The flight of a person after the commission of a crime is not sufficient in itself to establish guilt; however, if flight is proved, it is circumstantial evidence in determining guilt or innocence.

The essence of flight embodies the idea of deliberately going away with consciousness of guilt and for the purpose of avoiding apprehension or prosecution. The weight to which such circumstance is entitled is a matter for the jury to determine.

Although you are to consider only the evidence in the case in reaching a verdict, you must bring to the consideration of the evidence your everyday common sense and judgment as reasonable men and women. Thus, you are not limited solely to what you see and hear as the witnesses testify. You may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence which you feel are justified in the light of common experience, keeping in mind that such inferences should not be based on speculation or guess.

A verdict may never be influenced by sympathy, prejudice or public opinion. Your decision should be the product of sincere judgment and sound discretion in accordance with these rules of law.

In your deliberation you may not discuss or consider the subject of punishment, as that is a matter which lies solely with the court. Your duty is confined to the determination of the guilt or innocence of the Defendant.

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It is the constitutional right of a Defendant in a criminal trial that he may not be compelled to testify. Thus, the decision as to whether he should testify is left to the Defendant on the advice and counsel of his attorney. You must not draw any inference of guilt from the fact that he does not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your deliberations in any way.

-

When you retire to consider your verdict, you must select one of your members to act as foreperson who will preside over your deliberation and will be your spokesperson here in court.

During your deliberation, you will have all the exhibits which were admitted into evidence, these written instructions and forms of verdict which have been prepared for your convenience.

Your verdict must be unanimous. As soon as you have agreed upon a verdict, have it signed and dated by your foreperson and then return with it to this room.

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During the course of this trial, and your deliberations, you are not to:

- (1) communicate with anyone in any way regarding this case or its merits-either by phone, text, Internet, or other means;
- (2) read, watch, or listen to any news or media accounts or commentary about the case;
- (3) do any research, such as consulting dictionaries, using the Internet, or using reference materials;
- (4) make any investigation, experimentation at the scene, test a theory of the case, re-create any aspect of the case, or in any other way investigate or learn about the case or anyone involved with the case on your own.
- You may, of course, during deliberations, communicate with other members of the jury while you are in the jury deliberation room, after the case has been submitted to you for deliberation.

If, during your deliberation, you should desire to be further informed on any point of law or hear again portions of the testimony, you must reduce your request to writing signed by the foreperson. The officer will then return you to court where the information sought will be given you in the presence of, and after notice to, the district attorney and the Defendant and his counsel.

Playbacks of testimony are time-consuming and are not encouraged unless you deem it a necessity. Should you require a playback, you must carefully describe the testimony to be read back so that the court reporter can arrange his/her notes. Remember, the court is not at liberty to supplement the evidence.

Now you will listen to the arguments of counsel who will endeavor to aid you to reach a proper verdict by refreshing in your minds the evidence and by showing the application thereof to the law; but, whatever counsel may say, you will bear in mind that it is your duty to be governed in your deliberation by the evidence as you understand it and remember it to be and by the law as given to you in these instructions, with the sole, fixed and steadfast purpose of doing equal and exact justice between the Defendant and the State of Nevada.

GIVEN:

DISTRICT JUDGE

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Electronically Filed 4/19/2018 9:17 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

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DISTRICT COURT

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

VS.

CEASAR SANCHAZ VALENCIA,

Defendant.

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Case No. C-16-315580-1

DEPT. XVIII

BEFORE THE HONORABLE MARK B. BAILUS, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 1, 2017

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS RE: **JURY TRIAL - PHASE I - DAY 5**

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: MICHAEL DICKERSON, ESQ.

> (Deputy District Attorney) CHAD N. LEXIS, ESQ. (Deputy District Attorney)

For the Defendant: GREGORY E. COYER, ESQ.

ALEXIS ANNE PLUNKETT, ESQ.

RECORDED BY: ROBIN PAGE, COURT RECORDER

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Case Number: C-16-315580-1

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LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 1ST, 2017

[Proceedings commenced at 10:04 a.m.]

[Outside the presence of the jury.]

THE COURT: Please be seated. This is the continuation of the trial in Case No. C-16-315580, *State of Nevada vs. Ceasar Sanchaz Valencia*. Let the record reflect the presence of counsel for the State, counsel for the defense, and Mr. Valencia.

Are the parties ready to proceed this morning?

MR. DICKERSON: We are, Your Honor, on behalf of the State.

MR. COYER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm going to bring the jury in at this time.

[Jury reconvened at 10:05 a.m.]

THE COURT: Is the State ready to proceed?

MR. DICKERSON: Yes, Your Honor. We would begin back up with the defense cross-examination of witness Keith Bryant.

KEITH BRYANT

[having been recalled as a witness and previously sworn, testified as follows:]

THE COURT: Sir, I remind you that you're still under oath.

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Thank you. Have a seat.

You may proceed.

MR. COYER: May we proceed? Thank you, Judge.

was requested and responded out there for part of the perimeter on the initial set up of the perimeter, yes.

- Q Okay. So that wasn't something that you specifically requested?
 - A No, sir.
- Q Okay. Were you made aware of whether or not the K-9 officer or officers did a -- a walk around with the dogs at the residence of 625 North 10th?

A I know they walked around the -- the perimeter aspect of it on 10th and also the alleyway where the subject was last seen hopping over the wall heading west through the alleyway, which is normal practice. We basically go back and have the last officer who saw the subject running, we'll have K-9 start at that location and kind of do a walkthrough in the general area to see if the dog can pick up a scent.

- Q Dog's got to pick up the scent, right?
- A Correct.
- Q And then hopefully, in a perfect world, the dog can pick up the scent later in another location?
 - A Correct.
 - Q Thus giving officers a lead on where to search?
 - A Correct.
- Q Okay. In this incident, were you ever made aware that a dog had given any indication, or an alert as they call it, at the residence of 625 North 10th Street?
 - A No. That night, no, there was no pick up of any scent of

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THE COURT: Would have been an opinion based on his

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you had seen him?

Yes, it was.

Okay.

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Α	No

Q If any of those things had happened, you would have documented those in your report?

A Correct.

MR. COYER: We'll pass, Judge.

THE COURT: Any redirect by the State?

MR. DICKERSON: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. DICKERSON:

Q Detective Bryant, you said that if you were dealing with regular victims, like citizens --

A Correct.

Q -- you -- you might do a show-up?

A Correct.

Q What's the difference here?

A It -- an officer, we're -- we're trained a little bit more from day one to be able to pick up certain descriptors, certain height, weight, things like that, that maybe a normal citizen who isn't dealing with this on a daily basis wouldn't even think about to -- to look at. So an officer -- it's kind of normal practice to sit there, and if we have a photo, and show them realtime, hey, is this who you saw running? And they can identify it right away. Whereas a citizen usually needs a little bit more time and a little bit of understanding of what they're looking for.

Q Because an everyday part of your job as police officers is identifying people you've never seen before?

Α	No.	he	was	not.
	,			

- Okay. So by the time that vehicle stopped, where were all
- They were parked up behind the vehicle. Usually they'll have some officers on to the side kind of blocking traffic so there's no citizens that can be of any danger passing. Then there will be officers parked behind the vehicle as well, strategically.
- And the location of the stop here in the case had some
 - How so?
- Because it was close from the location that he just left and picked him up from the air unit. So it was a very close distance from the time they got in the vehicle to the time we made a stop.
 - In that area of Washington, is it kind of under the train tracks?
 - So are there routes to get away? I mean --
- There's -- there's multiple locations. It's almost -- the intersection itself is almost like a huge intersection, almost like an X. There's different avenues to -- to flee and different vehicles and citizens and dangers and things like that.
- But the specific area where this vehicle was stopped was before Main Street?
 - Α Correct.

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Q Kind of in the -- the dip, where there's walls for the --

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RECROSS EXAMINATION

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	BY MR	COYEF

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- Q Officer, you testified just now on redirect that police officers, unlike civilians, receive training, to use your words, to identify descriptors --
 - A Correct.
 - Q -- correct? Descriptors would include someone's race?
 - A Correct.
 - Q Perhaps their build?
- 10 | A Correct.
 - Q In some cases, clothing?
 - A Correct.
 - Q And identifiable traits, physical traits, right?
 - A Correct.
- 15 Q Like tattoos --
- 16 | A Yes.
- 17 | Q -- right? Scars?
 - A Correct.
 - Q Facial hair --
- 20 | A Correct.
 - Q -- right? Hair in general, right?
 - A Correct.
 - Q Okay. These are all things that officers receive training on, so that when they see these things in the field, they mention them, because they're important, right?

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1	Q	Do you have any reason to disagree with that?			
2	A	No.			
3	Q	Would you defer to the CAD on that?			
4	Α	I'm fine.			
5	Q	Sorry?			
6	A	I'm fine. CAD says it's 47 minutes, I just I was just			
7	estimating.				
8	Q	Okay.			
9		MR. COYER: Pass, Judge.			
10		THE COURT: Mr do you have any			
11		MR. DICKERSON: May I briefly, Your Honor?			
12		THE COURT: Briefly.			
13		FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION			
14	BY MR. DICKERSON:				
15	Q	Some talk about your the descriptors?			
16	A	Yes.			
17	Q	You ended up actually booking Ceasar Valencia into jail on			
18	the 21st;	is that right?			
19	A	Correct.			
20	Q	As part of that, you have to determine a couple things,			
21	identifier	s about the individual?			
22	Α	Correct.			
23	Q	How tall is Ceasar Valencia?			
	Q A	How tall is Ceasar Valencia? 5'7".			
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Α 185, I believe. Q Thank you. MR. COYER: Yes. State?

THE COURT: Counsel, can this witness be excused?

THE COURT: The State?

MR. DICKERSON: Yes.

THE COURT: Sir, thank you.

THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You are excused.

And before -- and I've had my bailiff watching to make sure nobody wanted to ask any questions of any of the witnesses. So again, I want to remind you that if there -- you do want to ask any witnesses question, please write it out on a full-length piece of paper before the witness is excused, make sure you provide it to my bailiff and we'll review it and make a determination whether it's a question that should or not be asked. Okay? Thank you.

MR. DICKERSON: Can we have a brief recess, Your Honor?

THE COURT: How long would you like, counsel?

MR. DICKERSON: 5, 10 minutes.

THE COURT: At this time we're going to take a 10-minute residence, ladies and gentlemen.

During this recess you're admonished not to talk or converse among yourselves or with anyone else on any subject connected with this trial, or read, watch, or listen to any report or commentary on the trial

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or any person connected with this trial by any medium of information, including without limitation, the social media, text, newspapers, television, the Internet, and radio; do not visit the scene of any of the events mentioned during the trial or undertake any investigation; do not do any posting or communications on any social networking sites or do any independent research, including Internet searches, or form or express any opinion on any subject connected with the trial until the case is finally submitted to you.

We'll be in recess for 10 minutes.

[Jury recessed at 10:45 a.m.]

THE COURT: Counsel?

MR. DICKERSON: Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is there anything you need to bring to my attention?

MR. DICKERSON: Not at this moment. I just need to speak with my co-counsel and we'll work it out here.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. DICKERSON: Thank you very much.

THE COURT: We'll be in recess.

[Court recessed at 10:45 a.m. until 10:54 a.m.]

[Outside the presence of the jury.]

THE COURT: This is continuation of the trial of *State vs.*Ceasar Valencia.

State, how many more witnesses do you have?

MR. DICKERSON: State will rest, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Defense, are you planning on presenting any witnesses?

MR. COYER: Your Honor, as of yesterday afternoon I had discussed with Mr. Valencia whether he wanted to testify. If he does, he would be our only witness. So I don't believe we have any, but I know the court has to go through the process with Mr. Valencia --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. COYER: -- personally.

THE COURT: Did you want me to admonish him -- give him the admonishment now or -- and take some time to discuss it with him? Or when do you want me to give Mr. Valencia the admonishment?

MR. COYER: It -- court's pleasure. I -- I spoke with him at length yesterday. I assume his mind hasn't changed. So we can do it now, and that's fine, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So what -- we're going to bring the jury back in. The State is going to rest. And then I'm going to ask you are you going to present any witnesses, and you're going to rest?

Depending on what -- if Mr. Valencia testifies, then that will be your only witness. If not, you're going to rest; is that correct?

MR. COYER: That's correct. But I think -- I think the court should probably admonish Mr. Valencia before bringing the jury in.

THE COURT: No. I'm going to admonish him now.

MR. COYER: Okay. Okay.

THE COURT: I'm trying to --

MR. COYER: I didn't know.

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THE COURT: -- tell you procedure.

MR. COYER: Yeah.

THE COURT: So if you rest, if Mr. Valencia decides not to testify, then I was going to excuse the jurors and we'll -- we'll go over the jury instructions.

MR. COYER: Very good.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEXIS: Just so the court's aware, we pretty much have agreed on most everything. There's only going to be argument really as to one jury instruction.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEXIS: So we should be able to --

THE COURT: Well, we'll take a little bit of time and then we'll put it on the record.

MR. LEXIS: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, counsel.

All right. So at this time, I'm going to bring the jury -- oh, no, I'm sorry. At this time I'm going to admonish Mr. -- Mr. Valencia regarding his right to testify.

Mr. Valencia, under the Constitution of the United States and under the Constitution of the State of Nevada, you cannot be compelled to testify in this case; do you understand that, sir?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: You may, at your own request, give up this right and take the witness stand and testify. If you do, you will be

subject to cross-examination by the Deputy District Attorney and anything that you may say, be it on direct or cross-examination, will be the subject of fair comment when the Deputy District Attorney speaks to the jury in his final argument; do you understand that, sir?

THE DEFENDANT: I understand.

THE COURT: If you choose not to testify, the court will not permit the Deputy District Attorney to make any comments to the jury because you have not testified; do you understand that, sir?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I understand.

THE COURT: If you elect not to testify, the court will instruct the jury, but only if your attorney specifically requests, as follows:

The law does not compel a defendant in a criminal case to take the stand and testify, and no presumption may be raised and no inference of any kind may be drawn from the failure of a defendant -- of a defendant to testify.

Do you have any questions about these rights, sir? THE DEFENDANT: No. None at all.

THE COURT: You're further advised that if you have a felony conviction and more than 1- years has not elapsed from the date you have been convicted or discharged from prison, parole, or probation, whichever is later, and the defense has not sought to preclude that coming before the jury, and you elect to take the stand and testify, the Deputy District Attorney in the presence of the jury will be permitted to ask the following questions:

1. Have you been convicted of a felony?

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2.	What	was	the	fel	ony?	And
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3. When did it happen?

However, no details may be gone into before -- no details may be gone into; do you understand that, sir?

THE DEFENDANT: I understand.

THE COURT: Do you have any questions of the court regarding anything I just -- regarding anything I have just advised you of?

THE DEFENDANT: None.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to take a very short recess that will allow you confer with your attorney. And then I'm going to come back on the bench and -- but I want you to take -- I know you've already talked to him previously. But now that I have admonished you, I want to give you the opportunity to speak with him in private. Okay?

THE DEFENDANT: All right.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

We'll be in short recess.

Mr. Coyer, let me know when you want to reconvene.

MR. COYER: Thank you, Your Honor.

MS. PLUNKETT: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Thank you.

[Court recessed from 10:59 a.m. until 11:02 a.m.]

[Outside the presence of the jury.]

THE COURT: Mr. Valencia, have you had sufficient time to discuss with your counsel regarding the admonishment I just gave you?

 Ladies and gentlemen, there's some housekeeping matters that counsel and myself have to take care of. We're going to take our lunch break at this time. Please return at 1:00. Yes. Wait, I have to give you my admonishment.

During this recess, you are admonished not to talk or converse among yourselves or with anyone else on any subject matter connected with this trial, or read, watch, or listen to any report of or commentary on the trial or any person connected with this trial by any medium of information, including without limitation, the social media, text, newspapers, television, the Internet, and radio; do not visit the scene of any of the events mentioned during the trial or undertake any investigation; do not do any posting or communications on social media networking sites or do independent research, including Internet searches, or form or express any opinion on any subject connected with the trial until the case is finally submitted to you.

We'll be on our lunch recess at this time. Thank you.

[Jury recessed at 11:07 a.m.]

THE COURT: Counsel, we'll settle jury instructions in the jury room, and then whatever the results are we'll on the record afterwards.

MR. DICKERSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

[Court recessed at 11:08 a.m. until 1:07 p.m.]

[Outside the presence of the jury.]

THE COURT: This is a continuation of the trial of *State of Nevada vs. Ceasar Sanchaz Valencia*, Case No. 16 C -- I'm sorry, Case No. C-16-315580. Let the record reflect counsel for the State,

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instructions.

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THE COURT: And these are the State's proposed

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the parties in agreement it should be given?

MR. LEXIS: Yes.

MR. COYER: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. As to Instruction -- Proposed -- State's Proposed Instruction No. 10, are the parties in agreement it should be given?

MR. LEXIS: Yes.

THE COURT: I thought --

MR. COYER: Yes.

THE COURT: -- this one was going to modified.

MR. LEXIS: Not -- that's not the one that's modified.

THE COURT: Okay. What about -- hold on, counsel. Let me just look at my notes.

MR. LEXIS: Oh, I apologize, Judge. I -- I was thinking about the lesser included. Yes, that's the one that we're going to incorporate the -- the assault definition.

THE COURT: Okay. And this is the one that -- Defendant's proposed jury instructions is going to be modified to include a portion of Defendant's Proposed Instruction No. 1; is that correct?

MR. COYER: Correct.

MR. LEXIS: And that was over the State's objection, but due to -- due to we believing that does not apply to this particular statute.

THE COURT: Okay. But in any event, I'm going to give the -- a modified version of Instruction No. 10. It's my understanding that it's going to read:

that instruction?

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MR. LEXIS: Yes.

THE COURT: And then on State's Proposed Instruction No. 18, are the parties in agreement it should be given? And this is State's Proposed Instruction No. 18.

MR. LEXIS: Yes.

MR. COYER: Yes.

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. And then are the parties in agreement that State's Instruction No. 19 should be given?

MR. LEXIS: Yes.

MR. COYER: Yes.

THE COURT: Thank you. And on State's Instruction No. 20, are the parties in agreement that that instruction should be given?

MR. LEXIS: Yes, Your Honor. And it looks like Instructions 21 through -- all right. Never mind, my mistake. Keep going, Judge. Sorry.

MR. COYER: We'll get through it.

THE COURT: So as to Proposed Jury Instructions 21 through 23, are the parties in agreement that those should be given?

MR. LEXIS: Yes.

MR. COYER: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. As to Jury Instruction No. 24, are the parties in agreement that instruction should be given?

MR. COYER: Yes, Judge. And for the record, this is the instruction we requested about the defendant not being required to testify.

be an effort to carry the intention to execution as part of the instruction

regarding the definition of assault.

MR. COYER: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay. So because of it's covered by other instructions, I'm not going to give Defendant's Proposed Instruction No. 1, as it's already covered by another instruction.

MR. COYER: Agreed.

THE COURT: And then as to Defendant's Proposed Instruction No. 2, this is one that states:

If you find the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any one element of a charged offense, you must find Defendant not guilty of that offense.

What's the defense position on giving that instruction?

MR. COYER: I believe Your Honor had decided to incorporate that language into the reasonable doubt instruction.

THE COURT: Well, I believe the State opposed that and I was going to give it as separate instruction --

MR. LEXIS: Correct.

MR. DICKERSON: Oh.

THE COURT: -- following the reasonable doubt instruction.

So I will give that and it will follow -- it'll be the next instruction after the reasonable doubt instruction.

And then as to the Defense Proposed Jury Instruction No. 3:

An act is not a crime if the act was committed through
misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there was no evil
design, intention, or culpable negligence.

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What's the defense position	on on that	instruction's
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MR. COYER: I stand by it. I thought it was going to be given by the court.

THE COURT: State?

MR. LEXIS: It was duplicative of a version that we already had in there.

THE COURT: And I was -- and I am going to give that instruction. And I was going to give it after Jury Instruction No. 20 that deals with intent. Okay. All right.

As to Defendant's Proposed Jury Instruction No. 4, it's my understanding that you're withdrawing that instruction, counsel?

MR. COYER: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay. That instruction will not be given and is withdrawn.

And as to Defense Proposed Jury Instruction No. 5?

MR. COYER: That language was incorporated into a -- sort of an omnibus lesser-included instruction.

THE COURT: Okay. And so you're satisfied by the modification of the lesser included; are you withdrawing this instruction?

MR. COYER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay. This instruction will not be given.

And then as to the Defense Proposed Jury Instruction No. 6?

MR. COYER: Same -- same issue. It's a lesser included.

THE COURT: Right. So are you withdrawing Defense Proposed Instruction No. 6?

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MR. COYER: Yes.

THE COURT: Then it will not be given.

What I'll do, counsel, is I'm going to attach as a court exhibit the -- Mr. Coyer.

MR. COYER: Judge, I just wanted to verify one thing real quick --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. COYER: -- so that we can finalize the --

MR. LEXIS: Because we sent Mr. Dickerson up to do a right to testify instruction. I'm believing it's not in here, but I believe it actually is in here --

MR. COYER: There was a 20 -- Number 24.

MR. LEXIS: Number 24.

THE COURT: I thought it was in here too.

MR. LEXIS: It's in No. 24. I was -- we were just verifying that.

THE COURT: Okay. In any event, what I was advising counsel is I was going to attach as a court exhibit your proposed -- the defense and the State's proposed jury instructions with citations. I -- I wasn't going to -- I wasn't going to attach the ones without the citation. Is that agreeable to the parties?

MR. LEXIS: Sounds good.

MR. COYER: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So we'll be in a short recess.

When the modifications have been made, provide them to defense counsel. If the parties are in agreement, that will be the jury instructions

I will give to the -- to the jury. And then it's my understanding that we're going to bring the jury in. The State is going to rest. The defense is going to rest. I then am going to give the jury instructions and we'll do closing arguments; is that correct?

MR. COYER: Both parties have already rested, but everything else --

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Did they?

MR. COYER: Everything else is correct.

THE COURT: I apologize.

MR. COYER: That's all right.

THE COURT: All right. So all we have to do, once the jury instructions are finalized is, I will read the instructions to the jury and then we'll do closing arguments, correct?

MR. COYER: Very good.

MR. LEXIS: Correct.

THE COURT: Thank you.

[Court recessed at 1:22 p.m. until 1:26 p.m.]

[Outside the presence of the jury.]

THE COURT: Again, this is continuation of *State vs. Valencia*. Let the record reflect that counsel for the State, counsel for the defense, and Mr. Valencia are present.

I just wanted to go over a few housekeeping matters with counsel.

First, I want to verify, State, is there any additional proposed jury instructions at this time.

MR. LEXIS: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Defense is there any additional proposed jury instructions at this time?

MR. COYER: No.

THE COURT: And then the other housekeeping matter is I want to verify with counsel that we weren't going to send the evidence envelopes back to the jury, because of the issue that came out earlier in the trial. And that I was just going to send pictures of the gun back and advise them if they want to actually look at the gun itself, that my marshal would bring it back and they could inspect it. Is that correct, counsel?

MR. LEXIS: The State stipulated to that at the request of the defense and the court.

THE COURT: Okay. And is that correct, counsel?

MR. COYER: That's all -- all fine, yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEXIS: And just so you know too, Judge, the -- even though the whole thing was admitted, the bag containing the drugs, there was also a bag of -- I believe the ODBs are in there as well. They don't need that. So, I mean, if you just want to send back the baggies with the drugs, that's all the State really is --

THE COURT: Is that agreeable to the defense?

MR. COYER: To remove the ODB sheets? Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. COYER: Yes.

THE COURT: Mr. Clerk, you heard the -- what we're going to do? Okay. Thank you.

MR. LEXIS: Just the three baggies of drugs.

THE CLERK: Just the three baggies.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I just -- we'll wait until we have the -- we'll be in a short recess. Once we have the finalized jury instructions, if counsel can review them and if they are what we -- what we -- were agreed upon, then -- do we have them? All right. I'm going to be in short recess.

[Court recessed at 1:29 p.m. until 1:45 p.m.]
[Outside the presence of the jury.]

THE COURT: This is the continuation of the trial in *State vs. Valencia*, Case No. C-16-315580.

Have the parties had an opportunity to review the proposed jury instructions?

MR. DICKERSON: We have, Your Honor.

MR. COYER: Yes.

THE COURT: Is -- I did notice one thing. I think I misspoke at the -- when we were settling instructions. On Jury Instruction No. 11, I thought I said when -- that we were going to add the phrase, mere menace is not enough. There must be an effort to carry the intention into execution, I put it in the first sentence. Apparently, it's in the -- it's been added to the third -- on line 6 and 7. And it reads:

To constitute an unlawful -- an unlawful attempt to use physical force against a person of another, mere menace -- mere

or innocence of the defendant.

Instruction No. 8 begins: The evidence which you are to consider in this case.

Instruction No. 9 begins: The credibility or believability of a witness.

Instruction No. 10 begins with: A witness who has special knowledge, skill, and experience.

Instruction No. 11 begins with: A person who unlawfully attempts to use physical force.

Instruction No. 12 begins: As used in the instructions, a deadly weapon means.

Instruction No. 13 in -- begins with: In order to use a deadly weapon.

Instruction No. 14 begins: The State is not required to have recovered the deadly weapon.

Instruction No. 15 begins with: When it is impossible to commit a particular crime.

Instruction No. 16 begins with: Any person who knowingly or intentionally.

Instruction No. 17 begins with: A person who knowingly, intentionally possesses a controlled substance.

Instruction No. 18, in order -- begins with: In order to prove the commission of trafficking in controlled substance.

Instruction No. 19 begins with: A person is a person -- repeat.

A person is in possession of an article or object.

MR. DICKERSON: And if they request those bags, if you could just contact counsel, as, like, a jury question, and we could talk about it at that time?

THE COURT: Yeah. I --

MR. COYER: That's agreeable.

THE COURT: -- agree. All right. So I'm going to bring the jury in. I'm going to read them the instructions. And then we're going to do closing arguments, correct?

MR. DICKERSON: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. COYER: Correct.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, counsel.

[Jury reconvened at 1:53 p.m.]

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your patience in this matter. The State and defense have rested and -- and I am about to instruct you upon the laws that applies in this case. I would like to instruct you orally without reading to you. However, these instructions are of such importance, it is necessary for me to read to you these carefully prepared written instructions.

The instructions are long and some are quite complicated. If they not -- are not especially clear when I read them to you, please keep in mind that when you go back to the jury room, you'll be able to take these -- you will be able to take these carefully prepared written instructions with you so you can read them and consider them carefully.

[Jury instructions read.]

THE COURT: Counsel are you prepared to -- for closing

arguments?

MR. LEXIS: Can you switch us over, Judge?

MR. DICKERSON: We are, Your Honor. We would just request the -- to have the monitor up.

Thank you very much, ma'am.

MR. LEXIS: Folks, what's the state of mind of a man who's willing to flee from the police on a moped with two patrol officers after him in a marked patrol unit in uniform? Or better yet, take off on foot? Or turn around with a gun in his hand and point at an officer placing that officer in danger, him in danger, and everyone else around in a residential area? Or better yet, someone with three of the most potent narcotics on the street when he's eventually caught? That's the type of man you're dealing with, a man who has zero regard for this community or for the safety of others.

Folks, you have a jury instruction, and this is straight from the jury instructions that says use your common sense. This case was over two days ago. Although you are to consider only the evidence in this case in reaching a verdict, you must bring to the consideration of that -- of the evidence your everyday common sense and judgment as reasonable men and women. What's that telling you? Follow the law and use your common sense.

You also have a jury instruction that the judge mentioned, and one of the only ones that he mentioned prior to this trial starting and at the end. And it's regarding direct and circumstantial evidence.

At the beginning of this case I told you, and the law allows, if

we just had one witness and that witness has a host of baggage, gang member, drug addict, you name it, and that person takes the stand, if you judge their credibility to be credible and believe them beyond a reasonable doubt, the State's entitled to a guilty verdict.

In addition, sometimes we're left with just circumstantial evidence, which we'll talk about in a second. Let's say somebody breaks in somebody's home. They hear somebody. They call the cops. And a -- some witness sees that somebody -- running down the street. The only description they could give is a white male wearing all black. The cops show up, comb the neighborhood, and eventually see somebody hiding in the corner.

Sure enough, this person is wearing all black, a white male. They go back to the scene and they see that a window is broken and there's -- the spigot's busted and water spewing out of it. Must have tried to jump up on the spigot in order to get into the house. And this suspect that they caught also, you know, has some shreds of glass on him. And lo and behold, their right leg is soaked.

That's all we have. No viable prints left behind. No viable DNA left behind. They bring it back to the person and the person can't make a positive identification, other than he was weighing black clothes and white male.

Do we have those cases? Absolutely. Do we prosecute those cases? Absolutely. Are we entitled to a guilty verdict if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed that crime? Absolutely.

Now, on the far other side of the spectrum, you have cases like this where you have both direct and circumstantial evidence, where your witnesses are cops. Folks, your instructions states there are two types of evidence, direct and circumstantial evidence. The law makes no distinction between the weight to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence. Therefore, all of the evidence in the case, including circumstantial evidence should be considered by you in arriving at your verdict.

What is that telling you? You don't look at each event in isolation. You don't look at each particular statement by every particular witness on this stand in isolation. Or each event, the one on the 19th and the one on the 21st, in isolation. No. The law instructs you to use everything combined to come to your conclusions on each and every charge.

What's the direct evidence in this case? Well, you have
Officer Jacobitz telling you 100 percent that's the man. That's the man.
Also, giving you a detailed account with his demonstration right here on how that man pulled that gun, brought it out, pointed it at him, and then it flew out of his hand when he hit the pole. That is direct evidence.

You have any other direct evidence to support his account? Yeah. Officer Houston also tells you 100 percent that's the man. Does he support Jacobitz's account? Absolutely. When they stop, he says Jacobitz runs after him. Houston gets out of the car, has to run around. As he's going around the car, he hears Jacobitz yell, Gun. He has an obstructed view of the defendant so he can't see the defendant at that

point in time, but he sees Jacobitz has now stopped. Runs over.

Jacobitz is now with the gun as he continues to proceed. Keep in mind too he was also there the 21st when he told you, again, that man 100 percent was the man both on the 21st and on the 19th.

Any other direct evidence? Yeah. There's a firearm. You think we're not going to proceed on this case if there wasn't a firearm?

No. And there's as jury instruction on that too. We don't need to recover the firearm. It's common sense tells you why. Crooks take off with the firearm. However, there was a firearm in further support of Jacobitz's accounts of the events.

Is there other direct evidence? Obviously, on the 21st, multiple officers observed the takedown of the defendant where those drugs were right in his pocket, that large amount of cash right in his pocket.

Again, the law makes no distinction between the weight to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence. The State can convict somebody 100 percent on direct evidence or 100 percent on circumstantial evidence.

What circumstantial evidence do you have in this case? What a coincidence, the location of the incident compared to where he lives, right next to him. What a coincidence, that's exactly where he fled.

What a coincidence -- and we'll talk more about this later -- he's caught on the 21st with three of the most potent street drugs there are.

And the fact that he ran from the police. You actually have a separate jury instruction on this, which tells you the flight of a person

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immediately after the commission of a crime or after he's accused of a crime is not sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact which, if proved, may be considered by you in light of all the other proof, facts in deciding the question of his guilt or innocence. Essentially, more circumstantial evidence against this man.

When you combine the two, folks, when you combine the two, there is a mountain of evidence against this man where he is boxed into a corner where there's no way out, period. So what does the defense do? There is no surprise what happened, no surprise whatever.

When you're dealing with amount -- this amount of evidence, this is what goes on. Blame the cops. Blame other people. Blame everybody other than the defendant. Really? Well, why take out the gun in the first place? We know for a fact the man's gun is laying on the ground. Why take it out in the first place? What's your common sense tell you about that?

Think he just run away from the cop and oh, he's -- he's just going to stop, pull his gun out and hand it to him? No. He already fled on his moped. Now, he's fleeing from them on foot. That's further circumstantial evidence of this man pulling his gun out and pointing it at that cop.

Motive, drugs, firearm. Further circumstantial evidence. Further circumstantial evidence. You have a jury instruction and this is it, verbatim. You're not mind readers, folks. We're not tasking you to be mind readers. Motive is not an element of the crime charged and the State is not required to prove motive. We don't need to prove motive on

the part of the defendant in order to convict. However, you may consider the evidence of motive or lack of motive as circumstance in this case, more circumstantial evidence.

And ask yourself, this man who's caught two days later on the 21st, a man you know, number one, carries a firearm, and number two, carries with him large amounts of cash along with heroin, meth, and cocaine. The police department doesn't take that lightly and neither does the District Attorney's office. There is no surprise to nobody that this man is running from the cops. No surprise. And willing to do an extreme measure, as pulling a firearm, putting everyone in danger including himself, the officer, and the public.

Monday night quarterback. What do I mean by that? You know what I mean by that, folks. It's easy the next day to say, you know what, they shouldn't have -- on that fourth down they should have punted it, they shouldn't have went for it. On the eighth inning when they pulled out the pitcher, ah, dumb move the next day. He should have just kept with it. That's easy.

When you're in the heart of the moment, it's a totally different ball game. And you don't get anymore of the heart of the moment. Your common sense tells you what's going on here. This officer is going after a suspect in a neighborhood where he was at, and then in an alley having a firearm pulled on him, and had to react. So what -- what do we do, right? What do we do? Attack the police, right?

First, we're going to go and Metro in general. First, the forensic evidence, right? Well, as those people came up here and told

you, it's no surprise to them. Sometimes they do get hits, sometimes they don't get hits, whether it's a viable print or viable DNA. Right?

Do you have other direct evidence in this case? Absolutely. We just went over it. So when that doesn't work, what do you do? You keep doing it, right? What's next?

They stated -- the cops stated that he dropped the gun, crime is drop the gun, right? Folks, you heard the significance of that. You heard these officers tell you the primary purpose of CAD is to give location -- their location and a description of the suspect. You have the CAD. Listen to me, this is not a full account of every detail that happened now. It's no police report. It's no submission to the District Attorney's office.

What was the significance of that, of he dropped the gun? Because he stayed still. That's what his updated location was, as his partner continued to flee after the man. Not to mention the fact, folks, this -- the CAD started at 1946. When things finally calmed down a little bit, at 2002, he actually makes a statement then. That's when he gives a more detailed report that the man pointed a gun at me.

Oh, God forbid this man in this type of situation waits until he's dealing with one crime, then sees two other people commit another crime and has to take care of that situation and then gives the -- another description over the CAD about what particularly happened.

When that doesn't work, what's next? They attack the description, right? Again, God forbid this man who has just experienced a situation where he almost had to be involved in an officer-involved

shooting, right, he just had a gun pointed at him, he gives a description of the suspect. What's your common sense tells you that officers are going to give a description of? Their general clothing, what they're wearing, whether they're black, Hispanic, white, Asian, exactly what he did.

What does the defense want to harp on? Oh, well, he didn't mention the facial hair at the bottom. Folks, you'll have the CAD. Again, it started at 1946. At 1958, less than 20 minutes later, they know Ceasar Valencia's name. They know who they're looking for, that man right there. Again, when that's doesn't work -- what -- what do we continue to do?

The cones. Attack the cones all you want. We spent probably an hour combined on cones. Jacobitz told you, I'm not positive who I particularly was with, who I told exactly where to place those cones, but yeah, those look like a true representations of where it occurred, where I first saw that man and where he was placed. Initially testimony, he's about 20 feet away. And at the time of the actual encounter, the -- the measurement was about 60 feet.

Attack these people all you want that are in the heart of the moment, all you want. It doesn't change the fact that that man pointed a firearm at that officer. And there we go, right, it's more and more and more.

You going to attack him. The defense wants you to believe, well, Officer Jacobitz, you should have kept running after the suspect. You were willing to go to the -- the moped, but you should have kept

running. First of all, what does that have to do with anyone -- anything?

Folks, you know what, in hindsight, who knows, right? Officer Jacobitz had no idea there was going to be two more bozos trying to steal the evidence that he was also trying to secure, the moped, along with the gun. Who knows? Monday night quarterbacking. Maybe he would have done something different and picked -- if he knew he was going to have to pick up the gun, maybe he would have picked up the gun and ran after him. Doesn't change the fact that that man pointed a firearm at Jacobitz.

And then another good one that we spent time on with both the detective and Jacobitz, okay, this -- this man has a full uniform on and you saw a picture of him in full gear. And they're telling you that he's in a full sprint after this man. The only reason he didn't shoot him, states he's wobbly. He's not stable. Why? Because you see the cone where he tells you he was standing where he first saw him. And then he's proceeding to run up these stairs after him.

Defense counsel, well, you should have jumped out of the way. Even if he should have jumped out of the way, it doesn't matter.

He -- that doesn't change the fact that that man pointed a firearm at him.

And that's not what they're trained to do. Ridiculous.

Fabricate. Folks, ask yourself when you're judging the credibility, what motivation does this man have to come in here and fabricate what he's telling you? This is not a situation in a trial where it's a business contract gone bad, domestic disturbance gone bad where you have child custody issues at play and maybe somebody is

overexaggerating something else. No.

You have officers trying to do their job and apprehend a suspect. This case is not about who did it or whether or not he pointed a firearm at that man. It's not. It's about what crimes did that man commit.

Assault. What is assault? A person who unlawfully attempts to use physical force against the person of another, or intentionally places another person in reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm is guilty of assault. Folks, pay attention to the or language. Okay.

Let me first focus on the top part. A person who unlawfully attempts to use physical force against the person of another. If I get mad at Mike right now and Mike starts walking out that door, and I take this clicker and I chuck it at him, I try to hit him, and I miss, the first part applies. I unlawfully attempted to use physical force against him. Now, if I hit him that would be a battery, totally separate thing. But as assault, I intentionally try to use physical force against him.

Also, for the first point to apply, this applies, to constitute an unlawful attempt, and it only applies to the first part, to use physical force against another person, mere menace is not enough. There must be an effort to carry out the intention into execution. Okay.

Are we trying to tell you that this man shot at Officer Jacobitz and missed? No. No. What applies, folks, is the second part: Intentionally place another person in reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm is guilty of an assault. I just bolded it here. It's the same definition, intentionally placing another person in reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm.

Go up to Mike, I'm mad at him. And I act like I'm going to hit him, placing him in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm. Guilty of assault. If I actually hit him, it's a battery. That's the difference.

When a weapon is involved, go up to some old lady at a mailbox and pull out a knife, and go ahead and give me your mail, ma'am, placing her in fear of bodily harm. It's assault with a deadly weapon. There is no better example of an assault with a deadly weapon than what you just heard on the stand. A firearm is the ultimate.

Officer Jacobitz told you how he felt. He thought his life was in danger. He thought he was going to have to shoot this man. He described it as divine intervention.

In addition, to constitute an assault, it is not necessary that any actual injury been inflicted. We'll not see that again when we talk about deadly weapon. If he would have shot and hit that man, Jacobitz, we'd be dealing with a whole host of other charges. All we're dealing with is an assault with a deadly weapon, him pulling out that gun, placing Jacobitz in reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm. That is an understatement. He placed that man in extreme apprehension of immediate bodily harm. He told you his finger was on the trigger.

A person who commits an assault upon a police officer during the performance of his duties as a police officer is guilty of assault on a protected person, period. You know that these men were acting as police officers, hence the charge.

The person who commits an assault upon a police officer by or through the use of a deadly weapon is guilty of assault upon a

protected person with use of a deadly weapon. Now, the common sense tells you a firearm is a deadly weapon, but let's go look at the statutes, just to show you how broad it is.

As used in these instructions, a deadly weapon means any instrument which, if used in the ordinary manner contemplated by its design or construction, will or is likely to cause substantial bodily harm or death. A hammer, a rock, a gun, a knife, a crowbar, and we can go on and on and on. Just to show you how broad this statute is, it has an or. Any weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, which under the circumstances of which it's used, attempted to be used, or threatened to be used is capable of causing substantial bodily harm or death. I grab this pen and I go up to Mike and, Give me your stuff or I'm going to stab you in the neck. Assault with a deadly weapon. A pen can be a deadly weapon. A string can be a deadly weapon. We can go on and on.

You are instructed, flat out in this case, that a firearm is a deadly weapon, period. Firearm is a deadly weapon whether loaded or unloaded, operable or inoperable. In order to use a deadly weapon, there may not be conduct which actually produces harm, but only conduct which produces a fear of harm or force by means of display of the deadly weapon in aiding the commission of the crime. Again, just to show you how broad this statute is, you do not need to use the weapon. Simply conduct which produces a fear of harm.

The State is not required to have recovered the deadly weapon used in the alleged crime, or to produce the deadly weapon in court to establish that the deadly weapon was used in the commission of

the crime. You have the luxury of having it in this case. There are a lot of cases where the State does not have it. And your common sense tells you why.

Possession. Folks, it's obvious. There's no better example of possession than when stuff is in somebody's pocket, period. Just to show you how broad possession is though, I want to go over the law with you. Obviously, we're talking about the trafficking charge and the possession of a controlled substance.

The law recognizes two types of possession. Actual possession and constructive possession. You don't need both. You can only need one. A person who has -- knowingly has direct physical control over a thing at any given time is in actual possession of it. Again, no better example than when you're carrying around a bag, a suitcase, a backpack, drugs in your pocket.

A person who, although not in actual possession, not only has both the power and the intention in any given time to exercise dominion and control over a thing either directly or through another person is in constructive possession. That just goes to show you how broad this statute is. A cop pulls you over and you don't have any drugs on you but they're in your glove compartment, they're in your middle console, they're in your trunk. So defense come in here and say, hey, ain't on me, you can't convict me. No.

Constructive possession. It can go even broader than that. We got a line of cocaine on your kitchen table at home and you're at work. The cops execute a search warrant on the house, constructive

possession.

A law -- the law recognizes also that possession maybe sole or joint. If one person alone has actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is sole, two or more persons show actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is joint. Again, just to show you how broad it is.

Two people have a -- share an apartment. They're roommates. And again, line of cocaine on the kitchen sink. Cops come in. They're not home. People can't come in here and say, hey, not, on me, I'm not even -- I'm not even in the state. No. Constructive possession. Again, there's no better example of possession in this case, when pulled straight from the man's pocket.

Trafficking. A -- any person who knowingly or intentionally is in actual or constructive possession of a scheduled or controlled substance or any mixture of -- any mixture which contains a scheduled or controlled substance, the quantity of which weighs or is represented by that person to weigh four or more grams is guilty of trafficking a controlled substance.

You heard from the expert. You actually have her sheet telling you that these substances were positive for cocaine, meth, and heroin. Officer Vallad actually told you that that -- in his years and years on the street, that's the most he's even seen from a suspect. You're flat out instructed that heroin is a Schedule 1 controlled substance. And again, it was over 11 grams, almost three times that amount. All that -- all that's needed is four.

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Again, you have that. That was the -- not only the testimony from the experts, you have the sheet telling you how many grams it was. In addition, the phrase four grams or more refers to the aggregate weight of the entire mixture, rather than the weight of the controlled substance that is contained in the mixture. It is not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant was aware of the amount of the controlled substance he possessed.

What's that tell you? Obviously, he can't get caught and say, oh man, I -- I only thought I had just a possession of controlled substance amount, less than four. No. It's the actual weight you have on you.

Possession of controlled substance. Any person who knowingly or intentionally possesses a controlled substance unless the substance was obtained directly from or pursuant -- through some legal means. Yeah, no. Folks, what other two controlled substances did this man have on him? And you're flat out instructed, and your common sense tells you, cocaine and methamphetamine are controlled substances.

The amount of evidence in this case, folks, is overwhelming. Blame the cops all you want. The evidence came from right here. It's no question. That's your man. And the facts demonstrate, he pointed a firearm at that man, causing him a reasonable apprehension of bodily harm, extreme apprehension of bodily harm. And then was caught two days later with three types of controlled substances on his person.

With that, the State asks you find the defendant guilty of

assault on a protected person with use of a deadly weapon, trafficking a controlled substance, and two counts of possession of a controlled substance. Thank you.

THE COURT: Defense?

MR. COYER: Your Honor, I don't recall exactly how long we've been going, but I wasn't sure if the court wanted to take a break? I'm happy to go either way.

THE COURT: Counsel approach.

[Bench conference transcribed as follows:]

MR. COYER: I know you told them every 90 minutes, but I'm not sure if we've been going --

THE COURT: Yeah. I think --

MR. LEXIS: They want us to keep going.

THE COURT: Let me ask counsel.

How long do you think it's going to be?

MR. COYER: Probably 15 minutes.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. COYER: It's pretty short.

THE COURT: We'll probably do your closing and then we'll take a break. Do Mr. -- I assume you're doing rebuttal? Unless you think it's going -- we -- we came back on the bench about a quarter till 2:00, if I recall. Closer --

MR. DICKERSON: Yeah, if they --

THE COURT: Between quarter till 2:00.

MR. DICKERSON: Yeah.

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lost count after about five or six.

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The State accused us, the defense, of doing one of these, and then proceeded to spend 15 minutes explaining to you what possession means. And he spent about 30 seconds talking about the forensic evidence in this case, which exonerates our client.

State likes to argue that they have to prove two things in a criminal case. That, one, that a crime was committed, and two, that the defendant committed the crime. For some of you, you may not even have to look passed the first part. Some of you may be more of the cynical type, like my esteemed colleague who said that we were suggesting that things were fabricated.

Some of you may think that I'm going to come out here and say that Officer Jacobitz planted that gun, because he's the only one whose fingerprint's on it. I'm not going to do that. I'm not going to attack the police.

Officer Jacobitz admitted that he doesn't remember all the details from that evening. It's not an attack to point out the truth. Officer Jacobitz admitted that he didn't provide any details about seeing facial hair. It's not attacking the police to point out the truth. Officer Jacobitz admitted that he doesn't remember even meeting with the CSA, Ms. Klosterman, the crime scene analyst. We know he did. She took pictures of him. It's not attacking the police to point out a fact.

Officer Jacobitz testified to what each and every one of you heard in the audio, which is that the first thing he sent out to his fellow officers was, "Be advised the crime is he dropped a firearm." Not he assaulted me, not he tried to shoot me. He dropped a firearm. Is it

possible that from 64 feet away maybe he didn't see what he later thought he saw? That's for you to answer.

There's about 100 pictures up there and they all look like this, dark sky. They're not very useful. Nobody went back and took a picture of what the scene should have looked like in the right light.

I'll tell you what, I will assume half of the State's case for you.

I will assume that Officer Jacobitz was assaulted on May 19th, 2016. I
am willing to do that. I am willing to assume that a gun was pulled out
from a fleeing perpetrator and pointed at Officer Jacobitz.

So let's simplify this. I will concede all of that, because I'm not here to defend whoever committed that crime on May 19th, 2016. I'm not here to defend the Hispanic male adult that was driving the moped. I'm not here to defend the man who ran from the police. And I'm sure as hell not here to defend the man who pulled a gun on Officer Jacobitz.

I'm here to defend Ceasar Valencia. Ceasar Valencia is the guy who just happens to live about two houses down from where this occurred. This case is not about whether Officer Jacobitz was assaulted or not. This case is about whether or not the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Ceasar Valencia assaulted Officer Jacobitz. This case is about what happens when a rush to judgment takes the place of a neutral careful investigation.

Let's talk about the evidence. You heard the judge instruct you already that the things that I say, the things that Mr. Lexis says, things that Mr. Dickerson says, things that Ms. Plunkett says, these things are not evidence. This is argument. I'm arguing. Evidence

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comes from up here. Okay? The witness stand.

So let's talk about the evidence. Again, tons of photographs. Tell me how useful most of them are. Does looking down this alley tell you that Officer Jacobitz was assaulted or not? No. We're -- we're not even sure if the CSA put the cones in the right place because she only spent 15 minutes with Officer Jacobitz. Who cares about the cones? The point is, the State put in dozens and dozens of these photographs and they're useless. But we're accused of doing this.

By the time these photos were taken, every single officer on that scene knew who their suspect was. Every single officer was convinced, Ceasar Valencia. Ceasar Valencia is the guy. These photos don't show Ceasar Valencia is the guy. These are just photographs. You've got in -- in the evidence for you what we keep calling the CAD, okay, computer aided dispatch, the printout of the things that get inputted into the computer system, and you've even got the audio. You've got the audio of what the officers said back and forth to one another while this event was unfolding.

These pieces of evidence, ladies and gentlemen, are like a crystal ball. You can look back and see exactly what happened. Don't take my word for it. Look at the evidence. Because you'll hear it in the audio, and you'll see it in the CAD. At 7:47 p.m. the description goes out, right? HMA, Hispanic male adult, 5'7", 160 pounds, dark hat, red-striped shirt. That's it. HMA, 5'7", 160, dark shirt -- dark hat, excuse me, red-striped shirt. That's it.

One minute later, at 7:48, one minute, Officer Jacobitz is

distracted by these two clowns trying to steal this moped from a crime scene. You know how that works in your own life experiences. You're focused on something, you're trying to remember something, and then you're distracted and it's out of your mind. Everybody's been there.

Does that make Officer Jacobitz a bad guy? Does that make him a liar? No. Makes him human. You got to see Officer Jacobitz as a human being before you see him as a police officer. That's why we spent so much time in jury selection asking about those questions, over and over, about whether you might have an implicit bias toward a law enforcement officer. Because Officer Jacobitz is a human being before he is a law enforcement officer.

At 7:51 p.m. -- don't take my word for it, look at the CAD, listen to the audio -- at 7:51 p.m., four minutes after the description has gone out, Officer Perez, who Officer Jacobitz identified his call sign as 3DP41, you'll see it in the CAD, he says over the radio, there's an HMA matching that description that has a residence in that area on 10th Street. Right then and there, at that moment, the investigation shifted from neutral toward Ceasar Valencia.

At 7:58 p.m., 11 minutes after the description first went out, HMA, 5'7", 160 pounds, 11 minutes later we hear the name Ceasar Valencia come across the radio. And from that moment on, there are no other suspects to this crime. There are no other leads. There is nothing else that anybody is interested in doing, except getting Ceasar Valencia. 11 minutes it took.

By 8:02 p.m., 15 minutes after the description went out, Officer

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22 24 Jacobitz comes over the radio. He's now using the name Ceasar Valencia to describe the crime that had occurred. When Ceasar pulled a gun on me. Now the victim has become convinced that the suspect is Ceasar Valencia.

At 8:04 p.m., two minutes later, Officer Jacobitz gets texted a picture of Ceasar Valencia. Jacobitz is already using Ceasar Valencia's name to describe the crime.

And try to imagine what the scene looks like at this point, 15 minutes in. Okay? We've got a perimeter set up. Suspect has got away, right? There's a perimeter. There's countless officers involved. There's an air unit. There's dogs coming in. This is a big scene. Officers are being pulled away from the barbecue. They're being pulled away from the memorial. This is a big deal happening down in the DTAC right now. Okay. Because Officer Jacobitz has been assaulted.

And his fellow officers say, hey, Ceasar Valencia lives in that area. He's an HMA. He's about 5'7". He's about 160. Must be Ceasar Valencia. Then Officer Jacobitz gets a picture, hey, Officer, here's Ceasar Valencia. What's Jacobitz going to say at that point? Honestly, what's he going to say? Is he going to say no, no guys, no, call it off, call off the perimeter, no, go back to what you were doing. That's -that's not him, that's not our guy. Does anybody really think that's going to happen at that point?

He's using Ceasar Valencia's name before he ever even sees a picture of him, ladies and gentlemen. One picture. One. Okay. This is what we call a positive feedback loop. Hey, the suspect is Ceasar

Valencia. Ceasar Valencia is an HMA. Here's a picture of Ceasar Valencia. Is that the suspect? Yeah. The suspect is Ceasar Valencia. Okay. That's what's happening here.

By 8:08 p.m., these officers are so focused on Ceasar Valencia that an individual is spotted in the area walking down the street wearing a red-striped shirt and a dark hat, but it's a BMA, so that can't be the guy. Can't be the guy. It can't be the guy because the guy is Ceasar Valencia. It always has been. It has been from the first time they heard that name. They all became convinced that that was the guy. Can't be the BMA that meets the clothing description, nope. Got to be Ceasar Valencia.

Look at the CAD. You know who says the BMA is not your guy? It's Officer Perez, the one who suggested that maybe Ceasar Valencia was a suspect in the first place. This rush to judgment leads to the police ruling out someone who is wearing the same clothes as the suspect within 21 minutes. 21 minutes. That's how fast the investigation focused on Ceasar Valencia.

Is that reasonable doubt? You better believe it. Is tunnel vision reasonable doubt? Is a poor investigation reasonable doubt? You better believe it. That doesn't mean that we're attacking the police. That means we're doing our job as citizens, as jurors, and we're holding the State to their burden to make sure that they prove a case against someone beyond a reasonable doubt.

Let's talk about the forensics. Fingerprints, we heard about fingerprints. They get about 14 percent hit rate on fingerprints. That's

not really very useful, is it? You know, but Jacobitz's fingerprint was on that gun. That's a little bit of a head scratcher, right? We know he picked it up. Right? We know he put it in his pants and eventually secured it. His fingerprint's still on the gun. And they know their target is Ceasar Valencia, but they don't bother to test any of the cartridges. And you'll remember there were five. You'll remember the fingerprint guy said smooth, metal surfaces are generally the best for finding fingerprints. And there you have five smooth, metal surfaces that weren't tested. That is five reasonable doubts, ladies and gentlemen, right there.

Let's talk about the DNA. This gun that's located at the scene, it goes on a little bit of a wild ride that night, right? It's in the suspect's hand, eventually goes flying out of the suspect's hand, lands in the dirt. Lays in the dirt for a little bit. Eventually gets picked up by Officer Jacobitz, goes in Officer Jacobitz's waistband is what he said. From there, Officer Jacobitz goes and arrests two idiots stealing a moped from a crime scene, and then eventually the firearm goes into Jacobitz's vehicle, somewhere in the vehicle, and is eventually secured and impounded.

And after going through all of that, a forensic scientist is still able to pull at least four individuals' DNA off that gun. A mixture profile is what they call that. And there's a major profile and there's a minor profile. And the major profile -- the major profile DNA is a female. And Ceasar Valencia is excluded -- excluded -- as a contributor to the major profile. Ladies and gentlemen, this is not evidence that can be ignored.

That DNA evidence is way more than reasonable doubt.

Let's talk about the burden of proof a little bit. Because we asked a lot about that during jury selection. And I wondered in jury selection, was there anybody here who thought Cesar was guilty the moment we heard -- they heard the charges read? What about now? Now that you've heard the evidence, do you feel more convinced that he's guilty? Do you feel less convinced? Because we were supposed to start from zero, remember?

Refer to the reasonable doubt jury instruction. It's No. 5. If there's questions in your mind, if you have unanswered questions, okay, whether or not those are reasonable doubt questions, you look at that jury instruction. It will guide you. Okay.

Does anyone here still think Ceasar has to prove his innocence now that you've heard the evidence? We know he doesn't. We know the State carries the burden of proof. State said it countless times in jury selection and opening statements. What would he do on these facts? What do you think he would do to prove his innocence? Take the stand? What's he going to -- what's he going to say? I wasn't there. I was somewhere else.

MR. DICKERSON: Objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Counsel approach.

[Bench conference transcribed as follows:]

THE COURT: What's the basis of your objection?

MR. DICKERSON: Basis of the objection is that he's telling them what his client would say if he testified. He can't do that.

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THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEXIS: Absolutely. He absolutely can't do it --

THE COURT: I heard -- okay.

Mr. Coyer, what is your response to the objection?

MR. COYER: That I'm demonstrating to them the impossibility of proving a negative, which is part of the burden of proof.

THE COURT: But you're saying what he would have said if he had testified.

MR. COYER: Well --

THE COURT: So I'm going to sustain the objection, ask the jury to disregard your last comment.

MR. COYER: Okay.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. DICKERSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

[End of bench conference.]

THE COURT: The objection is sustained. The last comment by counsel is to be disregarded by the jury.

MR. COYER: How does Ceasar Valencia prove his innocence? He lives two houses away from where this happened. Of course he's an HMA in the area with a residence. He lives right up the street. How would he possibly prove his innocence? That is why the State carries the burden of proof, ladies and gentlemen. That is why, in our system, we require the State to prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt. This case is a great example of why that's so important, because you cannot prove a negative, no matter what you do

or don't do. You cannot prove that you weren't somewhere. It can't be done.

You know, you heard some questions from the State directed at the forensic experts, right? Like, is it possible that you maybe don't get some DNA off of a firearm? Or is it possible that you don't get some fingerprints off of it? Sure. It's -- all that stuff is possible. Right? Is it possible that Ceasar Valencia is the guy? Sure. I'll concede that. But that's not the question. Okay. That's not the question.

But if you're going to ask those questions, you need to direct yourself to the reasonable doubt jury instruction. Okay. Because speculation, fanciful things, okay, those are not proper areas of inquiry for reasonable doubt.

Is it probable that this face is not the face that Officer Jacobitz saw on May 19th, 2016? You better believe it. Because Officer Jacobitz, just like Officer Houston, has training. He has experience. He's been through the police academy. And on that evening, he was very clear. Both officers could not have been clearer in their testimony, that they were alert, they were attentive, they were paying attention to details.

And you look at this face and you're not even going to mention that he's got that patch of hair under his chin? Are you kidding me? The State can stand up here and say that that's ridiculous all day. You guys get to decide what matters in this case.

Has the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that that face is the face that was seen by Officers Jacobitz and Houston on

May 19th, 2016? No way. They saw the suspect's face at a different location, followed him, then they got split up. Okay. Remember? Split up. They're in different areas, so they didn't have time to, like, you know, pow-wow with each other. And not one of them, neither one of those officers says, oh, by the way, guy's got a big, huge goatee under his skin. Not one of them at any point ever says that. That is significant.

They specifically testified that they're trained to recognize characteristics, physical traits, clothing, height, weight, all those things. But what gets pointed out? HMA, 5'7", 160 pounds.

What about the drugs? Ceasar had drugs in his pocket. On May 21st, Ceasar had drugs in his pocket. But did the State prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt that he had drugs in his pocket on May 19th? Not even close. Look at Jury Instruction No. 3. The charge is for May 19th.

I'm not going to tell you how to fill out a verdict form. I know you guys can figure that out on your own. I'm going to ask you for a favor though. Because the State carries that burden of proof, they get to come back up here and argue some more. And I would just like you to ask yourselves, whatever argument you're about to hear, is he talking about argument or is he talking about evidence? Did I hear that evidence come from this chair? And I ask you to keep that in mind now, and when you're deliberating. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen.

THE COURT: Mr. Dickerson, are you ready to go forward? MR. DICKERSON: Yes, Your Honor.

Bottom line, ladies and gentlemen, when we talk about

Instruction No. 3 and the drugs, obviously, they're conceding the drugs, that yeah, he had drugs on him, heroin, cocaine, meth, those are all his. Instruction No. 3 in that argument is not proper. What -- what we have here, Instruction No. 3, is the information. And here in the State of Nevada, it's notice pleading. So notice pleading is on or about May 19th, 2016, he had drugs on him. On or about May 19th, 2016, the defendant had drugs on him. He's guilty of that, no doubt about it. May 21st, 2016. This event started on May 19th, 2016. Here we are.

May 19th, 2016, do we need cartridges to tell us who pointed the gun? Do we need the gun itself to tell us who pointed the gun? No way. Ladies and gentlemen, we have two officers up here, Officer Houston and Officer Jacobitz. They both told you, yeah, that guy who I saw running from us there at 11th and Wilson, that was the defendant. Ceasar Valencia, yeah, that's his face. I know that face.

Well, then the guy gets off the moped running. Who's that guy? That's Ceasar Valencia. That's him. I know that face. They confirm it that night, less than half an hour into this perimeter being set up in an area of downtown being cordoned off. 100 percent confirmed looking at a photo, that's the guy that just ran from us. When it's freshest in their mind right there on scene, right after this guy runs from them, yeah, that's the guy who run -- who just ran from us.

Think about their motive, here and then. Who wants to catch the right guy more than the guy who was just victimized by Ceasar Valencia? Officer Jacobitz and Officer Houston. Do you think that they want to look at a picture of a guy that's not him and say, yeah, that's him,

knowing that the guy who just pointed the gun at him got away? Come on, these guys are police officers. Their job is law enforcement. They knew what they saw.

Bottom line, ladies and gentlemen, is if you believe the witnesses, you find the defendant guilty. You need nothing else. Do we have it? Yeah. We know there is a gun out there. That's circumstantial evidence that corroborates everything they're saying. The gun was on the ground. We have the gun.

In addition, we have the forensic testing that was completed showing the thoroughness of the investigation. That's why you guys heard about it, to hear that, hey, the buck doesn't just stop, right? It doesn't just stop with breakdown the perimeter, go find the guy. We present that to you so you see the full scope of everything. We have nothing to hide. Nothing. Because it's clear, 100 percent, Ceasar Valencia is the person who pointed a gun at Officer Jacobitz in that back alley of 610 North 10th Street.

What you see from the DNA evidence is pretty interesting information, actually. I think that most people don't realize the scope and breadth of what we get from DNA evidence and how it can be applied. But you heard from Crystal May that that evidence can only go so far. And what we have is a solid identification to a female. We don't know who the female is, so we can't say which female it is. We know it's not her, because she tested that. But we could only tell who that female was if we compared it to anybody else.

The other folks on there, males, at least three of them. She

told you she can't do more than three, right? Three is the maximum that their standards will let them -- or I'm sorry, four is the maximum that their -- their standards at the lab will allow them to do. After -- could it be 40? Could be. All she can do is four.

Why is that? She told you that too. Guns are notoriously bad for that reason for DNA analysis, because, obviously, as we've seen with this gun and the amount of DNA on it, they pass through multiple hands.

The fingerprints, exactly what we'd expect to find, without a doubt. Exactly what you'd expect to find on that gun is after that small .38 revolver, the only metal part is shoved into the waistband of Officer Jacobitz's fairly tight duty belt, we would have damage to the prints on there. And so that's ultimately pulled out of his pants with gloves -- or without gloves and secured in his car before it's impounded into that bag and kept just like that. The last person that touched it was Officer Jacobitz. And the fact that we got a fingerprint off of it is surprising in the first place, but of course it's his.

None of that says that Ceasar Valencia didn't have that gun.

None of that evidence says that. And you're instructed here -- I really want you to look at this. The reasonable doubt instruction that says, specifically, reason --

MR. COYER: Objection. I'm objecting to presenting highlighted portions of the jury instructions to the jury.

MR. DICKERSON: That's not an objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Wait, counsel. Approach.

[Bench conference transcribed as follows:]

be actual, not mere possibility or speculation. Possibility or speculation. That's all defense counsel's argument leaves us with. Is it possible that it's not him? No. We know it's him. And whatever they're asking you to consider, whatever questions they're asking you to answer in your mind, what do those questions call for? Speculation, possibility, things that you can't consider when considering reasonable doubt.

It's, frankly, without a doubt that Ceasar Valencia is guilty of the crime of assault with a deadly weapon on a protected person. The only thing that they're arguing is not that Officer Jacobitz didn't get a gun pointed at him, not that Officer Jacobitz isn't a police officer. They're saying just wasn't Ceasar Valencia. Well, of course it was Ceasar Valencia.

Regardless of everything we've talked about, about him 100 percent being ID'd by both police officers, experienced police officers at that, the night of, what other facts do we know? Well, we know Ceasar Valencia is a neighbor to Downtown Area Command. He may live closer than almost anybody. And when these officers are coming out of their home command post, a place where they spend a lot of time, and that day just finishing up eating, where do they see the moped first? The alley right behind Ceasar Valencia's house. Is that a coincidence? No. No doubt, that's not a coincidence.

Where is it coming from? Well, it's coming from that alleyway right behind his house. As that moped takes off going to opposite direction away from the house and officers finally get behind it, pulls into that area at 11th and Wilson. There, they try to conduct the traffic stop.

He looks back at them. They absolutely see it's him, for the first time seeing the face and being able to recognize it. But that's not what I'm talking about right now.

What I'm talking about is where does he go? He doesn't try to go back down away, the same direction that he was originally heading. Where do people go when they're scared? They go to a place that they know, a place of safety. And where does Ceasar Valencia go? He goes back towards his house, right? Right away. He turns up Wilson. He comes down that alley. He lives in the neighborhood. Reasonable inference, he knows that area. And where does he go? Right into the back alley of 610 North 10th Street, an area that just so conveniently has open access right to 10th Street. Who knows that area? Ceasar Valencia knows that area.

And where does he go? He goes through that alley after pointing the -- pointing the gun at Officer Jacobitz, continues. At that time end of that alley, does he go left away from 625 North 10th Street, his home? No. He goes right towards it, right towards his area of safety, his home because that's where people flee when they're scared and they want to get away.

Judging by Ceasar Valencia's actions that night, that's exactly what he wanted to do. He did not want those officers to stop him and he was willing to stop at nothing. Where does he end up? Right there, right at his house. It's right where officers lose track of him, surprising enough.

Once again, ladies and gentlemen, who knows that area?

Ceasar Valencia. In a neighborhood that you're familiar with, that a person is familiar with, who knows it better than that person themselves. And that's circumstantial evidence to support and corroborate the overwhelming direct evidence that establishes that Ceasar Valencia is the person that committed assault with a deadly weapon upon a protected person, that being Officer Jacobitz.

But ladies and gentlemen, we don't have to stop there. We don't have to stop there, because, I think very important to understanding what we have in front of us is we have a clear opportunity for Ceasar Valencia to get away; and he does. And when do we see him reemerge?

Well, we have the surveillance operation started. It's several hours in until we see him in the late evening hours, or the -- I guess the early morning of Saturday, a time when, hopefully, no one is around. What does that vehicle do as it's driving down the street? You heard that it tail checked. We know that -- that Ceasar Valencia wasn't driving. But it tail checked the surveillance team. Consider it. It's evidence for you to consider.

Where does it go? They lose it for a brief second. They pick it up unoccupied. Ultimately, later on, or an hour later, they get Ceasar Valencia. This time he's not driving. He's not operating the vehicle so he can't run. There's a whole slew of police officers, approximately 15 or so, with guns in an area that's enclosed on Washington and Main Street. There's nowhere to go.

He was caught, at least right then. And that's why he tells

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24 25 you, well, the -- yeah, drugs were in my pocket. Right? That's why the defense tells you that. But he's good for that. He's guilty of all of it.

Ladies and gentlemen, when you go back to that jury deliberation room, just consider the first thing I said here, that if you believe the witnesses, that's it. Ceasar Valencia is guilty. And what do we have here, divine intervention.

MR. COYER: Objection, Your Honor. Prejudicial argument.

THE COURT: Counsel approach.

[Bench conference transcribed as follows:]

THE COURT: Speak low. What's the base --

MR. COYER: Judge --

THE COURT: What's your objection, counsel?

MR. COYER: This a reference to religion. It's completely improper. It's inflammatory. It's totally improper argument to mention divine intervention, and I objected when that testimony came in as well from Officer Jacobitz.

THE COURT: Counsel?

MR. DICKERSON: It's proper comment on the testimony of the officer.

THE COURT: Okay. His objection is sustained. I'm going to have the jury disregard your last comment.

MR. DICKERSON: Okay.

[End of bench conference.]

THE COURT: The objection is sustained. I instruct the jurors to disregard counsel's last comment.

MR. DICKERSON: Ladies and gentlemen, I don't have to tell you anything. I don't have to tell you what it was, how scary that situation was for Officer Jacobitz. He stood here and he told you. And just the idea of an old fence post being the thing that stopped him from getting shot, and God forbid, having to shoot somebody else that night, that's what stopped this. That's what gets us here today, an assault with a deadly weapon on a protected person, not something much worse.

Officer Houston and Officer Jacobitz, they more than anybody else want to catch the right man. We're not here on a misidentification. We're here on a 100 percent positive identification of both officers. They know what they saw. There's no doubt about it.

When you consider the fact that these officers aren't telling us a line of baloney to try bolster each other's stories up. If that was the case, Officer Houston would have been telling us a story about how he saw. He was -- he was standing right next to Officer Jacobitz when this happened. No. They're just telling you what they saw. That's it.

Take it all into consideration, ladies and gentlemen. I submit to you, if you believe the witnesses, that's all you need. Ceasar Valencia is guilty. Please find him guilty of all counts. Thank you.

THE COURT: Counsel approach, please.

[Bench conference transcribed as follows:]

THE COURT: Okay. At this point, I'm going to have the officers sworn in. I'm just going to have the marshal take the jurors back to the deliberation room, advise them that they're going to get the exhibits, the jury instructions, save and except the weapon, the

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24 25 ammunition, and the -- the drugs. And if they want to inspect it, request the marshal to bring it back.

I was going to have my JEA, Ms. Fagin, take the alternates to my chambers. I'm not going to let them leave the building in light of --

MR. COYER: Because they have a --

THE COURT: -- the bifurcation issue.

MR. COYER: Yes.

THE COURT: So I'm not going to let them just -- I don't want to take the chance that -- so I'm just going to have Ms. Fagin keep them either in a separate isolated area. And then, you know, we'll be in recess.

MR. DICKERSON: Okay.

MS. PLUNKETT: Okay.

MR. COYER: Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.

[End of bench conference.]

THE COURT: The clerk will now swear in the officers to take charge of the jurors and the alternates -- alternate jurors. There's two of them.

[Officers sworn.]

THE COURT: At this time, ladies and gentlemen, the -- the jurors -- and the jurors are the first 12 seats in the jury box, the marshal is going to take you to -- don't leave yet. The marshal is going to take you to the jury room for deliberation. You also will be brought the exhibits, which have been introduced into evidence, and the jury

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24 25 instructions.

By agreement of the parties, we're not going to send back the weapon, the ammunition, or the drugs. However, if you want to inspect the weapon, the ammunition, or drugs, please inform the marshal and he will bring them to you so you could inspect them.

At this time, the marshal is going to take the jurors to the jury room for deliberation.

THE COURT: If the alternate jurors would just remain seated for one second.

[Jury recessed for deliberation at 3:38 p.m.]

THE COURT: While the jury is deliberation, my judicial executive assistant, Ms. Fagin, is going to take you to my chambers and you're going to remain at my chambers while the jury deliberates. Once the jury returns with a verdict, then you'll be brought back to the courtroom. All right. Thank you.

Ms. Fagin? Ms. Fagin.

THE JEA: Yes.

THE COURT: Please?

THE JEA: Sure.

THE COURT: Where do you want to put them? I mean --

THE JEA: I was going to put them in the room.

THE COURT: But you have to stay there with them.

THE JEA: Yeah.

THE COURT: Okay. So right now let's just put them in the courtroom, we'll make -- we'll put up a spot in chambers. All right. So

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THE JEA: Do they need a break?

THE COURT: They can go to the bathroom. And I mean, you just got to make sure nobody talks to them. Okay. Thank you. Thank you.

THE JEA: You're welcome.

THE COURT: All right. All right. Before counsel leave the courtroom, please provide my clerk with a telephone number where you can be reached once the jury returns a verdict. Please do not -- please be within 30 minutes of the courthouse.

MR. DICKERSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

MS. PLUNKETT: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Court is in recess.

[Court recessed at 3:40 p.m. until 4:26 p.m.]

[Outside the presence of the jury.]

THE COURT: Please be seated. This is continuation of the trial of *State of Nevada vs. Ceasar Sanchaz Valencia*, Case No. C-16-315580.

Counsel, I've been advised that the jury has reached a verdict. They're bringing the jury in with the alternates. And then what I'm going to do is excuse them for today, advise them that this was a bifurcated trial, there's an additional charge that needs to be tried.

MR. DICKERSON: I think it will probably take about 15 minutes, Your Honor, if we could just try to get it in.

THE COURT: Well, you told me I read to read the preliminary

1 We, the jury, in the above-entitled case find the defendant as 2 Count 1, assault on a protected person with use of a deadly 3 weapon: Guilty of assault on a protected person with use of a deadly 5 Count 2, trafficking in controlled substance, heroin: Guilty of 6 7 8 Count 3, possession of controlled substance, cocaine: Guilty 10 Count 4, possession of controlled substance: Guilty of 11 12 Dated this 1st day of December, 2017, Xavier Antheaume, 13 14 Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, are these your verdicts as 15 16 THE COURT: Does either counsel want the jury polled? 17 MR. DICKERSON: State does not wish to. 18 MR. COYER: Defense would ask that they be polled. 19 20 THE COURT: Mr. Clerk, please poll the jurors. THE CLERK: Juror No. 1, is this your verdict as read? 21 22 THE CLERK: Juror No. 2, is this your verdict as read? 23 24 25

just completed. I have to do the preliminary instructions, there is a

presentation of evidence, I have to read you the jury instructions, and then you would have to deliberate. The parties have left it up to you whether you want to start it today or come back on Monday at 10:00 to hear the testimony on the additional charge. It's late in the afternoon, so I will go for a while.

So if you could advise -- Mr. Foreperson, if you could discuss with your jurors if they want to continue or come back on -- on Monday?

MR. DICKERSON: Just -- and just for the record, Your Honor, we don't expect any additional testimony, just two pieces of evidence to

be admitted.

THE COURT: Okay. But we still -- is that correct, counsel?

We still have to do the preliminary instructions --

MR. DICKERSON: Yes.

Oh, counsel?

THE COURT: -- presentation of evidence, instruct the jury on the law, and then closing arguments?

MR. DICKERSON: Yes. And I believe, it -- the State's side will be very brief.

THE COURT: So we can come -- yes, sir?

JUROR NO. 5: Like to know the approximate time this will take so that we can all come up with a quality decision for you for this evening.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I would suspect it's going to take, to do everything, at least -- based on the representation of counsel, at least 45 minutes to an hour.

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1	VER					
2		FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT				
3	DISTRI	CT COURT INTY, NEVADA DEC - 1 2017				
4	CDARK COC	4:356.60				
5	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	BY, October ALAN PAUL CASTLE, SR, DEPUTY				
6	Plaintiff,	CASE NO: C-16-315580-1				
7	-VS-	DEPT NO: XVIII				
8	CEASAR SANCHAZ VALENCIA	C — 18 — 315580 — 1				
9	D.C. 1	VER Verdict 4701940				
10	Defendant.					
11	VERDICT					
12 13	We, the jury in the above entitled case, find the Defendant as follows:					
13	COUNT 1 – ASSAULT ON A PROTECTED PERSON WITH USE OF A DEADLY					
15	WEAPON					
16	(Please check the appropriate box, select only one)					
17	□ Not Guilty					
18	☐ Guilty of Assault on a Protected Person					
19	☐ Guilty of Assault with a	Deadly Weapon				
20	Guilty of Assault on a P	rotected Person with use of a Deadly Weapon				
21	COUNT 2 – TRAFFICKING IN CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (HERION)					
22	(Please check the appropriate box, select only one)					
23	☐ Not Guilty					
24	☐ Guilty of Possession of €	Controlled Substance				
25	Guilty of Trafficking in	Controlled Substance				
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28	///					
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1	COUNT 3 – POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (COCAINE)				
2	(Please check the appropriate box, select only one)				
3	□ Not Guilty				
4	Guilty of Possession of Controlled Substance				
5	<u>COUNT 4</u> – POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE				
6	(METHAMPHETAMINE)				
7	(Please check the appropriate box, select only one)				
8	□ Not Guilty				
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4	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA BY, Color St. ALAN PAUL CASTLE, SR, DEPUTY					
5	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	F NEVADA				
6	Plaintiff,	CASE NO:	C-16-315580-1			
7	-VS-	DEPT NO:	XVIII			
8	CEASAR SANCHAZ VALENCIA					
9	Defendant.					
11	Detendant.					
12	VERDICT					
13	We, the jury in the above entitled case, find the Defendant as follows:					
14	<u>COUNT 1</u> – OWNERSHIP OR POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY PROHIBITED					
15	PERSON					
16	(Please check the appropriate box, select only one)					
17	□ Not Guilty					
18	Guilty of Ownership or Possession of Firearm by Prohibited Person					
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DISTRICT COURT

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

VS.

CEASAR SANCHAZ VALENCIA,

Defendant.

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Case No. C-16-315580-1

DEPT. XVIII

BEFORE THE HONORABLE MARK B. BAILUS, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

THURSDAY, JANUARY 25, 2018

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS RE: **JURY TRIAL - SENTENCING**

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: MICHAEL DICKERSON, ESQ.

(Deputy District Attorney)

For the Defendant: GREGORY E. COYER, ESQ.

ALEXIS ANNE PLUNKETT, ESQ.

RECORDED BY: ROBIN PAGE, COURT RECORDER

Shawna Ortega • CET-562 • Certified Electronic Transcriber • 602.412.7667

<u>INDEX</u> **EXHIBITS** DESCRIPTION <u>ADMITTED</u> State's Exhibit Nos. 1 through 4 Shawna Ortega • CET-562 • Certified Electronic Transcriber • 602.412.7667

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MR. DICKERSON: And Count --

THE COURT: State, what's your position on sentencing?

MR. DICKERSON: And Count 5, Your Honor, possession of

THE COURT: I apologize. You're correct.

firearm by a prohibited person.

And Count 5, ownership or possession of firearm by a prohibited person.

State, what's your position on sentencing?

MR. DICKERSON: Your Honor, in this case, the State is seeking habitual treatment. We filed a habitual notice specifically on February 3rd, 2017, listing nine different felony convictions. Here today I have in my possession four judgments of conviction, detailing the felonies on the State's Notice of Habitual, Nos. 4 through 9.

THE COURT: Have those been admitted in court and they're certified copies?

MR. DICKERSON: They are certified copies. If I may approach your clerk to have them marked?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DICKERSON: You sat through the trial in this case, Your Honor, you heard the evidence. And based on the defendant's actions and his criminal history is really why we're asking for habitual treatment in this particular case.

What we have is an individual who has had a career of crime, no doubt about it. Nine different felonies, one gross misdemeanor conviction, 15 misdemeanors, 6 prison sentences, and 16 jail terms, Your Honor.

He started back in, as an adult, in 1998 with a possession of controlled substance conviction out of Bakersfield, California. In 1999, carrying concealed weapon out of Visalia, California. Then '99 as well, same time, different case, possession of controlled substance, Visalia, California.

2001, he makes his way to Las Vegas, picks up a trafficking controlled substance case, which is ultimately pled out to possession of controlled substance with intent to sell. He receives probation, is revoked, goes to prison there. Continues on into 2002, picking up additional charges and being convicted in 2003 here in Las Vegas of conspiracy to commit possession of a controlled substance, a felony offense, sentenced to prison there.

He continues with drug offenses throughout the next several years and onto 2006. He's also picked up and arrested and convicted of possession of a stolen vehicle. Again, sent to prison. And as well as another possession of stolen vehicle and possession of a stun device case that he picked up in 2006 and is sent to prison on.

As -- again, Your Honor, you see his criminal activity continuing, auto burglaries, possession of controlled substance, domestic battery. One thing that stays constant is that he seems to always be in possession of a controlled substance, as he was here.

And, ultimately, you heard that the day of the initial incident, when he ran from police officers and pointed a firearm at Officer Jacobitz as he was running from him, that was an incident where I think it would be reasonable to say, why would he be running?

Well, we take a look at his history. We take a look at the fact that he had a gun on him, that we know he's a felon, he's committing that crime. And the fact that the next day, he gets arrested with trafficking levels of multiple controlled substances. We see that there's no doubt that he has been living a life of crime. And part of that includes dealing drugs, based on the amount of controlled substances that he has, and the way that he's carrying them. In fact that he's carrying that weapon, as well, Your Honor, and he's willing to use that weapon.

The facts of this case show that he not only pulled the firearm on Officer Jacobitz, but it is really something of a miracle that he wasn't able to shoot Officer Jacobitz. Because what was formerly a fence that was in the alleyway where he was running had been torn down, and they'd left up that single fence post where he hit his arm. That fence post was what saved Officer Jacobitz's life that day. It's because when the defendant turned around to point his gun and fire at Officer Jacobitz, his elbow just happened to hit that fence post that had been left over from that old fence and he dropped the gun. That's why we're not here on a much more serious crime or even much more tragic circumstances.

And then, ultimately, Your Honor, he's convicted of the drugs and firearm as well.

So today, what I have is the judgments of conviction. Have you been provided those, Your Honor?

THE COURT: I have and I reviewed them.

MR. DICKERSON: Okay. And do you accept those as certified judgments of conviction of the defendant?

THE COURT: I do. I -- let me -- State -- shucks.

Defense, any objection to the admission of the certified copies of the judgment and conviction State's Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and 4?

MR. COYER: No, Your Honor. We were previously provided those.

THE COURT: They'll be admitted.

[State's Exhibit Nos. 1 through 4 admitted.]

MR. DICKERSON: So the defendant's now 38 years old. He committed his first adult felony when he was 19. He's -- hasn't stopped since. And he's escalated his behavior into trying to conceal it and taking violent means towards police officers to do that.

For that reason, on Count 1, the assault with deadly weapon on a protected person, we are asking for large habitual sentence of 10 to life.

On Counts 2, 3, and 4, we are asking those to run consecutive to Count 1. And these would be the various terms:

On Count 2 with the trafficking controlled substance, I would ask for 24- to 72-month sentence;

On the Count 3, possession of controlled substance, I would ask for 19- to 48-month sentence;

And on Count 4, possession of controlled substance, I would ask for the same 19- to 48-month sentence.

Those three drug convictions we would ask to run concurrent to one another, consecutive to Count 1.

As to Count 5, prohibited person in possession of a firearm, I

would ask for a 28- to 72-month sentence to run consecutive to Counts 1 through 4.

This is not the defendant's first firearm offense, as you can see from his history. And this time he's actually taken steps to use the firearm. For that reason, he should be punished to the maximum under that.

But the one that I am seeking a habitual sentence on and a 10-to-life sentence on is the assault with deadly weapon on a protected person. And that's because the circumstances that we're looking at here could have been much worse and it shows his intent to use violence on our law enforcement officers, which cannot be stood for.

I'm showing that he has 615 days credit for time severed, Your Honor. I would ask that you impose the sentence.

THE COURT: All right. So let me make sure I understand your argument, counsel. On Count 1, you're asking the large habitual criminal --

MR. DICKERSON: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- treatment? And then on Counts 2, 3, 4, and 5, you're not asking any habitual treatment, you're asking me to impose the statutory range of sentences; is that correct?

MR. DICKERSON: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.

Mr. Valencia, before your attorney speaks, is there anything you'd like to tell the court on your own behalf before I pronounce sentence?

THE DEFENDANT: Well, Your Honor, how can I deny that I have been -- that I have a substance abuse problem. And that's -- that's been my problem throughout the years. I've maintained relatively stable employment. I don't deal drugs. I just use them. And I know that's not -- no excuse, Your Honor. Nothing I can say. I mean, of course, to say, it's -- yeah, it's an excuse. So that's all I would like to say. And I know the court is going to be deciding a fair sentence for me today.

THE COURT: Defense, any argument in mitigation? MR. COYER: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.

My -- my goal today here, Your Honor, is to -- is to ask this court to be reasonable, to issue a sentence that is reasonable and appropriate given the verdict of the jury.

You've heard the State's argument, and they, by my calculation, are asking this court to give Mr. Valencia almost 15 years to life. In my practice, I routinely see murderers and rapists get less time than that, Your Honor. And it's always been a mystery to me and a curiosity as to which defendants get singled out for the habitual criminal treatment.

Even -- even years ago when the State -- when the DA's office had a repeat offender team, I was never able to discern or ever had anybody articulate to me what exactly what -- what is the criteria? Why does -- you know, why does this guy get singled out for habitual and the next guy doesn't?

I mean, we all know what the statute says, right? It's two prior felonies for the small, three priors for the large. That applies to half the

men you see sitting in the box here every day, Judge. And so it is always discretionary. And we're asking this court for a reasonable sentence.

Mr. Valencia has and has conceded, and the State has noted, that all of his crimes involved controlled substances. He has a drug problem. There's no doubt about that, Your Honor. But as I said, my goal here today is to be reasonable. I'm not going to come in here with Mr. Valencia's record and ask you to give him probation. I'm not going to do that.

Your Honor heard the evidence in this trial. And I'm not -- I'm not going to repeat any of that or belabor it. The information in this case was filed June of 2016. The Notice of Intent to seek habitual criminal was filed in February of 2017. And it was filed when the negotiations broke down. Okay. I'm not saying it was done as punishment or making him pay a trial tax or anything like that. But this case would never have gone to trial had Mr. Valencia ever had the opportunity to plead guilty to something that did not involve that firearm.

And Your Honor heard the evidence. You can't fault Mr. Valencia for going to trial on those gun charges. And I'm not asking the court to ignore the jury verdict. The jury found his guilty. But I'm just asking the court to consider the evidence along with the jury verdict.

What I'm asking this court to do -- well, and -- and let me note first, the State mentioned nine felonies, but there's only four judgments of convictions. And they mentioned six prison sentences. Okay. So I think for us to be reasonable, I think we need to put some of that into

perspective. Okay.

At least three of those prior felonies came out of one case.

And so it's clear for everybody, Mr. Valencia has been to prison twice.

Okay. We go through his PSI, and in 2002, he was sentenced to 12 to 30 months concurrent with the previous case where his probation had been revoked. Okay. That's prison sentence -- that's prison, you know, visit, if you will, number one.

Mr. Valencia was -- caught two cases in 2006, went to trial on one of them and got convicted of -- of three felonies. Ultimately, dealt the other case and was given 12 to 48 concurrent with the 24 to 60.

Okay. That's prison sentence number two.

He has not been to prison since then. And now we are here on our case. So when -- and I expect Your Honor will -- when Your Honor sentences him to prison, this will be his third term of going to the Nevada Department of Corrections. The number of felony convictions far exceeds the reality of how many times Mr. Valencia has gone to prison, been released, and re-offended.

So my point, of course, is, why does Mr. Valencia get the habitual criminal treatment as opposed to some other defendant? I would submit to the court that that's the State's burden to persuade Your Honor as to why that's appropriate. And I would submit that they failed to do that today.

The seriousness of this offense that he was convicted of is not in question. The bravery of Officer Jacobitz is not in question. The risk that our officers take protecting us every day is not in question. What is

in question is what is the appropriate sentence for Mr. Valencia given his history and this case, Judge.

I would submit to you that there are essentially two incidents in this case. There's the incident from the date where the flee -- the fleeing occurred. And there was the incident from when he was arrested and he had drugs in his possession.

I'm going to ask this court for 24 to 60 months on the assault on a protected person. I'm going ask this court for 24 to 60 months consecutive for the trafficking. I'm going to ask the court to run all the other counts concurrently. That's four to 10 years.

If we look at Mr. Valencia's prison history on the two times he's been to prison previously, the one thing you'll note, Your Honor, is the total absence of any grants of parole. This is not a man that the parole board gives love to. This is a man that's going to serve every day of whatever sentence you give him.

So a four to 10 is probably closer to about six and a half years. And I think that's pretty reasonable for the defense to come in here and make that request. And I want the court to be cognizant of that fact, that a life tale is totally inappropriate given everything that you've heard. I think a four to 10 is very reasonable, given the history and the conduct. And that would be aggregate. Obviously, I've already said two to five with a consecutive two to five.

Judge, and that's what we're asking for today. I'll submit it.

THE COURT: Thank you. I -- as to Count 1, the defendant is to be adjudicated under the small habitual criminal statute. In

accordance with the laws of the State of Nevada, this court does now sentence you as to Count 1 to confinement in the Nevada Department of Corrections for a maximum term of 240 months, with a minimum parole eligibility of 84 months.

As to Count 2, you're sentenced to confinement in the Nevada Department of Corrections for a maximum term of 24 months with a minimum term -- I'm sorry, with a maximum term of 72 months, with a minimum parole eligibility of 24 months. Count 2 is to run consecutive to Count 1.

As to Count 3, you are sentenced to a confinement in the Nevada Department of Corrections for a maximum term of 48 months with minimum parole eligibility of 12 months. Count 3 will run concurrent to Count 2.

As to Count 4, you're sentenced to Nevada Department of Corrections for a maximum term of 48 months with a minimum term of 12 months. Count 3 will run -- I'm sorry, Count 4 will run concurrent to Count 3.

As to Count 5, you're sentenced to confinement to -- in the Nevada Department of Corrections for a maximum term of 72 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 24 months. Count 5 will run concurrent to Count 4.

With an aggregate sentence of a maximum term of 312 months, with a minimum parole eligibility of 108 months.

There's a \$25 administrative assessment fee, \$150 for a DNA analysis fee and the defendant is to submit to testing, \$3 for a DNA

administrative assessment fee. The court does not impose a fine, no restitution owes. And the defendant will be given credit for time served in the amount of 608 days.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Six hundred and what, Your Honor?

MR. DICKERSON: I think it's --

THE COURT: 608 days.

MR. DICKERSON: I believe we have 615, Your Honor.

MR. COYER: It is, because we continued it --

THE COURT: 615 days credit --

MR. COYER: -- for the last week.

THE COURT: -- 615 days credit for time served.

Also, counsel, I'm attaching the letters of recommendation and -- and his letter that were reviewed by the court as court's exhibit to this sentencing.

MR. COYER: Thank you.

[Phase III proceedings concluded at 10:17 a.m.]

ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.

ShawnaOdega

Shawna Ortega, CET*562

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DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA.

Plaintiff,

-vs-

CEASAR SANCHAZ VALENCIA #1588390

Defendant.

CASE NO. C-16-315580-1

DEPT. NO. XVIII

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION (JURY TRIAL)

The Defendant previously entered a plea of not guilty to the crimes of COUNT 1

- ASSAULT ON A PROTECTED PERSON WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

(Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 200.471, COUNT 2 - TRAFFICKING IN

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 453.3385.1,

COUNT 3 - POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (Category E Felony) in

violation of NRS 453.336, COUNT 4 - POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE

(Category E Felony) in violation of NRS 453.336, COUNT 5 - OWNERSHIP OR

POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY PROHIBITED PERSON (Category B Felony) in

violation of NRS 202.360, and the matter having been tried before a jury and the

Defendant having been found guilty of the crimes of COUNT 1 – ASSAULT ON A PROTECTED PERSON WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 200.471, COUNT 2 - TRAFFICKING IN CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 453.3385.1, COUNT 3 – POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (Category E Felony) in violation of NRS 453.336, COUNT 4 - POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (Category E Felony) in violation of NRS 453.336, COUNT 5 – OWNERSHIP OR POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY PROHIBITED PERSON (Category B Felony) in violation of NRS 202.360; thereafter, on the 25TH day of January, 2018, the Defendant was present in court for sentencing with his counsel, Gregory Coyer, Esq. and Alexis Plunkett, Esq., and good cause appearing,

THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED guilty of said offenses as set forth in the Jury's verdict under the SMALL HABITUAL Criminal Statute as to COUNT 1 and, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment Fee and \$150.00 DNA Analysis Fee including testing to determine genetic markers plus \$3.00 DNA Collection Fee, the Defendant is SENTENCED to the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDC) as follows:

COUNT 1 - a MAXIMUM of TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY (240) MONTHS with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of EIGHTY-FOUR (84) MONTHS; COUNT 2 - a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS, CONSECUTIVE to COUNT 1; COUNT 3 - a MAXIMUM of FORTY-EIGHT (48) MONTHS with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of TWELVE (12) MONTHS, CONCURRENT with COUNT 2; COUNT 4 - a MAXIMUM of FORTY-EIGHT (48) MONTHS with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of TWELVE (12) MONTHS, CONCURRENT with COUNT 3; COUNT 5 - a MAXIMUM of SEVENTY-TWO (72) MONTHS with a

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MINIMUM parole eligibility of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS, CONCURRENT with COUNT 4; with SIX HUNDRED AND FIFTEEN (615) DAYS credit for time served. The AGGREGATE TOTAL sentence is THREE HUNDRED AND TWELVE (312) MONTHS MAXIMUM with a MINIMUM PAROLE ELIGIBILITY OF ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHT (108) MONTHS.

DATED this _____ day of January, 2018.

MARK B. BAILUS DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Electronically Filed 3/1/2018 1:32 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT **NOAS** 1 GREGORY E. COYER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 10013 2 **COYER LAW OFFICE** 600 S. Tonopah Dr., Suite 220 3 Las Vegas, Ñevada 89106 Telephone: 702.802.3088 4 Facsimile: 702.802.3157 E-mail: gcoyer@coyerlaw.com 5 Attorney for Defendant 6 DISTRICT COURT 7 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 8 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, Case No.: C-16-315580-1 10 Plaintiff, Dept. No.: XVIII 11 v. 12 COYER LAW OFFICE 600 S. TONOPAH DR., SUITE 220 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89106 CEASAR VALENCIA, **NOTICE OF APPEAL** 13 Defendant. 14 15 **NOTICE OF APPEAL** 16 17 TO: THE STATE OF NEVADA, STEVEN B. WOLFSON, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA AND DEPARTMENT XVIII OF THE EIGHTH 18 JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK 19 NOTICE is hereby given that Defendant, CEASAR VALENCIA, presently incarcerated in 20 the High Desert State Prison, appeals to the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada from the Eighth 21 Judicial District Court Judgment of Conviction and sentence entered against said Defendant on or 22 about February 2, 2018. 23 DATED this 1st day of March, 2018. 24 **COYER LAW OFFICE** 25 26 By: /s/ Gregory E. Coyer GREGORY E. COYER, ESQ. 27 Nevada Bar No. 10013 600 S. Tonopah Dr., Suite 220 28 Las Vegas, Nevada 89106

1 **CERTIFICATE OF MAILING** 2 The undersigned does hereby certify that on the 1st day of March, 2018, I did deposit in the 3 United States Post Office at Las Vegas, Nevada, a true copy of the above and forgoing Notice of 4 Appeal addressed to the following: 5 STEVEN B. WOLFSON 6 Clark County District Attorney Criminal Appeals Division 7 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, NV 89101 8 9 ADAM PAUL LAXALT Nevada Attorney General 10 100 North Carson Street Carson City, NV 89701 11 CEASAR SANCHEZ VALENCIA 12 ID# 94307 High Desert State Prison 13 P.O. Box 650 14 Indian Springs, NV 89070 15 16 17 By ____/s/ Gregory E. Coyer_ An Employee of Coyer Law Office 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 2 3 **Electronically Filed** No. 75282 CEASAR SANCHEZ VALENCIA, 4 Jul 20 2018 09:22 a.m. Elizabeth A. Brown 5 Appellant, Clerk of Supreme Court 6 v. 7 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 8 9 Respondent. 10 11 12 13 **APPELLANT'S APPENDIX "AA"** 14 **AA0001 – AA0941** 15 16 **VOLUME 4** 17 AA0717 – AA0941 18 19 20 21 22 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 23 GREGORY E. COYER, ESO. STEVEN B. WOLFSON, ESQ. 24 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar No. 10013 200 Lewis Avenue, 3rd Floor 600 S. Tonopah Drive, Suite 220 25 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Las Vegas, Nevada 89106 26 Telephone: 702.802.3088 Telephone: 702.617.2700 Facsimile: 702.802.3157 Facsimile: 702.868.2415 27

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7 8	Judgment Of Conviction (filed 02/06/18)	Vol. 4, AA0935
9	Motion To Dismiss Counsel (filed 12/28/16)	. Vol. 1, AA0082
10	Notice Of Appeal (filed 03/01/18)	. Vol. 4, AA0938
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23 24	Transcript – Calendar Call (07/19/16)	. Vol. 1, AA0004
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3	Per Motion for Right of Access to the Courts (11/08/16)Vol. 1, AA0097
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5 6	Courts and to Dismiss Counsel (02/28/17)Vol. 1, AA0112
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9	To the Courts (11/01/16)
10	Transcript – Defendant's Pro Per Motion to Right of Access to the
11	Courts; Confirmation of Counsel (11/08/16)
12	Transcript – Status Check Negotiations/Trial Setting (08/23/16)Vol. 1, AA0024
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15	
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DIRECT EXAMINATION

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BY MR. DICKERSON:

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Q Sir, how are you employed?

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Α I am a detective with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police

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Department.

Q Do you have a specific assignment as a detective?

Α Basically, investigate area crime from simple misdemeanors all the way up to homicide, prior to Homicide taking over.

Okay. And where are you working -- what unit are you working out of right now?

Α I am currently assigned to the Convention Center Area Command.

Q Where is Convention Center Area Command?

Α It's -- it incorporates all of the major Strip properties on the Las Vegas strip.

Q Okay. And where were you between May 19th and May 21st, 2016?

Α I was actually assigned as a detective at the Downtown Area Command.

 Ω And what area does the Downtown Area Command cover?

Α It incorporates a lot of the downtown, like Fremont Street area, the -- kind of Las Vegas Boulevard, Fremont Street.

Q And does it also have residential neighborhoods?

Α A lot of residential neighborhoods, yes. It spans quite a good distance.

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stop a subject on a moped. The subject fled. They got in a foot pursuit.

At some point during that time, a firearm was pointed at Officer Jacobitz.

- Q And so what was your reason for responding to that as a detective?
- A As detectives assigned to the area command at that time, we're the ones responsible for the follow-up investigation. We're going to go out there, conduct our investigation, interview anybody that's a witness, kind of go with the CSI, find out what evidence they have, and then conduct follow-up from that point and hopefully make an arrest.
- Q Now, am I correct in my understanding that you didn't arrive on scene until about 9:47 p.m.?
 - A Correct.
- Q And that was sometime -- approximately two hours after the actual event occurred?
 - A Correct.
 - Q Is that usual? Is that normal?
- A No. Normally we arrive pretty quick after the event is initiated. But, unfortunately, that night we were involved in another -- another incident going on at the police memorial. So we're -- we're on the other side of town at that time, so it took us some time to get down there.
- Q Okay. By the time you get down there, what does the scene look like?
- A It's pretty static at that time. Majority of all the officers that were there that had set up perimeters and things like that had already been cleared. Officer Jacobitz, Officer Houston were still there. I believe their sergeant was there, and then my squad was there as well,

which -- my sergeant and a couple other detectives.

- Q Okay. So no more perimeter going on?
- A No.
- Q No K-9 searching around?
- A They'd all been cleared.
- Q Okay. What do you do when you first arrive?
- A I make contact with Officer Jacobitz, kind of get a briefing about exactly what happened, as much details as I can about the incident, who was involved and things of that nature.
 - Q Do you request for any sort of crime scene analysis?
- A We eventually, because of everything that happened, we ended up calling ID to come out, crime scene analysis to come out and do their kind of analysis of the scene and -- and the situation.
- Q So we heard a couple terms there, ID, crime scene analysis. Explain that for us.
- A They're the same. It's just CSI, crime scene analysis. We also call them ID. They -- it's same -- it's just different ways to call the same --
 - Q Okay. And what is their job?
- A They come out and they basically look at the evidence. They take photographs. They document distances, things like that. They end up -- usually, if there's a weapon involved, for the most part, they'll couple out and impound it. They -- any kind of -- any kind of evidence at the scene that's going to be connected to the crime, they'll come out and impound it and take custody of that and document it.

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gets you back out onto 10th Street. The -- the stairwell was the area that Officer Jacobitz advised he was at when the subject turned around and pointed the firearm at him.

Q Okay. And --

MR. COYER: Counsel, will you identify the exhibit?

MR. DICKERSON: I'm sorry, yeah. Absolutely. That's State's

Exhibit 23. I think I did. I just --

BY MR. DICKERSON:

Q I'm going to further publish for you State's Exhibit 26; do you recognize this image, sir?

A Correct. That's going to be if you just walked up those steps we just looked at, that's going to be up in the alleyway continuing to head back west towards 10th Street.

- Q So this would have been right at the top of the steps, basically?
 - A Correct.
- Q And I want to -- here in the center of the photo, do you see a -- an orange cone over there?
 - A I do.
 - Q Was this part of your walkthrough?
 - A Correct.
 - Q And what was that?
- A That was to document the actual metal pole where the subject had turned around and hit his elbow before the gun was discharged from his -- or dislodged from his arm.

MR. COYER: Because it has no purpose other than to attempt to increase the danger level that is portrayed in this incident. This officer was not a part of the incident. And so if there is any relevance whatsoever, the unfair prejudice would outweigh any potential relevance, Judge. So my objection is twofold.

THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, why -- why is it relevant?

MR. DICKERSON: It's -- it's relevant to the fact of the entire incident. This is the lead investigator. It's giving his personal assessment of what he saw at the crime scene from the ground level. The assessment of the crime scene is 100 percent relevant to how this act occurred, where the parties were standing, what he sees at that area. He is there and able to get first-hand knowledge, outside of what the witness testified to, of what this area looks like, which is incredibly relevant.

THE COURT: Okay. He's not offering lay opinion testimony. So the only way it could come in is expert opinion. So at this time, I'm going to sustain the objection.

MR. DICKERSON: But that wasn't the objection.

MR. COYER: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Well, that's my ruling.

MR. DICKERSON: Well, I don't -- I think it is lay opinion testimony, given the fact that this area -- his -- his observation, what he sees the area is just a lay opinion. I mean, he's just --

THE COURT: Okay. But you're --

MR. DICKERSON: -- telling us --

THE COURT: All right. I'm not going to let him say fatal funnel.

MR. DICKERSON: So we can agree it's relevant?

THE COURT: All right. I'm not going to let him give an opinion --

MR. DICKERSON: Okay.

THE COURT: -- that this is a fatal funnel.

MR. DICKERSON: Okay.

THE COURT: You can -- this goes to the issue of Count 1
Assault with -- upon a police -- peace officer with a deadly weapon,
correct? And you want him -- the relevancy is that you want to give his
assessment of the alleyway. Okay. I'll let him give his assessment of
the alleyway.

What I'm having problems with -- this is an assault. He's using the term fatal funnel. Okay. If this was a different charge, I might have let it in. But that's the -- I apologize, counsel. I know it better as Rule 403. I think it's 48.035 or 48.045 in State court. But that's the prejudicial effect that outweighs -- let's see, the prejudicial effect outweighs its --

MR. DICKERSON: Probative value.

THE COURT: -- probative value. Okay. So that's the concern I have with the phrase fatal funnel. So let him give testimony. You're right. He did not object --

MR. DICKERSON: Okay.

THE COURT: -- as far as opinions. So I'm --

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THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DICKERSON: Thank you very much.

BY MR. DICKERSON:

Q Detective Bryant, having stood in this alley and looking at it here today, what, if anything, did you take note of as being significant to your assessment of the scene?

Just how close the pole where the subject was when he turned around towards Officer Jacobitz, how close he was to Officer Jacobitz. And then just how close everything was in -- you know, usually when you have, say, like, an open field, it's going to take a little bit longer to -- to pick up your -- your target. In a situation like this, it's such a close -- closed environment, that it's going to be -- all he has to do is basically aim -- point the gun and aim and he's going to get a good shot off on the --

MS. PLUNKETT: Objection --

THE WITNESS: -- officer.

MR. COYER: Object --

MS. PLUNKETT: -- speculation.

MR. COYER: Relevance, and prejudicial effect.

THE COURT: What's your objection, counsel? Speculation?

MR. COYER: Speculation, relevance, and prejudice, Judge.

MR. DICKERSON: And this would just be a lay opinion, Your Honor, that he's --

THE COURT: I'm going to allow it. It's overruled.

MR. DICKERSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

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BY MR. DICKERSON:

Q So once you had the opportunity to observe this crime scene, specifically this enclosed alleyway, what did you do next?

A Stayed with ID, let them process the scene. They did their measurements and -- and documented any of their evidence that was on scene. And then we basically walked back over to -- to 10th Street and kind of started wrapping up the investigation.

- Q Did Officer Jacobitz leave that scene at some point in time?
- A Yes, he did.
- Q And where did he go?
- A I believe he transported the -- Gilbert and Rivera down to -- to their -- I think to the City --
 - Q Is that Eric --
 - A -- City Jail.
 - Q -- Gilbert and Anibal Rivera?
 - A Yes.
 - Q The two individuals that he had in custody?
 - A Correct.
- Q So from there, you're on scene, you've done your walkthrough; what happens next in your investigation?
- A We determine at that point there was really nothing further to follow up on that night. So we returned back to our station and kind of decided what kind of game plan we wanted to go forth at that point.
- Q And, ultimately, do you proceed with your investigation the next day?

helped us. And they set up perimeters around 625 North 10th Street. And myself and my sergeant actually got on the balcony at 620 North 9th Street, which was basically just one house to the west of the alley right behind 625 North 10th Street.

- Q I'm going to show you here, just so you can show us, State's Exhibit 10; do you see the address 625 North 10th Street here?
 - A I do.
- Q If you can just -- it's right there in the middle of the screen; is that fair?
 - A Correct.
- Q So can you describe for the members of the jury how you set up this surveillance operation?
- A Myself and my sergeant, if you look just to the house that's just west of that location, there -- is off a little bit, that -- where the white dot is --
 - Q We've been hearing that all week.
 - A Yeah. There's a --
 - Q I'll -- I'll clear it for you.
- A Okay. It's 620 North 9th Street. This house, there's a balcony on the north side of that street that myself and my sergeant actually set up on with binoculars and we actually had a good eye visual of the backyard of 629 -- 625 North 10th. And then we had -- we had other officers and detectives that were set up in different locations -- there was one that was, I believe, at Wilson and 10th -- to keep a visual on 10th Street. And then we also had some set up on Bonanza and -- and 10th,

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just south of Bonanza. And then there were other officers actually in the parking lot of Downtown Area Command as well, just kind of keep, what we call, a perimeter around the area, so if he ends up getting mobile, we have some way -- somebody set up at different locations to be able to pick them up, so we're not trying to backtrack and locate him at that point in time.

Q So the surveillance operation starts in the late evening hours of Friday, May 20th. What do you do when you're on this surveillance operation? What's your role?

We basically -- what we call having the eye on the residence. Α We -- me and my sergeant had visual of the backyard with binoculars. So we're the ones that are communicating with the rest of the detectives that are out on the outside of perimeter, letting them know if we have any movement, anybody coming or going or anything of that nature.

- Q And just so we're clear, you said you're on the north side. North would be up towards the top of this photograph --
 - Α Correct.
 - Q -- is where we're looking at?
- Α Back where the 625 is, that just -- right in that area, that little gray -- my -- my finger is all messed up. Kind of that area there.
 - Q Okay. And how good was your view from there?
 - Α It was perfect. We had a direct shot right into the backyard.
 - Q So how long do you wait before you see anything?
 - Α I would probably say a couple hours.
 - Q Was it approximately 1:31 a.m. the next morning?

male, bald, around 5'6", 5'7". I broadcast -- actually, my sergeant broadcast on the radio that we had movement in the backyard, kind of notified the rest of the detectives in the area that, hey, we could possibly have somebody leaving the house that -- that's going to match the description of our subject.

Q Then what happens?

A The female and -- end up being Valencia, ends up walking back towards North 10th Street through, like, a gate. And then we lost visual at that time. There were other detectives that were setting up on the perimeter on 10th, had visual. They actually updated that there was a black Mustang that was parked in the driveway of 625 North 10th Street, and that they saw the male and the female get into that vehicle.

Q Okay. And then what do you do?

A At that time, my sergeant and I had actually climbed back down the roof and down the balcony and tried to make it back over to his vehicle, which was parked over at Downtown Area Command, front parking lot.

- Q And that's there --
- A That's -- yeah.
- Q -- to the left of the screen?
- A Yeah. It's just right in there. Yes, sir.
- Q So what happens from this point in time after you get that vehicle?

A We -- on radio traffic, we're getting updates that the -- the vehicle is mobile. It's taken off. And it's actually leaving the 625

asserted ---

MR. DICKERSON: I --

THE COURT: -- or the effect on the listener?

MR. DICKERSON: I'm offering for the truth of the matter asserted as a present-sense impression, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, what's your position on present-sense impression?

MR. COYER: I think that the best evidence of that would be whatever was actually broadcast or reflected in the CAD, not necessarily this witness's recollection, Judge.

MR. DICKERSON: I'm not having him testify to what the CAD says. That would be a best evidence rule objection. Here, I'm just having him testify to what he heard, Your Honor, which would be a statement from somebody else that was a present-sense impression of what that individual was seeing at the time.

THE COURT: Did you -- lay the foundation.

MR. DICKERSON: Absolutely, Your Honor.

BY MR. DICKERSON:

- Q You guys have radios?
- A Correct.
- Q How do those work?
- A We have vehicle radios and pack sets that we communicate back and forth with.
- Q Who's involved in this operation that you're communicating with?
 - A It was our detective section at DTAC and then we had some

officer on whether the warrant was valid. And there's some misrepresentations in the warrant that I would like to point out, if we're going to talk about a warrant.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. COYER: So I don't think it's fair. It's prejudicial. Those are the reasons.

THE COURT: Hold on a second.

MR. DICKERSON: Nothing -- first of all, as to the warrant, nothing that we're introducing was found during the warrant search. The relevance or the validity of the warrant is something that should have been challenged pretrial, if that was the concern of defense counsel and not here. It has nothing to do with this exhibit. This picture of this individual is absolutely relevant, Your Honor, given that this was the driver of the vehicle, Nicholas Harris.

It's relevant to show the identification by the officers of the defendant as they're driving, identifying Nicholas Harris as the driver, and identifying the defendant as the passenger, so as not to conflate the two saying, hey, maybe it was Nicholas Harris who actually had the gun, because they look alike. It's going to be absolutely probative to my identification of the defendant for me to show Nicholas Harris to the jury and say, yeah, you guys can seem him for yourself. This is him.

MR. COYER: As an offer of proof, I don't intend to make that argument.

THE COURT: I'm sorry?

MR. COYER: As an offer of proof, I don't intend to make that

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- Α Yes. It's a major thoroughfare.
- Q At this point in time, what happens?
- Α Other units in the area that were behind us were broadcasting that they had a vehicle continuing north on H. Myself, and I was with my sergeant at the time, he was driving, we continued to go up another street further west and try to backtrack to see if we can pick him back up again.
 - Q Did you ultimately locate that vehicle?
- Α We did not, but other officers and other detectives that were there located it in an alleyway by, like, H and West Monroe.
- Q We see a marking over here, West Monroe and H, is that that intersection right here?
 - Α Correct.
 - Q And is that vehicle occupied when it's located up there?
 - Α No, it's not.
- Q Specifically showing you here State's Exhibit 14; does that appear to be that general area?
 - Α Yes, it does.
 - Q And then what happens?
- Α The detectives that saw the vehicle unoccupied sat -- this is an alleyway between Monroe and Madison in this area. They kind of set up on the vehicle, kept -- again, keeping an eye on the vehicle to see if it got occupied. We just -- we had no idea where the occupants went to at that moment.

Α	Yeah.	Just for officer safety and so there's no confusion or
anything	like that	, so they know that it's actually the police stopping
hem		

- Q Okay. Showing you here State's Exhibit 13; does that appear to be the intersection of Main and Washington?
 - A Correct.
- Q And -- how -- is this the intersection where that car stop took place?
- A I want to say it was a little bit further up, possibly closer to this location up here. I know there was a big wall, like a barrier wall, where we stopped them.
- Q And that location that you indicated there on the screen, are there big walls on both sides?
- A I know there's a big wall on -- which would be the south side. I know that for a fact.
 - Q Okay.
 - A That's where the vehicle was stopped.
- Q I'm showing you here State's Exhibit 48; is that that vehicle at that stop?
 - A Correct.
- Q At that point in time, did you make contact with -- with the occupants of that vehicle?
- A Patrol had already stopped the vehicle, so by the time my sergeant and I got there, they were already bringing the passenger back to -- in front of the patrol vehicle.

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I would.

1	Α	I believe so, yes.		
2	Q	The letters out here to the left say USAS, correct?		
3	A	Correct.		
4	Q	What does that mean?		
5	A	The AS stands for assigned.		
6	Q	Okay. So that doesn't mean that she's on scene, correct?		
7	A	Correct.		
8	Q	Okay. Let me move this up so it's still on the screen. Okay.		
9	So this is USAS C23, correct?			
10	Α	Correct.		
11	Q	And then if we go down a little further, we see C23 again,		
12	correct?			
13	Α	Correct.		
14	Q	Yes?		
15	Α	Yes.		
16	Q	Okay. Just have to answer audibly. Okay?		
17	A	Yeah. I did.		
18	Q	And then out there to the left, we see the the letters USAR,		
19	right?			
20	Α	Correct.		
21	Q	Now, AR is shorthand for arrived?		
22	Α	Correct.		
23	Q	So this would indicate that she, Ms. Klosterman, arrived at this		
24	time out here, which is 2255, correct?			
25	Α	Correct.		
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1	our briefing at, at that location.		
2	Q	Okay. So just going to take you back to the CAD here and go	
3	one entry	down	
4	A	Uh-huh.	
5	Q	to 2342. Can you see that?	
6	Α	Yes, I can.	
7	Q And we see USCL and C23, right?		
8	A Correct.		
9	Q	What is CL?	
10	Α	That stands for clear.	
11	Q	Okay. So when does an officer normally clear themselves	
12	or or		
13	Α	When we're done with the scene.	
14	Q	Okay.	
15	Α	When we're leaving.	
16	Q	So would this entry suggest that Ms. Klosterman was done	
17	with her work at 2342, or left the scene, rather?		
18	A	I would say left the scene, yes.	
19	Q	Okay. That's it.	
20		THE COURT: Is there anything else you're going to ask about	
21	this CAD	?	
22		MR. COYER: Yes.	
23		THE COURT: How much longer?	
24		MR. COYER: Probably five minutes or so.	
25		THE COURT: All right.	
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1		MR. COYER: Okay.		
2		THE COURT: Go ahead.		
	DV MD			
3		BY MR. COYER:		
4		Q I'm just going to take you back up the page. Are you following		
5	'	pen tip?		
6	A	Yes.		
7	Q	Okay. You see this entry here, 3DP40, right?		
8	A	Correct.		
9	Q	2310, right?		
10	Α	Correct.		
11	Q	Okay. Now, the over here it says City Jail?		
12	Α	Correct.		
13	Q	Okay. What's what is that? What's that going to indicate to		
14	you?			
15	Α	That he's transporting somebody to the city jail.		
16	Q	That this person		
17	Α	The TO stands for to other.		
18	Q	Okay. 3DP40 is is transporting to jail?		
19	Α	Correct.		
20	Q	Now, is that going to be Officer Jacobitz or Officer Houston?		
21	Α	They were together, so it was both of them.		
22	Q	They both transported the two prisoners to jail together?		
23	Α	They're they should have been both in the same vehicle.		
24	That's why the A and the B.			
25	Q	Right.		
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A No, I was not.

Q Okay. So any information you would have about that crime, including the details of the crime scene, would have come from Officer Jacobitz, correct?

- A Correct.
- Q Okay. All right.

MR. COYER: Judge, I don't have anything further on the CAD, but I do have still have additional cross-examination.

THE COURT: No, I understand.

MR. COYER: Okay.

THE COURT: We're going to take our evening recess at this time.

During this recess you're admonished not to talk or converse among yourselves or with anyone else on any subject connected with this trial or read or watch or listen to any report of or commentary on the trial or any person connected with this trial by any medium of information, including without limitation, the social media, text, newspapers, television, the Internet, and radio; do not visit the scene of any of the events mentioned during the trial or undertake any investigation; do not do any posting or communications on any social networking sites or do any -- do any independent research, including Internet searches, or form or express any opinion on any subject connected with this trial until the case is finally submitted to you.

At this time, the jury is excused. We will reconvene tomorrow at 10:00.

Shawna Ortega • CET-562 • Certified Electronic Transcriber • 602.412.7667

AINF LED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN B. WOLFSON STEVEN D. GRIERSON 2 Clark County District Attorney **CLERK OF THE COURT** Nevada Bar #001565 3 CHAD LEXIS DEC - 1 2017 Deputy District Attorney 4:35 p.m. 4 Nevada Bar #010391 200 Lewis Avenue BY. 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 ALAN PAUL CASTLE, SR, DEPUTY (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff C-18-316580-1 AINE 7 DISTRICT COURT Amended information 4701939 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, CASE NO: C-16-315580-1 10 Plaintiff, DEPT NO: **XVIII** 11 -VS-12 CEASAR SANCHAZ VALENCIA, THIRD AMENDED #1588390 13 INFORMATION Defendant. 14 15 STATE OF NEVADA SS. COUNTY OF CLARK 16 17

STEVEN B. WOLFSON, District Attorney within and for the County of Clark, State of Nevada, in the name and by the authority of the State of Nevada, informs the Court:

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That CEASAR SANCHAZ VALENCIA, the Defendant(s) above named, having committed the crimes of OWNERSHIP OR POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY PROHIBITED PERSON (Category B Felony - NRS 202.360 - NOC 51460), , on or about the 19th day of May, 2016, within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, contrary to the form, force and effect of statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Nevada, did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously own, or have in his possession and/or under his custody or control, a firearm, to-wit: a .38 caliber revolver, the Defendant being a convicted felon, having in 2006, been convicted of Possession of Stolen Vehicle (Felony), in Case No. C224558, and/or having in 2006, been convicted of Unlawful Possession of Electronic Stun Device (Felony), Possession of Stolen Vehicle (Felony) and

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1	Burglary(Felony), in Case No. C223991, in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County,				
2	felonies under the laws of the State of Nevada.				
3 4		STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565			
5		Nevada Bai #001303			
6		BY AND TO SERVICE OF THE SERVICE OF			
7		Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #010391			
8		Nevada Bar #010391			
9	Nomes of witnesses Irnevente the	District Attannant Office at the discussion of City			
10	Names of witnesses known to the District Attorney's Office at the time of filing this Information are as follows:				
11	NAME	ADDRESS			
12		ADDRESS CODA (BUYESTICA TOP)			
13	BARLOW, DAWN or designee	CCDA/INVESTIGATOR 200 LEWIS AVE 9TH FLR LV NV 89155			
14	BRYANT, K.	LVMPD P#7773			
15	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS	CCDC			
16	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS	LVMPD/COMMUNICATIONS			
17	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS	LVMPD/RECORDS			
18	GOODRICH, A.	LVMPD P#9198			
19	HOFFMAN, J.	LVMPD P#9001			
20	HOUSTON, C.	LVMPD P#13249			
21	JACOBITZ, J.	LVMPD P#9383			
22	KLOSTERMAN, O.	LVMPD P#1317			
23	LEFEBVRE, N.	LVMPD P#8383			
24	WHITMARSH, B.	LVMPD P35645			
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27	16F08334X/pm/L-2/ckb				
28	LVMPD EV#1605193387 (TK8)				
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FILED IN OPEN COURT **INST** 1 STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT 2 3 **DISTRICT COURT** CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA BY. 4 ALAN PAUL CASTLE, SR. DEPUTY 5 6 THE STATE OF NEVADA, CASE NO: C-16-315580-1 7 Plaintiff, DEPT NO: XVIII 8 -VS-9 CEASAR SANCHAZ VALENCIA 10 Defendant. 11 12 INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY (INSTRUCTION NO. I) 13 MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 14 It is now my duty as judge to instruct you in the law that applies to this case. It is your 15 duty as jurors to follow these instructions and to apply the rules of law to the facts as you find 16 them from the evidence. 17 You must not be concerned with the wisdom of any rule of law stated in these 18 instructions. Regardless of any opinion you may have as to what the law ought to be, it would 19 be a violation of your oath to base a verdict upon any other view of the law than that given in 20 the instructions of the Court. 21 22 23 24 C-16-315580-1 25 INST instructions to the Jury 26 27 28

DEC - 1 2017

4:35 p.m.

If, in these instructions, any rule, direction or idea is repeated or stated in different ways, no emphasis thereon is intended by me and none may be inferred by you. For that reason, you are not to single out any certain sentence or any individual point or instruction and ignore the others, but you are to consider all the instructions as a whole and regard each in the light of all the others.

The order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative importance.

An Information is but a formal method of accusing a person of a crime and is not of itself any evidence of his guilt.

In this case, it is charged in an Information that CEASAR SANCHAZ VALENCIA, the Defendant(s) above named, having committed the crimes of ASSAULT ON A PROTECTED PERSON WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON; TRAFFICKING IN CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE and POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, on or about the 19th day of May, 2016, within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, contrary to the form, force and effect of statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Nevada,

COUNT 1 - ASSAULT ON A PROTECTED PERSON WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and intentionally place another person in reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm and/or did willfully and unlawfully attempt to use physical force against another person, to-wit: J. JACOBITZ, a protected person employed as a Police Officer with Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, while J. JACOBITZ was performing his duties as a Police Officer with Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, which Defendant knew, or should have known, that J. JACOBITZ was a Police Officer with Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, with use of a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm, by pointing said firearm at the said Officer J. JACOBITZ.

COUNT 2 - TRAFFICKING IN CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE

did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and knowingly or intentionally possess, either actually or constructively, 4 grams or more, but less than 14 grams, to-wit: approximately 11.8 grams of Heroin, or any mixture of substance consisting of approximately 11.8 grams containing the controlled substance Heroin.

COUNT 3 - POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE

did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled substance, to-wit: Cocaine.

COUNT 4 - POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE

did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled substance, to-wit: Methamphetamine.

It is the duty of the jury to apply the rules of law contained in these instructions to the facts of the case and determine whether or not the Defendant is guilty.

To constitute the crime charged, there must exist a union or joint operation of an act forbidden by law and an intent to do the act.

The intent with which an act is done is shown by the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.

Do not confuse intent with motive. Motive is what prompts a person to act. Intent refers only to the state of mind with which the act is done.

Motive is not an element of the crime charged and the State is not required to prove a motive on the part of the Defendant in order to convict. However, you may consider evidence of motive or lack of motive as a circumstance in the case.

The Defendant is presumed innocent unless the contrary is proved. This presumption places upon the State the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime charged and that the Defendant is the person who committed the offense.

A reasonable doubt is one based on reason. It is not mere possible doubt but is such a doubt as would govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs of life. If the minds of the jurors, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, are in such a condition that they can say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, there is not a reasonable doubt. Doubt to be reasonable must be actual, not mere possibility or speculation.

If you have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the Defendant, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty.

If you find that the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any one element of a charged offense, you must find the Defendant not guilty of that offense.

You are here to determine the guilt or innocence of the Defendant from the evidence in the case. You are not called upon to return a verdict as to the guilt or innocence of any other person. So, if the evidence in the case convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the Defendant, you should so find, even though you may believe one or more persons are also guilty.

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The evidence which you are to consider in this case consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits, and any facts admitted or agreed to by counsel.

There are two types of evidence; direct and circumstantial. Direct evidence is the testimony of a person who claims to have personal knowledge of the commission of the crime which has been charged, such as an eyewitness. Circumstantial evidence is the proof of a chain of facts and circumstances which tend to show whether the Defendant is guilty or not guilty. The law makes no distinction between the weight to be given either direct or circumstantial evidence. Therefore, all of the evidence in the case, including the circumstantial evidence, should be considered by you in arriving at your verdict.

Statements, arguments and opinions of counsel are not evidence in the case. However, if the attorneys stipulate to the existence of a fact, you must accept the stipulation as evidence and regard that fact as proved.

You must not speculate to be true any insinuations suggested by a question asked a witness. A question is not evidence and may be considered only as it supplies meaning to the answer.

You must disregard any evidence to which an objection was sustained by the court and any evidence ordered stricken by the court.

Anything you may have seen or heard outside the courtroom is not evidence and must also be disregarded.

The credibility or believability of a witness should be determined by his manner upon the stand, his relationship to the parties, his fears, motives, interests or feelings, his opportunity to have observed the matter to which he or she testified, the reasonableness of his statements and the strength or weakness of his recollections.

If you believe that a witness has lied about any material fact in the case, you may disregard the entire testimony of that witness or any portion of his testimony which is not proved by other evidence.

A witness who has special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education in a particular science, profession or occupation is an expert witness. An expert witness may give his or her opinion as to any matter in which he is skilled.

You should consider such expert opinion and weigh the reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound, however, by such an opinion. Give it the weight to which you deem it entitled, whether that be great or slight, and you may reject it, if, in your judgment, the reasons given for it are unsound.

is guilty of Assault. To constitute an assault, it is not necessary that any actual injury be inflicted. To constitute an unlawful attempt to use physical force against the person of another, mere menace is not enough; there must be an effort to carry the intention into execution.

or intentionally places another person in reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm

A person who unlawfully attempts to use physical force against the person of another

A person who commits an assault upon a police officer during the performance of his duties as a police officer is guilty of Assault on a Protected Person.

A person commits an assault by or through the use of a deadly weapon is guilty of Assault with a Deadly Weapon.

A person who commits an assault upon a police officer by or through the use of a deadly weapon is guilty of Assault on a Protected Person with Use of a Deadly Weapon.

As used in these instructions, a "deadly weapon" means:

- (1) Any instrument which, if used in the ordinary manner contemplated by it design and construction, will or is likely to cause substantial bodily harm or death; or
- (2) Any weapon, device, instrument, material or substance which, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing substantial bodily harm or death.

You are instructed that a Firearm is a deadly weapon. A firearm is a deadly weapon whether loaded or unloaded, operable or inoperable.

A "Firearm" means any device designed to be used as a weapon from which a projectile may be expelled through the barrel by the force of any explosion or other form of combustion.

In order to "use" a deadly weapon, there need not be conduct which actually produces harm but only conduct which produces a fear of harm or force by means or display of the deadly weapon in aiding the commission of the crime.

The State is not required to have recovered the deadly weapon used in an alleged crime, or to produce the deadly weapon in court at trial, to establish that a deadly weapon was used in the commission of the crime.

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When it is impossible to commit a particular crime without committing, at the same time and by the same conduct, another offense of lesser grade or degree, the latter is, with respect to the former, a "lesser included offense."

If you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant is guilty of the offense charged, you may find the Defendant guilty of any lesser included offense, if the evidence is sufficient to establish his guilt of the lesser included offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Assault on a Protected Person is a lesser included offense of Assault on a Protected Person with use of a Deadly Weapon.

Assault with a Deadly Weapon is a lesser included offense of Assault on a Protected Person with use of a Deadly Weapon.

Possession of Controlled Substance is a lesser included offense of Trafficking In Controlled Substance.

Any person who knowingly or intentionally is in actual or constructive possession of a Schedule I controlled substance, or any mixture which contains a Schedule I controlled substance, the quantity of which weighs, or is represented by that person to weigh, 4 grams or more, is guilty of Trafficking in Controlled Substance.

The phrase "4 grams or more" refers to the aggregate weight of the entire mixture rather than the weight of the controlled substance that is contained in the mixture.

It is not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant was aware of the amount of the controlled substance he possessed.

You are instructed that Heroin is a Schedule I controlled substance.

A person who knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled substance, unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a prescription or order of a physician, dentist, podiatric physician, optometrist, advanced practice registered nurse or veterinarian while acting in the course of his or her professional practice, is guilty of Possession of Controlled Substance.

You are instructed that Methamphetamine is a Schedule I controlled substance.

You are instructed that Cocaine is a Schedule I controlled substance.

In order to prove the commission of Trafficking In Controlled Substance and Possession Of Controlled Substance, the State must prove that the defendant had knowledge of the item's nature as a controlled substance.

A defendant's knowledge that the substance he possessed was a controlled substance may be shown by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence and reasonably drawn inferences.

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actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is joint.

You may find that the element of possession as that term is used in these instructions is present if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant had actual or constructive

possession, either alone or jointly with others.

A person is in possession of an article or object if it is carried on his person or, if not carried on his person, he knows that it is present and he has custody, dominion, or control over it.

The law recognizes two kinds of possession: actual possession and constructive possession.

A person who knowingly has direct physical control over a thing, at a given time, is then in actual possession of it.

A person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and the intention, at a given time, to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person or persons, is then in constructive possession of it.

The law recognizes also that possession may be sole or joint. If one person alone has actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is sole. If two or more persons share actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is joint.

"Knowingly" imports a knowledge that the facts exist which constitute the act or omission of a crime, and does not require knowledge of its unlawfulness. Knowledge of any particular fact may be inferred from the knowledge of such other facts as should put an ordinarily prudent person on notice. An act or a failure to act is "knowingly" done if done voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason.

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The intent of a person or the knowledge that a person possesses at any given time may not ordinarily be proved directly because there is no way of directly scrutinizing the workings of the human mind. In determining the issue of what a person knew or what a person intended at a particular time, you may consider any statements made or acts done by that person and all other facts and circumstances received in evidence which may aid in your determination of that person's knowledge or intent.

An act is not a crime if the act was committed through misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there was no evil design, intention or culpable negligence.