IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

ARTEMIS EXPLORATION COMPANY, a Nevada corporation, HAROLD WYATT, and MARY WYATT, individuals,

Appellants,

vs.

RUBY LAKE ESTATES HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION,

Respondent.

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Elizabeth A. Brown
Clerk of Supreme Court

Case No. 75323
District Court Case No. CV-C-12-175

RESPONDENT RUBY LAKE HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION'S ANSWER TO PETITION FOR EN BANC RECONSIDERATION

Respondent Ruby Lake Estates Homeowner's Association ("RLEHOA") files its *Answer to Petition for En Banc Reconsideration* ("*Answer*").

I. INTRODUCTION

NRAP 40A(a) is clear. En banc reconsideration of a Nevada Supreme Court panel decision

> ...***is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered*** except when (1) reconsideration by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions, or (2) the proceeding involves a substantial precedential, constitutional or public policy issue...

(Emphasis added.)

Neither exception to the Court's disfavor of en banc reconsideration exists in this case. The *Petition for En Banc Reconsideration* ("*En Banc Petition*") should be denied, just as the Panel unanimously denied the prior *Petition for Rehearing* ("*Petition*").

Appellants Artemis Exploration Company ("Artemis") and Harold and Mary Wyatt (collectively "Appellants") raised before the Panel in their prior *Petition* purported errors, which the Panel previously considered and rejected on appeal. Now, in their *En Banc Petition*, Appellants raise those same purported errors again, and make the same arguments again - including the Panel's purported failure to consider and/or apply Nevada precedent. Appellants' arguments here are made in just a slightly different order. And, Appellants' arguments here are made with slightly different, perfunctory captions which can only mimic the stringent, limited bases for en banc reconsideration. The Panel's decision in *Artemis Exploration Co. v. Ruby Lake Estates Homeowner's Ass'n,* 135 Nev. ____, 449 P.3d 1256 (2019) (hereinafter "*Opinion*"), *rehearing denied* February 27, 2020, illustrates, however, that Appellants' previously considered contentions – repeatedly, consistently, and judiciously rejected for nearly ten (10) years - must be rejected again.

Appellants incorrectly contend that the Panel Opinion is "...contrary to prior, published opinions of the Supreme Court of Nevada regarding real property covenants..." and that, as such, "...a substantial precedential and public policy issue..." exists. *En Banc Petition* at 1, 2. As established in the *Answering Brief* and the *Answer to Petition for Rehearing,* and where neither the facts of this case nor Nevada law support Appellants' arguments raised before the district court, in

their *Opening and Reply Briefs,* again in the *Petition*, and yet again in their *En Banc Petition*, there is no legal or factual basis which warrants en banc reconsideration. The *Opinion* is consistent and uniform with Nevada law, and it does not create any conflict in precedential or public policy. Rather, the *Opinion* recognizes the consumer protection and public policy intent of the legislature in enacting Chapter 116 of Nevada Revised Statutes which "'...must be applied and construed so as to effectuate ***its general purpose to make uniform the law*** with respect to the subject of this chapter among states enacting it.'" *Id.* at _____, 449 P.3d at 1261. (Emphasis added.)

Appellants' *En Banc Petition* is nothing more than repeated requests that the facts of this case and controlling statutes set forth in Chapter 116 be disregarded. The Panel, in its two (2) ***unanimous*** decisions, properly considered the salient facts of this case and Chapter 116 in its *Opinion*. *See Id.* at ____, 449 P.3d at 1256, 1258. The gravamen of the *En Banc Petition* is, once again, that RLEHOA failed to comply with ***statutes that were not in existence in 1989*** and, therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment in RLEHOA's favor and the Panel erred in affirming the district court's decision (the same arguments raised below, on appeal, in the *Petition,* and again here). There are no valid grounds for the *En Banc Petition.*

It remains confounding why Appellants continue, with no factual and legal basis, to try to push water uphill for approximately 10 years. Throughout this time, the Office of the Ombudsman for Common-Interest Communities, State of Nevada Department of Business and Industry Real Estate Division ("Ombudsman"), Arbitrator Leonard Gang ("Arbitrator"), the district court, and now the unanimous Panel of this Court all consistently and correctly found that RLEHOA is a common-interest community subject to Chapter 116, and that it was lawfully formed and authorized to impose assessments.

II. DISCUSSION

Appellants' *En Banc Petition* conveniently and conspicuously ignores the salient facts of this case and controlling statutes. Where those facts and the law do not support their position, Appellants can only rely on hyperbole and inapposite cases to make tortured arguments and attempt to distract the Court. The *En Banc Petition* cannot be addressed without measured review and analysis of these undisputed facts and law:

1. Stephen and Mavis Wright ("the Wrights") formed Ruby Lake Estates ("RLE") in 1989 through the proper filing and recording of the Plat Map and the Covenant, Conditions and Restrictions ("CC&Rs")[1], and there is no evidence in the record that the formation of RLE in 1989 failed to comply with the controlling

[1] Covenants, conditions, and restrictions can be used interchangeably with "declaration."

laws in existence at the time. Volume 3 Appellants' Appendix 87-91 ("__AA__"); 5AA152-154; Volume 1 Respondent's Appendix 02-05 ("__RA__"). Appellants offered no such evidence before the district court and on appeal.

2. Elko County has ***never*** accepted the roads within RLE for maintenance. 2AA108-109; 3AA87-91; 5AA152-154; 1RA02-16, 26-35. Elko County nevertheless requires the roadways and adjoining ditches and culverts to be maintained for health and safety reasons. 2AA60-61, 65-66, 108-109, 154-155, 174, 176, 211, 222, 251; 1RA02-16, 26-35. This is significant where the *RLE Fire Risk and Hazard Assessment Report* prepared as part of the Fire Plan for Elko County shows RLE to be in the "High Hazard" category for fire risk. 1RA74-82. Despite having numerous opportunities to do so, Appellants never once addressed the obvious before the district court, the Panel, or its *En Banc Petition*: Who is or should be responsible for maintaining RLEHOA's roads and weed abatement for public health and safety reasons if RLEHOA does not maintain the roads and conduct the required fire hazard, weed abatement? [2]

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[2] Footnote 5 on p. 13 of the *En Banc Petition* regarding "road maintenance agreements" is nonsensical. RLEHOA has never taken the position there was a road maintenance agreement and, therefore, a Chapter 116 association exists because of such an agreement. RLEHOA is a common interest community governed by Chapter 116 because of legislative mandate. Furthermore, because there is "no road maintenance agreement", it again begs the question of who is responsible for road maintenance and weed abatement for public safety if RLEHOA is not?

3. The CC&Rs "provide for the development and ***maintenance*** of an aesthetically pleasing and harmonious community of residential dwellings for the purpose of preserving a high quality of use and appearance . . ." and the creation of an Architectural Review Committee ("ARC") to ensure compliance with these provisions. 3AA87-91 (emphasis added).

4. In 1997 and after the Wrights sold the last lot, they formed Ruby Lake Estates Landowners Association ("the Association") to function as a common-interest community adopting budgets, collecting assessments, and maintaining roadways, perimeter fences, culverts, cattle guards entrance sign, and providing weed abatement. 1RA04-05. ARC, through the Association, assessed RLE lot owners for assessments, which were used to maintain roadways and perform weed abatement. 2AA108. RLEHOA holds title to real property deeded to it by the Wrights. 3AA119-122.

5. As specifically noted by the Panel in the *Opinion*, Elizabeth and George Essington (Mrs. Essington was the sole owner and/or director of Artemis) consistently and repeatedly recognized this collective responsibility well before RLEHOA's formation in 2006. 2AA110, 121-122, 161. Mr. Essington served on RLEHOA's Board of Directors ("Board") from 2007 to 2011 and in this capacity voted to levy assessments for roadway maintenance, weed abatement, and the repair of signs and culverts. 2AA137, 210-212, 220, 221-24, 250; 3AA1-11, 69-

70. Both before and during his tenure on the Board, Mr. Essington wrote letters to RLEHOA members confirming the existence and necessity of RLEHOA, the necessity of enforcing the CC&Rs, the applicability of Chapter 116 to the RLEHOA common-interest community and to RLE, and the authority and responsibility of RLEHOA to levy and collect assessments for maintenance of the common elements. 2AA121-122, 161, 200, 202-204, 206, 214, 216-218, 220, 222-224, 226-229. To the extent Appellants, and particularly Artemis, assert "surprise" or that formation of RLEHOA was never wanted or expected by them, such assertion is disingenuous and belied by these undisputed facts.

6. In 1991 (two years after the Wrights recorded the official Plat Map and the CC&Rs in 1989), the Legislature adopted the Uniform Common-Interest Ownership Act ("UCIOA") as Chapter 116. 1991 Nev. Stats., ch. 245 at 535. Chapter 116 did not become effective until 1992 (three years after the Wrights recorded the official Plat Map and the CC&Rs in 1989). *Id.*

7. Although it adopted the UCIOA in 1991, it was not until 1999 (10 years after the Wrights recorded the official Plat Map and the CC&Rs in 1989) when the Legislature made common-interest communities created by plat and declaration prior to 1992 subject to Chapter 116. NRS 116.1201(1). When the Legislature did so, it also expressly made clear that pre-1992 common-interest communities are ***not*** required to comply with the provisions of NRS 116.2101 to

NRS 116.2122: "The provisions of [NRS Chapter 116] do not . . . [r]equire a common-interest community created before January 1, 1992, to comply with the provisions of NRS 116.2101 to NRS 116.2122, inclusive . . ." NRS 116.1201(3)(b). Appellants did not address this controlling statute (or, if they did, in any meaningful manner) before the district court, on appeal, and now in their *En Banc Petition.* Stated another way, Appellants do not address this statutory mandate because it guts their position.

8. While the Legislature recognized that Chapter 116 is a consumer protection statute and, as such, wanted all common-interest communities in Nevada to be subject to these protections, it concomitantly and pragmatically recognized that it was not feasible for common-interest communities created prior to 1992 to change all of their governing documents to meet the newly enacted statutory requirements. The Legislature, therefore, adopted certain exceptions and exemptions for communities formed prior to 1992. NRS 116.1201(3)(b) and NRS 116.1206(1).

9. Appellants contend that the *Opinion* "selectively applies certain provisions of NRS Chapter 116 to [RLE], but refuses to apply others without explanation for why one provision is applied and not the other. The Panel *Opinion* applies the definition of NRS 116.021 retroactively to [RLE] in order to imply that [RLE] is a common-interest community, but refuses to apply NRS

116.3101(1) retroactively and thereby finds that RLEHOA is valid[,]". *En Banc Petition* at 6. This contention is entirely misplaced and conveniently ignores the express and unambiguous language of NRS 116.1201(3)(b) and NRS 116.1206(1).

10. In any event, the *Opinion* explains "why one provision is applied and not the other." By way of example, the *Opinion* includes a lengthy discussion to explain why NRS 116.3101(1) cannot be retroactively applied as a matter of law. *See Id.* ___, 449 P.3d at 1259-1260. The Panel unanimously and correctly concluded that "it would be ***absurd*** for the Legislature to decide in 1999 ***to impose NRS Chapter 116's requirements on pre-1992 communities*** but only if they knew, before 1992, that they would later be required to formally create the unit-owners' association before selling the first unit." *Id.*, 449 P.3d at 1260. (Emphasis added.) The Panel correctly concluded that Appellants' argument "leads to the ***absurd result that pre-1992 communities were required to comply with a statute which did not exist when they were created***." *Id.*, 449 P.3d at 1260. (Emphasis added.) Stated another way, it was ***factually and legally impossible*** for the Wrights and RLE to comply with NRS 116.3101(1) in 1989. It is incomprehensible as to why and how Appellants continue to insist that the Wrights and RLE had to comply, and could have complied, with ***any*** non-existent statutes in 1989.

11. Because the Plat Map and CC&Rs were recorded prior to 1992, RLEHOA was and is ***not*** required to comply with the provisions of NRS 116.2101 to NRS 116.2122. NRS 116.1201(3)(b).

12. NRS 116.2105, which the Legislature unambiguously declared has no application to pre-1992 common-interest communities and therefore no application to RLEHOA, specifies the contents of the covenants, conditions and restrictions. NRS 116.2105. NRS 116.2105(1)(a) provides for "[t]he names of the common-interest community and the association and a statement that the common-interest community is either a condominium, cooperative or planned community . . ." NRS 116.2105(1)(a). It would appear Appellants contend, that based upon this statutory provision, the declaration must expressly create or state a common-interest community. NRS 116.1201(3)(b), however, makes it abundantly clear that RLEHOA created ***prior to 1992*** is ***not required to comply*** with NRS 116.2105(1)(a). *See* NRS 116.1201(3)(b). NRS 116.1206(1) further provides that any parts of RLEHOA's CC&Rs "that violates the provisions of [Chapter 116] . . . ***[s]hall be deemed to conform with those provisions by operation of law, and any such declaration, bylaw or other governing document is not required to be amended to conform to those provisions.***" NRS 116.1206(1) (Emphasis added.) Appellants' contention that the RLEHOA CC&Rs' purported failure to create expressly a common-interest community, therefore, fails as a matter of law. *Id.*

Appellants never once addressed this controlling statute (or, if at all, in any meaningful manner) before the district court, on appeal, and now in their *En Banc Petition.*

13. Where RLEHOA is not required as a matter of law to comply with the mandates of NRS 116.2105, there is likewise no requirement that the CC&Rs contain a description of the real estate included in the common-interest community of RLEHOA or any real estate that is or must become common elements (even though the CC&Rs do). NRS 116.2105(1)(c) and (1)(f). Furthermore, NRS 116.1206(1)(a) provides that if RLEHOA's CC&Rs "violate" the provisions of Chapter 116, those provisions "...[s]hall be deemed to conform with those provisions by operation of law..." NRS 116.1206(1)(a). Stated yet another way, ***RLEHOA is a common-interest community governed by Chapter 116 because of legislative mandate and not because of any attempts by RLEHOA to add, change, or amend a covenant in the CC&Rs.***

14. Because RLEHOA is a pre-1992 common-interest community and therefore NRS 116.1201 and NRS 116.1206(1) control the facts of this case, it is baffling how Appellants continue to insist that *Diaz v. Ferne,* 120 Nev. 70, 84 P.3d 664 (2004), and *Caughlin Ranch Homeowners Ass'n v. Caughlin Club,* 109 Nev. 264, 849 P.2d 310 (1993) control and that, by extension, the *Opinion* fails to "maintain uniformity" with Supreme Court decisions or creates an inconsistent

"precedential...or public policy issue." NRAP 40A(a). Appellants made these same arguments to the district court and the Panel in their *Opening* and *Reply Briefs*, and in their *Petition*. Both the district court and the Panel considered these same arguments and correctly rejected them.

15. The facts in both of those cases are markedly distinguishable from the instant case. Nothing in the facts of *Diaz,* 120 Nev. at 70, 84 P.3d at 664 and *Caughlin Club,* 109 Nev. at 264, 849 P.2d at 310 are remotely analogous to the facts of this case. Nothing in *Diaz,* 120 Nev. at 70, 84 P.3d at 664 and *Caughlin Club,* 109 Nev. at 264, 849 P.2d at 310 involve the same issues and statutory provisions of Chapter 116 that the district court and this Court addressed.

16. In *Diaz,* which does not even involve Chapter 116, the court addressed the issue of whether a manufactured home was a mobile home for purposes of the conditions, covenants, and restrictions prohibiting mobile homes on lots designated for single-family homes. 120 Nev. at 70, 84 P.3d at 664. That is not the issue currently before this Court. Before this Court is a pre-1992 common-interest community governed by Chapter 116 because of legislative mandate and not because of any attempts by RLEHOA to add, change, or amend a covenant or restriction in the CC&Rs.

17. *Caughlin Club* is equally inapplicable. 109 Nev. at 264, 849 P.2d at 310. In that case, the subdivision's original declaration imposed assessments only

on residential lots, and years later the association ***amended*** the covenants to levy assessments against a commercial parcel that was developed ***after*** the declaration was recorded. *Id.*, 849 P.2d at 310. The issue was whether the amendment to the declaration was valid. *Id.,* 849 P.2d at 310. That is not the issue currently before this Court. Once again: Before this Court is a pre-1992 common-interest community governed by Chapter 116 because of legislative mandate and not because of any attempts by RLEHOA to add, change, or amend a covenant or restriction in the CC&Rs.

18. Even assuming for argument sake that RLEHOA had to comply with NRS 116.2105, the CC&Rs ***do include*** "common elements, other units or other real estate." NRS 116.2101 provides that a common-interest community is created through the recording of the covenants, conditions and restrictions in the county in which any portion of the common-interest community is located. NRS 116.2101.

19. As recorded with Elko County, Article I of the CC&Rs provides:

> ***The real property affected hereby is subjected to the imposition of the covenants, conditions, restrictions*** and reservations specified herein to provide for the development ***and maintenance of an aesthetically pleasing and harmonious community of residential dwellings for the purposes of preserving a high quality of use and appearance and maintaining the value of each and every lot and parcel of said property.***

5AA155 (Emphasis added.)

20. NRS 116.2109 provides that the Plat Map is deemed part of the covenants, conditions and restrictions. The Plat Map clearly depicts the common elements, including the roads that Appellants claim should not be maintained by RLEHOA or Elko County. 3AA87-91; 5AA152-154. The Plat Map for RLE establishes 51 residential lots, one commercial lot, roadways, easements, and set back requirements, as well as the lot which the Wrights deeded to RLEHOA as common area in 2007. 3AA87-91, 119-122; 5AA152-154. The roads in RLE, the same roads that Elko County rejected for maintenance purposes, are all clearly identified on the Plat Map as well as other common elements of the common-interest community RLEHOA is required to maintain. 3AA87-91; 5AA152-154. Sheets 2 and 3 of the Plat Map identify such common elements as the roadways, entrance sign, culverts, perimeter fencing, cattle guards, and a small lot that RLEHOA is required to maintain. 3AA87-91; 5AA152-154.

21. Of further significance is Sheet 1 of 3 of the Plat Map:

> At a regularly held meeting of the Board of Commissioners of Elko County, State of Nevada, held on the 5th day of July, 1989, this Plat was approved as a Final Plat pursuant to NRS 278,328. ***The Board does hereby reject on behalf of the public all streets or roadways for maintenance purposes*** and does hereby accept all streets and easements therein offered for utility, draining and access purposes only as dedicated for public use.

3AA87-91; 5AA152-154 (Emphasis added.)

22. In summary, this case must be reviewed consistent with the express language of: (1) NRS 116.1201(3)(b) exempting pre-1992 common-interest communities from having to comply with NRS 116.2101 to NRS 116.2122 and (2) NRS 116.1206(1) providing that any parts of RLEHOA's CC&Rs "that violates the provisions of [Chapter 116] . . . ***[s]hall be deemed to conform with those provisions by operation of law, and any such declaration, bylaw or other governing document is not required to be amended to conform to those provisions***." NRS 116.1206(1)(a) (Emphasis added). Appellants fail to address how these two controlling statutes have no application to the instant case. Instead, they continue to insist that the Wrights somehow could have and should have accomplished a ***factual and legal impossibility*** by complying with statutes not in existence at the time of RLE's formation as a common-interest community in 1989.

23. For the same reasons set forth in the above paragraphs in the *Answering Brief,* and RLEHOA's *Answer to Petition*, this Panel correctly ***"h[e]ld that RLE is a common-interest community under either version [of NRS 116.021]. The current language requires the declaration to describe the 'real estate' but does not require it to specify the payment obligation."*** *Opinion*, 135 Nev. at __, 449 P.3d at 1259 & n.4. (Emphasis added.)

24. Lastly, Appellants take issue with this Court's reliance upon *Evergreen Highlands Ass'n v. West,* 73 P.3d 1 (Colo. 2003) (hereinafter

"*Evergreen*") and the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 6.2 (2000) (hereinafter "the RESTATEMENT"). As an initial matter and for the reasons set forth in the *Answering Brief,* the *Answer to Petition,* and this *Answer*, it was not necessary for this Court to do so. In any event, this Panel did ***not*** "misapply" *Evergreen* and the RESTATEMENT.

25. As correctly noted in the *Opinion*, RLEHOA as a pre 1992 community is not required to comply with NRS 116.2105. *Opinion,* at 135 Nev. ___, 449 P.3d at 1259-1260 & n.5. As further correctly noted by the Panel, ***nothing in NRS 116.2105 "require[s] a declaration to expressly explain that unit owners may be subject to assessments*** or otherwise be financially responsible for maintaining common elements, ***and we do not read NRS 116.021 as imposing such a requirement.***" *Id.*, 449 P.3d at 1259. (Emphasis added.)

26. The Panel then proceeded to state that both *Evergreen* and the RESTATEMENT support the proposition that an implied obligation can be found: "An implied obligation may also be found where the declaration expressly creates an association for the purpose of managing common property ***or*** enforcing use restrictions and design controls, but fails to include a mechanism for providing the funds necessary to carry out its functions." *Id.*, 449 P.3d at 1259 (quoting the RESTATEMENT and emphasis added).

27. As noted by the Panel before, it cited to both the RESTATEMENT and *Evergreen, See Id., at* 449 P.3d at 1259: The CC&Rs "provide for the development and ***maintenance*** of an aesthetically pleasing and harmonious community of residential dwellings for the purpose of preserving a high quality of use and appearance . . ." and the creation of the ARC to "***maint[ain]*** . . . a high standard of architectural design, color and landscaping harmony and to preserve and enhance aesthetic qualities and high standards of construction in the development and ***maintenance*** of the subdivision." 3AA87-91. (Emphasis added.) Contrary to Appellants' contention that the CC&Rs do not create an association, therefore, the CC&Rs do expressly create an association for the purpose of enforcing use restrictions and design controls, and for maintenance of the community, as well as to specifically identify real estate and common elements to be maintained. Appellants could not be more wrong on this point, and the CC&Rs' reference to an "ARC" and not an "association" is legally and factually irrelevant.

28. But even assuming for argument sake that the CC&Rs did not "expressly create" an association, NRS 116.1206(1) provides that any parts of RLEHOA's CC&Rs "that violates the provisions of [Chapter 116] . . . ***[s]hall be deemed to conform with those provisions by operation of law, and any such declaration, bylaw or other governing document is not required to be amended to conform to those provisions***." NRS 116.1206(1) (emphasis added).

29. As set forth in paragraphs 1 through 4 and 18 through 21, the CC&Rs and Plat Map undeniably and expressly created an association and contained an obligation to be financially responsible for maintaining common elements. Without the authority to levy assessments, RLEHOA will be placed in the untenable position of being obligated to maintain facilities and infrastructure without any viable economic means by which to do so (to the detriment of the homeowners and public safety). Such a result directly conflicts with the Legislative history, intent, and mandate of Chapter 116 as discussed extensively in the *Answering Brief.*

30. In conclusion, conspicuously absent before the district court and absent in Appellants' *Opening* and *Reply Briefs,* in the *Petition,* and again in the *En Banc Petition*, is a discussion as to how the Wrights could have factually and legally complied with statutes that were not in existence in 1989. This is because it was both ***factually and legally impossible*** for the Wrights to comply with statutes that were not in existence at the time of RLE's formation as a common-interest community. The Legislature recognized this when, in 1999, it made Chapter 116 applicable to pre-1992 communities, but did not require those communities to comply with all of Chapter 116's requirements.

31. The Panel, not once but twice, correctly and unanimously determined this case consistent with Nevada law and the express language of: (1) NRS

116.1201(3)(b) exempting pre-1992 common-interest communities from having to comply with NRS 116.2101 to NRS 116.2122 and (2) NRS 116.1206(1) providing that any parts of RLEHOA's CC&Rs "that violates the provisions of [Chapter 116] . . . ***[s]hall be deemed to conform with those provisions by operation of law, and any such declaration, bylaw or other governing document is not required to be amended to conform to those provisions.***" NRS 116.1206(1) (emphasis added).

32. The *En Banc Petition* should be denied in its entirety. Neither exception for en banc reconsideration exists here. There is no lack of "uniformity of decisions" *or* a "substantial precedential...or public policy issue" which needs clarification. The *Opinion* is expressly consistent with Nevada precedent and the controlling statutory mandate of Chapter 116. Furthermore, the *Opinion* upholds the specific consumer protection and public policy enacted by the Legislature in Chapter 116 for uniform governance of Nevada's common interest communities. Any other result would undermine the Legislature's specific intent, eviscerate the express language of the statutes, and constitute improper statutory amendment.

33. This dispute and attendant litigation have gone on for nearly 10 years. Throughout this 10-year period, numerous decisions have been entered in favor of RLEHOA five (5) times, i.e. by the Ombudsman, the Arbitrator, the district court, and twice before the Panel in unanimous decisions. It is time for Appellants to accept the absurdity of their tortured legal arguments and recognize that RLEHOA

is a lawfully formed NRS Chapter 116 common-interest community, authorized to impose assessments under Nevada law.

III. VERIFICATION

Under the penalty of perjury, the undersigned declares that she is the attorney for Respondent named in the instant Brief and knows the contents of the Brief. The pleading and facts stated therein are true of her own knowledge, excepts as to those matters stated on information and belief, and that as such matters she believes them to be true. This verification is made by the undersigned attorney pursuant to NRAP 21(a)(5).

IV. CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

1. I certify that this Brief complies with the formatting requirements of NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeface requirements of NRAP 32(a)(5), and the type style requirements of NRAP 32(a)(6) because it has been prepared in proportionally spaced typeface using Word in 14 point Times New Roman font.

2. I further certify that this Brief complies with the page-or type-volume limitations of NRAP 40, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by NRAP 32(a)(7)(c), it is proportionally spaced, has a typeface font of 14 points or more, and contains 4,319 words.

3. I certify that I have read this Brief, and to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, it is not frivolous or interposed for any improper purpose.

I further certify that this brief complies with all applicable Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, in particular NRAP 28(e)(1), which requires every assertion in the brief regarding matters in the record to be supported by a reference to the page and volume number, if any of the transcript or appendix where the matter relied on is to be found. I understand that I may be subject to sanctions in the event that the accompanying brief is not in conformity with the requirements of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure.

DATED this 15th day of April 2020.

KAREN M. AYARBE, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 3358
LEACH KERN GRUCHOW ANDERSON SONG
5421 Kietzke Lane, Suite 200
Reno, Nevada 89511
Tel: (775) 324-5930
Attorneys for Respondent
Ruby Lakes Estates Homeowner's Association

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRAP 25(c)(1), I certify that I am an employee of the law firm of Leach Kern Gruchow Anderson Song, and that on this day I served the foregoing document described as ***RESPONDENT RUBY LAKE HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION'S ANSWER TO PETITION FOR EN BANC RECONSIDERATION*** on the parties set forth below, at the address listed below by:

☒ Placing an original or true copy thereof in a sealed envelope place for collection and mailing in the United States Mail, at Reno, Nevada, first-class mail, postage paid, following ordinary business practices, addressed to:

Travis W. Gerber, Esq.
Zachary A. Gerber, Esq.
Gerber Law Offices, LLP
491 4th Street
Elko, NV 89801

☒ NEFCR 9 Electronic notification will be sent to the following:

Travis W. Gerber, Esq.
Gayle A. Kern, Esq.

DATED this 15th day of April 2020.

/s/ Teresa A. Gearhart
TERESA A. GEARHART