see this document in 18 my review. 19 20 Did you see any reference to it in the Q. loan servicing platform? 21 22 I did not. A If you could go to Exhibit 18. Just tell 23 Q me when you've had a chance to review that. 24 25 A Okay.

Was this document in your imaging system? 1 Q 2 Not that I saw. A 3 Well, you looked at it. You looked at all Q the document in your imaging system relative to this 4 loan? 5 Right. And I'll just say it may 6 A Correct. be part of your imaging system now, but at the time 7 of the foreclosure sale to origination, it did not 8 exist in that population of documents. 9 And how do you know that? 10 Q 11 Because I reviewed all the documents in A 12 the imaging system and did not see this one. 13 That were received prior to March 1st of Q 14 2013? 15 Correct. A 16 Q Take a look, if you would, at Exhibit 19. Just tell me when you've had a chance to familiarize 17 18 yourself with that. Okay. 19 A 20 Was this document received and in your Q. imaging system prior to March 1st of 2013? 21 22 A It was not. 23 And how do you know that? Q 24 Because I reviewed all of the documents in A 25 the imaging system and did not see this document.

Did you see any reference to it in the 1 Q loan servicing platform? 2 3 A I did not. Just to go back for one second, did you 4 Q see any references in your loan servicing platform 5 to Exhibit 18? 6 7 No. A What company do you currently work for? 8 Q Wells Fargo Bank, NA. 9 A And you are -- what's your relationship to 10 Q Wells Fargo, in terms of this property or this loan? 11 12 I work for Wells Fargo. I'm not sure of A your question. 13 14 Typically, do you mean in relationship to U.S. Bank. 15 16 MR. VILKIN: To U.S. Bank. Sorry. Wells Fargo Bank is the servicer on behalf 17 A of U.S. Bank, as trustee for the pool of loans that 18 contain the Parks' loan. 19 20 BY MR. VILKIN: So the loan servicing platform is 21 0 22 maintained and controlled by Wells Fargo? 23 A That's correct. 24 Now, if you could look at Exhibit 17. Q Just tell me when you've had a chance to familiarize 25

yourself with that. 1 Okay. 2 A 3 Can you just describe in general terms Q. what was happening in this document. 4 This is a recorded document that is 5 Α assigning the mortgage, which has been introduced in 6 this -- in the prior exhibit as Exhibit 3, and it's 7 assigning the mortgage from Wells Fargo to U.S. Bank 8 National Association, and then there's the name of 9 the trust that follows. 10 And there's an address in that document 11 0 12 for Wells Fargo at One Home Campus, Des Moines, Iowa. Do you see that? 13 14 Α I do. And then there's another address for U.S. 15 Q 16 Bank, et al., at 60 Livingston Avenue in Saint Paul; 17 correct? 18 I see that. Α 19 Now, if some third party wanted to send a Q 20 notice concerning this mortgage after the date of this recording, on June 7th, 2012, which address 21 22 should it have sent it to? The address for -- that's listed in the 23 A Secretary of State website for Nevada, I believe, 24 gives Wells Fargo's proper service address. 25

Well, if a party sent the notice to 1 Q 60 Livingston Avenue, would it have ended up in your 2 servicing platform and imaging system -- or should 3 it have, I guess is the proper way to say it? 4 I'm unsure what U.S. Bank's processes were 5 Α for dealing with mail. 6 7 Q. Well, I believe in the first session of your deposition you testified there was some sort of 8 agreement associated with this assignment between 9 Wells Fargo and U.S. Bank; is that correct? 10 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Objection --11 12 BY MR. VILKIN: 13 Is there a separate agreement? Q 14 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Objection: Form of the question. 15 16 There is agreement governing Wells Fargo A role as servicer and U.S. Bank's role as trustee, 17 and it's the pooling and servicing agreement. 18 19 BY MR. VILKIN: To your recollection, does the pooling and 20 Q. servicing agreement put any obligations on behalf of 21 22 either party in terms of what to do with a document such as notices associated with the loan? 23 I haven't studied the servicing agreement 24 A related to that question. 25

So the answer would be, as you sit here 1 0 today, you don't know? 2 3 A That's correct. Why is it that, in answering my prior 4 0 question, you indicated that notices should be sent 5 after the recording of Exhibit 17 to Wells Fargo, as 6 opposed to U.S. Bank, since this -- since Exhibit 17 7 was an assignment from Wells Fargo to U.S. Bank? 8 9 A The assignment is a recorded document that's done in preparation of the bank's foreclosure 10 11 on the first deed of trust, and so before we can 12 foreclose in the proper name of the trust, we have to assign it from the servicer, who is Wells Fargo 13 14 in this case, and the originator of the loan to the 15 name of the trust so that we can foreclosure in the 16 proper name. 17 That's what I understand the reason is for 18 the assignment of mortgage. I don't think it has anything specific to do with how third parties would 19 20 serve Wells Fargo with legal documents, or the like, or provide notice to either entity listed on this 21 22 document. 23 Q Now, you're, I think, aware, as of today, at least, that there was foreclosure by the HOA on 24 25 an assessment lien on this property; correct?

1 Α That's correct. When you looked at your loan servicing 2 Q 3 platform, did you see any reference to any kind of delinquency or foreclosure by the HOA that was 4 entered into your system prior to March 1st of 5 2013, which I'll represent to you is the date of the 6 foreclosure sale by the HOA? 7 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Objection to the form of 8 the question. 9 10 A Not before the sale. I did see 11 information related to the HOA foreclosure sale in 12 our loan servicing platform and our image system on March 5th, so four days after the sale. 13 14 BY MR. VILKIN: 15 Let's start with the loan servicing Q 16 platform. What information did you see entered into 17 18 your loan servicing platform as of March 5th, 19 2013? 20 I saw a notation from our trustee -- I A 21 believe it was National Default -- indicating that they received a notice of foreclosure sale on this 22 23 property, and that was the extent of the note. 24 What form was that information? Q Was it an 25 Was it a document? A letter? e-mail?

It was a notation by -- I can't think of 1 A their name right now, but it was a notation by an 2 3 employee of the trustee --4  $\circ$ National Default --5 Yes. A -- communicating through a system called 6 7 "LPS," which links the trustee, National Default, to Wells Fargo servicing platform for purposes of 8 communicating. 9 What does "LPS" stand for, just for the 10 Q. record, if you know? 11 12 Α I don't know. 13 So I assume that that system, the LPS Q 14 system, allows, essentially, in a simplistic 15 description, electronic communications between entities? 16 17 Α Correct, between the trustee and 18 Wells Fargo. 19 Does that entry indicate on what date Q 20 National Default received the notice of the sale? No, just the note at which the person at 21 A 22 National Default entered it. As you recall, does the note say that they 23 Q found out that there was a sale or a notice of a 24 25 sale?

The note just says there was a document 1 A pertaining to a foreclosure on the property and that 2 3 they uploaded the same to our system, which I believe turned into an exhibit in our first session. 4 Would that be -- if you could take a look 5 Q at 18 and 19, is it one of those two? 6 7 It is not 18 or 19. Α Is it 16 --8 Q 9 I can find it. A 10 Q -- or 20? 11 A It is not 16. It is not 15. Let me 12 just -- do you want me to go through them and pull 13 out --14 Q Sure. 15 MS. EBRON: Are you looking for notes? 16 THE WITNESS: No. 17 MR. VILKIN: He's looking for the document 18 that was uploaded. 19 BY MR. VILKIN: 20 Correct, Mr. Ferguson --Q. 21 Α Yes. 22 -- the document uploaded to your system on Q. March 5th, 2013; correct? 23 24 That's correct. A 25 So your answer is the document that was Q

uploaded to your system is a document previously 1 marked as Exhibit 27 to your deposition? 2 3 A That's correct. And so if I understand what you're saying, 4 0 what you're testifying to, when you looked through 5 your imaging system, you saw Exhibit 27; correct? 6 7 Α I did. Was it date stamped in any way by your 8 Q company? 9 10 A No. It appears as it does on this exhibit. 11 12 Q. And is that because it was received through LPS, as opposed to mailed or delivered to 13 your job physically? 14 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Objection to the form of 15 the question. 16 17 A I do not know. 18 BY MR. VILKIN: Well, that actually raises another 19 Q 20 question. We were talking before about your loan 21 22 servicing platform and what would happen to documents that were mailed to your company. 23 If something was sent electronically, 24 25 would you also expect it to be "Received" stamped by

your company? 1 If it's sent electronically directly to 2 A 3 Wells Fargo, there would be -- well, if it was faxed, there would be a system-generated date 4 stamped. 5 If it was sent electronically via e-mail, 6 there would be the associated e-mail, which would, 7 again, be date stamped. 8 Okay. Well, in the case of Exhibit 27, 9 Q 10 which you have indicated that you saw in your imaging system, is there any information that you 11 12 saw in either your loan servicing platform or 13 imaging system that indicated when this document was received by Wells Fargo? 14 15 It was received by Wells Fargo on the A 16 5th of March. 17 Q And again, if you would -- I'm sorry if 18 I'm repeating it, but how do you know that? It appears on our imaging system on that 19 A date, and there's a corresponding note in our system 20 21 that was entered by National Default as a communication to Wells Fargo referencing the same 22 document. 23 And just to finish up -- and if I'm 24 Q 25 repeating, I apologize, but as I understand it now,

based on your testimony, your system does not have 1 any information to indicate when National Default 2 received Exhibit 27; is that correct? 3 4 Α That's correct. Now, when you were reviewing your 5 Q. system -- and if I've asked this previously, I 6 apologize, but I think my understanding is -- if you 7 can just confirm it -- you didn't see any reference 8 that you ever received Exhibits 16, 18, 19, and 9 20 -- or, excuse me, 16, 18, and 19 prior to 10 11 March 1st of 2013; correct? 12 A That is correct. But is it true that you did receive those 13 Q sometime after March 1st, 2013, or any of those? 14 15 A I believe all of these recorded documents 16 were pulled from the Clark County Recorders Office sometime after March 2013, in preparation for 17 18 this -- or in the efforts regarding this particular 19 lawsuit. 20 So do I understand you to be saying that Q you believe these documents, 16, 18, and 19, were 21 first received by Wells Fargo sometime after the 22 23 commencement of the current lawsuit? That's correct. 24 A And did you see any information in the 25 Q

either the loan servicing platform or the imaging 1 system that had dates associated with 16, 18, or 19, 2 3 as to when there were first received? I did not. 4 Α Are you saying it doesn't exist or you 5 just don't remember seeing it? 6 7 It doesn't exist between the date of the Α HOA foreclosure sale and the origination of the 8 mortgage. 9 10 Q So that's up to and including March 1st, 2013; correct? 11 12 Well, and I obviously looked in our system A a view days after the sale, because that's when I 13 14 found what we've referred to as Exhibit 27 in the corresponding note, which was on March 5th. 15 16 But what about the time period between Q 17 March 5th -- let's just use that date -- 2013, if 18 that's the date you looked at it, which I believe is 19 correct, and the date this lawsuit was filed? 20 I wouldn't have looked at documents in our A 21 system between those dates. 22 So they could be reflected at some point Q. in there; you just didn't look at them in 23 preparation for this deposition; is that correct? 24

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A


That's correct.

Since the first session of your deposition 1 0 on February 10th, 2016, did you review any 2 3 additional documents --Α The. 4 -- other than the transcript from 5 Q February 10th? 6 The transcript and I re-reviewed servicing 7 Α notes in -- that were between originations and the 8 foreclosure sale date, but no new documents besides 9 the transcript. 10 Just one more topic. Almost done. 11 Q 12 In reviewing the loan servicing platform, did you see any references to a bankruptcy case? 13 14 Α I did. 15 Can you just tell us what you recall Q 16 seeing in the notes on the loan servicing platform relative to a bankruptcy case? 17 18 The borrower filed, I believe, a A Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and it stuck out because 19 usually it's a 7 or 13; and the bank finally was 20 granted relief from stay in December of '12 from 21 22 that bankruptcy. Is that all you can recall at this 23 Q 24 point --Yes. 25 A

-- today? 1 Q 2 MR. VILKIN: I don't have anything further. 3 Thank you. 4 EXAMINATION 5 BY MR. WAITE: I just have one question. 6 Q 7 It's the LPS system? 8 Yes. A 9 Who has access to that? Meaning who can Q 10 input into that system, and do they -- go ahead. The trustee and Wells Fargo. 11 Α 12 Do people have to have a -- do those Q people have to have a log-in? 13 14 Α Yes. 15 And is that somehow noted in the system, Q 16 that this person is the person associated with this 17 note? 18 A In the LPS system, yes. 19 In the mortgage servicing platform, 20 Wells Fargo system, the note comes over as a generic 21 LPS note. 22 Is there anyone else that has access to Q. that system and input? 23 24 Just team members at Wells Fargo that are A 25 associated with default servicing, and then specific

```
trustees that Wells Fargo has engaged to perform
 1
     nonjudicial foreclosures on behalf of the bank.
 2
 3
          Q
               Once something's input into that system,
     is that permanent or can it be deleted?
 4
               It's permanent.
 5
          A
               And so there's no way to get rid of it?
 6
          Q
 7
               That's correct.
          A
 8
               MR. WAITE:
                            That's all I have.
 9
               MS. EBRON: Off the record for a second.
               (Pause in proceedings.)
10
11
               MS. EBRON:
                            That's it.
12
               MR. DELIKANAKIS: Thank you.
               MR. VILKIN: All right. Thank you.
13
               THE REPORTER: All instructions same as
14
     last time?
15
16
               MR. VILKIN:
                            Yes.
17
               MR. DELIKANAKIS: Yes.
18
               THE REPORTER:
                              Thank you.
19
               (Proceedings concluded at 9:14 a.m..)
20
                              -000-
21
22
23
24
25
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1
     STATE OF NEVADA
     COUNTY OF CLARK )
 2
 3
                    CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
          I, Andrea N. Martin, a duly commissioned and
 4
     licensed court reporter, Clark County, State of
 5
    Nevada, do hereby certify:
 6
7
          That I reported the taking of Volume II of the
     deposition of Robert Ferguson, commencing on
 8
     Wednesday, March 23, 2016, at the hour of 8:38 a.m.;
 9
    that the witness was, by me, duly sworn to testify
10
11
     to the truth and that I thereafter transcribed my
     said shorthand notes into typewriting, and that the
12
    typewritten transcript of said deposition is a
13
14
     complete, true, and accurate transcription of said
     shorthand notes; that I am not a relative or
15
16
     employee of any of the parties involved in said
     action, nor a relative or employee of an attorney
17
     involved in nor a person financially interested in
18
     said action; further, that the reading and signing
19
20
     of the transcript was requested.
21
          IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
22
     in my office in the County of Clark, State of
    Nevada, this 1st day of April, 2016.
23
24
25
                       ANDREA N. MARTIN, CRR, CCR NO. 887
```

1	STATE OF NEVADA )
2	COUNTY OF CLARK )
3	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
4	I, Andrea N. Martin, a duly commissioned and
5	licensed court reporter, Clark County, State of
6	Nevada, do hereby certify:
7	That I reported the taking of Volume II of the
8	deposition of Robert Ferguson, commencing on
9	Wednesday, March 23, 2016, at the hour of 8:38 a.m.;
10	that the witness was, by me, duly sworn to testify
11	to the truth and that I thereafter transcribed my
12	said shorthand notes into typewriting, and that the
13	typewritten transcript of said deposition is a
14	complete, true, and accurate transcription of said
15	shorthand notes; that I am not a relative or
16	employee of any of the parties involved in said
17	action, nor a relative or employee of an attorney
18	involved in nor a person financially interested in
19	said action; further, that the reading and signing
20	of the transcript was requested.
21	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
22	in my office in the County of Clark, State of
23	Nevada, this 1st day of April, 2016.
24	Indread Martin
25	ANDREA N. MARTIN, CRR, CCR NO. 887

## **TAB 26**

Electronically Filed 05/05/2017 12:30:27 PM

Hun J. Colum 1 **||JOIN** MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ. 2 | Nevada Bar No.: 1641 **CLERK OF THE COURT** mbohn@bohnlawfirm.com 3 ADAM R. TRIPPIEDI, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 12294 4 atrippiedi@bohnlawfirm.com LAW OFFICES OF 5 MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ., LTD. 376 East Warm Springs Road, Ste. 140 6 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 (702) 642-3113/ (702) 642-9766 FAX Attorney for defendant, NV WEST SERVICING, LLC a Nevada limited liability company, as trustee for NASHVILLE TRUST 2270 DISTRICT COURT 10 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 11 12 SFR INVESTMENTS POOL; 1, LLC a Nevada 13 limited liability company, CASE NO.: A-13-678814-C Consolidated with 14 Plaintiff, CASE NO.: A-13-688734-C 15 DEPT NO.: XXXI VS. 16 US BANK, N.A., a national banking association as Trustee for the Certificate Holder 17 of Wells Fargo Asset Securities Corporation, Mortgaged Pass-Through Certificates, Series 18 2006-AR4, a Nevada non-profit corporation NV WEST SERVICING, LLC'S JOINDER and LUCIÁ PARKS, an individual, DOES I 19 TO U.S. BANK'S OPPOSITION TO SFR through X; and ROE CORPORATIONS I **INVESTMENT POOL 1, LLC'S MOTION** through X, inclusive, 20 **FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT** Defendant. 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

1	SFR INVESTMENTS POOL; 1, LLC a Nevada	
2	limited liability company,	
3	Plaintiff	
4	VS	
5	Ill association as Trustee for the Certificate Holder I	
6	of Wells Fargo Asset Securities Corporation, Mortgaged Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR4; NV WEST SERVICING, LLC a Nevada limited liability company, as trustee for NASHVILLE TRUST 2270; DOES I-X; and	
7	2006-AR4; NV WEST SERVICING, LLC a Nevada limited liability company, as trustee for	
8	NASHVILLE TRUST 2270; DOÉS I-X; and ROES I-10, inclusive,	
9	Defendants	
10	NV WEST SERVICING, LLC a Nevada	
11	limited liability company, as trustee for NASHVILLE TRUST 2270	
12	Crossclaimant	
13	VS	
14 15	NATIONAL DEFAULT SERVICING	
16	XI through XX,	
17	Third Party Defendant.	
18		
19		d liability company, as trustee for NASHVILLE
20	TRUST 2270, by and through it's attorney Michael F.	Bohn, Esq. hereby joins U.S. Bank's opposition
21	to SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC's Motion for Summar	
22		
23		FICES OF
24	1	L F. BOHN, ESQ., LTD.
25		
26	$y \cdot \frac{75}{111}$	chael F. Bohn
27		IAEL F. BOHN, ESQ. ast Warm Springs Road, Suite 140
28	Las V	egas, Nevada 89119 neys for Nashville Trust 2270
	2	

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** 

Pursuant to NRCP 5, NEFCR 9 and EDCR 8.05, I hereby certify that I am an employee of Law Offices of Michael F. Bohn., Esq., and on the 5th day of May 2017, an electronic copy of the NV WEST SERVICING, LLC'S JOINDER TO U.S. BANK'S OPPOSITION TO SFR INVESTMENT POOL 1, LLC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served on opposing counsel via the Court's electronic service system to the following counsel of record:

lverson Taylor Hortensen & Sande Name	Email	Selec
Adam Knecht	aknecht@alversontaylor.com	
Kurt R. Bonds	efile@alversontaylor.com	
Kurt R. Bonds	kbonds@alversontaylor.com	D W
Trevor R. Waite	twaite@aiversontaylor.com	P 👸
im Gilbert Ebron		
Hame	Email	Selec
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E-Service for Kim Gilbert Ebron	eservice:@kaelegal.com	
Michael L. Sturm	<u>mike:@kaeleaal.com</u>	
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aw Offices of Richard Vilkin, P.C.		
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A.S		
Name	Email	Selec
Brandon E. Wood	<u>brandon@nas-inc.com</u>	<b>9</b>
Susan E. Moses	susanm@nas-inc.com	
nell & Wilmer L.L.P.		
Name	Email	Selec M
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Daniel Ivie	<u>divie @swław.com</u>	
Docket	<u>Dacket LAS@swiaw.com</u>	
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John Delikanakis	<u>idelikanakis @swław.com</u>	
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Richard C. Gordon	rgordon@swiaw.com	
Robin Perkins	rperkins@swiaw.com	

/s//Marc Sameroff/ An Employee of the LAW OFFICES OF MICHÂEL F. BOHN, ESQ., LTD.

## **TAB 27**

Alm J. Colum 1 **||JOIN** MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ. 2 | Nevada Bar No.: 1641 **CLERK OF THE COURT** mbohn@bohnlawfirm.com 3 ADAM R. TRIPPIEDI, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 12294 4 atrippiedi@bohnlawfirm.com LAW OFFICES OF 5 MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ., LTD. 376 East Warm Springs Road, Ste. 140 6 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 (702) 642-3113/ (702) 642-9766 FAX Attorney for defendant, NV WEST SERVICING, LLC a Nevada limited liability company, as trustee for NASHVILLE TRUST 2270 DISTRICT COURT 10 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 11 12 SFR INVESTMENTS POOL; 1, LLC a Nevada 13 limited liability company, CASE NO.: A-13-678814-C Consolidated with 14 Plaintiff, A-13-688734-C CASE NO.: 15 DEPT NO.: XXXI VS. 16 US BANK, N.A., a national banking association as Trustee for the Certificate Holder 17 of Wells Fargo Asset Securities Corporation, Mortgaged Pass-Through Certificates, Series 18 2006-AR4, a Nevada non-profit corporation and LUCIÁ PARKS, an individual, DOES I NV WEST SERVICING, LLC'S JOINDER 19 TO U.S. BANK'S OPPOSITION TO through X; and ROE CORPORATIONS I **COPPER RIDGE COMMUNITY** through X, inclusive, 20 **ASSOCIATION'S RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT** Defendant. 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

1 2	SFR INVESTMENTS POOL; 1, LLC a Nevada limited liability company,	
3	Disintiff	
4	4 VS	
5	U.S. BANK, N.A., a national banking association as Trustee for the Certificate Holder	
6	of Wells Fargo Asset Securities Corporation,	
7	Mortgaged Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR4; NV WEST SERVICING, LLC a Nevada limited liability company, as trustee for	
8		
9	9 Defendants	
10	NV WEST SERVICING, LLC a Nevada	
11	limited liability company, as trustee for NASHVILLE TRUST 2270	
12	Crossclaimant	
13	VS	
14 15	NATIONAL DEFAULT SERVICING	
16	XI through XX,	
17	Third Party Defendant.	
18	.8	
19	NV WEST SERVICING, LLC a Nevada limited liabi	lity company, as trustee for NASHVILLE
20	TRUST 2270, by and through it's attorney Michael F. Bohn,	Esq. hereby joins U.S. Bank's opposition
21	to Copper Ridge Community Association's Renewed Motion	for Summary Judgment filed on February
22	8, 2017.	
23	DATED this 5th day of May 2017.	
24	LAW OFFICES	
25		OHN, ESQ., LTD.
26	By: <u>/s/ Michael</u>	
27 28	376 Fact We	F. BOHN, ESQ. arm Springs Road, Suite 140
20	Las vegas, I	Nevada 89119 r Nashville Trust 2270
	2	

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

Pursuant to NRCP 5, NEFCR 9 and EDCR 8.05, I hereby certify that I am an employee of Law Offices of Michael F. Bohn., Esq., and on the 5th day of May 2017, an electronic copy of the NV WEST SERVICING, LLC'S JOINDER TO U.S. BANK'S OPPOSITION TO COPPER RIDGE COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION'S RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was

served on opposing counsel via the Court's electronic service system to the following counsel of record:

dverson Taylor Mortensen & Sand Name	ers Email	Select
Adam Knedit	aknedit@alversontaylor.com	oeneck □ ()
Kurt R. Bonds	efile@alversontaylor.com	
Kurt R. Bonds	kbonds@alversontaylor.com	
Trevor R. Weste	twaite@alversontaylor.com	
THE VOLUME TO THE VALUE OF THE	tores to 19 cary of 300 (100 ) cons	3.2.3
lim Gilbert Ebron		
Name	Email	Select
Diana Cline Ebron	<u>diana:@kgelegal.com</u>	
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Michael L. Sturm	mike@kaeleaal.com	
Tomas Valerio	staff@kgelegal.com	
aw Offices of Richard Vilkin, P.C.		
Name	Emaîl	Seleci
Richard Vilkin	<u>richard.⊈vilkinlaw.com</u>	
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Brandon E. Wood	<u>brandon@nas⊣inc.com</u>	
Susan E. Moses	<u>susanni ©nas-inc.com</u>	
inell & Wilmer L.L.P.		
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Robin Perkins	nperkins@swiaw.com	<b>S</b>

## **TAB 28**

Electronically Filed 05/05/2017 12:32:58 PM

Hun J. Colum 1 **JMSJ** MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ. 2 | Nevada Bar No.: 1641 **CLERK OF THE COURT** mbohn@bohnlawfirm.com 3 ADAM R. TRIPPIEDI, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 12294 4 atrippiedi@bohnlawfirm.com LAW OFFICES OF 5 MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ., LTD. 376 East Warm Springs Road, Ste. 140 6 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 (702) 642-3113/ (702) 642-9766 FAX Attorney for defendant, NV WEST SERVICING, LLC a Nevada limited liability company, as trustee for NASHVILLE TRUST 2270 DISTRICT COURT 10 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 11 12 SFR INVESTMENTS POOL; 1, LLC a Nevada 13 limited liability company, CASE NO.: A-13-678814-C Consolidated with 14 Plaintiff, CASE NO.: A-13-688734-C 15 DEPT NO.: XXXI VS. 16 US BANK, N.A., a national banking association as Trustee for the Certificate Holder 17 of Wells Fargo Asset Securities Corporation, Mortgaged Pass-Through Certificates, Series 18 2006-AR4, a Nevada non-profit corporation and LUCIÁ PARKS, an individual, DOES I NV WEST SERVICING, LLC'S JOINDER 19 TO U.S. BANK'S RENEWED MOTION through X; and ROE CORPORATIONS I **FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT** through X, inclusive, 20 Defendant. 21 22 23 24 25 26

27

28

1	SFR INVESTMENTS POOL; 1, LLC a Nevada	
2	limited liability company,	
3	Plaintiff	
4	VS	
5	U.S. BANK, N.A., a national banking association as Trustee for the Certificate Holder	
6	of Wells Fargo Asset Securities Corporation, Mortgaged Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR4; NV WEST SERVICING, LLC a Nevada limited liability company, as trustee for NASHVILLE TRUST 2270; DOES I-X; and	
7	2006-AR4; NV WEST SERVICING, LLC a Nevada limited liability company, as trustee for	
8	NASHVILLE TRUST 2270; DOES I-X; and ROES I-10, inclusive,	
9	Defendants	
10		-
11	NV WEST SERVICING, LLC a Nevada limited liability company, as trustee for NASHVILLE TRUST 2270	
12	Crossclaimant	
13	VS	
14	NATIONAL DEFAULT SERVICING	
15	CORPORATION an Arizona Corporation; does XI through XX,	
16	Third Party Defendant.	
17		J
18		·, 11·1·1·1·
19	NV WEST SERVICING, LLC a Nevada lii	
20	TRUST 2270, by and through it's attorney Micha	-
21	Motion for Summary Judgment filed on January 24	4, 2017.
22	DATED this 5th day of May 2017.	
23		OFFICES OF HAEL F. BOHN, ESQ., LTD
24 25	WITCI	TALLI. DOIIIN, LOQ., LIL
	By: <u>/</u> s	s/ Michael F. Bohn
26 27	3′	IICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ. 76 East Warm Springs Road
28		as Vegas, Nevada 89119 ttorneys for Nashville Trust
28		•
		2

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

Pursuant to NRCP 5, NEFCR 9 and EDCR 8.05, I hereby certify that I am an employee of Law Offices of Michael F. Bohn., Esq., and on the 5th day of May 2017, an electronic copy of the **NV WEST SERVICING, LLC'S JOINDER TO U.S. BANK'S RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT** was served on opposing counsel via the Court's electronic service system to the following counsel of record:

Name	Email	Sele
Adam Knedht	aknecht@alversontaylor.com	
Kurt R. Bonds	efile@alversontaylor.com	
Kurt R. Bonds	kbonds@alversontaylor.com	
Trevor R. Waite	<u>twaite@alversontaylor.com</u>	S (§
Gilbert Ebron		
Name	Email	Sele
Diana Cline Ebron	<u>diana:@koelegal.com</u>	
E-Service for Kim Gilbert Ebron	eservice:@kgelegal.com	
Michael L. Sturm	mike@kaelegal.com	
Tomas Valerio	staff@kgelegal.com	<b>\( \)</b>
Offices of Richard Vilkin, P.C.		
Name	Email	Sele
Richard Vilkin	richard@vilkinlaw.com	
Name	Email	Sele ☑
Brandon E. Wood	<u>brandon@nas⊣nc.com</u>	<u></u>
Susan E. Moses	<u>susanm @nas-inc.com</u>	<b>Y</b> 8
ll & Wilmer L.L.P.		
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Candy Charlet - Legal Secretary	ccharlet@swiaw.com	33
Daniel Ivie	<u>divie@swław.com</u>	
Docket	<u>Docket LAS@swlaw.com</u>	
Gaylene Kim	gkim@swlaw.com	
John Delikanakis	<u>idelikanakis@swlaw.com</u>	
Lyndsey Luxford	lluxford@swlaw.com	
Marioris Williams	mawilians@swlaw.com	
Richard C. Gordon	rgordon@swław.com	
A MARCA ARABA KAN MAKA MAKASI BARKASI K		

/s//Marc Sameroff/ An Employee of the LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ., LTD.

## **TAB 29**

## ELECTRONICALLY SERVED 5/19/2017 5:41 PM

1	NOTC	
2	DIANA CLINE EBRON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 10580	
3	E-mail: diana@KGElegal.com	
	JACQUELINE A. GILBERT, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 10593	
4	E-mail: jackie@KGElegal.com KAREN L. HANKS, ESQ.	
5	Nevada Bar No. 9578	
6	E-mail: karen@KGElegal.com KIM GILBERT EBRON	
7	7625 Dean Martin Drive, Suite 110 Las Vegas, Nevada 89139	
8	Telephone: (702) 485-3300	
	Facsimile: (702) 485-3301 Attorneys for SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC	
9	DISTRIC	CT COURT
10		NTY, NEVADA
11		, ,
12	SFR INVESTMENTS POOL1, LLC a Nevada limited liability company,	Case No. A-13-678814-C Consolidated with
13	Plaintiff,	Case No. A-13-688734-C
14	VS.	Dept. No. XXXI
	US BANK, N.A., a national banking	_
15	association as Trustee for the Certificate Holders of Wells Fargo Asset Securities	NOTICE OF BANKRUPTCY ORDER GRANTING RETROACTIVE
16	Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through	ANNULMENT OF THE AUTOMATION STAY
17	Certificates, Series 2006-AR4 and LUCIA PARKS, an individual, DOES I through X;	
18	and ROE CORPORATIONS I through X, inclusive,	
19	Defendants.	
	SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company,	
20	Plaintiff,	
21	vs.	
22	U.S. BANK, N.A., a national banking	
23	association, as Trustee for the Certificate Holders of Wells Fargo Asset Securities	
24	Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR4; NV WEST	
25	SERVICING, LLC, a Nevada limited liability	
	company, as Trustee for NASHVILLE TRUST 2270; DOES I-X; and ROES 1-10, inclusive,	
26	Defendants.	
27	NV WEST SERVICING, LLC, a Nevada	
28	limited liability company, as Trustee for	

# KIM GILBERT EBRON 7625 DEAN MARTIN DRIVE, SUITE 110 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89139

(702) 485-3300 FAX (702) 485-3301

Cross-Claimant,
vs.

NATIONAL DEFAULT SERVICING
CORPORATION, an Arizona Corporation;
DOES XI through XX,
Third Party Defendant.

SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC ("SFR") hereby files its NOTICE OF BANKRUPTCY ORDER GRANTING RETROACTIVE ANNULMENT OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY. As promised in SFR's Motion for Summary Judgment and during the Status Check of April 21, 2017, SFR hereby provides the written order regarding the retroactive annulment of the bankruptcy of Lucia Parks. This order is hereby attached as Exhibit 1.

DATED this 19th day of May 2017.

#### KIM GILBERT EBRON

/s/ Jaqueline A. Gilbert, Esq.
DIANA CLINE EBRON, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 10580
E-mail: diana@KGElegal.com
JACQUELINE A. GILBERT, ESQ.
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E-mail: karen@KGElegal.com

# 7625 DEAN MARTIN DRIVE, SUITE 110 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89139

(702) 485-3300 FAX (702) 485-3301

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** 

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 19th day of May 2017, pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I served via the Eighth Judicial District Court electronic filing system the foregoing NOTICE OF

BANKRUPTCY ORDER GRANTING RETROACTIVE ANNULMENT OF THE

**AUTOMATIC STAY**, to the following parties.

Adam Knecht	aknecht@alversontaylor.com
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Candy Charlet - Legal Secretary	ccharlet@swlaw.com
Daniel Ivie .	divie@swlaw.com
Diana Cline Ebron .	diana@kgelegal.com
Docket .	Docket_LAS@swlaw.com
Eserve Contact .	office@bohnlawfirm.com
E-Service for Kim Gilbert Ebron .	eservice@kgelegal.com
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Susan E. Moses	susanm@nas-inc.com
Tomas Valerio .	staff@kgelegal.com
Trevor R. Waite	twaite@alversontaylor.com

/s/ Zachary Clayton

An employee of Kim Gilbert Ebron

- 3 -

# EXHIBIT 1

Attorney or Party Name, Address, Telephone & FAX Nos., State Bar No. & Email Address David I. Brownstein (SBN 195393) Law Office of David I. Brownstein PO Box 16474 Irvine, CA 92623 (949) 486-4404 p (949) 861-6045 f david@brownsteinfirm.com	FILED & ENTERED  MAY 15 2017  CLERK U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT Central District of California BY steinber DEPUTY CLERK
<ul><li></li></ul>	
	ANKRUPTCY COURT FORNIA – <u>Santa ana</u> division
In re: RICHARD PARKS, and	CASE NO.: 8:10-bk-21738-TA CHAPTER: 11
LUCY PARKS,	ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 362 (REAL PROPERTY)
Debtor(s).	DATE: 3/28/2017 TIME: 10:30 am COURTROOM: 5B PLACE: Ronald Reagan Federal Building 411 W. Fourth Street, 5 <sup>th</sup> FI. Santa Ana, CA 92701
Movant: SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC	
1. The Motion was: ⊠ Opposed ☐ Unopposed	Settled by stipulation
2. The Motion affects the following real property (Property):	
Street address: 2270 Nashville Ave Unit/suite number: City, state, zip code: Henderson, NV 89052	
Legal description or document recording number (includ LOT FIVE (5) IN BLOCK FIVE (5) OF FINAL MAP OF PARCEL 40 THEREOF ON FILE IN BOOK 71 OF PLATS, PAGE 68, IN THE ONEVADA AND AS AMENDED BY THAT CERTAIN CERTIFICATE INSTRUMENT/FILE NO. 959 IN BOOK 961218 AND AS SHOWN THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER OF CLARK COUNT See attached page.	, A COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITY, AS SHOWN BY MAP FFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER OF CLARK COUNTY, OF AMENDMENT RECORDED DECEMBER 18, 1996 AS BY MAP THEREOF ON FILE IN BOOK 77 OF PLATS, PAGE 57, IN

This form is mandatory. It has been approved for use by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California.

Case 8:10-bk-21738-TA Doc 303 Filed 05/15/17 Entered 05/15/17 16:23:05 Desc Main Document Page 2 of 3 The Motion is granted under: a. X 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) b. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) c. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4). The filing of the bankruptcy petition was part of a scheme to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors that involved: (1) The transfer of all or part ownership of, or other interest in, the Property without the consent of the secured creditor or court approval; and/or (2) Multiple bankruptcy cases affecting the Property. (3) The court makes does not make cannot make a finding that the Debtor was involved in this scheme. (4) If recorded in compliance with applicable state laws governing notices of interests or liens in real property, this order shall be binding in any other case under this title purporting to affect the Property filed not later than 2 years after the date of the entry of this order by the court, except that a debtor in a subsequent case under this title may move for relief from this order based upon changed circumstances or for good cause shown, after notice and a hearing. Any federal, state or local government unit that accepts notices of interests or liens in real property shall accept any certified copy of this order for indexing and recording. As to Movant, its successors, transferees and assigns, the stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) is: a. X Terminated as to the Debtor and the Debtor's bankruptcy estate. ☐ Modified or conditioned as set forth in Exhibit \_\_\_\_\_ to this order. Annulled retroactively to the bankruptcy petition date. Any postpetition acts taken by Movant to enforce its remedies regarding the Property do not constitute a violation of the stay. Movant may enforce its remedies to foreclose upon and obtain possession of the Property in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law, but may not pursue any deficiency claim against the Debtor or property of the estate except by filing a proof of claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 501. Movant must not conduct a foreclosure sale of the Property before (*date*) contained within this order.

The stay shall remain in effect subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the Adequate Protection Agreement In chapter 13 cases, the trustee must not make any further payments on account of Movant's secured claim after entry of this order. The secured portion of Movant's claim is deemed withdrawn upon entry of this order without prejudice to Movant's right to file an amended unsecured claim for any deficiency. Absent a stipulation or order to the contrary, Movant must return to the trustee any payments received from the trustee on account of Movant's secured claim after entry of this order.

The co-debtor stay of 11 U.S.C. § 1201(a) or § 1301(a) is terminated, modified or annulled as to the co-debtor, as to the same terms and conditions as to the Debtor.

10. ☐ The 14-day stay as provided in FRBP 4001(a)(3) is waived.

6.

11. This order is binding and effective despite any conversion of this bankruptcy case to a case under any other chapter of the Bankruptcy Code.

12. Movant, or its agents, may, at its option, offer, provide and enter into a potential forbearance agreement, loan modification, refinance agreement or other loan workout or loss mitigation agreement. Movant, through its servicing agent, may contact the Debtor by telephone or written correspondence to offer such an agreement.

## Case 8:10-bk-21738-TA Doc 303 Filed 05/15/17 Entered 05/15/17 16:23:05 Desc Main Document Page 3 of 3

13.		Upon entry of this order, for purposes of Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.5, the Debtor is a borrowe Code § 2920.5(c)(2)(C).	r as defined in Cal. Civ.
14.		A designated law enforcement officer may evict the Debtor and any other occupant from from any future bankruptcy case concerning the Property for a period of 180 days from the property from the period of 180 days from the property from the period of 180 days from the property from the period of 180 days from the period	
	(a)	(a) without further notice.	
	(b)	(b) upon recording of a copy of this order or giving appropriate notice of its entry in conbankruptcy law.	ompliance with applicable
15.		This order is binding and effective in any bankruptcy case commenced by or against t 180 days, so that no further automatic stay shall arise in that case as to the Property.	he Debtor for a period of
16.		This order is binding and effective in any bankruptcy case commenced by or against a interest in the Property for a period of 180 days from the hearing of this Motion:	any debtor who claims any
	(a)	(a) without further notice.	
	(b)	(b) upon recording of a copy of this order or giving appropriate notice of its entry in conbankruptcy law.	ompliance with applicable
17.		☐ This order is binding and effective in any future bankruptcy case, no matter who the d	ebtor may be
	(a)	(a) without further notice.	
	(b)	(b) upon recording of a copy of this order or giving appropriate notice of its entry in conbankruptcy law.	ompliance with applicable
18.	$\boxtimes$	☐ Other (specify):	
		Items # 4(a) and (c) above, are also applied to provide relief, and annulment of the retroactive to the Petition Date, for any and all actions in support of the foreclosur Property by the Copper Ridge Community Association and/or its agent Nevada Association.	e taken with respect to the

###

Date: May 15, 2017

Theodor C. Albert United States Bankruptcy Judge

June 2014 Page 3 F 4001-1ARFS.RFSORDER

## **TAB 30**

### ELECTRONICALLY SERVED 5/19/2017 5:42 PM

	1	ОРР		
	2	DIANA CLINE EBRON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 10580		
	3	E-mail: diana@KGElegal.com JACQUELINE A. GILBERT, ESQ.		
		Nevada Bar No. 10593		
	4	E-mail: jackie@KGElegal.com KAREN L. HANKS, ESQ.		
	5	Nevada Bar No. 9578 E-mail: karen@KGElegal.com		
	6	Kim Gilbert Ebron		
	7	7625 Dean Martin Drive, Suite 110 Las Vegas, Nevada 89139		
	8	Telephone: (702) 485-3300 Facsimile: (702) 485-3301		
	9	Attorneys for SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC		
		DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
	10			
	11	SFR INVESTMENTS POOL1, LLC a Nevada	Case No. A-13-678814-C	
	12	limited liability company,	Consolidated with	
(702) 463-5500 FAA (702) 463-5501	13	Plaintiff,	Case No. A-13-688734-C	
	14	VS.	Dept. No. XXXI	
	15	US BANK, N.A., a national banking association as Trustee for the Certificate	SED INVESTMENTS DOOL 1 11 C/S	
	16	Holders of Wells Fargo Asset Securities	SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC'S OPPOSITION TO NV WEST SERVICING,	
		Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR4 and LUCIA	LLC'S JOINDER TO U.S. BANK'S RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY	
	17	PARKS, an individual, DOES I through X; and ROE CORPORATIONS I through X,	JUDGMENT AND OPPOSITION TO SFR'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY	
	18	inclusive, Defendants.	JUDGMENT	
	19	SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, a		
	20	Nevada limited liability company,		
	21	Plaintiff, vs.		
	22	U.S. BANK, N.A., a national banking		
	23	association, as Trustee for the Certificate		
		Holders of Wells Fargo Asset Securities Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through		
	24	Certificates, Series 2006-AR4; NV WEST SERVICING, LLC, a Nevada limited liability		
	25	company, as Trustee for NASHVILLE TRUST		
	26	2270; DOES I-X; and ROES 1-10, inclusive,		
	27	Defendants.  NV WEST SERVICING, LLC, a Nevada		
	28	limited liability company, as Trustee for NASHVILLE TUST 2270,		

KIM GILBERT EBRON 7625 DEAN MARTIN DRIVE, SUITE 110 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89139

7625 DEAN MARTIN DRIVE, SUITE 110 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89139

(702) 485-3300 FAX (702) 485-3301

Cross-Claimant,

VS.

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NATIONAL DEFAULT SERVICING CORPORATION, an Arizona Corporation; DOES XI through XX,

Third Party Defendant.

SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC ("SFR") hereby files its Opposition to NV WEST SERVICING, LLC'S Joinder To U.S. BANK'S Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to SFR'S Motion for Summary Judgment.

SFR has fully articulated in its Motion for Summary Judgment as to why the First Deed of Trust ("FDOT") was extinguished during the Association's foreclosure sale of March 1, 2013. Based on this, the Bank lacked authority to foreclose on the FDOT when it foreclosed on July 18, 2013. Logically it follows that Nashville Trust #2270 and its Trustee, NV West Servicing, LLC, could have purchased nothing from the Bank as the Bank lacked authority to foreclose on July 18, 2013.

Under Nevada law, for a buyer to qualify as a *bona fide* purchaser, that buyer cannot have notice, actual or constructive, of another party's unrecorded interest in the property. Huntington v. Mila, Inc., 119 Nev. 355, 357, 75 P.3d 354, 356 (2003). A duty of inquiry arises where circumstances put a reasonable person on notice of another's rights in the property. *Id.* Thus, any purchaser, including Nashville Trust #2270, was at least constructively aware of the Association's foreclosure sale as the foreclosure deed was a publically recorded document. See SFR's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 2-A. Additionally, the purchaser would have been aware of the Lis Pendens filed by SFR on March 22, 2013. See SFR's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 1-M.

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## KIM GILBERT EBRON 7625 DEAN MARTIN DRIVE, SUITE 110 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89139

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Thus, despite a later recording of the district court's wrongful order dismissing SFR's complaint and expunging the lis pendens, an experienced investor such as Nashville Trust #2270 and its Trustee NV West Servicing, LLC, would had been aware of the amount of litigation over NRS 116 pending at the time of this order and should have been aware of the specific facts of this case. As such, NV West Servicing, LLC at least had constructive notice that the order had been appealed. As such, Nashville Trust #2270 and its Trustee NV West Servicing, LLC, will not be able to avail itself of the equitable defense of being a BFP and thus should not be considered a BFP in any balancing analysis the court undertakes under Shadow Wood. Quiet Title against Nashville Trust #2270 and its Trustee, NV West Servicing, LLC, should be granted.

DATED this 19th day of May 2017.

#### KIM GILBERT EBRON

/s/\_ Jaqueline A. Gilbert, Esq.
DIANA CLINE EBRON, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 10580
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# 7625 DEAN MARTIN DRIVE, SUITE 110 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89139 (702) 485-3300 FAX (702) 485-3301

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 19th day of May 2017, pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I served via the Eighth Judicial District Court electronic filing system the foregoing SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC'S OPPOSITION TO NV WEST SERVICING, LLC JOINDER TO U.S. BANK'S RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND OPPOSITION TO SFR'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, to the following

parties.

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Candy Charlet - Legal Secretary .	ccharlet@swlaw.com
Daniel Ivie .	divie@swlaw.com
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/s/ Zachary Clayton An employee of Kim Gilbert Ebron

## **TAB 31**

6/2/2017 2:44 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 **RPLY** John S. Delikanakis 2 Nevada Bar No. 5928 Daniel S. Ivie 3 Nevada Bar No. 10090 SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. 3883 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 1100 4 Las Vegas, NV 89169 5 Telephone: (702) 784-5200 Facsimile: (702) 784-5252 6 Email: jdelikanakis@swlaw.com Email: divie@swlaw.com 7 Attorneys for Defendant U.S. BANK, N.A., a national 8 banking association as Trustee for the Certificate Holders of Wells Fargo Asset Securities Corporation, 9 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR4 IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 10 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 11 12 SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, a Consolidated Case Nos. 13 A-13-678814-C Nevada limited liability company, A-13-688734-C 14 Plaintiff. 15 Dept. XXXI vs. U.S. BANK'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 16 RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY U.S. BANK, N.A., a national banking association as Trustee for the Certificate **JUDGMENT** 17 Holders of U.S. Bank Asset Securities Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through 18 Certificates, Series 2006-AR4; LUCIA PARKS, an individual; DOES I through X; and 19 ROE CORPORATIONS I through X, inclusive, 20 Defendants. 21 22 AND ALL RELATED MATTERS. 23 Defendant U.S. Bank, N.A., a national banking association as Trustee for the Certificate 24 Holders of Wells Fargo Asset Securities Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 25 2006-AR4 ("U.S. Bank"), by and through its attorneys at the law firm of Snell & Wilmer L.L.P., 26 submits the following Reply in Support of its Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (the 27 28 "Motion")

**Electronically Filed** 

This Reply is based upon the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the papers and pleadings on file herein, and any oral argument the Court may permit at the time of hearing.

#### I. INTRODUCTION

U.S. Bank is entitled to summary judgment in this matter and SFR's Opposition has not changed that fact. SFR's Opposition fails for several reasons.

First, SFR argues that the sale was not commercially unreasonable for a number of reasons, all of which fail. SFR incorrectly summarizes the state of Nevada law on commercial unreasonableness and improperly excludes the Supreme Court's latest ruling in *Shadow Wood v. N.Y. Bancorp*, which holds that the price obtained at an HOA foreclosure sale is grossly inadequate as a matter of law if it falls below 20% of the property's fair market value. SFR also incorrectly asserts that evidence of fair market value is inapplicable to HOA foreclosure sales. This contention once again contradicts settled Nevada law, including *Shadow Wood*. Finally, SFR incorrectly asserts that U.S. Bank has not provided any evidence of fraud, unfairness or oppression to justify setting aside the sale. To the extent such evidence is even required in this case, U.S. Bank has shown that the existence of the automatic stay, as well as U.S. Bank's lack of notice of the HOA foreclosure action, both significantly contributed to the inadequate price obtained at the sale. The standard, however, requires only "slight" evidence. Thus, the sale is commercially unreasonable and should be set aside.

Second, SFR incorrectly asserts that U.S. Bank has not met its burden to prove that SFR is not a bona fide purchaser. In making this assertion, SFR ignores Nevada law that is directly on point and firmly establishes that the burden of proof actually lies with the party seeking protection as a bona fide purchaser—which in this case is SFR, not U.S. Bank. Further, SFR cannot dispute that it knew of U.S. Bank's competing interest in the property and that it was fully aware that purchasing the property would result in litigation. Thus, SFR cannot meet its burden of establishing that it is a bona fide purchaser entitled to title to the property.

For each of these reasons, as well as the arguments set forth fully in U.S. Bank's Motion<sup>1</sup>, summary judgment should be granted in U.S. Bank's favor.

#### II. ARGUMENT

## A. SFR's Arguments Regarding the Commercial Reasonableness of the HOA Foreclosure Sale Miss the Mark.

### 1. SFR Misstates Nevada Law on Inadequacy of Price.

SFR's Opposition gives an inaccurate picture of the state of Nevada law regarding commercial reasonableness. SFR repeats the holdings in *Golden v. Tamiyasu* and *Long v. Towne*, while at the same time missing (or ignoring) the Nevada Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the topic in *Shadow Wood*.

SFR argues that the Supreme Court in *Shadow Wood* cited *Golden* for the proposition that a grossly inadequate price cannot be the basis for voiding the sale. However, there, the Court cited *Golden* in support of the proposition that "our post-NRS 107.030(8) cases reaffirm that courts retain the power, in an appropriate case, to set aside a defective foreclosure sale on equitable grounds." *Shadow Wood*, 366 P.3d at 1111. As the Court did not cite *Golden* for the purpose SFR now seeks to use it, that citation does not speak to the issue of price as a basis for voiding a sale.

Furthermore, the Court in *Shadow Wood* relied on the Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages § 8.3, which states that a "foreclosure sale price obtained pursuant to a foreclosure proceeding that is otherwise regularly conducted in compliance with applicable law does not render the foreclosure defective **unless the price is grossly inadequate.**" *See Shadow Wood Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. New York Cmty. Bancorp, Inc.*, 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 5, 366 P.3d 1105, 1112-13 (2016) (emphasis added). The Court further relied on the Restatement approach for guidance on what constitutes a grossly inadequate price, advising that while "[g]ross inadequacy cannot be precisely defined in terms of a specific percentage of fair market value, [g]enerally ... a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For the reasons explained in U.S. Bank's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, U.S. Bank contends that NRS 116.3116 *et seq.* is facially unconstitutional because it violates both the Due Process and Takings clauses of the U.S. and Nevada constitutions. U.S. Bank recognizes that the Nevada Supreme Court declined to adopt these arguments in *Saticoy Bay LLC Series 350 Durango 104 v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage*, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 5 (Nev. Jan 16, 2017), but U.S. Bank preserves this issue here should the U.S. Supreme Court elect to consider the issue and decide differently.

court is warranted in invalidating a sale where the price is less than 20 percent of fair market value." *Id.* at 1112-13 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages § 8.3, cmt. b).

Thus, the current state of the law under *Golden*, *Long*, and *Shadow Wood* is that any sale that falls below 20% of the fair market value of the property is "obviously inadequate" and therefore commercially unreasonable as a matter of law. *Shadow Wood*, 366 P.3d at 1112. There is no further inquiry necessary. Only where a sale exceeds the 20% threshold must a party make a showing of "fraud, unfairness or oppression" to justify overturning a sale. *Id*.

Here, the HOA foreclosure sale was clearly below the 20% threshold, as the \$14,000.00 purchase price equaled only 6% of the property's fair market value of \$228,000.00 at the time of the sale. The price was therefore grossly inadequate as a matter of law under *Shadow Wood* and the Restatement approach and must be set aside.

2. Even if the Sales Price Is not Grossly Inadequate, there Is Ample Evidence of Fraud, Unfairness and Oppression to Justify Setting Aside the Sale.

Even if Nevada law required evidence of fraud, oppression, or unfairness in addition to a grossly inadequate sale price in order to set aside an HOA foreclosure sale as commercially unreasonable, U.S. Bank has provided ample evidence of such to justify setting aside the sale.

SFR's Opposition strangely ignores U.S. Bank's Motion and asserts that U.S. Bank has not offered any evidence of fraud, unfairness or oppression in this case. (Opp'n, 7:15-16.) Whether SFR questions the weight such evidence should be given is one matter, but SFR cannot seriously argue that there is no such evidence in this case. As mentioned many times now throughout the briefing, there is significant evidence of fraud, unfairness and oppression here

First, the HOA foreclosure sale was unfair, fraudulent and oppressive because it violated the bankruptcy court's automatic stay. The importance of this point cannot be overstated. Whether SFR is ultimately successful in retroactively annulling the automatic stay notwithstanding, the fact that the stay was in place at the time of the sale is a significant abnormality in the sale process. Parks' bankruptcy was a matter of public record and therefore served as constructive notice to all bidders that purchasing the Property at the sale carried a

significant risk that sale would be void. The sales price was necessarily depressed due to the likelihood that the sale would be voided due to the automatic stay.

Second, the sale was unfair because U.S. Bank did not have any of the foreclosure notices and had no notice of the foreclosure proceedings. Ex. 2 to Mot. for Summ. J., Ferguson Depo., 61:10-16; 62:1-5. U.S. Bank cannot be charged with failing to act to protect its interest in the Property when it had no notice whatsoever that its interest might be in jeopardy in this case.<sup>2</sup> This resulted in a significantly lower sales price, because the bidders at the sale knew that the Property was encumbered by a deed of trust.

It is important to note that overwhelming evidence is not required in order to invalidate a sale. Instead, "where the inadequacy is palpable and great, *very slight additional evidence* of unfairness or irregularity is sufficient to authorize the granting of the relief sought." *Golden*, 79 Nev. at 515 (emphasis added). U.S. Bank submits that the evidence in this case is anything but "very slight," and certainly a sale yielding only 6% of the property's fair market value must be considered greatly inadequate. The sale should be set aside.

3. Fair Market Value Is Unquestionably the Standard in Nevada for Evaluating Commercial Reasonableness.

SFR's assertion that "fair market value has no applicability" to the evaluation of an HOA foreclosure sale contradicts long-established Nevada law. (Opp'n, 9:24-25.) SFR's reliance on *BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation* is misplaced and should be disregarded. (*Id.*)

Nevada law, including *Shadow Wood*, has consistently established that the benchmark to perform a commercial reasonableness analysis is fair market value, not SFR's "disposition value." No authority binding on this Court holds that disposition value or fair forced value has any role in determining commercial reasonableness.

Contrary to SFR's unsubstantiated assertion, fair market value is unquestionably the legal standard in Nevada for determining whether a foreclosure sale price is commercially reasonable.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> SFR's Opposition makes the unsubstantiated allegation that "the Bank's internal document handling caused [the Notice of Sale] to not be handled until a month later," and that "this is an internal problem with the Bank and not an issue of fraud, oppression or unfairness." Opp'n, 9:9-11. This is complete conjecture by SFR and its counsel. There is absolutely zero evidence that the delay in receipt of any document was caused by U.S. Bank or its servicer, Wells Fargo.

Indeed, using the fair market value of a foreclosed property as the standard to measure commercial reasonableness has been in effect in Nevada since at least 1963. *Golden*, 79 Nev. at 505, 387 P.2d at 990. In *Golden*, the Nevada Supreme Court held that "[a]lthough the evidence is in conflict, there is substantial support of the court's finding that the land has a market value of \$2,500 an acre. As five acres had been released from the deed of trust, there remained approximately 80 acres valued at a total of approximately \$200,000. As against the inadequacy of the bid of \$18,025.73 as compared with this valuation[...]." *Id.* (1963) (emphasis added).

Further, in *Shadow Wood*, the Supreme Court took notice of an appraisal of the property and suggested that an appraisal of the property as of the date of the foreclosure sale could be used to establish the fair market value of the property at the time of the foreclosure sale for purposes of determining commercial reasonableness. *Shadow Wood*, 366 P.3d at 1113, n.3. SFR's contention that fair market value is irrelevant flies in the face of established Nevada law.

## B. The Burden of Establishing BFP Status Is on SFR and it Has not Met its Burden.

SFR incorrectly contends that U.S. Bank bears the burden of proving that SFR is *not* a bona fide purchaser ("BFP"). (Opp'n, 11:22) ("The Bank has failed to meet is burden to prove that SFR is not a Bona Fide Purchaser.") In truth, it is SFR's burden to prove that it is entitled to protection as a BFP. *Berge v. Fredericks*, 95 Nev. 183, 186 591 P.2d 246, 247 (1979) ("a party claiming title to the land by a subsequent conveyance **must show** that the purchase was made in good faith, for a valuable consideration; and that the conveyance of the legal title was received before notice of any equities of the prior grantee.")

SFR relies on the California case *First Fidelity v. Alliance Bank*, 60 Cal. App. 4th 1433, 71 Cal Rptr. 2d 295 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998), to claim that "the burden is on the party claiming [equitable title] to allege and prove that the person holding legal title is not a bona fide purchaser." (Opp'n, 11:24-27.) However, not *First Fidelity* supports SFR's contention. Instead, the California Court of Appeal agreed with the *Berge* holding: "The general rule places the burden of proof *upon a person claiming bona fide purchaser status* to present evidence that he or she acquired interest in the property without notice of the prior interest." *Id.* at 1442. Where a

party claims equitable rather than legal title, "the burden of proof is upon the person asserting that title." Since SFR has asserted protection as a BFP, the burden of proving that it is entitled to such protection remains with it. As U.S. Bank set out in its Motion, SFR has failed to meet this burden.

#### III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, U.S. Bank respectfully requests that this Court GRANT its Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety.

DATED June 2, 2017.

SNELL & WILMER L.L.P.

By: /s/ Daniel S. Ivie
John S. Delikanakis
Nevada Bar No. 5928
Daniel S. Ivie
Nevada Bar No. 10090
3883 Howard Hughes Parkway, Ste. 1100
Las Vegas, NV 89169

Attorneys for Defendant U.S. BANK, N.A., a national banking association as Trustee for the Certificate Holders of Wells Fargo Asset Securities Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR4

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I, the undersigned, declare under penalty of perjury, that I am over the age of eighteen (18) years, and I am not a party to, nor interested in, this action. On June 2, 2017, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing U.S. BANK'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by submitting it to the above-entitled Court for electronic filing and/or service upon the Court's Service list pursuant to the Eighth Judicial District Court's Administrative Order 14-2 dated May 9, 2014.

DATED: June 2, 2017

/s/ Tonya C. Stephenson An Employee of Snell & Wilmer L.L.P.

4822-2999-7380.1

# **TAB 32**

Electronically Filed 6/21/2017 12:31 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

**TRAN** 1 2 3 **EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT** CIVIL/CRIMINAL DIVISION 4 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 5 6 SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, CASE NO. A-13-678814 A-13-688734 7 Plaintiff, (Consolidated) DEPT. NO. XXXI 8 VS. 9 U.S. BANK, et al, 10 Defendants. 11 BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOANNA KISHNER, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 12 TUESDAY, JUNE 6, 2017 13 TRANSCRIPT RE: ALL PENDING MOTIONS 14 15 **APPEARANCES:** 16 17 For the Plaintiff: KAREN L. HANKS, ESQ. For Wells Fargo Bank: JOHN S. DELIKANAKIS, ESQ. 18 19 For NV West Servicing, LLC: MICHAEL F. BOHN, ESQ. 20 For Copper Ridge Community Association: TREVOR R. WAITE, ESQ. 21 22 23 24 RECORDED BY: Sandra Harrell, Court Recorder

AA\_1159

1	LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, TUESDAY, JUNE 6, 2017, 10:35 A.M.
2	* * * *
3	THE COURT: SFR Investments versus U.S. Bank, et al; 678814.
4	MR. DELIKANAKIS: Good morning, Your Honor. John Delikanakis from
5	Snell & Wilmer on behalf of Wells Fargo.
6	THE COURT: Thank you.
7	MS. HANKS: Karen Hanks on behalf of SFR.
8	MR. WAITE: Trevor Waite on behalf of the HOA.
9	THE COURT: Okay. Since I have
10	MR. BOHN: Michael Bohn.
11	THE COURT: Sorry, go ahead.
12	MR. BOHN: NV West Servicing.
13	THE COURT: Thank you.
14	Counsel, you're here
15	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I'm here just
16	THE COURT: Observing?
17	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes.
18	THE COURT: Everyone is just observing? Because this is the last one
19	I show on this morning's calendar. That's why I want to make sure someone
20	doesn't think that
21	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Same. Just observing.
22	THE COURT: Okay, no worries.
23	THE CLERK: And I apologize, I didn't get their appearances.
24	COURT RECORDER: I didn't either.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. I'm going to ask you --

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THE CLERK: Let's do it slower.

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MS. HANKS: Go ahead, counsel.

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MR. DELIKANAKIS: John Delikanakis from Snell & Wilmer on behalf of

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Wells Fargo.

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MR. WAITE: Trevor Waite on behalf of the HOA.

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MR. BOHN: Michael Bohn on behalf of NV West Servicing.

MS. HANKS: And Karen Hanks on behalf of SFR.

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THE COURT: Okay, welcome. So the reason why the Court just was

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confirming is because this was the last one I showed on my docket and I just wanted

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to make sure everyone was fully taken care of.

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Okay. So we have today three various motions for summary judgment

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and a motion in limine, okay. So it's going to make the most sense really to deal

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with the summary judgments first. I will tell you the Court is going to -- the main

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Court's area of question is going to be -- it's not really an inclination, but if you care

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it's really the nuance here about, no surprise, the bankruptcy, okay, the bankruptcy

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stay that was in place back in March of 2013. And the Court's question is going

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to be to all parties, although I appreciate where we have kind of -- as you all know

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because you did all the pleadings, you did the pleadings, there were stays, it's been

some time, various things have happened procedurally in the federal court world,

21 22 in the state court world, in the -- well, so far not in the U.S. Supreme Court world yet or withdrawn in the U.S. Supreme Court world and kind of filed in the supreme

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court world.

So I'm going to just phrase my general question in the area that I'd

MR. DELIKANAKIS: And, you know, with the Court's indulgence, we'll focus

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on your question.

MS. HANKS: Right.

MR. DELIKANAKIS: And if you have other questions, you just ask us.

THE COURT: And I'm not limiting it, I'm just -- I might as well give you the heads up --

MR. DELIKANAKIS: Appreciate it.

THE COURT: -- because, you know, a lot of the other arguments we've seen a lot. This has got that nuance and I presume that's the reason why you're here and why you have a gallery of people watching to see the impact of some of that nuance. So --

MS. HANKS: Your Honor --

THE COURT: So whoever is going -- Are you going first?

MR. DELIKANAKIS: Yeah, please, go ahead.

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. HANKS: Sorry. Plaintiff, so I kind of figured. Hopefully I can dispel pretty quickly the bankruptcy issue. On May 19, 2017, we filed a notice of the retroactive annulment of the stay. And in that order that's filed, the box is clearly checked that there was no violation of the stay. The bankruptcy court retroactively annulled it, so it basically blessed everything that happened with respect to the sale in terms of anything that may have been a violation. If you want to look that up, Your Honor, you can certainly. I was going to bring a copy, but it was filed so I didn't do that.

THE COURT: And I did look at that.

MS. HANKS: Yeah, it comes out of California, so it's a different looking order than what you would typically see from our court.

THE COURT: Oh, I'm very familiar.

MS. HANKS: Yeah. So, I thought it was weird, too, when I first saw it, but if you look at the -- I guess the first or second page there's boxes and they checked the box that said no violation of the automatic stay. They grant the retroactive annulment and they checked the box that said there's no violation of the automatic stay.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to --

MS. HANKS: Sure.

THE COURT: My follow-up question to that is going to be, because, you know, I did see that, did read that, what -- since this is a *nunc pro tunc* retroactive, however you'd like to phrase it order, okay --

MS. HANKS: You mean ex parte or --

THE COURT: Well, no. It's a retroactive order --

MS. HANKS: Right.

THE COURT: -- meaning it wasn't in place back in 2013.

MS. HANKS: Right.

THE COURT: I mean, there was no permission -- at least no one has argued that in March of 2013 the HOA or the HOA's agent -- the Court not taking any position on the agency, but NAS or the HOA did not seek it at the time.

MS. HANKS: Correct.

THE COURT: SFR didn't seek it at the time of purchase. Only the bank when it did it subsequent did. And I'm appreciative, because this order was filed afterwards, is does the order by saying that there's no violation of the bankruptcy stay, does that validate -- does that validate a 2013 HOA sale?

MS. HANKS: Yes.

THE COURT: Is that your argument?

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MS. HANKS: Yeah.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

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MS. HANKS: And that's exactly what -- that's the purpose for it because there's -- I think it's like an eight or a twelve part standard that the party bringing it, such as SFR, has to show. And that's why typically it's brought by parties that weren't involved in the bankruptcy or a party that might not be involved with getting the stay originally, or even a party that was, but typically when it's SFR there's

another type -- there's a list of -- a litany of standards that you have to show. And essentially what the retroactive annulment is saying is go back in time and lift the

stay as to that point in time as if it was filed at that time by the collection company

or the HOA. And we met that standard and the California bankruptcy court agreed

with that and said, yes, I'm going to lift it as if it was filed at that time.

So that's what the purpose of the retroactive annulment is. It's not as if they say the stay doesn't apply now. That's obvious because the discharge happened and we're way past that. It had to go back in time and essentially say, yes, I would have granted the stay -- I would have lifted the stay at this time if this party had filed it and I'm going to retroactively do it. And essentially there's been -and it actually says on the box that is checked it's not that they just lift the stay, it actually says there was no violation of the stay based on what was recorded in this case. So they actually checked the box that says that. There was no violation of the stay. They made that finding because they retroactively lifted it, essentially.

So for our purpose, Your Honor, and for your purpose there is no more argument with respect to the bankruptcy stay violation. Now, we have other

arguments, you know, that we argue that the bank doesn't have standing to bring it. There's a decision out of our district that has ruled that way. We have a state court case where something similar happened where a retroactive annulment was granted and the bank in that case appealed it to the bankruptcy panel here and the bankruptcy panel said you don't even have standing to fight that. You're not the party that has standing to bring any claim for a retroactive annulment and that it was, you know, granted or not granted rightfully.

So we don't have to really get there, though, because that was kind of our first argument before we went in and asked for a retroactive annulment, but that is clearly what you're asking the court to do in that application. I don't believe it was even ex parte in this case because we knew, so we notified the bank. The bank had the opportunity to oppose it. Unfortunately I'm not in a position to know if they did. I did not look at those pleadings in California, so I'll let counsel comment on that. But --

THE COURT: The box is marked opposed.

MS. HANKS: Okay, so they opposed it. The bankruptcy court considered their opposition, rejected it and said no, we're going to essentially go back in time and essentially lift the stay for all intents and purposes, so anything that was done that was technically a violation of the stay is now no longer a violation because they lifted it. That's what the retroactive annulment is. And so it does bless everything NAS did and say that whatever NAS did is not --

THE COURT: Okay. And this is really a question on whether or not I'm going to need subsequent briefing on this issue. And sorry I'm interrupting --

MS. HANKS: No, that's fine, Your Honor. That's fine.

THE COURT: -- but it's really getting to the heart of it.

MS. HANKS: You're right, this is really the issue, right? This case is pretty clean otherwise. There's really nothing -- you know, they have the constitutional argument.

THE COURT: The bank and the HOA have a little different viewpoint.

MS. HANKS: Of course, but you know -- no, you're right. So if you do -- and I would agree. When we submitted all of our briefing I don't believe -- it was all briefed before the order came from the bankruptcy court. So if the question is now that I have this retroactive annulment order what is the effect of that, does it do exactly what I'm saying it does, then I would ask for supplemental briefing on that as opposed -- because really it is a legal issue. There's really no reason to go to trial. It's not going to be a factual issue. You either have to say was there a stay violation or not, and we're saying there is no stay violation because it was annulled.

THE COURT: Okay. So here's -- trying to hone down into -- and I'm sorry it's a little bit more of a Q & A, but it's really hopefully to everyone's efficiency to kind of focus on where the arguments are and the issues. Is box 4-- Do you happen to have a copy of it with you?

MS. HANKS: I don't. Unfortunately I did not bring a copy. I've looked at it before I came.

THE COURT: Does anybody else have a copy by chance?

MR. DELIKANAKIS: I have a copy here. There you go.

MS. HANKS: Thank you.

THE COURT: Does anyone need us to make --

1	MR. WAITE: Could we get a couple copies?
2	THE COURT: You do or do not? Anybody else have copies by chance?
3	MR. DELIKANAKIS: I have another copy here we can look at together if
4	you'd like.
5	THE COURT: Can you share with counsel at your table?
6	MR. DELIKANAKIS: Yeah.
7	THE COURT: And Mr. Bohn, on behalf of the joinder party, do you have it
8	by chance or have it online? Okay, because where I'm going is Box 4, okay. Do
9	you see Box 4? It's X'd. And then the box says, "As to movant" and you all were
10	movant, right? SFR was movant, correct?
11	MS. HANKS: SFR filed it. Yes, Your Honor.
12	THE COURT: Okay. It says, "As to movant, its successors, transferees and
13	assigns, the stay of 11 U.S.C. Section 362 (a) is:" and then under that there's an
14	A, B and C box.
15	MS. HANKS: Uh-huh.
16	THE COURT: The A box everyone sees is X'd. There's an X in the A box.
17	MR. DELIKANAKIS: Yes.
18	THE COURT: And the A box says, "Terminated as to the debtor and debtor's
19	bankruptcy estate." Everyone so far in agreement that that's what it says? Okay.
20	MS. HANKS: Right.
21	THE COURT: The B box is not checked or not X'd, it's blank.
22	MS. HANKS: Right.
23	THE COURT: The C box has got an X in it and it says, "Annulled retroactively

to the bankruptcy petition date. Any post-petition acts taken by movant to enforce

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its remedies regarding the property do not constitute a violation of the stay." Okay, was that right? That's the language that you're relying on, right?

MS. HANKS: Yeah. Well, the box that was checked. Right.

THE COURT: The box that was checked. Okay.

MS. HANKS: I think it's a summary of kind of what the statute provides.

THE COURT: What the Court's question, and this is just -- it's really a question. I'm really going to ask you all if you need supplemental briefing and I hate the fact that you had to wait a little bit, you know, but the reason why you had ten o'clock is you knew we would be having the earlier motion calendar. Since that language says "any post-petition acts by the movant" -- actually it doesn't say the movant, it says "taken by movant to enforce its remedies regarding the property do not constitute a violation of the stay." Okay. It doesn't say -- it's not broader. Does that matter from each party's position?

MS. HANKS: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Because you asserted that what NAS did, NAS in its role as --

MS. HANKS: Collection agent.

THE COURT: -- collection agent. Whether there's truly an agency, I'm not going into any arguments you may have with regards to NAS or not NAS. But it doesn't say HOA, it doesn't say NAS --

MS. HANKS: And if I can --

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MS. HANKS: -- understand your question because I'm going to have to ask for supplemental briefing because I'm not a bankruptcy attorney. I don't file these petitions. I have a general understanding of what we do. We've done multiples

of them. But if I could just understand what you're saying so I can then respond.

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MR. DELIKANAKIS: I think we can answer.

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MR. WAITE: We can clear it up. Box 18.

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MR. DELIKANAKIS: Box 18, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. DELIKANAKIS: If I could direct the Court to look at Box 18.

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THE COURT: Going to Box 18: Other. Specify. Okay. "Items No. 4 A and C above are also applied to provide relief and annulment of the automatic stay retroactive to the petition date for any and all actions in support of the foreclosure taken with respect to the property by the Copper Ridge Community Association and/or its agent, Nevada Association Services." So --

MS. HANKS: If I could just ask a question so I can understand where I think you're --

THE COURT: Sure. Of course.

MS. HANKS: Is the question because SFR asked for it, the retroactive annulment, that it does not -- it's different because the HOA or NAS didn't ask for it? I mean, I guess this -- I would say this is what it does. I mean, and so I don't -- Is that the hang up? Is that what the question is? Because it uses the term movant and obviously we weren't the party doing anything with respect to foreclosing on the property, so enforcing the remedies. But I'm thinking that other -- I was about to argue this and it looks like the other box is applying that, that it doesn't matter who's actually applying for the retroactive annulment. Oftentimes you will see -- because I know we've done this multiple times, oftentimes you will see it will be a party that is affected by it but wasn't involved in the bankruptcy or the stay or enforcing the,

you know, *in rem* right, but it's applying it. It's applying and it's blessing the actions of a different party even though that's not the party moving for it.

THE COURT: My question really was just kind of -- going back to my initial, the broad aspect is what is the impact of the bankruptcy's order as to the issues before this Court, is probably more concise and encompassing, you know what I mean, because --

MS. HANKS: And from my --

THE COURT: -- that's really the question.

MS. HANKS: And from SFR's perspective this order answers that, you know.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead, finish your argument and then I'm going to let everyone else.

MS. HANKS: Okay. It says it's lifted and then it says that nothing that they did would constitute a violation of the stay. So I think for SFR's purposes there's no stay issue, there's no violation of a stay issue at any point now that that order was filed on May 19, 2017. So essentially the bankruptcy issue has been resolved.

The other claim that the bank argues is the due process, which at this point in time that's resolved. Saticoy Bay has ruled -- the Nevada Supreme Court has ruled that due process is not implicated because the HOA and/or its agent or collection agent is not a state actor, so due process is not indicated. Now, I know that they did not appeal that decision, this bank did not appeal the Saticoy decision, but the Bourne Valley decision has been appealed. And so --

THE COURT: To the U.S. Supreme Court.

MS. HANKS: To the U.S. Supreme Court. Right. And so whatever finding the U.S. Supreme Court -- in other words, if the U.S. Supreme Court affirms the

Ninth Circuit and says there is a state actor, then this Court would be bound by that. But at this point in time the state of the law in the state of Nevada, <u>Saticoy Bay</u> has resolved the issue. There is no constitutional issue because the bank can't even claim a violation of due process because there's no state actor. So I don't think this Court can rule on something that might happen in the future.

Now, I don't know if the bank is going to get up here and ask for you to stay the case. We would just say that there's no reason to do that at this time. Really, it is very up in the air what the U.S. Supreme Court is going to do. And frankly, if the U.S. Supreme Court denies cert, then it doesn't change anybody's position. The state law as it stands in <a href="Saticoy Bay">Saticoy Bay</a> still applies. So -- and we just don't know when that's going to happen. And so to rule on what ifs at this point in time, SFR would say that's not necessary. You can rule on what the state of the law is and due process is not indicated. So that argument fails and doesn't defeat SFR's right to quiet title and summary judgment.

They also claim wrongful foreclosure. That claim fails. SFR was not the party foreclosing. I'm not saying it might not -- I'm not saying it fails maybe to some other parties, but at least from SFR versus bank perspective it fails. SFR is not the party foreclosing. Even so, the elements of that claim are quite simple. The claim is you didn't have a breach upon which you could exercise your authority to sell. There is no dispute in this case that the homeowners failed to pay their assessments and that there was a breach to the association. So even if SFR was somehow the party that was foreclosing, which it wasn't, that basic element of that claim cannot be met here. And the bank has not made any argument that the homeowner did not in fact fail to pay the assessments and that there was in fact

a breach which the association could exercise its right to foreclose under NRS 116. So that claim fails as a matter of law. It cannot defeat SFR's right to summary judgment.

They also generically allege violation of 116, but in their motion and both their oppositions I didn't see anything where they talked about any violation of the actual statute. As I'm sure this Court is aware, there's multiple steps NAS has to follow and we -- although we don't have the burden to prove the sale was valid or all that was followed, they have the burden to prove that because it's presumed under Nevada law that both the deed and the sale are valid. We went the extra mile and within our motion we showed how NAS complied in every respect with NRS 116. How they recorded the notice of default and then mailed it to all the proper parties which show the proof of mailings. How they recorded the notice of sale and mailed it to all the proper parties. How they published the notice of sale. How they put it in -- posted it in three public places. How they served it or posted it on the actual property. Every step of the process of NRS 116, NAS followed, so there's no doubt that there's no violation of NRS 116 here.

Now, the bank in their opposition says we didn't receive the notice of sale. And we have a recent decision or order -- sorry, it's not a decision, it's an order, and I have copies if the Court would like to see it, where the 3-panel judges at the Nevada Supreme Court said no, receipt is not required. The statute only requires it be mailed. You do not have to prove receipt and it's not on the -- it's not incumbent upon the purchaser to prove it. Nevertheless, we have the proof of mailing where Wells Fargo -- or excuse me, U.S. Bank as trustee for Wells Fargo signed the green card. They received the notice of sale on February 11, 2013.

The sale happened in this case on March 1st, 2013.

So it's a complete misnomer to say you didn't receive it. It very well might not be scanned into your system, so the 30(b)(6) witness who was claiming that might not have seen it in his system. I can't explain that, only they can explain that. But we have a green card from NAS because they were required to mail the notice of sale via certified mail, which they did, and we have the signed green card. So there's no doubt, even though we don't have to prove receipt and even though receipt is not required under NRS 116, that's the only thing I saw that they were complaining about, that we didn't receive the notice of sale. That's what they said in their opposition. And you did. There's a signed green card saying that you -- and it's stamped February 11, 2013, so some three weeks before the sale.

Now, the other claim they have -- so that claim fails, Your Honor.

There's nothing where they've shown here there's a violation of NRS 116. In other words, they have offered no evidence to rebut the presumptions that are in favor of SFR that the sale was both valid and the deed is valid.

Then they have the intentional interference with a contract claim. That claim equally fails. You would have to show that SFR knew about the contract. And let's just say for the sake of argument that SFR had constructive notice of the deed of trust being recorded, and we all know if there's a deed of trust recorded there's a promissory note related to it and that the borrowers are, you know, bound by that promissory note. So let's say for the sake of argument SFR had knowledge of that. There is absolutely no evidence that SFR in any way encouraged or participated in the borrowers' default under that promissory note. And that's what they would have to prove for an intentional interference with a contract.

That's the contract they're talking about that you interfered. And in fact, what they say is that we interfered by purchasing the property at the foreclosure sale. I can't even follow the argument, frankly, that we interfered with the contract because we purchased the property at the foreclosure sale, which obviously under the statute extinguished the homeowners' interest in the property and therefore -- what? They still have a duty under the promissory note to pay you. The homeowner is not absolved of their obligation to pay. You just lost your security interest for it. You just lost the collateral that secured the promissory note.

So there's no interference with the promissory note and there's certainly no evidence in this case that SFR had any communications with the homeowner prior to purchasing the property. Frankly, I don't think there's any evidence that they even communicated with the homeowner after purchasing the property. So there's certainly zero evidence that SFR encouraged the homeowners to stop paying their mortgage. And they don't talk about the assessments, but let's assume they say that was also another contract. There's no evidence that SFR encouraged the homeowners to not pay their assessments. Most of these -- this default in this case occurred way before SFR was even in existence and occurred way before SFR even attended the sale. So that claim fails as a matter of law.

So, Your Honor, there's no -- oh, I'm sorry, and then their final argument, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Commercial reasonableness.

MS. HANKS: Commercial reasonableness. Right. And so the argument is, well, the sale was not -- it was below 20 percent of the fair market value. And in this decision that I have here that I can give to you, Your Honor, once again I think

it's been affirmed at least five or six times now by the Nevada Supreme Court that inadequate price, no matter how gross, is not enough to set aside a sale. You have to show fraud, oppression or unfairness. Now, they claim, well, it was unfair, we didn't receive the notice. That's what they claim. That's not the unfairness that we're talking about. The fraud, oppression and unfairness has to account for or bring about the low price. That's what the case says, <u>Golden v. Tomiyasu</u>, which was adopted by the supreme court in <u>Long v. Towne</u> and then reaffirmed recently.

So you have to show some type of fraud, oppression or unfairness that accounts for or brings about the low price, and the only thing I saw in their opposition where they cite unfairness was we didn't receive the notice of sale. Well, we dispelled that. You did receive the notice of sale. I don't know why it's not in your system, but you did receive it because we have a signed green card that you signed for it.

So, but even so, that's not unfairness. Your receipt or non-receipt of the notice of sale would have nothing to do with what SFR bid on the property. In other words, SFR doesn't have any knowledge of whether you received the notice of sale. That didn't dictate how the property was bid up at the auction. That's the type of unfairness we're talking about. Unfairness would be an example of keeping the price low, is not publishing the sale, not opening it up to the public so you had competitive bidding or telling SFR I'm going to let you bid this amount and that's it; you don't have to bid anything more and I'm going to give you the property. That's the type of stuff and that's those cases that cite <u>Golden v. Tomiyasu</u> that are dealing with fraud, oppression or unfairness are dealing with, something that favors someone there in terms of bidding on the property so they can get it for that price.

I think one of the cases that <u>Golden v. Tomiyasu</u> cites, there was a situation where that was actually told to the bidder that you only have to bid this amount. And that's where they said no, no, no, now we get to look behind a little bit and see what was going on here.

None of that's here. There's no evidence of that. SFR had no communications with NAS about how much it could bid for the property. No communications with the HOA. There's testimony no communications with other bidders. I could -- maybe another example might be if the bidders all colluded to say, hey, I won't bid against you. That never happened. It was highly competitive. You have testimony they didn't even talk to each other. So there's nothing here to show, other than price alone. That's what they want to rely on. They haven't shown any unfairness, fraud or oppression that accounted for or brought about the price paid by SFR.

At the end of the day SFR went to a public sale that the bank could have even attended themselves and bid -- it would have been a credit bid up to the point what they were owed -- and drove up the bid, but they didn't. And at the end of the day there was not one bidder present who was willing to bid a dollar more than SFR. So that's the price of the property. That's what it went for and it went after a publicly-noticed sale. There was nothing to say the sale was commercially unreasonable.

In fact, under the UCC, commercial reasonableness, the time, place and manner of the sale, everything about the sale was commercially reasonable. The time was reasonable. It was put in the notice of sale. It took place at a public place, NAS's office. They usually have it outside on the street. It was publicly

noticed and posted and published in public papers that you could find out about it. In fact, that's how SFR found out about it. And everyone was free to attend. The manner in which it was held was a normal NRS 116 auction, sold to the highest cash bidder. There's nothing that suggests that -- oh, held in the county where the HOA was located, which is required by the statute.

So every respect of the sale was commercially reasonable and they really just want to rely on price alone without showing the extra element that's required. And I know they want this Court to say that the Nevada Supreme Court has adopted the Restatement and its bright line rule that if it's 20 percent or below it's per se unreasonable, but that's just not the standard. And they've done it many times and they've reversed decisions. And the decision I have here with me where they -- I'm sorry, it's not a decision, it's an order -- where they have said they granted -- they affirmed a summary judgment granted by the court.

THE COURT: Are you talking about Stone Hollow, version 3?

MS. HANKS: No.

THE COURT: Oh.

MS. HANKS: No, Your Honor. No. <u>Stone Hollow</u> is completely out. That was reversed.

THE COURT: No, but that's why I said version 3.

MS. HANKS: No, Your Honor. I have another decision, Your Honor. It is PNC Bank versus --

THE COURT: Oh, okay. I know which one you're talking about.

MS. HANKS: And it's an unpublished decision -- excuse me, order. I keep on saying decision. It's an unpublished -- here you go, counsel -- it's an unpublished

order that came out on May 25th, 2017. It's PNC Bank v. Saticoy Bay.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MS. HANKS: And frankly, we have the pleasure of having Mr. Bohn here, who was the counsel on this representing Saticoy Bay, the purchaser. And he got a great order affirming a summary judgment. He got granted summary judgment in favor of his purchaser. And one of the arguments was commercial reasonableness, and again the bank said price alone is not enough. You have to show some fraud, oppression or unfairness that accounts for or brought about the price. So they said the court did not err in granting summary judgment. And so -- and this was also, they also said the court didn't err in granting summary judgment even though the bank argued they didn't receive notice. And they said, no, no, no, no, no, the statute only requires mailing; you don't have to prove receipt. And then they went even so far as saying let's be clear, the purchaser has no burden to prove any of this. They don't have to prove the validity of the sale. So that's where the supreme court is. That's where they always have been in terms of commercial reasonableness. And there's just really no basis to say that there's this 20 percent bright line rule.

And finally, Your Honor, with respect to the BFP issue, I think they say, well, SFR can't be a BFP because they took notice that we had notice of our deed of trust and they didn't pay adequate consideration. Fourteen thousand was just too little. And again we have the <a href="Shadow Wood">Shadow Wood</a> decision that dispelled both of those notions. It actually dealt with that very argument that notice of a deed of trust would be sufficient to dispel a BFP, and they said no, no, no, then we would never have a BFP and they said we're not going to do that. They said having notice that there might be a potential for someone coming back and disputing the sale is not

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enough to defeat a bona fide purchaser. You have to have interest of a superior interest in the property. And because NRS 116 extinguishes a first deed of trust, as long as the lien still has super priority amounts, then there is no notice of an interest just because a deed of trust is recorded.

And then they also went further and explained the adoption in the <a href="Berge">Berge</a> case that, hey, adequate consideration is not the same as valuable consideration. What we mean by valuable consideration is something more than free; more than a gift. As long as someone has paid something, it doesn't matter that the money paid is not equal to the value of what you think the property is worth. That's not what we mean by valuable consideration. We just mean not free.

So their argument that SFR is not a BFP because of those two, took notice because we purchased the property knowing that the deed of trust was recorded, and two, fourteen thousand dollars in their mind is not adequate, it fails as a matter of law based on the current state of the law in Nevada.

Now, I think they also argued takings in their papers, and again the Saticoy Bay decision that held constitutionality is not triggered because there's no state actor also dispelled the takings. They said there's no takings. So that argument fails as a matter of law. I think that was -- I think some of these briefs, like you had mentioned, Your Honor, were done before these decisions, but now that we have the decisions they can't win the day at this point.

And finally, Your Honor, with respect to SFR being entitled to summary judgment, this is a -- it kind of has a nuance because this is a case where the bank foreclosed after the association foreclosed and we have a third party purchaser coming in and buying it at the bank foreclosure. That purchaser cannot possibly be

a bona fide purchaser. They -- at the time they purchased the property, at the time they had that bank foreclosure, SFR had filed a lis pendens on March 22nd, 2013. Now, I know there was a court order entered on June 11th, 2013 that expunged that lis pendens, but less than a month later on July 12th, 2013, SFR appealed that order. And this sale, the bank sale didn't happen until July 18th, 2013, so at that moment the purchaser -- I think it's Nashville Trust -- took notice that SFR did have a superior interest and disputed the title in this case, and so they could not possibly be a bona fide purchaser when they purchased the property at the foreclosure sale. So quiet title in both respect to the bank and Nashville Trust is appropriate. There's no issues of fact.

Of course if Your Honor wants supplemental briefing on the bankruptcy, I would ask for that because I think when we were briefing this it was more at that time the stay wasn't lifted, so the argument was different. So I wouldn't want a decision based on that argument, but I do believe the order more than covers it. But of course --

THE COURT: In their reply, though, they mention that -- and it's in the moving papers as well, that the bankruptcy also had an impact with regards to the unfairness and the commercial reasonableness. I mean, I'm paraphrasing. They said it more eloquently, but.

MS. HANKS: I don't know what impact it could have had, Your Honor.

SFR didn't have any knowledge that there was a bankruptcy. It wouldn't have constructive notice of it because there was nothing recorded on the Recorder's website. So it didn't affect -- there's no testimony in this case that that accounted for or brought about the price. In other words, SFR didn't say, well, I only paid fourteen

thousand and wasn't willing to pay a dime more because I knew the homeowners had filed bankruptcy. That's what they have to show.

THE COURT: I think their argument was focused a little bit more because the bankruptcy would be a matter of public record, they said it reduced the price. I don't think they said it reduced the number of people coming to bid on it, but basically that that was an impact that should have been evaluated as well as the unique aspect.

MS. HANKS: It's highly speculative. I think that's a stretch. It's really just argument. In what way did it impact anything? Did it impact your ability to come to the sale? Did it impact your ability, bank, to pay the super priority portion to protect your interest? I mean, that's what we're talking about here. In what way did the bankruptcy -- and I don't believe the constructive notice of a publicly-filed document where you have to actually be registered to Pacer to even get notice to even access it is the same as a Recorder's website. So I would posture that that's not the same because you do have to have a log-in and have access to Pacer. It's not publicly available, unlike the state court where anyone can get on there and look at it, not like Wiznet but like Odyssey, whereas bankruptcy filings are not public record in terms of you have to actually apply for a Pacer account and then be able to log onto it.

And so nothing is recorded for SFR. I'm sure counsel asked SFR that question. As I sit here today I don't have a hundred percent recollection of the deposition, but I'm sure they asked it. I know for a fact that SFR didn't have any knowledge of the bankruptcy filing at the time of the sale. May have found out after the lawsuit was filed and this became an issue. But frankly, I don't think we

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knew it until the stay started becoming an argument, so that's why we went for the retroactive annulment. So that certainly tells you that it didn't dictate what SFR paid. And I haven't seen any other bidders named as witnesses in this case to suggest that that's why they didn't bid a dollar more. I mean, you'd be highly -- you'd be in the territory of highly speculative and really it runs afoul of the summary judgment standard. That is definitely gossamer whims of thread of speculation to say I think some of the purchasers there didn't bid on this property because of the bankruptcy filing.

And frankly, it didn't affect the bank's position. The bank's position always could have paid the super priority amount, but we have testimony from this very witness saying that wasn't Wells Fargo's policy. Wells Fargo never paid the super priority amount. Their policy -- we have testimony, binding testimony from this witness, Mr. Ferguson, saying Wells Fargo's policy was to pay after we foreclosed. So they wouldn't have changed anything. They didn't change their position. They didn't alter their position in any way. They did exactly what they would have done in any case. And nothing affected them from attending the sale, even if that was the case. They could have gone to the sale and said, hey, we dispute this, there's a bankruptcy, or bid. They would have essentially made a credit bid. They could have bid up this property to the point of what they were owed if they wanted to and they didn't. So that's really speculation, Your Honor.

And so we submit that there's really no issues of fact here, that summary judgment is warranted on both, against the bank and against the third party purchaser at the bank foreclosure.

THE COURT: I appreciate it. Thank you so very much.

MR. DELIKANAKIS: Good morning, Your Honor. We seem to have gone far afield from the moving papers, but I'm going to focus first on your initial question. What is the impact, if any, of the bankruptcy court's decision in California? And I would like to focus, because I know you've had experience in bankruptcy, is that when the bankruptcy court in California made this decision to annul the stay, it was looking through the lens, of course, of a bankruptcy court and relation to the debtor.

I think my colleague to my right overstates it by somehow that this decision, like a big sponge that God wields, washes away all sins and washes away the conduct that actually occurred. This Court sitting in equity should apply a different analysis because its concern is different as to what actually occurred and what unfairness. And I'm tying this to the unfairness component of the commercial unreasonableness and that's why I think this Court at the end of the day -- what this order bought my colleagues' client, SFR, is it robbed this Court of the foundation to declare that the sale was void ab initio, which is what probably would have occurred had this been a violation of the stay.

Granted, that's gone, but what is not gone is the conduct that occurred, and that's why this Court has to take cognizance of what occurred and how did it unfairly prejudice the bank at the time. And the reason why this is important, you only have to look at the timeline. Wells Fargo filed a bank notice of default on February 24th, 2010. It filed a bank's notice of trustee sale July 12th of 2010. The borrower filed bankruptcy on August 23rd of 2010. The bank properly, on July 2nd, 2012, filed a motion for relief of automatic stay. Now, it's operating in the legal realm, like we're not going to proceed with our foreclosure until we get a lift of the stay.

The HOA then on May 24th of 2012 files a notice of delinquent lien. We get an order, the bank -- oh, and the HOA in July of 2012 files a notice of default. The bank obtains then an order in August of 2012 granting relief from bankruptcy stay. The HOA's conduct is not absolved by the bankruptcy's order, especially if this Court is doing the analysis as to was there some fundamental unfairness about this transaction which accrued to the detriment of the bank. The HOA then ignored, for whatever reason, didn't bother didn't get a lift of stay; sold the property. Bank of America -- excuse me, Wells Fargo followed the law. Wells Fargo did not proceed with its foreclosure. It did not race to foreclose in violation of the stay.

So that is kind of the unfairness that occurred here. That's why I think the effect of the bankruptcy court's order is somewhat limited. You don't just ignore the facts because the bankruptcy court said for the purposes of the analysis of a bankruptcy court as to the debtor's estate and the debtor we're going to lift this stay because it really didn't harm the debtor. At the end -- and maybe we can talk about this in further briefing, but at the end of the day this Court still has to look at the conduct for the analysis under Nevada law as to what was fundamentally unfair when you have a commercially unreasonable price, which is only six percent of the fair market value.

THE COURT: Do I have any evidence that the bank did anything differently because the bankruptcy stay was in effect? Because as you know through -- starting with <u>SFR</u> back in September 2014, September 18th, I believe it was, you know the Nevada Supreme Court talks about, you know, banks could have done X, Y, Z to protect their interests. But do I have any evidence -- and this is my overall challenge on this case is because the order came down after you all had the briefing, is I don't

know if the HOA knew about the bankruptcy. I don't know if the HOA's agent knew about the bankruptcy. But then I'm limited to the pleadings before me in ruling on a motion. I don't know if the bank took action, didn't take certain action because it says, oh, there's a bankruptcy out here, I don't have to worry about this piece of property or not, you know what I mean. I don't know. These are all things --

MR. DELIKANAKIS: That's a reasonable inference, Your Honor, if the bank --

THE COURT: It's not even an --

MR. DELIKANAKIS: Yeah.

THE COURT: These are all I don't knows. And so -- but you mentioned in your reply in your motion -- and I'm not leaving you out, it's just you're not really at this stage, you know, back at the first one because -- but you mentioned that the bankruptcy has an impact and that's really why I was asking the question, you know what I mean. There seems to be this great unknown. I mean, I'm appreciative of the lens and the rubric in which a bankruptcy looks at it. A bankruptcy doesn't look to protect the HOA's interest, subsequent purchaser's interest --

MR. DELIKANAKIS: Of course.

THE COURT: -- the bank lienholder's interest and even first subsequent purchaser's interest. It's looking -- its jurisdiction is over debtor and does this impact what happened with regard to debtor and the creditors in that debtor's estate.

MR. DELIKANAKIS: Exactly.

THE COURT: And I'm not minimizing it, it's a great role, I'm just saying it's different than what I'm looking at here. So, anyway.

MR. DELIKANAKIS: Exactly. And that's the point. That's why I think my

1 colleague overstates it when they said the bankruptcy order somehow validates and 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 10

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approves of the entire process of the sale. That's not what the bankruptcy court did and I don't think the Court should read the bankruptcy order as doing that. This Court has to look at the time that the stay was in place what conduct, if any, by the HOA and SFR accrued to some unfairness to Wells Fargo. The unfairness is that it violated the stay and proceeded to race to foreclose on the property well before Wells Fargo could actually finish their foreclosure because Wells Fargo followed the law. And that's the kink in this transaction and that's why at the end of the day it's probably a fact question as to whether there was some fundamental unfairness in this transaction. As a matter of law I think you could rule, but, you know, there might be some differing opinions.

So that is -- I hope I answered at least some aspect of your question.

THE COURT: I appreciate it. Go ahead.

MR. DELIKANAKIS: Okay.

THE COURT: I just was looking at some of the documents because normally I have -- and I didn't remember seeing it here, normally you all attach the whole NAS/Alessi file, whatever the file may be showing all the records and showing that they did a diligent search before they did do it. I don't remember seeing that in this one and that's why I was quickly checking.

Sorry, counsel. Go ahead with your argument.

MR. DELIKANAKIS: My recollection is that there was some deposition testimony, and I wish I could point it to you, but I don't think they bothered to look for bankruptcy, to be blunt. I don't know if it was the deposition of the HOA or it was the deposition of SFR. I imagine it would be HOA. But anyway --

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Go ahead, counsel. I interrupted you. Sorry, go ahead, please.

MR. DELIKANAKIS: I'll withdraw that because I can't point you to it, so I'd rather not speculate. So at the end of the day was this transaction commercially unreasonable? I think it was. And at the end of the day is there some fundamental unfairness when a party follows the law and refrains from foreclosing -- especially when they filed their notice of default back in 2010 -- because of this stay and doesn't then proceed until after they bother to get a lift of stay. And that's the part, you know, the other parties, SFR and the HOA can't get around. They're stuck with --

THE COURT: The 196 days. Okay.

MR. DELIKANAKIS: They're stuck with that fact. It did occur and I don't think this Court should use the bankruptcy order to somehow wash away that fact to grant summary judgment in this case.

With regard to the <u>Bourne Valley</u> matter, I understand this Court's practice is not to grant stays, so I'm not going to *sua sponte* ask for a stay because I think it's going to be denied and it would be improper. If we wanted to file a motion to stay, we would. Do I think it would be prudent to wait until the U.S. Supreme Court, which this Court is bound by, to wait on the issue of the due process should be decided? Yeah, I think it would be prudent. But I understand that's kind of a non-starter pursuant to other decisions by this Court.

And aside from that, you know, I mean, I could go through -- this has been extensively briefed. To sit here and say that there are no genuine issues of material fact as to, for example unfairness, I think the question of fact is did we

receive notice. I understand there's a difference of opinion. You have cards, they said they were signed. Mr. Ferguson testified they did not receive it. I think there's another question as to whether the wording of the HOA foreclosure notice put U.S. Bank on notice that the security interest was in jeopardy. The notice was the generic notice that basically did not delineate that you had to pay the super priority amount. If anything, that's probably why Bank of -- excuse me, Wells Fargo Bank said we didn't change our procedure because we basically go ahead and proceed and foreclose and then pay it off. But there is a genuine question as to what is the effect of the notice on the bank that receives it if it does not delineate that they're in jeopardy of losing their collateral if they don't take some action.

And so once again, whether the bankruptcy automatic stay U.S.

Bank's abiding by versus the HOA's violation of it created a situation of unfairness at the HOA sale, yes. And also, the fact of the matter is is that if property is being sold and the debtor is in bankruptcy as a matter of public record, I think it did impact the fair market value sale.

So in this case it was six percent. It was \$14,000 versus I think \$128,000. This Court would be well within its power to declare at least as a matter of law that that dollar amount sale was so unconscionable that you can then at least proceed to the fact portion of the analysis as to the unfairness and allow the trier of fact to make a decision as to whether there was some unfairness, combined with this absurdly low price.

And unless the Court has any other questions --

THE COURT: I do not. Thank you so very much.

MR. DELIKANAKIS: Okay, thank you. Very good.

THE COURT: I appreciate it. Thank you.

Go ahead, HOA.

MR. WAITE: Your Honor, I'm not going to belabor much of what's said. My colleague for SFR did a fine job, and so I will just take what she said and say amen to that. And to answer your question, Your Honor, I'd like to read just the black and white words of this order from California. Box 18 checked: "Other. Specify. Items Number 4 A and C above are also applied to provide relief and annulment of the automatic stay retroactive to the petition date for any and all actions in support of the foreclosure taken with respect to the property by the Copper Ridge Community Association and/or its agent, Nevada Association Services."

I guess if God has a sponge that he wipes away things with, this would be the equivalent of the bankruptcy court sponge here. This says any and all actions taken, not the ones that we might think are okay or -- I don't even think they took a position other than bankruptcy stay gone as far as we've laid it out here. NAS, Copper Ridge and the movant, SFR, those are the only people we're worried about in this case, Your Honor. I would submit, just as my colleague for SFR did, this bankruptcy order does exactly what this Court needed it to to be able to make a decision as to whether or not there was a violation of the bankruptcy stay, and that is it was annulled retroactively and because of that it is as if it never existed for purposes of the foreclosure sale.

And so if we were to take what the bank wants us to and say, well, that's just what the paper says, but we think it's unfair, we don't think that it should be construed as broadly as they wrote it, that's not for us, that's not for the Court to decide whether or not we should construe another court's order broadly or not

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based on the wording. So we would submit, Your Honor, that this does take care of any issue with regard to a violation of the bankruptcy stay inasmuch as it relates to the foreclosure sale by NAS and the HOA.

THE COURT: Okay. But the bankruptcy code provision, right, any creditor can move forward, right, to lift the stay with relationship to an asset that's part of the debtor's estate in bankruptcy.

MR. WAITE: Yes.

THE COURT: Are you saying that the bankruptcy order applies Nevada law and says what can and cannot be done under a Golden v. Tomiyasu analysis, or are you saying that their limited focus -- and I don't have the benefit of the pleadings that even went before the bankruptcy court --

MR. WAITE: Right.

THE COURT: -- but, I mean --

MR. WAITE: And neither do I, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Right. So, do we know, was the bankruptcy court asked to just merely opine on whether or not an action that was taken against an asset of a debtor's estate, whether the fact that it was foreclosed on that it had no impact as to the debtor's estate, or are you saying that it was broader in front of the bankruptcy court?

MR. WAITE: What we're saying --

THE COURT: Hence the double lens that counsel for the bank is saying, you know what I mean. There's two aspects. The void ab initio aspect --

MR. WAITE: Right.

THE COURT: -- and then the second is, no, it just now goes back to what

1	impact, if I'm putting a lens on for what the parties knew in 2013, it goes back to
2	that aspect.
3	MR. WAITE: I understand, Your Honor. What we're saying is with regard to
4	the void ab initio this order should be pretty clear.
5	THE COURT: I don't think anyone disagrees that it's no longer void ab initio -
6	MR. WAITE: Right.
7	THE COURT: because the bankruptcy court says what the bankruptcy
8	court says. Right?
9	MR. WAITE: Right.
10	THE COURT: Are you contending that it's not I think you're conceding that,
11	right? I heard you concede it.
12	MR. DELIKANAKIS: Yes. Yes, Your Honor. Absolutely.
13	THE COURT: Joinder party. You're not I'll wait to hear from you to see if
14	they have a different position.
15	MR. BOHN: We're conceding. Yes.
16	THE COURT: Okay.
17	MR. WAITE: With regard to applying the Nevada law, applying the facts and
18	what affect the bankruptcy would have had on the foreclosure sale or the price that
19	was paid, the prices that were bid, we're not saying that this dispels with that aspect.
20	THE COURT: Okay.
21	MR. WAITE: But I will get to another point that was brought up with regard to
22	the notice of the bankruptcy. It is very true that you can't just go on the Recorder's
23	Office and see, just like you can if there's a lis pendens or other recorded documents

with the Assessor or the Recorder's website that something is pending, something

is out there. You can't do that with bankruptcy, at least not that I'm aware of. And so I don't -- because I cannot speak for NAS, I don't know what NAS did or did not know. It is my understanding, based on the facts that I have from NAS, that they were not aware of the bankruptcy or the stay. Certainly I can represent to Your Honor that the HOA itself had no idea. We first heard about the bankruptcy when it was brought up as an issue, and I don't have any other evidence to show that either NAS or the HOA were sent notice, were put on notice.

THE COURT: They weren't given a creditor's notice as having outstanding HOA payments?

MR. WAITE: We --

THE COURT: I mean, this is far afield. I mean, I'm just -- let's put it -- I take back my question. That was more of a --

MR. WAITE: Well, I understand what you're asking and the answer is to the best of my knowledge, no, I do not believe the HOA was listed as a creditor on the bankruptcy petition, which would have been listed as a -- on the mailing list for the notices. I don't have the pleading in front of me, the petition. I'm fairly certain that that's what the fact was, but again, I'm just going off of my recollection.

THE COURT: No worries. No worries.

MR. WAITE: And so I can't say whether or not the bankruptcy did or did not affect the price that anyone was willing to pay. Certainly we don't have any evidence. Nothing has been presented to this Court in pleadings, testimony, to say that anything did affect it -- that anything was affected, rather, by the bankruptcy.

We agree that SFR -- or we agree with SFR that <u>Saticoy Bay</u> does dispel or dispense with all the unconstitutionality claims. We would likewise not seek

or we would oppose a stay or a continuance. We feel Your Honor has the ability and 1 2 the authority to act and to make a decision based on the current state of Nevada law 3 in that regard. 4 And for purposes of time, Your Honor, again, I will just incorporate what 5 my colleague for SFR has said about the other issues that the bank has brought up. 6 And if Your Honor has any other questions, I'll be happy to answer them. 7 THE COURT: I appreciate it. 8 MR. WAITE: Thank you. 9 THE COURT: The spouse was Richard Parks, right? 10 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Excuse me, Your Honor? 11 THE COURT: Spouse was Richard Parks, the spouse's name? 12 MS. HANKS: Yes. I believe so, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Okay, thank you. 14 MS. HANKS: I don't know about Richard. I just know Parks. Sorry. I'm not 15 clear on that. THE COURT: No worries. I just was trying to get the husband's --16 17 MR. DELIKANAKIS: Yeah. I don't know, Your Honor. MS. HANKS: And it was Parks. Yeah. 18 19 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 20 MR. BOHN: Thank you, Your Honor. Michael Bohn for NV West Servicing. 21 I'm in an unusual position in this case. This isn't my normal big client I'm here on 22 most of the time. It's a different client and we have a different position here in that 23 my client acquired the property at the foreclosure sale done on the trust deed held

by U.S. Bank. We only filed joinders to U.S. Bank's position. If the Court rules

that the sale to SFR was not valid and they don't have good title, then my client has good title. If you rule in favor of SFR, then we have to have a long talk with the people at U.S. Bank. But we have just filed joinders and don't have anything to add other than what's already been presented to Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I appreciate it.

Have I given everyone an opportunity to speak? Anyone wish, in light of anybody's else, since they went first or second or third, think that there's anything more? Okay.

Well, I'm kind of back where I was at the beginning of this. And I appreciate the excellent oral argument. See, and I can't tell you that if you were to Google in people's name and type the word bankruptcy what might pop up or not pop up because that's not before me. I think I need subsequent -- as much as I'm appreciative of cost and expense, I really do think in this case if any party wishes to give me subsequent briefing of the impact of the bankruptcy on the sale, not the issue of the -- it seems you all agree, please let me know if somebody disagrees, that the fact that the bankruptcy did a retroactive order relating to the stay, that that takes away the bank's argument about being void ab initio and it would take away any oppositions, you know what I mean, that you disagreed with that, right?

So, but what still is left out there potentially, the Court takes no ruling, is the bank in both its motion for summary judgment and in its opposition -- U.S. Bank, I'll be more appropriate, U.S. Bank N.A. in its motion for summary judgment, opposition to SFR's motion and opposition to Copper Ridge's motion and indirectly by the joinders, since yours was a global joinder, it wasn't a limited joinder of the joinder party is that the Court should be evaluating the commercial reasonableness

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in a two-prong step. One is the straight 20 percent. Sorry, the Court is not going there. I don't think the Nevada Supreme Court goes there. But the second prong -- There's enough unpublished decisions. PNC is not the first of the unpublished decisions. There's a couple others. I say decisions, unpublished orders, excuse me, where the court has clarified it. In fact, very recently after Shadow Wood, it was about a month later was Judge Delaney's case. I think it was Centennial, but I'm pretty close.

But the second prong of looking at price plus, is the way I'm going to phrase it. Some people called it price plus, so -- and I'm not saying that that's the sole standard, but I think the Court in sitting in equity has to give the parties an opportunity if they choose, and if they don't wish to that's perfectly fine, but to evaluate whether or not the aspect of there being a bankruptcy of the underlying borrower or borrowers. I mean, some of you have called it borrower because only she's named, but yet in the bankruptcy petition it initially had both parties, it looks like, but whatever, party or individual borrower or borrowers. So I'll say Ms. Parks or the Parks, however you all wish to phrase it. That's going to be up to you. What impact that had that the Court should or should not -- whether the Court should or should not be considering the fact that there was that bankruptcy that was filed and as -- I'm looking at a lens of 2013 and what, if any, impact the Court should be looking at with regards to that and what -- you know, with regards to the pending motion for summary judgment.

Go ahead. You have a question for clarification?

MR. DELIKANAKIS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, of course. Go ahead.

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MR. DELIKANAKIS: Does this accrue to the claim that the sale was commercially unreasonable? Is that where the Court is going with this?

THE COURT: The equitable aspect that ties into the commercial unreasonableness. Yes.

MR. DELIKANAKIS: Yes. Okay. Thank you.

THE COURT: That's -- I'm limiting it to that. I think the other arguments that are fleshed out in your motions are fleshed out very well. I mean, I think everything is fleshed out very well, but I don't have the nuance in the other that I think that there is -- no one has asserted that there's any intervening law, any intervening factual scenario. While I'm appreciative I'm, what, I guess judge number three on this case, that doesn't matter for purposes -- I can read the record. But I think if I'm looking at dispositive motions where it's at least -- and the reason why the Court finds it's appropriate to ask for supplemental briefing because it was brought up in the bank's motion and opposition that this is an aspect that the Court should be looking at. And I think, though, now that you have an order and now that there is a little bit more known about the bankruptcy that I should give all the parties an opportunity if they choose to do so to do some supplemental briefing about what impact, if any, the bankruptcy -- you know, whether I'm looking at a lens that is 2013 or should I be looking at only a lens in 2017? Do you understand what I mean by that distinction?

MS. HANKS: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DELIKANAKIS: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. WAITE: Yes.

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THE COURT: Okay. Or maybe I should be looking at it both or maybe it should only be '17. I mean, any of those are options. And so I'm going to offer it out there if anyone thinks they want to potentially take it up. If everybody says you want me to rule today, I'll rule today.

MS. HANKS: Well, Your Honor, I think I would like to avoid a trial if at all possible, so if supplemental briefing might help in that, I would like to do that. It doesn't mean we might not end up with doing a trial and that there will be issues of fact that still appear, but I think it is certainly prudent to do a honed-in supplemental briefing on that very issue where we really just focus on that and then see where it goes.

MR. DELIKANAKIS: I would certainly welcome the opportunity to provide supplemental briefing.

MR. WAITE: Same.

MR. BOHN: I concur with counsel, yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, since I have everybody wanting to do it, you know what I mean -- like I said, it's optional. I'm not going to require it. But since at least one person wants to take me up on it, then I'm not going to rule today. And I think the cleaner, easier way really, although there's other arguments raised in each of the respective motions, is to do this in one fell-swoop order versus doing it piecemeal, particularly since if anyone wants any further -- whatever people may want or may not any further.

MS. HANKS: Understood.

THE COURT: Does anyone disagree with that concept?

MS. HANKS: No.

1	MR. WAITE: No.
2	MR. DELIKANAKIS: Just so I understand, we're all going to submit one
3	brief
4	THE COURT: Yeah.
5	MR. DELIKANAKIS: stating our position?
6	THE COURT: On the commercial reasonableness. I'm going to phrase it
7	as commercial I'm not narrowing it by calling it commercial reasonableness. The
8	assertion of I'll call it the equity arguments of what the Court should look at, the
9	impact of the bankruptcy with regards to the equity arguments raised by the various
10	parties in their briefs or responded to in their oppositions. Okay?
11	MR. DELIKANAKIS: Very good, Your Honor.
12	THE COURT: And then I think one brief, everyone to do it at the same time,
13	because this is an informational brief, this isn't an argument brief.
14	MS. HANKS: Right.
15	THE COURT: And that way if anyone doesn't want to do it, you know. Do
16	you want me to give you two days after the briefing date if somebody wants to do
17	a joinder?
18	MS. HANKS: Sure.
19	MR. DELIKANAKIS: Sure.
20	THE COURT: Or do you just want a straight briefing date? I'm not trying to
21	have people incur costs and fees. That's why
22	MS. HANKS: Let's do two days. That way if parties just want to join and they
23	don't want to

MR. BOHN: I'll likely just do a joinder.

1	MS. HANKS: Yeah. Let's do that, two days to join.
2	THE COURT: Okay. So I'm going to give you are you going to agree
3	upon a date that everybody, if you wish to file a briefing you file it by X date, and if
4	anybody didn't file a briefing but they want a joinder, then their joinder is two days.
5	But, you know, a joinder is
6	MS. HANKS: We join.
7	THE COURT: to that, it's not a you get two extra days. Okay? Is that fair
8	to everybody?
9	MR. DELIKANAKIS: Understood.
10	MR. WAITE: Understood.
11	THE COURT: Okay. So what date do you want?
12	MR. DELIKANAKIS: Three weeks?
13	MS. HANKS: Yeah, I
14	MR. DELIKANAKIS: Is that enough?
15	MS. HANKS: When is our trial? I'm sorry. When is our stack?
16	MR. DELIKANAKIS: There's no trial
17	MR. WAITE: I don't think we have one.
18	MS. HANKS: June 26th?
19	MR. DELIKANAKIS: I don't think we're on a stack, Your Honor.
20	MS. HANKS: Oh, we're not?
21	THE COURT: You do not currently have a trial date in this case
22	MR. DELIKANAKIS: Yeah, which is
23	THE COURT: which is where we were going next, because of your
24	bankruptcy, remember?

and discuss it among yourselves. Okay.

MS. HANKS: Particularly because we're not going to be able to respond, maybe we might.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to set it for a chambers decision. If I receive a request for hearing, it needs to have some reason why you need a hearing on -- you know what I mean, this aspect. Any requests for hearings, five days after the submission of the briefs.

MS. HANKS: Okay.

MR. DELIKANAKIS: Okay. You know, I had one --

THE COURT: Of course. Go ahead, counsel.

MR. DELIKANAKIS: -- one concern because this is what happens with these requests for hearings, they turn into opposition briefs. And, you know, if we're going to go down that road, then we're just going to do it uniformly. So if we just want to have -- you know, let's just, if we can, just agree that we're going to have a hearing because then it just turns in a whole slew -- everyone then feels compelled to file a response to the motion.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DELIKANAKIS: You know, it becomes very cumbersome. I've been there before.

MS. HANKS: And I'm okay doing it with chambers. It doesn't matter to me.

MR. DELIKANAKIS: We can -- yeah.

MS. HANKS: I'm confident in our briefing. I don't think we ever leave anything out. I just know that you had questions here today, and so it's always nice if you have some other questions, that's all. But --

THE COURT: I've been pretty exhaustive in my questions.

1	MS. HANKS: Yeah.
2	THE COURT: I mean, I wasn't trying to put anyone on the spot, but that's
3	really where the heart of when I saw this
4	MS. HANKS: Okay.
5	MR. DELIKANAKIS: Sure.
6	THE COURT: and I saw the order is this one has that unique aspect,
7	you know.
8	MS. HANKS: I'm fine either way.
9	THE COURT: You're fine either way?
10	MR. DELIKANAKIS: I'm fine either way.
11	MS. HANKS: I'm fine with that, too.
12	MR. DELIKANAKIS: I just don't want to go through this request oral
13	argument. Yeah.
14	THE COURT: HOA?
15	MR. WAITE: I'm good with that as well.
16	THE COURT: Which one?
17	MR. WAITE: We can set it for chambers. That's fine.
18	THE COURT: Okay.
19	MR. BOHN: I'm happy with chambers calendar, Your Honor.
20	THE COURT: Okay. Okay, so I'm going to set it for chambers, okay. And
21	today being June 6th, so I'm either going to have to set it for I'm either going to
22	have to give you two weeks well, if you wanted two weeks you'd have to do it
23	by June 20th and I'd set it for chambers for June 30th. If you don't want to do that,

then what I'm going to do is I'm not going to set it until chambers until July 28th

1	because I'm gone for a couple weeks in the July time period and I'm not going to
2	MS. HANKS: That would be
3	THE COURT: There's no reason to ask you to have briefs sitting around
4	here when I'm not here.
5	MS. HANKS: That would be perfect.
6	THE COURT: Unless you want to have briefs sitting around here when I'm
7	not here. That's your choice, too.
8	MR. DELIKANAKIS: No. July would work.
9	MS. HANKS: No. That will be perfect. That would give us
10	THE COURT: If I want chambers on July 28th, that means I need briefs by
11	July 18th.
12	MR. DELIKANAKIS: Very good, Your Honor.
13	THE COURT: Does that work?
14	MR. DELIKANAKIS: Yep.
15	MR. WAITE: Yes.
16	THE COURT: Is that too much time? Is that too little time?
17	MR. DELIKANAKIS: That's plenty of time.
18	MR. WAITE: That's plenty.
19	THE COURT: Okay. And then depending on the Court's ruling, what we'll do
20	is after the Court's ruling what I'm going to I'll probably well, depending on how
21	I rule on each of those, you may or may not get at the bottom of the minute order
22	that says the Court is then setting either a telephonic status check regarding trial
23	setting or you won't get it depending on how I rule, right?

MR. DELIKANAKIS: Exactly.

1	MS. HANKS: And do we want to reset our motion in limine?
2	MR. DELIKANAKIS: Yeah, can we
3	THE COURT: Do you want it today or you want it
4	MS. HANKS: I'd say reset it
5	MR. DELIKANAKIS: I'd like to reset it, Your Honor.
6	MS. HANKS: because it might be moot.
7	THE COURT: Is it moot? I mean, it's pretty much asking for I mean, it's
8	a standard
9	MS. HANKS: You've actually already ruled on a similar motion, so I imagine -
10	THE COURT: I mean, it's an NRCP 16 motion with a carve-out that if it's
11	new information the new information comes in at the time of trial, but you have to
12	establish it's new information.
13	MS. HANKS: Oh, that's our motion. Yes, Your Honor. Then you're right;
14	that's our motion. I was referring to I forgot we had our own motion.
15	THE COURT: Yeah, you had your motion. That's what I was
16	MS. HANKS: They have also a motion in limine, so.
17	THE COURT: Right.
18	MS. HANKS: But you're right, our motion doesn't really it doesn't matter
19	when you hear it. It's not that
20	THE COURT: When do you want yours heard?
21	MR. DELIKANAKIS: Before trial. Later.
22	THE COURT: Okay.
23	MR. DELIKANAKIS: Yeah.
24	THE COURT: So then we'll

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MR. DELIKANAKIS: The Court has dealt with this issue before, so.

THE COURT: It seems to me that if I need a telephonic, depending on the ruling on the 28th, then the Court is then at the bottom say the parties need to coordinate and set up a telephonic, because you're going to probably want just a telephonic to pick a new hearing date, if that's -- I mean, I'm not -- that's no way advance ruling, I'm just saying if there's anything left we'll do it that way. Is that the cleanest, easiest way, instead of having you come in for a status check?

MS. HANKS: That sounds good.

MR. DELIKANAKIS: We appreciate it.

THE COURT: And then we'll figure out then if you have to do a status check and reset hearings. Does that work for everyone?

MS. HANKS: Yes.

MR. DELIKANAKIS: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. BOHN: Yes.

THE COURT: Does that work for you as well? Okay, then we'll do it that way. So now that I've confused my clerk, because I have a wonderful clerk helping me this week that's not used to kind of the way I do these multi-step things, so July 28th is going to be the chambers calendar for a decision on the three pending motions for summary judgment and for the scheduling, if applicable, of the outstanding motions in limine. Okay?

THE CLERK: Okay.

THE COURT: So we'll move -- those motions in limine will be moved to the 28th of July, but realize there's not going to have a decision on that day, it's just we can't just leave things hanging out in dates. So it's going to be moved there, but

that's going to be for scheduling of those. Okay? And then July 28th is also going to be for setting up a telephone conference for trial scheduling if appropriate or if applicable. Okay? So that's in no way advance ruling, but that way at least we show what still is outstanding in this case.

MR. DELIKANAKIS: Very good, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It looks like you don't have -- I mean, of course you all are tracking your respective statute of limitations issues, right? And it looks like -- anybody think that somebody needs to expedite something?

MS. HANKS: I'm not aware of anything on our end.

MR. DELIKANAKIS: No.

MR. WAITE: No.

THE COURT: Okay. Then I think I've taken care of everything that was before me. Is there any other outstanding matters? Settlement conference in this case? I always ask. A lot of these cases have been resolved through the settlement conference procedure, honestly. I mean, there's a couple of judges who have done multiple of these and there's other judges who have done less than multiple but still have done them. A lot of them are resolving. Is this one --

MS. HANKS: We've resolved cases, too. My experience is we don't need a settlement conference.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. HANKS: Both parties are sophisticated; it's just numbers. We don't really need a mediator.

MR. DELIKANAKIS: Not at this point, Your Honor. That might change after your Court's ruling.

1	THE COURT: Okay. Sounds great. Then I won't at this juncture. Thank you
2	so very much for your time. Thank you for your patience. I hope everyone has a
3	nice rest of your week.
4	MR. DELIKANAKIS: Thank you, Your Honor.
5	MR. WAITE: Thank you, Your Honor.
6	MR. BOHN: Thank you, Your Honor.
7	THE COURT: Thank you.
8	(PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 11:43 A.M.)
9	* * * * *
10	
11	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the
12	audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.
13	Lig Sancia
14	Liz Garcia, Transcriber LGM Transcription Service
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# **TAB 33**

7/31/2017 5:49 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 John S. Delikanakis Nevada Bar No. 5928 2 Daniel S. Ivie Nevada Bar No. 10090 3 SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. 3883 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 1100 Las Vegas, NV 89169 4 Telephone: (702) 784-5200 5 Facsimile: (702) 784-5252 Email: jdelikanakis@swlaw.com 6 Email: divie@swlaw.com 7 Attorneys for Defendant U.S. BANK, N.A., a national banking association as Trustee for the Certificate 8 Holders of Wells Fargo Asset Securities Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR4 9 IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 10 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 11 12 SFR INVESTMENTS POOL 1, LLC, a Consolidated Case Nos. A-13-678814-C 13 Nevada limited liability company, A-13-688734-C Plaintiff, 14 Dept. XXXI 15 VS. U.S. BANK'S SUPPLEMENTAL ·U.S. BANK, N.A., a national banking **BRIEF RE: UNFAIRNESS** association as Trustee for the Certificate Holders of U.S. Bank Asset Securities 17 Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR4; LUCIA 18 PARKS, an individual; DOES I through X; and ROE CORPORATIONS I through X, inclusive, 19 Defendants. 20 21 AND ALL RELATED MATTERS. 22 Defendant U.S. Bank, N.A., a national banking association as Trustee for the Certificate 23 Holders of Wells Fargo Asset Securities Corporation, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 24 2006-AR4 ("U.S. Bank"), by and through its attorneys at the law firm of Snell & Wilmer L.L.P., 25 submits the following supplemental brief regarding the unfairness of the HOA foreclosure sale. 26 /// 27 /// 28

- 1 -

**Electronically Filed** 

#### I. INTRODUCTION

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At the last hearing on the parties' motions for summary judgment, the Court requested additional briefing regarding the issue of unfairness in the context of the HOA foreclosure sale at issue in this case. This brief responds to that request.

As a preliminary matter, the bankruptcy court's decision to retroactively annul the automatic stay to prevent the HOA sale from being voided does not mean that the HOA sale and the circumstances surrounding it are retroactively "fair." The standard applied by a bankruptcy court when considering whether to retroactively annul an automatic stay is entirely separate and distinct from the standard this Court must apply when evaluating the commercial reasonableness of the HOA foreclosure sale.

Second, when analyzed under the correct standard of "fairness" as defined by the Nevada Supreme Court, it becomes clear that the HOA sale in this case should be invalidated because it was fundamentally unfair to U.S. Bank. As the authorities discussed below demonstrate, the Nevada Supreme Court will invalidate transactions and protect a party's interests where the fairness and equity demand. This is just such a case. Additionally, authorities from Nevada federal courts and courts across the country agree that equity demands that an unfair foreclosure sale be set aside as a matter of equity.

Based on upon these supplemental authorities, as well as those contained in U.S. Bank's fully briefed motion for summary judgment, this Court should invalidate the HOA sale and enter a finding that U.S. Bank's deed of trust remains as a valid security interest on the property.

#### **ARGUMENT** II.

### The Bankruptcy Court's Retroactive Annulment Order Is Not Evidence that Α. the HOA Foreclosure Sale Was Conducted Fairly.

SFR is likely to argue that the bankruptcy court's decision to retroactively annul the automatic stay, thereby removing the basis for U.S. Bank's position that the HOA sale was void, confirms that the HOA sale was conducted fairly and is therefore commercially reasonable. However, the argument is flawed and should be rejected because it relies on the faulty premise that the bankruptcy court's decision was based on the same or similar standard that this Court

must apply in evaluating the commercial reasonableness of the sale. That is not the case. The bankruptcy court applied a distinct and wholly irrelevant standard in deciding to retroactively annul the automatic stay.

Bankruptcy courts have authority to make exceptions to, or to annul, an automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). *In re Fjeldsted*, 293 B.R. 12, 24–25 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2003). Bankruptcy courts in the Ninth Circuit evaluate whether cause exists for annulment of the automatic stay by using a "balancing of equities" test. *Id.* Although the *Fjeldsted* court articulated twelve factors, it also emphasized that those factors are merely a framework and not a scorecard to be mechanistically applied. *Id.* at 25. The *Fjeldsted* court also noted "[t]he general trend has been to focus on two factors in determining whether cause exists to annul the stay: "(1) whether the creditor was aware of the bankruptcy petition; and (2) whether the debtor engaged in unreasonable or inequitable conduct, or prejudice would result to the creditor." *Id.* Moreover, in any given case, one factor may so outweigh the others as to be dispositive. *Id.* 

In this case, the bankruptcy court noted that several of the *Fjeldsted* factors (1, 2, 4, 6, and 11) were simply inapplicable to this case as the debtors (the Parks) were not even involved in the reopened bankruptcy case. The bankruptcy court also noted that the ninth factor (how quickly SFR moved for annulment) weighed against SFR as it waited a considerable time to file its annulment motion after realizing that it had violated the automatic stay. *See* Annulment Order, p. 12, a copy of which is attached hereto as **Exhibit 7**. However, the bankruptcy court noted that the seventh (ease of restoring parties to status quo ante), eighth (cost of annulment to debtors and creditors), and twelfth (judicial economy and other efficiencies) factors favored annulment because denying annulment would result in voiding the sale to SFR, which would then create a chain of events and complications to undo the sale. **Ex. 7**, p. 12. The bankruptcy court was concerned that if the sale was deemed void, SFR would seek reimbursement from the debtor and/or U.S. Bank for the alleged funds it expended in rehabilitating the property. **Ex. 7**, p. 12.

The Bankruptcy Court concluded that it would be difficult to restore the status quo ante.

That factor, coupled with the fact that the debtors themselves had no position on the outcome of the annulment motion, and that the bankruptcy estate, the debtor, and all other creditors were

bystanders to the two party dispute between SFR and U.S. Bank, led the Court to grant annulment as it saw no bankruptcy purpose furthered by the denial of the annulment motion.

These factors, however, are irrelevant here.

## B. Under Nevada Law, The Retroactively Annulled Stay Created A Fundamental Unfairness Which Justifies Overturning The HOA Sale.

The Court's task in this matter is to assess whether the HOA sale, including the totality of the facts and circumstances as they were known and considered at the time of the sale, was conducted in a fair and commercially reasonable manner. When analyzed under Nevada Supreme Court authority concerning fairness in this and related contexts, it is clear that the sale was fundamentally unfair and should be invalidated.

The Nevada Supreme Court has not fully articulated what constitutes "fairness" as it relates to HOA foreclosure sales. However, it is well settled that a Nevada court, sitting in equity, may set aside an otherwise valid foreclosure sale (of whatever type) so long as two factors are present: (1) the sales price was inadequate<sup>1</sup>; and (2) there is evidence of fraud, unfairness, or oppression related to the sale. *Golden v. Tomiyasu*, 79 Nev. 503, 504, 387 P.2d 989 (1963); *Shadow Wood HOA v. N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp*, 366 P.3d 1105, 1112, 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 5 (2016).

Nevada first adopted this rule in *Golden v. Tomiyasu*, where the Nevada Supreme Court held "that inadequacy of price, however gross, is not in itself a sufficient ground for setting aside a trustee's sale legally made; there must be in addition proof of some element of fraud, unfairness, or oppression as accounts for and brings about the inadequacy of price." *Id.* at 514.

The *Golden* court went on to clarify that where the price "inadequacy is palpable and great, very slight additional evidence of unfairness or irregularity is sufficient to authorize the granting of the relief sought." *Id.*, at 515, 995 (internal citation omitted, emphasis supplied). Stated another way, "if there be great inadequacy<sup>2</sup>, slight circumstances of unfairness in the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> U.S. Bank has previously argued that Nevada law holds that a sales price less than 20% of the fair market value of the property is grossly inadequate as a matter of law, and therefore sufficient to invalidate a sale. *See* U.S. Bank's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, 8:11-11:19. U.S. Bank reasserts that argument here.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> U.S. Bank has previously demonstrated that the sales price at the HOA sale here was wholly inadequate. SFR paid only \$14,000 for the property, which is a mere 6.1% of the fair market value of the property at the time of the sale (\$228,000).

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conduct of the party benefitted by the sale will be sufficient to justify setting it aside." ZYZZX2, at \*4 (citing *Ballentyne*, 205 U.S. at 290).

The Nevada Supreme Court recently reiterated this rule in Shadow Wood HOA v. N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp, 366 P.3d 1105, 1112, 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 5 (2016). In that case, the court confirmed that Nevada law gives courts "the power, in an appropriate case, to set aside a defective foreclosure sale on equitable grounds." Id. at 1111. The Shadow Wood court expressly affirmed that an HOA foreclosure sale can be properly set aside where an inadequate price is combined with "a showing of fraud, unfairness or oppression." *Id.* at 1112.

In addition to the authorities cited above which discuss unfairness in the context of foreclosure sales, the Nevada Supreme Court has addressed what constitutes "fairness" in a number of other contexts, some of which are instructive here. A review of these cases demonstrates that the HOA's violation of the automatic stay was fundamentally unfair to U.S. Bank in the context of the HOA sale.

> It Is Unfair To Retroactively Alter Legal Requirements To Benefit One Party And The Detriment Of Another.

In City of Reno v. Nev. First Thrift, 100 Nev. 483, 686 P.2d 231 (1984), the Nevada Supreme Court reviewed whether a city may retroactively enforce zoning regulations against a contractor that acquired its permits under the prior code. Id., 100 Nev. at 485. There, non-party Vari-Build submitted construction plans for a residential complex in Reno. Id. After reviewing the plans, the city approved the project and issued Vari-Build a building permit. Later, Vari-Build obtained financing from Nevada First Thrift to complete construction. Id. During construction, the city amended the zoning code and the project no longer met the requirements. Id. These new zoning code prevented Vari-Build from qualifying for a business license or renting the units. *Id.* As a result, Vari-Build defaulted on its obligation with Nevada First. *Id.* 

Nevada First foreclosed and then obtained a writ of mandamus to compel the city to issue it a business license to complete the units and begin renting them. Id. The city appealed. Id. The Nevada Supreme Court, however, affirmed the writ finding "the City . . . acted unfairly by attempting to retroactively enforce the new interpretation of [the code]." Id. at 489. In essence,

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the Nevada Supreme Court ruled that it was unfair for the one party to disadvantage the other by retroactively applying the rules. Here, the City knowingly adopted changes that would adversely affect Vari-Build's interest in the project. Changing the rules at that stage of the project when the project was complete and ready to lease—was patently unfair. The Court also found that the city's actions were not merely unfair, they violated public policy as well. "It would ... offend public policy if cities were allowed to retroactively apply modified building rules and zoning changes so late in the life of a project." Id. at 487 (quoting Deer Park Civic Assoc. v. City of Chicago, 347 III. App. 346, 106 N.E.2d 823, 825 (1952)). Fairness does not allow one party to change the rules to its benefit and the detriment of others late in the interaction.

Applying Nevada First Thrift to this situation demonstrates that the retroactive annulment of the automatic stay to benefit SFR was inherently unfair to U.S. Bank. U.S. Bank complied with the automatic stay and delayed its own proper foreclosure action once the homeowner filed bankruptcy. U.S. Bank properly sought and obtained relief from the automatic stay in order to continue its foreclosure of the property. The HOA, on the other hand, and by extension SFR, violated the automatic stay by pressing forward and conducting the HOA sale while the homeowner's bankruptcy was still active, to the detriment of U.S. Bank. SFR then surreptitiously reopened the homeowner's bankruptcy proceedings and moved to annul the stay, without notifying U.S. Bank or the other parties to this litigation.<sup>3</sup>

The bankruptcy court's decision to retroactively annul the stay operated to unfairly benefit SFR and disadvantage U.S. Bank in these proceedings. Under the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in Nevada First Thrift, this retroactive changing of the rules to benefit one party created a fundamentally unfair situation vis-à-vis U.S. Bank.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> SFR never notified U.S. Bank of its efforts to reopen the bankruptcy or to retroactively annul the automatic stay and never served copies of its moving papers on U.S. Bank. Indeed, counsel for U.S. Bank did not learn of SFR's furtive actions in the bankruptcy court until SFR filed its Opposition to U.S. Bank's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment on February 13, 2017, less than 24 hours before the scheduled hearing on SFR's motion to retroactively annul the automatic stay on February 14, 2017. At no time during the course of its efforts to annul the automatic stay did counsel for SFR contact counsel for U.S. Bank to ascertain whether they were aware of the proceedings in the California bankruptcy court or if U.S. Bank intended to appear, despite the fact that SFR knew that U.S. Bank had raised the bankruptcy issue in its Motion for Summary Judgment filed in August, 2016.

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It Is Inherently Unfair To Punish A Party For Taking Steps To Avoid 2. Adverse Consequences.

In Wheeler Springs Plaza v. Beemon, 119 Nev. 260, 71 P.3d 1258 (2003), the Nevada Supreme Court examined whether a party's satisfaction of a judgment eliminated that party's right to appeal the judgment. Id., 119 Nev. at 262. In this case, Wheeler Springs owned a multifamily residential complex, and Beemon was a tenant. Id. Beemon sued Wheeler Springs for breach of contract and misrepresentation and the trial court entered judgment in favor of Beemon. Id. at 263. Although Wheeler Springs timely appealed, it did not seek to stay the judgment, but chose to satisfy the judgment while the appeal progressed. Id. On appeal, Beemon argued that Wheeler Springs had waived its right to appeal the judgment by satisfying it. Id. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected this argument because of the "inherent unfairness" to Wheeler Springs. The Court found it "inherently unfair" to extinguish a judgment debtor's right to appeal merely because that debtor acted in good faith to satisfy that judgment. *Id*.

Applying Wheeler Springs to the facts of this case demonstrates "inherent unfairness" in this HOA foreclosure sale. As discussed above, U.S. Bank halted its own foreclosure sale upon learning of the homeowner's bankruptcy in order to comply with the bankruptcy code and the automatic stay. In contrast, the HOA pressed forward with its own sale in violation of the automatic stay and federal law. Similar to Wheeler Springs, this Court should not allow the HOA sale to stand because doing so would result in punishing U.S. Bank for following the law and properly halting its own sale, while rewarding the HOA and SFR for violating the stay. It would be inherently unfair to punish U.S. Bank for complying with federal law while rewarding the HOA and SFR for flouting that same law, intentionally or not.

## Persuasive Authorities Outside Of Nevada Likewise Support A Finding Of C. Unfairness Justifying The Setting Aside Of The HOA Foreclosure Sale.

Though Nevada authorities in this area are somewhat limited, persuasive authorities from Nevada federal courts and from state and federal courts outside of Nevada provide significant support for finding that the HOA sale here was substantially unfair and should be set aside as commercially unreasonable.

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The first and perhaps most persuasive case comes from the federal district court in Nevada. In ZYZZX2 v. Dizon, 2016 WL 1181666 (D.Nev. March 22, 2017), Judge Mahan was faced with the task of determining whether an HOA foreclosure sale was commercially unreasonable under Nevada's HOA foreclosure statute. Id. at \*4-5. In Dizon, the property was sold for \$15,000, just seven percent of the fair market value of the property. Id. at \*5. Additionally, the HOA "represented to both the general public as well as Wells Fargo that the association's foreclosure would not extinguish the first deed of trust." *Id.* The HOA's governing documents, which the court noted were publicly available, also included a mortgage protection clause which provided that the HOA's lien was subordinate to the lender's deed of trust. Id. After the sale, the purchaser filed suit to quiet title and extinguish the deed of trust. The lender countered that the HOA sale was commercially unreasonable due to the extremely low sales price and the unfairness of the HOA's representation that the deed of trust would not be extinguished. *Id.* at \*4.

Analyzing this issue under Nevada's foreclosure and commercial reasonableness authorities, including Golden v. Tomiyasu, Long v. Towne and Shadow Wood Homeowners Association, Inc. v. New York Community Bancorp, Inc., the Dizon court first found that the \$15,000 sales price was "disproportionately low". Id. Noting that "[w]hen a sale price is demonstrably inadequate, courts in equity may invalidate a sale upon a showing of any slight defect in the sale," the court proceeded to analyze the circumstances of the sale for any evidence of "slight circumstances of unfairness in the conduct of the party benefited by the sale". Id. The court seized on the HOA's representations that the sale would not extinguish the lender's deed of trust and as evidence that the sale was unfair. Id. In particular, the court noted that the HOA's representations were "legally inaccurate and resulted in an unreasonably low sale price." *Id.* The court found that "[h]igher bidders were dissuaded from offering a commercially reasonable price based on the assertions that they would take title subject to the mortgage loan. This defect in sale, coupled with a disproportionately low price, demonstrates that the foreclosure was unfair and

commercially unreasonable." *Id.* (emphasis supplied).

The facts in *Dizon* and Judge Mahan's reasoning in that case are analogous to this matter. Here, the HOA sale produced a similar and extremely inadequate sales price equal to just <u>six</u> <u>percent</u> of the property's fair market value, one percent lower than in *Dizon*. Additionally, the HOA's sale of the property in this case, while the automatic stay was in place, similarly operated to dissuade higher bidders from offering a commercially reasonable price based on the knowledge that the sale could later be voided for violating the stay. This resulted in a foreclosure sale that was patently unfair for the same reasons expressed in *Dizon*. This Court should follow the reasoning of the federal district court and find that the HOA sale was commercially unreasonable due to the inadequate price and the unfairness of the automatic stay violation.

2. Foreclosing Agent Has Duty to Take Reasonable and Appropriate Steps to Avoid Sacrifice of Property.

In *Baskurt v. Beal*, 101 P.3d 1041 (Ala. 2004), the Alaska Supreme Court was faced with whether to set aside a foreclosure sale under a deed of trust. The applicable deed of trust covered two separate parcels of property and gave the foreclosure trustee the option of selling the parcels as a unit or separately. *Id.* at 1042. When the borrower defaulted, the trustee elected to sell the parcels as a whole and sold the entire property for the single bid of \$25,781.81, one dollar above the minimum opening bid and less than twelve percent of the property's fair market value. *Id.* at 1043, 1046. The borrower later moved to set aside the sale, arguing that the inadequate price combined with the trustee's decision to sell the property as one parcel justified setting the sale aside. *Id.* at 1043. The trial court agreed and set aside the sale. *Id.* 

On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision setting aside the sale. The court applied the Restatement's "grossly inadequate" sales price rule, which likely would have been enough to set aside the sale on its own, as the sales price was below the Restatement's 20 percent threshold. *Id.* at 1045. However, the *Baskurt* court went beyond the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> In a similar Nevada federal case, Judge Larry Hicks held that a lender's commercial unreasonableness claim was properly plead because the lender "sufficiently demonstrated that the price of the property was 'grossly inadequate'" under the Restatement of Property Mortgages § 8.3 and because the lender alleged that the HOA sale was defective because the HOA's lien improperly included costs of collection. *Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. TBR I LLC*, 2016 WL 3965195, \*4-5 (D.Nev. July 22, 2016). While Judge Hicks did not rule that the sale was commercially unreasonable at this stage (the matter came before the court via a motion to dismiss), this case demonstrates the court's acceptance of the "slight circumstances of unfairness" standard.

grossly inadequate price and analyzed the specific circumstances of the sale for evidence of unfairness. The court ruled that a foreclosure trustee has a "duty to take reasonable and appropriate steps to avoid sacrifice of the debtor's property and interest." *Id.* at 1046. In this case, the court found that the trustee's decision to sell the property in bulk, rather than in separate parcels, constituted an "unreasonable failure" justifying the invalidation of the sale.<sup>5</sup> *Id.* The court found that selling either parcel individually would likely have generated sufficient proceeds to satisfy the amount due. *Id.* 

The property in bulk was unreasonable, despite the fact that the deed of trust allowed the trustee to choose whether to sell it as one or separate parcels. By selling the property in bulk, the trustee failed to "take reasonable and appropriate steps" to avoid sacrificing the property. Here, the HOA and SFR failed to take reasonable steps to determine whether the borrower was in an active bankruptcy proceeding. Such information was publicly available to both parties, although neither even attempted to check for a bankruptcy. See Exhibit 4 to U.S. Bank's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, Kelso Depo., 27:8-20; see also Deposition of Sharon Bergeron, attached hereto as Exhibit 8, 48:19-49:2. As a consequence, the sale was conducted in violation of the automatic stay. The HOA had a duty to take reasonable and appropriate steps to avoid sacrificing the property by conducting a sale in violation of the stay. The presence of the stay chilled potential bidders from participating in the sale, resulting in a severely inadequate price. Just like in Baskurt, this Court should set aside the HOA foreclosure sale as commercially unreasonable.

3. Courts Will Find Unfairness Where "Justice Is Not Otherwise Done".

In Wells Fargo Bank v. McClusky, 999 N.E.2d 321, 376 Ill Dec. 438 (Ill. 2013), the Illinois Supreme Court analyzed the factors that justify setting aside a foreclosure sale. There, McClusky defaulted on her mortgage obligation with Wells Fargo Bank. *Id.* at 323. The bank then initiated foreclosure proceedings against McClusky, who failed to answer or otherwise

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> In a similar case, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts set aside a foreclosure where foreclosing party advertised the sale by the most limited means permitted by the statute. See In re Edry, 201 B.R. 604 (Bankr. Mass. 1996). Although the advertising scheme technically conformed to the statute, the court in In re Edry nevertheless overturned the sale because it concluded that "the Bank did not make, in good faith, a diligent effort to protect the interest of the Debtor." Id. at 607.

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respond to the notices of foreclosure. Id. Accordingly, the trial court entered a default judgment in favor of the bank. Id.

Seven months after the default judgment, McClusky filed an emergency motion to stay the foreclosure sale and set aside the default judgment. Id. at 323-24. She argued that her husband had since found gainful employment after the default judgment and could now meet the mortgage obligation. Id. Wells Fargo agreed to postpone its foreclosure for seventy-five days to negotiate a loan modification with McClusky. Id. Negotiations failed, however, and the trial court denied McClusky's motion to set aside the default judgment finding that she voluntarily withdrew the motion when she agreed to postpone the foreclosure sale. *Id.* at 324.

On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the court examined Illinois's foreclosure statute, which states:

> [T]he court shall confirm the sale unless the court finds that: (i) proper notice of the sale was not given; (ii) the terms of the sale were unconscionable; (iii) the sale was conducted fraudulently; or (iv) justice was not otherwise done.

Id. at 444 (citing 735 ILCS 5/15-1508(b) (West 2010) (emphasis added). Admittedly, the McClusky court analyzed a foreclosure statute unlike Nevada's. However, the court clarified that Illinois' statute "merely codif[ied] the long-standing discretion of the courts of equity to refuse to confirm a judicial sale." Id. It continued, "[1]ong before the codification of Foreclosure Law, courts have retained the power to vacate a sale where unfairness is shown that is prejudicial to an interested party." Id. (emphasis added). In other words, a court may unwind a foreclosure sale when one party's actions adversely affect the other party's interest in a property and prevent justice from being done. Id.; see also, Fleet Mortg. Corp. v. Deale, 287 IllApp.3d 385, 678 N.E.2d 35 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (finding that justice was not otherwise done when a lender's error prevented a borrower from exercising redemption rights); Comm. Credit Loans, Inc. v. Espinoza, 293 Ill.App.3d 915, 689 N.E.2d 282 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (justice was not otherwise done when a sales price of one-sixth of property's fair market value combined with lender ignoring borrower's requests to cure default prevented borrower from exercising her rights to redeem).