

1 **IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA**

2
3 WYNN RESORTS LIMITED and
STEPHEN A. WYNN,

4 Petitioners,
5 vs.

6 THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
7 COURT OF THE STATE OF
8 NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE
9 COUNTY OF CLARK; AND
10 THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH
11 GONZALEZ, DISTRICT JUDGE,
12 DEPT. XI

13 Respondent,

14 KAZUO OKADA; UNIVERSAL
15 ENTERTAINMENT CORP. AND
16 ARUZE USA, INC.,

17 Real Parties in Interest.

Case Nos. 74591

Electronically Filed
Jan 26 2018 04:09 p.m.

Elizabeth A. Brown

WYNN RESORTS LIMITED'S
OPPOSITION TO ARUZE
PARTIES' NRCP 27(e)
EMERGENCY MOTION TO
DEFER CONSIDERATION OF
THE PENDING WRIT PETITION,
ON WHICH ORAL ARGUMENT IS
SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY 6,
2018, PENDING FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS IN
DISTRICT COURT

18 **I. INTRODUCTION**

19 Real Parties in Interest Universal Entertainment Corp., Aruze USA, Inc. and
20 Kazuo Okada (collectively the "Okada Parties") should simply admit the obvious:
21 Their core contention throughout this case and upon which the District Court has
22 scheduled a six (6)-month trial as to Wynn Resorts – that the Business Judgment
23 Rule serves only as a limitation upon personal liability for directors – is utterly
24 indefensible. Unable to defend the indefensible, the Okada Parties' Answer to the
25 Petition – after making up non-existing rulings – devoted most of its efforts to
26 challenging something not raised by the Petition: The propriety of summary
27 judgment for the Director Defendants. Even the Okada Parties recognize that their
28 argument as to the Business Judgment Rule's application to Wynn Resorts is
untenable. The actions of the Board majority are, by definition, the actions of the
corporation itself.

1 Once again, the Okada Parties want this Court to ignore the continued
2 disintegration of Nevada's Business Judgment Rule, noting that they are challenging
3 the District Court's entry of summary judgment for the Director Defendants under
4 NRCP 60. This is no different than their Answer's contention that they intended to
5 appeal that ruling in the future so they suggest this Court should just leave the legal
6 error undisturbed. To pretend that there is substance here, they blusterously
7 proclaim "new" evidence that was "concealed" and that this undoes the District
8 Court's summary judgment for the Director Defendants. (Mot. at 2-3.) But, just as
9 with their Answer's empty rhetoric – manufacturing non-existent favorable rulings¹
10 – their lack of forthrightness continues.

11 Wynn Resorts' Petition concerns the District Court's ruling that Nevada
12 corporations do not get the benefit of the Business Judgment Rule even for actions
13 by a majority of directors, because the rule supposedly does not apply to the entity's
14 actions. That error is fundamental to this case and is unaffected by the
15 Okada Parties' Rule 60 motion before the District Court. Moreover, the information
16 about which the Okada Parties feign hyperventilation now is not remotely "new,"
17 and is consistent with, and cumulative of, the testimony and other evidence long
18 ago provided by the Director Defendants. Indeed, the Okada Parties argued all of
19 these same facts and inferences in opposing summary judgment, which the
20 District Court found did not create any material issues of fact.

21 But more fundamentally, it has no bearing on the merits of the Petition: The
22 District Court's ruling is that the Business Judgment Rule is a limitation on director
23 liability only and does not apply to a corporation's actions, even if those actions are
24 the result of a board vote. Even suspending reality and assuming a basis for
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26 _____
27 ¹ Recall, as noted in Wynn Resorts' Reply, the Okada Parties made a number
28 of outlandish claims as to how the District Court had concluded that there were
various material issues of fact for trial. Of course, the District Court made no such
findings whatsoever. (Wynn Resorts' Reply at 2 n.3 and 10 n.5.)

1 Rule 60 relief (which there is none), the District Court's erroneous application of the
2 Business Judgment Rule remains and will continue to infect this case.

3 That continuing flaw will still permeate any trial (assuming that there is a
4 basis for one). Thus, even assuming for the sake of argument that the
5 Director Defendants' entitlement to the protections of the Business Judgment Rule
6 were somehow an issue for trial, that would in no way resolve the Company's
7 entitlement to the protections of the Business Judgment Rule. According to the
8 District Court, the rule does not apply to the actions of the Company based upon the
9 Board's vote. Thus, even assuming grounds exist for a trial, should the
10 Director Defendants prevail, the District Court is still depriving the Company of its
11 rights under the Business Judgment Rule. That is a matter – indeed, the whole
12 point of the Petition – that needs to be immediately resolved regardless of what the
13 District Court does relative to the pending Rule 60 motion.

14 It is understandable why the Okada Parties do not want to address the actual
15 merits of the District Court's Business Judgment Rule analysis, an error they have
16 advanced and perpetuated throughout this case. That issue is fully briefed and ripe
17 for this Court's resolution now, particularly where the District Court has stated its
18 intent to hold a six-month trial concerning the Company, a trial premised on a clear
19 and indisputable legal error. No Nevada litigant, regardless of their economic
20 means, should be required to participate in a six-month long trial that is predicated
21 upon such a fundamental flaw of corporate law. Nor should the Nevada taxpayers
22 be required to incur that burden, particularly when this Court can promptly address
23 it and resolve it. The motion for deferment should be denied.

24 **II. ANALYSIS**

25 **A. The NRCP 60 Motion Fails and Still Does Not Resolve the** 26 **Erroneous Business Judgment Rule Analysis for Wynn Resorts.**

27 Most of the Okada Parties' deferment request rests upon the apparent hope
28 that this Court will make a snap assessment as to their NRCP 60 motion from which

1 the Okada Parties will then suggest that a deferment is a tacit approval by this Court
2 as to the merits of their Rule 60 request.² Respectfully, this Court should decline to
3 take that bait, as it is in no position to assess the merits of that motion. After all, the
4 merits of summary judgment for the Director Defendants is not the matter presented
5 by the Petition. As set forth in more detail below, the District Court's business
6 judgment error – that it does not apply to the Company's actions based upon a
7 majority vote of the Board – remains regardless of what the District Court does
8 relative to the already-adjudicated claims against the Director Defendants.

9 In the interest of completeness only, Wynn Resorts briefly exposes the lack
10 of substance to the Okada Parties' unhinged rhetoric of "new" evidence. It is
11 nothing of the sort, as it is simply more of the same materials long argued by the
12 Okada Parties as constituting a "sham" investigation by former federal judge and
13 FBI director Louis J. Freeh ("Judge Freeh"). But of course, presenting cumulative
14 and repackaged arguments is no basis for relief under NRCP 60. *See*
15 *Moron-Barradas v. Department of Ed. of Con. of Puerto Rico*, 488 F.3d 472, 482
16 (1st Cir. 2007) (evidence seeking to set aside summary judgment ruling is not
17 "new" under Rule 60 if it is cumulative of the other evidence and inferences which
18 were already deemed insufficient to defeat summary judgment); *see also Serafinn v.*
19 *Local 722, Int. Brotherhood of Teamsters*, 579 F.3d 908, 917 (7th Cir. 2010)
20 (purported new evidence could not have defeated summary judgment because it
21 was cumulative of other evidence and inferences made when opposing summary
22 judgment).

23 What the Okada Parties advertise as newly-discovered evidence is more of
24 the same basis for their original opposition to summary judgment, including on
25 matters that were not even disputed. Indeed, Wynn Resorts never disputed that its
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27 ² After all, they attach the entirety of their Rule 60 motion even though it was
28 just filed, the Director Defendants have had no opportunity to respond, and the
District Court will not consider it until February 5, 2018.

1 Directors believed that they had both a legal and factual justification for redeeming
2 the shares affiliated with the Okada Parties, including before Judge Freeh's
3 investigation and report. And, in opposing summary judgment, the Okada Parties

4 [REDACTED]
5 [REDACTED]. (Ex. 1, Defendants'
6 Counterstatement of Material Disputed Facts in Support of Opposition to
7 Wynn Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment, ¶ 105.)

8 Tellingly, the Okada Parties omit how they made all these same arguments in
9 opposing summary judgment in the first place. An entire section of their proffered
10 "disputed facts" is centered on Judge Freeh's investigation supposedly being a
11 "sham" because [REDACTED],

12 [REDACTED]. (Ex. 1, ¶¶ 47-89.) As
13 Director Boone Wayson testified nearly two years before the District Court entered
14 summary judgment, [REDACTED]

15 [REDACTED]
16 [REDACTED]
17 [REDACTED]. (Ex. 2, Dep. Tr., D. Wayson, Feb. 16, 2016, 144:12-22.) Similarly,
18 Director Alvin Shoemaker had noted, [REDACTED]

19 [REDACTED]
20 [REDACTED]. (Ex. 1,
21 ¶105.) Thus, there is nothing "new" about the fact that the Wynn Resorts Directors
22 believed that they had ample basis to take action against the Okada Parties even
23 before Judge Freeh's investigation and damning report confirmed Okada's corrupt
24 practices.

25 For the sake of brevity, here are just some of the very same facts that the
26 Okada Parties long ago claimed defeated summary judgment and which the
27 District Court rejected:

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- [REDACTED] . (Id. ¶¶ 48-51)
- [REDACTED] (Id. ¶ 52.)
- [REDACTED]³
- [REDACTED] (Id. ¶ 58.)
- [REDACTED] (Id. ¶ 57.)
- [REDACTED] (Id. ¶ 105.)

Simply put, there is nothing new about the Okada Parties' story or the evidence that they cite. [REDACTED].

³ The Okada Parties confirm their lack of substance and embarrass themselves when they claim that notes from [REDACTED] a since the inception of this case.

1 [REDACTED]
2 [REDACTED]
3 [REDACTED]. (*Id.* ¶ 54.) There is no dispute that the Board
4 conceived a need for action, even before Judge Freeh's investigation.

5 The Okada Parties either do not understand the purpose of the Business
6 Judgment Rule or are just desperate to subvert it. Contrary to their wants, the
7 Business Judgment Rule is not rendered unavailable simply because corporate
8 directors already believe that action is warranted, and seek confirmation from those
9 with outside expertise. That is, after all, the norm. Indeed, the most frequent
10 application of the Business Judgment Rule arises when directors consider the merits
11 of potential corporate mergers. Obviously, based upon their own knowledge,
12 judgment and experience, the directors necessarily have preconceived ideas about
13 whether to pursue or oppose a merger. But the benefits of the Business Judgment
14 Rule are not lost simply because the board engages outside experts – investment
15 bankers, lawyers, accountants – to assess whether the Board's views are sound.

16 The Business Judgment Rule's very purpose is to encourage a board to seek
17 such input so as to gain its protections. *See Brehm v. Eisner*, 746 A.2d 244, 263
18 (Del. 2000) (the Business Judgment Rule does not concern itself with "substantive
19 due care." Due care in the decision-making context addresses the process only.
20 "Irrationality is the outer limit of the business judgment rule."); *see also Cottle v.*
21 *Storer Communication, Inc.*, 849 F.2d 570, 578 (11th Cir. 1988) (a board need not
22 always obtain independent financial advice in order to obtain the protections of the
23 Business Judgment Rule or that of any other outsider as an advisor. "The fact that
24 the board did consult Dillon Read simply weighs in favor of finding that the
25 directors did not abuse their discretion.").

26 But what is particularly offensive about the Okada Parties' rhetoric and lack
27 of disclosure to this Court is that the Okada Parties have themselves *admitted* the
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1 accuracy of Judge Freeh's report. As Aruze's NRCP 30(b)(6) representative, Toji
2 Takeuchi, testified: [REDACTED]

3 [REDACTED]
4 [REDACTED].
5 (Ex. 3, Takeuchi Dep. Tr., Vol. II, 207:10-10:6.). And, Okada himself [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED]
7 [REDACTED]
8 [REDACTED] (Ex. 4, K. Okada
9 Dep. Tr., Vol. XIII, 1477:22-78:1.) Thus, there is no dispute that Judge Freeh's
10 report was correct: [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED] No amount of
12 pretending otherwise changes that reality.⁴

13 **B. The Erroneous Business Judgment Ruling is Unaffected and**
14 **Remains.**

15 But it is not just the lack of merit to the Rule 60 Motion that counsels against
16 deferring this Court's scheduled argument and prompt resolution of Wynn Resorts'
17 fully-briefed Petition. Regardless of how the Rule 60 Motion is resolved, the
18 District Court's erroneous view of the Business Judgment Rule as to the Company –
19 the legal error presented by the Petition – will remain. If the District Court denies
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21 ⁴ Because the Okada Parties attempt to insinuate that Wynn Resorts withheld
22 this so-called "new" evidence until after the summary judgment ruling,
23 Wynn Resorts must again correct the record. The Freeh documents, which the
24 Okada Parties now reference, were produced after the lifting of a stay when this
25 Court denied Wynn Resorts' Writ Petition (Case No. 73949) concerning those
26 documents on December 4, 2017. Wynn Resorts had sought summary judgment
27 clear back in August, and the District Court ultimately announced its decision on
28 November 13, 2017, after continuing that motion under NRCP 56(f). Notably, the
discovery as to the disputed Freeh documents was not the basis for the
District Court's Rule 56(f) continuance, nor did the Okada Parties claim that the
District Court could not resolve the summary judgment motion because of
Wynn Resorts' then-pending writ petition. Contrary to the Okada Parties'
misdirection, these documents were not due prior to this Court's resolution of the
then-pending writ petition.

1 the Rule 60 Motion, the Company will still be forced to go through an estimated
2 six (6) month trial solely because it does not believe that a Nevada corporation gets
3 the benefits of the Business Judgment Rule for actions of its directors, as though the
4 Board is separate and distinct from the entity itself. But that exact same legal error
5 remains even if the District Court were to somehow grant the Rule 60 Motion and
6 bring the Director Defendants back into the case for purposes of a trial.

7 Because of the District Court's current ruling, Wynn Resorts is precluded
8 from enlisting the Business Judgment Rule – regardless of its application to the
9 Director Defendants – because the District Court has ruled, as a matter of law, that
10 it does not apply to the actions of the corporation. Simply put, whether the Director
11 Defendants are in the case or out of the case does not moot or negate the continued
12 misapplication of the Business Judgment Rule. That error will continue to infect
13 Wynn Resorts' rights, even if a trial were to somehow proceed as to the
14 Okada Parties' position that it is up to a jury to decide to the propriety of the
15 redemption of the stock associated with the Okada Parties. Indeed, under the
16 District Court's view that the Business Judgment Rule does not apply to the
17 Company's actions pursuant to a Board vote, any trial would be infected with that
18 error.

19 Wynn Resorts' Petition is not moot regardless of the District Court's
20 disposition of the Rule 60 Motion. The Company's rights – even if a trial as to the
21 Director Defendants were to occur – will continue to be adversely impacted by the
22 District Court's misapplication of the Business Judgment Rule. *See*
23 *Martinez-Hernandez v. State*, 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 61, 380 P.3d 861, 863 (2016) ("A
24 moot case is one which seeks to determine an abstract question which does not rest
25 upon existing facts or rights."); *Bisch v. Las Vegas Metro Police Dept.*, 129 Nev.
26 Adv. Op. 36, 302 P.2d 1108, 1113 (2013) (matter is not moot and actual
27 controversy still exists if appealing parties' legal rights are still impacted).

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am an employee of PISANELLI BICE PLLC,
2 and that on this 26th day of January, 2018, I electronically filed and served by
3 electronic mail, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing **WYNN**
4 **RESORTS, LIMITED'S OPPOSITION TO ARUZE PARTIES' NRCP 27(e)**
5 **EMERGENCY MOTION TO DEFER CONSIDERATION OF THE**
6 **PENDING WRIT PETITION, ON WHICH ORAL ARGUMENT IS**
7 **SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY 6, 2018, PENDING FURTHER**
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12 Eighth Judicial District Court
13 Department XI
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14 *Respondent*

15
16 /s/ Kimberly Peets
17 An employee of PISANELLI BICE PLLC
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EXHIBIT 1

**SUBMITTED
UNDER
SEAL
PURSUANT
TO
CONFIDENTIALITY
ORDER**

EXHIBIT 2

**SUBMITTED
UNDER
SEAL
PURSUANT
TO
CONFIDENTIALITY
ORDER**

EXHIBIT 3

**SUBMITTED
UNDER
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PURSUANT
TO
CONFIDENTIALITY
ORDER**

EXHIBIT 4

**SUBMITTED
UNDER
SEAL
PURSUANT
TO
CONFIDENTIALITY
ORDER**