this order and the Court's already considered it. We're actually just seeking a decision as to the scope of the JPI as it concerns those other properties. We're not asking you to change your prior order. We're just asking you to expand it and consider all those things.

They make some arguments about the -- the ELN Trust, that we don't have any interest in Russell Road, and the Wyoming Downs property. I've already -- we've already set forth the facts. You've heard about those properties and the transfers a hundred times before. I won't go back into the specifics of those.

But the bottom line is on those that you haven't made that decision yet as to what the interests are. That's still open for a tracing and debate. And so until that decision is made, the -- we need to keep -- make sure that those properties are protected.

So what we've asked for is that the Court enter a joint preliminary injunction and we set forth the specific language that -- that we propose that is hereby ordered that no property list in the decree of divorce entered June 3rd, 2013 is to be transferred, encumbered, concealed, sold, or otherwise disposed of without a written agreement between the parties or further order of the Court to ensure the properties remain intact prior to the completion of the tracing.

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And then in the alternative -- and I -- I don't think this is appropriate. I -- I -- but if you weren't inclined to enjoin all the property, which is subject to a claim of community interest, then we would ask at the very least that you ensure that there is at least half the property enjoined and that would mean enjoining everything that was awarded to Lyn -- Lynita as part of a -- a half -- a half property division in the decree of divorce.

But again, with changing values and changing facts and circumstances, I don't know if that's going to be sufficient. We don't know what the tracing's going to provide. And property is unique. So we would ask that you enjoin all that.

Did you want me to respond to their counter or or wait for them and --

THE COURT: Why don't we give them a chance --

MR. KARACSONYI: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- and then we'll do that. So --

MR. KARACSONYI: Go piece-by-piece?

THE COURT: Because -- yeah, because we got so many issues on that. We can --

MR. KARACSONYI: Thanks.

MR. LUSZECK: Your Honor, this is the third time that they have been asking for the exact same relief which is

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for JPI over the -- all over the property that's owned by the ELN Trust and it's inappropriate.

You know, even in the last order this Court said okay, I'm going to impose a JPI, but just over BanOne and Lindell. But apparently that's not enough and they want a JPI over all of the property, even property that's -- can't be subject to a community property interest which includes Wyoming Downs.

I mean, we've -- I don't know how many times we've argued these facts before Your Honor, but the Wyoming Downs property was subject to a separate order. This Court found that it was the ELN Trust -- well, it -- it found that it was property of the ELN Trust, there was no community property interest, and that even if it was to be considered separate property, it was Eric's separate property. It was not remanded by the Nevada Supreme Court. She has absolutely no entitlement to a community property interest to it, but if this Court grants the requested relief today, they would even get a JPI over that property, Wyoming Downs, which is completely inappropriate.

Your Honor, the Nevada Supreme Court made it clear. The self-settled spendthrift trust were funded with each property separate which -- with each -- with Eric's separate property created the ELN self-settled spendthrift trust,

Lynita's separate property, funded Lynita's self-settled spendthrift trust.

Because of that, we're starting off with the proposition that it's separate property. I concede that in a regular divorce case you can impose a JPI over property that's titled in the name of the husband or in the name of the wife. That's not the circumstance here. The property that's owned isn't owned by them individually. It's owned by trusts, separate and distinct legal entities that the Court has -- the Nevada Supreme Court has already found what's funded with -- with each of their separate property.

So because of that, I think it's inappropriate to treat this like any other divorce case by finding -- by making some type of finding that it's community property, especially after the Nevada Supreme Court said that wasn't the case. I concede that a tracing needs to be done, but the tracing is going to be limited to whether or not Eric had any assets in his name individually that were transferred into this trust in conversely with Lynita. Other than that, the assets owned in the trust maintain their separate property nature unless it's proven by clear and convincing evidence that that's not the case. And that hasn't happened throughout this litigation. So for that reason, it's inappropriate to enter a JPI over each and every piece of property that's owned by the ELN

Trust.

Ironically, Counsel mentioned the fact that there should be a JPI over the LSN Trust now. Well, the fact of the matter is that she sold a lot of her assets, so it's gone. The Palmyra house, gone. It was sold. So it's -- you know, this Court -- there's really nothing for this Court to impose a JPI on from her side, because it's all gone.

The -- the 720,000 I -- I assume that he's requesting a JPI over that as well. Your Honor, this Court has specifically addressed that in the April -- or sorry, the May 22nd order had a whole section on it and it said it wasn't going to impose a JPI, yet here we are once again and they're asking for the exact same relief. If this Court is inclined to impose any type of JPI on it, I think it has to impose some type of bond that needs to be paid by -- by Lynita Nelson or the LSN Trust.

The fact of the matter is because this property is being held up in this litigation, the ELN Trust is losing millions of dollars, Your Honor. It is suffering irreparable damage because it's just being held in abeyance because of all the claims that are being brought. If she wants a JPI, fine, but this Court can impose a JPI -- or sorry, pose a bond and require a bond pursuant to NRCP 53. It's what's happens all the time in any case with preliminary injunctions or temporary

restraining orders. It's not uncommon to do.

Once again, if the -- if the property was titled in their names individually and if it clearly was community property, I wouldn't have an issue with it. But it's titled in the name of separate entities, the ELN Trust or the LSN Trust, which there's no community property interest in.

Further, Your Honor, with respect to the lis pendens issue, the problem that I have -- well, I have another -- a number of issues with that. First, after this Court came out in the May 22nd, 2018 order, the Court said okay, I'm only going to impose a JPI over BanOne and Lindell. So guess what the LSN Trust does? They -- they file a lis pendens over all of the property owned by the ELN Trust, almost just snubbing their nose in the Court's face. I mean, I can only imagine what the arguments would be from that side if this had been done by Eric or the ELN Trust.

So this Court says no, I'm doing the JPI over
Lindell, BanOne, and what -- what happens? We get a lis
pendens over all the properties. We get a lis pendens over
all the property. Even Bella Kathryn, Your Honor, which this
Court I'm sure will recall, she wanted nothing to do with.
The LSN Trust had -- wanted nothing to do with Bella Kathryn.
They fought to make sure that it ended up on the ELN Trust's
-- gosh, side -- side of the equation with respect to the

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divorce decree. She wanted nothing to do with it. And now all of a sudden she's filing a lis pendens on the Bella Kathryn property? It's ridiculous, Your Honor. This needs to stop.

If this Court's inclined to impose a JPI on any additional property, which I disagree with because I don't think -- in -- in a matter of equity and a matter of law and however you want to look at it, Your Honor, I think it's inappropriate. But if this Court is inclined to impose a JPI in any other property, it has to be limited to Russell Road and I think that would even been appropriate. But this Court should impose a bond over all of those assets as well.

It's not unheard for courts to impose bonds on property that's being held up pursuant to a TRO or a preliminary injunction. I think it's only equitable for this Court to do in this case, especially because of the money that's being lost as a result of the same.

THE COURT: Do you have a position on this or --

MS. FORSBERG: Your Honor --

THE COURT: -- that's kind of --

MS. FORSBERG: -- just --

THE COURT: -- of the Trust --

MS. FORSBERG: -- one -- one point is that I think the Court can't lose sight of the fact that part of what ELN

does is buy and sell property. I mean, that is the business.

I mean, by ham -- you know, hamstringing their entire business
by these lis pendens and JPIs.

MR. KARACSONYI: Okay.

THE COURT: Reply.

MR. KARACSONYI: First of all, this isn't the third time. This was brought up initially at a hearing and you reserved the right to -- to -- or you took it under submission. The first time you made a decision regarding the JPI was when you issued the May 22nd decision just covering the BanOne and the Lindell properties which you specifically said were the only properties you were considering.

Wyoming Downs, we -- we have argued about it a lot of times. But the fact of the matter is that the supreme court held that a tracing needs to occur to determine whether the properties in the trust are community property or separate property. And I don't see anywhere in that order where they say that this excludes Wyoming Downs, which was acquired during the marriage and prior to the divorce.

All property that these people acquired during their marriage is presumed to be community property. And the way they've tried to characterize the tracing is -- is not in accordance with Nevada law. What -- even if you start with the presumption or that the -- that the Nevada Supreme Court

made a factual finding that all the property in 2001 was separate property, you have to be able to trace any property acquired during marriage to that same separate property. So the property owned at the date of divorce would need to be traced back to that separate property. If it couldn't be traced back to that separate property, then it's — then it's presumptively community property. And then you have issues of transfers and why they occurred.

You'll find actually that -- well, they mentioned that these properties were titled in the ELN Trust. I think the facts are going to bear out that a lot of these properties were titled in the LSN Trust and I think the testimony has always been clear and it will be clear or -- or -- if the Court takes additional evidence that she didn't transfer these for a transmutation of community property. She transferred this property because she was told that it was going to be community property, so no transmutation has occurred.

The bottom line is in every divorce you may have -you're going to have trusts, especially with people of some
affluence and they're going to have property in trust. And
those people are entitled to the same protections as anybody
else who appears before this Court.

Just because you were reversed on appeal and we're sitting here 10 years later and people are a little worn out

and this has been going on a long time doesn't mean that she's not entitled to the same protection today that she was entitled to on day one. And so we're asking for those same protections that she was entitled to on day one because that's really where we find ourselves as far as a tracing goes.

Now they mentioned the Palmyra property. The Palmyra property interestingly is the only property that was still owned at the date of divorce that was listed in the separate property agreement. So that's the one property out of all the property that really was separate property.

Now the bond issue. And they -- and they brought this up and responded in the -- in the opposition, but they've never been required to post a bond. They only required to post a bond one time on appeal was the order that you issued 400,000 back to us.

If you'll recall, even though you're supposed to post a bond on appeal, what you did with the properties pending appeal is you said that I'm going to transfer some of the properties, not Russell Road, but I'm going to order that they not be transferred or cumbered -- encumbered or sold.

I'm going to order that you don't transfer, encumber, or sell Russell Road. So basically what you did is you used the -- the actual real properties as the bond for themselves.

We're not asking for the -- any of this to be sold

or -- or encumbered. We're -- we're asking for it to be -for you not to encumber or sell it. We're not asking for it
to be transferred to us, but there shouldn't be a bond in
place. There's not requirement for a bond and a bond would
have a chilling effect in divorce actions, especially if one
party couldn't pay the bond. So the -- there's specific rules
for JPIs and for maintaining the status quo on property that
are unique to divorce and we're relying on those rules.

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Now the lis pendens, the lis pendens meets all the requirements of NRS 14.015. And that's why I say again, just because we're here 10 years later doesn't mean she's not entitled to the same protections as day one. She has satisfied everyone of those factors. And, you know, there's been no response, there's been nothing to show that she hasn't. And real property is unique and this is the same argument they made to you, Your Honor, is don't -- make sure that she can't transfer this property pending appeal because this is unique. It's unique then. It should be unique now. And it -- -she is going to suffer irreparable harm if it's lost, just as they were going to suffer irreparable harm.

And so she's met all the requirements of a lis pendens to ensure that it doesn't get transferred. And why did she have to file the lis pendens? Because before you even had the transfer due date, she was getting notices from title

companies that he's trying to transfer the BanOne properties. She's going to be irreparably harmed. The property will be gone. So we need to protect this property and she's legally entitled to have a lis pendens pending — pending appeal in this action she claims. And this action affects the title or possession of real property described in the lis pendens. The action was not brought in bad faith. I think we can agree there. She would be able to perform any conditions precedent to the release sought as it affects the title of property. She would definitely be able to assume the title.

She would be irreparably injured as they conceded during the appeal and she's likely to prevail in this che -- action or has a fair chance. And for a lis pendens, as they pointed out, the burden is really low, to the satisfaction of the Court. If you find those factors are met, she's entitled to this lis pendens.

Again, I know it's been 10 years, it's been a long time, but please afford us the same -- we're asking to please be afforded the same protections as if we're here on day one even though it has been a long time.

So we hope that the Court will -- will properly protect Lynita during the pendency of this action to ensure that whatever happens at the end of the day that you can make it happen and that we're not with an order and then trying to

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scramble to find out what happened and where the property went.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LUSZECK: Your Honor, with respect to Wyoming Downs, it's, you know, Page 6 and 7 of -- of my opposition. This Court had a separate evidentiary hearing on Wyoming Downs, Your Honor. In that order, this Court specifically found that there is no transmutation of Wyoming Downs from separate property, community property. Even assuming that Wyoming Downs was separate property of the ELN, Eric Nelson and not the property of the ELN Trust.

> THE COURT: Are you referring to Page 6 of your --MR. LUSZECK: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- of your position?

MR. LUSZECK: Lynita -- Lynita appealed that order. And the Court upheld the order, Your Honor. So this argument that somehow the Nevada Supreme Court ordered that that issue to be traced is false because the Court never overturned the September 22nd, 2014 order. In fact, the -- the Supreme Court specifically said we have considered the parties' other arguments which would have included Lynita's argument with respect to Wyoming Downs to include there without merit.

So this fallacy that somehow Wyoming Downs is included in this tracing and that somehow she has a community

interest in that is false and it's completely contrary to the Nevada Supreme Court's decision. It upheld the September 22nd, 2014 order, period.

With respect to the argument that trust are always parties to a divorce proceeding. Well, that may be the case with the simple revocable trust. That's not what we have here. We have complex irrevocable trusts which have a whole different set of law under NRS 166. So you can't treat these self-settled spendthrift trusts which the supreme court has found to be valid the same way as you would a simple revocable trust. They are completely different concepts and trusts.

With respect to the bond issue, how, you know,

Counsel's argument that that somehow is going to have a

chilling effect on divorce, one, I disagree, but even if

that's the case, Your Honor, if -- if the LSN Trust can't post

a bond now which would really be de minimis in light of the

ultimate damages that can be proven later, then how is she

going to be able to -- to pay damages down the road? How is

the ELN Trust going to be -- going to be protected and

compensated if we -- if -- if all of the evidence shows that

it was the separate property and there's no community property

interest therein?

She should have to post a bond to protect the ELN Trust down the road, just like she's asking for protection,

the ELN Trust needs to be protected as well, Your Honor. And that's why a bond has to be posted now. The ELN Trust was required to post one during appeal. LSN Trust should be ordered to post one as well.

And with respect to the lis pendens issue, I think
Ms. Forsberg may deal with that on a little more issue.

But she's not likely to prevail. There's not even a reasonably likelihood that she's going to prevail in this instance, Your Honor, because it is clear that it was separate property by the Nevada Supreme Court, so they have to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it was transmutated from separate to community property and there's no evidence that that occurred, Your Honor.

MS. FORSBERG: Your Honor, a couple issues on the — the lis pendens issue. I — I think opposing Counsel fails to recognize that the Supreme Court has already ruled that those properties have to go back. And this Court ordered you need to do the deeds back. Instead of that — and this Court also found that there was sufficient property in the list to compensate for anything that might have been found. But instead, they want all of this frozen when the Supreme Court has already ruled that it should go back. Instead, they're kind of circumventing the Supreme Court by filing these lis pendens. Those lis pendens need to be removed so that

business contin -- can continue as usual.

Everything is not going to go anywhere at any time. If you buy and you sell property, you're going to sell one thing and then buy something else. I mean, that's how they make money. That was — that's how they became successful to begin with. This Court knows that was Mr. Nelson's acumen, that that's how he takes to press properties and purchase them and that's part of the — the issue.

But for them to put a lis pendens, now that stops that whole process. And they're failing to recognize that the Supreme Court has already ruled those need to go back. So I think they're -- you know, they have enough security already in the amount of property that is available. Even -- even without -- with -- releasing those lis pendens, they have sufficient property. This Court has already ruled that they have sufficient property on that. So them doing a lis pendens is another thing of snubbing their nose at this Court's ruling.

THE COURT: Thank you. All right. With regard to our next issue. I think we wanted to address the Lynita running Lindell and her paying rent. Is that --

MR. KARACSONYI: Yes, Your Honor. Ms. Nelson has managed the Lindell property for the last four years.

THE COURT: 2013, right, I think?

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MR. KARACSONYI: That's correct. And she's -- she's loved and cared for for this property and she's really poured her heart and soul into it. When she took it over, and we -we attached the pictures and -- and I know the Court -- the Court didn't like us saying that she -- that he was a -- a slum landlord. We won't say that with -- with regard to this property, but there was graffiti on the building, years of pigeon droppings on the roof, cracks and peeling of the paint, and unprofessional sign that you saw and that she's replaced with a very nice sign, trash collecting outside. A Clark County Building Department violations that noted that the building would be shutdown in 30 days if it wasn't brought into con -- compliance, homeless people sleeping or living in the steering gar -- well, taggers regularly climbing on the roof and -- and graffitiing the building and windows, breaking into suites, and leaving behind drug paraphernalia, food, and even feces.

So it -- she's really poured her heart and soul into this. Yes, she's put a lot of money into it, but she's done it so she can bring it to where it is today. And today, it's a beautiful building with a beautiful sign. And it's profitable. And it's attracting the type of tenants who are going to stay a long time, renew their lease, pay their rent.

THE COURT: I think you said there's only one

vacancy at the point --

MR. KARACSONYI: That's correct.

THE COURT: -- in time?

MR. KARACSONYI: That's correct. And -- and if you had -- had the rents, and -- and what we said is if you had the rents from 201, even with all the upgrades and improvements, if he had paid the hundred and eighty-eight thousand eight hundred dollars since June 3rd, 2013 when the property was transferred, well, then you wouldn't have this negative situation. It would have even covered all the improvements that had brought the property to where it is today.

So we ask that she continue -- be able to continue to manage the property. We ask for a 10 percent property management fee. And you previously found this sum to be reasonable for him. Now they -- they do some play on words, that she's asking for gross rents, but if you look at your order from the hearing, which we quoted in the -- in the reply, it's the exact -- exact same thing that you awarded to him which was 10 percent of the rents, the gross profit, and then less the expenses, the 10 percent of was one of the expenses.

But -- so it's no different than what they asked for before. And we ask that there is a lease entered into by Eric

and the ELN Trust because we need to have these rights and obligations and we -- they need to be responsible for rent. They can't take advantage of the fact that they're an owner because they're only a half owner. And them taking advantage -- advance -- advantage of being an owner is taking advantage of her and her rights.

And then we ask that you prohibit Eric from communicating with the tenants about the occupancy because obviously that would create issues within the building and he has been telling tenants that I believe from what she's been informed that -- that he is the exhusband and -- and to come to him with issues.

Now they asked to -- to manage it and to -- to do it for free. The reason they're making this offer is because they're going to make money on -- on the other end doing business, the way that he always did business, and that's making sure that there's no profits and that all kinds of expenses including children's health insurance and all the other expenses that we saw being paid through the business last time are paid through the business last time are paid through the business again and at the end of the day she gets nil. And so that is to her detriment and has always been to her detriment whenever he's in charge of things.

And so we allow that -- we ask that you not allow

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that to happen again, but he needs to pay rent and she should be able to continue to manage the property going forward.

THE COURT: Do you want that rent to go back to June 3rd, 2013 I think is what you're asking?

MR. KARACSONYI: Yeah -- yes. If -- if the Court's inclined -- but you did incline -- say that you may be inclined to do the offsets later. The -- the most important part is that it's going forward. But yeah, if the rent can be caught current -- current, that would be great as well. And -- and you remind me one other point. I apologize for -- for backtracking, but they said that they should only be required to pay 1600. That doesn't -- that's not how it works, because you're not factoring in to the overall expenses of the You pay in your 3200 into the general pool of monies and then you may not necessarily get 1600 profit from that 32 because all the expenses for the building are going to be paid. And whatever is left at the end of the day, you get one-half of that amount. And so doing it the way they're suggesting would only deprive her of -- of being able to get her full portion or benefit of that rent, the 3200.

THE COURT: Thank you. The Trust?

MR. LUSZECK: Your Honor, I know this is kind of paraphrasing, but I think the argument to some degree is is Eric can't manage it because if he does that he's going to

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make sure there's no profits and ensure at the end of the day that Lynita gets nil because that's always been the way when Eric's in charge.

Your Honor, if you've looked at the numbers, that's exactly the situation since Lynita has been running Lindell. There has been no profits. She has dumped over a hundred and seventy-thousands dollars into that building and she's make -- she's collecting less in rent today than she was when Eric -- the ELN Trust transferred those property to her back in 2014, Your Honor.

Exhibit 4 which is the accounting that they provided back in 2015 with the current rent roles, unit 101 in July of 2016 was collecting \$1,600 a month. So Lynita dumps a hundred and seventy thousand dollars into Lindell. Guess how much it's collecting in rent now? \$1,102. Unit 102, \$800 a month. The lease that — that she entered into now is for \$616 a month. Unit 103, \$800 a month back in 2014. Now it's — I think it's around 650 a month. It's a little hard to tell based on the accounting. I mean, it's — it's an absolute joke, Your Honor.

In December of 2008 -- or '17, the LSN Trust collected \$5,529. You compare that to July, August -- or July, August, September fo 2014, it collected \$7,800 a month.

So she's thrown in a hundred and seventy thousand dollars in maintenance and repairs and she's collecting less money than the ELN Trust was when apparently the -- the Lindell was in a horrible status and nobody wanted to -- to be tenants, Sir it's simply not the case.

I mean, the business loss, Your Honor, is just inexcusable. You know, it's interesting because when the ELN Trust was managing Lindell, and this court I'm -- I'm sure will certainly recall at one point the ELN Trust tried to get an offset for maintenance and repairs. And do you remember what the argument there was, Your Honor? It's so unreasonable. How can the ELN Trust this month's for maintenance and repairs? Well, that's a small fraction compared to what the LSN Trust has charged.

And this Court actually found that it wasn't even going to award the ELN Trust, all of the maintenance and repairs, because it found it to be excessive. And now in four years or five years they have incurred a hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars in debt to make Lindell not profitable.

And with respect to Lynita and the LSN Trust, I don't even know if she's properly licensed. I don't know if she has a license to manager the property. I don't know if she has business licenses. I don't know if she has any of

that. Maybe she does. I don't know. But it makes no sense for Lindell to pay her a -- or the ELN Trust to make sure she receives a 10 percent management fee when it's willing to do it for free. If she wants to do it for free, maybe that changes the equation to some degree.

But the ELN Trust shouldn't have to pay her management fee to do something that it's willing to do for free, especially with respect to the unit that it's renting, on the second floor. So even if this Court ordered that it start paying \$3200 a month, it's going to have to pay Lynita \$320 a month to manage the property. I don't know what if anything she's doing with respect to unit 201 where the ELN Trust operates out of. So it wouldn't be appropriate for her to do that.

With respect to paying rent, Your Honor, if this Court is inclined to order the ELN to start paying rent. AS Mr. Karacsonyi indicated, the LSN Trust already owes the ELN Trust 4 to \$500,000. So to the extent this Court wants to start ordering that those payments be made, it should be deducted from the amount. It should be offset so that the ELN Trust doesn't have to keep writing a -- a -- write a check every month to the LSN Trust. It should be deducted from the 4 or \$500,000 that this Court already recognized should not have been transferred from the ELN Trust to the LSN Trust.

With respect to the sign that we probably heard 10 times about today, at least the sign that the ELN Trust had up, at least it said that there was a vacancy. At least there was a phone number for somebody to call if they wanted to rent one of the units. The sign that's up now, there's nothing. There's no contact information. If somebody wanted to get into Lindell based on the pictures that were shown, I don't know how they would get in contact with Lynita to find out about that vacancy.

The fact of the matter is while she may have poured her heart and soul into this property, maybe she -- I don't know, but it's been a losing proposition from day one and the ELN Trust is suffering because of bad business decisions that have been made by the LSN Trust. Those units have been bacant -- vacant for years and I believe I identified that in my opposition. And the ELN Trust should not continue to incur damages because of -- of what's been going on today.

THE COURT: Do you got a position on this?

MS. FORSBERG: Your Honor, one thing to add. To our knowledge, I know they say that she's still a resident of Nevada, but she technically lives from our understanding is in Evanston. She's even on the Omni Award directory in Evanston, Wyoming, to our knowledge.

So the other problem is he's on property to manage

this -- this property all the time. She's nowhere to be found. So that's kind of hard to manage that on a day-to-day basis whenever it's early, not here, so --

MR. LUSZECK: Can I -- can I just add one more thing, Your Honor? And I don't know -- even if this Court finds if she can still manage it, I don't understand how this Court can preclude the ELN Trust which is a 50 percent owner in Lindell from speaking with any other -- any of the other tenants or precluding it somehow to exercise any of its rights as a manager.

Just because -- if this Court finds that the LSN

Trust can continue to manage it, she can't still keep
incurring this debt and making improvements without the
consent of the ELN Trust. There still has to be
communication. But it seems like what she's asking for is
just cart blanche authority to do whatever she wants despite
the fact that the Nevada Supreme Court found a year ago that
the ELN Trust still has a community -- or sorry, a 50 percent
interest in the property.

Oh, gosh. And then the whole parking roof debacle. I mean, that's just one example, Your Honor. I mean, that happens in December 20th and it's not -- there is -- a tenant has their truck that's stuck under this carport for a month and nothing happens. And I know in the reply they say well,

he wanted it to stay there for insurance purposes.

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Your Honor, that is so farfetched. You're telling me a tenant of a property is going to want their truck to stand under a carport for a month? That's a joke. There is no evidence of that. Where is the affidavit from the tenant stating that? That's not what happened. That's not what occurred. It was a complete liability for Lindell property, nonetheless, it sat there for 30 days until it was ultimately removed and the tenant was allowed to get his car out of there. And that carport still isn't up even though she's managing the property.

THE COURT: Any rebuttal?

MR. KARACSONYI: Okay. And -- and Ms. Nelson would like to say a few words about his last point. I mean, she's really -- really upset about that.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. KARACSONYI: But the rent roles -- first of all, two of those people stopped paying rent and were run off by Eric immediately after the transfer or weren't paying rent at the time. The church group stopped paying rent two months after the transfer. So you can have a lease for all the money you want, but if the people aren't paying rent and they're not staying at the building, you're not going to be profitable.

Now as far as the repairs and maintenance that they

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requested in the past, as you recall, a lot of those repairs and maintenance were for things that the Court really couldn't justify. He wasn't changing a roof. He wasn't painting the building. It was Lance Lou (ph) and other people who were just getting these — these monies for repair and management but the Court couldn't really determine at that point what was being repaired or managed by these people. You don't need to have a license as a private owner to rent your own property. You don't have to have a property management license. She's an owner of this property.

I didn't say -- he says that we acknowledge that she owes money. I didn't say she owes money. What I did acknowledge, and -- and reminded this Court of, is that the fact that -- that you've already said that if there are monies owed between the parties that you are going to reserve that for a later date. You haven't made that determination whether he owes money, she owes money, and you decided, I believe rightfully, that it should wait until we find out what the tracing produces because if the tracing states that property doesn't -- it needs to be transferred back to Ms. Nelson or vice versa, it's going to affect how you look at those monies that were collected during the pendency of the appeal, if she still has a right to those properties.

So you haven't made a determination that anybody

owes money. I haven't conceded that we owe any money. All I was simply saying is you took the issue of past monies owed between the parties. You took that and reserve that to be done at the very end of this case. And so to the extent that you asked about him paying the back rent, I -- I just reminded the Court that that was something that was reserved for a better -- for -- for a future date.

So the receivership we asked -- or they asked for, if you're not inclined to allow Ms. Nelson to run the property, certainly allowing Mr. Nelson to run the property isn't viable and we would ask then that you go with the receivership.

Now she is a resident of Nevada. She's never given up her residency. She is here managing the property.

And this -- this parking structure issue is so upsetting, because Ms. Nelson was on top of this issue from the very start even during the time of her mother's passing which was very difficult. So the -- the tenant asked to leave the -- the vehicle there until he can determine how to proceed with the insurance. And in the meantime, she had bids performed to replace the structure with the existing materials.

But here's what happened. We -- she gets these bids and he has all the stuff -- all -- all the material hauled

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away. And so we sent them a letter as they know. And it -we sent them a letter saying we believe you had all the -- all
the -- the material hauled away and you're causing -- costing
her more money because she was going to use the existing
material and already had the bids done. She's been on top of
these issues for day -- from day one.

The pictures don't lie. The condition of this property is a hundred times better today than it was back then. And with that, I think she would like to say a few words about that issue because -- because it's really upsetting to her to hear -- to hear such lies spewed in court.

MS. NELSON: Thank you, Your Honor. I stand here on the merit of my honesty that I've had ever since I walked into this court and that I've sworn to. And for the representation of Coun -- of opposing Counsel to suggest that from their client who has --

MR. KARACSONYI: You can just --

MS. NELSON: -- determined --

MR. KARACSONYI: -- stick to the --

MS. NELSON: -- otherwise. I -- I appreciate the opportunity to talk about this proposed issue with the cover. Okay.

With regards to -- I -- I'm not sure where the information is coming from. It's -- it's not from the tenant.

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It's -- it's not accurate. It is a lie. It's not honest. I was in contact with the tenant and told him that I could have lifted it off myself. He wanted to pursue some situations with insurance and almost refused my -- my multiple time after time suggestions just to move the truck and have the insurance cover for it afterwards. That's not what he wanted to do. It could have been removed. I could lift the cover and pull the truck out. I could do it. I had a maintenance employee lift it with me, however, and there wasn't a problem.

The tenant also called one of the persons that I had obtained a bid from, because he wanted the insurance to oversee all of this. He didn't want to do it himself. Like I said, I don't know why. That -- that was his decision. It wasn't my responsibility. He originally wanted it to be my responsibility. I told him it was not. I wasn't in charge of the accident. It wasn't my responsibility. It was between him and his insurance company and had nothing to do with mine which is I think why he delayed it. He was trying to convince people that it was my responsibility.

He ended up -- I have emails, I have texts, going out, lifting the cover himself, and pulling the truck out. It's between -- it was his decision. It had nothing to do with mine. And I will address the timing as well.

My mom asked me to stay with her and not to leave

THE COURT: -- that it still bothered her --

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MR. LUSZECK: And she's not talking about her --
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             MS. FORSBERG: It's someone in her family I think
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    what she's --
              MS. NELSON: No, I am talking about you.
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             MR. LUSZECK: Me?
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              MS. NELSON: Yes.
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              MR. LUSZECK: Come on, Your Honor.
             THE COURT: Yeah. Yeah.
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             MR. LUSZECK: This has got to stop. This is --
             THE COURT: Yeah, we don't --
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             MR. LUSZECK: -- ridiculous.
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             THE COURT: Yeah, I didn't think -- I didn't talk --
    I did not take it as being --
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             MS. NELSON: I'm talking about --
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             THE COURT: -- Eric at this time.
             MS. NELSON: -- Mr. Nelson and my sister who were in
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    cahoots together --
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             MR. LUSZECK: Your Honor, I object --
             MS. NELSON: -- during this.
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             MR. LUSZECK: -- to this.
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             MS. NELSON: And they bring up the point that there
   was --
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             MR. KARACSONYI: Okay.
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             MS. NELSON: -- there was --
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MR. LUSZECK: Your Honor --

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MS. NELSON: -- some weeds that weren't pulled.

anything from the record as far as anything dealing with the mother and stuff on that. I was more concerned about the property management. Those issues are -- and obviously what happens -- you know, the reason I had transferred the management to Ms. Lynita back in 2014, when it was on that, because there was -- these people can't communicate. That was the problem. They couldn't deal with the altercation with the gate and push in and Lynita's heel getting caught on that and we were having almost altercations over a gate and access to the property and changing locks.

That's why we going to have you guys communicate.

So I know you indicate they need to be able to communicate as co-owners and do it. And I wish they could, but we couldn't do that. And we almost got to a point where we had TPOs being filed and things like that, so we could not co-manage. And my other option would be to have a separate manager come and manage the property. That costs both parties money out that, because I think from when we had the testimony years ago about a 10 percent management fee was somewhere in the ballpark when we had it. We didn't really get a lot of expert. I mean, that's the problem, but my other option is to

get a separate person to come in and manage. Again, that costs -- that takes money out of both pockets. But if they have both owners communicate, I wish they could, but that's the problem on that.

But I think you're right for me to order and they cannot communicate with tenants. It's tough as ownership rights and that from the trust on that, but the fact is to try to have them communicate and work together, you know, probably is not going to happen. It's still very emotionally charged. It's been going on for -- I think they separated in 2008, filed in 2009, if I remember.

I mean, so I was hoping the case would ultimately settle after the Supreme Court decision to try to get there because I can only imagine the -- the pain and the stress and let alone business, but I think Ms. Lynita has always felt that when she came in on it, they talked to her kinda she was like a not very bright stay-at-home kind of mom raising kids on that and she felt that she can run business on that and she can always get into -- should they put the money in whose better business.

You know, the Court follows the business judgment rule. You assume people -- there's a judgment and not for me to secondguess people's judgment. They come in and make investments, do things like that, and people make business

enough for me to determine unless I see someone who's doing things fraudulently or not taking care of property, but that's the problem we're at this point, that no one trusts each other still, that they're afraid you're going to get rid of all the property just to try to make sure that no matter what happens that she won't get anything.

Your issue is you don't think that they're trying to tie you guys up, so you can't do business, but you guys need to get this resolved. But it's not going to be resolved. You guys are going to be litigating this probably -- I'm retiring in two-and-a-half years and I expect this will be litigated after my retirement and so be it. But I will take all the -- any issues that I missed that you want to address? Because T --

MR. LUSZECK: Well, I just had two quick things.

Counsel said that some of the tenants that were in the property when the LSN Trust took over the property weren't paying rent or only differ two months. That's false. If you look at Exhibit 4, gosh, the accounting that they provided for July, August, September of 2014 shows that every single tenant in there paid rent. The total of \$7,800 was collected from each month.

So I'm just telling you what they put in the accounting that they sent over to me that they ordered to by

the Court back in 2014. I believe it's Exhibit 4. Exhibit 4 to my opposition.

And then with respect to the -- the carport, Your Honor, it just boils down to it's a liability issue. If it was this light -- you know, if -- if it was as light as -- as Ms. Nelson says that it was and she could have lifted it up, we're talking about December. What -- what would have stopped the wind from coming and blowing that across the street or hitting a house or hitting a commercial property or hitting somebody? It's a liability issue. It needed to be submitted to the insurance company for them to deal with it. It's a pretty straightforward type thing when it comes to commercial liability and commercial insurance policies. So that's what should have been done, but it wasn't.

MR. KARACSONYI: And it's just not true Your Honor about the rents. They -- they weren't paying full rents, so --

MR. LUSZECK: Well, that's -- we got it from his office. So it's Exhibit 4.

THE COURT: Any other things? I felt that -- as I said, I'll give you guys written orders on, everything we need written orders on, everything to get this moving forward. I think Mr. Bertsch -- I think you need an issue as -- as far as the tracing? I mean, and so you can get started. I think

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that was the tie up on that. The parties cannot agree on a tracing date. Is that where we're still at?

MR. BERTSCH: You know, as I listen to this, in some cases it sounds like we're chasing the hamster and letting the elephants running over us.

THE COURT: Yeah, I --

MR. BERTSCH: And I've always tell my clients one of the best things to do if you're going any place, you get in the car and you go. What's the biggest window in that car? It's the windshield. That's where you're going. If you drive down the road looking in the rearview mirror, you're going to have an accident. And it appears by some of this that's about where we're headed

Now as far as the tracing is concerned, I was looking for a starting point. And I looked at the schedules that were prepared on May 31st, 2001. And ask each side to verify if that is the starting point.

So as I understand the trust, it's like two different companies. They have no relationship other than they do business with each other like a vendor. I find in looking at those, there was -- it was titles for everything that was on there with a few exceptions which have to be answered. But after that, they're claiming what went in there, there's no community assets because now it's private

and it belongs to them individually.

What I find in looking at some of the information is after that things get commingled. And they don't remain separate. The titles go back and forth. And what I'm told is if we change one or if the other person got this, they can do whatever they want. So they're gifts.

And to my way of thinking, if there is a transfer, or money transferred, even though it's commingled, there's got to be due to and due from. And the transfers have to be at an arms length transaction and they were not arms length transactions here.

So the differences are passing through the commingling of funds. Should be an arms length transaction. If it isn't arms length and it goes to this considering a gift, to me, it may not be community property going in, but it gives me some sense. It became community property afterwards. So we need a definition what is the community property.

The Lindell, I think there's no question the receiver has to operate that property. In my doing this for over 50 years, that's the solution. And the receiver then can report and operate the property. That's my look. So it becomes hard to trace if everybody has a different opinion. If I trace it and it goes from one commingled to another, does that mean it's a gift and I forget about it? If that's the

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case, where everything was signed up on May 31st, and it can be at a price that's not at fair value, you don't setup a due to and due from on everything. Then it's over. I have no tracing to do.

The other thing, we talked about the appraisal. And as I received the -- getting an appraisal on the property, one side said they didn't want to use the same person. I looked at finding an appraiser for the property on the cabin. And looking at their requirements and doing background checks, and I didn't look at the prior appraisal, I came up with who I'd like to talk to. I pull the appraisal it was the same person. So I think they're qualified. They both said it's okay to use the same one. I think it's cheaper. I think they're qualified. And I will contact them for doing an appraisal.

But I would like to have direction from the Court of how we treat this commingling, and if there are gifts, and should we pursue it on that basis.

MR. KARACSONYI: I'm going to -- oh.

MR. LUSZECK: Oh, sure.

THE COURT: Do you want to be heard on that? And then we'll -- thank you, Mr. Bertsch.

MR. LUSZECK: Yeah, I -- I thought this Court's order was clear. He's supposed to conduct a tracing as to what happened between the two entities, if anything. He's not

supposed to make opinions as to commingling or whether it's community property or whether it's fair market value or anything else. We have two separate entities. We've never disputed that there was business transactions between the two.

In the Supreme Court order on Page 17, this said the Court must trace trust assets to determine whether any community property exists within the trust. While I concede a tracing has to be done, it's not Mr. Bertsch's within his I think appointment of a special master to make a determination of whether or not anything was commingled or whether or not anything constitutes community property. I think that's a determination to be made by this Court.

So my understanding from day one is he's supposed to look at the two entities, identify any transactions between the two, and then come back to the Court and report that's what my finding is, Your Honor, you know. Entity A sold, you know, (indiscernible) to entity B, period. And then this Court makes a determination as to whether or not there's community property interest in there. If there's any claims of malfeasance or anything else with respect to a transaction, that's an A case, Your Honor. They've already filed a civil case for that. And that's where that deal's — that's a situation where that's dealt with.

But I don't think it's appropriate for the special

master who is appointed for a -- a fairly limited purpose to make determinations with respect to questions of fact and law which I think are ultimately for this Court to decide. And then --

MR. BERTSCH: Your Honor, if I recall, the order to me was to find if community property got involved with those transactions. So we need a starting point. They were all in the trust. There was no community property at that time because the titles were in the appropriate names.

If that's considered gifts, after that if it goes back and forth, there's nothing for me to do other than just say it starts where it is. But I'm telling you, as I started through it, some of these other questions came to mind, and I need instructions from the Court, do I just drop it or do I finish going through the transactions from the first up to current?

MS. FORSBERG: Your Honor, if I can -- one -- one thing and I think perhaps would help Mr. Bertsch is that the character of property remains as it is. If it's separate property and you're transfer between, it's still separate property. It doesn't lose its characteristic. I think that's the confusion he's having. He's basically saying nothing else happened and they were separate to begin with. And I don't see -- I believe that's what he's saying. So I think he's not

understanding that character of property remains as is, the existing property. If it's separate property, rents, issues, and profits, which means selling or purchasing of other things which is profits, rents, issues, and profits remain as they are. And yet, they have to determine if they brought something else in to make them community. I think that's what he's confused about.

MR. KARACSONYI: I think what -- what's causing the confusion is that it sounds to me like he's being told -- and I assume this is coming from Mr. Nelson, that these transfers are gifts. He -- he's not supposed to presume anything. I think what you would like -- and I think what the Supreme Court's charge is and what you would like him to do is find out -- to report on each and every one of those transactions. Okay. As he said, property was transferred, was it arms length. Was there money back. If not, what should have been paid and what wasn't paid. And to do that with each and every transaction going forward and to find out where the property that existed in 2013 came from and whether you can trace it all the way back or whether it's so commingled you can't even trace it back.

And so with each -- with each transaction, I think it -- it -- it's his charge to just chart each and every transaction between these entities, whether money was paid for

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it, you know, how the transfer occurred, each and every property that was acquired, where did the money come from to acquire that. Was -- did it come from the original money or did it come from money that was transferred between the two or did it come from money that it's impossible to say where it came from in which case that it's presumed to be community property.

And then at the end of the day Your Honor needs to make the decision once you have all this information, and they wrote this in their initial brief, they argued some of these points in their initial brief on remand, the -- the transfers were gifts and this and that, so you should find that they're separate property or whatever.

But it's ultimately your decision to determine under community property law whether there was a transmutation. And they talked a lot about transmutation. Whether her separate property was transmuted to his separate property. Whether her tran — separate property was transmuted to community property or whether his community property — or separate property was transmuted.

And so once you have all those transactions, then you can make the determination. And you can look at the law. Is this a clear and convincing evidence of a transmutation? This was Lynita's separate property. It went to Eric. Did

she intend to transmute that property and -- or did she intend to gift it to him?

And so those are all the things that you are ultimately — I agree with Counsel. You are ultimately going to make those decisions as to whether the character of property change. But I think for Mr. Bertsch's purposes, I think the charges map each and every transaction from 2001 you — which you indicated was the date that you thought the Supreme Court set to present — to 2013 — or 2013 and let me know what happened between these trusts and where the property that existed in 2013 if you can tell me definitively where that property came from. If you can tell me that you can trace that back to 2001.

MR. LUSZECK: Yeah, I don't -- I don't disagree with that. But that's what the charge is and that's the tracing that's supposed to happen is this -- yeah, what do we have in 2001 and where was it going forward.

But I think the big misconception here is the fact that the only way the community property would even arise in this situation is if Eric or Lynita have assets titled outside of the trust that they transferred into the trust. And that would make it community property. So if Eric had assets income that were outside of the ELN Trust that he funded after 2001 into the ELN Trust, then we may have a community property

1 issue. But the fact that the ELN Trust had an -- an asset in 2001, sold it, purchased another asset, things like that nature, that doesn't transmutate it into community property. The separate property retains its character throughout, through present.

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So I think that distinction needs to be made, that just because there may have been transfers between the trust or business transactions, that doesn't mean it's transmutated into community property. It keeps and it retains its same nature.

THE COURT: I think the issue with Mr. Bertsch is to -- except -- is to trace -- is to tell (indiscernible) -- is to trace it so the Court can make a determination. Many positions will be it's a gift. The Supreme Court talked about, you know, gifts, things like that. Well, that's the whole thing to determine about. Was it -- and part of to determine the gift is you look to see, you know, was there arms length transaction, was there value. If I find everything going from one to the other, there's millions of dollars of gifts to that side and this group's getting nothing, I don't know if it's really a gift or not. I mean, that's the whole issue it comes on that.

And so I think (indiscernible) as far as whether it's commingling, I -- I think those issues are due -- due to, due from. And to say where it went, how it got there, and where it went afterwards so we can determine those issues on that, was there a value paid, was there not value paid. Is it then going to be -- did he send her a gift or not a gift. I think that's the issue.

So I think the other fact is on that if we start from the premise that everything was a gift, I thin Mr.

Bertsch says that there's nothing to trace. And I'm not taking a presumption everything was a gift. I think the issue is to see where it came from, May 31st, 2001 through the divorce decree or that property was, who owned it, where it went.

And again, I agree with you. If it was separate property, it doesn't automatically lose that, but the issue -- I don't know where everything came. That's the issue on this question is that there's all these transactions, did this come from that, did this come from here, and that's what the Supreme Court was saying with the tracing. We don't know where everything came from, let alone with titles on that. But I know Mr. Karacsonyi disagrees, and I respect that about the Supreme Court, but they -- to me with their language, we hold. We find. I felt -- and that's why I went from the May 31st, 2001 based upon a -- now maybe they used poor language, but that's something you clarify with them. But that's why I

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went from the May 31st, 2001, here's where it started, where did it go through, June 2013. That's all I'm trying to trace it through that.

And I think Mr. Bertsch needs in all those issues, like was there value paid for it, was it this or that, so he can let me know on those issues and the Court would determine whether it's separate property or was it community property or where it went through, but there was the issues. I don't know where all the BanOne stuff came from, how it got there, to be honest

I know we had different pieces of property. It's been so long ago, I forgot, but there's an awful lot of transactions from the 2001 when they created the trust what was in there and what came up to 2013, was there any property that a party put in that was separate property that of course they could not give their community property and trust if there was community property used on that. Eric could give his half, but not Ms. Lynita's half.

So that's the issue is what it looks like with the properties. So I'm not sure what the exact issue is from -from the trust, but I'll hear it from --

MR. LUSZECK: Well, the issue is is -- yeah, he's supposed to conduct a tracing, but he's not supposed to state, you know, this is community property, this is -- I believe

this wasn't for fair market value in our link's transaction. That's not the scope of his retention. He's supposed to trace. He's supposed to look at the transactions, here they are, Your Honor, here's my spreadsheet, here's my document, here's what it is, but it shouldn't contain language such as community property, commingling, you know, it shouldn't have any of that because that's not what a special master is supposed to do.

THE COURT: I agree.

MR. LUSZECK: That's one. And two, Wyoming Downs shouldn't be included in this tracing either based upon the fact that the 9/22/2014 was not overturned by the Nevada Supreme Court. So the issue is completely outside of the scope of his retention because it has nothing to do with anything.

MS. FORSBERG: Your Honor, just to -- to finish the clarification on that, is -- is -- it's -- to determine whether it was community property instead of if it's trust property and they did business between each other, that's not community property. That's two trusts that are separate entities that don't have a community interest. They're now separate property that are going back and forth. And whether that's fair or not is not before the Nevada Supreme Court the Supreme Court said. It said find out if there's any community

property that's been put in there and gone back and forth. That's the difference. I think that's one thing that Eric -we have been discussing that that's what the task is. 4 And that's what the tracing should show you, whether they brought something in from the outside that they -- they had earned on a community property setting and put it in. It's not whether they tran -- transferred separate property and transferred -- it still remains separate property. I think that's the confusion too. 10 MR. LUSZECK: But that's true, because any -- any claims that, you know, a transaction --11 MS. FORSBERG: It's unfair or --12 13 MR. LUSZECK: -- was not fair or anything else, that's subject to the A case. 14 MS. FORSBERG: That's not --1.5 16 MR. LUSZECK: That's not --MS. FORSBERG: -- this. 17 MR. LUSZECK: -- even -- this Court is to determine 18 19 whether or not there's any --20 MS. FORSBERG: Community --21 MR. LUSZECK: -- community --22 MS. FORSBERG: -- property, period. 23 MR. LUSZECK: -- property within either one of the

trusts. It's not to determine whether or not a transaction

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was fair or anything else. It's whether there was community property. Once again, that's your determination, not Mr. Bertsch's.

MR. KARACSONYI: So if I may just respond to them.

I don't disagree on the part -- part that he's not going to make decision as he's not the judge and he's not going to make the decision on the character of property. I don't think we have any disagreement there or the character -- how -- how transactions changes the character of property.

Certainly though if -- if a transaction was done where property -- her separate property was transferred to his trust without consideration, he would say -- he would note that this was a transfer for zero dollars and the property sold for X dollars and she didn't get that. So whether you want to say whether he determines if it's arms length or not, he can say -- he can trace the transactions, was it zero, was it \$5, was it \$10.

And it is this Court's charge to find out what the character of property is and the transmutation issues. That's part of community property law and whether there were transmutations of property. And we -- we must not forget that anything earned or required during marriage is community property.

And everything they're doing in their trust, if he's

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earning monies during marriage, those are community efforts that need to be compensated. And so that -- if that's occurring in the trust and there's properties being acquired, even if you acquire them in trust, I can't go defeat my wife's community property interest by setting up a trust and buying a property in the name of that trust. I can't do that.

If you purchase a property during marriage in the name of a trust, just because you title it in a trust doesn't make it separate property. You have to show that it was derived from actual separate property. And that's exactly what his charge is, to go back and look. If it's the rents issues and profits, if you own the Palmyra residence, I'll just use my client as an example, and you sold it for 700,000 and you bought another house for 700,000, that's your separate property. I don't disagree if the transaction is the same on that side, although I disagree with the date of tracing, but that's for the Supreme Court to later decide if that was correct or not.

But this -- this idea that just because you did things in the name of the trust, that doesn't defeat your spouse's community property interest. So we just need to see all the transactions all the way through. If Wyoming Downs gets covered there at the very end, we need to see every dollar from point A to point B and then make a determination

community, because it's not according to the separate property

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agreement.

THE COURT: Now the -- the issue for Mr. Bertsch on that is -- to me is to see what transactions happened and was there value paid, not value paid, not whether it was gifts or commingled or transmuted where they to say what a property is. That's been the big question of this case from day one, what's the property, where it came from. There's so many transactions and this accounts. That's what we're trying to do is see where it came from and how it got there and from the 2001 to 2013. So as far as --

MR. KARACSONYI: And if this --

THE COURT: -- those issues about arms length transactions, it's like that, I think the issue is -- this was transferred from here to there, they paid a hundred bucks or paid no money --

MR. KARACSONYI: And --

THE COURT: -- and it --

MR. KARACSONYI: And when prop --

THE COURT: -- that becomes gifts or if it's community or separate. That's right.

MR. BERTSCH: Your Honor, what I'm talking about is on Page 5 and on the top of Page 6, because it's talking about at this particular point --

MS. FORSBERG: Of the Supreme Court?

MR. BERTSCH: -- this is from --

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MR. LUSZECK: Yeah.

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MR. BERTSCH: -- the Supreme Court.

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THE COURT: Okay.

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then the tracing of it is moot.

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MR. BERTSCH: It's talking about where Lana Martin, a Nevada resident, as initial distribution trustee was for

both parties. And then on the top of Page 8, it said many transfers of property occurred between the trusts between 2001, 2009, most of which were gifts from one trust to another. They're not designated that, but if they're saying that any -- anything was transferred after that was a gift,

THE COURT: Is -- is moot, yeah.

MR. LUSZECK: Because there was no community.

MR. KARACSONYI: I -- I don't have the full context of what he's reading right there, but I think he needs to trace again all the transactions, nobody disagrees, and let you make the ultimate decision of what the laws and the fact -- laws are and the facts.

As far as -- just one thing that I hope isn't missed, that he also has to when there's an acquisition, because we keep talking about these transfers back and forth, when there's an acquisition, he does need to say if it's acquired during marriage a piece of property do you know the

source of those monies. Can you determine where that money came from. Is it monies that could have come from her trust or both their trusts or -- or where. Can you trace it back to -- to which -- where did it come from, that money, so that you can determine whether you can trace that property back to separate property or whether you can't tell where that money came from, in which case the presumption arises that it's community property.

THE COURT: Well, the issue on that, I think the Supreme Court on that they did use the word gifts. But I think if they had meant gifts all the way 2009 and there are no sense to trace and they did mention about the need to trace is that's the issue is try to see where the property went from 2001 to 2013 time of divorce to see what was in there to see if there's any community property claims. There may have been gifts back and forth to trusts. You can give gifts between trusts on that, but I think the issue from this Court is to see where it came from, what it was, where it came from. That's what the whole purpose of tracing was then determined, was there any community interest or not.

I think the Supreme Court -- I said with their language I wasn't sure when it went back to 1993. They made it real clear that we find -- we hold that they were funded with separate property agreements. That's why I started with

the 2001 date because I thought the Supreme Court used the word we find, we hold. That's not dicta, that's findings. That's why again I did the tracing from the 2001 to the divorce decree to sit there and see where it came from, where it went, that way we can make a determination was it separate property, maintain separate property, fine.

Mr. Bertsch, anything else on that? I mean -MR. BERTSCH: And then I take it that I will start
with the deeds and things that are present at March 31st,
2001. I will then take it to disposition through today or
2009, whatever you ask me to do, which would be if there's a
sale, where did the funds go, how they show on a tax return.
Then if there's other purchases in the -- after that, then
where did the funds come from to have the purchase. And if
it's from one trust to the other, they used funds and there's
got to be a due to or due from.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. KARACSONYI: And there's one other issue. When money comes --

MS. NELSON: Wait. Wait. We can cut Larry -
MR. LUSZECK: Oh, I -- I don't -- I don't doubt

that. Yeah.

MR. KARACSONYI: Just to -- for -- as accounting purposes, I thin. But when there's money coming in to the

trust too, he's -- one other thing. Not just deeds, but if money comes into the trust, you have to determine where did that money come from. If -- if a trust -- if you take 200,000 in your savings and put it in a trust, you don't defeat the character of property and then buy property with it. So any money coming in too, you'll have to say where did that money come from, was it earnings, was it -- where did it -- do we know where it came from? If -- if we don't know, then it's community property and we -- the presumption arises.

THE COURT: I'm inclined not to have the Wyoming

Downs thrown in there, I remember when I did the divorce

decree and we held off on Wyoming Downs separately, but I'll

look at that, but we held separate. I think I made a separate

ruling on the Wyoming Downs. I heard separate testimony on

that. I believe it was not a final decree because I had held

off on Wyoming Downs because I needed to get an evidentiary

hearing, but I'll look at that, but I will not be inclined -
I think I made findings that the Wyoming Downs was separate at

that time even though they argued that it was still acquired

during marriage, should or shouldn't have been included on

that, but my inclination is not to include the Wyoming Doi -
Wyoming Downs in your tracing at this point. But I'll look at

all that whether -- a detailed written order.

But to get this going, I would think we start with

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the -- there was the May 31st, was it the date? May 30th,
    2001 date to --
 3
              MR. BERTSCH: Your Honor --
              THE COURT: -- tracing --
 4
 5
              MR. BERTSCH: -- if I take it from the trust because
 6
    you have to start with an inventory and see what happens, if I
 7
   happen to hit Wyoming Downs then I'm going to --
             MR. KARACSONYI: Yeah.
 8
 9
             MR. BERTSCH: -- have --
             THE COURT: Sure.
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             MR. BERTSCH: -- to talk about it.
11
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             MR. KARACSONYI: That's -- you're not going to be
13
   able to do that.
             THE COURT: Absolutely. I mean, if it's there on
14
15
   that, but that was my issue. I don't remember when that was
   purchased initially.
16
             MR. KARACSONYI: It was --
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             THE COURT: I don't --
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19
             MR. KARACSONYI: -- right before the divorce.
             THE COURT: How they bought it and sold it and then
20
21
   it --
             MR. LUSZECK: It was --
22
23
             THE COURT: -- reacquired it --
24
             MR. LUSZECK: -- during the pendency --
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MR. KARACSONYI: Thank you, Your Honor. 1 2 MR. LUSZECK: And one I guess further clarification point is I don't know that we asked for a receiver over Lindell. I think we just said a third party --5 THE COURT: You said --MR. LUSZECK: -- manager. 6 7 THE COURT: -- a disinterested manager. MR. LUSZECK: Yeah. 8 9 THE COURT: Okay. MR. KARACSONYI: I -- I was using receiver 10 11 interchangeably with that. THE COURT: I would be inclined to do that just 12 because it's unfortunate on that, but I think under the 13 14 circumstance there's no way we can -- that either party --15 (COUNSEL CONFER BRIEFLY) MR. BERTSCH: If you want to appoint that third 16 17 party over --18 THE COURT: Do you --MR. BERTSCH: -- they'll never get agreement. 19 THE COURT: Yeah, do you -- do you have -- do you 20 feel comfortable with making a recommendation to the Court as 21 a disinterested manager? I mean, you have more experience in that or you -- I can check (indiscernible) disinterested 23

manager for the --

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ELN Trust on May 22, 2018,6 she continues to manage said property despite the fact 2 that she possesses a 50% interest in said property. As evidenced by the Accountings provided by Lynita and/or the LSN Trust, Lynita has mismanaged the Lindell Property, and in so doing, has charged an unreasonable management fee. The ELN 6 Trust is willing to manage the Lindell Property for free pending resolution of the Divorce Proceeding, which will include the preparation of a monthly accounting and payment to the LSN Trust for 50% of rents collected. Alternatively, the ELN Trust respectfully requests that this Court appoint a disinterested management company to manage the same as it would be inequitable to allow Lynita to continue to manage the same.

THE ELN TRUST IS ENTITLED TO ITS ATTORNEYS' FEES AND F. COSTS.

NRS 18.010 explains:

"... the court may make an allowance of attorney's fees to a prevailing party: (b) Without regard to the recovery sought, when the court finds that the claim... of the opposing party was brought or maintained without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing party. The court shall liberally construe the provisions of this paragraph in favor of awarding attorney's fees in all appropriate situations. It is the intent of the Legislature that the court award attorney's fees pursuant to this paragraph and impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure in all appropriate situations to punish for and deter frivolous or vexatious claims and defenses because such claims and defenses overburden

Lynita violated this Court's April 19 Order because she failed to transfer the Banone LLC 27 and Lindell Property to the ELN Trust within "thirty days of the date of this Order." Indeed, although Lynita executed the quitclaim deeds on May 10, 2018, she tactically withheld turning over 28 the same until May 22, 2018, in violation of said order.

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limited judicial resources, hinder the timely resolution of meritorious claims and increase the costs of engaging in business and providing professional services to the public.

EDCR 7.60 allows the Court to award attorneys' fees and costs when "a party without just cause...(1) Presents to the court a motion or an opposition to a motion which is obviously frivolous, unnecessary or unwarranted... (3) So multiplies the proceedings in a case as to increase costs unreasonable and vexatiously."

Here, the Motion was brought without reasonable grounds for the reasons set forth above. Consequently, Eric request that he be awarded his attorney's fees and costs for having to oppose the frivolous Motion and seeking to have the improperly recorded lis pendens expunged.

IV. CONCLUSION

As indicated *supra*, this is not one of the "rare circumstances" where a rehearing and/or reconsideration should be granted. To the contrary, the majority (if not all) of the arguments made in Lynita's Motion for Reconsideration were identical to the arguments that she made at the prior hearings and considered by this Court when it entered its Orders on April 19 and May 15. Consequently, Lynita's Motion should be denied in its entirety.

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The ELN Trust also moves this Court for an order: (1) terminating the JPI; (2) 2 imposing a bond on any property subject to the JPI; (3) expunging the lis pendens; (4) allowing the ELN Trust to manage Lindell; and (5) for Attorneys' Fees and Costs.

DATED this 22nd day of June, 2018.

SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD.

Nevada State Bar No. 0418 JEFFREY P. LUSZECK, ESQ. Nevada State Bar No. 9619 9060 West Cheyenne Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89129

Attorneys for Matt Klabacka, Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001

SIGGINS & FRER PACSINILE (702) 853-5483 TREPHONE (702) 853-5483 TREPHONE (702) 853-5483 TANDESIGNE AND PROPERTY PACSIMILE (702) 853-5485 WWW.SDHVVLAW.COM

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HER	EBY CERTIFY, pursuant to NRCP 5(b), that on June 22, 2018, I served
a true and co	orrect copy of the foregoing OPPOSITION TO LYNITA NELSON'S
MOTION	FOR RECONSIDERATION AND CLARIFICATION OF THE
COURT'S	DECISION ENTERED MAY 22, 2018; AND COUNTERMOTION
TO: (1) TE	RMINATE THE JPI; (2) IMPOSE A BOND ON ANY PROPERTY
SUBJECT	TO THE JPI; (3) EXPUNGE THE INAPPROPRIATELY
RECORDE	D LIS PENDENS; (4) ALLOW THE ELN TRUST TO MANAGE
LINDELL;	AND (5) ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS, to the following in the
manner set fe	orth below:
	Hand Delivery
	U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
	Certified Mail, Receipt No.:
	Return Receipt Request
XXX	E-Service through Wiznet

DICKERSON LAW GROUP Robert P. Dickerson, Esq. 1745 Village Center Circle Las Vegas, NV 89134

Attorneys for Defendant

Rhonda K. Forsberg, Esq. 64 N. Pecos Road, Suite 800 Henderson, NV 89074

Attorneys for Plaintiff

An Employee of SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD.

EXHIBIT "1"

EXHIBIT "1"

1	NOTC Larry L. Bertsch, CPA, CFF	***					
2	Nicholas S. Miller, CFE LARRY L. BERTSCH, CPA & ASSOCIAT	TES					
3	265 East Warm Springs Rd., Suite 104 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119	123					
4	Telephone: (702) 471-7223 Facsimile: (702) 471-7225						
5							
6	Forensic Accountants						
7	DIST	RICT COURT					
8	FAMI	ILY DIVISION					
9	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA						
10	ERIC L. NELSON,	4					
11	Plaintiff,	Case No. D-09-411637-D Dept. O					
12	T AMILITY,	300.0					
13	LYNITA SUE NELSON,	NOTICE OF FILING ASSET SCHEDULE AND NOTES TO ASSET SCHEDULE					
14	Defendant.	AND IN TES TO ASSET SCHEDUE					
15	Decordan.						
16	Larry I. Bertsch CPA CFF and N	icholas S. Miller, CFE, of the accounting firm of LARRY					
17		eby file as Exhibit "A" their Asset Schedule and Notes to					
18	Asset Schedule pursuant to Judge Sullivan'						
19	DATED this 5th day of July, 201						
20	DATED IIIs V day of July, 201	LARRY L. BERTSCH CPA & ASSOCIATES					
21		LARRY L. BERTSCH CFA & ASSOCIATES					
22		A MAKE					
23		Larry I. Bertsch, CPA, CFF Nicholas S. Miller, CFE					
24		265 East Warm Springs Rd., Suite 104					
25		Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 (702) 471-7223 Telephone					
26		(702) 471-7225 Facsimile Forensic Accountants					
27							
28							
28		30					
	10015-01/545216	181					
	10013-01/943210						

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the day of July, 2011, I mailed a copy of the Notice of Filing

Asset Schedule and Notes to Asset Schedule to the following at the last known address, by
depositing the same in the United States mail in Las Vegas, Nevada, first class postage prepaid and
addressed as follows:

David A. Stephens, Esq. STEPHENS, GOURLEY & BYWATER 3636 N. Rancho Drive Las Vegas, NV 89130 Attorneys for Plaintiff Eric L. Nelson

Robert P. Dickerson, Esq. THE DICKERSON LAW GROUP 1745 Village Center Circle Las Vegas, NV 89134 Attorneys for Defendant Lynita Sue Nelson

An employee of Larry L. Bertsch, CPA & Associates

10015-01/545216

Exhibit "A"

Exhibit "A"

Nelson v. Nelson Asset Schedule

July 5, 2011

Larry L. Bertsch, CPA & Associates

Larry L. Bertsch, CPA, CFF

Nicholas S. Miller, CFE, CSAR, MBA

	1	Velson v.	Nelson					
		Asset Schedule						
. 1		1	1	520.00				
1			Lynita	Eric	Asset	Income		
		NOTE	Value	Value	Titled	Producing		
eal Estate								
7065 Palmyra - Las Vegas. Nevada		. 1	650.000	910,000	Lynita - Trust	NO		
2911 Bella Kathryn Circle - Las Vegas		2	TBD	000 000	Eric Trust - Banone	NO		
2911 Bella Kathryn Circle - Las Vegas		2	TBD		Eric Trust - Banone	NO		
· hara		1 21	* *	000.000	0.30.00			
AZ-31 Gateway Lots	iei.	24	139,500		Lynita Trust	NO		
AZ-29 Gateway Lots	6.2	. 17	139,500	139,500	Eric - Trust	NO		
						11.		
Russell Road Property (65%)		. 3						
Owned by Eric Nelson Auctioneering (50%)		3a	TBD	2,000,000	Eric - Trust	YES		
Owned by Eric Nelson Trust (15%)		36	TBD	2,000,000	Eric - Trust	YES		
Receivable from CJE & L, LLC		3c	742,368	TBD	Eric - Trust	Unknown		
A STATE OF THE STA	-		4 Manual			21000000		
Brianhead, Utah	3n 12	4	2,000,000	2,000,000	Each Trust - 50%	NO		
3611 Lindell - Las Vegas	44	5	TBD 1	1.400.000	Each Trust - 50%	YES		
John Billiam Bib. Logar		1	1	1,400,000	Lack Hast - Doro	1 123		
5913 Pebble Beach		6	75,000	75,000	Lynita - Trust	NO		
Wyoming - 200 acres (40%)		7	TBD	800.000	Lynita - Trust	NO		
						-		
ississippi Properties		D at						
830 Arnold Ave. (Clay House) - Greenville, Mi	55.	. 8	40,000	40,000	Lynita - Trust	YES		
MS Bay 200 Acres - allocated		9				1 33		
The second secon								
Emerald Bay, LLC (Holding Company)		9a	45,500	None	Euch Trust - 50%	NO		
Bal Harbour, LLC		96	TBD		Each Trust - 50%	NO		
Bay Beach Resorts, LLC		9c	TBD		Each Trust - 50%	NO		
Bay Resorts, LLC	e+):	9d	TBD		Each Trust - 50%	NO		
Bay Results, ELC	*	, Ju	. 100		Each Hust - Juve	NO		
MS Bay allocated acreage- Lynita Trust			1					
		0.	TOD		Leader Tour	NO.		
Lynita Trust - not used		9e	TBD		Lynita - Trust	NO		
RV Park		91	TBD		Lynita - Trust	YES		
	-4				L.F.			
Dynasty		. 10	TBD		Eric Trust - Dynasty			
Silver Slipper		10a	TBD	200	Eric Trust - Dynasty	YES		
MS Bay allocated acreage Titled to Dynasty		106	TBD		Eric Trust - Dynasty	NO		
MS Bay allocated acreage Titled Frank Soris	Trust	10c	TBD	312,500	Eric Trust - Dynasty	NO		
Grotta, LLC - 16.67% interest		111	TBD .		Lynita - Trust	NO		
Dynasty profit sharing agreement		Ha	TBD '	1000	Lynita - Trust	NO		
MS Bay allocated interest - titled to Grotta, L	LC	116	TBD	16,667	Lynita - Trust	NO		
Grotta Financial Partnership		lle	1			NO		
	9.04.1.4	1 110						
Riverwalk Ent. (Holding Company for Hides	way Casino)	12	Unknown	None	Eric - Trust	NO		
3 9 T H H		4	* *		1			

Other Investments	.04				
Banone, LLC		1			37.50
4412 Baxter - Las Vegas	13,13a j	62,522	82,522	Eric Trust - Banone	YES
5314 Clover Blossom Court - North Las Vegas, Nevada	13	108,705		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
1301 Heather Ridge - North Las Vegas	13	118,459		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
6213 Anaconda - Las Vegas	13	81,411		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
1608 Rusty Ridge Lane - Henderson (Daughters House)	13	77.526		Eric Trust - Banone	NO
Mesa Vista (5 acres)	13	100,000	The second second	Eric Trust - Banone	NO
Mesa Vista - Lot 68	13	21,229		Eric Trust - Banone	NO
2209 Farmouth Circle - Nevada	13 i	88,166		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
3301 Terra Bella Drive - Nevada	13	65,013		Eric Trust - Banone	
4133 Compass Rose Way - Nevada	13	67,820		Erle Trust - Banone	YES
4601 Concord Village Drive - Nevada	13	1 mm		4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	YES
	at a v	61,070		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
4612 Sawyer Ave - Nevada	13	49,304		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
4820 Marnell Drive - Nevada	. 13	23,643		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
5113 Churchill Avc Nevnda	13	58,070		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
5704 Rosendge Ave Nevada	13	61.510		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
6301 Cambria Ave Nevada	13	68,244		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
6304 Guadalupe Ave Nevada	13	41,599		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
Mesa Vista - Lot 67 - Arizona (Deeded Back)	14	21,263		Eric Trust - Banone	NO
1628 W. Darrel Road - Arizona	14	37,882	37,882	Eric Trust - Banone	YES
1830 N. 66th Drive - Arizona	14	24,791	24.791	Eric Trust - Banone	YES
1837 N. 59th Street - Arizona	14	29,050	29,050	Eric Trust - Banone	YES
2220 W. Tonto Street - Arizona	14	30,906	30,906	Eric Trust - Banone	YES
3225 W. Roma Ave Arizona	14	31,299		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
3307 W. Thomas Road - Arizona	14	35,383		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
3332 N. 80th Lanc - Arizona	14 1	29,924	2000000	Eric Trust - Banone	YES
3415 N. 84th Lanc - Arizona	1 14	35.368		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
3424 W, Bloomfield Road - Arizona	14	43,084		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
3631 N. 81st Ave Arizona	14	30,063		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
4141 N. 34th Ave Arizona	14	21,804		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
4541 N 76th Ave Arizona	14	32,540		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
[1] [1] [1] [2] [3] [3] [4] [4] [4] [4] [4] [5] [5] [6] [6] [6] [6] [6] [6] [6] [6] [6] [6	-			Eric Trust - Banone	22.35 A
4816 S. 17th Street - Arizona	14	19,633	1000	Company of the Compan	YES
5014 W. Cypress Street - Arizona	1 14	30,324		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
5518 N. 34th Drive - Arizona	14	27,641		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
6172 W. Fillmore Street - Arizona	14	39,871		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
6202 S. 43rd Street - Arizona	1 14	27,772		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
6720 W. Cambridge Ave Arizona	14	32,563		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
6822 W. Wilshire Drive - Arizona	- 14	40,477		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
6901 W. Coolidge Street - Arizona	14	32,583	32,583	Eric Trust - Banone	YES
	1				100
Banone, LLC - AZ					
4838 W Berkeley Rd Arizona	15	TBD	32,622	Eric Trust - Banone	YES
8 Homes - Arizona	15	TBD	251,000	Eric Trust - Banone	NO
					-
Janone Nevada Notes Recejvable	16	1 THE R.		Eric Trust - Banonc	
R & D Custom Builders - DMV Lot 16-17 (secured)	16a	45,463	35	Eric Trust - Banone	YES
Advantage Construction - MV Lot 37 (secured)		20,081	250	Eric Trust - Banone	YES
Gerald & Linda Fixsen - MV Lot 52 (secured)		22,838		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
Gerald & Linda Fixson - MV Lot 53 (secured)	110	22,838		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
Joe Williams & Sherry Fixsen - MV Lot 54 (secured)		22,838		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
Bidco, Inc MV Lot 61 (secured)	3	21,263		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
Cary & Troy Fixsen - MV Lot 98 (secured)		22,838		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
Amada & Chris Stromberg (secured by Condo in PA)	16b	133,357		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
JB Ramos Trust (secured by 436 Europa Way)	16c	78.000		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
Katherine Stephens (secured by 1601 Knoll Heights)	16d	83,000	63,000		YES
Chad Ramos (secured 7933 Dover Shores)	16e	60,000	-21000	Eric Trust - Banone	YES
Alicia Harrison (secured by 1025 Academy)	100	68,620		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
Eric T. Nelson (secured by 8619 W. Mohave - AZ)	161	95,000		Eric Trust - Banone	YES
ELIC 1. NEISON (SECURED by 8017 W. MOTHER - AL)	16g	23,625		Eric Trust - Banone	NO

Other Receivables			April 10 million			
Frank Soris (Contingent)		17	TBD	1,000,000	Eric - Trust	YES
Nikki Cvintavich		18	200,000		Eric Nelson	YES
1	~			lactor fraction		
Family Loans	1		W			1
Chad Ramos	100 A	19	261,675		Eric - Trust	Unknown
Jesse Harber		20	47,000	The state of the s	Eric - Trust	Unknown
Brock Nelson	8 . 3	-	10,000		Eric - Trust	Unknown
Trans.			I sales a		,	
Autos/Vehicles	9.5			* 1		1.00
2008 Escalade EXT SUV (Owned) (Eric's)	- 2	21	40,475	38 840	Eric - Trust	NO
2007 Mercedes SL 550 (Owned) (Eric's)		21	50,115		Eric - Trust	NO NO
2011 Audi (Leased) (Lynita's)		-1	Lease	Lease	Lynita	NO
	199	21-	TBD	TBD	Unknown	NO
ATV's and Snowmobiles	4	2la	100	IBD	Unknown .	NO
. L			1		•	1
Fax Situation	4	22	110 175		(maranda)	NO
2006 Tax Refund (Held by Dave Stephens, Esq.)	3.0	22	110,125	110,128	Eric Nelson	I NO
			. 1		1	1:
Cash & Investment Accounts	1.2		1		4	
Lynita's Accounts	W		· cordora *	3	Version with the	<u> </u>
Schwab Capstone Capital- 2834 (3/31/2011)		23	1,016,969		Lynita - Trust	**
Credit Union 1 37214-01 (3/31/2011)		23	. 5.		Lynita - Trust	
Credit Union 1 37214-22 (3/31/2011)	richts &	23	48,274		Lynita - Trust	eee.
Silver State 3736-01 (3/31/2011)	. 1	23	2.020		Lynita Nelson	
Silver State 3736-80 (3/31/2011)		23	3,767		Lynita Nelson	91
A 1	· A			One Contract		L
Eric Accounts					12 Table 1	1 -
Bank of America 5010-0976-5829 (3/31/2011)	1	23	1		APPENDING TO THE SECOND	
Bank of America 5010-0716-2754 (3/31/2011)	100	23		13,685	Eric Trust - Banone	
Bank of America 0050-1157-7064 (3/31/2011)		23	2 2	3,533	Eric Trust - Banone	1
Bank of America 5010-1100-6958 (3/31/2011)		23	90		Eric Trust - EN Auct	2
Citi National Bank 363201539 (3/31/2011)		23		84.919	Eric Trust - Banone	
Citi National Bank 363005152 (3/31/2011)		23	M S		Eric Trust - Dynasty	donos
Citi National Bank 363250807 (3/31/2011)		23		13,316	Eric Trust - Banone	10.00
Mellon - 10594001700 (3/31/2011)		23	1 1		Eric - Trust	21
The first of the control of the cont			3 3	4.4		4
Liabilities	7.8	34		raka can	dos m	2.0
Frank Soris Contingent Liability	4.5	17	1		Eric - Trust	***
Due on Line of Credit (3/31/2011)		23		(1,807,369	Eric - Trust	

Nelson v. Nelson Notes to Asset Schedule

July 5, 2011

Larry L. Bertsch, CPA & Associates

Larry L. Bertsch, CPA, CFF

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Larry L. Bertsch, CPA & Associates reserves the right to update this report upon the production of additional documents. The information contained within this report is for use only in the conjunction with the surrounding Clark County District Court case Nelson v Nelson.

Note 1 - 7065 Palmyra

This is the current residence of Lynita Nelson. It has been alleged that improvements have been made to the property in the last two years. The parties do not agree on the value of the Property.

Since there is no agreement on the value of the property, it is recommended an appraisal be made on the property directed by an independent third party.

Note 2 - 2911 Bella Kathryn

This is the current residence of Eric Nelson which includes an adjacent vacant lot for which Eric is conducting improvements. Eric has valued the property as \$900,000 for the residence and \$175,000 for the adjoining lot. Lynita does not agree and her issue is stated below.

According to the detailed records of Eric Nelson, a total amount of \$1,362,612.57 has been spent towards the property which contains the house. The house was initially purchased for \$381,984.00 on 12/28/2009 and improvements have been made to the property as of 06/11/2011 amounting to \$980,628.57.

In reviewing the details of the house improvements on the general ledger kept by Eric Nelson, there was only one payment recorded to a relative, Paul Nelson, in the amount of \$25,000 and designated as contract labor in building the Residence. There were other payments recorded to relatives for reimbursement of materials and supplies used on the building of the residence. None of the reimbursed amount appeared material or not related to the residence. Those reimbursed payments were made to Paul Nelson, Cal Nelson, and to Big Fish, LLC, a company owned by Cal Nelson.

The adjoining lot was purchased on 08/11/2010 for a cost of \$175,000. As of 06/11/2011, improvements have been made towards the lot in the amount of \$64,558.68. In total, the purchase price and additional improvements towards this property amount to \$239,558.68.

Therefore the aggregate costs of the residence and adjoining lot at 06/11/2011amounts to \$1,602,171.25.

Since there is no agreement on the value it is recommended an appraisal be made of the property directed by an independent third party or a decision that funds expended for the property be the criteria of value.

At issue - Lynita claims Eric has used community funds to build this residence and feels regardless of an appraisal, she should receive 50% on the costs to buy and build the property.

Note 3 - Russell Road Property

History

Property consisting of 3.3 acres at 5220 E. Russell Road was purchased on November 11, 1999 for \$855,945 by the Lynita Nelson Trust and the down payment from Cal Nelson amounting to \$20,000. Lynita then became a 50% partner with Cal Nelson in a partnership named CJE&L, LLC which was formed for the purpose of renting the property to Cal's Blue Water Marine.

Shortly thereafter, CJE&L, LLC obtained a loan from Business Bank of Nevada in the amount of \$3,100,000. The purpose of this loan was to build a building for the operations of Cal's Blue Water Marine, Inc. The loan was to be guaranteed by Clarence and Jeanette, individually as well as their Trust dated May 31, 2001 and also Cal's Blue Water Marine, Inc.

Sometime in 2004, Lynita signed a guarantee on the flooring contract for the inventory of Cal's Blue Water Marine, Inc. On 01/01/2005, Lynita withdrew her guarantee of the flooring contract and in return, Lynita signed an assignment or forfeit of her interest in the partnership to remove her from the property records. (The Examiner has not seen the flooring agreement that was signed by Lynita, although requested - Each of the parties claims the other has the contract). According to the records, the forfeiture of partnership interest was transferred to the capital account of Cal Nelson there being no cash attached to the transaction.

The boat business failed in 2008. At that time, the Bank demanded a \$300,000 pay down to keep the loan in performing status. Eric paid the \$300,000 which was secured by property owned by Cal Nelson and located in Utah.

Eric's purchase of the interest in property

On or about 02/10/2010, Eric Nelson decided to purchase a 65% interest in the property. Eric's 65% interest is said to have cost \$4,000,000; which is comprised of the following amounts:

- 1) In 2009, Eric purchased an FDIC note on a property in Phoenix commonly known as "Sugar Daddy's" for approximately \$520,000. The source of these funds came from the Line of Credit. The property was sold with proceeds amounting to \$1,520,597.88. Since this was designed as a 1031 exchange, the proceeds were used in 2010 to purchase Eric's interest in the Russell Road Property.
- 2) As indicated above, Eric had previously paid \$300,000 to pay down the Bank Loan which was secured by property in Utah. In addition, Eric paid off the mortgage on Cal's house amounting to \$400,000. Both amounts were paid from Eric's Line of Credit. These two amounts aggregating \$700,000 were then used as a credit towards the purchase price for Eric's interest.

- 3) Eric gave a credit amounting to \$522,138.47 which represented future agreements with Cal and the termination of any present verbal partnership agreements. This also included money on rental payments given to Cal.
- 4) The remaining amount to fulfill the obligation of the purchase price was to borrow \$1,257,263.67 from the Line of Credit in 2010.

Therefore the purchase of Eric's interest is comprised of the following:

Pay down of Bank Loan	\$ 300,000.00
Pay off of personal residence of Cal Nelson	400,000.00
Credit to Cal Nelson for prior payments	522,138.45
Amount to pay Bank Note from Sugar Daddy's	1,520,597.88
Amount to pay Bank Loan from Line of Credit	1,257,263.67
	\$ 4,000,000.00

Therefore the amount of cash contributed directly to the interest in the property by Eric in 2010, amounts to \$2,777,861.55 (1,520,597.88 + 1,257,263.67). The cash reportedly paid off the original loan held by Business Bank of Nevada.

According to CJE&L's tax returns and representations made by Cal Nelson, Cal Nelson's capital account includes \$855,000; which represents the purchase price of the land originally purchased on November 11, 1999 by the Lynita Nelson Trust as well as \$501,529 in leasehold improvements made by Cal's Blue Water Marine. The summary document supporting the leasehold improvements contribution was believed to be at cost and not the net depreciated value. As prior indicated Cal's Blue Water Marine eventually failed in 2008. Since the Business failure in 2008, Cal Nelson has taken distributions from CJE&L of \$11,096 in 2009 and \$73,978 in 2010, aggregating to \$85,074.

The current ownership of the 5220 E. Russell Road property is 50% by Eric Nelson Auctioneering (an asset of the Eric Nelson Trust), 15% by the Eric Nelson Trust and 35% by CJE&L, LLC. (See below).

Note 3a - 50% in Russell Road owned by Eric Nelson Auctioneering

In the purchase of the Russell Road Property, the ownership of 65% of the property purchase from CJE & L, LLC was described above to be \$4,000,000. Eric Nelson says that 50% of the interest was designated to be owned by Eric Nelson Auctioneering and the other 15% by the Eric Nelson Trust.

Note 3b - 15% sale back to Cal Nelson for 15% interest by Eric Trust

The 15% interest is evidenced by a note in the amount of \$2,000,000 the principal amount is due in seven years from 2/3/2010 from Cal Nelson to Eric Nelson Trust. The note is secured by 15% of the real property owned by CJE & L, LLC and 15% of all rents collected from the property will be recognized as interest on the note.

Note 3c - Receivable from CJE & L, LLC amounting to \$742,368.

According to the 2010 tax return of CJE&L, LLC (owned 99% by Nelson Nevada Trust (Cal's Trust) and 1% by Cal Nelson), the company reports a liability in the amount of \$742,368 is due to Bric Nelson Auctioneering (Reported under Eric Trust - Eric Nelson Auctioneering). We have not received information as to the nature of this note.

Because of the controversy on this property, it is recommended that an appraisal of the property be made directed by an independent third party.

At issue, Lynita believes that Cal Nelson has not put any capital into the investment and therefore the amount of this asset is 100% owned solely by Lynita and Eric Nelson.

Also at issue is that Lynita bought the land for \$855,000 and was forced to forfeit her interest through an assignment to Cal Nelson. This issue is over a guarantee made by Lynita on a flooring arrangement on boats for a company owned by Cal Nelson, named Cal's Blue Water Marine.

Subsequent Transaction

The property was sold to the Oasis Baptist Church on 05/27/2011, prior to this transaction, the church held an option to purchase for \$6,500,000. The payments on the note were to begin on 09/01/2011. Until this date, the Oasis Baptist Church was to pay \$17,500 each month for the months of June, July, and August. Then starting on 09/01/2011 the Oasis Baptist Church will pay interest only at 6% on \$6,000,000 for 5 years and then will have a balloon payment due of \$6,500,000.

This contract was amended on 06/15/2011 because the Church could not get an exemption from property taxes unless they own the property. Therefore the original financial arrangement has been amended.

The Oasis Baptist Church needs additional improvements in order to bring their school over to the Russell Road property. In order to do this, they need an additional \$300,000 in funds for improvements to the property. Currently, they are paying \$20,000 per month space rental for them to conduct their school.

As of 06/15/2011, Julie Brown loaned \$300,000 to the Oasis Baptist Church and has a 1st Note/Deed on the property.

A 2nd Note/Deed is placed on the property to recapture all back rents and taxes in the amount of \$295,000. The 2nd Note/Deed is shared 1/3rd to Eric Nelson Auctioneering, 1/3rd to the Eric Nelson Trust and 1/3rd to CJE&L, LLC.

Therefore the remaining amount of \$6,500,000 through subordination has become a 3rd Note/Deed in the favor of shared 1/3rd to Eric Nelson Auctioneering, 1/3rd to the Eric Nelson Trust and 1/3rd to CJE&L, LLC.

The current terms are to pay \$17,500 per month until 09/01/2011 and \$30,000 thereafter. However they may ask that the payments be extended to 12/01/2011 before they begin to pay \$30,000 per month for their purchase of the property.

We understand there is a servicing agreement to collect the mortgage payments. We do not know the entity that the servicing arrangement is contracted.

The servicing agency is an issue with Lynita.

Note 4 - Brianhead, Utah

The property located in Brianhead, Utah includes a cabin on 150 acres. In addition to the property and building, the ownership includes water rights.

Eric originally valued the asset at \$3,000,000 but now believes the property has a value of approximately \$2,000,000. Lynita states the property should bring \$2,000,000 at sale, which is her preference.

It appears there is an agreement on the value of this property. However, there is no agreement on the disposition of the asset. As a result, a third-party appraisal may be required to determine the value either party should pay to buy the other one out.

Note 5 - 3611 Lindell

This property is an office complex. The complex has 13,040 square feet and is the location of Eric Nelson offices. Eric collects the monthly rents as well as pays for the monthly maintenance.

Both income and expenses will be listed in the Sources of Income and Expenses report.

Since there is a disagreement about the value of the office building, it is recommended an appraisal by made of the property by an independent third party.

Note 6 - 5913 Pebble Beach

This property is owned by the LSN Nevada Trust and is occupied by Lynita's sister, Thelma. The mortgage of \$69,000 has been paid off and the property is currently unencumbered. It appears that neither party is interested in the property and may become a non-issue.

Note 7 - Wyoming (200 acres)

This property consists of 200 acres located in Evanston, Wyoming and owned 40% by Lynita's Trust, 50% by Paul Nelson (relative) and 10% by Aleda Nelson (relative). This property could be developed into 84 Lots and are in the name of Equestrian Estates, LLC.

Eric has given a value for Lynita's 40% interest in the property of \$800,000. Lynita has not determined a value,

It is recommended an appraisal be made by an independent third party to obtain a value of the 40% interest.

Note 8 - 830 Arnold Ave.

This is a 1,300 sq. ft. house located in Greenville Mississippi. The house is being rented at \$500 per month and the rent is being collected and deposited into Banone's Bank Account. Eric has valued the property at \$40,000, which is believed to be the initial purchase price of the property.

Because there are so many other issues, it is recommended the purchase price be considered the value based upon the current economic conditions,

Note 9 - MS Bay (200 acres)

This is 200 acres located in Mississippi. The ownership and titles to the property are not clear and need to be addressed. Currently the property is titled as follows:

	Acres
Bal Harbour, LLC (Note 9b)	4.7790560
Bay Harbour Beach Resort, LLC (Note 9c)	2.7996560
Emerald Bay, LLC (note 9a)	0.2217080
Grotta (Note 11)	25.3773880
Lynita Trust - RV Park (Note 9e)	20.6856080
Lynita Trust (Note 9f)	41.0152290
	94.8786450
Dynasty (Note 10b)	91.0927580
Frank Soris Family Trust (Note 10c)	30.1382120
	121.2309700
Total Acres	216.1096150

Note 9a - Emerald Bay, LLC has .221708 acres titled in its name, which was purchased for \$55,000. Emerald Bay, LLC (formally Paradise Bay Mississippi, LLC was formed in 2005 and changed name in 2007) is a holding Company whose purpose was to assemble property of 120

acres about 2 miles from the current Silver Slipper Casino to develop a resort type project. The subsidiaries of the Company were Bal Harbour, LLC, Bay Harbour Beach Resort, Montgage Resort, LLC, Bay Resorts, LLC, and Paradise landing, LLC. This project is not currently operating and is at a standstill.

In 2008 the ownership in this property went from 100% ownership by Eric Trust to an ownership of 50% to Lynita Trust and 50% to Eric Trust.

At issue, Emerald Bay owes Nelson & Associates \$45,500.

The amount due from Emerald Bay, LLC were funds advanced to pay for expenses in the assembling process. Emerald Bay does not have funds and therefore doubtful to repay Nelson & Associates back.

Note 9b - Bal Harbour, LLC has 4,779056 acres titled in its name.

Note 9c - Bay Harbour Beach Resort, LLC has 2.799656 acres titled in its name.

Note 9d - Bay Resorts, LLC currently does not have any ownership in land. This entity operated the RV Resort, had its own Bank Account until the law suit was filed. The Bank Account was closed and the rental income from Silver Slipper was the deposited into Banone.

Note 9e - Lynita Trust has 41.0152290 titled in its name. This property is not being used.

Note 9f - RV Park is owned by Lynita's Trust. The property designated for its use is 20.6856080 acres. The Silver Slipper is leasing this property and pays an amount of approximately \$4,000.00 per month.

Since there are different owners and the property is being used differently, it is recommended either an appraisal for the separate parcels be made or that the entire 200+ acres be appraised altogether, then the value could be allocated to the individual owners. In either case, the appraisal should be directed by an independent party.

Note 10 - Dynasty

Dynasty is an entity that is included in the Eric Nelson Trust consisting of various types of investments as described below.

Note 10a - Silver Slipper (Owned by Dynasty)

Dynasty has a 34% interest in the Silver Slipper Casino. If options were to be exercised, then the interest could increase to 43%.

There is currently a dispute between Eric Nelson and the other partners of the Silver Slipper Casino. In the operating agreement of Silver Slipper is a buyout provision. The other partners are attempting to exercise that provision and have offered \$1,586,000 and are pushing Eric Nelson to accept.

The other partners have filed a law suit in Los Angeles to force Eric Nelson to accept their offer. Eric Nelson is unwilling to accept the current position of the other partners. In order to oppose the other partners, Eric Nelson did put Dynasty into Bankruptcy, filing in Mississippi.

The other partners filed a motion to have the Bankruptcy dismissed as a bad faith filing. It is understood that hearing has taken place and the Bankruptcy has been dismissed. Therefore it is back to defending the law suit filed in Los Angeles.

There are other issues affecting the ownership interest in the Silver Slipper, one of which being that Lynita is not currently licensed by the Mississippi Gaming Authorities and therefore not qualified to own an interest in a gaming property.

It is recommended that a Business Valuation be directed by an independent third party to determine the value of the Silver Slipper and also to determine the value of the percent interest owned by Dynasty.

<u>Note 10b</u> - Dynasty owns 91.092758 acres. There has been a lien of \$1,000,000 placed against the property by BBJ, a lender to Silver Slipper.

Note 10c - This land consisting of 30.1382120 acres was deeded to Frank Soris Family to collateralize the \$1,300,000 owed from the 2002 transaction between Soris and Lynita Trust. (See Note 17 for the Soris transactions). It has been stated that this acreage has been quitclaimed back to Dynasty when the property in Banone was substituted as collateral for the \$1,300,000 note to Soris. The quitclaim has not been recorded.

Eric Nelson stated the value of the property, both what Dynasty owns and the Frank Soris property totaling 121.230970 acres is valued at \$1,250,000.

It is recommended that an appraisal be made of the property owned by Dynasty and the property currently owned by Frank Soris. Such an appraisal should be conducted as recommended in Note 9.

Note 11 - Grotta, LLC

Lynita's Trust owns a 1/6th interest or 16.67% with Eric Nelson's relatives owning the remaining 5/6th interest. Grotta, LLC controls various investments as described below:

Note 11a - Dynasty Profit Sharing Agreement

Eric Nelson states that this Company has an interest in a Profit Sharing agreement whereby Grotta, LLC is to receive 10% of Dynasty's Profits. (No determination has been made to ascertain if that is an investment and/or operating profits). There have been no profits to-date; therefore no payments from Dynasty have ever been made to Grotta, LLC.

Note 11b - Mississippi Land

The Grotta, LLC owns 25.377388 acres of the 200 acres described in Note 9 as MS Bay 200 acres. Eric states the value of that land is approximately \$100,000.

Eric values Lynita's trust ownership in this land at \$16,667. Lynita does not have a separate value for the property owned by Grotta, LLC.

Note 11c - Grotta Financial Partnership

The Grotta Financial Partnership owned land on Flamingo Road in Las Vegas, Nevada, which was condemned for the purpose of using the land to construct the "Beltway". The commendation was used as an IRS Section 1033 exchange. Cash amounting to \$3,025,000 which was in the Grotta Financial Partnership, was transferred to the Eric Nelson Trust for future investing purposes in order to comply with the IRS Section 1033 exchange provisions. Therefore, the cash on the books of Grotta Financial Partnership was replaced with a Note Receivable to the Eric Nelson Trust. The investments made by Eric Nelson through the Eric Nelson Trust would at this time be included in the current asset schedule.

If the Eric Nelson Trust were to pay Grotta Financial Partnership the amount of \$3,025,000 or any part thereof, it would then create the situation that the amount would become taxable because the transaction would be treated as a loan which does not qualify under the IRS Section 1033 exchange rules.

At issue, there is a Note Receivable in the amount of \$3,025,000 booked on Grotta Financial Partnership financial statements from the Eric Nelson Trust. The transaction contains various issues relating to taxable consequences if paid back.

Note 12 - Hideaway Casino

This was an Investment between Eric Nelson and Steve Bieri. Eric Nelson has not spent community funds in his effort to develop a casino. The investment was not viable and thus failed. Eric states that there may be a law suit against Eric Nelson to the extent of the loss suffered by Mr. Bieri amounting to approximately \$3,000,000.

Note 13 - Banone, LLC (Nevada)

These properties are located in Nevada and titled in the name of Banone, LLC, which is in Eric Nelson Trust. The value indicated on the schedule is the purchase price of the property including repairs thereto. In discussion with Lynita, she appeared to have a willingness to accept those values, with the exception of 4412 Baxter as described below:

Note 13a - 4412 Baxter - According to Lynita, the amount booked for 4412 Baxter is \$20,000 greater than it should be. Lynita claims the proper amount should be \$62,522; instead of \$82,522.

Note 14 - Banone, LLC (Arizona)

These properties are located in Arizona and titled in the name of Banone, LLC which is in Eric Nelson Trust. The value indicated on the schedule is the purchase price of the property including repairs thereto. In discussion with Lynita, she appeared to have a willingness to accept those values.

Note 15 - Banone AZ, LLC

There is one property in Banone AZ, LLC that is income producing. During 2010, 8 additional homes were purchased at a cost of \$251,000; at which time we have not received indication that they are income producing.

Note 16 - Notes Receivable

To date, we have not received copies of the documents relating to the various notes receivable. Eric represented that the notes were secured by property but we have not examined appropriate evidence to determine the validity of the collateral.

- a. This note is in default. Roger Nelson is owner of RD Builders. Roger Nelson is not a relative.
 - b. Amada & Chris Stromberg are the daughter and son-in-law of Eric and Lynita Nelson.
 - c. JB Ramos Trust is related to an employee of Eric Nelson
- d. Niece At issue by Lynita, Purchased by Banone on 03/02/2010 and questions the down payment of \$20,000 and if that money came from Community Funds.

- e. Chad Ramos is a Nephew to Eric
- f. Eric T. Nelson is a Nephew to Eric
- g. Have received deed in lieu of foreclosure.

Note 17 - Soris Transaction

History

This first transaction commenced in 2002 when Frank Soris made an investment as mortgage holder in the Wyoming operations, Mr. Soris loaned \$2,300,000 to the Lynita Trust on a building that was to be used for Off Track Betting to support a Race Track owned at that time by the Nelson's. The operations in the building were outlawed and the operations had to cease.

The \$2,300,000 was an amount needed by Frank Soris to complete a 1031 exchange (Tax Code provision to defer taxes). The amount actually loaned is \$1,300,000 and a note payable to Lynita's Trust for \$1,000,000. Sometime between the date of the 1031 and 2010, the promissory note was transferred to the Eric L Nelson Nevada Trust. We have not received indication as to why the note was transferred out of Lynita's Trust or if any consideration was given in return for the transfer. Information has been received that interest of \$75,000 was received in 2009 relating to the \$1,000,000 note which is being serviced by U. S. Loan Servicing.

When the Off Track Betting business failed, Mr. Soris insisted on collateral to replace the building in Evanston, Wyoming. Eric Nelson then collateralized the note with property in Phoenix, Arizona. Upon failure of that collateral, Eric Nelson then collateralized the note with property in Mississippi. Since there was ongoing litigation in Mississippi, Mr. Soris again sought collateral for the amount due him. It was then, in early 2010, when Eric made a decision to take the better of the Banone properties in Arizona and transfer those rental properties to the Frank Soris Family Trust.

It was understood from Eric Nelson that there was a deal with Frank Soris that if the properties were to sell in excess of the \$1,300,000, Eric would be entitled to monies from such sales. In documents received there was a written agreement that upon the transfer of the Banone properties, the \$1,000,000.00 note made payable to the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust is cancelled and considered satisfied. We have not received further documentation as to why the note was cancelled or satisfied. We have yet to determine which position is current. Of course, if the properties sell for less than \$1,300,000, the concerns of the \$1,000,000 will be dispelled.

Current Situation

The cost of the current twenty properties transferred to Soris has a book value of \$737,018.67. Therefore the aggregate amount of collateral against a debt of \$1,300.000 leaves a contingent liability of \$562,981.33. In addition, Eric has pledged to use 8 lots from his investment in AZ-29 Gateway Lots, but actual lots are to be determined at a later date according to the February 19, 2010 agreement between Soris and Eric Nelson.

The contingent asset may or may not have value if the properties sell for more than \$1,300,000, depending on the outcome of the agreement to share or if the note has been cancelled.

The interest on the \$1,300,000 note is being paid by the rents collected on the properties.

At issue, Lynita believes Eric gave Soris the best properties from Banone. Eric agrees with that statement.

Note 18 - Nikki Cvintavich Note Receivable

This is a loan made by Eric Nelson to Nikki Cvintavich, an employee in Mississippi. This loan has no direct connection to the Mississippi investments. We have not received documentation evidencing if this note is collateralized by any type of property.

Note 19 - Family Loan (Chad Ramos)

This was money given to start several businesses. The businesses have all failed. This money was given to him prior to 01/01/2009 and should be considered as community participation and be eliminated as an issue.

It is recommended that this item be eliminated from any settlement.

Note 20 - Family Loan (Jesse Harber)

We have not received documentation relating to the terms and conditions of this receivable. As a result, we cannot determine a value of the outstanding amounts due or if there was or is any collateral against the receivable.

Note 21 - Autos/Vehicles

The values given by each party was from Kelly Blue Book. It has not been determined what was used as mileage, accessories, or wholesale or retail suggested prices.

Note 21a - Both parties have indicated the presence of several ATVs and snowmobiles.

It is recommended a determination by an independent third party at a selected date determined by the Court.

Note 22 - Tax Situation

Is has been understood that the 2006 taxes were filed jointly. Thereafter the Federal Income Tax Returns have been filed as Married filing Separate. It has been stated that a 2006 refund in the approximate amount of \$110,125 is currently held by Eric Nelson's attorney in a separate bank account.

Note 23 - Bank Accounts

It is recommended that all of the Banking Accounts be brought up to a date determined by the Court and that all transactions be reviewed for subsequent transactions.

Note 24 - AZ-31 Gateway Lots

The property in this account consists of the following:

- 1. 29 parcels that are titled to the Lynita Trust.
- 8 parcels where the Lynita Trust has a 25% interest, Harber Investments has a 25% interest, Louis Walter has a 25% interest, and Gary & Margaret Zahlen have a 25% interest.
- 2 lots that were in foreclosure. As of the date of this report, we have not received documentation relating to the disposition of the foreclosure proceedings.
- 4. 7 lots from Joan Ramos. Joan Ramos filed bankruptcy and all lots were to be deeded back to Lynita's Trust. As of the date of this report, all seven lots are currently in the name of "Ramos Joan B Trustee".

Tabs3 Conflict of Interest Report Solomon Dwiggins & Freer, Ltd.

Client Name Description File Field

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EXHIBIT "2"

EXHIBIT "2"

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RPLY

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TRUST dated May 30, 2001

DISTRICT COURT

COUNTY OF CLARK, NEVADA

ERIC L. NELSON,

Plaintiff

VS.

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LYNITA SUE NELSON, MATT KLABACKA, as Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L, NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001,

Defendants.

MATT KLABACKA, Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001,

Cross-claimant,

VS.

LYNITA SUE NELSON,

26 Cross-defendant.

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Case No.:

D411537

Dept.:

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PSAPP0404

Case Number: D-09-411537-D

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REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ENFORCE SUPREME COURT'S ORDER DATED MAY 25, 2017; MOTION TO HOLD LYNITA S. NELSON IN CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATION OF SEPTEMBER 22, 2014 ORDER; AND FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

AND

OPPOSITION TO COUNTERMOTION FOR FINAL JUDGMENT CONSISTENT WITH THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT'S REMAND OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR AFFIRMATION OF JOINT PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, FOR A RECEIVER TO MANAGE THE PROPERTY PENDING FINAL JUDGMENT, FOR UPDATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES AND EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION, AND FOR SALE OF PROPERTY FOR PAYMENT OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

Matt Klabacka, Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001, hereby files his Reply to Opposition to Motion to Enforce Supreme Court's Order dated May 25, 2017; Motion to Hold Lynita S. Nelson in Contempt for Violation of September 22, 2014 Order; and for Attorneys' Fees and Costs and Opposition to Countermotion for Final Judgment Consistent with the Nevada Supreme Court's Remand or, in the Alternative, for Affirmation of Joint Preliminary Injunction, for a Receiver to Manage the Property Pending Final Judgment, for Updated Financial Disclosures and Exchange of Financial Information, and for Sale of Property for Payment of Attorneys' Fees and Costs.

This Reply and Opposition to Countermotion is made and based upon the pleadings and papers on file herein, the Points and Authorities attached hereto, and any other evidence the Court may adduce at the hearing on this matter.

DATED this 4th day of August, 2017.

SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD.

By: /s/ Jeffrey P. Luszeck MARK A. SOLOMON, ESQ., NSB 0418 JEFFREY P. LUSZECK, ESQ., NSB 9619 9060 West Cheyenne Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89129 Attorneys for Matt Klabacka, Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001

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- (9) compel Lynita to return the \$324,000.00 that was previously paid by the ELN Trust;
- (10) compel the LSN Trust to return the \$6,050.00 security deposit that the ELN Trust delivered to the LSN Trust on or around September 19, 2014;
- (11) compel the LSN Trust to prepare quarterly accountings for the Lindell Property and Banone LLC properties from June 2013 through present pursuant; and
- (12) compel the LSN Trust to return to the ELN Trust the \$75,000.00 paid by Banone-AZ, LLC to the LSN Trust.
- В. SUPREME COURT WAS TRANSMUTATED PROPERTY AND LYNITA FAILED TO INTRODUCE ANY EVIDENCE. ALONE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THAT PARTIES SEPARATE PROPERTY WAS TRANSMUTATED BACK TO COMMUNITY PROPERTY.

As an initial argument, Lynita requests that this Court review the evidence presented at trial (in lieu of conducting a tracing) and find that all assets owned by the SSSTs (with the exception of the Palmyra residence) are the community property of Eric and Lynita because all property was acquired during the marriage and her belief that the ELN Trust "conceded" at trial that it could not trace its assets from the property identified in the Separate Property Agreement. Lynita's argument is contrary to the Supreme Court's Opinion that specifically provides that the Separate Property Agreement was a valid agreement and transmutated Eric and Lynita's community property to separate property. See, e.g., Opinion at p. 12 ("We conclude that the SPA is a valid agreement and transmutated the Parties community property to separate property."). The fact that much of the original assets identified in the Separate Property Agreement were ultimately sold and said proceeds were utilized to purchase other property is inconsequential, because all acquisitions in Eric's Separate Property Trust originated from his separate property. Moreover, as discussed below, the Supreme Court also held that Eric's SSST was funded with his separate property in 2001. Because of such transmutation, Nevada law is clear that it is Lynita/Lynita's SSST, as opposed to Eric/the 26 ELN Trust, that has the burden to show that Eric's separate property was transmutated back to 27 community property. 28

"Once the separate character of property is established, a presumption arises that it remained 2 separate property in the absence of sufficient evidence to show an intent to transmute the property 3 from separate property to community property." Indeed, "the right of the spouses in their separate 4 property is as sacred as is the right in their community property, and when it is once made to appear 5 that property was once of a separate character, it will be presumed that it maintains that character 6 until some direct and positive evidence to the contrary is made to appear."4 This presumption shifts 7 the burden of proof to the party claiming the property was transmutated to community property. 8 The spouse claiming transmutation of separate property must produce objective evidence showing 9 that, during the marriage, the parties themselves regarded the property as common property of the 10 marriage; such evidence may include placing the property in joint names, transferring the property 11 to the other spouse as a gift, using the property exclusively for marital purposes, commingling the 12 property with marital property, using marital funds to build equity in the property, or exchanging 13 the property for marital property. 6 With specific regard to real property, for it to be transmutated to 14 community property, there generally must be an acknowledged writing proving the intent of the 15 separate real property holder to transmutate it to community property (e.g. community property 16 agreement).

In re Estate of Borghi, 219 P.3d 932 (Wash. 2009).

Id.

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37 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 379 (Originally published in 1984)("Ordinarily, the burden of proof to show that separate property has been transmuted into community property rests on the party alleging that such transmutation has taken place. This rule flows from the presumption that property once fixed as the separate property of one spouse has not been converted by agreement into community property merely because the other spouse acquires possession, management, or control of it. In such cases, the property is presumed to remain separate property, and the burden 23 rests on the other spouse, claiming a gift or change in status of the property, to show that it has in fact been transmuted."); Kenneth W. Weber, Washington Practice: Family and Community Property Law § 10.1, at 133 (1997) ("Possibly more than in any other area of law, presumptions play an important role in determining ownership of assets and responsibility for debt in community property law.").

Crossland v. Crossland, 397 S.C. 406, 725 S.E.2d 509 (Ct. App. 2012).

In re Estate of Borghi, 219 P.3d 932 (Wash. 2009); see also Volz v. Zang, 113 Wash. 378, 383, 194 P. 409 (1920).

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Here, the Supreme Court confirmed that Lynita has the burden to show that the separate 2 property was transmutated back to community property after 2001, because the purpose of the 3 tracing is "to determine whether any community property exists within the trusts." See Supreme 4 Court Opinion at 17. In other words, if all property owned by the SSSTs is community property 5 because it was acquired during Eric and Lynita's marriage, the Supreme Court would have ruled in 6 Lynita's favor and there would be no reason to conduct a tracing to "determine whether any 7 community property exists."

In light of the foregoing, if this Court believes that it has sufficient information to conduct a 9 tracing "to determine whether any community property exists within the trusts" after 2001, without 10 retaining a forensic accountant, the ELN Trust requests that this Court grant the relief requested in 11 the Motion to Enforce the Supreme Court's Order because Lynita has failed to show by clear and 12 convincing evidence that the separate property contained within the ELN Trust was transmutated to 13 community property.

C. LYNITA'S REQUESTED TRACING IS OVERBROAD CONTRARY TO THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT'S ORDER.

If this Court finds that a tracing is necessary to "determine whether any community property exists within the trusts," it is not as broad as Lynita would have this Court believe for the following reasons. First, the Supreme Court never ordered this Court to conduct a tracing from 993 through the creation of the SSSTs in 2001 because it repeatedly held that the ELN Trust and Lynita's SSST were funded with their respective separate property:

Later, the parties converted those trusts into self-settled spendthrift trusts (SSSTs) and funded them with their respective separate property. P. 2.

In 2001, Eric and Lynita converted their separate property trusts into Eric's Trust and Lynita's Trust, respectively, and funded the SSSTs with the separate property contained within the separate property trusts. P. 4.

On June 3, 2013, the district court issued the decree. The district court found that the SPA was valid and the parties' SSSTs were validly established and funded with separate property. P. 6.

For the reasons set forth below, we hold the SSSTs are valid and the trusts were funded with separate property stemming from a valid separate property

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RHONDA K. FORSBERG, CHARTERED RHONDA K. FORSBERG, ESQ.

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Attorneys for Eric Nelson, Individually

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

ERIC L. NELSON,

Plaintiff,

VS.

LYNITA SUE NELSON, MATT KLADACKA, as Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dates May 30, 2001,

Defendants.

MATT KLABACK, Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001,

Cross-claimant,

VS.

LYNITA SUE NELSON,

Cross- defendant.

CASE NO: D-09-411537-D DEPT NO: O

NOTICE OF JOINDER TO OPPOSITION TO LYNITA NELSON'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND CLARIFICATION OF THE COURT'S DECISION ENTERED MAY 22, 2018; AND COUNTERMOTION TO: (1) TERMINATE THE JPI; (2) IMPOSE A BOND ON ANY PROPERTY SUBJECT TO THE JPI; (3) EXPUNGE THE INAPPROPRIATELY RECORDED LIS PENDENS; (4) ALLOW THE ELN TRUST TO MANAGE LINDELL; AND (5) ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COST

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE Defendant, Eric Nelson, Individually, by and through

his Counsel of Record, Rhonda K. Forsberg, Esq., hereby join Defendant Eric L. Nelson,

PSAPP0409

Case Number: D-09-411537-D

Investment Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001, by and through his Counsel of Record in the Eighth Judicial District Court Case No. D-09-411537-D, the law firm of SOLOMON DWIGGINS, & FREER, LTD, in their OPPOSITION TO LYNITA NELSON'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND CLARIFICATION OF THE COURT'S DECISION ENTERED MAY 22, 2018; AND COUNTERMOTION TO: (1) TERMINATE THE JPI; (2) IMPOSE A BOND ON ANY PROPERTY SUBJECT TO THE JPI; (3) EXPUNGE THE INAPPROPRIATELY RECORDED LIS PENDENS; (4) ALLOW THE ELN TRUST TO MANAGE LINDELL; AND (5) ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COST, filed with this Court on or about June 22, 2018 to avoid duplicative pleadings in this matter.

Dated this 22nd day of June, 2018.

RHONDA K. FORSBERG, CHARTERED

RHONDA K. FORSBERG, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 009557

1070 W. Horizon Ridge Pkwy, #100

Henderson, Nevada 89012

Attorneys for Eric Nelson, Individually

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of Rhonda K. Forsberg, Chartered, and that on this
day of June, 2018, I caused the above foregoing document entitled "NOTICE OF JOINDER TO
OPPOSITION TO LYNITA NELSON'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ANI
CLARIFICATION OF THE COURT'S DECISION ENTERED MAY 22, 2018; ANI
COUNTERMOTION TO: (1) TERMINATE THE JPI; (2) IMPOSE A BOND ON ANY PROPERTY
SUBJECT TO THE JPI; (3) EXPUNGE THE INAPPROPRIATELY RECORDED LIS PENDENS; (4
ALLOW THE ELN TRUST TO MANAGE LINDELL; AND (5) ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COST
to be served as follows:
BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE: Pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a), EDCR 8.05(f), NRCP 5(b)(2)(D and Administrative Order 14-2 captioned "In the Administrative Matter of Mandatory Electronic Service in the Eighth Judicial District Court," by mandatory electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system;
BY MAIL: Pursuant To NRCP 5(b), I placed a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was prepaid in Las Vegas, Nevada
BY FACSIMILE: Pursuant to EDCR 7,26, I transmitted a copy of the foregoing document this date via facsimile.
BY ELECTRONIC MAIL: Pursuant to EDCR 7.26, I transmitted a copy of the foregoing document this date via electronic mail.
BY CERTIFIED MAIL: I placed a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope, return receipt requested.
To the party(s) listed below at the address, email address, and/or facsimile number indicated below;
Robert P. Dickerson, Esq. Mark A. Solomon, Esq. and Jeffrey P. Luszeck, Esq. The Dickerson Law Group Solomon Dwiggins Freer & Morse, LTD

Robert P. Dickerson, Esq. The Dickerson Law Group 1745 Village Center Circle Facsimile: (702) 388-0210 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134

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Mark A. Solomon, Esq. and Jeffrey P. Luszeck, Esq Solomon Dwiggins Freer & Morse, LTD Cheyenne West Professional Centre 9060 W. Cheyenne Avenue

Facsimile: (702) 853-5485 Las Vegas, Nevada 89129

An employee of Rhonda K. Forsberg, Chartered

7/12/2018 8:13 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP ROBERT P. DICKERSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 000945 OSEF M. KARACSONYI, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 010634 1745 Village Center Circle Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 Telephone: (702) 388-8600 Facsimile: (702) 388-0210 Email: info@thedklawgroup.com Attorneys for Lynita Sue Nelson 8 DISTRICT COURT FAMILY DIVISION 9 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 10 11 ERIC L. NELSON, CASE NO. D-09-411537-D 12 Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, DEPT NO. O 07/23/2018 13 Date of Hearing: 06/23/18 Time of Hearing: 10:00 a.m. 14 LYNITA SUE NELSON, MATT KLABACKA, as Distribution 15 Oral Argument Requested: Yes Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST, dated May 30, 16 2001, 17 Defendants/Counterclaimants. 18 19 MATT KLABACKA, as Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001, 20 21 Crossclaimant, 22 23 LYNITA SUE NELSON,
Individually and as Investment
Trustee of the LSN NEVADA
TRUST, dated May 30, 2001, and
ERIC NELSON, 24 25 26 Cross-Defendants. 27

PSAPP0412

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DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND
CLARIFICATION OF THE COURT'S DECISION ENTERED
MAY 22, 2018
AND
OPPOSITION TO COUNTERMOTION TO: (1) TERMINATE
THE JPI; (2) IMPOSE A BOND ON ANY PROPERTY SUBJECT
TO THE JPI; (3) EXPUNGE THE LIS PENDENS; (4) ALLOW

COMES NOW Defendant, LYNITA SUE NELSON ("Lynita"), by and through her attorneys, ROBERT P. DICKERSON, ESQ., and JOSEF M. KARACSONYI, ESQ., of THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP, and submits Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the Court's Decision Entered May 22, 2018, and Opposition to Countermotion To: (1) Terminate the JPI; (2) Impose a Bond on Any Property Subject to the JPI; (3) Expunge the Lis Pendens; (4) Allow the ELN Trust to Manage

This Reply and Opposition is made and based upon the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, all papers and pleadings on file herein, all exhibits attached hereto, as well as oral argument of counsel as may be permitted at the hearing on this matter.

Lindell; and (5) Attorneys' Fees and Costs ("Reply and Opposition").

DATED this 12th day of July, 2018.

THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP

ROBERT P. DICKERSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 000945
JOSEF M. KARACSONYI, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 010634
1745 Village Center Circle
Las Vegas, Nevada 89134
Attorneys for Lynita Sue Nelson

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

In Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the Court's Decision Entered May 22, 2018, and Opposition to Countermotion To: (1) Terminate the JPI; (2) Impose a Bond on Any Property Subject to the JPI; (3) Expunge the Lis Pendens; (4) Allow the ELN Trust to Manage Lindell; and (5) Attorneys' Fees and Costs ("Opposition and Countermotion"), Eric and ELN Trust disingenuously seek to prevent the Court from granting Lynita's reasonable and justified request for a reconsideration/clarification of its Decision Affirming the Date of Tracing; Denying a Separate Blocked Account for \$720,000; and Granting a Joint Preliminary Injunction for the Banone, LLC and Lindell Properties ("Decision"). In addition, Eric and ELN Trust have included a Countermotion baselessly seeking a variety of relief, ranging from a severely untimely request for reconsideration, to a ludicrous request for an award of attorneys' fees and costs.

II. <u>LEGAL ANALYSIS</u>

A. The Court Did Not Previously Address – Let Alone Deny – The Relief Lynita Has Requested, And Lynita's Motion For Reconsideration/Clarification Is Therefore Entirely Proper And Should Be Granted

In a disingenuous attempt to oppose Lynita's reasonable and proper request that the Court reconsider/clarify its Decision, Eric and ELN Trust have intentionally chosen to misrepresent the Court's Decision. In an attempt to rewrite history, and to thereby support their position, Eric and ELN Trust claim over and over again that Lynita is asking the Court to "rethink" its position and to grant relief that it has purportedly already

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rejected. Likewise, all of the case law cited by Eric and ELN Trust in support of their argument relate specifically to situations in which reconsideration was sought to obtain a new decision contrary to a decision already made by the Court. In this case, however, Lynita's request that a general Joint Preliminary Injunction ("JPI") be issued was not denied by the Court in its Decision, but was entirely overlooked The Court's Decision did not even address - let alone deny - Lynita's request for relief. The Court issued a limited JPI as part of its Decision, but did so based on its stated belief that Lynita had requested a JPI only with regard to the Banone, LLC Properties and the Lindell Property that were being transferred to Eric and ELN Trust. Specifically, the Court stated in its Decision that "this Court did not [previously] address the request for a Joint Preliminary Injunction for the Banone, LLC. and Lindell properties." In reality, however, Lynita's request that was before the Court was for a general JPI to be issued, not one related only to the Banone, LLC, and Lindell properties. A court's inadvertent failure to address in its order a party's claim for relief does not constitute a denial, but does constitute grounds for reconsideration/clarification of the order.

At this time, Lynita is simply asking the Court to make a decision as to the remaining, unaddressed portion of her original request that a general JPI be put in place. As detailed in Lynita's underlying Motion, there are numerous properties subject to a claim of community interest other than the Banone and Lindell properties, and a JPI over just the Banone, LLC and Lindell Properties does not protect sufficient property to ensure the Court can accomplish an appropriate division of property if it is determined that the properties held in the ELN Trust and LSN Trust are community property. In an attempt to counter this fact, Eric

¹ See Defendant's trial Exhibit UUUU, and specifically Grant, Bargain, Sale Deed 1999112301029, executed on September 25, 1999, and recorded on November 23, 1999, contained within said Exhibit.

and ELN Trust mischaracterize this Court's Decision entered on April 19, 2018, wherein the Court determined that there were "sufficient assets in both trusts to offset any deficiency once a final balance and distribution amount has been determined." Contrary to Eric and ELN Trust's attempt to misinterpret this determination, the Court's comment did not stand for the proposition that should Eric and ELN Trust improperly sell all of the parties' real properties there would still be enough assets to properly compensate Lynita and LSN Trust at the finalization of this matter. The determination in question was made by the Court in the limited context of its decision not to require the immediate transfer of certain funds (totaling only a few hundred thousand dollars).

Eric and ELN Trust argue that the Russell Road property should somehow be excluded from a general JPI, because Lynita and LSN Trust purportedly do not have an interest in the property. First, the Court has not decided yet if Russell Road is community or separate property, and until such a decision is made, <u>all</u> property acquired during marriage is presumed to be community property. *Forrest v. Forrest*, 99 Nev. 602, 604-05, 668 P.2d 275, 277 (1983).

Even if there was no such presumption under Nevada law, Eric's and ELN Trust's description of the acquisition of the Russell Road property is predicably untrue. On November 23, 1999, Lynita's revocable 1993 trust acquired sole ownership of Russell Road. As confirmed by Larry Bertsch, Lynita's revocable 1993 trust paid \$855,945.00 to

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 purchase this property.² On June 14, 2001, without any financial consideration being paid to the LSN Trust, Eric had Lynita transfer title to Russell Road to CJE&L, LLC,³ a newly formed entity whose membership consisted of the LSN Trust, and the Nelson Nevada Trust (Cal and Jeanette Nelson, Eric's brother and sister-in-law, as Trustees). On January 1, 2005, Eric had the LSN Trust assign its 50% membership interest in CJE&L, LLC to the Nelson Nevada Trust (Cal and Jeanette Nelson, Trustees), thus forfeiting all interest in the Russell Road property for which Eric had Lynita's 1993 trust pay the \$855,945.00 in 1999. Mr. Bertsch confirmed that the forfeiture of the LSN Trust's interest in the Russell Road property was transferred to the capital account of Cal Nelson, there being no cash attached to this transaction. On February 3, 2010, CJE&L, LLC sold its 50% interest in Russell Road to Eric Nelson Auctioneering for \$4,000,000.00.⁴ The LSN Trust has never received compensation for its interest in Russell Road.

With regard to Eric's and ELN Trust's claim that Wyoming Downs should be excluded from any JPI that is issued by the Court – and from any tracing – this property is also presumed to be community property as it was acquired during marriage. The Nevada Supreme Court did not

² The total purchase price was \$875,000.00 as reflected in Defendant's trial Exhibit UUUU (see Declaration of Value form immediately following Grant, Bargain, Sale Deed).

³ See Defendant's Trial Exhibit UUUU, and specifically Grant, Bargain, Sale Deed 2001061400850, executed on June 7, 2001, and recorded on June 14, 2001, contained within said Exhibit.

⁴ See Defendant's Trial Exhibit UUUU, and specifically Grant, Bargain, Sale Deed 201002030002960, executed on February 2, 2010, and recorded on February 3, 2010, contained within said Exhibit, and Eric's 2010 Testimony.

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exclude Wyoming Downs from a tracing when it indicated that the properties in trust needed to be traced.

B. Eric's And ELN Trust's Request For Reconsideration Is Untimely

After frivolously attacking Lynita's entirely proper request for reconsideration of the Court's Decision, Eric and ELN Trust have found it appropriate to include in their own Countermotion a request for reconsideration. Eric and ELN Trust have requested that the Court "reconsider the imposition of its JPI against Banone, LLC and Lindell without the imposition of a bond." Aside from the fact that such a request has no merit, it is fatally defective in that it was filed more than two (2) weeks after the deadline for such a request.

Eighth Judicial District Court Rules, Rule 5.512 (2018), provides as follows:

(a) A party seeking reconsideration and/or rehearing of a ruling (other than any order that may be addressed by motion pursuant to NRCP 50(b), 52(b), 59 or 60), must file a motion for such relief within 14 calendar days after service of notice of entry of the order unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the period for filing a notice of appeal.

(Emphasis added).

Had Eric and ELN Trust wanted the Court to reconsider its Decision of May 22, 2018, they could have done so at any time within fourteen (14) calendar days after service of notice of entry of the Decision – i.e., by no later than June 5, 2018. Instead, Eric and ELN Trust chose not to file their request until June 22, 2018 – a date seventeen (17) days after the deadline for same. As a result of the untimely nature of Eric's and ELN Trust's request for reconsideration, this Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain same, and the request should be denied.

C. Eric's And ELN Trust's Request For The Posting Of A Bond Should Be Denied

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Eric and ELN Trust have provided no justification - legal or otherwise – for their request that Lynita be required to post a bond as a result of the Joint Preliminary Injunction that was put in place by the Court in its Decision. In "support" of such a request, Eric and ELN Trust first cite to NRCP 65, which is entirely inapplicable to the Joint Preliminary Injunction issued in this matter. Thereafter, Eric and ELN Trust state that Lynita should be required to post a bond because "the ELN Trust has previously been required to post bond." Such an argument is characteristically disingenuous. Eric and ELN Trust know full-well that the only time they were required to post a bond in this matter was during the appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court, and only in relation to the approximately \$400,000 in back rents that had been ordered to be paid to Lynita and LSN Trust. A bond on appeal is required of a party who wishes to stay enforcement of the judgment being appealed. See NRCP 62. No such requirement attaches to the Joint Preliminary Injunction. Furthermore, and as the Court is aware, Eric and ELN Trust were not required to post a bond, even on appeal, for the Russell Road property (instead they were simply ordered not to transfer the property pending appeal), nor for any of the properties awarded to Lynita in the Decree of Divorce and transferred to her post-Decree (i.e., Banone and Lindell Properties), even though the Court enjoined Lynita from transferring such properties pending appeal. Simply put, Eric and ELN Trust were never required to post bond during the pre-divorce litigation of this matter, and were never at any time required to post a

bond with regard to any of the parties' real properties even when they were granted injunctive relief by the Court.

D. The Lis Pendens Recorded By Lynita Should Remain In Place

On May 11, 2018, Lynita recorded certain Notices of Lis Pendens on the Banone Properties, the Lindell property, the Bella Kathryn property, and the Russell Road property ("Lis Pendens"), in order to protect same. On May 14, 2018, the Lis Pendens were recorded with the Clark County Recorder's Office.

In their Countermotion, Eric and ELN Trust now seek to have the Lis Pendens expunged. In order to "support" such a request, Eric and ELN Trust have blatantly mischaracterized the Nevada Supreme Court's holdings in this matter by stating that "Eric and Lynita's community property was transmutated to separate property and Lynita failed to introduce any evidence . . . that the Parties separate property was transmutated back to community property." As the Court knows, Lynita and Eric presented an overwhelming amount of evidence that the property held by the parties in trust was transmuted to community property. This Court is actively engaged in conducting a tracing of the parties' properties, as directed by the Nevada Supreme Court, and will have to review/hear the evidence again and determine the character of property once the tracing is completed.

1. The Lis Pendens Meet All Requirements Of NRS 14.015

Pursuant to NRS 14.015(2) and (3), there are several factors that must be analyzed and established by Lynita in support of her Lis Pendens. Lynita bears the burden of establishing same to the satisfaction of the Court, which is an extremely low burden of proof that is less than

even a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, and in compliance with NRS 14.015, Lynita now addresses each factor, in turn, below:⁵

a. The instant action affects the title or possession of the real property described in the Lis Pendens

As conceded by Eric and ELN Trust in their Countermotion, lis pendens are permissible in "an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage upon real property, or affecting title or possession of real property." NRS 14.010(1); NRS 14.015(2)(a). Further, Eric and ELN Trust acknowledge that Nevada law provides that "lis pendens are not appropriate instruments for use in promoting recoveries in actions for personal or money judgments, rather, their office is to prevent the transfer or loss of real property which is the subject of dispute in the action that provides the basis for the lis pendens." *Levinson v. District Court*, 109 Nev. 747, 750, 857 P.2d 18, 20 (1993). Eric and ELN Trust do not even argue that the action does not affect the title to the real property in question.

As this Court is aware, the instant action unquestionably and undisputedly affects the title to countless parcels of real property, all of which are deserving of the protection offered by imposition of the Lis Pendens. The Lis Pendens were not recorded to promote the recovery of any personal or money judgment, but rather to protect Lynita's potential community property interest in same. The Nevada Supreme Court remanded this matter in order for the Court to perform a tracing and to determine the extent of the parties' community property interests in the properties held in the ELN Trust and LSN Trust. In the event the Court

⁵ Eric and ELN Trust have cited the relevant factors in their Countermotion, but have conveniently chosen to omit any analysis of same, knowing full-well that such an analysis would only support Lynita's actions.

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26 27 determines that any or all of the property held in the ELN Trust and LSN Trust is community property, then the title to such real property subject to Lynita's Lis Pendens will be affected.

The action was not brought in bad faith or for an improper motive

Lynita's First Amended Answer to Claims of the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust; and First Amended Claims for Relief Against Eric L. Nelson, Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust dated May 30, 2001, Lana Martin, Nola Harber, Rochelle McGowan, Joan B. Ramos, and DOES I through X ("Amended Answer"), was not brought in bad faith or for an improper motive. Lynita sought by that pleading only to protect her community property interests in the parties' assets, and to otherwise protect her rights resulting from the parties' marriage. Lynita did not act in bad faith or for an improper motive at that time, or at any time throughout the litigation of this matter, including, but not limited to, at the time that she recorded her Lis Pendens against a number of the real properties at issue in this matter.

Lynita would be able to perform any conditions precedent to the relief sought in this action insofar as it C. affects the title or possession of the real property

Should Lynita ultimately be awarded any of the real properties at issue in this matter, she would be perfectly able to assume title thereof, and there are no conditions precedent that she would not be able to perform.

Lynita would be irreparably injured by any transfer of the real properties prior to the conclusion of this action d.

If Lynita's Lis Pendens were expunged - thereby permitting Eric and ELN Trust to sell the real properties in question - and this Court's tracing

and final adjudication ultimately determines that Lynita has a community property interest in some or all of the real properties in question, Lynita would be irreparably injured. The Nevada Supreme Court has long held that the loss of real property constitutes irreparable harm. *See Thatcher v. Dixon*, 103 Nev. 414, 742 P.2d 1029 (1987)("Because real property and its attributes are considered unique and loss of real property rights generally results in irreparable harm). As the Court will recall, Eric and ELN Trust relied on this same argument (the uniqueness of property) to enjoin the sale or transfer of the Banone, LLC and Lindell Properties pending appeal, even though no bond was posted by Eric and ELN Trust to obtain a stay of enforcement of the judgment.

There is no doubt that if the Lis Pendens were expunged, Eric and ELN Trust would not hesitate to liquidate the properties as soon as possible, and prior to the completion of the Court's tracing. First, Eric's and ELN Trust's desire to immediately liquidate the properties in their grasp is the only reason that Eric and ELN Trust are so desperately seeking the expungement of the Lis Pendens and the cancellation/limitation of a JPI. Second, Eric had begun to make arrangements for the improper sale of a number of the real properties in question prior to the issuance of the limited JPI. In his haste, Eric made a mistake and did so even before Lynita had executed the Quitclaim Deeds necessary to title the properties in the name of the ELN Trust, thereby allowing Lynita to receive notification of some of the attempted sales. Exhibit A.

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e. Lynita is likely to prevail in this action or has a fair chance of success on the merits in the action and the injuries described above would be sufficiently serious that the hardship on Lynita would be greater than the hardship on Eric and ELN Trust resulting from the Lis Pendens

It is likely, and, in the alternative, there is at least a fair chance, that Lynita will prevail in this action and that this Court's decision of remand will result in a determination that Lynita has a community property interest in some or all of the real properties in question. The irreparable harm that would be suffered by Lynita in the event the Lis Pendens are expunged, as described above, is extremely serious, and makes clear that the hardship on Lynita would be far greater than the hardship to Eric and ELN Trust, which consists solely of an inability to sell the real properties in question prior to the finalization of this action. It must be pointed out that the real properties in question have been owned during the entire nine (9) year litigation of this action, and ELN Trust and Eric will not suffer any hardship by continuing to hold the properties until this matter is finalized.

f. If Lynita prevails in this action, she will be entitled to relief affecting the title or possession of the real properties at issue

As mentioned above, in the event the Court's tracing confirms Lynita's position that she has a community property in all of the parties' real properties, she will be entitled to relief affecting the title of same.

2. The Lis Pendens Are Also Specifically Permitted By NRS 125.220

In addition to the above analysis of the factors set forth in NRS 14.015, it is important for the Court to take into consideration that Nevada law specifically permits parties in divorce actions to record a

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notice of pendency of the action in any county in which the other party has real property. NRS 125.220 provides as follows:

- At any time after the filing of the complaint, the complaining spouse may record a notice of pendency of the action in the office of the county recorder of any county in which the other spouse may have real property. The notice has the same effect as notice in actions directly affecting real property.
- 2. The court may enjoin either spouse from disposing of any property during the pendency of the action.

By recording her Lis Pendens, Lynita has done nothing more than that she was entitled to do by NRS 125.220(1). Pursuant to NRS 125.220(2), this Court may enjoin Eric and ELN Trust from disposing of any property until a final determination is made.

Eric's And ELN Trust's Request To Manage The Lindell Property Should Be Denied E.

Given that the hearing on Lynita's instant Motion is being held simultaneously with that on Lynita's Motion for an Order to Allow Her to Continue to Manage the Lindell Property, and Requiring Eric Nelson and ELN Trust to Pay Rent for Their Tenancy at the Lindell Property ("Motion to Manage"), and in order to save judicial resources in reviewing the associated documents, Lynita will address Eric's and ELN Trust's request to manage the Lindell Property in her Reply to their Opposition to the Motion to Manage, which will be filed in the coming days. Suffice it to say, however, Eric's and ELN Trust's request should be denied, as Eric has proven that he cannot be trusted, and the granting of his request would certainly cause financial harm to Lynita and the LSN Trust.

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F. Eric's And ELN Trust's Request For Attorneys' Fees and Costs Should Be Denied

Eric's and ELN Trust's request for an award of attorney's fees should be denied. Lynita's instant Motion is not frivolous in the least, and Lynita's Lis Pendens were appropriately recorded.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Lynita respectfully requests that the Court grant the relief requested in her instant Motion, and deny Eric's and ELN Trust's request for attorneys' fees and costs.

DATED this 12th day of July, 2018.

THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP

ROBERT P. DICKERSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 000945
JOSEF M. KARACSONYI, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 010634
1745 Village Center Circle
Las Vegas, Nevada 89134
Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP, and that on this day of July, 2018, I caused the document entitled DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND CLARIFICATION OF THE COURT'S DECISION ENTERED MAY 22, 2018, AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTERMOTION TO: (1) TERMINATE THE JPI; (2) IMPOSE A BOND ON ANY PROPERTY SUBJECT TO THE JPI; (3) EXPUNGE THE LIS PENDENS; (4) ALLOW THE ELN TRUST TO MANAGE LINDELL; AND (5) ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS, to be served as follows:

- [X] pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a), EDCR 8.05(f), NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) and Administrative Order 14-2 captioned "In the Administrative Matter of Mandatory Electronic Service in the Eighth Judicial District Court," by mandatory electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system;
- by placing same to be deposited for mailing in the United States Mail, in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was prepaid in Las Vegas, Nevada;
- pursuant to EDCR 7.26, to be sent via **facsimile**, by duly executed consent for service by electronic means;
- [] sent a courtesy copy via e-mail on Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system;
- by hand-delivery with signed Receipt of Copy.

To the attorney(s) and/or person(s) listed below at the address, email address, and/or facsimile number indicated below:

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1	Mark A. Solomon, Esq.
2	9060 West Chevenne Avenue
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4	msolomon@sdfnvlaw.com iluszeck@sdfnvlaw.com
5	iluszeck@sdfnvlaw.com Attorneys for Eric L. Nelson, Investment Trustee of the ELN Trust
6	Rhonda S. Forsberg, Esq. RHONDA S. FORSBERG, ESQ., CHARTERED
7	
8	Henderson, Nevada 89074 rforsberg@forsberg-law.com
9	Attorney for Eric L. Nelson, Individually
10	
11	Jan Baracsomyi
12	An employee of The Dickerson Karacsonyi Law Group
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Exhibit "A"

Exhibit "A"

Exhibit "A"



L S N Nevada Trust 10170 W TROPICANA AVE #156-16 LAS VEGAS NV 89147 May 01, 2018

Subject Property: 1301 Heather Ridge Road, North Las Vegas, NV 89031

Assessor's Parcel No. 124-28-814-010

Order No.: 119-2542960

Dear L S N Nevada Trust:

First American Title Insurance Company was selected to provide title insurance involving a transaction on the above listed subject property.

We are writing to you today as part of First American's fraud prevention efforts. We want to alert you that a transaction may be pending. If you are not in the process of selling or refinancing this property, please contact us immediately at (866) 263-4563.

However, if you are in the process of selling or refinancing this property, there is no need to contact us. The purpose of this letter is simply to alert you as the property owner, in the event that somebody is trying to convey or encumber your property without your knowledge or permission.

If you are selling or refinancing this property, we thank you very much for allowing First American to handle this transaction. We appreciate your business.

First American Title Insurance Company is the largest subsidiary of First American Financial Corporation (NYSE:FAF). First American Financial Corporation traces its heritage to 1889 and was recognized as a Fortune® 500 Company in 2016.

Sincerely,

First American's Property Notification Group Fraud Protection Specialist 5 First American Way Santa Ana, CA 92707 Phone: 866-263-4563



L N S Nevada Trust 10170 W TROPICANA AVE #156-16 LAS VEGAS NV 89147 May 01, 2018

Subject Property: 4133 Compass Rose Way, Las Vegas, NV 89108

Assessor's Parcel No. 138-03-815-002

Order No.: 119-2542962

Dear L N S Nevada Trust:

First American Title Insurance Company was selected to provide title insurance involving a transaction on the above listed subject property.

We are writing to you today as part of First American's fraud prevention efforts. We want to alert you that a transaction may be pending. If you are not in the process of selling or refinancing this property, please contact us immediately at (866) 263-4563.

However, if you are in the process of selling or refinancing this property, there is no need to contact us. The purpose of this letter is simply to alert you as the property owner, in the event that somebody is trying to convey or encumber your property without your knowledge or permission.

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First American Title Insurance Company is the largest subsidiary of First American Financial Corporation (NYSE:FAF). First American Financial Corporation traces its heritage to 1889 and was recognized as a Fortune® 500 Company in 2016.

Sincerely,

First American's Property Notification Group Fraud Protection Specialist 5 First American Way Santa Ana, CA 92707 Phone: 866-263-4563



L S N Nevada Trust 10170 W TROPICANA AVE #156-16 LAS VEGAS NV 89147 May 03, 2018

Subject Property: 4820 Marnell Drive, Las Vegas, NV 89121

Assessor's Parcel No. 161-20-712-026

Order No.: 119-2542955

Dear L S N Nevada Trust:

First American Title Insurance Company was selected to provide title insurance involving a transaction on the above listed subject property.

We are writing to you today as part of First American's fraud prevention efforts. We want to alert you that a transaction may be pending. If you are not in the process of selling or refinancing this property, please contact us immediately at (866) 263-4563.

However, if you are in the process of selling or refinancing this property, there is no need to contact us. The purpose of this letter is simply to alert you as the property owner, in the event that somebody is trying to convey or encumber your property without your knowledge or permission.

If you are selling or refinancing this property, we thank you very much for allowing First American to handle this transaction. We appreciate your business.

First American Title Insurance Company is the largest subsidiary of First American Financial Corporation (NYSE:FAF). First American Financial Corporation traces its heritage to 1889 and was recognized as a Fortune® 500 Company in 2016.

Sincerely,

First American's Property Notification Group Fraud Protection Specialist 5 First American Way Santa Ana, CA 92707

Phone: 866-263-4563

FILED

AUG 1 4 2018

CLERK OF COURT

TRANS

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ERIC L. NELSON,

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vs.

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EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FAMILY DIVISION

GRIGINAL

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

)
Plaintiff,) CASE NO. D-09-411537-D
)
DEPT. O

LYNITA NELSON, (SEALED)

) (ERRATA)
) Defendant.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE FRANK SULLIVAN DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

TRANSCRIPT RE: ALL PENDING MOTIONS

MONDAY, JULY 23, 2018

D-09-411537-D NELSON 07/23/2018 TRANSCRIPT (SEALED) VERBATIM REPORTING & TRANSCRIPTION, LLC (520) 303-7356

APPEARANCES: 2 The Plaintiff: ERIC L. NELSON For the Plaintiff: RHONDA FORSBERG, ESQ. 3 64 N. Pecos Rd., Suite #800 Henderson, Nevada 89074 4 (702) 990-6468 5 The Trustee: NOT PRESENT For the Trustee: JEFFREY LUSZECK, ESQ. 6 9060 W. Cheyenne Ave. Las Vegas, Nevada 89129 7 (702) 853-5483 8 The Defendant: LYNITA NELSON For the Defendant: JOSEF KARACSONYI, ESQ. 9 1745 Village Center Cir. Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 10 (702) 388-8600 11 Also Present: LARRY BERTSCH Larry L. Bertsch, CPA 12 & Associates 13 14 15 16 17 18

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PROCEEDINGS

(THE PROCEEDINGS BEGAN AT 09:05:33)

THE COURT: -- computer up so I can pull up any documents I need. This is the time set in the -- whoops -- in the matter -- in the Nelson matter, case number D-09-411537. We'll get everyone's appearance for the record. We'll -- we'll start with --

MR. KARACSONYI: Josef Karacsonyi on behalf of Lynita Nelson who is present. 10634 is my bar number.

THE COURT: Mr. Bertsch?

MR. BERTSCH: Larry Bertsch. I've been appointed to do some extra research working on the project.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. LUSZECK: Jeff Luszeck, bar number 9619, on behalf of Matt Klabacka, distribution Trustee of the trust.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. FORSBERG: Good morning, Your Honor. Rhonda
Forsberg, 9557, on behalf of Eric Nelson who is present to my
right.

THE COURT: Thank you. Sit down. Good morning.

Good morning Ms. Lynita and Mr. Eric. Good to see both of you again. I have -- let me make sure I got everything pending

D-09-411537-D NELSON 07/23/2018 TRANSCRIPT (SEALED)
VERBATIM REPORTING & TRANSCRIPTION, LLC (520) 303-7356

D-09-411537-D NELSON 07/23/2018 TRANSCRIPT (SEALED)
VERBATIM REPORTING & TRANSCRIPTION, LLC (520) 303-7356

MR. KARACSONYI: I wasn't --

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D-09-411537-D NELSON 07/23/2018 TRANSCRIPT (**SEALED**) VERBATIM REPORTING & TRANSCRIPTION, LLC (520) 303-7356 for me.

(COUNSEL CONFER BRIEFLY)

THE COURT: I believe Mr. Bertsch you were here to try to get a date for your tracing? Is that kind of --

MR. BERTSCH: I need --

THE COURT: I know you want to trace --

MR. BERTSCH: -- further instructions from the

Court --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BERTSCH: -- as well.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay. Because some of this is kind of a motion for reconsideration specifically.

MR. KARACSONYI: Do you want me to start there?

THE COURT: Yeah, why don't we start there on that, because as I said, I've already started writing a motion to consolidate. I may include that in all these orders, all these orders, so that I have one comprehensive order, but --

MR. KARACSONYI: Okay. All right. On May 22nd, your decision basically set the groundwork for -- for what our request. And that is you said both the BanOne LLC and Lindell properties are subject to a claim of community interests, and I'm quoting you, as such, both properties are entitled to a joint preliminary injunction to ensure that the properties remain intact prior to the completion of tracing and the final

D-09-411537-D NELSON 07/23/2018 TRANSCRIPT (SEALED) VERBATIM REPORTING & TRANSCRIPTION, LLC (520) 303-7356

judgment of this Court.

Eventually, the argument we're making here is you did include the BanOne and the Lindell properties to protect those, but there are other properties that are subject to a claim of community interest that we believe were just simply overlooked. And — and the reason is clear. You were at that time transferring the BanOne and Lindell properties from — from Lynita and LSN Trust back to Eric and the ELN Trust. And so that point in time, those were the two properties that were really at the forefront of everyone's mind.

And as a result, we really didn't consider the other properties which are subject to a claim of community interest. Some of those properties that you divided even in the decree making an equal division were never transferred to her such as Russell Road, 2. -- 2.265 million worth of property. Bella Kathryn. All these properties that are in the ELN Trust and the LSN Trust are subject to a claim of community interest at this point in time. And until the tracing determines otherwise, I think we need to protect all those properties to ensure that she's protected.

EDCR 5.517 states that any property that's subject to a claim of community interest needs to be protected. And so we're not so much seeking reconsideration. They -- they make a big issue of well, you're seeking reconsideration of

D-09-411537-D NELSON 07/23/2018 TRANSCRIPT (SEALED)
VERBATIM REPORTING & TRANSCRIPTION, LLC (520) 303-7356

appraiser is available. Once received, the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust has the right of first refusal on any offer on the property with the ability to purchase the Lynita S. Nelson Nevada Trust's 50% interest.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event that the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust and the Lynita S. Nelson Nevada Trust cannot agree on a valid offer, Larry Bertsch, CPA, is to retain a realtor to place the property on the open market for a fair market offer. Once the realtor determines that a fair offer has been received, the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust has the right of first refusal on any offer on the property with the ability to purchase the Lynita S. Nelson Nevada Trust's 50% interest.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appraisal and realtor costs associated with the Brian Head Utah Cabin sale will be paid equally by both Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust and the Lynita S. Nelson Nevada Trust.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the \$720,000.00 being held in Bank of Nevada Account 7502338705 be released to an account of the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust's choosing.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Stay of Order is hereby DENIED.

DATED this / 9 day of April, 2018.

Honorable Frank P. Sullivan
District Court Judge – Dept. O

FRANK P. SULLIVAN DISTRICT JUDGE

Electronically Filed 5/3/2018 2:38 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP ROBERT P. DICKERSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 000945 JOSEF M. KARACSONYI, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 010634 1745 Village Center Circle Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 Telephone: (702) 388-8600 Facsimile: (702) 388-0210 Email: info@thedklawgroup.com 2 3 4 5 6 Attorneys for Lynita Sue Nelson 8 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FAMILY DIVISION 9 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 10 11 12 ERIC L. NELSON, CASE NO. D-09-411537-D DEPT NO. O 13 Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 14 15 Date of Hearing: 06/05/18 Time of Hearing: 9:30 a.m. LYNITA SUE NELSON, MATT KLABACKA, 16 as Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001, 17 ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED: YES 18 Defendants/Counterclaimants. 19 MATT KLABACKA, as Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001, 20 21 22 Crossclaimant, 23 24 LYNITA SUE NELSON, Individually and as Investment Trustee of the LSN NEVADA TRUST, dated May 30, 2001, and ERIC NELSON, 25 26 27 Cross-Defendant. 28

PSAPP0311

NOTICE: YOU ARE REQUIRED TO FILE A WRITTEN RESPONSE TO THIS MOTION WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT AND TO PROVIDE THE UNDERSIGNED WITH A COPY OF YOUR RESPONSE WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS OF YOUR RECEIPT OF THIS MOTION. FAILURE TO FILE A WRITTEN RESPONSE WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS OF YOUR RECEIPT OF THIS MOTION MAY RESULT IN THE REQUESTED RELIEF BEING GRANTED BY THE COURT WITHOUT HEARING PRIOR TO THE SCHEDULED HEARING DATE.

LYNITA NELSON'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND CLARIFICATION OF THE COURT'S DECISION ENTERED APRIL 19, 2018

COMES NOW, Defendant and Cross-Defendant, LYNITA SUE NELSON ("Lynita"), by and through her counsel, ROBERT P. DICKERSON, ESQ., and JOSEF M. KARACSONYI, ESQ., of THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP, and respectfully submits for the Court's consideration her Motion for Reconsideration, Correction, and Clarification of the Court's Decision Entered April 19, 2018 ("Motion").

Specifically, Lynita respectfully requests the following relief:

- 1. That the Court reconsider its Decision entered April 19, 2018, and Order that the appropriate time frame for the tracing of the parties' property is from July 13, 1993, through June 3, 2013;
- That the Court reconsider its Decision entered April 19, 2018, and Order the \$720,000 to be held in a blocked account until such funds can be traced;
- 3. That the Court immediately enter a Joint Preliminary Injunction;
- 4. That the Court enter an Order that any exercise of the right of first refusal by Eric and ELN Trust to purchase the LSN Trust's interest in the Brian Head cabin is done without prejudice to the parties' property rights; and
 - 5. For such further relief as deemed appropriate in the premises.

1	This Motion is made and based upon the pleadings and papers on
2	file herein, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities attached hereto,
3	and any oral argument at the time of the hearing of this matter.
4	DATED this 30 day of May, 2018.
5	THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP
6	
7	ROBERT P. DICKERSON, ESO.
8	Nevada Bar No. 000945 JOSEF M. KARACSONYI, ESQ.
9	Nevada Bar No. 010634
10	1745 Village Center Circle Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 Attorneys for Lynita Sue Nelson
11	Theorite's for Bythen one recom
12	NOTICE OF MOTION
13	TO: ERIC L. NELSON, Plaintiff;
14	TO: MATT KLABACKA, Distribution Trustee of the ELN Trust;
15 16	TO: RHONDA K. FORSBERG, ESQ., of RHONDA K. FORSBERG, CHARTERED, Attorney for Plaintiff; and
17	TO: MARK A. SOLOMON, ESQ., and JEFFREY P. LUSZECK, ESQ. of SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD., Attorneys for Distribution Trustee of the ELN Trust.
18	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will bring the
19 20	foregoing MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND CLARIFICATION
21	OF THE COURT'S DECISION ENTERED APRIL 19, 2018, on for
22	hearing before the above-entitled Court on 9:30 a.m. on June 5, 2018.
23	THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP
24	
25	By Delegation Eso
26	Nevada Bar No. 000945 IOSEF M. KARACSONYI, ESQ.
27	Nevada Bar No. 010634 1745 Village Center Circle
28	Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 Attorneys for Lynita Sue Nelson

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. FACTUAL STATEMENT

A. Introduction

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This matter was recently before the Court on January 31, 2018, on Plaintiff, ERIC L. NELSON ("Eric's) Motion to Enforce Supreme Court's Order Dated May 25, 2017; Motion to Hold Lynita S. Nelson in Contempt for Violation of September 22, 2014 Order; and for Attorneys' Fees and Costs, and Lynita's Opposition to Motion to Enforce Supreme Court's Order Dated May 25, 2017; Motion to Hold Lynita S. Nelson in Contempt for Violation of September 22, 2014 Order; and for Attorneys' Fees and Costs, and Countermotion to Final Judgment Consistent with Nevada Supreme Court's Remand, or in the Alternative, for Affirmation of Joint Preliminary Injunction, for a Received To Manage Property Pending Final Judgment, for Updated Financial Disclosures and Exchange of Financial Information, and for Sale of Property for Payment of Attorneys' Fees and Costs filed July 31, 2017 ("Opposition and Countermotion"). At the conclusion of the hearing of January 31, 2018, the Court took the matter under advisement, and thereafter issued its Decision on April 19, 2018 ("Decision").

Upon receipt and review of the Court's Decision, it became clear that clarification was necessary on a number of issues, and that the Court inadvertently did not make a ruling on a number of other issues. In addition, Lynita seeks reconsideration of the Court's Decision regarding the appropriate starting date to conduct a tracing of the parties' assets.

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27 28 The Need For Reconsideration/Clarification Of Certain Portions Of The Court's Decision

The Appropriate Time frame For Tracing

During the hearing of January 31, 2018, the Court made the following statements with regard to outstanding issues in this matter, and the manner in which the Court believed such issues were to be handled:

Court:

The issue I see is tracing. From the separate property agreement, which was 1993. I believe it was signed on July 13th 1993, so I don't intend to go beyond that period on that because I think the Supreme Court indicated those were appropriate separate property agreements so any community property interest would be transmuted at that time to separate property. My inclination would be to go tracing from the, after the July 13th 1993 to see if any community property claims, people put in the trust on that, they could put their half but they could not put the other party's half, so my plan but they could not put the other party's half, so my plan would be to trace after the July 13th, because when I read the separate property agreement I saw nothing for post property after that. It just said this is the property we got, this is separate property as of this time, but nothing for future property acquired during their marriage, which is presumed to be community property. So my plan would be to trace it going back to July, or maybe probably start August 1st 1993, currently because I know when they did the trusts, those were 2001, but there could have been property from 1993 August 1st to the could have been property from 1993 August 1st to the 2001 trusts which could have had community property claims. I don't know. And then for the 2001, of course, anything that was community property that either party put in to the trust, they would not have the right to put the other party's half. So that would be my inclination is do tracing from August 1st 1993 up to basically the time of the divorce decree to sift through and see was there community property interest.

January 31, 2018 Hearing at 11:34:57 (emphasis added). Further, while the Court acknowledged that such a tracing would be extremely timeconsuming and expensive, the Court emphasized that "we need to get this done for everybody." January 31, 2018 Hearing at 11:37:20.

Notwithstanding the above statements, the Court's Decision entered on April 19, 2018, concludes at page 3 that "the proper date to begin

tracing would be May 30, 2001, the date both the ELN and LSN Trusts were executed." The Court's stated basis for such a conclusion is that 10 11 12 13 15

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"The Nevada Supreme Court held that both the ELN and LSN Trusts were funded with separate property stemming from the 1993 Separate Property Agreement." As will be detailed further in the Legal Analysis Section below, however, the Nevada Supreme Court's ruling on this issue was based on the perception that this Court had itself made such a finding, and such a statement does not therefore constitute the law of the case as argued by ELN Trust in its Reply to Opposition to Motion to Enforce Supreme Court's Order Dated May 25, 2017; Motion to Hold Lynita S. Nelson in Contempt for Violation of September 22, 2014 Order; and for Attorneys' Fees and Costs and Opposition to Countermotion for Final Judgment Consistent with Nevada Supreme Court's Remand, or in the Alternative, for Affirmation of Joint Preliminary Injunction, for a Receiver to Manage the Property Pending Final Judgment, for Updated Financial Disclosures and Exchange of Financial Information, and for Sale of Property for Payment of Attorneys' Fees and Costs.

In addition to the above, in reaching the determination of what is the appropriate timeframe for conducting a tracing in this matter, it is extremely important for the Court to clearly establish and confirm at this time the nature and extent of the tracing that had been conducted by the Court at the time of entry of the parties' Decree of Divorce, and to clarify the findings that were made by the Court in such Decree. The Court's statements at the January 31, 2018 hearing, quoted above, clearly indicate that the Court did not previously trace the properties from the 1993 Separate Property Agreement to the properties placed in the ELN Trust and LSN Trust in 2001. A written confirmation and clarification of this fact is absolutely vital, as Eric and ELN Trust argue that the Nevada

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Court:

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Supreme Court has expanded the Court's findings beyond those actually made when it stated that "the district court found that the SPA was valid and the parties' SSST's were validly established and funded with separate property." Klabacka v. Nelson, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 24, 394 P.3d 940, 944 (2017).

Undersigned counsel specifically requested during the hearing of January 31, 2018, that the Court include a confirmation of the prior tracing and of its prior findings in its Decision. The Court acknowledged such request, and intimated that such a statement would be included in the Decision. The exchange in question is quoted below:

Mr. Karacsonyi: I just had one question. I'm sure you're already intending on doing this, but, whatever decision you make, in the decision, we would appreciate certainly if you could clarify in there, make clear, when you're tracing, what the tracing that occurred in the underlying proceedings was, so the Supreme Court knows whether you did find. If you did find that it was separate property, then fine If you that it was separate property, then fine. If you didn't. If you could just make it clear whatever your ruling, whatever you had done before. Because I know that's going to be an argument

above, so.

The issue where you said the Supreme Court said I made those findings, you make sure I made them?

Mr. Karacsonyi: Yeah, and if you can just put in your order – even if you rule against us, or you rule in their favor or in our favor – just so that we know we can make clear to the Supreme Court that this is what you did before so that they know exactly what you did.

January 31, 2018 Hearing at 12:17:54. Notwithstanding the above, the Court's Decision does not include any statement regarding the nature and extent of the Court's prior tracing, nor does it include any statement

confirming or denying that the Court ever found that the ELN Trust and the LSN Trust were funded with separate property.¹

2. The Release of \$720,000 To ELN Trust

During the hearing of January 31, 2018, the Court indicated that it was not inclined to release to ELN Trust the \$720,000 held in a blocked account at Bank of Nevada, as the Court still needed to "have that traced to see where that money came from." January 31, 2018 Hearing at 11:32:48. The Court's Decision, however, concludes that "[a]s the Supreme Court held that this Court erred in ordering the ELN Trust to pay Mr. Nelson's personal obligations, and as these funds were still readily

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THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that, pursuant to NRS 123.080 and NRS 123.220(1), the Separate Property Agreement entered into by the parties on July 13, 1993, was a valid Agreement.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Schedule A of the Separate Property Agreement contemporaneously established the Eric L. Nelson Separate Property Trust and named Mr. Nelson as trustor. [itemization of property held in trust omitted].

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Schedule B of the Separate Property Agreement contemporaneously established the Lynita S. Nelson Separate Property Trust and named Mrs. Nelson as trustor. [itemization of property held in trust omitted].

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THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that all of the assets and interest held by the Eric L. Nelson Separate Property Trust were transferred or assigned to the ELN Trust.

...

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that all of the assets and interest held by the Lynita S. Nelson Separate Property Trust were transferred or assigned to the LSN Trust.

Decree, pgs. 3-5. None of the above-quoted findings appear to state that the property used to fund the LSN Trust and the ELN Trust was separate property, but rather that the assets held in the parties' respective Separate Property Trusts – whether community property or separate property at the time of the formation of the ELN Trust and the LSN Trust – were transferred into the ELN Trust and the LSN Trust.

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The relevant findings made in the Decree of Divorce are as follow:

available to be dispersed, this Court will Order the \$720,000 to be transferred from the Bank of Nevada blocked account to an account of the ELN Trust's choosing." Accordingly, the monies in question are to be released to ELN Trust, which will then likely spend or "disappear" the monies.

Lynita requests that the Court reconsider this ruling and simply put in place an Order transferring the \$720,000 from the existing blocked account with Bank of Nevada to another frozen account without any designation that the funds are to assist in the payment of Eric's personal obligations. Such a ruling would not only comply with the Nevada Supreme Court's ruling that ELN Trust cannot be made to pay Eric's personal obligations, but it would simultaneously ensure that the monies in question are traced prior to being released to ELN Trust and perhaps irretrievably spent and lost by the community.

C. <u>Issues Upon Which The Court Did Not Rule</u>

1. <u>Joint Preliminary Injunction</u>

In Lynita's Opposition and Countermotion, Lynita requested that, in the event the Court determined it needed additional evidence regarding the character of the parties' property, the Court affirm the Joint Preliminary Injunction previously entered.

During the hearing of January 31, 2018, counsel for the ELN Trust requested that the Court require the LSN Trust to execute quitclaim deeds transferring to ELN Trust interests in the Lindell Property and the Banone, LLC properties. The Court indicated that it was inclined to do so, and that such order would likely be included in its Decision. In response, undersigned counsel again requested that the Court put in place a Joint Preliminary Injunction. The exchange was as follows:

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My inclination is to order those quitclaims deeds, but I'll wait in my decision and get that, but just so you know it's coming unless my research changes that is my inclination to order those quitclaim deeds be transferred back [...].

Mr. Karacsonyi: And you'll address the JPI then at the same time?

Absolutely. Court:

Mr. Karacsonyi: Because those go hand in hand.

Absolutely. And I would be issuing a JPI the same thing I did before on that and making sure its not encumbered or sold until we get it ultimately resolved [...]. Court:

January 31, 2018 Hearing at 12:20:44.

The Court's Decision did require the LSN Trust to transfer to the ELN Trust interests in the Banone, LLC properties and the Lindell Property. In addition, the Court's Decision permitted the \$720,000 held in the Bank of Nevada blocked account to be transferred to an account of Notwithstanding these Orders, and the ELN Trust's choosing. notwithstanding the above-quoted exchange, the Court's Decision made no mention whatsoever of a Joint Preliminary Injunction. Lynita believes that this omission was inadvertent, and now requests that such a Joint Preliminary Injunction be put in place before the assets transferred to Eric and ELN Trust are transferred or encumbered. Lynita will be submitting an ex parte request for a Joint Preliminary Injunction to the Court, but in the event the Court does not desire to issue such a Joint Preliminary Injunction on an ex parte basis, this request is included herein.

Buyout of Brian Head Cabin 2.

During the course of the hearing of January 31, 2018, undersigned counsel requested that in the event the Court followed its stated inclination and ordered the Brian Head cabin to be sold - providing ELN Trust with a right of first refusal to purchase the property - the Court

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should also make clear that ELN Trust's buyout of LSN Trust's interest be made without prejudice. In other words, in the event the monies used by ELN Trust to purchase LSN Trust's interest in the Brian Head cabin are ultimately traced and determined by the Court to constitute the community property of the parties, Lynita should be entitled to receive an additional award of property over and above her half of the remaining community property in the amount of one-half (1/2) of the purchase price of the interest in the Brian Head cabin sold by LSN Trust to ELN Trust.

While the Court's Decision provides that the Brian Head cabin is to be sold, and provides that ELN Trust has the right of first refusal with regard to the purchase of such cabin, the Court did not include any provision providing that the monies ELN Trust uses to purchase such interest will be without prejudice to Lynita and LSN Trust, and that Lynita will be compensated should ELN Trust utilize to purchase the Brian Head cabin monies that are ultimately determined to constitute community property of the parties.

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II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

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The Court Should Reconsider/Clarify Certain Portions Of Its Decision of April 19, 2018

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Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 (2018), provides in pertinent part as follows:

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(a) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.

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In addition, Eighth Judicial District Court Rules, Rule 5.512 (2018), provides as follows:

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- (a) A party seeking reconsideration and/or rehearing of a ruling (other than any order that may be addressed by motion pursuant to NRCP 50(b), 52(b), 59 or 60), must file a motion for such relief within 14 calendar days after service of notice of entry of the order unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the period for filing a notice of appeal the period for filing a notice of appeal.
- If a motion for reconsideration and/or rehearing is granted, the court may make a final disposition without hearing, may set it for hearing or resubmission, or may make such other orders as are deemed appropriate under the circumstance.

Finally, NRCP 59(e) provides the trial court the opportunity, within a limited time, to rehear a motion previously brought before it, and to correct or reconsider its order or judgment. Chiara v. Belaustegui, 86 Nev. 856, 859, 477 P.2d 857, 858 (1970). "[A] court may, for sufficient cause shown, amend, correct, resettle, modify, or vacate, as the case may be, an order previously made and entered on motion in the progress of the cause or proceeding." Trail v. Faretto, 91 Nev. 401, 403, 536 P.2d 1026, 1027 (1975).

The Court Should Order That The Appropriate Time Frame For The Tracing Of The Parties' Property Is From July 13, 1993, Through Entry Of The Parties' Decree Of Divorce

As stated in the Factual Statement above, the Court's ruling that the tracing of the parties' property should commence in 2001 is based exclusively on the Nevada Supreme Court's purported holding that the ELN Trust and LSN Trust were funded in 2001 with the parties' separate property. Eric and ELN Trust argued for such a ruling, and based their argument on their claim that the Nevada Supreme Court's holding on this matter constitutes "the law of the case." Such is not an accurate reading of Nevada case law on the matter, as described below. In fact, the only reasonable analogy to "law of the case doctrine" in this matter leads to the conclusion that the Nevada Supreme Court based its holding on its

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perception of "the law of the case" as established by this Court's Decree of Divorce.

Pursuant to Nevada law, "where an issue has once been adjudicated by a first appeal, that adjudication is the law of that case in subsequent proceedings." *Andolino v. State*, 99 Nev. 346, 350, 62 P.2d 631, 633 (1983). In this matter, no party to this action raised on appeal the issue of whether the ELN Trust and the LSN Trust were funded with separate or community property, and the issue was not "adjudicated" by the Nevada Supreme Court. Accordingly, the law of the case doctrine is entirely inapposite.

It is well-established by Nevada law that "[a] district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, even where predicated upon conflicting evidence, must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence, and may not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." *Pombo v. Nev. Apartment Ass'n.*, 113 Nev. 559, 562, 939 P.2d 725, 727 (1997). Likewise, the Nevada Supreme Court in this very matter specifically noted that "[t]his court defers to a district court's findings of fact and will only disturb them if they are not supported by substantial evidence." *Klabacka v. Nelson*, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 24, 394 P.3d 940, 949 (2017) (internal citations omitted).

With this legal background in mind, the Nevada Supreme Court specifically noted that "the <u>district court</u> found that the SPA was valid and the parties' SSST's were validly established <u>and funded with separate property</u>." *Id.*, 394 P.3d at 944. The Nevada Supreme Court did not itself perform any tracing of the parties' property, nor did it make any factual findings regarding same. Similarly, the Nevada Supreme Court did not rule that any finding of fact by this Court regarding a tracing of the parties' property was erroneous or that a contrary finding was being made. Accordingly, the Nevada Supreme Court relied upon this Court's

purported finding that the LSN Trust and the ELN Trust were funded with the parties' separate property, and deferred to such purported finding in its own holding. In other words, the Nevada Supreme Court relied upon the "law of the case" as established by this Court's Decree of Divorce.

In the event this Court truly made a finding that the ELN Trust and LSN Trust were funded with the parties' separate property in 2001, then the Nevada Supreme Court's holding does, in fact, confirm the law of the case, and the Court's instant Decision regarding the necessary time frame for tracing is accurate. In the event the Court did not make such a finding, however (as indicated by the Court at the January 31, 2018 hearing), then the Nevada Supreme Court's directives as to the appropriate time frame for tracing of the parties' property are clear:

In a divorce involving trust assets, the district court must trace those trust assets to determine whether any community property exists within the trusts – as discussed below, the parties' respective separate property in the SSST's would be afforded the statutory protection against court-ordered distribution, while any community property would be subject to the district court's equal distribution.

Id., 394 P.3d at 948. In other words, this Court must conduct a tracing that covers a time period sufficient to know whether there was community property of the parties placed into any trusts. In the event this Court truly found at the time of the parties' divorce that the LSN Trust and ELN Trust were funded with the parties' separate property in 2001, then the appropriate time frame for the tracing would be from 2001 to entry of the Decree of Divorce. If, however, this Court never made such a finding, and it remains unknown to the Court whether the ELN Trust and LSN Trust were funded in 2001 with separate or community property, then the appropriate time frame for the tracing is from July 13, 1993, to entry of the Decree of Divorce. Again, during the hearing of January 31, 2018, the

property:

So my plan would be to trace it going back to July, or maybe probably start August 1st 1993, currently because I know when they did the trusts, those were 2001, but there could have been property from 1993 August 1st to the 2001 trusts which could have had community property claims. I don't know.

Court specifically indicated that it did not know whether the property that

funded the ELN Trust and LSN Trust in 2001 was separate or community

January 31, 2018 Hearing at 11:35:40.

Based on all the above, Lynita believes that this Court never made a finding that the property with which the LSN Trust and ELN Trust were funded in 2001 constituted the separate property of the parties. Accordingly, Lynita respectfully requests that the Court reconsider its Decision that the tracing be conducted from 2001 to the entry of the Decree of Divorce, and that the tracing instead be conducted from July 13, 1993, to the entry of the Decree of Divorce. In addition, Lynita respectfully requests that this Court include in its Decision a statement confirming the nature and extent of the tracing that had been conducted at the time of the parties' divorce, and whether the Court had, in fact, made any finding that the LSN Trust and ELN Trust were funded in 2001 with the parties' separate property.

2. The Court Should Order The \$720,000 To Be Transferred To A New Blocked Account Pending A Tracing Of The Parties' Property

As detailed above, the Court's Decision allows for the amount of \$720,000 – all of which may ultimately be determined to be the community property of the parties – to be released to the ELN Trust without any restrictions being placed thereon. In keeping with the prior actions of ELN Trust and Eric throughout the course of this action, there is a significant likelihood that ELN Trust will spend or otherwise irretrievably lose/transfer such monies once they are released. Accordingly,

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27 28 in order to comply with the Nevada Supreme Court's ruling that ELN Trust cannot be required to pay Eric's personal obligations, and to simultaneously protect the monies in question, Lynita respectfully requests that this Court reconsider its Decision and enter an Order requiring the \$720,000 to be placed in a new blocked account that is not specifically designated as being intended to assist Eric in the payment of his personal support obligations.

The Court Should Immediately Enter A Joint Preliminary Injunction In This Matter EDCR 5.517 requires the issuance of a joint preliminary injunction upon the request of any party, to prohibit all parties, and "their officers, agents, servants, employees, or a person in active concert or participation with them from: (1) Transferring, encumbering, concealing, selling, or

otherwise disposing of any of the joint, common, or community property of the parties or any property that is subject of a claim of community <u>interest</u>, except in the usual course of conduct or for the necessities of life

or for retention of counsel. . . . " Emphasis added. NRS 125.050 requires the Court to "make such restraining order or other order as appears

necessary to prevent the act or conduct and preserve the status quo

pending final determination of the cause."

Based on the above, as well as the arguments and statements made during the hearing of January 31, 2018, Lynita respectfully requests that this Court enter a Joint Preliminary Injunction in this matter.

The Court Should Order That Any Exercise Of The Right Of First Refusal By Eric And ELN Trust To Purchase The LSN Trust's Interest in The Brian Head Cabin Is Without Prejudice C.

As detailed above, the Court should make clear that ELN Trust's right of first refusal to purchase LSN Trust's interest in the Brian Head cabin must be exercised, if at all, without prejudice to Lynita/LSN Trust.

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In the event the monies used by ELN Trust to purchase LSN Trust's interest in the Brian Head cabin are ultimately determined by the Court to constitute the community property of the parties, Lynita should be entitled to receive an additional award of property over and above her half of the remaining community property in the amount of one-half (½) of the purchase price of the interest in the Brian Head cabin sold by LSN Trust to ELN Trust.

III. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Lynita respectfully request the Court enter the following orders and grant her requests for relief:

DATED this 3th day of May, 2018.

THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP

ROBERT P. DICKERSON, ESQ Nevada Bar No. 000945 JOSEF M. KARACSONYI, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 010634 1745 Village Center Circle Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP, and that on this 3rd day of May, 2018, I caused the document entitled, LYNITA NELSON'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND CLARIFICATION OF THE COURT'S DECISION ENTERED APRIL 19, 2018 to be served as follows:

- [X] pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a), EDCR 8.05(f), NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) and Administrative Order 14-2 captioned "In the Administrative Matter of Mandatory Electronic Service in the Eighth Judicial District Court," by mandatory electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system;
- [] by placing same to be deposited for mailing in the United States Mail, in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was prepaid in Las Vegas, Nevada;
- pursuant to EDCR 7.26, to be sent via facsimile, by duly executed consent for service by electronic means;
- [] by hand-delivery with signed Receipt of Copy.

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1	To the attorney(s) and/or person(s) listed below at the address, email
2	address, and/or facsimile number indicated below:
3	RHONDA K. FORSBERG, ESQ .
4	RHONDA K. FORSBERG, CHARTERED 64 North Pecos Road, Ste. 800
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13	Attorneys for Distribution Trustee of the ELN Trust
14	$\mathcal{U}(\mathcal{U})$
15	An employee of The Dickerson Karacsonyi Law Group
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Electronically Filed 5/21/2018 3:32 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

OPPS

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Attorneys for Matt Klabacka, Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA

TRUST dated May 30, 2001

DISTRICT COURT

COUNTY OF CLARK, NEVADA

ERIC L. NELSON,

Plaintiff

VS.

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LYNITA SUE NELSON, MATT KLABACKA, as Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001,

Defendants.

MATT KLABACKA, Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001,

Cross-claimant,

VS.

LYNITA SUE NELSON,

Cross-defendant.

Case No.: D-09-411537-D

Dept. No.: O

INITIAL OPPOSITION TO LYNITA

NELSON'S MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION AND

CLARIFICATION OF THE COURT'S

DECISION ENTERED APRIL 19, 2018;

COUNTERPETITION TO REMOVE LIS

PENDENS INAPPROPRIATELY FILED

BY THE LSN TRUST; AND FOR

ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

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Matt Klabacka, Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated

May 30, 2001, hereby files his Initial Opposition to Lynita Nelson's Motion for Reconsideration

and Clarification of the Court's Decision Entered April 19, 2018; and his Counterpetition to

Remove Lis Pendens Inappropriately Filed by the LSN Trust; and for Attorneys' Fees and Costs.

PSAPP0330

1 Case Number: D-09-411537-D

SOURCE STATE ATTRIBUTE TO SUPPLY AND STATE AVENUE

OCINS & FREER FACSIMIE (702) 853-5483

OCINS & FREER FACSIMIE (702) 853-5485

OCINS & FREER FACSIMIE (702) 853-5485

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Lynita's Counsel has graciously extended the ELN Trust an extension to file its Opposition 2 to Thursday, May 24, 2018. Consequently, the ELN Trust intends to file a Supplement to the Opposition on or before Thursday, May 24, 2018.

DATED this 21st day of May, 2018.

SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD.

MON, ESQ., NSB 0418 JEFFREY P. LUSZECK, ESQ., NSB 9619 9060 West Chevenne Avenue

Las Vegas, Nevada 89129

Attorneys for Matt Klabacka, Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. BRIEF INTRODUCTION AND LEGAL STANDARD

In an attempt to re-litigate issues previously heard and decided by this Court, Lynita S. 15 Nelson requests that this Court "reconsider" and/or "clarify" its Decision entered on April 19, 2018 16 (hereinafter referred to as "Order") because she disagrees with this Court's ruling. Despite filing a 14-page Motion (which merely regurgitates the same arguments that this Court previously rejected 18 in entering its Order), Lynita fails to identify how the Court's Order is clearly erroneous and or 19 how new facts would support a reversal of this Court's decision. See, Moore v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 402, 405, 551 P.2d 244, 246 (1976) ("Only in very rare instances in which new issues of fact or law are raised supporting a ruling contrary to the ruling already reached should a motion for 22 reconsideration be granted.") (Emphasis Added); Masonry and Tile Constrs. v. Jolley, Urga & 23 Wirth, Ltd., 113 Nev. 737, 741, 941 P.2d 486, 489 (1997) (motions for reconsideration must be based on "substantially different evidence [that] is subsequently introduced" showing that "the decision is clearly erroneous."). Reconsideration motions cannot not be used merely to reargue the 26 arguments the movant already made to the Court, to "be used to ask the Court to rethink what it 27 has already thought, "Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mechanical Contractors, 215 F.R.D. 581, 582 28 (D. Ariz. 2003), or "to dress up arguments that previously failed." Waddell & Reed Fin., Inc. v.

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1 Torchmark Corp., 338 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1250 (D. Kan. 2004) (citations omitted).

Indeed, in her Motion, Lynita advances the identical arguments that she previously raised, 3 and/or could have raised, in her Opposition to Motion to Enforce Supreme Court's Order dated 4 May 25, 2017; Motion to Hold Lynita S. Nelson in Contempt for Violation of September 22, 2014; 5 and for Attorneys' Fees and Costs; and Countermotion for Final Judgment Consistent with Nevada 6 Supreme Court's Remand previously filed on July 31, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as 7 "Opposition") and Reply to Countermotion for Final Judgment Consistent with Nevada Supreme 8 Court's Remand previously filed on August 22, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as "Reply to 9||Countermotion"). Indeed, this is not one of those "rare circumstances" in which reconsideration is 10 appropriate, and to do so would be an abuse of discretion.

As indicated supra, Lynita's Counsel has granted an extension to the ELN Trust until 12 Thursday, May 24, 2018, to file its Opposition; however, in the interim (and in light of the fact that 13 an Ex Parte Application to have the Motion for Reconsideration heard on OST is currently pending 14 before this Court), the ELN Trust hereby briefly responds to Lynita's arguments as follows.

15 II. LEGAL ARGUMENT

THIS COURT FOLLOWED THE SUPREME COURT'S DIRECTIVE BY A. ORDERING THAT THE TRACING BEGIN ON MAY 30, 2001.

As indicated supra, Lynita's request that the tracing begin on July 13, 1993 is identical to the arguments raised in her Opposition and Reply to Countermotion, and as such, Nevada law requires that the Motion for Reconsideration be denied. As this Court recognized in its Decision entered on April 19, 2018:

> The Nevada Supreme Court held that both the ELN and LST Trusts were funded with separate property stemming from the Separate Property Agreement. As such, the proper date to begin the tracing would be May 30, 2001, the date both the ELN and LSN Trusts were executed. See Order at 3:10-14.

While the ELN Trust concedes that the tracing should begin on May 30, 2001, it adamantly objects to a tracing being conducted on Wyoming Downs for the reasons set forth in its Reply to Opposition to Motion to Enforce Supreme Court's Order dated May 25, 2017; Motion to Hold Lynita in Contempt for Violation of September 22, 2014 Order; and for Attorneys' Fees and Costs previously filed on August 4, 2017, at 8:24-10:2.

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Upon information and belief, this Court's ruling was based upon the following statements made by the Nevada Supreme Court in its Order:

> Later, the parties converted those trusts into self-settled spendthrift trusts (SSSTs) and funded them with their respective separate property, P. 2.

> In 2001, Eric and Lynita converted their separate property trusts into Eric's Trust and Lynita's Trust, respectively, and funded the SSSTs with the separate property contained within the separate property trusts. P. 4.

> On June 3, 2013, the district court issued the decree. The district court found that the SPA was valid and the parties' SSSTs were validly established and funded with separate property. P. 6.

> For the reasons set forth below, we hold the SSSTs are valid and the trusts were funded with separate property stemming from a valid separate property agreement. P. 13.

Although unclear, in addition to re-making the exact same arguments previously rejected by this Court, it also appears that Lynita is requesting that this Court essentially "second guess" the Nevada Supreme Court's Order, which is inappropriate and inconsistent with Nevada law because the Nevada Supreme Court's Order became the law of the case. See e.g., Bd. Of Gallery of History, Inc. v. Datecs Corp., 116 Nev. 289, 994 P.2d 1149, 1150 (2000) (when the law of the case doctrine applies, "the district court [is] without authority to make a contrary finding."). Indeed, if there was any confusion regarding the Supreme Court's directives then Lynita had a duty to file a petition for rehearing pursuant to NRAP 40, yet she failed to do so.

Because Lynita failed to raise any new issues of fact or law regarding this issue (and/or Lynita is trying to "dress-up" its other arguments that failed), this is not one of the "rare circumstances" identified by the Nevada Supreme Court where a rehearing and/or reconsideration should be granted.

LYNITA HAS FAILED TO RAISE NEW ISSUES OF FACT OR LAW AS TO B. WHY IT IS NECESSARY FOR THE \$720,000 TO BE TRANSFERRED TO A NEW BLOCKED ACCOUNT.

It is unnecessary for the \$720,000 to be placed in a blocked account because this Court 28 found in its decision that both the ELN Trust and the LSN Trusts possess "sufficient assets...to

offset any deficiency once a final balance and distribution amount has been determined." See
Order at 7:26-8:2. Lynita has failed to raise any new issues of fact or law regarding this issue. As
such, the requested relief should be denied.

Because Lynita failed to raise any new issues of fact or law regarding this issue, this is not one of the "rare circumstances" identified by the Nevada Supreme Court where a rehearing and/or reconsideration should be granted.

C. LYNITA HAS FAILED TO RAISE NEW ISSUES OF FACT OR LAW REGARDING THE IMPOSITION OF A JPI.

Contrary to Lynita's contention, the ELN Trust believes that this Court implicitly dealt with the JPI issue by finding that both the ELN Trust and the LSN Trusts possess "sufficient assets...to offset any deficiency once a final balance and distribution amount has been determined." See Order at 7:26-8:2. Since there are sufficient assets to offset any deficiency, it would be manifestly unjust to enter a JPI.

Notwithstanding, if this Court believes that it inadvertently failed to rule on Lynita's request for a JPI, said request should be denied because EDCR 5.85 only applies to the husband and wife in a divorce proceeding,² of which the ELN Trust is not. Consequently, if Lynita wishes to pursue an injunction against the ELN Trust she will need to seek a formal injunction that complies with NRCP 65.

Further, if the Court is inclined to enter a JPI over property which either party deems "community property," said JPI cannot and should not apply to Wyoming Downs because: (1) this Court previously found that Wyoming Downs was <u>not</u> community property; and (2) the Supreme Court upheld the September 22, 2014 Order that disposed of said asset. Specifically, as this Court will certainly recall, the Divorce Decree disposed of all of the assets owned by the ELN Trust and the LSN Trust, with the exception of Wyoming Downs. After a separate evidentiary hearing on Wyoming Downs on May 30, 2014, this Court entered the following findings and orders:

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that although Wyoming Downs

Indeed, whenever the term "party" or "parties" is referenced in Part V of the Eighth Judicial Court Rules it contemplates application to a husband and wife, and not to third parties.

SOLOMON I LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 891.29

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was acquired by the ELN Trust during the pendency of the marriage between Eric L. Nelson and Lynita S. Nelson, the Court does not find it to be community property as it was clearly purchased through Dynasty, an entity wholly owned by the ELN Trust and the Court maintained the ELN Trust. The Court found no facts leading it to conclude Lynita S. Nelson or the LSN Trust has an interest in Wyoming Downs. The Court maintained the integrity of the ELN Trust and LSN Trust for the reasons set forth in the Divorce Decree.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that there was no transmutation of Wyoming Downs from separate property to community property, even assuming that Wyoming Downs was separate property of Eric L. Nelson, and not the property of the ELN Trust, separate and distinct from Eric L. Nelson. *See* Notice of Entry of Order entered September 22, 2014.

Lynita appealed the September 22, 2014 Order. Indeed, one of the "Issues on Appeal" that Lynita identified in her Docketing Statement was the following:

Whether the district court erred in denying Lynita a one-half (1/2) interest in Wyoming Downs, which was purchased during the pendency of Eric's and Lynita's divorce proceedings. See LSN Trust's Docketing Statement at 4:10-12.³

In its Opinion, the Nevada Supreme Court <u>upheld</u>, as opposed to overturned, the September 22, 2014 Order:

Accordingly, we affirm in part and vacate in part the district court's decree of divorce, affirm in part and vacate in part the district court's June 8, 2015, order modifying and implementing the divorce decree, and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. *See* Nevada Supreme Court Order at p. 30.

Further, and perhaps most importantly, footnote 9 provides: "[w]e have considered the parties' other arguments [which would have included Lynita's argument with respect to Wyoming Downs] and conclude they are without merit." In light of the foregoing, it would be an error to enter a JPI and/or litigate any issue, which would include conducting a tracing on Wyoming Downs.

D. BRIAN HEAD CABIN.

Lynita's requested relief regarding the Brian Head Cabin stems from an oral request made by her Counsel at the January 31, 2018, which admittedly was not briefed in the underlying pleadings. It is inappropriate for this Court to tailor its Order to further Lynita's best interest

See also Lynita's Answering Brief and Opening Brief on Cross-Appeal at pp. 52-53.

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without giving the Parties the opportunity to respond to the same. For this reason, Lynita's requested relief should be denied.

3 III. CONCLUSION

As indicated *supra*, this is not one of the "rare circumstances" where a rehearing and/or reconsideration should be granted. To the contrary, the majority (if not all) of the arguments made in Lynita's Motion for Reconsideration were identical to the arguments that she made at the prior hearings and considered by this Court when it entered its Order.

As stated above, Lynita's Counsel has granted an extension to the ELN Trust until Thursday, May 24, 2018, to file its Opposition, and as such, the ELN Trust intends to supplement its Opposition if necessary.

DATED this 21st day of May, 2018.

SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD.

MARK A. SOLOMON, ESQ. Nevada State Bar No. 0418

JEFFREY P. LUSZECK, ESQ.

Nevada State Bar No. 9619

9060 West Cheyenne Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89129

Attorneys for Matt Klabacka, Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2	I HEREBY CERTIFY, pursuant to NRCP 5(b), that on May 21, 2018, I served a true and			
3	correct copy of the foregoing INITIAL OPPOSITION TO LYNITA NELSON'S MOTION			
4	FOR RECONSIDERATION AND CLARIFICATION OF THE COURT'S DECISION			
5	ENTERED APRIL 19, 2018; COUNTERPETITION TO REMOVE LIS PENDENS			
6	6 INAPPROPRIATELY FILED BY THE LSN TRUST; AND FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AN			
7	COSTS, to the following in the manner set forth below:			
8	[] Hand Delivery			
9	U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid Certified Mail, Receipt No.:			
10	Return Receipt Request			
11	[XXX] E-Service through Wiznet			

DICKERSON LAW GROUP Robert P. Dickerson, Esq. 1745 Village Center Circle Las Vegas, NV 89134

Attorneys for Defendant

Rhonda K, Forsberg, Esq. 64 N. Pecos Road, Suite 800 Henderson, NV 89074

Attorneys for Plaintiff

An Employee of SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD.

SOLOMON LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89129

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DISTRICT COURT FAMILY DIVISION CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

ERIC L. NELSON	Case No.	D-09-411537-D		
Plaintiff/Petitioner	Case No.	0		
V.	Dept			
LYNITA SUE NELSON Defendant/Respondent	MOTION/OPPOSITION FEE INFORMATION SHEET			
Defendant Respondent				
Notice: Motions and Oppositions filed after entry of a f subject to the reopen filing fee of \$25, unless specifically Oppositions filed in cases initiated by joint petition may accordance with Senate Bill 388 of the 2015 Legislative	y excluded by NRS 19.0 be subject to an addition	312. Additionally, Motions and		
Step 1. Select either the \$25 or \$0 filing fee in	the box below.			
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□ \$0 The Motion/Opposition being filed with this form is not subject to the \$25 reopen				
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☐ The Motion/Opposition is being file	d solely to adjust the	e amount of child support		
established in a final order.	. 1			
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☐ The party filing the Motion/Opposi				
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□ \$129 The Motion being filed with this form to modify, adjust or enforce a final or -OR-		29 fee because it is a motion		
□ \$57 The Motion/Opposition being filing wan opposition to a motion to modify, and the opposing party has already party	adjust or enforce a fi			
Step 3. Add the filing fees from Step 1 and Ste	ер 2.			
The total filing fee for the motion/opposition I \$\\ \\$0 \\ \\$\\$57 \\ \\$82 \\ \\$129 \\ \\$154	am filing with this f	orm is:		
Party filing Motion/Opposition: Matthew Klal	backa	Date		
Signature of Party or Preparer /s/ Gretta G. A	McCall			

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ERIC L. NELSON.

Plaintiff,

V.

9 LYNITA SUE NELSON, MATT KLABACKA, as Distribution Trustee of 10 the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA 11 TRUST dated May 30, 2001,

Defendants.

MATT KLABACKA, as Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001,

Cross-claimant,

v.

LYNITA SUE NELSON,

Cross-defendant.

5/22/2018 8:41 AM Steven D. Grierson

CLERK OF THE COURT

Electronically Filed

DISTRICT COURT FAMILY DIVISION – JUVENILE **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Case No.: D-09-411537-D

Dept. No.: O

DECISION AFFIRMING THE DATE OF TRACING; DENYING A SEPARATE BLOCKED ACCOUNT FOR \$720,000; AND GRANTING A JOINT PRELIMINARY INJUCTION FOR THE BANONE, LLC. AND LINDELL PROPERTIES

This matter was before the Court, pursuant to Lynita Nelson's Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the Court's Decision Entered April 19, 2018, and Lynita Nelson's Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Joint Preliminary

FRANK P. SULLIVAN DISTRICT JUDGE

FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. O LAS VEGAS NV 89101

Injunction. The Court, having reviewed all Motions, based thereon and good cause appearing therefor:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. May 30, 2001 is the Proper Date To Begin the Tracing Because the Nevada Supreme Court Found and Held That the ELN and LSN Trusts Were Funded With Separate Property

In its May 25, 2017 Order, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that this Court erred by "not tracing the assets contained within the trusts, either through a reliable expert or other available means." The Nevada Supreme Court also held that both the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust ("ELN Trust") and the Lynita S. Nelson Nevada Trust ("LSN Trust") "are valid and the trusts were funded with separate property stemming from a valid separate property agreement."

In its April 19, 2018 Order, this Court did not address the tracing performed in the underlying divorce proceeding. During the divorce proceeding, this Court did not perform a tracing of assets contained within either the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust ("ELN Trust") or the Lynita S. Nelson Nevada Trust ("LSN Trust"). In its May 25, 2017 Order, the Nevada Supreme Court found that "[i]n 2001, Eric and Lynita converted their separate property trusts into Eric's Trust and Lynita's Trust, respectively, and funded the SSST's with the separate

FRANK P. SULLIVAN
DISTRICT JUDGE
FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. O

LAS VEGAS NV 89101

¹ Klabacka v. Nelson, 394 P.3d 940, 948 (Nev. 2017).

² Klabacka, 394 at 947.

property contained within the separate property trusts."³ The Nevada Supreme Court then held that both the ELN and LSN Trusts were funded with separate property based on their findings.⁴

While this Court never performed a tracing of assets in the trusts in the underlying divorce proceedings, the Nevada Supreme Court held that "the SSSTs are valid and the trusts were funded with separate property stemming from a valid separate property agreement." Therefore, based upon the Nevada Supreme Court's finding and holding, this Court interprets the proper date to begin tracing as May 30, 2001, the date on which both the ELN and LSN Trusts were executed.

B. The \$720,000 Released to the ELN Trust Is A Valid Disbursement As the Funds Were Allocated In Error

In its May 25, 2017 Order, the Nevada Supreme Court found that this Court erred in Ordering the ELN Trust to pay the personal obligations of Mr. Nelson with regard to a lump-sum alimony payment.⁶ In response to the Nevada Supreme Court's holding, this Court Ordered the return of the \$720,000 which was paid by the ELN Trust and being held in a blocked account.

The sole purpose of the disbursement of the \$720,000 was for the payment of Mr. Nelson's personal obligations. Otherwise, the funds would have remained within the ELN Trust and be afforded all the protections of a Nevada Trust. As

³ *Id.* at 943.

⁴ Id. at 947.

⁵ *Id*.

⁶ Klabacka v. Nelson, 394 P.3d 940, 952 (Nev. 2017).

this Court erred when Ordering the distribution of funds from the ELN Trust to pay for Mr. Nelson's personal obligations, the Court is obligated to return the funds from the source of the distribution, the ELN Trust. Therefore, transferring the funds from one blocked account to a separate frozen account is improper at this time.

C. <u>A Joint Preliminary Injunction for the Banone, LLC. and Lindell Properties is Appropriate Because Both Properties Are Involved In A Claim of Community Property</u>

In its April 19, 2018 Order, this Court did not address the request for a Joint Preliminary Injunction for the Banone, LLC. and Lindell Properties. Eighth Judicial District Court Rule 5.517 states that "[u]pon the request of any party at any time prior to the entry of...final judgment, a preliminary injunction will be issued by the clerk against the parties to the action enjoining them and their officers, agents, servant, employees, or a person in active concert or participation with them from: transferring, encumbering, concealing, selling, or otherwise disposing of...any property that is the subject of a claim of community interest..."

Both the Banone, LLC. and Lindell Properties are subject to a claim of community interest. As such, both properties are entitled to a Joint Preliminary Injunction to ensure that the properties remain intact prior to the completion of tracing and the final judgment of this Court. However, while this Court is aware

that multiple Notices of Lis Pendens regarding both properties have been filed, a

Joint Preliminary Injunction on the properties is appropriate and will be granted.

Furthermore, considering the extensive litigation costs incurred to date, this Court is issuing this decision prior to any Opposition being filed by Mr. Nelson or the

ELN Trust and any Reply by Ms. Nelson. Therefore, any potential Oppositions and Reply will be reviewed and addressed accordingly as they are filed.

D. <u>Any Funds Used to Purchase the Brian Head Property That Are</u>
<u>Considered Community Property Will Be Reimbursed Following the</u>
<u>Tracing of Assets in the ELN and LSN Trusts</u>

In its April 19, 2018 Order, this Court stated any financial transfers or inequities found as a result of the tracing of assets would be settled after tracing has been completed and the Court issues a final judgment. This Court also stated that both the ELN and LSN Trusts have sufficient assets to offset any deficiencies ultimately found once a final balance and distribution amount has been determined. Therefore, in the event that the tracing finds that a share of LSN's property held within the ELN Trust was used to purchase the 50% interest in the Brian Head Cabin, the LSN Trust will be entitled to a reimbursement of said property.

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FRANK P. SULLIVAN DISTRICT JUDGE

FRANK P. SULLIVAN

DISTRICT JUDGE

FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. O
LAS VEGAS NV 89101

E. <u>The June 5, 2018 Hearing Shall Be Vacated Based On This Court's</u> Decision

As a result of Motions filed in this case, a Motion Hearing was set on this Court's calendar for June 5, 2018. As a result of this Decision, the June 5, 2018 Motion Hearing is hereby Vacated.

ORDER

Based thereon:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the this Court's decision to start the tracing of assets within the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust and the Lynita S. Nelson Nevada Trust on May 30, 2001 is hereby AFFIRMED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the release of the \$720,000 from Bank of Nevada Blocked Account #7502338705 to the ELN Trust is hereby AFFIRMED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the request to transfer the \$720,000 from the Blocked Account into a separate frozen account is hereby **DENIED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the request for a Joint Preliminary
Injunction on the Banone, LLC. and Lindell Properties to prevent the transfer,
encumbrance, concealment, sale, or otherwise disposition of the properties is
hereby GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event that a complete tracing of assets finds that the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust's purchase of the 50% interest

in the Brian Head Utah Cabin is made with community property, the Lynita S.

Nelson Nevada Trust is entitled to a reimbursement in the amount of the proceeds determined to be Lynita Nelson's portion of the community property used for purchase.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Stay of Order is hereby DENIED.

DATED this 22 day of May, 2018.

Honorable Frank P. Sullivan
District Court Judge – Dept. O

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FRANK P. SULLIVAN DISTRICT JUDGE

FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. O LAS VEGAS NV 89101

DISTRICT COURT FAMILY DIVISION – JUVENILE CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

CNILE

Electronically Filed 5/22/2018 10:24 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

Case No.: D-09-411537-D

Dept. No.: O

ERIC L. NELSON,

Plaintiff,

V.

LYNITA SUE NELSON, MATT KLABACKA, as Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001,

Defendants.

MATT KLABACKA, as Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001,

Cross-claimant,

v.

LYNITA SUE NELSON,

Cross-defendant.

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

TO:

Rhonda Forsberg, Esq. E-Service

Robert Dickerson, Esq. E-Service

Marc Solomon, Esq. E-Service

PSAPP0346

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the DECISION AFFIRMING THE DATE OF TRACING; DENYING A SEPARATE BLOCKED ACCOUNT FOR \$720,000; AND GRANTING A JOINT PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION FOR THE BANONE, LLC. AND LINDELL PROPERTIES was duly entered in the above-referenced case on the 22nd day of May, 2018.

DATED this 22 day of May, 2018.

Lori Parr

Judicial Executive Assistant

Dept. O

Electronically Filed 5/22/2018 8:41 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT FAMILY DIVISION – JUVENILE CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

ERIC L. NELSON,

Plaintiff,

V.

LYNITA SUE NELSON, MATT KLABACKA, as Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001,

Defendants.

MATT KLABACKA, as Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001,

Cross-claimant,

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LYNITA SUE NELSON,

Cross-defendant.

Case No.: D-09-411537-D

Dept. No.: O

DECISION AFFIRMING THE DATE OF TRACING; DENYING A SEPARATE BLOCKED ACCOUNT FOR \$720,000; AND GRANTING A JOINT PRELIMINARY INJUCTION FOR THE BANONE, LLC. AND LINDELL PROPERTIES

This matter was before the Court, pursuant to Lynita Nelson's Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the Court's Decision Entered April 19, 2018, and Lynita Nelson's Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Joint Preliminary

FRANK P. SULLIVAN DISTRICT JUDGE

FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. O LAS VEGAS NV 89101 Injunction. The Court, having reviewed all Motions, based thereon and good cause appearing therefor:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. May 30, 2001 is the Proper Date To Begin the Tracing Because the Nevada Supreme Court Found and Held That the ELN and LSN Trusts Were Funded With Separate Property

In its May 25, 2017 Order, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that this Court erred by "not tracing the assets contained within the trusts, either through a reliable expert or other available means." The Nevada Supreme Court also held that both the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust ("ELN Trust") and the Lynita S.

Nelson Nevada Trust ("LSN Trust") "are valid and the trusts were funded with separate property stemming from a valid separate property agreement."

In its April 19, 2018 Order, this Court did not address the tracing performed in the underlying divorce proceeding. During the divorce proceeding, this Court did not perform a tracing of assets contained within either the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust ("ELN Trust") or the Lynita S. Nelson Nevada Trust ("LSN Trust"). In its May 25, 2017 Order, the Nevada Supreme Court found that "[i]n 2001, Eric and Lynita converted their separate property trusts into Eric's Trust and Lynita's Trust, respectively, and funded the SSST's with the separate

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² Klabacka, 394 at 947.

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While this Court never performed a tracing of assets in the trusts in the underlying divorce proceedings, the Nevada Supreme Court held that "the SSSTs are valid and the trusts were funded with separate property stemming from a valid separate property agreement." Therefore, based upon the Nevada Supreme Court's finding and holding, this Court interprets the proper date to begin tracing as May 30, 2001, the date on which both the ELN and LSN Trusts were executed.

B. The \$720,000 Released to the ELN Trust Is A Valid Disbursement As the Funds Were Allocated In Error

In its May 25, 2017 Order, the Nevada Supreme Court found that this Court erred in Ordering the ELN Trust to pay the personal obligations of Mr.

Nelson with regard to a lump-sum alimony payment.⁶ In response to the Nevada Supreme Court's holding, this Court Ordered the return of the \$720,000 which was paid by the ELN Trust and being held in a blocked account.

The sole purpose of the disbursement of the \$720,000 was for the payment of Mr. Nelson's personal obligations. Otherwise, the funds would have remained within the ELN Trust and be afforded all the protections of a Nevada Trust. As

³ *Id.* at 943.

⁴ Id. at 947.

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⁶ Klabacka v. Nelson, 394 P.3d 940, 952 (Nev. 2017).

FRANK P. SULLIVAN DISTRICT JUDGE pay for Mr. Nelson's personal obligations, the Court is obligated to return the funds from the source of the distribution, the ELN Trust. Therefore, transferring the funds from one blocked account to a separate frozen account is improper at this time.

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C. A Joint Preliminary Injunction for the Banone, LLC. and Lindell
Properties is Appropriate Because Both Properties Are Involved In A
Claim of Community Property

In its April 19, 2018 Order, this Court did not address the request for a Joint Preliminary Injunction for the Banone, LLC. and Lindell Properties. Eighth Judicial District Court Rule 5.517 states that "[u]pon the request of any party at any time prior to the entry of...final judgment, a preliminary injunction will be issued by the clerk against the parties to the action enjoining them and their officers, agents, servant, employees, or a person in active concert or participation with them from: transferring, encumbering, concealing, selling, or otherwise disposing of...any property that is the subject of a claim of community interest..."

Both the Banone, LLC. and Lindell Properties are subject to a claim of community interest. As such, both properties are entitled to a Joint Preliminary Injunction to ensure that the properties remain intact prior to the completion of tracing and the final judgment of this Court. However, while this Court is aware

that multiple Notices of Lis Pendens regarding both properties have been filed, a Joint Preliminary Injunction on the properties is appropriate and will be granted. Furthermore, considering the extensive litigation costs incurred to date, this Court is issuing this decision prior to any Opposition being filed by Mr. Nelson or the ELN Trust and any Reply by Ms. Nelson. Therefore, any potential Oppositions and Reply will be reviewed and addressed accordingly as they are filed.

D. Any Funds Used to Purchase the Brian Head Property That Are Considered Community Property Will Be Reimbursed Following the Tracing of Assets in the ELN and LSN Trusts

In its April 19, 2018 Order, this Court stated any financial transfers or inequities found as a result of the tracing of assets would be settled after tracing has been completed and the Court issues a final judgment. This Court also stated that both the ELN and LSN Trusts have sufficient assets to offset any deficiencies ultimately found once a final balance and distribution amount has been determined. Therefore, in the event that the tracing finds that a share of LSN's property held within the ELN Trust was used to purchase the 50% interest in the Brian Head Cabin, the LSN Trust will be entitled to a reimbursement of said property.

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E. <u>The June 5, 2018 Hearing Shall Be Vacated Based On This Court's</u> Decision

As a result of Motions filed in this case, a Motion Hearing was set on this Court's calendar for June 5, 2018. As a result of this Decision, the June 5, 2018 Motion Hearing is hereby Vacated.

ORDER

Based thereon:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the this Court's decision to start the tracing of assets within the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust and the Lynita S. Nelson Nevada Trust on May 30, 2001 is hereby AFFIRMED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the release of the \$720,000 from Bank of Nevada Blocked Account #7502338705 to the ELN Trust is hereby AFFIRMED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the request to transfer the \$720,000 from the Blocked Account into a separate frozen account is hereby **DENIED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the request for a Joint Preliminary
Injunction on the Banone, LLC. and Lindell Properties to prevent the transfer,
encumbrance, concealment, sale, or otherwise disposition of the properties is
hereby GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event that a complete tracing of assets finds that the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust's purchase of the 50% interest

in the Brian Head Utah Cabin is made with community property, the Lynita S.

Nelson Nevada Trust is entitled to a reimbursement in the amount of the proceeds determined to be Lynita Nelson's portion of the community property used for purchase.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Stay of Order is hereby DENIED.

DATED this 22 day of May, 2018.

Honorable Frank P. Sullivan District Court Judge – Dept. O

6/5/2018 5:26 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT **MRCN** THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP⁽ 2 ROBERT P. DICKERSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 000945 JOSEF M. KARACSONYI, ESQ. 3 Nevada Bar No. 010634 1745 Village Center Circle Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 Telephone: (702) 388-8600 Facsimile: (702) 388-0210 Email: info@thedklawgroup.com 4 5 6 7 Attorneys for Lynita Sue Nelson 8 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 9 FAMILY DIVISION 10 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 11 12 ERIC L. NELSON, 13 CASE NO. D-09-411537-D DEPT NO. O Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 14 V. 15 LYNITA SUE NELSON, MATT KLABACKA, Date of Hearing: Time of Hearing: 16 as Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001, 17 ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED: NO 18 Defendants/Counterclaimants. 19 20 MATT KLABACKA, as Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001, 21 22 23 Crossclaimant, 24 25 LYNITA SUE NELSON, Individually and as Investment Trustee of the LSN NEVADA TRUST, dated May 30, 2001, and ERIC NELSON, 26 27 Cross-Defendant. 28

PSAPP0355

Electronically Filed

NOTICE: YOU ARE REQUIRED TO FILE A WRITTEN RESPONSE TO THIS MOTION WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT AND TO PROVIDE THE UNDERSIGNED WITH A COPY OF YOUR RESPONSE WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS OF YOUR RECEIPT OF THIS MOTION. FAILURE TO FILE A WRITTEN RESPONSE WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS OF YOUR RECEIPT OF THIS MOTION MAY RESULT IN THE REQUESTED RELIEF BEING GRANTED BY THE COURT WITHOUT HEARING PRIOR TO THE SCHEDULED HEARING DATE.

LYNITA NELSON'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND CLARIFICATION OF THE COURT'S DECISION ENTERED MAY 22, 2018

COMES NOW, Defendant and Cross-Defendant, LYNITA SUE NELSON ("Lynita"), by and through her counsel, ROBERT P. DICKERSON, ESQ., and JOSEF M. KARACSONYI, ESQ., of THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP, and respectfully submits for the Court's consideration her Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the Court's Decision Entered May 22, 2018 ("Motion").

Specifically, Lynita respectfully requests the following relief:

1. That the Court reconsider its Decision entered May 22, 2018,

and Order that the Joint Preliminary Injunction issued is not limited to

the Banone, LLC and Lindell Properties; and

2. For such further relief as deemed appropriate in the premises.

This Motion is made and based upon the pleadings and papers on file herein, and the Memorandum of Points and Authorities attached hereto.

DATED this ______ day of June, 2018.

THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP

ROBERT P. DICKERSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 000945 JOSEF M. KARACSONYI, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 010634 1745 Village Center Circle Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 Attorneys for Lynita Sue Nelson

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. FACTUAL STATEMENT

This matter was recently before the Court pursuant to Lynita's Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the Court's Decision Entered April 19, 2018 ("Motion"), and Lynita's Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Joint Preliminary Injunction. Having reviewed all such documents, and based thereon and good cause appearing therefor, on May 22, 2018, the Court issued its Decision Affirming the Date of Tracing; Denying A Separate Blocked Account for \$720,000; and Granting a Joint Preliminary Injunction for the Banone, LLC and Lindell Properties ("Decision").

As part of the Court's Decision, the Court noted that in its prior April 19, 2018 Order, "this Court did not address the request for a Joint Preliminary Injunction for the Banone, LLC. and Lindell properties." In reality, however, Lynita's request that was before the Court during the prior hearing of January 31, 2018, and which was the subject of the April 19, 2018 Order, was that a general Joint Preliminary Injunction be issued, and not one related only to the Banone, LLC, and Lindell Properties.

The legal justification provided by the Court for the issuance of the limited Joint Preliminary Injunction is as follows:

Both the Banone, LLC. and Lindell Properties are subject to a claim of community interest. As such, both properties are entitled to a Joint Preliminary Injunction to ensure that the properties remain intact prior to the completion of tracing and the final judgment of this Court.

Decision, page 4.

As this Court is aware, however, there are numerous other properties at issue in the parties' divorce action which are similarly the subject of a claim of community interest. Lynita requests – as she did in her prior Motions – that a general Joint Preliminary Injunction be issued in this

matter. Lynita asks that the Court make clear that <u>none</u> of the assets subject to a claim of community property can be transferred, encumbered, concealed, sold, or other disposed of by the parties pending the finalization of the Court's tracing and entry of the Court's final Order. As the Court will recall, in making an equal division of the parties' property in the Decree of Divorce entered June 3, 2013, Lynita was also awarded one-third (1/3) of Russell Road from the ELN Trust at a value of \$2,265,113.50. An injunction over just the Banone, LLC and Lindell Properties does not protect sufficient property to ensure the Court can accomplish an appropriate division of property if it is determined that the properties held in ELN Trust and LSN Trust are community property.

II. <u>LEGAL ANALYSIS</u>

A. The Court Should Reconsider/Clarify The Scope Of The Joint Preliminary Injunction Issued As Part Of Its Decision of May 22, 2018

Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 (2018), provides in pertinent part as follows:

(a) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.

In addition, Eighth Judicial District Court Rules, Rule 5.512 (2018), provides as follows:

(a) A party seeking reconsideration and/or rehearing of a ruling (other than any order that may be addressed by motion pursuant to NRCP 50(b), 52(b), 59 or 60), must file a motion for such relief within 14 calendar days after service of notice of entry of the order unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the period for filing a notice of appeal.

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(b) If a motion for reconsideration and/or rehearing is granted, the court may make a final disposition without hearing, may set it for hearing or resubmission, or may make such other orders as are deemed appropriate under the circumstance.

Finally, NRCP 59(e) provides the trial court the opportunity, within a limited time, to rehear a motion previously brought before it, and to correct or reconsider its order or judgment. *Chiara v. Belaustegui*, 86 Nev. 856, 859, 477 P.2d 857, 858 (1970). "[A] court may, for sufficient cause shown, amend, correct, resettle, modify, or vacate, as the case may be, an order previously made and entered on motion in the progress of the cause or proceeding." *Trail v. Faretto*, 91 Nev. 401, 403, 536 P.2d 1026, 1027 (1975).

B. The Court Should Immediately Enter A Joint Preliminary Injunction In This Matter Over All Property Listed In The Decree Of Divorce

EDCR 5.517 requires the issuance of a joint preliminary injunction upon the request of any party, to prohibit all parties, and "their officers, agents, servants, employees, or a person in active concert or participation with them from: (1) Transferring, encumbering, concealing, selling, or otherwise disposing of any of the joint, common, or community property of the parties or any property that is subject of a claim of community interest, except in the usual course of conduct or for the necessities of life or for retention of counsel. . . ." Emphasis added. NRS 125.050 requires the Court to "make such restraining order or other order as appears necessary to prevent the act or conduct and preserve the status quo pending final determination of the cause."

Based on the above, as well as the arguments and statements made during the hearing of January 31, 2018, Lynita respectfully requests that this Court enter a Joint Preliminary Injunction in this matter providing:

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no property listed in the Decree of Divorce entered June 3, 2013, is to be transferred, encumbered, concealed, sold, or otherwise disposed of without a written agreement between the parties or further Order of the Court to ensure that the properties remain intact prior to the completion of the tracing and the final judgment of this Court.

If the Court is not willing to enjoin all potential community property at issue in this matter, it should, at the very least, issue an Order to Eric and the ELN Trust providing:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no property held by Eric or the ELN Trust which was awarded to Lynita in the Decree of Divorce entered June 3, 2013, is to be transferred, encumbered, concealed, sold, or otherwise disposed of without a written agreement between the parties or further Order of the Court to ensure that the properties remain intact prior to the completion of the tracing and the final judgment of this Court.

Based on the above, as well as the arguments and statements made during the hearing of January 31, 2018, Lynita respectfully requests that this Court enter a Joint Preliminary Injunction in this matter as set forth herein.

III. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Lynita respectfully requests that the Court reconsider its Decision entered May 22, 2018, and Order that the Joint Preliminary Injunction issued is not limited to the Banone, LLC and Lindell Properties.

DATED this 5th day of June, 2018.

THE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP

ROBERT P. DICKERSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 000945 JOSEF M. KARACSONYI, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 010634 1745 Village Center Circle Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of THE 2 DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP, and that on this 5th day 3 of June, 2018, I caused the document entitled, LYNITA NELSON'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND CLARIFICATION OF THE 5 COURT'S DECISION ENTERED MAY 22, 2018 to be served as follows: 6 [X] pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a), EDCR 8.05(f), NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) and Administrative Order 14-2 captioned "In the Administrative Matter of Mandatory Electronic Service in the Eighth Judicial District Court," by mandatory electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic 7 8 9 filing system; 10 by placing same to be deposited for mailing in the United States Mail, in a sealed envelope upon which first class postage was prepaid in Las Vegas, Nevada; 11 12 pursuant to EDCR 7.26, to be sent via facsimile, by duly executed consent for service by electronic means; 13 by hand-delivery with signed Receipt of Copy. 14 To the attorney(s) and/or person(s) listed below at the address, email 15 address, and/or facsimile number indicated below: 16 17 RHONDA K. FORSBERG, ESQ. RHONDA K. FORSBERG, CHARTERED 18 64 North Pecos Road, Ste. 800 19 Henderson, Nevada 89074 rforsberg@forsberg-law.com 20 mweiss@forsberg-law.com Attorneys for Plaintiff 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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Attorneys for Matt Klabacka, Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA

TRUST dated May 30, 2001

DISTRICT COURT

COUNTY OF CLARK, NEVADA

ERIC L. NELSON,

Plaintiff

VS.

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SUE NELSON, MATT LYNITA KLABACKA, as Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001,

Defendants.

KLABACKA, MATT Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001,

Cross-claimant,

VS.

LYNITA SUE NELSON,

Cross-defendant.

Case No.: D-09-411537-D

Dept. No.: O

OPPOSITION TO LYNITA COUNTERMOTION TO: (1) SUBJECT TO THE JPI; (3) DXPUNGDTHD LIS PENDENS; (4) ALLOW THE ELN TRUST TO MANAGE LINDELL; AND (5) ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS

HEARING DATE: July 10, 2018 HEARING TIME: 9:30 a.m.

Matt Klabacka, Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA

TRUST dated May 30, 2001, hereby files his Opposition to Lynita Nelson's Motion

for Reconsideration and Clarification of the Court's Decision Entered May 22, 2018;

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and his Countermotion: (1) to Terminate the JPI; (2) Impose a Bond on any Property Subject to the JPI; (3) Expunge the Inappropriately Recorded Lis Pendens; (4) Allow the ELN Trust to Manage Lindell; and (5) for Attorneys' Fees and Costs.

DATED this 22nd day of June, 2018.

SOLOMON DWIGGINS & FREER, LTD.

Nevada State Bar No. 0418 JEFFREY P. LUSZECK, ESO. Nevada State Bar No. 9619

9060 West Chevenne Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89129

Attorneys for Matt Klabacka, Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF FACTS

"If at first you don't succeed try, try again."

Lynita S. Nelson has taken the aforementioned proverb to heart as this is the third time that she has requested the exact same relief: a joint preliminary injunction over all assets owned by the ELN Trust. Indeed, in her Motion (which merely regurgitates the same arguments that this Court previously rejected in entering its April 19, 2018 Order), Lynita fails to identify how the Court's Order entered on May 22, 2018 ("May 22 Order") is clearly erroneous and or how new facts would support a reversal of this Court's decision. What makes Lynita's self-serving actions even worse is that after this Court denied her requested relief, she filed lis pendens over

the majority, if not all, of the ELN Trust's real property (even property that was not awarded to Lynita in Divorce Decree like Bella Kathryn). In light of the foregoing,

Lynita's Motion should be denied in its entirety and the ELN Trust should be awarded its attorneys' fees and costs responding to the frivolous Motion.

Additionally, the ELN Trust countermoves this Court for an order: (1)

terminating the JPI; (2) compelling Lynita to post a bond on any property subject to

the JPI; (3) expunging the lis pendens; and (4) allowing the ELN Trust to manage

Lindell.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for reconsideration must be based on "substantially different evidence [that] is subsequently introduced" showing that "the decision is clearly erroneous." *Masonry and Tile Constrs. v. Jolley, Urga & Wirth, Ltd.*, 113 Nev. 737, 741, 941 P.2d 486, 489 (1997). "Only in very rare instances in which new issues of fact or law are raised supporting a ruling contrary to the ruling already reached should a motion for reconsideration be granted." *Moore v. City of Las Vegas*, 92 Nev. 402, 405, 551 P.2d 244, 246 (1976). Reconsideration motions cannot not be used merely to reargue the arguments the movant already made to the Court, to "be used to ask the Court to rethink what it has already thought," *Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mechanical Contractors*, 215 F.R.D. 581, 582 (D. Ariz. 2003), or "to dress up arguments that previously failed." *Waddell & Reed Fin., Inc. v. Torchmark Corp.*, 338 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1250 (D. Kan. 2004) (citations omitted).

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Notwithstanding the aforementioned black letter law, in her Motion, Lynita advances the identical arguments that she previously raised, and/or could have raised, in her: (1) Opposition to Motion to Enforce Supreme Court's Order dated May 25, 2017; Motion to Hold Lynita S. Nelson in Contempt for Violation of September 22, 2014; and for Attorneys' Fees and Costs; and Countermotion for Final Judgment Consistent with Nevada Supreme Court's Remand previously filed on July 31, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as "Opposition"); (2) Reply to Countermotion for Final Judgment Consistent with Nevada Supreme Court's Remand previously filed on August 22, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as "Reply to Countermotion"); and (3) Lynita Nelson's Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the Court's Decision entered April 19, 2018 ("April 19 Order"). Indeed, this is not one of those "rare circumstances" in which reconsideration is appropriate, and to do so would be an abuse of discretion.

III. LEGAL ARGUMENT

A. THIS COURT ERRED BY IMPOSING A JOINT PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ON THE BANONE, LLC AND LINDELL PROPERTIES.

As an initial matter, this Court erred by imposing a JPI over Banone, LLC and Lindell because EDCR 5.517 only applies to the husband and wife in a divorce proceeding, of which the ELN Trust is not. Consequently, if Lynita wishes to

Indeed, whenever the term "party" or "parties" is referenced in Part V of the Eighth Judicial Court Rules it contemplates application to a husband and wife, and not to third parties.

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pursue an injunction against the ELN Trust she must seek a formal injunction that 2 complies with NRCP 65, including, but not limited to, posting security pursuant to subsection (c). Requiring Lynita to post a security "for the payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been 6 wrongfully enjoined or restrained" is mandatory under NRCP 65, and is fair and equitable as the ELN Trust has previously been required to post bond. Further, the imposition of a JPI over Banone, LLC and Lindell does not make sense in light of this Court's finding that both the ELN Trust and the LSN Trust possess "sufficient assets in both trusts to offset any deficiency once a final balance and distribution amount has been determined." See April 19 Order at 7:26-8:2.

In light of the foregoing, the ELN Trust respectfully requests that this Court reconsider the imposition of its JPI against Banone, LLC and Lindell without the imposition of a bond.

SHOULD DENY LYNITA'S SELF-SERVING THIS COURT B. ATTEMPT TO INCREASE THE SCOPE OF THE JPI.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Lynita demands that this Court increase the scope of the JPI to encompass "any property listed in the Decree of Divorce entered June 3, 2013," or at the very least, to include any property "held by Eric or, the ELN

The ELN Trust disagrees that the LSN Trust has sufficient assets to "offset any deficiency once a final balance" has been determined because she has squandered the assets in the LSN Trust and owes the ELN Trust hundreds of thousands of dollars for the following: (1) rents allocated from both the Banone, LLC and Lindell Properties; (2) \$324,000 paid to Lynita from the Bank of Nevada blocked account; (3) a \$6,050 security deposit paid to the LSN Trust from the ELN Trust; (4) payments collected by the LSN Trust pursuant to the Farmouth Circle Note; and (5) \$75,000 paid to the LSN Trust by Banone-AZ, LLC. See, e.g., April 19 Order at 7:11-18.

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Trust which was awarded to Lynita in the Decree of Divorce entered June 3, 2013." 2 Motion at 4:1-12. Once again, Lynita's request ignores this Court's finding that both the ELN Trust and the LSN Trusts possess "sufficient assets in both trusts to offset any deficiency once a final balance and distribution amount has been determined." 6 See April 19 Order at 7:26-8:2.

> THIS COURT SHOULD DENY LYNITA'S REQUEST TO INCREASE THE SCOPE OF THE JPI TO ANY PROPERTY IDENTIFIED IN THE DIVORCE DECREE.

Lynita's request that this Court increase the scope of the JPI to any property identified in the Divorce Decree would constitute gross error. Specifically, said JPI cannot and should not encompass Wyoming Downs because: (1) this Court previously found that Wyoming Downs was not community property; and (2) the Nevada Supreme Court upheld the September 22, 2014 Order that disposed of said asset. As this Court will certainly recall, the Divorce Decree disposed of all of the assets owned by the ELN Trust and the LSN Trust, with the exception of Wyoming Downs. 20

After a separate evidentiary hearing on Wyoming Downs on May 30, 2014, this Court entered the following findings and orders:

> THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that although Wyoming Downs was acquired by the ELN Trust during the pendency of the marriage between Eric L. Nelson and Lynita S. Nelson, the Court does not find it to be community property as it was clearly purchased through Dynasty, an entity wholly owned by the ELN Trust and the Court maintained the ELN Trust. The Court found no

facts leading it to conclude Lynita S. Nelson or the LSN Trust has an interest in Wyoming Downs. The Court maintained the integrity of the ELN Trust and LSN Trust for the reasons set forth in the Divorce Decree.

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that there was no transmutation of Wyoming Downs from separate property to community property, even assuming that Wyoming Downs was separate property of Eric L. Nelson, and not the property of the ELN Trust, separate and distinct from Eric L. Nelson. *See* Notice of Entry of Order entered September 22, 2014.

Lynita appealed the September 22, 2014 Order. Indeed, one of the "Issues on Appeal" that Lynita identified in her Docketing Statement was the following:

Whether the district court erred in denying Lynita a one-half (1/2) interest in Wyoming Downs, which was purchased during the pendency of Eric's and Lynita's divorce proceedings. See LSN Trust's Docketing Statement at 4:10-12.³

In its Opinion, the Nevada Supreme Court <u>upheld</u>, as opposed to overturned, the September 22, 2014 Order:

Accordingly, we affirm in part and vacate in part the district court's decree of divorce, affirm in part and vacate in part the district court's June 8, 2015, order modifying and implementing the divorce decree, and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See Nevada Supreme Court Order at p. 30.

Further, footnote 9 of the Opinion provides: "[w]e have considered the parties' other arguments [which would have included Lynita's argument with respect to Wyoming Downs] and conclude they are without merit." In light of the foregoing, it would be

See also Lynita's Answering Brief and Opening Brief on Cross-Appeal at pp. 52-53.

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an error to enter a JPI and/or litigate any issue relating to Wyoming Downs.

THIS COURT SHOULD DENY LYNITA'S REQUEST INCREASE THE SCOPE OF THE JPI TO ANY AWARDED TO HER **OVERTURNED** BY THE **NEVADA** SUPREME COURT.

Alternatively, Lynita requests that this Court increase the scope of the JPI to include assets that were purportedly awarded to her in the Divorce Decree, despite the fact that said award was overturned by the Nevada Supreme Court. Although she does not come out and say it, upon information and belief the assets that Lynita is referring to are the \$720,000 that was released to the ELN Trust and Russel Road. Lynita's request to have a JPI imposed over the \$720,000 was already addressed by 14 this Court in its May 22 Order at 3:14-4:7, and as such, should be denied by this Court.

Lynita's request to have a JPI imposed over Russel Road should also be denied because said asset was purchased 100% by the ELN Trust. Indeed, on November 11, 1999, the LSN Trust purchased the Russell Road Property for \$855,945.4 Eric's brother, Cal Nelson, made a down payment of \$20,000.00 and became a 50% owner of the Russell Road Property. See id. Lynita and Cal later formed C J E & L, LLC, which rented the Russell Road Property to Cal's Blue Water Marine. See id. Shortly thereafter, C J E & L, LLC obtained a \$3,100,000 loan for the purpose of constructing a building for Cal's Blue Water Marine. See id. In 2004, Lynita

See Notice of Filing Asset Schedule and Notes to Asset Schedule filed on or around July 4, 2011, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.

executed a guarantee on the flooring contract for Cal's Blue Water Marine, and shortly thereafter, the LSN Trust forfeited its interest in C J E & L, LLC and the Russell Road Property to be released as a guarantor. See id.

The ELN Trust purchased a 66.67% interest in the Russell Road Property in February 2010, over 5 years after the LSN Trust forfeited its interest. The court-appointed Special Master, Larry Bertsch, found that the ELN Trust paid nearly \$4,000,000.00 for its 65% interest in the Russell Road Property, which is comprised of the following amounts:

- 1) In 2009, the ELN Trust purchased an FDIC note on a property in Phoenix commonly known as "Sugar Daddy's" for approximately \$520,000. The source of these funds came from the Line of Credit. The property was sold with proceeds amounting to \$1,520,597.88. Since this was designated as a 1031 exchange, the proceeds were used in 2010 to purchase Eric's interest in the Russell Road Property.
- As indicated above, the ELN Trust had previously paid \$300,000 to pay down the Bank Loan which was secured by property in Utah. In addition, the ELN Trust paid off the mortgage on Cal's house amounting to \$400,000. Both amounts were paid from a Line of Credit. These two amounts aggregating \$700,000 were then used as a credit towards the purchase price for ELN Trust's interest.
- 3) The ELN Trust gave a credit amounting to \$522,138.47 which represented future agreements with Cal and the termination of any present verbal partnership agreements. This also included money on rental payments given to Cal.
- 4) The remaining amount to fulfill the obligation of the purchase price was to borrow \$1,257,263.67 from the Line of Credit in 2010.

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Therefore the purchase of ELN Trust's interest is comprised of the following:

Pay down of Bank Loan	\$300,000.00
Pay off of personal residence of Cal Nelson	400,000.00
Credit to Cal Nelson for prior payments	522,138.45
Amount to pay Bank Note from Sugar Daddy's	1,520,597.88
Amount to pay Bank Loan from Line of Credit	1,257,263.67
	\$4,000,000.00 ⁵

Since the ELN Trust's interest in the Russell Road Property was paid for with its own assets and proceeds, as opposed to assets belonging to Lynita or the LSN Trust, it would be inappropriate to impose a JPI over the same (especially without requiring Lynita to post a bond).

C. THIS COURT SHOULD REMOVE THE INAPPROPRIATELY FILED LIS PENDENS RECORDED BY LYNITA ON OR AROUND APRIL 11, 2018.

NRS 14.010 permits a plaintiff to file a lis pendens only "[i]n an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage upon real property, or affecting title or possession of real property." "As a general proposition, lis pendens are not appropriate instruments for use in promoting recoveries in actions for personal or money judgments; rather, their office is to prevent the transfer or loss of real property which is the subject of dispute in the action that provides the basis for the lis pendens." *Levinson v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct.*, 109 Nev. 747, 750 (Nev. 1993). Accordingly, NRS 14.015(1) and (2) provide that a defendant may request a hearing upon 15 days' notice, whereupon the plaintiff must:

...establish to the satisfaction of the court that:

See id.

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- The action is for the foreclosure of a mortgage upon the real property described in the notice or affects the title or possession of the real property described in the notice;
- The action was not brought in bad faith or for an improper motive; (b)
- The party who recorded the notice will be able to perform any (c) conditions precedent to the relief sought in the action insofar as it affects the title or possession of the real property; and
- The party who recorded the notice would be injured by any (d) transfer of an interest in the property before the action is concluded.
- In addition to the matters enumerated in subsection 2, the party who 3. recorded the notice must establish to the satisfaction of the court either:
 - That the party who recorded the notice is likely to prevail in the action; or
 - That the party who recorded the notice has a fair chance of success on the merits in the action and the injury described in paragraph (d) of subsection 2 would be sufficiently serious that the hardship on him or her in the event of a transfer would be greater than the hardship on the defendant resulting from the notice of pendency, - and that if the party who recorded the notice prevails he or she will be entitled to relief affecting the title or possession of the real property.

If plaintiff fails to meet the foregoing burden, the lis pendens must be expunged. NRS 14.015(5).

Here, Lynita has not only recorded lis pendens on real property currently subject to the JPI (i.e. Banone LLC and Lindell), but also on Bella Kathryn (a property that was not awarded to her in the Divorce Decree and which has never been subject to a JPI following the entry of the Divorce Decree) and Russell Road. Said actions confirm Lynita's bad faith.

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Lynita cannot demonstrate that she is likely to "prevail in the action" or "have 2 a fair chance of success on the merits... and [her alleged injury] would be sufficiently serious that the hardship on [the LSN Trust] in the event of a transfer would be greater than the hardship on [ELN Trust] resulting from the notice of pendency" for the reasons set forth in the ELN Trust's Reply to Opposition to Motion to Enforce Supreme Court's Order filed on August 4, 2017 at 5:9-7:13, the portion of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 2. Specifically, the Nevada Supreme Court found that Eric and Lynita's community property was transmutated to separate property and Lynita failed to introduce any evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence, that the Parties separate property was transmutated back to community property. In light of the foregoing, the ELN Trust respectfully requests that the lis pendens be expunged and that it be awarded its attorneys' fees and costs stemming relating to the same.

THE ELN TRUST'S REQUEST FOR IMPOSITION OF A BOND.

The ELN Trust also requests that this Court impose a reasonable bond and/or other security stemming from the imposition of the JPI for the reasons set forth in Section III(A) supra.

TRUST RESPECTFULLY REQUESTS THAT TRUST BE ALLOWED TO MANAGE THE LINDELL PROPERTY.

Although Lynita provided the Quitclaim Deed for the Lindell Property to the

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 1 2 LYNITA SUE NELSON, INDIVIDUALLY, AND IN HER Supreme Court Case No.: 3 CAPACITY AS INVESTMENT Electronically Filed TRUSTEE OF THE LYNITA S. 4 District Ct. QCts30\20:1184110:007a.m. NELSON NEVADA TRUST DATED MAY 30, 2001, Elizabeth A. Brown 5 Clerk of Supreme Court Petitioner, 6 v. 7 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 8 COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, FAMILY DIVISION, 9 CLARK COUNTY; THE HONORABLE FRÂNK P. 10 SULLIVAN, 11 Respondents, 12 ERIC L. NELSON, INDIVIDUALLY, 13 AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS INVESTMENT TRUSTEE OF THE 14 ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST, DATED MAY 30, 2001, and MATT 15 KLABACKA, DIŚTRIBUTION TRUSTEE OF THE ERIC L. 16 NELSON NEVADA TRUST, DATED MAY 30, 2001, 17 Real Parties in Interest. 18 19 20 PETITIONER, LYNITA SUE NELSON'S, SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS TO PETITION FOR 21 WRIT OF MANDAMUS VOLUME 2 22 ΓHE DICKERSON KARACSONYI LAW GROUP ROBERT P. DICKERSON, ESQ. 23 Nevada Bar No. 000945 IOSEF M. KARACSONYI, ESQ. 24 Nevada Bar No. 010634 1745 Village Center Circle 25 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134 Telephone: (702)388-8600 26 Facsimile: (702)388-0210

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Attorneys for Petitioner, LYNITA SUE NELSON

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5 6 7	1	07/31/17	Appendix of Exhibits to Defendant's Opposition to Motion to Enforce Supreme Court's Order Dated May 25, 2017; Motion to Hold Lynita S. Nelson in Contempt for Violation of September 22, 2014 Order; and for	0149-0158
8 9			Attorneys' Fees and Costs and Countermotion for Final Judgment Consistent with Nevada Supreme Court's Remand, or in the Alternative,	
10 11			for Affirmation of Joint Preliminary Injunction, for a Receiver to Manage Property Pending Final Judgment, for	
12 13			Updated Financial Disclosures and Exchange of Financial Information, and for Sale of Property for Payment of Attorneys' Fees and Costs	
14 15 16	2	05/22/18	Decision Affirming the Date of Tracing; Denying a Separate Blocked Account for \$720,000; and Granting a Joint Preliminary Injunction for the Banone, LLC. and Lindell Properties, entered in case no. D-09-411537-D	0339-0345
17 18	2	04/19/18	Decision entered in case no. D-09-411537-D	0291-0299
19	3	10/16/18	Decision entered in case no. D-09-411537-D	0509-0518
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27	1	07/31/17	Defendant's Opposition to Motion to Enforce Supreme Court's Order Dated May 25, 2017; Motion to Hold Lynita S. Nelson in Contempt for Violation of September 22, 2014 Order, and for Attorneys' Fees and Costs and Countermotion for Final Judgment Consistent with Nevada Supreme Court's Remand, or in the Alternative, for Affirmation of Joint Preliminary Injunction, for a Receiver to Manage Property Pending Final Judgment, for Updated Financial Disclosures and Exchange of Financial Information, and for Sale of Property for Payment	0134-0148
28			of Attorneys' Fees and Costs	

1	08/22/17	Defendant's Reply to Opposition to Countermotion for Final Judgment Consistent with Nevada Supreme Court's Remand, or in the Alternative, for Affirmation of Joint Preliminary Injunction, for a Receiver to Manage Property Pending Final Judgment, for Updated Financial Disclosures and Exchange of Financial Information, and for Sale of Property for Payment of Attorneys' Fees and Costs	0197-0213	
2	07/12/18	Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the Court's Decision Entered May 22, 2018 and Opposition to Countermotion to: (1) Terminate the JPI; (2) Impose a Bond on any Property Subject to the JPI; (3) Expunge the Lis Pendens; (4) Allow the ELN Trust to Manage Lindell; and (5) Attorneys' Fees and Costs	0412-0432	
2	05/21/18	Initial Opposition to Lynita Nelson's Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the Court's Decision Entered April 19, 2018; Counterpetition to Remove Lis Pendens Inappropriately Filed by the LSN Trust; and for Attorneys' Fees and Costs	0330-0338	
2	05/03/18	Lynita Nelson's Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the Court's Decision Entered April 19, 2018	0311-0329	
2	06/05/18	Lynita Nelson's Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the Court's Decision Entered May 22, 2018	0355-0362	
1	07/10/17	Motion to Enforce Supreme Court's Order Dated May 25, 2017; Motion to Hold Lynita S. Nelson in Contempt for Violation of September 22, 2014 Order; and for Attorneys' Fees and Costs	0035-0133	
1	05/25/17	Nevada Supreme Court Opinion filed in case no. 66772	0005-0034	
1	11/03/14	Notice of Appeal	0001-0004	
2	04/19/18	Notice of Entry of Order entered in case no. D-09-411537-D	0300-0310	

2	05/22/18	Notice of Entry of Order entered in case no. D-09-411537-D	0346-0354
3	10/16/18	Notice of Entry of Order entered in case no. D-09-411537-D	0519-0530
2	06/22/18	Notice of Joinder to Opposition to Lynita Nelson's Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the Court's Decision Entered May 22, 2018; and Countermotion to: (1) Terminate the JPI; (2) Impose a Bond on any Property Subject to the JPI; (3) Expunge the Inappropriately Recorded Lis Pendens; (4) Allow the ELN Trust to Manage Lindell; and (5) Attorneys' Fees and Cost	0409-0411
1	08/04/17	Notice of Joinder to Reply to Opposition to Motion to Enforce Supreme Court's Order Dated May 25, 2017; Motion to Hold Lynita S. Nelson in Contempt for Violation of September 22, 2014 Order; and for Attorney's Fees and Costs and Opposition to Countermotion for Final Judgment Consistent with the Nevada Supreme Court's Remand or, in the Alternative for Affirmation of Joint Preliminary Injunction for a Receiver to Manage the Property Pending Final Judgment, for Updated Financial Disclosures and Exchange of Financial Information, and for Sale of Property for Payment of Attorney's Fees	0192-0196
2	06/22/18	Opposition to Lynita Nelson's Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the Court's Decision Entered May 22, 2018; and Countermotion to: (1) Terminate the JPI; (2) Impose a Bond on any Property Subject to the JPI; (3) Expunge the Inappropriately Recorded Lis Pendens; (4) Allow the ELN Trust to Manage Lindell; and (5) Attorneys' Fees and Costs	0363-0408

1	1	08/04/17	Reply to Opposition to Motion to Enforce Supreme Court's Order Dated	0159-0191
2			May 25, 2017; Motion to Hold Lynita	
3			S. Nelson in Contempt for Violation of September 22, 2014 Order; and for	
4			Attorneys' Fees and Costs and Opposition to Countermotion for	
5			Final Judgment Consistent with the Nevada Supreme Court's Remand or,	
6			in the Alternative, for Affirmation of Joint Preliminary Injunction, for a	
7			Receiver to Manage the Property Pending Final Judgment, for Updated	
8			Financial Disclosures and Exchange of Financial Information, and for Sale	
9			of Property for Payment of Attorneys' Fees and Costs	
10	1	08/29/17	Response to Defendant's Reply to Opposition to Countermotion for	0214-0224
11			Final Judgment Consistent with the Nevada Supreme Court's Remand or,	
12			in the Alternative, for Affirmation of Joint Preliminary Injunction, for a	
13			Receiver to Manage the Property Pending Final Judgment, for Updated	
14			Financial Disclosures and Exchange of Financial Information, and for Sale	
15			of Property for Payment of Attorneys' Fees and Costs	
16	2,3	07/23/18	Transcript Re: All Pending Motions	0433-0508
17			from Monday, July 23, 2018 (Errata)	
18	1,2	01/31/18	Transcript Re: Status Check of Wednesday, January 31, 2018	0225-0290
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record, they're not going to be taken up, and that's a concern.

MR. KARACSONYI: For later use for the Court for the (indiscernible) issue.

this in evidence at this time. If it becomes an evidentiary issue again, my issue I was looking at it -- yeah, I was looking at that as a waste argument, you know, the saying that she wasted the money or the apartment on that, and I wasn't inclined to get that because she was the manager and I figured people have the business judgment rule where they make decisions, good or bad, and the Court's not to secondguess unless they thought there's some type of fraud or corruption in there. So I wasn't inclined to get into that. But if it's raised by the parties thinking there were, of course, I would then have to get that admitted as an evidentiary.

But right now, the Court will accept it, but not -
I will keep it on the side in the confidential file, but won't

make it part of the record unless we come up to that issue.

That way we'll have it if it comes out to be disputed.

MR. KARACSONYI: Yeah, and you're -- you're not making any rulings on it anyhow right now, so it won't come up until that time, but we can't file color photographs so we wanted to provide Your Honor a copy.

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              MR. LUSZECK: Yeah. And we're not stipulating to
     the authentic -- anything like that.
   3
             MR. KARACSONYI: No.
  4
             MR. LUSZECK: We're not waiving --
  5
            MS. FORSBERG: Not waiving any of that.
            MR. KARACSONYI: No.
   6
   7
            MR. LUSZECK: -- any of that.
   8
              THE COURT: I will not admit it as an evidentiary at
 9
     this point.
 10
           MR. KARACSONYI: It's for the file, color
11
     photographs for Your Honor.
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               MR. LUSZECK: I understand.
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               MR. KARACSONYI: So to -- as back up.
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              THE COURT: Well, no, we'll not accept it as
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     evidence as we need a foundation and all that, so we'll just
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     take it as a courtesy copy to the Court to see if it becomes
 17
     an issue, then we can argue the evidentiary and get the
     foundation necessary to have it admitted.
 19
               MR. KARACSONYI: Yes.
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              THE DEFENDANT: And it's just a sampling as well.
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     It's not everything.
  22
               THE COURT: Not inclusive, okay.
  23
              MR. KARACSONYI: Okay. So Friday, the 9th then,
  24
     we'll have the rest of the general ledger and that's been
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stipulated to.

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With regard to the transfer back of Lindell and Banone, and the payment of monies. First, let me -- let me address the request for payment of funds and kind of make a dist -- a distinction between where we were in 2013 and where we are today.

In 2013, when you ordered the transfer of properties and you ordered the payment of funds, to Ms. Nelson, you did so because you had at that point a final judgment. We sit here today without a final judgment. So we're in a far different position today than we were in 2013 and that's why the amount of work and the amount of -- the amount of evidentiary proceedings and money that would be involved in trying to figure out because they say that she owes 500,000, we believe that they owe her 265,000, and I'll get to that in a minute.

That type of effort wouldn't make sense at this point because you don't have a final judgment. Now, if you ruled at final judgment in their -- in their favor, then they would be in the same position she was in in 2013 and the analysis would be different. But that is really the distinction, I think, that -- that supports Your Honor's ruling that we're not going to get into determining at this point whether or not the money should be transferred back.

With respect to returning the Lindell and Banone properties, obviously we're concerned. One, we're concerned because Ms. Nelson is in a very poor financial condition right now and she's going to be forced into a situation where she's going to have to start liquidating her other property and -- and just further depleting her estate. She has no money to -- to live off of at the present time without those properties.

Obviously, she's going to have to receive half the rent because Lindell is half hers, even without a tracing.

And so, we would have to do that. And she's owed -- she put 265,000 of her own money into the -- to the properties.

Here's the other issue and it -- and this is really important. We had a request to reinstate or to just reaffirm the JPI. You -- this Court and the courts sitting in divorce actions, are required to maintain some status quo during the pendency of the matter. And if you have a transfer of property back to them without any JPI in place that look, you're not going to encumber, sell, dispose of any of this property, you're putting at risk any final judgment that you may ultimately enter.

I mean, it's vitally important that no matter what you do, that you put in place a JPI to protect the parties.

And this protects both parties, because we don't know how it will turn out, to protect both parties to ensure that your

final judgment can be enforced. So we'd ask --

THE COURT: When I transferred that initially I put that into it to make sure to protect --

MR. KARACSONYI: You did.

THE COURT: -- her interest so they couldn't be sold or otherwise encumbered without a court order if I remember.

MR. KARACSONYI: That's absolutely true. You -- you actually put a freeze on -- you put a freeze on a couple things.

You put a freeze on everything that was transferred to her that she couldn't get rid of it without your approval and you also put a freeze on anything that was awarded to her, and I believe that included the Russell Road property that they couldn't get rid of that. So -- without your approval.

So that's the issue. So we need to, at least to the extent that -- I mean, at the very least, and I think is a minimum, put a -- put -- you -- put the JPI over everything that was awarded to her so you at least know that you got half if everything turns out to be community property. But I think really, putting a JPI in place for all property that's subject to a claim of community interest, and right now that's everything, putting a JPI in place, and it's not -- it's not that burdensome.

I mean, if they tell you well, that's really

burdensome. They brought that up about the receiver, but all you're saying is look, in order to sell or transfer anything at this point, you can do business as usual, but you need to come to me so that we know, so that we don't have an issue that you bought or sold or -- or did anything, without court approval or agreement of the parties. And that's really for everyone's protection. It's not that burdensome. And it makes sure that you can keep a tab on everything in existence during the pendency of the case.

Now, as to the tracing. We agree with -- with you that the tracing needs to start in 1993. The relevant -- the really relevant finding that -- that you quoted and that he quoted, Mr. Luszeck, was on page 6. "On June 3rd, 2013," under -- I underlined this -- "the District Court found that the separate property agreement was valid and the parties' self settle spendthrift trusts were validly established and funded with separate property."

The Supreme Court, if you -- Your Honor knows that you weren't -- you obviously didn't do a tracing back to 1993. The Supreme Court was relying on your statement in the decree that the properties from the 1993 revocable trust were transferred to the 2001 trust and was just simply referring to that to find that the -- the properties from one trust were transferred to another. The District -- the Supreme Court

didn't perform a tracing. The Supreme Court wasn't making
additional factual findings or meaning to make additional
factual findings separate and distinct from what Your Honor
made. And if Your Honor did not trace and find that 1993
property made it all the way through to 2001 in the initial
decree, the Supreme Court certainly wasn't contradicting its
own order, its own holding, by doing that.

It's -- essentially they want you to read the
Supreme Court as having made findi -- having contradicted

It's -- essentially they want you to read the Supreme Court as having made findi -- having contradicted themselves in their own decision, that you need to perform a tracing to see if community property exists, but with respect to anything before 2001, no tracing is necessary. Well, that would be contrary to exactly what the Supreme Court said that you need to determine whether or not there's any community property in these trusts, and the Supreme Court was clear on that.

In a divorce involving trust assets, the District Court must trust those trust -- trace those trust assets to determine whether any community property exists within the trust. And that was page 15.

THE COURT: Page 15 and again --

MR. KARACSONYI: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- it comes up on page 16, about without proper --

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MR. KARACSONYI: And to -- yeah.

THE COURT: Without proper tracing, this Court is left with only the parties' testimony regarding the characterization of property which carries no weight.

MR. KARACSONYI: Yeah. The parties' inconsistent testimony, on page 18, having concluded the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction, and the written instruments at issue are valid, and the District Court must trace assets to determine whether any community property exists within the trusts.

So that's the argument we made the first time and that's the argument we make again. It's interesting because in their -- in their brief, the things they focus on as to why the Supreme Court all of a sudden found that there was sufficient tracing all the way back to 1993 to conclude that everything in 2001 was separate property, was that the -- that the trust agreements themselves state that they should be separate property, which the Supreme Court said statements by the parties have no value, that Shelley Newell, the bookkeeper testified. You didn't even make any findings regarding her testimony, I believe. And that -- and that -- and those were really the two reasons.

And then section 12.13 of the ELN Trust and LSN Trust provide that any property held in trust shall be the separate property of the beneficiaries of such trust, which talks about distribution.

So, I don't think that the -- the arguments -- the
- the reasons that they enumerated in their -- in their brief

are -- are persuasive. And so we bel -- we believe that

you've made the right decision with respect to the tracing and

apparently they're going to take it up to the Supreme Court

and we'll go back for round, you know, the third or fourth

time and writs and appeals and we'll argue about that there,

if it's appropriate for writ relief, which I'm not sure it is.

But the other issue is you brought up gifts and the finding of a gift. I -- I -- in -- as part of this tracing and analysis, I -- I believe you have to determine if there were gifts and not or if those were gifts or not gifts, if they were intended to be gifts, just as you in any -- any -- any -- any divorce case. You often have, for example, people buy a house and one of them signs a quit claim deed to it because they can't borrow and the other one needs to be the sole party on it, and you have to determine whether or not that was meant to be a transmutation of property a gift or whether or not that was just a -- a matter of convenience. I believe you have sufficient testimony from before to show that there was no gift intent certainly because of the fact that the -- the -- the testimony was that he was telling her that

this was all being done for the benefit of the community and she certainly wasn't giving away the property. But I believe you could do that as part of the analysis, assuming there's even a tracing possible, because if -- if you can't trace back to 1993, everything acquired after 1993 is presumed to be community property and it should all be equally divided.

So those are our positions on -- on those issues.

With regard to the sale of Brianhead, you have

jurisdiction over the parties and their property, you -- the Court's already ruled you had subject matter jurisdiction.

You can make -- you can make orders regarding the parties' property. We believe that the sale of Brianhead is not only the correct -- correct order, but it's also necessary.

Because of the financial situation Ms. Nelson finds herself in, she absolutely needs that property sold.

We would ask that if there is an appraisal, that Mr. Bertsch select the appraiser and -- and select an appraiser for the parties. That way we can avoid any disputes between the parties over appraisers.

We'd also ask that you, you know, that any buyout be kind of without prejudice because, you know, he may be buying her out with what you determine to be community property and she shouldn't be paying herself for the property, so that if he buys her out, that that obviously doesn't mean that that

property he's used to buy her out is separate property, but that it'll just -- you'll -- you'll work it out in a balance sheet later.

I would also remind the Court that she does own half of Lindell and you have jurisdiction over that. And so, certainly, you have jurisdiction over her and the property of the LSN Trust. And certainly, if there's an issue later that requires reimbursement, you have sufficient property at issue to work it out in some kind of property division or sale.

THE COURT: Thank you. Counsel?

MS. FORSBERG: Your Honor, let's attack a couple of issues first. Let's start with the Brianhead property.

And what Mr. Karacsonyi -- we kind of agree with. I think maybe it's been lost on the Court that Mr. Bertsch is who ordered the appraisal to begin with on Brianhead, so it just needs to be updated. We agree that Mr. Bertsch should -- we'd ask the Court to task him with doing that and that that's -- but we also do disagree with the value going in -- up, because I know the Court probably heard the fire, that the fire destroyed the whole thing, so it -- they'll determine that, but clearly, I think that's where the difference is. And then there was deferred maintenance on that property that hasn't been done since this all began that --

THE COURT: I think it's at thirty --

MS. FORSBERG: -- but the appraisal will deal with that.

THE COURT: I think they're asking 30-grand I think as an offset for -- if I'm remembering in someone's motion on that, about 30-grand for maintenance or a side -- again, that may be updated, but --

MS. FORSBERG: There's still a lot more. But we're just saying that that — that we agree that Mr. Bertsch should be tasked with that, but we already had an appraisal. It seems like it'd be reasonable for them just to have it updated and Mr. Bertsch can order — Mr. Bertsch is the one who ordered the appraisal to begin with for the Court. So I don't know if that's been lost on everybody, but I think having him do it, we agree with Mr. Karacsonyi that he should just have it updated and — and go from that perspective. And then give that — and then it would give Mr. Nelson an opportunity to buy out her interest.

But, you know, clearly, the problem that I think both -- that we're having -- Mr. Nelson is having with this is it sounds like what they're asking for is that the Court asked ELN Trust to do all these things and Mr. Nelson to do all these things and said no, you're going to do it now, even if things are still up in the air because you knew it was going to the Supreme Court and stuff, but they don't want to do the

same back. That doesn't seem amicable or fair and equitable with this Court. So I think that's where the thing is.

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So if there's going to end up being a buyout, that also -- any money to her needs to be held. That's what you've said before; look, we need to hold the money and you're hol -- making him hold -- ELN Trust hold all that 500-and-some-odd-thousand according to their numbers, if -- it needs to be equitable. It can't just be well, we give her what she wants and not -- if it's exact same issue, which this is the exact same issue, it's the same property that was -- may go one should come the other, and I think this Court recognizes that.

As far as the instituting a joint preliminary injunction, that's all that these trusts do is buy and sell property. So when you say they should conduct business as usual, by putting in — that in place and not allowing them to sell things, that's what they do. So that would be — it's a severe burden that I think when — the fact that the Supreme Court has already ruled what needs to go back to the ELN Trust and I don't think we should be encumbering a business running and moving forward. These — that's how both sides function.

So I think that we can't lose sight of that.

And of course, rents issues and profits from separate property are separate property, and I'm sure that's part of what it is and so I think those are the two main

issues that I have from a Eric Nelson and as Eric Nelson
Investment trustee to make, were the two more things. The
rest I think Mr. Luszeck made on behalf of the trust, so.

THE COURT: Any rebuttal? I'll give it to you since it --

MR. LUSZECK: Yes.

THE COURT: -- started out as your motion to enforce the order, so.

MR. LUSZECK: Yeah, a quick follow-up.

With respect to the transfer of properties,

Counsel's statement that that didn't happen until after a

final judgment, that's not true. The divorce decree was

entered in June of 2013, but the judgment wasn't final until

the end of 2014 and the property was transferred prior to that

time. So this concept that we had a final judgment and that's

what distinguishes it from now is -- is not accurate.

You know, with respect to the JPI, you know, if this Court's inclined to do that, which the ELN Trust disagrees with, I think it would -- it has to be narrow -- narrowly tailored to the properties at issue; the Lindell, the Banone, I mean, issues that are -- clearly belong to the ELN Trust like Wyoming Downs which she has no interest in pursuant to the Supreme Court. That shouldn't be encumbered by any type of JPI, so I think if this Court's inclined to do that, it

needs to be specifically tailored.

You know, I -- I disagree with Counsel's characterization of the Supreme Court's statements. I read four statements from the order where it was clear that the Supreme Court had -- the Supreme Court had found that self settled spendthrift trusts were funded with separate property. And as such, the tracing should be limited to that specific time frame.

I won't go through those again. I'm in page 2, 4, and 13, irrespective of what this Court -- believe that this Court found on six page -- page 6 of the Supreme Court order.

And just in addition to that, I mean, the -- Section 12.13, which -- which Counsel referred to in the self settled spendthrift trust, specifically says any property held in trust and any income earned by the trust created hereunder, shall be the separate property in distinction with community property, joint tenancy property, tenancy in common, marital property, quasi-community property or tenancy by the entirety of the beneficiaries of such trust.

So this wasn't just a statement that was made by one of the parties as to their belief as to the -- the legal nature of the property, it was a statement that was made in a trust under the advice of counsel regarding the separate property nature of the property. So for that once again, I

think the -- the tracing needs to be narrowly tailored for that short time frame.

With respect to the sale of Brianhead, once again, I mean, they filed an A case. Last time we were here we discussed, you know, if it needed to happen, it was going to be a partition action. Counsel's position now that this Court has jurisdiction over that issue is really contradictory to the fact that they filed an A case seeking a partition of the -- sorry, a partition of the Brianhead property. So we would -- we would ask that this Court, I guess, defer ruling on that and if they -- if the A case is the proper -- proper forum for that to proceed, it should proceed there as opposed to here.

questions or anything what I need to do, I want to look into the argument I had again, laid out what my strategy was at and everything. I want to re-look at everything to see -- the key would be the tracing period, I need to re-look at that, I've heard arguments it should go to '93 and their argument it should be from 2001, so I need to read the Supreme Court decision again because I didn't find it as clear as everyone else seemed to find it and I was kind of looking at those issues to see what they were or not, because they made it clear that the Court did not trace and Court needs to trace on that, so they made it real clear on page 15 through 16 about

the tracing, and the issue is how far do we trace back I guess is the key question.

I want to read the -- the trust agreements again. I did read the separate property agreements, but was trying to find the trust agreements again to read that because the file was very voluminous, so I need a chance to read that so I want to see exactly what the trust documents said themselves when they were created in 2001 and give a written decision so we can get this moving or if people want to take it up on writs, at least it gives them an order to move up on that. I want to get this going.

As far as the last issue, mediation, is there any reason or chance? I know we went around the block several times before we had the case settled, prospectively a couple of times and it didn't pan out on that mediation, is -- if anybody -- if you respect that you think would do mediation on that because you know it's going to happen in this case no matter what we ultimately do, even when we get the tracings, it's probably going to back up to the Supreme Court, can sit there another year or two, and just going on ad infinitum on that, but the same token, the parties have a right to litigate this as much as they want, but I don't know if you've even thought that's worth it or if you had someone in mind you thought that --

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MR. KARACSONYI: I sent an email to them this morning telling them that our client has decided that based on the fact that we've been to so many mediations previously, the Supreme Court settlement conference, mediations prior to that, and given her financial situation, she just thinks it will be an incredible waste of time and money and we are willing to entertain any written proposal that they -- that they want to make, but I -- we just don't see it as being fruitful and it'll just put her in a more precarious financial situation.

MR. LUSZECK: And obviously, I can't make them participate in mediation. We disagree. We think if we have a strong mediator who can hear this case, we could potentially reach a settlement. I mean, I -- I think if we can get in front of a mediator in the next couple months it would be a lot less time consuming and expensive than litigating this over the next, you know, I don't know how long it's going to take. And no -- none of us do.

THE COURT: Yes, I -- right.

MR. LUSZECK: I mean, it's going to take a while regardless of what this Court's order, it's going to take a while for Mr. Bertsch to do his analysis and then, you know, if issues are taking up with the Supreme Court, so obviously, our preference is mediation or settlement conference with a very strong mediator or settlement conference judge, but, you know, I -- I don't think that we can make Ms. Nelson do that.

THE COURT: Mr. Nelson, your position on this or?

MS. FORSBERG: I believe -- we agree with Mr.

Luszeck. I mean, we can't force her to do it, but, at the same time, is it because she thinks she has access to the money that she doesn't have to give back? I don't know, maybe the Court needs to prompt a little bit. I don't know.

said, and when I had this case, we had a -- I think a 10-day trial and then we thought we had it settled and then started again on that, so I know it has a very -- I'm not inclined to order people to mediation unless they go there willingly, because otherwise, it's not going to get anything done. If you think it will be, I -- just let me know and if you have a specific mediator or settlement judge you want, contact my chambers, you can do a conference call and appoint one if you think it would be beneficial to get it done on that.

I'm going to get my order issued within the next 30 days so that we get that going. I -- no matter what happens on that, any paperwork you need, Mr. Bertsch, you can start it because we know we're going from at least 2001 currently, so we can get that started while we're waiting for the decision on if we go back to '93. But anything we can get started on that, let me know if you need any documents so that you can

get that started on that, because I just don't see it getting resolved and tracing's going to be a key issue and that's going to take a significant amount of time and resources for the parties on that.

And as far as the Brianhead, I have no idea what's that worth, but I think you'd probably need a new appraisal instead of just an addendum on that, because things change and it — if that fire did, you know, damage the surrounding things, I have no idea on that, but you might just should start with a new because I know at the time it was the real estate market was kind of down at that time, so that would be the key on that. Because what that materializes can help you out financially and if it's, you know, millions of dollars, that can help out both sides (indiscernible) on that as far as any of the costs on that, but I want to make sure everybody's protected on those interests in that.

So that'd be my think, we'll get a decision for you.

Did you want as far as if you want to put it on for a settlement thing, just let me know and we'll set up a phone conference and settlement. I'd like to get Mr. Bertsch maybe get -- at least start going from 2001 and forward.

Any special documents you need, Mr. Bertsch? A way to kind of get a jumpstart? I know I went through a lot of your reports that you did and there's so many on that, I was

June, what was it?

MR. KARACSONYI: 6th, 2013.

THE COURT: June 6th, 2013. So basically, June 2001 through June 2013 essentially, at least get started whatever paperwork you need. And again, I don't know how you go about that, with all the transfers, I'm not really sure on that because --

MR. BERTSCH: They have an accounting of the trust during those periods of time, right?

THE COURT: Do we have all the accountings? I don't

10 MS. FORSBERG: I think they're --

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MR, KARACSONYI: We've given them everything that -that we've had since the initial case.

THE COURT: Okay. I don't know a whole lot of --MR. BERTSCH: I'll have to go through the work papers, there's a lot of them there.

THE COURT: Yeah, there's a lot in the -- the problem is there's a lot in the file. The problem is, it's real tough to find it because we've got 9000 screens when you pull that up, so to try to find it unless you know the date, it's real tough to find it because there's so many entries. I mean, literally there's hundreds of screens when you pull up to just to find the separate property agreement it was difficult to find them unless you know when it was to get you

1 that time frame. 2 MR. BERTSCH: Okay. THE COURT: But if they have that and if Counsel can 3 provide that, that's great. If they have those readily 5 available --MS. FORSBERG: We'll get them --6 THE COURT: -- to try to find them in the record is 7 real difficult because it's so voluminous. MR. KARACSONYI: We'll give him all the accounting 9 records. Can we just stipulate that if you're going to give 10 him something new that hasn't been part of the record --11 MS. FORSBERG: Record? 12 MR. KARACSONYI: -- that you would let the other 13 side know or at least send us each -- maybe we'll each send --14 what -- whenever I send him something, I'll put a list and --15 and maybe reference where it was or the bates numbers, and if 16 they could do the same, that way we can kind of keep track of 17 who sent them what. 18 MS. FORSBERG: So everything in the record. 19 THE COURT: Would that work out? Again, I said the 20 record's so voluminous trying to identify what was --MR. KARACSONYI: To help us both along? 22 MR. LUSZECK: Yeah, that's fine. So any -- any 23 documents that we provide Mr. Bertsch, we just need to apprise

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1 the other side and give them copies of the same.
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             MR. KARACSONYI: Yeah, if it's a new disclosure.
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              MS. FORSBERG: Well, they already have -- if it's a
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     new disclosure.
            MR. KARACSONYI: If it's a new disclosure.
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            MS. FORSBERG: No need to get --
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            MR. LUSZECK: Okay. Okay.
            MS. FORSBERG: -- new copies if it's -- of those.
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            MR. KARACSONYI: If it's stuff you've already given,
     I think that if you just write the letter and say I'm giving
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     you -- Mr. Bertsch, I'm sending you --
              MR. LUSZECK: Understood. Understood.
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              MS. FORSBERG: Exhibit --
              MR. LUSZECK: I understand.
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              MS. FORSBERG: -- 33.
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             MR. KARACSONYI: And -- yeah, Exhibit 33 bates or --
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              MR. LUSZECK: I understand.
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            MS. FORSBERG; The --
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              MR. KARACSONYI: -- whatever. For disclosure
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      documents.
               THE COURT: I think we're up to quadruple S at one
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      time, so I'm not sure what the --
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               MR. KARACSONYI: Yeah, I don't know if we have to do
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      exhibits or disclosures.
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THE COURT: I'd --

MR. KARACSONYI: Just something that references that it's already in our file.

THE COURT: So you know where it's at so if it goes up on appeal, you've got a record on that because the Court can find it in the record then.

MR. KARACSONYI: I just had one question. I'm sure you're already intending on doing this, but whatever decision you make, in the decision we would appreciate certainly if — if you could clarify in there or make clear when you're tracing, what the tracing that occurred in the underlying proceedings was so the Supreme Court knows whether you did find — if you did find that it was separate property, then fine. If you didn't, if you could just make it clear whatever you're ruling and whatever you had done before, because I know that's going to be an argument above, so —

THE COURT: That issue when you said the Supreme Court said I made those findings and make sure I made those findings?

MR. KARACSONYI: Yeah. Yeah, and if you can just put in your order, even if you rule against us or you rule in their favor or in our favor, just so that we know that we can make it clear to the Supreme Court this is what you did before and so they know exactly what you did before.

MR. KARACSONYI: Yeah, so --

MS. FORSBERG: Yeah, we just want to make sure that 2 3 THE COURT: Yeah. MS. FORSBERG: -- he understands his task. 4 MR. KARACSONYI: So my understanding is you just 5 trace it back -- I don't think he's making legal 6 determinations. I think he's just going to provide you a 7 report that this property you can trace back to this, to this, 8 to this, to this, all the way to 2001, and then you can decide 9 at that point the -- the legal aspect of it for --10 MR. LUSZECK: Yeah. 11 MR. KARACSONYI: -- whether it's community or 12 separate property. Do you both agree? 13 THE COURT: I take it you're trying -- trying to see 14 where the property came from, the Court can determine if it's a community interest or not, to see when it was, how it came, 16 and where it came from. So I think, you know, that's all not 17 a legal determination if it was community property or not. 18 MR. KARACSONYI: That's your determination. 19 MS. FORSBERG: Yes. 20 THE COURT: The Court to make the determination. 21 MR. LUSZECK: In that I guess when -- when you do 22 issue your order, Your Honor, I would just request I think an 23

order for us to seek relief from the -- the Supreme Court, we

need to request a stay here.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LUSZECK: So if -- if, you know, depending on the way that this Court rules and the way that we make -- the decision that we make in regards to that, I'd just appreciate it if you would at least address that issue on --

THE COURT: And I'll do it for either party that -that any request for a stay is hereby denied from both sides,
that way, anybody wants to take up, they can take it up right
away. Is that fair enough --

MR. LUSZECK: Yeah.

MS. FORSBERG: Correct.

THE COURT: -- to everybody? And then with respect to I understand that this Court needs 30 days to look at the issues regarding the -- the scope of the tracing, but I'd still request that -- that in the interim that Ms. Lynita be required to execute the quit claim deeds to get the properties at least transferred back to the ELN Trust. We can deal with the accounting issues later, but we would like those quit claim deeds executed within five business days after the hearing, which is really the time frame that you gave the ELN Trust to execute those documents, you know, years ago, Your Honor.

MR. BERTSCH: Are you --

THE COURT: My -- my inclination is to order those quit claim deeds, but I'll wait on my decision and get that, but just so you know it's coming unless --

MR. KARACSONYI: Okay.

THE COURT: -- my research changes that, that is my inclination to order those quit claim deeds be transferred back to where we start to where it was on that, then we trace all that, and do it again, because I did the same thing when I told the trust, they said oh, it's going to be a hassle doing all that and I said well, too bad, we can transfer it back depending on the Supreme Court. So that is my inclination. Again, I will want to review the argument and review the paperwork, but that is my inclination just so you know it's coming, unless I change my mind when I research everything, but --

MR. KARACSONYI: And you'll address the JPI then at the same time?

THE COURT: Absolutely. Absolutely.

MR. KARACSONYI: Because those go hand in hand.

THE COURT: Absolutely. And I would be issuing a JPI, the same thing I did before on that, making sure it's not encumbered or sold until we get it ultimately resolved, but not make it more narrow so it doesn't hinder the operation of the property that has nothing to do with this matter that's

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clearly not community property.

MR. BERTSCH: Have we determined who is paying for it and shall there be a retainer to get started?

THE COURT: How much would you need as a retainer? What would you normally --

MR. BERTSCH: I don't know. I'd like to at least have 5,000 to get started.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay. I'll put that in the order on that before you get going on that, we'll make sure. My inclination was to have everybody pay 50/50, but you did raise the issue that you guys had paid about 139,000 in the past, so I'll look at that on that, but I'll put that right in the order, but you'll have the guarantee that you get paid if you want to get started on that with the -- do you need any upfront money to get going for -- you know, out of pocket expenses or --

MR. BERTSCH: I'd like to.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me --

MR. KARACSONYI: Your Honor, he had mentioned -- Mr. Luszeck had said something about -- you had just said something about property that was clearly not. I thought all the property's at issue.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, separate property for --

MR. KARACSONYI: They --

THE COURT: I'd have to look at that. I know we did it as a separate order, so I need to look at my order what we did. I know I made specific findings and I don't know what the Supreme Court -- like I said, if it had merits, I don't know if that include Brianhead -- I mean the Wyoming Downs --

MR. LUSZECK: Of course it did.

MR. KARACSONYI: Well, it didn't say that the -- you can do a tracing except Wyoming Downs. It didn't say that. I mean, it just doesn't say that. You could read it.

THE COURT: I'll check and look at that.

MR. LUSZECK: Yeah, that's --

MR. BERTSCH: Now, did they -- I would like to have the tax returns going back to that. I suppose it was a grantor trust they put on their tax returns.

MR. KARACSONYI: I think we have those as part of the discovery. I think he's going to get most of that.

THE COURT: Okay. We'll see what we can get going to get started. I'll guarantee the decision within 30 days.

I'll try to get it sooner if I can because I know it's going.

My issue is I have a huge juvenile calendar and being the lead judge for that, I'm on all these statewide committees and on national committees, so trying to -- I'm always either in court or at a meeting, but I want to get this done because

1 it's important. And again, if you guys think that mediation or settlement is a -- and everybody agrees, just let me know, we'll do a joint phone conference to save you the time on that 4 and see if there's somebody you think that might be able to help you get it resolved, because it's going to be costly and 5 time consuming with the way we're going, no matter what the 7 Court's decision is. Mr. Bertsch? 8 MR. BERTSCH: The appraisal on the Brianhead 9 property, should I wait until the order is signed before I do 10 anything with that? 11 THE COURT: Do you guys want to get that started or 12 13 MR. KARACSONYI: I'd prefer to get it started. We 14 don't have any signifi -- any -- any really funds to -- until 15 we get that sold or taken care of. 16 MR. BERTSCH: And who should I have them contact to 17 get into the property? 18 THE DEFENDANT: The weather may not allow them in. 19 MR. KARACSONYI: Okay. 20 THE DEFENDANT: But that may be a consideration as 21 22 well. THE COURT: So the point of contact would be the 23 Lynita fund could -- or both on that? 24

MR. KARACSONYI: Yeah, we're fine.

MR. LUSZECK: I almost think --

THE COURT: 50/50, so who's the --

MR. LUSZECK: I think it's almost part and parcel,
Your Honor. I mean, we've got an issue where we have an A
case that they've filed a partition action, so I think this
Court needs to make a determination as to who has jurisdiction
and authority to make a ruling.

THE COURT: Well, I would think I do under community -- another thing we had, I think I put it specifically in my divorce decree, that the other party had a right -- right of first refusal and I think I even said on the record that if we get to that point because the parties are 50/50, it's not tenable, it's not going to work out on that, with the nature of this litigation that'd be my inclination to sell it and give the other party right of first refusal and I put that I believe right in the divorce decree if I remember correctly. But I'll check that, but it'd be my inclination and then they can do an emergency motion in front of the A court and so you know it's coming to see if you want to stop me from doing it, but that would be my inclination.

MS. FORSBERG: We're getting an updated or new through Mr. Bertsch? I'm a little confused on what we're doing on that, on the appraisal then.

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            MR. LUSZECK: I thought Mr. Bertsch was making this
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     decision and now --
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              MS. FORSBERG: I thought he was. Now we're --
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              MR. LUSZECK: -- they're making the decision.
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               MS. FORSBERG: -- they're trying to make the
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     decision --
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               THE COURT: Well --
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              MS. FORSBERG: -- instead of allowing Mr. Bertsch to
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     -- if he used that guy last time --
              THE COURT: -- I don't know like he said that --
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              MS. FORSBERG: -- they chose -- he chose them.
             THE COURT: -- if that -- if that prior appraiser's
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     still in business or things or other one's you've dealt with
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     that you're comfortable with. I just want to try to avoid
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     anyone saying that there's been any (indiscernible) to try
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     this since it's so litigated on this point, I'm trying to
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      avoid that. If it's a new appraiser you're comfortable with
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      that might be preferable just simply because they can stop
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      saying that they had a preconceived idea --
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               MS. FORSBERG: Your Honor --
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               THE COURT: -- or this or that, so it --
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               MS. FORSBERG: If I could --
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               THE COURT: -- just makes it cleaner if they can,
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      but.
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MR. BERTSCH: On the agreement.

there was an order in place before and then they did the trust

to try to block it, and they said that specifically in the legislative history, and Nevada wants people to come to Nevada and put their money in expensive trusts and --

MR. KARACSONYI: Understand that.

THE COURT: So I mean, that's the issue on that, so I don't know -- you can file a motion on that to get --

MR. KARACSONYI: We're going to be seeking a charging order, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And see if they can get something like that and that might help resolve some of the funding on that.

Mr. Nel -- Mr. Bertsch, why don't you just put a hold on that. They can give you some of the documents, why don't you put a hold on everything until I make an order on the payment and that way you'll do it and we'll get that all done for you. That way you're not out of any pocket or expenses and -- and if we need to wait a couple weeks, I'll try to get that order in a couple weeks. I just need to look and digest because I don't remember all this stuff to make sure. While I respect all the attorneys here, it's legal argument and not facts. I need to look at that and see what's fair and just to try to get the ball rolling again, because it's going to be very costly.

So if you guys would start getting together the paperwork for Mr. Bertsch, but we can hold off taking any

action until you get your retainer in pocket and any fees out of that so you -- I don't want you spinning your wheels. Or I 3 should say maybe spinning your wheel under the circumstances, 4 but --5 (Laughter) 6 THE COURT: All right. I won't pick on Mr. Bertsch. 7 That was just silly. MR. LUSZECK: Thank you, Your Honor. 8 9 MS. FORSBERG: Thank you. 10 MR. KARACSONYI: Thank you. THE COURT: Thank you to everybody for coming today. 11 It's good to see you, Mr. Bertsch. 12 13 (PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 12:28:30) 14 ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and 15 correctly transcribed the digital proceedings in the 16 above-entitled case to the best of my ability. 17 18 /s/ Kimberly C. McCright 19 Kimberly C. McCright, CET 20 21 22 23 24

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Electronically Filed 4/19/2018 9:07 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT FAMILY DIVISION – JUVENILE CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

ERIC L. NELSON,

Case No.: D-09-411537-D

Plaintiff.

Dept. No.: O

v.

LYNITA SUE NELSON, MATT KLABACKA, as Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001,

Defendants.

MATT KLABACKA, as Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001,

Cross-claimant,

v.

LYNITA SUE NELSON,

Cross-defendant.

DECISION

This matter was before the Court on January 31, 2018, pursuant to Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Supreme Court's Order Dated May 25, 2017; Motion to Hold Lynita S. Nelson in Contempt for Violation of September 22, 2014 Order; and for Attorneys' Fees and Costs. The Court, having reviewed all

FRANK P. SULLIVAN DISTRICT JUDGE

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Motions, Oppositions, Countermotions, and Replies filed in this matter between July 10, 2017 and August 22, 2017, and having heard arguments of counsel, based thereon and good cause appearing therefor:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

On May 25, 2017, the Nevada Supreme Court filed an Order which affirmed in part and vacated in part this Court's June 3, 2013 Divorce Decree, and remanded the matter back to this Court. On July 10, 2017, the Plaintiff, Eric Nelson ("Mr. Nelson") filed a Motion to compel the Defendants, Lynita Nelson ("Ms. Nelson") and Matt Klabacka ("ELN Trustee"), to follow the Supreme Court's Order. Several Oppositions, Countermotions, and Replies were filed by all parties prior to a hearing before this Court on January 31, 2018, to address all pending matters, the most important being the interpretation of the Nevada Supreme Court's Opinion with regard to the tracing of property within the trusts.

A. The Tracing of Property Contained Within the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust and the Lynita S. Nelson Nevada Trust

In its May 25 Order, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that this Court erred by "not tracing the assets contained within the trusts, either through a reliable expert or other available means." The Nevada Supreme Court also held that both the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust ("ELN Trust") and the Lynita S.

¹ Klabacka v. Nelson, 394 P.3d 940, 948 (Nev. 2017).

Nelson Nevada Trust ("LSN Trust") "are valid and the trusts were funded with separate property stemming from a valid separate property agreement."2

In accordance with the Nevada Supreme Court's decision, this Court must Order the tracing of property in both the trusts. In order for an accurate accounting of the property in both the ELN and LSN Trusts to occur, this Court must determine the correct date to commence tracing of the property in the trusts. The Nevada Supreme Court held that both the ELN and LSN Trusts were funded with separate property stemming from the 1993 Separate Property Agreement.³ As such, the proper date to begin the tracing would be May 30, 2001, the date both the ELN and LSN Trusts were executed.

The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the assets in the trusts need to be traced through a reliable expert.⁴ In order for the trusts to be properly traced, this Court shall appoint Larry L. Bertsch, CPA ("Mr. Bertsch") to perform the tracing. In the interest of fairness in regards to payment, both parties will be required to split the cost of Mr. Bertsch's tracing, beginning with a \$5,000 payment from each party for Mr. Bertsch's initial retainer. The initial retainer payment to Mr. Bertsch shall be paid within thirty days of the date of this Order.

B. The Lindell Property and Banone, LLC Properties

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² Klabacka, 394 at 947.

⁴ Id. at 948

In its May 25 Order, the Nevada Supreme Court vacated the Constructive Trust held over the Lindell Property.⁵ The Nevada Supreme Court also held that "the issue of unjust enrichment was not tried by implied consent and, therefore, [this Court] erred in considering it when fashioning its remedies."

As the Nevada Supreme Court vacated the Constructive Trust held over the Lindell Property, the LSN Trust must transfer its 50% interest in the Lindell Property to the ELN Trust via Quitclaim Deed. Additionally, the LSN Trust shall provide to the ELN Trust copies of any and all tenant leases for the Lindell Property for the period of June 3, 2013 to the present. The LSN Trust shall also provide to the ELN Trust quarterly accountings for the Lindell Property, including any and all supporting documentation, for the period of June 3, 2013 to the present. Supporting documentation is to include records as to gross profits and expenses related thereto, including, but not limited to; general upkeep, management fees, administrative fees/wages, and maintenance fees/wages.

As the Nevada Supreme Court held that this Court's finding of unjust enrichment was in error, the LSN Trust must transfer its 100% interest in the Banone, LLC Properties to the ELN Trust via Quitclaim Deed. The LSN Trust shall also provide to the ELN Trust quarterly accountings for the Banone, LLC Properties, including any and all supporting documentation, for the period of

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⁵ Id. at 953

[°] Id.

June 3, 2013 to the present. Supporting documentation is to include records as to gross profits and expenses related thereto, including, but not limited to; general upkeep, management fees, administrative fees/wages, and maintenance fees/wages.

C. Sale of the Brian Head Cabin

The ELN and LSN Trusts each own a 50% interest in the Brian Head
Cabin ("Cabin") in Utah. Upon the request of Ms. Nelson for funds to pay her
litigation costs and other general expenses, this Court shall Order that the Cabin
be sold. This Court previously Ordered that "both parties shall have the right of
first refusal should either Trust decide to sell its interest in the Brian Head
[C]abin."⁷

In order to properly ensure that both parties are receiving the fair market value of the Cabin, Mr. Bertsch will be appointed to conduct the assessment of the property value via a property appraiser of his choosing. To avoid concerns raised as to the objectiveness of the upcoming appraisal, Mr. Bertsch shall select a property appraiser other than the previous property appraiser, if available. In the interest of fairness in regards to payment, both parties will be required to split the cost of the property assessment.

⁷ Divorce Decree filed June 3, 2013, pg. 46

RANK P. SULLIVAN

AMILY DIVISION, DEPT. O LAS VEGAS NV 89101 Upon receipt of a fair market value price for the Cabin, the ELN Trust is to be given the right of first refusal and allowed to purchase the 50% interest owned by the LSN Trust. In the event that a fair market value price for the Cabin cannot be agreed upon by the parties, the Cabin is to be placed on the open market until a valid offer is received. The ELN Trust will then be allowed to match the price of the valid offer to purchase the 50% interest owned by the LSN Trust.

In the event that the ELN and LSN Trusts cannot agree on the value of a valid offer, a realtor of Mr. Bertsch's choosing shall determine the validity of the offer and conduct the sale of the property accordingly. All fees and costs associated with the sale of the Cabin shall be shared equally between the ELN and LSN Trusts.

D. \$720,000 in Bank of Nevada Account 7502338705

In its May 25, 2017 Order, the Nevada Supreme Court found that this Court erred in Ordering the ELN Trust to pay the personal obligations of Mr. Nelson with regard to alimony payments.⁸

On November 15, 2013, this Court Ordered the ELN Trust to transfer \$1,068,000 to Bank of Nevada Account 7502338705. This account, which was set up as a blocked account to assist in paying Mr. Nelson's personal obligations with regard to alimony and child support, still holds \$720,000. As the Nevada

⁸ Klabacka v. Nelson, 394 P.3d 940, 952 (Nev. 2017).

Supreme Court held that this Court erred in ordering the ELN Trust to pay Mr. Nelson's personal obligations, and as these funds are still readily available to be dispersed, this Court will Order the \$720,000 to be transferred from the Bank of Nevada blocked account to an account of the ELN Trust's choosing.

E. All Remaining Financial Issues

Both the ELN and LSN Trusts have requested numerous financial transfers based on both this Court's June 3, 2013 Divorce Decree, as well as the Nevada Supreme Court's May 25, 2017 Order, including but not limited to: rents allocated from both the Banone, LLC and Lindell Properties; \$324,000 paid to Lynita Nelson from the Bank of Nevada blocked account; a \$6,050 security deposit paid to the LSN Trust by the ELN Trust; payments collected by the LSN Trust pursuant to the Farmouth Circle Note; and \$75,000 paid to the LSN Trust by Banone-AZ, LLC.

However, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the matter of tracing needs to occur to make an accurate accounting of property in both trusts.⁹

Therefore, it is this Court's opinion that before any financial transfers are to take place, the tracing of both trusts must occur to ensure the proper transfers occur.

This Court has reviewed the assets of both the ELN and LSN Trusts and has determined that there are sufficient assets in both trusts to offset any deficiency

⁹ Klabacka, 394 P.3d at 948.

once a final balance and distribution amount has been determined. Once the tracing is finalized and a final balance sheet is received, this Court will Order the proper funds to be transferred to each party accordingly.

ORDER

Based thereon:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Larry Bertsch, CPA is to trace the property in both the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust and the Lynita S. Nelson Nevada Trust beginning from the execution date of May 30, 2001 through the date of the Divorce Decree, June 3, 2013.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the tracing services provided by Larry Bertsch, CPA is to be paid equally by both Eric Nelson and Lynita Nelson, beginning with an initial payment of \$5,000 each. This payment shall be made within thirty days of the date of this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Lynita S. Nelson Nevada Trust execute Quitclaim Deeds to transfer the Lindell Rd. and Banone, LLC Properties to the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust. The transfer of the property shall be completed within thirty days of the date of this Order

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Larry Bertsch, CPA is to acquire an appraisal for the Brian Head Utah Cabin from an appraiser of his choosing. Mr. Bertsch is to select an appraiser different from the original appraiser, if different

appraiser is available. Once received, the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust has the right of first refusal on any offer on the property with the ability to purchase the Lynita S. Nelson Nevada Trust's 50% interest.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event that the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust and the Lynita S. Nelson Nevada Trust cannot agree on a valid offer, Larry Bertsch, CPA, is to retain a realtor to place the property on the open market for a fair market offer. Once the realtor determines that a fair offer has been received, the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust has the right of first refusal on any offer on the property with the ability to purchase the Lynita S. Nelson Nevada Trust's 50% interest.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appraisal and realtor costs associated with the Brian Head Utah Cabin sale will be paid equally by both Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust and the Lynita S. Nelson Nevada Trust.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the \$720,000.00 being held in Bank of Nevada Account 7502338705 be released to an account of the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust's choosing.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Stay of Order is hereby **DENIED**.

DATED this 19th day of April, 2018.

Honorable Frank P. Sullivan
District Court Judge – Dept. O

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DISTRICT JUDGE

FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. O
LAS VEGAS NV 89101

FRANK P. SULLIVAN

CLERK OF THE COURT

Dept. No.: O

Case No.: D-09-411537-D

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DISTRICT COURT FAMILY DIVISION – JUVENILE CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

ERIC L. NELSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

LYNITA SUE NELSON, MATT KLABACKA, as Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001,

Defendants.

MATT KLABACKA, as Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001,

Cross-claimant,

v.

LYNITA SUE NELSON,

Cross-defendant.

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER

TO:

Rhonda Forsberg, Esq. E-Service

Robert Dickerson, Esq. E-Service

Marc Solomon, Esq. E-Service

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the DECISION was duly entered in the above-referenced case on the 19th day of April, 2018.

DATED this \\ \day of April, 2018.

Lori Parr

Judicial Executive Assistant

Dept. O

Electronically Filed 4/19/2018 9:07 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT FAMILY DIVISION – JUVENILE CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

ERIC L. NELSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

LYNITA SUE NELSON, MATT KLABACKA, as Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001,

Defendants.

MATT KLABACKA, as Distribution Trustee of the ERIC L. NELSON NEVADA TRUST dated May 30, 2001,

Cross-claimant,

v.

LYNITA SUE NELSON,

Cross-defendant.

Case No.: D-09-411537-D

Dept. No.: O

DECISION

This matter was before the Court on January 31, 2018, pursuant to Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Supreme Court's Order Dated May 25, 2017; Motion to Hold Lynita S. Nelson in Contempt for Violation of September 22, 2014 Order; and for Attorneys' Fees and Costs. The Court, having reviewed all

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Motions, Oppositions, Countermotions, and Replies filed in this matter between July 10, 2017 and August 22, 2017, and having heard arguments of counsel, based thereon and good cause appearing therefor:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

On May 25, 2017, the Nevada Supreme Court filed an Order which affirmed in part and vacated in part this Court's June 3, 2013 Divorce Decree, and remanded the matter back to this Court. On July 10, 2017, the Plaintiff, Eric Nelson ("Mr. Nelson") filed a Motion to compel the Defendants, Lynita Nelson ("Ms. Nelson") and Matt Klabacka ("ELN Trustee"), to follow the Supreme Court's Order. Several Oppositions, Countermotions, and Replies were filed by all parties prior to a hearing before this Court on January 31, 2018, to address all pending matters, the most important being the interpretation of the Nevada Supreme Court's Opinion with regard to the tracing of property within the trusts.

A. The Tracing of Property Contained Within the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust and the Lynita S. Nelson Nevada Trust

In its May 25 Order, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that this Court erred by "not tracing the assets contained within the trusts, either through a reliable expert or other available means." The Nevada Supreme Court also held that both the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust ("ELN Trust") and the Lynita S.

¹ Klabacka v. Nelson, 394 P.3d 940, 948 (Nev. 2017).

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Nelson Nevada Trust ("LSN Trust") "are valid and the trusts were funded with separate property stemming from a valid separate property agreement."2

In accordance with the Nevada Supreme Court's decision, this Court must Order the tracing of property in both the trusts. In order for an accurate accounting of the property in both the ELN and LSN Trusts to occur, this Court must determine the correct date to commence tracing of the property in the trusts. The Nevada Supreme Court held that both the ELN and LSN Trusts were funded with separate property stemming from the 1993 Separate Property Agreement.³ As such, the proper date to begin the tracing would be May 30, 2001, the date both the ELN and LSN Trusts were executed.

The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the assets in the trusts need to be traced through a reliable expert. In order for the trusts to be properly traced, this Court shall appoint Larry L. Bertsch, CPA ("Mr. Bertsch") to perform the tracing. In the interest of fairness in regards to payment, both parties will be required to split the cost of Mr. Bertsch's tracing, beginning with a \$5,000 payment from each party for Mr. Bertsch's initial retainer. The initial retainer payment to Mr. Bertsch shall be paid within thirty days of the date of this Order.

B. The Lindell Property and Banone, LLC Properties

² Klabacka, 394 at 947.

⁴ Id. at 948

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In its May 25 Order, the Nevada Supreme Court vacated the Constructive Trust held over the Lindell Property.⁵ The Nevada Supreme Court also held that "the issue of unjust enrichment was not tried by implied consent and, therefore, [this Court] erred in considering it when fashioning its remedies."

As the Nevada Supreme Court vacated the Constructive Trust held over the Lindell Property, the LSN Trust must transfer its 50% interest in the Lindell Property to the ELN Trust via Quitclaim Deed. Additionally, the LSN Trust shall provide to the ELN Trust copies of any and all tenant leases for the Lindell Property for the period of June 3, 2013 to the present. The LSN Trust shall also provide to the ELN Trust quarterly accountings for the Lindell Property, including any and all supporting documentation, for the period of June 3, 2013 to the present. Supporting documentation is to include records as to gross profits and expenses related thereto, including, but not limited to; general upkeep, management fees, administrative fees/wages, and maintenance fees/wages.

As the Nevada Supreme Court held that this Court's finding of unjust enrichment was in error, the LSN Trust must transfer its 100% interest in the Banone, LLC Properties to the ELN Trust via Quitclaim Deed. The LSN Trust shall also provide to the ELN Trust quarterly accountings for the Banone, LLC Properties, including any and all supporting documentation, for the period of

⁵ Id. at 953

⁶ Id

June 3, 2013 to the present. Supporting documentation is to include records as to gross profits and expenses related thereto, including, but not limited to; general upkeep, management fees, administrative fees/wages, and maintenance fees/wages.

C. Sale of the Brian Head Cabin

The ELN and LSN Trusts each own a 50% interest in the Brian Head

Cabin ("Cabin") in Utah. Upon the request of Ms. Nelson for funds to pay her

litigation costs and other general expenses, this Court shall Order that the Cabin
be sold. This Court previously Ordered that "both parties shall have the right of
first refusal should either Trust decide to sell its interest in the Brian Head

[C]abin."⁷

In order to properly ensure that both parties are receiving the fair market value of the Cabin, Mr. Bertsch will be appointed to conduct the assessment of the property value via a property appraiser of his choosing. To avoid concerns raised as to the objectiveness of the upcoming appraisal, Mr. Bertsch shall select a property appraiser other than the previous property appraiser, if available. In the interest of fairness in regards to payment, both parties will be required to split the cost of the property assessment.

⁷ Divorce Decree filed June 3, 2013, pg. 46

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Upon receipt of a fair market value price for the Cabin, the ELN Trust is to be given the right of first refusal and allowed to purchase the 50% interest owned by the LSN Trust. In the event that a fair market value price for the Cabin cannot be agreed upon by the parties, the Cabin is to be placed on the open market until a valid offer is received. The ELN Trust will then be allowed to match the price of the valid offer to purchase the 50% interest owned by the LSN Trust.

In the event that the ELN and LSN Trusts cannot agree on the value of a valid offer, a realtor of Mr. Bertsch's choosing shall determine the validity of the offer and conduct the sale of the property accordingly. All fees and costs associated with the sale of the Cabin shall be shared equally between the ELN and LSN Trusts.

D. \$720,000 in Bank of Nevada Account 7502338705

In its May 25, 2017 Order, the Nevada Supreme Court found that this Court erred in Ordering the ELN Trust to pay the personal obligations of Mr. Nelson with regard to alimony payments.8

On November 15, 2013, this Court Ordered the ELN Trust to transfer \$1,068,000 to Bank of Nevada Account 7502338705. This account, which was set up as a blocked account to assist in paying Mr. Nelson's personal obligations with regard to alimony and child support, still holds \$720,000. As the Nevada

⁸ Klabacka v. Nelson, 394 P.3d 940, 952 (Nev. 2017).

Supreme Court held that this Court erred in ordering the ELN Trust to pay Mr. Nelson's personal obligations, and as these funds are still readily available to be dispersed, this Court will Order the \$720,000 to be transferred from the Bank of Nevada blocked account to an account of the ELN Trust's choosing.

E. All Remaining Financial Issues

Both the ELN and LSN Trusts have requested numerous financial transfers based on both this Court's June 3, 2013 Divorce Decree, as well as the Nevada Supreme Court's May 25, 2017 Order, including but not limited to: rents allocated from both the Banone, LLC and Lindell Properties; \$324,000 paid to Lynita Nelson from the Bank of Nevada blocked account; a \$6,050 security deposit paid to the LSN Trust by the ELN Trust; payments collected by the LSN Trust pursuant to the Farmouth Circle Note; and \$75,000 paid to the LSN Trust by Banone-AZ, LLC.

However, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the matter of tracing needs to occur to make an accurate accounting of property in both trusts.

Therefore, it is this Court's opinion that before any financial transfers are to take place, the tracing of both trusts must occur to ensure the proper transfers occur.

This Court has reviewed the assets of both the ELN and LSN Trusts and has determined that there are sufficient assets in both trusts to offset any deficiency

⁹ Klabacka, 394 P.3d at 948.

once a final balance and distribution amount has been determined. Once the tracing is finalized and a final balance sheet is received, this Court will Order the proper funds to be transferred to each party accordingly.

ORDER

Based thereon:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Larry Bertsch, CPA is to trace the property in both the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust and the Lynita S. Nelson Nevada Trust beginning from the execution date of May 30, 2001 through the date of the Divorce Decree, June 3, 2013.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the tracing services provided by Larry Bertsch, CPA is to be paid equally by both Eric Nelson and Lynita Nelson, beginning with an initial payment of \$5,000 each. This payment shall be made within thirty days of the date of this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Lynita S. Nelson Nevada Trust execute Quitclaim Deeds to transfer the Lindell Rd. and Banone, LLC Properties to the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust. The transfer of the property shall be completed within thirty days of the date of this Order

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Larry Bertsch, CPA is to acquire an appraisal for the Brian Head Utah Cabin from an appraiser of his choosing. Mr. Bertsch is to select an appraiser different from the original appraiser, if different

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