1	IN 7	THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
2 3	JONATHA	N QUISANO, ) No. 66816
4		Appellant, <b>E-File</b> Electronically Filed
5		V. Feb 17 2015 09:18 a.m. Tracie K. Lindeman
6 7	THE STAT	TE OF NEVADA,       Clerk of Supreme Court         Respondent.
8		)
9		FAST TRACK STATEMENT
10	1.	Name of party: Jonathan Quisano.
11	2.	Name of attorney submitting this fast track statement:
12		NORMAN J. REED, #3795
13		Clark County Public Defender's Office 309 S. Third St., Ste. 226
14		Las Vegas, Nevada 89155
15		(702) 455-4685
16 17	3.	Appellate counsel if different from trial counsel: Same.
18	4.	Judicial district, county, and district court docket number of
19	lower cour	rt proceedings: Eighth Judicial District, County of Clark, District
20	Court Case	e No. C294266.
21 22	5.	Name of judge issuing order appealed from: Valorie Adair.
23	6.	Length of trial. N/A.
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25	7.	<b>Conviction(s) appealed from:</b> Ct. 1 – Voluntary Manslaughter,
26	Ct. 2 – Chi	ld Abuse, Neglect or Endangerment with Substantial Bodily Harm.
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1	8.	Sentence for each count: \$25 Admin. fee; \$150 DNA analysis
2	fee; genetic	testing; Ct $1 - 48-120$ months in prison; Ct. $2 - 72-230$ months in
3		ecutive to Ct. 1; 488 days CTS.
4		ceduve to Ct. 1, 488 days C15.
5	9.	<b>Date district court announced decision:</b> 10/07/14.
6 7	10.	Date of entry of written judgment: 10/08/14.
8	11.	Habeas corpus: N/A.
9	12.	Post-judgment motion: N/A.
10 11	13.	Notice of appeal filed: 10/30/14.
12	14.	Rule governing the time limit for filing the notice of appeal:
13	NRAP4(b).	
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15	15.	Statute which grants jurisdiction to review the judgment:
16	NRS 177.01	15.
17 18	16.	<b>Disposition below:</b> Judgment upon entry of plea of guilt.
19	17.	Pending and prior proceedings in this court: N/A.
20	18.	Pending and prior proceedings in other courts: N/A.
21	19.	Proceedings raising same issues. Appellate counsel is unaware
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23	of any pend	ling proceedings before this Court which raise the same issues as
24 25	the instant a	ppeal.
25	20.	Dursuant to NDAD 17 is this matter presumptively assigned
26	20.	Pursuant to NRAP 17, is this matter presumptively assigned
27	to the Cou	rt of Appeals? Identify issues or circumstances that override
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any presumptive assignment to the Court of Appeals or require retention by the Supreme Court. Issues should be identified and explained with specific reference to arguments in the Fast Track Statement. Appellant does not oppose assignment to the Court of Appeals.

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21. Procedural history. Appellant JONATHAN QUISANO was 7 originally charged and plead not guilty in a two-count Information charging 8 9 child abuse murder and an alternative count of child abuse, neglect or 10 endangerment. (ROA 462-64) [Amended due to typographical error the next 11 12 day.](ROA 465-67) On June 9, 2014, and evidentiary hearing started which 13 was to proceed the jury trial. (ROA 1278-1513) Before the hearing was 14 completed and before the jury selection process started, the case negotiated. 15 16 On June 10, Quisano plead no contest to a Second Amended Information 17 charging Voluntary Manslaughter, Child and Abuse, Neglect or 18 19 Endangerment with Substantial Bodily Harm. (ROA 998-99). After a pre-20 sentence report was completed, the sentencing ultimately occurred on October 21 7, 2014. (ROA 1514-42) The lower court sentencing Quisano to the maximum 22 23 it was allowed to under the recommendation of the State prosecutor. (ROA 24 1166-7) 25

22. Statement of facts. On June 6, 2013, Quisano's wife called 91-1 and reported that her infant son had been injured at the residence while

with Quisano, the child's Father. (ROA 1022-39). When emergency personnel arrived, Quisano told them his son had fallen off of a chair and hit his head on the tile floor. (ROA 1022-39). The child was transported to the hospital where he ultimately died. (ROA 1022-39).

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The child had a skull fracture in the back of his head consistent with a fall. (ROA 1022-39). Apparently, the child had been playing with his brother when he accidentally fell over the back of the couch onto the tile floor below. (ROA 1022-39). The decedent's brother sustained no injuries. Information was later relayed from Mrs. Quisano that she had never witnessed Mr. Quisano lose his temper with their children.

Just as the matter proceeded to trial, Mr. Quisano entered into a negotiation whereby he pled guilty pursuant to Alford v. North Carolina to Voluntary Manslaughter and Child Abuse Resulting in Substantial Bodily Harm. (ROA 1000-08). At his sentencing, local media outlets appeared to record and/or report on the proceedings. (ROA 1514-42). Defense counsel objected to their presence, citing the lack of proper media request(s) filed on behalf of the outlets present for the sentencing proceeding. (ROA 1514-42). The trial court overruled the defense objection. (ROA 1514-42). Thereafter, Mrs. Quisano gave a victim impact statement. (ROA 1514-42; 1170-78)/ Over defense objection, the prosecutor questioned her using discovery not

previously provided to the defense. <u>Id</u>. Also over defense objection, the
prosecutor elicted testimony from Mrs. Quisano that was outside the scope of
the statutory authority. <u>Id</u>. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Mr. Quisano
to 48-120 months with a consecutive 72-230 months. <u>Id</u>.

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## 23. Issue on appeal.

8 I. WAS QUISANO SENTENCED UNFAIRLY AND IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW WHEN THE DISTRICT COURT ALLOWED THE STATE TO 9 USE PREVIOUSLY UNDISCLOSED INFORMATION, **IMPROPER** 10 VICTIM-IMPACT TESTIMONY, AND CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM WITHOUT FOLLOWING THE SUPREME COURT 11 **RULES**?

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## 24. Legal argument, including authorities:

14 There is no question that a criminal defendant is entitled to a fair a 15 impartial sentencing hearing. A district court's authority in sentencing is not 16 limitless. A tribunal cannot rely on highly suspect or impalpable information. 17 18 In the case at bar, the court allowed the State to impeach a victim witness 19 speaker with information that was never disclosed to the defense. The Court 20 21 also allowed the prosecutor to cross-examine the victim speaker outside the 22 scope of the statutory authority. Thirdly, the court let cameras in the 23 courtroom in violation of Supreme Court Rules. Thus, Quisano is entitled to 24 25 be sentenced anew.

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A defendant is entitled to a fair sentencing hearing. <u>See, Randell v.</u> 27 28 <u>State, 109 Nev. 5, 846 P.2d 278(1993)</u>. Also, "this court will not disturb a

1 sentenced that is within statutory limits unless the district court relies on 2 highly suspect or impalpable information. Silks v. State, 92 Nev. 91, 545 P.2d 3 (1976). Certainly, undisclosed evidence, exceeding the scope of examination 4 5 of a witness, and violating this Court's rules regarding cameras in the 6 courtroom fall within the purview of, "suspect or impalpable information." Id. 7 8 A) FAILING TODISCLOSE INFORMATION MATERIAL TOPUNISHMENT VIOLATES DISCOVERY LAWS AND WARRANTS 9 AN NEW SENTENCING HEARING 10 The prosecutor exercised his right to cross-examine the victim speaker. 11 12 As part of the examination, he made reference to an affidavit signed by the 13 victim speaker to show an apparent contradiction between the affidavit 14 submitted in a family court proceeding and the victim impact statement. The 15 16 document was never previously produced to the defense. In fact, the defense 17 has never received a copy of the affidavit. The Court made the affidavit part 18 of the court proceeding but allowed the prosecutor to use the document 19 20 against the victim speaker. This is a willful discovery violation requiring 21 reversal. 22 "[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 23

<sup>23</sup> "[1]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
<sup>24</sup> accuse upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either
<sup>25</sup> to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
<sup>27</sup> prosecution." <u>Brady v. Maryland</u>, 373 U.S. 83, 87(1963); see also, Mazzan v.

1	Warden, 116 Nev. 48, 66, 993 P.2d 25(2000)("Brady and its progeny require a	
2	prosecutor to disclose evidence favorable to the defense when that evidence is	
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4	material either to guilt or to punishment."). There is a three-prong test to	
5	determine whether a Brady violation has occurred: "[1] (t)he evidence at issue	
6	must be forcerable to the accurate either because it is even instant, or because	
<sup>.</sup> 7	must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because	
8	it is impeaching; [2] that evidence must have been suppressed by the State,	
9	either willfully or inadvertently; and [3] prejudice must have ensued."	
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11	Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82(1999).	
12	In this case, the evidence was impeaching. The prosecutor elicited	
13	testimony that the victim analyse was adving the court for maketion for her	
14	testimony that the victim speaker was asking the court for probation for her	
15	husband. In the undisclosed affidavit she allegedly said that he should go to	
16	prison for his actions. (ROA 1174-75).	
17	The evidence was suppressed by the State. Defense counsel represented	
18	The evidence was suppressed by the State. Detense counser represented	
19	that she had not seen the document previously. (ROA 1176, lines 6-11) Not	
20	that it matters whether it was willful or inadvertent, but the State claimed,	
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22	"It's not part of discovery. This is a victim-impact statement." (ROA 1176,	
23	lines 16-17)	
24	Prejudice ensued. The witness denied making the statements. There	
25	Trejudice ensued. The widess defined making the statements. There	
26	were prejudicial as impeaching the witness and making her opinion as to	
27	whether her husband would get probation or prison unbelievable, (ROA 1174-	
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1	75). Thus, evidence at issue was impeaching, the affidavit was suppressed by	
2 3	the State, and prejudice ensued." Strickler, supra. Thus, Quisano is entitled to	
4	a new penalty hearing for violation of discovery rules.	
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	<ul> <li>B) THE COURT RECEIVED SUSPECT OR IMPALPABLE INFORMATION WHEN IT ALLOWED THE STATE TO CROSS- EXAMINE THE VICTIM SPEAKER BEYOND THAT ALLOWED BY STATUTE AND CASE LAW The court allowed the victim speaker to make a sworn statement as</li> <li>required by law. The law allows a victim to reasonably express any views</li> <li>concerning the crime, the person responsible, the impact of the crime on the</li> <li>victim and the need for restitution. When the sentencing court allowed the</li> </ul>	
14 15 16	the scope of its statutory authority and requires a remand for a new sentencing hearing.	
17 18 19 20 21 22	The prosecutor began to cross-examine the witness over family court proceedings, as well as allegations of prior abuse. (ROA 1173-75). All of this was done despite defense counsel's repeated objections. This line of questioning far exceeds the scope of the victim impact statement and affected	
23 24 25	Quisano's right to a fair sentencing hearing. Failing to swear a victim impact speaker is clear error. <u>Buschauer v.</u>	
26 27 28	State, 106 Nev. 890, 893, 804 P.2d 1046(1990). When properly preserved for appellate review, this Court analyzes erroneous admission of victim impact	
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1	statements for harmless error. Sherman v. State, 114 Nev. 998, 1014, 965	
2	P.2d 903(1998). NRS 176.015(3) grants certain victims of crime an	
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4	opportunity to, "[r]easonably express any views concerning the crime, the	
5	person responsible, the impact of the crime on the victim and the need for	
6	restitution." Despite this, the extent of questioning of a victim speaker is not	
7	restruction. Despite tins, the extent of questioning of a victim speaker is not	
8	limitless. <u>Randell, supra.</u> Thus, the lower court erred by allowing questioning	
9	of a victim speaker beyond that allowed by law, i.e., prior allegations of abuse	
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11	and family court proceedings.	
12	C) THE COURT VIOLATED THIS COURT'S RULES BY ALLOWING	
13	CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM AND NOT MAKING SUFFICIENT FINDING TO ALLOW THE MEDIA COVERAGE	
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15	Normally, news reporters desiring permission to provide electronic	
16	coverage must make the request in advance. The judge may waive the timely	
17	written request requirement. A written order granting or denying said request	
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19	must be made part of this record. But, the attorneys involved are to be	
20	notified and the Court must make a record allowing the proceedings to be	
21	recorded. None of this was ever done in the instant case, thus making the	
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23	sentencing unfair. A new sentencing hearing should be granted.	
24	SCR 230 requires that, "1. News reporters desiring permission to	
25	provide electronic coverage of a proceeding in the courtroom shall file a	
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27 28	written request with the judge at least 24 hours before the proceeding	
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1 commences, however, the judge may grant such a request on shorter notice or 2 waive the requirement for a written request. The attorneys of record shall be 3 notified...The written order of the judge granting or denying access by a news 4 5 reporter to a proceeding shall be made a part of the record of the 6 proceedings." The second portion of the rule sets forth "particularized" five-7 part finding that the judge shall make on the record when determining whether 8 9 electronic coverage will be allowed at a proceeding, in whole or in part. None 10 of this was done in the case at bar. 11

The Rule is silent regarding a remedy for a violation. There are not
published cases addressing this issue. However, this Honorable Court should
consider this rule violation in terms of the overall fairness of the sentence.
Silks, surpa.

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Sentencing counsel preserved this issue by oral motion. (ROA 1515). 18 No prior approval had been obtained by the Review Journal (which was the 19 20 news agency seeking coverage). The court ruled that since other media 21 requests from different agencies had been done in the past, and that was good 22 23 enough. Furthermore, the court said, "if you had some kind of actual 24 prejudice, I would certainly grant your request to exclude the RJ (Review 25 Journal), but I don't really see a reason to do that. So they're allowed to stay." 26 27 (ROA 1518-1519) Ironically, the court's limited findings do not even begin to 28

address factors "a" through "f" of SCR 230(2). Thus, the court wrongfully
allowed cameras in the courtroom.

CONCLUSION

5 Based on the foregoing, Quisano was sentenced unfairly and in 6 violation of Nevada law when the district court allowed the State to use 7 previously undisclosed information to impeach a victim impact speaker. 8 9 improperly allowed the victim speaker to be examined concerning other 10 allegations of abuse and family court proceedings, and allowed cameras in the 11 12 courtroom in violation of Supreme Court Rules. These violations compel this 13 Court to disturb this sentence that is within statutory limits because the district 14 court relies on highly suspect or impalpable information. 15

## 25. **Preservation of issues:**

A) Objections by defense counsel. (ROA 1176-78)

19 B) Repeated objections by defense counsel. (ROA 1173-75)

<sup>20</sup> C) Sentencing counsel preserved this issue by oral motion. (ROA 1515)

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1	26. Issues of first impression or of public interest: Issue C is an
2	issue of first impression as there is no published case addressing SCR 230. It
3	issue of first impression as there is no published case addressing SCK 250. It
4	is also of public interest as the sentencing judge addressed public access to
5	courtrooms through the media.
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7	Respectfully submitted,
8	PHILIP J. KOHN CLARK COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
9	
10	By <u>/s/ Norman J. Reed</u> NORMAN L REED #3795
11	NORMAN J. REED, #3795 Deputy Public Defender 309 South Third St., Ste. 226 Las Vegas, NV 89155-2610 (702) 455-4685
12	Las Vegas, NV 89155-2610 (702) 455-4685
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1	VERIFICATION		
2 3	1. I hereby certify that this fast track statement complies with the		
4	formatting requirements of NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeface requirements of		
5	NRAP 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of NRAP 32(a)(6) because:		
6	This fast track statement has been prepared in a proportionally		
7	spaced typeface using Times New Roman in 14 font size;		
8	2. I further certify that this fast track statement complies with the		
9	page or type-volume limitations of NRAP 3C(h)(2) because it is either:		
10	[XX] Proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or		
11	more, and does not exceed 16 pages.		
12	3. Finally, I recognize that pursuant to NRAP 3C I am		
13	responsible for filing a timely fast track statement and that the Supreme Court		
14	of Nevada may sanction an attorney for failing to file a timely fast track		
15	statement, or failing to raise material issues or arguments in the fast track		
16	statement, or failing to cooperate fully with appellate counsel during the		
17	course of an appeal. I therefore certify that the information provided in this		
18	fast track statement is true and complete to the best of my knowledge,		
19	information and belief. DATED this 13 <sup>th</sup> day of February, 2015.		
20	PHILIP J. KOHN		
21	CLARK COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER		
22	By <u>/s/</u> Norman. J. Reed		
23	NORMAN J. REED, #3795		
24 25	Deputy Public Defender 309 South Third St., Ste. 226		
25 26	Las Vegas, NV 89155-2316		
27	(702) 455-4685		
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2	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
3	I hereby certify that this document was filed electronically with
4	the Nevada Supreme Court on the 13 <sup>th</sup> day of February, 2015. Electronic
5	
6	Service of the foregoing document shall be made in accordance with the
7	Master Service List as follows:
8	CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTONORMAN J. REEDSTEVEN S. OWENSNANCY L. LEMCKE
9	HOWARD S. BROOKS
10	
11	I further certify that I served a copy of this document by mailing
12	a true and correct copy thereof, postage pre-paid, addressed to:
13	JONATHAN QUISANO NDOC No. 1128389
14	c/o High Desert State Prison
15	P.O. Box 650
16	Indian Springs, NV 89018
17	
18	
19	
20	BY <u>/s/ Carrie M. Connolly</u> Employee, Clark County Public
21	Defender's Office
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