IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

| A CAB, LLC; AND A CAB SERIES, |) Supreme Court No. 7/050 |
|-------------------------------|--|
| LLC, |) Electronically Filed |
| Appellants, | Aug 05 2020 05:10 p.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court |
| V. |) |
| |) |
| MICHAEL MURRAY; AND |) |
| MICHAEL RENO, INDIVIDUALLY |) |
| AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS |) |
| SIMILARLY SITUATED, |) |
| |) |
| Respondents. |) |
| |) |
| | |

APPENDIX TO APPELLANTS OPENING BRIEF VOLUME XLIX of LII

Appeal from the Eighth Judicial District Court Case No. A-12-669926-C

HUTCHISON & STEFFEN, PLLC

Michael K. Wall (2098) Peccole Professional Park 10080 Alta Drive, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Attorney for Appellants

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| 165 | Plaintiffs' Motion for an Order Granting a Judgment Debtor Examination and for Other Relief, filed 10/05/2018 | XLV | AA009133- AA009142 |
| 65 | Plaintiffs' Motion on OST to Expedite Issuance of Order Granting Motion Filed on 10/14/2016 to Enjoin Defendants from Seeking Settlement of Any Unpaid Wage Claims Involving any Class Members Except as Part of this Lawsuit and for Other Relief and for Sanctions, filed 02/03/2017 | XVII, XVIII | AA003194- AA003548 |
| 125 | Plaintiffs' Motion on OST to Lift Stay, Hold Defendants in Contempt, Strike Their Answer, Grant Partial Summary Judgment, Direct a Prove Up Hearing, and Coordinate Cases, filed 04/17/2018 | XXXIII, XXXIV | AA006681- AA006897 |
| 176 | Plaintiffs' Motion to File a Supplement in Support of an Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs as Per NRCP Rule 54 and the Nevada Constitution, filed 10/29/2018 | XLVI | AA009401- AA009413 |
| 84 | Plaintiffs' Motion to Impose Sanctions Against Defendants for Violating this Court's Order of March 9, 2017 and Compelling Compliance with that Order, filed 07/12/2017 | XXII | AA004245- AA004298 |
| 167 | Plaintiffs' Objections to Claims from Exemption from Execution and Notice of Hearing, filed 10/15/2018 | XLV | AA009168- AA009256 |
| 195 | Plaintiffs' Objections to Claims of Exemption from Execution and Notice of Hearing, filed 12/19/2018 | XLIX | AA009892- AA009915 |
| 103 | Plaintiffs' Omnibus Motion in Limine # 1- | XXVIII, | AA005565- |
| | | | |

| | 25, filed 12/22/2017 | XXIV | AA005710 |
|-----|--|----------------|-----------------------|
| 132 | Plaintiffs' Reply to A Cab and Nady's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, filed 05/21/2018 | XXXV | AA007093- AA007231 |
| 97 | Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment and to Place Evidentiary Burden on Defendants to Establish "Lower Tier" Minimum Wage and Declare NAC 608.102(2)(b) Invalid, filed 11/29/2017 | XXVI, XXVII | AA005166- AA005276 |
| 98 | Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Bifurcation and/or to Limit Issues for Trial Per NRCP 42(b), filed 12/01/2017 | XXVII | AA005277- AA005369 |
| 52 | Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Enjoin Defendants From Seeking Settlement of any Unpaid Wage Claims Involving any Class Members Except as Part of this Lawsuit and for Other Relief, filed 11/10/2016 | VIII | AA001545- AA001586 |
| 74 | Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed 02/22/2017 | XIX, XX | AA003783- AA003846 |
| 110 | Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine #1-#25, filed 01/17/2018 | XXXI | AA006118- AA006179 |
| 151 | Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Judgment, filed 09/20/2018 | XLIII, XLIV | AA008835- AA008891 |
| 19 | Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify this Case as a Class Action Pursuant to NRCP Rule 23 and Appoint a Special Master Pursuant to NRCP Rile 53, filed 07/13/2018 | III | AA000447- AA000469 |

| 180 | Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for an Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs as Per NRCP Rule 54 and the Nevada Constitution, filed 11/08/2018 | XLVII | AA009605- AA009613 |
|-----|--|-------|-----------------------|
| 185 | Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to File a Supplement in Support of an Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs as Per NRCP Rule 54 and the Nevada Constitution, filed 11/28/2018 | XLVII | AA009668- AA009674 |
| 169 | Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Counter-Motion for Appropriate Judgment Enforcement Relief, filed 10/16/2018 | XLV | AA009264- AA009271 |
| 68 | Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion on OST to Expedite Issuance of Order Granting Motion Filed on 10/14/2016 to Enjoin Defendants From Seeking Settlement of Any Unpaid Wage Claims Involving Any Class Members Except as Part of This Lawsuit and For Other Relief and for Sanctions, filed 02/10/2017 | XIX | AA003621- AA003624 |
| 128 | Plaintiffs' Reply to Jasminka Dubric's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, filed 04/26/2018 | XXXIV | AA006931- AA006980 |
| 45 | Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion Seeking Reconsideration of the Court's Order Granting Class Certification, filed 03/14/2016 | VII | AA001232- AA001236 |
| 203 | Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Pay Special Master on an Order Shortening Time and Counter- Motion for an Order to Turn Over Property, filed 01/30/2019 | L | AA010115- AA010200 |

| 155 | Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, Amendment, for New Trial and for Dismissal of Claims, filed 09/27/2018 | XLIV | AA008995- AA009008 |
|-----|--|--------------|-----------------------|
| 11 | Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Strike First Amended Complaint and Counter-Motion for a Default Judgment or Sanctions Pursuant to EDCR 7.60(b), filed 04/11/2013 | II | AA000202- AA000231 |
| 24 | Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief, filed 08/28/2015 | IV | AA000651- AA000668 |
| 23 | Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Declaratory Order Regarding Statue of Limitations, filed 08/28/2015 | IV | AA000600- AA000650 |
| 172 | Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Dismissal of Claims on an Order Shortening Time, filed 10/17/2018 | XLVI | AA009289- AA009297 |
| 8 | Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion Seeking Reconsideration of the Court's February 8, 2013 Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed 03/18/2013 | I | AA000181- AA000187 |
| 154 | Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Ex-Parte Motion to Quash Writ of Execution on an OST and Counter-Motion for Appropriate Judgment Enforcement Relief, filed 09/24/2018 | XLIV | AA008919- AA008994 |
| 109 | Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony, filed 01/12/2018 | XXX, XXXI | AA006002- AA006117 |
| 184 | Plaintiffs' Response to Special Master's | XLVII | AA009665- |

| | Motion for an Order for Payment of Fees and Contempt, filed 11/26/2018 | | AA009667 |
|-----|--|--------------|-----------------------|
| 115 | Plaintiffs' Supplement in Connection with Appointment of Special Master, filed 01/31/2018 | XXXII | AA006239- AA006331 |
| 144 | Plaintiffs' Supplement in Reply and In Support of Entry of Final Judgment Per Hearing Held June 5, 2018, filed 07/13/2018 | XLI, XLII | AA008416- AA008505 |
| 146 | Plaintiffs' Supplement in Reply to Defendants' Supplement Dated July 18, 2018, filed 08/03/2018 | XLII | AA008576- AA008675 |
| 107 | Plaintiffs' Supplement in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed 01/09/2018 | XXX | AA005833- AA005966 |
| 75 | Plaintiffs' Supplement to Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed 02/23/2017 | XX | AA003847- AA003888 |
| 156 | Plaintiffs' Supplemental Response to Defendants' Ex-Parte Motion to Quash Writ of Execution on an OSt, filed 09/27/2018 | XLIV | AA009009- AA009029 |
| 46 | Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, filed 03/24/2016 | VII, VIII | AA001237- AA001416 |
| 170 | Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, Amendment, for New Trial, and for Dismissal of Claims, filed 10/16/2018 | XLV | AA009272- AA009277 |
| 58 | Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Pursuant to NRCP 12(c) with Respect to All Claims for Damages Outside the Two-Year Statue of Limitation and Opposition to Counter Motion for Toll of Statue of Limitations and for an Evidentiary Hearing, filed 12/28/2016 | XI | AA002179- AA002189 |

| 111 | Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude the Testimony of Plaintiffs' Experts, filed 01/19/2018 | XXXI | AA006180- AA001695 |
|-----|--|------------------|-----------------------|
| 178 | Resolution Economics' Application for Order of Payment of Special Master's Fees and Motion for Contempt, filed 11/05/2018 | XLVII | AA009553- AA009578 |
| 187 | Resolution Economics' Reply to Defendants' Opposition and Plaintiffs' Response to its Application for an Order of Payment of Special Master's Fees and Motion for Contempt, filed 12/03/2018 | XLVII | AA009690- AA009696 |
| 100 | Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 12/14/2017 | XXVII, XXVIII | AA005372- AA005450 |
| 31 | Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Claim for Relief, filed 09/28/2015 | V | AA000807- AA000862 |
| 3 | Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed 12/06/2012 | I | AA000016- AA000059 |
| 33 | Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff Michael Murray, filed 10/08/2015 | V | AA000870- AA000880 |
| 34 | Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff Michael Reno, filed 10/08/2015 | V | AA000881- AA000911 |
| 212 | Second Amended Notice of Appeal, filed 03/06/2019 | L | AA010285- AA010288 |
| 22 | Second Amended Supplemental Complaint, filed 08/19/2015 | III | AA000582- AA000599 |
| 130 | Second Supplemental Declaration of Class Counsel, Leon Greenberg, Esq., filed | XXXIV | AA007015- AA007064 |

| | 05/18/2018 | | |
|-----|--|------------|-----------------------|
| 213 | Special Master Resolution Economics' Opposition to Defendants Motion for Reconsideration of Judgment and Order Granting Resolution Economics Application for Order of Payment of Special Master's Fees and Order of Contempt, filed 03/28/2019 | LI | AA010289- AA010378 |
| 78 | Supplement to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed 05/24/2017 | XXI | AA004024- AA004048 |
| 79 | Supplement to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Bifurcate Issue of Liability of Defendant Creighton J. Nady From Liability of Corporate Defendants or Alternative Relief, filed 05/31/2017 | XXI | AA004049- AA004142 |
| 72 | Supplement to Order For Injunction Filed on February 16, 2017, filed 02/17/2017 | XIX | AA003777- AA003780 |
| 129 | Supplemental Declaration of Class Counsel, Leon Greenberg, Esq., filed 05/16/2018 | XXXIV | AA006981- AA007014 |
| 38 | Transcript of Proceedings, November 3, 2015 | VI | AA001002- AA001170 |
| 66 | Transcript of Proceedings, February 8, 2017 | XVII | AA003549- AA003567 |
| 70 | Transcript of Proceedings, February 14, 2017 | XIX | AA003755- AA003774 |
| 77 | Transcript of Proceedings, May 18, 2017 | XX, XXI | AA003893- AA004023 |
| 83 | Transcript of Proceedings, June 13, 2017 | XXII | AA004223- AA004244 |
| 101 | Transcript of Proceedings, December 14, 2017 | XXVIII | AA005451- AA005509 |

| 105 | Transcript of Proceedings, January 2, 2018 | XXIV | AA005720- AA005782 |
|-----|--|------------------|-----------------------|
| 114 | Transcript of Proceedings, January 25, 2018 | XXXI | AA006203- AA006238 |
| 117 | Transcript of Proceedings, February 2, 2018 | XXXII | AA006335- AA006355 |
| 122 | Transcript of Proceedings, February 15, 2018 | XXXII, XXXIII | AA006427- AA006457 |
| 137 | Transcript of Proceedings, filed July 12, 2018 | XXXVI, XXXVII | AA007385- AA007456 |
| 215 | Transcript of Proceedings, September 26, 2018 | LI | AA010385- AA010452 |
| 216 | Transcript of Proceedings, September 28, 2018 | LI, LII | AA010453- AA010519 |
| 175 | Transcript of Proceedings, October 22, 2018 | XLVI | AA009304- AA009400 |
| 189 | Transcript of Proceedings, December 4, 2018 | XLVIII | AA009701- AA009782 |
| 190 | Transcript of Proceedings, December 11, 2018 | XLVIII | AA009783- AA009800 |
| 192 | Transcript of Proceedings, December 13, 2018 | XLVIII | AA009813- AA009864 |

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I am an employee of HUTCHISON & STEFFEN, LLC and that on this date **APPENDIX TO APPELLANTS OPENING BRIEF VOLUME**

XLIX of LII was filed electronically with the Clerk of the Nevada Supreme Court, and therefore electronic service was made in accordance with the master service list as follows:

Leon Greenberg, Esq.
Dana Sniegocki, Esq.
Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation
2965 S. Jones Blvd., Ste. E3
Las Vegas, NV 89146
Telephone: (702) 383-6085

Facsimile: (702) 385-1827

leongreenberg@overtimelaw.com

Dana@overtimelaw.com

Attorneys for Respondents

DATED this 5th day of August, 2020.

/s/ Kaylee Conradi

An employee of Hutchison & Steffen, PLLC

Electronically Filed 12/19/2018 6:02 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT LEON GREENBERG, ESQ., SBN 8094 1 DANA SNIEGOCKI, ESQ., SBN 11715 Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation 2965 South Jones Blvd- Suite E3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89146 3 702) 383-6085 702) 385-1827(fax) 4 leongreenberg@overtimelaw.com 5 dana@overtimelaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs 6 DISTRICT COURT 7 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 8 9 MICHAEL MURRAY, and MICHAEL Case No.: A-12-669926-C RENO, Individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Dept.: I 10 Plaintiffs, 11 PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS 12 TO CLAIMS OF EXEMPTION VS. FROM EXECUTION AND A CAB TAXI SERVICE LLC, A CAB, 13 NOTICE OF HEARING LLC, and CREIGHTON J. NADY, 14 Defendants. 15 16 17 Plaintiffs, through their attorneys, Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation, 18 hereby submit these Objections to Claims of Exemptions from Execution filed by A 19 Cab, LLC. Pursuant to NRS 21.112(4) these objections also include a Notice of 20 Hearing. 21 Dated: December 19, 2018 22 23 Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation 24 By: /s/ Leon Greenberg 25 Leon Greenberg, Esq. Nevada Bar No.: 8094 26 2965 South Jones Boulevard - Suite E3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89146 27 (702) 383-6085 Attorney for Plaintiffs 28

NOTICE OF HEARING PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT the plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, will bring the foregoing Objections to Claims of Exemption from Execution for hearing before the Honorable Kenneth Cory on ______, 2018, at the hour of . Dated: December 19, 2018 Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation By: /s/ Leon Greenberg Leon Greenberg, Esq. Nevada Bar No.: 8094 2965 South Jones Boulevard - Suite E3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89146 (702) 383-6085 Attorney for Plaintiffs

OBJECTIONS

I. The Defendant A Cab, LLC has already exhausted its "wildcard" exemption under NRS 21.090(1)(z) and is not entitled to assert it again.

Plaintiffs, via the Las Vegas Constable, served a Writ of Execution and Garnishment on Bank of Nevada on November 13, 2018. *See*, Ex. "A." A response from Bank of Nevada indicating that it was in possession of a total of \$1.00 in an account belonging to the judgment debtor. *Id.* A check, in the amount of 98 cents was remitted to plaintiffs' counsel by the Office of the Constable. *Id.*

In prior proceedings before this Court, which were held on December 4, 2018, the Court granted defendants a single claim of exemption from execution under NRS 21.090(1)(z). *See*, minutes from hearing on December 4, 2018. Under this section, known as Nevada's "wildcard" exemption, a judgment debtor may exempt from execution property, including money, in an amount not to exceed \$10,000.00.

Defendants, after receiving notice of the writ of execution and garnishment served on Bank of Nevada, filed the Ex. "B" Claim of Exemption from Execution. As the Court has already allowed defendants to retain the maximum allowable \$10,000.00 as exempted funds from the over \$233,000.00 seized from defendants' bank accounts, they have exhausted this exemption and are not entitled to reassert it.

II. Defendant asserts an additional exemption which is inapplicable and/or incomplete and should be denied.

In addition to its redundant asserted "wildcard" exemption, defendant also asserts an exemption under NRS 21.105 seeking retention of \$400 or the entire money existing in a *personal bank account* subject to direct-deposit benefits. Ex. "B" at p. 4-5. First, the account subject to this writ of execution and garnishment was a business account titled to the judgment debtor A Cab, LLC and possessing its designated Employer Identification Number; it was not a personal bank account subject to an exemption under NRS 21.105. Moreover, to claim such exemption, defendant is

required to "attach proof of direct-deposit benefits." *Id.* at p. 4. No such attached proof of direct-deposit benefits exist in defendant's filing. Accordingly, this exemption should be denied.

III. An award of attorney's fees should be granted.

Plaintiffs' counsel, upon being served with defendant's frivolous exemption claim, contacted defendant's counsel and requested such baseless claim of exemption be withdrawn as it is clearly improper. Ex. "C," e-mail of December 11, 2018.

Defendant's counsel has neither acknowledged such communication nor offered to withdraw the claim of exemption. As a result, plaintiffs' counsel was forced to prepare and file the instant objections. Preparing and filing the instant objections consumed no less than 1.5 hours of associate attorney time. It is further anticipated that additional attorney time and costs will be expended should the Court require a hearing on this matter. Accordingly, plaintiffs' counsel requests the Court grant an award of attorney's fees in an amount that is no less than \$500.00, or some other amount that the Court deems appropriate, for defendant's and their counsel's refusal to withdraw what is clearly a frivolous claim of exemption from execution.

CONCLUSION

Wherefore, relief should be granted to plaintiffs as aforesaid.

Dated this 19th day of December, 2018.

Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation

By: /s/ Dana Sniegocki
DANA SNIEGOCKI, Esq.
Nevada Bar No.: 11715
2965 South Jones Blvd- Suite E3
Las Vegas, Nevada 89146
(702) 383-6085
Attorney for Plaintiffs

PROOF OF SERVICE The undersigned certifies that on December 19, 2018, she served the within: PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO CLAIMS OF **EXEMPTION FROM EXECUTION AND NOTICE OF HEARING** by court electronic service to: TO: Esther C. Rodriguez, Esq. RODRIGUEZ LAW OFFICES, P.C. 10161 Park Run Drive, Suite 150 Las Vegas, NV 89145 Jay A. Shafer, Esq. PREMIER LEGAL GROUP 1333 North Buffalo Drive, Suite 210 Las Vegas, NV 89128 /s/ Dana Sniegocki Dana Sniegocki

EXHIBIT "A"

| | NOV 1 3 2018 - Electronically Issued 11/7/2018 2:11 PM | |
|---------------|--|---|
| | Western ALLINCE BANK LEGAL DEPARTMENT LEGAL DEPARTMENT | s |
| $_{-1}$ | WRIT Dave + Time 11-13-18 1:00 pm | |
| 2 | Leon Greenberg, Esq. NV Bar No. 8094 Rond G.a Coules | |
| 3 | 2965 South Jones Blvd., Suite E-3 | |
| \setminus_4 | (Address) 175 Veges NV 89145 | , , |
| 5 | 702.383.6085; 702.385.1827 703.383.6085; 702.385.1827 703.383.6085; 702.385.1827 | table |
| 6 | (Telephone and Facsumile Number) | |
| 7 | leongreenberg@overtimelaw.com (E-mail Address) 702-455-4099 Put Case # & Name on Ch | eck |
| 8 | Attorney for (Name): | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |
| 9 | ☑ Plaintiff, ☐ Counterclaimant, or ☐ Third-Party Plaintiff, In Proper Person | |
| 10 | EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT | |
| 11 | CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA | بمصند |
| 12 | | |
| | Michael Murray and Michael Reno et al. , Case No.: A-12-669926-C Dept. No.: T | |
| 13 | Plaintiu(S), | |
| 14 | VS. WRIT OF EXECUTION EARNINGS | |
| 15 | A Cab Taxi Service LLC A Cab LLC et al. BANK ACCOUNT OTHER PROPERTY | *************************************** |
| 16 | Defendant(s). | |
| 17 | THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEVADA: | |
| 18 | To the Sheriff of Clark County or the Constable for the Township of Las Vegas | |
| 19 | Greetings: | |
| 20 | ☐ To Financial Institutions: This judgment is for the recovery of money. | |
| 21 | On August 21 ,2018 , a judgment was entered by the above-entitled court in the | |
| 22 | above-entitled action in favor of Michael Murray , as Judgment | |
| 23 | A Cab LLC, A Cab Taxi Service LLC, and A Cab creditor and against Series LLC , as Judgment Debtor, for | i |
| 24 | \$ 900,317.34 Principal, Date and Time: 11/13/18 | 1 |
| 25 | \$ 132,710.47 Pre-Judgment Interest, Received Via: Email | |
| 26 | Branch/Dept.: Legal Ops \$ 0.00 Attorney's Fees, and Name: John Bonds | |
| 27 | \$ 0.00 Costs, making a total amount of initials: W | |
| 28 | 1,033,027.81 The judgment as entered, and | |
| | Page 1 of 3 @ Civil Law Self-Help Center (Rev. 911917) | |
| • | A A O | 0000 |
| | Case Number: A-12-659926-C AAO (| 9898 |

| 1 | WHEREAS, according to an affidavit or a memorandum of costs after judgment, or both, filed | |
|----|--|---|
| 2 | herein, it appears that further sums have accrued since the entry of judgment, to wit: | |
| 3 | \$ Accrued Interest, and | |
| 4 | \$ Accrued Costs, together with | |
| 5 | \$ 10.00 Fee, for the issuance of this writ, making a total of | |
| 6 | \$As accrued costs, accrued interest and fees. | |
| 7 | Credit must be given for payments and partial satisfactions in the amount of | |
| 8 | \$ 233,619.54 | - |
| 9 | which is to be first credited against the total accrued costs and accrued interest, with any excess credited | |
| 10 | against the judgment as entered, leaving a net balance of | |
| 11 | \$ | |
| 12 | actually due on the date of the issuance of this writ, of which | |
| 13 | \$ 799,418.27 | |
| 14 | bears interest at 7.00 percent per annum, in the amount of \$ 153.31 per day, from the date | |
| 15 | of judgment to the date of levy, to which must be added the commissions and costs of the officer executing | g |
| 16 | this writ. | |
| 17 | NOW, THEREFORE, CONSTABLE/SHERIFF, you are hereby commanded to satisfy this judgment with interest and costs as provided by law, out of the personal property of the judgment debtor, except that for any interest and costs as provided by law, out of the personal property of the judgment debtor, except that for any | |
| 18 | workweek, 82 percent of the disposable earnings of the deptor during that week it the gross weekly state) of the | |
| 19 | disposable earnings of the debtor during that week if the gross weekly sainty of wage of the debtor on the debtor during that week if the gross weekly sainty of wage of the debtor on the debtor during that week if the gross weekly sainty of wage of the debtor on the debtor during that week if the gross weekly sainty of wage of the debtor during that week if the gross weekly sainty of wage of the debtor during that week if the gross weekly sainty of wage of the debtor during that week if the gross weekly sainty of wage of the debtor during that week if the gross weekly sainty of wage of the debtor during that week if the gross weekly sainty of wage of the debtor during that week if the gross weekly sainty of wage of the debtor during that week if the gross weekly sainty of wage of the debtor during that week if the gross weekly sainty of wage of the debtor during that week if the gross weekly sainty of wage of the debtor during that week if the gross weekly sainty of wage of the debtor during that week if the gross weekly sainty of wage of the debtor during that we wage gross of the gross of th | |
| 20 | section 206(a)(1) of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 0.3.c. ya 201 c. say, and if | Ü |
| 21 | the earnings are payable, whichever is greated, is exempt from any loss of the debtor in the aforesaid sufficient personal property cannot be found, then out of the real property belonging to the debtor in the aforesaid county, and make return to this writ within not less than 10 days or more than 60 days endorsed thereon with what | |
| 22 | you have done. | |
| 23 | Any Bank account of funds on deposit with bank of Action debtor A Cab LLC or A Cab Series LLC and titled under the Employee Identification Number (EIN) of 0590. | |
| 24 | | |
| 25 | | |
| 26 | | |
| 27 | | |
| 28 | | |
| | Page 2 of 3 @ Civil Law S-lf-Help Center (Sec. 91647) | |

| 1 | You are required to return this Writ from date of issuance not less than 10 days or more than 60 |
|-----|--|
| 2 | days with the results of your levy endorsed thereon. |
| 3 | STEVEN D. GRIERSON |
| 4 | CLERK OF COURT |
| 5 | By 11/8/2018 |
| 6 | Deputy Gerk Date |
| 7 | Alexander Banderas Issued at the direction of: |
| 8 | The state of the s |
| 9 | (Signature) ⊠ Attorney for (Name): |
| 10 | Name: Leon Greenberg Esq. Third-Party Plaintiff, In Proper Person |
| . | Address: 2965 South Jones Blvd. Suite E-e City, State, Zip: Las Vegas, NV 89146 |
| 11 | Phone: 792.383.6085 E-mail: leongreenberg@overtimelaw.com |
| 12 | SHERIFF OR CONSTABLE INFORMATION |
| 13 | |
| 14 | AMOUNTS TO BE COLLECTED BY LEVY: RETURN: |
| 15 | NET BALANCE: 194418.27 Not satisfied \$ Satisfied in sum of \$ |
| 16 | Garnishment Fee: 5 Costs retained \$ |
| 1.7 | Mileage: ZCommission retained \$ |
| 17 | Levy Fee: 30Costs incurred \$ |
| 18 | Postage: Commission incurred \$ |
| 19 | Other: Costs received \$ |
| | Sub-Total: 199,455,27 |
| 20 | Commission: 4049,78 |
| 21 | Total Live and a remitted to judgment creditor: |
| 22 | 809,000,00 |
| 23 | |
| 24 | I hereby certify that I have this date returned the foregoing Writ of Execution with the results of the levy endorsed thereon. |
| 25 | SHERIFF OF CLARK COUNTY or |
| 26 | CONSTABLE FOR THE TOWNSHIP OF |
| 27 | A. Lourenco P #15510 |
| 28 | Title Date |
| | Page 3 of 3 # Clivil Law Sall-Help Coulet Box 2001D |

| 1 | WRIT STATE |
|----|--|
| 2 | Leon Greenberg, Esq. |
| 2 | (Name) 2965 South Jones Blvd. Suite E-3 |
| 4 | (Address) Las Vegas, Nevada 89146 (City, State, Zip Code) |
| 5 | 702.383.6085 THE TOTAL THE PROPERTY OF THE PRO |
| 6 | (Telephone Number) 1eongreenberg@overtimelaw.com (E-mail Address) 38 Tell and returned to: |
| 7 | ☐ Plaintiff/☐ Counterclaimant, In Proper Person Las Vegas, WV 30101 |
| 8. | EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT |
| 9 | CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA |
| 10 | CLARK COOKI I, NEVADA |
| 11 | Michael Murray and Michael Reno et al. , Case No.: A-12-669926-C |
| 12 | Plaintiff(s), Dept. No.: I |
| 13 | ys. |
| 14 | A Cab Taxi Service A Cab LLC et al. WRIT OF GARNISHMENT |
| 15 | A cub ranz service A cub cec et as, |
| 16 | Defendant(s). |
| 17 | THE STATE OF NEVADA TO: |
| 18 | Bank of Nevada 100 South City Parkway Las Vegas, Nevada 89106 , Garnishee. |
| 19 | You are hereby notified that you are attached as garnishee in the above-entitled action, and you |
| 20 | are commanded not to pay any debt from yourself to A Cab LLC or A Cab Taxi Service LLC or |
| 21 | A Cab Series LLC , Defendant(s), and that you must retain possession and control of |
| 22 | all personal property, money, credits, debts, effects, and choses in action of said Defendant(s) in order that |
| 23 | the same may be dealt with according to law; where such property consists of wages, salaries, |
| 24 | commissions or bonuses, the amount you shall retain shall be in accordance with 15 U.S. Code 1673 and |
| 25 | Nevada Revised Statutes 31,295. |
| 26 | Plaintiff believes that you have property, money, credits, debts, effects, and choses in action in |
| 27 | your hands and under your custody and control belonging to said Defendant(s), more particularly |
| 28 | described as: |

Page 2 of 5

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(Ser. 97/12/17)

| - [] | STATE OF NEVADA) |
|--|---|
| | COUNTY OF CLARK) |
| | The undersigned being duly sworn states that I received the within WRIT OF GARNISHMENT |
| | on theday of, 20, and personally served the same on the day |
| | of, 20 in the same manner as provided by rule of court or law of this |
| | state for the service of a summons in a civil action, and I tendered the statutory fee of \$5.00 to |
| | at |
| | |
| | State of Nevada. |
| | By: |
| | By:Title |
| 100000000000000000000000000000000000000 | |
| | INTERROGATORIES TO BE ANSWERED BY THE GARNISHEE AND SIGNED UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY: A Cab LLC, A Cab Taxi Service LLC, or A 1. Are you in any manner indebted to the Defendant(s) Cab Series LLC |
| | , or either of them, either in property or money, and is the |
| | debt now due? If not due, when is the debt to become due? State fully all particulars. |
| | Answer: <u></u> ∧(ĵ) |
| | |
| | |
| | 2. Did you have in your possession, in your charge or under your control, on the date the Writ of |
| | Garnishment was served upon you, any money, property, effects, goods, chattels, rights, credits or |
| 1 | lacksquare |
| | choses in action of the Defendants A Cab LLC, A Cab Taxi Service LLC, or A Cab Series LLC, |
| | choses in action of the Defendants A Cab LLC, A Cab Taxi Service LLC, or A Cab Series LLC, or either of them, or in which Defendants are interested? If so, state its value, and state fully all |
| | or either of them, or in which Defendants are interested? If so, state its value, and state fully all |
| | or either of them, or in which Defendants are interested? If so, state its value, and state fully all particulars. |
| and the state of t | or either of them, or in which Defendants are interested? If so, state its value, and state fully all |
| | or either of them, or in which Defendants are interested? If so, state its value, and state fully all particulars. |

| | . Are you a financial institution with a personal account held by one or all of the Defendants? If so, | | |
|------|---|--|--|
| 2 | state the account number and the amount of money in the account which is subject to garnishment. As | | |
| 3 | set forth in section 3 of Assembly Bill 223 (76th Sess. 2011), \$2,000 or the entire amount in the | | |
| 4 | account, whichever is less, is not subject to garnishment if the financial institution reasonably | | |
| 5 | identifies that an electronic deposit of money has been made into the account within the immediately | | |
| 6 | preceding 45 days which is exempt from execution, including, without limitation, payments of money | | |
| 7 | described in section 3 of Assembly Bill 223 or, if no such deposit has been made, \$400 or the entire | | |
| 8 | amount in the account, whichever is less, is not subject to garnishment, unless the garnishment is for | | |
| 9 | the recovery of money owed for the support of any person. The amount which is not subject to | | |
| 10 | garnishment does not apply to each account of the judgment debtor, but rather is an aggregate amount | | |
| 11 | that is not subject to garnishment. | | |
| 12 | Answer: M | | |
| 13 | | | |
| 14 | | | |
| 15 | 3. Are you a financial institution that previously maintained an account held by A Cab LLC, A Cab Taxi | | |
| 16 | Service LLC, or A Cab Series LLC that was active on or after January 1, 2013 but is now closed? If | | |
| 17 | so, state the account number of all such closed accounts and whether, when such account was closed, | | |
| 18 | the remaining funds in that account were transferred to any different account, either at your financial | | |
| 19 | institution or another institution, and all particulars known to you about such account to which the | | |
| 20 | funds were transferred, including the account number, institution name and address, Employer | | |
| 21 | Identification Number associated with the account (if applicable), and the name of the account holder. | | |
| 22 | Answer: Any additional information on accounts closed would | | |
| 23 | require a subpresa. | | |
| 24 | | | |
| 25 | 4. State your correct name and address, or the name and address of your attorney upon whom written | | |
| 26 | notice of further proceedings in this action may be served. WESTERN ALLIANCE BANK | | |
| 27 | Alliance Association Bank Alliance Bank of Arizona Answer: Jim AlkShic Bank of Newada Bridge Bank First Independent Bank Torrey Pines | | |
| 28 | Attn: Legal Processing P.O. box 98814 | | |
| 0017 | Civil Law Self-Help Center Page 4 of 5 Las Vegas, NV 89193 | | |

| , } | | | | |
|-------|--|--|--|--|
| 1 | | | | |
| 2 3 | I declare under penalty of perjury that the answers to the foregoing interrogatories by me subscribed are true and correct. | | | |
| 4 | Executed on the 3rd day of the month of Docamber of the year 20/8. | | | |
| 5 | | | | |
| 6 | Simular of Complete of Minister Alliance Food | | | |
| 7 | Signature of Garnishee) Stern Alliance Bank Print name: JIM AlkShiS | | | |
| 8 | Title: Legal Spacialist | | | |
| 9 | | | | |
| 10 | NOTE: Under 31.297, if an employer, without legal justification; refuses to withhold the earnings of a | | | |
| 11 | Defendant demanded in a WRIT OF GARNISHMENT or knowingly misrepresents the earnings of the | | | |
| 12 | Defendant, the court may order the employer to appear and show cause why he should not be subject to the | | | |
| | following penalties: | | | |
| 13 | | | | |
| 14 | (1) If the Plaintiff has received a judgment against the Defendant, an order to the employer to pay the Plaintiff the amount of arrearages caused by the employer's refusal to withhold or his misrepresentation of the | | | |
| 15 | Defendant's earnings. | | | |
| 16 | | | | |
| 17 | (2) In addition, the court may order the employer to pay the Plaintiff punitive damages in an amount not to | | | |
| 18 | exceed \$1,000 for each pay period in which the employer has, without legal justification, refused to withhold | | | |
| 19 | the Defendant's earnings or has misrepresented the earnings. | | | |
| 20 | | | | |
| 21 | | | | |
| 22 | | | | |
| 23 | | | | |
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| 40 | | | | |

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

500 S GRAND CENTRAL PARKWAY PO BOX 551220

VENDOR NO. 780000

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89155-1220

CHECK NO. 1591279 Invoice Invoice Document Number / Assignment Gross Discount Net Number Date Text Amount Adjustment Amount A12669926C 12/06/2018 3019115051 / *CONSTABLE 0.98 0.00 0.98 CONSTABLE CLAIM-18LVTC034275 **CLARK COUNTY** TOTAL 0.98 0.00 0.98

Retirees of the Public Employees' Retirement System REMACM Exact Medical Medical Applications as Historia Fig. 1. The Public Compliance of the Pub NRS 286.520, all independent contractor information is subject to inspection by or disclosure to the Public Employees' Retirement System of Nevada.



CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 500 S GRAND CENTRAL PARKWAY PO BOX 551220 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89155-1220

BANK OF AMERICA 66-798 CHE NORTH CAROLINA

66-798 531

CHECK NUMBER 1591279

NOTICE

CASH WITHIN 90 DAYS

DATE AMOUNT 12/07/2018

PAY ZERO AND 98/100 DOLLARS

TO THE ORDER

LEON GREENBERG 2965 S JONES BLVD STE E LAS VEGAS NV 89146

EXHIBIT "B"

Electronically Filed 12/7/2018 12:57 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

| 1 | DOC | | |
|------|--|--|--|
| 2 | Jay Shafer, Esq. #9184 Premier Legal Group | | |
| 3 | 1333 North Buffalo Drive, Suite 210 | | |
| 4 | (Address) Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 | | |
| | (City, State, Zip Code) (702) 794-4411 | | |
| 5 | (Telephone Number) | | |
| 6 | jshafer@premierlegalgroup.com (E-mail Address) | | |
| 7 | ☑ Defendant/ ☐ Other, In Proper Person | | |
| 8 | EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT | | |
| 9 | | | |
| 10 | CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA | | |
| 11 | MICHAEL MURRAY and MICHAEL RENO, , Case No.: A-12-669926-C | | |
| 12 | Plaintiff(s), Dept. No.: | | |
| 13 | vs | | |
| 14 | A CAB TAX SERVICE LLC and A CAB LLC, et. al. EXECUTION | | |
| 15 | Defendant(s). | | |
| 16 | I, (Insart your name) A CAB LLC, by and through Premier Legal Group , submit this Claim of | | |
| 17 | Exemption from Execution pursuant to NRS 21.112 and state as follows: | | |
| 18 | (Check only one of the following boxes.) | | |
| ا وا | I am a Defendant in this case and have had my wages withheld or have received a Notice of | | |
| 20 | Execution regarding the attachment or garnishment of my wages, money, benefits, or | | |
| 21 | property, | | |
| 22 | I am not a Defendant in this case, but my wages, money, benefits, or property are the subject | | |
| 23 | of an attachment or garnishment relating to a Defendant in this case. (NRS 21.112(10).) | | |
| 24 | My wages, money, benefits, or property are exempt by law from execution as indicated below. | | |
| 25 | Pursuant to NRS 21.112(4), if the Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor does not file an objection and notice of | | |
| 26 | hearing in response to this Claim of Exemption within eight judicial days after my Claim of Exemption | | |
| 27 | from Execution has been served, any person who has control or possession over my wages, money, | | |
| 28 | benefits, or property (such as my employer or bank, for example) must release them to me within nine | | |
| | Page 1 of 6 Civil Law Salf-Halp Center, Here, 9/19/17 | | |
| | | | |

| 1 | judicial days after this Claim of Exemption from Execution has been served. | | | |
|----|--|--|--|--|
| 2 | (Check all of the following boxes that apply to your wages, money, benefits, or property.) | | | |
| 3 | | ☐ Money or payments received pursuant to the federal Social Security Act, including retirement, | | |
| 4 | | disability, survivors benefits, and SSI. (NRS 21.090(1)(y) and 42 U.S.C. § 407(a).) | | |
| 5 | | Money or payments for assistance received through the Nevada Department of Health and | | |
| б | | Human Services, Division of Welfare and Supportive Services, pursuant to NRS 422.291. (NRS | | |
| 7 | | 21.090(1)(kk) and 422A.325.) | | |
| 8 | | Money or payments received as unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to NRS 612.710. | | |
| 9 | | (NRS 21.090(1)(hh).) | | |
| 10 | | Money or compensation payable or paid under NRS 616A to 616D (worker's compensation/ | | |
| 11 | | industrial insurance), as provided in NRS 616C,205. (NRS 21.090(1)(gg).) | | |
| 12 | | Money or payments received as veteran's benefits. (38 U.S.C. § 5301.) | | |
| 13 | | Money or payments received as retirement benefits under the federal Civil Service Retirement | | |
| 14 | | System (CSRS) or Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS). (5 U.S.C. § 8346.) | | |
| 15 | | Seventy-five percent (75%) of my disposable earnings or eighty-two (82%) of my disposable | | |
| 16 | | earnings if my gross weekly salary is \$770 or less. "Disposable earnings" are the earnings | | |
| 17 | remaining "after the deduction of any amounts required by law to be withheld." (NRS | | | |
| 18 | 21.090(1)(g)(1).) The "amounts required by law to be withheld" are federal income tax, | | | |
| 19 | Medicare, and Social Security taxes. | | | |
| 20 | | ☐ Check here if your disposable weekly earnings to do not exceed \$362.50 or 50 times the | | |
| 21 | federal minimum wage (50 x \$7.25 = \$362,50), in which case ALL of your disposable | | | |
| 22 | earnings are exempt. (NRS 21.090(1)(g).) | | | |
| 23 | | ☐ Check here if your disposable weekly earnings are between \$362.50 and \$483.33, in which | | |
| 24 | | case your exempt income is always \$362.50. Your non-exempt income is your weekly | | |
| 25 | | disposable earnings minus \$362.50, which equals (tusert amount here): \$per | | |
| 26 | | week. (NRS 31.295.) | | |
| 27 | | Money or benefits received pursuant to a court order for the support, education, and maintenance | | |
| 28 | | of a child, or for the support of a former spouse, including arrearages. (NRS 21.090(1)(s)-(t),) | | |
| | | Page 2 of 6 Schollaw Schilleb Gener. Rev. 9/1977 | | |

| 1 | | Manay received on a complete fithe fordered Engand Income Toy Cheelit on similar credit consideration | | |
|----|---|--|--|--|
| 1 | | The state of the s | | |
| 2 | | under Nevada law. (NRS 21.090(1)(aa).) | | |
| 3 | 122 | \$10,000 or less of my money or personal property, identified as (describe the specific money or property you | | |
| 4 | | wish to make exempt) Funds held by Bank of Nevada up to the sum of \$10,000,00 | | |
| 5 | | which is not otherwise exempt under NRS 21.090. (NRS 21.090(1)(z).) | | |
| 6 | | Money, up to \$1,000,000, held in a retirement plan which conforms with or is maintained | | |
| 7 | | pursuant to applicable limitations and requirements of the Internal Revenue Code, including, but | | |
| 8 | | not limited to, an IRA, 401k, 403b, or other qualified stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plan. | | |
| 9 | | (NRS 21.090(1)(r).) | | |
| 10 | | All money, benefits, privileges, or immunities derived from a life insurance policy. (NRS | | |
| 11 | | 21.090(1)(k).) | | |
| 12 | | Money, benefits, or refunds payable or paid from Nevada's Public Employees' Retirement System | | |
| 13 | | pursuant to NRS 286.670. (NRS 21.090(1)(ii).) | | |
| 14 | | A homestead recorded pursuant to NRS 115.010 on a dwelling (house, condominium, townhome, | | |
| 15 | | and land) or a mobile home where my equity does not exceed \$550,000. (NRS 21.090(1)(I).) | | |
| 16 | | My dwelling, occupied by me and my family, where the amount of my equity does not exceed | | |
| 17 | | \$550,000, and I do not own the land upon which the dwelling is situated. (NRS 21.090(1)(m).) | | |
| 18 | | ☐ Check here if the judgment being collected arises from a medical bill. If it does, your | | |
| 19 | | primary dwelling and the land upon which it is situated (if owned by you), including a mobile | | |
| 20 | | or manufactured home, are exempt from execution regardless of your equity. (NRS 21.095,) | | |
| 21 | | My vehicle, where the amount of equity does not exceed \$15,000, or I will pay the judgment | | |
| 22 | | creditor any amount over \$15,000 in equity. (NRS 21.090(1)(f),) | | |
| 23 | ☐ Check here if your vehicle is specially equipped or modified to provide mobility for you or | | | |
| 24 | | your dependent and either you or your dependent has a permanent disability. Your vehicle is | | |
| 25 | | exempt regardless of the equity. (NRS 21.090(1)(p).) | | |
| 26 | | A prosthesis or any equipment prescribed by a physician or dentist for me or my dependent. | | |
| 27 | | (NRS 21.090(1)(q).) | | |
| 28 | | My private library, works of art, musical instruments, jewelry, or keepsakes belonging to me or | | |
| | | Page 3 of 6 Safething Safething Contact Base Stiffer | | |

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|----|--|--|--|--|--|
| 1 | my dependent, chosen by me and not to exceed \$5,000 in value. (NRS 21.090(1)(a).) | | | | |
| 2 | My necessary household goods, furnishings, electronics, clothes, personal effects, or yard | | | | |
| 3 | equipment, belonging to me or my dependent, chosen by me and not to exceed \$12,000 in value. | | | | |
| 4 | | (NRS 21.090(1)(b).) | | | |
| 5 | | Money or payments received from a private disability insurance plan. (NRS 21.090(1)(ee).) | | | |
| 6 | | Money in a trust fund for funeral or burial services pursuant to NRS 689.700. (NRS 21.090(1)(ff).) | | | |
| 7 | | My professional library, equipment, supplies, and the tools, inventory, instruments, and materials | | | |
| 8 | | used to carry on my trade or business for the support of me and my family not to exceed \$10,000 | | | |
| 9 | | in value, (NRS 21.090(1)(d).) | | | |
| 10 | | Money that I reasonably deposited with my landlord to rent or lease a dwelling that is used as my | | | |
| 11 | | primary residence, unless the landlord is enforcing the terms of the rental agreement or lease. | | | |
| 12 | (NRS 21.090(1)(n).) | | | | |
| 13 | ☐ Money or payments, up to \$16,150, received as compensation for personal injury, not including | | | | |
| 14 | compensation for pain and suffering or actual pecuniary loss, by me or by a person upon whom I | | | | |
| 15 | am dependent. (NRS 21.090(1)(u).) | | | | |
| 16 | | Money or payments received as compensation for loss of my future earnings or for the wrongful | | | |
| 17 | death or loss of future earnings of a person upon whom I was dependent, to the extent reasonably | | | | |
| 18 | | necessary for the support of me and my dependents. (NRS 21.090(1)(v)-(w).) | | | |
| 19 | | Money or payments received as restitution for a criminal act. (NRS 21.090(1)(x).) | | | |
| 20 | Money paid or rights existing for vocational rehabilitation pursuant to NRS 615.270. (NRS | | | | |
| 21 | | 21.090(1)(jj).) | | | |
| 22 | | Child welfare assistance provided pursuant to NRS 432.036. (NRS 21.090(1)(II),) | | | |
| 23 | | Other: | | | |
| 24 | <u>.</u> | | | | |
| 25 | | AUTOMATIC BANK ACCOUNT EXEMPTIONS | | | |
| 26 | (Some dir | rect-deposit funds are automatically protected and should not be taken from your bank account. If automatically | | | |
| 27 | protected | money was taken from your bank account, check the appropriate box below and attach proof of direct-deposit benefits.) | | | |
| 28 | | All exempt federal benefits that were electronically deposited into my account during the prior | | | |
| | | Page 4 of 6 Octob Law Soft Lieu Soft | | | |

| | 1 | | | |
|---------|--|--|--|--|
| 1 | | two months are protected, and I am, therefore, entitled to full and customary access to that | | |
| 2 | | protected amount. (31 C.F.R. part 212.6(a).) Money in my personal bank account that exceeds | | |
| 3 | | that amount may be subject to the exemptions stated above, | | |
| 4 | | Exempt state or federal benefits were electronically deposited into my personal bank account | | |
| 5 | | during the 45-day period preceding Plaintiffs service of the writ of execution or garnishment | | |
| 6 | | relating to my personal bank account, and under Nevada law, I am entitled to full and customary | | |
| 7 | | access to \$2,000 or the entire amount in the account, whichever is less, regardless of any other | | |
| 8 | | deposits of money into the account. Money in my personal bank account that exceeds that | | |
| 9 | | amount may be subject to the exemptions stated above. (NRS 21.105.) | | |
| 10 | | A writ of execution or garnishment was levied on my personal bank account, and under Nevada | | |
| 11 | | law, I am entitled to full and customary access to \$400 or the entire amount in my account, | | |
| 12 | | whichever is less, unless the writ is for the recovery of money owed for the support of any person, | | |
| 13 | | Money in my personal bank account that exceeds \$400 may be subject to the exemptions stated | | |
| 14 | | above. (NRS 21.105.) | | |
| 15 | | Pursuant to NRS 21.112(4), if you are a Garnishee or other person who has control or possession | | |
| | over my exempt 🗆 wages, 🗾 bank accounts, 🗀 benefits, 🗹 other accounts/funds, or 📝 personal or real | | | |
| 16 | propert | y, as stated above, you must release that money or property to me within nine judicial days after | | |
| 17 | my Claim of Exemption from Execution was served on you, unless the Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor files | | | |
| 18 | an obje | ction and notice of hearing within eight judicial days after service of my Claim of Exemption from | | |
| 19 | Executi | ion, which the Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor will serve on you by mail or in person. | | |
| 20 | | DATED this 7th day of December , 20 18 . | | |
| 21 22 | | I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct. | | |
| 23 | | | | |
| 24 | | Steve Beck (print name) | | |
| 25 | | Defendant/ Other, In Proper Person (print name) | | |
| 26 | | | | |
| 27 | | | | |
| 1 | | | | |
| 28 | | Page 5 of 6 45 Child Law Self-Elelo Conter. Rev. 9/19/12 | | |
| f | I | Page 5 of 6 | | |

| 1 | <u>C</u> F | ERTIFICATE OF MAILING |
|----|--|---|
| 2 | I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 7th day of December , 20_18 , I pla | |
| 3 | a true and correct copy of the foregoing | CLAIM OF EXEMPTION FROM EXECUTION in the |
| 4 | United States Mail, with first-class posta | age prepaid, addressed to the following (insert the name and address of the |
| 5 | following parties/entities): | |
| 6 | Attorney for Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor: | Leon Greenberg Esq. Christian Gabroy, Esq. Leon |
| 7 | (or Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor directly if unrepresented) | Greenberg PC Gabroy Law Offices |
| 8 | | 2965 S. Jones #E4 170 S. Green Valley #280 Las Vegas, NV 89146 Henderson, NV 89012 |
| 9 | ☐ Sheriff or ☑ Constable: | Office of Ex-Officio Constable |
| 10 | | 301 E. Clark Avenue #100 |
| 11 | | Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 |
| 12 | Garnishee: ☐ Employer | Bank of Nevada |
| 13 | ☑ Bank | Corporate Headquarters |
| 14 | ☐ Other | 4730 S. Ft. Apache Rd. #300 Las Vegas, NV 89147 |
| 15 | DATED this 7th day of December | |
| 16 | | I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the |
| 17 | | State of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct. |
| 18 | | Sta Met 3/ (signature) |
| 19 | | Léta Metz (print name) ☐ Defendant/ ☑ Other, In Proper Person |
| 20 | | La de Vancour 1000 |
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| | | Page 6 of 6 |

EXHIBIT "C"

Subject: Re: Claim of Exemption - Nevada State Bank Judgment Execution Writ

From: Leon Greenberg <wagelaw@hotmail.com>

Date: 12/11/2018 2:59 PM

To: Jay Shafer <JShafer@premierlegalgroup.com>, Dana Sniegocki <dana_s@overtimelaw.com>, dana sniegocki <dana@overtimelaw.com> **CC:** Esther Rodriguez <esther@rodriguezlaw.com>, "Michael K. Wall, Esq."

<mwall@hutchlegal.com>

I am writing to urge you to review this (served on 12/7/18) and suitably withdraw it, as it is senseless for all concerned. Specifically:

- 1. I am advised that Nevada State Bank had \$1 in their account for A Cab. That is right, \$1. The Constable has remitted 98 cents to me. See the attached.
- 2. Your invocation of the the "wildcard" exemption of \$10,000 is baseless in any event. It has been ordered applied to the Wells Fargo Account so it is exhausted.

I see no reason for you to proceed with this. If I am forced to file objections to this I will ask the Court to award fees to my office. The only point of such an exemption/objection process would be to harass plaintiffs' counsel and force them to do, yet again, additional work compelled by defendants for no reason (except to compel the performance of such work and burden plaintiffs' counsel).

On 12/11/2018 2:07 PM, Jay Shafer wrote:

I am ok with the changes on the mo on to dismiss. Please advise if I can a x your electronic signature or if you would prefer to send over.

Jay A. Shafer 1333 N. Bu alo Drive, Suite 210 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 (702) 794-4411 (702) 794-4421 fax

jshafer@premierlegalgroup.com

CONFIDENTIAL. This e-mail message and the information it contains are intended to be privileged and confidental communications protected from disclosure. If you are not the intended recipient, any dissemination on, distribution on copying is strictly prohibited. If you have received this e-mail message in error, please noting the sender by e-mail at jshafer@premierlegalgroup.com and permanently delete this message.

From: Dana Sniegocki [mailto:dana_s@overtimelaw.com]

Electronically Filed 12/20/2018 11:03 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

ORDR 1 JAY A. SHAFER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 006791 2 PREMIER LEGAL GROUP 1333 North Buffalo Drive, Suite 210 3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Telephone: (702) 794-4411 4 Fax: (702) 794-4421 jshafer@premierelegalgroup.com 5 Attorney for Defendants CAB TAXI SERVICE LLC and A CAB, LLC 6 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 MICHAEL MURRAY and MICHAEL RENO, Individually and on behalf of others similarly 10 Case No.: A-12-669926-C situated. 11 Dept. No.: I Plaintiff. 12 ORDER ON MOTION FOR DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS ON ORDER ٧. 13 SHORTENING TIME CAB TAXI SERVICE LLC and A CAB, LLC, 14 and CREIGHTON J. NADY, Date of Hearing: October 22, 2018 15 Time of Hearing: 9:00 a.m. Defendants. 16 ORDER ON MOTION FOR DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS 17 ON ORDER SHORTENING TIME 18 19 Defendants' motion for Dismissal of Claims on Order Shortening Time was heard on 20 October 22, 2018, Plaintiffs were represented by Leon Greenberg and Dana Sniegocki. 21 Defendants were represented by Esther Rodriguez, Michael Wall and Jay Shafer. 22

Defendants moved for dismissal based on the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the claims. Specifically, Defendants moved for dismissal pursuant to NRCP 12 (h)(3) and NRCP 12 (6)(1). Defendants argue that pursuant to Article 6, Section 6 of the Nevada Constitution, the District Courts shall have original jurisdiction in all cases excluded by law from the original jurisdiction of the Justice Courts. Further, if a District Court lacks subject matter

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jurisdiction, the judgment rendered is void. *Univ. of Nevada v. Tarkanian*, 95 Nev. 389, 396, 594 p. 2d 1159, 1163 (1979). Whether a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction can be raised by the parties at any time, or sua sponte by a court of review, and cannot be conferred by the parties. Swam v. Swam, 106 Nev. 464, 469, 796 P. 2d 221, 224 (1990).

Defendants rely upon Castillo v. United Federal Credit Union, wherein the Nevada Supreme Court "conclud[ed] that in Nevada, aggregation of putative class member claims is not permitted to determine jurisdiction". Castillo v. United Fed. Credit Union, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 3 (February 1, 2018); 409 P. 3d 54. Defendants argue that all claims asserted by the named Plaintiffs as well as all potential class members fall well-below the District Court's minimum threshold of \$15,000 per NRS 4.370. Further, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief are a non-issue as their claims cease as of December 31, 2015; and injunctive relief was not pursued by Plaintiffs. An injunction is appropriate when monetary damages are inadequate. Czipott v. Fleigh, 87 Nev, 496, 499, 489 P.2d 681, 683 (1971).

Plaintiffs argue that subject matter jurisdiction over the class claims is proper as they sought, still seek, and were granted equitable relief. Plaintiffs argue that the District Court's jurisdiction extends to all damage claims, of whatever amount, when those claims are brought as part of an action seeking equitable relief. Further, Plaintiffs assert that once the claim for equitable relief is properly made, the District Court does not lose subject matter jurisdiction over these damages claims also made in the same case even if equitable relief is denied. *Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest.*, 122 Nev. 317, 326 (2006).

Plaintiffs further argue that the Supreme Court's "Order Denying Motion to Depublish" filed June 12, 2018 in the Castillo matter, confirms that any conclusion pertaining to aggregation of claims would be a reliance on non-precedential dicta.

Having reviewed the pleadings and heard the arguments of the parties, the court does not

believe that it is devoid of jurisdiction in this matter for the reasons argued by the Defendants 1 and accordingly that motion is DENIED. 2 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 5 Dated this O day of 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Submitted by: 13 PREMIER LEGAL GROUP 14 JAY A. SHAFER 15 Nevada Bar No. 9184 1338/Morth Buffalo Drive, Suite 210 16 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 (7002) 794-4411, 17 Fax: (702) 794-4421 JShafer@premierlegalgroup.com 18 Attorney for Defendant 19 20 Approved as to Form and Content: 21 LEON GREENBERG PROFESSIONAL CORP. 22 23 Leon Greenberg, Esq. NSB 8094 LEON GREENBERG PROFESSIONAL CORP. 24 2965 S. Jones Boulevard - Ste. E-3 25 Las Vegas, NV 89146 Tel (702) 383-6085 26 Attorney for the Plaintiffs

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Electronically Filed 1/2/2019 1:59 PM Steven D. Grierson **CLERK OF THE COURT NOEO** 1 LEON GREENBERG, ESQ., SBN 8094 DANA SNIEGOCKI, ESQ., SBN 11715 Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation 2965 South Jones Blvd- Suite E3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89146 (702) 383-6085 4 (702) 385-1827(fax) 5 leongreenberg@overtimelaw.com dana@overtimelaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs 6 DISTRICT COURT 7 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 8 MICHAEL MURRAY, and MICHAEL 9 Case No.: A-12-669926-C RENO, Individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Dept.: I 10 Plaintiffs, NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER 11 12 VS. 13 A CAB TAXI SERVICE LLC, and A CAB, LLC, 14 Defendants. 15 16 17 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Court entered the attached Order on 18 December 18, 2018. 19 Dated: January 2, 2019 20 LEON GREENBERG PROFESSIONAL CORP. 21 /s/ Leon Greenberg 22 Leon Greenberg, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 8094 23 2965 S. Jones Boulevard - Ste. E-3 24 Las Vegas, NV 89146 Tel (702) 383-6085 Attorney for the Plaintiffs 25 26 27 28

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| 1 | CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE | | | |
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| 3 | The undersigned certifies that on January 2, 2019, she served the within: | | | |
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| 5 | NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER | | | |
| 6 | by court electronic service to: | | | |
| 7 | то: | | | |
| 8 | Premier Légal Group 1333 North Buffalo Drive - Suite 210 Las Vegas, NV 89128 | | | |
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| 13 | /s/ Sydney Saucier | | | |
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ERK OF THE COURT

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

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27 28 MICHAEL MURRAY, and MICHAEL RENO, Individually and on behalf of others similarly situated

A CAB TAXI SERVICE LLC, A CAB. LLC, and CREIGHTON J. NADY,

Defendants.

Case No.: A-12-669926-C

Dept.: I ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' DUNTER MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT

Hearing Dates: September 26, 2018 September 28, 2018 December 13, 2018

On September 21, 2018, Defendants filed "Defendant's Ex-Parte Motion to Quash Writ of Execution and, in the Alternative Motion for Partial Stay of Execution on Order Shortening Time. The Court set the hearing for September 26, 2018. On September 24, 2018, Plaintiffs filed "Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Ex-Parte Motion to Quash Writ of Execution on an OST and Counter-Motion for Appropriate Judgment Enforcement Relief." In Plaintiffs' Counter-Motion, Plaintiffs requested a) ordering a Judgment-Debtor examination, b) ordering property be deposited with plaintiffs' counsel, c) enjoining any transfer of funds from A Cab LLC and any of its series LLCs, d) issuing an order of attachment, and/or e) appointing a receiver. In Plaintiffs' Counter-Motion, Plaintiffs advised "Plaintiffs' counsel understands that the Court may not wish to issue any relief on the counter-motion at the scheduled

hearing given the short notice." This Court agreed, and continued Plaintiffs' Counter-Motion for Appropriate Judgment Enforcement Relief to October 22, 2018, to be heard at the same time as the several other pending motions scheduled for that day, so that Defendants may be afforded an opportunity to respond to Plaintiffs' Counter-Motion. On October 15, 2018, Defendants' filed their Opposition to Plaintiffs' Counter-Motion for Appropriate Judgment Relief.

On October 22, 2018, the Court heard 1) Defendants' Motion for Dismissal of Claims on Order Shortening Time, 2) Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, Amendment, For New Trial, and For Dismissal of Claims, and 3) Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Judgment. Because of the issues discussed during that hearing, the Court stayed the matter for 10 days, and continued Plaintiffs' Counter-Motion for Appropriate Judgment Relief to November 29, 2018, to be heard with the several other pending motions set to be heard on that day. On November 20, 2018, the Court issued a minute order setting those pending motions to December 4, 2018 for announcement of decision.

On December 4, 2018, the Court announced its decision on the majority of the pending motions, and heard from both sides regarding Plaintiffs' still pending Counter-Motion which requested the appointment of a receiver. The Court inquired of counsel as to the appropriate scope of the receivership and set the matter over to December 13, 2018 so that the Court may appropriately and thoughtfully determine what powers to grant the receiver given the complexity this case has presented. The Court, having reviewed the papers and pleadings on

file, having heard oral argument by counsel, and based on the entire record of these proceedings, enters the following order:

The Request for Appointment of a Receiver

The plaintiffs request the appointment of a receiver pursuant to NRS Chapter 32. The Court, given the circumstances presented, as discussed at the hearing on December 4, 2018, concludes at this time it would be more appropriate to appoint a Special Master. Accordingly, the request is granted to a limited extent in the form of an appointment of a Special Master as follows:

- 1. George C. Swarts is appointed as a Special Master pursuant to NRCP Rule 53;
- 2. The Special Master shall be provided by the judgment debtor A Cab LLC also known as A Cab Series LLC, including Creighton J. Nady and any other agents of judgment debtors, copies of all electronic and paper financial and business records of the judgment debtor A Cab LLC also known as A Cab Series LLC that the Special Master deems advisable to possess for the preparation of the report directed in this order, including but not limited to all such records involving all of its contracts or agreements with any other entity or person, including any series LLC it has issued pursuant to NRS 86.296. Upon being presented with a copy of this Order all persons and entities possessing any such records of the judgment debtor A Cab LLC also known as A Cab Series LLC shall deliver them to the Special Master;

- 3. The Special Master shall promptly advise plaintiffs' counsel of all property of the judgment debtor A Cab LLC also known as A Cab Series LLC that it has identified and plaintiffs' counsel shall take no action to proceed with any legal execution upon such property to satisfy plaintiffs' judgment pending further order of the Court following the Special Master's report;
- 4. The Special Master shall issue a report by February 1, 2019 to the Court advising the Court of:
- (a) A proposed plan, to the extent that they deem it feasible, for the Special Master to be appointed Receiver pursuant to NRS Chapter 32 over the operations of judgment debtor A Cab LLC also known as A Cab Series LLC in a manner that will allow the profits from the operation of the taxi medallions authorized to it to be applied towards satisfaction of the plaintiffs' judgment.
- 5. Plaintiffs' counsel shall be required to make available to the Special Master, from the funds they have collected on the plaintiffs' judgment and are holding in their IOLTA account pursuant to this Court's prior Orders, a sum not to exceed \$20,000 (Twenty Thousand Dollars) to pay for the Special Master's services. The Special Master shall be entitled to be paid a fee not exceeding \$300.00 (Three Hundred Dollars) per hour for their services. The Special Master shall be authorized, in their discretion, to cease further work and present the report discussed in paragraph 4 to the Court, to the extent it is able to complete such a report, once the cost for their services have exceeded 90% of the

amount specified in this paragraph that plaintiffs' counsel shall be required to make available to pay for such services.

- 6. The information and records received by the Special Master shall be kept confidential and subject to a protective order issued by the Court, precluding production to the general public except as directed by the Court.
- 7. Judgment debtors shall not create any additional Series LLCs without further order of this Court.

The Request for a Judgment Debtor Exam

As the Court ruled at the December 4, 2018 hearing this issue is the subject of a separate motion and will be addressed by a separate order.

The Request to Enjoin Certain Transfers of Funds

The plaintiffs requested that A Cab and any series LLC it has issued (the "series LLCs" that defendants also refer to as "cells" of A Cab) be enjoined from transferring any funds to defendant Nady or any of his family members. At the December 4, 2018 hearing the Court was advised by counsel for A Cab that defendant Nady's prior deposition testimony about regular transfers of funds from the series LLCs to Nady was incorrect and such transfers were actually to a trust. This branch of plaintiffs' motion is granted to the limited extent of prohibiting the transfer of any monies or other property owned by judgment debtor A Cab LLC (also known as A Cab Series LLC) to defendant Nady, to any of his family members, or to any trust of which Nady or any of his family members is a trustor, trustee or beneficiary. To the extent plaintiffs' motion

| 1 | sought further restraints on transfers by the series LLCs it is, without prejudic | | | |
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| 2 | denied at this time. | | | |
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| 6 | Other Requested Relief | | | |
| 7 | Plaintiffs' other requested forms of relief are, without prejudice, denie | | | |
| 8 | the Court at this time. | | | |
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| 11 | IT IS SO ORDERED. | | | |
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| 13 | District Court Judge | | | |
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1 ODM Jay A. Shafer, Esq. 2 Nevada Bar No. 006791 PREMIER LEGAL GROUP 3 1333 North Buffalo Drive, Suite 210 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 4 702-794-4411 jshafer@premierelegalgroup.com 5 Esther C. Rodriguez, Esq. 6 Nevada Bar No. 6473 RODRIGUEZ LAW OFFICES, P.C. 10161 Park Run Drive, Suite 150 7 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 8 702-320-8400 info@rodriguezlaw.com 9 Michael K. Wall, Esq. 10 Nevada Bar No. 2098 Hutchinson & Steffen, LLC 11 10080 West Alta Drive, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 702-385-2500 12 mwall@hutchlegal.com 13 Attorneys for Defendants DISTRICT COURT 14 15 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 16 MICHAEL MURRAY and MICHAEL RENO, Individually and on behalf of others similarly Case No.: A-12-669926-C 17 situated, Dept. No. 18 Plaintiffs, 19 VS. 20 A CAB TAXI SERVICE LLC and A CAB, LLC, 21 Defendants. 22 23 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' COUNTER-MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS 24 AND COLLECTION ACTIONS 25 Defendants' Counter-Motion to Stay Proceedings and Collection Actions was filed on 26 November 30, 2018, and heard on December 4, 2018. Plaintiffs were represented at the hearing by 27 their attorneys, Leon Greenberg and Dana Sniegocki of Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation. 28 Defendants were represented at the hearing by Jay A. Shafer of Premier Legal Group.

Page 1 of 2

Electronically Filed 1/15/2019 12:28 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 **NOAS** Michael K. Wall (2098) HUTCHISON & STEFFEN, PLLC 10080 West Alta Drive, Suite 200 3 Las Vegas, NV 89145 Tel: (702) 385-2500 (702) 385-2086 4 Fax: mwall@hutchlegal.com 5 Esther C. Rodriguez, Esq. (6473) RODRIGUEZ LAW OFFICES, P.C. 6 10161 Park Run Drive, Suite 150 Las Vegas, NV 89145 (702) 320-8400 8 info@rodriguezlaw.com Attorney for defendants 9 A Cab, LLC and Creighton J. Nady 10 DISTRICT COURT 11 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 12 MICHAEL MURRAY and MICHAEL RENO, Case No.: A-12-669926-C 13 Individually and on behalf of others similarly Dept. No.: I situated. 14 Plaintiffs. 15 AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 16 A CAB TAXI SERVICE, LLC, A CAB, LLC, 17 and CREIGHTON J. NADY, 18 Defendants. 19 20 Notice is given that A Cab, LLC, Creighton J. Nady, and A Cab Series, LLC, defendants 21 in the above-captioned matter, appeal to the Supreme Court of Nevada from the district court's 22 order granting summary judgment, severing claims, and directing entry of final judgment 23 entered on August 21, 2018. 24 2.5 ¹Under the fiction that A Cab, LLC, and A Cab Series, LLC, are one and the same entity, the district court, subsequent to its entry of its final judgment dated August 21, 2018, purported to 26 add A Cab Series, LLC, as a party defendant. The district court's order is far from clear, but it purports both to substitute A Cab Series, LLC, in the place and stead of A Cab, LLC, and to retain 27 both entities as separate defendants in the action below. Therefore, we have included A Cab Series, 28 LLC, as an appellant from the district court's final judgment and various other post-judgment orders.

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Notice is also given that A Cab, LLC, Creighton J. Nady, and A Cab Series, LLC, appeal to the Supreme Court of Nevada from the following listed orders of the district court:

- (1) The district court's order entered on October 22, 2018, amending its August 21, 2018 judgment to add A Cab Series, LLC, as a party defendant.
- (2) The district court's order entered on December 18, 2018, granting plaintiffs' counter-motion for judgment enforcement relief (receiver and injunction).
- (3) The district court's order entered on December 18, 2018, granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs' objections to defendants' claims of exemption from execution.
- (4) The district court's order entered on December 18, 2018, denying defendants' motion to quash writ of execution.
- (5) The district court's order entered on December 20, 2018, denying defendants' post-judgment motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
- (6) All other judgments and orders of the district court rendered appealable by any of the foregoing orders and judgments.

DATED this $\sqrt{5}$ day of January, 2019.

All India

10080 West Alta Drive, Suite 200

Las Vegas, NV 89145 Tel: (702) 385-2500 Attorney for defendants

A Cab, LLC, and Creighton J. Nady

| 1 | CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE | | | |
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| 2 | Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of HUTCHISON & STEFFEN | | | |
| 3 | and that on thisday of January, 2019, I caused the above and foregoing AMENDED | | | |
| 4 | NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served as follows: | | | |
| 5 6 | [] | by placing same to be deposited for mailing in the United States Mail, in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was prepaid in Las Vegas, Nevada; and/or | | |
| 7 | [] | pursuant to EDCR 7.26, to be sent via facsimile; and/or | | |
| 8 9 | ſΧΊ | pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a) and 8.05(f), to be electronically served through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system, with the date and time of the electronic service substituted for the date and place of deposit in the mail; and/or | | |
| 10 | [] | to be hand-delivered; | | |
| 11 | to the attorney(s) listed below at the address and/or facsimile number indicated below: Leon Greenberg, Esq. Dana Sniegocki, Esq. Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation 2965 S. Jones Blvd., Ste. E3 Las Vegas, NV 89146 Telephone: (702) 383-6085 Facsimile: (702) 385-1827 | | | |
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CLERK OF THE COURT

MOT LEON GREENBERG, ESQ., SBN 8094 DANA SNIEGOCKI, ESQ., SBN 11715 Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation 2965 South Jones Blvd-Suite E3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89146 (702) 383-6085 4 702) 385-1827(fax) 5 feongreenberg@overtimelaw.com dana@overtimelaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs 6 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 9 Case No.: A-12-669926-C MICHAEL MURRAY, and MICHAEL RENO, Individually and on behalf of 10 others similarly situated, Dept.: I 11 MOTION TO AMEND THE COURT'S ORDER ENTERED Plaintiffs, 12 **ON DECEMBER 18, 2018** VS. 13 A CAB TAXI SERVICE LLC, A CAB, 14 LLC, and CREIGHTON J. NADY, Defendants. 15 16 17 Plaintiffs, through their attorneys, Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation, 18 19 hereby move this Court to Amend the Court's Order entered on December 18, 2018. 20 This motion is made and based upon the annexed declaration of counsel, the memorandum of points and authorities submitted with this motion, the attached 21 exhibits, and the other papers and pleadings in this action. 22 23 /// /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28

NOTICE OF MOTION

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT the plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, will bring the foregoing Motion to Amend the Court's Order of December 18, 2018 which was filed in the above-entitled case for hearing before the Hon. Kenneth Cory on February 6, 2019, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. pursuant to Department 1's consent.

Dated: January 10, 2019

Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation

By: /s/ Leon Greenberg Leon Greenberg, Esq. Nevada Bar No.: 8094 2965 South Jones Boulevard - Suite E3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89146 (702) 383-6085 Attorney for Plaintiffs

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

BACKGROUND AND NATURE OF REQUEST TO AMEND THE COURT'S ORDER ENTERED DECEMBER 18, 2018

The Order entered on December 18, 2018 appointing George Swarts as Special Master erroneously contains a prohibition on class counsel executing on assets of the judgment debtor that Mr. Swarts may identify to class counsel. It is requested that prohibition be removed as the Court indicated at the motion hearing it was not necessary and would not be imposed.

ARGUMENT

I. THE REQUESTED AMENDMENT OF THE COURT'S ORDER ENTERED ON DECEMBER 18, 2018 SHOULD BE GRANTED

The error in the Court's Order of December 18, 2018 was brought to the Court's attention via a letter delivered on December 20, 2018 to District Judge Cory. Ex. "A." As discussed at the hearing held on December 13, 2018, the Court indicated it agreed that class counsel should not be restrained from their judgment collection efforts,

whether based upon information provided by Special Master George Swarts or otherwise. It indicated it agreed no such restraint was necessary as class counsel was already required, pursuant to the August 18, 2018 judgment and order, to *not* dispose of any such collected funds but place them in their IOLTA account until an appropriate further Order was issued by the Court. Ex. "B" transcript December 13, 2018, p. 27, 1. 3 - p. 29, 1.1

The Court should amend the December 18, 2018 Order to conform with the Court's stated intent. No basis exists to restrict class counsel's ability to take action on information provided by George Swarts. Not amending that Order will leave class counsel in the anomalous position of having to *not* receive information from the special master George Swarts out of fear such information will identify assets that they, under such Order, will then be prohibited from attaching to satisfy their clients' judgment. Such a situation would be senseless.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' motion should be granted in its entirety together with such other further and different relief that the Court deems proper.

Dated: January 10, 2019

LEON GREENBERG PROFESSIONAL CORP.

/s/ Leon Greenberg Leon Greenberg, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 8094 2965 S. Jones Boulevard - Ste. E-3 Las Vegas, NV 89146 Tel (702) 383-6085 Attorney for the Class

PROOF OF SERVICE The undersigned certifies that on January 15, 2019, she served the within: Motion to Amend the Court's Order Entered on December 18, 2018 by court electronic service to: TO: Esther C. Rodriguez, Esq. RODRIGUEZ LAW OFFICES, P.C. 10161 Park Run Drive, Suite 150 Las Vegas, NV 89145 Jay Shafer, Esq. Premier Legal Group 1333 North Buffalo Drive - Suite 210 Las Vegas, NV 89128 /s/ Dana Sniegocki Dana Sniegocki

EXHIBIT "A"



LEON GREENBERG

Professional Corporation
Attorneys at Law
2965 South Jones Boulevard • Suite E-3
Las Vegas, Nevada 89146
(702) 383-6085

Leon Greenberg Member Nevada, California New York, Pennsylvania and New Jersey Bars Dana Sniegocki Member Nevada and California Bars

December 20, 2018

Fax: (702) 385-1827

The Honorable Kenneth C. Cory District Court Judge 200 Lewis Avenue, Courtroom 16A Las Vegas, Nevada 89155

VIA HAND DELIVERY

Re: Murray v. A Cab A-12-669926-C

Order Entered on December 18, 2018 appointing Special Master

Dear Judge Cory:

The above Order (copy attached) at page 4, paragraph 3, lines 4 to 6, the language appearing after the words "plaintiffs' counsel" that states "....shall take no action to proceed with any legal execution upon such property to satisfy plaintiffs' judgment pending further order of the Court following the Special Master's report." I believe this language is in error.

At the December 13, 2018 hearing plaintiffs' counsel stated they would prefer to NOT be advised about the judgment debtor's property by the Special Master rather than be so advised and simultaneously restrained from judgment execution activity in respect to such property. Your Honor agreed at the hearing to remove this language from the Order, as the Court's prior Order and Judgment restrains plaintiffs' counsel from disbursing any monies collected on the judgment and requires that they maintain all collected funds in their IOLTA account.

I am requesting the Court amend this Order to comply with the Court's ruling on this issue at the December 13, 2018 hearing. I can submit a written Order for that purpose if that would be of assistance to the Court.

Respectfully submitted,

Leon Greenberg

cc: All Counsel (Via Email)

ORDR

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Steven D. Grierson
CLERK OF THE COURT

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EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

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similarly situated

. A CAB TAXI SERVICE LLC, A CAB, LLC, and CREIGHTON J. NADY,

Defendants.

Case No.: A-12-669926-C

Dept.: I ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' COUNTER MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT RELIEF

Hearing Dates: September 26, 2018 September 28, 2018 December 13, 2018

On September 21, 2018, Defendants filed "Defendant's Ex-Parte Motion to Quash Writ of Execution and, in the Alternative Motion for Partial Stay of Execution on Order Shortening Time. The Court set the hearing for September 26, 2018. On September 24, 2018, Plaintiffs filed "Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Ex-Parte Motion to Quash Writ of Execution on an OST and Counter-Motion for Appropriate Judgment Enforcement Relief." In Plaintiffs' Counter-Motion, Plaintiffs requested a) ordering a Judgment-Debtor examination, b) ordering property be deposited with plaintiffs' counsel, c) enjoining any transfer of funds from A Cab LLC and any of its series LLCs, d) issuing an order of attachment, and/or e) appointing a receiver. In Plaintiffs' Counter-Motion, Plaintiffs advised "Plaintiffs' counsel understands that the Court may not wish to issue any relief on the counter-motion at the scheduled

hearing given the short notice." This Court agreed, and continued Plaintiffs' Counter-Motion for Appropriate Judgment Enforcement Relief to October 22, 2018, to be heard at the same time as the several other pending motions scheduled for that day, so that Defendants may be afforded an opportunity to respond to Plaintiffs' Counter-Motion. On October 15, 2018, Defendants' filed their Opposition to Plaintiffs' Counter-Motion for Appropriate Judgment Relief.

On October 22, 2018, the Court heard 1) Defendants' Motion for Dismissal of Claims on Order Shortening Time, 2) Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, Amendment, For New Trial, and For Dismissal of Claims, and 3) Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Judgment. Because of the issues discussed during that hearing, the Court stayed the matter for 10 days, and continued Plaintiffs' Counter-Motion for Appropriate Judgment Relief to November 29, 2018, to be heard with the several other pending motions set to be heard on that day. On November 20, 2018, the Court issued a minute order setting those pending motions to December 4, 2018 for announcement of decision.

On December 4, 2018, the Court announced its decision on the majority of the pending motions, and heard from both sides regarding Plaintiffs' still pending Counter-Motion which requested the appointment of a receiver. The Court inquired of counsel as to the appropriate scope of the receivership and set the matter over to December 13, 2018 so that the Court may appropriately and thoughtfully determine what powers to grant the receiver given the complexity this case has presented. The Court, having reviewed the papers and pleadings on

file, having heard oral argument by counsel, and based on the entire record of these proceedings, enters the following order:

The Request for Appointment of a Receiver

The plaintiffs request the appointment of a receiver pursuant to NRS

Chapter 32. The Court, given the circumstances presented, as discussed at the hearing on December 4, 2018, concludes at this time it would be more appropriate to appoint a Special Master. Accordingly, the request is granted to a limited extent in the form of an appointment of a Special Master as follows:

- 1. George C. Swarts is appointed as a Special Master pursuant to NRCP Rule 53;
- 2. The Special Master shall be provided by the judgment debtor A Cab LLC also known as A Cab Series LLC, including Creighton J. Nady and any other agents of judgment debtors, copies of all electronic and paper financial and business records of the judgment debtor A Cab LLC also known as A Cab Series LLC that the Special Master deems advisable to possess for the preparation of the report directed in this order, including but not limited to all such records involving all of its contracts or agreements with any other entity or person, including any series LLC it has issued pursuant to NRS 86.296. Upon being presented with a copy of this Order all persons and entities possessing any such records of the judgment debtor A Cab LLC also known as A Cab Series LLC shall deliver them to the Special Master;

- 3. The Special Master shall promptly advise plaintiffs' counsel of all property of the judgment debtor A Cab LLC also known as A Cab Series LLC that it has identified and plaintiffs' counsel shall take no action to proceed with any legal execution upon such property to satisfy plaintiffs' judgment pending further order of the Court following the Special Master's report;
- 4. The Special Master shall issue a report by February 1, 2019 to the Court advising the Court of:
- (a) A proposed plan, to the extent that they deem it feasible, for the Special Master to be appointed Receiver pursuant to NRS Chapter 32 over the operations of judgment debtor A Cab LLC also known as A Cab Series LLC in a manner that will allow the profits from the operation of the taxi medallions authorized to it to be applied towards satisfaction of the plaintiffs' judgment.
- 5. Plaintiffs' counsel shall be required to make available to the Special Master, from the funds they have collected on the plaintiffs' judgment and are holding in their IOLTA account pursuant to this Court's prior Orders, a sum not to exceed \$20,000 (Twenty Thousand Dollars) to pay for the Special Master's services. The Special Master shall be entitled to be paid a fee not exceeding \$300.00 (Three Hundred Dollars) per hour for their services. The Special Master shall be authorized, in their discretion, to cease further work and present the report discussed in paragraph 4 to the Court, to the extent it is able to complete such a report, once the cost for their services have exceeded 90% of the

amount specified in this paragraph that plaintiffs' counsel shall be required to make available to pay for such services.

- 6. The information and records received by the Special Master shall be kept confidential and subject to a protective order issued by the Court, precluding production to the general public except as directed by the Court.
- 7. Judgment debtors shall not create any additional Series LLCs without further order of this Court.

The Request for a Judgment Debtor Exam

As the Court ruled at the December 4, 2018 hearing this issue is the subject of a separate motion and will be addressed by a separate order.

The Request to Enjoin Certain Transfers of Funds

The plaintiffs requested that A Cab and any series LLC it has issued (the "series LLCs" that defendants also refer to as "cells" of A Cab) be enjoined from transferring any funds to defendant Nady or any of his family members. At the December 4, 2018 hearing the Court was advised by counsel for A Cab that defendant Nady's prior deposition testimony about regular transfers of funds from the series LLCs to Nady was incorrect and such transfers were actually to a trust. This branch of plaintiffs' motion is granted to the limited extent of prohibiting the transfer of any monies or other property owned by judgment debtor A Cab LLC (also known as A Cab Series LLC) to defendant Nady, to any of his family members, or to any trust of which Nady or any of his family members is a trustor, trustee or beneficiary. To the extent plaintiffs' motion

sought further restraints on transfers by the series LLCs it is, without prejudice, denied at this time. Other Requested Relief Plaintiffs' other requested forms of relief are, without prejudice, denied by the Court at this time. IT IS SO ORDERED 12/17/2018 Honorable Kenneth Cdry District Court Judge

EXHIBIT "B"

Electronically Filed 12/26/2018 10:11 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

TRAN 2 3 **EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT** CIVIL/CRIMINAL DIVISION 4 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 5 6 MICHAEL MURRAY, et al. CASE NO. A-12-669926 7 Plaintiffs. DEPT. NO. I 8 VS. A CAB TAXI SERVICE, LLC, et al, 10 Defendants. 11 BEFORE THE HONORABLE KENNETH CORY, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 12 THURSDAY, DECEMBER 13, 2018 13 TRANSCRIPT RE: 14 PLAINTIFFS' EX PARTE MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND MOTION ON AN ORDER REQUIRING THE TURNOVER OF CERTAIN 15 PROPERTY OF THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR PURSUANT TO NRS 21.320 APPEARANCES: 16 17 For the Plaintiffs: LEON GREENBERG, ESQ. CHRISTIAN GABROY, ESQ. 18 KAINE MESSER, ESQ. For the Defendants: 19 ESTHER C. RODRIGUEZ, ESQ. MICHAEL K. WALL, ESQ. 20 JAY A. SHAFER, ESQ. 21 For Resolution Economics: PETER DUBOWSKY, ESQ. 22 ALSO PRESENT: JONATHAN WILSON Resolution Economics 23 CREIGHTON J. NADY 24

RECORDED BY: Lisa Lizotte, Court Recorder

MR. DUBOWSKY: Thank you.

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MR. GREENBERG: The TRO you signed and the request for the transfer of those motor vehicles or an order coordinating the transfer, so to speak, or assisting me in having those motor vehicles transferred ultimately to the sheriff for sale on judgment execution. And the other issue was this question of the appointment of a receiver pursuant to what I understood to be your concerns last week. I did submit, as you instructed, on Friday two different proposed orders for the Court's consideration and some correspondence that Your Honor may have seen. I did get a call yesterday from your law clerk, who asked me to provide those orders in computer format, presumably for further review by the Court. I'm pleased to address either of those issues or anything else I can help the Court with, but that's my understanding as to what I'm supposed to be doing here today.

THE COURT: All right. We have this morning the matter of whether to appoint a receiver, and if so, under what terms. You've seen the proposed order submitted by the defendants, which modifies the order which you had proposed. What is your view of that?

MR. GREENBERG: Well, Your Honor, I have two concerns regarding the order that they are proposing on that issue. One is that they are removing the provision that I had proposed to the Court. And just by way of background, Your Honor, I had essentially proposed two approaches here consistent with my understanding of the Court's concerns voiced last week. One would be really a limited form of receivership which would allow the receiver to take possession of assets that are under the control of the judgment debtor corporation, A Cab, LLC, and hold those assets, potentially pay liabilities in his discretion if he thought it was important to preserve the business, and to also gather information for a report to

the Court and a proposal, if possible, for actually managing the business in full for the purposes of satisfying the judgment, Your Honor. He would not have the power, essentially, to interfere or control any of the operations at this point, which is truly what a receiver does in the normal course.

As part of that receiver proposal, he would have also had the authority to withhold operation of the medallions which are possessed by the judgment debtor from the Series, these cells to which I am sure they have all now been leased and put in possession of who are generating revenue from them, not for the purpose of doing anything with those medallions but simply to assure cooperation from those cells in his work so that he can gather appropriate information. And if the cells refuse to cooperate, the cells of course are all controlled by Mr. Nady. He would have the authority to terminate those leases or if necessary ask the Taxi Commission to terminate -- excuse me -- terminate the leases of those medallions or ask the Taxi Commissioner to terminate the use of those medallions, essentially just to give him the power so that he could, if necessary, coerce sufficient cooperation so he can get the information he needs to do his job because as Your Honor is aware, it is the position of the defendants that these 200 or so cells are separate entities, they're not subject to o the judgment. We have no asked the Court to, you know, go beyond or deal with that issue.

The other form of order I proposed to the Court was far more limited and that was based on my discussion with Mr. Swarts last week, who said that perhaps a special master appointment would be more appropriate here, and that is far more limited. The special master would not actually take possession of any assets of A Cab. He would have no authority to pay expenses. He would simply

be essentially in charge of obtaining the records and reviewing the books and have access to the information of the company. He would have no coercive power in respect to the taxi medallions as I was proposing for the limited receiver. And he also would have a report to the Court with a proposal as to whether a receivership could be managed and how it would be managed for the business.

Under the special master proposal, which is obviously the far more limited of the two, that's the model the defendants have proposed a variation on to Your Honor, okay. Their variation of that model does two things that I would be strongly opposed to. First is it removes the provision that the special master would provide to plaintiffs' counsel information as to assets he locates that are in the name of the judgment debtor. The judgment is outstanding. I believe if there is going to be a special master appointment we're not going to have a receiver who's actually going to take possession of any assets. Plaintiff's counsel should be told, you know, what assets the special master comes up with so we can take effective means, if we can, to secure those assets for the benefit of our clients. They've removed that power from their proposed special master appointment.

The other thing that they have done is they've capped the fee that would be paid to the special master at \$5,000. That's clearly going to be an inadequate amount for me to get anyone to be willing to accept the appointment. I'm not pleased with seeing large amounts of money spent on a special master or a receiver. I have, as I've told the Court, believed it would be appropriate to commit some portion of the funds that have been attached in the Wells Fargo accounts and I actually did submit an order to the Court, I believe it was two days ago, asking Your Honor to direct the disbursement of those funds from the core \$10,000 to the

defendants, with the rest to go into my IOLTA account. This was ruled on last week by Your Honor at the hearing. But \$5,000 is not going to be enough. Mr. Schwarz' normal hourly fee is \$300 an hour. That is fairly substantial, although I suspect it's probably within the range of people typical with his experience in this area. I'm not eager to see, again, a large amount of money earmarked for a special master or a receiver, but I suspect a commitment more in the range of \$20,000 probably needs to be made to assure some kind of meaningful efforts are undertaken by anyone who's appointed for a special master or a receiver.

And the way I structured both of the orders I proposed to Your Honor is that the person so appointed would be earmarked such amount from the funds collected that Your Honor believes is appropriate and in the event that they have, you know, gone through 90 percent of that earmarked funds, they will at that point sum up whatever they can and provide whatever report they can to the Court at that point, even if it is a partial or incomplete report; the point being that we would like to get some sort of completed result from this process of having a special master or receiver appointed. Ultimately the cost of a receiver or special master really should be borne by the defendants, Your Honor, not by my clients, but I understand the problems we've had in this case and I cannot contemplate Mr. Swarts or anyone else being willing to take on such an appointment, particularly given the history we've had here, without an assurance that there are funds that have been dedicated in advance to pay them for some measure of their work and also an assurance that they will be relieved from doing unpaid work, which is why I tried to structure the orders I presented to Your Honor in that fashion.

So I think that reviews what I've proposed to the Court, the thoughts

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I have about this, the concerns I have with the alternative proposal that was given yesterday by defendants. If the Court has questions, I'd like to help if I can.

THE COURT: All right, thank you. We are at this juncture, of course, because of the refusal of the defendants, including Mr. Nady, to come forward with funds necessary to pay the special master.

Mr. Nady, I asked you to be here -- well, more than that. I ordered you to be here today and I indicated that I was seriously considering putting you in jail for contempt of court. You might be asking, well, what brought that about? But when I see that your attorneys are in her complaining that you simply can't pay -- first it was \$25,000 and then it was \$41,000 to the special master to do the work that really should have been done by you originally to make sure that the drivers were receiving under the law the minimum wage and that, you know, secondarily, if it wasn't done before there should have been evidence forthcoming from your side as to what the appropriate amount was. And all we ever heard was it can't be done, it can't be done; the trip sheets are the only accurate way to do it. And so we had a way to accomplish that through the special master, admittedly an expensive proposition, but that's what happens when you have to come back and clean up somebody else's mess.

When I found that you, despite your protests in September and October that you simply didn't have the money to pay the special master and then the plaintiff effected a seizure of a bank account and there's some \$230,000 laying in that bank account, I have become extremely immune to cries from an individual or a company individual that they just don't have the money to pay the special master to complete this work. And so it has resulted in the special master coming to the

 Court and asking to be paid. It was the Court that appointed the special master and I am certainly more than amenable to making sure that the special master gets paid for the work that they've put into the project, up to the point where the Court found that it was going to be so cumbersome and so expensive that it was better to simply grant the plaintiffs' earlier motion for summary judgment that included approximations. And according to the United States Supreme Court, those — if that's what you have, that's what you have and you can rely on those in a judgment.

So perhaps you can understand why it seemed to the Court that I might have to just put you in jail in order to get your attention. Well, fortunately for you and perhaps for all of us, rather than blow this matter up even further, there is a way that I believe I can accomplish that without having to put you in jail. It gives me no great pleasure to put you in jail, Mr. Nady, which is why I was so late coming to the point of seriously considering doing that. It's my belief that with the proposals that have been put forward by the plaintiff and been modified proposal by your counsel that there is a way that we can get the special master paid, albeit it is a way that will incur more fees that have to be paid.

I'm going to grant the relief that the plaintiffs have asked for in the sense of having a special master appointed again. This time we're not going to use the special master that previously was there. They have -- I wouldn't ask them to continue on at this point, but I am highly likely in a few minutes -- I want to hear from your attorney first, but I'm highly likely to appoint a special master, to have it Mr. Swarts and to order the defendants and their agents, and at this point that's where you come in, to give a full and complete disclosure of all the financial records that pertain to the company.

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I wanted to say that at this point because maybe it's just if you were feeling nervous and if you have your toothbrush in your pocket, I wanted you to realize that I'm not going to send you to jail today. Notwithstanding that, I hope that out of all of this you will come to realize that the Court is very serious about having this case proceed to its final resolution, including the payment of the judgments which have been awarded.

So with that, Mr. Shafer, what do you have to say further? I have received your opposition with your modifications of the proposed order by the plaintiffs. One of those was for confidentiality, which I think is appropriate. Anything which is revealed to the plaintiff should not be revealed to the public at large. I don't assume that there's any problem with that from the plaintiffs. I am inclined, as I just indicated, to not even make it an appointment of a receiver at this point, but I am inclined to make it be a special master with a view towards, if need be, becoming a receiver. Partly I have come to that conclusion because of your protests that when it comes to those medallions, at least, that you can't have someone else running the company or you run into problems. I don't know whether that is accurate, but I don't propose to jump into the middle of that issue by literally turning the company over to a receiver at this point. I agree with plaintiffs' counsel that to put a limit of \$5,000 for a special master at this point is not realistic for the job at hand. I may say that my whole purpose in doing this -- immediate purpose is to get the previous special master paid. Those are the things that I'm considering doing. What do you say?

MR. SHAFER: And I appreciate it, Your Honor. Obviously we've I think addressed most of our big points in our opposition. I think that you've hit the nail on the head that at least in our interpretation of the statutory authority appointment

of any operational control over A Cab would result in termination of its business or at least the current operators would have to go to the Taxicab Authority and say we can't operate anymore, which I think would cause problems for everybody.

As far as -- so we stand by our objection to the appointment of any receiver or special master on the record, just because it's an extraordinary remedy. They haven't even had a chance to look at our responses to their post-judgment debtor request for production yet. I think we're a little premature on that. But given that the Court's inclination is to appoint a receiver, we would like to make that as limited as possible with the goal of accomplishing what the Court's concerns are, and that's to maintain the assets to make sure we know what the current status is.

And I want to -- I'm glad the Court brought up the issue of the \$230,000 or \$250,000 that was taken in September of this year. That was not A Cab's money. As we briefed before the Court, and perhaps Mr. Dubowsky was not aware of this when he filed his motion for the special master, a majority of that money was held in trust either to pay employee tax provisions, the employer side tax provisions, FICA, and to pay the State, the Taxicab Authority its revenue and to pay the airport for its revenue. Those -- while those are collected daily, those are remitted quarterly. So those funds, a large majority of those funds represents payments that were held in escrow to be submitted to the State and its Authority. So it's not like they had a quarter million dollars sitting in an account that was available to pay whoever they wanted. That was already earmarked to be paid and was owed to be paid for sales tax, transfer tax and other authority.

As far as the issue of the receiver, our goal should be to limit the amount of costs that are incurred, the friction loss that is involved in this. My client

does not have the money to pay it. There is a limited amount of funds. And so the more duplicative work that is done will decrease the return to the actual drivers.

As minimal as it is now, we would like to avoid that further.

So our request is just to limit it just to receipt and review of the financial records of the company with the appropriate protective order. We put a placeholder \$5,000, indicating our desire to have that be minimal. Whether or not that's an accurate one, I don't know, but given the problem we had in this case of the \$200,000 special master, we would like -- we have no objection to Mr. Swarts being appointed, particularly if the Court is inclined to do that, but we would like it to be limited. And if additional funds were needed to complete additional review, we would rather them come back to the Court and ask for additional funds, rather than being unlimited and all of a sudden we run up a \$20,000 bill within the first week and not have additional funds later on. So that is why we put that placeholder, but if you'll notice we left most of the blanks -- we left placeholders for most of the other fees. But our goal is to have it as limited as possible and A Cab will cooperate to provide the financial records to minimize the costs and expenses that it is being forced to incur for the special master if the Court does grant that special master.

I think that's ---

THE COURT: Let me do this. I have reworked the draft that was submitted by the plaintiff and it's the short version. I've made some changes to it. This is what I am considering ordering. I think it would be best maybe if we just took a few minutes at least to let both sides see what's in the order that I'm thinking of signing and seeing whether or not that covers the various needs and issues of the parties. So why don't we run a couple of copies of this and let counsel have it and -- let's

see, let's make about four copies. My law clerk will run copies of that.

Let's — while they're doing that, that kind of takes care of what — on my check-off sheet that takes care of two out of three. One is the appointment of a receiver. I'm going to make that a special master for now. The prime objective of the receiver of Mr. Swarts, assuming that he's the one that accepts this, will be to get the previous special master paid. I want to see that happen and I want to see it happen as a primary goal of the special master at this point. That is more important to me than pulling funds out to pay the judgment creditor.

As to the contempt, I've already indicated I'm not going to hold Mr.

Nady -- well, I have held the defendants in contempt, but I'm not going to put Mr.

Nady into jail, until such time as he complies with the Court's order.

That leaves the final thing as being the temporary restraining order not to sell items. Is there anything more that needs to be argued about that? I don't see that it impedes the defendant's business to simply enter an order that says don't sell any of the assets, whether they are the automobiles or anything else, any of the assets without clearing it with the Court first.

Do defendants have problems with that?

MR. SHAFER: Our concern I think is just the transactional nature of this, whether or not -- you know, when they -- if they dispose of a certain asset, whether they have to get clearance from the Court to throw away a broken stapler or to -- you know, if a car is wrecked, to deal with that issue. We would probably put in a request that anything be -- if there is a sale that it be for equivalent value and records be maintained of that. So if they do sell that broken stapler, they donate it to charity, there's a record of that, or if they have to -- if there is a wrecked car and

they get an insurance payoff, that there's an earmark or identification of that --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. SHAFER: -- which would -- and our concern is --

THE COURT: Well, in terms of a wrecked car, that's -- if the only prohibition is from selling it -- oh, you're saying that it would be so wrecked you wouldn't be fixing it.

MR. SHAFER: Yeah. And, you know, the insurance company would probably require a sign-over of the wrecked vehicle in exchange for insurance proceeds, I imagine. And I think that also deals with our other concern that exerting control over the company might be considered exerting control over the operations and would put us in violation of the statute.

THE COURT: Well, if it's a special master and he's given no power to control at least initially, then that shouldn't be a problem, should it?

MR. SHAFER: I am not -- my concern is not reporting that to the special master or not notifying the special master or not including that in the finances, but as to the TRO and the Court exerting control over or precluding transfer or dealing with those assets as they are in the ordinary course of business. That's our only objection to that. We do not anticipate a sell-off of assets or otherwise deprive defendants of any rightful recovery that they have. And so I think it is over-broad to require -- to preclude them from transferring any asset, unless there is an exception --

THE COURT: Well, if we put a dollar amount in there and say something like don't dispose of any assets of a value of \$500 or more without at least advising the special master first --

MR. SHAFER: I think if the restriction is to reporting it to the special master,

I think that would probably be fine because that is -- you're not exerting control over the operations of the business, just requiring disclosure of the financial records, which is consistent with our position on the limitation and the nature of the special master.

THE COURT: Well, but I'm talking about doing more than simply requiring a reporting to the special master. I'm talking about saying don't dispose of assets. Obviously we don't want to see the assets walking out the back door when we're in a mode of trying to get a special master paid and then trying to get a plaintiff paid. So I don't see that it's, you know, assuming any managerial role in the company to have that kind of an order in place that the defendant is not to sell off assets.

MR. SHAFER: Our only caveat would be to — if such an order is entered, to be in the — it's not to be sold off except in the ordinary course of business. With that exception and with a notification requirement we can be assured that the judgment creditor would receive equivalent value. Whether it's in a car or whether it's in cash, it would make no difference to the judgment creditor. And would — with the notification requirement if a car is sold for a dollar and it is clearly a fraudulent transfer, they would be notified of that transfer and would be able to recover it back.

THE COURT: All right. Then I'll go for that as long as there's some time period of delay after notifying the special master before you actually dispose of the assets. It doesn't do much good to tell the special master and then just go ahead and sell the asset. If we say that, we haven't accomplished anything more than the provisions that all the financial — that the finances of the company be made available to the special master.

MR. SHAFER: I understand. If I might have just one moment to --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. SHAFER: Your Honor, I would suggest five business days would be an appropriate length of time.

THE COURT: All right, that will work. Let's make it say that no asset of a value of more than \$500 will be disposed of, sold, given away, whatever, without giving five days notice to the special master.

MR. SHAFER: Okay.

THE COURT: All right. Why don't we just take a few minutes while you guys take a look at the order that I've handed out and then I'd like to hear from you again before I finalize it.

Yes, sir?

MR. DUBOWSKY: May I address the issue of contempt, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DUBOWSKY: I understand Your Honor not putting Mr. Nady in incarceration. I understand that. But Your Honor did adjudicate him in contempt.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. DUBOWSKY: Under Nevada law for a civil contempt is just to compel compliance and whether this order addresses it or not, I'm not clear, but my client has not been paid. They've been ordered to be paid. I think Your Honor needs to — in that you already made the order finding him guilty of contempt, just compel compliance. Payment plus attorney's fees in order to comply with the Court order by a date certain so we comply with the contempt rules. And whatever else needs to be paid can be dealt with in the order, but Your Honor, you have found him to be in contempt. Another order just saying that my client is going to be paid, we have

those orders already. So I'm going to ask Your Honor to make an order, which we requested before, for civil contempt to do something that compels compliance.

THE COURT: In other words, that you be paid, your client be paid by a date certain or else what, Mr. Nady goes to jail?

MR. DUBOWSKY: That's within Your Honor's discretion, but yes, there's ways of dealing with that. But that would be one way, yes.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. DUBOWSKY: And under NRS 22.100, subsection 3, there's also attorney's fees because we've had to spend a lot of attorney's fees just to ask the Court --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. DUBOWSKY: -- to have him comply and we still can't get compliance. And I can tell Your Honor that we have not been approached to say, listen, we don't want to be in contempt. But under the Nevada rules he has to purge himself of the contempt and that means compliance plus attorney's fees. And that has to be addressed separately so that my client can be paid and we can be out of here. And whatever else needs to be paid through this process, that's fine, but, Your Honor, he is in contempt. He has to comply with the \$41,000 order.

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, if I may?

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: On behalf of my clients I do want to make clear on the record that I respect Your Honor's authority and discretion to proceed however you feel best within the confines of the law. And what you are proposing is within your discretion. However, I want to make clear on the record that on behalf of my clients,

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23 24 we definitely object to the idea that a special master should be appointed. The funds that have been executed on my client's judgment should be earmarked to pay that special master, with the purpose of that being really to try to locate funds or come up with a further plan to pay the prior special master who was already ordered to be paid by the Court. So to that extent we do not support the Court's direction on that issue that you were voicing a little while ago, but I respect Your Honor's --

THE COURT: What is it that you don't support?

MR. GREENBERG: Well, Your Honor, as counsel for the special master who has already been appointed was pointing out, they are due their funds pursuant to a long-standing order of this Court. The defendants are properly held in contempt. And candidly, Your Honor, I don't think that the defendants will comply with anything unless they're coerced to do it. An order of contempt that was being proposed could simply be that they either have to pay it by a date certain or Your Honor is going to suspend the use of their medallions.

I mean, at this point, Your Honor, the judgment debtor in this case, A Cab, LLC, I am sure has no assets except those medallions and the motor vehicles that are still titled -- and titled inadvertently, no doubt, because Mr. Nady has made it a point of transferring all of the assets to these various Series LLCs, the cells, as he calls them. We did execute on those funds at the Wells Fargo. I have had executions served on a variety of other banks. I was advised by Nevada State Bank there was one dollar in an account there. No doubt the business is still running, but they've acquired a new EIN number. They're running the operation through a new legally-registered entity, whether it's one of the series with a Tax I.D. number or something else. So --

THE COURT: Presumably that's something you will find out in your judgment debtor examination.

MR. GREENBERG: I will, Your Honor. And as counsel for the defendants have pointed out, well, if there's transfers of assets, you know, plaintiffs have their remedy. We can proceed with fraudulent conveyance actions. And obviously we may have to do that, Your Honor, but I don't wish to be involved in just a ceaseless series of litigation here involving transfers of assets. It's not in the interest of my clients. And defendants are essentially just working to exhaust my time, my resources. I have other clients I'm committed to. I have other cases I have to work on.

So ultimately the only way that anybody, my clients or the special master may get paid is if this Court uses its coercive power and simply tells the defendants, look, you either pay or the business is going to be shut down. Your Honor clearly has the authority to suspend the use of those medallions. And that's it. That's the only asset that the judgment debtor has and it only has that asset, Your Honor, because they can't actually transfer the right to those medallions. It's a limited franchise that's given to them under their CPCN. But they can lease them out, they can direct the revenue from those medallions to, you know, Tom, Dick and Harry, which is essentially what they've done here. I mean, this is the whole nature of the financial operation that Mr. Nady has run with the business to evade this judgment, to evade his creditors. So anything short of that --

THE COURT: Whose name are those medallions in?

MR. GREENBERG: The medallions are a limited license that's granted to A Cab Series, LLC, the judgment debtor. And we have the CPCN, it's in the record

here. It's a one page document. They're authorized for 73 or 120 or 94 or whatever it is medallions. And they are free -- they can't sell the medallions. They're not -- again, it's the nature of the license, but they can lease them, they are leasing them. And ultimately unless some coercive power is applied to the use of those medallions, I don't think the special master is going to get paid and I don't think my clients are going to get paid by the judgment debtor because that's really the only arrow we have left in the quiver here, Your Honor, against Mr. Nady because the way the entire business is structured at this point, unless the Court is going to go -- and we may have to reach this point of proceeding with an examination of the legal issues regarding the supposed separation of the cells, the Series LLCs from the judgment debtor.

As Your Honor is aware, we do have an alter ego claim pending against Mr. Nady which is currently stayed. Presumably the Court could some time in the new year reconvene, proceed to trial on that, gather evidence, make findings. I understand all of that, Your Honor, and perhaps that will have to be done at some point as well. But I don't see that there's going to be any other way to get the very substantial judgment rendered on behalf of my clients paid or the special master paid unless some coercion is applied to the judgment debtor here and Mr. Nady's business operations because essentially, Your Honor, the business is generating a large amount of cash, \$50,000 or more a month. Mr. Nady is free to fund this litigation, to fund the defense from the receipts of the business as long as he can keep it going. I think he values having the business, as he should. He worked hard to make the business and to keep it running, but he needs to respect the authority of this Court.

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And I'm trying to propose the simplest, most direct means, given the posture of this litigation right now, for this Court to accomplish its objective, which is to get the special master paid and to see that the judgment debtors (sic) are paid. And short of hanging that prospect over the defendants that their medallions are going to be suspended, that they're going to be shut down, I don't see that the Court has any other authority; again, given the current posture of this case. If we go to further proceedings and then we examine this whole issue of the alter ego claims against Mr. Nady and the legal issues presented by the supposed existence of these cells, that might be another avenue, Your Honor. But I think Your Honor understands my point and I respect Your Honor's thoughtful efforts here to reach an appropriate resolution and respect the interests of the parties.

THE COURT: Mr. Shafer, is this all a procedure that is going to wind up without getting even the special master paid?

MR. SHAFER: I don't believe so. And if it is, it's because there's no money to be paid and not out of any intent to avoid the judgment. And I understand --

THE COURT: Well, you know, to say that there's no money to pay is not going to work because in that case then why wouldn't I cause the business to be shut down and sell off whatever assets are left and --

MR. SHAFER: Well, I apologize, Your Honor. I tried to make my statement conditional that if there is no money to be paid the result is the same. They receive nothing. It is our argument that the Court's remedy in appointing a special master to review the finances and conduct a review of the assets of A Cab would provide some illumination both to this Court and to plaintiffs' counsel. As of now plaintiffs' counsel is essentially making up out of whole cloth the financial condition of A Cab

and what A Cab does or does not do and the status of --

THE COURT: Well, I'm not so sure we can say that at this point, Mr. Shafer.

A Cab has been under a standing Court order since at least last September to pay
the special master and not one dime has gone to payment.

MR. SHAFER: And I will distinguish between the special master's request for payment and the judgment collection. They are different and distinct. And I appreciate that the Court -- as a special master they are subject to the Court's review and discretion and they are essentially an adjunct to the Court and they have their own set of limited remedies. The statute provides that if a special master is not paid, they are entitled to a writ of execution.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. SHAFER: I don't believe that it is on that basis -- I think that the appointment of the special master you've suggested to review the finances at least on a limited basis would provide security both to the judgment creditor and to the special master, as well as continuing the operations if they exist or are able to be -- if A Cab is able to continue on, then that will provide some illumination on that issue. If the judgment creditor wants to shut down the company it has various methods to do that. They can file for an involuntary bankruptcy. They can ask for other extraordinary relief. But we are distinguishing between the judgment creditor and the special master because there has been no contempt as to the judgment creditor. It is limited only to the special master and the payment based on the Court's prior order ordering the \$41,000 be paid. The Court will recognize we made objections, but the Court issued that order. So there is a distinction between those two.

I do not think, responding to Mr. Dubowsky's point, that it is fair or

reasonable to impose a date certain by which a certain amount should be paid because one of the important aspects in any contempt hearing is the ability. It has not been established that as of now A Cab or Mr. Nady has the ability to pay, or A Cab has the ability to pay the special master fees.

THE COURT: Well, if they don't -- if they don't, then why don't we just wind up the business and pull out whatever assets to pay the judgment creditor -- I'm sorry, to pay the special master and the judgment creditor whatever there is and be done with it?

MR. SHAFER: Well, and that would be -- that would be subject to either negotiation or some subsequent motion practice subsequently. But my point is is that it is not --

THE COURT: Well, no, that kind of evades the question. I mean, what you're telling me is that your client basically simply cannot pay, so therefore we don't want to have any order that you must pay by a certain date or else because, gee, now we have to have a trial after the trial to show that your client can pay. Well, that's not my understanding of the way the process generally works. This is a judgment. And --

MR. SHAFER: It is. And we have two competing claims on these funds. Plaintiff's counsel took \$250,000 from our client, from A Cab. That money, most of it, as we discussed before, was earmarked for other purposes which have precedence to the State. But if there was any free funds, that could have been used to pay Mr. Dubowsky's client, the special master. And so now we're in a situation where my client does not have 1.6 million dollars to pay out of its ready cash right now. Does that mean that they might not be able to pay a reasonable

amount over time? I don't know. I don't have personal knowledge of the finances of the company. And even if I did, I'm not sure that the Court would believe me.

That's why I think it is imperative that the special master make the report before any further recommendations be enacted -- certainly on the contempt. If the special master determines that there is not sufficient funds nor sufficient profits to pay off the special master and their award, then the Court will make its determination based upon that when they make their report in thirty or whatever reasonable amount of time they make their report. I don't presume to indicate what time the special master would be able to complete that. But they would be no worse off than they are today because of the Court's order precluding the transfer of assets or the sale of assets according to the conditions that the Court has put in place and the continued operations of the business. They will be no worse off than they are today and they will still have the ability to recover those funds.

So I really seen no authority, also, to shut down the business. They haven't cited to any case law or statute that permits a judgment creditor to shut down a business or to preclude operations of its assets, except according to a receiver or some other writ of execution. The certificates are not subject to a writ of execution because they are not something that can be transferred. So, again, that goes back to the most reasonable course of action at this point is to allow the special master to conduct its review and to conduct the finances.

We are -- we have asked, as this Court knows, we asked for a stay pending a resolution and settlement and an appeal. We are getting pummeled, Your Honor, with the amount of motion practice and other procedures that are going through as a result of the defendant and the special master. We're trying to get our

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THE COURT: All right.

also have its business assets not be unnecessarily disturbed.

MR. SHAFER: So that's -- I think we would object to any date certain be paid.

feet underneath us to negotiate a resolution. We asked the Court for a stay and

it wasn't inclined to issue that stay. We are now seeking an emergency stay with

the supreme court to try to resolve this so we can just figure out where everybody

stands and what the assets are and what resources would be available to pay the

judgment creditor and to work out a fair resolution. But I think that -- I understand

the Court's concerns about assets not being diminished and it certainly would never

be my intention to intentionally avoid any order of this Court or judgment debt that is

properly entered, but is also imperative that due process follow. And I think that the

imposition of the special master accomplishes all of the necessary goals to maintain

that the judgment creditor and the special master be paid, that the judgment debtor

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, if I might just clarify. On behalf of my clients, the plaintiffs, the class members, I do not want to see the business close because I don't think that's going to be in their interest in terms of getting paid. My suggestion to the Court was in respect to the special master's claim that the Court do issue an order with the course of power I was proposing, giving A Cab, the defendants, a date certain to pay or to face the closure of their business. The reason why I proposed that is the amount that is owed to the special master is of a magnitude that I think they will definitely find the money to pay the special master what he was awarded and that issue will be closed and done with. In terms of appointing a special master going forward or a receiver, we've discussed this and

that is the avenue that I believe is in the interest of my clients. I think Your Honor understands my position.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: Mr. Dubowsky may want to address the Court.

THE COURT: Mr. Dubowsky.

MR. DUBOWSKY: Thank you, Your Honor. I don't understand Mr. Shafer's argument. Number one, he can't just come into court when his client has already been found in contempt and say we don't have the financial ability and it is the burden of the plaintiff to put us in involuntary bankruptcy. Well, number one, I'm no expert in bankruptcy, although I've worked alongside your brother for many years in different bankruptcy cases. I believe you need three creditors to get into an involuntary. But more important, in Your Honor's order, page 31, it says, "If A Cab truly lacks the financial resources to comply with those orders" -- this is to pay my client -- "it has a remedy under the United States Bankruptcy Code to seek protection of the bankruptcy court and its power to relieve it of those orders," etcetera.

In other words, Your Honor, we are going through the same thing again. It's the same song and dance. They're going to come in and say we don't have the money. Your Honor, we're past that. If they don't have the money, they have to file bankruptcy. And if they do, then everything gets resolved with the bankruptcy courts. But as it is right now, as we stand here today, Your Honor adjudicated them in contempt because they refuse to pay my client. And, yes, a date certain to pay -- not if they have the ability.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. DUBOWSKY: No. That is the exception -- Your Honor, we know what's happening here because so far as to my client, which was brought in by Your Honor, nothing you have ordered will change anything in the lives of the defendants or their counsel. Nothing.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. DUBOWSKY: So it's come to this point. I want to get my client paid. Our attorney's fees are also under statute, and then we just want to go. We were brought in by the Court. We want to make sure Your Honor gets us paid. You already found willful contempt. Respectfully, Your Honor, this is not going to do anything for my client. You already see that. So, yes, if they were smart they would have come in today with the money and say we want to purge ourselves of contempt. But under Nevada law you have to be purged of the contempt if they had already been found to be in willful violation of this Court's order. That means purge, pay the \$41,000 plus attorney's fees per statute and then that's it. Then we can leave. We'll be out of the picture. But, Your Honor, they're in contempt saying no, we can't comply. Your Honor, please, that is -- I think Your Honor can see through that. And again, another Court order is not going to help us. Please get us paid so we can get out. That's all I'm asking, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Let's take five minutes or so and let you folks look at the order and then we'll come back and I will make the decision on what we're going to do.

(Court recessed from 11:32 a.m. until 11:42 a.m.)

THE COURT: All right, please be seated. What I'm looking for, folks, here is minor tweaks to this order if there's anything that would help make this process work. I'm not looking for entire this is our position on the granting of an order. I'm

 going to sign this order.

So, the plaintiff.

MR. GREENBERG: Yes, Your Honor. My main concern is in paragraph 3. It directs the special master to advise plaintiffs' counsel of property it identifies, but then simultaneously restrains plaintiffs' counsel from performing any judgment execution on any such property identified.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: Candidly, Your Honor, that's counterproductive. I mean, if I'm told about the property and then told I can't execute on it, it doesn't do me any good in terms of the interest of my clients. I'd almost rather not be told by the special master because if I found out about it myself presumably I wouldn't be bound by the restraint in this order. The purpose -- I mean, when I had drafted this originally that restraint was not in the draft.

THE COURT: That's correct.

MR. GREENBERG: I understand this was part of your thought process that wound up putting that term in there, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: Again, Your Honor, if the special master was not a special master but was the form of limited receiver I was proposing and was actually taking possession of the property, then that would safeguard my clients' interests.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GREENBERG: But to the extent that there's property that is attachable because it is solely in the name of the judgment debtor at the current time that the judgment is entered against, my clients would like to preserve their right to proceed

with judgment execution, which is another issue we have with these motor vehicles, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: Candidly, I don't think there is any property, as we've been discussing. But nonetheless, I think my clients should be entitled to execute on it. So I would ask that that provision --

THE COURT: The reason -- there's one reason I did not and that is that if you execute on it then you've got it, and my intention is to try and get the previous special master paid.

MR. GREENBERG: I understand, Your Honor. And under the terms of the existing judgment any amounts that I collect have to be held in trust. I cannot disburse any of those funds without an order from Your Honor. I mean, that is the existing --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: -- limitation I am under in all respects, in respect to any money that is collected on the judgment. So if Your Honor was of a mind to require amounts that I collected on the judgment be paid over to the current special master I would object to that, but that would clearly be within your power to do so.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: And of course I have a duty currently to hold all those funds in trust pending Your Honor's direction. So this additional provision is not necessary to preserve that interest, so to speak, that Your Honor was concerned about because it is already preserved under the current arrangement, the current instructions accompanying the judgment, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Dubowsky.

MR. DUBOWSKY: Thank you, Your Honor. Again, unless I'm misinterpreting, is this supposed to address the contempt?

THE COURT: No.

MR. DUBOWSKY: Okay.

THE COURT: This really does not -- I mean, it only does in this sense. It is an attempt to get you paid first and get you paid in full, but it does not address specifically the contempt.

MR. DUBOWSKY: Will that be addressed, Your Honor? Because there is a finding of contempt. Will that be addressed?

THE COURT: Well, I think probably then what we should do is you should submit an order that does that separately because you are correct, the Court has found the defendant to be operating in contempt of court. Before -- we'll revisit that before we leave here.

Any minor tweaks?

MR. SHAFER: We do. I'll first respond to the issue on paragraph 3 that he's addressed. I think that the Court's inclination on that is wise to preserve the status quo. And I understand the concern that they have that if they identify the assets in the report that they're barred from ever executing on them. While my client would love that, we probably think that's probably not what the Court intended —

THE COURT: No.

MR. SHAFER: -- and think it would be --

THE COURT: My intention was to leave that in place until I get the report of the special master.

MR. SHAFER: And I think if you added that additional term, shall not execute it until after the special master's report is issued, that would both simultaneously accomplish maintaining the status quo, not precluding them from executing and allowing for the special master to get paid. I would echo that Mr. Greenberg brought up the fact that the Court could order the \$80,000 or the \$40,000 be disbursed from the monies that were already taken from A Cab. That would both simultaneously cure the contempt of A Cab and satisfy the special master's concerns immediately.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MS. SHAFER: We do have some other concerns on some of the other provisions.

THE COURT: Okay. Like what?

MR. SHAFER: Well, I think number two, Your Honor, and I hope this is not a feature but rather a bug in part of the drafting. If we turn that, it requires the special master — it gives the special master powers to obtain records.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. SHAFER: And going down to lines -- well, 24, 25, 26, where it says, "including but not limited to all such records involving (comma) and all of its contracts or agreements with (comma) any other entity or person including any Series LLC it has issued pursuant to the statute." Because of the commas it creates a parenthetical phrase which you read by excluding that, which would mean that they have the ability to get all such records involving any other person. And then when you refer back to the prior sentence, that requires Mr. Nady and any other Series LLC to provide any document it has concerning any other agreement with anybody ever at any time. So if they wanted to find out Mr. Nady's --

MR. SHAFER: So, yeah, the --

THE COURT: I'm looking at lines 23, 24.

MR. SHAFER: Yeah. So it says that -- if we look at the first part it says:
"The special master shall be provided by judgment debtor, including Creighton J.
Nady and any other agents of judgment debtors."

THE COURT: Which language are you looking at again?

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. SHAFER: And then it describes the type of documents: "Copies of all electronic and paper financial business records of the judgment debtor" --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SHAFER: -- "also known as A Cab Series, that the special master deems advisable." No concerns with the provision on that, other than we do a little bit to Mr. Nady as to his personal records. But the biggest concern is the part about "including but not limited to," where it makes that exception.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. SHAFER: "Including but not limited to (comma) all such records involving." And because of the parenthetical phrase that follows comma, and all of its contracts or agreements with (comma), when you are reading that order you have to exclude that clause for reading and interpreting the contract. So it's read as including all such records involving any other entity or person—

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. SHAFER: -- which would mean that that would entitle the special master to review any marriage contracts, divorce records, contracts with attorneys, contracts with -- communications. And I think it's probably not the Court's intention

to require that, but rather to all such records involving all of its contracts --

THE COURT: Does not "its" refer to the judgment debtor here or debtors?

MR. SHAFER: It does, Your Honor, but when you are reading that because it is bracketed by commas you have to exclude that when you are interpreting the scope of the documents because that --

THE COURT: Oh. All right. So take the comma out, then? Involving -- all such records involving and all of its contracts or agreements with any other entity or person, including any Series LLC. Is that what you're suggesting?

MR. SHAFER: All such records involving -- I would say all such records involving it and all of its contracts or agreements with any other person.

THE COURT: Well, it says all of its contracts --

MR. SHAFER: Correct.

THE COURT: -- or agreements with.

MR. SHAFER: But it doesn't -- because of the comma, then, all such records involving is not limited to the judgment debtor.

THE COURT: All right. Take the comma out. Anything else?

MR. SHAFER: Very quickly, on subparagraph 4A, which is on page 4, line -- I guess that would be 15.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. SHAFER: We would suggest that the -- it states: "that will allow the profits from the operation of the taxi medallions authorized to it to be applied towards satisfaction of plaintiffs' judgment." We would modify that to say "the operation of the business of A Cab, LLC to be applied."

THE COURT: Let's see. So where does that pick up?

MR. SHAFER: So we would omit "taxi medallions authorized to it" and substitute "business of A Cab, LLC." And the distinction then is to take the profits of the company rather than the profits of an asset of the company.

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, may I? I have no problem including that, along with the specification regarding the operation of the taxi medallions. The business of A Cab, LLC has no profits. The business is structured to have no profits because the profits, the revenue all flows to these supposed separate series entities and then out of those entities into the trust. Your Honor is familiar with all of this. So if the special master's authority is limited to proposing a plan relating to directing the profits of A Cab Series LLC to the benefit of the judgment creditors, there will be no plan. There will be no profits.

That's the reason why when I drafted this I referred to the operation of the tax medallions that are authorized to A Cab Series LLC, because ultimately those taxi medallions are the only asset of the business. They're the only asset of the business — of the judgment debtor that can't be transferred, as defendant's counsel stated. So I have no problem inserting that additional language, but the reference to the operation of the taxi medallions as part of the special master's report to examine is critical here, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So where would you insert this language, Mr. Shafer?

MR SHAFER: I would substitute "he taxi medallions authorized to it" on lines

15 and 16 and substitute "business of A Cab LLC." And the reason is if revenue

from the medallions is seized before its workers are paid, there won't be continuing
to be, you know, a business, if they try to step ahead of the current costs and

expenses of operating that medallion.

THE COURT: We're talking about simply a proposed plan here to do this.

MR. SHAFER: Correct.

THE COURT: We're not talking about effecting any plan. I don't see a reason to change that language. What else?

MR. SHAFER: The final change is in the last -- in the request to transfer certain funds. Two parts. In line 10 of page 5 there is a request to -- well, I guess -- no, I apologize. I'll retract that one. My concern on the transfers, precluding transfers to defendant Nady to any of his family members or to any trust which Nady or his family members is a trust or trustee and beneficiary, my concern is that that excludes any payment of salaries, any payment pursuant to any contracts that are within the company or in the ordinary course of business. Mr. Nady is currently continuing to operate the business and is entitled to and is being paid a salary for that.

THE COURT: What is his salary?

MR. SHAFER: I do not know. And obviously that would be identified to the special master that's being appointed. And in fact, I don't know that he is being paid, but that's --

THE COURT: Mr. Nady, what is your salary?

MR. NADY: It varies by month. I couldn't tell you exactly what it is.

THE COURT: How is it calculated? Is it a percentage?

MR. NADY: No, sir. It's just whatever happens -- needs happen to come up.

MR. SHAFER: And I do not have an encyclopedic --

THE COURT: When you say the needs that happen, you mean personal needs?

MR. NADY: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SHAFER: So that would be our only concern is that that would preclude that and put them in a very dire financial situation. I understand that it's the Court's concern that all of the assets and profits will go out the back door and I think that our proposal — and this is kind of the first time seeing this — is that it would be carveout those exceptions and those exceptions would need to be explicitly identified to the special master and would be subject to a reservation of rights, I presume.

THE COURT: My view is that if Mr. Nady needs to take less funds or no funds as salary until the special master gets paid, the previous special master, that's how — one way to purge himself from the contempt of the court. At this moment it's not the Court's concern to protect Mr. Nady in his need, personal need for salary over the needs and rightful debt to the special master.

MR. SHAFER: And I respect that distinction, Your Honor. Unfortunately the language in this proposed order does not make that distinction and precludes any transfer until the judgment debtor is satisfied.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. SHAFER: And on that basis I think it is -- there is a distinction between the two.

THE COURT: Well, it does -- the language says enjoined from transferring any funds to defendant Nady or any of his family members. That's -- if that's what it takes to get the special master paid, then that's what it's going to be.

MR. SHAFER: And, respectfully, I think is a distinction that is not reflected in this order because it doesn't put a limit on --

THE COURT: Well, it says --

MR. SHAFER: Because it's referring --

THE COURT: It says enjoined from transferring any funds to defendant Nady. How much -- how do we make that clearer?

MR. SHAFER: Because this order entered now continues on without end.

THE COURT: No. No, that's not necessarily so. Once I see that the special master has been paid and once I get the report of the new special master, Mr. Swarts, you know, all of the wording of this may be subject to being changed.

MR. SHAFER: If that's the Court's intention, we would suggest that that language -- that limiting language be placed in this, that this will occur until the special master is paid.

THE COURT: Well, I think we're past that. At this point we have someone who's been found in contempt. As you yourself have said, Mr. Nady is the one operating this business. It's under his control. If he chooses to get the special master paid and off his back, then he can do so. If he would rather not do so and he winds up violating this order, then we'll deal with it at that point.

MR. SHAFER: And perhaps my inartful speaking has not conveyed the point I wish to convey, and that's that the remedy that you structured that Mr. Nady should be precluded from being paid until the special master is paid is distinct from what is here.

THE COURT: Well, let's put it this way. What Mr. Nady and the other defendants have been found to be -- how they've been found to be in contempt of court is they were ordered at one point to pay \$41,000 to the special master. They didn't do so and they still haven't. So it is an ongoing contempt as far as I'm

concerned. If he wants to get some relief from the order of the Court, then obey the order of the Court, pay the \$41,000 and then let's talk.

MR. SHAFER: And I understand your -- I believe I understand what the Court is saying and all we're asking for is that that clause, that purge clause be contained in this order that once the special master is paid that this restriction and prohibition on Mr. Nady be excused.

THE COURT: No. We're past that, Mr. Shafer. We're past that. This Court entered orders last September, October, and they've just -- to this point just been blown off.

MR. SHAFER: And I understand.

THE COURT: So I'm not inclined to put those kinds of changes into this order. Once I see that the Court's orders are being obeyed and that once we can get the previous special master paid and out of this picture --

MR. SHAFER: So it is not --

THE COURT: -- that things can change.

MR. SHAFER: So it's not the intention of the Court to preclude payments until the 1.6 million dollar judgment is satisfied?

THE COURT: No.

MR. SHAFER: Okay.

THE COURT: No.

MR. SHAFER: That is our concern because that's the way we interpret this language being drafted. And if I'm incorrect --

THE COURT: I think Mr. Nady gets himself subject to this kind of language when he commits contempt of court by just flat refusing to pay an amount that he

was ordered to be paid to the special master. That's all.

All right. Thank you for your input.

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, I have one additional suggestion. You might want to include a provision in this order to prohibit A Cab Series, LLC from issuing any additional Series LLCs without further order of the Court because essentially that has been the gateway --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: -- for them to avoid this Court's orders. And they are the judgment debtor in this case. They ultimately are the one with the power to issue --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GREENBERG: -- these supposed separate entities. I would ask Your Honor to consider that and add a provision. I know I did not previously suggest that, but I think it would be a meaningful restraint on sort of limiting what we've been dealing with here in the future and appropriate under the circumstances.

THE COURT: All right, thank you. The Court is going to sign the order the way that you see it, plus I don't know that -- did they get the one that shows the confidentiality sits? We've included as paragraph 6 at the top of page 5, it now says: "The information and records received by the special master shall be kept confidential and subject to a protective order issued by the Court precluding production to the general public, except as directed by the Court." So it does include that confidentiality. The Court is going to say that the report of the special master called for in paragraph number 4 -- I'm going to say February 1st. That is a significant amount of time, but we do have the Christmas holidays in the meantime so he'll need extra time. The Court is appointing George Swarts as the special

master. The amounts in paragraph 5 are going to be the sum shall not exceed \$20,000 to pay for the special master's services. A fee not exceeding \$300 an hour. And I will -- I am going to add the provision that the judgment debtors will not create any further Series LLCs without further order of this Court.

MR. SHAFER: Your Honor, if I could just make a record on that very briefly? THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. SHAFER: That is an issue that is of an extraordinary remedy because it precludes their correct business operations and their liberty to engage in business. It is not -- if they acquire a new taxicab, if there is another business that requires them to set up a new Series LLC, there would be no basis to preclude that. It does not -- creation of an LLC does not mean that any assets are being disbursed or are otherwise being diverted. There is no benefit to the judgment creditor to have that preclusion. There is no basis in law or in fact to preclude the entity from creating a new business entity.

THE COURT: Now, that would be a business entity to do what?

MR.. SHAFER: I don't know, Your Honor and neither do they.

THE COURT: Well, then --

MR. SHAFER: And that's -- but this is a blanket prohibition. If you want to include that they cannot create a Series LLC to receive assets of A Cab, LLC, that might be a reasonable imposition.

THE COURT: Well, you just gave an example if there's a new taxicab. Is that it?

MR. SHAFER: If there is a new taxicab or if there's some other reason they need to create a new -- and the reason that they hold each taxicab is so if the taxi

is in an accident that liability doesn't spill over to the other assets of the corporation.

THE COURT: Uh-huh. Well, that doesn't say that they can never do it, it just says without further order of the Court and that's going to be in there.

Yes?

MR. DUBOWSKY: Can we address the contempt, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DUBOWSKY: What is Your Honor going to do to order to purge -- to have --

THE COURT: Well, as I've already stated verbally here, but it would probably be good to have an order on file that the judgment debtors are found to be in contempt of court by virtue of not having paid previous Court orders. One was \$25,000 and then it was raised to \$41,000. That's the way it stands at this point. I am not going to put a deadline in there at this point but I am considering doing that once I get the report from the special master.

I recognize that it doesn't do what you're wanting the Court to do, which is basically to enter an order and then if they don't pay it then they -- then I guess you ask for the Court to arrest Mr. Nady or do something like that. I am cognizant that in the statute that talks about payment of the special master it talks about allowing the special master to attach and execute on the resources. I think that is going to be closer to, assuming that there is some compliance by the time we next meet, that may be the route that the Court would go. It is of a concern to the Court and it hasn't been explained away how after being ordered to pay those amounts, a short while later it's found that he's sitting on a bank account with \$230,000 in it. And that has not been explained to the Court's satisfaction.

 MR. DUBOWSKY: Your Honor, we're very concerned without a date certain to pay my client. Again, we just want to get paid and get out.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. DUBOWSKY: If this is wide open, we're back where we were in May where Your Honor ordered the \$41,000. And then we have another order that they have to pay it and now we don't even have any kind of date certain and we still have the contempt that's up in the air. So I am going to ask Your Honor for some kind --

THE COURT: Well, he's looking at -- they're looking at losing control of their business if the Court proceeds to implement a plan proposed by the special master to make it be a receiver, notwithstanding their great concern that that's going to put them in violation of other court statutes. I don't know that that's the case yet, but that's the risk they take by further violation of this Court's orders. I think that is a significant hatchet, if you will, hanging over your head to know that if you continue to blow off Court orders you're going to lose control of your business.

MR. DUBOWSKY: I understand, Your Honor, but again I have to tell my client when they're going to be paid. And if they're going to say, well, we don't still have the money to pay, we need some kind of date certain for Your Honor, for the dignity of the Court to have some kind of date certain how to purge them of contempt to say, yes, by a certain date you have to pay the special master Your Honor hired so we can at least have some certainty.

THE COURT: In other cases I would be willing to do so. In this case at this juncture, given all of the competing interests, I am not willing to enter such an order. When we come back on February 1st -- well, let's see. We'll see what that -- actually I guess it calls for the report to be made by February 1st. It isn't a court

date. So let's set a court date shortly after February 1st, at which we will take up further, you know, generally these matters and specifically take up the matter of the contempt of court.

MR. DUBOWSKY: One final issue, Your Honor. The order was for \$41,000, however the fee is for \$85,280.56.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, say it again.

MR. DUBOWSKY: The order was for \$41,000.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. DUBOWSKY: However, the actual invoiced amount is for \$85,280.56.

THE COURT: Well, that is true, but I don't think that -- I mean, if I were representing them, at least, let's put it that way, if it's for contempt of court on a Court order, it's \$41,000. Then we deal with the rest of it.

MR. DUBOWSKY: Yes, Your Honor. So are you finding then that the \$41,000 is the order, but they are due to be paid the \$85,000 that is in our motion for fees?

THE COURT: The principal factor or goal of any plan that I put in place with the special master or a receiver is to get your client paid first. It is fairly ludicrous that after everything that's gone on in this case that the special master appointed by the Court to effectuate the judgment can't even get paid, so that is upper most in the Court's mind. But I'm still trying to do this in such a way that — the defendants seem to be saying that they would pay the judgment, given an appropriate plan to do so. The plaintiffs seem to be saying we don't want to put them out of business, we want them to pay the judgment. We'll see what comes out from the special master and we'll see whether or not that's a workable goal or not.

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, in respect to scheduling for the proceedings, I was going to suggest that Your Honor perhaps schedule a tentative date towards the end of January, maybe within a week or two prior to when the special master's report is due so that he could report to the Court if he's having any obstacles in completing his report at that time. If he's moving ahead smoothly, then we would cancel that and we would simply reconvene after the report is issued. I think such a contingency might help move things along. Do you understand my suggestion?

THE COURT: Well, I assume if the special master sees that he's not getting cooperation and is running into problems that he will -- in other cases I have a special master contact the Court and say I'm having this problem and then we schedule something.

MR. GREENBERG: I understand. Then if Your Honor prefers to simply set a date after the February 1st report, then that is of course appropriate.

THE COURT: Sure. I don't want -- for all I know, the special master may come back right after January 1st and say this is not working.

MR. GREENBERG: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And if so, then we will meet again.

MR. GREENBERG: Very well, Your Honor. Your staff will propose to date to us for February?

THE COURT: Yeah.

THE CLERK: February 6th at 9:00 a.m.

THE COURT: February 6th. If you'll submit an order, Mr. Dubowsky, holding the defendants, including Mr. Nady, in contempt of court for failure to pay the

\$41,000 to the receiver -- I'm sorry, the special master, then I will be signing that.

MR. DUBOWSKY: Thank you, Your Honor. I can do that. I'm not sure what the terms on how to purge them, but I can prepare that order. You made that finding. But to clarify, the \$41,000 is what's ordered, but the invoice amounts are for the \$85,000 figure which we presented. That is what is going to be paid in due course, correct, Your Honor?

THE COURT: That is my intention, yeah.

MR. DUBOWSKY: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, the only other issue was the TRO and the request for the turnover regarding those motor vehicles. I do have a proposed order that would direct the defendants to cooperate with the sheriff in respect to an execution. It would be my intent if Your Honor was to sign the order -- May I approach?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GREENBERG: And this order is essentially the same as what I had presented when we were here last week and I had given the defendants at that time. It would be my intention if Your Honor signed this order to prepare the executions, deliver them to the sheriff and the sheriff would then go through the normal process. But the defendants would be bound by this order to cooperate with the process. My concern is that without such an order the sheriff is simply not going to be able to effectively seize the vehicles because we're talking about five vehicles among, you know, a business that has maybe a hundred or more vehicles in use on their property.

And again the way this order is set up is that if A Cab can demonstrate

that they are in fact not the sole titleholder on these vehicles, then obviously they're not subject to execution. I've documented to the Court that we have the titles as issued by the DMV for the first four. The fifth one, the Mercedes-Benz, is based upon other information I have. But again, if they can produce documentation that it's not titled to the judgment debtor, then it won't be subject to execution.

THE COURT: If we're going down the road which you indicated earlier that on behalf of your clients you're not looking to put the defendants out of business, you're looking to get the judgment paid, then if we start seizing the cabs that they make their living with, are we --

MR. GREENBERG: Well, Your Honor, these vehicles are only titled to the judgment debtor because obviously it was an oversight by them not to have had them titled to one of the Series LLCs.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: These are the only ones that I was able to identify. I did do a thorough investigation from the sources available to me.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: This is it. I mean, the Wells Fargo account was attached. There are not going to be any other bank accounts that are going to be attachable at this point because defendants have shifted all of the liquid assets, the cash funds into other entities, other registrations. The same thing with their motor vehicle fleet. This is the only asset that is actually in the possession of A Cab, LLC are these motor vehicles. There's nothing else, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So what are you saying? You want to go ahead and execute on these?

MR. GREENBERG: I do. I do wish to go ahead and execute. I'm just trying to explain to Your Honor in my view the impairment of the business by the seizure of these assets is going to be nominal. It is some meaningful amount I can collect for my clients. I think I'm duty bound to ask the Court to effectuate the seizure. If the Court declines, the Court can decline to do so. You know, I could send it to the sheriff without the Court's order. The Court restrained the transfer of these titles. If the Court lifts that restraint, presumably those titles are going to be transferred very quickly.

THE COURT: Well, I'm not -- I haven't lifted the restrain, have I?

MR. GREENBERG: You have not, Your Honor. I understand that. And if
Your Honor --

THE COURT: If I have, I certainly don't intend to. No.

MR. GREENBERG: I understand, Your Honor. And this is a request for assistance by the Court. It is within your discretion, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: — either to proceed in the fashion I'm requesting or to deny my request. I understand that.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: And I don't want to belabor the point with the Court. You were inquiring as to why we were proceeding in this fashion and our view, given that I did advise the Court and I have repeatedly advised the Court that I think the best way to get my clients paid is to see this business continue to operate over time to pay them, and that ultimately is the big picture here. But in respect to this particular issue, this is a very limited portion of the assets. It is the only asset that

I think I'm ever going to be able to attach directly of the judgment debtor at this point. So absent the appointment of a receiver or absent we hold further proceedings and the Court makes further findings regarding, you know, these Series LLCs, the alter ego issues and so forth, Your Honor, this is probably the only other asset that I'm going to be able to collect for my clients. That's why I'm asking the Court to let me proceed in this fashion.

THE COURT: Well, it seems to me we're going down two -- trying to go down two roads at the same time now. I'm not inclined to do that at this time. I am inclined -- make no mistake, I consider these five vehicles to be under the Court's order that they not be disposed of in any fashion, whether they're sold, given away, anything. They're not to be disposed of. If it is possible to use these vehicles as part of a way to get the plaintiff judgment creditors paid and the previous special master paid, then they will be useful for that. But I'm not going to order them to be subject to execution at this point unless we're just saying let's grab any assets we can.

MR. GREENBERG: Well, Your Honor, we have a right to execute on these assets. I'm asking for the Court's assistance. If Your Honor declines to sign the order in the form I've submitted, I can still go to the sheriff and ask the sheriff to use his efforts to find them on the street and seize them. I'm trying to make that process more streamlined here in the interest of my clients because the sheriff is going to have to be paid for their efforts. If the sheriff possesses this order, he can go down to the business premises and the defendants will be bound by the Court's order to cooperate with that process. They're not necessarily bound to cooperate with the sheriff terribly much in locating or turning over the assets. That's why I'm asking for the Court's assistance, because we do have a right to seize these assets. They're

not exempt from execution.

So if Your Honor is not going to — Your Honor has been very patient. You've given us a lot of time today, as you have in this case continually, so I don't want to belabor the point with the Court. But I do disagree with what you're telling me. If Your Honor is not going to sign the order in the current form, I would ask that Your Honor at least allow me to submit another order specifically prohibiting the transfer of these vehicles' titles.

THE COURT: Yes, I would sign that. I would prohibit the transfer of these specifically. They're already under the general order. But, you know, to clarify it I would make it and make it very specific. I would sign an order that prohibits the defendants from disposing of these five vehicles in any manner.

MR. GREENBERG: I understand, but there's nothing to keep them from keeping them locked away or secreted somewhere where the sheriff will never find them and I'll never be able to execute on them, either. Your Honor, you've made your decision.

THE COURT: It sounds like you're inviting me to issue such an order.

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, you've made your decision. Let me not take up more of your time. I said I was not.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GREENBERG: I understand.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?

MR. SHAFER: Your Honor, just very briefly. The Mercedes identified does not belong to A Cab. Let's make that for the record. It is titled to another entity. So that's our only --

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THE COURT: Okay. What entity?

MR. SHAFER: I do not know if it's -- the exact name. I believe it's the --

MR. NADY: I sold it.

MR. SHAFER: It's been sold. So obviously if it was titled to A Cab, that will be part of it, but it wasn't. I'don't know what information --

THE COURT: Mr. Nady, do you still have the four cabs -- these four Toyotas, rather?

MR. NADY: They're -- excuse me, Your Honor. Two of them have liens and two of them don't. We still have them. The answer to your question is yes, we're still operating those cabs every day if they're not in a crash or anything.

THE COURT: When you say they have liens, what kind of liens?

MR. NADY: The bank owns them. The bank has the title to them.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. NADY: I think the bank may own the title to all of them, but they do most of them, but I don't know for sure.

THE COURT: All right. Do you know if they're in service? Are they being used as taxis?

MR. NADY: They're probably in service. I have no reason to believe they're not.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. NADY: They're part of my -- part of the operating.

THE COURT: Mr. Nady --

MR. NADY: Cabs get 100,000 miles a year. They have holes in the top where the hats are held on. The retail value of a cab when it's done, we sell them

for about two hundred bucks. There's no great value in these cars that Mr.

Greenberg will actually (inaudible). They're -- we put a lot of hard miles on these cars. To sell them, the return would be nil, honestly.

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, these are new vehicles so they do have value. And I would be pleased to see them continue in operation with the business if the revenue that they were generating or at least some portion of it was being paid to satisfy my clients' judgments. I concur with Mr. Nady that would be a more efficient economic use of them. The problem is that's not what they're being used for. Essentially the revenue is being used to fund this litigation and obstruct the collection of my clients' judgment, Your Honor —

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: -- in my view.

THE COURT: Well, I'm going to leave that as it is until we meet again.

MR. GREENBERG: Yes, Your Honor. I would just remind the Court I did submit orders earlier in this week regarding the turnover of those funds from the Clerk of the Court to my trust account and confirming the award of attorney's fees that Your Honor had granted last week. Hopefully Your Honor and your staff will be able to review those. There was also --

THE COURT: I'm sorry, say which order it is again.

MR. GREENBERG: There were two orders I submitted earlier this week.

One was submitted yesterday. I believe one was submitted on Tuesday. Your

Honor on our last meeting last week had granted the motion for the award of
attorney's fees to myself and Mr. Gabroy and costs.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: I submitted that order for signature pursuant to your findings last week. I had also submitted an order directing the Clerk of the Court to release \$10,000 of the funds on deposit from the Wells Fargo execution to the judgment debtor and to remit the rest of those funds to my trust account --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GREENBERG: -- which Your Honor also ordered last week. So those orders are with the Court. I would ask the Court in due course, hopefully soon, to review those and have them signed. I would also just remind the Court there was a fairly lengthy order involving some substantial findings regarding the motion to quash the judgment execution. That was submitted more than 30 days ago. The Court probably is still working on that. I'm just reminding the Court that we are awaiting the Court's attention to that.

THE COURT: What was the thrust of that order?

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, we held two days of hearings regarding this issue of the status of the Series --

THE COURT: What was the thrust of the order?

MR. GREENBERG: That the Wells Fargo accounts were properly executed upon for various reasons, based upon the findings that Your Honor made. The defendants had moved to quash the execution and Your Honor denied that.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GREENBERG: I think it would be helpful for the record to have of course that ultimately entered. It's just a reminder to the Court, that's all.

(The Court confers with the law clerk)

THE COURT: All right.

Steven D. Grierson **CLERK OF THE COURT** MOT 1 LEON GREENBERG, ESQ., SBN 8094 DANA SNIEGOCKI, ESQ., SBN 11715 2 Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation 2965 South Jones Blvd-Suite E3 3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89146 (702) 383-6085 4 702) 385-1827(fax) leongreenberg@ovértimelaw.com 5 dana@overtimelaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs 6 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 Case No.: A-12-669926-C MICHAEL MURRAY, and MICHAEL RENO, Individually and on behalf of 10 others similarly situated, Dept.: I 11 Plaintiffs, **MOTION TO DISTRIBUTE** 12 FUNDS HELD BY CLASS COUNSEL VS. 13 A CAB TAXI SERVICE LLC, A CAB, It 6,2019 9:00 am N LLC, and CREIGHTON J. NADY, 14 Defendants. 15 16 17 Plaintiffs, through their attorneys, Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation. 18 19 hereby move this Court for an order granting class counsel leave to distribute funds held by them and collected on the judgment entered by this Court. This motion is 20 made and based upon the annexed declaration of counsel, the memorandum of points 21 22 and authorities submitted with this motion, the attached exhibits, and the other papers and pleadings in this action. 23 /// 24 /// 25 26 /// 27 28

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NOTICE OF MOTION

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT the plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, will bring the foregoing Motion to Distribute Funds Held by Class Counsel which was filed in the above-entitled case for hearing before the Hon. Kenneth Cory on February 6, 2019, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. pursuant to Department 1's consent.

Dated: January 10, 2019

Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation

By: /s/ Leon Greenberg Leon Greenberg, Esq. Nevada Bar No.: 8094 2965 South Jones Boulevard - Suite E3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89146 (702) 383-6085 Attorney for Plaintiffs

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

BACKGROUND AND NATURE OF REQUEST TO DISTRIBUTE FUNDS HELD BY CLASS COUNSEL

The following facts are confirmed by the declaration of class counsel, Leon Greenberg, at Ex. "A":

1. Class counsel has received \$223,494.54 from the Clerk of the Court and deposited those funds into their IOLTA account. Such funds were secured from an execution on Wells Fargo bank pursuant to the judgment entered by the Court on August 21, 2018 in the total amount of \$1,033,027.81 on behalf of 890 class members with each class member's judgment being in a specified amount of at least \$10.00. That \$223,494.54 cannot be distributed until a further Order of the Court issues.

- 2. Class counsel request the Court authorize distribution of that \$223,494.54 in the following fashion:
 - (a) \$20,000 to George Swarts, the Special Master appointed by the Court in its Order entered on December 18, 2018;
 - (b) \$53,098.84 to class counsel, Leon Greenberg, for expenses incurred in the prosecution of this case and the collection of the judgment (Ex. "A", ¶ 2);
 - (c) \$50,131 to class counsel, Leon Greenberg and Christian Gabroy, in partial payment of their attorney's fees;
 - (d) \$93,116.60 to 159 detailed class members in the scheduled amounts set forth in Ex. "B" for the reasons explained *infra* that such distribution is just and expeditious under the circumstances;
 - (e) A disbursement not to exceed \$4,300 to Simpluris class action administrators to issue the payments (mail checks, handle and account for funds) to 157 detailed class members in the scheduled amounts set forth in Ex. "B";
 - (f) With the remaining amount of at least \$2,848.10, along with any uncashed checks of the \$93,116.60 to 159 detailed class members in the scheduled amounts set forth in Ex. "B," to be held by class counsel in their IOLTA account until a

further Order of the Court should issue

ARGUMENT

I. THE REQUESTED DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS SHOULD BE GRANTED AS IT IS FAIR, EQUITABLE, AND EFFICIENT UNDER THE RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES

A. Payment of Class Counsel's Expenses and George Swarts

Class counsel has incurred very substantial expenses on behalf of the class and should be allowed to recoup those expenses in the first instance from the judgment. As of the date of this motion those expenses total \$53,098.84. Ex. "A" ¶ 2. In addition, the Court's Order of December 18, 2018 reserved \$20,000 of the funds held in class counsel's IOLTA account to pay George Swarts for his services. That \$20,000 should be turned over to him to discharge that obligation.

B. Payment to Class Counsel of a Partial Fee of \$50,131, which is One-Third of the Remaining Funds, is Reasonable and Proper.

At the hearing held on December 4, 2018 the Court held that it was awarding \$568,071 in attorney's fees to class counsel (Order to be entered, transcript at Ex. "C" p. 6). It is appropriate that one third (\$50,131) of the \$150,395.57 remaining after payment of class counsel's expenses and to George Swarts be paid to class counsel as a partial payment of their attorney's fees.

C. Payment of \$93,116.60 to 159 detailed class members in the scheduled amounts set forth in Ex. "B"is just and expeditious under the circumstances.

The total amount of funds available for distribution, after paying the expenses of George Swarts and class counsel, is \$150,395.57. That sum is less than 10% of the combined damages judgment and attorney fee award of over \$1,600,000 (\$1,033,027 and \$568,071) in this case. The judgment amounts awarded to the class member vary greatly in amount and most class members hold relatively small judgments. Of the 890 class member judgment holders (Ex. "A" ¶ 3):

- (a) There are 592 (66.5%) who hold judgments of less than \$1,000;
- (b) There are 436 (48.98%) who hold judgments of less than \$500;

- (c) There are 309 (34.72%) who hold judgments of less than \$300;
- (d) There are 179 (20.11%) who hold judgments of less than \$150.

A "down the line" distribution of the collected funds (approximately 10% of each judgment amount to each class member) would be highly inefficient. The cost of actually issuing a check for \$50 or \$30 or \$15 or less would, in many instances, exceed the value of the check issued. Ex. "A" ¶ 4. In addition, the large majority of the damages owed to the class members are owed to a relatively small group of the class members. For example, \$634,345 of the total damages judgment, or 61.4% of the total judgment, is owed to just the 159 class members, or 17.86% of the class, who possess individual judgments exceeding \$2,000 and are listed on Ex. "B." *Id.*, ¶ 5.

Class counsel proposes a distribution of class funds to the 159 class members who possess judgments exceeding \$2,000 as set forth in the Ex. "B" schedule. That schedule proposes 157 of the class members receive payments equal to 14% of their judgment amount with the smallest such payment to be made equaling \$281.18. Ex. "A" ¶ 5. They propose the two named plaintiffs, class representatives Michael P. Murray and Michael Reno, receive payments equal to 50% of their judgment amounts, \$2,962.77 and \$2,849.11 respectively. *Id.* That higher level of payment to them is justified for their work in this case as class representatives. They both submitted to depositions and without their commitment to this litigation there would have been no recovery on the class claims. *Id.*

Utilizing the Ex. "B" schedule to distribute the class funds is just and appropriate under the circumstances. Payment of the limited funds available is properly made in meaningful amounts to those class members who have sustained the greatest damages. As some point in the future, when there will hopefully be additional sums to distribute to class members, the Court can tailor a different means of distribution targeted to the class members besides these 159 persons.

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D. Payment of no more than \$4,300 to Simpluris to process the Schedule "B" payments to the class members is proper, just and expeditious under the circumstances.

Class counsel should not have to incur the time and expense of issuing the proposed 157 Ex. "B" schedule settlement checks (besides those to the named plaintiffs Reno and Murray). Simpluris is an experienced third party class action settlement administrator located in Costa Mesa, California who have advised that they can economically set up a dedicated settlement fund and issue and mail the 157 proposed checks. Ex. "D" Simpluris proposal. In connection with that mailing they will update the last known addresses for such 157 persons with the United States Postal Service's last known address from the NCOA (National Change of Address) system and by doing so ensure a more accurate delivery of the same. Simpluris also advises that they maintain errors and omissions insurance in excess of the amount they are to distribute. The cost of their services will not exceed \$4,300 and class counsel is working on a revised proposal with Simpluris that may reduce that cost to \$3,200 or about \$20 per class member check issued. Ex. "A" ¶ 4

E. Retention of the remaining funds, a minimum of \$2,848.10 along with any uncashed checks of the \$93,116.60 to be distributed, in Class Counsel's IOLTA Account is appropriate.

Class counsel should continue to hold in their IOLTA account, subject to further Order of the Court, the remaining minimum of \$2,848.10 that is not proposed for distribution and any uncashed check funds. If the Court wishes it can direct class counsel to suitably report about the status of those funds once Simpluris has completed its work and returned to class counsel the funds from all uncashed checks.

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CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' motion should be granted in its entirety together with such other further and different relief that the Court deems proper.

Dated: January 10, 2019

LEON GREENBERG PROFESSIONAL CORP.

/s/ Leon Greenberg Leon Greenberg, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 8094 2965 S. Jones Boulevard - Ste. E-3 Las Vegas, NV 89146 Tel (702) 383-6085 Attorney for the Class

PROOF OF SERVICE The undersigned certifies that on January 15, 2019, she served the within: Motion to Distribute Funds Held by Class Counsel by court electronic service to: TO: Esther C. Rodriguez, Esq. RODRIGUEZ LAW OFFICES, P.C. 10161 Park Run Drive, Suite 150 Las Vegas, NV 89145 Jay Shafer, Esq. Premier Legal Group 1333 North Buffalo Drive - Suite 210 Las Vegas, NV 89128 /s/ Dana Sniegocki Dana Sniegocki

EXHIBIT "A"

| 1 | DECL | |
|----------|---|---|
| 2 | LEON GREENBERG, ESQ., SBN 8094 DANA SNIEGOCKI, ESQ., SBN 11715 | |
| 3 | DANA SNIEGOCKI, ESQ., SBN 11715 Leon Greenberg Professional Corporatio 2965 South Jones Blvd-Suite E3 | on |
| 4 | Las Vegas, Nevada 89146 (702) 383-6085 | |
| 5 | (702) 385-1827(fax) leongreenberg@overtimelaw.com | |
| 6 | dana@overtimelaw.com | |
| 7 | Attorneys for Plaintiffs DISTR | ICT COURT |
| 8 | CLARK CO | UNTY, NEVADA |
| 9 | MICHAEL MURRAY, and MICHAEL |) Case No.: A-12-669926-C |
| 10 | MICHAEL MURRAY, and MICHAEL RENO, Individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, | Dept.: I |
| 11 | Plaintiffs, | DECLADATION OF |
| 12 | vs. | DECLARATION OF PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL, |
| 13 | A CAB TAXI SERVICE LLC, A CAB, LLC, and CREIGHTON J. NADY, |) LEON GREENBERG, ESQ. |
| 14 | Defendants. |) |
| 15 | • | } |
| 16 | |) |
| 17 | Leon Greenberg, an attorney duly l | licensed to practice law in the State of |
| 18 | Nevada, hereby affirms, under the penalty | y of perjury, that: |
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| 20 | 1. I offer this declaration in support | rt of plaintiffs' motion for an Order |
| 21 | authorizing the requested distribution of | \$223,494.54 held in my attorney IOLTA |
| 22 | account and collected on the judgment en | stered in this case on August 21, 2018 in the |
| 23 | total amount of \$1,033,027.81 on behalf | of 890 class members. |
| 24 | | |
| 25 | 2. Today I reviewed the fully update | ated records of my office's expenses incurred |
| 26 | in the prosecution of this matter. Those e | expenses total \$53,437.79. Of that amount I |
| 27 28 | received reimbursement of \$638.95 in con | urt report costs as per the Court's sanctions |
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order entered on March 4, 2016, leaving an unpaid balance of \$53,098.84 in expenses. In my declaration filed with the Court on October 29, 2018 I advised the Court that my itemized, and unreimbursed, expenses for the prosecution of this case were, as best I ascertained at that time, \$46,528.07. I have now completed a full accounting of all expenses incurred by my office on this case through the end of 2018 (that information was not available to me on October 29, 2018). That accounting reveals there are an additional \$6,570.77 in unreimbursed expenses, including Wiznet filing charges and judgment execution fees paid to the Las Vegas Sheriff and Constable in 2018. Accordingly, I am requesting reimbursement for the full amount of my office's unreimbursed expenses, through the current date, of \$53,098.84.

- 3. I have thoroughly reviewed the Court's judgment for the 890 class members entered on August 18, 2018 and that judgment total of \$1,033,027.81 is distributed as follows:
- (a) There are 592 class members (66.5%) who hold judgments of less than \$1,000;
- (b) There are 436 class members (48.98%) who hold judgments of less than \$5500;
- (c) There are 309 class members (34.72%) who hold judgments of less than S300:
- (d) There are 179 class members (20.11%) who hold judgments of less than \$150.
- 4. I have conferred with Simpluris a class action settlement administrator that has successfully administered class action settlements in other cases I have litigated. I have no financial or personal relationship Simpluris and can attest, from my experience, that they are among the least expensive class action administrators and also have competently performed their duties. They maintain errors and omissions

insurance in an amount in excess of the amount of class member funds they will be handling. The have provided me with a proposal to distribute 157 checks to 157 of the class members as part of a total distribution of \$93,116.60 in funds from my office's IOLTA account to 159 class members (I would personally distribute two of those payments, \$2,962.77 and \$2,849.11, to the named representative plaintiffs Murray and Reno). They have proposed to complete that process at a cost of no more than \$4,300 and I believe they may be able to do so for a cost of no more than \$3,200 (I am attempting to confirm that lower amount with them). I believe engaging their services accordingly will be very cost effective, with a 'per check' cost of about \$20, and less than \$30, per class member check issued. They will also perform an NCOA trace (U.S. Postal Service National Change of Address) to locate current class member addresses prior to mailing those checks, and by doing so help ensure the check's more likely receipt by the class member. They will void and return the funds from all uncashed checks to my IOLTA account after a 90 day period from mailing.

5. I believe the proposed distribution of funds to 159 class members is appropriate given the configuration of the judgment entered by the Court. Most of that judgment, \$634,345, or 61.4% of the judgment, is owed to the 159 class members, or 17.86% of the class, who possess judgment amounts of \$2,000 or more. For that reason I am proposing a distribution, at this time, of funds just to those persons. It makes little sense to send a class member a check for \$50 or \$30 or \$20 or even less when there is a limited amount of money to distribute. As a result, I have drafted the Ex. "B" schedule submitted with this motion to calculate an amount equal to 14% of the judgment amount for 157 of class members holding judgments in excess of \$2,000 with the smallest such payment being \$281.18. I have also drafted that schedule to pay the two named plaintiffs, class representatives Michael P. Murray and Michael Reno, payments equal to 50% of their judgment amounts, \$2,962.77 and \$2,849.11 respectively. That higher level of payment to them is justified given their service to the class members. Without their efforts (they both gave depositions in this case) there

| 1 2 | would have been no relief granted to any of holders. It is only appropriate that they be re | |
|--------|---|------------------------------|
| 3 | I have read the foregoing and affirm the | he same is true and correct. |
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| 5 | Affirmed this 8th day of January, 2019 | /s/ Leon Greenberg |
| 6 7 | | Leon Greenberg |
| 8 | | Leon Oreenberg |
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EXHIBIT "B"

| | A B | C | D | |
|-------------|-------------------------|--|--|---|
| | | Total Judgement for All 159 Class Members With Judgments of \$2,000 or More: | \$635,228.92 | Total Proposed to Be Distributed to 159 Class \$635,228.92 Members is \$93,116.60 |
| <u> </u> | FF Last | | Total Judgment Entered with Pre-Judgment | 14% of judgment amount and for Michael P. Murray |
| 7 | Number Name | First Name | Interest | the judgment amount |
| | 3606 Abebe | Tamrat | \$3,454.44 | \$483.62 |
| · T | 3661 Ali | Abraham | \$2,552.82 | \$357.40 |
| Т | 2903 Allen | Otis | \$10,965.65 | \$1,535.19 |
| | 2968 Amato | Richard | \$4,589.78 | \$642.57 |
| т | 3672 Anderson | Roosevelt | \$2,426.36 | \$339.69 |
| | 3037 Archuleta | Alex | \$2,330.96 | \$326.33 |
| | 26553 Arnwine | Howard | \$2,318.78 | \$324.63 |
| 19 | 3828 Aseffa | Mulubahan | \$2,285.84 | \$320.02 |
| 11 | 2926 Awalom | Alemayehu | \$9,410.35 | \$1,317.45 |
| 12 | 27358 Baca-Paez | Sergio | \$2,438.08 | \$341.33 |
| 13 | 3838 Baker | Timothy | \$2,450.64 | \$343.09 |
| 14 | 27315 Bakhtiari | Marco | \$2,403.53 | \$336.49 |
| 15 | 3909 Barbu | lon | \$2,877.34 | \$402.83 |
| 16 | 100158 Barnes | Benjamin | \$6,812.00 | \$953.68 |
| | 23373 Bey | Ronald | \$3,996.57 | \$559.52 |
| 18 | 2960 Bialorucki Richard | Richard | \$7,502.40 | \$1,050.34 |
| 19 | 3072 Blumentha Alan | a Alan | \$2,209.10 | \$309.27 |
| 2 | 3101 Bly | Vertito | \$4,538.50 | \$635.39 |
| 21 | 2487 Boling | Freddy | \$2,950.85 | \$413.12 |

| | A B | C | Q | L |
|----|-----------------------|-----------|-------------|------------|
| 22 | 2802 Borja | Virginia | \$4,206.37 | \$588.89 |
| 23 | 28324 Bradley | Leroy | \$2,744.36 | \$384.21 |
| 24 | 2056 Brauchle | Michael | \$7,346.62 | \$1,028.53 |
| 25 | 3716 Brimhall | Tracy | \$4,365.69 | \$611.20 |
| 26 | 3621 Brisco | Allen | \$3,701.93 | \$518.27 |
| 27 | 3249 Chico | David | \$4,569.12 | \$639.68 |
| 28 | 3588 Christense Rosa | e Rosa | \$2,155.22 | \$301.73 |
| 29 | 3885 Cohoon | Thomas | \$2,394.77 | \$335.27 |
| 30 | 3552 Coizeau | Leonardo | \$3,769.81 | \$527.77 |
| 31 | 3738 Conway | James | \$3,993.82 | \$559.13 |
| 32 | 2051 Costello | Brad | \$2,613.44 | \$365.88 |
| 33 | 109796 Curtin | Ronald | \$2,170.52 | \$303.87 |
| 34 | 3777 Daniels | Donald | \$3,757.26 | \$526.02 |
| 35 | 3428 D'Arcy | Timothy | \$6,253.52 | \$875.49 |
| 36 | 28065 Davis | Bradley | \$2,580.64 | \$361.29 |
| 37 | 2031 Dinok | Ildiko | \$3,478.41 | \$486.98 |
| 38 | 3756 Disbrow | Ronald | \$2,840.56 | \$397.68 |
| 39 | 3704 Dobszewic Gary | c Gary | \$2,614.57 | \$366.04 |
| 40 | 3478 Dontchev | Nedeltcho | \$3,964.86 | \$555.08 |
| 41 | 2871 Draper | lvan | \$5,739.72 | \$803.56 |
| 42 | 2637 Edwards | Jeffrey | \$2,583.42 | \$361.68 |
| 43 | 3381 Egan | Joseph | \$4,091.77 | \$572.85 |
| 44 | 3595 Ekoue | Ayi | \$3,228.50 | \$451.99 |
| 45 | 3125 Elam | Damon | \$2,717.46 | \$380.44 |
| 46 | 3567 Ernst | William | \$2,376.27 | \$332.68 |
| 47 | 2682 Fears | Thomas | \$5,133.60 | \$718.70 |
| 48 | 3549 Fesehazior Teabe | r Teabe | \$2,458.98 | \$344.26 |
| 6 | 3877 Filfel | Kamal | \$3,600.84 | \$504.12 |
| 50 | 3705 Fleming | Gary | \$3,703.17 | \$518.44 |
| 51 | 2782 Garcia | John | \$11,608.72 | \$1,625.22 |
| 52 | 3522 Gardea | Alfred | \$2,971.01 | \$415.94 |
| 53 | 3328 Gelane | Samuel | \$5,453.13 | \$763.44 |
| 54 | 3121 Gleason | John | \$4,945.41 | \$692.36 |

| | A B | U | Q | Ш |
|------|------------------------|-----------|-------------|------------|
| 55 | 3391 Grafton | Natasha | \$2,699.54 | \$377.94 |
| 26 | 19253 Gray | Gary | \$3,585.16 | \$501.92 |
| 57 | 3197 Green | Tony | \$3,452.77 | \$483,39 |
| 58 | 2755 Greever | Rickey | \$4,400.72 | \$616.10 |
| 59 | 2971 Gross | Timothy | \$2,101.65 | \$294.23 |
| 09 | 3402 Hansen | Jordan | \$2,292.03 | \$320,88 |
| 61 | 2564 Harris | Jay | \$2,173.95 | \$304.35 |
| 62 | 3855 Harris | Dennis | \$2,817.84 | \$394.50 |
| 63 | 3742 Haskell | William | \$4,364.03 | \$610.96 |
| 64 | 2206 Hay | Mark | \$4,403.72 | \$616.52 |
| 65 | 3808 Hays | Larry | \$2,357.84 | \$330.10 |
| . 99 | 3822 Holt | John | \$3,350.60 | \$469.08 |
| 29 | 2289 Huffman | Britton | \$2,193.60 | \$307.10 |
| 89 | 2400 Hughes | Jerry | \$3,120.94 | \$436.93 |
| 69 | 2751 Hurtado | Hubert | \$7,111.57 | \$995.62 |
| 2 | 3701 Jackson | Willie | \$3,073.67 | \$430.31 |
| | 108839 Jackson | Frederick | \$3,186.18 | \$446.07 |
| 72 | 2483 Javelona | Mario | \$3,671.36 | \$513.99 |
| 73 | 3315 Jimenez | Michael | \$3,796.31 | \$531,48 |
| 74 | 3109 Jin | Casey | \$2,587.54 | \$362.26 |
| 75 | 2253 Jones | Glenn | \$4,259.29 | \$596.30 |
| 9/ | 3784 Joseph | Leroy | \$2,800.21 | \$392.03 |
| | 3772 Kaiyooraw Chaipan | v Chaipan | \$3,517.55 | \$492.46 |
| 78 | 2736 Kenary | Brian | \$3,959.06 | \$554.27 |
| 79 | 3484 Kern | Gary | \$10,591.89 | \$1,482.86 |
| 80 | 3893 Klein | Phillip | \$4,168.54 | \$583.60 |
| 81 | 3630 Kogan | Martin | \$7,772.22 | \$1,088.11 |
| | 3685 Leal | | \$2,503.43 | \$350.48 |
| | 3702 Lee | Thomas | \$3,388.06 | \$474.33 |
| 84 | 3006 Loyd | Gary | \$3,499.87 | \$489.98 |
| 1 | 3326 Lucero | Arturo | \$2,094.93 | \$293,29 |
| 98 | 3778 Macato | Jaime | \$2,818.73 | \$394.62 |
| | 2912 Mahmud | Omar | \$2,822.46 | \$395,14 |

| , ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, | | | |
|---|----------|-------------|------------|
| 3096 Mainwarin David | n David | \$4,993.64 | \$699.11 |
| 2757 Majors | John | \$11,770.32 | \$1,647.84 |
| 3583 Maras | Maria | \$2,519.05 | \$352.67 |
| 2587 McCarter | Patrick | \$4,330.85 | \$606.32 |
| 3690 McCarthy | John | \$3,986.97 | \$558.18 |
| 2596 Meloro | Paul | \$5,653.96 | \$791.55 |
| 2838 Mersal | Beth | \$2,979.89 | \$417.18 |
| 2959 Miller | Darryl | \$5,806.88 | \$812.96 |
| 17855 Milliron | Darrol | \$2,470.06 | \$345.81 |
| 2933 Mitchell | Jimmy | \$5,244.30 | \$734.20 |
| 31966 Mitrikov | Ilko | \$2,559.19 | \$358.29 |
| 105284 Monforte i Peter | l Peter | \$5,822.92 | \$815.21 |
| 3664 Moreno | James | \$5,017.71 | \$702.48 |
| 2162 Morris | Robert | \$3,317.13 | \$464.40 |
| 8321 Morris | Thomas | \$5,277.68 | \$738.88 |
| 2642 Murray | MichaelJ | \$3,045.99 | \$426.44 |
| 2018 Murray | MichaelP | \$5,925.53 | \$2,962.77 |
| 3859 Nazarov | Mikael | \$2,817.84 | \$394.50 |
| 1098 Nicol | Thaddeus | \$2,742.98 | \$384.02 |
| 3876 Norvell | Chris | \$5,383.49 | \$753.69 |
| 3753 Olen | Virginia | \$2,551.91 | \$357.27 |
| 2810 Paranhos | Eurico | \$2,008.45 | \$281.18 |
| 3597 Pariso | David | \$5,498.67 | \$769.81 |
| 3624 Patry | Michael | \$2,508.64 | \$351.21 |
| 1076 Peterson | Steven | \$4,174.92 | \$584.49 |
| 2473 Phillips | Gordon | \$3,451.69 | \$483.24 |
| 3523 Pilkington | Margaret | \$2,484.22 | \$347.79 |
| 107617 Pineda | Carlos | \$3,435.52 | \$480.97 |
| 3265 Pletz | David | \$4,801.08 | \$672.15 |
| 3201 Presnall | Darryl | \$2,686.80 | \$376.15 |
| 2568 Price | James | \$4,079.75 | \$571.17 |
| 3525 Rasheed | Willie | \$5,105.98 | \$714.84 |
| 2237 Relonez | Craip | ¢2 /85 76 | 70 07 07 |

| r | | 4 | | |
|------|-------------------------|-------------|-------------|------------|
| 1 | A B | C | Q | |
| 121 | 3544 Reno | Michael | \$5,698.22 | \$2,849.11 |
| 122 | 3191 Rivas | Victor | \$2,023.03 | \$283.22 |
| 123 | 2842 Roberts | James | \$2,015.70 | \$282.20 |
| 124 | 3814 Rohlas | Polly | \$3,425.39 | \$479.55 |
| 125 | 3104 Rosenthal | l John | \$2,425.31 | \$339.54 |
| 126 | 3504 Rotich | Emertha | \$2,409.06 | \$337.27 |
| 127 | 3323 Saevitz | Neil | \$2,713.30 | \$379.86 |
| 128 | 3169 Salameh | George | \$2,458.27 | \$344.16 |
| 129 | 3042 Saleh | Jemai | \$9,630.99 | \$1,348.34 |
| 130 | 3648 Saravanos John | s John | \$5,901.46 | \$826.20 |
| 131 | 25981 Schroeder William | r William | \$2,421.42 | \$339.00 |
| 132 | 3313 Schwartz | Steven | \$5,259.91 | \$736.39 |
| 133 | 3134 Serio | John | \$4,291.21 | \$600.77 |
| 134 | 3057 Serrano | Hector | \$2,862.36 | \$400.73 |
| 135 | 2899 Shallufa | Azmy | \$11,250.30 | \$1,575.04 |
| 136 | 105863 Siljkovic | Becir | \$2,128.06 | \$297.93 |
| 137 | 3041 Smith | Lottie | \$7,713.81 | \$1,079.93 |
| 138 | 3770 Sorrosa | Juan | \$2,167.38 | \$303.43 |
| 139 | 3055 Spilmon | Mark | \$9,471.24 | \$1,325.97 |
| 140 | 3757 Steck | Gregory | \$6,688.75 | \$936.43 |
| 141 | 3165 Stevenson John | n John | \$3,055.03 | \$427.70 |
| 142 | 3713 Stonebreal Dawn | al Dawn | \$2,285.92 | \$320.03 |
| 143 | 3726 Thomas | Scott | \$3,067.17 | \$429.40 |
| 144 | 3867 Thompson Glen | n Glen | \$3,351.95 | \$469.27 |
| 1.45 | 27963 Thompson Michael | n Michael | \$7,738.38 | \$1,083.37 |
| 146 | 22120 Travis | Brian | \$2,046.14 | \$286.46 |
| 147 | 3207 Tucker | Kenlon | \$3,296.72 | \$461.54 |
| 148 | 2925 Van Camp | o Carl | \$4,076.58 | \$570.72 |
| 149 | 2846 Vaughan | William | \$4,459.40 | \$624.32 |
| 150 | 3721 Viado | Ramon | \$2,354.16 | \$329.58 |
| 151 | 3796 Vongthep | Christopher | \$3,110.20 | \$435.43 |
| 152 | 3820 Wallace | Roy | \$4,224.00 | \$591.36 |
| 153 | 3496 Weaver | Gerie | \$5,540.23 | \$775.63 |
| | | | | |

| | А | 8 | U | | 0 | [1] |
|-----|------------|-------------------------|---------|------------|------------|----------|
| 154 | 3616 | 3616 Welzbache Daniel | Daniel | , | \$2,716.47 | \$380.31 |
| 155 | 3071 | 3071 White | Donavan | | \$2,365.28 | \$331.14 |
| 156 | 3608 | 3608 Wilson Jr. Mose | Mose | ν, | \$3,823.64 | \$535.31 |
| 157 | 3910 Wong | | Jorge | ν Γ | \$2,667.79 | \$373.49 |
| 158 | 3092 Yabut | | Gerry | | \$6,228.67 | \$872.01 |
| 159 | 108389 | .08389 Yamaguchi Alicia | Alicia | 0, | 33,544.50 | \$496.23 |
| 160 | 17259 \ | 17259 Yurckonis Hilbert | Hilbert | Ŭ, | 52,748.69 | \$384.82 |
| 161 | 2273 2 | 2273 Zawoudie Masfen | Masfen | U F | 53,048.31 | \$426.76 |

EXHIBIT "C"

Electronically Filed 12/17/2018 7:26 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

RTRAN

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

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MICHAEL MURRAY, et al.,

CASE NO. A-12-669926-C

Plaintiffs,

DEPT. NO. I

VS.

A CAB TAXI SERVICE, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

Defendants.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE KENNETH CORY, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 4, 2018

RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING: ALL PENDING MOTIONS

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:

LEON GREENBERG, ESQ. DANA SNIEGOCKI, ESQ.

.....

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

JAY A. SHAFER, ESQ.

FOR THE SPECIAL MASTER:

PETER DUBOWSKY, ESQ.

RECORDED BY: LISA LIZOTTE, COURT RECORDER
TRANSCRIBED BY: VERBATIM DIGITAL DEPORTING A

TRANSCRIBED BY: VERBATIM DIGITAL REPORTING, LLC

Page 1

| 1 | LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 4, 2018 |
|----|--|
| 2 | (Case called at 10:18 A.M.) |
| 3 | THE CLERK: 9926. |
| 4 | THE COURT: Good morning. |
| 5 | MR. GREENBERG: Good morning, Your Honor. Leon |
| 6 | Greenberg, Dana Sniegocki for plaintiffs. |
| 7 | MS. SNIEGOCKI: Good morning. |
| 8 | THE COURT: Good morning. |
| 9 | MR. DUBOWKSY: Good morning, Your Honor. Peter |
| 10 | Dubowsky, counsel for the Special Master, Resolution |
| 11 | Economics. |
| 12 | THE COURT: Ah, good morning. |
| 13 | MR. SHAFER: Just me, Jay Shafer, for defendant. |
| 14 | THE COURT: Good morning. |
| 15 | MR. SHAFER: Good morning. |
| 16 | THE COURT: This is a little different type of |
| 17 | calendar than I usually I have. I put it on to give the |
| 18 | ruling on some motions that are on the chambers calendar, have |
| 19 | been on a chambers calendar. And then we have still, argument |
| 20 | on the TRO motion, and I believe that's it for for today. |
| 21 | Am I correct? |
| 22 | MR. GREENBERG: I believe so, Your Honor. |
| 23 | THE COURT: All right. |
| 24 | MR. SHAFER: Yeah. |
| 25 | THE COURT: I did not set this up so that we could |
| | |

have further argument on these. I just thought that perhaps it would make a little more sense if I explained, and some of this, I'll just flat be reading and you can, you know, hopefully, it will find its way into the order which is ultimately entered on these.

I'm going to take this out of order somewhat from perhaps the way that it was listed on our chambers calendar. The first one I'm going to deal with is the separate Motion for an Order Granting a Judgment Debtor Examination and for Other Relief. In response to that motion, the defendants argue that there are a number of objections, including that the plaintiffs' request is overbroad.

The Court has determined that the -- at this juncture in the case that it is sufficient -- it is sufficient that the interests that are argued in the Defendants' Opposition, that they are protected by having in place a Protective Order.

Accordingly, it's going to be the order of the Court that the Motion for Judgment Debtor Examination is granted, and an appropriate protective order, which I assume counsel will be able to work out, if not, then come back in front of me and we'll fashion an appropriate protective order.

There are allegations by the defendant that it would include turning over personal information on these -- on some of the individual cab drivers. Presumably, they are part of

Mr. Greenberg's clientele in this lawsuit. But as a precaution, I'm going to enter a protective order that none of the information which is turned over to -- or discovered through the judgment debtor examination by the plaintiff, none of it may be revealed beyond those -- to anyone other than those directly involved with this case.

It is not to be -- and that protective order applies to all personnel in Mr. Greenberg's firm -- they are not to reveal any of the information which is received except that which is brought up in court if it -- if it results in further court action.

As to the Plaintiffs' Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, the Court is granting that motion. Several figures were put forward by the plaintiff with different rationale or criteria for each of them.

The Court is awarding what amounts to sort of the middle position which is \$568,071 in attorneys' fees. The Court is satisfied over the objection of the defendants that the plaintiff has kept records, and we have seen them previously, some of them, in this lawsuit.

I'm not going to require the plaintiffs' counsel to cough up the 1,220 individual timesheets and -- nor am I -- do I agree that they -- that those fees are excessive. It probably would do with noting that we are dealing here with attorneys' fees which are mandated by the Constitution of the

State of Nevada to a prevailing party.

And this important factor is one which comes back into play in a number of the issues, both past issues, as well as those that are currently before the Court, because some of the arguments that the defense puts forward are not well-taken in the face of a cause of action which itself is vouchsafed, if you will, as a -- as a right in the Constitution of the State. And we could -- we could argue all day long about whether we agree with the philosophy of making essentially a -- what is otherwise handled as a statutory cause of action putting it into a constitution, but it's not for me to quibble about that.

It is, as a fact -- matter of fact part of the Constitution and this Court will do everything it can to vouchsafe those rights which are enumerated in our Constitution, and I consider this to be one of those rights.

The defendant contends that the plaintiffs will have -- will collect another 50 percent of the judgment, in addition to whatever fees the Court is awarding. I think that the plaintiffs have adequately responded. But, Mr. Greenberg, is it true that your fees will be exclusively from whatever the Court awards as attorneys fees and that you will not be taking, in addition to that, part of the judgment award as part of your fees?

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, I cannot do that under

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the retainer agreements with the representative plaintiffs.

I'm not authorized to do that, because Your Honor is setting my fee. But beyond whether I would argue that you authorized, I wouldn't as a matter of practice, and also, I can't in compliance with the judgment you entered in this case, Your Honor. The Judgment you entered back in August authorizes collection, but it specifically prohibits any disbursement of funds without further order from you.

So there may be circumstances where I would feel that it would be justified for me to come to the Court and ask that I be paid from the recovery, but that will be subject to your approval and submission to Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

So the Court orders that those attorneys fees in the amount of \$568,071 are awarded pursuant to Article 15, Section 16 of the Nevada Constitution.

In response to the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs have failed to exceed an Offer in Judgment, this is my decision regarding that.

While the defendants contend that plaintiffs did not beat the Offer in Judgment, when the \$7500 to plaintiff, Michael Murray, and \$15,000 to plaintiff, Michael Reno, were offered in an offer in judgment the -- while the defendants argue that plaintiff Reno was ultimately awarded 4966.19, and plaintiff Murray was awarded 770.33, and therefore, it is not

a more favorable judgment, well, without addressing any argument that could come up perhaps under our old statute about a reasonableness of rejecting such an offer, the Court simply finds that the plaintiffs did secure a judgment in excess of a million dollars on behalf of more than 900 plaintiffs, and the Court holds that plaintiffs did obtain a more favorable judgment pursuant to Article 15, Section 16, of the Nevada Constitution, and Rule 68.

As I indicated, Article 15, Section 16 of the Nevada Constitution states that a prevailing plaintiff in one of these causes of action, quote, "shall be awarded his or her reasonable attorneys fees and costs", close quote.

At the time that those offers of judgment were made, plaintiffs' counsel had already expended more than 70 hours totaling at least \$20,000. The offers of judgment to the plaintiffs in the amount of \$7,500 and \$15,000 were, quote, "inclusive of interest, costs and attorneys fees", close quote.

Partly because we are dealing here with a constitutional provision, which serves a compelling public purpose, the Court finds that the award of attorneys fees to a prevailing plaintiff is mandated by the Constitution and therefore it must be read into the calculation, if you will, of the offer in judgment, and whether or not it was exceeded by the plaintiffs.

As to defendants' arguments that the plaintiffs' request is untimely as the plaintiff has argued and shown to the Court, the contention that under Rule 54(d)(2)(B) one has only 20 days after Notice of Entry of Judgment is served, that provision also says that the time for filing the Motion for Fees and Costs may not be extended after it has expired whereas in this case the judgment itself provided that the time was extended to 60 days after the service of the order with Notice of Entry.

The Order was filed August 21st, 2018. Notice of Entry was filed August 22nd, 2018, and so the deadline to file the Motion for Attorneys Fees was approximately October 21st and the Motion for Fees was actually filed on October 12th, which was well within the 60-day period afforded by the Court.

Next, the defendants' argument that the costs must be denied. The argument includes the point that plaintiffs are seeking in excess of \$29,000 for experts who were never utilized. And then the defendant brings up the argument that — that these experts were subject to being stricken as not having met the required standards for admissibility, and it cites us to the defendants' own Motion in Limine to exclude the plaintiffs' experts.

And because the Court granted the plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, at that point in time, the Court never really ruled on Defendants' Motion in Limine to exclude the

plaintiffs' experts. For that reason, I will indicate that the Court was prepared to deny the defendants' motion and hold that the Court was satisfied that both Charles Bass and Terrence Claurite, however he says it, have the requisite knowledge, skill, experience, training and education to express expert opinions on the plaintiffs' model and that their testimony as to the reliability of the model and the propriety of using such a model in the instant case would assist the trier of fact in determining whether and to what extent wages are owed to the class members. It is, as well, it is appropriately limited in scope to each of their areas of expertise and, finally, is based upon sufficiently reliable methodology, and that it's largely based on particularized facts.

That record was not made because the Court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment in its place, but to -- to argue -- any argument that the issue raised by the defendants in their Motions in Limine would have precluded the granting of costs, for those experts, is not well-taken.

So in these post-summary judgment proceedings, the defendants continue to allege that they were blindsided by the Court appointing a Special Master and the subsequent granting of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. And they cite, again, to their Motion in Limine. So the Court will take this opportunity to explain to the defendants somewhat, part of the

course and reasoning of the December and January proceedings.

The Court heard the plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on December 14th of 2017. The Court granted that motion, but only to the extent of holding that the plaintiff had established liability. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed the plaintiffs' supplement in support of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment arguing that the damages and liability are inextricably related.

And the defendants also filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on November 27th, 2017, which was heard January 2nd, 2018. Other motions before the Court in the end of December 2017, and early January of this year, included the plaintiffs' Motion to Place Evidentiary Burden on the defendant and the Plaintiffs' Motion to Bifurcate or Limit Issues at Trial.

The defendants' objection to the Discovery

Commissioner's Report and Recommendation was also filed. Both defendants' and plaintiffs' Motions in Limine, the Defendants' Supplement Regarding January 2nd Hearing, and both sides' objections pursuant to Rule 16.1(3), and the Plaintiffs' motions to strike affirmative defenses was — it was upon review of all of those motions that the Court found that liability and damages were, indeed, inextricably related and that is precisely why the Court gave defendants one more opportunity to present evidence which would rebut that

liability, but they could not.

In preparation of those pretrial motions the Court inquired into what evidence would be submitted and presented at trial. In the defendants' Motion in Limine the defendants argued that the plaintiffs' expert's methodology was unreliable because it calculated damages derived from inaccurate information, despite the plaintiffs' experts using the information consisting of computer data -- computer data files, which were in fact provided by A Cab.

The defendants argued at that time that the trip sheets were the only accurate information, and that is precisely why this Court appointed a Special Master who, unfortunately, apparently, alleges at least, that they expended some \$85,000 before it was stopped, in order to review those trip sheets and those trip sheets, it bears repeating again, did not comply with NRS 608.115, and the Special Master was doing this in an attempt to make a determination on a precise calculation of hours.

The defendants continued to make their noncompliance with the recordkeeping statutes, use it as both a sword and a shield, and that is when this Court decided to apply the reasoning of the Mt. Clemens, United States Supreme Court opinion, which stated that, quote, "The employer cannot be heard to complain that the damages lacked the exactness of measurement that would be possible had he kept records," close

quote.

1.0

Contrary to the defendants' assertions that the experts were never utilized, the plaintiffs' experts were necessary to this Court in granting summary judgment. It was the defendants' lack of evidence of the precise amount of work performed to negate the reasonableness of the inferences to be drawn from the employees' evidence, which warranted the granting of summary judgment. Again, that is pursuant to Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Potter Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687, a 1946 case which essentially holds that, The burden shifts to the employer to come forward with evidence of the precise amount of work performed or with evidence to negative or negate the reasonableness of the inferences to be drawn from the employees' evidence. If the employer fails to produce such evidence the Court may then award damages to the employee, even though the result be only approximate.

Now, I believe that case was probably in response to a federal cause of action, not one that was in the State Constitution like ours, but I see no reason why I would differentiate on that basis, the reasoning. The reasoning is equally applicable to this type of a case.

The Court gave the defendants every opportunity to come forward with precise evidence but the defendants failed to provide the initial \$25,000 deposit that was ordered by this Court for the Special Master.

The defendants might have a colorable argument against the plaintiffs' expert costs had the Special Master completed his work regarding the trip sheets and had the trial proceeded on that basis. However, as we know, that's not the case here. That's not what happened.

Plaintiffs' experts were necessary and their expenses were reasonable given the extent of the work performed in calculating the damages based upon the computer data information which was provided by A Cab. Therefore, the costs are awarded in their entirety.

There was, additionally, a claim of exemption filed in the case, together with Plaintiffs' Objections to the Claims of Exemption, exemption from execution.

The Court agrees with the plaintiffs' analysis regarding their objections. The defendants' claims of exemption are denied except as to the Nevada "Wildcard" exemption, which it does appear to be appropriate pursuant to NRS 21.090(1)(z). Therefore, the "Wildcard" exemption is applied in this case and the Clerk of the Court shall remit \$10,000 out of -- we're speaking of the funds that were seized from the Bank -- \$10,000 to A Cab, LLC, and the remainder of the funds shall be -- which have been deposited with the Clerk of the Court, shall be remitted to Plaintiffs' counsel for placement in their IOLTA account pending further order of the Court.

Now, having made those determinations, I go back to a -- kind of a -- not a boilerplate, but expansive motion, and that is, plaintiffs' countermotion. When the defendants filed their Ex-Parte Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution, the plaintiffs' filed a Counter-Motion for Appropriate

Judgment Enforcement Relief in which they asked for a judgment debtor examination. The Court's already granted that from the specific order.

So, I suppose that this would actually, in terms of this Counter-Motion, would be denied as moot, since it was already granted in the specific motion filed by the plaintiffs.

They also asked that the Court order the property in the possession of the series LLC's belonging to A Cab, LLC, be deposited with plaintiffs' counsel.

For now, as will be explained a little bit further in a minute, the Court is going to not order that it be given to plaintiff's counsel, but that it not be -- the terms of the TRO that the plaintiffs have obtained -- well, I guess that is what is on calendar though, isn't it -- that it be -- not be sold off or given away, that the property be maintained pending further Order of the Court.

The plaintiffs also ask that the Court enjoin any transfer of funds from A Cab, LLC to any of its series LLC's, or to Defendant Nady, or any family members, without further

order of the Court. It follows, that the Court is going to grant that. In doing so, I am well aware that that is a terribly stifling order on a business.

Something has got to change in terms of the collectability of the judgment here. I have, in the past, spoken of not wanting to kill the goose that lays the golden egg, but perhaps this is a place to insert the comment that Mr. Nady himself indicated his understanding of this series, LLC legislation was that it would enable him to avoid liability, and he certainly has taken steps apparently to do so in this case.

You cannot do that. I cannot condone that and say that that's the purpose of the legislation. If I did say it was the purpose of the legislation -- and by that what I mean is to prevent collection of legitimate debts, like a judgment, then I would have to make some sort of balancing determination between the constitutional provision, and the legislation.

I don't believe it's necessary, because I don't think that it was the legislature's intent to allow someone to utilize that device in order to avoid paying one's debts ordered pursuant to a judgment, most particularly, one mandated by our Constitution.

The plaintiff also asked for an Order of Attachment of assets including the CPCN Medallion and the sale of same. The Court is not ordering that at this time. It's my belief,

as I'll get into -- well, I'll just say that I will leave that hanging until we determine the viability of the TRO which is on calendar today.

The plaintiff also asked that the Court appoint a receiver. I have avoided doing that since the problem that arose when the Court appointed a Special Master. The -- I don't know how we would -- I don't know how we would pay for the Receiver. I'm sure that the plaintiff has a notion on that, but I just -- I have made no determination on that point to this -- to this point.

That brings us then finally -- let's see -- to what is on calendar today and, let's see, that is the Motion for a TRO and the order requiring the turnover of certain property of the judgment debtor pursuant to NRS 21.320.

So with that, I'll hear argument from the plaintiffs first and then see what the defense has to say.

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, just to answer your question that you asked a few minutes ago about appointment of a receiver in this case and paying a receiver, from my perspective, the class here is presented with two fairly unattractive choices in terms of judgment enforcement at this point.

One is to proceed to attempt to liquidate whatever property can be attached from the business which I don't think is going to be enough to easily satisfy the judgment. The

alternative would be to have a Receiver appointed which is going to be an expense to run the business and hopefully collect over time enough revenue to pay the judgment because I do think the business has value as an ongoing operation, greatly in excess of what its value would be in liquidation.

But of the two choices that are presented, neither are terribly attractive, but I think it would be in the interest of class members to see a Receiver appointed rather than see the business -- seize doing business or simply be sent into liquidation which is the other road that we have available to us.

So to answer Your Honor's question about how a Receiver would be appointed, as I understand it, Your Honor, is authorizing the continued holding of the Wells Fargo funds that were executed on, and that would be deposited in my attorney trust account.

THE COURT: That's correct.

MR. GREENBERG: There are approximately \$200,000 of funds there. That would be enough, obviously, to at least pay a Receiver to sit down and go over the books and come up with some sort of plan of operation. My understanding is that the business has positive cash flow of approximately \$50,000 a month based on the financials that we have, you know, which are a couple years old.

THE COURT: Um-h'm.

MR. GREENBERG: But the more current financials show that A Cab's volume of business, as reported to the Tax Commission has been strong. Not every operator in Nevada -- in Las Vegas has been doing so well, but their business is apparently stable, or strong in terms of just the volume of trips they're taking, because they do have to publically report that.

So there's every reason to believe that a Receiver could step in here, and even though, you know, they may have to be paid some thousands of dollars a month to perform their job and oversee the operations, that it could, over time, generate enough revenue to pay the judgment.

And that would be our preference, Your Honor, rather actually -- I mean, the vehicles that I'm asking that be seized towards judgment satisfaction, I'm not sure these vehicles are even being used, actually, in the operations of the business.

But candidly, Your Honor, they're a fairly small asset upon liquidation value compared to the amount of the judgment. The reason why I've come to the Court and requested action on them is because it's simply the only other option I have available to me at this point.

THE COURT: What if you did, you know, sort of a standard Writ of Execution to go after them at which point the defendant could put forward their claim for exemption or any

other objection to it, and the Court could rule on it then?

MR. GREENBERG: Well, Your Honor, part of my problem is that the normal process with the Sheriff to execute on a vehicle is they want to have a license plate number, not just a VIN number. You can't get license plate numbers directly from the Department of Motor Vehicles. It is possible I could hire a private investigator who would have access to that information and be able to provide it, and then I could provide it to the Sheriff.

Setting aside the additional expense of doing that, the Sheriff still has to actually physically locate the vehicles. This is a fleet of vehicles, I mean, A Cab has a fleet of maybe a hundred vehicles, 70 vehicles, dozens of vehicles, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Um-h'm.

MR. GREENBERG: They have to go to the premises and try to find the vehicles, whether they -- if they don't have license plate numbers, it's pretty difficult to actually examine each vehicle to find the VIN number on it.

The purpose of the requested order -- and I actually drafted an order here that I could present to Your Honor for consideration to counsel -- ids really just to compel them to cooperate with the Sheriff in respect to these vehicles. I mean, if the Order is in place and the Sheriff goes down to the property, there's no question that they're under an

obligation to say, okay, well, we'll bring the vehicle in at 3:00 o'clock or it's out -- it's out being used right now.

When it comes off shift, we're going to hold it and turn it over to you, etcetera, etcetera. There's no -- Your Honor understands, these things can be difficult when it comes to, you know, collecting, or getting property in these kinds of situations.

I don't see that there's any -- Your Honor mentioned this question of exemption and I actually did -- because they raised this in their Opposition, and I was examining yesterday the provisions of 21.090 which contain the exemption provisions, and 1(f) provides for an exemption for one vehicle if the judgment debtor's equity does not exceed \$15,000.

I -- if defendants were to exempt one of these six vehicles that we've identified -- and there may be more, Your Honor, but my investigation leads me to believe that the -- 90 percent of their fleet, or whatever it is, the vast majority is actually titled to the series LLCs, not A Cab, LLC, the judgment debtor, which is the reason why I'm not bringing the issue before Your Honor as to the status of property that's -- that's titled allegedly to these separate non-debtor entities. I'm just focusing on what is, in fact, clearly, by public record, titled to the judgment debtor.

But if one of these vehicles were to be exempted, then the others would be subject to execution. I mean, the

Sheriff can take possession of the vehicles and at that point 1 2 the question of exemption can be taken care. Obviously, I 3 will cooperate and authorize pursuant to a court order and understanding, the release of one of the vehicles, and the 4 5 other four or five can be, you know, processed and sent to auction through -- through the normal course. I don't really 6 7 have much more to say about this, Your Honor. I mean --8 THE COURT: Okay. 9 MR. GREENBERG: -- if Your Honor would like to see the proposed order I drafted here, I could -- I could -- I 10 11 could approach the Bench --12 THE COURT: All right. 13 MR. GREENBERG: -- if you have questions. 14 THE COURT: Has the other side seen it? 15 MR. GREENBERG: No, I will give it -- I'll give it 16 to them right now. But it's --17 THE COURT: Okay. 18 MR. GREENBERG: -- it's two pages, it's about two 19 paragraphs. 20 THE COURT: Okay. 21 MR. GREENBERG: It's relatively short, Your Honor. 22 (Mr. Greenberg hands document to Mr. Shafer and to the Court) 23 THE COURT: Is this essentially a turnover order 24 that -- such as you were arguing for, or does this merely 25 prevent them from selling or otherwise getting rid of the

vehicles?

MR. GREENBERG: Well, the actual recital of relief, the bottom paragraph of page one, makes clear that the relief being ordered is in respect only to the fact that A Cab, LLC is the sole title of any motor vehicles. So to the extent that there are motor vehicles that are owned by the series, that are owned by multiple owners on title, they are not affected by this order. I mean, I'm trying to limit this clearly to the property that is solely in the possession of the judgment debtor, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: And that is -- that's on the first -- the bottom paragraph on the first page.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GREENBERG: And the particular relief that I'm suggesting the Court order is confined to the top half of the second page.

And the purpose is to require that the defendants deliver, disclose upon inquiry by, or otherwise fully cooperate with the Sheriff of Clark County and make available for judgment execution all motor vehicles of which A Cab is the sole owner, including, but not limited to the following vehicles, unless the following vehicles, in fact, are not owned by them.

And, you know, to the extent that they say that I am

in error on the titles, the title information I've presented 1 to the Court is not correct, they obviously could still 2 establish that under this order and be excused from, you know, 3 4 turning those vehicles over to the Sheriff. But these 5 vehicles I have identified as having title held solely in the 6 name of the judgment debtor. 7 They have not disputed that, Your Honor, in their 8 Opposition. And the judgment is of record, Your Honor. I 9 don't see that there's a basis to deny the relief that's 10 requested here. I think Your Honor understands. any questions, anything I could assist the Court with? 11 12 THE COURT: Okay. The Motion and Order are directed 13 solely to these vehicles; correct? MR. GREENBERG: Well, it commands their cooperation 14 15 in respect to any motor vehicle. 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 MR. GREENBERG: So it identifies these. It says, 13 the following listed vehicles, including but not limited to. Candidly, Your Honor, I don't believe there are any other 19 20 vehicles or if there are any other vehicles, their value is 21 probably fairly small because they are very old. 22 THE COURT: Okay. All right. 23 MR. SHAFER: I'll just respond. I think this is 24 indicative of the problem, that there are shortcuts here. And 25 I respect the Court's position regarding the validity of the

judgment and I'm not going to begin to address that.

The thing here is, it is enshrined in our Constitution, a respect for due process, and a respect for the execution of the -- that is set out in the statute. They are asking essentially for an injunction to shut down the business. They want every vehicle that A Cab uses. And, in fact -- and I'll -- I'll briefly address this. If -- well, would you -- I'd like to address the issue of the restraint of the transfer of funds to the series LLC. Would you like me to do that now or at the end of my argument?

THE COURT: Let's -- let's talk first about the --

MR. SHAFER: Okay.

THE COURT: -- vehicles --

MR. SHAFER: All right.

THE COURT: -- and then we'll go on to the other.

MR. SHAFER: So they have essentially asked for injunctive relief for all of the property, regardless of the fact that it is neither owned by A Cab, however, that there is a claim of exemption for that. They haven't engaged in the — in the process or the evaluation that is required under injunctive statute, but you have to go through the test for setting out whether they have a reasonable probability of success, the suffering of irreparable harm, a balancing of the hardship, including a balancing of the hardship to the public and whether the present — it maintains the status quo.

Forcing --

THE COURT: The question I would have for you is how applicable is that at the, you know, following judgment? That certainly is the correct standard when you're dealing on the front end of a case where you don't have all the facts ascertained and the -- so you have to go through the test. But in this case, we're at the judgment.

MR. SHAFER: Correct.

THE COURT: So does those --

MR. SHAFER: We are --

THE COURT: -- does those -- is there some authority that says that you still apply the balancing kind of test that you would if this were a TRO on the front end of a case?

MR. SHAFER: Well, they are asking for injunctive relief not just as to A Cab but to all the other series. We have not been subjected to due process or, you know, service in this case.

It would be one thing if they were executing a single Writ as to, for example, the 2008 Toyota Corolla with a VIN ending 5153 because there is a set statutory process for which they execute the Writ, there's a basis for an objection and then a hearing is heard on that vehicle. They're asking for injunctive relief as to all vehicles, and precluding — precluding A Cab from either transferring or acquiring new they, you know, if they have a defunct cab that they need to

sell for parts they can't do that. They can't operate in the 1 2 normal business. 3 And so if the Court enjoins these cars, and forces the turnover of these cars without the due process required in 4 5 the writ process, it will deprive -- of the four cars which 6 they alleged are owned by A Cab, that will put 8 to 12 cab 7 drivers out of work. Moreover --8 THE COURT: So those are -- those are cabs? 9 are being used as cabs; is that right? 10 MR. SHAFER: I believe so. I mean, they -- A Cab doesn't own any vehicles that they don't use for cabs. 11 12 THE COURT: All right. 13 MR. SHAFER: It will also deprive the public of 14 being --15 THE COURT: Well, are the using the Mercedes Benz as 16 a cab? 17 MR. SHAFER: No. The Mercedes Benz is a personal vehicle, I understand. 18 19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 MR. SHAFER: And the other vehicle is registered to 21 another company called Guard Force out of Arizona. It's my understanding that that -- that's what the use of those two 22 23 vehicles. 24 THE COURT: Is that the Ford Transit? 25 MR. SHAFER: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay. 1 MR. SHAFER: That's my understanding of what the 2 3 situation is. And they certainly say that their investigation has led them to believe that these are owned by A Cab but 4 5 there's no documentation of that. 6 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 7 MR. SHAFER: My understanding is that they're not 8 owned by A Cab, that they're owned by other entities. And 9 therein lies the problem; without a hearing or proper source of claim for exemption they could basically take anything or 10 put my client in a significant risk of harm for trying to, you 11 12 know, dispose of their personal property if they're subject to 13 this --THE COURT: So are --14 15 MR. SHAFER: -- TRO. 16 THE COURT: -- you saying that contrary to what the 17 plaintiff is claiming that these -- let's take the four 18 Toyotas -- that they are not owned by the defendant? MR. SHAFER: I'm -- I'm not making a position on 19 20 that either way at this point. Because of the shortness of 21 time that we had to respond, just a few days, I was not able to get that information as to whether or not they are still 22 owned by A Cab, or whether they had been transferred to and --23 24 or sold to another entity.

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THE COURT: Well, I guess that kind of puts us right

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1 into what the quandary is. The plaintiffs are saying don't 2 let them sell off the property --3 MR. SHAFER: Right. 4 THE COURT: -- and --MR. SHAFER: Well, and --5 6 THE COURT: -- spend the money. 7 MR. SHAFER: Well, and the thing is, they would have 8 used this isn their ordinary course of business. I'm not 9 saying that they have been, I'm just saying I don't know. 1.0 do not know what the status of these vehicles is, above the 11 purported document that they have submitted in support of their motion which claims to be from the DMV. So I'm not 12 contesting that they are or they aren't subject to that, but I 13 know --14 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 MR. SHAFER: -- I've been told that the Mercedes and 17 the Ford are not A Cab's vehicles. 18 THE COURT: Would it make more sense from your 19 standpoint, or at least comport more with your -- your notion 20 of due process, etcetera, if the Court merely entered a 21 Restraining Order preventing any of the defendants from hypothecating, selling, giving away, whatever, any of the 23 vehicles which are currently in the name of the -- in other 24 words, and then require the -- the plaintiff to do a Writ of 25 Execution and defendant would have -- defendants would have

1 opportunity then to --2 MR. SHAFER: Okav. 3 THE COURT: -- do any claim of exemption. 4 that --5 MR. SHAFER: The answer to that is I have no problem with them proceeding with the Writ except subject to a caveat 6 7 which we have filed in our Opposition and Counter-Motion for 8 Stay, but we can reach that in just a minute. 9 THE COURT: Yeah. 10 MR. SHAFER: As to the transfer, the problem with 11 the transfer of the vehicles is that they acquire the vehicles and then they are transferred to the series LLC to establish 12 13 new entities or sometimes they are sold to another cab company 14 depending on -- as to these four vehicles, I would be fine 15 with an order of the Court precluding their transfer or sale 16 or further encumbrance as to these four Toyotas, if -- if they 17 still owned them at the time that they were served with the --18 with the order. 19 THE COURT: What about a restraining order that was broader than that, that simply said that the defendants are 20 21 enjoined from selling off, giving away, getting rid of any of the vehicles owned by these defendants? 23 MR. SHAFER: By A Cab? I think that that might be 24 okay. 25 THE COURT: By A Cab Taxi Service, A Cab, LLC --

MR. SHAFER: Correct.

THE COURT: -- I believe, also A Cab Series, LLC, and Mr. Nady.

MR. SHAFER: Well, Mr. Nady is not subject to the judgment, nor has he been brought in, has no restrictions. He can sell or dispose of his personal property as he would like. And that's not here.

I have no problem with the A Cab. My concern is as to the other series which own their own vehicles that are not subject to this jurisdiction at this point which we're still undergoing and may have an issue. But as to these four vehicles, I have no problem stipulating that A Cab will not transfer or if it hadn't -- if it still had them at the time that they were served with the Writ.

THE COURT: Um-h'm.

MR. SHAFER: Because if they somehow sold it before the Writ was served upon us then we can't maintain it if it's gone already. Other than that, I have no problem with that.

My concern is just the overbroadness of the potentially anything. You know, and they have a protection, because under the statute, if there were a transfer that wasn't in the ordinary course of business and value wasn't received, then there — they can move to set that aside as a fraudulent transfer. You know, if A Cab sells these vehicles for a dollar to B Cab, or some other entity, or you know,

Desert Cab or some other entity, without getting value for the receipt, then that would be subject to a set-aside under the fraudulent transfer statute.

If they sell the cab for \$25,000 because they need it to fund on going operations, they have received value for it and the plaintiffs are not in any worse condition that they — that there is liquid funds versus actual property to be executed upon. In fact, they're probably better off, because they don't have the transactions costs from the Sheriff and get a highest and best value.

You know, we would be happy to keep records of any transfer of sale of the property, such that there's no concern about the property going out the back door or under cover of night, that they know where it is and where everything went --received.

It is not our intention to try to pull a fast one or pull the wool over their eyes. We have a significant, obviously, a dispute that is on appeal regarding the validity of this and that needs to go through the process and then -- I think as to why we have a stay, or why we've asked for a stay.

But certainly, I think that an order requiring a defendant to turnover all of it's property is overbroad. As to these specific four vehicles, that's a different matter. There is the question though of whether or not it is in the best interests to force a turnover, to deprive 8 to 12

employees of their gainful employment and to cease service to the community. There was a reference to the appointment of a Receiver.

THE COURT: Is this where we get into the employees and the holiday season and putting them out of work and --

MR. SHAFER: I think we've addressed that in our Opposition and I won't belabor the point.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SHAFER: But I think that is a significant concern. Contrary to where — where we are now in the operation of the Cab business is substantially less profitable than it was 5 or 6 years ago. With the advent of Uber, Lyft and the other companies, there's been a significant drain on the demand for taxi companies. Further, there has been an increased vehicle cost. Vehicles cost more now than they used to. Gas costs more now than it used to. All the materials cost more now than they used to.

Labor costs more because now there's been an additional change in how they do that, I suppose. So they are less profitable now than they were 5 or 6 years ago.

And certainly, and I think this is where we go to, if they are precluded from transferring money to the series LLCs, that means that A Cab can't pay for the maintenance of the company. It can't pay for the operations because it can't pay its labor. It can't pay for the use of the medallions or

the taxis because that's how they pay for it. They have transfers between the series LLCs to account for the economic value that each one contributes.

And if they're precluded from doing so there is no way to pay its ongoing bills and expenses. But as far -- so I think as far as the TRO, I think it is overbroad. I think they -- they had their TRO. Now, they are asking for further injunctive relief.

THE COURT: Um-h'm.

MR. SHAFER: Because they want any property ever that -- that A Cab has, any vehicle that they ever have to be subject to turnover by the -- by the -- to the -- to the Sheriff.

And they haven't gone through the analysis under the injunctive relief and I don't believe that it's appropriate at this time to enter such an expansive relief.

THE COURT: Well, I wonder if in making these arguments which I -- which I -- I think are credible arguments, and one that the Court would have to deal with, and the plaintiffs would have to deal with, I wonder if you aren't -- if it doesn't become an argument in favor of putting a Receiver in, that that's the only thing that will preserve the assets without having to stop and run to court every time we turn around to try and get, you know --

MR. SHAFER: Yeah.

1 THE COURT: -- to have all these skirmishes over 2 whether --3 MR. SHAFER: Yeah. 4 THE COURT: -- the property belongs to the 5 defendant, whether the defendant can hypothecate it or, you 6 know. 7 MR. SHAFER: Well, and I think I could address that. 8 There has been no significant risk of harm for A Cab disposing of its assets improperly. Apart from the arguments --9 THE COURT: Say that again? There's been no risk 1.0 of harm --11 12 MR. SHAFER: Let me -- let me -- rephrase this. 13 THE COURT: Okay. 14 MR. SHAFER: Plaintiffs have argued that money might 15 go out the back door, that it might get transferred 16 inappropriately, precluding their execution on the judgment. 17 THE COURT: Um-h'm. MR. SHAFER: There's no -- been no risk or 18 19 indication or any factual evidence that such a -- that that either could or would occur. There's been no evidence that 20 21 there's been a significant transfer of funds to Jay Nady or some other entity, that there's been a massive sell-off of its 22 23 assets or other transfer. They are continuing to operate 24 their business as they have and continuing to serve the public 25 as they have and continuing to account for, as they always

have. There is no risk of harm that the plaintiffs will have if they continue -- if they allow this to go forward in the ordinary course.

You have ordered a judgment debtor exam and for the turnover of financial records. That will essentially determine what a Receiver would uncover anyway without the additional expense.

Now, there are times where Receivers are appropriate and I think useful. In this instance, I don't know that they are, not only because of the additional costs, but because of the nature of the business, I do not know that a Receiver could be appointed to a regulated business such as this. I have not researched that issue but I know that there are strict limitations put on the operation of a business that has a Certificate of Public Necessity.

And so I don't know that if we were to appoint a Receiver that they could continue to operate as a cab company because that Receiver would then have to be subject to investigation and approval by the Taxi Cab Authority, if they are making business decisions and operational decisions about the company.

THE COURT: Is that because this is a license, the type of license that --

MR. SHAFER: That is my understanding, correct.

THE COURT: Um-h'm. Okay.

MR. SHAFER: So -- and again, that's not been briefed, and I think that's why these ad hoc arguments do not serve any party and it would be better to take this in the ordinary course and with a calm and measured approach to how things are to go forward.

Obviously, if there's transfers, you know, a million dollars in gold bouillon goes out the back door to Jay Nady and he starts tiling his walk with it or something like that, then we've got a different situation. But we don't have that, Your Honor. We have they're continuing to operate, continuing to provide taxi service to the public.

So, I think that you have ordered a judgment debtor exam which somebody from A Cab will show up and produce records subject to these objections which will show the finances. There is -- and so on that basis, without getting too much into our countermotion for stay, unless you'd like us to address that now --

THE COURT: No.

MR. SHAFER: -- I think that the -- our sole position is that the TRO or the injunctive relief as to all vehicles is just overbroad and there's no basis for it at this point. If they have the specific four vehicles that they would like turned over, that should go through the Writ process.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Greenberg?

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MR. GREENBERG: Yes, Your Honor. The problem here is that there's representations made that, you know, well, there's no diversion of funds, there's no money that's going out the back door. We don't really know what's going on, Your Honor. And more to the point is, again, the value of the business here is as an ongoing operation.

And what's going on here is that the operation of the business through the series LLCs is completely dependent upon the judgment debtor status holding that CPCN. the CPCN. They have the medallions. They then have this arrangement with this multitude of series LLCs to have them use the medallions to actually generate money.

So, the series can't operate without the cooperation of the judgment debtor in terms of giving them access to the medallions. Mr. Nady's testimony at his deposition -- and this is in the record, otherwise, I have it on my computer here -- is that the way the business functions is that the revenue comes in in the first instance to the cells, to the series, LLCs, which are running the tabs. And then at the end of the day, the money gets transferred out of that company into a personal account of mine.

THE COURT: Um-h'm.

MR. GREENBERG: So what happens is, is that -- the fruits of the enterprise are going directly to Mr. Nady by his own testimony. There's no reason under this business

structure that any money should ever come back to the judgment debtor. That is how the business is organized, Your Honor. So ultimately, the purpose of appointing a Receiver is a Receiver who has control over the judgment debtor and the judgment debtor's use of those medallions is going to have to come in and essentially have the business restructured so that the profits that are earned, the revenue that's earned from the operation of those medallions, comes back to the judgment debtor for purposes of paying the creditors here which are my clients, the class members. Under the current structure, that money is just gone at the source or origin, essentially.

THE COURT: Um-h'm.

MR. GREENBERG: You understand my point, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Um-h'm.

MR. GREENBERG: And in terms of appointing a Receiver and how this may be a problem in respect to the operation of the Tax Commission and the CPCN, we're not suggesting that Mr. Nady be displaced from managing the business. I mean, we're simply asking that a Receiver come in and be responsible for seeing that the revenue of the business, as generated, is directed for the benefit of the creditors, here, for my client.

And we would be very amenable, and presumably the Court would be willing to supervise some sort of plan whereby the Receiver would earmark a certain amount of that revenue

and that profit to pay towards the judgment and a certain amount would be reserved for the owners of the business to continue. I mean, we can be cooperative here in terms of working out what would be akin, Your Honor, to in the bankruptcy process, a Chapter 13 restructuring, but here in the State Court, under your supervision with the guidance of a Receiver.

The problem is the defendants are simply not going to cooperate with any process like that unless Your Honor directs it. They have no incentive to. The revenue that's coming into the business, it's going out to the -- to the beneficiaries of the business directly from the operations at the source.

So the purpose of the Receiver is not actually to make them do anything different in respect to the -- the day-to-day operations of the business. It's only essentially to go in, do an accounting, see that the funds are, in fact, being directed to pay the judgment creditors, or in a cooperative basis, some portion of the funds, at least, are directed to pay for the judgment creditor --

THE COURT: So --

MR. GREENBERG: -- Mr. -- Mr. Nady presumably should be entitled to compensation for running the business if he's going to manage the business actively, as I think he has been doing.

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THE COURT: So it would be more of a simply a reporting process that Mr. Nady would make to the Receiver of monies that had been received by any of the defendants, corporate defendants?

MR. GREENBERG: Well, Your Honor, under the current structure, as limited documentation we have, is essentially the series LLCs have the medallions. They generate the fare revenue from the passengers, and then they — they pass certain portions of that revenue on to a company that pays the driver, that pays for the maintenance and other series that pays for the maintenance of the vehicle, and whatever profit is left goes directly to Mr. Nady. That profit amount needs to go back to the judgment debtor. It needs to go back to A Cab, LLC so it can be available to pay the creditors of the judgment debtor. The purpose —

THE COURT: So how would you -- what I'm trying to get at is what -- what would this order of appointing a Receiver, what would his duties and powers be?

MR. GREENBERG: His duties would be to have control over the use of all the medallions that are issued to the judgment debtor, which the judgment debtor has essentially leased to all the individual Series and to require that the judgment debtor get value for the use of those medallions.

Currently, the judgment debtor is giving those medallions out to all of the series, and the judgment debtor

is not getting anything back, because none of the money comes back to it. They, in fact, right now are making very meticulous care to be sure none of it comes back to them because it will be attached on the judgment. The money -- the profit from the business goes out to Mr. Nady directly from the Series themselves which are generated the fair revenue.

And, Your Honor, part of the -- part of what we wanted in terms of the way the judgment debtor examination was the financials that were filed with the Taxi Commission, because I am sure they are filing a consolidated financial statement with the Taxi Commission which indicates that A Cab is, in fact, operating as a single business entity. It's not -- it's 200 separate individually financially, you know, sustaining entities as they are alleging as a matter of law in respect to the attachment of its assets and income.

Essentially, A Cab, the judgment debtor itself, in the defendants' view has no income because all of the revenue that comes in is, again, at the source. It goes to the -- it goes to these various separate Series LLCs. And to the extent that there's any profit there it goes directly from there to Mr. Nady. It never comes back to --

THE COURT: Well, I'm still trying to figure out what -- how you would -- how you would formulate the duties and powers of this Receiver --

MR. GREENBERG: Well, Your Honor, if the --

1 THE COURT: -- in terms of this -- this cash flow 2 business. 3 MR. GREENBERG: If the Receiver's duties would be to review how the medallions issued to the judgment debtor are 4 5 being used and to ensure that the profits generated from those 6 medallions are coming back to A Cab, LLC, the judgment debtor. 7 They are not going from the operators, which are the series to 8 Mr. Nady. 9 THE COURT: Well, but what -- see, I'm trying to get 10 at, what -- where does the Receiver insert himself or herself into the business functioning of A Cab? Does he or she simply 11 12 get bank statements, get reports of this money that's flowing 13 through --14 MR. GREENBERG: Well --15 THE COURT: -- A Cab -- well, through all the series 16 and then to Mr. Nady and then from Mr. Nady back to A Cab? 17 MR. GREENBERG: -- you -- you -- well, when Mr. Nady was examined at his deposition in 2017 about this, about how 18 19 the fares are collected --20 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 21 MR. GREENBERG: -- and what happens to the money, 22 the revenue that's generated, and he was specifically asked 23 about this. This is at page 70 of his deposition transcript.

I believe this may be in the record elsewhere. He says, "At

the end of the day, all those sales is most of the money.

24

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sales all have money on them all the time, but most of the 1 money gets transferred out of the company into a personal 2 3 account of mine and then the next day it goes back into the administration company or the payroll company as it is 4 5 required." 6 THE COURT: Okav. 7 MR. GREENBERG: So the money goes directly from the 8 cab that's generating the fares, the series -- the single 9 series entity that is operating that taxi cab and gets that fare in the first place, then gives the money to Mr. Nady. 10 11 Mr. Nady then returns such monies as are necessary at that 12 point to fund administration of the company, maintenance of the vehicles, payroll, etcetera. 13 14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 MR. GREENBERG: Whatever he doesn't need to return 16 he keeps. 17 THE COURT: So what --18 MR. GREENBERG: The --19 THE COURT: -- do you want the Receiver to do? 20 MR. GREENBERG: What I want the Receiver to do is to 21 compel that the series that's operating that medallion, remit 22 the fares to A Cab, LLC, to the company. And --23 THE COURT: So cut Mr. Nady out of that flow? 24 MR. GREENBERG: Right. Have -- the funds need to go 25 back to the judgment debtor from all the medallion operations

1 and then -- and then the Receiver will have oversight as to 2 what happens. I mean, Mr. Nady's presumably knows how to run a taxi business, I mean, they've been running a successful 3 · 4 taxi business. 5 Again, we are not advocating that he should be 6 removed from management of the business, but the funds need to 7 go from the operators of the medallions into the judgment 8 debtor's account, and then the Receiver will authorize the 9 payment for maintenance costs, employee costs and so forth. 10 THE COURT: So the Receiver -- no payments could be made from the judgment debtor's accounts without approval of 11 12 the Receiver? 13 MR. GREENBERG: That is correct, Your Honor. the Receiver needs to restructure the business so that the --14 15 the fares generated by the medallions come back to the 16 judgment debtor. Currently, they don't come to the --17 THE COURT: When you say --18 MR. GREENBERG: -- judgment debtor. 19 THE COURT: -- when you say restructure the business 20 do you mean simply that Mr. Nady be cut out of the cash flow 21 at least at that initial stage --22 MR. GREENBERG: Correct. He -- he --23 THE COURT: -- let the money go to the -- to the 24 judgment debtor or debtors, and that it not be disbursed 25 without the approval of the Receiver.

1 MR. GREENBERG: Correct. And -- and --2 THE COURT: Which presumably would then disburse all 3 normal business expenses to be paid. 4 MR. GREENBERG: Correct, Your Honor, and that could 5 include an appropriate salary compensation to Mr. Nady for 6 managing the business. The Receiver would -- would have a 7 plan, would come to Your Honor for approval. We would 8 cooperate with that process. 9 THE COURT: Okay. 1.0 MR. GREENBERG: To the extent that there's profit leftover that would be -- go to pay the creditors, my clients. 11 12 THE COURT: Okay. Let's get a snapshot response 13 from Mr. Shafer and see what he thinks of that. 14 MR. SHAFER: I think our snapshot response is that 15 we're getting sandbagged here. They're bringing up relief -they've had plenty of opportunity to bring up the issue of a 16 17 Receiver; they've been collecting for months. And given the issues that I have, I don't think we can capitulate to this 18 given the significant issues we think might exist. 19 20 THE COURT: The -- given --21 MR. SHAFER: As far as the Receiver --22 THE COURT: -- the what? 23 MR. SHAFER: -- as far as the appointment of the 24 Receiver and whether it conflicts with the licensing of it. 25 They've also asked for a restructuring. It is cleverly

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1
    argued, essentially, he wants to structure it so that no
    payments can be made to these separate companies.
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 3
    payments can't be made to me as his -- their attorney to
 4
    defend the case. The payments can't be made to their gas
 5
    company --
 6
              THE COURT: Well --
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              MR. SHAFER: -- without appointment of a Receiver
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    which is -- that is a possibility --
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              THE COURT: -- yeah, that --
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              MR. SHAFER: -- for a Receiver, but that's a
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    significant --
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              THE COURT: -- that the Receiver would --
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              MR. SHAFER: -- expense.
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              THE COURT: -- would have the say-so, whether the
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    money goes to those various places --
              MR. SHAFER: Yeah. And that's a --
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              THE COURT: -- right?
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              MR. SHAFER: -- significant involved process, that
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    substantially increases the expenses. And I don't know that
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    there's --
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              THE COURT: Well, then what if -- what if initially
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    the order did not quite go that far but simply said the
   Receiver will be made aware of all payments? In other words,
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    that he -- he get access to the bank accounts of the debtors,
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   judgment debtors, and that he be made aware of what payments
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are going where.

MR. SHAFER: And I think my -- my response to that I think would be that we still have some of the same issues as far as briefing and the additional expense. And I don't know what additional value it would bring given that the Court has already required us to turn over the financial information as part of the judgment debtor exam process. I don't know what --

THE COURT: Well, that's on a one-time basis though, right?

MR. SHAFER: Yeah.

THE COURT: We're talking about doing something that we'd try to keep -- you know, once again we revisit the notion of whether to keep the goose alive.

MR. SHAFER: Well, it's not going to. And I just -THE COURT: Why?

MR. SHAFER: Well, given the Court's instruction that A Cab can't transfer any funds to the other Series, that's going to shut down the business. And that's why I wanted to --

THE COURT: No, I say, what if initially it was merely that the Receiver be there and be able to monitor all those payments, not necessarily that the Receiver has to give permission for any payments to be made, but that be made aware of exactly what payments are going where?

MR. SHAFER: I think my response to that would be tied in with both the opportunity -- we'd like to have an opportunity to brief that issue for the Court and the potential complex -- complexities that might arise being a regulated business, and also our request for a stay that we hadn't really addressed at this point.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. SHAFER: But we had made a counter-motion for a stay for two reasons. First, there are some issues, some of which are the orders which were delivered today that we may need to be seeking a writ on appeal. We've not had an opportunity to do so which directly come into whether or not we can be collected on.

The other issue is that the Supreme Court has ordered a stay on the proceedings pending assignment to the Supreme Court Settlement Program. So A Cab can't take forward it's appeal and can't get the timely relief because it's been assigned to the Supreme Court Settlement Program.

And I'm hopeful that that might resolve the issues. But it would be best for all parties to go in on equal footing and not feel like we are unable to proceed in that Supreme Court Settlement Program.

THE COURT: Well, are you -- are you saying that because of the stay imposed that the Court, essentially, has lost jurisdiction and can't order any of these things?

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MR. SHAFER: I -- well, I don't know on that issue.
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    I think practically that would be the case. I mean, if the
    Supreme Court isn't proceeding, has instituted a stay, I think
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    it would only be fair the District Court institute a stay for
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   the same period of time until this matter can be heard through
   the Supreme Court Settlement Program.
7
              THE COURT: Well, when you say through the Supreme
8
   Court Settlement Program --
             MR. SHAFER: Um-h'm.
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              THE COURT: -- let's assume that these folks don't
   get along any better than they have in the past, and that it
11
   doesn't settle.
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13
             MR. SHAFER: Um-h'm.
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              THE COURT: How long would we simply hang fire?
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             MR. SHAFER: Until it -- until the stay is in place
   with the Supreme Court Settlement Program. It would track
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17
   concurrently.
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              THE COURT: I'm sorry? Until --
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             MR. SHAFER: It would track concurrently.
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   because right now we can't go forward with the briefing on the
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   issue and get it in front of the Supremes because it's
22
   assigned to the settlement program.
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              THE COURT: Yeah.
             MR. SHAFER: And I think it is our argument that
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   during that period of time collection should not be allowed to
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occur that would harm A Cab's ability to either make a
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    voluntary -- you know, a voluntary payment settlement, or to
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    be hindered in its ability to address this. If we're
    constantly having to fight against collection and having to
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 5
    spend the time and resources there, it incurs a loss to
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    plaintiff and a loss to A Cab by diverting resources which
 7
    could be used to pay for or voluntarily given to plaintiffs to
    satisfy the judgment.
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 9
              THE COURT: Is there any reason to believe that
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    these folks will, after the knockdown, drag out that we've
    been through to this point, that they will be able to agree as
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    to most anything, even the time fo day?
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              MR. SHAFER: I don't -- I --
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              THE COURT: I mean, I have to --
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              MR. SHAFER: No, I know.
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              THE COURT: -- look at that notion with a bit of a
17
    jaundiced eye.
              MR. SHAFER: And I think that is absolutely
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19
    appropriate. We have certainly had cases -- I've had cases
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    where we think they are going to settle and they don't,
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    wherein they don't --
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              THE COURT: Yeah.
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              MR. SHAFER: -- and they -- and then they end up
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    settling.
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             THE COURT: Yeah.
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MR. SHAFER: But I think that all parties recognize the seriousness of this judgment. While A Cab has issues with the -- some of the issues which led up to it and are on appeal, they recognize that even if some of those issues are not -- are, you know, remanded for further, you know, issues, that there is the cost of defense and the possibility that a judgment still may be entered against them.

THE COURT: Um-h'm.

MR. SHAFER: And so they are certainly willing to negotiate and have — are motivated to resolve this. But I think that's our point is let's have an opportunity to sit down at the table.

And I can't speak to what happened before my involvement two months ago, but since I've been involved, there certainly hasn't been any discussion as to a potential resolution, so or that I'm aware of.

THE COURT: Um-h'm.

MR. SHAFER: But I think that's our request is that let's maintain the status quo until such time as this matter can at least be heard in front of a settlement conference and that there is a good faith opportunity to try to resolve this.

If my client -- if A Cab has to give up all its vehicles, it can't operate. It doesn't have any ability to try to resolve this. And it just -- it'll result in a liquidation and this matter will be mooted as a matter of

1 course. 2 As far as the payments and the representations as to what happened, respectfully, that is not necessarily what 3 happens. Mr. Nady doesn't get payments himself personally. 4 5 Payments are made to a --6 THE COURT: Until what? 7 MR. SHAFER: The payments are not made to Mr. Nady 8 personally. 9 THE COURT: It thought that's what his testimony 10 was. 11 MR. SHAFER: Well, he was mistaken. They are made 12 to a trust. And that is, again --13 THE COURT: To his trust? 14 MR. SHAFER: To a trust, a trust. 15 THE COURT: Of which -- of which he is the trustor, 16 I assume? 17 MR. SHAFER: Actually, he -- I don't -- I think someone else is the trustee for the trust. 18 19 THE COURT: Well, he is the trustor, he's the one 20 who set up the trust? 21 MR. SHAFER: I believe so. And I don't know whether 22 it's a revocable or a irrevocable trust or what the nature of 23 the trust is. But my point is that we're -- we're going off 24 with arguments about counsel -- about what's supposed to 25 happen without things being fully briefed. And it's our

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    requesting [sic], that a request for stay, that everybody take
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    a breath and take a step back to try to negotiate this and to
 3
    reach a resolution which maximizes the return to plaintiffs to
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    satisfy their judgment and doesn't shut down the company.
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              THE COURT: Well, you know, nine times out of ten I
 6
    would be all ears on that --
 7
              MR. SHAFER: Well, I understand.
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              THE COURT: -- because parties typically can work
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    out something that's better than, you know, some arbitrary
    third party coming in and ruling.
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11
              MR. SHAFER: Um-h'm.
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              THE COURT: But in this case, that has not been the
13
    case. That -- the history of this case all the way through
    has not involved most any kind of -- that kind of cooperation.
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15
    It just hasn't.
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              MR. SHAFER: Well, I'd like to think I might make a
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    difference but that might be a little --
              THE COURT: Well --
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19
              MR. SHAFER: -- hubris on my part.
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              THE COURT: -- you know, I mean, I'm --
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              MR. SHAFER: So essentially --
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              THE COURT: So what are you asking the Court to do
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    then?
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              MR. SHAFER: I'm asking the Court to deny their --
    their injunctive relief regarding the vehicles except as to
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the four Toyotas identified in their motion.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SHAFER: To the extent that they were still the property of A Cab at the time they were -- the writ -- the order was served, and that we will go through the normal debt collection process including the judgment debtor exam, and propounding of the finances at that time.

I think that might actually help a settlement because they'll see what the actual finances of A Cab are at that point. And that there be a stay in place, at least a temporary stay so that we can take these issues, these orders up on appeal.

So at least, at the very least, maybe another stay for a month so that we can seek the appropriate relief either first in this court on a stay or to the Supremes on these new orders that were announced today.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Greenberg, what's your view of the -- the question of what's the impact on anything that this Court might do, of the fact that the Supreme Court has placed a stay?

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, the Supreme Court has just stayed the appeal process. This is normal. I mean, you know, when you file an appeal almost all of the appeals are sent to the mediation program, and until the mediation efforts are fulfilled with respect to the appeal, briefing is

suspended. That's all that's happened here.

In respect to Your Honor staying proceedings in this case, Your Honor did stay proceedings for about two weeks last time we saw you. And I was hopeful during that time there would be discussions about trying to work out a resolution. I did get a phone call from Ms. Rodriguez who proposed something to me, I don't think it's appropriate for me to go into details. I did invite us to have a further dialogue at that point. She told me there would be no further dialogue. That proposal was not, in my mind, appropriate. And that was where that sort of ended. I wish it had extended further, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Um-h'm.

MR. GREENBERG: In respect to appointing a Receiver what I would suggest Your Honor might want to do here is to have a receive who's empowered to monitor the operations of the business, form an accounting, come up with a proposal, not actually implement any proposal for operations, but come up with a proposal to submit to the Court to take over or to direct the operations of the business so that the revenue can be used to pay the class members.

And also invest the Receiver with the power to withhold use of the medallions if they do not get cooperation in preparing their report and gathering that information. The reason why that third element is necessary, Your Honor, is

because it's defendants' position that the medallions are actually being operated by people who aren't debtors to this case, all of these series LLCs.

So I can very easily envision if Your Honor appoints a Receiver over the judgment debtor they will come in and there will be very little for them to examine because the position of the defendants -- and I'm using "the defendants" broadly -- is well, this series LLCs are not defendants in this case. They're not the judgment debtor here. We don't have access to their information.

The only way the Receiver would be able to get access to that information would be if they had the power to withhold use of the medallions, because the medallions have been leased by the judgment debtor to all of these other series entities.

So, that is the key to getting anything done through the use of a Receiver here on behalf of the plaintiffs.

Without that power, the Receiver is essentially powerless because I don't -- I don't think the judgment debtor is keeping a penny in their own account.

And presumably, none of the actual operations of the business, they will acknowledge, at least in respect to these proceedings, as being undertaken in the name of the judgment debtor. They've been working very hard to have everything undertaken in the name of, you know, hundreds of different

series LLCs that they continually change. We've been through this before, Your Honor. You don't need me to remind you of that background. So I would --

THE COURT: You would be able to structure an order that would accomplish those things without granting to the Receiver any managerial powers then for the present time?

MR. GREENBERG: That is correct. I mean, the Receiver -- the Receiver -- the only -- the power of the Receiver would be to examine the books and records of A Cab, LLC and the Series LLCs with which it has given use of the medallions to. And if -- if the medallion -- and if those separate series LLCs do not wish to cooperate with the Receiver's efforts, the Receiver will have the power to withhold use of the medallion. Because the medallion is a property of the judgment debtor, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. GREENBERG: I mean, we should be able to attach that and obtain -- and obtain control over it. That is the only sort of, you know, how would one say, leverage we have here, Your Honor, to get any sort of understanding of what's actually going on with the business here or cooperation because as Your Honor was commenting, Mr. Nady's entire sort of position here in this litigation has been that the business is operated by this multitude of separate entities that, therefore, are beyond reach of the Court's judgment.

I'm not asking the Court to get into this whole issue of, you know, setting aside or ignoring their claim that these series LLCs have separate legal status and so forth. I mean, we might get into that. But if we can side-step that issue, I think it's in the interest of my clients, it's in the

1 1

interest of Your Honor.

Clearly, the medallions are possessed by the judgment debtor. There is no dispute over that. The use of those medallions is at the sufferance of the judgment debtor. If the Receiver who is appointed has control over the use of the medallions they can then get a complete financial picture as to what is going on with the operation of the business, what the series LLCs are doing with the medallions. And if they refuse to cooperate, we'll suspend use of the medallions. I mean, essentially, they'll have to cooperate or they'll go — or the business will have to stop operating Your Honor.

Short of the Receiver having that power, I don't see that the Receiver's going to be do anything. And I'm not asking Your Honor to empower the Receiver to actually structure the business, as I was talking about before, and require that the funds come back into the judgment debtor at this point.

I believe that is justified, but if Your Honor doesn't want to go that far, Your Honor doesn't have to go that far. We can simply commission the Receiver to report

back with a plan based on their valuation of the business as to how the business could be conducted to ensure that the judgment creditors here, my clients, actually get paid because the money is in the continuing operation of the business.

In respect to the defendants' request to continue a stay of these proceedings, as I was explaining to Your Honor before, the business seems to have a positive cash flow. It could be \$50,000 a month on average, it could be close to a million dollars a year. I don't know. In prior years, Mr. Nady did present financial information indicating that the business was clearing in excess of a million dollars a year as recently as, I believe, 2015, or 2014.

I need to do something on behalf of my clients here, Your Honor, and that's why we're here. I would much rather we not be here. I'd much rather there was some cooperative basis to resolve this case.

I mean, I believe defendants haven't proceeded to bankruptcy court because -- presumably because the business is solvent. If we went to bankruptcy court, I suspect the bankruptcy court would compel the payment of not necessarily the entire judgment to my clients, but probably a lot of it. And they don't want to pay it.

As well as the fact that the bankruptcy court is going to ignore the series LLC status. There is very well-established law that the bankruptcy court is not going to

ignore the related entity status. They will look at it as a single debtor and a single business.

And to the extent that there were transfers out of the corporation to Mr. Nady or to the trust, they may also look to set those aside in bankruptcy court.

Now, I know defendants have said, well, to the extent that there's been transfers, we have our remedy, there can be a fraudulent conveyance; Your Honor, we've been litigating this case, as you've said, for many years now.

THE COURT: Yeah.

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MR. GREENBERG: The last thing I have enthusiasm for is to be bringing satellite litigation regarding, you know, conveyance issues.

So I would like to have Your Honor order the turnover of the four vehicles for sale by the Sheriff.

And by the way, Your Honor, I do have information relating to the other two vehicles, and I will concede upon close examination, if Your Honor wants to look at this -- the Ford Sports Van apparently is jointly titled to A Cab series, LLC and another entity. And I'd ask Your Honor only to direct the turnover as to motor vehicles exclusively titled to the judgment debtor. So, presumably, that would be excluded from the scope of the order. This is an investigative report, this is not the actual title document. The other Ford vehicles, I gave Your Honor the title documents I got from the DMV. And

there really isn't any dispute that those are clearly and exclusively titled, the four Toyotas, to A Cab, LLC. The other two vehicles --

THE COURT: Have you already done a Writ of Execution on those and has the defendant, you know, filed any exemption?

MR. GREENBERG: Well, Your Honor, I haven't, in part, because the Sheriff's Office' written instructions say they need a license plate number. I don't have a license plate number. They need a license plate number because --

THE COURT: Oh.

MR. GREENBERG: -- because they want to -- I guess they want to visually be able to find the vehicle. And in addition, they want a \$400 deposit per vehicle for a tow truck and so forth and so on.

I already have \$50,000 in costs in this case, close to it, invested Your Honor. I could -- I could proceed in that fashion. It just -- it just seems unduly burdensome and inefficient. I believe if Your Honor issues the order and directs that they cooperate with the Sheriff they will cooperate with the Sheriff. The vehicles will be turned over. I mean, the Sheriff can to go to the -- their place of business. The vehicles could be out in use. They could be, you know, wherever. There's -- there's dozens of vehicles that they have. I don't know if the Sheriff can really locate

them effectively. My impression is it would be very difficult 1 2 for them to execute in that fashion. 3 THE COURT: Interesting question; what's -- what does the Sheriff's Office do if you have a vehicle that 4 5 doesn't have a license plate? 6 MR. SHAFER: Well --7 MR. GREENBERG: I -- yes --8 MR. SHAFER: I can address that. 9 THE COURT: Yeah. 10 MR. SHAFER: They will take it. We've done it many 11 times. They do not require the license plate. 12 THE COURT: Okay. Here's my inclination and you 13 guys can see if anybody talks me out of it. My inclination is to take a look -- a hard look at any proposed order that the 14 15 plaintiff might put forward at this time. I -- I need 16 something that gives a concrete idea of what the powers are 17 that are given to a Receiver at this point. And I think 18 before really addressing that further, I really need to see what is it exactly that you're -- you're asking the Receiver 19 20 to be able to do. 21 MR. SHAFER: To that end, Your Honor, could we treat 22 their motion today as an oral motion? We could then have 10 23 days to file a response. We could even do it a little 24 shorter, I suppose, on the issue of --25 THE COURT: Well, it's an oral --

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              MR. SHAFER:
                          -- the Receiver.
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              THE COURT: -- motion to appoint a Receiver; is that
 3
    what you're saying?
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              MR. SHAFER: Yeah, that's a -- this is the first
 5
    we're hearing --
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              THE COURT: Well, they've --
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              MR. SHAFER: -- of it.
              THE COURT: -- they -- they did ask for that in
 8
 9
    their countermotion previously.
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              MR. SHAFER: I think that was just other relief.
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    There wasn't the -- we would like to have the opportunity to
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    respond on the issue of Receiver particularly as it applies to
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    the statutory issues.
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              THE COURT: Well, I think that --
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              MR. SHAFER: I mean, I think --
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              THE COURT: -- that -- did it not --
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              MR. SHAFER: -- even until the end of next week.
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              THE COURT: -- did that motion not specifically say
    appoint a Receiver?
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              MR. GREENBERG: Yes, Your Honor On October 15th,
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21
    the defendants did -- did file an Opposition to the
    countermotion and, I mean, it's fairly short. The
22
    countermotion did specifically ask for, as Your Honor recited
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   earlier, a variety of different relief, or proposed a variety
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   of different relief including the appointment of a Receiver.
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1 THE COURT: Um-h'm. 2 MR. GREENBERG: And --3 MR. SHAFER: Because we have significant concerns 4 regarding the effect that an appointment of a Receiver, 5 especially if it has coercive powers. It can do violence to 6 the company, including withholding improperly of revenues under a leased medallion. They have represented that these 3 are the property of defendant. They have not done so -- that is not correct. 9 10 Under the case of <u>Hagerman v. Tom Lee</u> that we cited to in our Opposition, if there is a claim by a third party to 11 12 the property it cannot be assigned without a hearing. 13 has to be -- they have to bring them into due process. 14 The series LLC have a claim of right or a claim of 15 property as to these medallions, or at least to use of them. 15 And so the Court can't assign a Receiver that does -- that can 17 withhold that, without bringing them in as a property third 1.8 party, anymore than a Receiver can withhold payment to me as their attorney or demand money back that I have been paid as 19 20 an attorney for providing services to A Cab. 21 But that's what they're asking for is the power to 22 withhold payment to anybody who doesn't cooperate without --23 THE COURT: Well, I don't --24 MR. SHAFER: And on that issue --25

THE COURT: I'm not -- I'm not -- you're talking

about what the precise powers are that they're -- that they're asking for. What I'm saying is, let me get a clear view of what the plaintiff is requesting, because I kind of get this (indicates), I kind of get, you know, it could do this and this and this, but then again, then it gets more --

MR. SHAFER: Okay.

THE COURT: -- invasive, if you will, or it gets more powers. I want to see what's the least intrusive powers that a Receiver could do so that at least the Court can get a clear picture of what's going on in the company.

MR. GREENBERG: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So that's why I want to see a specific proposal. I'm not suggesting that -- that I'd simply submit it in chambers and I would either sign it or not sign it. I think I'd have to come back and see what your further objections are. But in point of fact, I'm looking at page six of the plaintiffs' countermotion, and that was one of the specific requests of the -- of the plaintiff.

So in terms of, you know, you asking them for ten days to respond, well, that time has kind of come and gone. This is a fluid issue because it makes all the difference in the world as to what powers the Receiver would have and that's what I need to have sorted out.

I'm going to ask the plaintiff to submit such an order to the Court and make it very precise as to what powers

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1
    the Receiver would have. And then let me -- let me just.
 2
                       (Court/Clerk conferring)
 3
              THE COURT: How long would it take you to get me a
 4
    proposed order on the Receiver?
 5
              MR. GREENBERG: I would hope I could do that towards
 6
    the end of next week, Your Honor. Is that -- is that
 7
    appropriate for the Court's schedule?
 8
              THE COURT: That's not -- that's not going to work.
 9
    We need to know before we go dark for the -- for Christmas.
10
              MR. GREENBERG: Okay. What would be suitable for
11
    the Court's schedule?
12
              THE COURT: I would like to have you get it to me by
    the end of this week and come back next week on Thursday at
13
    10:30. And --
14
15
              MR. GREENBERG: Yes. We will comply with that
16
    desire, Your Honor.
17
              THE COURT: Okay.
             MR. GREENBERG: I will make it a point --
18
19
              THE COURT: And that --
20
              MR. GREENBERG: -- to do so.
21
              THE COURT:
                          If you can get it by the end of this
22
    week then the defendants have an opportunity to see
    specifically what powers I'm contemplating doing. And --
23
    anyway, that's it.
24
25
             MR. SHAFER: It's my hope --
```

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, I can also give Your 1 Honor two different potential orders involving different sort 2 3 of approaches. It sounds to me like Your Honor is concerned 4 at having, as you said, a structure that would be as minimally 5 intrusive as possible --6 THE COURT: Yeah. 7 MR. GREENBERG: -- in terms of interfering with the 8 defendants' business operation. 9 THE COURT: Right. 10 But also, hopefully as a result, MR. GREENBERG: 11 giving the Court a clear understanding of the financial circumstances and the options that would be available to help 12 13 the -- my clients, the judgment creditors here, you know, get their judgment satisfied. I will see that something gets 14 15 distributed hopefully by midday Friday. I --16

THE COURT: All right.

17

18

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MR. GREENBERG: I'm not going to be working too late Friday. Your Honor, question just in respect to the judgment debtor examination which intersects this to some extent because that does involve some disclosure of the financial information; you indicated you were granting the request, and part of the request is that the financial statements be produced, particularly, the ones that have been filed with the Taxi Commission, because they do have to file some yearly statements with the Taxi Commission as to their operations.

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I had requested that the judgment debtor exam be
 1
    before Your Honor. And I had requested that simply because of
 2
 3
    my --
 4
              THE COURT: Oh, that's right.
 5
              MR. GREENBERG: -- my feeling is that if it is not,
 6
    which is typical, I'm afraid I'm going to run into some
 7
    problems with it not being effective. But that is within your
 8
    discretion, Your Honor, and I just -- you didn't say one way
    or the other your inclination in that regard.
 9
10
              THE COURT: Well, I don't -- I don't really see that
    that's likely to happen before the end of the year at this
11
12
    point.
13
              MR. GREENBERG: I understand, Your Honor.
14
              THE COURT: So we can certainly --
15
              MR. GREENBERG: In submitting an order --
16
              THE COURT: -- consider that.
17
              MR. GREENBERG: -- on that should I include a
    recital that the Court will set a date for the examination --
1.8
19
              THE COURT: If you wish --
20
              MR. GREENBERG: -- for Your Honor?
21
              THE COURT: If you wish you can -- you can insert
22
         I mean, I don't -- I don't know what the chances are that
23
    the Court's going to wind up just signing any order that you
24
    submit at this point anyway.
25
             MR. SHAFER: Okay.
```

THE COURT: 1 But as far as a Receiver is concerned 2 anyway, but --3 MR. GREENBERG: Well, yes, Your Honor, I just --4 THE COURT: -- I just want to be able to consider it, but with a clearer picture of what enumerated powers the 5 6 Receiver would have. 7 MR. GREENBERG: I understand. The order in respect 8 to the Receiver will be a priority for this week. In terms of 9 the judgment debtor examination, that's a different order, 10 different issue --11 THE COURT: Yeah. 12 MR. GREENBERG: -- Your Honor. I was just trying to 13 get your information on your -- your inclination on that 14 because you did not clearly address it in what you discussed 15 with us otherwise, Your Honor. 16 MR. SHAFER: My suggestion on that point is we'll 17 try to mutually agree on a date that somebody on behalf of A Cab would be available to be subject to that examination. 18 19 THE COURT: Um-h'm. 20 MR. SHAFER: And if we can't resolve it, at a 21 reasonable point, they will give us three available dates and 22 we'll pick one of them. 23 THE COURT: Um-h'm. 24 MR. SHAFER: So that they --25 THE COURT: Why don't you -- why don't you guys make

1 it a priority of trying to hammer that out during this week as 2 well --3 MR. SHAFER: I'm happy to do that. 4 THE COURT: -- so that when you come back -- I'm 5 going to have you back next Thursday at 10:30. 6 MR. SHAFER: Okay. 7 MR. GREENBERG: Yes, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: And at that point, hopefully, you can tell me there's some agreement. Now, of course, there's 9 10 nothing to preclude you all from engaging in that -- in those 11 discussions, those settlement discussions that Mr. Shafer 12 brought up, potential for some sort of overall agreement. 13 would certainly welcome it. But --14 MR. SHAFER: As would I. 15 THE COURT: -- it is --16 MR. GREENBERG: As would I, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: -- we're in the mode of a judgment has been rendered and the Court is trying to do what is 18 unfortunate, but necessary. So I don't think the defendant 19 20 can count on the Court granting the leeway that the Court did 21 prior to judgment. 22 Frankly, I feel that the Court's earnest attempt to 23 make sure that the goose that lays the golden egg doesn't get 24 done in, in the process, has not worked to this point. It has 25 not worked.

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1
              MR. SHAFER: And I respect the Court's position
 2
    regarding --
 3
              THE COURT: Yeah.
 4
              MR. SHAFER: -- this is post-judgment although I
 5
    believe that there's due process, even post-judgment, AND
 6
    certainly as to the third parties that have not been subject
    to any jurisdictional elements. And I'm concerned that that's
 7
 8
    where we get into the problem is the --
              THE COURT: Yeah.
10
              MR. SHAFER: -- the shortcuts that are being taken
11
    have the -- have a likelihood to infringe upon the rights of
12
    those third parties and we don't want to have a --
13
              THE COURT: Well, what shortcuts are you talking
14
    about?
              MR. SHAFER: Well, for example, the TRO and the
15
    turnover instead of proceeding to through the Writ of
16
17
    Execution.
18
              THE COURT: Well, I'm not -- I'm not -- I haven't
19
    agreed to any turnover order at this point.
20
              MR. SHAFER: And I -- and I -- and I appreciate
21
    that.
22
                         I think that's a problematic area you
              THE COURT:
23
    need to address further.
24
              MR. GREENBERG: Can we revisit that when we
25
    reconvene next week, Your Honor?
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THE COURT: Yeah.
 1
              MR. GREENBERG: We will leave the TRO in place?
 2
 3
              THE COURT: Yeah. Yeah, it will remain in place.
    And most specifically, what I don't want to have happen is
 4
 5
    that any of the named defendants get rid of any property in
 6
    the -- you know, without --
 7
              MR. SHAFER: Okay.
 8
              THE COURT: -- without specific permission of the
 9
    Court to do so.
10
              MR. SHAFER:
                          And just for clarification, the two
    vehicles which are not the property A Cab, the Ford and the
11
12
    Mercedes, you're not ordering them to --
13
              THE COURT: Right. I think there's --
14
              MR. SHAFER: -- them be restrained?
15
              THE COURT: -- agreement that both the Mercedes and
16
    the Ford Transit Van are --
17
              MR. GREENBERG: Uh --
18
              THE COURT: -- are not subject to this order; is
19
    that right?
20
              MR. GREENBERG: Well, Your Honor, the information on
21
    the Mercedes, I can show it here to counsel.
22
              THE COURT: Okay.
23
              MR. GREENBERG: My investigative information is
24
   title is held solely in the name of A Cab, LLC. That is not
   true with the Ford. I apologize for my oversight.
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1
              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
 2
              MR. SHAFER: Well, respectfully, this from a 2013
 3
    issue date. I've been advised that it is now titled in
 4
    Arizona in another entity's name. So --
 5
              MR. GREENBERG: They --
              THE COURT: Well, there you go.
 6
 7
              MR. GREENBERG: Then they're not restrained, Your
 8
    Honor, if the title --
 9
              MR. SHAFER: Well and I --
10
              MR. GREENBERG: -- is not --
11
              MR. SHAFER: -- and I agree. But the order
12
    specifically references that car and VIN number. And so --
13
              THE COURT: Yeah.
14
              MR. SHAFER: -- that's the problem.
15
              THE COURT:
                          Well, let's do this then. I'm going to
    leave that in there. It's not being turned over.
16
17
              MR. SHAFER: Okay.
              THE COURT: Your clients are simply ordered not to
18
    get rid of any such property. And -- and if it's in
19
20
   Arizona --
21
              MR. SHAFER: Well, the vehicle is located here
22
    sometimes.
23
              THE COURT:
                           All right. Well, if -- whatever.
24
   you think that it's not subject to the Court's order for some
25
    reason, then I suggest you submit some evidence to that
```

1 effect. 2 MR. SHAFER: I -- well, that's -- again, that's 3 where we came into the Writ of Execution process. But in -under the --4 5 THE COURT: Yeah, I agree with the rest of the 6 stuff. 7 MR. SHAFER: Yeah. 8 THE COURT: But we're already to this point with these named items. And we're not talking about even turning 9 it over. This is not about -- what I am most concerned with 10 11 is -- at this moment is not so much whether it all gets turned 12 over or what if anything --13 MR. SHAFER: Yeah. 14 THE COURT: -- gets turned over; what I am concerned 15 about is whether they get rid of it so it's outside of the 16 Court's power to do anything with it. 17 MR. SHAFER: And if it were A Cab's property, I absolutely agree. But they have no more jurisdiction over 18 19 this Mercedes than they have over my personal vehicle, if it's 20 a third party that's unrelated to this. So I --21 THE COURT: Well, I trust that you'll be able to 22 show that to the Court then. 23 MR. GREENBERG: And, Your Honor, I fully agree. 24 it's not titled to the judgment debtor exclusively it should 25 not be subject --

THE COURT: Yeah. 1 2 MR. GREENBERG: -- to the TRO. 3 MR. SHAFER: Well, and respectfully, under the case 4 -- established case law you can't -- a third party cannot be 5 required to turn over information regarding its finances 6 unless they are subject to the jurisdiction that's established 7 in the procedures either through a Writ of Execution or 8 another action. So, I mean --THE COURT: All right. I think --9 10 MR. SHAFER: -- by -- by ordering --THE COURT: -- you'd better start your Writ of 11 12 Execution process at least as far as the Mercedes is 13 concerned. 14 MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, I understand. 15 again, there's no dispute. If the title isn't held by the 16 judgment debtor we are not asking for judicial action against 17 it. 18 Just one other question, Your Honor; when you 19 announced your decision on the award of the attorneys' fees 20 and costs, the amount of the costs that were sought were 21 submitted to Your Honor initially and then about eight days 22 later I had submitted a supplement to Your Honor and there was 23 separate briefing on that regarding approximately another 24 \$1400 in costs --25 THE COURT: Yeah.

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1
              MR. GREENBERG: -- that was omitted from the initial
 2
    submission.
 3
              THE COURT: That's correct.
              MR. GREENBERG: I just want to be clear in terms of
 4
 5
    what Your Honor is granting in respect to the costs request so
 6
    we can get --
 7
              THE COURT:
                          The --
 8
              MR. GREENBERG: -- an order to Your Honor
 9
    accordingly --
10
              THE COURT: The --
11
              MR. GREENBERG: -- with -- yes.
12
              THE COURT: The amount in the supplement, what the
13
    total expenses or costs at that point, were $46,528.07. And
    the -- order of the Court is that those amounts are costs and
14
15
    they are ordered to be collectible.
16
              MR. GREENBERG: Does -- does that mean that Your
17
    Honor is \operatorname{--} is \operatorname{--} is denying the request for the costs that
    were specified in the -- in the supplement?
18
19
              THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. I thought --
20
              MR. GREENBERG: Yeah.
21
              THE COURT: -- the supplement -- I thought the
22
    supplement, the total at the end of the supplement was --
23
    that's the amount it says. It says --
24
              MR. GREENBERG: Um --
25
              THE COURT: -- paragraph number 4, "As per above and
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set forth in the motion filed October 12th, my office requests
 1
 2
    reimbursement."
 3
              MR. GREENBERG: Yeah, $46,528.07. I apologize, Your
 4
    Honor.
 5
              THE COURT: Yeah.
 6
              MR. GREENBERG: It's my confusion.
 7
              THE COURT: That's the amount that is ordered --
 8
              MR. GREENBERG: Thank you.
              THE COURT: -- of costs.
 9
10
              MR. GREENBERG: We will -- we will submit an order
11
   accordingly to the Court.
12
              THE COURT: All right.
13
             MR. GREENBERG: And I will have a proposed order to
14
   Your Honor Friday, as we discussed. And --
15
              THE COURT: All right So we will see you all on --
16
             MR. DUBOWSKY: Tuesday, Your Honor.
17
             THE COURT: You're on Tuesday?
             MR. DUBOWSKY: Yes, Your Honor, for the --
18
19
             THE COURT: Oh, boy.
20
             MS. DUBOWSKY -- the Special Master's motion is on
21
   for Tuesday of next week, one week from today, Your Honor.
22
              THE COURT: Is that something that is resolvable
23
   without taking account of the rest of this that's going on?
24
   I'm wondering if that should be moved over to Thursday.
25
             MR. SHAFER: I'm sure we'd all appreciate coming on
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1
    one day.
 2
              THE COURT: Yeah.
                                 I think it would --
 3
              MR. DUBOWSKY: I'd like to keep it on Tuesday, Your
 4
            It is a separate issue and I do have --
    Honor.
 5
              THE COURT: Yeah.
 6
              MR. DUBOWSKY: -- I do have -- I potentially will
    have at least two people coming in, one from New York City,
 8
    one from Los Angeles. So they're already set hopefully to be
 9
    here on Tuesday for the hearings.
10
              THE COURT: Ah.
11
              MR. DUBOWSKY: I'm requesting that it stay on
12
    Tuesday.
13
              THE COURT: All right. Okay. We'll do that.
                                                             We'll
14
    leave it on Tuesday.
15
              MR. DUBOWSKY: Thank you, Your Honor.
16
              THE COURT: All right. Under other circumstances,
17
    I'd be happy to put those together, but.
18
              MR. SHAFER: And I apologize, one final
    clarification.
19
20
              THE COURT: Yeah.
21
              MR. SHAFER: You'd mentioned that there was a
22
   preclusion of transfers to the series, LLC. Are you
23
   precluding any transfer of funds between the different series?
   Are you precluding -- you're not precluding A Cab for paying
24
25
   the maintenance company for the maintenance expenses or the
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1
    employee company for the employee expenses?
              THE COURT: No. I'm really more -- more -- was
 2
 3
    dwelling on the -- on property, not funds per se.
 4
              MR. SHAFER:
                          Okay.
 5
              THE COURT: Not the --
 6
              MR. SHAFER: Okay. So it can continue --
 7
              THE COURT: -- business expenses.
 8
              MR. SHAFER: -- to operate and pay for the --
              THE COURT: Yeah.
 9
              MR. SHAFER: -- the value its received?
10
11
              THE COURT: Yeah.
12
              MR. SHAFER: Okay. Thank you.
              THE COURT: I'm not -- I'm not trying to -- that
13
14
    would be a total shutdown.
15
              All right. We'll see you Tuesday then.
16
              MR. DUBOWSKY: Thank you, Your Honor.
17
              THE COURT: Okay.
18
              MR. GREENBERG: Yes, Your Honor, in terms of the --
19
   the Court's -- well, we need to submit an order to the Court
20
   and we will do so. I'm just -- to be clear on the -- the TRO,
21
   the TRO as signed by the Court was in terms of the motor
   vehicles. Your Honor from the Bench had mentioned restraining
22
23
   transfers of property from the Series -- from A Cab or the
24
   Series LLCs to Mr. Nady or any trust or family members he
   controlled. We're not -- our position, Your Honor, is because
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