1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 2 JANET SOLANDER, CASE NO. 76228 Electronically Filed 3 Appellant, Apr 17 2019 09:30 p.m. Elizabeth A. Brown 4 vs. Clerk of Supreme Court **VOLUME XX** 5 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 6 Respondent. 7 **APPENDIX TO APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF** (Appeal from Judgment of Conviction (Jury Trial)) 8 KRISTINA WILDEVELD, ESQ. STEVEN B. WOLFSON 9 Nevada Bar No. 005825 Nevada Bar No. 001565 CAITLYN MCAMIS, ESQ. **District Attorney** 10 Nevada Bar No. 012616 STEVEN OWENS The Law Offices of Kristina Wildeveld Nevada Bar No. 004352 11 & Associates Chief Deputy District Attorney 550 E. Charleston Blvd., Suite A Office of the District Attorney 12 Las Vegas, Nevada 89104 200 Lewis Ave., Third Floor (702) 222-0007 Las Vegas, NV 89155 13 (702) 671-2750 14 **AARON FORD** Nevada Bar No. 007704 15 Nevada Attorney General 555 E. Washington Ave., Ste. 3900 16 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 486-3420 17 Attorneys for Appellant Attorneys for Respondent 18 19 20

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Yes. 1 Α Do you remember that? 2 3 Α Uh-huh. 4 0 And I think the word choice that was used initially 5 was you saw some crusting. Correct. 6 Α 7 And then there was a later question that talked about 8 it in a reference of it being a scar. Do you remember -- did you -- did you remember that being asked on cross-examination? 10 Α Yes. So initially it was -- the choice of words was 11 crusting, and then it changed to scar. Correct. 13 Α 14 I know that in your -- in your findings, did you 15 describe it as kind of being a flaking crust behind the ear? Correct. Yes. 16 17 Okay. Were you able to determine if there had been a scar underneath that? 18 19 I don't think I did. 20 Would you have had to kind of remove the flaking to 21 make that determination? 22 Yes, I would. 23 Okay. So would it -- would it surprise you if there 24 potentially may have been a scar behind there? I mean --25 MR. FIGLER: Objection, Your Honor. Assumes facts not

1 in evidence. 2 MR. HAMNER: That's actually incorrect. 3 approach on that. 4 MR. FIGLER: Approach. 5 MR. HAMNER: Sure. THE COURT: Sure. 6 7 (Off-record bench conference) 8 BY MR. HAMNER: 9 Doctor, since you haven't seen this child subsequent to March of 2014 --10 Yes. 11 Α -- can you say within a reasonable degree of medical 13 certainty that there is not a scar behind that flaking that you noted? 14 15 No. In line with that question about the ear, 16 Okay. 17 publishing 192. And, again, let me at least show it to you up close because the quality is not the best. 18 19 Α Thank you. 20 Let the record reflect I am showing the witness State's 192. 21 22 23 Looking at this area of the ear, what are you -- what 24 are you -- based on your training, what are you seeing there? 25 What is that marking near the ears or on the ears or around the 151

ears?

A So there is a disruption of the skin that appears consistent with a type of burn that is almost the entire outer area of the ear, and then behind the ear towards the hairline itself, and then it starts coming down to the shoulder area, over the collarbone, and then encompassing the -- the shoulder, both from the front part, as well as from the back part.

- Q From what you can see here, are these what appear to be burns to you? Could these be potentially caused by hot water?
- 11 A Yes.
 - Q Okay. Given the -- the degree of what appears to be, in your opinion, to be a burn behind the ears, could markings like that, if left untreated, leave a scar?
- 15 A Yes.
 - Q And if you could, could you mark or at least circle the areas that you were saying -- you were noting what appeared to be a burn like around the ear and also behind the ear? Can you circle those two areas for us? Okay. So those are the two areas. Does that encompass the ear itself, as well as behind the ear?
- 22 A Yes.
 - Q Okay. I want to show you your chart for a second. Publishing Defense X. And we were kind of -- there were some questions about what sort of things qualify as accident versus

kind of otherwise. With respect to the general appearance, what's the kind of difference that you see in burns? Does it matter what type of burn, if it's liquid versus fire versus chemical?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So all of those have a factor?

A Temperature, timing, the type of, I guess, ingredient or what causes the burn have a factor, yes.

Q Okay. So let me -- let me ask you, this chart that's in this presentation doesn't make a distinction between those variables?

A It does not.

Q Okay. So where it says general appearance and it says accidental or regular with variable severity, and then nonaccidental would be regular and more uniform, does that criteria always apply in the situation of, let's say, a hot liquid burn?

A No.

Q Why not?

A This is like a 400-slide talk, and this is one of my slides in this talk. And this is used when I educate people. It say I understand everybody is really busy, and so I hate algorithms because I find that common sense actually makes a better physician or, you know, to interpret something. So this is not something I've created, but it does come from some burn

literature.

As a suggestion of a place to start, I always caution to say, look, we have to do what is it, where is it, context. And so this is something that I provide to any students to make sure that they understand that there are some distinctions, but that we have to make sure we use common sense in order to really apply it to each specific situation. And so that would be my reason, I guess.

- Q Okay. In cases of people being burned with water, does it -- does it factor in how it's being done, if you're immersing skin in water, if it's being poured on you, if you're being sprayed, or being held under something? Are those all kind of --
- 14 A Those are all factors, yes.
 - Q Okay. If you have a situation where just hypothetically it's either being poured or maybe you're being held under something or some water is coming out, are you going -- let's just first take the pouring scenario. Are you going to expect to see a recognizable clear pattern, or may it be irregular if someone --
 - A It may be more irregular.
- Q Okay. Does that -- does gravity kind of come into play, I mean, with water?
- 24 A Yes.
- 25 Q Okay. Let's talk about special locations. There --

there were some questions about, well, I think you were asked on cross, well, I think some of the -- the words that were being used were, you know, this -- this appears to be in a shower or bathroom. Do you remember that?

A I remember that.

Q Okay. You weren't given any facts as to what's the circumstances surrounding when this picture was taken?

A No.

- Q Or what's happening in this picture?
- 10 A Correct.
- 11 Q Or whether a shower even happened?
- 12 A Correct.
 - Q Let me ask you this, though, Doctor. Publishing 192. When we -- when you look at these markings, if someone was in a shower and they're in the shower, they're being sprayed with, I guess, just hypothetically just a normal kind of shower head and the water is scalding hot, in your -- based on your training and experience, would you expect to see this type of pattern being under a scalding spray of a shower?
 - A This is not consistent with a scalding spray, but more of a pour or if the water was coming out more solidly out of the spigot.
- Q Why -- why, in your opinion, is this not consistent with a shower, a too hot shower?
- 25 A So, again, a too hot shower, we see this happen to

kids accidentally in the emergency department a lot of times, or even through child abuse evaluations. And so, again, a shower spraying distributes the water in a different pattern versus pouring water if it's coming out of a nozzle or something or whatever it's coming out has this affect of having larger areas that are burned. And so that's why I wouldn't think it's consistent with a spray shower.

Q Going back to Defense X. You talked about the severity. In accidental you may see a predominance of superficial or first-degree burns versus non-accidental you might see the predominance of deeper second and third-degree burns. And I don't know if you're able to determine, but can you make a determination about what degree this is without -- I don't know. Based on this photo alone, can you make a determination of the severity of the burn?

A With just the photo I would say it's definitely not a first-degree burn. First-degree burns are superficial thickness. A sunburn, that's a sunburn. So that's not that. Second-degree burns typically look pink and wet and will lots of times have blisters, so that's your partial thickness that goes through the skin layers. And so I see evidence of that on this picture. I'm concerned there are some third-degree, which is typically more dry and white looking, but I would not feel comfortable based just on this picture to say it to that extent.

Q Okay. But based on your training and experience, it

is not a first-degree burn? 1 2 Correct. 3 Possibly a second-degree burn? 4 Α Yes. 5 In your -- you've treated kids who have second-degree 6 burns? 7 Yeah. Α Or things that are -- when you have kids that have 8 9 that level burn, typically how long does it take to go away? 10 Okay. So it depends on how it's treated. So there's -- there's several aspects of burns. Burns take away our 11 12 barrier. That's our main barrier to infection and to how we get hydrated, right, so we start losing fluid from our skin. 13 And so 14 it needs to be wrapped appropriately, and also it can be 15 infected so it needs to have antibiotics. Pain control is a component of this, and so without knowing how this was treated, 16 17 it's -- you know, a typical burn well-treated would be two to three weeks to really start seeing some advanced healing where 18 19 -- where we're looking more at scar and not this open tissue. 20 Based on your training and experience, in your opinion 21 would you expect there to be kind of a persistent pain level 22 during those two to three weeks before you start seeing 23 significant healing? 24 So second-degree or partial thickness burns are actually to the level of your nerves, and so that's why they

hurt so much, because those nerves typically are fairly exposed.

And so these tend to be extremely painful.

Q Doctor, in terms of pain level, what happens if these are left untreated?

A Well, continuing pain with any -- any movement or any contact with that, or because it's on areas that we just move naturally with our body movements, potentially pain with that, as well.

Q Going back to Defense X. There were some questions under the category of numbers and timing. They all appear to be in different stages of healing. Are you able to make that determination based on State's 192, what level of healing we're at?

A Not based just on this picture. It appears to be all about the same time, but I would be uncomfortable to say more than that.

Q Okay. And, also, given the -- if we're talking about a burn, given the -- what's being used, is that also part of a factor about whether it's water versus fire or chemical, things like that? Does that all play a role in it?

A It can, yes.

Q Okay. I know here on Defense X there's an indication of edges that in an accidental scenario it's indistinct, irregular edges versus non-accidental sharp clearly demarked edges. In the -- in the scenario of pouring water, would you

have an expectation that there would be shark, clearly demarked 1 2 areas when you're pouring water onto a body? 3 No, I wouldn't. 4 0 Okay. So even if it's non-accidental, you don't have 5 an expectation if you're pouring hot water on someone that they're going to have a water scenario, a water pour, that's 6 7 going to have clearly demarked edges? 8 Correct. 9 Is that because of the substance that you're using, 10 water? 11 Α Yes. 12 How about being held under like a faucet, would you have an expectation, based on your training and experience, of a 13 14 clearly defined demarked edge? 15 No. Α Okay. Is that because we're dealing with water? 16 Q 17 Water and gravity. Α Okay. And are these clearly demarked edges? 18 Q 19 Α No. 20 Lastly, splash marks present. I know that it indicates in accidental, yes, you'll have splash marks, 21 22 non-accidental, no. In this situation are you able to determine if there are splash marks present? 23 24 There look like some smaller burns kind of around the neck and maybe the shoulder, and they could -- they could

possibly represent splash marks.

Q Okay. When dealing with water burns, does this rule automatically always apply in non-accidental situations with water you are not going to have splash marks?

A No. Again, the title is characteristics suggestive of. It's a place for, I think, my students and colleagues to start to look and to understand the dynamics of burns, but critical thinking needs to be applied, as well.

Q Okay. You were asked kind of almost at the end of cross a little bit about the well checks and that through all the records have revealed, you know, all the children presented at being well-nourished. Do you remember that?

A I do.

Q Did you review Anastasia's records with respect to Dr.

Dewan and a complaint of being a failure to thrive?

A That is correct. Dr. Dewan's office did mention that, yes.

Q Okay. So that was a situation where that's precisely the problem, that there was a lack of -- the child is not putting on enough weight and they've got to work towards that. She's losing too much weight.

A Correct.

Q Okay. So that's not an accurate statement that every time they came they presented as well-nourished? I mean, I know there was --

A The way I understood the question as it was asked to me was in the physical exam portion did anyone write anything other than well-nourished, and so --

Q Okay. I understand.

A -- that gets complicated because of how medical records are written or not.

Q Okay. Based on your review of the records, were -- were doctors prescribing more than one time PediaSure for some of these children?

A Yes.

Q There were some questions about the kind of growth of these kids. Did you see from the records that you reviewed kind of after, did you see any records in any visits that they had after kind of seeing you in March of 2014?

A You mean records of being seen after seeing me?

Q Yeah. So did you review any records that post-date your visit?

A I believe I saw some, yes, but the majority of it was to understand at the time that I saw them what had occurred.

Q Sure. And I don't know if you -- if you remember or not, but did you see any notations if they had any increase in either height or weight gain in those later visits?

A I believe their height velocity -- their weight was getting -- it was okay, but their height velocity I believe started correcting, but I would need to review that again.

1	Q	Okay.
2		MR. HAMNER: I have no further questions.
3		THE COURT: All right. Mr. Figler, any recross.
4		RECROSS-EXAMINATION
5	BY MR. FI	GLER:
6	Q	Doctor, based on that
7		MR. HAMNER: Want me to leave this for you?
8		MR. FIGLER: Thank you.
9	BY MR. FIGLER:	
10	Q	Based on this photo alone
11	А	Yes.
12	Q	can you say to any degree of medical certainty that
13	that's a	non-accidental injury or can you?
14	А	No.
15	Q	You can't. And then talking about Dr. Dewan's notes,
16	there was	a failure to thrive conversation, and then there was a
17	course of	action that Dr. Dewan gave to Janet Solander, isn't
18	that true	?
19	А	Yes.
20	Q	And then there were follow-ups, isn't that true?
21	А	There were a couple of follow-ups, yes.
22	Q	Okay. And Ms. Solander met all those follow-ups based
23	on those	records, isn't that true?
24	А	I don't know if Dr. Dewan I know there were some
25	follow-up	s that were missed. I think with Dr. Dewan she met
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them, yes.

Q Okay. And isn't it true that Dr. Dewan noted that it was working, that the measures that were instructed to Ms. Solander upon subsequent visits showed that the child was gaining appropriate weight, was doing everything great, and they were all very happy about that? Is anything like that reflected in his notes, do you recall?

A The weight, yes. The height, she had no growth for the entirety of the visits that I reviewed, so that would be inaccurate. There were some things that were good, some things that were not working.

Q Okay. So with regard to Dr. Dewan's -- if Dr. Dewan had testified that he noted something, prescribed something, it appeared as though the prescription was followed and got the results he was looking for, you would be surprised with that?

A That's a bit vague. With certain aspects of it, I would not be surprised with that, but his notes reflected that there was no height growth.

Q Okay. And, again, we talked about some of the organic factors that may be in play here; correct?

A Yes.

Q All right. The prosecutor asked you a question that was phrased in a certain way, and I'm going to ask you a question that was phrased in exactly the same way. Doctor, can you say to any degree of medical certainty that there is not a

scar behind my right ear? 1 2 No. 3 So that is the same answer as when Mr. Hamner 0 Okay. asked you if you can tell to any degree of medical certainty that there is not a scar right now behind Anastasia's ear; 5 correct? Same answer? 6 7 Yes. Α 8 The same answer was no; right? 9 Α The same answer was no. THE COURT: Yes, the same answer was no. Is that your 10 answer? 11 12 THE WITNESS: Correct. That is my answer. My final 13 answer. 14 BY MR. FIGLER: 15 Okay. And then you also talked about how -- you 16 talked about during my cross and it was discussed a little bit 17 on the redirect, but you were talking about the disclosures of 18 the -- of the girls, and you also talked about how they had 19 similar injuries and that was a concern to you; correct? 20 Α Yes. 21 Okay. And you're aware that these three siblings have been together in every placement that they've been in; correct? 23 That is correct. 24 Okay. So it is possible, because you can't age the scars, that they all received similar scars when they were

living together in the biological home; correct? 1 2 Potentially, yes. 3 Okay. Now, you also talked about on redirect that you looked at all the records, including the psychological records 5 in making your assessment; isn't that correct? Certain aspects of my assessment. The physical abuse 6 Α 7 and sexual abuse assessments, no, I $\operatorname{\mathsf{--}}$ I used what I $\operatorname{\mathsf{--}}$ 8 MR. HAMNER: Objection. 9 THE WITNESS: -- we were looking at. 10 MR. HAMNER: Objection. This is beyond the scope of redirect. 11 12 THE COURT: State your question. 13 MR. FIGLER: I was asking her about the records that 14 she reviewed in support of her findings, which was definitely gotten into in redirect. 15 16 THE COURT: Yeah, the objection is overruled. 17 MR. HAMNER: It was -- it was specifically --18 THE COURT: I think it was covered already, but --19 MR. HAMNER: It was a reference to psychological 20 records, and there was no discussion of that at any point on 21 direct, cross, or redirect. 22 THE COURT: Counsel approach. 23 (Off-record bench conference) 24 BY MR. FIGLER: 25 We had talked about the -- the boxes, the four options Q

1 of what type of abuse. You remember that? 2 Yes. 3 Okay. And you had talked about that on redirect, as 4 well, with Mr. Hamner just now; correct? 5 Α Yes. 6 And so if you recall, your testimony was that 7 your checkboxes that you did use were based on the disclosures 8 of the siblings. You remember that? 9 Α Yes. Okay. And so would it have been important for you to 10 look at the psychological records of the child with regard to 11 their veracity or trauma that they had sustained in the past? In order to do what? 13 14 Q In order to confidently check off that box. 15 Α No. Did you look at the psychiatric records of these 16 17 individuals? Just of the one. I believe -- was it Amaya, I think? 18 Α 19 Q Okay. So let me bring up Amaya's checkboxes. Will you accept my representation that that's Amaya's? 20 21 Α Yes. 22 And we can tell that because it only has the one box 23 versus the two boxes checked for probable abuse; correct? 24 Α Correct. 25 Okay. Now, two things. One, there is a parenthetical Q

next to the single box checked in support of probable abuse for 1 Amaya; isn't that correct? 2 3 That is correct. 4 And tell me what that parenthetical says. 5 Further investigation is recommended. 6 Okay. Now, let me ask you this. Hypothetically Q 7 speaking, if a child had a past history of exaggeration, would that be --8 9 MR. HAMNER: Objection. It's -- objection. 10 beyond the scope. THE COURT: It is a little beyond the scope. You can 11 just answer. Don't go too far into this area, but if a child had a past history for exaggeration, would that have affected 13 14 her opinion in checking off the box? Is that your question? 15 MR. FIGLER: That's part one of the question. BY MR. FIGLER: 16 17 Would that have affected your opinion checking off the Q 18 box? 19 Α No. 20 Would that be part of a further investigation that is 21 recommended? 22 As I am not an investigator, I am a medical evaluator, that's for the rest -- yes, that is part of the 24 multi-disciplinary team recommendation. 25 Okay. So even if you learned of lying or trauma or Q

exaggeration, you would not put that on your form in any way?

A No.

Q So you essentially -- your role is instructed to accept the child's opinion at face value whether or not there is contradictory evidence in her file and past?

A That's very subjective. My role is to look at her medically and offer recommendations for the multi-disciplinary team. So I can only offer medically this is what I see or what I don't see, and what this means or doesn't mean.

Q So in your capacity, you would never recommend see if this child has made exaggerated accusations in the past, that doesn't matter to you in your capacity?

A In my capacity, it doesn't change my medical evaluation, no.

Q Okay. All right. Last on sexual abuse. You indicated that -- Mr. Hamner asked you on redirect that -- there was that question just because you don't see any evidence of it doesn't mean it didn't happen; right? You remember that?

A Correct.

Q Okay. And then you talked about there are people who groom children for sexual abuse and are very careful; correct?

A Yes.

Q And who are having long-term sexual intercourse type relationships with children, being careful not to leave any kind of marks or evidence; correct?

1 Potentially, yes. Okay. So that's the typical sexual abuse that you 2 3 deal with in your line of work; correct? I wouldn't say typical in any way, shape, or form, but 5 that is a factor, yes. Okay. So what percentage of sexual abuse cases that 6 you do involve an adult placing their penis inside a child's 8 vagina? 9 I wouldn't dare to guess. I don't know. 10 Is it usually a penis or a finger or a mouth? Is that what we're looking at? 11 12 Usually, yes. Okay. And there's some degree of sexual gratification 13 that's involved in that? 14 15 For whom? MS. BLUTH: Objection. Speculation. 16 17 MR. FIGLER: I'll withdraw. THE COURT: All right. 18 19 BY MR. FIGLER: 20 What percent of sexual abuse investigations that you do involve a catheter being placed inside a urethra? 21 22 I don't investigate, but for my evaluations, this is 23 the first one I have ever heard of somebody using a catheter not in a medical format. 24 25 Okay. So this is the first time ever that you've been Q 169

asked to testify in any kind of sexual abuse case where there's 1 a catheter being inserted into -- the allegation of a catheter 2 3 being inserted, yes or no? 4 Specifically of a catheter, yes. 5 0 Okay. THE COURT: Pass the witness? 6 7 MR. FIGLER: Court's indulgence. 8 BY MR. FIGLER: 9 One last question. Maybe just one last question. did talk about your PowerPoint, and you said, well, I have over 10 400 slides on there; right? 11 12 Just on that one, yes. 13 On that one. That's the only one I got, so that's the 14 only one I have. I looked at every single slide. You're not 15 saying there were 400 slides about burns and causes of burns; 16 correct? 17 Α Correct. Okay. In fact, there's multiple slides that are 18 19 overview slides talking about, you know, what is physical abuse, 20 what are your objectives of physical abuse; correct? 21 Α Correct. 22 Okay. There's actually lots of photos of your very 23 adorable dog in there, as well; correct? 24 Α My dogs, yes. And they are adorable. Correct. 25 Okay. I think we can all stipulate to that. Q

seen them. There's probably like about 20 photos of them in 1 that slide set; right? 2 3 At least. Yes. 4 0 Okay. I won't ask you why. They're just cute, and 5 that's self-explanatory. So you do write in your PowerPoint on page -- on, well, probably the sixth slide right away is you 7 talk about physical abuse and you're looking for physical abuse; 8 right? 9 MR. HAMNER: It's beyond the scope. It's beyond the 10 scope. MR. FIGLER: We're talking about the slides and the 11 12 suggestion that --THE COURT: I think we're getting --13 MR. FIGLER: One question about the slide and one 14 15 slide in particular, Your Honor. THE COURT: It's quicker just to let you ask the 16 17 question, so ask the one question. But Mr. Hamner is correct, we're going beyond the scope of redirect here. 18 19 BY MR. FIGLER: 20 Okay. So one of the -- let's see, so under physical abuse you list one, two, three, four, five, six categories, and 21 22 the first one is skin findings, bruises, burns, bites, etcetera; 23 correct? 24 Α Yes. 25 Okay. And you testified about bruises and what Q 171

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potentially could be burns in this particular case; correct?
 1
 2
             Yes.
 3
             Okay. Well, you didn't testify to bruises, per se.
        Q
   You testified about scars that you saw; right?
 5
             Scars.
        Α
             Okay. Next one is mouth and throat. Is there
 6
 7
   anything about mouth and throat in this particular case?
 8
        Α
             No.
 9
             The next one is eyes. Anything about eyes in this
  particular case?
10
11
        Α
             No.
12
                  The next one is about internal damage, abdominal
   injury, organ damage. Anything about that in this particular
13
14
   case?
15
             No.
16
             Next one is head trauma. Anything about head trauma
17
   in this case?
18
        Α
             No.
             The next one is skeletal trauma. Anything about
19
20
   skeletal trauma in this case?
21
        Α
             No.
22
             Okay. And you have testified in a number of
   proceedings right here in this very courthouse, this big
24
   17-story courthouse; correct?
25
        Α
             Yes.
```

Okay. And you have testified about skeletal trauma 1 and head trauma and internal damage and those type of things in 2 child abuse prosecutions; right? 3 4 Α Correct. 5 And none of that exists in this case; right? 6 Α No. 7 Okay. Q 8 MR. FIGLER: With that, I'll pass the witness, Your 9 Honor. 10 FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION 11 BY MR. HAMNER: 12 So the question about that you didn't review the psychological stuff for your assessment, you remember those 13 questions? 14 15 I remember those questions. Doctor, when you're doing a medical exam and you're 16 17 physically observing a child's body, do you need a psychological report on a kid to help you see what you're seeing with your 18 19 eyes? 20 Α No. 21 And in a similar vein, you're not reviewing all Okay. of these interviews that may happen in a case where people talk 23 about all the things that they saw; right? 24 Α Correct. 25 Because that's not the purpose of it? 173

```
1
              No.
 2
              You're not reviewing to see what the police collected
 3
   from a house; right?
 4
        Α
              Correct.
 5
              You're not seeing what they may have collected off a
   computer; right?
 6
 7
        Α
              Correct.
 8
              Because that's not your role in this?
 9
        Α
             No.
10
             Your role is to observe them medically?
        0
11
              Yes.
        Α
12
              Not connect all the dots?
              Correct.
13
        Α
              Then you were asked some question about -- well, about
14
15
   hearing about catheters being put in for sexual purposes.
16
   Remember that?
17
              I remember that.
18
              You have reviewed -- made findings in sexual
        0
19
   assessments, sexual abuse assessments, where objects are being
20
   placed inside the genitalia of children; right?
21
        Α
              Oh, yeah.
22
              How often does that happen?
23
              Constantly.
        Α
24
        Q
              Okay.
25
        Α
              I couldn't give you a number.
                                   174
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```
And in some of the cases is there necessarily a sexual
 1
 2
   element to it?
 3
        Α
             No.
 4
        Q
             Objects being placed in the genitalia of children?
 5
             MR. FIGLER: I'm going to objection at that.
 6
             THE COURT: Yeah, that's sustained. We didn't get
 7
   into that on -- you objected on recross. It was sustained,
 8
   so --
 9
             MR. FIGLER:
                           Right.
10
   BY MR. HAMNER:
             And let's just be clear about something. You're not a
11
        0
12
   lawyer?
13
        Α
             No.
14
        Q
             All right.
                         So you --
15
             THE COURT: And she says, thankfully, I'm not a
16
   lawyer.
17
   BY MR. HAMNER:
18
             You're not a lawyer, so you don't really know what the
        Q
19
   law is regarding what certain crimes are; right?
20
             Not specifically, no.
        Α
21
             Okay. So with respect to a sexual abuse crime, you
22
   don't know what the law is because that's not your role?
23
             Generally, but, no, I don't know it.
24
             Your role is to see if there's physical markings that
25 might be indicative of sexual abuse?
                                   175
```

Correct. 1 Or physical markings that are indicative of physical 2 3 abuse? 4 Α Correct. 5 MR. HAMNER: No further questions. THE COURT: Just based on that, Mr. Figler. 6 FURTHER RECROSS-EXAMINATION 7 8 BY MR. FIGLER: 9 Focusing solely on the allegation of sexual abuse and your finding of probable abuse, the children's veracity has to 10 be important --11 12 MR. HAMNER: Objection. It's asked and answered at 13 this point, and beyond the scope. 14 THE COURT: I think it is beyond the scope. 15 BY MR. FIGLER: Chris asked you you're not a lawyer, so you know that 16 17 a finding of abuse by a doctor doesn't necessarily amount to criminal abuse; isn't that correct? 18 19 Α Correct. 20 Okay. And Mr. Hamner had asked none of those psychological records are important on redirect just now, didn't 21 22 he? 23 MR. HAMNER: That's a misstatement of my question. 24 MR. FIGLER: Did he say something along those lines, 25 Your Honor?

THE COURT: I don't remember. 1 2 But, Doctor, is that consistent with your memory of 3 what Mr. Hamner's question was? 4 THE WITNESS: No. THE COURT: 5 All right. BY MR. FIGLER: 6 7 What did Mr. Hamner ask you about the psychological --0 8 do you remember what he asked you about psychological records? 9 Yeah. Does the -- me looking at psychological records 10 change what I'm going to see on a vagina or on a butt or on the skin of a child, will that change how my actual medical 11 12 evaluation plays out? No. There are multiple factors in this 13 case where psychological factors may come into it, but for those 14 specific judgments, that is not important. 15 Okay. So I would ask you this. Are those type of 16 assessments important for -- because you relied solely on the 17 disclosure of the children, isn't the veracity of the children 18 or their psychological ability to be truthful important to you? 19 MR. HAMNER: Objection. It's been asked and answered. 20 Overruled. You can -- well, it wasn't --THE COURT: 21 is that important to you? 22 THE WITNESS: Not to my findings or recommendations 23 for the rest of the multi-disciplinary team. BY MR. FIGLER: 24 Okay. But, again, your findings of probable abuse are 25 Q

solely related to your disclosures, the disclosures of those 1 2 girls, weren't they? MR. HAMNER: Asked and answered. 3 4 THE COURT: Overruled. 5 THE WITNESS: I would never put definitive based on something that was given in a forensic interview because that's 6 7 not objective data, and, therefore, that is why there is a 8 spectrum to the findings and my recommendations. 9 BY MR. FIGLER: 10 And a spectrum that was created by your partner that 11 you use now? 12 Based on national standards and literature. Okay. And is this a national form, or is this a form 13 14 created by your partner? 15 Created by my partner. 16 Q Thank you. 17 MR. FIGLER: No further questions. MR. HAMNER: Nothing further. 18 19 THE COURT: Anything based on that? 20 MR. HAMNER: No, Your Honor. 21 Do we have any juror questions for the THE COURT: 22 No? No additional questions? witness? 23 All right. Doctor, thank you for your testimony. are excused at this time. 24 25 MS. BLUTH: And may we approach very briefly, Your 178

1	Honor?
2	THE COURT: Sure.
3	(Off-record bench conference)
4	THE COURT: State.
5	MS. BLUTH: Thank you, Your Honor. Subject to any
6	admissions of exhibits that still may need to be done, the State
7	is done calling witnesses and we would rest our case in chief.
8	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
9	Mr. Figler, you had taken a witness in your case in
10	chief out of order yesterday. Are there any additional
11	witnesses for the defense?
12	MR. FIGLER: Yes, Your Honor. Right now we'd like to
13	call Catherine Jorgenson to the stand.
14	THE COURT: All right. Ms. Jorgenson, just follow the
15	bailiff, please, right up here.
16	And, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I believe this
17	is going to be a very brief witness.
18	CATHERINE JORGENSON, DEFENSE WITNESS, SWORN
19	THE CLERK: Thank you. Please have a seat. State and
20	spell your first and last name for the record.
21	THE WITNESS: Catherine Jorgenson. And it's first and
22	last name spelled?
23	THE COURT: Yes, please.
24	THE WITNESS: C-A-T-H-E-R-I-N-E J-O-R-G-E-N-S-O-N.
25	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
	179

1		DIRECT EXAMINATION
2	BY MR. FIG	GLER:
3	Q	And, Ms. Jorgenson, where are you currently employed?
4	А	I work for the Clark County District Attorney's
5	Office.	
6	Q	Okay. And we've heard that there's a bunch of
7	different	divisions. What division do you work for?
8	А	I work in the civil division.
9	Q	Okay. And who is your boss, the top boss?
10	А	The top boss is Steve Wolfson.
11	Q	And he is the Clark County District Attorney?
12	А	Yes.
13	Q	Is he the top boss of the criminal division, as well?
14	А	Yes.
15	Q	Is he the top boss of the family division, too?
16	А	Family support?
17	Q	Yeah.
18	А	Yes.
19	Q	Thank you.
20		THE COURT: And the juvenile division?
21		THE WITNESS: Yes.
22		THE COURT: And are you an attorney?
23		THE WITNESS: Yes.
24	BY MR. FIG	GLER:
25	Q	And, Ms. Jorgenson, as an attorney, I requested
		180

procedurally for you to run any emails regarding a specific search term within County employees, is that fair to say?

A Yes. I received subpoenas, or I became aware of subpoenas that had been served on various county employees, and within that there were -- was a request for certain documents.

Q Okay. And I just want to focus. You very efficiently and dutifully broke them down into topics. Was there a topic related to a book called the Foster Care System or Abuse in the Foster Care System, something along those lines? I don't have it right this second in front of me.

- A Yes.
- Q But something along those lines?
- 13 A Yes.

2

3

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19

- Q Okay. And were you able to identify Clark County employee emails that were back and forth with regard to this particular book?
- A I believe that any time within those -- that set of emails I was reviewing, any time I saw a reference to the book I set those aside into that category of books.
- Q Okay. And did you produce those to the Court and the attorneys?
 - A To the Court.
- Q Okay. And if I were to show you that stack of -- of documents, do you think you'd be able to identify them?
- 25 A Yes, I believe so.

MR. FIGLER: Approaching the witness with Proposed 1 2 Exhibit BB, Your Honor. 3 MS. BLUTH: And, Judge, while she's looking at that, 4 may we approach? 5 MR. FIGLER: Oh, sure. MS. BLUTH: Thank you. 6 7 (Off-record bench conference) 8 BY MR. FIGLER: I'm sorry. You had identified those, Ms. Jorgenson, 10 as a fair and accurate copy of all the emails given the requested search term that were focused solely on Janet 11 Solander's book; is that correct? I reviewed through the emails that you had provided to 13 14 They were out of order, so I didn't actually go and make sure that every single one was there. 15 And that's my fault. Janet had gone through them. 16 17 But otherwise --It appears to me to be the entire group of emails that 18 19 I provided. And that was approximately -- was that 87 pages on 20 that topic? 21 22 I believe there was 66 emails that I was aware of, so I'm not sure how many pages it was. 24 Okay. You know what, that's correct, because it starts at No. 19. So if it went 19 through 87, that would be 66

emails; correct? 1 2 No. I'm sorry. What I meant was I believe there was 3 66 emails total, there may be multiple pages per email, so 87 would make sense. 5 Q Thank you. 6 MS. BLUTH: And, Judge, we would stipulate to their 7 admission. 8 THE COURT: All right. 9 MR. FIGLER: All right. 10 THE COURT: And so we can, then, based on that, admit Defense Exhibit BB. 11 (Defense Exhibit BB admitted) 12 13 MR. FIGLER: Thank you. 14 BY MR. FIGLER: 15 And, Ms. Jorgenson, you are now in the unenviable 16 task, and I'm sorry you drew the short straw over at the 17 District Attorney's Office, but what I'm going to need you to do is go through these emails that all relate -- and some of these 18 19 have attachments that were not attached, so it's thinner. The 20 attachment was typically a .pdf of the book, is that fair to say 21 generally speaking? 22 Yes. 23 Okay. And what I would ask you to do is, if you can, 24 without being redundant, go through the names of -- you might want to get your glasses -- the names of the individuals from

and to, and if you can identify them or not as a County 1 So what I'd ask is if you -- if you can't, just read 2 employee. 3 If you can in any way identify them as a County the name. employee, then you could indicate that they're a County employee or if they have a County employee email address. You would be 5 able to identify a County employee email address; correct? 6 7 Α Yes. 8 0 Okay. 9 MS. BLUTH: So, Judge, I'm going to object to that 10 because I think the documents speak for themselves, so I don't understand --11 12 Well, that's overruled. I mean, once the THE COURT: document is in evidence, she's allowed to read from the 13 14 document. We don't have to rely on the jurors reading it. I think probably there's going to be some follow-up. 15 Now, to be clear, all of the emails were between 16 17 County employees; is that correct? 18 THE WITNESS: They were to and from County employees. 19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 THE WITNESS: So I believe that there may have been 21 some that might have involved outside. 22 Okay. And then just to be clear, you did THE COURT: not print out the attachment which was the book; correct? 24 THE WITNESS: No, I didn't print out the attachments. And, in fact, I didn't print these out. An assistant did.

THE COURT: Okay. So what we have there is just the 1 2 emails and sometimes an attachment of the book, but the actual 3 attachment wasn't printed? 4 THE WITNESS: Right. Some reference to the 5 attachment, but not the attachment itself. THE COURT: Okay. 6 7 THE WITNESS: Yes. 8 THE COURT: All right. 9 MR. FIGLER: And I'm not asking Ms. Jorgenson about 10 the -- the content or the comments. That does speak for itself. I'm just trying to get into the record the names of the --11 THE COURT: That's fine. 12 13 So, Ms. Jorgenson, you can read the names of the 14 individuals involved in sending and receiving those emails. 15 THE WITNESS: Okay. And to and from? BY MR. FIGLER: 16 17 To and from. Q 18 Just starting from the bottom, going up? 19 Q That would be fine. And if you can, I know there's 20 going to be a lot of names, if you can avoid redundancies, but 21 if you do one that's redundant, nobody is going to care. 22 Okay. To start with --23 Go ahead. 24 Heather Richardson, Michelle Douglas, Lisa Lamb, 25 Briana McIntosh, Sara Broo, Lisa Lam, Brittany Mann, and Carmel

1 Sloan. Okay. Do you recognize any of those as County 2 3 employees? 4 Heather Richardson, Carmel Sloan are two names I 5 recognize. 6 Q Okay. 7 Shannon Edwards, Patrick Barkley, Jolie Courtney. recognize all three of them. 8 9 Okay. As County employees. 10 As County employees. Thank you. 11 12 Same names. Payal Patel, Brigid Duffy, Kristi Jourdan, Yvette Gonzalez, Faiza Ebrahim, Julia Bradley, Kristina 13 There's a Metro email address without a name. 14 Bernat. 15 Okay. The next one, please. Jerico Peterson, Collen Ramirez, Dina Cox, Minnie 16 17 Roberson, Nicole Mitchell, Lydia Brown, Devon Butts, Allison Cannon, a Hotmail address that I don't know, Yolanda Flores, 18 19 Sharon Kisling. 20 Do any of those look like or sound like County 21 employees to you, or they all -- most of them do? 22 I don't recognize them, but it's -- I would assume 23 they are, but I don't recognize their names. 24 Do some of them have County employee email addresses? 25 Actually, they don't. They just have their names, and Α

those are the ones I would assume are County email, but I couldn't say that for sure.

Q Okay.

A There's another Hotmail address that's -- I don't know the name. Shuuanndy Alvarez, Eduardo Alvarez, Marius Jurani, Anita Flores-Yanez.

Q Okay.

A Misty Williamson, Jane Green, Lisa Gibson, Crystal Patterson, Misty Williamson, Nancy Doyle, Del Rae Augustine, Sara Evans, Renee Ramberg, Vasa Brockelman. I do know she's one, a County employee.

Q Okay.

A Maria Torres, Chris Carrell, Candice Barker, Valerie Shyface. Jayme Esplin, Jill Anczelowitz, Natasha Jovisevic, Jessica Marable, Yerie Williams, Dixie Beach, Yvonne Walace, Michelle Pollock, Andrea Love, Aya Orenick, Kevin Liu, Naomi Caterina, Megan Eggers, Maryte Tallent, Chandler Levrich, Sonya Weathers, Colleen Ramirez, Mariah Boykin, Jerico Peterson, Anita — oh, I said that name already. Jane Green, Minnie Roberson, Tara Trass. Tiffany Nettles, Ms. Drea Love, Del Rae Augustine, Stephanie Jordan, Taryn LaMaison, Traci Nellis, Tisa Evans, Tiffany Flowers-Holmes.

Q Go back to Tisa Evans for a second. Do you know who Tisa Evans is?

A Yes, she's a County employee.

- Q And do you know what her role is?
- A She is an ombudsman.
 - Q For what division?
- A I believe it's multiple divisions, but I do know she works with the Department of Family Services.
 - Q Thank you. Keep going.
- A Kristen Weg, Kechia English, Lani Aitken, Stacie Dastrup, Viviana Cordeiro, Lisa Begaye, Mary Ellyazidi.
- Q Okay. Do some of those names sound like County employees or do you recognize them as County employees?
- A Kristen Weg and Stacie Dastrup both have County emails.
- 13 Q All right. Thank you.
- 14 A Tiffany Flowers-Holmes, Gloria Flores, Kalena Edwards,
- 15 Alison Brasier, Vera Sampson, Elizabeth Stumpf, Candace Barr,
- 16 Frances Emery, Candice Barker, Crystal Patterson, Brett Spratt,
- 17 Balisa Johnson, Leah Stromberg, Tara Donahue, Richard Nelson,
- 18 Lauren Soskin (phonetic), Paula Hammack, Willakemi Frizenmay
- 19 (phonetic), Luna Oclue (phonetic), Chris Graham, Gina Albert,
- 20 Karen Atlanic (phonetic), Kim Lee, Bosco Sullivan, Terrance
- 21 Collier.

1

2

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4

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8

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10

11

- Q Okay. There was a couple of names that I'm not sure
- 23 that you said because I was waiting for them. I'm sure there's
- 24 some that -- let's just do this, ask a question. Did you read
- 25 that name or do you remember that name?

```
Faiza Ebrahim?
 1
 2
        0
             Right.
 3
        Α
             Yes.
 4
        Q
             Okay. And -- and that was from Faiza Ebrahim, or to
 5
   Faiza Ebrahim?
             This one is from.
 6
 7
             And what was the date of that?
        0
 8
             March 11, 2014.
 9
             March 11, 2014. And is there an earlier one where she
10
   is the recipient of the subject line J. Solander Book?
11
             Yes.
        Α
12
             And when is that?
             March 7, 2014.
13
        Α
14
        Q
             Okay. Do you know who Faiza Ebrahim is?
15
             She works in the Department of Family Services.
             And do you know what her job was on March 11, 2014?
16
        Q
17
        Α
             No, I'm not sure.
18
             Okay. If I showed you a document that might refresh
        Q
19
   your recollection of what her capacity was on that date?
20
             The State's forensic specialist.
        Α
21
             Okay. And if you know, do you know that -- well,
22
   first of all, what time did that book email get sent by Faiza
23
   Ebrahim on March 11, 2014?
24
        Α
             7:40 a.m.
25
             Okay. Do you know that that same day Faiza Ebrahim
                                   189
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```
1
   was --
 2
             MS. BLUTH: Judge, I would object as to leading and as
 3
   to the scope of this witness's knowledge.
 4
             THE COURT:
                          That's sustained.
 5
             MR. FIGLER: Fair enough.
             THE COURT: Yeah. That's sustained.
 6
 7
   BY MR. FIGLER:
             Do you know what Faiza Ebrahim's involvement in this
 8
 9
   particular case was on March 11, 2014?
10
        Α
             No.
             Faiza Ebrahim also sent it to somebody -- what was the
11
   last name on there?
             Kristina Bernat.
13
14
             Okay. Do you know who Kristina Bernat is?
15
             I know she's a Department of Family Services employee.
             Okay. Do you know if she is a forensic specialist who
16
17
   does interviews of children, too?
18
             No, I don't know.
19
        Q
             Okay.
20
             MR. FIGLER: Court's indulgence. Can we approach,
21
   Your Honor?
22
             THE COURT:
                          Sure.
23
                      (Off-record bench conference)
24
   BY MR. FIGLER:
25
             I won't make you go all through it again, but do you
                                   190
```

have the general time range of when the emails about the book started, and generally speaking when the last one is in there, 3 or would you have to look through them again? 4 I believe they started, if I remember correctly, in December of 2013. 5 Q Okay. 6 7 The bulk of them, I believe, were in March of 2014. 8 Okay. 9 I think there's some in 2018, but I'd have to look 10 through them. But they -- it's your testimony that they did 11 go on for years after that; correct? Well, I think the result -- the bulk of them, like I 13 14 said, was 2014, and I think there were a few in 2018. I don't 15 think there was anything in 2017 or 2016. 16 Q Okay. 17 But I would have to look through them again to --Fair enough. But I think it's fair to say that 18 Q 19 generally speaking at least one or a couple will pick up again a couple years after the -- even the 2014? 20 21 I believe there's some in 2018. Α 22 Q Okay. 23 MR. FIGLER: I'll move for their admission and pass. 24 THE COURT: All right. I think they were already

25

admitted.

MR. FIGLER: Okay. 1 All right. Pass the witness. Cross. 2 THE COURT: 3 MR. HAMNER: Thank you. 4 CROSS-EXAMINATION 5 BY MR. HAMNER: Ms. Jorgenson --6 Q 7 MR. HAMNER: If I could see those emails. 8 BY MR. HAMNER: 9 So, Ms. Jorgenson, and I'm sure you've read all these; 10 correct? I actually didn't read through them really carefully. 11 I was just looking for the marker and then putting it into that 13 category. 14 Isn't it true that virtually -- are you aware that the 15 children, the Solander children were removed from the home on February 28, 2014? 16 17 Α I became aware of it as looking -- when I was looking 18 through these emails. 19 Isn't it true the vast majority of all of these emails 20 actually post dates the decision to remove these children from the home? 21 22 I believe the bulk of them are in March 2014. 23 Isn't it true that Gail Anderson's name doesn't appear 24 in any of these emails? I mean, I heard you read them. 25 Α I don't -- didn't recall seeing her name as I was 192

```
going through that.
 1
 2
              Yvette Gonzalez's name wasn't in there, either.
 3
              Whose?
             Yvette Gonzalez.
 4
 5
              I don't recall.
              You don't recall reading out Cherina Davidson?
 6
        Q
 7
        Α
              No, I don't recall.
              Lori Wells?
 8
        Q
 9
             No.
        Α
              Gennipher Dowling?
10
        Q
11
        Α
             No.
12
              Riley Lewis-Castro?
13
        Α
             No.
              Christina Day?
14
        Q
15
        Α
             No.
16
             Laura Hammack?
        Q
17
        Α
             No.
              THE COURT: She --
18
  BY MR. HAMNER:
19
20
              I know Paula.
        Q
21
              THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. She read Paula.
22
              THE WITNESS: There was Paula, but not Laura.
23 BY MR. HAMNER:
24
        Q
             But no Laura.
25
        Α
             No.
                                   193
```

```
Crystal Rosas?
 1
        0
 2
 3
             Sandra Cetl?
        Q
 4
        Α
             No.
 5
             Okay. And isn't it true from reviewing this, the vast
        Q
   majority of these emails is simply forwarding the book?
 7
             That was my impression when I -- when I was looking
        Α
 8
   through them.
 9
             Isn't it true through reviewing these, isn't it true
   that there's -- there's no email that says we need to go get
10
11
   Janet Solander for writing this book, we're going to remove
   those kids, anything like that?
13
             I don't recall seeing anything like that.
             Okay. We've got to do something about this and stop
14
        Q
15
   her?
16
             I didn't see anything like that.
17
             How dare this book, let's call the authorities,
18
   anything like that?
19
        Α
             No.
20
        Q
             Okay.
21
             MR. HAMNER: No further questions.
22
             THE COURT:
                          Anything based on that?
23
             MR. FIGLER:
                           Yes.
   ///
24
25
   ///
                                   194
```

1	REDIRECT EXAMINATION	
2	BY MR. FIGLER:	
3	Q Do you know the last date that this Clark County	
4	District Attorney's Office filed new charges with regard to this	
5	case?	
6	A No.	
7	Q Do you have an answer on why? I mean, most of those	
8	people were County employees; correct?	
9	A That's my yes, that's my impression.	
10	Q Do you know why all those County employees were	
11	sending that book back	
12	MR. HAMNER: Objection.	
13	BY MR. FIGLER:	
14	Q and forth to each other?	
15	MR. HAMNER: Speculation.	
16	BY MR. FIGLER:	
17	Q Do you know?	
18	MR. HAMNER: It's speculation.	
19	MR. FIGLER: I asked her if she knows.	
20	THE COURT: All right. Well	
21	MR. HAMNER: The question	
22	THE COURT: if she knows, that would be a yes or no	
23	question.	
24	MR. FIGLER: Correct.	
25	THE COURT: Do you know, yes or no? Then I'm assuming	
	105	
I	195	

Mr. Figler is going to follow up with is there anything in the 1 email or not follow up, but the -- and, ladies and gentlemen, 2 3 just to remind you, you'll have all that in evidence and review them yourself. 5 Do you know? Do you have any personal knowledge of why County emails were -- County employees were sending emails 6 7 of the book back and forth? THE WITNESS: No. 8 9 BY MR. FIGLER: 10 Do you have any knowledge, personal knowledge, why that book would be sent back and forth to and from forensic 11 interviewers in this case in March of 2014? 13 Α No. 14 Is email the only way that County employees can 15 communicate with each other? 16 Α No. 17 So there's no policy that prohibits them from talking on the phone to each other; correct? 18 19 Α They need to talk on the phone, so, no. 20 Okay. And so my subpoena, there's no transcription, 21 you guys don't listen in on everyone's phone calls; right? 22 No. 23 Okay. What's an interoffice envelope, or interoffice 24 mailer? 25 It is something that's also called a thousand-miler, Α

and it's a large mania envelope that has lines on it where you 1 can put a to and from. And if you put something within that 2 3 envelope, it can be sent from one office to another. 4 Okay. Are those documents that are placed in thousand-milers documented by being copied and put into a file 5 that can be searchable at some future time? 6 7 Documenting what's sent by thousand-miler? 8 0 Correct. 9 No, not that I'm aware of. 10 What about personal text messages between people's cell phones? Everyone carries a cell phone. Did you search that, or was that not part of our subpoena request? 13 That was not part of your subpoena request. 14 Q Could you do personal phones, or they have to be County phones? 15 I believe there is some law that if you use it for --16 Α 17 well, that wasn't part of your request. 18 0 Okay. So that could be out there. We just didn't ask 19 yet? 20 No. Α 21 Q Okay. 22 MR. FIGLER: No further questions. 23 Anything else, Your Honor, based on that? THE COURT: 24 MR. HAMNER: No, Your Honor. 25 THE COURT: Any -- wait, you're not done. There may

be juror questions.

Do we have any juror questions for the witness? All right. I see no questions.

Now you're done. Thank you for --

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

THE COURT: -- your testimony. Please do not discuss your testimony with anyone else that may be called as a witness in this case. Thank you and you are excused.

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, that's it for today. So we're going to go ahead and take our weekend recess.

MR. FIGLER: Oh. Your Honor, can we approach?

THE COURT: Oh. You're not done yet.

(Off-record bench conference)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, we're going to go ahead and take our weekend recess. Obviously, we didn't finish the trial today. We will finish the trial Monday. So Monday the Court will be reading to you the instructions on the law, and then the attorneys will have the opportunity to make their closing arguments.

We anticipate providing lunch for you all on Monday. So if anyone has any dietary restrictions, please let the bailiff know if you're a vegetarian or a vegan or anything like that. I don't think we can do Kosher meals, but if you do have

any dietary restrictions, let the bailiff know so we can plan for that.

Before I excuse you for the weekend recess, I must give you the admonishment. And I may have neglected to state our start time. We will be starting at 9:00 a.m. on Monday. 9:00 a.m. on Monday. The Court does not have any unrelated matters on its calendar for Monday. You will be the only thing. So as soon as everybody is here, we can get started. So 9:00 a.m. Monday.

During the weekend recess, you are all reminded you're not to discuss the case or anything relating to the case with each other or with anyone else. You're not to read, watch, or listen to any reports of or commentaries on the case, person, or subject matter relating to the case. Do not do any independent research by way of the Internet or any other medium, and please don't form or express an opinion on the trial.

Please place your notepads in your chairs, and follow the bailiff through the double doors. And Mr. Pistana, please remain in the courtroom.

(Jury recessed at 2:05 p.m.)

THE COURT: And I apologize. How do you say your surname again?

JUROR NO. 5: Pistana.

THE COURT: I always --

JUROR NO. 5: That's okay.

THE COURT: I did better. 1 JUROR NO. 5: I've been called worse. 2 3 THE COURT: All right. As you heard, we're not 4 finishing today. We will be finishing up on Monday and it'll be 5 submitted to the jury for deliberations. I know you have your trip. You were not one of the alternates, but if you would 6 7 prefer to be excused so you can take your trip, I can do that. 8 JUROR NO. 5: It's -- so Monday? 9 THE COURT: Right. 10 JUROR NO. 5: So I could --11 THE COURT: I mean, look, you know, it could go into deliberations Tuesday. You know, it's up to the jury how long 13 they take with deliberations. 14 JUROR NO. 5: Right. Will it go into deliberations 15 Monday? Like --16 THE COURT: We would start deliberations Monday, but 17 it could go into Tuesday. So I can't -- you know, obviously, we don't want people rushing through deliberations. 18 19 JUROR NO. 5: Right. 20 THE COURT: You know, we ask that everybody discuss 21 the evidence. So, you know, I can't promise you --22 JUROR NO. 5: Right. 23 THE COURT: -- you would be done Monday. 24 JUROR NO. 5: If I was -- yeah, if I was here and let's say deliberations carried over, that's the big darn

```
deliberations are --
 1
 2
             THE COURT:
                        Okay.
 3
             JUROR NO. 5: I mean --
 4
             THE COURT: Well, here's the thing, once you start
   deliberating, unless it's a medical necessity or something like
 5
   that --
 6
 7
             JUROR NO. 5: You've got to sit.
 8
             THE COURT: -- we would expect you to continue
 9
   deliberations until, you know, a verdict is reached or --
10
             JUROR NO. 5: Right.
             THE COURT: -- something like that. So I can't
11
   promise you you will be excused --
13
             JUROR NO. 5: Right.
14
             THE COURT: -- you know, Monday.
15
             JUROR NO. 5: Yeah. Because I was already --
16
             THE COURT: It takes how long it takes.
17
             JUROR NO. 5: I got it. No, I understand. Can I make
18
   a call? I feel like I've got to phone a friend.
19
             THE COURT: Yeah. I mean, that -- that's fine with
20
   me.
21
             JUROR NO. 5: I mean, for a few minutes just make a
   quick call to talk to -- or --
23
             THE COURT:
                        That's fine. That's fine.
24
             JUROR NO. 5: Okay.
25
             THE COURT: We're still here, so --
                                  201
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JUROR NO. 5: I mean, I've got nowhere to go right now
 1
 2
   anyway.
 3
             THE COURT: All right. So --
             JUROR NO. 5: I'm not going to go -- I'm not going to
 4
 5
   go to the office.
 6
             THE COURT: -- I'm going to ask you to -- I'm going to
 7
   have Kenny escort you into the hallway or the vestibule --
 8
             JUROR NO. 5: Okay. Yeah.
 9
             THE COURT: -- or wherever you're comfortable and you
10
   can make your phone call.
             JUROR NO. 5: That would be great.
11
12
             THE COURT: And then come back in and we'll follow up,
13
   okay.
14
             JUROR NO. 5: Maybe five minutes. Thank you.
                 (Outside the presence of Juror No. 5)
15
             THE COURT: I feel like he's torn. He kind of wants
16
17
   to see this to the end and --
18
             MR. FIGLER: But his job is important to him.
19
             THE COURT: -- hear the rest of it. But, yes, his job
20
                        And I feel like he feels like he's come
   is important to him.
21
   this far and he wants to -- he wants to see it to its
   conclusion.
                So let's let him make his call. I feel like we're
   on a reality show. Let's let him make his call, tick, tick,
24
   tick, tick, tick.
25
             MR. FIGLER: I mean, of course, the defense, just to
                                  202
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throw in another penny on the scale, the defense's concern is that if he chooses not to go based on what he said so far, that 2 it might weigh on his mind and might be a distraction on some level. Well, although, I'm giving him a clear 5 THE COURT: choice, and I've told him it's as long as it takes. 6 7 MR. FIGLER: Right. 8 THE COURT: You know, if it takes Tuesday. 9 can pretty much guarantee to him right now they're not going to 10 have a verdict on Monday. MR. FIGLER: 11 No. 12 MS. BLUTH: 13 MR. HAMNER: No. 14 THE COURT: Because he -- well, he doesn't -- you know, he doesn't know what kind of a department we are, so he 15 16 doesn't know that we're not a stay past dinner time department. 17 MS. BLUTH: Yeah. MR. HAMNER: And I -- and I don't think he's expressed 18 19 anything to indicate that he would be conflicted if 20 deliberating. He's just trying to decide --21 THE COURT: No, he knows --22 MR. HAMNER: -- whether he should --23 THE COURT: -- I can release him right now. But like 24 I said, I kind of feel like he wants to see it through to 25 completion.

MS. BLUTH: I think he wants you to make the decision 1 for him because he's -- he's so torn that he's like whatever she 2 tells me I'll have to do. But I think he's going to go make a call and that's going to make his decision for him. 5 THE COURT: Right. And then it is what -- I'm still going to tell him not to talk to anybody about it because, God 6 7 forbid, there's like a plague or something and we lose too many 8 jurors and we would have to bring him back. We're not doing 9 this trial again. Well, we may. Okay. I am not, to be clear. 10 MR. FIGLER: Jury instructions may hit the probability 11 of that one way or the other. 12 THE COURT: Sure. I mean, well --13 MR. FIGLER: I say that cheekily. We've exchanged 14 some jury instructions, Your Honor, already. THE COURT: Okay. 15 16 MR. FIGLER: I told the State I would try to mark up 17 some that I had, but I haven't had an opportunity to do that, but I could do that after lunch. I assume --18 19 THE COURT: What I was going to say --20 MR. FIGLER: -- we're going to break for lunch. 21 THE COURT: -- is we're going to break for lunch. 22 Poor Lynn Robinson has been waiting for me. 23 This whole time? MS. BLUTH: 24 THE COURT: All this time. 25 MR. FIGLER: Without food or water?

204

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THE COURT: What's that?
 1
 2
             MR. FIGLER: Or bagels or --
 3
             THE COURT: No, she -- I don't know. Maybe they have
   something on the third floor. We're going to take a lunch
   break, and then we'll come back and do the instructions. I like
 5
   the lawyers to meet. Excuse me. I like the lawyers to meet
 6
 7
   without me to see if you can resolve your differences.
 8
   assuming there will be some things you cannot agree to. And
 9
   then --
10
             MS. BLUTH: Can you give us a little bit longer of a
   lunch so we can go eat and then come back with each other here?
11
12
             THE COURT:
                         Sure.
             MS. BLUTH: And then you come in when you're done?
13
14
             MR. FIGLER: Yeah, since we don't have a jury waiting.
15
             THE COURT: How long do you folks need? I know you
   don't eat.
16
17
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Yeah.
18
             MR. FIGLER: Give us a half hour after however long.
19
   So give us an hour and a half maybe.
20
                          An hour and a half. That's what I was
             MR. HAMNER:
21
   thinking.
22
             MR. FIGLER:
                          Okay.
23
             MR. HAMNER:
                          That way we have an hour, essentially;
24
   right? Because it's 2:00 now.
25
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Yeah.
                                  205
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MR. HAMNER: So 3:30; right?
 1
 2
             THE COURT: Well, we need -- at some point we need
 3
   somebody to put this stuff on the record, so we'll need a clerk.
   I mean, I don't care who the clerk is, but we'll be in session,
 5
   so we need somebody.
             MR. FIGLER: Ms. Wildeveld may have participation in
 6
 7
   the trial again soon.
 8
             THE COURT: That's fine. Did you already give your
 9
   instructions to the State?
10
             MR. FIGLER: I gave my specials to the State last
   night, probably around 9:30 or something.
12
             THE COURT: Okay. Just make sure you don't both give
13
   me duplicates.
14
             MR. FIGLER: No.
15
             THE COURT: I mean, I just want --
16
             MR. FIGLER: There's only one that's in common right
17
         There's only one that's in common --
             THE COURT: Okay.
18
19
             MR. FIGLER: -- and we can probably work that one out.
20
             THE COURT:
                         Just pull that. I mean, if it's like
21
   changing a word from innocent to not guilty, you know, stuff
22
   like that --
23
             MR. FIGLER: We can probably work that.
24
             THE COURT: -- you can work that out. And I normally
  would make that change.
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Dayvid has asked if I would ask Krystal if
 1
             MS. BLUTH:
 2
   she would print a copy for him so he doesn't have to go back to
 3
   an office. Is that okay?
 4
             THE COURT:
                        Of course.
 5
                         And I had a copy printed for you, as well.
             MS. BLUTH:
             MR. FIGLER: Thank you, Your Honor.
 6
 7
             THE COURT:
                         Who are we having on Monday, Faiza?
 8
             MR. FIGLER: Faiza Ebrahim and Kristina Bernat.
 9
             THE COURT:
                         Okay.
10
             MR. FIGLER: They were both the forensic interviewers
   of all the children in this case. They -- we had attempted to
11
   subpoenas on both, but we -- our investigator failed and he took
12
   off.
13
14
             THE COURT:
                         Are they no longer with DFS?
15
                           The juror is here, Judge.
             THE MARSHAL:
16
             THE COURT:
                        Okay. Bring them in.
17
             MR. FIGLER: Faiza is, isn't she?
             MS. BLUTH:
18
                         Yeah.
19
                  (Inside the presence of Juror No. 5)
20
             JUROR NO. 5: All right.
                                       I'm in.
21
             THE COURT: Okay. Great. All right. So you'll be
22
   back --
23
             JUROR NO. 5: I'm not that important, apparently,
24
   there.
25
             THE COURT:
                         Okay. Great. You'll be back Monday at
                                  207
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1
   9:00?
             JUROR NO. 5: Yeah.
 2
 3
             THE COURT: So obviously the prohibition is very much
 4
   in effect that I just read to everybody.
 5
             JUROR NO. 5: Right.
 6
             THE COURT: We'll see you back at 9:00. And, once
 7
   again, if the other jurors want to know why we made you stay
 8
   back and what we discussed, please don't discuss this with them.
 9
             JUROR NO. 5: No problem.
10
             THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
             JUROR NO. 5: Yeah.
11
12
             THE COURT: Have a good weekend, and we'll see you
13
   back Monday at 9:00 a.m.
14
             JUROR NO. 5: 9:00.
15
                 (Outside the presence of Juror No.
                                                     5)
16
             THE COURT: So it's 2:15 now. Can we say 3:30?
                                                               Is
17
   that enough? Or let's say 3:40.
18
             MS. BLUTH:
                        But we're going to meet before you.
19
             THE COURT:
                         Right. So I'm going to be back at 3:40.
20
             MR. HAMNER: Yes.
21
                         Or 3:45. I'll be back here at 3:45.
             THE COURT:
                                                                Ι
   expect the lawyers here at 3:45.
23
             Ms. Solander, we're settling jury instructions on the
24
   record at 3:45. Those are legal arguments. You're, obviously,
   welcome to be here, but if your attorneys don't think you need
                                  208
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to be here and you want me to waive your appearance, that's
 1
 2
   fine, as well. So that's up to you and your lawyers.
   said, it's an open proceeding. As the defendant, you're welcome
 3
   to be here, but your appearance isn't required. So it's up to
 5
   you and your lawyers if you want to be here or not. If you're
   not here at 3:45, I'm not going to wait. I'm going.
 6
 7
             MR. FIGLER: No, we'll be here.
 8
             THE COURT:
                         So it's up to you. If she wants to be
 9
   here --
10
             MR. FIGLER: Yeah, we'll explain it to her --
                        -- and you want her here --
11
             THE COURT:
12
             MR. FIGLER: -- what usually happens.
13
             THE COURT:
                        -- it's up to -- it's up to you guys.
14
   It's just legal arguments.
15
             MR. FIGLER: That's fine, Your Honor. Thank you.
16
             MR. HAMNER: Thank you, Your Honor.
17
             MR. FIGLER: Thank you, staff.
18
             (Court recessed at 2:15 p.m., until 4:01 p.m.)
19
             MS. BLUTH: And then if we could just stop when we
20
   don't agree, would that be okay, or what do you want to do?
21
             THE COURT:
                         Just --
22
                         You're the boss.
             MS. BLUTH:
23
                         -- can we go to the ones you don't agree
             THE COURT:
24
   on, or you didn't tab those or --
25
             MR. HAMNER: I mean, I've noted them.
                                  209
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1 THE COURT: All right. One, two, three. Are we on 2 the record? 3 THE RECORDER: Yes. MR. FIGLER: Are you numbering them now? 4 5 THE COURT: No, no, no. We haven't agreed on them. I'm just --6 7 MR. FIGLER: Okay. 8 MS. BLUTH: Just can we start with -- oh, well, he has 9 some changes to the information he wants to make. 10 THE COURT: All right. MR. FIGLER: Are we on record here? 11 12 THE COURT: Yeah. 13 MR. FIGLER: Okay. Your Honor, I'm just going to do a 14 little prelude here. The defense has -- had concerns from the onset of when the trial began, at least, that some of the counts 15 16 are constitutionally vague as they apply to our client, and 17 certainly we aren't on notice for certain things, such as how 18 long is extended period of time for a bucket and things of that 19 nature. 20 So we did reference earlier, but I just wanted to make 21 it clear that based on Ford v. State, 127 Nev. 608, and some of the other cases we've cited about vagueness, that the -- the information as it stands itself is quite vaque. I think last 24 time I went through all the counts, so I'm not going to do that again. I think the record is made very clear on that.

That said, this is a very unique prosecution. I think that not only is Dr. Cetl, this is the first one that she's seen as a catheter inserted into a urethra which was purported to be for medical purposes being charged as a sexual assault, but I would venture to say this is probably the first catheter in a urethra ever charged by the State of Nevada as a -- as a sexual assault. And so it's going to be matters of first impression with a lot of these instructions that are being given in this particular case. So that's the prelude.

With regard to the instruction itself, the new issue is that in a multitude of counts the defendant is listed with Dwight Solander for the child abuse, neglect, endangerment, substantial bodily harm charges. And the first page of the information correctly now just lists Janet Solander. The instructions just list Janet Solander. Dwight Solander has already pled out and is not in this case, and he has plead to three counts in the case.

The State does allege conspiracy and aiding and abetting explicitly in the sexual assault. And so my comments are not related to that because they did plead that, and there is notice. But I believe that there would be confusion to the jury, and perhaps confusion during argument, with regard to the conspiracy that the jury could find, because the count lists both of them, the defendant guilty for the conduct of Dwight Solander.

THE COURT: Right. Because they don't know when the scars were caused. Was it Dwight Solander striking the child with the paint stick, or was it Janet Solander striking the child with the paint stick? They don't know which striking would have caused which scar.

MR. FIGLER: Right. So unless it's been -THE COURT: Which is why they have to plead it this

MR. HAMNER: Right.

way.

MR. FIGLER: Well, I mean -- so that's our objection, that it's plead this way, because the Jury may very well find that Janet is guilty of child abuse, neglect, even though only Dwight hit the child with a stick causing a scar, and that would be abdication of justice.

They're not being charged as consorts, they're not being charged as aiding and abet. But implicit in the State's argument, is it doesn't matter, and it does matter. And so we would ask that Dwight Solander's name be stricken from all the counts where it is listed. And there's also one count where Danielle Hinton is also listed as an individual.

Now, as I stated, the sexual assault, they pled it as a conspiracy. I understand why Dwight bought the catheters and all that stuff. I get it. We are on notice of that, but we are not on notice that if the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Dwight caused the scarring and did the substantial bodily

harm, that Janet would be found guilty. We're not on notice of that.

THE COURT: Does anybody want to respond?

MR. HAMNER: Yeah. I think that the -- the manner in which its plead is -- is entirely appropriate. This is no different than an unidentified co-conspirator. I mean, we do this sort of thing all the time. This isn't a situation where there's been a lack of evidence, either, that's been presented at trial where both of them engaged in some of these -- these actions. Additionally, there was extensive testimony that Dwight would act at the behest of Janet, to kind of enforce these rules or enforce discipline. Same thing with Danielle, as well.

And so the bottom line is, with respect to naming these particular, you know, non-parties right now in this case, specifically Danielle and -- and Dwight, there's nothing inappropriate with doing this. This is just kind of standard pleading or conspirator liability, accomplice liability. And there's nothing really wrong as a matter of law about it, and they've been on notice about it this entire time since the prelim. So at this point there's not a legal basis to remove them from the information.

THE COURT: Look, I think there's enough notice. They were acting together. There's ample evidence of that. I think it's fine. Just two comments. Whoever your secretary is, there

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are a lot -- there's not mistakes, really, but on the
 1
 2
   formatting, they'll have the lines, you know, the page break is
   like in -- I'm looking -- in the middle, between counts, and
   stuff like that.
 5
             MR. HAMNER: Right. Get that --
                         I'll have it --
             MS. BLUTH:
 6
 7
             MR. HAMNER: -- cleared up.
 8
             MS. BLUTH:
                         I'll have it fixed.
 9
             THE COURT: Clean that up. Also, let me just ask you
10
   this on the record now. Does either side object if when we get
   to Instruction 3 I don't reread it, and just say, you know,
   Counts 1 through 46 allege various, you know, child abuse, blah
12
13
   blah blah, and it was read to you by the court clerk at the
14
   beginning, and it's here in Instruction No. 3?
             MR. FIGLER: Can I inquire, does each juror have their
15
16
   own copy of the instructions?
17
             THE COURT: No, but if you want me to, we can give
   them one rather than me reading the whole thing. I would just
18
19
   note --
             MR. FIGLER: If that's the Court's --
20
21
             THE COURT: -- Judge Cherry used to do it that way --
22
             MR. FIGLER:
                         Yeah.
23
             THE COURT: -- when he was a District Court judge.
24 Normally, I reread it, but you know, 47 counts --
25
             MS. BLUTH: It takes 30 minutes.
```

-- that's another --THE COURT: 1 It takes 30 minutes to do that. 2 MS. BLUTH: 3 THE COURT: Yeah, I was going to say --4 MR. FIGLER: For the Court's convenience, the defense 5 would not have an objection if each juror had a set of their own instructions. 6 7 I'm fine doing it that way. THE COURT: Typically, I 8 don't give the jurors their own instructions because I feel like sometimes they're reading through the instructions instead of 10 listening to the closing arguments. That's my own feeling. I know some judges hand them out and think it's better to do it 11 12 that way. My personal view is it's not better, but if 13 requested, it doesn't really matter to me. We can make 15 14 copies 15 MR. FIGLER: And we don't mind if the -- if the jury 16 is admonished. But sometimes both sides would say if you look 17 at Juror Instruction No. 17 --MS. BLUTH: Yeah. And then --18 19 MR. FIGLER: -- it would be convenient for them to have it in front of them. So --20 21 THE COURT: Okay. But, normally when the -- look, if you want me to do it that way, that's fine. I would just note that normally, if you say Instruction 17 tells you, blah blah 24 blah, either it's up in their PowerPoint, it's on the Elmo, or you're reading it to them.

1 MR. HAMNER: My -- my --2 THE COURT: So --3 MR. HAMNER: My request, as far as having -- getting them a paper copy is, given that there's 46 counts and that it overlaps with the kids, I think it would be easier, from our 5 standpoint in terms of explaining the law about which counts, 6 7 because as I'm going through it I'm going to be saying things 8 like this conduct is Counts 5, 13, and 27. 9 THE COURT: Right. Now, of course, they get many 10 copies of the instructions in the back with them. 11 MR. HAMNER: Okay. 12 THE COURT: Yeah. No, no, no. You're just talking 13 about handing them 15 copies when I read the instructions --14 MR. FIGLER: Yes. 15 THE COURT: -- and that they then hold onto when you 16 guys make your closing arguments. If you like that better, I 17 don't care. So --MR. HAMNER: I'll submit it to the Court. 18 19 THE COURT: All right. 20 MS. BLUTH: And then also while we're on this, though, can I -- we have AS and their date of birth. It's already so 21 22 confusing with so many kids, so I'm going to put their -- it --23 when we do do these --24 THE COURT: Their real names. 25 -- I'm going to put their real name, and MS. BLUTH:

```
then can we file it under seal, because the whole -- we can't
 2
   file the jury instruction under seal?
 3
             MR. FIGLER: Well, one set of jury instructions.
                                                                 Ιt
 4
   can't be filed under seal, but you can --
 5
             THE COURT:
                         No.
             MR. FIGLER: -- redact it --
 6
 7
                         It can't be filed under --
             MS. BLUTH:
             MR. FIGLER: -- to their initials.
 8
 9
             MS. BLUTH: -- seal?
10
             MR. FIGLER: You can't file jury instructions under
11
   seal --
12
             THE COURT:
                         No.
13
             MR. FIGLER: -- because they get transmitted up on
14
   appeal.
            And --
15
                         They don't -- they don't have access to it
             MS. BLUTH:
16
   if you do that?
17
             MR. FIGLER: You don't. If they're under seal, no.
   Because when they're putting together the appendix, it would be
18
19
   highly --
20
                         Right. You have to file --
             THE COURT:
21
             MR. FIGLER: -- complicated.
22
                         -- the jury instructions.
             THE COURT:
23
                         Okay. Fine, I'll just --
             MS. BLUTH:
24
             THE COURT:
                         -- you can have another -- the official
   copy, and then an unofficial copy that's filed under seal and
                                  217
```

that could have their names in it. 1 2 MS. BLUTH: It's fine. I'll just --3 MR. FIGLER: We could do that. 4 MR. HAMNER: Don't worry about it. 5 THE COURT: And that's what we'll pass out. MR. HAMNER: We'll just lay out --6 7 MS. BLUTH: It's fine. 8 MR. HAMNER: I'll make sure I lay out the birthdays 9 and the --10 THE COURT: Okay. 11 MS. BLUTH: No, no, no. We're going to put their 12 names. It's fine. I'll put their names. Don't even worry 13 about it. 14 MR. HAMNER: Okay. 15 THE COURT: All right. 4, to constitute --16 MR. FIGLER: So, anyway, Your Honor, I'm sorry, but 17 the defense, I just want to make the objection clear that we are 18 not -- we were never on notice that they were going to allege a 19 conspirator liability or an aid and abet liability, and it's 20 certainly not in the language of the amended information or any 21 preceding charging document. So I appreciate the Court's ruling, I'm not going to ask you to change it, but our objection is that we are not on notice, that Janet could be found guilty 24 if the jury feels that Dwight imposed the conduct that caused 25 substantial bodily harm. 218

```
THE COURT: All right. 4, you're fine with, to
 1
 2
   constitute to crime charged. 5, the reasonable doubt --
                                 Where are we?
 3
             MR. FIGLER: Wait.
 4
             THE COURT: -- instruction.
 5
             MR. FIGLER: Hold on. I'm sorry, Your Honor.
 6
             MS. BLUTH: No, I think he does have an objection on
 7
   it.
 8
             MR. HAMNER: And just for the record, we know that
 9
   there was on that amended information one, one of the paragraphs
10
   at the very end is duplicative. We'll take that out.
   think you wanted to talk about the must and should, right,
11
12
   Dayvid --
13
             MR. FIGLER: Right.
             MR. HAMNER: -- before we move on?
14
15
             MR. FIGLER: So at the end of the -- at the end of the
   averment of charges instruction, it says each charge and the
16
17
   evidence pertaining, it should be considered separately.
18
             THE COURT:
                        Must be.
19
             MR. FIGLER: We like must.
20
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Got it.
21
             THE COURT:
                         Okay. That'll be changed. All right.
22
   constitute the crime charged.
23
             MR. HAMNER: No objections.
24
             THE COURT: No objections?
25
             MR. HAMNER:
                          None.
                                  219
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```
The reasonable doubt instruction?
             THE COURT:
 1
 2
             MR. FIGLER: We'll submit to Your Honor if you use
 3
   unless or until.
 4
             MR. HAMNER: This is just straight from the Supreme
 5
   Court, so --
 6
                         I mean, I just use this one, but I don't
             THE COURT:
 7
   think it matters if you want unless.
 8
             MR. FIGLER: We like unless.
 9
             THE COURT: Any objection to unless?
10
             MS. BLUTH: So reasonable doubt, the presumption --
             THE COURT: All right. You are here to determine the
11
   quilt or innocence.
13
             MS. BLUTH: Wait. Sorry, you guys. So you want me to
14
   change it to unless, the defendant is --
15
             THE COURT:
                        Yeah.
16
             MS. BLUTH: -- presumed innocent unless?
17
             MR. FIGLER: The contrary is proved. Yep.
             THE COURT: You are here to determine the guilt or
18
19
   innocence.
20
             MR. FIGLER: The defense likes -- that's fine and
21
   that's a true statement of law. We'd like a second paragraph
   that says, conversely, even if you believe beyond a reasonable
   doubt that the other people are guilty, that cannot be the sole
24
   reason to find this defendant guilty. It's just the converse of
   the last sentence.
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```
MS. BLUTH:
                        No, that's not law.
 1
                         I don't think we need to add that.
 2
             THE COURT:
 3
             MR. FIGLER: All right. So I'll submit that as a
 4
   proposed change. And we'll have it marked as such.
 5
             THE COURT:
                         Okay. All right. The evidence which you
   are to consider.
 6
 7
             MR. FIGLER: So the defense has an objection to that.
 8
             THE COURT: So you're basically going to object to all
 9
   of the stock instructions, is that where we are on this?
10
             MR. FIGLER: With due respect, I don't feel that there
   are stock instructions in the Eight Judicial District Court,
11
   none of which have been approved.
             THE COURT: Okay. Well, except these are the -- what
13
14
   -- by stock, what I mean --
15
             MR. FIGLER: Commonly used.
             THE COURT: -- is these are the instructions that are
16
17
   used, I would say, in virtually every criminal Eight Judicial
   District Court state prosecution --
18
19
             MR. FIGLER: And with the exception --
20
             THE COURT: -- which have been considered on appeal in
21
   pretty much every case, unless maybe people haven't raised those
22
   issues.
23
             MR. FIGLER: Correct, Your Honor.
24
             THE COURT: And I'm --
25
             MR. FIGLER: And with the exception of --
                                  221
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THE COURT: No case has been reversed because of them. 1 MR. FIGLER: I understand that. And with the 2 3 exception of myself and, I believe, Ms. JoNell Thomas, I don't know a lot of attorneys who object to this specific language that's used in these that are used over and over, but we do. 5 So if I can make that objection on the record. 6 7 THE COURT: All right. Well, if Ms. Thomas has made 8 the objection in her cases --9 MR. FIGLER: Sometimes they get appealed. 10 THE COURT: -- and it's withstood appellate scrutiny, 11 why are you making it? 12 MR. FIGLER: Well, Ms. Thomas taught me well, that sometimes in the future in the federal cases, decisions are made 13 14 which have an impact, and if it wasn't raised, it's waived, and 15 so we raise them. So the -- the objection on that one is that on what I 16 17 think Your Honor has as line 9, it repeats circumstantial evidence a second time. So it says the law makes no distinction 18 19 between the weight to be given to either direct or 20 circumstantial evidence, true statement of law; therefore, all 21 the evidence in this case, including the circumstantial 22 evidence, which we believe is superfluous language, should be 23 considered by you --24 THE COURT: You want me to cross out including the circumstantial evidence?

```
1
             MR. FIGLER: Yes, Your Honor.
 2
             THE COURT:
                         That's fine. That doesn't change it.
 3
             MR. FIGLER: And then to add on to the end of that
   sentence, each of you may give any evidence the weight you
 5
   believe it deserves.
             THE COURT:
 6
                         I think that makes it more confusing.
 7
             MR. HAMNER: Yeah.
 8
             THE COURT:
                         So I'm willing to cross the one thing
 9
   out --
10
                         That's fine. I noted that.
             MS. BLUTH:
                        -- but not add the other.
11
             THE COURT:
12
             MR. FIGLER: Thank you, Your Honor.
13
             THE COURT:
                         All right. The credibility or
14
   believability.
15
             MR. FIGLER: Your Honor, we have competing ones.
16
   you can just pick which one, I'm not going to argue it. We have
17
   the Ninth Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction. That's the -- often
18
   referred to as a long form credibility. The State has the short
19
   form one. We will submit it to Your Honor to select which one.
20
   I'm not going to add any additional argument.
21
             THE COURT:
                        All right. I'm going to give the one we
   always give. Although, yours is perfectly fine, as well.
   don't really see a big difference there. All right. The next
24
   one, the expert witness instruction.
25
             MR. HAMNER: It's okay. No objection on either side.
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MR. FIGLER: That's fine, Your Honor.
 1
 2
             THE COURT: Person who commits a sexual penetration.
             MR. FIGLER: Okay.
 3
 4
             MS. BLUTH:
                         So there's lots of competing on this.
 5
             MR. FIGLER: So now there's going to be a lot on
           We might want to skip over these and get to the ones
 6
 7
   that we don't and come back to these.
                          I thought -- well, look, we're going --
 8
             THE COURT:
 9
             MR. HAMNER: Let's take them in order.
10
             MR. FIGLER: However you want to do it, Your Honor.
                          Let's just take them in order.
11
             MS. BLUTH:
12
             MR. FIGLER: Okay.
13
             THE COURT:
                        Let's just take them in order.
14
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Yeah.
15
                         I mean, I thought we were only going to
             THE COURT:
16
   focus on the ones that there was a dispute about, but since
17
   we're going through the whole stack, let's just go in order.
18
             MS. BLUTH:
                          Okay.
19
             MR. FIGLER:
                          Okay.
20
             THE COURT:
                          All right. Do you have an alternative one
21
   to this?
22
             MR. FIGLER: We have two alternative ones to that.
23
             THE COURT:
                          You have a person is guilty of sexual
24
   assault.
25
             MR. FIGLER:
                           That's correct. And it should be -- oh,
                                  224
```

```
well, it's he or she, so that's fine.
                                           That's it.
1
2
             THE COURT:
                        All right. Where is your second one?
3
             MR. FIGLER: That's it. Just the one, Your Honor.
4
             THE COURT:
                         All right. So you've added the medical --
                         Purposes.
5
             MR. FIGLER:
                         Well, this is not a correct statement of
6
             THE COURT:
7
   the law.
8
             MR. FIGLER:
                         Which?
9
             THE COURT:
                         Yours.
10
             MR. FIGLER: Which one?
                         The definition of sexual penetration is
11
             THE COURT:
   logically confined to activities which are the product of sexual
12
13
   behavior or libidinal gratification, not merely the product of
14
   clinical examinations or domestic parental functions.
15
             MR. FIGLER: Interestingly enough, the Nevada Supreme
16
   Court, in a case you may have heard of, called Solander v
17
   State --
             THE COURT:
                         Is this taken from that?
18
19
             MR. FIGLER: Yes. They cited that Mississippi
20
   decision, talking about sexual penetration and its logical
21
   confine. Look, the Supreme Court determined that the sex
   assault charge could go forward, and they gave a lot of muddled
   and somewhat contradicting language within its own document to
24
   itself.
25
             But they made one thing very clear, that despite the
                                  225
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```
fact that the medical purposes language is -- was -- was
1
   codified later, it's always been the intent, and the fair
2
3
   implication of the sexual assault statute, to have a
   disallowance for medical necessity or medical purpose. And so
   then the Nevada Supreme Court went all over the place with
5
   regard -- without giving this Court any direction of what type
6
7
   of instruction should be given in this very unique type of case.
   And so it is defense's position --
8
9
             THE COURT: Well, shouldn't it be something like -- I
10
   think there needs to be something saying excluding it from
   medical purposes because -- but the sexual behavior -- is this
11
12
   language directly from the opinion?
13
             MR. HAMNER: Well, it's --
14
             MR. FIGLER: The definition -- that language is
   verbatim from what could either be considered dicta or guidance,
15
16
   depending --
17
                        Well, I was --
             THE COURT:
             MR. FIGLER: -- on what the Supreme Court intended.
18
19
             THE COURT:
                         I'm sorry. I was thinking we could put
20
   something -- a person is not quilty of sexual assault if the
21
   penetration is for legitimate medical purposes.
22
             MR. FIGLER: Well, and it --
23
             THE COURT:
                         Something like that.
24
             MR. FIGLER: Well, I think --
25
             THE COURT:
                         There has to be something because,
                                  226
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obviously, any time you, you know, you do a pelvic exam, you're 1 not committing a sexual assault if maybe the person is 2 3 unconscious or a child or something like that. 4 MR. FIGLER: And this -- herein lies the problem with 5 it being the [indiscernible] way, is what is or isn't legitimate, and how does that get defined? So now the Nevada 7 Legislature, in codifying that concept, only used the words 8 medical purposes. They did not use legitimate medical purposes, 9 though the Supreme Court --10 THE COURT: Well --MR. FIGLER: -- in their writ, talk about bona fide 11 and legitimate in a different context, and this becomes very convoluted. 13 14 THE COURT: Well --15 MR. HAMNER: Your Honor. THE COURT: -- I mean, I agree, they didn't give us a 16 17 lot of guidance. I don't agree with the State. I think that 18 the limited guidance calls for an exception for medical 19 purposes, which is obviously the case. How we define medical 20 purposes, I think, was left up in the air. I think it does have 21 to be a legitimate medical purpose. 22 MS. BLUTH: Can we look at the full language --23 MR. HAMNER: Yeah. 24 MS. BLUTH: -- though, Judge? 25 MR. HAMNER: Can --

```
MS. BLUTH:
                        Because --
 1
 2
             MR. HAMNER: Can I --
 3
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Go ahead. Go ahead.
 4
             MR. HAMNER: So the -- the language is what -- what
   they state, which I think should be added into the State's
 5
   instruction. It states, accordingly, we disagree with the
 6
 7
   Solanders that the insertion of a catheter into the urethra
   cannot constitute sexual assault as a matter of law because
 8
 9
   while a catheter has a medical purpose, it does not necessarily
10
   follow that it was used for legitimate medical purposes.
   think--
11
12
             THE COURT: Isn't that the word I said?
13
             MR. HAMNER: That is the word that you said, and I
14
   think that's what it -- it should probably state.
                                                       That unless
15
   the action is for a legitimate --
             THE COURT: Or --
16
17
             MR. HAMNER: -- medical purpose.
18
             THE COURT:
                        -- a person is not guilty of sexual
19
   assault if the penetration is for legitimate medical purposes.
20
             MR. HAMNER: Correct.
21
             MS. BLUTH:
                         That's fine with the State.
22
             THE COURT:
                         I think --
23
             MR. FIGLER: Okay.
24
             MR. HAMNER: That's fine.
25
             THE COURT:
                         -- that's a correct statement of the law.
                                  228
```

MR. FIGLER: And I'm okay with that so long as the 1 2 flipside of the scienter component matches that. And so now 3 we're left in the unique position, because of this unique charge, of determining the scienter as being a specific intent contained within a general intent crime. And so if Ms. Solander 5 is found to intend to have done this for legitimate purposes, 7 she should not be found guilty of sexual assault. It's not the 8 purposes that is to be evaluated, but the intent or the scienter 9 of the individual. So --10 THE COURT: I disagree with that because it's a 11 general intent crime. 12 MR. FIGLER: But that is --13 THE COURT: And that's the whole -- was the whole 14 point, to me --15 MS. BLUTH: Right. THE COURT: -- of the Supreme Court's decision. 16 17 Because I said, look, it's pretty clear she's doing this to the 18 purpose of voiding the bladder. Whether that's legitimate or 19 illegitimate, it was not for sexual purpose. It was for the 20 purpose of voiding the bladder. 21 MR. FIGLER: Right. 22 I think that that was undisputed, frankly. THE COURT: 23 MR. FIGLER: And so --24 THE COURT: But they --25 MR. FIGLER: -- if the jury finds out --

1 THE COURT: -- disagreed with me. 2 MR. FIGLER: Well, I don't know that they disagreed 3 with you. 4 MS. BLUTH: No, they --MR. FIGLER: I think they said that's a --5 Respectfully, they absolutely did. 6 MS. BLUTH: 7 MR. FIGLER: Well, respectfully, I don't know that 8 they disagreed with you. I think they said it's a jury question, not a matter of law. And so the question is for the 10 jury, was her purpose to void the bladder, which is a legitimate medical thing, or is her purpose violence --11 12 THE COURT: That's not --13 MR. FIGLER: -- or his her purpose sexual? 14 THE COURT: -- what they said, because don't forget how this got to the Supreme Court. I granted the -- that portion of 15 16 the defense's writ based on the evidence presented to the -- at 17 the prelim, which was -- and I think -- look, I worked on -- the 18 order had been originally drafted by Craig Mueller, and so I 19 worked off of that. 20 But I think the point was that I found that it was 21 undisputed in the evidence before the grand jury that the purpose of inserting the catheter was for voiding the bladder. And I think that language was -- may have even been used in the 24 court order, okay. So that was undisputed. So a matter of law, not a matter of law, there was no evidence that it was for any

purpose other than voiding the bladder put before the grand jury. So that's what -- or the justice court. That's -- so it's a writ. I'm saying there's no evidence of anything else, 3 and they're reversing me on that, on the writ. 5 MR. FIGLER: Right. But --So, to me, they're not -- they're finding 6 THE COURT: 7 that even if the evidence before the grand -- or the -- I keep 8 saying grand jury, but before the justice court is the purpose 9 is voiding the bladder, that that's not enough to say it's not a sexual assault. 10 11 MR. FIGLER: Right. But what they really talk about as the crux of -- of reversing Your Honor in there is saying, 13 look, we agree with the State that sexual assault doesn't always 14 mean something sexual when they're talking about the gratification part. 15 16 THE COURT: Right, but -- but it was -- you've got to 17 still remember how it got there, it got there on a writ. There was no evidence that there had been a sexual purpose --18 19 MS. BLUTH: Right. -- or that she was --20 THE COURT: 21 MR. HAMNER: Correct. 22 THE COURT: -- doing it for any purpose other than 23 voiding the bladder. That was the whole point of it. 24 MS. BLUTH: And the way it was argued, if you remember from Mueller's perspective, his whole thing was this is a

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slippery slope because now we can charge nurses, we can charge
 2
   doctors, we can charge this. And our argument was, no, the
   point is is you can't insert objects. Because, yeah, when you
   have a penis and you have a finger and things like that, you
 5
   know, you can always say, oh, there was some sexual intent. But
   a lot of our cases actually do -- are sexual assault via
 6
 7
             I know it sounds weird, but --
   objects.
 8
             THE COURT: Yeah. But I mean, if you stick a broom
 9
   handle in someone's vagina --
10
             MR. FIGLER: Well, come on, there's no medical --
                        -- there's clearly no --
11
             THE COURT:
12
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Well, no, of course.
13
             THE COURT:
                         -- medical purpose.
14
             MR. HAMNER: But there's also -- but there -- but the
15
   contrary is that there may not be a sexual purpose behind it,
16
   either.
            I mean --
17
             THE COURT:
                        No.
18
             MR. HAMNER: -- you know what I mean, it --
19
             THE COURT:
                         It could be to hurt the person.
20
             MR. HAMNER: Right.
21
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Right.
22
             THE COURT:
                         But --
23
             MS. BLUTH:
                         So you never have to have this sexual
24
   intent.
            So --
25
                         Right. Well, but what I'm saying is there
             THE COURT:
                                  232
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was no evidence of sexual intent.
 1
 2
             MS. BLUTH:
                        And there is not now.
 3
             THE COURT:
                         The only evidence was voiding the bladder.
 4
             MR. FIGLER: Okay. So --
                         Which a broom handle -- look, let's face
 5
             THE COURT:
   it, how many medical type devices are going to be inserted?
 6
 7
   probably a whole lot. You can have a speculum, you could have
 8
   this catheter. I mean, there's probably other things that I'm
 9
   not thinking of, but --
10
             MS. BLUTH: Yeah.
                        -- you know, it's not like a huge range of
11
             THE COURT:
   items that are going to be inserted --
13
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Right.
14
             THE COURT:
                         -- for --
15
             MR. FIGLER: Okay.
                         It could be a gloved finger to --
16
             THE COURT:
17
             MR. FIGLER: So here comes the ambiguous language of
   the Nevada Supreme Court decision in this case. We thus agree
18
19
   that if -- and -- and so how this is constructed is going to
   make all the difference --
20
21
             THE COURT:
                         It is.
22
             MR. FIGLER: -- in this case.
                                             If --
23
             THE COURT: And it'll be different justices.
24
             MR. FIGLER: Right. And this is only three -- this is
25 a three-judge panel.
                                  233
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THE COURT:
                         Who was it again?
 1
                          It was Pickering --
 2
             MR. FIGLER:
 3
             MR. HAMNER: Hardesty, Saitta --
 4
             MR. FIGLER: -- Hardesty --
                          -- and Pickering --
 5
             MR. HAMNER:
                          -- and Saitta. So we know at least one
 6
             MR. FIGLER:
 7
   of them is not there.
                          So we agree that if the Solanders
 8
   undertook the -- the catheterization for a bona fide medical
   purpose, they may avoid criminal liability. So everything
   revolves on four. If four describes the intent of the Solanders
10
   -- so if the Solanders thought they were doing it for a bona
11
   fide medical purpose, do they escape liability, or do we have to
12
   show -- does the defense have to show that it is a bona fide
13
14
   medical purpose when it happened? And that doesn't make any
15
   sense --
16
             MR. HAMNER:
                          Wrong.
17
             MR. FIGLER:
                          -- because that would be burden
   shifting --
18
19
             MR. HAMNER: No.
20
                          -- and when you talk about scienter or
             MR. FIGLER:
   intent, then that is on the State for the burden to show that it
21
22
   wasn't for. And then they go onto explain, look, the State
   said, look, it could have been as a form of punishment, not for
24
   medical use, and that is their argument. And so they can argue
   that's still under --
                                  234
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MR. HAMNER: It's our --
1
2
             THE COURT:
                         Okay. Well why don't we do this, take the
3
   language directly from the case. Read that language again.
4
             MR. FIGLER: If the Solanders undertook the
5
   catheterization for a bona fide medical purpose --
             THE COURT:
6
                         Okay.
7
             MR. FIGLER: -- they may avoid --
8
             THE COURT:
                         So if the --
9
             MR. FIGLER: -- criminal liability.
10
                         No, because that is a bona fide medical --
             MS. BLUTH:
   no, it is about -- what Your Honor said, a person is not guilty
   of sexual assault if the penetration is for a legitimate medical
13
   purpose, meaning you have a legitimate reason to be doing this.
14
             THE COURT:
                        What if we do some --
15
             MR. HAMNER: Or if you believe it.
16
             THE COURT: I'm just throwing this out. They don't
17
   have any guidance on burden shifting, but if -- you know how in
   like an issue of consent, if the defense raises the issue of
18
19
   consent, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it
   wasn't self-defense or it wasn't --
20
21
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Yeah.
22
                         -- in self-defense.
             THE COURT:
23
                         We should -- I think there should be --
             MR. HAMNER:
24
             THE COURT:
                         Why don't we add that?
25
             MR. HAMNER: -- that the burden is --
```

```
THE COURT: If the defense --
 1
 2
             MR. HAMNER: I mean, I think you --
 3
             THE COURT:
                         However that comes from the self-defense
 4
   language, just change --
 5
             MS. BLUTH:
                         The State must prove beyond a reasonable
   doubt that no legitimate medical --
 6
 7
             THE COURT:
                         Right. So --
 8
             MS. BLUTH:
                        -- purpose existed.
 9
             MR. HAMNER: The inserting of the --
10
             THE COURT: -- what's the language from the
   self-defense? If the defendant raises -- you see what I'm
11
   saying? It's how do they phrase that?
12
13
                         The standard of which --
             MS. BLUTH:
14
             MR. FIGLER: I don't think we should be --
15
             MR. HAMNER: Well --
16
             MR. FIGLER: -- creating new --
17
             MR. HAMNER: -- like a rebuttable presumption.
             THE COURT:
18
                         So you don't want that? That's to your
19
   benefit.
20
             MS. BLUTH:
                        Yeah. That's what --
21
             THE COURT:
                         That they have to --
22
             MR. FIGLER: Well, I do believe it's --
23
             THE COURT:
                        -- prove that it's beyond a reasonable
24
   doubt that --
25
             MR. FIGLER: But I don't know the -- I don't know what
                                  236
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the -- the burden is on the defense to raise. Is it if the
 1
   defense raises any evidence that there could be a bona fide
 2
   medical purpose, the State has to prove beyond a reasonable --
 3
 4
             THE COURT:
                          That's what I'm saying.
                           -- doubt that it was not done for a bona
 5
             MR. FIGLER:
   fide medical purpose?
 6
 7
                          How about this, if the defendant presents
             THE COURT:
 8
   any evidence that the penetration was for a medical purpose --
 9
             MS. BLUTH:
                         A legitimate.
10
             MR. HAMNER: No, no, no. Well, for a medical purpose.
             THE COURT:
                          That --
11
12
             MR. HAMNER: The burden is on the State --
13
             THE COURT: -- the penetration -- I mean, that, to me,
14
   helps the defense. I'm saying, well, you have to do this in
15
   other kinds of cases.
16
             MS. BLUTH:
                          Can you read it again?
17
                          I'm writing it. If the defendant presents
             THE COURT:
18
   any evidence that the penetration was for a medical purpose --
19
             MR. HAMNER:
                          It is on -- it is the burden --
20
             THE COURT:
                          Okay.
21
             MR. HAMNER: The State must prove --
22
                          The State must prove --
             THE COURT:
23
             MR. HAMNER:
                          -- beyond a reasonable doubt--
24
             THE COURT:
                          -- beyond a reasonable doubt --
25
             MR. HAMNER: -- that it is not -- that the insertion,
                                  237
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```
or whatever you have, the penetration --
 1
                         I'm using penetration, because that's --
 2
             THE COURT:
 3
             MS. BLUTH:
                        Penetration.
             MR. HAMNER: -- the penetration was not for a
 4
 5
   legitimate medical purpose.
 6
             MR. FIGLER: Was not undertaken for a legitimate
 7
   medical purpose. Because they used the word undertook, and I
 8
   believe undertook modifies for, which modifies intent.
   just how I read that.
10
             THE COURT: Yeah, that's fine.
11
   penetration --
12
             MR. FIGLER: Was not undertaken.
13
             THE COURT: -- was not undertaken for a legitimate
14
   medical purpose.
15
             MS. BLUTH:
                        Okay. So --
16
             THE COURT: Because you can still argue she's
17
   punishing these kids, there was no medical purpose --
18
             MR. HAMNER: Sure.
19
             THE COURT: -- because there --
20
             MR. FIGLER: Yeah, they could do that.
             THE COURT: -- are doctors --
21
22
             MR. HAMNER: Well, I mean there's plenty of evidence
23
   of that.
24
             MS. BLUTH: So can you read it for me one more time,
   Judge? Because I'm the one who's going to have to change it.
                                  238
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```
THE COURT: Okay. All right. So it's everything in
1
2
  the State's instruction, and then it says a person is not guilty
3
   of sexual assault if the penetration is for a legitimate medical
   purpose. If the defendant presents any evidence that the
5
   penetration was for a medical purpose, the State must prove
   beyond a reasonable doubt that the penetration was not
6
7
   undertaken for a legitimate medical purpose.
8
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Any evidence that the penetration --
9
             MR. FIGLER: I wanted undertaken --
             MR. HAMNER: Was -- was undertaken --
10
11
             MR. FIGLER: -- up higher.
12
             MR. HAMNER: -- for a legitimate medical purpose.
13
             THE COURT:
                         Well, undertaken --
14
             MR. FIGLER: Does it work right there?
15
                         Well, no. It's for a legitimate -- for,
             THE COURT:
16
   what does for mean? It means it's your purpose.
17
             MR. FIGLER: They didn't help us.
             THE COURT:
18
                         Huh?
19
             MR. FIGLER: They sent it back, but they did not help
20
   us.
21
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Judge, can you give me yours real quick?
22
   Sorry.
           Because you read so fast.
23
             THE COURT:
                        Mine is messy, but --
24
             MS. BLUTH:
                        It's fine. I'll be able to tell.
25
             THE COURT:
                         All right.
```

```
If the defendant presents any evidence
 1
             MS. BLUTH:
 2
   that the penetration was for a medical purpose.
 3
             MR. HAMNER: Light in the tunnel.
 4
             THE COURT: What's that?
 5
             MR. HAMNER: Light at the end of the tunnel.
 6
                         I'm thinking Monday we're probably going
             THE COURT:
 7
   to probably -- I don't know, have, what, two hours of Faiza?
 8
             MS. BLUTH:
                          No.
 9
             MR. HAMNER:
                         No.
10
             THE COURT:
                         Is she Israeli? Faiza, that's a --
             MR. FIGLER: No, she's Persian.
11
12
             THE COURT:
                          Oh. I was close.
13
                         Are you sure? I thought she was raised in
             MS. BLUTH:
   South Africa?
14
15
             THE COURT:
                          Oh.
16
             MR. FIGLER: Possibly.
17
             MS. BLUTH:
                          If the defendant -- because she was
   like --
18
                        What's her surname?
19
             THE COURT:
20
             MS. BLUTH: That -- I think that is.
             MR. HAMNER: Abraham?
21
22
                          Ebrahim.
             MS. BLUTH:
23
             MR. HAMNER:
                         Ebrahim?
24
             MS. BLUTH:
                         E-B-R-A-H-I-M. If the defendant presents
  any evidence that the penetration was for medical purposes --
                                  240
```

```
THE COURT: All right.
 1
 2
             MS. BLUTH: -- the State must prove beyond a
 3
   reasonable doubt that the penetration was not undertaken. Okay.
   Got it.
 5
             THE COURT:
                        Okay.
             MS. BLUTH:
                        Thank you.
 6
 7
             THE COURT:
                        All right. So that's more or less what
   the defendant wanted, but --
 8
 9
             MR. FIGLER: Well, but it's not, so --
10
             THE COURT: -- not exactly, so you --
             MR. FIGLER: -- we'll have a proposed.
11
12
             THE COURT: -- can make your exhibit.
13
             MR. FIGLER: And then we would like that to go with a
14
   scienter requirement that is in our proposed next, which is --
15
             THE COURT: Okay.
             MR. FIGLER: -- the general --
16
17
             THE COURT:
                         Let's go along -- okay. I don't think
   there's a scienter requirement.
18
19
             MS. BLUTH: There's not.
20
             THE COURT: I don't think they have to prove what
21
   wasn't going on in Solander's head. I think they just have to
   prove that it wasn't undertaken for a legitimate medical
23
   purpose.
             MR. FIGLER: Can we look at mine for a second?
24
                                                              You
25
   can read that.
```

```
THE COURT: Sure. Which one?
 1
 2
             MR. FIGLER: The general conditions of criminal
 3
   liability. And so when you look at Roby and U.S. v. X-Citement
   Video, so both Supreme Court and Nevada Supreme Court decisions,
   it guards against in exactly situations where we are, where even
 5
   though there's a general intent crime, that it -- it becomes so
 6
 7
   broad that the quilty mind or the --
 8
             THE COURT: Can I throw something out here before --
 9
             MR. FIGLER: Yeah.
10
             THE COURT: -- you make your argument? What if we
   were to add something kind of borrowing from civil law, and say
   a reasonable -- if a defendant has a reasonable belief, putting
12
13
   in a reasonable person standard, as to the legitimacy of the
14
   medical procedure, that would be a --
15
             MS. BLUTH: No, because --
16
             THE COURT:
                         -- defense or something like that.
17
                        No, because she could, in her head, think
             MS. BLUTH:
   that that's legitimate.
18
                            We --
19
             THE COURT:
                         That's -- wait, the word reasonable --
20
             MR. FIGLER: Reasonable --
21
             MS. BLUTH: But, in her head, she could think that --
22
             THE COURT:
                         That's not what a reasonable person
23
   standard is. A reasonable --
24
             MR. HAMNER: An objective standard.
25
             THE COURT: -- person standard --
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```
MR. HAMNER: Not subjective.
 1
 2
             THE COURT: -- is what's reasonable. That's why you
 3
   say a reasonable person. Her good faith -- it's not a good
   faith belief --
 5
             MS. BLUTH: I see what you're saying.
             THE COURT:
                        -- it's a -- just like in civil law.
 6
 7
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Right.
 8
             THE COURT:
                        You know, it's a reasonable person, so --
 9
             MS. BLUTH:
                        But --
10
             MR. FIGLER: Well, we want ours to go in forward,
   because we feel that's an accurate statement of law. We would
12
   not object to --
13
             THE COURT: Because I think a true statement is a
14
   reasonable belief as to the legitimacy of a medical procedure is
   a defense, something like that. I mean, that would even be like
15
16
   a doctor. Like if a doctor did something wrong, but reasonably
17
   thought it was appropriate, that's --
             MR. HAMNER: But the --
18
19
             MS. BLUTH: But my issue is -- sorry. My issue is we
20
   have this, as to constitute the crime charged, there must exist
21
   a union or joint operation of an act forbidden by law, and then
22
   an intent to do that act.
23
             THE COURT: Yeah. But that's --
24
             MS. BLUTH:
                        I mean --
25
             THE COURT: -- not what his --
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```
But that's the law. That is not the law.
             MS. BLUTH:
 1
 2
             THE COURT:
                         I'm not giving this one.
                                                    I'm just saying,
 3
   you know, like a reasonable person's belief.
 4
             MR. FIGLER: Well --
 5
             THE COURT:
                         It's not --
             MR. HAMNER:
                         The --
 6
 7
                         -- always a reasonable person standard.
             THE COURT:
 8
             MR. HAMNER:
                         Well, if I could just --
 9
             THE COURT:
                         It's not her subjective crazy belief.
10
             MR. FIGLER: See, so here's the --
             MR. HAMNER: If I could -- if I could be heard just
11
   briefly --
12
13
             MR. FIGLER: Okay, Chris.
14
             MR. HAMNER:
                          -- for a second. Sorry. I don't mean to
15
   interrupt. But the --
16
             THE COURT: Of course, you do.
17
             MR. HAMNER: Well, I don't mean to interrupt in that
   manner, I guess that's what I'm trying to say. The reliance on
18
19
   Roby v. State, the problem with it is when you look at Jenkins,
20
   Jenkins is 110 Nev. 865. They -- they eliminate kind of what
21
   they're seeking here in this instruction when you're dealing
   with general intent crimes. And that's the problem in this
   particular case, because this crime of sexual assault is a
24
   general intent crime. It's not a specific intent crime.
25
             THE COURT: Yeah. That's why I'm not --
                                  244
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MR. FIGLER: But --

THE COURT: -- giving this instruction, but I think it might be okay to say something like if there is a reasonable belief in the need for the medical procedure or something like that, then it's still a reasonable person standard. It's not some subjective crazy belief, it's what is reasonable. Like if a reasonable person would think that you needed to do this.

MR. FIGLER: The defense sticks by Roby being still a correct statement of law. Jenkins did not reverse it. But what Roby does is gives a very -- and I'd ask the Court to review Roby before making its ultimate decision on it.

MR. HAMNER: As well as Jenkins.

MR. FIGLER: Well, and Jenkins, as well. I don't have any fear of Jenkins coming into the discussion because here's the issue, if this was just a sexual intercourse sexual assault, or it was even really just the paint stick, I don't have any of these arguments.

THE COURT: Of course not.

MR. FIGLER: But I believe that the -- the medical purpose or the bona fide medical reason or whatever adds a new component of it that is exactly the type of thing that Roby is admonishing courts to do when they're talking about what -- when a -- there -- there is a small category, a narrow category of criminal liability --

THE COURT: What's your cite?

MR. FIGLER: -- that falls somewhere between --

THE COURT: What is the cite on that?

MR. FIGLER: I gave you the cites on that, Your Honor. There's three. And then Mr. -- if you want to write on that.

And Mr. --

THE COURT: I have my own.

MR. FIGLER: -- Hamner had -- I gave both the copies, but that's the Roby cite and the U.S. v. X-Citement cite. And Mr. -- Mr. Hamner wants you to review Jenkins, Roby in light of Jenkins, and he'll give you that cite again.

THE COURT: Mr. --

MR. FIGLER: But the concept is that there is a very narrow category of offenses that fall somewhere between general intent, but not -- don't have the specific intent scienter put in there. And when there isn't the actual language, the courts are faced with a quandary. And where we have here, this medical purpose exception, we're thrown into new territory. And so like the rule of lenity, Roby instructs us that we really don't want to take away any of the sort of more guilty mind intent analysis from these type of charges. And I would --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FIGLER: --- suggest that a medical purpose sexual assault case would demand there to be more than the reasonable person standard, but simply that there has to be the guilty mind. In other words, that if she intended to do it as a

```
medical procedure, we're done, and that it --
 1
 2
             THE COURT: Okay. Well --
 3
             MR. FIGLER: -- should be limited by reasonable.
 4
             THE COURT: -- first of all, I didn't get that out of
   the Solander decision in this case from the Supreme Court. So I
 5
   don't think that's right, according to what we can glean from
 7
   that decision. The best you can hope for is some kind of a
 8
   reasonable belief in the medical necessity as a defense to if
   you believe that the defendant had a reasonable belief that the
10
   insertion or the penetration was medically necessary or
   medically required, or some word like that, then you should so
12
   -- you should find her not quilty, or something like that, but
   it has to be a reasonable belief.
13
14
             MR. HAMNER: Right.
15
             THE COURT: Because anybody's subjective crazy
16
   belief --
17
             MR. FIGLER: Correct.
18
             THE COURT:
                         I mean, look, you know, if it's a
19
   subjective crazy belief, then who cares? It's always got to be
   -- you know, if it's not a specific intent crime, then we're
20
21
   going to go to a reasonable belief. If she reasonably believed.
   I think that's the best you could do here, honestly.
22
23
             MR. FIGLER: I'll submit it to Your Honor.
24
             THE COURT: Because -- because you don't get that out
   of the Solander --
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MR. HAMNER: I'll submit it, Your Honor.
 1
             THE COURT:
 2
                         -- writ decision. What's your cite,
 3
   Jenkins?
 4
             MR. HAMNER: Jenkins is -- do you have Jenkins?
 5
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Yeah. I've got it. 110 Nev. 865.
             THE COURT:
                         All right. So --
 6
 7
             MR. FIGLER: We would --
 8
             THE COURT:
                        -- the changes -- 110 Nevada what?
 9
             MS. BLUTH:
                        865.
10
             MR. HAMNER: 865.
                         Okay. So here's the deal. The changes
11
             THE COURT:
   we've made so far stay. I'm going to look these up. Have your
13
   secretary make these changes, and if we add a line about a
14
   reasonable person standard or whatever, we'll do that Monday.
15
   Okay. Moving on.
16
             MR. FIGLER: Oh, there's the last line there.
17
   labia majora is part of the female genitalia, on that one.
             THE COURT:
18
                         Yeah.
19
             MR. FIGLER: Okay. So we don't feel that should be
20
   part of instruction, but if it is in instruction, we ask that
21
   the urethra is not a genital.
22
             THE COURT:
                         Opening?
23
             MR. FIGLER: Is not a genital opening, sure.
24
         I mean, I get the State's going to argue it doesn't matter
  because you go through the labia majora, you've committed your
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penetration. But I want it. If they're going to get to say the
 1
 2
   labia majora is --
 3
                         Well, no --
             MS. BLUTH:
 4
             MR. FIGLER: -- part of the genitalia, then I get to
 5
   say the urethra is not a genital opening.
 6
             MS. BLUTH: No, no, no. That's very, very misleading.
 7
   The point is is everything beyond the labia majora is fair game
 8
   for penetration. So that is very confusing to say the
   penetration of a urethra opening is -- is --
                         Well, that's not what he wants.
10
             THE COURT:
11
   the urethra is not a genital opening.
12
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Okay. But that's not a --
13
             MR. FIGLER: You can keep the labia.
14
             MR. HAMNER: You can -- I mean, the --
                         This is law. I got it from the -- the
15
             MS. BLUTH:
16
   stuff that we argued at the Supreme Court writ. Hutchinson and
17
   Mahia (phonetic) both talk about -- because it was some -- they
   lick the outside, like the -- they lick the lip.
18
19
             THE COURT: Right. Well, no, nobody is disputing
20
   that.
21
             MR. HAMNER:
                         But, I mean, you would need to have --
22
             MR. FIGLER:
                          Right. But it doesn't say urethra being
23
   a genital.
24
             MR. HAMNER: You would need -- you would -- then if
   you're going to add the line of the urethra is not the genital
```

opening, but it is beyond the general opening, I mean, it's --1 2 MS. BLUTH: Yeah. 3 -- it's within the general opening --MR. HAMNER: 4 MR. FIGLER: Well, that's argument for you. 5 MR. HAMNER: -- past --THE MARSHAL: One at a time, counsel. 6 7 MR. HAMNER: No, no, no. THE MARSHAL: One at a time. 8 9 MR. HAMNER: If we're talking about -- if we're 10 talking about pure biology at this point, and you want to have the strict definition that technically a urethra is not a 11 genital opening, you need to have the further biological 12 13 definition it's beyond and past the genital opening, and it's 14 within the labia majora. I mean, it's -- it -- the whole point is this crime deals with penetrating the genital opening, and 15 it's irrelevant that a urethra is or is not a genital opening 16 17 because it is within the general opening of -- of the female 18 genitalia. 19 MR. FIGLER: But we have to leave something for the jury to make a factual determination, otherwise, then we're 20 21 violation Apprendi. So either I would ask that both get stricken, or that both remain, but that no further definitions or presumptions are being placed in front of this jury. 24 MS. BLUTH: No. No, I mean, that -- because here's the deal. The act of putting the catheter past the labia majora

is a sex assault. If they believe that Janet had a reasonable 1 2 belief that for a medical purpose, then it's not sex assault. But it's about what -- with the current jury instructions, it's 3 about, basically, her mind, or whether she -- she had a 5 legitimate medical purpose. It's not about there's penetration every day of the week, so I don't even know why we're arguing 6 7 It's about what was in her head and if it was about this. 8 reasonable. 9 MR. FIGLER: But the jury still has to decide that 10 there was penetration because that's an element of the offense. MS. BLUTH: But if they find that it had --11 12 MR. FIGLER: We can't put that -- we can't make a That -- that's reversable. You don't want that in 13 presumption. 14 your instruction, I'm telling you right now, because that would be a presumption that's not allowed by law. 15 16 MS. BLUTH: No. I'm --17 MR. FIGLER: You don't want that. You -- you --Don't want what? 18 MS. BLUTH: 19 MR. FIGLER: You -- you -- so if labia majora is part 20 of the female genitalia is in there, you're not abdicating You're fine with that. You can have that from a 21 jury. But if you tell the jury that any -- that -- that if you get to the urethra, you have penetrated the female genitalia, 24 you will be reversed on that because that invades the --

THE COURT:

Well, we're not going to give that --

```
MR. FIGLER: -- province of the jury?
 1
 2
             MS. BLUTH:
                        No, it's not.
 3
             THE COURT:
                         -- instruction.
                         If I argue that to them?
 4
             MS. BLUTH:
 5
             THE COURT:
                         The -- okay.
             MR. FIGLER: That way -- no, no.
 6
 7
             THE MARSHAL: Counsel. Counsel. Address the Judge.
 8
             THE COURT:
                        All right. Let's move on. Okay.
 9
             MR. FIGLER: No, you can argue that. You can't --
             THE COURT:
10
                         That's enough.
             MR. FIGLER: -- have that instruction.
11
             THE MARSHAL: Counsel.
12
13
             MS. BLUTH:
                        Okay.
14
             THE COURT:
                         That's enough.
15
             THE MARSHAL: Mr. Figler.
16
             MR. FIGLER: We weren't fighting.
17
                         Okay. I don't care if you're fighting or
             THE COURT:
   not, I just don't want to sit here while you're --
18
19
             MR. FIGLER: Pontificating?
20
             THE COURT: I was going to say bickering, which is
21
   really a synonym of fighting, so you were fighting. I think you
22
   were bickering. But in any event, you're wasting my time --
23
             MR. FIGLER: Got it.
24
             THE COURT: -- while you two are bickering back and
   forth. You have, you know, all weekend to bicker. Let's move
                                  252
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So I'll hold that in the abeyance along with the rest of 1 2 the instruction. Let's move to the next one, physical force. 3 MR. FIGLER: Okay. So --4 THE COURT: Any objection? 5 MR. FIGLER: Yeah. The defense is never going to arque, and I think that because this is not a traditional sex 6 7 assault case, defense is not going to argue that the child 8 didn't resist, that the child --9 THE COURT: It doesn't matter. It's still a correct 10 statement of the law. 11 MR. HAMNER: Right. 12 MR. FIGLER: Okay. So --13 THE COURT: And if she acquiesced and lay on the 14 towel, then they're entitled to give it. And so I don't -whether you argue it or not, I mean, I think you can still give 15 instructions. 16 17 MR. FIGLER: Okay. So if we're going to bring consent into the play, we feel that the next instruction should be 18 19 defense proposed. That starts, a parent, including an adoptive 20 parent. 21 THE COURT: Where did you get this from? 22 MR. FIGLER: Kirkpatrick. It's a care decision case, where there was a guardian that was imposed in there. 24 a criminal law case, because you're never going to find a criminal law case that talks about any of these --

```
THE COURT: But I don't think this applies in criminal
 1
 2
   law, because then in a sexual assault case --
 3
             MR. HAMNER: Correct.
 4
             MR. FIGLER: No.
 5
             THE COURT: -- the idea would be --
             MR. HAMNER: Right.
 6
 7
                         -- oh, well, the parent was consenting for
             THE COURT:
 8
   the kid.
 9
             MR. FIGLER: No, they can't do that because that's
10
   specifically precluded by case law, and I think even by the
   statute. A parent can never give consent for a sexual assault,
11
   but a parent can give consent for any --
             THE COURT: Medical or --
13
14
             MR. FIGLER: -- hygiene --
                        -- hygiene --
15
             THE COURT:
             MR. FIGLER: -- decision --
16
17
             THE COURT: -- decisions.
             MR. FIGLER: -- which is not sexual assault.
18
19
             THE COURT: But don't we already cover it? Look, I
20
   mean, I don't see that that comes out of the Solander decision
21
   from the Supreme Court.
22
             MR. HAMNER:
                         Yeah.
23
             THE COURT:
                         To me, we --
24
             MR. FIGLER: It wasn't raised.
25
             THE COURT:
                         -- cover the issue -- well, I know, but I
                                  254
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don't really think you can argue oh, well, Janet, it doesn't matter what Janet's intent was or whether it was medically 3 necessary because she was able to consent because she's the 4 parent. So I --MR. FIGLER: Well --5 6 THE COURT: -- think this is wrong. I mean, it's --7 technically, it's right, but that means they're talking about 8 medical procedures or dental procedures from a doctor --9 MS. BLUTH: Right. 10 MR. FIGLER: Maybe. THE COURT: -- not -- not her thinking, oh, I'm going 11 to give this kid a catheter. So I think the arguments covered 13 in the revision to the sex assault instruction, and if you were 14 to argue this instruction as, well, she's allowed to give her consent so she consented to giving the kid the catheter, that 15 16 would be incorrect argument. So I don't see how you could 17 utilize this instruction. 18 MR. FIGLER: All right. We'll submit it on that. 19 THE COURT: All right. 20 MR. FIGLER: So the last one we did object to, the 21 physical force is not --22 THE COURT: Okay. 23 MR. FIGLER: -- necessary. 24 THE COURT: A person is not required. 25 MR. FIGLER: And that, again, okay, so this is a very

```
unique set of facts.
 1
 2
             THE COURT:
                        Sure.
             MR. FIGLER: This is for a sexual assault. We are not
 3
   arguing that any of these three children should have fought
 5
   harder because they were so little or any attending
   circumstances. This is a sexual assault of the traditional
 7
   nature, and -- and it -- it gives undue emphasis that somehow it
 8
   -- it puts it on the child. It's not a necessary instruction.
   No one is going to argue against it or -- or argue the other way
10
   that somehow the girls should have put up a better fight. So I
   think this is --
11
12
             THE COURT: Well, just because you're not --
             MR. FIGLER: -- all covered.
13
14
             THE COURT:
                        -- going to argue it, doesn't mean they
15
   can't give the instruction.
             MR. FIGLER: Well, instructions aren't supposed to be
16
17
   argument, so --
18
             MR. HAMNER: Well, it's --
19
             THE COURT:
                         Well, except the idea is some juror may
20
   think --
21
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Right.
22
                        -- oh, well, you know, that kid could
             THE COURT:
23
   have --
24
             MR. HAMNER: Right.
             THE COURT: -- jumped up and run away, or she could
25
                                  256
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have peed on the towel, and --

MR. HAMNER: There's other things she could have done to let her know --

THE COURT: Right. So --

MR. HAMNER: -- she didn't want this done.

THE COURT: -- I think, even if you're not going to argue it, if it's something a reasonable juror might question, we can address it in the -- in the instructions. If some juror will say, like I said, well, why didn't she jump up, why didn't she just pee and void her bladder, you know, before the catheter or whatever.

MR. FIGLER: And so I would say that that's all covered in the prior instruction, and that if you give this instruction, then certainly the next instruction is not necessary at all. I mean, it's three -- to us, it's three instructions that say the same thing --

MR. HAMNER: No.

MR. FIGLER: -- that are -- are straw arguments to something that we're not even going to be arguing.

MR. HAMNER: It's -- it's an accurate statement of the law, and it ties back in to the very thing that the Court just pointed out. Sometimes you may -- regardless of whether they argue it, you could have a juror that sits there and says, hey, if the kid just lays there, well, they probably should have done -- put up more of a fight or express what they -- you know, that

they didn't want this done to them.

MS. BLUTH: And there was testimony of that. These girls did say that sometimes they would just lay down because they didn't want to --

THE COURT: All right. So --

MS. BLUTH: -- get hurt.

THE COURT: -- we've gone through submission. The --

MR. FIGLER: So we object --

THE COURT: All right.

MR. FIGLER: -- to the set being given, that it's cumulative, and undue -- undue emphasis on an area of law that is not a fact or an argument in controversy in this case.

THE COURT: The corroboration.

MR. FIGLER: Okay. So we believe, and -- and I've had this in other cases, while the first part is a true statement of law, it is also true that the jury -- and we cannot abdicate the jury's duty to consider the absence of corroboration in evaluating the credibility or lack of credibility of the allegations. Just because it isn't corroborated -- so this makes it seem as though we should be able to find her guilty even without corroboration, that's fine, but -- if there's no corroboration, can we still find him not guilty because of that? So it's confusing to the jury unless you say, yeah, you don't have to have the corroboration, but if you don't have the corroboration, you could consider that like any other evidence.

```
MR. HAMNER: I -- I don't think that this
 1
 2
   instruction --
 3
             THE COURT:
                         I don't think we need to do that.
 4
             MR. HAMNER: -- confuses the jury. It's an accurate
 5
   statement.
             MS. BLUTH: Yeah.
                                This --
 6
 7
             THE COURT:
                         All right. It is a defense to the charge
 8
   of sexual --
 9
             MR. FIGLER: So that will be a proposed.
             THE COURT: -- assault. You're fine with that?
10
11
             MR. FIGLER: No. We don't understand why sexual
   intercourse is in that instruction. There obviously is
13
   absolutely --
14
             THE COURT:
                         Oh, you're right.
15
             MS. BLUTH:
                         So penetration.
16
             THE COURT:
                         Well, it should just be consented to
17
   penetration --
18
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Yeah.
19
             THE COURT:
                         -- because there is no sexual penetration.
20
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Right. No, you're right. You're right.
21
             MR. FIGLER: And -- and so --
22
             THE COURT:
                         So it is a defense to the charge of sexual
   assault that the defendant entertained a reasonable, there's
24
   that word that we always use, and good faith belief that the
   alleged victim consented to penetration. If you find such
                                  259
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reasonable good faith belief, even if mistaken, you must give
 1
   the defendant the benefit of the doubt. This one is good for
 2
 3
   you folks.
 4
             MR. FIGLER: Right. So I believe that you should take
 5
   that language into consideration in fashioning your other
   instructions, so that it's not --
 6
 7
             THE COURT:
                        Well --
 8
             MR. FIGLER: -- confusing.
 9
             THE COURT: -- okay. You take them all together.
10
   I've changed in sexual intercourse to consented to penetration.
   All right. So I made the change.
12
             MR. HAMNER: Is it the penetration, or is it just
13
   penetration?
14
             MS. BLUTH:
                        Just --
15
             THE COURT: Well, it -- there's nothing here that it's
16
   sexual penetration.
17
             MR. HAMNER: No, no, no.
18
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Just to engage in -
19
             MR. HAMNER: I just meant --
20
             MS. BLUTH:
                         -- penetration --
21
             MR. HAMNER: I just didn't know --
22
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Not the penetration.
23
             MR. HAMNER: -- if there was an article "the".
24
             THE COURT: No, just to penetration --
             MR. HAMNER: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.
25
                                  260
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```
THE COURT: -- generally. Because there's a few
 1
 2
   penetrations.
 3
             MS. BLUTH:
                         In penetration, got it.
 4
             THE COURT: All right.
 5
             MR. FIGLER: So what -- I'm sorry, what's the new
 6
   language?
 7
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Just --
 8
             THE COURT: Consented to penetration.
 9
             MR. HAMNER: So you're eliminating the words --
             THE COURT: Lines three and four.
10
             MR. HAMNER: -- engage in sexual intercourse.
11
   words are deleted --
13
             THE COURT: Right.
14
             MR. HAMNER: -- and it's replaced by one word,
15
   penetration.
             MR. FIGLER: Okay. We still --
16
17
             THE COURT: All right.
             MR. FIGLER: -- want that -- the Court to play with
18
19
   that other instruction, but thank you for that change on that.
20
             THE COURT: All right. Number -- moving right along.
             MS. BLUTH: Like a herd of turtles.
21
22
             MR. FIGLER: We're trying.
23
             THE COURT: I thought it was funny.
24
             MR. FIGLER: I didn't hear what you said.
25
             MS. BLUTH: I said --
                                  261
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```
THE COURT:
                         I said --
1
2
             MS. BLUTH:
                         She said moving right along.
3
                          I said moving right along, and then we
             THE COURT:
4
   started laughing. Because we're not --
5
                         And I said like a herd of turtles.
             MS. BLUTH:
             THE COURT:
                         -- moving right along. I didn't have --
6
7
             MS. BLUTH:
                         You guys have gotten to the loopy point.
8
             THE COURT:
                         We're getting like punchy, but --
9
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Yes.
10
             THE COURT:
                         -- the four of us thought it was really
   hilarious.
11
12
                         We did have cake for lunch, so it could be
             THE CLERK:
13
   that.
14
             THE COURT:
                         I know.
                                  We had cake, so in a few minutes
15
   we're just going to run around the room a few times. All right.
                         Where a child.
16
             MS. BLUTH:
17
             THE COURT:
                         Where a child has been the victim.
18
             MR. FIGLER: Okay. So --
19
             THE COURT:
                         That's a good statement.
20
                          I -- no, it's not, because it was a
             MR. FIGLER:
21
   Supreme Court decision after a jury had already found someone a
           Cunningham certainly isn't a jury instruction case.
   talks about lessening the load on the State for the time --
24
   exact date of the act. So at a minimum we would ask to change
   the language where a child makes an accusation constituting
                                  262
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sexual assault, or makes an allegation of penetration, and is a
1
   minor under the age of 14, but does not remember the exact date
3
   of the act.
                The State is not required to prove a specific date,
   but is required, under Cunningham, to approximate the date as
5
   best as possible.
             MS. BLUTH: No. That's not --
6
7
             MR. HAMNER: That's not -- that's not --
8
             MR. FIGLER: That's what Cunningham says.
9
             THE COURT:
                          Well, I think this is a correct statement
                It -- the crime is still called sexual assault with
10
   of the law.
   a minor even though we're only talking about penetration.
11
12
             MR. FIGLER:
                          Sure.
13
             THE COURT:
                          So I think it's good. I think as worded,
14
   it's fine.
15
                          We'd object to the use of the word victim
             MR. FIGLER:
16
   in there because this child is not --
17
             THE COURT:
                          I -- I got it.
18
             MR. FIGLER:
                          Okay.
19
             THE COURT:
                          An alleged victim.
             MR. FIGLER: That would be better.
20
21
             MS. BLUTH:
                          Do you want me to add that?
22
             THE COURT:
                          Where a child has been the alleged victim
23
   of sexual assault with a minor.
24
             MR. HAMNER: That's fine.
25
             MS. BLUTH:
                          Okay.
```

```
THE COURT: All right.
 1
 2
             MR. FIGLER: The next one is going --
 3
             THE COURT:
                         A person who willfully --
 4
             MR. FIGLER: -- to be a mess.
                         -- causes a child. Yes.
 5
             THE COURT:
 6
             MR. HAMNER: And with respect to this, there's just a
 7
   couple little changes we need to make.
 8
             THE COURT:
                         On the next one?
 9
             MR. HAMNER: On the child --
10
             MS. BLUTH: On this one that you're on--
             MR. HAMNER: On the child abuse --
11
12
             MS. BLUTH: -- right now.
13
             MR. HAMNER: -- one.
14
             MS. BLUTH:
                         A person who willfully.
15
             THE COURT:
                         Okay.
16
             MR. HAMNER: A person who willfully. So because of
17
   the amended information that we filed, we were going to take out
18
   the paragraph that defines mental injury. We were going to
19
   remove that because we took that out. With respect to the
20
   negligent treatment or maltreatment definition, this is the
21
   definition that was in effect as of 2015, so it's the new
22
   definition. We have the old definition, so we need to replace
23
   that paragraph.
24
             MR. FIGLER: And we'd like to take a look at that.
25
             MS. BLUTH:
                         It's right here.
                                  264
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MR. HAMNER: And I can read it out for the record. It's defined as negligent treatment -- and this is the 2013 version. Negligent treatment or maltreatment of a child occurs if a child has been abandoned, is without proper care, control, and supervision, or lacks the subsistence, education, shelter, medical care, or other necessary -- other care necessary for the wellbeing of the child because of the fault or habits of the person responsible for the welfare of the child, or the neglect or refusal of the person to provide -- sorry, there's a highlighting here -- provide them when able to do so. And so, essentially, it's very similar, but it's --

MS. BLUTH: So --

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ HAMNER: -- a little bit differently reworded. So we need to put that in there.

MS. BLUTH: So, Judge, real quick, how this all happened, was after Clay, when Clay went up to the Supreme Court on a writ, they defined negligent treatment -- so we had -- we had to start separating it out physical abuse, negligent treatment, or maltreatment. So then we had to define negligent treatment or maltreatment, which was only defined in 432B. We went to the legislature, Ms. Luzaich and I, in 2015 and got it changed, but I forgot that the old language was still available in -- in 2013. So in my jury instructions, I accidentally included 2015, but the -- the correct statute --

THE COURT: So you'll change that?

MS. BLUTH: Yeah. For the --

THE COURT: Okay. That's fine.

MS. BLUTH: So I apologize about that.

MR. FIGLER: All right. So here's our objection about that. I appreciate the -- we were going to object to that paragraph, so I appreciate the State coming forward with that. They've offered a 2013 version of negligent treatment and maltreatment. Our complaint goes back to 2011. Negligent treatment and maltreatment of the child is not explicitly plead in the information. Abuse and neglect is, and abuse and neglect is already in there as negligent treatment or maltreatment. I don't know.

And I'm sorry, Ms. -- Ms. Bluth probably knows way more about this than I do because she deals with this day in and day out and I don't, but I appreciate that negligent treatment or maltreatment are -- is -- is listed in the abuse and neglect definition, but I don't know if it was ever defined prior to 2013.

MS. BLUTH: Yeah. So what happened was Clay -- so that's what Clay happened. Bryan Clay, besides the death penalty case, had beaten his pregnant girlfriend while -- while she was pregnant -- or, sorry, had beaten his pregnant girlfriend, and she was 17 years old. And so it was charged as physical abuse. And he punched her in the stomach.

At grand jury, she would not say it caused a physical

injury, and so the Supreme Court struck the child abuse charge and said if you're going to -- if you're going to charge abuse and neglect and there's no physical injury, then it has to be pled with specificity either as sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, or negligent treatment, or maltreatment.

So now every time we charge child abuse, we have to put to wit, physical injury of a non-accidental nature, or if we don't have a physical injury, we have to say child abuse or neglect to wit, negligent treatment or maltreatment. Therefore, every time I did not have a physical injury in the criminal complaint and information, I then charged it to wit, negligent treatment or maltreatment after Clay because Clay came out right when this case was happening.

MR. HAMNER: And --

THE COURT: So what are you asking for, Mr. Figler?

MR. FIGLER: Thank you. Our first preference would be that the entire paragraph of negligent treatment or maltreatment of a child be stricken. If the Court is unwilling to do that, the State should be able to replace it then with the 2013 --

THE COURT: So they're --

MR. FIGLER: -- version.

THE COURT: -- going to do that, so just replace it with the 2013 version.

MR. HAMNER: Correct. And just for the record, the 1985 statutes under Nevada page 1370 has the exact same

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definition that we just read as the 2013 version. So,
 1
   essentially, even if the -- some of the alleged conduct is 2011,
 2
 3
   it's still under the same definition.
 4
             MR. FIGLER: Okay. So our objection is noted, but
   we'd also object to that first paragraph because we felt that
 5
   all of the mental suffering was taken out of the information.
 6
 7
             THE COURT: Right. So do you want to just say in the
 8
   first paragraph on line 3, cross out mental suffering?
 9
             MR. FIGLER: And then again on line 4, yes.
10
   our --
             MS. BLUTH:
11
                         Well, no,
12
             MR. FIGLER: -- preference.
13
                         No, no, no, because the mental injury is
             MS. BLUTH:
14
   what we took out because we didn't allege a mental injury.
15
   That's different than mental suffering. Mental injury --
16
             THE COURT:
                         Right.
17
             MS. BLUTH:
                        So you can still --
18
             THE COURT:
                        Right, you can still have mental
19
   suffering.
20
             MS. BLUTH:
                        Right, but not mental injury. Mental
   injury has to be pled with specificity, but you could still have
21
22
   mental suffering.
23
             MR. FIGLER: I'm sorry. We need to look --
24
             THE COURT: Right. So it could be contemporaneous
25 mental suffering --
                                  268
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```
MS. BLUTH:
 1
                         Right. Yeah.
 2
              THE COURT:
                          -- as opposed to an ongoing mental injury.
 3
             MS. BLUTH:
                          Exactly.
             MR. HAMNER: Right.
 4
 5
                          So what they've alleged is contemporaneous
              THE COURT:
   mental suffering --
 6
 7
             MR. HAMNER: Correct.
 8
              THE COURT:
                          -- like I'm sitting here on a pot for
 9
   eight --
10
              MS. BLUTH:
                          Right.
              THE COURT:
                         -- hours, I'm suffering.
11
12
             MS. BLUTH:
                          But no --
13
              THE COURT:
                          But I don't have like long term
14
   psychiatric --
15
             MS. BLUTH:
                          Exactly.
16
              THE COURT:
                          -- problems.
17
             MS. BLUTH:
                         And -- and so I told --
                          That's the distinction they're making.
18
              THE COURT:
19
              MS. BLUTH:
                          I told Mr. Figler that the mental injury
20
   part, I did --
21
              THE COURT:
                          Right.
22
                          -- I did cross out, so --
              MS. BLUTH:
23
              MR. FIGLER: I've got it, Jill. I've got it, Jill.
24
              THE CLERK:
                          Okay. Never mind.
25
                          So when it says abuse or neglect means
             MS. BLUTH:
                                   269
```

physical or mental injury, I crossed out or mental injury, and then I crossed out the definition of mental injury because I do 3 believe -- I do agree with them that that's not appropriate --4 THE COURT: Right. 5 -- but mental suffering should stay. MS. BLUTH: 6 THE COURT: Right. So the mental suffering is 7 contemporaneous mental suffering. 8 MS. BLUTH: Right. 9 MR. FIGLER: Except the defense wasn't on notice in 10 the amended information, Your Honor, that mental suffering --THE COURT: I don't think you have to be. 11 12 MR. FIGLER: Okay. Well, our position is that we were 13 absolutely not on notice that we were defending against mental 14 suffering, only physical pain. 15 THE COURT: Oh, you're right. Because Count 5 you 16 take out unjustifiable physical pain. Count 6 -- are there any 17 counts where it says mental suffering? Yeah. Count 1, Count 2. 18 MS. BLUTH: 19 THE COURT: No. 20 MS. BLUTH: What? 21 THE COURT: Not on the amended information, what I'm 22 looking at. It just says physical pain. 23 MR. FIGLER: Right. 24 MR. HAMNER: No. 25 THE COURT: There's no mental suffering.

```
MR. HAMNER: Yes, there is. If you read -- so if you
 1
 2
   look at Count 1 --
 3
                          Well, I'm wondering if -- because --
             MS. BLUTH:
                          Wait. We've got -- this is what Mr.
 4
             THE COURT:
 5
   Figler has, is --
 6
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Right.
 7
                         -- working off the amended information.
             THE COURT:
 8
             MS. BLUTH:
                          See, but that --
 9
             MR. FIGLER: That's filed.
                          Isn't there a second amended information?
10
             THE COURT:
11
             MR. FIGLER:
                          No.
12
             THE COURT:
                          No. It's -- it does not say physical.
                                                                   Ιt
13
   just says --
14
             MS. BLUTH:
                          Do we only have one amended? Because
15
   remember, he -- I took it out at his request --
16
             THE COURT:
                         Well --
17
             MS. BLUTH:
                         -- for the mental injury.
18
             THE COURT:
                         It says --
19
             THE CLERK:
                         This is the one I read them.
20
                          My copy says or mental suffering in No. 3.
             THE COURT:
21
   So we're going to -- okay. Whatever the filed information,
   whether it's a second amended, a first amended, whatever.
   Whatever that says is what we're working off of. So if somebody
24
   was mistaken and looked off the wrong thing, that's their -- on
25
   them. So we're going to go with whatever the filed document is.
                                   271
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So, Jill, you're making a lot of overtime. Do you go to time
 1
   and a half or anything? You guys --
 2
 3
             THE CLERK: It's been a time and a half all day.
 4
             THE COURT: What do you --
 5
             THE MARSHAL: I take -- I take comp time.
             THE COURT: He's on time in the half.
 6
 7
             THE MARSHAL: I take comp time, though, when it's in
 8
   the department.
 9
             THE COURT:
                         I'm on -- so, again, whatever it says.
10
   What does it say?
                        Well, I didn't go over every -- sorry, I
11
             MS. BLUTH:
12
   didn't go over ever single one.
                        Let's just look at Count 1.
13
             THE COURT:
14
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Well, Count 1 is not there.
                                                       That's the
15
   stips.
16
             THE COURT:
                         Oh.
17
             MS. BLUTH: But here's the deal, though.
18
   information, though, they were on notice. Because I took this
19
   out at -- at Mr. Figler's request, where we were only supposed
20
   to take out mental injury, but they've been on notice the entire
21
   time. It's just my secretary didn't -- she took out -- instead
   of taking out every -- where mental injury, she took out
   everything that said mental, which was not correct. So to say
24
   that they're on notice is absolutely incorrect because that
   language was on the information.
                                  272
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MR. FIGLER: I get to rely on February 6, 2018, Your
 1
 2
   Honor.
 3
             MS. BLUTH:
                          Says who?
 4
             MR. FIGLER:
                           Says the law.
                          What law?
 5
             MS. BLUTH:
             MR. FIGLER: The law of notice. This is the one we
 6
 7
   went forward on, this is the one that was read to the jury, this
 8
   is the one that we based our opening argument on.
 9
             MS. BLUTH: Well, I don't -- I don't --
10
             MR. FIGLER: And, indeed, I have a limiting
   instruction that is next in the -- in the packet that talks
11
12
   about you have -- you may have heard testimony of emotional or
13
   mental impact of acts allegedly constituting abuse or neglect.
14
   You are not to consider any potential or real emotional or
   mental impact on any alleged victims in this case in determining
15
16
   whether or not any crime was committed. Defendant is not
17
   charged with committing acts resulting in emotional or mental
18
   harm or pain.
19
             MS. BLUTH:
                         No.
                               That's not law.
20
             THE COURT:
                          You're not getting that.
21
             MR. FIGLER: That's a limiting instruction.
22
             THE COURT:
                          I know, but --
23
                          That's [indiscernible], so that's going
             MR. FIGLER:
24
   to be our proposal.
25
                          We -- we've never -- we've never argued
             MS. BLUTH:
                                  273
```

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any mental injury, but you can still find that it was, you know,
 1
   I sat on buckets or I --
 2
 3
             THE COURT:
                         Yeah. I mean, I think the mental suffering
   is contemporaneous mental suffering.
 4
 5
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Right, but I'm not --
 6
                         Not like a long-term mental injury, it's
             THE COURT:
 7
   like I'm suffering because I'm here on this bucket and I'm
   sitting on a bucket.
 8
 9
             MS. BLUTH:
                          No, I know.
10
             MR. FIGLER:
                          They have plenty to argue without that --
             MR. HAMNER:
                           Well --
11
12
                           -- being in there --
             MR. FIGLER:
                           -- that -- but that --
13
             MR. HAMNER:
                           -- but it's -- the information is the
14
             MR. FIGLER:
15
   information.
16
             MS. BLUTH:
                          Well, no, we always have leave to amend.
17
             MR. HAMNER: We have leave to amend.
             MS. BLUTH:
                          I mean --
18
19
             MR. FIGLER: Okay. Well --
20
                          I -- I took the -- I -- at the defense's
             MS. BLUTH:
21
   request, I agreed with them in regards to the mental injury.
22
   Now, mental suffering, which is -- and this is what I don't
   understand because I remember us having this argument and me
24
   specifically saying on the record, no, mental suffering I can't
   take out, because that's an actual part of the statutory
                                  274
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```
language, mental injury I can --
 1
             THE COURT:
 2
                        Yeah. But you --
 3
             MS. BLUTH:
                         -- take out.
 4
             THE COURT: -- left it in the title. I couldn't
   figure out what you were saying, but I -- because you left it in
 5
   the -- oh, right.
 6
 7
                         What are you saying, Judge?
             MS. BLUTH:
 8
             THE COURT:
                         I thought -- okay. Yeah. She did say on
 9
   the record that she was keeping it in as part of the statutory
10
   language, which --
             MR. FIGLER: No. And that's when we --
11
12
             THE COURT: -- wasn't kept in.
             MR. FIGLER: And we objected at that point, if you do
13
14
   the playback, saying we don't want the mental stuff in there --
15
             THE COURT: All right. I'm going to have to --
             MR. FIGLER: -- and that this is just physical.
16
17
             THE COURT: -- look at a playback. For right now
   we're going to keep the instruction as written, with the
18
19
   deletion of mental injury on lines 12 to 14. As well as the --
20
             MR. FIGLER: What about on line 8?
21
             THE COURT:
                         -- insertion of the 2013 language on
22
   negligent treatment.
23
                        And then line 8, as well, I took out
             MS. BLUTH:
24
  mental injury.
25
                         Right. Okay. Let's move on.
             THE COURT:
                                                         If you find
                                  275
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beyond a reasonable doubt, the substantial bodily harm 1 instruction. 2 3 MR. FIGLER: I'll -- I'm going to defer to the Court. Mr. Hamner says that prolonged physical pain, that that is specific. I'll reserve because I -- I didn't see that in that 5 statute, but I accept Mr. Hamner's representation that that is 7 good law. But I just ask for the reservation to object to it if 8 I find something otherwise. But I accept --9 THE COURT: All right. 10 MR. FIGLER: -- Mr. Hamner's representation. MR. HAMNER: Yeah, it's pretty --11 12 THE COURT: All right. So that's fine. 13 MR. HAMNER: Yeah. 14 THE COURT: The corporal punishment instruction. 15 MR. FIGLER: Okay. So we have a dispute on that. 16 Your Honor, the -- there is an actual definition of corporal 17 punishment that's available under NRS 433.546. The second part 18 of that that the State has in theirs is not the statutory 19 language. All this stuff about without limitation to each, 20 that's going to be up for the jury to decide what they feel is 21 appropriate or not. 22 Where did -- State, where did you get this THE COURT: 23 instruction from? 24 MR. HAMNER: It actually comes from NRS 432B.150, I can read it. Excessive --276

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MR. FIGLER: The first sentence does.
 1
 2
             MR. HAMNER: Okay.
 3
             THE COURT:
                         Why don't we do this? I'm just proposing
         Why don't we incorporate the first two lines of Mr.
 5
   Figler's instruction. Corporal punishment means the intention
   infliction of physical pain, including, without limitation,
 6
 7
   hitting, pinching, or striking.
 8
             MR. FIGLER: That's exact language of the --
 9
             MS. BLUTH: Well, I don't think --
10
             MR. FIGLER: -- statute.
11
             MS. BLUTH:
                        -- you have to --
12
             THE COURT: And then a parent or guardian of a child
13
   may use corporal punishment as a means of discipline. Excessive
14
   corporal punishment may constitute abuse of a child, and then we
15
   go -- oh, to the --
                        Because it makes it a --
16
             MS. BLUTH:
17
             THE COURT: -- the reasonable person standard, again,
18
   on lines -- on line 4. So why don't we --
19
             MS. BLUTH: Because it --
                        -- include the two of them?
20
             THE COURT:
21
             MS. BLUTH: Because this makes it a specific intent
22
   crime, and it's not.
                         It means the intentional infliction of
   physical pain. So the intent -- the intent to cause pain, and
24
   that's actually not the law. Battery is a general intent crime.
   So I'm fine with working on it, but I can't say the intentional
```

```
infliction of physical pain --
 1
 2
             MR. HAMNER: That's fair.
 3
             MS. BLUTH: -- because that's not -- that's contrary
 4
   to the law.
 5
             THE COURT: Why don't we say this -- well, no, because
   the intent -- you're intentionally -- oh, I see.
 6
 7
             MR. FIGLER: Yeah.
 8
             THE COURT: Corporal punishment means the infliction
 9
   of physical pain, including, without limitation, hitting,
10
   pinching, or striking. And then use yours, a parent or guardian
   of a child may use corporal punishment.
12
             MR. FIGLER: Okay. And then where do we go from
   there? Because we want to --
13
14
             THE COURT: Just use the whole thing.
15
             MR. FIGLER: Their whole thing?
16
             MR. HAMNER: Yes.
17
             MR. FIGLER: And what about our whole thing about
18
   implements may be used in lawful corporal punishment?
19
             MS. BLUTH:
                         No. That's not --
                          That --
20
             MR. HAMNER:
             MR. FIGLER: They may.
21
22
                         -- the law.
             MS. BLUTH:
23
             MR. HAMNER: That's not -- that's not the law.
24
             MS. BLUTH:
                         That's argument, but it's not the law.
25
             THE COURT:
                         Where did you get that from?
                                  278
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```
MR. FIGLER: Well, they absolutely can be used in
 1
 2
   lawful corporal punishment.
 3
             MS. BLUTH:
                         But where did --
 4
             MR. HAMNER: Which --
 5
             MR. FIGLER: And certainly --
             MR. HAMNER: Which case?
 6
 7
             MR. FIGLER: -- every -- I could offer --
 8
             THE COURT:
                         I didn't use --
 9
             MR. FIGLER: -- additional authority --
10
             THE COURT:
                         I don't like --
             MR. FIGLER: -- where there have been implements used
11
   in cases that have found to be not constituting child abuse.
13
   Implements can be used in lawful corporal punishment.
14
   some testimony --
15
                        All right. So why don't we do this --
             THE COURT:
             MR. FIGLER: -- to that effect.
16
17
             THE COURT: -- we'll take the, essentially, the first
   sentence of yours, but changing -- deleting the word
18
19
   intentional.
20
             MS. BLUTH: But it still means infliction of physical
21
          I mean, why -- where does it say that the child has to
22
   express physical pain?
23
             MR. FIGLER: Corporal punishment, as defined by NRS
24
   433.546 says the intentional -- corporal punishment is the
   infliction of physical pain, including, without limitation,
                                  279
```

```
hitting, pinching, or striking.
 1
             THE COURT: So we deleted intentional?
 2
 3
             MR. FIGLER: That's it, right. And I'm --
 4
             THE COURT:
                        Do you want to put --
             MR. FIGLER: -- I'm fine with that.
 5
 6
             THE COURT: -- corporal punishment means the
 7
   infliction of physical pain, no matter how slight?
 8
             MR. FIGLER:
                          No.
 9
             THE COURT:
                         Including, without limitation, hitting,
10
   pinching or striking?
                          I mean, I'd like to put popping in there,
11
             MR. FIGLER:
12
   too, but that's not from the statute. I'd just put the
13
   statutory language, which is hitting, pinching, and striking.
14
             MR. HAMNER: And -- and -- and again, I'd --
15
             THE COURT:
                         Okay. And then we can say --
16
             MR. HAMNER: What's that statute, again?
17
             THE COURT:
                         -- implements. I don't like such as --
             MR. FIGLER: 433.546.
18
19
             THE COURT:
                         -- paint sticks.
20
                         No. Yeah, that's not --
             MS. BLUTH:
21
             THE COURT:
                         Maybe -- where did you get that from?
   you just --
22
23
             MR. FIGLER: Well, that's theory of defense, that
24
   that's an implement, and that is lawful. It is true that a
   paint stick, in and of itself, being used in corporal
                                  280
```

```
punishment, is not unlawful --
 1
 2
             MR. HAMNER: That's --
 3
             MR. FIGLER: -- it's how it's used.
 4
             THE COURT:
                         Well, why don't we just say implements may
 5
   be used in lawful corporal punishment?
 6
             MR. HAMNER: Thank you.
 7
             THE COURT:
                         I don't like --
             MR. FIGLER: That's fine.
 8
 9
             THE COURT: -- including, like, such as --
             MR. FIGLER: That's fine.
10
             THE COURT:
                         -- paint sticks.
11
12
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Wait, so what is it? Implements --
             MR. HAMNER: I don't --
13
14
             THE COURT:
                         Implements may be used in lawful
15
   corporal --
                        But there's no law that supports that.
16
             MS. BLUTH:
                                                                   Ι
17
   mean, they can argue that but there's nothing that they can
   point to where it says anything about implements.
18
19
             MR. HAMNER: This -- this was -- this is -- to quote
20
   Mr. Figler, this is -- it gets back to the whole Apprendi thing.
21
   I mean, that -- that's kind of a finding effect that needs to be
22
   made by -- by the jury about whether the implement in this
23
   circumstance --
24
             THE COURT: Is reasonable.
25
             MR. HAMNER: -- is reasonable.
                                  281
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MR. FIGLER: Oh, absolutely. But it doesn't -- it's
1
2
   not --
3
             MR. HAMNER: I don't --
4
             MR. FIGLER: Just appearance of implement --
5
                          Why don't we say this, the use of an
             THE COURT:
6
   implement must be reasonable under the circumstances?
7
             MR. FIGLER: That's fine.
8
             MR. HAMNER: I mean --
9
             MS. BLUTH:
                          No, I don't -- I have a problem with that.
10
   Like, they can argue --
                         I'm fine putting something like the use of
11
             THE COURT:
   an implement must be reasonable under the circumstances.
12
13
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Or something like the use of an implement
14
   in and of itself is not abuse.
15
             THE COURT:
                         It's not unlawful.
16
             MR. FIGLER: Yeah.
17
             MS. BLUTH: The -- the -- whatever -- some --
             THE COURT:
                        But must be reasonable under the
18
19
   circumstances.
20
                                 That's fine.
             MS. BLUTH:
                          Okay.
21
             THE COURT:
                          Why don't we say something like this, the
   use of an implement in and off itself is not unlawful, but must
23
   be reasonable under the circumstances.
24
             MS. BLUTH: The use of an implement in --
25
                          Everybody can live with that?
             THE COURT:
                                  282
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```
MS. BLUTH: -- and of itself is not unlawful.
 1
 2
                                  I mean, except it already talks
             MR. FIGLER: Yeah.
 3
   about -- that's fine. If we do that instead of excessive
   corporal punishment goes beyond what is reasonable as
 5
   additional --
                          Well, we're just going to keep --
 6
             THE COURT:
                          No. That --
 7
             MS. BLUTH:
 8
             THE COURT:
                          -- saying the same thing over and over --
 9
             MR. FIGLER: Right.
10
             THE COURT:
                          -- again.
                          Use of an implement in and off itself --
11
             MS. BLUTH:
12
             MR. FIGLER: So I'm fine --
             THE COURT: And it's a reasonable --
13
14
             MS. BLUTH:
                         -- is not unlawful.
15
             THE COURT:
                          -- standard.
16
             MR. FIGLER: Right, so --
17
             MS. BLUTH:
                          Okay. Judge, say it again, the use of an
18
   implement --
19
             THE COURT:
                          I was saying --
20
                          -- in and --
             MS. BLUTH:
21
             THE COURT:
                          -- the use of an implement in and of
22
   itself is not unlawful, but must be reasonable under the
23
   circumstances.
24
             MS. BLUTH: That's fine.
25
             MR. FIGLER: That's fine.
                                   283
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1 THE COURT: All right. Moving on. 2 Wait. But hold on, so do I add to the top MS. BLUTH: 3 of it? 4 THE COURT: I would put that as the last sentence. 5 MS. BLUTH: But the --6 THE COURT: It should read -- I'm going to read what I 7 think it should it should say. Corporal punishment means the 8 infliction of physical pain, however slight, including, without 9 limitation, hitting, pinching, or striking. A parent or 10 guardian of a child may use corporal punishment as a means of Excessive corporal punishment may constitute abuse 11 discipline. 12 of a child. Excessive corporal punishment goes beyond what is 13 proper or reasonable under the circumstances in light of various 14 factors, including, without limitations, the age and condition 15 of the child, the behavior being disciplined, the child's 16 response, and the amount of force used. The use of an implement 17 is not in and of itself unlawful, but must be reasonable under the circumstances. 18 19 MR. FIGLER: We don't think that the language, no 20 matter how slight, adds --21 THE COURT: Okay. So we'll take that out. 22 MR. FIGLER: -- anything to it. And then, 23 additionally, it's our objection that that sentence about 24 excessive corporal punishment goes beyond what is proper or reasonable under the circumstances. If Your Honor wants to

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offer that, that's fine. In the light of various factors,
   that's not -- I don't know where that comes from, that is not
 2
 3
   the statute, to my understanding.
 4
             THE COURT: Where does that come from?
 5
             MS. BLUTH: Hold on, you guys, I have to fix all
   these, so I'm --
 6
 7
             MR. HAMNER: Sorry, I was trying to look up something
 8
   else.
 9
             MS. BLUTH:
                         It's okay.
10
             THE COURT: Where did you, Mr. Hamner, get --
             MR. FIGLER: In light of, dot, dot, dot.
11
12
             THE COURT: -- in light of various factors?
                                                           Is that
13
   from a case?
                 I'm guessing it's from a case.
14
             MS. BLUTH: I thought we got it from 432B.
15
             MR. FIGLER: We looked that up, but we didn't see it
16
   there.
17
             THE COURT: If it's not in a case or in the statute,
   it'll be stricken.
18
19
             MR. HAMNER: I don't think it is.
20
             MS. BLUTH: I don't know. Okay. So --
21
             MR. HAMNER: Let me just double check. Because I
   don't -- I don't think it's -- I didn't prepare the
   instructions, but I don't believe -- I thought I just read that
24
   statute, and I didn't see --
25
             THE COURT: Okay.
                                  285
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MR. HAMNER: -- the full language there. 1 2 THE COURT: If it's in a case, we can use it, but if 3 it's not in a case and it's not in the statute, that portion will be stricken. 5 MS. BLUTH: Okay. So --THE COURT: Fair enough? 6 7 -- if that portion is stricken, it was MS. BLUTH: 8 read like this, corporal punishment means the infliction of physical pain, including, without limitation, hitting, pinching, 9 10 or striking. A parent or guardian of a child may use corporal punishment as a means of discipline. Excessive corporal 11 12 punishment may constitute abuse of a child. The use of an 13 implement in and of itself is not unlawful, but must be reasonable under the circumstances. 14 15 THE COURT: And then also the sentence excessive 16 corporal punishment goes beyond what is proper or reasonable under the circumstances --17 18 MS. BLUTH: Okay. 19 THE COURT: -- period. 20 So that's a period. MS. BLUTH: MR. HAMNER: That line isn't in there. 21 22 MS. BLUTH: Okay. Got it. 23 THE COURT: All right. 24 MS. BLUTH: Got it. 25 Moving on. Deadly weapon, any objection? THE COURT:

```
MR. FIGLER: No, Your Honor.
 1
 2
             THE COURT:
                         In order to use a deadly weapon --
 3
             MR. FIGLER: No, Your Honor.
             THE COURT: -- any objection? It is not necessary in
 4
 5
   proving a conspiracy?
 6
             MR. FIGLER: We'll leave it as is, with the noted
 7
   objection that the State should not be able to argue conspiracy
 8
   on any count but the sexual assault.
 9
             THE COURT: All right. Well, we've already had a lot
10
   of argument on that, I've ruled against you various times, so I
   don't think we need to make a more thorough record at this
11
12
   point.
13
             MR. FIGLER: I just want to preserve that.
14
             THE COURT: All right. A person who willfully
15
   attempts to use physical force.
             MR. FIGLER: That's fine. That's the statute.
16
17
             THE COURT: All right. Battery means.
             MR. FIGLER: That's the statute.
18
19
             THE COURT:
                         Any person who commits a battery.
             MR. FIGLER: That's statute.
20
21
             THE COURT:
                         All right. Evidence that the defendant --
22
             MS. BLUTH:
                         I -- yeah. I made some changes at
   Dayvid's request, so I'm going to take out line 6, opportunity,
24
   preparation, I'm going to add common scheme or plan, and then
   cross out identity. So basically, we're only using the words
```

that we used in our OBA motion. 1 2 THE COURT: Okav. 3 MR. FIGLER: And I'm going to just show you we have an alternate. And I appreciate the State making those 5 accommodations. I really thought that the crux of the State's bad acts motion and the reason that the Court granted it was on 7 common plan and scheme. And so that's why -- that's why I 8 offered my alternative. If Your Honor could just take a look at it, see if there might be a merger, or if the Court doesn't want 10 to do it, we'll just make it a proposed. But I'll -- I won't do 11 any more argument on that one. But --12 THE COURT: Okay. 13 MR. FIGLER: -- do you see which one I'm talking 14 about? You may have heard testimony concerning actions directed by the defendant towards the other foster children living in 15 16 their home who are not the subject of these criminal charges. 17 THE COURT: Any objection to the one Mr. Figler offers? Just because it's clearer on the evidence that the 18 19 defendant may have committed offenses against other children in 20 home or something. What was it --21 MS. BLUTH: I'm sorry. Which one is it, Dayvid? 22 this one. 23 MS. McAMIS: The last one. 24 MS. BLUTH: Wait. Where is yours? I don't --25 MR. HAMNER: Right here.

```
MS. BLUTH: -- see it.
 1
             MS. McAMIS: It's the last one.
 2
 3
             MS. BLUTH: I don't remember seeing that. I'm sorry.
 4
             MR. HAMNER: Which one is this?
 5
             MS. McAMIS: The last one.
 6
             MS. BLUTH: Could we actually -- that's fine. I would
 7
   -- but I would like to add -- just add it to ours.
                         Right.
 8
             THE COURT:
 9
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Yeah.
10
             THE COURT:
                        I just thought it was cleaner, because --
             MS. BLUTH:
                        That's fine.
11
12
             THE COURT: -- otherwise, I --
13
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Yeah.
14
             THE COURT:
                        -- thought it was a little confusing, so I
15
   kind of liked that one better.
             MS. BLUTH: Can I rip this off, Dayvid, so I --
16
17
   because I don't have that.
18
             MR. FIGLER: That's fine.
19
             MS. McAMIS: Yes.
20
             MR. FIGLER: I thought --
21
             THE COURT:
                         Okay.
22
             MR. FIGLER: -- I sent that to you.
23
             THE COURT:
                        All right. So we'll --
24
             MS. BLUTH: You probably did, but I just don't have
25
   one.
                                  289
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THE COURT: So she's going to incorporate the two.
 1
             MS. BLUTH: Yeah, that sounds good.
 2
 3
             THE COURT:
                        Okay. All right. It is a constitutional
   right, you're requesting --
 5
             MR. FIGLER: Correct. That's --
 6
             THE COURT:
                         -- that one.
 7
             MR. FIGLER: -- our request, Your Honor.
 8
             THE COURT:
                         All right. Although you are to consider.
 9
             MR. FIGLER: That's fine.
10
             THE COURT:
                         In your deliberation.
             MR. FIGLER: That's fine.
11
12
             THE COURT: During the course of the trial.
13
             MR. FIGLER: I've never seen this before, but I don't
14
   have --
15
             THE COURT: You know why --
             MR. FIGLER: -- an objection to it.
16
17
             THE COURT: -- they're adding this? Because there was
   that case --
18
19
             MR. HAMNER: Yep.
20
             THE COURT: -- that came down when there had been an
21
   experiment or something done and then the Supreme Court said,
   no, you've got to remind them every time about --
23
             MR. HAMNER: It's the admonishment like don't go
24
   looking on the Internet --
25
             MR. FIGLER: Okay.
                                  290
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MR. HAMNER: -- and all that stuff.
 1
 2
             MR. FIGLER: I'll submit it to Court. I just hadn't
 3
   seen it, so it just --
 4
             THE COURT: Yeah. It's a new thing based on a recent
 5
   case. Now we're given it in every --
             MR. FIGLER: Okay.
 6
 7
             THE COURT: All right. When you retire to consider
 8
   your verdict.
 9
             MR. FIGLER: That's fine.
10
             THE COURT:
                         The playback instruction, pull the
   readback.
11
12
             MR. FIGLER: That's fine.
13
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Right.
14
             THE COURT:
                         Now you will listen.
15
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Yep.
             MR. HAMNER: We're good.
16
17
             MR. FIGLER: Now, with regard to the verdict form,
18
   Your Honor.
19
             MS. BLUTH: No, we still have a couple of Dayvid's, I
   think.
20
21
             MR. FIGLER: That's instruction --
22
             THE COURT:
                         We're doing -- Mr. Hamner and I are doing
23
   our happy dance.
24
             MR. HAMNER: That's it.
25
             MR. FIGLER: I don't want to belabor and have us here
                                  291
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for a long time, so maybe we can settle this issue in the
 1
   morning, but I'm just going to throw it out there. The defense
 2
 3
   is going to request -- oh, did we hit all of the defense
   instructions?
 5
                        No. We hit all of the State's
             THE COURT:
   instructions --
 6
 7
             MS. BLUTH:
                        We have a few left of yours.
 8
             THE COURT: -- and some of the defense. So for the
 9
   defense one, we already talked to you about the quilty mind.
10
             MR. FIGLER: Right.
11
             THE COURT:
                         You had parents had a fundamental liberty
   interest in the care, custody, and management.
13
             MR. FIGLER: Yep. I think that's an important law
   which is --
14
15
                         Where did you get this?
             THE COURT:
16
             MR. FIGLER: That's from a family court case in Nevada
17
   and a United States Supreme Court case.
18
             MR. HAMNER: We've handled this; right?
19
             MS. BLUTH: Okay. Yeah.
20
             THE COURT: I think what this talks about is parental
21
   rights, not about a defense to committing crimes --
22
             MR. FIGLER: Well --
23
             THE COURT: -- so I don't really think it's applicable
24
   here.
25
             MR. FIGLER: Here's why I wanted this in here for the
                                  292
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defense, and that is that adoptive parents have the same rights as -- as biological parents in how they make decisions with regard to care, custody, and management of the child.

Now, obviously, if it violates the law, they're going to be found guilty of violating those laws. But they may have engaged in certain bizarre behaviors or things that are -- don't rise to the level, such as the toilet paper, two squares, six squares. They have an absolutely fundamental right to engage in the management and care of those children in any way they deem a purpose, so long as it doesn't crossover to criminal.

So I think it's very important to instruct the jury that just because there's some bizarre things like the toilet paper, which is not chargeable, but which has come out over and over through many of the witnesses, that they do have that liberty interest in caring for, just like biological parents.

MR. HAMNER: But --

MR. FIGLER: And I think that if we don't instruct the jury on that --

THE COURT: Well, we can say --

MR. FIGLER: -- that the argument falls --

THE COURT: -- something like adoptive parents have

the same rights as natural parents --

MS. BLUTH: And we can put that--

THE COURT: -- in the care, custody, and management of their children.

```
MS. BLUTH: Let's add that --
 1
 2
             MR. FIGLER: That's fine.
 3
                        -- under the corporal -- after the
             MS. BLUTH:
 4
   corporal punishment one. Do you want to?
 5
             MR. FIGLER: Afterwards --
             THE COURT:
 6
                         Or just --
 7
             MR. FIGLER: -- but not --
 8
             THE COURT:
                         -- have a new one.
 9
             MR. FIGLER: -- attached to it. I don't -- wouldn't
10
   mind if it went right in after it.
             THE COURT:
11
                         Okay. So --
12
             MR. FIGLER: That's fine.
13
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Okay. So what do you --
14
             THE COURT:
                         -- but you want is separate.
15
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Tell me -- what do you want me say?
16
             THE COURT:
                         How about something like adoptive parents
17
   have the same rights as natural parents --
18
             MR. HAMNER: I think that's --
19
             THE COURT: -- including the same interest in the
20
   care, custody, and management of their children --
21
             MR. FIGLER: That's fine.
22
                        -- or something like that.
             THE COURT:
23
             MR. HAMNER:
                         Right.
24
             MR. FIGLER:
                           I mean, I did, obviously, take that
25 evaporate and model parent language from that case, but I
                                  294
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appreciate if the Court doesn't want to put that in there, too. 1 2 THE COURT: Yeah. I mean, I think -- okay. In case 3 -- now, remember, some of this, if it occurred when they're 4 foster parents, it's different. 5 MR. FIGLER: It didn't, though. The --THE COURT: 6 Okay. 7 MR. FIGLER: -- the entire --8 MS. BLUTH: Right. 9 THE COURT: Well --MR. FIGLER: -- charge is --10 11 THE COURT: All right. Corporal punishment means the intentional infliction. We already talked --13 MR. FIGLER: You already --14 THE COURT: -- talked about that. MR. FIGLER: -- covered that. 15 16 THE COURT: Since the law defining child abuse 17 contains the term unjustifiable physical pain. 18 MR. FIGLER: Right. So two things here, justifiable 19 or unjustifiable is not defined anywhere in the child abuse 20 statute. But justifiable is defined in a number of other places 21 in the Nevada Revised Statutes. The Supreme Court talked about, and I believe in this case in the sexual assault context, and I'll get to that when we get to our lesser includeds that we 24 feel should come in, but that ultimately there are defenses at 25 law, at common law, including necessity, the desire to aid 295

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another, and reasonable reliance on a government agent. Now, if
 1
 2
   this isn't placed in -- as an instruction in its entirety, we
 3
   would like to discuss the ability to discuss No. 3, under
   there --
 5
             THE COURT:
                         Well, I think you --
             MR. FIGLER: -- as a separate.
 6
 7
             THE COURT:
                         Okay. Can I cut to the chase?
 8
             MR. FIGLER: Yeah.
 9
             THE COURT: I think you absolutely can discuss No. 3,
10
   regardless of whether or not we give the instruction.
   you can argue it without objection. Meaning they thought they
   were behaving reasonably because all these people were in their
12
13
   home and they saw the bucket and no one ever complained or said
14
   don't do it or whatever, so that's fair argument.
15
             MR. FIGLER: I believe it should be encompassed in one
16
   of the --
17
             THE COURT: But I don't know --
             MR. FIGLER: -- instructions.
18
             THE COURT: -- that it's an actual -- it's not -- you
19
20
   can't abuse your child because you reasonably --
21
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Right.
22
                        -- relied on the lack of action by a
             THE COURT:
   governmental representative.
24
             MR. FIGLER: But the bucket -- this goes really -- you
25
   -- you are right.
```

```
I mean, because --
 1
             THE COURT:
 2
             MR. FIGLER: That focuses on bucket, and can we use a
 3
   paint stick, yeah, but you can't use it too far --
 4
             THE COURT: Right.
 5
             MR. FIGLER: Can we -- you know, no one said --
                         But what I'm saying --
 6
             THE COURT:
 7
             MR. FIGLER: -- can't use the bucket.
             THE COURT: -- is I don't think that's a correct --
 8
 9
   look, if a judge were to tell you, yes, it's absolutely -- if
10
   I'm, you know, a family court judge, and if I were to say as a
   family court judge, oh, yes, during your visitation, you're
11
12
   allowed to keep --
13
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Right.
14
             THE COURT:
                         -- your 13-year-old in a playpen, you
   know, with arm ties, then I think you could reasonably rely on
15
   that person as a -- in a position of authority. But I don't
16
17
   think there's anything in the law that says you can reasonably
18
   abuse your child and behave, quote, unreasonably, because you
19
   thought some governmental --
20
                         CPS is okay with it.
             MS. BLUTH:
21
             THE COURT:
                         -- employee condoned it or failed to act
   or didn't notice it or whatever. So I don't think this is true.
22
23
             MR. FIGLER: So -- well, the cases --
24
                         I think you could -- I think you can argue
             THE COURT:
25
   it, though --
```

MR. FIGLER: The cases that we cited in there -THE COURT: -- as part of your reasonable person
argument.

MR. FIGLER: The cases that we cited are criminal cases, and it does say reasonable. And that is the modifier there, reasonable. It would be unreasonable to suggest that you can commit actual abuse on someone. That's where reasonableness comes in to modify. Those were all criminal cases.

So it's where -- the cases are where a law enforcement person or some government official says you can use that money in that way, and then they did, and then the -- the Court said, well, that was unreasonable to do. But if they said you can shoot that person, that would be unreasonable to rely on that government offers. That's why reasonable modifies that. So that is a correct statement of law.

It's reasonable to rely on the actions, it -- you know, you take your chances, if -- if -- if it's unreasonable to the jury, but if it's reasonable reliance that, yeah, they can continue to sit on buckets, we -- we should be able to have that on some basis of instruction. But --

MS. BLUTH: But no one is --

MR. FIGLER: -- necessity -- I'm sorry, Jacqueline --

MS. BLUTH: That's okay.

MR. FIGLER: The necessity and the desire to aid another person are definitely common law defenses, and -- and

with regard to the idea of justifiable anything. So what is 1 2 justifiable pain? What does it mean in that statute when they 3 say unjustifiable pain? Well, it necessitates that there is 4 some justifiable pain. 5 So if I take my child to the doctor and the doctor has to do a procedure that's going to hurt a whole lot, that is 6 7 justifiable pain. That is necessity. So we put that in there. 8 But there are other possible reasons when something can be 9 painful, but also justified, and the jury has no guidance on 10 that whatsoever in any of the instructions. THE COURT: Well, I don't think this gives them any 11 12 more quidance --13 MS. BLUTH: No, it's --14 THE COURT: -- frankly. -- confusing. And if you look at 200.275, 15 MS. BLUTH: 16 Judge, it's talking about justifiable homicide. 17 MR. FIGLER: Right. And -- and that's why I start --18 MS. BLUTH: So --19 THE COURT: I'm not going to give this instruction. 20 mean, look, I think it's misleading. In terms of reliance, I 21 think you can argue it without the instruction. I think the reasonable desire to aid or assist a child, you know, you can 22 23 argue they were trying to assist the child by, I don't know --24 MS. BLUTH: Voiding her bladder. 25 MR. FIGLER: Everything.

```
THE COURT:
 1
                         Right.
 2
             MR. FIGLER: But I mean, that's their whole --
 3
             THE COURT: But I think that --
 4
             MR. FIGLER: -- freakin' theory, you know that.
 5
             THE COURT:
                        -- you can argue that anyway. I just
   don't --
 6
 7
             MR. FIGLER:
                         Can I make another run on instruction for
 8
   Monday morning --
 9
             THE COURT:
                         Sure.
10
             MR. FIGLER: -- based on our conversation?
             THE COURT: You can make another run on it, but I
11
12
   don't see giving this --
13
             MS. BLUTH: So Dayvid, what do you want --
14
             THE COURT:
                         -- as written.
                        -- about the verdict form, though?
15
             MS. BLUTH:
16
             MR. FIGLER: Well, hold on, we'll get to that in a
17
            So I was just going to say something really quick, Your
   second.
18
   Honor.
19
             THE COURT: All right. The next one, you may have
   heard testimony of emotional or mental impact. We've already
20
21
   gone over that. You may have heard testimony concerning actions
   directed by the defendants towards the other foster children.
23
             MR. FIGLER: That's the one you put in.
24
             THE COURT: We've already --
25
             MS. BLUTH:
                         I added that.
                                  300
```

```
THE COURT: -- covered that. Do we have a State
 1
 2
   instruction in considering the testimony of any witness you may
   take into account? This is -- comes from the opening
   instructions that the Court gives.
 5
             MS. BLUTH: Which one is it?
 6
             THE COURT: This one is in -- some DAs gives them in
 7
   the packet, and some don't.
 8
             MS. BLUTH:
                         I -- tell me about it.
 9
             THE COURT: In considering the testimony of any
10
   witness, you may take into account the witness's opportunity
11
   to --
12
             MR. FIGLER: Yeah, you already rejected that from us,
13
   Your Honor, because we offered that as either being a supplement
14
   to or an alternate to the shorter credibility --
15
                         Oh, okay. We already have it.
             THE COURT:
16
             MR. FIGLER: -- instruction.
17
             MS. BLUTH: Oh. Yeah, yeah, yeah.
18
             MR. FIGLER: You already said no.
19
             THE COURT: Okay. I didn't remember.
20
             MR. FIGLER: Yeah.
21
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Yeah.
22
                         Okay. I didn't remember we already had
             THE COURT:
23
   that.
24
             MR. FIGLER: I mean, it -- you know, if you wanted to
   add it on, that's fine --
```

```
THE COURT:
 1
                         No.
             MR. FIGLER: -- but you already said no.
 2
 3
             THE COURT:
                         I just sometimes -- I didn't remember.
 4
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Yeah, no. Some DAs --
 5
             THE COURT:
                        Sometimes some --
                        -- do include it.
 6
             MS. BLUTH:
 7
             THE COURT:
                         -- DAs don't put it in the packet. I
 8
   couldn't remember if you guys had it in the packet. Okay.
 9
             MR. FIGLER:
                         Okay.
10
             MS. BLUTH:
                         All right.
                         I give it if it's in the packet, or
11
             THE COURT:
   anybody wants it.
12
                         Dayvid, verdict, what do you want?
13
             MS. BLUTH:
             MR. FIGLER: Oh. So verdict form.
14
15
             THE COURT: Okay. I think --
16
             MR. FIGLER: I'm just throwing this out.
             THE COURT: -- that's it. Excuse me. For the record,
17
   we've covered every -- all of the defendant's proposed
18
19
   instructions, they've either been rejected, or in many cases,
20
   incorporated --
21
             MR. HAMNER: Correct.
22
             THE COURT:
                         -- into one of the instructions that were
   given by the State.
24
             MR. HAMNER: Correct.
25
             MR. FIGLER: But, explicitly, I'll make a stack of
                                  302
```

1	proposed but modified and proposed but rejected for the
2	THE COURT: Okay.
3	MR. FIGLER: Court to lodge.
4	THE COURT: Sure.
5	MR. FIGLER: And I'll do that tonight.
6	THE COURT: All right. The verdict form.
7	MR. FIGLER: So the verdict form is fine as stands,
8	with the exception that the defense desires to as a lesser
9	included, and we can argue this tomorrow, please, with the
10	THE COURT: Well, you can argue it tomorrow.
11	MR. FIGLER: The child abuse, neglect, and
12	endangerment charges that battery constituting domestic violence
13	be a lesser included of those, that with the sexual assault with
14	a minor under 14 years of age
15	THE COURT: I have no idea what you're saying.
16	MR. FIGLER: Oh. We're asking for a lesser included.
17	THE COURT: On which I got that. On which one? So
18	on the child abuse, neglect, or endangerment with substantial
19	bodily harm, do you want a guilty of child abuse, neglect, or
20	endangerment without substantial bodily harm?
21	MR. FIGLER: Yes.
22	THE COURT: Okay. That isn't on your verdict form.
23	You just have guilty of and then a blank.
24	MS. BLUTH: I'll add it.
25	THE COURT: Okay. So those will be added on all of
	303

1 that. 2 MR. FIGLER: We'd also like there to be an option for 3 battery constituting domestic violence and attendant instructions that describe that to go on all the child abuse --5 THE COURT: Well --MR. FIGLER: -- neglect and endangerment --6 7 THE COURT: -- that's not really a lesser included. 8 State, are you objecting to battery constituting 9 domestic violence --10 MS. BLUTH: Yeah. THE COURT: -- as a lesser included? 11 12 MS. BLUTH: Definitely, yeah. 13 THE COURT: All right. It's not a lesser included, so 14 I'm not going to give it. 15 MR. FIGLER: Okay. 16 THE COURT: All right. Moving on to sexual assault 17 with a minor under 14 years. MR. FIGLER: Okay. So this is the defense's request 18 19 to have added on there as a lesser included, because of the 20 unique nature of these charges. And the unique nature of our 21 instructions that are going with these charges that we allow a 22 child abuse, neglect, or endangerment charge to be placed into those sexual assault charges, that this was just an abuse and 24 neglect by entering the -- the thing. 25 Look, there has never been a catheter in a urethra sex

```
assault. I understand the State's being creative here, but,
1
2
   typically, this would have been charged as an abuse or neglect,
3
   and so we feel that the elements of abuse and neglect so track
  the actual facts of this case, that if it's not a lesser
   included, it's an allowable lesser related to be included in the
5
   verdict form to give the jury that option that we don't think
7
   it's sexual, but we do think it's criminal, and so we are going
8
   to find them guilty of the child abuse and neglect. So it's our
9
   request to do that on all of the sexual assault charges.
10
             MS. BLUTH: So it's either all or nothing, like, I
   didn't --
11
12
             THE COURT:
                         Yeah.
13
             MS. BLUTH:
                        -- I chose not to --
14
             THE COURT:
                         I don't think -- okay. It's not a lesser
15
   included. They elected to proceed one way. You can argue,
16
   look, even if you don't agree with it, it's not a sexual
17
   assault, and the DAs chose not to charge it correctly, so it's a
   not guilty, and that's on them. I mean, that's fair argument,
18
19
   you can make that argument, but I don't really see it as
20
   something that the Court should give as a lesser --
21
             MR. FIGLER: Well --
22
                         -- included, or even --
             THE COURT:
23
             MR. FIGLER: -- given the unique --
             THE COURT: -- a lesser related --
24
25
             MR. FIGLER: -- given the unique nature of these
                                  305
```

```
charges, we feel it's absolutely appropriate to give the jury
 1
   another option here besides guilt or not guilt. Because if they
 2
 3
   believe that the insertion was done, but they may not -- it may
   be confusing to them as a sexual assault charge, but they might
   say this is still child abuse to do this. And if you look at
 5
   the elements of child abuse, I mean, this is really very -- not
 6
 7
   dissimilar elementwise from --
 8
             THE COURT: But it's totally --
 9
             MR. FIGLER: -- any of the other charges --
10
             THE COURT: -- it's totally --
11
             MR. FIGLER: -- of striking?
12
             THE COURT: -- dissimilar from -- I mean, look, it's
   not really a lesser related, and it's not a lesser included. So
13
14
   what legal authority, other than, okay, this is what I thought
   it should be, do I have to give it? I don't think I have any
15
16
   legal authority to give it.
17
             MR. FIGLER: Well, I -- I certainly do think it's --
   it's absolutely lesser related simply because it is -- it is the
18
19
   State's theory that this was done as punishment, that they -- it
20
   was an infliction of some discomfort or pain because of
21
   punishment purposes.
                         That's -- that's part of the basis of
22
   their argument. So to say that it's not related to --
23
             THE COURT:
                        Yeah. I mean, the conduct --
24
             MR. FIGLER: -- how they pled it --
25
             THE COURT: -- is related --
```

```
MR. FIGLER: Yeah.
 1
 2
             THE COURT: -- but it's not technically a lesser
 3
   related charge.
 4
             MR. HAMNER: Right.
 5
             THE COURT: So I -- because the elements don't match
   up, so I don't think I can give it. But I think you're free, if
 6
 7
   you want to, to argue, look, if this is anything, if you think
 8
   it was inappropriate child abuse, but the State didn't charge
   you with that, so you have to vote not guilty.
10
             MR. HAMNER: We bear all the risk, you know, we made
   that choice --
11
12
             THE COURT: All right.
             MR. HAMNER: -- we live with it?
13
14
             THE COURT:
                         Moving on. They did do a lesser included
   blank on the sex assault. Do you want a guilty of sexual
15
   assault and take out the age enhancement?
16
17
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Oh.
18
             THE COURT:
                        That's up to -- I mean, you have --
19
             MS. BLUTH: You don't care about that, do you, Dayvid?
20
   Because I mean, obviously they're under 14.
21
             MR. FIGLER: It makes no sense.
22
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Yeah.
23
                         Okay. Well, they left a blank for it.
             THE COURT:
24
             MS. BLUTH: No, she -- I told her not to do the
  verdict form yet --
                                  307
```

```
THE COURT:
 1
                          Oh.
                          -- because I felt we would --
 2
             MS. BLUTH:
 3
             THE COURT:
                          Okay.
 4
             MS. BLUTH:
                          -- be in so much --
 5
             THE COURT:
                          Right. Okay. I was just working off what
 6
   you guys --
 7
             MS. BLUTH:
                          Yeah. No, I should --
                          -- had done.
 8
             THE COURT:
                          -- have made that clear.
 9
             MS. BLUTH:
10
             THE COURT:
                          So you don't want that, okay.
             MR. FIGLER: But on Count 38, we would take guilty of
11
12
   battery.
13
             MS. BLUTH:
                          Yeah, I -- I wrote that in. And 39, as
14
   well.
15
             THE COURT:
                          39 you want --
                         And then --
16
             MS. BLUTH:
17
             THE COURT:
                         -- guilty of battery?
18
             MS. BLUTH:
                         -- what about assault with a weapon,
19
   Dayvid?
            Did you want without the weapon, or do you just --
20
   going to say that's all or nothing?
21
             MR. FIGLER: I would like just guilty of assault.
22
             MS. BLUTH:
                          Okay.
23
                         Right. They can think the paint stick
             THE COURT:
24
   isn't a deadly weapon.
25
             MS. BLUTH: No, no, no.
                                   308
```

```
MR. FIGLER: Oh, no. Razorblade.
 1
 2
             MS. BLUTH:
                         It's the razor.
 3
             THE COURT:
                         Oh, the razor.
 4
             MS. BLUTH:
                        But they could think that about that.
 5
             MR. FIGLER: But they might think that --
 6
             THE COURT:
                          They could think the --
 7
             MR. FIGLER: -- the razorblade wasn't used, but there
 8
   was still some manner of assault.
                                       That's possible.
 9
             THE COURT:
                          Right.
10
             MS. BLUTH:
                          Yeah.
             MR. FIGLER: I just had a robbery with use and they
11
   felt that there was just robbery. I mean, it happens --
             THE COURT: Well, especially --
13
14
             MR. FIGLER: -- even though a gun was used.
15
                        -- you've got something to --
             THE COURT:
16
             MS. BLUTH:
                         Yeah.
17
             THE COURT: -- work with there, because Dr. Cetl said
18
   there's no way to insert a catheter with one hand, and she's a
19
   skilled practitioner, so --
20
             MR. FIGLER: Yeah.
21
             THE COURT: -- how is she holding the razorblade?
22
   I mean, he has something to work with.
23
             MS. BLUTH:
                          I agree.
24
             THE COURT:
                        He has something --
25
             MR. FIGLER: Right.
                                  309
```

```
THE COURT:
                         -- to work with there.
1
2
             MS. BLUTH:
                          I agree.
3
             THE COURT:
                          All right. Is that it?
4
             MR. FIGLER: For now.
5
             MS. BLUTH:
                          So I guess the issue is, though, is
   they're coming at -- well, no, because I can -- I can work on
6
7
   these while --
                         I'm expecting you guys get to work.
8
             THE COURT:
9
   know you're supposed to get be to work no later than 8:00 a.m.
10
   and your secretary may get there as early as 7:00.
                         No, I'm going to do this this weekend.
11
             MS. BLUTH:
12
             THE COURT:
                          Oh, okay.
13
             MS. BLUTH:
                          But my thing is, is you reserved on 2.
14
             THE COURT:
                          2.
15
             MS. BLUTH: So will you make that decision -- if you
   make that decision this weekend, would you mind emailing --
16
17
   would that be okay to email us? I -- I have to --
18
             THE COURT:
                          I was going to just do it Monday because
19
   we have the two witnesses; right?
20
             MR. HAMNER:
                          Right.
21
             THE COURT:
                          And so Krystal, before we even start
   Monday, I'll just say what I'm going to do, and then --
22
23
                          Well then, maybe I'll just email our final
             MS. BLUTH:
24
   format --
25
             THE COURT:
                         Right, to Krystal --
                                   310
```

```
-- to Krystal and she can --
 1
             MS. BLUTH:
                         -- and then she can make --
 2
             THE COURT:
 3
             MS. BLUTH:
                         -- just type it in.
                         -- the changes.
 4
             THE COURT:
 5
             MS. BLUTH:
                         That sounds good.
             THE COURT:
                         -- and then print them out. And then --
 6
 7
                         That sounds good.
             MS. BLUTH:
             MR. FIGLER: If there's any additional --
 8
 9
                        -- we'll have the two witnesses, and maybe
             THE COURT:
10
   take a break before we move into the instructions; right?
11
             MR. FIGLER: That sounds great.
12
             THE COURT: All right.
             MR. FIGLER: We also are going to probably offer a
13
14
   special interrogatory related to the statute of limitations
   issue, and I'll send all the parties something. So there is
15
   still that statute of limitations issue we're -- we're allowed
16
17
   to raise. There is a date certain when the assault and battery
18
   were charged --
19
             THE COURT:
                         Oh.
20
             MR. FIGLER: -- and it has to be before the three
21
           If I don't do this, I waive that I did move to strike
   because of the statute of limitations. Your Honor denied that,
   but I do still have to, in other words --
24
             THE COURT: Okay.
25
             MR. FIGLER: -- without waiving it, ask the jury was
```

```
it beyond a reasonable doubt before or after the date of the
   complaint that has the charges in it because that's when the
   statute would have run. So I believe it was the assault or the
   battery, whichever it was --
 5
             MS. BLUTH: Assault.
             MR. FIGLER: -- assault was July --
 6
 7
             THE COURT:
                         Okay.
             MR. FIGLER: -- of 2014.
 8
 9
             THE COURT: So you'll prepare that. Can you email
10
   it --
             MR. FIGLER: Of course, I will.
11
12
             THE COURT: -- to them over the weekend --
13
             MR. FIGLER: Yeah, yeah.
14
             THE COURT: -- so they can look at it and then see if
15
  they have any objections for when we come back Monday morning?
             MR. FIGLER: That's fine, Your Honor.
16
17
             THE COURT: All right. I guess that's all. Happy
18
   dance.
           All right.
19
             THE CLERK: Have a good weekend. Bye.
20
              (Court recessed at 5:30 p.m., until Monday,
21
                     March 12, 2018, at 9:07 a.m.)
22
23
24
25
                                  312
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CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

AFFIRMATION

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

Julie Potter Kingman, AZ 86402 (702) 635-0301

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TRAN

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Defendant.) PROCEEDINGS
JANET SOLANDER,	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
vs.)
Plaintiff,) CASE NO. C299737-3) DEPT NO. XXI
THE STATE OF NEVADA,)

BEFORE THE HONORABLE VALERIE P. ADAIR, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

JURY TRIAL - DAY 20

MONDAY, MARCH 12, 2018

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE STATE: JACQUELINE M. BLUTH, ESQ.

JACQUELINE M. BLUTH, ESQ. CHRISTOPHER S. HAMNER, ESQ.

Chief Deputy District Attorneys

FOR THE DEFENDANT: CAITLYN L. MCCAMIS, ESQ.

DAYVID J. FIGLER, ESQ.

RECORDED BY: SUSIE SCHOFIELD, COURT RECORDER

TRANSCRIBED BY: JD REPORTING, INC.

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1	LAS VEGAS, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA, MARCH 12, 2018, 9:07 A.M.
2	* * * *
3	(Outside the presence of the jury)
4	MS. BLUTH: will void the bladder.
5	THE COURT: Yeah. But it has to be a legitimate
6	medical purpose.
7	MS. BLUTH: But we already have that.
8	THE COURT: Well, she doesn't have a reasonable and
9	good faith I mean, she doesn't have a reasonable belief that
LO	it's I mean, you can argue, well, how could this belief be
11	reasonable when the catheters weren't prescribed, when she
L2	didn't discuss it with the pediatrician
13	MS. BLUTH: Right.
14	THE COURT: when it was never ordered.
15	MR. FIGLER: On our side we have a medical if it
16	was actually used, we have a medical device that was used in
17	the manner it was intended to be used. It wasn't like taking
L8	a
L9	MS. BLUTH: Vacuum.
20	MR. FIGLER: Well, taking some
21	MS. BLUTH: I've seen that on another page.
22	THE COURT: See but I disagree with that because you
23	could clearly sexually assault someone with a speculum. Let's
24	just say you inserted a speculum and opened it up like you
25	would do in a pelvic exam. You're using it in the way the

medical device is designed for, but you could still be sexually -- you know, let's just say someone randomly grabbed a woman off the street and is like a freak and says, oh, I'd like to see -- I'd like to do this pelvic exam with my speculum here.

2.0

MR. FIGLER: Well, clearly the intent --

THE COURT: Do you see what I'm saying? You're still using it in the medically designed way.

MR. FIGLER: Well, and that would go to the intent because I don't think anyone could reasonably suggest that the intent --

THE COURT: Yeah. But maybe --

MR. FIGLER: -- of the random stranger was to conduct a medical exam on that individual which is much different than inputting a catheter into a place where catheters go when there is a perceived issue.

THE COURT: But here's the thing. If that were the standard, then I wouldn't have been reversed by the --

MR. FIGLER: Well, I don't know. I don't know how that was actually argued. I don't think it was argued specifically that way. I think that they said it's a fact question -- I think they just wanted to let the State argue. This wasn't a medical purpose. This was violence or punishment. That's what that -- that says all over the place.

THE COURT: I mean, that's --

MR. FIGLER: That's the decision. And --1 2 THE COURT: That's not how I got it. So you don't 3 like my language. That's fine. 4 MR. FIGLER: No. I like your language fine. 5 But if we look, it says if the defendant MS. BLUTH: 6 presents any evidence that the penetration was for a medical 7 purpose, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 8 the penetration was not undertaken for a legitimate medical 9 purpose. That covers what you're saying. I mean, I just -- I 10 get a little bit nervous about making up instructions because 11 we always get hit on that. 12 MR. FIGLER: Isn't that what we're doing here with 13 this particular charge? 14 THE COURT: We're totally making it up. Well, I just 15 know in other instructions you have a reasonable and good 16 faith, you know, it has to be reasonable. It has to be in good 17 faith. 18 MS. BLUTH: Because, I mean, to be honest with you I'm still -- I don't think that that's actual law. If the --19 2.0 THE COURT: But we've already got that. It is a 21 defense to the charge of sexual assault that the defendant 22 entertained a reasonable and good faith belief. 23 MS. BLUTH: Which is actual law. 24 THE COURT: Right. But that's what -- so I mean, 25

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that language.

MR. FIGLER: Right. I mean, that's going to be true in any general intent.

2.0

THE COURT: That's what I'm saying. So I was just taking that and putting it -- it is a defense to if the defendant had a reasonable and good faith belief that the penetration was for a legitimate medical purpose. I had it better before but would be a defense. So you're essentially taking language from other statutes and just -- I mean other instructions. I misspoke. Because, I mean, to me is it reasonable that it's for a legitimate medical purpose?

MR. FIGLER: Your Honor, before we get too deep in -- and are we on the record yet?

THE COURT RECORDER: Uh-huh.

MR. FIGLER: Okay. So the defense was looking at the law of lesser related and lesser included. The theory of the defense is that Ms. Solander — that Mr. Solander bought the catheters, that Ms. Solander did many actions in what could reasonably be determined to be preparation to use the catheters, but that her intent was to merely frighten the children so that they would stop withholding their pee and —

THE MARSHAL: We're still waiting on the jury, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FIGLER: We had previously requested the Court to allow as either a lesser included or an allowable less related child abuse and neglect under that and the Court had rejected

that. So I'm not going to reargue that.

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I also looked at the law of battery with related to that, and battery cannot be included in that. However, there are fact circumstances here specifically where Ms. Solander may have attempted by the threat and the purchase and putting the children in the bathroom to use the catheter but that because the children were squirming or they started peeing themselves or whatever that she didn't actually use the catheter, and so it would be appropriate in this limited circumstance to have an option for the jury to have attempt sexual assault as one of the things. Now, I know that the Court suggested we might want to go for all or nothing on that, but the defense feels that it is appropriate in this —

THE COURT: No. I didn't suggest that you go for an all or nothing. I said the State doesn't have to have child abuse and neglect. They are entitled to go for all or nothing because it's really not a lesser related, but --

MR. FIGLER: Oh, I see what you're saying. Well, that said we would like to request attempt sexual assault as an option for the jury in the jury verdict.

THE COURT: I think there might be facts -- my only thinking there is if you accept the testimony of the expert that you would need two hands to insert a catheter, although all the girls said the bladder was voided, but how would you insert a catheter if you're holding a razor blade with one --

1	MS. BLUTH: See that's where I
2	MR. FIGLER: Or pipe it in and then pull it out. I
3	mean, it doesn't seem like it actually happened, but it does
4	there's plenty of evidence that she tried.
5	MS. BLUTH: No. So here's the thing is the girls
6	never stated that the razor and the catheter were simultaneous.
7	That's why I was confused at what you guys were saying on
8	Friday. They said that they were threatened with one, if you
9	move I will use this. But it was never
10	THE COURT: Oh, I thought one of the girls said that
11	she was holding the razor to the throat when she was inserting
12	the catheter.
13	MS. BLUTH: No. It was never
14	THE COURT: And I thought that's why Ms who was
15	it? Mr. Figler?
16	MR. FIGLER: No, it's Ms. McAmis got that out.
17	THE COURT: Ms. McAmis made a big deal about
18	MR. FIGLER: Right.
19	THE COURT: okay, it would take you two hands, and
20	you've done a lot, and then the witness said oh, it would be
21	completely unethical to even try to insert a catheter with one
22	hand.
23	MR. FIGLER: Oh, that was mine.
24	THE COURT: And I remember the testimony being they
25	held the hand

MR. FIGLER: That's our recollection. 1 2 THE COURT: -- the razor blade to the throat. every girl said it the exact same way, but I remember testimony 3 4 to that effect. 5 I mean, if that's how --MS. BLUTH: That's how I remember it. 6 THE COURT: I could be 7 wrong, but that's why I thought they were making such a big 8 deal with Dr. Cetl about, oh, well, you'd have to have two 9 hands, and you would never try to do this with one hand. 10 MS. BLUTH: Yeah. And I knew that's where they were 11 I just don't -- I don't believe that -- I mean, and 12 quite honestly, like, you know, I've had this case for so long, 13 and I've talked to the girls about it, and none -- so I can't 14 tell you definitively that's not what the testimony said. 15 That's my belief, but I know, like, in, you know, prelim and in 16 pretrials they were never saying it was done simultaneously. But so anyways I don't --17 18 Sorry, Kenny. I'll move that. 19 THE MARSHAL: You're good. You're fine.

MS. BLUTH: Okay. I just -- I don't see the factual support for an attempt -- I apologize. I thought you were going to say assault.

MR. FIGLER: No. Assault with?

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MS. BLUTH: No. No, just a misdemeanor assault because they -- because your thing is they threatened them.

1 MR. FIGLER: Oh, on the razor? 2 MS. BLUTH: No. On the -- on the --3 MR. FIGLER: SA? Yeah. His thing is, like, if you're 4 THE COURT: 5 trying to get it in and the girls are squirming, or you've got 6 your hand with the razor you couldn't --7 MR. FIGLER: You don't actually make it past the 8 labia. 9 THE COURT: Right. 10 MR. FIGLER: Then that's an assault. I mean, that's 11 an attempt. 12 But there's just no -- but there was MS. BLUTH: 13 never any evidence of that. 14 MR. FIGLER: Well, I think there's plenty of 15 evidence. 16 MS. BLUTH: How? 17 MR. FIGLER: That the girl said she started peeing 18 before it happened. That they would squirm. It seems like 19 there's a lot of evidence of preparation. The dispute is 2.0 whether or not it actually went in or not, but that would be to 21 support an attempt of option for the jury in our opinion, and 22 that's our offer. I mean, that's our request. So we make a 23 formal motion to include attempt sexual assault in the verdict 24 form with the -- with the rest of the instructions. I mean,

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necessarily we would have to stick one in on what is an

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attempt, but I think that's pretty easy.

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THE COURT: Right. You'd have to --

MR. FIGLER: There's a stock on that to the extent that stocks exist.

THE COURT: To what?

MR. FIGLER: To the extent that there's stocks. I mean, there's a statutory definition of attempts. So --

MS. BLUTH: Yeah.

THE COURT: Right. Well, they haven't a stock on it. That's not a big deal.

MR. FIGLER: Yeah.

MS. BLUTH: Right. I just think that in regards to -- I agree with Mr. Figler that I think it was Amaya that discussed, you know, one time she was trying and I peed -- I just started peeing beforehand or something like that, but when I was doing the questioning of the girls, I discussed the times that it actually went in, and then I actually had them point on the times that it went in.

So I agree with him in a way. I just don't agree that that was the conduct charged. I mean, he said it happened multiple times, but then I went into, you know, where did it happen, and where did the catheter go the times that it was used. So I don't believe there's a factual basis for an attempt.

And so but going one step further, what I thought

Mr. Figler was asking for was -- because it seems like that the defense is, well, she threatened them multiple times with it, 3 but it never was used. So then I thought they were asking for a misdemeanor assault, like, you know, she threatened them, and 5 they were scared that it was going to go in but there was no --THE COURT: Yeah. Well, actually what you kind of 6 7 would have is a battery with intent to commit sexual assault because they held -- she held them down, and they were 8 9 squirming. So that's really even more than a -- I don't know. 10 MS. BLUTH: But there --11 MR. FIGLER: Yeah. I mean, either one -- I mean, 12 they are essentially the same. 13 THE COURT: Do you see what I'm saying? I mean, she held them down while they were squirming. There was testimony 14 15 about that.

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MS. BLUTH: Except -- but those -- I actually -- only a couple girls said -- only one girl said that she held her down which was Anastasia. However, there was testimony from, like, I believe Danielle and from one of the foster children that she heard -- they heard the defendant threatening to use it.

MR. FIGLER: Oh, absolutely. I mean, that's where the defense is going to go. I mean, it's no secret.

> MS. BLUTH: Right.

The defense is going to be argued that MR. FIGLER:

this was only a threat to do that. So if the State is willing 1 2 to concede assault as being part of the --3 THE COURT: Your lesser -- lesser related. MR. FIGLER: Or included perhaps, hard to say, and 4 5 then is assault part of the sexual assault. Is it contained Battery with intent --6 therein? 7 THE COURT: No, because an assault, a misdemeanor 8 assault, is an attempted battery. 9 MS. BLUTH: Right. 10 MR. FIGLER: Right. 11 THE COURT: And a sexual assault is a completed. 12 MR. FIGLER: Right. 13 So I don't see it as a lesser included THE COURT: 14 even though it's used in the same word assault because an 15 assault is an attempt. 16 MR. FIGLER: Well, I just felt there was --17 THE COURT: Whereas, like I said, the sexual assault 18 is a completed --19 MR. FIGLER: Right. 2.0 -- battery. THE COURT: 21 I just was looking at the case law, and MR. FIGLER: 22 it did appear as though there is a limited basis when it's 23 appropriate for the jury to consider attempt if there is a 24 factual basis in the record, and while we're disagreeing as far

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as the nuance, I think the Court understands that generally

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speaking there is sufficient evidence in the -- in the record from the testimony cumulatively and from the other witnesses as well that there very well could have just been an attempt sexual assault here and that the jury should have that option available to it. But, you know, we would take a battery with intent to commit sexual assault as well. I just feel like there should be some other option than the actual completion of the act -- which we are disputing.

THE COURT: Right.

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THE MARSHAL: All the jurors are here, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. Let's turn to -- on the sexual assault instruction. We had written that a person is not quilty of sexual assault if the penetration is for -- I think we should say then, if we're not going to include the other language, is undertaken for a legitimate medical purpose.

> MS. BLUTH: Sorry. [unintelligible].

THE COURT: And then that dubs -- that coincides then with line 18.

MR. FIGLER: Which one? I'm sorry.

MS. BLUTH: The main sex assault.

All right. How long on these next two THE COURT: witnesses, Mr. Figler?

MR. FIGLER: Not very long at all, Your Honor.

I mean, should we call them in and finish THE COURT: with them and then take a break and finish the instructions?

1	MR. FIGLER: I think that would be fine.
2	THE COURT: You want to do I mean, if it's only
3	going to be 10 minutes then that would look goofy, but if it's
4	going to be 30 or 40 minutes, let's finish with the witnesses.
5	MS. BLUTH: Is it I mean, aren't you just asking
6	them if they did the forensic and then if they've sent e-mails;
7	right?
8	MR. FIGLER: No. I've got a couple extra
9	questions
10	MS. BLUTH: Oh, okay.
11	MR. FIGLER: based on the forensic.
12	MS. BLUTH: Okay. Well, then
13	THE COURT: Why don't you bring them in then. Let's
14	get started. Let's get everything done and rested.
15	MS. BLUTH: Okay.
16	THE COURT: And then we'll finish the instructions.
17	MS. BLUTH: Got it.
18	THE COURT: What's
19	MR. FIGLER: I actually have, like, about four or
20	five little housekeeping things with regards to
21	[unintelligible] of the closer case.
22	THE MARSHAL: Are you sure your witnesses are here
23	because there's nobody else in the hallway except for the jury.
24	Mr. Figler?
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25	MR. FIGLER: I'm sorry?

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1	THE MARSHAL: Are you sure the witnesses are here
2	because there's nobody else in the hallway except for the jury.
3	MR. FIGLER: Oh.
4	THE COURT: Well, maybe we should finish this.
5	THE MARSHAL: Unless I missed somebody.
6	MR. FIGLER: Were you in contact with them?
7	MS. BLUTH: No.
8	MR. FIGLER: Jacqueline? Oh, I thought you said you
9	could have them here at 9:00.
10	MS. BLUTH: Oh, no. I said if you wanted to, let me
11	know. You never let me know.
12	MR. FIGLER: I'm sorry. Absolutely.
13	MS. BLUTH: Oh, no. I
14	MR. FIGLER: Oh, I miscommunication. Sorry.
15	MS. BLUTH: And I don't I don't know Christina. I
16	only know Faiza.
17	MR. FIGLER: Okay. Well, let's see if we can get
18	Faiza here.
19	MS. BLUTH: Oh, I'm sorry yeah. I
20	MR. FIGLER: I'm sorry. I really thought that on
21	Friday Ms. Bluth said I thought she was actually literally
22	texting that they could be here on Monday morning.
23	MS. BLUTH: Oh, no. I'm sorry, no.
24	THE COURT: This will never end.
25	MR. HAMNER: I'm just glad we get to spend a little

1 more time together. 2 This will never end. THE COURT: 3 MR. FIGLER: Me too. I don't want this to end. I don't want 4 MR. HAMNER: 5 it to end. 6 MR. FIGLER: I apologize, Your Honor. 7 MS. BLUTH: No. It was just a simple 8 miscommunication. 9 THE COURT: Well, if we can't get them I don't -- I 10 mean, what are you going to ask them? 11 MR. FIGLER: I was going to ask her if she got that 12 e-mail or sent that e-mail ahead of time. I'm also going to 13 ask about some parameters about the forensic examination, talk 14 about the forensic examination. So Faiza did the Solander 15 girls, and so there was some questions around, like, the 16 disclosure that were interesting to us. 17 THE COURT: Right. I mean, because if we can't get 18 her here. 19 MR. FIGLER: I don't know that we could stipulate to 2.0 that. I know the State doesn't want to stipulate to that. 21 She's probably just down the street. MS. BLUTH: 22 Just one second. 23 MR. FIGLER: Of the two she is the more vital one 24 because the other one just did the Stark girls. 25 THE COURT: All right. What language did you want me

to add to the sex assault instruction? 1 2 MR. FIGLER: Your -- Your Honor had come up with her 3 language. I wasn't going to --THE COURT: Were you fine with that or --4 5 MR. FIGLER: Whatever Your Honor said, yeah. 6 THE COURT: Well, I mean, I -- if nobody wants it --7 MS. BLUTH: I don't. 8 THE COURT: -- I don't have a dog in the fight. 9 just thinking, okay, that dub -- that kind of corresponds to 10 the consent language from a different instruction --11 MR. FIGLER: Whatever Your Honor had come in with a 12 statement, that was fine with the defense. 13 THE COURT: All right. A reasonable and good faith 14 belief that the penetration is for a legitimate medical purpose 15 is a defense. So that's basically the same as --16 MS. BLUTH: Can you say that again, please. 17 MS. MCAMIS: Yes, please. 18 THE COURT: I'm sorry? 19 MS. BLUTH: Would you mind saying it again. 2.0 Okay. A person is not quilty of sexual THE COURT: 21 assault if the penetration is for a legitimate medical purpose. 22 A reasonable and good faith belief that the penetration is for 23 a legitimate medical purpose is a defense to sexual assault. 24 If the defendant presents any evidence that the penetration was 25 for a medical purpose, the State must prove beyond reasonable

doubt that the penetration was not undertaken for a legitimate medical purpose.

MS. BLUTH: Okay. So the only thing that -- so I mean, that's just -- okay. So what we have on line 17, If the defendant presents any evidence that the penetration was for a medical purpose.

THE COURT: Right.

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MS. BLUTH: So we need to add legitimate there or reasonable because the putting in of a catheter is a medical purpose. It's not -- so it has to be -- it has to be a reasonable medical purpose or a legitimate medical purpose.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, we've been using the word legitimate.

MS. BLUTH: That's fine. He's doing the first close so --

MR. HAMNER: Hold on a second. Sorry, Your Honor, give me a second. I was just kind of editing as you were talking. Well --

THE COURT: Although it doesn't actually have to be for -- I mean, it has to be their reasonable and good faith. So for example, let's just say a physician or a nurse said, would you insert this catheter and you think, oh, okay. Well, it's a nurse telling me. I'm going to do it. If it turns out it really wasn't medically legitimate, you would still have a defense because you would have a reasonable and good faith

belief based on what a physician or a nurse or somebody like that -- can you give me a Kleenex -- was telling you. Do you see what I'm saying?

MS. BLUTH: Yeah.

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THE COURT: So that's why I think the law has to be written -- the instruction should be written that way because if your belief is reasonable and in good faith based on the attending circumstances --

MS. BLUTH: Right.

MR. FIGLER: Even if mistaken.

THE COURT: -- that should -- even if mistaken -- that should be the defense. Because, for example, let's say you were -- it wasn't really medically necessary or medically legitimate. That's not the standard. It's your reasonable and good faith -- do you see --

MS. BLUTH: Yeah. But so then we need the word reasonable though. It can't just be just a medical purpose because, of course, that obviously -- that a catheter is a medical purpose, but it has to be -- do you know what I'm saying, like --

THE COURT: Right. Do you see what I'm saying though because they're not, like, we're putting a person to the same standard as a physician or a nurse. It has to be their reasonable good faith belief that it's for a medical purpose. I mean, it's kind of like a fine distinction.

MR. HAMNER: I just -- I just wanted --1 2 THE COURT: That's why --3 MR. HAMNER: I just wanted to be able to approach so I could see that additional added sentence so I have the 4 5 wording right because I type it in. 6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 MR. FIGLER: But I think that if you're going to go 8 with that standard --9 THE COURT: See what I'm saying? 10 MR. FIGLER: Yeah. I agree --11 THE COURT: That to me is a better standard because 12 it's not what, like, a physician -- what would be medically 13 legitimate. It's what is reasonable and good faith for the 14 person --15 MR. FIGLER: Right. THE COURT: -- who's doing it. 16 17 MR. FIGLER: That's why I think because your --18 THE COURT: As opposed to --19 MR. FIGLER: Right. We're using that standard which 20 is allowed in many different contexts --21 THE COURT: Right. 22 MR. FIGLER: -- with regard to general intent and so 23 I would add -- I would ask that you add in, just like in those 24 other instructions, even if mistaken. Right in -- you know exactly where it goes because it flows naturally because I'm 25

sure you've given that instruction a bunch of times. 1 2 MS. BLUTH: Well, no --3 MR. FIGLER: So reasonable belief even if mistaken 4 blah, blah, blah, blah. 5 MS. BLUTH: No, because we have no evidence, 6 absolutely no evidence, that anyone -- she relied upon anyone. 7 So we can talk about her reasonable good faith, but not if 8 mistaken because there's no evidence that supports that. 9 MR. FIGLER: But that's the standard for --10 MS. BLUTH: No. 11 THE COURT: Well, that's the standard on consent. 12 MR. FIGLER: That is the standard for reasonably --13 that's right. 14 THE COURT: I mean, the standard on consent is if you 15 have a reasonable and good faith belief, that the alleged 16 victim consented. If you find such a reasonable good faith 17 belief, even if mistaken, you must give the defendant --18 MS. BLUTH: Yeah, but that's about consent. 19 about a --2.0 MR. HAMNER: Right. 21 -- someone who just lays there and MS. BLUTH: 22 doesn't fight or someone who is moaning. 23 MR. FIGLER: I don't see the distinction here. 24 MS. BLUTH: I mean that has nothing to do with --25 THE COURT: Well, that's -- I mean, that's --

1	MR. FIGLER: And mistake of fact is a common-law
2	defense recognized as well which is why it's usually
3	incorporated into the reasonable standard. So we'd ask that it
4	just be there too.
5	THE COURT: Well, I mean, I don't think we should
6	have a strict medical standard because that wouldn't be the
7	standard because they're not a physician.
8	MR. FIGLER: Correct.
9	THE COURT: So it can't be legitimate medical purpose
10	because
11	MS. BLUTH: But it can be reasonable.
12	THE COURT: It's their reasonable and good faith
13	belief.
14	MS. BLUTH: Right.
15	MR. FIGLER: Even if mistaken.
16	MS. BLUTH: No.
17	MR. HAMNER: Well, I mean, listen
18	MR. FIGLER: Even if mistaken.
19	MR. HAMNER: I mean, listen. The Supreme Court
20	specifically lays out
21	THE COURT: A reason
22	MR. HAMNER: in their holding that it needs to be
23	a legitimate medical purpose. So I think
24	THE COURT: Right.
25	MR. HAMNER: if we're trying to at least track the

Supreme Court's ruling, that language legitimate medical purpose needs to be in there.

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THE COURT: I think the way it's written is fine.

Here's the way it's written up. A person is not guilty of sexual assault if the penetration is for a legitimate medical purpose. A reasonable and good faith belief that the penetration is for a legitimate medical purpose is a defense to sexual assault. If the defendant presents any evidence that the penetration was for a medical purpose, the State must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the penetration was not undertaken for a legitimate medical purpose.

MS. BLUTH: But so why in every other line is it legitimate medical purpose but 17 is not? Everywhere else we have legitimate medical purpose. So why on 17 --

THE COURT: Well, because I -- it's just whatever -- usually the standard is if they present any slight evidence like that it's in self-defense. It's not if they present a reasonable defense of self-defense, then you must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it wasn't self-defense. It's if they present any evidence.

So I'm borrowing from these other statutes or these other instructions. Okay, so say self-defense -- you don't say if their evidence of self-defense isn't really goofy, then you have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. It's if they present any evidence of self-defense, then you must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt. So I think typically to not have any burden shifting is if they present any evidence, you've got to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt.

MS. BLUTH: Right. And I see what you're saying, but in this case that's not what the Supreme Court said. The Supreme Court said it would have to be legitimate in nature.

MR. FIGLER: Well, let's get real what the Supreme Court said about legitimate. They were saying that that is inherent in the sexual assault.

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. FIGLER: And they were going through a bunch of cases from other jurisdictions to show, yeah, these legitimate medical purposes, but let's also not forget they didn't give us an instruction to give. They told us that the common-law defenses are available, and while they use that language it is merely dicta because we know that when it was absolutely enumerated by the — or codified by the Nevada legislature, they did not use the word legitimate, and they felt that medical purposes was sufficient. So —

THE COURT: I mean, I don't think it's making the State prove any more then they would have had to prove anyway. I mean, you still have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it's not for a legitimate medical purpose.

MR. FIGLER: Right.

THE COURT: Like I said, I mean, we never quantify on

what the defense has to -- if they put -- it's usually if they present any evidence, then you have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this wasn't what -- then this isn't it. I just don't want to have any kind of burden shifting. So to me I don't see it as creating a greater or lesser burden on the State. It's if there's any --

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MR. FIGLER: I don't disagree. I just, you know, not to keep hitting that trumpet note, but I feel like with the reasonable belief you have to have even if mistaken in there because that goes to her mindset, but you're right about the State and their burden. So I don't see that the State's burden is lessened if Janet is mistaken.

MS. BLUTH: No. I -- I mean, I'll submit on the other issue, but the if mistaken, no, absolutely not.

THE COURT: I think we have to have a reasonable and good faith again because we're not holding her to the standard of a physician that it has to be correct. Do you see what I mean? It has to be subjectively reasonable and in good faith, but in terms of subjective --

MS. BLUTH: That's fine but not it's mistaken.

THE COURT: The subjective element, just to be clear, is the good faith. The reasonable standard is the broad standard of any, you know, what's reasonable man standard. So --

MS. BLUTH: It's incredibly --

1	THE COURT: Mr. Figler, you've got both. You've got
2	a subjective standard, and you've got the broader standard. So
3	I think that's the best I think we can come up with given the
4	guidance.
5	MR. HAMNER: So just to be clear so I know my can
6	you read it one more time just so I make sure I have my
7	THE COURT: Sure. Do you want to just look at it?
8	Would that help you?
9	MR. HAMNER: Sure. Thank you. Yeah, that would be
10	great.
11	MS. MCAMIS: If I could also approach?
12	MR. HAMNER: Thank you very much.
13	MR. FIGLER: Did you get a response from Faiza?
14	MS. BLUTH: [No audible response].
15	THE COURT: All right. What were the other issues
16	that were outstanding?
17	MS. BLUTH: So the information in regards to the
18	mental suffering was number 1. And then just so you guys
19	know
20	THE COURT: I thought I'd already ruled on that
21	because I thought it was clear
22	MS. BLUTH: You said you needed think about it this
23	weekend.
24	THE COURT: Oh.
25	MS. BLUTH: Because remember I asked you if you'd

e-mail me and you were like, no, I'll tell you guys on Monday. 1 2 THE COURT: All right. On that one I thought -- I 3 mean I think they made a mistake in the amended, but I feel 4 like if you look at the discussion and everything else it was 5 clear what they intended to do and that mental injury is prolonged mental injury -- this is what I said Friday as 6 7 opposed to the contemporaneous mental suffering. 8 MS. BLUTH: Right. And that -- yeah, just to be 9 clear, the defense had asked me to take out mental injury which 10 I totally agreed with, and I did, but in doing that my 11 secretary accidentally took out mental suffering. Which I had 12 stated, no, mental suffering needs stay because that's actually part of the elements of the statute. 13 14 THE COURT: And this is like such a minor point, and 15 it doesn't need to be cleaned up, but nobody cleaned up the 16 spacing on this. 17 MS. BLUTH: What? Where? 18 Well, it's better. Okay, maybe they did. THE COURT: 19 MS. BLUTH: Because that was something I 20 specifically --21 THE COURT: I saw one where you still have the 22 lines -- yeah. 23 That was something I specifically --MS. BLUTH: 24 THE COURT: Above count 18, but they did better. All

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In any event what were the other issues on the

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instructions?

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MS. BLUTH: I can't remember any other issues, but I did want to let the defense know under negligent treatment or maltreatment the standard is for a person who is responsible for the welfare of a child -- and I got dinged on a writ for not adding that.

So just so everybody knows under negligent treatment or maltreatment I did define per 432B the definition of a person responsible for the welfare of a child, and it's just straight out of the statute. It is the child's parent, guardian, stepparent with whom the child lives, an adult person, blah, blah, blah. So I mean, it's really kind of cut and dry. She's their parent, but, like I said, I got dinged for not doing it in a writ so I figured it —

THE COURT: Okay. So you added that.

MS. BLUTH: Yeah.

THE COURT: That's not really an issue obviously.

MS. BLUTH: No. I just want to -- I didn't want anyone to think I was trying to sneak anything in.

MR. FIGLER: Did that -- so on that instruction it trails at the last -- on line 19 on the version that I got.

MS. BLUTH: Yeah. So the one I sent you this morning I filled it out because I didn't have the language on my computer at home. So if you want to look at it, it's right here, Dayvid.

1	THE COURT: Has anybody heard from this Faiza person?
2	MS. BLUTH: No. I e-mailed her, or I texted her
3	three times, and I'm not getting anything back.
4	MR. FIGLER: Okay. That's [unintelligible].
5	MS. BLUTH: Cool.
6	MR. FIGLER: So
7	THE COURT: In terms of the dates you can argue the
8	dates because you've got the evidence in. You've got the date
9	of the e-mail plus the date of the interview. So I mean,
10	you've got enough there if we can't find Faiza to argue that
11	she had received the book prior to the interview.
12	MS. BLUTH: I'm fine with that.
13	THE COURT: Can we call? I hate texting
14	MR. FIGLER: I mean, we just have to stipulate.
15	MS. BLUTH: Sure.
16	THE COURT: because people don't always take their
17	phones out of their purses.
18	MR. FIGLER: Right.
19	MS. BLUTH: Yeah.
20	THE COURT: Can you call her secretary or her
21	supervisor?
22	MS. BLUTH: I'll just call her.
23	THE COURT: I like the old-fashioned can you run
24	down the hall and see if they're sitting in there?
25	MR. FIGLER: Back in the day.

1	THE COURT: I mean, it's like Crystal will e-mail
2	people, and I just it's, like, no, you know, sometimes people
3	don't check their e-mails for hours
4	MS. BLUTH: Yeah.
5	THE COURT: or days.
6	(Pause in the proceedings)
7	THE COURT: Is she coming?
8	MS. BLUTH: Yeah. She's like she
9	MR. FIGLER: I'd rather just put it on the record.
10	THE COURT: Okay. I was just doing this to have
11	something to do.
12	MR. FIGLER: [unintelligible].
13	MS. BLUTH: Just so you know, she's like a super
14	obsessive-compulsive preparer. So this has got her like in
14 15	obsessive-compulsive preparer. So this has got her like in and I kept trying to say this isn't about, you know, so I'm
15	and I kept trying to say this isn't about, you know, so I'm
15 16	and I kept trying to say this isn't about, you know, so I'm just letting everybody know.
15 16 17	and I kept trying to say this isn't about, you know, so I'm just letting everybody know. THE COURT: So where is she?
15 16 17 18	and I kept trying to say this isn't about, you know, so I'm just letting everybody know. THE COURT: So where is she? MS. BLUTH: She's on her way from Child Haven or
15 16 17 18 19	and I kept trying to say this isn't about, you know, so I'm just letting everybody know. THE COURT: So where is she? MS. BLUTH: She's on her way from Child Haven or wherever that is down there.
15 16 17 18 19 20	and I kept trying to say this isn't about, you know, so I'm just letting everybody know. THE COURT: So where is she? MS. BLUTH: She's on her way from Child Haven or wherever that is down there. THE COURT: So she's that's probably.
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	and I kept trying to say this isn't about, you know, so I'm just letting everybody know. THE COURT: So where is she? MS. BLUTH: She's on her way from Child Haven or wherever that is down there. THE COURT: So she's that's probably. MS. BLUTH: She's at Bonanza and whatever.
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	and I kept trying to say this isn't about, you know, so I'm just letting everybody know. THE COURT: So where is she? MS. BLUTH: She's on her way from Child Haven or wherever that is down there. THE COURT: So she's that's probably. MS. BLUTH: She's at Bonanza and whatever. MR. HAMNER: And Pecos.
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	and I kept trying to say this isn't about, you know, so I'm just letting everybody know. THE COURT: So where is she? MS. BLUTH: She's on her way from Child Haven or wherever that is down there. THE COURT: So she's that's probably. MS. BLUTH: She's at Bonanza and whatever. MR. HAMNER: And Pecos. MS. BLUTH: So, like, 15 minutes.

MR. FIGLER: There some more stuff we could do on the record right now.

THE COURT: Okay.

2.0

MR. FIGLER: So --

THE COURT: All right. What was left? I called counsel to the bench while Ms. Bluth was on the phone to find out what else was outstanding on the jury instructions.

MR. FIGLER: So in addition, Your Honor, I just made a little list of housekeeping. In addition to -- and I'll just focus on instructions and the verdict form. The defense's pending request to have at a minimum attempt sexual assault listed as an option for the sexual assault charges.

Additionally, Your Honor, if you recall the defense had raised the statute of limitations issue with regard to the battery with intent to commit sexual assault and the assault with use of a deadly weapon charges. Both those were done at different times after the original complaint was filed. I have the exact dates. I just don't have them on my fingertips. I believe one was in May, and one was in July of 2014 when they were filed. So that would have been outside the statute of limitations if the conduct occurred before those two dates and the allegations from the State go back to January of 2014. Oh, I'm sorry. Of a —

THE COURT: Refresh my memory.

MR. FIGLER: As late -- January 2011.

THE COURT: I know you can raise a statute of 1 2 limitations defense at any time --3 MR. FIGLER: Correct. THE COURT: -- but refresh my memory. I don't -- and 4 5 I could be mistaken or not remember -- I don't remember this --6 was this raised before? 7 MR. FIGLER: It was. So it was raised --8 THE COURT: Okay. I just don't remember it then, but 9 as I said, I know you can raise it at any time. 10 We move to strike based on the statute MR. FIGLER: 11 of limitations because of I think Cunningham or some other 12 allegation from -- or representation from the State there was 13 a -- an issue that the jury could easily find it within the --14 THE COURT: Right. 15 MR. FIGLER: -- statute of limitations, but that it 16 was still an affirmative defense for the defense. So in lieu 17 of an instruction that says if you find --18 THE COURT: If you find that this occurred prior to 19 this date, you must find the defendant not guilty or something 2.0 like that. 21 That would be one option. MR. FIGLER: 22 option is a special interrogatory asking them if they found 23 beyond a reasonable doubt that it occurred before this date. 24 have no preference on how that would be submitted to the Court.

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THE COURT: My preference would be to do a jury

25

1	instruction.
2	MS. BLUTH: Right.
3	THE COURT: That something like, if you find that the
4	assault what is it assault with a deadly weapon?
5	MR. FIGLER: I think it's if the State did not prove
6	beyond a reasonable doubt
7	THE COURT: Reasonable doubt.
8	MR. FIGLER: that this occurred before X date then
9	you must find
10	THE COURT: Then you must find the defendant not
11	guilty.
12	MR. FIGLER: then you must find the defendant not
13	guilty. That's fine.
14	MS. BLUTH: So forgive me because I can't even
15	remember right now. That was in
16	MR. FIGLER: I'm going to have to pull I have it.
17	THE COURT: Okay.
18	MS. BLUTH: In the assault those statutes are two
19	or three?
20	MR. FIGLER: Three. So they miss it by
21	MS. BLUTH: Oh, yeah.
22	MR. FIGLER: a matter of those months.
23	MS. BLUTH: Yeah. The only thing I'm trying to think
24	of is, you know, the sex assault
25	MR. FIGLER: Sex assault is not, but

No. I know, but I'm wondering if by 1 MS. BLUTH: 2 tying in with a bat with intent --3 MR. FIGLER: I don't think it does. MS. BLUTH: I do think it does. 4 5 MR. FIGLER: Because under the limitation of action 6 statute --7 THE COURT: Well, you can -- I mean, I don't know how 8 else to do it. Otherwise you can just dismiss the battery with 9 intent. 10 MS. BLUTH: What? No. 11 THE COURT: Well, I'm saying I don't know how to not 12 confuse -- I mean, I don't think it's confusing, but if that's 13 your concern the only way to address that --14 MS. BLUTH: No, it's not that I think it's confusing. 15 What I'm saying is that, you know, the sex assault, those are 16 all protected because it's like if the child was in a situation where they didn't feel like they could report it or whatever --17 18 THE COURT: Right, right, right. 19 MS. BLUTH: -- and I'm trying to think -- I'm trying 2.0 to think back to the case law that I've looked at. 21 battery with intent to commit --22 THE COURT: Is an also protected. 23 MS. BLUTH: -- is an also protected. I know the AWDW 24 is not. 25 THE COURT: Right.

1 MS. BLUTH: But I don't know why a bat with intent to 2 commit SA wouldn't be. 3 THE COURT: Well --MR. FIGLER: Well, it's specifically enumerated and 4 5 it's not one of them, and it doesn't say or related to and I --6 if Ms. Bluth or Mr. Hamner have case law to the contrary, I'll 7 concede, but I didn't see that anywhere. THE COURT: Okay. Well, if we're unsure then, then 8 9 we have to do it by way of an interrogatory. 10 MS. BLUTH: Yeah, that's fine. I'm fine. No, I --11 I'm fine. 12 THE COURT: If so -- okay. 13 It's not like -- honestly, it's not even MS. BLUTH: 14 worth it. So let's just give them the benefit. 15 THE COURT: Okay. So then we'll have an instruction. Let's do two different instructions. If the State -- if the 16 17 State has failed to prove that the assault with a deadly weapon 18 occurred prior to --19 MR. FIGLER: I'll give you those dates in the second. 2.0 It's downloading. I've got 26 seconds remaining. I mean, 21 theoretically it will be in the bind over of when the amended 22 complaints were done which is what I'm looking at right now. 23 MS. BLUTH: But wouldn't it just be --24 It's when you filed -- not the original MR. FIGLER:

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It's whenever you did the amended complaint. That

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complaint.

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would be when the statute triggers for the new offense.
 1
 2
     don't get to backdate from the original.
 3
                                 I know. I'm just saying -- yeah.
               MS. BLUTH:
                           No.
 4
               THE COURT:
                           What count was it, please? We've been
5
     through all this.
 6
               MS. BLUTH:
                           46 -- there's a couple.
                                                     So --
 7
                           All right. Count 20 --
               THE COURT:
8
               MR. FIGLER:
                            38, 39.
                           We're doing AW to be first.
 9
               MS. BLUTH:
10
               MR. FIGLER:
                            Oh, okay. That's 46.
11
               THE COURT:
                           Well, that's not helping me.
12
               MR. HAMNER:
                            That's 13 -- assault with uses are
13
     counts 13, 23 and 46.
14
               MR. FIGLER: Correct.
15
               MR. HAMNER: One for each of the girls.
16
               THE COURT:
                          All right. So --
17
               MS. BLUTH:
                           Did it load, Dayvid?
18
                                   So it looks like that AWDW were
               MR. FIGLER:
                            Yeah.
19
     put in on May 22nd, 2014. So it would have to be before May
2.0
     22nd --
21
               MS. BLUTH:
                           2011.
22
               MR. FIGLER:
                            -- 2011.
23
               MS. BLUTH: And then the BW -- the intent?
24
               MR. FIGLER: Give me a sec. That appears to be July
25
     23rd.
            So it would have to be before July 23rd, 2011.
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1	THE COURT: Okay.
2	MR. FIGLER: Do you want to confirm that, Jacqueline?
3	I don't want that to be an issue that's
4	MS. BLUTH: You mean confirm it by looking at yours
5	or do you mean
6	MR. FIGLER: I mean, you could, yeah. So battery
7	with intent to commit sexual assault first appears on the July
8	22nd
9	MS. BLUTH: July 22nd, okay.
10	MR. FIGLER: So if we go up to the
11	MS. BLUTH: July 23rd.
12	MR. FIGLER: Is it the 23rd?
13	MS. BLUTH: Yeah, [unintelligible].
14	MR. FIGLER: Sorry, July yeah.
15	MS. BLUTH: And the 11th, yeah. Oh, wait.
16	[unintelligible] the 8th.
17	MR. FIGLER: May 22nd I think it is and then oops.
18	AWDW is added there.
19	MS. BLUTH: Go back to that first one then, will you,
20	please.
21	MR. FIGLER: You want the first complaint?
22	MS. BLUTH: Yeah. No, no, no. The first one you
23	just showed me.
24	MR. FIGLER: Oh, sure. Hold on. Sorry, it's so
25	tiny. [unintelligible].

1	MS. BLUTH: It's like [unintelligible].
2	MR. FIGLER: Right. Oh, that's way better.
3	MS. BLUTH: Okay, cool.
4	MR. FIGLER: And then here is the July 23rd and
5	that's where the
6	MS. BLUTH: Yeah. Okay, perfect.
7	MR. FIGLER: Do you want to look at the, just to
8	confirm, look at the original complaint that has neither of
9	those in it, or do you remember that? There's the original
10	complaint from March.
11	MS. BLUTH: Yeah. Okay, cool.
12	MR. FIGLER: Okay.
13	MS. BLUTH: Thank you for sharing.
14	MR. FIGLER: Sure.
15	MS. BLUTH: So, Judge, am I running these out or are
16	you running them out to Crystal?
17	THE COURT: On that one I was letting you guys do.
18	MS. BLUTH: Okay, got it.
19	THE COURT: Everything else I wrote out, but I
20	don't
21	MS. BLUTH: No, I got it. I just didn't know. I
22	thought it was going to be
23	THE COURT: I assumed you guys Mr. Hamner was
24	going to type them up, and then just e-mail me another clean
25	set.

MS. BLUTH: No. I'm going to.

THE COURT: Okay.

2.0

MR. FIGLER: Okay. So that resolved in addition to the lesser included or the assault that's still outstanding. That's it as far as the jury instructions. However, I have a note here that I was supposed to bring up to the Court. There was some evidence — this is an internal note from us. There was some evidence during the trial from, and I believe it came from Debbie McClain, that she did receive photos of the children that would have depicted any injuries on the photos prior to her receiving the children in 2008.

We have searched for them, and they do not appear to exist. Ms. Bluth, I think, went above and beyond trying to see if any photos such as that existed, and there were a lot of photos, but nothing of that ilk. So the Court had invited us earlier if we felt that it rose to a level of Sanborn that we could request a failure to preserve or destroyed photograph instruction.

I'm not going to argue it at length. I think Your Honor knows the fact of basis here. I will put that in our group of proposed for marking if the Court is unwilling to allow it, but essentially it's that you've heard evidence that the Department of Family Services either failed to preserve or destroyed photographs of the adopted children issued in this case which would have shown the status of the children prior to

the -- the injury status of the children prior to placement in the foster care system, case law and then as such you may infer that there was evidence of child abuse in the photos which may be the same photographic evidence of child abuse testified to in this trial. So that would be the proposed Sanborn instruction if the Court feels that we've met the burden on that. So that --

2.0

THE COURT: I don't feel that -- State, do you want to weigh in?

MS. BLUTH: Yeah. So in what Ms. Richardson had said, and forgive me because I can't remember if we spoke to her outside of the presence or — that if there were any of those photos, to her knowledge that there wasn't any, but if there were they are part of the file 360 which is once adoption takes place is sent to Carson City, and that takes two months. I don't know why that takes two months. That seems ridiculous to me, but it takes two months to get back here. So I don't think that the defense has met any burden that, A that there is absolutely photos and B, that they were in any way destroyed. So I just don't see where a Sanborn would —

THE COURT: Yeah. I mean, I don't see it.

MR. FIGLER: Okay. We submit that, and then finally, Your Honor, we had a proposed instruction that did talk about the reasonable reliance on a government agent as part of another instruction. Obviously a large portion of the theory

of the defense here is that the DFS, which is a government agency, was in there. They saw numerous things and never told the Solanders that they needed to stop doing that or even reported it.

2.0

None of it was reportable offenses, and again, I went through all that case law, and it really does talk about any crime, and it doesn't have limitation, and I would suggest to the Court that if the government says you're allowed to kill that person because he is an enemy of the state, and he is coming at you right now and they did that, that would be reasonable reliance that would not make them culpable for the offense.

So when they're saying what you're doing with the buckets, what you're doing with the timers or what you're doing with even the paint sticks per se, to the extent that that's what was observed or that was disclosed --

THE COURT: But was there any -- I mean, let's really look at what the evidence was. Was there really evidence that anybody had said, oh, yeah, what you're -- I mean, the timer is one thing, but the buckets -- there was the picture of the buckets.

MR. FIGLER: Right.

THE COURT: But nobody actually said, oh, yeah, this is fine for you to use these buckets, or it's fine for you to --

MR. FIGLER: Well, I mean, that --

THE COURT: -- let the girls sleep on boards, or it's fine to dry them off with the fan or -- so I mean, if you look at what -- what was the evidence actually? The timer --

MR. FIGLER: Okay. So there's two -- there's actually --

THE COURT: Right.

2.0

MR. FIGLER: -- there's a couple different pieces of evidence. There's the Jan Finnegan testimony that -- allegation rather, that CPS investigated and the investigator who went out on Jan Finnegan was --

MS. BLUTH: Crystal Rosas.

MR. FIGLER: Was it Crystal Rosas?

THE COURT: Where's the detective?

MR. FIGLER: It was Crystal Rosas, and all these things were admitted to Crystal Rosas — all these things were admitted to Crystal Rosas and because of either explicit or implicit none of it was said to them, oh, you have to stop doing this. You can't be doing this, and a lot of that is around the bathrooming issues, et cetera, that the — or the toileting issues as the government keeps saying.

With regard to the buckets, Gail Anderson was in there. She did talk to the Solanders. She did take pictures of it. It's up to the jury as to whether or not there was a reasonable reliance here, and that's why we feel that

instruction is appropriate because the instruction is a simple two lines. The Department of Family Services, a government agency, its employers are government agents, one. Two, a person who reasonably relies on the government for advice cannot later be prosecuted for a crime explicitly or implicitly approved by the government.

2.0

This fact scenario — this fits the theory of defense. I don't know that we have to delineate all the specific ones. That's for argument. So Ms. McAmis with this instruction in place could argue to the jury, look, they were in there. They took pictures of the buckets. They saw the buckets. They didn't say anything about the buckets, or they did talk to her, and they didn't correct her. She talked to Crystal Rosas, both Mr. Solander and Mrs. Solander admitted to all these things, to hitting them with the paint sticks, to timing them, to limiting their food intake, to all that stuff, and no correction or sanction was imposed, but all that's a reasonable reliance on the government for advice not to be later prosecuted.

So we feel it's an appropriate instruction. There is case law that supports that instruction for government reliance. Certainly that is all over this case. The State is going to argue that the Department of Family Services and CPS was way out of line. They didn't do the right things here, and we're going to argue that to the extent that they gave explicit

or implicit approval the Solanders had a right to rely upon 1 2 that because that's reasonable given these circumstances. 3 THE COURT: Well, it would have to be reasonable in good faith --4 5 MR. FIGLER: Reasonable. 6 THE COURT: Because --7 MR. FIGLER: Okay. I could add in good faith. 8 Well, I'm just saying if you were to even THE COURT: 9 get that because look, a lot of it was oh, the buckets. 10 well, they've got these digestive issues, and that's why the 11 kid -- and again, I recall one kid, not three kids are having 12 to sit on the buckets. And oh, they have this that and the 13 other thing which it turns out they really don't have. So I --14 it's not just reasonable. It has to be good faith because if 15 you're lying to the government and then getting them to approve 16 things, then that's not good faith. 17 MR. FIGLER: Okay. I could easily put --18 THE COURT: I'm just saying, I mean --19 MR. FIGLER: I could put good faith in there. 2.0 doesn't change burdens. 21 Well, I don't know that you're entitled. THE COURT: 22

MS. BLUTH: I -- so first of all, I just want to really tailor what DFS knew about. Number 1, was the buckets,

24 but only the --

23

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THE COURT: But it was one bucket; right?

1	MS. BLUTH: Well, so, yes, but the showers and the
2	sleeping not those things. I'm trying to
3	THE COURT: They didn't know about the catheters?
4	MS. BLUTH: Oh, no.
5	MR. FIGLER: Well, no. There was never a disclosure
6	about catheters.
7	MS. BLUTH: But I'm talking okay, so the buckets
8	was one thing, and then there was I thought Dayvid,
9	didn't you say one other thing.
10	MS. MCAMIS: When Jan Finnegan went out they
11	interviewed and they investigated about the restricted water
12	usage and also the limited food, that there were only two meals
13	a day for at least one period of time of three weeks. They did
14	know about all that.
15	THE COURT: And the blended food.
16	MS. MCAMIS: They knew all about that.
17	THE COURT: Did they know about the blended food?
18	MS. MCAMIS: Yes. Crystal Rosas did interview about
19	that.
20	MS. BLUTH: Yeah. Yes.
21	MS. MCAMIS: And specifically that was all disclosed
22	to her.
23	MS. BLUTH: But here's the issue. If Janet had told
24	them the whole truth, and then the government was like, oh,
25	okay, you're good, then I agree with the defense that they'd be

entitled to it, but when she doesn't tell them the whole truth, then she knows that they don't know everything, and she can't have -- she can't rely on their -- them saying okay. Does that make sense?

2.0

THE COURT: No. I mean, my bigger issue is well, have they presented enough evidence, or is there enough evidence in the record that they are entitled to the instruction. Even though it's not comprehensive or even though clearly there are things that the government didn't know about that are critical to the case.

And she, I mean, the evidence was she either exaggerated or completely misstated things that would have formed the basis of at least some of the employees saying, oh, yeah, that's okay — like the buckets. So, you know, if you're saying, oh, well, the doctor told me to do this, and then the employee says oh, well, okay. If the doctor — now the employee may have dropped the ball in not saying, well, who's your doctor, and I need a doctor's letter, and I need the medical records, but if you're lying to the government and then they say, oh, yeah, okay, that sounds reasonable, but it's based on misrepresentation.

Why don't we do this? What about something like -- what did you propose? Can you print that out?

MR. FIGLER: Okay. I could actually print it right now and send it to -- let me send that to Crystal. That will

1 take me one second. 2 THE COURT: Do we have an ETA on Faiza? 3 MR. FIGLER: She's right here in the court right now, 4 I believe. 5 MS. BLUTH: No that's Yvette and Frances. 6 MR. FIGLER: Oh, no. That is Yvette, sorry, and 7 Detective Emery. I should look before I leap. 8 THE COURT: You folks may be here to watch the 9 closing arguments. Just so you know Mr. Figler is presenting 10 one other witness. So we're just finishing up the jury 11 instructions now. So after the other witness then the Court's 12 going to read the instructions on the law, which will probably 13 take about 30 minutes -- 20 minutes maybe, and then we'll move 14 in. So it's probably going to be conservatively, what, 40 15 minutes before we move into the actual argument? 16 MR. FIGLER: Oh --17 MS. BLUTH: Forty minutes? 18 MR. FIGLER: I think that's very optimistic. 19 MS. BLUTH: I would think an hour and a half. 2.0 MR. FIGLER: I would say an hour and 20 -- hour and 21 30. 22 THE COURT: An hour and a half. So you folks are all 23 welcome to sit and watch whatever else, but just to let you 24 know. 25 Or go to Starbucks. MS. BLUTH:

THE COURT: And, of course, the media might be 1 2 interested in Faiza and the witness. I don't know if you guys 3 are. So at least 45 minutes to an hour before the State 4 actually starts their closing. 5 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay. Thank you. We'll be 6 back. 7 THE COURT: And like I said, the media, I don't know. 8 They might be interested in the next witness. 9 (Pause in the proceedings) 10 THE COURT: Dayvid, did you just make this up, or did 11 you get this from something? 12 MR. FIGLER: I pulled these from a number of 13 government reliance cases. Obviously there's no child abuse 14 government reliance case, but there are for fraud. There are 15 for all sorts of money crimes. There is even an escape charge

18 THE COURT: Is this the language?

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there.

MR. FIGLER: That is the language. Well, good faith is -- Your Honor put that in.

that was in there. There's some interesting stuff that was in

THE COURT: Right.

MR. FIGLER: It was always reasonable and [unintelligible], but I didn't have a problem with that because I think that that's always there. They cannot be prosecuted for the crime if the government approved it, and it's for the

jury to determine if the government was reasonable in proof.

So I added explicitly or implicitly because there was no
language that modified. So I figured whatever the jury feels
would be sufficient evidence that would encompass it. So the
only part that I put in was explicitly or implicitly. The rest
comes from those cases, and I have those citations.

2.0

MR. HAMNER: I mean, the State's position, Your
Honor, is I think the problem with this is that because
Ms. Solander essentially hid the ball and the full extent of
what was going on, I think that this instruction is misleading.
I think they can argue it, but to say that in this case that
the DFS was giving advice, like, hey, it's totally fine to use
the buckets. It's totally fine on the catheters. It's totally
fine withholding food and water.

THE COURT: What if we added a sentence then -- just thinking off the top of my head -- a person who misleads the government in order to obtain approval and/or acquiescence cannot use this as a defense or something like that?

MS. BLUTH: That's fine with me.

MR. HAMNER: I mean, that's fine.

MR. FIGLER: If a person intentionally misleads the government, absolutely. That's fine.

THE COURT: A person who intentionally misleads the government in order to obtain approval and/or acquiescence in his or her conduct is not absolved from criminal liability.

1	MR. FIGLER: May still right. I mean, it doesn't
2	necessarily mean that they have criminal liability so if we
3	phrase that carefully, yeah.
4	THE COURT: No, it's
5	MR. FIGLER: I'm fine with that.
6	THE COURT: is not absolved from criminal
7	liability. What about adding something like that?
8	MR. FIGLER: Or this does not apply to a person who
9	intentionally misleads the government with the purpose of
10	for the purpose of receiving or however you want to do it.
11	THE COURT: Well
12	MR. FIGLER: I would just say this does not apply.
13	THE COURT: This statute does not apply to a person
14	who
15	MR. FIGLER: Yeah.
16	THE COURT: intentionally misleads the government
17	in order to obtain approval and/or acquiescence for his or her
18	conduct.
19	MS. BLUTH: Yeah.
20	MR. FIGLER: Perfect. We're all on that.
21	THE COURT: Is that good?
22	MR. HAMNER: That works, Your Honor. Yes, Your
23	Honor.
24	MR. FIGLER: That's a fair modification.
25	THE COURT: That way you can say, okay, it's based on

her lying and not doing full disclosure. They can say oh, they 1 2 knew about the pots. 3 MR. HAMNER: That's fine. 4 THE COURT: Or whatever. 5 MR. HAMNER: Yes, your Honor. 6 THE COURT: Did you get that? Because I didn't write 7 it out. Did anyone write that? 8 MS. BLUTH: No, tell me again. 9 THE COURT: Well, okay. A person who intentionally 10 misleads the government --11 MS. BLUTH: Okay. 12 THE COURT: -- to obtain approval and/or acquiescence 13 for his or her conduct is not absolved or -- maybe it was 14 better -- this instruction does not apply to a person who 15 intentionally misleads the government to obtain approval and/or 16 acquiescence for his or her conduct. 17 MR. HAMNER: That works. 18 MS. BLUTH: Okay. 19 MR. HAMNER: It's just that front. That first 2.0 sentence. 21 MS. BLUTH: Okay. So we're adding this whole thing 22 with that. 23 So you're adding this whole thing and MR. HAMNER: 24 then it should read this instruction does not apply to an

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individual who intentionally misleads the government to obtain

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approval and/or acquiescence for his or her conduct.

THE COURT: It should actually grammatically be approval for and/or acquiescence in his or her conduct.

MR. HAMNER: Okay.

2.0

MR. FIGLER: Okay.

THE COURT: Mr. Figler, you're the poet.

MR. FIGLER: I believe in free verse, Your Honor. So unless you want this to rhyme, and I could do that.

THE COURT: Everybody fine with the modification that I think makes it clearer?

MS. BLUTH: It's okay.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. BLUTH: Yeah.

THE COURT: What else?

MR. FIGLER: All right. The defense had indicated earlier as we proceeded through this case it became abundantly clear that more and more documents were relevant based on the testimony, and all the parties worked as quickly as we could to secure those documents. That was done in conjunction with court orders that were occurring throughout the course of the trial.

The defense had learned of some new individuals with their specific names from the Unity notes as it relates to the importance of and the interactions of some of the personnel both through H.O.P.E. Counseling, but more importantly Dr. Lisa

Shaffer. The defense has been attempting to locate these witnesses. These witnesses obviously would have a great deal of impeachment with regard to Debbie McClain's representations of the condition of the children at the time of the handoff, if you will, to Mr. and Mrs. Solander and the foster care system and some of the representations of Ms. McClain as to why they were either removed from the case in the case of Lisa Taylor or why H.O.P.E. was removed from the case when it was transferred over to what became known as A New Beginning for services, et cetera, and so the defense has not exhausted all measures.

2.0

We did, as Your Honor knows, get an investigator appointed from the office of appointed counsel after a trial had begun to assist us with various tasks such as serving subpoenas in locating witnesses. He has been unable to locate those three witnesses at least, and so we would ask for a modest continuance in order to find those before we close our case in chief, and with that I would just submit without further argument.

THE COURT: You need to put the witnesses' names on the record.

MR. FIGLER: Sure. Heidi --

MS. MCAMIS: Hanusa, H-a-n-u-s-a; Lisa Taylor, PSR worker and Dr. Lisa Shaffer. We're not sure of the spelling. It's either S-c-h-a-f-f-e-r or S-h-a-f-f-e-r. We've seen it both ways in different records.

THE COURT: All right. I know you've been looking, 1 2 at least what, over a week for these people? 3 MR. FIGLER: About a week now. I think we got --THE COURT: You haven't found them. 4 5 MR. FIGLER: -- those Monday. We did confirm that 6 they are not working for H.O.P.E. any longer. 7 THE COURT: Right. 8 MR. FIGLER: We did confirm that. 9 THE COURT: And I don't know if the State even tried 10 to aid you in finding those people. MS. BLUTH: No. When they told me -- the only way I 11 12 can normally do it is that they're still working with the 13 agency like Faiza. I could get Faiza here, but when they leave 14 agency it's, like, good luck. I can never find anyone. 15 THE COURT: And then Dr. Shaffer, I quess she's not 16 practicing anymore. It seems like she would have been really 17 easy to find. I mean, if she had still been practicing; right? 18 Just look her up on -- to find her office number. So --19 MS. MCAMIS: Right. I don't have more information on 2.0 that, but I know that we did try to contact, and we've not been 21 able to. 22 THE COURT: Right. So I mean, I would say there's no 23 reason to believe --MS. MCAMIS: I don't think she's listed. 24 25 THE COURT: -- you're going to find these people in

two weeks or a day or whatever. So your request is denied. 1 2 MR. FIGLER: Thank you. 3 THE COURT: Like I said, I mean, she must not be practicing here, or you have a really bad investigator because 4 5 it seems to me like just a simple Google search if she still 6 has an office would, you know, find such a person. I don't 7 know if there's -- isn't there some licensing board for 8 psychologists as well? 9 MR. FIGLER: I mean, we threw a lot at our 10 investigator. 11 You know what I mean? That that -- it THE COURT: 12 could have gone that --13 MR. FIGLER: I don't have a representation of that --14 THE COURT: -- right, what she did. I'm just saying 15 who even knows if they're still in the State. So any -- do we know where Faiza is? 16 17 MS. BLUTH: She might be outside. 18 MR. HAMNER: Want me to go check? 19 MR. FIGLER: Yeah. 2.0 MS. MCAMIS: Okay. 21 MR. FIGLER: Go, go, go. 22 THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Figler? 23 MR. FIGLER: I believe that was it. The only other 24 outstanding issue is that --25 THE COURT: Is on the attempts?

1 MR. FIGLER: Oh, besides that, Your Honor, is there 2 was an outstanding issue that Your Honor had not ruled upon. 3 THE COURT: What was that? It was an e-mail from Ms. Bluth to one 4 MR. FIGLER: 5 of the BST workers for one of the other foster children as far 6 as its admissibility or discoverability. 7 THE COURT: Oh, was work product? 8 MR. FIGLER: Yeah. 9 THE COURT: I think I did rule on that on Friday and 10 said that I didn't see the admissibility of that. So that 11 request was denied, but I think we covered that on Friday. 12 MR. FIGLER: Okay. Ms. Bluth filing her PowerPoint 13 from the opening with the court. 14 MS. BLUTH: Yes. I'll do that today. I'm sorry. 15 Yeah, I've got to print it, but I'll do that today. 16 THE COURT: All right. 17 MR. FIGLER: That was it. 18 THE COURT: All right. So the only issue is whether 19 or not you're entitled to an attempt sexual assault as a lesser 2.0 included, and then we would need to add an instruction on 21 attempt. 22 MR. FIGLER: Correct. And Your Honor had already 23 ruled on the -- whether or not Dwight Solander's name and

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Danielle Hinton's name gets to continue to appear in the

Information. Did you rule on that?

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THE COURT: Right. Well, just because they've been -- they've pled out doesn't mean they have to take their names from the Information because the evidence that was presented in the trial pertain to both Dwight and Danielle. So I don't see why they would have to take that out.

2.0

MR. FIGLER: All right. Well, as Your Honor may recall the defense's concern in limine was that those charges, as opposed to the one that was specifically pled as a conspiracy, be argued as a conspiracy. So that was our primary concern. We don't care that his name is in there.

We just -- two things. Number 1, conspiracy to liability is only and explicitly pled as it relates to the sexual assault charges, but more than that if the jury were to believe that Dwight Solander caused the substantial bodily harm on the children, if they even believe there was substantial bodily harm on the children, that the State not be able to argue that Janet's on the hook for that if Dwight did it.

THE COURT: Right. I remember the arguments, but I think we discussed this on Friday. And I think I said, well, they were acting together, and it might be impossible to discern who hit the stick -- I mean, they both were hit with sticks, according to the testimony, that caused bleeding. I mean, both Dwight and Janet hit the girls with sticks, if you believe the testimony, that caused bleeding, and it would be impossible, I think, for the State to establish whether it was

Dwight or Janet and they were acting together as part of a -- I mean, I think it was quite clear, and I think the defense was put on adequate notice, number 1, and number 2, I think that the evidence bore that out.

So in terms of any kind of notice issue, I think the defense was on adequate notice as to how the State was going to be proceeding on that.

MS. BLUTH: Faiza is walking through security right now.

THE COURT: Okay. So the only other issue is on whether or not they are entitled to an instruction of attempt sexual --

MR. FIGLER: Right.

2.0

THE COURT: I have a question for the defense. If you believe that she was inserting the catheter for a medical purpose, which is the defense's case, then how could you also think it might be an attempt sexual assault?

MR. FIGLER: Well, we can dispute. We can have -THE COURT: You know, if she's just -- right.

MR. FIGLER: We don't believe that the catheter made it in, but that everything, but that probably did happen. In other words, the threat, the preparation and actually further preparation to scare the children, but that didn't go in, but even if it did go in, her intent was for medical purpose. I mean, we're allowed to argue it that way.

It -- you're going to hear from the closing that we are adamantly suggesting in our argument that it never went in, but even if you believe it went in there's that out, and I think that's fair game.

Oh, we still have to talk about the medical records as long as we're just killing time on the record.

THE COURT: Oh, okay.

2.0

MR. FIGLER: All right. So the defense wanted to introduce part and parcel as self-authenticating the medical records that we were provided by the State of the children. In the alternative, Ms. McAmis and myself, while questioning the various doctors, did get the doctors who testified to state on the record that these were their medical records that they kept in their ordinary course, et cetera. If you recall Ms. McAmis would always end with that particular question with those witnesses.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. FIGLER: So in the alternative if they don't come in part — in full we would ask that at least the parts that correspond to the witnesses who testified be allowed to come in.

 $\mbox{\sc MS.}$ BLUTH: We already ruled -- we already ruled on this on Friday.

THE COURT: I don't think we did.

MR. FIGLER: No.

THE COURT: I think -- what's the State's -- I mean, 1 2 you should have moved to admit the medical records when the 3 witness was here. MS. BLUTH: But are we talking about -- isn't this 4 5 the same argument that we had when Dr. Cetl was on the stand 6 and you moved to put it in --7 MR. FIGLER: I did. 8 MS. BLUTH: -- and I said if you wanted them in, then 9 you should have done it --10 MR. HAMNER: Right. 11 MS. BLUTH: -- brought in your own expert 12 or -- because I don't have any way -- I didn't, in my medical 13 record, I didn't have a custodian sheet. 14 THE COURT: Right. 15 MS. BLUTH: And so I can't -- I'm not saying that 16 defense wasn't given my exact copy, but I don't know if things 17 are taken out, things are added. So my issue is there's no way 18 for me to authenticate the medical records. 19 THE COURT: Right. 2.0 MS. BLUTH: And the defense had the opportunity --21 THE COURT: I mean, to me I think Mr. Figler 22 correctly says that some of the records were authenticated by 23 the physicians themselves who looked at the records and said,

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these are my records, but then you should have moved to admit

the records when the witness was here so that Ms. Bluth could

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have then said, well, wait a minute. Where -- is there -- should there be another record here, and you didn't.

2.0

So I think, yes, you properly authenticated them at the time, but what you should have moved to admit right then and there when the witness was here and could have been questioned more about the records.

Now, had you moved to admit them with the doctor I would have admitted them because they would have been properly authenticated, but that would have given the State an opportunity to question them on voir dire before I admitted them to see if they were complete or whatever, and so I don't -- I think your request is actually untimely although, like I said, I think, yes, they could -- were in some part properly authenticated through the witnesses, but why didn't we move to admit them then?

MR. FIGLER: Well, it's the State's case in chief and we thought it would be more impactful to do that in --

THE COURT: Right. But what I'm saying --

MR. FIGLER: Well, we did try to do it through
Dr. Cetl because Doctor Cetl said she relied on numerous
records, and so that was the defense strategy for whatever, you
know, to whatever end is that it would be best to confront
Dr. Cetl with those particular records at that time. Again, it
was all during the State's case in chief, and the State chose
not to admit the records that they were talking to those

witnesses about.

2.0

THE COURT: Right.

MR. FIGLER: We did have those authenticated, and we thought that it would be appropriate to move in our case in chief to introduce those. We'll just submit it to the Court.

THE COURT: All I'm saying is that I think it should have been doing contemporaneously with the witness so that the State would have had an opportunity to question the witness more on the records, and like I said, they could have even taken the witness on voir dire prior to the Court admitting the records, and I would have let them do that if in cross-examination — although it frankly would have looked a little weird in front of the jury as to why the State was not agreeing to admit the records of their own witnesses, but —

MR. FIGLER: I mean, in the alternative --

THE COURT: They still could have done it -- yes.

MR. FIGLER: In the alternative we would ask for a modest continuance to be able to pull all those doctors back in --

THE COURT: Let me just -- let's cut to the chase. Why do you need the records in?

MR. FIGLER: Well, I think that the jury needs to see what was relied upon. The State's argument over and again is that -- well, no medical documentation was ever provided to you for any of these things. The Solanders didn't give you any

medical documentation about anything.

2.0

THE COURT: Well, you can still argue, Mr. Figler. You heard testimony about this big stack of records that the State chose not to admit, and, you know, it's not -- you saw doctors sit up here and page through pages of medical records, and that was the record in this case that Ms. Solander -- so I mean to me I think you could still -- look, it was done in front of the jury. They refresh their memory with pages of medical records. So I don't think it would be inappropriate argument for the defense to stand up and say, look the State never admitted these records. So but you saw the doctors read through these records. I think you could do that.

MR. FIGLER: Thank you, Your Honor. We just asked that --

THE COURT: I mean, I don't see that as inappropriate. You know if it was the State's case in chief then maybe it would be, but like I said, it happened in front of the jury. They reviewed the records, so you can talk about it.

MR. FIGLER: All right. Thank you, Your Honor. We'd asked that they be marked as State's -- or sorry as court exhibit.

THE COURT: As a court exhibit?

MR. FIGLER: Yeah.

MS. BLUTH: And then I just have one more thing. In

regards to the videos, how many nanobytes, gigabytes, whatever, videos were there that you obtained from Mr. Mueller?

MS. MCAMIS: I have no way of estimating.

MR. FIGLER: A lot -- a hundred hours maybe.

MS. BLUTH: A hundred hours?

MR. FIGLER: At least.

2.0

MS. MCAMIS: More than a hundred. I think it spanned several months, maybe even up to a year.

MS. BLUTH: Okay. So I'm just asking that the Court make an exhibit of those videos because --

MR. FIGLER: You can request those from Mr. Mueller.

MS. BLUTH: No. I'm asking -- the defense said I could have a copy, number 1, and also I'm asking for the Court to order a copy be made a court's exhibit. I don't need them for my file, but if there is a conviction, I can see this down the line someone saying so-and-so was ineffective for not putting these videos in, and so I would like those made as court exhibits so down the line if that becomes an issue, then we have access to those to use with Ms. McAmis or Mr. Figler should they have to take the stand at a later time.

MR. FIGLER: I would ask that -- we don't have the hard drive. So I would ask that Mr. Mueller be brought in, and if the Court is inclined to do that, to order Mr. Mueller to have his client turn it over to the Court or a reasonable facsimile of it.

Why -- I mean, the defense was going to 1 MS. BLUTH: 2 give me a complete copy. So --3 MR. FIGLER: At the time when we still had it, and 4 then it was given back. 5 THE COURT: Mr. Figler, you don't have it? 6 MR. FIGLER: I don't have the hard copy or the hard 7 drive. 8 MS. BLUTH: I'm not asking for the hard copy. 9 asking for whatever they have. 10 MR. FIGLER: Oh, I'll give her whatever we have. 11 That's fine. 12 THE COURT: Okay. So he'll give --13 MR. FIGLER: But I don't know that's complete, 14 Jacqueline. I don't --15 MS. BLUTH: Oh, I'm going to get --It's the volume of it --16 MS. MCAMIS: 17 THE COURT: Okay. So he'll give you whatever he has, 18 and then you can have that marked as a court's exhibit, and it 19 should clearly reflect, number 1, the Court has not viewed it 2.0 nor has the Court been requested to view it. Because if 21 there's something down the road in there that's either 22 extremely exculpatory or inculpatory, mainly exculpatory, I don't want anyone to think that the Court has seen it. 23 24 MS. BLUTH: No. 25 THE COURT: So well, it's just -- you know.

MS. BLUTH: Right. Of course. Yeah.

2.0

THE COURT: I want to make it really, really clear. So when you put it in say not viewed by Court because I don't want it to be like, oh, I was asked to look at it, and you know what I'm saying?

MS. BLUTH: Like CPS records.

THE COURT: If there's something really exculpatory on here down the road, I don't want anyone to think that I saw it and didn't say anything.

MR. FIGLER: That's fine. I'll need some time because I would have to go back to my office, see what we have saved, haven't saved. I'm not going to ask Mr. Solander to give me back anything.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. FIGLER: And whatever I have I will give to the Court as a court exhibit, and I imagine the State would get that too.

THE COURT: All right. Let's take a quick break.

MS. BLUTH: Faiza's outside just so you know.

THE COURT: Let's start with Faiza. We'll put the jury in. We'll finish her, and then we'll take like a 5 or 10 minute break. We'll number the jury instructions. Go ahead and send me or send Crystal the assault instruction just in case I'm going to give that.

MR. FIGLER: Attempt you mean?

1 THE COURT: Oh, the attempt. Thank you. 2 MS. BLUTH: Okay. So I sent it to -- I typed 3 everything out, sent it to my secretary to format. I'll tell her right now at that [unintelligible] to add the attempt 4 5 language. 6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 MR. FIGLER: And the SOL stuff. 8 THE COURT: And what? 9 MS. BLUTH: I already -- I did that. I already did 10 that. 11 MR. FIGLER: Oh, okay, great. The statute of 12 limitation stuff. 13 THE COURT: Oh, okay. So that was another 14 instruction. So let's just take a really quick, you know, 15 couple minute break. Then we'll start with Faiza. Then we'll 16 take another break assuming that's all we have for this 17 morning. We'll get this all finalized, and then we'll go to 18 instructions. 19 Frankly, I have been request -- it had been requested 2.0 of me that I pass out 15 copies. Because it's so late, and 21 that would take time for my staff to print out 15 copies,

MS. BLUTH: Yeah.

because there just isn't time to --

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THE COURT: That would take another 30 minutes.

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they're not getting 15 copies. I'm just going to read from it

1	MS. BLUTH: So the way that they are printed right	
2	now they're, like, not in any type of order at all. So may I	
3	ask Crystal to hand them to me? I'll put them in order, make	
4	sure the defense is okay with them before we number them?	
5	THE COURT: Sure.	
6	MS. BLUTH: Okay.	
7	THE COURT: And then give me	
8	MS. BLUTH: Then number them or do you want to number	
9	them or some Judges are like I want to number them and so	
10	on.	
11	THE COURT: No. I usually number them. We all as	
12	long as I get a copy of but okay. So that's fine, but don't	
13	number them yet.	
14	MS. BLUTH: Okay. I won't. I won't.	
15	(Proceedings recessed 10:22 a.m. to 10:29 a.m.)	
16	(Outside the presence of the jury)	
17	THE COURT: and then we'll go into the	
18	instructions.	
19	MS. BLUTH: Sounds good.	
20	THE COURT: So I'll get a new packet; right?	
21	MS. BLUTH: Yeah. She's just making the changes	
22	right now.	
23	MR. FIGLER: And then we'll take a second and number	
24	them together.	
25	THE COURT: And what?	

1	MR. FIGLER: We'll take a second to number them
2	together.
3	THE COURT: Yes. We're going to take a break with
4	the jury. We'll number them together, make sure we all have
5	the same copy of everything, and all the changes have been made
6	to everybody's satisfaction.
7	(Pause in the proceedings)
8	MR. FIGLER: Your Honor, we had moved previously to
9	admit the search warrant but not the application for search
10	warrant. This is the actual search warrant.
11	THE COURT: Yeah, that's fine.
12	MR. FIGLER: I thought that was admitted.
13	THE COURT: The actual search warrant is admissible.
14	MR. FIGLER: You didn't have any objection to the
15	actual search warrant?
16	THE COURT: Not the application.
17	MR. FIGLER: Not the application, just the search
18	warrant itself. We had moved it.
19	MR. HAMNER: I don't even remember that happening,
20	but that's fine. No objection.
21	MR. FIGLER: That was through Detective Emery.
22	THE COURT: All right.
23	(Jury entering 10:30 a.m.)
24	THE COURT: All right. Court is now back in session.
25	The record should reflect the presence of the State through the

1	deputy district attorneys, the presence of the defendant and	
2	her counsel, the officers of the court and the ladies and	
3	gentlemen of the jury.	
4	And the defense may call its next witness.	
5	MR. FIGLER: Your Honor, the defense would call Faiza	
6	Ebrahim.	
7	FAIZA EBRAHIM	
8	[having been called as a witness and being first duly sworn,	
9	testified as follows:	
10	THE CLERK: Thank you. Please have a seat. State	
11	and spell your first and last name for the record.	
12	THE WITNESS: Faiza Ebrahim. F-a-i-z-a,	
13	E-b-r-a-h-i-m.	
14	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.	
15	THE COURT RECORDER: Could you I'm sorry. Could	
16	you do that again.	
17	THE WITNESS: Sure. First name is F-a-i-z-a. Last	
18	name E-b-r-a-h-i-m.	
19	THE COURT RECORDER: Thank you.	
20	THE WITNESS: You're welcome.	
21	DIRECT EXAMINATION	
22	BY MR. FIGLER:	
23	Q Ms. Ebrahim, could you tell the jury what you do for	
24	a living right now?	
25	A Right now I am a CPS investigator in the west zone of	

Clark County.

2.0

- Q Okay. And prior to that, what was your -- were you employed by the county in approximately February of March of 2014?
 - A Yes.
 - Q And in what capacity did you serve at that time?
- A I was the forensic interviewer and program coordinator of the SNCAC.
 - Q And what is that acronym for?
 - A Southern Nevada Children's Assessment Center.
- Q Okay. That's a government entity that I have heard referred to as a one-stop shop for people who or children who are alleging sexual abuse; is that fair to say? I know they do some other things, but they do that there as well?
- A Correct. Predominantly sex crimes, but there is, like, other high profile, torture and murder and all that sort of stuff.
- Q Okay. And then working as a forensic interviewer in that capacity, what were your responsibilities?
- A As a forensic interviewer, basically it was just to interview the children. Law enforcement or CPS would set up appointments with us, and then we would get a bit of a briefing from them about what the allegations are, and then we would interview the kids.
 - Q And what safeguards or precautions would you take at

that time to make sure that the information that you were receiving from those children was usable or valid information?

- A The information that I got from the children --
- O Yes.

2.0

- A -- or that was given to me prior?
- Q No, from the children themselves.

A Well, a forensic interview is -- like I wouldn't ask a whole lot of closed ended questions. It would be, you know, we were trying to get a narrative response from the children, and so sometimes we would ask the same question in a slightly different way, and, you know, depending on the number of children involved, if there were more kids on the same case, then we would kind of go through similar questions with each of them.

Q Are there any safeguards that are put in place with regard to the interview itself? In other words, what would be a possible -- let me rephrase the question. What would be some possible sources of tainting information or to have information -- to avoid having information that wasn't valid or was maybe influenced by other people? Do you understand my question?

A I think so. Well, when we talk to the kids, one of the things that we go through is actually to try to suss out if somebody has led the kids or coached them in some way or, like, told them, you know, you need to say something. And all of the

interviews at the SNCAC that are done are recorded as well, and as a forensic interviewer, we never do the interview without either law enforcement or CPS in the observation room watching it live.

Q And when you say it's recorded, is it recorded in audio or visual?

A Both.

2.0

Q Oh. So there's an audio and a video component to those interviews. And what is the purpose of that? Why audio and video or why either?

A That's a national standard for all accredited CACs. You have to have them recorded through NCA which is the National Children's Alliance, and because we are -- I'm not interviewing for CPS or for law enforcement. We're a neutral entity. So it's not, like, my evidence. So we have to be able to just pass it on.

Q Okay. And it's important for you to be a neutral entity?

A Correct.

Q And so would you say that you intentionally restrict the amount of information that is given to you by law enforcement as to not in any way influence or bias your forensic interview of the children?

A When you say "intentionally restrict," what do you mean?

Q Is it a policy or is it good practice to limit the type or the amount of information that you get prior to going into a forensic interview?

A Yes. And, like, oftentimes when I get a case that, even now in the capacity of being an investigator, if I have a case that I know media is involved in, I intentionally don't, if I see something come up on the news, I don't read it. I don't watch it because I don't want anything else in my mind other than what the kids are going to tell me. So even if somebody gives me information ahead of time, there's no reason for me to deal with that other than -- all I need to know is what the basic allegation is, and then I go from there.

Even if they come and tell me the allegation is a sexual assault that happened in a bedroom and they give me lots of details with it, I'll still go down the path of abuse, neglect and everything else.

Q Okay. One last question on this topic. When you are interviewing a child, especially a young child, is it important to not suggest the answer to them or to try to prompt a specific answer out of them?

A Yes.

2.0

Q And back in 2014, would it have been your practice to avoid doing that?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what happens if you did that? Is the

resulting information that's elicited perhaps not as reliable 1 2 as if you hadn't done that? Is that fair to say? 3 Sorry. Say that again. Yeah, I know that was a very complicated way to 4 5 structure it. Why is it important for you not to suggest the 6 answer or prompt an answer? 7 Because as a forensic interviewer or even as an Α 8 investigator, my job is to get information from the child that 9 is their experience, not anybody else's experience or anybody 10 else's assumption. It's strictly what the child experienced. 11 Okay. So now I'm going to draw your attention to 12 March 11th of -- March 11th of 2014. Do you recall a 13 interview with a sibling set of three young girls known as the 14 Solanders? 15 Α Yes. 16 Okay. And were you the forensic interviewer on that 17 date for those three young girls? 18 Α Yes. 19 Okay. And again that was March 11, 2014; is that 2.0 your recollection? 21 Α Yes. 22 Okay. Now, did you interview those girls together in 23 one room or separately? 24 The same room separately. Α 25 Okay. At different times presumably? 0

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A Yes.

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Q Okay. And so why is it important to have the girls interviewed separately?

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A Correct.

Q Okay. If I told you that it was 10 days earlier that

- Q Do you know whether or not they were interviewed 10 days earlier by a family services representative from a different state?
- A Not that I know of. I know that there was an arrangement for them to be flown back to Vegas from Florida.
 - O Okay.
 - A But I am unaware of another interview.
- Q You are unaware of whether or not there was an interview --

they were in Florida, would that sound to be part of your 1 2 recollection as well? 3 Α Yes. 4 Q Okay. 5 I remember they were in, I think, a boarding school 6 out there. 7 Okay. So it did refresh your recollection. Very 8 good. 9 But you don't know what conditions were in 10 place to allow the girls to be separate or apart during that 11 10-day period? 12 Α Correct. I don't know. 13 Okay. And then what about after that 10-day period? 14 Did you ever interview those girls again or participate in any 15 interview with those girls? 16 After I did the forensic interviews in 2014? 17 0 Correct. 18 I did. Last year I believe there was a case that Α 19 came through, but it was unrelated to this situation. 2.0 Okay. Were there additional interviews done? Q 21 Not forensic interviews. They were just kind of Α 22 checking in with the family. 23 Okay. Q 24 Where they were staying at the time. Α

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Oh, I see. So that was in an interview about the

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subject matter of this case? 1 2 Correct. It had nothing to do with this situation or 3 this -- the Solander family. Okay. Are you aware or not as to whether or not the 4 Q 5 Clark County District Attorney's office does what's known as 6 pretrials or interviews with the children prior to coming to 7 court? 8 I think they do in pretty much all cases, I would 9 imagine. 10 Okay. Do you know if they utilize the same 11 safeguards as audio and video and the other national standards 12 that you referred to in interviewing children? 13 MS. BLUTH: Objection. Speculation. 14 BY MR. FIGLER: 15 Do you know? 0 16 THE COURT: Do you know? THE WITNESS: If the DA's office does that? 17 18 MR. FIGLER: Yes. 19 THE WITNESS: I don't know, but the national 2.0 standards I'm referring to are for CAC specifically. It's not 21 for any -- it's not even for CPS or law enforcement. 22 strictly for children's advocacy centers. 23 BY MR. FIGLER:

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videos and keeping kids separate is important to maintaining

Okay. But you did testify that recording those

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1	the integrity of the information being related to you by the		
2	children;	correct?	
3	А	Yes, for forensic interviewers because of our	
4	position.		
5	Q	Only if you're aware, are you aware of any audio or	
6	video rec	ording done by the Clark County District Attorney in	
7	meeting with the children in this case?		
8	А	I have no idea.	
9	Q	Okay. I want to direct your attention to March 7th	
10	of 2014.	Do you know an individual named Payal Patel?	
11	А	Yes.	
12	Q	And who is that individual?	
13	А	I believe she was the DA at the time, maybe in family	
14	court I t	hink.	
15	Q	Okay. Do you remember receiving an email from Payal	
16	Patel rel	ated to this case on March 7th, 2014?	
17	А	I may have. I'm not sure what the	
18	Q	I'm going to show you what has been marked as Defense	
19	Exhibit -	_	
20		MR. FIGLER: Where's the number on it?	
21		THE CLERK: On the back.	
22		MR. FIGLER: I would assume I kept them in order,	
23	Jill.		
24		Well, I know it's going to be a letter.	
25		THE COURT: Counsel, approach.	

1	(Conference at the bench not recorded)	
2	BY MR. FIGLER:	
3	Q I'm going to show you what's been marked as Defense	
4	Exhibit BB. I'm going to show you these two emails that have	
5	been admitted. Why don't you review those and see if it	
6	refreshes your recollection.	
7	A Oh, I remember this, yeah.	
8	Q Okay. So let me ask you just a couple questions	
9	about it. Do you remember receiving then a email from Payal	
10	Patel from the district attorney's office on March 7th, 2014,	
11	referencing Janet Solander's book?	
12	A Yes.	
13	Q Okay. And do you remember forwarding that to a	
14	number of other individuals at 7:40 a.m. on Tuesday, March	
15	11th?	
16	A I don't remember it, but I saw it on there.	
17	Q Does that refresh your recollection	
18	A Yes.	
19	Q that you might have done that?	
20	A Yes.	
21	Q Okay. And at 7:40 in the morning, would that have	
22	been before or after you think you did the three Solander	
23	girls' interviews, if you can recall?	
24	A If that was on March 7th, I	
25	Q Oh, I'm sorry. Let's go back to March 11th. On	

March 11th, you sent a email -- forwarded the email about Janet Solander's book. It appears to be at 7:40 to three people. So would that have been before or after you committed -- or conducted the forensic interview of the three children?

A That would've been before.

Q Okay. Finally, I have the forensic interview of Ava Solander. I'm going to approach you with page 65. If you could just review that full-page so you get the context.

A Okay.

2.0

Q If you need a page before or after, just let me know, but I think that has the context there. So just review that. See if it refreshes your recollection.

A Okay.

Q I mean, I'm assuming you don't remember every page of the forensic interview and what was said with regard to the specific topic.

A I actually wasn't aware that I was going to be testifying today.

Q Fair enough.

A So I haven't looked at those --

Q That's why --

A -- interviews since 2014.

Q -- I kind of skipped a step to let you read that.

A Okay.

So why don't you take your time, and if you need 1 2 additional pages, let me know. 3 Α Okay. 4 If you need the cover sheet just to verify that 5 that's the same one, let me know that as well. 6 Α Okay. Just that one page; right? 7 Just that one page. 8 Α Okay. 9 In reviewing that, does that refresh your Q recollection of that sequence of questions with Ava Solander? 10 I believe that had to do with the Home Depot buckets 11 12 with the toilet seats attached to it. 13 Okay. And do you remember asking the child if there 14 was another way of getting the pee out of her body? 15 Α Correct. 16 Okay. And do you remember her not responding to 17 that? 18 Α Yes. 19 And do you remember prompting her about what her sister had told her about a tube and a bag? 2.0 21 Α Yes. 22 Okav. So is it your testimony that you had to prompt 23 her to get that response? 24 Well, it's not prompting her. It's giving a little Α 25

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bit of information that her sister said. But the way I

provided the information, she could say she doesn't know anything about what her sister said, and I'm not a hundred percent sure because, like I said, I haven't looked at these interviews since 2014. I'm not -- I can't remember if all three girls had the same experience or not when it came to the buckets.

Q Okay. I'm not talking about the buckets now. I'm talking about the catheters. I think there's already been a stipulation between the parties. Do you accept the stipulation as true that Amaya Solander in her forensic CPS interview did not mention catheters at all?

MS. BLUTH: I'm sorry. In what?

MR. FIGLER: In her CPS interview -- Amaya.

Can we approach, Your Honor? I just want to make sure we do this right.

THE COURT: Sure.

(Conference at the bench not recorded)

BY MR. FIGLER:

2.0

Q Ms. Ebrahim, if I told you there was a stipulation between the district attorney and the defense that Amaya Solander, who is the middle child, did not mention anything at all about catheters or the allegation of insertion of catheter, anything about that at all in her statement, would you accept that as being a true stipulation, or do you need to review this yourself?

1	А	No, I would accept that.
2	Q	Okay. So just focusing on Ava Solander, you do admit
3	to be the	one who brought up her sister telling you something
4	else in ar	nother interview; is that correct?
5	А	Yes.
6	Q	And you were the one who brought up, quote, Some kind
7	of a tube	thing with a bag, as a prelude to her responding
8	with, Oh,	catheter?
9	А	Correct.
10	Q	And then when you asked her what a catheter was, do
11	you rememb	per her response being, It has a tube, and it has a
12	bag?	
13	А	Only from
14	Q	Do you remember that now if I showed that to you?
15	A	Yes.
16		Oh, yes. Uh-huh.
17	Q	And that's her response?
18	A	Yes.
19		MR. FIGLER: Okay. Pass the witness, Your Honor.
20		THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
21		Ms. Bluth.
22		MS. BLUTH: Yes, Your Honor.
23		CROSS-EXAMINATION
24	BY MS. BL	JTH:
25	Q	Okay. I want to ask you a few questions, but I want
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to make sure I get the question right. So just one second, please.

All right. Now, in her answer, and I'll approach if you don't remember it off the hand, after -- your question to her is, Your sister was telling me about some kind of tube thing with a bag. And she says, Oh, catheter. And you say, A catheter, what about a catheter? And isn't it true that her whole response was, It has a tube, and then it has a bag and, um, has -- if we have -- if we say we don't have to use the bathroom but to them it looked like we're pee dancing, they would put the catheter down in our private area?

A Yes.

2.0

- Q So she did provide additional facts and to when the catheter would be used on her?
 - A Correct.
- Q Now, you had also -- like you stated, you had interviewed all three sisters that day; correct?
- A Yes.
- Q And so defense brought up that Amaya Solander, the middle child, did not bring up the catheter, and that was a stipulation; correct?
 - A Yes.
- Q But in your interview with Anastasia, the youngest, she had brought up the catheter?
- A Yes.