IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Appellant,

Electronically Filed Sep 24 2018 02:51 p.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

V.

RIGOBERTO INZUNZA,

Respondent.

Case No. 75662

APPELLANT'S APPENDIX

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 Regional Justice Center 200 Lewis Avenue Post Office Box 552212 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 State of Nevada

ADAM PAUL LAXALT Nevada Attorney General Nevada Bar #012426 100 North Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717 (775) 684-1265 P. DAVID WESTBROOK Deputy Public Defender Nevada Bar #009278 309 South Third Street, Suite 226 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 (702) 455-4685

Counsel for Appellant

Counsel for Respondent

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify and affirm that this document was filed electronically with the Nevada Supreme Court on 24th day of September, 2018. Electronic Service of the foregoing document shall be made in accordance with the Master Service List as follows:

ADAM PAUL LAXALT Nevada Attorney General

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/s/ J. Garcia

Employee, Clark County District Attorney's Office

JEV/Ann Dunn/jg

JUSTICE COURT, NORTH LAS VEGAS TOWNSHIP CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

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Plaintiff,

-VS-

RIGOBERTO INZUNZA, aka, Rigoberto Lopez Inzunza #0448039,

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Defendant.

CASE NO:

14FN2148X

DEPT NO:

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

The Defendant above named having committed the crimes of SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE (Category A Felony - NRS 200.364, 200.366 - NOC 50105) and LEWDNESS WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 14 (Category A Felony - NRS 201.230 - NOC 50975), in the manner following, to-wit: That the said Defendant, on or between September 1, 2009 and October 31, 2010, at and within the County of Clark, State of Nevada,

COUNT 1 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject E.J., a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: digital penetration; by inserting his finger(s) into the genital opening of the said E.J., against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that E.J. was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 2 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject E.J., a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: digital penetration: by inserting his finger(s) into the genital opening of the said E.J., against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that E.J. was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 3 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject

2.7

E.J., a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: digital penetration: by inserting his finger(s) into the genital opening of the said E.J., against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that E.J. was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

<u>COUNT 4</u> - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject E.J., a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: digital penetration: by inserting his finger(s) into the genital opening of the said E.J., against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that E.J. was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

<u>COUNT 5</u> - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject E.J., a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: digital penetration: by inserting his finger(s) into the genital opening of the said E.J., against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that E.J. was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 6 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject E.J., a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: fellatio: by placing his penis on or in the mouth of the said E.J., against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that E.J. was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

<u>COUNT 7</u> - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject E.J., a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: fellatio: by placing his penis on or in the mouth of the said E.J., against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that E.J. was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 8 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject E.J., a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: fellatio: by placing his penis on or in the mouth of the said E.J., against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that E.J. was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 9 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject E.J., a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: fellatio: by placing his penis on or in the mouth of the said E.J., against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that E.J. was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 10 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject E.J., a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: fellatio: by placing his penis on or in the mouth of the said E.J., against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that E.J. was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 11 - LEWDNESS WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 14

did then and there wilfully, lewdly, unlawfully, and feloniously commit a lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, a child, to-wit: E.J., said child being under the age of fourteen years, by touching and/or rubbing and/or fondling the said E.J.'S genital area with his penis, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of said Defendant, or said child.

COUNT 12 - LEWDNESS WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 14

did then and there wilfully, lewdly, unlawfully, and feloniously commit a lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, a child, to-wit: E.J., said

child being under the age of fourteen years, by touching and/or rubbing and/or fondling the said E.J.'S genital area with his penis, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of said Defendant, or said child.

COUNT 13 - LEWDNESS WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 14

did then and there wilfully, lewdly, unlawfully, and feloniously commit a lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, a child, to-wit: E.J., said child being under the age of fourteen years, by touching and/or rubbing and/or fondling the said E.J.'S genital area with his penis, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of said Defendant, or said child.

COUNT 14 - LEWDNESS WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 14

did then and there wilfully, lewdly, unlawfully, and feloniously commit a lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, a child, to-wit: E.J., said child being under the age of fourteen years, by touching and/or rubbing and/or fondling the said E.J.'S genital area with his penis, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of said Defendant, or said child.

COUNT 15 - LEWDNESS WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 14

did then and there wilfully, lewdly, unlawfully, and feloniously commit a lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, a child, to-wit: E.J., said child being under the age of fourteen years, by touching and/or rubbing and/or fondling the said E.J.'S genital area with his penis, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of said Defendant, or said child.

All of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of Statutes in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Nevada. Said Complainant makes this declaration subject to the penalty of perjury.

25

26

27 28

14FN2148X/jjd NLVPD EV# 1419610 (TK)

12/03/14



Follow-Up Report

Case No. 141118019610

E-Police No. Report No.

141118019610.3

Report Date: 2/15/2017

Subject:	WFOJ	Routing		
	-1		-	
Case Report Status	A - Approved	Case Status	O - Open	
Case Attachments	Yes	Date Entered	2/15/2017 11:30:37 AM	Reporting Officer
		Entered By	NL1810 - Santos, Andrew	NL1810 - Santos, Andrew
Occurred On	8/1/2005 8:00:00 AM	Date Verified	2/15/2017 3:04:08 PM	
(and Between)		Verified By	NL1180 - Semper, Darreil	
		Date Approved	2/16/2017 6:44:38 PM	
Location	330 S CASINO CENTER	Approved By	NL0985 - Cheng, Luz	Assisted By
Jurisdiction	χ	Connecting Cases	•	
Grid	MTRO - Metro	Disposition	Active	
Sector	Χ	Searance Reason		
Map	ι	Date of Clearance ·		•
Census/Gea		Reporting Agency	North Las Vegas Police Department	
Call Source	Field	Division	Detectives	
		Notified		
Vehicle Activity		Means		
Vehicle Traveling		Other Means		
Cross Street		Motive		
		Other Motives		

)ffense Detail: 50975 - Lewdness W/Child < 14, (1st) - 201.230.2

Offense Description

50975 - Lewdness W/Child < 14, (1st) - 201.230.2

IBR Code IBR Group 11D - Forcible Fondling

Location Offense

20 - Residence/Home

No

Completed? Hate/Bias

Yes

No. Prem. Entered Entry Method

Crime Against Using

PΕ

Domestic Violence Fraud Related 88 - None (No Bias) No

Type Security Gang Related

No

Tools Used Criminal Activity

Weapons 99 - None

Report Narrative

On January 29, 2017, Rigoberto Inzunza (CS# 0448039) was arrested by the Monmouth County Sheriff's Department for an outstanding North Las Vegas Warrant (14CRN002215-000) under case # 14FN2148X. The warrant and extradition were confirmed by NLVPD Records on this same date.

On January 30, 2017, Detective Anthony Gomez #1270, contacted the victim in this case who said they were available and willing to prosecute. On this same day, he contacted Clark County District Attorney's (DA) Office and requested approval for extradition.

On January 30, 2017, Clark County Chief DA Rhodes approved extradition.

On February 2, 2017, Inzunza signed a waiver of extradition.

On February 11, 2017, PTS of America transported Clarke to the Clark County Detention Center where he was booked for the warrant.

Attachments: waiver of extradition.

12:00	1	Electronically Filed 03/24/2017 02:44:07 PM CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
12:00	3 4 5 6 7	THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff, vs. OGJ No. 16BGJ081X DC No. C321860 RIGOBERTO INZUNZA, aka Rigoberto
12:00	9 10 11 12	Lopez Inzunza,) Defendant.))
12:00	13 14 15 16	Taken at Las Vegas, Nevada Wednesday, March 8, 2017 4:03 p.m.
	17 18 19	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
12:00	20212223	
12:00	24 25	Reported by: Danette L. Antonacci, C.C.R. No. 222

1	GRAND JURORS PRESENT ON MARCH 8, 2017
2	
3	JOHN BLACKWELL, Foreperson
4	JANE REYLING, Deputy Foreperson
5	STACEY EARL, Secretary
6	MARGARET FREE, Assistant Secretary
7	MAYRA ALMONTE
8	ISABEL DARENSBOURG
9	BLANCA FISSELLA
10	PHILLIP HOLGUIN
11	GREGORY KRAMER
12	CAROLE LARKINS
13	REGLA MEGRET
14	CHARLOTTE MILLER
15	ADOLPH PEBELSKE, JR.
16	ELIZABETH ROMOFF
17	DERRICK SIMMONS
18	FRANCES STOLDAD
19	
20	Also present at the request of the Grand Jury:
21	Jacob Villani, Chief Deputy District Attorney
22	Chief Depacy District Mecoliney
23	
24	
25	
	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

12:00 1	<u>INDEX OF WITNESSES</u>
2	<u>Examined</u>
3	
4	ELISIANA JONES 7
12:00 5	ELIZABETH GUERRA 27
6	
7	
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23 24	
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2.3	

12:00	1	<u>INDEX OF EXHIBITS</u>	
	2		
	3	Grand Jury Exhibits	<u>Identified</u>
	4	1 - PROPOSED INDICTMENT	5
12:00	5	2 - INSTRUCTIONS	5
	6	3 - PHOTOGRAPH	11
	7	5 - DIAGRAM OF THE FEMALE ANATOMY	19
	8	6 - DIAGRAM OF THE FEMALE ANATOMY	12
	9	7 - DIAGRAM OF FEMAL ANATOMY	11
	10		
	11		
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LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, MARCH 8, 2017 12:00 1 2 3 DANETTE L. ANTONACCI, 4 12:00 having been first duly sworn to faithfully 5 6 and accurately transcribe the following 7 proceedings to the best of her ability. 8 9 MR. VILLANI: Good afternoon ladies and 04:03 gentlemen of the Grand Jury. My name is Jake Villani 10 11 and I will be presenting Grand Jury case number 12 16BGJ081X, State of Nevada versus Rigoberto Inzunza. 13 The record will reflect that I have marked a copy of the 14 proposed Indictment as Exhibit Number 1 and that all 04:03 members of the Grand Jury have a copy of it. 15 16 defendant in this case is charged with the crimes of 17 sexual assault with a minor under 14 years of age and 18 lewdness with a child under the age of 14, committed at 19 and within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, on or between September 1st of 2009 -- sorry -- March of 2008 04:03 20 21 and October 31st of 2010. 22 I'm required by law to advise you of the elements of these charges. I provided written 23 instructions to each of the grand jurors and marked a 24 25 copy of the instructions provided as Exhibit Number 2. 04:04

```
Are there any grand jurors who do not have a copy of the
04:04
         1
             instructions?
         3
                          Seeing no hands.
                          My first witness is Elisiana Jones.
         4
            Spelling of the first name E-L-I-S-I-A-N-A.
04:04
         5
                          THE FOREPERSON: Please raise your right
         6
         7
            hand.
         8
                          You do solemnly swear the testimony you are
            about to give upon the investigation now pending before
         9
            this Grand Jury shall be the truth, the whole truth, and
04:04
        10
        11
            nothing but the truth, so help you God?
        12
                          THE WITNESS:
                                        Yes.
        13
                          THE FOREPERSON: Please be seated.
        14
                          You are advised that you are here today to
04:05
            give testimony in the investigation pertaining to the
        15
        16
            offenses of sexual assault with a minor under 14 years
            of age, and lewdness with a child under the age of 14,
        17
            involving Rigoberto Inzunza.
        18
                          Do you understand this advisement?
        19
        20
04:05
                                        Yes.
                          THE WITNESS:
        21
                          THE FOREPERSON: Please state your first
        22
            and last name and spell both for the record.
        23
                          THE WITNESS:
                                        Elisiana Jones.
        24
            E-L-I-S-I-A-N-A, J-O-N-E-S.
04:05
        25
                          ///
```

04:05	1	ELISIANA JONES,		
	2	having been	first duly sworn by the Foreperson of the	
	3	Grand Jury t	o testify to the truth, the whole truth,	
	4	and nothing 1	but the truth, testified as follows:	
04:05	5			
	6		EXAMINATION	
	7			
	8	BY MR. VILLA	NI:	
	9	Q.	Elisiana, when were you born?	
04:05	10	Α.	01/18/1999.	
	11	Q.	January 8, 1999?	
	12	Α.	Yes.	
	13	Q.	Do you know a man by the name of Rigoberto	
	14	Inzunza?		
04:05	15	Α.	Yes.	
	16	Q.	How do you know Rigoberto Inzunza?	
	17	Α.	From Pahrump where we used to live and he	
	18	was a friend	of, my mom's friend and then he moved in	
	19	with us.		
04:05	20	Q.	You say you knew him from Pahrump. Did he	
	21	also live he	re in Las Vegas?	
	22	Α.	Yes.	
	23	Q.	Do you know about how old Rigoberto was?	
	24	Α.	No.	
04:06	25	Q.	Was he your age?	

04:06	1	Α.	No.
	2	Q.	Was he your mom's age?
	3	Α.	A little older.
	4	Q.	A little older than your mom. Okay.
04:06	5		All right. Now when you moved here to Las
	6	Vegas, was th	at into the Yerba Lane Apartments?
	7	А.	Yes.
	8	Q.	And that was on Yerba Lane street; correct?
	9	Α.	Yes.
04:06	10	Q.	That's here in Clark County, Nevada?
	11	Α.	Yes.
	12	Q.	Did you start living there around September
	13	of 2008?	
	14	А.	Yes.
04:06	15	Q.	And was Rigoberto living there with you at
	16	the time?	
	17	А.	Yes.
	18	Q.	Did you call him Rigoberto?
	19	А.	No, we called him Rigo.
04:06	20	Q.	And that's R-I-G-O, correct?
	21	Α.	Yes.
	22	Q.	While you were at that Yerba Lane
	23	apartment, di	d Rigoberto ever touch you inappropriately?
	24	Α.	Yes.
04:06	25	Q.	And how would he do that? What would he

04:07	1	use to touch	you?
	2	Α.	Do I have to say the word?
	3	Q.	Yeah.
	4	Α.	His penis.
04:07	5	Q.	Okay.
	6	Α.	His fingers.
	7	Q.	Okay.
	8	Α.	His tongue.
	9	Q.	Okay.
04:07	10		And did he make you do anything to him?
	11	Α.	Uhm, yes.
	12	Q.	What would he make you do to him?
	13	Α.	He would make me suck his penis.
	14	Q.	And is this all at the Yerba Lane
04:07	15	Apartments?	
	16	Α.	Yes.
	17	Q.	So I want to start step by step here. Who
	18	were you liv	ing with at those apartments?
	19	Α.	My mom, my mom's no. My mom, me and my
04:07	20	sister, my to	wo brothers and Rigo.
	21	Q.	And what were the sleeping arrangements?
	22	How many bed	rooms were there?
	23	Α.	There was three bedrooms. Me, my siblings
	24	and my mom wl	no would all sleep in one room, there was an
04:08	25	office in the	e middle and he would sleep in the room by

04:08	1	himself.
	2	Q. And when he would touch you
	3	inappropriately, in what room would he touch you
	4	inappropriately?
04:08	5	A. In his room.
	6	Q. How would get you into his room?
	7	A. By waking me up when all my brothers and
	8	sister was asleep and taking me there.
	9	Q. Where was your mom at the time?
04:08	10	A. She did night shift so she was working.
	11	Q. Was she always working when Rigoberto would
	12	touch you?
	13	A. Yes.
	14	Q. So would he wake up any of your other
04:08	15	siblings and bring them into his room?
	16	A. No.
	17	Q. It was just you?
	18	A. Yes.
	19	Q. Now while you were living at those Yerba
04:08	20	Lane Apartments, you were there September 2008 through
	21	about December of 2008?
	22	A. Yes.
	23	Q. About that long?
	24	While you were there, how often would he do
04:08	25	these things to you?

04:08	1	A. Almost every night.
	2	Q. You say almost every night. Now every time
	3	he did those to you, was your mom not home?
	4	A. Yes.
04:09	5	Q. And then every time he did that to you was
	6	it the same thing of wake you up and bring you over to
	7	his room?
	8	A. Yes.
	9	Q. First I want to talk about you said he
04:09	10	would use his hands. I'm going to show you, first let
	11	me show you Grand Jury Exhibit Number 3. Do you
	12	recognize the person in Grand Jury Exhibit 3?
	13	A. Yes.
	14	Q. Who is that?
04:09	15	A. Rigo.
	16	Q. Just talking about while you were at the
	17	Yerba Lane Apartments and just talking about when Rigo
	18	would use his hands on you. I'm showing you a diagram
	19	that's been marked as Grand Jury Exhibit Number 7. Do
04:09	20	you recognize that as a diagram of the female anatomy?
	21	A. Yes.
	22	Q. If I give you my pen, can you put an X
	23	where he would touch you with his fingers.
	24	And how often would he use his fingers
04:10	25	versus using his tongue versus using whatever else?

04:10	1	А.	Not so often.
	2	Q.	So the hand was less often?
	3		How many times did it happen at the Yerba
	4	Lane Apartme	nts?
04:10	5	Α.	I don't know, I'm sorry.
	6	Q.	Okay. Did it happen at least once?
	7	Α.	Yes.
	8	Q.	Did it happen more than once?
	9	Α.	Yes.
04:10	10	Q.	Now I want to talk about, you said he used
	11	his tongue o	n you. Did he use his tongue at the Yerba
	12	Lane Apartme	nts?
	13	Α.	Yes.
	14	Q.	How often would he do that?
04:10	15	А.	Quite often.
	16	Q.	So that was more often than the hand?
	17	А.	Yes.
	18	Q.	Showing you Grand Jury Exhibit Number 6.
	19	Do you recog	nize that as a diagram of the female
04:11	20	anatomy?	
	21	Α.	Yes.
	22	Q.	Could you put an X where he would put his
	23	tongue?	
	24		Now do you remember how many times he did
04:11	25	that with hi	s tongue?

04:11	1	Α.	No, I'm sorry.
	2	Q.	Did he do it one time, at least one time?
	3	Α.	More.
	4	Q.	More than one time.
04:11	5		Now you mentioned he would make you do
	6	something to	his penis. What would he make you do to
	7	his penis?	
	8	Α.	He would make me suck on it.
	9	Q.	And how often would he do that?
04:11	10	А.	Quite often.
	11	Q.	And this is at the Yerba Lane apartment?
	12	А.	Yes.
	13	Q.	Do you remember what grade you were in in
	14	the Yerba La	ne apartment?
04:11	15	Α.	Third or fourth grade.
	16	Q.	And what would he tell you to do when it
	17	was, when he	wanted you to suck on his penis?
	18	Α.	He would just tell me to do it.
	19	Q.	Would he say suck on my penis?
04:12	20	Α.	Yeah.
	21	Q.	Do you remember how often that would
	22	happen?	
	23	Α.	Quite often.
	24	Q.	More or less often than the hand?
04:12	25	Α.	Less.

04:12	1	Q.	And more or less often than the tongue?
	2	Α.	Less.
	3	Q.	So less often than both. Do you remember
	4	approximate	Ly how many times he did that?
04:12	5	Α.	No, I'm sorry.
	6	Q.	Okay. Did he do it at least one time?
	7	Α.	Yes. Sorry.
	8	Q.	That's okay. Did he do it more than one
	9	time?	
04:12	10	Α.	Yes.
	11	Q.	Would stuff ever come out of his penis
	12	while you we	ere sucking on it?
	13	Α.	No.
	14	Q.	Now did he ever touch you anywhere else
04:12	15	inappropriat	cely?
	16	Α.	My boobs.
	17	Q.	Would that be above or below your clothing?
	18	Α.	Below.
	19	Q.	So underneath your clothes?
04:13	20	Α.	Yes.
	21	Q.	Was that also at the Yerba Lane Apartments?
	22	Α.	Yes.
	23	Q.	And how often would he do that?
	24	Α.	Not that often.
04:13	25	Q.	Did he do it once?

04:13	1	A. Yes.
	2	Q. Did he do it more than once?
	3	A. Yes.
	4	Q. And that was while you were living at the
04:13	5	Yerba Lane Apartments?
	6	A. Yes.
	7	Q. Now I want to, after you moved out of the
	8	Yerba Lane Apartments, did you move into a house?
	9	A. Yes.
04:13	10	Q. Was that house located on Celeste Avenue?
	11	A. Yes.
	12	Q. Is that house also here in Clark County?
	13	A. Yes.
	14	Q. And that would have been around September
04:13	15	of 2008 when you moved out?
	16	A. Yes.
	17	Q. Now when you moved into the Celeste avenue
	18	house, who were you living with?
	19	A. My mom's friend Shannon, Rigo, my mom's
04:13	20	friend Shannon's kids, me and my siblings and my mom.
	21	Q. And was that a one story house or a two
	22	story house?
	23	A. A one story.
	24	Q. And do you remember how many bedrooms there
04:14	25	were?

04:14	1	A. There were three.
	2	Q. Three bedrooms. And where would you sleep?
	3	A. I would sleep in the master bedroom.
	4	Q. And who else slept with you in the master
04:14	5	bedroom?
	6	A. My mom and my siblings.
	7	Q. And who slept in the other two bedrooms?
	8	A. My mom's friend Shannon, she would sleep
	9	with her daughter in the other room, and then he would
04:14	10	sleep right next to her room, Rigo.
	11	Q. So your mom's friend Shannon had the second
	12	room and then Rigo had the third room?
	13	A. Yes.
	14	Q. Now did your mom also work nights while you
04:14	15	were at the Celeste Avenue house?
	16	A. Yes.
	17	Q. Did Rigo ever touch you inappropriately at
	18	the Celeste Avenue house?
	19	A. Yes.
04:14	20	Q. And how would he do that at the Celeste
	21	Avenue house? What manner would he touch you? Was it
	22	the same or different than he touched you at the Yerba
	23	Lane apartment?
	24	A. It was the same.
04:15	25	Q. And how would it happen? So at the Yerba

04:15	1	Lane apartment he would go in your bedroom and get you
	2	and bring him into your bedroom. How would it happen at
	3	the Celeste Avenue house?
	4	A. It would happen exactly the same.
04:15	5	Q. And he would touch you with his hands
	6	there?
	7	A. Yes.
	8	Q. And would he also touch you with his tongue
	9	there?
04:15	10	A. Yes.
	11	Q. And this is while you're living at that
	12	house; correct?
	13	A. Yes.
	14	Q. And so you were third, fourth grade in this
04:15	15	time as well?
	16	A. Yes.
	17	Q. And did he also have you suck on his penis
	18	at the house?
	19	A. Yes.
04:15	20	Q. And did he have you do, did he touch you in
	21	any other manner at that house?
	22	A. No.
	23	Q. No? Okay.
	24	Now did you, now you mentioned at the Yerba
04:15	25	Lane Apartments he would touch your breasts. Is that

04:15	1	the same at th	ne house?
	2	Α.	Yes.
	3	Q. 1	Now I want to go through individually how
	4	often would he	e touch you with his fingers at the house?
04:16	5	Α. (Quite the same as the other place.
	6	Q. A	At least once during the time you were
	7	living there?	
	8	A. 1	More.
	9	Q. I	More than once? Okay.
04:16	10	F	How about with his tongue while he was at
	11	the house?	
	12	A. 1	More than once.
	13	Q. A	At the Celeste Avenue house?
	14	Α. Σ	Yes.
04:16	15	Q. A	And then how about how often would he ask
	16	you to suck or	n his penis at the house?
	17	Α. Ι	More often.
	18	Q. (Once or more than once?
	19	Α. 1	More than once.
04:16	20	Q. A	And did you want to do any of these things?
	21	Α. 1	No.
	22	Q. I	Did he make any, did he say anything to you
	23	regarding if y	you tell or anything like that what the
	24	consequences v	would be?
04:16	25	Α. Σ	Yes, it would involve harming family or

04:16	1	trying to ge	et me in trouble.
	2	Q.	How often would he tell you those things?
	3	Α.	Not often but he told me quite a lot.
	4	Q.	Did he ever use his penis to touch your
04:17	5	vagina at th	e Celeste Avenue house?
	6	Α.	Yes.
	7	Q.	And how would that happen?
	8	Α.	Uhm, he would either get on top of me or he
	9	would make m	ne go on top of him.
04:17	10	Q.	Were you both naked on the bottom when this
	11	would happen	1?
	12	Α.	Yes.
	13	Q.	Could you feel his penis on your vagina at
	14	that time?	
04:17	15	Α.	Yes.
	16	Q.	Would he ever go into your vagina?
	17	Α.	No.
	18	Q.	So it was rubbing on your vagina?
	19	Α.	Yes.
04:17	20	Q.	Show you Grand Jury Exhibit Number 5. Do
	21	you recogniz	e that as a diagram of the female anatomy?
	22	Α.	Yes.
	23	Q.	Can you put an X where you would feel his
	24	penis on you	ır vagina?
04:17	25		Now did that happen once or more than once

04:17	1	while you were at the Celeste Avenue house?
	2	A. More than once.
	3	Q. When you moved out of the Celeste Avenue
	4	house, how long had you been there?
04:18	5	A. About a year.
	6	Q. Okay. About a year. Where did you move
	7	when you got out of the Celeste Avenue house?
	8	A. Uhm, Webster Circle.
	9	Q. And that's here in Clark County too?
04:18	10	A. Yes.
	11	Q. Where did you, who did you live with at the
	12	Webster Circle house?
	13	A. My mom, Shannon, my siblings and Rigo.
	14	Q. And so did Rigo kind of follow you from the
04:18	15	apartment to the Celeste Avenue house and then to the
	16	Webster Circle house?
	17	A. Yes.
	18	Q. And he was living with you guys that whole
	19	time?
04:18	20	A. Yes.
	21	Q. How many bedrooms were in this, the Webster
	22	Circle house?
	23	A. Three.
	24	Q. And where did you sleep?
04:19	25	A. Uhm, I slept with my, I slept with my mom

04:19	1	and my siblings. Shannon had her room and Rigo had his
	2	room.
	3	Q. Okay. So three bedrooms and kind of the
	4	same sleeping arrangements as the Celeste Avenue house?
04:19	5	A. Yes.
	6	Q. Did Rigo ever touch you inappropriately at
	7	the Webster Circle house?
	8	A. Yes.
	9	Q. Was it the same or different at the Yerba
04:19	10	apartment or the Celeste Avenue house?
	11	A. It was the same.
	12	Q. Was your mom working nights then as well?
	13	A. Yes.
	14	Q. Was Shannon ever home when these things
04:19	15	happened?
	16	A. Sometimes but sometimes not.
	17	Q. And was Shannon awake, asleep, where was
	18	she when this was going on?
	19	A. She was either asleep or she was out with
04:19	20	her friends.
	21	Q. So to your knowledge Shannon didn't know
	22	what was going on between you and Rigo?
	23	A. No.
	24	Q. Would he do the same thing, go into your
04:19	25	bedroom and wake you up?

04:19	1	Α.	Yes.
	2	Q.	Did you ever notice any of your siblings
	3	waking up at	the same time?
	4	Α.	No.
04:20	5	Q.	He would bring you into his room?
	6	Α.	Yes.
	7	Q.	And did he touch you with his fingers at
	8	the Webster	Circle house?
	9	Α.	Yes.
04:20	10	Q.	In the same manner as he did in the other
	11	houses?	
	12	Α.	Yes.
	13	Q.	Once or more than once?
	14	Α.	More than once.
04:20	15	Q.	Did he touch you with his tongue at the
	16	Webster Circ	le house?
	17	Α.	Yes.
	18	Q.	Was it the same way he did it at the other
	19	house?	
04:20	20	Α.	Yes.
	21	Q.	Once or more than once?
	22	Α.	More than once.
	23	Q.	Do you remember any specific dates that any
	24	of these thi	ngs occurred on?
04:20	25	Α.	No, I'm sorry.

04:20	1	Q. And was like birthday, any sort of anchor
	2	points, first day of school, anything you can remember
	3	whatsoever?
	4	A. No.
04:20	5	Q. Okay. Did he make you suck on his penis at
	6	the Webster Circle house?
	7	A. Yes.
	8	Q. Once or more than once?
	9	A. More than once.
04:20	10	Q. And did he rub on your genital opening with
	11	his penis at the Webster Circle house?
	12	A. Yes.
	13	Q. Once or more than once?
	14	A. More than once.
04:20	15	Q. And I don't know if we asked this, sorry.
	16	Back at the Celeste Avenue, was it once or more than
	17	once with the penis there?
	18	A. More than once.
	19	Q. Now when he used his hands, his tongue, his
04:21	20	penis in all these places, is he doing it in the same
	21	area that you marked on those exhibits?
	22	A. Yes.
	23	Q. Now you disclosed all of this to a person
	24	at the Children's, the CAC; correct?
04:21	25	A. Yes.

04:21	1	Q.	Do you remember having an interview over
	2	there?	
	3	Α.	Yes.
	4	Q.	Now the day you disclosed that, you had
04:21	5	actually bee	en in a mental hospital the day before;
	6	right?	
	7	Α.	Yes.
	8	Q.	And why were you in there?
	9	Α.	I threw a rock at my brother's head.
04:21	10	Q.	And then did you go up on the roof?
	11	Α.	Yes.
	12	Q.	Did the police have to come there?
	13	Α.	The police and the fire department.
	14	Q.	And how long had you been in that mental
04:21	15	facility unt	il?
	16	Α.	I was there for a week, they took me out
	17	and I went b	back for another week.
	18	Q.	So you went back for another week after the
	19	interview?	
04:22	20	Α.	Yes.
	21	Q.	Now this isn't the only person who has
	22	molested you	like this, is it?
	23	Α.	No.
	24	Q.	Was there another person that you knew by
04:22	25	DD?	

04:22	1	A. Yes.
	2	Q. What happened with DD?
	3	A. Uhm, we were playing hide and go seek in
	4	the dark, it's a game that me and my siblings like to
04:22	5	play, his, my step dad that was living with us at the
	6	time, his family was having a party, they live across
	7	the street, and he came to play with us. He kept
	8	following me and things happened.
	9	Q. Okay. So needless to say things happened
04:22	10	meaning you were molested in some way by DD; correct?
	11	A. Yes.
	12	Q. Now was that during the time that these
	13	things were going on with Rigo?
	14	A. No.
04:22	15	Q. When was that?
	16	A. After Rigo had left.
	17	Q. So after Rigo left a separate man actually
	18	took advantage of you?
	19	A. Yes.
04:23	20	Q. But all of these incidents we discussed
	21	were, this is all Rigo; correct?
	22	A. Yes.
	23	Q. No chance you're mixing up the incidents,
	24	right?
04:23	25	A. No.

04:23	1	MR. VILLANI: That concludes my questioning
	2	of this witness. Are there any questions from the grand
	3	jurors?
	4	Seeing no hands.
04:23	5	THE FOREPERSON: By law, these proceedings
	6	are secret and you are prohibited from disclosing to
	7	anyone anything that has transpired before us, including
	8	evidence and statements presented to the Grand Jury, any
	9	event occurring or statement made in the presence of the
04:23	10	Grand Jury, and information obtained by the Grand Jury.
	11	Failure to comply with this admonition is a
	12	gross misdemeanor punishable up to 364 days in the Clark
	13	County Detention Center and a \$2,000 fine. In addition,
	14	you may be held in contempt of court punishable by an
04:23	15	additional \$500 fine and 25 days in the Clark County
	16	Detention Center.
	17	Do you understand this admonition?
	18	THE WITNESS: Yes.
	19	THE FOREPERSON: Thank you. You're
04:23	20	excused.
	21	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
	22	MR. VILLANI: My next witness is Elizabeth
	23	Guerra.
	24	THE FOREPERSON: Please raise your right
04:24	25	hand.

04:24	1	You do solemnly swear the testimony you are
	2	about to give upon the investigation now pending before
	3	this Grand Jury shall be the truth, the whole truth, and
	4	nothing but the truth, so help you God?
04:24	5	THE WITNESS: Yes.
	6	THE FOREPERSON: Please be seated.
	7	You are advised that you are here today to
	8	give testimony in the investigation pertaining to the
	9	offenses of sexual assault with a minor under 14 years
04:24	10	of age, and lewdness with a child under the age of 14,
	11	involving Rigoberto Inzunza.
	12	Do you understand this advisement?
	13	THE WITNESS: Yes.
	14	THE FOREPERSON: Please state your first
04:24	15	and last name and spell both for the record.
	16	THE WITNESS: Elizabeth Guerra.
	17	E-L-I-Z-A-B-E-T-H, G-U-E-R-R-A.
	18	ELIZABETH GUERRA,
	19	having been first duly sworn by the Foreperson of the
04:25	20	Grand Jury to testify to the truth, the whole truth,
	21	and nothing but the truth, testified as follows:
	22	EXAMINATION
	23	BY MR. VILLANI:
	24	Q. Elizabeth, you're Elisiana's mom; correct?
04:25	25	A. Correct.

04:25	1	Q. Do you recall living at the Yerba Lane	
	2	Apartments with Elisiana and Rigoberto?	
	3	A. Yes.	
	4	Q. Approximately what were the dates that	you
04:25	5	lived there? Was it	
	6	A. September 2008 till December.	
	7	Q. So approximately September 2008 through	L
	8	December of 2008?	
	9	A. Correct.	
04:25	10	Q. And then once you moved from those	
	11	apartments, where did you move to?	
	12	A. To 6632 Celeste Avenue.	
	13	Q. And how long were you at that Celeste	
	14	Avenue address?	
04:25	15	A. Until February.	
	16	Q. Was Rigoberto also living there with yo	u?
	17	A. Correct.	
	18	Q. And then after you left the Celeste Ave	nue
	19	address, where did you move?	
04:25	20	A. To 3135 Webster Circle.	
	21	Q. How long were you at the Webster Circle	:
	22	address with Rigoberto?	
	23	A. He was there until September 2009.	
	24	Q. And September 2009 Rigoberto was no lon	ger
04:26	25	living at the Webster Circle address; correct?	

04:26	1	A. Correct.
	2	MR. VILLANI: I have no further questions
	3	for this witness. Do any of the grand jurors have any
	4	questions?
04:26	5	Seeing no hands.
	6	THE FOREPERSON: By law, these proceedings
	7	are secret and you are prohibited from disclosing to
	8	anyone anything that has transpired before us, including
	9	evidence and statements presented to the Grand Jury, any
04:26	10	event occurring or statement made in the presence of the
	11	Grand Jury, and information obtained by the Grand Jury.
	12	Failure to comply with this admonition is a
	13	gross misdemeanor punishable up to 364 days in the Clark
	14	County Detention Center and a \$2,000 fine. In addition,
04:26	15	you may be held in contempt of court punishable by an
	16	additional \$500 fine and 25 days in the Clark County
	17	Detention Center.
	18	Do you understand this admonition?
	19	THE WITNESS: Yes.
04:26	20	THE FOREPERSON: Thank you. You're
	21	excused.
	22	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
	23	MR. VILLANI: And ladies and gentlemen of
	24	the Grand Jury, for your information, regarding the
04:26	25	person referred to as DD with Elisiana, his name is

04:27	1	Darrington Rivers. He pled guilty to a charge of
	2	attempt lewdness with a minor under the age of 14. That
	3	charging document encompassed conduct between
	4	February 2009 and, I'm sorry, between January 18, 2009
04:27	5	and January 18, 2011. Elisiana was the victim of that
	6	conduct. He was sentenced on December 10th of 2015.
	7	That concludes my presentation of evidence.
	8	Do any of the grand jurors have any questions regarding
	9	the evidence or elements of the offenses alleged?
04:27	10	Seeing no hands, this matter is submitted
	11	for your deliberation.
	12	(At this time, all persons, other than
	13	members of the Grand Jury, exit the room at 4:27 p.m.
	14	and return at 4:29 p.m.)
04:29	15	THE FOREPERSON: Mr. District Attorney, by
	16	a vote of 12 or more grand jurors a true bill has been
	17	returned against the defendant Rigoberto Inzunza
	18	charging the crimes of sexual assault with a minor under
	19	14 years of age and lewdness with a child under the age
04:30	20	of 14, in Grand Jury case number 16BGJ081X. We instruct
	21	you to prepare an Indictment in conformance with the
	22	proposed Indictment previously submitted to us.
	23	MR. VILLANI: Thank you.
	24	(Proceedings concluded.)
04:30	25	00000

04:30	1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
	2	
	3	STATE OF NEVADA)
	4	: SS COUNTY OF CLARK)
04:30	5	
	6	I, Danette L. Antonacci, C.C.R. 222, do
	7	hereby certify that I took down in Shorthand (Stenotype)
	8	all of the proceedings had in the before-entitled matter
	9	at the time and place indicated and thereafter said
04:30	10	shorthand notes were transcribed at and under my
	11	direction and supervision and that the foregoing
	12	transcript constitutes a full, true, and accurate record
	13	of the proceedings had.
	14	Dated at Las Vegas, Nevada,
04:30	15	March 22, 2017.
	16	
	17	/s/ Danette L. Antonacci
	18	Danette L. Antonacci, C.C.R. 222
	19	
04:30	20	
	21	
	22	
	23	
	24	
	25	

04:30	1	AFFIRMATION				
	2	Pursuant to NRS 239B.030				
	3					
	4	The undersigned does hereby affirm that the				
04:30	5	preceding TRANSCRIPT filed in GRAND JURY CASE NUMBER 16BGJ081X:				
	6					
	7					
	8	X Does not contain the social security number of any				
	9	person,				
04:30	10	-OR-				
	11	Contains the social security number of a person as				
	12	required by:				
	13	A. A specific state or federal law, to- wit: NRS 656.250.				
	14	-OR-				
04:30	15	B. For the administration of a public program				
	16	or for an application for a federal or state grant.				
	17					
	18	/s/ Danette L. Antonacci				
	19	$\frac{3-22-17}{\text{Date}}$				
04:30	20					
	21	Danette L. Antonacci				
	22	Print Name				
	23	Official Court Reporter				
	24	Title				
	25					

ORIGINAL

IND 1 STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 JACOB VILLANI Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #011732 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 5 Attorney for Plaintiff 6 7 8 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA.

FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT

MAR 0 9 2017

DULCE MARIE ROMEA, DEPUT)

C-17-321860-1

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA Indictment 4630310

Plaintiff,

-vs-

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RIGOBERTO INZUNZA, aka, Rigoberto Lopez Inzunza, #0448039

Defendant.

CASE NO: C-17-321860-1

DEPT NO:

INDICTMENT

STATE OF NEVADA) ss.

The Defendant above named, RIGOBERTO INZUNZA, aka, Rigoberto Lopez Inzunza, accused by the Clark County Grand Jury of the crime(s) of SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE (Category A Felony - NRS 200.364, 200.366 - NOC 50105) and LEWDNESS WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 14 (Category A Felony - NRS 201.230 - NOC 50975), committed at and within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, on or between March 1, 2008 and October 31, 2010, as follows:

<u>COUNT 1</u> - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did on one or more occasions at the Yerba Lane address, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject E.J., a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: digital penetration: by inserting his finger(s) into the genital opening of the said E.J., against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that E.J. was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or

understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 2 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did on one or more occasions at the Yerba Lane address, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject E.J., a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: cunnilingus: by placing his tongue on or in the genital opening of the said E.J., against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that E.J. was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 3 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did on one or more occasions at the Yerba Lane address, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject E.J., a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: fellatio: by placing his penis on or in the mouth of the said E.J., against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that E.J. was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 4 - LEWDNESS WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 14

did on one or more occasions at the Yerba Lane address, then and there wilfully, lewdly, unlawfully, and feloniously commit a lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, a child, to-wit: E.J., said child being under the age of fourteen years, by touching and/or rubbing and/or fondling the said E.J.'S breasts, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of said Defendant, or said child.

COUNT 5 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did on one or more occasions at the Celeste Avenue address, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject E.J., a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: digital penetration: by inserting his finger(s) into the genital opening of the said E.J., against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that E.J. was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or

understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 6 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did on one or more occasions at the Celeste Avenue address, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject E.J., a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: cunnilingus: by placing his tongue on or in the genital opening of the said E.J., against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that E.J. was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 7 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did on one or more occasions at the Celeste Avenue address, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject E.J., a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: fellatio: by placing his penis on or in the mouth of the said E.J., against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that E.J. was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 8 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did on one or more occasions at the Celeste Avenue address, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject E.J., a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: intercourse: by touching and/or rubbing and/or fondling the said E.J.'S genital opening with his penis, against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that E.J. was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 9 - LEWDNESS WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 14

did on one or more occasions at the Celeste Avenue address, then and there wilfully, lewdly, unlawfully, and feloniously commit a lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, a child, to-wit: E.J., said child being under the age of fourteen years, by touching and/or rubbing and/or fondling the said E.J.'S genital area with his penis, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of

said Defendant, or said child.

COUNT 10 - LEWDNESS WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 14

did on one or more occasions at the Celeste Avenue address, then and there wilfully, lewdly, unlawfully, and feloniously commit a lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, a child, to-wit: E.J., said child being under the age of fourteen years, by touching and/or rubbing and/or fondling the said E.J.'S breasts, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of said Defendant, or said child.

<u>COUNT 11</u> - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did on one or more occasions at the Webster Circle address, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject E.J., a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: digital penetration: by inserting his finger(s) into the genital opening of the said E.J., against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that E.J. was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

<u>COUNT 12</u> - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did on one or more occasions at the Webster Circle address, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject E.J., a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: cunnilingus: by placing his tongue on or in the genital opening of the said E.J., against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that E.J. was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

<u>COUNT 13</u> - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did on one or more occasions at the Webster Circle address, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject E.J., a female child under fourteen

years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: fellatio: by placing his penis on or in the mouth of the said E.J., against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that E.J. was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

<u>COUNT 14</u> - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did on one or more occasions at the Webster Circle address, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject E.J., a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: intercourse: by touching and/or rubbing and/or fondling the said E.J.'S genital opening with his penis, against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that E.J. was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 15 - LEWDNESS WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 14

did on one or more occasions at the Webster Circle address, then and there wilfully, lewdly, unlawfully, and feloniously commit a lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, a child, to-wit: E.J., said child being under the age of fourteen years, by touching and/or rubbing and/or fondling the said E.J.'S genital area with his penis, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of said Defendant, or said child.

COUNT 16 - LEWDNESS WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 14

did on one or more occasions at the Webster Circle address, then and there wilfully, lewdly, unlawfully, and feloniously commit a lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, a child, to-wit: E.J., said child being under the age of fourteen

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years, by touching and/or rubbing and/or fondling the said E.J.'S breasts, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of said Defendant, or said child.

DATED this ___ day of March, 2017.

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565

BY

JACOB VILLANI Chief Deputy District Attorney Neyada Bar #011732

ENDORSEMENT: A True Bill

Foreperson, Clark County Grand Jury

ı	Names of Witnesses and testifying before the Grand Jury:
2	E.J., c/o CCDA, 200 Lewis Avenue, LV, NV 89101
3	GUERRA, ELIZABETH, c/o CCDA, 200 Lewis Avenue, LV, NV 89101
4	
5	Additional Witnesses known to the District Attorney at time of filing the Indictment:
6	BERNAK, KRISTINA, CAC
7	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS, NLV DETENTION CENTER
8	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS, NLV PD COMMUNICATIONS
9	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS, NLVPD RECORDS
10	HOYT, MARK, NLVPD# 1334
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28	NLVPD EV# 1419610

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

March 20, 2017

C-17-321860-1

State of Nevada

VS

Rigoberto Inzunza

March 20, 2017

9:00 AM

All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Ellsworth, Carolyn

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 16D

COURT CLERK: Andrea Natali

RECORDER:

Lara Corcoran

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Inzunza, Rigoberto

Defendant Plaintiff Attorney Attorney

Villani, Jacob J. Westbrook, P D.

State of Nevada

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- INITIAL ARRAIGNMENT INDICTMENT WARRANT RETURN

Mr. Westbrook stated the Deft. would be entering a not guilty plea. DEFT. INZUNZA ARRAIGNED, PLED NOT GUILTY, and WAIVED the 60-DAY RULE. COURT ORDERED, matter SET for trial. Upon Court's inquiry, Defense counsel's oral motion for discovery and State's oral motion for reciprocal discovery is GRANTED. Mr. Westbrook to prepare written order. Deft. has 21 days from today or filing of transcript to file writ. Mr. Westbrook anticipated more than one week for trial. Colloquy regarding the timeframe in which the Court could offer a setting with its current complex trial settings. Statement by Mr. Westbrook's regarding whether his client was waiving his right to a speedy trial under the federal statutes.

CUSTODY

11/27/17 - 9:00 AM - CALENDAR CALL

PRINT DATE: 03/28/2017 Page 1 of 2 Minutes Date: March 20, 2017

C-17-321860-1

12/4/17 - 1:30 PM - JURY TRIAL

PRINT DATE: 03/28/2017 Page 2 of 2 Minutes Date: March 20, 2017

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor

COURT MINUTES

January 29, 2018

C-17-321860-1

State of Nevada

VS

Rigoberto Inzunza

January 29, 2018

9:00 AM

All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Ellsworth, Carolyn

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 16D

COURT CLERK: Andrea Natali

RECORDER: Lara Corcoran

REPORTER:

PARTIES

PRESENT: Inzunza, Rigoberto

State of Nevada Plaintiff
Villani, Jacob J. Attorney
Westbrook, P D. Attorney

JOURNAL ENTRIES

Defendant

- CALENDAR CALL ... DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR OWN RECOGNIZANCE RELEASE BASED ON CHANGE IN STATE'S ASSESSMENT OF DEFENDANT'S LIKELIHOOD OF FLIGHT/DANGER TO THE COMMUNITY, AND TO SERVE THE REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS, FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS AND SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE

Mr. Westbrook stated he was still waiting for the State to turn over discovery; therefore, he was not ready for trial; advised he had provided a list of items he wanted turned over. Upon Court's inquiry, Mr. Villani stated he had turned over everything and Mr. Westbrook had asked for everything in the motion during an elevator ride. Statement by Mr. Westbrook regarding his request for information to be disclosed regarding Darrington Rivers' case. Colloquy regarding why a motion to continued was not filed. Mr. Westbrook stated he was not waiving the Deft.'s right to a speedy trial and he did not file a motion to continue as he did not want it to seem like it was his motion to continue. Mr. Villani announced ready; advised there were 5-7 witnesses and anticipated over one week for trial with half days in this Dept. Further, Mr. Villani stated the Darrington Rivers case had the same victim, that Deft. took a plea, never went to trial, and is in prison. Additionally, Mr. Villani stated North Las

PRINT DATE: 03/16/2018 Page 1 of 2 Minutes Date: January 29, 2018

C-17-321860-1

Vegas does not keep their notes and Mr. Westbrook was informed of that. Further, Mr. Villani argued in opposition to the motion for own recognizance release; advised the Deft. rejected the offer and it is now off the table. Upon Court's inquiry regarding whether the Defense was ready, Mr. Westbrook argued that the state was not ready statutorily or legally. Further, Mr. Westbrook summarized the circumstances related to the offer and argued that if his client were a risk to flee the State would not have let the Deft. out based on the negotiation. COURT ADVISED, it was not sure why this case could not go forward if the defense has been given the statement of the other person who was doing time for sexual assault and there were no notes; therefore, it sounded like the State had fulfilled its obligation; however, if later discovery or Brady materials are withheld that was another issue. Further, argument by Mr. Westbrook regarding why he could not proceed as he needed the records from Diana Saunders and all the information from the Darrington Rivers case. Mr. Villani stated he subpoenaed Ms. Saunders and requested all the records to be provided; however, he was not sure whether she would provide the records. COURT ADVISED, an order to produce the records in camera could be issued. Mr. Westbrook moved for an evidentiary hearing. COURT ADVISED it was not going to do that, as counsel could file a motion and NOTED this matter was on for calendar call. Mr. Westbrook sworn and testified as to the reason a trial continuance was needed. COURT NOTED, the reason for the trial continuance was because of Mr. Westbrook and not because of the State's actions. Colloquy regarding Mr. Westbrook preparing an order for in camera review of the documents and the information the order will need to contain. COURT NOTED, it would have to seal the order and it would review the documents in camera. COURT ORDERED, jury trial VACATED and RESET. Counsel anticipated one week and two days for trial.

As to the motion for own recognizance (OR) release, COURT NOTED the factors were listed but not addressed, it had already lowered the Deft.'s bail previously and ADVISED it frowned upon OR releases at entry of the plea as a motion should be reviewed and the statutory factors addressed. COURT ORDERED, motion for OR release DENIED and bail STANDS as set.

CUSTODY

4/16/18 - 9:00 AM - CALENDAR CALL

4/23/18 - 1:30 PM - JURY TRIAL

PRINT DATE: 03/16/2018 Page 2 of 2 Minutes Date: January 29, 2018

Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 PHILIP J. KOHN, PUBLIC DEFENDER NEVADA BAR NO. 0556 2 P. DAVID WESTBROOK, CHIEF DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER NEVADA BAR NO. 9278 3 309 South Third Street, Suite 226 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 4 (702) 455-1762 westbrpd@ClarkCountyNV.gov 5 Attorney for Defendant 6 DISTRICT COURT, LAS VEGAS 7 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 9 Plaintiff, CASE NO. C-17-321860-1 10 DEPT. NO. V v. 11 RIGOBERTO INZUNZA, DATE: March 19, 2018 12 TIME: 9:00 a.m. Defendant. 13 14 MOTION TO DISMISS, PURSUANT TO DOGGETT v. UNITED STATES, FOR 15 **VIOLATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS** 16 COMES NOW, the Defendant, RIGOBERTO INZUNZA, by and through P. DAVID 17 WESTBROOK, Chief Deputy Public Defender, and hereby moves the court to dismiss this case 18 because the State has violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and his due process 19 rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to United States Constitution and Article One, 20 Section Eight of the Nevada Constitution. 21 This Motion is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the 22 attached Declaration of Counsel, the authorities cited below, and oral argument at the time set for 23 hearing this Motion. DATED this 26th day of February, 2018. 24 25 PHILIP J. KOHN CLARK COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 26 27

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By:

/s/ P. David Westbrook P. DAVID WESTBROOK, #9278

Chief Deputy Public Defender

DECLARATION

P. DAVID WESTBROOK makes the following declaration:

- 1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada and I am the Deputy Public Defender assigned to represent the defendant, Mr. Inzunza, in the instant matter. The following is based on conversations with my client, interviews of witnesses in this case, discovery provided by the State, and the record on file.
- 2. Between November 3, 2014 and the date of his arrest, Mr. Inzunza lived at 740 Ridge Avenue, Lakewood, NJ and worked at LanceScaping, 605 Higgins Avenue, Brielle, NJ. Mr. Inzunza's city of residence and place of work both appear on his Facebook profile, which is listed under his legal name. Mr. Inzunza's profile was (and is) set to "public" because he uses Facebook to advertise his landscaping business.
- 3. Mr. Inzunza did not change his mobile phone number when he moved from Las Vegas to New Jersey in 2010. His "Nevada" number was active while Mr. Inzunza lived in New Jersey. On or about January 30, 2018, I spoke with Norma Goldsmith, Mr. Inzunza's sister. Ms. Goldsmith confirmed that Mr. Inzunza has had the same mobile number for many years and that he did not change the number when he moved to New Jersey in 2010.
- 4. Mr. Inzunza was never contacted about this case by either the North Las Vegas Police Department or the Clark County District Attorney's Office between the date of the initial accusation (November 3, 2014) and the date of his arrest (January 29, 2017). They did not call his mobile phone. They did not visit his home. They did not call his employer. They did not send mail to his residential or business addresses. They did not contact him through email or social media.
- 5. Mr. Inzunza first learned of the existence of the warrant for his arrest on the day of his arrest, January 29, 2017, <u>818 days</u> after the initial police report in this case.
- 6. During meetings with Mr. Inzunza, he has expressed great anxiety and concern due to his pre-trial confinement and the delay in bringing his matter to trial. He has expressed to me that he fears for his life inside the Clark County Detention Center and that the

nature of the charges against him puts him at an even greater risk of violence than the average inmate.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my information and belief. (NRS 53.045).

EXECUTED this 23rd day of February, 2018.

/s/ P. David Westbrook
P. DAVID WESTBROOK

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Rigoberto Inzunza pleaded <u>not guilty</u> to 16 felony counts, including Sexual Assault with a Minor Under 14 and Lewdness with a Child Under 14. The complaining witness in the case, E.J., made her initial disclosure to police on **November 3, 2014**. See Ex. A. According to the North Las Vegas "Crime Report," police were in possession of Mr. Inzunza's home and work addresses as early as November 3, 2014, but no later than November 18, 2014.

On November 6, 2014, E.J. emailed three photographs to Detective Mark Hoyt. See Ex. B. The photographs appear to show Mr. Inzunza's car (with visible license plate), his work trailer, and possibly his residence. His work phone number is clearly visible on the side of his trailer: 732-223-1444. The pictures were taken from Mr. Inzunza's Facebook page, which was (and remains) open to public viewing. Mr. Inzunza uses Facebook to promote his business, so he was literally advertising his whereabouts to anyone who cared to look.

In November of 2014, the State knew exactly where Mr. Inzunza was and how to contact him, but failed to act on that information for **818 days**. He was arrested in New Jersey on January 29, 2017 and transported to Nevada, where he was arraigned on March 15, 2017.

<u>ARGUMENT</u>

I. THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS THIS CASE BECAUSE THE STATE HAS VIOLATED MR. INZUNZA'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL.

A. Argument Summary:

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." The right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right enforced against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. <u>Barker v. Wingo</u>, 407 U.S. 514, 515 (1972). The criteria for determining whether a constitutional violation of speedy trial rights has occurred was first set forth in <u>Barker v. Wingo</u>, and explained further in <u>Doggett v. U.S.</u>, 505 U.S. 647 (1992). The four factors to be considered are: (1) whether the delay was uncommonly long; (2) whether the government or the defendant is more to blame for the delay; (3) whether, in due course, the

defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. <u>Doggett</u>, 505 U.S. at 651.

Once the right to a speedy trial has been violated, dismissal "is the only possible remedy." Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. supra at 522. A speedy trial violation cannot be cured after the fact. For example, simply having a trial "as soon as possible" cannot remedy a speedy trial violation because a *late* trial simply compounds the prejudice against the defendant.

As of this writing, three years, three months, and 23 days have elapsed since the initial police report. For two years, two months and 26 days, Mr. Inzunza was completely unaware that an arrest warrant existed in this case. The State knew exactly where Mr. Inzunza was and how to contact him, but made no attempt to do so. After finally initiating an arrest, it took 45 days to transport Mr. Inzunza from his New Jersey home to Nevada. Mr. Inzunza has now been incarcerated for **393 days** without a trial. Mr. Inzunza's fundamental right to a speedy trial and associated due process rights have been violated and the only just remedy is dismissal.

B. Application of the four-factor Doggett test requires dismissal.

FACTOR ONE: The delay of more than two years between the accusation and Mr. Inzunza's arrest was uncommonly long and presumptively prejudicial.

With respect to the length of the delay, the <u>Doggett</u> Court held that the "accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from 'presumptively prejudicial' delay." <u>Doggett, supra,</u> 505 U.S. at 651-52. Furthermore, the Court noted that "the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time." <u>Id.</u> at 652. The Court highlighted that most lower courts have found that delay of at least <u>one year</u> is "presumptively prejudicial." <u>Id.</u> at 652, fn. 1.

In this case, two years, two months and 26 days elapsed between the filing of the initial report and Mr. Inzunza's arrest. Another 45 days elapsed between Mr. Inzunza's arrest and his

arraignment in Justice Court. If courts have generally found that a one year delay is "presumptively prejudicial," then certainly a delay of nearly two-and-one-half times that length meets the standard for dismissal under Doggett.

FACTOR TWO: The State is to blame for the uncommonly long delay.

The <u>Doggett</u> Court held that, although the government did make some efforts to locate the defendant, its failure to do so was negligent. <u>Id.</u> at 652. Indeed, the <u>Doggett</u> Court noted that the government could have found the defendant within minutes had its agents bothered to try, explaining that, "[w]hile the government's lethargy may have reflected no more than [the defendant's] relative unimportance in the world of drug trafficking, it was still findable negligence, and the finding stands." <u>Id.</u> at 652-653.

In this case, the State had far more information about Mr. Inzunza's whereabouts than the federal government in <u>Doggett</u>, but made far *less* of an effort to secure his arrest or even inform him of the charges. Unlike Mr. Inzunza, Doggett had left the country at some point and spent time in custody outside of the United States before returning. Federal agents made "some" efforts to try to locate and apprehend Doggett, including sending word of his arrest warrant to all United States Custom stations and updating national registries and NCIC. <u>Id</u>. at 648-649. But, it's not like they had Doggett's home address, work address, or phone number. And, in 1980, Facebook did not exist.

In this case, the State *did* have Mr. Inzunza's home address, work address, and phone number. Facebook does exist now, and Mr. Inzunza has an open profile that advertises his landscaping business. In fact, on November 6, 2014, the complaining witness emailed three photographs from Mr. Inzunza's Facebook page to the lead detective in this case. See Ex. B. There is absolutely no question that the State knew precisely where Mr. Inzunza was located, but did absolutely nothing to advance the prosecution against him.

The <u>Doggett</u> Court noted that federal agents were negligent because they "could have found him within minutes." <u>Doggett</u>, <u>supra</u>, 505 U.S. at 654. The State's lack of diligence in this case is far more egregious. They did not need to "find" Mr. Inzunza; they already knew where he was. They simply needed to pick up a telephone.

The State violated Mr. Inzunza's speedy trial and associated due process right before he ever set foot in court. Thus, it is not necessary to analyze delays occurring *after* Mr. Inzunza's arraignment in order to meet the second prong of <u>Doggett/Barker</u>. However, the record also demonstrates that the State is responsible for significant delays after Mr. Inzunza's district court arraignment as well, which has certainly increased the prejudice suffered by Mr. Inzunza.

The State filed its criminal complaint on December 5, 2014. At arraignment, Mr. Inzunza was given the earliest available trial date: December 4, 2017, one day short of **three years** after the filing of the criminal complaint. At the November 27, 2017 calendar call, the Court determined that the District Attorney violated NRS 174.285 by producing new discovery the previous day, rather than 30 days before trial, as required by statute. The State's discovery violation necessitated a continuance.

At the next calendar call, January 29, 2018, defense counsel informed the Court that, once again, the State had failed to turn over discovery, including evidence it intended to use in its case-in-chief (*e.g.*, information regarding counselor Diana Saunders). The defense had specifically requested this evidence (and more) both in writing, in a November 27, 2017 Motion to Compel Discovery, and in person during a conversation with Deputy District Attorney, Jake Villani. <u>See</u> Ex. C.¹ The evidence has still not been produced.

It is now February of 2018. Mr. Inzunza has been deprived of his liberty interests for over

¹ This contemporaneous record of the conversation between Mr. Westbrook and Mr. Villani was also submitted as a court exhibit during the November 29, 2017 calendar call argument.

a year without a trial. In addition, the State's continued refusal to provide discovery, or even discuss discovery issues in good faith, threatens to delay Mr. Inzunza's trial even further.

FACTOR THREE: Mr. Inzunza invoked his federal right to a speedy trial.

Like Doggett before him, Mr. Inzunza did not know about his case until after he was arrested, at which point, it was already too late for a "speedy trial". The <u>Barker Court specified</u> that this does not preclude a speedy trial claim. "One reason for this position is that there are a number of situations, such as where the defendant is unaware of the charge or where the defendant is without counsel, in which it is unfair to require a demand..." <u>Barker, supra, 407</u> U.S. at 529, fn.28. Furthermore, "A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial, the State has that duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process." <u>Id.</u> at 527.

At his arraignment, Mr. Inzunza waived his right to a trial within 60 days pursuant to NRS 178.556(2), but expressed his intent to preserve his *federal* speedy trial rights. These rights are distinct, and waiving the first does not constitute a waiver of the second. Thus, Doggett meets the third prong of the <u>Doggett/Barker</u> test.

FACTOR FOUR: Mr. Inzunza is suffered both presumptive and actual prejudice from the delay.

Prejudice generally derives from (1) oppressive pre-trial incarceration; (2) anxiety and concern caused by excessive confinement and delay; or (3) impairment to the defendant's ability to present a defense. <u>Id.</u> at 654. Additionally, the <u>Doggett</u> court recognized that actual prejudice is difficult to show: "<u>Barker</u> explicitly recognized that impairment of one's defense is the most difficult form of speedy trial prejudice to prove because time's erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony 'can rarely be shown.' . . . Thus, we generally have to recognize that excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify." <u>Doggett</u>, 505 U.S. at 655 (citations omitted.) The <u>Doggett</u> Court suggested that, had the Government acted in bad faith, dismissal would be nearly automatic. <u>Id</u>.

at 657. However, "[a]lthough negligence is obviously to be weighed more lightly than a deliberate intent to harm the accused's defense, it still falls on the wrong side of the divide between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for delaying a criminal prosecution once it has begun." <u>Id.</u> at 657. Furthermore, "our toleration of such negligence varies inversely with its protactedness . . . and its consequent threat to the fairness of the accused's trial." <u>Id.</u> at 657 (internal citations omitted).

Characterizing the government's actions as "egregious," the <u>Doggett</u> Court determined that the delay entitled the defendant to a presumption of prejudice and that the defendant need not specify how he was prejudiced by the delay. <u>Id.</u> at 657-58. Accordingly, the <u>Doggett</u> Court reversed the decision of the lower court, which had ruled against the defendant, and ordered the case dismissed. <u>Id.</u> at 658. Although Doggett does not *require* Inzunza to quantify his actual prejudice, this case does contain clear and quantifiable examples of prejudice which are summarized below.

1) Mr. Inzunza has suffered oppressive pre-trial incarceration.

As of this writing, Mr. Inzunza has languished in the Clark County Detention Center for **393 days**. All deprivation of liberty is "oppressive," but in Clark County, it is particularly so.

The Court is already well-aware of the catastrophic overcrowding problem in our detention facilities. Inmates spend the vast majority of their time locked in their rooms with no reasonable access to exercise, showers, communication, and in many cases, medical and psychiatric care. There is a legitimate question as to whether the Clark County detention facilities meet the minimum requirements of the Eighth Amendment. And there is no sign that the situation will improve anytime soon.

Defense counsel has filed two motions requesting Mr. Inzunza's release from custody, but despite Mr. Inzunza's absence of criminal history and the State's lack of proof that he poses a

legitimate flight risk or danger to the community, the Court has declined to alleviate Mr. Inzunza's suffering, even after determining that his initial trial date was delayed because the State violated NRS 174.285. Thus, Mr. Inzunza's pretrial incarceration continues, along with the associated prejudice.

2) Mr. Inzunza has suffered anxiety and concern caused by excessive confinement and delay.

As stated in the Declaration of Counsel (above), Mr. Inzunza fears for his life. As an inmate accused of a sex offense, there is a target on his back in the jail and he suffers severe anxiety each and every day he remains behind bars.

3) The State's delay has impaired Mr. Inzunza's ability to present a defense.

In a sexual assault case like this, where there is no evidence apart from the allegation of a complaining witness, delay is particularly damaging to the defense. Countering a mere allegation is extremely difficult to begin with, but it becomes exponentially harder with the passage of time. For example, at this point, presenting an alibi defense is impossible. Too much time has passed for Mr. Inzunza to reliably account for his whereabouts during the time period these acts were alleged to have occurred. Tracking down possible defense witnesses is now far more difficult and their value will be intrinsically limited by the delay. Memory does not improve over time. Additionally, the State will attempt to argue to the jury that the lack of physical evidence is attributable to the delay, rather than the defense position: that there is no physical evidence because the acts never occurred.

CONCLUSION

The instant motion meets all four factors of the <u>Doggett/Barker</u> test, establishing a violation of Mr. Inzunza's right to a speedy trial and his associated due process rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Mr. Inzunza therefore respectfully requests that this Court dismiss this case.

DATED 26th day of February, 2018.

PHILIP J. KOHN
CLARK COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

By /s/P. David Westbrook
P. DAVID WESTBROOK, #9278
Deputy Public Defender

NOTICE OF MOTION

TO: CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, Attorney for Plaintiff;

YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Public Defender's Office will bring the above and foregoing Motion to Dismiss, Pursuant to Doggett v. United States, for Violation of State and Federal Constitutional Rights on for hearing before the Court on the 19 day of March 2018 at 9:00 a.m. in Department 5 of the District Court.

DATED 2nd day of March, 2018.

PHILIP J. KOHN CLARK COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

By <u>/s/P. David Westbrook</u>
P. DAVID WESTBROOK, #9278
Deputy Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE

I hereby certify that service of the above and forgoing Motion to Dismiss was served via electronic e-filing to the Clark County District Attorney's Office on this 2nd day of March, 2018.

District Attorney's Office E-Mail Address: Jennifer.Georges@clarkcountyda.com

By: /s/ Annie McMahan
An employee of the
Clark County Public Defender's Office

Case Name: Rigoberto Inzunza

Case No.: C-17-321860-1

Dept. No.: V

EXHIBIT A





Case No. 141118019610

E-Police No. Report No.

141118019610,1

Reporting Officer

Assisted By

NL1334 - Hoyt, Mark

Report Date: 11/18/2014

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				•	
hlack	SEVIIAL	ASSALILT	Reutino .		

Case Report Status Case Altachments

Occurred On (and Between)

Location Jurisdiction Grid

Sector Мар

Census/Geo Call Source

Vehicle Activity Vehicle Traveling Cross Street A - Approved

8/1/2005 8:00:00 AM

3525 W CHEYENNE AVE

NA3 - 0 A

Case Status Date Entered

Entered By Date Verified Verified By Date Approved Approved By

Connecting Cases Disposition Clearance Reason Date of Clearance Reporting Agency Division

> Means Other Means Motive Other Motives

Notified

O - Open

11/18/2014 2:57:12 PM NL1334 - Hoyt, Mark 11/20/2014 2:17:56 PM

NL0701 - Glazier, Thomas 11/20/2014 6:40:24 PM NL0985 - Cheng, Luz

Active

North Las Vegas Police Department

Offense Detail: 50975 - Lewdness W/Child < 14, (1st) - 201.230.2

Offense Description IBR Code

11D - Forcible Fondling IBR Group PE

Crime Against Using Tools Used Criminal Activity

Weapons 99 - None

50975 - Lewdness W/Child < 14, (1st) - 201.230.2 Location

Offense Completed? Hate/Bias

Domestic Violence Fraud Related

20 - Residence/Home Yes

88 - None (No Bias) No No

No. Prem. Entered Entry Method

Type Security Gang Related

Suspect S1: Inzunza, Rigoberto

Suspect Number **S1** Name

AKA Ateri(s) Ç\$ No MF No

Address CSZ Inzunza, Rigoberto

740 Ridge AVE

Lakewood, NJ 08701

Email Address Scars/Marks/Tattoos Attire

Notes

Telephone Numbers

Number Type Phone Number 5/22/1964

Age Sex M - Male Race W - White

DOB

Hair Color

Hair Style

Hair Length Facial Hair

Complexion

Build

Teeth

Ethnicity H - Hispanic Origin 5' 6" HI. Wi. 150 Eve Color

BRO - Brown BLK - Black

Place of Birth SSN DLN **DLN State DLN Country** Occupation/Grade

Employer/School Employer Address Employer CSZ Res. County Res. Country Resident Status

Suspect MO Other MO Habitual Offender



LanceScaping 605 Higgins AVE Brielle, NJ Clark

N - Nonresident

Victim V1: 0

Victim Code

I - Individual

Vicilm Of 50975 - Lewdness W/Child < 14, (1st) - 201.230.2



Crime Report

Case No.

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Alert(s) Elderly Abuse Address

720 Easy ST CSZ LV, NV 89030

Email Address Altire Injury N - None Circumstances

Law Enforcement Officer Killed or Assaulted Information

Type Assignment Activity Other ORI

Telephone Numbers

Phone Number Number Type CELL - Cell 702 428-9206

Victim Offender Relationships

Offender S1

Relationship CO - Cohabitant

Victim Notes

Emergency Contact Name

Justifiable Homicide Circumstances

Place of Birth Age

Sex Race Ethnicity Ht. Wt.

Eye Color Hair Color Facial Hair Complexion Build

06 F - Female W - White U - Unknown 5' 2"

175 BRO - Brown BRO - Brown

SSN DLN DLN State **DLN Country** Occupation/Grade

Employer/School Employer Address Employer CSZ Res. County Res. Country

Resident Status Testify

10th Western HS

Clark

N - Nonresident

Witness W1: Williams, Harry

Witness Code

W1 Name Williams, Harry

AKA Alert(a)

Address CSZ 720 Easy ST

LV, NV 89030

Email Address

Witness Notes

Attire

Elisiana's step father

Telephone Numbers Phone Type

Phone Number CELL - Cell 702 428-9213

Nitness W2: Guerra, Elizabeth

Witness Code

W2 Name

Guerra, Elizabeth AKA

Alert(s)

Address CSZ 720 Easy ST LV, NV 89030

Email Address

Attire

DOB Age Sex Race Ht.

Ethnicity Wt. Eye Color Hair Color Facial Hair

Complexion Build

DOB

Age

Sex

Ht.

Wt.

Race

Ethnicity

Eye Color

Hair Color

Facial Hair

Bulld

Complexion

16 M - Male B - Black

SSN DLN **DLN State DLN Country** Occupation/Grade Employer/School Employer Address Employer CSZ Res, County Res. Country Resident Status

Place of Birth

Clark

Testify

24

F - Female W - White U - Unknown

Place of Birth SSN DLN DLN_State **DLN Country** Occupation/Grade Employer/School Employer Address Employer CSZ Res. County Res. Country Resident Status

Clark



Crime Report

Case No. 141118019610

E-Police No.

141118019610.1

Report No. Report Date:

11/18/2014 Testifu

Witness Notes

Elislana's mother

Telephone Numbers

Phone Type CELL - Cell

Phone Number 702 428-9206

Saunders, Diana

Witness W3: Saunders, Diana

Witness Code W3

Name

AKA Alert(s)

Address

CSZ

Email Address Attire

Witness Notes

Elisiana's therapist

Telephone Numbers

CELL - Cell

Phone Number 248 765-5674 DOB Age 20

Sex Race Ethnicity Ht.

Wt.

Hair Color

F - Female

Eve Color

Facial Hair Complexion Build

Place of Birth DLN **DLN State**

DLN Country Occupation/Grade Employer/School

Employer Address

Employer CSZ Res. County Res. Country Resident Status Testify

Therapist

Elements of Motivation 6871 W Charleston

BLVD LV, NV 89117 Clark

Report Narrative

On 11-06-14, I received this possible sexual assault report for follow up investigations. After reading NLVPD Officer McGee's original report, I learned that Elizabeth Guerra came into the North Las Vegas Police Department, located at 1301 E. Lake Mead Blvd to file a report that her daughter, 15 year old had been sexually assaulted by two men, identified as 41 year old Rigoberto inzunza and 30 year old Darrington Rivers. Elizabeth stated she was also at the lobby with therapist, Diana Saunders. Elizabeth stated there were several incidents that dated back to when years old involving Rigoberto and there was only one incident involving Darrington in North Las Vegas. Elizabeth stated she had Saunders come to the department with her because she did not know much of the details that during a therapy session and told Saunders that she did not want to know due to her getting too angry. Officer McGee then spoke to Saunders who told her that did not want to talk to her about the incidents because she did not like talking about It. Saunders then told Officer McGee that on 10-30-14, she was at residence, located at 720 Easy St in Las adisclosed that Darrington exposed himself to her in October of Vegas for a scheduled therapy appointment when 🕮 2010 when they were playing hide and seek at her house. Darrington took to a dark room where he exposed his penis and told to suck his dick. It is not told Darrington "no" so Darrington took to suck his dick. It is not to suck his dick. It is not told Darrington took to fondle his penis. Darrington then asked for oral sex and forced to fondle his penis. The report also stated that Elizabeth's fiance, Harry Williams heard what was being said and confronted Darrington via the telephone on 10-31-14. Darrington denied the accusations but on 11-01-14, Darrington sent Harry a Facebook message stating that something did occur between him and and that he was sorry for what had happened. Officer McGee then asked to hear about what had occurred between and Rigoberto. When Elizabeth heard that Officer McGee wanted and Saunders to talk about Rigoberto, she excused herself from the room because she did not want to hear what told Saunders. disclosed to Saunders that Rigoberto touched her inappropriately from December of 2005 till October of 2009. Rigoberto would come into bedroom and force her to perform oral sex on him. When Saunders asked talk more about what had occurred, she became very uncomfortable in front of Officer McGee so Saunders continued to talk suffers from an unconfirmed mental disorder. Saunders then told about the abuse and told Officer McGee that Officer McGee that did disclose to her that Rigoberto did digitally penetrate her vagina. The original report also states that Darrington lives in Las Vegas and that he is employed at Mccarran Airport and that Rigoberto is believed to be living in New Jersey, per his Facebook page.

On 11-06-14, I called Elizabeth and explained the interview process to her. Elizabeth stated she was concerned that would not talk to me and that she asked if Saunders could come to the interview in case did not want to talk unless she was present. I explained that the interview would be conducted at the Children's Assessment Center (CAC) and that Saunders could come but that I wanted to have interviewed by the Forensic Interviewer first, I also went to Elizabeth's address located at 720 Easy Street in Las Vegas to obtain a copy of Individualized Education Program (IEP) because the CAC needed a copy of that, prior to the interview that was scheduled on 11-12-14 at 0930 hours. On 11-12-14 at about 0950 hours, Forensic Interviewer Kristina Bernak conducted a recorded interview with 🗱



they were all in his bed.

Rigo last forced her to suck his dick.

Crime Report

Case No. 141118019610

E-Police No.

Report No. 141118019610.1

stated he would move his

Report Date: 11/18/2014

understood what was expected of her during the interview and identified the people she lives with. she was at Desert Willow Treatment Center and that her mother had to come to get her from there to attend the interview. stated she was a Desert Willow because she threw a rock at her bother and then went onto the roof of the home to also talked about her biological father living in Oregon and that she does not see him. get away from her brother. When Kristina asked why she was there talking that day, she stated because she was molested. first time this occurred, she was living in Pahrump Nevada and that the person that molested her was Rigo. described this house in Pahrump as having two houses together and that Rigo lived in the other house than her but that he would watch her and her siblings when her mother went to work. stated Rigo would make her sleep in his bed and that he touched her in inappropriate places. When Kristina asked to go into more details about what Rigo touched, stated she did not want to say what happened and that she wanted to write it down so Kristina gave then wrote vagina, boobs and butt and stated Rigo touched all of them and described the first time he did that was when he touched her vagina with his finger and it made her feel uncomfortable. stated Rigo told her not to stated things would occur in his room when he watched the kids and that Rigo tell her mother so she didn't. eventually moved in with them and that was when the incidents would occur in her bedroom. Elisiana stated her brothers and sisters were home when Rigo touched her but stated they were sleeping or he would make her lay next to him when

with his fingers. When asked to go into more details about what Rigo did with his fingers, stated he would move his fingers back and forth, inside of her vagina. Stated she would always be wearing clothing but that he would put his

fingers underneath her clothing and that when they were laying on his bed, she would be facing away from Rigo. stated Rigo touched her every night that he lived with them and that when he lived next door, Rigo touched her probably once a week. stated no other part of Rigo's body touched her body and that he would never make her touch any other part of his body. also stated that Rigo never touched her in any other location other than his house or her

stated they would be underneath the covers when he would wake her up by touching her

CAC while I watched from the observation room. stated she attends Western High School and is in the 10th grade.

then talked about how Rigo made her suck his dick in the living room of their house or when he made her go to his talked about being woken up by Rigo on a regular basis and told what to do when they got to his room. When Kristina asked Elisiana what Rigo's dick looked like, she refused to answer that question. ** stated when Rigo made her suck his dick, he made her mouth do what he wanted her to do and that it made her feel disgusting then talked about stuff coming out of his dick and that he would tell her to stop and then go to the restroom. Elisiana stated when the stuff came out of his penis and into her mouth, she would splt the stuff onto the floor or in a trash can and then she would go back to bed. stated Rigo would always touch her at night and that her mother was usually at work. When Kristina how often she had to suck Rigo's dick, she stated every day for years and that she was 10 years old when

Kristina then asked to talk about the last time that she remembered Rigo making her do things. stated on the last incident, Rigo was not living with them and talked about how Rigo was a friend of her family's so he would come over to parties or that he would take her and her siblings to parties with him. talked about this incident as when Rigo spent the night and slept on the couch. He came into her bedroom and touched her vagina and described this as Rigo touching her vagina the same way as the other incidents. Talked about this incident by stating that her mother came into the house so he stopped touching her vagina and then left the residence.


then talked about another incident by stating she was sleeping on the couch when he pulled a chair up next to her and began talking to her. Rigo then reached underneath the covers and began touching her and stated he stopped because a stated this last incident lasted about 30 minutes.

As talked about certain incidents, she would tell Kristina that she wanted to write things down. When she did this on one occasion, Kristina read back "rub dick on vagina" as if that was what wrote on the piece of paper. When Kristina asked to go into more details about Rigo rubbing his dick on her vagina. when they both had their clothes off and he would rub his dick. Stated these incidents occurred when they were in his bedroom and that he would always tell her to take her clothes off. Stated she would be sleeping when he would tell her to go to his room and that this occurred more than one time and that she did not remember if anything came out of stated Rigo only stopped when she asked him to stop. When Kristina asked **Title** to clarify stated she felt Rigo's dick rubbing against her vagina and it felt weird and that this type his dick. When asked, the dick to vagina incident, of incident occurred about one time a month. When Kristina tried to clarify if Rigo penetrated her vagina with his dick, stated he would only rub the outside of her vagina.

When Kristina asked if anything happened in Las Vegas, stated it did in two different places, one being in an apartment near a Wal-Mart and the other incident occurred on Webster Circle in NLV and that Rigo lived with them in both places. further described Rigo living with them as stating when they moved away from Pahrump, Rigo was not around for about one year then Rigo moved back in with them when they lived in Las Vegas stated the sexual abuse started back up the first day Rigo moved in with them in Las Vegas.

It appeared that the needed a break so Kristina paused the interview so could sit outside with her mother and Saunders. After a few minutes, went back into the room with Kristina and talked about Darrington sexually abusing her. After the disclosed sexual abuse involving Darrington, I made contact with Darrington on 11-17-14 at Mccarran Airport. During a recorded interview, Darrington confessed to Inappropriate sexual contact with and was arrested





Case No.

141118019610

E-Police No.

Report No.

141118019610.1

Report Date:

11/18/2014

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under NLVPD Case #141103018752.

stated she first told her mother and Saunders what had occurred with both Rigo and DD about one week ago after a session with Saunders. also stated that Rigo told her that he would hurt her family if she ever told anyone so that was why she never told anyone until now.

I then had Kristina bring in a picture of Rigoberto and Darrington and had confirm their identity. Without hesitation,

I then conducted a recorded interview with Elizabeth and Harry while still at the CAC. Elizabeth confirmed that she and Harry confronted Darrington about the allegations and that they lived on Webster Circle from March 2007 to January of 2011. Elizabeth also stated that Rigoberto moved into the Webster address with them in September of 2009 and moved out in October of 2010, after an incident involving him and Darrington. During my interview with Elizabeth and Harry, Elizabeth had three photos saved on her cellular telephone of Rigoberto's Facebook page. These photos were of two screen shots of an older model white Honda Accord with New Jersey license plate S80-CJP that Elizabeth stated were of Rigoberto's vehicle. There was also a photo of a white trailer that read LanceScaping LLC with a telephone number of 732-223-1444. Elizabeth stated that was were Rigoberto's Facebook page stated he worked at. Elizabeth also gave me a copy of dates and places where they had lived.

Because Rigoberto lives in New Jersey, I did not interview him prior to submitting this case to the Clark County District Attorney's Office for their review. Based on disclosure (also based on Darrington's confession telling me that disclosure to me was what had truly occurred between her and Darrington), I believe probable cause exists to charge Rigoberto Inzunza with 2 counts of Sexual Assault Victim under 14 for Rigoberto digitally penetrating vagina while they lived on Webster Circle in NLV. I also believe probable cause exists to charge Rigoberto Inzunza with 4 counts of Lewdness with a Minor under 14 for the sexual contact with the includes counts for Rigoberto forcing his penis onto vagina, while they lived on Webster Circle. I am also requesting that the Clark County District Attorney's Office review this report for charges against Rigoberto Inzunza for the sexual contact that disclosed that occurred in Pahrump, Nevada.

Attachments: copies of the screen shots of Rigoberto's vehicle and place of employment in New Jersey, a copy of dates and addresses that Elizabeth stated they lived in, a copy of the lived in lived in, a copy of the lived in lived in lived in, a copy of the lived in liv



Crime Report

Case No. 141103018752

E-Police No. Report No.

141103018752.1

Report Date:

11/3/2014

Page 1 of 6

Subject:	LEWDNESS W CHILD <14	Routing		
Case Report Status	A - Approved	Case Status	O - Open	•
Case Attachments	No	Date Entered	11/3/2014 6:07:46 PM	Reporting Officer
		Entered By	NL2146 - McGee, Renee	NL2146 - McGee, Renee
Occurred On	12/1/2005 6:07:56 PM	Date Verified	11/4/2014 4:06:40 AM	•
(and Between)	9/1/2009 6:01:00 AM	Verified By	NL1076 - Middlebrook, George	
		Date Approved	11/12/2014 8:35:32 AM	
Location	3135 WEBSTER CIR	Approved By	NL1259 - Scarff, Denise	Assisted By
Jurisdiction	S	Connecting Cases	·,· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
Grid	NC4 - 0	Disposition	Active	
Sector	Ĉ.	Clearance Reason		
Мвр		Date of Clearance	·	
Census/Geo		Reporting Agency	North Las Vegas Police Department	
Call Source	Phone	Division	Patrol	•
		Notified		
Vehicle Activity		Means		
Vehicle Traveling		Other Means		
Cross Street		Motive		
		Other Motives		

Offense Detail: 50975 - Lewdness W/Child < 14, (1st) - 201.230.2

Offense Description 50975 - Lewdness W/Child < 14, (1st) - 201.230.2

IBR Code 11D - Forcible Fondling IBR Group

Offense Completed? Hate/Bias

Location

Domestic Violence Fraud Related 20 - Residence/Home Yes

88 - None (No Bias) No

No. Prem. Entered Entry Method Type Security Gang Related '

Tools Used No Criminal Activity N - None/Unknown Weapons 99 - None

Suspect S1: Inzunza, Rigoberto

Crime Against

Using



	The state of the s				
Suspect Number	S1	DOB		Place of Birth	MX
Name	Inzunza, Rigoberto	Age	41	SSN	
AKA	· -	Sex	M - Male	DLN	1601241972
Alert(s)		Race	W - White	DLN State	NV - Nevada
CS No	448039	Ethnicity	H - Hispanic Origin	DLN Country	USA - United States of America
MF No		Ht.	5' 6"	Occupation/Grade	Landscaper
Address	740 RIDGE AVE.	Wt.	150	Employer/School	LanceScaping
CSZ	Lakewood, NJ 08701	Eye Color	BRO - Brown	Employer Address	605 Higgins AVE
		Hair Color	Bl K - Black	Employer CSZ	Brielle N.I





Case No.

141103018752

E-Police No.

Report No.

141103018752.1

11/3/2014

Report Date:

Hair Style Hair Length

Facial Hair Complexion Build Teelh

01 - Clean Shaven MBR - Medium Brown M - Medium

Res. County Res. Country

Resident Status Suspect MO Other MO

Habitual Offender

USA - United States of

America

N - Nonresident

Notes

Attire

Email Address

Scars/Marks/Talloos

NJ OLN/I59976577305642

Telephone Numbers

Phone Number Number Type

Suspect S2: Rivers, Darrington



Them dude shit did went down Between us but how we got to that point is hard explain from what I can remember there was a lot off horse playing with the kids and firm sorry form the day that went down to couldn't find the word to any that it did happen, yesterday for noting especially over these of y'all house without fairing for the worse what could findpen at that point and of off happen at that point and of over these of yall house without fining for the worse what could off happen at that point and for that I'm sory too. I haven't III. Tarnishe about it but I'm going too any vary that's the wife wint in hiding that. And I worn't have no problem with that If Elizabeth teither self if she want's. I got to mention it.



Suspect Number S2 Name Rivers, Darrington AKA

Alert(s)

CS No 8106005

MF No Address CSZ

Email Address

Altire

Scars/Marks/Talloos

Hartford HLS LV, NV 89166

Ht. Wŧ. Eye Color Hair Color

Hair Style Hair Length Facial Hair

Complexion Build Teeth

DOB Age M - Male Sex Race B - Black Ethnicity H - Hispanic Origin

> 6' 5" 180 BRO - Brown BLK - Black B - Braided S - Short

03 - Full Beard and Mustache DRK - Dark L - Large

Place of Birth SSN DLN

DLN State DLN Country

Occupation/Grade Employer/School **Employer Address** Employer CSZ Res. County Res. Country Resident Status

Suspect MO Other MO Habitual Offender Status

Belize

1704223996 NV - Nevada USA - United States of America ramp agent

Clark

N - Nonresident

McCarran Airport

Possible address only. Info found via Facebook app, shown as location email was sent from.

Address on DL: 836 QUICKSAND LN, NLV, NV


Telephone Numbers

Number Type CELL - Cell 702 371-4709

Victim V1:

Victim Code V1

Victim Of 50975 - Lewdness W/Child < 14, (1st) - 201.230.2





Crime Report

Case No.

141103018752

E-Police No. Report No.

141103018752.1

Report Date: 11/3/2014

Victim Type I - Individual

> Name DOB

AKA Alert(s) Elderly Abuse Address CSZ

720 Easy ST NLV, NV 89030

Email Address Attire

Injury N - None Circumstances

Law Enforcement Officer Killed or Assaulted Information

Type Assignment Activity Other ORI

Telephone Numbers

Number Type Phone Number HM - Home 702 428-9206

Victim Offender Relationships

Offender

Relationship

S1 \$2 FC - Former Cohabitant FR - Victim Was Friend

Victim Notes

NETRMS populated incorrect age and will not change. Age of victim is 15 yo.

Emergency Contact Name

Place of Birth

SSN Age 06 DLN Sex F - Female DLN State Race W - White Ethnicity N - Not of Hispanic Origin Ht. 5' 2"

Wt. 175 Eye Color

Hair Color Facial Hair Complexion Bulld

BRO - Brown **BRO** - Brown LGT - Light HVY - Heavy

DLN Country Occupation/Grade Employer/School Employer Address Employer CSZ Res. County

Res. Country

Testify

Resident Status

N - Nonresident

10th grade

Western HS

Justifiable Homicide Circumstances

Other Entity: O3 -- Williams, Harry

Entity Code

Entity Type

CARD - Carded

Name AKA Williams, Harry

Alert(s)

710 Easy ST

Address CSZ

LV, NV 89107

Email Address Attire

Entity Notes

Guerra's live-in fiance

Telephone Numbers

Number Type CELL - Cell Phone Number 702 428-9213 other Entity: o1 -- Guerra, Elizabeth

DOB Age 17 Sex Race

Wt.

Eye Color

Hair Color

Facial Hair

Complexion

Build

M - Male B - Black Ethnicity N - Not of Hispanic Origin Ht.

5' 8" 230 **BRO - Brown** BLK - Black

DBR - Dark Brown HVY - Heavy

Place of Birth SSN DLN DLN Stale **DLN Country**

Occupation/Grade None Employer/School None Employer Address Employer CSZ

Resident Status

Clark

Res. County Res. Country

N - Nonresident



Crime Report

Case No.

141103018752

E-Police No.

141103018752.1

Report No. Report Date:

11/3/2014





Entity Type

P - Person Reporting

Name AKA

Guerra, Elizabeth

Alert(s) Address

720 Easy ST

ÇSZ LV, NV 89107

Email Address Allire

> **Entity Notes** Age 33

Telephone Numbers

Phone Number CELL - Cell 702 428-9206 **CELL - Cell** 702 428-9213

other Entity: o2 -- Saunders, Diana

Entity Code

Entity Type P - Person Reporting

Saunders, Diana

Name AKA

Alert(s)

Address

Email Address Attire

Entity Notes

Victim's therapist since 08/2012.

Telephone Numbers

Number Type CELL - Cell

Phone Number 248 765-5674

DOB Age Sex Race Ethnicity

Ht.

WL

Eye Color

Hair Color

F - Female W - White N - Not of Hispanic Origin

> 5' 4" 200 BLU - Blue **BRO** - Brown

Facial Hair Complexion LGT - Light Build HVY - Heavy Place of Birth **DLN State**

DLN Country Occupation/Grade Employer/School

SSN

DLN

Employer Address Employer CSZ Res. County Res. Country Resident Status

Clark

None

None

N - Nonresident

2002323737

NV - Nevada

of America

USA - United States

DOB Age Sex F - Female

Race W - White Ethnicity N - Not of Hispanic Origin

BRO - Brown

BRO - Brown

Ht. 5' 4" Wt. 125

Еуе Союг Hair Color Facial Hair Complexion

LGT - Light Build Thin - Thin

Place of Birth SSN DLN **DLN State DLN Country**

Occupation/Grade Employer/School

Employer Address Employer CSZ Res. County Res. Country Resident Status

Therapist Elements of Motivation 6871 W Charleston LV, NV 89117

N - Nonresident



Crime Report

Case No.

141103018752

E-Police No.

Report No. 141103018752.1

Report Date:

11/3/2014

5

Report Narrative

On Monday 11/3/14 at about 1555 hours, I was dispatched to the North Las Vegas Police Department Lobby, located at 1301 East Lake Mead Boulevard, reference a possible sexual assault report.

Upon arrival, I made contact with a White female adult who identified herself as Elizabeth Guerra. She told me she was there regarding her 15 year old daughter, who was present and identified as Guerra said Informed her she was sexually assaulted by a former live-in babysitter, Identified as Rigoberto Inzunza, from December of 2005 to October of 2009 at their previous address, which was 3135 Webster in North Las Vegas. She also advised of a singular incident of lewdness that occurred in October of 2010 at the same address on Webster involving Guerra's fiance's friend, Identified as Darrington Rivers. I asked Guerra if she could speak with me in private, away from and she said she would only talk to me if her therapist was with her. She then pointed to a White female adult, later identified as Diana Saunders, who introduced herself. She said she was therapist and had been treating her since August of 2012. Guerra told me Saunders was present when divulged the above Information, and knew more about the assault because she had to leave the room when

Guerra, Saunders and I then went into a private room adjacent to the lobby. As soon as the door closed, Guerra told me she would only answer questions and would not tell me what happened in story format. Guerra said she was molested when she was a child and it would be too difficult for her to have the same discussion concerning her daughter. She said Saunders was present during the entire conversation with and she could tell me what happened instead. I then asked Saunders to tell me what happened, and she said the following: On Thursday, 10/30/14, she was at a scheduled appointment with tat her family home, located at 720 Easy Street. She and Guerra 🛮 sat down with 🌑 to confront her about money that had gone missing from the home. Guerra told she suspected her of taking the money and was going to find out if she was lying. She added that he always finds out what is going on her and would get to the bottom of it. upset and blurted out, "You don't always know what's going on with me. There is a lot you don't know." Guerra pressed about the statement and told her she needed to tell her what was going on. finally told her Rivers exposed himself to her during a visit in the month of October of 2010. She said Rivers was playing hide and seek with and her siblings, when she and Rivers ended up in a dark room alone together. She sald Rivers pulled his pants down and asked her to "suck his dick." (said no, then Rivers took her hand and placed it on his penis. Saunders said she asked () she knew his pants were down if was dark in the room. told her she could feel that she was touching bare skin when he placed her hand on his penis. Guerra then said she had no clue anything happened between and Rivers because he had been around the family many times since then. I asked her if indicated there was any penetration and she sald no. She told me told her it was only Rivers pulling his pants down, exposing himself, propositioning her for oral sex and forcing her to fondle his penis. I asked Guerra if she knew where in the home it happened and she said say. She went on to tell me when her fiance, identified as Harry Williams, heard of the above statement and decided to confront Rivers about it via telephone on 10/31/14. Rivers denied the accusation over the phone, but on 11/1/14 he sent Williams a Facebook message where he acknowledged the incident did happen. Saunders showed me a screen shot of the message, which I read. Rivers wrote "shit did went down between us but how we got to that point is hard to explain from what I can remember there was a lot off (of) horse playing with the kids and I'm sorry form (from) the day that went down. I couldn't find the word to say that it did happen." I had Saunders forward me the message, which I later attached to this

I then asked Guerra if she could tell me what happened between and inzunza. She said she was going to excuse herself and have Saunders tell me what said. Guerra told me she chose not to listen when began providing details because she would want to hurt inzunza if she knew exactly what happened. Once Guerra left the room, Saunders told me the following: said inzunza touched her inappropriately while he lived with them on Webster from December 2005 and October 2009. said inzunza would come into her bedroom at night and force her to perform oral sex on him. Saunders asked her to describe exactly what happened and she said became very uncomfortable. She said was mentally slow and immature, so she would say "v" for vagina and "p" for penis. Jones told her inzunza put his "p" in her mouth and licked her "v." She asked if there was ever any penetration of his "p" into her "v" and she said no. Saunders told me denied any penetration by penis, but said he did use his hands. would not confirm if any digital penetration occurred. She added that said while the lewdness was occuring, inzunza threatened to hurt her family if she told anyone what was going on.

I had Guerra come back and asked her if she had Rivers' contact information. She told me she did not have a cell phone, but gave me his wife's cell phone number instead. His wife's name was Tarmisha Rivers and the cell phone number provide was 702-371-4709. She told me River's had recently moved and did not have his current address. She was able to find a possible street name of Hartford Hills in Las Vegas (89166) through Facebook. I asked her if he was currently employed and she said he worked at the McCarran Airport as a ramp agent. I asked Guerra for his identifying information and she described him as the following: about 6'5" tall weighing about 180 pounds, dark complexion, with a full beard and short twisted braids. His Nevada driver's license (DL) listed him as having brown eyes and black hair. The address on his DL was not updated, as it still showed an address in North Las Vegas.

I ran a wants and records check on Rivers and it returned with no local priors.

I then asked for Inzunza's information and she told me he moved from Nevada years ago, and according to his Facebook profile he now resides in Lakewood, NJ. A recent photo posted by Inzunza within the last five days showed him as an employee of LanceScaping as a landscaper. The listed address and phone number for the company was 605 Higgins Ave, Brielle, NJ 08730 732-223-1444. No other contact information was available.





Case No.

141103018752

E-Police No.

141103018752.1

Report No. Report Date:

11/3/2014

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Page 6 of 6

I ran a wants and records check on Inzunza and it returned with priors for DUI, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, resisting a police officer and traffic related offenses. He had one prior arrest for statutory sexual seduction on 7/31/85. His physical descriptors listed were 5'6", 160 pounds with black hair and brown eyes. A current Facebook photo of inzunza showed him as clean shaven with a medium brown skin tone.

I contacted Child Protective Services and there were no open cases for Guerra, or Williams. I gave Guerra a Victim's Information Guide and explained its use.

I determined was not in any immediate danger, since neither of the suspects lived with and the last incident occurred in 2010. For the same reason, Detectives were not called to respond. Based on my interviews with Guerra and Saunders, I was unable to determine if any penetration occurred with Rivers or Inzunza. This report of lewdness with a child under 14 years of age is being forwarded to the Detective Bureau for follow up investigation.

Attachments: One copy of Rivers' Facebook message.

EXHIBIT B



Mark Hoyt <hoytm@cityofnorthlasvegas.com>

ElisianaJones

1 message

#14

9610

Harry Williams <yrrah1010@gmail.com>
To: hoytm@cityofnorthlasvegas.com

Thu, Nov 6, 2014 at 2:13 PM

Picture that we found of rigoberto on Facebook his place of employment that was just updated monday the nov 4th and what looks like his vehicle

3 attachments



Screenshot_2014-10-30-21-37-02.png 431K



Screenshot_2014-10-30-21-35-50.png 821K



Screenshot_2014-10-30-21-33-33.png 310K

EXHIBIT C

David Westbrook

From:

David Westbrook

Sent:

Wednesday, November 29, 2017 1:04 PM

To:

David Westbrook

Cc:

Jeffrey Maningo; Bruce McAllister

Subject:

INZUNZA CASE: Memoralizing Conversation Between Myself and Jake Villani

He Bruce and Jeff: I just wanted to memorialize an elevator conversation I had with Jake Villani with these contemporaneous notes. This exchange has been preserved to the best of my recollection and typed within 10-20 minutes of the conversation. I am emailing both of you to establish a time stamp.

11/29/2017

Approx: 12:40 PM

Westbrook: Just so it is clear, since the court wants us to talk more face to face, I want you to provide everything I request in the Motion.

Villani: [Sarcastic] Oh, so why don't I just provide everything in the world? You can have everything in the world. Would you like all the GPS stuff too?

Westbrook: Yes, if it exists. I'm not asking for things that don't exist.

Villani: Well you don't say that in your motion.

Westbrook: It's obvious I'm not asking for fictional—

Villani: These are so general--

Westbrook: How is my asking for specific police records of the Detective's interview with a specific, named psychologist, "too general?"

Villani: It doesn't exist? Westbrook: You asked?

Villani: He said it doesn't exist. Westbrook: What about his notes? Villani: He doesn't have notes.

Westbrook: You asked?

Villani: <no response>

Westbrook: They always have notes.

J: How do you know?

M: I just went through a trial with Hamner and found that Metro keeps paper notes, notes in a computer file DA's can access, and notes in a separate computer database that DA's can't access.

J: Are you aware this is North Las Vegas?

M: Of course, you think North Las Vegas doesn't take notes?

J: You don't even know what you're talking about. I'm done.

M: Did you ask him if he had notes?

J: I don't answer to you.

<Elevator Doors Open, Villani walks away, I walk after him>

M: Did you ask him if he had notes?

J: <Walks away without responding>

P. David Westbrook Chief Deputy Public Defender 702-455-1762 westbrpd@ClarkCountyNV.gov

Electronically Filed 3/13/2018 4:12 PM Steven D. Grierson **CLERK OF THE COURT**

1 **OPPS** STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 JACOB J. VILLANI Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #011732 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 8 9 10 11 -VS-12 13

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

RIGOBERTO INZUNZA, #0448039

Defendant.

CASE NO: C-17-321860-1

DEPT NO:

STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS, PURSUANT TO DOGGETT V. UNITED STATES, FOR VIOLATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

DATE OF HEARING: MARCH 19, 2018 TIME OF HEARING: 9:00 AM

COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, through JACOB J. VILLANI, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and hereby submits the attached Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Pursuant to Doggett v. United States, for Violation of State and Federal Constitutional Rights.

This Opposition is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if deemed necessary by this Honorable Court.

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Case Number: C-17-321860-1

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 9, 2017, the State of Nevada ("State") filed an Indictment charging Defendant Rigoberto Inzunza ("Defendant") with Counts 1 through 3, 5 through 8 and 11 through 14 – Sexual Assault with a Minor Under Fourteen Years of Age; Counts 4, 9, 10, 15 and 16 – Lewdness with a Child Under the Age of 14. The District Court set bail in the amount of \$750,000.00, the same amount set by the North Las Vegas Justice of the Peace during Defendant's initial justice court arraignment.

On March 20, 2017, Defendant was arraigned by this Court, pleaded not guilty, waived his right to trial within 60 days, and his trial was set to begin on December 4, 2017.

On May 1, 2017, Defendant filed a Motion for Own Recognizance Release or, In the Alternative, for Setting of Reasonable Bail.

On May 15, 2017, this Court lowered Defendant's bail to \$75,000.00.

On November 20, 2017, one week before Calendar Call, Defendant filed a Motion to Compel Production of Discovery and Brady Evidence.

On November 28, 2017, the State received a recorded statement of the victim and two largely duplicative police reports from the lead detective on the case during a pretrial interview. The State immediately copied these items and made them available for the defense.

On November 29, 2017, Defendant argued his discovery motion. After hearing lengthy argument from both sides, this Court denied Defendant's discovery motion, noting that the motion did not contain specific requests and that a motion for discovery is not required under Nevada law, only a request. The Court also denied Defendant's request to release from custody as a sanction against the State for the late disclosure of the recently discovered interview with the victim. Defendant's trial was continued to February 5, 2018.

On January 25, 2018, two court days before calendar call, Defendant filed a Motion for Own Recognizance Release Based on Change in State's Assessment of Defendant's Likelihood of Flight/Danger to the Community, and to Serve the Requirements of Due Process, Fundamental Fairness, and Substantial Justice.

On January 29, 2018, at calendar call, this Court denied Defendant's motion, and granted defense counsel's oral motion to continue the trial so he could further investigate his case and try to obtain the victim's counseling records. Defendant's trial was continued to April 23, 2018.

On March 2, 2018, Defendant filed the instant motion.

ARGUMENT

Defendant argues, citing federal case law, that this Court should dismiss his case. Defendant bases this argument on two cases (the only two cases cited throughout his motion): Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) and Doggett v. U.S., 505 U.S. 647 (1992). Defendant's understanding of the law and the procedural history in this case are incorrect, so his motion should be denied.

In <u>Barker v. Wingo</u>, the Supreme Court affirmed a lower court finding that a defendant's speedy trial right had not been violated because the defendant had not wanted a speedy trial and because he had not been prejudiced by the delay. <u>Id.</u> at 515. In so holding, the Supreme Court stated:

We reject, therefore, the rule that a defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial forever waives his right. This does not mean, however, that the defendant has no responsibility to assert his right. We think the better rule is that the defendant's assertion of or failure to assert his right to a speedy trial is one of the factors to be considered in an inquiry into the deprivation of the right. Such a formulation avoids the rigidities of the demand-waiver rule and the resulting possible unfairness in its application. It allows the trial court to exercise a judicial discretion based on the circumstances, including due consideration of any applicable formal procedural rule. It would permit, for example, a court to attach a different weight to a situation in which the defendant knowingly fails to object from a situation in which his attorney acquiesces in long delay without adequately informing his client, or from a situation in which no counsel is appointed. It would also allow a court to weigh the frequency and force of the objections as opposed to attaching significant weight to a purely pro forma objection.

407 U.S. at 528-529. The "demand-waiver rule" referenced by the Court, *supra*, provided that a defendant waived any consideration of his right to speedy trial for any period prior to which he had not demanded a trial. Under this rigid approach, a prior demand was a necessary condition to the consideration of the speedy trial right. Id. at 525. Apparently at the time the

<u>Barker</u> case was decided, some states required defendants to affirmatively invoke their speedy trial right.

To the contrary, Nevada has no such rigid rule. Here, Defendant affirmatively waived his right to a speedy trial (trial within 60 days) at his arraignment. Defendant tries to get around this fact by claiming that he "expressed his intent to preserve his *federal* speedy trial rights" (emphasis in original) after he waived his statutory right to a speedy trial. Defendant apparently thinks that this Court should have foreseen that by waiving his 60-day trial right and setting his trial more than 60-days out, he actually wanted his trial sooner because he reserved his federal speedy trial right. This argument is illogical, obnoxious, and counsel's intent to set up a straw man argument to later knock down by vocalizing his retention of the "federal" right at arraignment is now clear.

Ultimately, the <u>Barker</u> Court opined that courts should approach speedy trial cases on an *ad hoc* basis, and (as noted in Defendant's motion) identified four factors which courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right: length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. <u>Id.</u> at 530.

In <u>Doggett v. U.S.</u>, Doggett was indicted on federal drug charges in 1980, but left the country before the DEA could arrest him. The DEA knew that Doggett was later imprisoned in Panama, but after requesting that he be expelled back to the United States, never followed up on his status. Once the DEA discovered that he had left Panama for Colombia, it made no further attempt to locate Doggett. Thus, the DEA was unaware that Doggett reentered this country in 1982 and subsequently married, earned a college degree, found steady employment, lived openly under his own name, and stayed within the law. The United States Marshal's Service eventually located Doggett during a simple credit check on individuals with outstanding warrants. Doggett was arrested in September 1988, 8 1/2 years after his indictment. <u>Id.</u> at 658-659. Under these facts, the Supreme Court applied the <u>Barker</u> analysis and held that the government's failure to prosecute Doggett for over eight years following his indictment clearly violated his right to a speedy trial.

Addressing the four <u>Barker</u> factors argued in Defendant's motion:

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Length of Delay

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New Jersey, and transported to Nevada to face his charges. The length of the delay is considerably less than the 8 ½ years in the <u>Doggett</u> case, and the circumstances vary greatly.

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27 28 The Reason for the Delay

While there was a delay in arresting the Defendant, the delay was not extraordinarily long. Additionally, the most recent delay of Defendant's jury trial was wholly the fault of the defense. Certainly, the defense cannot be heard to complain about Defendant having his trial delayed when he initially waived his right to a speedy trial, then requested and was granted a continuance to seek evidence which he deemed necessary to his defense. The fault regarding why Defendant's trial did not go forward on February 5, 2018 lies solely with the defense, not with the State.

Defendant was at large for less than three years, and was ultimately located, arrested in

Defendant's Assertion of His Right

As noted, *supra*, Defendant did not affirmatively assert his right to a speedy trial. In fact, he affirmatively waived his right to a speedy trial.

Prejudice to the Defendant

Any prejudice suffered by the Defendant in this case is of his own making. Defendant's case has been pending for almost exactly one year as of this writing. Assuming his trial goes forward on April 23, 2018, he would have seen a jury trial within a year and two months after being arraigned on 16 counts of sexual crimes against a child, all of which carry potential life sentences. As this Court knows well, such a delay is far from extraordinary in this jurisdiction.

None of the four factors articulated in the Barker case favor Defendant. The State acknowledges that the defense needed additional time to review the interview made available to them on November 28, 2017, and that this may have caused Defendant's trial to be continued the first time. However, it is unknown whether Defendant would have actually been prepared to go forward even if he had the statement at issue prior to November 28th, as evidenced by his subsequent request for a continuance to obtain counseling records. Between

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November 29, 2017 and January 25, 2018 (the time set for Defendant's continued calendar call), Defendant apparently did nothing to prepare for his trial. Counsel then filed a motion for own-recognizance release on order shortening time and appeared at calendar call accusing the State of not providing reports that his office acknowledged receiving months prior (*See* Receipt of Copy for Discovery Provided, filed November 28, 2017), and privileged counseling records of the victim which the State never had and could not obtain without a court order. This Court ultimately had defense counsel sworn and granted Defendant's oral motion to continue the trial once again. The State was prepared to proceed to trial on both November 28, 2017 and January 25, 2018. With the filing of the instant motion, Defendant makes clear his intention to continue to litigate the minutiae of his reasons for not being prepared for trial, and ignore his duty to actually prepare for trial.

CONCLUSION

If Defendant wanted to have his trial proceed promptly, he could have exercised his right to have a trial within 60 days, which he instead affirmatively waived. Defendant cannot request that his trial be delayed, then be heard to complain about how long it is taking his trial to proceed. Even with the delays, Defendant's trial has the potential to proceed a little more than a year after his initial arraignment, which is all but unprecedented when taking into account the charges in this case. Based upon the foregoing argument, the State respectfully requests that this Court deny Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Pursuant to <u>Doggett v. United States</u>, for Violation of State and Federal Constitutional Rights.

DATED this 13th day of March, 2018.

Respectfully submitted,

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565

BY /s/ JACOB J. VILLANI
JACOB J. VILLANI
Chief Deputy District Attorney
Nevada Bar #011732

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this 13th day of MARCH 2017, to: DAVID WESTBROOK, DPD mcmahaae@ClarkCountyNV.gov BY /s/ HOWARD CONRAD Secretary for the District Attorney's Office Special Victims Unit hjc/SVU

Electronically Filed 3/15/2018 5:14 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1	ROPP Columb.		
2	PHILIP J. KOHN, PUBLIC DEFENDER NEVADA BAR NO. 0556		
3	P. DAVID WESTBROOK, CHIEF DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER NEVADA BAR NO. 9278		
4	309 South Third Street, Suite 226 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155		
5	(702) 455-1762 westbrpd@ClarkCountyNV.gov		
6	Attorney for Defendant		
7	DISTRICT COURT, LAS VEGAS		
8	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,		
10	Plaintiff,	CASE NO. C-17-321860-1	
11	v.)	DEPT. NO. V	
12	RIGOBERTO INZUNZA,	DATE: March 19, 2018 TIME: 9:00 a.m.	
13	Defendant.	1 IME: 9:00 a.m.	
14			
15	<u>RE</u>	PLY	
16	TO STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDAR	NT'S MOTION TO DISMISS, PURSUANT TO	
17	<u>DOGGETT v. UNITED STATES, FOR V</u>	TOLATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL	
18	<u>CONSTITUTI</u>	ONAL RIGHTS	
19	COMES NOW, the Defendant,	RIGOBERTO INZUNZA, by and through P.	
20	DAVID WESTBROOK, Chief Deputy Public	Defender, and hereby submits his Reply to the	
21	State's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dis	miss pursuant to <u>Doggett v. United States</u> .	
22	This Reply is made and based up	on all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the	
23	attached Declaration of Counsel, the authorities	cited below, and oral argument at the time set for	
24	hearing this Motion.		
25	DATED this 15 th day of March, 2	018.	
26		ILIP J. KOHN	
27	CL	ARK COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER	
28	By:	/s/ P. David Westbrook P. DAVID WESTBROOK, #9278	
		Chief Deputy Public Defender	

AA 000084

Case Number: C-17-321860-1

DECLARATION P. DAVID WESTBROOK makes the following declaration: I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada and I am the Deputy Public Defender assigned to represent the defendant, Mr. Inzunza, in the instant matter. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my information and belief. (NRS 53.045). EXECUTED this 15th day of March, 2018. /s/ P. David Westbrook P. DAVID WESTBROOK

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In its Opposition, filed March 13, 2018, the State of Nevada repeated the charges contained in its indictment and referenced the procedural history of this case from March 9, 2017 to March 2, 2018. The State did not challenge Mr. Inzunza's Statement of Facts concerning the prosecution of this case covering the period between the initial report (November 3, 2014), to the date of the initial arraignment (March 15, 2017). Mr. Inzunza's Statement of Facts regarding this time period is not in dispute.

ARGUMENT

I. WAIVING THE STATUTORY RIGHT TO A TRIAL WITHIN SIXTY DAYS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF THE FEDERAL SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHT.

The Deputy District Attorney wants this Honorable Court to rule that when Mr. Inzunza waived his *statutory* right to a trial within 60 days, he "affirmatively waived" his *federal* right to speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Opp. at 5. He does this without citing to a single case in support of his position, instead choosing to call Mr. Inzunza's assertion of his Constitutional right, "illogical," "obnoxious," and a "straw man argument." Opp. at 4. Rather than merely hurling dismissive insults, as the State did, the defense will analyze the State's argument, including its basis in law and the consequences that would *logically* flow from crediting it.

A. There is no <u>legal</u> basis for the State's claim that waiver of the 60-day rule constitutes waiver of the federal speedy trial right.

The Nevada Supreme Court has expressly ruled that waiving the right to a trial within 60 days does not constitute a waiver of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. In analyzing the 60-day rule of NRS 178.556, the Nevada Supreme Court held that, "The statutory timetable for conduct of criminal proceedings is a guide to the speedy trial issue, but **does not define the constitutional right**." Anderson v. State, 86 Nev. 829, 834 (1970)(emphasis added). In Randolph v. Sheriff, 93 Nev. 532, 534 (1977), the Court held that, "a waiver of the sixty day rule, as a condition precedent of the right to pursue pretrial habeas corpus, a statutory right, **does not equate to a waiver of the constitutional right to a speedy trial**." The law on this point could

not be clearer, which is evidently why the State chose not to cite to the law. Mr. Inzunza did not waive his federal speedy trial right when he waived his right to a trial within 60 days.

B. There is no <u>logical</u> basis for the State's claim that waiver of the 60-day rule constitutes waiver of the federal speedy trial right and a ruling to the contrary would be disastrous for our justice system.

The State conceded that, at the time he waived his right to a trial within 60 days, Mr. Inzunza informed the Court that he intended to preserve his federal speedy trial right. Opp. at 4. However, the State argues that it is "illogical" to conclude that the Court could have foreseen that, when Mr. Inzunza *reserved* his right to a speedy trial right, he *wanted* a speedy trial. Opp. at 4. The State appears to have a strange definition of the word, "illogical," and no definition of the word, "irony."

At arraignment, the Court was very clear about the realities of its schedule. There was simply no room to set a trial within 60 days. Mr. Inzunza was given the earliest available trial date: December 4, 2017, which was **259 days** later. The Court also noted that there were other cases set for that period. This is precisely the reason why Mr. Inzunza expressly reserved his federal right to a speedy trial—he was concerned that his trial could be delayed beyond **one year**, which is the time when prejudice presumptively attaches to a speedy trial claim under federal law. See Doggett v. U.S., 505 U.S. 647, 652, fn.1 (1992). Inzunza wanted to make it clear that, while he was waiving his statutory right to a trial within 60 days, he did not intend to waive his right to a speedy trial under federal law, especially given his custody status. Thus, reserving his federal speedy trial right was *logical*.

Along with defying the law and logic, adopting the State's position would be disastrous public policy. NRS 178.556 provides the statutory right to a preliminary hearing within 15 days and a trial within 60 days. These rights are often waived by defendants for a variety of reasons, but imagine for a moment, that they were not. Imagine how our courts would function if *every* preliminary hearing were set within 15 days and *every* trial within 60 days. The word, "bedlam," would not begin to describe it.

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When a defendant waives his right to a trial within 60 days or a preliminary hearing within 15 days, he can certainly suffer prejudice, but he can at least be comfortable in the knowledge that the prejudice is, to some extent, limited. However, if waiving the statutory right to a trial within 60 days effectively waived the federal right to a trial within *a year or longer*, virtually no one would do it. And in most cases, lawyers who did would be presumptively ineffective.

Public policy disfavors the deprivation of liberty and the crippling of our social institutions. Adopting the State's argument in this case would do both.

C. The <u>Barker/Doggett</u> factors strongly favor dismissal.

1. Length of Delay

The State does not dispute that **818 days** passed between the time of the report and Mr. Inzunza's arrest, it merely points out that the period of time in the Doggett case (8 ½ years) was longer. This point is irrelevant and, once again, ignores the law. The Doggett Court noted that any period greater than one year is generally considered to be "presumptively prejudicial." <u>Doggett, supra,</u> 505 U.S. at 652, fn.1. Mr. Inzunza's case was delayed more than double that amount before he was even *arrested*, which is far more than enough, under the law, to trigger a finding in Mr. Inzunza's favor.

2. The Reason for the Delay

a) Pre-Arrest Delay

The State concedes that the delay in arresting Mr. Inzunza was in no way Mr. Inzunza's fault. The State does not dispute that police new exactly where Inzunza was for well over two years, but chose to do nothing. The State's only argument as to the pre-arrest delay is that it "was not extraordinarily long." The State failed to even attempt to support this naked assertion with legal authority.

b) Post-arrest Delay

The State does not deny responsibility for the continuance of the December 4th trial date. This means there is <u>no dispute</u> that the State is responsible for the first **1,127 days** of the delay to Mr. Inzunza's trial. The State does claim the defense is "solely responsible" for the February 5,

2018 delay, but the defense denies this because the delay was caused by the State's continued refusal to turn over discovery. That said, the question is irrelevant. Even if Mr. Inzunza were solely responsible for the *last* trial delay, it would not excuse the State's actions over the prior 1,127 days. Mr. Inzunza's rights were violated long before February 5, 2018 and nothing short of a time machine can change that fact.

3. Defendant's Assertion of His Right

The State admits that, at the time he waived his right to a trial within 60 days, Inzunza expressly reserved his federal speedy trial right. The State's only arguments, which again, are unsupported by any law whatsoever, are (1) that it is "illogical" to conclude Inzunza wanted a speedy trial when he reserved his right to one, and (2) that waiving the statutory 60 days is the same as waiving the right to a speedy trial under the 6th Amendment. These arguments are unsupported by the record, would make disastrous public policy, and are directly contradicted by Nevada law. See Anderson, supra, 86 Nev. at 834; Randolph, supra, 93 Nev. at 534.

4. Prejudice to the Defendant

The State addressed prejudice by claiming, "Any prejudice suffered by the Defendant in this case is of his own making." Opp at 5. This claim is belied by the record.

The State has admitted responsibility for the first **1,127 days** Mr. Inzunza's trial was delayed. Mr. Inzunza was arrested January 29, 2017 and his case was last continued February 5, 2018, a period of **372 days**. Thus, the State has **admitted** that it is responsible for Mr. Inzunza spending **over one year** in custody without a trial. The prejudice suffered by Mr. Inzunza due to this period of "oppressive pre-trial incarceration" is grounds for dismissal. <u>Doggett</u>, <u>supra</u>, 505 U.S. at 654.

The State did not even try to address Mr. Inzunza's other, specific claims of prejudice, including:

- (1) Mr. Inzunza has suffered anxiety and concern caused by excessive confinement and delay;
- (2) The delay has impaired Mr. Inzunza's ability to present a defense in ways including, but not limited to, the following:

- a. The delay has made it impossible for Mr. Inzunza to present an alibi defense because too much time has passed for Mr. Inzunza to reliably account for his whereabouts during the relevant period;
- b. Tracking down possible defense witnesses is now far more difficult;
- c. The value of defense witnesses will be intrinsically limited by the delay because memory degrades with time.
- d. The State will attempt to argue that the lack of physical evidence is attributable to delay—the delay the State caused.

To be clear: the State did not argue a <u>lack</u> of prejudice. The State recognizes the existence of prejudice, but argues that it is the fault of Mr. Inzunza and his attorney. However, making this argument, the State expressly limits Mr. Inzunza's responsibility for the prejudice to the period between February 5, 2018 and the present. So, even if the Court fully credits the State's position, then the Court must nonetheless conclude the following:

- (1) Mr. Inzunza suffered prejudice between April 4, 2014 and February 5, 2018;
- (2) The prejudice was caused by the delay to his trial;
- (3) The State was responsible for the delay.

These are the facts and they are not in dispute.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Inzunza's Motion to Dismiss meets all four factors of the <u>Doggett/Barker</u> test, establishing a violation of Mr. Inzunza's right to a speedy trial and his associated due process rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Mr. Inzunza therefore respectfully requests that the Court dismiss this case.

DATED this 15th day of March, 2018.

PHILIP J. KOHN CLARK COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

By: <u>/s/ P. David Westbrook</u>
P. DAVID WESTBROOK, #9278
Chief Deputy Public Defender

1	CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that service of REPLY TO STATE'S OPPOSITION TO
3	DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS, PURSUANT TO DOGGETT v. UNITED STATES,
4	FOR VIOLATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL CONTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, was made this
5	15th day of March, 2018, by Electronic Filing Service to:
6	
7	CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE Motions@clarkcountyda.com
8	JACOB VILLANI, Deputy District Attorney
9	Attorneys for Plaintiff, State of Nevada E-Mail: jacob.villani@clarkcountyda.com
10	
11	By: <u>/s/ Sara Ruano</u>
12	Secretary for the Public Defender's Office
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RTRAN 1 2 3 4 DISTRICT COURT 5 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 6 7 8 THE STATE OF NEVADA, CASE#: C321860-1 9 Plaintiff, DEPT. V 10 VS. 11 RIGOBERTO INZUNZA AKA RIGOBERTO LOPEZ 12 INZUNZA, 13 Defendant. 14 BEFORE THE HONORABLE CAROLYN ELLSWORTH, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 15 WEDNESDAY, APRIL 4, 2018 16 RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING: EVIDENTIARY 17 HEARING: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO DOGGETT VS. UNITED STATES FOR VIOLATION OF STATE AND 18 FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 19 **APPEARANCES:** 20 For the State: JACOB J. VILLANI, ESQ. 21 Chief Deputy District Attorney 22 P. DAVID WESTBROOK, ESQ. For the Defendant: 23 Deputy Public Defender 24 25 RECORDED BY: LARA CORCORAN, COURT RECORDER

AA 000092

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AA 000094

Las Vegas, Nevada, Wednesday, April 4, 2018

[Hearing began at 11:35 a.m.]

THE COURT: All right, are we ready? Let's go on the record.

THE RECORDER: We are.

THE COURT: Okay, we're on the record in State of Nevada versus Rigoberto Inzunza, case number C17321860. And this is the evidentiary hearing set in relation to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to *Doggett versus United States* for Violation of State and Federal Constitutional Rights.

I'd just say that basically *Doggett* is Sixth Amendment Right to speedy trial and so the Court had asked for an evidentiary hearing concerning the -- why there was the delay from the time of the filing of the Complaint and to -- until the arrest. So, what steps were taken by the North Las Vegas Police Department to get him arrested and whether or not the Defendant was aware of the charges against him prior to his actual arrest. So that was the purpose of the hearing. And that would be pursuant to factors that I would need to consider under the analysis set forth in *Barker versus Wingo*.

Okay, are we ready?

MR. WESTBROOK: We are.

MR. VILLANI: If I could just give a little preamble, Your Honor, maybe I can give an offer of proof.

So, the four factors in Barker, the first kind of has been

deemed to be a triggering factor, right, but the delay itself, whether or not it's more than a year? If it's more than a year basically most courts have found that's a triggering factor for the other factors to come into play.

Then we ask, what was the reason for the delay, whether the Defendant invoked his right to a speedy trial, and finally whether the Defendant suffered any prejudice. These are the factors we're dealing with. Now, in speaking with my Detective we're not going to gain much information from him as far as the why is concerned. The why is basically that they had the information saying that, hey he might be in New Jersey, when they submitted the case? It would have done them no good to contact New Jersey police, because our office hadn't approved it and a warrant hadn't issued. And they don't get notified when a warrant issues.

From our -- basically our office approves it and then the warrant goes out. So the failing was in failing to check up and then seeing that a warrant was approved and then following up on the information from New Jersey. North Las Vegas relies heavily on NCIC as does Metro is my understanding. But my specific conversation with my Detective they rely on NCIC. The warrant goes into NCIC and they basically sit back and wait for somebody to have police contact. And that's the reason for the delay.

So if we're going to gain any information from my witness, that's going to be it. And so, if the Court's going to make their decision solely based off of that factor, then that's what I'll tell you you'll receive

from his testimony and nothing more.

THE COURT: Okay. And do you know why North Las Vegas isn't notified when a warrant is -- when a Complaint has been filed?

MR. VILLANI: It's -- it just has to do with -- it's not that North Las Vegas -- I don't know that he can speak for the entire police department, since the Detective isn't notified. So, basically they submit it to our office, our office either approves or denies it. And if the person isn't in custody or what have you, they're just not notified. The warrant goes into NCIC and then that person is eventually picked up due to police contact.

I will say that I believe it's the *Doggett* case where the guy went back and forth between countries. And it was the DEA case where there was 8½ years, I can't remember if that was *Doggett* or *Barker*, but there was an 8½ year timeline. He was going back and forth between the U.S. We're dealing with apples and oranges here as far as resources are concerned and --

THE COURT: It doesn't matter -- the person who has it.

MR. VILLANI: Well --

THE COURT: -- the law is very clear that that part there's a presumption that the Government has more resources. And the Supreme Court, in fact in *Doggett* addressed that and basically said, hey, okay we can understand that there may be resources, but that's your problem Government, you know. You need to --

MR. VILLANI: I know.

THE COURT: -- bring the resources you need. And so, I

AA 000097

mean, to me what you're telling me is somebody whether it was the District Attorney's Office, -- I mean, normally when you're -- you submit a case and there's a request for an arrest warrant it's done on an affidavit --

MR. VILLANI: Mm-hmm.

THE COURT: -- by the Detective.

MR. VILLANI: It is.

THE COURT: So, one would expect that the Detective would have enough of an interest to follow-up on whether or not that happened and do something then, so --

MR. VILLANI: So the issue we're running into, and I have those conversations as well, is so by the time our office approves sometimes it can be a week, sometimes it can be a month, sometimes it could be multiple months depending on our screening's caseload. So by that time he's received five, ten, other cases that he's now out actively working. And whether or not it's an excuse I'm not here to argue, but that's the reason is the lack of resources essentially on our end?

And I guess my argument to the New Jersey information is there's been nothing presented to show what if anything would have come of that. It's not like it was Rigoberto Inzunza Landscaping, it was Lancescaping. And it was somebody else owned the company and it was a couple of photographs that were taken by the family off of Facebook.

And I've been trying to get the reports from the people who actually arrested him and I've been unable to do so. They were

supposed to fax them over to me. I haven't received them yet. I followed up this morning; they were supposed to fax them again. I haven't received anything, but so I -- because I was interested in seeing was it a traffic stop? Were you doing a general NCIC search and he popped up? Was it an employment records check? Because there's a variety of reasons he could have been contacted.

But basically the States in a position here where I don't have the information the Courts looking for, but my argument is that's just one of the factors the Court's to consider. I have yet to find a *Doggett* or *Barker* case where the Defendant waived his speedy trial right, where he waived his 60 day right to trial. And all of the Nevada cases even though *Barker* says from indictment, all the Nevada cases focus on, well here's the time he was arrested, and then here's the time his trial was.

So the difference between an Indictment a criminal complaint being issued and the arrest date is quite different, because at the arrest date everybody's put on notice. I think we can all agree on that.

THE COURT: Right. The focus here, my concern, the Court's concern is because most of the cases that talk about this have talked about it in terms of federal cases where everything's indicted.

MR. VILLANI: Right.

THE COURT: That's how you have a charge. You don't have the -- although I did find one case where there was a criminal Complaint as well. But, so we're talking about the time from the charging document to arrest, so that is what triggers the Sixth Amendment.

MR. VILLANI: Right.

THE COURT: Because the time before that is a due process issue and then there's the requirement for -- that is -- that the burden is on the Defendant to show actual prejudice --

MR. VILLANI: Right.

THE COURT: -- under our due process argument, but we don't have that. We have here the argument that from the Complaint, the charging document --

MR. VILLANI: Mm-hmm.

THE COURT: -- which is the equivalent to an Indictment, until the time of the arrest. And granted yes, most cases by the time they're decided there has either been a dismissal and then an appeal or a trial and then an appeal. And so most of them have come for a decision before the appellate courts in the posture of there has been a trial and now we have some additional considerations.

Now, there is a difference between the invocation of the State's statutory 60 day right to request a trial within 60 days, which the State has as well.

MR. VILLANI: Mm-hmm.

THE COURT: State may demand a trial within 60 days and the constitutional right to speedy trial. And so, just because someone says, well I don't need a trial within 60 days. And here the Defendant expressly stated that he wasn't waiving his Sixth Amendment Right to speedy trial. And he wanted that to be clear, because he wasn't demanding a trial within 60 days under the State statute.

And so again, it comes down to the -- and what I'm focusing

on what I'm concerned about is that over 2 year, so 2 years and 2 months delay from the time the charging documents were filed until he is arrested. Thereafter frankly, any delays that have been -- have occurred thereafter there haven't been all that many. And I think that some of them have been the result of the Defense. But I'm still again, focusing on that 2 years and 2 months, because even if that was the only delay that had occurred the Court is saying that's a presumptive trigger for the analysis.

MR. VILLANI: And it's a --

THE COURT: And I need to look at the other factors. Why was there a delay?

MR. VILLANI: Mm-hmm.

THE COURT: Which is -- you're telling me, because they didn't really look for him.

MR. VILLANI: Because it's not pattern and practice for them to go and try to revisit that sort of issue, yes, that's --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. VILLANI: -- so basically, you know, whether the Court wants to take that as reason or as lack of reason, I understand. I was able to find a Nevada, well okay.

THE COURT: It's important, okay, and so you may still want to call your witness, because an intentional --

MR. VILLANI: Mm-hmm.

THE COURT: -- you know, if it was a bad faith intention to prejudice the Defendant --

1	MR. VILLANI: Okay.
2	THE COURT: then
3	MR. VILLANI: Then I'm more
4	THE COURT: you're done.
5	MR. VILLANI: if that's the Court's concern, yes I will call
6	him.
7	THE COURT: So I think you better, you know, call the
8	witness. So and also, then I want to hear from that witness, because I
9	would assume Defense wants to cross-examine regarding that. And
0	then, you know, obviously if it's just negligence then that's a different,
1	you know, factor in the analysis.
2	MR. VILLANI: Okay.
3	THE COURT: But, you know, it progresses and it with like
4	over 2 year and I found one case where it they said, you know, the
5	presumptive prejudice kind of attaches at 20 months. And so, you're
6	looking at presumptive prejudice,
7	MR. VILLANI: Mm-hmm.
8	THE COURT: which then shifts the burden to you, State, to
9	prove, to rebut I should say the presumption of prejudice.
20	MR. VILLANI: Okay, and
21	THE COURT: So I don't know if you're prepared to do that as
22	well, but
23	MR. VILLANI: I
24	THE COURT: that would be the analysis.
25	MR. VILLANI: I'll do my best. I have everything that I could

1	possibly have at my disposal, short of flying somebody in from the other
2	jurisdiction. I do have a case that I would like to provide to the Defense
3	and the Court. I did find it's Middleton versus State. It's a Supreme
4	Court of Nevada case. Basically where they say, the delay in this case
5	of less than 2½ years does not give rise to such presumptive prejudice,
6	especially since Middleton was responsible for most of the delay. It's
7	MR. WESTBROOK: The key to that case, Your Honor, is that
8	Middleton was responsible for most of the delay, clearly not the case
9	here.
10	THE COURT: Exactly, I read Middleton.
11	MR. VILLANI: Okay.
12	MR. WESTBROOK: As did I.
13	MR. VILLANI: Okay, good. Then I'm ready to call my first
14	witness, Mark Hoyt.
15	THE MARSHAL: What was the name again, counselor?
16	MR. VILLANI: Hoyt.
17	THE MARSHAL: Thank you.
18	THE MARSHAL: Sir, can you please take the witness stand.
19	Remain standing, raise your right hand face the Court Clerk and be
20	sworn in.
21	MARK HOYT
22	[having been called as a witness and being first duly sworn testified as
23	follows:]
24	MR. HOYT: Yes, I do.
25	THE CLERK: Please be seated. If you'd please state and

1	spell you	r first and last name for the record.
2		MR. HOYT: It's Mark Hoyt, M-A-R-K, H-O-Y-T.
3		THE COURT: You may proceed.
4		MR. VILLANI: Thank you, Your Honor.
5		DIRECT EXAMINATION
6	BY MR. V	/ILLANI:
7	Q	Sir, how are you employed?
8	Α	I am a Detective with the North Las Vegas Police Department.
9	Q	How long have you been a Detective with North Las Vegas
10	Police Department?	
11	Α	Since September of 2008.
12	Q	What is your current assignment?
13	Α	I am part of the Special Victim's Unit.
14	Q	How long have you been with the Special Victim's Unit?
15	Α	Since September of 2008.
16	Q	On November 6 th , 2014, or thereabout, did you become
17	assigned	to a case of an alleged sexual assault from a young lady by the
18	name of	Elizabeth Jones or I'm sorry, Elisa Jones?
19	Α	Yes, I was.
20	Q	Can you tell us how you got assigned to that case and what
21	investigatory steps you took?	
22	Α	We get assigned by cases. If it's a patrol case it'll go through
23	the patro	sergeant; gets assigned to the Detective Bureau and then it's
24	assigned by a detective sergeant or a lieutenant. And I don't really know	
25	why you	get a case, you just get a case. I would imagine per caseload.

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counseling session. And I acted on the information that I got through her

disclosure, and then tried to make contact with both suspects. 1 And how did you go about trying to make contact with both 2 Q suspects? 3 Α I actually made contact with Darrington Rivers. Contacted him 5 at work over at McCarran Airport, where he subsequently confessed and he was arrested. I tried to do the follow-ups with Rigoberto, but I could 6 7 not locate him. So I submitted that case to the District Attorney's Office, 8 for prosecutorial review. Q Now, at the time of the submission you were provided with an 9 10 email that had photographs attached purporting to be where Rigoberto 11 was, correct? Α 12 Correct, yes. Can you talk about how that came about? 13 Q Α That was the mother of the victim. She had -- she gave me all 14 15 the information that I was using to try to make contact with both. And 16 the -- some of those emails included some Facebook pictures, screen 17 shots, if you will, of possible locations for Rigoberto. Q Did you do any follow-up on those Facebook pictures, 18 screenshots that you recall? 19 20 Α I did not, no. I did local stuff, but it's Facebook, so it's -- can't 21 really trust the stuff on Facebook right now. 22 Q Okay. Being provided with that with that stuff how come you 23 didn't follow-up on the photographs on anything that was provided to 24 you? Α With the information given to me I tried to find local stuff. At 25

through all of my leads that I've exhausted to try to locate him locally, I just submitted the case. We have a caseload of over 50 cases. We, you know, just don't have the time. I wish we had the comfort of a small caseload to where we can follow-up as much as we can, but submitting the case to the District Attorney's Office that could take several weeks to several months to get a word back, even if we even get a word.

If it's issuing an arrest warrant we don't even get notified. The only time we get notified is either the charge was amended or denied or if they a -- the District Attorney's Office is requesting additional information for their review. But other than that, pretty much just out-of-sight out-of-mind when it comes to follow-up when it comes to after the submission.

We rely heavily on NCIC for its intended purpose to try to make, you know, someone ever comes in contact with the person if they issued a warrant. We rely on that, but it's pretty rare that we have time to follow-up. It goes into a case file and out-of-sight out-of-mind for us until we get subpoenaed in this instance.

Q Could you talk about your reliance on NCIC? What's your understanding of once a case -- once somebody is flagged in NCIC as having a warrant kind of how that works?

A So it goes -- first of all we submit the case to the District

Attorney's Office. It goes to their prosecutorial review. It could take two
weeks to four weeks apparently depending on their caseload. From
there is goes to a Judge's signature. It could take a week or two to get

that. And then from the Judge's signature it goes over to the police department jurisdiction where it lies and it has to be put into NCIC by the Records Department.

Once it's in NCIC, it's a national data base so if we -- I don't have knowledge that it was ever granted, the warrant. So we submit these cases in hopes and even on my paragraph it says, that I believe probably cause exists to charge this person with this incident. But we don't ever get notified. So we rely heavily on NCIC. If they ever come in contact with law enforcement or if there's ever a background check done through employment and they run an NCIC check, we rely on that to where that jurisdiction will come in contact with that person and then take appropriate actions.

- Q So when you're referring to us, your using the word we a lot.
- A I'm sorry.
- Q Do you mean detectives that submit cases?
- A Detectives that submit cases and then we, the police department, coming in contact with somebody that has a -- an a warrant that's placed into NCIC, so.
- Q So what you just described is you submit a case it's approved by our office, sent to a Judge for signature and then you said the Judge then from there it goes back to the Records Department of the originating police department, right?
 - A Correct.
- Q So in this case that would be North Las Vegas Police Department, right?

1	Α	Correct.
2	Q	Okay. So your Records Department actually does get notified
3	that there	e is a there's been a warrant issued for this person, right?
4	Α	They're the ones that place the warrant into NCIC, yes.
5	Q	Does your Records Department then notify you that a warrant
6	has beer	n issued?
7	Α	No.
8	Q	Okay. So it's not common for you to receive that information?
9	Α	No, it is not.
10	Q	Okay. When is the next time you had contact with this case?
11	In other v	words, how did this case, because you said it went back kind of
12	out-of-siç	ght, out-of-mind. How did this case pop back up on your radar?
13	Α	Through I believe it was a the subpoena. So we'll get
14	subpoen	aed through the District Attorney's Office, saying that there's an
15	upcomin	g court appearance. So that's
16	Q	And at that point you retrieve the file and
17	Α	that's when I review the file.
18	Q	so are you ever notified yourself of the fact that if a
19	defendar	nts arrested in another jurisdiction out-of-state, do you as the
20	Detective	e on the case, get notified?
21	Α	No, I don't.
22	Q	Okay. And so are you notified I know your office has a I'm
23	sorry you	ur department has somebody that deals with extraditions,
24	correct?	
25	Α	Correct, yes we have a fugitive detail.

1	Q	Okay, a fugitive detail. When that fugitive detail gets
2	informa	ation that there's been an arrest made, do they then notify the
3	lead de	etectives that there's been an arrest made?
4	Α	It all depends. I've probably been notified the almost ten
5	years I	ve been at the department in the Detective Bureau, maybe twice
6	three ti	mes that I've been notified that someone has been picked up on
7	an arre	st warrant. It's not common.
8	Q	Do you recall in this case if you were notified or not?
9	Α	I don't recall.
0		MR. VILLANI: All right, Your Honor, I'll pass the witness.
1		THE COURT: Cross?
2		CROSS-EXAMINATION
3	BY MR	. WESTBROOK:
4	Q	Good morning, Officer.
5	А	Good morning.
6	Q	Detective, excuse me.
7	А	It's okay.
8	Q	So your testimony here today is that your own Records
9	Depart	ment doesn't notify the lead detective when an arrest warrant is
20	issued	in one of your own cases?
21	А	That is correct.
22	Q	You've been here for ten years, right?
23	А	Yes.
24	Q	You're aware that this is how the Records Department works,
25	right?	And you have been for the last ten years?

1	Α	Correct.
2	Q	So you're aware that cases can fall through the cracks, right?
3	Α	I would imagine so, I guess.
4	Q	Well you just testified that it happens, right?
5	Α	That what happens?
6	Q	It happens. Cases fall through the cracks, out-of-sight out-of-
7	mind, rigl	ht?
8	Α	I don't believe that the cases fall I don't understand why
9	Q	Okay.
10	Α	what you mean by fall through the cracks.
11	Q	Okay, let me be clearer.
12	Α	Okay.
13	Q	You said that it's common practice
14	Α	Okay.
15	Q	for you to not be notified when an arrest warrant issues.
16	Α	Correct.
17	Q	Correct?
18	Α	Yes.
19	Q	Okay. So it must happen quite often that a case sits out there
20	for a long	time without you being notified, right?
21	Α	Correct.
22	Q	You've been there for ten years so you're aware that this
23	happens,	right?
24	Α	Yes.
25	Q	Internally, the North Las Vegas Police Department is aware

that there's this communication problem, right? 1 2 Α I don't -- who's calling it a problem? I don't know who's calling it a problem. 3 Q You don't think it's a problem? Is that fair to say? Α 5 It's fair to say, yes. Q Okay. You think that it's okay if a case languishes out there 6 7 for 2 or 3 years with nobody following up on it? That's not a problem to you? 8 No. Α 10 Q Okay. Have you taken any steps to improve communication 11 between yourself and the Records Department? 12 Α No, not personally. 13 Q Has your department taken any steps to create better 14 communications between the detectives who investigate the cases and 15 the Records Department who apparently are getting these records? 16 I can't speak for the communication between the two, but I can tell you we have a Problem Solving Unit. And they sometimes if they 17 18 have time they'll go into what's called, Warrant Pro, or check NCIC to see if there's any active warrants for local warrants. And they'll do 19 20 follow-up. Sometimes we get -- I get emails from the PSU Unit saying 21 that they picked up an arrest warrant by somebody, but as far as the communication I don't know how it could be corrected. 22 Q 23 Okay. 24 Α They deal with so many. 25 Q 50 you said, right?

1	Α	I have 50 cases on my screen alone, but we have six
2	detectiv	es that are doing this in
3	Q	Okay.
4	Α	Clark County I mean, you know, I don't know how many
5	they hav	ve so how long it might take. But in North Las Vegas, there's
6	only six	detectives that are doing the SVU, yes.
7	Q	Okay. You said you did local stuff, right? To you said in
8	reference	ce to what you did to find him. You said I could not find him, I did
9	local stu	uff.
10	Α	I can't remember exactly what I did, but I would have done
11	some ki	nd of a search, followed up maybe on what the mom told me
12	where h	e could possibly be. She told me that she believed that she
13	he was	in a different state. I'd follow-up just like I did with Darrington
14	Rivers,	found him, so.
15	Q	Sure. You actually reviewed an email that she sent you, right?
16	Α	Right, right.
17	Q	That email actually had a picture of his truck which had his
18	phone r	number on it, right?
19	Α	Correct.
20		MR. VILLANI: Objection as to whether or not that was his
21	truck. I	don't think that's been that's been a proved.
22	BY MR.	WESTBROOK:
23		MR. WESTBROOK: Okay you got a picture
24		THE COURT: All right.
25		MR. WESTBROOK: that the person sending this email

1	purporte	ed to be Mr. Inzunza's truck, correct?
2		MR. VILLANI: That's an objection as well, misstates the
3	evidence	e.
4		MR. WESTBROOK: I could get the exhibit out, I guess, if he
5	really wa	ants to object.
6		THE COURT: Well, I'm looking at this
7		MR. WESTBROOK: I mean, he just testified to receiving it,
8	SO	
9		THE COURT: and I'm looking at the police report, the crime
10	report.	Is this his?
11		MR. WESTBROOK: The last three pages of it.
12		THE COURT: Right.
13		MR. WESTBROOK: And my copy's really bad, it was just a
14	black an	nd white photocopy.
15		THE COURT: All right. Overruled, go ahead.
16		MR. WESTBROOK: Okay.
17	BY MR.	WESTBROOK:
18	Q	So you got a picture of a truck with a phone number on it,
19	right?	
20	Α	Correct.
21	Q	You never called that phone number did you?
22	Α	I can't recall if I did or not.
23	Q	Okay. When you are doing an investigation you keep records
24	right?	
25	Α	We do, yes.

1	Q	Okay. Written records?
2	Α	Correct, yes.
3	Q	You keep detective notes, right?
4	Α	We do.
5	Q	Okay.
6	Α	Well, until the case is submitted and then we destroy
7	everything	g
8	Q	Really? You destroy
9	Α	other than the case file.
10	Q	the records. Did you destroy records in this case?
11	Α	Well, we case notes
12	Q	You destroyed your case notes in this case?
13	Α	Correct.
14	Q	So you had case notes detailing your investigation, but you
15	conscious	sly destroyed them?
16	Α	Yes.
17	Q	Okay. How did you destroy them?
18	Α	Just shred them. We have a shredder pile.
19	Q	Okay. So they were just written notes?
20	Α	Just written notes.
21	Q	Were they ever in a computer anywhere?
22	Α	No.
23		MR. WESTBROOK: Your Honor, may I approach the
24	witness?	
25		THE COURT: Yes.

1		MR. WESTBROOK: I only have one copy of this, but it was in
2	your disc	covery that you turned over.
3		MR. VILLANI: Okay.
4		MR. WESTBROOK: Your Honor, I'm going to mark this as
5	Exhibit B	if I could and then
6		THE COURT: All right.
7		MR. WESTBROOK: see if I can authenticate it.
8		THE CLERK: Doing two jobs.
9	BY MR.	WESTBROOK:
10	Q	Officer, do you recognize this?
11	Α	To be I don't recognize it, but it could have been
12	Q	What's that number on the top right?
13	Α	That's our case number.
14	Q	Okay. Does this appear to be something from this case?
15	Α	Yes.
16	Q	Have you ever seen these notes before?
17	Α	I can't remember. It's been almost four years.
18	Q	Okay. Do you have your case file with you?
19	Α	I don't, no.
20	Q	Did you review your case file in preparation for this case?
21	Α	Just read the report.
22	Q	Okay. Go ahead and read those over and I want to ask you a
23	few ques	stions about them.
24	Α	Okay.
25	Q	Okay. You said the case number on this is for this case,

1	right?		
2	А	It is, yes.	
3	Q	You're the lead detective in this case, right?	
4	Α	Yes, I am.	
5	Q	If something is in your office and it has this case number on it	
6	you have	e access to it, right?	
7	Α	I do, yes.	
8	Q	Okay. You haven't reviewed your file is that right, in this case	
9	today, is	that right?	
0	Α	Not my file, no.	
1	Q	Okay. What did you review in preparation for this day?	
2	А	Just my report.	
3	Q	The arrest report that was issued?	
4	А	The submission, yes.	
5	Q	Okay. Was there anything about was this document any	
6	part of that report that you reviewed?		
7	А	Just parts of my communication with the mother after the	
8	forensic	interview of the child.	
9	Q	Okay.	
20	Α	Like the dates on when they were when they lived at	
21	Webster	and stuff like that, so.	
22	Q	When you say mother, you mean the mother of the alleged	
23	victim in	the case?	
24	Α	Correct.	
25	Q	You're not talking about my client's mom?	

1	Α	No, no, sorry.
2	Q	You never called my client's mom, right?
3	Α	No.
4		THE COURT RECORDER: Mr. Westbrook, do mind if that's
5	on, but -	-
6		MR. WESTBROOK: Absolutely, I'll go over here.
7		THE COURT RECORDER: Thank you.
8	BY MR.	WESTBROOK:
9	Q	So, this says; moved to Pahrump, May 2003. Rego [phonetic]
0	was neig	hbor in Pahrump, from March 2004 to January 2005. Would
1	this be p	art of your investigation of the case in looking for, you know,
2	looking i	nto the background information of the suspect?
3	Α	I just got that from the mother of the victim. I wouldn't have
4	checked	to just make sure that there was anything like verification of the
5	address	in Pahrump. I would have never
6	Q	I see, so this is information that you got from the mother of the
7	victim?	
8	Α	Correct.
9	Q	So these are your notes?
20	Α	You know what; they look like what is written in my reports. I
21	don't ren	nember physically writing that, but it has our case number and
22	it's some	ething that is coincides with my reports, so
23	Q	Okay.
24	А	yes. But I don't remember writing that; it's been so long.
25	Q	Okay, so why you don't remember this document? Do the

1	notes wr	itten in here accurately reflect the notes that you took as part of
2	your inve	estigation to build your report?
3	Α	Yes.
4	Q	Okay. I'd like to submit this as Defense Exhibit B, Detective's
5	notes.	
6		THE COURT: May I see it.
7		MR. WESTBROOK: Yes, Your Honor, I'm sorry that's my only
8	copy. I	wasn't expecting to need it.
9		MR. VILLANI: May I have voir dire on that document, Your
10	Honor?	
11		THE COURT: Yes. Yes, I'm I don't I'm not sure that
12	characte	erizing it as Detective's notes is probably accurate given what is
13	stated in	the report.
14		MR. VILLANI: May I, Your Honor?
15		THE COURT: You may.
16		MR. VILLANI: Thank you.
17		VOIR DIRE REGARDING DETECTIVE'S NOTES
18	BY MR.	VILLANI:
19	Q	Is it possible the mom provided this typed document to you?
20	Α	It is absolutely possible.
21	Q	Okay. So these aren't necessarily your notes? When you
22	take not	es with a case, the ones that you were talking about that you
23	shred, a	re those handwritten or are they typed?
24	Α	Those are handwritten.
25	Q	Okay. So this is not consistent, this document Defense B is

1	not cons	sistent with the notes you generally take in your cases?
2	Α	Correct. I've never done a screen like a shot, like a Word
3	docume	nt like that,
4	Q	Okay.
5	Α	never before.
6	Q	Okay. So the hand written notes you take that you then
7	incorpor	ate into your report before shredding them, those are
8	handwri	tten?
9	Α	Those are hand written, yes.
10		MR. VILLANI: Okay. I don't object to the submission. I object
11	to the su	ubmission as Detective notes.
12	THE CC	OURT: All right.
13	VOII	R DIRE REGARDING DETECTIVE NOTES BY THE COURT
14	BY THE	COURT:
15	Q	I want to ask a question. So I'm looking at your report. You
16	reviewe	d it before you came to testify?
17	Α	Yes, ma'am.
18	Q	Okay, the document that's just attached as to the motion.
19		MR. WESTBROOK: Thank you, Your Honor.
20	BY THE COURT:	
21	Q	Okay. And it says, crime report: page 5, on the one, two, third
22	paragra	ph down, it says, Elisabeth also gave me a copy of dates and
23	places v	where they have lived.
24	Α	Okay.
25	Q	Does that refresh your recollection about what she gave you?

A It does not. I don't remember exactly what it was that she gave me. I wish I could remember exactly what that piece of paper was, if it even was a piece of paper, an email or something, I don't remember.

Usually when I write my reports I go off of the interview that I did. That I conducted that was recorded after the forensic interview.

That could have been something that I got from her after, I don't remember ever receiving that. Unfortunately, I'm sorry it's been -- too many time has passed or too many cases in between.

Q Okay. So you don't have a present recollection of what you did in the investigation. But when -- did you -- when you wrote this report did you do it close in time to when you met with the mother of the alleged victim whose first name is apparently Elisabeth?

- A Yes, I did.
- Q Did you do that?

A So the report that's written is from the notes and the recorded statement that I got from her the same day that we did the forensic interview at the CAC.

Q Okay.

A I wouldn't have gone off of those notes. I would imagine I would not have, because my report is reflected from the interviewed -- or the recorded interview that I did with the mom after that.

- Q Okay. Listen to my question.
- A Okay.
- Q That's all I'm asking. So your report date is November 18th, 2014, is that the date you did your report? That's what's noted here?

1	Α	I don't know exactly what day it was that I did it.
2		THE COURT: All right. I was trying to lay a foundation for
3		MR. WESTBROOK: Sorry.
4		THE COURT: past recollection recorded, but I'm not getting
5	there, be	cause he's
6		MR. WESTBROOK: Thank you, Your Honor.
7		THE COURT: We can admit this, but
8		MR. WESTBROOK: I'd like to admit it just as an Exhibit of
9	what may	or may not be Detective notes.
10		MR. VILLANI: No, I
11		THE COURT: I'm not going to admit it as detective notes,
12	because	I think it's pretty clear that he's indicated he doesn't ever do
13	typed not	es. Basically, the all the evidence I do have I would draw the
14	reasonab	le inference that it's the copy that she gave him based upon his
15	testimony	that he never types up his notes, so. You can admit it,
16		[DEFENSE EXHIBIT B - ADMITTED]
17		MR. WESTBROOK: Thank you, Your Honor.
18		THE COURT: but that's how give it the weight.
19		MR. WESTBROOK: Well maybe we'll get to the bottom of it
20	someday	•
21		THE COURT: Okay.
22		CROSS-EXAMINATION CONTINUED
23	BY MR. V	VESTBROOK:
24	Q	Not everything you write in your report, I'm sorry excuse me,
25	let me rei	phrase that. Not everything that you put in your notes makes it.

1	into the final report, right?	
2	А	Yes.
3	Q	Okay.
4	Α	Ultimately, yes.
5	Q	So once you shred your notes all that stuff is gone forever,
6	right?	
7	Α	Well we have recorded forensic interview and the interview
8	with the	mom, but yes.
9	Q	The contents of your notes is gone forever once you shred it?
10	Α	Correct, yes.
11	Q	And you shred your notes in every case?
12	Α	Yes, I do.
13		THE COURT: Okay, let's that's not the scope of this here.
14		MR. WESTBROOK: That's all I had, Your Honor.
15		THE COURT: Okay.
16		MR. WESTBROOK: That's all I had on that.
17		MR. VILLANI: Also can I get a clarification. The question was
18	kind of v	vorded in a negative, the answer was yes. So the question was,
19	do you i	ncorporate into your report everything that's in your notes or you
20	don't?	The way it was phrased can I just get an answer to that
21	question	? Because I'm unclear as to what the answer was.
22		THE COURT: Well you're getting back on redirect. Why don't
23	you do t	hat?
24		MR. VILLANI: Okay, that's fine.
25		MR_WESTBROOK: I can just ask it real quick

1	BY MR.	WESTBROOK:
2	Q	You don't put everything that's in your written notes into the
3	report, r	ight?
4	Α	I'm sorry, yes I do. Yes.
5	Q	You put every single word that's in your notes, the written
6	notes, ir	nto the report?
7	А	Not verbatim, but yes. I summarize it, yes.
8	Q	But not verbatim?
9	Α	No.
10	Q	You summarize?
11	А	Not verbatim.
12	Q	Okay. So you don't put every single word that's in the written
13	notes in	to the report, do you?
14	А	Okay, then no.
15	Q	Okay. You said you investigated Darrington Rivers at this
16	same tir	me, right?
17	А	Yes, give or take weeks or months.
18	Q	Okay. And that case would be under a separate event
19	number,	because it was a different defendant, right?
20	Α	Correct.
21	Q	There'd be a separate file for that case, is that right?
22	Α	Yes.
23	Q	Let's see here. You testified that when you request you do
24	your affi	davit to request an arrest warrant. And then it can take a couple
25	of week	s for the DAs to process it; maybe a week for the Judge to sign

1	it; maybe	two, three weeks for it to eventually the warrant to be issued
2	and to ge	t back to the Records Department at your office, right?
3	А	Correct. I don't know the exact time, but it takes weeks.
4	Q	Okay. Well in this case you made your request by affidavit on
5	the 19 th or	f November, 2014, is that right?
6	А	That's correct.
7	Q	Okay. And the criminal Complaint was issued on December
8	3 rd , 2014,	right?
9	Α	That's correct.
10	Q	So a couple of weeks, not many weeks, right?
11	А	They're all different. I don't know how long it takes.
12	Q	Okay. And you're comfortable not knowing how long it takes,
13	right?	
14	А	Yes. I there's I don't have any other answer for yes.
15	Q	Okay.
16	Α	There's nothing else that I can do.
17	Q	You said you exhausted leads, but you can't say what leads
18	you exhausted in trying to find Mr. Inzunza, correct?	
19	Α	Correct. I can't remember exactly what I did.
20	Q	Was one of those leads ever opening up Facebook?
21	Α	I'm sure, yes.
22	Q	Do you think you opened up Facebook, great?
23		MR. WESTBROOK: This is currently marked as Defense
24	Exhibit A,	Your Honor, but to avoid confusion that the Exhibit A that's,
25		THE RECORDER: You can't speak over here.

1		MR. WESTBROOK: sorry. To avoid confusion with the
2	Exhibit A	that is associated with the motion, should we remark it as C?
3		THE COURT: I don't think that's
4		MR. WESTBROOK: We're okay? Yeah.
5		THE COURT: necessary. Yes it will be
6		MR. WESTBROOK: Okay, just checking. May I approach?
7		THE COURT: exhibit to the hearing.
8		MR. VILLANI: Can I see that, please?
9		MR. WESTBROOK: I'm going to give you a copy. Your
10	Honor, he	ere's a courtesy copy.
11		THE COURT: Thank you.
12	BY MR. \	WESTBROOK:
13	Q	I'm holding what is marked as Defense proposed Exhibit A.
14	Α	Okay.
15	Q	Do you recognize that?
16	Α	Yes.
17	Q	What is it?
18	Α	It's a Facebook profile.
19	Q	Anyone's particular Facebook page?
20	Α	Rigoberto Inzunza's.
21	Q	Okay. And is it your testimony here today that you checked
22	this Face	book page and still couldn't find Mr. Inzunza?
23	Α	It's social media. I'm a 13 I have a persona of a 13 year old
24	girl right i	now on Facebook. So I don't really rely too much on social
25	media inf	formation, so, but ves.

1	Q	Okay, so your testimony here	
2	Α	I looked at it, but I may not followed to the T exactly what it	
3	says to lo	ocate people.	
4	Q	Okay, so your testimony here today is that you checked	
5	Faceboo	k to look for Mr. Inzunza and with the information on Facebook	
6	you could	dn't find him? Is that your testimony here today?	
7	Α	Yes, with the information from Facebook, I did not find him.	
8	Q	Okay. Let's turn to the second page of this document? Here I	
9	can uncli	p it for you.	
0	Α	Sorry.	
1	Q	Do you see what's in the middle of the page there?	
2	Α	Yes, I do.	
3	Q	Okay, what is it?	
4	Α	It's a Pindrop of him being well of him saying that he's at this	
5	location.		
6	Q	Well it's not him saying, right? It's an automatic thing. It's	
7	GPS had	tracked him to that location, right?	
8	Α	If he's behind the phone or the devise that's doing it, then yes.	
9	Q	So presuming he has his phone with him, his Facebook page	
20	is saying	that on this exact date and time, which happens to be in this	
21	point, Jui	ne 20 th , 2016, right?	
22	Α	Correct.	
23	Q	Okay. You could have found him at the Azteca Restaurant in	
24	Belmar, I	Belmar, New Jersey, right?	
25	Δ	There's no way unless you check the EXIE data on the photo	

1	but Face	ebook always strips the EXIF data so there's really no way of	
2	knowing	knowing exactly where he was.	
3	Q	You mean, you couldn't have called the restaurant?	
4	А	I could have.	
5	Q	Yeah. Next page please. Do you recognize the other	
6	А	Another Pindrop?	
7	Q	Another Pindrop?	
8	А	Mm-hmm.	
9	Q	See that's also Azteca. Sorry I'm going to give you this one.	
10	А	No, that's okay.	
11	Q	Also another Pindrop, right?	
12	Α	Yes.	
13	Q	This one Ocean County Park, correct?	
14	А	Correct.	
15	Q	All right. Next page, another Pindrop this one Sea Girt Beach	
16	New Jersey, right?		
17	Α	Correct.	
18	Q	Okay, so not only is he on Facebook with all of his	
19	associat	ions, his friends, etcetera listed, but he's also got, you would	
20	agree G	PS active so that his phone checks in automatically when he	
21	goes places, right?		
22	А	A devise, yes.	
23	Q	A devise does?	
24	Α	A devise does, yes.	
25	Q	Did you call any friends on his friends list?	

1	А	No.
2	Q	Did you try to friend Mr. Inzunza and send him a message?
3	Α	No.
4	Q	This is an open profile so you have no problem getting into it.
5	Did you	leave a message on his wall? There's a warrant for your arrest,
6	please c	all me.
7	А	At the time there wasn't a warrant for his arrest.
8	Q	Okay. Two and a half weeks later there was. Two and a half
9	weeks la	ter did you go into Facebook and leave a little message on his
10	wall?	
11	А	I did not.
12	Q	No? Did you ever call his mom, Rafaela DeGoldsmith?
13	А	I can't recall if I did or not?
14	Q	Okay. Do you have any records of making these phone calls?
15	Α	I wouldn't have any records, no.
16	Q	Okay.
17	Α	Unless it goes through the police department phone, but
18	Q	Are all the records that you have, have they been produced to
19	the State	e?
20	Α	Yes.
21	Q	Every record in your file's been produced to the State?
22	Α	Yes.
23	Q	Does that include computer records?
24	Α	No. I probably not.
25	Q	Okay. So there's computer records that haven't been

1	produced	l, fair to say?	
2	Α	Are you meaning like IP address	
3	Q	I'm talking records.	
4	Α	everything on the computers?	
5	Q	Yes.	
6	Α	It's never been done, in my tenure. I don't know if anybody,	
7	but no.		
8	Q	Okay.	
9	Α	No computer records of my personal computer or my	
0	computer	through work has been sent to the District Attorney, no.	
1	Q	Okay. And the records that are housed digitally on the work	
2	system h	ave then have they been sent to the District Attorney?	
3	Α	Other than the reports, no.	
4	Q	Okay. Do you recall calling Guadalupe Lopez DeHughes, his	
5	sister?		
6	Α	I don't recall. The only information that I tried was everything	
7	from the	victim's mother. I don't know. I can't recall if there was a	
8	phone nu	imber. I wouldn't document the stuff after the fact if I'm trying to	
9	locate hir	m during the time that I was trying to also locate Darrington. I	
20	didn't doo	cument I wouldn't document every phone call that I had made	
21	to try to fi	to try to find him. It's I just don't do that.	
22	Q	Okay.	
23	Α	I don't have time to do it.	
24	Q	So it's your testimony that you did everything based on the	
25	information you got from the victim and her mother?		

1	Α	Correct.
2	Q	Okay. You testified earlier that you didn't call the phone
3	number	on the side of the truck of which you received a picture though,
4	right?	
5	А	From Facebook, no.
6	Q	Okay. So you didn't do everything, that's wrong? You could
7	have ca	lled that number; you didn't do it, right?
8	А	Okay, yes.
9	Q	Just tell me if you remember these names, I assume the
10	answers	s going to be no, but I want to just check. Kayla Hughes, his
11	niece. [Did you ever call her?
12	Α	No.
13	Q	Melissa Collaso, friend for over 20 years. Did you ever
14	contact	her?
15	Α	No.
16	Q	Did you ever contact James Blomgren, brother-in-law and
17	friend fo	or 46 years?
18	Α	No.
19	Q	Did you ever contact Maria Guadalupe Bortolotti, cousin?
20	Α	It wasn't given to me, so no.
21	Q	Okay. Emmanuel Nicholas Vosdoganis, did you ever contact
22	his neph	new?
23		THE COURT: Mr. Westbrook, I'm not sure, I mean, he's
24	pretty m	uch said he didn't do anything.
25		MR. WESTBROOK: I'm just checking, Your Honor, because

1	this could allow me to not call a bunch of witnesses. So if I could just get
2	to the last two names I'll be done.
3	THE COURT: Did you call anybody, any friends or associates
4	of the Defendant that who was the suspect in your case?
5	THE WITNESS: No, ma'am, there was very limited
6	information that I got from the mother and the victim, so.
7	MR. WESTBROOK: All right. I think I might pass the witness.
8	Just give me one second, Your Honor.
9	BY MR. WESTBROOK:
10	Q Prior to the preparation for this hearing did you have any direct
11	contact with the State, Mr. Villani, specifically?
12	A Yes.
13	Q Okay. Was that involving, you know, providing discovery or
14	was it about something else?
15	A It was about providing discovery, yes.
16	MR. WESTBROOK: Okay. I'll pass the witness.
17	THE COURT: Cross or I mean redirect?
18	MR. VILLANI: Thank you, Your Honor, just a few.
19	REDIRECT EXAMINATION
20	BY MR. VILLANI:
21	Q Mr. Westbrook was asking you if you provide a computer
22	records to our office, and your answer was, other than the reports, no.
23	What other computer records exist that aren't being provided or what
24	were you thinking of when you were answering that?
25	A The only thing I'm thinking of is downloading my entire

computer and giving it to you that has contents of everything that I've done within that timeframe. No I have not. The only other thing that I have is just the reports that I've generated on the computer, the work computer.

Q Okay. So we're not talking about notes being kept, stuff that would be germane to the case? What you're talking about is the digital file itself basically showing all the steps you've taken within your computer, or what are you talking about?

A So I don't -- it's rare that we keep track of our daily basis, if you will, like what we do on a case. We might write like an update after 30 days that's -- I don't typically do that because I try to get my reports done in a timely manner. It doesn't always happen, because due to caseload or whatever is going on in my personal life, or whatever. But as far as any kind of digital evidence it's just the reports that are generated. There is nothing else.

When he was -- I took it as everything that's going to be in my computer did I give it over to the -- I'm sorry the District Attorney and I did not.

Q Okay.

A But it's -- I -- we don't ever do that, so.

Q Mr. Westbrook asked, he referenced the leads exhausted, you know, you exhausted all your local leads. Now I know you don't remember exactly what you did from your testimony with this particular case. What do you generally do when you're looking for a defendant? Do you have particular steps you take in every case or does it vary case

1	by case? Can you
2	MR. WESTBROOK: Objection, relevance, Your Honor.
3	The what's important here is what he did in this case and he can't
4	recall a single thing.
5	THE COURT: Sorry, are you trying to lay a foundation for
6	habit or something?
7	MR. VILLANI: Yes, that's and I'm just trying to if he can't
8	remember what he did in this particular case, understandable it's so long
9	ago. I'm wondering if he has a pattern and practice of what he does in
10	every case that could give us some information as to how he tries to
11	seek out defendants.
12	THE COURT: Well I'd like to know. So in every case once
13	if the case is submitted to the District Attorney's Office, you're done?
14	You don't do anything more unless they call you, is that it?
15	THE WITNESS: That's correct, yes.
16	THE COURT: Okay.
17	MR. VILLANI: That's fine.
18	BY MR. VILLANI:
19	Q Now Mr. Westbrook said you feel it's not a problem for a case
20	to languish two to three years and your answer was, yes. Why don't you
21	feel that's a problem?
22	A If I had control over it then I would be, I would have a problem.
23	But I don't have control. I don't know what people's actions are if they
24	leave the State, if they leave the country, if they never come back. I

don't know. All I know is that I believe that there is probable cause to

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1	exist to	submit the cases to the District Attorney's Office for prosecutorial
2	review.	If there was then they issued the arrest warrant and then from
3	there we	e we're never notified. We're in hopes that NCIC does what it
4	is entaile	ed to do. But if I had further control or if I had a five case
5	caseloa	d and I can follow-up at a later date with these, then yes. I have
6	a proble	m with it, but unfortunately I can't there's it's out of my
7	control.	
8	Q	Does it benefit you at all as an SVU Detective to allow a
9	suspect	to languish out of custody without being arrested on a warrant?
10	Α	It does not benefit me, no it, no.
11		MR. VILLANI: Okay. That's all I have, Your Honor.
12		MR. WESTBROOK: I just brief follow-up, Your Honor.
13		RECROSS EXAMINATION
14	BY MR.	WESTBROOK:
15	Q	You have a very large caseload, right?
16	Α	Yes.
17	Q	Puts a lot of pressure on you, doesn't it?
18	Α	Yes.
19	Q	Okay. I understand and emphasize. When someone
20	languish	es out of your state 2, 3 years and the case doesn't go forward
21	that's les	ss work for you, right?
22	Α	For me personally, the work is done. I've submitted my case
23	to the D	istrict Attorney in hopes that they issue the arrest warrant. If
24	they do	then out-of-sight, out-of-mind for me, so.
25	Q	Sure. If they arrest him and he comes back then that's more

1	work for you, right?	
2	Α	Well it's just court appearances. It's not work; it's not tedious
3	work.	
4	Q	But if he stays gone forever then you don't do anymore work
5	on the case. It's out of sight out of mind, right?	
6	Α	Well, yes.
7	Q	You said if I had control over it, it would concern me. You
8	could have checked with the Records Department just a few weeks after	
9	you submitted your affidavit, right?	
10	А	Yes, but we never do. I never do.
11	Q	You never do, but you would have control over that. You
12	could do it if you wanted too, right?	
13	А	I could, yes.
14		MR. WESTBROOK: Nothing further.
15		MR. VILLANI: Just one, Your Honor.
16		FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION
17	BY MR. VILLANI:	
18	Q	Why don't you check with the Records Department?
19	Α	After we submit the case to the District Attorney's Office it
20	goes into a file and it goes into a file cabinet. In there we're hoping that	
21	that arrest warrant is issued. And then after that we're hoping that NCIC	
22	in another jurisdiction would hopefully pick him up, if not ours. So this is	
23	just in hopes that he is located. I wish there was more we could do. I	
24	just	

QUESTIONS BY THE COURT

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BY THE COURT:

- Q Do you ever like contact the jurisdiction -- if you have information on a suspect and you do Special Victims, so you're talking about sexual assault victims?
 - A Yes.
- Q And what's the penalty for -- if somebody's convicted of sexual assault?
 - A It varies, but it's huge. It's very large.
 - Q Life?
 - A Life, yes.
- Q Life with the possibility, okay. So you ever -- you've been given information in this case. You were given information that this Defendant resided in the State of New Jersey, specifically had a business. The name of the business, the phone number on the trailer and landscaping, you know, the truck. Did you think, maybe I could call the jurisdiction, New Jersey, a tiny state?
- A Sure, yes. So at that point when I submit the case the arrest warrant is not issued, so if it takes a month or two to be issued, and we're never notified and it's out-of-sight out-of-mind. I understand if it's a high profile case maybe I've called a jurisdiction or two in my past ten years of being there, but this is a -- I hate to say it but a common sexual assault. We deal with this a lot. So much so, to where it's just common practice for us to submit the case, and hopes that a warrant's issued.

If something were to arise and it was brought back to our attention then I could have, but at that time we -- there wasn't an issued

warrant, so I don't know. I could call the jurisdiction and say can you find out if this person's there. However, there's nothing to do when you do because there's no issued warrant yet. And that doesn't happen for sometimes it's, you know, it took three weeks here, I guess, on this case. But depending on the caseload for screening and the Judge that signs it, and then putting it into NCIC it could take a month or so. We just don't have the time. I wish we had more time to deal with it.

That's why we rely on the Problem Solving Unit to try to find local. They could have even done some checks to see if he was local. If they -- if he was go by a house, go by a residence, you know, call some numbers to try to locate him. But we're in hopes of that NCIC hit as being the go to, hopefully to get this person into custody. But --

- Q Okay, but do you --
- A -- to answer your question, I did not.
- Q -- do you understand that under our constitution there's a right to speedy trial?
 - A Yes.
- Q And that that starts to attach as soon as an arrest warrant has -- a Complaint a charging document has been filed.
 - A Yes.
- Q And you knew that? And did you know that you're potentially then by not following up jeopardizing the Defendant's right to a speedy trial?
- A If I know where he is, I guess, but I don't know exactly -- what I have is Facebook. I don't really rely on information from Facebook. I

could, but I -- in this case and in other cases I haven't. I've submitted several cases to the District Attorney's Office, we've -- for prosecutorial review and I've had several cases that have gone into arrest warrant. It's just not common practice for us to follow-up. We just -- I wish we had the time to do it.

Q So essentially if you live in North Las Vegas and you happen to be a victim of very serious crime, too bad. They're never going to catch the defendant the suspect or the case could get dismissed.

Because you never follow-up, is that basically it?

A Hopefully with NCIC and our PSU unit hopefully they get -- they get arrested.

- Q Okay. So you're still not understanding about this right to speedy trial thing, the Sixth Amendment?
 - A Okay.
 - Q So did you go through the academy?
 - A Yes.
- Q Okay. Okay. Did they talk to you about the -- how long have you been a Detective?
 - A Almost ten years.
- Q Okay. So the case law regarding right to speedy trial *Barker versus Wingo*, the *Doggett* case for that matter, has all been Black Letter Law since you've been a Detective. You don't remember anything about that? How about -- how you need to try and follow those leads so that at least you're telling the Defendant: Hey we want you. You've committed a crime, you need to come in and talk to us. Try and locate him,

1	because otherwise you're jeopardizing the case. You don't know	
2	anything about that?	
3	A I do know that, yes. I just I	
4	Q You do know that, okay?	
5	A we just I wish we had the time to do it.	
6	Q Okay, so you intentionally just left it because you figured well if	
7	we ever pick him up, well that will be good enough?	
8	A I don't intentionally do that, ma'am, no. I just it's with the	
9	caseload that we have we just hope that he gets picked up in a timely	
10	manner. I never intentionally, not do something, against the Sixth	
11	Amendment, no ma'am.	
12	Q Okay. Sorry, questions as a result of my questions?	
13	MR. WESTBROOK: Just one thing, Your Honor.	
14	You don't need an arrest warrant to interview a suspect do	
15	you?	
16	THE WITNESS: No.	
17	MR. WESTBROOK: Nothing further.	
18	THE COURT: Any questions as a result?	
19	MR. VILLANI: No, Your Honor.	
20	THE COURT: Thank you, for your testimony.	
21	THE WITNESS: Thank you.	
22	THE COURT: And that was the only witness you had to call?	
23	MR. VILLANI: Yes, Your Honor.	
24	THE COURT: Mr. Westbrook, is there	
25	MR. WESTBROOK: Your Honor, in the interest of time I	

actually have seven witnesses outside who will all testify that they were never contacted by law enforcement. But I think that the Court could probably find that based on the Officer's testimony. I do have it in a declaration. Would the Court accept a declaration in lieu of the live testimony; it'll save us some time?

THE COURT: I don't know.

MR. VILLANI: I mean, well he testified that he didn't -- I don't think that we need a declaration admitted. But he testified that he never contacted these people. He never had any information regarding these people, so I'm fine with that stipulation. He never contacted the seven witnesses Mr. Westbrook has outside.

MR. WESTBROOK: I just wanted to show the declaration, because it shows that among other things despite my caseload I went and called people. I think that's sort of an important point, but also it specifically names people that this officer or any officer could have easily gotten my client's information from. It puts their names in; they wanted to put their name on it. They all showed up today to testify despite the fact that it's the middle of a workday. A lot of people had to take time off. I don't think we need them to come in here if we do the declaration, but if not, I guess I need to put them on.

THE COURT: Well I don't think we need them to come in. I don't know that, you know, what the declaration says, because counsel's just offered to stipulate that none of these witnesses were called by the Detective.

MR. WESTBROOK: And that's all the declaration says. I'd

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just like to submit it for filing.

THE COURT: But this is your declaration?

MR. WESTBROOK: It's my declaration of all the people that were spoken to and how they would have testified coming in here today. I prepared that just in case we got to this point to speed things up.

THE COURT: This is just one and I have two copies. Is that --

MR. WESTBROOK: Yeah, one of them was courtesy copy.

THE COURT: All right, so let's see. All right, do you have any objection to him filing this declaration?

MR. VILLANI: I do, Your Honor. I don't see its relevance. The testimony was, he was getting all the information regarding this case from the victim's mother. There's nothing in this declaration that indicates the victim's mother was familiar with any of the people on this list or their information regarding where these people lived.

I mean, I think it's great Mr. Westbrook went out and contacted these people, but I don't know -- he had access to his client, which is something the Detective was obviously lacking in this case. So I don't see the relevance of admitting this declaration basically saying none of these people were contacted, because it doesn't fit at all with the testimony that was just presented.

THE COURT: Well, you know, I agree with that, I mean, that's -- it's fine that you contacted these people. I don't --

MR. WESTBROOK: The issue is due diligence, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Correct and --

MR. WESTBROOK: And --1 2 THE COURT: -- the Detective --MR. WESTBROOK: -- had none. 3 THE COURT: That your due diligence is not at issue. MR. WESTBROOK: Yeah. 5 THE COURT: Okay. So I stipulate that you've been diligent 6 7 in contacting friends and relatives of the Defendant, but --MR. WESTBROOK: And --8 THE COURT: -- my question here was what if anything the 9 10 Defendant did after the Complaint was filed or frankly before the 11 Complaint was filed. Because I was hoping that there might be, you 12 know, some additional information gleamed from him or any other 13 witness. Because remember, I was pretty specific what I wanted to know. I wanted to know what steps they took to track the Defendant 14 15 down and find him, particularly after the warrant was issued and whether 16 or not the Defendant was aware of the charges against him. And I think I said at that particular time, you know: Did the ex-wife or however she 17 18 was related to him, the mother of the child, --MR. VILLANI: Right. 19 20 THE COURT: -- you know. Did she potentially call him and 21 say: You know, I called the police and they're looking for you and they're 22 -- that testimony I haven't had either. 23 So all I've had is the Detective to say he didn't do anything.

And that's his practice and they don't have the ability to do anything.

They don't bother following up, the Detectives don't. The police

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 department knew there was a warrant. There was a Complaint that had issued, but nothing was done because they just figured it's good enough if sometime in the distant future they're picked up on the warrant. So --

MR. VILLANI: But -- and I'm not looking to argue with Court's points at all. I just, I think it's a little unfair to say he did nothing. We were dealing with two Defendants in this case. One that was brought to justice, plead guilty. The other one being out-of-state, I think the testimony is basically been, it's a timing issue, right? So the pictures that the Court has were submitted with the case. Meaning they were submitted to our office with the case. His testimony was pattern and practice, not his, of the department, is you submit it to the DA's office. It goes into a file and you wait to hear what happens.

So in this case, criminal Complaint was filed, arrest warrant was issued. His testimony is he wouldn't of heard of any of that, so file still sits in the drawer. They rely obviously heavily on NCIC. They did their due diligence in the Records Department putting it in NCIC.

Now could there be a better way they handled it? I don't know, with caseloads, I don't know what goes on on their side. But what he did do is make sure it was in NCIC and he was picked up because of that NCIC entry. And he was arrested in another jurisdiction and transported here.

Now it was 2, 2½ years later, but he was picked up and we're still within the statute of limitations. Which I think is the ultimate guide --

THE COURT: Don't go there this -- the cases have already said the statute of limitations has no bearing on this inquiry.

1	MR. VILLANI: But the
2	THE COURT: And that a Court erred when it used that
3	argument.
4	MR. VILLANI: But the seminal case on this was 8½ years.
5	And we are at most at 2½ years. And like I said before, there was no
6	invocation of a speedy right. I mean, that is one of four elements that
7	has to fall our way on this test. Because although he said: Oh I'm
8	invoking my Federal
9	THE COURT: Wait, wait. Are you arguing that he knew
10	before his arrest?
11	MR. VILLANI: I don't know if he knew before his arrest. What
12	I'm saying is
13	THE COURT: Okay, so is
14	MR. VILLANI: when they
15	THE COURT: counsel, you can't invoke a right to speedy
16	trial if he doesn't know he's wanted.
17	MR. VILLANI: No, I get that. I get that so he's here and then
18	the 60 day statutory right, the State right is waived. No, I'm fine with
19	that. And then we have two continuances and now we're here. And the
20	allegation is I'm not getting my speedy trial right. Well he had an
21	opportunity to have a trial within 60 days, despite being in the wind for
22	2½ years.
23	THE COURT: His argument isn't that. His argument is, well I
24	don't want to a put words in your mouth, but as I understand
25	MR. WESTBROOK: When is

THE COURT: -- the Defense argument is that it's the delay from the issuance of the charging document, the Complaint in this case, until his arrest that has violated his Sixth Amendment Right to speedy trial, which he's stated. While he was willing to waive the setting within the 60 days he was not willing to waive his right to speedy trial, because he was planning on filing this motion. And that's why I said the Court is only focusing on that first.

Because frankly I agree, that once he's in custody and we're up -- we're moving a pace; and that continuance that were granted, were granted at the Defendant's request. But that doesn't change the fact that we've already gone past before he's ever placed into custody, we've already gone past the triggering time period.

And yes in *Doggett*, it was 8½ years, but there the Court was focusing on the fact that the State knew or the Government knew where he was and didn't try and get him. They did some things, but they did try and get him back. So it's a little bit of a different case. But we still have some of the same facts. We have the fact that the Government conceded in that case that he didn't know he was wanted. And that appears to be the case here. He didn't -- there's no -- nothing to indicate that he knew that he was wanted, because the Detective said he could never get ahold of him. If he'd been able to get ahold of him and interview him and he confessed, then justice would have been done in North Las Vegas. But if you don't get that, then we get nothing.

MR. WESTBROOK: And, Your Honor, just to add to your recitation of my point was exactly right with one exception. It extends

beyond his initial arrest date. Because as the State admitted in the last hearing and in their opposition, the State was responsible for all continuances except for the last one. Now we argue that that wasn't our fault either, but set that aside. So we're talking about continuances up until the February court date. The State has admitted responsibility for it because of the discovery issue.

MR. VILLANI: And --

MR. WESTBROOK: So that's all. But again I know you're -- where you're focusing and I agree that it's important to focus there.

THE COURT: Because I disagree with your characterization after, because you could have -- the Court would have given you a trial within 60 days if you'd wanted that. And so that's to me -- that's a different ball of wax.

MR. WESTBROOK: Okay.

THE COURT: But we still have this other delay.

MR. VILLANI: And so if I may address the factors then, the four factors.

THE COURT: Okay, go ahead.

MR. VILLANI: Okay. So the first factor triggering factor, I think we all agree. And the Courts basically you get close to a year and it's triggered. And so what that triggers is the next three factors. The second factor is your reason. What is the reason for the delay? Okay I think it's -- neither side can argue that part of the reason for the delay is the fact that the Defendant was not in our jurisdiction. He was outside of our jurisdiction.

get him, yes? Do I think it's purposeful that they didn't? Do I think that that they sat on their hands just because it somehow benefits them or somehow gives them less of a workload? No I don't believe that at all. But the fact of the matter is from the State's perspective the reason is is because he was in New Jersey. Now whether he was fleeing or whether hey, he just decided to pick-up and rebuild his life in New Jersey, fine. But the reason being he was in New Jersey.

Now could the -- could North Las Vegas have done more to

Now the next factor is, did he invoke his speedy trial right?

Which no, he did not. There's a State speedy trial right. There's a State 60 days. He stood up here and said: No I don't want my trial within 60 days.

Now we go to the last factor, which specific prejudice articulated. What specific prejudice has he suffered due to the lapse of time here? Because it appears Mr. Westbrook was able to track down all these people who will be able to testify in his behalf. And so my question is what specific prejudice has transpired beyond what was already present with the late disclosure of the victim? So the victim disclosed years after this abuse occurred. So he's already got some prejudice there being that, well I would have to go back and find all of these witnesses. Okay that's already existing. But what prejudice beyond that has been -- has the Defendant suffered based upon the delay in him being arrested for 2½ years? And so I think the factors once we get into the *Doggett* and *Barker* the *Barker* test weigh in favor of the State here. And that's my argument here, Your Honor.

I'm not saying that North Las Vegas did a perfect job here. I'm not saying they did what they should. I'm saying if anything it's attributable as to negligence and not as to gross negligence, certainly not as the purposeful conduct. And I'm asking the Court to rely on that. Because otherwise we're setting a precedent here where if we don't get defendants into custody within 2 years and there's nothing even indicating that had these leads been followed up on that he would have been taken into custody. There's nothing indicating that it was credible. That if they would have called that number it's credible that he was employed there. There's nothing indicating that these locations on Facebook, — I mean, Mr. Westbrook said, well did you call the restaurant. I'm guessing he would have been long gone from the restaurant if that was even on there at the time Detective Hoyt looked at Facebook.

So I'm submitting it on that, Your Honor. We believe that the Barker and Doggett factors weigh in our favor.

THE COURT: Okay, well. All right, so --

MR. WESTBROOK: I think your hands are tied, Your Honor. That's my only argument that I would make. And I think they were tied by the Detective.

THE COURT: I just want to say that it's -- I'm not setting the precedence. The Supreme Court has set the precedent. Now that maybe much to the sorrow, and over the dissent, the imminent dissent of Justice Douglas, -- a Justice Thomas, but nonetheless the precedent is there. And it's been followed throughout many decisions, including our

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own Supreme Court has cited to *Doggett*.

And so when you say that I -- if I dismiss the case or I make -- that I would be setting a precedent, and I have to go through an analysis. At this point frankly I don't, you know, I'll let Mr. Westbrook, you can argue whether you think there's any indication of an intentional attempt to delay to hamper the Defense, I don't think so. I think it's --

MR. WESTBROOK: There doesn't have to be. That's my argument.

THE COURT: I know. There doesn't have to be.

MR. WESTBROOK: But also I think there, I --

THE COURT: I think it's -- I find that it's gross negligence on the part of North Las Vegas.

MR. WESTBROOK: Sure. And --

THE COURT: -- Police Department, which is --

MR. WESTBROOK: And I would argue a step --

THE COURT: -- is the State.

MR. WESTBROOK: And I would argue a step further. I'm sorry to interrupt, my bad.

THE COURT: Okay. Well so then we have to go to the next part of the analysis. So once you're finding that it's over what is the common delay, which they've -- now the Courts have said like the year mark. And then I've got -- I found one case where it said, well it's more like 20 months maybe. Then you have to presume prejudice. There's a -- yeah, there's a -- that's what your missing here.

MR. VILLANI: Well was it -- that --

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THE COURT: And that's in Barker versus Wingo, that --

MR. VILLANI: But *Middleton* addresses that from our Supreme Court, Your Honor, the presumptive prejudice. And so the 2½ years isn't enough for that presumptive prejudice.

MR. WESTBROOK: In a case where the defendant was responsible, not this case.

MR. VILLANI: Well --

THE COURT: So where there is -- there's no indication that he had -- was on any notice. Yes, it's true that he has a responsibility to assert his right. But if he didn't have any notice of it, then he can't assert his right if he doesn't have a notice of it. And so again, I'm focusing not on the time period after he was taken into custody. I'm focusing on this gap of 2 years, over 2 years, 2 years 2 months if I calculated correctly. And then there's a presumption of prejudice to the Defendant that can be rebutted by the State.

And I found one case where the Court had said: No, he wasn't deprived, you know, there was no prejudice and that there was a reversal by the Ninth Circuit. And so, yes -- that's -- it was not a published decision. But what I'm relying on was their speaking of saying: Okay now the District Court should have afforded the Government an opportunity to rebut the presumption of prejudice. There it was a 50 month delay that was attributable to the Government's negligence. So they said that was sufficient to then shift the burden back to the Government. And so it was remanded back to the Government to show, okay, so you can now rebut the presumption of

prejudice.

Do you want to --

MR. VILLANI: The only other witness I could call, Your Honor, would be her mom. And I don't know that a phone call made to the Defendant saying -- I don't know that that was ever done. I don't know whether it was done.

I guess, you know, in order to live your life to be employed generally you have to enter employment. Sometimes they do background checks. This is what NCIC is for and this is how the State's rely upon it. I know, and I see you shaking your head, Your Honor. But I see a big difference between *Doggett* and *Barker*, because of the resources of the Federal Government, and because we're talking about the DEA here. That guy left the country. The DEA has fingers everywhere. The North Las Vegas Police Department just doesn't have that ability and neither do a lot of small state police departments. And so they rely on upon NCIC.

I realize the Supreme Court said: Well resources are not to be taken into consideration there, but I think there has to be a big difference. I mean, why else do we have this 60 day trial rate in Nevada as a separate statutory issue? Why don't we just rely upon the Federal Sixth Amendment speedy trial right? Well our Supreme -- our Legislature has determined that once you are arraigned you have a right to trial within 60 days. And if you invoke that right and that rights violated then we talk about whether or not your speedy trial rights have been violated.

THE COURT: The State has the right to give a Defendant more rights than the United States Constitution does. It can't take away.

MR. VILLANI: Right.

THE COURT: Okay. So by saying that a defendant at the time of arraignment may demand to have a trial within 60 days it's not even couched in the statute in terms of speedy trial. It's just you have a right to demand and there's another statute that gives the State the right to demand --

MR. VILLANI: Well I --

THE COURT: -- a trial within 60 days.

MR. VILLANI: -- kind of.

THE COURT: And sometimes the State does that. But that doesn't change the Sixth Amendment analysis.

MR. VILLANI: But what we're also talking about with the analysis is the fact that they -- the way the Federal Government does things. They convene a Grand Jury, they present evidence to the Grand Jury, the Grand Jury finds probable cause and then an Indictment is issued. I mean, here we're talking about a case being submitted to our office. A criminal Complaint is issued and a warrant is issued for the arrest.

Now a lot of times when these guys are contacted pursuant to the arrest warrant they'll be interviewed when they're taken into custody. So the cases proceed differently. So the Federal Government doesn't have to go and go back to Justice Court and start from ground zero once the guy is taken into custody on a warrant from an Indictment. They just

go straight to trial.

In the State it's different. Once we get this guy into custody we still have make a probable cause showing. I still had to show the Grand Jury that I had probable cause to hold this guy to answer in District Court. So it's -- I just see it as very different what we're comparing here between what the Court was working with with *Barker* and -- or with *Doggett* and what we're working with --

THE COURT: Well the Court --

MR. VILLANI: -- here.

THE COURT: -- in *Middleton*, you know, acknowledges *Doggett*. It doesn't say, you know, it doesn't say, oh gee what, you know, there's a carve out in it somewhere in the Constitution it says, gee, you know, the Sixth Amendment Right doesn't apply in Nevada, because it's a small state.

MR. VILLANI: All right.

I understand that. My argument is that I don't believe his speedy trial right has been violated. I don't believe that's the case. I don't believe this is a long enough time between an arrest warrant being issued and him being arrested and taken into custody on that arrest warrant to justify dismissal of the case. And that's my only argument.

THE COURT: I wish that was the case, but the problem is that we have and I think it was interesting in the dissent in *Doggett*. I think that Justice Thomas, who wrote the main dissent, said you know: sometimes bad facts make bad law. And I guess the Supreme Court might not be immune from that. But, and sometimes there may be

unintended consequences.

But this is precedent from the United States Supreme Court that has been followed by all the Circuit Courts Appeal, the Ninth Circuit. We're talking about constitutional issues. It's been followed by our Supreme Court. And so if you don't have anything that you can offer to rebut a presumption of prejudice here where I've gone through an analysis, that shows it has been triggered because it's been more than a year. There was gross negligence on the part of the police department, hence because police department is an arm of the State.

The State, the Government in this case and they -- maybe that's due to their lack of resources, well then they need to do what -- it's up to the Government to make sure that there's resources. Does that mean tax the people, maybe so? But if they make these choices I don't like it. In fact I abhor it. The thought to me that if you live in North Las Vegas and you potentially are victimized in a sexual assault crime on a child, you know, your child, that they're not going to do what is necessary to bring such a person to justice before trial and you know, and get to the bottom of it with a trial in front of a jury;' that's pretty disheartening.

But there's also, there was no opportunity for him to assert his right prior to his being arrested. So I can't look at that, you know, because he didn't have the opportunity. And then what is triggered is then a presumption, because it's been so long of prejudice, which then puts it into the State's ballpark to show to rebut that presumption. And if you don't have anything to give to me then I feel like my hands are tied.

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MR. VILLANI: Well I guess, so what I'm not understanding is where the Court sees this presumption's kicking in? Now I see the test kicking in on the first prong when it's been a year. So that's what kicks the test in. I'm not seeing where the presumption of then shifts to the State. I'm seeing the factors. I'm seeing okay, provide a reason, provide -- and I'm also not seeing where the Court gets the idea that the invocation -- he has to be given an opportunity to invoke. I haven't found a case yet where the invocation was anything less than him standing up and saying, yes I want a speedy trial in front of this Court.

So you're saying he didn't have an opportunity to invoke his right prior to being arrest because he's supposedly had no idea that these charges were pending.

THE COURT: Okay. So let's say it was 8 years. Let's say it was 10 years before he gets arrested.

MR. VILLANI: Right.

THE COURT: And then he says I don't need a trial within 60 days but I'm not waiving my right to speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment.

MR. VILLANI: Right.

THE COURT: Okay. So basically I take that as an invocation of a right to speedy trial. But prior to that he didn't know, yes you could. If you knew that there were charges pending against you. That there was a warrant for your arrest and you knew that the State could show he knew there was a warrant for his arrest, then whole different ballgame. He could have turned himself in. He could have invoked his right and

said, prove it. You bear the burden of proof. Prove it, let's go.

But he didn't have that opportunity, because nobody making -- lifting a finger to even follow-up on the case.

MR. VILLANI: But I guess I fail to see how the behavior post-invocation doesn't factor into that analysis. How the two continuances to his speedy trial when the State was ready to go both times, how the two continuances don't weigh against that analysis of his invocation. If we're calling, I waive my 60 days, but I meant Federal right, okay if that's his invocation, how then does subsequent actions not weigh against that?

MR. WESTBROOK: I'm sorry, Your Honor, but there's a factual finding that the State did not produce discovery in a timely fashion prior to the first continuance and that's the basis for the continuance. The State admitted this at the last hearing and now going back on it. They're estopped from now arguing that it wasn't their fault when they already admitted in the last hearing that it was.

MR. VILLANI: You keep saying there was some admission. Here's what I'll admit to. We -- I received a recording during a pretrial with my lead Detective while I was pre-trialing for the trial. I turned it over immediately. The recording, I don't know what was it; an hour maybe 45 minutes was on there. I turned it over; still saying I'm ready, but I understand if the Defense wants a continuance to review that recording. Okay so that's the extent to which my admission as far as the first continuance will go.

But then we have the second continuance where nothing was done. Talk about sitting on hands. Nothing was done by the Defense to

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walk in here on a motion for OR at calendar call then saying: Well, you know, they didn't get me counseling records. And I specifically asked in there counseling records. And now this Court is well aware that has been litigated ad nauseam, those counseling records.

So I don't see how none of that subsequent action, doesn't weigh against this Sixth Amendment invocation that was initially made.

MR. WESTBROOK: Your Honor, first of all it doesn't because the law says that it doesn't. He invoked his right to a speedy trial and it was violated before he ever walked in the room, because of the -- I'm shocked with what I saw on the stand. I'm sure the Court is as well. The complete lack of any kind of effort, and not only lack of effort, but the lack of caring about even making an effort.

Your Honor, you did a much better job questioning him than I did, because you asked him something that I should have thought of, which is do you know there's such a thing as a right to a speedy trial? And he said yes.

He understands that defendants have a right to a speedy trial. And he made it very clear that he knows that it's violating the right to a speedy trial when they just let these things languish. With making no effort whatsoever and that he doesn't care about it, which is why I think it's bad faith. I mean, understanding that there's an issue like this and that someone's rights are being violated and then chooses to do nothing about it, and then just throwing your hands up, because I'm a real busy guy. That's bad faith to me, but regardless a bad faith showing isn't required and I understand the Court's position.

But it's a matter of record in this case that the first continuance was made because the State violated its requirements under the NRS. We have -- it's on the record that's the reason the continuance was made. They factually and legally violated the NRS by not turning over requested discovery that was part of their case-in-chief at least 30 days prior to the trial. Okay that's on the record. We can't go back in time and pretend it's not what the record is.

THE COURT: And that is true. It was not -- I'm not tagging you with that.

MR. VILLANI: No it's --

THE COURT: I, you know, you personally I'm not saying that.

And you know, it goes back to why weren't you given this by the

Detective originally?

MR. VILLANI: Right.

MR. WESTBROOK: Which is why we have Kyle's [sic] and -THE COURT: So now that I see, I've heard his testimony. So

MR. VILLANI: Right.

THE COURT: But then, you know, I granted the continuance because it wasn't produced in a timely manner under the statute.

MR. VILLANI: Right. And my only -- the other point I would like to make there is that had a file review been requested prior to trial, which none was. But had one been requested, I would've -- everything would have been available to inspect, photograph, or copy to save that. But none was requested. There was never -- so even if I had that, I only

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had -- I had an obligation to make it available to inspect, photograph, or copy under the Nevada Revised Statute. But I had no obligation to produce it, to put it in their hand. That's not an obligation the State has. We have to make everything available to inspect, copy, or photograph.

Now it's different than the pre-prelim discovery statute where we do. The statute does say you must provide these items, but the pretrial statute says we need to make available to inspect, copy or photograph any exculpatory evidence, reports, that sort of thing. We do it as a courtesy in this office. We provide all this discovery as a courtesy, but we have no obligation to do so.

THE COURT: All right. So now you're getting back to the same dilemma that caused the memo to be issued from the District Attorney's Office saying we don't have an open file policy. And that is the Court saying: Okay, you have an open file policy now the other side gets to rely on that. So if you're doing things as a courtesy I'm sure they appreciate that, but now they also get to rely on that.

But in this case we're talking about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin, because that's not what happened here. Because you didn't have it.

MR. VILLANI: Right.

THE COURT: So do they have to request a file review when the common practice is upon request will -- we will produce all the things that we're required to do under the statute under Chapter 174?

And yes you could put out another memo saying, we're not going to do that anymore. Now you need to come over, look at the file

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and flag with stickies what you want copied and then we'll copy it for you.

MR. VILLANI: But --

THE COURT: But you probably don't want to do that because that would cause a lot more work for you. But here it wasn't, you know, there's not a requirement for them to ask for a specific file review of the Detective's file.

MR. VILLANI: No.

THE COURT: All they have to do is make a request --

MR. VILLANI: Right.

THE COURT: -- to the State and for those things and it triggers your obligation.

MR. VILLANI: I agree.

THE COURT: And because you didn't have that, because it wasn't provided to you. You didn't find out about it until you were pretrialing the Detective. That was problematic and so I can do all kinds of things. I have pretty wide discretion as to how I address a violation of a discovery request, failure to produce. So I addressed it by agreeing to what I intended to be a short continuance. It was the next continuance that was granted because the Defense indicated that they needed more time as I recall. If I'm --

MR. VILLANI: It was for counseling records, which they didn't have at the time of the first continuance. So assuming -- and I agree with the Court, provided late, received late, that's fine. But that first one even if completely on our shoulders, they wouldn't have been ready to

go, because then they requested another continuance for stuff they didn't have at the first continuance.

So even if we provided that I'm assuming that the argument would've been made by the Defense: Well they don't have counseling records, so we haven't turned those over, because it was that basis that formed the basis for that second continuance.

MR. WESTBROOK: Your Honor, that wasn't all, if I may. I think we're getting too far afield here, because this isn't a discovery issue. What this is is a speedy trial issue and my client's speedy trial rights have absolutely been violated. And I agree that the Court's hands are tied here. They're tied by obviously a Detective and apparently a police department that does not care actively as a policy about speedy trial rights or I might suggest the rights of victims in these cases. It's frankly terrifying what I heard here today. I can't believe the lackadaisical attitude of that department. I've never heard anything like that before and it's amazing.

But to set the record straight, we heard evidence today that there's still discovery that the State intends to prove to provide in its case-in-chief that has not been turned over. As you recall I asked this officer whether there was a separate case for Darrington Rivers.

Mr. Villani, in one of the discovery hearings said, that wasn't a thing, that doesn't exist. There's no separate case for Darrington Rivers. There is a separate case for Darrington Rivers this Detective just confirmed that. That has not been turned over. That has been a basis of my discovery request to Mr. Villani since the very beginning of this

case.

MR. VILLANI: I --

MR. WESTBROOK: So it's a fantasy to say that everything's been turned over or that it's somehow my fault.

MR. VILLANI: And here's how that dovetails --

MR. WESTBROOK: But it's also not part of this case right now.

MR. VILLANI: -- into the instant issue is it is relevant, because it shows that it was the Defendant's fault, but that we are now this long without having a jury trial. It's -- that's what it's relevant to is okay invocation under the Sixth Amendment. But you didn't have the information you needed to proceed to trial anyway and you still don't presumably.

And as far as Darrington Rivers is concerned the Court can look at the receipt of copy. He has those reports. And I'll point the Court to the reports that I turned over that he signed, his office signed. The receipt of copy, it's in Odyssey. Those Darrington Rivers reports I can give them to you right now. They've had them the entire time, since that ROC was filed. So that's kind of how -- that's why it dovetails in.

THE COURT: All right, again though. So this isn't, you know, this isn't just the discovery issue. This is really not -- the time period I'm looking at is the time period is the 2 years and 2 months, that's what I'm looking at.

MR. VILLANI: Okay.

THE COURT: Because prior to that he doesn't have the

opportunity to invoke. So that's what I'm focusing on and I think that's what I'm required to focus on now. If the Supreme Court, our Court, I think that because it's a constitutional dimensions, it would end up going up the food chain. But they want to carve out and say, well now if you don't even though there was this time if you don't after you've finally been taken into custody no matter how long it is, you don't move that trial along then you've waived the 10 year delay, because it could be 10. Because based upon your argument that you're talking about it only attaches once he's in Court and able to say, I want a speedy trial or I don't want a speedy trial.

MR. VILLANI: I mean, there are multiple --

THE COURT: I agree that somebody could retroactively waive their right to speedy trial, but that didn't happen here.

MR. VILLANI: Yeah and I guess, I see a distinct difference between him actually saying: Look I have a right to a trial within 60 days, yeah I want that. And I don't want the trial within 60 days, but I'm maintaining my arguments on the Federal. I see a distinct difference in that. To me that's a waiver of your speedy trial right. And I understand the Court disagrees with that, but if -- is the Court's ruling then narrowly tailored to that 2½ years? Because there's nothing I can do about that. The 2½ years before he was taken into custody, that's what the Court's taking issue with and believes that violated his speedy trial right? Because I just need to -- the issue then that's the issue I can take up.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. VILLANI: Okay, okay.

1	THE COURT: I'm going to prepare the order since I know,
2	you know, I knew from the get go that no matter where I came down
3	there was going to be an appeal and so I'll just prepare the order and
4	you'll have it in a couple of days.
5	MR. WESTBROOK: Thank you, Your Honor.
6	So is the order that the
7	THE COURT: I'm taking it under advisement.
8	THE CLERK: Okay, so
9	MR. WESTBROOK: Right.
10	THE COURT: so I can go through my complete analysis in
11	the written
12	MR. WESTBROOK: Thank you, Your Honor.
13	THE COURT: and cite to the appropriate cases, so you'll
14	have it all.
15	MR. WESTBROOK: Just to a housekeeping matter. Exhibit's
16	A and B admitted?
17	THE CLERK: Well you didn't move
18	MR. WESTBROOK: Or I move to admit.
19	THE CLERK: This is not
20	MR. WESTBROOK: That's the Facebook page and then
21	whatever those notes were.
22	THE COURT: The Facebook page?
23	MR. WESTBROOK: The one that shows, you know,
24	THE COURT: That was the
25	MR. WESTBROOK: where he lives and every friend in his

1	life.
2	THE CLERK: Only B was admitted. He didn't move to admit
3	A until at this point, Your Honor, he did
4	THE COURT: Is the Facebook?
5	THE CLERK: Yes.
6	THE COURT: Is there an objection?
7	MR. VILLANI: No.
8	THE COURT: It will be admitted.
9	[DEFENSE EXHIBIT A - ADMITTED]
10	MR. WESTBROOK: And then the declaration I understand
11	that we had the stipulation. I'd like the declaration if it's not filed as a
12	declaration at least made a Court record.
13	THE COURT: You could mark it as offered, right?
14	MR. WESTBROOK: Okay.
15	THE COURT: You can mark it as an Exhibit, but I'm not
16	admitting it, because I don't think it's necessary.
17	MR. WESTBROOK: Okay, so we can mark it as Exhibit C
18	then?
19	THE COURT: Yeah.
20	MR. WESTBROOK: Thank you.
21	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
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23	111
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1	MR. VILLANI: Thank you, Your Honor.
2	MR. WESTBROOK: Thank you, Your Honor.
3	[Hearing concluded at 1:10 p.m.]
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21	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed
22	the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my
23	Jay M. Reiger
24	Gail M. Reiger
25	Court Recorder/Transcriber

AA 000167

Electronically Filed 4/11/2018 4:28 PM Steven D. Grierson **CLERK OF THE COURT**

ORDR

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

RIGOBERTO INZUNZA,

-VS-

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

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DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

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CASE NO:

C-17-321860-1

DEPT NO:

V

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter first came on for hearing before the above-entitled Court on the 19th day of March, 2018, on Defendant's "Motion to Dismiss, Pursuant to *Doggett v. United States*, for Violation of State and Federal Constitutional Rights", with Plaintiff represented by Jacob Villani, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and the defendant present in custody with his attorney P. David Westbrook, Chief Deputy Public Defender. The Court ordered that an evidentiary hearing be held to determine a factual basis for the Court to undergo the legal analysis required by Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) and Middleton v. State, 114 Nev. 1089, 968 P.2d 296 (1998). Specifically, the Court indicated that it wished to hear evidence as to the cause of the delay between the filing of the Criminal Complaint until the date of the defendant's arrest and whether or not the defendant was aware of the charges against him prior to his arrest. The evidentiary hearing commenced on the 4th day of April, 2018 with Plaintiff represented by Jacob Villani, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and the defendant present in custody with is attorney P. David Westbrook, Chief Deputy Public Defender.

T:\ORDERS\2018-3-30 (RIGOBERTO INZUNZA) ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS PURUSANT TO DOGGETT.DOC

AA 000168

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A Criminal Complaint was filed on December 5, 2014 charging Mr. Inzunza with fifteen charges, including Sexual Assault with a Minor Under Fourteen Years of Age and Lewdness with a Child Under the Age of Fourteen. An arrest warrant was also issued for Mr. Inzunza on December 5, 2014 on the strength of an affidavit for arrest submitted by North Las Vegas Police Detective Mark Hoyt, who was the investigating detective. It is unclear when Mr. Inzunza was arrested on the warrant. Mr. Inzunza asserts that he was arrested on the warrant in New Jersey on January 29, 2017. The North Las Vegas Justice Court case search indicates that the arrest warrant was served on February 11, 2017. Apparently, the defendant was extradited from the State of New Jersey to Nevada. Thereafter, at the time set for preliminary hearing in Justice Court on the Criminal Complaint, the District Attorney notified the North Las Vegas Justice Court that Mr. Inzunza had been indicted on the charges and the case pending in Justice Court was dismissed.

The Indictment was filed March 9, 2017. At the District Court arraignment on March 20, 2017, Mr. Inzunza waived his Nevada right to a trial within sixty days, but specifically, through counsel, stated that he was not waiving his right to speedy trial under the 6th Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court set trial for December 4, 2017. Defense did not object to this date, nor did the defense request an earlier setting. At calendar call on November 29, 2017, the defense objected to discovery (i.e. a video of the detective's interview with the child and a police report) produced later than 30 days before trial, and so the Court granted a trial continuance to February 5, 2018 because defense counsel represented he could not proceed to trial as scheduled due to his need to have a defense expert review the video.

At the calendar call on January 29, 2018, the defense again requested a continuance to further investigate the case and trial was set for April 23, 2018. Mr. Inzunza filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on March 2, 2018. The State filed its Opposition on March 13, 2018. Defense filed its reply on March 15, 2018.

At the evidentiary hearing, Detective Mark Hoyt testified that after doing his investigation, he submitted the case to the District Attorney's office and did nothing further with the matter until he was later contacted by the District Attorney's office following the defendant's arrest in New Jersey. He stated that this was his practice because under the procedures in place at the North Las Vegas Police Department, the practice was to hope that a suspect would eventually be arrested on the warrant which would be entered into NCIC. He stated that although the records department of the North Las Vegas Police Department would be notified as to the acceptance of the case for prosecution and the granting of an arrest warrant, there was no procedure in place to notify him that the warrant had issued and the Complaint filed. Rather, the records department would enter the warrant into NCIC. He made no affirmative inquiry of the D.A. as to the status of his case submission because he had a very heavy case load and this case was just a typical or "ordinary" sexual assault case. Although he had been given information as to the potential whereabouts of the defendant in the State of New Jersey, as well as the name of the defendant's landscaping business, the telephone number of the business and information concerning the defendant's Facebook page and its contents, he could not recall whether he made any effort to locate the defendant (during his investigation) with that information. In fact, Detective Hoyt's testimony was that he would only attempt to locate a suspect who was within Nevada; that he discounted the Facebook information because Facebook pages can be opened with false information; and that in any event, he did nothing to locate the defendant following the issuance of the arrest warrant because he did not know about the warrant due to his normal practice of making no further inquiries once the case was submitted to the D.A. The detective reiterated that the practice of the North Las Vegas Police Department was to hope that a suspect would eventually be arrested on a warrant entered in NCIC.

The State submitted no witness or evidence that the defendant had any knowledge of the charges filed against him until he was arrested approximately two (2) years and two (2) months after the filing of the Criminal Complaint. Detective Hoyt admitted that he had

never interviewed or spoken to the defendant. The defendant, via the declaration of defense counsel attached to the moving papers, maintained that he first learned of the existence of the warrant for his arrest on January 29, 2017 when he was arrested on said warrant. He also maintained that his city of residence and place of work appeared on his Facebook profile under his own name; that his Facebook profile was open to the public, and that the information was accurate between November 3, 2014 and the date of his arrest on the warrant—he was not in hiding.

Although given an opportunity to present any evidence to rebut a presumption of prejudice, the State offered nothing.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standards

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provide that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." *U.S. Const. amnd.VI.* The United States Supreme Court has established that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right, which is imposed upon the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. *Barker v. Wingo*, 407 U.S. 514, 515, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (1972). In *Barker v. Wingo*, the Court established a four-part balancing test to determine whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated. The four factors to consider are: length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. *Id.* at 530.

In order to trigger a speedy trial analysis, "an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from 'presumptively prejudicial' delay." *Doggett v. U.S.*, 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (1992). Courts have generally found delay "presumptively prejudicial" as it approaches the one year mark. *Id.* at 652, fn. 1.

Before analyzing the last three factors, Mr. Inzunza must first show that the delay in his case between the complaint and trial triggers the speedy trial analysis.

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II. Analysis

a. The length of delay from the filing of the Criminal Complaint to trial is sufficient to trigger the speedy trial analysis.

Mr. Inzunza argues that the delay in his case meets the standard for "presumptively prejudicial." The State argues that the length of delay in this case is considerably less than the delay in *Doggett*. In *Doggett*, the Court found that eight and a half years between indictment and arrest clearly triggered the speedy trial inquiry. *Doggett*, 505 U.S. at 652. Other courts have found shorter delays sufficient to trigger the analysis. For example, in *U.S. v. Shell*, 974 F.2d 1035, 1036 (9th Cir. 1992), the court determined that a five year delay created a strong presumption of prejudice. The Nevada Supreme Court held that a delay of almost two and a half years necessitates further inquiry. *Middleton v. State*, 114 Nev. 1089, 1110, 968 P.2d 296 (Nev. 1998). The Ninth Circuit also found that a delay of fourteen and a half months from the date of arrest to the start of trial did not "exceed the threshold needed to trigger judicial examination" because of the nature and seriousness of the charges and because the case potentially involved the death penalty. *U.S. v. Tanh Huu Lam*, 251 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2001). As a guideline, the Court noted in *Doggett* that delays approaching one year are "presumptively prejudicial." *Doggett*, 505 U.S. at 652, fn. 1. However, this inquiry also depends on the nature of the charges. *Id*.

Here, the Court has focused primarily on the delay between the date of the filing of the first charging document (i.e. the Criminal Complaint) and the defendant's arrest. The Court specifically found that the delays of the trial date following his indictment were occasioned by the defendant, who waived his State right to trial within 60 days of arraignment, and by subsequent requests to continue made by the defense. However, the Court cannot ignore the approximately 26 month delay between the date of the original charging document and his arrest on those charges. Trial has not yet commenced. The nature of Mr. Inzunza's charges is serious, but they are not complex, nor are the charges ones that carry the death penalty. Moreover, in the cases considering the complexity of the matter as a factor in trial delay, these were usually delays which occurred after the

defendant was brought before the court following arrest. Even without considering the time of delay after arrest, a delay of nearly two years and three months is sufficient to trigger the speedy trial inquiry.

b. The State is primarily responsible for the delay.

Once the speedy trial analysis has been triggered, the next factor to consider is the reason(s) for the delay. The inquiry is whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay. *Doggett*, 505 U.S. at 651. The reasons for delay should be assigned weight. For example, an intentional attempt by the State to delay trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily. *Barker*, 407 U.S. at 531. Neutral reasons such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily, but should still be considered "since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant." *Id.* Lastly, valid reasons, such as a missing witness, should justify appropriate delays. *Id.*

The Court should determine which party is primarily responsible for the delay. In Doggett, the government made no serious effort to locate Doggett abroad. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652. Doggett had a warrant for his arrest and the government gave notice of his warrant to all United States Customs stations and to other law enforcement organizations, in addition to putting Doggett's name in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and the Treasury Enforcement Communication System. Id. at 649. Eventually, Doggett returned to the United States where he married, earned a college degree, and lived under his own name. Id. Doggett was arrested almost six years after he returned to the United States and eight and a half years after his indictment. Id. at 650. The Court did not reject the district court's finding that the government was negligent in pursuing Doggett. Id. at 647.

Further, the Ninth Circuit has also addressed reasons for delay. In *U.S. v. Shell*, 974 F.2d 1035, 1036 (1992), the government lost the defendant's file in 1984 and did not resume its search for him until 1989. The government's mishandling of the file created a five year delay. *Id.* After addressing other factors, the court went on to affirm the dismissal of the indictment. *Id.* In *U.S. v. Reynolds*, 231 Fed. Appx. 629, 631 (9th Cir. 2007)

(unpublished decision), the government presented evidence of attempts to apprehend Reynolds for only six of the fifty six months of delay, and during the other fifty months, Reynold's warrant was listed in the NCIC database. The court found that the actions of the government did not constitute diligence, and "because the government did not explain fifty months of delay in Reynold's case and there [was] no evidence that Reynolds knew of the indictment or was in any way responsible for the delay, the district court erred in not weighing the second *Barker* factor in Reynold's favor. *Id.* In *U.S. Corona-Verbera*, 509 F.3d 1105, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007), the government put Corona-Verbera's name into NCIC, into the border computer system, and also contacted Unsolved Mysteries and America's Most Wanted, both of which aired segments on the defendant. The Court found that with those efforts the government exercised due diligence. *Id.*

However, courts have held that if the delays are due to the defendant's actions, this factor should weigh against the defendant. In *U.S. v. Tanh Huu Lam*, 251 F.3d 852, 857 (9th Cir. 2001), the court agreed with the district court's finding that the second *Barker* factor weighed heavily against Lam because every continuance was asked for by Lam's counsel. In *Farmer v. State*, 405 P.3d 114, 123 (Nev. 2017), the Court held that the second *Barker* factor weighed against Farmer because almost all of the delay was attributable to the defense. In *Middleton v. State*, 114 Nev. 1089, 1110, 968 P.2d 296 (1998), Middleton's trial was delayed due to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a motion to reconsider the petition after denial, a motion to sever, and a motion to dismiss. There was also an appeal after the district court granted Middleton's pretrial habeas petition. *Id.* The Court concluded that the delay was more Middleton's actions than the state's actions. *Id.*

Another component to consider when analyzing the reasons for delay is whether or not the defendant was aware of the case against him or her. This also closely relates to *Barker* factor three. The defendant "is in the best position to stop the clock and avoid the damage." *U.S. v. Aguirre*, 994 F.2d 1454, 1458 (9th Cir. 1993). In *Aguirre*, the court held that where "the government diligently pursues the defendant and the defendant is aware the government is trying to find him, even severe prejudice would still not be enough to tip the

balance in [the defendant's] favor." *Id.* In *Reynolds*, 231 Fed. Appx. at 631, the court noted that "without knowledge of the indictment, Reynolds could not have acquiesced in the delay."

At the evidentiary hearing in the present case, the State called Detective Hoyt as a witness. Detective Hoyt was the detective assigned to Mr. Inzunza's case and his testimony included the general procedures of the North Las Vegas Police Department (NLVPD) and his specific inquiries in the instant case. The alleged victim's mother provided Detective Hoyt with Mr. Inzunza's phone number and address, which she apparently retrieved from Mr. Inzunza's public Facebook profile. Detective Hoyt testified that he could not locate Mr. Inzunza locally and that Mr. Inzunza resided in New Jersey. Detective Hoyt did not attempt to call law enforcement in New Jersey about Mr. Inzunza, nor did he attempt to contact Mr. Inzunza with the information from the alleged victim's mother. According to his testimony, Detective Hoyt submitted the case to the State. At this point, the case was out of Detective Hoyt's hands. After the Criminal Complaint and arrest warrant were filed, the records department of NLVPD placed the warrant in NCIC.

Detective Hoyt testified that he did not conduct any further investigation after submitting the case to the State. Due to heavy workloads, detectives at NLVPD do not typically look at cases once they are submitted to the State, unless and until a defendant is arrested on the warrant. Here, the complaint and warrant were filed December 5, 2014. The arrest warrant was not served until January 29, 2017. The State dismissed the Criminal Complaint and filed an Indictment on March 9, 2017. However, from December 5, 2014 to January 29, 2017, the only step taken to apprehend Mr. Inzunza was putting the arrest warrant in NCIC. The Court finds that this does not equal due diligence on behalf of the State and that the State's gross negligence caused the delay of over two years.

Additionally, there is no evidence that Mr. Inzunza was aware of the charges against him. When the Court ordered the evidentiary hearing, it was very specific about what information it was looking for. The Court wanted to know what steps NLVPD took to track down and extradite the defendant and whether or not the defendant was aware of the

charges against him. Detective Hoyt testified that he had no contact with Mr. Inzunza. Further, the State presented no evidence that Mr. Inzunza was aware of the charges. As the government was grossly negligent in causing the delay between the filing of the Criminal Complaint and the arrest of Mr. Inzunza, and because Mr. Inzunza was not aware of the charges against him, the Court finds that the State is solely responsible for the delay.

It should be noted that trial has not yet commenced and that Mr. Inzunza has contributed to the delay between the time of arrest and the pending trial. Mr. Inzunza was arraigned in District Court on March 20, 2017. The Court set the first trial setting for December 4, 2017. Mr. Inzunza did not object to this date, nor did he request an earlier setting. At calendar call on November 29, 2017, defense counsel raised a complaint about discovery so the Court granted a trial continuance to February 5, 2018. At calendar call on January 29, 2018, the defense again requested a continuance to further investigate the case. However, the Court is not considering the time after Mr. Inzunza's arrest, and is instead concerned with the delay from the first formal accusation (the Criminal Complaint) until the time of arrest.

c. Mr. Inzunza did not waive his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.

The third *Barker* factor to consider is invocation of the right to a speedy trial. The right to a speedy trial "primarily protects those who assert their rights, not those who acquiesce in the delay- perhaps hoping the government will change its mind or lose critical evidence." *Aguirre*, 994 F.2d at 1457. "Failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial." *Barker*, 407 U.S. at 532. However, a defendant "is not to be taxed for invoking his speedy trial right only after his arrest." *Doggett*, 505 U.S. at 654. In *Reynolds*, the court stated that without "knowledge of the indictment, Reynolds could not have acquiesced in the delay." 231 Fed. Appx. at 631. Further, in *U.S. v. Salgado-Ramiro*, 2017 WL 6507854, 2 (unpublished opinion), the court stated that there was no evidence that Salgado-Ramiro asserted his right to a speedy trial during the delay, and held that he "cannot be required to assert a right that he is totally unaware has accrued."

Here, the defense argues that Mr. Inzunza waived his statutory right to a trial within 60 days pursuant to NRS 178.556(2), but that he preserved his federal speedy trial rights. The State argues that Mr. Inzunza did not affirmatively assert his right to a speedy trial. Again, the Court is not considering what events may have happened after Mr. Inzunza's arrest and is instead focusing on the delay from the first official accusation (i.e. the Criminal Complaint) to Mr. Inzunza's arrest. There is no evidence in the record, nor was any presented at the evidentiary hearing, that Mr. Inzunza knew about the charges against him. Therefore, he could not have asserted his right to a speedy trial before his arrest on the warrant and this factor cannot be weighed against him.

d. Because the State was solely responsible for the delay, Mr. Inzunza does not need to show prejudice and the State did not rebut the presumptive prejudice.

The speedy trial right is to protect the defendant and prejudice should be assessed in light of the interests of the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. The Court should address the following three interests when determining prejudice to a defendant: 1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; 2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and 3) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. *Id.* The last of these is most serious because "the inability of a defendant to adequately prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system." Id. Some possible impairments include the unavailability of witnesses or if defense witnesses are unable to recall events of the distant past. Id. However, there are circumstances that give rise to presumptive prejudice. "[A]ffirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential to every speedy trial claim." Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655. The Court in Doggett noted that "negligence [is not] automatically tolerable simply because the accused cannot demonstrate exactly how it has prejudiced him." 505 U.S. at 657. Although negligence should be weighted less than a deliberate intent to harm the defense, it still "falls on the wrong side of the divide between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for delaying a criminal prosecution once it has begun." Id. The government is afforded the opportunity to persuasively rebut presumptive prejudice. *Id.* at 658.

The Nevada Supreme Court addressed the *Barker* factors and presumptive prejudice in *Middleton v. State*, 114 Nev. 1089, 968 P.2d 296 (1998). The Court found in *Middleton* that a delay of "less than two and a half years did not give rise to such presumptive prejudice, especially since Middleton was responsible for most of the delay." *Middleton* 114 Nev. at 1110. In *Middleton*, the Court required a showing of actual prejudice because the delay was much more attributable to Middleton rather than the State due to his extensive pretrial litigation and because Middleton did not assert his right to a speedy trial. *Id*.

Here, Mr. Inzunza argues that, according to *Doggett*, he is not required to show actual prejudice. The State argues only that none of the four *Barker* factors favor Mr. Inzunza and that any prejudice suffered by him is of his own making. The delay in this case is far less than the delay in *Doggett*. Doggett faced of delay of nearly eight and a half years, while Mr. Inzunza's delay from the Criminal Complaint to his arrest was roughly twenty six months. This is approximately six years less than the delay in *Doggett*. The delay is actually slightly less than the delay in *Middleton*, where the court found that Middleton was required to show prejudice on a delay of less than two and a half years. However, this case is distinguishable from *Middleton* because in *Middleton*, factors two and three of the *Barker* criteria weighed against Middleton. Middleton was primarily responsible for the delay and he did not assert his right to a speedy trial when he knew about the charges against him. Here, the 26 month delay was solely due to the State's gross negligence and Mr. Inzunza did not assert his right to a speedy trial because he was unaware of the charges against him.

While it is true that when weighing *Barker* factor number two, negligence should receive less weight than intentional hampering of the defense, the Court finds that the government's lack of diligence in apprehending Mr. Inzunza is grossly negligent. Therefore, more weight is applied to factor number two than mere negligence. This is yet another distinction between the instant case and *Middleton*.

¹ The defense argued, at the time of the evidentiary hearing that the Detective's testimony supported a finding of intentional delay. However, case law suggests that intentional delay would require evidence demonstrating a specific intent to hamper the defense so as to amount to bad faith. While the Court found Detective Hoyt's testimony to be shocking, it did not feel that the delay was intended to prejudice and hamper the defense, but rather was the result of willful neglect due to ignorance on the part of the detective as to the possible ramifications of such neglect.

Further, the State has not persuasively rebutted the presumptive prejudice in this case. The State offered no rebuttal evidence at the evidentiary hearing. Additionally, the State did not address prejudice in its Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss regarding the period of delay between the complaint and Mr. Inzunza's arrest. The State's argument is that Mr. Inzunza caused any prejudice himself. This does not persuasively rebut the presumptive prejudice in the delay from the filing of the complaint to arrest. Therefore, Mr. Inzunza does not need to make a showing of actual prejudice. The State also suggested, at the time of the evidentiary hearing, that to grant the defendant's motion would "set a dangerous precedent." This Court takes no pleasure in ruling in a manner that results in the dismissal of such serious charges before a trial, but nonetheless must apply the precedent already set by the United States Supreme Court.²

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, then, the Court finds that Mr. Inzunza's Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial was violated by the delay between the filing of the Criminal Complaint and his arrest on those charges some 26 months later.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Pursuant to Doggett v. United States, for Violation of State and Federal Constitutional Rights is **GRANTED**. The Defendant shall be released from custody unless a stay is granted by the appellate court.

DATED this ______ day of April, 2018.

CAROLAN ELLSWORTH DISTRICT JUDGE

² It is interesting to note that Justice Thomas' dissenting opinion quoted the old saying of "bad facts make bad law" and decried that "so too odd facts make odd law" *Supra* at 505 U.S. 659, in his dissent from the majority's decision in *Doggett*. But *Doggett* is precedent followed by many courts in the intervening 26 years since its publication, which this court likewise feels obliged to follow.

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certifies that on the
2	Order Regarding Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Pursuant to Doggett v. United States, for
3	Violation of State and Federal Constitutional Rights by faxing, mailing, or electronically
4	serving a copy to counsel as listed below:
5	bot in the desired and the training at the property of the desired and the des
6 7	Jacob J. Villani, Chief Deputy District Attorney 200 Lewis Ave. Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
8	
9	P. David Westbrook, Chief Deputy Public Defender 309 South Third St. Suite 226
10	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
11	2300 W. Sahara Ave, Suite 680 Box 32 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102
12	^
13	Shelbuloppel
14	Shelby Lopaze, Indicial Executive Assistant
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4/16/2018 2:03 PM
Steven D. Grierson
CLERK OF THE COURT

1	NOASC	Others, Atum
2	STEVEN B. WOLFSON	
	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565	
3	JONATHAN E. VANBOSKERCK	
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #006528	
5	200 Lewis Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500	
6	(702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff	
7	•	CT COURT
8		JNTY, NEVADA
9	THE CTATE OF NEWARA)
	THE STATE OF NEVADA,)
10	Plaintiff,) Case No. C-17-321860-1
11	v.) Dept. No. V
12	RIGOBERTO INZUNZA, #448039,	}
13	Defendant(s).	NOTICE OF APPEAL
14	Defendant(8).	. }
	TO: RIGOBERTO INZUNZA, Def	endant; and
15 16	TO: P. DAVID WESTBROOK, De	puty Public Defender and
17	TO: CAROLYN ELLSWORTH, Distr Dept. No. V	rict Judge, Eighth Judicial District Court,
18	NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THA	T THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff in the
19	above entitled matter, appeals to the Supre	eme Court of Nevada from the Order Granting
20	Defendant's Motion to Dismiss filed April 1	1, 2018.
21	Dated this 16 th day of April, 2018.	
22	STEV	EN B. WOLFSON,
23		County District Attorney
24		//I .I I
	<u> </u>	/s/ Jonathan E. VanBoskerck JONATHAN E. VANBOSKERCK
25		Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #006352
26		
27		
28		

I:\APPELLATE\WPDOCS\SECRETARY\DISTRICT COURT- EIGHTH\NOA\INZUNZA, RIGOBERTO, C321860, NOA.DOC

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL was made April 16, 2018 by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to: P. DAVID WESTBROOK 309 South Third Street, Suite 226 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 JUDGE CAROLYN ELLSWORTH Eighth Judicial District Court, Dept. V Regional Justice Center, 16th Fl. 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 BY /s/j. garcia Employee, District Attorney's Office JEV/jg

14CRN002215-0000

Case Type
Case Status:

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT NLV

Case Status: File Date:

CLOSED 12/05/2014

DCM Track:

Action: SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST

CHILD UNDER 14

Status Date: Case Judge: 02/11/2017 HOO, KALANI

Next Event:

All Information Party Charge Ticket/Citation # Event Docket Disposition

Party Information INZUNZA, RIGOBERTO LOPEZ - DEFENDANT CR/TR Disposition Disp Date Alias Party Attorney Attorney Bar Code A00330 Address Phone More Party Information

Party Charge Information INZUNZA, RIGOBERTO LOPEZ - DEFENDANT CR/TR Charge #1: 50105 - FELONY SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST CHILD UNDER 14 Original Charge 50105 SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST CHILD UNDER 14 (FELONY) Indicted Charge Amended Charge DV Related? Modifiers Stage Date

Ticket # ATN # Tracking #

Place of Offense NORTH LAS VEGAS

TOWNSHIP

Offense Location

Date of Offense 09/01/2014

Complainant

Party Charge Disposition
Disposition Date

Disposition Date Disposition 03/15/2017

DIS-INDICTED BY GRAND JURY-DO NOT DESTROY

EVIDENCE

Sentencing Information

INZUNZA, RIGOBERTO LOPEZ - DEFENDANT CR/TR

Charge # 2:

50105 - FELONY SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST CHILD UNDER 14

Original Charge

50105 SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST CHILD UNDER

14 (FELONY)

Indicted Charge Amended Charge DV Related?

Modifiers **Stage Date**

Ticket # ATN# Tracking #

Place of Offense NORTH LAS VEGAS

TOWNSHIP

Offense Location

Date of Offense 09/01/2014

Complainant

Party Charge Disposition

Disposition Date Disposition 03/15/2017

DIS-INDICTED BY GRAND JURY-DO NOT DESTROY

EVIDENCE

Sentencing Information

INZUNZA, RIGOBERTO LOPEZ - DEFENDANT CR/TR

Charge #3:

50105 - FELONY SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST CHILD UNDER 14

Original Charge

50105 SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST CHILD UNDER

14 (FELONY)

Indicted Charge Amended Charge DV Related? Modifiers Stage Date

Ticket# ATN# Tracking #

Place of Offense NORTH LAS VEGAS

TOWNSHIP

Offense Location

Date of Offense

Complainant

Party Charge Disposition

Disposition Date Disposition 03/15/2017

DIS-INDICTED BY GRAND JURY-DO NOT DESTROY

EVIDENCE

Sentencing Information

INZUNZA, RIGOBERTO LOPEZ - DEFENDANT CR/TR

09/01/2014

Charge #4:

50105 - FELONY SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST CHILD UNDER 14

Original Charge

50105 SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST CHILD UNDER

14 (FELONY)

Indicted Charge Amended Charge DV Related? **Modifiers** Stage Date

Ticket# ATN# Tracking #

Place of Offense NORTH LAS VEGAS **TOWNSHIP**

Offense Location

Date of Offense Complainant

09/01/2014

Party Charge Disposition

Disposition Date Disposition 03/15/2017

DIS-INDICTED BY GRAND JURY-DO NOT DESTROY

EVIDENCE

Sentencing Information

INZUNZA, RIGOBERTO LOPEZ - DEFENDANT CR/TR

Charge #5:

50105 - FELONY SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST CHILD UNDER 14

Original Charge

50105 SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST CHILD UNDER

14 (FELONY)

Indicted Charge **Amended Charge** DV Related? Modifiers Stage Date

Ticket # ATN# Tracking #

Place of Offense NORTH LAS VEGAS

TOWNSHIP

Offense Location

Date of Offense 09/01/2014

Complainant

Party Charge Disposition

Disposition Date Disposition 03/15/2017

DIS-INDICTED BY GRAND JURY-DO NOT DESTROY

EVIDENCE

Sentencing Information

Load Party Charges 6 through 10 Load All 15 Party Charges

Citation # : - NC	ORTH LAS VEGAS TOWNSHIP	Offense Date	09/01/2014
Agency Officer Second Officer Complainant	NORTH LAS VEGAS POLICE DEPARTMENT	Speed Cited Speed Limit Location Insured/Proof Accident Work Zone Haz Mat Points Priors License Taken BAC	N N
Plate State Year Type Style Color			

Events				
Date/Time	Location	Туре	Result	Event Judge
02/15/2017 08:30 AM	DEPARTMENT 1	FELONY ARRAIGNMENT NLV	ARRAIGNMENT HEARING HELD	HOO, KALANI
03/15/2017 09:30 AM	DEPARTMENT 1	PRELIMINARY HEARING NLV	CRIMINAL HEARING HELD	HOO, KALANI

Docket In	formation		
Date	Description	Docket Text	Amount Owed
09/01/2014	BAIL AMOUNT	BAIL AMOUNT Charge #13: LEWDNESS W/CHILD UNDER AGE 14, 1ST	
09/01/2014	BAIL AMOUNT	BAIL AMOUNT Charge #11: LEWDNESS W/CHILD UNDER AGE 14, 1ST	
09/01/2014	BAIL AMOUNT	BAIL AMOUNT Charge #12: LEWDNESS W/CHILD UNDER AGE 14, 1ST	
09/01/2014	BAIL AMOUNT	BAIL AMOUNT Charge #14: LEWDNESS W/CHILD UNDER AGE 14, 1ST	
09/01/2014	BAIL AMOUNT	BAIL AMOUNT Charge #15: LEWDNESS W/CHILD UNDER AGE 14, 1ST	
09/01/2014	BAIL AMOUNT	BAIL AMOUNT Charge #1: SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST CHILD UNDER 14	

Date	Description	Docket Text	Amount
09/01/2014	BÁIL AMOUNT	BAIL AMOUNT Charge #2: SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST CHILD UNDER 14	
09/01/2014	BAIL AMOUNT	BAIL AMOUNT Charge #3: SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST CHILD UNDER 14	
09/01/2014	BAIL AMOUNT	BAIL AMOUNT Charge #4: SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST CHILD UNDER 14	
09/01/2014	BAIL AMOUNT	BAIL AMOUNT Charge #5: SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST CHILD UNDER 14	
09/01/2014	BAIL AMOUNT	BAIL AMOUNT Charge #6: SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST CHILD UNDER 14	
09/01/2014	BAIL AMOUNT	BAIL AMOUNT Charge #7: SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST CHILD UNDER 14	
09/01/2014	BAIL AMOUNT	BAIL AMOUNT Charge #8: SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST CHILD UNDER 14	
09/01/2014	BAIL AMOUNT	BAIL AMOUNT Charge #9: SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST CHILD UNDER 14	
09/01/2014	BAIL AMOUNT	BAIL AMOUNT Charge #10: SEXUAL ASSAULT AGAINST CHILD UNDER 14	
12/05/2014	COMPLAINT SWORN TO & FILED	COMPLAINT SWORN TO AND FILED: WARRANT OF ARREST ISSUED BY JUDGE HOO BAIL AMOUNT: 750,000 (50,000 X 15)	
12/05/2014	ALERT INFORMATION	ALERT INFORMATION ARREST WARRANT - CRIMINAL issued on: 12/05/2014 For: INZUNZA, RIGOBERTO LOPEZ Bond Amt: \$ 0.00	
02/14/2017	ALERT INFORMATION	ALERT INFORMATION ARREST WARRANT - CRIMINAL served on: 02/11/2017 For: INZUNZA, RIGOBERTO LOPEZ	
02/14/2017	SET FOR COURT APPEARANCE	SET FOR COURT APPEARANCE Event: FELONY ARRAIGNMENT NLV Date: 02/15/2017 Time: 8:30 am Judge: HOO, KALANI Location: DEPARTMENT 1	
		Result: ARRAIGNMENT HEARING HELD	
02/15/2017	OFFICERS PRESENT NLVJC DEPT 1	K. HOO, JP M. LAVELL, DDA K. ZICHA, CLK (RECORDED JAVS) S. BONAVENTURE, DPD	
02/15/2017	INDIGENT DEFENSE FEE WAIVED	INDIGENT DEFENSE FEE WAIVED	
02/15/2017	ARRAIGNMENT HEARING HELD	ARRAIGNMENT HEARING HELD	
		INITIAL ARRAIGNMENT DEFENDANT PRESENT IN CUSTODY NLV (EXTRADITED FROM NEW JERSEY) COMPLAINT PRESENTED, ADVISED, WAIVES PUBLIC DEFENDER APPOINTED – INDIGENT DEFENSE	

Date	Description	Docket Text	Amount Owed
		FEE WAIVED DEFENDANT WAIVES 15 DAY RULE PRELIMINARY HEARING SET NLV/750,000	
02/15/2017	SET FOR COURT APPEARANCE	SET FOR COURT APPEARANCE Event: PRELIMINARY HEARING NLV Date: 03/15/2017 Time: 9:30 am Judge: HOO, KALANI Location: DEPARTMENT 1	
03/15/2017	HEARING HELD	HEARING HELD	
		THIS IS THE TIME SET FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING DEFENDANT PRESENT IN CCDC CUSTODY DEP DA STATES THAT SHE HAS NOTE INDICATING DEFENDANT WAS INDICTED ON THESE CHARGES - CASE DISMISSED	
03/15/2017	CASE CLOSED	CASE CLOSED	
03/15/2017	OFFICERS PRESENT NLVJC DEPT 1	K. HOO, JP C. CAMPBELL, DDA R. DAMI, CLK (RECORDED JAVS) J. FRASER, DPD	
03/15/2017	CASE FILE HAS BEEN ELECTRONICALLY SCANNED	CASE FILE HAS BEEN ELECTRONICALLY SCANNED	

Case Disposition			
Disposition	Date	Case Judge	
CLOSED	03/15/2017	HOO, KALANI	