IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

MDB TRUCKING, LLC,

Appellant,

vs.

VERSA PRODUCTS COMPANY, INC.,

Respondent.

Supreme Court No.: 75319

Electronically Filed Apr 02 2018 03:21 p.m. District Court Case No Edizabeth 7. Brown Dept. 10 Clerk of Supreme Court

DOCKETING STATEMENT CIVIL APPEALS

Department: 10

1. Judicial District: Second Judicial District

County: Washoe

Judge: The Honorable Elliott A. Sattler

District Ct. Case No.: CV16-00976

2. Attorney filing this docketing statement:

Attorneys: Nicholas M. Wiezcorek, Jeremy J. Thompson and Colleen E. McCarty

Telephone: (702) 862-8300

Firm: Clark Hill PLLC

Address: 3800 Howard Hughes Parkway Suite 500, Las Vegas, NV 89169

Client: MDB Trucking LLC ("MDB")

3. Attorney(s) representing respondents(s):

Attorney: Josh Cole Aicklen, David B. Avakian and Paige S. Shreve

Telephone: (702) 893-3383

Firm: Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP

Address: 6385 S. Rainbow Boulevard, Suite 600 Las Vegas, NV 89119

Client(s): Versa Products Company Inc. ("Versa")

4. Nature of disposition below (check all that apply):

	Judgment after bench trial		Di	smissal	
۵	Judgment after jury verdict			Lack of ju	irisdiction
	Summary judgement			Failure to	state a claim
	Default judgment			Failure to	prosecute
	Grant/Denial of NRCP 60(b) relief		х	Other (spe	cify): NRCP 37
	Grant/Denial of injunction		Di	vorce Decree	:
	Grant/Denial of declaratory relief			Driginal	Modification
	Review of agency determination	Ot	her di	sposition (sp	ecify):

5. Does this appeal raise issues concerning any of the following?

- Child Custody
- Venue
- Termination of parental rights

Not Applicable.

6. Pending and prior proceedings in this court. List the case name and docket number of all appeals or original proceedings presently or previously pending before this court which are related to this appeal:

Nevada Supreme Court

- MDB Trucking LLC v. Versa Products Company, Inc., Case No. 75022
- MDB Trucking LLC v. Versa Products Company, Inc., Case No. 75321

7. Pending and prior proceedings in other courts. List the case name, number and court of all pending and prior proceedings in other courts which are related to this appeal (*e.g.*, bankruptcy, consolidated or bifurcated proceedings) and their dates of disposition:

Second Judicial District Court

- Fitzsimmons v. MDB Trucking, et al., Case No. CV15-02349
- Bible v. MDB Trucking, et al., Case No. CV16-01914

On December 8, 2017, the Court filed an Order dismissing MDB's Cross-Claim in the *Fitzsimmons* matter. The Notice of Entry was filed on December 29, 2017. Based upon its December 8, 2017 Order, the Court filed an Order dismissing MDB's Cross-Claim in the *Bible*

matter on January 22, 2018. The Notice of Entry was filed on February 8, 2018. Both of these matters are currently pending appeal.

8. Nature of the action. Briefly describe the nature of the action and the result below:

This case arises from a personal injury action. A complaint was filed by Ernest and Carol Fitzsimmons on December 4, 2015, *Fitzsimmons v. MDB Trucking, LLC, et al.*, Second Judicial District Court Case No. CV15-02349 (the "*Fitzsimmons Action*"). Numerous other plaintiffs were consolidated into the *Fitzsimmons Action*. Two additional cases, the instant matter and the above-referenced *Bible* matter, were filed outside of the *Fitzsimmons Action*. The personal injury claims all related to multiple traffic accidents which occurred when a semi-trailer owned and operated by MDB inadvertently dumped a load of gravel on the freeway.

In the instant case being appealed, the Third Party Complaint at issue filed by MDB is one for Contribution from Versa Products Company, Inc. ("Versa"). On May 15, 2017, Versa filed a Motion to Strike MDB's Third Party Complaint, pursuant to NRCP 37, wherein it sought sanctions for the alleged spoliation of evidence. Following briefing and a hearing on August 29, 2017 in the *Fitzsimmons Action*, the District Court issued an Order dated September 22, 2017 in which it found "there would be some sanctions levied on MDB for their discovery abuse: the actual sanction was not determined." The District Court's Order set the matter for evidentiary hearing and further stated "Each party will be familiar with *Young, supra, Nevada Power, supra,* and their progeny and present witnesses in support of their respective positions." The District Court issued its September 22, 2017 Order without discussion of the Supreme Court's holding in *Bass-Davis v. Davis*, 122 Nev. 442, 134 P.3d 103 (2006).

The District Court held the evidentiary hearing to determine what sanctions to issue against MDB on October 13, 2017. At the conclusion of the hearing the District Court informed the parties that Versa's Motion to Strike would be granted and that case concluding sanctions would be imposed. Thereafter the District Court vacated the October 30, 2017 trial date in the *Fitzsimmons Action* and took the matter under submission. At the time it granted case concluding sanctions and vacated the trial date pending shortly thereafter, the District Court had nineteen (19) pre-trial motions under advisement.

The District Court subsequently entered its final written Order in the *Fitzsimmons Action* on December 8, 2017. Thereafter, in the instant matter, the District Court issued an Order dated January 22, 2018 which held that the aforementioned Order in the *Fitzsimmons Action* shall be considered dispositive herein as "[t]he issues are identical, as are the relevant parties." Versa served MDB with Notice of Entry of the District Court's Order on February 8, 2018, and MDB's timely appeal followed. In imposing case concluding sanctions pursuant to NRCP 37, the District Court again failed to consider the Supreme Court's long-standing spoliation of evidence jurisprudence, including the limitations on the degree of sanctions to be imposed for negligent spoliation of evidence under *Bass-Davis v. Davis*.

9. Issues on appeal. State specifically all issues in this appeal (attach separate sheets as necessary):

 Whether the District Court abused its discretion by imposing case concluding sanctions pursuant to NRCP 37, where the District Court failed to consider the Supreme Court's long-standing spoliation of evidence jurisprudence, including the limitations on the degree of sanctions to be imposed for negligent spoliation of evidence under *Bass-Davis v. Davis*.

2) Whether the District Court committed legal error when it applied the definition of "willfulness" set forth in *Childers v. State*, 100 Nev. 280, 283, 680 P.2d 598, 599 (1984), a child abuse prosecution, to its analysis pursuant to NRCP 37 and *Young v. Ribeiro Building Inc.*, 106 Nev. 88, 787 P.2d 777 (1990), as to whether MDB acted willfully. In *Childers*, the definition of "willfully" was derived from the child abuse statute, NRS 200.508 and California Penal Code Section 7(1), and approved for use only in a criminal context involving child abuse. *See also Sonia F. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court*, 125 Nev. 495, 215 P.3d 705 (2009) (Where the legislature has explicitly applied a rule to one type of proceeding, a court construing the rule will presume it deliberately excluded the rule's application to other types of proceedings).

10. Pending proceedings in this court raising the same or similar issues. If you are aware of any proceedings presently pending before this court which raises the same or similar issues raised in this appeal, list the case name and docket number and identify the same or similar issue raised.

Please see responses to Nos. 6 and 8, above.

11. Constitutional issues. If this appeal challenges the constitutionality of a statute, and the state, any state agency, or any officer or employee thereof is not a party to this appeal, have you notified the clerk of this court and the attorney general in accordance with NRAP 44 and NRS 30.130?

- X N/A
- □ Yes
- D No
- If not, explain:
- 12. Other issues. Does this appeal involve any of the following issues?
 - □ Reversal of well-settled Nevada precedent (identify the cases(s))
 - An issue arising under the United States and/or Nevada Constitutions
 - □ A substantial issue of first impression
 - An issue of public policy
 - An issue where en banc consideration is necessary to maintain uniformity of this court's decisions
 - A ballot question

If so, explain:

Not applicable.

13. Assignment to the Court of Appeals or retention in the Supreme Court.

MDB respectfully asserts that this matter is presumptively retained by the Supreme Court, pursuant to NRAP 17(a)(10) and/or (11). The Supreme Court further clarified its spoliation jurisprudence in *Bass-Davis v. Davis*, 122 Nev. 442, 134 P.3d 103 (2006), but it remains a question of first impression and/or inconsistency in the published decisions of the Appellate Courts what impact the *Bass-Davis* decision has on a district court's exercise of discretion to impose sanctions under NRCP 37. It is MDB's position in the instant case that the District Court failed to recognize the limitations on the degree of sanctions to be imposed for negligent or willful spoliation of evidence under *Bass-Davis* and abused its discretion in entering case concluding sanctions.

To the extent this matter could otherwise be viewed as presumptively assigned to the Court of Appeals pursuant to NRAP (17)(b)(5), MDB respectfully requests the Supreme Court retain the case despite the presumptive assignment for all of the reasons stated above.

14. Trial. If this action proceeded to trial, how many days did the trial last?

Not applicable.

Was it a bench or jury trial?

Not applicable.

15. Judicial Disqualification. Do you intend to file a motion to disqualify or have a justice recuse him/herself from participation in this appeal? If so, which Justice?

No.

16. Date of entry of written judgment or order appealed from.

Order signed and filed on January 22, 2018 Notice of Entry Order filed on February 8, 2018

If no written judgment or order was filed in the district court, explain the basis for seeking appellate review:

Not applicable.

17. Date written notice of entry of judgment or order appealed from: February 8, 2018

Was service by:

Delivery

X Mail/electronic/fax

18. Date written notice of entry of Judgment or order was served: February 8, 2018

19. If the time for filing the notice of appeal was tolled by a post-judgment motion (NRCP 50(b), 52(b), or 59)

(a) Specify the type of motion, the date and method of service of the motion, and the date of filing.

NRCP 50(b)	Date of filing
NRCP 52(b)	Date of filing
NRCP 59	Date of filing

(b) Date of entry of written order resolving tolling motion

(c) Date written notice of entry of order resolving tolling motion was served

Was service by:

Delivery

Mail

Not applicable.

Date notice of appeal filed: March 8, 2018 20.

If more than one party has appealed from the judgment or order, list the date each notice of appeal was filed and identify by name the party filing the notice of appeal:

Not applicable.

21. Specify statute or rule governing the time limit for filing the notice of appeal, e.g., NRAP 4(a) or other

N.R.A.P. 4(a)(1)

SUBSTANTIVE APPEALABILITY

22. Specify the statue or other authority granting this court jurisdiction to review the judgment or order appeal from:

(a)

1		
x	NRAP 3A(b)(1)	NRS 38.205
	NRAP 3A(b)(2)	NRS 233B.150
	NRAP 3A(b)(3)	NRS 703.376
	Other (specify)	

Explain how each authority provides a basis for appeal from the judgment or (b) order:

The District Court's Order resolved all issues in dispute raised by Appellant's Cross-Claim. There is nothing remaining to be adjudicated by the parties.

N.R.A.P. 3A(b)(1) allows an appeal to be taken from the final judgment or orders of a district court.

22. List all parties involved in the action or consolidated actions in the district court:

(a) Parties:

(1) MDB Trucking, LLC

(2) Versa Products Company, Inc.

(b) If all parties in the district court are not parties to this appeal, explain in detail why those parties are not involved in this appeal, *e.g.*, formally dismissed, not served, or other:

Not applicable.

23. Give a brief description (3 to 5 words) of each party's separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, or third-party claims and the date of formal disposition of each claim.

MDB's cross-claim for Contribution against Versa.

24. Did the judgment or order appeal from adjudicate ALL the claims alleged below and the rights and liabilities of ALL the parties to the action or consolidated actions below?

X Yes

🗆 No

25. If you answered "No" to question 23, complete the following:

(a) Specify the claims remaining pending below:

(b) Specify the parties remaining below:

(c) Did the district court certify the judgment or order appealed from as a final judgment pursuant to NRCP 54(b)?

□ Yes

No

(d) Did the district court make an express determination, pursuant to NRCP 54(b), that there is no just reason for delay and an express direction for the entry of judgment?

- □ Yes
- 🗆 No

26. If you answered "No" to any part of question 24, explain the basis for seeking appellate review (e.g., order is independently appealable under NRAP 3A(b)):

27. Attach file-stamped copies of the following documents:

- · The latest-filed complaint, counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party claims
- Any tolling motion(s) and order(s) resolving tolling motion(s)
- Order of NRCP 41(a) dismissals formally resolving each claim, counterclaims, crossclaims and/or third-party claims asserted in the action or consolidated action below, even if not at issue on appeal
- Any other order challenged on appeal
- Notices of entry for each attached order

VERIFICATION

I declare under penalty of perjury that I have read this docketing statement, that the information provided in this docketing statement is true and complete to the best of my knowledge, information and belief, and that I have attached all required documents to this docketing statement.

MDB Trucking, LLC	Nicholas Wieczorek, Jeremy Thompson and
Name of appellant	Colleen E. McCarty
	Name of counsel of record
4/2/2018	Allen E. Malat
Date	Signature of counsel of record
Nevada, Clark County	
State and county where signed	

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE


I certify that on the 202 day of April, 2018, I served a copy of this completed docketing statement upon all counsel of records:

- By personally serving it upon him/her; or
- X By mailing it by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address(es): (NOTE: If all names and addresses cannot fit below, please list names below and attached a separate sheet with the addresses.)

JOSH COLE AICKLEN, ESQ. DAVID B. AVAKIAN, ESQ. PAIGE S. SHREVE, ESQ. LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP 6385 S. Rainbow Blvd., Suite 600 Las Vegas, Nevada 89118 Attorneys for Defendant VERSA PRODUCTS COMPANY, INC LANSFORD W. LEVITT 4230 CHRISTY WAY RENO, NV 89519

Dated this 200 day of April, 2018.

An Employee of Clark Hill PLLC



1	4180		FILED Electronically CV16-00976 2016-06-22 11:40:06 AM Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court
	Katherine F. Parks, Esq., State Bar No. 6227		Transaction # 5574280 : rkwatch
2	Brian M. Brown, Esq., State Bar No. 5233 Thierry V. Barkley, Esq., State Bar No. 724		
3	Thorndal Armstrong Delk Balkenbush & Eising 6590 S. McCarran Blvd., Suite B	ger	
4	Reno, Nevada 89509 (775) 786-2882		
5	Attorneys for Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff MDB TRUCKING, LLC		
6	IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRIC	T COURT OF	THE STATE OF NEVADA
7	IN AND FOR THE C	OUNTY OF	WASHOE
8	GENEVA M. REMMERDE,	Case No.	CV16-00976
9			and a story of
10	Plaintiff,	Dept. No.	10
11	VS.		
12	DANIEL ANTHONY KOSKI, MDB TRUCKING, LLC, DOES 1-X and		
13	ROE I-V		
14	Defendants.		
15	MDB TRUCKING, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company,		
16	Third-Party Plaintiff,		
17	VS.		
18 19	RMC LAMAR HOLDINGS, INC. a Colorado Corporation; VERSA PRODUCTS COMPANY, INC., a New Jersey Corporation	-	
20	THE MODERN GROUP GP-SUB, INC., a Texas corporation and general partnership; DRAGON ESP, LTD., a Texas limited		
21	partnership; and DOES 1-10 and BLACK AND WHITE COMPANIES,		
22	Third-Party Defendants.		
23			
24	THIRD-PARTY	COMPLAI	NT
25	COMES NOW the Defendant/Third-Part	y Plaintiff, M	DB Trucking, LLC (hereinafter
26	"MDB") by and through its counsel of record Th	orndal Armstr	rong Delk Balkenbush & Eisinger,
THURNDAL ARSISTRONG DELK DALKENRUSH & EISINGER 27	and hereby brings this Third-Party Complaint ag	ainst Third-Pa	rty Defendants RMC Lamar
ALCONS EVEN	111		

1	Helden the Many Deducts Company Ing. and the Modern Group GP. Sub Ing. and Dragon
1	Holdings, Inc, Versa Products Company, Inc., and the Modern Group GP-Sub, Inc. and Dragon ESP, Ltd. and hereby alleges as follows.
3	FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
4	(General Allegations)
5	1. Third-Party Plaintiff incorporates herein that Plaintiff's Complaint solely for the
6	purposes of establishing that a Complaint has been filed against MDB Trucking, LLC, but
7	without admitting the truth of any allegation therein except for such allegations which may have
8	been admitted in Third-Party Plaintiff's Answer. Third-Party Plaintiff is informed and believes
9	and therefore alleges that the matters referred to in Third-Party Plaintiff's Complaint were
10	proximately caused by the acts and omissions of Third-Party Defendants.
п	2. Third-Party Plaintiff MDB Trucking, LLC was at all relevant times a Nevada
12	limited liability company authorized to conduct business within the State of Nevada.
13	3. Third-Party Defendants DOES 1-10 and BLACK AND WHITE COMPANIES are
14	sued herein under fictitious names and the true names and capacities of said Third-Party
15	Defendants are not known by Third-Party Plaintiff who asked leave of court to amend this Third-
16	Party Complaint to set forth same as it becomes known or ascertained.
17	4. Third Party Defendant RMC Lamar Holdings, Inc. (fka Ranch Manufacturing)
18	was at all relevant times hereto a Colorado corporation engaged in the business of designing and
19	manufacturing trailers and semi-trailers and placed same into the stream of commerce and was
20	doing business in the State of Nevada.
21	5. Third-Party Defendant Versa Products Company, Inc was at al relevant times
22	hereto a New Jersey Corporation engaged in the business of designing and manufacturing
23	pneumatic air solenoid valves specifically for bottom dump trailers and gate activated controls
24	and placed into the stream of commerce and was doing business in the State of Nevada.
25	6. Third-Party Defendant the Modern Group GP-Sub, Inc. was at all relevant times
26	hereto a Texas corporation and the general partner of Dragon ESP, Ltd., a Texas limited
27	partnership.
28	709

THURNMAL ARMISTRONG DEEK BAENERUUSH & LININGER I S MicCaraa, Suite B Net ada 8290 200-2005 1 7. Third Party Defendant Dragon ESP, Ltd. was at all relevant times a Texas limited 2 partnership.

8. A Complaint was filed on May 2, 2016 in the Second Judicial District Court,
Case No. CV16-00976, Department 10 in which the Plaintiff Geneva M. Remmerde prayed for
damages against Defendant MDB Trucking, LLC alleging negligence in regards to an accident
which occurred on July 7, 2014 where a trailer owned by MDB Trucking, LLC spilled a load of
gravel causing an accident and injury which are claims presented by Plaintiff.

9. Upon information and belief, the Ranco trailer was activated inadvertently causing
the gates of the trailer to release a subject load of gravel on the highway and was defective in
whole or in part as designed by the Defendant RMC Lamar Holdings, Inc. (fka Ranch
Manufacturing Company) (also known by the trade name and trademark Ranco).

12 10. Third Party Defendant RMC Lamar Holdings, Inc. manufactured the subject
 13 Ranco trailer in 2002 under the vehicle brand Ranco with VIN No. 1R9BP45082L008431 Idaho
 14 Plate No. TE3528.

15 11. Third-Party Defendants the Modern Group and Dragon ESP acquired Ranch
 16 Manufacturing on or about August 1, 2007 through an Asset Purchase Agreement.

17 12. Upon information and belief, Third-Party Defendant Dragon, ESP has continued
 18 to sell Ranco trailers and semi-trailers with the same components within the same general market
 19 and to same customers.

Third-Party Defendant Dragon ESP has maintained its manufacturing and
 assembly locations in the same venue of Lamar, Colorado after its acquisition of Ranch
 Manufacturing Company.

23 24

25

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14. William Carder the former President and owner of Ranch Manufacturing, Inc. became an officer with Dragon ESP, Ltd. and maintained his position as Vice-President for Ranco through all relevant times up to and including 2015.

26 THUDRINDAL ARMISTRONG DELK BALKENBUNI S KAINGER 27 S MCCANDS NOT 1 Network 1914 17 This 2002 28 15. Upon information and belief, Dragon ESP, Ltd. is a *de facto* successor to Ranch Manufacturing, Inc. and has engaged in substantial continuation of Ranco's business.

Dragon ESP, Ltd. is liable to Third-Party Plaintiff to the same extent as RMC 1 16. 2 Lamar Holdings, Inc. (fka Ranch Manufacturing Company). 3 17. Third-Party Plaintiff MDB Trucking, LLC in 2012 was the last purchaser and end user of the subject Ranco trailer and the direct purchaser of the subject Versa Valve unit 4 5 in 2013. 6 18. On or before July 7, 2014, the Ranco trailer that left Ranch Manufacturing's 7 control as designed, assembled, and manufactured by Ranco was unreasonably dangerous and defective in one or more of the following respects: 8 9 The semi-trailer was designed, assembled and manufactured and/or a. 10 configured in such a manner that the Versa solenoid valve would activate inadvertently allowing the gates to open and release the load carried by the trailer; and 11 12 That the Ranco trailer was designed, assembled, manufactured and/or b. 13 configured in such a manner that the Versa Valve was not equipped with a safety lock to prevent 14 inadvertent activation allowing the gates to open. 15 Ranch Manufacturing knew that Versa Products Company, Inc. had a safer 19. 16 design available in the stream of commerce on or about 2002 which employed a manual lock safety design; and, that same should have been provided to its end use customers in lieu of the 17 18 Versa Valve model incorporated in the subject Ranco trailer. 19 Upon information and belief, Versa Products Company also knew both 20. 20 in 2002 and 2014 that they had an alternate safer design available in the stream of commerce 21 which employed a manual lock safer design; and, that same should have been provided to its end 22 user customers MDB Trucking in lieu of the model incorporated in the subject Ranco trailer. 23 21. To the extent Plaintiff was injured as a proximate result of the unreasonably 24 dangerous conditions and defects at the time of manufacturing or negligent design, such as a 25 direct and proximate result of the negligence of Third-Party Defendants; and any negligence that 26 exists as alleged by the Plaintiffs is expressly denied. Third-Party Defendants were actively and solely negligent and Third-Party Plaintiff was passively negligent or without fault. 27 28 111

THURPDAL ARMSTRONG DELK HALKENBUSH & EISINGER (57): 5: MICLAUSE, SUBE B V. (64): TSALE (PEOP (753): 76-7382


	1	22. Third-Party Defendants' breach of duty of care owed to the Third-Party Plaintiff
	2	and Third-Party Defendants are required to indemnify and hold Third-Party Plaintiff harmless
	3	with respect to all allegations and liabilities as set forth in the Complaint filed in this matter.
	4	23. Third-Party Plaintiff has placed Third-Party Defendants on notice of claims
	5	pending in this matter.
	6	24. Third-Party Plaintiff is required to expend costs and attorneys' fees in defending
	7	the negligence claims in the Complaint on file herein and for prosecuting the instant Third-Party
	8	Complaint.
	9	FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
	10 11	(Implied Indemnification as to Third-Party Defendants RMC LAMAR HOLDINGS & THE MODERN GROUP and DRAGON ESP)
	12	25. Third-Party Plaintiff realleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs
	13	1-24 as more fully set forth herein.
	14	26. Third-Party Plaintiff is therefore entitled to complete indemnification against
	15	Third-Party Defendants with respect to all allegations or liabilities set forth in the Complaint on
	16	file in this matter.
	17	27. Third-Party Plaintiff is entitled to all costs and fees expended in the defense of
	18	claims of negligence in this matter as well as prosecution of this Third-Party Complaint.
	19	SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
	20	(Contribution as to Third-Party Defendants
	21	RMC LAMAR HOLDINGS & THE MODERN GROUP and DRAGON ESP)
	22	28. Third-Party Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in
	23	paragraphs 1-27 above as if more fully set forth herein.
	24	29. Third-Party Plaintiff is entitled to contribution from Third-Party Defendants with
	25	respect to any settlement, judgment, awards or any other type of resolution or claims brought
	26	forward by the Plaintiff in her Complaint on file herein.
THORNDAL ARMSTRONG DELK BALKENBUSH & EISINGER	27	30. Third-Party Plaintiff is entitled to all costs and fees expended in defense of claims
05.60 S. McCarran, Suite B Octor, Nevada 87909 (7757 78602382	28	of negligence in this matter as well as prosecution of the Third-Party Complaint.
		- 5 -

		THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
	1	
		(Implied Indemnification as to VERSA)
	3	31. The Third-Party Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained
	4	in paragraphs 1-30 above as if more fully set forth herein.
	5	32. The Third-Party Plaintiff is entitled to complete indemnity against VERSA
	6	PRODUCTS COMPANY, INC. with respect to all allegations or liabilities set forth in the First
	7	amended Complaint.
	8	33. The Third-Party Plaintiff is therefore entitled to all costs and fees expended in the
	9	defense of the claims of negligence in this matter as well as prosecution of the Third-Party
	10	Complaint.
	11	FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
	12	(Contribution as to VERSA)
	13	34. The Third-Party Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained
	14	in paragraphs 1-33 above as if more fully set forth herein.
	15	35. The Third-Party Plaintiff is entitled to contribution from the Third-Party
	16	Defendant VERSA PRODUCTS COMPANY, INC., with respect to any settlement, judgment,
	17	awards, or any other type of resolution of the claims brought forward by the Plaintiffs in her
	18	Complaint on file herein.
	19	36. The Third-Party Plaintiff is entitled to all costs and fees expended in the defense
	20	of the claims for negligence in this matter as well as prosecution of the Third-Party Complaint.
	21	WHEREFORE, Third-Party Plaintiff demands judgment against Third-Party Defendants
	22	as follows:
	23	1. For implied indemnification with respect to all negligence claims brought against
	24	Third-Party Plaintiff in this matter;
	25	2. For contribution with respect to all negligence claims brought against Third-Party
	26	Plaintiff in this matter;
THORNDAL ARMSTRON DELK HALKENBUSH & Eisinger	27	 For attorneys' fees and costs expended in this matter; and
1.5787 a MicCartan, Suite II Gen (Ben da 17550) 17733 (166-2882	28	///
		- 6 -

 4. For such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper in the premises. DATED this 2nd day of June, 2016. HORNDAL ARMSTRONG By: Watherine Furders, Ess., State Bar No. 223 Thisry V. Barkley, Ess., State Bar No. 223 Thisry V. Barkley, Ess., State Bar No. 223 Shifter and M. Brown, Ess., State Bar No. 223 Shifter and M. Brown, Ess., State Bar No. 223 Shifter and M. Brown, Ess., State Bar No. 223 Shifter and M. Brown, Ess., State Bar No. 223 Shifter and M. Brown, Ess., State Bar No. 223 Shifter and M. Brown, Ess., State Bar No. 223 Shifter and M. Brown, Ess., State Bar No. 223 Shifter and M. Brown, Ess., State Bar No. 223 Shifter and M. Brown, Ess., State Bar No. 223 Shifter and M. Brown, Ess., State Bar No. 223 Shifter and M. Brown, Ess., State Bar No. 223 Shifter and M. Brown, Ess., State Bar No. 223 Shifter and M. Brown, Ess., State Bar No. 223 Shifter and M. Brown, Ess., State Bar No. 224 Shifter and M. Brown, Ess., State Bar No. 224 Shifter and M. Brown, Ess., State Bar No. 224 Shifter and M. Brown, Ess., State Bar No. 224 Shifter and M. Brown, Ess., State Bar No. 224 Shifter and M. Brown, Ess., State Bar No. 224 Shifter and M. Brown, Ess., State Bar No. 224 Shifter and M. Brown, Ess., State Bar No. 224 Shifter and M. Brown, Ess., State Bar No. 224 Shifter and M. Brown, Ess., State Bar No. 224 Shifter and M. Brown, Ess., State Bar No. 224 Shifter and M. Brown, Ess., State Bar No. 224 Shifter and Shi		
2 premises. 3 DATED this 2 ^{md} day of June, 2016. 4 THORNDAL ARMSTRONG DELK BALKENBUSH & EISINGER. 5 By: 6 Natherine Flow, Stag, State Bar No. 6227 7 Ratherine Flow, Stag, State Bar No. 6227 7 Ratherine Flow, Stag, State Bar No. 6227 8 Premises. 9 Natherine Flow, Stag, State Bar No. 6227 9 Ratherine Flow, Stag, State Bar No. 6227 9 Natherine Flow, Stag, State Bar No. 6227 9 Bar N. 724 6500 S. McCarne Blod, Suite B 9 Atomety for Defendant Third-Party Plaintiff 10 MDB TRUCKING, LLC 11 Premises. 12 Premises. 13 Premises. 14 Premises. 15 Premises. 16 Premises. 17 Premises. 18 Premises. 19 Premises. 20 Premises. 21 Premises. 22 Premises. 23 Premises. 24 Premises. 25 Premises. 26 Premises. 27 Premises. 28 Premises		
DATED this 22 nd day of June, 2016. HORNDAL ARMSTRONG DELK BALKENBUSH & EISINGER By: Katherine FV Parks, Esq., State Bar No. 6227 Brian M. Brown, Esq., State Bar No. 724 Brown, Esq., State Bar No. 724 Brown, Esq., State Bar No. 6227 Brian M. Brown, Esq., State Bar No. 6227 Brian M. Brown, Esq., State Bar No. 6227 Brown, Esq., State Bar No. 6207 Brown, Esq., State Bar No. 6207 Brown, Esq., State Bar No. 6207 Brown, Esq., State Bar No. 6207 B		
4 THORNDAL ARMSTRONG DELK BALKENBUSH & EISINGER 5 6 6 By: 7 Brian Brown, Ess., State Bar No. 5227 Brian Brown, Ess., State Bar No. 5233 Theory V. Barkley, Ess., State Bar No. 5233 Theory V. Barkley, Ess., State Bar No. 524 6590 S. McCarran Blvd, Suite B 9 9 9 9 9 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 23 24 25 26 27 28		
S DELK BALKENBUSH & EISINGER By: Katherine FUParks, Esc., State Bar No. 6227 Brian M. Brown, Esc., State Bar No. 6227 Brian M. Brown, Esc., State Bar No. 6227 Brian M. Brown, Esc., State Bar No. 724 69 9 9 9 9 9 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28		
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11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28	6	By: Katherine F/Parks Esq. State Bar No. 6227
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28	7	Brian M. Brown, Esq., State Bar No. 5233 Thierry V. Barkley, Esq., State Bar No. 724
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1	AFFIRMATION
2	Pursuant to NRS 239B.030
3	The undersigned hereby affirms that the preceding document filed in above-entitled court
4	does not contain the social security number of any person.
5	DATED this 2011 day of June, 2016.
6	THORNDAL ARMSTRONG
7	DELK BALKENBUSH & EISINGER
8	By: By: Branch Bran Day No. (2027
9	Katherine F Parks, Esq., State Bar No. 6227 Brian M. Brown, Esq., State Bar No. 5233 Thierry V. Barkley, Esq., State Bar No. 724 6590 S. McCarran Blvd., Suite B
10	6590 S. McCarran Blvd., Suite B Reno, Nevada 89509
11	Attorneys for Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff MDB TRUCKING, LLC
12	MDD IROCKING, ELC
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26 THORNMAL ARMSTRONG	
DELK HALKENHUSH & EISINGER 1990 S. McCarton, Sund B	
1915, 789-2742 28	
	- 8 -

	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of Thorndal Armstrong Delk
3	Balkenbush & Eisinger, and that on this date I caused the foregoing THIRD-PARTY
	COMPLAINT to be served on all parties to this action by:
-	placing an original or true copy thereof in a sealed, postage prepaid, envelope in the
	United States mail at Reno, Nevada.
3	Second Judicial District Court Eflex ECF (Electronic Case Filing)
5	hand delivery
ç	electronic means (fax, electronic mail, etc.)
10	Federal Express/UPS or other overnight delivery fully addressed to
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	Reno, NV 89501 Third-Party Defendant RMC Lamar Holdings
18	
19	David B. Avakian Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP
20	6385 S. Rainbow Blvd., Suite 600 Las Vegas, NV 89118
21	Third-Party Defendant Versa Products Co., Inc.
22	
23	DATED this 2 2 day of June, 2016.
24	1. 11
25	Ellen alig
26	An employee of Thorndal Armstrong Delk Balkenbush & Eisinger
DIGRNDAL ARMSTRONG DELK BALKENBUSH & EISINGER 27	
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	FILED Electronically CV16-00976 2018-01-22 04:15:56 Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court Transaction # 64925
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTR	ICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
	E COUNTY OF WASHOE

GENEVA M. REMMERDE,	
Plaintiff,	Case No. CV16-00976
vs.	Dept. No. 10
DANIEL ANTHONY KOSKI; MDB TRUCK LLC; et al.,	ING,
Defendants.	
	/
<u>0</u>	DRDER
Presently before the Court is THIRD-PA	ARTY DEFENDANT VERSA PRODUCTS
COMPANY, INC.'S MOTION TO STRIKE D	EFENDANT/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF MDB
TRUCKING, LLC's THIRD-PARTY COMPL	AINT PURSUANT TO NRCP 35; OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, FOR AN ADVERSE JURY	INSTRUCTION ("the Motion"). The Motion was
filed by Defendant/Cross-Claimant/Cross-Defe	endant VERSA PRODUCTS COMPANY, INC.
("Versa") on May 15, 2017. Defendant/Cross-	-Claimant MDB TRUCKING, LLC ("MDB") did not
file an Opposition to the Motion. ¹ See WDCR	12(2). The Motion was submitted for the Court's
consideration on December 12, 2017.	
This case arises from a personal injury a	action. A COMPLAINT was filed by plaintiffs Ernes
Bruce Fitzsimmons and Carol Fitzsimmons, on	December 4, 2015 ("the Fitzsimmons Action"). The
Fitzsimmons Action was assigned Second Judie	cial District Court case number CV15-02349.
¹ The issues presented in the Motion were fully briefed in CV15-02349.	n FITZSIMMONS, et al. v. MDB TRUCKING, LLC, et al.,
	-1-

1 Numerous other plaintiffs were joined into the Fitzsimmons Action. Two additional cases were filed 2 and prosecuted outside of the Fitzsimmons Action: the instant case and JAMES BIBLE v. MDB 3 TRUCKING, LLC et al., CV16-01914 ("the Bible Action"). The instant action was filed on May 2, 4 2016. The Bible Action was filed September 20, 2016. It is alleged in all three actions that on July 5 7, 2014, Defendant Daniel Anthony Koski ("Koski"), while driving a truck for MDB, negligently 6 spilled a load of gravel into the roadway. The spilled gravel caused the driving plaintiffs to lose 7 control of their vehicles and numerous accidents occurred resulting in the three separate cases. The 8 plaintiffs sustained physical and emotional injuries as a result of the accidents. In response to the 9 complaint filed in the instant action, MDB filed a THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT ("the MDB Cross-10 Claim") June 22, 2016. The MDB Cross-Claim had two causes of action relative to Versa: Implied u Indemnification and Contribution.² MDB alleges it was not Koski's negligence that caused the 12 gravel to spill; rather, the spill was caused by the "unreasonably dangerous and defective" design 13 and manufacture of the trailer that held the gravel. The MDB Cross-Claim, 4:6-8. Therefore, MDB 14 brought the Cross-Claim against the manufacturers of the trailer and its components, including 15 Versa. MDB avers Versa produced a solenoid valve which would, "activate inadvertently allowing 16 the gates to open and release the load [of gravel] carried by the trailer." The MDB Cross-Claim, 4:9-17 11. MDB also claims there were safer alternatives available to Versa; the solenoid valve was 18 unreasonably dangerous and defective; and Versa failed to provide appropriate safety mechanisms 19 regarding the solenoid valve. The MDB Cross-Claim, 4:15-22.


The Motion is the same as the motion practice in the Fitzsimmons Action and the Bible
 Action. The issues are identical, as are the relevant parties. The Court issued an ORDER ("the
 December Order") on December 8, 2017, in the Fitzsimmons Action. The December Order
 conducted a thorough analysis of the issue presented in the Motion. See generally Young v. Johnny
 Ribeiro Building, Inc., 106 Nev. 88, 787 P.2d 777 (1990), and NRCP 37. The Court found in the
 December Order case concluding sanctions were an appropriate sanction for MDB's spoliation of

 ²⁷ Versa filed THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT VERSA PRODUCTS COMPANY INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF, MDB TRUCKING, LLC'S THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR IMPLIED INDEMNITY
 ²⁸ PURSUANT TO NRCP 12(B)(5) ("the MTD") on July 19, 2016. The Court granted the MTD on October 19, 2016. The only remaining cause of action alleged by MDB against Versa is for Contribution.

1	critical evidence. The Court finds a restatement of the December Order is unnecessary in the instar
2	action. Given the indistinguishable issues the Court attaches hereto and incorporates herein as
3	EXHIBIT A the December Order which shall be considered dispositive of the issue raised in the
4	Motion. ³
5	It is hereby ORDERED THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT VERSA PRODUCTS COMPAN
5	INC.'S MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF MDB TRUCKING,
'	LLC's THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO NRCP 35; OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
3	FOR AN ADVERSE JURY INSTRUCTION is GRANTED. MDB TRUCKING, LLC'S CROSS
1	CLAIM is DISMISSED.
	DATED this 22 day of January, 2018.
	Entra
	ELLIOTT A. SATTLER
	District Judge
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,	³ The Court notes D.C.R. 13(3) states, "[f]ailure of the opposing party to serve and file his written opposition may be construed as an admission that the motion is meritorious and a consent to granting the same." Versa has not moved to have the Motion granted under this standard.

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2	CEDTIFICATE OF MAILING
3	CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
4	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of the Second Judicial District Cour
5	of the State of Nevada, County of Washoe; that on this day of January, 2018, I deposited in
6	the County mailing system for postage and mailing with the United States Postal Service in Reno,
7	Nevada, a true copy of the attached document addressed to:
8	
9	
0	
1	CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that I am an employee of the Second Judicial District Court of the State of
3	Nevada, in and for the County of Washoe; that on the 22 day of January, 2018, I electronically
4	filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court by using the ECF system which will send a notice
5	of electronic filing to the following:
6	of cloculonic ming to the following.
7	MATTHEW ADDISON, ESQ.
8	JOSH AICKLEN, ESQ. KATHERINE PARKS, ESQ.
9	BRIAN BROWN, ESQ. THIERRY BARKLEY, ESQ.
0	SARAH QUIGLEY, ESQ.
1	JESSICA WOELFEL, ESQ. JACOB BUNDICK, ESQ.
2	NICHOLAS M. WIECZOREK, ESQ.
3	
4	S. O. Mandell
5	Sheila Mansfield
6	Judicial Assistant
7	
8	
	-4-

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	FILED Electronically CV15-02349	
	2017-12-08 02:59:2 Jacqueline Brya Clerk of the Cou Transaction # 643	
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTR	ICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA	
	COUNTY OF WASHOE	

ERNEST BRUCE FITZSIMMONS, et al.,		
Plaintiffs,	Case No. CV15-02349	
vs.	Dept. No. 10	
MDB TRUCKING, LLC; et al.,		
Defendants.	/	
0	RDER	
Presently before the Court is DEFENDA	ANT/CROSS-CLAIMANT/CROSS-DEFENDANT	
VERSA PRODUCTS COMPANY, INC.'S MO	DTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT/CROSS-	
CLAIMANT/CROSS-DEFENDANT MDB TH	RUCKING, LLC'S CROSS-CLAIM PURSUANT	
TO NRCP 35; OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, F	FOR AN ADVERSE JURY INSTRUCTION ("the	
Motion"). The Motion was filed by Defendant	/Cross-Claimant/Cross-Defendant VERSA	
PRODUCTS, INC. ("Versa") on May 15, 2017	¹ Defendant/Cross-Claimant, MDB Trucking,	
LLC ("MDB") filed MDB'S OPPOSITION TO	VERSA PRODUCTS COMPANY, INC.'S	
MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR SPOLIATIO	N INSTRUCTIONS ("the Opposition") on June 2,	
2017. Versa filed DEFENDANT/CROSS-CLA	AIMANT/CROSS-DEFENDANT VERSA	
¹ Versa filed the ERRATA TO DEFENDANT/CROSS-CLAIMANT/CROSS-DEFENDANT VERSA PRODUCTS COMPANY, INC.'S MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT/CROSS-CLAIMANT/CROSS-DEFENDANT MDB TRUCKING, LLC's CROSS-CLAIM PURSUANT TO NRCP 37; OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR AN ADVERSE JURY INSTRUCTION ("the Errata") on May 5, 2017. The Errata clarifies Versa is bringing the Motion pursuant to NRCP 37, not NRCP 35 as noted in the caption to the Motion. The reference to NRCP 35 is made only in the caption to the pleading; therefore, the Court presumes it is merely a typographical error.		
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PRODUCTS COMPANY, INC.'S REPLY TO MDB'S OPPOSITION TO VERSA PRODUCTS
 COMPANY, INC.'S MOTION TO STRIKE MDB TRUCKING, LLC'S CROSS-CLAIM
 PURSUANT TO NRCP 37; OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR AN ADVERSE JURY
 INSTRUCTION ("the Reply") on June 12, 2017, and contemporaneously submitted the matter for
 the Court's consideration. The Court entered an ORDER on August 1, 2017, setting the Motion
 for oral argument.² The Court heard the arguments of counsel on August 29, 2017, and took the
 matter under submission.

8 The Court felt case concluding sanctions were a potential discovery sanction for the alleged 9 abuse following the oral argument. An evidentiary hearing affording both sides the opportunity to 10 present witnesses was required given this conclusion. See generally, Nevada Power v. Fluor Illinois, 11 108 Nev. 638, 837 P.2d 1354 (1992). The Court entered an ORDER ("the September Order") on 12 September 22, 2017, directing the parties to set the matter for an evidentiary hearing. The 13 evidentiary hearing was conducted on October 13, 2017 ("the October Hearing"). Versa called one 14 expert witness, Scott Palmer ("Palmer"), and one lay witness Garrick Mitchell ("Mitchell") at the 15 October Hearing. MDB called one expert witness, Dr. David Bosch ("Dr. Bosch"), and two lay 16 witnesses, Patrick Bigby ("Bigby") and Erik Anderson ("Anderson") at the October Hearing. The 17 Court admitted numerous exhibits during the October Hearing. The Court permitted the parties to 18 argue their respective positions. Trial was scheduled to begin on October 30, 2017. The Court was 19 aware of its obligation to make detailed findings of facts and conclusions of law. Further, the Court 20 wanted to fulfill these obligations in a thoughtful manner and in writing pursuant to the mandates of 21 the Nevada Supreme Court. The Court informed the parties the Motion would be granted and 22 vacated the trial date. The Court took the matter under submission. This written ORDER follows. 23 This case arises from a personal injury action. A COMPLAINT ("the Complaint") was filed

²⁴ by Plaintiffs Ernest Bruce Fitzsimmons and Carol Fitzsimmons, on December 4, 2015. Numerous
 ²⁵ other plaintiffs were joined into the Fitzsimmons case. It is alleged on July 7, 2014, Defendant
 ²⁶ Daniel Anthony Koski ("Koski"), while driving a truck for MDB, negligently spilled a load of

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² There were numerous other pre-trial motions scheduled for oral argument on the same date.

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Ł gravel into the roadway. The spilled gravel caused the driving plaintiffs to lose control of their 2 vehicles and numerous accidents occurred. The plaintiffs sustained physical and emotional injuries 3 as a result of the accidents. In response to the Complaint, MDB filed a THIRD-PARTY 4 COMPLAINT ("the MDB Cross-Claim") June 15, 2016. The MDB Cross-Claim had two causes 5 of action relative to Versa: Implied Indemnification and Contribution.3 MDB alleges it was not 6 Koski's negligence that caused the gravel to spill; rather, the spill was caused by the "unreasonably 7 dangerous and defective" design and manufacture of the trailer that held the gravel. The MDB 8 Cross-Claim, 3:5-7. Therefore, MDB brought the Cross-Claim against the manufacturers of the 9 trailer and its components, including Versa. MDB avers Versa produced a solenoid valve which 10 would, "activate inadvertently allowing the gates to open and release the load [of gravel] carried by 11 the trailer." The MDB Cross-Claim, 3:10-11. MDB also claims there were safer alternatives 12 available to Versa; the solenoid valve was unreasonably dangerous and defective; and Versa failed 13 to provide appropriate safety mechanisms regarding the solenoid valve. The MDB Cross-Claim, 14 3:12-18.

15 Versa has denied its product is defective and further denies any responsibility for the spilling 16 of the gravel. Additionally, Versa filed DEFENDANT/CROSS-CLAIMANT VERSA PRODUCTS 17 COMPANY, INC.'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS ERNEST BRUCE FITZSIMMONS AND 18 CAROL FITZSIMMONS' FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST 19 MDB TRUCKING, LLC; DANIEL ANTHONY KOSKI; AND DOES I-X, INCLUSIVE ("the 20 Versa Cross-Claim") on June 29, 2016. The Versa Cross-Claim alleges one cause of action against 21 MDB: Contribution. Versa alleges MDB "negligently operated, maintained, owned, serviced and/or 22 entrusted the subject trailer " The Versa Cross-Claim, 10:17-18. Versa and MDB are the only 23 remaining parties in this litigation: all of the plaintiffs consolidated into these proceedings, and all 24 of the other defendants have been dismissed and/or settled.

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- ³ Versa filed CROSS-DEFENDANT VERSA PRODUCTS COMPANY INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS CROSS-CLAIMANT, MDB TRUCKING, LLC'S THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR IMPLIED INDEMNITY PURSUANT TO NRCP 12(B)(5) ("the MTD") on June 27, 2016. The Court granted the MTD on October 19, 2016. The only remaining cause of action alleged by MDB against Versa is for Contribution.

T The Motion avers MDB has destroyed or disposed of critical evidence which directly 2 impacts Versa's ability to represent itself in the instant litigation. Specifically, the Motion contends 3 after the accident MDB continued to use the truck in question; failed to keep the truck in the same 4 condition as it was on the day in question; serviced the truck routinely; repaired and replaced the 5 electrical systems that control the solenoid which operated the Versa valve; and failed to take steps 6 to preserve this critical evidence knowing litigation was highly probable. The Opposition contends 7 there has been no spoliation of evidence in this case. Further, the Opposition posits there was 8 nothing more than routine maintenance done on the trailer; therefore, Versa's ability to defend itself 9 has not been impaired.

10 The Motion avers MDB had a duty to preserve the discarded electrical systems in 11 anticipation of the underlying action. In Fire Ins. Exchange v. Zenith Radio Corp., 103 Nev. 648, 12 651, 747 P.2d 911, 914 (1987), the Nevada Supreme Court held, "even where an action has not been 13 commenced and there is only a potential for litigation, the litigant is under a duty to preserve the 14 evidence which it knows or reasonably should know is relevant to the action." The Motion 15 concludes the appropriate sanction for the failure to preserve this crucial evidence should be 16 dismissal of the entire action. See generally Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Building Inc., 106 Nev. 88, 17 787 P.2d 777 (1990), and NRCP 37.

18 Discovery sanctions are within the discretion of the trial court. See Stubli v. Big D Int'l 19 Trucks, Inc., 107 Nev. 309, 312, 810 P.2d 785, 787 (1991), and Kelly Broadcasting v. Sovereign Broadcast, 96 Nev. 188, 192, 606 P.2d 1089, 1092 (1980). "Generally, sanctions may only be 20 21 imposed where there has been willful noncompliance with the court's order, or where the adversary process has been halted by the actions of the unresponsive party." Zenith, 103 Nev. at 651, 747 22 23 P.2d at 913 (citing Finkelman v. Clover Jewelers Blvd. Inc., 91 Nev. 146, 147, 532 P.2d 608, 609 24 (1975) and Skeen v. Valley Bank of Nevada, 89 Nev. 301, 303, 511 P.2d 1053, 1054 (1973)). Accord GNLV Corp. v. Service Control Corp., 111 Nev. 866, 869, 900 P.2d 323, 325 (1995). 25 Dismissal of an entire action with prejudice is a dramatic punishment for a discovery abuse. The 26 27 Nevada Supreme Court cautions district courts the use of such a Draconian sanction should be 28 approached with caution. "The dismissal of a case, based upon a discovery abuse such as the

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æ destruction or loss of evidence, 'should be used only in extreme situations; if less drastic sanctions 2 are available, they should be utilized."" GNLV, 111 Nev. at 870, 900 P.2d at 326 (citation omitted). 3 Additionally, the Nevada Power Court held it was an abuse of discretion for a district court to grant 4 case concluding sanctions without an evidentiary hearing. The Nevada Power Court held the party 5 facing a case terminating sanction needs an "opportunity to present witnesses or to cross-examine 6 [the movant] or their experts with regard to [the discovery violations]." Nevada Power, 108 Nev. at 7 646, 837 P.2d at 1360. Cf. Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. ("Bahena II"), 126 Nev. 606, 8 612, 245 P.3d 1182, 1186 (2010).

9 The Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a party who fails to comply with discovery 10 orders or rules can be sanctioned for that failure. NRCP 37(b). Sanctions against a party can be 11 graduated in severity and can include: designation of facts to be taken as established; refusal to allow 12 the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses; prohibition of the 13 offending party from introducing designated matters in evidence; an order striking out pleadings or 14 parts thereof or dismissing the action; or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient 15 party. NRCP 37(b)(2). Case concluding sanctions need not be preceded by other less severe sanction. GNLV, 111 Nev. at 870, 900 P.2d at 325. A disobedient party can also be required to pay 16 17 the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees caused by the failure. NRCP 37(b)(2)(E).

18 The Young Court adopted an eight factor analysis ("the Young factors") district courts must 19 go through if they feel a discovery abuse is so severe it warrants dismissal. The Young Court held, 20 "every order of dismissal with prejudice as a discovery sanction be supported by an express, careful and preferably written explanation of the court's analysis of the pertinent factors." Young, 106 Nev. 21 22 at 93, 787 P.2d at 780. The Young factors are as follows: (1) the degree of willfulness of the 23 offending party; (2) the extent to which the non-offending party would be prejudiced by a lesser 24 sanction; (3) the severity of the sanction of dismissal relative to the severity of the discovery abuse; 25 (4) whether any evidence has been irreparably lost; (5) the feasibility and fairness of less severe sanctions; (6) the policy favoring adjudication on the merits; (7) whether sanctions unfairly operate 26 27 to penalize a party for the misconduct of his or her attorney; and (8) the need to deter parties and 28 future litigants from similar abuses. Id. In discovery abuse situations where possible case-

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concluding sanctions are warranted, the trial judge has discretion in deciding which factors are to be considered on a "case-by-case" basis. *Bahena II*, 126 Nev. at 610, 245 P.3d at 1185 (citing *Higgs v. State*, 126 Nev. 1, 17, 222 P.3d 648, 658 (2010)). The *Young* factor list is not exhaustive and the Court is not required to find that all factors are present prior to making a finding. "Fundamental notions of fairness and due process require that discovery sanctions be just and ... relate to the specific conduct at issue." *GNLV*, 111 Nev. at 870, 900 P.2d at 325.

The Nevada Supreme Court has addressed orders of case concluding sanctions on numerous
 occasions. The Zenith Court found a party whose agent destroyed and/or lost a television prior to
 the commencement of the underlying action, after the party's expert had an opportunity to test the
 television and opine on the television as a cause of a fire, had committed a discovery abuse
 warranting case concluding sanctions.⁴ The Zenith Court held, "[t]he actions [of the appellant] had
 the effect of reserving to itself all expert testimony based upon examination of the television set."
 103 Nev. at 652, 747 P.2d at 914.

14 The Kelly Broadcasting Court held the striking of an answer and entry of a judgment in favor 15 of the non-offending party (Kelly) was an appropriate sanction for failing to complete discovery by 16 the offending party (Sovereign). Kelly Broadcasting, 96 Nev. at 192, 606 P.2d at 1092. Sovereign 17 argued a lesser sanction of striking only the affirmative defense to which the interrogatories applied 18 was a more appropriate sanction. The Kelly Broadcasting Court disagreed, noting "[t]he question is 19 not whether this court would as an original matter have entered a default judgment as a sanction for 20 violating a discovery rule; it is whether the trial court abused its discretion in so doing. We do not 21 find an abuse of discretion in this case." Id.

The Stubli Court upheld case concluding sanctions when the appellant or its agents failed to preserve evidence related to the cause of a trucking accident. The respondent provided expert affidavits which posited the cause of the accident could have been something other than the respondent's work on the truck. "The experts further asserted that appellant's failure to preserve the

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⁴ The trial court actually struck the appellant's expert witness from the trial. The appellant indicated it had insufficient evidence to proceed without its expert and the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the respondent. Zenith, 103 Nev. at 651, 747 P.2d at 913.

[truck and its components] had made it impossible for respondents to establish their defense theory." Stubli, 107 Nev. at 312, 810 P.2d at 787. See also, North American Properties v. McCarran International Airport, 2016 WL 699864 (Nev. Supreme Court 2016). But see, GNLV, supra (case concluding sanctions not appropriate when other evidence existed which experts could use to assist in their analysis including the statements of witnesses who saw the spoliated evidence).

6 The Court has considered the arguments of counsel, all of the pleadings on file in the instant 7 action, the testimony of the witnesses at the evidentiary hearing, the exhibits admitted at that 8 hearing, and the relevant case law discussed, supra. The issue presented in the case is actually very 9 narrow: MDB claims it was a defective solenoid manufactured by Versa that malfunctioned causing 10 a truck full of gravel to dump onto one of the two busiest roadways in Washoe County. MDB does 11 not dispute the electrical systems were not preserved in anticipation of the trial or potential testing. 12 MDB took no steps to warn its employees to keep any components in the electrical system should 13 they need to be replaced. There are no pictures taken of the electrical system or the components. 14 MDB's employees cannot testify to the condition of the components when they were replaced. 15 Versa avers there were other potential causes of the malfunction, including an electrical issue. Versa 16 further contends it cannot present these issues to the jury in support of its defense because the 17 evidence no longer exists. The Court reviews the Young factors as follows:

I. Willfulness

The first Young factor is willfulness. In Childers v. State, 100 Nev. 280, 283, 680 P.2d 598, 599 (1984), the Nevada Supreme Court found the term willful, "implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or to make the omission in question. The word does not require in its meaning any intent to violate law, or to injure another, or to acquire any advantage." Willfulness may be found when a party fails to provide discovery and such failure is not due to an inability on the offending party's part. Havas v Bank of Nevada, 96 Nev. 567, 570, 613 P.2d 706, 708 (1980). The Nevada Supreme Court has not opined that it is necessary to establish wrongful intent to establish willfulness.

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1 Clearly MDB should have anticipated extensive litigation as a result of the incident that 2 occurred on July 7, 2014. This was not a mere "slip and fall" where the putative plaintiff initially 3 claims he/she is not injured only later to come back and sue. There were numerous accidents and 4 injuries as a result of collisions occurring on a highway. MDB, or its counsel, had to know there 5 would be litigation as a result of these events. The Court heard no testimony that MDB took any 6 steps to preserve the truck or trailer in any way. There was no testimony indicating memorialization 7 of the condition of the vehicle was ever contemplated by anyone at MDB. On the contrary, the truck 8 and trailer continued to be in use after the events of July 7, 2014. It was subject to "routine" 9 maintenance. The Court may have condoned the continued use of the truck, and even the trailer, had 10 there been any steps taken to preserve the appearance of these items as they existed at the time of the 11 event, or prior to the "routine" maintenance. The memorialization did not occur.

12 It would have been simple to inform the shop staff to photograph the truck and trailer on or 13 about July 7, 2014. It would have required minimal effort to inform the shop staff to preserve any 14 electrical parts taken off the truck or trailer during the maintenance. If these steps had been taken 15 the Court would be looking at this case through the prism of GNLV because both parties would have 16 had alternative ways to prove or disprove their theory of the case. Based on the inaction of MDB in 17 preserving or memorializing the condition of the truck and trailer the Court must view this case through the prism of Stubli and Zenith: MDB alone has the ability to call experts to support their 18 19 position. Versa's expert has a theory he can neither confirm nor refute based on the loss of the 20 electrical components. The Court does not find MDB intentionally disposed of the components in 21 order to harm Versa, nor were MDB's employees acting with any malevolence; however, the Court 22 does find MDB is complicit of benign neglect and indifference to the needs of Versa regarding 23 discovery in this action.

II. The possibility of a lesser sanction

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The second Young factor is possible prejudice to Versa if a lesser sanction were imposed. The Court would consider lesser sanctions, including an adverse inference instruction, a rebuttable presumption instruction, and the striking of the MDB's expert as alternative sanctions. The Court

-8-

1	does not find any of these sanctions stalle the same wist below how how how he
2	does not find any of these sanctions strike the appropriate balance between MDB's actions and the
3	harm imposed on Versa's case. Should the Court strike Dr. Bosch from being a witness at the trial
4	MDB would be in the same position as the appellant in Zenith: unable to prove its case given the
5	lack of expert testimony and subject to a motion for summary judgment. This outcome would be a
	patent waste of limited judicial resources and of the jury's time. The Court does not find an adverse
6	inference instruction pursuant to NRS 47.250(3) and Bass-Davis v. Davis, 122 Nev. 442, 134 P.3d
7	103 (2006), is appropriate under the circumstances before the Court. ⁵ As noted by the Zenith Court
8	"[t]he actions of [MDB] had the effect of reserving to itself all expert testimony based upon
9	examination of the [electronic components]. Any adverse presumption which the court might have
10	ordered as a sanction for the spoliation of evidence would have paled next to the testimony of the
11	expert witness." Zenith, 103 Nev. at 652, 747 P.2d at 914. Additionally, an adverse inference
12	instruction requires an "intent to harm another party through the destruction and not simply the
3	intent to destroy evidence." Bass-Davis, 122 Nev. at 448, 134 P.3d at 106. The Court does not find
4	MDB intended to harm Versa by destroying or disposing of the electrical components; therefore, it
5	could not give this instruction. The Court can conceive of no other sanction which would be
16	appropriate under these circumstances.
8	³ At oral argument counsel for MDB stated:
9 20 21	Recently the Nevada Supreme Court has declared that the Bass versus Davis case is the prevailing case on the spoliation of evidence, not Young versus Ribeiro. And in a case called Walmart Stores, Inc. versus the Eighth Judicial District, No. 48488, January 3 1st of 2008, the court said, "It is an abuse of discretion for a district coun not to consider the case of Bass-Davis versus Davis when imposing sanctions pursuant to Nevada Rule of Civi Procedure 37 for an allegation of spoliation."
2	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, EVIDENTIARY HEARING, 208:15-24. The citation to an unpublished disposition of the Nevada Supreme Court issued prior to January 1, 2016, is a violation of ADKT 0504 and SCR 123
4	(the SCR was repealed by the ADKT). The Court found it difficult to believe the Nevada Supreme Court would make such a sweeping change to firmly established precedent as that represented by counsel in an unpublished disposition.
5	The Court was unfamiliar with Walmart, so the Court endeavored to familiarize itself with the case. The Court looked up the case number provided by counsel on the Nevada Supreme Court webpage. Troublingly, the Court was unable to
6	verify the veracity of the proposition proffered by MDB because the parties agreed to dismiss their proceedings and the Nevada Supreme Court vacated the order upon which MDB makes its argument. The Nevada Supreme Court had
27	granted a Writ of Mandamus on January 31, 2008; however, it withdrew that order on a subsequent date. The Nevada Supreme Court webpage indicates the parties contacted the Supreme Court on February 2, 2008, and indicated they had
28	settled their case. The Nevada Supreme Court entered an order vacating the January 31, 2008, order upon which MDB relies and "den[ied] the petition as moot" on February 13, 2008. In short, the "case" MDB relies upon does not even exist.
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111. The severity of the sanction of dismissal relative to the severity of the discovery abuse

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	"The dismissal of a case, based upon a discovery abuse should be used only in extreme
situa	tions; if less drastic sanctions are available, they should be utilized." GNLV, 111 Nev. at 870,
900 1	P.2d at 325 (citing Young, 106 Nev. at 92, 787 P.2d at 779-80). The Court is keenly aware that
grant	ting the Motion effectively ends the case. The Court does not take this action lightly. The only
issue	in this case is why the door to the trailer opened causing the gravel to dump into the roadway.
The (Court finds MDB's disposal of the electronic components without memorializing them in any
way	effectively halted the adversarial process. It left all of the "cards" in MDB's hands and left
Vers	a with nothing other than a theory it could neither prove nor disprove. MDB could simply rely
on its	s expert during trial and argue Versa had no proof of its theory and the theory itself was
prepo	osterous. This is the position taken by MDB at the evidentiary hearing. Versa is left with no
way	of verifying its theory of the case.
	Counsel for MDB directed the Court's attention at the evidentiary hearing to the strength of
heir	expert (Dr. Bosch) and the weakness of Versa's expert (Palmer). Counsel further emphasized
the la	ack of plausibility of the Palmer's conclusions that it could have been an abraded wire which
cause	ed an electrical failure rather than some issue with the solenoid or the Versa valve. The Court
not c	convinced this should be the deciding factor in resolving the issue of case concluding sanctions
for th	he following reasons:
	 MDB's own employee (the same employees who serviced the truck and trailer) acknowledged at the evidentiary hearing that the abrasions Palmer referenced actually d occur;⁶ and
	Okay. You also mentioned that you want to replace those cords, the seven and the – the seven-conductor and the conductor cords because they will get cut on the deck plate, they will get abraded, they will become cracked; is the ct?
A: 11	have seen that, yes.
TRA	NSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, EVIDENTIARY HEARING (testimony of Patrick Bigby), 154:1-6.
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1 2	 Dr. Bosch had to acknowledge, though grudgingly and with great circumspection, that i was possible though highly unlikely the electrical system could have caused the valve in question to open.⁷
3	The Court's decision regarding the issue presented in the Motion is not predicated on who has
4	the "stronger case" or the "better expert" at the evidentiary hearing. If this were the analysis the
5	
6	Court would agree with MDB: Dr. Bosch is a very credible witness and it is likely MDB has the
7	more compelling argument to present to the jury. This, however, is not the issue. The issue in the
8	Court's analysis is MDB's actions deprived Versa of any ability to prove its case: the adversarial
9	process was stymied by MDB regarding the most critical pieces of evidence. Had MDB's witness
0	testified the abrasions never occur, or abrasions were photographed and/or documented and none
1	existed on this truck, the Court's conclusion may have been different. Here we know it could have
	occurred as Palmer suggested.
2	IV. Whether evidence is irreparably lost
3	Cloude the relevant or idea or is but. The analysis of MDD togetified at the ordinations
4	Clearly the relevant evidence is lost. The employees of MDB testified at the evidentiary
5	hearing the electronic components had been thrown away.
6	V. The feasibility and fairness of a less severe sanctions
7	The Court discussed the possibility of less severe sanctions in section II. The same analysis
8	applies here. There does not appear to be any sanction short of case concluding sanctions which
9	would be appropriate under the circumstances of this case. The Court also acknowledges that
0	progressive sanctions are not always necessary. The circumstances presented in the Motion are
1	unique and the most severe sanction is appropriate.
22	unique and the most severe salienon is appropriate.
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26	⁷ Q: Is there any scenario under which current from the seven-prong cord having contact with the four-prong cord cou open the versa valve?
27	A: Anything is possible, but it's highly improbable in this case.
28	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, EVIDENTIARY HEARING (testimony of Dr. Bosch), 161:5-9. Dr. Bosch's testimony clearly established he did not believe there was a short or other electrical failure that caused the value to ope
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VI. The policy favoring adjudication on the merits; and

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VII. The need to deter parties and future litigants from similar abuse

The Court considers the sixth and eighth Young factors together. Nevada has a strong policy, 5 and the Court firmly believes, that cases should be adjudicated on their merits. See, Scrimer v. Dist. 6 Court, 116 Nev. 507, 516-517, 998 P.2d 1190, 1196 (2000). See also, Kahn v. Orme, 108 Nev. 510, 7 516, 835 P.2d 790, 794 (1992). Further, there is a need to deter litigants from abusing the discovery 8 process established by Nevada law. When a party repeatedly and continuously engaged in discovery Q misconduct the policy of adjudicating cases on the merits is not furthered by a lesser sanction. 10 Foster, 126 Nev. at 65, 227 P.3d at 1048. The case sub judice is not one of systemic discovery 11 abuse. However, the Court concludes to allow the case to go forward as it is currently postured 12 would be the antithesis of allowing it to proceed "on the merits." The merits of Versa's case would 13 not be able to be evaluated by the jury because Versa could not test its theory on the actual 14 components. The jury would be left to guess about what may have occurred rather than weigh the 15 competing theories presented. MDB would have an overwhelmingly unfair advantage given its 16 action. 17

The Court balances the laudable policy of trial on the merits against the need to deter future 18 litigants from abusing the discovery process. The Court turns back to the Zenith Court's direction to 19 all potential litigants regarding their duty to preserve evidence. The Zenith Court stated, "[i]t would 20 be unreasonable to allow litigants, by destroying physical evidence prior to a request for production, 21 to sidestep the district court's power to enforce the rules of discovery." Id. 103 Nev. at 651, 747 22 P.2d at 913. Accord, Colfer v. Harmon, 108 Nev. 363, 832 P.2d 383 (1992). To allow this case to 23 go forward, when the only evidence which may have supported Versa's defense was in the sole 24 possession of MDB and MDB did nothing to preserve or document that evidence, would set a 25 dangerous precedent to similarly situated parties in the future. It would also be antithetical to a 26 potential litigant's obligation to preserve the very evidence it may have to produce during discovery. 27

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When the Court balances the sixth and eighth Young factor it concludes dismissal of MDB's claims 2 against Versa are appropriate.

VIII. Whether sanctions unfairly operate to penalize a party for the misconduct of his or her attorney

There is no evidence to show MDB's counsel directed MDB to destroy or fail to memorialize 6 the evidence in question. The Court finds this factor to be inapplicable to the Young analysis. 7

"Fundamental notions of fairness and due process require that discovery sanctions be just 8 and ... relate to the specific conduct at issue." GNLV, 111 Nev. at 870, 900 P.2d at 325 (citing 9 Young, 106 Nev. at 92, 787 P.2d at 779-80). The Court recognizes that discovery sanctions should 10 be related to the specific conduct at issue. The discovery abuse in this case crippled one party's 11 ability to present its case. Weighing all eight factors above the Court concludes the dismissal of the 12 MDB Cross-Claim is appropriate. Due to the severity of MDB's discovery abuse there are no lesser 13 sanctions that are suitable. 14

It is hereby ORDERED DEFENDANT/CROSS-CLAIMANT/CROSS-DEFENDANT 15 VERSA PRODUCTS COMPANY, INC.'S MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT/CROSS-16 CLAIMANT/CROSS-DEFENDANT MDB TRUCKING, LLC'S CROSS-CLAIM PURSUANT TO NRCP 35; OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR AN ADVERSE JURY INSTRUCTION is 18 GRANTED. MDB TRUCKING, LLC'S CROSS-CLAIM is DISMISSED. 19

DATED this 8 day of December, 2017.

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
IOTT A. SATTLER District Judge

-13-

	CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
2	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of the Second Judicial
3	District Court of the State of Nevada, County of Washoe; that on this day of December, 2017
1	I deposited in the County mailing system for postage and mailing with the United States Postal
5	Service in Reno, Nevada, a true copy of the attached document addressed to:
5	CEDTIFICATE OF DIFCTDONIC SEDVICE
'	CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE
3	I hereby certify that I am an employee of the Second Judicial District Court of the State of
	Nevada, in and for the County of Washoe; that on the <u>8</u> day of December, 2017, I
)	electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court by using the ECF system which will
	send a notice of electronic filing to the following:
2	JOSH AICKLEN, ESQ.
3	MATTHEW ADDISON, ESQ. KATHERINE PARKS, ESQ.
	BRIAN BROWN, ESQ.
i	THIERRY BARKLEY, ESQ. SARAH QUIGLEY, ESQ.
	JESSICA WOELFEL, ESQ.
į,	JACOB BUNDICK, ESQ. NICHOLAS WIECZOREK, ESQ.
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	Shele Marsfuld
1	Sheila Mansfield Judicial Assistant
	Juuciai Assistant
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
JOSH COLE AICKLEN Nevada Bar No. 007254 Josh.aicklen@lewisbrisbois.com DAVID B. AVAKIAN Nevada Bar No. 009502 David.avakian@lewisbrisbois.com PAIGE S. SHREVE Nevada Bar No. 013773 Paige.shreve@lewisbrisbois.com LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLF 6385 S. Rainbow Boulevard, Suite 600 Las Vegas, Nevada 89118 702.893.3383 FAX: 702.893.3789 Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant VERSA PRODUCTS COMPANY, INC.		FILED Electronically CV16-00976 2018-02-08 01:13:47 Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court Transaction # 65225
DISTRIC	TCOURT	
WASHOE CO	UNTY, NEVADA	
GENEVA M. REMMERDE,	Case No. CV16-00976	
Plaintiff,	Dept. 10	
vs.	NOTICE OF ENTRY	
DANIEL ANTHONY KOSKI; MDB TRUCKING, LLC; DOES I-X and ROE I-V,		
Defendants.		
AND ALL RELATED CASES.		
TO: ALL INTERESTED PARTIES:		
111		
///		

LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH ILP

1	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Order was entered by the above-entitled Court on
2	the 22 nd day of January, 2018, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1 and made
3	a part hereof.
4	AFFIRMATION
5	Pursuant to NRS 239B.030, the undersigned hereby affirms that this document
6	filed in this court does not contain the social security number of any person.
7	DATED this 8 th day of February, 2018
8	Respectfully Submitted,
9	LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP
10	
11	
12	By /s/ Josh Cole Aicklen JOSH COLE AICKLEN
13	Nevada Bar No. 007254 DAVID B. AVAKIAN
14	Nevada Bar No. 009502 PAIGE S. SHREVE
15	Nevada Bar No. 013773 6385 S. Rainbow Boulevard, Suite 600
16	Las Vegas, Nevada 89118
17	Attorneys for Defendant/Cross-Defendant VERSA PRODUCTS COMPANY, INC.
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	4810-9078-7930.1 2

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LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP ADDRNEYS AT LAW



1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that on this 8 th day of February, 2018 a true and correct copy
3	of NOTICE OF ENTRY was served via the Court's electronic e-filing system addressed
4	as follows:
5	Matthew C. Addison, Esq. McDONALD CARANO WILSON LLP 100 W. Liberty St., 10 th Floor
6	Reno, NV 89501
7	RMC LAMAR HOLDINGS, INC.
8	Nicholas M. Wieczorek, Esq. Jeremy J. Thompson, Esq.
9	CLARK HILL PLLC 3800 Howard Hughes Pkwy, Ste. 500
10	Las Vegas, NV 89169 Attorneys for MDB TRUCKING, LLC and
11	DANIEĽ ANTHONY KOSKI
12	
13	/s/ Susan Kingsbury
14	An Employee of LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP
15	LEWIS BRISDOIS DISGAARD & SMITH LLP
16	
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	4810-9078-7930.1 4

LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP ADDREW AT LAW

FILED Electronically CV16-00976 2018-02-08 01:13:47 PM Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court Transaction # 6522570

EXHIBIT 1

4845-3057-6394.1

ī	FILED Electronically CV16-00976 2018-01-22 04:15:56 PM Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court
2	Transaction # 6492566
3	IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
4	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
5	***
6	GENEVA M. REMMERDE,
7	Plaintiff, Case No. CV16-00976
8 9	Dept. No. 10 vs.
10 11	DANIEL ANTHONY KOSKI; MDB TRUCKING, LLC; et al.,
12 13	Defendants/
14	ORDER
15	Presently before the Court is THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT VERSA PRODUCTS
16	COMPANY, INC.'S MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF MDB
17	TRUCKING, LLC's THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO NRCP 35; OR IN THE
18	ALTERNATIVE, FOR AN ADVERSE JURY INSTRUCTION ("the Motion"). The Motion was
19	filed by Defendant/Cross-Claimant/Cross-Defendant VERSA PRODUCTS COMPANY, INC.
20	("Versa") on May 15, 2017. Defendant/Cross-Claimant MDB TRUCKING, LLC ("MDB") did not
21 22	file an Opposition to the Motion. ¹ See WDCR 12(2). The Motion was submitted for the Court's consideration on December 12, 2017.
23	This case arises from a personal injury action. A COMPLAINT was filed by plaintiffs Ernest
24	Bruce Fitzsimmons and Carol Fitzsimmons, on December 4, 2015 ("the Fitzsimmons Action"). The
25	Fitzsimmons Action was assigned Second Judicial District Court case number CV15-02349.
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27 28	¹ The issues presented in the Motion were fully briefed in FITZSIMMONS, et al. v. MDB TRUCKING, LLC, et al., CV15-02349.
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1 Numerous other plaintiffs were joined into the Fitzsimmons Action. Two additional cases were filed 2 and prosecuted outside of the Fitzsimmons Action: the instant case and JAMES BIBLE v. MDB 3 TRUCKING, LLC et al., CV16-01914 ("the Bible Action"). The instant action was filed on May 2, 4 2016. The Bible Action was filed September 20, 2016. It is alleged in all three actions that on July 5 7, 2014, Defendant Daniel Anthony Koski ("Koski"), while driving a truck for MDB, negligently 6 spilled a load of gravel into the roadway. The spilled gravel caused the driving plaintiffs to lose 7 control of their vehicles and numerous accidents occurred resulting in the three separate cases. The 8 plaintiffs sustained physical and emotional injuries as a result of the accidents. In response to the 9 complaint filed in the instant action, MDB filed a THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT ("the MDB Cross-10 Claim") June 22, 2016. The MDB Cross-Claim had two causes of action relative to Versa: Implied 11 Indemnification and Contribution.² MDB alleges it was not Koski's negligence that caused the 12 gravel to spill; rather, the spill was caused by the "unreasonably dangerous and defective" design 13 and manufacture of the trailer that held the gravel. The MDB Cross-Claim, 4:6-8. Therefore, MDB 14 brought the Cross-Claim against the manufacturers of the trailer and its components, including 15 Versa. MDB avers Versa produced a solenoid valve which would, "activate inadvertently allowing 16 the gates to open and release the load [of gravel] carried by the trailer." The MDB Cross-Claim, 4:9-17 11. MDB also claims there were safer alternatives available to Versa; the solenoid valve was 18 unreasonably dangerous and defective; and Versa failed to provide appropriate safety mechanisms 19 regarding the solenoid valve. The MDB Cross-Claim, 4:15-22.

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
The Motion is the same as the motion practice in the Fitzsimmons Action and the Bible 21 Action. The issues are identical, as are the relevant parties. The Court issued an ORDER ("the 22 December Order") on December 8, 2017, in the Fitzsimmons Action. The December Order 23 conducted a thorough analysis of the issue presented in the Motion. See generally Young v. Johnny 24 Ribeiro Building, Inc., 106 Nev. 88, 787 P.2d 777 (1990), and NRCP 37. The Court found in the 25 December Order case concluding sanctions were an appropriate sanction for MDB's spoliation of

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² Versa filed THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT VERSA PRODUCTS COMPANY INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF, MDB TRUCKING, LLC'S THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR IMPLIED INDEMNITY PURSUANT TO NRCP 12(B)(5) ("the MTD") on July 19, 2016. The Court granted the MTD on October 19, 2016. The only remaining cause of action alleged by MDB against Versa is for Contribution.

Ē critical evidence. The Court finds a restatement of the December Order is unnecessary in the instant action. Given the indistinguishable issues the Court attaches hereto and incorporates herein as EXHIBIT A the December Order which shall be considered dispositive of the issue raised in the Motion.3 It is hereby ORDERED THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT VERSA PRODUCTS COMPANY, INC.'S MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT/THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF MDB TRUCKING, LLC's THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO NRCP 35; OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR AN ADVERSE JURY INSTRUCTION is GRANTED. MDB TRUCKING, LLC'S CROSS-CLAIM is DISMISSED. DATED this 22 day of January, 2018. SATTI District Judge ³ The Court notes D.C.R. 13(3) states, "[f]ailure of the opposing party to serve and file his written opposition may be construed as an admission that the motion is meritorious and a consent to granting the same." Versa has not moved to have the Motion granted under this standard. -3-

	CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of the Second Judicial District Con
l	of the State of Nevada, County of Washoe; that on this day of January, 2018, I deposited in
	the County mailing system for postage and mailing with the United States Postal Service in Rend
	Nevada, a true copy of the attached document addressed to:
	CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE
	I hereby certify that I am an employee of the Second Judicial District Court of the State of
	Nevada, in and for the County of Washoe; that on the 22 day of January, 2018, I electronically
	filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court by using the ECF system which will send a notice
	of electronic filing to the following:
	MATTHEW ADDISON, ESQ.
	JOSH AICKLEN, ESQ.
	KATHERINE PARKS, ESQ. BRIAN BROWN, ESQ.
	THIERRY BARKLEY, ESQ.
	SARAH QUIGLEY, ESQ. JESSICA WOELFEL, ESQ.
	JACOB BUNDICK, ESQ.
	NICHOLAS M. WIECZOREK, ESQ.
	Sherler II makere
	Sheila Mansfield Judicial Assistant



	2017-12-08 02:59: Jacqueline Bry Clerk of the Co Transaction # 64:
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTI	RICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN AND FOR TH	E COUNTY OF WASHOE
the second second second second second	***
ERNEST BRUCE FITZSIMMONS, et al.,	
Plaintiffs,	Case No. CV15-02349
VS.	Dept. No. 10
MDB TRUCKING, LLC; et al.,	
Defendants.	1
	ORDER
Presently before the Court is DEFEND	ANT/CROSS-CLAIMANT/CROSS-DEFENDANT
VERSA PRODUCTS COMPANY, INC.'S M	OTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT/CROSS-
CLAIMANT/CROSS-DEFENDANT MDB T	RUCKING, LLC'S CROSS-CLAIM PURSUANT
TO NRCP 35; OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE,	FOR AN ADVERSE JURY INSTRUCTION ("the
Motion"). The Motion was filed by Defendant	t/Cross-Claimant/Cross-Defendant VERSA
PRODUCTS, INC. ("Versa") on May 15, 201	7.1 Defendant/Cross-Claimant, MDB Trucking,
LLC ("MDB") filed MDB'S OPPOSITION TO	O VERSA PRODUCTS COMPANY, INC.'S
MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR SPOLIATIO	ON INSTRUCTIONS ("the Opposition") on June 2,
2017. Versa filed DEFENDANT/CROSS-CL.	AIMANT/CROSS-DEFENDANT VERSA
COMPANY, INC.'S MOTION TO STRIKE DEFEND. TRUCKING, LLC'S CROSS-CLAIM PURSUANT TO JURY INSTRUCTION ("the Errata") on May 5, 2017.	CLAIMANT/CROSS-DEFENDANT VERSA PRODUCTS ANT/CROSS-CLAIMANT/CROSS-DEFENDANT MDB NRCP 37; OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR AN ADVERS The Errata clarifies Versa is bringing the Motion pursuant to Aution. The reference to NRCP 35 is made only in the caption a typographical error.

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PRODUCTS COMPANY, INC.'S REPLY TO MDB'S OPPOSITION TO VERSA PRODUCTS
 COMPANY, INC.'S MOTION TO STRIKE MDB TRUCKING, LLC'S CROSS-CLAIM
 PURSUANT TO NRCP 37; OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR AN ADVERSE JURY
 INSTRUCTION ("the Reply") on June 12, 2017, and contemporaneously submitted the matter for
 the Court's consideration. The Court entered an ORDER on August 1, 2017, setting the Motion
 for oral argument.² The Court heard the arguments of counsel on August 29, 2017, and took the
 matter under submission.

8 The Court felt case concluding sanctions were a potential discovery sanction for the alleged 9 abuse following the oral argument. An evidentiary hearing affording both sides the opportunity to 10 present witnesses was required given this conclusion. See generally, Nevada Power v. Fluor Illinois, 11 108 Nev. 638, 837 P.2d 1354 (1992). The Court entered an ORDER ("the September Order") on 12 September 22, 2017, directing the parties to set the matter for an evidentiary hearing. The 13 evidentiary hearing was conducted on October 13, 2017 ("the October Hearing"). Versa called one 14 expert witness, Scott Palmer ("Palmer"), and one lay witness Garrick Mitchell ("Mitchell") at the 15 October Hearing. MDB called one expert witness, Dr. David Bosch ("Dr. Bosch"), and two lay 16 witnesses, Patrick Bigby ("Bigby") and Erik Anderson ("Anderson") at the October Hearing. The 17 Court admitted numerous exhibits during the October Hearing. The Court permitted the parties to 18 argue their respective positions. Trial was scheduled to begin on October 30, 2017. The Court was 19 aware of its obligation to make detailed findings of facts and conclusions of law. Further, the Court 20 wanted to fulfill these obligations in a thoughtful manner and in writing pursuant to the mandates of 21 the Nevada Supreme Court. The Court informed the parties the Motion would be granted and 22 vacated the trial date. The Court took the matter under submission. This written ORDER follows. 23 This case arises from a personal injury action. A COMPLAINT ("the Complaint") was filed 24 by Plaintiffs Ernest Bruce Fitzsimmons and Carol Fitzsimmons, on December 4, 2015. Numerous 25 other plaintiffs were joined into the Fitzsimmons case. It is alleged on July 7, 2014, Defendant 26 Daniel Anthony Koski ("Koski"), while driving a truck for MDB, negligently spilled a load of

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² There were numerous other pre-trial motions scheduled for oral argument on the same date.

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1 gravel into the roadway. The spilled gravel caused the driving plaintiffs to lose control of their 2 vehicles and numerous accidents occurred. The plaintiffs sustained physical and emotional injuries 3 as a result of the accidents. In response to the Complaint, MDB filed a THIRD-PARTY 4 COMPLAINT ("the MDB Cross-Claim") June 15, 2016. The MDB Cross-Claim had two causes 5 of action relative to Versa: Implied Indemnification and Contribution.³ MDB alleges it was not 6 Koski's negligence that caused the gravel to spill; rather, the spill was caused by the "unreasonably 7 dangerous and defective" design and manufacture of the trailer that held the gravel. The MDB 8 Cross-Claim, 3:5-7. Therefore, MDB brought the Cross-Claim against the manufacturers of the 9 trailer and its components, including Versa. MDB avers Versa produced a solenoid valve which 10 would, "activate inadvertently allowing the gates to open and release the load [of gravel] carried by 11 the trailer." The MDB Cross-Claim, 3:10-11. MDB also claims there were safer alternatives 12 available to Versa; the solenoid valve was unreasonably dangerous and defective; and Versa failed 13 to provide appropriate safety mechanisms regarding the solenoid valve. The MDB Cross-Claim, 14 3:12-18.

15 Versa has denied its product is defective and further denies any responsibility for the spilling 16 of the gravel. Additionally, Versa filed DEFENDANT/CROSS-CLAIMANT VERSA PRODUCTS 17 COMPANY, INC.'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS ERNEST BRUCE FITZSIMMONS AND CAROL FITZSIMMONS' FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST 18 19 MDB TRUCKING, LLC; DANIEL ANTHONY KOSKI; AND DOES I-X, INCLUSIVE ("the 20 Versa Cross-Claim") on June 29, 2016. The Versa Cross-Claim alleges one cause of action against 21 MDB: Contribution. Versa alleges MDB "negligently operated, maintained, owned, serviced and/or entrusted the subject trailer " The Versa Cross-Claim, 10:17-18. Versa and MDB are the only 22 23 remaining parties in this litigation: all of the plaintiffs consolidated into these proceedings, and all 24 of the other defendants have been dismissed and/or settled.

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³ Versa filed CROSS-DEFENDANT VERSA PRODUCTS COMPANY INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS CROSS-CLAIMANT, MDB TRUCKING, LLC'S THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR IMPLIED INDEMNITY PURSUANT
 TO NRCP 12(B)(5) ("the MTD") on June 27, 2016. The Court granted the MTD on October 19, 2016. The only remaining cause of action alleged by MDB against Versa is for Contribution.

1 The Motion avers MDB has destroyed or disposed of critical evidence which directly 2 impacts Versa's ability to represent itself in the instant litigation. Specifically, the Motion contends 3 after the accident MDB continued to use the truck in question; failed to keep the truck in the same 4 condition as it was on the day in question; serviced the truck routinely; repaired and replaced the 5 electrical systems that control the solenoid which operated the Versa valve; and failed to take steps 6 to preserve this critical evidence knowing litigation was highly probable. The Opposition contends 7 there has been no spoliation of evidence in this case. Further, the Opposition posits there was 8 nothing more than routine maintenance done on the trailer; therefore, Versa's ability to defend itself 9 has not been impaired.

10 The Motion avers MDB had a duty to preserve the discarded electrical systems in 11 anticipation of the underlying action. In Fire Ins. Exchange v. Zenith Radio Corp., 103 Nev. 648, 12 651, 747 P.2d 911, 914 (1987), the Nevada Supreme Court held, "even where an action has not been 13 commenced and there is only a potential for litigation, the litigant is under a duty to preserve the 14 evidence which it knows or reasonably should know is relevant to the action." The Motion 15 concludes the appropriate sanction for the failure to preserve this crucial evidence should be 16 dismissal of the entire action. See generally Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Building Inc., 106 Nev. 88, 17 787 P.2d 777 (1990), and NRCP 37.

18 Discovery sanctions are within the discretion of the trial court. See Stubli v. Big D Int'l 19 Trucks, Inc., 107 Nev. 309, 312, 810 P.2d 785, 787 (1991), and Kelly Broadcasting v. Sovereign 20 Broadcast, 96 Nev. 188, 192, 606 P.2d 1089, 1092 (1980). "Generally, sanctions may only be 21 imposed where there has been willful noncompliance with the court's order, or where the adversary 22 process has been halted by the actions of the unresponsive party." Zenith, 103 Nev. at 651, 747 23 P.2d at 913 (citing Finkelman v. Clover Jewelers Blvd. Inc., 91 Nev. 146, 147, 532 P.2d 608, 609 24 (1975) and Skeen v. Valley Bank of Nevada, 89 Nev. 301, 303, 511 P.2d 1053, 1054 (1973)). 25 Accord GNLV Corp. v. Service Control Corp., 111 Nev. 866, 869, 900 P.2d 323, 325 (1995). 26 Dismissal of an entire action with prejudice is a dramatic punishment for a discovery abuse. The 27 Nevada Supreme Court cautions district courts the use of such a Draconian sanction should be 28 approached with caution. "The dismissal of a case, based upon a discovery abuse such as the

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1 destruction or loss of evidence, 'should be used only in extreme situations; if less drastic sanctions 2 are available, they should be utilized." GNLV, 111 Nev. at 870, 900 P.2d at 326 (citation omitted). 3 Additionally, the Nevada Power Court held it was an abuse of discretion for a district court to grant 4 case concluding sanctions without an evidentiary hearing. The Nevada Power Court held the party 5 facing a case terminating sanction needs an "opportunity to present witnesses or to cross-examine 6 [the movant] or their experts with regard to [the discovery violations]." Nevada Power, 108 Nev. at 7 646, 837 P.2d at 1360. Cf. Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. ("Bahena II"), 126 Nev. 606, 8 612, 245 P.3d 1182, 1186 (2010).

9 The Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a party who fails to comply with discovery 10 orders or rules can be sanctioned for that failure. NRCP 37(b). Sanctions against a party can be 11 graduated in severity and can include: designation of facts to be taken as established; refusal to allow 12 the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses; prohibition of the 13 offending party from introducing designated matters in evidence; an order striking out pleadings or 14 parts thereof or dismissing the action; or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient 15 party. NRCP 37(b)(2). Case concluding sanctions need not be preceded by other less severe 16 sanction. GNLV, 111 Nev. at 870, 900 P.2d at 325. A disobedient party can also be required to pay 17 the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees caused by the failure. NRCP 37(b)(2)(E).

18 The Young Court adopted an eight factor analysis ("the Young factors") district courts must 19 go through if they feel a discovery abuse is so severe it warrants dismissal. The Young Court held, 20 "every order of dismissal with prejudice as a discovery sanction be supported by an express, careful 21 and preferably written explanation of the court's analysis of the pertinent factors." Young, 106 Nev. 22 at 93, 787 P.2d at 780. The Young factors are as follows: (1) the degree of willfulness of the 23 offending party; (2) the extent to which the non-offending party would be prejudiced by a lesser 24 sanction; (3) the severity of the sanction of dismissal relative to the severity of the discovery abuse; 25 (4) whether any evidence has been irreparably lost; (5) the feasibility and fairness of less severe 26 sanctions; (6) the policy favoring adjudication on the merits; (7) whether sanctions unfairly operate 27 to penalize a party for the misconduct of his or her attorney; and (8) the need to deter parties and 28 future litigants from similar abuses. Id. In discovery abuse situations where possible case-

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¹ concluding sanctions are warranted, the trial judge has discretion in deciding which factors are to be
 ² considered on a "case-by-case" basis. Bahena II, 126 Nev. at 610, 245 P.3d at 1185 (citing Higgs v.
 ³ State, 126 Nev. 1, 17, 222 P.3d 648, 658 (2010)). The Young factor list is not exhaustive and the
 ⁴ Court is not required to find that all factors are present prior to making a finding. "Fundamental
 ⁵ notions of fairness and due process require that discovery sanctions be just and . . . relate to the
 ⁶ specific conduct at issue." GNLV, 111 Nev. at 870, 900 P.2d at 325.

The Nevada Supreme Court has addressed orders of case concluding sanctions on numerous
 occasions. The Zenith Court found a party whose agent destroyed and/or lost a television prior to
 the commencement of the underlying action, after the party's expert had an opportunity to test the
 television and opine on the television as a cause of a fire, had committed a discovery abuse
 warranting case concluding sanctions.⁴ The Zenith Court held, "[t]he actions [of the appellant] had
 the effect of reserving to itself all expert testimony based upon examination of the television set."
 103 Nev. at 652, 747 P.2d at 914.

14 The Kelly Broadcasting Court held the striking of an answer and entry of a judgment in favor 15 of the non-offending party (Kelly) was an appropriate sanction for failing to complete discovery by 16 the offending party (Sovereign). Kelly Broadcasting, 96 Nev. at 192, 606 P.2d at 1092. Sovereign 17 argued a lesser sanction of striking only the affirmative defense to which the interrogatories applied 18 was a more appropriate sanction. The Kelly Broadcasting Court disagreed, noting "[t]he question is 19 not whether this court would as an original matter have entered a default judgment as a sanction for 20 violating a discovery rule; it is whether the trial court abused its discretion in so doing. We do not 21 find an abuse of discretion in this case." Id.

The *Stubli* Court upheld case concluding sanctions when the appellant or its agents failed to preserve evidence related to the cause of a trucking accident. The respondent provided expert affidavits which posited the cause of the accident could have been something other than the respondent's work on the truck. "The experts further asserted that appellant's failure to preserve the

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 - ⁴ The trial court actually struck the appellant's expert witness from the trial. The appellant indicated it had insufficient evidence to proceed without its expert and the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the respondent. Zenith, 103 Nev. at 651, 747 P.2d at 913.

1 [truck and its components] had made it impossible for respondents to establish their defense theory." 2 Stubli, 107 Nev. at 312, 810 P.2d at 787. See also, North American Properties v. McCarran 3 International Airport, 2016 WL 699864 (Nev. Supreme Court 2016). But see, GNLV, supra (case 4 concluding sanctions not appropriate when other evidence existed which experts could use to assist 5 in their analysis including the statements of witnesses who saw the spoliated evidence).

б The Court has considered the arguments of counsel, all of the pleadings on file in the instant 7 action, the testimony of the witnesses at the evidentiary hearing, the exhibits admitted at that 8 hearing, and the relevant case law discussed, supra. The issue presented in the case is actually very 9 narrow: MDB claims it was a defective solenoid manufactured by Versa that malfunctioned causing 10 a truck full of gravel to dump onto one of the two busiest roadways in Washoe County. MDB does 11 not dispute the electrical systems were not preserved in anticipation of the trial or potential testing. 12 MDB took no steps to warn its employees to keep any components in the electrical system should 13 they need to be replaced. There are no pictures taken of the electrical system or the components. 14 MDB's employees cannot testify to the condition of the components when they were replaced. 15 Versa avers there were other potential causes of the malfunction, including an electrical issue. Versa 16 further contends it cannot present these issues to the jury in support of its defense because the 17 evidence no longer exists. The Court reviews the Young factors as follows:

I. Willfulness

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The first Young factor is willfulness. In Childers v. State, 100 Nev. 280, 283, 680 P.2d 598, 20 599 (1984), the Nevada Supreme Court found the term willful, "implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or to make the omission in question. The word does not require in its 22 meaning any intent to violate law, or to injure another, or to acquire any advantage." Willfulness 23 may be found when a party fails to provide discovery and such failure is not due to an inability on 24 the offending party's part. Havas v Bank of Nevada, 96 Nev. 567, 570, 613 P.2d 706, 708 (1980). 25 The Nevada Supreme Court has not opined that it is necessary to establish wrongful intent to 26 establish willfulness. 27

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1 Clearly MDB should have anticipated extensive litigation as a result of the incident that 2 occurred on July 7, 2014. This was not a mere "slip and fall" where the putative plaintiff initially 3 claims he/she is not injured only later to come back and sue. There were numerous accidents and 4 injuries as a result of collisions occurring on a highway. MDB, or its counsel, had to know there 5 would be litigation as a result of these events. The Court heard no testimony that MDB took any 6 steps to preserve the truck or trailer in any way. There was no testimony indicating memorialization 7 of the condition of the vehicle was ever contemplated by anyone at MDB. On the contrary, the truck 8 and trailer continued to be in use after the events of July 7, 2014. It was subject to "routine"

maintenance. The Court may have condoned the continued use of the truck, and even the trailer, had
 there been any steps taken to preserve the appearance of these items as they existed at the time of the
 event, or prior to the "routine" maintenance. The memorialization did not occur.

12 It would have been simple to inform the shop staff to photograph the truck and trailer on or 13 about July 7, 2014. It would have required minimal effort to inform the shop staff to preserve any 14 electrical parts taken off the truck or trailer during the maintenance. If these steps had been taken 15 the Court would be looking at this case through the prism of GNLV because both parties would have 16 had alternative ways to prove or disprove their theory of the case. Based on the inaction of MDB in 17 preserving or memorializing the condition of the truck and trailer the Court must view this case 18 through the prism of Stubli and Zenith: MDB alone has the ability to call experts to support their 19 position. Versa's expert has a theory he can neither confirm nor refute based on the loss of the electrical components. The Court does not find MDB intentionally disposed of the components in 20 order to harm Versa, nor were MDB's employees acting with any malevolence; however, the Court 21 22 does find MDB is complicit of benign neglect and indifference to the needs of Versa regarding 23 discovery in this action.

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II. The possibility of a lesser sanction

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The second Young factor is possible prejudice to Versa if a lesser sanction were imposed. The Court would consider lesser sanctions, including an adverse inference instruction, a rebuttable presumption instruction, and the striking of the MDB's expert as alternative sanctions. The Court

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1	does not find any of these sanctions strike the appropriate balance between MDB's actions and the
	harm imposed on Versa's case. Should the Court strike Dr. Bosch from being a witness at the trial
	MDB would be in the same position as the appellant in Zenith: unable to prove its case given the
	lack of expert testimony and subject to a motion for summary judgment. This outcome would be a
	patent waste of limited judicial resources and of the jury's time. The Court does not find an advers
	inference instruction pursuant to NRS 47.250(3) and Bass-Davis v. Davis, 122 Nev. 442, 134 P.3d
	103 (2006), is appropriate under the circumstances before the Court. ⁵ As noted by the Zenith Cour
	"[t]he actions of [MDB] had the effect of reserving to itself all expert testimony based upon
	examination of the [electronic components]. Any adverse presumption which the court might have
	ordered as a sanction for the spoliation of evidence would have paled next to the testimony of the
	expert witness." Zenith, 103 Nev. at 652, 747 P.2d at 914. Additionally, an adverse inference
	instruction requires an "intent to harm another party through the destruction and not simply the
	intent to destroy evidence." Bass-Davis, 122 Nev. at 448, 134 P.3d at 106. The Court does not find
	MDB intended to harm Versa by destroying or disposing of the electrical components; therefore, it
	could not give this instruction. The Court can conceive of no other sanction which would be
	appropriate under these circumstances.
	³ At oral argument counsel for MDB stated:
	Recently the Nevada Supreme Court has declared that the Bass versus Davis case is the prevailing case on the spoliation of evidence, not Young versus Ribeiro. And in a case called Walmart Stores, Inc. versus the Eighth Judicial District, No. 48488, January 31st of 2008, the court said, "It is an abuse of discretion for a district court not to consider the case of Bass-Davis versus Davis when imposing sanctions pursuant to Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 37 for an allegation of spoliation."
l	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, EVIDENTIARY HEARING, 208:15-24. The citation to an unpublished disposition of the Nevada Supreme Court issued prior to January 1, 2016, is a violation of ADKT 0504 and SCR 123 (the SCR was repealed by the ADKT). The Court found it difficult to believe the Nevada Supreme Court would make such a sweeping change to firmly established precedent as that represented by coursel in an unpublished disposition.
	The Court was unfamiliar with Walmart, so the Court endeavored to familiarize itself with the case. The Court looked up the case number provided by counsel on the Nevada Supreme Court webpage. Troublingly, the Court was unable to verify the veracity of the proposition proffered by MDB because the parties agreed to dismiss their proceedings and
1	the Nevada Supreme Court vacated the order upon which MDB makes its argument. The Nevada Supreme Court had granted a Writ of Mandamus on January 31, 2008; however, it withdrew that order on a subsequent date. The Nevada Supreme Court webpage indicates the parties contacted the Supreme Court on February 2, 2008, and indicated they had
	settled their case. The Nevada Supreme Court entered an order vacating the January 31, 2008, order upon which MDB relies and "den[ied] the petition as moot" on February 13, 2008. In short, the "case" MDB relies upon does not even exist.
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III. The severity of the sanction of dismissal relative to the severity of the discovery abuse

La constantes	"The dismissal of a case, based upon a discovery abuse should be used only in extreme
	ns; if less drastic sanctions are available, they should be utilized." GNLV, 111 Nev. at 870,
900 P.2	d at 325 (citing Young, 106 Nev. at 92, 787 P.2d at 779-80). The Court is keenly aware that
granting	g the Motion effectively ends the case. The Court does not take this action lightly. The only
issue in	this case is why the door to the trailer opened causing the gravel to dump into the roadway.
The Co	urt finds MDB's disposal of the electronic components without memorializing them in any
way cff	ectively halted the adversarial process. It left all of the "cards" in MDB's hands and left
Versa w	with nothing other than a theory it could neither prove nor disprove. MDB could simply rely
on its ea	spert during trial and argue Versa had no proof of its theory and the theory itself was
	erous. This is the position taken by MDB at the evidentiary hearing. Versa is left with no verifying its theory of the case.
	Counsel for MDB directed the Court's attention at the evidentiary hearing to the strength of
	pert (Dr. Bosch) and the weakness of Versa's expert (Palmer). Counsel further emphasized
	of plausibility of the Palmer's conclusions that it could have been an abraded wire which
	an electrical failure rather than some issue with the solenoid or the Versa valve. The Court
	vinced this should be the deciding factor in resolving the issue of case concluding sanctions
	following reasons:
	 MDB's own employee (the same employees who serviced the truck and trailer) acknowledged at the evidentiary hearing that the abrasions Palmer referenced actually d occur;⁶ and
	y. You also mentioned that you want to replace those cords, the seven and the – the seven-conductor and the luctor cords because they will get cut on the deck plate, they will get abraded, they will become cracked; is the
A: I have	e seen that, yes.
TRANSC	RIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, EVIDENTIARY HEARING (testimony of Patrick Bigby), 154:1-6.

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1 2	 Dr. Bosch had to acknowledge, though grudgingly and with great circumspection, that was possible though highly unlikely the electrical system could have caused the valve question to open.⁷
3	The Court's decision regarding the issue presented in the Motion is not predicated on who has
4	the "stronger case" or the "better expert" at the evidentiary hearing. If this were the analysis the
5	Court would agree with MDB: Dr. Bosch is a very credible witness and it is likely MDB has the
6	more compelling argument to present to the jury. This, however, is not the issue. The issue in the
7	Court's analysis is MDB's actions deprived Versa of any ability to prove its case: the adversarial
8	process was stymied by MDB regarding the most critical pieces of evidence. Had MDB's witness
9	testified the abrasions never occur, or abrasions were photographed and/or documented and none
10	existed on this truck, the Court's conclusion may have been different. Here we know it could have
11	occurred as Palmer suggested.
2	IV. Whether evidence is irreparably lost
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4	Clearly the relevant evidence is lost. The employees of MDB testified at the evidentiary
	hearing the electronic components had been thrown away.
5	V. The feasibility and fairness of a less severe sanctions
	The Court discussed the possibility of less severe sanctions in section II. The same analysi
8	applies here. There does not appear to be any sanction short of case concluding sanctions which
9	would be appropriate under the circumstances of this case. The Court also acknowledges that
0	progressive sanctions are not always necessary. The circumstances presented in the Motion are
1	unique and the most severe sanction is appropriate.
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15	⁷ Q: Is there any scenario under which current from the seven-prong cord having contact with the four-prong cord cou
6	open the versa valve?
7	A: Anything is possible, but it's highly improbable in this case.
28	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, EVIDENTIARY HEARING (testimony of Dr. Bosch), 161:5-9. Dr. Bosch's testimony clearly established he did not believe there was a short or other electrical failure that caused the value to ope
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VI. The policy favoring adjudication on the merits; and

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VII. The need to deter parties and future litigants from similar abuse

The Court considers the sixth and eighth Young factors together. Nevada has a strong policy, 5 and the Court firmly believes, that cases should be adjudicated on their merits. See, Scrimer v. Dist. 6 Court, 116 Nev. 507, 516-517, 998 P.2d 1190, 1196 (2000). See also, Kahn v. Orme, 108 Nev. 510, 7 516, 835 P.2d 790, 794 (1992). Further, there is a need to deter litigants from abusing the discovery 8 process established by Nevada law. When a party repeatedly and continuously engaged in discovery 9 misconduct the policy of adjudicating cases on the merits is not furthered by a lesser sanction. 10 Foster, 126 Nev. at 65, 227 P.3d at 1048. The case sub judice is not one of systemic discovery 11 abuse. However, the Court concludes to allow the case to go forward as it is currently postured 12 would be the antithesis of allowing it to proceed "on the merits." The merits of Versa's case would 13 not be able to be evaluated by the jury because Versa could not test its theory on the actual 14 components. The jury would be left to guess about what may have occurred rather than weigh the 15 competing theories presented. MDB would have an overwhelmingly unfair advantage given its 16 action. 17

The Court balances the laudable policy of trial on the merits against the need to deter future 18 litigants from abusing the discovery process. The Court turns back to the Zenith Court's direction to 19 all potential litigants regarding their duty to preserve evidence. The Zenith Court stated, "[i]t would 20 be unreasonable to allow litigants, by destroying physical evidence prior to a request for production, 21 to sidestep the district court's power to enforce the rules of discovery." Id. 103 Nev. at 651, 747 22 P.2d at 913. Accord. Colfer v. Harmon, 108 Nev. 363, 832 P.2d 383 (1992). To allow this case to 23 go forward, when the only evidence which may have supported Versa's defense was in the sole 24 possession of MDB and MDB did nothing to preserve or document that evidence, would set a 25 dangerous precedent to similarly situated parties in the future. It would also be antithetical to a 26 potential litigant's obligation to preserve the very evidence it may have to produce during discovery. 27

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When the Court balances the sixth and eighth Young factor it concludes dismissal of MDB's claims against Versa are appropriate.

VIII. Whether sanctions unfairly operate to penalize a party for the misconduct of his or her attorney

There is no evidence to show MDB's counsel directed MDB to destroy or fail to memorialize
 the evidence in question. The Court finds this factor to be inapplicable to the Young analysis.

⁸ "Fundamental notions of fairness and due process require that discovery sanctions be just ⁹ and . . . relate to the specific conduct at issue." *GNLV*, 111 Nev. at 870, 900 P.2d at 325 (*citing* ¹⁰ *Young*, 106 Nev. at 92, 787 P.2d at 779-80). The Court recognizes that discovery sanctions should ¹¹ be related to the specific conduct at issue. The discovery abuse in this case crippled one party's ¹² ability to present its case. Weighing all eight factors above the Court concludes the dismissal of the ¹³ MDB Cross-Claim is appropriate. Due to the severity of MDB's discovery abuse there are no lesser ¹⁴ sanctions that are suitable.

It is hereby ORDERED DEFENDANT/CROSS-CLAIMANT/CROSS-DEFENDANT
 VERSA PRODUCTS COMPANY, INC.'S MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT/CROSS CLAIMANT/CROSS-DEFENDANT MDB TRUCKING, LLC'S CROSS-CLAIM PURSUANT TO
 NRCP 35; OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR AN ADVERSE JURY INSTRUCTION is

19 GRANTED. MDB TRUCKING, LLC'S CROSS-CLAIM is DISMISSED.

DATED this _ day of December, 2017.

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ELLIOTT A. SATTLER District Judge

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1	CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
2	Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of the Second Judicial
3	District Court of the State of Nevada, County of Washoe; that on this day of December, 2017,
4	I deposited in the County mailing system for postage and mailing with the United States Postal
5	Service in Reno, Nevada, a true copy of the attached document addressed to:
6	CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE
7	
8	I hereby certify that I am an employee of the Second Judicial District Court of the State of
9	Nevada, in and for the County of Washoe; that on the <u>8</u> day of December, 2017, I
10	electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court by using the ECF system which will
11	send a notice of electronic filing to the following:
12	JOSH AICKLEN, ESQ.
13	MATTHEW ADDISON, ESQ.
14	KATHERINE PARKS, ESQ. BRIAN BROWN, ESQ.
15	THIERRY BARKLEY, ESQ. SARAH QUIGLEY, ESQ.
16	JESSICA WOELFEL, ESQ.
17	JACOB BUNDICK, ESQ. NICHOLAS WIECZOREK, ESQ.
18	
19	Stela Marshald
20	Sheila Mänstfeld Judicial Assistant
21	
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