1 witness.

MR. BRADLEY: No questions.
JUDGE STOCKARD: Thank you, Judge.
THE WITNESS: My pleasure.
MR. TERRY: We would rest, Mr. Chairman.
JUDGE STOCKARD: Thank you.
Mr. Bradley, closing.
MR. BRADLEY: Yes.

9 May it please the Commission, I'm not going 10 to repeat all of the evidence you've just heard. 11 It's been a very short hearing. But I would like to 12 highlight just a few things that I think are 13 important.

First, as we went through the exhibits, at First, as we went through the exhibits, at Tab 7, which was the June 8th court minutes, the court minutes reflect that Judge Hughes "finds that the mother has failed to facilitate Father's New York and the father has failed to facilitate visitation with the father, she violated his parental rights and the orders of this court.

"She was advised at the last hearing that if she did not compel the minor child to visit with the father on the weekends, the child would spend the entire summer with the father.

Page 177

Page 178 "Based on the reasons stated above, it is hereby ordered that the Court finds the plaintiff is in contempt of court to facilitate visitation on weekends with the Father. An order to show cause shall issue.

6 The court followed -- Judge Hughes followed 7 that up on June 14th, Tab 8, Bates 95, "The Court 8 further finds that Plaintiff is in contempt of the 9 Court's order to facilitate visitation on weekends 10 with Father."

11 She follows that up with an order the 12 following day, June 15th, and it is a journal entry 13 and it says "Due to Mom's failure to facilitate 14 visitation and compel the child to visit with Dad, 15 the Court is ordering that Dad shall have temporary 16 sole legal and sole physical custody."

17 Clearly, Judge Hughes was using as a sword 18 a change of custody to punish Ms. Silva for 19 violating the visitation order. The causal 20 connection is undeniable and for the judge to 21 testify that one had nothing to do with the other is 22 suspect.

And for the judge to say that, clearly she And for the judge to say that, clearly she didn't hold Ms. Silva in contempt because there was no sanction, I submit to you that taking away a

Page 93 1 alienation is because that is considered 2 psychological abuse -- not my words -- in the DSM 5. So when you look at the pathology that's 3 4 present in the child through the materials of 5 Dr. Craig Childress that I was referred to by Judge 6 Elliott and Judge Duckworth. And in our judicial 7 educational requirements I get these things. You look at the responses by the child and 8 9 you look at the materials and there's a checklist. 10 Is the child exhibiting this, is the child 11 exhibiting that. There's five or six impressions. 12 Q All right. MR. BRADLEY: Your Honor, I think we're 13 14 going pretty far afield even from last time. She's 15 talking about Dr. Childress and what he did. That 16 was excluded in motions in limine. I would ask for 17 some guidance from --JUDGE STOCKARD: Mr. Terry. 18 19 MR. TERRY: We're not going to get into Dr. 20 Childress not much, if at all. We recognize the 21 Chair's ruling and accept the Chair's ruling that 22 the documents provided by Dr. Childress on which 23 Judge Hughes relied in part are not admissible. Ŵе 24 accept that. It's part of her learning. It's like 25 law school. You learn torts and property.

Page 94 1 JUDGE STOCKARD: I'm going to sustain the 2 objection but I think it's probative as to the 3 history of the hearings. But I think going too much 4 afield of -- getting into what was addressed in 5 Motion in Limine 1, I'm going to sustain it as to 6 that. MR. TERRY: We will not refer to Dr. 8 Childress anymore but there will be further 9 testimony as to the terminology, the actions in 10 reference to the parental alienation. JUDGE STOCKARD: And we'll take them as 11 12 they come. 13 MR. TERRY: Very well. 14 BY MR. TERRY: 15 Q All right. Now, you had -- as the 16 chronology showed, you had set a hearing for 17 7/9/2015. You received Ms. Weiford's letter 18 6/29/2015. But before the 7/9/2015 you received a 19 supplemental letter, and that's at RO 157. 20 Α Okay. 21 0 Take a moment and look at that. 22 Α Okay. (Witness reviewing document.) 23 24 BY MR. TERRY: This is Ms. Weiford's letter of what in 25 Q

Page 95 1 effect would have been the day before the hearing. 2 Α Okay. 3 All right? Are you familiar with this? Q 4 А Yes. Okay. By way of summary, does it indicate 5 Q 6 no sessions have occurred between Annie and the 7 natural father? That is correct. Α 8 9 Q Okay. Does it indicate that Dad has 10 followed all directions? Yes. 11 А Does it indicate that Subject Minor is 120 13 complaining about, again, about being tested by the 14 natural father? Ά I don't know. I don't recall. Oh, she 15 16 does say something. 17 Okay. Q Yes. She's upset about the testing. 18 А 19 And does it also indicate that there is no Q 20 consequence to the subject minor for not cooperating 21 with the reunification attempt? Oh, absolutely. Mother is not supporting 22 А 23 reunification. 24 All right. Upon what are you basing that? Q The comments by the therapist that Mother 25 Α

Page 96 1 called days in advance of the first meeting and 2 said, What do I do if she doesn't want to come? The 3 therapist told her that she still needed to 4 encourage her. She told -- the mother told the 5 therapist, I don't know why you just can't take her 6 word for it. Did you ever find one piece of evidence 0 7 8 that indicated that mother was encouraging 9 reunification? 10 Ά No. Was there any experts' reports that were 11 Q 12 ever provided to you that indicated Mother is 13 encouraging reunification? Just the opposite. 14 А Okay. Did Mother ever say in any of her 15 Q 16 documents filed with you, I am encouraging 17 reunification? 18 А No So back to the July 8th, 2015, letter, 19 Q 20 Ms. Weiford reports to you that there has been no as 21 she calls it, conjoint appointment ever. Is that correct? 22 23 Α Up until this time, no. 24 0 So this would have been the second attempt 25 and she makes reference in paragraph one, "I'm

r	
1	Page 97 writing this letter as an update to the
2	above-mentioned case that was forwarded to my office
3	May 26th," and then she makes reference to the
4	June 29th letter
5	A Yes.
6	Q correct?
7	A Yes.
8	Q So does that refresh your memory that
9	June 29th would have been the first session, the
10	first attempt at reunification?
11	A Well, I entered my order the end of May.
12	Q Correct.
13	A And I know that she made several attempts
14	and I think she goes into this historically what she
15	tried to do to get the sessions established. It
16	wasn't happening.
17	Q So advise the Commission what Ms. Weiford
18	indicated to you in this letter.
19	A Okay. That several days before the first
20	appointment, Mom called and was resistant to even
21	scheduling the appointment and she mentioned to the
22	therapist that Annie was sorry Subject Minor
23	was too stressed, that she wouldn't get in the car,
24	that she was having, like, a panic attack, that she
25	was crying.
1	

Page 98 And the therapist at one point talked to 1 2 the child on the phone and the child was upset and 3 crying and that the therapist calmed her down, and 4 she stopped crying when she said, Okay. I don't 5 know what "okay" meant, Okay, you don't have to 6 come. Okay, you know, we're going to end the 7 conversation. But Mother was very resistant to bringing 8 They came -- at one point Father was already 9 her. 10 upstairs in the conference room and they wouldn't 11 get out of the car and it's August. I know I'm 12 jumping ahead but ... 13 MR. BRADLEY: It's fine. THE WITNESS: Is that okay with you? 14 15 MR. BRADLEY: Excuse me, counsel. 16 BY MR. TERRY: Continue with this letter. 17 Q I'm sorry. Mother wanted to know what she Α 18

19 If a borry. Nother wanted to know what ble 19 should do if the child did not want to come to the 20 appointment or was unwilling to get her in the car, 21 if she couldn't get her to leave to go to the 22 appointment or if Dad started to lie. Mother wanted 23 to give the child words to use if she was feeling 24 certain ways.

25 Q How did you construe that? A signal?

Page 99 1 A Yes. Like safe words that you use. That's 2 how I construed that. And the therapist tried to 3 impress upon Mother you need to let it be organic, 4 let them have their time together, let them be 5 reunified, let them meet. It's a safe environment, 6 it's in my office, it's okay, and --

7 Q Did the mother indicate to Ms. Weiford 8 that, You, Ms. Weiford, are not making my daughter 9 feel comfortable?

10 A Yeah, she did.

11 Q Okay.

A She said she doesn't have this problem with anyone else in her life, meaning the targeted parent, the father. So validating my child does not like him, does not want to be reunified with him, she doesn't have this problem with anyone else in her life and so you should accept my child's position on this and not force this reunification.

19 Q And that's based upon Ms. Weiford's second 20 letter.

21 A Yes.

22 Q Now, she continues in the reference to the 23 father, obviously, he's greatly disappointed.

A He loves his daughter very much and wants 25 to have a relationship with his daughter and he's

1 heartbroken.

2 Q Did that change?

3 A No.

4 Q He never gave up.

5 A No, he didn't give up. It was a year and 6 he didn't give up.

Page 100

7 Q Now, in the interview with the father he 8 basically portrayed a whole different situation with 9 the subject minor, showing photographs of he and the 10 subject minor.

11 A Right.

12 Q At any point in time, well in advance of 13 this, et cetera, were they depicted as everything 14 was fine?

15 A Having a good relationship, yes.

16 Q Having a good relationship.

17 Now, Ms. Weiford also gives you 18 observations at page 159. Part of that is, "Subject 19 Minor is not very clear when she talks about her 20 relationship with her father. It seems very much 21 intertwined with Mom's relationship with dad. I am 22 concerned with the possible enmeshment that Subject 23 Minor and Mom might have."

24 A Yes.

25 Q And this goes back to the we are one --

1 A Yes.

2

5

Q The parental alienation.

3 A It's called a cross-generational parental 4 alienation.

Page 101

O What is that?

A So if you think about parent/child 7 relationships, a pyramid -- upside-down pyramid 8 where the base is at the top and it points down to 9 the bottom.

10 In a normal-range family, a normal 11 functioning family, at the top of the pyramid in 12 each corner are the parents and the child is at the 13 bottom. They are the executory function. They make 14 the decisions and they hand those decisions down to 15 their child.

In a pathogenic situation or a Cross-generational parental alienation, the materials that I reviewed said that it's a perverse triangle, meaning that child and parent are giving decisions to this parent. This is the outed parent, the targeted parent. This is an allied parent and this is the child. They make the decisions and they the targeted parent, This is how it's going to the targeted parent, This is how it's going to

25

And the enmeshment is because of the

Page 1 cross-generational coalition. The coalition in this 2 case was so strong and so solidified it was, We are 3 a team, Dad's the enemy. That's what this was 4 portraying to me.

102

5 Q All right. Now, at page 160 Ms. Weiford 6 gives opinions in reference to the subject minor as 7 being very strong-willed, articulate, and quite 8 adult in many ways.

9 A Uh-huh.

10 Q And then she opines, "So it was curious 11 when she was not able to specifically articulate 12 what her concerns were with Dad."

13 A Right.

14 Q Did I read that correctly?

A She is a very articulate young lady. I call it "adultification," which isn't a good thing.
People make --

18 Q Older than your years.

A Well, your vocabulary, that's fine, if you20 have a sophisticated vocabulary.

But when you're taking on adult problems and adult situations and making them your own, that's a very strong enmeshment. So when she says she couldn't articulate the problems she had with her father, that they were really the problems that 1 Mother had with Father.

2 And she was taking on a protective role of 3 the mother and all the adult problems. And that's 4 adultification. That's not a good thing for a child 5 to be put in the middle. They become a 6 psychological battle ground.

Page 103

7 Q Now, the recommendation portion --8 MR. BRADLEY: Your Honor, I hate to do this 9 but we're getting far afield of what happened in 10 this case and we're hearing all these ideas about 11 adultification and things that I don't think are 12 central to what this Commission's already said are 13 the central issues.

I get that we have to go through a for chronology but we're going way far afield and we'll he here all day into tomorrow if we think about very single issue about this child and whether she's an adult and whether she's articulate and all hese other things. We need to look at the bigger picture, which is moving this case through the history of what happened. I understand the Commission's ruling but this part is way too detailed. JUDGE STOCKARD: Mr. Terry.

25 MR. TERRY: Mr. Chairman, I'm mindful of

Page 104 1 the time periods that you've given us, okay? Four 2 hours for the prosecutor and four hours for Judge 3 Hughes' case. If necessary, I won't call some of 4 the other witnesses that we were prepared to call. 5 We will get through it at the time that your Honor 6 has ordered.

7 However, addressing myself now to the --8 what I'll construe as the relevancy issue, this is 9 the buildup. This is part of the big picture. And 10 counsel's right. It's going to continue to grow 11 just like this. There is another Weiford letter in 12 here and another expert is appointed and you'll run 13 into the same thing.

We can either do that by way of summary, We can either do that by way of summary, which I don't recommend because I think it's very if important for the panel to understand that the video that you saw was the last straw. It was all that Judge Hughes could do based upon the totality of what had occurred in this case.

JUDGE STOCKARD: Well, I'm going to sustain 21 the objection. But what I want to do is stay with 22 the chronology and not get into -- something between 23 a summary and kind of where we're at now.

24 Does that make sense.

25 MR. TERRY: I believe it does, Mr.

Page 105 1 Chairman. And I think what you're saying to me is 2 save it for closing. But if my colleague objects on 3 relevancy, I'll move on to something else. Is that a fair analysis? 4 JUDGE STOCKARD: Sure. I think so. 5 But, I 6 mean, if you believe it's getting too far field, 7 then just renew your objection. MR. BRADLEY: Thank you. 8 MR. TERRY: May I continue? 9 10 JUDGE STOCKARD: Of course. 11 BY MR. TERRY: We are done with that letter from Ms. 12 0 13 Weiford. 14 Α Okay. 15 Now, the next document the panel has deals Q 16 with the telephonic conference. And what is this in reference to? 17 This is 18 dated July 15th. 19 The court and counsel had a question as to Α 20 whether father's request to go back to his custodial 21 schedule, whether that request should be granted, 22 whether that was in the best interest of the child. So we asked Ms. Weiford if she would have a 23 24 telephone confirmation with us, because she wasn't 25 quite clear in her recommendations whether he could

Page 106 1 go back to his weekend visitation or if she was 2 recommending visitation only through reunification. And that is what she recommended, that 3 4 visitation only happen through the reunification 5 therapy. Okay. And, in fact, in the July 9th 6 0 7 order, which is referenced in the chronology, 8 indicates the hearing on Dad's motion for an order 9 to show time and modified custody and you're finding 10 that Mom -- that Weiford's recommendations are 11 adopted, reunification will continue. 12 Δ Yes. Okay. And Mom ordered to support the 13 0 14 reunification process --15 А Yes. 16 -- the order to show cause of compensatory 0 17 time for Dad is deferred. 18 Α Right. So his motion for order to show 19 cause, his motion to modify custody, it's all 20 deferred, because I'm opting to triage this family 21 through therapy. I think that's the best approach. 22 Q Now, on July 15th there's, in fact, a 23 status hearing -- and I'm trying to be mindful of 24 the Chair's directive here, Judge Hughes. 25 Α Right.

1 Q Okay?

2 A Okay.

Q On July 15th there's a status here for 4 counsel and the court to call Ms. Weiford regarding 5 those two prior letters that you've already 6 testified to.

Page 107

7 A Right.

8 Q And as a result of that, Dad's visitation 9 is temporarily suspended and ordered to occur 10 through reunifications with Weiford.

11 A Right.

12 Q So you suspend Dad's visitation rights.

13 A Temporarily as in the best interest of the 14 child, because it needs to happen through therapy. 15 There is still a valid court order that says he has 16 weekends, and he made that point. He said, I still 17 have weekends. It hasn't been overruled. It hasn't 18 been modified. Judge, why are you making me, you 19 know, go through reunification? I have weekend 20 visitation.

21 And I thought, Well, you've had the police 22 over there seven or eight times. She's not going. 23 I ordered reunification therapy. It's supposed to 24 happen here and Weiford recommended that it happen 25 here in the therapist's office. So in the best

Page 108 1 interest of the child I temporarily suspended his 2 visits in order for it to happen in therapy. I 3 thought that was the best approach. 4 0 And that certainly doesn't show any type of 5 bias against the natural mother. It was a detriment 6 to the father, correct? Unfortunately, for a very long time. 7 Α Okay. Now, on August 5th, 2015, you 8 0 9 received an additional letter from Ms. Weiford. 10 That is at 162. 11 Α Okay. Generally, this makes you aware that Mom 120 13 had called the office. She was in the parking lot. 14 Subject Minor would not get out of the car. 15 Ultimately there is no reunification therapy on that 16 day? А That's correct. 17 18 0 Third time in a row, right? 19 Α Yes. Okay. Ms. Weiford said, If I could be of 20 Q 21 further assistance, basically, let me know. She's 22 done. А I took it as that and I was not happy with 23 24 that. Okay. On 8/25 that was the status of the 25 Q

Page 109 1 reunification therapy and you made a note that 2 Subject Minor was again still continuing to refuse 3 to participate, correct? 8/25, yes. 4 А 5 Q Okay. And I ordered Mom to support it or an order 6 А 7 to show cause would issue and I set a status 8 hearing. 9 0 And you set a status for 9/29 but on 9/1610 Dad files a new motion for an order to show cause 11 and the motion to modify custody based on not seeing 12 the subject minor since April of 2015 and Mom not 13 being concerned with the judge, as you put it, and 14 clueless family court system. Not my words. Those were her words to him. 15 Α Okay. And you set a hearing for April --16 0 17 I'm sorry -- November 4th, 2015. Well, right. It was initially set right 18 Α 19 before Thanksgiving and it was changed. Moved up. 20 Now, there is a supplemental letter by Ms. 0 21 Weiford at 165 dated September 2nd indicating an 22 inability to pay for her services on behalf of Mom. 23 Does that fairly summarize it? It was a letter addressed to the mother, 24 Α

**APP430** 

25 yes.

Page 110 Then at 169 an additional letter of 1 0 Okay. 2 October 8th, 2015, from Ms. Weiford indicating to 3 you that your Honor had requested that you do three 4 reunification sessions but that, basically, it did 5 not work. А I'm sorry. Which letter are you looking 6 7 at? 169. 0 8 9 А Okay. So the October 8th. 10 Q Correct. She conducted the three unification 11 Α 12 sessions with Child and Father, thanked them for 13 their participation, and said she would like to 14 continue the therapy. Right. Did that give you some hope? 15 0 A little. 16 Α All right. Now, by 9/22, that's when Dad 17 Q 18 had filed the motion for an order to show cause. 19 This letter comes in October 4th, not that long 20 after that, correct? Correct. 21 Α Okay. If we move on to November 20th, 22 Q 23 Dad's motion to clarify orders and reconsider 24 Weiford's recommendations, do you see that in the 25 chronology?

1 A Yes, I see that.

2 Q That's set for a hearing -- reset for the 3 hearing on 12/8/2015. Is that correct?

Page 111

4 A Correct.

5 Q Okay. On 12/8 this is the hearing on the 6 motion to clarify, et cetera, and your directive at 7 that point in time is -- again, both parties are 8 present.

9 A Right.

10 Q Okay. You give both parties an opportunity 11 to be heard, correct?

12 A Yes.

13 Q And ultimately you direct that Weiford is 14 to continue the reunification therapy, facilitate 15 visitation for Dad, make recommendations, and Dad is 16 permitted to take Subject Minor out for an activity. 17 A That's what Weiford recommended.

18 Q And the exchange would occur at Ms. 19 Weiford's office.

20 A She offered her office because Donna's 21 House is not always available. They don't have 22 constant hours and a lot of times parents exchange 23 at the security gate if they can't exchange at 24 Donna's House.

25 She also offered her office if it was like

Page 112 1 a 7:00 p.m. on a Monday, or whenever they weren't 2 available at Donna's House she would facilitate, in 3 other words. And page 171 an additional report by Ms. 4 0 5 Weiford. Α Yes. 6 Okay. Briefly summarize what this report Q 8 indicates. I can't. There is no brief about it. 9 Α Pursuant to the directive of the Chair. 10 0 Α I'm sorry. I know. It's so many pages. 11 12 MR. BRADLEY: I'll stipulate to allow Mr. 13 Terry to summarize it. MR. TERRY: Okay. I appreciate that. 14 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 15 16 BY MR. TERRY: At page 171 she gives a summary of what she 17 Q 18 refers to as "the conjoint sessions." First 19 session, "Subject Minor did not respond to Dad 20 directly. At a later time Annie opened up most of 21 the time that they were together." This is page 22 172. And at the third session, second paragraph, 23 24 "Right before the third session, as I'm walking" --25 this is Ms. Weiford -- "the Subject Minor into the

Page 113 1 room, she was determined to let me know that she did 2 not want to be reunified." Is that accurate? Yes. After a second successful session she 3 Α 4 did a 180. 5 0 Right. So finally there had been a meeting 6 between Dad and the subject minor. Α Correct. But that was the second attempt. 8 0 9 А Right. 10 Q Third attempt, I don't want to be 11 reunified. Right. 12 Α 13 0 Okay. Part of the observation was that the 14 subject minor reporting that she had been acting 15 when she was spending time with her father all these 16 years. Acting. 17 Α That very much hurt her father. Okay. Now, Ms. Weiford makes reference to 18 Q 19 Annie's -- Subject Minor's therapist. 20 Who was the subject minor's therapist? 21 Α I believe it was a Ms. Harper. 22 Q Okay. 23 Α But she only went twice. Correct. But what's important is that 24 0 25 Annie's not reporting any type of abuse, neglect or

Page 114 1 other issues with her father, correct? 2 That is correct. Α Okay. And then the last paragraph, "It 3 Q 4 appears that Mom's thoughts are that the problems 5 lie solely with Dad. Therefore, if we get rid of 6 Dad, the problem is solved." Is that what she --Yes, that's what she said. Α Okay. And counsel's right. This is a 8 0 9 relatively long letter. At page 173 -- you already 10 testified to this -- Mom's attitude is much more 11 permissive. Dad's attitude is structured. The parenting styles are different. 12 Α 13 Q That doesn't mean they're wrong in their 14 parenting styles. It just means they have a 15 different approach. 16 Α Again, a normal-range parent, there's a 17 wide variety of parenting styles. It's when you get 18 outside of the normal-range, which Mother was, that 19 you have issues. 20 What are you relying on in indicating that Q 21 to the panel? 22 That she was out of range? Α 23 0 Yes. 24 А The enmeshment, the cross-generational 25 coalition. It's us against him. He can just go

Page 115 1 back to Brazil where he came from. We don't need The child not being able to articulate what 2 him. 3 her problems were. She was protecting her mom. The problems were the adult conflict and a 5 child turned into a psychological battle ground. 6 And I know you don't want me to use those terms, but 7 that is my thought process. All right. Did you determine that Mom and 8 Q 9 Subject Minor were talking about the reunification? 10 Absolutely. Α 11 Q Okay. 12 А She gave the child an email from the 13 therapist. 14 Q Okay. 15 That was directed to Mom. Α 1.6 Q All right. In the middle of 173 she 17 opines, "I believe that Subject Minor is a child of 18 divorce that is in the middle of the conflicts with 19 her parents. If Subject Minor was spending all of 20 her days being schooled by Mom, going to the dance 21 studio with Mom, and is really close to Mom, of 22 course she is going to see Dad as the enemy." 23 A really strong term. 24 Very strong term but, unfortunately, a Α 25 reality.

Page 116 Okay. Then in that same paragraph "This 1 Q 2 stance is being supported in championed by her 3 mother, " correct? А I thought that was a strong word too, Δ 5 championed. That means wholeheartedly supported 6 contrary to everything that's in the child's best 7 interest. Yet Ms. Weiford is still recommending that 2 0 9 the counseling continue because she indicates it 10 makes sense to align with the parent that she's 11 closest to and who she observes as being victimized. 12 Α Right. 13 Now Mom is the victim. 0 14 Ά Yes. 15 Okay. However, continuing with the quote, 0 16 "However, discarding her previous relationship with 17 Dad is not the answer." 18 In other words, she still is recommending 19 steps to be taken towards the reunification. What is the alternative? 20 Ά 21 0 Well, the alternative is what? 22 Dads walks away and says goodbye? Α Correct. 23 Q.... And they win? That he's out of her life 24 Α 25 and he loves her very much and he cares for her very

6.

Page 117 1 much and all he wants to do is have a normal 2 relationship? So what's he supposed to do? It's not happening -- Mom's not 3 4 facilitating, the child is refusing, and therapy is 5 the only answer. That's what has to happen or he 6 walks away. What are the options? At page 174 Ms. Weiford indicates, "It 0 8 seems that Mom believes that she has Subject Minor's 9 best interest by protecting her daughter from her 10 father. However, Mom supporting that relationship 11 with Dad is the best thing she could do for her." 12 In other words, encourage the relationship 13 with Dad. 14 А Child needs to have two parents. And she 15 had a parent that loves her and that relationship 16 wasn't being fostered. It's not in a child's best 17 interest to cut a parent out that wants to show 18 love, affection, and attention. 19 0 Now, you had set a status hearing for 20 January 28th, 2016, and you just made reference to 21 Ms. Weiford's letter of January 21st, 2016. On the notation in reference to 22 23 January 28th, the first time you indicate that 24 exchanges are to occur at Donna's House, what is 25 Donna's House so that the panel understands?

Page 118 Donna's House is -- as a point of history, Α 1 2 Judge Steel created it when a court staff was 3 murdered by her significant other or ex-husband in a 4 domestic violence situation over a child custody exchange. 5 So she created this entity that's on the 6 7 family court campus -- it's not a house. It's an 8 office. It's at the mediation center -- that 9 protects people when they're in high conflict. And 10 you go to Donna's House and it's monitored 11 exchanges. They report to the court but they have 12 to go through an orientation process and they have 13 to know the rules. They have to go through the 14 security gate like the airport where there are metal 15 detectors. That's what Donna's House is. 16 Q All right. Now, at page 176 you received 17 an additional report from Ms. Weiford. 18 Are you familiar with that? I'm there. 19 Α 20 Okay. Part of her recommendations -- and Q 21 she does articulate the fact that Mom was not 22 showing up for appointments with Subject Minor. 23 She scheduled various appointments and they Α 24 weren't participating. 25 And you had ordered family reunification 0

1 therapy, correct?

2 A Many times.

Q Okay. "I have not had a reunification 4 appointment with Dad and his daughter since 5 September 24th, 2015. My office on several 6 occasions has tried to schedule appointments with 7 Mom and Subject Minor. Our last scheduled 8 appointment was December 10th. Mom was aware of 9 the appointment. She made contact with us the day 10 before the appointment. Mom made it clear that she 11 would not be bringing Subject Minor because she 12 could not afford the sessions and because it 13 stressed Subject Minor and gave her headaches," 14 correct?

Page 119

15 A Yes.

16 Q So between the dates articulated in Ms.
17 Weiford's letter and this January 21st letter,
18 there hadn't been any further visitations between
19 Dad and the subject minor, correct?

20 A Correct. The only contact he had was in 21 the three sessions with Weiford.

Q Yet her recommendations are "Dad should be able to start having access to his daughter weekly. Here can be a four-week plan in place," and she talks about what the weeks are. 1 A She did.

2 And she made several other recommendations 0 3 in there. Α Yes, she does. 4 Did you adopt those recommendations? Q 5 6 (Witness reviewing document.) 7 BY MR. TERRY: The reason I ask is it says "All exchanges 8 Q 9 take place at Donna's House." I'm reading all of them. "Dad participate 10 Α 11 monthly." Most of these I did. At some point I 12 ordered them to parenting classes also through UNLV 13 but, yes, exchanges to be done at Donna's House. 14 Now, by February 16th Donna's House advises 0 15 you they are closing their case because Subject

Page 120

16 Minor refuses to go with Natural Father, correct? 17 A Yes. 18 Q Now, by way of summary, what efforts had

19 been made to get the Subject Minor to Donna's House
20 and then ultimately to meet with Dad for the
21 exchange that had been recommended by you?
22 A What do you mean "what efforts had been
23 made"?
24 Q Well, did Mom take her?
25 A She took her.

Page 121 1 Did Subject minor get out of the car? 0 I don't recall. 2 Д 3 Okay. Were there reunifications meetings 0 4 with Dad? At Donna's House? 5 Α Yes. 6 0 7 Д No Do you recall why? 8 Q 9 Α The child refused to go. Okay. How many different times? 10 Q Two or three. 11 А 12 0 Okay. So by this point in time -- and, 13 actually, continuing through this point in time --14 Subject Minor is making the decisions as to what she 15 is and isn't going to do. I think the coalition was making the 16 А 17 decisions. 18 Q Okay. Subject Minor with the support of the 19 Α 20 mother wholeheartedly. 21 But Dad is getting no visitations? 0 22 А None. 23 Now, you set an evidentiary hearing for 0 24 March 29th and then it was reset to 5/12 to allow 25 time for a custody evaluation.

Page 122 1 Α Yes. A full-custody evaluation by Claudia 2 Schwartz, Marriage and Family Therapist. Who is that? 3 0 She is a marriage and family therapist in Α 5 the community that performs these services. There 6 are several that do but I thought her fees would be 7 more reasonable and affordable for the parties 8 rather than a Ph.D. 9 And the outsource custody evaluation as 10 part of it consists of a full psychological 11 evaluation, which in this case I thought was needed 12 due to what appeared to me to be parental 13 alienation. All right. And 178 is Ms. Schwartz's 14 0 15 letter to you indicating that Natural Mother's 16 indicating she cannot afford it. 17 Α Yes. She said she was unable to afford it. 18 0 Now, there's an additional letter at 179 19 from Ms. Steincamp. Are you familiar with her? 20 Ά Yes. 21 Who is Ms. Steincamp? 0 She's also a marriage and family therapist 22 А 23 that I appointed to be a parenting coordinator. 24 That's a liaison between two parents who are 25 high-conflict and they can't communicate effectively

Page 123 1 or respectively so they communicate through the 2 parenting coordinator, and that was going to be her 3 role. 0 So this was the next move you made in an 4 5 effort to ensure reunification. А 6 Yes. 7 0 And pursuant to the April 10th letter, it 8 indicates, "Ms. Silva disagrees with everything." 9 A Are you at 179? 10 0 I am. A Okay. 11 (Witness reviewing document.) 12 13 THE WITNESS: Yes, that's what it says. 14 "Ms. Silva disagrees with everything" and that she 15 smelled like pot. 16 BY MR. TERRY: 17 0 Correct. Now, did Ms. Steincamp continue 18 in her services? 19 А Not really. There was, however, another letter dated 20 0 21 June 12th, 2017, at 182 from Ms. Steincamp. Yes, there is. 22 А 23 Q Would you look at that. 24 A Yes. 25 Q Okay. And can you summarize that letter?

Page 124 Well, at first impression she seems to be 1 Α 2 including reports from other therapists because she 3 talks about history and the minor child's 4 statements. And she, to my knowledge, did not 5 interview the child. She had no authority to do 6 that. She was simply the liaison between the 7 parents. "PC" for short, parenting coordinator is 8 to just help them communicate. 9 She indicates at 182 she interviewed 0 10 Subject Minor and she's adamant she does not want to 11 see Father at all. I'm not sure she interviewed her or if 12 А 13 she's taking -- I don't know. I didn't provide her 14 any reports but I don't know if she's taking these 15 comments from someone else. Because she also 16 indicates the wrong age for the child, so I don't 17 know what she's relying on there. I did not talk to 18 her about it. 19 0 Who appointed her to have any involvement 20 in this case? 21 A I did. 22 Okay. For what purpose? Q Just to be the liaison, the communications 23 Α 24 person between Mom and Dad. 25 What does typically a liaison person do? Q

Page 125 A Because they can't communicate effectively with each other, they communicate with the parenting coordinator and the parenting coordinator contacts the other parent.

5 And the parenting coordinator may have 6 communications with both of them, like have them on 7 a conference call or circulate emails. But they 8 filter out the vindictive, disparaging comments, the 9 conflict. They reduce the conflict.

10 Q She, interestingly enough, at 183 either 11 comes up with her own opinion or, again, is relying 12 on somebody else, that it is apparent that Subject 13 Minor and Mother are enmeshed.

14 A I saw that word many times.

15 Q You find that interesting? It's the same 16 terminology that Ms. Weiford is using.

17 A Yes.

18 Q Okay. She also goes on to say "She is 19 almost 12 and she likely knows her way around the 20 Internet."

21 A Oh, yeah.

22 Q What did you construe that as?

A Well, this was after I changed custody on a24 temporary basis.

25 Q Correct.

Page 126 Α And I believe what she was referring to was 1 2 the posting of this video of the child crying by 3 Mother on You-Tube. 0 By that time what had been posted on 4 5 You-Tube? Α The video we saw today. 6 The video we just saw? 7 Q А Yeah. 8 MR. BRADLEY: I have to object. She's 9 10 being charged with violating Nevada law and Nevada 11 Judicial Code up to June 15th, 2016, and anything 12 that happens after that is not really relevant to 13 our proceedings here today. I ask that the references to whether or not 14 15 this was played on the Internet is -- should be 16 stricken. MR. TERRY: And I'll leave that one to the 17 18 Chair --JUDGE STOCKARD: I'm going to --19 20 MR. TERRY: -- however, the comment about 21 this case ended on the day of the video that we saw 22 is incorrect. There was an order to show cause 23 hearing that was set at a later point in time that 24 we intend to have testimony, Mr. Chairman. 25 JUDGE STOCKARD: As to the testimony

Page 127 1 regarding the video on You-Tube, I'll sustain that 2 objection. I'll allow you -- as other issues come 3 up, you can renew your objection, so it's sustained. MR. TERRY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can I 5 have your indulgence for one second? JUDGE STOCKARD: 6 Of course. 7 BY MR. TERRY: 8 Q I want you to turn to Respondent's Exhibit 9 book page 125. This is the same journal entry that 10 my colleague made reference to of June 8th, 2016. 11 Do you have that? 12 Α Yes, I do. Now, within this journal entry, which is 13 0 14 five pages long, you recount certain facts, correct? 15 Yes. А 16 0 My colleague didn't necessarily go into 17 those, but, for example, "This case has a lengthy 18 troubled history. Since the parties' divorce of 19 April 26th, 2013, they've been before the court no 20 less than nine times primarily on father's motions 21 to enforce his custody rights, et cetera." 22 Α Right. Okay. And you go on to articulate facts 23 Q 24 that have been ascertained on this case since you 25 have been the judge on this case, correct?

Page 128 I do. 1 А You make reference to the Wealthy reports. 2 0 3 You make reference to Donna's House, et cetera, and 4 the failures to effectuate reunification. А Yes. 5 By this point in time had you determined 6 Q 7 that the parental alienation was obviously present? Absolutely. 8 Α Did you determine that Mother was 9 Q 10 interfering with the reunification process? 11 Α Yes. Is it for that reason that you Okay. 12 0 13 directed that the subject minor be brought to court? А Yes. 14 By the June -- date of this order, had you 15 Q 16 already -- journal entry. I beg your pardon --17 Α Right. 18 Q -- had you already determined that a 19 temporary change of custody was appropriate? 20 Д Yes. 21 And was it based upon that which is set 0 22 forth within this journal? These are the highlights, obviously. 23 Α Ι 24 couldn't draft a 10-page journal entry but I felt it 25 important to describe the efforts that I had made to

Page 129 1 try to reunify the child and the father, and those 2 were part of my findings to temporarily transfer 3 custody. Now, prior to the journal entry, Dad had 0 4 5 filed requests for order to show cause why Mom should not be held in contempt, correct? 6 Correct. And I hadn't ruled on those. А Не 8 had two motions to have her held in contempt and he 9 had two motions to change custody. 10 And those hadn't been ruled on? 0 11 Rather than granting or denying, I chose to Α 12 deal with it therapeutically, but they were still 13 pending. 14 0 Okay. Now, at page 128 you indicate "This 15 Court finds that Plaintiff, Natural Mother" --16 Α Right. -- "is in contempt of the Court's order to 17 0 18 facilitate visitation on weekends with the father. 19 An order to show cause shall issue." 20 А Yes. Once again, the change of custody wasn't as 21 Q 22 a result of your, quote, finding, closed quote, of 23 contempt. Is that correct? 24 Not at all. А What was the change of custody based upon? 25 0

Page 130 1 Α What we had been enduring for the last year 2 was Mother withholding the child, Mother committing 3 parental alienation, the child not going, and 4 therapy failing because Mom wouldn't encourage and 5 facilitate. She wouldn't participate in therapy. 6 Did you feel it was in the best interest of 0 7 the minor child to have a relationship with her 8 father? 9 Д Of course. 10 Q Okay. Had Ms. Silva ever filed anything 11 that said, I don't want my daughter to have any 12 relationship with her father? 13 Α Had she filed anything? I don't recall. 14 Basically, a motion to terminate parental Q 15 rights. 16 Α Oh, no, no, no. 17 Okay. That type of document had never been Q 18 filed. 19 Α No. 20 Q And then you continue "An order to show 21 cause is also issued against Plaintiff for not 22 complying with the Court's orders to refinance the 23 house or have it sold," correct? Home equity line of credit. 24 Α "And a further order to show cause is 25 Q

1.145

Page 131 1 further issued against Plaintiff for not having the 2 subject minor tested for math proficiency." 3 Now, this is from the order that you 4 entered in February of 2015. Is that correct? I believe. It was over a year prior. 5 А Okay. Well, as of June 8th it would have 6 Q 7 been over a year. Yeah. It was in 2015. 8 Α 9 Q Okay. 10 А There were a couple of orders. Okay. Then you indicate at 129, "The order 11 Q 12 to show cause hearing shall be scheduled for 13 July 28th. Status check set for July 28th at 14 ten is hereby vacated," at page 19, correct? Correct. There wasn't a need for a status 15 А 16 check because the order to show cause hearing had 17 been set. All right. On June 15th, which is the date 18 0 19 that the panel had seen the hearing, did you --It's not a hearing. 20 Α 21 Well --0 22 Α It was a child custody exchange. Did you feel you had any other choice 23 0 Yes. 24 at that point in time other than to change the 25 custody?

1 A No.

2 Q And why is that?

A I had tried everything. I'd used every
4 resource that was available to me. There was
5 nothing else I could do.

Page 132

6 Q This was based upon your training and 7 experience?

8 A The experts that I had, the reunification 9 therapist, the parenting coordinator, Donna's House. 10 I didn't have anything else I could do. I didn't 11 have another way to address this.

12 Q Well, you could have continued it.
13 A Over --

14 Q -- on and on and on and on for another two 15 or three years, Judge. Why didn't you do that? 16 A That's not appropriate. Because all this 17 while the child is not having a relationship with 18 her father and there's nothing wrong with her 19 father.

20 Q And the longer she's away from her father, 21 the harder reunification is going to be.

A There's no other way to do it. And my job 3 is very tough and I took no pleasure in doing that. 4 Q Now, what isn't shown here is that there's 25 a point in time -- when I say "here," the video that

Page 133 1 we saw -- there was a point in time when you address 2 the subject minor, just you and she. 3 А Yes. 0 And is this permissible? 4 Α Yes. 5 Under what authority? 0 6 Under the best interest of the child, the 7 А 8 Court has great latitude. There's case law on that, 9 that I can make any order as I deem best interest of 10 the child. During that nine minutes, what if anything 11 Q 12 was your exchange with the subject minor? Was it an 13 interrogation? It was not. I did not ask her questions. 14 Α How would you summarize it? 15 Q It was an opportunity for me to explain to 16 Α 17 her what was happening and why. 18 Q Did you do that? I did that, yes. 19 Α 20 Q Okay. Was she upset? 21 Α No. Now, you see her crying on this video and 22 Q 23 you ultimately go back on and order that she go with 24 Dad. 25 Right. Α

Page 134 Okay. Is your testimony she wasn't crying Q 1 2 when you and she were together? Absolutely not. Α 3 Okay. Your court clerk was likewise 4 0 5 present, correct? Α And my marshal. 6 Why did you do that out of the presence of 0 8 all other parties and just you and the subject minor 9 and not on video? A Okay, that's a lot. So why did I not do it 10 11 on video? Am I allowed to answer that? We don't 12 videotape children because the parents can misuse 13 those videos and put them on You-Tube. And I know 14 you made an objection to that but --Okay. That's probably good enough. 15 0 16 Α -- I'm trying to protect the child. It's 17 not in the best interest of the child to videotape 18 her because it can be misused. Second of all, as if in a child interview, 19 20 which this was not a child interview, it wasn't 21 under Chapter 50, we seal those so they can't be 22 misused. So that's why it wasn't videotaped. The reason the parents were asked to leave 23 24 was that they could not influence the message that I 25 was trying to deliver to this child. They couldn't

Page 135 1 construe it for the child or comment, and I wanted 2 the child to understand that this is my decision. I 3 have made this decision for your best interest.

And I didn't want her to blame her father because I'm now temporarily placing her with her father to stop the coalition that happened. And this is a recommended treatment method of parental alienation where you temporarily issue an order of no contact by the allied parent and you put the child with the targeted parent and allow them to form a relationship without any interference.

12 They once had a great relationship, they 13 were on their way to getting a good relationship, 14 and they needed time to be together without her 15 interference.

And so I explained to her, I'm doing this for your best interest. I said, Your father loves you very much. He just wants to spend time with you. Please give him a chance. Please decide that you -- open your heart to him and you will go with him. He misses you and he cares for you.

Q Did it appear to you that he was willing to 23 do that?

A She said "I will not" three times. Crossed 25 her arms.

		Page 136		
1	Q	Were her arms folded?		
2	A	Yes. And I said child's name "This		
3	is very	important. You need a father in your life."		
4	And she	started asking me questions and posing		
5	scenario	os to me, what-if scenarios. What if this		
6	and what	t if this, and I answered her questions and		
7	that was	s it.		
8	Q	Ultimately she went with her father that		
9	day, com	rrect?		
10	A	She did.		
11	Q	She never went to Child Haven?		
12	A	No.		
13	Q	Okay. And pursuant to your temporary		
14	order, s	she was ordered to spend the summer with her		
15	father.			
16	A	Yes.		
17	Q	Okay. And ultimately on 7/28, according to		
18	the chro	onology, that's when Mrs. Silva files the		
19	objectio	ons to the further hearing that was going to		
20	occur ai	nd you granted the objections, correct?		
21	А	Well, as to the May 12th order, because		
22	counsel	, unbeknownst to me, did not have that		
23	23 finalized.			
24	Q	Never made the		
25	A	The May 12th order was the Donna's House		

Page 137 1 exchange. 2 0 So there was no order to show cause to 3 proceed upon, correct? I issued the order to show cause because I А 5 didn't know that the May 12th -- there was a 6 handwritten order for Donna's House. That was an 7 order. But I didn't know counsel was not 8 9 successful in getting her order turned in because I 10 had a temporary clerk and she rejected the order. 11 But the temporary clerk didn't advise me of that. 12 My clerk would have told me. Okay. If you look at 133 of the exhibits 13 0 14 in front of you -- this is dated July 28th, 2016--15 А Yes. -- it makes reference to that. 16 0 17 А Oh, okay. Look at that and see if it refreshes your 18 0 19 memory. 2.0 А Right. The order had not been signed or 21 filed regarding Donna's House. The handwritten 22 order had been done but counsel had not submitted 23 the order with the findings. 24 Now, the natural mother also filed a motion 0 25 for reconsideration. Is that correct? That was on

Page 138 1 10/4/2016. After I made my decision on the math 2 Α 3 testing. Correct. And just so we're clear, after a 0 4 5 hearing did you hold her in contempt on any items? At the order to show cause hearing I А 6 7 believe the only thing we proceeded on was the 8 HELOC, maybe -- no, not the HELOC -- the math 9 testing that was ordered over a year ago. 10 0 The one from February --Yes. 11 Α -- of 2015? 12 0 That was the only thing she was held in 13 Α 14 contempt on and sanctioned. 15 And what was the sanction? 0 \$500. 16 А Now, by October 14th she files a motion 17 Q 18 for reconsideration, the motion is denied. Dad's 19 countermotion for fees is granted and the court 20 reiterates that Mom was not held in contempt for 21 violating any visitation orders. That's correct. 22 А Is that correct? 23 0 24 Α That is correct. Now, up to this point in time you hadn't 25 Q

Page 139 1 been recused from the case, correct? I was never recused. 2 Ά Okay. On 10/11 of '16 is the evidentiary 3 Q 4 hearing on the modification of custody. That was when it was scheduled. It didn't А 5 6 take place. Correct. And, once again, why didn't it 7 0 8 take place? 9 Α The parties stipulated that Father would 10 continue to have temporary sole legal custody, 11 primary physical custody and Mom would have 12 visitation one week on a Saturday and the next week 13 on a Sunday alternating. And that was pursuant to stipulation? 14 Q Stipulation through counsel, but the 15 Α 16 parties were present. 17 And both were represented by counsel? Q 18 А Yes. And I ordered them to parenting 19 classes. I continued the evidentiary hearing at 20 their request. MR. TERRY: Mr. Chairman, recognizing that 21 22 you've given us a period of time to present Judge 23 Hughes' case too, I believe that would be the end of 24 my cross-examination. 25 JUDGE STOCKARD: Okay. Mr. Bradley?

Page 140 1 MR. BRADLEY: No questions. 2 JUDGE STOCKARD: Why don't we take a 3 10-minute break. (Recess taken.) 4 5 JUDGE STOCKARD: Back on the record on Case 6 No. 2016-113-P in the matter of the Honorable Rena 7 Hughes. The parties are present and the Commission 8 is present. Mr. Bradley. 9 MR. BRADLEY: Your Honor, I just wanted to 10 confirm that, because there were no objections filed 11 by Respondent, that all of my exhibits are admitted? MR. TERRY: That is an accurate statement, 12 13 Mr. Chairman. JUDGE STOCKARD: They're admitted. 14 15 MR. BRADLEY: Accordingly, prosecuting 16 officer rests. 17 JUDGE STOCKARD: And just so we know from a 18 time perspective, I show Prosecution has two hours 19 and 56 hours remaining and Respondent has two hours 20 19 minutes remaining. 21 MR. TERRY: I think we can do that, Mr. 22 Chairman. 23 JUDGE STOCKARD: And, Mr. Terry, it's 24 11:30. I'd like to break as close to noon as we 25 can, so how do you --

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Page 141 MR. TERRY: How about if I address the 7 2 Chair after we finish with our first witness? Would that be permissible? 3 JUDGE STOCKARD: Yes. Δ MR. TERRY: The only other thing I would 5 6 ask is I assume that now that the Chair's made 7 rulings on all of the other exhibits, do we have a 8 stipulation that all other exhibits are admitted 9 other than the ones that the Chair has excluded? 10 MR. BRADLEY: Yes. I'll stipulate all the 11 ones are admitted other than the ones you've ruled 12 are inadmissible. MR. TERRY: We, likewise, provided to the 13 14 reporter three or four additional character letters, 15 which I would like to present copies to you at the 16 appropriate time. 17 MR. BRADLEY: And I have no objection to 18 those. JUDGE STOCKARD: And are those different 19 20 than the ones that were uploaded on Friday? MS. DAVIS: I think --21 MR. TERRY: At the end of your book those 2.2 23 are not different because we did forward those to 24 you on Friday. So I have nothing further but I 25 would, for purposes of the record, indicate that I

Page 142 1 did provide those to the court reporter before I got 2 the ruling from the Chair. JUDGE STOCKARD: Very well. So those will 3. 4 all be admitted. 5 Mr. Terry. MR. TERRY: We're prepared to proceed, Mr. 6 7 Chairman, now that Mr. Bradley has rested. JUDGE STOCKARD: Okay. 8 MR. TERRY: Our first witness would be Ms. 9 10 Scaggs, your Honor, Tiffany Scaggs. She's in the 11 witness room. 12 (Witness sworn.) 13 JUDGE STOCKARD: Mr. Terry. DIRECT EXAMINATION 14 15 BY MR. TERRY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 16 Q 17 Ms. Scaggs, for the record, would you spell 18 your first and second name, please. Tiffany, T-i-f-f-a-n-y, Skaggs, Α 19 20 S-k-a-g-g-s. 21 I should have said your last name. Q 22 А Oh, sorry. 23 By whom are you employed? Q 24 Clark County. Α And what is your position? 25 Q

1	A	Page 143 District Court Courtroom Clerk II.	
2	Q	And you work with Judge Hughes?	
3	A	Yes.	
4	Q	Would we commonly refer to you as her court	
5	clerk?		
6	А	Yes.	
7	Q	How long have you had that position?	
8	A	With Judge Hughes?	
9	Q	Yes.	
10	А	Three years.	
11	Q	And that would be since she became a judge?	
12	А	Correct.	
13	Q	And prior to that time you were a court	
14 clerk for other judges, correct?			
15	А	Yes.	
16	Q	I want to direct your attention to a	
17	specific	case that was entitled the Silva case, and	
18	18 consistent with the agreement of all the parties,		
19	we're not	t mentioning the subject minor's name. We	
20	are refe	rring to her as "Subject Minor."	
21	А	Okay.	
22	Q	Do you recall a hearing or a proceeding	
23 conducted by Judge Hughes that was not videoed and			
24	was outs:	ide of the presence of counsel and parents	
25	and just	with the subject minor?	
1			

Page 144 Α Yes. 1 2 Okay. Who else was present in the 0 3 courtroom? The judge, the marshal, myself, and a А 4 trainee clerk. 5 If you could speak up a little bit, I would 6 Q 7 greatly appreciate it. А It was --8 I heard you. I just wanted to make sure 9 Q 10 that the panel's hearing you too. 11 Α Okay. Did that hearing last about nine minutes? 12 Q 13 Α Yes. 14 0 Would you refer to it as a hearing or how 15 would you refer to it? 16 Α It was just letting the minor know what was 17 happening and why. 18 Okay. What did Judge Hughes indicate 0 19 during that hearing to the subject minor? 20 A That for children it's best that they have 21 both parents in their lives. 22 What else? 0 That her father had been trying to have a 23 Α 24 relationship with her and that it was mainly for 25 children who need both parents.

Page 145 How did the subject -- strike that. 1 Q Did Judge Hughes specifically tell the 2 3 subject minor that she was going to be going with 4 her dad? А Yes. 5 6 0 And this was during that nine-minute period 7 also. 8 Ά Yes. What was the demeanor of the subject minor? 9 Q А She was upset. She was somewhat 10 11 argumentative. In what way? Tell the panel. 12 0 She -- she was -- seemed like a girl who 13 Α 14 was used to getting her way, so she was, I'm not 15 gonna do this, You can't make me do this, I don't 16 want to go with him. 17 What was Judge Hughes' response to those Q 18 types of comments? Just that she was the adult and she knew А 19 20 what was best for children and that children need 21 both parents. Were you also present -- Court's 22 Q 23 indulgence. I keep saying "Court." I apologize. Were you also present when the natural 24 25 father was allowed back into the room and attorneys,

1 et cetera?

2	A	Yes.
3	Q	And I will tell you that the panel has seen
4	the vide	o of the proceedings, not the nine-minute
		oviously, as that was not taped.
6	L , , ,	Did the demeanor of the subject minor
	change a	t the point in time that Judge Hughes
	_	that she go with her father?
		-
9	A	At the beginning she seemed worse but then
	she mello	owed and said, Okay, let's go.
11		MR. TERRY: Pass the witness, Mr. Chairman.
12		MR. BRADLEY: No questions.
13		JUDGE STOCKARD: Thank you.
14		MR. TERRY: We will call Judge Hoskin to
15	the stan	d.
16		(Witness sworn.)
17		DIRECT EXAMINATION
18	BY MR. T	ERRY:
19	Q	Would you please state your first and last
20	name for	the record.
21	А	Charles Hoskin.
22	Q	And would you spell it.
23	А	C-h-a-r-l-e-s, H-o-s-k-i-n.
24	Q	Getting right to the point, you are in,
25	fact a,	judge?

Page 146

Page 147 1 Α I am. And a judge of what? 2 Q I'm a district court judge in the Eighth 3 Α 4 Judicial District in the Family Division. 5 Q How long have you held that position? 6 Α Almost ten years. Okay. Have you ever been the presiding 7 Q 8 judge? I have been. 9 Д 10 For how many years? 0 11 А Four years. Are you the current presiding judge? 12 Q I am not. 13 А 14 Q Okay. Did there come a point in time when 15 you became familiar with the newly elected Judge 16 Hughes? Yes. 17 А Would that have been right after election 18 0 19 in January of 2015? 20 А No. Do you remember when? 21 Q 22 It would have been in the summer of 1990. Α Okay. Because she was a practitioner. 23 Q Correct. We -- I was clerking in that firm 24 Α 25 and I believe she was an associate in the firm at

Page 148 1 the time. There came a time, however, when you were 2 0 3 already on the bench as a judge and Judge Hughes was 4 elected. Would that be accurate? That is correct. 5 А And would that have been in approximately 0 6 7 January of 2015? А I believe that is correct. 8 Now, how many other family court district 9 Q 10 court judges were there in January of 2015? There were 19 others. 11 А 19 others? 12 0 So 20 total. 13 А 14 0 And did you have a system or an agreement 15 of -- with new judges appointing or offering 16 services to new judges as far as mentoring was 17 concerned? 18 А I did. If you need to talk to me, come see me, if 19 Q 20 you have specific issues, thing like that? 21 That's correct. А Before I get into that, it appears to 22 Q 23 the -- may appear to the Commission that the rules 24 on contempt that deal with family court are somewhat 25 unique. Generally on a contempt -- are contempt

Page 149 1 issues heard before a different judge? I don't know generally. Upon objection of 2 А 3 the party that's being accused, I believe, it should 4 go to another judge. How does that work in family court? 5 0 6 Α Family court is exempt from that rule. The 7 judge who is making a contempt finding is also the 8 judge who hears the contempt charge. Just so we're clear, the judge that makes 0 9 10 the finding of contempt or before that issues the 11 order to show cause, is the one that sits on the 12 issue dealing with whether or not that person is in 13 contempt? Yes. NRS 22.030, I think. 14 А Is that pursuant to a local rule? 15 0 Actually, pursuant to statute. 16 Α Okay. That applies to family court? 17 Q 18 Α Correct. Okay. But other than that, the general 19 Q 20 rules dealing with contempt are the same. 21 А Yes. 22 Okay. Is it oftentimes proper for a judge Q 23 to order a minor to be brought to court? Is it oftentimes proper? 24 Α 25 Q Proper. How about this: Is there

Page 150 1 authority for that? 2 Α Is the question, Can I have a child appear? 3 0 Yes. Yes, I can. А 4 5 0 Okay. And I want to direct your attention 6 now to Judge Hughes. Were there points in time 7 where Judge Hughes came to you and did not discuss 8 the case by way of case name but discussed it in a 9 hypothetical? 10 А Yes. Okay. And ultimately did you determine 11 0 12 that one of the cases that she spoke to you about 13 was a case called Silva --Yes. 14 Α -- the Silva case? But you did not learn 15 0 16 that until a later point in time. Would that be accurate? 17 That would be correct. 18 Α 19 Q So your discussions with Judge Hughes would 20 have been in reference to issues that were occurring 21 within her court that she was seeking your advice 22 on--23 А Yes. -- as a senior judge? 24 Q 25 Α As a colleague, I would say, but I was also

Page 151 1 serving as the presiding judge at the time. And a friend? 2 0 Yes. 3 Α 4 0 And that was not unusual for all the judges 5 to do? It is very common --6 А Okay. 7 Q -- for that to occur, yes. 8 А 9 Speak to other judges about issues that are Q 10 arising. 11 Α Yes. 12 Do you remember a specific conversation Q 13 with her under a hypothetical which you later 14 learned to be the Silva matter where it was an issue 15 of potential parental alienation? Yes. 16 Α 17 Q Do you remember what facts she related to 18 you? Do I remember? Do I have a specific 19 А 20 recollection? I don't know that I could honestly 21 say I have a specific recollection of the 22 conversation. Although, based upon the events that 23 occurred afterwards, would remind me of the fact 24 that we did have a conversation and we did have a 25 discussion.

Ξ.

Page 152 Do you recall what it was she was asking 1 Q 2 you about? 3 А She was asking in a circumstance where, as 4 I recall, one parent was not permitting contact with 5 another parent contrary to court order, was there a 6 way to elicit enforcement of that order. And did you give her suggestions? 7 0 T believe T did. Ά 8 Would you call that advice or would you 9 Q 10 call it suggestions? I would call it a discussion --11 Α 12 Okay. 0 Α -- because I don't believe that I gave her 13 14 only one way of doing it. I think we talked about 15 more than one way of accomplishing it. What were the ways that you discussed with 16 Q 17 her enforcing the child custody/parental alienation 18 issue? You could simply leave your order in 19 Α 20 enforcement. You could have an order to show cause 21 hearing, if that was placed before you, to make the 22 transfer take place. Threat of contempt is a way to 23 enforce compliance with that. 24 If you've gone beyond those remedies and 25 you have other ways of dealing with it, you can have

Page 153 1 it occur at a therapeutic practitioner's office. 2 You could, perhaps, have the Family Mediation Center 3 assist with that, and we also discussed doing it in 4 the courtroom. I'm sorry? 5 Q We also discussed having that occur in the 6 Α 7 courtroom. Did you also discuss the potentiality of 8 0 9 Child Haven if the minor refused to go? Not as part of the transfer taking place 10 Α 11 but as an ultimate destination for the child if one 12 parent would not allow the child to go and the child 13 refused to go to another parent, Child Haven would 14 be a place where the child could go pending further 15 determinations, yes. And that would be equally applicable if the 16 Q 17 child simply said, I'm not going? 18 Δ Yes. And just so the panel is clear, what is 19 0 20 Child Haven? Child Haven is -- it's adjacent to our 21 Α 22 juvenile detention facility on the same property as 23 the family division courthouse. And it's used for 24 individuals when the authorities don't have any 25 place else to take them. It's not a lock-down

Page 154 1 facility. They prefer that the children stay there 2 but they could leave if they needed to. I don't know that I have a great answer to 3 4 that question other than it's a place where children 5 are taken. I've heard of other circumstances where 6 either a parent's being arrested or something's 7 occurring and the Metro will take them to Child 8 Haven. MR. TERRY: Can I have the panel's 9 10 indulgence for a moment? JUDGE STOCKARD: Of course. 11 12 BY MR. TERRY: Did you ever refer to Child Haven as a 13 Q 14 jail? A Um, I probably would have made that 15 16 reference. I don't know that that's an accurate 17 reference but I believe that I did make that 18 reference. It's not a place that a child would want 19 to go. It would -- going with a parent would be 20 preferable to going to that facility, yes. 21 0 And you made that suggestion to Judge 22 Hughes? I believe I did. I don't have a specific 23 А 24 recollection but I believe I did. Q Back on the parental alienation issue, 25

Page 155 1 you've indicated that there are steps that can be 2 taken. 3 Is one of those ultimate steps a temporary 4 change of custody if you determine that followed by 5 an order to show cause, a more formal hearing, if 6 you determine that one parent is purposely keeping 7 the minor away from the other parent? Okay. Your question went long for me, so I 8 Α 9 wanted to make sure I'm answering your question. 10 Is the question, Is it one of the steps? 11 Is that the question? Is it one of the options? 12 0 It is one of the options, yes. We are 13 Α 14 tasked as family division judges with making 15 determinations as to what's in the best interest of 16 children. How do you define best interest of the 17 0 18 minor child? 19 A Well, the legislature has defined factors 20 for us to make that determination. 21 What are those? 0 Nine or ten factors found in -- well, they 22 А 23 just changed, 125. 24 Q If you could speak up a little bit. 25 Sure. I'm trying to remember the statute Α

Page 156 125.0035 is the factors that we consider in 1 name. 2 making that determination. Wishes of the child, 3 nomination of parents, which is more likely to 4 foster a relationship, mental physical health of the 5 parents, special needs of the children. The list goes on and on and it's not 6 7 exclusive. There's also other factors the court can find in order to make that determination. 8 9 Okay. And is that unusual for a temporary Q 10 change of custody order to be issued? Is that a fair statement? 11 Α Is what unusual? 12 A temporary change of custody order. 13 Q 14 Α We make temporary orders all the time. 15 Family court is unique in the civil arena in that we 16 are tasked with handling a case at the very 17 beginning before we have all the evidence. We take 18 argument and try and put a Band-Aid on family's 19 lives in order to get them from the beginning of 20 litigation to the end of litigation. 21 We don't always have all the information 22 that we need to make the determination, but we're 23 tasked with handling that procedure through that 24 process. 25 Q Do you rely on child therapists? Do you

Page 157 1 rely on other individuals in reunification attempts? Do I rely on them? 2 А 3 0 Yes. On occasion. 4 А Okay. 5 0 6 Α Well, I guess I would -- I don't like the 7 word "rely." Have I utilized them to assist me in 8 getting to the facts? Yes. I don't know that I 9 rely on that. 10 Q Listen their input? 11 Α I review their input. 12 Q Are you also familiar with Donna's House? Α T am. 13 And so the panel is clear, what's Donna's 14 Q 15 House? Donna's House -- we're actually lucky in 16 Α 17 the Eighth Judicial District that we have a facility 18 that allows us to either have exchanges or have --19 supervised exchanges or supervised visitation occur 20 in a supervised setting that's still sort of 21 connected to the court, so Donna's House is that 22 facility that we have. Why do you need a facility like Donna's 23 Q 24 House? 25 Α Well, occasions occur quite a bit where I

Page 158 1 believe that visitation should be maintained but it 2 should be supervised many times out of an abundance 3 of caution. Either a parent has been out of a 4 child's life for an extended period of time or the 5 parent is on drugs or doing something that I think 6 would be potentially harmful for a child, I would 7 order supervised visitation.

8 If the parents have a difficult time 9 co-parenting or even exchanging the child, I may 10 order that they go to Donna's House for a supervised 11 exchange.

12 Getting back to your question why do we 13 need that, because many times I will ask parents --14 I'm not a big fan of Donna's House. I think it's 15 not the best way for parents to interact with their 16 children. It's very sterile and foreign, it's not 17 very family-centric.

But in circumstances where parents cannot 19 agree on a supervisor or they don't have anyone in 20 their family that can assist with the supervision 21 that they feel is safe, then that's my point of last 22 resort, Donna's House.

23. MR. TERRY: If I can have the panel's 24 indulgence for a moment.

25 JUDGE STOCKARD: Of course.

Page 159 1 BY MR. TERRY: 2 Would the wishes of a child ever be the 0 3 lead determining factor in determining child 4 custody? A Are you saying are the wishes of the child 5 6 the determining factor? Yes. 7 Q 8 А No. Have you seen situations where one child 9 Q 10 doesn't necessarily want to go with one parent but 11 there are directives that that reunification or that 12 visitation occur? It is very often the case that children 13 А 14 think that they know what is best. I don't know if 15 you want me to elaborate on that. 16 0 One more time. Panel's indulgence. JUDGE STOCKARD: Judge Hoskin, speak up 17 18 just so we make sure. THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. Usually that's 19 20 not a problem for me. MR. TERRY: Thank you very much. I pass 21 22 the witness. Thank you, Judge. 23 JUDGE STOCKARD: Mr. Bradley? 24 25 //

Page 160 1 CROSS-EXAMINATION 2 BY MR. BRADLEY: Judge, we can agree that contempt power 3 Q 4 must be used with the utmost restraint? I don't know that I understand the А 5 6 question, "utmost restraint." Let's see. The unjustified use of contempt 7 0 8 is prejudicial to the administration of justice. We can agree? 9 10 A Unjustified, yes, I totally agree with 11 that. And judges have a responsibility to apply 12 Q 13 contempt power judiciously? A I would agree with that. 14 And only when contempt is clearly 15 0 16 unequivocally shown? A You have to demonstrate the contempt, yes, 17 18 that it's willful as well as there's a clear order, 19 yes. Q And we can agree that if there's an abuse 20 21 of the contempt power constituting this conduct, 22 then discipline is warranted? If there's an abuse of the contempt Α 23 24 power...that discipline is warranted. 25 I guess if abuse is demonstrated, then it

Page 161 1 would be a violation of probably 1.1, yes. Even if we assume that Ms. Silva was a 2 0 3 pathogenic parent, does that give Judge Hughes the 4 right to use a temporary change of custody as a 5 sword to punish that parent's violation of 6 visitation orders? Object to the form of the MR. TERRY: 8 question. It's not supported by the facts. 9 Utilization of the word "punished." 10 If the question was phrased, Is it unusual 11 to grant temporary custody, we have no objection but 12 the way the question is phrased that it's a 13 punishment, we object to the form of the question. JUDGE STOCKARD: Mr. Bradley. 14 MR. TERRY: Your Honor, the law is very 15 16 clear in Nevada that judges are not permitted to use 17 changes in custody as a punishment for violation of 18 things like visitation orders. Judge Hughes is trying to distinguish the 19 20 fact that she didn't make any permanent change in 21 custody and just a temporary change. But I just 22 want to confirm that Judge Hoskin agrees that it's 23 not appropriate to use a temporary change in custody 24 as a sword to punish parental misconduct. And I'm 25 using the language in Nevada Supreme Court in Dogger

Page 162 1 so I disagree with counsel's interpretation. JUDGE STOCKARD: I'll allow the question. 2 3 THE WITNESS: And now I'm not clear. MR. BRADLEY: Now I have to ask it all over Δ 5 aqain. BY MR. BRADLEY: 6 Even assuming that Ms. Silva was a 0 8 pathogenic parent, does that give Judge Hughes the 9 right to use a temporary change of custody as a 10 sword to punish Ms. Silva because she violated 11 visitation orders? 12 Α Is your -- so that I understand the 13 question, are you asking, Is it appropriate to use a 14 change of custody as a sanction for contempt? No, I did not include the word "contempt." 15 0 16 А So as a sanction for ... The judge's belief that there was a 17 0 18 violation of visitation orders. I'm not jumping to 19 the -- whether or not there was contempt or not. Okay. So as a sanction for violating a 20 Α 21 court order that you would temporarily change 22 custody. Do you want me to say that again? 23 Q Because I guess the way that the question 24 Α 25 is being asked I'm not clear on --

Page 163 Right. I want to make sure you're clear. 1 0 Right. I know you're not trying to trick 2 Α me because --3 Okay. 0 5 А -- I spend a lot of time ... Okay. Is it appropriate for Judge Hughes 6 0 7 to use a temporary change of custody as a sword to 8 punish the parent's violation of visitation orders? I can think of circumstances where that --9 Α 10 I believe that would be an appropriate temporary 11 action, yes. Sir, isn't the sole consideration in either 12 0 13 a temporary or permanent change in custody to be the 14 best interest of the child? 15 А That is what I'm thinking about when I'm 16 answering that question. 17 But you're assuming that it's in the best 0 18 interest of the child to punish the parent. 19 No, I'm not. That's not why I'm answering Α 20 the question that way. 21 Explain to me how, without my question even Q 22 mentioning any determination about what's in a 23 child's best interest, that a judge can use a 24 temporary change of custody as a sword to punish a 25 parent's violation of visitation orders.

Page 164 A The way that you've asked the question, it would not be appropriate if the sole reason for the change would be to punish a parent. I would agree with that.

5 Q What about the primary purpose as opposed 6 to the sole purpose?

7 A Even primary purpose. Best interest has to8 be the controlling factor.

9 Q So there has to be a determination by the 10 judge before even making a temporary change in 11 custody that the change is solely for the best 12 interest of the child and not to be used as a sword 13 to punish.

14 A It should not be used as a sword to punish. 15 I'm hesitating on the first part of your question 16 because it is a temporary order and not all the 17 evidence has been taken by the court in order to get 18 to that position.

But what I am -- what I'm indicating is 20 that we attempt with the information we have before 21 us to make the best decision for the benefit of the 22 child. I'm not sure -- I'm not sure if I danced 23 around your question or I answered your question at 24 that point.

25 Q I think you answered it.

Page 165 1 MR. BRADLEY: I don't have any other 2 questions. Thank you. 3 JUDGE STOCKARD: Mr. Terry. 4 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 5 BY MR. TERRY: Is it in the best interest of a minor child 6 0 7 to have contact with both parents --It is. Α 8 9 Q -- assuming no abuse or neglect? 10 А If you can establish that they are fit 11 parents, it is in a child's best interest, according 12 to the supreme court and Nevada legislature, to have 13 contact with both parents. Is it a duty of a presiding family court 14 Q 15 judge to make sure that that is effectuated, that 16 there is contact between both parents and the 17 subject minor? Going from your last question to this one 18 А 19 and considering the best interest of the minor 20 child, my answer is yes. 21 And would that include sometimes forcing 0 22 the child to have contact with a parent they do not 23 wish to have contact with? 24 А Yes. 25 MR. TERRY: Nothing further.

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1	Page 166 JUDGE STOCKARD: Mr. Bradley?
2	MR. BRADLEY: Nothing.
3	JUDGE STOCKARD: Judge Hoskin, thank you.
4	We'll now break for lunch.
5	Is 1:00 o'clock agreeable for everyone?
6	We'll break for an hour.
7	(Recess taken at 11:55 a.m.)
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1	Page 167 AFTERNOON SESSION.
2	JUDGE STOCKARD: We're back on the record
3	in Case No. 2016-113-P. It's in the matter of the
	Honorable Rena Hughes. Parties are present as is
	the entire Commission.
6	Mr. Terry, are you ready to proceed?
7	MR. TERRY: We are, Judge.
8	JUDGE STOCKARD: You may proceed.
9	MR. TERRY: May I call our next witness?
10	JUDGE STOCKARD: Of course.
11	MR. TERRY: Judge Steel.
12	JUDGE STOCKARD: Just as a matter of
13	housekeeping, we got these additional exhibits. Is
14	there any objection to the admission of those?
15	MR. BRADLEY: No, sir.
16	JUDGE STOCKARD: It's Bates-stamped 0185
17	through 0190.
18	MR. TERRY: Those are the ones I referred
19	to this morning, Mr. Chairman, and we would ask they
20	be admitted. They are additional character letters.
21	JUDGE STOCKARD: Hearing no objection, they
22	are likewise admitted.
23	MR. TERRY: Thank you. We have provided a
24	copy to the court reporter.
25	JUDGE STOCKARD: Judge Steel, if you'll
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Page 168 1 come up here to the chair right here next to the 2 court reporter. (Witness sworn.) 3 DIRECT EXAMINATION Δ 5 BY MR. TERRY: Good afternoon. Would you mind spelling 6 0 7 your first and last name for the record please? A For the record Cynthia, C-y-n-t-h-i-a -- my 8 9 middle name is Diana. I go by that usually -- Steel 10 Steel, S-t-e-e-l. Okay. And are you, in fact, a judge of the 11 0 12 Eighth Judicial District Court Family Division? 13 Α For 21-plus years. For 21 years strictly handling family 14 Q 15 court? 16 Α Yes. 17 Q Okay. Are you familiar with Judge Hughes? 18 Α I am. 19 Q Did there come a point in time in roughly 20 January of 2015 when she was elected as judge? 21 Α Yes. And whether or not there was any formality 22 Q 23 to it or not, was there also a policy between the 24 judges of the family court to assist new judges? 25 A Yes.

Page 169 Were you, in fact, Judge Hughes' mentor? 1 0 I believe so. 2 Α And how would you classify that? How would 3 0 4 you define that? As a neophyte judge we didn't do that. We 5 А 6 didn't have mentors. It became clear after a while 7 of the progress of the bench that some of the newer 8 judges coming in didn't know prior judges' meetings. 9 They may not know prior policies. They may not have 10 learned that we used to do it this way but now we do 11 it that way. It's different from the bench than it is 12 13 being an attorney and so we decided that we should, 14 each of us, have a judge -- a mentor when they come 15 in to sort of quide them through and somebody they 16 can be comfortable with and be able to discuss 17 hypotheticals or process or how to set up a 18 calendar, lots of different things. 19 0 You just indicated that "we would discuss 20 hypotheticals." 21 Did that often occur between you and Judge 22 Hughes? 23 Α Yes. 24 Okay. And whether you are or not aware of Q 25 it, we're here in reference to a matter involving a

Page 1 Ms. Silva. And recognizing what you just said about 2 "we talk in terms of hypothetical," did there come a 3 point in time when Judge Hughes came to you to seek 4 your advice or to get your input on certain matters 5 of what she classified as parental alienation in a 6 case that she had before?

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7 A Yes.

8 Q And do you recall what it was that she 9 discussed with you?

10 A One of the things that she discussed was 11 asking what I would do in a certain circumstance 12 where one parent was not permitting the other parent 13 to have access to the child.

And there's so many varieties of things it could be that would cause that. It could be that there was truth to a statement of some sort of harm that might be coming to the child. It could be that there was just a fear in that parent's mind that something might happen to the child. It could be a control issue of one parent over the other parent. It could be a lot of different things. So when I talked to her about it, I tell

23 her I need to know more about what the circumstances 24 are that are going on between the parties, because 25 every time you work with a party, it's never the

Page 171 1 same thing. If I said I always do this in that 2 case, I would be telling a lie because I don't 3 always do the same thing. And I'm sort of a different kind of judge. 5 I do things differently than some of the other 6 judges do and so I always preface what I say with, 7 Be sure and ask a couple other judges to get a real 8 true feeling around a feeling about what you're 9 doing. 10 But, yes, she talked to me about what do 11 you do as a judge when parties are not cooperating 12 with each other, not co-parenting, and I gave her 13 some ideas of how I've handled it in different 14 circumstances. 15 You just mentioned two factors. Are there Q 16 more factors? What do you do in the case of X? I look at is the parent that isn't 17 Α Yeah. 18 getting the visitation safe? Are they just being 19 annoying and trying to use the court to bludgeon the 20 other person by bringing motion after motion after 21 motion. I look at whether or not the child -- if 2.2 23 I've had an opportunity to talk to the child and 24 sometimes I have and sometimes I haven't -- has said 25 in an FMC report or something, I wish my parents got

Page 172 1 along better, that tells me that that child is not 2 afraid the other parent. If they didn't want to see 3 the other parent they wouldn't want them to get 4 along.

5 Q Judge --

A So there's lots of things that would happen 7 in the hearing and I didn't read the file. You come 8 to a hypothetical, here is the broad picture of 9 what's going on and what do you do, and that's 10 basically it.

11 Q Did judge Hughes give you a broad picture?
12 A Yes, she did.

13 Q Did she indicate that the matter had been 14 in front of her for close to a year?

15 A I don't know if she mentioned that to me or 16 not but I knew it had several hearings.

17 Q Did she indicate that she had made attempts 18 at reunification with different entities and 19 different specialists?

A Well, because during our conversation I said, Well, have you sent them to Donna's House? Have you looked at family therapy? I don't do family therapy but a lot of the other judges do. They will send them to somebody to get them back together again and try to get either -- whatever -- Page 173 1 one of the parents needs something from the other 2 parent to feel comfortable in the custody situation, 3 and so a therapist can sometimes ferret that out. 4 It doesn't necessarily have to be about the child 5 even. It could be about some other circumstance. 6 And so sometimes a therapist can bring it back home 7 to just focusing on that child.

8 But ultimately, whenever we're making the 9 decisions and we've not ever met the child, all we 10 have is the pleadings in front of us, the parents 11 and their attorneys who are telling us stuff. We 12 have a third-party beneficiary out there who, by our 13 statutes, gets to have the observation of best 14 interest of that child.

And so we're sometimes in a predicament we don't know, really, which parent is telling the truth or not, and we get a feel after a while by knowing the parents and after many hearings you can sort of discern what you're up against.

Frequently, it becomes a situation where I 've taken over a lot of cases midstream, high-conflict cases. And the court may have made a blunder, the prior court, in my mind, but they didn't appeal it so that's the law of the case. I've got to work with that law of the case.

Page 174 And you can see how sometimes they're just trying to get the record right and they keep filing and filing to make sure the judge understands and then suddenly it becomes me against the litigant instead of the litigants working to get something done for their child. It can devolve into that so you have to try not to let that happen. That would be something I would have told her.

9 Q Do you remember any other specific advice 10 that you gave to Judge Hughes based on this 11 hypothetical?

12 A Well, I told her that I frequently will 13 change custody pending an evidentiary hearing. If I 14 feel the other parent is safe and that the child has 15 no fear of that person and is going to be okay, I 16 will change custody of a child.

17 Q You just said "pending an evidentiary 18 hearing."

19 A Right. We're not allowed to do it without 20 -- we used to do it when I was a neophyte and we 21 would change custody. And unless somebody did an 22 appeal on the motion it would go up. There was a 23 decision and they could appeal it.

Q So you were referring to a temporary change 25 of custody.

Page 175 Yes. 1 Α And does that occur often? 2 0 Д Yes. 3 But then eventually you set a hearing on 4 0 5 permanent change of custody. I do. I usually do it at that hearing. 6 Α You set it at that hearing. 7 0 Α Yeah. 2 I heard you indicate earlier that there was 9 Q 10 occasions when you talk to a minor child. Ά Yes. 11 Under what circumstances? 12 0 Α It's a learning process. I remember I was 13 14 a new judge and I had some very wealthy people 15 coming into court and they had all these reports 16 from all these therapists and counselors and 17 everything. And both parties said, Judge, if you 18 just talk to her, you'll understand what's going on. So I said, Okay, and took her up to my 19 20 chambers, because that was the standard of the day 21 back in the late '90s, and talked to her. And I 22 said, Wouldn't it be okay if you and your Dad --23 because they were very estranged -- just had dinner 24 once a month to start off, just to see, you know. And we had our conversation and I went back 25

Page 176 1 downstairs. And I said, I believe she's okay with 2 doing this, and they set it up. And then I got a 3 motion that I needed to maybe not be involved in 4 that case anymore because I had coerced the child 5 into something. And I had no witness. Nobody was 6 in the room but me and her.

7 So I learned early on that I would prefer 8 to have someone in the room with me and, generally, 9 I won't talk to a child unless there's two 10 attorneys, one for each parent. Otherwise, they can 11 go to mediation and the family mediator can give me 12 the information.

13 Q Did you advise Judge Hughes that she could 14 talk to the minor child?

15 A I don't recall telling her to talk to the 16 minor child without somebody in the room. I said it 17 may be a good idea to talk to the minor child but I 18 don't think I told her about how to set that up.

19 Q Do you recall specifically telling her that 20 you can talk to the minor child?

A You can talk to the minor child. A lot of 22 judges still do take the kids up into chambers. I 23 just got burned and so I don't do it that way 24 anymore.

MR. TERRY: Thank you. We would pass the

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Page 9 1 intends to present a very narrow pace. That is not 2 our intent. And we recognize that there will be 3 potential rulings that the Commission has to enter 4 into. But what we're asking the Commission to do 5 initially is wait until you hear all of the 6 evidence, because it's not just what occurred at one 7 hearing. It's what occurred leading up to that 8 hearing and including that hearing and after that 9 hearing.

10 This is a case involving what is typically 11 referred to as -- and it has different names --12 parental alienation. Judge Hughes had multiple 13 hearings on this. I believe it was nine. Part of 14 our exhibits we will go through at the time that 15 Judge Hughes testifies. She will detail all the 16 procedures that she went through before we get to 17 the subject matter, which is the complaint in this 18 case.

As we do that, I'm going to ask you to look As we do that, I'm going to ask you to look at the mother's actions, look at the minor child's actions, and look at the dad's actions. Because this was a situation where the special prosecutor is going to attempt to prove that a temporary change of actual was done as a result of Judge Hughes' bolding Ms. Silva in contempt for failure to file --

Page 10 1 follow her orders, and that is not the situation. To the contrary, Judge Hughes may have used 3 the language of contempt and you have before you the 4 interrogatories and the interview with Judge Hughes. 5 And I want you to note that there are numerous exhibits that we did not object to in this case. 6 The Silva interview, it's my understanding 8 that special prosecutor, while giving us notice of 9 who the witnesses were, has limited strictly to 10 Judge Hughes, but what we wanted to present to you 11 was the total story in this case. 12 Judge Hughes indicated that she found Ms. 13 Silva in contempt for not bringing -- for not 14 complying with her court orders in reference to 15 multiple things. But the finding of contempt, while 16 technically incorrect, had no sanction to it. Judge 17 Hughes is authorized under the statutes to change 18 custody if it is in the best interest of the minor 19 child, and that's why the proceedings leading up to 20 this are important. 21 I could go into a lot of detail in

22 reference to the multiple hearings, but I think it's 23 better to let the evidence show that. So with that, 24 it's our position that Judge Hughes did not violate 25 any of the rules in question. We are cognizant of

Page 11 1 the fact that, in order for this Commission to find 2 that she violated the rules, you have to find that 3 she did so in a willful way, almost in a malicious 4 way, and that we do not believe that the special 5 prosecutor will be able to demonstrate to you. 6 The specific rule that we obviously have to 7 look at is in order to discipline Judge Hughes, the 8 Commission has to find that she committed willful 9 misconduct, willfully or persistently failed to 10 perform the duties of her office or is habitually 11 intemperate, and I rather doubt that habitually 12 intemperate is going to be provided to you. 13 So you have to find that this was a willful 14 misconduct or a persistent failure to perform 15 duties. What the special prosecutor would have you 16 do is look at one day's worth of a journal entry and 17 one day's worth of a meeting with a minor and a 18 change of custody. And it is upon that that he's 19 going to attempt to prove the rule violations. 20 So with that, we would submit it to you and 21 we're prepared to proceed. 22 JUDGE STOCKARD: Mr. Bradley. 23 MR. BRADLEY: Your Honor, the prosecuting 24 officer would call Judge Hughes. 25 JUDGE STOCKARD: Judge Hughes, I think

1	we'll have you sit right there by the court Page 12
2	reporter.
3	MR. TERRY: We would move to exclude any
4	witnesses. I do that out of an abundance of
5	caution, Mr. Chairman. I realize my colleague has
6	said that Judge Hughes is the only witness but
7	JUDGE STOCKARD: Do you have any other
8	witnesses here?
9	MR. BRADLEY: I don't.
10	MR. TERRY: Let me make sure and make sure
11	our witnesses are outside.
12	Yes, thank you.
13	JUDGE STOCKARD: Would you stand and raise
14	your right hand, please.
15	(Witness sworn.)
16	DIRECT EXAMINATION
17	BY MR. BRADLEY:
18	Q Judge, can we agree that contempt power
19	must be used with the utmost restraint?
20	A Not necessarily.
21	Q Can we agree that unjustified use of
22	contempt is prejudicial to the administration of
23	justice?
24	A Can you say that one more time.
25	"Unjustified," is that what you said?

Page 13 1 MR. TERRY: If Judge Hughes could speak up a little bit. 2 3 JUDGE STOCKARD: Yes. THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. 4 Unjustified. 5 BY MR. BRADLEY: 6 Can we agree that the unjustified use of 7 Q 8 contempt is prejudicial to the administration of 9 justice? 10 А It can be. And, Judge, can we agree that judges have 11 Q 12 the responsibility to apply the power of contempt 13 judiciously and only when contempt is clearly and 14 unequivocally shown? Judges have a duty to apply it responsibly. 15 Α MR. TERRY: Judge, I apologize but, again, 16 17 Judge Hughes, if you could speak up a little bit. 18 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. Okay. 19 BY MR. BRADLEY: 20 0 Judge, can we agree that the abuse of the 21 contempt power constitutes misconduct warranting 22 discipline? 23 Α Not necessarily. 24 Judge, can we agree that when wielding Q 25 contempt powers, judges must be very careful to

Page 14 1 follow the law governing contempt? To the best of their ability. 2 Α 3 Judge, let's look at the law of contempt in Q It's fair to say the law of contempt in 4 Nevada. Nevada is not that complicated, correct? 5 I would disagree with that. А 6 7 You find it very complicated? 0 Α As the new judge I found it very 8 9 complicated. 10 0 Let's take a look at the law of contempt. 11 If the contemptuous behavior occurs in a judge's 12 presence, then that same judge can find the litigant 13 or lawyer in contempt, correct? А I believe what you're defining as direct 14 15 contempt, that happens in the purview of the court. 16 Is my statement correct? 0 I don't know. I'm sorry. 17 Α 18 Q If the contemptuous behavior occurs in a 19 judge's presence, then that same judge can find the 20 litigant or lawyer in contempt, correct? 21 А Yes. And that same judge can then impose a 22 Q 23 sentence, correct? 24 Α Consistent with the law. 25 Now, if the contemptuous behavior does not Q

Page 15 1 occur in the immediate view and presence of a judge, 2 then different rules apply, correct? 3 Ά Yes. Q In those circumstances normally an 5 affidavit detailing the facts constituting the 6 contempt must be presented to the judge, correct? 7 А If a movement is bringing a motion for an 8 order to show cause seeking to hold someone in 9 contempt, they are required to submit an affidavit. 10 Q And then additionally if the contempt is 11 not committed in the immediate presence of a judge, 12 then upon objection of a litigant a different judge 13 has to preside over the contempt trial, correct? Not in family court. 14 Α 15 Q Family court doesn't have to abide by 16 Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure in the Nevada 17 statutes? 18 Ά Of course they do. MR. TERRY: Objection to the form of the 19 20 question. 21 JUDGE STOCKARD: Sustained. 22 BY MR. BRADLEY: You are aware there's two types of 23 0 24 contempt, correct, civil and criminal? 25 Д Yes.

Page 16 And generally criminal contempt sanctions 1 0 2 are punitive in nature, right? Generally. 3 Ά Δ 0 And criminal contempt sanctions act to 5 punish a party for disobeying a court directive, correct? 6 А Yes. On the other hand, civil contempt is 8 0 9 considered remedial in nature. 10 Generally. Α And the purpose of that is to coerce a 11 0 12 party into future compliance with court orders. 13 Δ Yes. 14 And any civil sanctions imposed will Q 15 terminate upon the offending party's compliance with 16 the court order at issue. 17 Α Not necessarily. 18 Q Civil contempt allegations need only be 19 proven by clear and convincing evidence? 20 Indirect contempt for civil contempt is Α 21 clear and convincing evidence. Whereas, criminal contempt sanctions are 22 Q intended to punish for past disobedience, correct? 23 24 А Yes. And not to compel future compliance, 25 Q

Page 17 1 correct? 2 Α Yes. And in criminal contempt proceedings the 3 Q 4 litigant is entitled to the assistance of counsel? 5 Α Yes. And the allegations have to be proven 6 0 7 beyond a reasonable doubt, correct? А Yes. 8 And under NRS 22.100, contempt is only 9 0 10 punishable by fine, jail or both, correct? Civil contempt or indirect contempt is 11 Α 12 punishable by sanctions, attorney's fees, and fines 13 or any combination of the above. I'm talking about NRS 22.100. 14 0 You can sanction by all three. There are 15 Α 16 monetary sanctions, \$500, attorney's fees, or 17 incarceration or any combination thereof. And we can also agree that a judge can't 18 0 19 use a change of custody as a sword to punish 20 parental misconduct, correct? 21 There is case law on that. Α There is. 22 Q 23 Yes. Α 24 Q So you can agree with that statement, can't 25 you?

Page 18 Yes, yes. 1 Α And --2 0 Α And I would never do that. 3 4 Q And this is not a law school exam but do 5 you remember the names of those cases? Not off the top of my head. 6 А Fair enough. We can agree that you have a 7 0 8 sworn duty to uphold the law? 9 Д Of course. All right. And the rules on contempt are 10 0 11 pretty straightforward as we've just gone through 12 them. Wouldn't you agree? No, I wouldn't. 13 Α Okay. Let's turn to the Silva case. Ms. 14 Q 15 Silva and Mr. Silva were divorced in 2013, correct? That's what I recall. 16 Α 17 And they had one minor child? 0 18 Α Yes. And I think we should, just for the purpose 19 0 20 of this hearing, refer to her as "the daughter" or 21 "the child" and not use her name. 22 Would that be agreeable? I will agree with that, yes. 23 Α 24 Okay. Thank you. And in the original Q 25 decree of divorce the court granted the mother

Page 19 1 primary physical custody? 2 Α That's my recollection. 3 And the father received weekend visitation? Q Α Yes. 4 All right. And then in approximately 2015 5 Q 6 you basically, I think as your counsel phrased it, 7 inherited the Silva case from another judge. А Correct. 8 9 0 Okay. And the parties began litigating a 10 number of issues? 11 Α Yes. One was the well being of the child, 12 0 13 correct? 14 Α I don't know what you mean by "the well 15 being of the child." There were specific 16 allegations. Okay. One of the other issues was whether 17 Q 18 or not the mother was interfering with the father's 19 visitation rights, correct? Initially it was not, that I recall. 20 Α 21 Q Would you open the binder, the prosecuting 22 officer's exhibits. I'd ask you to turn to Exhibit It's the Tab 5. 23 5. 24 Okay. А 25 So Exhibit 5 is your court minutes from Q

Page 20 1 May 12th, 2016. Do you see that? 2 Ά Yes. And if you would, turn to the second 3 Okay. 0 4 page. The Bates stamp number at the bottom is 5 Hughes 83. А Yes. 6 All right. And then under the section it 7 Q 8 says, "Court ordered the following, temporarily 9 Defendant shall receive visitation with the child 10 from Saturday at 11:00 a.m. until Sunday at 5:00 11 p.m. beginning Saturday, May 14th, 2016." 12 That's what it says, correct? That's what it says. 13 Α 14 All right. And then the order goes on to Q 15 say at No. 2, "The parties shall exchange the child 16 under supervision through Donna's House. Plaintiff 17 shall drop the child off at Donna's House, then 18 leave. If the child does not go on the visitations, 19 Plaintiff will be held in contempt of court and the 20 child will be with the defendant for the entire 21 summer break from school," correct? 22 Α That's what this says. But you also have 23 to be mindful, counsel, that this is a court clerk 24 writing this. This is not the official record. Are you saying that this is incorrect? 25 0

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Page 21 A I'm saying that it's not complete, because 2 these notes are meant to remind the judge of what 3 occurred at the hearing. This is never the official 4 record.

5 Q So --

A And this is written by a court clerk who i r summarizing what is happening. But oftentimes there are mistakes -- I'm not saying she made a mistake but I'm just reminding the Commission -- and the judges on the Commission know this -- this is not the official record.

12 Q Judge, for our purposes today you knew that 13 you were going to come in and testify regarding this 14 case, correct?

15 A Of course.

16 Q And you reviewed the records before you 17 came in here today, didn't you?

18 A Mostly, yes.

19 Q Okay. Tell me what is incorrect on page 20 83, if anything.

21 A On page 83, okay. I have to read the whole 22 page.

23 Q Under the court order.

A Oh, under the court orders.

25 Q Tell me --

Page 22 It's not complete. That's my testimony. 1 Α What material facts are omitted from your 2 Q 3 court order on page 83? Α The history of this case and how we got to this point. 5 What is incorrect about your order 6 0 7 excluding the history? I did order them to exchange the child 8 Α 9 under the supervision of Donna's House. I did order 10 Plaintiff to drop off and leave. I did tell the 11 plaintiff that she must facilitate the visitations. 12 I did tell her that the child would go for the 13 entire summer if she did not facilitate visitations. 14 And I may have said that, You are at risk of being 15 held in contempt, but I didn't hold her in contempt -16 on that date. Turn to Tab 7. 17 0 I'm there. 18 Α All right. Now, Tab 7 are your court 19 Q 20 minutes from June 8th, 2016. Is that correct? That is correct. 21 Ά 22 Q And it's a fairly lengthy set of court 23 minutes but I'd ask you to turn to Bates No. at the 24 bottom right-hand corner 89. Are you there? 25 А I am there.

Page 23 I'd like to read to you the fourth, fifth 1 Q 2 and sixth paragraphs and tell me if I'm reading it 3 accurately. "This Court finds that the mother has 4 failed to facilitate father's visitation with the 5 minor child. Because mother has failed to 6 facilitate visitation with father, she has violated 7 his parental rights and the order of this court. "Mother was advised at the last court 8 9 hearing that, if she did not compel the minor child 10 to visit with father on the weekends, the child 11 would spend the entire summer with the father. 12 "Based upon the reasons stated above, it is 13 hereby ordered that this Court finds Plaintiff is in 14 contempt of the court's orders to facilitate 15 visitations on weekends with the father. An order 16 to show cause shall issue." 17 Did I read that correctly? Yes, you did. 18 Α 19 Q Okay. And that is an accurate statement of 20 what occurred on June 8th, 2016, correct? Well, this is my writing. There was no 21 Α 22 hearing. It's a correct statement of the order that 23 0 24 you issued. It's a journal entry so it's not 25 А

1 technically on order.

2 Q It is a correct statement of what your 3 intentions were. Page 24

4 A Yes.

5 Q And then if you turn to the next page, 6 Bates 90, that first paragraph, it says "Mother 7 shall bring the minor child to Department J 8 Courtroom 4 on June 15th, 2016, at 1:30. If Mother 9 fails to deliver the minor child to the courtroom on 10 June 15th, 2016, she shall be deemed in further 11 contempt of the court and sentenced to 25 days in 12 incarceration."

13 When you used the word "further," that 14 means that you already had determined to hold the 15 mother in contempt, correct?

16 A That's incorrect.

17 Q What does the word "further" mean in that 18 sentence, then?

19 A It means that I found there was a prima 20 facia showing that she was in contempt, that she had 21 violated my court orders by not facilitating visits, 22 by not complying with the court's orders for HELOC, 23 but not having the minor child map tested and order 24 to show cause issued.

25 So this is yet another example of I find

Page 25 1 there is a prima facia showing of contempt but she 2 was never held in contempt. 3 Okay. We can all agree the words "prima Q 4 facia" aren't anywhere in Exhibit 7, right? Α I don't think it's helpful to litigants to 5 6 use legalese when I write journal entries. I don't 7 think they would know what "prima facia" meant. Could you have thought of non-legalese 8 0 9 words that would have conveyed to Ms. Silva the fact 10 that you hadn't already determined that she was in 11 contempt? 12 Α Again, I determined there was a prima facia 13 showing of contempt, which is a court order, a valid 14 court order, that she had notice of the valid court 15 order, and that she had not complied with the valid 16 court order. 17 I have to make a finding that she has 18 violated my court orders in order to issue an order 19 to show cause. I can't issue an order to show cause 20 based on nothing. I have to make findings. This 21 was a finding that I made. 22 Q Okay. So we can agree you found that Ms. 23 Silva was in contempt of court? 24 That's what it says. Α Okay. And then if you'd turn to Tab 8, 25 Q

Page 26 1 now, this is an order, correct? It's not the --2 it's an actual order? А Correct. 3 And it's an order that you signed at page 4 0 5 96, correct? I did. А 6 Okay. And it looks like it was written by 7 Q 8 the lawyer for the father. Would that be correct? Α Yes. 9 Before you sign an order written by one of 10 Q 11 the litigant's attorneys, do you read it carefully? 12 Α I try to. And in preparation for the hearing today, 13 0 14 did you see anything that was incorrect in your 15 order that you signed on June 14th, 2016? 16 Α I didn't review this but I'm assuming that 17 it's correct. Do you have any reason to believe it's not 18 0 19 correct? (Witness reviewing document.) 20 THE WITNESS: Right, because it says that I 21 22 admonished her and I say "She may be held in 23 contempt," that's correct. She's failed to 24 facilitate visitations. 25 BY MR. BRADLEY:

Page 27 1 0 We'll be going through that. 2 Α Oh, okay. I'm sorry. If you'd turn to page five of the order, 3 0 4 which is page 95 of the Bates on the bottom 5 right-hand side --Yes. Δ -- is it correct that the order you signed Ο 8 states, "The Court finds that Mother has failed to 9 facilitate Father's visitation with the minor child. 10 Because Mother has failed to facilitate visitation 11 with father, she has violated his parental rights 12 and the orders of this court. "Mother was advised at the last hearing 13 14 that if she did not compel the minor child to visit 15 with Father on weekends, the child would spend the 16 entire summer with Father. The Court further finds 17 that Plaintiff is in contempt of the Court's order 18 to facilitate visitation on weekends with Father," 19 and then, "good cause appearing," it says, "It is 20 hereby ordered that based upon the reasons stated 21 above, an order to show cause shall issue." 22 Α Yes. 23 I'll skip the part about the HELOC and the 0 24 math proficiency. And then at the bottom it says, 25 "It is further ordered that Mother shall bring the

Page 28 1 child to Department J, Courtroom 4, on June 15th, 2 2016, at 1:30. If Mother fails to deliver the child 3 to the courtroom on June 15th, 2016, she shall be 4 deemed in further contempt of court and sentenced to 5 25 days' incarceration. If Mother fails to appear, 6 a bench warrant shall issue." Now, this is a correct statement of the 8 order that you issued, correct? Α Yes. 9 And it does state that you found --10 0 11 finds -- my verb tense it wrong -- it does state, 12 "The court Further finds that Plaintiff is in 13 contempt, " correct? I made the findings above in order to base 14 Α 15 the order to show cause from and this would be a 16 direct contempt, as we discussed earlier. The last 17 paragraph, if she fails to deliver the child to my 18 courtroom, that would be direct contempt. All right. 19 Q 20 А So it's two different things. 21 0 And "deemed in further contempt," that 22 indicates that to be in further contempt you already 23 have to be in contempt, right? I think I testified that I found she was in 24 Α 25 contempt sufficient to issue an order to show cause.

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Page 29 1 That was my intent, to make that finding. 2 And, again, you earlier said it was a prima 0 3 facia case but nowhere in this document did you use 4 the word "prima facia," correct? I didn't draft this document. 5 Α And you didn't -- there were no other words 6 0 7 indicating it was an initial finding or a prima 8 facia finding, right? It looks like she just copied -- I'm sorry. 9 Α 10 I didn't mean to interrupt you. It looks like she 11 just copied my court journal entry --And --12 0 -- because there mistakes in here. 13 Ζ 14 Q If a judge reviews a proposed order written 15 by a lawyer that's incorrect, the judge certainly 16 can correct it or tell the lawyer how to correct it. I can certainly do that. 17 А 18 Q Right. Okay. 19 Α Can I have some water, please? 2.0 Q Sure. So if you would turn to Tab 9, please, 21 22 these are more of your court minutes, correct? 23 Α Yes. 24 Q And this one's dated June 15th, 2016, 25 correct?

Page 30 Α Yes. 1 2 If you'd turn to page two, does it state, 0 3 "Due to mom's failure to facilitate visitation and 4 compel the child to visit with Dad, the Court is 5 ordering Dad shall have temporary sole legal and 6 sole physical custody, " correct? That's what it says. 7 А And then moving down to No. 4, does it also 8 Q 9 say, "Mom shall have no contact with Minor"? 10 А Yes. 11 We can agree that's a pretty significant 0 12 penalty, not to have any contact with your child, 13 can't we? 14 А It's not a penalty. Should we call that a sanction? 15 0 16 Α No. 17 Q Okay. And it's fair to say that the reason 18 that you changed custody is that the mom failed to 19 follow the visitation orders that you'd issued, 20 correct? That's part of it, yes. 21 Α 22 Q If you'd turn to Tab 10, this is an order 23 as opposed to minutes, correct? 24 Yes. Ά 25 And you did sign this one, correct? Q

Page 31 1 Α I assume so. If you'd turn to page 105 --2 0 Yes, I signed it. 3 А All right. And this one's dated June 15th, 4 0 5 2016, correct? А Yes. 6 And if you'd turn to the second page of the 7 0 8 order Bates 101 --9 Α Okav. -- in the second paragraph, does it state, 10 0 11 "The Court further finds that Wealthy was advised at 12 the last hearing, if she did not facilitate weekend 13 visitation between Rogerio and the minor child as 14 previously ordered, she would be held in contempt of 15 court and Annie would spend the summer in Rogerio's 16 custody. 17 "Good cause appearing, it is hereby ordered 18 that based upon Wealthy's failure to facilitate 19 Rogerio's relationship with Annie and Wealthy's" --20 I'm sorry -- "the minor child and Wealthy's decision 21 not to allow the minor child to have any visitation 22 with her father, Rogerio is hereby awarded temporary 23 sole legal and sole physical custody of the minor 24 child effective immediately." 25 It says that, correct?

Page 32 А Yes. 1 So it's clear that because Ms. Silva failed 2 0 3 to comply with your visitation order that you 4 changed custody to the father, correct? А And it's also correct that I found it was 6 not in the child's best interest what Mother was That's the paragraph at the top of the page. 7 doing. 8 0 Okay. А On the first page I find that she committed 9 10 extreme parental alienation and she's precluded 11 Rogerio from having a relationship with his 12 daughter. And you did sign that order, correct? 13 0 14 Yes, I did. Α 15 Q And, again, it doesn't say anything about 16 prima facia, does it? 17 I believe in all of the orders there is no Α 18 mention of prima facia. 19 Okay. So because you didn't include the 0 20 words "prima facia," how would a litigant like Ms. 21 Silva know that she wasn't already found in contempt 22 of court when you kept repeatedly -- I think we've 23 looked at five different documents -- that say you 24 find her in contempt? How would she know that she's 25 only being prima facia held in contempt?

Page 33 1 Α Well, she probably wouldn't know what 2 "prima facia" meant, first of all. That's why I 3 don't use the term with litigants. Again, legalese, 4 they teach us in judicial college not to use that, 5 to speak plainly. What does "prima facia" mean in lay terms? 6 Q Α I already said that. Valid court order, 7 8 the party has notice of the order, and there's clear 9 and convincing evidence that the party has violated 10 the court's order. But if a judge goes ahead and finds 11 Q 12 somebody in contempt and skips those steps --I didn't skip those steps. 13 Α If, judge. 14 Q Oh, theoretically. 15 Α 16 And skips those steps and imposes a Q 17 sanction, then the reality is the person is still 18 found in contempt. I didn't skip those steps and I didn't 19 А 20 sanction her for contempt. 21 That's something that I find interesting, Q 22 is that you don't feel --23 MR. TERRY: Object to the form of the 24 question --25 JUDGE STOCKARD: Sustained.

Page 34 MR. TERRY: -- respectfully. 1 2 BY MR. BRADLEY: It's your testimony that you did not 3 0 4 sanction Ms. Silva, correct? Not until we got to the math testing. 5 Α You did not sanction -- it's your testimony 6 0 7 you didn't sanction Ms. Silva for violating the 8 visitation orders, correct? 9 Δ That is correct. So prior to your use of the words "I find 10 0 11 her in contempt," Ms. Silva enjoyed being the 12 primary physical custodian of her daughter, correct? 13 Α She misused her custodial position. Can you answer my question? 14 0 15 Prior to you stating on the record --Α Okay. I don't mean to interrupt you. 16 17 Prior to you stating on the record that you Q 18 find her in contempt, Ms. Silva enjoyed the right to 19 be the primary physical custodian of her daughter, 20 correct? I wouldn't agree with "enjoyed. I would 21 Α 22 agree that there was a court order that said she was 23 the primary physical custodian. And in that exercise of her right, she had 24 0 25 the child, presumably, at least Monday through

Page 35 1 Friday, correct? 2 А She had the child solely. And then once you used the words, "I find 3 Q 4 her in contempt," then suddenly she was no longer 5 the primary physical custodian. In fact, you gave 6 custody of the minor child to the father completely, 7 100 percent, correct? Α I had been finding her in contempt for a 8 9 year. 10 0 Just answer. No, that's not correct. 11 Α 12 Okay. So prior to the time that you issued 0 13 these orders in early June, the mother had the right 14 to be with her child at least Monday through Friday. 15 We can agree on that, correct? The court order gave her that custodial 16 Α 17 time. 18 Q Right. And then once you found Ms. Silva 19 in contempt -- I'm sorry. You didn't really find 20 her in contempt. You just stated in the orders that 21 you found her in contempt, but once you wrote down 22 those words, then you changed custody so the father 23 got sole physical custody, right? 24 A Your analysis is incorrect, counsel, 25 respectfully.

Page 36 I found her in contempt in October of 2015 1 2 for not facilitating visitation, so this was not a 3 new finding. You have to go back all the way to 4 early in the case. This is not, Oh, at the last 5 minute I changed custody. I had been finding her in 6 contempt for a year. I believe that you answered in your 7 Q 8 interrogatories that it was June 8th when you 9 decided you were going to make the change. Is that correct? 10 That is correct. 11 Α 12 All right. So on June 8th Ms. Silva went Q 13 from having primary physical custody to having no 14 physical custody, correct? I believe it was June 15th. 15 A

Q Okay. But the order was June 15th, but on June 15th we can agree that Ms. Silva's custody went R from being the primary physical custodian to having no physical custody, correct?

20 A Temporarily, correct.

21 Q And as of June 15th the father had sole 22 legal custody too, right?

23 A Temporarily, correct.

Q And that the mother was ordered not to have 25 any contact with her daughter, correct?

Page 37 1 Α Temporarily, correct. The word "temporary," I realize you put 2 Q 3 that in the title of the order but the order had no 4 end date, did it? What order? 5 А I'm sorry. The order that we're looking at 6 Q 7 on Exhibit 10, page 101. MR. TERRY: I'll object to the form of the 8 9 question, the show cause hearing was also set for a 10 later point in time where that would have been an 11 issue. 12 MR. BRADLEY: Your Honor, I appreciate 13 counsel's helping the witness with the answer, but I 14 just asked whether there was end date as to the 15 change of custody. 16 JUDGE STOCKARD: I'm going to allow the 17 question. 18 THE WITNESS: There was an evidentiary 19 hearing regarding custody set for October 11th at 20 1:30. So at that time I would make further orders 21 on custody. 22 BY MR. BRADLEY: 23 Okay. There is no date that changes 0 24 custody in this order other than the fact that 25 you're going to set another evidentiary hearing,

Page 38 1 correct? 2 Α I don't understand. 3 It doesn't say that the father's awarded Q 4 temporary sole legal and physical custody for the 5 next four weeks, correct? There's no end date. All 6 you did --А This is an evidentiary hearing. 7 All you did was set an evidentiary hearing, 8 0 9 right? That's why I set it, to make further 10 A 11 orders. 12 0 Right. There's no end date in the order. 13 All you did is set a hearing date, correct? Α The end date is the date I have the 14 15 evidentiary hearing --16 Okay. Q 17 Α -- because right now it's a temporary order 18 and --19 Because you have a --Q JUDGE STOCKARD: And, Judge, if you'll just 20 21 let him finish his questions. THE WITNESS: Okay. I'm sorry. 22 23 BY MR. BRADLEY: 24 Just because you set a hearing date doesn't Q 25 mean you're going to change the order, does it?

Page 39 I have to keep an open mind and take 1 А 2 evidence at the evidentiary hearing before I make a 3 permanent custodial order. So the answer is, Just because you're 0 5 scheduling a hearing doesn't mean you're going to 6 change custody, correct? 7 Α I don't understand. I'm sorry. Unless and until you change custody, this 0 8 9 order remains in effect, correct? Yes. It's a temporary order, though. 10 Α 11 Think about this, though. 0 I know how you're trying to spin it. 12 А Until you issue another order, this order 13 Q 14 remains in effect, correct? Yes, temporarily. My intent -- I'm sorry. 15 Α If you had scheduled the evidentiary 16 Q 17 hearing two years out, it would be --MR. TERRY: Objection, speculative, not 18 19 consistent with the facts. JUDGE STOCKARD: Sustained. 20 21 BY MR. BRADLEY: Just because you set an evidentiary hearing 22 Q 23 out doesn't mean that this order isn't valid and 24 effective unless and until you issue another order, 25 correct?

Page 40 A temporary order is a valid order but it 1 А 2 means it's temporary in nature and it will be 3 reviewed more fully based upon the evidence. Just because there's a hearing didn't mean 4 0 5 it's going to be revised, correct? 6 Ά Incorrect. MR. TERRY: Objection, speculative. 7 THE WITNESS: It's incorrect. Q JUDGE STOCKARD: Judge, when there's an 9 10 objection, please don't answer until I rule. 11 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. 12 JUDGE STOCKARD: And I understand, but I 13 want to make sure that we keep this orderly. 14 THE WITNESS: Okay. JUDGE STOCKARD: I'm going to allow that 1.5 16 question. 17 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. Say it again. 18 BY MR. BRADLEY: My point is that just by setting a hearing 19 0 20 doesn't change the order. The order remains in 21 effect unless and until you change the visitation 22 and custody order, correct? 23 Α Can you say that one more time please? Let me try a different way. You set a 24 Q 25 hearing for October in this case, correct --

Page 41 (Witness nods.) 1 Α 2 -- so at a minimum this temporary order was 0 3 going to last about four months, right? Ά Yes. 4 Okay. Now --5 0 Unless someone brought a motion and then I 6 А 7 would consider it. And frequently hearings get postponed, 0 8 9 correct? I would say if the parties stipulate, but 10 А 11 typically I don't postpone them. If the hearing was postponed, this order 12 0 13 would remain in effect. Say it got postponed into 14 November. That order would still remain in effect 15 is my point. A Well, in fact, the parties stipulated to 16 17 postpone this order --18 0 That wasn't the question. I know what your question was, but my А 19 20 answer is what my answer is. It would be helpful if you'd answer my 21 Q 22 question and not a different one. I'm answering your question. No. 23 А I'm 24 sorry. I am answering your question. If parties stipulate, as they did in this 25

Page 42 1 case, the date got moved. They did stipulate to 2 move this hearing and I accept their stipulation. If you would turn to Exhibit 4, which are 3 0 4 your answers to interrogatories, and I'd ask you to 5 turn to the Bates stamp number on the bottom 55. And in Interrogatory 3 does the question 6 7 state, "Please explain how your findings of the 8 complaint and the in contempt complies with Nevada 9 Revised Statutes regarding finding a party in 10 contempt for violating a court order." 11 Answer -- and I'll just read the first 12 paragraph -- "NRS 22.0103 deems contempt to be 13 'disobedience or resistance to any lawful writ, 14 order, rule or process issued by the judge in 15 chambers.'. 16 "Ms. Silva willfully violated my orders to 17 facilitate Mr. Silva's custodial time against the 18 best interest of the child and in violation of Mr. 19 Silva's constitutional parental rights," correct? That's what that says. 20 Α 21So in your answers to interrogatories, that 0 22 does indicate that you did find her in contempt, not 23 a prima facia finding of contempt, right? 24 I don't see the difference. Δ 25 0 You don't?

Page 43 1 Α No. Turn to Exhibit 14, the interview you gave 2 0 3 to the Commission investigator. Do you see that? I'm there. А 5 Q And if you turn within that document to 6 page 167, tell me when you're there. 7 Ά I'm there. About halfway down the line numbers starts 0 8 9 out "25:27, AW," who is the investigator. And the 10 question was asked, "Did you find the mother in 11 contempt for failing to facilitate the visitation? 12 "RH" -- that's you, you answer. "I did." 13 Uh-huh. Α So in that answer did you explain, No, I 14 Q 15 really didn't. It was just a prima facia order, or 16 was that pretty clear indication you admitted you 17 found the mother in contempt? Again, I don't see the difference. 18 Α You 19 have to make a finding of contempt in order to issue 20 an order to show cause. Then I think you went on to say that -- if 21 Q 22 you turn to the next page -- middle part of the page 23 at 2657, the question "Now, your finding -- just a 24 finding of contempt for failing to facilitate the 25 visitations, okay, does that violate the mother's

1 due process?"

2 Your answer, "She had no consequences for 3 that. She never suffered any consequences for that. 4 I probably found that she violated my orders but I 5 didn't sanction her. I didn't, obviously, 6 incarcerate here her."

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7 That's what the question and answer said?
8 A Yes.

9 Q And you don't find that by changing custody 10 from the mother, who used to have primary physical 11 custody, to awarding sole physical custody, sole 12 legal custody and no contact for the mother, you 13 don't find that to be a sanction at all?

14 A No, that was not the reason for it.

15 Q When you use the words you find her in 16 contempt, what legal standard were you applying?

17 A Clear and convincing evidence.

18 Q And that's the appropriate standard of 19 proof for a civil contempt, correct?

20 A That's correct.

21 Q And do you think that by making a temporary 22 change of custody that's not using the temporary 23 change in custody as a sword to punish parental 24 misconduct?

25 A I did not do that.

Page 45 We can agree that the Nevada Supreme Court 1 0 2 has made it extremely clear in cases Sims and Lewis 3 and Hager that it is absolutely forbidden to use a 4 permanent change in custody as a sword to punish 5 parental misconduct, correct? I haven't read those cases in a while so I 6 Ά 7 can't agree with your analysis. I am aware that 8 there is case law that you do not change custody as 9 punishment for parental misconduct. 10 I believe in your answers to 0 11 interrogatories you indicated that you made the 12 temporary change in custody pursuant to NRS 13 125(c).0045, right? I would have to look. 14 Δ 15 Q I'll represent to you that's what your 16 answer said. 17 Okay. Α 18 0 And I guess my question is -- and I know 19 you do this work day in, day out -- but that section 20 .0045 still requires a finding that it's in the best 21 interest of the child to make a change in custody, 22 correct? On a temporary basis? 23 Α 24 Q Correct. 25 А Yes.

Page 46 Q You have to find that it is in the child's 2 best interest to make even a temporary change in 3 custody, correct?

, 30 1 1

4 A Yes. And I did.

5 Q Okay. And another section, the section 6 that comes right before 0045 is 0035 that delineates 7 all the factors that a change is supposed to take 8 into account in determining whether or not it's in 9 the child's best interest, correct?

10 A That is a non-exclusive list but that is a 11 partial list.

12 Q Okay. And there are half a dozen factors 13 of this list of things that a judge should consider 14 in determining best interest, correct?

15 A I think the statute lists that many, but 16 that's not all of the factors.

Q Correct. But one of the things is, for kexample, the wishes of the child if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to form an intelligent preference as to his or her custody. Is that one of the factors you put in your order about why you find it in the minor child's best interest to have sustody changed?

24 A That was not in my order.

25 Q Okay. Did you put in any factors other

Page 47 1 than the fact that there was a lack of the mother 2 complying with the father's visitation? I believe lack of contact with the father, 3 Α 4 failure to facilitate visitation, lack of 5 participation and reunification therapy, yes, I 6 believe there were many things. That June 8th court minute or journal 8 entry details all of the steps I took 9 therapeutically that were not supported by the 10 mother, so those were part of my findings. 11 0 All of the things the mother did wrong 12 appear more to be a sword against the mother's 13 parental misconduct than a finding that it's 14 actually in the child's best interest. 15 Wouldn't you agree? 16 Α That's incorrect completely. Do you have any regrets about the manner in 17 0 18 which you treated Ms. Silva on June 15th, 2016? I regret she put me in that position. 19 Α Okay. We're looking at -- do you have any 20 Q 21 regrets about your conduct? No. I did what I had to do. 22 Α - And --23 Q It wasn't fun but I had to do it. 24 А 25 Q So on May 12th you had ordered Ms. Silva

Page 48 1 to facilitate visitation with the father on 2 May 14th, right? We've gone through that. "May 12th," did you say? 3 Α Yes. May 12th you had the hearing and the 4 0 5 weekend coming up was May 14 and 15th and you 6 ordered a visitation to be facilitated through 7 Donna's House, correct? That is correct. Α 8 All right. And then you didn't have 9 Q 10 another hearing until June 15th, correct? 11 Α Yes. All right. And so after you entered the 12 0 13 order on May 12th, you received a report from 14 Donna's House indicating that the mother did not 15 facilitate the visitation that you had ordered for 16 the 14th and 15th of May, correct? 17 Α I don't know the date that they went, 18 because I can't recollect. I'd have to look at the 19 letter. 20 0 You know, I want you to be sure on the 21 dates. Why don't we go back to Exhibit 6, the 22 second page, and maybe that'll refresh your 23 recollection as to dates. Can you give me a Bates number. 24 А 25 0 83.

1

Page 49 1 Α I go from six to seven. It's Tab 5, I apologize. 2 Q 3 А This isn't Donna's House. 4 0 This is a May 12th -- are you at tab -- is 5 this your minutes on the second page about your 6 order about visitation? Right. But it's not the Donna's House 7 Α Oh, are you talking about the referrals? 8 letter. 9 Q I'm trying to refresh your recollection, 10 Judge, on the dates. You indicated you weren't 11 sure. 12 ·A Okay. 13 So this minute order is dated May 12th and 0 14 you're ordering visitation starting on Saturday, 15 May 14th going into Sunday May 15th, right? Well, Donna's House requires orientation. 16 А 17 I don't know if they had to do orientation again, so 18 it may not have been a couple days later. It may 19 have been the next week. I don't know the dates. 20 That's what I'm saying. I don't know that it's 21 important that those were the dates but Donna's 22 House --23 After you issue -- let's try it a different 0 24 way. 25 After you held this hearing on May 12th and

1	Page 50 you ordered another visitation at Donna's House, you
2	subsequently received a report from Donna's House
3	indicating that the visitation that was supposed to
4	occur after May 12th didn't occur, correct?
5	A Yes.
6	Q And that's why on May 8th you decided you
7	were going to change custody, correct?
8	A June 8th.
9	Q June 8th. Right?
10	A Yes.
11	Q Okay. Now, when did you give Ms. Silva an
12	opportunity to be heard about whether or not Donna's
13	report was incorrect or why it may have been not a
14	willful violation of your order to have this
15	post-May 12th visitation occur?
16	A I don't understand your question. I'm
17	sorry.
18	Q Let me try it again.
19	So there was supposed to be a visitation
20	that came about after May 12th that never occurred
21	in your opinion, correct?
22	A Yes.
23	Q And it was this post-May 12th report from
24	Donna's House that caused you on June 8th to find
25	her in contempt, correct?

2. 1 1

Page 51 1 Ά Yes. If there was no hearing between May 12th 2 Q 3 and June 15th, when did you give Ms. Silva an 4 opportunity to be heard on the issue of why that 5 visitation either did occur or why it did not occur? Well, Ms. Silva --А 6 Just answer that question if you can. 7 0 MR. TERRY: She was attempting to do that, 8 9 Mr. Chairman. All we got was "Ms. Silva." 10 JUDGE STOCKARD: So I can't rule until I 11 know what the answer is, so sustained. THE WITNESS: Ms. Silva was ordered to 12 13 leave the premises. She was ordered right here to 14 drop off and leave the premises and not stay. 15 Donna's House sent me a letter saying that she did 16 not do that. 17 BY MR. BRADLEY: When did Ms. Silva get an opportunity to 18 Q 19 contest the accuracy of that letter that you 20 received from Donna's House? She never contested the accuracy of that. 21 Α 22 When did she have the opportunity to do Q 23 that before you changed custody on June 15th? 24 Α Between this and June 15th. I didn't have 25 a hearing between those two dates.

Page 52 That's my point. She did not have an Q 1 2 opportunity to contest that letter and that letter 3 was not an affidavit, correct? It's a report from a court facilitator. Α Right. And the statute doesn't have an 5 0 6 exception for requiring affidavits before you find 7 somebody in contempt for reports from a court 8 facilitator, correct? Α It requires clear and convincing evidence. 9 10 Q Okay. And an opportunity to be heard, 11 right? 12 А Well, before you issue a contempt penalty, 13 of course. That's why I issued an order to show 14 cause saying, Ms. Silva, why should you not be held 15 in contempt for having violated this order, for not 16 leaving Donna's House, as was reported to me by 17 Donna's House, and I set an order to show cause 18 hearing. 19 The change in custody was not as a result 20 of this. It was as a result of the seven or eight 21 hearings I had before and still Dad had no contact, 22 no visitation. MR. BRADLEY: Your Honor, now would be a 23 24 good time to play the video. Could I have a few 25 minutes to set that up?

Page 53 JUDGE STOCKARD: Sure. We'll take a 1 2 five-minute recess. We'll convene back at 9:15 a.m. (Recess taken.) 3 JUDGE STOCKARD: So we're back on the 4 5 record on Case No. 2016-113-P. It's in the matter 6 of Honorable Rena Hughes. Parties are present. Mr. Bradley, you may continue. 7 MR. BRADLEY: With the Commission's 8 9 permission, I'd like to play the videotape that's 10 actually three segments, but I don't think it makes 11 sense to break it apart because they are all pretty 12 brief. Can we go through all three of them? JUDGE STOCKARD: Any objection, Mr. Terry? 13 MR. TERRY: No objection. 14 15 JUDGE STOCKARD: Very well. (Video played.) 16 17 JUDGE STOCKARD: Can we pause the video. 18 This video shows the minor child. It's 19 okay to capture but I don't want to unfairly 20 capture. Go ahead. (Video played.) 21 22 BY MR. BRADLEY: Judge, can we agree on this hearing we just 23 Q 24 witnessed on June 15th Ms. Silva did not have an 25 opportunity to be heard about whether or not the

Page 54 1 Donna's House letter stating that she failed to 2 facilitate the post-May visitation was in error? That wasn't a hearing. 3 Ά 4 0 I would agree. JUDGE STOCKARD: Judge, can you speak up. 5 THE WITNESS: Oh, I'm sorry. I said, "That 6 7 wasn't a hearing." 8 BY MR. BRADLEY: So because it wasn't a hearing, Ms. Silva 9 0 10 did not get an opportunity to explain whether or not 11 that letter from Donna's House was correct or 12 incorrect. She would have done that at the order to 13 А 14 show cause hearing. 15 At the June 15th hearing she wasn't given 0 16 an opportunity to be heard on whether or not the 17 father should be given sole physical custody, 18 correct? It wasn't a hearing. It was a child 19 Α 20 custody exchange. 21 We can agree that Ms. Silva was not given 0 22 an opportunity to be heard on the issue whether or 23 not the father should be given sole legal custody. Counsel, it wasn't a hearing. It was an 24 Α 25 exchange--

1 Q And --

2 A -- a very painful one.

Q And we can agree that she was not given an 4 opportunity to be heard on the issue whether or not 5 she should be deprived of any contact for a period 6 of four months at a minimum, correct?

Page 55

7 A It wasn't a hearing.

8 Q Would you agree generally that, if a judge 9 violates the judicial code, that judge should admit 10 her mistakes?

11 A I don't know what you're talking about.

12 Q Given everything we've discussed today, do 13 you still deny that you violated any Nevada laws or 14 any section of the Nevada Judicial Code?

15 A Absolutely.

16 MR. BRADLEY: Those are all the questions I 17 have at this time. Thank you.

18 JUDGE STOCKARD: Mr. Terry.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

20 BY MR. TERRY:

19

21 Q Your Honor, we're going to take it from the 22 point in time that my colleague began to ask you 23 questions in reference to the chronology of this 24 matter.

25 You've testified that the change of custody

Page 56 1 was not a sanction or a penalty against Ms. Silva. Is that correct? 2 That is correct. 3 Α All right. What was it? 4 Q А Can I have some Kleenex, please. 5 6 JUDGE STOCKARD: We'll get some. THE WITNESS: Thank you. 7 JUDGE STOCKARD: Go ahead, Mr. Terry. 8 9 BY MR. TERRY: Thank you. Did you understand my question? 10 Q 11 Α I'm sorry. Can you say it again? 12 Let's back up a little. Your June 8th, Q 13 2016, directive directed Ms. Silva to bring the 14 minor child into the court. That is correct. 15 Α 16 Q Okay. Under what authority were you 17 relying to enter that directive? Sorry. It was akin to a pickup order. 18 А What is a pickup order? 19 Q Under NRS 125(c). 20 Α Speak up, Judge. 21 Q 22 А Sorry. Can we take a break? MR. TERRY: Can we? 23 MR. BRADLEY: If the judge would like to 24 25 take a break, no objection.

Page 57 MR. TERRY: A 10-minute break? 1 COMMISIONER STOCKARD: We'll be in recess. 2 (Recess taken.) 3 JUDGE STOCKARD: We're back on the record 4 5 on Case No. 2016-113-P in the matter of the 6 Honorable Rena Hughes. The record should reflect 7 the presence of the Commission. Mr. Terry, you may proceed. 8 9 BY MR. TERRY: 10 0 I believe that before the break I had asked 11 you in reference to the change of custody you 12 consistently used the term "temporary." 13 Under what authority did you believe you 14 had at that time to make a temporary change of 15 custody? The authority is found in the statutes and 16 Α 17 in case law that the District Court Family Division 18 may act as in the best interest of the child 19 whenever the judge believes that custody needs to be 20 changed at least on a temporary basis, and that can 21 be done without a hearing. Is that done in other situations other than 22 0 23 what occurred in this case, which is a chronology of 24 hearings that led up to that? For example, there's 25 an allegation of drug usage.

Page 58 A Well, yes. Judges will change based upon -- examples would be positive drug tests, truancy of the child, neglect of the child. There's a plethora of reasons to temporarily change custody without a hearing.

6 Q All right. And you had issued an order to 7 show cause. What is the purpose of an order to show 8 cause?

9 A The purpose of the order to show cause is 10 to have the person who is the subject of the order 11 explain why they should or should not be held in 12 contempt and for the court to determine or hear 13 their affirmative defenses, if they have any, and 14 then make a decision on whether or not sanctions 15 should issue.

Q Now, my colleague had consistently asked Now whether or not Ms. Silva had an opportunity to Revelain the Donna's House situation. At the order of show cause would you have given her the opportunity to explain?

21 A That's what the order to show cause hearing 22 is for.

Q And are briefs and motions appropriate
24 before you get to the order to show cause hearing?
A Yes. They can be submitted.

Page 59 Memorandum of points and authorities as to Q 1 2 why you should not hold --Α Yes. 3 -- me, if I represent Ms. Silva, my client, Q 4 in contempt? Would that have been appropriate? 5 Α In fact, she submitted one. 6 Okay. What did she submit? 0 Objections to the order to show cause. R Α All right. Did she complain about the 9 Q 10 Donna's House exchanges in the plural? Α At that time she had a lawyer who was 11 12 unbundled, I believe, and he made an objection that 13 the order to show cause was not appropriate because 14 the May 12th hearing had not been reduced to a 15 written order by Leslie Cohen, Rogerio's attorney. We had the Donna's House order. That is an 16 17 order that I handwrote but I thought his objection 18 had merit and I granted her objection to the order 19 to show cause and we never proceeded on it. 20 So, in fact, she was given an opportunity Q 21 to be heard -- is that correct -- at the show cause 22 hearing? 23 А Yes. 24 Q Which would have been the appropriate time 25 for it. Would that be correct?

Page 60 A That's the only appropriate time. After an 2 order to show cause hearing I have to make a 3 decision on whether or not she should be held in 4 contempt.

5 Q And by that point in time she was 6 represented by counsel.

7 A Right.

8 Q And a memorandum of points and authorities 9 was, in fact, viable for you, correct?

10 A That is correct.

11 Q Okay. Now, you've indicated that that was 12 not a penalty against the mother. In your mind what 13 was it, the temporary change of custody?

14 A I had to do this because this child was15 suffering psychological abuse through parental16 alienation.

Q Generally what is parental alienation?
A Parental alienation is when we have an
out-of-normal-range parent inflicting psychological
abuse and in this particular case it was
attachment-based parental alienation.

22 Q Attachment with who?

23 A The mother.

Q Okay. We're going to go through the 25 minutes and the orders, et cetera. But throughout

Page 61 1 the course of the proceedings you had even brought 2 experts in to talk to the subject minor. 3 Is that correct? I ordered therapists, yes. А 4 All right. We'll get to that. 5 Q 6 Α Okay. I had asked you if it was appropriate for 7 0 8 you to issue a directive to bring the minor child to 9 court before we took the break. A Right. 10 Under what authority were you relying when 11 Q 12 you directed the mother to bring the minor child to 13 court? NRS 125(c).0055 is akin to a pickup order. 14 Α 15 I direct the mother to bring the child for the 16 purposes of the exchange -- it was not a hearing --17 because she had been withholding from the father and 18 under that --There was a more radical approach that you 19 0 20 could have used which is --Well, I was about to talk about that. 21 Α 22 0 Go ahead. The statute actually says that I can send 23 Α 24 legal authorities over there, so an armed police 25 officer would have gone to the child's home and

Page 62 1 removed the child out of her home. And I could not 2 see that happening. I did not want to traumatize 3 the child in that way. So I thought as a better approach to have 5 the child brought to court and do the exchange in 6 the privacy of my courtroom. In your directive you advised the mother 7 Q 8 that, if she didn't produce the child, potential 9 sanctions could apply. 10 That's because it would be direct contempt. А 11 I had no idea if she was going to come or not 12 because she had refused therapy, she had refused to 13 go to the therapist, so I didn't know that she was 14 going to come. When you say "she," who is that? 15 Q I'm sorry. The mother. 16 А 17 Q And we're going to use the term "Subject 18 Minor" and "Mother." 19 Α Okay. 20 So you had the authority to direct the 0 21 mother to bring the minor child to court? 22 Α Yes. 23 Q And that was for purposes of effectuating 24 the temporary change in custody. That's correct. 25 A

Page 63 Now, the decision to have the temporary 1 Q 2 change of custody, that was based upon the totality 3 of the case that had been in front of you. Would that be accurate? 4 Absolutely. All the hearings that we'd had 5 Α 6 and the enormous time that we had spent and all the 7 therapeutic approaches that had failed, everything 8 had failed, that I tried to institute. 9 Okay. You had the opportunity to view the Q 10 video before we took a break, correct? 11 Α Yeah. All right. 12 0 13 JUDGE STOCKARD: Make sure you answer out 14 loud. 15 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. Yes, I did. 16 17 BY MR. TERRY: Very emotional to watch the subject minor 18 0 19 on that. 20 It's very painful. Α Was that an easy decision for you? 21 Q А It was the toughest thing I've ever done. 22 23 And as a judge you cannot express your Q 24 feelings, your emotions --25 Α Oh.

Page 64 -- as you did during these proceedings in · 0 1 2 front of the minor child or the parties. А Absolutely. I couldn't cry. I felt like 3 4 crying. Q Okay. 5 MR. TERRY: Now, I would invite the --6 7 Madam Reporter, would you place the Respondent's 8 exhibit books in front of her, please. 9 BY MR. TERRY: 0 I would like the panel's attention to 10 11 R0096. 96 and the subsequent pages are a chronology 12 of the different hearings, orders, journal entries, 13 minutes that occurred in this case. Is that correct? 14 It's a partial chronology. The entire 15 Α 16 chronology is so massive. All right. We're going to start with --17 Q 18 you were not the original judge on this case. That's correct. 19 А Q All right. And how long had you, in fact, 20 21 been a judge as of February 18th, 2015? 22 Α Six weeks. And would it be accurate that this was the 23 0 24 first case of this nature with this type of, as you 25 classified it, parental abuse that you had handled?

Page 65 1 Α Yes. But independent of that, you were 2 Q 3 knowledgeable of such things as parental alienation, 4 correct? 5 Α I had studied it, yes. 6 All right. And you understand that the 0 7 Chair has ruled that documents that you would have 8 relied on are not admissible. You understand that? 9 Α Unfortunately. 10 Okay. However, you had training and 0 11 experience in this area, correct? 12 Α Yes. And because you were a new judge, you also 13 Q 14 discussed this case with other judges, correct? 15 Α Many. Okay. But when you discussed this case 16 0 17 with other judges, you did it in a hypothetical. 18 Would that be correct? That is correct. 19 А 20 0 Okay. Why did you discuss this case with 21 other judges? It was such a high-conflict case and there 22 Α 23 were so many problems. I'd never encountered 24 something this severe and I sought the advice of 25 more senior judges than me, people who had been on

Page 66 1 the bench for a long time who possibly had this 2 situation occur. 3 0 Would you indicate to the panel the names 4 of the judges that you discussed it with. Yes. Judge Duckworth, who is now my Α 5 6 presiding. Judge Elliott, Judge Hoskin, Judge 7 Steel, and possibly, Judge Teuton --0 All right. 8 -- who is a juvenile court judge. 9 А And the panel has allowed Judge Steel and 10 0 11 Judge Teuton to testify today. I believe so. Α 12 13 Q Okay. Let's start with page 96, the entry 14 of 2/18/15: And so the panel is aware of this --15 and I believe Mr. Bradley is already aware of it --16 this document is a chronology. However, there are documents which I'm 17 18 going to be referring to that are these documents, 19 so would you look at E103. 20 Now, this is consistent with the first 21 entry of the chronology that has been prepared -- is 22 that correct -- the February 18th, 2015 --23 Yes. Again, it's court minutes so it's a Α 24 summary, it's not the official record. 25 Okay. I want you to summarize for the Q

Page 67 1 Commission and for the record what the February 18th 2 proceedings were in reference to.

A All right. So the father had filed a 4 motion to modify custody and to have the subject 5 minor academically tested because she was 6 home-schooled. And, of course, there was an 7 opposition and a countermotion for Rule 11 8 sanctions.

9 I found that -- and, again, this is not the 10 official record. It says I found an order. The 11 parties already had joint legal custody.

12 Q Correct.

Yes.

Α

25

The reason that that's included in here was 13 Α 14 because the father was objecting to the 15 homeschooling and joint legal custody is defined in 16 their decree of divorce that they make these 17 decisions together. It's a mutual decision and 18 Mother unilaterally decided to homeschool. So it's 19 reiterated the parties have joint legal custody. 20 Q And throughout your proceedings you learned 21 that the father had been paying to have the minor 22 child go to the Montessori school. 23 Α Yes, \$1,000 a month prior. 24 And he was paying \$1,000 a month? Q

Page 68 And you also learned that he was not 1 Q 2 consulted in reference to the unilateral decision to 3 withdraw the child from school and to, quote, 4 homeschool. I believe the sequence of events was that 5 Α the child was in school and Mother withdrew before 6 7 they separated but he acquiesced in that. And then when they divorced, he said, I 8 9 want the child tested to make sure that she's at her 10 academic level. And when there was significant 11 resistance to that, he said, I'm withdrawing my 12 consent to have her home-schooled, but he acquiesced 13 in that by doing nothing. But then he brought a motion? 14 Q Yes, he brought a motion to have her tested 15 A 16 to make sure she was at her level. And his concern was that she was not 17 0 18 progressing sufficiently and the homeschooling 19 wasn't working. 20 A He was. Because there's all types of 21 criteria that you have to meet if you're 22 homeschooling. 23 Did you later learn that the mother had not Q 24 abided by those criteria? Yes, I did. 25 А

Page 69 1 Q Okay. Can you give the Commission an 2 example of that. When you homeschool a child, you have to 3 Α 4 file your notice of intent with the Clark County 5 School District. You have to --Stop. Was that done? 0 6 It was done much later, not when she -- it 7 Α 8 has to be done before you homeschool. It was not 9 done. 10 Right. Continue. Q The intent has to show that you have the 11 Α 12 custodial rights to do it. Father did not consent, 13 so it was not -- it was a joint legal custodial 14 decision. She didn't file it until well after we 15 had many hearings on the subject. It also has to 16 attach the curriculum and it has to be a Clark 17 County School District-approved curriculum. The 18 document that was given to me didn't have any 19 curriculum attached to it. So did you question the homeschooling? 20 Q А Well, the father was questioning it and he 21 22 basically wanted her math-tested and tested for 23 reading. 24 Now, the disposition notes that it was Q 25 granted as to the academic testing, correct?

		Page 70
1.	A	Yes.
2	Q	Denied as to a request for a change of
3	custody.	
4	A	Right.
5	Q	So the father had filed a motion to change
6	custody.	
7	А	He had.
8	Q	And that was denied.
9	А	Yes.
10	Q	Okay. You entered a behavioral order.
11	What is	a behavioral order?
12	A	It's pretty much what it says it is. It
13	gives a	list of 10 or 12 things you shall not, you
14	shall no	t, don't disparage. Don't bring the child
15	into lit	igation. Don't discuss the litigation with
16	the chil	d. Basically behave yourself. It's not
17	like a r	estraining order like against domestic
18	violence	but it's a mutual behavioral order that
19	tells th	e parents these are the things that you
20	should r	not do.
21	Q	At the first proceeding you likewise
22	ordered	the child to be interviewed.
23	A	Yes.
24	Q	By whom?
25	A	Family Mediation Center. They have child

1 interviewers.

2 Q And at page 103, that's Notation No. 4, 3 "Referred to Family Mediation Center." Page 71

4 A Right.

5 Q What is that for?

6 A Family Mediation Center is a tool that 7 family court uses to offer mediation services to see 8 if they can help parents come up with a resolution 9 on their own because the court would rather have 10 them decide. I'm the default position.

Families, parents, they need to have the riput. They're the ones who know their child better than I do and I give them the opportunity to come to an agreement. So it was also on his custodial timeshare. While I denied his change of custody, I didn't find adequate cause under Rooney to even have an evidentiary hearing on a change in custody. I an evidentiary hearing on a change in custody. I schedule that works best for you.

20 Q Did Mother go to mediation?

21 A I don't recall if she went to mediation.

22 Q Second question, was mediation successful?
23 A No.

Q Okay. Now, at page 104, item 10, you 25 indicated, "Minor shall be tested through Clark

Page 72 1 County School District or another facility of 2 defendant's" -- just so we're clear, who is the 3 defendant in this case? The father. А 4 Q Okay. 5 "of Defendant's choice shall be granted to 6 7 determine if Minor is performing at Minor's grade 8 level as to math, reading and, if not, why. Results 9 shall be provided to both parties," and you ordered 10 the father to pay for that. 11 Α I did. Okay. So that portion was granted in part, 12 0 13 correct? 14 Α That was his motion, yes. All right. And you also directed the 15 Q 16 mother to comply with all the guidelines for 17 homeschooling. Α Yes. 18 And did she ever provide you any proof that 19 Q 20 she was complying with the guidelines for 21 homeschooling --22 А No. 23 0 -- throughout the course of this whole 24 proceeding. 25 Α No.

Page 73 Was the minor child ever tested? 1 Okay. Q 2 А Yes. At what point in time? This is February of 3 0 4 2015. Excuse me, your Honor. MR. BRADLEY: Ι 5 6 feel like we're going way astray. I've been trying 7 to grant some latitude. I understand they want to 8 talk about background, but she's not being charged 9 with any misconduct having to do with finding her in 10 contempt with regard to homeschooling, taking a math 11 test or anything else, so I'd object that all of 12 this testimony is irrelevant. JUDGE STOCKARD: Mr. Terry? 13 14 MR. TERRY: And we suggest that the 15 totality of this case is relevant because it leads 16 up to those actions which occurred by Judge Hughes 17 at the hearing that you saw on the video. This is 18 not a case you can look at with just one simple 19 procedure. 20 The totality of the case has to be viewed, 21 including what input the, quote, experts had, the 22 failures by the natural mother to comply with the 23 prior court orders in an attempt to reunify the 24 subject minor with the natural father, and those are 25 what is demonstrated within all the documents we're

1 going to be referring to.

2 The February 1 from 2015 is just the 3 beginning. But we need to demonstrate to you that 4 Mother was not in compliance with what would 5 ultimately be the court orders which started to be 6 entered into February.

Page 74

JUDGE STOCKARD: I'm going to allow it. I 8 want just -- my ruling is based, one, on res gestae, 9 which I think is the totality of the circumstances; 10 and, two, if the Commission determines that 11 discipline is appropriate it may be relevant and 12 consistent with Motion in Limine No. 1 as to 13 mitigation.

MR. TERRY: And I acknowledge that the 15 panel can give it what weight they wanted, but I 16 appreciate the admissibility portion.

17 BY MR. TERRY:

18 Q All right. Is there anything else in 19 reference to the 2/8/2015 hearing that's relevant 20 for the Commission?

21 (Witness reviewing document.)

THE WITNESS: Just that I admonished them to stop making derogatory remarks about each other and having disagreements in front of the child. In stimation this child was caught in the middle of

Page 75 1 adult conflict. 2 BY MR. TERRY: 3 Q And that was the very first hearing --А Yes. 4 -- of February 15th? 5 Q That's why I issued the behavioral Α Yes. 6 7 order basically telling the parents behave 8 yourselves, stop involving your child. She doesn't 9 need to know about the things that you're in 10 disagreement about. 11 Q Now, you set a return hearing for 12 April 23rd, 2015. Is that correct? 13 Α Yes. However, your chronology indicates that on 14 0 15 3/16/2015, the parties stipulated to move the 4/23 16 hearing. 17 А They did. Okay. And you accommodated them and set 18 0 19 the hearing for 5/26/2015. Is that correct? 20 Α Yes. All right. Then on 5/26/2015 -- and if you 21 Q 22 will now turn to page 105, this was the return 23 hearing. Would you explain to the Commission what 24 this hearing was in reference to and what you 25 ultimately ordered.

1 A So the parents were given the child 2 interview report from Family Mediation Center to 3 review and problems had already occurred from the 4 time they were in court the last time.

5 Q Articulate for the Commission what those 6 problems were.

7 A So Father paid for the child to be 8 reading-tested and that went smoothly, from what I 9 understand. But Father did his own informal test of 10 the child at home and it made the child very angry. 11 And this is according to the therapist and according 12 to the reports of the father in court, that the 13 child was very upset with him for testing her.

And he apologized to her and said it Note: And he apologized to her and said it Note: And the start of things got a Hereitan and the start of things got a Hereitan and the start of things got a And that's when the child start saying, I'm not Note: And the start of the start of

19 BY MR. TERRY:

20 Q There were other issues that were raised in 21 the 5/26 hearing. Is that correct?

22 A Yes.

Q I mean, one of them was the sale of 24 property which had been ordered, but that was not 25 the primary concern at this point in time.

	Page 77
1	Would that be accurate?
2	A It was one of the issues but it was a
3	provision of their decree that had not been complied
4	with. The main thing the court addressed was that
5	the child was now having difficulties in her
6	relationship with her father because he tested her
7	and defendant's or Father's attorney suggested a
8	reunification therapist, which Plaintiff agreed to
9	through her counsel.
10	Q And that is the last paragraph on page 105
11	of your journal entry?
12	A Yes. That Keisha Weiford would provide
13	services for reunification. I ordered Dad to be
14	responsible 100 percent for the cost because,
15	admittedly, he tested the child, the child was upset
16	with him, and I was not convinced at this point that
17	there was parental alienation going on and so I did
18	initially order him to pay all the fees for that.
19	Q Now, who is Keisha Weiford?
20	A She's a licensed marriage and family
21	therapist.
22	Q Does she work through the family court?
23	A No. No. She's an independent therapist.
24	Q Do you know how she was chosen in this
25	case?

ġ

Page 78 1 Ά Defendant's attorney suggested her and 2 Plaintiff's attorney agreed. They stipulated. So at this time both parties were 3 Q 4 represented by counsel? А Yes. 5 Okay. So there was a stipulation to have 6 0 7 Ms. Weiford, who was recognized as the therapist, 8 meet with the minor child and the parents? 9 Α And perform reunification therapy, so that 10 entails sessions where the child and the father are 11 present in the therapist's office and they address 12 their conflict. 13 0 Okay. What -- get to the bottom of the problem so Α 14 15 we can get back on with our relationship. So you start with mediation, which doesn't 16 Q 17 work. 18 Α Right. And now you're going to therapy? 19 0 20 А Therapy. One step higher. Correct? 21 Q 22 А Yes. 23 Q In an effort to --24 In an effort to? Α Cause what? Reunification? 25 Q

. . . . . . 1.1

Page 79 Well, to repair their relationship, because Α 1 2 it wasn't happening. Something was going on that 3 needed to be therapeutically addressed. Now, is there anything more to the 5/26 0 5 journal entry that you feel is relevant for the 6 Commission? Well, again, I ordered the math testing to Д 8 be done within 30 days, because it hadn't been done, 9 and that Dad be ordered compensatory time over the 10 summer break. Even though the child was 11 homeschooled, I understood she had a summer break, 12 but he had been denied visitation already. 13 Okay. First of all, what is compensatory 0 14 time? To make up, to make up for what you lost. 15 А 16 0 And when you indicate to the Commission he 17 had been denied visitation --18 Α Yes. -- upon what are you basing that? 19 0 20 ·Α It was an uncontroverted fact. The weekend 21 visitation wasn't happening. He has every weekend. 22 And because he tested the child, the child says, I'm 23 not going anymore, and Mother was not encouraging 24 the child to go and so he missed four weekends. 25 Father was still attempting to get those Q

Page 80 1 visitations, however? Α Of course. 2 And that's why he asked for the 3 Q 4 compensatory time? 5 Α Yes. 6 And you awarded that to him? 0 7 А Absolutely. Okay. But your order didn't indicate --0 8 9 your journal entry didn't indicate when it would 10 occur. It says "over the summer break." Even 11 Α 12 though she was homeschooled, it would happen over 13 the summer break. So summer was coming up. This was 14 Q 15 May 26th. Yes, 2015. 16 Á 17 Now, you set a status-check hearing at the Q 18 bottom of page 106 for August 6th, 2015. Is that correct? 19 20 А Yes. But moving down the chronology, by 21 Q 22 August 4th, 2015, Dad files a motion for an order to 23 show cause and to modify custody due to the 24 withholding of the subject minor --25 А Yes.

Page 81 1 Q -- correct? 2 Α Yes. 3 Q And that matter was set for hearing on 4 7/9/2015. Correct. 5 Α Fairly quick hearing date. 6 Q Well, it's quick and it's just after we had Α 7 8 a status hearing. It was within a week of our 9 hearing. He files another motion to have her held 10 in contempt and to modify custody because the mother 11 wasn't participating in the reunification therapy. And what was the basis of his request? 12 0 That that was it, mother wasn't 13 Α 14 participating in reunification. He still hadn't had 15 any time with his child, his visitation was still 16 being withheld. Now, as of June 29th, 2015, you received 17 Q 18 the first report from Ms. Weiford. Is that correct? 19 Α I don't know. MR. TERRY: That was at RO 1052, ladies and 20 21 gentlemen, in your exhibit book. 2.2 Judge, I would direct your attention to 23 that. THE WITNESS: I don't know if this was the 24 25 first one or not.

1 BY MR. TERRY:

Chronologically it is dated June 29th, 2 0 2015? Do you need to refresh your memory and look 3 4 at that? I'm looking at it. I don't know if this Α was the first one, but I'm there at the report. 6 7 Q Now, recalling that you had set a hearing 8 already for 7/9, this is dated June 29th, 2015. And 9 what does Ms. Weiford advise you in this letter? 10 А You want me to go to the recommendations? And then I'll have you back up and go 11 Q Yes. 12 through the reasons for the recommendations. Α All right. So the recommendations are 156, 13 14 that Dad needs to go through the process of 15 reunification with his daughter, so she was 16 identifying that their relationship needed 17 therapeutic help, that it was somewhat broken, that 18 he may need to learn parenting skills that are 19 better fit for his relationship with his daughter, 20 and I did order parenting classes for him. 21 That Dad and daughter learn and practice 22 new communication skills. Apparently, she 23 identified that may be the source of their 24 relationship deterioration, and it's all 25 therapeutic. Mom to support the reunification

Page 82

Page 83 1 process and participate in it, because at that point 2 she had not been supporting it at all. And the 3 parents learn how to coparent and commit on working 4 on their own issues and any issues identified during 5 the reunification process. 6 0 Up to this point in time there had been no 7 sanctions issued against the natural mother in this 8 case. Is that correct? 9 А Correct. 10 Okay. Dad is paying the costs, correct? Q 11 Д Yes. 12 0 Dad is attempting to have the 13 reunification --Yes. 14 Δ 15 Q -- correct? Dad is having to request that 16 the minor child be tested. 17 А Yes. 18 Q And you're granting that. 19 А Yes. 20 0 But there's nothing that you've shown that 21 would show any type of bias against the mother in 22 this case at this point. 23 Д NO. 24 Q All right. Now, the reason for the 25 recommendations are likewise set down in Ms.

Page 84 1 Weiford's letter, correct? 2 Α Yes. She gives her findings. All right. What was her finding in 3 Q 4 reference to the subject minor? That she's bright and articulate, that she Α 5 6 wants to be an actress or a performer. Did you take note of that, that she wanted 7 0 8 to be an actress or performer? 9 А Not initially. 10 Didn't have any significance? 0 I assumed that was natural because her 11 Α No. 12 mother owns a dance studio and she's been in plays. 13 Okay. 0 That she immediately reported to Keisha 14 Α 15 Weiford upon entering her office that she did not 16 want to see her father. And you construed that as that was the 17 Q 18 first thing that was said, I don't want to see Dad? 19 Right. Α 20 There was another note right before that, Q 21 though, that she speaks way beyond her years. Yes. She's very articulate. Speaks like 22 А 23 an adult, I took it. 24 Okay. Continue. What else did --0 When the therapist asked her if she knew 25 Α

Page 85 1 why she was there, and she knew why she was there, 2 to be reunified and she immediately informed her she 3 didn't want to be reunified. At this point in time the subject minor Q 4 5 hadn't been in the court. Ά No. 6 Okay. So you hadn't had any discussions 7 0 8 with her, correct? No. This is a year before. 9 Α 10 Q He hadn't had any visitations. Correct. 11 А So this could have only been coming from 12 0 13 Mom, correct? А I gathered that. I mean, this was a year 14 15 before she was in my courtroom. 16 Correct. Q Right. And that the therapist tried to 17 Α 18 reassure her that this was a process. She reported 19 she was homeschooling an un-schooling curriculum, 20 which I don't know what that means -- or I didn't 21 know at that time -- but I understood later it was 22 not a Clark County school-approved homeschooling. 23 And this is what the subject minor told 0 24 you. 25 Α Yes.

[		Page 8	6
1	Q	Go ahead.	0
2	A	That she likes being homeschooled. School	
3	wasn't w	orking out for her. She reported she made	
4	the deci	sion to be homeschooled.	
5	Q	So Subject Minor Makes the decision that	
6	she want	s to be homeschooled.	
7	A	Uh-huh.	
8	Q	Mother acquiesces.	
9	A	Yes.	
10	Q	Father has a concern.	
11	A	Yes.	
12	Q	All right.	
13	A	So everyone is not onboard with this.	
14	Mother a	and Daughter are making the decisions.	
15	Q	Did Ms. Weiford report what the subject	
16	minor's	tone was?	
17	A	Irritated or angry at some point, I	
18	believe.	And at this juncture that she was critical	
19	of her f	Eather. She said that he ran over a garbage	
20	can, tha	at he was recklessly driving and took her	
21	phone av	way from her and made some comments about the	
22	mother,	which, again, I admonished them not to do	
23	that. A	And that Annie was very protective over her	
24	mother -	I'm sorry. The subject minor. I'm	
25	reading	it.	

Page 87 1 Q Go ahead. 2 Α She reported that it was her decision for 3 them to get a divorce. Did you find that odd? 4 0 5 Α Very odd. Very odd. And shortly thereafter they got a divorce. 0 6 А Yes. And she believed that once they got a 8 divorce she wouldn't have to see her father again, 9 which isn't what occurred, so I found that puzzling 10 that she would report that. Let's be clear. The Weiford letter doesn't 11 0 12 indicate that the subject minor is saying she's the 13 subject of abuse or neglect by the father. At no point, no. 14 Α Okay. What she talks about as an example 15 0 16 is Dad will not let her have sleepovers. 17 Α Right, which I ordered him to do. 18 Which you, once again in support of the 0 19 mother and minor child, ordered him to do. 20 Α I did. 21 0 And did he comply? 22 А He never got a chance. 23 0 Correct. So from this point in time until 24 ultimately when you see that video, did Dad ever 25 have an opportunity to have the subject minor at his

Page 88 1 residence for a sleepover? 2 А NO. Okay. Did this letter raise any concerns 3 Q 4 in your mind that Mom was interfering with the 5 relationship between Dad and Subject Minor? А Absolutely. 6 0 And what were your concerns after you 7 8 digested this? And there's more at page 154. 9 Α Uh-huh. (Witness reviewing document.) 10 11 BY MR. TERRY: But for brevity purposes, what were your 12 0 13 concerns? That Mom reported the child was extremely 14 Α 15 attached to her after age two and that Mother 16 reported she felt caught in the middle between 17 Daughter and Father. I thought that was very 18 strange. She reported that she assessed Father as 19 20 having a narcissistic personality disorder due to 21 her research and she --Who is the "she" you're referring to? 22 0 23 А Mother. 24 Q Okay. And that Mother was in support of her 25 А

Page 89 1 daughter asserting that she does not want to go with 2 her Dad. That was very troubling to me. 3 Why? Q Because that's parental alienation. 4 Α All right. 5 Q There is a decree of divorce, he has 6 А 7 rights. She as the primary custodial parent under 8 the decree, she has the affirmative obligation to 9 promote and foster and maintain a relationship 10 between the child and the father. 11 Does that include telling a child, If you 0 12 don't want to go, you don't have to? That would absolutely be contrary to her 13 Α 14 legal obligations. 15 Okay. Now, in the interview that the Q 16 counselor did with Dad, he indicated that he had not 17 even seen his daughter for a four-month period of 18 time. 19 Α Correct. 20 What was your impression of that? Q That was not acceptable. 21 А 22 Q Okay. 23 Α That was not acceptable. How do you 24 maintain a relationship with your child? 25 Why was that not acceptable? Q

Page 90 Α You can't maintain a relationship with your 1 2 child. And he's a normal-range parent. That's 3 someone who takes into consideration their parenting He was more structured. The mother was 4 styles. 5 more laissez faire and permissive. But you have to be in that normal range. 6 7 Borderline personalities will manipulate and lie and 8 put the child in the middle, triangulation, put them 9 in the middle of the conflict. 10 And I had a normal-range parent, the 11 Father, who didn't do anything wrong. Every parent 12 makes mistakes, so if he tested her informally and 13 she got mad, he apologized. 14 At this point he hadn't done anything 15 wrong, he hadn't abused her, and he was being denied 16 a relationship with his daughter. So I found that 17 to be very contrary to the best interest of the 18 child and to his legal rights. 19 The statutes, in fact, encourage both Q 20 parties, Mom and Dad, to have contact with the minor 21 child. 22 Α It's a state policy. 23 State policy. Q 24 Under the statutes. Α And it wasn't being done in this case. 25 Q

Page 91 1 Α Absolutely not. Now, there are other references to the fact 2 0 3 that Dad went to pick up the minor child on Father's 4 Day and the police had gotten involved. It was Father's Day, correct? 5 Yeah. He called the police several times 6 Α 7 in May of 2015 and had event cards. He called the 8 police on Father's Day. He was denied access at 9 every juncture. And that was for purposes of effectuating 10 0 11 his court-ordered visitation, correct? Α Yes. 12 And those are situations where you ask the 13 0 14 police for assistance? 15 Right. А They go with you. But if the subject minor 16 Q 17 doesn't want to go, the police don't make them go. Well, it was reported to me and there was a 18 Α 19 police report that was provided -- at the top it 20 says, "To the Family Court" -- that the police 21 officers even tried to talk to the minor child and 22 say, Hey, your Dad wants to spend time with you, why 23 don't you want to go with your Dad? And Mother was 24 not encouraging it. That was in their statement to 25 me.

Q All right. Now, at the bottom of 155 Ms.
Weiford gives her impression and indicates, "I'm
also under the impression that part of the Subject
Minor's decision to not have a relationship with her
Dad is to protect her mother, which also needs
exploration. It seems like Mom and Subject Minor's
7 relationship is enmeshed."

8 What does the term "enmeshed" mean? 9 A It's a psychological term. It means that 10 you can't tell where one starts and the other ends. 11 They're so enmeshed that the parent's ideas and 12 conflict with the ex-spouse become the child's ideas 13 and conflict with the parent that's outed, the 14 targeted parent.

So if Mom complains to the child, the child develops that thought process and takes it out on the targeted parent. So we become one. We are a team. It's a cross-generational parental alienation, and that is the mental health disorder that manifests itself in the child. Q There's terms for parental alienation too, is it not? What else is it referred to?

A Well, parental alienation is not in the DSM
V, the Diagnostic Statistical Manual for Mental
Health Disorders. Attachment-based parental

LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL MARKS DANIEL MARKS, ESQ. Nevada State Bar No. 002003 NICOLE M. YOUNG, ESQ. Nevada State Bar No. 12659 610 South Ninth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 386-0536; FAX (702) 386-6812 Attorneys for Appellant

Electronically Filed Jan 29 2019 12:09 p.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN THE MATTER OF THE HONORABLE RENA G. HUGHES, EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, FAMILY DIVISION, DEPARTMENT J. COUNTY OF CLARK, STATE OF NEVADA. Case No. 76117

Appeal from the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline

APPELLANT'S APPENDIX Volume II of IV

Docket 76117 Document 2019-04454

DOCUMENT	VOL. NO.	PAGE NO.
Certified Copy of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Imposition of Discipline, filed June 18, 2018	IV	APP943-957
Certified Copy of Notice of Appeal, filed June 22, 2018	IV	APP958-960
Commission Exhibit 2- Verified Statement of Complaint by Welthy Silva, dated June 19, 2016	III	APP515-524
Commission Exhibit 3- Verified Statement of Complaint by Steve Sanson, dated December 19, 2016	III	APP525-566
Commission Exhibit 4- Judge Hughes' Responses to Interrogatories, dated May 23, 2017	III	APP567-595
Commission Exhibit 5- Court Minutes from hearing held May 12, 2016 and Order for Supervised Exchange	III	APP596-599
Commission Exhibit 7- Minute Order, dated June 8, 2016	III	APP600-604
Commission Exhibit 8- Order, filed June 14, 2016	III	APP605-610
Commission Exhibit 9- Court Minutes from June 15, 2016, Child Exchange	III	APP611-613
Commission Exhibit 10- Order, filed June 15, 2016	III	APP614-619
Commission Exhibit 11- Court Minutes from July 27, 2016	III	APP620-621
Commission Exhibit 13- Affidavit Seeking Disqualification of Judge Due to Bias or Prejudice, filed January 11, 2017	III	APP622-665
Commission Exhibit 14- Recorded Interview of Judge Hughes, dated January 27, 2017	III	APP666-692
Commission Exhibit 16- Recorded Interview of Welthy Silva, dated February 8, 2017	III	APP693-749
Commission Exhibit 18- Formal Statement of Charges, filed October 10, 2017	IV	APP750-756

DOCUMENT	<u>VOL. NO.</u>	PAGE NO.
Commission Exhibit 19-Verified Response and Answer, filed October 30, 2017	IV	APP757-761
First Amended Order Setting Public Hearing and Notice of Panel Members, Order Regarding Media Access, filed on April 6, 2018	Ш	APP276-278
Formal Statement of Charges, filed October 10, 2017	Ι	APP233-239
Judge Hughes' Responses to Interrogatories, dated May 23, 2017	I	APP204-232
Letter from Commission on Judicial Discipline to Judge Hughes regarding Judicial Conduct Complaints, dated April 26, 2017, with Complaints and Investigation File attached	Ι	APP1-203
Motion in Limine No. 1, dated May 7, 2018	Π	APP279-285
Objection to Respondent's Exhibits, dated May 18, 2018	Π	APP293-297
Opposition to Motion in Limine No. 1, dated May 9, 2018	Π	APP286-292
Order Denying Motion for Expansion of Time to Present Respondent's Defense, filed on April 4, 2018	П	APP267-275
Order Denying Motion to Dismiss Complaint, filed May 25, 2018	II	APP312-321
Order Denying Motion to Transfer Hearing to Las Vegas, Nevada or, in the Alternative, to do Said Hearing by Video, filed on April 4, 2018	Π	APP253-266
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion in Limine No. 1, filed on May 23, 2018	II	APP303-311
Order Setting Public Hearing and Notice of Panel Members Order Regarding Media Access, filed on January 25, 2018	Π	APP250-252
Prehearing Order, filed January 5, 2018	Ι	APP245-249

<b>DOCUMENT</b>	VOL. NO.	PAGE NO.
Respondent Exhibit A- JAVS Video of 7/28/16 Hearing (CD not attached)	IV	APP763
Respondent Exhibit C- Character Letters	IV	APP764-784
Respondent Exhibit D- Chronology of Silva Hearings	IV	APP785-791
Respondent Exhibit E- District Court, Family Division Court Minutes	IV	APP792-840
Respondent Exhibit F- Documentation of Keisha Weiford	IV	APP841-873
Respondent Exhibit G- Additional Character Letters	IV	APP874-879
Respondent's List of Exhibits	IV	APP762
Respondent's Proposed Exhibit B- Information Provided to Family Court Judges Regarding Parental Alienation (Not Admitted at Hearing)	IV	APP880-933
Respondent's Proposed Exhibit C- Character Letters (Not Admitted at Hearing)	IV	APP934-942
Response to Objection to Respondent's Exhibits, dated May 23, 2018	II	APP298-302
Transcript of Proceedings, dated May 30, 2018	II III	APP322-499 APP500-514
Verified Response and Answer, filed October 30, 2017	Ι	APP240-244

1	BEFORE THE NEVADA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE			
2	STATE OF NEVADA FILED			
3	In the Matter of JAN 25 2018			
4	THE HONORABLE RENA G. HUGHES,			
5	District Court Judge, Family Division, Eighth ) CASE NO. 2016-113-P Judicial District Court, Department J, )			
6	County of Clark, State of Nevada,			
7	Respondent.			
8				
9.				
10	ORDER SETTING PUBLIC HEARING AND NOTICE OF PANEL MEMBERS			
11	ORDER REGARDING MEDIA ACCESS			
12	TO, THE HONORADIE DENIA C. HUGHER Barner Jant			
13	TO: THE HONORABLE RENA G. HUGHES, Respondent WILLIAM B. TERRY, ESQ., Counsel for Respondent			
14	THOMAS C. BRADLEY, ESQ., Prosecuting Officer			
15	Pursuant to order of the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline ("Commission"), a public			
16	hearing in the above-captioned matter has been scheduled to commence on May 29, 2018, at the hour of			
17	8:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard and will conclude at or before 5:00 p.m. The			
18	public hearing will be conducted at the office of the State Bar of Nevada, 9456 Double R Boulevard,			
19	Suite B, Reno, Nevada 89521. The Respondent, Respondent's counsel and the Prosecuting Officer will			
20	appear in person.			
21	The following panelists are scheduled to participate as members of the Commission: Gary			
22	Vause (Chair), Hon. Leon Aberasturi, Karl Armstrong, Esq., Bruce C. Hahn, Esq., Stefanie Humphrey,			
23	Mary-Sarah Kinner and Hon. Jerome Polaha.			
24	Members of the media intending to record this public hearing must obtain consent to do so from			
25	the Commission. Media entry requests should be directed to Gary Vause, Chair and may be mailed to			
26	the Commission at Post Office Box 48, Carson City, NV, 89702, sent via facsimile to (775) 687-3607			
27	or sent by electronic mail to <u>ncjdinfo@judicial.state.nv.us</u> . The request should contain the name and			
28	111			
	APP250 1			
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# APP250 1


1	type of media outlet, including address, telephone and facsimile number(s). Requests must be received			
2	by the Commission no later than 3:00 p.m., May 18, 2018.			
3	Chairman Gary Vause is authorized to sign this order on behalf of the full Commission.			
4	IT IS SO ORDERED.			
5	DATED this 25 <sup>th</sup> day of January, 2018.			
6	STATE OF NEVADA			
7	COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE			
8	Buy buse			
9	Gary Vause, Chairman			
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1	APP251 2			

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
2	I hereby certify on this 25 <sup>th</sup> day of January, 2018, I transmitted a copy of the foregoing ORDER	
3	SETTING PUBLIC HEARING AND NOTICE OF PANEL MEMBERS, ORDER REGARDING	
4	MEDIA ACCESS, via email and by placing said document in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, addressed	
5	to:	
6	William B. Terry, Esq.	
7	William B. Terry, Chartered Attorney at Law 530 South Seventh Street	
8	Las Vegas, NV 89101-6011 Info@WilliamTerryLaw.com	
9	Counsel for Respondent	
10	Thomas C. Bradley, Esq.	
11	Sinai, Schroeder, Mooney, Boetsch, Bradley & Pace 448 Hill Street	
12	Reno,NV 89501 Tom@stockmarketattorney.com	
13	Prosecuting Officer	
14	Valerie Carter	
15	Valerie Carter, Commission Clerk	
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	APP252 3	

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#### BEFORE THE NEVADA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE

# STATE OF NEVADA In the Matter of THE HONORABLE RENA G. HUGHES. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, ) Department J, County of Clark, State of Nevada,) Respondent.



CASE NO. 2016-113-P

#### ORDER DENYING MOTION TO TRANSFER HEARING TO LAS VEGAS, NEVADA OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO DO SAID HEARING BY VIDEO

TO: THE HONORABLE RENA G. HUGHES, Respondent WILLIAM B. TERRY, ESQ., Counsel for Respondent THOMAS C. BRADLEY, ESO., Prosecuting Officer

Currently before the Commission on Judicial Discipline ("Commission") is a Motion To Transfer Hearing To Las Vegas, Nevada Or, In The Alternative, To Do Said Hearing By Video ("Motion"), which was filed by counsel for the Honorable Rena G. Hughes, District Court Judge, Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, Department J for Clark County, Nevada ("Respondent") on February 20, 2018. Opposition To Respondent's Motion To Transfer Hearing To Las Vegas, Nevada Or, In The Alternative, To Do Said Hearing By Video was filed by the Prosecuting Officer for the Commission ("Prosecuting Officer") on March 6, 2018. Reply to the Prosecuting Officer's Opposition was filed by the counsel for Respondent on March 23, 2018.

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## STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Formal Statement of Charges alleges that Respondent, a District Court Judge in Clark County, Nevada, held a Ms. Silva ("mother") in contempt without due process and an opportunity to be heard; imposed a penalty for contempt that changed custody of the minor child by awarding sole

physical and legal custody to the father; and changed physical and legal custody of the minor child without a hearing as required by Nevada law.

On February 20, 2018, Respondent filed her Motion to change the hearing location to Las Vegas, or in the alternative, permit testimony by video. The Respondent states that if the hearing is held in Reno it will come at a rather significant cost to the Eighth Judicial District Court because Judges Charles Hoskin and Diane Steel are anticipated to testify, as well as Senior Judge Gloria O'Malley. Additionally, Respondent states that one witness, Ms. Tiffany Skaggs, is unable to travel for the hearing because she has a flight out of the country the next day. Moreover, Respondent estimates it would cost her over \$4,000 to have the witnesses appear in Reno based upon air fare, food and lodging. Respondent argued that the Commission has significant funds to cover the cost of the Commissioners' travel and as such should bear the cost burden of the trial.

12 Respondent opines that the Commission's procedural rules afford too much discretion in setting 13 a trial location. She notes, the Commission has previously relied on Jones v. Nev. State Bd. of Med. 14 Exam'rs, to deny a motion for change in venue based on the rule therein that when a general venue 15 statute and a specific venue statute conflict, the specific statute takes precedence. Jones v. Nev. State 16 Bd. Of Med. Exam'rs, 342 P.3d 50, 52 (Nev. 2015). However, Respondent states that Jones is not 17 entirely on point. She argues that in Jones, despite the fact that NRS 630.355 applies to procedures 18 regarding an administrative agency, the two conflicting procedural rules were both adopted by the 19 Nevada legislature, and therefore sit on equal footing. In the present situation, one of the conflicting 20 rules, NRS 13.040, has been adopted by the legislature and enacted into law, while the other, 21 Commission Rule 18, is a rule adopted by the Commission on Judicial Discipline and by the Nevada 22 Supreme Court by court order in 1988.

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While Nevada courts have the power to make their own procedural rules, Respondent alleges 24 that Commission Procedural Rule 18 affords the Commission too much discretion. She notes that comparatively, procedural rules governing attorney disciplinary proceedings state that "venue shall be 25 26 the county in which the attorney resides or maintains his or her principal office for the practice of law, where the alleged offense was committed or where the parties have stipulated." SCR 105(2)(c). She 27

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makes the analogy that SCR 105(2)(c) more closely resembles the general venue statute NRS 13.040. which calls for a determination of venue based on the defendant's residency.

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Respondent further argues that she meets NRS 13.050(2)(c)'s requirements that "the court may, on motion, change the place of trial... when the convenience of the witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change." See also Eaton v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 96 Nev. 773, 75, 616 P.2d 400, 401 (1980), overruled on other grounds by Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004). Respondent noted in her affidavit that having four judges, including herself, in Reno would hamper the ability of the Eighth Judicial District Family Court Division to function.

Moreover, Respondent argues that holding the hearing in Reno, Nevada constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Goodman v. Goodman, 68 Nev. 484, 487-88, 236 P.2d 305, 306 (1951). Jackson v. State, 117 Nev. 116, 120, 17 P.3d 998, 1000 (2001). She argues that the relative burdens imposed on either side are markedly unequal because holding the hearing in Reno will burden the Eighth Judicial District Family Court Division's functioning, inconvenience a number of witnesses, critically interfere 14 with Respondent's due process rights, and cost the Respondent an excessive and unwarranted amount of money to defend her case.

In the alternative, Respondent requests that she and all witnesses testify from Las Vegas by 17 videoconference pursuant to NRCP-43(a). NRCP 43(a) states that "in every trial, the testimony of 18 witnesses shall be taken in open court ... The court may, for good cause shown in compelling 19 circumstances and upon appropriate safeguards, permit presentation of testimony in open court by 20 contemporaneous transmission from a different location." NRCP 43(a). Respondent acknowledges that 21 all pertinent language in this rule mirrors the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 43, and that in-22 person testimony has value; however, the witnesses are judges and court staff and thus understand the 23 importance of testifying truthfully. Moreover, Respondent emphasizes that the functioning of the 24 Family Division of the Eighth Judicial District Court will be negatively impacted if several judges are 25 required to testify in Reno. Furthermore, one key witness is unavailable to testify in Reno based upon a 26 previously planned out of country trip. 27

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Respondent further points out that the 1996 Committee Notes favor video transmission over telephonic transmission, and that videoconferencing would allow the Commission to view each witness as though they were sitting in-person at the hearing, noting that direct and cross examination with documents and exhibits is possible, as is questioning by the panelists. She highlights that the Commission would be able to observe witnesses' demeanor, facial expressions, reactions to questions, body language, voice inflections, etc., which are all important elements in the fact-finder's task.

In summary, the Respondent argues that the facts and circumstances regarding the inability of a key witness to attend, and the high cost to transport all witnesses there, may prevent Respondent from adequately defending herself.

The Prosecuting Officer opposes Respondent's Motion to transfer the hearing location from Reno to Las Vegas because the Respondent has failed to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances to justify a change of venue, noting that the facts of the case are simple. The Prosecuting Officer summarized the case as follows. In the underlying case, the mother and father had one child together. The parties divorced in 2013 and the mother was granted primary custody and the father had weekend visitation with the minor child. There were visitation problems and the father alleged that the mother failed to comply with the recently ordered visitation, thus on May 17, 2016, the father's counsel filed a Motion to place the matter back on calendar regarding the visitation.

On June 8, 2016, Respondent issued a Minute Order detailing the visitation issues. The Respondent concluded that, "[t]his Court finds that Plaintiff [Mother] is in contempt of the Court's order to facilitate visitation on weekends with the Father, AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE SHALL ISSUE." The Minute Order further stated, "[m]other shall bring the minor child to Dept. J, Court room [sic] #4, on June 15, 2016 at 1:30 p.m. If the Mother fails to deliver the minor child to the courtroom on June 15, 2016, she shall be deemed in further contempt of Court, and sentenced to twenty- five (25) days incarceration. If the Mother fails to appear, a bench warrant shall issue." The Minute Order also addressed other Order to Show Cause issues that were not related to visitation, and stated in closing, "[t]he Order to Show Cause Hearing shall be scheduled for July 28, 2016 at 1:30 p.m."

The mother arrived with her minor child at the scheduled hearing on June 15, 2016. Respondent ordered all parties and counsel, except the minor child, to leave the courtroom, and addressed the child

for nine (9) minutes off the record. The mother was not allowed to return to the courtroom and was escorted off the Courthouse property. In the mother's absence, Respondent awarded the father temporary sole legal and physical custody, terminated the father's child support obligation, ordered the mother to pay the statutory minimum child support to the father, and the mother was ordered to have no contact with the minor child. The minor child was clearly distressed and cried during the entire process. Respondent addressed the crying minor child by stating that the change in custody occurred because the mother and minor child were not cooperative with the Court ordered visitations. Respondent further stated that if the minor child refused to go with the father she would end up in Child Haven, which Respondent referred to as a jail for kids.

The Prosecuting Officer summed up the case as having three issues: Did Respondent violate 10 Nevada law and the Judicial Code: 11

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1) By holding Ms. Silva in contempt without due process and an opportunity to be heard:

2) By imposing a penalty for contempt that changed custody of the minor child by awarding sole physical and legal custody to the father; and

3) By changing physical and legal custody of the minor child without a hearing as required by Nevada law.

The Prosecuting Officer argued that the Respondent incorrectly claims that the Commission's 18 Rules afford too much discretion and violate a Respondent's due process rights. The Prosecuting 19 Officer cited to In the Matter of the Honorable Melanie Andress-Tobiasson, Case No. 2014-094-P, 20 wherein the Commission relied upon Jones v. Nev. State Bd. Of Med. Examiners, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 4 (Feb. 5, 2015) for holding the Judicial Commission hearing for a Las Vegas jurist in Reno, Nevada. He 22 argues that the doctrine of forum non conveniens is comprised of various factors, including a balancing 23 test of several factors such as public and private interests, access to sources of proof, availability of 24 compulsory process for unwilling witnesses, the cost of obtaining testimony from willing witnesses, 25 and the enforceability of a judgment and if failure to apply the doctrine would subject the defendant to 26 harassment, oppression, vexatiousness or inconvenience. See Eaton v. Second Judicial Court, 96 Nev. 27

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**APP257** 

773, 774 (1980) (citations omitted). See also, NRS 13.050. NRS 13.050(2)(c); Mountain View Recreation v. Imperial Commercial Cooking Equipment Co., 129 Nev. 413 (2013)(citations omitted).

The Prosecuting Officer notes that Respondent failed to disclose the substance of the testimony of potential witnesses. For example, Respondent identifies Judge Diane Steel, Senior Judge Gloria O'Malley, and Judge Charles Hoskin, but fails to include the substance of their expected testimony or explain the relevance of their testimony. To counsel's knowledge, those Judges did not observe nor did they have any involvement in the alleged misconduct. To the extent that Judges Hoskin and Steel will provide a character reference, such evidence should be submitted by letter as is customarily done in these cases. Accordingly, it is unclear if some of these witnesses will even be allowed to testify based upon relevance and duplicity. *See* NRS 48.025 and 48.035.

Furthermore, the Prosecuting Officer notes that cost arguments are misguided as the witnesses all could fly up and back the same day and thus the expenses would not amount to the \$4,000 claimed. Moreover, the argument that less Commissioners would have to travel than witnesses is incorrect as five (5) Commissioners would have to travel to a hearing for multiple days in Las Vegas, and as such the cost is significant, but more importantly the availability of the Commissioners impacts the hearing location decision as well. Thus, he argues that Commission Procedural Rule 18(1) instructs the Commission to consult with Respondent and counsel regarding scheduling the date and time of the hearing "where possible" to accommodate their schedules; and that occurred in this instance.

Respondent failed to demonstrate good cause to justify the use of videoconference to conduct the hearing. The Prosecuting Officer acknowledges that the Commission possesses videoconference capabilities between Reno and Las Vegas and has utilized it in a few uncontested hearings. The Commission, however, does not have to grant such a request. *See* NRCP 43(a). Although the Commission's procedural rules are silent as to whether hearings may be held by videoconference, the Commission has previously determined that it is instructive to look to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's standards governing videoconferences. *See In Re Andress-Tobiasson,* Case No. 2014-094-P. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43 states that for "good cause in compelling circumstances and with appropriate safeguards, the court may permit testimony in open court by contemporaneous transmissions from a different location."

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The Prosecuting Officer cites to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43, Advisory Committee's Notes which frown upon videoconferencing testimony without good cause. Notes to the 1996 Amendment to Rule 43(a); *see also Sille v. Parball Corp.*, 2:07-CV-00901-KJD, 2011 WL 2680560, at 2 (D. Nev. July 8, 2011 ). Moreover, the Prosecuting Officer cited to cases highlighting the importance of in-person testimony. *See Edwards v. Logan* 38 F. Supp. 2d 463 , 467 W.D. Va. (1999); *Morrow v. U.S Parole Commission*, 2012 WL 2877602 ); *United States v. Williams*, 641 F.3d 758, 764-65 (6th Cir.20 11) (Being physically present in the same room with another has certain intangible and difficult to articulate effects that are wholly absent when communicating by videoconference).

Further, the Prosecuting Officer argues that the Nevada Federal District Court found that, when the federal rule states a court may permit contemporaneous transmission "for good cause in compelling circumstances" the rule really means "for good cause in compelling circumstances." *Niemeyer v. Ford Motor Co.*, 2:09- CV-2091 JCM PAL, 2012 WL 5199145, at 2 (D. Nev. Oct. 18, 2012). Additionally the Prosecuting Officer states that a blanket request for authorization for video testimony was ruled" problematic due to the fact it is unclear at this juncture how many of those witnesses will actually be able to provide testimony relevant to the issues in this case." *Sille v. Parball Corp.*, 2:07-CV-00901-KJD, 2011 WL 2680560, at 2 (D. Nev. July 8, 2011). He states, furthermore, in federal cases, monetary expenses fail the good cause test. *See Vaughn v. Stevenson*, 2007 WL 460959, at 2-3 (D. Colo. 2007). He argues that Respondent's allegations fail to meet the standard of "compelling circumstances." He notes, however, if the Commission is inclined to grant testimony by videoconference, it should be limited to certain relevant witnesses, and not the Respondent, based upon good cause. Finally, he notes that the hearing at issue was videotaped so testimony regarding the events that transpired during the hearing is unnecessary, and that the procedural history and pleadings are contained in the Court's docket sheet and file so no oral testimony is needed regarding procedural history.

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In conclusion, he argued that Respondent's Motion for Change of Venue should be denied because the Respondent failed to show compelling circumstances to justify moving the hearing from Reno to Las Vegas; and failed to disclose the substance or relevance of the testimony of her witnesses so it is not possible to determine whether certain witnesses should be allowed to testify by

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videoconference. Therefore, Respondent fails to meet her burden to allow videoconferencing and the Motion should be denied.

Respondent's Reply noted that the witnesses, which are expected to be called, are all from Las Vegas. She notes there may be changes or additions to the witnesses and Respondent is still considering that at this point in time, however, no matter who specifically ends up testifying, however, it appears that they will be from Las Vegas, Nevada since that is where the "event" occurred. Respondent states that she was never consulted as to whether or not it would be convenient to have the hearing in Reno, Nevada vs. Las Vegas, Nevada. The Respondent distinguishes the Tobiasson matter, where in that instance the judge was the only witness.<sup>1</sup>

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#### ISSUE

Whether the venue for the formal hearing in question should be changed from Reno, Nevada to Las Vegas, Nevada based upon NRS 13.050(2)(c), and/or if the hearing should be conducted through videoconference between Reno, Nevada and Las Vegas, Nevada.

STANDARD FOR CHANGE OF VENUE

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### **Commission Procedural Rule 18. Formal Hearing.**

1. When the answer has been filed, a formal hearing shall be scheduled, if practicable, within 60 days unless waived by both the Commission and the Respondent. The Respondent and all counsel must be notified of the time and place of the hearing and must first be consulted concerning the scheduling thereof to accommodate, where possible, the schedules of the Respondent and counsel and those of their witnesses. The proper venue for judicial hearings and proceedings shall be determined by the Commission at its sole discretion.

### NRS 1.462. Proceedings before Commission; applicable rules

- 1. Proceedings before the Commission are civil matters designed to preserve an independent and honorable judiciary.
- 2. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 1.425 to 1.4695, inclusive, or in the procedural rules adopted by the Commission, after a formal statement of charges has been filed, the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure apply.

NRS § 1.462

. . .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Only Judge Tobiasson testified at the hearing; however, one other witness was scheduled to testify and was in Reno, 28 Nevada for the hearing. 8

NRS 13.050. Cases in which venue may be changed

2. The court may, on motion, change the place of trial in the following cases:

(c) When the convenience of the witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change.

NRS § 13.050

#### DISCUSSION

#### I. Venue

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that the long standing rule of statutory construction wherein a specific statute conflicts with a general statute, the specific statute takes precedence. *Andersen Family Assocs. v. State Eng'r*, 124 Nev. 182, 187, 179 P.3d 1201, 1204 (2008). In that vein, the Supreme Court held in *County of Clark v. Howard Hughes Co.*, 305 P. 3d 896 (2013) that NRS 361.420(2), which permitted a taxpayer to seek judicial review of a State Board's determination in any court of competent jurisdiction within Nevada, prevailed over the general venue statute of NRS 13.030(1), which read that actions against a county may be commenced in the judicial district embracing said county. The Supreme Court applied that same reasoning regarding administrative agencies in *Jones v. Nev. State Bd. Of Med. Examiners*, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 4 (Feb. 5, 2015).

In *Jones*, the Supreme Court examined venue within the administrative agency context. In that matter, a doctor from Clark County appealed a Second Judicial District Court's (Washoe County) denial of her motion for a change of venue to the Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County. The change in venue motion was denied based upon NRS 630.355 which held that the proper venue for contempt was in the district court of the county in which the proceeding was being conducted, which in that matter was Washoe County. The doctor argued that NRS 13.040's forum non conveniens was not considered in the ruling. The Supreme Court held that NRS 630.355 prevailed as it specifically addressed the issue of venue in a contempt action and thus took precedence over the general venue statute of NRS 13.040, therefore, the doctor's arguments based upon forum non conveniens were unavailing.

In *Jones*, the Supreme Court held that the venue for the petition was in the county where the work of the Medical Board was taking place, and that forum non conveniens was not applicable. The same holds true in this instance. The Commission is located in northern Nevada, and Commission Rule

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18 states that respondent must be consulted regarding the scheduling of the hearing regarding date and time only, and to accommodate, where possible. The consultation did occur regarding date and time, and the location for the hearing was set in Reno, Nevada as per the Commission's authority in Commission Rule 18.

Furthermore, Respondent's Motion to Change Venue is procedurally deficient as it lacks any discussion regarding specific witness testimony in support of the change in venue. NRS 13.050(2)(c). which provides a court with discretion to change venue "[w]hen the convenience of the witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change." The Nevada Supreme Court has indicated that venue may only be changed under NRS 13.050(2)(c) "under exceptional circumstances strongly supporting another forum," and that "[a] motion for change of venue based on forum non conveniens must be supported by affidavits so that the district court can assess whether there are any factors present that would establish such exceptional circumstances." Mountain View Recreation, Inc. v. Imperial Commercial Cooking Equip. Co., 129 Nev. 413, 419, 305 P.3d 881, 885 (2013). In the absence of such evidence as to why a venue change is warranted, the Supreme Court has concluded that a venue change under NRS 13.050(2)(c) is improper. Id. at 420, 305 P.3d at 885.

In this instance, Respondent's affidavit addressed the costs to fly the five (5) witnesses to Reno and the impact upon the court calendar of two sitting judges who are listed as witnesses. While the Commission takes note of the impact upon trial calendars of the judges, the same impact occurs for two of the judicial Commissioners in this action as well. The impact on the Eighth Judicial District Family Court's docket for the day of trial is unavoidable if the witnesses testify, even if the trial were in Las Vegas. Furthermore, it is not clear from the Motion or affidavit, if the witnesses' testimony is relevant or duplicative. NRS 48.025 and NRS 48.035. The hearing at the center of the Formal Statement of Charges was captured primarily on the Court's JAVS system, and thus the video and court documents, in addition to Respondent's testimony, are relevant to the Commission hearing.

Moreover, general allegations regarding inconvenience or hardship are insufficient because "[a] specific factual showing must be made." Eaton v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 96 Nev. 773, 774-75, 616 P.2d 400, 401 (1980), overruled on other grounds by Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004). Respondent simply made general allegations that Respondent, her

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staff and court staff witnesses are all based in Las Vegas, and it would be costly for Respondent to pay 1 for the travel of all witnesses and would inconvenience the Eighth Judicial District Court. However, the 2 trial is scheduled for one day and all of the witnesses can fly from Las Vegas to Reno on the day of 3 trial. This lessens the impact upon Respondent's costs and any inconvenience to the witnesses. 4 Moreover, Respondent cited to the Commission's budget noting that the Commission returned funds to 5 the State of Nevada. The budget of the Commission is far more complicated than pled, and making 6 travel arrangements for seven Commissioners, whose schedules must be accommodated, is extremely 7 problematic. Furthermore, fiscal concerns are permitted to be considered by the Commission in 8 scheduling hearings at the expense of taxpayer dollars. See Matter of Halverson, 123 Nev. 493, 517-9 18, 169 P.3d 1161, 1178 (2007). 10

In order for venue to change based upon forum non convenience, exceptional circumstances must be plead. *Mountain View Rec. v. Imperial Commercial*, 305 P.3d 881 (2013). In *Mountain View*, allegations that holding trial in Pahrump, where the underlying incident occurred, would be inconvenient to witnesses and parties because the majority of the litigation and discovery, including the majority of depositions, took place in Las Vegas, and that physical evidence, the special master, and the majority of counsel were located in Las Vegas, and that all experts located outside of Pahrump would have to travel through Las Vegas to attend court proceedings in Pahrump, failed to establish the existence of exceptional circumstances, thus the Nevada Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision to change venue from Nye County to Clark County. *See id.* The same general allegations apply in this matter as the trial is a one day trial that will require only minimal travel by the witnesses as all witnesses can fly to and from Reno in one day. Respondent provided a list of witnesses in her affidavit, however without notice of what each witness will testify to, there are no factors present that would establish exceptional circumstances as required in *Mountain View*. Respondent failed to plead any exceptional circumstances that would merit a change in venue.

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Therefore, Respondent's Motion for Change of Venue is hereby denied.

### **II. Electronic Testimony**

In the alternative, Respondent argues for the videoconferencing of the hearing. While the State's teleconference abilities between locations provides the persons present at each location with the ability to hear and communicate with the persons present at each other location, the Commission does not have to grant such a request. NRCP 43

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 43 permits for "good cause in compelling circumstances and with appropriate safeguards, the court may permit testimony in open court by contemporaneous transmission from a different location." While such testimony may be permitted, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43, Advisory Committee's Notes frown upon videoconferencing testimony without good cause. The notes to the 1996 amendment to Rule 43(a) make it clear that transmission cannot be justified by demonstrating that it is inconvenient for the witnesses to attend the trial. *See also Sille v. Parball Corp.*, 2:07-CV-00901-KJD, 2011 WL 2680560, at 2 (D. Nev. July 8, 2011) The Notes emphasize the importance of actual, live testimony by a witness who is present in the courtroom. The Notes state that the "ceremony" of the courtroom and the actual "presence of the fact finder may exert a powerful force for truth-telling."

The Nevada Federal Court found that, "when the federal rule states a court may permit contemporaneous transmission "for good cause in compelling circumstances" the rule really means "for good cause in compelling circumstances." *Niemeyer v. Ford Motor Co.*, 2:09-CV-2091 JCM PAL, 2012 WL 5199145, at 2 (D. Nev. Oct. 18, 2012). In *Niemeyer*, the court noted that video transmission would "deprive jurors of the ability to make face-to-face determinations about Dr. Singer's testimony, demeanor, mannerisms, and reactions to certain questions proffered by defendants." *Id.* Additionally, a blanket request for authorization for video testimony was ruled "problematic due to the fact it is unclear at this juncture how many of those witnesses will actually be able to provide testimony relevant to the issues in this case." *Sille v. Parball Corp.*, 2:07-CV-00901-KJD, 2011 WL 2680560, at 2 (D. Nev. July 8, 2011) Furthermore, in federal cases, monetary expenses fail the good cause test. *See Vaughn v. Stevenson*, 2007 WL 460959, at 2-3 (D. Colo. 2007) (holding that the fact that producing a witness will be expensive and time consuming does not demonstrate "good cause" much less

"compelling circumstances" that would warrant deviation from the preferred practice of presenting live testimony in the courtroom).

Respondent's "good cause" for a videoconference is monetary and/or for convenience of the Respondent and witnesses. However, it is unclear if all witnesses listed will testify based upon relevance or duplicity. Respondent's reasons for requesting testimony by video lacks any compelling circumstances, and appears to be more of a threat that her hearing will impact the Eighth Judicial District Family Court Division. Such a broad swipe at a change of venue request through a listing of judges and court staff as witnesses without specificity as to testimony is not a relevant factor for a change in venue. Moreover, minor monetary issues and inconvenience fail the good cause standard.

District courts have "inherent power to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with 10 economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants." In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 614, 617 (D.Nev.1998). In this instance, the Commission controls the time, place and forum of the hearing. Commission Rule 18. As the Commission sets its own procedures within the confines of due process, the Commission likewise controls its own docket, and as such may deny the motion for video conferencing, and based upon lack of good cause and lessened ability to observe the demeanor of Respondent and witnesses, the Motion for Electronic Testimony is hereby denied. However, any character evidence may be presented by letter, and thus there is no need for electronic testimony.

Respondent's Motion for Change of Venue, or in the Alternative, for Electronic Testimony is hereby denied. The Honorable Jerome Polaha is authorized to sign this order on behalf of the full Commission. DATED this 3 day of Grief, 2018.

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STATE OF NEVADA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE

Jerome Polaha, Presiding Judge

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify on this 6 <sup>th</sup> day of April, 2018, I transmitted a copy of the foregoing ORDER
3	DENYING MOTION TO TRANSFER HEARING TO LAS VEGAS, NEVADA OR, IN THE
4	ALTERNATIVE, TO DO SAID HEARING BY VIDEO, via email and by placing said document in the
5	U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
6	William B. Terry, Esq.
7	William B. Terry, Chartered Attorney at Law 530 South Seventh Street
8	Las Vegas, NV 89101-6011 info@williamterrylaw.com
9	
10	Thomas C. Bradley, Esq. Sinai, Schroder, Mooney, Boetsch, Bradley & Pace
11	448 Hill Street Reno,NV 89501
12	tom@stockmarketattorney.com
13	
14	Valerie Carter
15	Valerie Carter, Commission Clerk
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	APP266 14

1	BEFORE THE NEVADA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
2	STATE OF NEVADA
3	FILED
4	APR 04 2018
5	In the Matter of )
6	Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, ) CASE NO. 2016-113-P
7	Department J, County of Clark, ) State of Nevada, )
8	Respondent.
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11	ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR EXPANSION OF TIME
12	TO PRESENT RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE
13	TO: THE HONORABLE RENA G. HUGHES, Respondent
14	WILLIAM B. TERRY, ESQ., Counsel for Respondent
15	THOMAS C. BRADLEY, ESQ., Prosecuting Officer
16	Currently before the Commission on Judicial Discipline ("Commission") is a Motion For
17	Expansion of Time To Present Respondent's Defense ("Motion"), which was filed by counsel to the
18	Honorable Rena G. Hughes, District Court Judge, Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division,
19	Department J for Clark County, Nevada ("Respondent") on February 20, 2018. Opposition To
20	Respondent's Motion For Expansion of Time To Present Respondent's Defense was filed by the
21	Prosecuting Officer to the Commission ("Prosecuting Officer") on March 6, 2018. The Reply to the
22	Prosecuting Officer's Opposition was filed by the counsel for Respondent on March 23, 2018.
23	STATEMENT OF FACTS
24	The Formal Statement of Charges alleges that Respondent, a District Court Judge in Clark
25	County, Nevada, held a Ms. Silva ("mother") in contempt without due process and an opportunity to be
26	heard; imposed a penalty for contempt that changed custody of the minor child by awarding sole
27	physical and legal custody to the father; and changed physical and legal custody of the minor child
28	without a hearing as required by Nevada law.
	APP267

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On February 18, 2018, Respondent filed her Motion to enlarge the amount of time Respondent has regarding the hearing that is scheduled for one (1) day. The Prehearing Order sets forth four (4) hours for each side to present evidence. Respondent is seeking eight (8) hours for her defense, and does not object to allowing the Prosecuting Officer additional time, if requested.

The Respondent incorporated by reference herein the points and authorities filed in her motion to transfer hearing to Las Vegas, Nevada or, in the alternative, to conduct said hearing by way of video in Las Vegas, Nevada, along with the affidavit in support of the motion to transfer. Respondent argues that she needs more time to present her defense as she plans to call five (5) witnesses, not including herself.

Respondent acknowledged that under the Procedural Rules of the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline Rule 26 that "The Commission may limit time each party is allowed to present evidence ...." Respondent states that she does not question the ability of the Commission to limit the amount of time; however, she objects to the amount of time which has been allocated. She notes that any limitations on time must be based on reasonableness and not on an abuse of discretion. She alleges that the Commission has failed to take into consideration the Respondent's ability to prepare and present her own defense and therefore four (4) hours is insufficient. Respondent is seeking eight (8) hours to present her defense.

The Prosecuting Officer notes that this is not a complex case, as the relevant procedural history is not complicated and the allegations of misconduct are centered upon one brief hearing that was videotaped with the exception of nine (9) minutes where the Respondent held an "off the record" discussion. Therefore, four (4) hours for each side to present the case is more than sufficient time to address all the issues.

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The Prosecuting Officer summarized the case as follows. In the underlying case, the mother and father had one child together. The parties divorced in 2013 and the mother was granted primary custody and the father had weekend visitation with the minor child. There were visitation problems and the father alleged that the mother failed to comply with the recently ordered visitation, thus on May 17, 2016, the father's counsel filed a Motion to place the matter back on calendar regarding the visitation.

On June 8, 2016, Respondent issued a Minute Order detailing the visitation issues. The Respondent concluded that, "[t]his Court finds that Plaintiff [Mother] is in contempt of the Court's order to facilitate visitation on weekends with the Father, AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE SHALL ISSUE." The Minute Order further stated, "[m]other shall bring the minor child to Dept. J, Court room [sic] #4, on June 15, 2016 at 1:30 p.m. If the Mother fails to deliver the minor child to the courtroom on June 15, 2016, she shall be deemed in further contempt of Court, and sentenced to twenty- five (25) days incarceration. If the Mother fails to appear, a bench warrant shall issue." The Minute Order also addressed other Order to Show Cause issues that were not related to visitation, and stated in closing, "[t]he Order to Show Cause Hearing shall be scheduled for July 28, 20 16 at 1:30 p.m."

The mother arrived with her minor child at the scheduled hearing on June 15, 2016. Respondent 10 ordered all parties and counsel, except the minor child, to leave the courtroom, and addressed the child for nine (9) minutes off the record. The mother was not allowed to return to the courtroom and was 12 escorted off the Courthouse property. In the mother's absence, Respondent awarded the father temporary sole legal and physical custody, terminated the father's child support obligation, ordered the 14 mother to pay the statutory minimum child support to the father, and the mother was ordered to have no 15 contact with the minor child. The minor child was clearly distressed and cried during the entire 16 process. Respondent addressed the crying minor child by stating that the change in custody occurred because the mother and minor child were not cooperative with the Court ordered visitations. 18 Respondent further stated that if the minor child refused to go with the father she would end up in Child 19 Haven, which Respondent referred to as a jail for kids. 20

The Prosecuting Officer summed up the case as having three issues: Did Respondent violate Nevada law and the Judicial Code:

1) By holding the mother in contempt without due process and an opportunity to be heard;

2) By imposing a penalty for contempt that changed custody of the minor child by awarding sole physical and legal custody to the father; and

3) By changing physical and legal custody of the minor child without a hearing as required by Nevada law.

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The Prosecuting Officer noted that the Commission has previously analyzed the issue of time limits in judicial discipline hearings. See In the Matter of the Honorable Melanie Andress-Tobiasson, Case No. 2014-094-P. Tobiasson cited to Matter of Halverson, 123 Nev. 493, 517-518, 169 P.3d 1161, 1178 (2007), wherein former Judge Halverson maintained that the Commission denied her due process by allocating an additional hour of the hearing to the special prosecutor to present her case during her one-day suspension hearing; however, the Nevada Supreme held that the Commission did not violate Halverson's due process rights. The Prosecuting Officer noted that in Tobiasson and in Halverson, fiscal economy regarding the Commission was upheld. Moreover, he noted that the Prehearing Order permits the Commission to reallocate time if necessary. He argued that accordingly, the Commission should adopt its prior reasoning and established case law rejecting Respondent's argument regarding time.

The Prosecuting Officer stated that the Commission follows the Nevada Rules of Evidence. *See* Commission Rule 24. NRS 48.025 provides that evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. NRS 48.035 provides that even relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Accordingly, Counsel contends that a great deal of the testimony from Respondent's witnesses is likely to be either not relevant or excluded because its probative value is substantially outweighed by considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Thus, the Prosecuting Officer argues there will be no need for additional time since he is only calling one witness, Judge Hughes.

The Prosecuting Officer noted that the Respondent identified Judges Hoskin, Steel, and O'Malley as witnesses but failed to identify the substance of their testimony or the necessity for their appearance. He argues that any character testimony can be done by letter, and if Respondent relied upon the advice of any of these Judges, such evidence provides no defense to a violation of the Judicial Code.

Moreover, he opines that in any event, there is no allegation that their testimony would be lengthy and may not even be admissible. *See Matter of Halverson*, 123 Nev. 493, 169 P.3d 1161 (2007), NRS 48.025 and 48.035. The Prosecuting Officer acknowledges that the Respondent also

identifies Ms. Skaggs, her Court Reporter, but fails to identify the substance of her testimony or how her testimony is relevant. He states, presumably, Ms. Skaggs intends to testify regarding the nine (9) minutes of the hearing that the Respondent failed to have recorded by videotape, but such testimony would not be lengthy. The Prosecuting Officer argues that this is not a complicated case that requires a lengthy hearing, and thus four (4) hours is more than sufficient to present.

In her Reply, Respondent notes that the underlying case was long and ongoing, and thus requires background information so the Commission can understand what led up to the ultimate hearing. Moreover, Respondent argues that the substance of the witnesses' testimony is not important at this point in time but is concerned by the fact that they will have to fly to Reno, Nevada to testify.

#### **ISSUES**

Whether the Commission's Scheduling Order, setting evidentiary time limits, denies Respondent's procedural due process rights.

#### STANDARD OF LAW

#### **Commission Procedural Rule 26**

The Commission and the respondent are each entitled to present evidence and produce and cross-examine witnesses, subject to the rules of evidence applicable to civil The Commission may limit the time each party is allowed to present proceedings. evidence.

#### **Due Process**

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Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). In Mathews, the United States Supreme Court noted whether procedural due process has been satisfied depends on a balance of three factors: (1) the private interest affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an improper deprivation of that private interest given the procedures used and any probable value of additional or different procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or different procedural requirements would necessitate. See id.

#### DISCUSSION

Redundancy and delay are to be minimized at trial, and thus testimony and evidence are subject to a reasonable limit. Time limits in judicial discipline hearings have been upheld by the Nevada Supreme Court. In *Matter of Halverson*, 123 Nev. 493, 517–18, 169 P.3d 1161, 1178 (2007), former Judge Halverson maintained that the Commission denied her due process by allocating an additional hour of the hearing to the special prosecutor to present her case during her one-day suspension hearing. In *Halverson*, the Nevada Supreme Court analyzed the time allotment pursuant to the United States Supreme Court case, *Mathews v. Eldridge*, C 424 U.S. 319, 334–35, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). In *Mathews*, the United States Supreme Court noted whether procedural due process has been satisfied depends on a balance of the three factors set forth above.

Moreover, courts have wide discretion in conducting a trial, including limitations on the presentation of evidence. *Young v. Nev. Title Co.*, 103 Nev. 436, 441, 744 P.2d 902, 904–05 (1987). That discretion to set reasonable time limits must be balanced against a party's due process rights to a fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard. *Gen. Signal Corp. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp.*, 66 F.3d 1500, 1509 (9th Cir.1995). Therefore, based upon *Halverson*, case law, and Commission Procedural Rule 26, the Commission may prescribe time or times within which the presentation of evidence must be concluded and establish time limits on direct or cross-examination of witnesses.

The Commission issued its Prehearing Order setting forth time limits based upon an informed analysis of the facts of the case, known evidence and potential witnesses. This case is not complex in its evidence or testimony. The Formal Statement of Charges centers upon one hearing, which was recorded on the Court's JAVS system, with the exception of nine (9) minutes with the minor child, and related court filings. Furthermore, the Prosecuting Officer is only going to call one witness, the Respondent. Moreover, the only identified percipient witnesses are Respondent and her court clerk, Ms. Tiffany Skaggs. While Respondent's testimony will be long, it is presumed that Ms. Skaggs will testify regarding the hearing, including the unrecorded nine (9) minutes; however, such testimony should not take a significant amount of time. While Respondent has identified other judges as witnesses, Respondent has failed to identify with any specificity what her listed judicial witnesses would testify to as they were not percipient witnesses to the event. Therefore, it is unclear if the judicial witnesses have

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APP272

any relevant testimony or non-duplicative testimony to offer that would necessitate more time. NRS 48.025 and NRS 48.035. The list of judicial witnesses is similar to *Halverson* wherein a parade of witnesses all testifying in the same vein was denied, and that denial did not violate Halverson's due process rights. The key issue is what occurred or did not occur at the hearing, and related court documents, and therefore, the scope of the proceeding is narrow, on video and contained within the court records. Thus, the time limits in the Prehearing Order reflect an informed analysis of the time necessary to afford each party a full and fair opportunity to present their case.

Time limits are necessary to avoid the Commission being unreasonably delayed by the undue prolongation of the presentation of evidence. This is similar to other disciplinary boards. *See e.g.* NAC 628.440(6) (The Board or the hearing officer may set reasonable time limits for oral presentation in disciplinary actions for accountants). While Respondent argues that the Commission must understand the background regarding the underlying case, the background to the hearing can be handled through Respondent's testimony and the court record. Moreover, Respondent has failed to demonstrate why she needs more time to have numerous judicial witnesses testify to an event in which they were not percipient witnesses. Additionally, fiscal economy favors a one day trial as some Commissioners must travel, as well as any witnesses for the Respondent. Similar fiscal economy was upheld in *Halverson* as well. Moreover, the Court in *Halverson* noted, the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful time and manner was satisfied in *Halverson* even when the special prosecutor was given an extra hour to present in a one day trial, and in this instance, the time is allotted equally among the parties. Respondent has not presented any evidence that she will need more than her four (4) hours of allotted time.

Moreover, the allotted times are not inflexible. The Commission's Scheduling Order permits the scheduling of the hours to be modified at its discretion. (Prehearing Order p. 4, 1.2). Furthermore, the time limitation of four (4) hours each is reasonable in relation to the complexity of the case. The case centers upon one brief hearing in which the majority was recorded on the JAVS system. Therefore, the time limit is not arbitrary or inflexible as to limit justice in the name of efficiency and cost. Accordingly, the Commission may reallocate time among the parties as necessary for good cause shown at the hearing. This allows the Commission to conduct a fair and impartial proceeding in which the parties are given a reasonable opportunity to present evidence. Based upon the limited issues in the 

case, the parties have adequate time to present the evidence and any mitigating factors before the Commission. 

In order to address Respondent's due process concerns, the Commission may allow post-trial briefs, if necessary and requested, to be filed in this matter within five (5) days of the conclusion of the hearing. 

Therefore, Respondent's Motion For Expansion of Time To Present Respondent's Defense is denied as Respondent's due process rights are protected through the Prehearing Order as the Commission has the discretion to modify the allotted hours in order to meet any due process requirements at the hearing.

Respondent's Motion For Expansion of Time To Present Respondent's Defense is denied. The Honorable Jerome Polaha is authorized to sign this order on behalf of the full Commission.

IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED this 3 day of line, 2018.

> STATE OF NEVADA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE

Jalaha

Jerome Polaha, Presiding Judge

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify on this 6 <sup>th</sup> day of April, 2018, I transmitted a copy of the foregoing ORDER
3	DENYING MOTION FOR EXPANSION OF TIME TO PRESENT RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE, via
4	email and by placing said document in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
5	William B. Terry, Esq.
6	William B. Terry, Chartered Attorney at Law 530 South Seventh Street
7	Las Vegas, NV 89101-6011 Info@williamterrylaw.com
8	
9	Thomas C. Bradley, Esq. Sinai, Schroder, Mooney, Boetsch, Bradley & Pace
10	448 Hill Street Reno,NV 89501
11	tom@stockmarketattorney.com
12	Valerie Carter
13	
14	Valerie Carter, Commission Clerk
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20	APP275 9

1	BEFORE THE NEVADA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
2	STATE OF NEVADA FILED
3	In the Matter of APR 06 2018
4	THE HONORABLE RENA G. HUGHES,
5	District Court Judge, Family Division, Eighth ) Judicial District Court, Department J, ) County of Clark, State of Nevada, )
7	) Respondent.
8	
9	)
10	FIRST AMENDED ORDER SETTING PUBLIC HEARING
11	AND NOTICE OF PANEL MEMBERS, ORDER REGARDING MEDIA ACCESS
12	
13	TO: THE HONORABLE RENA G. HUGHES, Respondent WILLIAM B. TERRY, ESQ., Counsel for Respondent
14	THOMAS C. BRADLEY, ESQ., Prosecuting Officer
15	Pursuant to order of the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline ("Commission"), a public
16	hearing in the above-captioned matter has been rescheduled to commence on May 30, 2018, at the hour
17	of 8:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard and will conclude at or before 5:00 p.m.
18	The public hearing will be conducted at the office of the State Bar of Nevada, 9456 Double R
19	Boulevard, Suite B, Reno, Nevada 89521. The Respondent, Respondent's counsel and the Prosecuting
20	Officer will appear in person.
21	The following panelists are scheduled to participate as members of the Commission: Gary
22	Vause (Chair), Bruce C. Hahn, Esq., Stefanie Humphrey, Laurence Irwin, Esq., John Krmpotic, Hon.
23	Jerome Polaha and Hon. Thomas Stockard.
24	Members of the media intending to record this public hearing must obtain consent to do so from
25	the Commission. Media entry requests should be directed to Gary Vause, Chair and may be mailed to
26	the Commission at Post Office Box 48, Carson City, NV, 89702, sent via facsimile to (775) 687-3607
27	or sent by electronic mail to <u>ncjdinfo@judicial.nv.gov</u> . The request should contain the name and
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	APP276

# APP276

1	type of media outlet, including address, telephone and facsimile number(s). Requests must be received
2	by the Commission no later than 3:00 p.m., May 18, 2018.
3	Chairman Gary Vause is authorized to sign this order on behalf of the full Commission.
4	IT IS SO ORDERED.
5	DATED this 6 <sup>th</sup> day of April, 2018.
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7	STATE OF NEVADA COMMASSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
8	Juny Lause
9	Gary Vause, Chairman
10	Gary Vaux, Chaiman
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	APP277

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify on this 6 <sup>th</sup> day of April, 2018, I transmitted a copy of the foregoing FIRST
3	AMENDED ORDER SETTING PUBLIC HEARING AND NOTICE OF PANEL MEMBERS,
4	ORDER REGARDING MEDIA ACCESS, via email and by placing said document in the U.S. Mail,
5	postage prepaid, addressed to:
6	William B. Terry, Esq.
7	William B. Terry, Chartered Attorney at Law 530 South Seventh Street
8	Las Vegas, NV 89101-6011 Info@WilliamTerryLaw.com
9	Counsel for Respondent
10	Thomas C. Bradley, Esq.
11	Sinai, Schroeder, Mooney, Boetsch, Bradley & Pace 448 Hill Street
12	Reno,NV 89501 Tom@stockmarketattorney.com
13	Prosecuting Officer
14	Valerie Carles
15	Valerie Carter, Commission Clerk
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	APP278 3

1	THOMAS C. BRADLEY, ESQ. Bar No. 1621	
2	Sinai, Schroeder, Mooney, Boetsch, Bradley and Pace	
3	448 Hill Street Reno, Nevada 89501	
4	Telephone (775) 323-5178 Tom@TomBradleyLaw.com	
5 6	Prosecuting Officer for the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline	
о 7		
8	BEFORE THE NEVADA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE	
9		
10	IN THE MATTER OF THE HONORABLE RENA G. HUGHES, Eighth Judicial District Court, Department J - Family Court,	
11	County of Clark, State of Nevada,	
12	Respondent.	
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14		
15	MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 1	
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17	Prosecuting Officer, Thomas C. Bradley, hereby moves this Commission for an order in	
18	limine, before the hearing, excluding expected testimony from Respondent's witnesses. This	
19	Motion is brought pursuant to Commission Procedural Rules 24, which states that rules of evidence	
20	applicable to civil proceedings shall apply at the hearing, and is based upon applicable court	
21	decisions, Commission Procedural Rule 8, NRS §§ 48.015, 48.025, 48.035, 50.275, 50.285, 50.295,	
22	all documents on file with the Commission in this matter, and the points and authorities that follow.	
23	DATED this <u></u> day of May, 2018.	
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25	Prosecuting Officer Thomas C. Bradley, Esq	
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#### POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

### 2 I) FACTUAL SUMMARY

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Welthy Silva ("Mother") and Rogerio Silva ("Father") were divorced in 2013 in Clark County, Nevada. The parties had one minor child. In the original Decree of Divorce, the Court granted the Mother primary physical custody and the Father weekend visitation of the child.

Beginning in May 2015, the parties began litigating a number of issues concerning the wellbeing of their child and whether the Mother was interfering with the Father's visitation rights.
During the next twelve months, Respondent held a number of hearings on these issues.

9 On May 12, 2016, an in-person hearing was held. During the hearing, the parties argued 10 whether the Mother was interfering with the Father's rights of visitation. Respondent then advised 11 the Mother that she was close to being held in contempt and being incarcerated. At the conclusion 12 of the hearing, the Respondent ordered that the Father shall have visitation with the child on the 13 upcoming weekend and that the parties shall exchange the child under the supervision of Donna's 14 House Central.

Subsequently, the Father alleged that the Mother allegedly failed to comply with the recently ordered visitation. On May 17, 2016, the Father's counsel filed a motion to place the matter back on calendar regarding the visitation. On June 8, 2016, Respondent issued a Minute Order detailing the visitation issues. The Respondent concluded that, "[t]his Court finds that Plaintiff [Mother] is in contempt of the Court's order to facilitate visitation on weekends with the Father, AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE SHALL ISSUE."

The Minute Order further stated, "[m]other shall bring the minor child to Dept. J, Court room [*sic*] #4, on June 15, 2016 at 1:30 p.m. If the Mother fails to deliver the minor child to the courtroom on June 15, 2016, she shall be deemed in further contempt of Court, and sentenced to twenty-five (25) days incarceration. If the Mother fails to appear, a bench warrant shall issue." The Minute Order also addressed other Order to Show Cause issues that were not related to visitation, and stated in closing, "[t]he Order to Show Cause Hearing shall be scheduled for July 28, 2016 at 1:30 p.m."

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Mother arrived with her minor child at the scheduled hearing on June 15, 2016. Respondent ordered all parties and counsel, except the minor child, to leave the courtroom, and Respondent addressed the child for nine (9) minutes off the record. The Mother was not allowed to return to the courtroom and was escorted off the Courthouse property. In the Mother's absence, Respondent awarded the Father temporary sole legal and physical custody, terminated the Father's child support obligation, ordered the Mother to pay the statutory minimum child support to the Father, and ordered the Mother to have no contact with the minor child.

8 The minor child was clearly distressed and cried during the entire process while the Father 9 remained impassive at his counsel table. Respondent addressed the crying minor child by stating 10 that the change in custody occurred because the Mother and minor child were not cooperative with 11 the Court ordered visitations. Respondent further stated that if the minor child refused to go with 12 the Father she would end up in Child Haven, which Respondent referred to as a jail for kids.

At the court proceeding on June 15, 2016, no evidence or testimony was entered into the record regarding the change of custody, change in child support or the finding of contempt. No Order to Show Cause issued regarding the failure to facilitate visitation or notice regarding the change of custody and/or child support, and no hearing was held.

17 **II**)

#### **RELEVANT ISSUES**

- 18 Accordingly, the issues in this case are narrow:
- 19 Did Respondent violate Nevada law and the Nevada Judicial Code:
  - 1) By holding Ms. Silva in contempt without due process and an opportunity to be heard;
  - 2) By imposing a penalty for contempt that changed custody of the minor child by awarding sole physical and legal custody to the Father; and
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- 3) By changing physical and legal custody of the minor child without a hearing.
- 24 III) <u>ARGUMENT</u>

Motions in limine have long been recognized as a vehicle by which a party may seek to
preclude introduction of inadmissible evidence prior to trial. Under Commission Procedural Rule
24, "[t]he rules of evidence applicable to civil proceedings apply at the hearing."

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In Respondent's *Request for Subpoenas*, Respondent described the expected testimony of a
 number of witnesses which the Prosecuting Officer contends is not admissible. Each category of
 inadmissible evidence is discussed below.

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### A) Expert Opinions Regarding Child Custody Issues

In Respondent's *Request for Subpoenas*, Respondent stated that Dr. Childress is expected
to testify regarding the subject of pathogenic parenting and his checklist to be utilized for judges
when pathogenic parenting is present. See Exhibit 1, ¶ 5. The expected testimony from Dr.
Childress is not relevant. See NRS §§ 48.015 and 48.025.

9 The Formal Statement of Charges makes clear that the only relevant issues are whether 10 Respondent violated Nevada law and the Nevada Judicial Code (i) by holding Ms. Silva in contempt 11 without due process and an opportunity to be heard; (ii) by imposing a penalty for contempt that 12 changed custody of the minor child by awarding sole physical and legal custody to the Father; and 13 (iii) by changing physical and legal custody of the minor child without a hearing. The Commission has no jurisdiction to review the merits of a change of custody or a finding of contempt as long as 14 15 the judge adheres to the law governing those issues. See Commission Procedural Rule 8. Had the Respondent followed the law governing contempt and the change of custody, there would have 16 17 been no Commission involvement in the Silva matter.

18 NRS § 50.275 provides, "[i]f scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist 19 the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify to matters within 20 21 the scope of such knowledge. The determination of whether to admit expert testimony is within the 22 Commission's discretion. In re Assad, 124 Nev. 391, 399 (2008). The expert opinion, however, 23 must be relevant. Id. The expected testimony of Dr. Childress is clearly not relevant regarding 24 contempt and failure to follow the law. To the extent that such evidence is tangentially relevant, 25 the evidence is not admissible because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 26 of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues. See § NRS 48.035(1).

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#### B) **Character Evidence**

In Respondent's Request for Subpoenas, Respondent stated that (1) Judge Burton will testify as a character witness; (2) Judge Hoskin will testify that he was Judge Hughes' mentor and 4 he specifically instructed Judge Hughes to advise the subject minor that if she did not go to the visitation with her father she would be placed in Child Haven; and (3) Judge Steel will testify that 6 she was a mentor of Judge Hughes and she provided advice to Judge Hughes as to how to handle 7 the Silva matter. See Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 2-4.

8 To the extent that Judges Burton, Hoskin, or Steel wish to provide character references, 9 such evidence can and should be submitted by letter as is the custom and practice before this 10 Commission. In fact, the Prosecuting Officer will not oppose the introduction of the proposed 11 character letters.

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#### C) **Advice from Other Judges**

13 To the extent that Judges Hoskin and Steel advised Respondent on child custody and 14 parenting issues, such advice is not relevant to the issues for the same reasons why the testimony 15 of Dr. Childress is not relevant. Parenting and child custody advice is not relevant to the issues of 16 contempt and failure to follow the law. To the extent that such evidence is tangentially relevant, 17 the evidence is not admissible because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 18 of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues. See § NRS 48.035(1).

19 To the extent that Judges Hoskin and Steel wish to provide expert testimony on the legal 20 issue whether the Respondent's actions violated Nevada law, such expert testimony is also not 21 admissible. The Assad Court held although expert testimony is admissible, the Commission must 22 first determine that the expert testimony would be helpful before admitting such evidence. In re 23 Assad, at 403.

24 The Prosecuting Officer contends that expert testimony in this case would not be helpful. 25 The Commission is comprised of experienced judges and lawyers who are very familiar with 26 Nevada law governing contempt and change of custody. Thus, the Commission would not benefit 27 from expert opinion on these legal issues. Instead these legal issues should be discussed by counsel in their prehearing briefs and determined by the Commission following the completion of the 28

1 hearing.

Expert testimony that impermissibly encroaches on the trier of fact's province should be properly excluded. *Burrows v. Riley*, (Nev. App., Jan. 19, 2018, No. 71350) 2018 WL 565431, at \*2. Moreover, although expert testimony concerning a legal issue is not per se improper, an expert witness cannot give an opinion on an ultimate issue of law. *See Hangarter v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co.*, 373 F.3d 998, 1016 (9th Cir. 2004). The relevant issues are whether Respondent violated Nevada law and the Nevada Judicial Code (i) by holding Ms. Silva in contempt without due process and an opportunity to be heard; (ii) by imposing a penalty for contempt that changed custody of the minor child by awarding sole physical and legal custody to the Father; and (iii) by changing physical and legal custody of the minor child without a hearing are ultimate issues of law. These are ultimate issues of law which are the sole province of the Commission to decide. Therefore, this type of expert testimony is not admissible

Moreover, to the extent that such evidence is tangentially relevant, the evidence is not admissible because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues. *See* NRS § 48.035(1).

### IV) <u>CONCLUSION</u>

Accordingly, the Prosecuting Officer request that no evidence may be offered or received relative to (1) the expert testimony of Mr. Childress; and (2) the expected testimony of Judges Burton, Hoskin, and Steel. Moreover, the Prosecuting Officer requests that Respondent be precluded from using any pleading, testimony, remarks, questions, or arguments that might inform the Commission about such evidence and that the Commission instruct Respondent, her counsel, and witnesses called on her behalf not to make any reference to this motion or the fact that it has been filed and decided.

DATED this  $2^{m/m}$  day of May, 2018.

Prosecuting Officer Thomas C. Bradlev. Eso

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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
2	I certify that on the $\underline{7}^{\mu}$ day of May, 2018, I emailed a true and correct copy of this <i>MOTION IN</i>	
3	LIMINE NO. 1 to the following:	
4		
5	William B. Terry Law Offices William B. Terry, Chartered	
6	530 South Seventh Street	
7	Las Vegas, NV 89101 info@williamterrylaw.com	
8	Paul C. Deyhle	
9	Executive Director Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline	
10	pdeyhle@judicial.state.nv.us	
11	TAD 1	
12	By:	
13	Prosecuting Officer for NCJD	
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1	WILLIAM B. TERRY, ESQ.
2	Nevada State Bar No. 001028 ALEXANDRA ATHMANN-MARCOUX, ESQ.
3	Nevada State Bar No. 014474 WILLIAM B. TERRY CHARTERED
4	530 South Seventh Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
5	(702) 385-0799 (702) 385-9788 (Fax) Info@WilliamTerryLaw.com
6	$\begin{array}{c} \underline{Info(@)WilliamTerryLaw.com} \\ Attorney for Respondent \\ ORIGINAL \\ \end{array}$
7	NEVADA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
8	STATE OF NEVADA
9	
10	In the Matter of CASE NO. 2016-113-P
11 12	THE HONORABLE RENA HUGHES,)Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division,)Department J, County of Clark, State of Nevada,)
12	Respondent.
14	)
15	OPPOSITION TO MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 1
16	COMES NOW, the Respondent, the Honorable Rena Hughes, Eighth Judicial District Court,
17	Family Division, Department J, County of Clark, State of Nevada, by and through her counsel,
18	WILLIAM B. TERRY, ESQ. and ALEXANDRA ATHMANN-MARCOUX, ESQ., of the law offices of WILLIAM B. TERRY, CHARTERED and files the instant opposition to the Prosecuting
19	Officers Motion in Limine No. 1 filed on or about May 7, 2018 in the instant case.
20	Said Opposition is made and based upon the attached analysis of facts and points and
21	authorities.
22	WILLIAM B. TERRY, CHARTERED
23	1. 13 -11
24 25	WILLIAM B. TERRY, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 001028
25	ALEXANDRA ATHMANN-MARCOUX, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 014474
27	WILLIAM B. TERRY, CHARTERED 530 South Seventh Street
28	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 385-0799
	Attorney for Respondent
	APP286

WILLIAM B. TERRY, CHARTERED 530 South Seventh Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 385-0799

### **ANALYSIS OF FACTS**

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2 Pursuant to the Motion in Limine No. 1, the Special Prosecutor seeks to eliminate multiple 3 witnesses from testifying for and on behalf of the Honorable Judge Hughes. As will be argued 4 herein, their testimony is relevant and necessary in the instant proceedings. The Prosecuting Attorney is correct in that beginning in May of 2015, there was litigation between the mother and 5 6 the father regarding visitation rights over the minor child. This proceeded and continued for a twelve 7 month period of time during which Judge Hughes presided over all the matters. The Special 8 Prosecutor is also correct in that in Judge Hughes' Request for Subpoenas a brief outline was given 9 as to what each individual was expected to testify to. Special Prosecutor cites Commission 10Procedural Rule 24 as indicating that the Rules of Evidence applicable to civil proceedings apply at 11 any hearings before the Commission. The Respondent does not dispute this. In reality what the 12 Special Prosecutor is relying on, however, is NRS 47.080 in filing his motion in limine. In that 13 statute it provides that:

In jury cases, hearings on preliminary questions of admissibility, offers of proof in narrative or question and answer form, and statements of the judge showing the character of the evidence, shall to the extent practicable, unless further restricted by... be conducted out of the hearing of the jury...

17 The Nevada Supreme Court has long recognized motions in limine. See, for example, Moore v. State, 96 Nev. 220, 607 P.2d 105 (1980) and Hicks v. State, 96 Nev. 82, 605 P.2d 219 18 19 (1980). While these were criminal cases, again, Respondent does not dispute the fact that a motion 20 in limine is appropriate for questions of an evidentiary nature prior to the court proceeding with a 21 trial or hearing. The issue of relevancy is also important and relevancy is defined under NRS 48.015 22 as "...evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence". The 23 Commission is asked to note that the word "any" is utilized in this statute twice and as a result the 24 25 issues of relevancy should be construed liberally in favor of the proponent. The weight that the Commission gives to any specific testimony is a separate issue. It is further suggested that while the 26 27 Special Prosecutor cites NRS 48.035 he does not set forth any basis in fact in to show basis, prejudice, confusion or a waste of time. That statute provides in part as follows: 28

1. Although relevant, evidence is not admissible if it's probative value substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues or of misleading the jury...

2. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if it's probative value is substantially outweighed by consideration of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence...

5 It is suggested that the probative value of the proffered testimony is not substantially 6 outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of issues or of misleading the tribunal. 7 The word tribunal is utilized because the statute utilizes the word "jury". The Commission in the 8 instant case, respectfully, are much more sophisticated and understand the law better than a "jury" 9 where confusion might exist. Even in subsection 2 of NRS 48.035 the word "substantially 10 outweighed" is utilized. The Commission has given to the Respondent four hours to present the 11 defense case. The Respondent does not believe that this will unduly delay or cause of waste of time 12 or a needless presentation of cumulative evidence. To the contrary, each witness is singularly 13 important in and of themselves.

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First, in reference to Judge Burton, the prosecutor suggests that character evidence should come in through character letters which may not be opposed by the Special Prosecutor. Respectfully, a character letter while critically important to the Respondent is not as critical as hearing the actual testimony and again even subject to cross examination by the individual judge.

18 As to Judges Hoskin and Steel, the Respondent is not offering these individuals up as experts 19 but only as other judges who specifically advised Judge Hughes in the instant case. In the original 20 Request for Subpoenas each of the relevancy of the testimony of each individual was substantially 21 outlined. Judge Hoskin was specifically Judge Hughes's supervising judge and she specifically 22 conferred with him regarding the case. Additionally, it was Judge Hoskin that suggested to Judge Hughes that part of what she might considering doing was putting the subject minor into custody. 23 Judge Steel was the mentoring judge of Judge Hughes. Judge Hughes had only been on the bench 24 25 for approximately a year and it was Judge Steel who would discuss with her issues of law and specific issues. Even if they pertain to a factual situation. What was relevant in the instant case was 26 27 the issue of what will be referred to and has been referred to pathogenic parenting. Sometimes the terminology, not necessarily correctly, has been utilized of parental alienation. The Commission 28

1 is reminded that Judge Hughes presided over this issue for a period in excess of almost 12 months 2 and she had issued prior orders in reference to the visitation situation in the instant case. For 3 example, on the issue of contempt, there are not any necessarily concrete rules or guides in Nevada 4 for judges in reference to the procedural requirements for holding an individual in contempt other 5 than a knowledge between civil and criminal contempt. The Commission might also consider the 6 testimony of Judge Hoskin and Judge Steel as mitigating evidence due to the fact that Judge Hughes 7 was a relatively new judge and the issue before her was a rather complex one. She had sought help 8 from the other judges specifically Hoskin and Steel in reference to this matter although the ultimate 9 decision was hers.

10 The Special Prosecutor also objects to the testimony of Dr. Childress. Again, in the Request 11 for Subpoenas the relevancy of Dr. Childress was set forth. He is an expert in the area of pathogenic 12 parenting. He would not be testifying as an expert on behalf of Judge Hughes as to whether she did 13 or did not violate certain of the rules applicable to judges. As a result, the instant case can be easily 14 distinguished from the case of In Re: Assad, 124 Nev. 391 (2008). The ultimate majority holding 15 in the Assad case was to affirm the Judicial Discipline Commission's refusal to admit judicial ethics 16 experts testimony. That is not what is being proffered herein. The Commission is also reminded 17 that there were two Justices that dissented in the Assad case finding that "Judge Assad should have 18 been permitted to introduce all evidence including expert testimony which supported his defense. 19 The Commission would then have been free to weigh the evidence as it deemed appropriate..." 20 Interestingly enough, that is exactly what the Respondent is arguing herein in reference to Dr. 21 Childress. Dr. Childress is not being offered as an expert in the area of judicial ethics but is being 22 offered an expert in the area of pathogenic parenting. Here the Special Prosecutor has cited 23 Procedural Rule 24 of the Commission which is what the Supreme Court addressed themselves to 24 in the Assad case along with relevancy. In Assad the Court recognized that "the Rules of Evidence 25 concerning the admissibility of expert testimony do not diminish between civil and criminal 26 proceedings and many of our civil cases discussing NRS 50.275 rely on criminal cases..." The Court 27 in Assad was also critical of the Commission's over-reading of the Mosley case in The matter of 28 Mosley, 120 Nev. 908, 102 P.3d 555 (2004). Again, respectfully, in criticizing the Commission, the

Court found that part of the Commission's order was ".... not the words of this court as characterized 1 2 in the Commission's order but in fact is the language of a scholarly article that was quoted in Mosley..." The Court went on to find in Assad that the words utilized by the court in Mosley were 3 not meant to "...discourage the Commission from admitting such evidence where appropriate..." 4 5 Ultimately, the Assad court did not concur with the Commission's decision for a public censure and found "Nevertheless, a public censure is too extreme a form of discipline in this case since the record 6 7 does not support a finding that Judge Assad's conduct was willful and reflects considerable 8 mitigation..." Ultimately, the court ordered Judge Assad to issue a formal apology to an individual 9 and to take a judicial ethics class at the National Judicial College. The point, however, is that while 10 the Nevada Supreme Court in Assad did find by a majority that expert opinions pertaining to whether or not a judge violated a specific rule under which he works being a rule of judicial conduct was not 11 admissible. They did not exclude all experts. Again, Dr. Childress is being offered as an expert in 12 one specific areas which Judge Hughes will testify that she like other judges followed. It is almost 13 like a checklist approach. 14

15 More needs to be said in reference to Dr. Childress but as far as the above-indicated reasons 16 are concerned Judge Burton is important as a live character witness. The Commission will be 17 presented with character letters on behalf of Judge Hughes but Judge Burton would be subject to 18 cross examination which letters, quite frankly, are not. Judge Hoskin was Judge Hughes' mentor, 19 advisor and past presiding judge and specifically told Judge Hughes to make the comment to the 20 child of if she did not go to the visitation with her father she would go to Child Haven, it is just like 21 a jail for kids. Judge Steel is important because of the advise she likewise gave to Judge Hughes which is not cumulative in nature. Counsel for the Respondent notices that the prosecuting attorney 22 23 did not object to the testimony of Tiffany Skaggs, the court clerk, who will testify to the nine minutes 24 that was not recorded on the video.

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Further in reference to Dr. Childress, Dr. Childress has written books and done publications 26 dealing with the complainants pathogenic parenting. Dr. Childress is an author and has written 27 extensively on the problems plaguing child custody cases. He has also written guidelines for the 28 judiciary on how to handle pathogenic parenting cases based on his research and expertise in the

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1	field of psychology. It will be shown that Judge Hughes followed the guidelines as well as the
2	recommendations by the other judges in addressing the pathogenic parenting abuses in the case.
3	CONCLUSION
4	For the above-indicated reasons, it is respectfully requested that the Motion in Limine No.
- 5	1 filed by the Special Prosecutor in reference to proposed witnesses by Judge Hughes be denied.
6	DATED this $\underline{\mathcal{AH}}$ day of May, 2018.
7	WILLIAM B. TERRY, CHARTERED
8	
9	WILLIAM P. TEPPY PSO
10	Nevada Bar No. 001028/ ALEXANDRA ATHMANN-MARCOUX, ESQ.
11	Nevada Bar No. 014474 WILLIAM B. TERRY, CHARTERED
12	530 South Seventh Street
13	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 385-0799 Attorney for Respondent
14	Attomey for Respondent
15	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
16	I hereby certify that on the $\underline{94}$ day of May, 2018, I, as an employee of WILLIAM B.
17	TERRY, CHARTERED, that a true and correct copy of this <b>OPPOSITION TO MOTION IN</b>
18	LIMINE NO. 1 was emailed to the following:
19	
20	Paul C. Deyhle Executive Director
21	Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline pdeyhle@judicial.state.nv.us
22	puojinellajudiendistate.inv.us
23	Thomas Bradley, Esq. Special Prosecutor
24	<u>Tom@TomBradleyLaw.com</u>
25	
26	Savah Da
27	As an employee of William B. Terry ,Chartered
28	
	6
	APP291

# Sarah Daniels

From:	Sarah Daniels <sarah@williamterrylaw.com></sarah@williamterrylaw.com>
Sent:	Wednesday, May 9, 2018 4:03 PM
То:	ncjdinfo@judicial.state.nv.us; Jill C. Davis (jcdavis@judicial.state.nv.us)
<b>Cc:</b>	pdeyhle@judicial.state.nv.us;
Subject:	NCJD vs. Rena Hughes, Case No. 2016-113-P
Attachments:	Opposition to Motion In Limine No. 1 2016-113-P.pdf

Please find attached the **Opposition to Motion in Limine No. 1** which we are submitting to be filed with the Commission in the Hughes matter. A copy is likewise being forwarded herein to Mr. Deyhle and Mr. Bradley.

Thank you for your attention and courtesies in this matter.

Sarah Daniels, Legal Assistant William B. Terry, Chartered 530 S. Seventh Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 385-0799 Sarah@WilliamTerryLaw.com

## **CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION**

This message or any attachments may contain information that is privileged, confidential, or exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you have received this message in error, please do not forward or use this information in any way, immediately notify the sender by reply e-mail, and delete the message and any attachments. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, or the employee or agent for delivering this message to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited.

1	THOMAS C. BRADLEY, ESQ.		
2	Bar No. 1621 Sinai, Schroeder, Mooney,		
3	Boetsch, Bradley and Pace 448 Hill Street		
4	Reno, Nevada 89501 Telephone (775) 323-5178		
5	Tom@TomBradleyLaw.com Prosecuting Officer for the Nevada		
6	Commission on Judicial Discipline		
7			
8	BEFORE THE NEVADA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE		
9			
10	IN THE MATTER OF THE HONORABLE RENA G. HUGHES, Eighth Judicial District Court,		
11	Department J - Family Court, County of Clark, State of Nevada,		
12	Respondent.		
13			
14			
15	<b>OBJECTION TO RESPONDENT'S EXHIBITS</b>		
16			
17	Prosecuting Officer, Thomas C. Bradley, hereby objects to certain exhibits which		
18	Respondent intends to introduce at the hearing. This Objection is made pursuant to the		
19	Commission's Prehearing Order dated January 5, 2018, and is based upon Commission Procedural		
20	Rules 8 and 24, NRS §§ 48.015, 48.025, 48.035, 50.275, 50.285, 50.295, all documents on file with		
21	the Commission in this matter, and the points and authorities that follow.		
22	DATED this $\frac{18}{100}$ day of May, 2018.		
23	NA M		
24	Prosecuting Officer Thomas C. Bradley, Esq		
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#### 1 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 2 I) FACTUAL SUMMARY and RELEVANT ISSUES 3 The Prosecuting Officer hereby incorporates the factual summary and relevant issues contained in his Motion in Limine No. 1. 4 5 **OBJECTIONS** 6 Dr. Childress' Article Concerning Parenting Issues A) Respondent wishes to introduce a fifty-four (54) page article entitled "Recommended 7 8 Treatment-Related Assessment Protocol for Parent-Child Attachment Pathology Surrounding 9 Divorce" that was written by Dr. Childress. See Respondent's Exhibits 0001-0054. The article 10 written by Dr. Childress is not relevant. See NRS §§ 48.015 and 48.025. 11 The Formal Statement of Charges makes clear that the only relevant issues are whether 12 Respondent violated Nevada law and the Nevada Judicial Code (i) by holding Ms. Silva in contempt 13 without due process and an opportunity to be heard; (ii) by imposing a penalty for contempt that 14 changed custody of the minor child by awarding sole physical and legal custody to the Father; and 15 (iii) by changing physical and legal custody of the minor child without a hearing. The Commission 16 has no jurisdiction to review the merits of a change of custody or a finding of contempt as long as 17 the judge adheres to the law governing those issues. See Commission Procedural Rule 8. Had the 18 Respondent followed the law governing contempt and the change of custody, there would have 19 been no Commission involvement in the Silva matter. 20 NRS § 50.275 provides, "[i]f scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist 21 the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 22 expert by special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify to matters within 23 the scope of such knowledge." The determination of whether to admit expert testimony is within 24 the Commission's discretion. In re Assad, 124 Nev. 391, 399 (2008). The expert opinion, however, 25 must be relevant. Id. The article written by Dr. Childress is clearly not relevant regarding contempt and failure to follow the law. To the extent that such evidence is tangentially relevant, the evidence 26 27 is not admissible because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 28 prejudice or confusion of the issues. See § NRS 48.035(1).

APP294

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## Character Letters Containing Expert Opinions on the Merits

The Prosecuting Officer does not oppose the introduction of character letters as long as the letters do not offer expert opinions on the issue whether Judge Hughes acted appropriately in the Silva case. Unfortunately, several letters identified as "character letters" which the Respondent seeks to introduce at the hearing include opinions regarding the propriety of Judge Hughes's action the Silva case. These letters are not relevant nor are they admissible as expert opinions. *See* NRS §§ 48.015, 48.025, 48.035, 50.275, 50.285, 50.295.

8 Ms. Abrams opines that Judge Hughes "handled the [Silva] situation appropriately..." and 9 she should be portrayed as a "hero." See Respondent's Exhibits 0068-0069. Ms. Abrams also 10 attached an Order of Recusal in another child custody case which also has no relevance to this 11 matter. See Respondent's Exhibits R0070-0080. Mr. DiCiero admits that he does not know Judge 12 Hughes but offers his opinions on the Silva case, despite the fact he does not appear to be lawyer. See Respondent's Exhibits R0089-0093. Mr. Willick opines that a "scurrilous organization" is 13 14 attempting to influence the Commission in the Hughes disciplinary proceeding. See Respondent's 15 Exhibits R0094-0095. Accordingly, these letters should be excluded because they are not relevant 16 nor are they admissible as expert opinions.

17 Expert testimony that impermissibly encroaches on the trier of fact's province should be properly excluded. Burrows v. Riley, (Nev. App., Jan. 19, 2018, No. 71350) 2018 WL 565431, at 18 \*2. Moreover, although expert testimony concerning a legal issue is not per se improper, an expert 19 20 witness cannot give an opinion on an ultimate issue of law. See Hangarter v. Provident Life & Acc. 21 Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1016 (9th Cir. 2004). The relevant issues are whether Respondent violated Nevada law and the Nevada Judicial Code (i) by holding Ms. Silva in contempt without due process 22 and an opportunity to be heard; (ii) by imposing a penalty for contempt that changed custody of the 23 minor child by awarding sole physical and legal custody to the Father; and (iii) by changing 24 25 physical and legal custody of the minor child without a hearing are ultimate issues of law. These 26 are ultimate issues of law which are the sole province of the Commission to decide. Therefore, this 27 type of expert testimony is not admissible.

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Moreover, to the extent that such evidence is tangentially relevant, the evidence is not

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admissible because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice
 or confusion of the issues. See NRS § 48.035(1).

II) <u>CONCLUSION</u>

Accordingly, the Prosecuting Officer objects to the introduction of Dr. Childress' article and the letters written by Ms. Abrams, Mr. DiCiero, and Mr. Willick. Moreover, the Prosecuting Officer requests that Respondent be precluded from using any pleading, testimony, remarks, questions, or arguments that might inform the Commission about such evidence, and that the Commission instruct Respondent, her counsel, and witnesses called on her behalf not to make any reference to this objection or the fact that it has been filed and decided.

DATED this  $\frac{18}{100}$  day of May, 2018.

Prosecuting Officer Thomas C. Bradley, Esq

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I certify that on the $\frac{18}{100}$ day of May, 2018, I emailed a true and correct copy of this OBJECTION
3	to the following:
4	
5	William B. Terry Law Offices William B. Terry, Chartered
6	530 South Seventh Street
7	Las Vegas, NV 89101 info@williamterrylaw.com
8	Paul C. Deyhle
9	Executive Director Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline
10	pdeyhle@judicial.state.nv.us
11	TAD A
12	By:
13	Prosecuting Officer for NCJD
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1 2 3	WILLIAM B. TERRY, ESQ. Nevada State Bar No. 001028 ALEXANDRA ATHMANN-MARCOUX, ESQ. Nevada State Bar No. 014474 WILLIAM B. TERRY CHARTERED 530 South Seventh Street				
4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 385-0799 (702) 385-9788 (Fax)				
6	Info@WilliamTerryLaw.com Attorney for Respondent				
7	NEVADA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE				
8	STATE OF NEVADA				
9	In the Matter of ) CASE NO. 2016-113-P				
10	THE HONORABLE RENA HUGHES, ) Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, )				
11	Department J, County of Clark, State of Nevada,				
12	Respondent.				
13	RESPONSE TO OBJECTION TO RESPONDENT'S EXHIBITS				
14	COMES NOW, the Respondent, the Honorable Rena Hughes, by and through her counsel				
15	WILLIAM B. TERRY, ESQ. and ALEXANDRA ATHMANN-MARCOUX, ESQ., of the law offices of WILLIAM B. TERRY, CHARTERED and files the instant response to the Special				
16					
17	Prosecutor's objections to the Respondent's exhibits. It is the position of the Respondent that the				
18	objections should be denied and that in fact, all documents and letters are exceedingly relevant to				
19	issues before the Commission.				
20	Said Response is made and based upon the attached analysis of facts and points and				
21	authorities in support hereof.				
22	WILLIAM B. TERRY, CHARTERED				
23	Id a state				
24	WILLIAM B. TERRY, ESQ.				
25	Nevada Bar No. 001028 ALEXANDRA ATHMANN-MARCOUX, ESQ.				
26	Nevada Bar No. 014474 WILLIAM B. TERRY, CHARTERED				
27 28	530 South Seventh Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 385-0799				
20	Attorney for Respondent				

WILLIAM B. TERRY, CHARTERED 530 South Seventh Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 385-0799 ø

## ANALYSIS OF FACTS

Respectfully, the Special Prosecutor is attempting to limit the Respondent's case to that which occurred only on one day particularly in reference to the Dr. Childress articles. This makes little sense. The Special Prosecutor is attempting to limit a number of things which have been set forth in the proposed exhibits and the Respondent will go through each of those as did the Special Prosecutor.

# 7 A. Dr. Childress's article concerning parenting issues.

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8 The article attached as an exhibit is followed by most if not all of the family court lawyers 9 when dealing with certain parenting issues. It is no different than reviewing Prosser on torts or law review articles in anticipation of making rulings. A judge's knowledge and particularly that of a 10family court judge is influenced by many factors. Obviously her law school education, her 11 experience as a practitioner and her experience as a judge. Judge Hughes utilizes Dr. Childress's 12 13 suggested approach in many of her cases. Parental alienation, although it is called other things, 14 occurs in many forms and a judge has to deal with it almost on a sliding scale. First there might be 15 a request that the subject minor become involved in visitation with the alienated parent. Next, that 16 they see a psychologist together until such time as ultimately some form of visitation can be 17 awarded. Judges historically are faced with parental alienation where one spouse basically controls 18 a minor to the point that the minor is doing exactly what that spouse is directing them to do. As an 19 example, in the Silva case, Judge Hughes presided over the full duration of all of the proceedings 20 and not just the proceeding which is the subject of the complaint. She utilized her knowledge and 21 her experience both as a judge and as a practitioner in formulating progressive orders and progressive 22 approaches. She sought counsel from other more experienced judges. As of the time of filing the instant response to the Special Prosecutor's objections, certain motions in limine have not even been 23 24 ruled upon in attempt by the Special Prosecutor to limit the number witnesses and the specific 25 witnesses in testifying. As an example, currently pending is an objection to Dr. Childress's testifying. 26 At a minimum, his article or articles are relevant because part of Judge Hughes's state of mind was 27 exactly what Dr. Childress had suggested. Judges are given a unlimited but subject to review right to exercise their discretion. The appellate process is utilized in an effort to challenge that judges 28

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1 exercise of discretion. The thought processes, however, that go into a judge's determination are 2 exceedingly relevant including in this case Dr. Childress's approach to, as the Special Prosecutor 3 calls it, the "pathology". Contrary to the Special Prosecutor's arguments, she did not "change 4 custody" as a penalty for any type of contempt. It will demonstrated at the hearing that she has a 5 right to change custody if it is in the best interest of the minor child. What went into her thinking 6 is exceedingly relevant including the information she had ascertained from Dr. Childress. There is 7 also no prejudice to the Special Prosecutor in introducing this evidence. He can cross examine 8 utilizing the article and he can certain cross examine Judge Hughes. His reliance on In Re: Assad, 9 124 Nev. 391, 399 (2008) is misplaced. In the Assad case, what the court ruled in part was that the 10 respondent could not call an expert in the legal field to testify that the judge did or did not violate 11 a specific judicial rule. That is a far cry from what went into Judge Hughes's determination. It 12 appears to counsel for the Respondent that the Special Prosecutor is trying to eliminate and all 13 evidence which the Respondent seeks to produce. The Special Prosecutor has objected to all 14 witnesses except for one including Dr. Childress and now has objected to the articles of Dr. 15 Childress. Again, this was part of the basis of the ruling of Judge Hughes as well as the input from 16 the other judges.

The Special Prosecutor states "the article written by Dr. Childress is clearly not relevant 17 18 regarding contempt and failure to follow the law ... " Again, the Special Prosecutor reads the 19 allegations in the case too narrowly and particularly reads the defenses to narrowly. It is the position 20 of the Respondent that she in fact followed the law. The Special Prosecutor fails to note in his motion that the change of custody was done temporarily and further that a show cause order was set. 21 22 The basis for Judge Hughes's temporary change of custody is entirely relevant including that 23 information which she ascertained from Dr. Childress. Certainly she does not have to follow what Dr. Childress recommends but it is information that is inputted for consideration. 24

The Special Prosecutor also objects to certain of the character letters containing what he represents as being "expert opinions on the merits..." These letters are not offered as "expert opinions". Ms. Abrams opinion that Judge Hughes handled the "Silva situation appropriately..." is an opinion by a lay practitioner and is not offered as an expert opinion. The order of recusal in another child custody case is also relevant. As to the Willick letter, quite frankly, he does give a
 recitation as to what he describes as the "scurrilous organization". In fact, an organization was
 involved in the instant case and respectfully the motives of Mr. Sanson are also relevant.

4 What is also disturbing to the Respondent is the conclusion paragraph of Special Prosecutor's 5 objections. He objects to the introduction of Dr. Childress's article but then broadly asks what appears to be a request that no information regarding what Judge Hughes learned from Dr. Childress 6 be discussed. If the Respondent is incorrect on this, the Special Prosecutor needs to be more specific 7 because his conclusion indicates "...that Respondent be precluded from using any pleading, 8 9 testimony, remarks, questions or arguments that might inform the commission about such evidence..." Certainly, Judge Hughes should be permitted to testify to information she had which 10 was "inputted" into her decision making process. This would include not just the actions of the 11 12 subject minor and the parents involved but also the information she had ascertained from Dr. 13 Childress.

## **CONCLUSION**

For the above-indicated reasons, it is respectfully requested that the objections to the Special Prosecutor to the exhibits be denied.

DATED this  $\underline{\mathcal{B}'}^{\alpha}$  day of May, 2018.

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
WILLIAM B. TERRY, CHARTERED

WILLIAM B. TERRY ÆSQ. Nevada Bar No. 001028 ALEXANDRA ATHMANN-MARCOUX, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 014474 WILLIAM B. TERRY, CHARTERED 530 South Seventh Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 385-0799 Attorney for Respondent

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that on the $23^{rd}$ day of May, 2018, I, as an employee of WILLIAM B.
3	TERRY, CHARTERED, that a true and correct copy of this <b>RESPONSE TO OBJECTION TO</b>
4	<b>RESPONDENT'S EXHIBITS</b> was emailed to the following:
5	Paul C. Devhle
6	Paul C. Deyhle Executive Director Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline
7	Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline pdeyhle@judicial.state.nv.us
8	Thomas Bradley Esg
9	Thomas Bradley, Esq. Special Prosecutor <u>Tom@TomBradleyLaw.com</u>
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12	As an employee of William B. Terry ,Chartered
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	APP302

#### BEFORE THE NEVADA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE

STATE OF NEVADA



In the Matter of

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THE HONORABLE RENA G. HUGHES Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, Department J, County of Clark, State of Nevada,)

CASE NO. 2016-113-P

# Respondent.

## ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 1

12 Currently before the Commission on Judicial Discipline ("Commission") is Motion in Limine 13 No. 1 ("Motion"), filed by the Prosecuting Officer to the Commission ("Prosecuting Officer") on May 14 7, 2018. The Opposition to the Motion in Limine ("Opposition") was filed by counsel to the Honorable 15 Rena G. Hughes, District Court Judge, Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, Department J, 16 for Clark County, Nevada ("Respondent") on May 9, 2018. No Reply was filed by the Prosecuting Officer.

I. Motion

#### a. Statement of Facts

The underlying complaint alleges that Respondent acted in violation of the Judicial Canons. 20 Welthy Silva ("Mother") and Rogerio Silva ("Father") were divorced in 2013 in Clark County, Nevada. 21 The parties had one minor child. In the original Decree of Divorce, the Court granted the Mother 22 primary physical custody of the child and the Father weekend visitation. 23

Beginning in May 2015, the parties began litigating a number of issues concerning the well-24 being of their child and whether the Mother was interfering with the Father's visitation rights. During 25 the next twelve months, Respondent held a number of hearings on these issues. 26

On May 12, 2016, an in-person hearing was held. During the hearing, the parties argued whether 27 the Mother was interfering with the Father's rights of visitation. Respondent then advised the Mother 28

that she was close to being held in contempt and being incarcerated. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Respondent ordered that the Father shall have visitation with the child on the upcoming weekend and that the parties shall exchange the child under the supervision of Donna's House Central.

Subsequently, the Father alleged that the Mother failed to comply with the recently ordered visitation. On May 17, 2016, the Father's counsel filed a motion to place the matter back on calendar regarding the visitation. On June 8, 2016, Respondent issued a Minute Order detailing the visitation issues. The Respondent concluded that, "[t]his Court finds that Plaintiff [Mother] is in contempt of the Court's order to facilitate visitation on weekends with the Father, AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE SHALL ISSUE."

The Minute Order further stated, "[m]other shall bring the minor child to Dept. J, Court room [*sic*] #4, on June 15, 2016 at 1:30 p.m. If the Mother fails to deliver the minor child to the courtroom on June 15, 2016, she shall be deemed in further contempt of Court, and sentenced to twenty-five (25) days incarceration. If the Mother fails to appear, a bench warrant shall issue." The Minute Order also addressed other Order to Show Cause issues that were not related to visitation, and stated in closing, "[t]he Order to Show Cause Hearing shall be scheduled for July 28, 2016 at 1:30 p.m."

The Mother arrived with her minor child at the scheduled hearing on June 15, 2016. Respondent ordered all parties and counsel, except the minor child, to leave the courtroom, and Respondent addressed the child for nine (9) minutes off the record. The Mother was not allowed to return to the courtroom and was escorted off the Courthouse property. In the Mother's absence, Respondent awarded the Father temporary sole legal and physical custody, terminated the Father's child support obligation, ordered the Mother to pay the statutory minimum child support to the Father, and ordered the Mother to have no contact with the minor child.

The minor child was clearly distressed and cried during the entire process while the Father remained impassive at his counsel table. Respondent addressed the crying minor child by stating that the change in custody occurred because the Mother and minor child were not cooperative with the Court ordered visitations. Respondent further stated that if the minor child refused to go with the Father she would end up in Child Haven, which Respondent referred to as a jail for kids.

At the court proceeding on June 15, 2016, no evidence or testimony was entered into the record regarding the change of custody, change in child support or the finding of contempt. No Order to Show

Cause issued regarding the failure to facilitate visitation or notice regarding the change of custody and/or child support, and no hearing was held.

## b. Argument

The Prosecuting Officer argues that Dr. Childress' testimony regarding pathogenic parenting is not relevant to the issues charged in the Formal Statement of Charges. The Prosecuting Officer notes that the only relevant issues are whether Respondent violated Nevada law and the Nevada Judicial Code (i) by holding Ms. Silva in contempt without due process and an opportunity to be heard; (ii) by imposing a penalty for contempt that changed custody of the minor child by awarding sole physical and legal custody to the Father; and (iii) by changing physical and legal custody of the minor child without a hearing. The Prosecuting Officer further notes that the Commission has no jurisdiction to review the merits of a change of custody or a finding of contempt as long as the judge adheres to the law governing those issues. *See* Commission Procedural Rule 8. Moreover, the Prosecuting Officer argues that Dr. Childress' expected testimony is not relevant to contempt and failure to follow the law, and thus is not admissible, and its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues. NRS 48.035(1).

The Prosecuting Officer asserts that Respondent stated that (1) Judge Burton will testify as a character witness; (2) Judge Hoskin will testify that he was Respondent's mentor and he specifically instructed Respondent to advise the subject minor that if she did not go to the visitation with her father she would be placed in Child Haven; and (3) Judge Steel will testify that she was a mentor of Respondent and she provided advice to Judge Hughes as to how to handle the Silva matter. The Prosecuting Officer notes that all character references may be submitted by letter, as is the customary practice before the Commission.

The Prosecuting Officer further contends that to the extent that Judges Hoskin and Steel advised Respondent on child custody and parenting issues, such advice is not relevant to the issues of contempt and failure to follow the law. *See also* § NRS 48.035(1). Further he argues, to the extent that Judges Hoskin and Steel wish to provide expert testimony on the legal issue whether the Respondent's actions violated Nevada law, such expert testimony is also not admissible. The *Assad* Court held that although expert testimony is admissible, the Commission must first determine that the expert testimony would be helpful before admitting such evidence. *In re Assad*, 124 Nev. 391, 403 (2008). The Prosecuting Officer

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contends that expert testimony in this case would not be helpful because the Commission is comprised of experienced judges and lawyers who are very familiar with Nevada law governing contempt and change of custody. Thus, he states the Commission would not benefit from expert opinion on these legal issues, but rather pre and post hearing briefs may address the issue, if requested by the Commission.

Moreover, the Prosecuting Officer opines that expert testimony that impermissibly encroaches on the trier of fact's province should be properly excluded. *Burrows v. Riley*, (Nev. App., Jan. 19, 2018, No. 71350) 2018 WL 565431, at \*2. The Prosecuting Officer states that although expert testimony concerning a legal issue is not per se improper, an expert witness cannot give an opinion on an ultimate issue of law. *See Hangarter v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co.*, 373 F.3d 998, 1016 (9th Cir. 2004). He notes that the relevant issues are whether Respondent violated Nevada law and the Nevada Judicial Code regarding contempt and change of custody which are ultimate issues of law for the Commission to decide, and thus, expert testimony is not admissible. *See also* NRS § 48.035(1).

II. Opposition

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On May 9, 2018, Respondent filed her Opposition. The Opposition states that the Prosecuting Officer is relying upon the Rules of Evidence, but that he is really relying upon NRS 47.080 which states:

In jury cases, hearings on preliminary questions of admissibility, offers of proof in narrative or question and answer form, and statements of the judge showing the character of the evidence, shall to the extent practicable, unless further restricted by ... be conducted out of the hearing of the jury ...

The Respondent notes that the Nevada Supreme Court has long recognized motions in limine. See, for example, *Moore v. State*, 96 Nev. 220, 607 P.2d 105 (1980) and *Hicks v. State*, 96 Nev.82, 605 P.2d 219 (1980). Respondent further notes that she does not dispute the fact that a motion in limine is appropriate for questions of an evidentiary nature prior to the court proceeding, and that issues of relevancy are important. Respondent emphasizes that the word "any" is utilized twice in NRS 48.015 and, as a result, the issues of relevancy should be construed liberally in favor of the proponent, and the weight that the Commission gives to any specific testimony is a separate issue.

Respondent argues that the probative value of the proffered testimony is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of issues or of misleading the tribunal because the Commission is much more sophisticated and understands the law better than a "jury" where

confusion might exist. Moreover, Respondent states that character evidence should come in through 1 2 testimony and not character letters, therefore Judge Burton should be allowed to testify at the hearing. Respondent clarifies that Judges Hoskin and Steel are not testifying as experts but only as judges who 3 advised Respondent in the instant case. Respondent explains that Judge Hoskin was Respondent's 4 supervising judge and she specifically conferred with him regarding this case and that he suggested that 5 Respondent might consider putting the subject minor into custody. Moreover, she notes that Judge Steel 6 was her mentor as Respondent had only been on the bench for approximately one year. Respondent 7 expounds, as a mitigating factor, that she was a relatively new judge when she heard this rather complex 8 case, and therefore, she sought assistance from Judges Hoskin and Steel. 9

Respondent contends that pathogenic parenting is important to understanding the underlying complex case; wherein Respondent was the judge in excess of 12 months and had made prior visitation rulings. Furthermore, on the issue of contempt, she avers that there are no concrete rules or guides in Nevada for judges in reference to the procedural requirements for holding an individual in contempt, other than a knowledge of civil and criminal contempt.

Respondent specifies that Dr. Childress would not be testifying as an expert on behalf of Respondent regarding judicial ethics, but rather as an expert on pathogenic parenting, and thus the instant case can be easily distinguished from the case of *In Re: Assad*, 124 Nev. 391 (2008). Respondent singles out the fact that in *Assad*, two justices dissented stating that "Judge Assad should have been permitted to introduce all evidence including expert testimony which supported his defense. The Commission would then have been free to weigh the evidence as it deemed appropriate ..." In this vein, Respondent argues that this is exactly what the Respondent is arguing pertaining to Dr. Childress, as he is offered as an expert in the area of pathogenic parenting, and that she followed his guidelines. *See also The Matter of Mosley*, 120 Nev. 908, 102 P.3d 555 (2004).

## ISSUES

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<u>APP307</u>

Whether the testimony by Dr. Childress, Judge Burton, Judge Hoskin or Judge Steel is relevant.

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1	STANDARDS FOR ADMISSIBILITY				
2	NRS 48.025. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence				
3	inadmissible				
4	1. All relevant evidence is admissible, except:				
5	2. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.				
6	NRS § 48.025				
7 8	NRS 48.035. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion or waste of time				
9 10	1. Although relevant, evidence is not admissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues or of misleading the jury.				
11					
12	NRS § 48.035				
13	NRS 50.275. Testimony by experts				
14 15	If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify to matters				
16 17	within the scope of such knowledge.				
18	NRS § 50.275	ļ			
19	DISCUSSION				
20	NRS 48.025(2) provides, "[e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible." NRS 48.035(1)				
21	provides, "[a]lthough relevant, evidence is not admissible if its probative value is substantially				
22	outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues or of misleading the jury." NRS				
23	50.275 provides, "[i]f scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to				
24	understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by special				
25	knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify to matters within the scope of such				
26	knowledge." Moreover, to be admissible, evidence must be relevant, that is, it must have some				
27	"tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence." The determination of whether to admit	1			
28	expert testimony is within the Commission's discretion. In re Assad, 124 Nev. 391 (2008).	.			
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The only relevant issues are whether Respondent violated Nevada law and the Nevada Judicial Code by (i) holding Ms. Silva in contempt without due process and an opportunity to be heard; (ii) imposing a penalty for contempt that changed custody of the minor child by awarding sole physical and legal custody to the Father; and (iii) changing physical and legal custody of the minor child without a hearing. Therefore, the only relevant testimony pertains to these charges. This case centers upon changing custody through a contempt finding and not whether the mother was a pathogenic parent.

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The testimony of Dr. Childress does not impact allegations pertaining to Respondent's actions in failing to follow the law regarding contempt and using a change in custody as a contempt punishment. Respondent can testify for background purposes regarding the mother's failure to cooperate regarding what led up to the hearing in question, but an evaluation of the mother as a pathogenic parent is not relevant to the counts in the Formal Statement of Charges. Therefore, the testimony of Dr. Childress is not relevant.

Judge Burton is strictly a character witness. Evidence of good character in the form of letters from individuals is recognized as mitigating evidence. There is no benefit to Respondent of having live testimony and cross examination of Judge Burton. Moreover, the Prosecuting Officer stipulated to the admission of such character letters.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, there is no need to have Judge Burton testify at trial.

Moreover, expert evidence testimony is not required to find a violation of the Judicial Code. See generally Assad. The Commission is comprised of judges, lawyers, and lay people experienced in judicial ethics; therefore, the Commission does not require expert evidence to support its findings and conclusions. In re Boardman, 979 A.2d 1010 (Vermont 2009). Similarly, the Connecticut Supreme Court stated that questions about public confidence in the judiciary "may be answered as competently by those without formal legal training as by those with such training." In re Flanagan, 690 A.2d 865 (Connecticut 1997). See also In the Matter of Mosley, 102 P.3d 555 (Nevada 2004) and In re Assad, 185 P.3d 1044 (Nevada 2008). Therefore, there is no need for numerous witnesses to testify as to character or pathogenic parenting as it relates to violations of the Code.

However, the testimony by Judges Steel and Hoskin do point towards mitigating factors if Respondent, as a relatively new judge, followed the advice of more senior judges. While following

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Prosecuting Officer stipulated that he would not object to character evidence submitted in the form of letters; however, he reserved the right to object to specific character letters.

such advice does not excuse violations of the Judicial Code, such actions impact the discipline imposed 1 2 by the Commission. Each judge is personally responsible for acting in accordance with the law and the standards of the Judicial Code. Thus, if Respondent testifies that she acted upon the advice of those who 3 were similarly derelict in their duties, that is not a defense to a violation of the Judicial Code. Accord In 4 re Duckman, 699 N.E.2d 872 (New York 1998) (re-affirming the holding that evidence showing that 5 many other judges engaged in similar misconduct is irrelevant in judicial discipline proceedings). б However, inexperience is a mitigating factor pertaining to the type of discipline to be imposed by the 7 Commission. Furey v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 743 P.2d 919 (Cal. 1987). Therefore, 8 mitigating circumstances can be considered in weighing the discipline to be imposed on a judge. Adams 9 v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 897 P.2d 544 (California 1995); Broadman v. Commission on 10 Judicial Performance, 959 P.2d 715 (California 1998). Therefore, the testimony of Judges Steel and 11 Hoskin is relevant as to mitigation regarding the discipline imposed and thus, they may testify in that 12 limited aspect. 13

Therefore, the Prosecuting Officer's Motion in Limine pertaining to the preclusion of testimony by Judge Burton and Dr. Childress is granted and denied to the extent that Judges Steel and Hoskin may offer testimony in mitigation for Respondent.

The Honorable Thomas L. Stockard is authorized to sign this order on behalf of the full Commission.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this <u>33<sup>rd</sup></u> day of <u>May</u>, 2018.

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STATE OF NEVADA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE

Thomas L. Stockard, Presiding Officer

APP310

1	<u>CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE</u>
2	I hereby certify on this 25 day of May, 2018, I transmitted a copy of the foregoing
3	ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 1, via email
4	and by placing said document in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
5	William B. Terry
6	William B. Terry, Chartered Attorney at Law 530 South Seventh Street
7	Las Vegas, NV 89101-6011 Info@WilliamTerryLaw.com
8	Counsel for Respondent
9	
10	Thomas C. Bradley Sinai, Schroder, Mooney, Boetsch, Bradley & Pace
11	448 Hill Street Reno,NV 89501
12	Tom@TomBradleyLaw.com
13	Prosecuting Officer
14	
15	CT M.R.I
16	Tarah L. Hansen, Commission Clerk
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## **BEFORE THE NEVADA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE**

#### STATE OF NEVADA

In the Matter of

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I.

THE HONORABLE RENA G. HUGHES, Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, Department J, County of Clark County, State of Nevada,

Respondent.

MAY 25 2018

FILED

CASE NO. 2016-113-P

## ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT

Currently before the Commission on Judicial Discipline ("Commission") is a Motion to Dismiss Complaint ("Motion"), which was filed by counsel to the Honorable Rena G. Hughes, District Court Judge, Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, Department J, for Clark County, Nevada ("Respondent") on May 11, 2018. Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Complaint was filed by the Prosecuting Officer to the Commission ("Prosecuting Officer") on May 21, 2018. No reply to the Prosecuting Officer's Opposition was filed by the counsel for Respondent.

#### Statement of Facts

The underlying complaint alleges that Respondent acted in violation of the Judicial Canons. Welthy Silva ("Mother") and Rogerio Silva ("Father") were divorced in 2013 in Clark County, Nevada. The parties had one minor child. In the original Decree of Divorce, the Court granted the Mother primary physical custody of the child and the Father weekend visitation.

Beginning in May 2015, the parties began litigating a number of issues concerning the wellbeing of their child and whether the Mother was interfering with the Father's visitation rights. During the next twelve months, Respondent held a number of hearings on these issues.

On May 12, 2016, an in-person hearing was held. During the hearing, the parties argued whether the Mother was interfering with the Father's rights of visitation. Respondent then advised the Mother

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that she was close to being held in contempt and being incarcerated. At the conclusion of the hearing,
 the Respondent ordered that the Father shall have visitation with the child on the upcoming weekend
 and that the parties shall exchange the child under the supervision of Donna's House Central.

Subsequently, the Father alleged that the Mother failed to comply with the recently ordered visitation. On May 17, 2016, the Father's counsel filed a motion to place the matter back on calendar regarding the visitation. On June 8, 2016, Respondent issued a Minute Order detailing the visitation issues. The Respondent concluded that, "[t]his Court finds that Plaintiff [Mother] is in contempt of the Court's order to facilitate visitation on weekends with the Father, AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE SHALL ISSUE."

The Minute Order further stated, "[m]other shall bring the minor child to Dept. J, Court room [*sic*] #4, on June 15, 2016 at 1:30 p.m. If the Mother fails to deliver the minor child to the courtroom on June 15, 2016, she shall be deemed in further contempt of Court, and sentenced to twenty-five (25) days incarceration. If the Mother fails to appear, a bench warrant shall issue." The Minute Order also addressed other Order to Show Cause issues that were not related to visitation, and stated in closing, "[t]he Order to Show Cause Hearing shall be scheduled for July 28, 2016 at 1:30 p.m."

The Mother arrived with her minor child at the scheduled hearing on June 15, 2016. Respondent ordered all parties and counsel, except the minor child, to leave the courtroom, and Respondent addressed the child for nine (9) minutes off the record. The Mother was not allowed to return to the courtroom and was escorted off the Courthouse property. In the Mother's absence, Respondent awarded the Father temporary sole legal and physical custody, terminated the Father's child support obligation, ordered the Mother to pay the statutory minimum child support to the Father, and ordered the Mother to have no contact with the minor child.

The minor child was clearly distressed and cried during the entire process while the Father remained impassive at his counsel table. Respondent addressed the crying minor child by stating that the change in custody occurred because the Mother and minor child were not cooperative with the Court ordered visitations. Respondent further stated that if the minor child refused to go with the Father she would end up in Child Haven, which Respondent referred to as a jail for kids.

At the court proceeding on June 15, 2016, no evidence or testimony was entered into the record regarding the change of custody, change in child support or the finding of contempt. No Order to Show Cause issued regarding the failure to facilitate visitation or notice regarding the change of custody and/or child support, and no hearing was held.

II. Motion

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Respondent filed her Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on May 11, 2018. In her Motion, 6 Respondent cited to Judge Weller's motion to dismiss<sup>1</sup> arguing that the Commission's procedures 7 regarding investigating complaints are in contravention of the Rules of the Commission, Nevada Rules 8 of Civil Procedure, and Respondent's due process rights. Regarding due process violations, Respondent 9 states that the Commission improperly wears multiple hats as it executes the investigation, prosecution, 10 hearing, and decision in judicial discipline matters. Furthermore, Respondent questions who is making 11 the determination as to whether a rule violation has occurred and whether those same judges or 12 individuals are on the ultimate hearing panel. Respondent argues if they are the same individuals, then 13 in effect they have already prejudged the case without hearing Respondent's witnesses, mitigating 14 evidence and defenses. Pertaining to civil procedure violations, Respondent notes that pursuant to the 15 Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, interrogatories are sent out only after a formal complaint has been 16 filed; however, the Commission sends out interrogatories before a case is assigned to a prosecuting 17 officer. 18

Respondent cites to Judge Weller's points and authorities which argued that the Commission failed to follow applicable procedural rules, and thus acted in excess of its jurisdiction and denied Judge Weller his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Moreover, Respondent cites to the *Whitehead* decisions and the ABA Model Rules that Judge Weller used in his motion to highlight the need for separate investigative and adjudicative functions of the commission members. Respondent acknowledges that the Nevada Supreme Court has the ultimate authority to review the Commission's findings de novo. *Assad v. Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline*, 124 Nev. 391 (2008).

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Respondent attached and incorporated by reference Exhibit A, a copy of Judge Weller's unfiled points and authorities for Case No. 2017-025-P. Respondent noted that the cases are the same on a procedural level even though the cases are factually distinct.

Finally, Respondent agrees with Judge Weller's points and authorities that there is no basis set forth within the interrogatories to justify the use of interrogatories prior to the filing of a formal statement of charges.

III. Opposition

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5 The Prosecuting Officer argues that Respondent inappropriately integrated an unfiled, twentynine page pleading from an entirely different case in her Motion. The Prosecuting Officer notes that 6 Respondent incorporated the entire motion as her own by stating that her case and Judge Weller's are 7 almost identical. However, the Prosecuting Officer attests that even if Judge Weller's arguments were 8 applicable to Respondent, her Motion exceeds the Commission's Pre-Hearing Order page limits of 9 fifteen (15) pages for the motion. While the limitation does not apply to exhibits, Respondents use of 10 the "exhibit" as a pleading causes Respondent's Motion to be thirty-five pages. Furthermore, he notes 11 that Respondent did not seek permission to file a motion in excess of the page limits. 12

Moreover, the Prosecuting Officer notes that Judge Weller's arguments are not applicable to Respondent. Judge Weller argues that the allegations against him lack merit and thus the Commission's decision was arbitrary and capricious in violation of Judge Weller's Fourteenth Amendment rights. However, the Prosecuting Officer further notes that no such argument has been made by Respondent, as Respondent's case centers upon a hearing that was recorded on the Court's JAVS system, with the exception of nine (9) minutes, and related court filings.

The Prosecuting Officer noted that in Mosely v. Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline, the 19 Nevada Supreme Court analyzed the combination of the Commission's investigative, prosecutorial and 20 adjudicative functions in regards to a judge's due process rights. 177 Nev. 371, 22 P. 3d 655 (2001). 21 The Prosecuting Officer states that the Court rejected that argument, and noted that the Commission is 22 authorized to play multiple roles through the legislative intent manifested in the amendment process to 23 the Constitution. See Mosley at 379 (citing to Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) (holding that a 24 medical disciplinary board's process of investigating and then holding a hearing on the same issues did 25 not deny the doctor his procedural due process rights). The Prosecuting Officer declares that judicial 26 discipline proceedings wherein there is a combination of adjudicative and prosecutorial functions is not 27 biased per se, and without more, does not violate a judge's due process rights. Mosley, 117 Nev. At 28

1 380.

2 The Prosecuting Officer further argues that pursuant to Mosely, Respondent has the burden of showing actual bias to prove a violation of her due process rights. The Prosecuting Officer notes that 3 Respondent claims that the Commission is inherently biased because the Commission had made a 4 probable cause determination; however, he opines that this argument was rejected by the Nevada 5 Supreme Court in Matter of Davis, 113 Nev. 1204, 1218 (1997) (holding that probable cause 6 determinations are not determinations of guilt, and that proof by clear and convincing evidence is 7 required at the formal adjudicatory level, thus Commissioners who found probable cause were not 8 disqualified from participating in the formal hearing). 9

The Prosecuting Officer emphasizes that the Commission is presumed to be comprised of people who are capable of judging a controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances. *Mosley*, 117 Nev. At 381 (citing to Withrow, 421 U.S. at 54). Therefore, the Prosecuting Officer argues that the burden rests upon Respondent to overcome the presumption that the Commission is unbiased. *Id*.

The Prosecuting Officer further argues that Respondent's contention that Nevada should adhere to the 1994 ABA Model Rules for Judicial Discipline Enforcement ("Model Rules") of a two-panel system, separating investigative and adjudicative functions, is without merit as those rules were rejected in Nevada when the Nevada Constitution was amended in 1997 to create the modern Commission. Moreover, he notes, that decisions of the Commission are reviewed de novo; therefore, any risk of harm to Respondent is minimal.

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#### ISSUES

Whether the combination of the Commission's investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative functions violate the due process rights of Respondent.

## STANDARD OF LAW

The Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure provide that the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may, at the option of the defendant, be made by motion. NRCP 12(b)(1).

NRCP 12(b)(5) permits a party to file a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
 relief can be granted. In considering a motion to dismiss, the court construes all factual allegations in
 the complaint as true and draws all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. *Buzz Stew, LLC v. City*

of North Las Vegas, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (Nev. 2008). A complaint will be dismissed if it appears beyond
 doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of fact which, if true, would entitle it to relief. *Id.*

DISCUSSION

Respondent's Motion to Dismiss attacks the composition and procedures of the Commission as 4 it relates to due process. However, the cited points and authorities are in the form of an exhibit to 5 Respondent's Motion. Respondent attached an unfiled brief of the Honorable Charles Weller for Case 6 No. 2017-025-P. Procedurally, the Commission issued a Prehearing Order in this matter, wherein 7 motions were limited to fifteen pages in length. While the Prehearing Order does not set a page limit for 8 9 exhibits, Respondent's incorporation of an exhibit as her own argument is a blatant attempt to circumvent the reasonable page limits set by the Commission. Therefore, Respondent's Motion is 10 procedurally in violation of the Commission's Prehearing Order, and as such, only the actual Motion 11 filed by Respondent and the Prosecuting Officer's Opposition will be addressed in this Order. 12

Respondent makes an overall due process argument that the Commission wears too many hats, 13 stating that the Commission does the investigation, prosecution, and adjudicatory functions. Moreover, 14 Respondent notes that it is unclear if the same Commissioners participate in the initial determination of 15 probable cause and in the formal hearing. Respondent's concern is that if the same Commissioners 16 participate in both proceedings, the clear and convincing evidence standard falls to the wayside. 17 However, this due process argument has already been ruled upon in Mosley v. Nevada Comm'n on 18 Judicial Discipline, 117 Nev. 371, 22 P.3d 655 (2001); see also Matter of Davis 113 Ne. 1204, 1218, 19 946 P. 2d 1033, 1043 (1997) (holding that because some of the Commissioners previously had found 20 there was probable cause to believe appellant had committed perjury does not require that they be 21 disqualified from participating in the formal hearing). In Mosely, the Court held that the Commission's 22 combination of prosecutorial, investigative, and adjudicative functions is not implicitly prejudicial to 23 judges brought within the disciplinary process, and therefore, the Commission's procedures do not 24 violate a judge's protected due process rights. 25

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The combination of investigative and prosecutorial functions vested in disciplinary commissions has been consistently upheld by the Nevada Supreme Court and other courts. See, e.g., Matter of Davis, 113 Nev. 1204, 1218, 946 P.2d 1033, 1043 (1997); Mosley v. Nevada Comm'n on Judicial Discipline, 1 22 P.3d 655, 660 (Nev. 2001) ("Although the Court's ruling concerned an administrative agency and
2 not, as here, a court of judicial performance [or discipline], ... Withrow is otherwise indistinguishable
3 and therefore dispositive."); Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Russell, 691 So.2d 929,
4 946 (Miss. 1997) (bifurcated judicial disciplinary process presented "no more evidence of bias or the
5 risk of bias ... than inheres in the very fact that the Board had investigated and would now adjudicate")
6 (quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at 54); In re Eriksson, 36 So.3d 580, 591 (Fla. 2010) (finding that "the
7 analysis of Withrow from other jurisdictions [in the context of judicial discipline] is persuasive").<sup>2</sup>

The Mosely and Davis decisions ruled that the combination of functions did not per se violate 8 the judges' due process rights; however, the Court noted that in order to make such a finding, a judge 9 must show actual bias. Respondent, as in the Mosely and Davis cases, has not demonstrated actual bias. 10 Moreover, Commission Procedural Rule 3(6) permits challenges for cause for a judge to disqualify a 11 commissioner for actual or implied bias or prejudice or other cause based upon an affidavit specifying 12 why the disqualification is sought. Respondent did not file such a challenge for cause, but rather she 13 filed a peremptory challenge to remove a Commissioner, the Honorable Jerome Polaha, under 14 Commission Procedural Rule 3(8). 15

Respondent alleges that her due process rights were violated during the investigatory phase of the proceedings regarding the Commission's use of interrogatories. Respondent's objections to answering interrogatories after the investigation has occurred, but before a prosecuting officer is appointed, lacks merit. Although not mandated by procedural due process, Commission Procedural Rule 12 permits the judge an opportunity to present information during the investigatory process. The interrogatories provide Respondent with more due process as the interrogatories narrow the issues from the initial complaint filed with the Commission, to allegations based upon the factual findings

23 2 See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 52-58 (1975), wherein the Supreme Court rejected a physician's challenge to the constitutionality of the Wisconsin Medical Examining Board on the basis that the Board's combined investigative and adjudicative functions implicitly biased the adjudicators and, therefore, violated due process. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 57-58. Noting that constitutional due process does not bar a judge from making a preliminary determination of probable cause and then presiding over a criminal trial, the Court held that such a combination of investigative and adjudicative functions in an administrative agency likewise did not violate due process. Id., at 56-57. Further the Court held that "The mere exposure to evidence presented in non-adversary investigative procedures is insufficient in itself to impugn the fairness of the board members at a later adversary hearing. Without a showing to the contrary, [Commission members including judges, attorneys and laypersons] 'are assumed to be [people] of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances." Withrow, 421 U.S. at 55 (quoting United States v. Morgan, 313

28 U.S. 409, 421 (1941).

supported by the independent investigator's investigation, and subsequent determination by the
 Commission based on the same. Commission Procedural Rule 12 effectuates important public policy
 concerns regarding the confidentiality required in judicial disciplinary proceedings prior to the filing of
 a formal statement of charges. NRS 1.4683. In this instance, Respondent provided the Commission
 with a detailed written response and exhibits.

Furthermore, confidentiality during the investigatory stage protects a judge's due process rights. 6 Such confidentiality protects judges from "injury which might result from publication of unexamined 7 and unwarranted complaints," and further enhances the public confidence in the judicial system by 8 preventing the "premature announcement of groundless claims of judicial misconduct or disability since 9 it can be assumed that some frivolous complaints will be made against judicial officers." Landmark 10 Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 835 (1978); see also Jones v. Nev. Comm'n on Jud. 11 Discipline, 318 P.3d 1078 (2014) citing to In re Flanagan, 690 A.2d 865, 875 (Conn 1997) (holding 12 that "Two interests must be accommodated in judicial disciplinary proceedings: (1) the review council 13 must have broad authority to investigate the conduct of our judges in order to maintain public 14 confidence in the judiciary; and (2) our judges must be afforded adequate process before discipline is 15 imposed to ensure that discipline is not imposed on the basis of unfounded charges of misconduct."). 16 Therefore, the fact that Respondent was provided an opportunity to respond to allegations in the 17 complaint and investigatory findings while the matter was confidential, protected Respondent's due 18 process rights. 19

Moreover, procedural due process rights attach at the adjudicatory stage, and not during the 20 investigatory phase of the judicial discipline process. Jones v. Nevada Comm'n on Judicial Discipline, 21 318 P.3d 1078, 1083 (Nev. 2014). Judicial discipline proceedings consist of two distinct phases, one 22 investigatory and the other adjudicatory, wherein the investigatory phase is confidential and the 23 adjudicatory phase is public. "It is during this [adjudicatory] phase that the judge's legal rights are 24 adjudicated, not before. Accordingly, due process rights will generally not attach before a formal 25 statement of charges is filed." Jones at 1083; see also Ryan v. Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 754 26 P.2d 724, 729 (Cal. 1988) (stating that while "a judge certainly has the right to conduct a proper defense 27 in disciplinary actions[,] ... the right attaches [only] once formal proceedings are instituted," not during 28

the preliminary investigation); In re Petition to Inspect Grand Jury Materials, 576 F. Supp. 1275, 1284
 (S.D. Fla. 1983), aff'd, 735 F.2d 1261 (11th Cir. 1984) (observing that during the judicial-misconduct
 investigatory stage "procedural protections are minimal at most").

The Commission has protected Respondent's due process rights. The procedures employed by 4 the Commission in this case followed the step by step path set out in the Procedural Rules of the 5 Commission from the initial complaint through the investigation and adjudication phase. Moreover, due 6 process rights do not attach until the formal statement of charges issues; therefore, Respondent lacks a 7 procedural due process constitutional challenge to the Commission's investigatory procedures. 8 Furthermore, the Nevada Supreme Court has de novo authority over the Commission's adjudicatory 9 decisions, thus there is another layer of due process protection for Respondent. Moreover, Respondent 10 has not shown the bias required by the Nevada Supreme Court in Davis, Mosley, and Jones to support 11 her assertion of a denial of due process. 12

Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint is therefore denied.

The Honorable Thomas L. Stockard is authorized to sign this Order on behalf of the full Commission.

IT IS SO ORDERE DATED this 25 day of May, 2018.

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STATE OF NEVADA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE

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Thomas L. Stockard, Presiding Officer

# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

1	I hereby certify on this 35 day of 2018, I transmitted a copy of the foregoing ORDER
2	DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT, via email and by placing said document in the
3	U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
4	William B. Terry, Esq.
5	William B. Terry, Chartered Attorney at Law 530 South Seventh Street
6	Las Vegas, NV 89101-6011
7	Info@WilliamTerryLaw.com Counsel for Respondent
8	Thomas C. Bradley, Esq.
9.1	Sinai, Schroder, Mooney, Boetsch, Bradley & Pace 448 Hill Street
10	Reno,NV 89501 Tom@TomBradleyLaw.com
11	Prosecuting Officer
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14	Janey Schreiten
15	Nancy Sphreihans, Commission Clerk
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1 2 3 4 5 BEFORE THE NEVADA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE 6 7 STATE OF NEVADA 8 In the Matter of 9 THE HONORABLE RENA G. HUGHES, District Court Judge, Family 10 Division, Eighth Judicial District Court, Department J, 11 County of Clark, State of Nevada, 12 13 Pages 1 to 193, inclusive. 14 15 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 16 Wednesday, May 30, 2018 17 18 19 20 21 22 REPORTED BY: Christina Amundson, CCR #641 Sunshine Litigation Services 23 24 25 JOB NO.: 464231

Page 2 1 2 PANEL MEMBERS 3 4 Gary Hause, Chair 5 Bruce C. Hahn, Esq. 6 Stefanie Humphrey 7 Laurence Irwin, Esq. 8 John Krmpotic 9 Hon. Thomas Stockard 10 11 Thomas C. Bradley, Prosecuting Officer 12 William B. Terry, Counsel for Respondent 13 Hon. Rena G. Hughes, Respondent 14 -000-15 16 Examination of the Hon. Rena G. Hughes: 17 By Mr. Bradley 12 18 By Mr. Terry 55 19 20 Examination of Tiffany Skaggs: 21 By Mr. Terry 142 22 23 Examination of the Hon. Thomas Hoskin 24 By Mr. Terry 146, 165 25 By Mr. Bradley 160

			•	
1		INDEX		Page 3
2				
3	Examination of the Hon.	Steel		
4	By Mr. Terry		168	
5				
6	Closing by Mr. Bradley		177	
7	Closing by Mr. Terry		185	
8		-000-		
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				
15				-
16				
17				
18				
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21				
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25				

Page 4 Reno, Nevada -- May 30, 2018 -- 8:02 A.M. 1 -000-2 CHAIRMAN VAUSE: We are here this morning 3 4 for this hearing before the Nevada Commission of 5 Judicial Discipline. It's in the matter of the 6 Honorable Rena Hughes, Eighth Judicial District 7 Court, Department J, Family Court, County of Clark, 8 State of Nevada. My name is Gary Vause. I'm the 9 chairman of the Commission. I'm a lay member from 10 Las Vegas, Nevada. I'll let the other members of the 11 12 Commission introduce themselves, but I'll be turning 13 this matter over to the Honorable Judge Tom Stockard 14 who will preside over these proceedings. So, Bruce, we'll start with you. Introduce 15 16 yourself. COMMISSIONER KRMPOTIC: Good morning, my 17 18 name's John Krmpotic. I'm a lay appointment at the 19 Northern State -- northern part of Nevada. 20 COMMISSIONER HUMPHREY: Stefanie Humphrey, 21 lay member, Carson City, Nevada. 2.2 JUDGE STOCKARD: Tom Stockard, District 23 Court Judge in the Tenth Judicial District in 24 Churchill County. 25 COMMISSIONER HAHN: Bruce Hahn, Attorney

1 member, Washoe County.

2 MR. IRWIN: Laurence Irwin, attorney 3 member, Clark County. Page 5

4 MR. DEYHLE: Paul Deyhle, Executive 5 Counsel.

6 MS. DAVIS: Jill Davis, Associate General 7 Counsel.

3 JUDGE STOCKARD: Thank you. We have a lot 9 to cover. There's some pretty strict time frames 10 and so I will be as quick as I can. There's one 11 pretrial matter that I think we need to address and 12 that's the objections to the exhibits filed by 13 prosecuting counsel.

14 The first is the -- the first objection 15 objects to Exhibit B. That was dealt with in the 16 Commission's orders regarding Motion In Limine No. 1 17 and that will not be admitted.

18 With respect to Exhibit 3, Jennifer 19 Abrams's letter, pages 68 and 69 was objected to as 20 an opinion. Mark Decero's letter was objected to 21 regarding pages 89 to 93 regarding an opinion and 22 then Marshall Willitts letter, pages 94 and 95 were 23 objected to as to expressing an opinion on the 24 motivation for the complaint.

25 Those three exhibits -- not Exhibit 3, but

Page 6 1 those three letters will not be admitted. 2 Everything else pursuant to the stipulation of the 3 parties will be admitted. Will the parties please state their 4 5 appearances on the record. MR. BRADLEY: Thomas Charles Bradley, 6 7 Prosecuting officer in this matter. MR. TERRY: William Terry, with the 8 9 Honorable Judge Hughes. 10 JUDGE STOCKARD: Thank you both. Mr. Bradley, you may begin. 11 12 MR. BRADLEY: Thank you. May it please be 13 Commission, Counsel, Judge Hughes. I know we're all 14 very anxious to hear from Judge Hughes so I'll make 15 my opening statement extremely brief. 16 I believe this is a real straightforward, 17 simple case. Judge Stockard on behalf of the 18 Commission entered an order on a motion in limine. 19 In that order he ruled that the only relevant issues 20 are whether the respondent violated Nevada law and 21 the Nevada Judicial Code by, one, holding Ms. Silva 22 in contempt without due process and an opportunity 23 to be heard; two, imposing a penalty for contempt 24 that changed custody of the minor child by awarding 25 sole physical and legal custody to the father; and,

Page 1 three, changing physical and legal custody of the 2 minor child without a hearing. Therefore, the only 3 relevant testimony pertains to these charges. I assure the Commission that I will do my 5 utmost to follow the Commission's guidance in this 6 regard. At the conclusion of this hearing, I'm 7 confident that you will conclude that all of the 8 charges in the formal statement of charges have been 9 proven by clear and convincing evidence. Thank you. 10 JUDGE STOCKARD: Thank you. And, Mr. 11 Terry, do you wish to make your opening statement 12 now? MR. TERRY: I do, Mr. Chairman. 13 May I raise an initial question. 14 I see 15 that the media is here and we don't have any 16 objection to that. But may I inquire if the 17 Commission's authorized the filming by any other individuals and what the ruling would be if we 18 19 object. JUDGE STOCKARD: And I don't know that 20 21 we've addressed that. I see -- sir, you are? 22 CAMERMAN : CBS. 23 MR. TERRY: We don't object to that, the 24 media. COMMISIONER STOCKARD: And, sir, you are? 25

Page 8 VETERANS INVOLVED REP: Veterans In 1 2 Politics. 3 JUDGE STOCKARD: And Paul? 4 MR. DEYHLE: Well, we received two media 5 requests. There's no others. So it will be just 6 these two gentlemen. MR. TERRY: And, again, we don't object to 7 8 the media request. We object to anyone else filming 9 the proceedings. 10 JUDGE STOCKARD: What other gentleman? MR. TERRY: The other gentleman, I don't 11 12 believe he's with the media. 13 JUDGE STOCKARD: Sir, Veterans Involved in 14 Politics, is that a media --15 VETERANS INVOLVED REP: Yes. We've been on 16 the air 12 years. 17 JUDGE STOCKARD: I'm going to allow it. 18 VETERANS INVOLVED REP: Thank you, sir. 19 MR. TERRY: Just so we note our objection, 20 Mr. Chairman. 21 JUDGE STOCKARD: So noted. 22 MR. TERRY: I believe he has a television 23 program. 24 JUDGE STOCKARD: Thank you. 25 MR. TERRY: All right. My colleague