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6 Attorney for Respondent,  
7 **AD ART, INC.**

8 **IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA**

9 CHARLES SCHUELER,  
10

11 Appellant,

12 vs.

13 AD ART, INC.,  
14

15 Respondent.

SUPREME COURT CASE NO.:  
75688

DISTRICT COURT  
CASE NO.: A-15-722391-C

16 Appeal from the Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada  
17 in and for the County of Clark  
18 The honorable Michael P. Villani, District Court Judge

19  
20 **RESPONDENT' S ANSWERING BRIEF**  
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**NRAP 26.1 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT**

The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following are persons and entities as described in NRAP 26.1 (a) and must be disclosed:

Law firms whose partners or associates have appeared for the party in the instant case (including proceedings in the district court or before an administrative agency) and are expected to appear in this court:

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**Las Vegas, NV 89113**

These representations are made in order that Judges of this Court may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal.

DATED this 6<sup>th</sup> day of December, 2018.

RAY LEGO & ASSOCIATES



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## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

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1 **Statutes**

2 FRCP 56 6

3  
4 NRCP 54 14

5 NRCP 56 6

6 **Rules**

7  
8 EDCR 2.24 14

9  
10 **JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT**

11 Respondent does not object to Appellant's jurisdictional statement.

12 **ROUTING STATEMENT**

13  
14 Respondent does not object to Appellant's routing statement.

15 **STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES**

- 16
- 17 1. Whether the District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of
- 18 AD ART, when it found that the pylon in this case was not a product for the
- 19 purpose of a strict liability claim.
- 20
- 21 2. Whether the District court properly granted AD ART 'S Motion for
- 22 Reconsideration by rehearing AD ART'S Motion for Summary Judgement.
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**STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

On July 30, 2015 Plaintiff, Charles Schuler filed suit against MGM Grand Hotel, LLC, AD ART INC., and 3A Composites USA, Inc. as a result of personal injuries he sustained while repairing the MGM pylon. (001-011). On May 20, 2016, prior to the close of discovery, AD ART filed a Motion for Summary Judgment disputing liability as it was not a successor entity of the company who originally supplied the MGM pylon. (047-121). The District Court denied the motion without prejudice so that discovery could continue as to the successor liability issue. (138-139). Defendant AD ART filed another Motion for Summary Judgment on August 2, 2017 arguing: (1) it was not a successor to the entity that performed the services on the MGM pylon; (2) the MGM pylon was not a product for a strict liability claim; (3) Plaintiff's claims were barred by the Statutes of Repose; and (4) Plaintiff's premises failed because Defendant AD ART was not the owner of the MGM pylon nor the occupier of the land that the MGM pylon is located. (140-245). Plaintiff opposed the motion on August 22, 2017. (246-324).

The Court held a hearing on the Motion on September 6, 2017, but deferred ruling on the Motion at that time. (366). On October 9, 2017, the Court issued a Minute Order denying the Motion and finding that Defendant AD ART's ownership was a question of fact for the jury. (367-368). The Court did grant summary

1 judgment regarding Defendant's fourth point and dismissed the claim for premises  
2 liability. *Id.*

3  
4 Subsequently, Defendant AD ART filed a Motion for Reconsideration  
5 regarding the successor liability and product liability claims on December 21, 2017.  
6 (375-459). The basis of the Motion for Reconsideration was that the District Court  
7 had not fully addressed all the issues and case law that were presented in the original  
8 motion for Summary Judgment. *Id.* After reviewing Defendant's Motion for  
9 Reconsideration, the Court granted AD ART's Motion for Summary Judgment on  
10 the issue of the MGM pylon not being a product for the sake of a product's liability  
11 claim. (475-483). Mr. Schuler now files this present appeal.  
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#### 14 **STATEMENT OF FACTS**

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16 The MGM pylon in question was originally designed and/or erected between  
17 1993 and 1994. (047-121). Located at 3799 S Las Vegas Boulevard, this sign is one  
18 of the most noteworthy and memorable signs located in the heart of the Las Vegas  
19 Strip. The entity involved in the original design and construction of the MGM pylon  
20 was a separate entity named Ad Art Electronic Sign Corporation that was liquidated  
21 in 2001. *Id.* On or about March 25, 2003, a new corporation, Defendant AD ART,  
22 was formed using the former web address, phone number and name of the previously  
23 liquidated corporation. *Id.* Subsequently, Defendant AD ART became a Foreign  
24 Corporation in the State of Nevada on January 6, 2004. *Id.* Defendant AD ART had  
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1 no involvement in the MGM pylon since its formation in 2003. *Id.* Additionally,  
2 Defendant AD ART was not involved in the design, construction or any subsequent  
3 maintenance, improvement or retrofit of the MGM pylon in any way. *Id.*  
4

5 On July 31, 2013, Plaintiff Charles Schuler was contracted through his  
6 employer Young Electric Sign Company to repair a LED display on the MGM pylon.  
7 (001-011). The MGM pylon is located outside of the MGM Grand Hotel and Casino  
8 in Las Vegas, Nevada. Plaintiff fell from the pylon while he was assisting with  
9 repairs or alternations of the pylon. Plaintiff sustained serious injuries as a result of  
10 his fall. *Id.*  
11

### 12 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

13  
14 The MGM pylon in this case is not a product that would permit a strict liability  
15 claim under Nevada law. The strict products liability doctrine does not apply to  
16 items that are uniquely designed and constructed. *Calloway v. City of Reno*, 116  
17 Nev, 250, 263, 993 F.2d 1259, 1267 (2000) (overruled on other grounds).  
18 Furthermore, the judicial objectives used to develop the doctrine of strict products  
19 liability do not apply to the MGM pylon. *Id.* at 268, 1276.  
20

21  
22 In reaching its final holding the *Calloway* court used Restatement of Torts  
23 (Second) Section 402A, to address policy concerns when applying the doctrine of  
24 strict products liability. The doctrine of strict products liability developed from  
25 judicial objectives to: [1] promote product safety [2] spread the costs of damage from  
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1 dangerously defective products to the consumer by imposing them on the  
2 manufacturer or seller, and [3] shift plaintiff's ability to prove a remote  
3 manufacturers or seller's negligence. *Id.* Situations that do not further those  
4 objectives have traditionally fallen outside of the purview of the strict products  
5 liability doctrine. *Id.*

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7  
8 The holding in *Calloway* dictates that the MGM pylon is not a "product" as a  
9 matter of law. The pylon was initially designed for the sole use of MGM and built  
10 under the direction of MGM. It is unique, it was not mass produced, and it was not  
11 intended to be injected into the stream of commerce. The pylon had many different  
12 companies involved in its production including those involved in the foundation,  
13 supply of materials, and designers. As a result, the policy objectives of the strict  
14 products liability doctrine would not be furthered in this case. As such, Plaintiff's  
15 strict products liability claim was properly dismissed by AD ART's Motion for  
16 Summary Judgment.

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19 Finally, a district court has discretion to grant a motion for reconsideration on  
20 "a previously decided issue if substantially different evidence is introduced or the  
21 decision is clearly erroneous." *Masonry & Tile Contractors v. Jolly, Urga & Wirth*,  
22 113 Nev. 737, 741, 941 P.2d 486, 489 (1997). Since the District Court did not  
23 initially take all the necessary factors into consideration when making its first order  
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1 for summary judgment against AD ART, a motion for reconsideration was  
2 respectfully submitted and granted at the District Court's discretion.

## 3 4 **II. POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

### 5 **A. STANDARD OF REVIEW**

6 An order granting summary judgment is reviewed *de novo* by this Court.  
7  
8 *Wood v. Safeway, Inc.*, 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). Summary  
9 judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and other evidence demonstrate that no  
10 genuine issue remains as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to  
11 a judgment as a matter of law. When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the  
12 evidence, and any reasonable inferences drawn from it, must be viewed in a light  
13 most favorable to the non-moving party. *Id.* at 732, 121 P.3d 1031.

14  
15 The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will  
16 not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. Instead,  
17 the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. *Id.* Only disputes  
18 over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will  
19 properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. *Id.* Moreover, factual disputes  
20 that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be considered. *Id.*

21  
22 A factual dispute is genuine when the evidence is such that a rational trier of  
23 fact could return a verdict for the non-moving party. *Id.* While the pleadings and  
24 other proof must be construed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, the  
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1 non-moving party must, by affidavit or otherwise, set forth specific facts  
2 demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial or have summary judgment  
3 entered against him. *Id.* The non-moving party is not entitled to build a case on the  
4 gossamer threads of whimsy, speculation, and conjecture. *Id.*

5  
6 Last, this Court has determined that when the party bringing its motion for  
7 summary judgment (here, AD ART) does not have the burden of proof at trial, it  
8 merely has to negate an essential element of the non-moving party's claim or show  
9 that there is no evidence to support it. *Cuzze v. University and Community College*  
10 *System of Nevada*, 123 Nev. 598, 172 P.3d 131 (2007); *See also FRCP 56(c)(1)(A);*  
11 *NRCP 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986), *cert. denied*, 484  
12 U.S. 1066 (1988). When the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial  
13 (here, Appellant), to defeat summary judgment, it must "transcend the pleadings and  
14 come forward with documentation admissible in evidence in the form of specific  
15 facts that show the existence of a genuine issue/dispute of material facts." *Id.*  
16 Otherwise, it is mandatory for the court to enter judgment according to the law. *See*  
17 *FRCP 56(a); NRCP 56(e); see also, Beard v. Banks*, 548 U.S. 521, 529 (2006).  
18 Appellant failed to meet its burden, thus summary judgment was granted in favor of  
19 AD ART and should be affirmed on this appeal.  
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**B. The District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant AD ART, when it found that the pylon in this case was not a product for the purpose of a strict liability claim.**

Under Nevada case law, the MGM pylon, is not a product that would permit a strict liability claim. Nevada law, as well as case law from many other jurisdictions, illustrate that the strict products liability doctrine does not apply to items that are uniquely designed and constructed. *Calloway v. City of Reno*, 116 Nev, 250, 993 F.2d 1259 (2000) (overruled on other grounds).

There is a difference between a product for purposes of strict products liability and any other product. For instance, other jurisdictions have gone on to establish that items not put into the stream of commerce, or items that are indivisible parts of a building's structure, are not product's under the product liability doctrine. *See, Martens v. MCL Const. Corp.*, 347 Ill. App. 3d 303 (Ill. App.2004)(rejecting the argument that a steel beam from which an employee fell at a construction site could be considered a "product" for strict liability purposes); *See also, Dayberry v. City of East Helena*, 80 P.3d 1218 (Mont. 2003)(holding that a city swimming pool was not a "product" for strict liability purposes as a pool was not in the stream of commerce nor was it mass produced or prefabricated). Items that would be considered products from a strict product liability stand point would be relatively common items, such as a hammer or lightbulb, that are easily mass produced, intended to enter into the stream of commerce and can be assembled prior to shipment.

1 In this case, the MGM pylon that was designed for the sole use of MGM was  
2 not mass produced, it was built under the direction of MGM, and it was not intended  
3 to be injected into the stream of commerce. The MGM pylon is a massive structure  
4 positioned at a staggering 254 feet tall and 94 feet wide. Since its 1993 or 1994  
5 erection, there have been numerous designers, engineers, contractors and  
6 maintenance teams that were all assembled specifically for this one-of-a-kind  
7 project.  
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10 More to the point, the pylon's original design called for a significantly smaller  
11 horizontal LED pylon, whereas in 2013, the pylon was redesigned to include two  
12 vertical LED displays. The redesigned displays are 50 feet by 114 feet which creates  
13 a 5,700 square foot digital display on each side of the pylon. All things considered,  
14 this makes the pylon uniquely designed and constructed. Surely such a massive and  
15 complex structure, with such an evolving design could not be deemed to have been  
16 prefabricated, especially by this defendant, as Plaintiff states. The fact that the MGM  
17 pylon is such a "uniquely designed and constructed" object is precisely why it falls  
18 outside of the strict products liability doctrine. Also, for this exact reason it is  
19 precluded from the application of strict products liability claims under *Calloway*.  
20 Because the District court failed to apply *Calloway* to its full extent, the initial Order  
21 for summary judgment was in error.  
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1 The *Calloway* case involved a class action brought by townhouse owners  
2 against the builder of the homes. *Id.* at 254-55, 993 P.2d at 1262. The homeowners  
3 asserted a strict liability or products liability claim against the builders for the alleged  
4 defective-construction of the homes. *Id.* The trial court concluded that the  
5 homeowners could not pursue their strict liability claims because “a house is not a  
6 ‘product’ for strict liability purposes.” *Id.*

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9 In reaching its final holding the *Calloway* court relied on Restatement of Torts  
10 (Second) Section 402A. In *Calloway* the court was concerned about enforcing  
11 standards that did not support the application of the strict product liability doctrine.  
12 For example, the Court explained that the doctrine of strict products liability  
13 developed from judicial concerns to [1] promote product safety [2] spread the costs  
14 of damage from dangerously defective products to the consumer by imposing them  
15 on the manufacturer or seller, and [3] shift plaintiff’s ability to prove a remote  
16 manufacturers or seller’s negligence. *Id.*

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19 These are the same policy considerations taken into account in *Queen City*  
20 *Terminals, Inc. v. Gen. Am. Tramp. Corp.*, 653 N.E.2d 661 (Ohio 1995). Also  
21 seeking guidance from Restatement of Torts (Second) Section 402A, the Supreme  
22 Court in Ohio explained that although the “Restatement...does not specify exactly  
23 what constitutes a product meriting the application of strict liability,...[s]trict  
24 liability developed to achieve specific policy objectives.” *Id.* at 621. “Situations  
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1 which would not further these objectives have long been, recognized to be outside  
2 the purview of strict liability.” *Id.* The *Queen City Terminals* Court took a careful  
3 look at those policy considerations underlying the strict product liability doctrine,  
4 and considered whether it should apply in cases involving uniquely designed and  
5 constructed products. In that case, the issue was whether specially ordered and  
6 designed tanker cars were “products” within the meaning of the strict product,  
7 liability doctrine. *Id.* at 620. The Court held that they were not because the policy  
8 considerations were not triggered.

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11 Further to the point, the *Calloway* court goes on to actually make distinctions  
12 to support its holding that the doctrine of strict product liability should not be applied  
13 to uniquely made items. For example, when considering why a townhome is a unique  
14 product the court references the fact that products are mass produced goods; the  
15 construction of a building depends on the cooperative interaction of a number of  
16 independent parties; most buildings are one of a kind requiring methods and  
17 materials that change with each, product; an architect cannot work out a design  
18 weakness in a series of prototypes, which are built but are never put on the market,  
19 as is often done with manufactured goods; and a contractor cannot test a variety the  
20 methods and materials combinations before putting up the final structure. *Id.* at 269-  
21 70, 993 P.2d .at 1271-72 (internal quotations omitted). For these reasons, the Court  
22 in *Calloway* determined that a homebuilder cannot be held liable under a theory of  
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1 strict products liability because a home is a unique good that is not mass produced.

2 *Id.*

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4 As applied to this case, the holding in *Calloway* and *Queen City* dictate that  
5 the MGM pylon is not a “product” as a matter of law because the policy objectives  
6 of the strict products liability doctrine would not be furthered in this case. First, the  
7 *Queens City* court stated that the “safety policy is not furthered [because] the process  
8 of manufacturing a custom-made item...heavily involves the consumers...in making  
9 manufacturing decisions, computing risks, and setting safety specifications,” *Id.*  
10 Because the MGM pylon is a custom, one-of-a-kind item that was built under the  
11 direct supervision of MGM, applying the strict products liability doctrine would do  
12 nothing to promote the safety of the MGM pylon. MGM was involved in every  
13 aspect of the design of the MGM pylon, and it was not simply the creation of the  
14 former AD ART company. (221-245).

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18 Second, the *Queens* court held that the manufacturer was “not in any better  
19 position to assume the costs than the Customers [because tire tanker cars were] not  
20 a mass-scale enterprise...” *Id.* The purchaser of the tanker cars selected the  
21 manufacturer “to produce a specific, one-time order of [tanker cars] to meet the  
22 [purchaser’s] need. In such case, the manufacturer has no opportunity to spread the  
23 costs throughout its many customers, because no other customers exist.” *Id.* Here,  
24 the MGM pylon was a specific, one-time order of a massive pylon designed  
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1 specifically for the MGM Grand. This is very similar to the purchase of tanker cars  
2 which for one specific purpose for the consumer. It was not built for the benefit of  
3 any other company, but simply as a way to market the MGM Grand to everyone on  
4 the world-famous Las Vegas Strip. Additionally, since the construction of the MGM  
5 pylon was not a “mass-scale enterprise,” AD ART would not be in a better position  
6 to “spread the costs” across its customers by increasing the price of the MGM pylon.  
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9 Finally, in *Queens* the court concluded that the manufacturer was not in the  
10 best position to determine if the tanker cars were defective, and that other parties  
11 involved in the design and manufacturing process were “in a position to know and  
12 prove that the manufacturer might have been negligent,” *Id.* at 623. According to  
13 the court, the doctrine of strict product liability did not apply because “the product  
14 was coaxed into the market by its consumers. [The manufacturer] did not launch  
15 this product into the stream of commerce, this was a custom-made order, fashioned  
16 expressly at the request of [the buyer].” *Id.* at 622. Again, this is not a product that  
17 was put into the stream of commerce by AD ART. AD ART created a custom-made  
18 pylon, expressly at the request of the MGM Grand. Though other pylons had been  
19 made in the past, there is no pylon that is or was identical to the MGM pylon. The  
20 MGM pylon was and is truly a one of a kind article.  
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25 The *Calloway* court points out “some very real differences between mass-  
26 produced goods and [uniquely constructed projects] and their respective methods of  
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1 production.” *Calloway*, 116 Nev. at 269, 993 P.2d at 1271 (citation omitted). For  
2 those reasons, to apply the doctrine of strict product liability in this case would be to  
3 ignore “the very real differences” between the unique nature of the design and  
4 construction of the MGM pylon in comparison to mass produced goods. It would  
5 further frustrate the policy considerations the *Calloway* court explicitly took the time  
6 to address regarding when the strict product liability doctrine is applicable.  
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9 In addition Plaintiff’s Appellate Brief references the fact that the Defendant  
10 AD ART lists its pylon as “products” on its website. However, there is a stark  
11 difference between advertising an item as a “product” for consumer navigation of a  
12 website, versus a “product” for the purpose of strict products liability. There are  
13 specific standards and definitions that the legal realm imposes that simply do not  
14 translate in the same way to the general population.  
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17 For example, use of the word slander in everyday language can simply mean  
18 saying insulting things about someone else. However, in the legal context, there is a  
19 standard and burden of proof that must be met before slander is adequately applied  
20 to a situation. Similarly, use of the word “product” to point out merchandise to  
21 customers who are browsing a non-legal website versus asking a court to grant a  
22 specific claim that requires an item to be considered a product as a matter of law for  
23 strict products liability, is not the same. Certainly, Plaintiff does not mean to argue  
24 that all legal definitions can automatically be correlated to their everyday usage in a  
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1 non-legal context. The MGM pylon is not a “product” under strict products liability,  
2 simply because it was listed on a website and therefore the doctrine of strict products  
3 liability has no application in this case.  
4

5 For these reasons, Plaintiff’s strict products liability claim was properly  
6 dismissed by AD ART’s Motion for Summary Judgment and subsequent Motion for  
7 Reconsideration.  
8

9 **C. Whether the District court properly granted AD ART’s Motion for**  
10 **Reconsideration by rehearing AD ART’S Motion for Summary**  
11 **Judgement.**

12 Pursuant to NRCP 54(b), “the district court may at any time before the entry  
13 of final judgment, revise orders...” *Barry v. Lindner*, 119 Nev. 661, 670, 81 P.3d  
14 537, 543 (2003). Moreover, a court has the inherent authority to reconsider its prior  
15 orders. *Trail v. Faretto*, 91 Nev. 401, 536 P.2d 1026 (1975). Further, EDCR 2.24  
16 states that a motion that has already been ruled upon cannot be reheard without leave  
17 of the court. However, a district court has discretion to grant a motion for  
18 reconsideration on “a previously decided issue if substantially different evidence is  
19 introduced or the decision is clearly erroneous.” *Masonry & Tile Contractors v.*  
20 *Jolly, Urga & Wirth*, 113 Nev. 737, 741, 941 P.2d 486, 489 (1997). (emphasis  
21 added).  
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25 In seeking reconsideration for its Motion for Summary judgment, Defendant  
26 AD ART respectfully submitted that the District Court applied the incorrect legal  
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1 test in determining whether the pylon was a product for a strict products liability  
2 claim. AD ART asserted that the District Court's decision was in error because it  
3 had not applied the correct analysis in reaching its ruling. This is the primary issue  
4 for this appeal. In its original Order denying summary judgment the Court only cited  
5 to *Calloway* to define strict products liability. More specifically, the Order states  
6 "one is strictly liable for a dangerously defective product if one is a seller 'engaged  
7 in the business of selling such a product.'" (367-368). Thus, based solely on that  
8 rationale the Court found AD ART to be a manufacturer of pylons. Further, the Court  
9 went on to say that although the MGM pylon is one of a kind, it did not preclude  
10 such a claim against its manufacturer, AD ART. *Id.*

14 As previously discussed, there were a multitude of factors that should have  
15 been considered when determining whether the MGM pylon was a product. The  
16 Court failed to consider all the criteria that is required for the application of a product  
17 being considered for purposes of strict products liability. The District Court did not  
18 initially take these factors into consideration when making its first order for  
19 summary judgment against AD ART. Therefore, AD ART respectfully asserted that  
20 the order was erroneous and then properly sought reconsideration. At that point, the  
21 District Court had the authority to either deny the Motion for Reconsideration or to  
22 rehear and reconsider its prior ruling.  
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1 In the instant case the Court chose to do the latter. Because the court did not  
2 certify its findings of fact, conclusions of law and order for summary judgment  
3 entered on October 20, 2017 to be final, the court had the discretion to consider AD  
4 ART's renewed motion for summary judgment. Therefore, Plaintiff's claim that the  
5 District Court erred by granting the Motion for Reconsideration even though AD  
6 ART's motion did not contain any new or additional information, completely fails.  
7  
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9 **III. CONCLUSION**

10 For the reasons set forth above, Defendant AD ART requests that this Court  
11 affirm the District Court's holding and find that summary judgment was properly  
12 granted in this case.  
13

14 DATED this 6 day of December, 2018.

15  
16 Respectfully submitted,

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18 

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23 Attorney for Respondent, AD ART, INC.  
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**Certificate of Compliance**

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2 1. I hereby certify that this brief complies with the formatting  
3 requirements of NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeface requirements of NRAC 32(a)(5) and  
4 type style requirements of NRAC 32(a)(6) because this brief has been prepared in a  
5 proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Office Word with 14 pt. font size  
6 and Times New Roman font.  
7

8  
9 2. I further certify that this brief complies with the page- or type-volume  
10 limitations of NRAP 32(a)(7)(C), because it does not exceed 30 pages.  
11

12 3. Finally, I hereby certify that I have read this respondent's answering  
13 brief, and to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, it is not frivolous or  
14 interposed for any improper purpose. I further certify that this brief complies with  
15 all applicable Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, in particular NRAP 28(e)(1),  
16 which requires every assertion in brief regarding matters in the record to be  
17 supported by reference to the page and volume number, if any, of the transcript or  
18 appendix where the matter relied on is to be found.  
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1 I understand that I may be subject to sanctions in the event that the accompanying  
2 brief is not in conformity with requirements of the Nevada Rules of Appellate  
3 procedure.  
4

5 DATED this 6 day of December, 2018.

6 Respectfully submitted,  
7

8 RAY LEGO & ASSOCIATES

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

Pursuant to NRAP 25(1)(c), I hereby certify that I am an employee of RAY  
LEGO & ASSOCIATES and that on the 6<sup>th</sup> day of December, 2018 electronic  
service of **RESPONDENT'S ANSWERING BRIEF** was made by delivering a  
true copy with Appellant's and Respondent's Joint Appendix to the following:

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