STATE OF CHRISTOPHER ANDERSEN, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ROB BARE, EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGE, Respondent, CITY OF LAS VEGAS, Real Party in Interest.	NEVADA NEV. SUPREME CT. CASE NO NEV. CT. OF APP. CASE NO DIST. CASE NO. C-16- 319933-A DIST. CT. DEPT. 32 MUNICIPAL CT. CASE NO. C11135328A/B MUNICIPAL CT. DEPT. 1
	1 Docket 75208 Document 2018-08077
	The Pariente Law Firm, P.C. 3960 Howard Hughes Parkway Suite 615 Las Vegas, NV 89169 (702) 966-5310 Attorney for Petitioner IN THE SUPREME C STATE OF CHRISTOPHER ANDERSEN, Petitioner, VS. THE HONORABLE ROB BARE, EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGE, Respondent, CITY OF LAS VEGAS,

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1 2 3 4 5	NOT Michael D. Pariente John G. Watkins, Of Counsel The Pariente Law Firm, P.C. 3960 Howard Hughes Parkway Suite 615 Las Vegas, NV 89169 (702) 966-5310 Attorney for Defendant	CALLER MAN
6	LAS VEGAS	MUNICIPAL COURT
7	CITY OF LAS VEGAS	
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9	CITY OF LAS VEGAS,	Case No: C1135328A
10	Plaintiff,	Dept No: 1
D. 11	vs.	NOTICE OF DEMAND FOR JURY
-12	CHRISTOPHER ANDERSEN,	TRIAL
R 200 00 10	Defendant.	
> 113 - 2	DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL COMES NOW Defendant, CHRISTOPHER ANDERSEN, by and through his	
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T DEVENTION ALDERATION ALDER		
ARIENT 3960Hon 10000 10001 1000000		
< 10	attorney of record, MICHAEL D. PARIENTE, and pursuant to the Sixth Amendment	
20 L	of the United States Constitution and <u>Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas</u> , 489 U.S. 538	
20	(1989) moves this Honorable Court for a jury trial setting.	
22		
23		Respectfully submitted:
24		respectfully adomitted.
25		MICHAEL D. PARIENTE
26		
27		
28		Kalter
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2. 6	
1	Nevada Bar No. 9469
2	330 South Third Street, Suite 1075
3	Las Vegas, NV 89101
4	Attorney for Defendant
5	
6	NOTICE OF DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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8	TO: CITY OF LAS VEGAS, Plaintiff
9	TO: CITY ATTORNEY, Attorney for Plaintiff
. 10	YOU AND EACH OF YOU, WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the
U 11	undersigned will bring the above and foregoing NOTICE on for hearing before the
Signature 12	Court at the Courtroom of the above entitled Court on the 3 day of OCH 2016, at
202) XX 14	2.0 p.m. of said day, in Department 3 of said Court.
N SALANA 15	Respectfully submitted.
- 1955-996 16	1 Kin
IN 17	Michael D. Pariente, Esq.
PARIEN 3306 19 19 19 19 19 19 19	
✓ 19	DATED this day of July, 2016
20	
21	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
22	
23	Mr. Andersen, a father, business owner, and entrepreneur here in Las Vegas,
24	requests this Honorable Court grant him a jury trial. He argues the loss of fundamental
25	rights due to a conviction for domestic violence is a serious offense entitling a defendant
26	to a right to a jury trial. He distinguishes his case from Amezcua v. Eight Judicial
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28	District Court, 319 P.3d 602 (Nev. 2014) due to the fact that NRS 202.360 has been
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amended subsequent to Amezcua, to make him a felon punishable up to 6 years in Nevada prison if he is caught possessing a firearm and has a conviction for domestic violence.¹ In 2015, the Nevada Legislature amended NRS 202.360 to deprive Nevadans of their Second Amendment Right to Bear Firearms if convicted in Nevada of domestic violence.

1 NRS 202.360 Ownership or possession of firearm by certain persons prohibited; penalties.

 A person shall not own or have in his or her possession or under his or her custody or control any firearm if the person:

(a) Has been convicted in this State or any other state of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33);

(b) Has been convicted of a felony in this State or any other state, or in any political subdivision thereof, or of a felony in violation of the laws of the United States of America, unless the person has received a pardon and the pardon does not restrict his or her right to bear arms;

(c) Is a fugitive from justice;

(d) Is an unlawful user of, or addicted to, any controlled substance; or

(e) Is otherwise prohibited by federal law from having a firearm in his or her possession or under his or her custody or control.

A person who violates the provisions of this subsection is guilty of a category B felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum term of not less than 1 year and a maximum term of not more than 6 years, and may be further punished by a fine of not more than \$5,000.

2. A person shall not own or have in his or her possession or under his or her custody or control any firearm if the person:

(a) Has been adjudicated as mentally ill or has been committed to any mental health facility by a court of this State, any other state or the United States:

(b) Has entered a plea of guilty but mentally ill in a court of this State, any other state or the United States;

(c) Has been found guilty but mentally ill in a court of this State, any other state or the United States;

(d) Has been acquitted by reason of insanity in a court of this State, any other state or the United States; or

(e) Is illegally or unlawfully in the United States.

A person who violates the provisions of this subsection is guilty of a category D felony 26 and shall be punished as provided in NRS 193.130.

As used in this section:

(a) "Controlled substance" has the meaning ascribed to it in 21 U.S.C. § 802(6).

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(b) "Firearm" includes any firearm that is loaded or unloaded and operable or inoperable.

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A Nevada conviction for domestic violence creates a presumption that the person so convicted is an unfit parent. This consequence makes domestic violence a serious offense entitling Mr. Andersen to a jury trial.

A person convicted of domestic violence in Nevada faces serious consequences in family law courts. Specifically, a person so convicted faces a presumption that he or she is an unfit parent.²

2 NRS 432B.157 Presumption concerning custody when court determines that parent or other person seeking custody of child is perpetrator of domestic violence.

1. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 125C.210 and 432B.153, a determination by the court after an evidentiary hearing and finding by clear and convincing evidence that either parent or any other person seeking custody of a child has engaged in one or more acts of domestic violence against the child, a parent of the child or any other person residing with the child creates a rebuttable presumption that it is not in the best interest of the child for the perpetrator of the domestic violence to have custody of the child. Upon making such a determination, the court shall set forth:

(a) Findings of fact that support the determination that one or more acts of domestic violence occurred; and

(b) Findings that the custody or visitation arrangement ordered by the court adequately protects the child and the parent or other victim of domestic violence who resided with the child.

2. If after an evidentiary hearing held pursuant to subsection 1 the court determines that more than one party has engaged in acts of domestic violence, it shall, if possible, determine which person was the primary physical aggressor. In determining which party was the primary physical aggressor for the purposes of this section, the court shall consider:

(a) All prior acts of domestic violence involving any of the parties;

(b) The relative severity of the injuries, if any, inflicted upon the persons involved in those prior acts of domestic violence;

(c) The likelihood of future injury;

(d) Whether, during the prior acts, one of the parties acted in self-defense; and

(e) Any other factors that the court deems relevant to the determination.

In such a case, if it is not possible for the court to determine which party is the primary physical aggressor, the presumption created pursuant to subsection 1 applies to each of the parties. If it is possible for the court to determine which party is the primary physical aggressor, the presumption created pursuant to

subsection I applies only to the party determined by the court to be the primary physical aggressor. 3. A court, agency, institution or other person who places a child in protective custody shall not release

a child to the custody of a person who a court has determined pursuant to subsection 1 has engaged in one or more acts of domestic violence against the child, a parent of the child or any other person residing with the child unless:

(a) A court determines that it is in the best interest of the child for the perpetrator of the domestic violence to have custody of the child; or

(b) Pursuant to the provisions of subsection 2, the presumption created pursuant to subsection 1 does not apply to the person to whom the court releases the child.

 As used in this section, "domestic violence" means the commission of any act described in NRS 33.018.

28 NRS 125C.230 Presumption concerning custody when court determines that parent or other person seeking custody of child is perpetrator of domestic violence.

1. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 125C.210 and 125C.220, a determination by the court after

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Mr. Andersen has a substantive right to be an active father in raising his daughter.

The complaining witness in this case is the mother of his daughter.

"A parent's interest in raising his or her child is a fundamental right. Parental termination proceedings implicate this fundamental right. We analyze substantive due process challenges to statutes impinging on fundamental constitutional rights under a strict scrutiny standard." Vincent L.G. v. State Div. of Child & Family Servs. (In re D.R.H.), 120 Nev. 422, 426-427 (Nev. 2004).

"Embedded within the Fourteenth Amendment is a substantive component that 'provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.' The United States Supreme Court has recognized several fundamental interests including 'the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children." Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000) (plurality opinion) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 138 L. Ed. 2d 772, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 117 S. Ct. 2302 (1997), Rico v. Rodriguez, 121 Nev. 695, 704 (Nev. 2005).

Because Mr. Andersen's substantive right to raise his children is threatened by a

an evidentiary hearing and finding by clear and convincing evidence that either parent or any other person seeking custody of a child has engaged in one or more acts of domestic violence against the child, a parent of the child or any other person residing with the child creates a rebuttable presumption that sole or joint custody of the child by the perpetrator of the domestic violence is not in the best interest of the child. Upon making such a determination, the court shall set forth:

(a) Findings of fact that support the determination that one or more acts of domestic violence occurred; and

(b) Findings that the custody or visitation arrangement ordered by the court adequately protects the child and the parent or other victim of domestic violence who resided with the child.

If after an evidentiary hearing held pursuant to subsection 1 the court determines that more than one party has engaged in acts of domestic violence, it shall, if possible, determine which person was the primary physical aggressor. In determining which party was the primary physical aggressor for the purposes of this section, the court shall consider:

(a) All prior acts of domestic violence involving any of the parties;

(b) The relative severity of the injuries, if any, inflicted upon the persons involved in those prior acts of domestic violence;

(c) The likelihood of future injury;

(d) Whether, during the prior acts, one of the parties acted in self-defense; and

(e) Any other factors that the court deems relevant to the determination.

In such a case, if it is not possible for the court to determine which party is the primary physical aggressor, the presumption created pursuant to subsection 1 applies to each of the parties. If it is possible for the court to determine which party is the primary physical aggressor, the presumption created pursuant to subsection 1 applies only to the party determined by the court to be the primary physical aggressor.

3. As used in this section, "domestic violence" means the commission of any act described in NRS 33.018.

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domestic violence conviction, the Court must afford him a jury trial consistent with his

procedural due process rights:

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[O]nce it is determined that the Due Process Clause applies, 'the question remains what process is due.' [Citation.]" (Loudermill, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 541.) "[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." (Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 481 [33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 92 S. Ct. 2593].) "[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." (Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 335 [47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 96 S. Ct. 893].) Cook v. City of Buena Park, 126 Cal. App. 4th 1, 6 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2005).

Applying the first prong of the Matthews test to Mr. Andersen's case, the private interest that will be affected is the right of Mr. Andersen to raise his daughter. The second prong is the risk of an erroneous deprivation caused by a conviction for domestic violence. This criminal conviction creates the presumption that Mr. Andersen is an unfit parent under NRS 432B.157 and NRS 125C.230. Third, the additional protection of a six person jury trial to hold the City to its burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt would help eliminate the risk that Mr. Andersen does not face an erroneous deprivation because the City must convince six people, instead of one Municipal Court Judge. Finally, the City's interest in fiscal and administrative burdens would be proportionately no greater than those incurred by the overwhelming majority of states that provide jury trials for misdemeanors.

25 In conclusion, a criminal conviction for domestic violence would adversely affect Mr. 26 Andersen's fundamental rights to raise his children. The gravity of the consequences for 27 him makes this a serious offense requiring the procedural protections of a jury trial. 28

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Indeed, the Nevada Legislature deems domestic violence so serious an offense that it created this rebuttable presumption that persons convicted of domestic violence are unfit parents and therefore not deserving of the right to see their children.³ The fact that the Nevada Legislature has passed this law to make it harder for persons convicted of domestic violence to see and raise their children indicates that it deems the offense serious in its attempt to protect children and families affected by domestic violence. The loss of the right of an accused to raise his or her own child is a substantial burden on the person convicted of domestic violence. It is for these reasons that the offense is serious. Had the Nevada Legislature not deemed domestic violence a serious offense, it would have never passed such a law creating a presumption that a person so convicted of domestic violence is presumed an unfit parent.4

3 Even before a conviction, the Nevada Legislature treats domestic violence as a serious offense. First, per NRS 178.484(7), a person arrested for domestic violence faces a mandatory 12-hour hold before release from incarceration. The mandatory minimum bail requirements for alleged (and as yet unconvicted) domestic battery arrestees increases from \$3,000 to \$5,000 for alleged second offenders and to \$15,000 for alleged third offenders. See NRS 178.484(7). The enhanced bail for domestic battery arrestees with alleged prior convictions has no time limitation on the age of the alleged prior convictions per NRS 178.484(7)(b)(2) and (c). This contrasts with the enhanced penalties for multiple domestic violence convictions under NRS 200.485(1)(b) and (c) and (3)(b). Enhanced bail for domestic violence arrestees is harsher than for suspects arrested for any other misdemeanors. Enhanced bail for domestic violence charges do not require that the prior offense be committed within seven years. All other offenses, such as DUI, which have enhanced bail, apply to defendants with prior offenses within the immediately preceding seven years only. A defendant arrested for battery constituting domestic violence whom the arresting police believe has two prior convictions from 10 or more years ago will be held on \$15,000 bail although it is only a misdemeanor charge with a minimum two-day jail sentence. See NRS 200.485(1)(a).

Unlike other misdemeanors, arrest is mandatory for a defendant suspected of domestic battery within 24 hours of the suspected offense. See NRS 171.137(1). In all other misdemeanor cases, the peace 23 officer has discretion to issue a citation instead of arresting the suspect. See NRS 171.1771 and NRS 24 171.1772.

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4 In its effort to remain one of the only states that prohibits jury trials for domestic violence charges. 26 Petitioner expects the City will pin its hopes on Blanton footnote 8, which reads as follows:

In performing this analysis, only penalties resulting from state action, e.g., those mandated by statute 27 or regulation, should be considered. See Note, The Federal Constitutional Right to Trial by Jury for the Offense of Driving While Intoxicated, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 122, 149-150 (1988) (nonstatutory consequences 28 of a conviction "are speculative in nature, because courts cannot determine with any consistency when and if they will occur, especially in the context of society's continually shifting moral values"). Blanton v.

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The automatic rebuttable presumption upon conviction of being an unfit parent is a penalty. The relevant matter is whether the rebuttable presumptions that NRS 432B.157 and 125C.230 that automatically apply are illustrative of legislative intent of seriousness. These statutes provide a person convicted of domestic violence now bears the burden of proving to the Court by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is not an unfit parent. The difficulty of convincing a family law court that the presumption of being an unfit parent due to a conviction for domestic violence is fairly obvious. For example, Russo v. Gardner held that "since Gardner was criminally convicted of domestic violence, by definition it follows that the 'clear and convincing' standard was met for a finding of domestic violence under NRS 125.480(5), thereby creating a rebuttable presumption." Russo v. Gardner, 114 Nev. 283, 290 (1998). A domestic violence conviction leads to the automatic penalty of having to rebut a presumption in every family law matter henceforth. Such a thorough intrusion into one's fundamental rights to raise one's children reflect the severity of the offense.

Perhaps the best demonstration of the seriousness of this penalty comes from referring to a question asked by this Honorable Court during Oral Argument in Blanton: specifically, was the punishment of having to perform community service in an

23 N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 n.8 (U.S. 1989)

Petitioner argues that taking away his Second Amendment Right and thus barring him from owning or possessing a firearm under NRS 202.360, a Category B Felony, is the type of statutory change referenced in Blanton signaling the intent of the Nevada Legislature to make Misdemeanor Domestic Violence a serious offense!

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embarrassing outfit "even worse than six months in jail" ... "They'd rather go to jail for six months than wear this for 48 hours?" Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Blanton, 489 at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_87_1437. U.S. 538, available Although counsel for Petitioner in Blanton struggled to answer in the affirmative, here, Mr. Andersen firmly believes that, if asked the same question, the vast majority of people would answer that losing the right to raise one's children is worse than six-months in jail, and if given the choice, one would choose jail instead of permanently losing one's children.

The loss of the right to possess a firearm makes a conviction for battery constituting domestic violence a serious offense. The Court held that the right to possess a firearm for self-defense is a fundamental right and cannot be abridged by the State. Specifically, the Court in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) held that the Second Amendment is a fundamental right that is fully applicable to the States through the

Fourteenth Amendment. McDonald further holds:

Self-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from ancient times to the present day, and in Heller, we held that individual self-defense is "the central component" of the Second Amendment right. 554 U.S., at ____, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d, at 662; see also id., at ____, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d, at 679 (stating that the "inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second Amendment right"). Explaining that "the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute" in the home, *ibid.*, we found that this right applies to handguns because they are "the most preferred firearm in the nation to 'keep' and use for protection of one's home and family," id., at ____, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d, at 679 (some internal quotation marks omitted); see also id., at ___, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d, at 679 (noting that handguns are "overwhelmingly chosen by American society for [the] lawful purpose" of self-defense); id., at ___, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d, at 680 ("[T]he American people have considered the handgun to be the quintessential selfdefense weapon"). Thus, we concluded, citizens must be permitted "to use [handguns] for the core lawful purpose of self-defense." Id., at ____, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d, at 680. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (U.S. 2010).

Other courts have recognized the right to a jury trial in cases where a defendant faces

a lifetime prohibition of possession of a firearm as a consequence of a misdemeanor

assault conviction not punishable by more than six months:

In the present case the question is whether the lifetime prohibition of possession of a firearm in addition to 6 months imprisonment makes the offense serious under Blanton and therefore entitles Defendant to a jury trial. Citing USA v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2000), the Government argues that the lifetime prohibition on firearm possession does not make the penalty serious. The undersigned is unpersuaded by the court's reasoning in Chavez and concludes that the penalty is serious. In Chavez, the court focused on the fact that in 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a)(33)(B)(i)(II) Congress recognized that some domestic violence offenses do not carry the right to a jury trial even though a conviction results in the prohibition of firearm possession. However, the issue is not whether Congress recognized a right to a jury trial for domestic violence offenses. The issue is whether the penalty Congress attached to the offense was serious enough to entitle the Defendant to a jury trial under the 6th Amendment. Having examined that issue, the Court finds that a lifetime prohibition on the possession of a firearm is a serious penalty which entitles a Defendant to a jury trial under the 6th Amendment. Possession of a firearm for military purposes, self protection and sport has been an important aspect of American life throughout our history. Today, the issue of Governmental restriction of firearm possession is hotly debated. Substantial segments of American society hold strong opinions on the issue. Many advocate strict government restrictions on the ability to possess firearms while many others take the opposite view and consider firearms possession to be an integral part of their lives. In this context, the issue is very serious. Moreover, the categories of persons prohibited from possessing firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and the penalties imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 924 for violating the prohibition (10 years) demonstrate that Congress views the prohibition as serious. The Court finds that a lifetime prohibition on the possession of a firearm is a serious penalty and, when combined with 6 months imprisonment, entitles a Defendant to the common sense judgment of a jury. Defendant's Motion for a Jury Trial is GRANTED. United States v. Smith, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1317-1318 (N.D. Okla. 2001).(italics added)

The Smith case, supra, is right on point. The fact that the Nevada Legislature has barred persons from owning or possessing firearms, even for self-defense for the rest of their lives, and subjects them to felony prosecution punishable up to 6 years if such persons are convicted of domestic violence, demonstrates that the Legislature "views the prohibition as serious." Thus, this Court should find the Legislatures lifetime ban and felony prosecution for possessing a firearm, when combined with 6 months imprisonment

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"entitles a Defendant to the common sense judgment of a jury."

The United States Attorney's Office for the U.S. District in Nevada prosecutes defendants convicted in Nevada courts of Battery Constituting Domestic Violence under 18 USC § 922(g)(9) if defendants are caught possessing a firearm. In Clark County, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department has created a custom that a person even arrested for domestic violence must surrender his or her firearms and return his or her permit to carry a firearm. Even persons who have been arrested for domestic violence, but have had their cases denied for prosecution, face difficulty from Nevada state authorities in purchasing a firearm. These customs by state actors of treating persons accused of domestic violence and treating those accused, but later exonerated as if they have been convicted of domestic violence, violate their Second Amendment right to possess a firearm. "Counties and municipalities are [state actors] ... for constitutional deprivations resulting from application of governmental custom or policy." *Miranda v. Clark County*, 319 F.3d 465, 469 (9th Cir. Nev. 2003).

In this case, Mr. Andersen, together with thousands of men and women each year who are accused of domestic violence in Clark County, suffer an unconstitutional deprivation of their Second Amendment right to bear arms based solely on an accusation of domestic violence even if that accusation proves false and the charges are dropped. For those convicted of domestic violence, they are not permitted in Nevada to purchase weapons, any guns seized from them will not be returned, and under NRS 202.360 they are prosecuted for violating this Category B Felony facing up to 6 years in prison. It is for this reason that defendants are admonished of these risks they face by pleading guilty.

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The Court should look at the entire penalty scheme when reviewing the offense under Blanton. An example of a court applying Blanton is in Fushek v. State, 183 P.3d 536 (Ariz, 2008), where the court reviewed all the related statutory provisions, considering the mandatory lifetime registration and loss of privacy, the codification of the offense in a statutory section containing mostly felonies, and the clear statement of purpose in the legislative history; to conclude that the consequences of conviction "reflect a legislative determination that the offense is indeed serious," and Fushek was entitled to a jury. Fushek, 183 P.3d at 541, 541-544 (internal citations omitted).

The same analysis applies here. The severity of the penalties unequivocally demonstrate that Nevada has deemed the crime serious. NRS 202.360 now makes it a Category B Felony if one is caught owning or possessing a firearm if previously convicted of domestic violence. An offense of NRS 200.485, in addition to the 6-month maximum sentence, carries mandatory fines and administrative fees, mandatory community services hours, mandatory counseling, additional Civil liability under a claim unique to this offense, the removal of the prosecutor's ability to plea bargain, and is the only crime in Nevada to mandate that a police officer must arrest in instances of apparent domestic violence. NRS 200.485.

Furthermore, the legislative declaration itself should erase any doubts as to the legislative intent: "The legislature hereby finds and declares that: 1. There is a critical public need to ensure the effective prosecution of persons who commit acts of domestic 24 25 violence in this state." A.B. 170, 69th Leg. Sess. (Nev. 1997). Such a preamble 26 declaration of the legislature's views was persuasive in Fushek that the offense was 27 serious. Fushek, 183 P.3d at 543 ¶29. 28

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Here, the clear statutory language and numerous penalties are all in addition to the two penalties that Mr. Andersen has long maintained are severe enough to be sufficient by themselves to demonstrate that the Nevada Legislature has determined that Domestic Violence is a serious crime: the loss of one's children and the loss of one's Second Amendment Right to Bear Arms.

Now, NRS 202.360 explicitly bans gun-ownership for a conviction of misdemeanor domestic violence. Additionally, NRS 202.3657, the statute governing the issuance of Concealed Firearm Permits, NRS 202.3657(g) contains an explicit provision that mandates the denial of all applications and also the revocation of current permits for anyone who: "Has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence . . ." (NRS 202.3657(g)). This proscription alone, even without NRS 202.360, amounts to a constructive ban on the ability of a person to use a firearm for selfdefense. When enacted, the belief of the vast majority of legislators was that the ability to legally conceal and carry ones firearm was fundamental to the ability to be able to use firearm for self-defense; the law's intent was to make it easier to obtain a concealed firearms permit ("CFP") in Nevada. Senator Porter summarized the bill best; its purpose was "to provide citizens with a more uniform process by which they can exercise their Second Amendment right." Hearing on S.B. 299 Before S. Judiciary Sub-Comm., 68th Sess., (April 25, 1996). Senator Adler proposed an explicit provision in the bill that domestic violence violators, "should be excluded from those allowed to carry concealed weapons, whether they are convicted of a felony or misdemeanor," Hearing on S.B. 299 Before S. Judiciary Comm. (Mar. 28, 1995), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/68th1995 minutes/SJD328.txt. This became NRS

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202.3657(g). Nevada felt CFP is critical for self-defense, and as McDonald v. City of Chicago, supra, held, self-defense is a fundamental element of the Second Amendment Right. Nevada has constructively prevented those convicted of domestic violence from bearing arms for self-defense, thus, Nevada has prohibited Mr. Andersen's Second Amendment Right.

Even before the change in NRS 202.360 making it a felony to own or possess a firearm if a Nevada was previously convicted of domestic violence, there is also ample legislative history showing that the Nevada Legislature was aware that NRS 202.360 did not proscribe firearm ownership for a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction, and was comfortable with such a determination only because there is a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. §921(a)(33)(B)(i), already prohibiting firearm possession and use by those convicted of such a charge. See Hearing on A.B. 394 Before S. Judiciary Comm., 71st Sess., (April 19, 2001) (Senator Care "indicated owing to the Lautenberg amendment ... a misdemeanor of domestic violence [conviction] loses the right to possess a firearm."). But now, the Nevada Legislature has amended NRS 202.360(2) to mirror the Lautenberg Amendment and ban those and prosecute those Nevadans who are caught possessing a firearm after they have been convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence. Thus, the loss of Mr. Andersen's Second Amendment right to bear arms, by state application is such a penalty rendering it a "serious offense."

Since a conviction under NRS 200.485 effectively destroys one's Second Amendment right to bear arms and results in criminal liability under NRS 202.360,; United States v. Smith, supra, is persuasive. In Smith, the Court held that a "lifetime prohibition on the possession of a firearm is a serious penalty," which entitles

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 PARIENTE LAW FIRM. P. 3960 Howard Hughes Pawy, Suite 615 Las Vegas, NV 87809 Las Vegas, NV 87809 PHONE (702) 966-5310 | FAX (702) 953-7065 WWW, PARENTELAW COM 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

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Defendant to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 1318. The same principle

applies here.

Other courts have concluded that driving while intoxicated is a serious offense requiring jury trial. The United States Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a 15-year license revocation for a third conviction for driving while intoxicated rebuts the presumption that a maximum term of imprisonment is petty:

"The Supreme Court's analysis of the facts in Blanton supports our conclusion that adding the 15 year license revocation to the six month prison term resulted in a penalty severe enough to warrant a jury trial in this case. In Blanton a DWI conviction led to a penalty of up to six months imprisonment, a \$1000 fine, a 90-day suspension of the offender's driver's license, and compelled attendance at an alcohol abuse education course. Because the maximum possible prison sentence did not exceed six months, the Court weighed the severity of the additional statutory penalties. The Court held that the \$1000 fine was not 'out of step' with a six month sentence, and that the required education course "[could] only be described as de minimis." 109 S Ct. at 1294 n. 9. With regard to the license suspension, the Court was unable to determine if the suspension ran concurrently with the prison term. But even if the suspension were consecutive, the court observed that the offender could obtain a restricted license after 45 days. A full suspension for 45 days and a partial suspension for another 45 days was not severe enough to raise sixth amendment concurs. Id. Far from ruling out consideration of license revocations, the Court's decision implies that license revocations are exactly the kind of "additional statutory penalties" we should consider. While a 90 day suspension was not severe enough to raise sixth amendment concerns, a 15-year revocation is a substantial burden on the offender that is completely "out of step" with a six month prison term. Upholding this conviction would permit the Nebraska legislature to defeat the right to a jury trial by keeping the prison sentence to no more than six months, while finding other severe penalties to punish what it considers to be a serious offense. We therefore conclude that Richter was denied his sixth amendment right to a jury trial. Richter v. Fairbanks, 903 F.2d 1202, 1205 (8th Cir. Neb. 1990).

In this case, Mr. Andersen is providing notice under NRS 175.011 demanding his
 right to trial by jury. If Mr. Andersen is convicted of Battery Constituting Domestic
 Violence in violation of NRS 200.481, NRS 200.485, and NRS 33.018, he faces the loss of

his right to possess a firearm even for self-defense, up to 6 years in prison if he is caught

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owing or possessing a firearm under NRS 202.360(2), despite the fact that the Court in McDonald v. City of Chicago, supra, held that the Second Amendment right to bear arms is a fundamental right incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment to the States.

Mr. Andersen argues the loss of raising his dauther far outweighs the severity of the loss of a defendant's driver's license for fifteen years where the latter is entitled to a jury trial in another jurisdiction. Additionally, Mr. Andersen's Second Amendment right to possess a firearm is at risk of being lost. These potential consequences create the need for an additional safeguard to ensure that Mr. Andersen does not suffer a violation of his Due Process rights in the form of the loss of his Second Amendment right and the right to raise children.

By allowing a judge and not a jury to convict a defendant of Battery Constituting Domestic Violence, a judge thus unconstitutionally has the ability to terminate a defendant's right to raise his or her own children. This is due to the presumption created by NRS 432B.157 and NRS 125C.230 that the now convicted defendant is an unfit parent.

The fact that a defendant stands to lose his Second Amendment right and face felony prosecution under NRS 202.360(2) upon conviction of misdemeanor battery constituting domestic violence makes this criminal offense anything but "petty." In fact, there is no other misdemeanor in the Nevada Revised Statutes where a defendant risks losing a federally protected constitutional right upon conviction. Indeed, the admonishment 24 Nevada courts use warn a defendant that a conviction for battery constituting domestic 25 26 violence may subject a defendant to state prosecution for a violation of NRS 202.360 and 27 to federal prosecution if the defendant is subsequently caught possessing a firearm. 28

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While a defendant convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) suffers suspension of his or her license, that loss is only temporary as he or she can eventually re-apply to have his or her license privileges reinstated. A conviction for battery constituting domestic violence results in the permanent loss of a defendant's Second Amendment right. Because a defendant's Second Amendment right is at stake in a criminal complaint of Battery Constituting Domestic Violence and because he or she faces subsequent felony prosecution under NRS 202.360(2) if caught owning or possessing a firearm, a defendant should be afforded the additional safeguard of a jury to decide his or her fate.

CONCLUSION

The Court should grant Mr. Andersen demand for a jury trial.

Respectfully submitted, the

MICHAEL D. PARIENTE JOHN G. WATKINS, OF COUNSEL The Pariente Law Firm, P.C. 3960 Howard Hughes Parkway Suite 615 Las Vegas, NV 89169 Tel: (702)966-5310

Counsel for Petitioner

DECLARATION OF COUNSEL

STATE OF NEVADA

17021953-705

PHONE (702) 966-530 1 FAX (70 WWW, PARIENTELAW, COM

FIRM.

PARIENTE LAW

SOKO HOWERD HUGS

COUNTY OF CLARK

I, MICHAEL D. PARIENTE, ESQ., being first duly sworn according to law, upon oath, deposes and says:

 Your declarant is an Attorney at Law duly licensed to practice in all courts in the State of Nevada;

2. Your declarant is the Attorney of record for the Defendant herein:

FURTHER YOUR DECLARANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

MICHAEL D. PARIENTE, ESQ.

1	ROC Misheel D. Perionte		
2	Michael D. Pariente John G. Watkins, Of Counsel The Pariente Law Firm, P.C. 3960 Howard Hughes Parkway Suite 615 Las Vegas, NV 89169 (702) 966-5310		
3	3960 Howard Hughes Parkway Suite 615		
4	Las Vegas, NV 89169		
5	Attorney for Defendant		
6			
7	LAS VEGA	S MUNICIPAL COURT	
8	CITY	OF LAS VEGAS	
9			
10	CITY OF LAS VEGAS,	Case No: C1135328A	
ບ _ທ 11	Plaintiff,	Dept No: 1	
RM. P. State 615 13 13	vs.	NOTICE OF DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL	
12 12 13 14 12 13 14	CHRISTOPHER ANDERSEN,	TRIAL	
11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11	Defendant.		
A A Manual 15	RECEIPT OF COPY		
TE LAW toward Hughes Lan Vegas, N Lan Vegas, N 22) 966-5300 1 WWW.PARIENTE	RECEIPT OF COPY of the NO	TICE is hereby acknowledged this 26 day of	
ARIENTE 3960 Howard 1476 1960 Howard 1476 1960 Howard 1476 1960 Howard 1476 Howard 1477 Howard 1476 Ho	JULY, 2016.		
B BH 18			
۲ 19		CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE:	
20		CITY ATTORNEY CRIMINAL DIVISION) PD1	
21		CITY ATTORNEY	
22		200 Lewis Ave. Las Vegas, NV 89101	
23		140 TOBRO, 117 OUTOT	
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1	BRADFORD R. JERBIC	
2	City Attorney Katherine Currie-Diamond	
3	Deputy City Attorney Nevada Bar No. 13676	
4	Regional Justice Center, 2nd Floor P.O. Box 3930	
01	Las Vegas, Nevada 89127	
5	LAS VEGAS	MUNICIPAL COURT
6	CLARK CO	OUNTY, NEVADA
7		
8	THE CITY OF LAS VEGAS.	CASE NO.: C1135328A/B
9		DEPT NO.: 1
10	Plaintiff, vs.	
11	CHRISTOPHER LEE ANDERSEN	
12	Defendant.	
13	OPPOSITION TO D	EMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
14	COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, the C	City of Las Vegas ("City") and files the following
15	Opposition to Demand For Jury Trial. The	is pleading is based upon the points and authorities
16	outlined below.	
17	POINTS A	ND AUTHORITES
18	The law on this matter is very clear.	A person charged with a petty offense is not entitled
19	to a jury trial. Blanton v North Las Vegas, 4	489 U.S. 538, 103 L Ed 2d 550 (1989), State v Smith,
20	9 Nev. 806, 672 P. 2d 631 (1983).	
21	In Blanton, the Supreme Court add	ressed the question of when an offense was deemed
22	serious for jury trial purposes. In Blanton	, a unanimous Supreme Court found that Nevada's
23	DUI statute was not a serious crime such that	at the defendant was entitled to a jury trial:
24	To be a first second data at	the house is a material sector and matter and
25	offenses which is not subject	"there is a category of petty crimes or ct to the Sixth Amendment jury trial
26		whether a particular offense should be arly decisions focused on the nature of
27	the offense In recent y	years, however, we have sought more
28	the offense." "[w]e have fo	seriousness with which society regards and the most relevant such criteria in
A NEW AND A		authorized penalty Following this
City of Lee Vegas flue of the City Attorney P.O. BCX 3930 as Vegas, Nevada 88327 702-229-6201		1

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approach, our decision in Baldwin established that a defendant is entitled to a jury trial whenever the offense for which he is charged carries a maximum authorized prison term of greater than six months. Blanton, 448 U.S. at 542-42, citations omitted. In State v Smith, 99 Nev. 806, 672 P.2d 631 (1983), the Nevada Supreme Court held that where the maximum penalty is six months imprisonment or less, the offense is "petty" and the 6 right to trial by jury does not attach. Id. at 811. Additionally, the Court in Smith held that 7 neither Article 1, Section 3 of the Nevada Constitution, nor the Sixth Amendment of the United 8 States Constitution guarantee the right to trial by jury for first offense DUI. 9 The Nevada Supreme Court has recently re-addressed the issue whether a defendant is 10 entitled to a jury trial for a petty offense. In Amezcua v Eighth Judicial District Court, 319 P.3d 602 (2014), Amezcua was charged with first-offense battery constituting domestic violence. He 12 filed a timely notice for a jury trial which was denied by the justice court. Amezcua 13 subsequently filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the district court, which was denied. His 14 conviction was affirmed on appeal by the district court. Amezcua then filed a petition for writ of 15 mandamus or habeas corpus with the Nevada Supreme Court. 16 In denying the petition, the Nevada Supreme Court again acknowledged that the right to a 17 jury trial does not extend to every criminal proceeding. Amezcua, 319 P.2d at 604, citing 18 Blanton. The right to a jury trial only attaches to "serious" offenses. Id. The Nevada Supreme 19 Court went on to state: 20

> "[T]o determine whether the . . . right to a jury trial attaches to a particular offense, the court must examine 'objective indications of the seriousness with which society regards the offense." United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 3, 113 S. Ct. 1072, 122 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1993) (quoting Blanton v. N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541, 109 S. Ct. 1289, 103 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1989)). The best objective indicator of the seriousness with which society regards an offense is the maximum penalty that the legislature has set for it. Id. Although a "penalty" may include things other than imprisonment, the focus for purposes of the right to a jury maximum authorized period of trial has been "on the incarceration." Id. (quoting Blanton, 489 U.S. at 542). Taking this approach, the Supreme Court has held that an offense for which the period of incarceration is six months or less is presumptively a "petty" offense and a jury trial is not constitutionally required. Id. We have reached the same conclusion. Blanton.

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103 Nev. at 633-34, 748 P.2d at 500-01. The presumption may be overcome "only by showing that the additional penalties, viewed together with the maximum prison term, are so severe that the legislature clearly determined that the offense is a 'serious' one." Nachtigal 507 U.S. at 3-4 (quoting Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543). Amezcua, 319 P.3d at 604. 4 Amezcua argued that collateral consequences associated with a conviction for battery 5 constituting domestic violence reflected a legislative intent that the offense should be considered 6 a serious offense, thus mandating a jury trial.1 The Nevada Supreme Court rejected these 7 arguments and held that the statutory penalties imposed by the Nevada Legislature for battery 8 constituting domestic violence did not elevate the crime to a "serious" offense. 9 In this case the Defendant is arguing the exact collateral consequences associated with a 10 conviction for battery constituting domestic violence that the Nevada Supreme Court has already 11 rejected. The Amezua case is directly on point in this matter. The law relating to the right to a 12 jury trial for an offense punishable of up to 6 months in jail is abundantly clear. The defendant 13 does not have a right to a jury trial in this case. The issues that Defendant raises in his brief are 14 matters that must be dealt with by the legislature, as this Court is bound by the decision of both 15 the United States Supreme Court as well as the Nevada Supreme Court. 16 CONCLUSION 17 Based upon the foregoing argument, the City respectfully requests that the Defendant 18 19 request for a jury trial be denied. 20 11111 21 IIIIT. 22 UIII 23 11111 24 HHH 25

City of Las Vegit fice of the City Attamey P.O. BOX 3930 as Vogas, Nevada 59127 712-229-6201

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These collateral consequences included the rebuttable presumption that a perpetrator of domestic violence is unfit

for sole or joint custody of children (NRS 432B.157 and NRS 125C 230), the loss of the right to possess a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9) and the possibility of deportation for noncitizens under federal immigration law.

1	DATED this 19 day of September, 2016
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3	11 A - 1
4	Katherine Currie-Diamond
5	Deputy City Attorney Bar # 13676
6	Las Vegas City Attorney's Office 200 Lewis Avenue Suite 2327
7	Las Vegas, Nevada 89127 (702) 229-6201
8	(702) 229-0201
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City of Las Vegas flos of the Oily Attensey P.O. BOX 3930 as Vegas, Neveda 39127 702-229-6301	

1	CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
2	I hereby certify that on September 13, 2016, 1 forwarded a true and correct copy of the
3	foregoing OPPOSITION TO DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL, by facsimile transmission to:
4	
5	Michael D. Pariente
6	3960 Howard Hughes Parkway
7	Suite 615
8	Las Vegas, Nevada 89169
9	(702) 953-7055
10	MAR
11	An employee of the City of Las Vegas
12	An employee of the City of Las vegas
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4	MUNICIPAL COURT
5	LAS VEGAS, NEVADA
6	
7	THE CITY OF LAS VEGAS) CASE NO. C1135328A/B
8	Plaintiff,) DEPT. 1
9	vs.
10	CHRISTOPHER LEE ANDERSEN)
11	Defendant.
12	,
13	
14	BEFORE THE HONORABLE CYNTHIA LEUNG,
15	MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE
16	TRANSCRIPT RE: MOTION
17	OCTOBER 19, 2016
18	
19	APPEARANCES:
20	The Plaintiff:THE CITY OF LAS VEGASFor the Plaintiff:MATTHEW WALKER, ESQ.200 Lewis Avenue
21	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
22	The Defendant: CHRISTOPHER LEE ANDERSEN For the Defendant: MICHAEL D. PARIENTE, ESQ.
23	3960 Howard Hughes Pkwy. Las Vegas, Nevada 89169
24	Las vegas, nevada 09109

1	LAS VEGAS, NEVADA OCTOBER 19, 2016
2	<u>PROCEEDINGS</u>
3	(THE PROCEEDINGS BEGAN AT 09:36:18)
4	THE COURT: All right. We're back on record.
5	Good morning.
6	This is the matter of Christopher Lee Andersen,
7	BATTERY/DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, C1135328A, and, Count B, SIMPLE
8	BATTERY.
9	Mr. Pariente.
10	MR. PARIENTE: Yes, Your Honor. Good morning.
11	THE COURT: All right.
12	Trial's still set for December 6th. Today is the
13	day we had set for your motion.
14	Is there anything else that you your motion
15	did you get a copy of the opposition?
16	MR. PARIENTE: I did, Your Honor. We didn't do a
17	reply. Basically, our position is that <u>Amesqua</u> doesn't
18	control because NRS 202.360 was amended to prohibit people
19	who've been convicted of domestic violence of for to
20	actually, it's a felony if they're caught possessing a
21	firearm if they've been convicted of domestic violence. So
22	that, therefore, it is no longer a petit offense of dome
23	that makes domestic violence a serious offense.
24	Other than that, we'll submit on the briefs.

THE COURT: Okay.

1	THE COURT: Okay.
2	Doesn't City, doesn't <u>Amesqua</u> isn't
3	doesn't that stand for the proposition that that is a
4	collateral consequence?
5	MR. WALKER: I believe so, Your Honor.
6	THE COURT: Okay.
7	And your position is that's not
8	MR. PARIENTE: Right. There's
9	THE COURT: (indiscernible) interpret that?
10	MR. PARIENTE: there's language in <u>Stanton</u>
11	the I'm sorry, the <u>Blanton</u> case, the Supreme Court case
12	where they talked about how the statutes cannot be written to
13	pack below the line, which means they can't add too many
14	things with a well, we're keeping it at six months but
15	require all these other things, and it can make it serious.
16	For instance, in Arizona, there is a statute that
17	it's a maximum of six months, it's a misdemeanor but if
18	the person is convicted of and it's a sexual offense and they
19	have to register as a sex offender, that Court there said
20	that that even though there's a six-month maximum, that
21	makes it a serious offense.
22	THE COURT: Um-hmm (in the affirmative).
23	MR. PARIENTE: So there are other cases I've cited.
24	THE COURT: Yeah. Okay.

1 All right. City, anything else that you want to 2 add? 3 MR. WALKER: No, Your Honor. I think we'll submit 4 it on our opposition. 5 THE COURT: Okay. 6 You know, I think that This Court has been pretty 7 consistent in denying that request. I think that the 8 direction that I need to follow is the Supreme Court, United 9 State Supreme Court as well. And I think that those cases, 10 City's indicated, give me clear direction that this is 11 considered a petit offense. So I am going -- you know, I am 12 going to be consistent with the rest of my rulings. 13 I'm not sure what you're doing, though, with what 14 happens with these rulings. 15 Are you -- do you have another case that you're taking up, are you going forward --16 17 MR. PARIENTE: No. 18 THE COURT: -- (indiscernible)? 19 MR. PARIENTE: My client's actually authorized me 20 to take this one up to the U.S. Supreme Court, so that's what 21 we're actually prepared to do. We did that with the Amesqua 22 case. 23 THE COURT: Right. 24 MR. PARIENTE: And, actually, the State was ordered

to do a response by the --1 2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 MR. PARIENTE: -- U.S. Supreme Court, which is unprecedented. We've taken it up about five times to the 4 5 U.S. Supreme Court. We are going to take it up on this one, 6 too. 7 THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything else in the record that you think 8 9 your record should reflect or you're fine with your briefs --10 MR. PARIENTE: I'm fine --11 THE COURT: -- (indiscernible) your experience --12 MR. PARIENTE: -- with --13 THE COURT: Okay. 14 MR. PARIENTE: -- what you've done. 15 MR. WALKER: We're fine, Your Honor, as well. 16 THE COURT: All right. 17 MR. PARIENTE: All right. Thank you, Judge. 18 THE COURT: Okay. 19 MR. PARIENTE: Appreciate it. Okay. 20 THE COURT: We'll see you December 6th. 21 Sounds good. Thank Your Honor. MR. PARIENTE: 22 THE COURT: All right. 23 (PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 09:39:32) 24 5

1	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and
2	correctly transcribed the video proceedings in the above-
3	entitled case to the best of my ability.
4	<u>/s/CHARLENE BARRA</u> TRANSCRIPTIONIST
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4	MUNICIPAL COURT
5	LAS VEGAS, NEVADA
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7	THE CITY OF LAS VEGAS) CASE NO. C1135328A
8	Plaintiff,) DEPT. 1
9	vs.
10	CHRISTOPHER ANDERSEN,)
11	Defendant.
12	/
13	
14	BEFORE THE HONORABLE CYNTHIA LEUNG, MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE
15	TRANSCRIPT RE: PLEA NEGOTIATION
16	DECEMBER 6, 2016
17	DECEMBER 0, 2010
18	
19	APPEARANCES:
20	The Plaintiff:THE CITY OF LAS VEGASFor the Plaintiff:MATTHEW WALKER, ESQ.
21	200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
22	The Defendant: CHRISTOPHER ANDERSEN
23	For the Defendant: MICHAEL PARIENTE, ESQ. Pariente Law Firm PC
24	3960 Howard Hughes Parkway #615 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169

1	LAS VEGAS, NEVADA DECEMBER 6, 2016
2	
3	<u>PROCEEDINGS</u>
4	(PROCEEDINGS BEGAN AT 09:53:06)
5	THE COURT: Okay. This is the matter of Christopher
6	Anderson. This is a BATTERY/DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, C1135328A,
7	Count B is a SIMPLE BATTERY.
8	Good morning, Mr. Pariente.
9	MR. PARIENTE: Good morning, Your Honor.
10	Your Honor, Michael Pariente in to for Mr. Anderson.
11	Your Honor, this is negotiated.
12	THE COURT: Okay.
13	MR. PARIENTE: It's a little complicated so I'll
14	explain it all.
15	THE COURT: Okay.
16	MR. PARIENTE: And I'll call on Matt to assist if
17	there's any ambiguity.
18	Basically what we're doing is we're going to enter a
19	plea to the DOMESTIC VIOLENCE Count. The SIMPLE BATTERY Count
20	will be dismissed.
21	Now, what we have agreed is that we are going to be
22	allowed to stay the proceedings. We're going to file a Notice
23	of Appeal today. During this time we're going to appeal this
24	case to the District Court on the jury trial issue that we

1 raised which was denied before.

2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 MR. PARIENTE: If it's denied there, we will appeal it to the Nevada Appeals Court. If it's denied at that level, 4 5 go to the Nevada Supreme Court Level. If it's denied there, then we will petition the U.S. Supreme Court to hear this 6 7 issue. 8 If we do achieve relief along that way, then, of 9 course, the guilty-plea conviction, which would be stayed, of 10 course, would be set aside and we would obviously have the 11 right to a jury trial. 12 If we are not successful, then the conviction would 13 be imposed at that point and the requirements would --14 THE COURT: Okay. MR. PARIENTE: -- would kick in. 15 16 Sir, you're in agreement to plead to the THE COURT: 17 charge and then stay the imposition of the sentence while you 18 file a Writ, is that what you're filing? 19 MR. PARIENTE: Well, it's actually going to be an 20 So we're going to be appealing the conviction because appeal. 21 we weren't allowed a jury trial. So it's -- we're going to be 22 appealing it to the District Court. 23 THE COURT: Okay. 24 City, was that your understanding as well?

1 MR. WALKER: It is, Your Honor. I think 2 procedurally the conviction would have to enter in order for 3 it to be a final judgment --THE COURT: Uh-huh. 4 5 MR. WALKER: -- to qualify for appeal. But it's our understanding The Court would stay the 6 sentencing. We wouldn't ask for The Court to --7 8 Impose the sentencing? THE COURT: 9 MR. WALKER: -- pursue the sentencing at this -- and 10 I think you would have to -- the sentence would have to be 11 imposed, but stay the execution of the sentence for Mr. 12 Anderson to pursue his appellate remedy and higher court 13 remedies thereafter. 14 And it is my understanding they are going to file 15 the Notice of Appeal today. 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 MR. WALKER: So we'd have no objection to staying 18 that. 19 As Mr. Pariente indicated, he did advise that they 20 would be proceeding through all levels of potential remedy. 21 And we would have no objection to continuing the stay of the 22 sentencing pending the outcome of that pursuit, with a proviso 23 that all filings and timely prosecution of those remedies be 24 fulfilled by Mr. Andersen.

1 Simply put, Judge, if it appears that there's some 2 delay in pursuing those remedies, we'd be asking The Court to 3 revisit enforcing the sentence. 4 THE COURT: Okay. 5 MR. PARIENTE: And obviously we will timely file 6 what we need to. 7 THE COURT: Okay. 8 MR. PARIENTE: All right. 9 THE COURT: All right. Sounds like everyone's in 10 agreement with respect to procedurally how we're going to go forward on it. Okay. 11 12 MR. PARIENTE: As far as the requirements, Judge, 13 I'll let the State -- excuse me -- I'll let the City --14 THE COURT: Oh, sure. 15 MR. PARIENTE: -- put theirs on the record. 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 So what was the proposed resolution for sentence? 18 MR. WALKER: In regards to the A Count, the count 19 that they're pleading on, it'd be one eighty suspended for one 20 year with a broad stay-out-of-trouble, and City's minimums for 21 a first offense, the Level One Counseling, four sixty fine, 22 forty-eight hours community service, two days credit to cover 23 for the two-day jail requirement. 24 THE COURT: Okay.

1 All right. Mr. Anderson, do you understand the 2 resolution and then procedurally how the case is going to move 3 forward? 4 THE DEFENDANT: I do. 5 THE COURT: Okay. Is anybody forcing you to do this 6 plea today? 7 THE DEFENDANT: No. 8 THE COURT: Do you understand you have the right to 9 go to trial if that's what you wanted to do? 10 THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 This document (holding for view) is the waiver form 13 on a BATTERY/DOMESTIC VIOLENCE charge. Did you go over this 14 with Mr. Pariente? 15 Yes, I did. THE DEFENDANT: 16 THE COURT: Did he answer any questions that you 17 had? 18 THE DEFENDANT: (Indiscernible.) 19 THE COURT: Okay. So you understand that when you 20 plead guilty or no contest, you will have a misdemeanor 21 conviction for BATTERY/DOMESTIC VIOLENCE? 22 THE DEFENDANT: Um-hmm (in the affirmative). 23 THE COURT: Do you understand that? 24 THE DEFENDANT: (No audible response.)

1	THE COURT: Okay. Do you also understand this case
2	could be used against you in the future to make penalties
3	harsher if you were convicted of a second or third
4	BATTERY/DOMESTIC VIOLENCE charge?
5	THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
6	THE COURT: Okay. Tell me how you plead, Sir.
7	THE DEFENDANT: No contest.
8	THE COURT: All right. You're stipulating to a
9	factual basis?
10	MR. PARIENTE: Yes, Your Honor.
11	THE COURT: I will accept your no-contest plea and
12	I'm going to follow the resolution.
13	There's a hundred and eighty days of jail but it is
14	suspended for a period of one year. What that means is the
15	case would stay open for a year while you stay out of trouble,
16	which means you can't pick up any new cases.
17	The requirements are by statute. Level I
18	Counseling, a four hundred and sixty dollar fine, and forty-
19	eight hours of community service.
20	You do have two days credit, so that will satisfy
21	the jail requirement.
22	At the end of one year, case will be closed out as
23	long as you had completed these requirements. But if you
24	didn't, do you understand you could face the hundred and

1 eighty days in jail?

2	THE DEFENDANT: (No audible response.)
3	THE COURT: Okay. Now based upon the conversation
4	and the representations from your attorney and the prosecutor,
5	I will stay the imposition or execution of the sentence with
6	the understanding that Mr. Pariente and yourself are going to
7	move forward filing an appeal with respect to the jury trial
8	issue.
9	All right. So let me just make sure that my Orders
10	are clear.
11	And once you file the appeal, for all intents and
12	purposes will take this case out of my jurisdiction. So do
13	you just want kind of a status check here as a place marker or
14	do you
15	MR. PARIENTE: I always
16	THE COURT: want to just take it off calendar or?
17	MR. PARIENTE: We could just take it off calendar.
18	I think that'd be the easier thing.
19	THE COURT: Okay.
20	MR. PARIENTE: I'm going to file I have my
21	runner's going to take it over and file it. They're going to
22	pick it up today. It'll be filed tomorrow.
23	Now I think it has to be
24	THE COURT: Why don't I do just a thirty-day status

check date? 1 2 MR. PARIENTE: Okay. 3 THE COURT: Waive your appearance and then --MR. PARIENTE: Okay. 4 5 THE COURT: -- we'll see how that proceeds. And 6 then once I know that the paperwork's there then I'll just take it off calendar. 7 8 MR. WALKER: Right. 9 MR. PARIENTE: And if I could just interrupt. I 10 think we do have to have your final Entry of --11 THE COURT: Judgment? 12 MR. PARIENTE: -- Judgment before we do the Notice of Appeal. 13 14 THE COURT: That's fine. 15 MR. PARIENTE: So --16 THE COURT: I can do that right now, if you --17 MR. PARIENTE: Okay. Great. THE COURT: -- if that's --18 19 MR. PARIENTE: Okay. 20 THE COURT: I have no problem with that. 21 MR. WALKER: Thirty days is fine with us, and then 22 take it off calendar at that point, Judge. 23 But I apologize, and I apologize to Mr. Pariente, 24 there was an additional term of the negotiation that we didn't 1 get on the record.

2 THE COURT: Okay. What is that? 3 MR. WALKER: We did contemplate a No-Contact Order 4 from the victim in this case excepting as consistent with 5 Family Court Orders. There is a minor child involved and 6 there's a child-exchange arrangement that's been reached 7 through Family Court. 8 THE COURT: So are you --9 MR. PARIENTE: Well, he's not clear on that. Just 10 11 THE COURT: Yeah. Yeah. 12 MR. PARIENTE: If I could just --13 THE COURT: Absolutely. 14 MR. PARIENTE: -- clarify. 15 THE COURT: Do you want a minute? 16 MR. PARIENTE: Your Honor, there is a Family Court 17 Order that allows him to see the child, basically every --18 what is it? 19 THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, every week. Fifty-percent 20 custody. 21 MR. PARIENTE: Yeah. So I guess what they're saying 22 is no outside contact with the complaining witness --23 THE COURT: In that case? 24 MR. PARIENTE: -- that is not consistent with the

Family Court order. 1 2 THE COURT: right. 3 MR. WALKER: And that's our understanding. THE COURT: Okay. 4 5 It's a little -- it's rid -- it's not really redundant. It's just an added condition. 6 7 Obviously, I'm not going to supercede the District 8 Court order. 9 You have an order in place that should clearly tell you how you can do the exchange and what kind of contact you 10 can have. 11 12 This No-Contact Order would mean that you can't just contact -- is it Mirabelle Andersen? 13 14 (NO AUDIBLE RESPONSE.) Yeah, you can't just contact her for a reason other 15 16 than having to do with the exchange or custody of your 17 children. 18 I mean, for practical purposes, City, there's going 19 to be some communication --20 MR. WALKER: Absolutely. 21 THE COURT: -- because of their raising children 22 together. 23 MR. WALKER: Yes, I know. 24 THE COURT: Okay. So --

1	MR. WALKER: And we would contemplate that obviously
2	they would need to have contact regarding the exchange of the
3	child. But any contact outside that issue is what we're
4	concerned about.
5	THE COURT: Okay.
6	So here's how I would put it to you. The
7	Prosecutor's
8	And, City, you can clarify if I'm misspeaking.
9	They don't want you to contact they don't want
10	you to do any sort of harassing-type of communication or
11	THE DEFENDANT: I understand, Your Honor.
12	THE COURT: Yeah, or anything like that.
13	THE DEFENDANT: I understand harassment. It's just
14	difficult to not be able to call or ask about
15	THE COURT: Right.
16	THE DEFENDANT: choir events, school events
17	THE COURT: Right.
18	THE DEFENDANT: medical records.
19	THE COURT: And I think that that type of
20	communication is well within the parameters of what the
21	District Court Order would have contemplated.
22	If these are smaller children, they're going to have
23	to talk about stuff like that, school events
24	MR. WALKER: Yes, Your Honor.

1 THE COURT: -- medical. Yeah. 2 So what it is, is they don't want you to be 3 contacting her over and over and over again for purposes of creating a problem. 4 5 THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 6 THE COURT: I mean, that's a sort of common-sense 7 way of putting it. I don't anticipate having that kind of 8 issue at all. I think it's just something that the prosecutor 9 -- and doesn't sound like your attorney has an issue with it 10 because they don't think that's what's going to happen. 11 Okay? So it's just a provision. 12 You guys have an Order from the District Court to 13 the extent that you need to communicate in order to follow 14 that. I'm going to be perfectly fine with that. 15 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay. 16 THE COURT: Okay? 17 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Um-hmm (in the affirmative). Does that help to clarify? 18 THE COURT: 19 (NO AUDIBLE RESPONSE.) 20 Mr. Pariente, anything --21 MR. PARIENTE: Yes, Your Honor? 22 THE COURT: -- else we need to -- I need to address 23 with respect to that? 24 If you just want to give us the MR. PARIENTE: No.

1 thirty-day --2 THE COURT: Yeah. 3 MR. PARIENTE: -- return date --4 THE COURT: Okay. 5 MR. PARIENTE: -- it's (indiscernible). 6 THE COURT: All right. Let's get you a thirty-day status check date. 7 8 You do not need to appear, Mr. Andersen. This is 9 kind of a place marker to see that the District Court -- that 10 the case is now moving forward as you all have described. 11 Thirty-day date will be? 12 THE CLERK: January 12th at eight thirty. 13 THE COURT: January 12th at eight thirty. 14 MR. PARIENTE: Thank Your Honor. THE COURT: 15 Okay. 16 All right. Good luck. 17 THE DEFENDANT: Thank you. 18 MR. PARIENTE: Thank you. 19 MR. WALKER: Thanks, Mike. 20 21 (PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 10:02:58) 22 23 / 24

1	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and
2	correctly transcribed the video proceedings in the above-
3	entitled case to the best of my ability.
4	<u>/s/CHARLENE BARRA</u> TRANSCRIPTIONIST
5	IRANSCRIPTIONIST
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Print Report

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Las Vegas Municipal Court At the Regional Justice Center 200 Lewis Ave, P.O. Box 3950 Las Vegas, Nevada 89127 Mailing Address: P.O. Box 3950 Las Vegas, NV 89127 www.lasvegasnevada.gov

Printed on: 2/28/2018 2:14 PM

Phone: 38-Court(382-6878)

History Number: 100278079	Name: ANDERSEN, CHRISTOPHER LEE
Case Number: C1135328A	Department: 1
Citation Number: C1135328A	Court Date: 3/1/2018 3:00 PM
Violation: BATTERY/DOMESTIC VIOLENCE	

Case Sentencing			
Item Name	Due	Paid	Balance
Administrative Assessment	\$ 95	0	95
Construction Assessment	\$ 10	0	10
CS FEE	\$ 35	0	35
Domestic Violence Assessment	\$ 35	0	35
DV1 FEE	\$ 780	0	780
Fine	\$ 310	0	310
Genetic Marker Testing AA	\$ 3	0	3
Specialty Court Program Assess	\$ 7	0	7
Community Service	48	0	48
DV Level I	1	0	1
No Contact with Victim	1	0	1
Stay Out of Trouble-BROAD	1	0	1
Suspended Jail	0	0	0

Total monetary balance due: \$1275

Violation Date: 4/24/2015 10:30 PM

Case Activity

Activity Date	Activity
11/29/2017 10:18 AM	Continued
10/30/2017 11:38 AM	Correction: MARSHAL'S UNABLE TO SERVE THE SUMMONS ON 10/25/17
10/23/2017 12:26 PM	Continued
8/15/2017 2:36 PM	Appeal Decision: Dismissed
8/15/2017 2:34 PM	Correction: 8/1/17 NOE Order Dismissing Appeal
8/1/2017 2:47 PM	Tape Start 1: 8/1/2017 9:05 AM
8/1/2017 9:04 AM	Continued
7/19/2017 7:23 AM	Tape Start 1: 7/18/2017 9:01 AM

7/18/2017 9:02 AM	Continued
4/17/2017 2:45 PM	Tape Start 1: 4/17/2017 8:37 AM
4/17/2017 1:53 PM	Continued
3/14/2017 7:11 AM	Appeal: Copy to City Attorney
1/12/2017 3:20 PM	Tape Start 1: 1/12/2017 9:46 AM
1/12/2017 9:46 AM	Continued
12/8/2016 12:17 PM	Appeal: Copy to City Attorney
12/8/2016 12:17 PM	Appeal: Appeal sent to District Court
12/7/2016 4:06 PM	Correction: APPEAL BOND OR
12/7/2016 11:55 AM	Appeal Fee Due: 24
12/7/2016 11:55 AM	Appeal Submitted by Attorney PARIENTE, MICHAEL D Bar# 9469
12/6/2016 4:45 PM	Appeal Fee Due: 24
12/6/2016 4:45 PM	Appeal Submitted by Attorney PARIENTE, MICHAEL D Bar# 9469
12/6/2016 1:49 PM	Tape Start 1: 12/6/2016 9:53 AM
12/6/2016 10:02 AM	Continued
12/6/2016 10:02 AM	Correction: NO CONTACT (TO FOLLOW DISTRICT COURT ORDER)
12/6/2016 10:00 AM	Reason for removing multiple calendared event: Matter handled with primary event
12/6/2016 10:00 AM	Multiple calendared event for 12/6/2016 9:15 AM removed
12/6/2016 10:00 AM	Correction Sentence: No Contact with Victim due 1
12/6/2016 9:57 AM	Sentence: Community Service due 48
12/6/2016 9:57	
AM	Sentence: DV Level I due 1
AM 12/6/2016 9:57 AM	Sentence: DV Level I due 1 Sentence: Genetic Marker Testing AA due \$3
12/6/2016 9:57	
12/6/2016 9:57 AM 12/6/2016 9:57	Sentence: Genetic Marker Testing AA due \$3
12/6/2016 9:57 AM 12/6/2016 9:57 AM 12/6/2016 9:57	Sentence: Genetic Marker Testing AA due \$3 Sentence: Administrative Assessment due \$95

AM	
12/6/2016 9:57 AM	Sentence: Fine due \$310
12/6/2016 9:57 AM	Sentence: Suspend JAIL 180 days
12/6/2016 9:57 AM	Suspend Sentence for 1y
12/6/2016 9:57 AM	Finding: GUILTY
12/6/2016 9:57 AM	Plea: NOLO
12/6/2016 9:56 AM	Withdraw Plea of: NOT GUILTY
12/5/2016 4:39 PM	Miscellaneous: Cert. of facsimile transmission Submitted by City Attorney WALKER, MATTHEW Bar# 10790
12/5/2016 3:31 PM	Miscellaneous: CITY'S OPPOSTION Submitted by City Attorney WALKER, MATTHEW Bar# 10790
12/1/2016 2:49 PM	Multiple Calendared Event continued
12/1/2016 2:49 PM	Multiple Calendared Event Set
12/1/2016 2:49 PM	Motion to Place on Calendar Submitted by Attorney PARIENTE, MICHAEL D Bar# 9469
10/19/2016 10:36 AM	Correction: TAPE: 10/19/16 @ 09:36AM
10/19/2016 10:36 AM	Correction: DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL DENIED
9/28/2016 1:38 PM	Tape Start 1: 9/28/2016 10:02 AM
9/28/2016 10:05 AM	Sentence: Stay Out of Trouble-BROAD due 1
9/28/2016 10:04 AM	Continued
9/28/2016 10:03 AM	Motion: Place on Calendar Granted
9/27/2016 3:43 PM	Miscellaneous: SUPP REPLY TO OPP CONT TRIAL Submitted by Attorney PARIENTE, MICHAEL D Bar# 9469
9/22/2016 12:19 PM	Miscellaneous: REPLY TO OPPOSITION Submitted by Attorney PARIENTE, MICHAEL D Bar# 9469
9/21/2016 1:15 PM	Miscellaneous: OPP TO CONT TRIAL Submitted by City Attorney CURRIE- DIAMOND, KATHERINE Bar# 13676
9/19/2016 2:14 PM	Multiple Calendared Event continued
9/15/2016 4:13 PM	Miscellaneous: MOT TO CONTINUE TRIAL Submitted by Attorney PARIENTE, MICHAEL D Bar# 9469
9/13/2016 3:07 PM	Miscellaneous: OPP TO JURY TRIAL Submitted by Attorney CURRIE-DIAMOND, KATHERINE Bar# 13676
7/26/2016 3:19 PM	Miscellaneous: NOTICE OF DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Submitted by Attorney PARIENTE, MICHAEL D Bar# 9469
7/21/2016 2:11 PM	Correction: TAPE BEGINS ON 7/21/16 @ 11:02AM

7/21/2016 11:32 AM	Reason for removing multiple calendared event: Case Continued
7/21/2016 11:32 AM	Multiple calendared event for 7/21/2016 9:15 AM removed
7/21/2016 11:30 AM	Multiple Calendared Event continued
7/21/2016 11:04 AM	Continued
7/21/2016 11:03 AM	Continued
7/7/2016 1:55 PM	Multiple Calendared Event continued
7/7/2016 9:29 AM	Multiple Calendared Event Set
7/7/2016 9:29 AM	Motion to Place on Calendar Submitted by Attorney PARIENTE, MICHAEL D Bar# 9469
5/10/2016 4:48 PM	Tape Start 1: 5/10/2016 8:52 AM
5/10/2016 8:53 AM	Continued
3/7/2016 5:35 PM	Tape Start 1: 3/7/2016 2:51 PM
3/7/2016 2:49 PM	Continued
1/4/2016 11:28 AM	Tape Start 1: 1/4/2016 9:07 AM
1/4/2016 9:06 AM	Continued
12/21/2015 2:36 PM	Tape Start 1: 12/21/2015 2:36 PM
12/21/2015 2:34 PM	Continued
10/22/2015 1:55 PM	Tape Start 1: 10/22/2015 9:32 AM
10/22/2015 9:33 AM	Continued
8/13/2015 8:45 AM	Continued
6/4/2015 12:46 AM	Bail Refund Processed - Check # 510003015 Date: 06/03/2015
6/3/2015 7:18 AM	Bail Refund Transmitted \$3115 (IR15-014915)
5/26/2015 3:40 PM	Tape Start 1: 5/26/2015 8:59 AM
5/26/2015 8:58 AM	Bail Refund Ordered: \$3115
5/26/2015 8:57 AM	Continued
5/26/2015 8:57 AM	Plea: NOT GUILTY
5/26/2015 8:30	Private Attorney PARIENTE, MICHAEL D Bar# 9469

AM 5/21/2015 3:36 Complaint Filed 5/21/2015 3:35 PM PM 5/18/2015 2:05 Bail Poster Address Change PM 4/25/2015 7:59 Bail Paid \$3115 (3rd Party) ANDERSEN, JOAN JANIE PM 4/25/2015 7:59 Paid \$3115 (15-LEST 4-001691) PM 4/25/2015 7:59 Continued $\mathbf{P}\mathbf{M}$ 4/25/2015 4:01 Continued PM 4/25/2015 4:01 Probable Cause Found PM 4/25/2015 7:18 **Bail Review Complete** AM 4/25/2015 7:18 Continued AM 4/25/2015 2:39 Initial Court Date AM 4/25/2015 2:39 Bail Due: \$3115 AM 4/25/2015 2:39 Allocated to Department: 1 AM 4/25/2015 2:39 Arrest/Case Created AM

Class Requirement:

Classes Due: 26 Classes Completed: 0

REGISTER OF ACTIONS CASE NO. C-16-319933-A

Christopher Lee Andersen, Appellant(s) vs Las Vegas City of, Respondent(s)

Case Type: Criminal Appeal Date Filed: 12/09/2016 Location: Department 32 Cross-Reference Case Number: C319933 Lower Court Case Number: C1135328A/B

PARTY INFORMATION

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Appellant Andersen, Christopher Lee

Respondent Las Vegas City of

Lead Attorneys Michael D. Pariente *Retained* 702-966-5310(W)

Bradford Robert Jerbic Retained 702-229-6629(W)

EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT

	OTHER EVENTS AND HEARINGS
12/09/2016	Appeal from Lower Court (Criminal)
12/09/2016	Record on Appeal Receipt for Documents and Notice of Hearing Receipt for Documents and Notice of Hearing
01/18/2017	Appeal From Lower Court (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Bare, Rob)
	Parties Present <u>Minutes</u>
03/08/2017	Result: Set Status Check Status Check (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Bare, Rob) <i>Status Check: Transcript</i>
	Parties Present
	Minutes
02/44/2047	Result: Briefing Schedule Set
03/14/2017	Supplement Supplement to Appeal
05/09/2017	Supplement
05/10/2017	Supplement on Appeal Respondent's Brief
05/10/2017	Respondent's Answering Brief
07/05/2017	Argument (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Bare, Rob) Argument / Decision
	Parties Present
	Minutes
	06/14/2017 Reset by Court to 07/05/2017
	06/28/2017 Reset by Court to 07/05/2017
	07/05/2017 Reset by Court to 06/28/2017
00/04/0047	Result: Appeal Denied
08/01/2017	Order Order Dismissing Appeal
08/09/2017	Notice of Entry of Order Notice of Entry of Order Dismissing Appeal
08/15/2017	Remittitur to the Lower Court

Electronically Filed 03/15/2017 08:36:55 AM

APP Michael D. Pariente, Esq. The Pariente Law Firm, P.C. John G. Watkins, Esq., Of Counsel 3960 Howard Hughes Parkway 1 CLERK OF THE COURT 2 ٦, Suite 615 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 (702) 966-5310 4 Attorney for Defendant 5 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 6 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA $\overline{7}$ 8 DC Case No: A-16-746752-W Municipal Court Case No: C1135328A Christopher Andersen, 9 Municipal Court: 1 Appellant, 10 APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT FROM LAS VEGAS MUNICIPAL COURT ¥8. 11 City of Las Vegas, 2201-639 (294) 12 Stiller 6.15 Appellee. 13 Les Vegal, NV 89469 PEICNE: C/021966-5370 | FAX: C76 WWW/PA2828075LAWJOUM COMES NOW Appellant, CHRISTOPHER ANDERSEN, by and through his 14 15 attorney of record, MICHAEL D. PARIENTE, and files this appeal from the judgment 1960 Howard Hugh 16 PARIENTE of conviction entered by the Las Vegas Municipal Court No. 1 on December 6, 2016. 17 Respectfully submitted. 18 19 20 21 MICHAEL D. PARIENTE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No.: 9469 22 3960 Howard Hugbes, Suite 615 23 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 24 25 DATED this 15th day of March, 2017. 26 27 28 1

R.M.

LAW

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 FIRM. P.C. PARIENTE LAW FIRM. P.1 3060 Reward Regless Wr994.09 1as Vr995. NV 994.09 PRIME: (702) 966-5340 FAM: (702) 953-7055 WWW.PARIESTICAM.COM 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Mr. Christopher Andersen, a father, business owner, and entrepreneur here in Las Vegas, requests this Honorable Court grant his appeal to set aside the judgment of conviction entered on December 6, 2016 because the Las Vegas Municipal Court denied him his request for a jury trial. On December 6, 2016, Mr. Andersen entered a conditional guilty plea reserving the right to appeal this issue of the denial of his right to a jury trial. He argues the loss of fundamental rights due to a conviction for domestic violence is a "serious offense" entitling a defendant to a right to a jury trial. He distinguishes his case from Amezeua v. Eight Judicial District Court, 319 P.3d 602 (Nev. 2014) due to the fact that NRS 202.360 has been amended subsequent to Amercua, to make him a felon punishable up to 6 years in Nevada prison if he is caught possessing a firearm and has a conviction for domestic violence.⁴ In 2015, the Nevada Legislature amended NRS

1 NRS 202.360 Ownership or possession of firearm by certain persons prohibited: penalties. 1. A person shall not own or have in his or her possession or under his or her custody or control any

firearm if the person! (a) Has been convicted in this State or any other state of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a) (33);

(b) Has been convicted of a felony in this State or any other state, or in any political subdivision thereof, or of a felony in violation of the laws of the United States of America, unless the person has received a pardon and the pardon does not restrict his or her right to bear arms;

- (c) Is a fugitive from justice;
- (d) Is an unlawful user of, or addicted to, any controlled substance: or
- (e) is otherwise prohibited by federal law from having a firearm in his or her possession or under his or her custody or control.
- A person who violates the provisions of this subsection is guilty of a category B felony and shall be 24 punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum term of not less than 1 year and a maximum term of not more than 6 years, and may be further punished by a fine of not more than 25
- 2. A person shall not own or have in his or her possession or under his or her custody or control any \$5,0893. 26 firearm if the person-
- (a) Has been adjudicated as mentally ill or has been committed to any mental health facility by a 27 court of this State, any other state or the United States;
- (b) Has entered a plea of guilty but mentally ill in a court of this State, any other state or the United 28 States;

202.360 to deprive Nevadans of their Second Amendment Right to Bear Firearms if

convicted in Nevada of domestic violence. 2

The lower court erred in denying Mr. Andersen a jury trial consistent with his

procedural due process rights:

[O]nce it is determined that the Due Process Clause applies, 'the question remains what process is due.' [Citation.]" (Loudermill, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 541.) "[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." (Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 481 [33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 92 S. Ct. 2593].) "[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." (Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 335 [47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 96 S. Ct. 893].) Cook v. City of Buena Park, 126 Cal. App. 4th 1, 6 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2005).

Applying the first prong of the Matthews test to Mr. Andersen's case, the private

interest that will be affected is his Second Amendment right to bear arms. The second

prong is the risk of an erroneous deprivation of his Second Amendment right caused by

a conviction for domestic violence. Third, the additional protection of a six-person jury

trial to hold the City to its burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt would 19

help eliminate the risk that Mr. Andersen does not face an erroneous deprivation of his 20

Second Amendment right because the City must prove its case beyond a reasonable

- (c) Hus been found guilty but menially ill in a court of this State, any other state or the United 24 States!
- (d) Has been acquitted by reason of insanity in a court of this State, any other state or the United 25 States; or
 - (e) is illegally or unlawfully in the United States.
- 26 A person who violates the provisions of this subsection is guilty of a category D felony and shall be punished as provided in NRS 193.130. 27
 - As used in this section;
 - (a) "Controlled substance" has the meaning ascribed to it in 21 U.S.C. § 802(6).
 - (b) "Firearm" includes any firearm that is loaded or unloaded and quarable or inoperable.

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doubt to six people sitting in a jury, instead of one Municipal Court Judge. Finally, the City's interest in fiscal and administrative burdens would be proportionately no greater than those incurred by the overwhelming majority of states that provide jury trials for misdemeanors.

The loss of the right to possess a firearm makes a conviction for battery constituting domestic violence a serious offense. The Court held that the right to possess a firearm for self-defense is a fundamental right and cannot be abridged by the State. Specifically, the Court in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) held that the Second Amendment is a fundamental right that is fully applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. McDonald further holds:

Self-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from ancient times to the present day, and in Heller, we held that individual self-defense is "the central component" of the Second Amendment right, 554 U.S., at ____ 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d, at 662; see also id., at ___, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d, at 679 (stating that the "inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second Amondment right"). Explaining that "the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute" in the home, *ibid.*, we found that this right applies to handguns because they are "the most preferred firearm in the nation to 'keep' and use for protection of one's home and family," id., at ____, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d, at 679 (some internal quotation marks omitted); see also id., at ____, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d, at 679 (noting that handguns are "overwhelmingly chosen by American society for [the] lawful purpose" of self-defense); id., at ___, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d, at 680 ("[T]he American people have considered the handgun to be the quintessential self-defense weapon^e). Thus, we concluded, citizens must be permitted "to use [handguns] for the core lawful purpose of self-defense." Id., at ____, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d, at 680. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (U.S. 2010).

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Other courts have recognized the right to a jury trial in cases where a defendant faces

24 a lifetime prohibition of possession of a firearm as a consequence of a misdemcanor 25

assault conviction not punishable by more than six months: 26

In the present case the question is whother the lifetime prohibition of possession of a 27 firearm in addition to 6 months imprisonment makes the offense serious under Blanton and therefore entitles Defendant to a jury trial. Citing USA v. Chavez, 204 28

F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2000), the Government argues that the lifetime prohibition on firearm possession does not make the penalty serious. The undersigned is unpersuaded by the court's reasoning in Chavez and concludes that the penalty is serious. In Chavez, the court focused on the fact that in 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a)(33)(B)(i)(II) Congress recognized that some domestic violence offenses do not carry the right to a jury trial even though a conviction results in the prohibition of firearm possession. However, the issue is not whether Congress recognized a right to a jury trial for domestic violence offenses. The issue is whether the penalty Congress attached to the offense was serious enough to entitle the Defendant to a jury trial under the 6th Amendment. Having examined that issue, the Court finds that a lifetime prohibition on the possession of a firearm is a serious penalty which entitles a Defendant to a jury trial under the 6th Amendment. Possession of a firearm for military purposes, self protection and sport has been an important aspect of American life throughout our history. Today, the issue of Governmental restriction of firearm possession is hotly debated. Substantial segments of American society hold strong opinions on the issue. Many advocate strict government restrictions on the ability to possess firearms while many others take the opposite view and consider firearms possession to be an integral part of their lives. In this context, the issue is very scrious. Moreover, the categories of persons prohibited from possessing firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and the penalties imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 924 for violating the prohibition (10 years) demonstrate that Congress views the prohibition as serious. The Court finds that a lifetime prohibition on the possession of a firearm is a serious penalty and, when combined with 6 months imprisonment, entitles a Defendant to the common-sense judgment of a jury. Defendant's Motion for a Jury Trial is GRANTED. United States v. Smith, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1317-1318 (N.D. Okla. 2001). (italics added)

The Smith case, supra, is right on point. The fact that the Novada Legislature has barred persons from owning or possessing firearms, even for self-defense for the rest of their lives, and subjects them to felony prosecution punishable up to 6 years if such persons are convicted of domestic violence, demonstrates that the Legislature "views the prohibition as serious." The Legislature chose to amend NRS 202.360 in 2015 to treat persons convicted of domestic violence the same as felons, mentally ill persons, and drug addicts by lumping them in with the category of people who cannot own or possess a firearm even for self-defense demonstrates a clear intent of the Legislature that it believes Domestic Violence is a serious crime. Thus, this Court should find the Legislature's lifetime ban and felony prosecution for possessing a firearm, when

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combined with 6 months imprisonment "entitles a Defendant to the common-sense judgment of a jury."

In this case, Mr. Andersen has provided notice under NRS 175.011 demanding his right to trial by jury. If Mr. Andersen's appeal is denied and he is convicted of Battery Constituting Domestic Violence in violation of NRS 200.481, NRS 200.485, and NRS 33.018, he faces the loss of his right to possess a firearm oven for self-defense, up to 6 years in prison if he is caught owning or possessing a firearm under NRS 202.360(2). despite the fact that the Court in McDonald v. City of Chicago, supra, held that the Second Amendment right to bear arms is a fundamental right incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment to the States.

The fact that a defendant stands to lose his Second Amendment right and face felony prosecution under NRS 202.360(2) upon conviction of misdemeanor battery constituting domestic violence makes this criminal offense anything but "petty." Because a defendant's Second Amendment right is at stake in a criminal complaint of Battery Constituting Domestic Violence and because he or she faces subsequent felony prosecution under NRS 202.360(2) if caught owning or possessing a firearm even for selfdefense, a Mr. Andersen should have been afforded a jury trial per his demand.

CONCLUSION

This Honorable Court should grant Mr. Andersen's appeal, reverse the conviction, 23 and remand this case to the Las Vegas Municipal Court Department No. 1 for a jury 24 25 trial.

Respectfully submitted,

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MICHAEL D. PARIENTE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No.: 9469 3960 Howard Hughes, Suite 615 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169



FIRM.

LAW

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DATED this 15th day of March. 2017.

DECLARATION OF COUNSEL

STATE OF NEVADA COUNTY OF CLARK

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I, MICHAEL D. PARIENTE, ESQ., being first duly sworn according to law, upon oath, deposes and says:


Your declarant is an Attorney at Law duly licensed to practice in all 1. courts in the State of Nevada;

2. Your declarant is the Attorney of record for the Defendant herein:

FURTHER YOUR DECLARANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

8

MICHAEL D. PARIENTE, ESQ.



Electronically Filed 05/10/2017 12:00:05 PM

City Attorney MATTHEW B. Walker Deputy City Attorney Nevada Bar No. 10790 2 CLERK OF THE COURT 3 Regional Justice Center, 2nd Floor P.O. Box 3930 4 Las Vegas, Nevada 89127 5 DISTRICT COURT б CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 7 8 CHRISTOPHER ANDERSEN CASE NO.: C-16- 319933-A Appellant-Defendant, 9 DEPT NO.: 32 VS. 10 Municipal Case: C1135328A CITY OF LAS VEGAS 11 Respondent-Plaintiff. 12 13 RESPONDENT'S ANSWERING BRIEF 14 Hearing Date: 15 Hearing Time: 16 17 18 ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 19 20 BRADFORD R. JERBIC Michael D. Pariente, Esq. Nevada Bar #9469 City Attorney 21 Matthew B. Walker, Esq. The Pariente Law Firm 22 John G. Watkins, Esq., Of Counsel Deputy City Attorney Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 Nevada Bar #10790 23 200 Lewis Street, 2nd Floor (702) 966-5310 24 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 229-6201 25 26 27 28 City of Les Veges flice of the City Attorney

BRADFORD R. JERBIC

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P.O. BOX 3930

Vegas, Nevada 89127 782-229-6201

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2	STATEMENT OF THE CASE
3	On April 24, 2015, an altercation occurred wherein the Appellant-
4	Defendant, Christopher Andersen ("Defendant" herein), was arrested for Battery
5	Domestic Violence ("BDV"). He was ultimately charged with BDV and a second
6	count of Simple Battery. Subsequent to his arraignment on the charges, Defendant
7	filed a Notice Of Demand For Jury Trial. That Notice was heard on October 19,
8	2016, and denied by the lower court. On December 6, 2016, the scheduled date for
9	trial on the charges, Defendant entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere to the
10	BDV ¹ with stipulation by the parties that he was preserving his right to appeal the
11	Court's decision as to the jury trial issue. This timely Appeal followed.
12	<u>п.</u>
13	STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
14	On July 26, 2016, Defendant filed his Notice Of Demand For Jury Trial.
15	The City then filed a timely Opposition To Demand For Jury Trial. The Notice
16	was treated as a Motion by the Court, and calendared for argument on October 19,
17	2016.
18	At the time of the hearing, the City's position, as conveyed in its Opposition,
19	was that the Nevada Supreme Court was very clear in Amezcua v. Eighth Judicial
20	District Court, 319 P.3d 602 (2014), that misdemeanants charged with BDV were
21	not entitled to a trial by jury due to it being a petty offense. See Respondent's
22	Exhibit #1.
23	Defendant's chief argument was that an amendment of NRS 202.360 by the
24	Nevada Legislature subsequent to the Amezcua decision, which criminalized
25	possession of a firearm after a BDV conviction, had in effect re-classified BDV as
26	a serious offense. Transcript Re: Motion at 2:16-23.
27	111
28	The Simple Bettern Count man dismissed at that time and the second state
The Verse	¹ The Simple Battery Count was dismissed at that time pursuant to negotiations.

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1	The Court then denied the Motion, citing to the findings in Amezcua that
2	deemed consequences affecting firearm possession as collateral, as well as the
3	jurisprudence on the issue as established by the United States and Nevada Supreme
4	Courts. Transcript Re: Motion at 3:2-4 and 4:6-12.
5	<u>III.</u>
6	ARGUMENT
7	The Amendment To NRS 202.360 Does Not Elevate
8	Battery Domestic Violence To A "Serious" Crime
9	The Amezcua case is only the latest in a long history of jurisprudence by
10	both the Nevada Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court under which
11	Defendant is clearly not entitled to a jury trial.
12	In State v. Smith, 99 Nev. 806, 672 P.2d 631 (1983), the Nevada Supreme
13	Court held that where the maximum penalty is six months imprisonment or less,
14	the offense is "petty" and the right to trial by jury does not attach. Id. at 811. In
15	Smith, the court noted that "despite the differences in language of the
16	constitutional provisions," neither Article 1, Section 3 of the Nevada Constitution,
17	nor the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantee the right to
18	trial by jury for first offense DUI or any "petty" offenses. Id. at 810.
19	A few years later, in Blanton v. North Las Vegas Mun. Court, 103 Nev. 623
20	(1987), several defendants charged with DUI petitioned to claim their right to jury
21	trials in municipal courts. The defendants in Blanton argued that Article 1, Section
22	3 of the Nevada Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States
23	Constitution guaranteed them a right to a jury trial.
24	The Nevada Supreme Court ultimately held that the right to a jury trial "does
25	not extend to every criminal proceeding." Id. at 629. The Nevada Supreme Court
26	identified "significant issues relating to serious financial, administrative and policy
27	concerns" that would arise from misdemeanor trials, and concluded that such
28	concerns should be addressed and "resolved by the legislature after conducting
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City of Las Vegis Mcc of the City Atterney P.O. BOX 3930 In Vegas, Neveda 89127 703-229-6301 appropriate hearings and investigations on the implications" of these types of trials.
 Id. at 636. The Nevada Supreme Court further found that if such a drastic change
 was to be judicially mandated, "such a decision must come from the United States
 Supreme Court." *Id.* at 637.

This decision was actually entertained by the United States Supreme Court a
little over a year later in <u>Blanton v. North Las Vegas</u>, 489 U.S. 538, 103 L Ed 2d
550 (1989) through *Writ Of Certiorari*. In <u>Blanton</u>, the United States Supreme
Court addressed the question of when an offense was deemed serious for jury trial
purposes. In <u>Blanton</u>, a unanimous Supreme Court found that Nevada's DUI
statute was not a serious crime such that the defendant was entitled to a jury trial:

It has long been settled that "there is a category of petty crimes or offenses which is not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury trial provisions." In determining whether a particular offense should be categorized as "petty", our early decisions focused on the nature of the offense In recent years, however, we have sought more "objective indication of the seriousness with which society regards the offense." "[w]e have found the most relevant such criteria in the severity of the maximum authorized penalty ... Following this approach, our decision in Baldwin established that a defendant is entitled to a jury trial whenever the offense for which he is charged carries a maximum authorized prison term of greater than six months. Blanton, 448 U.S. at 542, citations omitted.

The <u>Blanton</u> court then went on to establish a guideline for evaluating the seriousness of an offense. It ruled that if the maximum jail time authorized by statute does not exceed six months, there is a presumption that the offense is petty. Said presumption then can only be overcome if "additional statutory penalties, viewed in conjunction with the maximum authorized period of incarceration, are so severe that they clearly reflect a legislative determination that the offense in question is a 'serious' one." *Id.* at 543.

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The United States Supreme Court went on to apply this test in United States 1 v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 122 L Ed 2d 374 (1993). In Nachtigal, the defendant was 2 charged with DUI in a national park. If convicted, a defendant could be sentenced 3 to up to six months in jail and a \$5,000 fine. A defendant could also be placed on 4 probation for up to five years. A person on probation could be subject to up to 21 5 conditions of probation. And, most pertinent to the instant case, one of those 6 conditions as set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3563(b)(8) is that a defendant "refrain from 7 possessing a firearm, destructive device or other dangerous weapon". 8

Nachtigal argued that the probation conditions meant that the crime of DUI
in a national park was a serious offense. The United States Supreme Court held
that the penalties Nachtigal faced were not sufficient to overcome the presumption,
despite the fact that a defendant could, as part of his probation, be ordered not to
possess a firearm. The United States Supreme Court stated:

Because the maximum term of imprisonment is six months, DUI under 36 CFR 4.23(a)(1) is presumptively a petty offense to which <u>no</u> <u>jury trial right attaches.</u> ... Nor do we believe that the parole alternative renders the DUI offense serious. Like a monetary penalty, the liberty infringement caused by a term of probation is far less intrusive than incarceration. The discretionary probation conditions do not alter this conclusion; while they obviously entail a greater infringement on liberty than probation without attendant conditions, they do not approximate the severe loss of liberty caused by imprisonment for more than six months. <u>Nachtigal</u> 507 U.S. at 9-10. Citations omitted. (Emphasis Added).

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Given the <u>Nachtigal</u> ruling, it is clear that the United States Supreme Court does not consider the potential loss of the right to possess a firearm upon conviction a significant enough factor to overcome the <u>Blanton</u> presumption.

Furthermore, following the rationale laid out by the <u>Nachtigal</u> ruling, the Nevada Supreme Court, recently ruled in <u>Amezcua v. Eighth Judicial District</u> <u>Court</u>, 319 P.3d 602 (2014) that collateral consequences, those not explicitly

City of Las Vegas files of the City Atlantay P.O. BOX 2930 ts Vegas, Novada 89127 702-229-6201 1 authorized as penalties under the charging statute, are not relevant to a 2 "seriousness" analysis.

In <u>Amezcua</u>, the defendant was charged with first-offense battery constituting domestic violence. He filed a timely notice for a jury trial which was denied by the justice court. Amezcua subsequently filed a petition for a *writ of mandamus* in the district court, which was denied. His conviction was affirmed on appeal by the district court. Amezcua then filed a petition for *writ of mandamus* or *writ of habeas corpus* with the Nevada Supreme Court.

9 In denying the petition, the Nevada Supreme Court reiterated that the right to 10 a jury trial only attaches to "serious" offenses, and that the penalties set forth for 11 those offenses were the bar upon which the "seriousness" of the offense was to be 12 measured:

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"[T]o determine whether the . . . right to a jury trial attaches to a particular offense, the court must examine 'objective indications of the seriousness with which society regards the offense." United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 3, 113 S. Ct. 1072, 122 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1993) (quoting Blanton v. N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541, 109 S. Ct. 1289, 103 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1989)). The best objective indicator of the seriousness with which society regards an offense is the maximum penalty that the legislature has set for it. Id. Although a "penalty" may include things other than imprisonment, the focus for purposes of the right to a jury trial has been "on the maximum authorized period of incarceration."' Id. (quoting Blanton, 489 U.S. at 542). Taking this approach, the Supreme Court has held that an offense for which the period of incarceration is six months or less is presumptively "petty" a offense and a jury trial is not constitutionally required. Id. We have reached the same conclusion. Blanton, 103 Nev. at 633-34, 748 P.2d at 500-01. The presumption may be overcome "only by showing that the additional penalties, viewed together with the maximum prison term, are so severe that the legislature clearly determined that the offense is a 'serious' one." Nachtigal, 507 U.S. at 3-4 (quoting Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543). Amezcua, 319 P.3d at 604. (Emphasis added)

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1	Amezcua argued that, in addition to other consequences of his conviction, he
2	could potentially lose his gun rights under 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(9), and that these
3	consequences were sufficient "additional penalties" to reflect a legislative intent
4	that the offense should be considered serious.
5	Citing to its previous rulings in Palmer v. State, 118 Nev. 823, 826, 59 P.3d
6	1192, 1194 (2002) and Nollette v. State, 18 Nev. 341, 344, 46 P.3d 87, 89 (2002),
7	the Amezcua court found that Amezcua's potential loss of his gun rights was a
8	collateral consequence of his conviction, and therefore not relevant to an analysis
9	of the "seriousness" of an offense. Id. at 605.
0	Following the Nachtigal court's lead, the Amezcua court placed heavy
.1	emphasis on the direct sentencing allowed under the charging statute:
2	
3	The only penalties that NRS 200.485(1) imposes, in addition to
4	imprisonment, are a community-service requirement of not more than 120 hours and a fine of not more than \$1,000. There is nothing so
5	severe in those penalties, considered together, as to clearly indicate a determination by the Nevada Legislature that this is a serious offense to which the right to a jury trial attaches.
7	to milen ino right to a jury that attaches.
8	The Amezcua court then found that Amezcua had failed to overcome the
)	Blanton presumption, and that the Nevada Legislature did not view misdemeanor
	BDV a "serious" offense. ² Id.
	In his Appeal From Judgment From Las Vegas Municipal Court (Appeal),
2	Defendant ignores the clear law of Blanton and Nachtigal, and asks this Court
	instead to apply a fresh due-process analysis. Appeal, p. 3. However, as described
-	in detail above, the United States Supreme Court has already conducted its own
	due-process analysis, and ruled that there is not a Sixth Amendment right to a
5	2
3	² While it is instructive rather than precedential, it is worth noting that this Court has previously agreed with the <u>Blanton</u> and <u>Amezcua</u> courts. <u>See</u> Respondent's

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City of Las Vegas files of the City Allomey P.O. BOX 3938 to Vegas, Nevada 89127 702-229-6201 jury trial for petty crimes or offenses. <u>Blanton</u> at 541, citing <u>Duncan v</u>, Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1452, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968).

Therefore, the only real analysis to be applied is whether misdemeanor BDV, under NRS 200.485, is a petty offense or a serious offense. In support of his position that it is a serious offense, Defendant focuses primarily on the recent amendment to NRS 202.360, criminalizing possession of a firearm by those convicted of misdemeanor BDV, and argues that it is a reflection of a change in the Nevada Legislature's intent. Under the jurisprudence cited herein above, this focus is premature, and ultimately incorrect.

10 The maximum allowed incarceration under the charging statute NRS 11 200.485 is six months, and that has not been changed by the Nevada Legislature. 12 Therefore under <u>Blanton</u>, *it is presumed* that the Nevada Legislature considers 13 NRS 200.485 BDV to be petty. The only way Defendant can overcome that 14 presumption is if there are additional penalties so severe that the Nevada 15 Legislature clearly determined the offense is a 'serious' one.

As the Amezcua court noted, loss of the right to a firearm is not a direct 16 consequence of conviction of BDV under Nevada law. Given that the penalty 17 component of NRS 200.485 has not been amended since the Amezcua ruling, even 18 if the Defendant were to argue that the abridgement on his firearm rights and the 19 criminalization thereof under NRS 202.360 are "additional penalties" severe 20 enough to overcome the Blanton presumption, they could not be considered 21 because, under Amezcua, they are collateral and thus irrelevant. With no other 22 factors to consider, it would still be presumed that the Nevada Legislature 23 considers NRS 200.485 BDV to be petty, and the "seriousness" analysis could stop 24 25 there.

But, even were this Court were to disregard the <u>Amezcua</u> court's ruling that collateral consequences are irrelevant, Defendant must show that there are "additional penalties" beyond six months in jail and that those penalties combined

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1	with the jail time are sufficiently severe. The Defendant was charged under NRS
2	200.485 as defined by NRS 33.018 and NRS 200.481. See Respondent's Exhibit
3	#2. Unfortunately, for the Defendant, the current language of NRS 202.360,
4	specifically defines battery domestic violence differently than NRS 200.485:
5	NRS 202.360(1)(a) states:
6	1. A person shall not own or have in his or her possession or under
7	his or her custody or control any firearm if the person:
8	(a) Has been convicted in this State or any other state of a
9	misdemeanor crime of domestic violence as defined in 18 U.S.C.
10	§ 921(a)(33);
11	(Emphasis added)
12	Therefore, any consequences to the Defendant arising from NRS 202.360
13	cannot be said to be penalties of a conviction under NRS 200.485, but are the
14	consequences of conduct arising under a completely different definition.
15	Furthermore, as can be seen from the plain language of the statute, the
16	Nevada Legislature specifically limited the definition of misdemeanor domestic
17	violence under NRS 202.360 to that already criminalized by the federal
18	government3. Thus, far from changing its position regarding the relative
19	"seriousness" of misdemeanor BDV, the Nevada Legislature specifically took care
20	in its choice of language to make clear that its position had not changed.
21	Lastly, the Nachtigal court has already ruled that potential loss of a firearm
22	is not severe enough of an "additional penalty" to overcome the Blanton
23	presumption. Therefore, even if this Court were to find that NRS 202.360 creates
24	new penalties for violations of NRS 200.485, under Nachtigal, such a finding
25	would not be sufficient to show the requisite Legislative intent that misdemeanor
26	BDV was "serious" enough to warrant a right to a jury trial.
27	///
28	³ 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(9).

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1	<u>IV.</u>
2	CONCLUSION
3	Given the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court and the Nevada
4	Supreme Court regarding the designation of "petty" versus "serious" offenses, the
5	Defendant has not and cannot show that he is facing penalties beyond six months
6	in jail which are so severe that the Nevada Legislature intended his offense to be
7	considered serious. Therefore, his argument that the lower court erred in denying
8	his Motion for jury trial fails because he cannot show that he is being charged with
9	a serious offense, a procedural prerequisite to the right to a jury trial.
10	For the foregoing reasons, the City respectfully requests that this Court
11	dismiss the Defendant's Appeal.
12	Wh
13	Respectfully submitted this 10 day of May, 2017.
14	
15	mand
16	Matthew B. Walker
17	Deputy City Attorney, Bar #10790 Las Vegas City Attorney's Office
18	200 Lewis Avenue, Suite 2327
19	Las Vegas, Nevada 89127 (702) 229-6201
20	(102) 229-0201
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1	CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILIE TRANSMISSION
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3	I hereby certify that on May /D, 2017, I forwarded a true and correct copy
4	of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S ANSWERING BRIEF, via facsimile
5	transmission, to:
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8	Michael D. Pariente, Esq. 702-953-7055
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12	An employee of the City of Las Vegas
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EXHIBIT 1

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1	BRADFORD R. JERBIC	134567
2	City Attorney Katherine Currie-Diamond	A A A
		FIFD V
3	Deputy City Attorney Nevada Bar No. 13676	- SEP 1/2016
4	Regional Justice Center, 2nd Floor P.O. Box 3930	
5280	Las Vegas, Nevada 89127	a channer colt
5	LAS VEGAS	MUNICIPAL COURT
6		OUNTY, NEVADA
7		Joenni, nevaba
8	THE CITY OF LAS VEGAS,	CASE NO.: C1135328A/B
9	THE CIT I OF LAS VEGAS,	
10	Plaintiff, vs.	DEPT NO.: 1
11		
12	CHRISTOPHER LEE ANDERSEN Defendant.	
13	OPPOSITION TO I	EMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
14	COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, the	City of Las Vegas ("City") and files the following
15		is pleading is based upon the points and authorities
16 -	outlined below.	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
17	POINTS A	ND AUTHORITES
18	The law on this matter is very clear.	A person charged with a petty offense is not entitled
19	to a jury trial. Blanton v North Las Vegas,	489 U.S. 538, 103 L Ed 2d 550 (1989), State v Smith,
20	9 Nev. 806, 672 P. 2d 631 (1983).	
21	In Blanton, the Supreme Court add	ressed the question of when an offense was deemed
22	serious for jury trial purposes. In Blanton	, a unanimous Supreme Court found that Nevada's
23	DUI statute was not a serious crime such the	t the defendant was entitled to a jury trial:
24	It has been been solited that	Where is a saturney of a the states of
25	offenses which is not subject	"there is a category of petty crimes or et to the Sixth Amendment jury trial
1	provisions." In determining	whether a particular offense should be
26	categorized as "petty", our ea	rly decisions focused on the nature of
27		ears, however, we have sought more
20		eriousness with which society regards and the most relevant such criteria in
28		authorized penaltyFollowing this
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approach, our decision in <u>Baldwin</u> established that a defendant is entitled to a jury trial whenever the offense for which he is charged carries a maximum authorized prison term of greater than six months. <u>Blanton</u>, 448 U.S. at 542-42, citations omitted.

In <u>State v Smith</u>, 99 Nev. 806, 672 P.2d 631 (1983), the Nevada Supreme Court held that where the maximum penalty is six months imprisonment or less, the offense is "petty" and the right to trial by jury does not attach. <u>Id</u> at 811. Additionally, the Court in <u>Smith</u> held that neither Article 1, Section 3 of the Nevada Constitution, nor the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantee the right to trial by jury for first offense DUI.

The Nevada Supreme Court has recently re-addressed the issue whether a defendant is entitled to a jury trial for a petty offense. In <u>Amezcua v Eighth Judicial District</u> Court, 319 P.3d 602 (2014), Amezcua was charged with first-offense battery constituting domestic violence. He filed a timely notice for a jury trial which was denied by the justice court. Amezcua subsequently filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the district court, which was denied. His conviction was affirmed on appeal by the district court. Amezcua then filed a petition for writ of mandamus or habeas corpus with the Nevada Supreme Court.

In denying the petition, the Nevada Supreme Court again acknowledged that the right to a
 jury trial does not extend to every criminal proceeding. <u>Amezcua</u>, 319 P.2d at 604, citing
 <u>Blanton</u>. The right to a jury trial only attaches to "serious" offenses. <u>Id</u>. The Nevada Supreme
 Court went on to state:

"[T]o determine whether the . . . right to a jury trial attaches to a particular offense, the court must examine 'objective indications of the seriousness with which society regards the offense." United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 3, 113 S. Ct. 1072, 122 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1993) (quoting Blanton v. N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541, 109 S. Ct. 1289, 103 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1989)). The best objective indicator of the seriousness with which society regards an offense is the maximum penalty that the legislature has set for it. Id. Although a "penalty" may include things other than imprisonment, the focus for purposes of the right to a jury trial has been "on maximum the authorized period of incarceration." Id. (quoting Blanton, 489 U.S. at 542). Taking this approach, the Supreme Court has held that an offense for which the period of incarceration is six months or less is presumptively a "petty" offense and a jury trial is not constitutionally required. Id. We have reached the same conclusion. Blanton,

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103 Nc at 633-34, 748 P.2d at 500-01. The resumption may be overcome "only by showing that the additional penalties, viewed together with the maximum prison term, are so severe that the legislature clearly determined that the offense is a 'serious' one." <u>Nachtigal</u> 507 U.S. at 3-4 (quoting <u>Blanton</u>, 489 U.S. at 543). Amezcua, 319 P.3d at 604.

Amezcua argued that collateral consequences associated with a conviction for battery constituting domestic violence reflected a legislative intent that the offense should be considered a serious offense, thus mandating a jury trial.¹ The Nevada Supreme Court rejected these arguments and held that the statutory penalties imposed by the Nevada Legislature for battery constituting domestic violence did not elevate the crime to a "serious" offense.

In this case the Defendant is arguing the exact collateral consequences associated with a conviction for battery constituting domestic violence that the Nevada Supreme Court has already rejected. The <u>Amezua</u> case is directly on point in this matter. The law relating to the right to a jury trial for an offense punishable of up to 6 months in jail is abundantly clear. The defendant does not have a right to a jury trial in this case. The issues that Defendant raises in his brief are matters that must be dealt with by the legislature, as this Court is bound by the decision of both the United States Supreme Court as well as the Nevada Supreme Court.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing argument, the City respectfully requests that the Defendant request for a jury trial be denied.

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¹ These collateral consequences included the rebuttable presumption that a perpetrator of domestic violence is unfit for sole or joint custody of children (NRS 432B.157 and NRS 125C.230), the loss of the right to possess a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9) and the possibility of deportation for noncitizens under federal immigration law.

. DATED this 19 day of September, 2016 X. ano-T Katherine Curric-Diamond Deputy City Attorney Bar # 13676 Las Vegas City Attorney's Office 200 Lewis Avenue Suite 2327 Las Vegas, Nevada 89127 (702) 229-6201 City of Las Vogas filee of the City Attorney P.O. BOX 3930 Vogse, Neveda 89127 702-229-6201




EXHIBIT 2

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1	BRADFORD R. JERBIC	
2	City Attorney Regional Justice Center, 2 nd Floor	
3	P.O. Box 3930 Las Vegas, Nevada 89127	
4		
5	LAS VEGAS MU	ICIPAL COURT
6	CLARK COUN	ITY, NEVADA
7		T
8	CITY OF LAS VEGAS,	CASE NO.: C1135328A/B
220	Plaintiff,	DEPT NO.: 1
9	VS.	CODE NO.: 5018/5019
10	CHRISTOPHER LEE ANDERSEN	
11	ID#: 7515016 Defendant.	CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
12		<u>_</u>
13	Said Defendant, on or about April 24, 20	15, at and within the City of Las Vegas, State of
14	Nevada, in the area on, about, or between, 950	1 West Sahara and 9300 West Sahara Avenue,
15	has committed the following:	
16	cou	A TR
17	BATTERY which constituted domestic viol	ence as defined by NRS 33.018 (Misdemeanor -
18	LVMC 10.02.010 and NRS 200.481, 200.485),	o-wit: That the said Defendant did then and
19	there willfully and unlawfully use force or violen	ce upon the person of another, to-wit: Maribel
20	Andersen, which included striking her about the	face, with his open hand, thereby causing her
21	to fall to the ground and bite her lip, and/or pus	hing her upon her body, thereby causing her to
22	strike her head upon the floor, and/or grabbing a	and dragging her by the wrists.
23	Such conduct constituted domestic viole	nce, as defined by NRS 33.018 in that at the
24	time of the described conduct, the victim was a	person with whom the Defendant is and/or was
25	a spouse, and/or former spouse and/or any oth	ner person to whom he is related by blood or
26	marriage and/or a person with whom is or was	, actually residing and/or a person with whom
27	has had or is having a dating relationship and/o	r a person with whom has a child in common
28	and/or the minor child of any of those persons ar	vd/or his child

City of Las Vegas Office of the City Attorney P.O. BCK 3930 Las Vegas, Nevada 89127 702-229-6201

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1	COUNT B
2	BATTERY (Misdemeanor - LVMC 10.02.010 and NRS 200.481), in the manner following
3	to-wit: That the said Defendant, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully use force or violent
4	upon the person of another, to-wit: Dustin Pascoe, which included striking him about h
5	abdomen, with his fist, and/or struggling with him, thereby causing him to fail to the ground.
6	All of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of Statutes in such cases made an
7	provided and against the peace and dignity of the City of Las Vegas, State of Nevada. Sa
8	Complainant makes this declaration on information and belief subject to the penalty of perjury
9	Dated: May 14, 2015
10	CARLENE HELBERT
11	CARLENE HELBERT, Complainant
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O. BOX 3	r Attorney 1930 1504244275 / /JKP da 89127

EXHIBIT 3

SF (25)

Electronically Filed 5%/2017 10:15 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERIK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

DAVIS MONJE,

Appellant,

VS.

ORDR

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STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. CASE NO.: C-16-316727-A DEPT. NO. 32

DECISION AND ORDER

On September 25, 2015, the Appellant, Davis Monje, was charged with one misdemeanor count of Driving Under the Influence. On April 12, 2016, the Appellant filed a Motion for Jury Trial, which the Las Vegas Justice Court denied on April 14, 2016. The Appellant was thereafter found guilty on July 13, 2016. On July 20, 2016, the Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. The appeal came on for oral argument before this Court on March 15, 2017.

The Appellant appealed his conviction on the sole issue of the denial of his Motion for Jury Trial for a misdemeanor offense. The Appellant contends that the denial was in error because Article I, Section 3 of the Nevada Constitution

26 provides that "[t]he right of trial by Jury shall be secured to all." The Appellant

contends that this provision of the Nevada Constitution stands for the proposition

that all misdemeanors in Nevada are entitled to jury trials. This Court disagrees. RECEIVED

CLERK OF THE COURT

(AY 0 9 2017

Case Number: C-16-316727-A

Page 1 of 4

The Nevada constitutional jury right provision secures the jury trial right as it was known at common law. Blanton v. N. Las Vegas Municipal Court, 103 Nev. 623, 633, 748 P.2d 494, 500 (1987) (citing State v. Ruhe, 24 Nev. 251, 52 P. 274, 277 (1898)). Thus, this constitutional provision is coextensive with that guaranteed by the federal constitution. Id. The Nevada Supreme Court has ruled where the maximum possible penalty is six months imprisonment or less, the offense is a petty offense, and the right to a jury trial does not attach. State v. Smith, 99 Nev. at 809, 672 P.2d at 633 (1983). Further, the Nevada Supreme Court has directly addressed the question of whether a person charged with a misdemeanor DUI is entitled to a jury trial in Blanton v. N. Las Vegas Mun. Court, 103 Nev. at 633, 748 P.2d at 500 (1987). In Blanton, the Nevada Supreme Court adopted a bright-line test for the misdemeanor jury trial issue, holding that petty offenses, i.e. offense punishable by incarceration of six months or less, are not eligible for jury trials. Id. This rule is identical to the federal rule. Id.

The Blanton Court considered the speed and inexpensive nature of bench trials, the chilling effect any other decision might have on DUI prosecution, the burden placed on rural potential jurors, the practical limitations of judicial officials in outlying areas of the state, and the governmental body best suited to institute such a change that would contravene over a hundred years of practice and procedure. *Id.* Further, collateral or speculative consequences of a conviction for such an offense do not change the maximum statutory penalty analysis. *See State v. Smith*, 99 Nev. at 809, 672 P.2d at 633 (1983)(holding "the principal criterion used in characterizing an offense as 'petty' or 'serious' is the severity of the maximum authorized penalty"); *see also Amezcua v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State ex rel. Cty. of Clark*, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 7, 319 P.3d 602, 604 (2014)(restating the "petty offense" demarcation at six months and holding that collateral consequences of conviction are immaterial to jury trial analysis).

Page 2 of 4

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In this case, the Ap	pellant was convicted of a misdemeanor DUI carrying a
maximum incarceration p	enalty of six months or less. Therefore, under the case
law, his Motion for Jury 1	frial was appropriately denied by the Las Vegas Justice
Court. Pursuant to Blanto	on, Smith, and Amezcua, the Nevada Supreme Court has
made it clear that the righ	t to a jury trial does not attach to petty offenses, which
are offenses that carry a n	naximum incarceration penalty of six months or less.
IT IS HEREBY OF	DERED, Appellant's conviction is AFFIRMED and
REMANDED back to the	lower court for any further proceedings.
Detect	this <u> </u>
Dated	uns day of May, 2017.
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	Dab Dam
	Rob Bare,
	Rob Bare, Judge, District Court, Department 32
	Rob Bare,
(3)	Rob Bare,
\$2 * 5	Rob Bare,

CERTIFICATI	E OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the date file	ed, I or mailed or faxed a copy to:
CRAIG MUELLER, ESQ. KELSEY BERNSTEIN, ESQ.	AARON NANCE, ESQ. Deputy District Attorney
Mueller Hinds & Associates	Clark County District Attorney
600 South 8th Street	200 Lewis Avenue
Las Vegas NV 89101	Las Vegas NV 89155
(702) 940-1234 Attorneys for Appellant	(702) 671-2500 Attorney for Respondent
Dated this 41	ay of May, 2017.
7	ATIMMAG
Ta	ra Moser
	dicial Executive Assistant, Dept. 32
	(達)
-	4 of 4

Electronically Filed 6/9/2017 1:53 PM Steven D. Grierson I

 1 2 3 4 5 6 7	REP The Pariente Law Firm, P.C. Michael D. Pariente, Esquire John G. Watkins, Esquire, Of Counsel Nevada Bar No. 9469 3960 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 63 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 (702) 966-5310 Attorney for Appellant	
67		IAL DISTRICT COURT
8	CLARK CO	DUNTY, NEVADA
9 10 11 ن	Christopher Andersen, Appellant,	DC Case No: A-16-746752-W Municipal Court Case No: C1135328A Municipal Court: 1
P. C. 11 11 11 11 12 13 14 12 12 13 14 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12	vs. City of Las Vegas, Appellee.	REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S ANSWERING BRIEF
RIENTELAW 3960 Howard Hughes P Lass Vegass NV r Lass Vegass NV r 12 11 15 000 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10	COMES NOW Appellant, CHRISTOPHER ANDERSEN, by and through his attorney of record, MICHAEL D. PARIENTE, ESQUIRE, and replies to Respondent's Answering Brief. DATED this <u>9th</u> day of June, 2017.	
20 21		Respectfully submitted,
21		Alter
22		MICHAEL D. PARIENTE, ESQ.
23		Nevada Bar No.: 9469 3960 Howard Hughes Pkwy, Suite 615
25		Las Vegas, Nevada 89169
26		Attorney for Appellant
27		
28		-
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

The City cites United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 122 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1993) suggesting that a condition of probation prohibiting the possession of a firearm is tantamount to Mr. Christopher Andersen's lifelong loss of his Second Amendment right to possess a firearm even for self-defense. Nachtigal dealt with a condition of probation where the defendant convicted of DUI could not possess a firearm while on probation. Nachtigal's probation was for a fixed number of years. If convicted of Battery Constituting Domestic Violence, Mr. Andersen will forever be banned from possessing a firearm. The fact that the Nevada Legislature chose to deprive a fundamental right for a conviction of domestic violence and to punish that person with a felony can only mean the Nevada Legislature considers Battery Constituting Domestic Violence as a "serious" crime.

The City relies on Blanton, but ignores the relevant language where Blanton cautions hiding too many onerous penalties behind the 6-month incarceration term of imprisonment.

A defendant is entitled to a jury trial in such circumstances only if he can demonstrate that any additional statutory penalties, viewed in conjunction with the maximum authorized period of incarceration, are so severe that they clearly reflect a legislative determination that the offense in question is a "serious" one. This standard, albeit somewhat imprecise, should ensure the availability of a jury trial in the rare situation where a legislature packs an offense it deems "serious" with onerous penalties that nonetheless "do not puncture the 6-month incarceration line."

Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, Nev., 109 S.Ct. 1289, 1293, 489 U.S. 538, 543

(U.S.Nev., 1989) 26

The United States Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a 15-year

28 license revocation for a third conviction for DWI rebuts the presumption that a

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maximum term of imprisonment of 6 months is petty.

"The Supreme Court's analysis of the facts in Blanton supports our conclusion that adding the 15-year license revocation to the six month prison term resulted in a penalty severe enough to warrant a jury trial in this case. In Blanton a DWI conviction led to a penalty of up to six months imprisonment, a \$1000 fine, a 90day suspension of the offender's driver's license, and compelled attendance at an alcohol abuse education course. Because the maximum possible prison sentence did not exceed six months, the Court weighed the severity of the additional statutory penalties. The Court held that the \$1000 fine was not "out of step" with a six month sentence, and that the required education course "[could] only be described as de minimis." 109 S Ct. at 1294 n. 9. With regard to the license suspension, the Court was unable to determine if the suspension ran concurrently with the prison term. But even if the suspension were consecutive, the court observed that the offender could obtain a restricted license after 45 days. A full suspension for 45 days and a partial suspension for another 45 days was not severe enough to raise sixth amendment concurs. Id. Far from ruling out consideration of license revocations, the Court's decision implies that license revocations are exactly the kind of "additional statutory penalties" we should consider. While a 90-day suspension was not severe enough to raise sixth amendment concerns, a 15-year revocation is a substantial burden on the offender that is completely "out of step" with a six month prison term. Upholding this conviction would permit the Nebraska legislature to defeat the right to a jury trial by keeping the prison sentence to no more than six months, while finding other severe penalties to punish what it considers to be a serious offense. We therefore conclude that Richter was denied his sixth amendment right to a jury trial.

Richter v. Fairbanks, 903 F.2d 1202, 1205 (8th Cir. Neb. 1990).

Nevada Legislature created an "additional statutory penalty" when it amended NRS 202.360 by adding to the list of prohibited persons those who have been convicted of Battery Constituting Domestic Violence. It is immaterial that the Legislature did not place this amendment under NRS 200.485. What matters is that the Nevada Legislature deemed those misdemeanants convicted of domestic violence as odious as convicted felons and drug addicts and thus unworthy of keeping their Second Amendment right to possess a firearm even for self-defense.

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CONCLUSION

This Honorable Court should grant Mr. Andersen's appeal, reverse the conviction, and remand this case to the Las Vegas Municipal Court Department No. 1 for a jury trial.

DATED this 9th_ day of June, 2017.

ENTELAWFIRM. P.C 900 Howard Hughes Prwy. Suite 615 Las Vegas, NV B9169 E. (702) 966-5300 | FAX. (702) 953-7055 www.pargentelaw.com

PARIENTE LAV

PHONE

Respectfully submitted,

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MICHAEL D. PARIENTE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No.: 9469 3960 Howard Hughes Pkwy, Suite 615 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 Attorney for Appellant

DECLARATION OF COUNSEL

STATE OF NEVADA)) COUNTY OF CLARK)

202-E29 (20V

WWW.PARENTELAW.COM

PHONE

FIRM.

LAW

PARIENTE 3960 Howa I, MICHAEL D. PARIENTE, ESQ., being first duly sworn according to law, upon oath, deposes and says:

 Your declarant is an Attorney at Law duly licensed to practice in all courts in the State of Nevada;

2. Your declarant is the Attorney of record for the Defendant herein;

FURTHER YOUR DECLARANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

MICHAEL D. PARIENTE, ESQ.

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e				
	ROC			
1	The Pariente Law Firm, P.C.			
2	Michael D. Pariente, Esquire			
3	John G. Watkins, Esquire, Of Counsel Nevada Bar No. 9469			
	3960 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 61	5		
4	Las vegas, Nevada 65165			
5	(702) 966-5310 Attorney for Appellant			
6	Autorney for Appendix			
7	EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT			
8	CLARK CO	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
9				
10	Christopher Andersen,	DC Case No: A-16-746752-W Municipal Court Case No: C1135328A		
ບໍ່ 11	Appellant,	Municipal Court Case No: C1135328A Municipal Court: 1		
SS07-ES	vs.	REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S ANSWERING BRIEF		
	City of Las Vegas,			
N 13 100 1202 13 13 13	Appellee.			
	RECEIPT OF COPY			
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PAREN 14 1960 14 18 19 19 19 19		CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE:		
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		CT ATTORNEY		
20		CRIMINAL DIVISION		
21		CITY ATTORNEY		
22		200 Lewis Ave.		
23		Las Vegas, NV 89101		
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Electronically Filed 2/28/2018 9:50 AM Steven D. Grierson **CLERK OF THE COURT** 1 TRAN DISTRICT COURT 2 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 3 4 * * 5 6 CHRISTOPHER LEE ANDERSEN, CASE NO. C-16-319933 7 Appellant, 8 DEPT. NO. vs. XXXII 9 CITY OF LAS VEGAS, 10 Transcript of Proceedings Respondent. 11 12 BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROB BARE, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE ARGUMENT/DECISION 13 14 WEDNESDAY, JULY 5, 2017 15 **APPEARANCES:** 16 For the City: MATTHEW B. WALKER, ESQ. 17 For the Appellant: MICHAEL D. PARIENTE, ESQ. 18 19 20 RECORDED BY: CARRIE HANSEN, DISTRICT COURT 21 TRANSCRIBED BY: KRISTEN LUNKWITZ 22 23 Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording, transcript 24 produced by transcription service. 25 1

1 WEDNESDAY, JULY 5, 2017 AT 10:24 A.M. 2 3 THE CLERK: We're going to go to page 3. It's 4 case number C319933, Christopher Andersen versus City of 5 Las Vegas. 6 MR. PARIENTE: Good morning, Your Honor. Michael 7 Pariente for the petitioner. He's not present. We 8 respectfully ask if we can waive his presence. 9 THE COURT: All right. It's waived. Go on. MR. WALKER: Matthew Walker for the City of Las 10 11 Vegas, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: All right. So, let's have a little 13 bit of interactive court. 14 MR. PARIENTE: Well, Your Honor --15 THE COURT: In other words, I'll give you the --16 on a scale of one to 10, how much of this do you want me to 17 cover with you? One being you just submit it and we leave, 18 10 being I give you the overall true view of what I think 19 about everything from the briefs because I've read over and 20 thought about this a couple of times now. 21 MR. PARIENTE: Your Honor, I will just -- I'm 22 comfortable with just submitting on the briefs, I believe. 23 THE COURT: Okay. So, that would be one on the 24 scale. 25 MR. PARIENTE: We'll give you a one, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. You got somewhere to be. 1 2 Don't you? 3 MR. PARIENTE: Yeah --4 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Walker? 5 MR. PARIENTE: Well, I mean, I'm okay to argue. Ι 6 have no problem with -- I have no time restrictions. I'm 7 just saying --8 THE COURT: Okay. 9 MR. PARIENTE: -- I think I've covered everything 10 ad nauseam. 11 THE COURT: Fair enough. Okay. 12 MR. PARIENTE: Okay. 13 THE COURT: I'll give you that. 14 MR. WALKER: Likewise, Judge. I think we covered 15 all the arguments in the brief. If the Court has concerns 16 or questions, like Mr. Pariente said, we'd be more than 17 happy to discuss it now. But a one sounds good to me, too. 18 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I have had the opportunity -- you guys can sit down and relax. I've had 19 20 an opportunity to look over the briefs. And, Mr. Pariente, 21 what I want to say to you is, along with a few other 22 defense lawyers, I have, as an Appellate Court now for, I 23 don't know, about three and a half years or something I've been doing this Wednesday Appellate Court, you know, I've 24 25 seen other lawyers come in and start, probably over the

1 last six months, it might be a little bit more than that, 2 asking for jury trials in these misdemeanor cases. I think 3 Craig Mueller has done it; now I see that you've done it. 4 And I do want to say to you -- and I know you'll believe 5 this to be true, that, I mean, I have a respect for what 6 you're trying to do. I have said in other cases -- and I 7 just want you to know because I've said it in other cases on the record, that in a perfect world, if it were totally 8 9 up to me, just if somebody said -- and I never want this to 10 happen, by the way, but if somebody said that I could come 11 up with whatever I wanted to come up with on this issue, I 12 would say: Give them all jury trials. That's what I'd 13 say, for a lot of reasons I don't need to give you another 14 10 minutes on, but I would do that if it were only up to 15 me.

16 The thing about it though is it's not up to me. 17 Unless it turns out that it is. Okay? But, really, I 18 don't think it is up to me because of the fact that there's precedent that directs what I think I have to do. 19 In other 20 words, if it were an area of law that's such that I could 21 comfortably come up with something along these lines, I'd 22 be happy to do it. But it does seem to me that there's 23 precedent that makes it pretty clear that ultimately it may 24 be up to one of these Appellate Courts, either the 25 Intermediate Court or the Nevada Supreme Court, should they

1 so desire to tweak this and start giving everybody jury 2 trials. 3 To me, it's really clear enough to where 4 ultimately, I think it would have to be up to them if they 5 wanted to do something about it. And I say that because -mainly because Mr. Walker, in his brief, has enlightened 6 me, as he's done in other cases too, but this A-M-E-Z-C-U-7 A, I don't even know how to say that, but --8 9 MR. PARIENTE: That was actually -- Your Honor, 10 that was my case from years ago. 11 THE COURT: Yeah. 12 MR. PARIENTE: Sergio Amezcua. 13 THE COURT: Amezcua. Okay. And it seems to me 14 that that's pretty much right on point with what we're 15 talking about here. In the instance case, it's the same 16 type of underlying case and maybe the only change is the 17 idea that there's been an amendment of NRS 202.360 where 18 the Nevada Legislature, in its wisdom, subsequent to that 19 case, decided that possession of a firearm after a 20 battery/domestic violence conviction would be something that would be affected. And I understand your argument 21 22 that that, then, makes things rise to where the presumption 23 under Blanton -- I think there is a presumption under the 24 U.S. Supreme Court case Blanton, that the offense is petty. 25 Your position, I know Mr. Pariente, is that that can be

1 overcome if certain additional statutory penalties are put 2 in place that reflect the legislative determination that 3 the offense is a serious one.

And, anyway, I guess I've said enough. What I'm really trying to say -- and I -- I'm not mentioning all the other cases because I know you guys submitted this, but what I'm trying to say to you, Mr. Pariente, is I respect -I truly do respect what you're trying to do.

9 And, you know, what really comes to mind is it's a 10 weird thing now, just pops into my head, who was that guy? I think it was somebody named Clarence Earl Gideon who, a 11 long time ago, probably in the '60s, decided, you know, 12 13 trying to represent yourself in a criminal case doesn't 14 make a lot of sense, and I'm not a lawyer, Mr. Gideon says 15 to himself, I think I should be afforded a free lawyer. 16 And can you imagine when Clarence Earl Gideon first came up 17 with that thought? The way everybody would have had to 18 view that? You're crazy. This guy's crazy. Free lawyers 19 to criminal defendants at the State expense or the City 20 What? Well, guess what? Gideon versus expense. 21 Wainwright, everybody gets a free lawyer because somebody 22 did something and it made a significant change. And, 23 really, that's what I think you're doing here. I'm not 24 saying you're Gideon because you're probably better than 25 Gideon.

1 MR. PARIENTE: Well, he had more of an impact than
2 I've had. So --

3	THE COURT: Well, I mean, but that's how change
4	happens. And, so, what I'm saying what I'm getting to
5	is I do feel constrained to say that I'm going to agree
6	more with what's in Mr. Walker's brief on the law than
7	what's in yours. In other words, I have to affirm the
8	conviction and make a finding that, as far as I see it,
9	there's no right to a jury trial. And I'm getting to that
10	because I'm saying I want to leave court today with Mr.
11	Walker drafting the Order as opposed to me drafting the
12	Order. That's really what I'm trying to accomplish. And,
13	so, Mr. Walker, go ahead and draft the Order and give it to
14	him to take a look at and
15	MR. WALKER: Yes, Your Honor.
16	THE COURT: I'll, you know, send it on and who
17	knows, maybe the next level Court will now that you've
18	done what you have to do to get it there, at least
19	conceptually. I mean, I know it's a writ type of thing.
20	It's discretionary on their part. But, you know, I'll give
21	you this, and maybe somebody will look at this transcript.
22	I've see this come up now, two or three times, and it seems
23	like it's another thing ripe for review, to me. And, so,
24	there you go. As far I can't control whether the
25	higher-level Courts decide to entertain writs and all that.

1 That's ultimately up to their discretion, of course, and I respect that. But if I were to have any sort of input, I'd 2 3 say it's there. I mean, the law obviously has been petty 4 offense, no jury trial, even for domestic violence cases 5 for some time now. There has been some legislative 6 activity, you know? So, it's -- may be an opportunity for 7 them to revisit it. So, there you have it. MR. PARIENTE: There is interest on the Amezcua 8

9 case. I took that up to the U.S. Supreme Court twice, 10 pretrial and post-conviction. And, actually, pretrial --11 THE COURT: Yeah.

12 MR. PARIENTE: -- the U.S. Supreme Court ordered 13 the State of Nevada to do an Opposition and to which I did 14 a Reply. So, it certainly got someone's interest. That was many years ago. I've taken it about six times since 15 16 then before the legislative change and had denied -- got 17 some answer right away. But there was interest back then, 18 I'm hoping to rekindle that interest with this case, given that it's after the legislative change to 202.360. 19

20 THE COURT: All right. Well, hopefully that same 21 spirit that you had with *Gideon* happens with you. Who 22 knows?

23 MR. PARIENTE: I will not give up the fight. 24 THE COURT: Mr. Walker, do you want to say 25 anything?

MR. WALKER: No, Your Honor. I appreciate it. We'll draft the Order. THE COURT: All right. MR. PARIENTE: Thank you, Your Honor. I appreciate it. PROCEEDING CONCLUDED AT 10:33 A.M. * * + *

1	CERTIFICATION
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4	I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from
5	the audio-visual recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
6	
7	
8	AFFIRMATION
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10	I affirm that this transcript does not contain the social security or tax identification number of any person or
11	entity.
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19	Luster Unkunt
20	KRISTEN LUNKWITZ
21	INDEPENDENT TRANSCRIBER
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7	BRADFORD R. JERBIC City Attorney MATTHEW B. WALKER Deputy City Attomey Nevada Bar No. 10790 Regional Justice Center, 2 nd Floor P.O. Box 3930 Las Vegas, Nevada 89127 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
8	CHRISTOPHER ANDERSEN CASE NO.: C-/6-3/9937-A
10	Appellant-Defendant, DEPT NO.: 32
11	CLID SODO A
12	CITY OF LAS VEGAS Respondent-Plaintiff.
13	
14	
15	
16	ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL
17	This matter having come before the Court by way of an Appeal from the
18	conviction of the Appellant-Defendant in the Municipal Court of the City of Las
19	Vegas, the case being set for Argument and Decision on the merits of Appellant
20	Defendant's Appeal on July 5, 2017, the Appellant-Defendant being not present
21	and represented by Michael D. Pariente, Esq., the Respondent-Plaintiff represented
22	by Matthew B. Walker, Deputy City Attorney, the Court having reviewed the
23	briefs prepared by the parties:
24	THE COURT HEREBY FINDS that Blanton v North Las Vegas, 489 U.S.
25	538 103 L Ed 2d 550 (1989) and Amezcua v Eighth Judicial District Court, 319 P.
26	3d 602 (2014) are the governing authority when evaluating a demand for a jury
27	trial.
28	
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THE COURT HEREBY FINDS that pursuant to the aforementioned governing authority. Appellant-Defendant is not entitled to a jury trial when charged with misdemeanor Battery Constituting Domestic Violence.

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant-Defendant's conviction is affirmed, his Appeal is dismissed, and the case is remanded to Las Vegas Municipal Court Department 1 for further proceedings consistent with this Order.

8 DATED: July 28, 2017 9 10 de 11 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 12 13 UP PISTRICT COURT, DEPARTMENT 32 DOB BARE Submitted by: 14 Matthew B. Walker Deputy City Attorney Nevada Bar No.10790 15 200 Lewis Avenue, Suite 2327 16 Las Vegas, Nevada 89127 (702) 229-6201 17 18 19 Reviewed as to form and content: Michael D. Pariente, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 9469 2021 3960 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 615 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 (702) 966-5310 22 23 24 25 262728 City of this Virgas filias of the Cocy Arcmey PK1_000CUMB Vepan, Vexada 89127 712-229-6201 Ζ.

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