IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

JAMES J. COTTER, JR., derivatively on behalf of Reading International, Inc.,

Appellant,

v.

MARGARET COTTER, ELLEN COTTER, GUY ADAMS, EDWARD KANE, DOUGLAS McEACHERN, WILLIAM GOULD, JUDY CODDING, MICHAEL WROTNIAK,

Respondents,

and

READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada Corporation,

Nominal Defendant.

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JOINT APPENDIX IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

VOLUME XXVI (JA6149-6328)

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the 22nd day of January 2019, I served a copy of **JOINT APPENDIX IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF VOLUME XXVI (JA6149-6328)** upon all counsel of record:

☑ By mailing it by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid
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Defendant Reading
International, Inc.

By: /s/ Patricia A. Quinn
An employee of Morris Law Group

THE COURT: Thank you. 1 Ms. Levin, is this your motion? 2 MS. LEVIN: Yes, Your Honor. 3 As we said in our opposition, we believe this is an 4 improper and premature motion just because Mr. Cotter 5 obviously will be here at trial testifying. 6 THE COURT: So you want me to rule on the questions 7 and answers as they're given. So if somebody asks him, well, 8 did you talk to Mr. Adams about what he was going to do, he 9 can then tell me what he said. 10 MS. LEVIN: Correct, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Well, what did you think he meant? 12 That's speculation. 13 Unless, of course, he's got a basis for 14 MS. LEVIN: his belief. And I think that some of the deposition 15 testimony, those responses were invited by the very questions. 16 So to the extent that he has a basis to believe -- you know, 17 to state his belief I think that, again, it should be 18 determined on the question by question. 19 Okay. So the motion is denied. 20 THE COURT: premature. It's an issue that has to be handled at trial 21 based upon the foundation that is laid related to the issue. 22 So -- and plus you won't be here. You won't be 23

MR. RHOW: I'm sorry?

here; right?

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THE COURT: You won't be here; right? 1 I hope not. Is Your Honor I don't know. 2 MR. RHOW: saying I should not be here or that my client won't be here then? 4 That's what the business judgment ruling THE COURT: 5 deals with; right? So I granted your client's business judgment rule motion. Well, you know, he may be a witness. I'm sorry, Your Honor. Did I miss 8 MR. KRUM: 9 something? 10 THE COURT: What? We haven't had that motion argued yet, MR. KRUM: 11 12 Mr. Gould's motion. THE COURT: I included Mr. Gould because you briefed 13 it relate to all of the motions for summary judgment and I 14 asked you questions about all the directors, except Mr. Adams. 15 I'm sorry. I didn't understand that, MR. KRUM: 16 Your Honor. I didn't answer as to Mr. Gould. 17 THE COURT: Do you want to tell me an answer to Mr. 18 Gould? 19 I do, because we have a hearing set for MR. KRUM: 20 the 8th on his motion, which is why misunderstood that. 21 THE COURT: I used it because it was included in 22 your opposition, the supplement to those motions. 23 That was confusion that we created, and I MR. KRUM: 24 apologize. The reason we did that, Your Honor, is that we 25

didn't have an opportunity to prepare a Gould brief, but we didn't want to be accused of doing nothing. And some of the evidence in those motions in our view did relate to Gould, and we therefore put him on there.

That said, he filed two pieces of paper, they asked me if we could have the hearing today. I told them no, I wanted to respond. So -- but let me try to answer your question with respect to Mr. Gould. So we start, Your Honor, as we do, with the threat to terminate and the termination. And I respectfully submit --

THE COURT: I will tell you that on your Mr. Gould you've got the same list that we've already talked about. What I'm trying to find out is — and I understand the threat is part of what you've alleged related to Mr. Gould along with the other six or seven bullet points that are on pages 5 and 6 of the opposition. Is there something else related to Mr. Gould, something like you have with Mr. Adams that would establish a lack of disinterestedness?

MR. KRUM: Let me answer, and then you'll decide.

THE COURT: Yeah. That's what I'm trying to pull out of you.

MR. KRUM: So, for example, with respect to the termination Mr. Cotter raised the question of Mr. Adams's independence before a vote was taken, and Mr. Gould asked Mr. Adams, well, can you tell us about that. And Mr. Adams got

mad and said in words or substance, no. And Mr. Gould said, okay. That, Your Honor, is a perfect example of a failure to act in the face of a known duty to act. We're not talking about someone who is unfamiliar with fiduciary obligations here. Mr. Gould is a corporate lawyer.

So we get to the -- we get to the executive committee, same meeting, June 12. Ellen Cotter says, I want to repopulate the executive committee, Mr. Gould, would you like to be on it. His testimony, his deposition testimony was that he declined because he knew that it would take a lot of time. Now, if he knew that it would take a lot of time, Your Honor, how is it that it didn't occur to him that this was what the sisters were doing in October of 2014 when they were trying to circumvent the board?

THE COURT: These are all on your list of bullet points.

MR. KRUM: Okay.

THE COURT: What I'm trying to find out is if there's anything that's not on the list of bullet points that are on pages 5 and 6 of your supplemental opposition that relate to Mr. Gould. Because when I made my ruling I was including Mr. Gould as someone because I specifically excluded Mr. Adams and the two Ms. Cotters.

MR. KRUM: Bear with me. I'm mentally working.

THE COURT: I'm watching you. I'm watching him

work.

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MR. KRUM: So I don't think we had the executive committee there, but I just said that.

So then, Your Honor, the composition of the board. So Mr. Gould was not a member of the nominating committee. His testimony was that, on a Friday Ellen Cotter called me and asked me if she could come to my office and she and Craig Tompkins came to my office and showed me Judy Codding's resume and said we were going to have a board meeting on Monday to put Ms. Codding on the board. And Bill Gould said, this isn't sufficient time, I can't do my job. But he voted for her That, Your Honor, is the same thing that happens nonetheless. over and over and over again with Mr. Gould. That is, in the face of a known duty to act he chooses not to do so. intentional misconduct. Your Honor, you've denied the motion with respect to the CEO search. That is Mr. Gould. It is Mr. Gould and Mr. McEachern who are the ones who together with Margaret Cotter aborted the CEO search. Literally the last time they spoke to Korn Ferry was the day Ellen Cotter declared her candidacy. After the what did they do? told Craig Tompkins to tell Korn Ferry to do no more work. And Mr. Gould, he was the one whose name was on a press release saying, Ellen Cotter was made CEO following a thorough She was not made CEO as a result of that search. was made CEO in spite of that search.

THE COURT: Okay. So all of those are issues that I'm aware of considered when I had previously included Mr. Gould in the granting of the summary judgment related to the business judgment rule. The fact that I am denying certain issues related to other summary judgments does not diminish the fact that the directors that I found there was not evidence of a lack of disinterestedness have the protection the statute provides to them.

Okay. So let's go back to Mr. Cotter's Motion Number 3. This is related to the coach.

MS. LEVIN: Your Honor, this motion should be denied because the hiring of High Point, that's post hoc --

THE COURT: It's your motion. You wanted it granted.

MS. LEVIN: I'm sorry. You know, the Court -- I'm sorry. The Court should exclude the after-acquired evidence on the -- in the form of any testimony or documents relating to the hiring of High Point, because the breach of fiduciary duty claims, they are -- they concern what the directors did and knew at the time that they decided to fire the plaintiff. So we cited the <u>Smith versus Van Gorkom</u> case, which holds post hoc data is not relevant to the decision.

So at the time that they made this decision they did not have nor did they rely on the High Point evidence. So therefore the after-acquired evidence cannot be as a matter of

law relevant to their decision to terminate the plaintiff.

That would amount to a retroactive assessment of his ability,
which are not at issue. And I think that that's the -- you
know, the --

THE COURT: The problem I have with that is part of what your client's position has been in this case is he is suitable to be acting as the CEO, and if there is information that is relevant to that suitability, that's where I have the problem on this. I certainly understand from a decision—making process that that information was not in the possession of anyone who was making the decisions at the time. But given the affirmative proposition by your client that he is suitable to CEO, I have concerns about granting the motion at this stage.

MS. LEVIN: Well -- okay. So -- but with respect to the decision which you can agree that they could not use that evidence to show that after the fact they made the right decision because of the after --

THE COURT: No. That's a problem if your client is saying he's suitable and therefore he should be able to be CEO. Because part of what he originally asked for was to make them make him be CEO.

MS. LEVIN: All right. And here at issue I believe it's the -- we're seeking to void the termination.

THE COURT: I know.

MS. LEVIN: So -- but I think that even -- and I think that in that respect if you were inclined to allow it on his suitability, the problem then becomes first of all the hiring of consultant doesn't necessary mean that somebody is unsuitable.

THE COURT: Absolutely. It may mean they're trying to get better.

MS. LEVIN: Exactly. And I was thinking -- when I read these facts I was thinking about the analogy. If you were a professional runner and you hire a runner coach --

THE COURT: Coach.

MS. LEVIN: -- doesn't mean that you're not a good runner. You may --

THE COURT: You want to be better.

MS. LEVIN: Exactly. So that was --

THE COURT: I understand.

MS. LEVIN: So and the other thing is that, you know, the opposition argues, well, but it looks like in his own assessment he wasn't good for it. And that, of course, again doesn't follow from that. And so then we get into the category of even if there's a remote relevance, Your Honor, then whatever that relevance is would be substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudicial effect that that would cause. Because, again, his assumed thoughts, then the jury could think like, well, you know, he thinks he's not qualified

because he hired a coach. So all in all I believe that it's unfairly prejudicial.

Just on the point of the unclean hands defense, again they are citing the Fetish, Las Vegas Fetish case. But, again, the unclean hands defense requires egregious misconduct and serious harm caused by it. And they haven't further substantiated that. So with that being said, our position is to exclude it for those reasons.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. LEVIN: Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Searcy --

MR. SEARCY: I'll address that.

THE COURT: -- I am inclined to deny the motion.

But if the evidence is admitted at trial, to admit it with a limiting instruction that says that it only goes to suitability.

MR. SEARCY: And, Your Honor, I think that we're okay with that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SEARCY: I just want to clarify that we can certainly ask Mr. Cotter about the Alderton documents --

THE COURT: You ask him about it, then I'm going to give the limiting instruction, and we'll probably give it five times or six times, and it'll be a written instruction, so it's part of it. And if the plaintiff doesn't want me to give

the limiting instruction because they believe that calls to much attention to it, they can, of course, waive that request.

MR. SEARCY: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So think about whether you really want the limiting instruction, come up with your text for the limiting instruction, and then we'll talk about it when we have our final pretrial conference as to whether you think you really want it.

That takes me to the last motion in limine by Mr. Cotter, which relates to the ability of Mr. Ferrario to participate at trial, also known as Motion in Limine Number 2.

MR. KRUM: Thank you, Your Honor. I enjoy this very much, showing that perhaps I've spent too many years in the corporate governance jurisprudence. Three points, and it's not complicated. First, as a general rule a nominal defendant is not allowed to introduce evidence and defend the merits of claims against the director defendants.

Second, the handful of exceptions to that are exceptions where it's a serious fundamental corporate interest that is challenged by the derivative suit, a reorganization or restructuring, an effort to appoint a receiver. None of those exist here.

Third, if you disagree with us on all of that, there's a question of unfair prejudice and waste of time.

And, you know, the individual defendants are represented by

capable counsel. They don't need a second lawyer carrying their water. And for a jury to have someone who represents the company asking questions that imply conclusions adverse to the plaintiff is, if not unfairly prejudicial, something beyond that.

So that's the argument in a nutshell, Your Honor. If you have any questions, I'd be happy to answer them.

THE COURT: Nope. Motion's denied.

All right. So let's go to your Motion in Limine

Number 1 regarding advice of counsel. I forgot we need to hit
that one. Ms. Levin.

And then we're going to go to the Chief Justice

Steel that I'm not going to really hear, because I didn't give
you permission to refile.

MS. LEVIN: Your Honor is familiar with the share options, so if I talk about the share option, I don't --

THE COURT: I am.

MS. LEVIN: Okay. Well --

THE COURT: And also with the drama related to the production and the creation and all the stuff about the advice of counsel issue.

MS. LEVIN: Okay. I'll just --

THE COURT: But I also am aware the Nevada Supreme

Court has told us on a business judgment issue we cannot reach

behind the advice of counsel except to make a determination as

to essentially process issues, how the attorney was hired, what the scope of the retention was, and those kind of issues, as opposed to the actual advice.

MS. LEVIN: That's true, Your Honor. And so our arguments are really twofold. Number one is that Adams and Kane, who were two of the three directors on the compensation committee, they testified, as the Court found in its October 27, 2016, hearing, that they relied solely on the substance of advice of counsel to determine whether the authorization decision to authorize the estate to invoke the option was proper. So, unlike in Wynn or in Comverge, on which the defendants rely, they did not rely on anything else. So if they are asked at trial to explain why they authorized the option, they must rely on that legal advice.

So the second point is that the defendants waived the attorney-client privilege by partially disclosing attorney-client privileged information. Now, they're saying -- or RDI says in the opposition that individual directors cannot waive the privilege.

THE COURT: That's the <u>Jacobs versus Sands</u> case.

MS. LEVIN: Exact, Your Honor. And I agree with that. But, of course, RDI can only act through its officers and directors.

THE COURT: That's the Jacobs versus Sands case.

MS. LEVIN: And the current officer -- and I think

in particular if you look at the Exhibit 4 that we attached to our motion, is that that email was produced by Ellen Cotter, who is a current CEO and is an officer and director, and she --

THE COURT: I understand.

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MS. LEVIN: So, in other words --

THE COURT: And then Mr. Ferrario clawed it back.

MS. LEVIN: Right. So she produced it, and so there's a Supreme Court case that says, "The power to waive the corporate attorney-client privilege rests with the corporation's management and is usually -- and is normally exercised by its officers and directors." And that's what happened here.

and 3, the 2 and 3 they raise the legal issues. 2 and 3 identify the legal issues of whether there was a reason why Ellen Cotter could not exercise the option and whether enough — whether the trust documents did not pour over — the share option didn't pour over into the trust. But Exhibit 4 specifically seeks legal advice from the company attorney and as to the legal rights of the estate to exercise the option in light of the proxy language. So that is — under our statute is an attorney-client communication for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. So they partially disclosed that, so we believe there's a waiver issue. And under Wardleigh you

cannot use the attorney privilege both as a shield and a sword, which is what they're now doing, is because what they're going to say is, well, we partially disclosed but you cannot find out what it was. But even the very --

THE COURT: But that's the Nevada Supreme Court who's made that decision, not the rest of us. They were very clear that we're not allowed to get behind that.

MS. LEVIN: Correct. But one thing that the Wynn decision did not decide was the waiver issue. And that was in Footnote 3 of the decision.

THE COURT: I made that decision separately after that came back. But that's a case by case, and I haven't made that decision in this case. In fact, my belief is you guys have a writ pending on this issue still. Right?

MR. KRUM: I think the writ pending is on a different privilege issue, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. HENDRICKS: Your Honor, the writ relating to this issue was filed by RDI, and the Supreme Court actually came back and said the facts were analogous to <u>Wynn</u> and it needed to make a decision, and that was shortly after you did make the decision when we were back before you on it.

THE COURT: Yeah. We had a hearing.

MS. HENDRICKS: And we had the supplemental briefing.

THE COURT: Yep. Okay. So anything else on this one?

MS. LEVIN: Only -- the only thing is that the partially disclosed privileged emails themselves show that the board had information that would cause reliance on advice to be improper. So that would --

THE COURT: Okay. So your motion's denied. Come up here. I'm going to give you these. These are your I believe documents you actually want sealed. Since I granted your motion, it was on the calendar today, hopefully you can work out with the Clerk's Office so they will actually take the sealed documents and put them so they're part of the record in some way.

MS. LEVIN: And I brought them with me, too.

THE COURT: Yeah. Good luck. You've got to do it at the counter.

MS. LEVIN: Okay. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. So I am declining to hear again the motion in limine on Chief Justice Steel. I've previously made a ruling on that. I've reviewed your brief, and there's nothing in it that causes me to change my mind.

I have already granted your motions to seal and redact. It was on calendar for today.

And now we need to set our final pretrial conference. I usually do it the week before.

MR. KRUM: The week before is fine, Your Honor. 1 (Pause in the proceedings) 2 THE COURT: The week before is fine? 3 MR. KRUM: The week before is fine, Your Honor. 4 What day are you guys arguing in the THE COURT: 5 6 Supreme Court? That's the 3rd. 7 MR. TAYBACK: 3rd. So do you want to come in on --THE COURT: 8 MR. TAYBACK: 4th? 9 [Inaudible]. 10 THE CLERK: No, I'm not seeing them on January 2, THE COURT: 11 12 you're seeing them on January 2. How about on January 5 at 3:00 o'clock? 13 MR. TAYBACK: That's good. Thank you. 14 MR. KRUM: Perfect. 15 Thank you, Judge. MR. FERRARIO: 16 THE COURT: That will be your final pretrial 17 conference. At your final pretrial conference we're not going 18 to bring exhibits, because you're already going to deal with 19 that. But you are going to bring any jury instructions, 20 you're going to exchange your draft jury instructions. If you 21 have limiting instructions you think are appropriate, try and 22 have those, as well. And we're also going to deal with any 23 exhibits that you want in a notebook for the jury. 24 reason I suggest that is sometimes documents that we show on

screens aren't easily able to be seen by a juror. There's contract documents and things you may want. If there are selected items you want to have in a jury notebook, it will be a single jury notebook. It will be not more than 3 inches. So whatever we put in it has to fit in the 3 inches. And so if you have things you think you want included in that, we'll talk about that. And you're going to -- I will make final decisions on voir dire questions at that time. I encourage you to exchange them a week ahead of time.

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MR. KRUM: Your Honor, with respect to exhibits we have a date this week of Wednesday or Thursday for our exhibit list. I think in view of today's developments it would be a good idea to push that back to next week.

THE COURT: You guys need to get working on it.

MR. KRUM: No, we're working on it.

THE COURT: It takes a lot longer than you think it does.

All right. Anything else that I missed?

MR. FERRARIO: There may be some utility to that,
Mark, in light of the rulings of the Court today, because the
complexion of the case has changed.

MR. KRUM: Well, that's -- we're working on it. We understand that, Your Honor. So may we have until Wednesday of next week you think, Mark?

MR. TAYBACK: Yeah, that's fine.

THE COURT: I still need to see representatives from those parties who remain in the case at the calendar call on December 18th. If you are out of town, I do not do call-ins for calendar calls, Mr. Krum, so just make sure Mr. Morris and Ms. Levin know whatever it is they need to say.

I am going to be asking you whether given the rulings I made today it has changed the estimate that you provided to me through Ms. Hendricks on December 4th as the amount of time for trial. Because I need to negotiate for space, and knowing the time that I need is important for me in my space negotiations.

MR. RHOW: Your Honor, sorry. One point of clarification as to Mr. Gould specifically. He is out of the case entirely?

THE COURT: Well, I granted the motion on the business judgment for him. My understanding is that is the only way that you would be involved, because there are no direct breach of contract claims against you. If there were other types of claims against you that were not protected by the business judgment rule, you might not be out. But I didn't see that in the briefing. But I don't know your case as well as you do.

MR. RHOW: Assuming that's the case, I just want to make sure that no one's going to sanction me if I don't show up.

THE COURT: Do you think you have any remaining 1 claims against Mr. Gould given my ruling today? 2 MR. KRUM: Your Honor, probably not. But I'll go 3 back through it. 4 If you could communicate if you think 5 THE COURT: there are any, and then I'll have to handle that on a 6 7 supplemental motion practice. MR. RHOW: Understood, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: Okay. So the people who I anticipate 9 will be here only in the capacity as witnesses would be --10 okay, I've got to go back to this list -- Kane, McEachern, 11 Gould, Codding, Wrotniak. That's all of them. So the people 12 who remain parties are Cotter, Cotter, Adams, and then Mr. 13 14 Cotter. MR. TAYBACK: Yes, Your Honor. I understand that. 15 THE COURT: All right. So see you on the 18th. 16 MR. TAYBACK: Thank you, Your Honor. 17 MR. KRUM: Thank you. 18 MR. EDWARDS: Your Honor --19 THE COURT: Yes, Jim. 20 MR. EDWARDS: -- on the 2nd is local counsel going 21 to be here for the exhibits? Do you want local counsel here? 22 THE COURT: Counsel does not need to be here. 23

can send paralegals.

sit through it if they don't want to.

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So local counsel does not need to come

MR. EDWARDS: Okay. THE COURT: But it may be helpful if local counsel is going to be intimately involved in the process of doing it for you to have someone here. But I leave that to work out with your people. Anything else? MS. HENDRICKS: Your Honor, on the exhibit list did we get an extra week, then, so we kind of work through these issues? THE COURT: I'm not involved in the exhibit list That's you guys on 2.67. I'm out of that. issue. MR. FERRARIO: Thank you, Your Honor. THE PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 12:00 NOON

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

AFFIRMATION

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

FLORENCE HOYT Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

FLORENCE M. HOYT, TRANSCRIBER

12/12/17

DATE

CLERK OF THE COURT ORDR COHEN|JOHNSON|PARKER|EDWARDS 1 H. STAN JOHNSON, ESQ. 2 Nevada Bar No. 00265 sjohnson@cohenjohnson.com 3 375 E. Warm Springs Rd., Suite 104 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 4 Telephone: (702) 823-3500 Facsimile: (702) 823-3400 5 OUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP 6 CHRISTOPHER TAYBACK, ESO. California Bar No. 145532, pro hac vice 7 christayback@quinnemanuel.com MARSHALL M. SEARCY, ESQ. 8 California Bar No. 169269, pro hac vice marshallsearcy@quinnemanuel.com 9 865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017 10 Telephone: (213) 443-3000 11 Attorneys for Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, Edward Kane 12 Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak 13 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 14 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 15 Case No.: A-15-719860-B Dept. No.: XI 16 JAMES J. COTTER, JR. individually and derivatively on behalf of Reading Case No.: P-14-082942-E 17 International, Inc., Dept. No.: XI 18 Plaintiffs, Related and Coordinated Cases 19 **BUSINESS COURT** MARGARET COTTER, et al., 20 Defendants. ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS' AND 21 MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFF'S AND READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada 22 **DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE** corporation, 23 Judge: Hon. Elizabeth Gonzalez Nominal Defendant. 24 Date of Hearing: December 11, 2017 25 Time of Hearing: 8:30 a.m. 26

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THIS MATTER HAVING COME TO BE HEARD BEFORE the Court on December 11, 2017, Mark G. Krum, Steve Morris, and Akke Levin appearing for plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff"); James L. Edwards, Christopher Tayback, and Marshall M. Searcy III appearing for defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, Edward Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak (collectively, the "Individual Defendants"); Mark E. Ferrario and Kara B. Hendricks appearing for nominal defendant Reading International, Inc. ("RDI"); and Ekwan Rhow appearing for defendant William Gould ("Gould," together, with the Individual Defendants and RDI, "Defendants"), on the following motions:

- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 1) re: Plaintiff's Termination and Reinstatement Claims, and supplement thereto;
- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 2) re: The Issue of Director Independence, and supplement thereto;
- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 3) on Plaintiff's Claims Relating to the Purported Unsolicited Offer, and supplement thereto;
- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 5) on Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Appointment of Ellen Cotter as CEO, and supplement thereto;
- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 6) re: Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Estate's Option Exercise, the Appointment of Margaret Cotter, the Compensation Packages of Ellen Cotter and Margaret Cotter,

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and the Additional Compensation to Margaret Cotter and Guy
Adams, and supplement thereto;

- Defendant Gould's Motion for Summary Judgment;
- Individual Defendants' Renewed Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony of Myron Steele Based on Supplemental Authority;
- Individual Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence
 That Is More Prejudicial Than Probative;
- Defendant Gould's Motion in Limine to Exclude Irrelevant
 Speculative Evidence;
- RDI's Motion to Redact Opposition to Plaintiff James J. Cotter,
 Jr.'s Motion in Limine No. 1 re: Advice of Counsel and File
 Exhibit "E" Under Seal;
- Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 1 re: Advice of Counsel;
- Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 2 re: the Submission of Merits-Related Evidence by Nominal Defendant Reading
 International, Inc.;
- Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 3 re: After-Acquired Evidence;
- Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibit 2 to Plaintiff James J. Cotter's Opposition to Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence That Is More Prejudicial Than Probative;
- Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibits 3-6, 8-9, 11-2 and to Redact Portions of Plaintiff's Supplemental Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Nos. 2 and 3 and Gould Summary Judgment Motion;

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- Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibits 7-11, and 15-17 to Plaintiff's Supplemental Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Nos. 2 and 5 and Gould Summary Judgment Motion; and
- Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibits 4 Through 11 to Plaintiff's Supplemental Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Nos. 2 and 6 and Gould Summary Judgment Motion.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 1) re: Plaintiff's Termination and Reinstatement Claims is GRANTED with respect to Defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak because there are no genuine issues of material fact related to the disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors, and is DENIED with respect to Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, and Guy Adams because there are genuine issues of material fact related to the disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 2) re: The Issue of Director Independence is GRANTED with respect to Defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak because there are no genuine issues of material fact related to the disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors, and is DENIED with respect to Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, and Guy Adams because there are genuine issues of material fact related to the disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 3) on Plaintiff's Claims Relating to the Purported Unsolicited Offer is GRANTED because of

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Plaintiff's failure to show damages related to an unenforceable, unsolicited	
nonbinding offer. While Plaintiff at trial cannot claim any damages arising	
from Defendants' actions with respect to the Patton Vision indications of	
interest, Plaintiff may still attempt to use evidence regarding the Patton	
Vision indications to show a breach of fiduciary duty.	

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 5) on Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Appointment of Ellen Cotter as CEO is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 6) re: Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Estate's Option Exercise, the Appointment of Margaret Cotter, the Compensation Packages of Ellen Cotter and Margaret Cotter, and the Additional Compensation to Margaret Cotter and Guy Adams is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Defendant Gould's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT judgment in favor of Defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak is GRANTED on all claims asserted by Plaintiff.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Renewed Motion *in Limine* to Exclude Expert Testimony of Myron Steele Based on Supplemental Authority is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion *in Limine* to Exclude Evidence That Is More Prejudicial Than Probative is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHERED ORDERED THAT Defendant Gould's

Motion in Limine to Exclude Irrelevant Speculative Evidence is DENIED as

premature, with the issues raised in the motion to be addressed at trial based upon the relevant foundation laid.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 1 re: Advice of Counsel is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion in Limine
No. 2 re: the Submission of Merits-Related Evidence by Nominal
Defendant Reading International, Inc. is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion *in Limine*No. 3 re: After-Acquired Evidence is DENIED. However, to the extent that
Plaintiff's retention and use of Highpoint Associates and Derek Alderton is
admitted at trial, it will be admitted with an instruction limiting the
evidence solely to the issue of Plaintiff's suitability as President and CEO of
RDI.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT RDI's Motion to Redact Opposition to Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.'s Motion *in Limine* No. 1 re: Advice of Counsel and File Exhibit "E" Under Seal is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motions to Seal and/or Redact are GRANTED.

JA6175

PREPARED AND SUBMITTED BY:

COHEN JOHNSON PARKER EDWARDS

By: /s/ H. Stan Johnson

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Attorneys for Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, Edward Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak

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And

12/28/2017 4:13 PM Steven D. Grierson **MSTY** MORRIS LAW GROUP 2 Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543 Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102 3 411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 4 Telephone: (702) 474-9400 5 Facsimile: (702) 474-9422 Email: sm@morrislawgroup.com 6 Email: al@morrislawgroup.com 7 Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913 8 Yurko, Salvesen & Remz, P.C. 1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor 9 Boston, MA 02108 10 Telephone: (617) 723-6900 Facsimile: (617) 723-6905 11 Email: mkrum@bizlit.com 12 Attorneys for Plaintiff 13 James J. Cotter, Jr. 14 DISTRICT COURT 15 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 16) Case No. A-15-719860-B JAMES J. COTTER, JR.,) Dept. No. XI derivatively on behalf of Reading 17 International, Inc., Coordinated with: 18 Plaintiff, 19 Case No. P-14-0824-42-E Dept. No. XI 20 MARGARET COTTER, ELLEN 21 **Jointly Administered** COTTER, GUY ADAMS, EDWARD KANE, DOUGLAS **MOTION STAY** 22 McEACHERN, WILLIAM **AND** GOULD, JUDY CODDING, 23 MICHAEL WROTNIAK, APPLICATION FOR ORDER 24 SHORTENING TIME

JA6177

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READING INTERNATIONAL,

INC., a Nevada corporation,

Nominal Defendant.

Defendants.

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Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff") hereby moves the Court to stay this case pending filing and resolution of his forthcoming petition for writ of mandamus of the Court's impending order granting the individual defendants' motions for partial summary judgments Nos. 1 and 2 ("Partial MSI Nos. 1 and 2") and William Gould's motion for summary judgment ("Gould MSJ"). Plaintiff further moves the Court under EDCR 2.26 for an Order shortening time to notice and hear this Motion.

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Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.

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DECLARATION OF AKKE LEVIN IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME

I, Akke Levin, declare:

- I am an attorney with Morris Law Group, counsel for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this declaration except as to those stated on information and belief, which facts I have investigated and believe to be true. I would be competent to testify to them if called upon to do so.
- On December 11, 2017, the Court heard oral argument on 2. the individual defendants' Partial MSJs, Gould's MSJ, and some of the parties' motions in limine. The Court granted Partial MSJ No. 1 regarding Plaintiff's termination and reinstatement; Partial MSJ No. 2 regarding director independence; and Partial MSJ No. 3 regarding the unsolicited Patton Vision offer as to five of the eight defendants. The Court also granted defendant William Gould's MSJ on all claims. The Court further ruled in favor of Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak on all four of Plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claims asserted against them.
- On December 18, Plaintiff submitted a motion for 3. reconsideration of the Court's rulings on Partial MJS Nos. 1 and 2, Gould's MSJ, and the Court's dismissal of William Gould, Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak from the case.
- On December 21, 2017, Plaintiff submitted to the Court a proposed order on all the Court's December 11 rulings.
- The Motion for Reconsideration is set for hearing on 5. December 28, 2017.
- Good cause exists under EDCR 2.26 to shorten the time for 6. notice and hearing of this Motion to Stay. Trial is set to begin on January 8, JA6179

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2018. If the Motion to Stay is set on the regular calendar, it would not be heard until after trial begins, which would defeat its purpose. Plaintiff proposes that the Court hears this Motion on December 28, 2017, the same day and time that the Court scheduled hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration.

- This Motion is being served by the court's E-Service · 7. System to all counsel of record.
- I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the 8. State of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct

Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102

ORDER SHORTENING TIME

On application of Akke Levin, counsel for plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr., and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the time for notice and hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification shall be, and it hereby is, shortened and shall be heard on shortened time on the day of

 \Rightarrow 2017₅ at the hour of \Rightarrow

Elizabeth Goff Gonzalez District Court Judge, Dept. 11

DATED:

INTRODUCTION I.

The Court on December 11, 2017 dismissed all Plaintiff's four claims against five of the eight defendants because the Court found there were no issues of material fact as to their disinterestedness and

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independence. The Court's rulings were based the individual defendants' Partial MSJ Nos. 1 and 2 and Gould's MSJ. Plaintiff is seeking reconsideration of this ruling. Plaintiff has prepared and will file—as soon as the Court enters an order on these rulings—a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to vacate the impending order on the motions for summary judgment to the extent the Court does not amend its December 11 rulings following the hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. A stay of this case pending the resolution of Plaintiff's Writ Petition is warranted under Renown Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 130 Nev. , 335 P.3d 199 (2014) and NRAP 8(c).

II. ARGUMENT

The Court Should Stay the Case to Permit Plaintiff to file a A. Writ Petition.

Plaintiff's writ petition is based, in part, on the Court's dismissal of all four claims against five defendants whereas the individual director defendants other than Gould had filed only motions for partial summary judgment on certain issues. In Renown Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct. —a case on point in which the district court found in favor of the plaintiff on two claims "even though the full merits of these claims were not specifically argued" in the motions or at the hearing—the district court "stayed the remainder of the case so that Renown could seek writ relief in [the Nevada Supreme Court]." 130 Nev. ____, ___, 335 P.3d 199, 201 (2014). Given the similarities of both cases (as more fully further discussed in Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration) the Court should likewise stay this case.

The Court Should Stay the Case Pending the Outcome of **B**. Plaintiff's Writ Petition.

A party may seek a stay of the proceedings in the district court pending the "resolution of a petition to the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals for an extraordinary writ." NRAP 8(a)(1)(A). The initial stay $A_0 = A_0 = A_0$

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motion must be made in the district court. Id. "In deciding whether to issue a stay or injunction, the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals will generally consider the following factors: (1) whether the object of the appeal or writ petition will be defeated if the stay or injunction is denied; (2) whether appellant/petitioner will suffer irreparable or serious injury if the stay or injunction is denied; (3) whether respondent/real party in interest will suffer irreparable or serious injury if the stay or injunction is granted; and (4) whether appellant/petitioner is likely to prevail on the merits in the appeal or writ petition." NRAP 8(c). Not all factors have to weigh in the moving party's favor: some factors may be particularly strong and "counterbalance other weak factors." Mikohn Gaming Corp. v. McCrea, 120 Nev. 248, 251, 89 P.3d 36, 38 (2004). As discussed below, however, each of these factors weighs in Plaintiff's favor.

The Object of the Writ Petition Would be Defeated if the 1. Stay is Denied.

The object of Plaintiff's writ petition will be defeated if trial proceeds on January 8 against just three defendants when the result of a successful writ petition will require a second trial against all eight individual defendants. Cf. McCrea, 120 Nev. at 251, 89 P.3d at 39 (finding that the benefits of arbitration, including its purpose to avoid "longer time periods associated with litigation," would "likely be lost" if the appellant "had to simultaneously or sequentially proceed in both judicial and arbitral forums"). Thus, the first factor weighs in Plaintiff's favor.

Plaintiff Would Suffer Serious Harm Without a stay. 2.

As demonstrated in Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, the presumption under NRS 78.138 is rebuttable. If Plaintiff is not allowed to rebut the rebuttable presumption against the five dismissed director defendants at trial, Plaintiff will suffer severe harm at trial, because it

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deprives him of his right to present his case against the five dismissed director defendants to a jury.

Defendants would not Suffer Prejudice, much less 3. Irreparable Harm, if a Stay is granted.

It would be in all the parties' interest—including defendants' interest— to stay the case and avoid a costly and time-consuming "do over" of the trial that is about to start if the Nevada Supreme Court vacates the district court's impending order. This factor therefore also weighs in Plaintiff's favor.

Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits. 4.

Plaintiff is likely to prevail on one or more aspects of his Writ Petition, which seeks an order vacating the impending order on Partial MSJ Nos. 1 and 2, Gould's MSJ, and the Court's ruling to dismiss five of the director defendants from the case on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff did not get notice and an opportunity to be heard before all four claims were dismissed against these five defendants; (2) briefing on Gould's MSJ was still open; and (3) the Court's ruling deprived Plaintiff of the right to introduce evidence at trial to rebut the presumption that the acts and omissions of the five dismissed directors were protected by the business judgment rule.

In Renown, the Nevada Supreme Court granted the hospital's writ petition in similar circumstances. There, the district court found in favor of the plaintiff "on his breach of contract and intentional interference with contract claims, even though the full merits of these claims were not specifically argued in the cross-motions for summary judgment or at the hearing." 130 Nev. at ____, 335 P.3d at 202. The Nevada Supreme Court granted the writ petition because these claims were not mentioned anywhere "in the six summary judgment briefs" and Renown did not receive ten days notice and an opportunity to defend itself on those claims. Id.

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Similarly here, the director defendants other than Gould filed only motions for partial summary judgment on certain issues (not claims) and Plaintiff did not receive notice and an opportunity to defend himself before summary judgment was granted as to five defendants.

As to the third ground, Plaintiff raises a sound legal issue that is meritorious as well: the district court decided Plaintiff's fiduciary duty claims against five directors based solely on the grounds that Plaintiff had failed to raise a disputed issue of material fact regarding their disinterestedness or independence. This factor therefore also weighs in Plaintiff's favor.

CONCLUSION III.

For the reasons stated above, the Court should stay this action pending decision of the Writ Petition.

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Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.

MORRIS LAW GROTP

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D) and E.D.C.R. 8.05, I certify that I am an employee of MORRIS LAW GROUP and that on the date below, I cause the following document(s) to be served via the Court's Odyssey E-Filing System: MOTION TO STAY AND APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME to be served on all interested parties, as registered with the Court's E-Filing and E-Service System. The date and time of the electronic proof of service is in place of the date and place of deposit in the mail.

DATED this 19th day of December, 2017.

An employee of Morris Law Group

Electronically Filed 12/29/2017 11:27 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

TRAN

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA * * * * *

JAMES COTTER, JR.

CASE NO. A-15-719860-B

Plaintiff

A-16-735305-B P-14-082942-E

MARGARET COTTER, et al.

vs.

DEPT. NO. XI

Transcript of Proceedings

Defendants

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

HEARING ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION FOR STAY

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 28, 2017

COURT RECORDER:

TRANSCRIPTION BY:

JILL HAWKINS District Court FLORENCE HOYT

Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

MARK G. KRUM, ESQ. AKKE LEVIN, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

H. STANLEY JOHNSON, ESQ. MARSHALL M. SEARCY, ESQ. MARK E. FERRARIO, ESQ. SHOSHANNA BANNETT, ESQ.

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 28, 2017, 9:02 A.M. 1 (Court was called to order) 2 THE COURT: Good morning. 3 Mr. Ferrario, so kind of you to join us. 4 MR. FERRARIO: Wouldn't miss it. 5 THE COURT: You can sit down. 6 Mr. Ferrario called my staff yesterday to see if he 7 could get out of coming to court. 8 MR. FERRARIO: I just hinted. 9 THE COURT: So I have a motion for stay that was 10 submitted on an OST, but it was submitted after 5:00 o'clock 11 on Tuesday, so we didn't get it in time to set it for this 12 morning. Does anyone have an objection to the motion for stay 13 being heard after I hear the motion for reconsideration? 14 MR. SEARCY: No objection. 15 THE COURT: Okay. So we'll hear that this morning. 16 I'll have Dulce take care of whatever that means. But come on 17 up and let's do the motion. 18 (Pause in the proceedings) 19 THE COURT: Ms. Levin, I don't know what happens 20 after this, but I'm now handing it to Dulce, and you and Dulce 21 talk after the hearing. 22 MS. LEVIN: The motion to stay? 23 THE COURT: Okay. You're up, Mr. Krum. 24 Thank you, Your Honor. Good morning. MR. KRUM: 25

The motion for reconsideration, as I trust you saw, raises three arguments. And I'll speak to the two principal arguments, the first of which is what we view as the error of granting a dismissal of the case when it wasn't sought. The second is what we view as the error of the application of the business judgment rule. The motion -- excuse me. The oppositions pretty much agree with us on how you handle this, and we just disagree about how it should have been handled.

But before I speak to that, Your Honor, I note that there was some complaint about there wasn't any new evidence. I don't know if that's correct or not, but there is new evidence that we were not in a position to include in our motion because we just received it last night. And what it is, Your Honor, is that the five individuals with respect to whom you made a determination that there was no disputed issue of material fact --

THE COURT: Codding, Kane, Gould, Wrotniak, and McEachern.

MR. KRUM: Correct. Yeah. Those five individuals have apparently requested that the matter be added to a board meeting agenda tomorrow. And what they propose to do is to ratify the conduct of some of them and some of others as to matters, Your Honor, with respect to which you denied motions for summary judgment. So --

THE COURT: Mr. Krum, let me step back for a minute

just so we're clear. Because it may be that I communicated poorly when we were all here. I made a determination that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the interestedness of those five individuals. As a result, that means the direct claims against those individuals for personal liability was granted, because I did not make a finding that there was an interestedness on their part. I understand you may have issues with that from a factual standpoint, and we'll talk about that in a minute.

The impact of that is that it doesn't affect the claims that you're making against the company. Because while you are arguing that there has been a breach of an agreement and other things related to the conduct of those individuals, as well, that doesn't preclude from making that argument. It simply precludes under the business judgment rule from obtaining personal liability against those five directors who I made a determination there was insufficient evidence to go forward given the business judgment rule.

So I'm just trying to make sure that we're clear on what I did. Because when I was reading your briefing I wasn't really sure that that came across.

MR. KRUM: Well, Your Honor, I think so. I think that we just have a disagreement.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. KRUM: And disagreement, Your Honor, not with --

so much with respect to the facts, but rather with respect to the law and the application of the business judgment rule.

But may I finish this new evidence?

THE COURT: Yes, please.

MR. KRUM: Because I think, Your Honor, this goes to interestedness or --

THE COURT: Ratification?

MR. KRUM: -- independence. Indeed it does, Your Honor, independence.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KRUM: So here's what we have. We have five individuals who think they're out of the case now, and they're prepared to take steps so that new evidence can be introduced in the case against the other individual defendants. What they're trying to do, Your Honor, is change the burden of proof at trial we're supposed to commence on January 8th. Because what they're going to say is that a majority of disinterested and independent directors have ratified all these actions and that Mr. Krum's argument that the remaining directors bear the burden of proof and so forth and so on doesn't play anymore. And so what they're doing, Your Honor, is creating an entire new fact set so the lawyers can try to argue different legal standards apply.

Now, if I may, because I don't want to speak to the particulars, it's easy to look at them. May I give this to

you? 1 THE COURT: Is it okay if I mark it as Court's 2 Exhibit 1, since you're getting a copy? 3 MR. SEARCY: That's acceptable, Your Honor, now that 4 I've got a copy. 5 And it's stamped as confidential. MR. KRUM: 6 THE COURT: Court's Exhibit 1, please. 7 Since it's stamped as confidential because it 8 apparently includes commercially sensitive information, I am 9 going to not talk about it specifically, but only in 10 How's that? generalities. 11 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. KRUM: 12 So you want this sealed, Your Honor? THE CLERK: 13 It will be sealed. THE COURT: 14 Thank you. 15 THE CLERK: THE COURT: Thank you, Dulce. 16 So, Your Honor, the point of this action MR. KRUM: 17 to date and action that's anticipated is that it shows -- it 18 evidences further the lack of independence of these persons 19 who are undertaking to ratify conduct you have found to be 20 such that it raises a triable issue of fact. So on the issue 21 of independence with respect to which we disagree, 22 respectfully, as to how that can be rebutted -- I mean, I 23

think I understood what you said, and the opposition takes the

position that reflects my understanding of what you said, that

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we didn't show disinterestedness, actually was what you said, and therefore --

THE COURT: Lack of interestedness.

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MR. KRUM: Yeah. And therefore the rule applies and there's no liability. And I respectfully disagree. And we've talked past each other at some length at the last hearing where I kept talking about the evidence and you kept telling me I was talking about evidence of breach of fiduciary duty. And I don't intend to repeat that. But this, Your Honor, is new evidence. It is new evidence of a lack of independence. And that's without regard to the issue that These five people who are witnesses, based what do we do now. on your decision, are going to come in here and testify, we ratified the actions set out in pages 3(a) and (b) of the document that I handed to the Court. And these are matters that -- as to which you denied summary judgment. They're matters as to which equitable relief is sought, and they're going to argue to you, Judge, based on the actions of these five people you've found are independent the case is over, you can't grant equitable relief no matter whether you could before. So I --

THE COURT: Most people might say that's a little late in the game.

MR. KRUM: Well, I think it is, Your Honor. And so maybe I'm ahead of myself on the stay issue.

But -- so that's the new evidence that we learned -- I learned about 10:00 o'clock when I landed in LAX back on the 48 last night.

So on the first issue, Your Honor, that was in our motion the Court granted summary judgment as to these five individuals and dismissed the case as to the claims for breach of the duty of care, breach of the duty of loyalty, and breach of the duty of candor.

Now, the only motion that sought summary judgment across the board was the one by Mr. Gould. And, of course, you know our point on that, and we talked about it at the last hearing. I'm not going to repeat myself.

The other ones were described as motions for partial summary judgment, and they were directed at specific issues. There wasn't a single one that said dismiss the case. And with respect to partial -- Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Number 2, which was the one -- that director interestedness, that didn't request dismissal, either. All that did was request a determination on that discrete issue. And, Your Honor, the business judgment rule is a evidentiary presumption, and we're entitled to rebut it, and we're entitled to do so by showing that they breached their fiduciary duties. I'm not going to go into that, because I'm already repeating myself.

The other thing I'd say, Your Honor, is at the

hearing in October of 2016 we had some discussion about the nature of these motions, and at page 83, line 8 to 12, you said, "It's not summary judgment, but, yeah, I understand you're asking for a pretrial ruling or a pretrial determination. But it's not supposed to be summary judgment on that kind of fact." And the fact that was raised by Mr. Tayback to which you responded was independence. And so that's why we understood we were supposed to provide these details. And then we get to the question of what's jury instruction going to be with respect to, for example, the abort CEO search.

So, Your Honor, the last point on this independence issue, independence isn't required. You know, their duty of care claims can be made and brought regardless of whether there's independence or interest and so forth. And the same, by the way, is true for duty of candor claims. That issue really ties in with the duty of loyalty. So now the last comment on that is — and this perhaps is why we seem to be talking past one another or perhaps I wasn't listening well, as the case may be — breaches of the duty of loyalty are evidence of a lack of independence. It's — the loyalty is supposed to be singular. It's supposed to be to the company. It's not supposed to be divvied up between the company and the controlling shareholders or any other party. And where it is — where there's evidence that it is, that's evidence of a

lack of independence.

So on the business judgment rule, Your Honor, I think we've covered that. We have a different view of what it means to have a director who is not -- does not lack independence and who is disinterested. All that means in our view is that the presumption applies, the three-part presumption, and that we can rebut it by evidencing any one of those three parts didn't happen. And the Shoen case talks about that and the cases we cited in the briefing, and so I'm not going to belabor that.

So I guess with that, unless you have questions, I'll stop.

THE COURT: I don't have any questions. Thank you.

MR. SEARCY: Your Honor, I'll try to be brief. The plaintiff's claim that we didn't move on all the causes of action is a red herring here. We moved on all the specific breaches that were supposedly put at issue by plaintiff in their causes of action, and in fact at the Court's direction plaintiff identified the breaches that are at issue in their supplemental briefing, and we moved on all of those issues. And those are set forth on page 6 of our opposition.

With respect to Motion Number 2 that we filed, which went specifically to the issue of disinterestedness, that was clearly dispositive on all claims with respect to those directors, because it implicated the business judgment rule.

Issues in this case have been briefed extensively. They've had every opportunity to submit evidence on these issues, and they failed to come forward with any evidence that would show a lack of disinterestedness with respect to the directors on whom you've granted summary judgment, specifically Mr. Kane, Mr. McEachern, Mr. Wrotniak, and Ms. Codding. They haven't come forward with any evidence showing a beholdenness or some sort of self interest that is implicated in any of the transactions that are at issue in this case.

With respect to the new evidence that plaintiff has now come forward with --

THE COURT: Court Exhibit 1.

Honor.

MR. SEARCY: Court Exhibit 1. Thank you, Your

-- this simply demonstrates the problem with the reasoning of plaintiffs with respect to all of this.

Plaintiff disagrees with the decision of the board, therefore that somehow is supposed to be an indication of lack of disinterestedness. It doesn't work that way with the business judgment rule. He's got to come forward with evidence that shows that their reasoning, that their thought process was somehow impacted. He's failed to do that.

Your Honor, the motion for reconsideration should be denied.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Ms. Bannett.

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MS. BANNETT: Mr. Krum didn't address Mr. Gould specifically when he spoke, but, again, he did not point to any evidence that shows that Mr. Gould had a financial relationship with either of the Cotter sisters or that Mr. Gould had a close personal relationship with either of the Cotter sisters. And under the business judgment rule that is what is needed in order to rebut the presumption and move on to the next part of the case. It's not only what the Court has said, it's also what plaintiff's own expert witness said. That would be Chief Justice Steele from the Delaware Supreme Court, former Chief Justice. He found that there was no evidence that Mr. Gould was -- lacked independence or lacked disinterested and, as a result, he found that there is no basis for the claims against Mr. Gould to proceed. He did not apply his opinions about breaches of fiduciary duty to Mr. Gould, and he specifically excepted him from his opinions in this case.

If the Court has any questions about Mr. Gould -THE COURT: I don't have any questions. Thank you.
Mr. Ferrario, anything on behalf of the nominal
defendant?

MR. FERRARIO: No, Your Honor. Other than I think your ruling initially was correct and I think it should stand.

And I suspect that coming out of the meeting Friday, depending on what occurs, there may be some issues we may need to bring to Your Honor's attention at the pretrial conference set for next Friday. And I'm not saying this to be facetious. I have gone through Mr. Krum's complaint, participated in one of the calls, you know, dealing with the pretrial order, and I've gone through the pretrial order. And I really think it would be beneficial for the Court -- we're going to have a jury impaneled -- that at that pretrial conference that plaintiff articulate clearly what claims plaintiff believes he still has left.

THE COURT: I'm not there.

MR. FERRARIO: Okay. I'm just --

THE COURT: That is technically part of what has to be in the pretrial order, though.

MR. FERRARIO: And, Judge, the pretrial order, Ms. Cowden and I have gotten into a number of arguments over the last couple days about what I heard coming out of the call and what's in the pretrial order. I think everybody was pressed due to the holidays. We got this in. I'm just going to encourage Your Honor at that pretrial conference, and it may be a somewhat unusual pretrial conference, that we have some delineation as to what the claims remaining actually are.

Because I don't think we -- my reading of it in light of the Court's ruling, there's very little, if anything, left to be

tried. And, again, there may be something occurring, and Mr. Krum assumes certain things are going to happen. There may be something occurring on Friday that may provide some relief under Nevada Revised Statutes, NRS 78.140 in particular, and there may be something —

THE COURT: Little late for ratification. It's a little late for ratification, Mr. Ferrario.

MR. FERRARIO: Well, Your Honor -- and I anticipated you may say that. But keep in mind --

THE COURT: I've got a trial starting a week from Monday.

MR. FERRARIO: Your Honor, I understand that. But keep in mind because of how this unfolded and what happened with the motions for summary judgment until the Court ruled, any attempted ratification would have involved arguments by them as to lack of independence, that type stuff. So there has been a change in the tenor of the case. That's all I'm telling the Court. I'm just giving you a heads up. Lots of stuff going on. And looking forward to the pretrial conference.

THE COURT: Okay. Oh, swell.

Mr. Krum.

MR. KRUM: Briefly, Your Honor. The assertion by Mr. Searcy that they moved on everything is incorrect. First as we discussed last October, the manner in which the duty of

loyalty claim is pleaded, for example, is all this conduct collectively evidences a breach of the duty of loyalty.

That's the same thing as moving for summary judgment of the case, and they didn't do that, either.

Second, Your Honor, they didn't even move on all the particular matters we identified as matters that we thought in and of themselves, not just with others, constituted or gave rise to breaches of fiduciary duty. And we've said this. And the first example is the first one, which is threat, the attempted extortion by Adams, Kane, and McEachern when they threatened plaintiff with termination if he didn't resolve his personal trust and estate disputes with his sisters on terms satisfactory to them.

As to the comments by counsel for Mr. Gould -- and I try to be descriptive, not disparaging -- reliefs a check-the-box analysis to the question of independence. It's not are they financially dependent and are they -- have thick-as-blood relations, yes, no, end of analysis.

THE COURT: Do they sleep on an air mattress in the Manhattan apartment and go visit.

MR. KRUM: I recall that conversation. And so the point is particularly important with respect to Mr. Gould, because we have, as we've described, an ongoing course of conscious -- a conscious decision not to do his job and to acquiesce to the wishes of the controlling shareholders.

And the last thing I want to say in reply is the characterization of Chief Justice Steele is misleading and in fact actually it's inaccurate. He answered a specific question that was in the nature of a hypothetical question that didn't go to anything beyond that. And because he didn't need to get to that second step for the purpose of his opinion, he didn't do it.

Unless you have questions, Your Honor, I have nothing further.

THE COURT: I don't have any questions.

The motion for reconsideration is denied. I do not see -- although I've reviewed Court's Exhibit 1, I do not see any new information that would cause me to change my decision from a factual standpoint, and I have not been provided with any new legal analysis that would cause me to change my decision.

That takes me to the motion to stay.

MR. KRUM: Your Honor, on the motion to stay we have the same two principal issues, whether the Court committed error when it granted summary judgment and dismissed the case as to those individuals -- I'm not going to repeat that; you've read it, you've heard it -- on the second issue the question is one where I think we respectfully disagree with the Court and the defendants as to what the consequence is of a director being able to invoke the statute and the business

judgment rule. And in our view that's nothing more than the -- than that the plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving that the director didn't in fact do what he's presumed to do.

And those are -- those are questions, Your Honor, along with a third one about viewing the evidence collectively that we're going to make the subject of a writ.

In terms of a stay what we have is the prospect of, in our view, Your Honor, trying substantially the same case without these five people as defendants, having an appeal with respect to them and whatever is appealed from the trial, and then, if we're successful, looking at a do over. If we're successful on any of these issues. And --

THE COURT: That's how it is on every time I grant partial summary judgment, Mr. Krum.

MR. KRUM: Understood, Your Honor. Understood. I think that -- we think, respectfully, these issues are particularly apt for review, but we'll see.

The other issue is what we just talked about with Exhibit 1. And, you know, we have people who are attempting to move the target, so to speak, and that puts us in a completely untenable position. As I explained earlier, they're going to introduce evidence -- they're going to seek to introduce evidence about something that happened -- actions they took based on a decision you made; they're going to argue, Your Honor, that that's a different --

THE COURT: After the pretrial order was submitted.

MR. KRUM: Well, they're going to argue, Your Honor,

that there are different burdens of proof as a result of that.

And if --

THE COURT: I understand, Mr. Krum.

MR. KRUM: If you don't let them do that, Your Honor, then they're going to preserve that for appeal. And so --

THE COURT: People preserve things for appeal every day in Department -- well, every Monday in Department 11.

MR. KRUM: Yeah. So that's all I have, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MR. SEARCY: Nothing from me, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The motion for stay is denied.

MR. KRUM: Well, Your Honor, we've submitted an order that I think we indicated in our cover letter was acceptable to the defendants except in one respect, and that single respect was that Mr. Gould's counsel initially objected, and the other individuals have joined, that we included once or twice in that order a sentence or phrase to the effect that Mr. Gould's summary judgment motion was set for January 8th. And our thinking was no more complicated than this. You can either sign the order as we submitted it, or you can interlineate that out and sign it. Because

otherwise it's a mutually acceptable order. And we'd like to have that signed as quickly as possible. 2 3 THE COURT: If Cassandra was here, I would ask if we had it. But she's not here. 5 MR. KRUM: We'll be happy to deliver another --6 THE COURT: Did you submit a competing order in Word format the way I require it? 8 MS. BANNETT: We didn't. We can do that if --9 THE COURT: Well, see, that creates a problem with me getting Mr. Krum an order if you intend to submit a 10 11 competing order in Word format. 12 MS. BANNETT: We can do that. We'll take care of that today. 13 MR. SEARCY: MR. KRUM: Actually, let us be helpful. 14 submit ours in Word, and we'll have one with and one without. 15 They objected to objectionable language. 16 MR. SEARCY: That's certainly acceptable, Your 17 18 Honor. That's perfect, as well. Either way you 19 THE COURT: 20 Just so I have the two versions in Word so I can look do it. at them and make a decision which is the most appropriate. 21 22 MR. KRUM: Will do, Your Honor. And to who -- I'm sorry, Your Honor. 23 MS. LEVIN: Τo 24 who do we send it? 25 THE COURT: Send it to

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kutinacd@clarkcountycourts.us. And

That's for my JEA and my law dept111c@clarkcountycourts.us. clerk.

So just so everybody remembers, I don't All right. think Mr. Gould is going to be at issue given my ruling, so I think he will only be involved as a witness, so I'm not addressing these comments to Ms. Bannett.

You know that Addressing them to you, Mr. Searcy. Nevada counsel has to be present at your side the entire trial.

> Thank you, Your Honor. MR. SEARCY:

THE COURT: So someone from the Cohen firm has to be here sitting there with you doing whatever it is they have to So if there becomes an issue on our quirky Eighth Judicial District Court rules or other unusual procedures in Nevada, you can turn to them and say, hey, really, and we can deal with it then.

MR. SEARCY: He has been sending me notes throughout the entire hearing, Your Honor.

I know he has. I know. Well, and THE COURT: you've had Mr. Edwards some and you've had Mr. Johnson some, and, you know, it's not like you haven't had one of them. just reminding you I'm not waiving it for the trial.

> MR. SEARCY: Thank you, Your Honor. I understand. THE COURT: All right. Anything else?

1	MR. KRUM: No, Your Honor.
2	THE COURT: Okay. When you meet with the IT folks
3	next week on Tuesday please make sure everything works. If
4	there are concerns, I would rather know about the problems
5	soon. We are still working with the facility across the
6	street.
7	MR. FERRARIO: Are we meeting over there?
8	THE COURT: Well, I'm not in charge of that. That's
9	Dulce.
10	THE CLERK: I think we're meeting in this courtroom,
11	but I want to confirm with Brandi. [Inaudible].
12	MR. FERRARIO: Whatever we do here will transfer
13	over there?
14	THE COURT: When Judge Bailess lets us. We are
15	serving at his pleasure. I don't have a courtroom.
16	MR. FERRARIO: If think if you say that like every
17	day on the record, some little
18	THE COURT: I have a meeting with County Management
19	next week. All right. What else?
20	MR. FERRARIO: I thought we were getting the big one
21	upstairs when they refurb it.
22	THE COURT: And when's that going to be, Mr.
23	Ferrario? How long do you think that construction project's
24	going to last?

MR. FERRARIO: I agree. Okay. That I do know.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? 1 No, Your Honor. 2 MR. KRUM: THE COURT: All right. So, Mr. Krum, Ms. Levin, 3 you're sending me the versions. I'm going to review them, I'm 4 going to sign one. We'll let you know which one is signed, 5 and then you do what you've got to do with the Supreme Court and ask them for the stay, because I've already denied it. 7 MR. KRUM: Understood. 8 THE COURT: And if they want to stay your trial, 9 they'll stay your trial. 10 Thanks, Your Honor. MR. KRUM: 11 MR. FERRARIO: Thank you, Your Honor. 12 MR. SEARCY: Thank you. 13 THE COURT: Otherwise I will have you guys visiting 14 with Dulce on the 2nd and visiting with me on the 5th. 15 THE PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 9:31 A.M. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

AFFIRMATION

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

FLORENCE HOYT
Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

FLORENCE M. HOYT, TRANSCRIBER

12/28/17

DATE

COURT EXHIBIT 1 READING INTERNATIONAL,INC. BOARD OF

DIRECTORS MEETING AGENDA

TO

12-28-18 HEARING ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND STAY

(TO BE FILED UNDER SEAL)

MORRIS LAW GROUP
411 E. BONNEVILLE AVE., STE. 360 · LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101
702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an Order Regarding Defendants' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's and Defendants' Motions *in Limine* was entered by this Honorable Court on the 28th day of December, 2017. A copy of the Order is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

MORRIS LAW GROUP

By: /s/ Akke Levin
Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543
Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102
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Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.

MORRIS LAW GROUP 1 E. BONNEVILLE AVE., STE. 360 · LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D) and E.D.C.R. 8.05, I certify that I am an employee of MORRIS LAW GROUP and that on the date below, I cause the following document(s) to be served on all interested parties as registered with the Court's E-Filing/E-Service System: NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER. The date and time of the electronic proof of service is in place of the date and place of deposit in the mail.

DATED this May of December, 2017.

By: <u>/s/ Linda P. Daniel</u>
An employee of Morris Law Group

EXHIBIT A

Oppp	•		Electronically Filed 12/28/2017 4:22 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
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Telephone:	213) 443-3000		
Attorneys fo	or Defendants Margaret Cotter,	•	
Ellen Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, Edward Kane			
Judy Coddir	ng, and Michael Wrotniak		
	EIGHTH JUDICIAI	DISTRICT C	COURT
	CLARK COU	NTY, NEVADA	A
		Case No.:	A-15-719860-B
	COTTER, JR. individually and you behalf of Reading	Dept. No.:	XI
Internation		Case No.: Dept. No.:	P-14-082942-E XI
	751 1. (200	_	• ••
ν.	Plaintiffs,	Related and	Coordinated Cases
	T COTTER, et al.,	BUSINESS	COURT
AND	Defendants.	ORDER RE	EGARDING DEFENDANTS'
		MOTIONS	FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
READING corporation,	INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevad	JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFF'S AND DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE	
	Nominal Defendant.	Judge:	Hon, Elizabeth Gonzalez
	·		ring: December 11, 2017 ring: 8:30 a.m.

THIS MATTER HAVING COME TO BE HEARD BEFORE the Court on December 11, 2017, Mark G. Krum, Steve Morris, and Akke Levin appearing for plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff"); James L. Edwards, Christopher Tayback, and Marshall M. Searcy III appearing for defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, Edward Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak (collectively, the "Individual Defendants"); Mark E. Ferrario and Kara B. Hendricks appearing for nominal defendant Reading International, Inc. ("RDI"); and Ekwan Rhow appearing for defendant William Gould ("Gould," together, with the Individual Defendants and RDI, "Defendants"), on the following motions:

- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 1) re: Plaintiff's Termination and Reinstatement Claims, and supplement thereto;
- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 2) re: The Issue of Director Independence, and supplement thereto;
- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 3) on Plaintiff's Claims Relating to the Purported Unsolicited Offer, and supplement thereto;
- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 5) on Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Appointment of Ellen Cotter as CEO, and supplement thereto;
- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 6) re: Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Estate's Option Exercise, the Appointment of Margaret Cotter, the Compensation Packages of Ellen Cotter and Margaret Cotter,

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and the Additional Compensation to Marg	aret Cotter and Guy
Adams, and supplement thereto;	

- Defendant Gould's Motion for Summary Judgment;
- Individual Defendants' Renewed Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony of Myron Steele Based on Supplemental Authority;
- Individual Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence That Is More Prejudicial Than Probative;
- Defendant Gould's Motion in Limine to Exclude Irrelevant Speculative Evidence;
- RDI's Motion to Redact Opposition to Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Ir.'s Motion in Limine No. 1 re: Advice of Counsel and File Exhibit "E" Under Seal;
- Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 1 re: Advice of Counsel;
- Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 2 re: the Submission of Merits-Related Evidence by Nominal Defendant Reading International, Inc.;
- Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 3 re: After-Acquired Evidence;
- Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibit 2 to Plaintiff James J. Cotter's Opposition to Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence That Is More Prejudicial Than Probative;
- Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibits 3-6, 8-9, 11-2 and to Redact Portions of Plaintiff's Supplemental Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Nos. 2 and 3 and Gould Summary Judgment Motion;

Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibits 7-11, and 15-17 to Plaintiff's Supplemental Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Nos. 2 and 5 and Gould Summary Judgment Motion; and

 Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibits 4 Through 11 to Plaintiff's Supplemental Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Nos. 2 and 6 and Gould Summary Judgment Motion.

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 1) re: Plaintiff's Termination and Reinstatement Claims is GRANTED with respect to Defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak because there are no genuine issues of material fact related to the disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors, and is DENIED with respect to Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, and Guy Adams because there are genuine issues of material fact related to the disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 2) re: The Issue of Director Independence is GRANTED with respect to Defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak because there are no genuine issues of material fact related to the disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors, and is DENIED with respect to Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, and Guy Adams because there are genuine issues of material fact related to the disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 3) on Plaintiff's Claims
Relating to the Purported Unsolicited Offer is GRANTED because of

Plaintiff's failure to show damages related to an unenforceable, unsolicited
nonbinding offer. While Plaintiff at trial cannot claim any damages arising
from Defendants' actions with respect to the Patton Vision indications of
interest, Plaintiff may still attempt to use evidence regarding the Patton
Vision indications to show a breach of fiduciary duty.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 5) on Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Appointment of Ellen Cotter as CEO is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 6) re: Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Estate's Option Exercise, the Appointment of Margaret Cotter, the Compensation Packages of Ellen Cotter and Margaret Cotter, and the Additional Compensation to Margaret Cotter and Guy Adams is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Defendant Gould's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT judgment in favor of Defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak is GRANTED on all claims asserted by Plaintiff.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Renewed Motion *in Limine* to Exclude Expert Testimony of Myron Steele Based on Supplemental Authority is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence That Is More Prejudicial Than Probative is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHERED ORDERED THAT Defendant Gould's

Motion in Limine to Exclude Irrelevant Speculative Evidence is DENIED as

premature, with the issues raised in the motion to be addressed at trial based upon the relevant foundation laid.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 1 re: Advice of Counsel is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion in Limine
No. 2 re: the Submission of Merits-Related Evidence by Nominal
Defendant Reading International, Inc. is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 3 re: After-Acquired Evidence is DENIED. However, to the extent that Plaintiff's retention and use of Highpoint Associates and Derek Alderton is admitted at trial, it will be admitted with an instruction limiting the evidence solely to the issue of Plaintiff's suitability as President and CEO of RDI.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT RDI's Motion to Redact Opposition to Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.'s Motion *in Limine* No. 1 re: Advice of Counsel and File Exhibit "E" Under Seal is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motions to Seal and/or Redact are GRANTED.

DATED this 28 day of December

_, 2017.

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THE THE TRANSPORTER

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PREPARED AND SUBMITTED BY:

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14	James J. Cotter, Jr.	Marke	
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15	CLARK CO	UNTY, NEVADA	
16	() 2) Case No. A-15-719860-B	
17	derivatively on behalf of Reading) Dept. No. XI	
18	International, Inc.,) Coordinated with:	
•	Plaintiff,	,)	
19	v.) Case No. P-14-0824-42-E	
20	NAADCADET COTTED ELLEN) Dept. No. XI	
21	MARGARET COTTER, ELLEN COTTER, GUY ADAMS,)) Jointly Administered	
22	EDWARD KANE, DOUGLAS)	
	McEACHERN, WILLIAM	MOTION FOR RULE 54(b)	
23	GOULD, JUDY CODDING, MICHAEL WROTNIAK,	CERTIFICATION AND STAY	
24	WHETAEL WROTHEN,	γ AND	
25	Defendants.	APPLICATION FOR ORDER	
26	And) SHORTENING TIME	
	READING INTERNATIONAL,) Her Olloylis	
27	INC., a Nevada corporation,) Heg. 01/04/18 @ 81304.4.	
28	* ⁻	A Chia Condition and	
	Nominal Defendant.)	
	Nominal Defendant.)	

MORRIS LAW GROUP BONNEVILLE AVE., STE. 360 - LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 - FAX 702/474-9422

Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff") hereby moves the Court on an emergency basis under Nev. R. Civ. P. 54(b) for an order certifying the portion of her December 28, 2017 Order that grants William Gould's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Gould MSJ"), grants defendants' motions for partial summary judgments Nos. 1 and 2 ("Partial MSJ Nos. 1 and 2") and dismisses defendants William Gould, Douglas McEachern, Edward Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak from the case as final. Plaintiff further moves the Court under EDCR 2.26 for an Order shortening time to notice and hear this Motion.

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DECLARATION OF AKKE LEVIN IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME

I, Akke Levin, declare:

- 1. I am an attorney with Morris Law Group, counsel for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this declaration except as to those stated on information and belief, which facts I have investigated and believe to be true. I would be competent to testify to them if called upon to do so.
- 2. On December 11, 2017, the Court heard oral argument on the individual defendants' Partial MSJs, Gould's MSJ, and some of the parties' motions *in limine*. The Court granted Partial MSJ No. 1 regarding Plaintiff's termination and reinstatement; Partial MSJ No. 2 regarding director independence; and Partial MSJ No. 3 regarding the unsolicited Patton Vision offer as to five of the eight defendants. The Court also granted defendant William Gould's MSJ on all claims. The Court further ruled in favor of Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak on all Plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claims asserted against them.
- 3. On December 18, 2017, Plaintiff submitted a motion for reconsideration of the Court's rulings on Partial MJS Nos. 1 and 2, Gould's MSJ, and the Court's dismissal of William Gould, Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak from the case. Plaintiff also submitted a Motion to Stay on December 26, 2017.
- 4. During the December 28, 2017 hearing, the Court denied Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Stay.
- 5. On December 28, 2017, the Court signed the order on Gould's MSJ, the individual defendants' Partial MSJs, and the MILs ("Order").

MORRIS LAW GROUP E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 · Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 703/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422

6. Good cause exists under EDCR 2.26 to shorten the time for
notice and hearing of this Motion for Rule 54(b) certification. Trial is set to
begin on January 8, 2018. The Court denied Plaintiff's Motion to Stay.
Plaintiff plans to seek immediate relief in the Nevada Supreme Court, but
the form of relief—direct appeal or writ petition—depends on whether the
Court will certify portions of the order as final. If this Motion for Rule 54(t
certification is set on the regular calendar, it would not be heard until after
trial begins. Plaintiff proposes a telephonic hearing with counsel on Friday
afternoon, December 29, 2017, so that Plaintiff may timely file his writ
petition or appeal immediately thereafter.

- 7. This Motion is being served by the court's E-Service System to all counsel of record.
- 8. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct

Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102

MORRIS LAW GROUP E. BONNEVILLE AVE., STE. 360 - LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101

ORDER SHORTENING TIME

On application of Akke Levin, counsel for plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr., and good cause appearing,

> Judge Elizabeth Coff Conzalez District Court Judge, Dept. 11

DATED: 29 Dee 17

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Court on December 11, 2017 dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims against five of the eight defendants because the Court found there were no issues of material fact as to their disinterestedness and independence. The Court's rulings were based the individual defendants' Partial MSJ Nos. 1 and 2 and Gould's MSJ. For the reasons stated below, the Court should certify as final its order (1) granting Gould's MSJ, (2) granting Partial MSJ Nos. 1 and 2, and (3) dismissing defendants William Gould, Douglas McEachern, Edward Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak. The Court should further stay the case pending Plaintiff's appeal. A proposed order is attached as Exhibit 1.

II. ARGUMENT

A. The Legal Basis for this Motion

NRCP 54 (b) provides, in relevant part:

(b) Judgment Involving Multiple Parties. When multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment

When "asked to certify a judgment based on the elimination of a party, [the district court] should first consider the prejudice to that party in being forced to wait to bring its appeal." *Mallin v. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 106 Nev. 606, 611, 797 P.2d 978, 981 (1990). "Second, the district court should consider the prejudice to the parties remaining below if the judgment is certified as final." *Id.* "[T]he fact that a decision by [the Nevada Supreme Court] will affect the decision below cannot be the deciding issue" and preclude a finding that there is no just reason to delay an appeal. *Id.* at 610, 797 P.2d at 981. "The district court should weigh the prejudice to the various parties and should certify a judgment as final in a 'parties' case if the

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prejudice to the eliminated party would be greater than the prejudice to the parties remaining below." *Id.* at 611, 797 P.2d at 981.

B. Plaintiff will be Severely Prejudiced If Required to Wait to Appeal.

Plaintiff will be severely prejudiced if required to wait to appeal, for a number of reasons.

First, as the remaining defendants have made clear, they will take the position that dismissal of this case as against the five individual director defendants severely limits the matters on which Plaintiff can base breach of fiduciary duty claims against the remaining defendants. In that regard, defendants have indicated that they will take the position that, with respect to any matter as to which a majority of the directors making or approving a decision have been dismissed by the Court, those matters alone may not serve as bases for breach of fiduciary duty claims against the remaining defendants. Any doubt that that is the position defendants intend to pursue is put to rest by Court Exhibit 1 to the December 28, 2018 hearing, which shows that the dismissed five director defendants intend to take action to formally ratify prior conduct as to which the remaining director defendants will not be able to show that a majority of the directors who made or approved the decision were disinterested and independent. For example, with respect to the 3-to-2 vote to terminate Plaintiff, the five dismissed director defendants intend to ratify that vote, and then allow the remaining defendants to argue that Adams' lack of independence does not matter and that the termination vote cannot serve as a basis for liability on his part. Thus, according to the remaining defendants, the Court's ruling dismissing the five director defendants effectively guts Plaintiff's case.

Second, as the remaining director defendants have previewed, they will take the position that dismissal of the case as against the five dismissed director defendants affects which party bears the burden of proof.

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With respect to matters as to which the Court has determined that the remaining defendants lacked disinterestedness, independence or both and therefore cannot invoke the statutory presumptions typically referred to as the business judgment rule, the remaining defendants will argue that the business judgment rule nevertheless applies because a majority of the directors who made or approved the challenged decision were found by the Court not to lack disinterestedness or independence and were dismissed. As to matters with respect to which they cannot show that a majority of the directors who made or approved the challenged decision were dismissed by the Court, the remaining defendants clearly intend to rely on the forthcoming ratification of those actions by the dismissed five director defendants. One example that illustrates this point is the 3-to-2 termination vote.

Third, and independent of the foregoing, Plaintiff is severely prejudiced because the jury is certain to be confused about why the same evidence showing breaches of fiduciary duty by a more than one director is introduced when fewer than all of the directors who engaged in such fiduciary breaches remained defendants. For example, as the Court has seen, the evidence will show clearly that Adams, Kane and McEachern threatened Plaintiff with termination if he did not resolve trust and estate disputes with his sisters on terms satisfactory to them. In particular, the evidence will show that at the board meeting adjourned in the early afternoon on May 29, 2015, the three told Plaintiff that the meeting would reconvene telephonically at 6:00 p.m. that evening and that they would vote to terminate him as President and CEO of RDI if he had not resolved the trust and estate disputes on terms satisfactory to his sisters. The likely and reasonable inferences jurors will draw from the fact that only Adams of the three remains a defendant is that extortionate conduct in furtherance of the

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interests of the sisters, not the interests of RDI, is not a breach of fiduciary duty.

Fourth, plaintiff's ability to present this case, which arises from an ongoing course of breaches of loyalty by directors who consistently and repeatedly deferred to the wishes of the controlling shareholders rather than protecting only the interests of the Company, is severely impaired.

C. The Remaining Defendants Will not be Prejudiced if the Order Dismissing the Five is Certified.

On the other hand, the remaining defendants will not be prejudiced, much less severely prejudiced, if the Court grants the rule 54(b) certification Plaintiff requests. Presumably they will complain about delay, but delay does not compare to substantive prejudice and, as a practical matter, they lack standing to complain, having effectively stayed this case for approximately a year by their writ practice regarding discovery matters. Indeed, the only "prejudice" to which the remaining defendants can cite is the possible loss of the ability to defend the case against them based on the Court's ruling dismissing the five, which will be lost only if this case is stayed. In other words, the remaining defendants will suffer no actual prejudice, much less severe prejudice, if the Court grants rule 54(b) certification.

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III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court should grant this Motion and certify under Rule 54(b) as final its order (1) granting Gould's MSJ, (2) granting Partial MSJ Nos. 1 and 2; and (3) dismissing defendants William Gould, Douglas McEachern, Edward Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak, and stay the case pending Plaintiff's appeal.

MORRIS LAW GROUP

By: Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543
Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102
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Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913 YURKO, SALVESEN & REMZ, P.C. 1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor Boston, MA 02108

Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D) and E.D.C.R. 8.05, I certify that I am an employee of MORRIS LAW GROUP and that on the date below, I cause the following document(s) to be served on all interested parties, as registered with the Court's E-Filing and E-Service System:

MOTION FOR RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION AND STAY AND APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME. The date and time of the electronic proof of service is in place of the date and place of deposit in the mail.

DATED this 29th day of December, 2017.

By: <u>/s/ Linda P. Daniel</u>
An employee of Morris Law Group

Exhibit 1

MORRIS LAW GROUP SONNEVILLE AVE., STE. 360 · LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 8910⁻ 707/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422

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THIS MATTER CAME BEFORE THE COURT on the Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification and Stay of plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff"). The Court, having considered any papers filed and arguments made in support of and in opposition to the Motion, and for good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification is GRANTED because Plaintiff will be severely prejudiced if required to wait to appeal and the remaining defendants will not be prejudiced if the Court's December 28, 2017 order dismissing defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak is certified.

The Court therefore finds and determines, under Nev. R. Civ. P. 54(b), that there is no just reason for delay and hereby directs entry of judgment as to defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak on all of Plaintiff's claims against them.

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1	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the case is stayed pending
2	Plaintiff's appeal.
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4	DATED this day of, 2017.
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7	THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH
8	GONZALEZ, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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10	Submitted by:
11	MORRIS LAW GROUP
12	
13	By: <u>/s/ Akke Levin</u> Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543
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17	Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913 YURKO, SALVESEN & REMZ, P.C.
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20	Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.
21	James J. Cotter, Jr.
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Steven D. Grierson **CLERK OF THE COURT OPPM** 1 **COHENJOHNSONPARKEREDWARDS** H. STAN JOHNSON, ESQ. 2 Nevada Bar No. 00265 3 siohnson@cohenjohnson.com 375 E. Warm Springs Rd., Suite 104 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 4 Telephone: (702) 823-3500 Facsimile: (702) 823-3400 5 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP 6 CHRISTOPHER TAYBACK, ESQ. California Bar No. 145532, pro hac vice 7 christayback@quinnemanuel.com 8 MARSHALL M. SEARCY, ESQ. California Bar No. 169269, pro hac vice 9 marshallsearcy@quinnemanuel.com 865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor 10 Los Angeles, CA 90017 Telephone: (213) 443-3000 11 Attorneys for Defendants Margaret Cotter, 12 Ellen Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, Edward Kane Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak 13 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 14 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 15 A-15-719860-B Case No.: 16 Dept. No.: JAMES J. COTTER, JR. individually and 17 derivatively on behalf of Reading P-14-082942-E Case No.: International, Inc., Dept. No.: \mathbf{XI} 18 Plaintiff, Related and Coordinated Cases 19 **BUSINESS COURT** MARGARET COTTER, et al., 20 Defendants. THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS' 21 **AND OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S** 22 **MOTION FOR RULE 54(b)** READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada CERTIFICATION AND STAY corporation, 23 Hon. Elizabeth Gonzalez Judge: Nominal Defendant. 24 Date of Hearing: January 4, 2018 25 Time of Hearing: 8:30 a.m.

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INTRODUCTION

At the hearing held on December 11, 2017, the Court determined that Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. failed to raise a genuine issue of triable fact as to the disinterestedness and/or independence of five of his fellow Reading International, Inc. ("RDI") directors: Michael Wrotniak, Judy Codding, Douglas McEachern, Edward Kane, and William Gould. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the Court's ruling, which the Individual Defendants opposed. At a hearing held on December 29, 2017, the Court denied Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and indicated that it would enter a written order later that day granting summary judgment in favor of Directors Wrotniak, Codding, McEachern, Kane, and Gould on all claims—which it subsequently did.

Immediately following the Court's denial of his motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff made an oral request for a stay pending his planned appeal of the Court's summary judgment order. Plaintiff argued that if a trial was held in the interim, the parties could face the prospect of multiple, conflicting appeals and "a do over" trial; Plaintiff also claimed that he would be prejudiced by certain legal and factual arguments that RDI and the Individual Defendants would make at trial in light of the Court's ruling. (See 12/29/17 Tr. at 18:23-20:17.) The Court denied Plaintiff's oral motion, noting that such risks occur any time a court grants partial summary judgment. (Id. at 19:18-19.) Instead, the Court emphasized its willingness to proceed with the scheduled trial starting on Monday, January 8, 2018, and to leave it to the Nevada Supreme Court to decide whether to stay the case pending Plaintiff's planned appeal. (Id. at 24:11-18.)

Following the conclusion of the December 29, 2017 hearing, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification and Stay. The Individual Defendants take no position as to the merits of Plaintiff's motion to the extent that he seeks certification pursuant to Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) that the Court's judgment is final as to Directors Wrotniak, Codding, McEachern, Kane, and Gould. To the extent that Plaintiff again seeks a stay, he does nothing more than repeat the same arguments he already has raised and the Court has rejected. Plaintiff's motion provides no valid reason to reconsider the Court's decision. Indeed, due to his myopic focus on the Rule 54(b) certification issue, Plaintiff does not address, let alone satisfy, the four-

factor test governing stays pending appeal in Nevada. As set forth below, Plaintiff cannot meet any—let alone all—of the elements required for such a stay. There is no basis for the Court to revisit its earlier ruling. Plaintiff's motion for a stay should be denied.

ARGUMENT

In Nevada, courts are to consider four factors when evaluating a request to stay trial pending an appeal: (1) whether the object of the appeal or writ petition will be defeated if the stay is denied; (2) whether appellant/petitioner will suffer irreparable or serious injury if the stay is denied; (3) whether respondent/real party in interest will suffer irreparable or serious injury if the stay is granted; and (4) whether appellant/petitioner is likely to prevail on the merits in the appeal or writ petition. See Hansen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct. In and For the Cnty. of Clark, 116 Nev. 650, 657, 6 P.3d 982, 986 (2000); NRAP 8(c). As demonstrated below, Plaintiff cannot meet any of these requirements.

I. THE OBJECT OF PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL WILL NOT BE DEFEATED IF A STAY IS DENIED

The object of Plaintiff's appeal is to seek the view of another court as to whether Directors Wrotniak, Codding, McEachern, Kane, and Gould are disinterested and independent as a matter of law with respect to a series of RDI Board decisions that he has challenged. Plaintiff has not waived his claims against these Individual Defendants, nor will he do so if this case proceeds to trial in the near future. Indeed, after trial, Plaintiff will be able to combine his appeal as to the Court's independence ruling with any other issues that he may seek to contest. Absent the "waiver" of an entire issue or defense, courts in Nevada do not consider the object of an appeal to be defeated. See Hansen, 116 Nev. at 657-58, 6 P.3d at 986 (because party's jurisdictional challenge, rejected by the district court, was preserved and could eventually be heard on appeal, no waiver existed and thus the object of appeal was not defeated); cf. Mikohn Gaming Corp. v. McCrea, 120 Nev. 248, 253, 89 P.3d 36, 39 (2004) (granting stay because allowing case to proceed in district court rather than in an arbitration would defeat the object of appeal). Because the object of Plaintiff's appeal will be preserved even if the parties proceed to trial on January 8, 2018, the first factor suggests that a stay is not warranted.

II. PLAINTIFF WILL NOT SUFFER IRREPARABLE OR SERIOUS INJURY IF THE STAY IS DENIED

In his motion, Plaintiff asserts that he will be "severely prejudiced" absent a stay pending appeal because RDI and the Individual Defendants will likely use the Court's summary judgment ruling to make arguments at trial that are not favorable to his case, including that the business judgment rule applies to certain transactions approved or ratified by a majority of disinterested, independent directors or that the behavior of purportedly interested directors (such as Guy Adams) was consistent with the behavior of other, legally-independent directors. (See Mot. at 7-9.) Plaintiff further contends that costs and efficiency weighs in favor of a stay, as the possibility of a second trial will be avoided. (Id.)

Neither argument has merit. As the Court recognized at the December 29, 2017 hearing, Plaintiff's substantive objections to proceeding to trial are no different from any plaintiff who has lost on a partial summary judgment motion. Nevada does not provide disgruntled plaintiffs with an automatic stay and right of immediate appeal simply because some of the original claims or defendants are no longer in the case. That the Individual Defendants may take advantage of a favorable summary judgment ruling to make arguments at trial plainly available based on the record and under governing law is a fact of litigation, not irreparable or serious injury to Plaintiff. See Hansen, 116 Nev. at 658, 6 P.3d at 987 (noting that "irreparable harm is harm for which compensatory damages would be inadequate, such as the sale of a home at trustee's sale, because real property is unique"). For instance, while Plaintiff complains about the RDI Board's votes on December 29, 2017 to ratify both Plaintiff's termination and the exercise of a share purchase option held by the Estate of James J. Cotter, Sr. (see Mot. at 7), this is simply evidence that the RDI Board and its directors continue to take action; indeed, the Board has held scores of meetings and voted on numerous matters since the filing of Plaintiff's lawsuit. That the Board continues to move forward is not grounds for delay, rather it is a reason for moving on to trial. The legal effect of the Board's ratification decision, which is now accomplished, is clear under NRS 78.140 and the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp., 122 Nev. 621, 636, 137 P.3d 1171, 1181 (2006). Of course, there are other grounds for a defense verdict

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separate and apart from independence and/or ratification, and the fact that the Court's independence decision made Plaintiff's factually unsupportable case more difficult legally for him is not the kind of irreparable or undue injury that supports delay.

Plaintiff's related contention that a second trial will be avoided is mere "speculation," and courts have rejected the possibility that a "do over" may result following an appeal as a valid basis to stay a case. See Busey v. Richland Sch. Dist., No. 2:13-CV-5022-TOR, 2016 WL 8938423, at *4 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2016) (denying certification and stay pending appeal because plaintiff's argument that a second trial would be avoided was "speculative"); Hansen, 116 Nev. at 658, 6 P.3d at 986-87 (noting that appellant's argument that, absent a stay, it would be "required to participate 'needlessly' in the expense of . . . trial" is "neither irreparable nor serious" injury). Indeed, every appeal, whether before or after trial, raises the specter of a potential second trial. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the second factor required for a stay pending appeal.

III. THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS WILL SUFFER SERIOUS INJURY IF A STAY IS GRANTED

Admittedly, "a mere delay in pursuing . . . litigation" does not normally constitute irreparable injury or serious harm. *Mikohn*, 120 Nev. at 253, 89 P.3d at 39. However, the Nevada Supreme Court has recognized that, "in certain cases," it may, and that possibility "should be considered in the stay analysis." *Id.* In this case, where the parties are two-and-a-half years removed from Plaintiff's termination that started it all, the Individual Defendants are rightfully concerned that they may suffer irreparable or serious injury if a stay is granted and the case stalls on the very eve of trial.

Since June 2015, the Individual Defendants have been repeatedly smeared in the press by a serious of wild, unsupportable accusations made entirely out of vindictiveness by a divisive, poorly-performing CEO who threatened to "ruin them financially" even before they terminated him. Others (such as the T2 plaintiffs) have brought follow-on suits against the Individual Defendants based solely on Plaintiff's claims only to discover that they are without merit, and have exited the litigation by settling on favorable terms. Not only have Plaintiff's baseless

allegations threatened the professional reputations and livelihood of the Individual Defendants, they have seriously affected the business operations of RDI as it seeks to move beyond the turmoil fostered by Plaintiff. Indeed, given Plaintiff's (untenable) reinstatement demand, RDI continues to face great uncertainty regarding its permanent leadership.

In any lengthy litigation where delays have occurred, important witnesses may forget relevant facts or become unavailable. However, here, where the business operations of a company and the lives of its directors continue to be harmed because the board made an informed business judgment to do what it thought was best for the company and its stockholders, it makes sense to avoid further injury and proceed to the planned trial. This is also true because there are dispositive issues—other than directorial independence—to be tried that may moot any appeal by Plaintiff. For example, if Plaintiff cannot prove at trial that he would be a suitable CEO, then the injunctive relief he seeks is moot; if Plaintiff cannot establish damages to RDI at trial, then his entire case fails. There is no valid reason to delay resolution of these issues just to allow Plaintiff another chance to revisit the Court's independence determination, which may be mooted by what happens at trial.

IV. PLAINTIFF IS UNLIKELY TO PREVAIL ON THE MERITS OF HIS APPEAL

In his motion, Plaintiff has not argued, let alone established, that he is likely to prevail on the merits of his appeal. The Court's decision to award summary judgment in favor of Directors Wrotniak, Codding, McEachern, Kane, and Gould followed multiple rounds of summary judgment briefing and a year of additional discovery pursuant to Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), which the Court allowed to ensure that Plaintiff had been given a full and fair opportunity to try to prove his claims. The Court held multiple oral arguments on Plaintiff's claims prior to its decision, and repeatedly asked whether there were any additional facts that Plaintiff wanted the Court to consider in determining the independence/disinterestedness issue. Moreover, the Court considered—and rejected—Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration in which he attempted to reargue the issues on which he lost. Absent any indication that Plaintiff is likely to prevail on his appeal of the Court's considered ruling (which he is not), a stay pending appeal is entirely unwarranted.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Individual Defendants respectfully request that the Court deny Plaintiff's Motion to Stay this case pending appeal. The Individual Defendants take no position on Plaintiff's request for certification under Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).

Dated: January 2, 2018

COHENJOHNSONPARKEREDWARDS

By: /s/ H. Stan Johnson

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Telephone: (702) 823-3500
Facsimile: (702) 823-3400 **OUINN EMANUEL URO**

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that, on January 2, 2018, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION AND STAY to be served on all interested parties, as
registered with the Court's E-Filing and E-Service System.

/s/ Sarah Gondek
An employee of Cohen|Johnson|Parker|Edwards

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I. INTRODUCTION

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By his "Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification and Stay..." (the "Motion"), plaintiff James J Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff") sought a rule 54 (b) certification of the Court's rulings that included dismissing five director defendants from the case, and sought a stay of the case before the Court pending disposition by the Nevada Supreme Court of issues arising from the Court's rulings dismissing the five director defendants.

The three remaining individual defendants filed an opposition (the "Opposition") which took no position on the certification request and argued against the request for a stay, making two principal arguments. The first was that, notwithstanding their position that the Court's rulings "made Plaintiff's ... case [against them] more difficult legally," requiring Plaintiff to proceed to trial against them does not cause Plaintiff serious injury or defeat an object of Plaintiff's appeal. The second is that the remaining defendants are entitled to defend the case against them at trial by using newly created evidence, namely, the December 29, 2017 "ratification" by the five dismissed director defendants of the only issues the three contend remain, namely, Plaintiff's termination and the authorization of the 100,000 share option, because (they contend) that "ratification" was merely an ordinary course of business action by the (other five) RDI directors. In truth, the purported ratification is nothing less than an effort to change the evidence and burden of proof at trial and, ultimately, the results of the trial against the remaining three defendants. This too creates obvious prejudice of Plaintiff and, in the process, undermines at least one object of Plaintiff's appeal. In taking these positions, the Opposition shows that the Motion should be granted, both as to the certification sought and as to the stay sought, for the reasons described below.

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A. An Object of Plaintiff's Appeal Will be Defeated, and Plaintiff Will Suffer Serious Prejudice and Harm, if a Stay is Denied.

As Plaintiff demonstrated in the Motion, because of (i) what defendants maintain are the legal consequences of the Court's dismissal of the five director defendants on the case against the remaining three defendants and, separately, (ii) actions the five dismissed defendants took on December 29 to attempt to ratify conduct of the three remaining defendants which indisputably remains a subject of the trial, one of the objects of the relief Plaintiff seeks and will seek from the Nevada Supreme Court, to avert changes in the applicable legal standards and possibly the evidence that may be fatal to his case against the three defendants, will be defeated if a stay is denied. As Plaintiff also demonstrated, he will be severely prejudiced if a stay is denied.

For example, Plaintiff in the Motion first argued as follows:

"First, as the remaining defendants have made clear, they will take the position that dismissal of this case as against the five individual director defendants severely limits the matters on which Plaintiff can base breach of fiduciary duty claims against the remaining defendants. In that regard, defendants have indicated that they will take the position that, with respect to any matter as to which a majority of the directors making or approving a decision have been dismissed by the Court, those matters alone may not serve as bases for breach of fiduciary duty claims against the remaining defendants."

(Motion at 7:7-15.)

In the Motion. Plaintiff also argued as follows:

Second, as the remaining director defendants have previewed, they will take the position that dismissal of the case as against the five dismissed director defendants affects which party bears the burden of proof. With respect to matters as to which the Court has determined that the remaining defendants lacked disinterestedness, independence or both and

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therefore cannot invoke the statutory presumptions typically referred to as the business judgment rule, the remaining defendants will argue that the business judgment rule nevertheless applies because a majority of the directors who made or approved the challenged decision were found by the Court not to lack disinterestedness or independence and were dismissed.

(Motion at 7:27-8:7.)

In their Opposition, the remaining three defendants do not dispute the foregoing. On the contrary, they tacitly admit it, stating:

"[T]he fact that the Court's independence decision made Plaintiff's ... case more difficult legally for him is not the kind of irreparable or undue injury that supports delay."

(Opposition at 4:1-2.)

The Opposition's conclusion of no irreparable or undue injury does not follow from the admission of their position regarding the legal and practical consequence of the Court's rulings. Instead, the erroneous conclusion of no irreparable or undue injury is predicated on the erroneous premise that the sole object of Plaintiff's writ and appeal is limited to "seek[ing] review of another court as to whether [the dismissed five] are disinterested and independent as a matter of law..." (Opposition at 2:14–17) and that "Plaintiff's substantive objections to proceeding to trial [therefore] are no different from any plaintiff who has lost a partial summary judgment motion" (Opposition at 3:10–13). The individual defendants are mistaken, as the Motion shows.

The legal and practical consequences of the relief Plaintiff seeks and will seek from the Nevada Supreme Court are not limited to the dismissed five. It also concerns the remaining three defendants, as the Motion demonstrates and as the Opposition tacitly acknowledges. Simply put, the statement in the Opposition "that the Court's independence decision

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makes Plaintiff's ... case more difficult legally" is a backhanded way of admitting the individual defendants' position that the Court's ruling dismissing the five director defendants eliminates as to the remaining three defendants every issue in the case (except for the two with respect to which those defendants on December 29 took actions to change the evidence and legal standard at the trial of the remaining three defendants, which is discussed below). As the Opposition acknowledges (Opposition at 2:20-22), that is exactly what Nevada courts hold amounts to defeating the object of an appeal. Separately, Plaintiff in the Motion also argued as follows:

As to matters with respect to which they cannot show that a majority of the directors who made or approved the challenged decision were dismissed by the Court, the remaining defendants clearly intend to rely on the forthcoming ratification of those actions by the dismissed five director defendants. One example that illustrates this point is the 3 to 2 termination vote.

(Motion at 8:8–13.)

Not only does the Opposition not dispute the foregoing, it affirmatively and boldly embraces it and previews the argument the three remaining defendants intend to make at trial, stating as follows:

> "[] Plaintiff complains about the RDI Board's votes Imeaning the vote of the five dismissed directors] on December 29, 2017 to ratify both Plaintiff's termination and the exercise of a share purchase option held by the Estate of James I Cotter. Sr.... The legal effect of the Board's ratification decision, which is now accomplished, is clear under NRS 78.140 and the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp., 122 Nev. 621, 636, 137 P.3d 1171, 1181 (2006)."

(Opposition at 3:19–28.)

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The foregoing is nothing less than an admission that the three remaining defendants, with the intervening assistance of the five dismissed defendants, intend to take advantage of the Court's rulings which are and will be the subject of review by the Nevada Supreme Court to alter the evidence proffered, to change the burden of proof applied and, ultimately, to change the results of the trial against the remaining three defendants. In taking that position, expressly in the Opposition, the three remaining defendants have made the case that proceeding with trial against them prior to resolution of the issues raised by the Court's rulings dismissing the five director defendants necessarily will require rulings by the Court at and/or before trial that will serve as additional bases for appeal by one side or both. Moreover, whether the recently created evidence should be admitted, and what it shows, are issues as to which Plaintiff will be required to take different positions than if the matters to be resolved by the Nevada Supreme Court were resolved first. As the foregoing illustrates, proceeding with trial under the circumstances puts the parties, Plaintiff in particular and the Court in some respects as well, in the position of "shooting at a moving target" and, in the process, severely prejudicing Plaintiff and undermining one of the objects of Plaintiff's writ and appeal.

II. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully submits that the Motion should be granted in all respects.

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By: <u>/s/ AKKE LEVIN</u>
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411 E. BONNEVILLE AVE, STE. 360 · LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422 Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913 YURKO, SALVESEN & REMZ, P.C. 1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor Boston, MA 02108 Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.

JA6252

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D) and E.D.C.R. 8.05, I certify that I am an employee of MORRIS LAW GROUP and that on the date below, I cause the following document(s) to be served via the Court's Odyssey E-Filing System: **REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION AND STAY**, to be served on all interested parties, as registered with the Court's E-Filing and E-Service System. The date and time of the electronic proof of service is in place of the date and place of deposit in the mail.

DATED this 3rd day of January, 2018.

By: <u>/s/ PATRICIA FERRUGIA</u>

		•	
MORRIS LAW GROUP 411 E. BONNEVILLE AVE, STE. 360 · LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28	· ·	Electronically Filed 1/4/2018 10:35 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT UNTY, NEVADA) Case No. A-15-719860-B) Dept. No. XI Coordinated with:) Case No. P-14-0824-42-E) Dept. No. XI Jointly Administered) ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION AND STAY) Date of Hearing: January 4, 2017 Time of Hearing: 8:30 a.m.

Case Number: A-15-719860-B

JA6254

MORRIS LAW GROUP E. BONNEVILLE AVE, STE. 360 · LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422

THIS MATTER CAME BEFORE THE COURT on the Motion for
Rule 54(b) Certification and Stay of plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff").
The Court, having considered any papers filed and arguments made in
support of and in opposition to the Motion, and for good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification is GRANTED because Plaintiff will be severely prejudiced if required to wait to appeal and the remaining defendants will not be prejudiced if the Court's December 28, 2017 order dismissing defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak is certified.

The Court therefore finds and determines, under Nev. R. Civ. P. 54(b), that there is no just reason for delay and hereby directs entry of judgment as to defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak on all of Plaintiff's claims against them.

m MORRIS~LAW~GROUP 411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 - Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 702/474-9400 - Fax 702/474-9422

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the case is
[]stayed;
not stayed pending Plaintiff's appeal.
DATED this day of January, 2018.
ENAM
THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Submitted by:

MORRIS LAW GROUP

By: /s/ Akke Levin
Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543
Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102

411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

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Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.

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Electronically Filed

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This matter came before the Court on December 28, 2017 for hearing on plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.'s Motion to Stay and Motion for Reconsideration or Clarification of Ruling on Motions for [Partial] Summary judgment Nos. 1, 2, and 3 and Gould's Summary Judgment Motion ("Motion for Reconsideration"). Mark G. Krum and Akke Levin appeared for plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff"); Marshall M. Searcy III appeared for defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, Edward Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak; Mark E. Ferrario appeared for nominal defendant Reading International, Inc.; and Shoshana Bannett appeared for defendant William Gould ("Gould").

The Court, having considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Stay, having heard oral argument of the parties, having considered (sealed) Court Exhibit 1, and for good cause appearing:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. Although the Court reviewed Court Exhibit 1, the Court finds it was not provided with new factual information or new legal analysis that would cause the Court to change its decision on Motions for Partial Summary Judgment Nos. 1, 2, and Gould's Motion for Summary Judgment.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Stay is DENIED.

DATED this day of 2018.

THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

411 E. BONNEVILLE AVE., STE. 360 · LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422 MORRIS LAW GROUP

Submitted	by:

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Electronically Filed 1/4/2018 11:28 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COUDT

COHENJOHNSONPARKEREDWARDS H. STAN JOHNSON, ESQ. 2 Nevada Bar No. 00265 sjohnson@cohenjohnson.com 3 375 E. Warm Springs Rd., Suite 104 4 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 Telephone: (702) 823-3500 5 Facsimile: (702) 823-3400 OUINN EMANUEL UROUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP 6 CHRISTOPHER TAYBACK, ESQ. 7 California Bar No. 145532, pro hac vice christayback@quinnemanuel.com 8 MARSHALL M. SEARCY, ESQ. California Bar No. 169269, pro hac vice 9 marshallsearcy@quinnemanuel.com 865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor 10 Los Angeles, CA 90017 Telephone: (213) 443-3000 11 Attorneys for Defendants Margaret Cotter, 12 Ellen Cotter, and Guy Adams 13 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 14 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 15 Case No.: A-15-719860-B Dept. No.: XI JAMES J. COTTER, JR. individually and 16 derivatively on behalf of Reading Case No.: P-14-082942-E International, Inc., 17 Dept. No.: XI 18 Plaintiff, Related and Coordinated Cases 19 MARGARET COTTER, et al., BUSINESS COURT Defendants. 20 THE REMAINING DIRECTOR AND **DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR** 21 JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada 22 corporation. APPLICATION FOR ORDER 23 Nominal Defendant. SHORTENING TIME 24 Hon. Elizabeth Gonzalez Judge: 25 Date of Hearing: Time of Hearing: 26 27

01-03-18P55:00 RC

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TO ALL PARTIES, COUNSEL, AND THE COURT:

Pursuant to Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56, Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, and Guy Adams (collectively, the "Remaining Director Defendants"), by and through their counsel of record, CohenlJohnsonlParkerlEdwards and Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, hereby submit this Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. The Remaining Director Defendants request that this matter be heard on an order shortening time.

This Motion is based upon the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of Noah S. Helpern, the pleadings and papers on file, and any oral argument that the time of a hearing on this motion.

Dated: January 3, 2018

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By: /s/ H. Stan Johnson / H. STAN JOHNSON, ESQ.

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Attorneys for Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, and Guy Adams

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1 I	ORDER SHORTENING TIME
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2	It appearing to the satisfaction of the Court and good cause appearing therefor, IT IS
3	HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, and Guy Adams'
4	(collectively, "Remaining Director Defendants") Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law shall
5	be heard before the above-entitled Court in Department XI, on the day of
6	January, 2018 at (a.m.)p.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard.
7	
8	Dated this day of January, 2018
9	
10	CIAV) D)
11	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
12	
13	PREPARED AND SUBMITTED BY:
14	COHENIJOHNSONIPARKERIEDWARDS
15	1111
16	By: H. STAN JOHNSON, ESQ.
17	Nevada Bar No. 00265
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I, Noah Helpern, state and declare as follows:

- 1. I am a member of the bar of the State of California, and am an attorney with Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP ("Quinn Emanuel"), attorneys for Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, and Guy Adams (the "Remaining Director Defendants"). I make this declaration based upon personal, firsthand knowledge, except where stated to be on information and belief, and as to that information, I believe it to be true. If called upon to testify as to the contents of this declaration (hereinafter referred to as "HD"), I am legally competent to testify to its contents in a court of law. This declaration is made in good faith and not for the purpose of delay.
- 2. Attached hereto as **Exhibit A** is a true and correct copy of the December 29, 2017 Notice of Entry of the Court's December 28, 2017 Order Regarding Defendants' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's and Defendants' Motions in Limine.
- 3. Attached hereto as **Exhibit B** is a true and correct copy of the draft Minutes of the Meeting of the Reading International, Inc. ("RDI") Board of Directors held on December 29, 2017, which remain subject to approval by the Board.
- 4. The Court's December 28, 2017 Order granted summary judgment in favor of RDI Directors William Gould, Douglas McEachern, Edward Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak on all claims following a determination that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to the disinterestedness and independence of each; the Court denied summary judgment, and left for trial, whether Directors Guy Adams, Ellen Cotter, and Margaret Cotter were disinterested and/or independent with respect to the transactions challenged by Plaintiff.
- 5. The Court's December 28, 2017 Order left only two transactions without the votes of a majority of legally disinterested, independent directors: (1) the actions taken by the Board up to and including Plaintiff's termination; and (2) the decision by RDI's Compensation Committee to allow the exercise of an option held by the Estate of James J. Cotter, Sr.
- 6. On December 29, 2017, the RDI Board held a Special Meeting in which the five directors found by this Court to be legally disinterested and independent (Gould, McEachern,

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Plaintiff's termination and the stock option exercise. The Remaining Defendant Directors Guy Adams, Ellen Cotter, and Margaret Cotter did not vote on the resolutions adopted by the Board. Pursuant to NRS 78.140(2)(a) and the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp., 122 Nev. 621, 636, 137 P.3d 1171, 1181 (2006), Nevada's business judgment rule therefore applies to the Board's actions relating to Plaintiff's termination and the stock option exercise because those decisions were ratified by a majority of disinterested, Given that the business judgment presumption applies to all Board actions challenged by Plaintiff and it is beyond dispute that each decision was attributable to a rational business purpose, Plaintiff cannot sustain any of his breach of fiduciary duty claims against any of the Remaining Director Defendants. Judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's fiduciary duty claims should therefore be awarded to the Remaining Director Defendants. Because Plaintiff cannot show a breach of fiduciary duty by any Defendant, he cannot establish the elements required for a cognizable aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claim. As such, his Fourth Cause of Action, asserted against Ellen and Margaret Cotter, also fails as a matter of law. Judgment on Plaintiff's aiding and abetting claim should therefore be awarded to Ellen and Margaret Cotter, leaving no actionable claims left for trial. Good cause exists to hear this motion on shortened time. Presenting this motion in the ordinary course would prevent the Court from ruling on it prior to the scheduled trial date.

Noah Helpern

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION

As a result of the Court's recent ruling, which granted summary judgment on all claims in favor of Reading International, Inc. ("RDI") Directors William Gould, Douglas McEachern, Edward Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak, all of the corporate "transactions" alleged by Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. to be actionable breaches of fiduciary duty were approved by a majority of disinterested, independent directors, save for two: (1) the actions taken by Board members leading up to and including the termination of Plaintiff as CEO and President of RDI; and (2) the RDI Compensation Committee's approval of the exercise of a stock option held by the Estate of James J. Cotter, Sr. With respect to those transactions, the outcome-determinative vote was cast by Director Guy Adams, and the Court concluded there were genuine issues of material fact as to his independence that precluded judgment as a matter of law in his favor.

Following the Court's decision, the full RDI Board convened a Special Meeting on December 29, 2017 at the request of the five disinterested, independent directors to reevaluate the two remaining transactions. Such reconsideration made logical sense, given that Plaintiff is asking that those Board decisions be re-reviewed through this litigation. This reexamination was also appropriate under NRS 78.140 and the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in *Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp.*, 122 Nev. 621, 636, 137 P.3d 1171, 1181 (2006), which provide that a transaction involving or depending on an interested director, such as—potentially—Mr. Adams, may become "valid" and subject to the business judgment rule following an informed ratification at any time.

After discussing Plaintiff's allegations as to the potential interestedness or non-independence of Mr. Adams, the independent directors addressed the challenged termination and stock option decisions at the Special Meeting. In doing so, they were informed by the Company's counsel, their own extensive knowledge of the applicable facts, their previous corporate board experience, and a further review of the contemporaneous RDI Board materials relevant to those decisions; the Board also allowed additional debate and comment. Ultimately, with Mr. Adams, Ellen Cotter, and Margaret Cotter not voting, the RDI Board voted 5-1 (with

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only Plaintiff dissenting) to ratify Plaintiff's termination and the Compensation Committee's stock option decision. With the RDI Board having met all of the legally-required criteria, Nevada's strong business judgment rule therefore applies to those "transactions," as it does to the other corporate decisions questioned by Plaintiff in this derivative suit. Because Plaintiff's 4 breach of fiduciary duty claims cannot survive upon an application of Nevada's business judgment rule and his aiding and aiding breach of fiduciary duty claim also fails without a cognizable breach, judgment in favor of the Remaining Director Defendants as to all claims is fully warranted. No trial is necessary: all challenged actions have either been approved or ratified by a disinterested majority of directors, meaning that, as a matter of law, RDI has suffered no damage, and only damage to the Company is at issue in this derivative litigation. 10

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court Granted Summary Judgment in Favor of Five Director A. Defendants on All Claims

Plaintiff filed his currently-operative Second Amended Complaint in this action on September 2, 2016, which asserts broad derivative claims for breach of the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, candor, and disclosure against the other eight current members of the Reading International, Inc. ("Reading") Board of Directors—Douglas McEachern, Edward Kane, William Gould, Judy Codding, Michael Wrotniak, Guy Adams, Ellen Cotter, and Margaret Cotter—as well as an additional claim for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty against Ellen and Margaret Cotter. (See Second Am. Compl. ("SAC") ¶¶ 173-200.) As Plaintiff subsequently clarified, his Second Amended Complaint identifies six "actions or transactions" by these RDI directors that he claimed were "independently entailing or constituting breaches of fiduciary duty": (1) the threat to terminate Plaintiff "if he did not resolve [the Cotter family] trust disputes"; (2) Plaintiff's actual termination; (3) the authorization of the exercise of the 100,000 share option to the Estate of James J. Cotter, Sr.; (4) the permanent CEO search, which resulted in Ellen Cotter's selection; (5) the decision to hire Margaret Cotter as Executive Vice President, Real Estate Development-New York; and (6) the Board's response to the indications of interest

presented by Patton Vision. (See, e.g., Pl.'s Opp'n to Ind. Defs.' Suppl. Mot. for Summ. J.

2 Nos. 1 & 2 at 5-6.)

In conformity with the case management schedule set forth by the Court, the Director Defendants moved for summary judgment on each of these issues, as well as generally as to all claims with respect to their independence and disinterestedness. At the hearing on the Director Defendants motions held on December 11, 2017, the Court determined that Plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of triable fact as to the disinterestedness and/or independence of Directors Wrotniak, Codding, McEachern, Kane, and Gould. In light of Nevada's strong business judgment rule and consistent with well-established law, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of these directors on all breach of fiduciary duty claims asserted by Plaintiff. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the Court's ruling, which the Director Defendants opposed. At a hearing held on December 28, 2017, the Court denied Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and indicated that it would enter a written order later that day granting summary judgment in favor of Directors Wrotniak, Codding, McEachern, Kane, and Gould on all claims—which it subsequently did. (See HD Ex. A (12/29/17 Notice of Entry of Order).)

B. <u>A Majority of Independent, Disinterested RDI Directors Subsequently</u> <u>Ratified the Board's Decision to Terminate Plaintiff and the Compensation</u> Committee's Decision to Permit the Exercise of a Share Purchase Option

Given the contours of the Court's summary judgment ruling, a majority of disinterested, independent RDI directors approved three of the transactions identified as "breaches" by Plaintiff, thereby triggering the application of Nevada's business judgment rule as to those decisions—the search for a permanent CEO of RDI, which culminated in the hiring of Ellen Cotter; the hiring of Margaret Cotter as Executive Vice President, Real Estate Development-New York; and the Board's decision not to further pursue the Patton Vision indication of interest after devoting two board meetings to the issue, hearing a management presentation on the Company's valuation, and discerning the intent of the controlling stockholders not to sell at that time.\(^1\) See

Discounting the votes of Guy Adams and Margaret Cotter, the selection of Ellen Cotter was approved by a vote of 5-1 (see Pl.'s Proposed Tr. Ex. 35); discounting the vote of Mr.

Pogo.com, Inc., No. Civ. A. 18532-NC, 2002 WL 1358760, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 14, 2002) ("Only upon a showing by a challenger that raises a reasonable doubt as to the independence and/or disinterestedness of a majority of a company's directors who approved the challenged transaction will the presumption of director fealty which lies at the core of the business judgment rule be rebutted.") (citation omitted).

In contrast, the Court's order left the following RDI Board decisions without a majority of disinterested, independent RDI directors voting in favor: (1) Plaintiff's June 12, 2015 termination, which was approved by legally-independent directors McEachern and Kane, as well as Mr. Adams and the Cotter sisters, for whom independence/disinterestedness remains a jury question; and (2) the September 21, 2015 decision by RDI's Compensation Committee, consisting of legally-independent director Kane and director Adams, to approve the use of Class A Stock to pay the exercise price of an option held by the Estate of James J. Cotter, Sr.

After the Court's order, Directors Gould, Kane, McEachern, Codding, and Wrotniak issued a call on December 27, 2017 for a special meeting of the RDI Board pursuant to Article II, Section 7 of the Company's Bylaws, which provides that "[u]pon the written request of a majority of the directors, the Chairman or Vice Chairman of the Board or the President shall call a special meeting of the Board to be held within two days of the receipt of such request."

Neither Director Adams nor Ellen or Margaret Cotter participated in the calling of the special meeting. (See HD Ex. B (12/29/17 RDI Board Minutes) at 3.) As indicated on the agenda distributed in advance, the purpose of the special meeting was for the RDI Board to discuss

Adams, the decision to hire Margaret Cotter was approved by a vote of 5-0 (see Pl.'s Proposed Tr. Ex. 207); and, discounting the votes of Mr. Adams and the Cotter sisters, the Board's response to the Patton Vision indication of interest was approved by a vote of 5-0. (See Pl.'s Proposed Tr. Ex. 387.) Other Board decisions periodically complained of by Plaintiff, but which—according to him—are not independently-actionable breaches, such as the appointments of Mr. Wrotniak and Ms. Codding as directors and the award of special compensation to Mr. Adams, were also taken by a majority of disinterested, independent directors. (See id.; see also Pl.'s Proposed Tr. Exs. 263, 380, 381.)

whether to reassess and potentially ratify the two decisions left at issue by the Court's summary judgment ruling—Plaintiff's termination and the share option exercise. (*Id.* at 3-4.)

The full RDI Board subsequently met on December 29, 2017. (*Id.*) Counsel for the Company was present, and updated the Board both on the status of this litigation as well as the content of Plaintiff's allegations as to why Mr. Adams was purportedly not "independent" with respect to the at-issue decisions. (*Id.*) Counsel further informed the Board as to the scope of NRS 78.140 ("Restrictions on Transactions Involving Interested Directors or Officers"), as well as the Board's fiduciary duties under Nevada law, including the duties of due care and loyalty. (*Id.* at 4.) Without conceding the independence or disinterestedness of any directors that remain as Defendants in this action, the RDI Board then proceeded to consider the actions taken leading up and including Plaintiff's termination, as well as the option decision. (*Id.* at 4-5.) Mr. Adams, as well as Margaret and Ellen Cotter, did not vote on either issue—leaving the discussion and ultimate decisions to the five disinterested, independent directors. (*Id.* at 4-6.)

1. The Ratification of Actions Taken by Board Members Relating to the Termination of Plaintiff as President and CEO of RDI

Following this introduction, Lead Independent Director Gould summarized the first issue for consideration: ratification of the actions taken by the Board members relating to the termination of Plaintiff as President and CEO of RDI, as such actions are outlined in the Minutes of the Board Meetings held on May 21, May 29, and June 12, 2015. (*Id.* at 4.) All directors were provided copies of the referenced Minutes. (*Id.*) In addition to their "thorough" review of the relevant Board materials, Directors Codding and Wrotniak, who were not yet members of the RDI Board at the time of Plaintiff's termination, stated that they were drawing on their "extensive knowledge about the Board's reasons for the termination of Mr. Cotter, Jr.," including their observations of Plaintiff's "behavior and demeanor in Board meetings" since each joined over two years ago. (*Id.*) Ms. Codding expressed her view that Plaintiff "did not possess the knowledge, ability or demeanor to be chief executive officer of the Company," an opinion with which Mr. Wrotniak concurred. (*Id.*) Discussion then ensued regarding the Board materials, including the fact that Plaintiff had retained an outside consultant, Highpoint Associates, to assist

him in his CEO duties—a fact that he did not disclose to the Board prior to his termination. (Id. at 4-5.)

Director McEachern then made a motion, seconded by Ms. Codding, as follows:

BE IT HEREBY RESOLVED that the Board ratifies the actions taken by the Company's board members relating to the termination of James J. Cotter, Jr. as President and CEO as such actions are outlined in the minutes of the Board meetings held on May 21, 2015, May 29, 2015, and June 12, 2015.

(*Id.* at 5.) After debate and further discussion, including an opportunity by Plaintiff to make comments, the proposed resolution was adopted by Directors Codding, Gould, Kane, McEachern, and Wrotniak, with Plaintiff casting the sole vote in opposition. (*Id.*) Plaintiff characterized the ratification as simply being a litigation device (*id.*), despite the fact that the five ratifying directors were no longer parties to his derivative litigation and have no personal stake in whether the litigation goes forward.

2. The Ratification of the Compensation Committee's Decision to Approve the Exercise of a Share Purchase Option Held by the Cotter, Sr. Estate

Director Gould then introduced the second issue for consideration: ratification of the September 21, 2015 decision by RDI's Compensation Committee to permit the Estate of James J. Cotter, Sr. to use Class A non-voting stock as the means of payment (as opposed to cash) for the exercise of an option to purchase 100,000 shares of Class B voting stock in RDI. (*Id.*) Counsel for the Company summarized the information regarding the matter considered by the Compensation Committee in 2015, including the fact that acceptance of stock was within the discretion of the Compensation Committee as Administrators of the 1999 Stock Option Plan under which the stock option was granted. (*Id.*) The disinterested, independent Board members then generally expressed their awareness of the information as well as their review of the relevant Board materials and Compensation Committee minutes, and opened the floor up for debate, including comment by Plaintiff. (*Id.*)

A motion was made and seconded, as follows:

BE IT HEREBY RESOLVED that the Board ratifies the decision of the Compensation Committee of the Company, as outlined in the minutes of its September 21, 2015 meeting, to permit the Estate of James J. Cotter, Sr. to use Class A non-voting

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(Id. at 6.) The proposed resolution was then adopted by Directors Codding, Gould, Kane, McEachern, and Wrotniak, with Plaintiff casting the sole vote in opposition. (Id.) Again, Plaintiff complained that the ratification vote was taken solely for a "litigation purpose" (id. at 5-6) despite the fact that the ratifying directors have no personal stake in any relevant litigation.

The Board then moved, without objection, that its resolutions include the "authorization to take such other actions as may be necessary to accomplish the matters approved herein." (*Id.* at 6.) Given the legal impact of the ratification of these previous decisions by a majority of disinterested, independent directors under NRS 78.140 and Nevada Supreme Court precedent, the Remaining Director Defendants now bring this Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law as to all claims asserted by Plaintiff.

ARGUMENT

I. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE APPLIES TO ALL DECISIONS COMPLAINED OF BY PLAINTIFF

NRS 78.140 provides, in relevant part, that a "transaction" by a Nevada corporation such as RDI "is not void or voidable" because an interested or non-independent director is present during a meeting or joins in a board resolution approving the transaction if "[t]he fact of the common directorship, office or financial interest is known to the board of directors or committee, and the directors or members of the committee, other than any common or interested directors or members of the committee, approve or *ratify* the contract or transaction in good faith." NRS 78.140(2)(a) (emphasis added). Citing NRS 78.140, the Nevada Supreme Court has made clear that the business judgment rule applies "in the context of *valid* interested director action, or the valid exercise of business judgment by disinterested directors in light of their fiduciary duties." *Shoen*, 122 Nev. at 636, 137 P.3d at 1181 (emphasis added).

Here, all of the requirements for the application of NRS 78.140, and thus the business judgment rule, are met with respect to the Board's actions relating to Plaintiff's termination and the approval of the contested option exercise. All members of the RDI Board have long been aware of Plaintiff's claims that Mr. Adams, Ellen Cotter, and Margaret Cotter are interested or

not independent in light of their financial interests. Plaintiff made such allegations at the time of his termination, and in every iteration of his complaints; indeed, Plaintiff has not alleged that Mr. Adams' purported conflicts were not "known," but rather that RDI's directors went forward in the face of these known conflicts. (See, e.g., SAC ¶ 1, 6, 21, 33, 35, 37, 48, 49, 64-71.) The RDI Board has also repeatedly discussed Plaintiff's allegations at various board meetings, including at the December 29, 2017 Special Meeting. (See HD Ex. B (12/29/17 RDI Board Minutes) at 3-4 (corporate counsel summarizing allegations of interestedness/non-independence against Director Adams).) Thus, the "fact" of the "financial interest" alleged by Plaintiff was certainly "known to the board of directors" at the time a majority of independent, disinterested directors made their ratification decisions on December 29, 2017, as required by NRS 78.140(2)(a).

Moreover, as required by NRS 78.140(2)(a), the RDI Board ratified each of the remaining challenged "transactions" by a 5-1 vote, counting only the votes of those directors whom this Court has determined to be disinterested and independent as a matter of law. (*See* HD Ex. B (12/29/17 RDI Board Minutes) at 5-6.) And the December 29, 2017 ratification vote was certainly "in good faith": the directors who were not present at the time these matters were initially decided, Mr. Wrotniak and Ms. Codding, made an effort to inform themselves of the relative merits of the decisions, including by reviewing contemporaneous materials and drawing on their personal knowledge gleaned in their two years of Board service; corporate counsel was present and advised the entire Board of its fiduciary duties under Nevada law, as well as the history of each decision; no ratifying director had a personal stake in the derivative litigation brought by Plaintiff; and discussion and debate occurred prior to the final votes, with all directors—including Plaintiff—afforded the chance to ask questions or make comments. (*See id.*) Accordingly, all of the preconditions necessary for a "valid interested director transaction" under NRS 78.140(2)(a), and thus the application of the business judgment rule under *Shoen*, are present.²

In taking this ratification action and making this argument, the Remaining Director Defendants do not concede that Mr. Adams, Ellen Cotter, or Margaret Cotter are interested or not

Significantly, nothing in the text of NRS 78.140 places any deadline or time limitation—upon ratification. In fact, the Nevada Supreme Court in *In re Amerco Deriv. Litig.*, 127 Nev. 196, 252 P.3d 681 (2011), acknowledged that a ratification that occurred years after the challenged conduct could have a potentially case-dispositive effect. *See* 127 Nev. at 217, 252 P.3d at 697, n. 6 (noting that a ratification that had apparently occurred in 2007, after the *Shoen* remand, could have had a dispositive effect, but refusing to reach the issue because it was raised for the first time on appeal); *see also id.*, 127 Nev. at 233, 252 P.3d at 707 n.4 (Pickering, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that "this issue is potentially dispositive in this case"). Nor should a deadline be unilaterally imposed here, especially given that Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief to reverse his June 12, 2015 termination and to be forcibly reinstated as RDI's CEO and President; as such, it makes logical sense that the present RDI Board can still reevaluate the actions leading up to and involving his termination, and either reverse or ratify the earlier decisions.

Here, because the RDI Board properly ratified the earlier termination and option approval actions in conformity with NRS 78.140, "valid interested director" transactions are present and the business judgment rule applies—as it does to those transactions that the Court has already found to be the product of actions by a majority of disinterested, independent directors.

II. JUDGMENT ON ALL BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS IN FAVOR OF THE REMAINING DIRECTOR DEFENDANTS IS WARRANTED UNDER THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE

In this litigation, Plaintiff has never contested that if the business judgment rule were to apply, his fiduciary duty claims would fail as a matter of law; instead, his entire argument has been that the business judgment rule does not apply. The business judgment rule is a "presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company." *Shoen*, 122 Nev. at 632, 137 P.3d at 1178-79 (citation omitted); *see*

independent; rather, they continue to believe that Mr. Adams was not on both sides of any disputed transaction and satisfies the legal definition of a disinterested, independent director. Similarly, the Remaining Director Defendants do not concede the relevance of any independence/disinterestedness determination under Nevada law to any of the claims at issue.

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also NRS 78.138(3) (codifying the rule under Nevada law). "The business judgment rule postulates that if directors' actions can arguably be taken to have been done for the benefit of the corporation, then the directors are presumed to have been exercising their sound business judgment rather than to have been responding to self-interest motivation." Horwitz v. SW. Forest Indus., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1130, 1135 (D. Nev. 1985).

As the Nevada Supreme Court has stressed, "even a bad decision is generally protected by the business judgment rule" Shoen, 122 Nev. at 636, 137 P.3d at 1181, and the rule protects corporate decisions whenever they can be "attributed to any rational business purpose." Katz v. Chevron Corp., 22 Cal. App. 4th 1352, 1366 (1994). Courts have routinely found that the same concerns that animated the majority of RDI directors in their termination and share option decisions to be valid business judgments, immune from any claims under the operation of the business judgment rule. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 72-73 (Del. 2006) (fact that a company's CEO cannot "work well" with its directors or executives, and requires "close and constant supervision," is a valid basis for terminating the officer, and is a decision protected by the business judgment rule); Carlson v. Hallinan, 925 A.2d 506, 540 n.232 (Del. Ch. 2006) (where "the evidence indicated that Carlson was not effective in the role of President of CR and that he had important managerial shortcomings," "firing him could have fostered CR's welfare" and was thus protected by the business judgment rule); Franklin v. Tex. Int'l Petroleum Corp., 324 F. Supp. 808, 813 (W.D. La. 1971) (an officer's "inability to perform adequately" and lack of "experience, expertise, and proper degree of affability" are protected reasons under the business judgment rule for his or her termination).

In light of the Board's recent ratifications, all of the RDI Board transactions challenged by Plaintiff are protected by Nevada's strong business judgment rule. Because Plaintiff has not shown, and cannot establish, that the challenged transactions were not attributable to any rational business purpose, all of his breach of fiduciary duty claims are legally untenable. No trial on them is necessary. Judgment as a matter of law should be awarded to the Remaining Director Defendants on all breach of fiduciary duty claims.

III. ABSENT ANY COGNIZABLE BREACH, JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S AIDING AND ABETTING BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS IN FAVOR OF ELLEN AND MARGARET COTTER IS APPROPRIATE

In addition to his untenable breach of fiduciary duty claims against Mr. Adams, Ellen Cotter, and Margaret Cotter, Plaintiff has also asserted a claim against Ellen and Margaret Cotter for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, in which he contends that his sisters "solicited and aided and abetted the decisions and actions of" the other RDI Directors that he claims constituted breaches of his fiduciary duties. (See SAC ¶ 193-200.) In Nevada, "[a]iding and abetting the breach of a fiduciary duty has four required elements: (1) there must be a fiduciary relationship between the two parties, (2) that the fiduciary breached, (3) the defendant knowingly and substantially participated in or encouraged that breach, and (4) the plaintiff suffered damage as a result of the breach." Guilfoyle v. Olde Monmouth Stock Transfer Co., Inc., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 78, 335 P.3d 190, 198 (2014); see also In re Amerco Deriv. Litig., 127 Nev. at 225, 252 P.3d at 701 (same).

Given that the Court has awarded summary judgment to Directors Gould, Kane, McEachern, Codding, and Wrotniak on all breach of fiduciary duty claims against them, Plaintiff cannot sustain an "aiding and abetting" claim against Ellen and Margaret Cotter based on any of those directors' purported "breaches," as one cannot aid and abet a breach that does not exist. See Lift Certification Co. v. Thomas, No. A521533, 2008 WL 8588925 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2008) (because "Thomas did not breach his duty of loyalty to his employer Lift, while he prepared to change employment and compete with Lift, . . . it is not legally possible for American Equipment to have committed the Tort of Civil Aiding and Abetting"); Manzo v. Rite Aid Corp., No. Civ. A. 18451-NC, 2002 WL 31926606, at *6 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 2002) ("Because the breach of fiduciary duty claims are dismissed with prejudice, the claim against KPMG for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty is similarly dismissed with prejudice."). With respect to Director Adams, the fact that a majority of disinterested, independent RDI directors has now either approved or ratified all challenged transactions involving Mr. Adams is further evidence that he did not commit any breach of fiduciary duty, since any bias he could even conceivably have obviously did not affect his actual decisions, which were fully consistent

with those of legally disinterested, independent directors. Moreover, the fact that Mr. Adams is only one of eight directors and he voted either along with a majority of disinterested directors or had his decisions ratified by a majority of such directors means that any purported "breach" by him did not cause any damages to RDI. Plaintiff's failure to show causal damages with respect to Mr. Adams, another required element, provides yet another reason why Plaintiff's aiding and abetting claim against Ellen and Margaret Cotter is unsustainable.³ Accordingly, judgment as a matter of law also should be awarded to Ellen and Margaret Cotter on Plaintiff's aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claim—leaving no viable claims for trial. **CONCLUSION** For the reasons set forth above, the Remaining Director Defendants respectfully request that the Court grant their Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law.

Dated: January 3, 2018

COHENJOHNSONPARKEREDWARDS

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³ Even separate from the fact that a majority of disinterested, independent directors approved or ratified the at-issue transactions, Plaintiff cannot show cognizable damages to RDI as a result of the conduct he has identified—as the Director Defendants have previously emphasized. (See, e.g., Ind. Defs.' Mot. for Summ J. (No. 1) at 22-23; Ind. Defs.' Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 19-20; Ind. Defs.' Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (No. 1) at 17-19.)

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5	Cotter, and Guy Adams
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EXHIBIT A

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Pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D) and E.D.C.R. 8.05, I certify that I am an employee of MORRIS LAW GROUP and that on the date below, I cause the following document(s) to be served on all interested parties as registered with the Court's E-Filing/E-Service System: NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER. The date and time of the electronic proof of service is in place of the date and place of deposit in the mail.

DATED this Aday of December, 2017.

By: <u>/s/ Linda P. Daniel</u>
An employee of Morris Law Group

EXHIBIT A

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CLERK OF THE COUR ORDR COHEN|JOHNSON|PARKER|EDWARDS H. STAN JOHNSON, ESQ. 1 2 Nevada Bar No. 00265 sjohnson@cohenjohnson.com 3 375 E. Warm Springs Rd., Suite 104 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 4 Telephone: (702) 823-3500 Facsimile: (702) 823-3400 5 OUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP 6 CHRISTOPHER TAYBACK, ESQ. California Bar No. 145532, pro hac vice 7 christayback@quinnemanuel.com MARSHALL M. SEARCY, ESQ. 8 California Bar No. 169269, pro hac vice marshallsearcy@quinnemanuel.com 865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017 10 Telephone: (213) 443-3000 11 Attorneys for Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, Edward Kane 12 Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak 13 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 14 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 15 Case No.: A-15-719860-B Dept. No.: XI 16 JAMES J. COTTER, JR. individually and derivatively on behalf of Reading P-14-082942-E Case No.: 17 International, Inc., Dept. No.: XI 18 Plaintiffs, Related and Coordinated Cases 19 **BUSINESS COURT** MARGARET COTTER, et al., 20 Defendants. ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS' AND 21 MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFF'S AND READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada 22 **DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE** corporation. 23 Hon. Elizabeth Gonzalez Judge: Nominal Defendant. 24 Date of Hearing: December 11, 2017 25 Time of Hearing: 8:30 a.m.

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THIS MATTER HAVING COME TO BE HEARD BEFORE the Court on December 11, 2017, Mark G. Krum, Steve Morris, and Akke Levin appearing for plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff"); James L. Edwards, Christopher Tayback, and Marshall M. Searcy III appearing for defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, Edward Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak (collectively, the "Individual Defendants"); Mark E. Ferrario and Kara B. Hendricks appearing for nominal defendant Reading International, Inc. ("RDI"); and Ekwan Rhow appearing for defendant William Gould ("Gould," together, with the Individual Defendants and RDI, "Defendants"), on the following motions:

- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 1) re: Plaintiff's Termination and Reinstatement Claims, and supplement thereto;
- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 2) re: The Issue of Director Independence, and supplement thereto;
- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 3) on Plaintiff's Claims Relating to the Purported Unsolicited Offer, and supplement thereto;
- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 5) on Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Appointment of Ellen Cotter as CEO, and supplement thereto;
- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 6) re: Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Estate's Option Exercise, the Appointment of Margaret Cotter, the Compensation Packages of Ellen Cotter and Margaret Cotter,

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1		and the Additional Compensation to Margaret Cotter and Guy
2	•	Adams, and supplement thereto;
3	•	Defendant Gould's Motion for Summary Judgment;
4	•	Individual Defendants' Renewed Motion in Limine to Exclude
5		Expert Testimony of Myron Steele Based on Supplemental
6		Authority;
7	•	Individual Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence
8		That Is More Prejudicial Than Probative;
9	•	Defendant Gould's Motion in Limine to Exclude Irrelevant
10	·	Speculative Evidence;
11	•	RDI's Motion to Redact Opposition to Plaintiff James J. Cotter,
12		Jr.'s Motion in Limine No. 1 re: Advice of Counsel and File
13		Exhibit "E" Under Seal;
14	•	Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 1 re: Advice of Counsel;
15	•	Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 2 re: the Submission of Merits-
16		Related Evidence by Nominal Defendant Reading
17		International, Inc.;
18	•	Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 3 re: After-Acquired Evidence;
19	•	Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibit 2 to Plaintiff James J. Cotter's
20		Opposition to Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence That Is
21		More Prejudicial Than Probative;
22		Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibits 3-6, 8-9, 11-2 and to Redact
23		Portions of Plaintiff's Supplemental Opposition to Motion for
24		Summary Judgment Nos. 2 and 3 and Gould Summary
25		Judgment Motion;
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- Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibits 7-11, and 15-17 to Plaintiff's Supplemental Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Nos. 2 and 5 and Gould Summary Judgment Motion; and
- Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibits 4 Through 11 to Plaintiff's Supplemental Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Nos. 2 and 6 and Gould Summary Judgment Motion.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 1) re: Plaintiff's Termination
and Reinstatement Claims is GRANTED with respect to Defendants
Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and
Michael Wrotniak because there are no genuine issues of material fact
related to the disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors,
and is DENIED with respect to Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter,
and Guy Adams because there are genuine issues of material fact related to
the disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 2) re: The Issue of Director Independence is GRANTED with respect to Defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak because there are no genuine issues of material fact related to the disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors, and is DENIED with respect to Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, and Guy Adams because there are genuine issues of material fact related to the disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 3) on Plaintiff's Claims
Relating to the Purported Unsolicited Offer is GRANTED because of

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Plaintiff's failure to show damages related to an unenforceable, unsolicited, nonbinding offer. While Plaintiff at trial cannot claim any damages arising from Defendants' actions with respect to the Patton Vision indications of interest, Plaintiff may still attempt to use evidence regarding the Patton Vision indications to show a breach of fiduciary duty.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 5) on Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Appointment of Ellen Cotter as CEO is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 6) re: Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Estate's Option Exercise, the Appointment of Margaret Cotter, the Compensation Packages of Ellen Cotter and Margaret Cotter, and the Additional Compensation to Margaret Cotter and Guy Adams is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Defendant Gould's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT judgment in favor of Defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak is GRANTED on all claims asserted by Plaintiff.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Renewed Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony of Myron Steele Based on Supplemental Authority is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence That Is More Prejudicial Than Probative is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHERED ORDERED THAT Defendant Gould's Motion in Limine to Exclude Irrelevant Speculative Evidence is DENIED as

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premature, with the issues raised in the motion to be addressed at trial based upon the relevant foundation laid.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 1 re: Advice of Counsel is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion in Limine
No. 2 re: the Submission of Merits-Related Evidence by Nominal
Defendant Reading International, Inc. is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion in Limine
No. 3 re: After-Acquired Evidence is DENIED. However, to the extent that
Plaintiff's retention and use of Highpoint Associates and Derek Alderton is
admitted at trial, it will be admitted with an instruction limiting the
evidence solely to the issue of Plaintiff's suitability as President and CEO of
RDI.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT RDI's Motion to Redact Opposition to Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.'s Motion *in Limine* No. 1 re: Advice of Counsel and File Exhibit "E" Under Seal is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motions to Seal and/or Redact are GRANTED.

DATED this 28 day of December

_, 2017.

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PREPARED AND SUBMITTED BY:

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Attorneys for Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, Edward Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak

EXHIBIT B

FILED UNDER SEAL

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il	ٽب	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27	MORRIS LAW GROUP Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543 Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102 411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Telephone: (702) 474-9400 Facsimile: (702) 474-9422 Email: sm@morrislawgroup.com Email: al@morrislawgroup.com Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913 Yurko, Salvesen & Remz, P.C. 1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor Boston, MA 02108 Telephone: (617) 723-6900 Facsimile: (617) 723-6905 Email: mkrum@bizlit.com Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. DISTR CLARK CO JAMES J. COTTER, JR., derivatively on behalf of Reading International, Inc., Plaintiff, v. MARGARET COTTER, ELLEN COTTER, GUY ADAMS, EDWARD KANE, DOUGLAS McEACHERN, WILLIAM GOULD, JUDY CODDING, MICHAEL WROTNIAK, Defendants. And READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada corporation,	ICT COURT UNTY, NEVADA Case No. A-15-719860-B Dept. No. XI Case No. P-14-0824-42-E Dept. No. XI Jointly Administered

Case Number: A-15-719860-B

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MORRIS LAW GROUP 11 E. BONNEVILLE AVE., STE. 360 - LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 - FAX 702/474-9422

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification and Stay was entered in this action on the 4th day of January, 2018.

A copy of the Order is attached as Exhibit 1.

MORRIS LAW GROUP

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Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102
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Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913 YURKO, SALVESEN & REMZ, P.C. 1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor Boston, MA 02108

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D) and E.D.C.R. 8.05, I certify that I am an employee of MORRIS LAW GROUP and that on the date below, I cause the following document(s) to be served via the Court's Odyssey E-Filing System: NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER, to be served on all interested parties, as registered with the Court's E-Filing and E-Service System. The date and time of the electronic proof of service is in place of the date and place of deposit in the mail.

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Cohen-Johnson, LLC	
255 East Warm Springs Road, Ste. 110)
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Donald A. Lattin Carolyn K. Renner Maupin, Cox & LeGoy 4785 Caughlin Parkway Reno, Nevada 89519

Christopher Tayback Marshall Searcy Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP 865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor Los Angeles, CA

Ekwan E. Rhow Shoshana E. Bannett Bird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert, Nessim, Drooks, Lincenberg & Rhow, P.C. 1875 Century Park East, 23rd Fl. Los Angeles, CA 90067-2561

Attorneys for /Defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, Judy Codding, and

> Attorneys for Defendant William Gould

Michael Wrotniak Mark Ferrario

Kara Hendricks Tami Cowden Greenberg Traurig, LLP 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway Suite 400 North Las Vegas, NV 89169

Attorneys for Nominal Defendant Reading International, Inc.

day of January, 2018.

EXHIBIT 1

JA6297

Electronically Filed

MORRIS LAW GROUP BONNENILE AVE, STE. 360 - LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89701 702/474-9400 - FAX 702/474-9422

THIS MATTER CAME BEFORE THE COURT on the Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification and Stay of plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff"). The Court, having considered any papers filed and arguments made in support of and in opposition to the Motion, and for good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification is GRANTED because Plaintiff will be severely prejudiced if required to wait to appeal and the remaining defendants will not be prejudiced if the Court's December 28, 2017 order dismissing defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak is certified.

The Court therefore finds and determines, under Nev. R. Civ. P. 54(b), that there is no just reason for delay and hereby directs entry of judgment as to defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak on all of Plaintiff's claims against them.

MORRIS LAW GROUP 11E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 • Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 702/474-9400 • FAX 702/474-9422

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the case is [] stayed; not stayed pending Plaintiff's appeal.

DATED this ____ day of January, 2018.

THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH
GONZALEZ,
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Submitted by:

MORRIS LAW GROUP

By: /s/ Akke Levin
Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543
Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102
411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913 YURKO, SALVESEN & REMZ, P.C. 1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor Boston, MA 02108

Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.

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MORRIS LAW GROUP 411 E. BONNEVILLE AVE., STE. 360 · LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28	l t	Electronically Filed 1/4/2018 5:26 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT UNTY, NEVADA) Case No. A-15-719860-B) Dept. No. XI) Coordinated with:) Case No. P-14-0824-42-E) Dept. No. XI Jointly Administered NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

Case Number: A-15-719860-B

JA6300

MORRIS LAW GROUP 111 E. BONNEVILLE AVE., STE. 360 - LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 - FAX 702/474-9422

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Stay and Motion for Reconsideration was entered in this action on the 4th day of January, 2018.

A copy of the Order is attached as Exhibit 1.

MORRIS LAW GROUP

By: Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543
Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102
411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360
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Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D) and E.D.C.R. 8.05, I certify that I am an employee of MORRIS LAW GROUP and that on the date below, I cause the following document(s) to be served via the Court's Odyssey E-Filing System: NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER, to be served on all interested parties, as registered with the Court's E-Filing and E-Service System. The date and time of the electronic proof of service is in place of the date and place of deposit in the mail.

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Attorneys for /Defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak

Attorneys for Defendant William Gould

Mark Ferrario Kara Hendricks Tami Cowden Greenberg Traurig, LLP 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway Suite 400 North Las Vegas, NV 89169

Attorneys for Nominal Defendant

Reading International, Inc.

day of January, 2018:

EXHIBIT 1

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MORRIS LAW GROUP 411 E. BONNEVILLE AVE., STE. 360 - LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 - FAX 702/474-9422	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27	_ · ·	Electronically Filed 1/4/2018 10:35 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT UNTY, NEVADA Case No. A-15-719860-B Dept. No. XI Coordinated with: Case No. P-14-0824-42-E Dept. No. XI Jointly Administered ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STAY AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION Date of Hearing: December 28, 2017 Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m.	
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	27		į́	
	28	Nominal Defendant.)	
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Case Number: A-15-719860-B

JA6304

MORRIS LAW GROUP

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This matter came before the Court on December 28, 2017 for hearing on plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.'s Motion to Stay and Motion for Reconsideration or Clarification of Ruling on Motions for [Partial] Summary judgment Nos. 1, 2, and 3 and Gould's Summary Judgment Motion ("Motion for Reconsideration"). Mark G. Krum and Akke Levin appeared for plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff"); Marshall M. Searcy III appeared for defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, Edward Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak; Mark E. Ferrario appeared for nominal defendant Reading International, Inc.; and Shoshana Bannett appeared for defendant William Gould ("Gould").

The Court, having considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Stay, having heard oral argument of the parties, having considered (sealed) Court Exhibit 1, and for good cause appearing:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. Although the Court reviewed Court Exhibit 1, the Court finds it was not provided with new factual information or new legal analysis that would cause the Court to change its decision on Motions for Partial Summary Judgment Nos. 1, 2, and Gould's Motion for Summary Judgment.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Stay is DENIED.

DATED this 4 day of ___

ORABLE ELIZABETH

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MORRIS LAW GROUP

Submitted	by
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MORRIS LAW GROUP

By: <u>/s/ Akke Levin</u> Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543 Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102 411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

> Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913 YURKO, SALVESEN & REMZ, P.C. 1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor Boston, MA 02108

Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.

Electronically Filed 1/5/2018 12:49 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

TRAN

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
* * * * *

JAMES COTTER, JR.

CASE NO. A-15-719860-B

Plaintiff

A-16-735305-B

P-14-082942-E

vs.

DEPT. NO. XI

MARGARET COTTER, et al.

Transcript of

Defendants

Proceedings

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RULE 54 (b) CERTIFICATION

THURSDAY, JANUARY 4, 2018

COURT RECORDER:

TRANSCRIPTION BY:

JILL HAWKINS

FLORENCE HOYT

District Court

Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

MARK G. KRUM, ESQ. STEVE L. MORRIS, ESQ. AKKE LEVIN, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

SHOSHANA E. BANNETT, ESQ. MARSHALL M. SEARCY, ESQ. JAMES L. EDWARDS, ESQ. MARK E. FERRARIO, ESQ. LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, THURSDAY, JANUARY 4, 2018, 8:31 A.M. (Court was called to order)

THE COURT: That takes me to Cotter.

MR. SEARCY: Good morning, Your Honor. It doesn't appear that Mr. Ferrario's here yet.

THE COURT: Oh. So I'm not ready on Cotter, either, huh?

MR. KRUM: We're ready, yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So I'm not ready yet, either. Then I guess I'll just here patiently waiting for all sides of any case to be available.

(Pause in the proceedings)

THE COURT: Good morning. Counsel, I was given an order this morning denying plaintiff's motion to stay and motion for reconsideration that appears to have been agreed to by all parties. Is that accurate?

MR. SEARCY: That's accurate, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Then I'm going to go ahead and sign.

Ms. Levin, you can pick it up up here, if you'd like.

So we've finished one item of business. That takes me to my second item of business, which relates to our trial schedule. Dan has arranged for a courtroom here in the RJC for jury selection because of the logistics related to getting jurors across the street to the Phoenix Building. So Judge Denton is out of town for a couple of days next week, so we're

going to borrow his courtroom for those couple of days, but 1 only to pick the jury. So just be aware of that. 2 cannot start until 1:00, because I have a Business Court 3 settlement conference. 4 MR. KRUM: Monday? 5 THE COURT: On Monday. 6 So let's go to the pending motion. 7 Okay. MR. FERRARIO: Your Honor, if we're on the 8 administrative stuff, I was asked to ask you if we need to 9 submit original depos to the Court tomorrow --10 THE COURT: You do. 11 MR. FERRARIO: -- or should we do it on Day 1 of the 12 trial due to the courtroom uncertainty. 13 MR. KRUM: Your Honor, we may have an issue with 14 that on account of the blizzard on the East Coast. Either we 15 will or we won't. 16 THE COURT: We're here in Las Vegas. There's not an 17 issue with a blizzard here. 18 MR. KRUM: Well, some of our originals need to come 19 20 out of my office. THE COURT: Okay. I only need the originals of 21 depositions you intend to use in lieu of live testimony, not 22 those you intend to use for impeachment purposes. 23

MR. KRUM: Understood.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. FERRARIO: And where do you want us to deliver them tomorrow?

THE COURT: You're going to meet us at 2:00 o'clock for the final pretrial conference.

MR. FERRARIO: Oh. That's right. Okay. And where will be meeting?

THE COURT: We'll be in 10C, Judge Togliatti's courtroom. I don't have a courtroom of my own. I have a meeting at 11:00 o'clock about that. I'm not hopeful that that will result in any changes to my current situation, but, as you know, I don't have a courtroom. Since 2013 we've been down a courtroom.

MR. FERRARIO: Can you spread that on the record? I have one --

THE COURT: Just in case nobody knows.

MR. FERRARIO: I have one final question. Do you want us -- if a witness is unavailable and let's say Mr. Krum is going to present that witness through deposition, do you want to run the depo consistently and have ours just flow, or how do you want to deal with it?

THE COURT: It is my opinion, and I can be persuaded related to this, that it is easier for the jury to understand if all of that witness's testimony is presented at one time.

MR. FERRARIO: And I would agree with that.

THE COURT: But I am open to discussion with counsel

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1	about that if it is a problem, and those are part of the items
2	that are on my list to talk about with you tomorrow afternoon.
3	MR. KRUM: Is it 2:00 o'clock, Your Honor, or 3:00
4	o'clock?
5	THE CLERK: 3:00 o'clock.
6	THE COURT: It's 3:00 o'clock.
7	MR. KRUM: Thank you.
8	THE COURT: In Department 10 and 10C, where we are
9	borrowing a courtroom tomorrow.
10	MR. FERRARIO: Thank you.
11	THE COURT: All right. Anything else before I go to
12	the motion?
13	Mr. Krum, it's your motion. Mr. Morris.
14	MR. MORRIS: I do have one thing that's not on
15	calendar.
16	THE COURT: Okay.
17	MR. MORRIS: We were in the Supreme Court yesterday
18	on the writ, we argued the writ.
19	THE COURT: Which writ?
20	MR. MORRIS: The one that arises out of the motion
21	to compel the production of emails between Mr. Krum and
22	Alexander Robertson that you decided
23	THE COURT: Many years ago.
24	MR. MORRIS: on September the 8th, 2016.
25	THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MORRIS: The court pointed out to us when we were arguing that they didn't have a written order on the motion to compel. What they have is what we have, and that is the minute order and the transcript. And Justice Gibbons discussed the absence of that order. Mr. Searcy didn't know that it was not in the record, and neither did I. But it turns out it isn't.

THE COURT: There isn't an order from that?

MR. MORRIS: No.

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THE COURT: There's no order that was submitted from that?

MR. KRUM: I think, Your Honor, there was an order submitted, but not signed.

MR. MORRIS: In any event, we don't have that order. And Justice Gibbons said we could supplement the record after the argument, so I prepared an order that tracks your minute order and the transcript, denies the motion to compel for the reason you gave, I gave it to Mr. Searcy, and he now -- he's now saying that he wants some time to think about this and --

THE COURT: I don't get much time when the Supreme Court asks me to supplement the record. I usually get a couple of hours.

MR. SEARCY: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Occasionally they give me 30 days if it's a really big job.

MR. SEARCY: This situation is somewhat odd, though, Your Honor, in that we've had -- my recollection was certainly that there was a written order already submitted by the Court. And here what we're looking at is a written order approximately almost two years after the fact for the Court to sign.

THE COURT: Yes. That's a problem.

MR. SEARCY: And it is a problem, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But it's a problem for a number of reasons, and I just don't know which one it is, because it's been two years -- or a year and a half, year and a half.

MR. MORRIS: It was on September the 8th, 2016, not quite two years, a year and a half.

MR. SEARCY: So what I've said to Mr. Morris is I want to take a look at this, I want to take a look at the issue before we agree one way or the other on the order.

THE COURT: So let me ask you the question. Do you recall there being competing orders that were submitted on that issue?

MR. SEARCY: Your Honor, my recollection -- and apparently it's wrong, because I have looked at the record and I have not seen a written order.

THE COURT: So you think there's a written order, you just can't find it.

MR. SEARCY: I thought that there was one. But I

haven't found it. And I will note that in the appeal that was taken by the plaintiff in the case that it says in the first line that he is taking it from your oral order compelling documents. Again, though, it was my recollection that there was a written order. So we're looking for that. That's what the court asked us to supplement the record with, is the written order from [inaudible]. They're not asking for a new order.

THE COURT: Oh. An existing written order.

MR. SEARCY: Exactly.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SEARCY: They're not asking that -- they're not directing that the Court enter an order on this, because that raises its own set of issues. Certainly we would want to go back in the benefit of hindsight and the benefit of just having had an argument in front of the Supreme Court to add all sorts of things to the order to reflect the record.

THE COURT: If we enter an order, it's going to be based on what happened then, a year and a half ago. It's not going to be updated with what you think it should have now.

Mr. Morris, I'll take the order. I'm also going to research if we think we logged it out and perhaps it got lost. Because frequently after I sign an order it gets picked by a runner from a different law firm, and we never know what happens to it, and we have people a couple times a week that

have to resubmit orders because other runners picked up their 1 2 orders. The order we submitted is accompanied MR. MORRIS: 3 by a copy of your minute order from that day, as well as the 4 5 transcript. I'll look at it as soon as we get out of 6 THE COURT: 7 here. 8 MR. MORRIS: Thank you. 9 THE COURT: Or after the bond calendar. Thank you, Your Honor. 10 MR. SEARCY: So any other items that aren't on my THE COURT: 11 calendar this morning that you want to talk to me about? 12 MR. KRUM: One item of clarification about what 13 we're supposed to do tomorrow, I guess, or Monday. Hard 14 copies of the exhibits --15 THE COURT: You do not need to bring hard copies of 16 17 Dulce's email said you don't need to worry the exhibits. about the exhibit part because of your electronic exhibits 18 that you're using. 19 20 Right? Thank you. 21 MR. KRUM: THE COURT: Anything else? Mr. Edwards. 22 MR. EDWARDS: We brought over a motion to stay, and 23 I don't know whether it was --24 THE COURT: I signed it. I set it for Monday at 25

8:30. (Pause in the proceedings) 2 MR. EDWARDS: We did serve it [inaudible]. 3 THE COURT: Here you go, Mr. Edwards. MR. EDWARDS: Thank you, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Apparently I was holding onto it. 6 Next? Any other issues before I get to what's 7 actually on calendar this morning? 8 If we could go to our motion for Rule 54(b) 9 certification and renewed motion for stay. 10 Thank you, Your Honor. So the 11 MR. KRUM: oppositions with respect to certification -- there was no 12 opposition from the individual defendants. They took no 13 position. The opposition from the company made a compelling 14 case, in our view, as to why both an order of certification 15 should issue, as well as a stay. 16 Let me ask. Did you receive and have an opportunity 17 to review the brief reply we submitted? 18 THE COURT: I did. 19 Okay. 20 MR. KRUM: THE COURT: And I have notes on it that I'm going to 21 say at the end that will make Mr. Searcy curious. 22 So, Your Honor, according to the MR. KRUM: 23 defendants, our case is dead on arrival based on the rulings 24

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that you previously made.

THE COURT: I understand that's what your brief

MR. KRUM: Yes.

said.

THE COURT: And I understand their brief sort of says that, too.

MR. KRUM: And to the point for the motions today, Your Honor, the individual defendants acknowledge that those rulings make our case against the remaining three defendants more difficult legally. Those are the words they used.

THE COURT: So can I cut to the chase. The defendants are not correct by indicating that they believe that the conduct of the disinterested directors will not be the subject of evidence before the jury for breach of fiduciary duty claims as to the remaining defendants. If you thought that, that was not what I said.

Okay. Next, Mr. Krum?

MR. KRUM: Yeah. Well, that's helpful, Your Honor. It leads me to another point I have, which is I think legally we're looking at potentially different standards. Assuming based on what you said we're not looking at different evidence, we nonetheless from the plaintiff's perspective are going to be required to make a different showing on account of your prior rulings. And this is why. There's no way to explain to a jury how it is that three people, two or three or more, as the case may be, but say, for example, with respect

to the 100,000 share option two people, Adams and Kane, with respect to what I succinctly characterize as extortion, in other words, the threat to terminate unless you settle. That would be three people, Adams, Kane, and McEachern. So we put on the evidence as you just described that all three of them breached their fiduciary duties. There's no --

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THE COURT: Mr. Krum, we deal with that in every case, and we never explain to the jury while they're answering questions on the questionnaire or interrogatories as to only certain defendants. We just don't explain it. It's you don't explain it. You present the evidence, you give them the interrogatories, they answer them. That's part of the jury instructions.

MR. KRUM: Well, I'm getting there. The jury instruction is where I'm going on this. Bear with me. So how do we explain from plaintiff's perspective that three people who engaged in the same conduct, two of them are not defendants here?

THE COURT: You don't explain it. It's not your job.

MR. KRUM: No. And the jury instruction they're going to propose is effectively going to tell the jury that, well, those two people are the majority and therefore you can't rule against the remaining one. And so what we're going to do, Your Honor, is try a case where there is basically an

irrebuttable misimpression with which the jury will start.

And so on the stay issue what the defendants, all of them, really said, Your Honor, it was made pretty clear I think in the company -- so-called company opposition, they don't want a stay because they want this motion that they delivered yesterday, half of which is for reconsideration and issues they should take up with the Nevada Supreme Court and the other half of which is for summary judgment predicated on evidence they created six days ago, they want that --

THE COURT: That's not set till Monday at 8:30.

MR. KRUM: Monday at 8:30. Right. And so they want that to go forward, but they don't want -- they really don't want the case to go forward. And I understand why they say that, Your Honor. So we don't know, really, what the target is, except for it's moving. It's moved since the last ruling, and it may move again on Monday.

THE COURT: That's how litigation is, especially when you're right before trial.

MR. KRUM: Your Honor, I think that the point of that is two things.

THE COURT: Do you really want certification if I'm not going to grant a stay?

MR. KRUM: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you object to certification?

MR. SEARCY: No objection, Your Honor.

The certification is granted because of THE COURT: all the claims related to the what I've determined to be disinterested directors have been resolved. That does not preclude from presenting evidence related to the conduct or activities of those as it relates to other issues in your case. All right. MR. KRUM: Your Honor, we had an order that anticipated --THE COURT: Granted in part? MR. KRUM: -- granted in part. I thought we distributed these, but perhaps not. What we did, Your Honor, was it granted the certification motion --THE COURT: And denied the stay? 13 Then it had check the box, grant the stay MR. KRUM: 14 or deny the stay. 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 MR. KRUM: We were prepared for both eventualities. 17 This one's not that. THE COURT: 18 This appears to be the wrong order, Mr. MR. SEARCY: 19 20 Krum. THE COURT: This isn't that order. 21 MR. KRUM: I have the wrong order. Well, that's --22 my paralegal skills, and I once was one, have deteriorated. 23 So bear with me, Your Honor. I apologize. 24 Okay. The one that says what it should say. 25

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THE COURT: Mr. Edwards, I did say the other day 1 that you or someone from your firm is required to be here for 2 3 the entire trial. Okay. We're prepared. MR. EDWARDS: 4 THE COURT: It doesn't have to be you. You can send 5 6 [unintelligible]. MR. EDWARDS: I've got a trial coming up 7 8 [inaudible]. THE COURT: I just need local issue so if there is 9 an issue about the District Court Rules of the Eighth Judicial 10 Court or any of our unusual -- I will be able to turn Mr. 11 Searcy to a local Nevada attorney who can answer his questions 12 13 before I yell at him. MR. SEARCY: I appreciate the [inaudible], Your 14 15 Honor. Okay, Mr. Krum. Here's your order. THE COURT: 16 'Bye. See you tomorrow at 3:00. Next? 17 All right. MR. FERRARIO: So I take it you did not want to hear 18 the points we raised and you'll hear them Monday? 19 THE COURT: What? 20 MR. FERRARIO: In our opposition. 21 THE COURT: I heard your opposition. Your 22 opposition primarily is there's nothing left to try, Judge. 23 MR. FERRARIO: And the math. 24 25 THE COURT: So we'll hear that Monday at 8:30. I

1	was not going to set it on less than 36 hours' notice.
2	MR. FERRARIO: No. I think that's good.
3	THE COURT: I know that we need one judicial day,
4	but some issues are a little more important.
5	MR. FERRARIO: Do we have a status check on Wynn on
6	Monday?
7	THE COURT: Okay. You're coming tomorrow at 3:00.
8	MR. FERRARIO: No. I know. Do we have a status
9	check
10	THE COURT: And then you're coming Monday at 8:30.
11	MR. FERRARIO: What about Monday
12	THE COURT: And then we're starting trial at 1:00
13	Monday.
14	MR. FERRARIO: I know.
15	THE COURT: I have 60 jurors coming.
16	MR. FERRARIO: I said the Wynn case.
17	THE COURT: Oh. Yes. I have an 8:00 o'clock
18	hearing on Monday on Wynn.
19	(Pause in the proceedings)
20	THE COURT: Dulce says there's nothing on Wynn. So
21	sleep in, Mr. Ferrario. I'll see you at 8:30 instead of 8:00.
22	Okay. Goodbye.
23	MR. FERRARIO: Thank you, Your Honor.
24	MR. MORRIS: Thank you, Your Honor. Monday at 8:30?
25	MR. KRUM: We're here Monday at 8:30, as well?

THE COURT: Monday at 3:00 [sic] -- Monday at 8:30 two motions. They're both about the same issue of the ratification issue, and then we'll deal with it. Goodbye. MR. MORRIS: Thank you, Your Honor. THE PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 8:59 A.M.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

AFFIRMATION

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

FLORENCE HOYT
Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

FLORENCE M. HOYT, TRANSCRIBER

1/4/18

DATE

MORRIS LAW GROUP

JA6326

Electronically Filed

MORRIS LAW GROUP 411 E. BONNEVILLE AVE., STE. 360 · LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422

Please take notice that Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of Nevada and/or the Appeals Court of the State of Nevada from:

1. The District Court's December 28, 2017 Order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak on all of Plaintiff's claims against them.

By Order dated January 4, 2018, the District Court certified its Order dismissing these five defendants as final under Nev. R. Civ. P. 54(b) and entered judgment in favor of them.

MORRIS LAW GROUP

By: /s/ Akke Levin
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Stan Johnson

Mark Ferrario

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D) and E.D.C.R. 8.05, I hereby certify that I am an employee of MORRIS LAW GROUP and that on the date below, I cause the following document(s) to be served via the Court's Odyssey E-Filing System: NOTICE OF APPEAL, to be served on all interested parties, as registered with the Court's E-Filing and E-Service System. The date and time of the electronic proof of service is in place of the date and place of deposit in the mail.

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DATED this 1st day of February, 2018.

By: /s/ Linda P. Daniel

An employee of Morris Law Group