## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

JOSHUA HONEA,
Appellant,
v.

STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent.

Docket No. 76621
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## JOSHUA HONEA

By: /S/MONIQUE MCNEILL
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## DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA, )

) REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
OF
EVIDENTIARY HEARING

JOSHUA HONEA,
Defendant.
)

BEFORE THE HONORABLE KATHLEEN DELANEY DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

DATED: THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 2019

APPEARANCES:
For the State: STACEY KOLLINS, ESQ. KRISTINA RHOADES, ESQ.

For the Defendant: JONATHAN MACAUTHUR, ESQ. MONIQUE MCNEILL, ESQ.

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA; THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 2019
PROCEEDINGS

*     *         *             *                 * 

THE COURT: Good morning.
Calling State of Nevada vs. Joshua Honea. It's not quite 10:55. It's 10:52 on the clock. I can see in the court room we'd originally scheduled this matter upon request of counsel, Jonathan MacArthur to start at 10:15, based on an appearance he needed to make that was already scheduled in Department 23. We have not had any word when he might finish down there and be able to come up here. The court had an obligation that it thought it would be able to meet around the lunch hour because of the original time schedule to start the matter, and even with the push back thought we could get a good chunk of time in this morning and then be able to continue in the afternoon. Of course, was willing to play it by ear to rearrange something if we were close to finishing and needed to go into the lunch hour in some way.

Given we haven't started at all, and it's getting close to 11:00, I am concerned and I didn't really want to do this where we take just one witness then trail it out and take a lunch break. So our alternatives are to start at 11:00-ish and then -- the estimate I think right
now -- here comes Mr. MacArthur.
Come in Mr. MacArthur. Literally 2 minutes ago I called the matter because -- and Ms. McNeill indicated she would stand in. I had a very brief conference for scheduling purposes in chambers with Ms. Kollins and Ms. McNeill, just because we weren't sure when you might be able to complete your duties down in Department 23 and we knew Department 23 had started their calendar late -MR. MACAUTHUR: They did. THE COURT: -- and knew this was circumstances beyond your control, of course. But we were getting worried about how we were going to start, when we might finish, and would it make sense to start now and take the lunch break and come back. Start now, go all the way through. Or actually ask folks to take a lunch break now and return at $1: 00$ and be able to start and finish all in one fell swoop. My preference, in all candor, so I wouldn't have to adjust the schedule that I'd originally had for today, would be that we bring the jurors in, speak with them about delays that were occurring that the court will take responsibility for so that neither party is blamed for that. Ms. Kollins in chambers expressed some concerns it's a state subpoena and not getting started that this might enure to the negative consequence from their perspective to the state. So my thought was bring
them in, explain that there were circumstances beyond the court's control why we couldn't start now, or earlier then now, and that ultimately we would reassume at 1:00 and then start at 1:00 and finish whenever.

Ms. Kollins had estimated maybe we could be 3 hours, give or take, on how many witnesses. What do you think Mr. MacArthur, as far as your preparation for today, how much time do you think you would need.

MR. MACAUTHUR: I was also thinking 3 hours or less. Let me just say that this is the most important case I have going and whatever accommodations are necessary $I$ won't be anywhere else.

THE COURT: Ms. Kollins was given a trial free day by Judge Kephart so she could be here all day. I don't know what Ms. Rhoades' schedule is. Ms. McNeill, I know you are scheduled to give testimony. You know, like I said, it's 11:00. We could start at 11:00, 12:00. 1:00. 2:00 and power through to 2:00 and be done, or we can break now, bring them in to help them understand why the court takes responsibility for it, come back at 1:00 and start at 1:00 and go until we conclude. I'm open to either suggestion, in all candor.

MR. MACAUTHUR: So am I.
THE COURT: Ms. Kollins.
MS. KOLLINS: I don't know what the court had
planned, so with deference to that, my preference would be to start now. I still have trial preparation. I don't really want to be here till 5:00 or 6:00.

THE COURT: Understood.
Mr. MacArthur.
MR. MACAUTHUR: That's fine.
THE COURT: All right. So we will -- does anybody need to do anything before we bring the jurors in and start at 11:00. Does anybody need to use the restroom.

MS. MCNEILL: I need to use the restroom.
MR. MACAUTHUR: I'll make representations while you're gone.

I don't know if this was discussed before I arrived. Stop me if it has.

THE COURT: Nothing has been discussed. We had 2 seconds of scheduling.

MR. MACAUTHUR: Okay. Because Ms. McNeill is testifying today, she is a witness. However, this creates an odd circumstance. Typically witnesses are also not able to advocate for defendants, or in this case appellant. What's important here is that the appeal that was drafted for Mr. Honea was drafted by Ms. McNeill. The motion for new trial that relates to this evidentiary hearing, two years after the fact, was written by Ms.

McNeill. It's not that I'm incapable. I'm going to be doing the questioning. But, even though Ms. McNeill no longer works in my firm, this is very much still our case. Mr. Honea's family asked if she would continue to work on it. She assured them she would. And she fully intends to.

As long as we don't have a problem where Ms. McNeill's not allowed to be at counsel table or we're not allowed to confer about, hey, what questions should we ask, or what do we remember about this incident, then I have no objection. However, in the trial I do remember that when passions were high there was one point where Ms. Kollins had said, hey, they put themselves in a position to be witnesses, she can no longer be and advocate and the court did not rule in the State's favor on that and that's fine. But $I$ don't want to have a problem moving forward where $I$ consult Monique or she's sitting at counsel table and then there's an objection because she was available as a witness today and now she's no longer an advocate. So I want to put that out first. This is her material work and she's still counsel of record.

THE COURT: So here's an interesting think I guess I need to share with you try to understand this. Ms. McNeill, can I ask you to go into the anti-room and we're talking about you and I need to have a conversation
before you come back in.
So two things, Mr. MacArthur. On the last hearing date when you were not present and Ms. McNeill stood in for you, Ms. Kollins had raised the issue that she thought Ms. McNeill was no longer on the case and that's not necessarily they were tied together but that is why she would then be able to give witness testimony. That we just understood she was no longer on the case. I understood Ms. McNeill to confirm that and that she was only going to be here today as a witness. That was last time we were together in court. This morning, when we were having the scheduling conversation in the office, when I said, you know, about not sure when you were going to get there and whether we should postpone this until the afternoon, she said words to me in front of Ms. Kollins to the affect of I'm just a witness. I don't have anything -- because it was in context of me asking how long the hearing might take. Like, were we talking an hour, 2 hours, 3 hours, what was the estimate. She said, I'm just a witness today. I haven't prepped anything. So I don't know. So those two comments are -- don't square up, in my opinion, with what you're saying.

Now, do I have heartburn with Ms. McNeill giving witness testimony and remaining as an attorney on the case. Certainly, as all attorneys, and we've been
well-trained in our ethics, it's odd at best. It's not ideal. But this is such a limited component of what it is that Ms. McNeill knows that if she's still an attorney on the case I think we need to have that record made. And if she's still an attorney on the case, I think she can give limited witness testimony and she remains an attorney on the case. It's just her representations last time we were in court and this morning I believed were inconsistent with that.

Hold on. Ms. Kollins, what would you like to say. MS. KOLLINS: Essentially, I don't think we have a dog in this fight. And I don't think there is any ethical obligation for her to remain on the case, as I know the canons. That's certainly, you know, between her and Mr. MacArthur. She's provided an affidavit, if we have any questions further from that, you know, we'll certainly bring them up and have her sworn. I haven't determined that yet. It's, kind of, based on what the jurors give, I guess. So that's where I'm at. THE COURT: You mean not to call her as a witness.

MS. KOLLINS: She said -- she told me in person she preferred a subpoena. Mr. MacArthur directed her to give an affidavit and not testify. She has a subpoena. She has an affidavit. She understands she can be called
today.
THE COURT: Let me ask you something. Are you talking about a new affidavit or the one that was attached to the motion.

MS. KOLLINS: This is a new -- wait. This is one attached to the motion.

THE COURT: I haven't seen a new one. MR. MACAUTHUR: No. There's not a new one. THE COURT: So yeah. She had a prior affidavit. She can -- so is she on the case or not on the case.

MR. MACAUTHUR: She is. I'll make these representations so the court understands the timeline.

I made a court appearance where we set the date. During that the court ordered me, I would like to have as much information as possible about how Ms. McNeill identified that Brett Jankiewicz' sister, Taylor Jankiewicz, a friend of Morgan, et cetera. I took that message back to Ms. McNeill. Bear in mind that Ms. McNeill had left the firm. She's now a sole-entity. We still have a couple of cases in common that we're cooperating, but we're not taking news cases together.

At any rate, when I told her that, she said, somewhat frustratingly, did any of you actually read my declaration. I'm like, I'm just telling what you the judge said. She said, well, it explains in detail exactly
how I did that. I don't know how I'm supposed to supplement. I said, I understand, but it's due by tonight. So if there's anything additional, please draft it. She then sent an e-mail, I believe, to Ms. Kollins and everybody else saying, hey, I'm going to send you my same declaration again. I'll be available as a witness in the event that, you know, I'm needed. But this is really all I have to say.

The next thing that happens is the next court date. At that court date Ms. McNeill's here, and I'm not. The family approached her about continuing on as counsel, I believe that day. She was here with them. They saw her in the hallway. She said, of course, she would.

She originally was under the impression that because Mr. Honea was my client and we hasn't really thoroughly discussed it since she parted with the firm, she didn't want to make any promises or assertions without talking to me first. But when she did talk to me I expressed that it was always my assumption that she was counsel in this case until the wheels fell off. That we're not going to leave Josh with half of his counsel. So, I said what was said in court and she conveyed exactly to me what the court conveyed, and I said, well, that might leave them with the impression you're no longer counsel and that you're only a witness. And so in preparation for this hearing she
agreed with me one hundred percent that because she had drafted the motions and essentially had educated me as to the issues -- I'm kind of -- we're both in-court capable, but I tend to be the in court guy, and she tends to be the motion writer when there's any -- when those things don't overlap.

So she made it clear that she had asserted to the family or reassured them that she remained counsel. And I said, well, $I$ think it's important that we make a record because I don't want the State to be able to say, hey, this is a surprise to us. All of a sudden you've been present for witness testimony and you still expect to advocate. So walking in, I have no doubts that Ms. McNeill knows exactly what I'm talk about. I think that the court should be able to assure itself of her understanding without me having to say a word to her. You just call her back in and ask her what promises she made to the family, what discussions she had with me yesterday. I sit quiet. And I think she repeats exactly what I told you.

THE COURT: Other then it's inconsistent with what she just said this morning.

MR. MACAUTHUR: I don't know why that would happen. I don't know why say'd say that.

THE COURT: Elvis, can you bring in Ms. McNeill,
please. Come on up. You can be there at counsel table.
I'm just trying to clarify a couple of pieces of confusion. We're all smart people. We can all have communications. Then we can realize, oops, we're saying different things. Mr. MacArthur said I can ask you a question and he can sit there silent to see what the answer was.

When Mr. MacArthur came in to make representations, as you went to the restroom, he made representations that you were still on the case and that he wanted to make sure there weren't going to be objections or concerns. That although you may give witness testimony that you were still counsel on the case. I said, I don't understand now what you're telling me because when we were in court last time you indicated you were not still on the case -- I thought -- and this morning, just now when we were talking about the scheduling piece, you indicated you were just here to give witness testimony and you couldn't estimate the time frame because you hadn't prepared anything and you weren't integral -- my words, not yours -- integral to today's proceedings.

But from Mr. MacArthur's representations it sounds like you are integral to today's proceeding. That you would be co-counsel together at the table doing today's proceedings, and that you are still on the case.

So, can you help us clarify the confusion. MS. MCNEILL: I don't know why I'm in this case. THE COURT: I don't either.

MS. MCNEILL: Well, Mr. MacArthur and I are not working together. So that being the case I indicated I wouldn't be assisting with this hearing. He has since told me that he believes that because I authored the motion and the appellate brief that I likely have responsibilities to Mr . Honea and to the case because of that. I somewhat agree with that. I know that Mr. Honea would like me to stay on the case.

So as the court is aware I take my responsibilities to my clients seriously. So I further indicated to him that as far as today's hearing, I'm not doing any questioning. He's prepared to do that. I'm just here. And I indicated that I think that my role as a witness is really just the same as if, as a lawyer, I made representations as an officer of the court, I have the same duties to be honest under oath. So I don't think that puts me in a position adverse to Mr. Honea, which was his concern, but as a witness in the case. If there were a retrial, I wouldn't be able to assist on that. That wasn't my understanding.

I know that he -- Mr. Honea would like me to stay on the case. I will not be assisting in this hearing as
counsel.
THE COURT: So this may be an unfair question to ask now because maybe you haven't decided, but as you stand here right now, are you on the case or are you off the case.

Ms. MCNEILL: I guess I'll say I'm on the case because I know that's what Mr. Honea would request.

THE COURT: So I don't have heartburn -- I said that before you came back in the room, and I'll say it again to you now, that you would give representations as a witness in this case based upon, you know, the information related to Juror No. 3, the Facebook page, the friends situation. Yes, we had your affidavit at the time, but there may have been some misunderstanding cause I don't recall indicating that $I$ was mandating that you be a witness. I have your affidavit.

You know, $I$ am still trying to, sort of, digest the fact that the appellate court sent this back for this purpose and how it is that we are to do this. Because, in all candor, when they indicate in their order of limited remand that they somehow could not determine whether or not I have used my discretion on whether or not there had been prejudicial juror misconduct. We have affidavits. We have pleadings. I wrote my own order. We had the lengthy argument. So I don't understand what the issue
is. But they sent it back for an evidentiary hearing. So when we had the status check about the evidentiary hearing my feeling was, let's get whomever here you think or need or want as counsel to flesh this out. You know, I didn't mandate any particular entity. Mr. MacArthur indicated some people he wanted to call. Ms. Kollins offered to issue the subpoenas to make sure that people got her out of concern that if the State didn't issue them maybe people wouldn't come. I think it all, kind of, narrowed down to -- and we talked about it would be those jurors who are identified in the pleadings -- in the briefing -I'm sorry -- in the motion and the declarations. So even though we didn't have a declaration from Juror No. -- I want to be precise on these numbers while making this record -- Juror No. 4, Ms. Monson, that she was going to be subpoenaed. The other jurors that were subpoenaed were the ones who had declarations or had spoken to counsel and -- so here we are.

Ms. Kollins, you stood up.
MS. KOLLINS: I wanted to make a suggestion about the perimeters of the hearing. Based on my reading of the case law, based on my reading of Miasta and Myer and NRS 50.0652, I concur with the court. I thought we had an adequate record last time. Perhaps things weren't supplemented such that the Supreme Court had all the
affidavits and had everything to review in combination with the court's order, but I would ask this court limit this hearing pursuant to Miasta and Myer. We are -- I don't think anything in the order that came down in this court requires us to go into anything that transpired during deliberation. I think that's inappropriate, by statute and by case law, inappropriate.

I have issued subpoenas for everyone that the court just reiterated for the record. We were incapable of locating Morgan Savage, at Mr. MacArthur's request. She has a case in warrant right now. For the record, my investigator reached out to Metro, the detective that was originally assigned to this case, and reached out to someone else -- the name is slipping me right now -- but -- I'm sorry -- Ms. Savage's mother has not had contact with her since June or July, so we don't have her today.

THE COURT: Mr. MacAuthur -- one last thing about witnesses, then $I$ want to hear Mr. MacAuthur's response to the sort of tenor of or parameters of the hearing. Tobi Caperon, if I'm pronouncing the name correctly -- the investigator, my understanding, also not a witness today.

MR. MACAUTHUR: Correct.
MS. KOLLINS: She was subpoenaed. She has failed to respond to our subpoena. Our investigator has
called the law office of Mr. Claus, where she works, multiple times. Even had her call again this morning. Someone answered the phone. Said Tobi was unavailable. Tobi was out of town. Tobi was unavailable.

I issued the subpoenas a month ago, so she has failed to respond to our subpoena. I think there is information that she might have that $I$ would certainly like in the record, but I can't speculate about that right now. Just so the Supreme Court knows that she failed to comply with the subpoena issued by the State for this hearing.

MR. MACAUTHUR: Two things on that, Judge. First, at that time last hearing where I was present when we were defining the witnesses the State had expressed an interest in speaking to Tobi Caperon. I made some representations about contact with Morgan Savage and how we learned about Taylor Jankiewicz. The court issued at that time -- looking at the transcript -- that Tobi Caperon would not be a witness.

Now, to the extent the State issued a subpoena, I'm not really familiar with that.

THE COURT: Hold on. Let's -- let's hold on. I don't want this record to be unclear. There are representations when they get made they don't match my recollection. That doesn't mean they're wrong, but if they don't match my recollection I would have to
respectfully make that record.
I have zero recollection of when we had the status check indicating any particular witnesses I did or did not want. My recollection was that I indicated that I was still, again, I'll say it again, trying to digest exactly what the Supreme Court was asking us to do here and what those circumstances would be and we talked about the people who had given declarations or what not. I didn't drive the train as to who was going be called at as a witness. Counsel drove the train as to who was going to be called as a witness. If there was an argument over it and I was asked to make a call and I made a call, I don't recollect it. I don't recall in any way saying Ms. McNeill has to be a witness. Tobi Caperon cannot be a witness. Like, I have no recollection of those conversations at all.

So either tell me in the transcript where that is or be more precise in your language, Mr. MacAuthur. You're saying these things definitively, and I don't have any recollection of that.

MR. MACAUTHUR: I believe that everything I'm about to say can be borne out in the transcript.

My recollection is that the court asked us what witnesses would be needed. Everybody agreed that Blaire Savko -- I should know the juror number, but --

THE COURT: I'll give you Juror 7 .
MR. MACAUTHUR: -- everybody agreed that Juror No. 7 was appropriate. Everybody agreed that Makinster -Juror No. 11 was appropriate. Everyone agreed that Rago and Jankiewicz -- Jurors number 1 and 3 -- were appropriate.

I then brought up Ms. Monson. The State objected saying we don't have an affidavit from Ms. Monson. Then I said I thought there was one. I went back through the electronic file, told the court I didn't find one, but was wondering why am I relying on her representations. Then I saw inside of my affidavit included as an exhibit to the motion for new trial my recollections of the conversation with Ms. Monson. I then reminded the court that I'd argued what Ms. Monson said in front of the Supreme Court. It's part of their record. The court then said it was appropriate that she come as well. The State then said I would like to have Tobi Caperon as a witness. I didn't have an objection to it, but $I$ said in the interest of time if this is to the issue of how we identified Taylor Jankiewicz as a percipient witness that she wasn't part of that. That Ms. McNeill did that. And then because we didn't want to have direct contact, we set Tobi Caperon to see if she could verify, and we did not get additional information. All Tobi Caperon did was through proprietary
investigative techniques -- I think is what they call them -- she established that Brett Aaron Jankiewicz and Taylor Jankiewicz were brother and sister, and they had a mother in common and a common address at some point in the past.

When I said that, the court then said, well, it doesn't appear as though we need Ms. Caperon. That was not an order. That was just my understanding based on the discussion. And I think that's exactly what it ways in the transcript.

THE COURT: I think Ms. McNeill is going to testify. I hay have said that. Two minutes ago you just said, I said we don't need that person. If it's in the context -- if the State issued the subpoena, the State issued the subpoena, you all were welcomed to issue subpoenas to whomever you wanted to.

MR. MACAUTHUR: I don't have an objection to the State's subpoena.

THE COURT: I didn't preclude anybody.
I want to be precise about the fact that when you're talking about things that the court said, it sounds like you're saying the court ordered things. I didn't order those things, and I want to be clear.

MR. MACAUTHUR: To be fair, Judge, the court's words carry a lot of weight with attorneys because you're the highest ranked person in the room. I think what you
said was, well, it sounds like we don't need her. I then probably gestured, then no further discussion.

I didn't take it as an order. I didn't take it as a limitation. I was merely saying to the extent the subpoena was not responded to -- I didn't even know she was going to be a witness. I haven't had any contact with Tobi Caperon since that.

THE COURT: Let's move on to the other point that Ms. Kollins made about the scope of the inquiry of these witnesses.

Did you have any response to that. Basically Ms. Kollins is saying we don't talk about deliberations.

MR. MACAUTHUR: Yes. Here's my objection to that.

I understand the holding of Myers. However, there was a dissent in Myers, I believe by Supreme Court Justice Agustie (ph) -- if it wasn't Agustie then it was the other Chief Supreme Court Justice at the time. But the point was is that the Chief Justice, in dissent, said that the harm of intrinsic versus extrinsic juror misconduct is the same, and that they should be treated the same. I realize that's the minority opinion. It was 5, 4. However, I also argued that. I didn't get any feedback on it, but I also argued that before the Supreme Court, and I was hoping they'd make a bright line rule in
accordance.
What I see instead is they sent an order back down to your Honor, which specifically says that not only are we trying to find out whether there was juror misconduct, but also to make a determination whether there was prejudice. The only way that we can determine if there was prejudice is if we ask the jurors who testify, okay, this thing you heard or that you saw, how did it effect you. If they say no it didn't, then there's no prejudice. If they say, well, it made me think this thing and I did this other thing, technically that would be the juror's thought process, but it's the only was to establish prejudice. So given that this was sent back and the court has already expressed that it's a little befuddled as to how it didn't somehow satisfy all the factors to begin with, I would ask the court take a broad view of the information available. Everybody at the Supreme Court is well-versed on what information is relevant and what information isn't. The same way I can make an argument to the court and the court doesn't have to take into account. There is information included in this evidentiary hearing that the Supreme Court say, hey, this isn't what we were talking about and act accordingly.

I would hate to have this second opportunity at an
evidentiary hearing I think should have happened 2 years ago when things were fresh and still miss the mark because we don't answer the question of how -- if there was prejudice, how did it occur.

THE COURT: We're going to go ahead and proceed. I'm going allow questioning that relates to the information these jurors had, the impact it had on them, and how it may have impacted how they conducted their business.

In my order -- so to the extent that that overlaps with some deliberations, I guess the way we explain it to the State and confirm an agreement with Mr. MacArthur, that whatever happens in this hearing happens in this hearing is going be in the record. At the end of the day, I'm going to be issuing the written order, and I'm going to be making a determination on whether or not $I$ think this information is appropriate to be considered or not to be considered in what my outcome is.

In my original order I declined to consider and I struck the declaration of Jurors 7 and 11 because when you look at their declarations they say specifically, only during deliberation these things occurred. So I did not feel, based on Myer and the case law we have, that it would be appropriate to inquire in that regard.

We've now been sent back an order that says that we
need to conduct an evidentiary hearing. It does indicate that the purpose of the review of the record will be to determine whether or not I abused my discretion, which, of course, depending on the outcome of the order may or may not be a further moot point. And ultimately if it does go back up with an order indicating still a denial of the motion, that the prejudicial juror misconduct, if it occurred, did not occur. And to some degree, obviously, it will have to be up to the court to decide what is appropriate to consider, issue its order, whatever that outcome is, however it goes back up to the appellate court who has otherwise retained jurisdiction of the appeal for them to determine what needs to be determined.

I think we have to have the discussion of the whole scope so that it's in the record and not run the risk that somehow we didn't do enough, or as Mr. MacAuthur put it, miss the mark.

We'll get started. Does either counsel wish to make any -- I'm sort of viewing this as, yes, it's an evidentiary hearing, but do we conduct this like I would conduct any evidentiary hearing, which is there's a motion. There's a request for relief. There's an opposition thereto. And ultimately the parties will have an opportunity to indicate what they believe the evidence showed or didn't show as far as the outcome.

So I'll give the opportunity for counsel to make closing remarks if they wish or we can just take the testimony. The court is well-versed in what each sides arguments are, I believe. But I don't know what's going to come out in testimony. I don't know if it's going to be different in any way from the declarations and therefore counsel would like that opportunity.

MS. KOLLINS: The State doesn't need an opening, your Honor. I would remind the court that Mr. Rago retained counsel. Lance Coburn wanted to make a telephonic appearance with the court today. If we could take that first because he is in Spain. They are 9 hours ahead.

THE COURT: We can do that. Can we start with Mr. Rago. Was there any particular order, Mr. MacArthur, that you wanted to examine these witnesses.

MR. MACAUTHUR: No. Whatever is most efficient.

THE COURT: Let's bring in Mr. Rago, Elvis. Mr. Rago, come up to the witness stand. My clerk will swear you in. Then $I$ have some preliminary remarks for you.

THE WITNESS: Okay. THE COURT: Be seated. THE CLERK: Do you solemnly swear the testimony
you are about to give in this action shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God.

THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE CLERK: Be seated. State and spell your name for the record.

THE WITNESS: Francis Anthony Rago, F-r-a-n-c-i-s, $A-n-t-h-o-n-y, R-a-g-o$.

MR. MACAUTHUR: We're missing a --
THE COURT: Hang on a second. I know what we're doing.

MR. MACAUTHUR: Okay.
THE COURT: Have a seat, Mr. Rago.
The folks that are observers, they are welcomed into the courtroom now. I don't want the witnesses in the courtroom. Based on Mr. MacAuthur's discussions with Ms. McNeill he's asking for perhaps an exception to be made because she's counsel and may or may not be giving testimony today, but the observers can be present in the room.

Mr. Honea is present in the room. I just didn't bring them in. I just wanted to have the witness in the room and take care of the witness first. We're getting started with the hearing. We apologize for the delays.

Mr. Rago, I do want you to understand we're very
apologetic for the delay in the start today. I'll explain this to each of the jurors here to give testimony. There were some court impediments to having everybody present and being able to proceed. And then I have been in discussion with counsel for an extended period of time before we got started. So, thank you for your patience. We are going to get started.

Elvis, maybe you can tell the remaining witnesses out there that the hearing has now begun, and we do intend to go through until conclusion. We appreciate their patience and to stay close by.

Mr. Rago, we started with you because we were informed by counsel for the State that you had retained counsel for purposes of being here today. And that your counsel is actually not present in the jurisdiction so could not be present physically but he is possibly available by telephonic conference. Can you confirm you retained counsel for purposes of today.

THE WITNESS: Yeah. I got subpoenaed. Obviously, not knowing what it was about, I called an attorney.

THE COURT: We'll go ahead and get your attorney on the phone. Then I'll explain to your attorney what it's about. I would have thought the attorney would have been able to discern that from the record, but to the
extent he did not have an opportunity to take that look we'll explain to him what the circumstances are.

You have the phone number, Ms. Kollins.
MS. KOLLINS: I do.
THE COURT: If my clerk is right and there's a problem, he'll have to call us. Are you able to text him.

MS. KOLLINS: I just did. I said we're calling you.

THE COURT: Tell him to call in chambers and she can transfer it, if you don't mind, please.

MS. KOLLINS: Apparently Mr. Coburn and Mr. Rago had a conversation where he doesn't need his counsel to be present on the phone.

Is that correct, Mr. Rago. THE WITNESS: Right. MS. KOLLINS: That's new information to me. THE COURT: It's new information to me too. I'm sorry. I thought you needed me to have him on the phone.

THE WITNESS: No. I obviously retained counsel. I didn't know what this was about.

THE COURT: You do now what this is about. THE WITNESS: I do. THE COURT: Okay. Great. Mr. MacAuthur,
questions for Mr. Rago.
MR. MACAUTHUR: Thank you, Judge.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Good morning, Mr. Rago.
A. Hello.
Q. It's been a couple of years, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. You and I have spoke zero times in that interim; is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. I guess first I would like to ask you, do you remember the case, the events, the timeline, et cetera?
A. I mean, I don't -- the big details, yeah, but not the intricate stuff.
Q. You do recall you were a juror?
A. Correct.
Q. You do recall you deliberated with your fellow jurors and arrived at a unanimous verdict?
A. Yes.
Q. That verdict was guilty on I believe Count 39 and not guilty on all other counts?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall you and I almost always had to go to the bathroom at the same time?
A. Yes.
Q. At any rate, Mr. Rago, is it true that at some point, either during or prior to jury deliberations, that you consulted media sources on how they were covering this trial?
A. The second day of trial I believe there was an article that showed up on my Facebook stream. I clicked it. I realized I shouldn't be reading it. I closed it.

Judge Delaney, I believe even mentioned the article the next day, that's when I told someone at recess, I said, oh, I clicked on that article.
Q. Okay. Now, you recall that there were a lot of times where the attorneys would get into just about everything, right, and the jury would be ushered out? MS. KOLLINS: Objection, leading, relevance. THE COURT: Sustained. MR. MACAUTHUR: I didn't get the answer before the court ruled. I can say why that question is there. THE COURT: Sustained. MR. MACAUTHUR: Okay. Understood. BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Do you recall leaving with your other jurors many times during many days of trial?
A. Vaguely, yes.
Q. Do you recall that the Judge would read what
we call an admonishment before you left every single time?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall that in that admonishment one of the terms was do not consult outside sources, such as media. Don't conduct your own investigation. Things like that.
A. Yes.
Q. So to be fair, you did understand her when she said that?
A. I did.
Q. Now, is it, in fact, true that you also advised your other fellow jurors during deliberations that you had read this article?
A. I don't remember saying that in deliberation. I remember saying it on recess to another juror, that $I$, whoops, I clicked on that article in reference to Judge Delaney mentioning the article that day.
Q. Outside, did you recognize any of the fellow jurors?
A. Yes.
Q. I don't know of you know them by name, but you did recognize them as your fellow jurors?
A. I recognized them from that, yes.
Q. If we had been told that you presented the
article during jury deliberations, but then thought better of it before anybody read that article, does that refresh your recollection as to whether that occurred?

MS. KOLLINS: Objection, hearsay, argumentative. He can ask him what he remembers. He can't discuss what other jurors have allegedly said in phraseology. This is supposed to be a fact-finding mission here, not putting words in Mr. Rago's mouth.

MR. MACAUTHUR: Your Honor, I'm not asking him to give a hearsay response.

MS. KOLLINS: He's asking him to adopt Mr. MacAuthur's --

MR. MACAUTHUR: May I ask it during my --
THE COURT: Okay, listen, the two of you. I'm not having this during this hearing. Not one time. Don't talk to each other. Talk to the court. I'm done. We're not doing this.

I don't prefer speaking objections. I can make rulings, and $I$ can make my determinations. If I call for you to give me a speaking objection, give one. If I don't, don't. I will rule when I rule.

Ms. Kollins, I allowed you to give a speaking objection. Mr. MacAuthur, you can complete your response, if you wish.

MR. MACAUTHUR: Thank you.

It's not objectionable as to hearsay. I'm not asking him to say what anybody else said to him. I'm asking him, as a premise, if this is information we received, is that in your recollection true. That's essentially what I've asked him.

THE COURT: Ms. Kollins, anything further.
MS. KOLLINS: I believe his question was, if another juror said, which is an outside statement offered for the truth. It's in his statement. He's not asking Mr. Rago to relay hearsay, but it's based on hearsay information.

THE COURT: I'm going to sustain the objection, but I'm going to allow you to rephrase, Mr. MacAuthur. As Ms. Kollins correctly pointed out, as you are trying to do, I don't subscribe differently, this is just a fact finding objective to understand what occurred and what didn't.

This witness has testified he does not recall discussing it during jury deliberations. You may rephrase the question to understand further what it is he recalls or doesn't recall.

BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Just to be clear and removing the premise, do you recall whether you had a copy of the article with you in deliberation that you offered to show to other jurors
but then did not do so having thought better of it?
A. No.
Q. Is your, no, no I didn't do that, or, no, I don't recall?
A. No. I did not do that.
Q. So if another juror testified that you did, they would be mistaken?
A. Yes.

MS. KOLLINS: Same objection.
MR. MACAUTHUR: He said they would be mistaken.

THE COURT: I heard the answer. It's not your fault, Mr. Rago. Generally, if there is an objection, it's up to the witness -- and the court should have clarified this earlier -- to wait to answer until I rule on the objection.

The objection is sustained. You knew what the objection was, Mr. MacAuthur. Rephrase the question. The way it's phrased is not proper. We have the answer, so move on. BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Mr. Rago, do you recall Juror No. 3, Brett Aaron Jankiewicz from the trial?
A. Yes.
Q. He sat to your left, two seats over?
A. Okay. If he was 3, I was 1. I'm assuming yes.
Q. Did you also recall Katheryn Wong who sat to your left. An Asian woman?
A. Vaguely. I really don't remember.
Q. Do you recall whether you had occasion to have lunch with Mr. Jankiewicz every day in the last week of the trial?

I think it was a 3-week-long trial. I'll focus on the last week. Do you recall being lunch partners with him during that last week?
A. I recall going to lunch with everybody.
Q. Specifically, do you recall that he was a constant fixture of lunches with you on the last week?
A. It's possible, yeah.
Q. Okay. And the court had admonished you not to discuss the facts of the case with anyone before it was submitted to you for deliberation; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Didn't you, in fact, discuss facts as you heard them and reflect on the events of the day with Mr. Jankiewicz over lunch?

MS. KOLLINS: Objection, foundation.
THE COURT: Overruled. He may answer.
THE WITNESS: No, I don't remember speaking
about the case. Only in deliberations. BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Okay.

Mr. Rago, do you recall which juror or jurors you told that you had read the article?
A. I don't. We were on recess. Everybody was out there. It was just small talk. I didn't target anyone to say, hey, I red the article. I knew I shouldn't have done that. I said, oh, oops. I read -- I clicked on the link.
Q. All right. After deliberations began, when the case was given to the jury then you were allowed to discuss it in your sequestered room, did you have occasion to exchange telephone numbers with certain jurors?
A. Yeah.
Q. In fact, did you not speak with some of the jurors in the first weekend, after deliberation began?

More specific, you guys go home on Friday. You come back in on Monday, say 9:00 a.m. -- hypothetically. I don't remember what time you started. But is it, in fact true, that you had occasion to speak with one or more jurors over the weekend by cell phone?
A. I don't recall doing that.
Q. I get that you don't recall. Is it possible that you did?

MS. KOLLINS: Objection, speculation.
THE WITNESS: I don't remember calling any jurors.

THE COURT: Again, in order for the record to be more clear, when you hear counsel say objection, you must not speak until I rule on the objection and direct you to answer.

I'm going the ask, just briefly, can I ask the witness, can you step down and go follow the marshal and he'll take you to the anti-room. I want to have a conversation with counsel. You're right there. I don't know that I can do it at the bench without you overhearing it.

Two concerns I have, Mr. MacAuthur, about this line of questioning and then a prior line of questioning.

I didn't say anything before because I was doubting myself as far as my recollection. I didn't remember, in reviewing everything coming in for today's hearing, anybody indicating that he actually had a physical copy of the article in the jury room. I had a recollection of one or more jurors declarations indicating he referenced it, but not that he had the copy. So I didn't have too much grief over that. And he indicated this did not occur anyway.

But now you're asking about something I don't
remember coming up in the motion at all, which is cell phone exchanges and communications over the weekend. I have zero information in the motion related to that. I could not have conducted an evidentiary hearing on that. So how are we not going into a territory that is completely inappropriate for this hearing and likely, potentially, leading to more difficulties in the final hour.

MR. MACAUTHUR: As you've asked me two questions, I'll answer them in the order you gave.

The reference or should I say the citation -- I'm referring to Leslie McKinster's declaration. I will read entires 3 and 4. She said, that during deliberations Juror No. 1, Francis Rago, made a statement that the State did not do its job. Did not present evidence to indict, but he'd read a newspaper article with a headline about the DA getting a bomb dropped on them. This is important because it indicates that this is during deliberations.

Additionally --
THE COURT: The point isn't that it was not discussed in deliberation based on these jurors' statements, he indicates he did not do that. My point was you asked him, did you bring an article in, and then thinking better of showing it to people. That's very different.

MR. MACAUTHUR: Your Honor, I said there were two lines.

The second line is that Juror No. 1, also offered to show the jurors the article, but then changed his mind. And so in considering these are chronological, in 3, it's during deliberation, he said "X", including an article. Then in 4, he offered to show the article to everyone else. That suggests he had access to the article and offered to show it to other people during deliberation.

THE COURT: Again, I'm just asking you to be more precise in your words. Those things can be interpreted as either, he had the article somewhere else. You all want to see it, I'll bring it in. Or $I$ have it with me. And you asked a very specific question, either way it cuts either way. You want to get the answer. I don't know how he's hearing your question. But when you are asking a question based on facts that aren't necessarily clear, that's an issue.

Let's move forward to the other issue.
MR. MACAUTHUR: The second issue was that -- and I fail to remember which juror. If it's important, I'll find it before proceeding. But we were given the impression that the cabal of Juror No. 1 and Juror No. 3, Brett Jankiewicz, at some point, took a position we need to convict him of something. I think that might be

Monson, but I don't remember specifically.
THE COURT: It's in multiple declarations.
MR. MACAUTHUR: This is the part of the prejudice element, we need to convict him of something. The natural question would be, why, why did he say that, if you know. Did he convey to you why you needed to convict him of something.

THE COURT: Where did the information come from that there was phone numbers exchanged and communications over the weekend. I don't remember seeing that in anything that $I$ reviewed.

MR. MACAUTHUR: That is not a -- just so I'm clear. That was not a direct statement made by anyone. However, the context is that in talking to other jurors they -- more than one said that I got the feeling that when we came back things had shifted. It was almost like all of the guys knew something that we didn't.

THE COURT: I saw that in the declaration. So I'm trying to find out if the reason for that is he had contact with other jurors over the weekend.

THE COURT: What is your basis for asking the question very specifically that they exchanged phone numbers, and they talked to each other during the weekend.

MR. MACAUTHUR: Other jurors told me that during
the course of the three --
THE COURT: Hold on, Ms. Kollins. Let him finish with the record.

MR. MACAUTHUR: Other jurors told me that over the course of the 3 -week trial that many of them exchanged phone numbers, and they were speaking socially on a regular basis because they had shared the same experience.

One of those same jurors said that when we came back after the weekend, it felt like things had shifted and all of the guys seemed to be on the same side. I don't know if they talked to each other over the weekend. Well, that makes me wants to ask, hey, did you talk to other jurors over the weekend. That's the reason I asked that question. No one specifically said that it occurred, but I was given the penumbra of this is how it may have occurred by another juror.

THE COURT: Ms. Kollins.
MS. KOLLINS: I just think the vagueness of some jurors said that they exchanged phone numbers and we don't have that in any motion and so now we're just going to use it to get on a train that this juror did something wrong. It's no where in any of these documents. It's beyond the scope of what the Nevada Supreme Court already reviewed.

MR. MACAUTHUR: Ms. Savko's declaration, entry
number 2, during juror deliberation Jurors 1, Francis Rago, and 3, Brett Aaron Jankiewicz made comments about the Defendant needed to be convicted of something. That's where I drew that from.

MS. KOLLINS: Well --
THE COURT: Go ahead.
MS. KOLLINS: So those are statements that were either made by one or both in agreement during deliberation. That's part of the deliberation process. I don't know how you extrapolate a weekend phone call from that information. I understand what Mr. MacAuthur wants to thinks it says, but $I$ don't think it says that.

MR. MACAUTHUR: I found another entry. Sorry.
THE COURT: Is it the same entry I already acknowledged $I$ know was in there about comments being that they said they needed to convict someone, or is it something more specific.

MR. MACAUTHUR: No. From Ms. McNeill's declaration, line 15. I learned from speaking to jurors that Juror No. 5, Steven Hankins, came back to deliberate after the weekend and it seemed as if something had happened because he suddenly had a change of mind. Mr. Hankins is refusing to speak to counsel. Putting that together with the other line I put, that he needed to be convicted of something, $I$ think this is a fair question.

He said that he doesn't remember.
THE COURT: Mr. MacAuthur, I don't have a problem with you asking questions of this witness of things he did or did not do as he may testify about talking to jurors in deliberations outside of deliberations otherwise, but I cannot and will not allow you to pose a question to a juror that is based on facts that are not in this case in this motion.

You are supposing things.
MR. MACAUTHUR: It is in the motion.
THE COURT: It's not in the motion. There is zero in the motion that says anything about people exchanging telephone numbers, talking to each other over the weekend during deliberations, zero. There is speculation from these jurors about what they thought was different. So I don'ts have a problem with you asking questions about did you have discussions with them, any other ways in which he might have introduced this evidence that is indicated that he did, but I cannot -- this hearing is an evidentiary hearing based on the motion and the opposition and what we had to understand from those and ultimately the testimony that will flesh that out. If I open the door now to you going into a bunch of presupposed facts that don't exist in this record and it goes down a line of questioning, it is going to make this
far more muddy then it already is. I'm not allowing it. No.

You may ask more questioning of him on what he did or didn't do. Stop premising your questions with, if all of these things happened, then did this happen. Just ask the man the questions. You are bringing in facts that are not in evidence.

MR. MACAUTHUR: All right. I will accept the court's ruling. I disagree. But you're the one in charge, so I'll ask it the way you want it asked.

THE COURT: Let's see how it goes. Bring Mr. Rago back to the stand, please.

Thank you, Mr. Rago, for stepping out for a moment. I'm going to put you on the stand. I've had a discussion with counsel about the further questioning. As soon as you retake the stand, you may take your seat.

Can I just ask you to acknowledge, for the record, that even though we had a brief break and were not with us, you understand you're still under oath.

THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Mr. MacAuthur, you may resume when you are ready. BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Mr. Rago, I think the last question I asked you is did you have occasion to speak with one or more
jurors over the weekend. You said you did not remember.
A. No.
Q. Specifically do you remember Juror No. 5, Steven Hankins -- I believe he's the black male on the jury?
A. Vaguely.
Q. Do you recall whether you had his cell phone number in particular?
A. I did not.

MS. KOLLINS: I'm sorry, for the record -MR. MACAUTHUR: He did not.

MS. KOLLINS: He did not have it or didn't remember.

MR. MACAUTHUR: He said he did not have it.
MS. KOLLINS: Okay.
BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Mr. Rago, with regard to the media source that you consulted, how many did you consult?
A. That article showed up on my Facebook stream. I didn't seek that article out. I'm not consulting media. I knew it was wrong when I did it. I shut it down. I didn't do anything further.
Q. Is that the only article you consulted?
A. Yes.
Q. You said that you told other jurors about it,
but your recollection is that that happened during trial like in the hallway?
A. Yes.
Q. Not during deliberation?
A. Correct.

MR. MACAUTHUR: Court's indulgence.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. MACAUTHUR: No further questions.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Ms. Kollins, any questions for Mr. Rago.
MS. KOLLINS: I do. May I approach your clerk.

THE COURT: Of course.
MS. KOLLINS: May I approach Mr. Rago. THE COURT: You may.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MS. KOLLINS:
Q. How are you?
A. Good.
Q. I'm showing you what's been marked for purposes of verification for this hearing, state's Proposed Exhibit 1. We've had discussions about an article that -- I guess Mr. MacAuthur's words were consulted, but your words it just kind of popped up on your Facebook feed, right?
A. Correct.
Q. Does what's depicted in State's 1, does that appear to be the article?
A. I remember the title was drops a bombshell on State's case or something like that.
Q. Did you read the whole contents of the article?
A. No, I clicked on it, you know, the title. I just clicked on it. As it popped up, I shut it down.
Q. As it popped up it has a photograph of the Defendant that was in trial?
A. I don't remember that being the photograph.
Q. Did you read the entire contents of the article?
A. I don't remember reading the contents, no.
Q. When -- I would move for admission of Exhibit 1, please.

THE COURT: Any objection. MR. MACAUTHUR: No, Judge. THE COURT: State's Proposed Exhibit 1 will be admitted. I will note, for the record, that it was included in the motion that's at issue for this hearing as an attachment. I believe Exhibit $B$ to the declaration of Mr. MacAuthur. So it's also in the record.

MS. KOLLINS: I'm trying to consolidate
everything.
THE COURT: It's an evidentiary hearing, and I'd much rather have the evidence coming in independently, so to speak, for this hearing. If we have other ways to do that, that's fine. I just wanted to note that it is also in the record. BY MS. KOLLINS:
Q. Mr. Rago, as this article came out about the second day of trial; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. When Mr. MacAuthur asked you, did you share that article with the jurors in the hallway, what was the nature of the conversation you had about that article?
A. Judge Delaney had mentioned the article, I believe that day in trial on recess. I was like, whoops, I clicked that article. I just mentioned it just like that. That was it.
Q. Did you discuss the contents of the article? Did you discuss any of the quotes of the defense attorney that were contained in the article?
A. I don't remember doing that.
Q. Did you keep that or hit it as a favorite in your Facebook feed and then do anything with it during deliberations?
A. No.
Q. Did you open it during deliberations?
A. No.
Q. Did you offer to share it with anyone during deliberations?
A. No.
Q. We have some statements that are inputted to you and I want to ask you about those. Okay?
A. Okay.
Q. During deliberations did you make comments to the effect that the Defendant had to go down for something?
A. No. I don't remember saying those words.
Q. Did you make comments to the effect that myself, Ms. Kollins and Ms. Rhoades failed to do our jobs so it was incumbent upon you and your fellow jurors to do our jobs for us?
A. No.

MS. KOLLINS: One second, Mr. Rago.
BY MS. KOLLINS:
Q. At any point, at any point, either the day that article came out, the day that article came out through the course of the 3 weeks we were here or during the 3 or 4 days of deliberation process, did you offer to share that article with anyone?
A. No.

MS. KOLLINS: I have nothing else.
THE COURT: Mr. MacAuthur, anything further.
MR. MACAUTHUR: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Rago, I really do appreciate your time again. I'm sorry that maybe communications could have been better from the court's perspective as to what the purpose was for bring you all back here today. Our appellate court did indicate we should have had evidentiary hearing related to some concerns that were expressed in a motion that was made to the court. And so that's what we're trying to do. Thank you again for your time today.

THE WITNESS: Okay.
THE COURT: If you'll make sure you don't discuss it with anyone still outside, because they still have to be called as a witness.

THE WITNESS: Okay.
THE COURT: You are excused at this time. Thank you.

Who is next.
MR. MACAUTHUR: Brett Aaron Jankiewicz.
THE COURT: Mr. Jankiewicz, come forward and raise your right hand.

THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give in this action shall be the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God.

THE WITNESS: I do.
THE CLERK: Be seated. State and spell your name for the record.

THE WITNESS: Brett Aaron Jankiewicz, Brett Aaron Jankiewicz.

THE COURT: Do you have an understanding of why you were subpoenaed to come here today.

THE WITNESS: No.
THE COURT: So, in hindsight, perhaps the court could have helped folks understand subsequent to the trial in this case there was a motion made that was brought to the court's attention. The court made a rulings on that motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing related to that motion, and as the matter has been up on appeal in this case, the Supreme Court indicated that it would have needed us to have conducted an evidentiary hearing that we did not conduct. It relates to some concerns with regard to jury conduct. So we are now conducting that hearing.

So it's a little unusual circumstance. We appreciate your response to the subpoena. I'll turn it over now to counsel to ask you some questions.

THE WITNESS: Okay.
THE COURT: Mr. MacAuthur, when you are ready.

MR. MACAUTHUR: Thank you, Judge.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Good morning, Mr. Jankiewicz.
A. Good morning.
Q. Do you remember this case?
A. Briefly.
Q. You were a juror in the trial of Joshua Honea?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When you deliberated the jury returned a verdict of guilty on Count 39 and not guilty on all others. Do you recall that?
A. I don't remember which count it was, but I do remember coming to the conclusion of it, yes.
Q. Understood. All right. Did you recognize any of your fellow jurors outside?
A. Yeah.
Q. In particular, did you recognize Juror 1, Mr. Rago -- Tony Rago?
A. Yeah.
Q. Thinking back to the trial, two Decembers back, do you recall whether you were lunch partners with Mr. Rago consistently during the last week?
A. I don't recall that.
Q. Do you recall whether or not you exchanged cell phone numbers with Mr. Rago?
A. Yes, we did.
Q. Do you recall whether or not you spoke with Mr. Rago -- just to not be confusing. At some point the case was given to you to deliberate, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Remember there being a weekend after you started deliberating, a weekend in between when you started and when you rendered a verdict?
A. Can you rephrase that.
Q. Okay. So at some point the Judge read jury instructions. We argued in front of you. And then you guys were allowed to finally deliberate about the case, right?
A. Yeah.
Q. Do you recall that that deliberation was interrupted by a weekend?
A. I don't remember that, no.
Q. Given that you don't remember it, I'm not sure if my next question will make any sense to you, but do you recall having spoken with Mr. Rago over that weekend?
A. I do not.
Q. You don't recall or --
A. I don't recall, no.
Q. Is it possible you may have?

MS. KOLLINS: Objection, speculation.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. MACAUTHUR: Understood.
THE COURT: Perhaps the focus of the question could be outside the deliberations without being tied to that time frame, just to be clear.

MR. MACAUTHUR: Understood.
BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Do you recall discussing the facts and events of the case with Mr. Rago outside of deliberations in the special deliberation room?
A. I don't recall that.
Q. Do you recall Juror No. 5, Steven Hankins, I think he would have been the only black male juror?
A. Yeah. Yeah. I no what you're talking about.
Q. Did you have his cell phone number?
A. I did not.
Q. Mr. Jankiewicz, were you aware at any point of Juror No. 1, Tony Rago, having consulted a newspaper article about the case titled something like Teen Drops a Bomb on State's case?
A. I remember hearing something about it, but I didn't know who it was tied to.
Q. Do you remember how you heard about it?
A. Waiting out there to be called in, someone said something about it.
Q. So this -- would this have been before or during deliberation?
A. I don't remember that. I don't remember.
Q. But you feel like it was in the hallway?
A. Yeah. Yes.
Q. Mr. Jankiewicz, you, in fact, have a sister named Taylor Ann Jankiewicz; is that correct?
A. Taylor what?
Q. I might have the middle name wrong. Sorry, Taylor Page. I apologize.
A. Yes, I do have a sister named that.
Q. Younger sister? Older sister?
A. She's younger.
Q. I don't intend to do an inappropriate deep dive. Has Taylor had some substance abuse issues in the past?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you maintain a close relationship with your sister?
A. No.
Q. Thinking back -- I'm not asking you about now. I'm referencing the time frame of approximately when the
trial occurred, fair?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know whether Taylor was -- well, was she struggling with a substance abuse issue at that time?

MS. KOLLINS: Objection.
MR. MACAUTHUR: Basis.
MS. KoLLINS: Relevance.
THE COURT: Can I ask you, Mr. Jankiewicz, I apologize for the inconvenience. It's easier to have a conversation with counsel with them standing there and you being there. Would you mind stepping down and following the marshal and stepping outside the courtroom for a second. You'll go into an anti-room, and we'll bring you back in.

The objection is overruled because I do recognize that in the communications about Taylor and how she may have known Morgan it was referenced that they met on the streets. I understand that to be the genesis of this questioning, so I belive there is foundation for the question in the circumstances. I understand Ms. Kollins' concern about relevancy to it, but, again, $I$ know this seems like we're having a battle, Mr. MacAuthur. I don't feel we need to be having a battle. I think you can just go and ask these questions, but you're so intent on
setting up foundation for the questions that $I$ think you're sometimes either shortening the scope of the question unnecessarily, or you're creating some confusion to the question. I don't have a problem. I'm going to overrule. You can ask this and you can lead to where you need to go, but I don't know there is going to be any objection if you just get to the heart of the matter either.

MR. MACAUTHUR: I'll try to do that, Judge. THE COURT: Ms. Kollins, anything further for the record.

MS. KOLLINS: If we may just have some foundation for that time frame as well.

THE COURT: Again, I know you're not asking for the answer, but I'll answer initially. The discussion was that the profile -- I'm trying to -- this is out of Ms. McNeill's declaration. It's an indication of a Facebook page, common pictures. Then there was a reference a little bit later that indicated they had met on the streets, but now I'm trying to find where that indication exists. That was the -- met on the street corner. And there was some indication that --

MS. KOLLINS: Maybe I wasn't clear. I apologize. I understand where he's going with it, but some foundation about her drug issues.

THE COURT: That's what I thought I was answering. Because we knew where Morgan had come from at the time we did the warrant to bring her in for the testimony and she was living on the streets and there was a reference to them meeting on the street corner, maybe I extrapolated that into that discussion.

Go ahead and make your proffer. I'm also going to ask you to make a proffer, Mr. MacAuthur, of what subsequent questions in this line you're going to ask to get to where we need to go.

MR. MACAUTHUR: I don't expect that -- well, maybe I shouldn't expect --

THE COURT: Proffer on the drug use. Just because they met on the street corner.

MR. MACAUTHUR: No. Morgan Savage advised us that the way she'd come to know Taylor Jankiewicz was that Taylor Ann Jankiewicz apparently got into the passenger side seat of Morgan Savage's father's car. The State will recall that she was living, sort of, in the car, which was inside an alleyway between a couple of apartment places and both parties had tried to find her there, unsuccessfully, before she went into custody on the material witness warrant.

At any rate, Morgan -- and, by the way, I want the record to reflect that Ms. McNeill and I don't remember
this the same way. But my recollection was that the two made a friendship based on that contact and that Morgan did not specifically recall all the details that she gave to Taylor Ann Jankiewicz about the case, but she did recall talking to her about it.

Given that part of the State's objection has been there is no inappropriate relationship when people just know each other on Facebook, we have been countering by saying, no, it's not just $I$ knew this person on Facebook. That they were friends in the real world. And the way that they met is that they both apparently have a heroin problem and so in order to give that legitimacy I wanted to provide foundation through Mr. Jankiewicz himself that, yes, that's my sister. Yes, she has a drug problem. And my next question will be do you know if in the summer of 2017 she was homeless in the area of East Charleston and Torrey Pines. I don't know if he's going to say he knows that or not.

THE COURT: Let me -- Ms. Kollins, don't lose your thought.

I found a paragraph in Mr. MacAuthur's declaration not Ms. McNeill's declaration, which also talks about the Facebook page. In paragraph 12, it says, that in-person contact with Morgan Savage on December 22 nd, 2017 revealed that she had become friends with Taylor Jankiewicz after
meeting her on the street near Charleston Boulevard and Torrey Pines some months prior to trial. Further, that Savage has started a new Facebook page upon her release from custody on the material witness warrant and was aware that Taylor was an acknowledged friend on that new page. That's the sum total of the information that $I$ saw in the declaration about that.

Go ahead, Ms. Kollins.
MS. KOLLINS: That's fine. I'll withdraw it. THE COURT: Are you sure you don't want to make a record.

MS. KOLLINS: All of Morgan Savage's information is hearsay for purposes of this hearing, so we're kind of polluting the Supreme Court with this record. What is important is what did that -- what influence did that have on this juror and how did that prejudice Mr. Honea. So I just wanted to wrap that long conversation up with that.

THE COURT: I agree with your assessment, that's why I asked Mr. MacAuthur to make the proffer. I think if this witness knows, even what he knows, would eventually reveal the hearsay based on how he knows it or doesn't know it.

Again, the line of questioning you indicated you wanted to ask to get to the heart of the question $I$ don't have a problem with it, but let's just pick it up and get
there. The objection is overruled. Again, let's just get to the heart of the information.

Elvis, we're ready for Mr. Jankiewicz. Come back up and take the stand. I appreciate your patience while I discussed matters with counsel.

I'll ask you to have a seat. Can you acknowledge for the record you understand even though we had a short recess with you outside the courtroom, you are still under oath.

THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Mr. MacAuthur, the objection posed before we excused Mr. Jankiewicz is overruled. You may have the witness answer or reask the question. BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Just to restart. Is it true that your sister, Taylor, had a problem with heroin in the year of 2017?
A. I was not aware of that, no.
Q. Do you know where your sister was living the year of 2017?
A. I do not.
Q. Do you know if she may have been transient in the area of East Charleston and Torrey Pines in the summer of 2017?
A. I have no idea.

MS. KOLLINS: Objection, speculation.
MR. MACAUTHUR: Only if he knows.
THE COURT: Overruled.
I'm going to start doing this with each witness out of the gate. If one of the counsel would object to the question -- you may not remember during trial, but we'd ask the witness wait until the court rules on the objection.

I'm overruling the objection. I don't think the question is speculation. I think you answered, no. Maybe we need to clarify for the record.

MR. MACAUTHUR: He said, no. He didn't know.
Is that correct, you didn't know if she was living in that vicinity at that time.

THE WITNESS: I haven't even been in contact with my sister for over 5 years. BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Do you know if your sister maintains contact with your parents?
A. I have no idea.

MR. MACAUTHUR: No further questions for Mr. Jankiewicz.

THE COURT: Thank you.
Ms. Kollins.
MS. KOLLINS: Couple of brief questions.

## CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MS. KOLLINS:
Q. Thank you. Sorry about the inconvenience. No contact with your sister for 5 years?
A. None.
Q. So do you have any awareness of her social circles or any of her friends?
A. No.
Q. Do you have any specific knowledge that she may have been a Facebook friend of the victim in this case?
A. No. I'm not even Facebook friends with her. MS. KOLLINS: Nothing further, your Honor. THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. MacAuthur. MR. MACAUTHUR: No, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Jankiewicz, thank you for your time. You are excused now. You don't have to stay, but as you're on your way out make sure you don't speak with any of the other witnesses.

THE WITNESS: Do I go to someone for the parking validation.

MS. KOLLINS: If you go to the third floor, victim witness, they'll be able to validate your parking.

THE COURT: When you come off those elevators on
the third floor, take a right, and it's right there on the right hand side.

MS. KOLLINS: Around in a horseshoe, where the jury service is.

THE COURT: Thank you so much again for your time.

Which is next.
MR. MACAUTHUR: Juror 4, Sharon Monson.
THE COURT: Elvis, Juror Sharon Monson. Come forward and be sworn.

THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give in this action shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God.

THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE CLERK: Please state and spell your name for the record.

THE WITNESS: Sharon Monson, $S-h-a-r-o-n$, $M-o-n-s-o-n$.

THE COURT: Have a seat. Thank you. Do you understand why you were subpoenaed to come here today.

THE WITNESS: Kind of sort of.
THE COURT: What's your understanding.
THE WITNESS: I'm thinking it was because I know when you sit on a jury you are not supposed to discuss
things outside of the courtroom, and things like that, and that was done.

THE COURT: So what's happening here today -thank you so much for responding to the subpoena. The State issued the subpoena, but, of course it's at the court's mandate that this occur because the matter of the trial is up on appeal and there is an issue that was raised related to the jurors' conduct in the case. And the appellate Court determined that for a limited purpose the case should come back to this court to have a hearing, an evidentiary hearing, on those issues. So that is why you were subpoenaed.

Counsel are going to ask you some questions. Just answer the questions to the best of your ability. Should counsel ask a question and the other counsel pose an objection, please, wait to answer until the court has ruled on that objection.

THE WITNESS: Okay.
THE COURT: Mr. MacAuthur, whenever you are ready.

MR. MACAUTHUR: Thank you, Judge.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Good afternoon, Ms. Monson.
A. Good morning. Afternoon, right.
Q. Thank you for being here. I'm sure you were surprised 2 years later to be back involved in the same case.
A. Yep.
Q. I'll try not to waste your time.

Did you recognize some of your fellow jurors from this case outside?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Do you recall being a juror that deliberated in this case?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall the jury returned a verdict of one guilty count on Count 39 and not guilty on all other counts?
A. Yes.
Q. One more thing. Do you recall having been contacted by Ms. McNeill around Christmas -- sorry. Do you recall having been contacted by me around Christmas time of 2017?
A. I do.
Q. Do you recall me asking for facts and things that happened in the -- related to jury deliberation and the verdict?
A. I believe so, yeah.
Q. Do you recall -- your very first statement as
to why you thought you might be here, because there was an admonishment that no discussion should happen outside of deliberation, but that it had happened.

Would you mind sharing the details of that with us, please.
A. Um, you know, when we were sitting in the hallways waiting for court to start, there were a couple of the jurors discussing, you know, we read something in the newspaper. I just overheard that. It was never directed toward me. Just discussing that, that they read an article in the paper about the case.
Q. To the best of your recollection, do you remember what juror that may have been?
A. I don't know the names. It was the first guy that was brought in today.
Q. So the very first person who came in, yay tall, gray hair?
A. Glasses, yeah.
Q. Okay. Were there any other discussions that you were aware of?
A. No. That's all I recall. I was just waiting in the hallways.
Q. Ms. Monson, do you recall who -- I think you've identified the person we're calling as Juror No. 1, Tony Rago?
A. Okay.
Q. Do you recall who it was that Mr. Rago may have been talking to?
A. The second guy that just left -- before -- the second gentleman.
Q. He walked out. Shorter than Mr. Rago. Younger, a five-o'clock shadow?
A. Yes.
Q. We're calling him Juror No. 3, or Mr. Jankiewicz?
A. Okay.
Q. Do you recall whether Mr. Rago and Mr. Jankiewicz were frequently social or in each other's company a lot?
A. Yeah.
Q. How were you able to observe that?
A. Well, again, you see the people in the hallways talking. A few of us would gather for lunch. I've had lunch with them as well. There would be 5 or 6 of us, we'd go for lunch together. Those two gentlemen were included and a few others. But nothing was ever discussed at the lunch things. They were strictly more just a social thing.
Q. If you could -- I realize it's been 2 years. How often do you think you saw Mr. Rago and Mr. Jankiewicz
go to lunch together?
A. Okay. Pretty often. I'm -- I can't say a hundred percent, but I'm pretty sure it was probably daily.
Q. Okay. Now, do you recall whether during jury deliberation Mr . Rago -- court's indulgence.

Do you recall whether Mr. Rago presented the article? I'm not -- do you remember -- do you recall whether or not he presented an article for anyone in jury deliberation?
A. He discussed it, and he tried to literally present it, I believe, on his phone. But I think it was pretty much discarded, shut down.
Q. As best you can recall, what prevented him from successfully being able to share it?
A. People saying, you can't do that.
Q. Your recollection is that he attempted to share it, but somebody else shut him down?
A. Right. He was at that end of the deliberation table, I was at this end. So from what $I$ saw, I didn't see it. I didn't see him show anybody. That's all I know.
Q. You are testify to what you heard him say and what other people didn't respond?
A. Right.
Q. Understood.

Do you recall at some point whether or not either Mr. Rago or Mr. Jankiewicz said that Josh should go down for something?
A. Yes.
Q. Could you provide us some context? Like, when would that have been said in deliberations?
A. Really, like --
Q. If you know.
A. I don't know what you mean by when he might have said that. We were there for -- I don't even remember how many hours.

I think either it was probably towards the end. You know what I mean. Because it wasn't an immediate. Everybody was, you know, throwing guilty, guilty, guilty, you know. So we were discussing it, and it was more towards the end of the deliberation or second half maybe.
Q. And, if you remember, what -- I mean, did that have any meaningful effect on you, in them having said that?
A. I don't think that had any effect on me.
Q. That particular instance?
A. Right.

I don't think they influenced me in any way, if
that's what you're leading to. It was my own personal decision to --
Q. Do you remember whether it was Mr. Rago or Mr. Jankiewicz, neither, or both, that said that Josh needed to go down for something?
A. I want to say it was Mr. -- what did you call him?
Q. Jankiewicz, the second one. The shorter one?
A. I want to say it's him.
Q. As far as you can recall, did he remain committed to that position after he said that?
A. Absolutely.
Q. You say absolutely with emphasis.
A. He repeated it. It's not something he just said once and let go. You know, he repeatedly said that. So that was his strong feelings whether or not he was trying to persuade other people, you know, convince them that was the route to go. But that's why I say that because he repeated it.
Q. Did -- do you recall Mr. Jankiewicz stating what that something needed to be found guilty of was?
A. Just -- I can't say for sure. I really can't remember that.
Q. Understood.

Do you recall if he gave a reason why Josh needed to be convicted of something?
A. Because of the history of the case, of Josh with -- I can't remember her name.
Q. Morgan Savage?
A. Yeah. Sorry.

Just because of the history they had together. He just, $I$ think, thought that it was wrong and -deliberate, I guess. You know, not that -- like it was planned, you know. This whole, everything, the whole relationship and so forth, that Josh, you know, knew better and he still did it.
Q. That was Mr. Jankiewicz' feelings?
A. Yeah.

MR. MACAUTHUR: No further questions for Ms. Monson.

THE COURT: Ms. Kollins.
MS. KOLLINS: Just a couple.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MS. KOLLINS:
Q. How are you?
A. Good. Thank you.
Q. You spoke to Mr. MacAuthur, it looks like December 26 th, after the trial?
A. Shortly after the trial. I don't know the
date.
Q. I'm just taking this from an affidavit Mr. MacAuthur drafted. So that's where my questions are coming from, okay.

The newspaper article, you never read it or saw it, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Mr. Rago didn't personally show that to you or go through its contents with you?
A. No.
Q. Mr. MacAuthur indicated that you did not recall which juror had said Josh had to go down for something. So today you said it was Mr. Jankiewicz. Did more than one juror say that or -- I'm just a little confused is all.
A. The two were sitting together at the table, and I -- maybe -- I don't know. Everything was just blurry. But now -- I mean, I can picture them sitting next to each other, and I've never tried to picture it before. And Mr. Jankiewicz -- whatever -- being pretty adamant and $I$ was surprised because -- not that we discussed it during the -- what do you recall it -- the case and when it was -- when he was talking to the other guy -- I'm sorry.
Q. We're talking about Jankiewicz during
deliberation, right?
A. Right. During deliberations and in the hall, he seemed to be kind of a quiet guy, I guess, and then when he was kind of -- it was kind of like this. I think he should, something, he should be, you know, go down for something.
Q. Contextually, this is a conversation between all the jurors, right?
A. During deliberation, yes.
Q. So this isn't any one bullying their way through deliberations. This is someone who's giving an opinion.
A. That's my opinion of it, yeah.
Q. That they were giving an opinion?
A. Right.
Q. It was just part of the process of people exchanging information?
A. That's my opinion of it, yes.
Q. So it didn't -- did it have any negative influence on you, or did it seem to upset anyone?
A. It upset me. It was hard for me, only because I have a son the same age. And I wanted to make sure that everybody was doing it for the right reason and not because somebody was saying, I think, you know, we should charge him with something.
Q. Okay. I understand that the nature of the case is upsetting. I'm sure. You know, you have a son. I'm sure jurors had daughters similar to the age of Ms. Savage. So on both sides it is troubling.

But my question is, was any of the commentary or exchanges made during deliberation upsetting?

I understand the facts are upsetting.
A. Right.
Q. Did, he should go down for this, that didn't cause to make a decision, right?
A. No, it did not. It didn't cause me to make a decision. It was the hardest thing I've ever had to do in my life.
Q. Earlier you said it didn't influence you.
A. No. He did not influence me at all.
Q. You said it was your personal decision, right?
A. Yes.

MS. KOLLINS: Thank you, ma'am.
THE COURT: Mr. MacAuthur, anything further for Ms. Monson.

MR. MACAUTHUR: Yes. Court's indulgence. THE COURT: Okay.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Ms. Monson, it strikes me as a strange statement, the way you expressed it, that Mr. Jankiewicz thought that Josh should go down for something. Something being less specific then he needs to go down for this particular crime.

Just being charged with something, I think. Not to let him go with not guilty all across the board.
Q. Did it appear to you that it was important what that something was, or more or less anything is fine?

MS. KOLLINS: I'm going to object to the phraseology of the question.

THE COURT: Overruled on this one. Again, Mr. MacAuthur, the question should be directed to the witness as to what she knows not your impressions on anything with regard to the testimony.

MR. MACAUTHUR: Understood. BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Let me get us back there.

Jankiewicz said repeatedly that Josh needed to be convicted of something?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. This was surprising to you because he was a quiet fellow?
A. Right.
Q. And that suddenly he asserted himself, late in the proceedings, saying, he needed to be convicted of something?
A. Right.
Q. You testified that he should not be given a not guilty all the way down the board?
A. Right.
Q. Did he -- this is where we left off. Did he attach that something to a particular crime, or was it like anything will do?
A. I don't recall it being attached to any particular crime. More like, anything would do. That was my impression. Everybody interprets things differently.
Q. Understood.

MR. MACAUTHUR: No further questions.
THE COURT: Ms. Kollins.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MS. KOLLINS:
Q. Ma'am, your verdict was unanimous as to the one count, correct?
A. Yes.

MS. KOLLINS: Nothing further.
THE COURT: Thank you for your time of day. I just apologize for the late start.

Please, you are discharged. You don't have to stay.

Please make sure you don't discuss what occurred in here with anyone else out there.

THE WITNESS: No problem.
THE COURT: We've been going in the order in which they were jurors, so Leslie McKinister.

Come in and raise your right hand.
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give in this action shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God.

THE WITNESS: I do.
THE CLERK: State and spell your name for the record.

THE WITNESS: Leslie Makinster, L-e-s-l-i-e, M-a-k-i-n-s-t-e-r.

THE COURT: Ms. Makinster, do you have an understanding of why you were subpoenaed to come here today.

THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: What's that understanding.
THE WITNESS: I did sign -- well, I don't know what the paperwork was.

THE COURT: A declaration.
THE WITNESS: Yeah. Okay. Yes. And what it was that during deliberation and what we spoke about.

THE COURT: We just want to know if you understood why you're here today.

THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: You think it's with regard to take declaration you gave.

THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: In some respects it is. Let me just orient you with what we're doing here today.

So after you gave that declaration, there was a motion made to the court to consider some outcomes related to what was put before the court. I'm not going to go into the details. That doesn't matter. But the court made a ruling. The court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, like it is doing now, but it made a ruling on the information it had available to it at the time.

The matter of the entire case has since been appealed and the appellate Court indicated they would like us to have the evidentiary hearing that we did not have then and that is what we're doing now. So it is related to that information. Counsel are going to direct some questions to you. You just answer them, of course, to the best of your ability.

I would ask you that if counsel poses a question and the other counsel objects to the question, if you would, please, wait before you answer to let me rule on that
objection. Just like you might remember from the trial. Other then that, we'll have them asking some questions and that's it. Okay.

THE WITNESS: Okay.
THE COURT: Mr. MacAuthur.
MR. MACAUTHUR: Thank you, Judge.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Good afternoon, Ms. Makinster.
A. Good afternoon.
Q. Does it feel weird to be back after 2 years?
A. Yes. Especially here.
Q. I get it. This shouldn't take too long. Thank you for being here.

Do you recall having been a juror in the State's case against Joshua Honea two years ago?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember deliberating with your fellow jurors?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember that the jury returned a verdict of guilty on one count, count 39, and acquitted him on all the other counts?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall whether after deliberations
began, right, counsel made their arguments and then the Judge --- well, the Judge probably read instructions, we did the arguments, then the case was given to you as a group?
A. Yes.
Q. Remember whether there was a weekend in between your deliberations?
A. Yes.
Q. Thinking back, during deliberations, do you recall whether Juror No. 1, Tony Rago, presented a newspapers article to anyone?
A. During deliberation?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. You seem confident about that. How do you remember that that happened in deliberation?
A. Okay. So he was sitting right cross from me. I was like one of the last jurors to vote guilty because I didn't see all the - you know, the evidence that was given to jurors. It was going around the table, and I was one of the last ones to see the evidence. So I was just waiting until I looked through all of the paperwork to look at it. So he was sitting right across from me and we talked about -- I just said, well, what happens if we say not guilty or guilty, and he said, well, we have to do
something. We have to vote on something, because if we let him go, he's going to turn around and sue the County or whatever it is. And then he'll win a bunch of money and stuff like that. So he goes, this case is really important. And then he puts, like, this -- he typed in like an e-mail address on some news article and he goes this is proof how important this case is.

So he Googled something. And all I saw on the phone -- because when he flashed it, was like Review Journal or something like that.
Q. Okay. So Mr. Rago felt strongly that if Mr. Honea was acquitted on all counts --

MS. KOLLINS: Objection.
THE COURT: Sustained. The witness can't tell to what Mr. Rago felt or thought. Ms. Kollins stated her basis. I don't want a speaking objection, but stated her basis.

MR. MACAUTHUR: Understood.
THE COURT: Proceed.
BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Mr. Rago said in deliberation that the case was important?
A. Right.
Q. And the reason that it was important was that if Josh Honea was acquitted on all counts, he might sue
some governmental entity and get a lot of money?
A. Right.
Q. Your impression was that Mr. Rago didn't want that to happen?

MS. KOLLINS: Objection.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. MACAUTHUR: Okay.
THE COURT: I appreciate you're asking her impression, but it calls for speculation.

MR. MACAUTHUR: Understood. May I ask is that how she took it.

THE COURT: Ask your next question. The objection was sustained.

MR. MACAUTHUR: Understood. BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Do you know whether or not -- you said he offered to show the article to other jurors?
A. Right.
Q. Do you know whether any other jurors saw that article?
A. We all said, no, no, no. Don't do it. Like, you know, cause we were told not to look at articles. So we told him right away, we're, like, turn your phone off. Don't show it to us. Essentially, I was like I don't want to take part in it. Like, don't show it to anybody.

And so he set the phone away, when everybody said, you know, objected to him showing us the article. Because we knew we could get in trouble for it.
Q. Do you recall whether any jurors around that time in deliberation said that the Defendant needed to be convicted of something?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember which juror or jurors were pushing that narrative?
A. Well, it was --

MS. KOLLINS: Objection as to the characterization "pushing narrative."

MR. MACAUTHUR: Do you know which jurors -- what juror or jurors said that?

THE WITNESS: Well, $I$ was sitting right in front of Tony and -- I think it's Brett. Those are the people that -- there was Kathy in between them, and then they were right there. So it was mainly those two. Brett was like -- I don't want to say -- you know what I mean. Like, I don't know the correct words, what wording he said, but he said he's guilty. He's not going to -- he needs to be convicted of something. I think that's -- not the complete words, you know, something along those words.

BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Did he tie that something to a specific crime? I mean, did he use a particular thing?
A. I also --

MS. KOLLINS: Objection, speculation, as to the second part.

THE COURT: Overruled. Rephrase. BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Did Mr. Jankiewicz say, for example, he needs to be convicted of Count 11 because of these facts and this evidence?
A. It wasn't exactly like which count. Tony was more like you need to -- we need to convict him of the sexual assault that happened in California, because that's when he thinks that something happened, that time frame. And when we convicted him of that time frame, it was to show that we thought that something happened in that California vacation.
Q. Okay. Now, with regard to Mr. Rago and Mr. Jankiewicz, you said they were sitting across from you?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall whether they were frequently in each other's company when you were not deliberating?
A. Oh, yeah. They were having lunch together.
Q. Do you know how often they were having lunch together prior to deliberation?
A. I know the first two days they were having lunch with us and then -- I don't know, the trial was 3 weeks. Then after that they started having more lunch together.
Q. Okay. Do you recall another juror by the name of Blaire Savko?
A. Yes.
Q. Did the two of you socialize during the trial?
A. Yes.
Q. Thinking back to the deliberations, in the context of Mr. Rago and Mr. Jankiewicz saying he needed to be convicted of something, did that create a problem for you and/or Ms. Savko?

MS. KOLLINS: Objection as to Ms. Savko.
THE COURT: You'll just testify as to your own personal understanding.

THE WITNESS: Okay. Can you repeat the question. BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Did -- did the proposed verdict give you misgivings or a bad feeling?

THE COURT: That wasn't your question. Is that what you're supposing now.

MR. MACAUTHUR: What I'm trying to do is not
include Ms. Savko.
THE COURT: You can easily reask the question and not include Ms. Savko. That's not the same question. So are you changing the question or are you trying to reask the same question.

MR. MACAUTHUR: I don't remember exactly how I asked it.

THE COURT: Would it be difficult for the court reporter to read back the question that involved the names of both Ms. Makinster and Ms. Savko.

THE REPORTER: Thinking back to the deliberations, in the context of Mr. Rago and Mr. Jankiewicz saying he needed to be convicted of something, did that create a problem for you and/or Ms. Savko.

THE WITNESS: Create a problem with me?
THE COURT: Do you need the reporter to read it again?

Do you want him to reask the question.
THE WITNESS: Well, it was -- there is so much to take in when you're deliberating, and this person's life is at your hand -- in your hands. So, yes and no, I guess. I mean, I just wanted to be thorough about the evidence and everything else. So, I guess, yes. I guess the question is, yes.

BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Based on the insistence of jurors number -MS. KOLLINS: Objection, as to characterization.

THE COURT: Mr. MacAuthur, I'm going do sustain. You don't need to editorialize. Please, just ask the question. BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Based on the statements and observable conduct from Mr. Rago and Mr. Jankiewicz, did it appear to you or seem to you like they knew something you didn't?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Why did you feel that way?
A. Okay. So Brett and I were talking he said that he knew someone that was -- didn't know Morgan at all but knew someone --
Q. Brett didn't know or the person he knew?
A. He knew someone that knew Morgan. Didn't know them personally, but knew something. So I kind of -that's how I kind of interpreted why he was -- he didn't really say much during deliberation. He was just sitting back. And so every time $I$ would ask a question he was just kind of shaking his head and like looking at me like I was dumb for asking these questions. But I do feel that since he kind of knew somebody that was kind of close to --
Q. Morgan.
A. -- Morgan that he kind of knew some
information. Then I knew Tony did, because I knew that he told me in several times that he did look at the internet or paper clippings or newspaper stuff.
Q. You said internet, paper clippings -newspaper stuff. Did you get the impression that he had looked at more than one article?
A. Yes.
Q. You seem certain about that. Why did you have the implication that he consulted more than one thing?
A. I think like on the first day when we got chosen as jurors, there were articles about Mr. Honea getting arrested. So I think he said something about that article, like a junior police officer, you know, like, not -- yeah -- I don't know what they're called -- was arrested or something like that. So that came up. And then the whole article about the -- something about bomb -- drops a bomb or something about that. And he talked about it in lunch and during the deliberation.
Q. Now, when you say lunch, was it lunch during deliberations or was it lunch before you guys started deliberating?
A. Before.
Q. As best as you can tell, did he do that
outside of deliberations? Did he do that more than once?
A. I think I just remembered those two incidents.
Q. So one in a lunch before deliberation?
A. Actually two. Because of the one that says the arrest, that article arrest. Then the second one would be the bomb -- dropping the bomb, something about that. And then during deliberation that article was mentioned again. So I don't know if that's three.
Q. If I understand, you said there was an initial article about an arrest he consulted?
A. Yes.
Q. And that was discussed over lunch?
A. That was when we are walking out after we were in court.

THE COURT: Maybe the Court can clarify something here.

Are you with knowledge that there were different articles, or are you assuming there were different articles? How do you know these articles -- this article or articles weren't all one and the same.

THE WITNESS: I don't know if that is the case because when we were leaving one time he mentioned an article with me about someone getting -- the arrest, then
whatever the teenager -- I don't know what it was he said. And that was early on in the trial. So within the first week. I think it was like the second or third night.

THE COURT: What I'm trying to get at is the only time you saw some aspect of the article, did you indicate you saw what he tried to show you on the phone in deliberations.

THE WITNESS: I didn't read the article. It did show up --

THE COURT: You saw the headline.
THE WITNESS: The headline, yes.
THE COURT: Do you have any reason to know that that article wasn't the same article from earlier.

THE WITNESS: I don't know that. It could be the same article.

THE COURT: You don't know either way.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. To be clear. You don't know what he's looking at when he's talking, fair?
A. Right.
Q. But he discusses an article with you early in the trial walking out the door?
A. Right.
Q. He on a separate occasion discusses what you
thought was a second article over lunch?
A. Yes.
Q. This is also before deliberation?
A. Right.
Q. Then lastly, there's discussion of an article which appears to be a repeat during deliberation?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.

MR. MACAUTHUR: Court's indulgence.
THE COURT: Yes.
BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Ms. Makinster, thinking about the event we're discussing with Mr. Rago and/or Mr. Jankiewicz, did their conduct involving reading newspaper articles or alternatively, I know someone who knows Morgan Savage, did that put you in a position where you were pushed or manipulated into making a verdict you didn't want to make?
A. I guess, yes, it did have an influence in my verdict, because I did -- I felt they did know more than I did at that time.
Q. You felt like maybe that thing they knew was true?

MS. KOLLINS: Objection, leading.
THE COURT: Sustained.

BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. I don't mean to lead. Could you explain to the court why them consulting -- I shouldn't say them. Start over again.

Can you tell the court why Mr. Rago consulting one or more articles and why Mr. Jankiewicz saying he knew somebody who knew Morgan, why did they influence you in a way that resulted in you making a verdict you didn't want to make?
A. Well --

THE COURT: Hold on. That question is not properly phrased.

MR. MACAUTHUR: That's what she said in her previous answer.

THE COURT: That question is not properly phrased, based on the witness' testimony.

You indicated that -- I wrote it down exactly. It did have an influence in my verdict. How and what way.

THE WITNESS: I felt that they were very sure of themselves.

THE COURT: I'm not asking what you thought they thought.

THE WITNESS: Oh, okay. THE COURT: You also testified here that the
jurors deliberated. You've also testified here that you were the last one to look at the evidence and that you made a decision. When you indicate that it influenced your verdict, did it change your verdict, did it not change your verdict? What was your verdict? Was your verdict your choice? This is what we're trying to understand. Does that help you.

THE WITNESS: Yes, it does.
Okay. I was the last person to look at all the evidence. And right from the beginning they were very sure of their verdict, and so I started thinking to myself why is everybody so sure of their verdict and I'm still here, kind of, trying to process everything.

They were -- those two were guilty right away. They were very sure of themselves so $I$ kind of -- I guess I didn't have the confidence, or I didn't -- you know, like, why are they so sure, and why am I still kind of doubting.

THE COURT: Fair enough. At some points a verdict was reached.

THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Was that your verdict.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Mr. MacAuthur, you still have a question. I'm sure Ms. Kollins will have questions.

BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. The misgivings you just described, do you have personal knowledge as to whether any other juror also shared those misgivings with you?

MS. KOLLINS: Objection, relevance.
THE COURT: Overruled on that basis. However, editorializing, again, the witness' testimony.

If you want to ask her what -- how many were one way, how many were another. Did they change -- you can't get into other people's heads, but you can ask her factual questions about what occurred.

MR. MACAUTHUR: Understood. BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. The misgivings you just described, did anyone else say they had those same misgivings. Did anybody say that to you?
A. Yes.

MS. KOLLINS: Hearsay, your Honor.
MR. MACAUTHUR: I'm just asking who, not what was said.

THE COURT: This will just be the way we'll do this hearing. I'm going to ask you briefly if you don't mind, Ms. Makinster, to step out of the courtroom so I can have a discussion with counsel without you present.

The marshal will show you a room you can wait in.

THE WITNESS: Okay.
THE COURT: Technically asking her did somebody say something to you would be hearsay. I think there's other ways to get to this.

If you want to have impressions of what the verdict was and perhaps from her impression influence of others, I don't have a problem. My concern, Mr. MacAuthur, and I keep suggesting it and I don't know how to otherwise say it, you're editorializing. She did not use the word that she had misgivings. It's how you're interpreting her testimony. You cannot editorialize because you interpret something a certain way and then repeat it back as if it's something she said. It's not appropriate questions.

MR. MACAUTHUR: All right.
THE COURT: Ms. Kollins, I know you posed the objection as hearsay. I'm going to sustain that basis, but I think he can rephrase.

There is also information in the record that the court considered then and has in front of it now that I believe came from -- I don't know if it came from Ms. Makinster. I think it came from Ms. Monson. The jurors were originally 7 to 5, then eventually, obviously, got to a verdict.

I don't have a problem generally with an understanding if she thought from her perspective she
observed others feeling the way she felt, or -- I understand you're going to ask questions about whether this verdict was hers or not. I just want to get to the heart of it, without editorializing and putting words in people's mouths. That's -- we're very close to that line.

Anything else, Ms. Kollins. MS. KOLLINS: No, thank you. THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. MacAuthur. MR. MACAUTHUR: No, your Honor. THE COURT: May we have the juror/witness back, please.

Thank you, Ms. Makinster. I appreciate that so much. Come up and retake your seat. We just had a brief break with you. Can you state for the record you understand you're still under oath.

THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Mr. MacAuthur, any additional questions. By MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Ms. Makinster, based on the articles and the reference of $I$ know someone who knows Morgan Savage, did you have misgivings about your verdict?
A. Can you -- I'm sorry. Can you define what misgivings is.
Q. Sure. Maybe I shouldn't use my word. How would you describe how you felt about those influences?
A. I guess like what I said before. I just felt like I wasn't so sure about my verdict or guilty or not guilty, so -- are you saying did other people influence me?
Q. Well, I think I have asked that. Correct me if I'm wrong.

You said that Mr. Rago, Juror No. 1 and Mr. Jankiewicz, Juror No. 3, seemed so certain?
A. Yes, they were.
Q. You felt like they knew something you didn't know?
A. Yes.
Q. You said that it had some kind of influence on you, but I don't want to choose the word for you.
A. Right.
Q. How would you describe the influence that it had?
A. I just felt like they -- well, Tony, having looked at articles -- well, article, I just know one -- it seems like he knew something more than I did. And Brett was so sure of everything that he walked in there and, you know, guilty right away. So I don't -- I'm sorry. I'm not articulating what I'm trying to say.
Q. Did it seem like it was easier for them to render a verdict because they knew something you didn't know?
A. Yes.

MS. KOLLINS: Objection, speculation.
MR. MACAUTHUR: Did it seem, that's her impression.

THE WITNESS: Sorry.
THE COURT: Sustained. You are asking her to say what she thinks they thought. Just want to know what her impressions are.

I know that seems like a fine line to walk, but there is a distinction. And they've already testified. So really it's her impressions that we need. BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Did it bother you that it felt like they knew something you didn't know?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know if it bothered anyone else on the jury that it seemed like they knew something you didn't know?
A. I don't think so.
Q. Not to your knowledge. Got it. Did thinking they knew something you didn't know make you feel like you needed to vote guilty?
A. Um, no. No, in a sense that -- repeat the question again. I'm sorry. I'm just so nervous. I don't think I'm listening properly.

THE COURT: Ms. Makinster, I don't know how to say this in any other way then to just say it. You're not on trial here. We're just trying to understand what happened to the best of recollection two years ago. We just need the information. There are no right or wrong answers. Just your honest answers.

The court reporter can read that back.
THE REPORTER: Did thinking they knew something you didn't know make you feel like you needed to vote guilty?

THE WITNESS: Okay, yes. I'm sorry. This is asked before too. Yes, I do. I do think that they did know something more than $I$ did, more than what the evidence was given to us.
Q. Did that make you feel like you needed to vote guilty as well?
A. I voted guilty because I actually thought -you know, I looked at the evidence, and what I was -- what I got from the evidence, I really wasn't so sure at first but when everybody was telling me what they thought, I kind of went along with it -- the guilty verdict. Does that make sense.
Q. It does.
A. Okay.
Q. And everybody telling you would include Mr. Rago and Mr. Jankiewicz?
A. Yes.
Q. You said they were the first two guilties right out of the gate?
A. Even Tony said there is nothing -- like he threw his hands up. It's just a guilty verdict, or something like that. Like it's just -- he's just guilty. Something like that.
Q. Understood.

MR. MACAUTHUR: No further questions.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Ms. Kollins.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MS. KOLLINS:
Q. Ms. Makinster, when is the last time before today you spoke with Mr. MacAuthur?
A. Last night.
Q. Did you discuss what you would be testifying to today?
A. No. He just told me --
Q. Please. You don't have any privilege with him. He's not your lawyer.
A. He just told me that I'll be testifying today. I'm not in trouble. I'm not in trial. That kind of stuff. Then he said, do you remember the declaration that you signed two years ago. Then I said, yes. He goes that's what it is about, about the Supreme Court appeal. That's about it.
Q. Did you talk about Mr. Rago and Mr. Jankiewicz?
A. No.
Q. There was more than Mr. Rago and Mr. Jankiewicz at the beginning of deliberations that were voting guilty; is that right?
A. I'm sure. That's all I know. Because they were sitting across from me, yeah.
Q. Somebody else said 7 for guilt 5 for not guilty at the beginning. Does that --
A. Yes, towards the end of that night. Yes.
Q. You never read those articles?
A. The article -- no.
Q. Do you remember specifically Judge Delaney on day 2 or 3 of jury selection talking about that specific article and saying don't read it. It came out today or came out yesterday, don't read it?
A. I don't remember that.
Q. But you never read the contents of that
article?
A. No.
Q. So you ultimately went through your own deliberation process; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you reviewed all the evidence. You said you were the last one to go through all the paperwork?
A. Yes.
Q. Including the photographs and everything?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Yes?
A. Yes.
Q. And ultimately you, as group of jurors, concluded Count 39 was appropriate based on the California trip; is that right?
A. Yes.

MS. KOLLINS: All right. No more questions. THE COURT: Mr. MacAuthur, anything further from Ms. Makinster.

MR. MACAUTHUR: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: Ms. Makinster, thank you for your time today. We appreciate this is not an easy thing to do. We appreciate your time, and we apologize for getting started later. We didn't anticipate it. Just some things wee had to work out before we got started.

THE WITNESS: Thank you.
THE COURT: You are excused. You don't need to stay. As you leave, there are still some folks to testify, make sure you don't discuss this with them now.

THE WITNESS: Thank you.
THE COURT: We are ready for Blaire Savko.
MR. MACAUTHUR: We are.
THE COURT: Elvis, Blaire Savko.
Take a seat. My clerk will swear you in.
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give in this action shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth so help you God.

THE WITNESS: I do.
THE CLERK: State and spell your name for the record.

THE WITNESS: Blaire Savko, B-l-a-i-r, $s-a-v-k-o$.

THE COURT: Before we begin, you have an understanding of why you're with us today.

THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Were did you get that understanding.

THE WITNESS: We talked afterwards.
THE COURT: Have you talked more recently to
someone.
THE WITNESS: From before, yes.
THE COURT: So that's what this is about. Let me put it into some sort of orientation for you.

So subsequent to the results of the trial there was a motion brought before the court that $I$ had to consider that related in some respects to jurors' conduct. I made a ruling on that. The case, as a whole, has been appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court, in looking over the record, indicated that the court -- felt that this court should have rather then rule based on what was presented alone in the paperwork should have had an evidentiary hearing. They sent it back for us to do that. That's what were're doing. That's why it's a couple of years later. Sorry for the fact it's a couple of years later.

We appreciate you responded to the subpoena and are here with us today. Counsel are going to ask you some questions. If one of the counsel should ask a question that the other counsel should object to, if you'll just wait to answer until $I$ rule on the objection for the record -- you might remember that from the trial.

And there are no right or wrong answers here. There's nothing to be nervous about. It's strictly for us to have a little better understanding of, you know,
information that was presented to us previously.
THE WITNESS: I apologize if I cough. I'm getting over being sick.

THE COURT: There's water there if you need it.
Mr. MacAuthur, when you're ready.
MR. MACAUTHUR: Thank you, Judge.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Good afternoon, Ms. Savko. Thank you for being here all day.
A. No problem.
Q. I'm sure you remember we frequently started late back in the day too?
A. Yeah.
Q. Texas, right?
A. Texas, yes.
Q. Do you remember this case?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember being a juror on it?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember that after deliberating with your fellow jurors you returned a verdict of guilty on Count 39 and not guilty on everything else?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall after you were instructed and
after you heard argument from both counsel when you started deliberating?
A. What?
Q. Do you recall when you started deliberating?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall if there was a weekend interruption?
A. Yes.
Q. Between the deliberation and when you
resumed?
A. Yes.
Q. First things first. Do you remember Juror No. 1, Tony Rago?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember if he had occasion during jury deliberations to present some newspaper article?
A. It wasn't the actual article. He offered to show us on his phone.
Q. Okay. Do you remember where you were when he did that?
A. In the room when we were in there.
Q. Are you aware of him showing that to you or anybody else before that moment?
A. No. I told him I didn't want to see anything.
Q. Do you know if anybody else consulted the article after you said no to it?
A. No, I don't know if anyone else did.
Q. Did you recall Juror No. 3, Brett Aaron Jankiewicz?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you see Mr. Rago and Mr. Jankiewicz together?
A. Yes.
Q. How often?
A. They would have lunch together a few times during the week. Maybe more then that. I don't know. I never ventured past across the street.
Q. Understood. If you can recall, if you can't that's okay.

When they had lunch together did you see them in a larger group of jurors or was it just the two of them?
A. Just them.
Q. Just those two?
A. Yes.
Q. Was that usually the case?
A. I have seen they went to lunch a few other people in the beginning but towards the end it was just them two.
Q. Understood.

Do you recall whether at any point it appeared to you that Juror Rago, No. 1, or Juror Jankiewicz, No. 3, knew something you didn't know?

MS. KOLLINS: Objection. Calls for speculation.

MR. MACAUTHUR: Her impression.
THE COURT: Rephrase. Sustained, but rephrase. BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Thinking back to when the jury deliberation started, do you remember how things looked as far as how many people were voting guilty and how many were voting not guilty?
A. Do I remember how it looked?
Q. Yeah. Do you have any idea what the split was, or who was on the guilty side and who was on the not guilty?
A. There was 5 of us that were on the not guilty side when we got in there.
Q. Do you happen to remember who the strongest voices for guilty may have been?
A. $\quad 1$ and 3 were pretty --
Q. Gung-ho.
A. Yeah.
Q. That's Rago and Jankiewicz?
A. Yes.
Q. Did either of the men give you their rational for why they were so confident? Did they share any information with you on why they were so gung-ho?
A. No, they didn't say.
Q. We've used an example of Rago and Jankiewicz were working together. Did you have somebody you clicked up with and frequently went to lunch with?
A. Yeah.
Q. Do you remember who that -- what juror that may have been?
A. About 4 or 5 of us that would go and have lunch.
Q. If you remember?
A. Leslie, Marilou, Shay would be with us sometimes too.
Q. Let me interrupt you. Was Shay, Ms. Monson, the foreperson?
A. I thought Marylou was the foreperson.
Q. Sorry. Marylou foreperson. And you said Shay, and that's Ms. Monson?
A. Yes.
Q. Who are the other names?
A. Kathy, I believe. I don't know her last name.
Q. Would that have been the Asian woman?
A. Yes.
Q. Kathy Wong?
A. Yes.
Q. Juror No. 2.

Do you recall being contacted by either me or Ms.
McNeill in December 2017?
A. Yes.
Q. Remember answering of these same types of questions for us?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember signing a declaration of what you remembered or what you had to contribute?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember whether a juror or jurors said that Josh needed to be convicted of something?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know who said that?
A. 1 and 2 -- 1 and 3. Tony and -- I don't remember what his name is.
Q. Male or female?
A. Male.
Q. Shorter or taller?
A. They are both tall.
Q. Did you see them outside today?
A. Yes.
Q. Might that have been Brett Jankiewicz?
A. Yes.
Q. So those two both said that Josh needed to be convicted of something?
A. They said separate things but along the same lines, yes.
Q. Did they tie that to a specific thing, or did it seem like they had a particular thing in mind?
A. No. They just told us we needed to use common sense.
Q. Do you know if Mr. Rago showed a newspaper article or articles to anyone else?
A. No.
Q. You don't know?
A. I don't know if he did or not, no.
Q. Do you recall whether Mr. Jankiewicz ever said something along the lines of he knew another person who knew Morgan Savage?
A. I didn't finds out about that until the trial was over. He told --
Q. Break that down.

MS. KOLLINS: I'm sorry. Let her finish her response before you start asking another question.

THE COURT: Did you have more you wanted to add
to that. You said you found something out after the fact.

MS. KOLLINS: She said she learned he told someone -- then Mr. MacAuthur started asking his question.

THE WITNESS: I was going to elaborate more on how I knew.

Leslie, after the trial was over -MR. MACAUTHUR: Is this Ms. Makinster. THE WITNESS: Yes.

She had told me that he told her he knew somebody. This is was in the beginning when the whole trial started, like before we even knew what was going on in here. He didn't know why he was here. She said I don't know why I am either, and it came up. BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. If I might. Are you talking about during jury selection, like when we were figuring out who was going to be over there?
A. Yes.
Q. That's when -- and this is hearsay. This is something Me. Makinster told you?
A. Yes.
Q. But your impression was she said Brett knew somebody who knew Morgan way early during jury selection?
A. Yes.
Q. You didn't hear that from Mr. Jankiewicz himself?
A. No.
Q. Understood.

And before today have you shared that information with anyone?
A. Which information?
Q. What you just said about him apparently knowing somebody who knew Morgan?
A. Have you told anybody?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. Who have you told?
A. My significant other. I tell him everything.
Q. I'll put it a different way. Have you told anybody else in this room before today?
A. No.
Q. And first let me assure you you are not in trouble. We're not here judging you at all.

When I contacted you back in December -- I'm sorry. When Monique contacted you back in December of 2017, did you remember that detail?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you tell that to her?
A. About Jankiewicz knowing somebody, yes. Did I tell her. I don't remember if I did or not. My impression is I did.
Q. Okay. I'm sure you would have been delighted to know, one way or another. Okay.

Thinking back to the jury deliberations, the verdict ultimately was guilty. And it was unanimous; is that fair?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you have misgivings about the verdict?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you express those misgivings to any other juror?
A. Afterwards, after a couple of days, after my mind had time to wrap around all that happened, yes.
Q. First let me front load. I'm not going to ask you about any misgivings that don't relate to Mr. Rago and/or Mr. Jankiewicz, okay.
A. Okay.
Q. Did any of your misgivings result from their actions, words, or conduct during the trial?
A. The way they made my mind feel towards it, yes. My own personal -- I don't know. They made me feel stupid, so after it was over $I$ felt stupid for letting
them make me feel that way.
Q. Not to put words in your mouth. Your words are important, not mine. Did you feel bullied?

MS. KOLLINS: Objection. Sorry. Withdrawn.
THE COURT: You may answer.
THE WITNESS: In a sense, yes.
BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Is there a better word then bullied?
A. I don't know if there is a better word than bullied.
Q. I don't want you to feel you are under some kind of time pressure. What we're here to find out is whether or not anything they did influenced you to do something different then what you otherwise would have done.

I characterize bullied trying to find a word that captures what you're talk about. Take an opportunity and what might be the best word that conveys how you felt their conduct influenced you while you were deliberating?
A. Pressured, pushed into feeling the same way that they felt.
Q. Okay. Do you know -- just so I'm clear on the time line. Before the verdict is read, do you know if there is any other juror that also has that same feeling
that you just expressed?
A. Afterwards or --
Q. Before the verdict was read.
A. Yes.
Q. Let me refresh your recollection.

Remember when you walked in and the verdict is going to be read. Remember sitting over there, bottom row, all the way to the left. After the verdict was read and the clerk made it all the way to Count 39 with a lot of not guilties, you knew that that guilty was coming, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Am I correct that you kept looking upward at the top row when that was happening?

MS. KOLLINS: Objection, leading, relevance. What does that have to do with what influenced her.

THE COURT: The witness is on the stand and I'm not recalling this information having been provided before. Is there a specific question you -- you were orienting her in time as to a certain time frame in which you were going to ask a question. Can you just do that. MR. MACAUTHUR: Sure. BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Now, Ms. Savko, I'm just asking a question based on my impression.

It seemed like you were uncomfortable about something when the verdict was being read?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that true?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall whether you looked repeatedly up at the top row at someone else?
A. I can't tell you if I remember. My heart was going pretty fast in that moment.
Q. Okay. Court's indulgence.

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. MACAUTHUR: No further questions.
THE COURT: Ms. Kollins, questions for Ms. Savko.

## CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MS. KOLLINS:
Q. Ms. Savko, there was a split when all the jurors got back to the deliberation room, right?
A. Yes.
Q. There were, from what we understand now, 7 guilty 5 not guilty?
A. Yes.
Q. So there were more people then just Mr. Jankiewicz and Mr. Rago with the opinion that Josh Honea was guilty?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you all talk about the evidence?
A. We did.
Q. Okay. Because we don't have a video camera back there, we don't get to see what happens. We spoke to Ms. Makinster and she mentioned reviewing, kind of everybody was going in order reviewing all the admitted evidence. Do you remember that?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you do that?
A. I went through some of it, yes.
Q. Did you talk about that with the other jurors?
A. Yes.
Q. When you -- so that's everybody in the conversation, not just Mr. Jankiewicz and Mr. Rago and yourself, but everybody is in that conversation?
A. Yes.
Q. It's my understanding based on what I heard today that when everybody returned a verdict on Count 39 that was related to the California trip; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that what you all ultimately decided on?
A. Yes.
Q. That was the basis of your verdict?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.

You never looked at that article?
A. No.
Q. So you didn't know what was contained in it?
A. No.
Q. So that had no influence on any decision you made because you didn't see it; is that fair?
A. Yes, that's fair.
Q. You said -- you filled out an affidavit from Ms. McNeill or Mr. MacAuthur; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Since that time you have had no conversations with them?
A. No.
Q. Okay. No information from outside came into the deliberation room then, no articles, no papers, no internet access anything like that, right?
A. No.
Q. Everybody on the jury had different personalities?
A. Yes.
Q. Some people are more aggressive, some people weren't?
A. Yes.
Q. You were polled for your verdict, right? You came out here and told the Judge that was your verdict?
A. Yes.
Q. During your deliberation process you didn't make any reports that you felt like you were being pushed around or bullied, as Mr. MacAutthur's word. You didn't ask for a bailiff or ask for the court to intervene that you were being pushed around, right?
A. No, I didn't.

MS. KOLLINS: Okay. I have nothing further. THE COURT: Mr. MacAuthur, any questions for Ms. Savko.

## REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Earlier in my questioning, Ms. Savko, I asked you whether -- in general terms, whether you had a problem with the verdict. And then you said something about, well, after?
A. Yes.
Q. Did the problem you had with the verdict have anything to do with something Mr. Rago or Mr. Jankiewicz did?
A. The problem --
Q. Does that make sense?
A. No.
Q. So to be clear, we're not allowed to ask you about why you had second guesses or why you were okay or not okay with the verdict, unless it had something to do with Mr. Rago or Mr. Jankiewicz.

MS. KOLLINS: Objection.
MR. MACAUTHUR: I'm being careful not to ask you any questions outside that.

THE COURT: Ms. Kollins was indicating an objection to the way that was phrased.

What Mr. MacAuthur is trying to convey is he's just trying to ask you questions in a certain way. It's okay if you don't understand the question. He can repeat it. He can repeat it or ask it a different way.

So without further explanation of why you're asking the question, Mr. MacAuthur, you can ask it differently. BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Did you feel like you arrived at the right verdict?
A. At the time, yes.
Q. Afterward you felt like you did not?
A. Yes.
Q. Did your feelings like you had not rendered the right verdict have anything to do with -MS. KOLLINS: Objection, leading. Why, just ask
her why.
MR. MACAUTHUR: Then you're stuck with the answer. BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Why did you have misgivings after a verdict was rendered?
A. My personal feeling. You know, you make a choice in life. You're supposed to feel a hundred percent, right, with the choices you make.

THE COURT: If only that were true all the time.

THE WITNESS: I know. I didn't feel okay with this choice.

THE COURT: Let me ask a question and then counsel can follow up.

You know every juror who sits on a panel is a human being. Ever juror that sits on the panel is making a decision either you remember and talked about and maybe you remember instructions that the punishment for the outcome is the court's determination not anything to do with jurors. I guess what we're trying to get at is the misgivings that you had afterwards, it was because of the outcome.

THE WITNESS: No. I just didn't feel like I made the right choice. I should have held my own voice in
the room. Even if it would have just been me making us sit in there for 8 more hours, I should have held my own against them.

THE COURT: Do you believe the verdict outcome would have been different.

THE WITNESS: Maybe we wouldn't have had to -- I don'ts know. Maybe it would have. We wouldn't have -- I wouldn't have had to have chosen.

THE COURT: Were your concerns about the fact that you had to make a choice. Would you have preferred not to have to make a choice.

THE WITNESS: Yes, but you have to make choices.

THE COURT: Ms. Kollins asked you some questions a minute ago, sort of along the lines of there's 12 of you in the room. You're deliberating. You're talking to each other. You reach a verdict. You mentioned a second a ago that at that time --

THE WITNESS: I felt fine with that.
THE COURT: Was that based on the evidence you reviewed? Was that based on the discussion you had. What was that based on that, at that time, that you felt fine with.

THE WITNESS: When they said you just need to use your brain, common sense, it made me feel like I was
missing something. When I use common sense, I mean, from the evidence that we had, yes, you could have assumed or known something was there, but I didn't know that for sure.

THE COURT: You understand there was also an instruction on reasonable doubt. And it wasn't no doubt, it was -- I can read it again.

So I guess we're just trying to understand, did you make a decision -- you know, what was your decision based on when you made that decision with your fellow jurors.

THE WITNESS: It was based on -- say that again, please. I'm sorry.

THE COURT: When you and your fellow jurors ultimately reached a conclusion unanimously to find guilty as to Count 39, what was that based on.

THE WITNESS: Them having intercourse. It was that one, right.

THE COURT: They each had different factual underpinnings. That was -- I'll look at the charge related to it.

MS. KOLLINS: It was sexual assault by intercourse. It was --

THE COURT: Related to --
MS. KOLLINS: It was related to the time frame of the trip to California.

THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: It was related to a particular incident.

THE WITNESS: Where it could have happened, yes.

THE COURT: Mr. MacAuthur, any further questions. BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Q. Ms. Savko, if I heard you correctly, you said you wished you held your voice?
A. Yes.
Q. Did the conduct of Mr. Rago and/or Jankiewicz contribute to muting your voice?
A. They got pretty loud back there.
Q. Would you characterize that as, yes, they muted your voice, or, no, they did not?
A. Yes. I have had a problem was that in the past.

MR. MACAUTHUR: No further questions.
THE COURT: Ms. Kollins, anything further from the Court's questions for the witness.

RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MS. KOLLINS:
Q. Just to be fair so the record is complete. Everybody in that deliberation room, all 12 jurors,
were exchanging information with each other; is that fair? Everybody was talking about what their opinion was?
A. Yes.
Q. Not just Mr. Rago and not just

Mr. Jankiewicz?
A. No.
Q. And you were able to say what you thought and why -- I mean, nobody prevented you physically from speaking?
A. No.
Q. You were able to give your input, even if there was people that disagreed with it; is that fair?
A. Yes.
Q. Then you ultimately made your decision?
A. Yes.

MS. KOLLINS: Nothing further.
THE COURT: Any final questions, Mr. MacAuthur. MR. MACAUTHUR: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Savko, thank you for your time. It's not an easy thing. We very much thank you for your time. We apologize for the late start getting to you all. We had things to take care of before getting started with you. You are excused. Thank you.

MS. KOLLINS: We'd just admit Ms. McNeill's affidavit. I don't have questions for Ms. McNeill. I
assume there is no objection.
MR. MACAUTHUR: No.
THE COURT: Make sure that's in evidence.
THE COURT: Do you have a copy.
MS. KOLLINS: I have a clean copy for the court.

THE COURT: We'll make that State's 2.
MS. KOLLINS: I don't have any questions for Ms. McNeill. Based on what I've heard today, I don't have any questions for Tobi Calderon $I$ feel are relevant. It's already clear Mr. MacAuthur contacted who he contacted. He had investigators contact those witnesses on his behalf before this hearing started. I don't think it made a difference.

I don't have anything on behalf of the State.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
Mr. MacAuthur, are there any other witnesses.
MR. MACAUTHUR: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: I'll invite Mr. MacAuthur first. Are there any final remarks you wish to make for the court's consideration.

The court is going to, as directed, issue a written order following this evidentiary hearing within the time frame prescribed by the Supreme Court. By my calculation I believe that written order would be due -- we calculated
it as December 27 th, but that could be mistaken. It's not my intention to delay issuing a written order.

I do want to have time to put it together, but other then that -- and go back over, perhaps, listen to the testimony again, to make sure it's fresh in my mind. That JAVZ recording will not be available until tomorrow, so it's my intention while it's still fresh to issue a written order related to the case. But beyond that, if there is anything you'd like to add to the record.

MR. MACAUTHUR: Thank you, Judge.
CLOSING STATEMENT
BY MR. MACAUTHUR:
Ms. McNeill reminds me to be brief.
Judge, going back 2 years ago, this trial was
intense. I don't want to have to revisit any of it. The point is that the outcome was irregular. It seems so strange that he was convicted on one count and acquitted on all the others, because either they believed the State's witness, namely Morgan Savage, or they didn't.

There was no way to say, well, she's right about this one thing, but we disbelieve everything else. There was no way to distinguish many of the counts. They have the exact same elements, exact same timeline. Ultimately, Mr. Honea was convicted in a 3 -count window of 1 of those 3 counts related to Carlsbad, California. But it makes one
wonder why, if there were 3 counts associated with the Carlsbad, California trip, why was only one of them true.

It invites the question of, well, is this a compromised verdict. Which is not illegal. Jurors are allowed to compromise. It's not a good look to the intellectual mind, but they're allowed to do that. But in this instance, there was circumstantial evidence that two things went wrong. Mr. Rago seemed to be influenced by outside information. And that Mr. Jankiewicz appeared to have an awfully strange coincidental relationship to Morgan Savage.

Now, I understand the court's view back then, because the law is not really well-written on extrinsic versus intrinsic juror misconduct. It's easy when you're on the extremes. Somebody makes threats against a juror, or they offer a bribe. That's clearly extrinsic. The court is going to explore that all day. But on intrinsic, it's going to be like, well, you know what, I've had this neighbor and he was black. I can't stand him, so I'll hold it against this juror. We can't really go into why jurors think what they think and what information they rely on. It's a limitation of democracy. But this instance falls on the line between those two. It is not clearly intrinsic, which we're not supposed to explore,
and it's not clearly extrinsic, which would have been an open door invitation to an evidentiary hearing. What we had was intrinsic misconduct where one juror -- Juror No. 1 reaches outside of the deliberations, before they even start, to consult one or more articles.

Now, I know that everybody agreed it was one, but one juror felt like it was her impression it was more than one because it was two different topics. One about the arrest. And the other about the teenager drops a bomb. But regardless of whether the court heard one and believed one or more than one, the point is, is that one juror was very specific -- this is Makinster -- that he talked about it on the second or third day and that he talked about it again at a different day at lunch, then he talked about it again in deliberation. What's more, it's not just the way a couple of jurors that suggested, like, he offered it, but we all went no. One juror remembered him saying more then that. And if she said that to us, by golly it would have been in our affidavit.

The reason why we have an evidentiary hearing is because they are a fact finding mission. I'm grateful for that partition. She said, your Honor, under oath that Mr. Rago said that Josh needed to be convicted of something, because if he got a not guilty all the way down the board he was going to sue the County or someone. I
suggest it's probably Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, but her words were County. Then he's going to get a whole bunch of money.

So relying on that, it appeared that the most important thing to Mr. Rago was that Josh should not be rewarded with money. And that the only way to stop that was by convicting him of a crime that sends him to prison for life.

You also heard from multiple jurors that Rago and Jankiewicz were particularly close. One juror even said they were together all the time. Sometimes with other people, others times by themselves. Then in the second bombshell of this trial two years later, we find out that two people obtained information that Jankiewicz knew someone, didn't know who, who knew Morgan Savage. The court's allowed to make permissible inferences. There is a zero percent chance that Jankiewicz was going to come in here and say, hey, my sister, Taylor Jankiewicz, who also has a heroin addiction, who also was on East Charleston and Torrey Pines, who also happened the make friends with Morgan Savage just like Morgan told us. You don't have to take the representations of counsel as trust. I'm not submitting what I've said as evidence. What I'm saying is what are the chances I'm right about that without knowing what these witnesses are going to say 2 years ago.

We asked for the evidentiary hearing, and we didn't get it because it wasn't clear whether this was intrinsic or extrinsic. It still falls on the line and it was compelling enough where the Supreme Court sent it back. And it turns out that's exactly what we were afraid that it was, that Brett Aaron Jankiewicz, his sister, with the heroin problem, knew Morgan. And he confided that in another juror, Ms. Makinster, who testified to you today.

I wish I followed up with when did you know that thing, but apparently he knew it, according to Ms. Savko during voir dire. When we asked them, hey, do you know any of the witnesses. Do you know any of the counsel. If you have any sort of conflicts. That's when you're supposed to present it. And he laid in wait. He sat through a 3-week trial knowing that his sister knew Morgan and feeling like he knew something everybody else did not. That's misconduct. And it deprived Mr. Honea of 12 neutral jurors. That's prejudicial. He was entitled to 12 people who didn't know him, didn't know the facts, and didn't feel any particular way after voir dire. He found an ally in Mr. Rago, who, again, very small chance he's going to come in here and tell you, hey, Judge. I knew what the order was, but $I$ defied it, potentially multiple times. I talked about it on the way out of the courtroom into the hallway. I talked about it again at lunch. Then

I tried to show everybody inside of jury deliberation and everybody stopped me.

He wasn't going to tell you that. Just because he is not a defendant and just because there is no legal consequences for Rago or Jankiewicz doesn't mean that it's not scary as hell sitting in front of a judge, having to admit you defied her rules. They don't know they can't get trouble for that. So they behave the same way that a lot of people behave. Especially when they're a defendant, they get on the stand and lie under oath to save themselves. If this evidentiary hearing was only based on Rago and Jankiewicz, you would never know the other details.

Let me focus on the prejudice. You heard from more than one juror and from the information we submitted in our motion for new trial that, at the end of the first day, there was a split of 7 to 5 guilty versus not guilty. I don't close early in the day. There's a weekend in between. Some jurors feel like something has shifted when they come back, and ultimately Blaire Savko expressed in her own way that she wasn't convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, that she had uncertainty. She felt dumb because Rago and Jankiewicz were so certain that Josh was guilty, and they said that she had to use common sense. She said that Jankiewicz sat back and act like she was dumb. As a
matter of fact, I think that's Ms. Makinster, but both of them had similar testimony. Acted like they were dumb because they didn't see how Josh was guilty. Blaire Savko said that she wished she'd kept her voice. Not found a voice, kept her voice. It was her intention to vote not guilty. And by what she described as pressure, originally I asked bullied, she agreed with me, but that not perhaps being the best word I asked her to find her own word. When she took the opportunity to do that she said, pressure and something else.

She then changed her guilty verdict to guilty. Ms. Makinster expressed, for lack of a better term, similar misgivings, but not for the same reason. She said that Rago and Jankiewicz appeared to know something she didn't. And it's implied that she felt like that must have been credible because, it pushed her toward thinking she should also vote guilty. So with an impure motive of Rago trying to keep Josh from being able to sue Metro and Jankiewicz having a real word sister who was real world friends with Morgan, saying that Josh had to be convicted of something, they hijacked our jury.

They did not have to do it the way of saying, hey, these are our secrets and this is how you should look at the evidence. They could just lock down guilty for wrong reasons and persuade other people to also vote guilty for
reasons not related to the evidence, but related to their own personal convictions.

Lastly, it's always a slog uphill when we bring to the attention of all parties that, hey, this is weird. I get that it's an adversarial process. I don't expect it to ever run smoothly. But there was so much ill-will between both parties, because of both parties, that any time something unexpected happened the assumption was somebody was doing something dirty. The State's mad over being betrayed by Morgan. We're mad over people changing what they said and getting a verdict we can't explain. Sometimes it's just because other people are crap. Jankiewicz and Rago were crappy, and they should not have been on our jury. If Jankiewicz had answered the questions put to him on voir dire honestly, he would have been removed. If Rago had followed your instructions faithfully, he would have been removed. And Ms. Coliel (ph) would have replaced one or both of them when it was time to deliberate.

So we've lost two years. Josh has not been able to return to his normal life. He's grateful as hell to be out of custody. And thank you, Judge, for having done that. But it's not like he can make long-term plans and move to another state, start a business, get married, have kids, because this case is pending.

So now we finally have the evidentiary hearing that we should have had two years ago. I feel like I won the lottery because what $I$ thought happened did. It's going to be up to your Honor as to whether you think this misconduct, which is now proven, tainted the verdict in such a way that it undermined our faith in its legitimacy. I think it's obvious that it does, but then again, I'm defense counsel. I pick my side of the aisle on purposes because it fits with my ideology.

I don't have anything else $I$ have to add on that. But I think the outcome is apparent.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. MacAuthur.
Ms. Kollins, final remarks.
CLOSING STATEMENT
BY MS. RHOADES:
We are reading directly from the Supreme Court order. We're here to determine if prejudicial juror misconduct, in fact, occurred, and if so, whether -- just going back here -- whether the misconduct occurred back to what the Defendant needs to prove himself. Whether the conduct occurred, whether it's prejudicial. It is his burden to show that based on evidence.

It is not what they believe. It's not what they believe happened or what they think happened or reading between the lines. That's not what it is at all.

So the first question is whether juror misconduct occurred in fact, which the evidence presented today you can't even determine that juror misconduct did in fact occur.

Regarding the money and that he was going to sue somebody, that came from one witness. There's contradictory evidence about that. Mr. Rago said that that never happened. He never talked about anything. There was one witness that testified about that. So that -- you can't even be sure that that misconduct, that conduct actually occurred.

The article, there is no evidence that anybody ever saw the article, except Mr. Rago. And he only saw the headline. He testified about that. Even Ms. Savko, Ms. Makinster, they testified they never saw the article at all. So how can that be misconduct. He didn't show it to anybody. Mr. Rago testified he didn't show it to anybody. All the other witnesses testified they never saw it. It didn't come up in deliberations. Mr. Rago said he saw that headline, which, by the way the article was completely in favor of the Defendant and of Mr. MacAuthur. It has quotes from Mr. MacAuthur on that and presents stuff that was testified about during trial in front of the jury anyway. So there was nothing collateral that would enure to the State's benefit in any way at all.

The relationship with Mr. Jankiewicz that Ms. Makinster testified about, so that's the first time anybody has ever heard anything about her knowing about that relationship. That wasn't even in her affidavit or what she told Mr. MacAuthur and Ms McNeill.

How she testified about that, she said, someone that he knew that wasn't related knew Morgan. That's all the information she had. I don't know where that came from. Again there is contradictory evidence, because Mr. Jankiewicz said he never talked about that. He talked about his sister, how he hasn't talked to her in 5 years. He had no idea that she was Facebook friends with Morgan Savage. So there is contradictory evidence about that.

Even taking Ms. Makinster's word that he said that, she said that that didn't come into deliberations at all either. That it was some tangential relationship that didn't come up at all. So I don't think that they can even prove -- again, it's their burden to prove -- that there was actual misconduct. And I don't think they even get there. But more importantly, the prejudice. They can not show prejudice. You know, just going back to the misconduct, going to lunch together is not misconduct. A belief that a defendant is guilty after sitting through trial and hearing evidence and seeing evidence and holding evidence in your hand, that's not misconduct either.

Telling other jurors what they think is not misconduct. Going to the prejudice, the reasonable probability or likelihood that it effected the verdict. So the misconduct is the article and this alleged relationship that Mr. Jankiewicz may have known Morgan Savage. Those are the two misconducts that we're looking at. Which I don't even think they have shown that that is misconduct. But even assuming that it is, there is no prejudice. Every single witness that came here and testified today said that it didn't come up in deliberations, that it didn't effect their deliberations. It didn't effect their verdict. Their verdict was what it was based on the evidence they passed around and looked at. So there's absolutely no showing of prejudice, and the Defendant has not shown either prong of this argument and the motion should be denied.

THE COURT: Mr. MacAuthur, final rebuttal, ass this is your motion.

MR. MACAUTHUR: Thank you, Judge. CLOSING STATEMENT BY MR. MACAUTHUR:

Having listened to the State's argument, it gets rid of the nuances of complexity of human interaction. She takes a binary, either it was said or it wasn't. And if it wasn't said, then there's no prejudice and we move
on. So in rebuttal $I$ would like to focus on the prejudice and why the State's argument is flawed.

I'm reminded that when you go to school a lot of times you see Mormon kids are always really well-dressed, nice cars, clean, friendly. Mormons make great neighbors. Part of the reason for that is because it's part of the projecting who you are in your culture so you can bring more people into the fold. Like, hey, they're well-dressed. They're nice. They're successful. Maybe I should explore how they live. And that kind of appeal helps invite them to church, and some people convert.

The same thing is true of jurors. When you start with a juror who has made up their mind that a person is guilty for an illegitimate reason and they're pushing for other people to agree, even if they're not sharing that illegitimate reason, it's an improper factor. It's an improper force. And here's the prejudice that was observable.

First, the State characterizes the article that Mr. Rago read as having been favorable to me because my comments are all in it. That's an assumption by the State. We don't have anyone testifying as to how Mr. Rago received that article. Maybe he read it and thought, you know, that MacAuthur sure is an arrogant ass. And he pissed me off. I wish I didn't have to listen to him for

3 weeks. He'd probably get a lot of people to agree with him.

THE COURT: We heard testimony from one of the witnesses today that the way it was understood by Mr. Rago was it made the case important.

MR. MACAUTHUR: Understood. I don't mean to say that the way I'm characterizing it is what $I$ want the court to rely on. I'm merely saying that the State characterized the article as having been favorable to the defense. The State is not inside of the jurors' minds. Fortunately, you've reminded me that, yes, we did receive some insight on how he received the article. And he treated it as important. It was part of the larger narrative that he did not want Josh to get off scot free and be able to sue -- what $I$ think was characterized as the County.

So Mr. Rago, having reached outside of the evidence available in the case, namely by reading articles, formed an opinion that was not based on evidence, that he did not want to see Josh get found not guilty, and then somehow receive a windfall by a successful civil suit against the County. That's not what he was asked to do. He was asked to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Josh committed a crime. And the proof that that's not what he did is
inherent in the fact that there is one guilty count, 39, and there's 2 other counts from that exact same day and those exact same circumstances in is not guilty there. Either josh did it or he didn't. It doesn't make any sense how he's found guilty of one count.

Mr. Rago made himself a non-objective, non-neutral juror and denied Josh the opportunity to have an objective juror in his place.

Number 2, Mr. Jankiewicz, he completely undermined the entire purpose. We spent a lot of time on voir dire. I think we spent at least 3 days on voir dire. This case went forever. And Mr. Jankiewicz sat through all of that knowing that his sister knew Morgan, and then took that prejudice with him into the room giving other jurors the impression that they knew something that the jurors did not. He doesn't have to say what that something is. You can see the effect in their testimony. It made them feel stupid, or it made them feel like Jankiewicz and Rago knew something credible and that a guilty verdict was appropriate for that reason. But that wasn't evidence produced by either party at trial.

Mr. Jankiewicz' verdict was based on outside evidence. It was based on information he received outside of court that was not sworn, that was not vetted, that was not corroborated or contradicted in cross-examination. He
therefore so deprived Josh of a neutral objective juror. But that's not where it ended.

There is also prejudice on the part of Ms. Makinster and Ms. Savko. I'm skipping Ms. Monson because Ms. Monson said that while she was aware of these things and she thought they were inappropriate, she was confident she arrived at her verdict the proper way. But what we don't see going back to my Mormon neighbors example is how did the negative influences of Rago and Jankiewicz impact her in ways that she's not conscious of. I'm not going to ask the court to rely on that point, I'm merely saying it's more complicated then the binary description given by the State.

The prejudice for the last two points are on Ms. Makinster and Ms. Savko. Ms. Makinster said she felt like Mr. Jankiewicz and Mr. Rago knew something she didn't. And assuming that that thing was true, she felt like he didn't have a choice but to find him guilty -Josh -- in the absence of certainty that came from the evidence in the case.

Lastly is Ms. Savko. Same outcome, different reason. She said that the two people who most strongly promulgated findings of guilt -- and this is not just from Ms. Savko -- were from Rago and Jankiewicz. Consistently everyone told you, other than Rago and Jankiewicz, that
they were together all the time. That it was common to see them together. Sometimes with others, sometimes by themselves. And that they went to lunch together, in one witness' opinion, pretty much everyday throughout the entire trial.

What an odd coincidence that the two people who engaged in juror misconduct happened to click up and continued to talk to each other about whatever they talked about for the duration of trial. And then apply pressure to Ms. Savko, who characterized herself as the last hold-out. She wish she'd sat there and kept her voice, even if it took another 8 hours, so she could vote not guilty. She felt pressured. She felt bullied. And now she regrets it.

The Supreme Court asked for this hearing to establish the prejudice. I belive it's been well-established through Mr. Rago and Mr. Jankiewicz, Ms. Makinster, Ms. Savko. Four of a 12 member jury panel, fully 33 percent.

THE COURT: Thank you. All right.
We have completed the evidentiary hearing. As the court pointed out the limited remand from the Supreme Court was a 90-day turnaround to have a full hearing conducted and a written order issued. The court will further review the testimony from today, as well as in the
context of the original briefings and render a written order within the time frame prescribed.

Thank you.
MR. MACAUTHUR: Thank you.

CERTIFICATE
OF
CERTIFIED COURT REPORTER

*     *         *             *                 * 

I, the undersigned certified court reporter in and for the State of Nevada, do hereby certify:

That the foregoing proceedings were taken before me at the time and place therein set forth; that the testimony and all objections made at the time of the proceedings were recorded stenographically by me and were thereafter transcribed under my direction; that the foregoing is a true record of the testimony and of all objections made at the time of the proceedings.


$$
\begin{gathered}
\text { Sharon Howard } \\
\text { C.C.R. \#745 }
\end{gathered}
$$

CERTIFICATE
OF
CERTIFIED COURT REPORTER

*     *         *             *                 * 

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$$
\begin{gathered}
\text { Sharon Howard } \\
\text { C.C.R. \#745 }
\end{gathered}
$$



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