IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

A CAB, LLC; AND A CAB SERIES,) Supreme Court No. 7/050
LLC,) Electronically Filed
Appellants,	Aug 05 2020 04:21 p.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court
V.)
)
MICHAEL MURRAY; AND)
MICHAEL RENO, INDIVIDUALLY)
AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS)
SIMILARLY SITUATED,)
)
Respondents.)
)

APPENDIX TO APPELLANTS OPENING BRIEF VOLUME XX of LII

Appeal from the Eighth Judicial District Court Case No. A-12-669926-C

HUTCHISON & STEFFEN, PLLC

Michael K. Wall (2098) Peccole Professional Park 10080 Alta Drive, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Attorney for Appellants

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24	Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief, filed 08/28/2015	IV	AA000651- AA000668
23	Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Declaratory Order Regarding Statue of Limitations, filed 08/28/2015	IV	AA000600- AA000650
172	Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Dismissal of Claims on an Order Shortening Time, filed 10/17/2018	XLVI	AA009289- AA009297
8	Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion Seeking Reconsideration of the Court's February 8, 2013 Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed 03/18/2013	I	AA000181- AA000187
154	Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Ex-Parte Motion to Quash Writ of Execution on an OST and Counter-Motion for Appropriate Judgment Enforcement Relief, filed 09/24/2018	XLIV	AA008919- AA008994
109	Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony, filed 01/12/2018	XXX, XXXI	AA006002- AA006117
184	Plaintiffs' Response to Special Master's	XLVII	AA009665-

	Motion for an Order for Payment of Fees and Contempt, filed 11/26/2018		AA009667
115	Plaintiffs' Supplement in Connection with Appointment of Special Master, filed 01/31/2018	XXXII	AA006239- AA006331
144	Plaintiffs' Supplement in Reply and In Support of Entry of Final Judgment Per Hearing Held June 5, 2018, filed 07/13/2018	XLI, XLII	AA008416- AA008505
146	Plaintiffs' Supplement in Reply to Defendants' Supplement Dated July 18, 2018, filed 08/03/2018	XLII	AA008576- AA008675
107	Plaintiffs' Supplement in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed 01/09/2018	XXX	AA005833- AA005966
75	Plaintiffs' Supplement to Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed 02/23/2017	XX	AA003847- AA003888
156	Plaintiffs' Supplemental Response to Defendants' Ex-Parte Motion to Quash Writ of Execution on an OSt, filed 09/27/2018	XLIV	AA009009- AA009029
46	Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, filed 03/24/2016	VII, VIII	AA001237- AA001416
170	Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, Amendment, for New Trial, and for Dismissal of Claims, filed 10/16/2018	XLV	AA009272- AA009277
58	Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Pursuant to NRCP 12(c) with Respect to All Claims for Damages Outside the Two-Year Statue of Limitation and Opposition to Counter Motion for Toll of Statue of Limitations and for an Evidentiary Hearing, filed 12/28/2016	XI	AA002179- AA002189

111	Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude the Testimony of Plaintiffs' Experts, filed 01/19/2018	XXXI	AA006180- AA001695
178	Resolution Economics' Application for Order of Payment of Special Master's Fees and Motion for Contempt, filed 11/05/2018	XLVII	AA009553- AA009578
187	Resolution Economics' Reply to Defendants' Opposition and Plaintiffs' Response to its Application for an Order of Payment of Special Master's Fees and Motion for Contempt, filed 12/03/2018	XLVII	AA009690- AA009696
100	Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 12/14/2017	XXVII, XXVIII	AA005372- AA005450
31	Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Claim for Relief, filed 09/28/2015	V	AA000807- AA000862
3	Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed 12/06/2012	I	AA000016- AA000059
33	Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff Michael Murray, filed 10/08/2015	V	AA000870- AA000880
34	Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff Michael Reno, filed 10/08/2015	V	AA000881- AA000911
212	Second Amended Notice of Appeal, filed 03/06/2019	L	AA010285- AA010288
22	Second Amended Supplemental Complaint, filed 08/19/2015	III	AA000582- AA000599
130	Second Supplemental Declaration of Class Counsel, Leon Greenberg, Esq., filed	XXXIV	AA007015- AA007064

	05/18/2018		
213	Special Master Resolution Economics' Opposition to Defendants Motion for Reconsideration of Judgment and Order Granting Resolution Economics Application for Order of Payment of Special Master's Fees and Order of Contempt, filed 03/28/2019	LI	AA010289- AA010378
78	Supplement to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed 05/24/2017	XXI	AA004024- AA004048
79	Supplement to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Bifurcate Issue of Liability of Defendant Creighton J. Nady From Liability of Corporate Defendants or Alternative Relief, filed 05/31/2017	XXI	AA004049- AA004142
72	Supplement to Order For Injunction Filed on February 16, 2017, filed 02/17/2017	XIX	AA003777- AA003780
129	Supplemental Declaration of Class Counsel, Leon Greenberg, Esq., filed 05/16/2018	XXXIV	AA006981- AA007014
38	Transcript of Proceedings, November 3, 2015	VI	AA001002- AA001170
66	Transcript of Proceedings, February 8, 2017	XVII	AA003549- AA003567
70	Transcript of Proceedings, February 14, 2017	XIX	AA003755- AA003774
77	Transcript of Proceedings, May 18, 2017	XX, XXI	AA003893- AA004023
83	Transcript of Proceedings, June 13, 2017	XXII	AA004223- AA004244
101	Transcript of Proceedings, December 14, 2017	XXVIII	AA005451- AA005509

105	Transcript of Proceedings, January 2, 2018	XXIV	AA005720- AA005782
114	Transcript of Proceedings, January 25, 2018	XXXI	AA006203- AA006238
117	Transcript of Proceedings, February 2, 2018	XXXII	AA006335- AA006355
122	Transcript of Proceedings, February 15, 2018	XXXII, XXXIII	AA006427- AA006457
137	Transcript of Proceedings, filed July 12, 2018	XXXVI, XXXVII	AA007385- AA007456
215	Transcript of Proceedings, September 26, 2018	LI	AA010385- AA010452
216	Transcript of Proceedings, September 28, 2018	LI, LII	AA010453- AA010519
175	Transcript of Proceedings, October 22, 2018	XLVI	AA009304- AA009400
189	Transcript of Proceedings, December 4, 2018	XLVIII	AA009701- AA009782
190	Transcript of Proceedings, December 11, 2018	XLVIII	AA009783- AA009800
192	Transcript of Proceedings, December 13, 2018	XLVIII	AA009813- AA009864

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I am an employee of HUTCHISON & STEFFEN, LLC and that on this date **APPENDIX TO APPELLANTS OPENING BRIEF VOLUME XX**of LII was filed electronically with the Clerk of the Nevada Supreme Court, and therefore electronic service was made in accordance with the master service list as follows:

Leon Greenberg, Esq.
Dana Sniegocki, Esq.
Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation
2965 S. Jones Blvd., Ste. E3
Las Vegas, NV 89146
Telephone: (702) 383-6085

Facsimile: (702) 385-1827

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Dana@overtimelaw.com

Attorneys for Respondents

DATED this 5th day of August, 2020.

/s/ Kaylee Conradi

An employee of Hutchison & Steffen, PLLC

- 1 number 87.48. Do you see that?
- 2 A: Right.
- 3 Q: Which again would be the time that
- 4 A Cab recorded Mr. Sergeant was working for payroll
- 5 purposes...
- A: Right.
- 7 Q: ... for this pay period? 0.48 of an
- 8 hour is 28.8 minutes.
- 9 A: Is it?
- 10 Q: Yes. Do you have any explanation
- 11 as to how he would arrive at 0.48 of an hour as
- 12 opposed to 0.4 or 0.5 of an hour?
- 13 A: Other than having different days
- 14 where they were different and the addition and
- 15 subtraction could've been inaccurate, but to answer
- 16 your questions, I don't know how that happened. But
- 17 it was input by someone at 48 it should've been 50,
- 18 most likely.
- 19 Q: Is information from Cab Manager
- 20 system ever used to record hours of work in
- 21 QuickBooks?
- A: I don't think so.
- Q: Well, when you say you don't think
- 24 so, do you know that?
- A: I think you've asked this of me

- 1 three times in other depositions, and the same answer
- 2 I'll give you now is that I don't think so. If I
- 3 knew so, I would say no. If I thought yes, I would
- 4 say I think it is, but I don't think it is.
- 5 Q: Mr. Nady, if you can't answer that
- 6 you know, when you say, "I think so," you're going to
- 7 get another question from me, because your answer
- 8 really should be you don't know. So if you don't
- 9 know the answer to that question, you don't know. So
- 10 just again to be clear on the record, you don't know
- 11 if information from Cab Manager is ever used to
- 12 record time worked in QuickBooks. Is that correct?
- MS. RODRIGUEZ: Objection; misstates
- 14 his testimony. You can answer. I'm sorry if you
- 15 did. I missed your answer.
- 16 A: Could you ask the question again?
- 17 I'm sorry. I thought you were chastising me and I
- 18 stopped listening.
- 19 Q: Mr. Nady, do you know if
- 20 information from Cab Manager was ever used to record
- 21 working time in QuickBooks?
- A: I don't know.
- Q: Does A Cab currently use a
- 24 timeclock system? By timeclock, Mr. Nady, I mean a
- 25 system whereby employees would each have a card or a

- 1 code that they would punch in to the system when they
- 2 start work each day and end work each day.
- 3 A: Yes, they have a timeclock.
- 4 Q: Is that timeclock system used for
- 5 taxi drivers?
- 6 A: No.
- 7 Q: Is there any reason it's not used
- 8 for taxi drivers?
- 9 A: I never thought of it.
- 10 Q: It didn't occur to you after the
- 11 department of labor investigations that it might be
- 12 good to have taxi drivers use that timeclock system?
- 13 A: They have a timeclock system. They
- 14 punch in and punch out.
- Q: Well, I'm talking about the
- 16 timeclock you were just referring to that is used by
- 17 some employees but not taxi cab drivers at A Cab.
- 18 I'm referring to that timeclock system.
- 19 A: Yes.
- Q: Did it ever occur to you after the
- 21 department of labor investigation to extend use of
- 22 that timeclock system to the taxi drivers?
- A: And I've answered just about a
- 24 minute ago. I said no, because they already use a
- 25 timeclock. That's twice now. If you ask me again,

- 1 I'll wait.
- 2 Q: And by timeclock in that answer,
- 3 Mr. Nady, you're referring to the record that is kept
- 4 on the trip sheets, correct?
- 5 A: I am. I think that's in
- 6 compliance, don't you?
- 7 Q: Now, Mr. Nady, the meters that are
- 8 in the taxi cab upload information into the Cab
- 9 Manager system, correct?
- 10 A: Yes.
- 11 Q: So it will tell A Cab's computer
- 12 system the amount of fares that were recorded on the
- 13 meter during their shift, correct?
- 14 A: That's correct.
- Q: Will it also record the individual
- 16 trips that were taken on the meter?
- 17 A: I don't know. I could say maybe,
- 18 but I don't know.
- 19 Q: Has A Cab ever considered having an
- 20 out-of-service recording feature to be available on
- 21 the taxi meters for the drivers?
- A: I don't know if we have one or not.
- 23 I know that sounds bad, but I don't recall. I
- 24 haven't discussed it for so long. It might be on
- 25 there now, but I don't think so. It might... I think

- 1 preparing to work or gets ready, gets his cab ready,
- 2 until the moment he gets in and gets his work
- 3 completed, unless anytime when he specifically
- 4 reports that he has taken his cab for some personal
- 5 use or drives home or pulls into McDonald's or does
- 6 something that he reports on the trip sheet. We try
- 7 to pay them from the time they get there to the time
- 8 they leave.
- 9 Q: My question, Mr. Nady, was
- 10 different, which is, what is A Cab's understanding of
- 11 the kind of records it was required to keep of the
- 12 time the drivers were working as you've described?
- 13 And I understand A Cab indents to pay the drivers for
- 14 all of their working time, as you've described. My
- 15 question isn't whether A Cab was going to do that or
- 16 trying to do that; my question was, what records of
- 17 that working time did A Cab understand it needed to
- 18 keep?
- 19 A: Trip sheets.
- Q: Did it have any understanding as to
- 21 any other records that it needed to keep?
- A: Well, the trip sheets didn't
- 23 reflect when they came in and dinked around for 5
- 24 minutes or 10 minutes or when they come in and dinked
- 25 around for 5 minutes or took the stuff out of their

- 1 cab and put it in their car on the way in to start to
- 2 do their manipulation on the computer or the time it
- 3 took them to do the inspection, so we estimated that
- 4 time. We met with a good portion of drivers. We're
- 5 going to pay you six minutes for this and six minutes
- 6 for that, and then we raised it to eight minutes
- 7 about a few months later when we started timing it.
- 8 So what records do we keep? We keep records based on
- 9 when they start and then we just allow time for it.
- 10 That's the best we have. I don't think we can do it
- 11 any better. It's an honest effort to do so.
- 12 Q: Well, what you're describing is A
- 13 Cab has made and is making an effort to keep track of
- 14 the time the drivers are working. And...
- 15 A: Thank you.
- 16 Q: Has A Cab ever consulted with
- 17 anyone about the specific form that those records
- 18 should take?
- 19 A: Can you give me an example of who
- 20 you think we might've talked with, because maybe you
- 21 can tell me who I might've talked with?
- Q: Mr. Nady, it's a question of
- 23 whether you have any knowledge of anyone at A Cab on
- 24 behalf of the company consulting with someone about
- 25 this issue.

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1	CERTIFICATE OF RECORDER
2	STATE OF NEVADA)
3	COUNTY OF CLARK)
4	NAME OF CASE: MICHAEL MURRAY vs A CAB TAXI SERVICE LL
5	I, Shaynelle McCalister, a duly commissioned
6	Notary Public, Clark County, State of Nevada, do hereby
7	certify: That I recorded the taking of the
8	deposition of the witness, Creighton Nady,
9	commencing on 11/22/2016.
10	That prior to being examined the witness was
11	duly sworn to testify to the truth.
12	I further certify that I am not a relative or
13	employee of an attorney or counsel of any of the
14	parties, nor a relative or employee of an attorney or
15	counsel involved in said action, nor a person
16	financially interested in the action.
17	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my
18	hand in my office in the County of Clark, State of
19	Nevada, this 11/22/2016.
20	May Afficalista
21	
22	Shaynelle McCalister Notary
23	
24	
25	

1	Page 319 CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIPTION
2	STATE OF NEVADA)
3	COUNTY OF CLARK)
4	NAME OF CASE: MICHAEL MURRAY VS A CAB TAXI SERVICE LL
5	I, Peter Hellman, a duly commissioned
6	Notary Public, Clark County, State of Nevada, do hereby
7	certify: That I transcribed or supervised the transcription
8	of the Recorded deposition of the witness,
9	Creighton Nady,
10	commencing on 11/22/2016. The Transcription is a true
11	and accurate represetation of the testimony taken from
12	the witness, Creighton Nady.
13	I further certify that I am not a relative or
14	employee of an attorney or counsel of any of the
15	parties, nor a relative or employee of an attorney or
16	counsel involved in said action, nor a person
17	financially interested in the action.
18	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my
19	hand in my office in the County of Clark, State of
20	Nevada, this 11/22/2016.
21	
22	
23	Peter Hellman - Notary
24	
25	

LEON GREENBERG

Attorney at Law
2965 South Jones Boulevard • Suite E-3
Las Vegas, Nevada 89146
(702) 383-6085

Leon Greenberg
Member Nevada, California
New York, Pennsylvania and New Jersey Bars
Admitted to the United States District Court of Colorado
Dana Sniegocki
Member Nevada and California Bars

May 17, 2016

The Honorable Bonnie A. Bulla Discovery Commissioner 200 Lewis Avenue, 5th Floor Las Vegas, Nevada 89155

VIA HAND DELIVERY ON MAY 18, 2016

Re: Murray v. A Cab A-12-669926-C

May 20, 2016 Status Check on Compliance with Discovery

Production - Quickbooks Payroll Information Production

Dear Commissioner Bulla:

When counsel last appeared in this case on April 8, 2016 they were in conflict regarding the production of class member payroll information maintained by the defendants in Quickbooks. Your Honor reviewed the form of Quickbooks data furnished by defendants and considered my concerns with that production. While no formal Report and Recommendation was issued at that time, as the minutes from April 8, 2016 (attached) reflect, I believe Your Honor did understand there was a need to "...re-format the data from Quickbooks in a meaningful way." Your Honor directed counsel to cooperate in doing so and instructed that I "...put in writing to Defense counsel a letter re: what is necessary and an explanation, and courtesy copy Commissioner..." I believe that directive resulted from defendant's counsel's assertion that defendants did not know how to produce the Quickbooks data in an appropriate format and my pledge to Your Honor that I could provide written clarification about how to do so from a skilled Quickbooks professional.

With this letter I provide the declaration of Nancy Whissel, a "Certified ProAdvisor" of Quickbooks (that certification is conferred by Intuit, the creator of



Fax: (702) 385-1827

Quickbooks), which I delivered to the defendants' counsel today. Exhibit "3" of the declaration (previously provided to defendants' counsel on May 13, 2016) is an illustrated step by step process to produce the Quickbooks data in a suitable format. I believe Your Honor may gain a beneficial understanding about this issue by reviewing Ms. Whissel's declaration and the exhibits thereto in their entirety.

As of the date of this letter, I am unsure if the parties will reach an appropriate understanding about the Quickbooks data production.

I would also like to comment, briefly, about the fundamental background, and dynamics, of the Quickbooks data production. The Quickbooks information sought (class member payroll data) was maintained in that electronic fashion, within Quickbooks, in the first instance by the defendants in the normal course of their business. Such information, only after being so created, maintained, and inputted into Quickbooks, was then used to print defendants' paper paycheck stubs. Pursuant to NRCP Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(ii), governing the production of electronically stored information, a party "...must produce it [electronically stored information] in a form or forms which it is ordinarily maintained...."

The defendants "ordinarily maintained" the payroll data electronically in Quickbooks as part of a master "Quickbooks Company" file, which is akin to a complete "file cabinet" of company financial data. Defendants do not dispute they can easily make a complete copy of their "Quickbooks Company" file (Quickbooks has a built in "push the button" function to do so), something plaintiffs are willing to accept. Defendants do not want to produce that entire "Quickbooks Company" file (even subject to a protective order) since it would contain all of their Quickbooks stored financial information and include information plaintiffs do not seek or desire and have no use for. But I do not believe that under NRCP Rule 34 it should be plaintiffs' burden to remedy the defendants' purported lack of expertise on how to extract just that single "file drawer" containing the Quickbooks payroll data when the entire "file cabinet" (the Quickbooks Company file) is so easily produced. Notwithstanding that fact, I have incurred a considerable expense in securing the Whissel declaration and have expended a very considerable amount of time trying to provide such expertise to the defendants.

Respectfully submitted,

Leon Greenberg

cc: Esther Rodriguez, Esq. (Via Email)

https://www.clarkcountycourts.us/Anonymous/CaseDetail.aspx?CaseID=9429974&HearingID...

		Case No. A-12-6699	26-C	
Nichael Murray	, Plaintiff(s) vs. A Cab Taxi Service LLC, Defendant(s)	(in (in (in (in (in) (in) (in)	Subtype: Date Filed:	Other Civil Filing Other Civil Matters 10/08/2012 Department 1 A669926
		PARTY INFORMATIO	∀	
)efendant	A Cab LLC			Lead Attorneys Esther Rodriguez <i>Retained</i> 7023208400(W)
efendant	A Cab Taxí Service LLC			Michael K. Wall Relained 7023852500(W)
refendant	Nady, Creighton J .			Esther C. Rodriguez Retained 7023208405(/V)
laintìff	Murray, Michael			Leon Greenberg Retained 7023836085(VV)
laintiff	Reno, Michael			Leon Greenberg Retained 7023838085(W)

04/08/2016 Further Proceedings (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Bulla, Bonnie)

Further Proceedings: Discovery Production / Deferred Ruling

Minutes

03/16/2016 10:00 AM

04/06/2016 10:00 AM

Colloquy re: the District Court Judge has not made all Decisions, a stay is in place on the
February 10th order, and a separate Motion is set to stay all proceedings. Commissioner is not
inclined to Recommend further fees and costs today as Motions are pending. Colloquy. Ms.
Rodriguez explained her attempts to comply with Commissioner's Recommendation.

1 of 2

5/18/2016 11:18 AM

https://www.clarkcountycourts.us/Anonymous/CaseDetail.aspx?CaseID=9429974&HearingID...

Arguments by counsel. Print out of production provided from Mr. Greenberg to Commissioner in Open Court. Colleguy re: data disclosed. Discussion re: the Bahera Decision.

Commissioner DENIED Mr. Greenberg's request for Defense counsel to correspond with him in writing. Colleguy re: providing information with a Motion pending. Ms. Rodriguez will re-format the data from Quickbooks in a meaningful way. Colleguy re: submission in carnera. COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDED, produce 1) employees (absent names until the Court rides on class certification), 2) wage earned and hours. 3) pay period, and 4) any deductions and for what (including health deductions). Commissioner advised Mr. Greenberg to put in writing to Defense counsel a letter re: what is necessary and an explanation, and courtesy copy Commissioner; Ms. Rodriguez will identify employees by number and develop a key. No Report and Recommendation today. Commissioner expects better communication between counsel: COMMISSIONER RECOMMENDED, Status Check SET in 30 days, 5/20/16-10:00 a.m. Status Check: Status of Case.

Parties Present Return to Register of Actions

2 of 2

5/18/2016 H:18 AM

1 LEON GREENBERG, ESQ. Nevada Bar No.: 8094 DANA SNIEGOCKI, ESQ. Nevada Bar No.: 11715 Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation 2965 South Jones Boulevard - Suite E-3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89146 (702) 383-6085 5 702) 385-1827(fax) leongreenberg@ovértimelaw.com 6 dana@overtimelaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs 8 DISTRICT COURT 9 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA MICHAEL MURRAY and Case No.: A-12-669926-C 10 MICHAEL RENO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly DEPT .: I 11 situated, 12 Plaintiffs, 13 VS. DECLARATION OF NANCY WHISSEL 14 A CAB TAXI SERVICE LLC, A CAB, LLC, and CREIGHTON J. 15 NADY, Defendants. 16 17 Nancy Whissel, hereby affirms, under penalty of perjury, that: 18 19 I am the owner of Nevada Quickbooks Pro. My office, Nevada 20 Quickbooks Pro, provides services involving the use of Quickbooks to a variety of 21 businesses in Las Vegas. I have over 25 years of experience using Quickbooks 22 23 including the use of Quickbooks to maintain and process employee payroll 24 information. Quickbooks is the standard business software used by the vast majority 25 of small businesses to keep track of their finances, including their employee payroll. 26 27 The sort of employee payroll information that Quickbooks is used to keep track of and 28 process includes compensation paid (including various different kinds of

compensation), hours worked, and deductions made from an employee's pay. I am highly familiar with the use of Quickbooks and the ability of Quickbooks to transfer ("export") information into Excel (spreadsheets). I have received certification from Intuit (the maker of Quickbooks software) as a "Certified ProAdvisor" in Quickbooks.

- 2. I have been asked by the plaintiffs' attorneys in this case to furnish a statement explaining how information on printed employee paystubs, originally printed from Quickbooks, can be exported (transferred) from Quickbooks into an Excel computer file. The purpose of such a transfer of information from Quickbooks to Excel would be to use the Excel software to easily determine if an employee was paid at least the required minimum hourly wage for each of their pay periods.

 Attached to this declaration, Exhibit "1," is a copy of what I am told are four "paystubs" for one A-Cab employee. I am advised that those paystubs were prepared (printed) from Quickbooks.
- 3. Attached to this declaration, Exhibit "2," is a "sample" form of Excel spreadsheet containing some of the Exhibit "1" paystub information set up in a form that would easily allow a determination of the hourly rate for this employee. Columns "A" through "L" of Exhibit "2" contain the payroll information from the Exhibit "1" paystubs with column "M" of Exhibit "2" being the "calculation" column showing what the employee's hourly rate was for each of the four Exhibit "1" pay periods (excluding tips from that calculation and assuming the number "Minimum Wage Subsidy Qty" represents the hours worked).

1

Having the payroll information for A-Cab, that is printed on the Exhibit "I" paystubs, exported directly from Quickbooks into Excel, and placed into an Excel spreadsheet in the form of Exhibit "2," allows the calculation of the hourly rate for many thousands of different employee pay periods instantaneously (that is done by inserting the column "M" calculation, as in Exhibit "2"). The Exhibit "2" sample (Excel uses the term "worksheet" to refer to such a thing) has a "single line" format, meaning all of the information for each single pay period (employee name, date, all other particulars of the payroll) appear on a "single line." This single line format is essential for easy analysis of the payroll information, as it allows the creation of the Exhibit "2" column "M" calculation. The alternative to this sort of automated analysis in Excel would involve having someone sit down with a calculator, and determine, manually, for each individual pay period, the hourly rate from the printed paystubs. That process, if it were to involve thousands of individual paychecks to hundreds of employees, would be incredibly time consuming. In addition, although not demonstrated in the attached Exhibit "2," the Excel software can easily and instantaneously (by adding columns "N" and "O") calculate the amount of unpaid minimum wages, if any, due the employee in a particular pay period depending on whether the minimum wage rate was \$7.25 or \$8.25 an hour.

5. I have been asked whether the Quickbooks software, that produced the Exhibit "1" paystubs, can easily transfer ("export" is the term used in Quickbooks) the information in those printed paystubs into Excel in a manner that would either, when

28

transferred, appear in the "single line" format of Exhibit "2" or in another fashion that can easily be rearranged by Excel into that "single line" format. The answer to that question is yes. I have also been asked how difficult it would be to perform that transfer ("export") of information from Quickbooks into Excel. The answer to that question is that the procedure is not very difficult. Attached to this declaration at Exhibit "3" is a narrative I constructed that includes actual "screen shots" of Quickbooks. It explains how to create a "payroll detail report" that will export into Excel in a single line format one payroll item for all employees for a specified time period. This procedure would have to be repeated for each relevant payroll item appearing on the printed paystubs, there are 8 such payroll items in the paystubs at Exhibit "1" (reproduced at columns "E" through "L" of Exhibit "2") meaning the Exhibit "3" process would have to be repeated 8 times based upon the paystubs provided. But that would be 8 times for all employees not each employee. The process detailed in Exhibit "3" can also be easily filtered by "class." The "class" designation in Quickbooks is typically used by employers to designate a particular department of employees, such as in this case just its taxi drivers. Such a "taxi driver class" filter, if included in the Exhibit "3" process, would limit the exported Excel information to just A-Cab's taxi drivers.

6. In respect to the time needed to perform the export into Excel of the Quickbooks information, as I describe in Exhibit 3 and discuss above in paragraph 5, there is no reason for that process to consume more than a few hours of someone's

time. That is true even if 100,000 or 200,000 or more individual employee paychecks were so processed. That is because actually performing the process I detail in Exhibit "3" only takes a few minutes. While it may take 5 or 10 minutes for each of the 8 "executions" of that Quickbooks to Excel export process to run, the person entering that process in the computer need not stand by the computer and can do other things while the computer processes each Excel export. Any computer in use today can rapidly process very large amounts of data in a very short amount of time. There is no reason to believe it would take more than one day to export from Quickbooks into Excel all of A-Cab's payroll records from 2008 through the present using the method I detail in Exhibit "3" even if A-Cab was paying 200 employees every two weeks.

- 7. The process I describe in Exhibit "3" will, once performed, allow the easy creation, within Excel, of the desired "single line" Excel worksheet that is illustrated at Exhibit "2." That is because each outputted line of information from Quickbooks, using the Exhibit "3" method, will have a common reference, a unique check number, for each related payroll item. Through the use of formulas within the Excel software making use of that common reference, the information exported from Quickbooks into Excel using the Exhibit "3" process can be easily reconfigured into the Exhibit "2" form of worksheet for analysis purposes.
- 8. It would also be possible to produce the information that appears on the Exhibit "1" paystubs for all A-Cab taxi drivers by identifying the particular computer files in Quickbooks that contain that information and just copying those

"export" of information from Quickbooks into Excel in the manner I have described.

That sort of "file copying" process is not something I can advise about but can be performed by someone with suitable knowledge of the Quickbooks files, the sorts of information contained in those files, and the relationships between those files.

9. In the event the personnel at A-Cab who use their Quickbooks software would have difficulty understanding the process of producing an Excel file in the form annexed at Exhibit "3" or otherwise need assistance in properly exporting into Excel their relevant Quickbooks payroll information, I can come to the offices of A-Cab and assist in the production of that Excel file. My standard hourly rate for such services is \$125.00 an hour. I have been paid that rate for the time I have spent speaking with plaintiffs' attorney about this matter and preparing, signing and reviewing this declaration and its attached Exhibits. I have no personal relationships with plaintiffs' attorneys nor any of the parties to this case and no personal interest in the outcome of this case. I have never acted as a consultant or witness for plaintiffs' attorneys in any prior matter.

I have read the foregoing and affirm under penalty of perjury that the same is true and correct.

Nancy Whissel Date

Employee			EW-A	*	SSN	Status (Fed/State)		Allowances/Extra	
Michael C. Sargeant, 2001 Rai	mrod Ave. #221	5, Henders	on, NV 89014		***-**-5207	Single/(none)	WOODDECOUNTED TO LOCAL TO THE PARTY WANTED	Fed-1/0/NV-0/0	
Earnings and Hours	Qη	Rate	Current	YTD Amount	Pay Period; 07/	05/2014 - 07/18/2014		Pay Date: 07/25/2014	4
Minimum Wage Subsidy	57.08	4.27	243.73	583,62					
Driver Commission	1.00	165,01	165,01	1,163.01					
Incentive #5	٠.	5.00	5,00	16.00		•			
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Social Security Employee			-28,55	-125.98	, to the second				
Medicare Employee 🔻	1		-6,67	-29.46		•			
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Net Pay			346,52	/ 1,487.64					
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A Cab. LLC. 1500 Searles Avenue. 1500 Searles Avenue, Las Vegas, NV 89101-1123, A CAB TAXI SERVICE LLC

A CAB, SERIES LLC Employee Leasing Company

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Aichael C. Sargeant, 2001 Ram	rod Ave. #221	5, Henderso	n, NV 89014		***,**-5207	Status (Fed/State) Single/(none)		Allowances/Extra Fed-1/0/NV-0/0
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Supervisor Counseling Pay			0.00	1.45			معيد	, j
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A Cab, LLC, 1500 Searles Avenue, 1500 Searles Avenue, Las Vegas, NV 89101-1123, A CAB TAXI SERVICE LLC

Employee	-		SSN	Status (Fed/State)	. Allowances/Extra
Michael C. Sargeant, 2003 Ramrod Ave. #22	5. Hencerson	, NV 89014	***-**-5207	Single/(none)	Fed-1/0/NV-0/0
Earnings and Hours Oty	Rate	Current YTD	Pay Period: unount	05/24/2014 - 08/06/2014	Pay Date: 06/53/2014
Minimum Wage Subsidy 87.48 Driver Commission 1.00	1,43 415,41	125.10	125.10	And the state of t	
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A CAB, SERIES LLC Employee Leasing Company


12613

Michael C. Sargeant, 2001 Ram	rod Ave. #221	5. Hendersc	n. NV 89014		SSN ***-**-5207	Status (Fed/State) Single/(none)	Allowances/Extra
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
A Cab, LLC. 1500 Searles Avenue, 1500 Searles Avenue, Las Vegas, NV 89101-1123, A CAB TAXI SERVICE LLC

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ယ	Sargeant Michael	Michael	8/1/2014	8/1/2014 7/28/2014	22.81	93.06	72.41	0	17.9	තු	0	-17.9	0	7.25

1. Run Payroll Item Detail Report




2. Click on Customize Report




- 3. Choose the desired date range.
- 4. In the Columns section, Uncheck (left margin), Type and Wage Base.
- 5. In the Columns section, Check Qty (represents Hours), Sales Price (represents Wage Rate), Pay Period Begin Date, Pay Period End Date.


6. The resulting report will contain the paycheck detail for all employees grouped by Payroll Item Detail. It will show all of the check dates with the first wage rate grouped together with a total and then the next wage rate grouped together with a total and so on for each Payroll Item.




7. Click the Excel button that is just above the report in the window. Choose Create New Worksheet.



8. Click the blue Export button.



9. The result will be as shown below:



10161 Park Pun Drive Suite 150	Las Vegas, Nevada 89145	Tel (702) 320-8400	Fax (702) 320-8401	

VS.

OPPS
Esther C. Rodriguez, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 6473
RODRIGUEZ LAW OFFICES, P.C.
10161 Park Run Drive, Suite 150
Las Vegas, Nevada 89145
702-320-8400
info@rodriguezlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendant A Cab, LLC

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

MICHAEL MURPHY and MICHAEL RENO, Individually and on behalf of others similarly situated,	Case No.: A-12-669926-C Dept. No. I
Plaintiffs,	Hearing Date: November 18, 2015 Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.

A CAB TAXI SERVICE LLC and A CAB, LLC,

Defendants.

DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

Defendant A Cab, LLC ("A Cab"), by and through its attorney, Esther C. Rodriguez, Esq., of RODRIGUEZ LAW OFFICES, P.C., hereby submits this Opposition to Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief submitted November 16, 2015.

Plaintiffs brought this dispute pertaining to their request for Cab Manager data, before the Discovery Commissioner in March 2015. Plaintiffs then proceeded to request continuances of this hearing and this issue before the Discovery Commissioner until 8 months later. Since then, discovery has been closed as of October 1, 2015; and for all purposes, this was assumed to be a dead or non-issue. On the eve before the status check, Plaintiffs suddenly submit extensive supplemental briefing hurling all types of unfounded allegations against Defendant and seeking over \$29,000 in sanctions.

On May 20, 2015 at one of the continuances of this matter, the Discovery Commissioner ordered that complete copies of 2 deposition transcripts be submitted to her (by July 21, 2015); the

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Commissioner did not indicate that the Plaintiffs would be allowed to basically submit a new motion with new allegations on the eve before the hearing. With less than 1 day in which to respond to the various accusations, Defendant will do its best to respond to the numerous allegations, as the evidence demonstrates that Plaintiffs' allegations are unfounded and not supported by the record of events.

The reality of this case is that Plaintiffs have failed to prepare their case within the discovery deadlines. Discovery closed October 1, 2015, and the Plaintiffs altogether failed to make a minimal showing of any type of wage claim for either Plaintiff Michael Murray or Plaintiff Michael Reno. No documents, witnesses, or any other type of evidence has ever been produced by Plaintiffs to support a minimum wage claim. As such, Defendants moved for summary judgment and dismissal against Plaintiff Michael Murray and Michael Reno. The dispositive motions were just recently heard by Judge Cory on November 3, 2015, who denied summary judgment based on Plaintiffs' representations that the unresolved discovery issues pertained to Murray and Reno -which is not the case.

As this Court is aware, in order to avoid summary judgment, Plaintiff must come forward with specific facts on which the Court could rule in its favor on the issues addressed in this motion. Hickman v. Meadow Wood Reno, 96 Nev. 782, 617 P.2d 871 (1980). At the summary judgment hearing of this matter on November 3, 2015, Defendant highlighted to Judge Cory that dismissal was appropriate as there were no genuine issues of fact which remain for trial and Defendant A Cab is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Defendant demonstrated to the Court that neither Plaintiff had attached any supporting affidavits, testimony, or document that would support the claims of Michael Reno or Michael Murray, and discovery was closed October 1, 2015. Defendant also demonstrated to Judge Cory that Plaintiffs had refused to comply with NRCP 16.1's requirement of ever demonstrating a calculations of damages. Plaintiffs had repeatedly attached documents to pleadings that had never been produced in discovery. And Defendants submitted deposition transcripts to show that Plaintiffs had refused to participate in discovery, by outright refusing to answer questions in a deposition, or pleading the Fifth Amendment Right against self incrimination fearing prosecution for perjury during the deposition.

Incredibly, the only thing Plaintiffs' counsel could argue to survive summary judgment was that there were issues remaining before the Discovery Commissioner that remained unresolved, and therefore summary judgment should not be entered. Defendant informed the Court that the issues before the Discovery Commissioner did <u>not</u> pertain to Plaintiffs Murray or Reno, but rather were Plaintiffs' counsel's attempts to acquire information on *other* drivers. The Motion to Compel has nothing to do with information on Murray or Reno, and in fact pertains to a time period for when they were no longer employed at A Cab.

All documentation including payroll records, stubs, personnel records, tripsheets have been turned over to Plaintiffs for Michael Murray and Michael Reno, very early on in the discovery period. In the three years, Plaintiffs have been unable to demonstrate any type of minimum wage claim throughout the course of discovery. Before the Court ever considers a certification of class claims, the Court must be assured that the named Plaintiffs have a justiciable claim. Michael Murray and Michael Reno do not.

Out of an abundance of caution, Judge Cory denied the motions for summary judgment without prejudice, pending the hearing before the Discovery Commissioner and allowed Defendant to re-file following the hearing before the Discovery Commissioner.

Judge Cory also did not certify the matter as a class action, but has taken the matter under advisement to consider the various issues including the suitability of the Plaintiffs as representatives, or even whether they have a justiciable claim.

1. Plaintiffs' failure to participate in discovery should not be rewarded.

Well in advance of the discovery deadlines, Defendant produced over 1800 documents to Plaintiffs including all documents pertaining to Michael Murray and Michael Reno. With the discovery conducted, or lack thereof by Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs altogether failed to establish a prima facie case for either plaintiff.

Seeking to overcome their clear deficiency, Plaintiffs brought in a new defendant right before the close of discovery. Based on the new addition of naming the cab company owner, Creighton J. Nady, Plaintiffs now seek to reopen discovery and to do what they should have done over the last 3 years.

The deadlines for amending pleadings and adding parties are established to allow parties to amend to conform to the evidence which has surfaced during the discovery period. In this instance, Plaintiffs have amended their pleading for the purpose of obtaining another discovery period. Such tactics should not be allowed, as it defeats the purpose of having a Scheduling Order and deadlines.

In defiance of the rules of discovery, Plaintiffs have never indicated a calculation of damages in compliance with NRCP 16.1. The ramifications of this noncompliance was highlighted during the depositions of each Plaintiff. Firstly, as Plaintiff Michael Reno never indicated a value of his claim, a Department of Labor determination was reviewed as valuing any possible underpayment to Reno as \$1048.94. Exhibit 1. Defendant made an offer to resolve this claim months ago to the Plaintiff in a formal pleading in an amount 15 times the value of the case at \$15,000.00. Exhibit 2. Contrary to the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct, this information was never conveyed to Plaintiff Reno by his counsel. Plaintiff was never informed of the offer on the table. Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2 and Rule 1.4.

- Q. Are you aware that A Cab offered you \$15,000 as an attempt to resolve any amounts that you were owed?
- A. I never heard anything. Nobody ever told me anything.
- Q. Take a look at that document that I have just handed you, Mr. Reno.
- A. I wonder why they wouldn't --
- Q. Have you ever seen this document before, it's entitled A Cab LLC's Offer Of Judgment To Plaintiff, Michael Reno?
- 21 A. No, ma'am.
 - Q. So you were unaware that there was a \$15,000 offer to you? Exhibit 3, Deposition of Reno, 68:10-22.

Similarly, Michael Murray was never told by his counsel about the offer of judgment made to him in a timely manner. Such actions are telling for a number of reasons. Firstly, this demonstrates that this action is attorney-driven litigation, not one in which the interest of these Plaintiffs is at the heart of the matter. Secondly, NRCP 16.1 has a requirement of disclosures, and in this instance, Plaintiffs have simply refused to comply.

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As this Court is aware, a primary purpose of a deposition is to allow an adverse party to ascertain the basis of a claim. At no time during the deposition of Michael Reno, was there any indication that he is either pursuing a minimum wage claim, nor that he has any basis to support such a claim. In fact, from his testimony, Reno has very little concept of what he is suing for, or even who he is suing.1 Instead, Reno made clear in several pages of testimony that he believed and he was told that the company was "stealing" from him, and that his proof was in the fact that he was making less money than he had in the past. Exhibit 3, Deposition of Reno, 21:15-24; 27:14-19; 39:5-40:20.

Similarly, during his deposition, Plaintiff Michael Murray indicated he had no idea of what he is claiming from A Cab, and when pressed for any details refused to answer further. When asked why he did not accept the offer from A Cab, he pled the Fifth Amendment against Self Incrimination, under threat of perjuring himself in his deposition.

So in answer to why you didn't accept that, is it your testimony that you didn't think it was Q: enough?

Plaintiff's Counsel: I'm going to object. That has been asked and answered. I'm also going to just caution you that you're not going to discuss or you're not going to testify as to any of the contents of the communications you may have had with myself or your other counsel, Mr. Greenberg.

THE WITNESS: Okay.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Can we have the question read back to the deponent, please. I thought there was a question.

(Record read by reporter.) 21

MS. SNIEGOCKI: I'm going to assert the same objection. It's already in the record. And I'll again

¹ O. Do you understand that you filed a complaint against A Cab? A. Well, that's -- that's kind of a thing like the president, you sign a deal to get something, the book has you giving up everything else. I went against A Cab. They got something going on with Western because they are in, what, collusion you call it? That's not my idea, but if their shortness, too, and I'm working for them, of course I want that money, too. I just want fairness. If another person is shorting them, another person is shorting them, then they are all in it. All of their hands are dirty. Exhibit 3, Reno deposition, 25:7-18.

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Yes.

, And	cautio	on you that you're not going to testify as to any communications you've had with myself or Mr		
2	Gree	nberg during the course of representation. You can answer the question.		
3	A:	I'm going to cite the Fifth on that.		
4	Q:	You're going to cite the Fifth on that?		
5	A:	Um-hmm.		
6	Q:	Is that a "yes"?		
7	A:	No.		
8	Q:	You have to say your answers verbally. I know you're nodding your head to me, but		
9	A:	Yes.		
10	Q:	when I asked you earlier if you didn't accept why you didn't accept this, and I		
		understood your testimony to say that you thought it wasn't enough, and I was trying to find		
12		out if that's, indeed, what you said. And I know we got objections, and I will accept your		
13		objections on the record. But now I'm asking you to confirm that. Is that what you said?		

And you're asserting the Fifth? Q:

Yes. That was my answer. Exhibit 4, Deposition of Murray, 61:4-63:3.

The purpose of this rule [NRCP 68] is to encourage settlement of lawsuits before trial. Morgan v. Demille, 106 Nev. 671, 799 P.2d 561 (1990). This rule and NRS 17.115 are designed to facilitate and encourage settlement. Matthews v. Collman, 110 Nev. 940, 878 P.2d 971 (1994).

In this instance, there was a complete failure on the part of Plaintiff's counsel to relay Defendant's good faith offer to the client.

Plaintiffs acted in bad faith following a discovery conference as to the remaining discovery.

On September 10, 2015, the parties engaged in a telephonic conference to determine any remaining discovery to be completed with the approaching October 1st deadline. At that time, the parties agreed that Defendant would be deposing the Labor Commissioner and Deputy Labor Commissioner on September 29th and 30th. At no time during that discussion did Plaintiffs indicate any other discovery other than their request to continue the deposition of Jay Nady.

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The following evening Plaintiffs suddenly set five (5) depositions on the same days on		
which Defendants' depositions were already set. Exhibit 5, Correspondence to Plaintiffs'		
Counsel. Due to the conflicting notices, Defendant continued the depositions of the Labor		
Commissioner and Deputy, and made all requested witnesses available including:		

September 29, 2015: 9 am, Sam Wood

11 am, Jon Gathright

1 pm, Mike Malloy

September 30, 2015: 3 pm, Bob McCullough

Defendant did not agree to another Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of A Cab. The prior deposition had already exceeded 7 ½ hours excluding breaks.

3. Plaintiffs' Improper PMK deposition.

The Discovery Commissioner indicated that the Plaintiffs could take a PMK deposition to determine the nature of the electronic storage of any payroll information. Plaintiffs instead sent a 23 category notice of deposition, with subcategories. **Exhibit 6**. This deposition lasted from 11 am to after 7 pm at night on August 18, 2015. Despite the detailed categories and defendant's attempts to ensure compliance with all 23 categories and subparts, Mr. Greenberg proceeded to spend the majority of the time of the deposition asking questions outside the scope of the numerous categories. When this tacted was objected to, Mr. Greenberg indicated he simply would not be using the responses in a court proceeding.

Due to the short period in which defense counsel has been given to respond to Plaintiffs' extensive pleading just received, Defendant requests additional time to brief as to why this PMK deposition should be terminated.

4. <u>Defendant should not be compelled to turn over data not related to the claims.</u> nor the named Plaintiffs.

Cab Manager Program: Plaintiffs seek production of the cab manager data base in its entirety. The testimony from Jim Morgan supports that this cannot be completed, nor is Cab Manager a payroll program.

Quickbooks Database: Plaintiffs seek production of the company Quickbooks program.

Correspondence has been sent to Plaintiffs' counsel indicating why this cannot be completed. The
data stored in Quickbooks includes information on the company's vendors, expenses, and revenue.
Therefore, to simply plug a drive into their system to copy it in the "data dump" format that
Plaintiffs seek will be overly invasive in acquiring company information not in the least relevant to
the claims. The Quickbooks company data is in no way relevant to a claim for minimum wage,
much less relevant to the Plaintiffs in this case. Nevertheless, the offer was made to Plaintiffs that
if they would specify what information they are seeking from the Quickbooks database, A Cab
would see whether a query can be run to capture the specific data, or whether it is stored at all in
Quickbooks.

DOL Excel spreadsheet: Plaintiffs are now asking for an Excel spreadsheet that was prepared for the Department of Labor. This was provided to Plaintiffs prior to February 2015, as acknowledged by Mr. Greenberg. **Exhibit 7**.

II. Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing points and authorities, Defendant A CAB, LLC respectfully requests this Honorable Court to enter an Order denying Plaintiff's Motion to Compel the Production of Documents, and to deny the Motion to Extend discovery.

DATED this 17th day of November, 2015.

RODRIGUEZ LAW OFFICES, P. C.

/s/ Esther C, Rodriguez, Esq.
Esther C. Rodriguez, Esq.
Nevada State Bar No. 006473
10161 Park Run Drive, Suite 150
Las Vegas, Nevada 89145
Attorneys for Defendant A Cab, LLC

Rodriguez Law Offices, P.C. 10161 Park Run Drive, Suite 150 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Tel (702) 320-8401 Fax (702) 320-8401

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY on this 17th day of November, 2015, I electronically filed the
foregoing with the Eighth Judicial District Court Clerk of Court using the E-file and Serve System
which will send a notice of electronic service to the following:

Leon	Greenberg, Esq.	
Leon	Greenberg Professional	Corporation
2965	South Jones Boulevard,	Suite E4
Las V	Vegas, Nevada 89146	
Coun	sel for Plaintiff	

/s/ Susan Dillow
An Employee of Rodriguez Law Offices, P.C.

Hun & Lalin

CLERK OF THE COURT

SUPP 1 LEON GREENBERG, ESQ., SBN 8094 DANA SNIEGOCKI, ESQ., SBN 11715 Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation 2965 South Jones Blvd- Suite E3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89146 702) 383-6085 702) 385-1827(fax) 5 ongreenberg@overtimelaw.com lana@overtimelaw.com 6 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 MICHAEL MURRAY, and MICHAEL RENO, Individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, 12 13 VS.

A CAB TAXI SERVICE LLC, A CAB,

LLC, and CREIGHTON J. NADY,

Defendants.

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Case No.: A-12-669926-C Dept.: I

FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs, through their attorneys, Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation, hereby submit this supplement to their reply to defendants' opposition to plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment.

WAGES OWED TO EACH CLASS MEMBER AS ESTABLISHED BY DEFENDANTS' PAYROLL RECORDS

As discussed at page 8 of plaintiffs' reply an issue is raised in defendants' opposition about awarding partial summary judgment based upon defendants' payroll records for the period after 12/31/15. That issue is raised because the prior (currently as of the date of this submission) NRCP Rule 23(b)(3) damages class certification in this case was only through 12/31/15 (a motion has been pending since October 14, 2016 to extend that time period). As discussed in the reply, the Court should, at a

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minimum, award the class damages based upon the defendants' payroll records through 12/31/15. Plaintiffs' moving papers presented a summary of the payroll records through 5/20/16 and the "per plaintiff" calculations of minimum wages owed based upon that summary. That entire summary of the payroll records included every payroll period from 1/1/13 to 12/31/15 and is not now reproduced again.

A somewhat smaller amount of minimum wages are owed to each of the individual class members at the \$8.25 an hour rate¹ if the Court only grants partial summary judgment for the period prior to 1/1/2016. The amounts so owed are detailed in Exhibit "1" to Exhibit "A" hereto, the supplemental declaration of Charles Bass.² There are also 65 persons who would only be entitled to an award of minimum wages based upon defendants' payroll records if an award was to include the payroll records for the time after 12/31/15. Those 65 persons are identified at Exhibit "2" to Exhibit "A" hereto.

Accordingly, as discussed in plaintiffs' prior submissions on this motion, judgment is requested for, at a minimum, the amounts specified in Exhibit "1" to Exhibit "A" hereto for each class member so identified.

Dated: February 23, 2017

LEON GREENBERG PROFESSIONAL CORP.

/s/ Leon Greenberg
Leon Greenberg, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 8094
2965 S. Jones Boulevard - Ste. E-3
Las Vegas, NV 89146
Tel (702) 383-6085
Attorney for the Class

The minimum wages owed at the \$7.25 an hour rate are not changed by using the 12/31/15 "cutoff" for the partial summary judgment award. There were no \$7.25 an hour minimum wage deficiencies established by the payroll records, except for nominal rounding errors totaling less than \$23.00 for the entire class, during the 2016 time period.

² A signed copy of the Bass declaration will be filed shortly.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

The undersigned certifies that on February 23, 2017, she served the within:

Plaintiffs' Supplement to Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

by court electronic service to:

TO:

Esther C. Rodriguez, Esq. RODRIGUEZ LAW OFFICES, P.C. 10161 Park Run Drive, Suite 150 Las Vegas, NV 89145

/s/ Dana Sniegocki

Dana Sniegocki

1	LEON GREENBERG, ESO.		
2	LEON GREENBERG, ESQ. Nevada Bar No.: 8094 DANA SNIEGOCKI, ESQ. Nevada Bar No.: 11715 Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation 2965 South Jones Boulevard - Suite E-3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89146		
3			
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5	(702) 383-6085 (702) 385-1827(fax) leongreenberg@overtimelaw.com		
6 7	leongreenberg@overtimelaw.com dana@overtimelaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs		
, 8			
9	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
10	* A.I.T.B.B.B.B. * V	PRITE E 9 1 TEN V CREPCE	
11	MICHAEL MURRAY and	Case No.: A-12-669926-C	
12	MICHAEL RENO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,	DEPT.: I	
13	Plaintiffs,		
14	VS.	DECLARATION OF CHARLES BASS	
15	A CAB TAXI SERVICE LLC, A		
16	CAB, LLC, and CREIGHTON J. NADY,		
17	Defendants.		
18 19	Charles Bass hereby affirms, under penalty of perjury, that:		
20			
21	1. I am self-employed as a computer systems and software consultant. I have		
22	over 30 years of experience in working with computer spreadsheets and databases		
23	including Microsoft Excel software. I previously provided a detailed declaration to		
24	the Court that I signed on January 11, 2017 that discussed the summarization I		
25 26	performed of the Excel files that were provided to me in this case.		
20 27	2. Attorney Leon Greenberg, who I understand represents the plaintiffs (class		
2 <i>1</i> 28			
	members) in this case has requested that I modify the summarization that I previously		

performed and discussed in my January 11, 2017 declaration. He requested that I reconstruct that summarization in the exact same manner as I describe in my January 11, 2017 declaration except that I limit the payroll periods so summarized to those that have a "Pay Period End Date" that is prior to 1/1/2016 (the prior summarization I performed included payroll periods through May of 2016). I have done so and provided to Leon Greenberg that revised summarization, which, when printed, consists of 529 pages and summarizes 14,263 pay periods. I have also provided to Leon Greenberg a "per plaintiff" summary of that 529 page summary of such 14,263 pay periods with a "Pay Period End Date" prior to 1/1/2016. That "per plaintiff" summary is attached to this declaration as Exhibit "1" and is the same form of summary I provided at Exhibit "3" of my declaration of January 11, 2017, except that it only covers the time period prior to 1/1/2016. Because the Exhibit "1" summary that is attached covers a shorter time period it contains 65 fewer employees than the Exhibit "3" summary of my declaration of January 11, 2017. That is because no payroll records were given to me for those 65 employees that predate 1/1/2016. The names of those 65 employees are set forth in the list attached to this declaration as Exhibit "2."

3. The two summaries I discuss in paragraph 2, except for their shortened time period (only using information for payroll periods ending *prior* to 1/1/2016), were performed using the exact same process I describe in my January 11, 2017 declaration.

I have read the foregoing and affirm under penalty of perjury that the same is true and correct. day of February, 2017 Affirmed this Charles M. Bass 3.

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7	*If the driver's first payroll date is after 3/14/2013, it is assumed they were on a waiting period for health insurance and should be paid a minimum wage of \$8.25 and their first 60 or 90 days and then \$7.25 and they \$7.25 and \$7.	ver's first payroll date is after 3/14/2013, it is they were on a waiting period for health and should be paid a minimum wage of \$8.25 or either their first 60 or 90 days and then \$7.25 or either their first 60 or 90 days and then \$7.25	14/2013, it is or health i wage of \$8.25 and then \$7.25 EES OWED AT	For Class at \$7.25 an For Class at \$8.25 an Hour Minimum Wage Hour Minimum Wage Rate Rate \$174,423.39	For Class at \$8.25 an Hour Minimum Wage Rate	For Class Hired after 3/14/13 rate is \$8.25 an Hour for Waiting Period and \$7.25 an Hour Thereafter
ന	Account Number Last Name	First Name	Last Payroll Check Date	Total pay below 7.25 per hour in each pay period	Total pay below 8.25 per hour in each pay period	90 day Waiting Period before 6/1/2014 and 60 day Waiting Period after 5/31/2014
574	28160 Wong	Wanjin	7/3/2015	\$1,115.61	\$3,537.25	\$1,549.91
575	108239 Wright	Edward	9/13/2013	\$0.00	\$59.05	\$0.00
576	3092 Yabut	Gerry	12/18/2015	\$1,569.20	\$5,414.02	\$1,569.20
577	108389 Yamaguchi	Alicia	10/9/2015	\$2,331.88	\$6,131.96	\$2,331.88
578	113044 Yazdian	Ali	9/11/2015	\$0.00	\$102.78	\$95.56
579	114275 Yerima	Mollah	12/18/2015	\$0.00	\$840.30	\$420.34
580	114673 Yu	n L	10/23/2015	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
581	113075 Yu	Mary	12/18/2015	\$0.00	\$765.28	\$479.60
582	17259 Yurckonis	Hibert	4/10/2015	\$2,395.57	\$6,937.29	\$2,395.57
583	30374 Zafar	John	12/18/2015	\$46.22	\$165.28	\$46.22
584	114189 Zaldivar	Maikel	12/18/2015	\$0.00	& 1.2 5.1.5	\$0.00
585	2273 Zawoudie	Masfen	12/18/2015	\$452.16	\$1,681.26	\$452.16
586	17936 Zekichev	N N	1/3/2014	\$324.17	\$666.15	\$666.15
587	3235 Zeleke	Abraham	3/1/2013	\$0.00	\$19.69	\$0.00
588	111519 Zghaier	Hassan	12/18/2015	\$0.00	\$50.58	\$17.54

	A	В	C	D	Ē
				First Payroll Check	Last Payroll Check
1	Account Number	Last Name	First Name	Date	Date
2	27190	Abrego	Jacobo	1/15/2016	5/20/2016
3	115507	Aguero-Pons	Eduardo	2/26/2016	5/20/2016
4	114336	Akins	Pierre	1/29/2016	5/20/2016
5	113805	Alasania	Nugzar	3/11/2016	5/20/2016
6	115751	Alvarez	Randy	5/6/2016	5/20/2016
7	111333	Anderson	Rodney	1/15/2016	5/20/2016
8	115027	Baek	Sung	5/20/2016	5/20/2016
9	115476	Barrick	Antonio	3/11/2016	5/20/2016
10	113621	Beke	Sandor	1/1/2016	5/20/2016
11	115349	Benner	Charles	1/29/2016	5/20/2016
12	113545	Berilo	Senad	1/1/2016	2/26/2016
13	115440	Brown	Leila	2/12/2016	5/20/2016
14	114067	Cadiz	Randy	4/8/2016	5/20/2016
15	106441	Camarena	Erik	2/26/2016	5/20/2016
16	115695	Coleman	Carl	4/22/2016	5/20/2016
17	114538	Contreras-Ceballo	Hugo	5/20/2016	5/20/2016
18	11039	Conway	Robert	5/20/2016	5/20/2016
19	100840	Danner	Kevin	5/20/2016	5/20/2016
20	28065	Davis	Bradley	5/6/2016	5/20/2016
21	114663	Demeke	Yohannes	5/20/2016	5/20/2016
22	28210	Dicoio	William	4/8/2016	5/20/2016
23	113424	Dills	Debora	1/29/2016	5/20/2016
24	115687	Dumais	Peter	4/8/2016	5/20/2016
25	12469	Field	Harry	3/25/2016	5/20/2016
26	114910	Gallegos	Jose	2/12/2016	5/20/2016
27	16999	Gerezgiher	Negasi	3/11/2016	5/20/2016
28	103550	Habte	Amanuel	3/11/2016	5/6/2016
29	114522	Headman	Gregory	1/1/2016	4/22/2016
30	26305	Hesariha	Arash	1/29/2016	5/20/2016
31	31107	lonescu	Dumitru	3/11/2016	5/20/2016
32	25574	Kapoor	Arun	2/26/2016	5/20/2016
33	115049	Kincade	Jennieann	4/22/2016	5/20/2016
34	115429	Krakow	Joshua	2/12/2016	2/26/2016
35	113761	Logan	David	5/6/2016	5/20/2016
36	113653	Lopez	Jorge	1/29/2016	5/20/2016
37	115798	Marco	Charles	5/6/2016	5/6/2016

	A	В	С	D	E
					Lank Day wall Olamak
1	Account Number	Last Name	First Name	First Payroll Check Date	Last Payroll Check Date
2	27190	Abrego	Jacobo	1/15/2016	5/20/2016
38	110863	McCary	John	3/11/2016	5/20/2016
39	26609	Mezzenasco	Pedro	2/26/2016	5/20/2016
40	24660	Morales	Michael	3/11/2016	3/11/2016
41	113016	Odisho	Talina	1/15/2016	4/22/2016
42	114433	Okparaji	George	2/12/2016	5/20/2016
43	23121	Pascua	Filipinas	2/12/2016	5/20/2016
44	21905	Patai	Andras	3/11/2016	5/20/2016
45	114736	Patvakanian	Artur	4/22/2016	5/20/2016
46	115506	Peterson	Miles	3/25/2016	4/8/2016
47	115688	Pike	Robert	4/8/2016	4/22/2016
48	115536	Quezada	Anthony	3/11/2016	5/20/2016
49	17693	Racz	Bela	2/12/2016	5/20/2016
50	108263	Ramirez	Christopher	2/26/2016	5/20/2016
51	30820	Reithel	Shannon	2/12/2016	5/20/2016
52	109803	Retzlaff	Jeffrey	1/29/2016	5/20/2016
53	107503	Sanginiti	Ronald	1/29/2016	5/20/2016
54	115343	Sarfaty	Robert	2/12/2016	4/8/2016
55	115193	Shin	Sung	3/25/2016	5/20/2016
56	22785	Stewart	Victor	1/1/2016	5/20/2016
57	113503	Thomas	Edward	4/8/2016	5/20/2016
58	115805	Thornton	Michael	5/6/2016	5/20/2016
59	105196	Torres	Dorothy	2/26/2016	5/20/2016
60	32039	Tsilipakos	Emmanuel	5/20/2016	5/20/2016
61	109971	Varga	Tamas	4/22/2016	5/20/2016
62	108223	Vargas	Rodrigo	3/11/2016	3/25/2016
63	30238	Vazquez	Rene	1/15/2016	3/11/2016
64	26860	Wainaina	Erick	4/22/2016	5/20/2016
65	115264	Weiss	Arthur	1/1/2016	1/29/2016
66	109174	Yu	Paul	2/12/2016	5/20/2016

Hum D. Lahren LEON GREENBERG, ESQ., SBN 8094 DANA SNIEGOCKI, ESQ., SBN 11715 Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation **CLERK OF THE COURT** 2965 South Jones Blvd- Suite E4 Las Vegas, Nevada 89146 702) 383-6085 (702) 385-1827(fax) eongreenberg@ovértimelaw.com dana@overtimelaw.com 5 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 6 **DISTRICT COURT** 7 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 8 9 MICHAEL MURRAY, and MICHAEL Case No.: A-12-669926-C RENO, Individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Dept.: I 11 **DECLARATION OF CHARLES** Plaintiffs, 12 BASS VS. 13 A CAB TAXI SERVICE LLC, and A CAB, LLC, 14 Defendants. 15 16 Please find attached a signed copy of the declaration of Charles Bass, which was 17 submitted unsigned with Plaintiffs' Supplement to Plaintiffs' Reply to 18 Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed on 19 February 23, 2017. 20 21 Dated: February 27, 2017 Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation 23 By: /s/ Leon Greenberg 24 Léon Greenberg, Esq. Nevada Bar No.: 8094 25 2965 South Jones Boulevard - Suite E3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89146 26 (702) 383-6085 Attorney for Plaintiff 27 28

1			
2	LEON GREENBERG, ESQ. Nevada Bar No.: 8094		
3	DANA SNIEGOCKI, ESQ. Nevada Bar No.: 11715		
4	Leon Greenberg Professional Corporal 2965 South Jones Boulevard - Suite F.	tion -3	
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89146 (702) 383-6085		
6	(702) 385-1827(fax) leongreenberg@overtimelaw.com		
7	dana@overtimelaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs		
8	DISTF	RICT COURT	
9	CLARK CO	DUNTY, NEVADA	
10			
11	MICHAEL MURRAY and	Case No.: A-12-669926-C	
12	MICHAEL RENO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,	DEPT.: I	
13	Plaintiffs,		
14	VS.	DECLARATION OF CHARLES BASS	
15 16	A CAB TAXI SERVICE LLC, A CAB, LLC, and CREIGHTON J.	DECEMENTION OF CHARLES DASS	
17	NADY, Defendants.		
18			
19	Charles Bass hereby affirms, und	er penalty of perjury, that:	
20	1. I am self-employed as a com	puter systems and software consultant. I have	
21 22	over 30 years of experience in working	with computer spreadsheets and databases	
23	including Microsoft Excel software. I p	reviously provided a detailed declaration to	
24	the Court that I signed on January 11, 20	017 that discussed the summarization I	
25 26	performed of the Excel files that were provided to me in this case.		
	2 Attornory Toom Commission	ho I was downtoned services (4 3 ° CCC / 4	
27	2. Attorney Leon Greenberg, wi	ho I understand represents the plaintiffs (class	
28	members) in this case has requested that	t I modify the summarization that I previously	

performed and discussed in my January 11, 2017 declaration. He requested that I reconstruct that summarization in the exact same manner as I describe in my January 11, 2017 declaration except that I limit the payroll periods so summarized to those that have a "Pay Period End Date" that is prior to 1/1/2016 (the prior summarization I performed included payroll periods through May of 2016). I have done so and provided to Leon Greenberg that revised summarization, which, when printed, consists of 529 pages and summarizes 14,263 pay periods. I have also provided to Leon Greenberg a "per plaintiff" summary of that 529 page summary of such 14,263 pay periods with a "Pay Period End Date" prior to 1/1/2016. That "per plaintiff" summary is attached to this declaration as Exhibit "1" and is the same form of summary I provided at Exhibit "3" of my declaration of January 11, 2017, except that it only covers the time period prior to 1/1/2016. Because the Exhibit "1" summary that is attached covers a shorter time period it contains 65 fewer employees than the Exhibit "3" summary of my declaration of January 11, 2017. That is because no payroll records were given to me for those 65 employees that predate 1/1/2016. The names of those 65 employees are set forth in the list attached to this declaration as Exhibit "2."

3. The two summaries I discuss in paragraph 2, except for their shortened time period (only using information for payroll periods ending *prior* to 1/1/2016), were performed using the exact same process I describe in my January 11, 2017 declaration.

I have read the foregoing and affirm under penalty of perjury that the same is true and correct.

Affirmed this 22day of February, 2017

Charles M. Bass

Electronically Filed 5/25/2017 3:07 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1	TRAN			
2				
3	EIGHTH JUDICIAL			
4	CIVIL/CRIMIN CLARK COUN			
5				
6	MICHAEL MURRAY, et al,) CASE NO. A-12-669926		
7	Plaintiffs,) DEPT. NO. I		
8	VS.			
9	A CAB TAXI SERVICE, LLC, et al,			
10	Defendants.)		
11	BEFORE THE HONORABLE KENNETH CORY, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE			
12	THURSDAY, N			
13	TRANSCI			
14	ALL PENDIN	G MOTIONS		
15				
16	APPEARANCES:			
17	For the Plaintiffs:	LEON GREENBERG, ESQ. DANA SNIEGOCKI, ESQ.		
18	For the Defendants:	ESTHER C. RODRIGUEZ, ESQ.		
19		MICHAEL K. WALL, ESQ.		
20	ALSO PRESENT:	CREIGHTON J. NADY		
21				
22				
23				
24	RECORDED BY: Lisa Lizotte, Court Reco	rder		

1	LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, THURSDAY, MAY 18, 2017, 9:07 A.M.
2	****
3	(Court was called to order)
4	THE COURT: Good morning. Please be seated.
5	So, we lost the case, we (interruption in court recording). That being
6	the case, let's see, what else has happened? Oh, you had mediation. It didn't work.
7	And these motions were filed, when, January or so, February, somewhere around
8	then, the first of the year?
9	MR. GREENBERG: Some predate January, Your Honor.
10	THE COURT: Predate?
11	MR. GREENBERG: Yes.
12	THE COURT: Okay. So what is our trial date and how is our 5-year rule
13	doing? February 5th of 2018 is what I show. Anybody done a calculation of what
14	our 5-year clock is doing? This was stayed while it was on mediation, was it?
15	MR. GREENBERG: It was stayed while on mediation. It was also stayed
16	extensively for decisions from the Nevada Supreme Court
17	THE COURT: Okay.
18	MR. GREENBERG: that were rendered on the issues. I can advise the
19	Court on that precisely because I do have the calculation.
20	THE COURT: Okay.
21	MR. GREENBERG: It is sometime in the latter part of 2018. This case
22	would still be ripe for trial
23	THE COURT: All right.
24	MR. GREENBERG: in September or October of 2018, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And safe to say nobody sees any reason why we would need to continue this trial date another time?

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, I hope not, but we're going to deal with a number of issues today. There is outstanding discovery. We were advised by defendants that they are going to be serving a supplement in respect to some discovery that was ordered back in March.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: And what needs to be done in respect to discovery is implicated by what they produce, if we get compliance from them. It's also implicated by the Court's decision on the motion to bifurcate which is before the Court today. If the motion to bifurcate is granted, that will remove certain issues; a deposition of Mr. Nady, for example, and other things that still need to be conducted. Beyond that, upon providing the rest of that discovery that has been ordered, I need to fully supplement the plaintiff's damages claims based upon the defendant's records. I did serve a Rule 16.1 statement two days ago, providing what I could regarding an allocation of damages for each of the over 500 plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay. I just was trying to get a handle on whether we are -- I was trying to get a handle on whether we were starting to approach. Generally speaking when we're in the last year or the fourth year, in other words, of a case we set the trial and I don't continue trials once we're into that point. That's my typical stance, anyway. I have seen a few cases where cases got dismissed, never went to the merits, and it's just a sad state of affairs that I don't propose to see happen.

So, all right, we have on today a whole slew of motions. I tried to figure out what might be the best order of business. The closest that I have come

1	is it seems to me we ought to deal with defendants' motion for judgment on the
2	pleadings probably at the front or near the front and then take the others after that.
3	Now, I'm open to suggestion if anybody thinks there's a good order of business
4	here. Anybody think that we shouldn't take the defendants' motion for judgment
5	on the pleadings first?
6	MR. GREENBERG: No, Your Honor, that makes sense to me.
7	THE COURT: Ms. Rodriguez, how does that sound?
8	MS. RODRIGUEZ: No problem, Your Honor. It seems like that motion is
9	very straightforward.
10	THE COURT: Okay. All right, let's do that.
11	MS. RODRIGUEZ: And, Your Honor, these motions were filed awhile ago.
12	It looks like this one was actually filed I think you were asking earlier.
13	THE COURT: Yeah.
14	MS. RODRIGUEZ: If I'm looking at the right one, this
15	THE COURT: November, it looks like.
16	MS. RODRIGUEZ: Right. November.
17	THE COURT: Yeah.
18	MS. RODRIGUEZ: And I believe this was just our motion for a ruling based
19	on the 2-year statute of limitation based on the Perry v. Terrible Herbst case
20	THE COURT: Yeah.
21	MS. RODRIGUEZ: that came out on October 27th, 2016.
22	THE COURT: Uh-huh.
23	MS. RODRIGUEZ: The cite is 132 Nevada Advance Opinion No. 75. So

based on Rule NRCP 12(c), we move to dismiss the claims that are outside of the

2-year statute of limitation. And I think Your Honor gathers the gist of that. There's not a whole lot more to say on that issue.

THE COURT: Okay. It gets a little murkier for me when we get into the plaintiff's response and actually part of your argument. I don't recall if it was in your -- I think it was in your reply, but I'm not sure that deals with the order that's -- the issue that's raised is whether there was an order submitted to the Court that was different than what the minute order reflected as far as the beginning date for the claims at issue. You had argued somewhere in there that the minute order said something about 2008. The actual order signed goes back to -- I forget what month.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: July of 2007.

THE COURT: July of 2007. At any rate, that's one nuance that somewhere in here we've got to deal with. The plaintiff makes argument that by virtue of equity tolling that the statute of limitations should be tolled, which would take it back presumably to -- am I correct that you -- do you cling to the 2007 date?

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, the July 1st, 2007 date that I reference in the cross motion arises because that was the first date upon which there was a change in the minimum wage rate, which defendants were constitutionally required to provide written notice to each employee of.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GREENBERG: And it is our position they did not, and therefore the appropriate remedy for that violation would be a toll.

THE COURT: And so you argue for the July 1st, 2007?

MR. GREENBERG: That's correct, Your Honor. And really to sum up the issue here, there's no dispute it's a 2-year statute of limitations and we don't dispute

that the employer here in some capacity had some sort of standard notice posted on the premises of the business, which presumably if the cab drivers came in the office or went by that location they would have had an opportunity to see. We're not disputing that factual background here.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GREENBERG: The issue is really I think a question of law, Your Honor, in terms of what the employer was required to do to comply with the terms of the Constitution's requirement, which, you know the language is discussed --

THE COURT: You argue that by virtue of the language of the statute and the federal cases you rely on that actual separate written notice must be given to each employee?

MR. GREENBERG: Well, the literal language, as recited at page 2 of my paper, says an employer shall provide written notification of the rate adjustments to each of its employees. So we're talking about a written notification to each of its employees, not collectively, not orally, not in some group manner. I mean, each means each. That would be the way I would postulate it. In respect to the federal cases that are cited, Your Honor, I only cite them to give the Court some point of reference in terms of somewhat analogous circumstances arising under some federal laws.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GREENBERG: But obviously this is state law. This is the language of the Nevada State Constitution. So --

THE COURT: Persuasive authority only. Yeah.

MR. GREENBERG: For what the Court finds it to be of value.

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THE COURT: Okay. Let's talk about that because that kind of gets us down to the heart of the issue on your motion as well. So, what would you say is the --I mean, I think I know what you would say is the notice required. Part of what I need to get down to is whether or not this Court needs to do a hearing, and I don't recall the name, a case that starts with a "C," Cromwell, Conroy, something. What is it?

THE LAW CLERK: Copeland.

THE COURT: Copeland.

MR. GREENBERG: The Copeland case, Your Honor, from the Nevada Supreme Court.

THE COURT: An evidentiary hearing to determine what notice was given. The plaintiff would rely on the deposition of Mr. Nady. And so the question would be, do we need such a hearing and if so, does the defendant then have some other evidence on the issue of what notice was actually given here?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Well, Your Honor, I attached the notice as not only the deposition of Mr. Nady but the actual photos from the site of A Cab, the premises, showing all of the notices that are in fact posted that advise the drivers of all the labor laws and they are in compliance. And the deposition does in addition support that, Mr. Nady's testimony indicating that as soon as they received any kind of notifications from the Labor Commissioner, whether they be the state or the federal, they immediately post them, advise the drivers, each driver of the change.

And one of the things I mentioned in my reply was that the cases that Mr. Greenberg is relying upon go to the fact that there was a complete nonadvisement to the employees. And that's what we're talking about here is whether the employees were made aware of the change in minimum wage or not. And

clearly by the evidence that we've produced, not only in this case but attached to our reply, there was an advisement to the drivers.

And one thing I would just mention real quickly, Your Honor, you know, I don't know the Court's preferences on this, but one of the problems that's been in this litigation is the fact that we file motions and for every motion we file we get a countermotion.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: So I would argue that this motion, Mr. Greenberg's motion is not properly filed nor served or set in the proper course by just being in the terms of a countermotion. Rather than filing oppositions to our motion, he usually files these countermotions, which kind of complicate things --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: -- because then, you know, we don't get a chance to really properly brief it and make a separate -- his argument is completely separate about an equitable tolling issue. Ours is strictly based on whether the Court is going to follow the supreme court mandate from the Perry v. Terrible Herbst matter. So if he wants an evidentiary hearing, that's, you know --

THE COURT: Well, okay, but is not -- I mean, these issues are intertwined, are they not?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Correct.

THE COURT: So part of my -- the things I'm trying to get down to is before we really make an argument on the law that should apply to this case, do we have a need to have an evidentiary hearing? Do we need to have more evidence as to the actual notice that was given?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Well, obviously, Your Honor, I would argue it's not necessary based on the evidence that we've already produced. I mean, if Your Honor wants testimony to say, yes, from the general managers or the drivers that they actually see these things in the workplace and they're required to walk in to clock in and out every day or to fill out their paperwork, that they're in the common workplace, we obviously can bring witnesses to support that. But I think Mr. --

THE COURT: I'm not so much requesting you to do that. I'm just trying to figure out, okay, do we have the facts assembled --

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Right.

THE COURT: -- so that I can apply the law to it.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: I think we do because Mr. Greenberg, I don't think he's disputing that. I think he said he's not disputing --

THE COURT: No, I don't either. I think he thinks that the deposition of your client is sufficient. So then that raised the issue in my mind, well, before we even proceed, because I do tend to think, and you know, I'm open to argument on it, but I tend to think that the -- what is the name of the hearing again, the name of the case?

MR. GREENBERG: Well, an evidentiary hearing under the <u>Copeland</u> decision --

THE COURT: Copeland. Yeah.

MR. GREENBERG: -- regarding a statute of limitations toll.

THE COURT: So the question -- the first question would be do we need a Copeland hearing? Does anybody feel the need for more evidence to come before the Court on the issue of the actual notice given before we then look to the law and

the interpretation of the law, whether that was adequate? And I think what I'm hearing is no, neither side feels --

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Not unless the Court is inclined to hear from the State Labor Commissioner in terms of what he supplies to A Cab and what A Cab then proceeds to do in compliance with instruction from the State.

THE COURT: We have what he actually supplies, is that right?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Correct.

THE COURT: And that is the form that was posted?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Correct. It's attached to the reply at Exhibit 2.

THE COURT: What does he say as far as how it's to be disseminated?

Does he give any -- I can't really read those very well, frankly. I can see where they were posted, but what does he say? Does he give any instruction to an employer as to how they're supposed to make drivers aware?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: These are actually just a notification. They just indicate Office of the Labor Commissioner, State of Nevada. And it's a posting saying the minimum wage and what it is for that particular time period, whether health insurance is offered or not; the two tiers. But there is no further instruction from the Labor Commissioner with that particular posting. Again, so --

THE COURT: Yeah. Well, one of the questions in my mind is what do we make of that? And I guess I would ask Mr. Greenberg, if the Labor Commissioner doesn't say that written notice of this event has to be handed to each driver, then should I not take from that that posting the notice the way it's done here would be adequate under the statute? What do I make of the -- does that not weaken your argument somewhat?

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, I don't see that the Labor Commissioner's opinion on any of these issues regarding how the employer's obligations are fulfilled under the Nevada Constitution are really of any weight for the Court's consideration one way or the other, quite honestly. I mean, in the MDC case, which was a companion to the Perry case which was decided last year by the Nevada Supreme Court, they specifically overruled the Labor Commissioner regulation that said tips could be included in calculating the ten percent of gross wages --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: -- requirement for the insurance qualification term of the Constitution. So clearly the Nevada Supreme Court is not giving any deference to the Labor Commissioner's regulatory interpretations of what an employer must do under the act, the constitutional act. It's really a question of what Your Honor believes the constitutional command is here. The language is the language. I mean, my position is that you -- written notification of a rate adjustment to each of its employees requires an actual placement in the hand in writing to each of the employees by the employer of the change and its effective date and the rate that is imposed. I mean, this is not an overwhelming obligation on the employer to then be able to invoke the statute of limitations shield.

THE COURT: Yeah. Well, I grant you that it seems that whatever mandate there is that appears in our Constitution probably achieves sort of a distinction even over a legislative act in terms of the impetus that it places upon a court to carefully and fully apply such a mandate. But when it comes down to it, your argument then rests on the language of the Constitution itself, a plain reading of the language of the Constitution?

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MR. GREENBERG: It is, Your Honor. I mean, we have "shall provide," which is an affirmative duty, it's not a discretionary duty.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: "Written notification to each of the employees." So, I mean, when you combine that language together, I would submit the clear import of the language is the obligation on the employer is to if not place in the hand of each employee at least have delivered to each employee through an appropriate means in their paycheck or their -- you know, in a mailing to each employee or something. If the employee fails to actually make themselves aware of it at that point, then --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: -- well, you know, it doesn't say that the employee has to acknowledge that they've been informed, it just says that the employer has to provide written notification to each employee.

THE COURT: This language became operative, as you point out, November 28th of 2006. That's when the constitutional amendment became effective. Is that right?

MR. GREENBERG: That is correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And there's no -- there's been no Nevada case law since then that has interpreted that in the context of the issue that we have now?

MR. GREENBERG: That is correct, Your Honor. I'm unaware of any jurist in the state considering this issue.

THE COURT: Okay. All right, now I have to ask Ms. Rodriguez a question. Given that this is language in our Constitution and it is a constitutional mandate,

does that not provide some increased force or impetus or whatever you want to call it, imperative to the Court to read that -- if anything, to read it broadly in terms of the requirement?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Well, Your Honor, in answer to your question, I would look to all laws pertaining to employment law, whether they be federal or state. The practice -- and I think this goes back to your question of what does the Labor Commissioner advise the employer to do -- the practice is never to hand each employee an advisement of these are your rights under the ADA, these are your rights under the FMLA, you know, these are your rights for health; anything. It's always that the notice must be posted in a common area --

THE COURT: Right.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: -- for all of the employees and that's what they inspect for.

THE COURT: And was that not because that is specifically what is called for?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: That it must be -- yes, that is correct --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: -- that it must be -- the employees must be advised of this right, similarly to what the Constitution says. You know, Mr. Greenberg's interpretation, as Your Honor pointed out, is his interpretation of what the Constitution has said. The Court has not indicated that a written notification must go be handed or mailed or put in their paycheck to each one.

THE COURT: Yeah. Well, and I take your point to be that why would we make this be -- I mean, to some extent your point is why would we make this be the exception to the rule --

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Correct.

THE COURT: -- if the rule is both under state and federal legislation that it be posted, that they simply be advised in some fashion or other?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Correct. That it is a written notification as opposed to an oral advisement of these are your rights, so that an employee can at his or her leisure go and inspect the posting and understand their rights, what they're entitled to. The same thing with the minimum wage.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: They need to know what their minimum wage is, what they're entitled to, and that is what is posted. And I would just add, Your Honor, that even if the Court would somehow determine that A Cab was not in compliance with this written advisement, I think what we're looking at more is an administrative penalty that would be enforced, as opposed to -- that still isn't grounds for what Mr. Greenberg is arguing, an equitable tolling to take it back to July of 2007. Again, this goes back to what is he arguing for, because the two don't necessarily go hand in hand in support of his equitable tolling, that if he finds or the Court finds that there must be an actual notification, written notification to each driver, that that somehow supports that the statute of limitations should be extended --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: -- retroactively back to July of 2007.

THE COURT: And why is that?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Well, I don't know, actually. I mean, that doesn't make sense to me as to -- there's nothing to support that as to why would an interpretation of the Constitution in this manner to say that this is the requirement, why would that toll -- retroactively extend the statute of limitations to July of 2007?

THE COURT: Uh-huh. All right. Well, let's ask Mr. Greenberg that. Why would we -- assuming that I agree with you that -- and I must tell you both that the lay of the land is I have frankly tried to talk myself out of a very literal application of this because it seems to me generally speaking the law, you know, is more concerned with effective notices where you're talking about notices, as opposed to some precise, exact way to do it. However, I am leaning towards finding that the interpretation that Mr. Greenberg is arguing for probably is correct, that to satisfy the Constitution it is necessary to give the written notification to each of the employees.

But now let's take the next step of the argument, which I think Ms.

Rodriguez is raising and has raised in her pleadings, is why would you then jump from that finding, that conclusion of the law that that automatically gives you an equitable tolling, when the only penalty for such a thing that exists in the law is an administrative regulation? Is that correct, Ms. Rodriguez --

MR. GREENBERG: Well, no.

THE COURT: -- that it's a -- there's some provision that says that if you don't abide by it that it would be at most some sort of administrative regulatory matter?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Well, there's nothing on point, Your Honor. It hasn't been interpreted.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: So there isn't one way or another that it would either be an administrative penalty or that --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: I mean, no one has thought up that this should somehow be an equitable tolling issue.

THE COURT: Yeah. Okay.

So, Mr. Greenberg, why -- assuming that I agreed with your interpretation, even, why do you jump from that to the notion that there must be some equitable tolling?

MR. GREENBERG: Well, Your Honor, this is where the authorities I cited to you from the analogous federal decisions dealing with notifications under age discrimination law or federal minimum wage law come into play. And those statutes actually -- it's actually regulatory, I believe. I don't believe it's statutory. But they refer to a posting in the workplace. It is not the same command that we see here --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: -- in the Constitution. But in that line of cases where courts have found that those notifications were not properly granted, they have estopped the employer from invoking the statute of limitations defense against the employees' claim. And I'm essentially asking for the same remedy here, and this is again discussed at page 3 of my submission, because the remedial provision of the Constitution here is extremely broad, which it says, you know, if there's a violation -- I mean, we're assuming there's a violation, that the notice requirement wasn't complied with. Well, if there's a violation the injured employee is entitled to all remedies as, you know, broadly possible, as discussed at page 3 of my --

THE COURT: Excuse me. I may be missing something. You said page 3.

MR. GREENBERG: Page 3 of my opposition and cross motion -- counter-

motion, Your Honor.

MR. GREENBERG: At line 22.

THE COURT: Okay, which is the --

THE COURT: -- the deposition testimony?

MR. GREENBERG: No. Page 3 of the opposition to defendants' motion for -- Oh, it's below the deposition testimony. I'm sorry. It's at line 22, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right, thank you.

MR. GREENBERG: And as I was saying, if the purpose of the Constitution is to require the employer to provide the notice, as we've been discussing, if the employer doesn't provide the notice why should they be allowed to invoke the statute of limitations that is applicable to these claims? I mean, that is the remedy that we're asking for here. Otherwise, the employer essentially has no incentive to provide the notice. I mean, if he doesn't provide the notice, maybe the employee will remain ignorant of his rights and therefore won't exercise them. I mean, the purpose of the notice requirement presumably is to be sure the employee knows what his rights are. I mean, there can't really be any other purpose to the notice requirement.

THE COURT: Do I take from that you're meaning -- that you're saying that -- well, I'm just doing circular logic back to the language that you quoted from Article 15, Section 16 says that an employee claiming the violation gets to enforce the provisions of this section, shall be entitled to all remedies available under the law or in equity appropriate to remedy any violation. You're saying that the violation -- that this is a violation, no matter how you cut it?

MR. GREENBERG: Well, Your Honor, if there's no violation, I'm not entitled to a remedy.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor was positing before, well, assuming Your Honor agrees there was a violation or a non-compliance with the mandate of the

THE COURT: Yeah.

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thing?

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MR. GREENBERG: They posted it simply because they had to post it

MR. GREENBERG: You were asking, well, why is the remedy a toll of the

statute of limitations? The reason why the remedy is a toll of the statute of

limitations, Your Honor, is otherwise the protection becomes meaningless because

the employer has no incentive to comply with their obligation under the Constitution.

Essentially they get rewarded by keeping the employee ignorant because the statute

of limitations continues to run. This is the analogy from --

THE COURT: Well, isn't it true you could hardly argue that in this case they

simply covered everything up and kept the employees ignorant? They posted a

MR. GREENBERG: Well, Your Honor, we've been litigating this case since

2012 against this company and the industry, which has taken the position, as Your

Honor recalls, that none of the industry was subject to the Nevada minimum wage

amendment. So it's not as though they actually advised the employees in any direct

sense -- not the employees. Let me make that more clear. The taxi drivers. Their

other employees they concede are covered by the minimum wage law and so forth.

But they never actually advised the taxi drivers themselves that they were covered

because it's always been their contention they were not subject --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GREENBERG: -- to the Nevada minimum wage.

THE COURT: Well, then what do we make of the fact that they posted this

because they are required to in respect to their business for the other employees.

At least that was their position. They were not undertaking to post this notice because of --

THE COURT: For the drivers.

MR. GREENBERG: -- because of the drivers. They weren't telling the drivers anything about the Nevada minimum wage because their position was the drivers weren't entitled to anything under the Nevada minimum wage. And in fact, they had an incentive not to tell the drivers because they might well have been subjected to this litigation years earlier if they had done so. I mean, that's the reason why the remedy I am proposing to the Court is really the only appropriate remedy if the Court agrees as to the obligation of the employer here as I have presented to the Court. I don't know what other remedy could possibly be imposed that would be equitable or would repair the damage done here and fulfill the obvious purpose of the notice requirement.

Now, I do just want to make clear to the Court on the record here one thing that the Court should be aware of and that I think I need to concede, which is that the obligation is an obligation to provide notice --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: -- as to the change.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: That change comes about July 1st of every year if there is in fact a change. So the statute of limitations toll presumably applies to employees who were there when the change occurred. Do you understand, Your Honor? And therefore were not provided with that notice. Look, this is the limited

structure of the obligation under the Constitution. It doesn't say when you hire the employee you have to notify him or every month you have to notify him. You must notify him in this fashion when there's a change. So when we talk about a statute of limitations toll back to July 1st of 2007, it would not in fact encompass everyone who worked from July 1st, 2007 through 2010, which is the period we're talking about, because, for example, we could have had somebody who worked from August of 2007 to December of 2007.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GREENBERG: There would have been no change. There would have been no obligation on the employer to advise this employee of any change during that period, so he would not have a claim before this Court. We would have to weed that out, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GREENBERG: -- but I just want to be clear with the Court as to what the scope of the toll would be if it was granted, Your Honor. This is somewhat of a technical issue, but the Court should understand this.

THE COURT: Yeah. Okay. All right, anything more on this issue?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Your Honor, I think you could probably see through some of that argument, but just so that the record is clear, most of what Mr. Greenberg just talked about, I'm not sure where he's getting any of that about the notice and that -- implying that A Cab was deliberately withholding notice from the drivers and only posting it for certain employees. There's nowhere in the facts, the depositions or anything. I think we started this morning's hearing with him stipulating and agreeing that these notices were posted in the common work area. So, I don't think

there's any question that notice was given to the drivers and to the employees. We're just talking about a technicality as to whether the Constitution requires an actual handing of every time there's a change in the minimum wage to each driver in their paycheck or by mail or in person. I think it's a procedural technicality that Mr. Greenberg is arguing for because there's no question that notice was given to the drivers. But again, our position would be that even if that wasn't -- if the Court finds that for some reason there isn't a notice to the drivers, because those are the cases that he's relying upon where there was absolutely no notice, no advisement, that an equitable tolling was appropriate because the driver wasn't aware or the employee wasn't aware at all that they had these rights. That's not the case here.

So I think then we are looking more at an administrative penalty rather than this equitable tolling argument back to July of 2007 that he's seeking. That's completely improper. I don't think he meets either standard for the Court to allow what he's asking for; one, that we have given the proper notice. A Cab did give the proper notice. And two, that it doesn't support a reason to toll the statute of limitations back to July of 2007. We're asking for the 2-year, in compliance with what the supreme court has ordered as of last fall.

THE COURT: Okay. It is definitely, as everyone has conceded, not a 4-year statute, it's a 2-year statute. I feel compelled to interpret the Constitution in the way that the plaintiff has argued for here and I do so reluctantly because it requires so much more than posting of such a thing. It wouldn't matter how big a print, how -- it wouldn't matter if they broadcast it over a P.A. system, if it didn't do what this language in the Constitution says then it would not comply. And that's essentially what I feel compelled to hold. I generally speaking am much more in favor of more

practical approaches to say that, you know, something adequate, sufficient notice, something of that sort. But I think that Mr. Greenberg's argument that the literal language of the Constitution and I guess the fact that it is in the Constitution I feel it's entitled to more respect, if you will, judicial respect and careful and assiduous application, even a broader application than perhaps statutory language. I have a great regard for constitutions, both the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Nevada. It's not a question of how I think it should be done, it's a question of does this language mean that literally written notice must be given to each driver, and my holding is that that is what the language says.

The next question is whether that then provides an equitable tolling, and I must -- again, I feel compelled to hold that it does; once again because of the broad statement in another part of the Constitution which says an employee claiming the violation of this section may bring an action against his or her employer in the courts of this state to enforce the provisions of this section and shall be entitled to all remedies available under the law or in equity appropriate to remedy any violation of this section, including but not limited to back pay, damages, reinstatement, injunctive relief. The best I can do is to say I think that principles of constitutional application and interpretation require this result.

That being the case, then it necessarily follows that the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings must be denied. And so that we are clear, it does seem to me that that means that it does extend back to July 1st of 2007. That's the best I can do with that one.

Let's touch upon this notion of every time the defense files a motion, the plaintiff not only responds but files a countermotion. Mr. Greenberg, do you care

to speak to that? Is there a reason why? In other words, if your motion is important enough that the Court really needs to look at it, is there a reason that it should be mixed up in the back and forth and the back and forth of a countermotion, as opposed to a separate motion?

MR. GREENBERG: Well, Your Honor, I don't appreciate the characterization of my conduct by defense counsel. But putting that aside, Your Honor, this particular issue before the Court really is intertwined. I mean, we don't -- and the direction Your Honor was going in with your order, I would point out the ultimate order that needs to be entered needs to make clear that the statute of limitations toll is limited to those individuals who were employed from this period of July 1st --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GREENBERG: -- 2007, who --

THE COURT: Yes. By operation of the definition of the class.

MR. GREENBERG: As we -- well, as we were discussing before, though, who were actually employed during the period of time when there was a change that they should have been advised of, because there are individuals who were employed during that period --

THE COURT: Understood.

MR. GREENBERG: -- who are not going to fall into that group. So it's not going to be everyone who was employed from July 1st, 2007 to October 8th, 2010, which is the period we're talking about. It's going to be a more limited group, which we will have to ascertain.

THE COURT: The notice itself was required or the change in the rate occurred what dates?

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, the notice that was dispatched was to everyone who was identified going back to 2007, okay. We sent the notice --

THE COURT: Okay. And so there aren't any other years that we have to be concerned about?

MR. GREENBERG: No. The notice would not need to change because when I came to the Court and asked the notice be sent, I anticipated we would deal with this issue in the future. We also were not sure at that time as to the statute of limitations, which was settled subsequently to the notice being dispatched.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GREENBERG: So there's no need for a further notice, but there is going to be a need to ascertain whose claims are going to come in and be before the Court for this 2007 through 2010 period.

THE COURT: Well, let's talk about that. If this Court's application or interpretation and application of this constitutional mandate withstands the rigors of appeal, would not this employer and every employer be well advised to immediately then, if they haven't done so before, do what you're arguing for, that they hand out written notices of the change? Otherwise they're going to be facing a future litigation.

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Probably from you.

MR. GREENBERG: They give their employees paystubs with their paychecks. It's very easy for them to print on the paystub the Nevada minimum wage rate is this much and this much; whether you get health insurance. That's it. It's one sentence. They put it on the paystub.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: It goes to the employee. They've complied with the law.

This is not an incredibly difficult thing for employers to comply with.

THE COURT: Well, I'm not talking about how difficult it is, I'm just saying that if the argument that I have now accepted turns out to be accurate, then they do need to get that word out. Otherwise there's just going to be another class action.

MR. GREENBERG: Well, they need to make that notification every time there's a change, okay.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GREENBERG: And the scope of this problem is really probably limited to his industry or maybe a few other industries where they have simply neglected their obligation under the Nevada minimum wage amendment. In other industries they've recognized their obligation and they've paid the minimum wage, largely, so we don't have a flurry of litigation involving complete non-compliance with the minimum wage standard in the state because employers generally comply --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: -- because they're not in this industry.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: I'm just going to comment on that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Excuse me. But, you know, the Court's ruling I think really has broader ramifications than what Mr. Greenberg is representing because I'm not sure there's any employer that sends out a written letter to every employee. This is not the taxicab industry. This is now every employer in the state of Nevada every time there's a rate change --

THE COURT: I agree.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: -- and this is not how it's been done, will have to send a letter or some --

THE COURT: Or do what he's talking about.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Do something like that --

THE COURT: Something. Yeah.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: -- which is kind of -- you know, again, we're getting back to a technical thing where he's saying all they should have done is just print it on the top of a paycheck and that would have been sufficient, as opposed to the big posters that are available to everybody to see.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: And because of that, then now the employer is on the hook now for an additional almost four years of liability based on that --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: -- which, you know, again, I just wanted to make that comment that I think this is a lot broader ruling --

THE COURT: I agree.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: -- than what he's saying in terms of it just being limited to the taxicab industry, A Cab or the taxicab industry. It's all employers.

THE COURT: Yeah. And I think part of the reason why I feel compelled to interpret the Constitution as I believe it's intended to be interpreted is because there needs to be -- obviously everybody needs to know, is that really true, do we really have to give some written notice to each and every employee in order to comply with the Constitution. And the only way to know that is for somebody to rule it and I'm

just sorry it's me, because as I said, I'm not saying I'm sorry that they have to have
notice, I'm saying that I tend to where possible think what's pragmatic is what
works, is what passes muster under the law. I'm afraid I don't think so in this case.
To do so I would be modifying, I would be I don't know, just not doing what the
Constitution appears to me to specifically require.

Be that as it may, so the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied and technically the defendant's -- I'm sorry, the plaintiffs' countermotion for --

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, I would actually propose that their motion needs to be granted in part, because to the extent that Your Honor has certified a class of individuals going back to 2007 --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: -- who are not subject to a toll for the reasons I explained to you and they do not have claims after October 10th, 2008, they need to be dismissed.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: And we need to ascertain who those individuals are.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GREENBERG: We're going to have to engage in a process to do that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That's correct. All right, so big win. The defendants' motion is granted to the extent -- You're going to have to define that again, Mr. Greenberg.

MR. GREENBERG: I will draft an order and get it to defendants.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GREENBERG: I think the parties are going to have to coordinate a stipulation, an exhibit of some sort indicating who these individuals are who are subject to the toll within the definition that -- the ruling Your Honor has made. And if we can't do that, then we'll have to -- that will have to be subject to some further ruling by the Court.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GREENBERG: We'll have to submit the information to Your Honor and Your Honor will have to rule whatever our dispute is --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GREENBERG: -- in terms of weeding out who these individuals are.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: I would like it repeated, Your Honor, because I really don't -- I'm looking at my co-counsel, too --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: -- and I'm kind of confused as to what he's wanting.

THE COURT: So let's talk about who doesn't it apply to, then.

MR. GREENBERG: If an individual was employed between July 1st, 2007 and October 8th, 2010 --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GREENBERG: -- but was not employed when there was a change in the minimum wage rate.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: Changes in the minimum wage rate occur on July 1st of every year if there is a change. There were changes -- I believe it was in 2008, 2009. Well, my associate is advising me that it was 2010. I believe there were

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had an obligation to notify them, so they're not going to benefit from a toll.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: That is how we would discern the members of the
already certified class who are going to remain and not have their claims dismissed.
Some of these people did not work, you know, for a long period of time. They
didn't work during that trigger date where the obligation of the employer existed.
Therefore, they're not going to get a toll. I want to be sure that the Court's order
is implemented in a fashion consistent with the law and the obligations we've been
discussing, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And is there no one else who could claim some equitable tolling? For example, if there was some sort of notice, you said in 2008 or 9? Was there any?

MR. GREENBERG: Well, if someone was employed from June 1st of 2008 through let's say September of 2008 and they didn't get the notice that was required on July 1st, 2008 --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GREENBERG: -- their claim would be tolled back to July 1st, 2008 --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: -- because that was the act, the violation. So part of their claim would be tolled. They would have actually had some employment prior to July 1st of 2008 in that example.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GREENBERG: But that part wouldn't be tolled --

THE COURT: Wouldn't be tolled.

MR. GREENBERG: -- because the employer didn't violate any obligation until July 1st of 2008. So the toll that's going to be applied is going to be to a limited

group of individuals and it's not actually going to run from the same date for each individual. We need to review the records and see who was employed during that trigger date, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Does this not operate as yet another reason why a more pragmatic interpretation of the constitutional mandate should be used?

MR. GREENBERG: Well, Your Honor --

THE COURT: I mean, because now we've got, you know, I don't know if it amounts to subgroups or subclasses, but you've got bunches of individuals. It's going to be a monumental work to figure out who was employed during -- on the operative date, July 1st of 2007.

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, we have the benefit of computerized payroll records. We know who was employed when based on the data that was produced in this case. It's actually not a very great task. And in fact, Your Honor, it's really no different than looking at the start date that each person started working. They don't have a claim before they starting working for the employer, in any event. So we're just saying for certain of these individuals their start date for purposes of this case is going to be July 1st of one of those years, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010. For other individuals they're going to be dismissed entirely because the employer never had an obligation to notify them in accordance with the constitutional language.

I'm not telling you, Your Honor, that this is an extremely effective, pragmatic, easy sort of structure of the law here, but it is the structure of the law, as Your Honor has acknowledged. And the Court's obligation is to --

THE COURT: Well, the implementation of constitutional protections is seldom an easy task. It's messy.

MR. GREENBERG: I understand, Your Honor, but --

THE COURT: You were going to say something, Ms. Rodriguez.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Well, I just -- I don't know if I should leave this alone or not. It's just getting more and more kind of fuzzy in my mind because I wasn't clear that the Court -- I think what the Court is saying is that in accordance with the Constitution only written notification of the adjustment or the change has to be given to the employee, but if the employee comes in July 2nd after that written notification has already gone out, then they don't get to find out about it until the next time there's a rate adjustment. There's no requirement -- the Court is not saying there's a requirement to let them even know what the minimum wage is.

THE COURT: There's no equitable tolling of the 2-year statute as to them.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Uh-huh. Okay.

THE COURT: So I don't know how that's going to shake out exactly, but that would be the only -- you know, the furthest that I can logically think you would do in applying this precept.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: So unlike his suggestion that it has to be on all the paychecks every time they get a paycheck, it really has to only be on the July 1st paycheck when there's a rate adjustment, and if you come in --

THE COURT: I thought that's all he was saying. I thought that's --

MS. RODRIGUEZ: -- if you come in afterwards --

THE COURT: That was the only thing I thought he was saying.

MR. GREENBERG: I would concur with defense counsel on that point, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You think it has to be every week?

MR. GREENBERG: No, that it would only have to be advised as to the notification.

THE COURT: Oh. That it would only have to be the one paycheck.

MR. GREENBERG: Say the Nevada minimum wage rate has now increased to whatever it has.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: And that's it. The employer has complied.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I think we've flayed that one pretty well. Why don't we move on to another one. Anyone want to nominate one for the next consideration?

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, I am eager to see the motion for partial summary judgment determined by the Court.

THE COURT: I'll bet you are.

MR. GREENBERG: But Your Honor may feel it's more appropriate to deal with some of the other ones first.

THE COURT: I do, as a matter of fact. I would tend to leave that one for probably last. Let's look at defendants' motion for leave to amend the answer to assert a third party complaint. The plaintiffs' response includes a couple of things, a couple of points. One is that there is no action, court action for champerty. And secondly -- let's see, I have to be reminded of what your second one was. What is your second one in a nutshell, Mr. Greenberg?

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, there were in fact two motions filed for this. The first one was withdrawn.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GREENBERG: We only objected to the withdrawal to the extent we wanted our cross motion for sanctions heard. The second motion which does remain before the Court claims that there was an interference with contract because we persuaded Your Honor --

THE COURT: Interference with contract.

MR. GREENBERG: -- to issue an injunction in the Dubric case.

THE COURT: And what was your -- the essence of your response to that?

MR. GREENBERG: Well, Your Honor, there's no contract that was interfered with because they allege that we've obstructed their agreement to resolve and settle the Dubric litigation on a class-wide basis and they had no legal right to do that.

I mean, any right to do that obviously was subject to approval by the Court. We in fact represent the class members so we have a right to object, in any event, and to come to Your Honor or to Judge Delaney, who we did see on that as well, and persuade the Court to take action otherwise. So there's no basis for --

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you a question.

MR. GREENBERG: Yeah.

THE COURT: Why would -- I mean, you're arguing to me the facts, but why would I not determine whether such a third party action could be filed based simply on a basic construction of the law or interpretation of the law? If, for example, you're correct that there is no cause of action for champerty, okay, then why would I let them file such a complaint? But if the resolution of whether or not they could have a cause of action based upon the second, the whole argument that you just laid out, if that is fact-driven, then why would I not let them file the complaint at least so that, for one thing, it would protect the statute of limitations on it? That's not to

say that it has to be resolved at the same time as the rest of this lawsuit. I would see no reason why it couldn't be severed or -- yeah, severed and dealt with separately. But as to the question of why they couldn't file such an action, how far am I supposed to go in trying to make a determination now of whether they might ever, based on these facts, be successful?

MR. GREENBERG: Well, Your Honor, there's a big difference between them naming me as a third party defendant in this case --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: — and bringing some independent claim against me because I did some tortious conduct or some other improper act and injured the defendant. Obviously they have a right to their legal remedies if I have violated the law and the Court should deal with that. But their allegation on that point, as I think Your Honor is pointing out, has no relationship to this case whatsoever. Proof of those — assuming those allegations were sustainable in the first place, proof of those allegations has nothing to do with proof of any issue that's being litigated before Your Honor in this case. There's no reason for that case to be brought as a third party, as an impleader action to implead me in this case. The only reason they're doing this, Your Honor, is to make it impossible for me to represent the class and to create a conflict of interest because obviously if I — I mean, it would be a very strange trial to say the least, Your Honor, if we were going to simultaneously present evidence to the jury to the defendants' liability and then the defendants were going to turn around and say, well, you know, men and women of the jury, if we're liable then plaintiffs' counsel is liable to us.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GREENBERG: I mean, it's completely untenable. It doesn't work, Your Honor. This is just done in an abusive fashion and harassing fashion. They actually modeled this on the Western Cab litigation before Judge Bell where they're attempting -- where they actually filed a third party complaint against me, claiming that I tortiously interfered with their contracts with their cab drivers to be paid less than the minimum wage, which was an allegation -- and that I engaged in champerty again, okay. So this is a model that certain members of this industry have adopted in terms of fighting these litigations and taking them against me.

Now, I understand Your Honor isn't here to take sides. Your Honor is here to apply the law and I respect that and you're trying very hard to do that with a clear mind and a clear sight. If Your Honor simply wants to take the position that, look, whatever issues you have that you are raising here, they don't belong in this case and simply leave it at that, then that's Your Honor's decision. I would suggest that Your Honor should make a determinative ruling as to the inadequacy of these claims because there is no legal basis for them. There's no claim that can be made for champerty. Champerty isn't a cause of action.

And in addition, their claim that I tortiously interfered with a third party contract refers to a nonexistent contract. I mean, the allegation that I interfered with their contract to settle the Dubric litigation, they didn't have an enforceable contract. I can't interfere with something that they don't have a legal right to do. Their legal right is limited by leave of this Court. So to the extent -- I mean, obviously to the extent that I was acting on behalf of the class, I would also submit if we were to go beyond that analysis, Your Honor, the fact that this Court previously appointed me class counsel, okay --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GREENBERG: -- so that as a result my clients who I represent, a thousand drivers of the company, they have a privilege, they have a vested right to speak to the Court about their interest in any resolution of their claims, which is what they were proposing.

So even if the Court were to not go with the first level of the analysis here, which I say there is no enforceable right, okay, as a matter of law the conduct they allege I engaged in was privileged. It has to be privileged because of my role as class counsel, as appointed by this Court.

THE COURT: So, what I hear you saying is it does not really take some sort of sorting out and determination of the correctness or incorrectness of factual allegations.

MR. GREENBERG: That is --

THE COURT: So much as you're saying that you can't -- that as a matter of law an attorney who does even what they claim they did is not -- has not violated any right, and I'm sure you would add and on top of that the Court must be looking carefully to be sure that this is not used as a trial tactic in any case to knock out the attorney for one side or the other.

MR. GREENBERG: Well, yes, Your Honor. I think the Court needs to be concerned about the proper administration of justice here.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Rodriguez, what --

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Well, I think the Court --

THE COURT: That sounds reasonable, doesn't it?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Well, first of all, I don't know about the allegation that

there's this industry conspiracy against him. I do know -- I am aware that other 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

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defendants have brought in third party complaints or direct counter-complaints against Mr. Greenberg. Western Cab is one of them. He has moved to dismiss that and Judge Bell has not dismissed that as of today. So I know that there are other pending cases against Mr. Greenberg and his firm. They're appropriate in this circumstance and I think the Court is correct, is that he is arguing -- at this point he's arguing factual allegations to support the Court denying our right to even allege the complaint.

Champerty is an appropriate cause of action and I cited to the cases in my briefing on that. And as well as the second cause of action, which is the tortious interference claim, Mr. Greenberg is only mentioning to the Court half of that basis for that claim. The other basis for that claim is interference with a contract with a former employee, Wendy Gagliano. There is an agreement in place that we believe Mr. Greenberg has induced Ms. Gagliano to break that agreement with A Cab. And in preparing for this case I did note that there is another important California case that I would like to bring to the Court's attention. It's called Zimmerman v. Bank of America National T&S Association. The cite is 191 Cal. App. 2d 55, or 12 Cal. Rptr. 319. It's a 1961 case which says, "The actionable wrong lies in the inducement to break the contract or to sever the relationship, not in the kind of contract or relationship so disrupted, whether it is written or oral, enforceable or not enforceable."

So that is really contrary to what Mr. Greenberg is arguing in terms of the Dubric matter. He's arguing that we would have no cause of action against him because the Dubric contract was not enforceable. That remains to be seen. That

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has not -- I mean, there still is an agreement in place with the Barrasso Law Firm and their clients and that is up before the supreme court right now.

THE COURT: Good.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: So we did have a contract there. But there's also the second part of that contract, which is the Gagliano/A Cab agreement that Mr. Greenberg has also interfered with. So they are legitimate causes of action and we're still within the discovery period to complete any discovery that needed to be done on those particular third party complaint causes of action. And if the Court determines that it needs to be bifurcated at trial at that point, you know, the discovery will at least be completed and the Court can make a decision then. But right now he's arguing basically for summary judgment, when we haven't had an opportunity to work up the remainder of those claims.

THE COURT: And do I have your proposed --

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Yes, Your Honor. It's attached to the motion, I believe at exhibit -- it's probably the first exhibit. Let me check. Yes, it's Exhibit 1. It's defendants A Cab and Creighton J. Nady's amended answer to second amended complaint and third party complaint and it alleges first cause of action champerty and second cause of action intentional interference with contractual relations. And again, I know Mr. Greenberg said earlier in his argument he was criticizing my characterization of his pleadings tactic, and it's not my characterization, he's filed a countermotion to this. You know, every time we file a motion there's a countermotion.

THE COURT: Uh-huh. Well, generally speaking when I'm told, you know, you shouldn't be able to file a countermotion, I have to look at it one at a time and

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there are times when I simply advise the other side that that's the kind of matter that should be raised in its own motion, most notably the attempts to get Rule 11 sanctions on counsel that are not raised in a separate pleading, as opposed to throwing it in, you know, as a response to a motion.

So we have four --

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor --

THE COURT: I'm not on the right page. All right. So, jeopardy, intentional interference with contractual relations. And those are the only two causes of action, right?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Greenberg.

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, if I might just address the issue of Ms. Gagliano, which I did not discuss with the Court. To the extent that defendants' allegations are true, that they have this contract with her, that she was not supposed to, you know, provide information or discuss things and that contract was violated, as discussed at page 5 of my opposition, the NRS, NRS 41.071 specifically provides that a contract to prevent another from being a witness or disclosing any matter or information is not enforceable, okay. It states -- this is Rule 11 -- no person has a privilege to prevent someone else --

THE COURT: Okay. So you're --

MR. GREENBERG: -- from truthfully providing information. So their contract, to the extent that they had one with Ms. Gagliano, did not bar her from -- it's not enforceable to the extent that it would bar her from providing evidence in this proceeding, which is what they allege she did by giving me a statement.

THE COURT: So you're suggesting that is a cause of action that the Court could look at and deal with without waiting because as a matter --

MR. GREENBERG: Well, Your Honor, as a matter of law there's no enforceable -- there's no enforceable legal right there, is what I'm saying. As alleged in their complaint, their complaint doesn't -- assuming all the facts are true, which the Court I understand is going to do, there's no legal right that they are articulating here that the Court has the power to recognize for these reasons, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And you assert the same or similar argument as to champerty, that you can't have a cause of action for champerty?

MR. GREENBERG: There's never been a cause of action for champerty.

Champerty is a defense as to enforcement of a contract. It's never been recognized under the common law as an affirmative claim.

THE COURT: Okay. So, at any rate, it appears that perhaps both sides agree that the two causes of action the Court can look at that and at least rule as a matter of law -- be able to rule whether or not as a matter of law you could not file such a third party complaint. Let's move beyond that. Let's say the Court looks at the -- at that proposed third party complaint and determines that one or both survive such an analysis so that the Court could not say that legally as a matter of law you could not have such a cause of action. Then the question becomes how do we treat that? Does the Court allow the filing as a third party complaint and then do something with it, other than make it a part of the lawsuit? I think if I was hearing right that both sides are in agreement that it would have to be walled off from the main complaint at trial, that we would not be trying to visit -- not trying to litigate

1	the complaint and the third party complaint at the same time.
2	Do you agree with that, Ms. Rodriguez?
3	MS. RODRIGUEZ: I think we would have to see what came out in discovery
4	and how intertwined the testimony of Ms. Gagliano would be.
5	THE COURT: Uh-huh.
6	MS. RODRIGUEZ: That's what comes to mind because, you know, I think
7	Mr. Greenberg and I are arguing two different things. You know, he's arguing that
8	her contract is not enforceable, and I gave Your Honor the case that says that's
9	not really a reason for defeating intentional interference with business contracts.
10	And I note I forgot to mention that that case is already is also mentioned in
11	the Nevada Supreme Court. It's relied upon in the Stalk v. Mushkin case, which is
12	125 Nevada Advance Opinion
13	THE COURT: Hold on one second with that.
14	MS. RODRIGUEZ: Sure.
15	THE COURT: I lost my law clerk.
16	MS. RODRIGUEZ: Yes. I'm sorry.
17	THE COURT: Okay. She's citing another case, a Nevada case.
18	MS. RODRIGUEZ: <u>Stalk v. Mushkin</u> . Michael Mushkin, I believe. It's 125
19	Nevada
20	THE COURT: No doubt.
21	MS. RODRIGUEZ: I'm sorry?
22	THE COURT: No doubt.
23	MS. RODRIGUEZ: Oh. 125 Nevada Advance Opinion No. 3, or 199 P. 3d

838. It's a January 29th, 2009 case that also cites and relies upon the Zimmerman

case, indicating that it doesn't matter whether the contract is enforceable or not in addressing intentional interference with prospective business contractual relations.

So I guess in answer to the Court's question, I think we would be interested in taking Ms. Gagliano's deposition before the close of discovery. And perhaps some of that's where I see maybe these two matters overlapping, but if --

THE COURT: Well, my intention would no doubt be, if I allow either or both of these to be filed, is that I would -- the default position would be that I would sever them, subject to any motion at some point, at a later point to revisit that question. I do tend to agree with Mr. Greenberg that it would become almost impossible to litigate a case if you at the same time are trying to litigate a third party complaint against one of the attorneys in the case. So I don't see how that would work, but I'd, you know, listen to argument.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: It also will become, depending on how the Court is going to handle it, but I think the Court would probably handle any motions on attorney's fees should they prevail at the underlying minimum wage case because that's really where the champerty argument is coming in. You know, as the Court is now aware, there's the same cause of action, the same class that's over in Judge Delaney's courtroom and we're looking at attorney's fees in the \$50,000 range. Here we're looking at attorney's fees in the \$500,000 range. So perhaps -- I'm not sure how the Court would lay out the sequence of events, but if this is going to be a matter -- attorney's fees are going to be a matter for the Court to hear the evidentiary hearing as opposed to the jury, that may be where the champerty evidence would come in for the Court's consideration.

THE COURT: I'm not going to determine at this point whether or not that

motion could be granted. I'm going to have to look at the authorities a little more. Before we leave that, though, let's -- I mean, we've kind of attenuated the whole thing because of my inquiry to Mr. Greenberg that he's already responded to. But let's not just leave it at this. For example, Mr. Greenberg contends that not only should I not allow the third party complaint to be filed, but that I should sanction the other side for even proposing it or filing it. Is there any more that needs to be argued as to that proposition?

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, I think that the briefings as submitted to the Court are clear. I just want to emphasize one thing because defendants' counsel is citing to this <u>Zimmerman</u> case in California and is making this assertion that whether the contract that they supposedly had with Ms. Gagliano was enforceable or not is not the issue in respect to making out a claim for interference. That is not the law. As discussed at page 5 in my brief --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: -- the Nevada Supreme Court has been very clear in the Sutherland case --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: -- which was from 1989: "To establish intentional interference with contractual relations the plaintiff must show, one, a valid and existing contract."

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: "The defendant's knowledge, intentional acts, actual disruption of the contract, and five, resulting damage." Your Honor, it is impossible for them to meet these requirements, given the protection of NRS 41.071, which is

that they have no privilege to prevent from Ms. Gagliano from giving testimony in this case. So they cannot claim that they have resulting damage from a violation of a contractual obligation that she obtained that I somehow induced. Forget about whether they established that I induced it or not --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: -- I'm just saying on the allegations that are made, given the structure of the law here, there is no claim stated, Your Honor. And this again is precisely the reason why I have asked for the sanctions in this case, because they know better, okay. But let me not belabor the point. Your Honor wants to reflect on this further.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GREENBERG: We have other issues to deal with.

THE COURT: What about on your countermotion, though, for sanctions? What is -- tell me -- remind me, what is the sanctions you're asking for? Ten thousand dollars, I see.

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, whatever the Court deems appropriate.

I mean, dealing with this particular motion, you know, has consumed -- I had requested \$4,815 in fees because I responded to the first motion, which they then withdrew twenty days after I served them with a Rule 11 notice. And then I requested another \$1,500 -- \$6,345 in terms of responding to both motions. It is up to Your Honor to decide an appropriate quantum of attorney's fees. I mean, a sanction could be in the form of a payment to the Law Library here in Clark County or something else. This is discussed in my papers. Your Honor has broad parameters to work with here. I don't want to take up the Court's time on it, unless

the Court has questions.

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THE COURT: Okay.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Your Honor, I would like to be heard on the sanctions issue --

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: -- because I brought this issue up before the Discovery Commissioner and unfortunately it was never addressed. It bothers me and it is a real problem in this lawsuit, as well as my understanding is in the lawsuits -- the other lawsuits that Mr. Greenberg has brought in the Eighth Judicial District Court, in that every pleading he files with the court, particularly with the Discovery Commissioner, every single one he asks for sanctions against me personally, against Mr. Wall, against my client.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: And to me, being a member of the Bar for 20 years, sanctions are an extreme measure when there has been some very bad behavior. I've never been sanctioned in 20 years. I can tell Your Honor that I get calls quite frequently from my colleagues that he has terrified because he threatens these sanctions over and over and over. And I think his motive is if you ask for them enough times, eventually you're going to get them. I think they're improper. He's been using them as a bully tactic. I think Your Honor is aware that he's misrepresented to the Nevada Selection on the Judicial Commission where I've applied for a judge position twice. He submitted correspondence indicating already that I have been sanctioned, when I have not been sanctioned.

THE COURT: I was not aware of that.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: And the Discovery Commissioner many moons ago sanctioned A Cab for a deposition that they felt -- that she felt was unnecessary. It remains to be seen whether that deposition was unnecessary or not because it's come -- we've both relied on it quite frequently, so I think it was a necessary deposition. That was of James Morgan. But Mr. Greenberg continues to reiterate to everyone from the Judicial Commission to Governor Sandoval that that sanction was a sanction against me. And, you know, he's got everybody shaking in their shoes about these sanctions and it puts me in a very difficult position of either wanting to protect myself and not file motions which I believe are with good basis and I've argued as to why they're a good basis, they're not frivolous motions, or protecting my client, doing my job, advocating for my client, because every time I advocate for my client he threatens me with sanctions.

I think they're not proper in this instance and I would ask the Court to address those with Mr. Greenberg, that you can't be asking for sanctions every single time you're filing a motion, to be used in this fashion as a bully. It's really a bullying tactic, is why he's threatening these sanctions constantly.

THE COURT: Well, I would not propose to discuss this with Mr. Greenberg, other than to say I suppose what's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. It is conceivable, at least, that if someone was doing that sort of thing that they might get sanctioned. I am not -- I'm not at all saying that I feel inclined to tell Mr. Greenberg that he should not ask for sanctions if he thinks they're warranted. I'm here to litigate the issues, whatever they may be. It is obviously more costly and prolongs the litigation if you have bad blood between the attorneys and then you wind up dealing with the case inside the case and it probably is something that is better left

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to some other avenue. But that's as far as I would make comment.

MR. GREENBERG: I understand, Your Honor. If I might respond, counsel has stated twice to Your Honor now that I advised the Commission on Judicial Selection that she was sanctioned. That is absolutely untrue. I have the written correspondence. It should be on my computer here. I expressly advised the Commission that Ms. Rodriguez could not be held responsible personally for a sanction issued against her client. I never told them that she was sanctioned. I explained I had other issues with her conduct in this litigation.

And, Your Honor, I also have an issue that she then went to the Discovery Commissioner and asked the Discovery Commissioner to issue an order to refrain -- that I should refrain from making further comments to the Judicial Commission about her, Your Honor. My participation in that process as a member of the State Bar is of course a duty that I have to advise the Commission and it's also privileged. The court doesn't have any basis to restrain me from making that sort of, you know, complaint, inquiry, comment on the appointment of someone to the bench, Your Honor.

My point, Your Honor, is we shouldn't -- this should not be before Your Honor is my point, and it is absolutely untrue. I can provide my correspondence to the Commission if Your Honor would like to see it. But we should move on. Your Honor needs to deal with the issues in this litigation, not collateral matters that should not be brought before Your Honor.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Well, it's not collateral, Your Honor, because he's asked for them again.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: He's asked for them again. And that's not what I asked the Discovery Commissioner. I didn't ask her to restrain Mr. Greenberg from making a public comment. I asked her for him to clarify because he was implying in so many words that I was sanctioned, and that was very clear in the discussions with the Judicial Commission. It was public record. It was publicly broadcast to the public as to Mr. Greenberg's letter. And like I said, it went up to Governor Sandoval, who said he read the entire deposition of Mr. Nady. He reviewed the pleadings and everything that Mr. Greenberg had submitted and said I didn't get anything out of these pleadings and this deposition in accordance with what Mr. Greenberg was representing. So I felt at least a lot better that the Governor, a former federal judge, had read this, but this shows how far it's been going. And it's not necessarily bad blood, Your Honor. I haven't asked for -- I don't go after him personally and sanctions like that. So this is -- you know, this is coming from him, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, my experience so far is that generally speaking when we get this kind of to some extent bad blood between the attorneys, nobody can say it's all the other side, it's not me at all. I mean, it is almost part of the nature of the beast that when you're litigating and you're in the heat of battle it's pretty tough not to land some blows that might be technically outside the safe zone.

So I'm not inclined to hold either side at fault over -- particularly over any conduct outside of this litigation. But I have to deal with -- both sides have generally complained that the other side is doing something for purely tactical reasons, as opposed to resolving genuine issues within the litigation. This is certainly not the only case that I get those kinds of arguments, and we'll just deal with them as we have to as we move along.

All right. So I'm going to take the motion itself under submission, as well as the countermotion for sanctions and I will put those down for a chambers calendar.

THE CLERK: June 5th, chambers calendar.

THE COURT: Okay. June 5th, chambers calendar.

All right. Okay, how about bifurcate?

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, that's plaintiff's motion. This is really directed to the Court's discretion. I mean, I don't see that there's any controlling direction that the Court needs to follow in this. I think the Court really needs to evaluate the circumstances and proceed in the fashion that they think is most efficient and effective from a judicial economy point of view. And on that note, Your Honor, I think that the economy is going to be served by bifurcating the question of liability against Mr. Nady because his liability is completely derivative here. If whatever is found against A Cab is satisfied by A Cab, there's no need --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: -- for there to be findings regarding these alter ego allegations or misconduct allegations --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: -- or his other potential conduct that would have to be evaluated and the facts bearing on that and decisions made on that. So on that basis alone I would submit that the bifurcation makes sense, Your Honor. If the Court is not inclined to agree to the bifurcation, I need to address this issue of how Mr. Nady may or may not be able to shield his personal liability based upon this exploration -- not exploration, Your Honor, but established facts as to what his

financial gain was from the operations of the business. And we can address that separately if Your Honor wants to just deal with --

THE COURT: Well, does the -- does his involvement emanate purely from the piercing the corporate veil aspect?

MR. GREENBERG: Well, Your Honor, it does in the sense that the major allegation against him in this case in terms of his personal liability I believe really corresponds to the time period after February of 2013. At that time Your Honor made a ruling that the minimum wage act applied to the class.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: And clearly the defendants were on notice that they had to comply with the act.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: They did not. They did not actually start complying with the act, by their own admission, and this is, you know, part of the partial summary judgment motion, until about 18 months later, sometime in 2014. Mr. Nady is the principal and the sole beneficiary of the business operations. It essentially enhanced his financial returns, his reward from the operations of the business through that violation of the law for that approximate 15 month, 18 month period. The company clearly knew that they had to comply with the law. Your Honor had ordered it. They didn't.

Now, there are other allegations against him regarding his misuse of the corporate form and his use of the corporation as an agent to otherwise not keep proper records or otherwise manipulate the record keeping or instruct the corporation intentionally not to pay the drivers minimum wages for other periods of

times and involving other circumstances. I'm separating out those other allegations,
Your Honor --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: -- because I'm sure Your Honor can understand those involve somewhat different issues factually. When we talk about this time period from February 2013 through August of 2014, approximately, it's established record, you know, what happened in terms of the business, in terms of Your Honor's rulings and in terms of the conduct of the company because we have the payroll records, we have Your Honor's ruling from February 2013. So --

THE COURT: So are you saying as to those charges or allegations or causes of action, theory of action that no discovery -- well, I mean, is there really any reason to bifurcate as to those?

MR. GREENBERG: Well, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Isn't really the discovery done as to those and --

MR. GREENBERG: I still -- I need to take Mr. Nady's deposition. He's going to have to go on the record in terms of how he was informed as to the circumstances of the Court's January 17th, 2013 order; what steps he did or did not take. He obviously has not admitted that he has any responsibility for anything owed to the drivers for that time period. After we establish that record, will there in fact be some disputed issue of fact that will require a trial as to his conduct and liability for that time period? I don't know, okay. We would establish that record.

As I said, sort of the sort of highest reason that I have proposed to the Court to bifurcate the liability issue of Mr. Nady is simply because if we proceed to conclusion in this case and the claims are in fact fully paid to the class from the

corporate entity by A Cab, there is no need to make any findings --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: -- as to Mr. Nady's liability because his liability is completely derivative. We're dealing with one set of damages here. Plaintiffs aren't going to collect twice. So on that basis I would propose that bifurcation makes sense.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: But again, this is within Your Honor's discretion and I understand that and Your Honor may view it differently. I am certainly prepared to proceed with the claims against Mr. Nady in tandem with the claims against the corporate entity. My problem with the current posture of the case is that I believe Mr. Nady has a colorable defense to raise here that his personal liability should be limited by his personal gain from the misconduct that he has alleged to engage in; his unjust enrichment, so to speak. And if he's going to present that argument to the Court, then I need to be able to document to the Court in these proceedings what in fact his unjust enrichment was, what was his personal gain from the operation of the business.

And again, this goes to this question of disclosure of what he actually profited from from the business. And there is in fact -- this is discussed in my moving papers, it was discussed before the Discovery Commissioner -- there is in fact no entity level transfer record of distributions from A Cab to Mr. Nady because A Cab is an LLC, he is the sole shareholder. All earnings of the company are reported to him personally on his 1040 tax return, which is allowable if it's a sole member LLC entity. So it would be on Schedule C or Schedule E or both of his

personal tax return. Those documents have not been disclosed to me. They need to be disclosed. If Mr. Nady is not going to interpose a defense based upon limiting his liability based on his financial gain, then we don't need this discovery, Your Honor. But if he's going to be able to interpose that defense, a potential limit on his liability, how am I going to address that without actual documentation as to what his financial gain was during the period in question?

THE COURT: Well, if we bifurcate -- are you saying bifurcate -- I forget now.

Did you say bifurcate for trial or bifurcate for discovery purposes as well?

MR. GREENBERG: I would bifurcate in its entirety, Your Honor. I mean, if we're talking about judicial economy here, we would simply bifurcate and hold the claim against Mr. Nady in separation in its entirety in terms of the development of a further record as necessary and obviously for trial as well if necessary. Let us deal with the liability of A Cab, ascertaining that liability. We know Mr. Nady's liability is not going to exceed the liability of A Cab. If A Cab satisfies that liability, other -- he has no liability to pay and there's no need to make any findings. There's no need to conduct further discovery.

THE COURT: If we were to do that, would we put ourselves in danger of eventually running into a 5-year rule as far as the Nady part of the litigation?

MR. GREENBERG: That's an interesting question, Your Honor. I did want to address to the Court because you had raised this initially and I did check my computer, this case has been stayed for 300 days in total, according to my notes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: That would mean a trial would need to be commenced, unless there was a further stay or extension of the 5-year rule, by the end of July of

next year. So we have about 13 months or so to bring the case to disposition in total.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: I don't think that would be a problem, Your Honor. But again, it is for Your Honor's judgment to decide these things.

THE COURT: When are we trying this case? I saw that a moment ago. When is the trial on this case?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: February.

THE COURT: February. That seems to be putting us pretty -- perhaps untenably close to the July cut-off date. I mean, I don't know, if we do this in February --

MR. GREENBERG: We could complete the discovery, Your Honor, and then we don't necessarily need to bifurcate the --

THE COURT: If I were going to bifurcate at all, I would think it would simply be for trial. And I don't know that it logistically or that it really makes sense to only bifurcate for trial. What's your view on that, Ms. Rodriguez?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Well, we agree, Your Honor. If we were just talking about bifurcating for trial, we don't have a problem with that. But I think what this really is is a motion to reopen discovery because our discovery is due to close probably in about 45 days or so and Mr. Greenberg simply hasn't worked up these causes of action against Mr. Nady. His third cause of action is for civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting, concert of action and as the alter ego of the corporate defendants, and we were intending to move for summary judgment on that issue because there's a lot of serious allegations raised against Mr. Nady personally that have not been proven or are not going to come to fruition. So we're intending to move at the close of

discovery and in time with the dispositive motion deadline on those causes of action.

And what Mr. Greenberg's motion to bifurcate says is that the Court can direct the parties to engage in discovery, dispositive motions necessary, briefing if necessary on a trial against Mr. Nady. So I think what this is is he just wants to then work up the discovery that he has failed to do in the last nearly five years. And what he is also arguing is -- on these financial issue we've been before the Discovery Commissioner probably three times, if not more, on everything that he's arguing to Your Honor this morning about the 1040s and Mr. Nady's tax forms. And I think Your Honor has seen the Report and Recommendations from the Discovery Commissioner and she has limited what Mr. Nady is supposed to turn over to the plaintiffs and he has in fact turned over everything that she has ordered. Mr. Greenberg didn't object to any of those Report and Recommendations, hasn't asked for a reconsideration, but he's just kind of snuck in those things in a motion to bifurcate. So it's improper for him to now be arguing those things that were properly before the Discovery Commissioner and he failed to address at that point.

So, again, in answer to the Court's question, if we're just talking about bifurcating the trial, the defendant doesn't have an opposition to that. But in terms of reopening discovery, when we're within 45 days of the close of discovery, on these additional causes of action that he hasn't worked up, we would definitely oppose that.

THE COURT: Would the bifurcated part of the trial, that part against Mr. Nady himself, would that also be a jury trial? I assume so.

MR. GREENBERG: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Don't we just sort of add a lot of cost to this litigation by doing that?

MR. GREENBERG: As I said, Your Honor, there are no firm guideposts here --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: -- that the Court needs to follow. It is within your discretion. I presented my thoughts to Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, my discretion to this point would be to deny this motion.

I would do so without prejudice to re-raising it at least as to the trial situation. If it seems that there is a need ultimately to bifurcate the trial, then I would reconsider it.

But at this point, at least, I would deny this motion without --

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yeah?

MR. GREENBERG: I understand Your Honor is not inclined to proceed in a bifurcated fashion at this time, but the issue still remains as to the disclosure of the financial gain that Mr. Nady received from the business. In respect to Ms. Rodriguez' representations to the Court that this was ruled on by the Discovery Commissioner, she is correct, there were rulings made. However, we did file an objection to her second ruling on this -- I believe it was her second ruling -- because it was not in compliance with -- the initial ruling was give information on distributions from the company to Mr. Nady. There are no -- there is no record of distributions because there's no K-1 issue because it's an LLC. It doesn't file an entity-level K-1. I explained this to Commissioner Bulla. For whatever reason, she did not understand it in respect to the need to get that information from the Schedule C and the Schedule E, as I've explained to Your Honor.

Your Honor entered -- did sign with a note that there was no opposition

1	the Discovery Commissioner's subsequent Report and Recommendation which
2	was filed on March 9th, with a note that there was no objections, but in fact we did
3	file objections to this.
4	THE COURT: You did? All right.
5	MR. GREENBERG: On I have it right here on my computer, on January
6	30th. So for some reason that bypassed Your Honor
7	THE COURT: Well, then I would
8	MR. GREENBERG: and presumably Your Honor didn't I mean, if there's
9	no objections Your Honor would sign it.
10	THE COURT: It's very possible it's very possible we made a mistake,
11	in which event that would be a good subject for a motion for reconsideration.
12	MR. GREENBERG: Well, if Your Honor thinks it's more sensible for me
13	to bring this back before the Court on a motion for reconsideration, I will do so.
14	THE COURT: Well, the thing is, you know, I don't know that I'm prepared
15	to even respond to this at this point, unless you've got something that shows
16	(Speaking to the clerk) Do you show an objection having been filed?
17	On what date did you say?
18	MR. GREENBERG: I can I have this right here. It was electronically filed
19	on January 27.
20	THE COURT: January 27.
21	MR. GREENBERG: I mean, I have it. This is on my screen here.
22	THE COURT: Objection to the Commissioner's ruling.
23	THE CLERK: Plaintiffs' partial objections?

THE COURT: Partial objection? Was that what it was labeled?

and Mr. Greenberg withdrew that objection, because that's the one that she kind of

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MR. GREENBERG: -- to bring it to Your Honor's attention. We did not

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withdraw these objections. In fact, we sort of added them in tandem with the motion to bifurcate. They were filed two weeks later because of the course of events here.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I have two different factual contentions, one that they were withdrawn and one that they were not. If what you're saying is notwithstanding, even if they were withdrawn that it's appropriate for the Court to deal with the bifurcation because it was raised in a motion filed -- January 11th, you said?

MR. GREENBERG: That's correct. Well, it's not the -- it's the question of this disclosure, Your Honor, we're talking about, the financial information disclosure. It was raised as part of the motion to bifurcate. And this was explained in the objections filed on January 27th. We did not withdraw these objections, Your Honor. There's just some confusion on this point, okay.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: It is unfortunate that there's been confusion here, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GREENBERG: But I would impress upon Your Honor we have acted diligently. We have tried to --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GREENBERG: I mean, obviously a party needs to invoke their rights.

They have to follow the procedures and time frames given by the Court. We understand that. We have done so in this case, is what I'm trying to impress upon the Court.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GREENBERG: And to deny this disclosure and allow Mr. Nady to come before the Court at trial and raise these defenses without a disclosure as to his financial gain is inequitable, to say the least, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, to the extent that that is raised that the question of what shall be the discovery on this issue, to the extent that that has been raised in a motion filed January 11th to bifurcate, then I think it's fair for the Court to consider it, regardless of whatever happened in front of the Discovery Commissioner.

MR. GREENBERG: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So I will consider whatever is in the motion. Whether that reaches the extent of what you want to do discovery-wise, I don't know. But I guess what we're saying is the Court needs to rule in the ruling on your motion to bifurcate.

MR. GREENBERG: That is --

THE COURT: The Court would have to consider the question of whether further discovery would be allowed. Is that a fair statement?

MR. GREENBERG: That is correct, Your Honor. It's not -- well, again, it's just this question, this narrow issue of the financial --

THE COURT: Understood.

MR. GREENBERG: I actually have the financial disclosures that were given and we could discuss them in detail. They are confidential. I don't know if the Court wants to get into any of that at this hearing.

THE COURT: No, I don't.

MR. GREENBERG: Thank you.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Well, I would request the Court's permission then, because to me they're two separate issues entirely and I oppose orally and in my

briefing the issue on the bifurcation. I think that's what we are here to talk about.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: If we're going to go back and talk about the financial disclosures, I would like an opportunity to get -- I have the transcript, I believe, back in my office, to see if this is the one that the objections were withdrawn and it was a done issue, because I think we already went back before the Discovery Commissioner, but I would just like an opportunity to look at that and supplement if there is something, because I think it's improper the way that he kind of put that in the middle of this motion to bifurcate.

THE COURT: So you want to make further response to the motion to bifurcate, is that what you're saying?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: I do, Your Honor. I do, if necessary.

THE COURT: All right. How long do you need to file what you want to file?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: If I could have a week, that would be great.

THE COURT: All right, a week. And then you'll probably want to reply.

MR. GREENBERG: If I had an opportunity, Your Honor.

THE COURT: This is all done in the context of the motion to bifurcate.

Obviously I will vacate the oral ruling I made a few minutes ago that it was denied without prejudice. I will review this, even with the context of the discovery. I'm not -- folks, let's get this clear. There is a great need to have rules of discovery and not to have matters left until the end if they can be done expeditiously throughout.

Notwithstanding that, it's my view that the issues of the case, if you are correct that it was squarely drawn or brought up, if that turns out to be the case, and we're just now dealing with the motion to bifurcate, then, you know, and that can't be attributed

to either side. It was -- the case went to a different department, it came back. It was stayed for mediation. I'm not going to have the so-called merits of the case resolved by issues of whether or not somebody gets to do one certain thing in discovery if we've got this long until the trial. I would not be inclined to close the door on that unless I find that it really wasn't, it simply wasn't even brought up, in which event I would probably fall back to the interpretation of the rules of discovery and see whether or not it was objected to or not or what happened there.

So I'm going to look at it, but I will receive in a week more from the defense. And then -- how long did you say, a week after?

MR. GREENBERG: One week would be fine, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: -- if that's allowable.

THE COURT: So let's get our dates. One week for the defense.

THE CLERK: May 24th.

THE COURT: And then a week for the plaintiff.

THE CLERK: May 31st.

THE COURT: And then I don't propose we'll argue this again. We'll simply submit it. It will stand submitted and the Court will put it on the next available chambers calendar. Is that that same one we just said?

THE CLERK: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: All right, let's do that at the same time.

THE CLERK: June 5th.

THE COURT: June 5th.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay, that takes care of that one. So it appears we may have to actually get down to the motion for partial summary judgment. Have we dealt with everything else now? Yeah, I think we've dealt with all the other motions on file. Do you agree?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: I think so, Your Honor.

THE COURT: We've already dealt with everything. All right.

MR. GREENBERG: Well, Your Honor, there is an issue that does remain from my motion that was actually filed in October for the injunction regarding the Dubric case. As part of that motion, Your Honor, I had requested that Your Honor extend the class certification in this case, the damages class certification through the present date. Your Honor's prior certification only certified the damages class through the end of 2015. Now, Your Honor on my OST did issue the injunction, but reserved that issue for further consideration, along with my request for attorney's fees in relation to that application.

THE COURT: Which of these motions that are on today was that touched on?

MR. GREENBERG: This is not on today, formally noticed, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I know it's not, but wasn't it touched on in one of these motions, in the oppositions that I read for today?

MR. GREENBERG: Well, Your Honor, the Court may not wish to address this now. I'm just bringing up the point that this was reserved for a decision by the Court, this issue of extending the class certification.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: We're before the Court today on the partial summary judgment, okay, so it does have some relationship to that because the partial

summary judgment actually has information relating through May of 2016 which has been presented to the Court, but we've also presented information that's congruent with the end of 2015, if the partial summary judgment at this time is going to be limited to that period, which is fine, Your Honor. But the issue still remains as to whether there's going to be an extension of the damages class through the current date that will require supplementing the disclosures of the defendant's payroll records and so forth past what they've produced in the litigation. Discovery Commissioner Bulla has actually allowed for this contingency by already ordering that if Your Honor extends the class certification, defendants are going to have to provide the same information. I'm just raising it with Your Honor now --

THE COURT: Well, then that certainly -- that certainly needs to be resolved immediately if it's going to necessitate additional discovery.

MR. GREENBERG: Right, Your Honor. And again, this was raised on October 14th, which is when I originally filed that motion, Your Honor. And remember we had the transfer of the case.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: The case came back. There was the OST regarding the Dubric --

THE COURT: I'm trying to recall what I thought when I reserved it for future determination. I'm trying to remember if I thought there was some event that would trigger the further resolution of it. Maybe this is it; we're at it.

MR. GREENBERG: Well, to be quite honest and candid with Your Honor, this is a copy of the order that Your Honor issued. If you'd like, I can approach.

THE COURT: Yeah, sure.

MR. GREENBERG: At that time we brought this in front of Your Honor on an OST because of the immediacy of the action of the Dubric -- developments in the Dubric action. So the focus of myself as class counsel was simply to deal with that issue. So I did not want to burden Your Honor, who is quite busy, of course, with other things, with reaching that issue at that time. And you'll see at the very end of that order in the last sentence it just generally refers that the foregoing is without prejudice to the grant of further relief on the motion and the Court intends to issue a subsequent order on the same. We never actually got a subsequent order addressing these other requests in the original motion from October, which was, again, the request to extend the class certification.

THE COURT: Yeah, the last paragraph says, "The foregoing is without prejudice to the grant of further relief by the Court on the motion and the Court intends to issue a subsequent order addressing the same." You're saying that -- that is the preservation --

MR. GREENBERG: That's the totality of where we left this, Your Honor, okay.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: And it was my drafting on this order. Your Honor did sign this order sort of like the day before or the morning of the proceedings in the Dubric case.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GREENBERG: So it was sort of a hurried situation, Your Honor. It wasn't really desirable from any perspective. But I am bringing it back to Your Honor's attention because no subsequent order has been issued. We do have to manage this case for trial, as Your Honor understands.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: And I don't see why the class period would not be extended.

THE COURT: Well, I don't propose to resolve that at this point today.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What's your take on it?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Well, I'm at a loss. I don't know what order he handed you, but I think that's the order where you did subsequently issue -- the Court wrote out the order as to why you enjoined --

THE COURT: The amended -- or not amended, but a supplement to this.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Right. It had nothing to do with what he's mentioning right now, if I'm recalling that right. The Court went into an explanation as to why you felt compelled to --

THE COURT: Well, yeah, that was simply my intention to at least let it be known why I would take what I considered --

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Right.

THE COURT: -- to be a very bold action, to say the least.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Right. It had nothing to do with extending the 2015 date. I think the reason he's bringing that up is because that's part of our opposition to the motion for partial summary judgment, is that the class order as it stands right now and what he's moving for is not even within the time period within the class order. So that's why -- but I didn't bring all of the pleadings having to do with the motion to enjoin or the items. It's not on calendar today.

THE COURT: Well, let's do this. I'm not sure that there's any order that

I should make today that has to do with this issue of whether first of all, whether	
or not there is still to be addressed an issue of extending the class certification	
time-wise. And second of all, I'm not prepared to address you know, if there is	
a preservation of such an issue, I'm certainly not prepared to address what the	
implications of that would be.	

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, I wasn't necessarily proposing Your Honor address this today. I just think it does relate to what we're trying to deal with here and to get guidance from the Court. If the Court simply says we're going to review this and issue a subsequent order one way or the other, then I know the Court is going to do that. I'm bringing it to the Court's attention. If the Court thinks we should re-notice a motion specifically addressed to this issue --

THE COURT: I do.

MR. GREENBERG: -- I will do that most promptly.

THE COURT: I clearly would have to say that because I don't -- I'm not --

MR. GREENBERG: Then that's how we will proceed in respect to that issue, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. So, you will file a motion as to that. Today we may touch on it as part of the determination of this last one.

MR. GREENBERG: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: We're going to take a short break before we get into this. We're going to take a five minute recess and then we'll come back to that final motion.

MR. GREENBERG: Thank you, Your Honor.

(Court recessed from 11:05 a.m. until 11:19 a.m.)

THE COURT: Okay, we are back. Okay, this one I probably -- it would be helpful to me if plaintiff would summarize your argument and particularly point out an easy way to figure out the difference between a low tier and a high tier, and then somewhere along the way deal with the defendants' contention that you claim to be relying upon established facts when those really are issues of material fact.

MR. GREENBERG: Yes, Your Honor. In respect to the high tier versus the low tier issue, okay, I would urge the Court at a minimum to focus on the \$174,000 of cumulative underpayments at the \$7.25 an hour rate. There is no issue in respect to that rate being applicable, okay. No one argues that rate is not applicable. In respect to the \$8.25 an hour rate, there is a whole issue that I addressed to the Court previously which Your Honor declined to reach, as to whether it should even be plaintiffs' burden to establish entitlement to the \$8.25 an hour rate or whether it should be defendants' burden to establish that they're entitled to pay only the \$7.25 an hour rate.

THE COURT: As I recall, there's no authority that says that it falls to the defendant.

MR. GREENBERG: There is no authority one way or the other, Your Honor, and Your Honor declined to make a finding on that issue -- this was last year -- and directed further discovery be conducted and we would perhaps revisit that further. We are still waiting to develop the record in respect to the relevant information on that issue. I'm advised that defendants have a supplement for me today which is going to be sent, which is going to provide me with --

THE COURT: On the issue of the \$7.25?

MR. GREENBERG: Well, on the facts that bear on the \$8.25 --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: -- because there's two sets of facts that bear on the \$8.25. One set of facts is was the employee even eligible to enroll in the insurance. That issue is analyzed in part in the submission on this partial summary judgment motion because there was a waiting period. There was a 60-day or 90-day waiting period. So when we see someone is hired, they first appear in the payroll record on March 1st, 2013 in the review we did of the records and that's the first indication we have of them ever working for the company, they're going to be entitled to that \$8.25 rate either for 60 or 90 days after March 1st, 2013 because they don't have enough waiting time in to participate in the program, okay.

The other issue in terms of qualification deals with this question of ten percent cost, which is that the cost to the employee can't be more than ten percent of the wages for them to participate in the insurance for both themselves and their family members. The participation cost is much less for single employees. It is prohibitive for people with spouses or children in terms of that ten percent issue. So, single employees --

THE COURT: Two hundred and seventy-three dollars every two weeks or some such thing?

MR. GREENBERG: Well, it's a lot, okay. It clearly wouldn't reach -- it clearly wouldn't meet the ten percent threshold. In this partial summary judgment motion we have not analyzed that issue, in part because we don't have enough information. We are getting information on that which we think is important. It was ordered by the Discovery Commissioner. It will identify the marital status of many of the class members. So we will revisit that later.

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But in terms of just differentiating between the \$8.25 and the \$7.25 tier for purposes of this motion, the only issue we have looked at is this question of waiting period. Did the employee -- were they a new hire? What we've assumed is that anyone who was hired after March 1st, 2013, because we're looking at January 1st, 2013 through the end of 2015, this 2-year period, anyone hired after that date is a new hire if they're just appearing in the payroll records. Anyone who first comes into the payroll records prior to that date, we're giving the defendants the benefit of the doubt and saying that they qualified at that point; their waiting period had expired. We don't actually know that to be true, but we're making the most conservative assumption in favor of the defendants on that issue.

So if the Court is declining to put the burden on the defendants in terms of establishing the \$7.25 rate, because we have provided the calculations at \$8.25 for everyone -- Your Honor may not want to go in that direction and make the differentiation based upon the information we've provided, the only differentiation we're asking the Court to make here is based on the waiting period, which is again when the employee is first hired or first paid after March 1st, 2013, to apply the 60 or 90-day period.

THE COURT: When you say differentiation, you mean that some members of a class might get a certain amount and others might get a different amount?

MR. GREENBERG: By differentiation, I mean between the \$7.25 and the \$8.25 rate.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: Someone who appears in the payroll in January of 2015, if the Court is going to apply only the waiting period analysis, is only going to get a

judgment at \$7.25 an hour. They're not going to be entitled to any judgment at all 1 2 3 4 5 6

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on an \$8.25 analysis because for our purposes we are assuming they were eligible to participate in the insurance at all times, that they were not under a waiting period. We don't know that fact to be true, but we're giving defendants the benefit of the doubt. It's only when the employee is in fact first appearing in the payroll records after that March 1st of 2013 date that we're imposing the 60-day or 90-day waiting period time where we're calculating an \$8.25 rate for that person.

Now, if Your Honor rejects making any differentiation, as I've just explained, then Your Honor can just grant summary judgment under the \$7.25 an hour rate in its entirety, ignore the higher tier rate for the moment and this issue will be addressed at some point in the future, if Your Honor feels that is more appropriate. As I was explaining when I started speaking, there is \$174,000 collectively that is owed under the \$7.25 an hour rate that we have documented from the payroll records. So hopefully I have given the Court some insight in terms of this issue of the rates, the two rates as they apply to this motion that's before the Court right now.

Your Honor's other inquiry to me was to address the defendants' contention that somehow we are basing this motion on facts that are not really established --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: -- and that there are material issues. Your Honor, this is based -- this motion is based in its entirety on defendants' own payroll records and on defendants' corroborating testimony about what the information in those payroll records contains, okay. They produced to me in October of last year Excel

files. This is discussed in my declaration, Exhibit A, paragraph 2. They gave me these two Excel files with the information, the payroll information in it. It was turned over to Mr. Bass, who went through it and assembled a line-by-line computation of 14,000 separate pay periods. And in fact, we could even do this on paper paystub by paystub, and I actually have an example in the moving papers of a paystub from Mr. Sergeant which confirms the same minimum wage deficiency for that pay period as in -- at page 489 of the summary that Mr. Bass prepared, which is 689 pages because we're dealing with 14,000 lines and 14,000 separate paychecks that were issued. Some of those paychecks do not show any deficiency for minimum wage purposes, some of them do. Defendants --

THE COURT: How would it be that they show no deficiency?

MR. GREENBERG: The employee got paid more than the \$7.25 an hour rate. And in fact, Your Honor, the only reason we're seeing a deficiency at a \$7.25 an hour rate in this 2-year period is because defendants until August of 2014 were applying a tip credit, okay. After August of 2014, that \$7.25 an hour rate deficiency essentially disappears or it's just -- maybe there's a few nominal errors or something, because they were complying with the federal minimum wage requirement which let them count the tips towards that \$7.25, but not the state minimum wage requirement which doesn't allow the tip credit.

So this is a damage of \$174,000 to the class members that resulted expressly from defendants' process in terms of how they were running their payroll at the time. And defendants have not disputed any of what I've just explained to Your Honor. There is no declaration in opposition saying that there are any errors in the calculations; that the information they gave to us was not correct; that we have not

taken the correct information out of those records in terms of, you know, what 1 2 information. There's this Quantity, QTY minimum wage adjustment number and this 3 4 5 6 7 9

the drivers were using.

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23 24 is discussed I believe at page 4 -- yeah, page 4 of my moving papers, that Mr. Nady testified under oath was the hours worked per pay period that was recorded. And we actually have that on a physical paystub that was issued to Mr. Sergeant. It's in the record. Subsequently when he gave a deposition last year, he was examined about this issue again, and this is discussed in my reply. He testified under oath that the records of the hours worked that are in those payroll records from 2013 to 2015 are the most accurate records of the work hours of the cab drivers. THE COURT: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: And your argument is that leaves this outside the defendants' argument that there's still issues of material fact as to the accuracy of these

MR. GREENBERG: They in fact are more accurate than the trip sheets that

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, they haven't raised any, okay. I mean, all they say is that, well, plaintiff is manipulating the records or may be manipulating the records. They point to no specific discrepancies, no manipulation. There is no declaration from Mr. Nady, from any other witness with personal knowledge raising any material factual issues to say that if we went through these 14,000 paychecks that were issued for this 2-year period, which we did, you would come up with a different number or a different result as to whether we had compliance at the \$7.25 an hour rate that I've just been discussing with you, okay. So there are no material issues.

I do apologize, there were some errors in some of the exhibits that were presented, so there's two erratas. Defendants did raise an issue to correct some of the exhibits, Your Honor. Defendants did raise an issue which I concede is material but not material in respect to denying the motion, that the motion as postured relied upon payroll records through May of 2016 and that was what was in the Bass compilation. However, that doesn't actually change the analysis in respect to the \$7.25 rate amounts that are owed. And in our reply -- we filed a supplement to our reply -- Mr. Bass created a limited per plaintiff, per class member table. We have a total of 570 class members. This was filed on February 23rd.

THE COURT: I must tell you, I'm not sure I read that.

MR. GREENBERG: Well, Your Honor, I'm trying to address the objection that defendants made --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GREENBERG: -- that is germane to the posture of the case. The objection was that the summary of the six hundred -- it's something like a 689 page, you know, 14,000 paycheck summary that was presented by Mr. Bass, included this 5-month period that was beyond the class certification.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: What I'm trying to explain is the amount owed per class member. Some class members are owed nothing. We've identified approximately 300 class members who are owed something at the \$7.25 an hour deficiency analysis. There is in fact no difference -- there's only a \$23.00 different between the total amount owed at \$7.25 when we include those extra five months and when we cut it off at December 31st, 2015, and that \$23.00 is due to some rounding errors

or some nominal issues, because as I was explaining to Your Honor, they were in compliance internally on their payroll record-keeping system after about August of 2014.

So there isn't a material issue there that prevents the Court from issuing summary judgment and my request is that the summary judgment, partial summary judgment be issued in compliance with the chart that was annexed to the February 23rd, 2017 filing, which cuts off the per plaintiff analysis on December 31st, 2015. And Mr. Bass also indicates 65 additional persons who were hired after January 1st, 2016. They are outside the class period, so they wouldn't be subject to any award, not that they're owed anything under a \$7.25 analysis.

THE COURT: Do you have a copy of that?

MR. GREENBERG: I can give you a copy of this, Your Honor, to reference.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. GREENBERG: I hope that I have explained reasonably well what the plaintiffs' position is and assisted the Court.

THE COURT: Uh-huh. I think I understand that part at least. What about when you go for the big number?

MR. GREENBERG: Well, by the big number you mean the \$8.25 an hour deficiency amount?

THE COURT: I do.

MR. GREENBERG: Well, Your Honor, I don't see why the Court should refrain from awarding the additional -- it's about another sixty or eighty thousand dollars that's itemized and owed to the class members. Some of these class members are only owed money under an \$8.25 an hour analysis. I don't see why

the Court should refrain from doing that for the waiting period time. Again, defendants have not countered the assertion that any of those individuals were in fact eligible to enroll in the insurance program. They were not under the waiting period that they had access to the health insurance program during that 60 or 90 day period. We based -- it's not always 60 or 90 days because the waiting period was something like 60 days in 2013 and then it went to 90 days and then it went back to 60 days or something.

So we took that change in the waiting period status into account when we prepared the table that I just gave you. Defendants have not controverted any of that. They haven't pointed to any errors in terms of our application of the arithmetic here, so to speak, nor have they proffered any evidence that any of these individuals that we claim were ineligible to participate in the insurance program in fact were eligible to participate in the insurance program during the time period at issue.

So, yes, I would submit that Your Honor should enter the award, not at the uniform \$7.25 an hour rate, but include that waiting period of qualification for those class members who were under a waiting period for the reasons that I've explained to the Court.

THE COURT: All right. Let's see what Ms. Rodriguez says. She'll probably agree with all of that, won't you?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Oh, sure. Sure, Your Honor. I'm not that hungry for lunch yet.

Your Honor, this motion was filed by Mr. Greenberg on January 11th of this year and there were a number of documents attached to his motion with

purported calculations from this Charles Bass, coming up with some number of what they believe the damages are owed. Two days later, January 13, we get an errata, saying, oh, we got the numbers wrong, here's really what the numbers are when Mr. Bass recalculated.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: February 21st we get a second errata saying, well, no, those numbers were wrong, these are really the numbers that we recalculated and this is the number that Mr. Bass believes is the appropriate number for damages. The reply we get a month later, February 23rd, a supplement to plaintiff's reply, actually, that has yet new numbers and new calculations from Mr. Bass. What we don't have is a timely expert report, a timely designation of an expert. But that's what these are. This is Mr. Bass doing his interpretation of the documents and basically Mr. Greenberg is just submitting an expert piecemeal to report to the Court and asking for summary judgment and arguing that there is no discrepancy as to material fact.

THE COURT: Is there anything in his declaration that amounts to opinion evidence as opposed to some sort of affirmative -- I mean, administrative ministerial thing?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Well, all of it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: We don't know what his methodology was for the calculations of all of these. They have not actually attached the actual documents, the trip sheets. They weren't even in possession of the trip sheets when they came up with the original motion and the calculations. And that was my first argument

in my opposition, is how can they say that these are the actual hours worked when they haven't even bothered to look at the trip sheets --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: -- which we have alleged from the very beginning are the hours that the drivers themselves document as the hours that they are working. When you're talking about minimum wage, you're talking about actual hours, actual paid time for that, and they've not --

THE COURT: Why should they not be able to rely upon the information on the -- well, they're not hard drives, but whatever you call those PDF things?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: All the items that they have been arguing for that we always said were not accurate representations of the actual hours worked, the actual pay. We said if you want to know the actual hours, look at the trip sheets. If you want to look at the actual pay, look at the paystubs. Mr. Greenberg insisted on these --

THE COURT: Then what were those items that were given in discovery to the plaintiff?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: There's been a number of items, Your Honor. And I can't tell from all of these erratas which ones Mr. Bass chose to use in coming up with his calculations. I can tell --

THE COURT: Mr. Greenberg, what were the -- what was contained on the -- please help me out. You said it was two something -- memory sticks?

MR. GREENBERG: I was given, Your Honor, two Excel files.

THE COURT: Excel files. Thank you.

MR. GREENBERG: The defendants -- and I had to assist them, actually,

in getting an expert in and getting a narrative process for them to follow to produce that information, which they did follow and they produced it to me. Mr. Bass' declaration contains no opinion whatsoever. It is 12 pages. It is extremely detailed. It explains each item of information that was in the Excel file, how he sorted it, how he arranged it, and how he then after arranging it in the fashion that we could have the gross wages that were paid on one line.

THE COURT: It sounds like an explanation of methodology.

MR. GREENBERG: It is an explanation of methodology.

THE COURT: That an expert would do.

MR. GREENBERG: Well, Your Honor, he has been designated as an expert.

That's not true when defendants say there is no expert designation.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: He has been designated as an expert. We need to provide further documentation as to our calculations of damages. For the reasons I was explaining to Your Honor, I'm still awaiting information to address fully this \$8.25 an hour issue. It is supposed to be gotten to me. I don't believe that his work is an expert opinion or report work because it is a compilation or a summarization of voluminous records under the rules of evidence. Your Honor, as I documented in the moving papers with Mr. Sergeant's actual printed paystub, one can go and look at each printed paystub and sit down and do the same calculation in long hand or with the assistance of an electronic calculator.

All he's done is taken 14,000 of these paychecks, taken the information from defendants' Excel system. It's the Excel system. It was originally QuickBooks.

They exported it into Excel and then the Excel information, you know, puts it on one

line for us. And then, you know, the hours that are in for the pay period are divided into the wages for the pay period. It tells us what the hourly rate was. If it's under \$7.25, well, then we know there was a deficiency.

I mean, Your Honor, this is basic arithmetic. Again, it is a summarization. But in the event that the Court would view it differently in terms of the context of this litigation, Mr. Bass will be available for deposition and he could be treated as an expert for that purpose, in which case we should presumably do that process when we have a full record of all of the information available for all time periods, for all conditions. Defendants --

THE COURT: Is he -- are you saying that to this point he is not intended to be a designated expert?

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, I have -- it is my position that he doesn't need to be designated as an expert, but I have designated him as an expert and they were given his C.V. In fact, his C.V. is attached to his declaration.

THE COURT: And when is his expert report due?

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, it was due -- expert reports were due some time ago in this case. The problem is that I'm still waiting to get the discovery that was ordered by the Discovery Commissioner relating to all of these issues in the case. And when that's provided, I will provide a further declaration from Mr. Bass, a further study from him as to his compilation and summarization of the data under all of the relevant conditions, and defendants will be free to take his deposition.

THE COURT: Are we not, though, sort of short-circuiting all that process, including the deposition by saying, well, he's been designated but there's no report yet because we can't because there's this -- but here's a report. I mean, here is

a declaration with 600 or 700 pages attached to it and here's the methodology that he used. It sounds an awful lot like we're saying this is a report produced by your expert.

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, if the Court takes that view of it, okay, I don't believe that's material to the issue right now.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: I mean, my position is that's not the issue because, again, this is a summarization.

THE COURT: Your position is that they can't contest the accuracy of the Excel sheets?

MR. GREENBERG: They can't and they don't in terms of this piece of the damages that are claimed in the case because it is based upon what is shown on the face of their own payroll records --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: -- and their testimony about what's in those records. And, Your Honor, these are minimum wages. They're owed to about 300 people at \$7.25 an hour or maybe 400 if we include the \$8.25 amount. They're not large amounts. They should get a judgment for this amount now. There's no reason to defer this for the future, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is it your contention that the Excel records that were given were taken from the appropriate trip sheets, or were they taken from a different source?

MR. GREENBERG: The defendants' testimony is that they took -- they reviewed the trip sheets and they recorded in the Excel file the hours on the trip

sheets. And in fact, as Mr. Nady testified -- this is in my reply -- that they even added certain amounts of time to those records which went -- that information which went into the QuickBooks payroll system to include periods of time that were not captured by the trip sheets. And he testifies under oath that in fact that record is more accurate than the trip sheets in terms of establishing the hours of work for these individuals.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: So there is no material issue of fact that these are the hours that these individuals worked, and there's no material issue of fact in respect to this is what they paid them, as reflected on each line of the summary that Mr. Bass prepared. So there's no issue raised here. All they raise are just suppositions, Your Honor, that somehow plaintiffs have manipulated this. Ms. Rodriguez is saying, well, we don't know which errata applies or what table Mr. Bass was referring to. This is not true, Your Honor. The errata that was provided was because there were misplaced exhibits that were not actually properly attached. They didn't have to do with Mr. Bass' calculations or with his table.

The six hundred and so page long form 14,000 line chart that I gave the defendants, which is in the moving papers, Your Honor, includes information beyond the December 31st period, so that information is not germane. That's why, because that extra five months of information was included, I gave Your Honor the supplement to the reply which simply trimmed down the information set to the December 31st, 2015 date and summed it up by the five hundred or so class members in summary. But all the information is laid out to defendants. Every single paycheck for those individuals has appeared on a line of that summary.

And it relates -- it's an exact reproduction of the information in their payroll system.

And they don't dispute any of it, Your Honor. So I don't understand how summary judgment can be denied under these circumstances.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Ms. Rodriguez, we kind of cut in on your response.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Thank you. Well, I don't know why he continues to say we don't dispute it because we certainly dispute it. In his argument I think he's mixing apples and oranges with what is in the database versus what is on the trip sheets. Those don't have anything to do with each other. The trip sheets are the hours. What he was referring to was the pay that the -- would correlate with the paystubs. But this goes back to methodology.

THE COURT: Well, why could you not -- why do you really need the trip sheets if these six hundred some odd pages that were prepared and produced by the defense --

MS. RODRIGUEZ: I can tell you why, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- or at least the Excel files that generated this --

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Your Honor, this really does come down to methodology --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: -- because the Department of Labor, the Federal Department of Justice came in, reviewed the trip sheets for four years. They came up with a completely different figure than Mr. Greenberg's expert has come up with. They came up with \$139,000 or thereabouts. We had an independent CPA for the Dubric matter come in and use her own methodology.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: She came up with a figure of about \$225,000.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Different from the DOL, different from Mr. Greenberg's expert. Mr. Greenberg's expert comes in, uses his own methodology. He comes up with \$700,000 for the same 2-year period; one of the numbers that's contained in there. So, basically what they're arguing is damages. We haven't gotten into liability or anything further and they're wanting summary --

THE COURT: It sounds like, since you're saying the figure from the Department of Labor is more accurate, that you would not oppose a partial summary judgment for the \$135,000.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: I'm not saying it's more accurate. I'm saying that it's different, that everybody uses a different methodology, everybody comes up with a different number, and we have a right to present to a jury whether their expert's numbers and his interpretation of the documentation and how he chose to add and subtract and work out his formulas on the spreadsheet --

THE COURT: Well, frankly, what I'm more concerned with at this moment is not whether you have a right to present it to the jury, but do you have a right to be enabled to more accurately or completely take issue with the assertion by the plaintiff that there is no issue of material fact as to these numbers? If these numbers wind up reflecting the information taken from the Excel sheets that were provided by your client, I'm not so sure that I buy into the argument that the trip sheets is the only way to go. But I don't know -- I am concerned about whether or not -- whether or not you really are able to fairly contest the accuracy of these numbers if you don't have -- whether it be some more time to have your own expert

weigh in on it, in which event there's no reason not to go ahead and step up to the -you know, what would normally in a normal case, which this case doesn't bear a lot
of resemblance to, we would have waited until we had experts not only designated
but completely conflicting expert reports as to --

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Right.

THE COURT: -- the time of day and everything else. And then the Court could determine whether or not there was at least a non-issue -- you know, a no issue of material fact as to certain facts and then whether that provided a basis to issue a partial summary judgment. I am concerned about whether we're really squarely to that point. Have you designated an expert?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: No. No, we have not, Your Honor. And your point is well taken because that's exactly what has occurred here is that there was no expert report from the plaintiff.

THE COURT: But they did designate an expert?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Well, not really.

THE COURT: No?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: This is the first time that I hear this because we've got kind of a fuzzy designation saying we don't believe that we need to designate an expert, but should the Court interpret that we do, then we kind of named Charles Bass. We didn't get any report, we didn't get any C.V., we didn't get anything. Later on in a subsequent supplement, past the expert deadline, we did get a C.V. that was attached for Mr. Bass. Still no expert report. Still nothing else in compliance with what the expert disclosures mandate. We see then all these little erratas and piecemeals. We still haven't seen a final report, any report from Mr. Bass --

1	THE COURT: Uh-huh.
2	MS. RODRIGUEZ: other than what's been attached to
3	THE COURT: Well, I want to back up to the point of whether the plaintiff
4	has designated an expert. Do you have that handy?
5	MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor
6	THE COURT: Do you have whatever was your designation of an expert?
7	MR. GREENBERG: I do. It is on my computer here. This was designated.
8	And the designation was clear, Your Honor, that while we did not believe Mr. Bass'
9	work was in fact subject to an expert report disclosure
10	THE COURT: Yeah.
11	MR. GREENBERG: that we were designating him as an expert. They
12	were provided with his C.V. when this motion was served.
13	THE COURT: Okay, but let's back up to what constituted your designation
14	of him as an expert.
15	MR. GREENBERG: It was a 7th supplemental it was a 7th supplemental
16	discovery, Rule 16 discovery response. I was looking at it the other day. It was
17	yeah, here we have it here. It was served on January 27th of this year, Your Honor.
18	THE COURT: All right.
19	MS. RODRIGUEZ: It's actually attached to my opposition as Exhibit A to
20	show that they did a reservation, but there was nothing no expert report attached.
21	THE COURT: Well
22	MS. RODRIGUEZ: That's exactly what I represented to the Court. In the
23	event that materials presented by

THE COURT: Hang on.

1	MS. RODRIGUEZ: Sure.
2	THE COURT: Before you start arguing, let me get to where you are with it,
3	then. It's attached as Exhibit
4	MS. RODRIGUEZ: A.
5	THE COURT: No. 8?
6	MS. RODRIGUEZ: A. A as in Apple.
7	THE COURT: A. Okay. Reservation of expert witness. Okay.
8	At that juncture, give me just a minute. I apparently have some
9	emergency matter that needs to be dealt with. This won't take more than two
10	minutes at most.
11	MR. GREENBERG: Yes, Your Honor.
12	(Court recessed from 11:54 a.m. until 12:00 p.m.)
13	THE COURT: All right. I'm sorry for the delay there. Would you believe
14	it was some lawyers being unreasonable? It's just hard to fathom.
15	All right. Where were we with this? The question I think I had
16	a question put to you, Ms. Rodriguez; did I? Or did you answer that one?
17	MS. RODRIGUEZ: Well, I think, Your Honor, what I was basically
18	THE COURT: Oh, the question was whether this operated as a true
19	MS. RODRIGUEZ: Right. And my argument was that, no, because other
20	people have come to different final numbers. And I think we were looking oh,
21	you were looking at the designation of the expert.
22	THE COURT: Designation. Yeah.
23	MS. RODRIGUEZ: Right. And my argument has been that Mr. Bass is
24	offering expert testimony. The plaintiffs were not in compliance with the designation.

 They didn't produce a report, which the deadline I think was January 27th or so.

And so if that's -- if they're going to rely completely on an expert report --

THE COURT: Well, here's what I'm going to hear from them, and maybe with some legitimacy. I'm not sure. But I'm going to hear from them that how could we do it, how could we even know if we haven't been given the discovery, the rest of the discovery that we need from the defense.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: That's been their argument for probably four years, Your Honor, and the last time we were before the Discovery Commissioner she really tried to pin down Mr. Greenberg and said what do you need? What else do you need so that, you know, she doesn't have to continue to hear this argument over and over and over? And we're at the close of discovery. This is the first time that I hear this argument now from him saying, oh, an expert report is forthcoming if and when we ever get whatever we're still looking for.

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, as I was explaining earlier, the marital status, dependent status of the class members is a critical consideration in respect to the \$8.25 an hour issue. Defendants were ordered to provide information on that from their payroll system from the W-4s of the class members, which will indicate whether they're married or unmarried. That will tell us a great deal about that issue. I'm told that --

THE COURT: When were they ordered to do that?

MR. GREENBERG: In March of this year. I'm advised that they're going to be providing that information today in a supplement. Upon being provided with that information, we will be prepared to provide a summarization, a statement of damages in respect to all the various conditions as thoroughly as we can --

THE COURT: Does that mean that --

MR. GREENBERG: -- based upon the relevant information.

THE COURT: Does that mean that if you had the opportunity to your expert, assuming we call him an expert, could prepare his report?

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, his report will consist of charts and tables. That will be his report, if you want to term it that. Again, my position is this is just a repetitive calculation and summary saying, well, this is what the payroll shows the person was paid, this is what the payroll shows the hours they worked.

THE COURT: Okay. Then what I'm hearing is that the Court has to resolve, first of all, whether or not it is opinion testimony.

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, it's defendants' payroll records.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: And they've affirmed that these are the accurate payroll records that show how much the person worked during a pay period and how much they were paid for the period. There's no opinion in that, Your Honor. And whether that gross amount paid -- if the man worked 54 hours and we divide the 54 into the \$300 he was paid, it's going to give us a number that we all agree on. That doesn't change. And that number is either more --

THE COURT: And am I understanding correctly that the sole remaining piece of discovery you need from the defendants in order to do that is forthcoming today?

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, I'm hopeful it will be forthcoming.

THE COURT: Well, let's ask.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: No, it's not. I'm not sure -- No. No.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Pardon me?

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THE COURT: Okay.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: The W-2s or W-4s, the Discovery Commissioner ordered that A Cab go back and pull the W-4s for each employee and provide those to Mr. Greenberg. That is a large task. I have not continued to meet with the payroll people at A Cab to find out how far along they are pulling every single individual employee file.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: But what I was going to mention to the Court was that the Discovery Commissioner -- we talked about this over and over -- felt that that was not an important part or a necessary part of Mr. Greenberg's calculations, but nevertheless she was going to order it.

THE COURT: Then let's find out right now. In order for your expert to issue an expert report, if he's going to issue one, and I presume he is or else why is he even being designated or reserved as an expert, will that information -- do you have to have this piece of information, the W-2s, W-4s that have just been described?

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, I believe it's essential for fully analyzing the \$8.25 an hour damages in this case, for the reason I explained.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

MR. GREENBERG: And, Your Honor, that information is actually in defendants' payroll system because when they do the tax withholding they have to classify someone as married or unmarried. That was never given to me. It's in the QuickBooks data. They don't actually have to go and pull W-4 forms. Everybody who they've issued a paycheck to, it's resident in their computer system. But they don't want to produce it to me. They haven't produced it to me so far. Hopefully I will get that shortly and we will have our damages position analysis finalized.

I would hope within 30 days of when I get that piece of information. And Mr. Bass is our expert. He was designated as an expert, if he's to be treated as an expert. It is not our --

THE COURT: When you say he was designated, you mean this reservation?

MR. GREENBERG: Well, it says at the end of that document, "In the event the materials prepared by Charles Bass for plaintiffs are deemed by the Court to constitute the work product of an expert witness, plaintiffs so designate him as an expert witness."

THE COURT: All right. Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: This is unequivocal, Your Honor. He is our expert.

THE COURT: Well, it seems to me that, you know, to the extent that he is also describing any kind of a methodology, it sounds to me like we're going to -- that's what experts do when they're going to render opinion evidence.

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, it's not an opinion that two plus two is four, okay.

THE COURT: I'm sorry?

MR. GREENBERG: It's not an opinion that two plus two is four or that when we divide ten into a hundred we get ten.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: He is not rendering any opinion as to any analysis.

THE COURT: That is a mere calculation.

MR. GREENBERG: All he is doing is performing calculations on the defendants' records and summarizing those records within the meaning of NRS 52.275, which he's presenting it as a chart. Again, we have 14,000 individual

paychecks. We could look at each individual paycheck stub and write up on the margin the hours --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: -- divide the hours into the gross wages and show the hourly rate. If under \$7.25 we could show what the deficiency was. That could be done 14,000 times on 14,000 pieces of paper. That is what he is doing, Your Honor, okay. He's not offering an opinion as to anything. But nonetheless, Your Honor, I don't want to belabor the point. If he is to be deemed to be presenting as an expert in respect to the charts that he's preparing, it would be my position he would simply corroborate the origin of the materials, which are defendants' records which have tens of thousands of payroll entries in them. He would simply corroborate the origin of the materials, corroborate the summary that he prepared, and that would be presented to the Court and provided to the defendants, of course.

And if defendants have issues with those summaries, they think there's errors, they think they didn't actually summarize the original source material properly, they would be able to counter that and raise an issue of fact in respect to that. And that's the problem in terms of where we're at right now is defendants have done none of that, Your Honor. We hear from Ms. Rodriguez how the Department of Labor found this and that some CPA found that. Your Honor, where is it? They need to put it in the record. They don't come in here with counsel and make these ad hoc allegations --

MS. RODRIGUEZ: It's attached, Your Honor.

MR. GREENBERG: -- in response to this without putting it in the record.

They need to document that there is in fact a material factual issue in dispute --

MR. GREENBERG: -- for this limited time period, which is based again exclusively on defendants' records.

THE COURT: If I'm correct, you do agree that regardless of whether the Court counts it as requiring -- you know, rules that if need be that as a matter of evidence it amounts to opinion testimony or the Court does not do so, that if you're supplied the things that the Discovery Commissioner has ordered, that you'll be ready to go with calculation --

MR. GREENBERG: That is --

THE COURT: -- with a calculation of damages, with a calculation -- well, presumably the same calculation by this individual, be it expert or not, of what the amount of damages are that the plaintiff is seeking?

MR. GREENBERG: Just so Your Honor understands, in this motion we're dealing with this very limited issue of where the hours are in the payroll. Defendants have essentially admitted the hours of work.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: Everybody agrees what the payroll was. We all know what the class members were paid in every pay period, okay.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: Nobody says otherwise. It's in the payroll records. The other issue in this case is how many hours they worked where we don't have information in the payroll records. From 2013 to 2015 we have that information in the payroll records. The defendants have admitted under oath, confirmed that that information is completely accurate. That is the basis for this motion.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: Outside of that period there's questions as to how long the drivers worked each pay period. That's going to be an issue of fact that's going to have to be tried. And we will provide --

THE COURT: Well, all right. One question that I have is if we can't even get the 2013 to 2015 issue resolved, how in the world are we going to by -- even by the time that the trial is presently set, be able to resolve the rest of it?

MR. GREENBERG: Well, Your Honor, my analysis -- my expert, Mr. Bass, will provide a projection as to how much the damages are going to be based upon a finding as to what the shift length was for each driver in each pay period, because we know how many shifts --

THE COURT: So am I hearing that -- am I hearing that while an expert is not needed for purposes of this motion, that an expert will be presumably produced at trial and render an opinion based on whatever his methodology and what he does?

MR. GREENBERG: Well, just so Your Honor understands the information we're working with, we know what the payroll was.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GREENBERG: We also have a separate set of information that indicates how many shifts someone worked in a pay period.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GREENBERG: So if we say every shift was 10 hours or every shift was 11 hours, again, it's just a question of multiplying the shifts by that 10 or 11 or 9 hours per shift assumption. You get an hours per payroll period, you divide it into the wages. It's a simple arithmetic formula.

THE COURT: What I hear you saying is you're not convinced that you need an expert for your trial testimony.

MR. GREENBERG: I'm not convinced that this is within the scope of expert testimony. I don't believe it is, Your Honor. I believe it's simply a compilation, a calculation based upon defendants' records, a summarization as provided, to be presented under the NRS based upon the source material, which is all defendants' source material. And we provide the summary, which is going to be the chart, like we did in this motion. And if defendants take issue with the summary or the chart, they can examine it. The person who prepared the chart or the summary has to, you know, corroborate it, confirm its existence. It could have been done by someone by hand using old-fashioned ledger page, as we did many years ago when I was starting out before they had Excel. But it's no different Your Honor, it's the exact same thing. But we can set that aside. I am perfectly comfortable designating Mr. Bass as an expert, as I have done, having him provide his final tabulation, calculation summary to defendants in full scope, based upon the full disclosures of the information.

THE COURT: Well, here's an initial problem. It isn't so much with your overall statement, but you keep saying that he has been designated, but if he's -- you know, it's only if the Court determines that expert testimony is needed. But then that raises the whole question of is there going to be an expert report, which there would be, presumably, if he's designated as an expert. So, you know, that's not for the defendant to guess about.

MR. GREENBERG: Right, Your Honor.

THE COURT: They've got to know whether you're designating an expert or not.

opinion testimony.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: And it's not testimony that's beyond the normal purview of an average individual. There's no --

THE COURT: Okay. But it would be safe to say that as far as you're concerned if the Court decides that it requires an expert opinion in order to put in either at trial or for purposes of this partial summary judgment motion the calculations which he's done, that he is designated.

MR. GREENBERG: He is designated as the expert.

THE COURT: All right. Then we need to get down to that very question, and frankly, in all of the things that I have before me I'm not sure that it's squarely raised. I think that maybe in order to resolve this motion I need to first at least allow opportunity to both sides to give me whatever authorities they want to on the question of whether the Court cannot accept the calculations in these 600 some odd pages as uncontested fact.

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, they are uncontested facts. Defendants have had an opportunity to contest them. They were provided with the summary, the 600-page summary you're referring to. Every single pay period, based upon the records they gave us.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GREENBERG: They've affirmed --

THE COURT: Okay. So as far as you're concerned, the issue of whether there is an issue of material fact that prevents the granting of your present motion rests upon whether the Court agrees with the defense that it is an issue of material fact whether even the Excel -- what do you call it, Excel sheets, the --

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MR. GREENBERG: Excel files.

THE COURT: Excel files. Thank you. That were given to the plaintiff are the appropriate basis for a calculation of damages, you know, even for the purposes of this limited motion.

MR. GREENBERG: Well, there's two elements to the damages calculation. There's the wages that were paid. Defendants don't dispute that the wages that were paid are in the Excel files. And there's the hours that the class members worked. Defendant --

THE COURT: Okay. But what I'm trying to deal with is this issue that keeps getting raised that, oh, wait a minute, we have to go to the trip sheets.

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor --

THE COURT: So I'm -- if you'll just let me --

MR. GREENBERG: Yes. I'm sorry.

THE COURT: I am about to probably agree with you that if they believe that there is an issue of material fact, it would be up to them to show the Court that the trip sheets -- some study of the trip sheets that presumably has not yet been done would have to be done in order to -- in order for the plaintiff to either prevail at trial or prevail on this motion as to the calculation of the -- to prevail on the issue of whether the materials provided by them do in fact present an issue of uncontested fact.

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yeah?

MR. GREENBERG: Again, just to turn to page 5 of the reply on the motion for partial summary judgment --

THE COURT: Let me just get to that.

MR. GREENBERG: Yes.

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THE COURT: Let me get to plaintiffs' reply, page 5.

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MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor is correct. If there's a dispute as to the accuracy of the information, then there's a dispute as to the accuracy of the information. But there is no dispute in respect to the accuracy of the information in the fashion Your Honor was talking. From line 17 onward on page 5 you have the reproduction of Mr. Nady's testimony. He was specifically asked what records existed of the working time and he said the trips sheets, and then he goes on to explain that the trip sheets actually aren't wholly accurate, that the accurate information is put in the QuickBooks system.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: So they have gone on the record as confirming the accuracy of the time records that this is based upon. Nobody disputes that the wages were paid through the payroll system as well. So there is no disputed issue of material fact. They've had an opportunity, Your Honor, to examine the calculations that I presented, the 600 pages, the 14,000, you know, pay period paystub analysis. They have responded in no fashion. They do not actually submit anything now attacking the accuracy of the information that I was working off of, which was the Excel files, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I understand your point.

MR. GREENBERG: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Rodriguez, what about that?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Well, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Am I correct that you're saying that without the trip sheets

there is presented an issue of material fact?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Absolutely. That's definitely one of the points. And I don't know why he keeps saying we've presented nothing because I have them attached to the opposition. Exhibit C is the Department of Labor's analysis. Again, this is their numbers that they arrived after going through the 14,000 documents that Mr. Greenberg referenced but doesn't want to look at them. They went through the documents and came up with the \$139,000 figure. Exhibit D --

THE COURT: Exhibit C. Hang on. I'm still trying to get to Exhibit C.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Okay.

THE COURT: We either didn't get -- yeah, the courtesy copy is not tabbed and I'm a little slow at flipping through these and getting to the right page. All right, Exhibit C. Go ahead.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Exhibit C is the consent judgment written by the department -- the Federal Department of Labor, that came up with the figure of -- it's on page 3, \$139,988.80 for the time period of October 1st, 2010 through October 1st, 2012.

Exhibit D is -- and I haven't -- I don't think I've emphasized this enough. This lady is an independent CPA. This is Nicole Omps of Beta Consultants, who was hired primarily by the other plaintiff's counsel, the Barrasso Law Firm, and A Cab as an independent CPA who did her own analysis going through the actual trip sheets and through the actual payroll system and came up with her figures of liability for the relevant years of April 2009 through September 2016. And she broke that out in terms of her findings and her methodology and her opinions as to what the liability would be. And yet none of these numbers match up with what Mr. Greenberg's

That's the class certification.

1	THE COURT: Okay.
2	MR. GREENBERG: And that was the supplement I gave Your Honor earlier.
3	THE COURT: 2013 through
4	MR. GREENBERG: Those three calendar years, '13, '14 and '15.
5	THE COURT: All right. Okay.
6	MR. GREENBERG: The Department of Labor finding involves prior years,
7	2012, 2011. It has no bearing
8	THE COURT: All right. So, back to back to your point about this Exhibit D.
9	If that's a slightly different time frame, I mean, how do I
10	MS. RODRIGUEZ: It outlines them per the year, Your Honor.
11	THE COURT: It does. All right.
12	MS. RODRIGUEZ: But I think that's an important point that Mr. Greenberg
13	just conceded, because he just said that was in his supplement. And he's alleged
14	a number of dates, but the original motion asked for partial summary judgment
15	through May of 2016.
16	THE COURT: The motion as it stood when you filed an opposition?
17	MS. RODRIGUEZ: Correct.
18	THE COURT: Okay.
19	MS. RODRIGUEZ: But following my opposition is when all the erratas came
20	in with the different dates. So I guess what I'm hearing is that he's only asking
21	through 12/31/2015 and the remainder of 2016 has been dropped.
22	THE COURT: No, I think for purposes of his partial summary judgment
23	motion. Is that

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, as the case is currently postured before

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MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, this is just an assumption. The Department

of Labor settlement, for whatever amount, represented a percentage underpayment of gross wages. Your Honor, counsel was just representing to Your Honor that somehow this constituted some independent evaluation of actual factual material, such as trip sheets which were mentioned by her. This CPA didn't look at any trip sheets. All she did was take a look at this prior settlement and compare it against the payroll, come up with a percentage --

MS. RODRIGUEZ: That assertion has --

MR. GREENBERG: -- and say based upon that analysis the proposed settlement is proper.

THE COURT: And I suppose the real question is does it present an issue of material fact as to your calculations put forward in your motion for partial summary judgment?

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, how could it? It doesn't address any actual payroll period that we did the calculation on.

THE COURT: Okay, that's a fair question. Ms. Rodriguez?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Yes, it does, Your Honor. It's right there through -October 2012 through June 2014; July 2014 through September 2016. This is on
Appendix A of that report. And it absolutely does raise a material fact. This expert --

THE COURT: Well, it says it's based on an assumption.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Well --

THE COURT: That's not --

MS. RODRIGUEZ: -- what Mr. Greenberg just represented to the Court, I don't know how he knows that Ms. Omps didn't review a trip sheet; how he can make that representation, unless he's had some discussions with her that I'm not aware of,

numbers. And --

THE COURT: Well, he's not -- he's not putting them forward as an expert for purposes of this calculation. The question is, do you need an expert to do the calculation?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: I think you absolutely need an expert for the calculation.

THE COURT: Okay. Why?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Because that's why all of these experts are arriving at different figures. And we have not formally -- Your Honor asked whether --

THE COURT: But if he takes your agreed upon numbers, you know, individual numbers, does a spreadsheet and calculates that out, why does that require an expert?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Well, for one, it's not taking into consideration breaks. It's not taking into consideration the appropriate hours worked. You can only derive those from the trip sheets, which is what the other experts have sat down and looked at and come up with, and you come up with it. We can --

THE COURT: Okay. Then that in turn depends upon what was represented by the defendant that these spreadsheets were. What was represented that they were?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: And that's what I started out saying, Your Honor. I have made this argument repeatedly to the Discovery Commissioner that the data that Mr. Greenberg was requesting was not relevant to his determination of the minimum wage calculation. Mr. Greenberg kept insisting we want this data and this data only, and we want to manipulate it how we want to manipulate it. And that is what has happened is that we turned over this documentation, saying this is not the appropriate documentation for a calculation of minimum wage. And now he's

moving for summary judgment, saying --

THE COURT: What was it represented to be?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: The trip sheets and the actual paystubs.

THE COURT: That's what's in the --

MS. RODRIGUEZ: No. No. Again, Your Honor, I don't know what Mr. Bass is using because we --

THE COURT: No, no, no, no, no, no, no no. Before he ever took the --whatever device it was on ---

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Mr. Greenberg asked, for example, for everything that was in Cab Manager, which is a GPS tracking device for the cabs. That's a program to track the cabs as they make their trips throughout the city.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: He asked for electronic data from Cab Manager. We had to hire Mr. Morgan, who designed the Cab Manager program, to write a program to take out some GPS times and give this data in its raw form to Mr. Greenberg, for example. He has now had Mr. Bass pull that raw data, GPS time, and assumed, okay, well, this is a start and an end time.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So, let me ask Mr. Greenberg, do you have anything that answers the question in writing of what the defendants represented that the spreadsheets were, so that I can determine whether a calculation of those things represents --

MR. GREENBERG: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- an uncontestable -- in other words, it does not present an issue of material fact?

1	MR. GREENBERG: The defendants have just discussed something called
2	Cab Manager.
3	THE COURT: Yeah.
4	MR. GREENBERG: Which data was produced and is being analyzed. It has
5	nothing to do with this motion. This motion is not based on anything from the Cab
6	Manager or the dispatch system.
7	THE COURT: Okay.
8	MR. GREENBERG: This is based solely upon the QuickBooks records. The
9	bi-weekly payroll the defendants printed out. There are paystubs, as counsel was
10	referring to
11	THE COURT: Okay.
12	MR. GREENBERG: that show amount paid
13	THE COURT: So what it was represented to be by the defendants to you is
14	the QuickBooks?
15	MR. GREENBERG: Correct. That was given
16	THE COURT: And what are the QuickBooks?
17	MR. GREENBERG: The Quickbooks is every two weeks a paycheck is
18	issued to the employee. It will have an amount for wages and it will have an amount
19	for hours worked.
20	THE COURT: Okay.
21	MR. GREENBERG: So we divide the hours worked into the wages. If it's
22	below \$7.25 or below \$8.25, there's a deficiency.
23	THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: And we just do the multiplication, the subtraction and

the addition. 1 2 THE COURT: All right. MR. GREENBERG: It's very simple, Your Honor. 3 4 THE COURT: Now, back to you, Ms. Rodriguez. Why could he not take 5 what was represented to be the QuickBooks that contain the number of hours and 6 the amount of money paid and say -- and do a calculation of what that comes out to 7 in terms of payment per hour and the hours worked? 8 MS. RODRIGUEZ: Well, first of all, there weren't any representations made by 9 the defendants. We always -- A Cab turned over what the Discovery Commissioner ordered. What Mr. --10 11 THE COURT: Okay. What did she order? 12 MS. RODRIGUEZ: Your Honor, there's been so many different --13 THE COURT: Does that get us further away? MS. RODRIGUEZ: Yeah. 14 15 THE COURT: Okay. MS. RODRIGUEZ: There's been so many different productions in this. 16 17 THE COURT: All right. 18 MS. RODRIGUEZ: That's why I'm saying, I don't know what Mr. Bass ended 19 up using from -- we've had to produce so many different sets of electronic data, I don't know which one he used. And I haven't deposed him because there's not 20 21 been a report. THE COURT: Sure. Understood. 22

because he's way past the deadline. So why would I waste my client's money

MS. RODRIGUEZ: There wasn't a designation. I'm moving to strike him

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deposing this guy if he's never going to testify? And, you know, for him to just piecemeal erratas and then move for summary judgment, it just -- I don't know what else to argue on this because I've never seen anything like this where you're asking for these piecemeal damages and giving the Court like, well, you can pick A, B or C, but pick one of them and just give us money.

THE COURT: Well, it doesn't -- for purposes of a partial summary judgment motion, it doesn't have to represent the entire world of damages that they are seeking at trial. It only needs to represent some period of time with a certain number of hours worked, a certain amount of money paid for those hours worked from which presumably even I --

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Right.

THE COURT: -- could calculate for these certain hours they were or they were not underpaid.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: But he's relying upon an expert incomplete report, piecemealed, to convince the Court of that. And what I've done in opposition is shown you that other experts arrive at different opinions entirely. So we have a right to dispute that.

THE COURT: Well, sure, for trial purposes. But for purposes of this motion if he is relying on what is represented as certain information from your client, it seems very conceivable to me that if it does represent -- if it's represented to be the hours worked and the monies paid for a certain period of time --

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: -- then that is information from which almost anyone, not including me, could calculate what the hours worked -- I mean, what the hourly rate

was and how much more would have to be paid in order to meet the minimum wage just for those hours during that pay period.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: And Your Honor skipped over -- you didn't want to hear my arguments, but they are important arguments that I don't even think he has a right to ask for these time periods. He doesn't have a class representative during that time period. And I know the Court is brushing that argument aside --

THE COURT: No, no, I'm not. I'm not really --

MS. RODRIGUEZ: -- but Mr. Reno and Mr. Murray --

THE COURT: We haven't gotten to that.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: -- they're from 2011 and 2012. Well, that's where we should have started because he's -- first of all, what he originally was asking for was outside the class order. And then everything he's asking for from 2013 and 2015, Murray and Reno are from 2011 and 2012. He's never even shown that he has a proper representative plaintiff for that time period. And without disclosing --

THE COURT: Okay. And you objected to that --

MS. RODRIGUEZ: I did.

THE COURT: -- in front of the Discovery Commissioner?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: I did.

THE COURT: And what did she rule?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: No, I didn't object to -- I objected in this briefing. This

THE COURT: Well, wouldn't you have objected in front of the Discovery Commissioner that it was irrelevant to --

MS. RODRIGUEZ: No, she's going by what you certified, which is through

12/31, so -- I mean, 12/31/15, so we've turned over everything through that time period.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: But he's moving for summary judgment now for 2013 through 2016, although I think we've cut that off now, that it's 2013 to 2015.

THE COURT: Well, yeah, the end of 2015.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Right.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: But that's another reason that summary judgment for that time period is improper because Murray and Reno are from 2011 and 2012.

THE COURT: All right, let's deal with that issue. Why would we allow partial summary judgment for a period for which you don't have a class representative?

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, Michael Sergeant was certified as a class representative in this case. He's not named in the caption, but in your class certification order he was expressly named and designated as a representative. He is a class member --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: -- so he's eligible to be a representative. He was employed in 2014 and does present a claim for damages during this time period. This is all documented in the record before Your Honor.

THE COURT: 2014.

MR. GREENBERG: That was in 2014. Your Honor, defendants don't actually produce any legal authority for this concept that somehow every class member in a class action case must personally possess damages for every particular time period

or interval at issue for the class claims. I mean, there is no such requirements, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GREENBERG: They don't cite to any.

THE COURT: You're saying that the class representative did suffer damages for at least part of the time frame from 2013 to 2015?

MR. GREENBERG: That's correct. He was employed, he did suffer damages. We've documented it. I can actually refer you to the exact line in the 600-page calculation. His paystub is presented in the record. It is discussed fully before Your Honor. So this is not an issue, okay, in terms of the adequacy of the representation, the representatives or there being a sufficient representative.

I think Your Honor understands very clearly where we're at here, okay. If there is no dispute about the information that was provided to plaintiffs and plaintiffs have now provided this summary of the 14,000 or so paychecks to Your Honor, done the calculations Your Honor was just discussing, if defendant is not coming in before the Court and establishing in a sufficiently evidentiary fashion either that the information we're relying on is not accurate -- and by the way, Your Honor, contrary to Ms. Rodriguez' representations, the information relied upon is expressly identified in my declaration as two Excel files, the particular dates, particular sizes that they gave to me in October that were given to Mr. Bass. Mr. Bass prepared the summary. They have not in fact challenged a single line of that summary in terms of those calculations. They have all of the information that I relied upon, Your Honor, and they've agreed that that information is an accurate statement of the hours and the wages for each pay period.

THE COURT: In the 600 some odd page attachment that you put on there, is all of the information on there exactly -- I mean, is that on the Excel spreadsheet?

MR. GREENBERG: It all comes from the Excel. As Mr. Bass explains in his declaration, the total wages amount that you see on the summary, okay, which appears in Column G, okay --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: -- consists of commission pay and sometimes there's bonus pay. There's different classifications of pay. But it doesn't include any tips which are reported on the payroll system. And defendants had given testimony based upon actual paystubs that were presented to them, Mr. Sergeant's paystubs, about the itemization on the paystubs that were printed out, what each of those items were. They confirmed what the categories of items were that were wages, what was tips. So, Mr. Bass, when he compiled this is only including in total wages paid actual wages, not tips, because tips are excluded for minimum wage purposes under Nevada law.

THE COURT: Right. So back to my question. So, column A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H were all --

MR. GREENBERG: That is correct, Your Honor. All of that information is resident in defendants' produced Excel files. They have not disputed the accuracy of any line of any of those columns A through H.

THE COURT: And the calculation that he's done that you're putting forward and asking the Court to grant partial summary judgment for represents columns I --

MR. GREENBERG: Well, I would be if the Court was to use the uniform \$7.25 rate --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GREENBERG: -- and K would be if it was going to differentiate, as we were discussing, regarding the waiting period. The J column simply applies \$8.25 for all time periods.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: But that is correct. And as Your Honor can see, often in many pay periods nothing is owed. But if Your Honor was to sit down, you could divide, you know, the H amount into the G amount and you would come up with the hourly rate. And then if it was deficient, below \$7.25, you could multiply that deficiency again by the H amount, the hours worked, and you would get the amount in Column I, for example --

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GREENBERG: -- which is the \$7.25 an hour rate. Very simple.

THE COURT: All right. Now -- thank you.

Back to Ms. Rodriguez. Do you contest that columns A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H represent the information that was contained within the spreadsheets?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: I don't know what Mr. Bass looked at, Your Honor. I don't know how many times -- I'm not being clear in terms of what Mr. Bass looked at.

I mean, what strikes me is that this is charts and summaries from Mr. Bass. I think this is a hearsay document.

THE COURT: So what we would need to look at is the actual spreadsheets that you provided, your client provided?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: We didn't provide spreadsheets, Your Honor. We provided raw data. Mr. Bass put all of these together.

1	THE COURT: Okay. Well, I was going from what somebody on your side,
2	I think it was your client, or I'm not sure
3	MS. RODRIGUEZ: Yeah.
4	THE COURT: called it a spreadsheet.
5	MS. RODRIGUEZ: Right.
6	THE COURT: Okay.
7	MS. RODRIGUEZ: Yeah, I don't know
8	MR. NADY: I was trying to help you.
9	THE COURT: Well, whatever. So whatever the term
10	MS. RODRIGUEZ: Right. No, it was raw data that's always been provided
11	to Mr. Greenberg, at his insistence, was raw data.
12	THE COURT: And that raw data included
13	MS. RODRIGUEZ: I don't know, Your Honor.
14	THE COURT: You don't know?
15	MS. RODRIGUEZ: I mean, I don't know how else to answer that because,
16	like I said, I'm hearing representations for the first time as to Mr. Bass' piecemealed
17	little pieces of what he apparently went through to come up with these numbers.
18	But, you know
19	THE COURT: Do you have a copy of the raw data?
20	MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, I do. That could be filed with the Court if
21	the Court wanted. I wanted to point out Mr. Bass' declaration is at Exhibit 2 of the
22	moving papers.
23	THE COURT: Right.

MR. GREENBERG: It was provided to defendants. At page 2 of that,

paragraph 3, he specifically states what he looked at, which were the two Excel files that I was referring Your Honor to.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Well, we got -- we got a number of erratas after that.

THE COURT: Wait. Don't interrupt. Let's not get that far.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Well, Your Honor, he's interrupted me so many times. I've had to sit down three different times because every time Your Honor asked me to argue, he starts back up again on his argument. And, you know, it's like -- do you not see that, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Well, I'll try to watch more carefully to see that doesn't happen. That's not my intention.

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Okay. May I reply to something that he answered to you earlier, too?

THE COURT: Well, let me --

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Because you asked specifically about --

THE COURT: Okay, but he was finally getting down to answering one of my questions. What is in the spreadsheet? How do I determine what the information was that was given from the defendants to the plaintiffs?

MR. GREENBERG: Well, Your Honor, you don't have a visual representation in the papers of the spreadsheet.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: But Mr. Bass in his declaration, starting at paragraph 3, actually explains what is in the Excel file. He explains it contains 10 columns that identify the following pieces of information on each line. And he explains what each one is and what he was advised there was. For example, Column C is a number