# IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

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## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

JAMES J. COTTER, JR., derivatively on behalf of Reading International, Inc., Plaintiff,	Supreme Court Case No. 75053
v. MARGARET COTTER, ELLEN COTTER, GUY ADAMS, EDWARD KANE, DOUGLAS McEACHERN, WILLIAM GOULD, JUDY CODDING, MICHAEL WROTNIAK, Defendants. And READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada corporation,	<ul> <li>Case No. A-15-719860-B</li> <li>Coordinated with:</li> <li>Case No. P-14-0824-42-E</li> <li>DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO</li> <li>NUMBER 27 OF DOCKETING</li> <li>STATEMENT OFAPPELLANT</li> <li>JAMES COTTER JR.</li> <li>PART 3 OF 3</li> </ul>
Nominal Defendant.	)

Nominal Defendant.

12/28/2017--Order Regarding Defendants' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's and Defendants' Motions In Limine

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6	QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIV	AN, LLP
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0	California Bar No. 169269, <i>pro hac vice</i> marshallsearcy@quinnemanuel.com	
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10	Los Angeles, CA 90017	
10	Telephone: (213) 443-3000	
11	Attorneys for Defendants Margaret Cotter,	
12	Ellen Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, E	dward Kane
14	Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak	
13		
14	EIGHTH JUDICIAL	DISTRICT COURT
1.1		TIN7 - NITINT / A TN A
15	CLARK COUN	Case No.: A-15-719860-B
16	JAMES J. COTTER, JR. individually and	Dept. No.: XI
19	derivatively on behalf of Reading	•
17	International, Inc.,	Case No.: P-14-082942-E
18		Dept. No.: XI
10	Plaintiffs,	Related and Coordinated Cases
19	V.	DIGDIEGE COUDE
20	MARGARET COTTER, <i>et al.</i> , Defendants.	BUSINESS COURT
	AND	ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS'
21		MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
22	READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada	JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFF'S AND
	corporation,	DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE
23		Judge: Hon, Elizabeth Gonzalez
24	Nominal Defendant.	Judge:   Hon. Elizabeth Gonzalez
		Date of Hearing: December 11, 2017
25		Time of Hearing: 8:30 a.m.
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## THIS MATTER HAVING COME TO BE HEARD BEFORE the

Court on December 11, 2017, Mark G. Krum, Steve Morris, and Akke Levin 2 appearing for plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff"); James L. Edwards, 3 Christopher Tayback, and Marshall M. Searcy III appearing for defendants 4 Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, Edward 5 Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak (collectively, the "Individual 6 Defendants"); Mark E. Ferrario and Kara B. Hendricks appearing for 7 nominal defendant Reading International, Inc. ("RDI"); and Ekwan Rhow 8 9 appearing for defendant William Gould ("Gould," together, with the Individual Defendants and RDI, "Defendants"), on the following motions: 10

> Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 1) re: Plaintiff's Termination and Reinstatement Claims, and supplement thereto;

 Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 2) re: The Issue of Director Independence, and supplement thereto;

 Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 3) on Plaintiff's Claims Relating to the Purported Unsolicited Offer, and supplement thereto;

 Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 5) on Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Appointment of Ellen Cotter as CEO, and supplement thereto;

 Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 6) re: Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Estate's Option Exercise, the Appointment of Margaret Cotter, the Compensation Packages of Ellen Cotter and Margaret Cotter,

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1		and the Additional Compensation to Margaret Cotter and Guy
2		Adams, and supplement thereto;
3	•	Defendant Gould's Motion for Summary Judgment;
4	•	Individual Defendants' Renewed Motion in Limine to Exclude
5		Expert Testimony of Myron Steele Based on Supplemental
6		Authority;
7	•	Individual Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence
8	· · ·	That Is More Prejudicial Than Probative;
9	•	Defendant Gould's Motion in Limine to Exclude Irrelevant
10		Speculative Evidence;
11	•	RDI's Motion to Redact Opposition to Plaintiff James J. Cotter,
12		Jr.'s Motion in Limine No. 1 re: Advice of Counsel and File
13		Exhibit "E" Under Seal;
14	•	Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 1 re: Advice of Counsel;
15	•	Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 2 re: the Submission of Merits-
16		Related Evidence by Nominal Defendant Reading
17		International, Inc.;
18	•	Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 3 re: After-Acquired Evidence;
19	•	Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibit 2 to Plaintiff James J. Cotter's
20		Opposition to Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence That Is
21		More Prejudicial Than Probative;
22	•	Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibits 3-6, 8-9, 11-2 and to Redact
23		Portions of Plaintiff's Supplemental Opposition to Motion for
24		Summary Judgment Nos. 2 and 3 and Gould Summary
25		Judgment Motion;
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Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibits 7-11, and 15-17 to Plaintiff's 1 Supplemental Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment 2 Nos. 2 and 5 and Gould Summary Judgment Motion; and 3 Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibits 4 Through 11 to Plaintiff's 4 Supplemental Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment 5 Nos. 2 and 6 and Gould Summary Judgment Motion. 6 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' 7 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 1) re: Plaintiff's Termination 8 and Reinstatement Claims is GRANTED with respect to Defendants 9 Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and 10 Michael Wrotniak because there are no genuine issues of material fact 11 related to the disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors, 12 and is DENIED with respect to Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, 13 and Guy Adams because there are genuine issues of material fact related to 14 the disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors. 15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' 16 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 2) re: The Issue of Director 17 Independence is GRANTED with respect to Defendants Edward Kane, 18 Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak 19 because there are no genuine issues of material fact related to the 20disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors, and is DENIED 21 with respect to Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, and Guy Adams 22 because there are genuine issues of material fact related to the 23 disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors. 24 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' 25 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 3) on Plaintiff's Claims 26 Relating to the Purported Unsolicited Offer is GRANTED because of 27 00

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Plaintiff's failure to show damages related to an unenforceable, unsolicited,
 nonbinding offer. While Plaintiff at trial cannot claim any damages arising
 from Defendants' actions with respect to the Patton Vision indications of
 interest, Plaintiff may still attempt to use evidence regarding the Patton
 Vision indications to show a breach of fiduciary duty.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 5) on Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Appointment of Ellen Cotter as CEO is DENIED.

9 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants'
 10 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 6) re: Plaintiff's Claims Related
 11 to the Estate's Option Exercise, the Appointment of Margaret Cotter, the
 12 Compensation Packages of Ellen Cotter and Margaret Cotter, and the
 13 Additional Compensation to Margaret Cotter and Guy Adams is DENIED.
 14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Defendant Gould's Motion
 15 for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT judgment in favor of
Defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy
Codding, and Michael Wrotniak is GRANTED on all claims asserted by
Plaintiff.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants'
 Renewed Motion *in Limine* to Exclude Expert Testimony of Myron Steele
 Based on Supplemental Authority is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants'
Motion *in Limine* to Exclude Evidence That Is More Prejudicial Than
Probative is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHERED ORDERED THAT Defendant Gould's
 Motion *in Limine* to Exclude Irrelevant Speculative Evidence is DENIED as

premature, with the issues raised in the motion to be addressed at trial 1 based upon the relevant foundation laid. 2 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion in Limine 3 No. 1 re: Advice of Counsel is DENIED. 4 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion in Limine 5 No. 2 re: the Submission of Merits-Related Evidence by Nominal 6 Defendant Reading International, Inc. is DENIED. 7 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion in Limine 8 No. 3 re: After-Acquired Evidence is DENIED. However, to the extent that 9 Plaintiff's retention and use of Highpoint Associates and Derek Alderton is 10 admitted at trial, it will be admitted with an instruction limiting the 11 evidence solely to the issue of Plaintiff's suitability as President and CEO of 12 RDI. 13 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT RDI's Motion to Redact 14 Opposition to Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.'s Motion in Limine No. 1 re: 15 Advice of Counsel and File Exhibit "E" Under Seal is GRANTED. 16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motions to Seal 17 and/or Redact are GRANTED. 18 19 DATED this 28th day of December 2017. 20 21 COURNUDGE 22 23 24 25 2627 10 6

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By: /s/ H. Stan Johnson\_

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Attorneys for Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, Edward Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak

12/29/2017--Notice of Entry of Order (re: Order Regarding Defendants' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's and Defendants' Motions *In Limine*) MORRIS LAW GROUP 411 E. BONNEVILLE AVE., STE. 360 - LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 - FAX 702/474-9422

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14		Electronically Filed 12/29/2017 1:23 PM CLERK OF THE COURT
15	CLARK CO	UNTY, NEVADA
<ol> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> <li>24</li> <li>25</li> <li>26</li> <li>27</li> <li>28</li> </ol>	JAMES J. COTTER, JR., derivatively on behalf of Reading International, Inc., Plaintiff, v. MARGARET COTTER, ELLEN COTTER, GUY ADAMS, EDWARD KANE, DOUGLAS McEACHERN, WILLIAM GOULD, JUDY CODDING, MICHAEL WROTNIAK, Defendants. and READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada corporation, Nominal Defendant.	Case No. A-15-719860-B Dept. No. XI Coordinated with: Case No. P-14-0824-42-E Dept. No. XI Jointly Administered NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an Order Regarding Defendants'
 Motions for Partial Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's and Defendants'
 Motions *in Limine* was entered by this Honorable Court on the 28<sup>th</sup> day of
 December, 2017. A copy of the Order is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

# MORRIS LAW GROUP

By: /s/ Akke Levin

Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543 Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102 411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913 YURKO, SALVESEN & REMZ, P.C. 1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor Boston, MA 02108

Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.

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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
2	Pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D) and E.D.C.R. 8.05, I certify	
3	that I am an employee of MORRIS LAW GROUP and that on the date	
4	below, I cause the following document(s) to be served on all interested	
5	parties as registered with the Court's E-Filing/E-Service System: NOTICE	
6	OF ENTRY OF ORDER. The date and time of the electronic proof of	
7	service is in place of the date and place of deposit in the mail.	
8	DATED this $\mathcal{M}$ day of December, 2017.	
9		
10	By: <u>/s/ Linda P. Daniel</u>	
11	An employee of Morris Law Group	
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MORRIS LAW GROUP 411 E. BONNEVILLE AVE., STE. 360 - LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422

# EXHIBIT A

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			CLERK OF THE COURT
1	ORDR COHEN JOHNSON PARKER EDWARDS		Stand Hu
2	H. STAN JOHNSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 00265		
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6	QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVA CHRISTOPHER TAYBACK, ESQ.	AN, LLP	
7	California Bar No. 145532, pro hac vice christayback@quinnemanuel.com		•
8	MARSHALL M. SEARCY, ESQ. California Bar No. 169269, pro hac vice		
9	marshallsearcy@quinnemanuel.com 865 South Figueroa Street, 10 <sup>th</sup> Floor		
10	Los Angeles, CA 90017 Telephone: (213) 443-3000		
11	Attorneys for Defendants Margaret Cotter,		
12	Ellen Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, E Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak	dward Kane	
13			
14	EIGHTH JUDICIAL	DISTRICT COUL	<b>KT</b>
15	CLARK COUN		15-719860-B
16	JAMES J. COTTER, JR. individually and	Dept. No.: XI	
17	derivatively on behalf of Reading International, Inc.,	Case No.: P- Dept. No.: XI	14-082942-E
18	Plaintiffs,	Related and Coor	dinated Cases
19	v. MARGARET COTTER, et al.,	BUSINESS COU	J <b>RT</b>
20	Defendants. AND		RDING DEFENDANTS'
21			PARTIAL SUMMARY
22	READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada corporation,		MOTIONS IN LIMINE
23	Nominal Defendant.	Judge:	Hon. Elizabeth Gonzalez
24		Date of Hearing:	December 11, 2017
25		Time of Hearing:	
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# THIS MATTER HAVING COME TO BE HEARD BEFORE the

Court on December 11, 2017, Mark G. Krum, Steve Morris, and Akke Levin 2 appearing for plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff"); James L. Edwards, 3 Christopher Tayback, and Marshall M. Searcy III appearing for defendants 4 Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, Edward 5 Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak (collectively, the "Individual 6 Defendants"); Mark E. Ferrario and Kara B. Hendricks appearing for 7 nominal defendant Reading International, Inc. ("RDI"); and Ekwan Rhow 8 appearing for defendant William Gould ("Gould," together, with the 9 Individual Defendants and RDI, "Defendants"), on the following motions: 10

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 Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 1) re: Plaintiff's Termination and Reinstatement Claims, and supplement thereto;

 Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 2) re: The Issue of Director Independence, and supplement thereto;

 Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 3) on Plaintiff's Claims Relating to the Purported Unsolicited Offer, and supplement thereto;

 Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 5) on Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Appointment of Ellen Cotter as CEO, and supplement thereto;

 Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 6) re: Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Estate's Option Exercise, the Appointment of Margaret Cotter, the Compensation Packages of Ellen Cotter and Margaret Cotter,

1		and the Additional Compensation to Margaret Cotter and Guy
2		Adams, and supplement thereto;
3	•	Defendant Gould's Motion for Summary Judgment;
4	•	Individual Defendants' Renewed Motion in Limine to Exclude
5		Expert Testimony of Myron Steele Based on Supplemental
6		Authority;
7	•	Individual Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence
8		That Is More Prejudicial Than Probative;
9	•	Defendant Gould's Motion in Limine to Exclude Irrelevant
10		Speculative Evidence;
11	•	RDI's Motion to Redact Opposition to Plaintiff James J. Cotter,
12		Jr.'s Motion in Limine No. 1 re: Advice of Counsel and File
13		Exhibit "E" Under Seal;
14	•	Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 1 re: Advice of Counsel;
15	•	Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 2 re: the Submission of Merits-
16		Related Evidence by Nominal Defendant Reading
17		International, Inc.;
18	•	Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 3 re: After-Acquired Evidence;
19	•	Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibit 2 to Plaintiff James J. Cotter's
20		Opposition to Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence That Is
21		More Prejudicial Than Probative;
22	•	Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibits 3-6, 8-9, 11-2 and to Redact
23		Portions of Plaintiff's Supplemental Opposition to Motion for
24		Summary Judgment Nos. 2 and 3 and Gould Summary
25		Judgment Motion;
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Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibits 7-11, and 15-17 to Plaintiff's Supplemental Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Nos. 2 and 5 and Gould Summary Judgment Motion; and

Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibits 4 Through 11 to Plaintiff's Supplemental Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Nos. 2 and 6 and Gould Summary Judgment Motion.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' 7 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 1) re: Plaintiff's Termination 8 and Reinstatement Claims is GRANTED with respect to Defendants 9 Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and 10 Michael Wrotniak because there are no genuine issues of material fact 11 related to the disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors, 12 and is DENIED with respect to Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, 13 and Guy Adams because there are genuine issues of material fact related to 14 the disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors. 15

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' 16 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 2) re: The Issue of Director 17 Independence is GRANTED with respect to Defendants Edward Kane, 18 Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak 19 because there are no genuine issues of material fact related to the 20 disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors, and is DENIED 21 with respect to Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, and Guy Adams 22 because there are genuine issues of material fact related to the 23 disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors. 24

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 3) on Plaintiff's Claims Relating to the Purported Unsolicited Offer is GRANTED because of 27

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Renewed Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony of Myron Steele

Plaintiff.

Based on Supplemental Authority is DENIED. 22 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' 23 Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence That Is More Prejudicial Than 24 Probative is DENIED. 25

Plaintiff's failure to show damages related to an unenforceable, unsolicited,

nonbinding offer. While Plaintiff at trial cannot claim any damages arising

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 5) on Plaintiff's Claims Related

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 6) re: Plaintiff's Claims Related

Additional Compensation to Margaret Cotter and Guy Adams is DENIED.

to the Estate's Option Exercise, the Appointment of Margaret Cotter, the

Compensation Packages of Ellen Cotter and Margaret Cotter, and the

Defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy

Codding, and Michael Wrotniak is GRANTED on all claims asserted by

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants'

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants'

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Defendant Gould's Motion

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants'

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT judgment in favor of

from Defendants' actions with respect to the Patton Vision indications of

interest, Plaintiff may still attempt to use evidence regarding the Patton

Vision indications to show a breach of fiduciary duty.

to the Appointment of Ellen Cotter as CEO is DENIED.

for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHERED ORDERED THAT Defendant Gould's 26 Motion in Limine to Exclude Irrelevant Speculative Evidence is DENIED as 27

premature, with the issues raised in the motion to be addressed at trial
 based upon the relevant foundation laid.
 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion *in Limine*

No. 1 re: Advice of Counsel is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion *in Limine* No. 2 re: the Submission of Merits-Related Evidence by Nominal Defendant Reading International, Inc. is DENIED.

8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion *in Limine* 9 No. 3 re: After-Acquired Evidence is DENIED. However, to the extent that 10 Plaintiff's retention and use of Highpoint Associates and Derek Alderton is 11 admitted at trial, it will be admitted with an instruction limiting the 12 evidence solely to the issue of Plaintiff's suitability as President and CEO of 13 RDI.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT RDI's Motion to Redact
Opposition to Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.'s Motion *in Limine* No. 1 re:
Advice of Counsel and File Exhibit "E" Under Seal is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motions to Seal
 and/or Redact are GRANTED.

DATED this 25" day of December 2017. UÌDGE 6

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# COHEN|JOHNSON|PARKER|EDWARDS

By: /s/ H. Stan Johnson\_

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Attorneys for Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, Edward Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak

01/04/2018--Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Stay and Motion for Reconsideration MORRIS LAW GROUP 411 E. BONNEVILLE AVE., STE. 360 · LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422

		Electronically Filed 1/4/2018 10:35 AM Steven D. Grierson
1	ORDR	CLERK OF THE COURT
2	MORRIS LAW GROUP Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543	Atump. Frun
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4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Telephone: (702) 474-9400	
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10	Telephone: (617) 723-6900	
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12	Email: mkrum@bizlit.com	
13	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
14	James J. Cotter, Jr.	
	DISTR	ICT COURT
15	CLARK CO	UNTY, NEVADA
16	JAMES J. COTTER, JR.,	) Case No. A-15-719860-B
17	derivatively on behalf of Reading International, Inc.,	) Dept. No. XI
18		) Coordinated with:
19	Plaintiff,	) )
	<b>v</b> .	) Case No. P-14-0824-42-E ) Dept. No. XI
20	MARGARET COTTER, ELLEN	) Dept. No. XI
21	COTTER, GUY ADAMS,	) Jointly Administered
22	EDWARD KANE, DOUGLAS McEACHERN, WILLIAM	) ) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
23	GOULD, JUDY CODDING,	) MOTION TO STAY AND MOTION
24	MICHAEL WROTNIAK,	) FOR RECONSIDERATION
25	Defendants.	) Date of Hearing: December 28, 2017
26	And	) Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m.
27	READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada corporation,	
28	Nominal Defendant.	
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
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This matter came before the Court on December 28, 2017 for 1 hearing on plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.'s Motion to Stay and Motion for 2 Reconsideration or Clarification of Ruling on Motions for [Partial] Summary 3 judgment Nos. 1, 2, and 3 and Gould's Summary Judgment Motion ("Motion 4 for Reconsideration"). Mark G. Krum and Akke Levin appeared for plaintiff 5 James J. Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff"); Marshall M. Searcy III appeared for 6 defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, 7 Edward Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak; Mark E. Ferrario 8 appeared for nominal defendant Reading International, Inc.; and Shoshana 9 Bannett appeared for defendant William Gould ("Gould"). 10

The Court, having considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Stay, having heard oral argument of the parties, having considered (sealed) Court Exhibit 1, and for good cause appearing: 14

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for 15 Reconsideration is DENIED. Although the Court reviewed Court Exhibit 1, 16 the Court finds it was not provided with new factual information or new 17 legal analysis that would cause the Court to change its decision on Motions 18 for Partial Summary Judgment Nos. 1, 2, and Gould's Motion for Summary 19 20 Judgment.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Stay is DENIED. DATED this 4 day of \_\_\_\_\_

2018.

RABLE ELIZABETH

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AS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101

702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422

411 E. BONNEVILLE AVE.,

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MORRIS LAW GROUP

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)NŻALEZ,

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

411 E. BONNEVILLE AVE., STE. 360 · LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422

MORRIS LAW GROUP

MORRIS LAW GROUP

Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543

411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360

Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913

YURKO, SALVESEN & REMZ, P.C.

Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

By: <u>/s/ Akke Levin</u>

1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor Boston, MA 02108 Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.

THIS MATTER CAME BEFORE THE COURT on the Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification and Stay of plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff"). The Court, having considered any papers filed and arguments made in support of and in opposition to the Motion, and for good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification is GRANTED because Plaintiff will be severely prejudiced if required to wait to appeal and the remaining defendants will not be prejudiced if the Court's December 28, 2017 order dismissing defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak is certified.

The Court therefore finds and determines, under Nev. R. Civ. P.
 54(b), that there is no just reason for delay and hereby directs entry of
 judgment as to defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William
 Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak on all of Plaintiff's claims
 against them.

1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the case is 2 [] stayed; 3 not stayed pending Plaintiff's appeal. 4 5 DATED this \_\_\_\_ day of January, 2018. 6 7 LE ELIZABETH BI 8 LEZ, 9 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 10 Submitted by: 11 MORRIS LAW GROUP 12 13 By: /s/ Akke Levin 14 Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543 Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102 15 411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 16 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 17 Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913 YURKO, SALVESEN & REMZ, P.C. 18 1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor 19 Boston, MA 02108 20 Attorneys for Plaintiff 21 James J. Cotter, Jr. 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

STE. 360 · LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 MORRIS LAW GROUP 702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422 411 E. BONNEVILLE AVE.,

01/04/2018--Notice of Entry of Order (re: Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Stay and Motion for Reconsideration)

Electronically Filed 1/4/2018 5:26 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1	MORRIS LAW GROUP	Aten b. At
2	Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543	
3	Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102	
4	411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101	
5	Telephone: (702) 474-9400	
	Facsimile: (702) 474-9422 Email: sm@morrislawgroup.com	
6	Email: al@morrislawgroup.com	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
7	Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913	
8	Yurko, Salvesen & Remz, P.C.	
9	1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor	
10	Boston, MA 02108 Telephone: (617) 723-6900	
11	Facsimile: (617) 723-6905	
12	Email: mkrum@bizlit.com	
13	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
	James J. Cotter, Jr.	
14	DISTR	ICT COURT
15	CLARK CO	UNTY, NEVADA
16	JAMES J. COTTER, JR.,	) Case No. A-15-719860-B
17	derivatively on behalf of Reading International, Inc.,	) Dept. No. XI
18	International, inc.,	) Coordinated with:
19	Plaintiff,	) ) Case No. P-14-0824-42-E
20	<b>V</b> .	) Dept. No. XI
	MARGARET COTTER, ELLEN	)
21	COTTER, GUY ADAMS, EDWARD KANE, DOUGLAS	) Jointly Administered
22	McEACHERN, WILLIAM	$\acute{ m )}$ NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER
23	GOULD, JUDY CODDING,	).
24	MICHAEL WROTNIAK,	<b>/</b>
25	Defendants.	<b>)</b>
26	And	
27	READING INTERNATIONAL,	ý
	INC., a Nevada corporation,	<b>}</b>
28	Nominal Defendant.	
		-
	Case Number: A-15-7	19860-B

# MORRIS LAW GROUP 411 E. BONNEVILE AVE., STE. 360 · LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422

1	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an Order Denying Plaintiff's	
2	Motion to Stay and Motion for Reconsideration was entered in this action on	
3	the 4th day of January, 2018.	
4	A copy of the Order is attached as Exhibit 1.	
5	MORRIS LAW GROUP	
6		
7	By: talk	
8	Steve Mørris, Bar No. 1543 Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102	
9	411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360	
10	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101	
11	Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913 YURKO, SALVESEN & REMZ, P.C.	
12	1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor Boston, MA 02108	
13 14		
14 15	Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.	
16		
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MORRIS LAW GROUP 411 E. BONNEVILLE AVE., STE. 360 - LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D) and E.D.C.R. 8.05, I certify that I am an employee of MORRIS LAW GROUP and that on the date below, I cause the following document(s) to be served via the Court's Odyssey E-Filing System: NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER, to be served on all interested parties, as registered with the Court's E-Filing and E-Service System. The date and time of the electronic proof of service is in place of the date and place of deposit in the mail.		
9 10 11 12 13	Stan Johnson Cohen-Johnson, LLC 255 East Warm Springs Road, Ste. 110 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 Christopher Tayback Marshall Searcy Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP	Donald A. Lattin Carolyn K. Renner Maupin, Cox & LeGoy 4785 Caughlin Parkway Reno, Nevada 89519 Ekwan E. Rhow Shoshana E. Bannett	
14 15 16 17	865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor Los Angeles, CA Attorneys for /Defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak Mark Ferrario	Bird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert, Nessim, Drooks, Lincenberg & Rhow, P.C. 1875 Century Park East, 23rd Fl. Los Angeles, CA 90067-2561 Attorneys for Defendant William Gould	
18 19 20 21 22	Kara Hendricks Tami Cowden Greenberg Traurig, LLP 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway Suite 400 North Las Vegas, NV 89169 Attorneys for Nominal Defendant		
23 24 25 26	Reading International, Inc. DATED this day of January, 2018	How Jong to	
27 28	3		

# MORRIS LAW GROUP 411 E. BONNEVILE AVE., STE. 360 · LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422

# EXHIBIT 1

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# EXHIBIT 1

	#1 			
			Electronically Flied 1/4/2018 10:35 AM Steven D. Grierson	
	1	ORDR	CLERK OF THE COURT	
	2	MORRIS LAW GROUP Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543	Bann	
	3	Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102		
	4	411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101		
	5	Telephone: (702) 474-9400		
	·	Facsimile: (702) 474-9422 Email: sm@morrislawgroup.com		
	6	Email: al@morrislawgroup.com		
	7	Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913	· · · ·	
	8	Yurko, Salvesen & Remz, P.C.	· · · ·	
10	9	1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor		
<b>GROUP</b> AS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 2/474-9422	10	Boston, MA 02108 Telephone: (617) 723-6900		
UP EVAD	11	Facsimile: (617) 723-6905		
<b>FROU</b> VEGAS, NE 474-9422	12	Email: mkrum@bizlit.com		
<b>GI</b> 2,47.	13	Attorneys for Plaintiff	·	
.AW GROUP 360 LAS VEGAS, NEVAL FAX 702/474-9422	14	James J. Cotter, Jr.		
E Ho	15	DISTRICT COURT		
RRIS ] LLE AVE., STE 1/474-9400			UNTY, NEVADA	
<b>MORRI</b> NNEVILLE AVE., 702/474-9	16	JAMES J. COTTER, JR., derivatively on behalf of Reading	) Case No. A-15-719860-B ) Dept. No. XI	
	17	International, Inc.,	)	
ы Бо Т	18	Plaintiff,	) Coordinated with:	
411 E.	19	V.	) Case No. P-14-0824-42-E	
	20	ADCADET COTTED ELLEN	) Dept. No. XI	
	21	MARGARET COTTER, ELLEN COTTER, GUY ADAMS,	) Jointly Administered	
	22	EDWARD KANE, DOUGLAS	) ) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S	
•	23	MCEACHERN, WILLIAM GOULD, JUDY CODDING,	) MOTION TO STAY AND MOTION	
	24	MICHAEL WROTNIAK,	) FOR RECONSIDERATION	
		Defendants.	) ) Date of Hearing: December 28, 2017	
	25	And	) Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m.	
	26	READING INTERNATIONAL,		
	27	INC., a Nevada corporation,	)	
	28	Nominal Defendant.		
			<b>4</b>	
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Case Number: A-15-719860-B

This matter came before the Court on December 28, 2017 for hearing on plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.'s Motion to Stay and Motion for Reconsideration or Clarification of Ruling on Motions for [Partial] Summary judgment Nos. 1, 2, and 3 and Gould's Summary Judgment Motion ("Motion for Reconsideration"). Mark G. Krum and Akke Levin appeared for plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff"); Marshall M. Searcy III appeared for defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, Edward Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak; Mark E. Ferrario appeared for nominal defendant Reading International, Inc.; and Shoshana 10 Bannett appeared for defendant William Gould ("Gould").

The Court, having considered the papers filed in support of and 11 in opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Stay, having 12 heard oral argument of the parties, having considered (sealed) Court Exhibit 13 14 1, and for good cause appearing:

15 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. Although the Court reviewed Court Exhibit 1, 16 17 the Court finds it was not provided with new factual information or new legal analysis that would cause the Court to change its decision on Motions 18 19 for Partial Summary Judgment Nos. 1, 2, and Gould's Motion for Summary 20 Judgment.

21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Stay is 22 DENIED.

2

DATED this 4 day of \_\_\_\_\_

DRABLE ELIZABETH NZALEZ. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

2018.

S VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 MORRIS LAW GROUF E. BONNEVILLE AVE., STE. 360 · LAS VEGAS, NF 702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422 1

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411 E. BONNEVILLE AVE., STE. 360 · LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422

MORRIS LAW GROUP

Submitted by: MORRIS LAW GROUP By: <u>/s/ Akke Levin</u> Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543 Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102 411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913 YURKO, SALVESEN & REMZ, P.C. 1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor Boston, MA 02108 Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. 

01/04/2018--Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 5(b) Certification and Stay

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14		Electronically Filed 1/4/2018 10:35 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28	CLARK COU JAMES J. COTTER, JR., derivatively on behalf of Reading International, Inc., Plaintiff, v. MARGARET COTTER, ELLEN COTTER, GUY ADAMS, EDWARD KANE, DOUGLAS McEACHERN, WILLIAM GOULD, JUDY CODDING, MICHAEL WROTNIAK, Defendants. And READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada corporation, Nominal Defendant.	UNTY, NEVADA Case No. A-15-719860-B Dept. No. XI Coordinated with: Case No. P-14-0824-42-E Dept. No. XI Jointly Administered ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION AND STAY Date of Hearing: January 4, 2017 Time of Hearing: 8:30 a.m.

# MORRIS LAW GROUP 411 E. BONNEVILLE AVE., STE. 360 · LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422

THIS MATTER CAME BEFORE THE COURT on the Motion for
 Rule 54(b) Certification and Stay of plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff").
 The Court, having considered any papers filed and arguments made in
 support of and in opposition to the Motion, and for good cause appearing,
 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 54(b)

<sup>6</sup> Certification is GRANTED because Plaintiff will be severely prejudiced if
<sup>7</sup> required to wait to appeal and the remaining defendants will not be
<sup>8</sup> prejudiced if the Court's December 28, 2017 order dismissing defendants
<sup>9</sup> Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and
<sup>10</sup> Michael Wrotniak is certified.

The Court therefore finds and determines, under Nev. R. Civ. P.
 54(b), that there is no just reason for delay and hereby directs entry of
 judgment as to defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William
 Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak on all of Plaintiff's claims
 against them.

1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the case is 2 [] stayed; 3 🕅 not stayed pending Plaintiff's appeal. 4 5 DATED this \_\_\_\_ day of January, 2018. 6 7 ORABLEELIZABETH 8 ALEZ, 9 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 10 Submitted by: 11 MORRIS LAW GROUP 12 13 By: /s/ Akke Levin 14 Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543 Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102 15 411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 16 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 17 Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913 18 YURKO, SALVESEN & REMZ, P.C. 1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor 19 Boston, MA 02108 20 Attorneys for Plaintiff 21 James J. Cotter, Jr. 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3

# 411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 · Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 MORRIS LAW GROUP

702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422

01/04/2018--Notice of Entry of Order (re: Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 5(b) Certification and Stay)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	CLARK CO	Electronically Filed 1/4/2018 5:28 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT WALLAND ICT COURT UNTY, NEVADA ) Case No. A-15-719860-B ) Dept. No. XI ) Coordinated with: Case No. P-14-0824-42-E ) Dept. No. XI ) Coordinated with: Case No. P-14-0824-42-E ) Dept. No. XI ) Jointly Administered ) NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER	
24	MICHAEL WROTNIAK,		
25		) 	
26			
27	READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada corporation,		
28	Nominal Defendant.		

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# MORRIS LAW GROUP 411 E. BONNEVILLE AVE., STE. 360 · LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422

1	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an Order Granting Plaintiff's	
2	Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification and Stay was entered in this action on the	
3	4th day of January, 2018.	
4	A copy of the Order is attached as Exhibit 1.	
5	MORRIS LAW GROUP	
6		
7	By: All	
8	Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543 Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102	
9	411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360	
10	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101	
11	Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913 YURKO, SALVESEN & REMZ, P.C.	
12	1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor	
13	Boston, MA 02108	
14	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
15	James J. Cotter, Jr.	
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MORRIS LAW GROUP 411 E. BONNEVILLE AVE., STE. 360 · LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422

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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE			
2	Pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D) and E.D.C.R. 8.05, I certify			
3	that I am an employee of MORRIS LAW GROUP and that on the date			
4	below, I cause the following document(s) to be served via the Court's			
5	Odyssey E-Filing System: NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER, to be served on			
6	all interested parties, as registered with the Court's E-Filing and E-Service			
7	System. The date and time of the electronic proof of service is in place of the			
8	date and place of deposit in the mail.			
9 10 11	Stan JohnsonDonald A. LattinCohen-Johnson, LLCCarolyn K. Renner255 East Warm Springs Road, Ste. 110Maupin, Cox & LeGoyLas Vegas, Nevada 891194785 Caughlin ParkwayBaraa Navada 80510Baraa Navada 80510			
12	Reno, Nevada 89519 Christopher Tayback Marshall Searcy Ekwan E. Rhow			
13 14	Quinn Emanuél Urquhart & Sullivan LLPShoshana E. Bannett865 South Figueroa Street, 10th FloorBird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert, Nessim, Drooks, Lincenberg &			
15	Rhow, P.C.			
16	Attorneys for /Defendants Edward Kane, 1875 Century Park East, 23rd Fl. Douglas McEachern, Judy Codding, and Los Angeles, CA 90067-2561			
17	Michael Wrotniak Attorneys for Defendant William			
18	Mark Ferrario Gould			
19	Kara Hendricks Tami Cowden			
20	Greenberg Traurig, LLP 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway			
20 21	Suite 400 North			
22	Las Vegas, NV 89169			
	Attorneys for Nominal Defendant Reading International Inc			
23	Reading International, Inc.			
24	DATED this day of January, 2018.			
25 00	Bux total and any or juntumy 2010			
26	1. Andrew A			
27				
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MORRIS LAW GROUP

41.1 E. BONNEVILLE AVE., STE. 360 · LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422 EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 1

.

THIS MATTER CAME BEFORE THE COURT on the Motion for
 Rule 54(b) Certification and Stay of plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff").
 The Court, having considered any papers filed and arguments made in
 support of and in opposition to the Motion, and for good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 54(b)
 Certification is GRANTED because Plaintiff will be severely prejudiced if
 required to wait to appeal and the remaining defendants will not be
 prejudiced if the Court's December 28, 2017 order dismissing defendants
 Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and
 Michael Wrotniak is certified.

The Court therefore finds and determines, under Nev. R. Civ. P.
 54(b), that there is no just reason for delay and hereby directs entry of
 judgment as to defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William
 Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak on all of Plaintiff's claims
 against them.

MORRIS LAW GROUP 411E. BONNEVILE AVE, STE. 360 - LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 - FAX 702/474-9422

1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the case is 2 [] stayed; 3. N not stayed pending Plaintiff's appeal. 4 5 DATED this \_\_\_\_ day of January, 2018. 6 7 ELIZABETH 8 GON LEZ, 9 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 10 Submitted by: 11 MORRIS LAW GROUP 12 13 By: /s/ Akke Levin 14 Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543 Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102 15 411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 16 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 17 Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913 18 YURKO, SALVESEN & REMZ, P.C. 1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor 19 Boston, MA 02108 20 Attorneys for Plaintiff 21 James J. Cotter, Jr. 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3

STE. 360 · LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101

E. BONNEVILLE AVE.,

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702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422

MORRIS LAW GROUP

#### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

MORRIS LAW GROUP Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543 Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102 411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Telephone: (702) 474-9400 Facsimile: (702) 474-9422 Email: sm@morrislawgroup.com Email: al@morrislawgroup.com

Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913 Noemi Ann Kawamoto (*admitted pro hac vice*) Yurko, Salvesen & Remz, P.C. 1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor Boston, MA 02108 Telephone: (617) 723-6900 Facsimile: (617) 723-6905 Email: mkrum@bizlit.com Attorneys for Plaintiff, James J. Cotter, Jr.

#### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

JAMES J. COTTER, JR., derivatively on behalf of Reading International, Inc., Plaintiff,	Supreme Court Case No. 75053
v. MARGARET COTTER, ELLEN COTTER, GUY ADAMS, EDWARD KANE, DOUGLAS McEACHERN, WILLIAM GOULD, JUDY CODDING, MICHAEL WROTNIAK, Defendants.	<ul> <li>Case No. A-15-719860-B</li> <li>Coordinated with:</li> <li>Case No. P-14-0824-42-E</li> <li>DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO</li> <li>NUMBER 27 OF DOCKETING</li> <li>STATEMENT OFAPPELLANT</li> <li>JAMES COTTER JR.</li> </ul>
READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada corporation,	) PART 2 OF 3
Nominal Defendant.	)

#### 2

12/19/2017--Motion for Reconsideration or Clarification of Ruling on Motions for Summary Judgment Nos 1, 2, and 3 and Gould's Summary Judgment Motion and Application for Order Shortening Time

		Electronically Filed 12/19/2017 10:02 AM Steven D. Grierson
1	MRCN	CLERK OF THE COURT
2	MORRIS LAW GROUP Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543	Column.
3	Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102	
4	411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101	
5	Telephone: (702) 474-9400 Facsimile: (702) 474-9422	
6	Email: sm@morrislawgroup.com	
7	Email: al@morrislawgroup.com	
8	Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913	
9	Yurko, Salvesen & Remz, P.C. 1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor	
10	Boston, MA 02108 Telephone: (617) 723-6900	
11	Facsimile: (617) 723-6905	
12	Email: mkrum@bizlit.com	
13	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
14	James J. Cotter, Jr.	· · · · ·
15		ICT COURT UNTY, NEVADA
16	JAMES J. COTTER, JR.,	) Case No. A-15-719860-B
17	derivatively on behalf of Reading	) Dept. No. XI
18	International, Inc.,	) ) Coordinated with:
19	Plaintiff,	)
20	V.	) Case No. P-14-0824-42-E ) Dept. No. XI
21	MARGARET COTTER, ELLEN COTTER, GUY ADAMS,	) ) Jointly Administered
22	EDWARD KANE, DOUGLAS	MOTION FOR
23	McEACHERN, WILLIAM GOULD, JUDY CODDING,	RECONSIDERATION OR
24	MICHAEL WROTNIAK,	CLARIFICATION OF RULING
25	Defendants.	JUDGMENT NOS 1, 2, AND 3 AND GOULD'S SUMMARY
26	And	JUDGMENT MOTION
27	READING INTERNATIONAL,	AND
28	INC., a Nevada corporation, Nominal Defendant.	) APPLICATION FOR ORDER ) SHORTENING TIME

MORRIS LAW GROUP 411 E. BONNEVILLE AVE., STE. 360 · LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422

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Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff") hereby moves the Court
under EDCR 2.24(b) to reconsider and/or clarify the Court's ruling on the
individual defendants' motions for partial summary judgments Nos. 1 and 2
("Partial MSJ Nos. 1 and 2") and William Gould's motion for summary
judgment ("Gould MSJ"). Plaintiff further moves the Court under EDCR
2.26 for an Order shortening time to notice and hear this Motion.

#### MORRIS LAW GROUP

By:

Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543 Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102 411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

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#### DECLARATION OF AKKE LEVIN IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME

I, Akke Levin, declare:

I am an attorney with Morris Law Group, counsel for
 Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in
 this declaration except as to those stated on information and belief, which
 facts I have investigated and believe to be true. I would be competent to
 testify to them if called upon to do so.

On December 11, 2017, the Court heard oral argument on 9 2. the defendants' motions for summary judgment and some of the parties' 10 motions in limine. The Court granted Partial MSJ No. 1 regarding Plaintiff's 11 termination and reinstatement; Partial MSJ No. 2 regarding director 12 independence; and Partial MSJ No. 3 regarding the unsolicited Patton Vision 13 offer as to five of the eight defendants. The Court also granted defendant 14 William Gould's MSJ on all claims. The Court further ruled in favor of 15 Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak 16 on all four of Plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claims asserted against 17 18 them.


19 3. During the December 11 hearing, the Court set January 8,
20 2018 as the trial start date.

4. Good cause exists under EDCR 2.26 to shorten the time for
notice and hearing of this Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification
because trial is less than fourteen business days away, and the issues raised
by this Motion have substantial impact on trial preparation and the scope of
issues and claims remaining for trial. Plaintiff's counsel is available any day
of the week of December 18, 2017.

27 5. This Motion is being served by the court's E-Service
28 System to all counsel of record.

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<sup>1</sup> judgment on all claims against these defendants under these circumstances
<sup>2</sup> was error and should be reconsidered by the Court.

3 The Court also erred in granting summary judgment for these defendants under the business judgment rule because the Court did not 4 adequately consider that intentional misconduct by directors rebuts the 5 6 presumption that they acted in good faith and are entitled to immunity for 7 their misconduct by the rule. Moreover, in assessing the dismissed 8 directors' conduct for summary judgment purposes, the Court apparently overlooked the law that says the acts and omissions of individual directors 9 10 must be viewed collectively, not separately, to determine, for example, 11 whether their conduct and motives show independence of actions in the interest of their corporation, as distinct from their own interests or that of 12 13 control shareholders.

As these observations suggest and the following law and
evidence support, the Court erred in dismissing the five subject directors
without allowing the jury to hear the evidence on disputed material facts
and render a verdict on whether the dismissed directors were acting in
RDI's interest or to protect and further the interests of the controlling
shareholders, as alleged in detail in the Second Amended Complaint
("SAC") and set out again in the Joint Pretrial Memo.

#### <sup>21</sup> **II.** STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

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A. Plaintiff's Complaint and Claims/Causes of Action

The SAC pleads four claims: (1) breach(es) of the duty of care; (2)
 breach(es) of the duty of loyalty; (3) breach(es) of the duty of candor; and (4)
 aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty. SAC at 47–54. The Claims

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- <sup>28</sup> || The Court denied summary judgment for defendants Ellen Cotter ("EC" hereafter), Margaret Cotter ("MC" hereafter), and Guy Adams ("Adams" hereafter).

MORRIS LAW GROUP 411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 · Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422 <sup>1</sup> 1–3 are against each of the individual director defendants; the fourth claim is
 <sup>2</sup> against EC and MC. *See id.*

Plaintiff's duty of care claim(s) are based on acts and omissions 3 set out in the SAC, some of which were not the subject of a motion for partial 4 summary judgment. Examples of such acts and omissions include: (i) the 5 6 one time "special nominating committee" of McEachern, Kane and Adams forcing director Storey to "retire" and adding unqualified persons loyal to 7 8 EC and / or MC to the RDI Board; and (ii) knowingly disseminating erroneous and materially misleading statements in RDI public disclosures 9 (SEC filings and press releases). The acts and omissions on which fiduciary 10 duty claims of care and loyalty are based also include one as to which MSJ 11 12 No. 4 was denied in relevant part-misuse of the executive committee. See 13 December 21, 2016 Order Regarding Defendants' Motions For Partial Summary Judgment Nos. 1-6..." (the "MSJ Order"), Ex. 1 at 3:15–19 (granting 14 MSJ No. 4 "[a]s to formation and revitalization (activation) of the Executive 15 Committee," but denying it "as to utilization of the committee"). 16

Plaintiff's duty of loyalty claims also were based in part on 17 18 matters which were not the subject of the motions for partial summary 19 judgment, including breaches of the duty of loyalty arising from the misuse by EC and MC of their position as controlling shareholders and breaches of 20 the duty of loyalty by the other director defendants in acquiescing to the 21 22 wishes of EC and MC and actively assisting them in protecting and pursuing their personal interests rather than acting solely in the interests of 23 the Company. These breaches are evidenced by other matters pleaded in 24 the SAC and summarized in section II. B. below, some of which were not the 25 subject of a partial summary judgment motion, such as the threat to 26 terminate Plaintiff if he did not settle trust disputes unrelated to his sisters 27 on terms satisfactory to them and the threat to terminate Plaintiff's family's 28

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<sup>1</sup> health insurance if he did not resign as a director, among others. The breach
<sup>2</sup> of the duty of loyalty claims also are based on the misuse of the executive
<sup>3</sup> committee, as to which a prior motion for summary judgment (Partial MSJ
<sup>4</sup> No. 4) was denied in relevant part.

#### B. The Partial Summary Judgment Motions

On September 23, 2016, the individual director defendants other than Gould filed six separate motions for *partial* summary judgment numbered 1 through 6 ("Partial MSJ Nos. 1–6"), each of which was directed only at specific matter raised in the respective motions. None sought summary judgment on any of the four claims pleaded in the SAC.

The Court on October 27, 2016 denied Partial MSJ No. 1, finding that "there are genuine issues of material fact and issues related to interested directors participating in the process." *See* Oct. 27, 2016 Hearing Tr., Ex. 2 at 117:9–12. The Court granted in part and denied in part Partial MSJ No. 4 regarding the executive committee of the RDI Board. The Court ruled: The motion related to the executive committee is granted in part. As the formation and revitalization of the committee the Motion is granted. *As to the utilization of the committee it's denied*.

*Id.* at 93:10–13 (emphasis added).

Other Partial MSJs regarding particular matters—director
independence (No. 2), the offer (No. 3), the CEO search (No. 5) and other
matters including the exercise of the 100,000 share option and the
employment and compensation of MC (No. 6), were denied on rule 56 (f)
grounds. See December 21, 2016 Order, Ex. 1.

All of those motions were reset for hearing and heard on
December 11, 2017. As Plaintiff understands the Court's oral rulings, the
Court granted Partial MSJ No. 1 regarding termination as to defendants
Kane, McEachern, Gould, Wrotniak, and Codding on the grounds that
Plaintiff had failed to raise a disputed issue of material fact regarding their

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disinterestedness or independence. December 11, 2017 Hearing Tr., Ex. 3, at 1 41:4-20. The Court granted Partial MSJ No. 2 regarding director 2 independence on the same grounds as to the same five defendants. Id. at 3 4 44:20-45:4. The Court granted Partial MSJ No. 3 regarding the unsolicited offer on separate grounds. Id. at 48:17-22. The Court denied Partial MSJ No. 5 5 regarding the CEO search and denied Partial MSJ No. 6 regarding the 6 option exercise, compensation package and related conduct. Id. at 49:11-7 8 52:15.

9 Although the director defendants who filed Partial MSJ Nos. 1-6 did not seek summary judgment with respect to any of the *claims* for breach 10 11 of fiduciary duty against them in the SAC, the Court indicated that only EC, 12 MC and Adams remain defendants in the case. Id. at 73:9-14. As to director defendant Gould, his separate summary judgment motion had been noticed 13 for hearing on January 8, 2018. See Request for Hearing on Gould MSJ, on 14 15 file at 3. Nevertheless, on December 11, 2017 the Court ruled that Gould was entitled to summary judgment on the same grounds as the director 16 defendants other than EC, MC and Adams. December 11, 2017 Hearing Tr. 17 18 at 41:4-20; 44:20-45:4; 73:9-14.

#### 19 III. ARGUMENT

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#### Reconsideration and clarification of the Court's rulings are Α. warranted.

The Court has authority under EDCR 2.24(b) to reconsider prior 22 rulings, and inherent authority to "reconsider, rescind, or modify an 23 interlocutory order for [sufficient] cause . . . . " City of L.A., Harbor Div. v. 24 Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2001). Courts may grant 25 reconsideration based on new evidence or if the decision is clearly 26 erroneous. Masonry & Tile Contractors Ass 'n of S. Nev. v. Jolley, Urga & Wirth, 27 Ltd., 113 Nev. 737, 741, 941 P.2d 486, 489 (1997). As discussed below, the 28 Court should reconsider and clarify its rulings on Partial MSJ Nos. 1, 2, and 8

<sup>1</sup> 3 and the Gould MSJ, because in ruling in favor of defendants Codding,
<sup>2</sup> Kane, Gould, Wrotniak, and McEachern on all four claims for breaches of
<sup>3</sup> fiduciary duty, the Court overlooked that: (1) Partial MSJ Nos. 1, 2, and 3
<sup>4</sup> did not seek complete relief on all four claims for breaches of fiduciary duty
<sup>5</sup> and briefing on Gould's MSJ was incomplete; and (2) Plaintiff's fiduciary
<sup>6</sup> duty claims are supported by other conduct not addressed by these Partial
<sup>7</sup> MSJs that is sufficient to rebut application of the business judgment rule.

## B. The Court erred in granting summary judgment on all claims against five defendants.

When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, "the evidence, 10 and any reasonable inferences drawn from it, must be viewed in a light most 11 favorable to the nonmoving party." Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 12 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). Although a district court has the inherent power 13 under Nev. R. Civ. P. 56 to sua sponte grant summary judgment on claims 14 that are not a part of a motion for summary judgment, before doing so the 15 Court must give the non-moving party 10 days notice and the opportunity 16 to defend himself. Renown Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 130 Nev. 17 335 P.3d 199, 202 (2014) ("Renown"); Soebbing v. Carpet Barn, 109 18 Nev. 78, 83-84, 847 P.2d 731, 735 (1993)(holding that the defending party 19 must be given the full 10 days notice under Nev. R. Civ. P. 56(c) and an 20 opportunity to defend itself before a court may grant summary judgment 21 sua sponte). 22

*Renown* is instructive, because its procedural history is similar to
this case. There, the defendant hospital moved for summary judgment on
three specific issues: policy coverage, third-party beneficiary status of the
plaintiff, and Renown's compliance with certain statutes. *Renown*, 335 P.2d
at 201. "The full merits of Wiley's claims for breach of the provider
agreement and intentional interference with his Cigna policy were not at
issue in the summary judgment proceedings." *Id.* The district court initially

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denied the motion, holding there were issues of fact. Id. Thereafter, 1 Renown renewed its motion for summary judgment on the same three 2 3 issues and Wiley filed summary judgment motion but only on the statute violation issue. Id. After a hearing on the summary judgment motions, the 4 district court denied Renown's motion and granted Wiley's motion. But in 5 granting that motion, the court decided not only the three issues raised by 6 Renown; it also found "in favor of Wiley on his breach of contract and 7 intentional interference with contract claims, even though the full merits of 8 these claims were not specifically argued in the cross-motions for summary 9 judgment or at the hearing." Id. (emphasis added). "The district court stayed 10 11 the remainder of the case so that Renown could seek writ relief in this court," which it did. Id. The Nevada Supreme Court granted the writ 12 petition with respect to that portion of the order because the "claims for 13 breach of contract and intentional interference with contract . . . were 14 15 nowhere mentioned in the six summary judgment briefs." Id. at 202.

## 1. Partial MSJ Nos. 1, 2, and 3 did not argue the full merits of Plaintiff's fiduciary duty claims.

Here, the individual defendants (other than Gould) moved for 18 partial summary judgment on distinct issues only--i.e., Plaintiff's 19 termination and reinstatement (Partial MSJ No. 1); director independence 20 (No. 2); the unsolicited Patton Vision offer (No. 3); the executive committee 21 (No. 4); the appointment of EC as CEO (No.5); and option exercise and other 22 issues (No. 6). See, e.g., Partial MSJ No. 1 at 2 (Defendants seek summary 23 judgment "as to the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action in 24 Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, to the extent that they assert claims 25 based on Plaintiffs [sic] June 12, 2015 termination . . . .") (emphasis added). 26 Unlike defendant Gould, the individual defendants did not 27 move for summary judgment on all four claims for breach of fiduciary duty, 28

which involve additional issues not addressed in the MSJs—e.g., materially 10

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misleading and erroneous board materials published in public disclosures
and process failures. See Pretrial Memo at 5–9. Moreover, the Court denied
Partial MSJ Nos. 5 and 6, which involve conduct by dismissed defendants.
For example, Partial MSJ No. 5 relates to the appointment of Ellen Cotter as
CEO, which is a decision in which defendants Gould and McEachern
participated.

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## 2. The Court's ruling deprived Plaintiff of Notice and an Opportunity to be heard.

A party's right to notice and an opportunity to be heard on 9 matter not addressed in a motion for summary judgment "has nothing to do 10 with the merits of the case." Soebbing, 109 Nev. at 83, 847 P.2d at 735 (citing 11 U.S. Dev't Corp. v. Peoples Fed. Savings and Loan Ass'n, 873 F.2d 731, 734 (4th 12 Cir.1989)). " '[R]egardless of a claim's merit, a district court may not sua 13 sponte enter summary judgment against it until the claim's proponent has 14 been given notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard.'" Soebbing, 109 15 Nev. at 83, 847 P.2d at 735 (quoting U.S. Dev't Corp., 873 F.2d at 734). 16

Here, because the individual defendants other than Gould did 17 not seek summary judgment across the board on all claims against all five 18 defendants, and the Court's ruling went beyond the issues raised in Partial 19 MSJ Nos. 1, 2, and 3 and dismissed all claims against five defendants, 20 Plaintiff should have received ten days' notice and been given an 21 opportunity to be heard. Nev. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Renown, 335 P.3d at 202. 22 Plaintiff was entitled to the same notice on the Gould MSJ, because briefing 23 was still open on that MSJ on December 11. See Request for Hearing on 24

25 Gould MSJ at 3 (setting hearing on the MSJ for January 8).

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27 28 C. The Court overlooked the conduct, acts and omissions stated in the SAC and Pretrial Memorandum.

During the October 27, 2016 hearing, the Court asked counsel to apprise the Court of the topics that would be the subject of special

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interrogatories, which Plaintiff's counsel understood to mean matters
Plaintiff would claim also gave rise to or constitute breaches of fiduciary
duty *alone*, not just a breach of duty when considered together with other
complained of conduct. Oct. 27, 2016 Hearing Tr., Ex. 2 at 60:23–61:8. That
is what Plaintiff did on pages 5 to 6 of his supplemental opposition that was
discussed with the Court at the December 11, 2017 hearing.

But those matters were not the entirety of the bases for the 7 claims of breaches of fiduciary duty, as the SAC reflects on its face, (which 8 the Court observed during the October 27, 2016 hearing (*id*. at 58:19–25)), as 9 Plaintiff explained in the Joint Pretrial Memorandum, and as the list below, 10 included for the convenience of the Court, reflects. Likewise, the evidence 11 proffered with Plaintiff's oppositions to Partial MSJ Nos. 1-6 (and Gould's 12 MSJ) was of course focused on, but not confined to, the matters listed on pages 13 5 to 6 of the supplemental opposition that was discussed with Court at the 14 15 December 11, 2017 hearing.

The matters which evidence fiduciary breaches by the individual director defendants include the following:

1. The threat by Adams, Kane and McEachern to terminate Plaintiff as President and CEO of RDI if he did not resolve trust disputes with his sisters on terms acceptable to them (which included giving them control of RDI);

2. The vote by Adams, Kane and McEachern to terminate Plaintiff because he failed to acquiesce to the threat;

3. EC's threat to terminate health insurance for JJC and his family if JJC did not resign as a director, which Gould acknowledged was an erroneous position, but to which he acquiesced, resulting in erroneous SEC filings by RDI, among other things;

4. Use of the executive committee of Kane, Adams, EC and MC to limit the participation of Plaintiff and Storey as directors, to which Gould acquiesced;

5. Manipulating board materials, including creating inaccurate minutes, to which Gould acquiesced;

6. Kane and Adams as compensation committee members authorizing exercise of the 100,000 share option to assist EC and MC in their efforts to retain control of RDI, over the stated reservations of Storey;

7. The involuntary "retirement" of director Storey by the onetime "special nominating committee" of McEachern, Adams and Kane, at the direction of EC and MC, because Storey failed to exhibit the required subservience to EC and MC as controlling shareholders;

8. Board stacking/adding Codding and Wrotniak by the onetime "special nominating committee" of McEachern, Adams and Kane, to which Gould acquiesced while acknowledging that he had insufficient time to fulfill his fiduciary responsibilities;

9. The CEO search committee of MC, McEachern and Gould aborting the CEO search and selecting EC even though she did not possess the required experience and qualifications for the position, which the Board acknowledged;

10. Hiring MC as EVP RED NY and paying a \$200,000 preemployment bonus "recommended" by EC, even though all directors had acknowledged that she had no real estate development experience and was not qualified for the position;

11. Paying \$50,000 to Adams because EC "recommended" it;

12. Erroneous and/or materially misleading statements in board materials, such as agendas and minutes; and

13. Materially misleading and inaccurate statements and omissions in public disclosures, including SEC filings and press releases

20  $\|SAC \P\P 9, 13, 72, 101(a)-(i), 109-119, 135(a)-(k), 136(a)-(i), 147 (all).$ 

D. Plaintiff Proffered Evidence of Fiduciary Breaches and Intentional Misconduct More Than Sufficient to Raise Disputed Issues of Material Fact.

The business judgment rule presumes that directors in making business decisions acted in good faith, on an informed basis and with a view to the interests of the corporation. NRS 78.138(3). Courts therefore give deference to directors' decisions reached by proper *process*, and do not evaluate the reasonableness of the subject decision itself, as distinct from the process by which it was made. *Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp.*, 695 A.2d 43, 49 (Del.

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1 [1997]. Thus, the business judgment rule presumption "is a rule of evidence
that places the initial burden of proof on the plaintiff challenging the board's
decision." *Cinerama v. Technicolor, Inc.,* 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995). To
rebut this presumption, the plaintiff bears "the burden of providing
evidence that the Board of Directors, in reaching its challenged decision,
breached any one of its... fiduciary duties [of] good faith, loyalty or due
care." *Id.* at 1164.

In particular, NRS 78.138(7) requires the plaintiff to: (a) rebut the
presumption under NRS 78.138(3) that directors are presumed to act in good
faith, on an informed basis and with a view to the interests of the
corporation; (b) show that the director's act or failure to act constituted a
breach of fiduciary duty; and (c) show that such breach involved intentional
misconduct, fraud or a knowing violation of law.

14 "Intentional misconduct" is one of three ways in which a 15 fiduciary can fail to act in good faith. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 16 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006). The first occurs "where the fiduciary 17 intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best 18 interests of the corporation." Id. The second occurs "where the fiduciary acts 19 with the intent to violate applicable positive law." Id. The third occurs 20 "where the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to 21 act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties." Id.

Additionally, as a matter of law and, in cases such as this, logic
as well, the acts and omissions of the individual director defendants must be
viewed collectively, not in isolation. *See, e.g., In re Ebix, Inc. Stockholder Litig.*,
2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 5 at \*66-67 n.137, 2016 WL 208402 (Del. Ch. Jan. 15,
2016) (rejecting director defendants' contention that bylaw amendments
should be viewed individually rather than collectively); *Carmody v. Toll Brothers., Inc.*, 723 A.2d 1180, 1189 (Del. Ch. 1998) (finding that particularized

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allegations that directors acted for entrenchment purposes sufficient to 1 excuse demand); Chrysogelos v. London, 1992 WL 58516, at \*8 (Del. Ch. 1992) 2 3 ("None of these circumstances, if considered individually and in isolation 4 from the rest, would be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to the propriety of the director's motives. However, when viewed as a whole, they 5 do create such a reasonable doubt . . . "); Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. 6 Coulter, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 144 at \*29-30, 2002 WL 31888343 (Del. Ch. Dec. 7 18, 2002) (concluding that allegations which individually would be 8 9 insufficient to show a lack of disinterestedness or independence when taken 10 together, were sufficient to do so).<sup>2</sup>

Plaintiff respectfully submits that the evidence proffered with
 his various oppositions to the various motions, including the evidence
 highlighted below, is more than sufficient to raise disputed issues of
 material fact and rebut the presumptions that the RDI directors in taking the
 actions raised in this case and described above acted in good faith, on an
 informed basis and with a view to the interest of the corporation.

#### 1. Examples of Evidence Sufficient to Rebut the Business Judgment Rule Presumptions.

a) The (a) Attempted Extortion (by threatening termination) and (b) the Termination Because Plaintiff Refused to Be Extorted.

As Plaintiff demonstrated in his own summary judgment motion and in his oppositions to Partial MSJ No. 1, and as summarized again below, Kane, McEachern, and Adams attempted to extort plaintiff by telling him that they would vote to terminate him as President and CEO of RDI if he did not resolve personal disputes with his sisters concerning trust and estate

Plaintiff understood the Court to recognize and agree that, even if

<sup>27</sup> || individual matters or activities did not in and of themselves constitute

28 breaches of fiduciary duty, that "taken with other activities [they may] evidence... a breach of fiduciary duty." See Oct. 27, 2016 Hearing Tr., Ex. 2 at 57:9-11. matters (including control of RDI), unrelated to his performance as an officer
and director of the corporation. Once Kane, McEachern and Adams had
threatened JJC with termination, Kane used his position as a RDI director to
pressure Plaintiff to acquiesce to that extortion.

5 When Kane, McEachern (who personally solicited plaintiff to 6 resign rather than be terminated, Oct. 13, 2016 Decl. of JJC, ¶ 14) and Adams 7 failed to extort him, they acted on their threat and terminated plaintiff. They 8 did so because, as Adams memorialized contemporaneously, they had 9 picked the sisters' side in their *family dispute* with plaintiff, as opposed to acting in the interest of RDI. Remarkably, Kane admitted to plaintiff just 10 11 before he terminated Plaintiff, "there is no one more qualified to be the 12 CEO of this company than you." Appendix ("App.") Ex. 2 13 (JCOTTER009286) (emphasis added). In making this statement, Kane not 14 only admitted that he, Adams, and McEachern were not acting in the interests of RDI, but also admitted that they were acting in derogation of 15 RDI's interests. (The details of these events are summarized below from 16 17 Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and opposition to Partial MSJ No. 18 1, and the citations are to the Appendices of evidence Plaintiff submitted

<sup>19</sup> previously therewith).

20 On May 19, 2015, EC distributed an agenda for a RDI board of 21 directors meeting two days later, May 21, 2015. App. Ex. 6 (EC Dep. Ex. 22 339). The first agenda item was "Status of President and CEO." Id. This subject had not been previously addressed at an RDI Board of Directors 23 24 meeting. Indeed, a draft agenda a few days earlier made no mention of the subject. App. Ex. 7 (EC Dep. Ex. 338). Storey wrote in a May 20, 2015 email 25 26 to Director Gould that "I am only assuming the matter before us is a resolution to immediately remove the CEO---that isn't clear from the 27 agenda, or any direct comment made to me by any party." App. Ex. 8 28

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(TS0000073). But before May 19, 2015, each of Adams, Kane and McEachern 1 communicated to EC their agreement to vote as RDI directors to terminate 2 3 plaintiff as President and CEO of RDI. App. Ex. 1 (EC 6/16/16 Dep. Tr. 175:17-176:8); App. Ex. 5 (Storey 2/12/16 Dep. Tr. at 96:5-91:4, 98:21-100:8, 4 5 100:14-101:11); App. Ex. 9 (Adams 4/28/16 Dep. Tr. at 98:7-17; 98:18-99:22); App. Ex. 9 (Adams 4/29/16 Dep. Tr. at 378:15-370:5); see also App. Ex. 6 (TS 6 7 8/31/16 Dep. Tr. at 66:22-67:20) and App. Ex. 26 (Dep. Ex 131). During their planning that predated the supposed May 21 8 meeting, Kane sent an email to Adams on May 18, 2016, in which he (Kane) 9 10 agreed to second the motion for plaintiff's termination: See if you can get someone else to second the motion [to 11 terminate Plaintiff as President and CEO]. If the vote is 5-3 I 12 might want to abstain and make it 4-3. If it's needed I will vote. It's personal and goes back 51 years. If no one else will second it 13 I will. 14 App. Ex. 19 (Dep. Ex. 81 at GA00005500). 15 Also prior to May 21, 2015, Kane and Adams discussed other 16 motions related to plaintiff's termination, such as the appointment of an 17 interim CEO. App. Ex. 9 (Adams 4/29/16 Dep. Tr. at 366:5-367:6); see also 18 App. Ex. 20 (Adams Dep. Ex. 82 at GA00005502–03). In a May 19, 2015 email 19 to Kane, Adams confirmed they had chosen sides in a family dispute: 20 Ed, 21 I am sorry, as I know your relationship with the family started long before they were born. I also know-and now see for 22 myself-why SR placed such a high value on you and your 23 counsel. More than anyone else on the board, you worked behind the scenes attempting to bridge every problem with the 24 kids. Lastly, I know that more than anyone else, you have been at SR's side at every turn as he built his empire. I think you and I 25 share a [sic] obligation to the family .... based upon our 26 commitment to our friend .... Unfortunately, it seems that we have no choice but to choose a side. 27 28

App. Ex. 21 (Adams Dep. Ex. 85 at GA00005544-45 (emphasis added); see 2 also App. Ex. 6 (TS 8/3/16 Dep. Tr. at 65:12-66:20). Where is the "interest" of 3 RDI in this admission? NRS 78.138(1).

4 In the face of a pre-arranged agreement among Adams, Kane 5 and McEachern to vote to terminate plaintiff, Gould warned that they all 6 could "face possible claims for breach of fiduciary duty if the Board takes 7 action without following a process . . . . " App. Ex. 318 (Gould Dep. Ex. 318). (Emphasis added). Storey used the term "kangaroo court," and observed as 8 9 to the non-Cotter directors that, "as directors we can't just do what a 10 shareholder [meaning EC and MC] asks." App. Ex. 22 (Kane Dep. Ex. 116) (emphasis added). Kane rejected their request to meet separately from the 11 Cotters, stating that "the die is cast." App. Ex. 23 (EK Dep. Ex. 117 at 12 13 TS000069).

The supposed May 21, 2015 special meeting was convened and 14 15 concluded with no termination vote having been taken. Sept. 23, 2016 JJC 16 Declaration In Support of Plaintiff's Motion ("JJC Decl.") ¶ 11.

17 On or about Wednesday, May 27, 2015, a lawyer representing 18 MC and EC in the California Trust Action sent an attorney representing 19 Plaintiff in that action a document outlining terms on which EC and MC would resolve their disputes with him. Id. ¶ 12; App. Ex. 4 (MC 6/15/16 20 Dep. Tr. at 154:19-156:19); App. Ex. 32 (Dep. Ex. 322). Not coincidentally, EC 21 22 on May 27, 2015 emailed RDI directors stating "that the board meeting held last Thursday [May 21] was adjourned, to reconvene this Friday, May 29, 23 2015. The board meeting will begin at 11:00 a.m. at our Los Angeles office." 24 JJC Decl. ¶ 13; App. Ex. 1 (MC 6/16/16 Dep. Tr. at 185:13-186:9); App. Ex. 35 25 26 (Dep. Ex. 340).

Once the termination threat had been made, Kane continued 27 28 misusing his position of trust and power as a director at RDI to pressure

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Plaintiff to give in to the threat of his sisters and resolve his disputes with 1 2 them by acceding to their demands. For example, on May 28 Kane wrote 3 Plaintiff: "Ellen is going to present you with a global plan to end the litigation and move the Company forward. If you agree to it, you, Ellen and 4 Margaret will work in a collaborative manner and you will retain your title." 5 6 App. Ex. 4 (Dep. Ex. 118 at EK 00000396 (emphasis added). Kane further 7 warned, "If it is a take-it-or-leave-it, then I STRONGLY ADVISE YOU TO TAKE IT, even though I have not seen or heard the particulars." Id. 8 9 (emphasis added).

10 The supposed special board meeting on May 29 commenced and 11 Adams made a motion to terminate Plaintiff as President and CEO. In response, Plaintiff questioned Adams' independence and/or 12 13 disinterestedness. JJC Decl. ¶ 15. Adams refused to speak to the subject, 14 and neither Gould nor any other RDI director received or required an explanation from Adams. Id. The supposed special meeting was adjourned 15 until 6:00 p.m. that evening. Plaintiff was then told by Kane, McEachern 16 17 and Adams that he needed to resolve his disputes with his sisters by then or 18 they would to terminate him. Id. That threat was memorialized by director 19 Storey, whose contemporaneous handwritten notes state:

long board discussion

ended with basically a command from "majority" – Jim go settle something with sisters in next hour or you will be terminated.

<sup>23</sup> App. Ex. 5 (Storey 2/12/16 Dep. Tr. at 110:6–12); App. Ex. 15 (Storey Dep.

<sup>24</sup> || Ex. 17) (emphasis added).

The Board reconvened telephonically around 6:00 p.m. and Ellen
 Cotter reported that she and Margaret Cotter had reached an agreement in
 principle with plaintiff to resolve their disputes. Ellen Cotter concluded
 that, while no definitive agreement had been reached, she would have one

MORRIS LAW GROUP 411 E. BONNEVILE AVE., STE. 360 · LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422 of their lawyers provide documentation to counsel for plaintiff. No
termination vote was taken. JJC Decl. ¶ 16; Motion App. Ex. 3 (MC 5/13/16
Dep. Tr. at 368:13–369:22); see also App. Ex. 15 (Dep. Ex. 17) and Ex. 1 (Kane
5/2/16 Dep. Tr. at 191:6–24). On Wednesday, June 3, 2015, counsel for EC
and MC transmitted a new document to counsel for JJC. JJC Decl. ¶ 17;
App. Ex. 3 (MC 5/13/16 Dep. Tr. at 377:7-24); App. Ex. 28 (Dep. Ex. 167).

7 A few days later, on June 7 and 8, 2015, Kane admitted that the termination threat was in furtherance of the interests of EC and MC, not RDI. 8 In a June 8 email to Plaintiff, Kane stated that "there is no one more qualified 9 10 to be the CEO of this company than you." App. Ex. 2 (JCOTTER009286) (emphasis added). A day earlier, Kane said "I want you to be CEO and run 11 the company for the next 30 years or more." Id. Kane thus confirmed that 12 13 when he, Adams, and McEachern threatened to terminate Plaintiff and thereafter did so, they not only were not acting in the interests of RDI, but 14 15 that they were acting against of RDI's interests, in breach of their fiduciary 16 duties.

On June 8, 2015, Plaintiff advised EC and MC that he could not 17 accept their so-called settlement document. MC responded that she would 18 19 advise the RDI board of directors. JJC Decl. ¶ 18; App. Ex. 3 (MC 5/13/16 Dep. Tr. at 368:13-369:22); see also App. Ex. 3 (MC 5/12/16 Dep. Tr. at 20 271:22-279:7); App. Ex. 27 (Dep. Ex. 156). On Wednesday afternoon, June 10, 21 22 2015, EC transmitted an email to all RDI board members stating, among 23 other things, that "we would like to reconvene the Meeting that was adjourned on Friday, May 29th, at approximately 6:15 p.m. (Los Angeles 24 time.) We would like to reconvene this Meeting telephonically Friday, June 25 12 at 11:00 a.m. (Los Angeles time) . . . " JJC Decl. ¶ 19. 26

When the termination vote was rescheduled for the next day,
Kane resumed pressuring Plaintiff stating on June 11, 2015: "I do believe

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that if you give up what you consider 'control' for now to work cooperatively with your sisters," Kane admonished, "you will find that you 2 will have a lot more commonality than you think." App. Ex. 5 (Kane Dep. 3 Ex. 306 at EK 00001613). "Otherwise," Kane threatened, "you will be sorry 4 for the rest of your life, they and your mother will be hurt and your 5 children will lose a golden opportunity." Id. Tellingly, Kane also wrote: 6 "[F]or now I think you have to concede that Margaret will vote 7 the B stock. As I said, your dad told me that giving Margaret the 8 vote was his way of 'forcing' the three of you to work together. Asking to change that is a *nonstarter*." 9 App. Ex. 5 (Kane Dep. Ex. 306) (emphasis in original). 10 On Friday, June 12, 2015, a supposed RDI board of directors 11 special meeting was convened. Adams, Kane and McEachern voted to 12 terminate JJC (as did MC and EC). App. Ex. 10 (Kane 5/2/16 Dep. Tr. at 13 191:25-192:12, 193:-194:10); App. Ex. 5 (Storey 2/12/16 Dep. Tr. at 139:22-14 140:11); see also App. Ex. 6 (TS 8/3/16 Dep. Tr. at 75:4-76:16 and 81:22-82:6). 15 Kane in deposition admitted that JJC was fired because he did not acquiesce 16 to the termination threat made by Kane, Adams and McEachern: 17 Kane:I-I said to him at one point, "Take it. You have nothing to 18 lose. You're going to get terminated if you don't. If you can work it out with your sisters, it will go on and I will support you. I'll 19 even make a motion to see if the company will reimburse the 20 legal fees." I did not want him to go. And you, I'm sure, see emails in there to that effect. Even though I voted-was voting 21 against him, I wanted him to stay as C.E.O. 22 \* \* \* 23 But that resolution did not come to pass because Jim O.: Cotter, Jr., rejected it, correct? 24 He rejected it, yes. Kane: 25 And he got himself terminated, right? Q.: 26 Kane: Yes. 27 App. Ex. 1 (Kane 5/2/16 Dep. Tr. at 194–195 (objection omitted). 28

#### b) The Aborted CEO Search

Rather than recite the record evidence regarding the CEO search 2 again, Plaintiff respectfully refers the Court to his prior briefs and the 3 evidence described therein and proffered therewith. See October 13, 2016 4 Oppositions to Partial MSJ No. 5 and Gould's MSJ and December 1, 2017 5 Supplemental Opposition to Partial MSJ Nos. 2 and 5. By way of summary, 6 that evidence shows that the CEO search committee, comprised of MC, 7 McEachern and Gould (after EC declared her candidacy and withdrew), 8 effectively terminated the search on the same day EC declared her 9 candidacy. That was the last day the committee had a substantive 10 communication with Korn Ferry, the outside professional search firm 11 employed and paid by RDI to lead the CEO search. Shortly thereafter, Korn 12 Ferry was told to stand down, to not provide the agreed and paid for 13 proprietary assessment of final qualified candidates and, in effect, to not 14 interfere with the decision of MC, McEachern and Gould to ignore the fact 15 that EC did not possess the experience and qualifications that they had 16 agreed were the sine qua non to be selected as RDI's new CEO. The CEO 17 search committee then presented (surprise!) EC as their choice, and did not 18 present the full Board with the final three candidates as the previously set 19 process prescribed. The Board dutifully agreed, and EC was made CEO. For 20 Judy Codding, a close family friend who had been a Board member for only 21 two months, that was the result she previously had determined to bring 22 about, because it was her view that RDI was a "family business" of which 23 only a Cotter should be CEO. JJC Decl. ¶ 24. 24

c) The Matters Which Were the Subject of MSJ No. 6
 Because the Court is familiar with the matters raised in Partial
 MSJ No. 6 and denied that motion, Plaintiff will not recite the record
 evidence bearing upon those matters. However, Plaintiff respectfully
 reminds the Court that it was director defendant Kane who, together with

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Adams, authorized the exercise of the 100,000 share option, and did so
notwithstanding the fact that (1) questions he deemed needed to be
answered before doing so were not answered, and (2) the responses
provided were identified as insufficient by director Storey. Together with
the context of that conduct—to enable EC and MC to retain control of RDI—
Plaintiff respectfully submits that these facts alone preclude dismissal of this
action as against Kane.

**Gould's Recurring Intentional Misconduct.** 8 d) Rather than attempt to recite the record evidence contained in 9 Plaintiff's oppositions to the various motions addressing matters to which 10 Gould was a party, Plaintiff respectfully refers to Court to the motions. 11 However, for ease of reference and the convenience of the Court, Plaintiff 12 provides the following inventory of facts that he contends show that 13 director-defendant Gould engaged in intentional misconduct, meaning that 14 he intentionally failed of to act in the face of a known duty to act, 15 demonstrating a conscious disregard of his duties to RDI, and/or that he 16 intentionally acted with a purpose other than advancing the best interests of 17

<sup>18</sup> || RDI. The inventory of misconduct includes the following:

• Gould failed to take steps to prevent or to terminate the efforts by Kane, Adams and McEachern to extort plaintiff.

• Gould failed to follow through and require Adams to produce, and the Board assess, information regarding his financial dependence on EC and MC, as a result of which Gould allowed Adams to cast the decisive vote to terminate Plaintiff.

• Gould failed to require the Board to decide whether the position taken by EC, that Plaintiff was required to resign as a director upon termination as an executive, notwithstanding the fact that Gould new the position was erroneous, thereby acquiescing to conduct that was erroneous if not improper.

• Gould acquiesced to the use of an executive committee he knew at the time it was put in place would be used to limit the participation of Plaintiff and Storey as directors.

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• Gould acquiesced to stacking the RDI board with unqualified loyalists to the Cotter sisters, even acknowledging at the time that he did not have sufficient opportunity to make an informed decision about whether to disagree or acquiesce.

• Gould as one of three members of the executive committee allowed EC to manipulate the process and then took affirmative steps to abort the CEO selection process, in order to bend to the wishes of EC to be CEO.

• Gould admitted at the time and subsequently that MC lacked real estate development experience, making her unqualified to be the senior executive vice president of RDI responsible for development of its valuable New York City real estate, but he nevertheless acquiesced to her being given that position and paid as if she were qualified.

• Gould acquiesced to EC's recommendation that Adams be given \$50,000, without having any RDI basis for doing so.

• Gould took his cue from EC and Craig Tompkins and directed the discussion at the 1 hour and 25 minutes telephonic board meeting regarding the Patton Vision offer to the subject of whether the controlling shareholders would approve, thereby pre-empting and preventing any genuine consideration of how RDI should assess and respond to that offer.

• Gould repeatedly acquiesced to RDI issuing and not correcting erroneous SEC filings, including a June 15, 2015 Form 8-K that asserted the erroneous statement that Plaintiff was required to resign as a director upon termination as a senior executive, as well as a materially misleading if not erroneous Form 8-K in January 2016 regarding the selection of CEO, which included a statement from Gould implying that the selection of EC was the result of a "thorough search process," when in fact the process had been aborted and selection was not the result of the proper process.

The motion papers are devoid of any explanation, much less justification, for the conduct of Kane, McEachern and Adams in threatening Plaintiff with termination in order to force him to settle trust disputes with his sisters on terms that suited them, as distinguished from terms suitable to RDI. The evidence regarding the aborted CEO search, for which MC, Gould and McEachern are responsible, likewise raises disputed issues of material fact that preclude dismissal of this action against any of them. Finally by way of example, when viewed collectively and in context, as it must be,
Gould's recurring abdication of his fiduciary responsibilities evidences
disputed issues of material fact that require denial of Gould's separate
motion.

<sup>5</sup> IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court should clarify, reconsider, and vacate its rulings on Partial MSJ Nos. 1 and 2, and on Gould's MSJ.

### MORRIS LAW GROUP

By:

Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543 Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102 411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913 YURKO, SALVESEN & REMZ, P.C. 1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor Boston, MA 02108

Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.

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### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

Pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D) and E.D.C.R. 8.05, I certify that I am an employee of MORRIS LAW GROUP and that on the date below, I cause the following document(s) to be served via the Court's Odyssey E-Filing System: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR CLARIFICATION OF RULING ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOS 1, 2, AND 3 AND GOULD'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION AND APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME to be served on all interested parties, as registered with the Court's E-Filing and E-Service System. The date and time of the electronic proof of service is in place of the date and place of deposit in the mail. 

DATED this \_\_\_\_\_ day of December, 2017.

By:\_

MORRIS LAW GROUP E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 · Las Vegas, nevada 89101 702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422

## Exhibit 1

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	ORDR Mark G. Krum (SBN 10913)	CLERK OF THE COURT
2	Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP 3993 Howard Hughes Pkwy, Suite 600 Las Vegas, NV 89169-5996	
4	Las vegas, NV 89109-3990 Tel: 702-949-8200 Fax: 702-949-8398	
5	E-mail:mkrum@lrrc.com	
6	Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.	
7.	DISTRIC	TCOURT
8	CLARK COUN	NTY, NEVADA
9	JAMES J. COTTER, JR., individually and derivatively on behalf of Reading International,	CASE NO.: A-15-719860-B DEPT. NO. XI
10	Inc.,	Coordinated with:
11	Plaintiff,	Case No. P-14-082942-E
12	VS.	Dept. No. XI
.13	MARGARET COTTER, ELLEN COTTER, GUY ADAMS, EDWARD KANE, DOUGLAS	Case No. A-16-735305-B Dept. No. XI
14	GUY ADAMS, EDWARD KANE, DOUGLAS McEACHERN, TIMOTHY STOREY, WILLIAM GOULD, and DOES 1 through 100,	Jointly Administered
15	inclusive,	Business Court
16	Defendants.	
14		
17	and	[PROPOSED] ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL
17 18		DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOS. 1–6 AND MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE
17 18 19	and READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a	DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOS. 1-6 AND
17 18 19 20	and READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada corporation, Nominal Defendant.	DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOS. 1–6 AND MOTION <i>IN LIMINE</i> TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY
17 18 19 20 21	and READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada corporation,	DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOS. 1–6 AND MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE
17 18 19 20 21 22	and <u>READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a</u> Nevada corporation, Nominal Defendant. <u>T2 PARTNERS MANAGEMENT, LP, a</u> Delaware limited partnership, doing business as	DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOS. 1-6 AND MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY Date of Hearing: October 27, 2016
17 18 19 20 21 22 23	and <u>READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a</u> Nevada corporation, <u>Nominal Defendant.</u> <u>T2 PARTNERS MANAGEMENT, LP, a</u> <u>Delaware limited partnership, doing business as</u> <u>KASE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, et al.,</u>	DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOS. 1-6 AND MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY Date of Hearing: October 27, 2016
<ol> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> <li>24</li> </ol>	and <u>READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a</u> Nevada corporation, <u>Nominal Defendant.</u> <u>T2 PARTNERS MANAGEMENT, LP, a</u> Delaware limited partnership, doing business as KASE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. MARGARET COTTER, ELLEN COTTER,	DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOS. 1-6 AND MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY Date of Hearing: October 27, 2016 Time of Hearing: 8:30 a.m.
17 18 19 20 21 22 23	and READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada corporation, Nominal Defendant. T2 PARTNERS MANAGEMENT, LP, a Delaware limited partnership, doing business as KASE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. MARGARET COTTER, ELLEN COTTER, GUY ADAMS, EDWARD KANE, DOUGLAS MAEACHERN WILLIAM GOULD, JUDY	DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOS. 1-6 AND MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY Date of Hearing: October 27, 2016 Time of Hearing: 8:30 a.m.
<ol> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> <li>24</li> <li>25</li> </ol>	and READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada corporation, Nominal Defendant. T2 PARTNERS MANAGEMENT, LP, a Delaware limited partnership, doing business as KASE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. MARGARET COTTER, ELLEN COTTER, GUY ADAMS, EDWARD KANE, DOUGLAS McEACHERN, WILLIAM GOULD, JUDY CODDING, MICHAEL WROTNIAK, CRAIG TOMPKINS, and DOES 1 through 100,	DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOS. 1-6 AND MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY Date of Hearing: October 27, 2016 Time of Hearing: 8:30 a.m.
<ol> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> <li>24</li> <li>25</li> <li>26</li> </ol>	and READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada corporation, Nominal Defendant. T2 PARTNERS MANAGEMENT, LP, a Delaware limited partnership, doing business as KASE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. MARGARET COTTER, ELLEN COTTER, GUY ADAMS, EDWARD KANE, DOUGLAS McEACHERN, WILLIAM GOULD, JUDY CODDING, MICHAEL WROTNIAK, CRAIG	DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOS. 1-6 AND MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY Date of Hearing: October 27, 2016 Time of Hearing: 8:30 a.m.
<ol> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> <li>24</li> <li>25</li> <li>26</li> <li>27</li> </ol>	and READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada corporation, Nominal Defendant. T2 PARTNERS MANAGEMENT, LP, a Delaware limited partnership, doing business as KASE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. MARGARET COTTER, ELLEN COTTER, GUY ADAMS, EDWARD KANE, DOUGLAS McEACHERN, WILLIAM GOULD, JUDY CODDING, MICHAEL WROTNIAK, CRAIG TOMPKINS, and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,	DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOS. 1-6 AND MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY Date of Hearing: October 27, 2016 Time of Hearing: 8:30 a.m.
<ol> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> <li>24</li> <li>25</li> <li>26</li> <li>27</li> </ol>	and READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada corporation, Nominal Defendant. T2 PARTNERS MANAGEMENT, LP, a Delaware limited partnership, doing business as KASE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. MARGARET COTTER, ELLEN COTTER, GUY ADAMS, EDWARD KANE, DOUGLAS McEACHERN, WILLIAM GOULD, JUDY CODDING, MICHAEL WROTNIAK, CRAIG TOMPKINS, and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants.	DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOS. 1-6 AND MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY Date of Hearing: October 27, 2016 Time of Hearing: 8:30 a.m.

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3993 Howard Hughes Pikwy, Suite 600 Las Vegas, NV 89169-5996

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and	
READIN Nevada c	G INTERNATIONAL, INC., a orporation,
	Nominal Defendant.
T	HESE MATTERS HAVING COME BEFORE the Court on October 27, 2016, Mark
Krum apr	pearing for plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff"); H. Stanley Johnson, Christopher
Tayback,	and Marshall M. Searcy appearing for defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, Dou
McEache	m, Guy Adams, Edward Kane, Judy Codding and Michael Wrotniak; Mark E. Ferrar
and Kara	Hendricks appearing for Reading International, Inc.; and Ekwan Rhow, Shoshana E.
Bannett a	ppearing for William Gould, on the following motions:
-	• Individual Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (No. 1) Re: Plaintiff's
	Termination and Reinstatement Claims;
	• Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 2) Re: The
	Issue of Director Independence;
	<ul> <li>Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 3) On</li> </ul>
	Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Purported Unsolicited Offer;
	Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 4) On
	Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Executive Committee;
	• Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 5) On
	Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Appointment of Ellen Cotter as CEO;
	Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 6) Re:
	Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Estate's Option Exercise, the Appointment of
	Margaret Cotter, the Compensation Packages of Ellen Cotter and Margaret Cott
	and the Additional Compensation to Margaret Cotter and Guy Adams; and
	• Defendants' Motion In Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony of Myron Steele,
	Tiago Duarte-Silva, Richard Spitz, Albert Nagy, and John Finnerty;
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3993 Howard Hughes Pkwy, Suite 600 Las Vegas, NV 89169-5996

Lewis Rocd Rothgerber Christle IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment No. 1 is
 DENIED. There are genuine issues of material fact as to the issues related to interested directors
 participating in the process.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Rule 56(f) relief is GRANTED with respect to
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment No. 2, and supplemental briefing will be discussed once
the relevant discovery is complete. The independence issue needs to be evaluated on a transaction
or action-by-action basis, because the independence related to each needs to be separately
evaluated; even though facts overlap, the Court cannot evaluate this in a vacuum. Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment No. 2 is CONTINUED pending Plaintiff's submission of a
supplemental opposition.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Rule 56(f) relief is GRANTED with respect to
 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment No. 3, because depositions have not been completed and
 the relevant documents have not been produced. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment No. 3 is
 CONTINUED pending Plaintiff's submission of a supplemental opposition.

15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Motion for Partial Summary Judgment No. 4 is
16 GRANTED IN PART. As to the formation and revitalization (activation) of the Executive
17 Committee, the motion is GRANTED; as to utilization of the committee, the motion is DENIED.
18 Formation and revitalization includes a decision by the company to make use of their previously
19 dormant Executive Committee and put people on that Executive Committee.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Rule 56(f) relief is granted with respect to Motion for
 Partial Summary Judgment No. 5. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment No. 5 is CONTINUED
 pending Plaintiff's submission of a supplemental opposition.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Rule 56(f) relief is granted with respect to Motion for
 Partial Summary Judgment No. 6. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment No. 6 is CONTINUED
 pending Plaintiff's submission of a supplemental opposition.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Motion *in Limine* to Exclude Expert Testimony of
 Myron Steele, Tiago Duarte-Silva, Richard Spitz, Albert Nagy, and John Finnerty is GRANTED
 IN PART. With respect to Chief Justice Steele, he may testify only for the limited purpose of
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identifying what appropriate corporate governance activities would have been, including activities where directors are interested, including how to evaluate if directors are interested. As to Dr. Finnerty, the Motion In Limine was WITHDRAWN. As to the other experts, the motion is DENIED. DATED this 10 day of December, 2016. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE Submitted by: LEWIS ROCA ROTHGERBER CHRISTIE LLP By <u>/s/ Mark G. Krum</u> MARK G. KRUM (SBN 10913) 3993 Howard Hughes Pkwy., Ste. 600 Las Vegas, NV 89169 Attorneys for Plaintiff

3993 Howard Hughes Pkwy, Suite 600 Las Vegas, NV 89169-5996 Lewis Roca Rotheerber christle

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# Exhibit 2

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CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA \* \* \* \* \*

JAMES COTTER, JR. Plaintiff	• • •	CASE NO. A-719860 A-735305 P-082942
vs.	•	DEPT. NO. XI
MARGARET COTTER, et al.		Transcript of
Defendants	•	Proceedings

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

#### HEARING ON MOTIONS

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 27, 2016

COURT RECORDER:

TRAN

TRANSCRIPTION BY:

JILL HAWKINS District Court FLORENCE HOYT Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

of a breach whether they are in and of themselves a breach.
 See, there's a different concept that I'm trying to deal with
 as a trial judge than I think you're dealing with in your
 motions, which it's your job.

5 MR. TAYBACK: There's two issues. One is could it 6 be a breach as a matter of law. And my answer to that 7 question is no. The second question is is there evidence that 8 it's a breach. And the answer to that is no, as well.

9 THE COURT: That's not what I said, Counsel. Is 10 this activity taken with other activities evidence of a breach 11 of fiduciary duty?

MR. TAYBACK: I understand his argument, plaintiff'sargument.

14 THE COURT: That's not his argument. That's what 15 trial judges think about.

MR. TAYBACK: The question -- it begs the question, though, is what is the breach. There has to be a specific thing that occurred that is a breach --

19 THE COURT: Uh-huh.

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20 MR. TAYBACK: -- as opposed to saying, this is a 21 course of conduct. And that's the way plaintiff has 22 characterized it. And the course of conduct can be relevant 23 to a breach --24 THE COURT: Yes.

MR. TAYBACK: -- but it begs the question what is

the breach, what is the breach. This is not the breach. This 1 is not a breach. It's not a valid basis for a breach claim. 2 And to say it might be relevant evidence of something else, 3 some other breach, that's a decision you could make. 4 THE COURT: You're not asking me to exclude evidence 5 of this, only to not instruct it or include it on a special 6 interrogatory that it could be found an independent breach --7 MR. TAYBACK: That's correct. 8 THE COURT: -- as opposed to evidence of breaches 9 that have occurred. 10 That's absolutely correct. MR. TAYBACK: 11 THE COURT: I just needed you to say that, because 12 that's not what your motion says. 13 MR. TAYBACK: I believe it's not -- I believe 14 ultimately it wouldn't be relevant perhaps. But that's a 15 different question. That's a different question. And that's 16 not our motion. Our motion is to summarily adjudicate the 17. basis of this unsolicited offer as being a breach. 18 There is no -- there is no allegation of THE COURT: 19 the unsolicited offer as the breach of fiduciary duty claim. 20 It is one of many things that are alleged as evidence of 21 22 breach of fiduciary duty. MR. TAYBACK: If I'm --23 THE COURT: I pulled the complaint to read it again, 24 because --25

MR. TAYBACK: I did, too.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. TAYBACK: And if in fact we misunderstood what 3 his basis of the alleged breach is, then you're right, then 4 it's not an issue, then it's not an alleged breach how we 5 dealt with the -- how the company dealt with this unsolicited 6 offer. It's merely evidence. But it's only relevant evidence 7 if it relates to a breach. And certainly I think somewhere in 8 our motions we address the thing that he says was actually the 9 breach. But begs the question is what he's saying is the 10 breach. What occurred that breached a fiduciary duty by 11 individual directors, individual directors. For instance, Mr. 12 Wrotniak, who's never even been deposed, who's seemingly 13 collateral to every theory that's being proffered by the 14 plaintiff, was in the room to discuss this particular 15 unsolicited offer. What, if anything, did he do to breach any 16 duty, and what is the relevance, I suppose, to address Your 17 Honor's question, of how he did it to some other breach that 18 is alleged but unspecified at least in our conversation right 19 now as to what it is that plaintiff is saying breached a 20 fiduciary duty to the company. 21 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? 22 MR. TAYBACK: Only if you have questions, Your 23

24 Honor.

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THE COURT: I don't have any more. I asked you

1 them.

MR. KRUM: Your Honor, as I see this motion, the 2 partial issue is the one you identified. And it's not just 3 this motion, it's arguably all of them. But it's certainly 4 It's certainly the executive committee motion. And this one. 5 I've said this. I said it when we moved for leave to amend. 6 We pleaded the complaint this way, as you saw it. We haven't 7 alleged 10 or however many isolated acts as individual 8 That's not the nature of unrelated fiduciary duty breaches. 9 the case. And in point of fact the offer issues in some 10 respects sort of close the loop that begun with the seizure of 11 control of the company. So I can go through that whole 12 argument that you've obviously read and you understand better 13 than I do, because you try cases all the time. It's an 14 argument that is a practical, realistic, and legal issue from 15 the perspective of trying a case, it's an argument that has a 16 basis in the law of corporate fiduciaries. 17

18 THE COURT: So let me ask you a question. So you've 19 got your couple of breach of fiduciary duty claims and your 20 aiding and abetting claim, and it is your intention, I assume, 21 to submit special interrogatories to the jury.

22 MR. KRUM: Yes.

THE COURT: What are you going to ask them? MR. KRUM: Well, I need to finish the discovery. I'm not trying to be nonresponsive, Your Honor, but, for example,

we're talking about the offer. I haven't deposed a single 1 witness, so I can't tell you today whether I'm going to take 2 the position that what transpired with respect to the offer is 3 evidence only or is evidence and independent breach. Your 4 question is a perfectly correct question. I acknowledge that. 5 THE COURT: Okay. So when after you finish the 6 discovery are you going to be able to answer that question for 7 me? Because that impacts like six of these motions. 8 MR. KRUM: That, Your Honor, is on our whole list of 9 trial-related activities to perform. So obviously we'll turn 10 to that as quickly as we can after we complete the discovery. 11 Perhaps I can answer it when we speak on December 1st. I'11 12 do my best. 13 And, by the way, I have all sorts of arguments here 14 on this particular motion, a 56(f) argument about the facts 15 and the law. 16 THE COURT: I know. 17 But I assume you don't need to hear those MR. KRUM: 18 19 from me. THE COURT: No. The reason I did this one next is 20 because it's the most closely related to the 56(f) issues. 21And it makes it hard for you to finish when you don't have the 22 last little bit of information, haven't finished the depos. 23 But I was hoping you could tell me what questions you thought 24 you were going to ask the jury. 25

will have to, as discussed, decide what exactly the special 1 interrogatories are going to be. But it is absolutely, 2 positively compelling evidence of what transpired here. Ιt 3 was a whole exercise to seize and perpetuate control. So it's 4 not -- it's not -- you know, it's legal and therefore 5 everything is copacetic is just wrong as a matter of law. 6 I don't have anything unless you have questions for 7 8 me. THE COURT: Thank you. 9 The motion related to the executive committee is 10 granted in part. As to the formation and revitalization of 11 the committee the motion is granted. 12 As to the utilization of the committee it's denied. 13 MR. KRUM: Point of clarification, Your Honor. By 14 revitalization are you referring -- is that something 15 different than -- that's activation? Is that what that is? 16 THE COURT: Activation. I think you called it 17 repopulation, putting people on it. I'm not including 18 utilization, which is the activities of the executive 19 committee afterwards. 20 MR. KRUM: And utilization includes the purposes for 21 which these other activities were done? 22 THE COURT: No. Formation and revitalization 23 include a decision by the company, whether it's a decision by 24 the company to make use of their previously dormant executive 25

plaintiff. There's no wrong to the company for the company 1 following the bylaws, following Nevada law, following the 2 terms of the contract, and on these facts, taking them as he 3 said, where people are fighting and its infecting the 4 operation of the company for the board to say, I'm picking 5 It's literally that simple. these two over that one. 6 THE COURT: Okay. Are you done? 7 MR. FERRARIO: Yes. 8 THE COURT: All right. The motion's denied, as 9 there are genuine issues of material fact and issues related 10 to interested directors participating in a process. 11 If I could go to the motion in limine related to 12 plaintiff's experts. 13 So, for the record, in September of 2013 I spoke on 14 a panel called Multijurisdiction Case Management Litigation 15 Being Pursued in Multiple Forums with Chief Justice Myron 16 Steele. I don't think it affects my ability to be fair and 17 impartial, but I make that disclosure to you just in case you 18 need it. 19 Thank you, Your Honor. I'll try and go MR. SEARCY: 20 through the four experts that were touched upon in our motion 21 in limine fairly briefly, because it's getting late. 22 THE COURT: And I've got to find them in the book. 23 So you keep going. 24 If the Court has any questions, MR. SEARCY: Okay. 25

#### CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

#### AFFIRMATION

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

#### FLORENCE HOYT Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

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FLORENCE M. HOYT, TRANSCRIBER

10/31/16

DATE

## Exhibit 3

TRAN		DISTRICT COURT K COUNTY, NEVAD * * * * *	DA	
JAMES COT	IER, JR. Plaintiff vs. COTTER, et al. Defendants	CAS	SE NO. A-15-719860-B A-16-735305-B P-14-082942-E DEPT. NO. XI Transcript of Proceedings	
BEFORE TH	IE HONORABLE ELI	ZABETH GONZALEZ	, DISTRICT COURT JUDG	E
	ING ON MOTIONS I		, DISTRICT COURT JUDG RETRIAL CONFERENCE 2017	Е
	ING ON MOTIONS I	IN LIMINE AND PF	RETRIAL CONFERENCE	Έ
	ING ON MOTIONS I MONDAY	IN LIMINE AND PF	<b>RETRIAL CONFERENCE</b> 2017	Έ

#### APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

MARK G. KRUM, ESQ. STEVE L. MORRIS, ESQ. AKKE LEVIN, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

H. STANLEY JOHNSON, ESQ. MARSHALL M. SEARCY, ESQ. CHRISTOPHER TAYBACK, ESQ. JAMES L. EDWARDS, ESQ. MARK E. FERRARIO, ESQ. KARA B. HENDRICKS, ESQ. EKWAN RHOW, ESQ.

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, MONDAY, DECEMBER 11, 2017, 10:24 A.M. 1 (Court was called to order) 2 MR. FERRARIO: Ms. Hendricks has something to take 3 4 up with you. MS. HENDRICKS: I just have a question. 5 THE COURT: On what? 6 MS. HENDRICKS: On how many drives we each need. 7 Wait. Don't go 8 THE COURT: Wait. That's not me. 9 there yet. 10 MS. HENDRICKS: Okay. THE COURT: Who are you looking for? 11 MR. MORRIS: I'm so unaccustomed to being on the 12 13 plaintiff's side. (Pause in the proceedings) 14THE COURT: All right. So moving on. Good morning. 15 We were talking about the pro bono awards at the 8:00 o'clock 16 session this morning, and Mr. Ferrario didn't get one this 17 year, so I was giving him a hard time because nobody from his 18 firm did a lot of work. But apparently they did. It just 19 didn't get reported because it was done with a different 20 21 agency. Right, Ms. Hendricks? 22 MS. HENDRICKS: Yes. We're getting that fixed right 23 24 now. THE COURT: Okay. So before we start on your 25

motions I need to hit some practical problems. As those 1 lawyers who practice here in the Eighth all the time know, as 2 the chief judge I do not have a courtroom. That occurred 3 because when the Complex Litigation Center was investigated 4 for purposes of conducting the CityCenter trial we determined 5 that it had a structural issue and some electrical issues. As 6 a result, we did not renew the lease --7

When was that, Mr. Ferrario?

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MR. FERRARIO: It was 2013.

THE COURT: In 2013 we did not renew the lease, and 10 since that time we have been down one courtroom. The person 11 who gets screwed is the chief judge. So since 2013 we have 12 had the chief judge be a floater. Unfortunately for you guys, 13 I'm the first judge who kept my docket, because Business Court 14 cases have a lot of history and it's not one of those things 15 you can get rid of and assume somebody else is going to be 16 able to be familiar with it fairly quickly. 17

So the down side for all of you is that I don't have 18 a courtroom. Which is why sometimes we borrow Judge 19 Togliatti's courtroom when you guys see me, sometimes in this 20 courtroom. And you've been in the two Family Court courtrooms 21 a couple of times here. I also have judges who lend me their 22 courtrooms on a regular basis on the third floor, and 23 sometimes I have courtrooms in other places in the building I 24 25 borrow.

Recently I learned that I am going to be able on 1 behalf of the court to acquire the seventeenth floor that used 2 to be occupied by the Supreme Court and to build a new Complex 3 Litigation Center, because since 2013 every time we have a 4 complex trial we build out a courtroom, it costs a quarter of 5 a million dollars, and then when we're done with it we take it 6 back down to put it back in regular shape. And so finally the 7 County has realized that's probably not an effective use of 8 the funds, and so we're going to build out the seventeenth 9 floor as a complex litigation, jury, and criminal caseload 10 accommodated. Unfortunately, that's a construction project, 11 and it is in process. And when I say in process it means 12 they're still in the bid evaluation process and it has to now 13 go to something called long-term planning at County 14 management, which means that some day there'll be a courtroom 15 In the meantime --16 there.

MR. MORRIS: So our trial will start when the construction is complete on 17?

THE COURT: No, no. You're going to start. I just 19 don't know where we're going to be, Mr. Morris. This is the 20 reason for the speech, because Mr. Ferrario says nobody 21 believes me that I don't have a courtroom. I don't have a 22 So I will have a courtroom when I end being chief courtroom. 23 I'll go back to being a regular judge and I'll have a 24 judge. courtroom, and then the new chief won't have a courtroom 25

1 unless we finish building out the seventeenth floor by then.

So right now the reason I'm telling you that is it impacts your trial. The trial I am currently in is a bench trial, so it's not a jury trial and we have moved from courtroom to courtroom during our 10 days we've been in proceedings so far. So we've not been in the same courtroom every day. But that's sort of the life of being in this department at the moment. That's the history.

Now let's go to the electronic exhibit part of our 9 Brandi is the head of the Clerk's Office, Mike is 10 problem. the head of IT, so they are the two people who are here to 11 make sure that they are able to interact with you -- and then 12 I'll let them leave while I hear your motions -- about the 13 electronic exhibit protocol. Because when we use the 14 electronic exhibit protocol there's two ways that we have to 15 deal with it, from an IT standpoint and from the Clerk's 16 Office standpoint. So instead of us hauling all the paper 17 volumes from courtroom to courtroom, depending on where we're 18 going to be, the clerk won't have to do that. They will have 19 the drives, as Ms. Hendricks mentioned earlier, for that 20 purpose so that Dulce will then -- after IT has cleared the 21 drives Dulce will then work with the drives, and then we 22 usually keep one that is called golden that we don't mess 23 with, and we have one that's a working drive. But I'll let 24 Mike explain that and Brandi explain it, because not all of 25

1 you have been through the electronic exhibit protocol in the 2 past.

Mike, you're up.

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MR. DOAN: So this is a jury trial, so a high level. We expect three drives, a working copy, a golden copy, and then a blank for the jury that everything that gets accepted or submitted in a group will be over on that drive.

Depending on the number is drives is just based on 8 the space. So if your teams, whoever's putting these drives 9 together -- we have problems if you get a million exhibits on 10 one drive or even 600,000 on one drive. Not so much even the 11 space, it's just navigating through those files. And so as 12 long as your team can navigate and view the files, that's okay 13 for us. We don't have like a set number. We just ask that 14 the drives be twice as big as the amount of the exhibits, 15 because in theory everything could get accepted, and therefore 16 everything would be stamped and there'd be duplicate on the 17 18 drive.

19 THE COURT: And when it's stamped there's a program 20 that goes through and it puts a stamp on each page of the 21 electronic exhibit that says it's admitted so that we have 22 your original proposed copy and then your admitted copy. The 23 one drawback for lawyers is if you decide you want to admit a 24 partial version if an exhibit, we cannot do that with 25 electronic exhibits. We need you to submit a replacement

electronic exhibit that includes only the pages that you are offering. That will then have an exhibit marker placed upon it. But I can't with the electronic exhibits admit pages 6 through 10 of the 25-page document.

So, Mike, what did I miss?

MR. DOAN: That's it.

THE COURT: Okay, Brandi. You're up.

8 MS. WENDELL: Have you already given them the 9 ranges? Do we have --

THE COURT: No, we have not done ranges yet. 10 The protocol is pretty basic. MS. WENDELL: Okay. 11 Your paralegals or your IT people that are going to be working 12 on those might have questions. Usually -- a lot of times on 13 They're all the other trials Litigation Services was used. 14 very familiar with this program. I'm not advocating for them 15 or anything, but if anybody's contracted with them, they're 16 pretty familiar with how to do it. It's really important that 17 you pay attention to the naming convention. Make sure there 18 are no letters in it. It has to be strictly numbers and then 19 The last time there was a question about whether .tifs 20 .pdf. worked, and Mike was able to verify that .tifs are -- we're 21 able to use those. But color photos can be done as long as 22 there's a little border up at the top for the stamping program 23 to mark all of the information. 24

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Another thing that we have found useful, it's not in

the protocol, but at least a couple weeks before the trial 1 starts we do like a dry run, because your exhibit list, the 2 templates that Dulce went ahead and emailed to you, you cannot 3 change that, the formatting. It's critical because Mike's 4 team will do a validation, and it validates the exhibit 5 numbers to what is on the drive, each exhibit. And it'll 6 identify if there's something that's missed or skipped that's 7 on the list but it's not actually on the drive. And a lot of 8 times there's been some formatting problems when people try to 9 get creative. So, you know, just a little advice that we 10 found from trial and error that that is an important piece. 11 12 What else? MR. DOAN: That's the biggest thing, is if you can 13 get with us -- and we'll make ourselves available as soon as 14 you're available to do like an initial run before you start 15 all printing and doing all these other things just so 16 everything can be tested for format so there's not a lot of 17 time wasted. 18 MS. WENDELL: The clerk must have -- the exhibit 19 list must be printed out. 20 THE COURT: Not in 2 font, Ms. Hendricks. 21 MS. HENDRICKS: [Inaudible] that was not our 22 office's fault, Your Honor. 23 MS. WENDELL: That should be in a binder so that the 24 clerk as you're actually offering and admitting the evidence 25

during the trial, she'll be working on that. Later that day 1 she'll be doing the electronic stuff or we'll have a second 2 clerk that'll be helping her. Antoinette is court clerk 3 supervisor, and so she's here to make sure that, you know, if 4 we have any questions that have to be answered. 5 A lot of times -- oh. Last trial somebody asked if 6 because the exhibit list itself was going to be like 14 of 7 those big binders, they asked if they could print on the front 8 and the back. That was in Judge Kishner's big trial. We let 9 them do it, and -- but the trial settled, so it wasn't an 10 11 issue. THE COURT: It's not a good idea. 12 MS. WENDELL: It's not ideal, so --13 THE COURT: Please don't do a front and back. 14 MS. WENDELL: Anybody have any idea how many 15 exhibits you're looking at? 16 THE COURT: We're going to start with them and do 17 our ranges first. But we're not quite there yet. 18 So if anybody has questions or your staffs have 19 questions, would you like contact information to reach out to 20 either Antoinette, Brandi, or Mike? 21 22 MR. TAYBACK: Yes. MS. HENDRICKS: That would be great, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: So tell them or give them business 24 25 cards.

MS. WENDELL: Okay. 1 MR. FERRARIO: If you all have cards, then that'd be 2 easiest. 3 THE COURT: They're County employees. Does that 4 mean they get cards? 5 MR. DOAN: Yeah. 6 THE COURT: Oh. Look at that. 7 MR. DOAN: You know, and it's best to have one point 8 of contact so then we don't get confused. 9 MS. WENDELL: I'm putting my cards away now. 10 THE COURT: Who do you guys want to be the person 11 that calls? Do they want to call Antoinette, they want to 12 call you, want call Mike? 13 MS. WENDELL: Well, Antoinette is -- she's not 14 Dulce's direct supervisor, but I can be the point of contact, 15 and then I can go ahead and let you guys know. My email 16 address and my phone number are both on here. If you could 17 pass some of these out, that'd be great. And then I'll 18 probably hand you off depending on the questions that come up. 19 Most of them are going to be technical questions, but I'll try 20 to help if I can. 21 THE COURT: All right. So do you have any more 22 questions for the Clerk's Office, the IT folks, in the 23 electronic exhibit protocol? You will notice because of what 24 happened in CityCenter in paragraph 6 it now says the exhibit 25

list will be font size 12, Times New Roman. So we're very 1 specific on what size, because the clerk's actually have to 2 work with the paper copy. And so although you can blow up the 3 Xcel spreadsheet and see it when it's 2 font, they can't. So 4 we have to have it in a larger font. 5 Any more questions? 6 Okay. Mr. Krum, how many exhibits do you think 7 you're going to have so I can set the exhibit ranges? 8 MR. KRUM: The answer is it's in the hundreds, not 9 in the thousands. So if --10 THE COURT: So if I give you 1 to 9999, you will be 11 12 okay? MR. KRUM: Yes. 13 THE COURT: All right. Who wants to have 10000 as 14their start? Mr. Searcy, how many have you got? 15 MR. SEARCY: I think our approximation is basically 16 the same. It's in the hundreds, not the thousands. So if we 17 18 had 10000 to --THE COURT: 1999 [sic]? 19 MR. SEARCY: Yeah, that would be perfect. 20 THE COURT: I have to give you lots of extras, 21 because if you're going to do partial exhibits, we need that 22 space to be able to add those. So if you've got subparts of 23 one exhibit, I need an exhibit number for each one of those. 24 So I'm giving you more than you need. 25

Mr. Ferrario, how many do you need? 1 MR. FERRARIO: Your Honor, Your Honor, I would 2 suspect our -- any exhibits we would introduce independent of 3 what Mr. Krum and the other defendants would be nominal. So 4 you can give us a very short range. 5 THE COURT: 20000 to 2499 [sic]. 6 THE COURT: Who else wants exhibit lists that's not 7 one of those three? Anybody else need --8 MR. TAYBACK: Counsel for Mr. Gould is sitting 9 behind me. 10 THE COURT: So Mr. Gould's counsel, you want about 11 the same range Mr. Ferrario has, 25000 to 30000? 12 MR. RHOW: That's fine, Your Honor. Just for 13 14 protocol --THE COURT: Hold on. They've got to get your name, 15 because otherwise I'm going to get really -- I'm going to 16 17 screw up. MR. FERRARIO: Can you let Ekwan speak today? He's 18 been here all -- he hasn't even got to argue one time, Your 19 20 Honor. THE COURT: All right, Mr. --21 MR. RHOW: I'm actually in this case. Ekwan Rhow, 22 23 Your Honor. Thank you. THE COURT: Okay. 24 MR. RHOW: We can have a separate range for sure, 25

but is there any problem with incorporating Mr. Gould's
 exhibits into the exhibits for Mr. Searcy that he presents?

THE COURT: There is absolutely no problem with your exhibits being within their exhibit range, but I need to give you a separate range for your own in case you all don't reach an agreement.

MR. RHOW: I see.

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8 THE COURT: So my exhibit ranges based on what I've 9 heard today is 1 to 9999 for the plaintiffs, 10000 to 1999 10 [sic] for the Quinn Emanuel folks and their associated, which 11 includes Mr. Edwards; right? Okay. And 20000 to 2499 [sic] 12 for Mr. Ferrario and his team. And, Mr. Krum, we gave you 13 25000 to 2999 [sic] for Mr. Gould.

Do we anticipate there is anyone else who's going to need more numbers? Anybody else who's going to show up for randomly in the case?

17All right. Any other stuff I need to do on your18part?

Based on that, that's very good MS. WENDELL: No. 19 The goal will be for all counsel to prepare your 20 news. exhibits and then everybody put them one drive. The only 21 reason why we do different drives is because if there's like ·22 10,000 exhibits on one, like Mike said, so if there's any way 23 possible -- and you all have to use the same exhibit list 24 template. Now, if that's a problem to do that, then if your 25

1 exhibits are on your own hard drive, then your exhibit list 2 must be what is on that drive. So if two of you get together 3 or three of you get together, everything that's on that drive 4 must be one exhibit list, because it cross-checks and makes 5 sure it validates.

6 THE COURT: So it's okay for the plaintiffs to have 7 one drive and an exhibit list of 1 through 9999 -- or up to 8 that number, and the defendants to decide jointly they're just 9 going to use the 10000 to 1999 [sic], have one drive, and one 10 exhibit list?

11 MS. WENDELL: That is okay. But based on the size, 12 you know, we're -- I think that, you know, it's better to 13 always have one --

14THE COURT: Yeah. But you're asking for15cooperation?

16 MS. WENDELL: Yes.

THE COURT: Just because you worked for Commissioner
Biggar for however many years and you could make them
cooperate doesn't make I can as a trial judge.

All right. So anybody else have more stuff?
Yeah. Your history will never die.

22 MS. WENDELL: I know. It's going to follow me out 23 of here in February.

24 THE COURT: All right. Anybody else have any more 25 questions for my IT team or my Clerk's Office team so that

they can leave and not have to sit here through your motion 1 2 practice? Dulce wants you to set the dry run date today. We 3 have a holiday coming up, and you have asked me to let you go 4 the second week. I'm going to be able to accommodate that 5 request. I found some victim to go the first week. 6 MR. FERRARIO: So we start on the 8th now? 7 THE COURT: Plan is for you to start on the 8th. So 8 when do you want your dry run to be with your staff to bring 9 over the lists and the drives? It doesn't have to be you 10 quys. It can be your paralegals. 11 MR. FERRARIO: But you said you want enough time in 12 case there's glitches. So --13 MS. WENDELL: If there's a glitch, then you'll need 14 time to fix it. 15 MR. FERRARIO: So at least the week before -- we 16 need it two weeks before; right? 17 THE COURT: Two weeks before is the week of 18 Christmas, so we'll be here the 26th through the 29th working 19 20 that week. MR. FERRARIO: And then you guys will be here to do 21 that? 22 MR. DOAN: We'll make it work. 23 THE COURT: Some of them will be here. 24 MR. FERRARIO: I think it has to be that week in 25

case there's a problem. Because then the following week is 1 short, and then we're right up on trial and won't be able to 2 correct any of the stuff. 3 MR. KRUM: So why don't we say the 29th? 4 THE COURT: You guys all okay with the 29th? What 5 time do you want to meet? 6 MR. KRUM: I think we need to talk to the people who 7 are going to do it. 8 THE COURT: Okay. I would recommend the morning. 9 And the reason I recommend the morning is typically on the 10 weekend of New Year's Eve they try and get everybody out of 11 downtown by about 2:00 o'clock because of all the things that 12 happen in the streets here on that weekend. 13 MR. KRUM: Understood. 14 THE COURT: So -- and we will tell you what 15 courtroom we are able to find. I'm pretty sure on that day I 16 could get a courtroom on this floor. And if you guys want a 17 morning, if you can accommodate that, we'll do that. 18 Otherwise --19 I'm going to tell you, Judge, MR. FERRARIO: 20 [inaudible] people are going to be in this trial, I think if 21 you could convince Judge Sturman to let you have this for the 22 length of the trial, that would [inaudible]. 23 THE COURT: She has a trial that I had to vacate 24 when her mom became ill that I think she's going to try and 25

1 restart in January. I will know better when she actually gets
2 back to town. But we will talk to her. Her courtroom and
3 Judge Johnson's courtrooms are equipped differently than the
4 other courtrooms, so they are a little bit bigger.

5 MR. FERRARIO: Yes. This would accommodate 6 [inaudible].

7 THE COURT: I was thinking of putting you in
8 Potter's courtroom and having a special corner for you.

9 MR. KRUM: Your Honor, I've just been reminded that 10 it was presumptuous of me to speak for others.

11 THE COURT: You want to talk to the staff members to 12 see who's taking the week off?

MR. KRUM: Here's the question. And I'm now taking Mr. Ferrario's line. Would it be possible for us to start the following week so we could make --

We won't get done. If we do that, THE COURT: No. 16 we won't get done in time for me to do my February stuff. 17 It's a five-week stack. It starts on the 2nd of January. So 18 if you need to talk to your teams and see if being here on 19 January 2nd at 8:00 o'clock in the morning is a preference for 20 them instead of the 29th, which gives you -- you lose the 21 weekend, but you're here the rest of the time. It gives you 22 almost two weeks to straighten it out. 23

MR. KRUM: Okay.

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THE COURT: And that's okay with me. Even though

Mike would say he needs two weeks before, January 2nd is okay 1 with me. 2 MR. KRUM: Okay. We will check with our people. 3 THE COURT: Okay. So any other electronic exhibit 4 lists? 5 So, Dulce, just mark them down that they are 6 planning to visit with you on January 2nd. I'm fairly certain 7 I can find a courtroom on January 2nd, but there's no 8 guarantees on that day. 9 All right. 'Bye, guys. Thank you for being here. 10 Antoinette, thank you for being here. I know it's going to be 11 exciting again. 12 All right. That takes me to the motions. Do you 13 have a preferred order you'd like to argue them in? I usually 14 try and do the summary judgments and then go to the motions in 15 16 limine. That would be our suggestion, as well. 17 MR. KRUM: 18 MR. TAYBACK: That makes sense, Your Honor. You can 19 go numerical order is fine. THE COURT: Whatever you want to do. 20 21 Can I have my calendar. I don't need -- well, I 22 have notes all over the motions, so --MR. FERRARIO: Are we on the clock? 23 THE COURT: You have until five till 12:00. So 24 we've got an hour. 25

1	(Pause in the proceedings)
2	MR. TAYBACK: Mr. Krum was just suggesting that I
3	raise the parties' both filed joint motions or filed
4	motions to seal. We'd ask you to grant them.
5	THE COURT: Is there any objection to any of the
6	motions to seal? They weren't all motions to seal. Some of
7	them were motions to redact, and that was appropriate. The
8	motions to seal I do have a question for Mr. Morris's office,
9	and so I'll ask you hold on, if I can find the one I wrote
10	the page on. Got a question. It was a process question, not
11	a substance question, so let me hit it before we go to the
12	next step.
13	When you sent me a courtesy copy and the courtesy
14	copy had a sealed envelope in that did you also file the
15	sealed version of the document that has like this sealed
16	envelope that's with the Clerk's Office?
17	MS. LEVIN: I don't believe, Your Honor.
18	THE COURT: And we have to do it that way
19	MS. LEVIN: Okay.
20	THE COURT: Because otherwise I can't even grant
21	your motion now, because then it's going to get screwed up.
22	MS. LEVIN: I understand, Your Honor. And I think
23	that this was based on our conversations with the clerk, who
24	said you cannot submit it until you have the order. And we
25	were saying, but that

THE COURT: No. You submit it when you file the motion. When you file the motion with it, which is why you have to file them at the counter. You can't efile when you're filing under seal.

MS. LEVIN: Right.

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6 THE COURT: And that's why it gets screwed up.
7 So I have some process concerns about the
8 plaintiff's filings related to that, and I'm going to let you
9 and Dulce talk about those after we finish the hearing to see,
10 if we can.

11 I'm going to grant the motion, but it may be that 12 you have to do something different to have a motion that 13 actually goes with it to the Clerk's Office instead of an 14 order. Because having the order will not accomplish what you 15 want.

All right. So to the extent that you asked previously for a motion to seal and/or redact, it appears to be commercially sensitive information related to financial issues, and there's some other sensitive information that relates to individuals' personal information, so I'm going to grant the requests for sealing and redacting that have been submitted.

23 Okay. You're up. What motion do you want to start 24 with?

MR. TAYBACK: It'll be Summary Judgment Motion

Number 1. And it also -- there's -- relates to Summary
 Judgment Motion Number 2. So I will argue them jointly. They
 were at least opposed jointly, and we replied jointly with
 respect to those two motions.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. TAYBACK: I'm here on behalf of the director 6 defendants Michael Wrotniak, Judy Codding, Douglas McEachern, 7 Edward Kane, Guy Adams, Margaret Cotter, and Ellen Cotter. As 8 9 Your Honor will recall and as addressed in the briefing, Your Honor said, and this is a truism, really, for any case, you've 10 got to analyze claims defendant by defendant, in this case 11 director by director, and transaction by transaction. And 12 that's, you know, just basic, basic legal analysis. 13

14 On top of that, sort of as an overlay, another thing 15 that I know Your Honor is well aware of is the recent law that 16 clarifies -- I see you chuckling --

THE COURT: I don't know anything about the Wynn-Okada case. You don't know anything about it, because your firm wasn't involved at all, and Mr. Ferrario doesn't know anything, and Mr. Morris I'm sure was involved, too, because he's been involved in some of the appellate process in that case, too.

- 23 Right, Mr. Morris?
- 24 MR. MORRIS: Yes.

THE COURT: See, so we all know.

1 MR. TAYBACK: But all I need to know, all I need to 2 know and all I really care about here and all that matters 3 here is the language of the Supreme Court's opinion, because that's really what animates the business judgment rule in 4 Nevada as we stand here now. And I think that combined with 5 the recent clarifications by the legislature regarding the 6 7 latitude afforded directors work together to set the bar very, very high. I'm sure Your Honor has read the opinion multiple 8 times, applied it in that case, a case I'm not privy to, but 9 it's --10 I did. I granted partial summary THE COURT: 11 judgment, which is on a writ. 12 MR. TAYBACK: And, as you well know --13 THE COURT: Are we supposed to be calling somebody? 14 MR. FERRARIO: No. 15 THE COURT: I have a call-in number. I'm not in 16 charge of doing this. 17 18 (Pause in the proceedings) THE COURT: Hold on. Apparently someone thinks 19 they're calling in. 20 I'm It's okay, Your Honor. No need. 21 MR. RHOW: 22 here. It was you? 23 THE COURT: Oh. MR. RHOW: Not necessary. 24 THE COURT: Okay. Good. I'm glad we don't have to 25

1 call you.

Okay. Keep going. So I granted partial summary judgment, but I found some directors were not disinterested, so not all of the directors were covered by the summary judgment. I also in that case made a determination the business judgment rule only applies to officers and directors, it does not apply to the corporation itself. Just so you know.

And I'm aware of that only through MR. TAYBACK: 9 having read the pleadings and having read now the court's 10 opinion here. But the question is as it applies to this case. 11 And as it applies to this case collectively that recent 12 quidance and the guidance from the legislature make it clear 13 that it's not really the province of a plaintiff or a court or 14 jury to come in and say the business judgment rule should be 15 overridden in order to second guess a particular decision made 16 by a corporation's directors or its officers. And if you 17 start at that premise, the idea that the applicable Nevada 18 statutes here elevate -- give that sort of latitude to 19 directors in the first instance and then you take it to sort 20 of the next level of analysis, that is to say, even if one 21 could rebut the presumption, even it's rebutted the standard 22 then for imposing liability is even higher, because there 23 remains still a two-prong test for which plaintiffs have to . 24 show a material disputed issue of fact to proceed to trial. 25

Both an individual director on a particular transaction 1 breached their fiduciary duty and, secondly, that that 2 individual director did so with fraud, knowing -- as a knowing 3 violation of the law or engaged in intentional misconduct. 4 THE COURT: Well, you understand that finding is 5 6 only needed to make a determination as to whether the 7 individual officer or director is insulated from -- for 8 personal liability purposes, as opposed to derivative liability, which would be funded through the corporation. 9 MR. TAYBACK: Correct. 10 THE COURT: Okay. 11 Though they are seeking personal MR. TAYBACK: 12 13 liability. Their complaint makes that clear. THE COURT: I understand they are. But your motion 14 seemed to take the position that unless I found fraud they 15 need to be dismissed. And that's not how it works. 16 MR. TAYBACK: Well, but they do need to rebut the 17 presumption with respect to the business judgment rule: 18 THE COURT: That's a different issue, Counsel. 19 MR. TAYBACK: It is a different issue. And it's a 20 multiple-hurdle test. 21 THE COURT: Yes. 22 MR. TAYBACK: And with respect to that second hurdle 23 even the issue comes down to Your Honor's adjudicating their 24 claim for personal liability, then that's also part of the 25

1 motion.

But you don't need to get there, because they have 2 not established the evidence necessary to rebut the initial 3 presumption. And that's clear because when you look at what 4 governs the decision here by these individual directors on 5 termination, which I'm going to take that transaction because 6 that's the subject of our first motion for summary judgment, 7 if you look at that, what governs that decision are the 8 And the bylaws which we've submitted are amply clear bylaws. 9 that the board was given complete discretion, that officers, 10 including the CEO, serve at the pleasure of the board and can 11 be terminated with or without cause at any time. 12

With the bylaws being the operative rules of the 13 road, so to speak, and the law being what it is with respect 14 to the deference afforded boards and individual board members, 15 plaintiff's efforts to try to get around the idea that that 16 presumption should be applied here are based on generalized 17 allegations of disinterestedness. But you don't see specific 18 evidence in the record anywhere that any of the three 19 directors who voted to terminate Mr. Cotter, Jr. --20

THE COURT: And you're including Mr. Adams in that, 22 are you?

MR. TAYBACK: I am including Mr. Adams in that.
 THE COURT: Just checking. So what happens if I
 make a determination that Mr. Adams is not disinterested? You

1 then do not have a majority of disinterested directors; 2 correct?

3 MR. TAYBACK: If you made that finding that would be 4 true. But it wouldn't change the liability, the claim against 5 Mr. McEachern or Mr. Kane.

THE COURT: You mean for personal liability? 6 I mean whether -- not whether or not 7 MR. TAYBACK: you can say we need to revisit that action, but whether or not 8 they were disinterested, whether they breached their fiduciary 9 duty. That would be adjudicated in their favor even if you 10 found against Mr. Adams on a particular transaction -- but I 11 would say you should not find against Mr. Adams on this 12 transaction. The evidence isn't that his -- that the decision 13 to terminate had any connection to his -- the level of his 14 income, the amount of his -- the amount of his income, the 15 amount of his expenditures, his continuity on the board. 16 There's no connectivity, which is required in order to find 17 disinterestedness even if disinterestedness was the standard. 18 Because I will say the standard in Nevada is not independence 19 for -- unless it's a transaction in which the director is on 20 both sides of the transaction or it's a change of control 21 The termination of a CEO is an operational circumstance. 22 matter where you don't get to the independence question unless 23 and until you have established a basis, a legitimate basis in 24 the law to show that the presumption should not apply. 25

In light of the law, in light of the bylaws, in light of the undisputed evidence with respect to Mr. Adams, Mr. Kane, Mr. Wrotniak, the Cotter sisters, and Ms. Codding -and, of course, Mr. Wrotniak and Ms. Codding weren't even on the board at the time of this transaction -- the fact is that there's no basis upon which to allow plaintiff's claim to proceed.

The last point that I want to make with respect to 8 Summary Judgment Motion Number 1 and 2 as it relates to that 9 point is the plaintiff has tried to really muddy the law. And 10 I think whatever you ultimately decide on this motion for 11 summary judgment -- and I absolutely believe that these 12 defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this record, 13 but whatever you decide the parties will be well served by 14 understanding Your Honor's view of the law. Because we do not 15 see eye to eye with the plaintiffs on the law. They strive to 16 import this Delaware entire fairness test. 17

18 THE COURT: I rejected that in Wynn, because that 19 was the part that the Okada parties argued once the writ came 20 back on [inaudible].

21 MR. TAYBACK: And notwithstanding that, I believe 22 the plaintiffs are still advocating for it. It shows up in 23 their papers.

THE COURT: I understand it's in their briefing.
 MR. TAYBACK: And the law at least in Nevada with

respect to that is that it doesn't apply here. Independence 1 for the same reasons is not required for the benefit of the 2 business judgment rule where, as here --3 THE COURT: You don't think the Shoen case says that 4 independence is required for application of business judgment 5 6 rule? In Shoen to the extent it says that at 7 MR. TAYBACK: all it says it in the context of demand futility. It's not 8 the presumption that we're talking about here. And in fact 9 that's -- I believe that's exactly what certainly the Wynn 1011 Supreme Court --THE COURT: There's two Shoen cases; right? 12 MR. TAYBACK: Yes. 13 THE COURT: There's the first Shoen case and the 14 second one that they gave a different name to. 15 MR. TAYBACK: Independence is not required unless 16 you have a director who's on both sides of a transaction. 17 18 THE COURT: Okay. MR. TAYBACK: I believe the law is amply clear on 19 20 that. Okay. I think their analysis is 21 THE COURT: 22 slightly broader than that, but okay. MR. TAYBACK: Given the bylaws, given the fact that 23 entire fairness does not apply, you cannot simply get past or 24 rebut the presumption of the applicability of the business 25

judgment rule by saying a director is biased, a director has some family connection, a director has income that's attributable to the company. And that's really what this case comes down to. Where the facts here are frankly undisputed summary judgment is warranted.

That's it for Summary Judgment 1 and 2, Your Honor,
unless you have any questions.

THE COURT: No. It's okay.

Mr. Krum, Mr. Morris?

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MR. KRUM: Good morning, Your Honor. Thank you. 10 So I have some argument to make about what are 11 pervasive misstatements of the law that were made with respect 12 to Number 1, as well as the other ones. That said, if I'm 13 listening, you're prepared to deny Number 1, just as you did 14 previously, nothing has changed, including the law; and if 15 that's the case, I'll just defer those comments till we get to 16 something else. 17

THE COURT: Well, then let me ask you a question.
Because when I read all these I have notes all over them,
because some of them are interrelated and the
disinterestedness issue is an issue that is involved in some
of the motions in limine, as well as this.
Can you tell me what evidence, other than what is

23 ,Can you tell me what evidence, other than what is 24 listed on page -- you had -- in your brief you had a list of 25 all of the company activities that you believe show decisions

1 that were made by certain of the directors that showed they 2 were interested. Can you tell me, other than that list -- and 3 I can't, of course, find it right now, but I'm looking for it 4 -- is there any other information other than from Mr. Adams 5 that you have that would provide a basis for the Court to 6 determine that they are not disinterested?

7 MR. KRUM: I'm sorry. That who is not disinterested 8 with respect --

9 THE COURT: Anyone except Mr. Adams and the two Ms. 10 Cotters. The two Ms. Cotters I think is fairly easy. They 11 didn't even move, from what I can tell. But, for instance, 12 for Mr. Kane.

MR. KRUM: Certainly, Your Honor. In our -- first 13 let me say I think the list to which you're referring is a 14 list that I had understood the Court to request when we last 15 argued summary judgment motions and was intended, Your Honor, 16 to identify the particular matters which we contend give rise 17 to or constitute breaches of fiduciary duty in and of 18 themselves as well as together with other matters. And so --19 THE COURT: I don't know that that's the reason you 20 I found it. It is on pages 5 and 6. I'm on the did it. 21 Supplemental Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Number 22 1 and 2 and Gould Motion for Summary Judgment, and there is a 23 list that includes threats of termination if you don't get 24 along with your sisters and resolve the probate case --25

MR. KRUM: Yes.

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THE COURT: -- exercise of the options, the termination, the method of the CEO search. All of those are company transactions. What I'm trying to find out is, other than for Mr. Adams, is there other evidence of a lack of disinterestedness that you have other than what is included in the list of activities that relate to their work as directors which are on pages 5 and 6 of that brief in the bullet points.

9 MR. KRUM: Let me answer it this way, Your Honor. 5 10 and 6 was our effort to do what I just said. And what that 11 is, to try to be clear, is to identify particular activities 12 that we thought would be the subject of, as is appropriate, 13 either instructions or interrogatories to the jury with 14 respect to these particular matters.

15 So let's take Number 1 bullet point, the first 16 bullet point, the threat by Adams, Kane, and McEachern to 17 terminate plaintiff if he did not resolve trust disputes with 18 his sisters on terms satisfactory to them. That, Your Honor, 19 from our perspective is separate from the termination which is 20 the subject of Number 1. And on this --

THE COURT: I see that. But let me have you fall back, because I certainly understand those may be issues that you may want to submit interrogatories or just to include in jury instructions related to breaches of fiduciary duty by someone who survives this motion, who I don't grant it on 1 behalf of.

But my question is different. Other than these 2 which you've argued in your brief are evidence of a lack of 3 disinterestedness separate and apart from Mr. Adams, who you 4 have other evidence that is presented related to a lack of 5 disinterestedness, is there any evidence that has been 6 attached to your various supplements and other motions related 7 to a lack of disinterestedness for the other directors known 8 as Mr. Kane, Mr. McEachern, Mr. Gould, Ms. Codding, and Mr. 9 Wrotniak? 10

11 MR. KRUM: The answer is yes, Your Honor. So I'm 12 going to try to do it a couple ways.

13 THE COURT: Tell me where to go. Because I looked 14 through this whole pile of about 2 foot of paper last night 15 trying to find it, and the only one I could find specific 16 allegations of a lack of disinterestedness, besides the two 17 Cotter sisters, was Mr. Adams.

18 MR. KRUM: Okay. Well, so, for example, with 19 respect to Mr. Kane in the response to MSJ Number 1 and 2 we 20 introduced evidence that showed that Kane was of the view that 21 he knew best what James Cotter, Sr., wanted in his trust 22 documentation.

THE COURT: I see he understood what Mr. Cotter, Sr.'s plan was. How does that make him have a lack of disinterestedness?

MR. KRUM: Well, the answer, Your Honor, is he acted 1 on that. That was the basis on which he decided to vote to 2 terminate the plaintiff. He -- and, for example, the evidence 3 includes an email from Mr. Adams to Mr. Kane in April or early 4 May 2015 in which Mr. Adams says, "This was difficult. We had 5 to pick sides in this family dispute. But we can take comfort 6 that Sr. would have approved our decision." And so the point 7 from our perspective, Your Honor, is Kane, in acting as a 8 director, in fact acted to carry out what in his judgment were 9 the personal interests of Sr. with respect to his trust 10 planning. And on that basis he voted to terminate Mr. Cotter. 11 There are emails from Mr. Kane to Mr. Cotter telling him, I 12 don't know what the sisters' settlement is but I urge you to 13 take it. Well, we think the evidence also shows that he knew 14 what it was, that it entailed Mr. Cotter giving up control of 15 the issues they've been litigating. 16 THE COURT: Under the Shoen analysis do you believe 17 that that contact and that information is sufficient to show 18

19 | that Mr. Kane is not disinterested?

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20 MR. KRUM: Well, the answer is, yes, we do, Your 21 Honor. And I hasten to add that the way <u>Shoen</u> puts it is that 22 disinterestedness and independence are a prerequisite to 23 having standing to invoke the business judgment rule. 24 THE COURT: I'm aware of that. Which is why we're

having this discussion. So -- but usually we have either a

direct financial relationship, even if it's not on both sides 1 of the transaction, or we have a very close personal or 2 familial relationship with the people who are subject to the 3 transaction. And simply believing you understand Sr.'s plan 4 -- estate plan does not, I don't think, rise to that same 5 level to show a lack of disinterestedness; but I'm waiting for 6 you to give me a spin on that argument I may not have thought 7 8 of.

Sure, Your Honor. The answer is -- and I MR. KRUM: 9 say this because I appreciate what the finder of fact -- what 10 the Court has to do now and what the finder of fact has to do. 11 The evidence has to be assessed collectively, not 12 individually. And you understand that. We've cited cases for 13 The other side disputes that. There's "The complaint 14 that. of acts and omissions upon which plaintiff's claims are based 15 must be viewed and assessed collectively, not separately in 16 isolation." That's the Ebix case that we've cited. And there 17 The point, Your Honor, are other cases for that proposition. 18 is "assessing whether a director was independent and in a 19 particular instance acted independently or whether the 20 director was disinterested as required or whether -- and made 21 the decision based entirely on the corporate merits, not 22 influence by personal or extraneous considerations," that was 23 CVV Technicolor, that's the test. And so, Your Honor, in 24 Shoen, just to go back to that, "Independence can be 25

challenged by showing that the directors' execution of their 1 duties is unduly influenced." If Kane made a decision based 2 in any respect on his view that Sr. intended for one or both 3 of the sisters to have something and Jr. was in the way of 4 that, that, Your Honor, at a minimum survives summary judgment 5 so the finder of fact can make a determination after 6 considering all the evidence whether the director acted and 7 decided in that particular instance entirely on the corporate 8 9 merits. So what is --

THE COURT: Let's skip ahead, then. Mr. McEachern.
What evidence of disinterestedness do you have for Mr.
McEachern? And if you could tell me where in the briefing it
is, I will look at it again. But, as I've said, other than
Mr. Adams I did not see evidence of disinterestedness as
opposed to allegations of breach of fiduciary duty.

MR. KRUM: Mr. McEachern attempted to extort Mr. Cotter. Along with Mr. Kane and Mr. Adams he told Mr. Cotter, you need to go resolve your disputes with your sisters and we're going to reconvene at 6:00 o'clock and if you don't you'll be terminated. Now, there's no dispute about that. We have in evidence the testimony --

THE COURT: I understand that that's one of your claims of breach of fiduciary duty. But I'm trying to determine if there was any additional evidence, other than those items that are those bullet points you put in the brief,

which are on pages 5 and 6 of your supplemental opposition, 1 that goes to Mr. McEachern. And then I'm going to ask you the 2 same question for Mr. Gould and Ms. Codding and Mr. Wrotniak. 3 MR. KRUM: Your Honor, as a threshold matter, the 4 presumption can be rebutted by showing conduct in derogation 5 of the presumption. It's not simply a interest or 6 disinterested phenomenon, cite Shoen. Let me be clear. Ι 7 don't want to talk past you. The other side argues there are 8 only two circumstances in which interestedness matters. Well, 9 that's belied by Shoen. It says, "Business judgment rule 10 pertains only to directors whose conduct falls within its 11 protections. Thus, it applies only in the context of a valid 12 interested director transaction -- " that's 138 -- 78.140, 13 excuse me "-- or the valid exercise of business judgment by 14 disinterested director in light of their fiduciary duties." 15 And to be a valid exercise, Your Honor, it has to be made in 16 the interest of the corporation. 17

So Mr. McEachern -- let me go through the list 18 mentally. He attempted to extort Mr. Cotter to resolve the 19 trust disputes in favor of the sisters, he voted to terminate 20 --- he decided not to terminate after he understood an 21 agreement had been reached to resolve those disputes. And 22 when that didn't come to pass he voted to terminate. He, 23 along with Mr. Gould, chose the wishes of the controlling 24 shareholders. Rather than to complete the process he had set 25

up, they aborted the CEO search. So, Your Honor, that's
 squarely within the <u>Shoen</u> language of manifesting a direction
 of corporate conduct in such a way as to comport with the
 wishes or interests of the person doing the controlling.

5 Now, I heard you. You view that as a fiduciary 6 breach.

7 THE COURT: An allegation of a fiduciary duty 8 breach.

9 MR. KRUM: Allegation of fiduciary duty breach, 10 right. But that's -- if proven, that rebuts the presumption, 11 and off we go.

I skipped over Mr. McEachern's role in involuntarily 12 retiring Mr. Storey. Mr. McEachern, together with Mr. Adams 13 and Mr. Kane, in October and November -- September or October 14 I guess it was of 2015 comprised the ad hoc first time one 15 time special nominating committee. That committee had two 16 roles. One was to tell noncompliant director Timothy Storey 17 that he wasn't going to be renominated, and they explained to 18 him that the sisters, who controlled the vote, had told him 19 they weren't going to vote to elect him so he could either 20 resign and get a year's benefits of some sort or just be left 21 off. 22

23 What else did that committee do? They approved Judy 24 Codding and Michael Wrotniak. Did they undertake to search 25 for candidates? No. Did they do anything that one would do

as a director of a nominating committee to identify and 1 They recruit directorial candidates? No. What did they do? 2 did what they were asked and told. Ellen Cotter gave them 3 Judy Codding, good friend of Mary Ellen Cotter, the mother, 4 with whom Ellen Cotter lives, and Michael Wrotniak, husband of 5 Patricia Wrotniak, one of Margaret Cotter's few good friends. 6 And they obviously did virtually nothing, because promptly 7 after the company announced Ms. Codding had been added to 8 board a shareholder brought to their attention there were lots 9 of Google articles that raised questions about Ms. Codding's 10 relationship with her prior employer and the prior employer's 11 conduct. 12

13 So on the nominating issue, Your Honor, on the board 14 stacking our view is that all evidences loyalty to the 15 controlling shareholders. And that, Your Honor, would be 16 somewhere in the range of lack of independence or

17 disinterestedness.

18 THE COURT: So, Mr. Krum, if we're going to get 19 through all the motions this morning I need you to wrap up. 20 Because I think I have all the information I need on Motion 21 for Summary Judgment Number 1.

MR. KRUM: Okay. Certainly, Your Honor.
So just to finish the bullet points which you
brought to my attention, these directors, Kane, Adams,
McEachern, they're all on record dating back to the fall of

2014 that, yes, we should find a position for Margaret Cotter 1 at the company so she can have health insurance, but, no, she 2 can't be running our real estate. Well -- that's in the 3 emails we have in the evidence actually, Your Honor, the first 4 time around. And there's some more from Mr. Gould or 5 McEachern. We had some additional testimony that we added 6 this time. And so what happens? Ellen Cotter is made CEO 7 after the aborted CEO search, she says, I want Margaret to the 8 have the senior executive position, for which she has no prior 9 experience and no qualifications. And what do these people do 10 as committee members and board members? They say, where do we 11 12 sign.

So, Your Honor, it's an ongoing, recurring, 13 pervasive lack of independence or disinterestedness. And the 14 conclusion of that, Your Honor, of course, was by what they 15 did in response to the offer -- and I've sort of wrapped up 16 the whole thing without talking about the law I intended to 17 discuss -- and that is they ascertained what the controlling 18 shareholders wanted to do and they did it in an hour-and-19 twenty-five-minute telephonic board meeting. 20

I didn't discuss what I intended to discuss, but I tried to answer your questions.

23 THE COURT: I understand, Mr. Krum. But the
24 briefing was very thorough, which is why I tried to hit the
25 questions --

MR. KRUM: Understood. 1 THE COURT: -- because I had some questions after 2 reading it. 3 So Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Number 1 is 4 granted in part. It is granted with respect to Edward Kane, 5 Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael 6 Wrotniak. 7 It is denied as to Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, 8 and Guy Adams because there are genuine issues of material 9 fact related to the disinterestedness of each of those 10 individuals. As a result, they cannot at this point rely upon 11 the business judgment rule. 12 MR. TAYBACK: Your Honor, is there a ruling on the 13 aspect of the motion that goes to inability to hold the 14 individuals personally liable for this claim? 15 THE COURT: For the three that I didn't grant the 16 business judgment? 17 MR. TAYBACK: Correct. 18 THE COURT: No, you do not get a ruling to that 19 20 effect. Did you want to go to your next motion for summary 21 judgment? 22 MR. TAYBACK: Yes, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: And I'm trying to be consistent with the 24 decision I made in the Wynn based upon the facts that seem to 25

be slightly different on the conduct of directors. I've got this thing in my head that nobody understands but me, so I'm trying to draw that line by asking questions so I can figure out where that is. Mr. Ferrario knows nobody understands but me. And I can't say it in a way the Supreme Court will understand, because they don't understand it, except for Chris Pickering, and she won't be deciding your appeal.

8 MR. TAYBACK: Your Honor, we have a second motion. 9 It's Motion Number 2. It's also woven through some of the 10 other motions. For the sake of just clarity I'll address 11 Motion Number 2 separately, and I'll only --

THE COURT: Briefly.

12

MR. TAYBACK: -- briefly. I'll only say this. Even 13 if you go to the -- well, I've certainly said my piece 14 already, and I think you can just incorporate what I've said 15 previously on this point, that independence I do not believe 16 is a legal prerequisite to the invocation of the business 17 judgment rule. Even if you look at the Shoen case, which Your 18 Honor has discussed, where it talks about interestedness and 19 the word it uses "interestedness," the quote there is, "To 20 show interestedness a shareholder must allege that -- " it's 21 talking about allegations in that case "-- allege that a 22 majority of the board members would be, quote, 'materially 23 affected' either to benefit or detriment by a decision of the 24 board in a manner not shared by the corporation and the 25

stockholders." To the extent there is a question of 1 independence, it's not the generalized allegations that I 2 think pollute the claims here, the transaction-by-transaction 3 claims that the plaintiff seems to be asserting. You can't 4 just say independence is lacking because there's -- one of the 5 directors favored one of the board members versus one of the 6 others, favored the sisters versus the brother. You have to 7 show that there's a material impact in the transaction itself 8 that was being voted upon, and that's the contention that 9 we're making with respect to independence and how plaintiff's 10 claims, all of them against all of the individual defendants 11 transaction by transaction should fail under a summary 12 judgment standard. 13 With that I'll stop, and then I'll allow him to 14 address it, and then I've got on Motion Number 3. 15THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Krum, anything else on Motion 16 17 Number 2? Just briefly, Your Honor, because I think MR. KRUM: 18 we have a fundamental -- I'm going to repeat myself in one 19 respect -- misapprehension of law. This is not a check-the-20 box exercise. 21 THE COURT: No, it is not. 22 MR. KRUM: So in <u>Shoen</u> the court says, "Thus, as 23 with the Aronson test, under the Brehm test, director 24 independence can be implicated by particularly alleging that 25

1 the directors' execution of their duties is unduly influenced, 2 manifesting a direction of corporate conduct in such a way as 3 to comport with the wishes or interests of the person doing 4 the controlling."

Now, we know that's a demand case, but that doesn't change the law, it just changes the application of the law. And so the point isn't any more complicated than what it said elsewhere in <u>Shoen</u>, and that is "Directors' discretion must be free from the influence of other interested persons."

So Motion Number 2 is -- it's nonsensical, because 10 that has to be assessed based on facts and based on the 11 particular application. You just did it with respect to 12 Number 1. And so it doesn't work that way. And the -- in 13 Rails the court said, of which Shoen is cited with approval, ' 14"Directorial interest exists whenever divided loyalties are 15 present." And we have this ongoing set of transactions that 16 entail furthering and protecting the interests of the Cotter 17 That, Your Honor, is a perfect example of sisters. 18 circumstances that show divided loyalties. Thank you. 19

THE COURT: Thank you.

20

21 Motion for Summary Judgment Number 2 is granted in 22 part. To the extent that you asked me to make a determination 23 as to whether there has been a showing of a lack of 24 disinterestedness there is a lack of disinterestedness for 25 Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, and Guy Adams.

With respect to the other directors who were 1 involved in the motion there does not appear to be sufficient 2 evidence presented to the Court to proceed with a claim of 3 lack of disinterestedness. 4 That takes you to Number 3. 5 Okay. MR. TAYBACK: Your Honor, with respect to the Motion 6 for Summary Judgment Number 3, which relates to what's called 7 the patent vision expression of interest --8 THE COURT: Yeah. 9 MR. TAYBACK: -- there are --10 THE COURT: The unaccepted offer which may not have 11 been a real offer. 12 MR. TAYBACK: Not may not have been. Was admitted 13 by plaintiff --14 THE COURT: Eh, you know. 15 MR. TAYBACK: Was admitted by the plaintiff was 16 nonbinding expression of interest that could have been 17 withdrawn or rejected at any point in time. Moreover, when 18 you look -- that in and of itself disposes of the claim, 19 because there are no damages that flow from that. There 20 cannot be. And that Cook case, which is a Delaware case, but 21 the Cook case really makes that clear. 22 THE COURT: I thought I wasn't supposed to look at 23 Delaware law according to you. You know the legislature can't 24 tell the court what it's allowed to look at. 25

MR. TAYBACK: And I did know that. 1 THE COURT: Okay. 2 I'm encouraging you to look at it. 3 MR. TAYBACK: THE COURT: I'm looking at all sorts of things, but 4 I'm trying to interweave it into the legislative intent 5 related to business judgment and the protections that we 6 should give to officers and directors in Nevada. 7 MR. TAYBACK: Yeah. And I think what it is is it's 8 factually analogous. It's factually analogous. 9 THE COURT: Right. I just had to give you a hard 10 Anything else you want to tell me? 11 time. MR. TAYBACK: The only other thing that I would tell 12 you is that when you look at what it is that the board members 13 can look at with respect to the consideration of potential 14 change of control overtures, call it expression of interest or 15 anything else, it's nonexclusive. It says they may consider 16 any of the relevant facts. And here the undisputed evidence 17 is that they did consider a lot of relevant facts, including 18 the views of the plaintiff, the views of the two Cotter 19 sisters, including the presentations of the board. And 20 they're entitled to rely upon that. And the reasonableness of 21 the decision is not something that can be second guessed at 22 this juncture based upon the showing that plaintiff has made. 23 THE COURT: Mr. Krum. Let's skip past a couple of 24 those arguments and focus on a different issue. Other than as 25

1 evidence of breaches of fiduciary duty, do you have any claim
2 of specific damages to the failure to accept the unsolicited
3 offer?

4 MR. KRUM: Well, first, Your Honor, the notion that 5 it's nonbinding and therefore it cannot result in damages is 6 belied --

7 THE COURT: No. I asked you a very direct question.
8 MR. KRUM: I'm sorry.

9 THE COURT: Do you have damages that you have 10 provided me evidentiary basis for strictly related to the 11 failure of the company or the directors to accept the 12 unsolicited offer?

MR. KRUM: Mr. Duarte Solis speaks to that in his
expert opinion which was the subject of a motion in limine you
denied in October of last year.

16 THE COURT: I know. But I'm asking you a question.
17 Do you have specific evidence of damages related to the
18 decision by the board not to accept the unsolicited offer?
19 MR. KRUM: No. The answer I have is the one I just
20 gave, Your Honor.

21THE COURT: All right. So that's the only answer22you have. Okay. Anything else you want to tell me?

23 MR. KRUM: I just wanted to say again on law, 24 different point, though, intentional misconduct, one of the 25 ways that occurs is where the fiduciary acts with a purpose

1 other than advancing the best interests of the corporation. I
2 think the evidence on this subject, Your Honor, the offer
3 raises a question of fact, a disputed question of material
4 fact as to whether that's what the directors did.

Another category of intentional misconduct is where 5 the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a 6 known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his 7 That is a pervasive and recurring phenomenon here, 8 duties. and I submit, Your Honor, with respect to the so-called offer 9 that's what happened. So the point is, as I said before on 10 the offer in particular, Your Honor, it sort of bookends this 11 whole sequence of events, starting with the seizure of 12 control. And you've read the papers, so I'll leave it at 13 that. 14

15 THE COURT: Anything else?

16 MR. KRUM: No.

THE COURT: Okay. Because of the failure of damages
related to an unenforceable, unsolicited, nonbinding offer, I
am granting the motion.

20 However, that does not preclude the plaintiff from 21 utilizing that factual basis for claims of a breach of 22 fiduciary duty. Okay?

23 MR. TAYBACK: Or for other alleged -- to prove other 24 alleged breaches you're saying it might be admissible as 25 evidence.

THE COURT: Well, it may be additional evidence of 1 breach of fiduciary duty. But they don't get to claim any 2 damages from it, since they haven't established damages 3 related to that because of the legal issues related to the 4 nature of the offer. 5 So what is your next motion for summary judgment, if 6 7 I think there were six. anv? MR. SEARCY: Your Honor, I'm addressing Motion for 8 That relates to the CEO search. Summary Judgment Number 5. 9 And --10 THE COURT: Ready for me to say denied? 11 MR. SEARCY: If you'll let me --12 THE COURT: You can talk, Mr. Searcy, but we're 13 leaving here in 25 minutes whether you guys are done or not. 14 MR. SEARCY: All right. Well, if you're going to --15 before you say denied then let me just address a few of the 16 points in it. If you're going to say granted, then I'll 17 18 certainly sit down. THE COURT: I'm not going to say granted. 19 MR. SEARCY: The point, Your Honor, is that there's 20 no dispute on the material facts here. There was a process 21 that was undertaken by the board here to appoint a CEO. The 22 board appointed a special committee, the special committee 23 hired a search firm, that search firm went out and got 24 information, they interviewed candidates, those candidates 25

were selected by the search firm Korn Ferry, and they were 1 considered along with internal candidates. The board -- or 2 the committee, rather, interviewed Ellen Cotter and decided 3 that she was the best candidate, and the board agreed with 4 that decision. And in the context of the law here you have a 5 majority of disinterested directors who agreed with that 6 decision. There's a presumption that all of this was 7 conducted in good faith. There hasn't been a rebuttal of the 8 presumption here, Your Honor, and, as a result, the motion 9 should be granted. 10 Are there particular issues, though, that I can 11 address for Your Honor? 12 THE COURT: Not that will cause you to be able to 13 get me to change my mind on denied. 14 MR. SEARCY: Okay. Are there any that I can at 15 least make an effort on, Your Honor? 16 THE COURT: Nope. 17 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. SEARCY: 18 THE COURT: All right. So that motion is denied. 19 Can we go to Number 6. 20 MR. SEARCY: Number 6 is mine, as well. 21 This has to do with the special bonus to THE COURT: 22 Mr. Adams. 23 MR. SEARCY: That's correct, Your Honor. There are 24 three main issues here. One has to do with the exercise of 25

options, and in that case there was an executive committee that considered those options. There's no doubt, no dispute that that was an existing plan, that the committee received advice from counsel, and approved of the -- approved of the exercise of the options.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?

6

7 MR. SEARCY: In addition to that -- and that's --8 again, that is an exercise that is presumed to be done in good 9 faith and especially here, where the statute provides that you 10 can obtain information. And that's what the committee did.

In addition to that, Your Honor, there's the issue of the payment to Mr. Adams that you just raised. That again was approved by the board, approved by unanimous board who were disinterested in the subject and are entitled to business judgment on that subject.

And finally, with respect to Margaret Cotter's 16 appointment it's certainly within the board's discretion to 17 decide that someone who's worked for the company and been 18 affiliated with the company for approximately 20 years or so 19 has the qualifications to take on that job. And as Mr. 20 Tayback said, hiring someone to fill a role is certainly --21 that's an operational decision that's within the discretion of 22 a board of directors, and certainly they're entitled to be 23 able to exercise the business judgment when it comes to that, 24 especially here. And with all of these decisions, Your Honor, 25

you're talking about a decision made by a majority of 1 disinterested directors, directors that you've found to be 2 disinterested. 3 THE COURT: Some directors I found to be 4 disinterested. 5 Well, for those directors, though, Your 6 MR. SEARCY: Honor, that you found to be disinterested, they constitute a 7 majority of the decision makers here. And --8 THE COURT: Well, they're protected. Those people 9 are protected. 10 MR. SEARCY: And exercising their business judgment 11 they approved these decisions. 12 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? 13 MR. SEARCY: Thank you, Your Honor. That's it. 14 THE COURT: Denied. 15 So you had Number 4 I think we didn't get to. Was 16 Number 4 reserved for this time, or had I ruled on it 17 18 previously? MR. TAYBACK: Your Honor, you --19 MR. KRUM: You ruled on it previously. 20 THE COURT: Okay. So that takes me to your motions 21 There were two that I think are important. One is in limine. 22 Mr. Gould's motion in limine to exclude irrelevant and 23 speculative evidence. 24 MR. RHOW: Your Honor, can I speak on this one? 25

It's your motion. THE COURT: 1 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. RHOW: 2 MR. FERRARIO: Hey, come on. This is his first 3 time. 4 I feel honored to actually ---5 MR. RHOW: THE COURT: Here's my first question. 6 MR. RHOW: By the way, is it tentative to grant? 7 I'd like to know that first. 8 THE COURT: My first question for you is one that 9 I'm going to ask all the people in motions in limine. Did you 10 have an opportunity to meet and confer with opposing counsel 11 before you filed the motion to see if there were areas of 12 agreement? 13 The answer is I don't think we did. MR. RHOW: 14THE COURT: You know, we have a rule. 15 MR. SEARCY: I'm going to have to disagree with Mr. 16 We actually did meet and confer with Mr. Krum on the Rhow.  $17^{-1}$ 18 phone. I'm sorry. Oh. MR. RHOW: 19 MR. SEARCY: Mr. Rhow wasn't part of the meet and 20 confer, but his associate, Shoshana Bannett, was. 21 Okay. All right. THE COURT: Oh. 22 MR. RHOW: Okay. I had looked at -- I should have 23 looked at Mr. Searcy. 24 THE COURT: Because usually -- usually I get a 25

1 declaration that tells me, we met and conferred on this
2 date --

MR. RHOW: Correct.

3

THE COURT: -- so that I can then gauge whether
somebody's being unreasonable or not. So it's your motion.
MR. RHOW: Thank you, Your Honor.

I think the motion was short and sweet on purpose. 7 During the deposition of Mr. Cotter, Jr., and it lasted days 8 and days and days, and throughout the questioning it was quite 9 clear that he was testifying based on not what he saw, what he 10 heard, what he observed; he was literally saying, here's what 11 I think -- thought at the time, here's what I was thinking Mr. 12 Gould was thinking and others were thinking and so therefore I 13 believe the claim is sufficient because of my subjective 14 belief as to what other directors were thinking. If that's 15 going to be part of this trial, first, this trial's not going 16 to be four weeks, it's going to be eight weeks; but, second, 17 there's nothing in the law, there's nothing based on common 18 sense that tells you that what the subjective beliefs of the 19 plaintiff are none of that is relevant, none of that is 20 relevant under the law, none that is relevant under common 21 sense. So to streamline this case, if he's going to talk 22 about what he saw, what he heard, certainly that's admissible. 23 But if he's going to talk about what he believes, that's 24 subjective and should not be part of this trial. 25

THE COURT: Thank you. 1 Ms. Levin, is this your motion? 2 MS. LEVIN: Yes, Your Honor. 3 As we said in our opposition, we believe this is an 4 improper and premature motion just because Mr. Cotter 5 obviously will be here at trial testifying. 6 THE COURT: So you want me to rule on the questions 7 and answers as they're given. So if somebody asks him, well, 8 did you talk to Mr. Adams about what he was going to do, he 9 can then tell me what he said. 10 MS. LEVIN: Correct, Your Honor. 11THE COURT: Well, what did you think he meant? 12 That's speculation. 13 MS. LEVIN: Unless, of course, he's got a basis for 14 his belief. And I think that some of the deposition 15 testimony, those responses were invited by the very questions. 16 So to the extent that he has a basis to believe -- you know, 17 to state his belief I think that, again, it should be 18 determined on the question by question. 19 THE COURT: Okay. So the motion is denied. It's 20 premature. It's an issue that has to be handled at trial 21 based upon the foundation that is laid related to the issue. 22 So -- and plus you won't be here. You won't be 23 here; right? 24 I'm sorry? MR. RHOW: 25

THE COURT: You won't be here; right? 1 Is Your Honor MR. RHOW: I don't know. I hope not. 2 saying I should not be here or that my client won't be here 3 4 then? That's what the business judgment ruling THE COURT: 5 deals with; right? So I granted your client's business 6 judgment rule motion. Well, you know, he may be a witness. 7 Did I miss MR. KRUM: I'm sorry, Your Honor. 8 something? 9 What? THE COURT: 10 We haven't had that motion argued yet, MR. KRUM: 11 Mr. Gould's motion. 12 THE COURT: I included Mr. Gould because you briefed 13 it relate to all of the motions for summary judgment and I 14asked you questions about all the directors, except Mr. Adams. 15 I'm sorry. I didn't understand that, MR. KRUM: 16 Your Honor. I didn't answer as to Mr. Gould. 17 THE COURT: Do you want to tell me an answer to Mr. 18 Gould? 19 I do, because we have a hearing set for 20 MR. KRUM: the 8th on his motion, which is why misunderstood that. 21 I used it because it was included in THE COURT: 22 your opposition, the supplement to those motions. 23 That was confusion that we created, and I MR. KRUM: 24 apologize. The reason we did that, Your Honor, is that we 25

1 didn't have an opportunity to prepare a Gould brief, but we 2 didn't want to be accused of doing nothing. And some of the 3 evidence in those motions in our view did relate to Gould, and 4 we therefore put him on there.

5 That said, he filed two pieces of paper, they asked 6 me if we could have the hearing today. I told them no, I 7 wanted to respond. So -- but let me try to answer your 8 question with respect to Mr. Gould. So we start, Your Honor, 9 as we do, with the threat to terminate and the termination. 10 And I respectfully submit --

THE COURT: I will tell you that on your Mr. Gould 11 you've got the same list that we've already talked about. 12 What I'm trying to find out is -- and I understand the threat 13 is part of what you've alleged related to Mr. Gould along with 14 the other six or seven bullet points that are on pages 5 and 6 15 Is there something else related to Mr. of the opposition. 16 Gould, something like you have with Mr. Adams that would 17 establish a lack of disinterestedness? 18

MR. KRUM: Let me answer, and then you'll decide. THE COURT: Yeah. That's what I'm trying to pull out of you.

22 MR. KRUM: So, for example, with respect to the 23 termination Mr. Cotter raised the question of Mr. Adams's 24 independence before a vote was taken, and Mr. Gould asked Mr. 25 Adams, well, can you tell us about that. And Mr. Adams got

1 mad and said in words or substance, no. And Mr. Gould said, 2 okay. That, Your Honor, is a perfect example of a failure to 3 act in the face of a known duty to act. We're not talking 4 about someone who is unfamiliar with fiduciary obligations 5 here. Mr. Gould is a corporate lawyer.

So we get to the -- we get to the executive 6 committee, same meeting, June 12. Ellen Cotter says, I want 7 to repopulate the executive committee, Mr. Gould, would you 8 like to be on it. His testimony, his deposition testimony was 9 that he declined because he knew that it would take a lot of 10 time. Now, if he knew that it would take a lot of time, Your 11 Honor, how is it that it didn't occur to him that this was 12 what the sisters were doing in October of 2014 when they were 13 trying to circumvent the board? 14

15 THE COURT: These are all on your list of bullet 16 points.

MR. KRUM: Okay.

17

18 THE COURT: What I'm trying to find out is if 19 there's anything that's not on the list of bullet points that 20 are on pages 5 and 6 of your supplemental opposition that 21 relate to Mr. Gould. Because when I made my ruling I was 22 including Mr. Gould as someone because I specifically excluded 23 Mr. Adams and the two Ms. Cotters.

MR. KRUM: Bear with me. I'm mentally working.
 THE COURT: I'm watching you. I'm watching him

1 work.

2 MR. KRUM: So I don't think we had the executive 3 committee there, but I just said that.

So then, Your Honor, the composition of the board. 4 So Mr. Gould was not a member of the nominating committee. 5 His testimony was that, on a Friday Ellen Cotter called me and 6 asked me if she could come to my office and she and Craig 7 Tompkins came to my office and showed me Judy Codding's resume 8 and said we were going to have a board meeting on Monday to 9 put Ms. Codding on the board. And Bill Gould said, this isn't 10 sufficient time, I can't do my job. But he voted for her 11 nonetheless. That, Your Honor, is the same thing that happens 12 over and over and over again with Mr. Gould. That is, in the 1.3 face of a known duty to act he chooses not to do so. That is 14 intentional misconduct. Your Honor, you've denied the motion 15 That is Mr. Gould. It is Mr. with respect to the CEO search. 16 Gould and Mr. McEachern who are the ones who together with 17 Margaret Cotter aborted the CEO search. Literally the last 18 time they spoke to Korn Ferry was the day Ellen Cotter 19 declared her candidacy. After the what did they do? They 20 told Craig Tompkins to tell Korn Ferry to do no more work. 21 And Mr. Gould, he was the one whose name was on a press 22 release saying, Ellen Cotter was made CEO following a thorough 23 search. She was not made CEO as a result of that search. She 24 was made CEO in spite of that search. 25

THE COURT: Okay. So all of those are issues that 1 I'm aware of considered when I had previously included Mr. 2 Gould in the granting of the summary judgment related to the 3 business judgment rule. The fact that I am denying certain 4 issues related to other summary judgments does not diminish 5 the fact that the directors that I found there was not 6 evidence of a lack of disinterestedness have the protection 7 the statute provides to them. 8 Okay. So let's go back to Mr. Cotter's Motion 9 Number 3. This is related to the coach. 10 MS. LEVIN: Your Honor, this motion should be denied 11 because the hiring of High Point, that's post hoc --12 It's your motion. You wanted it THE COURT: 13 14 granted. I'm sorry. You know, the Court -- I'm MS. LEVIN: 15 The Court should exclude the after-acquired evidence 16 sorry. on the -- in the form of any testimony or documents relating 17 to the hiring of High Point, because the breach of fiduciary 18 duty claims, they are -- they concern what the directors did 19 and knew at the time that they decided to fire the plaintiff. 20 So we cited the Smith versus Van Gorkom case, which holds post 21 hoc data is not relevant to the decision. 22 So at the time that they made this decision they did 23 not have nor did they rely on the High Point evidence. So 24 therefore the after-acquired evidence cannot be as a matter of 25

1 law relevant to their decision to terminate the plaintiff.
2 That would amount to a retroactive assessment of his ability,
3 which are not at issue. And I think that that's the -- you
4 know, the --

THE COURT: The problem I have with that is part of 5 what your client's position has been in this case is he is 6 suitable to be acting as the CEO, and if there is information 7 that is relevant to that suitability, that's where I have the 8 problem on this. I certainly understand from a decision-9 making process that that information was not in the possession 10 of anyone who was making the decisions at the time. But given 11 the affirmative proposition by your client that he is suitable 12 to CEO, I have concerns about granting the motion at this 13 14 stage.

MS. LEVIN: Well -- okay. So -- but with respect to the decision which you can agree that they could not use that evidence to show that after the fact they made the right decision because of the after --

19 THE COURT: No. That's a problem if your client is 20 saying he's suitable and therefore he should be able to be 21 CEO. Because part of what he originally asked for was to make 22 them make him be CEO.

23 MS. LEVIN: All right. And here at issue I believe 24 it's the -- we're seeking to void the termination.

THE COURT: I know.

25

So -- but I think that even -- and I MS. LEVIN: 1 think that in that respect if you were inclined to allow it on 2 his suitability, the problem then becomes first of all the 3 hiring of consultant doesn't necessary mean that somebody is 4 unsuitable. 5 Absolutely. It may mean they're trying THE COURT: 6 to get better. 7 Exactly. And I was thinking -- when I MS. LEVIN: 8 read these facts I was thinking about the analogy. If you 9 were a professional runner and you hire a runner coach --10 THE COURT: Coach. 11 MS. LEVIN: -- doesn't mean that you're not a good 12 13 runner. You may --THE COURT: You want to be better. 14 MS. LEVIN: Exactly. So that was --15 THE COURT: I understand. 16 MS. LEVIN: So and the other thing is that, you 17 know, the opposition argues, well, but it looks like in his 18 own assessment he wasn't good for it. And that, of course, 19 again doesn't follow from that. And so then we get into the 20 category of even if there's a remote relevance, Your Honor, 21 then whatever that relevance is would be substantially 2.2 outweighed by the unfair prejudicial effect that that would 23 cause. Because, again, his assumed thoughts, then the jury 24 could think like, well, you know, he thinks he's not qualified 25

because he hired a coach. So all in all I believe that it's
 unfairly prejudicial.

Just on the point of the unclean hands defense, again they are citing the <u>Fetish</u>, <u>Las Vegas Fetish</u> case. But, again, the unclean hands defense requires egregious misconduct and serious harm caused by it. And they haven't further substantiated that. So with that being said, our position is to exclude it for those reasons.

9 THE COURT: Thank you.

10 MS. LEVIN: Thank you.

11 THE COURT: Mr. Searcy --

12 MR. SEARCY: I'll address that.

THE COURT: -- I am inclined to deny the motion.
But if the evidence is admitted at trial, to admit it with a
limiting instruction that says that it only goes to
suitability.

17 MR. SEARCY: And, Your Honor, I think that we're 18 okay with that.

19 THE COURT: Okay.

20 MR. SEARCY: I just want to clarify that we can 21 certainly ask Mr. Cotter about the Alderton documents --

THE COURT: You ask him about it, then I'm going to give the limiting instruction, and we'll probably give it five times or six times, and it'll be a written instruction, so it's part of it. And if the plaintiff doesn't want me to give

the limiting instruction because they believe that calls to
 much attention to it, they can, of course, waive that request.
 MR. SEARCY: Thank you, Your Honor.

4 THE COURT: Okay. So think about whether you really 5 want the limiting instruction, come up with your text for the 6 limiting instruction, and then we'll talk about it when we 7 have our final pretrial conference as to whether you think you 8 really want it.

That takes me to the last motion in limine by Mr. 9 Cotter, which relates to the ability of Mr. Ferrario to 10 participate at trial, also known as Motion in Limine Number 2. 11 MR. KRUM: Thank you, Your Honor. I enjoy this very 12 much, showing that perhaps I've spent too many years in the 13 corporate governance jurisprudence. Three points, and it's 14 not complicated. First, as a general rule a nominal defendant 15 is not allowed to introduce evidence and defend the merits of 16 claims against the director defendants. 17

Second, the handful of exceptions to that are exceptions where it's a serious fundamental corporate interest that is challenged by the derivative suit, a reorganization or restructuring, an effort to appoint a receiver. None of those exist here.

23 Third, if you disagree with us on all of that, 24 there's a question of unfair prejudice and waste of time. 25 And, you know, the individual defendants are represented by

capable counsel. They don't need a second lawyer carrying 1 their water. And for a jury to have someone who represents 2 the company asking questions that imply conclusions adverse to 3 the plaintiff is, if not unfairly prejudicial, something 4 5 beyond that. So that's the argument in a nutshell, Your Honor. 6 If you have any questions, I'd be happy to answer them. 7 THE COURT: Nope. Motion's denied. 8 All right. So let's go to your Motion in Limine 9 Number 1 regarding advice of counsel. I forgot we need to hit 10 that one. Ms. Levin. 11 And then we're going to go to the Chief Justice 12 Steel that I'm not going to really hear, because I didn't give 13 you permission to refile. 14 MS. LEVIN: Your Honor is familiar with the share 15 options, so if I talk about the share option, I don't --16 THE COURT: I am. 17 MS. LEVIN: Okay. Well ---18 THE COURT: And also with the drama related to the 19 production and the creation and all the stuff about the advice 20 of counsel issue. 21 I'll just --MS. LEVIN: Okay. 22 THE COURT: But I also am aware the Nevada Supreme 23 Court has told us on a business judgment issue we cannot reach 24 behind the advice of counsel except to make a determination as 25

to essentially process issues, how the attorney was hired,
 what the scope of the retention was, and those kind of issues,
 as opposed to the actual advice.

MS. LEVIN: That's true, Your Honor. And so our 4 arguments are really twofold. Number one is that Adams and 5 Kane, who were two of the three directors on the compensation 6 committee, they testified, as the Court found in its October 7 27, 2016, hearing, that they relied solely on the substance of 8 advice of counsel to determine whether the authorization 9 decision to authorize the estate to invoke the option was 10 proper. So, unlike in Wynn or in Comverge, on which the 11 defendants rely, they did not rely on anything else. So if 12 they are asked at trial to explain why they authorized the 13 option, they must rely on that legal advice. 14

So the second point is that the defendants waived the attorney-client privilege by partially disclosing attorney-client privileged information. Now, they're saying -- or RDI says in the opposition that individual directors cannot waive the privilege.

20 THE COURT: That's the <u>Jacobs versus Sands</u> case.
21 MS. LEVIN: Exact, Your Honor. And I agree with
22 that. But, of course, RDI can only act through its officers
23 and directors.

24THE COURT: That's the Jacobs versus Sands case.25MS. LEVIN: And the current officer -- and I think

1 in particular if you look at the Exhibit 4 that we attached 2 to our motion, is that that email was produced by Ellen 3 Cotter, who is a current CEO and is an officer and director, 4 and she --

THE COURT: I understand.

5

6

MS. LEVIN: So, in other words --

7 THE COURT: And then Mr. Ferrario clawed it back. MS. LEVIN: Right. So she produced it, and so 9 there's a Supreme Court case that says, "The power to waive 10 the corporate attorney-client privilege rests with the 11 corporation's management and is usually -- and is normally 12 exercised by its officers and directors." And that's what 13 happened here.

So I think especially Exhibit 4, but even Exhibit 2 14 and 3, the 2 and 3 they raise the legal issues. 2 and 3 15 identify the legal issues of whether there was a reason why 16 Ellen Cotter could not exercise the option and whether enough 17 -- whether the trust documents did not pour over -- the share 18 option didn't pour over into the trust. But Exhibit 4 19 specifically seeks legal advice from the company attorney and 20 as to the legal rights of the estate to exercise the option in 21 light of the proxy language. So that is -- under our statute 22 is an attorney-client communication for the purpose of 23 obtaining legal advice. So they partially disclosed that, so 24 we believe there's a waiver issue. And under <u>Wardleigh</u> you 25

1 cannot use the attorney privilege both as a shield and a
2 sword, which is what they're now doing, is because what
3 they're going to say is, well, we partially disclosed but you
4 cannot find out what it was. But even the very --

5 THE COURT: But that's the Nevada Supreme Court 6 who's made that decision, not the rest of us. They were very 7 clear that we're not allowed to get behind that.

8 MS. LEVIN: Correct. But one thing that the <u>Wynn</u> 9 decision did not decide was the waiver issue. And that was in 10 Footnote 3 of the decision.

11 THE COURT: I made that decision separately after 12 that came back. But that's a case by case, and I haven't made 13 that decision in this case. In fact, my belief is you guys 14 have a writ pending on this issue still. Right?

MR. KRUM: I think the writ pending is on adifferent privilege issue, Your Honor.

17 THE COURT: Okay.

MS. HENDRICKS: Your Honor, the writ relating to 18 this issue was filed by RDI, and the Supreme Court actually 19 came back and said the facts were analogous to Wynn and it 20 needed to make a decision, and that was shortly after you did 21 make the decision when we were back before you on it. 22 THE COURT: Yeah. We had a hearing. 23 MS. HENDRICKS: And we had the supplemental 24 briefing. 25

Okay. So anything else on this THE COURT: Yep. 1 2 one? MS. LEVIN: Only -- the only thing is that the 3 partially disclosed privileged emails themselves show that the 4 board had information that would cause reliance on advice to 5 be improper. So that would --6 THE COURT: Okay. So your motion's denied. Come up 7 I'm going to give you these. These are your I believe 8 here. documents you actually want sealed. Since I granted your 9 motion, it was on the calendar today, hopefully you can work 10 out with the Clerk's Office so they will actually take the 11 sealed documents and put them so they're part of the record in 12 13 some way. MS. LEVIN: And I brought them with me, too. 14 THE COURT: Yeah. Good luck. You've got to do it 15 at the counter. 16 Thank you. Okay. MS. LEVIN: 17 So I am declining to hear again Okay. THE COURT: 18 the motion in limine on Chief Justice Steel. I've previously 19 made a ruling on that. I've reviewed your brief, and there's 20 nothing in it that causes me to change my mind. 21 I have already granted your motions to seal and 22 It was on calendar for today. redact. 23 And now we need to set our final pretrial 24 conference. I usually do it the week before. 25

- 1	
1	MR. KRUM: The week before is fine, Your Honor.
2	(Pause in the proceedings)
3	THE COURT: The week before is fine?
4	MR. KRUM: The week before is fine, Your Honor.
5	THE COURT: What day are you guys arguing in the
6	Supreme Court?
7	MR. TAYBACK: That's the 3rd.
8	THE COURT: 3rd. So do you want to come in on
9	MR. TAYBACK: 4th?
10	THE CLERK: [Inaudible].
11	THE COURT: No, I'm not seeing them on January 2,
12	you're seeing them on January 2.
13	How about on January 5 at 3:00 o'clock?
14	MR. TAYBACK: That's good. Thank you.
15	MR. KRUM: Perfect.
16	MR. FERRARIO: Thank you, Judge.
17	THE COURT: That will be your final pretrial
18	conference. At your final pretrial conference we're not going
19	to bring exhibits, because you're already going to deal with
20	that. But you are going to bring any jury instructions,
21	you're going to exchange your draft jury instructions. If you
22	have limiting instructions you think are appropriate, try and
23	have those, as well. And we're also going to deal with any
24	exhibits that you want in a notebook for the jury. The only
25	reason I suggest that is sometimes documents that we show on

screens aren't easily able to be seen by a juror. There's 1 contract documents and things you may want. If there are 2 selected items you want to have in a jury notebook, it will be 3 a single jury notebook. It will be not more than 3 inches. 4 So whatever we put in it has to fit in the 3 inches. And so 5 if you have things you think you want included in that, we'll 6 talk about that. And you're going to -- I will make final 7 decisions on voir dire questions at that time. I encourage 8 you to exchange them a week ahead of time. 9 MR. KRUM: Your Honor, with respect to exhibits we 10 have a date this week of Wednesday or Thursday for our exhibit 11 list. I think in view of today's developments it would be a 12 good idea to push that back to next week. 13 THE COURT: You guys need to get working on it. 14 MR. KRUM: No, we're working on it. 15 It takes a lot, longer than you think it THE COURT: 16 does. 17 All right. Anything else that I missed? 18 MR. FERRARIO: There may be some utility to that, 19 Mark, in light of the rulings of the Court today, because the 20 complexion of the case has changed. 21 MR. KRUM: Well, that's -- we're working on it. Ŵе 22 understand that, Your Honor. So may we have until Wednesday 23 of next week you think, Mark? 24 25 MR. TAYBACK: Yeah, that's fine.

1 THE COURT: I still need to see representatives from 2 those parties who remain in the case at the calendar call on 3 December 18th. If you are out of town, I do not do call-ins 4 for calendar calls, Mr. Krum, so just make sure Mr. Morris and 5 Ms. Levin know whatever it is they need to say.

6 I am going to be asking you whether given the 7 rulings I made today it has changed the estimate that you 8 provided to me through Ms. Hendricks on December 4th as the 9 amount of time for trial. Because I need to negotiate for 10 space, and knowing the time that I need is important for me in 11 my space negotiations.

MR. RHOW: Your Honor, sorry. One point of clarification as to Mr. Gould specifically. He is out of the case entirely?

THE COURT: Well, I granted the motion on the 15 business judgment for him. My understanding is that is the 16 only way that you would be involved, because there are no 17 direct breach of contract claims against you. If there were 18 other types of claims against you that were not protected by 19 the business judgment rule, you might not be out. But I 20 didn't see that in the briefing. But I don't know your case 21 as well as you do. 22

23 MR. RHOW: Assuming that's the case, I just want to 24 make sure that no one's going to sanction me if I don't show 25 up.

THE COURT: Do you think you have any remaining 1 claims against Mr. Gould given my ruling today? 2 MR. KRUM: Your Honor, probably not. But I'll go 3 back through it. 4 THE COURT: If you could communicate if you think 5 there are any, and then I'll have to handle that on a 6 supplemental motion practice. 7 Understood, Your Honor. MR. RHOW: 8 THE COURT: Okay. So the people who I anticipate 9 will be here only in the capacity as witnesses would be --10 okay, I've got to go back to this list -- Kane, McEachern, 11 So the people Gould, Codding, Wrotniak. That's all of them. 12 who remain parties are Cotter, Cotter, Adams, and then Mr. 13 14 Cotter. MR. TAYBACK: Yes, Your Honor. I understand that. 15 THE COURT: All right. So see you on the 18th. 16 MR. TAYBACK: Thank you, Your Honor. 17 MR. KRUM: Thank you. 18 MR. EDWARDS: Your Honor --19 THE COURT: Yes, Jim. 20 MR. EDWARDS: -- on the 2nd is local counsel going 21 to be here for the exhibits? Do you want local counsel here? 22 THE COURT: Counsel does not need to be here. Thev 23 can send paralegals. So local counsel does not need to come 24 sit through it if they don't want to. 25

MR. EDWARDS: Okay. THE COURT: But it may be helpful if local counsel is going to be intimately involved in the process of doing it for you to have someone here. But I leave that to work out with your people. Anything else? Your Honor, on the exhibit list did MS. HENDRICKS: we get an extra week, then, so we kind of work through these issues? THE COURT: I'm not involved in the exhibit list That's you guys on 2.67. I'm out of that. issue. MR. FERRARIO: Thank you, Your Honor. THE PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 12:00 NOON \* \* 

## CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

### AFFIRMATION

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

> FLORENCE HOYT Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

Unexem. Hough

FLORENCE M. HOYT, TRANSCRIBER

12/12/17

DATE

## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

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## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

Supreme Court Case No. 75053
Case No. A-15-719860-B Coordinated with: Case No. P-14-0824-42-E DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO NUMBER 27 OF DOCKETING STATEMENT OF APPELLANT JAMES COTTER JR. PART 1 OF 3

# DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO NUMBER 27 OF DOCKETING STATEMENT

1.	09/02/2016	Second Amended Complaint
2.	12/19/2017	Motion for Reconsideration or Clarification of Ruling on Motions for Summary Judgment Nos 1, 2, and 3 and Gould's Summary Judgment Motion and Application for Order Shortening Time
3.	12/28/2017	Order Regarding Defendants' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's and Defendants' Motions In Limine
4.	12/29/2017	Notice of Entry of Order (re: Order Regarding Defendants' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's and Defendants' Motions <i>In Limine</i> )
5 <u>.</u>	01/04/2018	Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Stay and Motion for Reconsideration
6.	01/04/2018	Notice of Entry of Order (re: Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Stay and Motion for Reconsideration)
7.	01/04/2018	Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 5(b) Certification and Stay
8.	01/04/2018	Notice of Entry of Order (re: Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 5(b) Certification and Stay)

09/02/2016--Second Amended Complaint

		ELECTRONICALLY SERVED 09/02/2016 05:02:57 PM	
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6	Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.		
7	DISTRICT	COURT	
8	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
9			
10	JAMES J. COTTER, JR., individually and derivatively on behalf of Reading International,	CASE NO. A-15-719860-B DEPT. NO. XI	
11	Inc.,	Coordinated with:	
12	Plaintiff,	CASE NO. P-14-082942-E DEPT. NO. XI	
13	<b>v</b> .	CASE NO. A-16-735305-B	
14	MARGARET COTTER, ELLEN COTTER, GUY ADAMS, EDWARD KANE, DOUGLAS	DEPT. NO. XI	
15 16	McEACHERN, WILLIAM GOULD, JUDY CODDING, MICHAEL WROTNIAK, and	Jointly administered	
10	DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,	[PROPOSED] SECOND AMENDED	
17	Defendants.	VERIFIED COMPLAINT	
19	and	[Business Court Requested: [EDCR 1.61]	
20		[Exempt From Arbitration: declaratory	
20	READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada corporation;	relief requested; action in equity]	
22	Nominal Defendant.		
23	T2 PARTNERS MANAGEMENT, LP, a Delaware limited partnership, doing business as		
24	KASE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, et al.,		
25	Plaintiffs,		
26	vs.		
27	MARGARET COTTER, ELLEN COTTER, GUY ADAMS, EDWARD KANE, DOUGLAS		
28	McEACHERN, WILLIAM GOULD, JUDY CODDING, MICHAEL WROTNIAK, CRAIG		
	-1-	2010586508_10	

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### TOMPKINS, and DOES 1 through 100, 1 inclusive, Defendants. 2 3 and 4 **READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a** 5 Nevada corporation, Nominal Defendant. 6 7 For his complaint herein, plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. hereby alleges the following: 8 9 NATURE OF THE CASE This action arises from breaches of fiduciary duty by the individual defendants, 10 1. each of whom is a member of the board of directors of Reading International, Inc. ("RDI" or the 11 "Company"), a public company. In particular and without limitation, Edward Kane ("Kane"), 12 Guy Adams ("Adams") and Douglas McEachern ("McEachern"), together with Ellen Cotter 13 ("EC") and Margaret Cotter ("MC") (collectively, the "Interested Director Defendants"), acted to 14 wrongfully seize control of RDI and to perpetuate that control, to protect and further their personal 15 financial and other interests, in purposeful derogation of their fiduciary obligations as directors of 16 RDI. In doing so, they have squandered if not appropriated corporate opportunities, wasted 17 corporate assets and caused monetary and nonmonetary injury to RDI and its shareholders. 18 These director defendants first threatened James J. Cotter, Jr. ("JJC" or "Plaintiff") 19 2. with termination as President and Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") of RDI if he failed to resolve 20 trust and estate litigation with EC and MC on terms acceptable to the two of them and to cede 21 control of RDI to them. They threatened to terminate JJC on less than forty-eight (48) hours' 22 notice after EC belatedly provided a purposefully vague agenda for a supposed special meeting. 23 When they understood that Plaintiff had acquiesced to their demand and had reached an agreement 24 with EC and MC acceptable to the two of them, Kane, Adams and McEachern did not act on their 25 26 termination threat. Next, when JJC failed to consummate a resolution of the disputes with EC and MC, 27 3. these director defendants acted on their threat and terminated JJC as President and CEO of RDI. 28

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These director defendants acted without undertaking any semblance of a process to warrant 1 making any decision regarding the status of JJC (or anyone) as President and CEO, and did so in 2 the face of express admonitions by outside directors Timothy Storey ("Storey") and William 3 Gould ("Gould") that the directors had failed to undertake any process that would warrant making 4 any decision about the status of the President and CEO of RDI, much less the decision to remove 5 JJC as President and CEO of RDI. Gould warned the others that, because they had undertaken no 6 process to warrant even making such a decision, they all could be subject to liability. Storey 7 called the lack of process a "kangaroo court," and observed as to the non-Cotter directors that, "as 8 directors we can't just do what a shareholder [, meaning EC and MC,] asks." Not only did these 9 director defendants precipitously terminate JJC as President and CEO of RDI without undertaking 10 any process and on purposefully inadequate notice, they pre-empted and aborted an ongoing and 11 incomplete process that the five non-Cotter directors had put in place in March 2015. 12

Immediately following the termination of JJC as President and CEO of RDI, EC 13 4. asserted that JJC's executive employment agreement required him to resign from the RDI Board 14 of Directors upon the termination of his employment as an executive. That assertion was 15 erroneous. Gould, who drafted and negotiated that employment agreement, told the RDI Board 16 and told EC and Craig Tompkins on a separate occasion that it did not require JJC to resign as a 17 director. On or about June 15, 2016, EC on behalf of the Company sent JJC a letter reiterating the 18 assertion that he was required to resign as a director upon the termination of his executive 19 employment. On or about June 18, 2015, the Company issued a Form 8-K which, among other 20 things, reiterated that assertion. EC took and caused these actions with the approval of if not active 21 assistance of the other Interested Director Defendants. 22

5. Kane has a decade's long *quasi*-familial relationship with EC and MC, who call
him "Uncle Ed." Adams is financially dependent on income from companies and deals that EC
and MC control. What each of Kane, Adams and McEachern did was to choose sides in family
disputes between EC and MC, on one hand, and JJC, on the other hand, which disputes included
certain trust and estate litigation commenced by EC and MC against JJC following the September
2014 passing of their father, James J. Cotter, Sr. ("JJC, Sr."), particularly regarding voting control

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of RDI, and included disputes about whether EC and MC would report to their "little brother," who succeeded JJC, Sr. as CEO of RDI, or to anyone, as a practical matter.

6. EC and MC have at all times acted purposefully to protect and further their own
personal financial and other interests to the detriment of RDI and all of its shareholders other than
them. They regularly sought, and often received, money, benefits, titles, positions and/or
promotions they would not have received but for their status as potential controlling shareholders,
including EC being appointed and compensated as CEO in January 2016 and MC being appointed
and compensated as Executive Vice President-Real Estate Management and Development-NYC
("EVP-RED-NYC") in March 2016.

7. Since wrongfully seizing control of RDI, each of the Interested Director Defendants
 also have engaged in a systematic misuse of the corporate machinery of RDI. They have done so
 to preserve and perpetuate their control of RDI. They also have acted to further their own
 financial and other interests. Since joining the RDI Board of Directors, defendants Judy Codding
 ("Codding") and Michael Wrotniak ("Wrotniak") also have acted to protect and advance the
 personal interests of EC and MC, and their own as well. All such complained of actions were in
 derogation of these defendants' fiduciary duties to RDI and its shareholders.

8. The Interested Director Defendants effectively eliminated Plaintiff, Storey and Gould as functioning members of RDI's Board of Directors by, among other things, a purported executive committee of RDI's Board of Directors. The executive committee ("EC Committee") was populated by EC, MC, Kane and Adams. The EC Committee purportedly possesses the full authority of RDI's full Board of Directors. Gould has acquiesced to if not cooperated with the ongoing self-dealing of these five defendants, who forced Storey to "retire" as a director and added to the Board unqualified persons loyal to EC and MC by virtue of pre-existing personal friendships, namely, Codding and Wrotniak.

9. EC with the approval if not assistance of other director defendants has withheld and
manipulated board agendas and meetings, including by belatedly providing a vague agenda for the
May 21, 2015 supposed special meeting, and has withheld and manipulated minutes of Board of

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Directors meetings, including the supposed meetings of May 21 and 29 and June 12, 2015. They
 did so in an effort to conceal their fiduciary breaches and avoid liability for such breaches.

10. On or about September 17, 2015, EC and MC acted to exercise a supposed option
claimed held by the estate of JJC, Sr. (the "Estate"), of which they are executors, to acquire
100,000 shares of RDI Class B voting stock. On or about September 21, 2015, Kane and Adams,
as directors and as members of the Compensation Committee, authorized the request of EC and
MC that the Estate be allowed to exercise that supposed option. In doing so, Kane and Adams
breached their fiduciary duties, including for the reasons alleged herein.

9 11. EC on or about October 5, 2015 proposed adding Codding, a close and longstanding friend of the mother of the Cotters, Mary Cotter, with whom EC lives, to RDI's Board of
Directors. Without performing or causing competent, basic due diligence, Kane, Adams and
McEachern agreed. So did Gould, though he had learned of Codding only days prior. Codding
has no expertise in either of RDI's principal business segments, cinema operations and real estate
development, and has no public company corporate governance expertise. Plaintiff is informed
and believes that Codding was selected because she is expected to be loyal to EC and MC.

EC and MC determined that Storey would not be nominated to stand for reelection 16 12. as a director at the 2015 ASM, which had been set for November 10, 2015. Plaintiff is informed 17 and believes that this decision was made in part because Storey had insisted that the RDI Board of 18 Directors act to protect and further the interests of all shareholders, not just EC and MC. Kane, 19 Adams and McEachern, purporting to act as a one time special nominating committee, agreed to 20 and implemented the decision of EC and MC to not nominate Storey to stand for reelection as a 21 director at the 2015 ASM. Adams and/or McEachern pressured Storey to "retire." The supposed 22 nominating committee, acting at the direction and request of EC and MC, then selected Wrotniak 23 to replace Storey. Wrotniak does not have expertise in either of RDI's principal business 24 segments, cinema operations and real estate development, and has no public company corporate 25 governance experience. Wrotniak's wife is a long-time, close personal friend of MC. Plaintiff is 26 informed and believes that Wrotniak was chosen because MC and EC expect him to be loyal to 27 28 them.

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As an integral part of their scheme to seize control of RDI and to perpetuate their 1 13. control of RDI to further their personal financial and other interests, EC and MC systematically 2 failed to make timely and accurate disclosures and SEC filings they were required to make, and 3 systematically made materially misleading if not inaccurate disclosures, including as alleged 4 herein. EC and MC, with the active assistance or at least knowing acquiescence of Kane, Adams, 5 McEachern and Gould, as well as Codding and Wrotniak after they became RDI directors, also 6 caused the Company to make materially misleading if not inaccurate disclosures, including in the 7 Proxy Statements issued by the Company in connection with the 2015 Annual Shareholders 8 Meeting and the 2016 Annual Shareholders Meeting, and in Form 8-Ks issued regarding the 9 10 matters alleged herein, including as alleged herein.

Promptly following the termination of JJC as President and CEO, EC was appointed interim CEO. EC selected Korn Ferry as the outside search firm the Company would 12 use to conduct the search for a permanent CEO. A stated rationale for that selection was that Korn 13 Ferry would employ a proprietary candidate evaluation process to evaluate the finalists. The three 14 finalists each were to be interviewed by the full board of directors. EC appointed MC, McEachern 15 and Gould as members of the CEO search committee. Members of the search committee and 16 certain executives selected by EC and MC provided input to Korn Ferry, which prepared a 17 document listing specifications which were used to identify CEO candidates. Months later, just 18 prior to initial interviews of CEO candidates, EC allegedly announced that she was a candidate to 19 be President and CEO and resigned from the search committee, for which she had acted as 20 chairperson. McEachern and Gould allowed MC to remain on the committee and proceeded with 21 candidate interviews. After interviewing EC, however, they agreed with MC to abort the search 22 process and agreed to have Korn Ferry not perform the proprietary candidate evaluations of 23 finalists it had been engaged to perform and not to present the three finalist candidates to the full 24 board to be interviewed. MC, McEachern and Gould presented EC to the full Board of Directors 25 as the choice for CEO, which the individual director defendants approved with little if any 26 deliberation, after having not participated in nor been kept apprised of CEO search activities for 27 28 months prior.

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On or about March 10, 2016, MC was appointed EVP-RED-NYC. In that position, 1 15. MC became the senior executive at RDI responsible for the development of its valuable New York 2 City properties often referred to as Union Square and Cinemas 1, 2 & 3 (the "NYC Properties"). 3 However, MC has no real estate development experience. She is demonstrably unqualified to hold 4 that senior executive position. As EVP-RED-NYC, MC was awarded a compensation package 5 that includes a base salary of \$350,000 and a short-term incentive target bonus of \$105,000 (30% 6 of her base salary), and was granted a long-term incentive of a stock option for 19,921 shares of 7 Class A Common Stock and 4,184 restricted stock units under the Company's 2010 Stock 8 Incentive Plan. Additionally, the Compensation Committee, consisting of Adams, Kane and 9 Codding, and the Audit and Conflicts Committee, comprised of Kane, McEachern and Wrotniak, 10 in or about March 2016 each approved so-called "additional consulting fee compensation" of 11 \$200,000 to MC. In effect, MC was given a \$200,000 gift. The Compensation Committee also 12 recommended and the RDI Board of Directors (meaning all of the individual director defendants) 13 also approved payment of \$50,000 to Adams for what subsequently was described as 14 "extraordinary services provided to the Company and devotion of time in providing such 15 services." These after-the-fact payments in effect were gifts. 16

On or about May 31, 2016, third parties unrelated to the Cotters made an 17 16. unsolicited all cash offer to purchase all of the outstanding stock of RDI at a purchase price of \$17 18 per share. That was approximately thirty-three percent (33%) in excess of the prices at which RDI 19 stock was trading at the time. None of the individual director defendants engaged independent 20 counsel or a financial advisor to advise them with respect to the offer. Nor did they undertake any other independent actions to make an informed, good faith determination of how to respond to the 22 unsolicited offer. Instead, they deferred to EC, who allowed the response date in the offer to pass 23 and who subsequently reported to the full Board of Directors orally that internal management had 24 generated a supposed valuation of the Company, which valuation pegged the value of the 25 company at well in excess of both the price at which RDI stock traded and the above market price 26 the third parties offered to buy all outstanding RDI stock. The individual director defendants 27 agreed that the offer was inadequate and agreed to not pursue the offer. 28

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## PARTIES

Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. (JJC) is and at all times relevant hereto was a 2 17. shareholder of RDI. JJC also has been a director of RDI since on or about March 21, 2002. 3 Involved in RDI management since mid-2005, JJC was appointed Vice Chairman of the RDI 4 board of directors in 2007 and President of RDI on or about June 1, 2013. He was appointed CEO 5 by the RDI Board on or about August 7, 2014, immediately after JJC, Sr. resigned from that 6 position. He is the son of the late James J. Cotter, Sr. (JJC, Sr.) and the brother of defendants MC 7 and EC. JJC presently owns 770,186 shares of RDI Class A non-voting stock and options to 8 acquire another 50,000 shares of RDI Class A non-voting stock, and is co-trustee and beneficiary 9 of the James J. Cotter Living Trust, dated August 1, 2000, as amended (the "Trust"), which owns 10 2,115,539 shares of RDI Class A (non-voting) stock and 1,123,888 shares of RDI Class B (voting) 11 stock. The Trust became irrevocable upon the passing of JJC, Sr. on September 13, 2014. 12

Defendant Margaret Cotter (MC) is and at all times relevant hereto was a director 13 18. of RDI. MC is engaged in trust and estate litigation against JJC, by which she seeks, among other 14 things, to invalidate a trust document as part of an overall effort by MC and EC to, among other 15 things, procure control of RDI Class B stock sufficient to elect RDI's directors. MC became a 16 director of RDI on or about September 27, 2002. MC is the owner and President of OBI, LLC, a 17 company that provides theater management services to live theaters indirectly owned by RDI 18 through Liberty Theatres, of which MC is President. Commencing in or before the Fall of 2014, 19 MC sought to become an employee of RDI. In particular, MC sought to be the senior person at 20 RDI responsible for development of highly valuable real estate in New York City owned directly 21 or indirectly by RDI, i.e., the NYC Properties. MC opposed the hiring of a senior executive 22 experienced in real estate development. EC with the approval and active assistance of the other 23 individual defendants on or about March 10, 2016, made MC EVP-RE-NYC. As such MC is the 24 senior person at RDI directly responsible for development of the NYC Properties. MC had and 25 26 has no real estate development experience.

19. Defendant Ellen Cotter (EC) is and at all times relevant hereto was a director of RDI. EC is engaged in trust and estate litigation against JJC, by which she seeks, among other

things, to invalidate a trust document as part of an overall effort by MC and EC to, among other
things, procure control of RDI Class B voting stock sufficient to elect RDI's directors. She
became a director of RDI on or about March 13, 2013. EC was a senior executive at RDI
responsible for the day-to-day operations of its domestic cinema operations. EC was appointed
interim CEO on or about June 12, 2015 and was appointed CEO in January 2016.

Defendant Edward Kane (Kane) is and at all times relevant hereto was an outside 20. 6 director of RDI. Kane has been a director of RDI since approximately October 15, 2009. By 7 Kane's own admission, he was made a director of RDI because he was a friend of JJC, Sr., the 8 now deceased father of JJC, EC and MC. By Kane's own admission, he neither had nor has skills 9 or expertise to add value as a director of RDI, except possibly with respect to certain tax matters. 10 Kane has sided with EC and MC in their family disputes with Plaintiff, launching vicious ad 11 hominem attacks against those such as Gould who have expressed unfavorable opinions relating to 12 either or both MC and EC, and lecturing JJC about how he (Kane) is implementing Corleone 13 ("Godfather") style family justice in dealing with JJC. Nevertheless, Kane has acknowledged that 14 JJC is the person most qualified to be CEO of RDI. Kane sold all of the RDI options he then 15 16 owned on or about May 27, 2014.

Defendant Guy Adams (Adams) is and at all times relevant hereto was an outside 17 21. director of RDI. Adams became a director of RDI on or about January 14, 2014. Almost all of 18 Adams' recurring income is paid to him by Cotter family businesses over which EC and MC 19 exercise control. For that reason, among others, Adams is financially dependent on EC and MC. 20 For those reasons and others, including that Adams has a financial interest in assets controlled 21 directly or indirectly by EC and/or MC, Adams was and is not a disinterested director for the 22 purposes of any decision to terminate JJC as President and CEO of RDI or any other decision of 23 interest to EC and/or MC, including matters relating to their compensation. Adams sold all of the 24 RDI options he then owned on or about March 26, 2015. He was paid \$50,000 for reported 25 "extraordinary services provided to the Company and devotion in time in providing such services" 26 in or about March 2016, and had been granted options only a few months earlier. Until he 27 resigned in or about May 2016, Adams was at all relevant times a member of the RDI Board of 28

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1 Directors Compensation Committee.

Defendant Douglas McEachern (McEachern) is and at all times relevant hereto was 2 22. an outside director of RDI. McEachern became a director of RDI on or about May 17, 2012. 3 McEachern acted to protect and preserve his personal interests, and chose the side of EC and MC 4 in their family disputes with JJC, including by agreeing as an RDI director to threaten and to 5 terminate JJC as President and CEO of RDI, and thereafter by misusing his position as a director 6 to protect and further the personal interests of EC and MC, as well as his own, purposefully acting 7 in ways he knew were detrimental to RDI and its public shareholders, including by pressuring 8 9 Storey to resign from RDI's Board of Directors.

Defendant William Gould (Gould) is and at all times relevant hereto was an outside 10 23. director of RDI. Gould was appointed a director on or about October 15, 2004. Gould approved 11 minutes for the board meetings at which the subject was the termination of JJC as President and 12 CEO, which minutes Gould knew to contain inaccuracies. Gould failed to cause the Company to 13 correct the materially misleading if not inaccurate Form 8-K filed on or about June 18, 2015. 14 Gould effectively abdicated his responsibilities as a director, including by acceding to the EC 15 Committee, agreeing to the appointment of unqualified persons to the RDI board following 16 effectively no deliberation by him and by participating in the CEO search, which was aborted if 17 18 not manipulated.

Defendant Judy Codding (Codding) at all times relevant hereto was and is an 19 24. outside director of RDI. Codding became a director of RDI on or about October 5, 2015. 20 Codding supposedly was elected to fill a board seat that had been vacant since August 2014. 21 Codding has never served as the director of a public company and possesses no personal 22 experience in either of RDI's principal businesses, real estate development and cinemas. Plaintiff 23 is informed and believes that Codding was selected by EC and added to the RDI Board of 24 Directors because of Codding's long-standing personal relationship with Mary Cotter, with whom 25 EC now lives. Codding as a director of RDI has acted to advance and protect the personal interests 26 of EC and MC, to the detriment of other RDI shareholders, including by voting to make EC CEO 27 after the CEO search process was aborted, by voting to make MC EVP-RED-NYC, by voting to 28

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provide MC with what amounted to a \$200,000 gift, and by her acts and omissions in response to
 an offer by a third-party to purchase all of the stock of RDI at a cash price above which it trades in
 the open market.

Defendant Michael Wrotniak (Wrotniak) at all times relevant hereto was and is an 25. 4 outside director of RDI. Wrotniak became a director of RDI on or about October 12, 2015. 5 Wrotniak was elected to fill a board seat that had been vacated by the supposed retirement of 6 former RDI director Tim Storey on October 11, 2015, which so-called retirement in fact was 7 precipitated by EC and MC, with the supposed special nominating committee giving Storey the 8 choice of resigning and receiving a severance package or simply not being nominated to stand for 9 reelection. Wrotniak has never served as a director of a public company and possesses no 10 expertise in either of RDI's principal businesses, real estate development and cinemas. Plaintiff is 11 informed and believes that Wrotniak was added to the RDI Board of Directors because of 12 Wroniak's wife's long-standing close personal relationship with MC. Wrotniak as a director of 13 RDI has acted to advance and protect the personal interests of EC and MC, to the detriment of 14 other RDI shareholders, including by voting to make MC EVP-RED-NYC, by voting to provide 15 MC with what amounted to a \$200,000 gift, by voting to make EC CEO after the CEO search 16 process was aborted, and by his acts and omissions in response to an offer by a third-party to 17 purchase all of the stock of RDI at a price above which it trades in the open market. 18

Nominal defendant Reading International, Inc. (RDI) is a Nevada corporation and 19 26. is, according to its public filings with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (the 20 "SEC"), an internationally diversified company principally focused on the development, 21 ownership and operation of entertainment and real estate assets in the United States, Australia and 22 New Zealand. The Company operates in two business segments, namely, cinema exhibition, 23 through approximately 58 multiplex cinemas, and real estate, including real estate development 24 and the rental of retail, commercial and live theater assets. The Company manages world-wide 25 cinemas in the United States, Australia and New Zealand. RDI has two classes of stock, Class A 26 stock held by the investing public, which stock exercises no voting rights, and Class B stock, 27 which is the sole voting stock with respect to the election of directors. An overwhelming majority 28

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Lewis Roco Rothgerber christie (approximately eighty percent (80%)) of the Class A stock is legally and/or beneficially owned by
shareholders unrelated to JJC, EC and MC. Approximately seventy percent (70%) of the Class B
stock is subject to disputes and pending trust and estate litigation in California between EC and
MC, on the one hand, and JJC, on the other hand, and a probate action in Nevada. Of the Class B
stock, approximately forty-four percent (44%) is held in the name of the Trust. RDI is named only
as a nominal defendant in this derivative action.

7 27. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate or
8 otherwise, of Defendants named and identified herein as Does 1 through 100, inclusive, are
9 currently unknown to Plaintiff. Plaintiff, therefore, sues said Defendants by such fictitious names
10 and will amend his Complaint to show their true names and capacities upon ascertaining the same.
11 Upon information and belief, each of the Defendants sued herein as Doe has some responsibility
12 for the damages arising as a result of the matters herein alleged.

#### **ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS**

#### **General Background**

28. Since approximately 2000, and until he resigned as Chairman and CEO of RDI on or about August 7, 2014, James J. Cotter, Sr. (JJC, Sr.) was the CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors of RDI. Additionally, JJC, Sr. (according to RDI filings with the SEC, among other things) through the Trust controlled approximately seventy percent (70%) of the Class B voting stock of RDI. As such, JJC, Sr. unilaterally selected and elected the board of directors.

For all intents and purposes, JJC, Sr. ran the Company as he saw fit, without 20 29. meaningful oversight or input from the board of directors. According to Kane, JJC, Sr. "did not 21 seek directors that could add significant value but sought out friends to fill out the 'independent' 22 member requirements." Kane himself acted as if his job as a director was to protect and further 23 the interests of his life-long friend and benefactor, JJC, Sr., not to protect and further the interests 24 of RDI and its shareholders. With the passing of JJC, Sr., Kane also acknowledged that it was 25 "time to change this approach and appoint individuals that could offer solid advice and counsel, 26 such as some NYC real estate people and/or NYC people with political know-how that we might 27 need if we are to develop our valuable assets there." 28

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Recognizing JJC, Sr.'s control of the Company, the board asked that he provide 1 30. them with a succession plan. He did so in or about December 2006, and the RDI board 2 implemented it. The succession plan was to have JJC assume JJC, Sr.'s position when JJC, Sr. 3 retired or passed, as the case may be. 4

Since 2005, JJC was involved in most RDI executive management meetings and 5 31. privy to most significant internal senior management memos. JJC was appointed Vice Chairman 6 of the RDI board in 2007. The RDI board appointed JJC President of RDI on or about June 1, 7 2013, which responsibilities he filled without objection by the RDI board of directors. 8

On or about September 13, 2014, JJC, Sr. passed. Soon thereafter, trust and estate 9 32. litigation was commenced by his daughters, MC and EC, against JJC, which litigation involved 10 the issue of whether MC or JJC, or both, would serve as trustees of the voting trust that controlled 11 or would control the RDI voting stock previously controlled by JJC, Sr., among other things. 12

As President and CEO of RDI, JJC alienated his sisters because he acted to protect 13 33. and further the interests of RDI and all of its shareholders, repeatedly rebuffing the efforts of MC 14 and EC to advance their own interests, as well as efforts by Kane and others to protect and further 15 the interests of MC and EC, as well as their own interests, all to the detriment of the Company and 16 its other shareholders. For example, JJC questioned and/or rejected purported expenses EC and 17 MC sought to have RDI pay. In one instance, EC attempted to charge RDI for an expensive 18 Thanksgiving dinner with her mother, sister and sister's children, which effort Plaintiff rejected. 19 In another instance, MC sought to charge RDI for certain expenses of her father's funeral. 20

JJC insisted that RDI employ an executive with experience in real estate 21 34. development to be the senior person at RDI overseeing RDI's domestic real estate development 22 business, including the NYC Properties. MC resisted. MC wanted to be employed by RDI and to 23 secure lucrative compensation and/or benefits she otherwise would not receive. MC wanted to be 24 the senior person at RDI responsible for development of the NYC Properties. However, she is 25 unqualified to do so. MC has no real estate development experience. 26

Frustrated by Plaintiff's refusal as President and CEO to accede to their demands 35. for titles, positions, promotions, employment contracts and money from RDI, and with MC in 28

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jeopardy of losing her lucrative consulting arrangement to manage live theater operations due to
the Orpheum Theatre debacle described herein, MC and EC agreed to act together and acted to
protect and advance their personal interests by seizing and acting to perpetuate control of RDI. To
that end, EC secured the agreement of defendants Kane, Adams and McEachern to choose sides in
their family dispute with JJC.

6 36. Kane, Adams and McEachern threatened Plaintiff with termination unless he 7 resolved his disputes with EC and MC on terms dictated by the two of them. When they 8 understood that Plaintiff had acquiesced, they relented. When they learned that he had not 9 acquiesced, they fired Plaintiff as President and CEO of RDI and thereafter acted to perpetuate 10 their control of RDI.

## EC and MC Act To Further Their Own Interests; Kane Assists and Does Too

37. Soon after JJC, Sr. passed, EC sought an employment agreement and a promotion. Plaintiff is informed and believes that EC did so in part because she was fearful that JJC, acting to protect and further the interests of the Company, would fire her, notwithstanding the fact that he had never expressed any intention of doing so. Soon after JJC, Sr. passed, EC also sought a raise. The claimed impetus for the requested raise was to qualify for a loan on a Laguna Beach, California condominium.

18 38. Kane, who has a decade's long quasi-familial relationship with each of MC and 19 EC, who call him "Uncle Ed," acted to ensure that EC would obtain the loan she sought, described above. To that end, Kane, purporting to act as chairman of the RDI Compensation Committee, signed a letter on RDI letterhead to EC's lender that represented that the Committee "anticipate[d] a total cash compensation increase of no less than 20%" for EC "effective no later than January 1, 2015." Despite JJC pointing out that sending such a letter to EC's bank was inappropriate, EC executed the letter on behalf of Kane.

39. Also, in October 2014, Kane prompted the RDI board to provide EC a "bonus" of
\$50,000, on account of a supposed error by the Company in connection with the issuance of RDI
stock options EC had exercised in 2013. No other similarly situated RDI executive received such
a "bonus," which was tantamount to a gift or other unearned compensation given to EC from the

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coffers of RDI. With EC as interim CEO and now CEO, the Company, EC and McEachern have
 taken the opposite position with JJC.

40. Separately, commencing shortly after JJC, Sr.'s death on September 13, 2014, Kane began pressing Plaintiff as President and CEO to recommend to the RDI board, and thereby effectively approve, increases in directors' fees and consideration paid to Kane and other outside board members. Kane and the other outside directors were successful in increasing their compensation, including by way of supposed one-time and/or special fee awards, including as alleged herein.

### MC And EC Bring Cotter Family Disputes To RDI

Notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiff had been President of RDI since 2013, 10 41. notwithstanding the fact that JJC, Sr. and the RDI board had implemented a succession plan 11 pursuant to which Plaintiff would succeed JJC, Sr. as CEO of RDI after substantial preparation, 12 and notwithstanding that JJC, Sr.'s testamentary disposition memorialized to EC and MC his 13 intention that JJC serve as President of RDI, MC and EC resisted and sought to avoid reporting to 14 JJC. For example, EC in October 2014 sought to have EC and MC report to an executive 15 committee, not Plaintiff as CEO. Later, when Plaintiff as CEO of RDI sought to engage in 16 substantive communications with MC about the live theater business for which she was 17 responsible, MC refused to have substantive communications with Plaintiff about such matters. 18

19 42. The non-Cotter board members, faced with the personal disputes MC and EC had 20 with JJC, including the pending trust and estate litigation, took steps to protect and enhance their 21 personal interests. The RDI board of directors on January 15, 2015 determined to purchase a 22 directors and officers insurance policy (which it never had before) with a limit of \$10 million. At 23 the time, they also determined that stock option grants to individual directors made previously 24 would vest immediately and further determined that January 15, 2015 would be the date on which 25 to establish the stock price for option purposes.

43. In a private session of the non-Cotter directors on January 15, 2015, they discussed
and agreed upon a course of action put forth by EC and MC which initially was proposed to be the
first two paragraphs quoted below, but after discussion became all three. They resolved and

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LOWIS ROCO 3993 Howard Hughes Pkwy, Suite 600 ROTHGERBER CHRISTIE Las Vegas, NV 89169-5996	1	approved, with Plaintiff, EC and MC abstaining, as follows:
	2	"The CEO [,JJC,] cannot terminate the employment of Ellen Cotter unless
	3	a majority of the independent directors concur with the CEO's recommendation to terminate Ellen Cotter;
	4	The CEO [,JJC,] cannot terminate the existing Theater Management Agreement of Ms. Margaret Cotter unless a majority of the independent directors
	5	concurs with the CEO's recommendations to terminate such Theater Management
	6	Agreement; and The CEO [,JJC,] cannot be terminated without the approval of the
	7	majority of the independent directors."
	8	JJC Succeeds As President And CEO; MC And EC Continue To Object
	9	44. Plaintiff's work as CEO was recognized as successful by the stock market. RDI
	10	stock was trading at \$8.17 per share when Plaintiff became CEO but, by approximately the end of
	11	2014, had traded as high as \$13.26 per share and, in the Spring of 2015, traded at over \$14.45 per
	12	share.
	13	45. One analyst described the successes of JJC as President and CEO as follows:
	14	Management Catalysts
	15	RDI has historically suffered from a control discount. The dual class structure created a situation where the Cotter family owned approx. 30%
	16	of outstanding shares, but 70% of class B voting stock. James Cotter Sr., the longtime CEO, made little effort to promote the company and was
		slow to monetize assets and unlock the value even though he did acquire
	17	assets smartly and did a good job of operating the business. Over the past two years, asset monetization has moved ahead and seems to be a sign of
	18	things to come. In early August, James Cotter, Sr., resigned from serving
	19	as the Company's Chairman and CEO and recently passed away. Cotter's son Jim has taken over the CEO position. We think that Jim has already
	20	been a positive influence in terms of value realization during the last year. We believe that Jim was instrumental in pushing not only the sales of
<b>S</b> SE SE	21	important Australian assets, but also the share buyback. He is also seeking
	22	other ways to increase value (e.g. considering ways to further monetize the Angelika brand). We expect the stock will move much closer to fair value
	23	once definitive announcements are made around the New York City assets
	24	and other smaller asset monetization announcements in the next 12 months. The two New York assets discussed have appreciated
	25	significantly in recent years and are a part of the value here. It is also worth noting that RDI also owns other valuable, underutilized real estate
	26	(including Minetta Lane Theater, Orpheum Theater, Royal George in
	27	Chicago, etc.) that could ultimately be redeveloped and create incremental value for shareholders.
	28	46. After meeting JJC in person in October 2014, one large stockholder commented, "I
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came away from our meeting with a firm view that you care about shareholders and that both you 1 and us will be nicely rewarded over time... I intend to remain a long-term partner. I am confident 2 that if you continue to buy back stock and the investment community begins to believe that you, as 3 a leader, will act in the best interests of shareholders, the stock price will be considerably higher." 4 The stock price did move considerably higher. 5

On June 1, 2013, when JJC was appointed President of RDI, the stock price was 6 47. only \$6.08 per share. By May 31, 2015, The Street Ratings upgraded their recommendation of 7 RDI to a "buy" or "purchase." On June 4, 2015, RDI Class A stock traded in the public 8 marketplace as high as \$14.45 per share. 9

MC and EC objected to Plaintiff's on-going, successful efforts as President and 48. CEO of RDI which, though in the best interests of all RDI shareholders, including the public non-Cotter family shareholders, were viewed by MC and EC as not in their personal interests. MC and EC have preferred that the price at which RDI Class A stock traded be artificially depressed and preferred that the conduct of the Board and senior management not be scrutinized.

By their actions and statements, including but not limited to their demands for 49. additional compensation and employment agreements, MC and EC made clear that their personal interests were paramount, and that they would act to protect and further their personal interests, to the detriment of the interests of RDI and its other shareholders. 18

## JJC Complies With Board Processes, MC And EC Prompt The Termination of Such Processes

In March 2015, the non-Cotter directors appointed director Storey to function as 50. their representative or ombudsman to work with JJC as CEO, including by acting as a facilitator with EC and MC.

On behalf of the non-Cotter directors, one or both of Gould and Storey advised MC 51. and EC and Plaintiff that the process the non-Cotter directors had put in place, involving director Storey as ombudsman, would continue through June 2015, at which time an assessment would be made of the situation, including in particular the extent to which each of the three of them had cooperated in the process and had undertaken to improve their working relationships and to

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1 sustain improved working relationships.

52. From that point forward, Plaintiff worked with director Storey in the manner Storey
on behalf of the non-Cotter directors had requested. However, MC and EC did not, including as
otherwise averred herein, including by refusing to do certain things requested by Plaintiff, which
Storey had agreed were in the best interests of RDI. They also complained to Kane about Storey.

6 53. Although MC for months had refused to have substantive discussions with Plaintiff 7 about the live theater business operations for which she was responsible, and for months had failed 8 and refused to produce even the most rudimentary of business plans, she nevertheless pushed to be 9 provided an employment agreement with RDI. For example, on May 4, 2015, by which time the 10 Orpheum theater debacle had come to light, and by which time she had provided no business plan 11 whatsoever, she emailed Plaintiff, stating "any idea when this employment agreement of mine that 12 you have been working on for months will be presented?"

The Outside Directors Demand and Receive Money and Stock Options

54. In the same time frame, the non-Cotter directors were seeking additional compensation. In particular, Kane pushed Plaintiff to provide all non-Cotter directors other than director Storey an extra \$25,000 for the first six months of 2015, with the understanding "that at year-end we will be asking for an additional payment."

55. With respect to director Storey, who resides in New Zealand and had taken no fewer than a half dozen trips to Los Angeles in furtherance of his role as the representative or ombudsman of the non-Cotter directors in interfacing with Plaintiff, on the one hand, and MC and EC, respectively, on the other hand, Kane's proposal was that Storey receive an additional \$75,000 for the first six months of 2015, in recognition of the ongoing time and effort Storey was expending as the representative or ombudsman for the non-Cotter directors.

24 56. Plaintiff advised Kane that he had some reservations about the additional
25 compensation Kane proposed providing to the non-Cotter directors.

### MC's Orpheum Theatre Debacle Puts Her In Jeopardy

57. RDI's Proxy Statement filed with the SEC in connection with the annual meeting of RDI stockholders that occurred in 2014 described MC's role in relevant part as "the President

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of Liberty Theatres, the subsidiary through which we own our live theaters. [MC] manages the real estate which houses each of four live theaters [including the one which is the principle source 2 of revenue, the Orpheum Theatre,] [and as such] secures leases, manages tenancies, oversees 3 maintenance and regulatory compliance on the properties. . . . " 4

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MC's diligence and candor, or lack of one or both, were called into question by her 58. handling of the relationship with the Stomp Producers. The Stomp Producers, the tenant at the RDI owned Orpheum Theatre and the source of a majority of RDI's live theater revenues, gave. notice on April 23, 2015 of termination of the lease for cause.

MC had been aware of the alleged issues raised by the Stomp Producers for 9 59. months. In particular, by email and correspondence dated February 6, 2015, the Stomp producers 10 wrote to MC and complained "about the maintenance and upkeep of the Orpheum Theatre." They 11 further stated in their February 6, 2015 letter to MC as follows: 12

> "Nothing in this letter is new to you as we and our employees have been in almost constant contact about recurring problems at the theater, but there is now an urgent need to attend to this matter on an immediate and comprehensive, rather than piecemeal, bases ....."

Prior to receipt of the April 27, 2015 notice of termination, MC failed to disclose 60. the February 6, 2015 letter or the substance of it or that the Stomp Producers told MC on April 9, 2015 that they were going to vacate the theater or even the situation with the Stomp Producers generally to Plaintiff, to the Company's General Counsel or to any outside member of the RDI board of directors. In doing so, she breached her fiduciary obligations as a director.

Upon learning of the Stomp Producer's notice to terminate, director Gould stated an 61. assessment to the effect that MC's handling of the situation (independent of the merits or lack of merits of the claims of the Stomp Producers), including not notifying anyone about the risk that the Company could lose a material portion of its live theater business income, could be grounds for termination. 25

#### Kane Chooses Sides in a Family Dispute

Responding to complaints by EC and MC about Storey, Kane concluded that JJC 62. had allowed Storey to come between him and his sisters. Kane chose the sisters' side in their

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disputes with JJC. Kane communicated privately with Adams about terminating JJC as President 1 2 and CEO of RDI.

Kane's quasi-familial relationship and visceral support of MC and EC has been 3 63. evidenced by, among other things, stunning ad hominem invectives directed at directors Gould and 4 Storey, as well as by rants to JJC about "The Godfather" and the Corleone family from that series 5 of movies, even including a suggestion that termination of JJC would be analogous to the murder 6 of someone disrespecting a Corleone family member. 7

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#### Adams Is Beholden To MC And EC

In or about 2007 or 2008 (according to Adams' own sworn testimony in a recent 64. divorce proceeding), Adams' business of an activist investor, by which he invested monies he raised privately, failed after he lost approximately seventy percent (70%) of the monies invested with him. Since that time, Adams has been unsuccessful in reviving that business and, for all intents and purposes, has been unemployed. He has described it as a "sabbatical."

EC secured Adams' agreement to serve as interim CEO of RDI after termination of 65. JJC. Holding that position would be of value to Adams in terms of any additional compensation 16 he would receive.

On or about July 10, 2013, Adams entered into an agreement whereby Adams was 17 66. to receive, among other things, cash compensation of \$1,000 per week from JC Farm Management 18 Inc. ("JC Farm"), a private company JJC, Sr. owned, as well as carried interests in certain real 19 estate projects, including one by the name of Shadow View. Adams has been paid and continues 20 to be paid the \$1,000 per week. Together with his income from RDI, those monies are the monies 21 Adams needs and uses to pay for his day-to-day expenses. Adams also received the carried 22 interests. The value of Adams' carried interests in those real estate projects including Shadow 23 View, including whether it will be monetized and the extent to which it will be monetized for the 24 benefit of Adams, like JC Farm, is contended by MC and EC to be the controlled by the estate of 25 26 JJC, Sr., of which MC and EC presently are the executors.

Based on information provided by Adams in sworn statements in a recent divorce 27 67. proceeding, the \$1000 per month together with other amounts paid to him by Cotter entities over 28

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which EC and MC exercise control or claim to exercise control amounted to over half (50%) of 1 Adam's (claimed approximate \$90,000) income in 2013, at a minimum, and possibly amounted to 2 3 over eighty percent (80%) of that income.

Thus, Adams is financially dependent on MC and EC. Practically, Adams has little 68. choice if any but to accommodate and advance the personal interests of MC and EC, including by 5 helping them seize, consolidate and perpetuate control of RDI, including as alleged herein. 6

For such reasons, Adams was and is not independent generally, and was and is 7 69. neither independent nor disinterested with respect to matters involving the Cotters, including the 8 disputes between MC and EC, on one hand, and JJC on the other, the decision whether to fire JJC, 9 and compensation and employment decisions regarding EC and MC. 10

In or about March 26, 2015, Adams sold all RDI options he then had, including 70. options he had been granted only a few months earlier. He apparently failed to disclose that he owned RDI options in his divorce proceedings.

After Adams' financial dependence on income from Cotter-controlled companies 14 71. was disclosed in this action, director defendant Gould acknowledged that Adams was not 15 independent for purposes of decisions regarding compensation of any of the Cotters, and Adams, 16 on or about May 14, 2016 resigned from the RDI Board of Directors Compensation Committee. 17

## Defendants Other Than Gould Threaten Plaintiff With Termination If He Fails to Resolve Disputes With EC and MC on Terms Dictated By Them

On Tuesday, May 19, 2015, EC distributed a purported agenda for an RDI board of 72. 20 directors meeting scheduled for Thursday, May 21, 2015. The first action item on the agenda was 21 entitled "Status of President and CEO[,]" which in fact was the agenda item to raise an issue 22 previously never discussed at an RDI Board of Directors meeting, namely, termination of JJC as 23 President and CEO of RDI. EC purposefully had not previously distributed the agenda earlier. EC 24 purposefully chose the phraseology "status of President and CEO." She did both to conceal the 25 fact that the meeting was specially called to concern the termination of JJC as President and CEO. 26 The agenda was untimely and deficient. 27

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Prior to May 19, 2015, each of Adams, Kane and McEachern communicated to EC 73.

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and/or between or among themselves their respective agreement to vote as RDI directors to
 terminate JJC as President and CEO of RDI.

74. In the face of objections by directors Gould and/or Storey that the non-Cotter
directors had not undertaken an appropriate process to make any decision regarding whether or not
to terminate the President and CEO of RDI, and a request that the non-Cotter directors meet before
the scheduled May 21 meeting, Kane provided a visceral response to the effect that the outside
directors did not need to meet, acknowledging the agreement to vote and admitting that even the
pretense of process would not be undertaken because "the die is cast."

9 75. EC and Adams previously had hired counsel ostensibly representing RDI, Akin
10 Gump, and had that counsel attend the May 21 board meeting at which the first and only item
11 discussed was termination of JJC as President and CEO.

Faced with a clear record that the non-Cotter directors had failed to undertake any 12 76. process, much less an appropriate process, to make a decision regarding whether to terminate JJC 13 as President and CEO, Adams sought to have a discussion about a later item on the agenda that 14 arguably related to JJC's performance. Gould objected. JJC recognized that Adams, Kane and 15 McEachern appeared to have previously determined to vote to terminate him, and that the non-16 Cotter directors previously had put in place a process (described above) that was to play out 17 through the end of June, at least. Because that process had not been completed, any vote by any of 18 the non-Cotter directors to terminate JJC as President and CEO was in derogation of, and pre-19 empted, their own process. No substantive discussion of the later agenda items, or of JJC's 20 21 performance, occurred.

22 77. The supposed May 21, 2015 special meeting was concluded, with no termination
23 vote having been taken.

78. On Wednesday, May 27, 2015, Texas attorney Harry Susman, one of the lawyers
representing MC and EC in the trust and estate litigation, transmitted to Adam Streisand, an
attorney representing JJC in the trust and estate litigation, a document outlining terms to which JJC
was required to agree to avoid the threatened termination as President and CEO of RDI. The
proposal was communicated as effectively a "take-it or leave-it" proposal and was accompanied by

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1 || a deadline of 9:00 a.m. on Friday, May 29 to accept the proposal.

2 79. Also on May 27, 2015, EC emailed RDI directors claiming "that the board meeting
3 held last Thursday was adjourned, to reconvene this Friday, May 29, 2015. The board meeting
4 will begin at 11:00 a.m. at our Los Angeles office."

80. By the foregoing actions, among others, MC and EC made clear that accepting their
take-it or leave-it proposal, which would have resolved matters in dispute in the trust and estate
litigation and dispute about control of RDI, was what JJC had to do to avoid being fired as
President and CEO of RDI.

81. Also on May 28, 2015, approximately one day after EC and MC's lawyer
transmitted the "take-it or leave-it" proposal and one day before the RDI board was to meet, Kane
told JJC to accept the take-it or leave-it offer to "end all of the litigation and ill feelings." Among
other things, by email on May 28, 2015, Kane stated as follow to JJC:

"I have not seen the [take it or leave it settlement] proposal. I understand that it would leave you with your title, which is very important to you and which you told me was essential to any settlement . . . if it is take-it or leave-it, then I STRONGLY ADVISE YOU TO TAKE IT, . . . if we can end all of the litigation and ill feelings, -- and their offer to keep you as CEO as a major concession -- . . ."

82. On Friday, May 29, before the supposed RDI special board of directors meeting commenced, EC and MC met with JJC and told him that the document that had been conveyed by attorney Susman on their behalf two days earlier was a take-it or leave-it offer and that, if JJC did not accept it, the RDI board would terminate him as President and CEO. JJC attempted to discuss proposed changes with them, to which EC and MC responded that they would accept no changes. They repeated that if JJC did not accept the agreement as proposed, JJC would be terminated as President and CEO of RDI.

24 83. Director Gould shortly thereafter came to JJC's office and said that the majority of
25 the non-Cotter board members (meaning Adams, Kane and McEachern) were prepared to vote to
26 terminate him and that the supposed board meeting was about to commence.

84. JJC entered the conference room where the supposed special meeting was to occur.
The supposed meeting was commenced and Adams made a motion to terminate JJC as President

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and CEO. JJC observed that Adams was not independent or disinterested, pointing out that a
substantial portion of his income came from Cotter entities controlled by EC and MC, as
evidenced by sworn testimony Adams had given in his then-recent divorce proceeding. JJC
invited Adams to prove otherwise, to which Adams responded that he did not have to do so. One
or more of the non-Cotter directors inquired of Adams' financial relationship to Cotter entities, but
Adams declined to provide substantive responses.

85. Director Gould opined that it was not the role of the RDI board of directors to intercede in the personal disputes between EC and MC, on the one hand, and JJC, on the other hand, nor to tip the balance of power in those disputes. He further observed that the board should not intercede in personal disputes or attempt at a minimum to maintain the status quo until the courts resolved the trust and estate litigation, and added that he thought JJC had done a good job.

12 86. Kane offered more personal invective directed to JJC, including comments to the
effect that he thought that JJC had "\*\*\*\*ed Margaret over with the changes . . . made to the estate"
and that JJC "does not have people skills especially with his two sisters . . ."

87. The five outside directors asked JJC to leave the conference room so that they could talk with EC and MC. Next, JJC was advised that the supposed RDI board meeting would be adjourned until at or about 6:00 p.m. that evening. JJC was told that he had until the supposed meeting reconvened that evening to strike a deal with EC and MC, failing which he would be terminated as President and CEO of RDI when the supposed meeting reconvened.

The supposed meeting reconvened at or about 6:00 p.m. on Friday, May 29, 2015, 20 88. at which time EC reported that she and MC had reached an agreement in principal with JJC. EC 21 read to the RDI Board of Directors portions of the document attorney Susman had transmitted to 22 attorney Streisand on May 27, 2015, including one that provided for an executive committee of the 23 Board of Directors which, she indicated, would be comprised of EC, MC, JJC and Adams, who 24 would be Chairman. EC concluded that, while no definitive agreement had been reached, EC and 25 MC would have one of their lawyers provide documentation to counsel for JJC. Ed Kane offered 26 congratulations and commented favorably about Plaintiff remaining CEO. No termination vote 27 28 was taken. The supposed special meeting concluded.

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LEWIS ROCO ROTHGERBER CHRISTIE 89. On Wednesday, June 3, 2015, attorney Susman on behalf of EC and MC transmitted a new document to JJC's trust and estate attorney Streisand. The document contained new terms previously not discussed, much less agreed, by the parties.

90. On Friday, June 5, 2015, attorney Susman left a message for attorney Streisand, the sum and substance of which was that he (Susman) was awaiting word that JJC had agreed to all of the terms in the document. By that message, attorney Susman implied that the document was a "take-it or leave-it" proposal.

91. On June 8, 2015, JJC advised EC and MC that he could not accept their take-it or
leave-it document. MC responded that she would advise the RDI board of directors, referencing
the threat to have JJC terminated as President and CEO of RDI if he failed to reach a global
agreement (including of all trust and estate litigation matters) satisfactory to EC and MC.

92. On June 9, 2015, in furtherance of important ongoing RDI business, JJC asked for a response from MC with respect to a senior executive candidate to oversee RDI's United States real estate, including development of the NYC Properties, which candidate had been endorsed by senior executives at RDI. MC consistently resisted employing such a person because hiring such a person would preclude her from being the senior person at RDI responsible for overseeing development of the NYC Properties. In response to JJC's email, she called him and said, among other things, "you were supposed to be terminated but for a global settlement . . . bye."

93. On Wednesday afternoon, June 10, 2015, EC transmitted an email to all RDI board
members (and RDI's general counsel) stating, among other things, that "we would like to
reconvene the Meeting that was adjourned on Friday, May 29<sup>th</sup>, at approximately 6:15 p.m. (Los
Angeles time.) We would like to reconvene this Meeting telephonically *Friday, June 12 at 11:00 a.m. (Los Angeles time)*..." The email purported to further "confirm [] our meeting of the Board
of Directors on Thursday, June 18<sup>th</sup>... We will be distributing Agenda and Board package for this
Meeting at the end of this week ..."

26 94. On Friday, June 12, 2015, a supposed RDI special board of directors meeting was
27 convened. Following through on their prior threat to terminate JJC if he did not resolve all
28 disputes with EC and MC on terms satisfactory to the two of them, Adams, Kane and McEachern

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each voted to terminate JJC, after McEachern made one last effort to pressure JJC, inviting him to resign rather than be terminated. Storey and Gould voted against terminating JJC as President and CEO. EC was elected interim CEO with the expressed intention of immediately initiating a search for a new President and CEO.

Additionally, and notwithstanding the fact that both directors and senior executive 95. officers at RDI had agreed that the Company needed to hire an executive with actual real estate development experience to advise the Company with respect to the NYC Properties, and notwithstanding the fact that at least one candidate acceptable to all but MC had been identified, neither that candidate nor any other person was offered the position to oversee RDI's United States real estate. That is because EC, in one of her first acts as interim CEO, suspended the search for such a person until a new CEO was hired, she stated. EC did so to ensure that MC could retain control of activities related to the NYC Properties.

### EC and Others Pressure Plaintiff In An Effort to Force Him to Abandon This Action

EC, with the active assistance or knowing acquiescence of MC, Kane, Adams, 96. McEachern and Gould, has taken actions to pressure Plaintiff to abandon this action and cede control of RDI to them. The actions taken to pressure Plaintiff include immediately terminating 16 his access to his RDI email account and to RDI's offices and concocting new "policies" and/or 17 "practices" designed to bring financial pressure to bear on Plaintiff. One such activity is impairing 18 his ability to exercise RDI options and to sell RDI stock in a manner consistent with RDI's 19 20 historical practices.

After the purported termination of Plaintiff on or about June 12, 2015, on EC's 97. recommendation, the RDI Board had approved a new so-called insider trading policy. Plaintiff is informed and believes that this supposed policy was created to impair his ability to generate liquidity through the sale of RDI stock, the principal source of Plaintiff's net worth. Given the extremely limited holdings in RDI stock by any director, officer or employee of RDI other than Plaintiff, this supposed policy enables EC to control the disposition of such shares through the imposition of supposed blackout periods, which she has effectively done, with the assistance of Craig Tompkins. Kane and McEachern, who purportedly oversee compensation related and 28

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related party matters, each have agreed to and cooperated in efforts to prevent Plaintiff from exercising RDI options and selling RDI shares.

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98. In an effort to pressure Plaintiff to abandon this action, and to secure his resignation from the RDI Board of Directors, EC on June 15, 2015 transmitted a letter to Plaintiff in which she claimed that the employment agreement entered into by him as an executive (over a decade after he became a director) required him to resign as a director upon his termination as an officer. That letter claimed that his failure to do so constituted a breach of the referenced employment agreement and threatened to terminate payments and benefits to Plaintiff if he did not resign within 30 days of his termination. Shortly thereafter, the Company terminated the health and medical benefits the Company provides to him, his wife and his three children and also terminated severance payments and other benefits.

EC, MC, Kane and Adams Act to Entrench Themselves and Mislead RDI Shareholders

99. Subsequent to terminating Plaintiff, EC, MC, Kane, Adams and McEachern acted to limit if not eliminate the participation in governance of RDI of JJC and directors Storey and Gould. To that end, a previously inactive executive committee of the RDI Board of Directors has been activated (i.e., the "EC Committee"). It has been repopulated so that EC, MC, Kane and Adams are its only members, with only McEachern able to attend any of its meetings as he wishes. The full authority of the RDI Board of Directors purportedly now is held by the EC Committee. By such actions, EC, MC, Kane and Adams purposely impaired if not eviscerated the functioning of RDI's full Board of Directors, selectively replacing it with the EC Committee as EC saw fit. Separately, McEachern as chairman of the Audit and Conflicts Committee barred directors who were not committee members or at least Plaintiff, from attending committee meetings, ending a longstanding practice of allowing all directors to attend.

24 100. Other fundamental corporate governance practices and protections at RDI have
25 been altered, circumscribed or eliminated. EC, with the active assistance and/or knowing
26 cooperation of MC, Kane and Adams, manipulated and reduced the flow of information to JJC,
27 Gould and Storey as RDI directors, including by failing to timely distribute drafts of prior RDI
28 board of directors meeting minutes and by failing to provide board packages sufficiently in

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advance of board meetings such that board matters were, to the knowledge of JJC, Storey and Gould, impromptu actions (which had been addressed previously by one or more of EC, MC, Kane and Adams).

4 101. EC, with the active assistance and/or knowing cooperation of MC, Kane, Adams, 5 McEachern and Gould, has caused RDI to disseminate materially misleading if not inaccurate 6 information to its public shareholders. They have done so in an effort to delay if not avoid 7 discovery of the actions of EC, MC, Kane, Adams and McEachern, and to avoid being held 8 accountable for those actions, whether by way of derivative action or otherwise. Among other 9 things, these defendants caused RDI to disseminate the following press release(s) and/or SEC 10 filings, each of which was misleading if not inaccurate by omission, commission or both:

a. RDI on June 15, 2015 issued a press release stating that its board of directors "has appointed [EC] as interim President and [CEO], succeeding [JJC] ...." This press release was misleading because, among other things, it failed to address the circumstances of the purported termination of JJC as President and CEO, much less disclose that he purportedly had been terminated, much less that the purported termination was without cause, or even that JJC had filed this action;

b. On or about June 18, 2015, RDI filed with the SEC a Form 8-K which was materially misleading if not inaccurate in several respects, including that it stated that JJC was "required to tender his resignation as a director of [RDI] immediately upon termination of his employment [, that he had not done so and that RDI] considers such refusal as a material breach of [the] employment agreement [] and has given [JJC] thirty (30) days in which to resign .... " The employment agreement in question, which is an exhibit to the Form 10-Q for period ending June 30, 2013 filed by RDI with the SEC, on its face not only does not require JJC to resign as a director in the event that he is terminated as an executive officer, but on its face contemplates that he may continue to serve as a director, which position he in fact held for many years prior to becoming an officer and entering into the subject employment agreement. Separately, the employment agreement contains a thirty (30) day cure provision with respect to breaches of the agreement which may constitute a basis for termination of JJC for cause, which defendants do not claim occurred here. Therefore, the characterization in the Form 8-K of what the Company has done for thirty (30) days is misleading both as to what the employment agreement provides and what the Company has done, which in fact is to assert that JJC is breach of an agreement which the Company purports to have terminated previously. Additionally, the Form 8-K is materially misleading in describing this action;

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- c. RDI has failed to file a Form 8-K with respect to the EC Committee, which is a development that materially deviates from the prior practices of RDI and RDI's SEC disclosures with respect to those practices.
- d. On or about October 13, 2015, RDI filed with the SEC a Form 8-K which was materially misleading if not inaccurate. In particular, the description in that Form 8-K of defendant Storey "retir[ing]" from the RDI Board of Directors is misleading if not inaccurate. As alleged herein, Mr. Storey had been told that he would not be nominated to stand for reelection and he effectively was forced to resign as a director. The Form 8-K also is misleading if not inaccurate insofar as its descriptions of new board members Judy Codding and Michael Wrotniak suggest that their respective experiences described in the Form 8-K, such as Codding having experience in the field of education and/or Wrotniak having "considerable experience in international business, including foreign exchange risk mitigation," were the reasons those two persons were made Directors of RDI. The Form 8-K also is misleading if not inaccurate with respect to those two persons being made directors of RDI because it fails to disclose their respective personal relationships with Cotter family members. As alleged herein, Codding is a personal friend of Mary Cotter and Wrotniak and/or his wife are personal friends of MC.
- e. On or about November 13, 2015, RDI filed with the SEC a Form 8-K which was materially misleading if not accurate. It purported to describe the voting results of the 2015 ASM and, in doing so, reflected the (likely purposefully) erroneous results the new inspector of elections, First Coast, have been engaged to provide.
- f. On or about January 11, 2016, the Company issued a Form 8-K attaching a press release of that date. The press release included a statement by defendant Gould that said: "After conducting a thorough search process, it is clear that Ellen is best suited to lead Reading moving forward." That statement is materially misleading if not inaccurate, including because it implies erroneously that the selection of EC was the result of a (supposedly) "thorough search process."
- g. On or about March 15, 2016, RDI filed with the SEC a Form 8-K which stated, among other things, that the RDI Board of Directors Compensation Committee and its Audit and Conflicts Committee each had approved payment of so-called "additional consulting fee compensation" of \$200,000 to MC "for services rendered by her to the Company in recent years outside the scope" of a Theater Management Agreement dated January 1, 2002, between the Company's subsidiary, Liberty Theaters, Inc. and OBI, LLC, an entity wholly-owned by MC. The Form 8-K also stated that the RDI Board of Directors approved "additional special compensation" of \$50,000 to be paid to Adams "for extraordinary services provided the Company and devotion of time in providing such services." The Form 8-K was materially misleading if not inaccurate because, among other things, those payments were awarded for reasons other and/or additional to those set in the Form 8-K.
- h. On or about July 20, 2016, RDI filed with the SEC a Form 8-K which was materially misleading if not accurate. It purported to describe the voting results

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of the 2016 ASM and, in doing so, reflected the (likely purposefully) erroneous results the inspector of elections, First Coast, have been engaged to provide.

On or about July 18, 2016, after failing to file a Form 8-K regarding the offer, i. the Company issued a press release regarding the offer. It stated that the "Board of Directors, after receiving input from management and its outside advisors, carefully evaluated the [offer]. Following this review, the Board of Directors determined that our stockholders would be better served by pursuing our independent, stand-alone strategic business plan ... " The press release was materially misleading if not false because, among other things, no "independent, standalone strategic business plan" has been delivered by management to the Individual Director Defendants, either in connection with the offer or otherwise.

## EC, MC, Kane, Adams and McEachern Manipulate the Corporate Machinery of RDI in An Effort to Control the Election of Directors at the 2015 Annual Shareholders Meeting

At least approximately forty four percent (44%) of the Class B voting stock of RDI 102. is held in the name of the James J. Cotter Living Trust, which became irrevocable upon JJC, Sr.'s death on September 13, 2014 (the "Trust"). Who has authority to vote the RDI Class B voting 12 stock held in the name of the Trust is a subject of dispute in the California trust and estate litigation between EC and MC, on one hand, and JJC, on the other hand. Plaintiff is informed and 14 believes that, unless EC, MC and JJC as co-trustees of the Trust all agree and provide a unanimous 15 direction to the Company as required under Section 15620 of the California Probate Code, none of 16 them can vote any of those shares in connection with an RDI Annual Shareholders Meeting 17 ("ASM"). 18

Plaintiff is informed and believes that EC and MC are aware of the foregoing 103. regarding whether the RDI Class B voting stock held in the name of the Trust properly can be voted at or in connection with RDI's ASM.

Plaintiff is informed and believes that EC and MC agreed to act and took actions to 104. increase the number of RDI Class B shares they could vote at RDI's ASM in order to attempt to control that vote without including the Class B voting stock held in the name of the Trust.

On or about April 17, 2015, EC and MC exercised options to acquire a. 50,000 and 35,100 shares of RDI Class B shares, respectively.

On or about September 17, 2015, EC and MC, acting as executors of the b. estate of JJC, Sr., exercised an option to acquire 100,000 shares of RDI Class B voting stock. Despite claiming a need to preserve assets of the

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Estate, EC and MC utilized liquid RDI Class A shares to pay for the exercise of the Estate's option to acquire these illiquid RDI Class B shares.

105. In or about June 12, 2015, Plaintiff was told by RDI that the prior practice of allowing the Compensation Committee of RDI's full Board of Directors to approve the exercise of options had been changed to require that each member of the Board of Directors approve any exercise of options by any director. When Plaintiff on or about June 5 and July 2 sought to exercise two separate tranches of RDI options, processing of his requests was delayed for weeks from the times he gave notice of his election to exercise such options.

10 106. However, that purported new practice later was reversed or abandoned. Plaintiff is 11 informed and believes that that was because EC and MC, purporting to act as executors of the 12 Estate of JJC, Sr., intended to seek to exercise a supposed option to have the Estate acquire 13 100,000 shares of Class B voting stock (which they did, as alleged herein). EC and MC feared 14 that JJC as an RDI director would refuse to consent to the exercise of this option controlled by EC 15 and MC as executors of the Estate of JJC, Sr.

Two of three members of the Compensation Committee are Adams and Kane. On 107. 16 or about September 21, 2015, Kane and Adams, purporting to act as directors and as members of 17 the Compensation Committee, authorized the request of EC and MC that the Estate be allowed to 18 (use liquid Class A stock to) exercise the supposed option to acquire the 100,000 shares using 19 shares of RDI Class A stock. Kane and Adams did so in derogation of the interests of RDI, which 20 received no benefit from receiving Class A stock (rather than cash), which merely reduced the 21 float of such stock. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Kane and Adams also did so without 22 requiring EC and MC as executors of the Estate to produce documentation establishing the 23 Estate's entitlement to exercise such option, which documentation may not exist. Kane and 24 Adams claimed that they decided to allow EC and MC to exercise the supposed 100,000 share 25 option based on the advice of counsel, including Craig Tompkins. The third director who was a 26 member of the Compensation Committee, Timothy Storey, was unable to attend the supposed 27 meeting of the Compensation Committee because it was called with too little notice. 28

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108. Plaintiff is informed and believes that EC and MC took such actions because of a concern that, absent the exercise of the supposed option for the Estate to acquire 100,000 shares of RDI Class B voting stock which EC and MC will purport to vote as executors of the Estate, EC and MC might have lacked sufficient votes to control the 2015 ASM and, in effect, unilaterally elect as RDI directors whomever they choose, in view of the requirement of unanimity under California Probate Code Section 15620.

## EC And MC Systematically Mislead RDI Shareholders, Including By Failing To Make Disclosures Required By The Federal Securities Laws And By Making Misleading Disclosures.

109. On or about September 24, 2014, MC and EC filed a Schedule 13D with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC"). In that 13D, each of MC and EC indicated that they were not a member of a 13D group and each excluded any and all RDI shares not owned by them, including shares owned by the Trust and shares held by the Estate, from the shares each reported as beneficially owned and/or shares subject to shared voting power.

110. On or about December 22, 2014, EC and MC were appointed in the accompanying Nevada probate action to act as co-executors of the Estate. Plaintiff is informed and believes that they commenced the Nevada probate action at least in part to exercise control as executors of certain Company Class B voting stock.

111. On or about January 9, 2015, MC and EC filed an amendment to the schedule 13D they filed on or about September 24, 2014 (the "13D1"). The 13D1 for the first time identified the two of them as a 13D group. The 13D1 also was filed for the Estate, but it expressly indicates that the RDI Class B voting stock held by the Estate was not stock with respect to which either MC or EC had shared voting power.

112. On or about April 16, 2015, EC exercised one or more options to acquire 50,000
shares of RDI Class B voting stock. She was allowed to do so by using RDI Class A non-voting
stock rather than cash. That provided no benefit to RDI. EC did not file the required Form 4
disclosure with the SEC regarding that acquisition of Class B voting stock until on or about
October 9, 2015, three days after the record date of October 6, 2015 set for the 2015 ASM.

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113. On or about April 17, 2015, MC exercised options to acquire a total of 35,100 shares of RDI Class B voting stock. She was allowed to do so by using RDI Class A non-voting stock rather than cash. That provided no benefit to RDI. MC did not file the required Form 4 disclosure with the SEC regarding that acquisition of Class B voting stock until on or about October 9, 2015, three days after the record date of October 6, 2015.

114. Plaintiff is informed and believes that in or before April 2015, MC and EC agreed
that they would exercise shared voting power of the RDI Class B voting stock held in the name of
the Estate together with RDI Class B voting stock held individually by each of them, such that EC
and MC together with the Estate were members of a group for the purposes of Schedule 13D.

On or about October 9, 2015, EC and MC filed an amended 13D (the "13D2"). The 10 115. 13D2 disclosed for the first time that EC and MC together with the Estate were members of a 11 group for the purposes of Schedule 13D. Plaintiff is informed and believes that EC and MC 12 purposefully failed to disclose the prior existence of this 13D group until such time as they had 13 exercised an option held by the Estate to acquire an additional 100,000 shares of RDI Class B 14 voting stock and until after the October 6 record date had passed, as part of their scheme to 15 attempt to control over fifty percent (50%) of the Class B voting stock (not including such stock 16 held in the name of the Trust) before the record date for the 2015 ASM. They acquired the 17 100,000 shares on or about September 21, 2015. 18

116. The 13D2 filed on or about October 9, 2015 also states that the Trust "is also a
member of the group with the Estate, Margaret Cotter and Ellen Cotter" and says that the "Trust
has separately filed a report on Schedule 13D on the date hereof." The 13D2 also states that MC
and EC have shared voting power with both the Estate and the Trust.

117. On or about October 9, 2015, EC and MC caused the Trust to file a Schedule 13D.
That Schedule 13D, like the 13D2, states that the Trust is a member of a group for the purposes of
Schedule 13D with the Estate, MC and EC. In response to these late filings as well as others made
by the Company, one RDI shareholder representative asked the Board, "Why does this board and
management choose to continue to be serial abusers of the securities laws?"

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1 118. Contrary to what the Schedule 13D filed for the Trust on or about October 9 and
 the 13D2 imply, EC and MC do not control the shares held in the name of the Trust for voting
 purposes, shared or otherwise. Plaintiff is informed and believes that such statements made in
 these two schedule 13Ds (and in the Company's Proxy Statement for the 2015 ASM) were
 intended by EC and MC (and by Kane, Adams and McEachern) to mislead other holders of RDI
 Class B voting stock in anticipation of and in connection with the 2015 ASM and the 2016 ASM.

Thus, EC and MC systematically have manipulated their disclosure of actual and
claimed ownership and control of RDI Class B voting stock for the purposes of misleading RDI
shareholders and facilitating their scheme to seize control of RDI and perpetuate their control of
RDI. All such actions were purposefully taken by them in derogation of their fiduciary
obligations, including the duty of disclosure.

12 120. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Kane was and Adams and McEachern may
have been party to this scheme. Kane and Adams acted to facilitate this scheme, acting as directors
and members of the Compensation Committee to effectuate the acquisition by the Estate of
100,000 shares of Class B voting stock, including as alleged herein.

## EC, MC, Kane, Adams and McEachern Act to Stack the Board With Others Loyal to EC and MC

121. EC, MC, Kane and Adams have added to the RDI Board of Directors individuals who have had long-standing friendships with EC, MC and/or their mother.

122. On or about August 1, 2015, a couple days before a RDI board meeting, EC as Chairman of the Board included on a Board of Directors agenda an item not previously discussed, proposing to add to RDI's Board an individual purported to have needed and sought after real estate development experience. EC has known this individual over twelve years and has a close, personal relationship with him, his wife and child. However, that individual previously had done business with RDI in a manner that caused harm to RDI. After Plaintiff objected based on these factors, EC reported to the Board that her nominee had withdrawn from consideration.

123. On or about October 3, just days before a board meeting, EC proposed Codding as a director candidate. This prevented directors who had not been informed of this candidate,

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including Plaintiff, Storey and Gould, from genuinely vetting and deliberating about the candidate. 1 Codding has no expertise in either of RDI's two principal business segments, cinema operations 2 and real estate development. Codding also has no experience as a director of a public company. 3

However, Codding maintains a long standing, close personal friendship with Mary 4 124. Cotter, the mother of EC, MC and Plaintiff. Mary Cotter has chosen the side of EC and MC in the 5 family disputes between EC and MC, on one hand, and JJC, on the other hand. EC currently 6 7 resides with Mary Cotter.

EC, together with Adams, McEachern and Kane, pushed to have Codding added to 8 125. RDI's Board in advance of the 2015 ASM. On October 5, Codding was made a director on an 9 impromptu basis, after only minutes of supposed deliberation by the Board. Each of defendants 10 other than Storey (and Plaintiff) acquiesced to EC's request and voted to add her to the Board. 11 While Gould said that more time was needed to allow for vetting of Codding, he approved the 12 appointment, effectively acknowledging that he was abdicating his fiduciary responsibilities in 13 14 order to accommodate EC and/or MC.

After Codding's appointment to RDI's Board of Directors was disclosed, one of 126. RDI's shareholder representatives communicated his disbelief over the appointment of someone 16 with no relevant experience and whose activity relating to her employer's alleged violations of the 17 public bidding laws to secure a contract with L.A. Unified School District (LAUSD) to provide 18 iPads to schools allegedly was under scrutiny in a federal criminal investigation, discovered 19 through a simple Google search. None of Kane, Adams, McEachern or Gould had either 20 performed or caused a basic, competent public records search or other such diligence that would 21 have discovered this publicly available information regarding Codding before approving Codding 22 to be a director of RDI. None of Adams, McEachern or Kane therefore were aware of, or at least 23 disclosed to the Board any prior knowledge of, Codding's involvement in such alleged activity 24 prior to voting to add her to the RDI Board. EC knew previously, but did not disclose what she 25 26 knew.

On October 5, 2015, EC announced to the full RDI Board of Directors that a so-27 127. called nominating committee comprised of Kane, Adams and McEachern supposedly would

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propose a board slate of nominees for the RDI's 2015 ASM, which has been set for November 10, 2015. RDI's counsel indicated that EC and MC's personal lawyer recommended that EC and MC 2 not be involved in the nominating process and that the Board form a nominating committee for 3 optical reasons, given EC and MC's role as executors of the Estate and trustees of the Trust. 4

EC and MC previously had determined that director Storey would not be 128. nominated to stand for reelection. Each member of the so-called nominating committee agreed to execute the decision of EC and MC to not nominate director Storey to be reelected.

Plaintiff is informed and believes that the insistence of director Storey that RDI 8 129. directors act in the interest of all shareholders, not just EC and MC, and his efforts to do so, 9 account in part for the decision and agreement of EC, MC, Kane, Adams and McEachern to not 10 nominate director Storey to stand for reelection at the 2015 ASM. 11

McEachern and Adams, purporting to act as members of the so-called special 130. nominating committee, pressured Storey to "retire" as a director. Storey acquiesced.

The supposed nominating committee, acting at the direction and requests of EC and 14 131. MC, then selected Wrotniak, who was a candidate about whom EC provided information to the 15 full Board only a couple days before the Board meeting, to replace Storey. 16

Wrotniak does not have expertise in either of RDI's business segments, cinema 132. operations and real estate development. Nor does he possess experience in public company corporate governance. However, Wrotniak is the husband of MC's long-standing best friend. He was chosen because of that friendship. MC and EC expect loyalty from him.

The supposed nominating committee selected Wrotniak, notwithstanding the fact 133. that a senior executive with chief financial officer experience at a public, multi-billion dollar real estate services and investment company, experience with Wall Street and years of experience in the real estate industry, expressed a willingness to serve on RDI's Board of Directors. That candidate had been suggested by Plaintiff and had no ties to any of the Cotters.

By the foregoing actions, EC, MC, Kane, Adams and McEachern each have 26 134. continued to misuse the corporate machinery of RDI, including in particular to attempt to rig the

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vote at the 2015 and 2016 ASMs, to entrench and perpetuate themselves in exclusive control of RDI. Gould has acquiesced, at a minimum.

135. On or about October 20, 2015, the Company issued its Proxy Statement for the 2015 ASM scheduled for November 10, 2015. The Proxy Statement is materially misleading if not inaccurate in a number of respects, including the following:

a. It states (at page 10) that, under Nevada law, EC and MC, as two of three trustees of the Trust, have the power to vote all of the RDI Class B voting stock held in the name of the Trust on the books and records of the Company;

b. It states (at page 10) that EC and MC together have the power to vote71.9% of a Class B voting stock entitled to vote for directors at the 2015 ASM;

c. It states (at pages 10 and 11) that the Company is a controlled company under NASDAQ listing rules;

d. It states (at page 11) that EC has been appointed as interim President and CEO and that the Board has established an Executive Search Committee comprised of EC, MC, Adams, Gould and McEachern which, it says, "will consider both internal and external candidates." Plaintiff is informed and believes that the undisclosed plan is to make EC President and CEO after conducting a search the purpose of which is to create the misimpression of a bona fide process;

e. It states (on page 12) that the "Special Nominating Committee and the Board accordingly considered the views of (EC and MC) with respect to the 2015 Director nominees," when in fact the Special Nominating Committee and every member of the Board other than Plaintiff acted as each understood EC and MC desired;

f. It states (on page 12) that Plaintiff "vot[ed] against each of the recommended nominees (including himself)," which is inaccurate;

g. It describes (on page 15) historical business experience of defendant
Adams, as if that experience is the reason he is a director and is nominated for
reelection, but fails to disclose his close personal ties to the late JJC, Sr. and to EC

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and MC, fails to disclose Adams' financial dependence on companies and deals 1 controlled by EC and MC and misstates his recent professional activities; 2 It describes (at page 15) professional experience of Judy Codding in the 3 h. field of education as if that were the reason she was made a director and is 4 nominated for reelection, but fails to disclose her personal relationship with Mary 5 Cotter, the mother of EC and MC, and misstates her recent professional activities; 6 It describes (at pages 15-16) the role of MC with respect to the Company's 7 i. live theatre operations, and says that she "heads up the re-development process 8 with respect to these properties and our Cinemas 1, 2 & 3," but fails to disclose that 9 MC successfully has ended the search by the Company for an experienced real 10 estate executive to lead its real estate development efforts, in the United States, 11 including for the NYC Properties. Among the reasons MC did so was to create a 12 purported basis for seeking and securing employment with the Company; 13 It describes (at page 16) certain professional experience of Kane, including 14 j. experience from 1987 and 1988, but fails to disclose his historical and ongoing 15 quasi-familial relationship with EC and MC; 16 It describes (at page 16) certain professional experience of Wrotniak, as if 17 k. that were the reason he was made a director and is nominated for reelection, but 18 fails to disclose the close personal relationship he and his wife have with MC. 19 On or about May 18, 2016, the Company issued its Proxy Statement for the 2016 20 136. ASM scheduled for June 2, 2016. The Proxy Statement was materially misleading if not 21 inaccurate in a number of respects, including the following: 22 It implies (at page 7) that the Company is entitled to determine the identity 23 a. of the trustees under the so-called Cotter Trust, the right of those trustees to vote 24 under California law and/or that the books and records of the Company identify 25 each of EC, MC and Plaintiff as trustees of the so-called Cotter Trust (the "Trust"); 26 It describes (at page 8) the supposed CEO search in a manner that implies 27 b.

that EC timely resigned from the CEO search committee, that that committee relied

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on Korn Ferry and that Korn Ferry evaluated EC as a candidate for the CEO position;

c. It states (at page 9 and elsewhere) that the Company is a controlled company under NASDAQ listing rules;

d. It states (on pages 9-10) that Adams served on the compensation committee through May 14, 2016, but fails to disclose how it came to pass that he resigned;
e. It describes (on page 15) historical business experience of defendant Adams, as if that experience is the reason he is a director and is nominated for reelection, but fails to disclose his close personal ties to the late JJC, Sr. and to EC and MC, and fails to disclose Adams' financial dependence on companies and deals controlled by EC and MC and misstates his recent professional activities;

f. It describes (at page 15) professional experience of Codding in the field of education as if that were the reason she was made a director and is nominated for reelection, but fails to disclose her personal relationship with Mary Cotter, the mother of EC, and MC and her relationship with her employer would be coming to an end and the reasons for such termination;

g. It describes (at page 16) the role of MC with respect to the Company's live theatre operations, and says that she "heads up the re-development process with respect to these properties and our Cinemas 1, 2 & 3," but fails to disclose that MC successfully has ended the search by the Company for an experienced real estate executive to lead its real estate development efforts in the United States, including for the NYC Properties. Among the reasons MC did so was to create a purported basis for seeking and securing employment in such position with the Company;

h. It describes (at page 16) certain professional experience of Kane, including experience from 1987 and 1988, but fails to disclose his historical and ongoing quasi-familial relationship with EC and MC;

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i. It describes (at page 16) certain professional experience of Wrotniak, as if that were the reason he was made a director and is nominated for reelection, but fails to disclose the close personal relationship he and his wife have with MC.

# The CEO Search is Aborted, Manipulated or Both, and EC is Selected

137. At a Board meeting on or about June 30, 2015, EC was empowered to select an outside search firm to search for a new, permanent President and CEO for RDI. EC selected EC, MC, McEachern and Gould as members of a CEO search committee. EC functioned as the chairperson of the committee until she resigned, as described below.

9 138. On or about August 4, 2015, EC reported to the Board that she had selected Korn
10 Ferry to be the outside search firm. A stated and accepted rationale for selecting Korn Ferry was
11 that Korn Ferrry would perform a proprietary detailed assessment of the finalists for the position
12 of President and CEO of RDI. The full Board had been told that each of the three finalists would
13 be presented to the full Board to be interviewed.

14 139. Korn Ferry interviewed each of the four members of the CEO search committee
and Craig Tompkins, as well as other persons EC and/or MC had Korn Ferry interview and, based
on those interviews and further communications with some of those people, Korn Ferry created a
"position specification" document. The stated purpose of the document was to list qualifications
and characteristics that had been agreed to as those that would be used to select candidates and,
ultimately, a new President and CEO.

140. Finally, on or about November 13, 2015, an initial set of interviews of CEO
candidates was set to occur. Shortly before those interviews were to commence, EC allegedly
announced to the other members of the CEO search committee that she was a candidate for the
positions of President and CEO. At that point, she purportedly resigned from the committee.
Plaintiff is informed and believes that EC had considered being a candidate well before the initial
set of interviews, but chose to not disclose that.

141. At that point, McEachern, Gould and MC had no discussions about whether MC
should or could continue to serve on the committee, in view of the fact that her sister was a
candidate. Nor did the committee or any of them seek the advice of outside counsel with respect

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to that subject or any other issue related to EC declaring her candidacy after having directed Korn 2 Ferry for months.

After on or about August 4, 2015, neither EC nor the CEO search committee 142. provided any reports regarding the (supposed) CEO search to the full Board until mid-December 4 2015. That was so in spite of requests by Storey and Plaintiff for reports or updates. 5

McEachren, Gould and MC in November and December interviewed several CEO 143. candidates. They identified at least one and possibly two of them as finalists. They also interviewed EC. After interviewing EC, the three of them preliminarily agreed that she was their choice to be CEO. They also agreed that Korn Ferry would be instructed to cease further work.

McEachern, Gould and MC then conducted a conference call during year-end 10 144. holidays, confirmed their choice of EC and charged Tompkins with summarizing their reasons. 11 Tompkins did so. The stated reasons for selecting EC did not match or even approximate the 12 qualifications and characteristics that were summarized in the "position specification" document 13 14 prepared by Korn Ferry.

Korn Ferry did not perform its proprietary special assessment of EC or of any other 145. candidate.

On or about January 8, 2016, McEachern, Gould and MC presented EC to the full 17 146. Board of Directors as their selection to be the President and CEO of RDI. With little if any 18 deliberation, and with little if any information regarding the search and/or other candidates other 19 than a summary provided to them just days prior to meeting, each of the director defendants 20 agreed and voted to make EC President and CEO. 21

On or about January 11, 2016, the Company issued a Form 8-K attaching a press 147. release of that date. The press release included a statement by defendant Gould that said: "After conducting a thorough search process, it is clear that Ellen is best suited to lead Reading moving forward." That statement is materially misleading if not inaccurate, including because it implies erroneously that the selection of EC was the result of a (supposedly) "thorough search process." 26

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## The Director Defendants Commence Looting The Company

148. Following the 2015 ASM in November 2015, by which the individual defendants secured effectively unfettered control of the Company, and following the appointment of EC as President and CEO in January 2016, the individual defendants turned their attention to the subjects of employment, titles and compensation.

6 149. On or about March 10, 2016, MC was appointed EVP--RED – NYC on EC's
7 recommendation as President and CEO. In that position, MC became the senior executive at RDI
8 responsible for the development of its valuable NYC Properties. However, MC has no real estate
9 development experience. She is unqualified to hold that senior executive position.

10 150. As EVP--RED – NYC, MC was awarded a compensation package that includes a
base salary of \$350,000 and a short-term incentive target bonus of \$105,000 (30% of her base
salary), and was granted a long-term incentive of a stock option for 19,921 shares of Class A
common stock and 4,184 restricted stock units under the Company's 2010 Stock Incentive Plan.

14 151. Additionally, the Compensation Committee, comprised of Adams, Kane and
15 Codding, and the Audit and Conflicts Committee, comprised of Kane, McEachern and Wrotniak,
16 in or about March 2016 each unanimously approved so-called "additional consulting fee
17 compensation" of \$200,000 to MC. Each of the Individual Director Defendants (with EC and
18 MC abstaining) approved this \$200,000 payment to MC. In effect, MC was given a \$200,000 gift.

152. At the request of EC, the EC Committee requested the Compensation Committee to review executive compensation. The result was that EC as President and CEO received a new compensation package. If all bonuses available are paid to her, she will be paid over three times what Plaintiff was paid as President and CEO.

153. The Compensation Committee also recommended and the RDI Board of Directors
(meaning all of the individual director defendants) also approved so-called "additional special
compensation" of \$50,000 to Adams. This after-the-fact payment in effect was a gift.

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## The Non-Cotter Director Defendants Effectively Ignore a Third Party Cash Offer to Buy All of the Outstanding Stock of RDI at a Price in Excess of the Market Price

154. On or about May 31, 2016, EC as Chairman, President and CEO of RDI and each director received an unsolicited offer from a third party to purchase, for all cash, all of the outstanding shares of RDI stock, meaning all Class A nonvoting shares and all Class B voting shares (the "Offer"). This Offer was sent to EC and the other board members shortly after an RDI employee reporting to EC reported to the third party that the Company was not for sale after such third party indicated an interest in buying the Company. The proposed cash purchase price was \$17 per share. That price represented an approximate thirty-three percent (33%) premium over the prices at which RDI stock was then trading in the open market.

155. The Offer to purchase all of the outstanding shares of RDI stock expressly allowed for the possibility that, following due diligence, the Offer price might be increased from \$17 per share. The Offer indicated that a response to it was needed no later than June 14, 2016. The Offer also indicated that those making it did not intend to make it public at the time.

156. EC distributed the Offer to members of the RDI Board of Directors on or about May 31, 2016. The Board of Directors met with respect to the Offer on Thursday, June 2, 2016. The Board agreed to meet the following week to determine whether and how to respond to the Offer, after management distributed to Board members a business plan and materials relating to the value of the Company.

157. The RDI Board of Directors did not reconvene with respect to the Offer until June 23, 2016. No business plan and no materials relating to the value of the Company were provided to Board members in advance of or at the June 23, 2016 meeting. Nor were any other materials relevant to assessing the Offer provided. EC made an oral presentation concluding that RDI was worth a price dramatically in excess of the Offer price and recommended that RDI pursue its (supposed) long-term business plan. All of the individual director defendants agreed that an Offer of \$17 per share was inadequate. Plaintiff abstained in view of management's failure to provide information promised to be delivered before the meeting.

LEWIS ROCO ROTHGERBER CHRISTIE 158. Neither EC nor anyone acting at her direction or request has ever provided a strategic or long-term business plan for the Company to the RDI Board of Directors.

In connection with determining whether and, if so, how to respond to the Offer, 3 159. none of the non-Cotter director defendants indicated that they had and, on information and belief, 4 Plaintiff alleges that they had not, consulted with outside independent counsel, outside 5 independent financial advisers such as investment bankers, or anyone else on whom directors are 6 entitled to rely in determining in good faith whether and, if so, how, to respond to such an offer. 7 Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that each of the non-Cotter 8 160. directors, in determining whether and, if so, how to respond to the Offer, made their respective 9 decisions largely if not entirely on their understanding of what they understood EC and MC (as 10 supposedly controlling shareholders) wanted to do or not do in response to the Offer. 11

12 161. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that neither EC nor MC 13 consulted with outside independent counsel, outside independent financial advisers such as an 14 investment bank, or anyone else on whom directors are entitled to rely in determining in good 15 faith whether and, if so, how, to respond to such an Offer. Plaintiff is further informed and 16 believes and thereon alleges that neither EC nor MC in good faith even considered accepting the 17 Offer, pursuing discussions with the offerors or taking any other steps that would amount to 18 anything other than rejection of the Offer.

None of the individual director defendants made an informed, good-faith 19 162. determination of what was in the best interests of RDI and its stockholders in responding to the 20 Offer. None of the individual director defendants made a good faith determination of whether, 21 much less that, RDI with its present senior management, including EC as CEO and MC as EVP-22 RED-NYC, could, much less would, deliver value or achieve results that approximated, much less 23 resulted in, RDI trading at the price or value EC told the Board of Directors on June 23, 2016 that 24 management had ascribed to the Company. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges 25 that none of the individual director defendants took any actions to test or to verify any of the oral 26 presentation by EC regarding the supposed value of the Company. 27

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#### **RDI and RDI Shareholders are Injured**

When the individual defendants' complained of conduct became publicly known 2 163. and disseminated, the price at which RDI stock traded dropped, evidencing injury to RDI and 3 resulting in monetary damages to RDI and to RDI stockholders. One or more directors or officers 4 of RDI observed at or about the time that this had occurred. Those damages are estimated to be in 5 the millions of dollars. When subsequent complained of actions of the individual defendants, 6 including to stack the RDI Board, became publicly known, RDI stock prices dropped again. 7 When the Offer described above was (belatedly) disclosed by the Company on or about July 18, 8 2016, the price at which RDI stock traded increased, evidencing injury and damages resulting 9 from the individual director defendants' complained of conduct. 10

The individual defendants' complained of conduct has resulted in injury to and 11 164. impairment of RDI's reputation and goodwill. The consequences of such damage include 12 diminished ability to attract and retain qualified senior executives, increased costs if able to do so, 13 an impaired ability to effectuate transactions that may involve use of Company stock as 14 consideration, diminished willingness of institutional investors to buy and to hold RDI stock and 15 other impairment of and increased costs to conduct RDI's business. Increased costs include 16 payment of unnecessary and/or excessive consulting fees, payment of duplicative or redundant 17 compensation and payment of increased professional costs, including audit and legal fees. 18

165. The individual defendants' complained of conduct effectively has eliminated important rights of shareholders, including the right to be timely informed of material developments, the right to not be misled, the right to rely on timely and accurate SEC filings and the right to have elections for directors that are not manipulated and not rigged.

166. The individual defendants' complained of conduct constitutes waste and has caused
monetary damages to RDI, including what amounted to a gift of \$50,000 to EC, a \$200,000 gift to
MC and a \$50,000 gift to Adams. Likewise, the engagement and payment of Korn Ferry, which
was used to create a misimpression of a *bona fide* CEO search, but which was not used to identify
or evaluate EC, who was selected by MC, McEachern and Gould without input from Korn Ferry,
which they instructed to cease work, also amounts to waste of at least the monies paid to Korn

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In taking the actions complained of herein, the individual defendants have wasted if 2 167. not appropriated corporate opportunities and wasted corporate assets. In particular and without 3 limitation, they have failed to act in good faith and on an informed basis to determine how to 4 monetize the Company's valuable real estate assets, including the NYC Properties. Instead, they 5 have chosen to not take such steps but rather to hire MC to "keep the ball in the air," so that there 6 is a pretext to employ her in the position in which is now employed, which she is wholly 7 unqualified to fulfill. In doing so, they have caused the Company to spend and continue to spend 8 substantial sums of money, believed to be at least in the millions of dollars, to pay outside 9 consultants because the Interested Director Defendants effectively acquiesced to MC's insistence 10 that RDI not hire an executive experienced in real estate development, and because all of the 11 individual defendants instead approved hiring MC as EVP-RED-NYC. The extra monies paid to 12 outside consultant is believed to be in the millions of dollars. 13

14 168. The failure of the individual defendants to undertake to make an informed, good 15 faith determination of what was in the best interests of RDI and its stockholders in responding to 16 the Offer described above has resulted in injury to RDI and each of the stockholders. That injury 17 includes lost opportunity of each and every RDI stockholder to decide for himself, herself or itself 18 whether to sell his, her or its RDI stock at a price in excess of the price at which it trades in the 19 open market.

#### **Demand Is Excused**

Insofar as any or all of the claims made herein are derivative in nature, demand 21 169. upon the RDI board is excused because, among other things, as to each matter complained of 22 herein, a majority if not all members of RDI's Board of Directors except Plaintiff (and in certain 23 instances former director Storey) took and/or approved the complained of conduct. They therefore 24 are unable to exercise independent and disinterested business judgment in responding to a demand, 25 including because the actions giving rise to this action alleged herein were not undertaken honestly 26 and in good faith in the best interests of RDI, much less the product of a valid exercise of business 27 28 judgment.

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Each and all of the RDI board members named as defendants herein would be 170. materially affected, either to their benefit or detriment, by a decision of the RDI board with respect 2 to any demand, and would be so affected in a manner not shared by the Company or its 3 stockholders, including for the reasons alleged herein. 4

Additionally, as to each and all matters complained of herein, a majority if not all of 171. the director defendants is and would be unable to exercise independent and disinterested business judgment responding to a demand because, among other things, doing so would entail assessing 7 their own liability, including possibly to the Company. The same is true particularly with respect 8 to the non-Cotter directors, who lack independence and lack disinterestedness, including for the 9 reasons alleged herein, including but not limited to Adams' financial dependence on companies 10 controlled by EC and MC, Kane's quasi-familial relationship with EC and MC, McEachern's and 11 Gould's fiduciary breaches and Codding and Wrotniak's personal relationships with Cotter family 12 13 members.

Additionally, notwithstanding the foregoing allegations, each of Adams, Kane and 14 172. McEachern lack disinterestedness and independence because each has affirmatively chosen, 15 without any obligation to do so and in derogation of their fiduciary obligations as directors of RDI, 16 to pick sides in a family dispute involving trust and estate litigation between Plaintiff, on one hand, 17 and EC and MC, on the other hand, and to misuse their positions as directors in doing so. Like 18 MC and EC, in so acting, they did not act honestly and in good faith in the best interests of RDI. 19 Additionally, in voting to give EC and MC positions for which they are unqualified, and 20 corresponding compensation packages, and in failing to take steps to make an informed, good faith 21 decision regarding the Offer to purchase all RDI stock at a premium, and instead effectively 22 deferring to EC and/or MC, each of the director defendants, including Codding and Wrotniak, 23 acted in derogation of the fiduciary duties they owe to RDI and its other shareholders. 24

#### FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

## (For Breach of Fiduciary Duty – Against All Defendants)

Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 172, inclusive, of this complaint 173. and incorporates them herein by this reference as though set forth in full.

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	1	174.	Each of	the individual defendants at times relevant hereto was a director of RDI.		
	2	As such, each	owed fi	luciary duties to RDI and to Plaintiff and other RDI shareholders, including		
	3	fiduciary duties of care, candor, disclosure, good faith and loyalty to RDI.				
	4	175.	The du	ty of care owed by each of these defendants entails, among other things, an		
	5	obligation to e	exercise	the requisite degree of care in the process of decision making as a director		
	6	and to act on an informed basis.				
	7	176.	The du	ty of care further requires, among other things, that these directors do not act		
	8	with undue haste, a lack of board preparation or a failure of deliberation with respect to the merits				
	9	of any and every supposed business decision.				
	10	177.	By the	conduct described herein, each of the individual defendants (insofar as he or		
	11	she was a director at the time) breached their respective duties of care and good faith. Each did so				
ite 600	12	as alleged her	ein, incl	uding by, among other things, the following:		
wy, Su 96	13		a.	They failed to engage in any process to assess the skills and performance of Plaintiff as President or as CEO in connection with the decision to threaten		
ghes Pk 169-599	14			to terminate and to terminate him, and instead pre-empted an ongoing		
rd Hug VV 891	15			process;		
3993 Howard Hughes Pkwy, Suite 600 Las Vegas, NV 89169-5996	16 17		b.	They abdicated, or caused other directors to abdicate, their fiduciary responsibilities as directors by creating and acting through the EC Committee;		
Lewis Roca Rothgerber christie	18 19		с.	They failed to take steps to cause, much less assure, that persons added to the RDI Board possessed any qualifications other than personal relationships with one or more members of the Cotter family;		
	20 21		d.	They failed to take actions to cause, much less assure, a <i>bona fide</i> , fair and un-manipulated search for a new President and CEO to occur;		
<b>O</b> E	22		e.	They failed to take and/or delayed taking action, after having been informed		
	23	f.		of the financial dependence of Adams on Cotter family businesses for income, to eliminate or even circumscribe Adam's authority as a director or		
	24			as a member of the Compensation Committee responsible for determining compensation to EC and MC;		
	25		f	They failed to take actions to enable themselves to make an informed, good		
	26		<b>J.</b>	faith decision regarding whether to respond to the Offer, and if so, how, and		
	27			instead did what they thought EC, MC or both wished.		
	28	178.	Asac	irect and proximate result of the acts and omissions of said defendants as		
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described herein, Plaintiff and the Company and its other shareholders have suffered injury and 2 continue to suffer injury as alleged herein.

Plaintiff cannot ascertain at this time the full nature, extent or amount of damages, 179. which are in excess of \$50,000, suffered by virtue of the complained of conduct of said defendants. Plaintiff will amend this complaint and set forth said damages when they are ascertained, 6 according to proof at trial.

#### SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

#### (Breach of Fiduciary Duty – Against All Defendants)

Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 172, inclusive, of this complaint 180. and incorporates them herein by this reference as though set forth in full.

Each of the individual defendants at times relevant hereto were directors of RDI. 181. As such, each owed fiduciary duties, including fiduciary duties of care, candor, disclosure, good faith and loyalty, to the Company, to Plaintiff and to other RDI shareholders.

The duty of loyalty includes the obligation to not use their positions of control of 182. the Company, including in particular as directors, to further their own personal or financial interests or the personal or financial interests of another of them to the detriment of the interests of the Company and its shareholders.

By the conduct described herein, each of these defendants have undertaken to 183. further their own interests or the interests of another of them, to the direct, immediate and ongoing detriment of the Company, Plaintiff and each of its other shareholders. That conduct includes, but is not limited to, the following:

- Threatening to terminate Plaintiff as President and CEO if he did not strike a. a resolution of trust and estate disputes with EC and MC on terms satisfactory to the two of them;
- Terminating Plaintiff as President and CEO of RDI after he did not strike a b. resolution of trust and estate disputes with EC and MC on terms satisfactory to the two of them;
- Repopulating and activating an executive committee where none was c. needed and where the effect, if not the purpose and effect, was to prevent

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Plaintiff, Storey and Gould from fully participating as members of the RDI Board of Directors;

- d. Allowing EC to direct the (supposed) search for a permanent President and CEO, allowing MC to participate, including in particular following the disclosure by EC that she was a candidate, and by effectively firing Korn Ferry in order to assure the selection of EC and selecting EC;
- e. Awarding EC and MC positions they were not qualified to hold, and by gifting monies to EC, MC and Adams; and
  - As to all individual defendants other than EC and MC, choosing not to take any actions such as employing independent counsel or financial advisors to advise them regarding whether and, if so, how to respond to the Offer, but instead relying on untimely, incomplete and/or inadequate information provided by a conflicted EC and by effectively deferring to EC, MC or both of them;
- g. As to all individual defendants other than EC and MC, abdicating their fiduciary responsibilities to the Company and shareholders other than EC and MC; and
- h. As to EC and MC, misusing their position as purportedly controlling shareholders to usurp or attempt to usurp the authority of the RDI Board of Directors.

184. By reason of the foregoing, each of the individual defendants has breached their fiduciary obligations, and in particular their fiduciary duties of good faith and loyalty, to the Company and to Plaintiff and all other shareholders of the Company.

185. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and omissions of said defendants as described herein, Plaintiff and the Company and its other shareholders have suffered injury and continue to suffer injury as alleged herein.

186. Plaintiff cannot ascertain at this time the full nature, extent or amount of damages, which are in excess of \$50,000, suffered by virtue of the complained of conduct of said defendants.

24 Plaintiff will amend this complaint and set forth said damages when they are ascertained,

25 according to proof at trial.

#### THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

### (Breach of Fiduciary Duty-Against All Defendants)

187. Plaintiff repeats realleges paragraph 1 through 172, inclusive, of this complaint and

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incorporates them here in by this reference as though set forth in full.

Each of the defendants at times relevant hereto was a director of RDI. As such, 2 188. each owed fiduciary duties to RDI and to its shareholders, including Plaintiff, including the duties of care, candor, disclosure, good faith and loyalty.

The duties of candor and disclosure require that the Individual Director Defendants 5 189. each cause the Company to make timely, accurate and complete disclosures of information to its 6 7 shareholders.

By the conduct described herein, including in particular but not limited to causing 8 190. or allowing RDI to disseminate untimely and materially misleading if not inaccurate information, 9 in SEC filings and/or by press releases, each of the individual defendants has breached his or her 10 11 duties of candor and disclosure.

As a direct and proximate result thereof, the Company and its shareholders have 191. suffered injury and continue to suffer injury is alleged herein.

Plaintiff cannot ascertain at this time the full nature, extent amount of damages 14 192. suffered by virtue of the complained of conduct of said defendants. 15

#### FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

## (Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty - Against MC and EC)

Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 192, inclusive, of this 193. complaint and incorporates them herein by this reference as though set forth in full.

Insofar as any or all of Defendants contend that the decision to terminate Plaintiff 194. as CEO and President was made based upon a vote of the non-Cotter directors, and independent of the fact that such vote was legally ineffectual, the fiduciary breaches alleged above were solicited and aided and abetted by MC and EC.

As alleged more fully herein, EC and MC had solicited and assisted the actionable 24 195. conduct of defendants Kane, Adams and McEachern, including in particular but not limited to the 25 threat by the three of them to terminate JJC as President and CEO of RDI if, in the few hours 26 between the adjournment of the supposed RDI board meeting on Friday, May 29, 2015 the 27 resumption of that supposed meeting at or about 6:00 p.m. that evening, JJC did not reach a global 28

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settlement agreement with EC and MC, meaning agree to their take-it or leave-it agreement or any
 other such agreement they would demand he accept.

196. EC and MC further solicited and aided and abetted the decisions and actions of defendants Adams, Kane and McEachern to terminate JJC as President and CEO of RDI.

5 197. EC and MC further prompted and aided and abetted the fiduciary breaches of other
6 directors as alleged herein, including but not limited to matters as to which EC, MC or both
7 abstained or otherwise did not vote, including votes regarding their employment at RDI.

8 198. Each of EC and MC have acted with knowledge of the fiduciary obligations of the
9 five outside directors. Each of EC and MC have acted with knowledge of the manner in which
10 those fiduciary obligations were breached, and aided and abetted and continue to aide and abet
11 said breaches. Accordingly, each of EC and MC are liable for aiding and abetting those fiduciary
12 breaches.

13 199. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and omissions of said defendants as
14 described herein, Plaintiff and the Company and its other shareholders have suffered injury and
15 continue to suffer injury as alleged herein.

200. Plaintiff cannot ascertain at this time the full nature, extent or amount of damages, which are in excess of \$50,000, suffered by virtue of the complaint of conduct of said defendants. Plaintiff will amend this complaint and set forth said damages when they are ascertained, according to proof at trial.

#### **Irreparable Harm**

As a result of the ongoing acts of Defendants, the Company, Plaintiff and other RDI 21 201. shareholders have suffered and will continue to suffer immediate and ongoing irreparable injury 22 for which no adequate remedy at law exists, including as alleged herein. Accordingly, Plaintiff is 23 entitled to relief restraining Defendants, and each of them, from continuing their course of conduct 24 and undertaking further actions in derogation of their fiduciary obligations, and to an order and 25 judgment finding that the actions undertaken to date, including to threaten JJC with termination 26 and thereafter terminate JJC as President and CEO of RDI, as well as their actions undertaken in 27 furtherance of the self-dealing and entrenchment scheme alleged herein, are legally ineffectual and 28

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of no force and effect, will be enjoined, or both. 1

In particular, unless such injunctive relief is granted, Plaintiff, the Company and 2 202. other shareholders will suffer irreparable harm for which no adequate remedy at law exists. 3

#### PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants and each of them, jointly and severally, as follows:

For relief restraining and enjoining Defendants from taking further action to 7 1. effectuate or implement the (legally ineffectual) termination of Plaintiff as President and CEO of 8 9 RDI;

For a determination that the purported termination of Plaintiff as President and 10 2. CEO of RDI was legally ineffectual and is of no force and effect;

> For entry of an order that: 3.

> > Finds that that EC, MC, and one or more of Kane, Adams and/or a. McEachern lacked the requisite disinterestedness and/or lacked independence and/or failed to act with the requisite disinterestedness and/or independence in voting (and purporting to act as) directors of RDI to remove Plaintiff as President and CEO of RDI, finds that actions to remove Plaintiff as President and CEO were void or voidable and declares such action voided and legally ineffectual, such that Plaintiff is restored to and EC is removed from the positions of President and CEO of RDI (unless and until such time as he resigns or is removed by way of proper and legally enforceable procedure);

Enjoins the individual defendants and each of them, and their agents, from b. any and all actions to circumvent, impair the function of or render ineffective RDI's full Board of Directors, including in particular but not limited to any and all actions to (i) delay the delivery of draft minutes of RDI Board of Directors meetings and/or cause minutes to be edited or revised to suit the litigation purposes of any or all of EC, MC, Kane, Adams and McEachern, (ii) cause the failure or untimely delivery of agendas and materials to be used at RDI Board of Directors meetings, (iii) cause

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minutes of RDI Board of Directors meeting to be inaccurate, misleading or incomplete, (iv) cause the EC Committee or any other committee of the Board of Directors (other than its audit and compensation committees in the ordinary course of business) to take any actions, to make any decisions or to otherwise act or fail to act in place or in lieu of the full Board of Directors with respect to any and all decisions of the type or nature that can be made by RDI's Board of Directors (rather than by its senior executives), and (v) put any member of RDI's Board of Directors in a position of making any decision on an informed basis, in good faith and with the best interests of all RDI shareholders in mind;

c. Directs RDI and the individual defendants to make such corrective disclosures as are determined by the Court to be appropriate, with such disclosures required to be made in advance of RDI's 2017 ASM or, alternatively, orders that the 2017 ASM to be postponed pending such corrective disclosures;

d. Enjoins the individual defendants and each of them, and their agents, from manipulating the 2017 ASM, including by entering an order sterilizing or voiding any vote they cast at or in connection with the 2017 ASM of the 100,000 shares of Class B voting stock that were the subject of an option purportedly exercised in or about September 2015 and any shares of Class B voting stock held in the name of the Trust on the Company's stock register; and

e. Requires that nominees for RDI's Board of Directors have *bona fide* qualifications to serve on the board of a public company engaged in RDI's two principal business segments, cinemas and real estate development.

4. For judgment against each of the Defendants for breach of their respective fiduciary obligations;

5. For actual and compensatory damages incurred by RDI and/or by Plaintiff and against each of Defendants in an amount according to proof at trial;

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
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For costs of suit herein; and

1	7. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper					
2		DATED this 2nd day of September, 2016.				
3		LEWIS RC	CA ROTHGERBER CHRISTIE LLP			
4						
5		<u>/s/ Ma</u> Mark G. K	<u>/s/ Mark G. Krum</u> Mark G. Krum (Nevada Bar No. 10913)			
6		Mark G. Krum (Nevada Bar No. 10913) 3993 Howard Hughes Pkwy, Suite 600 Las Vegas, NV 89169-5958				
7						
8		Attorneys 1 James J. C	for Plaintiff <i>Cotter, Jr</i> .			
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1	VERIFICATION OF JAMES J. COTTER, JR. OF							
2	SECOND AMENDED VERIFIED COMPLAINT							
3	I, James J. Cotter Jr., declare as follows:							
4	1. I am over the age of eighteen (18) years and competent to testify to the matters set							
5	forth herein. Pursuant to all applicable laws, I swear as follows:							
6	2. As a shareholder of Reading International, Inc. ("RDI"), I am plaintiff in the above-							
7	captioned action.							
8	3. As stated in the Second Amended Verified Complaint (the "First Amended							
9	Complaint"), I am and at all times relevant to this action have been a shareholder of nominal							
10	defendant RDI.							
11	4. I have read the Second Amended Complaint and am familiar with the contents							
12	thereof. The factual allegations therein are true based upon my personal knowledge, except for							
13	those matters set forth upon information and belief, which I believe to be true, as well.							
14	I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.							
15								
16	DATED this $31$ day of $A - 9 - 1 + 2016$							
17								
18	JAMES J. COTTER, JR.							
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#### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

#### MORRIS LAW GROUP

Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543 Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102 411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Telephone: (702) 474-9400 Facsimile: (702) 474-9422 Email: sm@morrislawgroup.com Email: al@morrislawgroup.com Electronically Filed Mar 05 2018 08:08 a.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913 Noemi Ann Kawamoto (*admitted pro hac vice*) Yurko, Salvesen & Remz, P.C. 1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor Boston, MA 02108 Telephone: (617) 723-6900 Facsimile: (617) 723-6905 Email: mkrum@bizlit.com Attorneys for Plaintiff, James J. Cotter, Jr.

#### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

JAMES J. COTTER, JR., derivatively on ) behalf of Reading International, Inc., ) Plaintiff, )	Supreme Court Case No. 75053
v. ) MARGARET COTTER, ELLEN COTTER, ) GUY ADAMS, EDWARD KANE, ) DOUGLAS McEACHERN, WILLIAM ) GOULD, JUDY CODDING, MICHAEL )	Case No. A-15-719860-B Coordinated with: Case No. P-14-0824-42-E
WROTNIAK, Defendants.	DOCKETING STATEMENT CIVIL APPEALS
And )	
READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a ) Nevada corporation, )	
Nominal Defendant.	

1.	Judicial D	istrict <u>Eighth</u>	Department <u>XI</u>			
	County	lark	Judge Elizabeth Gonzalez			
	District Court Case No. <u>A-15-719860-B Coordinated with:</u> P-14-0824-42-E					
2.	Attorney filing this docketing statement:					
	Attorney _	Akke Levin (9102)	Telephone <u>702-474-9400</u>			
	Firm	MORRIS LAW GROUP				
	Address	e 360				

Client(s) James C. Cotter, Jr.

If this is a joint statement by multiple appellants, add the names and addresses of other counsel and the names of their clients on an additional sheet accompanied by a certification that they concur in the filing of this statement.

### 3. Attorneys representing respondents:

Attorney: Stan Johnson

Firm: Cohen-Johnson, LLC

Address: 255 East Warm Springs Road, Ste. 110, Las Vegas, Nevada 89119

**Clients:** Respondents Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak.

Attorneys: Christopher Tayback and Marshall Searcy

Firm: Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP

Address: 865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor, Los Angeles, CA

**Clients:** Respondents Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak.

Attorneys: Donald A. Lattin and Carolyn K. Renner

Firm: Maupin, Cox & LeGoy

Address: 4785 Caughlin Parkway Reno, Nevada 89519

Client: Respondent William Gould.

Attorneys: Ekwan E. Rhow and Shoshana E. Bannett

**Firm**: Bird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert, Nessim, Drooks, Lincenberg & Rhow, P.C.

Address: 1875 Century Park East, 23rd Fl. Los Angeles, CA 90067-25614.

Client: Respondent William Gould.

## 4. Nature of disposition below (check all that apply):

- Judgment after bench trial
- Judgment after jury verdict

Summary Judgment

Default Judgment

Grant/Denial of NRCP 60(b) relief

Grant/Denial of injunction

Grant/Denial of declaratory relief

Review of agency determination

Dismissal

Lack of Jurisdiction

Failure to state a claim

Failure to prosecute

- Other (specify)
- Divorce Decree:
- Original 🗌 Modification

Other disposition (specify)\_\_\_\_

## 5. Does this appeal raise issues concerning any of the following?

Child custody

Venue

Termination of parental rights

No.

- 6. **Pending and prior proceedings in this court.** List the case name and docket number of all appeals or original proceedings presently or previously pending before this court which are related to this appeal:
  - (1) *James J. Cotter, Jr. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct.*, Petition for Writ of Prohibition or, in the Alternative, Mandamus, Case No. 71267;
  - (2) Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, Guy Adams, Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., Petition for Writ of Prohibition or, in the Alternative, Mandamus, Case No. 72261; and
  - (3) *James J. Cotter, Jr. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct.,* Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Case No. 74759.
- 7. Pending and prior proceedings in other courts. List the case name, number and court of all pending and prior proceedings in other courts which are related to this appeal (e.g., bankruptcy, consolidated or bifurcated proceedings) and their dates of disposition:
  - James J. Cotter Jr. v. Reading International Inc., Case No. A-16-735305-B, Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada, Dept. 11 (coordinated for certain matters with Case No. A-15-719860-B). Date of disposition: October 4, 2016 (order on motion and countermotion for summary judgment)
  - (2) In the Matter of the Estate of James J. Cotter, Sr., Case No. P-14-0824-42-E, Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada, Dept. No. XXVI (coordinated for certain matters with Case No. A-15-719860-B in Dept. 11). Date of disposition: N/A.
- 8. Nature of the action. Briefly describe the nature of the action and the result below:

This is a shareholder derivative case against eight directors (two of whom also are officers and controlling shareholders) for breaches of fiduciary duty (duty of care, duty of loyalty and duty of candor) owed to nominal defendant Reading International, Inc. ("RDI"), a publicly-traded Nevada corporation, and to RDI's shareholders. Plaintiff was and is a substantial shareholder and director and former President and CEO of RDI. Defendants are members of the RDI board of directors. All individual defendants other than defendant William Gould filed motions for partial summary judgment on specific *issues* (not claims). Defendant William Gould filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims against him that was scheduled for hearing on January 8, 2018. At the December 11, 2017 hearing on these motions, however, the district court granted summary judgment against Plaintiff and in favor of five of the eight individual defendants—Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, Judy Codding, Michael Wrotniak, and William Gould—on *all claims* against them under Nevada's business judgment rule on the grounds that there are no genuine issues of material fact related to their interestedness and/or independence. The court denied such relief as to the three other individual defendants—Ellen Cotter, Margaret Cotter and Guy Adams.

Plaintiff appeals from the portion of the December 28, 2017 order granting summary judgment in favor of the five dismissed defendants. The district court certified this dismissal as final under Nev. R. Civ. P. 54(b) by order dated January 4, 2018.

9. **Issues on appeal.** State concisely the principal issue(s) in this appeal (attach separate sheets as necessary):

1. Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of four defendants on all Plaintiff's claims when the full merits of these claims were not challenged in the partial motions for summary judgment.

2. Whether the District Court erred in *sua sponte* granting summary judgment as to five defendants on all claims without giving Plaintiff ten days notice and an opportunity to be heard.

3. Whether a derivative plaintiff may rebut the presumptions of NRS 78.138(3) only by showing that the directors in question lacked disinterestedness and/or independence, such that the statutory presumptions did not apply in the first instance; or, may a shareholder plaintiff rebut the presumptions of NRS 78.138 by showing that the director defendants breached their fiduciary duties?

4. Whether, in assessing director disinterestedness and independence, as well as claimed breaches of fiduciary duty, the court is to consider all of the evidence, or only evidence relating to a particular matter.

**10. Pending proceedings in this court raising the same or similar issues.** If you are aware of any proceedings presently pending before this court which raises the same or similar issues raised in this appeal, list the case name and docket number and identify the same or similar issue raised: Appellant James Cotter is not aware of any pending proceedings raising the same or similar issues.

**11**. **Constitutional issues.** If this appeal challenges the constitutionality of a statute, and the state, any state agency, or any officer or employee thereof is not a party to this appeal, have you notified the clerk of this court and the attorney general in accordance with NRAP 44 and NRS 30.130?



If no, explain:

12. Other Issues. Does this appeal involve any of the following issues?

Reversal of well-settled Nevada precedent (identify the case(s))

- An issue arising under the United States and/or Nevada Constitutions.
- A substantial issue of first impression
- $\square$  An issue of public policy
- An issue where en banc consideration is necessary to maintain uniformity of this court's decisions
- a ballot question
- 13. Assignment to the Court of Appeals or retention in the Supreme Court. Briefly set forth whether the matter is presumptively retained by the Supreme Court or assigned to the Court of Appeals under NRAP 17, and cite the subparagraph(s) of the Rule under which the matter falls. If appellant believes that the Supreme Court should retain the case despite its presumptive assignment to the Court of Appeals, identify the specific issue(s) or circumstance(s) that warrant retaining the case, and include an explanation of their importance or significance:

The Nevada Supreme Court should retain this writ proceeding under NRAP 17(11), because this writ raises an issue of statewide importance to resolve whether the only means by which the presumptions of NRS 78.138(3) can be rebutted is to show that the

directors in question lacked independence or disinterestedness, such that the statutory presumptions did not apply in the first instance. The issue is of statewide importance because the Legislature recently amended NRS 78.138(7) to include, among other changes, a new subsection (a) that says a director or officer cannot be liable to the corporation "unless... [t]he trier of fact determines that the presumption [that the director or officer acted in good faith, on an informed basis and with a view to the interests of the corporation established by subsection 3 has been rebutted." S.B. 203, 2017 Leg., 79th Sess. § 4 (2017). If, as the District Court found, independence and disinterestedness are the only criteria—not only to assess whether the business judgment rule applies in the first place but also to assess whether the plaintiff provided evidence to rebut the rule's presumptions—a plaintiff would never be able to show that disinterested and independent directors' acts or omissions were a breach of their fiduciary duties.

**14. Trial**. If this action proceeded to trial, how many days did the trial last? N/A.

Was it a bench or jury trial? N/A

**15.** Judicial Disqualification. Do you intend to file a motion to disqualify or have a justice recuse him/her from participation in this appeal? If so, which Justice?

No.

### TIMELINESS OF NOTICE OF APPEAL

#### 16. Date of entry of written judgment or order appealed from

- (1) December 28, 2017.
- (2) January 4, 2018 is the date of the district court's order certifying as final the portion the December 28, 2017 order that is the subject of this appeal.

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If no written judgment or order was filed in the district court, explain the basis for seeking appellate review: N/A.

## 17. Date written notice of entry of judgment or order was served

- (1) December 29, 2017
- (2) January 4, 2018 is the date of the notice of entry of the district court's order certifying as final the portion the December 28, 2017 order that is the subject of this appeal.

Was service by: Delivery Mail/electronic/fax

## 18. If the time for filing the notice of appeal was tolled by a postjudgment motion (NRCP 50(b), 52(b), or 59)

(a) Specify the type of motion, the date and method of service of the motion, and the date of filing: Motion for Reconsideration



Date of filing \_\_\_\_\_ Date of filing \_\_\_\_\_ Date of filing: December 19, 2017.

NOTE: Motions made pursuant to NRCP 60 or motions for rehearing or reconsideration may toll the time for filing a notice of appeal *See AA Primo Builders v. Washington*, 126 Nev. \_\_\_, 245 P.3d 1190 (2010)

(b) Date of entry of written order resolving tolling motion: January 4, 2018.

(c) Date written notice of entry of order resolving tolling motion was served: January 4, 2018.

Was service by: Delivery Mail/electronic/fax

### **19.** Date notice of appeal filed

If more than one party has appealed from the judgment or order, list the date each notice of appeal was filed and identify by name of the party filing the notice of appeal: On February 1, 2018, Appellant James Cotter Jr. filed a notice of appeal.

On February 14, 2018, Respondents Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak filed a notice of cross-appeal.

On February 15, 2018, Respondent William Gould filed a notice of cross-appeal.

**20.** Specify statute or rule governing the time limit for filing the notice of appeal, e.g., NRAP 4(a) or other: NRAP 4(a).

## SUBSTANTIVE APPEALABILITY

- 21. Specify the statute or other authority granting this court jurisdiction to review the judgment or order appealed from:

(b) Explain how each authority provides a basis for appeal from the judgment or order:

Under NRAP 3(b)(1), an appeal may be taken from a "final judgment entered in an action . . . commenced in the court in which the judgment is rendered." James Cotter Jr. commenced this case in the Eighth Judicial District Court. On January 4, 2018, the district court certified as final under NRCP 54(b) that portion of its December 28, 2017 order that dismissed five of the eight defendants from the case. James Cotter Jr. appeals from that final disposition.

## 22. List all parties involved in the action or consolidated actions in the district court:

(a) Parties: James Cotter Jr., Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, Judy Codding, Michael Wrotniak, William Gould, Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, Reading International Inc. (b) If all parties in the district court are not parties to this appeal, explain in detail why those parties are not involved in this appeal, *e.g.*, formally dismissed, not served, or other:

Reading International Inc. is a nominal defendant. Plaintiff James Cotter Jr.'s claims are made on its behalf, not against it.

# 23. Give a brief description (3 to 5 words) of each party's separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, or third-party claims and the date of formal disposition of each claim.

Plaintiffs' Claims for Relief:

- (1) Breach of Fiduciary Duty-Care
- (2) Breach of Fiduciary Duty-Loyalty
- (3) Breach of Fiduciary Duty-Candor
- (4) Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty
- 24. Did the judgment or order appealed from adjudicate ALL the claims alleged below and the rights and liabilities of ALL the parties to the action or consolidated actions below:

□ Yes ⊠ No

## 25. If you answered "No" to question 23, complete the following:

(a) Specify the claims remaining pending below: all four claims—*i.e.*, breach of fiduciary duty-care, -loyalty, and -candor, and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty—against the remaining three defendants (Ellen Cotter, Margaret Cotter, and Guy Adams).

(b) Specify the parties remaining below: Plaintiff James Cotter Jr., and Defendants Ellen Cotter, Margaret Cotter, and Guy Adams.

(c) Did the district court certify the judgment or order appealed from as a final judgment pursuant to NRCP 54(b)?



(d) Did the district court make an express determination, pursuant to NRCP 54(b), that there is no just reason for delay and an express direction for the entry of judgment?



## 26. If you answered "No" to any part of question 24, explain the basis for seeking appellate review (*e.g.* order is independently appealable under NRAP 3A(b)): N/A.

## 27. Attach file-stamped copies of the following documents:

- The latest-filed complaint, counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party claims.
- Any tolling motion(s) and order(s) resolving tolling motion(s)
- Orders of NRCP 41(a) dismissals formally resolving each claim, counterclaims, cross-claims and/or third-party claims asserted in the action or consolidated action below, even if not at issue on appeal.
- Any other order challenged on appeal
- Notices of entry for each attached order

## VERIFICATION

I declare under penalty of perjury that I have read this docketing statement, that the information provided in this docketing statement is true and complete to the best of my knowledge, information and belief, and that I have attached all required documents to this docketing statement.

JAMES J. COTTER, JR., derivatively on behalf of Reading International, Inc.

Name of Appellant

March 2, 2018

Date

<u>Clark County, Nevada</u> State and county where signed <u>Akke Levin</u> Name of counsel of record

Falch

Signature of counsel of record

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I certify that on the 2<sup>nd</sup> day of March, 2018, I served a copy of this completed docketing statement upon all counsel of record:

By personally serving it upon him/her; or

By mailing it by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address(es) and/or through the court's efiling service:

Stan Johnson Cohen-Johnson, LLC 255 East Warm Springs Road, Ste. 110 Las Vegas, NV 89119

Christopher Tayback Marshall Searcy Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP 865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017

Attorneys for Defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak

Mark Ferrario Kara Hendricks Tami Cowden Greenberg Traurig, LLP 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway Suite 400 North Las Vegas, NV 89169

Attorneys for Nominal Defendant Reading International, Inc.

Donald A. Lattin Carolyn K. Renner Maupin, Cox & LeGoy 4785 Caughlin Parkway Reno, NV 89519

Ekwan E. Rhow Shoshana E. Bannett Bird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert, Nessim, Drooks, Lincenberg & Rhow, P.C. 1875 Century Park East, 23rd Fl. Los Angeles, CA 90067-2561

Attorneys for Defendant William Gould

DATED this 2nd day of March, 2018.

An employee of Morris Law Group