### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

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ROBERT SCOTLUND VAILE,

Petitioner,

VS.

CISILIE A. PORSBOLL F/K/A CISILIE A. VAILE,

Respondent.

S.C. Flectronically Filed D.C. Sep 1982012309848pa.m. Tracie K. Lindeman Clerk of Supreme Court

# OPPOSITION TO "EMERGENCY MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS AND ENFORCEMENT IN THIS CASE PENDING APPEAL"

### I. INTRODUCTION

The most recent *Motion* and *Appeal* are simply another attempt by R. Scotlund Vaile to delay and run up the cost of this litigation in an attempt to avoid payment of his child support obligations. Scotlund's actions in this case since 1998 consist of an unbroken series of ploys by a vexatious litigant seeking to evade payment of his "*stipulated*" child support over the past decade while making the process as timeconsuming and expensive as possible for all other parties, and the courts.

Before the Court now are appeals *number 13 and 14*, in a child support case. Scotlund has instituted litigation in several other States and appealed those orders as well, failing to prevail anywhere he has filed. Scotlund certainly has not "earned" any special consideration by this or any other court as he continues to just ignore and/or misinterpret every order issued by every court in which he has appeared, while misrepresenting the course of proceedings in every submission.

As always, Scotland Vaile purposely misstates facts and outright lies in the *Motion* he filed and is currently pending in this Court. He was given more than ample

opportunity to fully brief his position at the trial court, and that briefing is part of the existing record.

As this Court is well aware, the right to appeal is *not* the right to re-argue a case, but to point out error in the judgment from the District Court. Since the issues presented by Scotlund are already fully briefed in the record, full briefing in this Court is a waste of resources – both judicial and those of the Respondent.

Additionally, Scotlund is unhappy that he now is being ordered to actually pay his long-overdue child support.<sup>1</sup> If he had complied with the child support agreement that *he* drafted and was entered as an order of the Nevada Courts at the time of his 1998 divorce, he would not have a massive arrearage or have been subjected to attorney's fee awards and sanctions for the past decade.

Now that this Court and the court below have found that Scotlund has a massive arrearage and have entered the orders necessary to actually collect – and to hold him in contempt if he continues to refuse to pay – he has run back to this Court seeking a stay to the collection. His request is without merit and is just another attempt to avoid paying his required support.

As such, we ask the Court to deny Scotlund's *Emergency Motion* in its entirety and with prejudice. Collection of the support, contempt proceedings in the court below, and payment of all required bonds and fees should proceed as calendared.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Scotlund still refuses to pay the ordered support. He sent a check for \$150 for July and a check for \$150 for August. He has not paid any support for September, though it was due not later than the fifth of the month.

### II. POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

#### A. FACTS

The *actual* facts of this case – which are supported by the record – are provided below and (of course) bear little resemblance to the strained version provided in all of Scotlund's filings.

On January 26, 2012, the Court issued its *Order of Reversal and Remand*, stating:

Because we conclude that the district court's establishment of a \$1,300 per month sum certain for Vaile's child support obligation constitutes an impermissible modification of the original support obligation, we reverse the district court's order setting Vaile's support payment at \$1,300, and we further reverse the arrearages calculated using the \$1,300 support obligation and the penalties imposed on those arrearages. We remand the matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Court added a footnote stating that the parties' appellate filings and the record alluded to a possible child support order entered in Norway, and so directed the family court, on remand, to determine whether any such order existed and, if so, assess its bearing, *if any*, on enforcement of the Nevada support order (emphasis added).

On April 9, 2012, Department I of the Eighth Judicial District Court held a hearing specifically on the issues on remand and on our *Motion For An Order To Show Cause* based on Scotlund's failure to pay child support in accordance with the 1998 *Decree of Divorce*, for his failure to inform the court of his change of address, and for failure to begin payments on the attorney's fee judgments awarded against him.

The Court heard extensive oral argument on April 9, 2012, on all issues and ruled that the parties were to further brief their respective positions. A briefing schedule was ordered and it was stipulated that the minutes of the hearing would act as an order of the court in accordance with EDCR. 7.50.

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Contrary to Scotlund's assertion, he did not ask the lower court to stay any proceedings pending any appeal at the April 9, 2012, hearing. Even if he had, any such request would have been premature, as no order had yet been issued from which an appeal could be taken.

In accordance with the lower court's *Order*, Scotlund did file an FDF on April 23, 2012, however, it was neither complete nor in accordance with the NRCP 16.2 rules. Cisilie filed her FDF on the same day.

Scotlund filed his briefing on the effect of the Norwegian child support orders and their applicability under UIFSA on May 9, 2012. His brief was to include a calculation of child support under both the Nevada child support orders and under the Norwegian child support orders. He failed to provide that information.

Cisilie filed her responsive briefing on the issues required by the family court on May 21, 2012.

Supplemental filings were provided to the Court by us with calculations of child support arrearages based on collection efforts by the District Attorney's office, once Scotlund finally provided some financial information - though not in accordance with the 1998 Decree of Divorce – that allowed us to do a comprehensive child support arrearage calculation based on Scotlund's annual income since 2000.

The Court held another hearing on June 4, 2012, to allow oral argument on the briefings that had been filed. The court posed many legal and technical questions to both parties about the effects of UIFSA and as to the nature of the Norwegian orders. The Court then took the matter under advisement.

On July 10, 2012, the lower court entered a Decision and Order that affirmatively dealt with all remanded issues. Scotland was unhappy – as always – that his position was identified as meritless and his legal argument faulty.

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Seeking delay, on July 19, 2012, Scotlund filed a so-called *Emergency Petition* for Writ of Mandamus Under NRAP 27(e). On July 23, this Court denied it.

The present *Appeal* followed on July 30.

On August 29, Scotlund filed a document entitled *Amended Notice of Appeal*, which the Court noted as a new appeal (SC 61626), making this the **14**<sup>th</sup> original proceeding in this case filed in this Court.

### III. OPPOSITION

## A. The Request for a Stay of Proceedings and Enforcement Should be Denied

Scotlund's only claim against enforcement is that he is unemployed. This is not a reason for a stay. If Scotlund truly is unemployed, it would appear that he only is so intentionally and wilfully, but in any event, the point is largely irrelevant. If Scotlund has no job then the next adjustment of current support will reflect that employment, per the child support order Scotlund himself concocted.

Of course, his current work status does not excuse him for the many months of non-payment when he was making in excess of \$130,000 per year. He also has made over \$80,000 this year with no explanation of what he did with the money, or all the money he has made previously and apparently transferred to his current spouse or others in attempted evasion of child support collection.

There is no emergency or reason for a stay, as litigation expenses, particularly those created and initiated by Scotlund, do not create irreparable or serious harm.

Scotlund offers no reason for a stay, let alone any "emergency." He is just fearful that the pigeons are *finally* coming home to roost after a decade, and that he may find himself in jail for contempt after ten years of laughing at the courts' pursuit of child support payments.

As been his habit throughout this case, Scotlund has peppered his pleadings with half-truths and misrepresentations of prior facts and orders. As an example: Scotlund cites to his current attempts to get the California court to domesticate the Nevada order and to honor the Norwegian orders as controlling.

What Scotlund does *not* say (to this Court or the current California court) is that the California courts have previously acknowledged that they do not have jurisdiction in the matter.<sup>2</sup> His claims are *res judicata* in that court, and are actually a slap in the face to the Nevada District Court and this Court, as he is forum shopping in an attempt to get an order that he likes, hoping to muddy the waters and further delay and evade.

The Court will note that Scotland brings new (and entirely made up) "facts" before the Court in his *Motion* by arguing that his child support should be set at \$780 per month. There is *nothing* in the lower court record that could support any assertion of that amount.

Scotlund's attempts to use only portions of rulings made in other States as justification for his meritless claims and to misquote the lower court is (at best) disingenuous. This Court can see the lengths the lower court went to allow Scotlund every conceivable opportunity to argue his position by reviewing the record of the most recent motion proceedings, which is one of the most complete and fully briefed on any subject that we have ever seen.

Simply put, a stay is not necessary, as no collection is being done, nor has Scotlund made any attempts to voluntarily make any payments. Scotlund offers no explanation as to just what dire effects would occur if a stay was not put into place, because in the real world there are none. He just does not want to pay.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See attached Order of the Superior Court of California, County of Sonoma dated September 27, 2010.

Scotlund pretends that there are "conflicting orders." He is again seeing things that are not there. The remand was for the court below to set child support in accordance with the 1998 *Decree of Divorce*. That was done. The remand also asked the court to determine whether the Norwegian child support orders had any effect on the setting of a child support amount in accordance with the 1998 *Decree*. The lower court made that decision as well. There are no conflicting orders.

Lastly, Scotlund argues that the "status quo" should be maintained. By this he means that he should be permitted to continue paying nothing toward the many tens of thousands of dollars in arrears, interest, penalties, and fees assessed against him, while avoiding answering to what should be a felony failure to pay support. The "status quo" would only aide Scotlund and do nothing to make Cisilie whole or to get child support flowing into the hands of the long-suffering primary custodian of the children, who raised and supported them with no significant assistance from Scotlund.<sup>3</sup>

### B. Likelihood Of Success Does Not Weigh In Appellant's Favor

Scotlund has failed to produce one shred of evidence, or any opinion from any expert or other authority, anywhere, that would hold that his position has any merit. He has misread and mis-cited to scholarly papers, the authors of which have explicitly repudiated his "interpretation" of their writings.

He cites to provisions of NRS 130 (the Nevada codification of UIFSA) that explicitly apply to *initial* child support determinations instead of to the very distinct provisions for child support *modification*, in concocting an argument that the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Scotland always argues that Norway law should apply as to child support payments being the property of an emancipated child. Norway law does not apply as this Court has already ruled that Nevada retains personal jurisdiction over Scotland and – with the exception of NRS 125B.070 – all Nevada rules and statutes apply.

Norwegian child support orders are "controlling." He refuses to accept that modification jurisdiction and initial child support jurisdiction are completely different analyses.

In a nutshell, Scotlund *can't* prevail in this *Appeal* as the black letter law is clear and unambiguous.<sup>4</sup>

# C. The Only Order Reversed By This Court Was The Modification Of Child Support

Scotlund wrongly reads this Court's last remand, pretending that it says anything other than that the order modifying the child support was reversed. No orders for attorney's fees were modified. There is no question that Scotlund did not pay his child support for years and has massive arrearages, and imposition of fees in that circumstance are essentially mandatory per the directions of this Court.<sup>5</sup>

As it turns out, the \$1,300 a month in child support was set very low. Once the calculations — crafted and imposed by Scotlund — were done, it turns out his arrearages and monthly payments are actually over \$2,800. As this Court noted in the last opinion, Nevada lacks subject matter jurisdiction to lower that amount. Scotlund has been repeatedly advised for the past decade to go to Norway, properly register the Nevada order there, and modify the support order if he wished; he failed to do so, and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> It is worth noting, in passing, that even if there *was* some remote possibility that Scotlund could prevail on appeal, no stay should be granted. Even under the irrelevant internal Norway welfare orders, Scotlund would owe many tens of thousands of dollars in back child support, interest, and attorney's fees, and the proceedings he wants to suspend would be going forward exactly as they are now doing.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See, e.g., Edgington v. Edgington, 119 Nev. 577, 80 P.3d 1282 (2003).

thus is stuck with the Nevada order he concocted, which has continued to accrue over all those years.<sup>6</sup>

The modest attorney's fees awarded by the lower court are far from adequate to compensate Cisilie for the massive damage Scotland has caused her and the massive attorney's fees that have resulted from his continuous vexatious and frivolous litigation all over the country for the past decade.<sup>7</sup>

### D. The Effects of a Stay Would Be Dire Only to Cisilie – and Justice

Scotlund argues that he paid Cisilie directly when the District Attorney was not collecting against his pay. He was warned multiple times that this was not in accordance with the Court's order and the District Attorney's office warned him in a letter that any direct payment to Cisilie would be considered a gift.<sup>8</sup>

His current filing also provides some weird statement that he would have to make \$1,485,410 per year in order to meet the monetary awards in the district court's judgment. Where he gets that number is a mystery.

Scotlund's total principal obligations in this case are just over \$2,000,000 – which includes the tort judgments that are collectable only from Scotlund's separate

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Scotlund feared going to Norway as they would have likely arrested him for the kidnaping of his children in 2000.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> It is irrelevant to the issues actually presented, but dealing with the vexatious Scotlund over the past ten years has run up over \$1.3 Million in unpaid attorney's fees and costs.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> This makes perfect sense, as the DA's Office would have no way of tracking arrearages if payments were not made through their office. Scotlund essentially admitted that he made direct payments to Cisilie hoping to foment a conflict between her and this law office by finding some way to keep us from being paid for working on her case.

property. Paying the minimum of 50% of his income against his debts is all that is required. He needs to find work and begin paying. Scotlund has been given much more than enough latitude<sup>9</sup> and it is time that he accept his responsibilities.

### IV. CONCLUSION

The only "bias" evident in this case is that of Scotlund against all who do not hold his opinion. He holds this Court and every court that has found against him in utter contempt. The California Bar has determined that his behavior (the kidnaping, massive child support arrears, and otherwise) is so despicable that it has refused to grant him a license to practice law. And within the past several months, a bankruptcy judge in California (he was there in another effort to evade paying support) encouraged the courts of this State to lock Scotlund up and throw away the key.

It is time for this Court to issue an order that allows the lower court to proceed with contempt proceedings and to dismiss this present *Appeal* with prejudice as expeditiously as possible.

Respectfully submitted,



MARSHAL S. WILLICK, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 002515

3591 E. Bonanza Road, Suite 200 Las Vegas, Nevada 89110-2101

(702) 438-4100

email@willicklawgroup.com Attorneys for Respondent

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> During the time this case has been in litigation, Scotlund has made well over a million dollars in regular income; if he had simply paid his child support when due during that time, arrearages would be non-existent, and most of the attorney's fee and sanction awards would never have been entered.

### **CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE**

_	1.	I hereby certify that this brief complies with the formatting requirements of
3		NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeface requirements of NRAP 32(a)(5) and the type style
1		requirements of NRAP 32(a)(6) because:
5		[X] This brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface
5		using Corel WordPerfect Office X3, Standard Edition in font size 14,
7		and the type style of Times New Roman; or
3		[ ] This brief has been prepared in a monospaced typeface using [state
9		name and version of word processing program] with [state number of
		characters per inch and name of type style].
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2	2.	I further certify that this brief complies with the page or type-volume
3		limitations of NRAP 32(a)(7) because, excluding the parts of the brief
		exempted by NRAP 32(a)(7)(C), it is either:
5		[ ] Proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more and
5		contains words; or
'		[ ] Monospaced, has 10.5 or fewer characters per inch, and contains
		words or lines of text; or
)		[X] Does not exceed 10 pages.
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3. Finally, I hereby certify that I have read this Motion, and to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, it is not frivolous or interposed for any improper purpose. I further certify that this brief complies with all applicable Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, in particular NRAP 28(e)(1), which requires every assertion in the brief regarding matters in the record to be supported by a reference to the page and volume number, if any, of the

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transcript or appendix where the matter relied on is to be found. I understand that I may be subject to sanctions in the event that the accompanying brief is not in conformity with the requirements of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure.

**DATED** this 104 day of September, 2012.

WILLICK LAW GROUP

MARSHAL S. WILLICK, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 002515
3591 East Bonanza Road, Suite 200
Las Vegas, Nevada 89110-2101
(702) 438-4100
email@willicklawgroup.com
Attorneys for Respondent

### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** September, 2012, pursuant to EDCR 7.26(a), by U.S. Mail addressed as follows: Mr. Robert Scotlund Vaile P.O. Box 727 Kenwood, California 95452 Respondent In Proper Person That there is regular communication between the place of mailing and the place so addressed. An Employee of the WILLICK LAW GROUP P:\wp13\VAILE\00009263.WPD/rlc

#### COMMISSIONER LOUISE BAYLES-FIGHTMASTER COMMISSIONER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT 1 Civil and Family Law Courthouse 2 3055 Cleveland Avenue SEP 2 7 2010 Santa Rosa, CA 95403 3 Telephone: (707) 521-6732 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SONOMA By O COA 4 5 б 7 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SONOMA 8 9 Case No. SFL-49802 10 Petitioner: ROBERT SCOTLUND VAILE Order on Notice of Registration of Out-11 of-State Support Order and Request VS. for Hearing Regarding Earnings 12 Respondent: CISILIE A. PORSBOLL **Assignment** 13 14 This matter was initially heard by this Court on March 1, 2010 in Department 23. 15 before the Honorable Judge Cerena Wong on ROBERT SCOTLUND VAILE's (hereafter Husband) Notice of Registration of Out-of-State Support Order and Request for Hearing 16 17 Regarding Earnings Assignment filed on February 9, 2010. Present at the hearing were 18 Petitioner, and JEANNE MISKEL, Chief Child Support Attorney on behalf of the Sonoma 19 County Department of Child Support Services (hereafter DCSS). CISILIE A. PORSBOLL 20 (hereafter Wife) was not present. 21 The matter was discussed with the court and continued to Department 20 on 22 March 16, 2010 at 8:30 before Commissioner Louise Bayles-Fightmaster, the assigned 23 Title IV-D Commissioner for Sonoma County as this matter was currently being handled 24 by the Clark County Nevada IV-D child support agency. 25 l. Procedural History: 26 The parties were divorced in Clark County Nevada on August 21, 1998. Their

Decree of Divorce included an agreement that provided a precise formula for calculating

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child support.

In November 2007 Wife asked the Nevada District Court to establish the child support arrears that had accrued pursuant to the parties' agreement and to establish a sum certain for child support, i.e. modify the agreement that was set forth in the parties' Decree of Divorce. Neither party nor the children resided in Nevada at the time of this proceeding. The Nevada Court issued its ruling on October 9, 2008, enforcing the parties' informal agreement for \$1,300 per month. This sum was previously paid by Husband pursuant to this informal agreement until April 2000. Payments resumed later when a wage assignment was issued.

The Nevada Court set the arrears pursuant to this informal agreement and Nevada State Law.

Petitioner has appealed this order and that action is still pending in Nevada with the Nevada Supreme Court.

Petitioner then, in February of this year, sought to register the 2008 Nevada order in Sonoma County, and to modify it based on the fact that one of the parties' children had emancipated. He also requested a stay of the wage assignment.

Petitioner contends that the Nevada Court was without jurisdiction to enter the orders it made on October 9, 2008, outlined above.

After reviewing the voluminous pleadings, declarations, and other documents, listening to oral argument and reviewing the law regarding interstate child support jurisdiction and enforcement, the Court makes the following findings and orders:

### II. Relevant Law:

The overarching applicable law in the case is found in the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) (Family Code § 4900, et seq.) and the Federal Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act (FFCCSOA). When there are interstate ties, or a pre-existing out-of-state order, California can exercise jurisdiction to establish, enforce, or modify support orders only if consistent with UIFSA and FFCCSOA. Stone v. Davis (2007) 148 Cal.App. 4<sup>th</sup> 596, 600; Marriage of Crosby and Grooms (2004) 116 Cal.App. 4<sup>th</sup> 201, 206; de Leon v. Jenkins (2006) 143 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 118, 124; Hogoboom & King, California

Practice Guide: Family Law (TRG 2010) §17.3.

The FFCCSOA, as set forth in 28 USC §1738B, states, in part:

- "...(c) Requirements of child support orders. A child support order made by a court of a State is made consistently with this section if ~
  - (1) a court that makes the order, pursuant to the laws of the State in which the court is located and subsections (e), (f), and (g) 1
    - (A) has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the matter and enter such an order; and
    - (B) has personal jurisdiction over the contestants; and
  - (2) reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard is given to the contestants.
  - (d) Continuing jurisdiction. —A court of a State that has made a child support order consistently with this section has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order if the State is the child's State or the residence of any individual contestant unless the court of another State, acting in accordance with subsections (e) and (f), has made a modification of the order."

### III. Analysis and Conclusion:

When the Nevada District Court assumed jurisdiction over the issues of child support in 2008 it, perhaps, did so because it had issued the original divorce decree in 1998. Nevada's assumption of jurisdiction over the child support issues must comply with the UIFSA and FFCCSOA law, but it does not.

Nevada did not have continuing exclusive jurisdiction under the FFCCSOA because neither the children nor the parents resided in Nevada at the time of the proceeding.

FFCCSOA provides that a State that made a child support order may exercise continuing jurisdiction over the child support order "if the State is the child's State or the residence

Subsections (e), (f) and (g) are not relevant to the issues presented in this case.

of any individual contestant." 28 USC §1738B(d). Since Nevada was no one's residence at the time of the October 2008 order this order does not comply with the FFCCSOA and cannot be enforced by the California courts.

In addition, Nevada does not have continuing exclusive jurisdiction under UIFSA either. Under UIFSA (see NRS 130.205(1)<sup>2</sup>; see also California Family Code § 4909(a)<sup>3</sup>), a State has continuing and exclusive jurisdiction to modify its child support order if the order is the controlling order and (1) either of the parents or children reside in Nevada at the time of the request for modification or (2) the parties consent in a record or in open court that the tribunal of this State may continue to exercise jurisdiction to modify its order. Because none of the parents or the children resided in Nevada, and Husband did not consent to continuing exclusive jurisdiction in Nevada, Nevada does not have continuing exclusive jurisdiction over child support under UIFSA, and, therefore, its 2008 child support order is unenforceable by a California court.

<sup>2</sup> NRS 130.205(1) states:

"1. A tribunal of this State that has issued a child-support order consistent with the law of this State has and shall exercise continuing and exclusive jurisdiction to modify its child-support order if the order is the controlling order and:

(a) At the time of the filing of a request for modification, the State is the residence of the obligor, the oblige who is a natural person of the child for whose benefit the support order is issued; or

(b) Even if this State is not the residence of the obligor, the oblige who is a natural person or the child for whose benefit the support order is issued, the parties consent in a record or in open court that the tribunal of this State may continue to exercise jurisdiction to modify its order."

<sup>3</sup> California Family Code § 4909(a) states:

"A tribunal of this state issuing a support order consistent with the law of this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order:

 As long as this state remains the residence of the obligor, the individual oblige, or the child for whose benefit the support order was issued; or

(2) Until all of the parties who are individuals have filed written consents with the tribunal of this state for a tribunal of another state to modify the order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction."

In conclusion, this Court will not grant either request made by Husband as it does not have jurisdiction in this matter, as set forth above. Husband's remedies are elsewhere. Husband's Notice of Registration of Out-of-State Support Order is vacated and his Request for a stay of the Earnings Assignment order is denied.

Dated: September 27, 2010

LOUISE BAYLES-FIGHTMASTER Commissioner of the Superior Court

### PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL

I certify that I am an employee of the Superior Court of California, County of Sonoma, and that my business address is 3055 Cleveland Avenue, Santa Rosa, CA 95403; that I am not a party to this cause; that I am over the age of 18 years; that I am readily familiar with this office's practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service; and that on the date shown below I placed a true copy of the foregoing attached papers in an envelope, sealed and addressed as shown below, for collection and mailing at Santa Rosa, California, first class, postage fully prepaid, following ordinary business practices.

Date: September 27, 2010

JOSÉ OCTAVIO GUILLÉN

COURT EXECUTIVE OFFICER

Deputy Clerk

-ADDRESSEES--

SONOMA COUNTY DCSS 1755 COPPERHILL PKWY SANTA ROSA, CA 95403

VAILE, ROBERT SCOTLUND PO BOX 727 KENWOOD, CA 95452