IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NEVADA

GAVIN COX and MINH-HAHN COX,	Supreme Court No. 76422
Husband and Wife,	Electronically Filed
Appellants,	Jun 13 2019 01:28 p.m.) District Court No Etiz tho 로 代 A CHROwn) Clerk of Supreme Court
vs.)
)
MGM GRAND HOTEL, LLC; DAVID	
COPPERFIELD aka DAVID S. KOTKIN;)
BACKSTAGE EMPLOYMENT AND)
REFERRAL, INC.; DAVID)
COPPERFIELD'S DISAPPEARING, INC.;)
TEAM CONSTRUCTION)
MANAGEMENT, INC.; and BEACHERS)
LV, LLC,)
Respondents.	
)
JOINT APPENDIX	- VOLUME 2

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3/12/2018 2:00 PM

Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

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DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

GAVIN COX,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. A-14-705164-C DEPT NO. XIII

VS.

MGM GRAND HOTEL LLC,

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Defendant.

AND OTHER PARTIES

BEFORE THE HONORABLE MARK R. DENTON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

RE: MOTIONS

THURSDAY, JANUARY 19, 2017

APPEARANCES:

FOR PLAINTIFF:

ADAM E. DEUTSCH, ESQ.

PERRY FALLICK, ESQ.

CHRISTIAN N. GRIFFIN, ESQ.

FOR TEAM CONSTRUCTION &

BEACHER'S LV:

GARY W. CALL, ESQ.

FOR MGM DAVID COPPERFIELD &

COPPERFIELD'S DISAPPEARING: ERIC O. FREEMAN, ESQ.

ELAINE K. FRESCH, ESQ.

FOR BACKSTAGE EMPLOYMENT:

HOWARD J. RUSSELL, ESQ.

D. LEE ROBERTS, JR., ESQ.

ALSO PRESENT:

JERRY POPOVICH, ESQ.

RECORDED BY: MARTHA SZRAMEK, COURT RECORDER

TRANSCRIBED BY: JD REPORTING, INC.

would also go for Mr. Fallick, whose motion has not yet been submitted for pro hac vice, as we notified.

THE COURT: All right. I'll hear the motion (inaudible) first.

All right. Everything appears to be in order on that motion (inaudible) Popovich, and the same is granted. An order has been submitted, and I'll go ahead and sign that now.

And I'll set a status check on notification to the State Bar of this submission (inaudible) March -- March 27th, 2017, for 9:00 a.m. If the record shows that the State Bar has been notified of the admission by that time, there will be no need to come to the status check. All right.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Here's the order. All right. Do you want to approach the bench and claim the order.

(Inaudible) process the clerk's office.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. The thought occurred to me that the next motion in order would be the joint motion for a firm trial setting, or should I hear the bifurcation one first?

MR. DEUTSCH: Your Honor, on the motion for the joint trial setting, all counsel had gotten together to discuss that. The biggest concern from everyone was just the amount of witnesses and the amount of expert witnesses and the difficulties of all parties, a lot of whom are coming — the

experts are coming from out of state, and just the difficulty in — in having sort of a more firm set schedule ahead of time to make the logistics easier was the basis that we had all moved for that — that firm trial setting.

THE COURT: And the record will reflect that we had the pretrial conference just before this. During that time the Court was informed that counsel expects this case to take at least 15 trial days.

MR. DEUTSCH: I think that would be an accurate assessment.

THE COURT: The motion sought to have a firm setting on this stack, which does not have that many days.

MR. DEUTSCH: We understand that --

THE COURT: All right. (Inaudible) you're seeking a firm setting?

MR. DEUTSCH: We are seeking a firm setting.

Obviously part of the motion was the hope that we could in some way take preference in light of the complexity of this case over some of the other cases that you had in this stack. As I notified the Court in the back, you know, my clients are under some pretty significant financial distress in light of this case taking as long as it has.

And the longer that it continues to get delayed is difficult for them, and therefore I believe as part of that joint motion was a request to take preference on this stack

from some of the other cases if the Court was so willing to do so. In light of the number of — we have 2, 4, 6 — we have 9, 10 attorneys. We have a number of witnesses, as I said, from out of town that number probably close to a dozen. So that was the hope in making the motion, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I don't know that there is any objection to a firm setting, was there?

MS. FRESCH: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So here's what I'll do. I'll grant the motion for a firm setting; however, I can't grant -- I can't grant a firm setting on the upcoming stack. It's just not long enough. (Inaudible) cases (inaudible) as well.

So here's what I'm going to do. I spoke with my JEA after the pretrial conference before coming out here, and she said that the best thing to do would be for her to confer with counsel as to — to let you know what stacks were available. So what I'll do is I'll recess here for a moment and have her come out here and meet with counsel to discuss that.

MR. DEUTSCH: Thank you, Your Honor.

MS. FRESCH: Thank you, Your Honor.

(Pause in the proceedings.)

THE COURT: All right. We're back on the record. You may be seated. My JEA has met with counsel now and has discussed possibilities for the firm setting that's been

ordered by the Court. That being so, we know the firm setting will not — it will be set as a firm setting. We know it will not be going on the stack. So I'll vacate the trial as presently scheduled, which is January 31st, and I'll vacate the calendar call, which is the 23rd. Okay. And a new trial order will issue, and we'll go from there.

Okay. I think the next motion I guess would be what, the bifurcation motion?

Okay. And that motion is -- let me look at my calendar. Is that defendant Backstage Employment and Referral, Inc.'s motion to bifurcate trial? Right?

MR. RUSSELL: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You know, before we get to that, maybe what we ought to do is have an understanding as to all the sealing motions that were filed. I don't think there were any objections to any of the sealing motions, were there?

MR. RUSSELL: Oh, I don't believe there were any objections. No.

MS. FRESCH: No, me neither.

THE COURT: Okay. So that being so, I'm persuaded that the motions to seal the items that are referenced in each one should be sealed, and accordingly all the sealing motions are granted. Okay. (Inaudible.)

All right. So now I'll take the bifurcation.

MR. RUSSELL: Thank you, Your Honor. Again, Howard

Russell for Backstage Employment and Referral.

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This case is somewhat unique in that bifurcation is probably more appropriately the rule rather than the exception in a case like this. Bifurcation is not normally granted, and we don't file these types of motions in every case; however, this is a case in which we have a very, very clear delineation in time, really a particular moment in time that the trial can be bifurcated across.

Now, the basis for granting bifurcated trials in Nevada is if it's going to avoid prejudice, promote expedition and judicial economy and so long as the issues of liability and damages are not so intertwined that you can't reasonably have two separate proceedings.

As to the first issue of avoiding prejudice, this case carries with it a very significant risk of prejudice to the defendants if there is a single proceeding. The Court has now heard from the parties, both as part of the motion for joint firm trial setting as well as during the pretrial conference, that this is expected to be a lengthy trial. I will represent to you that I believe no one will disagree that the vast majority of that time is going to be spent on damages. The liability aspect of this case should take two to three days.

We have I think about six witnesses. Mr. Copperfield himself. We may have somebody -- MGM may bring

somebody as a corporate representative. We will have a couple of employees from Backstage, all of whom will talk about this illusion and how it's carried out. Plaintiff Gavin Cox will, of course, testify. His wife Minh-Hahn Cox may testify, but her testimony would be pretty limited since she was not there during the illusion. Maybe she'll testify to what they did that day, you know, prior to going to the show and what she saw during the illusion, but that would be a fairly discrete amount of testimony.

And then depending on the Court's ruling, there may or may not be a liability expert on behalf of the plaintiffs to talk about the actual execution of the illusion. Not only do we have a limited number of witnesses, six, seven at the most if you count Mrs. Cox — and then, I apologize, one other witness perhaps on behalf of Team Construction to talk about their work there and whatever cleanup work they did around the construction area. Not only do we have a very limited number of witnesses, but the testimony is going to be very brief.

The liability witnesses as far as Backstage is concerned, their depositions lasted about a total of an hour and a half each, and they were pretty extensive. All of the liability aspects of this case happen in a 10 minute, 15 minute time frame essentially. They happen from the moment in time in which Mr. Copperfield and the stagehands start throwing beach balls out to the audience. When Mr. Cox catches one, comes up

to the stage, is asked if he can run and then does the illusion.

The moment in time he starts to stumble forward, that's where the liability issues end. That's where the question of why did he fall and was it because of the negligence of one of the defendants, okay. So we've got a very, very limited scope of liability testimony, and then the jury will hear a week and a half and two weeks worth of damages testimony.

After, you know, we expect we're going to be possibly 15 trial days which will possibly constitute four to five calendar weeks, it's going to be very difficult for a jury to divest itself from what it's heard over the past three weeks about Mr. Cox's claimed injuries, his claimed traumatic brain injury, his claimed damages going forward, and to go back in time and to think objectively, well, wait, let me decide if any of the defendants actually caused this man to fall in the first place.

The prejudice to the defendants is very, very real in this case if we're asking the jury to be able to objectively weigh the evidence after hearing all of that damages testimony. There is no prejudice to the plaintiffs in this case, not any significant prejudice. They can tell their liability story.

The only person that's going to have to testify in both phases of trial will be Mr. Cox and again Mrs. Cox if she

wants to give a little background about the evening they spent before the illusion. He's going to be here through the trial anyway.

The testimony about the accident took up — we cited the Court to it — I think about 20 pages of deposition time, and that was a pretty thorough examination of step-by-step each thing that happened along the way. I anticipate his liability testimony will take an hour or two. It's going to be very brief. There's not going to be duplication. So there is no prejudice to — to bifurcating the trial because there's not going to be any overlap, and the plaintiffs aren't going to have to put on a second case.

THE COURT: Under the bifurcation scenario envisioned by you, what would the jury need to be told in the first phase about the injuries being claimed by the plaintiffs so that they would understand what impact that might have upon his testimony and his ability to testify and that kind of thing?

MR. RUSSELL: I think that it can be simply — first of all, I don't think it's really necessary because, as we pointed out to the Court, Mr. Cox remembers very, very clearly what happened up until the point of his fall, and we cited to the Court to specific testimony which he says after he fell, And at that point I don't remember much. We're talking about pages and pages of very precise deposition testimony; however, that's a fair point, and plaintiffs have raised that.

I think the jury can simply be told at the outset that, ladies and gentlemen, you're going to hear issues about the liability of the defendants and whether or not any of them caused Mr. Cox to fall. Part of Mr. Cox's claim for damages involves impaired memory, impaired cognitive abilities because of his injuries, and in the event this case goes to a second phase, you'll hear more about those injuries later; however, to the extent you find Mr. Cox has recollection issues, that is part of his claimed damages. And leave it at that, and so it'll give the jury some context.

I do think that's fair. Again, I don't think he's going to have trouble because he didn't, you know, a year ago. So if we need to advise the jury, I think we can do that in a way that doesn't put too much weight or emphasis on it, simply acknowledge that Mr. Cox is claiming some cognitive and some recollection difficulties because of his injuries. You know, you can't — you know, and if you even want to go so far as to say you can't hold that against him, innocent recollection, innocent lack of recollection is not suggesting that he's lying. We can give the jury an instruction on that. That can be cured fairly easily.

Now, whether it will promote expedition, I think that's very clearly as well because if we can try this liability issue in two, three, four days and be done with it and the jury decides that the defendants were not negligent or

that any alleged negligence did not cause Mr. Cox to fall, the case would be over very, very quickly. So there's certainly a significant chance that we're going to promote judicial economy in this case if indeed we bifurcate the action.

So then the last issue is is there a clear delineation between liability and damages? As I said, there is a very clear moment in time. The second in time where Mr. Cox begins to stumble forward, the liability question's essentially, you know, did one of the defendants cause that to happen?

How he fell, and I mean how he fell from the standpoint of the mechanism of how he fell, how did that fall impact his injuries? How did that fall cause his injuries? How does his demeanor and his conduct and his actions after he fell, how does that fall into his injuries? All of those things are damages issues. There's not any overlap there.

And the reason you can see there's no overlap there is because none of the damages experts in this case, none of plaintiffs retained experts, none of his treating physicians have looked at anything to do with liability. They haven't looked at the surveillance video. They haven't looked at the incident reports. Most of them haven't read Mr. Cox's deposition. They don't really care what caused him to fall. They might care about how his fall impacted his injuries, and that's understandable, but that's part of damages.

You've been through enough trials, Your Honor, that you know that most treating physicians and damages experts will come in and will say I'm not here to talk about liability. You know, I don't know why this person fell, or I'm not here to talk about how he got hurt. I'm here to tell you that he told me he fell, and I'm telling you that because he fell, X, Y and Z happened. So there is a clear delineation there.

And, in fact, the experts and the plaintiff's treating physicians, they can't testify to anything to do with liability because they haven't looked at any of that material, and it had nothing to do with their treatment, and it had nothing to do with their expert analysis. Everything the damages experts talk about will start at that moment in time after he has started to stumble forward.

The plaintiffs keep mixing these concepts of causation. You know, there are two causation issues here: What caused him to fall, and was it the defendant's negligence, and what injuries were caused once he fell? And it's that break in time that makes bifurcation in this case appropriate and hopefully will promote some judicial — will preserve some judicial resources if we can expedite the trial and get the liability issues tried quickly.

I don't believe in the length of the trial at all. As we said, the liability issues are fairly discrete, and giving the jury a day or a day and a half to deliberate, to

decide liability issues is not going to cause any significant lengthening of the trial. So this is one of those rare cases where really bifurcation is not only appropriate but warranted.

THE COURT: Any of the joining defendants wish to be heard on this bifurcation?

MR. FREEMAN: We joined, but no further comments.

MR. CALL: We joined also, Your Honor, but one further comment on this. We agree with the premise here about the bifurcation, and one of the reasons my client agrees with it is because I think my client would be prejudiced by also hearing the damages aspect of the case because of the egregious damages that are being alleged arising from this.

My client is being alleged to have dust on the walkway, and it's our position later on in our motion for summary judgment that there's no causation issue, but it's feared that my client may be brought in and be held somewhat liable for having dust on the walkway even though that they had little to anything to do with this, with this injury.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. DEUTSCH: Thank you, Your Honor. I think Your Honor touched on the most important piece here, which is the issue of credibility in the case, and as we all know, there's a lot of trial lawyers in this room, and we've talked to a lot of juries. One of the most important functions of a jury is to assess the credibility of a witness, especially in a case like

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this, and Mr. Cox's credibility is going to be at issue, and I don't believe that even a simple suggestion of that he's claiming memory impairment or that he's claiming this is sufficient to overcome the prejudice.

Mr. Cox answers questions very slowly. He speaks slowly. He has trouble identifying words. He has memory problems, and when you talk to juries during jury selection, the number one thing that jurors tell you is what do you look for when you assess credibility, and they say the body language, how long it takes someone to answer a question, whether the person has difficulty finding the answer, whether they remember things.

Those are key components in this case, and to — to just brush by them and have the jury wonder with a very simple phrase that he's claiming brain injuries does not in any way allow them to either excuse or recognize why he's answering the questions the way he is, and I think that is the most important point against bifurcation.

The other factor is is that, you know, I appreciate that Mr. Russell wants to sort of separate the causation analysis, but throughout all of the depositions of experts in this case, the way he fell, the way the accident happened, how fast he was running, how slow he was running, whether he was running or not, what direction he fell, how he fell are all parts of all of the defendants' — all of the defendants'

defense in this case.

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They're claiming that he could not have sustained this brain injury based on how this accident happened. So if they are coming here to say that that's no longer an issue in the case, that they're not going to make that argument, then okay, but since I doubt that's going to happen, it's pretty clear to me that the issue of how the accident happened and what his injuries were are totally inextricably combined that that bifurcation would not be proper.

And I appreciate Mr. Call's argument that, well, just because my client sustained serious, serious injuries, that that's somehow prejudice to his client to sit through a trial. That's no different than any other trial. We're claiming that he sustained serious injuries. We're claiming that they were at fault for those injuries, and that's what the jury is going to have to decide, and the fact that his injuries are more severe than someone else doesn't create an additional prejudice on his client.

THE COURT: What if in a bifurcated trial the plaintiff were allowed to call a medical witness just to establish a diagnosis or condition of plaintiff?

MR. DEUTSCH: The problem --

THE COURT: Without getting into causation of it or anything like that.

MR. DEUTSCH: Well, the problem I think is that it

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would be a number of witnesses. There would be a neurologist. There would be a neural radiologist to talk about his brain injury. There would be a number of witnesses, and at that point, we're talking three probably of the main medical witnesses in the case. At that point I'm not sure if it really makes much of a difference, bifurcation or not.

THE COURT: Okay. Just as a matter of observation, the last trial — jury trial conducted in the old Clark County courthouse was my trial. It was bifurcated. The jury came back and found liability in the old courthouse, and we tried damages in this courthouse. Okay.

MR. DEUTSCH: It happens.

THE COURT: So, I mean, bifurcation doesn't mean that the -- that the -- cases can be bifurcated, you know.

MR. DEUTSCH: I agree cases can be bifurcated. I think that there's significant prejudice to my client in this case because of the nature of his injuries and the defenses in the case where they're going to relitigate liability in the damages portion of the trial again. We're going to do everything twice — how he fell, how his accident happened — because all of their doctors opine on that issue in saying to the jury that he can't have a brain injury based upon how this accident occurred.

So I think that if anyone is prejudiced, I think the prejudice issue with respect to the credibility issue is -- is

far and away more of a concern than the cost or the number of days, and, you know, it's hard pressed to argue anything about cost for the defendants here. They have three lawyers when I'm sure that they're all each capable by themselves. So I don't think that it's really a cost issue that's a concern. I think it's a prejudice issue, and I think my client is the one that will be prejudiced.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Do you want to respond?

MR. RUSSELL: Just briefly.

THE COURT: Sorry about this pillar.

MR. RUSSELL: That's okay.

MS. FRESCH: I'll just point.

THE COURT: I should probably put a mirror someplace over here and over here.

MR. RUSSELL: Just on — simply I want to respond to the issue of the defense experts and the notion that we're going to litigate liability issues twice. It's simply not true. I'll tell you the defense experts on the traumatic brain injury component are a neurologist, a neuroradiologist, a neuropsychologist, but those experts are going to testify that this man's cognitive testing and his neuropsychological testing and his brain imaging do not — are not consistent with someone who claims to have suffered a traumatic brain injury.

We have a biomechanic who's going to talk about the

mechanism of fall, but he doesn't have any opinions about why Mr. Cox fell. He's simply saying, okay, I've seen this man's — you know, I've seen the way this man fell. I've read the descriptions of how we fell. When someone falls in that manner, you don't suffer a traumatic brain injury. When someone falls in that manner, you don't suffer certain cervical injuries. When someone falls in that manner, you might suffer a shoulder injury. I can appreciate that.

All of that testimony, and all those opinions about the mechanism of the fall, again, they start at that point in time after the fall has already started, and I — I debated whether to include my little diagram in my reply brief, but I actually think it's a fairly perfect depiction of what we're talking about here. It's that moment in time, and once he starts stumbling forward, the reasons why and whether it was because of the negligence of one of the defendants, that's already been established. You know, that point time is now over, and now we start talking about damages. So the jury should be able to decide at that point in time.

Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. I'll reflect on that motion a bit more. I'll have it under advisement for now, and I'll make a ruling as soon as I can after — after (inaudible.)

Now, it seems to me that we probably ought to get

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into the summary judgment motions, then go from there to the in limine motions. How's that?

So that being so, anybody have a consensus on the order in which the summary judgment motion should be taken? The first one on calendar is Backstage Employment and Referral's motion for summary judgment, right? Let's hear that one.

MR. RUSSELL: Thank you again, Your Honor. I don't want to rehash the extensive briefing. So I'll try and focus on some of the things that were raised in the opposition and address those. They were addressed in our reply, but I think they're important to point out.

The interesting point I think that has been made is the plaintiffs apparently still are relying on an old summary judgment standard. The slightest doubt standard is no longer the standard for resolving motions for summary judgment in this jurisdiction. That has been changed since 2005; yet the arguments that plaintiffs make are essentially nothing more than slightest doubt arguments, that if there is any minimal amount of evidence, that somehow creates a material question of fact for the jury to consider.

The Nevada Supreme Court has been very clear on this point, that summary judgment motions should no longer be disfavored. They should be considered an important procedural tool for the resolution of cases, and in light of that policy,

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the slightest doubt standard no longer obtains, and the Court is supposed to look at whether the plaintiff has raised a material question of fact that a jury can rely on to find in the plaintiff's favor.

So with that standard in mind, go through the basic elements that we have to deal with in this particular case. At its heart, this is a negligence case. The first question is whether there is a duty, and we have raised the issue in the motion about the potential application of a limited duty. For purposes of resolving this motion, we don't necessarily need to decide that today.

The Fiesta Palms decision from a couple years ago from the Supreme Court left open a window to say there might be situations in which we can extend the Turner versus Mandalay Entertainment rule. There might be situations in which the plaintiff engages in a recreational or an entertainment activity in such a way that there is a risk inherent in engaging in that activity, and that risk of injury creates only a limited duty on the — on the entertainer or on the sports team.

They did not extend the rule in the Fiesta Palm case, but they did leave open that possibility. So I do think that that would be a briefing for another day as to whether limited duty should apply here.

But I do think a situation in which a person

voluntarily engages in a magical illusion, is asked if they can run, is then asked to run during the illusion and then slips, that could potentially put us into a scenario of only imposing a limited duty because the risk of slipping while running is a risk inherent in running, and the participant, the voluntary participant has now been told you're going to be asked to run so. But I don't think we need to address that issue today.

I raised it for the Court's consideration because at some point in time, either through jury instructions or further motions we are going to be asking the Court to apply a limited duty to the particular situation. The point of our motion is to highlight that no matter whether you apply a general negligence standard or a more limited duty, there is no evidence to support the breach element of a negligence claim, and that's what we need to focus on.

The first couple aspects in the motion we can get out of the way right away. There was no opposition to the motion on the issue of punitive damages. Plaintiffs have essentially conceded that, and there's clearly no evidence of punitive conduct. So that portion of the motion should be granted.

Plaintiffs have not disputed the position that respondent superior is not a cause of action. That should not be a cause of action. It's not going to be on a verdict form. It's not going to be read to the jury. That cause of action should be dismissed because it's not a recognized cause of

action.

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And then the negligent hiring, training, supervision claim, there is good case law, including from Nevada now, which says that a negligent hiring, training, supervision claim emerges if the employer admits respondeat superior liability for the acts of its employees which we have in this case.

We've cited -- we've given the Court some of that case law, and the reason is -- it's fairly obvious and it's been addressed by numerous courts -- the plaintiff can only recover once if an employer has acknowledged responsibility for its employees' acts, and if the employee acted negligently, the employer's on the hook. You don't need a secondary cause of action for negligent hiring, training or intention. So those causes of action should merge, and again we've provided the Court with the case law on that.

In addition to that case or that claim, I should say, being legally subject to dismissal and summary judgment, there's also evidence to support any negligent hiring — hiring or training claim. That claim requires evidence that an employee was unfit for his job or that the employer didn't properly train the employee to do his job.

There has been no evidence provided or cited by the plaintiffs to support any such claim. There is no evidence that Backstage did not train its employees properly. There is no evidence that the employees did something contrary to what

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they were trained to do. There is no evidence that the employees were somehow unfit for their position.

What the plaintiffs have said is, well, you shouldn't have trained your employees to do this. Essentially they've taken the employees' testimony and corporate representatives' testimony, which coincide, match up, and they say, well, you shouldn't have trained your employees to do this. Well, that's just your basic negligence standard. That's going back to Backstage and saying you shouldn't do this as part of carrying out this illusion. It doesn't add an additional claim for negligent hiring or training or supervision. That doesn't --UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Sorry.

MR. RUSSELL: That doesn't -- that doesn't constitute evidence of negligent hiring or training or supervision. there's been no evidence and really no argument articulated as to how there would be factually a claim for negligent hiring, training, supervision or retention, and as I pointed out, legally that claim should merge into the negligence claim given that we've acknowledged respondeat superior.

THE COURT: But evidence of the facts or that the plaintiff contends to have been negligence in training or supervision or something like that would still be adduced, right? It just wouldn't be a separate cause of action?

MR. RUSSELL: Correct. Yeah. I mean, they can argue that Backstage was negligent --

THE COURT: It's part of the negligence.

MR. RUSSELL: Right. Exactly. It's not a separate cause of action.

Now, as to the negligence claim, again we're focusing on what evidence is there that there was actually a breach of any duty owed to plaintiff, and we would submit that there is no evidence of any breach of any duty. The plaintiffs have raised various theories in various arguments that they will make, but at this point in the litigation, theories and arguments don't carry the day.

So what is the evidence that any duty of care was breached to Mr. Cox because he was allegedly hurried through the illusion? The simple fact that he was hurried through the illusion, how is that evidence of negligence? There's no expert to talk about the standard of care for a production company in a similar position as Backstage who carries out an illusion like this. They have not put up an expert that's going to say, no, that's the wrong way to do that illusion. You shouldn't do it that way. You should have done it this way.

Okay. There's no evidence of any prior injuries during the illusion. So there's no evidence that Backstage had reason to believe that the way that it conducted the illusion and allegedly hurrying people through it was going to cause any risk of danger because no one had ever been injured doing it in

 the hundreds, if not thousands of times it had been done. You have to recall, Your Honor, this trick, this illusion was done 15 days -- 15 times a week for several years without incident.

So also where is the evidence that you've breached the duty of care by asking someone if they can run, having them run and then they slip and fall? That is simply a situation where an accident has happened, but an accident itself is not proof of negligence. That's exactly what the plaintiffs want to do in this case. They want to say, well, Mr. Cox slipped and fell. So therefore someone must have been negligent to make him slip and fall. That's not enough. They need actual evidence and proof of negligence, and they've not done that.

The other -- another theory they bring up, well, they failed to -- to protect him from known hazards. Well, what is the evidence of a known hazard? As I mentioned, there haven't been any injuries in carrying out this illusion. So where is the evidence that Backstage knew of a hazard of someone getting hurt?

There's no evidence of notice to Backstage of the alleged construction debris or dust. There's been no one to come up and testify that they went out there and they saw it and Backstage should've seen it as well.

There's also no evidence to suggest that Backstage had any reason to believe that Mr. Cox was incapable of running, that they were subjecting him to some hazard because

he was incapable of performing the illusion. Again, we're going back to, well, this accident happened so it must be somebody's fault, and there's no evidence of that.

This is all just supposition and theory at this point in time. And then we go through the discussion of plaintiff saying, well, there's evidence that they failed to warn him of hazards. Again, what did Backstage fail to warn Mr. Cox of? He was asked if he could run. He ran. Yes, they run through this corridor, but they run through a corridor with people lining each side of it telling them which way to go.

There's a train of people with one of our employees at the front and one of our employees at the back who are running the exact same route. There are 12 other participants who are running the exact same route. None of whom ever came forward and claimed that they engaged in or — or encountered any known hazard or that Backstage failed to warn them of any hazard.

So again, we're talking about theories and speculation at this point. We're not talking about evidence, and plaintiffs in responding to our summary judgment motion have not put forth any evidence of a breach of duty. They've simply put forth their theory, and under Wood versus Safeway, and the summary judgment standards of this state, that's not sufficient anymore.

Thank you.

MR. DEUTSCH: I think where we need to start, Your Honor, is — is what this — what we're dealing with here, which is we're dealing with a situation where Copperfield takes people out of the audience at random. It's late at night. They've sat through a show. They get pulled up on stage and put into a box. They're told nothing at all about what's about to happen, where they're supposed to go, what they need to do, what they're about to do, where they're going to go, how fast, nothing.

They're asked three questions. Are you a magician? Are you in the press? Or can you run? That's it. They're not asked what kind of shoes you're wearing. They're not asked anything about anything. The curtain comes down when these people are sitting there oblivious of what is about to happen, oblivious. They don't know where they're going to go. They think they're going to disappear.

They have no idea, and at some point a gentleman pops out of a secret compartment. The testimony in the case, not theory or supposition, but the testimony in the case is that the Backstage employees then yell at these people let's go, let's go, let's go. They get up. They don't know where they're going. They then start to run, and, you know, there's a lot of testimony in terms of issues of fact where they claim nobody really does run, but if you watch the video, everybody's running. The documents say these are the people that are

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supposed to make them run. The testimony is that everybody's running.

They're running around through a corridor in the dark. They then have to go from inside to outside, turning corners. They know none of this. They don't know where they're going. They're given a flashlight that doesn't work, trying to turn on the flashlight — Mr. Cox — it doesn't work. He goes outside, and outside there's a dumpster by Team Construction, and the photographs show it. We have them here. They're attached to a number of different motions that show the dust that's all over the ground in this area next to the dumpster.

This argument that they have no evidence of any prior injuries is a red herring. I don't think they should be able to make that argument. If it were a negligence case involving an automobile, the fact that I've never gotten in an accident before doesn't change anything here. This night was different than all other nights. Mr. Cox was a different participant than any other night.

The construction dust is all over the back of the theater. Right next to the dumpster where Mr. Cox was running. When he falls, if you look at the photographs of him afterwards, the construction dust is all over him. Nobody warns him of that. Nobody says from Backstage that says you're going to have to run, and we're going to go outside in the

dark, and there's going to be no lights, and there's construction going on. So be careful. Watch where you're going. None of that happened.

The testimony from Mr. Cox is that it's pandemonium is the word he uses, that he's getting pushed by Backstage employees to go faster, go faster, go faster. They didn't warn him that it was going to be dark. All of these things are issues of fact that a jury could conclude is negligence on behalf of Backstage — how the trick was done, what they told my client before he started to do it and how they went about doing it.

Is it safe to have someone running in the dark when they don't know where they're going while you're screaming let's go, let's go? We believe that's negligence, and clearly there is an issue of fact with respect to whether or not Backstage employees, who there's a concession from Backstage, everyone agrees, that them along with Copperfield personally were the ones who were at least partially responsible for the protocols of how this trick was done, for making sure those protocols were followed, deciding what the route was that the patrons were supposed to take. Those were all things that they are responsible for.

And all of those things create a number of issues of fact as to whether my client -- as to whether Backstage failed to warn Mr. Cox as to the dangers that are inherent in this

 trick, inherent dangers in sending a gentleman who's a large man, who's wearing moccasins at the time and having him run with no knowledge of where he's going with the only — their — their suggestion here with respect to this limited duty is preposterous. It's preposterous.

You go to a baseball game. You know that a foul ball may come and hit you. Mr. Cox knew nothing of what to expect. How they could suggest that he somehow assumed a risk in this trick by catching a beach ball and getting called up on stage is insane. It's as insane as this trick. It really is. And we don't know that nobody else has fallen. We don't know whether someone else has gotten hurt, and we don't know if this trick ever happened while there was construction outside.

What we do know is that there have been times in the past when Backstage and Copperfield decided not to have the people reappear. So what they did was in the past is that they would have the people disappear, but because of some reason or another, for example raining outside, they wouldn't have them run outside. They would just have them disappear, and that would be the end of the trick instead of reappearing in the back.

I think there's issues with respect to notice, constructive notice. Should they have known that there were dangers outside? If you look at the photographs that are in all of these respective motions, there's dust everywhere.

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There's piles of debris from Team Construction's construction work, and I think that if you put all of those factors together, it's clear that a jury could say that there was a failure to warn him. So I think there's a number of issues of fact here, and I think their motion is totally baseless in this instance.

MR. RUSSELL: I'll — I'll touch on the issue of the dust because even though I told the Court I was going to focus on breach, I'm going to have to phase into causation now. The problem with the argument about dust being out there is there's no evidence and no testimony that the dust is what caused him to fall or that the dust made the sidewalk any more slippery. The Court and every member of this jury is going to know that dusty sidewalks in Las Vegas are nothing new or nothing all that unique.

We asked plaintiff's expert -- and this is part of our motion in limine on that expert -- about the dust, and, well, did the dust make the sidewalk more slippery? Did his shoes make him more susceptible to fall because of the slippery surface. His answer was, well, I think so, but I don't really know because I haven't done any testing. I haven't done any coefficient of friction testing. I haven't done any slip resistance testing. So I really don't know how it impacted things. So now you're asking the jury to speculate as to whether or not the dust actually made the pathway more

dangerous, and the jury is not allowed to do that.

There's no evidence that the dust actually made the pathway more dangerous. So we can take that on the causation front, and that's the issue there, and there's no evidence of that, and plaintiffs have not presented it. They have not presented a single expert. They have not presented a single witness who's going to come in and say that because there was dust on the sidewalk the sidewalk was more slippery than it would've been any other day.

Now, plaintiff keeps going back -- plaintiff's counsel keeps going back to, well, we can't talk about the lack of accidents because that -- that's irrelevant. Well, it's not irrelevant. Negligence is did you fail to act as a reasonable person would under the circumstances. Well, the reasonable person we're looking at are the people that have been running this show for years and carrying out this illusion, and so the question is did they act reasonably given their knowledge?

Because the plaintiff is going to want to argue, they're going to want to argue to the jury that Backstage should have known that carrying out the illusion in this fashion would lead to injury. That has to be their argument because that's the definition of negligence is that you knew or should have known that your conduct was — was presenting a risk of injury. So since we don't have any prior accidents, I don't know what evidence they are going to use to prove that

Backstage knew or should have known that there was a risk of injury in carrying out this illusion because there were no other injuries.

And plaintiff's counsel says, well, we don't know. Well, we've been done with the discovery in this case for months. They asked these questions in discovery. They asked these questions during deposition, and witness after witness and discovery response after discovery response was we don't know of any injuries to any other people carrying out this illusion. They had a chance to ask those questions, and so now he's saying, well, we don't know. So essentially we don't have proof of other accidents, but we would like you to presume there are some because that's what would put Backstage on notice of a potential risk in carrying out this illusion in this manner.

This is all just speculation on top of speculation. If they want to argue to the jury that Backstage should have known that carrying out the illusion in this manner caused a risk of injury, then by all means, the fact that there were no prior injuries is absolutely relevant, and the jury will absolutely need to hear about that, and once they do, that then eradicates any claim for breach of a duty because there was no reason to know that an injury could have occurred. We get to rebut that.

And the last point I'll point out is I don't think

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it's preposterous that there might be a limited duty. Obviously the Nevada Supreme Court in the Fiesta Palms case didn't think it was preposterous because they spent several pages talking about it. He's now explained that his client stood up, all of a sudden "didn't" have a flashlight that didn't work, and it was dark, but he continued on.

There was never — there was never any evidence that he tried to get out of the illusion, that he stepped out of the way, that he didn't want to be part of it. He was part of it. He chose to be part of it. So there might be a limited duty. It's not preposterous, and we'll have to deal with that when it comes down the pipe.

But for the purposes of this motion, there is no evidence to support the fact that simply carrying out this illusion after they asked plaintiff if he could run, had him run, and no evidence of any breach of duty causing injury. There is no negligence claim there. Summary judgment would be warranted in these — in these circumstances.

Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. DEUTSCH: Your Honor, may I be heard on one

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DEUTSCH: I just -- this issue that he's raised, that lack of evidence of prior accidents is somehow an

element --

THE COURT: I'm not going to get into that right now.

MR. DEUTSCH: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay. I don't — the motion is not entirely without merit. I will grant it in part relative to punitive damages and a separate cause of action for respondent superior. Also my understanding is that the defendant recognizes the negligent — negligence and failure to warn, negligence in training and that kind of thing would be part and parcel of an underlying claim for negligence. That being so, I'll also grant the motion relative to the separate cause of action for negligent hiring, training and retention.

But I'll deny the motion in part insofar as it relates to the underlying claim of negligence, and I'm not going to treat right now the prior incident situation. That will be further developed. Okay.

MR. FREEMAN: Thanks, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So now the next motion, I believe, is Team Construction Management, Inc., and Beacher's LV's motion for summary judgment.

MR. CALL: Thank you, Your Honor. This is Team Construction's motion for summary judgment against plaintiff.

Mr. Russell set out the standard of care -- the standard --

THE COURT: Before we go further, I'll ask counsel for plaintiff to -- well, let's see. Counsel for plaintiff,

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plaintiff?

submit the proposed order on that one?

MR. RUSSELL: It was --

THE COURT: Does it make any difference?

MR. RUSSELL: I can prepare the order, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Will you run it by counsel for the

MR. RUSSELL: I will.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. CALL: Okay. Mr. Russell set out the standard for a motion for summary judgment in the State of Nevada. It is not the slightest doubt standard as has been argued by plaintiff. In this action or this motion, Team Construction and Beacher's will concede the duty portion of this motion at this time.

Now, what I want to address here prior to getting into the merits of the motion is that plaintiff needs to establish causation as an element of its cause of action, and in this instance, it's our position that they cannot move forward on causation because they cannot show that anything that Team Construction or Beacher's did out there at the scene resulted in Mr. Cox's fall.

I think it's up to the Court to look at cases and identify factually unsupported claims. The reason that the Court needs to do this is so we don't waste, you know, the time of the Court, and we don't cause undue anguish to the

litigants, and they're expensive. And that's what this motion is all about is because, as Mr. Russell pointed out, and which I was going to point out, plaintiff has not shown that anything on that walkway, whether it be dust, debris or anything, caused that walkway to be more slippery.

In fact in their opposition, they provide five areas where they say there's a material issue of fact. One's Mr. Cox's testimony; the other one, photographs taken after Mr. Cox's fall depicting dust on Mr. Cox's clothing; photographs of the accident location depicting identical dust on the illusion pathway which Mr. Deutsch showed the Court, which frankly I don't — I think are just pictures of a walkway; photographs of the accident location also depicting construction debris. This was taken after the date of the incident. And last, which I'll go into first is their expert, Dr. Ayres's report.

Dr. Ayres's report doesn't have a scientific basis for its opinion that there was debris or dust on the walkway that caused Mr. Cox to slip and fall. Dr. Ayres's deposition, in his deposition he testified he did not perform any scientific test on the walkway. He did not perform a coefficient of friction indicating that the walkway was slippery.

He did not perform any test that the walkway would be slippery even with this alleged concrete dust that plaintiff

states was present on the walkway. So he has no basis for doing that, for making an opinion that that walkway was slippery. In fact, his whole report should be stricken. He should not be allowed to testify.

So what do they have to rely on as far as showing causation element of their case? Mr. Cox's testimony. If you look at Mr. Cox's testimony, he described the dust as cement-like. He was assuming that it was cement dust. That is — that is throughout his deposition testimony. He doesn't know what it was essentially. He just assumed it was, and when he assumed it was, after two days later, when he went out there with his attorney to point out where he fell, there was construction going on in the site.

In plaintiff's opposition they present pictures of the concrete all over the walkway. In fact, that dumpster that we've been talking about is now in the middle of the walkway. That wasn't like — like that at the scene. In fact, the scene, the dumpster was on the side. There was no big construction debris in the walkway. This was two day — two to three days later, and that's when he assumed it was concrete dust that was on his clothes. That's where he ties it in, and he's assuming that's what caused his fall. He's assuming it caused his fall because he doesn't know.

Okay. The dust on Mr. Cox's clothing could have been picked up by falling on the sidewalk. I mean, as Mr. Russell

pointed out, and I was going to point out, there's dust all over the sidewalk here in Las Vegas, whether it's in Las Vegas, New York City, you know, or anywhere. I mean, you fall, you're going to get dust. At that point on that walkway, there's a planter also next to the walkway. There's this dumpster that's there that with MGM's permission was placed there.

There was no construction going on at that time by Mr. Haversack [phonetic], MGM's person most knowledgeable. In his deposition he said there was no construction going on there at that — that night. This happened during the night about 8:00 o'clock. That area was controlled by MGM during that time. In fact, Brinks trucks could go in and out of that area because there was a, I think, a cage there for cash.

It is incumbent on plaintiff to show that there was a causal link between whatever my client did and the fall. It's not incumbent upon my client to prove their case. They have not provided this Court with any evidence to show that what my client did caused the fall. They have to connect that dumpster to the dust which is all speculation at this time, and that dust caused the fall because it made that walkway slippery. They have not presented any evidence so far, and I doubt that they can, Your Honor.

Thank you.

MR. DEUTSCH: Let me start by saying, Your Honor, that irrespective of the motion in limine with respect to

Dr. Ayres, I don't — and whether he's called or not called, this is not a case that requires expert testimony. I know you guys probably don't deal with it a lot out here, but we do back in New York — snow and ice cases. If I slip on a piece of ice, I don't need an expert to come in and say that ice is slippery. Same thing here — it's a slip and fall case, and you do not need an expert to testify about a slip and fall case.

We have photographs of a walkway that is covered in dust. We have my client who's got dust — which is clearly different than just falling on a sidewalk — all over him immediately after the accident that is identical to the color of the dust emanating from that dumpster outside of the doorway where he was running past. So clearly there's issues of fact.

But before we even get there, there's the issue of whether or not Team Construction has met their burden for summary judgment here. At this point in the case, it is their burden to prove that there was no dust there, that they didn't cause and create any dangerous condition, that they — that they didn't have any notice of any dust on the floor.

This is their burden. They don't put in anything to meet that burden. There's not an affidavit of someone from Team Construction that says we cleaned the area. That's not our dust. We, you know, cleaned it very carefully, and last time I saw it before this trick it was clean. We don't have

that. We don't have any deposition testimony from anyone from Team Construction saying what they did. There is absolutely nothing from them to meet their burden that this dust was not theirs, that there was — that the dust wasn't there. I think that the pictures clearly —

So irrespective of the fact that they didn't meet their burden, and I don't even think we should get to the rest of it, a reasonable jury could look at the photographs, could look at the fact that there's the dumpster there, could look at the fact that there's construction there, can see the pictures of the walkway, can see the pictures of Mr. Cox afterwards and can reasonably infer that all of those things were from Team Construction's construction work, and there was testimony by Mr. Haversack who said that the responsibility for cleaning that area up was Team Construction's because of the fact that they had the dumpster there.

And what's — what's kind of interesting was that we have pictures of this location which show dust on the ground. We have a picture of the part of the walkway which also shows huge piles of dust on the ground, but one picture that was — and these were taken by MGM and disclosed by MGM, but one picture that was taken of the area that I think that covered exactly where he fell reminded me of the picture in My Cousin Vinny where the woman was looking through the screen, and it was completely fuzzy. So they decided not to take another

right?

photograph of the exact location where she fell. So clearly there's issues of fact, Your Honor, with respect to whether or not there was dust from this dumpster, that it was on the ground, that it was on Mr. Cox and that dust like that can be slippery and cause someone to fall irrespective of whether you have an expert to say it or not.

THE COURT: Okay. I think MGM was --

MR. DEUTSCH: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: I think MGM filed an opposition, too,

MR. CALL: Yes, they did.

MR. FREEMAN: Yeah. We'll just submit on the opposition.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

MR. CALL: Your Honor, two things I'd like to address. The first is I guess the inherent slipperiness of dust, whether it's concrete dust or not, okay, and that's not even going to the fact that I don't think they've even shown where the concrete — the alleged concrete dust, if it was, arose from anything that Team Construction did.

Unlike ice, there's nothing that shows that dust on a walkway is inherently slippery. It's not like water that you have on a floor that could be slippery when somebody steps on it. Plaintiff is incorrect. You do need an expert to show that if something's slippery, whether it's going to be a marble

 floor with nothing on it that's been waxed, you have to have an expert to come in and show that the way that the wax was put on, how much wax was put on, that it was slippery at that time that the plaintiff fell.

In this instance, we don't have anything. We just have allegations. Allegations are not good enough to carry—to dispute a proper motion for summary judgment as we have here. They don't show anything. They just allege that because a dumpster's there the dust came from that dumpster, and it came from TCM, and that because the dust was on the ground, then naturally it was slippery. They haven't shown us anything that dust on a sidewalk is inherently slippery.

And also, secondly is plaintiff, you know, says that TCM and Beacher's has a burden to show that the dust wasn't present on the ground. There's nothing that says that we have the burden to show that. In fact, it is plaintiff's burden to prove every element of their cause of action, one of that being causation, that dust on the ground was a substantial factor in causing Mr. Cox's fall. They haven't done it. They don't have any experts to do it, and they're only speculating whether it was something that came from work by Team Construction.

Let me inform the Court here that plaintiff had every opportunity to determine what was going on there at the time that Mr. Cox fell, the day that he fell, you know, the day before he fell and what kind of renovations were being taken in

a different part of the MGM facility to show that there was possible debris on the ground. They didn't depose anybody. They didn't try to bolster their case to be able to prove their cause of action against Team Construction. They did nothing, and now they're asking this Court to not grant this motion for summary judgment essentially based upon speculation.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

All things considered, I'm not persuaded by the motion, and it's denied. All right.

The next one I have on the calendar is defendant's motion for summary judgment on punitive damages. I already ruled on one motion for summary — on that.

MR. DEUTSCH: We had no opposition to those motions, Your Honor. We will -- we will stipulate to withdraw that, the claim for punitive damages against all defendants.

MR. CALL: Okay. Because Team Construction --

MR. FREEMAN: We filed a notice of --

MR. CALL: -- joined on that.

MR. FREEMAN: Yeah.

-- a notice of nonopposition as well.

THE COURT: All right. Very well. So that motion's granted then.

I received a proposed order on that motion from Ms. Fresch, right?

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MS. FRESCH: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. CALL: Your Honor, we -- Team Construction and Beacher's also joined that motion, too, and it's not reflected in that order.

MR. FREEMAN: We can revise that order to show that it's for everyone.

THE COURT: Okay. Yeah. Just make it applicable to all --

MR. FREEMAN: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- moving parties. Okay.

Now I've got MGM Grand Hotel LLC's motion for partial summary judgment against defendants Beacher -- Beacher's LV LLC and Team Construction Management.

MR. DEUTSCH: Your Honor. Your Honor, since I have no skin in this motion, may I use the rest room while they --

THE COURT: Oh, of course.

MR. DEUTSCH: Thank you.

MS. FRESCH: Your Honor, MGM has brought a motion for summary judgment and/or alternative leave for summary adjudication against both Beacher's and Team, and it really segues into what the last motion was about because it's all about this claim that there was construction dust at the point of where Mr. Cox fell and that that was the cause of Mr. Cox to fall whether -- however he might have fallen.

Beacher's contracted with MGM to lease space, and

Team Construction contracted with Beacher's to do the construction. Beacher's lease with MGM had a specific express indemnity provision in it, and we assert that Beacher's and derivatively Team because they incorporated our lease into their construction contract with Beacher's that they would both defend and indemnify MGM. There is a clear allegation that Team and Beacher's were negligent because they did not comply.

If plaintiff can prove their case that it was construction dust that led to the fall, Beacher's and Team had an obligation to keep that area clean and safe, and if it's proven that there was construction dust on the ground and that's what led Mr. Cox to fall, then they're — they were negligent, and pursuant to that agreement, they had an obligation to both — to indemnify MGM.

More importantly, they have the immediate duty right now to be defending, and they have failed, and they have — to defend MGM. It's rather ironic because Team has agreed to defend Beacher's. So it's really no different because it's the same contractual relationship between these three parties. So if Team has acknowledged that it needs to defend Beacher's, it should also be defending my client right at this point and pay and reimburse us for past defense fees up and to this date.

The contract is quite clear. Their opposition went into the fact that they are somehow — that under — going with the Rayburn analysis that that is unclear about the negligence

of MGM. We assert that the agreement is not ambiguous. It is quite clear that it says however and by whomever caused. That would put that it doesn't matter if we have negligence or not separate or in combination with them. They still have to defend. They still have to indemnify us.

And then finally --

THE COURT: If they were negligent.

MS. FRESCH: Well, they have to defend regardless, even if they were negligent or not because there's been a claim that they are negligent, and so we have to defend that claim because of them. So I assert that it's clear that they have a duty to defend regardless if there's an ultimate finding of negligence or not. Now, the indemnity —

Obviously we all deny that there was construction dust on the ground. I'm not — that's our position. We say there wasn't construction dust. We say none of us were negligent, and none of us led or caused the fall that Mr. Cox suffered, however, if plaintiff proves their case, they have an obligation to indemnify us, and we — we'd like a declaration that they do have an obligation to indemnify us if plaintiff proves that they were negligent and that they should be defending us right now.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. CALL: Your Honor, plaintiff's causes of action are varied and many in this instance, as you well know.

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They've claimed against MGM because of the walkway. There was a ramp on part of the walkway. They accused MGM of not having proper lighting out there and allowing David Copperfield's company to go ahead and use that walkway even at the time that my client had that dumpster out there at the time, and so there's many areas you can look at where liability could possibly lie.

As far as the indemnity agreement between Beacher's and the MGM, as the Ryburn [phonetic] case and its progeny show, that indemnification agreements are supposed to be strictly construed. In fact, when we — indemnification of one person, the contractual language on point must be particularly clear and explicit. In this instance it's more general type of language, boilerplate language contained in the indemnity agreement, and therefore — and that is something that is not — and that's been ruled as unfavorable in the State of Nevada.

And especially when you have somebody in superior bargaining power, such as the MGM which owns probably, you know, half the Las Vegas Strip, against a local contractor, to put something such as that is onerous. They — if they want to do something like that, they should make it explicit that my clients would go ahead and indemnify them for anything that MGM did. In this instance I don't think that the indemnity clause is explicit enough under Ryburn and the other cases. United

was one of them, and therefore you should deny the motion, Your Honor.

MS. FRESCH: I really just want to touch on one point from counsel's argument that it's not clear concerning the indemnity rights under the contract. First, it's ironic that they're claiming that somehow my client had a superior bargaining position, but in actuality, Beacher's had a superior bargaining position over Team, and Team is defending Beacher's in this lawsuit. So and again the two contracts are essentially hooked together because Team accepted all the obligations and responsibility of the — Beacher's had to MGM in the lease agreement.

And it's — the indemnity provision is a little bit unique, and it's because under 12.5.1 it specifically says that the tenant, which is Beacher's, has an obligation to indemnify if they breach the lease. They have breached the lease here because they were supposed to keep it safe and clean. They didn't do that because their contractor didn't do that — if, in fact, it's proven because again we all deny that there was dust on the ground — but that breach requires them to indemnify.

The language couldn't be any more clear. It's they breached the lease. They had an obligation to indemnify us. If they are negligence -- negligent, they have an obligation to indemnify us, but the defense duty is much broader, and it's

clear that they have a duty to defend MGM right now because the allegation is clear. We just heard the last motion. We've heard enough from the plaintiff's counsel through the papers and in the courtroom today that their main allegation is that there was dust that led to the fall of Mr. Cox.

MR. CALL: Your Honor, if I may just --

THE COURT: Okay. She has the last word though.

MR. CALL: Okay. Briefly. Under United Rentals Highway text, the indemnification duty to defend is also subject to strict construction. So I just want — I just wanted to inform the Court.

THE COURT: I wanted to ask Ms. Fresch what if the jury were to come back and find that the — find negligence but find that it wasn't Team Construction and the other one, Beacher's or whatever it is, that it was Backstage, for the way in which the defendant was handled?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I object.

THE COURT: The way people were directed or hurried or this and that the other thing. What — what would be the situation then (inaudible)?

MS. FRESCH: Well, I — I would assert that the way the indemnity agreement is written in terms of whoever and whatever, if there's any negligence that would be found as to MGM, as to their conduct with respect to their participation or involvement in the illusion and keeping — it's really MGM's

responsibility really stems from what the premises that --

THE COURT: It seems to me like you're seeking a conditional declaration. If it's determined that because of the fall was the dust, and if it's determined that whatever it is, those companies, they're the ones that caused the dust, then there's a duty to indemnify. That's what it seems to me that you're saying.

MS. FRESCH: Well, if they're -- if they have negligence, they for sure have a duty to indemnify, and if it's -- if we're found to be negligent, I --

THE COURT: Yeah. Yeah. That's what I'm saying.

MS. FRESCH: Well, if I'm -- if MGM. Obviously --

THE COURT: Right.

MS. FRESCH: — there has to be a finding of negligence because then if there's no finding of negligence as to MGM, then — then clearly they don't have a duty to indemnify because there is nothing to indemnify, but that doesn't really address the fact that the duty to defend is right now. They should be defending us. Even if Your Honor looked and said we're not going to make a decision on the indemnity right now, we should wait and see how it plays out in the first phase of this trial, then — but it doesn't matter with respect to the defense duty.

THE COURT: Okay. But MGM has been defending itself up to now, and couldn't it if it was determined that there were

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the right to recover on that claim that could be effectuated down the road, couldn't it, for reimbursement and the cost of defense recovered?

MS. FRESCH: Well, true, but the intent of the parties at the time by putting it in, the provision is clear that it's — if they make a demand to — for Beacher's and Team to defend it, they have an obligation right then to accept that defense, and they should be paying for a defense now regardless. I mean, it's prejudicial to my client that they're having to be held in abeyance when it was clear intent of the parties from the contract that the Team and Beacher's were going to defend if a claim arose that related to Team and Beacher's.

THE COURT: Let me hear from Mr. Call on that again, and then you'll have the last word.

MR. CALL: Okay.

THE COURT: I'm looking for the defend aspect as opposed to the indemnity agreement.

MR. CALL: Defend aspect is also similar to the indemnity aspect, especially when you have where you have to defend like MGM in this case because it has to be — it's strictly construed. I mean, MGM did not — it could've put it in the indemnity clause that we would indemnify MGM for MGM's negligence, and in this case they did not do so.

They put in ambiguous language, you know, any and all

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claims which is disfavored by the Court here, and whomever and soever. That is ambiguous. It doesn't state MGM in particular. They need to be specific. They did not do so in this instance, and therefore, we would assert that the duty to defend is not triggered until you show that, you know, Team Construction or Beacher's did something incorrectly, and that they were negligent in this action.

Here we're saying that there's no causation as, you know, MGM says, and so the duty to defend isn't even triggered at this time, and the duty for indemnification is not an express indemnity clause. It's a general indemnity clause, and we do not have to go ahead and, I mean, we do not have to indemnify MGM for their own — for their own negligence.

THE COURT: So what you're saying, I guess, is that I can make that ruling on the duty to defend just based on the language of indemnity or the contract?

MR. CALL: You can make it on the contract because it's ambiguous. The contract does not specifically state that we would indemnify them or defend them for their own negligence in this cause of action, and we don't have any duty to indemnify them for their own negligence which is, according to plaintiff, is pretty great.

THE COURT: Where's the language regarding the duty to defend? I'm going to have to look at that. I'm looking at the indemnity -- okay. Okay. It's the, Tenant hereby

covenants and agrees to indemnify, defend, save and hold the landlord parties, the premises and the leasehold estate created by this lease --

That's what we're talking about, right?

MR. CALL: Correct.

THE COURT: That language.

from and against any and all liabilities, losses, costs and expenses including reasonable attorney's fees, judgments, claims, liens, fines, penalties and demands of any kind whatsoever caused by, resulting from or in any way connected with one, any act or omission for negligence of tenant or tenant's agents, employees, servants, contractors, subtenants, licensees, customers or business invitees while in, upon, about or in any way connected with the premises or the hotel complex, including but not limited to the sale of unlicensed merchandise or goods to, arising from any accident, injury or damage howsoever and by whomsoever caused to any person or property whatsoever occurring in, upon, about or in any way connected with tenant's activities, tenant's work or tenant's use of the premises or the hotel complex or any portion thereof.

MR. CALL: And it hasn't been determined whether any of Beacher's or Team Construction has done anything that would've caused any injury at this juncture, and again, just to reiterate, the language in that indemnity agreement is more

 boilerplate than specific as required under the Ryburn case and the other cases that discuss strict indemnity.

THE COURT: Could I make a conditional determination that if it's determined that it was due to?

MR. CALL: I think then it would -- if it's a general indemnity agreement, I think what would happen is that it would have to be an apportionment, and that would be --

THE COURT: Well, the point is I think a conditional one would probably effectuate it right now in any event.

MR. CALL: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay. So did you have anything else to say, Counsel?

MS. FRESCH: Well, Your Honor, I just — just very briefly because you read the provision, I just want to reiterate, to me, the whomever whatsoever language is really clear, and counsel is trying to say, well, that's not specific enough under Rayburn, but I can say I don't know how more specific you need to get, and the cases are clear you do not need to use the word negligence. The indemnity agreement though does go into their negligence and any act or admission by them, and it's clear from whomever that would have to include MGM. I don't understand how it could be anything else.

THE COURT: Well, I know the duty to defend can transcend the duty to indemnify, but the language that I'm referring to here at the end says, About or in any way

connected with tenant's activities, tenant's work or tenant's use of the premises or hotel complex, right? And we don't know what the ultimate determination is going to be. The determination might be, if it were made for the plaintiff, it could be that it was Backstage and not the other ones, right?

MS. FRESCH: Well, I guess theoretically you could find that it would just all be Backstage. We dispute that, but I just — but I still say the defense obligation can be ruled upon right now and declaration can be made with a summary adjudication that the duty — they have a duty to defend because there is a claim about their activities on — at the — at the MGM with respect to this construction. That is not — it's not in dispute, but that is the claim.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. FRESCH: So their duty should for defending should be right now, and to me, this provision, 12.5 -- 12.5.1 -- I said that too quickly -- is quite clear on that.

THE COURT: All right. All things considered, I'm going to deny the motion. Of course, that's without prejudice to your intentions down the road as to rights, duties and obligations are. Okay.

MS. FRESCH: Okay. So --

THE COURT: I need a proposed order on that.

MR. CALL: I'll prepare the order, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay. The David Copperfield

motions.

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MR. FREEMAN: Good afternoon again, Your Honor. You've heard motions from the corporate defendants. I want to focus on the individual David Copperfield who is named in this lawsuit. Plaintiffs claim that David Copperfield is individually liable by his personal participation and actions that caused plaintiff's injury. They say they're not pursuing David — Mr. Copperfield as president or manager of David Copperfield Disappearing, Inc., which I'll refer to as DCDI from now on, but that is exactly what they're doing in their opposition.

First starting by looking at their complaint, the allegations are against the acts of corporate defendants, the alleged duties and breaches of these corporate defendants. There aren't any allegations against Mr. Copperfield, that he personally participated in any act in his individual capacity. They're trying to hold Mr. Copperfield liable for the alleged torts of the corporate defendants.

There isn't any allegation that Mr. Copperfield in his individual capacity had anything to do with this incident, Mr. Cox's fall. The allegations are generally regarding the handling, setting up, performing of the show, performing of the illusion, not the personal actions of Mr. Copperfield. When plaintiff fell, Mr. Copperfield was inside onstage. He was nowhere near Mr. Cox.

They are alleging personal participation, but when you look at the actual allegations, they're against the corporate defendants, and they're basically saying David Copperfield and DCDI are one and the same. They've alleged that Mr. Copperfield leased the theater, that he purchased the illusion, he designed the sets in the show, he entered contracts with MGM. That's DCDI. That's not Mr. Copperfield, but they're just lumping it all in to one to try to bring — to bring and keep Mr. Copperfield in this case. They're doing it because they're saying he is DCDI.

If this was David Smith, he would not be in this case, but he's David Copperfield. It's the David Copperfield show. We've already seen plaintiffs reach out to tabloids and the media. It's David Copperfield, and that's why they want him in here, not because they have actual allegations of his personal participation, stuff that he individually did that caused this accident. If someone was to trip and fall at a Walmart, you wouldn't sue Sam Walton.

THE COURT: Automobile accidents happen all the time where the driver's sued in addition to the truck companies.

MR. FREEMAN: Well, and that's where — and that all goes down to that personal participation. They cited several cases about entertainers being involved, but when you looked at those cases, the entertainer was stage diving. He landed on someone and injured them. The other one the entertainer was

assisting a person off the stage by taking their hand and leading them down. Mr. Copperfield was on the stage. Others were --

THE COURT: Giving the direction to people according -- I mean, that's what the contention is is that he was the face of giving the direction to people of what they were supposed to do and --

MR. FREEMAN: Well, and that was all stagehands. There was, you know, 30-some-odd people. You know, he's on stage. There's stagehands on stage, but once that curtain goes down, there isn't any — there isn't any contact with David Copperfield and the audience participants. He's on — he's in front of the audience talking to the audience about what's going on. There's stagehands who are taking the people off of the apparatus leading them down the ramp, taking them outside and around. Mr. Copperfield's not involved in any of that.

And again, you know, we're talking about this personal participation. The cases that they also cite are all controlling corporate entities that have responsibility, that have a duty. Two of the cases that they cited, FGA and the Elko case, one was a slip and fall in a restaurant. They brought the allegations against the corporate entity. They didn't sue the president of the company. They didn't sue the waitress or the hostess or the bartender.

They brought these claims against the corporate

entity, and, you know, the allegations are that the corporations had a duty to use reasonable care, not an individual manager, owner or employee. Personal liability can't be imposed on an individual manager, owner or employee simply because they have general administrative duties with the corporation. There has to be some actual conduct, for example, jumping off the stage, driving the truck into the back of someone, leading someone off a stage.

There has to be some sort of action that ties that individual to the incident, and again they don't have that. They go back and say, well, David Copperfield signed the lease. That's been disclosed in evidence, and the lease is signed by David Copperfield Disappearing, Inc., again the corporation. They're not one and the same.

Also, as far as — we put a section in the — in our motion about alter ego because we're — we're trying to find what avenue do they have there to try to get to Mr. Copperfield individually. DCDI didn't file a motion for summary judgment. That's a separate entity. We're talking about David Copperfield individually.

And plaintiffs claim that the record evidence established that there's material facts that Mr. Copperfield is the alter ego, and what they do is they offer conclusory statements. They say, well, he was the president and sole officer. That's not one of the factors that finds alter ego.

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They say that, well, he couldn't recall some of the corporate formation details. The corporation was formed over 30 years ago. He wasn't there being deposed as the PMK. They took the PMK's deposition afterwards, and they didn't get any evidence that there was any alter ego going on between Mr. Copperfield and DCDI.

DCDI is a Nevada corporation in good standing. They are up to date on all of their filings. They're sufficiently insured and capitalized, and there's no evidence of commingling or undue influence. These are the factors that support a finding of alter ego. In this case we don't have any of that evidence here and, you know, you can't rest on the general allegations and assertions and unsubstantiated conclusory statements.

David Copperfield is entitled to summary judgment in this matter as he — starting from the complaint, allegations aren't alleged against him individually. They're all focused on these corporate entities.

Thank you.

MR. DEUTSCH: Mr. Freeman started with the -- ended with the complaint. So I will start with the complaint.

Paragraph 16 of the complaint, Defendants and each of them failed to warn plaintiff that unreasonably dangerous conditions exist.

Paragraph 18, Defendants by implementing this trick

did place Gavin Cox in physical danger, giving him no warning of the same.

Paragraph 19, Defendants had a duty to maintain the premises and keep clear the areas of traffic and walkways where the trick was being performed.

Paragraph 20, Defendants had a duty to maintain the premises and keep warning signs — warning signage in the areas of traffic and walkways.

Paragraph 21, Defendants had a duty to keep common areas and walkways clean and free of hazards.

Paragraph 25, Each defendant breached their duties in the following ways, including, but not limited to, one, hurrying plaintiff through a dark construction zone; two, failing to clear the walkway of debris and dust; three, failing to — failure to maintain adequate lighting; four, failure to devise a trick that would be safe for audience participants; five, failure to warn audience participants of hazards prior to participation; six, failure to adequately warn or instruct the audience participants prior to getting consent for participation; seven, knowingly subjecting audience participants to knowing hazards.

So I don't think there's really a dispute that the complaint clearly does lay out claims against Copperfield personally. There's no dispute here on what the law is. The defendants' cases concede, their motion concedes that when

member of a company or a corporation that that person has individual liability separate and apart from the company. The motions they cite GK Las Vegas and a number of the other ones also clearly say that they cite the restatement of agency. That also says the same thing.

So then the question is let's look at what

there's an issue of personal participation of a director or

So then the question is let's look at what Mr. Copperfield's participation was personally in the issues that we've been talking about this afternoon.

On pages 60 and 64 and 65 of Copperfield's deposition, he — he admits that after purchasing this trick that he modified it to make it his own. So when we're talking about the issue of the trick in and of itself is just ridiculous, he's the one who created that. That's personal participation.

On pages 68, 76, 77, 94 and 95, Copperfield admits that he designed and implicated — implemented the protocols for this illusion.

On pages 167, Copperfield admits that he's the guy with final decision-making authority as to everything that goes on with respect to this trick.

On pages 26, 27 and 28 of Mr. Kenner's deposition, and Mr. Kenner is the gentleman from Backstage who was -- who testified that Mr. Copperfield personally was the person who set up the pathway for the illusion, so this issue of where

they're running, and how they're running, all Copperfield personally.

Mr. Kenner then testified also that the -- on page 87 of his deposition which is Exhibit 7, testified that Copperfield is along with everybody else, but him individually is responsible for keeping this pathway clear of debris.

Mr. Haversack, who is the 30(b)(6) witness from MGM, testified on pages 60 and 61 and 64 that Mr. Copperfield was the guy responsible for warning participants about the elevation changes in this pathway that he was responsible for choosing.

On page 57 of Mr. Copperfield's dep, he testifies that one of the things he personally does is assess whether the people coming up on stage are fit to run around like they do, what clothing they're wearing, if he feels they're comfortable, and the people from Backstage testified that everything they did, there were things they do are from — from the protocols that they set up and at the end of the day Mr. Copperfield has the final say. So there's clearly an abundance of evidence that Mr. Copperfield individually was negligent here, and there are issues of fact as to that.

I don't even think we need to get to the alter ego argument, but because they brought it up, I will just note that Mr. Copperfield testified that he's the president and the only officer of David Copperfield Disappearing, Inc. Everyone

concedes that -- Mr. Copperfield at page 41 of his deposition, Mr. Kenner at page 10 and 11 of his deposition.

And yet despite the fact that he is the only officer, the only person employed by David Copperfield Disappearing, Inc., Mr. Copperfield didn't know when the entity was incorporated, where it was incorporated. He didn't know where it was domiciled. He didn't know if there were any other shareholders or officers. He didn't know whether it had an annual meeting. He didn't know whether it had any employees, and the reason he didn't know this thing is because this company doesn't do anything. This company is Mr. Copperfield's alter ego.

And Mr. Kenner, who testified exactly that, he was asked the direct question at page 27 and 28 of his deposition. I think this was on 27. He's asked, question, David Copperfield is the David Copperfield Disappearing, Inc., correct? Nobody else? Answer, Yes. So even with respect to the issue of alter ego, there's the issues of fact that the jury would have to decide.

I think their motion should be denied, Your Honor.

MR. FREEMAN: He went through and read a bunch of the allegations of their complaint and they say defendants, so on, defendants, so on. That's just lumping in Mr. Copperfield with a bunch of corporate defendants. There isn't any evidence that Mr. Copperfield is personally involved. All the things they

cited to was David Copperfield purchased the illusion. David Copperfield set up the show. David Copperfield sets up the illusions. David Copperfield did this and that. Sure. He's the boss, but because he's the boss and he has general management duties doesn't make him individually personally liable when someone slips and falls. He has to have some sort of involvement in that beyond just generally involved with putting on the David Copperfield show.

THE COURT: So you're saying that if this were a situation with somebody on stage directing somebody to get into a tank of water or something like that and the tank was defective and filled up and the person couldn't out, you're saying that the person who directed the person to get into the tank couldn't be held liable?

MR. FREEMAN: Well, there would be some personal involvement if they were putting them in that tank whereas plaintiff's alleged that someone pushed them or yelled for them to hurry.

THE COURT: There was personal involvement allegedly, wasn't there, in the sense that he's the one who directed them to do what they did, right — the people who were involved in this act?

MR. FREEMAN: The corporate entities are what set this up.

THE COURT: Well, he was the one on the stage, right?

MR. FREEMAN: Yeah. There — there was a bunch of people on stage. It's — I mean, it's a big production. They're trying to make it sound like, you know, David Copperfield puts on this show and does everything, you know. This is — there's, you know, many, many things involved, you know, but what personal action did he take? You know, they went through their (unintelligible) thing.

There isn't any evidence that David Copperfield personally had a duty to clear the walkways, that he personally had a duty to maintain the lighting, that he needed to -- had a duty to personally warn anybody, that there isn't any evidence that David Copperfield told Mr. Cox to hurry, that he failed to clean up any debris that was out there. These are all things that show that Mr. Copperfield was not involved when plaintiff fell.

There's allegations against corporate entities.

There's a number of businesses involved in putting on this show in production, but as far as a personal standpoint, what action did he take? There isn't any evidence of that.

I mean, really under plaintiff's theory, then every single person involved in the show should be named individually because they had different — different involvements with the illusion and the route and the design and the lighting and the what have you, you know.

And then as far as saying, you know, the alter ego

issues, you know, under their theory all single owner companies would be alter egos under their theory. Alter ego finding is the exception, not the rule. There has to be findings that are laid out in clear Nevada case law, you know, evidence of commingling, undue influence, a whole list of things. There isn't any evidence of that at all.

This case, there's been discovery going on for several years. They took Mr. Copperfield's deposition. They took the PMK deposition which was under their topics of review. They didn't get any evidence that says that DCDI is some sham corporation and it's all David Copperfield. He just happens to be the sole owner.

You know, and again I think it comes down to, you know, what can you point to as the personal participation. The cases that they cite, you see clearly what they are. A guy dove off the stage into a crowd, and someone was injured. That's being pretty — pretty involved in that incident happening. Or if Mr. Copperfield —

THE COURT: What about -- how about before -
MR. FREEMAN: -- had taken the person's hand and said

come on, Mr. Cox, let's go.

THE COURT: How about if at the start of the show says go jump off the roof and the person does it? You're saying that's not anything that could lead to personal responsibility?

MR. FREEMAN: Well, that could be -- that could be possibly he's -- he's directing them to do something, you know, but go jump off the roof. We'll take care of it. It's all part of the act --

THE COURT: Wasn't he directing him to do this?

MR. FREEMAN: He wasn't doing that. No. People came up on the stage. There are stagehands there. They walk around the apparatus, and then stagehands begin to lead him up into this suspended cage.

THE COURT: The ones who are directed to be led, right? The ones who catch the ball?

MR. FREEMAN: The one who catch — the people who catch the balls, they're the audience participants. There's a whole, you know, vetting process about whether these people, you know, should be involved in this. They get on stage. Someone puts a cover on it, and then that's when the stagehands come in and get involved in, you know, opening up the back, taking the people out and going around. You know, the only time Mr. Copperfield spoke to these — these individuals is afterwards when he's thanking them for participating and, you know.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FREEMAN: So thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Here's my ruling; I'll deny the motion as it relates to the claim against David Copperfield

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individually for alleged negligence on his part. I'll grant the motion in part relative to the alter ego aspect of it because I don't see any genuine issues there. Okay.

> MR. FREEMAN: Thank you.

THE COURT: So that's the motion's granted in part, denied in part.

Let's take a brief recess till how about a quarter to 4:00. All right.

(Proceedings recessed 3:31 p.m. to 3:47 p.m.)

THE COURT: All right. Be seated. We're back on the record.

> Are there any other motions for summary judgment? MR. DEUTSCH: None, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Everything else now relates to motions in limine, right?

MR, DEUTSCH: Correct.

THE COURT: Is there a consensus on the order in which I should hear them?

MR. DEUTSCH: We have. We have spoken, Your Honor, and I think that we agree that some of them, at least at this point, may be premature, and if we were going to start with any, I think some of the ones that are more contentious are going to be the ones dealing with the National Health System and the testimony from experts with respect to treatment in England versus treatment here and what value should come of

1 them. 2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 MR. DEUTSCH: So I think maybe that's where we should 4 start. 5 MR. CALL: I would agree. 6 MR. DEUTSCH: So I think there's one -- there's an 7 MGM and Copperfield made one about Clauretie regarding 8 Household Services, I think, UK. 9 (Counsel conferring.) 10 MR. DEUTSCH: Which I think is Copperfield's Motion 11 In Limine No. 3. 12 THE COURT: That's defendant's motion in limine to 13 exclude plaintiff's expert Terrence M. Clauretie regarding loss 14 in the value of household services, Motion in Limine No. 3. 15 MR. DEUTSCH: I think that's the one, and I think the 16 other one is -- I think the more important one actually is 17 Backstage Motion in Limine No. 1, which is the opinions of 18 Dr. Oliveri with respect to the cost of the future medical care 19 in England versus the United States. 20 (Counsel conferring.) 21 MR. RUSSELL: Is that okay with you, Your Honor? 22 THE COURT: What's that? 23 MR. RUSSELL: Is that -- would you like to do that 24 one first? 25 THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RUSSELL: All right. So this is our Motion in Limine No. 1 on precluding Dr. Oliveri from testifying as to the costs of future medical care in the United Kingdom. I think as you read the briefs, Your Honor, you find that there's — well, there's no dispute that the law in Nevada is that a plaintiff is only entitled to recover future medical damages which he is reasonably certain to incur. That's what the law says, what the jury instruction says.

There's also absolutely no dispute that Mr. Cox is going back to the United kingdom after this case is over, and the sooner the better according to him and his wife. And Dr. Oliveri, who I have nothing but respect for and I think is a fine witness and has a great deal of integrity, and so when he learned that Mr. Cox was returning to the UK, he revised his report to say, well, if he's going back to the United Kingdom, then I need to revise my report, and so this is what I'm going to do.

And so Dr. Oliveri said that, well, looking at going back to the UK, Mr. Cox is going to incur significantly less or he is reasonably likely to incur significantly less because of the National Health System. So then he calculated his damages and his life care plan that way. So everyone seems to be in agreement that the United Kingdom costs will control, that the cost of healthcare in the United Kingdom, whether it be through the National Health System or through some private funding,

 that's going to be benchmarked for what Mr. Cox is reasonably certain to incur.

The only evidence of what the cost of Mr. Cox's medical care is going to be in the United Kingdom comes from experts. It comes from Dr. Oliveri and our expert Dr. Luke [phonetic], and Dr. Oliveri has not come forth with a report which says, you know, this particular procedure or this particular surgery or this particular drug or this particular modality is going to cost X amount of dollars.

Instead he's provided us a life care plan which has no costs associated with it for a good number of the items. Pain management, based on research, this is provided under the NHS. Mr. Cox would have access to physicians; therefore, no costs are listed for this, and so he took about — out a bunch of his costs. So there's a whole component of costs that everybody agrees on.

The -- I suppose the disputed area and really kind of the focus of our motion is the cost of attendant care. Now, Dr. Oliveri is going to offer the opinion that because of what Mr. Cox is reporting as a brain injury and what the medical experts that are going to be called by plaintiffs are going to identify as a brain injury, Mr. Cox is going to need certain future care. He's going to need certain treatments. He's going to need certain attendant care, and a big component is that he's going to need some sort of assistance with activities

of daily living.

Now, I don't dispute that Dr. Oliveri is qualified to render opinions on the -- I mean, there might be some areas that he's not qualified, but as a general matter, he's a life care plaintiff's medical doctor, and as long as it's within his scope of treatment, and as long as it's within his foundation as a life care planner and medical doctor, he's going to be able to offer some opinions on what Mr. Cox's needs are. That's not what this motion is about.

The motion is about the next step. What do those needs really cost? And Dr. Oliveri's opinion at this point is, well, I don't know what they're going to cost because I don't really know anything about the National Health System; however, if Mr. Cox has to pay for these things out of pocket, here's how much they would cost, and I've done some research and found out how much they cost in the area which he lives because he agrees that the benchmark for future medical care is the area where Mr. Cox is going to live.

So Dr. Oliveri says, Well, I've knocked out all of the medical treatments because they're all covered. So there's no cost associated with that; however, there might be these costs associated with attendant care, and he's broken that down. The problem with the second part of that opinion is Dr. Oliveri doesn't know whether or not that attendant care is going to be covered by the National Health System because he

 doesn't know anything about it. He's not done the research about it. So he is not in a position to offer to a reasonable degree of medical probability what the cost of that attendant care are going to be in the United Kingdom.

He acknowledges that there is a needs test, and if Mr. Cox passes this needs test, then, yeah, all of this is going to be covered, but I don't really even know what the needs test is, and so I'm not really sure how it's going to work. So he's come up with basically no opinion, and he even says he has no opinion on whether these attendant costs would be covered.

And so plaintiffs apparently want to put them up here just to speculate about, well, if they're not covered, then it might cost this, but he doesn't have any expert opinion on that, and it is plaintiff's burden to prove what medical costs Mr. Cox is reasonably certain to incur, and Dr. Oliveri doesn't get the (unintelligible.) Can he get up there and say I think he's going to need this type of help? Yes, subject to being cross—examined on what his qualifications are, yes, because he's got some background. He's got some education and some history to talk about that.

But can he talk about, well, and when he goes back to the United Kingdom to get these costs — to get these treatments, it's going to costs this? No, he can't testify to that because he's not qualified to do so.

So now that gets us down to the question of are we improperly using the National Health System as a collateral source? This is not about collateral source. Collateral source is the jury hears evidence that the plaintiff is going to need X, Y and Z treatments in the future, and X, Y and Z treatments cost this much money, and, yes, just because you've got insurance doesn't mean you get to zero that money out, okay, because there is a reasonable certainty that the plaintiff is going to incur them. Yeah, he might get insurance to pay for them, but he's reasonably certain to incur those costs. In some sense, he's going to get billed for them.

In Mr. Cox's case, he's never going to get a bill. This is not privatized insurance. This is not insurance at all. It's a universal national health program, so much so that Dr. Oliveri himself has said there are no costs incurred with this. This isn't a matter of Mr. Cox going and getting billed for it. He's going to show up at the doctor, show his ID and get the medical care he needs. There are no out-of-pocket costs. There are no costs that he's reasonably certain to incur.

As it relates to a vast majority of Dr. Oliveri's life care plan, the reasonable costs or the costs that are reasonably certain to be incurred are zero, and so we're not talking about a collateral source. The point is is that it's plaintiff's burden to show what costs he's going to incur, and

in this situation, because of the national health plan, it's zero. So they haven't gotten over the first hurdle of what are the costs that he's reasonably certain to incur.

Again, we're not talking about a situation in which you're presented with evidence of what the cost of a particular treatment is, and you're asking to zero it out because of insurance. The cost to Mr. Cox is zero, and Dr. Oliveri has not provided anything to the contrary. He hasn't come in and said, well, in the UK this medicine costs this much. He's just said the cost is zero. That's his opinion. They're his expert. If they're going to put him on the stand to talk about that, he's stuck with it.

THE COURT: Do we know anything about subrogation?

MR. RUSSELL: In the UK, there is no -- I mean, it's a universal health plan. I mean, it's --

THE COURT: I mean, could it subrogate --

MR. RUSSELL: No.

THE COURT: -- on any recovery by the plaintiffs?

MR. RUSSELL: I don't -- I don't believe so, no.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. RUSSELL: I don't know. No. But fortunately for me, I'm not the plaintiffs. So I don't have to actually prove what that will be dealing with.

But now as a procedural matter, and this is important, the plaintiffs have essentially already conceded

application of the National Health System. They're required under 16.1 to provide a calculation of damages. After Dr. Oliveri redid his life care plan and after they had Dr. Clauretie rerun the numbers, they provided an updated calculation of damages which basically took out every dime that was going to be covered by the National Health Plan.

We are now, I mean, we're longer from trial than where we started this morning, but that's what they've disclosed with a week and a half before the scheduled trial date as to what their damages were. So they can't go back now and say, well, no, actually it costs this. You know, they lost the opportunity to do that. Dr. Oliveri has laid that down.

So all that's left to question is has Dr. Oliveri provided an adequate foundation, an adequate expertise to be able to talk about the cost of attendant care in the United Kingdom, and he hasn't. His response to the questions is I don't know if it's going to be covered or not. I don't know if Mr. Cox is going to have any out-of-pocket expenses. I know there is this needs test. I know he has to go through that. I don't know what the outcome is going to be. So I don't know if he's going to have these costs or not, and I don't know is not an acceptable answer for an expert.

Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. DEUTSCH: I disagree fundamentally that there's any concessions here with respect to what applies. Dr. Oliveri

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gave two separate reports that talk about different scenarios, and we don't know sitting here today whether the National Health System, A, will be around next year or in two years or in three years. As we know from what's going on in our own country, that stuff could disappear very quickly.

There's other cases involving situations. There was just one out of the Second Circuit where a veteran was injured, and the defendants in that case argued that — I'm blanking on the name. I apologize — where the veterans in that case said, well, he shouldn't be entitled to any future medical care because he could go to the VA and get free care, and the Court said, well, absolutely not because if the jury finds that you caused these injuries and that these injuries require future care, he should be allowed to go wherever he wants to get that care, and that's the same thing in England.

The doctor that he may choose to go to for a specific thing, that's the best guy in the world, that he should be entitled to go see if they find that they were responsible for causing his injuries may be in Sweden. It may be in the United States. It may be somewhere else, and he shouldn't be required to go in a national system when there's something better.

It would be the same thing here as saying, well, you know, you were injured, but why should we pay for it? Go get Medicare. Go get Medicaid. We know that that's not legitimate because the person should be entitled to choose whatever doctor

they choose, wherever that doctor is, and they should have to pay for it if the jury so finds.

So I believe that Dr. Oliveri giving the cost of this treatment, here in the United States is what's more appropriate for the jury in that we're not dealing with pounds. We're not dealing with anything else. We're dealing with the damages law of the state where the accident occurred is what always applies, and that's what we're talking about here.

So I do not concede that there's been any concession that — that one applies over the other. Dr. Oliveri gave two separate reports to cover multiple bases and, you know, to make a suggestion that he should be required to go back home and accept free treatment is — is just not right. If they're found to have caused the injuries and those injuries require care, he should be entitled to go anywhere for them, and he's not going to have an opportunity to come back here.

If they find, well, you're under the national healthcare and in two years the National Health System is no longer available or the type of care that he needs is not covered under that system, he can't come back to court and say, hey, pay for it now. This is his time, and he should be compensated based on the numbers here in the United States for those things.

MR. RUSSELL: I guess now I'm confused as to where Mr. Cox is going to get his medical treatment in the future. I

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mean, well, he can get it here if he wants. He can get it in Sweden if he wants. Those are all wonderful fanciful things, Your Honor, but we're here about evidence and proof and experts and testimony and what the jury can do.

The jury in this case, the law of this state, which does control, is that the only future medical damages Mr. Cox is entitled to are those which he is reasonably certain to incur. He is not reasonably certain to incur costs in the United States. Why? Because he's not staying in the United States. He has no intention of staying in the United States. He has not asked to stay in the United States. He's going back. He's not reasonably certain to incur some Swedish doctor because he's not going to Sweden.

But most importantly, what Mr. Deutsch is saying is well, he gets to pick what doctor he wants, and he can get whatever medical care he wants, and we should maybe hear it — we should price it here in the United States. Where are the prices for these other doctors? Where are the prices for the doctor in Sweden that he might go to? Where are the prices for the doctor in the United States that he might go to? That's speculation.

The rule is, the law is is that what he's reasonably certain to occur. So this has to be based on UK costs because that's the only evidence we have is that Mr. Cox intends to go to the UK as soon as this case is over. So the fact that he

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might want to choose where he goes is irrelevant because he doesn't get to recover his cost based on where he might choose to go sometime in the future if the National Health System which has been in place for 70 years all of a sudden folds tomorrow. I have a hard time that that's going to happen.

And as far as the case Mr. Deutsch talked about with the VA, they didn't provide that in their brief. So I don't really have much to go on, but I will say this. It's one thing to say you live in this country. This is what medical care costs. Yeah, you have another option to go get it somewhere else, but there's a situation, like I talked about earlier with the collateral source rule, where you're saying here's how much this treatment costs.

It costs \$15,000 to get the surgery in this — in the, you know, in the locale where you live because even Dr. Oliveri will tell you that's the determining factor, where you live. So it costs \$15,000 to get this surgery. Sure you could go get it from the VA for free, but the collateral source rule says we're not going to let you put that into evidence. The National Health System is something different.

There's not been any evidence that it's going to cost \$15,000 for Mr. Cox to have this procedure, but he can get it from the national healthcare. There's -- the \$15,000 hasn't been put on the table. No expert, no witness, no doctor has said this is what it will cost. All you have is Dr. Oliveri

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saying there is no cost. So there's no alternative that we're trying to wipe out with the collateral source rule. This is a wholly different regime that we're dealing with.

And so on those facts and on that basis, we need to determine a cost based on UK costs, which for, again, a large portion of these treatments is zero, and as far as future care that Dr. Oliveri has put a cost with, since he doesn't know that Mr. Cox is actually reasonably certain to incur those costs, he can't testify to it because it's too speculative.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

All right. That one stands submitted. I'll review it further before I make my ruling. I'll do so as quickly as I I know it's one of the ones you're waiting for.

And the next one is - is it Dr. Clauretie?

MR. CALL: Your Honor, I was -- if you don't mind, I was going to go on the wage loss issue.

> THE COURT: The what?

MR. CALL: The wage loss.

THE COURT: Oh, wage loss.

MR. CALL: This is Team Construction's motion in limine for wage loss.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CALL: Okay. I'm going to hit on two issues on the wage loss issues here. One is Ira Spector, who was

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plaintiff's expert for future wage loss. He used a database from the United Kingdom; however, he was unfamiliar with the database. He did not research it, whether it was actually similar to the United States information that he had previously used. He testified that when asked have you ever used this report in any other evaluation, and he had not, and I am certainly not an expert on this statistical research, and I didn't examine anything other than this small snapshot of occupations to come to a conclusion regarding Mr. Cox's wage loss or alleged wage loss.

And last, in addressing Ira Spector's report, he used a life expectancy information based on US data, and US data I would submit is dissimilar from a person that lives in the United Kingdom with the United Kingdom's health plan and, I guess, culture, whether the life expectancy information based upon US data would be similar to the United Kingdom data I think is left up to speculation, and Mr. Spector cannot testify to life expectancy based upon data he is unfamiliar with.

Second of all, the wage loss presented by plaintiffs is essentially tainted. We have wage loss information provided to us by testimony from Mr. Cox about how much wage loss he incurred; however, right at the beginning of this litigation, his son Oliver Cox —

THE COURT: He chucked everything, right?

MR. CALL: He chucked everything. He chucked

 everything, and the thing is, Oliver Cox's girlfriend is the one that put him in touch with an attorney here in the United States; therefore, they knew that this was in litigation. It's not something like, oh, dad, I didn't know that you were suing. They knew he was going to — you know, pursuing a cause of action against Copperfield and the MGM, and therefore, what I'm saying is everything that they present the defendants have had no opportunity to look at that wage loss claim and dissect it and determine whether it's a firm basis for that.

We're essentially going by the word of the plaintiff, and based upon that, we think the wage loss should be considered excluded in this or at the very least we should have an instruction about that, that it should be presumed it would've gone against them.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okav.

MR. DEUTSCH: Your Honor, I think that their motion is misplaced because I think that all of these things go to the weight of this testimony, not its admissibility. My clients are entitled to testify that this is how much they were making. We're entitled to get the testimony from the experts, and Mr. Call is going to adequately represent his client by getting up here and cross-examining Mr. Cox about the fact that are we supposed to believe you? You threw out all the documents. We don't have them, and the jury is going to be able to consider

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do we believe this? Would we have liked to see the documents? All of that goes to the weight of the evidence, not to its admissibility.

And, in fact, Mr. Oliver Cox, the son, did testify, not that he knew. He, in fact, testified that he didn't know. He testified that the house was being sold and that they got rid of the documents, and there's no evidence to suggest that Oliver Cox, a young kid from England, was in some way aware that his parents' lawsuit in a United States court had claims involving lost earnings where these documents were going to be relevant. So there's going to be able to be no showing by anybody that there was any intent or malice by Mr. Cox in getting rid of these documents.

So I think all of this goes to the weight of the testimony and not its admissibility, and it's all fair game for cross—examination, and they might be able to score, well, really good points, but it shouldn't be precluded.

MR. CALL: Your Honor, defendants tried to get tax information from plaintiff during the case and were never provided that. We would ask that if the Court is not inclined to exclude testimony concerning wage loss that at least there should be a jury instruction concerning the wilful destruction of this evidence.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Here's what I'll do. I won't preclude the plaintiff

from endeavoring a foundation for the wage loss evidence. I don't settle jury instructions until the evidence is closed, and I don't -- I don't state which instructions I'm going to give until the evidence is closed, but I will likely be willing to give an adverse inference instruction based on what I understand the situation to be at this point.

I'm not determining at this point that it was intentionally disposed of or whatever, but it appears that it may have been negligently disposed of. I'm not going to make that determination now. I'll be open to that, and then I'll likely give such an instruction.

MR. CALL: So how would you like the order to read? That you denied the order -- I mean, the motion?

THE COURT: It's without prejudice to objections and without prejudice to proffers of jury instructions relative to evidence spoliation, higher evidence would be adverse (unintelligible) being produced, that kind of stuff.

MR. RUSSELL: Well, I apologize. Your Honor, just for clarity, though, we're talking about two sort of separate things. We're talking about whether plaintiff can put on a wage loss claim by getting up there and saying how much he made as opposed to whether Mr. Spector without foundation can get in and testify as an expert.

THE COURT: I said I'm not going to preclude him at this point.

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MR. RUSSELL: Okay.

THE COURT: I'm not going to say he can't endeavor a foundation.

MR. RUSSELL: Okay. Thank you.

THE COURT: So and that's without prejudice to any objections that are made. Okay. Sometimes what I'll do is when it comes to that, I take things outside the presence of the jury, the foundation aspects and things like that. Okay. So if it comes to that, approach the bench, and we'll have the jury go out and then we'll explore it further.

All right. The next one then would be what?

MR. FREEMAN: To exclude expert Terrence Clauretie regarding the loss of valued household services.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DEUTSCH: Before we start, Your Honor, I would prefer that if, like, the identical motion to the one we just dealt with.

MR. FREEMAN: Well, and that -- that's the perfect time to deal with it now. I'm not going to take very long. It -- it is -- it is similar to the other issues. Here we have --

THE COURT: It wasn't a --

MR. FREEMAN: Oh, sorry.

THE COURT: There's nothing about disposing of evidence or anything, is there, in this one?

MR. FREEMAN: No. No, there isn't. No

THE COURT: So that's what -- okay.

MR. FREEMAN: It's basically an opinion with no evidence.

THE COURT: (Unintelligible.)

MR. FREEMAN: Dr. Clauretie has issued a report regarding a loss of value of household services, and this is based on an interview with Mr. Cox and some US studies. Again, we know all this loss of household services is going to be involved — involved with Mr. Cox returning to the UK. His opinion is based on an unreliable methodology, false assumptions and speculations. Clauretie did not take into any facts regarding household services in the UK. There weren't any personalized facts. This was a cut and paste motion. There's areas in there where he had her loss instead of his loss, and so it's — it's just all speculative and misleading.

There's nothing to base that the reasonable costs of what household services are in the US. There wasn't any basis on medical records, vocational assessments, no confident — competent evidence except for an interview with the plaintiff, and again it's going to be his self-serving statements that is the basis of Mr. Clauretie's report, and that just does not meet the standard of Hallmark.

Thank you.

MR. DEUTSCH: I disagree, Your Honor. I think that

everyone in the courtroom is aware of the expert field of vocational rehabilitation. I think everyone in the courtroom has seen vocational rehabilitation experts testify. I don't think that there's anyone here saying that Mr. Clauretie's credentials don't qualify him as a legitimate vocational rehab expert.

THE COURT: He's not --

MR. DEUTSCH: Nevada law permits the loss of household services as an item of damages to be claimed. There's no one here disputing the fact that there is a legitimate basis for the fact that there were household services that were lost.

Dr. Clauretie's opinions are based upon his expert knowledge, his experience in the field, the study of peer-reviewed literature on the subject and tables and other surveys that are used in his field on an everyday basis to come to a value of all of these services. They're based upon national criteria and standards, all things that will assist a jury in being able to identify if they believe that he lost these household services of what kind of monetary value should be awarded for those things. So I don't think that there's anything out of the ordinary here.

I think that just the fact that he lives somewhere else versus here I think is really a red herring, and I don't think it plays any part in this motion, and I think their

motion should be denied.

MR. FREEMAN: And I would just like to add that Dr. Clauretie is not a vocational expert. He's an economist, and he based his opinions on these US studies. He didn't base them on any of the actual medical records or vocational assessments to support his opinions.

THE COURT: Okay. I'll -- and I won't preclude defendant from endeavoring a foundation to admit some or all of the evidence from Dr. Clauretie. All right.

MR. DEUTSCH: Yeah.

THE COURT: So the motion's denied without prejudice to objections and --

MR. POPOVICH: A question, Your Honor, on that. When plaintiff seeks to lay a foundation, does the Court allow defense counsel to stand up and ask to voir dire the witness on that?

THE COURT: Oh, yes. Absolutely.

MR. POPOVICH: Beautiful. Thank you.

THE COURT: Yeah. And that's what I was saying earlier I often will have the jury taken out, and we'll have proceedings take place outside the presence of the jury.

MR. DEUTSCH: You know, along those lines, Your Honor, I know it's late, but there are a couple of other motions that I think we could probably dispose of very quickly.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DEUTSCH: Things that I think in line with some of these issues are just premature. There was a motion from -THE COURT: You know, on the last couple -- I think on the last couple I heard I need to have orders submitted by counsel for the plaintiff, right? And so just pass them by counsel.

MR. DEUTSCH: Okay. Sure.

You know, there's a couple others that I think we can just dispose of quickly. There was a motion by MGM, their No. 1 about excluding certain photographs and videos that were taken concededly after the fact. You know, look, we're entitled to attempt to lay a foundation for whatever photograph we have. If a witness from MGM —

THE COURT: Should I hear the motion first? Should I hear the moving party?

MR. FREEMAN: Yes.

MR. DEUTSCH: All right. I was trying to speed things up, but okay.

THE COURT: Does everyone agree I should hear that one next?

MR. FREEMAN: Sure. Why not.

MR. DEUTSCH: I just thought we had a couple minutes. I thought we could do it quickly.

THE COURT: Yeah. All right.

MR. FREEMAN: Well, there's -- there's several issues

with the video and photos. It's not only can -- it can't be authenticated and they can't lay any foundation, they have no knowledge about these photos. There's the other issue of it's irrelevant and prejudicial.

The video and photos were disclosed saying that it was video taken by Mr. Gavin Cox. Going through his deposition, he never took the video. He's never seen the video. He doesn't know when the video was taken, from what location it was taken. He didn't know anything. He said he admitted he'd have to guess. Took the deposition of Mrs. Cox, and she was of the same opinion, didn't know anything about it, but her husband never took it. So the fact that it was disclosed as being a video taken by Mr. Cox is untrue.

Same thing with the photographs. He assumed his attorney took it because he went there with his attorney but wasn't sure. So that's one issue.

The other one is that --

THE COURT: Did he say anything about the photos looking like it appeared at the time of the incident or --

MR. FREEMAN: No. In fact, that was my next point, and this is really critical because he said, you know, it looks like the area, but it's not how it was the day I was there. He said there was not piles of rubble here on the ground, and there was not a dumpster in the path that I took to get back into the theater. So we've got a picture that was the area but

looks completely different about it, and how is it going to look --

And in their opposition, plaintiffs claim that the sole purpose of the photo is just to show the area, what it looked like, design of the driveway, the doors, the routes. Okay. But we sat here today and counsel pulled out pictures and saying, Look, piles of debris. If they go and pull those photos out and show piles of debris along with their allegations that he slipped on construction dust, a jury is going to go well the picture shows a pile of debris and construction dust right there even though it has absolutely nothing to do with what the real scene was, and that's Mr. Cox stating that. He actually brought it up before we even got into questioning on it saying, you know, this is the area, but this is not what it looked like. So another thing — so again, highly prejudicial.

Here's the other thing. Plaintiff's expert was given access to the show, the exact route and the entire area, and it was documented, photographed, videoed. David Copperfield's show even comped him tickets to see the show. They got access to everything. So it's been documented. If they want to show some pictures of what the area — how did they — to just show with the area looked like, they could have those photographs which would be far more telling of what it looked like on an evening before, during and after a show and the entire route

can be shown.

These photos here was it was a photo of a pile of rubber — rubble with a dumpster in the back. It doesn't show the door. It doesn't show the pathway. It doesn't show the area. It shows a pile of rubble, and regardless of whether they think they can authenticate it, it should not come in because it's completely irrelevant to as to the time of the incident, and it's certainly prejudicial.

Thank you.

MR. DEUTSCH: I agree with almost everything that he said, that before I could use a photograph and admit it into evidence and show a jury, I have to lay a foundation for it.

Mr. Cox is one witness who I can lay a foundation for a photograph with. There's going to be about 11 other witnesses who were there that night and who know what the scene looked like that may say something different. If I asked them a question, and they say that's not what it looked like, maybe it doesn't come in. If I ask them a question, and they do say that's what it looked like, then it comes in. It's premature, this motion.

THE COURT: Well, we got photos --

MR. DEUTSCH: Photos and — so the photographs are — are what I was just talking about, the issue of whether there were piles or things. I'm entitled to ask all the different witnesses because a lot of them, you know, unfortunately I

could take the position here that I was not involved in this case when a lot of these depositions went on. So I could sort of say that, but there has — I'm entitled to try to lay a foundation with the photographs, whether this pile of dust, these things were there that night and whether it fairly and accurately represents —

THE COURT: Is it admitted that the dumpster isn't in the same place or --

MR. DEUTSCH: There is one photograph where a dumpster is in a different place, but the photo could be used for different purposes with respect to just the pile of dust with a limiting instruction of the understanding that the dumpster is moved.

THE COURT: How long after the incident were these photos taken?

MR. DEUTSCH: I think within a couple of days.

THE COURT: Because the video was like five months.

MR. DEUTSCH: I agree, and the video is a different issue because the video would not be used for the purposes of saying that this is exactly what happened.

The video, if used at all, would be used for demonstrative purposes only with the understanding to the jury that this is not exactly what happened that night, but the jury's going to hear a lot of testimony about people running around the corner and where they're going, and it's really

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difficult unless maybe Mr. Copperfield would be happy to have us all go down the street and check out the trick from Backstage while it's going on. Maybe we could do that instead of the video.

But — but the video will be used for — if used or offered will be for demonstrative purposes only just so the jury will be able to see what we're talking about because the video footage from that night, the surveillance footage is very blurry, covers a very limited area of — of this thing. So I think the video would be a demonstrative exhibit only with the understanding that it is not representative specifically of that.

I think with respect to the photographs and arguably with the video, too, I think we're entitled to attempt to lay a foundation with any witness that testifies in trial, and I think that any motion to exclude evidence such as this at this point in time is premature.

MR. FREEMAN: A couple more things, Your Honor. We are not asking to exclude all photographs. There were photographs that were taken the night of the incident by the MGM security that, you know, they were I think less than an hour after it happened, but what we're talking about is these photos taken several days later.

And just, you know, forget about the authentication and trying to lay foundation, how prejudicial the photos and

video is. The video appears that it looks like he's across the street zooming in. It looks like someone's running through a dark tunnel. You can't even really make out figures. To put it in that light, to show the photos, you know, to sit here today and have plaintiff's counsel say piles of debris are shown in these photos, you know what the intention is. They're trying to say look, piles of debris and all that's going to do is confuse the issues, mislead the jury and very prejudicial.

So, you know, that's why we're asking here for an order in limine --

THE COURT: What about the video as demonstrative? What's your take on that?

MR. FREEMAN: Well, just I don't think it is demonstrative. It's -- it's a dark tunnel from someone so far away. I mean, if I had to guess, they were standing at the Tropicana or out there on the --

THE COURT: Are these photos -- do the photos that we're talking about here also include those emergency room photos, or is that a different --

MR. DEUTSCH: Different batch, Your Honor.

MR. FREEMAN: Yeah. Those, you know, we asked -- we included that into our motion but our main focus is the photos of the piles of rubble that were not there at the time of the incident, the dumpster that was not in the path, that plaintiff said this does not look like it, and then --

that?

 THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

I need to -- I haven't looked at all of those photos and the video yet.

MR. FREEMAN: And you were provided the photos in the video.

THE COURT: Yeah. And I'll look at them.

MR. DEUTSCH: Your Honor, if I just may — may I add one little piece to what — I agree. We cannot make an argument about piles of rubble or anything in front of the jury until we have some evidence of it, and if one of the witnesses in the case, and obviously they will be very well prepared to not say that, but one of the witnesses in the case says, yeah, that pile of rubble was there that night, it comes in.

THE COURT: Well, do we have a witness that says

MR. DEUTSCH: As of now we don't but that doesn't mean --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DEUTSCH: -- but that doesn't mean that at trial that by my brilliant cross-examination of one of these witnesses might not make one of them say you know what, now that I think about it, that pile was there. They weren't asked at the deposition.

MR. CALL: Your Honor, if you don't mind, there was pictures taken on the day of the incident, the night of the

incident --

true.

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THE COURT: Without the piles of rubble.

MR. CALL: -- and without piles of rubble --

MR. DEUTSCH: Well, Your Honor, actually that's not

MR. CALL: This is nothing but prejudicial.

MR. DEUTSCH: That's not true, Your Honor. The picture of the location of the accident is the one that was taken, at least one of them was the one that I showed you that looks like it was taken through the dirty screen from My Cousin Vinny. The one photograph of the actual location is the only one that was blurry.

And when the gentleman who was taking these photographs for the purposes of doing an accident investigation took the photograph, I'm sure it wasn't done by a film camera. I'm sure he had an opportunity to see in the little screen what it looked like, and he saw that it was blurry because those little things in front of it were leaves, and the screen is dirty. He chose not to take it again. I think there's an argument to be made that there is an inference as to why, and I'm entitled to try to argue that and try to lay a foundation for the other photographs.

MR. FREEMAN: And one more thing, we asked Mr. Cox if there were any piles of rubble, if he saw any disrepair of the concrete, and he said no. So, you know, the fact that they

have a photo days later of a pile of rubble is again would completely confuse the jury as to why is that here, and is not representative of the scene besides the fact that it's so highly prejudicial.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Okay. What's the next one that you want me to address now?

MR. DEUTSCH: I have —— I have a motion, Your Honor, in one of our omnibus motions about the issue that we raised earlier this morning about the issue of being able to argue that no prior accidents had ever occurred as some evidence that they were not negligent in this instance. I think those should be precluded. I mentioned it earlier with respect to the car accident case. I had tried to —— I was going to get up at some point after Mr. Russell ——

THE COURT: Well, a car accident case is entirely different from a premises liability.

MR. DEUTSCH: Your Honor, here's my question. If — let's say the facts were identical to this case except that this is two weeks in or a month in to Mr. Copperfield doing this trick, every other fact being identical, and they say, well, we couldn't have been negligent because nobody's fallen this month. There's always a first, and just because something doesn't happen in a particular time doesn't mean that somehow

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this is not a negligent trick or that they didn't act negligently.

Every single other day, maybe things were different. According to Mr. Copperfield, on every other occasion these people are specifically told not to run. That was the testimony from the defendants. They're not supposed to run. Nobody runs. They walk briskly.

THE COURT: So this is -- this is one of your omnibus motions, right?

MR. DEUTSCH: Correct.

MR. FREEMAN: No. 22.

MR. DEUTSCH: 22, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Because, you know, we're not going to get through all these motions today obviously.

MR. DEUTSCH: No. I was just throwing them out there, a couple of them. We can wait until another time for this if Your Honor would like to. It's late and --

THE COURT: Well, I think for purposes of the record, I think it's probably better to do it that way because otherwise we're going to -- well, did we do that on that day? No, I don't think so.

MR. DEUTSCH: I understand, and I'll be happy to just wait, and we'll save all of these until a later day.

THE COURT: If there are any specific motions, apart from addressing piecemeal omnibus motions, I think that we

better do that.

MR. DEUTSCH: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I think we're at the point now where we should adjourn and just -- do you want to come back on the 30th? Is that what we had determined?

MR. RUSSELL: I don't know that there's a rush to come back prior to the settlement conference on any of these.

MR. DEUTSCH: My request, Your Honor, just in light of the fact that we are traveling from New York would be that if we could somehow — if we do pick a date for the settlement conference, potentially it could work out where they're all done the same, and I could save my clients the expense of having to fly out here again and — because unlike the defendants, at the end of the day, all my expenses will come out of money that's in their pocket at the end of the day if we are successful. So I would ask —

THE COURT: So just --

MR. DEUTSCH: And it --

MR. FREEMAN: Well, we had a conversation with Lorraine here that we would conference with ourselves about the different stacks, and we would also talk about dates that would be good for an MSC. I think probably we need to do that first, and then we could maybe set something up in conjunction that way.

JD Reporting, Inc.

back up on it, but my position, Your Honor, would be, and

obviously I'm never wanting to affect anyone's personal vacation time or whatever they have, but with that being said, I do have a client who is — this is really a financial burden on them, that as long as this case —

Ms. Fresch is from a very large firm. There's at least one other attorney who's already here trying the case on behalf of them. So if March 28th was a date that worked for everyone, I would really push — implore the Court to ask, to order that we take that trial stack as opposed to October just in light of Ms. Fresch's, you know, potential vacation schedule, and again I hate to do that but —

THE COURT: All I'm doing now is setting a status check that has to do with ascertaining what's happened relative to setting a settlement conference and for scheduling a further proceeding — further proceedings on motions in limine.

MR. DEUTSCH: Okay. Maybe two weeks.

THE COURT: So I was thinking maybe February 2nd, Thursday.

MR. DEUTSCH: Yeah.

THE COURT: Is that -- is that a good day?

MR. FREEMAN: What time?

THE COURT: 9:00 a.m. It would be a status check regarding settlement conference and resumption appearing on motions in limine, right? That would be the status check.

MR. DEUTSCH: Right.

THE COURT: In the meantime, it'll give you a chance to talk among yourselves and everything else, and then I can figure out when to hear the rest of these motions in limine, et cetera.

MR. DEUTSCH: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And anyone who is not in town can participate by telephone.

MR. DEUTSCH: Thank you very much. We'll get the number from your officer.

THE COURT: Talk to Bob about how to do that.

MR. DEUTSCH: Yeah.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FREEMAN: And if I may, what was the date again for compliance with the State of Nevada on the pro hac?

THE COURT: March 27th.

MR. FREEMAN: March 27th.

THE COURT: Yeah, just -- all I need is proof of service of the order from the State Bar.

MS. FRESCH: Yeah, we'll get that before.

MR. FREEMAN: Yeah. I just want to make sure I wasn't running up against the --

MR. DEUTSCH: And we do have one more pro hac motion that we'll get filed also for Mr. Fallick. So we'll get that filed as well.

THE COURT: Very well. Okay. Those of you

traveling, have a safe trip back.

MR. DEUTSCH: Thank you very much, Your Honor, for your time.

MS. FRESCH: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

(Proceedings concluded 4:36 p.m.)

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ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case.

Dana P. Williams

Dana L. Williams Transcriber

A-14-705164-C

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Negligence - Premises Liability

COURT MINUTES

February 02, 2017

A-14-705164-C

Gavin Cox, Plaintiff(s)

MGM Grand Hotel LLC, Defendant(s)

February 02, 2017

5:04 PM

Decision

HEARD BY: Denton, Mark R.

COURTROOM: RIC Courtroom 03D

COURT CLERK: Marwanda Knight

PARTIES

None. Minute Order only - no hearing held.

PRESENT:

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- HAVING further reviewed and considered the subject of Defendant Backstage Employment and Referral, Inc.'s Motion to Bifurcate Trial filed on December 19, 2016 and heard on January 19, 2017 together with the Joinders thereto, the Court determines that the same has merit and it is GRANTED. In making this ruling, the Court will permit Plaintiffs to adduce limited evidence in the first, liability phase concerning the nature and extent of injuries claimed.

Counsel for moving Defendant is directed to submit a proposed order consistent herewith and with the underpinnings as briefed and argued in support of the Motion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

CLERK'S NOTE - A copy of this Minute Order was distributed to the following:

Christian N. Griffin, Esq. (By facsimile: 702-880-4528)

Adam E. Deutsch, Esq. (By facsimile: 212-751-0046)

Gary W. Call, Esq. (By facsimile: 702-997-3802)

Eric O. Freeman, Esq./Elaine K. Fresch, Esq. (By facsimile: 702-228-8824)

Howard J. Russell, Esq./D. Lee Roberts, Esq. (By facsimile: 702-938-3864)

PRINT DATE: 02/02/2017

Page 1 of 1

Minutes Date: February 02, 2017

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I D. Lee Roberts, Jr., Esq. Nevada Bar No. 8877 **CLERK OF THE COURT** Iroberts@wwhgd.com Howard J. Russell, Esq. 3 Nevada Bar No. 8879 hrussell@wwhgd.com Timothy A. Mott, Esq. 4 Nevada Bar No. 12828 5 tmott@wwhgd.com Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins, GUNN & DIAL, LLC 6 6385 S. Rainbow Blvd., Suite 400 7 Las Vegas, Nevada 89118 Telephone: (702) 938-3838 8 Facsimile: (702) 938-3864 Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins, Gunn & Dial, LLC 6385 S. Rainbow Blvd., Suite 400 Las Vegas, Nevada 89118 (702) 938-3838 9 Attorneys for Defendant Backstage Employment and Referral, Inc. 10 11 DISTRICT COURT 12 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 13 14 GAVIN COX and MINH-HAHN COX, Husband Case No.: A-14-705164-C and Wife. Dept. No.: XIII 15 Plaintiffs, 16 ٧, 17 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 18 MGM GRAND HOTEL, LLC: DAVID BACKSTAGE EMPLOYMENT AND COPPERFIELD aka DAVID S. KOTKIN: REFERRAL, INC.'S MOTION TO 19 BACKSTAGE EMPLOYMENT AND BIFURCATE TRIAL REFERRAL, INC.; DAVID COPPERFIELD'S 20 DISAPPEARING, INC.; TEAM CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT, INC.: 21 DOES 1 through 20; DOE EMPLOYEES 1 22 through 20; and ROE CORPORATIONS 1 through 20; 23 Defendants. 24 ST 52730 TA 25 26 /// 27 111 28 ///

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Defendant Backstage Employment and Referral, Inc.'s Motion to Bifurcate Trial came before the Court for hearing on January 19, 2017, D. Lee Roberts, Jr., Esq. and Howard J. Russell, Esq. appearing for Defendant Backstage Employment and Referral, Inc., and Adam Deutsch, Esq. and Christian Griffin, Esq. appearing for Plaintiffs. Having reviewed the briefs and submissions of all parties (including the Joinders by Defendant Team Construction Management, Inc., Beachers LV, LLC, David Copperfield Disappearing, Inc., David Copperfield aka David S. Kotkin, and MGM Grand Hotel, LLC), considering the arguments of counsel, and for the reasons set forth, the Court finds as follows:

FINDINGS

- 1. Defendant Backstage Employment and Referral, Inc. ("Backstage") moves to bifurcate trial of this matter into separate phases for liability and damages. Backstage argues the following with respect to this Motion:
 - a. The Court has the authority to bifurcate trial if it will avoid prejudice and promote expedition and judicial economy. See NRCP 42(b).
 - b. The issue of liability is separate and distinct from the issue of damages as the evidence presented during the liability phase will focus solely on the execution of the Illusion to the point of Mr. Cox's fall while the damages phase will focus solely on the events after Mr. Cox's fall.
 - c. Trying the liability issues first will assure that the jury makes a reasoned, dispassionate decision on liability before Plaintiffs present Mr. Cox's alleged injuries, alleged damages, and the emotional accounts of his injuries, treatment, and future prognosis.
 - d. Bifurcation will promote expedition and judicial economy as the liability portion of the trial is expected to last only a few days while the damages portion is expected to last several weeks.
 - e. A non-bifurcated trial could waste considerable resources and the time of both the judiciary and the parties, at the risk of prejudicing Defendants if the jury cannot objectively decide liability issues after weeks of damages testimony.
- 2. Plaintiffs oppose Backstage's Motion on the following grounds:

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- The liability and damages issues in this action are inextricably interrelated and cannot be efficiently or fairly tried separately.
- b. Bifurcation will severely prejudice the Plaintiffs by preventing them from explaining Mr. Cox's severe cognitive deficits which will be evident to the jury during his trial testimony and by unfairly requiring Plaintiffs to present the same evidence twice.
- c. Backstage has failed to demonstrate that bifurcation is clearly necessary to lessen costs and expedite the litigation.

HOLDING

- 1. Backstage's Motion to Bifurcate Trial is **GRANTED**.
- 2. Trial will be bifurcated into two separate phases: the liability phase followed by the damages phase, if necessary.
- 3. Plaintiffs are permitted to adduce limited evidence in the first phase (i.e., the liability phase) concerning the nature of the injuries claimed. Specifically, Plaintiffs are permitted to adduce limited evidence in the first phase as to what Mr. Cox alleges his injuries are to establish that Mr. Cox may have less than a clear recollection of the events on the night of the fall. Plaintiffs will not otherwise be permitted to adduce evidence as to the nature or extent of Mr. Cox's alleged injuries, or the damages and medical treatment stemming therefrom, in the first phase.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

This 24 day of February, 2017.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

corroberts: Is Lea Howard J. Russell, Eso.

Timothy A. Mett, Esq.

WEINBERG, WHEELER, HUDGINS, GUNN & DIAL, LLC

6385 S. Rainbow Blvd., Suite 400

Las Vegas, Nevada 89118 Attorneys for Defendant

Backstage Employment and Referral, Inc.

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Cox, et. al. v. Copperfield, et. al.

Case No.: A-14-705164-C

Order Granting Defendant Backstage Employment
and Referral, Inc.'s Motion to Bifurcate Trial

Approved as to form and content:

No Response

Adam E. Deutsch, Esq.

Admitted Pro Hac Vice
(Signed with permission)

777 Third Avenue 31st Floor
New York, NY 10017

Coupel for Hainiffs

Approved as to form and content:

Gary Call, Tsq. X Melissa I., Alessi, Esq. RESNICK & LOUIS, P.C. 5940 S. Rainbow Blvd. Las Vegas, NV 89118

Attorneys for Defendants Team Construction Management, Inc. and Beacher's LV, LLC

redulpermission

Approved as to form and content:

Enc O. Freeman, Iso.
SELMAN BREITMAN, I.J.P
3993 Howard Hughes Pkwy., Suite 200
Las Vegas, NV 89169
Attorney for Defendants David Copperfield's
Disappearing, Inc., David Copperfield aka

David S. Kotkin and MGM Grand Hotel, LLC

Electronically Filed 9/25/2017 12:05 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

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GAVIN COX,

vs.

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24 25 DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

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Plaintiff(s),

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DEPT. NO. XIII

CASE NO. A-14-705164-C

MGM GRAND HOTEL LLC,

Defendant(s).

BEFORE THE HONORABLE MARK R. DENTON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS RE:

PLAINTIFFS' OMNIBUS MOTION IN LIMINE; DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE; TEAM CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT, INC., AND BEACHER'S LV LLC'S JOINDER TO FOURTH SUPPLEMENT TO DEFENDANT BACKSTAGE EMPLOYMENT AND REFERRAL, INC.'S DESIGNATION OF EXPERT WITNESSES AND DOCUMENTS

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 2017

(APPEARANCES ON PAGE 2)

COURT RECORDER: JENNIFER GEROLD, DISTRICT COURT

TRANSCRIPTION BY: SHAWNA ORTEGA, CET-562

1

1	APPEARANCES:	
2	For the Plaintiff(s):	ADAM E. DEUTSCH, ESQ. CHRISTIAN N. GRIFFIN, ESQ.
4	For the Defendant and Cross-Defendant,	
5	Team Construction	
6 7	Management, Inc.; and for Third-Party Defendant, Beacher's LV LLC:	GARY W. CALL, ESQ.
8	For the Defendants and	
9	Cross-Claimants, David Copperfield's	
10	Disappearing, Inc., and David Copperfield;	
11	and for the Defendants, Cross-Claimants, and Third	
12 13	Party Plaintiffs, MGM Grand Hotel LLC:	ERIC O. FREEMAN, ESQ.
14		ELAINE K. FRESCH, ESQ. JERRY POPOVICH, ESQ.
15	For the Defendant,	
16	Backstage Employment and Referral, Inc.:	D. LEE ROBERTS, JR., ESQ.
17		TIMOTHY A. MOTT, ESQ. HOWARD J. RUSSELL, ESQ.
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THE COURT: All right. Well, Plaintiff's omnibus Motion in Limine, I'll take that first.

> MR. DEUTSCH: Sure, Your Honor.

We discussed outside to try to sort of narrow the issues that -- that at least I think need to be decided today. And there were three things that were really important that I'd like to just focus on. The first is, is the issue with respect to the defendant's suggestion that they're going to make some arguments during the case that during the life of this illusion or this trick, that there had never been any prior accidents.

And I think that that's -- that's problematic for -- for a number of reasons, Judge. One is because the evidence in the case already suggests that that's just not accurate. There's testimony from two witnesses that people had fallen during this trick.

THE COURT: Well, I'm not -- this isn't a Motion for Summary Judgment.

MR. DEUTSCH: No, no. I understand. But the -- the question is they want to argue that there were never any prior accidents. We think that's prejudicial. We think that it's extremely prejudicial, and we think it's -- it's not admissible and relevant to this case. Just like in a case with a car accident, I've never been in an accident before; it doesn't mean they were not negligent on this day.

I understand in a products liability case they cite the case involving Grassli [phonetic] I think it is, with a jungle gym in the McDonald's that was hot. That's the same, that jungle gym, every time. So if Plaintiffs are trying to argue that the jungle gym was defective and someone comes in and say, We've had this jungle gym there for 10 years, no one's ever gotten hurt on it before, I understand how that's relevant.

This is a very different scenario. This is a scenario where every night the trick is different. This night there was construction, other nights there weren't construction. And their ability to come in and say we've never had an accident before, in all the years we've been doing this trick, no one's ever had an accident, is impossible for us to refute. We can't cross-examine it. We know that it's not true, because there's two witnesses that have testified that there were accidents.

So then they try to change the argument to, well, no one's ever gotten injured during this trick. Well, that's not really relevant, either. Because that goes to causation and damages, not to liability. The issue with respect to someone could have fallen and just gotten lucky and not gotten hurt. So it has no relevance as to whether or not they were negligent in a performance of the trick on the night of the accident. So — so that's the first piece that

I think is -- they should not be allowed to argue that we've been doing this trick for 20 years and no one's ever gotten hurt.

THE COURT: Well, we're not talking just about argument, we're talking about evidence. I mean, this is a Motion in Limine to preclude evidence. Not --

MR. DEUTSCH: That's all right. We're asking to preclude them from offering testimony that they've been doing this trick for 15 years and no one's ever gotten hurt, because it has no relevance in this case.

THE COURT: Anybody want to respond?

MR. FREEMAN: This was -- they started at the end. This was No. 22 on Plaintiff's omnibus motion. And, you know, this -- simply what they want to do is claim that the illusion was dangerous, that no measure of safety was taken; we knew of this danger and hazard and we didn't care; we had notice of this; and it's -- it's too broad as a Motion in Limine just to say outright any other evidence is --

THE COURT: Okay. Thanks. Anything you want to say in response?

MR. DEUTSCH: I don't think it's broad at all, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I -- I think it is. I'm denying the motion without prejudice to any objections that are made in the context of what's happening at trial. Okay.

MR. FREEMAN: Thank you.

THE COURT: The next one --

MR. DEUTSCH: The next one, Your Honor, deals with the issue of medical payments from the National Health System in London. As you know, my clients are from London. And the defendants are -- are -- we anticipate an argument from the defendants with respect to future medical damages in the case, that they shouldn't be entitled to recover future medical damages, because when they go back to London, they can get free medical care. And I think that's -- it's prejudicial. I think it's -- it's not a legitimate argument. It's just any other collateral source, Your Honor.

If -- if my clients were -- if it's found that my clients were injured as a result of their negligence, my clients should be allowed to go to whatever doctor they want to get treatment. And that includes in -- in London, where you can get treatment above and beyond what the National Health System requires. So I don't think it's proper for the jury to hear anything about the -- a collateral source that they may or may not get free treatment in London with respect to future medical damages for my client.

MR. RUSSELL: Thank, Your Honor.

Well, there -- there are two aspects on this evidence of the National Health System. One Mr. Deutsch just pointed out was on the future care. Well, as the Court

knows, you've already ruled that Dr. Oliveri cannot testify as to what the future medical care costs are in the United Kingdom, because he's not an expert on those issues. We've already had that argument, you've already entered an order on that.

That being the case, there is no -- there will be no future care number put up, because there's no expert to come in and say what that number is. They've not offered any evidence, because the only evidence they had was through Dr. Oliveri, which has now been stricken by the Court. They are not going to have a witness come up here and testify as to what it will cost in London, whether by private care or the National Health System or whatever it may be.

So we actually, as far as future care goes, we don't need our expert to come in and talk about the fact that their future care will be free, because they don't have — they have a zero to put up. Now, they can come in and talk about his needs, they can come in and head off Dr. Oliveri, say that I believe he's going to need X, Y, and Z. And they can argue that as part of their general pain and suffering. But they can't — at this point they can't put a specific number on it. So I don't have to bring in an expert and talk about a zero when they already have a zero. So that takes care of sort of the future care.

As far as -- now, that being said, if during

trial there's some suggestion or testimony by the plaintiffs that say, Oh, we have all the future care, we're going to have to pay for it, well, now I do have to bring in a rebuttal expert that says, well, no, you don't.

So as of right now, if it simply stands that there's no future medical care number put up. I don't need to worry about the National Health System, because I don't need to rebut anything on that.

Now, the past medical damages, it is relevant on a few potential issues. One, failure to mitigate. There has already been testimony in this case that, you know, this has caused them to become poverty stricken. And if they bring that up, and I'm not saying they will, but if they bring that up, we are certainly entitled to bring in evidence of the fact that they could have gone back to the United Kingdom to get whatever medical care they needed without having to incur over a million dollars in charges here in the United States. So that does go to failure to mitigate, and there is case law that says once you've opened that door and cried poverty, the fact that you had a collateral source of benefits to help pay for your medical care does become relevant and admissible.

Even beyond that, though, there are medical records from the Center for Neuro Skills, which is a in-patient facility that Mr. Cox attended in California.

Among those records are phone calls from his wife complaining

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about the delay and why haven't you seen my husband yet and why haven't you taken his case? Well, if they come into court and then complain that, well, we couldn't get our medical care here in the United States fast enough, they wouldn't take us in California fast enough, we should be allowed to put in evidence of the fact that, well, you had the opportunity to get the care you needed back in — in the United Kingdom.

And our expert has looked through all of the medical records and has determined that all of the medical care Mr. Cox has received would have been provided free of charge back in the United Kingdom.

And finally to the extent that they argue there was some unavailability of treatment, well, he needs to get this treatment, but he's not been able to, because he doesn't have the money or he doesn't have a doctor here that will refer those things. Again, that goes to rebuttal testimony that we should have an expert be able to come in and say, You could have gone and got this medical care. So it goes to a rebuttal — a rebuttal to an argument on damages and a failure to mitigate damages. So that's where we are on the National Health System stuff.

On the future care matters, like I said, I don't think it's really an issue, because they don't have any future care numbers to be able to present to the jury on past

medical damages, it does go to the failure to mitigate.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RUSSELL: Thank you.

MR. DEUTSCH: Your Honor, a couple of things that are — that were inaccurate there. First of all, there's no rule anywhere that requires someone to go — if they're injured and they say you could go to this doctor, whether it's Medicaid or Medicare or the National Health System that said that I have to go to the free doctor. I might, if I get injured as a result of their negligence and I want to go see the best guy in the field to do my surgery, I'm entitled to go to that guy. And if I incur costs as a result of it, they should have to pay for it. They don't get a benefit because I could have gone to a worse doctor for free. So that's with respect to the past damages.

With respect to Dr. Oliveri, the only ruling that Your Honor made was that Dr. Oliveri couldn't offer any cost with respect to London. There was no ruling about him being able to give costs of the stuff that he testified -- he -- his report already talks about the future care that he needs, and the cost of those with respect to the American system. So I don't think the -- the London issue has any bearing on either the past costs or the future costs, because there's no rule that requires someone to go to the -- the free doctor instead of the best doctor.

MR. RUSSELL: Yeah, so --

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THE COURT: But I think my -- my ruling on -- in the context of this motion --

MR. RUSSELL: Of the past.

THE COURT: -- stands. It's granted. But if the door's opened, it may very well be something that you can explore. Okay?

MR. RUSSELL: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What's the next one?

MR. DEUTSCH: Our motion, Your Honor, to preclude them -- there's an issue with respect to emotional damages in the case, depression. And there's no dispute that -- that Mr. Cox did have a history of some depression. And, obviously, we're going to conceded that.

Our only piece about that is that -- that there's some discussion about the fact when he was 17, 40-50 years ago, that he -- he tried to commit suicide. And -- and we believe that that is -- is way too remote to be relevant here. And, obviously, we -- we'd like that precluded. We think it's prejudicial. There's no dispute that within a couple of years before this accident, that he had treated for some depression. We're going to concede that.

We're just talking about something as remote as when he was a child, we think it's prejudicial and -- and has no real probative value. Considering that from that point up until close to the accident, where there's no argument, he

didn't have any issues. So I think it's -- it's too remote, it's prejudicial, and has no probative value. And they should not be allowed to argue or discuss the fact that -- that he has this issue where he tried to commit suicide when he was a teenager.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. FREEMAN: Again, this is No. 1 on the omnibus motion. I think the way the -- the motion is written is it's asking for a blanket order on all prior and subsequent accidents, injuries, or medical conditions. Again, that's -- that's far too broad. There is a history of depression and anxiety that carries some significance as far as Plaintiff's mental condition, how he presented to Defendant experts on -- at the IMEs. It also goes to their alleged damages.

So, you know, in the proper context, this evidence can be relevant and admissible as far as it goes to causation or a possible alternate explanations as to his condition and -- and injuries. You know, maybe something as remote as a suicide attempt back when he was 17 might not be, but we know months before, he spoke to mental health providers about suicidal thoughts and -- and, you know, where -- where he was on that.

And so there's a big, broad history when you're talking about generally his prior -- his prior conditions and injuries or accidents. So again, this is something that

should be brought up, depending on the context, should be 1 2 ruled when it's -- the specific --3 THE COURT: Okay. 4 MR. FREEMAN: -- subject comes up. 5 THE COURT: All right. Thanks. 6 Counsel? 7 MR. DEUTSCH: Your Honor, if I may. I think what he said is exactly right. He agrees with me completely. 8 The 9 motion itself might have been broad. I'm here today to limit There's no dispute. He just said the stuff that 10 happened within the year or two prior, there's no argument 11 12 about it. They could bring it up, we'll bring it. 13 I'm talking specifically about the stuff when he 14 was 17. He just conceded that that was too remote and that's 15 really the only part of the motion that -- that we're looking to keep out. 16 17 THE COURT: Counsel, did you hear what was said just 18 now? 19 MR. FREEMAN: Well, I don't think there was -- we --20 we agreed with him. We basically said it depends on the situation --21 22 THE COURT: That's what I understood him to say. 23 -- as they come up in the context of MR. FREEMAN: 24 it depends on the witness and the evidence and -- there's too 25 many factors to decide right now whether a particular thing

is excluded or not.

MR. DEUTSCH: Your Honor, my issue is I'm trying to limit it to a very specific thing. There's no doubt that my client had some history of depression. There's -- it's in the records all over the place. We can't hide it. We're going to talk about it.

I'm talking about just precluding the fact that he tried to commit suicide when he was 17. Mr. Freeman just got up here and said, I agree that that's kind of remote. So I don't think that that has any relevance. I think it's prejudicial and it has no bearing in the case. If they want to talk about his depression within the three, four, five years before this accident, go ahead. We're going to talk about it, too. So it's — it's an exacerbation with respect to those symptoms; they're entitled to talk about it. I'm just talking about the suicide. That's all.

MR. FREEMAN: Well, and I believe there were three separate suicide attempts. And as -- as remote as it is, I only meant that in the context that it happened when he was 17 years old. As far as a medical context, it could be very relevant.

So again, it depends on what exact incident or condition or injury are we talking about and in what context. It's -- it's far too broad of a -- of a motion just to say it's granted, all prior conditions and injuries.

THE COURT: But do you have to attribute them to suicide attempts?

MR. CALL: Well, they were ischemic changes. That means he was cut off, again, with The blood to the brain for a short period of time, which could be addressed to the white matter changes within the MRI. They're saying that the white matter changes to the MRI were the result of this fall. We're going to say that it was probably the result of other things that happened.

THE COURT: But you don't have to say it was suicide attempt. It's just -- say it preexisted. Right?

MR. CALL: Well, I think you have to show that the suicide -- that his depression, which is going to go to the symptoms alleged on the TBI, are related to his severe depression, which is shown also by the suicide attempts.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RUSSELL: And -- and the -- and the neuropsychological and neurologic defense experts both talk about his history of depression going back to his teenage years as being, you know, as being relevant to and important to their diagnosis as to what his current state is.

So they do go back that far into his broad psychological history in their testing and in their analysis. And those reports have been out there for a while, Plaintiffs know that those opinions are --

THE COURT: So in other words, the fact of suicide attempts is germane to the condition?

MR. RUSSELL: Their analysis. Correct.

MR. DEUTSCH: Your Honor, it is -- to -- to suggest that a 60-year-old person's suicide attempt when he was a teenager, and then had no problems until recently before this accident, is -- is -- it's crazy.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know what --

MR. DEUTSCH: It's just there's --

I'm being asked to -- I'm not -- I'm not a doctor. Okay. I don't know. I'm going to -- I'm going to -- I'll rescind my prior ruling. I'll deny the motion without prejudice to objections and context of the case. And in doing so, I'm not requiring you now to narrow your -- your motion as it was. As far as I'm concerned, all the things are on the table and I'll entertain any objections that are made to evidence as it's adduced. Or as efforts are made to adduce them. Okay.

So what's the next?

MR. DEUTSCH: Your Honor, there was an issue, and unfortunately in my notes I didn't argue what number they are, so I apologize. But there was an issue with respect to Minh Cox, his wife, had filed a claim for disability at some point in her life. And we anticipated the defendants wanting to raise that in some suggestion that they're litigious

loss of consortium.

THE COURT: She's got a -- she's got a claim for

MR. DEUTSCH: Number 15. She has a loss of consortium claim. But that has no bearing on the fact that she hurt her back a couple of years ago at work and filed a disability claim, which is what it was. So I don't see what relevance that has in this case at all. And it — it should be precluded, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay. Anybody want to address that?

MR. CALL: Your Honor, the extent of her disability is germane to this, especially for the loss of consortium claim. You've got a loss of society as far as, you know, sexual relationships, her ability to perform different tasks together, you know, enjoy each other's life.

Regarding whether she was disabled or not I think ties right into that. What were they doing prior to this? How did her disability affect that? And how did it change after Mr. Cox's alleged injuries? So I think it is germane to, you know, what we're looking at.

As far as, you know, delving, you know, drilling down deep into her disabilities, I don't think we have to. However, I think it is relative to show — to contrast what she was able to do before, what she was able to do afterward, and how that impacted their relationship.

THE COURT: But the -- the motion seems to go to disability/wrongful termination action. What does that have to do with anything?

MR. CALL: The wrongful termination action is relevant to Mr. Cox's wrongful termination.

MR. DEUTSCH: No, it was Minh Cox's wrongful termination.

MR. RUSSELL: No. It was his against the --

MR. CALL: No.

MR. RUSSELL: -- the Box Club [phonetic].

MR. DEUTSCH: Oh. Right.

MR. CALL: So Mr. Cox was essentially terminated from his prior employment. Right after that, he also had an exacerbation of his depression. And — and that really impacted his life after that. He was very intimately involved with trying to show that he was wrongfully terminated. In fact, during the termination phase of the case, he had — it was denied, his termination appeal, because he had failed to tell his employer that he was disabled because of his mental health issues.

So I think that is germane to what happened here and whether he was able to continue and how that affected his depression after his termination from the club.

THE COURT: Well, I thought Mrs. Cox had a prior -- MR. CALL: She did.

THE COURT: -- disability/wrongful termination claim. Mrs. Cox's prior disability/wrongful termination claim is what's referenced in the motion.

MR. DEUTSCH: Yes.

THE COURT: Her claim.

MR. CALL: Okay. So we're -- you're not opposing bringing in Mr. Cox's termination from the Box Club?

MR. DEUTSCH: I don't --

MR. CALL: That's how I understood them.

MR. DEUTSCH: Well, I don't think -- they're entitled to talk about Mr. and Mrs. Cox's -- things that they could do beforehand, things they couldn't do beforehand, things that they did together, all of that, without the necessity of talking about the legal claims that were filed. Those have no bearing on anything other than to try to smear their character and make it seem as if they're litigious people. And that doesn't really have any bearing here.

So if they want to talk about the things that Ms. Cox -- Ms. Cox, what did you used to do beforehand?

Isn't it true that you didn't really do much beforehand?

They're free to do that. But to say you filed a lawsuit about it is irrelevant.

THE COURT: All right. I agree. Motion's granted, unless the door's opened to get into why there were certain conditions or whatever.

that they can proceed with, and you've got -- it goes to weight of the evidence, it doesn't go to the admissibility of the concept that this has endured for some period of time without something like this ever happening.

MR. DEUTSCH: But this is not something that endured. This night that they did the trick, just like it --

THE COURT: You know, I really have to move on. I've made my ruling on it. Okay.

So let's go to the next motion.

MR. DEUTSCH: I think that's all the plaintiffs have in their omnibus motion. There was an issue with respect to Gavin Cox being a malingerer. I'll withdraw that part of the -- the motion. If they want to argue --

THE COURT: And keep in mind on the last one we were talking about -- I hate to open up Pandora's box, but the point is I have said you can object in context. If -- if there's something that is being improper in your mind, object.

MR. DEUTSCH: Okay.

THE COURT: And I'll -- I'll determine at that time.

MR. DEUTSCH: Okay.

THE COURT: And I would, I guess, caution defense in their opening statements to anticipate that there may be objections that may be sustained. Okay.

MR. DEUTSCH: Fair enough, Judge.

And so the only other one I think that was the issue with respect to whether he's a malingerer, that's their defense. Let them argue it all they want.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DEUTSCH: I think that was all I had, Judge.

MR. CALL: I think you were withdrawing your motion on Dr. Ayers [phonetic]?

MR. DEUTSCH: That was your motion.

MR. RUSSELL: That was our motion. He's -- he's not going to call Dr. Ayers.

MR. DEUTSCH: Right. They had made a motion with respect to precluding Dr. Ayers, which I don't know whose motion or what number it was.

MR. RUSSELL: It was our number -- No. 2.

MR. DEUTSCH: Number 2.

MR. FREEMAN: As far as -- as far as Plaintiff's motions, you're -- you're done, right?

MR. DEUTSCH: That's all I got for now.

MR. FREEMAN: And -- and I think of those 22, we obviously didn't go through 22 motions today. But -- but a great number of those were covered in a stip and order that we filed. And I would just say that, as far as the others that weren't argued, that those would be denied.

MR. DEUTSCH: My request, Your Honor, is that -- that I think that the -- the real -- instead of just denying

 opposition, Plaintiffs admitted that comments or references to Defendant's wealth or their financial condition would be irrelevant and prejudicial. So in that respect, this motion would be granted.

But there's another part of it and it's that it appears that Plaintiffs plan to present evidence that they've been financially impaired because of this case and because of this incident above and beyond presenting their case and — and alleged damages. There were — there were comments of we were forced to move to the United States, we're held hostage here, we're trapped here, we're destitute, this case has caused us to be financially ruined. And these are all improper appeals to — to the jury.

It's well settled in Nevada that an appeal to economic prejudices to the -- excuse me, that the appeal to the economic prejudices of the jury are improper and it's misconduct. We've already seen the plaintiffs, what they've said to the UK tabloid media. We're concerned that Plaintiffs are going to try to turn this courtroom into TMZ with these type of comments and, you know, like I said, the held hostage, you know, they're -- they're forcing us to stay here, that kind of stuff.

MR. DEUTSCH: We're not going to do it, Your Honor. We spoke -- we spoke about it outside. I took Mr. Freeman outside while you were doing other cases, we discussed this,

we told them that we were going to do it and that there was no reason to even argue the motion. So I'm somewhat perplexed by the fact that we're listening as he's arguing the motion.

THE COURT: This has to do with the defendants' wealth aspect of it. You're not going to be arguing about the defendants' --

MR. DEUTSCH: Don't think I need to tell anyone I North Las Vegas how rich David Copperfield is, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know.

MR. FREEMAN: And we did talk about it outside. But I wanted to make sure our conversation was -- was officially on the record and that we wouldn't revisit this later on saying, But there was a conversation outside. So.

THE COURT: So what do I do? Do I --

MR. DEUTSCH: Your Honor --

MR. FREEMAN: Well, I think they've admitted that both parts of the motion, they're not going to bring up the wealth of David Copperfield and they're also not going to bring up the lack of wealth or --

THE COURT: So you're saying the motion's moot based on that or do I need to rule on it?

MS. FRESCH: Go ahead.

MR. DEUTSCH: Your Honor, I think that the -- if I may, Your Honor, I think that all of these motions are better

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THE COURT: Well, let me hear each one so I know what you're talking about. Okay. I'm hearing this one now having to do with excluding reference to defendants' financial condition and wealth, right? That's the one I --

MR. FREEMAN: That's the one part of it. And by their opposition, they basically said we're not going to do it, we agree it's prejudicial.

THE COURT: So is it moot?

MR. FREEMAN: Well, and I think the -- it is, according to them, but I think it should be granted.

THE COURT: Okay. The record will so reflect.

MR. FREEMAN: It's, basically, unopposed as far as that is concerned.

THE COURT: Okay. The record will reflect that it's moot based on the plaintiff's statement that they will not be alluding or referencing Defendants' financial condition and wealth. Okay?

MR. FREEMAN: Well, then there's the second part of the motion --

THE COURT: Which has to do with the plaintiffs' --

MR. FREEMAN: The plaintiffs, yes.

THE COURT: -- condition.

MR. FREEMAN: Their side. Their -- their basic financial impairment and lack of wealth. And it's due to,

you know, above and beyond just proving their -- their damages. These outrageous comments of, you know, we were held hostage here. And again, they said they're not going to do it, so based on that, I think that's unopposed motion, as well, and should be granted in its entirety.

THE COURT: Or is it moot?

MR. DEUTSCH: Your Honor, my -- my clients are going to discuss the fact that this accident changed their lives --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DEUTSCH: -- significantly.

THE COURT: The motion -- that aspect of the motion's denied without prejudice to objections and context.

Okay?

MR. FREEMAN: Okay. There's another one, No. 4, and this goes to precluding inflammatory arguments and questions and responsibility avoidance arguments. Specifically, in deposition, Plaintiffs' counsel asked a lot of irrelevant and harassing questions to Mr. Copperfield. They twisted prior public statements, they took them out of context, and had no relevance other than to harass and embarrass Mr. Copperfield.

They asked him, you know, is he the best ever, is he the best magician in the world, did he think he's better than Jesus Christ; stuff like that is -- is completely irrelevant. Again, it's -- it's, you know, it -- now, the questions originally came through -- I talked about TMZ

before, I think these were those type of TMZ

walking-the-red-carpet kind of -- kind of questions.

They're -- you know, while they may be funny for reality

television, they're inappropriate in -- in the courtroom.

They have, you know, they -- they -- not only do they have not any relevancy, but I think it -- they're trying to show David Copperfield is egotistical, arrogant, religiously insensitive, even blasphemous. These type of questions are -- are just not appropriate.

As far as the responsibility avoidance arguments, Defendants have a fundamental right to defend themselves; to — they have the right to confront witnesses against them; they have a right to present their defenses in their case.

You know, Plaintiffs start off with the conclusion that it's already been established that Defendants have breached their duty and now they're failing to accept responsibility for that. They have, you know, they have -- I could go in going back to keeping us hostage here, you know, how did they have the audacity to -- to take this to court, why aren't they accepting responsibility for what they did.

And -- and those type of arguments are improper. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. DEUTSCH: Your Honor, the stuff -- the -- the initial part of that motion, with respect to comments made by

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David Copperfield, there's lots of comments that he's made in the past that are relevant towards his credibility, towards his demeanor on the witness stand, and they're all fair game. If there's a question that's asked at trial that Your Honor feels is inappropriate, they can object to it. A blanket ruling about all questions on cross-examination seems a little bit much at this point.

I don't quite understand what the second part of his motion is about. Your Honor's already bifurcated the case. If we get to a damages phase in the trial, we're entitled to tell the jury that they've already been found responsible for this accident. And I don't know if that would be encompassed in what they're seeking to preclude, because I don't think it's very clear.

I think every plaintiff in every case is entitled to say we think they have a responsibility here that they're not living up to. And I think we intend to do that here. So — but I don't think that's out of the ordinary of any case. We believe they had a duty. They're not taking responsibility for what they had a responsibility to do. As a result, my client suffered and we're here in court. I don't think that there's anything wrong with that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MR. FREEMAN: Well, just again, that really pertains

to those type of comments about being held hostage here and -- and forced to be here, which, as part of the other motion, they've agreed that they're not planning to bring that up. So --

MR. DEUTSCH: In — in terms of a this phrase held hostage here, we had a discussion, we did it in the pre-trial stipulation that any issues with respect to my client's immigration status or any of that, that they would agree that that has no bearing in it, and as a result, we're not going to argue in any way that they're here solely because of the defendant's fault.

We're going to argue, and I -- I tried to make this clear outside with everyone, that this accident affected their life, it disrupted their life, it caused them to have to lose their business and -- and disrupt them in terms of their kids. But I don't think anyone's going to say they were held hostage here. So --

THE COURT: All right. Motion's denied without prejudice to objections. Okay.

Anything else?

MR. DEUTSCH: There was the Dr. Ayers motion, but we agreed, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DEUTSCH: -- not to call Dr. Ayers.

MR. RUSSELL: Yeah. So our -- yeah, Backstage's

I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly ATTEST: transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability. Shawractor Shawna Ortega, CET*562

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DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

GAVIN COX,

Plaintiff(s),

VS.

MGM GRAND HOTEL LLC,

Defendant(s).

Case No. A-14-705164-C

DEPT. XIII

BEFORE THE HONORABLE MARK R. DENTON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

THURSDAY, MARCH 29, 2018

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS RE: PRETRIAL CONFERENCE

(APPEARANCES on page 2.)

RECORDED BY: JENNIFER GEROLD, COURT RECORDER

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APPEARANCES:	
For the Plaintiff(s):	ADAM E. DEUTSCH, ESQ. (Appearing telephonically)
	CHRISTIAN N. GRIFFIN, ESQ. PERRY S. FALLICK, ESQ.
	(Appearing telephonically)
For the Defendant and Cross-Defendant,	
Team Construction Management, Inc.;	
and for Third-Party Defendant,	CARVW CALL FOO
Beacher's LV LLC:	GARY W. CALL, ESQ. ROGER W. STRASSBURG, ESQ.
For the Defendants and	
Cross-Claimants, David Copperfield's	
Disappearing, Inc.,	
and for the Defendants,	
•	
MGM Grand Hotel LLC:	ERIC O. FREEMAN, ESQ.
	ELAINE K. FRESCH, ESQ. JERRY POPOVICH, ESQ.
	(Appearing pro hac vice)
For the Defendant,	
and Referral, Inc.:	D. LEE ROBERTS, JR., ESQ.
	HOWARD J. RUSSELL, ESQ.
	For the Plaintiff(s): For the Defendant and Cross-Defendant, Team Construction Management, Inc.; and for Third-Party Defendant, Beacher's LV LLC: For the Defendants and Cross-Claimants, David Copperfield's Disappearing, Inc., and David Copperfield; and for the Defendants, Cross-Claimants, and Third Party Plaintiffs, MGM Grand Hotel LLC: For the Defendant, Backstage Employment

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LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, THURSDAY, MARCH 29, 2018

[Case called at 10:37 a.m.]

THE COURT: In a few minutes I'll be summoning counsel into chambers relative to the *Cox vs. MGM* case. Okay.

[Off the record at 10:37 a.m. until 10:44 a.m.]

THE COURT: All right. This is not a hearing, it's a conference. Okay. Usually I do these pretrial meetings before the commencement of a jury trial in chambers, but given the number of people who are here and given some of the issues involved here in the proceeding, I decided to come out into the courtroom.

The recorder is going to, as I understand it, record this. But not because it's a hearing, but because it's -- to do minutes, the clerk is going to, you know, may have some questions about what we discuss.

So do you have everybody's appearance here?

THE CLERK: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Anybody -- if you want to sit somewhere or --

MR. CALL: Yeah, we're -- we're back here in the corner, Your Honor.

THE COURT: If you want to move over --

MR. CALL: So this is going to be --

THE COURT: -- wherever you want to be, just so -- so it's --

MR. FREEMAN: Do you mind if we tear out this phone?

THE COURT: Yeah, I know. That's the --

MR. CALL: I know, that's --

THE COURT: That's why they call this courtroom 3D. It's got -- okay. All right. Well -- and we've got somebody on the phone.

MR. DEUTSCH: Yeah, Judge. Adam Deutsch and Perry Fallick in New York.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DEUTSCH: Good morning.

THE COURT: So we're scheduled next week to -- to start trial, right? For purposes of jury selection -- and this case has been bifurcated, so we're going into the liability phase first. And so one thing that we'll want to be prepared for earlier on than would normally be the case will be jury instructions. So we'll want to -- I'm not sure how long the liability phase is going to last. Anybody have anything you want to say about that?

MR. DEUTSCH: You know, it's hard to tell, Your Honor.

We -- we think it should be rather -- move rather quickly. You know,
we're prepared to -- to provide everyone, you know, sooner rather than
later, with sort of a pared down witness list from the, you know, zillions of
witnesses that were on everyone's witness list initially. We're calling
most of the defendant's witnesses and they all should be pretty short,
other than a couple. You know, it all depends on how many zillions of
witnesses the defendants are planning on calling.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, in any event, we're going to be going to the jury with jury instructions after the liability phase is concluded. So we're going to want to keep that in mind. And, of course,

most of those -- a lot of those jury instructions will be the stock instructions that we'll be utilizing, and then we'll just indicate that -- that the issue is, you know, what -- what's being presented at that time, that'll be more specific.

And then depending on what happens in the liability phase, then we go in -- we may or may not go into a damages phase. And then there'll be subsequent instructions given to the court -- or given by the court if that were to be the case.

I think what we -- one thing we need to do, first of all, as far as I'm concerned there are two sides in this case. Okay. We have two sides. I know there are -- I think there are cross-claims or whatever, I don't remember exactly off the top of my head. But there are basically two sides here. So when we're doing the -- let's -- let's identify the -- we're going to have 24 people that are going to be seated in the -- in the jury box or in folding chairs in front of it, because there aren't 24 seats there. And then each side will have, let's see -- let's see, what do we have? We've got the -- each side will have four peremptory challenges to the regular jurors. And four peremptory challenges to the -- I'm sorry, two peremptory challenges to the alternate jurors. Okay.

So what we need to do at this point is we need to identify who the alternate jurors are going to be. And the way that I do that, I do it by seat, okay, by seat number. All right. So I do it by flipping a coin initially. Whoever wins the coin toss, that side selects the first -- the first alternate seat. Okay. And then I go to the other side to select the next one, then back to the first side, then back to the other side.

1	THE COURT: Okay.
2	MR. DEUTSCH: 8.
3	THE COURT: Okay. That's the first alternate. Now the other
4	side, choose a number from 1 to 12, except 8.
5	MR. DEUTSCH: Judge, if I may for a second, just to clarify,
6	so so when we the jury gets selected and they're put in the box,
7	whoever ends up in that eighth seat is an alternate, is what we're saying
8	here?
9	THE COURT: That's right.
10	MR. DEUTSCH: Okay. Gotcha.
11	THE COURT: And you should have been given I'm sorry,
12	I you should have given the
13	MR. DEUTSCH: I do have the instructions.
14	THE COURT: Yeah, the process.
15	MR. DEUTSCH: And I read them a couple of times. But
16	THE COURT: Right.
17	MR. DEUTSCH: I wasn't 100 percent clear. But thank you.
18	THE COURT: Okay. So now we go to the defense side to
19	choose a number from 1 to 12, excluding 8.
20	MR. POPOVICH: I think we consensused at 7.
21	THE COURT: 7? Okay. Plaintiff's side again. 1 to 12,
22	excluding 8 and 7.
23	MR. DEUTSCH: 12.
24	THE COURT: Okay. Defense side again? 1 to 12,
25	excluding 8, 7, and 12.

 MR. POPOVICH: 11.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So those will be the alternate seats. I don't identify the alternates until the conclusion of the argument and before the jury goes into deliberation. Okay. So whoever ends up in those seats will be alternate jurors. Okay.

MR. GRIFFIN: And, Your Honor, to clarify --

MR. DEUTSCH: Judge, are the --

MR. GRIFFIN: -- that is the order of the alternates?

THE COURT: Yes. And that's the order. First alternate is 8, second is 7, third is 12, fourth is 11. Okay.

MR. DEUTSCH: And, obviously, I understand why Your Honor does not say anything to them until they go into deliberate. In terms of the bifurcated trial, do those people then remain or are we going to select new alternates or how does that work at that point?

THE COURT: My recollection, you know, that's a good question. My recollection is that they -- that they would remain. But -- but I need to verify that. I think we had a case that was on that point some time ago. But that's my -- that's the presumption that I'm going by is that those alternates would remain. There's no --

MR. DEUTSCH: They would remain and then they would be alternates again on the next phase?

THE COURT: Yes. Unless -- unless there's a need to replace a regular juror. Yeah. Uh-huh.

MR. DEUTSCH: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay? So that takes care of that. How long do

you think jury selection's going to take?

You know, before I -- before I get to that, why don't we do this, let's make sure we -- we note there are a couple of jurors -- we have two more that have requested an excuse. One is Jason Volts [phonetic]. He sent an e-mail to the court on Monday, the 26th.

THE CLERK: Do you know his badge number?

THE COURT: His badge number is I think 14, is it?

MR. POPOVICH: 614.

THE COURT: Oh, I'm -- yeah. Uh-huh. Let's see. 614, that's right. Uh-huh. He says -- let me read this to you and then I'll make this the next court exhibit in order, this particular e-mail. I'll read a portion of it, I'm not going to read the whole thing. The most recent one, March 26th, and he says:

Good morning. I'm awaiting feedback from you regarding my request to be excused from jury duty. The court has been moved from March 27th to now, April 3rd. In addition to the issue that I am having with school and the interference this court date will cause me, now with the date changed I am also having an additional issue about the jury duty. I am a guest of honor for a luncheon on April 4th, the day after my required court appearance. If I am chosen to serve for court, I will not be able to attend this important function. I have been patiently waiting a response to my first e-mail since it has been over six days since I had sent the e-mail. The e-mail response that was sent to me said that I will receive a response to my e-mail in 24 to 48 hours based on business levels.

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So far it has been six days and I have yet to hear any communication regarding my request. Like I said before, I am happy to serve my civic duty, but right now a lengthy court case will disrupt my life and cause a major issue with my education that I am seeking. Thank you for your assistance in this matter. Jason Volts.

MR. POPOVICH: Your Honor, Jerry Popovich. When we compare what Mr. Volts said in his hardship request to his actual questionnaire, he's a full-time casino manager. And he's taking one course, which I assume is at night, I don't know that we know that, in order to complete his master's. My thought is if he can work a full-time job, he can come and do jury duty instead of working the full-time job, and he really doesn't have a net change in the time he has available to finish his master's thesis and things he's talking about.

I at least wanted to talk to him.

THE COURT: Okay. Very well. Anything else?

Okay. So at this point he'll be informed that he's expected to come to court on the 3rd and further questioning. Okay.

So that's the next court exhibit.

Then I've also gotten one this morning from looks like it's Phoebe Carrasco [phonetic].

MR. POPOVICH: Badge 717.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DEUTSCH: Number 40? Yeah.

THE COURT: She sent something. It's:

To whom it may concern, I am requesting for an excusal from

jury duty because of traveling on April 8, 2018, to May 9, 2018, going to Philippines. Attached is my itinerary. Hoping for your kind consideration. Respectfully yours, et cetera.

And she's provided a copy of a ticket apparently, Korean Air. All right?

MR. POPOVICH: For MGM and Copperfield, no objection to releasing.

MR. FREEMAN: Same for Backstage, no objection.

MR. DEUTSCH: We have no objection, Your Honor, the plaintiff.

MR. CALL: Yeah, no objection for the Team, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Very well. Ms. Carrasco will be informed that she is excused from further service in this case.

And that this item will be the next court exhibit in order.

All right? Okay. Now, having discussed that, I assume what counsel will do is get together and compare notes relative to their thinking about the questionnaires and agree upon -- I mean, you may agree upon excuses for some or whatever.

MR. DEUTSCH: We've already started to do that, Your Honor. And have circulated a bunch of names already back and forth, so.

THE COURT: Okay. So you'll be working on that. And then the dust will --

THE JEA: He was supposed to give it to us today.

THE COURT: What's that?

	THE JEA: He was supposed to give it to us today.
	THE COURT: Apparently that was supposed to be given to us
today.	Is that going to happen today?

MR. POPOVICH: Defense circulated eight names on Tuesday by e-mail. And we received this morning from Plaintiffs one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight more names. I have not had a chance --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. POPOVICH: -- to go back and look at the questionnaires of the ones received this morning.

THE COURT: Is tomorrow okay?

MR. CALL: Can -- can we get those to you tomorrow? Okay.

THE COURT: Yeah. Okay.

THE JEA: Let's set a time, please.

THE COURT: Should we do it --

MR. DEUTSCH: That would --

THE COURT: How about by noon tomorrow?

MR. DEUTSCH: -- there's a couple on there --

THE COURT: Is by noon tomorrow okay?

MS. FRESCH: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. POPOVICH: We can get it done.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DEUTSCH: There's a couple of them, in order to speed up the process, there's at least one I think that we can all agree on without the need for the questionnaire, Mr. -- Mr. Feiger

[phonetic] No. 34, is a construction manager at the MGM.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, you can discuss these things among yourselves and --

MR. DEUTSCH: Okay.

THE COURT: -- whatever -- yeah, we're not going to deal with each one right now.

Okay. So that being so, how many is that going to leave? Do counsel -- what have you calculated as to how many that's going to leave in the jury venire?

MR. RUSSELL: As of -- as of yesterday, the ones we had agreed on, Your Honor, 11 and I think Mr. Deutsch had, like I said, seven or eight more. So we had a couple that were being circulated. So I think we're probably looking about 20 total, and that includes the four that were gone last week. The four that had already been excused. So I'm including those in that count. So we're -- we're looking at 20 and maybe there'll be a couple of others circulated. So I would think we'd still be left with at least 50 to 55 jurors.

THE COURT: Okay. So I think we had discussed doing the voir dire in stages with the prospective jurors because of the time -- or the space constraints that we have here. So I was thinking we maybe bring in 30 at a time, isn't that what we discussed, something like that?

MR. POPOVICH: I think that would be fine.

THE COURT: Okay. And of course I orient the prospective jurors when they come in and then I allow counsel to commence their voir dire. Do I need to place any time limitations on -- on voir dire? Do

start in the morning?

THE COURT: We start at 9:00, go till 12:00, then 1:30 till 5:00. That's the usual time when -- on our all-day sessions. Okay.

MR. DEUTSCH: Yes.

THE COURT: And except Friday the 6th, I've got to be out of here at 4:30 to be someplace at 5:00. Also we won't be in session on April -- Thursday, April 19th, and Friday, April 20th. Okay?

MR. FREEMAN: Will we be able to go till 5:00 on that Wednesday, or do you need to leave that afternoon?

THE COURT: As far as I know we can go till 5:00.

MR. FREEMAN: Okay.

THE CLERK: I have the calendar. Can you go over the dates with them?

THE COURT: Okay. Here's what we have set out so far for the -- for the dates. Start on the 3rd of April, 9:00 to 5:00, with a lunch of 12:00 to 1:30; Wednesday 9:00 to 5:00, again, lunch 12:00 to 1:30; Thursday the 5th, 1:30 until 5:00, because I've got motions on Thursday morning. Now if it turns out on Wednesday the 4th that I could give some time on Thursday the 5th in the morning, I'll let you know and we'll see -- but -- but, I mean, these are the dates and times I'm going to be giving the prospective jurors. So I think that if I -- if I do a different time, I have to make sure that they're on the same page. Okay.

So then the 6th, 9:00 to 12:00, and then 1:30 till 4:30. Okay. We're not in session on Monday the 9th. Tuesday the 10th, 9:00 to 5:00, same lunch period; Wednesday the 11th, 9:00 to 5:00; Thursday

the 12th, 10:00 to 5:00. I apparently can give you some time on Thursday the 12th, because of a short motions calendar. Friday the 13th, that's usually a holiday in Department 13, but --

MS. FRESCH: Yeah.

MR. POPOVICH: It should be.

THE COURT: -- but we're going to --

MR. POPOVICH: Yeah, it should be.

THE COURT: We'll be in session 9:00 to 5:00. Okay. Let's see. Apparently I've got the afternoon open on the 16th. Is that right? So I could give you time the afternoon of the 16th. So why don't we just do that. Let's make it 1:30 till 5:00, how's that? Will that work for you? Unless you've already made plans based on --

MR. DEUTSCH: Your Honor, we -- we had planned on -- on not being back in Vegas until that Monday --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DEUTSCH: -- afternoon.

THE COURT: Okay. So since that was -- since you weren't told that I would be available, I won't make you change your plans. Okay. So we won't be in session on Monday the 16th. And usually I'm not in session on jury trials anyway on -- on Mondays. Okay. 17th at 9:00 to 5:00; 18th, 9:00 to 5:00; dark on the 19th and 20th, as I indicated. Then we go back on the 24th, 9:00 to 5:00; 25th, 9:00 to 5:00; 26th, 1:30 till 5:00; 27th, 9:00 to 5:00. Okay. And apparently I do have some time open on Monday the 30th if it gets to that. Okay. So we can discuss that later, unless you want me to go ahead and -- and

make it clear that we'll be in session that day if necessary?

Mr. Deutsch, did you have a problem?

MR. DEUTSCH: That was --

THE COURT: That's a Monday again.

MR. DEUTSCH: That was Monday the -- or the 30th?

THE COURT: Right.

MR. DEUTSCH: That's kind of far off. I hadn't looked that far forward.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's --

MR. DEUTSCH: So if we could --

THE COURT: Okay. Let's keep that, you know, that's a possible time. Then we go to May 1st, 9:00 to 5:00. Now, I do have a commitment at noon that day, so I'm not sure -- that shouldn't take too long, though. But it's 9:00 to 5:00 on Tuesday the 1st; 9:00 to 5:00 Wednesday the 2nd; 1:30 to 5:00 Thursday the 3rd; and 9:00 to 5:00 on Friday the 4th. So -- okay. Very good.

Then we'll all be ready for Cinco de Mayo Saturday the 5th. Okay.

So what -- anything else?

MR. DEUTSCH: At this pace, Your Honor, we might need to get ready for Thanksgiving.

THE COURT: All right. Okay. Now, I know we've got the issue regarding the cameras and all that. So we're going to have to focus on that somewhat. I indicated that they — the cameras will not be in court during jury selection. Okay. I think there was some discussion

about opening statements. And we'll need to figure out how to attend to that. I think -- what I'm thinking is that once Plaintiff gets to the point that Plaintiff's going to be discussing in opening statement the manner in which this happened, you know, in other words, the -- the magical aspect of it, we're going to probably require -- I'll probably require the counsel to approach the bench and let me know so that I can then instruct the camera operators to -- or operator to turn it off. Okay.

MR. DEUTSCH: My guess is, Your Honor, that that will be so intertwined with the opening that if Your Honor is inclined to keep cameras off for anything detailing how the trick is done, then -- then it's probably better off just to not have them there for opening statements. Our position is, is that there's nothing confidential about this trick at all, and therefore having the cameras there for opening statements is -- there's nothing wrong with that.

I understand that if a certain witness does not want to be on camera, that they have that right, because they don't want to be on camera. But since Your Honor's already ruled that the courtroom is open and free for reporters to report on it, including reporting on how the trick was done, because there is no confidentiality for that, I don't quite see how filming the opening statements is a problem.

THE COURT: Okay. And response to that?

MR. POPOVICH: Your Honor, I don't believe the court ruled one way or another whether open versus not. We had addressed the fact that there might be portions of the trial where we're going to ask for the courtroom to be closed. That has not been addressed to the court. I

didn't think the court had made a ruling. So that being said --

THE COURT: No, I didn't. I'm just throwing it out and giving a head's up, basically.

MR. POPOVICH: Yeah.

MR. DEUTSCH: Well, Your Honor, I thought that the court hadn't ruled on that. I thought that the -- the court was pretty clear -- and if I was wrong, I apologize -- that -- that while cameras can be potentially turned off if certain witnesses don't approve, then Your Honor recognized that courtrooms are open and that if reporters or whoever else wants to be in the courtroom to report on things, that the confidentiality does not apply once you get to trial.

THE COURT: I think I did --

MR. DEUTSCH: I -- I thought that --

THE COURT: I think I did allude to opening statements in my -- in -- as I recall when it came before me. I think I alluded to the concept of opening statements and the possibility that maybe the camera would not be operable during a portion of opening statements.

MR. DEUTSCH: Right. But -- but reporters would be allowed in the courtroom during opening statements, correct?

THE COURT: As far as -- yeah, this is an open courtroom.

The question --

MR. POPOVICH: It seems --

THE COURT: -- came to me from the camera aspect. That was how it was presented.

MR. DEUTSCH: That's what I thought. Though my point was

as long as the reporters to report on -- on what we're saying in our opening statements, then I don't -- I don't understand what the rationale would be for not having a camera there. I understand the rationale for certain witnesses not wanting to be on camera themselves. But if it's just a question of not reporting on certain things about how the trick is done and that could be done any way by a reporter sitting in a courtroom, I don't see why the defendants would have a rationale to -- to seek to turn cameras off during opening statements.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FREEMAN: Well, you know, there is a confidentiality agreement in place, and you know, I know Plaintiff's position is that, well, go on the Internet and there's all sorts of stuff on there. Even participants in the illusion do not know the entirety of how the illusion is performed. And so it is -- it should be kept confidential, whether you're in the audience or even as a participant, there are aspects that they don't get the full effect of the illusion, how it's done. And so that's what needs to be protected.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DEUTSCH: But --

MR. FREEMAN: And that's what we agreed to early on.

THE COURT: I'm not making a ruling now --

MR. DEUTSCH: That's --

THE COURT: -- I'm just listening to what you're saying.

MS. FRESCH: Okay.

MR. DEUTSCH: Just so I'm clear, Judge, I disagree that

that -- from what Mr. Freeman said in terms of our position. Our position is that confidentiality agreements in any trial do never extend to when the trial started. They're for discovery purposes only. And once the trial starts, the courtroom is open and never sealed, because it's against the Constitution to seal the courtroom.

So I don't think that anything that was bound in the confidentiality agreement during discovery extends to once the trial begins.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. I know your respective positions now. I'll think about it, determine on what to do. Okay.

MR. RUSSELL: Your Honor, I know there was a question with the -- the real-time reporter, has she got that worked out now? I know there was a concern whether we all agreed to it. So we'll have a real-time reporter set up. I think we're okay with that. I just wanted to make sure we --

THE COURT: Let's make sure the record reflects what it is that the real-time reporter will be doing and what will be the official record. My understanding is the official record will be the court recorder's transcript --

MR. RUSSELL: Right.

THE COURT: -- right?

MR. RUSSELL: But we -- the parties will be allowed to refer -- to use the real-time reporter's transcript --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. RUSSELL: -- as part of the case.

asks for, like, a read-back of testimony or something, does that come from the real-time reporter or does that have to come from the recording device?

THE COURT: The real-time reporter.

MR. DEUTSCH: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay?

MR. DEUTSCH: Yeah. That's fine.

MR. POPOVICH: That's what we intended, I believe, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RUSSELL: And this is not something that needs to be resolved today, but it does need to be resolved during -- before openings. I know there was an issue, because the bifurcated trial, that the court was going to give some instruction to the jury on -- on the plaintiff's mentation. So we could avoid Plaintiff getting into why he claims he has recollection issues. So just before opening, I think we'll just have to have -- understand what the court's language is going to be on that.

THE COURT: I think the idea was that the jury could be informed about what's ultimately being -- well, contended by the plaintiff relative to his recollection.

MR. RUSSELL: Right. That -- that -- as I understood, the court's instruction is going to be something along the lines of the -- the plaintiff alleges he has a medical condition which impacts his ability to recall things and therefore you can't --

1	THE COURT: Well
2	MR. RUSSELL: hold it against him for his lack of
3	THE COURT: you think counsel can come up with an
۱	agreed upon instruction that I
5	MR. RUSSELL: Yeah, we'll circulate something.
3	THE COURT: Beg your pardon?
7	MR. RUSSELL: We'll circulate something. Yeah.
3	THE COURT: Why don't you do that? That that's what
•	think would be good. Okay. All right.
,	Lorraine?

MR. RUSSELL: I think our -- we've got the defense exhibits here today. They're going to be provided. I spoke with Mr. Deutsch this morning. I understand by -- by close of business tomorrow we'll have a Dropbox of all the up-to-date Plaintiff exhibits. Correct?

MR. DEUTSCH: Yeah. You know, but Howard, I -- the one that was circulated last night said Bates-stamped. I thought they were. I'm looking at them now and they don't appear to be. So I just followed up to see exactly what happened to those. Because I thought that that had been finalized and Bates-stamped and they were all done. But I don't see that. So I'll figure that out today.

MR. RUSSELL: Thank you.

MR. CALL: They'll be finalized today, Adam.

MR. DEUTSCH: But the -- but the list is finalized. The list is -- is finalized.

MR. RUSSELL: Right. Understood. Understood. Okay.

Thank you.

MR. DEUTSCH: One issue that we wanted to raise, Your Honor, a concern that we had in light of Your Honor's point at the beginning that there are really two sides to this lawsuit, our concern is that there's a lot of -- there's a bunch of cumulative testimony in terms of some of the experts and the questioning. And our concern is that -- that the multiple defendants are going to call similar experts giving the identical opinion just to sort of, you know, pile on the same thing over and over again. And we don't think that they should be entitled to do that.

THE COURT: Well, let me look --

MR. DEUTSCH: And it's hard --

THE COURT: Let me look at it in context, though, when --

MR. DEUTSCH: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- if it's theirs, you can object, you know, if you think that --

MR. DEUTSCH: Okay.

THE COURT: -- there's an objection. Okay. The sides, one of the reason I brought up the sides aspect, two sides, is an exercise or waiver of your peremptory challenges. The plaintiff is one side, the defense is the -- another side. So you --

MR. DEUTSCH: Right.

THE COURT: -- the defense will get together in determining how to exercise or waive their peremptory challenges. Okay.

MR. POPOVICH: In the process, is Your Honor adverse to

giving us, you know, 30 seconds or a minute to mingle --

THE COURT: No. No.

MR. POPOVICH: -- and reach a decision?

THE COURT: No. I want you to make informed decisions.

MR. POPOVICH: Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DEUTSCH: Did --

THE COURT: All right?

MR. DEUTSCH: We have one other issue, Your Honor, which is a Motion in Limine that was -- was not made by us that we would seek to make at this point with respect to one of the liability experts of Team Construction. Having got -- we received yesterday or within the last week or so a PowerPoint presentation of this expert I guess that he intends to try to use during trial. That's close to 200 slides. And in going through that, it became clear -- and then looking back at his report again, it became clear that -- that a bulk of his testimony was based upon some testing he did with respect to this slip resistance of the -- the coefficient of friction on the -- the floor where Mr. Cox fell. And in preparing the case, you know, as we approach trial and seeing that, it became very clear that he -- that the floor that he tested had been changed and there's a different floor than at the time of the accident. So I'm not exactly sure how he could give any of those -- that testimony at all.

So I don't know if Your Honor would like to sort of just wait as we get closer to that witness or if Your Honor would give us leave to file a -- a Motion in Limine with respect to that now. But --

THE COURT: I think it's probably best to wait for the witness.

And if you think that a foundation has to be laid or whatever or at that point --

MR. DEUTSCH: Okay.

THE COURT: -- I can excuse the jury and you can conduct -MR. DEUTSCH: Perfect. Thank you, Your Honor. That's
what we thought, but we appreciate that. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. All right. Let's see. Settlement conference? I mean, I -- it's Thursday at 11:15. I don't know if I could get anybody to do one. But.

MR. CALL: I think that's Mr. Deutsch's call on that.

MS. FRESCH: We're -- the defense is always willing.

MR. POPOVICH: We're happy to go for it.

MS. FRESCH: We're -- yes. We're happy to participate.

THE COURT: What do you think, Mr. Deutsch?

MR. DEUTSCH: I'm not sure, you know, what we're participating in, Your Honor. We've been -- we -- we -- you know, when we last left off this conversation, we informed them that we were always open to talking. And I -- I had received no phone calls from any of the attorneys with any interest. And at this point I don't believe that their positions have changed in terms of their view of the value of the case, and therefore I'm not sure --

THE COURT: All right. Well, you can talk among yourselves.

MR. DEUTSCH: -- unless there -- unless their views changed,
I don't know --

THE COURT: All right. Well, you can talk among yourselves and if you think you'd like one, let us know. The sooner we know, the sooner we can get one set up, hopefully.

MR. DEUTSCH: Okay. We'll do that.

THE COURT: And I -- I do settlement -- I don't do settlement conferences in my own bench cases, but -- nonjury cases, but I -- I do them -- I'm willing to do them in jury cases where all sides -- where both sides agree, all parties agree and everything. I can understand why you wouldn't want the trial judge to do a settlement conference. But by the same token I've done them in some cases that have resulted in settlement. There have been some cases where I started -- went into a settlement conference mode the first day of trial and we've got them settled. Other cases we did the same and didn't get them settled.

But, you know, I prefer, basically, that it be somebody else. But if it's agreeable to everybody, I can take a stab at it. But by the same token, we don't want to -- we don't want to lose trial time in this case. So.

MR. CALL: Your Honor, just for the record, the -- the defense is ready to, you know, enter into a settlement conference. Mr. Deutsch just has to go ahead and say yes, and we can go ahead and do that. So.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CALL: We're here --

THE COURT: Since we're not going to be in session on Monday, I mean, the sooner we know that you'd like -- well, we're not

going to be in session tomorrow, although I think tomorrow's probably not a -- not a real good day. But in any event, if we could know that you want one, we could try to get one set up.

MR. DEUTSCH: I think what our position would be, Judge, is if the defendants called us and told us that they're starting at a point that is within the realm of reality, then we'll be happy to do it. But -- but based upon the discussion thus far, we believe that it would be a waste of time.

THE COURT: What about virtual reality?

MR. DEUTSCH: So if they want -- if they would call me up -- I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, in any event, anything else to come before the court at this time in this conference? Yes?

THE JEA: How are we going to know which ones they agree upon? In a conference call or an e-mail or?

THE COURT: Which?

THE JEA: Jurors they excuse.

THE COURT: Oh, yeah. You've got to let the -- by tomorrow at noon, you'll let Lorraine know which jurors you've agreed to excuse, right?

MR. GRIFFIN: You want an e-mail?

THE JEA: However you want.

MR. FREEMAN: E-mail.

THE JEA: Okay.

THE COURT: Is that handled -- that taken care of?

		2/20/2010 0:03 AM
		Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
1	CASE NO. A705164	Stewart. Lenner
2	DEPT. NO. 13	
3	DOCKET U	
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5	DISTRICT C	COURT
6	CLARK COUNTY,	NEVADA
7	* * * *	*
8	GAVIN COX and MINH-HAHN COX,)
9	husband and wife,	
10	Plaintiffs,	
11	vs.	
12	MGM GRAND HOTEL, LLC; DAVID COPPERFIELD aka DAVIS S.	
13	KOTKIN; BACKSTAGE EMPLOYMENT	
	COPPERFIELD'S DISAPPEARING, INC.; TEAM CONSTRUCTION	
	MANAGEMENT, INC.; DOES 1	
	through 20; DOE EMPLOYEES 1 through 20; and ROE	
16	,)) REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
17	Defendants.)) OF
18	MGM GRAND HOTEL, LLC.,))) JURY TRIAL
19	Third-Party Plaintiff,)) BEFORE THE HONORABLE
20	vs.) MARK R. DENTON
21	BEACHER'S LV, LLC, and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive,)) DEPARTMENT XIII
22)
23	Third-Party Defendants.	TUESDAY, APRIL 3, 2018
24		W = 2.2
25	REPORTED BY: KRISTY L. CLARK,	RPR, NV CCR #708, CA CSR #13529

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14	
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1	LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, TUESDAY, APRIL 3, 2018;
2	1:39 P.M.
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4	PROCEEDINGS
5	* * * * * *
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7	THE MARSHAL: All rise for the veniremen.
8	(The following proceedings were held in
9	the presence of the jury.)
10	THE MARSHAL: Just hold up right there.
11	Okay. Just go about halfway down there. Good.
12	All rise. Eighth Judicial District Court
13	Department 13 is now in session, the Honorable Mark
14	Denton now presiding.
15	THE COURT: Good afternoon. Please be
16	seated.
17	All right. Court calls the case of Gavin
18	Cox, et al., plaintiffs v. MGM Grand Hotel, et al.,
19	defendants.
20	Please state appearances of counsel, identify
21	parties and party representatives who are present
22	today.
23	MR. MORELLI: Benedict Morelli for the
24	plaintiff, Gavin and Minh Cox, C-o-x.
25	MR. DEUTSCH: Adam Deutsch, also for the

1 plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Cox. 2 MR. FALLICK: Perry Fallick, also for the 3 plaintiffs. 4 THE COURT: Okay. 5 MR. POPOVICH: Thank you, Your Honor. Good 6 afternoon. I'm Jerry Popovich for defendant MGM Grand 7 Hotel. Part of the team is Susan Fillichio. Also, we have Eric Freeman. And on behalf of MGM today is Kelly 9 Davis. At different times during the trial, we will 10 l also have Mark Haversack and Will Martin. And then also part of the team is Mike Infuso. 12 MR. INFUSO: Good afternoon. 13 MS. FRESCH: Good afternoon, everyone. 14 Elaine Fresch, and I represent David Copperfield 15 Disappearing, Inc., as well as David Copperfield. 16 MR. ROBERTS: Good afternoon. My name is Lee 17 Roberts. My partner Howard Russell and I represent 18 Backstage Employment and Referral, one of the 19 defendants in the action. 20 Thank you, Judge. 21 MR. STRASSBURG: Hello, Judge. My name is 22 Roger Strassburg. And my partner Gary Call -- stand up, Gary, would you please -- we'll be talking for Team Construction, a licensed Nevada contractor involved in 24

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the case.

1 And here for Team is David Noble. 2 Could you stand up, David. 3 MR. NOBLE: Good afternoon. 4 MR. STRASSBURG: He is one of the cofounders 5 of the company that specializes in remodeling tenant 6 spaces in large casinos on the strip. 7 He's also accompanied here by his number two 8 right hand, Paul King, who is also in the company. Both of them are on the witness list to be called to 10 testify in this case, along with Superintendent David 11 Boyce. 12 Thank you, Judge. 13 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 14 Also present are the officers of the court. 15 Are counsel and the parties ready to proceed? 16 MR. MORELLI: Yes, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, 18 l you're in Department 13 of the Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of 20 Clark. My name is Mark Denton. I'm the presiding 21 judge in this department. You have been summoned today to serve as jurors in a civil lawsuit. 23 At this time, I will take the opportunity to 24 introduce the court staff with whom you'll be coming 25 into contact.

1 The court recorder on my far left here is Jennifer. She's recording everything that's being said 3 during the trial. We also have here with us -- state 4 your name. 5 THE COURT REPORTER: Kristy Clark. 6 THE COURT: -- right -- who's also reporting 7 what's being said during these proceedings. 8 The deputy court clerk to my immediate left 9 here is Alice. She's the court clerk who swears in 10 l witnesses, marks exhibits, keeps track of evidence, and prepares minutes for descriptions of the proceedings for the official record. 12 13 You have met Bob, the marshal. He's the 14 person with whom you'll have most contact during these 15 l proceedings. He maintains courtroom security and brings the jury into court and ensures privacy during 17 jury deliberations. 18 I believe Andrew, my law clerk, is present. 19 If not, you'll meet him later on. He's my law clerk. 20 He will assist -- he'll come out later on to assist 21 counsel during the jury selection process.

At this time, I'll ask lead counsel for the plaintiffs to introduce themselves and explain to you the — briefly the nature of the case, tell you the names of the witnesses he believes he may call to

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1 testify on behalf of the plaintiffs. And if his -- if 2 the plaintiffs are present, he'll introduce them as 3 well. 4 MR. MORELLI: Good afternoon, everyone. I'm 5 Benedict Morelli. I'm from New York, in case you 6 couldn't tell by my accent. And we're going to be 7 trying the case. I represent Gavin and Minh Cox. And we're suing, as you can see, a number of defendants in 9 the case. 10 And I'm going to be asking you, as I've asked 11 many juries throughout the country -- because I travel 12 around trying cases -- to give us your God-given common 13 sense and make a determination that you feel is fair 14 and equitable. Okay? 15 Now, just to confuse everything, Juror No. 1 is all the way up there. Okay? 17 You're Juror No. 1. How are you? 18 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 031: Fine. 19 MR. MORELLI: Okay. And so it goes that way, 20 1, 7, and so on. Okay? 21 And I'm going to have an opportunity to talk 22 to you about something about the case. At the 23 beginning of the trial, I'll be the first one to speak to you to give an opening statement to tell you what we

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intend to prove in the case.

1 Now, if in fact any of you have opinions 2 about this particular case after you hear something 3 about it, we would appreciate you sharing those 4 opinions with us so that nobody is prejudiced because 5 of some strong opinion you have. 6 When I talk to jurors in New York and out of 7 New York, in Texas and Illinois and New Jersey and 8 various place where I've been to try cases, I tell them 9 all the same thing. And that is I'm always going to 10 tell you straight and this is --11 MR. POPOVICH: Objection. Argumentative. 12 Conditioning. 13 THE COURT: Sustained. 14 Counsel, at this time, all you're going to do 15 is tell them generally the nature of the case. We're 16 going to get into some of these other aspects later on. 17 Just generally, it's not argument; it's not an opening 18 statement. 19 MR. MORELLI: This is the case where my 20 client, Gavin Cox, was injured as a result of an 21 accident that happened --22 Do you need some water? You okay? 23 -- November 12th, 2013. And it happened at

the MGM Grand here in Las Vegas. And he was caused to

be injured, to fall and be injured, we say as the

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result of the negligence of the defendants who are represented by these attorneys who introduced themselves.

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There's various levels of involvement of 5 these defendants. And I'm not going to go into detail I will have an opportunity to go into detail with all of you. Those of you who are selected to be jurors in this case will have an opportunity to hear all of our opening statements, where we tell you what we intend to prove and something about why we believe that the plaintiffs are entitled to your verdict.

This is a case that is going to be tried in two parts. It's a bifurcated case, meaning that the first part of the case you will hear the liability or responsibility part, who, if anyone, is responsible to Gavin and Minh Cox as a result of this accident.

It's a negligence case. It's a slip-and-fall It's a simple set of facts. And I will go into detail at the appropriate time when you are impaneled, if any of you or most of you are impaneled as our juror -- as our jury, about exactly what I believe you are going to hear from the testimony, because I know, obviously, a lot about this case. And you don't know anything about this case yet except what you're going to hear from the attorneys.

2 after we introduce ourselves and we have a chance to

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fine too.

position.

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Thanks so much.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Counsel.

At this point, I won't ask you to name all of

the witnesses that you're intending to call. The witnesses are listed on the attachment to the questionnaire. Okay? So — but those are witnesses to be called by both sides. So the questionnaire was made available, obviously, to the prospective jurors. And you'll be asked, I'm sure, if there's voir dire later, if you're acquainted with the witnesses or anybody.

So I'm going to ask you at a certain point,

If you can be, great; if you can't be, that's

But let's be honest with each other about

And what we're asking all of you, through

If you feel that you can't be a fair and

speak to you individually, to tell us what your real

along with you as to whether or not you should be a

that. No one's here to try to put you in a bad

ask you, to not put us in a bad position.

fair and impartial juror in this case.

thoughts are and -- so that we can make a determination

your honesty to any of the questions that the attorneys

impartial juror, tell us so that we can explore it and

1 5 their respective defense cases and ... 6 MR. POPOVICH: Thank you. 7 9 here on behalf of MGM. 10 16 18 l 19 20 during an illusion. 21 22

THE COURT: All right.

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At this time, I will ask the respective 2 defendants to state -- to introduce -- counsel for the 3 respective defendants to introduce themselves and their 4 client representatives, explain to you the nature of Once again, I'm Jerry Popovich representing 8 MGM Grand Hotel here. I had mentioned Kelly Davis is This accident did take place at the MGM Grand 11 | Hotel on the outside of the casino on the Tropicana 12 Avenue side. We believe that the plaintiffs are here 13 because Mr. Cox fell and injured himself on our 14 property. He is upset about that. He's upset about 15 his injuries, as are -- as is his wife. Ultimately, we're going to introduce 17 testimony through MGM security folks. We're going to -- introduce evidence through stagehands working on the David Copperfield show, as this accident happened Ultimately, we believe that we can bring these witnesses together to show you that MGM Grand had no fault for this accident; Mr. Cox tripped. Thank you.

Thank you.

1 MS. FRESCH: Good afternoon again, everyone. 2 As I mentioned, I'm Elaine Fresch. And I'm very privileged to represent David Copperfield's Disappearing, Inc., as well as David Copperfield. 5 Mr. Cox and his lawyers have sued Mr. Copperfield as well as his corporation because 7 Mr. Cox was injured. We look forward to bringing you 8 the evidence to show that we did everything appropriate in the performance of the illusion, which you will hear 10 a lot about. And we will identify and show you all 11 that, in fact, we did everything appropriately and within the standard of care in our performance of that 13 illusion. 14 Thank you so much. 15 MR. ROBERTS: Thank you. 16 Good afternoon again. To remind you, my name 17 is Lee Roberts. And my partner Howard Russell and I are attorneys here in Las Vegas. We've been here about 19 15 years. Much like the plaintiffs' counsel that you 20 heard from, I came here to try a case and I never went 21 home. 22 We represent Backstage Employment and 23 l And they're a company that provides 24 stagehands to Mr. Copperfield to assist in the

performance of his show, including to assist in the

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1 performance of the 13 illusion that you're going to 2 hear about in this case.

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From our perspective, there's no dispute that 4 the plaintiff in this case, Mr. Gavin Cox, fell while 5 volunteering to participate in the illusion. dispute is, what makes this our fault? There is no negligence on behalf of my client. And that's what we look forward to presenting to you in this case.

Before I sit down, I also want to point out, over behind me is Ms. Audra Bonney. She's a paralegal who works for our firm, and she assists in displaying evidence on the video screens and keeping track of exhibits and other things for our team.

Thanks very much. Nice to meet you.

MR. STRASSBURG: Okay. Speaking for Team Construction, I will prove to you that this accident occurred at 8:35 p.m. Team had closed the job site, cleaned up, gone home six hours earlier at 2:30 p.m. In fact, Team didn't even know that the area in front of its Dumpster outside was part of Mr. Copperfield's illusion. That's a secret. They don't tell the contractors or anyone else. Based on that, we'll prove to you that Team is not liable here.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

1	At this time, Alice will call the roll of the
2	panel of prospective jurors. When your name is called,
3	please answer "present' or "here."
4	THE CLERK: Alex Daniel, Badge 031.
5	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 031: Yes.
6	THE CLERK: Susan Millhouse
7	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 462: Present.
8	THE CLERK: Badge 462.
9	Nicole Lutey, Badge 559.
10	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 559: Present.
11	THE CLERK: Essai Cardoza, Badge 563.
12	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 563: Present.
13	THE CLERK: Mei-Yen Sun, Badge 567.
14	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 567: Present.
15	THE CLERK: Maria Parras, Badge 570.
16	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 570: Present.
17	THE CLERK: Lara Dupree, Badge 0573.
18	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 573: Present.
19	THE CLERK: Enrie Davis, Badge 582.
20	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 582: Present.
21	It's Enrie.
22	THE CLERK: Thank you. Sorry.
23	Richard De-Sterre, Badge 601.
24	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 601: Present.
25	THE CLERK: Cheryl Celline, Badge 604.

1	PROSPECTIVE	JUROR NO. 604: Present.
2	THE CLERK:	Linette Ayala, Badge 611.
3	PROSPECTIVE	JUROR NO. 611: Present.
4	THE CLERK:	Jason Voltz, Badge 614.
5	PROSPECTIVE	JUROR NO. 614: Present.
6	THE CLERK:	Steve Willis, Badge 66 616.
7	PROSPECTIVE	JUROR NO. 616: Present.
8	THE CLERK:	Sally Wahl, Badge 617.
9	PROSPECTIVE	JUROR NO. 617: Present.
10	THE CLERK:	Sheila Mosallaei, Badge 622.
11	PROSPECTIVE	JUROR NO. 622: Present.
12	THE CLERK:	Manuel Garcia-Rayas, Badge 624.
13	PROSPECTIVE	JUROR NO. 624: Present.
14	THE CLERK:	Nicholas Meneley, Badge 633.
15	PROSPECTIVE	JUROR NO. 633: Present.
16	THE CLERK:	Nancy Solloway, Badge 636.
17	PROSPECTIVE	JUROR NO. 636: Present.
18	THE CLERK:	Lisa Duran, Badge 669.
19	PROSPECTIVE	JUROR NO. 669: Present.
20	THE CLERK:	Michele Taketa, Badge 670.
21	PROSPECTIVE	JUROR NO. 670: Present.
22	THE CLERK:	Robert Loerwald, Badge 676.
23	PROSPECTIVE	JUROR NO. 676: Present.
24	THE CLERK:	Gerald Schaffner, Badge 690.
25	PROSPECTIVE	JUROR NO. 690: Present.

1	THE CLERK:	Germaine Prescott, Badge 696.
2	PROSPECTIVE	JUROR NO. 696: Present.
3	It's Prescot	ct.
4	THE CLERK:	David Allen, Badge 702.
5	PROSPECTIVE	JUROR NO. 702: Present.
6	THE CLERK:	Thomas Torres, Badge 704.
7	PROSPECTIVE	JUROR NO. 704: Here. Present.
8	THE CLERK:	Luzangelica Gomez, Badge 710.
9	PROSPECTIVE	JUROR NO. 710: Present.
10	THE CLERK:	Lilia Avila, Badge 712.
11	PROSPECTIVE	JUROR NO. 712: Present.
12	THE CLERK:	John Saylor, Badge 728.
13	PROSPECTIVE	JUROR NO. 728: Present.
14	THE CLERK:	Michael Carelli, Badge 729.
15	PROSPECTIVE	JUROR NO. 729: Hey. I'm here.
16	THE CLERK:	Gabriela Pond, Badge 737.
17	PROSPECTIVE	JUROR NO. 737: Present.
18	THE CLERK:	Debra Crane, Badge 747.
19	PROSPECTIVE	JUROR NO. 747: Present.
20	THE CLERK:	Yan Wu, Badge 749.
21	PROSPECTIVE	JUROR NO. 749: Present.
22	THE CLERK:	James Burgett, Badge 769.
23	PROSPECTIVE	JUROR NO. 769: Present.
24	THE CLERK:	Gary Meyers, Badge 770.
25	PROSPECTIVE	JUROR NO. 770: Present.

1	THE CLERK: Nita Douglas, Badge 781.
2	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 781: Present.
3	THE CLERK: Ramon Diaz-Aguacia, Badge 783.
4	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 783: Right here.
5	THE CLERK: Barbara Hall, Badge 790.
6	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 790: Here.
7	THE CLERK: Shing Gan, Badge 797.
8	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 797: Here.
9	THE CLERK: Derick MacFawn, Badge 815.
10	THE MARSHAL: That's it.
11	THE CLERK: We don't have any more after
12	that?
13	THE MARSHAL: No.
14	THE CLERK: So Badge 797 is the last one?
15	THE MARSHAL: Yes.
16	THE COURT: Is there anybody whose name was
17	not called?
18	I see no hands.
19	The questioning of a prospective jury at the
20	beginning of the case is done under oath. Alice will
21	now administer the oath to the prospective jurors.
22	THE MARSHAL: Please stand up.
23	THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that you
24	will well and truly answer such questions that may be
25	put to you touching upon your qualifications as jurors
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in this case at issue, so help you God?

IN UNISON: I do.

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THE COURT: All right. Thank you. You may be seated.

Ladies and gentlemen, we're about to commence what is called the voir dire examination of the prospective jurors in this case. The term "voir dire" is a French term. Loosely translated, it means to tell the truth. Literally translated, it means "to see, to say."

During this process, you will be asked 12 questions bearing on your ability to sit as fair and impartial jurors. The Court, the lawyers, and all persons involved in this case are deeply interested in having this matter tried by a jury composed of 12 open-minded people who are completely neutral, who have no bias or prejudice towards or against either side.

In order to accomplish this desired result, it is necessary for me to ask you some questions. attorneys, if they choose, will also be given this opportunity.

It's not our desire to unnecessarily pry into your personal lives, although some of the questioning may at times seem somewhat or even intensely personal. Our only objective is to determine whether there is any 1 reason why any of you cannot sit as fair and impartial jurors in this case.

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Wide discretion is vested in the trial judge 4 as to the method of examination of jurors. Thus, from time to time, I may entertain objections or intervene or inquire of any of the lawyers if there's a problem with the way that the examination is being conducted.

The following areas of inquiry are not properly within the scope of your voir dire examination 10|by counsel: Questions already asked and answered by the Court and other counsel; questions touching upon anticipated instructions on the law; questions touching upon the verdict a juror would return when based upon hypothetical facts; questions that are in substance arguments of the case.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is important that you know the significance of full, complete, and honest answers to all of the questions that we're about to ask I caution you not to try to hide or withhold anything which might indicate bias or prejudice of any sort by any of you.

Should you fail to answer truthfully or if you hide or withhold anything touching upon your qualifications, that fact may tend to contaminate your verdict and subject you to further inquiry even after

you're discharged as jurors.

Your decision should be based upon all of the evidence presented during the trial and not based upon preconceived prejudice or bias. Prejudice is a predisposition against something or someone. Bias is a predisposition in favor of something or someone.

I'll be conducting a general voir dire examination of all of you while you're seated in the gallery portion of the courtroom, including those of you who are seated in the jury box portion.

After those general questions, Alice will call 24 names using the order provided to us by the jury commissioner as you are seated in the jury box. I and the attorneys will then conduct an examination of those 24 prospective jurors, after which each — the sides will be entitled to exercise six peremptory challenges each.

At some point during the process of selecting the jury, the attorneys for both sides have the right to ask that a particular person not serve as a juror. These requests are called challenges. There are two types of challenges: challenges for cause and peremptory challenges.

A challenge for cause means that a juror has been excused because his or her answers to some of the

voir dire questions indicate that he or she would have a difficult time in giving a fair and impartial hearing to the case.

A peremptory challenge means that a juror can be excused from duty without counsel having to give a reason for the excuse.

Please do not be offended should you be excused by either of the challenge procedures. They're simply a part of the procedures designed to protect the rights of the parties under our system of government.

Now, if you wish to respond to a question individually and in the affirmative — a question I'm about to pose to you — please raise your hand, give your name and indicate the number that you've been given on your badge. All right?

Also, the list attached to the questionnaire, as I have indicated to you previously, that you have completed names the parties and the witnesses and attorneys involved in this case. All right? So you've had a chance before today to — to see that list.

Are any of you acquainted with any of the people on that list — witnesses, attorneys, parties?

Okay. I see a hand.

Okay. Would you please state your name and badge number.

1	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 670: Michelle Taketa,
2	670.
3	I work for the gaming control board as an
4	agent, so I'm well I'm very familiar with the MGM
5	Grand.
6	THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you.
7	Anybody else?
8	I see another hand. I see a couple more
9	hands. I'll start in the back and move forward.
10	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 633: Nicholas Meneley,
11	Badge No. 0633.
12	I do entertainment work for MGM, I through
13	a third-party company but on all the MGM properties.
14	THE COURT: Okay.
15	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 604: Cheryl Celline,
16	0604.
17	The questionnaire I did was on March 8th, but
18	it had it was all medical doctors. So I'm a little
19	misled on these names, because mine was all medical
20	doctors and and PAs and so on.
21	THE COURT: What was it you were involved in?
22	I couldn't hear.
23	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 604: It was the
24	questionnaire that we received on March 8th, that one
25	didn't have any of these names. It was all medical

```
1
             So that's why I -- I'm a little confused
   doctors.
 2
   today, because I don't know if I had the wrong
   questionnaire.
 4
             PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 971: Correct.
 5
   with me.
 6
             THE COURT: All right. I'm taking one of the
 7
   completed questionnaires here. It's got a list of
   names on two pages in the back. Okay?
 9
             And there are many of these people who are
10
   not physicians. For example, No. 34 is David
11
   Copperfield a.k.a. David Kotkin.
12
             UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No, he
13
   wasn't on there.
14
             UNIDENTIFIED PROSPECTIVE JUROR:
                                              There must
15 have been 50 doctors.
16
             THE MARSHAL: I need only one person to talk
17
   at a time, please.
18
             THE COURT: What's that?
19
             MR. DEUTSCH: We had 115 names on the list we
20
   believe was provided.
21
             THE COURT:
                         That's what is on here on the
22
   questionnaire. And these are completed questionnaires.
23
   These are -- for example, I'm looking at one filled out
24
   by one of the veniremen here that has the list attached
```

to it. It's signed with the list.

```
1
             PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 604: Are they all
 2 | medical doctors?
 3
             THE COURT: Let's see. You're No. 604?
                                                       Is
 4
   that what you indicated? Cheryl Celline?
 5
             PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 604: Yes, 0604.
 6
             THE COURT: Okay. I'm looking at the
   questionnaire that you completed --
 7
 8
             THE MARSHAL: Come to order.
 9
             THE COURT: -- and it has that item attached
10 to it.
11
             PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 604: Okay. And it's
12 all medical doctors on there?
13
             THE COURT: No, they're not all medical
14 doctors.
             There are many medical doctors, but there are
15 | lot of non --
16
             PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 604: That's why --
17 l
   where I got lost at when I saw -- okay. Thank you.
18
             THE COURT: Okay. There are a lot of medical
19 l
   doctors, but there are a lot of nonmedical doctors as
20
   well.
21
             I guess what I could do, Counsel, I could go
22 l
   ahead and read.
23
             MR. POPOVICH: Please, Your Honor.
24
             THE COURT: I will read the names. There's
25
   115, so bear with me. Okay.
```

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1
             Gavin Cox; Minh-Hahn Cox; Alexander Anderson;
 2
   Joseph Stone; James Ramiseier, M.D., Mary Magruder,
   M.D.; Mark Girella, M.D. -- that's Cirella, M.D.;
   Jeffrey Markham, M.D.; Douglas White, M.D.; Lawrence
 5
   Bogle, M.D.; James Balodimas, M.D.; Aury Nagy, M.D.;
   James Dettling, M.D.; Marjorie Belsky, M.D.; Andrew
 7
   Cash, M.D.; Michael Horan, M.D.; Mario Tarquino, M.D.;
   Peter Hamlyn, M.D.; Christopher Brooks, M.D.
 9
             Bernard Ong; Stephen Yakaitis, M.D.; Juan
10 Martinez-Moreno, M.D.; Keith Lewis, M.D.; James Loong,
   M.D.; Stuart Kaplan, M.D.; Enrico Fazzini, D.O.;
11
12
   Clifford Friesen, M.D.; Rick Yeh, M.D.; Morris Schaner,
   M.D.; Maureen McCormack, M.D.; Christopher Johnson,
   M.D.; Clifford Friesen, M.D.; Brian Lemper, D.O.; David
15
   Copperfield, a.k.a. David Kotkin; Kevin Jansen; Dennis
   Funes-Navas; Juan J. Bermejo, M.D.
17
             David J. Oliveri, M.D.; Ryan Carvalho; Pomai
   Weall; Shane Engle; Nathan Head; Jamie Edelman; George
18
19
   Baker; Troy Mayborne; Spencer Hegewald; Eugene
20
   Williams; Patrick Reed; Jacob Hafen; Christian Smith;
21
   Michael Hankins; Chris Oberle or Oberle; Jason Higbie;
22
   Andrew Lacombe; Cheryl Murphy; Jay Harmas; Chris
23
   Kenner; Homer Liwag; John Pigg.
24
             Rene Nadeau; Danny Berro; Stacy DeRosa;
25
   Jackie Fisher; Audra Geving; Elizabeth McInerney;
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1 Ashliegh Drew; J.R. Hedger, M.D.; P. Rhode, M.D.; Tim
   Tees, M.D.; Sultana Rasheed, M.D.; Zoe Kelion, M.D.;
   Fiona Butler, M.D.; F. Klemperer, M.D.; Alessandra
   Lemma, M.D.; R. Sanchez, M.D.; Jasmine Chopra, M.D.;
   Andrew Davies, M.D.; M.J. Sinha; A. Locum, M.D.; Andrew
   McIver, M.D., Paul Farmer, CPN; K. Al-Kaid, M.D.; Kerry
 7
   Solomon; Lyn Nicholls, CPN.
 8
             Bliss White; Adam Cooney; Lars Reinhart,
 9
   M.D.; Michael Linetsky, M.D.; Robert Asarnow, M.D.;
   Ronald Luke, PhD; Howard Tung, M.D.; John E. Baker,
10
11
   PhD; Mark Habersack; Matthew Ashley, M.D.; Thomas
12
   Ayers, PhD; Govind Koka, M.D.; Terrence Clauretie, PhD;
13
   Ira Spector, MS; Arthur Kowell, PhD; Nicholas Yang,
14
   PhD.
15
             Benedict P. Morelli, Esq.; Adam D. Deutsch,
16
   Esq.; Perry Fallick, Esq.; Brian K. Harris, Esq.;
   Heather E. Harris, Esq.; Christian Griffin, Esq.;
17
18
   Howard J. Russell, Esq.; Timothy A. Mott, Esq.; D. Lee
19
   Roberts, Esq.; Gary W. Call, Esq.; Roger Strassburg,
20
   Esq.; Elaine K. Fresch, Esq.; Jerry C. Popovich, Esq.;
21
   Eric O. Freeman, Esq. That completes the names of the
22
   list.
23
             All right.
                         Now, I will get back to my former
24
   question. Are any of you acquainted with any of those
25
   people? Okay. I've heard from some. Now that the
```

1 names have been -- all the names have been read, I'll 2 go back to the questioning and identify -- have people identify people they're acquainted with. 3 4 THE COURT: What's the badge number? 5 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 559: 559, Nicole 6 Lutey. 7 THE COURT: Okav. 8 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 559: Terrence Clauretie was one of my professors at UNLV, probably 10 about 20 years ago. 11 THE COURT: Okav. 12 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 031: Alex Daniel, 0031. I'm not associated with anyone on that list, but I am a contractor, that I have worked on the strip, and 15 I have my wife and my brother that's employed by MGM, 16 so... 17 THE COURT: Okay. Anybody else on this side 18 over here? I see no additional hands. 19 Anyone out in the gallery? 20 I will need your name and badge number, 21 please. 22 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 781: My name is Nita 23 Douglas. Badge number is 781. I'm a pharmacy 24 technician, and Drs. Linetsky and Nagy, I type a lot of 25 prescriptions, so they sound very familiar to me.

1	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 729: Michael Carelli,
2	Badge No. 729. I worked really closely with Cheryl
3	Murphy for a couple years.
4	THE COURT: For which?
5	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 729: Cheryl Murphy.
6	Couple of years. And then Ryan Carvalho, me and his
7	brother Chris, we used to party a lot, so
8	That's about it.
9	Oh, also, and then I do stage tech work, so I
10	will be working on the MGM here and there too.
11	THE COURT: All right. Anybody else?
12	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 747: Debra Crane,
13	Badge 747. I actually met David Copperfield.
14	THE COURT: You what?
15	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 747: I met I met
16	David Copperfield.
17	THE COURT: Okay.
18	Anybody else? Have I covered everybody on
19	that last question? Okay.
20	Are there any of you or members of your
21	immediate families who may be clients of any of the
22	lawyers or law firms involved in this case?
23	I see no hands.
24	Are there any of you who believe you may have
25	heard or read about this case before coming to court

today?

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I see no hands.

Does anybody know anything about this case other than what has been stated in the courtroom today?

I see no hands.

Is there anybody who has such a sympathy, prejudice, or bias relating to age, religion, race, gender, or national origin that they feel would affect their ability to be open-minded, fair, and impartial as jurors?

I see no hands.

Okay. Now, this case is expected to last -let me look at the calendar here. Looking through the calendar here. I thought I had it.

All right. This case is expected to last up to -- I say up to, not necessarily as long as I'm going to indicate; could be shorter, could be longer, but generally the estimates are -- are fairly good -- up to 19 to 20 trial days. Trial days. Okay? We're not in -- we're not in trial every day. We're not in trial on Saturday and Sunday, for example. Generally, we're not in trial on Mondays. All right?

I'll go ahead and go through this calendar and give you an idea of what days we're likely to be in 25 trial up to that period. Some of those days will --

1 some of the days on the calendar, we won't be in trial; 2 some of the days, we'll be in trial only half day. Let 3 me go through the calendar now, and I'll give you an 4 idea of what the periods expected to be. 5 Today, of course, till 5:00 o'clock. Wednesday, April 4th, 9:00 to 5:00. Generally, we take 7 lunch from 12:00 to 1:30. Okay? Thursday, this Thursday, the 5th, we'll just be in session in the afternoon, 1:30 until 5:00, because I have motions on 10 Thursday mornings, and I have to hear those. 11 can't be in trial usually on Thursday mornings. Sometimes I can. But this week it will be 1:30 to 12 13 5:00. Friday, the 6th, 9:00 until 4:30. All right? 14 We won't be in session on the Saturday, the 15 7th, or Sunday, the 8th. We won't be in session on Monday, the 9th, because I have motions on Monday 17 mornings and other things that are scheduled far in 18 advance in the afternoon. So we won't be in session 19 Monday, the 9th. 20 Tuesday, the 10th, 9:00 to 5:00, again, with 21 the lunch period that I have indicated. The 11th, 9:00 22 to 5:00. The 12th, I can give some time on Thursday 23 morning, so we have it down now for 10:00 to 5:00. 24 Again, we take a lunch break, but we will be in session

Thursday morning, the 12th, at 10:00. Okay? Friday,

1 the 13th, 9:00 to 5:00. 2 Not in session Saturday, the 14th, or Sunday, 3 the 15th, or Monday, the 16th. 4 Tuesday, the 17th, from 9:00 to 5:00. 5 Wednesday, the 18th, from 9:00 to 5:00. 6 We will not be in session Thursday, the 19th, 7 or Friday, the 20th, or Saturday, the 21st, or Sunday, the 22nd, or Monday, the 23rd. All right? 9 We'll then be back in session on Tuesday, the 10 24th, from 9:00 to 5:00. Wednesday, the 25th, from 11 9:00 to 5:00. Thursday, the 26th, not in session in 12 the morning. 1:30 till 5:00. Friday, the 27th, 9:00 13 to 5:00. 14 And not in session Saturday, the 28th, or 15 Sunday, the 29th. 16 Monday, the 30th, I can give some time to it, 17 l on the afternoon, 1:30 till 5:00. 18 Then, if that matter is not finished by that 19 l time, we're not in session. We come back on Tuesday, the 1st, from 9:00 to 5:00. Wednesday, the 2nd, 9:00 20 21 to 5:00. Thursday, the 3rd, 1:30 to 5:00. Friday, the 22 4th, 9:00 to 5:00. Okay? 23 Those are the days that we have allotted to 24 this case. The case could be shorter. Conceivably it 25 could be longer, not likely. But, in any event, those

1 are the dates and times we have been allotted for this 2 case. 3 Would serving that period of time represent 4 an undue burden upon any of you given the fact that we're not going to be in session every day, there will 5 be space in between trial days? And what I'll do is I'll hear from each of you who raises your hand and 8 identify the nature of the burden. 9 Let's see. Let me start over to the left 10 I'll start the front row. I'll work from my 11 left to the right. 12 Okay. So front row, who do we have here? 13 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 728: My name is John 14 Saylor, Badge 728. I just -- I just have family coming 15 in from Pennsylvania from April 11th through April 20. And I also have an eye doctor appointment on the 5th, 17 which I canceled once already. 18 THE COURT: Okay. So it's April 11th until 19 when? 20 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 728: April 20th. have family coming from Pennsylvania. 22 THE COURT: Okay. Okay. As I indicated, we 23 won't be in session on Saturday, the 14th, or Sunday, 24 the 15th, or Monday, the 16th, nor will we be in

session, Thursday, the 19th, or Friday, the 20th,

1	so
2	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 728: Okay.
3	THE COURT: Okay. And you had an eye
4	doctor's appointment you said too?
5	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 728: Yeah. I canceled
6	that once before. Me and my wife. She's disabled, so
7	I drive her.
8	THE COURT: I see. Okay. Thank you.
9	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 728: Yep.
10	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 712: My name is Lilia
11	Avila, Badge No. 712. April, the 20th, I'm finalizing
12	my wedding.
13	THE COURT: You're doing what? Finalizing?
14	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 712: My wedding.
15	THE COURT: Finalizing your wedding?
16	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 712: Yes.
17	THE COURT: It's not the wedding; it's
18	your your the plans for it?
19	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 712: I have to fly out
20	to finalize everything: venue, food, cake.
21	THE COURT: So the wedding is not going to be
22	here in Las Vegas?
23	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 712: Correct.
24	THE COURT: Okay. You're flying somewhere
25	else to make arrangements for it?

1 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 712: Correct. 2 THE COURT: Okay. When is the wedding 3 scheduled? 4 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 712: October 20th. 5 THE COURT: Oh, okay. All right. 6 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 729: As I said 7 earlier, Michael Carelli, Badge 729. I work stage tech, so I just take projects as they come and I need that money to survive. I've got a lot of projects 10 coming up that don't have a specific date, but they are -- one's starting on Friday, actually, and then 11 12 over the next couple of weeks, whatever weekday they 13 end up getting them going, so ... 14 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 15 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 737: My name is Gabriela Pond, 737. I was born and raised in Moldova, East Europe, and I have a little bit of problem to 17 understand very good English. 18 19 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 20 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 747: Debra Crane, 747. 21 I just returned back to work after having breast 22 surgery, so having that time off could be a financial hardship on my family since I'm already way behind on 23 24 my bills. 25 THE COURT: Where do you work?

	·
1	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 747: I work for AAA.
2	THE COURT: AAA?
3	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 747: Yes.
4	THE COURT: Do you know whether or not they
5	compensate for jury service?
6	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 747: One day. Today.
7	THE COURT: What's that?
8	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 747: One day. For
9	today. One day at a time. Like they did once, but
10	will they pay me for the three weeks? No. And I can't
11	qualify for short-term disability. I had that, and
12	they only give you 66 percent of your pay, which is why
13	I am far behind on my bills right now, so
14	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
15	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 747: You're welcome.
16	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 770: Gary Meyers,
17	Badge 770. I'm a high school special ed teacher.
18	THE COURT: What's the number?
19	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 770: 770.
20	THE COURT: Okay.
21	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 770: 770. I'm a high
22	school special ed teacher. And starting next well,
23	Monday, we're I have IPs I have to write and
24	reevaluations on the students between now and the end
25	of April into early May, so

	A Prince Control of the Control of t
1	THE COURT: So you work for the Clark County
2	School District?
3	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 770: No, I actually
4	I actually work in Nye County.
5	THE COURT: Oh, in Nye County.
6	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 770: But I live here
7	in Clark County.
8	THE COURT: Okay. Do you know whether they
9	compensate for jury service?
10	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 770: We are. But
11	it we're a very small department at the high school
12	I work at, and to have the other special ed teachers
13	have to write my IPs for my students and the testing
14	would put a hardship on my department.
15	THE COURT: Now, do you you live here in
16	Las Vegas or Las Vegas area here?
17	THE CLERK: I live in Mountain's Edge.
18	THE COURT: But when do you go to Tonopah
19	or Pahrump?
20	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 770: Pahrump. I work
21	in Pahrump.
22	THE COURT: Pahrump.
23	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 770: But I live here.
24	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
25	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 781: My name is Nita

1	Douglas, Badge No. 781. And I was planning on going
2	out of town that weekend. It's my mother's 83rd
3	birthday. She's not doing very well.
4	THE COURT: When are you going out of town?
5	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 781: I'm sorry?
6	THE COURT: When are you going out of town?
7	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 781: On the 13th of
8	April, on that Friday.
9	THE COURT: Okay.
10	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 781: Okay.
11	THE COURT: What time you leaving?
12	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 781: I could leave in
13	the afternoon.
14	THE COURT: And you're just going for the
15	weekend, Saturday and Sunday, and coming back?
16	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 781: Yeah, coming
17	back.
18	THE COURT: Okay.
19	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 783: I am Ramon Diaz
20	Badge 703.
21	THE COURT: What's your badge number, sir?
22	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 783: What you say?
23	Excuse me?
24	THE MARSHAL: Your badge number.
25	THE COURT: What is the badge number?

1	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 783: 703. 783.
2	THE COURT: 783. Okay. All right. Thank
3	you.
4	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 783: I have a problem
5	with my English. I I understand. I don't speak
6	English. Sorry.
7	THE COURT: Okay.
8	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 790: Barbara Hall,
9	Badge No. 790. I have a disabled husband and a son at
10	home that I have to take care of, and I work for the RJ
11	at night. So usually I sleep during the day, so that
12	would really be a hardship on me.
13	THE COURT: What do you do at home?
14	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 790: I take care of my
15	disabled husband who had a stroke and my son who's had
16	a stroke.
17	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
18	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 790: Thank you.
19	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 797: Shing Gan, Badge
20	No. 79 797. And my English isn't that good.
21	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
22	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 749: My name is Yan
23	Wu. My badge is 749. My English is not very well and
24	no understand well anybody.
25	THE COURT: Okay.

1	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 749: That's all.
2	THE COURT: Okay. We'll go to this second
3	front row.
4	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 702: David Allen,
5	Badge 702. I'm technically supposed to be out of town
6	for the next month for work purposes for the
7	out-of-town building of a brand-new store. So over
8	there from Monday to Friday and off on the weekends.
9	THE COURT: Where do you work?
10	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 702: For Star Nursery.
11	It's a plant nursery in Vegas. We're building out in
12	Bullhead City.
13	THE COURT: Oh. Do you know whether you're
14	compensated for jury service or not?
15	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 702: I think so, but I
16	think it's only, like, half. I'm not 100 percent sure.
17	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
18	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 696: Germaine
19	Prescott, Badge No. 696. I recently had a breast
20	biopsy, so I have an appointment to see a breast
21	surgeon on the 18th.
22	THE COURT: Okay. Do you know whether or not
23	that that can be scheduled for the next day or we're
24	not in session on the 19th.
25	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 696: I can call him

1 and see. I don't know. 2 THE COURT: Thank you. 3 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 690: Gerald Schaffner, Badge No. 690. I have a CT scheduled for April the 4 5 I 11th and a doctor's appointment on April the 15th. 6 THE COURT: Okay. So you have the --7 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 690: The problem is getting an appointment with my doctor. If I have to 9 reschedule, it's three to five weeks. 10 THE COURT: You said the doctor's appointment 11 is on the 15th. 12 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 690: Yeah, Monday. 13 Oh, the 15th -- 16th. 14 THE COURT: 15th is a Sunday. 16th we're not 15 in session. Okay. All right. Thank you. 16 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 669: Lisa Duran, 669. 17 l I have to take my daughter to California to sign her college papers on this Friday, and then I work for the 18 l 19 test site. Starting April 20, we've got a critical mission that I have all the plans for, so I would have to get back to there tonight and try and get the work 22 organized for them to do without me being there. 23 THE COURT: So what -- what's the -- you said 24 the test --25 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 669: I work at the

1 test site, and we have a critical mission starting on 2 the 20th that I have all the plans for locked in my office that nobody can get into, 'cause coming to jury duty, you just don't really think you will ever get 5 that far. 6 THE COURT: You work for the federal 7 government. 8 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 669: Yes, sir. 9 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 10 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 616: Steve Willis, 11 Badge 616. I have a flight reservation April 10th 12 through 14th, Tulsa, Oklahoma. 13 THE COURT: What was the time period again? 14 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 616: The 10th through 15 l the 14th. 16 THE COURT: And what's happening in Tulsa? 17 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 616: My father, who lives in Cushing, Oklahoma, is not doing well at all. 19 And so I'm flying out to -- to visit with him. 20 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you. 21 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 624: Manuel Garcia, 22 I have problem, like, I -- I don't understand 23 English, so that's the only problem I got. 24 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 633: Nicholas Meneley, 25 Badge No. 633. I'm the sole provider for my family.

1 My wife doesn't work. She is a stay-at-home mom. 21 I already booked out work for Latin Billboards EDC and ACMAs that have just came up for April. So I'm booked 4 every single day. 5 THE COURT: Do you know whether you're 6 compensated for jury service? 7 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 633: I don't think so. 8 We work --9 THE COURT: What's the name of -- who's your 10 | employer? 11 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 633: I work for 12 | multiple employers. We work for entertainment 13 companies throughout all the properties for Vegas. So 14 3G, Rhino, ILT. All of them. 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 614: My name is Jason 17 Voltz, Badge 614. Just the tail end of getting my 18 master's degree at UNLV, so I'm in the middle of my 19 professional paper/thesis. It's due May 9, so a lot of 20 meetings with my chairperson/professor coming up. 21 this is going to be a major impact on the -- getting 22 that done. It's been a two-and-a-half-year program. 23 THE COURT: Okav. 24 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 604: Cheryl Celline, 25 604. This would be a hardship. I get three days' pay

for jury duty, and I've already used two of those. And 2 I have mortgage, car payment. And this would be really 3 difficult. I wouldn't be able to make my bills. 4 THE COURT: Where do you work? 5 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 604: HealthCare 6 Partners. I'm a nurse. And I'm the only nurse in that department there, so it would be a hardship on them 8 too. 9 THE COURT: All right. Do you have any other 10 | source of support or --11 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 604: No. I own my own 12 home, single. And so it's just my finances, mortgage, 13 l everything. Car payment. 14 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 15 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 601: Your Honor, 16 Richard De-Sterre, Badge No. 601. I work for Air Force 17 Materiel Command. I train, I design, and I work with 18 l I train them. people that have to go to war. 19 remote. I don't work in Vegas. And we only have two 20 people. I have to get them ready. I cannot go for a 21 whole month. Just sometimes I go with them, so I 22 cannot stay here. 23 My mother's 83 years old. I go home to my 24 mom all the time. I can't leave her alone. I just

25 can't do that. Sorry. But Mr. Denton at the center

1 was my -- was my lawyer, my child's lawyer. They're 2 very good people. Sorry. 3 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 559: Nicole Lutey, Badge 559. I'm a UNLV law student, and I have a class 5 that runs on Tuesdays and Thursdays, starting at 4:40. 6 THE COURT: 4:40? 7 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 559: Yep. Every 8 Tuesday and Thursday. 9 THE COURT: What class is that? 10 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 559: "Bioethics and 11 the Law." 12 THE COURT: Okay. 13 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 563: Essai Cardoza, 14 Badge No. 563. I live with my aunt and my uncle who are disabled due to a car crash out back on -- back at 15 '06. And I help take care -- take care of them by moving them around and move -- putting -- sitting them 17 18 up for eating and on the wheelchair. 19 And on top of that, I do not have 20 transportation. No -- I don't have a car. So it's 21 really, like, puts me in --22 THE COURT: What part of town do you live in? 23 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 563: I live on -- I believe the east side. No, it was -- you know where 24 25 | 5045 North Monte Cristo Way, next to the Santa Fe

1	Casino?
2	THE COURT: Next to what?
3	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 563: The Santa Fe
4	Casino, all the way over there.
5	THE COURT: Okay. And how did you get here
6	today?
7	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 563: Well, I got I
8	got an Über. But the thing is I don't have the
9	financials to keep calling Über for 20 or more days
10	because it's 20 20 to get here and 20 to go back,
11	that's 40.
12	THE COURT: Is anybody helping with your aunt
13	and uncle at this time?
14	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 563: No. It's only
15	me.
16	THE COURT: So they're by themselves now?
17	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 563: Yes.
18	THE COURT: How old are they?
19	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 563: How old are they?
20	They're 50, and the and my uncle is Geraldo. He's,
21	like, 60.
22	THE COURT: Okay.
23	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 563: And I'm only 20.
24	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
25	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 031: Alex Daniel,

1	0031. I do have a civil duty to be here, but I also
2	have 120 employees that I'm responsible for, and asking
3	for 20 workdays is pretty hectic.
4	THE COURT: Well, all the days we're in
5	session are not several days are workdays, but we
6	won't be in session. I mean, workdays, you know,
7	for for you, but not we won't be in session on
8	those days. So some Mondays we won't be in session.
9	Right?
10	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 031: Correct. I I
11	still have business that I got to run.
12	THE COURT: What days do you work?
13	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 031: Oh, Monday
14	through Saturday.
15	THE COURT: Monday through Saturday. So
16	we're not in session on Saturdays, and we're not in
17	session on Mondays. Okay.
18	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 031: Workdays.
19	Workdays. Monday through Friday.
20	THE COURT: And you work for the
21	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 031: I have my own
22	company.
23	THE COURT: Your own company. Okay. Thanks.
24	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 570: Hi. My name is
25	Maria Parras, and my badge number is 4215.

1 It would be a hardship for me to do this, because my schedule time where I work, I work in a home through a company called Dungarvin. I'm a caretaker to four individuals with disabilities. And every single 5 day that you have here except for one Monday is my day off, every single day. From Tuesday to Sunday I work, 7 so it would be hard. 8 I do 2:00 to 10:00 every -- every single day. 9 Saturdays, I work a graveyard shift and a regular 10 shift. So that's not going to matter for Sunday, but 11 Monday through Friday, I can't. 12 THE COURT: Okay. Do you know whether you 13 are compensated for --14 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 570: No, we're not. 15 THE COURT: -- for jury service? 16 All right. Thank you. 17 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 570: Thank you. 18 THE COURT: Anybody else? 19 Okay. I see no additional hands. 20 Are there any of you who believe that, for 21 any other reason, you would be unable to serve on this 22 particular case other than what's been stated so far? 23 Okay. I see no hands. 24 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 601: Your Honor, how 25 my personal belief -- sorry.

1 THE MARSHAL: Hang on. 2 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 601: Badge No. 601, 3 Richard De-Sterre. 4 How about a personal belief? 5 THE COURT: Okay. That's 601, you said? 6 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 601: Yes, sir. 7 Richard De-Sterre; right? THE COURT: 8 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 601: Yes, sir. 9 I'm a Chinese, and our culture is always 10 working hard and never take anything for anything. 11 my wife retired from UMC. She retired with 640 hours of sick leave. And, according to most people, when 13 they retire, they take sick leave -- you burn up the 14 l time. You get paid. We don't believe in that. 15 I work for my company 30 years. I never call a single day sick. To me, those falls, I have fallen 17 quite a few times at Wal-Mart because the floor was I got up and go -- kept going. Those things, to 19 me, is I just don't believe, you know, can cause by 20 other things. Sorry. I don't want to affect anybody 21 else. That's my personal belief. 22 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. All right. 23 PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 601: Sorry, sir. 24 THE COURT: Is there anybody who may not be

able to follow all of the instructions of the Court on

1	the law of the case even if the instructions differ
2	from their personal beliefs of what the law ought to
3	be?
4	Okay. I see no okay. I saw a hand back
5	there.
6	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 747: Can you explain
7	that?
8	THE MARSHAL: Your badge number?
9	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 747: 747, Debra Crane.
10	THE COURT: What was the badge number again?
11	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 747: 747, Debra Crane.
12	THE COURT: Okay. What that means is that
13	the Court will instruct you on the law that applies in
14	the case. The jury determines what the facts are, then
15	the Court instructs you on what the law is. And the
16	question is whether you would have any difficulty
17	following the instructions of the Court on what the law
18	is even if that differed from what your personal
19	beliefs are.
20	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 747: Okay. I get it
21	now. Thank you, sir.
22	THE COURT: Thank you. Okay.
23	Now, as a follow-up to the previous question,
24	I must tell you that, in this civil trial, there are
25	actually 13 judges. The 12 members of the jury sitting

11 collectively are going to be the judges of the 2 questions of fact in the case. 3 As presiding judge, I'm judge of the 4 questions of law. It's my responsibility to be sure 5 that I give instructions on the law that applies in a 6 particular case. It would be a violation of a juror's duty if he or she tried to render a judgment based upon what he or she believed the law to be if that differed 9 from my instructions. 10 With that in mind, is there anybody who feels 11 that he or she cannot be a fact-finder and follow my 12 instructions on the applicable law in this case? 13 I see no hands. Okav. 14 Okay. At this time, I would ask counsel to 15 approach. 16 (A discussion was held at the bench, 17 not reported.) 18 THE MARSHAL: Please no talking. Everything 19 is being recorded. 20 (A discussion was held at the bench, 21 not reported.) 22 THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, 23 if and when I read your name, please stand and remain 24 standing until I give you further directions. 25 right?

1	Richard De-Sterre. That's badge No. 601.
2	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 601: Yes, sir.
3	THE COURT: Cheryl Celline, 604.
4	Manuel Garcia-Rayas I'm sorry. No,
5	that's pardon me.
6	Next one is 633, Nicholas Meneley.
7	All right. Next is that's Badge No. 633.
8	Next is 669, Lisa Duran. All right?
9	Okay. The next is 729, Michael Carelli.
10	THE MARSHAL: He's in the bathroom, Your
11	Honor.
12	THE COURT: Okay. 729, Michael Carelli.
13	747, Debra Crane.
14	Okay. 749, Yan Wu.
15	783, Ramon Diaz-Aguacia.
16	Okay. 790, Barbara Hall.
17	797, Shing Gan. Did I say that right?
18	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 797: Yeah.
19	THE COURT: Okay. Those of you whose names
20	I've just called out will be excused from further
21	service in this case. We thank you for your
22	participation up to now in this rather tedious process.
23	You're directed to leave the courtroom, and I believe
24	you need to go back to the jury office for any further
25	instruction that they may have for you. Okay?

1	PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 747: Thank you so
2	much, Your Honor.
3	
	(Whereupon excused jurors exited the
4	courtroom.)
5	THE COURT: Okay. At this time, I will ask
6	Alice to call the first 24 names that will be seated in
7	the order 1 through 24 over here in the jury box and in
8	the chairs just in front of it. Some of the people are
9	already in the proper seats that will have to be
10	some may have to move over or so let's make sure
11	everyone is in the proper seats.
12	Bob, I think people should go back where they
13	were and we're just going to fill the empty seats. So
14	they should go back.
15	THE MARSHAL: You don't want them in order?
16	THE COURT: No, she's going to fill the seats
17	that were vacant.
18	THE CLERK: Right now, we're going to have
19	Alexan Daniel in Seat No. 1.
20	Susan Millhouse in Seat No. 2.
21	Nicole Lutey in Seat No. 3.
22	Essai Cardoza in Seat No. 4.
23	Mei-Yen Sun in Seat No. 5.
24	Maria Parras in Seat No. 6.
25	Lara Dupree in Seat No. 7.

1	Enrie Davis, Seat No. 8.
2	THE COURT: Slow down a little bit now. So
3	now they've got two that were excused, which were 9 and
4	10.
5	THE CLERK: Okay. Seat No. 9 is going
6	to to be Thomas Torres. He is Badge No. 704.
7	THE MARSHAL: So that's Seat No. 9?
8	THE CLERK: Seat No. 9, correct.
9	Seat No. 10 will be Luzangelica Gomez, Badge
10	710.
11	Seat No. 12, Jason Voltz, Badge No. 614
12	or yeah, Seat No. 11 Seat No. 11 is Linette
13	Ayala, Badge 611 in Seat 11.
14	Jason Voltz, Badge 614, in Seat 12.
15	Steve Willis, Badge 616, in Seat 13.
16	Sally Wahl, Badge 617, in Seat 14.
17	THE MARSHAL: Yeah.
18	THE CLERK: Sheila Mosallaei, Badge 622, in
19	Seat 15.
20	Manuel Garcia-Rayas, Badge 624, in Seat 16.
21	Lilia Avila, Badge 712, please take Seat
22	No. 17.
23	Nancy Solloway, Badge 636, please take
24	Seat 18.
25	John Saylor, Badge 728, please take Seat