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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

MMAWC, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; BRUCE DEIFIK, an individual; and NANCY AND BRUCE DEIFIK FAMILY PARTNERSHIP LLLP, a Colorado limited liability partnership,

Appellants

v.

ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST and SHAWN WRIGHT as trustee of ZION WOOD OBI WAN TRUST; WSOFF GLOBAL, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company,

Respondents.

Electronically Filed
Aug 15 2018 12:59 p.m.
Elizabeth A. Brown
Clerk of Supreme Court
APPEAL No. 75596

Eighth Judicial District Court
Case No. A-17-764118-C

APPELLANTS' [Amended] OPENING BRIEF

Attorney For Appellants:
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APPELLANTS' NRAP 26.1 DISCLOSURE

The undersigned counsel of record for Appellants/Defendants MMAWC, LLC, Bruce Deifik and the Nancy And Bruce Deifik Family Partnership LLLP certifies that:

MMAWC, LLC is a private Nevada limited liability corporation registered to do business in Nevada. To our knowledge, there are no publicly held companies that own 10% or more of common stock of MMAWC, LLC and that no publicly held company owns any interest in MMAWC, LLC.

The Nancy And Bruce Deifik Family Partnership LLLP is a private Colorado family partnership that does not do transact business in Nevada within NRS Chapter 86. To our knowledge, there are no publicly held companies that own 10% or more of common stock of the Nancy And Bruce Deifik Family Partnership LLLP and that no publicly held company owns any interest in the Nancy And Bruce Deifik Family Partnership LLLP.

MMAWC, LLC, Bruce Deifik and the Nancy And Bruce Deifik Family Partnership LLLP have been represented in this appeal and the underlying matter by the following attorneys and law firms:

BLACK & LOBELLO
Maximiliano D. Couvillier III, Esq. NSB 7661
10777 W. Twain Ave., Ste. 300
Las Vegas, Nevada 89135

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and
KENNEDY & COUVILLIER, PLLC
Maximiliano D. Couvillier III, Esq. NSB 7661
3271 E. Warm Springs Rd.
Las Vegas, NV 89120

Respectfully Submitted this 15th day of August, 2018.

KENNEDY & COUVILLIER< PLLC

/s/ Maximiliano D. Couvillier III, Esq. _____
Maximiliano D. Couvillier III, Esq. NSB 7661

*Attorneys for Appellants MMAWC, LLC, Bruce
Deifik and The Nancy And Bruce Deifik Family
Partnership LLLP*

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III. The District Court Erred In Refusing To Apply And Follow
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IV. The Circumstances Here Demonstrate That NRS 597.995 Is
Vague And Ambiguous And Therefore, Void And Unenforceable . 23

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5 S. Ct. 834, 838, (1995) 16, 17, 18
6 *Brad Assocs. v. Nevada Fed. Fin. Corp.*, 109 Nev. 145, 848 P.2d 1064
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9 *Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto*, 517 U.S. 681, 687, 116 S. Ct. 1652
10 (1996) 15, 16, 17, 25
11 *Fat Hat, LLC v. DiTerlizzi*, 385 P.3d 580, 2016 WL 5800335 *1, n. 1 (Nev.
12 2016)..... viii, 1, 15, 21, 22
13 *Fisher's Blend Station v. Tax Comm'n of State of Washington*, 297 U.S. 650,
14 56 S. Ct. 608 (1936) 19
15 *Perry v. Thomas*, 482 U.S. 483, 107 S. Ct. 2520 (1987)..... 17, 18
16 *Sheriff, Washoe Cty. v. Burd*, 118 Nev. 853, 59 P.3d 484 (2002)..... 21
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18 P.3d 682 (2006) 21, 22
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21 *Tallman v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.*, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 71, 359 P.3d 113
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to NRS 38.247(1)(a), which provides in relevant part: “An appeal may be taken from...[a]n order denying a motion to compel arbitration.” *Id.* Appellants appeal from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration that was entered on March 13, 2018 (*Appellants’ Appendix (“AA”) Vol. 1, AA205-AA206*).¹

¹ Undersigned Appellants’ counsel made several good faith efforts to confer with Respondents counsel regarding the Appendix, as provided by NRAP 30(a). Respondents’ counsel, however, did not respond and Appellants are filing their individual Appendix.

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW

1. Whether NRS 597.995 Is Invalid And Unenforceable Because It Violates The Federal Arbitration Act, Which Preempts NRS 597.995.
2. Whether The District Court’s Application of NRS 597.995 Here Violated the U.S. Constitution.
3. Whether The District Court Erred In Refusing To Apply And Follow The Federal Arbitration Act.
4. Whether The Circumstances Here Demonstrate That NRS 597.995 Is Vague And Ambiguous And Therefore, Void And Unenforceable.
5. Whether The District Court Abused Its Discretion and/or Erred In Elevating Form Over Substance And Finding The Arbitration Provision At Issue Here Was Void Under NRS 597.995.

1
2 **ROUTING STATEMENT**

3 Respectfully, this is appeal should be retained by the Supreme Court
4 because this appeal raises constitutional issues, important issues that
5 significantly affect commercial transactions and agreements, and because
6 this appeal takes up the issues regarding NRS 597.995 observed by the
7 Supreme Court in *Fat Hat, LLC v. DiTerlizzi*, 385 P.3d 580, 2016 WL
8 5800335 *1, n. 1 (Nev. 2016).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal arises from the District Court’s refusal to enforce a clear and unambiguous arbitration provision (“**Arbitration Provision**”) pursuant to NRS 597.995. The sole issue on appeal is whether the parties’ otherwise valid, expressly negotiated and jointly drafted arbitration agreement is nonetheless void under NRS 597.995.

First, the Arbitration Provision at issue complies with NRS 597.995. While the Arbitration Provision does not specifically have a signature or initial line underneath the provision for the parties’ signature or initials, the arbitration provision was specifically negotiated, drafted and authorized by the parties and their respective counsel and thus, substantively complies with NRS 597.995, which does not set forth clear standards for compliance.

Second, and more importantly, NRS 597.995 is not enforceable because it violates the Federal Arbitration Act, which preempts NRS 597.995 under the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution, as this Court previously suggested in *Fat Hat, LLC v. DiTerlizzi*, 385 P.3d 580, 2016 WL 5800335 *1, n. 1 (Nev. 2016); *see* NRAP 36(c)(3).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. BACKGROUND

Appellant MMAWC, LLC’s (“**MMAWC**”) is a private Nevada

1 limited liability company whose previous primary asset and business was
2 operating and promoting mixed martial arts (“MMA”) events across the
3 United States under the marks and monikers “World Series of Fighting” and
4 “WSOF,” which intellectual property MMAWC owned. *AA Vol. 1 at*
5 *AA004, AA105-115*. MMAWC’s MMA events were also broadcasted across
6 the United States and beyond via NBC Sports. *Id.*

7
8
9 Appellant BRUCE DEIFIK (“**Deifik**”) is a founding member of
10 MMAWC, who subsequently transferred his membership interest to the
11 NANCY AND BRUCE DEIFIK FAMILY PARTNERSHIP LLLP (“**The**
12 **Deifik Family Partnership**”) which remains a member and owner of a
13 majority of membership interests in MMAWC². Respondent ZION WOOD
14 OBI WAN TRUST (“**Zion Wood**”) is a member of a MMAWC. *AA Vol. 1*
15 *at AA004*. Respondent SHAWN WRIGHT (“**Wright**”) is a Control person
16 and Trustee of Zion Wood (*AA Vol. 1 at AA004-005*) and former employee
17 and director of MMAWC. *AA Vol. 1 at AA042*.

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19
20 Since its inception in 2011, MMAWC has had a tortured history of
21 power struggles and financial disputes, which resulted in several lawsuits
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25 ² In 2015, MMAWC’s initial manager and majority membership holder,
26 Shawn Lampman, plead guilty and was sentenced to ten months in prison for
27 willful failure to file a tax return. That same year, after Mr. Lampman
28 became incarcerated, The Deifik Family Partnership acquired Mr.
Lampman’s interest in MMAWC and became the majority membership
holder (Mr. Lampman’s interest in MMAWC were held by the ACAK
Revocable Trust, of which Mr. Lampman was the Trustee).

1 over the years (*i.e.*, Eighth Judicial District Court Case Nos. A724474,
2 A725225 and A725975; and US Dist. Court, Dist. Of NV, Case No. 2:15-cv-
3 02065)(“Prior Lawsuits”). Such power plays and disputes included certain
4 loans purportedly made by Zion Wood to MMAWC and an October 2012
5 licensing agreement entered into between MMAWC (signed by then
6 manager, Shawn Lampman, on behalf of MMACW) and Vince Hesser
7 whereby MMAWC granted Mr. Hesser an “exclusive license for the WSOF
8 brand to be used or licensed outside of the US territory for mixed martial
9 arts events, or any other related business.” *AA Vol. 1 at AA043*. Mr. Hesser
10 served as Chief Financial Officer and on the Board of Managers of
11 MMAWC between October 2013 and July 2015, when he was removed
12 from both positions. *See e.g., AA Vol. 1 at AA042*. Mr. Hesser subsequently
13 assigned that October 2012 licensing agreement to WSOF Global Limited, a
14 Hong Kong company (“**Hong Kong**”) (*AA Vol. 1 at AA105*), of which
15 Respondent Wright was a director (*AA Vol. 1 at AA043*).

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22 In February 19, 2016, MMAWC, Deifik and The Deifik Family
23 Partnership, Wright, Zion Wood, Hong Kong and others entered into a
24 comprehensive settlement agreement, composed of several cross-referenced
25 and interconnected agreements, to resolve the Prior Lawsuits. At the top of
26 the hierarchy of the interrelated written agreements that make up the
27
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1 settlement is a Confidential Settlement Agreement dated February 19, 2016
2 (“Settlement Agreement”). *AA Vol. 1 at AA042-064*. Flowing underneath
3 the Settlement Agreement are several other agreements that are part of and
4 expressly incorporated into the Settlement Agreement (as both exhibits and
5 incorporation language) which include a Fourth Amended And Restated
6 Operating Agreement Of MMAWC, L.L.C. (“4th Operating Agreement”)(
7 *AA Vol. 1 at AA066-102*) and Amendment to Consulting And Master
8 Licensing Agreement (“Amended Licensing Agreement”) (*AA Vol. 1 at*
9 *AA104-115*).

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14 Among other things provided by such inter-woven settlement
15 agreements: (a) MMAWC paid \$750,000 to Zion Wood as repayment in full
16 for all outstanding loans (*AA Vol. 1 at AA048*); (b) Zion Wood agreed to
17 reduce its membership interest in MMAWC to 4.50%, but not further
18 dilutable, and the 4th Operating Agreement was executed (*id. at AA047*); and
19 (c) MMAWC agreed to amend the October 2012 licensing agreement
20 between MMAWC and Hong Kong, and the Amended Licensing Agreement
21 was executed (*id.*), which defines MMAWC’s business territory to include
22 “the United States and its territories” and provides for Hong Kong to operate
23 outside such business territory of MMAWC (*id. at AA106*). Respondent
24 WSOF Global, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company (“**Global**”),
25
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1 represents and alleges that Mr. Hesser subsequently assigned Hong Kong's
2 rights under the Amended Licensing Agreement to Respondent Global. AA
3 *Vol. 1 at AA004, AA008.*

4
5
6 In 2016, MMAWC refocused its business from operating and
7 promoting its own MMA events to becoming an investor in another,
8 unrelated entity that operates its own MMA events. Specifically, MMAWC
9 sold substantially all of its rights and assets, including the "World Series of
10 Fighting" and "WSOF" marks and monikers, to MMAX Investment
11 Partners, Inc. ("MMAX"), but provide MMAX with the Amended Licensing
12 Agreement. MMAX initially promoted and produced its MMA events using
13 the "World Series of Fighting" and "WSOF" marks and monikers across the
14 United States. AA *Vol. 1 at AA006 (¶14).* MMAX, however, ultimately
15 opted to operate and promote its own MMA events under MMAX's primary
16 mark and moniker "Professional Fighter's League" or "PFL" and eventually
17 discontinued promoting its MMA events under the "World Series of
18 Fighting" tradename. AA *Vol. 1 at AA011 (¶64).*

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23 In sum, MMAWC's current primary operation is simply being an
24 investor in MMAX, and MMAWC's asset is its membership interest in
25 MMAX. Moreover, after such transaction, the rights to use the "WSOF" or
26 "World Series of Fighting" brands and monikers conveyed in the October
27
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1
2 2012 licensing agreement or its Amended Licensing Agreement have not
3 been restricted. Nor have Respondents' interest in MMAWC been affected.
4 In other words, Respondents' interest in MMAWC did not decrease after
5 MMAWC sold its assets and became an investor in MMAX.
6

7 Nonetheless, in the action below, the Respondents attempt to usurp
8 certain interests they manifestly do not have. In sum, Respondents'
9 substantially allege that: (a) they somehow acquired certain licensing rights
10 to the intellectual property of MMAX, *i.e.*, the right to use MMAX's
11 "Professional Fighter's League" brand and tradename as the result of
12 MMAWC becoming an investor in MMAX; (b) their interest in MMAWC
13 has somehow been diluted because MMAWC became an investor and part
14 owner in MMAX; and (c) they are somehow entitled to their own, individual
15 interest in MMAX (as opposed to what they have now: an indirect interest in
16 MMAWC). *AA Vol. 1 at AA003-023.*
17
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20 **B. RESPONDENTS' CLAIMS ARE SUBJECT TO THE**
21 **EXPRESSLY AGREED TO AND A JOINTLY NEGOTIATED**
22 **& DRAFTED ARBITRATION PROVISION**

23 Respondents (and all relevant parties) were unquestionably aware of
24 and specifically authorized the Arbitration Provision at issue because the
25 parties, with aid of counsel (including Respondents' counsel of record),
26 jointly negotiated, drafted and expressly agreed to such Arbitration
27
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1 Provision.

2
3 Respondents' claims are all based on the integrated settlement
4 agreements discussed above (*e.g.*, the Settlement Agreement, 4th Operating
5 Agreement and Amended Licensing Agreement)³ which are subject to an
6 expressly negotiated Arbitration Provision that was jointly drafted by the
7 parties and subsequently expressly agreed to by the parties.
8

9
10 Specifically, the Amended Licensing Agreement provides the broad
11 reaching Arbitration Provision at issue here:

12 18. Arbitration. MMA and Consultant agree that

13
14 ³ Respondents' first and second claims are for breach of the Settlement
15 Agreement and associated and incorporated Licensing Agreement, and
16 related breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. *AA*
17 *Vol. 1 at AA015-016*. Respondents' third claim seeks declaratory relief as to
18 the parties' rights and obligations under the Settlement Agreement. *Id. at*
19 *AA017*. Respondents' fourth and fifth claims for "Intentional Interference
20 with Prospective Economic Advantage" and "Tortious Interference with
21 Contract" concern Respondents' alleged rights under the Licensing
22 Agreement. *Id. at AA008, AA012, AA015, AA018, AA019(Comp. ¶¶49, 76,*
23 *77, 104-107, 139-146 & 147-153)*. Respondents' sixth claim alleges alter
24 ego liability for Deifik and the Deifik Family Partnership for the alleged
contract claims against MMAWC. *Id. at AA019 (¶153)*. Respondents'
seventh claim is for breach of fiduciary duty arising from the Settlement
Agreement and the 4th Operating Agreement. *Id. at AA020*. Respondents'
ninth claim for relief seeks specific performance of the interrelated
settlement agreements. *Id. at AA021-022*.

25 Respondents' eighth claim for RICO was dismissed with leave to
26 amend, but Respondents did not amend their RICO claim within the
27 deadline imposed by the District Court. *AA Vol. 1 at AA2016*. Finally,
28 Respondents' tenth claim is an unjust enrichment asserted in the alternative
to the contract claims. *Id. at AA022*.

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any dispute, controversy, claim or any other causes of action whether based on contract, tort, misrepresentation, or any other legal theory, related directly or indirectly to the Master License (as amended hereby), which cannot be amicably resolved by the parties, shall be resolved by binding arbitration in accordance with the provisions of this Section 18. Unless the parties agree to use other rules, or the arbitrator deems other rules to be applicable, the arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") in effect at the time the demand for arbitration is filed, and either the Federal Arbitration Act (Title 9, U.S. Code) or the applicable State of Nevada arbitration statute. The arbitration award or decision may be confirmed, entered and enforced as a judgment in a court having jurisdiction, subject to appeal only in the event of the arbitrator's misapplication of the law, no evidence to support the award, or such other grounds for appeal of arbitration awards that exist by statute, common law or the applicable rules. If any party commences litigation in violation of this Section 18, or refuses or neglects to timely submit to arbitration in accordance with this Section, then such party shall reimburse the other party(s) for costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees: (1) incurred in seeking abatement or dismissal of such litigation; and/or (2) incurred in judicially compelling arbitration. However, the foregoing does not preclude a party from seeking emergency relief, including injunctive relief, from a court of competent jurisdiction and the prosecution of a request for such emergency relief will not be deemed a breach or waiver of the provisions contained herein.

See AA Vol. 1 at AA114.

1
2 The Amended Licensing Agreement was initially drafted by
3 Respondents' counsel of record, Byron Thomas, Esq., in late January
4 2016. On January 26, 2016, counsel for MMAWC, Christopher Childs,
5 Esq., responded to Respondents' counsel with several edits to the initial draft
6
7 by Respondents' counsel:

8
9 Christopher Childs <chris@childswatson.com> Tue, Jan 26, 2016 at 11:55 AM
To: Vince Hesser <vincehesser@yahoo.com>, "Antony M. Santos" <tony@amsantoslaw.com>, Byron Thomas
<byronthomaslaw@gmail.com>
10 Cc: Keith Redmond <keithredmond@mac.com>, Carlos Silva <carlos@wsof.com>, Bruce Deifik <bruce@integprop.com>,
Max Couvillier <mcouvillier@blacklobellolaw.com>

11 Gentlemen,

12 Attached is a redline of the license against the last draft that Byron sent me. Although I have reviewed the document you
13 proposed with Keith Redmond, I have not had the chance to review it in detail with Carlos Silva or Bruce Deifik. Hopefully
the attached draft and redline help move along our 1:30 toward a resolution.

14 Please use the following dial-in information for the call:

15 Dial in: 760-569-7171
Access Code: 207 555 532

16 Thank you,
Chris

17 Christopher R. Childs
Childs Watson & Gallagher, PLLC
770 E. Warm Springs Road, Suite 225
18 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119
Email: chris@childswatson.com
19 Office: 702-848-4533
Mobile: 702-606-1034

20
21 AA Vol. 1 at AA160. Included in such edits was the addition of the
22 Arbitration Provision at Paragraph 18 of the Amended License Agreement.
23
24 In addition to Respondents' counsel, Respondent Zion's control person
25 (Vince Hesser⁴) was directly included among the recipients of Mr. Childs'
26 January 26, 2016 email and discussion of the Arbitration Provision. *Id.* Mr.
27
28

1
2 Childs' January 26 response further confirms the conference call scheduled
3 among the parties to discuss the Amended Licensing Agreement and various
4 related documents. *Id.*

5
6 In the draft exchanged among Respondents' counsel, Respondent
7 Zion and MMAWC's counsel, the Arbitration Provision was prominently
8 identified in distinctive blue, underlined font that stood apart from the
9 original text:
10

11
12 18. **Arbitration.** MMA and Consultant agree that any dispute, controversy, claim or causes
13 of action whether based on contract, tort, misrepresentation, or any other legal theory, related
14 directly or indirectly to the Master License (as amended hereby), which cannot be amicably
15 resolved by the parties, shall be resolved by binding arbitration in accordance with the provisions
16 of this Section 18. Unless the parties agree to use other rules, or the arbitrator deems other rules
17 to be applicable, the arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the Commercial
18 Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") in effect at the time the
19 demand for arbitration is filed, and either the Federal Arbitration Act (Title 9, U.S. Code) or the
20 applicable State of Nevada arbitration statute. The arbitration award or decision may be
21 confirmed, entered and enforced as a judgment in a court having jurisdiction, subject to appeal
22 only in the event of the arbitrator's misapplication of the law, no evidence to support the award,
23 or such other grounds for appeal of arbitration awards that exist by statute, common law or the
24 applicable rules. If any party commences litigation in violation of this Section 18, or refuses or
25 neglects to timely submit to arbitration in accordance with this Section, then such party shall
26 reimburse the other party(s) for costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees: (1)
27 incurred in seeking abatement or dismissal of such litigation; and/or (2) incurred in judicially
28 compelling arbitration. However, the foregoing does not preclude a party from seeking
emergency relief, including injunctive relief, from a court of competent jurisdiction and the
prosecution of a request for such emergency relief will not be deemed a breach or waiver of the
provisions contained herein.

AA Vol. 1 at AA172.




⁴ See AA Vol. at AA005 (¶5).

1
2 On January 29, 2016, Respondents' counsel responded to Mr. Childs'
3 revision stating that: (a) his clients had reviewed Mr. Childs' January 26
4 draft of the Amended Licensing Agreement(which included the Arbitration
5 clause); and (b) he had some changes to the revised draft:
6
7

8 Byron Thomas <byronthomaslaw@gmail.com> Fri, Jan 29, 2016 at 6:03 PM
To: Christopher Childs <chris@childswatson.com>, Max Couvillier <mcouvillier@blacklobellolaw.com>

9 Chris it has taken longer to get this done than I thought. My clients are giving it one more look over, but I want to get
10 something to you today.

11 3 attachments

- 12  2Operating Agreement of MMAWC (4th AR) 012716a.docx
141K
- 13  2Amendment to Consulting and License Agrmt 012816redline.docx
34K
- 14  2Settlement Agreement 012816red.docx
47K

15
16 *AA Vol. 1 at AA178.*

17 Neither Respondents' counsel nor his clients objected to the
18 Arbitration Provision; nor expressed any concerns that it did not comply
19 with NRS 597.995 or was otherwise unenforceable. On the contrary, those
20 changes that Respondents' counsel mentioned included **Respondents'**
21 **counsel broadening the scope of the Arbitration Provision.** *AA Vol. 1 at*
22 *A189.*
23

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2 Specifically, Respondents’ counsel broadened the Arbitration
3 Provision to cover any cause of actions beyond the Amended Licensing
4 Agreement, which he identified by red font and underlined edits:

5
6 18. **Arbitration.** MMA and Consultant agree that any dispute, controversy, claim, uncured
7 breach or any other causes of action whether based on contract, tort, misrepresentation, or any
8 other legal theory, related directly or indirectly to the Master License (as amended hereby),
9 which cannot be amicably resolved by the parties, shall be resolved by binding arbitration in
10 accordance with the provisions of this Section 18. Unless the parties agree to use other rules, or
11 the arbitrator deems other rules to be applicable, the arbitration shall be conducted in accordance
12 with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) in
13 effect at the time the demand for arbitration is filed, and either the Federal Arbitration Act (Title
14 9, U.S. Code) or the applicable State of Nevada arbitration statute. The arbitration award or
15 decision may be confirmed, entered and enforced as a judgment in a court having jurisdiction,
16 subject to appeal only in the event of the arbitrator’s misapplication of the law, no evidence to
17 support the award, or such other grounds for appeal of arbitration awards that exist by statute,
18 common law or the applicable rules. If any party commences litigation in violation of this
19 Section 18, or refuses or neglects to timely submit to arbitration in accordance with this Section,
20 then such party shall reimburse the other party(s) for costs and expenses, including reasonable
21 attorney’s fees: (1) incurred in seeking abatement or dismissal of such litigation; and/or (2)
22 incurred in judicially compelling arbitration. However, the foregoing does not preclude a party
23 from seeking emergency relief, including injunctive relief, from a court of competent jurisdiction
24 and the prosecution of a request for such emergency relief will not be deemed a breach or waiver
25 of the provisions contained herein.

26 [signature page follows]

AA Vol. 1 at A189.

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1
2 On February 10, 2016, Respondents' counsel confirmed that his
3 clients approved the jointly drafted settlement documents, including the
4 revised Licensing Agreement and Arbitration Provision, which
5 Respondents' counsel himself broadened:
6

7 On Wed, Feb 10, 2016 at 12:09 PM, Byron Thomas
8 <byronthomaslaw@gmail.com> wrote:
9 Hello Chris. Have you guys had a chance to look at
10 the documents? I know there was a delay on our
11 part in getting them back to you, but we pretty
12 much accepted all of Chris's changes from his last
13 version, so I thought we would get this done in a day
14 or so. If that is not going to happen please let me
15 know. Deadlines in the litigation were pushed out
16 until this Friday and I need to know if we are back in
17 litigation [sic] mode. Thanks.

18 *AA Vol. 1 at AA193.*

19 Shortly thereafter, the Amended Licensing Agreement was signed by
20 Respondent Wright (*AA Vol. 1 at AA114-115*), who is also the Managing
21 Member of Respondent Global (*id. at AA147*) and the control person and
22 trustee of Respondent Zion (*id. at AA005*)(¶5)).

23 As drafted by Respondents' counsel, the broad Arbitration Provision
24 not only applies to all claims concerning the Amended Licensing
25 Agreement, but to all claims concerning or arising from the related and
26 integrated Settlement Agreement and 4th Operating Agreement. Thus,
27 Section 2 of the Settlement Agreement also provides that the Amended
28

1
2 Licensing Agreement is a “material part of settlement” and “incorporated”
3 thereto. *AA Vol. 1 at AA047 (§2.1)*. Respondents further admit the terms
4 and conditions of the underlying and associated Licensing Agreement and
5 4th Operating Agreement apply to the Settlement Agreement. *See i.e., AA*
6 *Vol. 1 at A005 (§10)*(“The Amended Operating Agreement was attached to
7 the Settlement Agreement as an Exhibit and fully incorporated into the
8 Settlement Agreement”); *id. at AA016 (§110)*(alleging that the Defendants
9 “breached the Settlement Agreement....by breaching the terms of the
10 Licensing Agreement...”).

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12
13
14 **C. DISTRICT COURT DECLINED TO ENFORCE**
15 **ARBITRATION BECAUSE IT DETERMINED THAT IT**
16 **VIOLATED NRS 597.995**

17 On January 8, 2018, Appellant MMAWC moved to dismiss the
18 complaint and to enforce the parties’ jointly prepared Arbitration Provision.
19 *AA Vol. 1 at AA024-115.*⁵ Respondents argued that it was not enforceable
20 because it did not comply with NRS 597.995. *AA Vol. 1 at AA118-119*. The
21 District Court agreed with Respondents and concluded that the Arbitration
22 Provision was void pursuant to NRS 597.995 and, on March 13, 2018,
23
24

25 ⁵ Appellants Deifik and The Deifik Family Partnership were served after the
26 February 21, 2018, hearing on Appellant MMAWC’s Motion to Dismiss,
27 during which the Court denied the motion. Accordingly, Deifik and The
28 Deifik Family Partnership filed a subsequent joinder and motion to dismiss
on March 23, 2018, to preserve their appeal rights with MMAWC. *See AA*
Vol. 1 at AA211 to Vol. 2 at AA337.

1 entered an order denying Appellant's motion to compel arbitration
2 ("03/13/18 Order"). *AA Vol. 1 at AA206.*

4 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

5 The only issue before the District Court, and now before this Court, is
6 whether the parties' Arbitration Provision is void under NRS 597.995.
7

8 Foremost, NRS 597.995 is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act,
9 which compels enforcement of the Arbitration Provision here and reversal of
10 the District Court's 03/13/18 Order.
11

12 To the extent that NRS 597.995 may somehow be applicable here
13 (which it is not), the record demonstrates substantive compliance.
14 Respondents had notice of and specifically negotiated, drafted, authorized
15 and agreed to the Arbitration Provision as otherwise required by NRS
16 597.995. Respectfully, the District Court's elevated form over substance in
17 its determination and its conclusion that the parties' Arbitration Provision
18 was void under NRS 597.995 was abuse of discretion or reversible error.
19
20
21

22 ARGUMENT

23 **Standard Of Review**

24 Together, Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 2
25 (2013)) and Nevada's Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000 express Nevada's
26 fundamental policy favoring the enforceability of arbitration agreements.
27
28

1
2 NRS 38.219(1) provides: “An agreement contained in a record to submit to
3 arbitration any existing or subsequent controversy arising between the
4 parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable and irrevocable except ... upon
5 a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract.” *Id.*
6

7 Enforcement of an arbitration provision is a question of law which
8 this Court reviews de novo. *Tallman v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.*, 131 Nev. Adv.
9 Op. 71, 359 P.3d 113, 118–19 (2015)(quoting *State ex rel. Masto v. Second*
10 *Judicial Dist. Court*, 125 Nev. 37, 44, 199 P.3d 828, 832 (2009)). “As a
11 matter of public policy, Nevada courts encourage arbitration and liberally
12 construe arbitration clauses in favor of granting arbitration.” *Id.*
13
14

15 Courts may not invalidate an agreement to arbitrate under state laws,
16 such as NRS 597.995, which are applicable only to arbitration. *U.S. Home*
17 *Corp. v. Michael Ballesteros Tr.*, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 25, 415 P.3d 32, 40
18 (2018)(citing *Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto*, 517 U.S. 681, 687, 116 S.
19 Ct. 1652 (1996)(“Courts may not ... invalidate arbitration agreements under
20 state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions.”).
21
22

23 **I. As This Court Previously Suggested, NRS 597.995 Is Invalid And**
24 **Unenforceable Because It Violates The Federal Arbitration Act,**
25 **Which Preempts NRS 597.995**

26 In *Fat Hat, LLC v. DiTerlizzi*, this Court alluded to the fact that NRS
27 597.995 violates the Federal Arbitration Act:
28

1
2 Fat Hat makes no argument that the Federal
3 Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., applies. We
4 therefore do not address NRS 597.995's validity or
5 application under the FAA. *But see Doctor's
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto*, 517 U.S. 681, 683
(1996).

6 *Id.*, 385 P.3d 580, 2016 WL 5800335 *1, n. 1 (Nev. 2016); *see* NRAP
7
8 36(c)(3).

9 The Nevada Supreme Court is indeed correct, NRS 597.995 is
10 displaced and preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C.
11 §1 *et seq.* Section 2 of the FAA provides:

12
13 A written provision in any maritime transaction or
14 a contract evidencing a transaction involving
15 commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
16 thereafter arising out of such contract or
17 transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or
18 any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
19 submit to arbitration an existing controversy
20 arising out of such a contract, transaction, or
refusal, **shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable**, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.

21 *Id.* (emphasis added).

22 In *Doctor's Assocs.*, the authority cited by the Nevada Supreme Court
23 in *Fat Hat*, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the FAA applies to state
24 courts and trumps any state statute (like NRS 597.995) which single out
25 arbitration provisions to void them in otherwise valid contracts. *Id.* 517 U.S.
26 681, 116 S. Ct. 1652. Specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court commands that
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1
2 “the FAA applies in state as well as federal courts and “withdr[aws] the
3 power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims
4 which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.” *Doctor's*
5 *Assocs., Inc.*, 517 U.S. at 684, 116 S. Ct. at 1655 (internal quotations
6 omitted)(citing *Southland Corp. v. Keating*, 465 U.S. 1, 12, 104 S.Ct. 852,
7 859 (1984)). Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court further commands that, per the
8 FAA, “Courts may not ... invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws
9 applicable only to arbitration provisions.” *Doctor's Assocs., Inc.*, 517 U.S. at
10 687, 116 S. Ct. at 1656; *see also Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v.*
11 *Dobson*, 513 U.S. 265, 270, 115 S. Ct. 834, 838, (1995)(“the basic purpose
12 of the Federal Arbitration Act is to overcome courts' refusals to enforce
13 agreements to arbitrate.”). And here NRS 597.995 applies only to
14 arbitration provisions and is therefore displaced and preempted by the FAA.

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19 A main problem with NRS 597.995 is that it places arbitration clauses
20 on an unequal footing vis-à-vis other contract provisions and settled contract
21 law, giving arbitration provisions “suspect status.” The U.S. Supreme Court
22 reasons:
23

24
25 States may regulate contracts, including arbitration
26 clauses, under general contract law principles and
27 they may invalidate an arbitration clause upon
28 such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.... *What States may not
do is decide that a contract is fair enough to*

1
2 *enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit),*
3 *but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration*
4 *clause. The Act makes any such state policy*
5 *unlawful*, for that kind of policy would place
6 arbitration clauses on an unequal footing, directly
7 contrary to the Act's language and Congress's
8 intent.

9
10 *Doctor's Assocs., Inc.*, 517 U.S. at 685–86, 116 S. Ct. at 1655 (emphasis
11 added)(quoting *Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson*, 513 U.S. 265, 281,
12 115 S.Ct. 834, 843 (1995)).

13
14 Therefore, NRS 597.995 does not preclude the Court from enforcing
15 the parties' jointly negotiated, authorized and drafted Arbitration clause and
16 dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint in its entirety.

17 **II. The District Court's Application of NRS 597.995 Here Violated** 18 **the U.S. Constitution**

19 The FAA was enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause of the US
20 Constitution (U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3) and "is enforceable in both state
21 and federal courts." *Perry v. Thomas*, 482 U.S. 483, 489, 107 S. Ct. 2520,
22 2525 (1987). Section 2 of the FAA "is a congressional declaration of a
23 liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any
24 state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary. The effect of the
25 section is to create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability,
26 applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act." *Id.*

1
2 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court in *Perry* (which is relied on by
3 *Doctor's Assocs., Inc.*) specifically found that the FAA “embodies Congress’
4 intent to provide for the enforcement of arbitration agreements within the
5 full reach of the Commerce Clause” and preempts state law. *Perry*, 482 U.S.
6 at 490–91, 107 S. Ct. at 2526. Accordingly, that any state arbitration statute
7 [like NRS 597.995] which conflicts with the FAA, “must give way” under
8 the Supremacy Clause. *Id.*
9
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11 The Commerce Clause is undisputedly triggered here because the
12 parties’ settlement and corresponding agreements and activities, including
13 the Arbitration Provision, involve commerce. As stated above, the FAA
14 applies to “any transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
15 commerce....” 9 U.S.C. §1 *et seq.* The application of the FAA under the
16 Commerce Clause is expansive and far reaching to the very outer limits of
17 Constitutional power. The US Supreme Court has examined such language
18 and the FAA’s background and structure and concluded “that the word
19 ‘involving’ is broad and is indeed the functional equivalent of ‘affecting.’”
20 *Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc.*, 513 U.S. at 273–74, 115 S. Ct. at
21 839. And, the US Supreme Court has ultimately concluded that the FAA
22 “signals an intent to exercise Congress’ commerce power to the full.” *Id.*,
23 513 U.S. at 277, 115 S. Ct. at 841.
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2 The record here includes several factors indisputably establishing
3 interstate commerce. MMAWC promoted MMA events nationwide, which
4 were nationwide broadcasted via the commonly known national network,
5 NBC Sports (*AA Vol. 1 at AA004* (§1)), which MMAX continues to
6 broadcast after acquiring MMAWC's assets and rights (*id. at AA006*)(§14).
7
8 *See Fisher's Blend Station v. Tax Comm'n of State of Washington*, 297 U.S.
9 650, 655, 56 S. Ct. 608, 609 (1936)("By its very nature broadcasting
10 transcends state lines and is national in its scope and importance—
11 characteristics which bring it within the purpose and protection, and subject
12 it to the control, of the commerce clause."). Indeed, one of the MMA
13 productions specifically at issue occurred in New York City, New York,
14 which was nationally televised via NBC Sports. *AA Vol. 1 at AA008*.

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18 Furthermore, the subject matter of the Amended Licensing Agreement
19 expressly concerns interstate commerce, as defined by the FAA. Section 1
20 of the FAA defines "commerce" to include "**commerce among the several**
21 **States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States.**"
22 *9 U.S.C. §1* (emphasis added). Respondent Global's rights at issue under
23 the Amended Licensing Agreement⁶ are rights to engage in commerce with
24 foreign nations using the licensed marks and reserving MMAWC's
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28 ⁶ As the represented assignee of Hong Kong, the original party to the Amended Licensing Agreement. *AA Vol. 1 at AA008* (§50).

1 commerce territory to include the United States and the rest of the Americas.

2
3 Thus, Section 1.2 of Amended Licensing Agreement provides:

4 The Parties agree that the geographic area within
5 which Consultant shall be permitted to use the
6 Licensed Marks for the Licensed Use pursuant to
7 the terms of the Master License (as amended
8 hereby) shall be any part of the world other than
9 North America (including Canada, the United
10 States and its territories and possessions, including,
11 but not limited to, Puerto Rico, Guam, American
12 Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and U.S. ships
13 at sea), the Islands of the Caribbean Basin, Mexico
14 and the countries that comprise any party of
15 Central America, and South America (the "WSOF
16 Territory").

17 *AA Vol. 1 at AA106 (§1.2).*

18 Section 3 and 4 further provide that Respondents intend to produce
19 several MMA events outside of North America, Central America or South
20 America, which events may be broadcasted and/or promoted across the
21 Unites States and world-wide via You Tube and other social media. *AA Vol.*
22 *1 at AA107-108.*

23 The District Court's 03/13/18 Order is manifestly contrary to the FAA
24 and Commerce Clause and therefore, violates the US Constitution.

25 **III. The District Court Erred In Refusing To Apply And Follow The**
26 **Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.**

27 In seeking to compel arbitration, MMAWC established to the District
28 Court that the FAA applies, which displaces NRS 597.995 and directs

1 enforcement of the Arbitration Provision. *AA Vol. 1 at AA031-33 and*
2
3 *AA153-155*. The District Court had no discretion to ignore the FAA and
4 committed reversible error in refusing to apply the FAA. “So long as
5 ‘commerce’ is involved, the FAA applies.” *Tallman v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.*,
6 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 71, 359 P.3d 113, 121 (2015). Thus, this Court further
7 recognizes that “[t]he [US] Supreme Court has made it unmistakably clear
8 that state courts must abide by the FAA, which is the supreme Law of the
9 Land... and by the opinions of [the Supreme] Court interpreting that law.”
10 *Id.*, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 71, 359 P.3d at 121 (internal citations and quotations
11 omitted). Thus, the District Court was obligated to cede to the FAA and
12 enforce the Arbitration Provision, and its failure to do compels reversal of its
13 03/13/18 Order and a directive to compel arbitration.

14 **IV. The Circumstances Here Demonstrate That NRS 597.995 Is** 15 **Vague And Ambiguous And Therefore, Void And Unenforceable**

16 The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that this Court
17 reviews de novo. *Sheriff, Washoe Cty. v. Burdg*, 118 Nev. 853, 857, 59 P.3d
18 484, 486 (2002). “Statutes are presumed to be valid, and the burden is on
19 the challenger to make a clear showing of their unconstitutionality.” *Id.*
20 (quoting *Childs v. State*, 107 Nev. 584, 587, 816 P.2d 1079, 1081 (1991)).
21 To overcome this burden, there must be a “clear showing” of invalidity.
22 *Sheriff, Washoe Cty.*, 118 Nev. at 857, 59 P.3d at 486. A statute is vague
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1 and unenforceable when “it lacks specific standards, thereby encouraging,
2 authorizing, or even failing to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory
3 enforcement.” *Silvar v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Cty. of Clark*, 122
4 Nev. 289, 293, 129 P.3d 682, 685 (2006)
5
6

7 Appellants are aware that in the unpublished determination of *Fat*
8 *Hat, LLC*, the three-member Panel determined that NRS 597.995 was not
9 void or ambiguous regarding its scope⁷, but respectfully the circumstances
10 here reveal ambiguities and possible, unintended problems and obstacles to
11 commercial, arms-length transactions which impermissibly burden the
12 fundamental right to contract, as the District Court did here. The legislative
13 intent behind NRS 597.995 is to address circumstances where arbitration
14 provisions are obfuscated in consumer, unilaterally prepared boiler-plate and
15 not readily obvious to one of the parties. *See NV Assem. Comm. Min. on AB*
16 *326, 3/27/2013 (BDR 52-803)*. Thus, NRS 597.995(1) requires an
17 agreement to “include specific authorization for the provision which
18 indicates that the person has affirmatively agreed to the provision.” *Id.*
19 NRS 597.995(1) however, does not specify or articulate what it means to
20 include such specific authorization and what such authorization looks like.
21
22 In other words, NRS 597.995 lacks specific standards for compliance.
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27 _____
28 ⁷ *Fat Hat*, 385 P.3d 580, 2016 WL 5800335.

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2 *Fat Hat, LLC* concerned boilerplate independent contractor and
3 employment contracts presented by *Fat Hat, LLC* to employees or
4 contractors. Under the facts of *Fat Hat, LLC* the Court’s three-member
5 Panel stated that the placement of an arbitration provision immediately
6 above the signature line for the contract was somehow not “specific
7 authorization” under NRS 597.995(1). *Id.* 2016 WL 5800335 at *2. The
8 Panel also determined that an initial at the bottom of the page containing the
9 arbitration provision was also not “specific authorization” under NRS
10 597.995(1) because the party had also initialed the other pages. *Id.*
11 Ultimately, the Panel concluded printing a name and address in the blank
12 spaces of the arbitration provision did constitute “specific authorization”
13 under NRS 597.995(1). *Id.*

14
15 Respectfully, NRS 597.995(1) however, does not state or imply that
16 printing a name and address constitutes “specific authorization.” Nor does
17 NRS 597.995(1)
18 say that a separate signature line is required. Nor does it say that initials by
19 the arbitration provision are required. In sum, NRS 597.995(1) says nothing
20 about what a specific authorization looks like, must state, must include, or
21 where it is located vis-à-vis the arbitration provision. *See Silvar*, 122 Nev.
22 at 293, 129 P.3d at 685 (a statute is vague when “it lacks specific standards,
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2 thereby encouraging, authorizing, or even failing to prevent arbitrary and
3 discriminatory enforcement.”). NRS 597.995(1) also says nothing about
4 agreements and arbitration provisions that are jointly drafted by the parties,
5 as is the case here.
6

7 To be sure the circumstances here unquestionably demonstrate that
8 the arbitration provision was “specifically authorized” by Respondents, as
9 substantively intended by NRS 597.995:
10

- 11 • The Amended Licensing Agreement is not a take it or leave it
12 form/boilerplate agreement or consumer agreement.
- 13 • The Amended Licensing Agreement was jointly negotiated and
14 drafted among Respondents and Appellants.
- 15 • In fact, Respondents’ counsel initially drafted the Amended
16 Licensing Agreement.
17
- 18 • Respondents’ counsel and Respondents themselves actively
19 discussed with Appellants the drafting and editing of the Amended
20 Licensing Agreement, including the addition of the Arbitration
21 Provision.
22
- 23 • Respondents’ counsel edited and increased the reach and
24 application of the Arbitration Provision, thereby conclusively
25 demonstrating knowledge of the provision and agreement to
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1 arbitrate; indeed Respondents wanted an even broader arbitration
2 obligation imposed.

- 3
- 4 • Respondents agree and admit that the Amended Licensing
5 Agreement, including the Arbitration Provision, together with the
6 4th Operating Agreement, are part and parcel of the Settlement
7 Agreement.
8

9
10 *See e.g., AA Vol. 1 at AA016; 047; 105-115; and 159-197.*

11 NRS 597.995 says nothing about such circumstances and evidence.
12 Certainly, the consideration of the foregoing evidence is not excludable as
13 parol evidence (because evidence does not vary contract). And yet, such
14 circumstances compellingly and without question show that the Arbitration
15 Provision was specifically authorized and NRS 597.995 substantively
16 satisfied, particularly when NRS 597.995 does not provide a clear and
17 unambiguous form of compliance.
18

19
20 Moreover, it is facially apparent that the Amended Licensing
21 Agreement is not a form or boiler plate agreement. It deals with a discreet
22 subject matter regarding very specific and individualized: (a) intellectual
23 property; (b) broadcast and promotion rights; (3) limitations on promotions
24 and events; (4) geographic scope of commerce; and (5) parties, among other
25 things; and the agreement cannot be replicated over and over just by
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2 changing one of the names of the parties. In other words, it is not like a
3 residential loan agreement for example, which can be replicated by simply
4 changing the names of the parties, purchase price and property address.

5
6 The lack of clarity and guidance from NRS 597.995 raises other
7 concerns here, where you have parties, like Respondents, which take to
8 machinations and suddenly disavow a jointly negotiated and drafted contract
9 provision for self-serving purposes, as Respondents argued here because
10 their counsel did not include a so-called “specific authorization” – whatever
11 that may be – under NRS 597.995. **Indeed, Respondents are themselves**
12 **responsible for such “omission” since they jointly drafted and edited the**
13 **Amended Licensing Agreement and the Arbitration Provision.** If
14 Respondents omitted drafting a “specific authorization” (however that may
15 look like) from the Arbitration Provision because they never intended to
16 comply with such provision, they have engaged in bad faith or committed
17 fraud to induce Appellants’ consent – which is safe to say not what NRS
18 597.995 intended as a result. On the other hand, a “specific authorization”
19 may not have been restated because, *inter alia*: (i) again, NRS 597.995 does
20 not say what such authorization looks like or must say; (ii) arbitration
21 clauses should not be singled out “suspect” and treated differently than other
22 contract terms, as the US Supreme Court recognized in *Doctor's Assocs.*,
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2 *Inc.*, 517 U.S. 681, 116 S. Ct. 1652; or (iii) because such would have been
3 unnecessary and redundant since Respondents and Appellants jointly
4 discussed, negotiated and drafted the Arbitration Provision.

5
6 **V. The District Court Abused Its Discretion and/or Erred In Voiding**
7 **The Arbitration Because It Did Not Comply With Or Violated**
8 **NRS 597.995 Because Such Findings Is Contradicted By The**
9 **Record**

10 Respectfully, the District Court exalted form of substance and ignored
11 the compelling circumstances here which unquestionably show Respondents
12 “specifically authorized” the Arbitration Provision. And, as discussed
13 above, such “form” is vague and ambiguous. Accepting the District Court’s
14 determination allows the Respondents to escape by subterfuge their
15 unquestionable agreement to arbitrate their claims.
16

17
18 Such is contrary to the very principles of justice, fairness and
19 reasonableness. Indeed, this Court time and again rejects following form
20 over substance when it delivers absurd and unfair results, as is the case
21 below. *See e.g., Brad Assocs. v. Nevada Fed. Fin. Corp.*, 109 Nev. 145, 848
22 P.2d 1064 (1993). In *Brad Assocs.*, the district court granted the defendant
23 credit union’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s action because plaintiff failed to
24 file a fictitious name certificate as required by NRS 602.070, which “clear
25 mandate” states: “No action may be commenced or maintained by any
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1 person ... or general partnership ... unless prior to the commencement thereof
2 the certificate required by this chapter has been filed.” *Id.*, 109 Nev. at 147-
3 149, 848 P.2d at 1066-1067 (citing NRS 602.070). Notwithstanding the
4 clarity of NRS 602.070, this Court determined that the district court erred in
5 granting the credit union’s motion and dismissing plaintiff’s claims because,
6 given the circumstances, the district court wrongly elevated form over
7 substance and dismissal was unreasonable:
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11 Brad Associates argues that, under the present
12 facts, NRS 602.010 and NRS 602.070 should not
13 operate to deny Brad Associates its day in court.
14 The reason, contends Brad Associates, is because
15 the note and the deed of trust were executed not by
16 Brad Associates, but by the partners in their
17 individual capacities. Accordingly, the Credit
18 Union had all the information which a filed
19 certificate would have given it.

20 *****

21 We agree with Brad Associates. The Credit Union
22 knew full well the identity of the parties with
23 whom it was dealing. Throughout the negotiations,
24 the Credit Union was dealing with each individual
25 partner of Brad Associates. Neither the original
26 note nor the deed of trust and assignment of rents
27 agreement makes any mention of Brad Associates.
28 Indeed, according to the documents presented to
this court, “Brad Associates” does not even appear
until the extension agreement.

Furthermore, the original loan applications
presumably required the partners to disclose
personal information to the Credit Union. Surely
the Credit Union's decision to approve the loan
was based on each individual partner's credit

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worthiness and not upon Brad Associates' credit record. Even had Brad Associates filed a certificate as required by NRS 602.010, the Credit Union would have had no additional information on which to base its decision. Because the Credit Union had all the information which a certificate would have provided, we conclude that an application of NRS 602.070 would be a classic case of form over substance. Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in granting the Credit Union's motion to dismiss Brad Associate's claim.

Brad Assocs., 109 Nev. at 148–49, 848 P.2d at 1066–67.

The District Court similarly erred here in ignoring the undisputed circumstances which clearly demonstrate that Respondents “specifically authorized” the Arbitration provision that they negotiated, discussed and drafted with Appellants.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the District Court, vacate the 03/13/18 Order and direct the District Court to compel arbitration of Respondents’ claims, as Respondents expressly agreed to via the Arbitration Provision they jointly negotiated and drafted.

KENNEDY & COUVILLIER, PLLC

/s/ Maximiliano D. Couvillier III, Esq. _____
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*Attorneys for Appellants MMAWC, LLC,
Bruce Deifik and the Nancy And Bruce Deifik
Family Partnership LLLP*

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**CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
PURSUANT TO NRAP 32**

1. I hereby certify that this Appellants’ Opening Brief complies with the formatting requirements of NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeface requirements of NRAP 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of NRAP 32(a)(6) because:

This brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word, 2016 Edition, Times New Roman in 14-point font.

2. I further certify that this combined answering/opening brief complies with the page or type-volume limitations of NRAP 32(a)(7)(ii), excluding the parts exempted by NRAP 32(a)(7)(C), because:

It is proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more and contains approximately **6,115 words**.

3. Finally, I hereby certify that I have read this appellate brief, and to the best of my knowledge, information and belief, it is not frivolous or interposed for an improper purpose. I further certify that this brief complies with all applicable Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, in particular NRAP 23(e)(1), which requires every assertion in the brief regarding matters

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in the record to be supported by reference to the page and volume number, if any, of the transcript or appendix where the matter relied on is to be found. I understand that I may be subject to sanctions in the event that the accompanying brief is not in conformity with the requirements of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Dated: August 15, 2018.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on August 15, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing **APPELLANTS’ OPENING BRIEF** together with **APPELLANTS’ APPENDIX VOLS. 1 & 2 (in CD Format)** upon all counsel of record by depositing the same in the US Mail, correct postage pre-paid, to the following at their last known address:

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