IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

Electronically Filed Feb 13 2019 03:41 p.m.

S.C. NO: 73838/75824beth A. Brown D.C. NO: A-17-749418-6f Supreme Court

JENNIFER V. ABRAMS; AND THE ABRAMS & MAYO LAW FIRM,

Appellant,

STEVE W. SANSON; VETERANS IN POLITICS INTERNATIONAL, INC: LOUIS C. SCHNEIDER; AND LAW OFFICES OF LOUIS C. SCHNEIDER, LLC,

Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S APPENDIX

Attorney for Appellant:
Marshal S. Willick, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 2515
WILLICK LAW GROUP
3591 East Bonanza Road, Suite 200
Las Vegas, Nevada 89110-2101
(702) 438-4100
Email: email@willicklawgroup.com

Attorney for Respondents:
Maggie McLetchie, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 10931
MCLETCHIE LAW
701 E Bridger Avenue, #520
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
(702) 728-5300
Email: maggie@nvlitigation.com
Attorney for Sanson Parties

Dennis L. Kennedy, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 1462
Joshua P. Gilmore, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 11576
8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue
Las Vegas, Nevada 89148
(702) 562-8820
Email: <u>Dkennedy@BaileyKennedy.com</u>
Jgilmore@BaileyKennedy.com

Joseph W. Houston, II, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 1440 430 S. Seventh St. Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 982-1200 Email: jwh7408@yahoo.com Attorney for Schneider Parties

RESPONDENT'S APPENDIX INDEX

A.	Order To Seal Records filed 10/6/16RA 1
В.	Order Prohibiting Dissemination Of Case Material filed 10/6/16RA 2-3
C.	Order Without Hearing filed 3/21/17RA 4-25
D.	Order Dismissing Appeal filed 5/2/18RA 26-28
	Dated this 2 day of February, 2019.

Joseph W. Houston, II, Esq.
State Bar #1440
430 South 7th Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
(702) 982-1200
Attorney for Respondent
LOUIS C. SCHNEIDER; AND LAW OFFICES
OF LOUIS C. SCHNEIDER, LLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of Joseph W. Houston, II, Esq. and that on this day of formula documents entitled Respondent's Appendix were filed electronically with the Clerk of the Nevada Supreme Court, and therefore electronic service was made in accordance with the master service list as follows, to the attorneys listed below at the address, email address, and/or facsimile number indicated below:

Marshal S. Willick, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 2515 WILLICK LAW GROUP 3591 East Bonanza Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89110-2101 (702) 438-4100 Attorney for *Appellant*

Dennis L. Kennedy, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 1462 Joshua P. Gilmore, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 11576 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148 (702) 562-8820 Attorneys for *Appellant*

Maggie McLetchie, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 10931 MCLETCHIE LAW 701 E Bridger Avenue, #520 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 728-5300 Attorney for Sanson Parties

An employee of Joseph W. Houston, II, Esq.

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1	OSFD Down & Comme		
	Brandon K. Leavitt, Esq. CLERK OF THE COURT		
2	Nevada State Bar Number: 11834		
3	THE ABRAMS & MAYO LAW FIRM 6252 South Rainbow Blvd., Suite 100		
,	Las Vegas, Nevada 89118		
4	Tel: (702) 222-4021		
	Fax: (702) 248-9750		
5	Email: BKLGroup@TheAbramsLawFirm.com Attorney for Plaintiff		
6			
	Eighth Judicial District Court Family Division		
7	Clark County, Nevada		
8	BRANDON PAUL SAITER,) Case No.: D-15-521372-D		
9	Plaintiff,) Department: L		
10	vs.		
11	TINA MARIE SAITER,		
12	Defendant.		
13	ORDER TO SEAL RECORDS PURSUANT TO NRS 125.110(2)		
14	Upon written request of Plaintiff, Brandon Paul Saiter, by and through his		
15	attorney of record, Brandon K. Leavitt, Esq., of The Abrams & Mayo Law Firm, and		
16	pursuant to NRS 125.110(2),		
17	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all documents filed with the clerk in the		
ι8	above-entitled action except for pleadings, findings of the Court, Orders made on		
19	motion as provided in the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure and any judgments, shall		
10	be and are hereby sealed.		
21	DATED this day of Conser 2016.		
2	THE ABRAMS & MAYO LAW FIRM DISTRICT COURT JUDGE		
3	Brandon K Leavitt, Esq. (11834); JENNIFER L. ELLIOTT		
ایر	6252 South Rainbow Blvd., Suite 100		
4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89118 Attorney for Plaintiff		

CLERK OF THE COURT

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JENNIFER L. ELLIOTT DISTRICT RUDGE FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. L LAS VEGAS, NV 89101

DISTRICT COURT FAMILY COURT DIVISION CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

BRANDON PAUL SAITER,	Ž	
Plaintiff, vs.) CASE NO: D-15-521372) DEPT NO: L	-D
TINA MARIE SAITER,)) HEARING DATES: 9/29	/16
Defendant.) HEARING TIMES: 10:00) a.m.

ORDER PROHIBITING DISSEMINATION OF CASE MATERIAL

This matter having come before the Court for several pending matters on the 29th day of September at 10:00 a.m., Plaintiff Brandon Saiter represented by Jennifer Abrams, Esq. and Brandon Leavitt, Esq. and Defendant, Tina Marie Saiter represented by Louis Schneider, Esq., and the Court hearing preliminary matters, entertained and granted Ms. Abrams request for a closed hearing pursuant to EDCR 5.02, with the exception of permitting the parents of Defendant to remain pursuant to NRS 125.080 (2) (e).

Thereafter, the videotape of this hearing was posted on youtube and a link to the video was emailed to multiple third parties not involved in the case on or about the 3rd day of October, 2016.

On October 5, 2016, the parties resolved all issues required for a Decree of Divorce. Counsel then stipulated to seal the case and to disallow any further release of

RA 2

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case information and to demand that the current post of the September 29, 2016 hearing video, or any other hearing video from this case be immediately removed from the internet and to prohibit any portion of these proceedings from being disseminated or published and that any such publication or posting by anyone be immediately removed, as the September 29, 2016 hearing was a closed hearing. Additionally, counsels and the parties recognize that the case has been settled and that such an Order is in the best interest of the four (4) children in this case and is also authorized by NRS 125.080, NRS 125.110, EDCR 5.02, and Supreme Court Rules, Part VII, Rule 2(2)(a) and 3(4).

PURSUANT TO THE STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the current post of the September 29, 2016 hearing video, or any and all other hearing video(s) from this case shall be immediately removed from the internet. All persons or entities shall be prohibited from publishing, displaying, showing, or making public any portion of these case proceedings; nothing from the case at bar shall be disseminated or published and that any such publication or posting by anyone or any entity shall be immediately removed as the Court finds the stipulation of the parties and this Courts' Order to be in the best interest of the four (4) children in this case and to be fully supported by law (NRS 125.080, NRS 125.110, EDCR 5.02, and Supreme Court Rules, Part VII, Rule 2(2)(a) and 3(4)).

Jenniser Elliott, District Court Judge,

Family Division, Dept. L

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DISTRICT COURT FAMILY DIVISION CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

ORDER WITHOUT HEARING PURSUANT TO EDCR 2.23

The Court in review of Plaintiff's NRCP 60(A) Motion to Correct the Order After Hearing of September 29, 2016 filed February 2, 2017;

Defendant's Opposition and Countermotion for Attorney's Fees and Costs filed February 14, 2017; Plaintiff's Reply and Opposition to Countermotion filed February 27, 2017; Plaintiff's Motion for an Order to Show Cause filed February 13, 2017; Steve Sanson's Opposition filed March 6, 2017; and Defendant's Opposition To Motion For Order To Show Cause Re: Contempt and Countermotion For Attorney's Fees filed March 7, 2017, hereby FINDS and ORDERS, pursuant to EDCR 2.23, that these matters are hereby decided without a hearing and vacates the hearings set for March 21, 2017 at 10:00 a.m. and March 30, 2017 at 9:00 a.m.

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JENNIFER L. ELLIOTT DISTRICT JUDGE FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. L LAS VEGAS, NV 89101

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ENNIFER L. ELLIOTT

DISTRICT JUDGE
FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. L
LAS VEGAS, NV 89101

A. Relevant Factual Background

- 1. The parties were divorced pursuant to the Decree of Divorce (hereinafter "Decree") filed December 28, 2016.
- 2. Prior to the filing of the Decree, pursuant to emails between the parties' counsel on October 5, 2016, and copied on the Court on October 6, 2016, the parties, through their counsel, stipulated to seal the case.
- 3. Additionally, Plaintiff filed a Petition to Seal Records Pursuant to NRS 125.110(2), which was granted and an Order to Seal Records Pursuant to NRS 125.110(2) was filed on October 6, 2016. An Order Prohibiting Dissemination of Case Material was also filed on October 6, 2016.
- 4. Subsequently, on January 11, 2017, Plaintiff filed his Motion to Enter the Order After Hearing of September 29, 2016.
- 5. On January 20, 2017, the Order from the September 29, 2016 hearing was prepared and filed by the Court because the parties' counsel could not agree on the precise language of the order.
- 6. On February 2, 2017, Plaintiff filed his NRCP 60(a) Motion to Correct the Court's Order After Hearing of September 29, 2016.
- 7. Defendant filed her Opposition and Countermotion for Attorney's Fees and Costs on February 14, 2017.

8. Plaintiff filed his Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's NRCP 60(a) Motion and Opposition to Defendant's Countermotion for Attorney's Fees and Costs on February 27, 2017.

9. On February 13, 2017, Plaintiff filed his Motion for an Order to Show Cause Against Defendant's Counsel of Record, Louis Schneider, Esq. (hereinafter "Schneider"), and a third party, Steve Sanson (hereinafter "Sanson").

10. The Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff's counsel of record, Jennifer Abrams, Esq. (hereinafter "Abrams") and her firm, the Abrams and Mayo Law Firm, has filed a civil suit against Schneider and Sanson, among others, in case A-17-749318-C alleging defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, false light, business disparagement, harassment, concert of action, civil conspiracy, RICO violation, copyright infringement and injunction for acts that arose, in part, from the current case. This case is pending before Department 21.

B. Plaintiff's NRCP 60(a) Motion

Plaintiff's NRPC 60(a) Motion seeks to amend the Order from the September 29, 2016 hearing, specifically requesting the following three (3) changes:

(1) "Upon Plaintiff's request, the hearing is closed to the public."

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(2) "In an email dated September 16, 2016, Tina [Defendant] made it clear that she no longer wanted to be represented by Mr. Schneider."

(3) Delete the "clerk's note" on page 3, lines 7 through 10 of the order.

The Court, after review of all available records, ORDERS that

Plaintiff's NRCP 60(a) Motion be granted in part and denied in part.

As to the first request to close the hearing, Abrams, pursuant to EDCR 5.02 (which was then in effect) sought to close the hearing (see video record at 12:08:02).

Rule 5.02. Hearings may be private.

(a) In any contested action for divorce, annulment, separate maintenance, breach of contract or partition based upon a meretricious relationship, custody of children or spousal support, the court must, upon demand of either party, direct that the trial or hearing(s) on any issue(s) of fact joined therein be private and upon such direction, all persons shall be excluded from the court or chambers wherein the action is heard, except officers of the court, the parties, their witnesses while testifying, and counsel. . .

At 12:08:04, the Court stated, "Sure." At 12:08:05, the Court Ordered "All those not a party, not representing a party would please exit the courtroom." Later in the hearing, Abrams states that her request to close the hearing is still pending (see video record at 12:13:06). However, the Court had already ruled on Abrams' request at the outset of this hearing, and the

Court, for good cause, had allowed Defendant's parents to remain as support for the Defendant who was struggling with whether she should continue to have legal representation. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's request to add this language to the minutes and the Order: "Upon Plaintiff's request, the hearing is closed to the public."

With regard to Plaintiff's second request as to Defendant's September 16, 2016 email to Schneider, and Plaintiff's position regarding whether Defendant stated that she did not want to be represented by Schneider therein. The Court did comment that the September 16, 2016 email was the first time where it appeared that there was any settled purpose or clear intent by Defendant not to be represented by Schneider.

However, this did not also mean that the Court made a finding or believed that it was in the best interest of Defendant to be without assistance of counsel. The Court was concerned with issues such as, the difference in the economic knowledge/power balance between the parties, Defendant's mental and emotional competency to make the decisions on behalf of herself, issues pending such as the results of the forensic income report, and later in the hearing, the allegation that Plaintiff must pay for the community business from his post-tax personal income rather than through the business itself, leaving Plaintiff apparently unable to pay alimony to Defendant while

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grossing over \$20,000 a month, and the significant equity in the business that had not been accurately disclosed to Defendant, etc. Therefore, the Court was especially concerned that both parties continue to have the benefit of counsel pending the Court's ability to canvas and ensure the fairness of all of the settlement terms.

The Court further FINDS that Schneider had his Motion to Withdraw pending before the Court at this same hearing, which he withdrew after the Court asked him to remain on the case to look into the financial aspects of the parties' agreement, including the need to pay \$5,000 monthly business debt payment from personal post-tax income and expenses that Plaintiff listed on his Financial Disclosure Form (hereinafter "FDF") filed April 4, 2016.

With those concerns having been mentioned, the Court GRANTS

Plaintiff's request to add to the order: "In an email dated September 16,

2016, Tina [defendant] made it clear that she no longer wanted to be represented by Mr. Schneider."

As to the "Clerk's Note", those notes were specifically included at the Court's request following the hearing and constitutes a finding of the Court. Plaintiff's FDF, filed April 4, 2016, did not include the royalty payments which were paid through mid-2016; the royalty payment was also not

JENNIFER L. ELLIOTT DISTRICT JUDGE FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. L LAS VEGAS, NV 89101 included in his December 14, 2015 FDF. Plaintiff's objection to the inclusion of the "Clerk's Note" is DENIED. Defendant's Countermotion for Attorney's Fees and Costs is DENIED.

C. Plaintiff's Motion for an Order to Show Cause

1. Parties' Arguments

ca. Plaintiff's Allegations

Plaintiff alleged that Sanson, even after being served with the Order Prohibiting Dissemination of Case Material, continued to post the video from the September 29, 2016 hearing on various websites and posted commentary that specifically referred to the parties' names and case number. As a result, he alleged the safety of the parties' children has been compromised and the parties' privacy had been invaded because neither party wanted their divorce case to be public. Plaintiff managed to take the video down from YouTube and Vimeo after making privacy complaints, but Sanson allegedly continued to post the video on a Russian website and despite further multiple requests, refused to take down the videos.

Plaintiff argued that Sanson need not be inter-pled as a party because he interjected himself into the case by obtaining a copy of the

RA 10

JENNIFER L. ELLIOTT
DISTRICT JUDGE
FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT, L.
LAS VEGAS, NV 89101

hearing video and posting it online in an attempt to influence the case, bringing him within the jurisdiction of the Court.

Plaintiff further argued that Sanson's actions do not constitute free speech because the hearing was closed to the public and there is no legitimate purpose in invading the parties' privacy and risk of harm to the parties' children. Furthermore, Schneider was complicit in Sanson's actions because he acted in concert with Sanson to escalate the case and released the case material to him. Plaintiff argued that since the violation of the Order Prohibiting Dissemination of Case Material cannot be completely purged, Sanson and Schneider's conduct constitutes criminal contempt.

b. Sanson's Allegations

It is noted that Sanson made a special appearance to oppose Plaintiff's Motion for an Order to Show Cause.

Sanson stated he is accused of violating an Order in a case to which he is not a party and had not been given notice or opportunity to be heard. He also notes the civil cases Abrams and her counsel, Marshal Willick (hereinafter "Willick") brought against Sanson and his organization, Veterans in Politics International (hereinafter "VIPI"): case numbers A-17-749318-C and A-17-750171-C. Sanson argued that his

criticisms of Abrams and Willick's Court practices led to them filing suits against Sanson and VIPI. Sanson additionally noted Plaintiff's Motion for an Order to Show Cause failed to attach a supporting affidavit from Plaintiff and concluded the motion was filed to strengthen Abrams and her civil lawsuit against Sanson and VIPI and has nothing to do with Plaintiff.

Sanson noted that neither he nor VIPI were previously named as a party or served with process; furthermore, the Order Prohibiting

Dissemination of Case Material was issued without a hearing or any due process protection for Sanson or VIPI.

The gravamen of Sanson's opposition is as follows: (1) this Court does not have jurisdiction over Sanson and (2) even if this Court has jurisdiction, the Court's Order Prohibiting Dissemination of Case Material is void as unconstitutionally overbroad, violating both federal and state law. Sanson argued that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under *Del Papa v. Steffen*, 920 P.2d 489, 112 Nev. 369 (1996). However, even if this Court has subject matter jurisdiction, he argues that there is a strong presumption for open courtroom proceedings. Furthermore, Sanson argued that he has the right to free speech to criticize Abrams' courtroom behavior and his posting of videos

and making commentary regarding Abrams is a valid exercise of his right to free speech. Furthermore, even if the case was sealed, under Johanson v. District Court, 182 P.3d 94, 124 Nev. 245 (2008), sealing the entire case file without notice or opportunity to be heard constitutes abuse of discretion, especially if it fails to make findings of any clear and present danger or threat of serious and imminent harm to a protected interest and without examining alternative means to accomplish that purpose; furthermore, the Order Prohibiting Dissemination of Case Material was not narrowly drawn and failed to discuss whether any less restrictive alternatives were available. Since the Order Prohibiting Dissemination of Case Material cannot meet the Johanson test, Sanson argued that the Court's Order Prohibiting Dissemination of Case Material is impermissibly broad and thus, it should be vacated.

In addition, Sanson argued that if Plaintiff's Motion for an Order to Show Cause is granted, that this Court should be disqualified per Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.11 because he alleged that this Court's impartiality may be questioned.

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c. Defendant's Opposition

Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for an Order to Show Cause alleged simply that said motion is aimed solely at bolstering Abrams' civil case against Schneider and Sanson.

2. Relevant Law

Pursuant to NRS 125.110(2), once a party requests that a domestic case be sealed, the Court must seal the case. Other than pleadings, findings of the Court, Orders, and Judgments, all other records shall be sealed and shall not be open to inspection except to the parties or their attorneys, or when required as evidence in another action or proceeding (see below).

NRS 125.110 What pleadings and papers open to public inspection; written request of party for sealing.

- In any action for divorce, the following papers and pleadings in the action shall be open to public inspection in the clerk's office:
 - (a) In case the complaint is not answered by the defendant, the summons, with the affidavit or proof of service; the complaint with memorandum endorsed thereon that the default of the defendant in not answering was entered, and the judgment; and in case where service is made by publication, the affidavit for publication of summons and the order directing the publication of summons.
 - (b) In all other cases, the pleadings, the finding of the court, any order made on motion as provided in Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, and the judgment.
 - 2. All other papers, records, proceedings and evidence, including exhibits and transcript of the

testimony, shall, upon the written request of either party to the action, filed with the clerk, be sealed and shall not be open to inspection except to the parties or their attorneys, or when required as evidence in another action or proceeding. (Emphasis added.)

Under Landreth v. Malik, 251 P.3d 163, 127 Nev. 175 (2011), even if the matter at hand is outside the scope of a traditional Family Court matter, Family Court Judges do have subject matter jurisdiction over such matters and thus, Landreth overruled Del Papa v. Steffan.

The Court is mindful of the Nevada Supreme Court Rule VII, Rule (3)(4), which states that sealing is justified by identified compelling privacy or safety interests that outweigh the public interest in access to the Court record. However, under *Johanson*, the Nevada Supreme Court clarified the use of NRS 125.110 in sealing cases. In that case, the District Court entered an Order sealing the entire case file and sua sponte issued a gag order preventing all parties and attorneys from disclosing any documents or discussing any portion of the case.

The *Johanson* Court adopted the following standard regarding gag Orders, or an Order that prevents participants from making extrajudicial statements about their own case: (1) a party must demonstrate a clear and present danger or a serious and imminent threat to a protected competing interest, (2) the order is narrowly drawn, and (3) less restrictive

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alternatives are not available. In *Johanson*, respondent argued that the Court has inherent power to completely seal divorce cases beyond NRS 125.110. However, the Nevada Supreme Court declined to adopt such broad standard and even assuming, in arguendo, that the Court indeed has such broad power, one must show the Court that sealing the entire case file is necessary to protect his, or another person's rights, or to otherwise administer justice. *Johanson*, 182 P.3d at 97-98, 124 Nev. at 250.

Under NRS 22.010, disobedience or resistance to any lawful order issued by the court constitutes contempt. Furthermore, under *Cunningham v. District Court*, 102 Nev. 551, 559-60, 729 P.2d 1328, 1333-34 (1986), the order must be "clear and unambiguous."

Lastly, under new EDCR 5.301, (as with EDCR 5.03, in effect in 2016), the parties and their counsel are prohibited from knowingly permitting others to (a) discuss the case with the minor children, (b) allow minor children to review the proceedings, pleadings or any records, or (c) leaving such materials in a place where it is likely or foreseeable that any minor child will access those materials.

3. Discussion

The Order to Seal Records filed October 6, 2016 states the following: "all documents filed... in the above-entitled action exception

for pleadings, findings of the Court, Orders made on motion... and any judgments, shall be and are hereby sealed." There is no dispute as to the validity of this Order. However, as Sanson alleged, there is a dispute over the validity of the Court's Order Prohibiting Dissemination of Case Material.

a. Does this Court have Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Sanson?

Sanson, citing *Del Papa*, argued that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over him. However, there is no discussion of how *Landreth*, which grants family courts subject matter jurisdiction over other matters, is distinguished. Accordingly, Sanson's argument facially fails in this regard. The Court FINDS that it has subject matter jurisdiction.

<u>b. Even if this Court has Subject Matter Jurisdiction, is the Order Prohibiting Dissemination of Case Material Impermissibly Broad?</u>

The Order Prohibiting Dissemination of Case Material states, pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, in the best interest of the children, and the fact that the parties have settled their case, all hearing videos shall be immediately removed from the internet and "all persons or entities shall be prohibited from publishing, displaying, showing, or making public any portion of these case proceedings." This Order clearly constitutes a gag order as to the parties as well as non-parties as

contemplated in the *Johanson* case and hence, must be subject to the *Johanson* 3-part test.

1. Is there a Serious and Imminent Threat to a Protected Competing Interest?

The first amendment right to free speech and the freedom of the press are obviously protected competing interests when weighed against divorcing parties' privacy interests and the best interest of their children in not being exposed to the case (*see* EDCR 5.301 and prior EDCR 5.03).

Plaintiff framed the issue as the parties and their children being dragged through the mud by unwanted exposure through the actions of Sanson and VIPI, allegedly acting in concert with Schneider. On the other hand, Sanson framed the issue as the exercise of his right to free speech in criticizing Abrams' courtroom behavior.

At the time the Court drafted the Order Prohibiting Dissemination of Case Material, it was very cognizant that there were four (4) minor children, ages 14, 12, 10 and 8 involved in the case and that their parents had settled this matter after over a year of great acrimony between the parties, as well as between their counsel. The Court believed it was certainly not in the best interest of the parties or the children to access YouTube, or hear from others who have accessed YouTube, or to see

their parents in Court during their divorce proceedings. This Court would not want the children, their friends or relatives to see their mother struggling with the divorce issues, struggling with whether or not to be represented, to see their maternal grandparents in the background, clearly worried about their daughter, who was very emotional and distraught during the hearing, to listen to financial and other matters being discussed in escalated tones, to hear accusations flying across the room, seeing their parents in conflict in the courtroom setting where children are not typically allowed to be present in divorce actions *for very good reasons*, to know their friends and relatives can access this same video material online at any time, etc. This material would clearly be disturbing emotionally and mentally to most any child who witnessed it.

It was paramount in the Court's mind that the case simmers down and that the parties get down to co-parenting and focusing on bringing some peace to the restructuring they had done in two separate homes. There had been little peace to date; in the Court's view, continuing the case controversy based on any debate would not be in the best interest of the parties or their children. Thus, the Court FINDS that the best interest of the children would trump Sanson's and VIPI's free speech rights in this case.

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2. Was the Order Narrowly Drawn?

The Court must find that the Order is facially overbroad as it is not narrowly drawn where it forbids ALL persons or entities to disseminate information obtained prior to the sealing without giving notice or opportunity to be heard on the issues. However, the Court finds that the Order to Seal Records filed October 6, 2016 forbids dissemination of videos of the hearing, which is covered as the official transcript under NRS 125.110(2):

"All other papers, records, proceedings and evidence, including exhibits <u>and transcript of the testimony, shall, upon the written request of either party to the action, filed with the clerk, be sealed</u> and shall not be open to inspection except to the parties or their attorneys, or when required as evidence in another action or proceeding." (Emphasis added.)

3. Less Restrictive Alternatives Not Available?

The Court Ordered removal of the video from the September 29, 2016 hearing from the entire "internet" and there was no discussion by the Court of whether there were less restrictive means available (e.g. removing the parties' names or case number from the case—which would be little help here where dealing with identification by video…). Plaintiff's motion mentioned that the parties' minor children have access to FaceBook and could have accessed the videos, and this

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Court is in agreement with that view. In this era, children are frequently online, especially watching videos on YouTube at age two (2) and older.

At this time, the Court FINDS that the only sure way it can conceive of that would have worked to assure the restriction of the video being shown only to interested adults, and not to children, would have been through advertised scheduled showings in a place where children are not allowed.

Again, the Court FINDS as the Order Prohibiting Dissemination of Case Material failed to give notices to any of the "All persons or entities," including Sanson, no one was given any means to challenge the validity of the order. Thus, any non-party, without prior notice, could have been dragged into court unconstitutionally, despite lack of any reasonable connection with the case.

Accordingly, the Court FINDS that the Order Prohibiting

Dissemination of Case Material to be unconstitutionally overbroad

and as such, the Court HEREBY ORDERS the Order Prohibiting

Dissemination of Case Material shall be struck and vacated.

Although the Court must find that the Order fails and cannot be enforced as written, nonetheless, this Court must always have the best interests of children in mind in all decision-making, and as such is

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compelled to find that, after the Court made it clear what the concerns were, the Court does not find it was appropriate to continue to post the hearing video on the internet where the parties' minor children would have easy access to emotionally and mentally disturbing material, without attempting to reach an intended audience in a more responsible way. Notwithstanding, there is nothing this Court can do in this case to enforce this viewpoint.

4. Disqualification of the Court

Since the Court finds that the Order Prohibiting Dissemination of Case Material is overbroad and Orders that it be struck and vacated, it need not rule on Sanson's request that should this court grant Plaintiff's Motion for an Order to Show Cause, that the Court disqualify itself under Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.11 because Sanson argued that he can reasonably infer that this Court is seeking to stifle criticism and thus, the Court's impartially may be questioned.

The Court would note that there is a great deal of case law under which his argument fails and Sanson fails to cite any rule of law in his support. Following his reasoning, if Sanson criticizes any or every Judge, each and every Judge who he criticized must recuse from hearing any case where Sanson involves himself. What then becomes of the

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independence of the judiciary? Independent, except for Sanson?

Independent, except for this or that reporter, or newspaper, or news station?

D. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

The Court FINDS and Orders that without a valid Order
Prohibiting Dissemination of Case Material, that Plaintiff's Order to
Show Cause cannot stand.

Although the Order to Seal Records (1) excludes any pleadings, findings, orders and judgments per NRS 125.110 requirements and under subsection (2) this includes the video as the "official transcript" in family court; this however, is not a fact that is widely known. The Court does not believe anyone working outside of the area of family court (or some inside for that matter) would be aware that the video is the official transcript of the hearing. Thus, the statute reads as if it is limited to documents only and does not give proper notice to anyone as to the prohibitory use of a hearing video as a hearing transcript.

Additionally, at this juncture, the Plaintiff's Motion for an Order to

Show Cause is unquestionably vague as to how the parties were or even

Plaintiff (real party/parties in interest in this case) was harmed by the posting

RA 23

of the information on-line. Accordingly, the Court CANNOT FIND that either Schneider or Sanson violated the Order to Seal Records.

The Court further FINDS that Plaintiff's Motions appear to be more about bolstering Abrams' civil action against Schneider and Sanson, especially since neither party has alleged specific harm. Proper venue to hear this matter appears to be Abrams' civil action against Schneider and Sanson, or the State Bar of Nevada, if appropriate.

Furthermore, it seems illogical that Plaintiff is seeking an order to compel Defendant to personally appear in this matter when his Motion for an Order to Show Cause is predominantly regarding allegations against Sanson. Plaintiff stated that both he and Defendant were mortified that case materials were being posted on-line. Plaintiff stated that he attempted to resolve the matter, but Sanson refused to remove the case materials. Schneider's alleged role in the matter was not made clear to the Court. In his Motion for an Order to Show Cause, Plaintiff made no claims against Defendant. The Court declines to Order Defendant to personally appear.

E. ATTORNEY'S FEES

Furthermore, the Court ORDERS that all parties to bear their own fees and costs in this matter.

RA 24

Court's calendar set for March 21, 2017 at 10:00 a.m. and March 30, 2017 at 9:00 a.m. and the case shall be CLOSED with the Notice of Entry of this Order, which shall be prepared by Department L. The Order and Notice of Entry of Order may be emailed and faxed to both counsel for the parties and counsel for Mr. Sanson, who shall be advised there shall be no appearances. Department L shall additionally mail the Order and Notice of Entry of Order to all counsel.

The Court Orders that the Clerk shall remove the hearings from the

day of

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. L

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RAZS

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

BRANDON PAUL SAITER,

Appellant,

VS.

TINA MARIE SAITER,

Respondent.

No. 72819

FIRE

MAY 0 2 2018

CLERK OF CUPPEME COURT

BY

DEPUTY CLERK

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

This is an appeal from a district court order granting in part and denying in part a motion under NRCP 60(a), denying a motion for an order to show cause regarding contempt, and vacating an order prohibiting dissemination of case material. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Court Division, Clark County; Jennifer Elliott, Judge.

When our initial review of the docketing statement and documents before this court revealed that the challenged order may not be substantively appealable, we ordered appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant has filed a response and respondent has filed a reply.

This court has jurisdiction to consider an appeal only when the appeal is authorized by statute or court rule. Brown v. MHC Stagecoach,

RA 26

18-16614

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

¹No cause appearing, appellant's motion to file a response to respondent's reply is denied. The clerk shall detach the response from the motion filed on November 6, 2017, and return it unfiled.

LLC, 129 Nev. 343, 345, 301 P.3d 850, 851 (2013). No statute or court rule appears to authorize an appeal from an order vacating an order prohibiting dissemination of case material or from an order denying a motion under NRCP 60(a). Further, a contempt order that is ancillary to another proceeding is not independently appealable. Pengilly v. Rancho Santa Fe Homeowner Ass'n, 116 Nev. 646, 5 P.3d 569 (2000). Although appellant asserts that the order is appealable as a special order after final judgment, see NRAP 3A(b)(8), he does not demonstrate that the order affects his rights arising from the final judgment (the divorce decree), see Gumm v. Mainor, 118 Nev. 912, 914, 59 P.3d 1220, 1221 (2002) (defining an appealable special order after final judgment as an order that "affect[s] the rights of some party to the action, growing out of the judgment previously entered. It must be an order affecting rights incorporated in the judgment"). The order prohibiting dissemination of case material was entered on October 6, 2016, prior to the entry of the divorce decree on December 28, 2016. However, the order does not resolve any portion of the complaint for divorce, and the divorce decree does not incorporate the October 6, 2016, order. Thus, the order vacating the October 6, 2016, order does not affect appellant's rights incorporated in the final judgment.

Appellant also seems to assert that the order is appealable because the issues presented are of public importance and "susceptible to repetition but evading review." The nature of the issues raised in an appeal does not confer jurisdiction; rather, jurisdiction must be established by statute or court rule with reference to what the order does. See Brown, 129 Nev. at 345, 301 P.3d at 851. We decline appellant's request to treat the notice of appeal as a petition for an original writ. If appellant's counsel determines that pursuit of an original writ petition with this court is proper,

RA 27



appellant may file a petition in this court in compliance with NRAP 21. We conclude that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal and we ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.²

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cc: Hon, Jennifer Elliott, District Judge, Family Court Division Ara H. Shirinian, Settlement Judge Willick Law Group Louis C. Schneider, LLC Eighth District Court Clerk

RAZ8

²We decline respondent's requests to award sanctions and attorney fees and to refer this matter to the State Bar of Nevada.