## ORIGINAL

1	IN THE COURT OF APPEALS (	OF THE STATE (	OF NEVADA	
2 3	JONATHAN QUISANO, )	No. 66816		
4	Appellant,	E-File	FILED	
5	$\mathbf{v}$ .		JUN 2 6 2015	
6	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	• .		
7	Respondent.		TRACIE K. LINDEMAN. CLERK OF SUPPEME COURT BY DEPUTY CLERK	
8	SUPPLEMENTAL FAST	TRACK STATE	MENT	
9	1. Name of party: Jonathan (	Quisano.	A Maria Maria	
11	2. Attorney submitting this f	ast track stateme	. * .	
12	NORMAN J. REED, #3795	;	The transfer of the second of	
13	NANCY LEMCKE, #5416			
14	Clark County Public Defender's Office			
15	309 S. Third St., Ste. 226 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155		Rate con	
16	(702) 455-4685			
17	3. Appellate counsel if differ	Appellate counsel if different from trial counsel: Same.		
18			dealest number of	
19	4. Judicial district, county, a	and district court	docket number of	
20	lower court proceedings: Eighth Judio	cial District, Coun	ty of Clark, District	
21	Court Case No. C294266.			
22			1 7 1 - 1 A 1 - 1 - 1	
23	5. Name of judge issuing ord	ier appealed from	: Valorie Adair.	
24	6. <b>Length of trial.</b> N/A.			
25	7. <b>Conviction(s) appealed from:</b> Ct. 1 – Voluntary Manslaughter,			
26	Ct 2 ELGE NUCLEARING OF Endang	erment with Substa	antial Bodily Harm	
27	Ct. 2 Chird Abuse, Neglect or Endangerment with Substantial Bodily Harm.  JUN 1 7 2015			
28	TRACIE K. LINDEMAN CLERK OF SUPPREME COURT CLERK OF SUPPREME COURT		2 \$6.753 at 164 a \$50 ar	
	CLERK OF SUFFICIENT DEPUTY CLERK			

any presumptive assignment to the Court of Appeals or require retention by the Supreme Court. Issues should be identified and explained with specific reference to arguments in the Fast Track Statement. Appellant does not oppose assignment to the Court of Appeals.

- 21. Procedural history. Appellant JONATHAN QUISANO was originally charged and plead not guilty in a two-count Information charging child abuse murder and an alternative count of child abuse, neglect or endangerment. (ROA 462-64) [Amended due to typographical error the next The matter proceeded to trial on/about June 9, 2014, day.](ROA 465-67). with a pre-trial evidentiary hearing. (ROA 1278-1513). Before the hearing was completed and before jury selection began, the case negotiated. On June 10, Mr. Quisano plead no contest to a Second Amended Information charging Voluntary Manslaughter, and Child Abuse, Neglect or Endangerment with Substantial Bodily Harm. (ROA 998-99). After completion of a pre-sentence report, the sentencing ultimately occurred on October 7, 2014. (ROA 1514-42) The lower court sentenced Mr. Quisano to the maximum allowed under the recommendation of prosecutor. (ROA 1166-7)
- 22. **Statement of facts.** Appellant Jonathan Quisano plead guilty (via *Alford v. North Carolina*) to Voluntary Manslaughter and Child Abuse/Neglect Resulting in Substantial Bodily Harm in connection with the

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death of his 3 year-old son, Khayden. (ROA 998-99). Khayden died as a result of blunt force trauma to his head. (ROA 1022-39).

On June 6, 2013, Mr. Quisano called his common-law wife, Christina Rodrigues, and reported that the couple's son, Khayden, had fallen from the family's sofa onto the tile floor and hit his head. Mr. Quisano was concerned because Khayden was unconscious and unresponsive. Ms. Rodriguez called 911. Emergency personnel responded and transported Khayden to the hospital, where he was diagnosed with a skull fracture and related head trauma. (ROA 1022-39). Khayden's fracture was consistent with the fall Mr. Quisano described. (ROA 1022-39). When Khayden later succumbed to his injuries, prosecutors charged Mr. Quisano with Murder by Child Abuse. He ultimately plead guilty pursuant the negotiations outlined above.

At sentencing, Ms. Rodrigues, who testified at the preliminary hearing and had been noticed as a witness in the government's case-in-chief, gave a victim impact statement. (ROA 1514-42; 1170-78). In that statement, she asked the court for leniency in sentencing Mr. Quisano, a man with no criminal history (other than a DUI conviction). Over defense objection, the prosecutor questioned her using an affidavit of a Department of Family Services official. (ROA 1174-75). In that undisclosed affidavit, the DFS official quoted Ms. Rodriguez as expressing a desire that Mr. Quisano go to

prison. (ROA 1174-75). The prosecutor argued that prior disclosure of the DFS Affidavit was not required as "It's not part of discovery. This is a victim-impact statement." (ROA 1176). The Court overruled the defense objection, and allowed the prosecutor to examine Ms. Rodrigues about the contents of the affidavit. (ROA 1176-80). Also over defense objection, the prosecutor elicited testimony from Mrs. Quisano that was outside the scope of the statutory authority. (ROA 1514-42; 1170-78). Thereafter, the court sentenced Mr. Quisano to the maximum allowed pursuant to the prosecutor's recommendation. (ROA 1166-7).

Notably, prior to Mr. Quisano's entry of his guilty plea, the defense filed a Motion to Compel Discovery. (ROA 792-816). In that Motion, the defense requested production of any/all statements of all witnesses the government intended to call at trial, as well as impeachment information for those individuals. (ROA 807-812). Since Ms. Rodrigues was one of the individuals noticed on the government's witness list (ROA 617), she was one of the individuals for whom the defense sought the prior statement and impeachment information. (ROA 807, 811). The prosecution responded by, *inter alia*, citing the Clark County District Attorney's open file policy. (ROA 828-835). The trial court granted the defense discovery requests, ordering the

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disclosure of witness statements and impeachment information. (ROA 1250-1253).

- 23. **Issue on appeal.** See Question #24.
- 24. Legal argument, including authorities: The trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to question Ms. Rodriguez at sentencing using a document not previously provided to the defense. NRS 174.234, which governs discovery production in criminal cases, obligates prosecutors to notify the defense, not less than 5 judicial days prior to trial, of any witness he intends to call in his case in chief. Similarly, NRS 174.235(1)(a) requires the government to provide: "Written or recorded statements or confessions made by the defendant, or any written or recorded statements made by a witness the prosecuting attorney intends to call during the case in chief of the state..." NRS 174.235(1)(c) further obligates the government to disclose to the defense "books, papers, documents, tangible objects, or copies thereof, which the prosecuting attorney intends to introduce in the case in chief of the state." NRS 174.305 provides that, when a party fails to comply with the provisions of NRS 174.235, the trial court may "permit inspection of the materials not previously disclosed, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the material not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances."

Prosecutors noticed Ms. Rodrigues as a case-in-chief witness. Accordingly, she was the subject of the defense request(s) for prior statements. The court granted the request and ordered prosecutors to turn over any written or recorded statement statements made by Ms. Rodrigues and the other noticed witnesses. The prosecutor failed to honor this directive, and instead withheld the DFS affidavit containing Ms. Rodrigues's statements. Accordingly, the prosecutor violated the trial court's discovery Order, as well as NRS 174.235.

Admittedly, the matter did not proceed to trial, and Ms. Rodrigues, as the mother of the deceased, provided a victim impact statement at sentencing. However, the term 'case in chief,' as set forth in NRS 174.235, includes each party's evidentiary presentation at a penalty hearing. Floyd v. State, 118 Nev. 156 (2002). Accordingly, the prosecutor violated the lower court's discovery Order as well as NRS 174.235 by withholding the statement of a witness who exercised her statutorily conferred right to testify at the instant sentencing hearing.

Notably, even if prosecutors ultimately decided not to call Ms. Rodrigues at either the trial or sentencing phases of Mr. Quisano's proceeding(s), they nonetheless were obligated to disclose the affidavit at issue. Prosecutors may not lawfully withhold inculpatory material and

information simply because they do not intend to present the material or information during the government's case in chief. State v. Harrington, 9 Nev. 91, 94 (1873); People v. Carter, 312 P.2d 665, 675 (Cal.1957); People v. Bunyard, 756 P.2d 795, 809 (Cal. 1988). Any holding to the contrary would allow prosecutors to engage in unfair surprise by withholding inculpatory material from the government's case in chief, only to surprise the defense by using it in rebuttal.

Additionally, the instant prosecutor's invocation of, and defense counsel's subsequent reliance upon, the Clark County District Attorney's Office 'open file policy,' compels the conclusion that use of the prosecutor's use of the document at issue here required prior disclosure. Historically, the Clark County District Attorney's Office has employed an 'open file' policy in which prosecutors allow defense counsel to review the discovery contained in the government's trial file. Once this open file policy is invoked, as was the case here, the defense may rely on that representation and assume that the prosecutor has provided all relevant discovery. See, e.g., Strickler v. Green, 527 U.S. 263, 283, n. 23 (1999) ("If a prosecutor asserts that he complies with Brady through an open file policy, defense counsel may reasonably rely on that file to contain all materials the State is constitutionally obligated to

disclose..." See also Amando v. Gonzalez, No. 11-56420 at 27 (9th Cir. 2013).

Indeed, this was the Nevada Supreme Court's holding in McKee v. State, 112 Nev. 642, 644 (1996). In McKee, the prosecution withheld an inculpatory photo of the defendant. After the defendant testified, the government disclosed the photo and sought to admit it through another witness. Id. The trial court allowed introduction of the photo. Id. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed, holding that, given the prosecutor's earlier assurance of an 'open file policy,' the defense was entitled to assume the government had provided all relevant inculpatory and exculpatory evidence in the case. Id. Accordingly, the prosecution's introduction of the undisclosed inculpatory photo at trial amounted to unfair surprise. Id.

This is precisely what happened here. Not only did both NRS 174.234 and the lower court's discovery Order require disclosure of the instant affidavit, but the prosecutor's assurance of an 'open file policy' compelled the disclosure, as well. The prosecutor's invocation of an 'open file policy' misled the defense into believing that the government had provided all relevant discovery. As such, the introduction of the undisclosed affidavit amounted to unfair surprise. And the surprise revolved around the critical issue of Mr. Quisano's sentence. As this Court is well-aware, a testifying

victim-impact speaker can have large sway over a sentencing authority. But
for the unfair surprise and resulting prejudice occasioned by the DFS
affidavit, the sentencing result may have been very different. Thus, under

McKee, the instant discovery violation requires reversal.

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25. Preservation of issues: A) Objections by defense counsel.(ROA 1176-78); B) Repeated objections by defense counsel. (ROA 1173-75);C) Sentencing counsel preserved this issue by oral motion. (ROA 1515).

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Notably, this Honorable Court asked the parties to discuss both <u>McKee</u>, supra, as well as <u>Furbay v. State</u>, 116 Nev. 481 (2000). In <u>Furbay</u>, the Nevada Supreme Court rejected the defense contention that prosecutors were required to disclose reports authored by a police officer who testified at Furbay's penalty hearing. However, <u>Furbay</u> is not dispositive of the issue currently before this Court. First, the <u>Furbay</u> prosecutor, unlike the instant prosecutor, did not offer assurances of an 'open file policy.' The <u>Furbay</u> Court distinguished <u>Furbay</u> from <u>McKee</u> on this basis. Second, unlike the case at bar, there is no evidence that Furbay sought and obtained a discovery order directing production of the very material withheld from the defense. Third, there is no evidence that the witness at issue in <u>Furbay</u>, unlike Ms. Rodrigues, had been noticed as a prosecution case-in-chief witness, such that the discovery obligations conferred by NRS 174 applied. Thus, unlike **McKee**, **Furbay** is not dispositive of the issue(s) at bar.

26. **Issues of first impression or of public interest:** Issue C is an issue of first impression as there is no published case addressing SCR 230. It is also of public interest as the sentencing judge addressed public access to courtrooms through the media.

Respectfully submitted,

PHILIP J. KOHN

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By\_

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## **VERIFICATION**

1. I hereby certify that this supplemental fast track statement complies with the formatting requirements of NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeface requirements of NRAP 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of NRAP 32(a)(6) because:

This supplemental fast track statement has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Times New Roman in 14 font size;

2. I further certify that this supplemental fast track statement complies with the page or type-volume limitations of NRAP 3C(h)(2) because it is either:

[XX] Proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more, and contains 2,142 words.

3. Finally, I recognize that pursuant to NRAP 3C I am responsible for filing a timely fast track statement and that the Supreme Court of Nevada may sanction an attorney for failing to file a timely fast track statement, or failing to raise material issues or arguments in the fast track statement, or failing to cooperate fully with appellate counsel during the course of an appeal. I therefore certify that the information provided in this fast track statement is true and complete to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

DATED this 15<sup>th</sup> day of June, 2015.

PHILIP I. KOI CLARK CAUI	IN VILLE DEF.
	N J. REED, #3795
Denuty 1	Public Defender

NA Dep

By

ICX LEMCKE, #5416

Deputy Public Defender

## **CERTIFICATE OF MAILING**

I hereby certify and affirm that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Supplemental Fast Track Statement to the attorney of record listed below on this 16<sup>th</sup> day of June, 2015.

STEVEN B. WOLFSON
CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
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BY

Employee, Clark County Public Defender's Office

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