IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

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2	In the Matter of the:	Supreme Court No. 74964
3	FUND FOR THE	Electronically Filed Apr 04 2019 02 31 p.m.
4	ENCOURAGEMENT OF SELF RELIANCE	Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court
5	An Irrevocable Trust.	
6	DOAN L. PHUNG,	
7	Appellant,	
8	VS.	
9	THU-LE DOAN,	
10	Respondent.	
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12	MOTION TO REISSUE ORDE	CR AS A PUBLISHED OPINION
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		Docket 74964 Document 2019-14756

MOTION TO REISSUE ORDER AS A PUBLISHED OPINION

Appellant Doan L. Phung, by and through his undersigned attorney, moves the Court to reissue its March 21, 2019 Order as a published opinion. NRAP 36(f). Publishing the order in this case will provide clear guidance to trustees administering trusts and estate planning practitioners in both Nevada and foreign jurisdictions that "decanting" a trust under NRS 163.556 cannot be utilized to thwart the settlor's intent; and that an unauthorized decanting is void ab initio.

Judicial review of Nevada's decanting statute is of significant importance because Nevada is nationally recognized as being at the forefront of trust decanting legislation and also because there is a dearth of reported cases nationwide interpreting decanting statutes.1

I. **Publication Is Warranted**

This Court "will decide a case by published opinion if it:"

(A) Presents an issue of first impression:

(B) Alters, modifies, or significantly clarifies a rule of law previously announced by the court; or

(C) Involves an issue of public importance that has application beyond the parties.

NRAP 36(c). Here, two of the three criteria are easily met, though either of them

¹ See In re: Connell Living Trust, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 19, at n.1 (2017) (where this Court granted a motion to publish its unpublished order in a trust matter where it was asserted by the movant that "Nevada's case law on trusts should be robust" because Nevada is a jurisdiction where an ever-growing number of trusts are established).

alone is sufficient for publication.

A. This Court's March 21, 2019 Order Further Clarifies that a Trustee's Authority to Decant an Irrevocable Trust is Governed by the Terms of the Trust and the Settlor's Intent.

This Court has previously ruled that it construes trusts "in a manner effecting the apparent intent of the settlor." *In re Connell Living Tr.*, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 73, 426 P.3d 599, 602 (2018). This Court has also previously ruled that to determine the settlor's intent, it "employ[s] contract principles, including determining the intentions of the settlor 'by considering the trust as a whole[.]" *Id.* (internal citations omitted). But until now, the Court had not squarely addressed whether a settlor's intent is relevant to determine whether a trustee has discretion and authority to decant a trust under NRS 163.556.

What this Court appeared to resolve by way of its March 21, 2019 Order is that a trustee's authority to decant is ultimately governed and limited by the terms of the trust instrument, which are construed, as a matter of law, "in a manner effecting the apparent intent of the settlor."

In the case at bar, this Court concluded that the trustee did not have the "discretion or authority to distribute" because it construed the phrase "Trustees ... may, in their discretion," to mean that one single trustee could not unilaterally distribute trust property, notwithstanding NRS 163.556(1), which provides that " \underline{a} [single] trustee ... may exercise such discretion."

One could conceive of similar situations where a trustee of an irrevocable trust had powers to distribute but with limitations imposed by the express terms

of the trust instrument. If a decanting were performed under NRS 163.556 for the
 purpose of freeing the trustee and the beneficiaries from those limitations (e.g.,
 spendthrift provisions, no contest provisions, ascertainable distribution
 standards), such action would completely thwart the settlor's purpose for
 expressly including such limitations in the trust instrument.²

Preserving a settlor's intent when performing a trust decanting under
Nevada law is also an issue of public importance that has application beyond the
parties of this case. In recent years, Nevada has been at the forefront of decanting
legislation. Because of this, the Court should publish its March 21, 2019 Order
because any trustee who avails himself or herself of Nevada's decanting laws
must not abuse such laws. Indeed, decanting is intended to fix outdated, inflexible
or otherwise deficient trusts. It is not intended to thwart a settlor's intent.

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B. The Validity of an Unauthorized Decanting is an Issue of Public Importance that Applies Beyond the Parties to this Case

In the case at bar, this Court held that the district court "erred in ordering
a course of action that the trust instrument did not permit and that the settlors did
not intend." (March 21, 2019 Order at 3-4.) The course of action ordered by the
district court was an order instructing the trustee to decant half of the assets of
the Fund for the Encouragement of Self Reliance ("FESR") into a new trust to be

²¹ $\begin{bmatrix} 2 \\ See, e.g., Matter of Tracy, 464 Pa. 300, 306, 346 A.2d 750, 752 (Penn. 1975) \\ ("[W]e are not prepared to apply legal rules of construction to thwart settlor's intent.").$

controlled by the Respondent.³ By way of its March 21, 2019 Order, this Court
 remanded the matter back to the district court to unwind the decanting. (March
 21, 2019 Order at 4.) Implied by operation of the relief afforded was that this
 Court determined that the decanting was void ab initio as Respondent did not
 have the authority to unilaterally decant the FESR:

Because the trust instrument does not provide that a trustee may unilaterally distribute trust property, unanimous action by the trustees would be required to exercise the decanting right under the statute.

9 (March 21, 2019 Order, at 3.)

A decanting is void ab initio when the same is done without authority.⁴
Publishing the Court's March 21, 2019 Order will provide guidance to trustees
and estate planning practitioners in that any attempt to decant an irrevocable trust
pursuant to NRS 163.556 where a trustee has no authority to do so constitutes a
void transaction.

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C. The Text of the March 21, 2019 Order Need Not be Revised

The Court's March 21, 2019 Order can be published without revision. The

^{17 &}lt;sup>3</sup> Appellant's Appendix, Vol. V at AA 001313-AA 001329, pp. 6-7.

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¹⁸ ⁴ See, e.g., Hodges v. Johnson, 170 N.H. 470, 473, 177 A.3d 86, 88 (N.H. 2017)
¹⁹ (decanting held void ab initio because it eliminated future interests of beneficiaries); Revised Code of Washington 11.107.080(7)(1)("A provision in the second trust instrument which is not permitted under this chapter is void to the extent necessary to comply with this chapter."); *Stafford v. Crane*, 382 F.3d 1175
²¹ (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that an irrevocable trust was void ab initio because the settlor lacked authority to form trust); *Day v. Seblatnigg*, 186 Conn.App. 482, 199
²² A.3d 1103 (Conn.App.2018) (Irrevocable trust declared void ab initio because settlor lacked legal capacity to form a trust).

Court laid out the relevant facts and procedural history and included a thoughtful
 and well-sourced analysis in its discussion. There are no "additional issues not
 included in the original decision" that need to be discussed. NRAP 36(f)(4). This
 factor, too, points in favor of publication.

II. CONCLUSION

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This Court's March 21, 2019 Order should be published. It meets the
criteria for publication, and publication will send a clear message to all trustees
and estate planning practitioners that decanting an irrevocable trust under NRS
163.556 cannot be utilized to defeat a settlor's intent for imposing limitations on
a trustee's powers and discretion and any attempt to do so will result in a void
decanting.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
Pursuant to NRAP 25(d), I certify that on this day of April, 2019, I		
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Reissue Order as a		
Published Opinion as follows:		
[] by placing same to be deposited for mailing in the United States		
Mail, in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was		
prepaid in Las Vegas, Nevada;		
[X] via electronic means by operation of the Court's electronic filing	a	
system, upon each party in this case who is registered as an		
electronic case filing user with the Clerk;		
[] via hand-delivery to the addressee listed below;		
[] via facsimile;		
[] by transmitting via email to the email address set forth below		
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	 Pursuant to NRAP 25(d), I certify that on this Additional day of April, 2019, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Reissue Order as a Published Opinion as follows: by placing same to be deposited for mailing in the United States Mail, in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was prepaid in Las Vegas, Nevada; via electronic means by operation of the Court's electronic filing system, upon each party in this case who is registered as an electronic case filing user with the Clerk; via hand-delivery to the addressee listed below; via facsimile; by transmitting via email to the email address set forth below 	