IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

Michael Alan Lee, Petitioner/Appellant))	Supreme Court Case No.: 76330 Electronically Filed
VS.)))	APPELLANT'S APPENDEX eth DAE XB rown Vol. VI Clerk of Supreme Court
Brian E. Williams, Sr., Warden High)	Pages 1000-1054
Desert State Prison,)	
Respondent,)	
)	
and)	
)	
The State of Nevada,)	
Real Party in Interest)	
)	
	_)	

Appendix Index (Alphabetical)

Document Name	<u>Date</u>	Bates No.
Appellant's Supreme Court Opening Brief	09/08/2015	914-935
(Docket No. 66963)		
Errata to Petition for Writ of Habeas	09/16/2017	961-974
Corpus (Post-Conviction)		
Information	11/18/2011	001-003
Judgment of Conviction	11/10/2014	912-913
Jury Instructions	08/15/2014	843-867
Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas	08/07/2017	1009-1021
Corpus (Post-Conviction)		
Order Granting Second Petition for Writ of	07/09/2018	1048-1054
Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction)		
Order of Affirmance	09/13/2016	936-949
Order of Dismissal	12/19/2017	1022-1026
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-	05/12/2017	950-960
Conviction)		
Second Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus	02/06/2018	1027-1039

(Post-Conviction)		
State's Response to Petition for Writ of	06/20/2017	975-990
Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction)		
State's Response to Second Petition for	04/03/2018	1040-1047
Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction)		
Transcripts, Jury Trial Day 1	08/04/2014	004-182
Transcripts, Jury Trial Day 2	08/05/2014	183-285
Transcripts, Jury Trial Day 3	08/06/2014	286-442
Transcripts, Jury Trial Day 4	08/07/2014	443-628
Transcripts, Jury Trial Day 5	08/08/2014	629-728
Transcripts, Jury Trial Day 6	08/11/2014	729-772
Transcripts, Jury Trial Day 7	08/14/2014	773-842
Transcripts, Jury Trial Day 8	08/15/2014	868-905
Transcripts, Jury Trial Day 9	08/16/2014	906-911
Transcripts, Petition for Writ of Habeas	07/12/2017	991-1008
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Appendix Index (Chronological)

1 that was damaging to the defense expert, but it didn't have anything to do with the 2 defense in this case of intentional or non-intentional or accidental versus non-3 accidental. And it says, next sentence, Ms. von Magdenko was not qualified to first 4 chair a non-capital murder case. Well what's the relevance of that? She was 5 retained. Both the Defendant and his parents were canvassed by this Court in detail 6 over a period of years that this Court sat pretrial in this department, and at no point 7 did anybody raise any concern. In fact, it was their express desire to continue with 8 the representation when directly asked by this Court.

Next line, line 15, refused to adhere to Mr. Altig's advice not to insert -- assert an inconsistent defense. There was no inconsistent defense presented in this trial whatsoever, either by Mr. Altig, by Ms. von Magdenko, or any combination thereof, and the record clearly reflects it.

The next thing is Mr. Altig also told Ms. von Magdenko to object several times, but she failed to timely object. What's the objection? It's in the next line, 21 through 23. Specifically, Mr. Altig was objecting to having the medical examiner's testimony given early in the trial and cross-examination delayed until the State's case in chief was ending. I don't remember that at all, and the trial record won't reflect that. It's simply untrue.

Then here's the kicker, the last prayer to the Court, page 9, line 2 -- 28. Steve Altig submits that Michael Lee case was a defensible case and believes that a different outcome was probable with experienced trial counsel. Both medical experts argued that the injury was not accidental. Simply not true. He didn't argue it. He never stated that. It's a complete distortion and outright misrepresentation of the record.

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The Appellate Court of Nevada has already been critical of trial's counsel's

1 opening the door, parenthetically, unnecessarily, for repeated use of the autopsy 2 photos. No one can look at the Nevada Supreme Court's clear, plain, written record 3 and draw that conclusion. Number one, it doesn't state it, and number two, there's 4 no inference that can be drawn. They make no comment that the door was opened 5 by counsel's theory or argument, and that it was unnecessary. It was imbedded 6 inherently in the defense of the case no matter how the defense occurs. There was 7 no pretrial ruling limiting the use of the autopsy photographs, and as the Nevada 8 Supreme Court said in direct appeal with painstakingly clarifying language that the 9 use of the autopsy photos to the lay witnesses was the use of the external 10 photographs that showed this child beaten from head to toe that were clearly visible. 11 All the witnesses that were shown, five of them were shown the photographs 12 because they were the last people around this child until the child was unequivocally 13 and uncontrovertibly in the sole possession of the Defendant and his then wife. And 14 thus that evidence and those witnesses would have been called no matter what the 15 Defendant said and no matter what the defense theory or theories were. As soon as 16 he pled not guilty, those photographs and those witnesses are relevant no matter 17 what.

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THE COURT: Okay, with a response, sir?

MR. POTTER: Yes, Your Honor. The important aspect here is that Ms. Magdenko in her opening talked about this being as a result of an accident. The expert that's in question was the individual that she was trying to get the Court to allow to make determinations. He's a biomechanical engineer. The individual that she was then relying upon could not opine, according to the Court's ruling, as to whether this was a result, and the injuries were as a result of an accidental. Her other expert, her medical expert --

1	THE COURT: Well, but shouldn't that have been an issue if shouldn't that	
2	have been an issue for appeal if the appellate court believed that it was error of this	
3	Court not to disallow the defense's expert? And I don't remember which one. It was	
4	a biomechanical expert.	
5	MR. POTTER: Yes, ma'am.	
6	THE COURT: Yeah, it was biomechanical experts; not only do they testify	
7	regarding how a body moves and everything else,	
8	MR. POTTER: Right.	
9	THE COURT: but they wanted to go to the next step, whether that	
10	movement could cause injury, which is	
11	MR. POTTER: Right. Now he was he was clearly making a determination	
12	of medical in a medical nature.	
13	THE COURT: Okay, so wouldn't that be something that should have been	
14	MR. POTTER: But her own medical expert doesn't	
15	THE COURT: presented on appeal? That would not be a post-conviction	
16	relief.	
17	MR. POTTER: It's it's not something because we're not saying that the	
18	Court was wrong. We're saying she was wrong because she went against her own	
19	expert in trying to argue that this was accidental. What Mr. Altig has expressed is	
20	that she was advised by him that that is an inconsistent defense trying to use one	
21	expert that the Court had already excluded his testimony, which she's then trying to	
22	argue that in the opening, and clearly that's the determination that the supreme	
23	court made in making a determination about her theory of defense. Her theory of	
24	defense is it was accidental in nature, and that's what she argued, and in the	
25	opening, contrary to what Mr. Altig had advised her.	

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All we're asking is the opportunity to have these individuals either testify in a 2 hearing or by deposition, which is what I would prefer to do, and I mean, it's -- it's 3 not a situation where it's -- his parents make the determination. I mean, he's an 4 individual. He's the one that has requested the petition be filed on his behalf, whether it was prudent -- I mean, the Court did what you -- what you thought was 6 proper in asking the parents, but the parents don't control the decision of an 7 individual.

THE COURT: The Defendant was likewise asked.

MR. POTTER: I'm sorry?

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THE COURT: The Defendant was also asked.

MR. POTTER: I understand that, Your Honor.

12 THE COURT: And he is an adult, and he does get to make that decision 13 regarding his representation.

14 MR. POTTER: Correct. And he wasn't given the option of having appointed 15 counsel take over. Instead, what he was told that -- is this individual had an interest 16 in protecting him, but that's not what happened, and that's what the record shows, 17 and it's what's been bolstered by is Mr. Altig's representations, not only to myself, 18 but to the family, and to the client as to what actually took place; that this individual, 19 the reason she volunteered -- she wasn't retained. The reason she did this is 20 because she wanted to get experience as trial counsel so she could move up the 21 ladder on this appointed panel that they have dealing with these types of cases, and 22 it's not merely just argument on our part at this point, because Mr. Altig is the one at 23 this stage who's advised and he felt compelled to advise as to what was taking 24 place. And Mr. Knapp confirms that he was going to come in, and he had issues, 25 and he couldn't do it, and so she was left with the situation that Mr. Altig was -- I

Bates 1004

mean he can testify before the Court that he wasn't co-counsel. I mean he's made that very clear to me on multiply occasions. He was not co-counsel in this case.

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THE COURT: All right. Is there anything else by any person?

MR. STANTON: Well, Judge, first of all, the *Labastida* argument of child abuse and neglect, that doesn't even apply in this case. The theory in the charging document was abuse and first degree murder in a premeditated fashion, so Labastida in the unpublished opinion is of no import in this case whatsoever at any time. The jury instructions that counsel -- you -- Court just asked earlier directly about the instructions, that belies the entire argument. There was no theory that was expanded. There was no instructions on neglect. This is not a neglect case. It's a straight abuse, premeditated murder. That's the way it's charged. That's the way the jury was instructed, and that's what the verdict form reads. And there is no analysis to the prejudicial prong. There's no need for an evidentiary hearing. You should deny the petition outright.

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THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything else.

16 MR. POTTER: Yes, Your Honor. The prejudice is directly expressed. The Labastida is appropriate. There's no distinctions made by the court as to that particular case. It's the way it was instructed, and it's contrary to the existing supreme court law.

20 THE COURT: But you have never indicated that it's contrary to what the 21 evidence was during the course of the trial. The jury -- okay, is there anything else? 22 MR. STANTON: Not from the State.

THE COURT: And the defense?

24 MR. POTTER: Yeah, Your Honor, I would just point out that the instructions 25 are -- the jury is allowed to have a plain reading of the -- of the jury instructions and whether they brought forward and argued it differently is not germane to the fact that those instructions were given, and they're contrary to the existing supreme court law.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So, at this point, I am going to deny the Defendant's petition in its entirety for the following reason: With respect to the claims that there was ineffective assistance by trial counsel, the Court does note that this was a situation where the trial attorney was retained and chosen by the Defendant; and again there was a canvas whereby the Court asked him specifically whether he wanted Ms. Magdenko to represent him, and he answered yes. As far as claims that he was not aware that the public defenders or some type of appointed counsel would be available to him, I think that's likewise belied by the record insofar as if you look at his criminal history contained in his PSI, this gentleman has an extensive history with the criminal system. It seems very disingenuous that he did not understand that there's public defenders who could represent him since he had been through the criminal system so many times. In fact, probably sitting in court all the multitude times for his various criminal cases, he had probably seen the public defender's office represent a multitude of individuals and perhaps even himself through his myriad of cases.

As far as the issue about the jury instructions, the Court finds that it's just not backed up by the record. Throughout the case the State's theory of death was that the child died by child abuse, and there is nothing in the record indicating neglect, and that the jury instructions did mirror the evidence, the State's theory throughout the case, and the evidence that came out during the course of the case.

As far as the effectiveness of the appellate counsel, the Court likewise finds there's no merit to their argument. There's been no showing that anything would

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have been different if different issues had been raised on appeal. The Court does note that the supreme court has repeatedly said that it's appellate counsel's obligation to go through and determine which are the strongest arguments and present those arguments to the Nevada Supreme Court, and there is no indication in the record that -- that any -- that the appellate counsel did anything other than that.

As far as the photographs, there's been a lot of discussion about the photographs. This has been an issue that's already been decided by the higher courts. The higher courts in a pretty detailed analysis did already make the determination that the photographs, although they may have been prejudicial and they used the word simply because you have a young victim, which is upsetting to many individuals, the photographs were more -- nonetheless more probative than prejudicial. They went directly to what the state had to prove which is the manner and cause of death, and they showed that there was injuries on this child and those photographs being shown to the lay witnesses in this case. They were shown for the purpose, and I think the courts have recognized this, to narrow down when those injuries could have occurred, because the individuals those photographs were shown to were -- were with the child in the few days leading to the child's death, so the Court doesn't believe that any relief is granted on that grounds either.

Lastly, because the Court's not finding the Defendant entitled to relief on the habeas, the Court is likewise not granting any discovery. Thank you. I need an order, please.

MR. STANTON: Judge, could you instruct your court reporter to -- recorder to prepare a transcript of the Court's findings so that I can make a detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law?

THE COURT: Yeah. Maria, -- I need an order. Okay, yeah, can you submit

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2	MR. POTTER: And could we also have in addition to the findings of fact,	
3	conclusion of law, written notice of the entry.	
4	THE COURT: I can't hear you. I'm sorry, Mr. Potter.	
5	MR. POTTER: I'm sorry. We're just confirming that we would also get the	
6	written notice of the entry you told us.	
7	THE COURT: Yeah. If it's transcribed. Maria is just going to need an order.	
8	MR. STANTON: Okay. I'll prepare an order.	
9	THE COURT: And then once I sign it, she'll get that started,	
10	MR. STANTON: Thank you, Judge.	
11	THE COURT: probably not until next week, though.	
12	MR. STANTON: Right.	
13	MS. SPELLS: Your Honor,	
14	THE COURT: Yes, ma'am.	
15	MS. SPELLS: I would just like the record to reflect that we are withdrawing on	
16	this case at this time.	
17	THE COURT: Oh, yeah.	
18	MS. SPELLS: It's still showing that.	
19	THE COURT: And it should show Mr. Potter's office is the counsel of record.	
20	I did notice that. Thank you.	
21	MS. SPELLS: Thank you.	
22	[Proceedings concluded at 10:08 a.m.]	
23	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.	
24	Parla Walsh	
25	Paula Walsh Court Recorder/Transcriber	
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			Electronically Filed 7/31/2017 1:49 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
1	FCL		Alen b. Sum
2	STEVEN B. WOLFSON		Cum
3	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565		
	RYAN J. MACDONALD Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #12615		
4	200 Lewis Avenue	:	
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500		
6	Attorney for Plaintiff		
7		CT COURT NTY, NEVADA	
8			
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	1	
10	Plaintiff,		
11	-VS-	CASE NO:	C-11-277650-1
12	MICHAEL ALAN LEE	DEPT NO:	XXIII
13	#1699107 Defendant.		
14	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
15	FINDINGS OF FAC LAW AN	T, CONCLUSIONS (ND ORDER	OF
16	DATE OF HEAR	ING: JUNE 28, 2017 ARING: 9:30 AM	
17	TIME OF HEA	ARING: 9:30 AM	
18	THIS CAUSE having come on for hear	ring before the Honor	able STEPHANY MILEY,
19	District Judge, on the 28th day of June, 201	17, the Petitioner bei	ng represented by CAL J.
20	POTTER III, and JASMIN D. SPELLS, the	Respondent being re	presented by STEVEN B.
21	WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney	y, by and through E	OAVID STANTON, Chief
22	Deputy District Attorney, and the Court h	aving considered the	e matter, including briefs,
23	transcripts, arguments of counsel, and docu	ments on file herein,	now therefore, the Court
24	makes the following findings of fact and conc	clusions of law:	
25	FINDINGS OF FACT, O	CONCLUSIONS OF	LAW
26	On November 18, 2011, Michael Ala	an Lee ("Defendant"	r) was charged by way of
27	Information with: Count 1 – Murder (NRS 2	200.010, 200.030, 20	0.508) and Count 2: Child
28	Abuse and Neglect With Substantial Bodily F		
	—	-	

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Before trial on June 10, 2014, Lee filed a Motion in Limine to Exclude Autopsy Photographs. The State filed its Opposition on June 20, 2014. The court denied the Motion on June 25, 2014.

Lee's jury trial commenced on August 4, 2014. On August 15, 2014, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts.

On August 18, 2014, Lee filed a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal. On August 20, 2014, Lee filed a Motion for a New Trial. The State filed its Oppositions to the Motions on August 21 and 22, 2014. The court denied the Motions on September 3, 2014.

On October 21, 2014, Lee was adjudicated guilty and sentenced as follows: as to Count 1: life without the possibility of parole; and as to Count 2: a minimum of 96 months and a maximum of 240 months, consecutive to Count 1. Lee received no credit for time served. A Judgment of Conviction was filed on November 10, 2014.

A Notice of Appeal was filed on November 24, 2014. On August 10, 2016, the Nevada Supreme Court Affirmed the Judgment of Conviction. Remittitur issued September 6, 2016.

On May 12, 2017, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. On June 19, 2017, Petitioner filed an errata to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The State responded on June 20, 2017. On June 28, 2017, this Court heard the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and denied the Petition for the following reasons:

I. COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE

A. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel, Generally:

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." <u>Strickland v. Washington</u>, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); <u>see also State v. Love</u>, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must prove he was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87, 104 S. Ct. at 2063-64. See also Love, 109 Nev. at 1138, 865 P.2d at 323. Under the Strickland test, a defendant must show first that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 2068; Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the Strickland twopart test). "[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

The court begins with the presumption of effectiveness and then must determine whether the defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011, 103 P.3d 25, 32 (2004). "Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is '[w]ithin the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Jackson v. Warden, 91 Nev. 430, 432, 537 P.2d 473, 474 (1975).

Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make futile objections or arguments. See Ennis v. State, 122 Nev. 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006). Trial counsel has the "immediate and ultimate responsibility of deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop." Rhyne v. State, 118 Nev. 1, 8, 38 P.3d 163, 167 (2002).

Based on the above law, the role of a court in considering allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel is "not to pass upon the merits of the action not taken but to determine whether, under the particular facts and circumstances of the case, trial counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance." Donovan v. State, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978). This analysis does not mean that the court should "second guess reasoned choices" between trial tactics nor does it mean that defense counsel, to protect himself against allegations of inadequacy, must make every conceivable motion no matter how remote the possibilities are of success." Id. To be effective, the constitution "does not require that counsel

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Bates 1011

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do what is impossible or unethical. If there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel cannot create one and may disserve the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.19, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046 n.19 (1984).

"There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 689. "Strategic choices made by counsel after thoroughly investigating the plausible options are almost unchallengeable." <u>Dawson v. State</u>, 108 Nev. 112, 117, 825 P.2d 593, 596 (1992); <u>see also Ford v. State</u>, 105 Nev. 850, 853, 784 P.2d 951, 953 (1989). In essence, the court must "judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

Even if a defendant can demonstrate that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, he must still demonstrate prejudice and show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. <u>McNelton v. State</u>, 115 Nev. 396, 403, 990 P.2d 1263, 1268 (1999) (citing <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." <u>Id.</u> (citing <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 687-89, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-65, 2068).

The Nevada Supreme Court has held "that a habeas corpus petitioner must prove the disputed factual allegations underlying his ineffective-assistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence." <u>Means v. State</u>, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). Furthermore, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief must be supported with specific factual allegations, which if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. <u>Hargrove v. State</u>, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "Bare" and "naked" allegations are not sufficient, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. <u>Id.</u> NRS 34.735(6) states in relevant part, "[Petitioner] *must* allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition[.]...Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause your petition to be dismissed." (emphasis added).

A defendant who contends his attorney was ineffective because he did not adequately investigate must show how a better investigation would have rendered a more favorable outcome probable. Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 192, 87 P.3d 533, 538 (2004).

B. Defendant Has Not Demonstrated Ineffectiveness At Trial

1. Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Failing To Challenge Jury Instructions Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge jury instructions because the State's theory of the case, and all argument and evidence presented, demonstrated that Defendant willfully, intentionally, and directly killed Brodie via blunt-force trauma. Defendant attempts to analogize the instant case to the unpublished Nevada Supreme Court case Thompson v. State, 2016 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 79, *2 2016 WL 315216 (Nev. 2016), and a published case, Labastida v. State, 115 Nev. 298, 986 P.2d 443 (1991). Petition 8-9. These cases, while facially similar, are inapplicable because the issues raised in those cases do not apply in Defendant's case.

In Labastida, the Court held that "we are not willing to read NRS 200.030(1)(a) so as to define first degree murder to include a murder which is perpetrated by means of child neglect." Labastida, 115 Nev. at 303, 986 P.2d at 446. Additionally, the Court found that because the jury did not convict Labastida of child abuse causing substantial bodily harm. "the evidence presented below simply [did not] justify an assumption that the jury could have found Labastida guilty of committing an act or acts with the intent to cause the child pain or suffering and at the same time acquitted her of willfully causing the child to suffer physical pain or mental suffering, either directly or by aiding and abetting Strawser." Id. at 304. In essence, the error committed allowed for the possibility that the jury could have convicted Labastida of felony murder by child abuse when they only found that she committed child neglect, as evidenced by their acquittal on the child abuse causing substantial bodily harm charge. The Thompson Court assigned the same error in that case, specifically addressing that "[b]ecause of the State's argument, it is unclear whether the jury convicted Thompson of first-degree felony murder for conduct prohibited by the felony murder statute or for conduct merely prohibited by NRS 200.508." Thompson, 2016 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS at *5.

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Bates 1013

In the instant case, no such error was possible because the State never argued that 1 Defendant could have allowed Brodie to die through neglect. Instead, the State argued only, 2 and repeatedly, that Defendant directly killed Brodie through blunt force trauma. For example, 3 the State, during introductions, summarized what the case was going to show as follows: 4 "This case involves the death of Brodie Aschenbrenner who was murdered on 5 June 15th of 2011. The State alleges that the defendant beat Brodie 6 Aschenbrenner to death." 7 Trial Transcript (T.T.), August 4, 2014, p. 15. 8 During opening statements, the State provided the following roadmap: 9 "Most importantly, [Dr. Gavin will] tell you that this was a homicide. This was 10 child abuse. Someone inflicted these wounds. This isn't accidental." . . . 11 "At the end of this trial, we're going to ask you to find the defendant guilty of 12 first degree murder for beating Brodie and causing his death." 13 <u>T.T.</u>, August 5, 2014 at p. 25, 27-28. 14 15 During closing arguments, the State further argued that Defendant beat Brodie and 16 caused his death – a direct act of child abuse and not child neglect: 17 "The elements are listed here, somewhat similar as to the child abuse charge. The defendant willfully caused blunt force trauma in some unknown manner --18 same idea as with the other count -- to Brodie's abdomen. This one resulted in 19 his death. As I stated previously, it doesn't matter what the defendant intended when he beat Brodie. It only matters he intended to beat him. If he killed Brodie 20 when he beat him, causing his death, and it was unintentional, he didn't want him to die, it doesn't matter for purposes of murder by child abuse. You beat a 21 kid, you run the risk. Malice is implied. A malignant and abandoned heart is 22 implied. You beat a kid, you run the risk of killing him, first degree murder." 23 "So with that said, we know that the car accident or fender bender means nothing 24 here. It wasn't an accident. We know that the nature, severity and extent of those injuries indicate they were caused by someone else. 25 We know it wasn't the Power Wheels incident. That's an accident, right? 26 Well, it's not an accident what happened here. Those are eliminated for you. You don't have to worry about that. 27 /// 28

Most importantly in my opinion is the Bambam injuries are ruled out. Bambam injuries are inherently accidental. If this is a kid running around banging his head on stuff and banging his body on stuff, those are accidents. That's ruled out. This was homicide. You don't have to worry about that."

"And most importantly, you can't ignore those symptoms when we're talking about timing of the injuries. You can't ignore those. That's common sense. This kid had a transected internal organ, completely severed internal organ. If you believe that he didn't show symptoms almost immediately after that, we disagree completely. That is a little boy with an internal injury so severe that it's only seen or usually seen in major car accidents, fatal car accidents. He's showing symptoms almost immediately after that injury's inflicted."

"Again I'll highlight for count two, the substantial bodily harm, who was alone with him during the operative time period? The defendant. *Who was alone with him during the operative time period that the fatal injury occurred? The defendant*. The head injury, we know now, happened after Monday night dinner, some point before Tuesday morning, because Brodie woke up on Tuesday, per Arica, and had a headache; his head hurt. That's the first sign of symptoms. Arica wasn't alone with him Monday night. The defendant was.

The duodenum. Remember the hair salon, they did -- they ran these errands throughout the day on Tuesday. They went to Shark Reef, they went to a number of different places. They got to the hair salon. Brodie's fast asleep already showing symptoms from the head injury. He's exhausted, didn't want to walk. He's fast asleep in the back in the center, facing forward in his car seat. She gets out, she closes the door gently so she doesn't wake her sleeping baby. She comes back within five minutes and that kid's screaming at the top of his lungs. Once again the defendant is alone with him and the defendant blames it on something else; says when you closed the door, he started freaking out. That's when that fatal injury was inflicted. That's within the operative time period.

Brodie starts vomiting later. Brodie won't eat his lasagna. Mom has to force feed him the lasagna. She wants him to eat.

Those injuries are not accidental. Those injuries are not inflicted by Arica. They're inflicted by one person and one person alone.

Those injuries are not accidental. They're not inflicted by Arica. One person and one person alone inflicted them.

Those injuries. No accidental. Not inflicted by Arica. Those injuries. Definitely not accidental. Definitely not inflicted by Arica.

I'll remind you one more time it doesn't matter whether there was an intent to kill. It matters who beat him, who intended to beat him, and who caused his death. Find that defendant guilty of both those counts. Thank you."

<u>T.T.</u> August 15, 2014 p. 4-5, 7, 13-14.

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Finally, during rebuttal argument, the State again emphasized that Defendant killed

Brodie through child abuse:

"Now, [Brodie's] body tells you that he was the victim of significant physical abuse over a period of time. Now we focused somewhat unfairly so on two injuries, the injuries to the head and the injuries to the abdomen. But he has a lot more injuries. And the most compelling evidence in this case and I would submit to you simply uncontroverted is the distinction between Bambam injuries and *non-accidental physical abuse*.

Every single person who took this witness stand in this trial told you that what you see at autopsy are not Bambam injuries. Every single person.

Even the defendant's sister, as you saw when I showed her the photographs at autopsy, had a physical reaction to what she was seeing. No one had seen those before. No one. *That is because they are indicative of physical abuse, child abuse, intentionally inflicted upon this child.* And as I just heard counsel's argument to you is that's the murder. That's the killer right in front of you."

"Exhibit 66. That is a hand, ladies and gentlemen. And I'm going to ask you to do -- keep in mind two things about that. Number one is it's unmistakably because of the scalloped, the number, where the thumb would be of what's right underneath the skin. And the internal organs as you go from anatomically from what you just saw inside Brodie's body, you have the lower abdomen, but you also have his rib. His eighth rib was fractures. Another injury that we haven't talked a lot about. But once again indicative of child abuse."

"Brodie was murdered. But not by Arica. By that man sitting right in front of you. And I respectfully submit the evidence is overwhelming to that effect. Hold him accountable and convict him of first degree murder."

<u>Id.</u> p. 27, 32-33.

. . .

The State's theory of the case, argument, and evidence presented demonstrated only that Defendant killed Brodie through the intentional act of beating him hard enough to break a rib and dissect Brodie's duodenum. For the purposes of felony murder: "'Child abuse' means physical injury of a nonaccidental nature to a child under the age of 18 years." NRS 200.030(6)(b). The State consistently argued that Defendant willfully inflicted a physical injury of a non-accidental nature to Brodie, a child under the age of 18 years. Therefore, the State argued precisely the elements of felony murder child abuse.

Counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the jury instructions at trial because there was no evidence that supported a finding that Defendant had committed child neglect – only child abuse. As Defendant states, [b]oth medical experts argued that the injury was nonaccidental." <u>Petition</u> at 10.

Further, even if counsel were deficient, Defendant did not demonstrate prejudice. Again, even if the jury instructions were incorrect, the State argued the correct elements of felony murder child abuse. Unlike <u>Labastida</u> and <u>Thompson</u>, there was no possibility that Defendant could have been erroneously found guilty based on child neglect because there was no evidence or argument presented that neglect occurred. Additionally, unlike <u>Labastida</u>, where the Court reversed an earlier decision, in part, because the jury did not find the defendant guilty of child abuse with substantial bodily harm, leading to the inference that the defendant did not inflict a non-accidental physical injury, here the jury found Defendant guilty of that charge. Had counsel challenged the jury instructions, and had those instructions replaced the instructions given, the Defendant would still have been found guilty because the State argued the correct elements of felony murder child abuse, and no alternative "neglect" finding was possible.

This Court FINDS the following facts: Throughout the case the State's theory of death was that the child died by child abuse, and there is nothing in the record indicating neglect, and that the jury instructions did mirror the evidence, the State's theory throughout the case, and the evidence that came out during the course of the case.

Because Defendant did not demonstrate ineffectiveness, and because even if Defendant had demonstrated ineffectiveness Defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice, this Court now FINDS that Defendant has not demonstrated that counsel was ineffective, and additionally FINDS that Defendant has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced even if counsel were deficient.

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Defendant's claim is, therefore, DENIED.

2. Defendant's Remaining Claims Of Ineffectiveness Are Unsubstantiated Defendant's vague assertions that trial counsel was ineffective because she was "not qualified" are "bare" and "naked" assertions fit only for summary dismissal. <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984).

Additionally, these claims are belied by the record. <u>Id.</u> A brief review of the Odyssey filings demonstrate that counsel argued, before, during, and after trial, effectively on behalf of her client.

Defendant's claims regarding defense counsels' interactions with each other are unsupported by evidence, and do not appear likely to require relief. They certainly do not demonstrate ineffectiveness by a preponderance of the evidence. <u>Means</u>, 120 Nev. at 1012, 103 P.3d at 33. Even if Nadia Von Magdenko were deficient, at worst she was supported by attorney Steve Altig, who was present through trial and who, according to Defendant, provided effective counsel. Defendant, therefore, cannot demonstrate prejudice because he was represented by at least one attorney who he admits was not ineffective.

This Court also FINDS the following facts: Defendant has an extensive criminal history, and was certainly aware that a Public Defender could be appointed. Defendant chose to retain counsel, and cannot now argue that more qualified counsel could have been appointed. Additionally, Defendant affirmatively requested the counsel that was actually retained.

Therefore, this Court FINDS that Defendant's claim that counsel was unqualified is unsupported by the record and the claim is DENIED.

Additionally, Defendant claims that the Nevada Supreme Court, in its' Order of Affirmance, was critical of counsel's performance because counsel "opened the door" to repeated use of autopsy photos. <u>Petition</u> 10. This claim is also belied by the record. <u>Hargrove</u>, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "[T]he contested images, both below and on appeal, depict Brodie's external injuries." <u>Order of Affirmance</u> at 2, fn. 2. The Court first rejected Defendant's argument because the photos "had a high probative value." <u>Id.</u> at 3.

Second, because the photos were highly probative, "they would need to be exceedingly gruesome for the district court to have abused its discretion in admitting them." <u>Id.</u> at 4. Nor was the Court in any way critical of trial counsel's performance. Defendant's claim is, therefore, wholly unsupported and belied by the record.

This Court hereby FINDS the following facts: That the Nevada Supreme Court has determined that the autopsy photos were more probative than prejudicial. The photographs shown were highly relevant to the State's case, and were relevant to determining when certain injuries were inflicted.

Therefore, this Court FINDS that counsel was not deficient as regards the autopsy photos.

Because Defendant's claims are vague, unsupported, and belied by the record, Defendant's claims are hereby DENIED.

C. Defendant Has Not Demonstrated Ineffectiveness On Appeal

There is a strong presumption that appellate counsel's performance was reasonable and fell within "the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." <u>See United States v.</u> <u>Aguirre</u>, 912 F.2d 555, 560 (2nd Cir. 1990); citing <u>Strickland</u>, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. A claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must satisfy the two-prong test set forth by <u>Strickland</u>. <u>Kirksey v. State</u>, 112 Nev. 980, 998, 923 P.2d 1102, 1114 (1996). In order to satisfy <u>Strickland</u>'s second prong, the defendant must show that the omitted issue would have had a reasonable probability of success on appeal. <u>Id.</u>

The professional diligence and competence required on appeal involves "winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues." Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3313 (1983). In particular, a "brief that raises every colorable issue runs the risk of burying good arguments . . . in a verbal mound made up of strong and weak contentions." Id. at 753, 103 S. Ct. at 3313. For judges to second-guess reasonable professional judgments and impose on appointed counsel a duty to raise every 'colorable' claim suggested by a client would disserve the very goal of vigorous and effective advocacy." Id. at 754, 103 S. Ct. at 3314.

Defendant's sole claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel appears to be that appellate counsel did not raise the jury instruction issue. As explained in Section I B, supra, there was no reason to raise the issue because it was unlikely to succeed on appeal. Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make futile arguments. Ennis, 122 Nev. at 706, 137 P.3d at 1103.

Therefore, the Court FINDS that Appellate counsel was not deficient in not raising this issue because it was unlikely to succeed on appeal, and Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the outcome of his appeal would have been affected by that argument.

Defendant's claim that appellate counsel was ineffective is, therefore, DENIED.

II. **DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO DISCOVERY**

This Court also FINDS that, because Defendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is meritless, no discovery is warranted pursuant to NRS 34.780(2). Post-conviction discovery is not available until "after the writ has been granted" and good cause is shown. Id. Neither of these statutory requirements has been fulfilled in this case. Therefore, Defendant's request for discovery is premature and must be DENIED.

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1	<u>ORDER</u>
2	THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all issues included in Defendant's
3	Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) and supplements thereto shall be, and
4	they are, hereby DENIED.
5	IT IS ADDITIONALLY ORDERED that Defendant's request for Post-Conviction
6.	discovery shall be, and it is, hereby DENIED.
7 [.]	DATED this day of July, 2017.
8.	
9	-DISTRICT JUDGE
10	
11	STEVEN B. WOLFSON JUDGE STEFANY A. MILEY
12	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565
13	M - Juiting
14	BY RYAN J. MACDONALD
15	Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #12615
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC FILING
21	I hereby certify that service of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order,
22	was made this 19th day of July, 2017, by Electronic Filing to:
23	CAL POTTER, ESQ. cpotter@potterlawoffices.com
24	<u>cpotter@potterlawoffices.com</u>
25	
26	BY: /s/ Stephanie Johnson Employee of the District Attorney's Office
27	
28	11FH1653X/JN/saj/MVU
	13 Datas 1021
	Bates 1021

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

MICHAEL ALAN LEE, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. Supreme Court No. 74089 District Court Case No. C277650

FILED

DEC 1 9 2017

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

STATE OF NEVADA, ss.

I, Elizabeth A. Brown, the duly appointed and qualified Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, do hereby certify that the following is a full, true and correct copy of the Judgment in this matter.

JUDGMENT

The court being fully advised in the premises and the law, it is now ordered, adjudged and decreed, as follows:

"ORDER this appeal DISMISSED."

Judgment, as quoted above, entered this 17th day of November, 2017.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have subscribed my name and affixed the seal of the Supreme Court at my Office in Carson City, Nevada this December 14, 2017.

Elizabeth A. Brown, Supreme Court Clerk

By: Amanda Ingersoll Chief Deputy Clerk

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

MICHAEL ALAN LEE, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. NOV 17 2017

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

This is an appeal from a district court order denying postconviction petitions for writs of habeas corpus. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Stefany Miley, Judge.

Our initial review of this appeal revealed that the notice of appeal was untimely filed. The district court served notice of entry of its order by mail on August 2, 2017. But the notice of appeal was not filed in the district court until September 19, 2017, after the expiration of the 30-day appeal period set forth in NRS 34.575(1). We thus ordered appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Lozada v. State, 110 Nev. 349, 352, 871 P.2d 944, 946 (1994) ("[A]n untimely notice of appeal fails to vest jurisdiction in this court.").

Appellant represents that the district court granted appellant's former counsel an extension of time to file the notice of appeal. Attached to the response are copies of the district court minutes indicating that the district court granted appellant two extensions of time to file the notice of appeal. However, "the district court lacked authority to extend the thirtyday period within which [appellant] could file his notice of appeal." Walker

Supreme Court of Newada

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v. Scully, 99 Nev. 45, 46, 657 P.2d 94, 94 (1983). Accordingly, the notice of appeal was untimely filed, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, and we ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.

J.

J.

Douglas Gibbons

Pickering J, Pickering

cc: Hon. Stefany Miley, District Judge Mayfield, Gruber & Sheets Michael Alan Lee Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

MICHAEL ALAN LEE, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. Supreme Court No. 74089 District Court Case No. C277650

REMITTITUR

TO: Steven D. Grierson, Eighth District Court Clerk

Pursuant to the rules of this court, enclosed are the following:

Certified copy of Judgment and Opinion/Order. Receipt for Remittitur.

DATE: December 14, 2017

Elizabeth A. Brown, Clerk of Court

By: Amanda Ingersoll Chief Deputy Clerk

cc (without enclosures):

Hon, Stefany Miley, District Judge
Mayfield, Gruber & Sheets
Clark County District Attorney
Attorney General/Carson City

RECEIPT FOR REMITTITUR

Deputy District Court Clerk

RECEIVED APPEALS

DEC 1 9 2017

CLERK OF THE COURT

Electronically Filed 2/6/2018 4:01 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT A. E.

I	DAMIAN R. SHEETS, ESQ.
2	Nevada Bar No. 10755
3	MAYFIELD, GRUBER & SHEETS 726 S. Casino Center Blvd. Suite 211
4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
5	(702) 598-1299 dsheets@defendingnevada.com
6	Attorney for Petitioner
7	DISTRICT COURT
8	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADATHE STATE OF NEVADA,)))CASE NO.C-11-277650-1
9	Plaintiff/Respondent,) DEPT NO. XXIII
10	vs.) 04-09-18 @ 11:00 am
11	MICHAEL LEE,
12	#1699107
13	Defendant/Appellant.)
14	DEFENDANT'S DETITION FOD MULT OF HADE AS CODDUS
15	DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
16	COMES NOW, MICHAEL ALAN LEE, by and through his attorney, DAMIAN
17	SHEETS, ESQ. of Mayfield, Gruber & Sheets, and hereby Petitions this Court for post-
18	conviction relief pursuant to NRS 34.735.
19	1. Name of institution and county in which you are presently imprisoned or where and how
20 21	you are presently restrained of your liberty: High Desert State Prison, Clark County, Nevada
22	2. Name and location of court which entered the judgment of conviction under attack:
23	Eighth Judicial District Court
24	3. Date of judgment of conviction: November 10, 2014
25	4. Case Number: C-11-277650-1
26	
27	5. (a) Length of sentence: Count 1, Life without the Possibility of Parole,
28	consecutive to C199242; and Count 2, a Maximum of Two Hundred Forty (240) Months
	- 1 -

Zero	(0) days credit for time served.
6.	Are you presently serving a sentence for a conviction other than the conviction under
attacl	c in this motion? Yes No _X
7.	Nature of offense involved in conviction being challenged: Count 1. First Degree
Muro	ler by Child Abuse, Count 2. Child Abuse and Neglect with Substantial Bodily Harn
8.	What was your plea? (check one)
	(a) Not Guilty _X_
	(b) Guilty
	(c) Guilty but mentally ill
	(d) Nolo contendere
9.	If you entered a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill to one count of an indictment or
inforr	nation, and a plea of not guilty to another count of an indictment or information, or if a ple
of gui	ilty or guilty but mentally ill was negotiated, give details: Petitioner pled not guilty
10.	If you were found guilty or guilty but mentally ill after a plea of not guilty, was the
findir	ng made by: (check one)
	(a) Jury _X_
	(b) Judge without a jury _X_
11.	Did you testify at the trial? Yes No _X_
12.	Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction? Yes X No Public Defender
13.	If you did appeal, answer the following:
	(a) Name of court: Nevada Supreme Court
	(b) Case Number or citation: 66963

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(c) Result: Order of Affirmance

(d) Date of result: August 10, 2016

14. If you did not appeal, explain briefly why you did not: N/A
15. Other than a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence, have you previously filed any petitions, applications or motions with respect to this judgment in any court,

state or federal? Yes _X_ No ____

16. If your answer to No. 15 was "yes", give the following information:

(a) (1) Name of court: **Eighth Judicial District Court**

Nature of Proceeding: Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
 Grounds Raised: That there was no direct or circumstantial

evidence that Petitioner committed a criminal act of abuse against the decedent

(4) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition, application or motion? Yes ____No _X__

(5) Result: **Denied**

(6) Date of result: January 30, 2012

(7) If known, citations of any written opinion or date of orders entered

pursuant to such result: N/A

(b) As to any second petition, application or motion, give the same information

(1) Name of court: **Eighth Judicial District Court**

(2) Nature of Proceeding: **Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus**

(3) Grounds Raised: Ineffective assistance of counsel

(4) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition, application or motion? Yes No X_

- 3 -

1	(5) Result: Denied
2	(6) Date of result: June 28, 2017
3	(7) If known, citations of any written opinion or date of orders entered
4	pursuant to such result: July 31, 2017
5	
6	(c) As to any third or subsequent additional applications or motions, give the same
7 8	information listed above, list them on a separate sheet and attach: N/A
9	(d) Did you appeal to the highest state or federal court having jurisdiction, the result
10	or action taken on any petition, application or motion? Yes
11	(1) First petition, application, or motion? No
12	Citation or date of decision: N/A
13	(2) Second petition, application or motion? Yes
14	Citation or date of decision: December 19, 2017
15	(e) If you did not appeal from the adverse action on any petition, application or
16	motion, explain briefly why you did not. N/A
17	
18 19	17. Has any ground being raised in this petition been previously presented to this or any other
20	court by way of petition for habeas corpus, motion, application or any other post conviction
21	proceeding? If so, identify?
22	(a) Which of the grounds is the same: Ineffective assistance of counsel
23	(b) The proceedings in which these grounds were raised: Second Petition for
24	Habeas Corpus filed May 12, 2017
25	(c) Briefly explain why you are again raising these grounds. As stated in the Points
26	and Authorities, due to ineffective assistance of counsel Petitioner was denied his right to
27	
28	appeal the decision of his Second Petition for Habeas Corpus.
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1	18. If any of the grounds listed in Nos. 23(a), (b), (c) and (d), or any listed on any additional	
2	pages you have attached, were not previously presented in any other court, state or federal, list	
3	briefly what grounds were not so presented, and give your answers for not presenting them. N/A	
4 5	19. Are you filing this petition more than 1 year following the filing of the judgment of	
5	conviction or the filing of a decision on direct appeal? If so, state briefly the reasons for the	
7	delay. No, the Petition is timely	
8		
9	20. Do you have any petition or appeal now pending in any court, either state or federal, as to	
10	the judgment under attack? Yes No _X_	
11	21. Give the name of each attorney who represented you in the proceeding resulting in your	
12	conviction and on direct appeal: Patrick McDonald, Gregg Knapp, Nadia Von Magdenko,	
13	Kendrick Bassett, (Direct Appeal) and Steve Altig (Trial, Cal Potter (Appeal)	
14	22. Do you have any future sentences to serve after you complete the sentence imposed by	
15 16	the judgment under attack? Yes No _X_	
17	POINTS AND AUTHORITIES	
18	I.	
19	STATEMENT OF FACTS	
20	A Criminal Complaint, filed on October 26, 2011, charged Michael Lee (hereinafter "Mr.	-
- 21	Lee") with the crimes of Murder and Child Abuse and Neglect with Substantial Bodily Harm. A	
22		
23	Preliminary Hearing was held on November 8, 2011, in Henderson Justice Court before the	
24	Honorable David S. Gibson. At the conclusion of the hearing, Mr. Lee was held to answer on	
25	the two charges and was bound over to District Court. An Information, counting the two	
26	criminal charges, was filed in District Court on November 18, 2011.	
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On December 12, 2011, Mr. Lee filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on the grounds that there was no direct or circumstantial evidence that Petitioner committed a criminal act or abused the decedent. The Writ was denied on January 30, 2012.

A jury trial was held in Department 23, before the Honorable Stefany Miley. The trial began on August 4, 2014 and concluded on August 18, 2014. At the conclusion of deliberations, the jury returned verdicts of guilty for both counts. Mr. Lee was sentenced on Count 1 (Murder) to Life without the possibility of parole, consecutive to case C199242; and Count 2 (Child Abuse and Neglect with Substantial Bodily Harm) to a maximum of 240 months with a minimum parole eligibility of 96 months, consecutive to Count 1. Because he was on parole at the time of these charges, Mr. Lee received zero days credit for time served.

In November 2014, Mr. Lee's appellate counsel filed an Appeal with the Nevada Supreme Court claiming two issues: 1) that the trial court erred when it denied the defense motion for a mistrial, and 2) that there was insufficient evidence produced to sustain the allegations that Michael Lee murdered Brodie Aschenbrenner. The Supreme Court issued an Order of Affirmance on August 10, 2016.

On May 12, 2017, Mr. Lee filed a second Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Writ was denied on June 28, 2017 with Finds of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order entered on July 31, 2017.

On August 18, 2017, Mr. Lee's counsel, Potter Law Offices, filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel due to Mr. Cal Potter, III's medical issues instead of filing the one page Notice of Appeal to preserve Mr. Lee's right to appeal the decision on the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

At the hearing held on August 30, 2017, the district court ordered an extension of 30 days to file an appeal and continued to the matter to September 13, 2017. At the hearing on

- 6 -

September 13, 2017, the district court was advised that Mr. Lee had retained Mayfield, Gruber and Sheets. Counsel requested an extension to file the appeal and was granted that extension to October 25, 2017.

Counsel for Mr. Lee filed the Notice of Appeal on September 19, 2017. On December 19, 2017, the Nevada Supreme Court issues a dismissal of the appeal due to lack of jurisdiction under NRAP 4. The Supreme Court held that there was no authority granted to supersede the jurisdictional boundaries outlined in NRAP 4 and therefore the appeal was untimely, thus forcing the Supreme Court to deny the appeal.

II.

GROUNDS FOR RELIEF

A. Standard for *Lozada* Appeal

In *Lozada v. State*, 110 Nev. 349, 871 P.2d 944 (1994), Jose Manuel Lozada filed an untimely notice of appeal from his 1987 conviction. The basis for Lozada's appeal was a claim that his trial counsel had been ineffective and had deprived him of a timely direct appeal from the conviction without his consent. *Lozada*, 110 Nev. at 350-52, 871 P.2d at 945-46. The Nevada Supreme Court held that Lozada should raise this claim in a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in the district court. However, because Lozada had previously filed a petition for post-conviction relief, he had to demonstrate good cause and prejudice to excuse the filing of a successive petition pursuant to NRS 34.810. *Id.* at 352-53, 871 P.2d at 946. The Court held that Lozada could demonstrate good cause for filing a successive petition.

Specifically, the Court concluded that the initial, erroneous denial of Lozada's meritorious appeal deprivation claim in his prior, timely petition for post-conviction relief constituted an impediment external to the defense, and was thus good cause for raising the claim

- 7 -

again in a successive habeas corpus petition. *Id.* at 352-58, 871 P.2d at 946-49. The Court further concluded that Lozada could demonstrate actual prejudice if his trial counsel's conduct in fact deprived Lozada of a direct appeal without his consent. *Id.* at 358-59, 871 P.2d at 949-50.

Here, Mr. Lee was deprived of a timely appeal on the Writ of Habeas Corpus by the Potter Law Offices' ineffective assistance of counsel. The Notice of Appeal, which would have preserved Mr. Lee's right to appeal, is a one page document that takes less than ten (10) minutes to draft. However, instead of drafting and filing a Notice to preserve Mr. Lee's right to appeal, the Potter Law Offices filed a much more substantial Motion to Withdraw and Motion for Stay. Mr. Lee was denied effective assistance of counsel and thus deprived of his right to timely appeal the decision on his Writ of Habeas Corpus.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel. "The question of whether the defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel...in violation of the Sixth Amendment is a mixed question of law and fact and is thus subject to independent review." *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).

The Nevada Supreme Court looks to the test set out in *Strickland* when determining whether there has been ineffective assistance of counsel. *Warden v. Lyons*, 100 Nev. 430 (1984). Under this two-prong test, a defendant who shows that 1) counsel's performance was deficient, and 2) the defendant was prejudiced by such deficiency, will be deemed to have suffered from ineffective assistance of counsel. *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 687. When trial counsel's representation of the defendant falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, the assistance will be deemed deficient. *Id.* at 688. If the defendant establishes that counsel's performance was

deficient, the defendant must then demonstrate the result of the proceeding probably would have been different. *State v. Love*, 109 Nev. 1136, 1139 (1993).

If the defendant establishes that counsel's performance was deficient, he must then demonstrate that the result of the proceeding probably would have been different. *State v. Love*, 109 Nev. 1136, 1139 (1993). In the context of a plea agreement, the defendant can satisfy this element by showing that, had counsel not been deficient, he probably would not have plead guilty. *Molina v. State*, 120 Nev. 185, 190 (2004).

Here, as stated *supra*, Mr. Lee retained counsel to file the Writ of Habeas Corpus and when that Writ was denied, Mr. Lee instructed his counsel to file an appeal. However, Mr. Cal Potter, III became ill and instead of filing the Notice of Appeal in a timely manner, the Potter Law Offices filed a Motion to Withdraw and Motion to Stay. Mr. Lee was deprived of his right to a timely appeal due to the Potter Law Offices failing to file a one page document. Filing the Motion to Withdraw took substantially more time than timely filing the Notice of Appeal would have taken, which would have preserved Mr. Lee's appeal and still allowed the Potter Law Offices to withdraw from the case due to counsel's medical issues.

As such, Mr. Lee asserts that he was deprived of his right to a timely appeal of the Writ of Habeas Corpus due to the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel.

C. Denial of Appeal

<u>Prior counsel's performance was deficient and prejudice is presumed because he did not</u> perfect the appeal as requested by Mr. Lee.

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that an attorney has a duty to perfect an appeal when a convicted defendant expresses a desire to appeal or indicates dissatisfaction with a conviction. *Mann v. State*, 118 Nev. 351, 46 P.2d 1228 (2002). *Prejudice is presumed* for purposes of establishing ineffective assistance of counsel *when counsel's conduct completely*

-9-

denies a convicted defendant an appeal. Id. (Emphasis Added). Thus, under *Lozada*, if a defendant "demonstrates that his counsel in fact ignored his request for an appeal, then [the defendant] has established ineffective assistance of counsel and is not required to demonstrate anything further." *Id.* At that point, "the district court would be obligated at that point to appoint counsel to represent and assist [the defendant] in the preparation of a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus asserting any issues that could have been raised on direct appeal." *Id.*

In the instant case, the Potter Law Offices were retained to file the Writ of Habeas Corpus and the subsequent appeal when the Writ was denied. However, instead of perfecting the appeal by filing a timely Notice while Mr. Lee searched for and obtained new counsel, the Potter Law Offices filed a Motion to Withdraw and a Motion for Stay but nothing else. Mr. Lee was denied his right to appeal because the Potter Law Offices did not comply with NRAP 4 and file a one page Notice of Appeal.

Therefore, under *Mann*, prejudice is presumed because counsel's failure completely deprived Mr. Lee of an appeal.

Even if this Court concludes that prior counsel did not ignore Mr. Lee's requests for an appeal, he had a duty to properly advise Mr. Lee when he reasonably demonstrated his individual interest in appealing and, but for that failure, a Notice of Appeal would have been filed by Mr. Lee or new counsel.

While Nevada case law holds counsel does not have absolute duty to advise a defendant who pleads guilty of the right to appeal, obligations do exist under certain circumstances, such as when defendant inquires about an appeal, or when defendant may benefit from receiving the advice, such as when there exists a direct appeal claim that has a reasonable likelihood of success. *Thomas v. State*, 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999). Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has held that "counsel has a *constitutionally imposed duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal* when there is reason to think either (1) that a rational defendant

would want to appeal (for example, because there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing. Roe v. Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 479; 120 S. Ct. 1029 (2000). (Emphasis Added). When determining whether the client suffered any prejudice by counsel's failure to consult with the defendant, "defendant's inability to 'specify the points he would raise were his right to appeal reinstated,'...will not foreclose the possibility that he can satisfy the prejudice requirement where there are other substantial reasons to believe he would have appealed." *Id.* at 486. (Emphasis Added).

Here, for the same reasons as noted above, Mr. Lee was denied his right to appeal. Specifically, Mr. retained counsel to file his appeal and followed that counsel's advice regarding hiring new counsel when it became apparent that health issues would preclude Mr. Potter from completing the retainer. However, the Potter Law Offices did not file the one page Notice of Appeal, did not advise Mr. Lee or his family to file the one page Notice of Appeal and instead delayed the proceedings substantially by filing the Motion to Withdraw and Motion for Stay, ignoring years of Nevada Supreme Court rulings on extending the time to file the Notice of Appeal under NRAP 4. Therefore, because Mr. Lee took every step he could to advise his attorney of his desire for an appeal, and because counsel failed act on Mr. Lee's request or properly advise Mr. Lee of the consequences of delay, Mr. Lee has been prejudiced in that he has been deprived of his appellate rights.

Therefore, this Court should allow Mr. Lee to raise the limited appealable issues denied in the Writ of Habeas Corpus by way of a *Lozada* appeal. *Lozada v. State*, 110 Nev. 349, 871 P.2d 944 (1994). Accordingly, and pursuant to the facts outlined above, Mr. Lee specifically asked for an appeal and certainly would have benefited from receiving advice regarding his

- 11 -

appeal. In any circumstance, pursuant to Mr. Lee's testimony, a Notice of Appeal would have been filed had Mr. Lee at least been notified by his counsel that he could file such on his own behalf or that a delay would be grounds for immediate dismissal of his appeal. Mr. Lee seeks to raise to appeal the denial of his Writ of Habeas Corpus.

III.

APPEAL ISSUES

Accordingly, Mr. Lee would seek to raise the issue that he was denied effective

assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Under *Roe*, no other specifics regarding the appellate issues need be stated.

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WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that the court will grant him such relief to which he is entitled.

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, the State must grant Mr. Lee a new trial. DATED this 2 day of January, 2018.

DAMIAN'R. SHEETS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 10755 726 S. Casino Center Blvd., Ste 211 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 598-1299 Attorney for Petitioner

1	CERTIFICATE OF MAILING					
2 3	I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of January, 2018, I mailed a					
4	true and correct copy of the above and foregoing DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR					
5	WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, by depositing the same in the United States mail,					
7	first class, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:					
7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 6 7 7 8 9 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	Tirst class, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY Regional Justice Center 200 Lewis Avenue P.O. Box 552212 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 <i>Counsel for Plaintiff/Respondent</i> ADAM LAXALT Nevada Attorney General 100 North Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717 <i>Counsel for Respondent</i> MICHAEL LEE NDOC No. 81950 c/o High Desert State Prison P.O. Box 650 Indian Springs, Nevada 89070-0650 <i>Defendant/Appellant</i> AN EMPLOYEE OF THE LAW OFFICES OF MAYFIELD GRUBER & SHEETS					
7						
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1 2 3 4 5	RSPN STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 CHARLES W. THOMAN Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #12649 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500		Electronically Filed 4/3/2018 10:55 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT		
6 7	Attorney for Plaintiff				
8	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA				
9	MICHAEL ALAN LEE,				
10	#1699107,				
11	Petitioner,	CASE NO:	C-11-277650-1		
12	-VS-	DEPT NO:	XXIII		
13	THE STATE OF NEVADA,				
14	Respondent.				
15	STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (POST-CONVICTION)				
16 17		ING: April 9, 2013 RING: 11:00 AM	8		
18	COMES NOW, the State of Nevada		WOLFSON, Clark County		
19	District Attorney, through CHARLES W. TH	•			
20	submits the attached Points and Authorities in	n Response to Defe	endant's Third Supplemental		
21	Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Con	viction).			
22	This Response is made and based upor	n all the papers and	pleadings on file herein, the		
23	attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if				
24	deemed necessary by this Honorable Court.				
25	//				
26	//				
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		w:\2011\2011F\H16\53\111	FH1653-RSPB CLES MICHAD 002.docx		
	Case Number: C-11-277650-1				

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES **STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

On November 18, 2011, Defendant Michael Alan Lee was charged by way of Information with: Count 1 – Murder (NRS 200.010, 200.030, 200.508) and Count 2: Child Abuse and Neglect with Substantial Bodily Harm (Felony – NRS 200.508).

Before trial on June 10, 2014, Lee filed a Motion in Limine to Exclude Autopsy Photographs. The State filed its Opposition on June 20, 2014. The Court denied the Motion on June 25, 2014.

Lee's jury trial commenced on August 4, 2014. On August 15, 2014, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts.

On August 18, 2014, Lee filed a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal. On August 20, 2014, Lee filed a Motion for a New Trial. The State filed its Oppositions to the Motions on August 21 and 22, 2014. The Court denied the Motions on September 3, 2014.

On October 21, 2014, Lee was adjudicated guilty and sentenced as follows: Count 1 – life without the possibility of parole; and Count 2 – 96 to 240 months, consecutive to Count 1. Lee received no credit for time served. The Judgment of Conviction was filed on November 10, 2014. A Notice of Appeal was filed on November 24, 2014. On August 10, 2016, the Nevada Supreme Court Affirmed the Judgment of Conviction. Remittitur issued September 6, 2016.

On May 12, 2017, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The State filed its Response on June 20, 2017. This Court denied the Petition on June 28, 2017. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order issued on July 31, 2017. Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on September 19, 2017. On December 19, 2017, the Nevada Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and Remittitur issued.

Defendant then filed a Second Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on February 6, 2018. The State responds herein.

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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS¹

In December of 2008, Arica Foster gave birth to Brodie Aschenbrenner. Brodie's father was Dustin Aschenbrenner. When Arica's relationship with Brodie's father dissolved, she kept custody of Brodie. Brodie was a fearless, loving and rambunctious child. In October of 2010, Arica met and began dating Lee after they were introduced to each other by their respective sisters. In the beginning of the relationship, Lee and Brodie liked each other and got along. In February of 2011, Arica, Brodie, and Lee moved into an apartment together. At some point, Arica became concerned about Brodie's physical condition. Arica became concerned because she started to find more bruises on Brodie than usual. Arica noticed that the bruises were appearing on Brodie's face and were much darker than the normal everyday bumps Brodie used to get.

In early May of 2011, Arica and Lee began to have arguments over Brodie's potty training. Lee felt that Arica was babying Brodie too much and that Brodie should have been potty trained by that point. Arica and Lee also argued about Lee waking Brodie up in the early mornings to use the bathroom and changing him from his diaper into his pull up underwear. Arica kept waking up and finding Brodie in his pull up underwear instead of the diaper she put on him at night so he did not wet the bed. Arica and Lee also argued about keeping Brodie's bedroom door open at night. While Arica wanted the door open so she can hear Brodie at night, Lee insisted on the door being closed. When Arica would wake up in the morning she would find Brodie's bedroom door closed.

Around the same time, Brodie's demeanor towards Lee began to change. Brodie began not to want to be around Lee; he would cower, cry and run over to Arica. Brodie's reaction towards Lee began to put a strain on his and Arica's relationship. After noticing the bruising on Brodie, Arica decided to have her sister Amanda babysit Brodie instead of Lee's sister Jennifer. Once Amanda started babysitting Brodie, the bruising stopped for about two to three weeks but started back up again. The bruises began to show up more frequently, in different

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¹ The following facts are derived from the State's Answering Brief filed with the Nevada Supreme Court on October 13, 2015. Citations to the Appellant's Appendix have been removed.

locations on Brodie's body and were more much severe than usual. At some point, Arica researched nanny cams because she was concerned about the bruises on Brodie.

On May 25, 2011, Arica and Brodie were involved in a fender bender. Brodie was in his car seat at the time of the accident. After the impact, Arica turned around in her seat to look at Brodie and he appeared fine. Arica went to the hospital to be checked out, while her mother took Brodie home. When Arica returned home, she examined Brodie and felt no concern as he was acting like his normal playful self. The next day, Arica brought Brodie to ABC Pediatrics just to be safe. Brodie was examined by Dr. Sirsy, who found Brodie to be injury free. In June 2011, Arica decided to take Brodie's racecar bed apart and put padding around it so Brodie would not bump his head on the wall. Around the same time, Arica began to look for a new place to live because Brodie did not like Lee or want to be around him anymore.

In the evening of June 6, 2011, Arica noticed that Brodie had a fat lip underneath his nose. Arica was not home at the time the injury happened so she asked Lee about the injury since he was with Brodie. Lee told her that the board from the toddler bed fell on Brodie. On June 9, 2011, Brodie was riding his power wheel while walking the dogs around the apartment complex with Arica. While riding his power wheel, Brodie hit a curb and fell off. After falling down, Brodie jumped back up and continued to act like his normal self. Brodie ended up with a tiny little bruise on his cheek from the fall. That night Brodie never complained about being in any type of pain and appeared normal. On June 10, 2011, Arica noticed that Brodie's eyes were goopy so she took him to ABC Pediatrics, where he was diagnosed with pink eye and prescribed eye drops. Arica never mentioned the power wheel incident to the physician because Brodie never complained of any pain.

On June 11, 2011, Arica dropped Brodie off at her parents' house while she went to work. After work, Arica and Lee went out to dinner. At dinner they had a discussion regarding the jealousy between Lee and Brodie. Arica told Lee that Brodie was her number one priority. On June 12, 2011, Lee told Arica that he would do whatever it took for everything to work out and for them to be together. That evening, Arica picked Brodie up from her parent's house. When Arica and Brodie came home, Brodie got mad because Lee was there. That same evening, Brodie was playing around with the curtains in his room when they fell down and scratched his lower back. The scratches were small and barely bled.

On June 13, 2011, Arica, Brodie and Lee went to the swimming pool with Lee's sister Jennifer and her two boys. Brodie swam in the pool and acted like his normal self. They left the swimming pool around 1:20 p.m. and Arica left for work around 4 p.m. Prior to leaving for work, Arica put Brodie down for a nap and then left him alone with Lee. Arica returned home around 8:15 p.m. and checked on Brodie. When she bent down to give Brodie a kiss, Arica noticed a quarter sized bruise on his forehead. When she asked Lee about the bruise, he told her that Brodie fell in some rocks while leaving his friend Danny Fico's house.

The next morning June 14th, when Brodie woke up, Arica noticed that he had a lot more bruises on him than the night before. He had a couple of bruises on his forehead and the bruise on his cheek was a lot bigger and darker. Brodie also seemed very upset; he ran into Arica's room screaming and wanting to be cuddled. That type of behavior was not normal for Brodie. That day Arica, Brodie and Lee had plans to go the Mandalay Bay Shark Reef. After Brodie ate breakfast, Arica dressed him for the day. When Arica was dressing him, Brodie complained that his head hurt. Before leaving the house, Lee mentioned to Arica that he did not want to bring Brodie anywhere because it looked like they beat him. Before going to the Shark Reef, they made a stop at the gas station where Lee worked. Lee told Arica that he did not want her to bring Brodie inside the store because of his bruises. Arica and Brodie went inside the store, while Lee went to the car wash part of the gas station. Inside the store, Arica ran into Danny Fico, who commented on the bruises on Brodie's face. When they got to the Shark Reef and began walking inside, Brodie refused to hold Lee's hand. Arica had to tell Brodie that if he did not hold Lee's hand they would not go to the Shark Reef.

After the Shark Reef, they went to a McDonalds in Circus Circus to eat. While in McDonalds, Brodie had an accident and wet himself through his pull-ups. Lee became annoyed and commented that Brodie should have been potty trained. Before returning home that day, Arica stopped by a hair salon. She left Brodie, who was sleeping in his car seat, with Lee. Arica was gone approximately 5- 10 minutes. When she returned, Brodie was crying and

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screaming hysterically inside the car. Lee told her that Brodie woke up when she got out of the car. Afterwards, they went to Best Buy where Brodie kept saying "night night," which was a way of him telling Arica he was tired and wanted to go to bed. Inside Best Buy, Brodie wanted to get a movie. Arica told Brodie that if he wanted the movie he had to be nice to Lee. However, when Lee attempted to walk up to Brodie, Brodie got angry and kept saying "no, no, no," so Arica had to put the movie back. When they got home, Arica put Brodie in his room and went to make dinner. During dinner, Arica had to spoon feed Brodie, which was not normal.

After dinner, Arica put Brodie to bed. Arica then told Lee she had to go grocery shopping and run some errands. Lee got upset and asked Arica why she just didn't do it earlier. Arica told Lee that if he didn't want her to leave Brodie with him, she would wake him up and take him with her. Lee told her to just leave Brodie at home. Arica was gone for approximately an hour. When Arica got home, she put the groceries away, took a bath and went to bed. At approximately 1:00 a.m. the next morning, June 15th, Arica woke up and noticed Lee walking into their bedroom. Lee told her that he went to use Brodie's bathroom and it stunk and he thought Brodie had thrown up.

Arica immediately got up to check on Brodie. When she went into Brodie's room Arica could smell vomit and saw that Brodie was covered in vomit. She took him to the bathroom, where he threw up again. Brodie told Arica that his head hurt. Arica cleaned Brodie up, laid him down on the couch in the living room, and laid next to him for a short time until Brodie drifted off to sleep. After Brodie fell asleep, Arica went back to bed. Sometime in the early morning when it was still dark outside, Lee carried Brodie into the bedroom and laid him next to Arica. When Arica woke up around 8:50 a.m. she began rubbing Brodie's back. As she was rubbing his back, Arica noticed that he was cold to the touch. Arica jumped up out of bed and ran around the bed to face Brodie, whose eyes were open but not moving. At that point, Arica called 911. Brodie was pronounced dead at 11:00 a.m.

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Clark County Coroner's Office Medical Examiner Dr. Lisa Gavin performed an autopsy on Brodie on June 16, 2011. The autopsy revealed Brodie had suffered fatal internal injuries along with several external injuries. Ultimately, Dr. Gavin determined Brodie died from blunt force trauma to his head and abdomen resulting in a transected duodenum and acute peritonitis. Dr. Gavin ruled Brodie's death a homicide.

ARGUMENT

I. DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL AND THEREFORE DID NOT RECEIVE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF THAT COUNSEL

Defendant claims that he was entitled to post-conviction counsel and counsel was ineffective for failing to file a Notice of Appeal based on the denial of his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Pet. at 9 – 12. However, the Nevada Supreme Court has consistently held that there is no right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel for noncapital prisoners. Brown v. McDaniel, 130 Nev. Adv. Rep. 60, 331 P.3d 867, 870 (2014). The Nevada Supreme Court stated, "[t]his is because there is no constitutional or statutory right to the assistance of counsel in noncapital post-conviction proceedings, and where there is no right to counsel there can be no deprivation of effective assistance of counsel." Id. (citing McKague v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159, 163-65, 912 P.2d 255, 257-58 (1996) (internal quotations omitted)). Here, as Defendant is a noncapital prisoner, he was not entitled to post-conviction counsel. Therefore, he was also not entitled to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. Accordingly, Defendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be denied.

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1	CONCLUSION				
2	Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that this Court order				
3	Defendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) be DENIED.				
4	DATED this 2nd day of April, 2018.				
5	Respectfully submitted,				
6	STEVEN B. WOLFSON				
7	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565				
8	BY /s/ Charles W. Thoman CHARLES W. THOMAN				
9 10	Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #12649				
10					
12					
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15					
16	CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC FILING				
17	I hereby certify that service of State's Response to Defendant's Third Supplemental				
18	Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction), was made this 3rd day of April, 2018,				
19	by Electronic Filing to:				
20	Damian R. Sheets, Esq. <u>dsheets@defendingnevada.com</u>				
21	<u>dsneets@derendingnevada.com</u>				
22					
23	BY: /s/ Stephanie Johnson				
24	Employee of the District Attorney's Office				
25					
26					
27 28					
28	11FH1653X/CT/saj/MVU				
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	Electronically Filed 7/9/2018 9:12 AM Steven D. Grierson				
	CLERK OF THE COURT				
1	NEO				
2	DISTRICT COURT				
3	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA				
4					
5	MICHAEL A. LEE, Case No: C-11-277650-1				
6	Petitioner, Dept No: XXIII				
7	vs.				
8	THE STATE OF NEVADA,				
9	NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT, Respondent, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER				
10					
	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on July 5, 2018, the court entered a decision or order in this matter, a				
11	true and correct copy of which is attached to this notice.				
12	You may appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision or order of this court. If you wish to appeal, you				
13	must file a notice of appeal with the clerk of this court within thirty-three (33) days after the date this notice is				
14	mailed to you. This notice was mailed on July 9, 2018.				
15	STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CLERK OF THE COURT /s/ Heather Ungermann				
16	Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk				
17					
18					
19	CERTIFICATE OF E-SERVICE / MAILING				
20	I hereby certify that on this 9 day of July 2018, I served a copy of this Notice of Entry on the following:				
21	By e-mail and certified copies by the United States mail addressed as follows:				
22	Clark County District Attorney's Office, 200 Lewis Ave., Las Vegas, NV 89101 Attorney General's Office, Appellate Division,				
23	555 E. Washington Ave., Ste. 3900, Las Vegas, NV 89101				
23	 Certified copies by the United States mail addressed as follows: Michael Lee # 81950 Damian R. Sheets, Esq. 				
	1200 Prison Rd.726 S. Casino Center Blvd., Suite 211Lovelock, NV 89419Las Vegas, NV 89101				
25 26					
26	/s/ Heather Ungermann Heather Ungermann, Deputy Clerk				
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MAYFIELD GRUBER & SHEETS							
Damian R. Sheets, Esq.							
Nevada Bar No. 10755							
Kelsey Bernstein							
Nevada Bar No. 13825 726 S. Casino Center Blvd., Suite 211							
P: (702) 598-1299							
dsheets@defendingnevada.com							
	Attorney for Petitioner						
Michael Lee							
DISTRICT COURT							
	CLARK COUN	ΓY, NEVADA					
The State of Nevada)	Case No. C-1					
Plaintiff/Respondent)	Dept. No. XX					
VS.	j	FINDINGS O					
ichael Lee,)	LAW AND O FOR WRIT (
Defendant/Petitioner.	J	CONVICTIO					
,	J						

No. C-11-277650-1

No. XXIII

INGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF AND ORDER GRANTING PETITION WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (POST-(ICTION)

This matter having come on for hearing before the Court on the 9th day of April, 2018, the Petitioner present in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections and represented by his attorney of record, Damian Sheets, Esq. of Mayfield Gruber & Sheets, and Respondent represented by Steve B. Wolfson, by and through Jennifer Clemons, Esq., and the Court having considered the matter, including briefs, arguments and documents on file herein, and now therefore makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 111

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FINDINGS OF FACT

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- On November 18, 2011, an Information was filed that charged Michael Lee ("Petitioner") with: Count 1, Murder; Count 2, Child Abuse and Neglect with Substantial Bodily Harm. Petitioner at the time was represented by Patrick McDonald, Esq.
- 2. Petitioner proceeded to trial on August 4, 2014. Petitioner at the time was represented by Nadia von Magdenko, Esq. and Steven Altig, Esq. Petitioner was convicted on all charges.
- 3. On August 21, 2014, Petitioner was sentenced as follows: Life without the possibility of parole.
- Petitioner timely directly appealed his conviction to the Nevada Supreme Court. On September 13, 2016, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.
- Petitioner filed his first Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) on May 12, 2017. Petitioner at the time was represented by Cal Potter, Esq.
- 6. Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was denied on June 28, 2017 with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered July 31, 2017.
 - 7. Petitioner's Counsel never filed a timely Notice of Appeal to appeal the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on July 31, 2017. Instead, Petitioner's Counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel on August 18, 2017.
- 8. Petitioner field his second Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) on February 6, 2018 containing a claim that Petitioner was improperly deprived of his appeal on the denial of his first Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Bates 1050

9. This Court heard argument on the second Petition on April 9, 2018. At the hearing, the Court found that Petitioner's Counsel acted ineffectively for failing to timely file a Notice of Appeal and that ineffectiveness deprived Petitioner of his right to appeal.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to... have to Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI. "[T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). In Nevada, the appropriate vehicle for review of whether counsel was effective is a post-conviction relief proceeding. *McKague v. Warden*, 112 Nev. 159, 912 P.2d 255, 258 at n.4 (1996). In order to assert a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, the Petitioner must prove that he was denied "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel by satisfying the two-pronged test set forth in *Strickland*. See, *State v. Love*, 109 Nev. 1136, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993). Under *Strickland*, the defendant must show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that absent those errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different. *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 697.

2. NRAP 32(c) provides that "[t]rial counsel shall file the notice of appeal, rough draft transcript request form, and fast track statement and consult with appellate counsel for the case regarding the appellate issues that are raised." Counsel has a duty to file an appeal when the client's desire to challenge the Court's appealable ruling can reasonably be inferred from the totality of the circumstances, focusing on what

counsel knew or should have known at the time. *Toston v. State*, 127 Nev.Adv.Op. 87, 267 P.3d 795 (2011); see also, *Davis v. State*, 115 Nev. 17, 974 P.2d 658, 660 (1999) ("[I]f the client does express a desire to appeal, counsel is obligated to file the notice of appeal on the client's behalf"). Prejudice is presumed for purposes of establishing ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel's conduct completely denies a convicted defendant of a direct appeal. *Toston*, 267 P.3d at 800 (citing *Lozada v. State*, 110 Nev. 349, 871 P.2d 944, 949 (1994).

- 3. Here, Petitioner's Counsel never filed a timely Notice of Appeal to appeal the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on July 31, 2017, and the Court therefore finds that Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel. As a result, Petitioner suffered presumed prejudice due to the complete loss of an opportunity to present an appeal.
- 4. The instant Petition is timely as it was filed within one year of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on July 31, 2017. Petitioner is therefore entitled to relief and the Court grants the instant Petition.
- 5. NRAP 4(c) provides that an untimely notice of appeal may be filed when a postconviction petition for writ of habeas corpus has been timely and properly filed in accordance with the provisions of NRS 34.720 to NRS 34.830, asserting a viable claim that the Petitioner was unlawfully deprived of the right to a timely appeal, and the District Court in which the Petition is considered enters a written order containing specific findings of fact and conclusions of law finding that Petitioner has

established a valid appeal-deprivation claim and is entitled to a direct appeal with the assistance of appointed or retained counsel. <u>ORDER</u> IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner Michael Lee's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) is GRANTED, AND THE Court finds Petitioner was unlawfully deprived of the right to a timely appeal, and; /// /// /// /// /// Bates 1053 **IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that the District Court Clerk shall prepare and file within five (5) days of the entry of this order a Notice of Appeal from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on July 31, 2017 on Petitioner's behalf. Pursuant to NRAP 4(c)(2), the District Court Clerk shall serve certified copies of the District Court's written order and the notice of appeal required by rule 4(c) on the Petitioner and Petitioner's counsel in the post-conviction proceeding, the respondent, the Attorney General, the district attorney of the county in which the petitioner was convicted (Clark County, Nevada), and the clerk of the Supreme Court.

JUDGE STEFANY A. MILEY

Dated this day of 2018.

Submitted by: MAYFIELD-GRUBER & SHEETS

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