On October 14, 2005, an indictment was returned charging Flowers with offenses relating to both Coote and Gonzalez.² With the permission of the Court, the State dismissed the original information charging Flowers with offenses relating to Coote only (that was set for trial October 24, 2005), and proceeded on the indictment pertaining to both Coote and Gonzalez.

Interestingly, approximately, two weeks before the trial date in a capital case, attorney Bret Whipple sent a letter to the Office of the District Attorney indicating that he had been retained to represent defendant Flowers on the charges pertaining to Coote. He had filed no appearance with the Court, he had filed no motions, he had filed no notice of experts, he had filed no witness list, yet he claimed to be ready for trial. Further, he objected to the continuance of the trial.

The Court continued the trial to January 29, 2007. When the trial was continued, and Flowers' family could no longer afford to pay his fee, Whipple no longer represented Flowers. He asked the Court to appoint him. The Court denied that request.

While preparing for trial, the State discovered that Flowers' DNA was found in the vagina of a third woman who had been strangled and violently sexually assaulted (the case before this Court). The State presented the case to the grand jury and an indictment was returned. The State filed a motion to consolidate the cases in the case with the lower case That Court denied the motion, but did appoint Whipple to represent Flowers despite the fact that 2 special public defenders are already representing him and have done all of the work.

The defense now asks this Court to appoint Whipple to represent Flowers in addition to the special public defenders. The State opposes.

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² C216032 is scheduled for trial in district court 6 on October 22, 2007.

ARGUMENT

DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A THIRD ATTORNEY

THAT WOULD BE PAID HOURLY AT THE

TAXPAYER'S EXPENSE

Clearly Flowers has a constitutional right to counsel. Because the instant case is a capital case, Supreme Court Rule 250 applies. Supreme Court Rule 250 requires the appointment of two attorneys in capital cases where the defendant is indigent and is receiving the assistance of counsel by means of appointed counsel by the court. Thus, Flowers must have two (2) attorneys. In fact, he has two (2) attorneys. Special public defenders Randall Pike and Clark Patrick have been actively representing Flowers, filing motions and making requests of the State since their appointment in September 2005. Flowers simply wants Whipple even though he cannot afford to pay him and complains about the attorneys who are working hard for him believing he can get this court to appoint Whipple as well.

While it is axiomatic that a criminal defendant has a right to an attorney, "The right to counsel of one's own choosing is not absolute." <u>United States v. Deegan</u>, 428 F.2d 714, 716 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 928 (1970). Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has stated that, "[t]he Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a meaningful relationship between accused and his counsel." <u>Morris v. Slappy</u>, 461 U.S. 1, 13 (1983).

Long ago, our Supreme Court stated, "[a] defendant is not entitled to reject his court-appointed counsel and request substitution of other counsel at public expense absent a showing of adequate cause for such a change." <u>Junior v. State</u>, 91 Nev. 439, 441 (1975). Subsequently, in <u>Thomas v. State</u>, 94 Nev. 605, 607-08 (1978), that Court held that a defendant's right to substitution of counsel is limited. The decision whether friction between counsel and client justifies appointment of new counsel is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court and should not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear showing of abuse.

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More recently, in <u>Gallego v. State</u>, 117 Nev. 348, 23 P.3d 227 (2001), the Supreme Court stated:

An indigent defendant "has a right to substitution only upon establishing 'good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown of communication, or an irreconcilable conflict which [could] lead ... to an apparently unjust verdict.' The mere loss of confidence in his appointed counsel does not establish 'good cause.'" Good cause is not "determined solely according to the subjective standard of what the defendant perceives. While loss of trust is certainly a factor in assessing good cause, a defendant seeking substitution of assigned counsel must nevertheless afford the court with legitimate reasons for the lack of confidence." "Attorney-client conflicts justify the grant of a substitution motion only when counsel and defendant are so at odds as to prevent presentation of an adequate defense." (citations omitted).

The defense has made no showing whatsoever regarding "good cause" to dismiss the special public defenders and appoint alternate counsel. The defendant has created his own conflict so he can have the attorney of his choice without having to pay for him. Flowers has two (2) attorneys who handle only capital murders. Who better to represent the defendant than the attorneys who have worked diligently on his case for more than one year and are intimately familiar with all aspects of the case? The defendant's request to appoint Whipple must be denied.

EVIDENCE OF THE MURDERS OF COOTE AND GONZALEZ SHOULD BE ADMITTED

Section 48.045(2) of the Nevada Revised Statutes provides:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

In applying NRS 48.045(2), courts must assess whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by a risk of prejudice. Significantly, however, courts have recognized a distinction between evidence that is incriminating versus evidence that is actually prejudicial. For instance, in <u>United States v. Harrison</u>, 679 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the prosecution presented evidence that the defendant had been engaged in drug dealing in the past over a period of time in order to establish motive, intent, preparation, and absence of mistake on his current drug charges. The court held that allowing the extrinsic

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There is nothing "unfair" in admitting direct evidence of the defendant's past acts by an eyewitness thereto that constituted substantive proof of the relevant intent alleged in the indictment. The intent with which a person commits an act on a given occasion can many times be best proven by testimony or evidence of his acts over a period of time prior thereto . . .

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Id. at 948. 6

Therefore, while certain evidence may increase the likelihood of conviction and thus be incriminating, such evidence may not unfairly cast the defendant in a bad light and therefore be prejudicial.

In the instant case, Flowers' two cases are cross-admissible. Evidence of the May murders of Coote and Gonzalez are admissible in a trial focusing on the March murder of Quarles because such evidence would be relevant to identity, intent, and motive and vice versa. In Gallego v. State, 101 Nev. 782, 711 P.2d 856 (1985), the Nevada Supreme Court noted how a defendant's prior murders could be relevant in establishing a common plan, intent, identity, and motive in a subsequent murder case. In Gallego, the defendant was charged with kidnapping, assaulting, and killing two young women by bludgeoning them with a hammer. The trial court permitted the State to introduce evidence that Gallego had previously kidnapped two young women from a shopping mall and shot and killed them. Id. at 789, 711 P.2d at 861. On appeal, Gallego challenged the introduction of such evidence.

The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and introduction of the evidence on several grounds within NRS 48.045(2). The court noted that the evidence was relevant to Gallego's intent and motive, because both instances were prompted by a "sex slave" fantasy on the part of Gallego. The court also commented that the evidence was relevant because the prior murders were "not remote in time from the killings here considered" and that "substantial similarities" were shown to exist between the two events, suggesting that the evidence was relevant to issues of identity as well as a common scheme or plan. See id.

In other cases, the Nevada Supreme Court has commented how a particular modus operandi to a crime can be relevant and admissible under NRS 48.045(2) when the identity of the perpetrator is at issue. The court has stated that modus operandi evidence is proper in

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"situations where a positive identification of the perpetrator has not been made, and the offered evidence establishes a signature crime so clear as to establish the identity of the person on trial." Mortensen v. State, 115 Nev. 273, 280, 986 P.2d 1105, 1110 (1999).

In the case of Flowers, all three victims were casual acquaintances of Flowers. All three were killed in their residences. All three were killed during daylight hours. In addition to being murdered, all three also had some minor property taken from them as well. More significantly, of course, all three were sexually assaulted prior to their deaths. The victims all had damage to their vaginal and/or anal areas substantiating the sexual assault charges. All three victims were killed by means of strangulation. Admittedly, the cause of death for Sheila Quarles was a drowning; however, the strangulation was a significant contributing factor to the death. Certainly, the similarity of the three murders constitutes evidence of identity admissible under NRS 48.045(2).

The murder of Quarles is a crime that went unsolved. Investigators pursued every lead available to them, but were unable to ascertain who killed and sexually assaulted her. It wasn't until Flowers' DNA profile was obtained, analyzed and entered into the DNA database during the course of the investigation into the murders of Coote and Gonzalez that the investigators were notified that there was a match with the minor component DNA from Quarles vaginal swabs. Investigators then learned that Flowers knew Quarles mother, Debra. He would take her home from work. In fact, they had a dating relationship for a period of time. He also knew victim Coote and knew of victim Gonzalez through his girlfriend.

Additionally, evidence of the March 2005 killing is relevant to the May 2005 killings because it would constitute evidence of intent and lack of accident as well which are also admissible under NRS 48.045(2). In Petrocelli v. State, 101 Nev. 46, 52, 692 P.2d 503, 508 (1985), reversed on other grounds by Petrocelli v. Angelone, 242 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2001), the Nevada Supreme Court explained how in a murder prosecution where defendant was claiming that a homicide was an accident, evidence of a prior killing committed by him which he also claimed was accidental was relevant and admissible under NRS 48.045(2).

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In one of his interviews regarding the May killings, Flowers maintained that while he may have had sex with Marilee Coote, but he did not kill her. This, of course, occurred after he adamantly denied having sex with her at all. In any case, given that one possible defense available to Flowers is that he had consensual sex with Coote and she somehow died during the encounter, evidence of the March 2004 killing is relevant to his intent during his encounter with Coote. The fact that he previously had had a violent sexual encounter which resulted in vaginal trauma to victim Sheila Quarles as well as her strangulation and death is evidence that Coote's strangulation was intentional and not an accident. See id.

Finally, evidence of the March 2005 murder is relevant to the May 2005 murders in terms of the sexual assault counts. In one of several interviews with detectives, Flowers claimed that he had consensual intercourse with Marilee Coote, notwithstanding the trauma to her genital area. He mentioned that they may have engaged in "rough" sex at one point during his interview. Evidence of the sexual assault trauma to Sheila Quarles would be relevant to the issue of whether Coote consented to a sexual encounter with Flowers. In Williams v. State, 95 Nev. 830, 603, P.2d 694 (1979), a sexual assault victim testified that she met the defendant while discussing a possible job as his secretary. At some point, the defendant offered her \$5000 for a "one night stand," but she refused. The defendant told her that he was trained in martial arts and demonstrated what he could do to her and then sexually assaulted her. The defendant maintained that the intercourse was consensual. The State presented the testimony of two prior victims, from incidents occurring nineteen months before the charged incident, who testified that they met the defendant through a job interview and were coerced into having sex with him after he demonstrated his karate knowledge. In affirming the admission of testimony regarding the prior incidents, the Nevada Supreme Court stated:

In the instant case, evidence of Williams' sexual misconduct with other persons was admitted as being relevant to prove his intent to have intercourse with the victim without her consent. This evidence was introduced after Williams admitted committing the act, but claimed to have done so with the victim's consent. By acknowledging the commission of the act but asserting his innocent intent by claiming consent as a defense, Williams himself placed in issue a necessary element of the offense and it was, therefore, proper for the

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prosecution to present the challenged evidence, which was relevant on the issue of intent, in order to rebut Williams' testimony on a point material to the establishment of his guilt.

<u>Id</u>. at 833.

Because all three victims were killed after they were sexually assaulted, the State must rely on circumstances and medical testimony to establish the lack of consent in the instant case. Flowers' subsequent conduct with Coote and Gonzalez, who also were sexually assaulted by Flowers and subsequently killed, is that much more probative.

Although the murders and sexual assault of Coote and Gonzalez occurred after the murder and sexual assault of Quarles, the courts have held that there is no distinction between "prior" and "subsequent" bad acts so long as both satisfy the statutory analysis for admissibility. See, <u>United States v. Ayers</u>, 924 F.2d 1468, 1472-1474 (9th Cir. 1991).

As far as the penalty hearing is concerned, the State is unsure how Flowers justified excluding the murders of Coote and Gonzalez. Assuming for purposes of argument that there is a conviction for first degree murder, pursuant to NRS 175.552, a penalty hearing must be held. During that hearing, "evidence may be presented concerning aggravating and mitigating circumstances relative to the offense, defendant or victim and on any other matter which the court deems relevant to sentence, whether or not the evidence is ordinarily admissible." What could possibly be more relevant at the sentencing regarding the Quarles murder than the fact that Flowers did the same thing to two other women? Additionally, the other murders are potentially aggravating circumstances. *See* 200.033.

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1	<u>CONCLUSION</u>
2	Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully asks this Court to deny defendant's
3	Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence of Other Bad Acts and Motion to Confirm Counsel.
4	DATED this <u>2nd</u> day of February, 2007.
5	Respectfully submitted,
6	DAVID ROGER
7	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781
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9	BY /s//LISA LUZAICH
10	LISA LUZAICH Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #005056
11	Nevada Bar #005056
12	CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
13	I hereby certify that service of State's Opposition, was made this 2nd day of February,
14	2007, by facsimile transmission to:
15	RANDALL PIKE, Special Public Defender CLARK W. PATRICK, Special Public Defender
16	455-6273
17	and
18	BRET WHIPPLE, ESQ. 543-3505
19	
20	BY M. Warner Employee of the District Attorney's Office
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1	DISTRICT COURT
2	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
3	THE STATE OF NEVADA,
4) GLERK
5	Plaintiff,)
6	vs.) No. C228) Dept. XI
7	NORMAN FLOWERS,
8	Defendant.) Of
9	
10	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
11	BEFORE THE HONORABLE DONALD M. MOSLEY
12	April 13, 2007 9:00 a.m.
13	Department XIV
14	
15	
16	A DDEADANGEC.
17	APPEARANCES:
18	For the State: MS. LISA LUZAICH
19	Deputy District Attorney
20	For the Defendant: MR. RANDALL PIKE Special Deputy Public Defender
21	special beputy rubite belender
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24	Reported by:
25	Joseph A. D'Amato Nevada CCR #17

AUG 2 8 2008 CLERK OF THE COURT

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	1	1	office.
7-	1 DISTRICT COURT	2	THE COURT: I thought you were the
	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA	3	Defendant for a minute. Excuse me.
7	3 THE STATE OF NEVADA,	4	MS. LUZAICH: We informed Judge
	4) Plaintiff,)	5	Bonaventure of the other two, the murder of the two
	5) vs.) No. C228755 6) Dept. XIV	6	individuals was set for trial when we discovered
	NORMAN FLOWERS,)	7	that the Defendant was linked to the murder of the
	Defendant,)	8	third victim.
1	9	9	We informed Judge Bonaventure about
	10 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE DONALD M. MOSLEY	10	that and we indicated that we were doing a motion to
-	11 12 April 13, 2007	11	consolidate and we were under the impression that he
	9:00 a.m. 13 Department XIV	12	was then going to accommodate and when we did the
	14	13	motion to consolidate he denied it.
	15	14	We were all, I think, a tad surprised.
	16 APPEARANCES:	15	THE COURT: Well, notwithstanding that,
	17 For the State: 18 MS. LISA LUZATCH	16	certainly I don't want to suggest any disrespect to
	Deputy District Attorney	17	Judge Bonaventure. I'm the guy that's got to take
ļ	For the Defendant: 20 MR. RANDALL PIKE	18	care of this now.
	Special Deputy Public Defender 21	19	MS. LUZAICH: Correct.
	22	20	THE COURT: I feel that I have it
	23	21	within my authority to evaluate it in any way I care
	24 Reported by: Joseph A. D'Amato Nevada CCR #17	22	to.
		23	I don't know why you want to have two
		24	trials when you could have one. Looks to me like
		25	this is practically everything about this is
	2		4
1	THE COURT: C228755, State versus	1	consistent. Correct me if I misstate something
2	Norman Flowers. There's been a request to hear the	2	here.
3	Flowers matter, at the outset.	3	Allegedly, there was sexual assault of
4	It there any problem?	4	the three victims. The first murder, allegedly, was
5	MS. LUZAICH: I'm in trial.	5	the 24th of March. Forty days later, the 3rd of of
6	THE COURT: I know you don't have a	6	May, two other murders, again, sexual assault in all
7	problem with it. The record reflects the presence	7	three, all three strangulation, all three little
8	of the defendant, in custody, we have Mr. Pike	8	pieces of memorabilia, comes, whatever, taken from
9	present for the Defendant, Ms. Luzaich for the	9	the victims and the Defendant is now charged with
10	State.	10	all three, I believe.
11	This matter is on for a Motion to	11	MS. LUZAICH: Correct.
12	Suppress.	12	THE COURT: Counsel?
13	I have a couple preliminary questions	13	MR. PIKE: Well, procedurally, the
14	I'd like to ask. First of all, it's supressed	14	reason I filed this motion is because when the
15	unless there is a successful motion for bad acts.	15	Indictment came forward and it was not tracked to
16	We have this thing backwards, but	16	Department VI and came to your department as a
17	regardless, we're here.	17	separate case.
18	Why is this matter not consolidated	18	The State then, within the time limit
19	for trial?	19	that they had, filed their notice of intent to seek
20	MS. LUZAICH: That's kind of a good	20	the death penalty which included reference to the
21	question.	21	other cases.
22	MR. PIKE: Judge Bonaventure	22	So because he had invoked his right to
23	THE COURT: We have the defendant, in	23	a speedy trial in those other cases and this came up
24	custody. This gentleman is?	24	it was my impression that the State would bring a
25 1 of 2	MR. PIKE: Clark Patrick from my 9 sheets Page 1 to	25 4 of	repeat motion, and that they also intended to bring 113 08/25/2008 06:01:11 AM
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5 in that evidence, if they were successful in so we're asking for a ruling on this so we can then 1 2obtaining a first degree conviction, in a penalty 2 evaluate whether or not we'll bring in the motion to 3 phase. 3 ioin that. I needed to find out if we were in a 4 Again, we're not conceding these are 5 scenario where, in order to protect my Defendant's similar in any way, shape or form. They are only 5 due process rights from him invoking his right to a 6 tied together in that Mr. Flowers had knowledge of 7 speedy trial in Department VI, that the evidence of 7 or new people that knew these other people. the other cases as well as this case be tried 8 THE COURT: Ms. Luzaich, what about 9 completely separate and that there not be any 9 this DNA? 10 cross-reference to those offenses to this offense. 10 In the case currently before the Court 11 And given that situation I thought it 11 the March incident, there was DNA? 12 was appropriate to bring the Motion in Limine prior 12 MS. LUZAICH: Yes. 13 to the State bringing the motion, because if the 13 The Defendant's DNA is present in the Court was going to deny the Motion in Limine, rather 14 14 vagina of the victim who was murdered. than wait close to the time of trial, if it was 15 15 THE COURT: The other two, what's the 16 denied, I felt it was necessary to preserve that 16 status of the DNA there? 17 issue so that if subsequent to your ruling that 17 MS. LUZAICH: In the other two there you're going to allow it in anyway, then you're 18 18 were two murders committed on the same day in the right. 19 19 same apartment complex within hours of each other 20 Then a consolidated trial -- the taint 20 and they were committed in exactly -- almost exactly 21 is going to be there, the difficulty is going to be 21 the same way. there and we should at that point in time consider 22 22 His DNA is present in the vagina and 23 23 whether or not the defense, in order to avoid the around the body of the first victim. He was -- he 24 potential prejudice of having two death penalty 24 was excluded from the second victim, but there were 25 hearings, death penalty trials -- it would be in 25 also partial -- there were several different DNA Mr. Flowers' benefit to -- for the extraordinary mixtures. However, although his DNA was excluded 1 1 2 motion for the defense to actually accommodate it 2 from her body, after the preliminary hearing several 3 and to preview that in front of the jury. jailhouse informants came to us and testified at the The issue that's involved in this as Grand Jury that the Defendant admitted to far as the time frame and the facts as the Court has participating in that murder, but that he did it 6 set them forth, there was a connection or knowledge 6 with another individual, which he also says he did 7 where Mr. Flowers knew these individuals. 7 the other murder on that day with another The DNA specifically excluded him on individual. 8 9 one of the other two and the only reason that the 9 While his DNA is not present in victim 10 second one in the Department VI case came to 10 number three, in time, there are admissions by the 11 light -- it was dismissed at a preliminary hearing, Defendant that he was present at the scene and 11 then the State, through some jailhouse informants, 12 12 participated. 13 was able to obtain an indictment. 13 MR. PATRICK: If I may, the three 14 This case was brought to the attention 14 murders are really not that similar. The first one 15 of the defense and basically it's just tied in with 15 that happened first in time which we're here for --16 DNA that was present on the deceased in the case 16 actually the cause of death was drowning. before Your Honor. 17 The coroner did mention there may have 17 18 been some strangulation involved, but the cause of There is no -- nothing else other than 18 that DNA to suggest that Mr. Flowers was involved in death was actually drowning. 19 19 20 it and so I'm anticipating because of the nature of 20 The second one where Mr. Flowers' DNA the other two offenses in the other case, that they 21 21 was found was manual strangulation. The victim was 22 would attempted to bring that in to prove identity 22 nude. They had had a sexual relationship in the

or motive or common scheme or plan.

That's why we're here. We didn't have

a ruling on this last time when it was not granted,

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The third victim, where Mr. Flowers'

DNA was not found, was strangulated using ligatures,

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past.

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1	was fully clothed on her bed. There	1	if nothing else.
2	Is a lot of objection there's more	2	MS. LUZAICH: Procedurally, I don't
3	dissimilarities in these three cases than	3	know if you actually consolidate the cases, because
G A	similarities.	4	Judge Bonaventure has the lower case number. So if
5	I think the reason why Judge	5	they agree to the consolidation I guess that would
6	Bonaventure didn't accommodate these is he was	6	waive the actual procedural issue that you can admit
7	looking at Tabish and the fact there was 41 days in	7	the bad acts.
8	between the two incidences is too far in time to	8	THE COURT: You're correct in the sense
9	make them a part of the same plan or scope.	9	that, yes, if I'm going to consolidate and he's
10	MS. LUZAICH: With all due respect to	10	going to try it, he has the last say in the matter.
11	Judge Bonaventure, ever since he was referenced in	11	That's true. We don't know who will
12	Tabish he doesn't accommodate anything anymore and	12	be trying it.
13	pretty much severs anything.	13	MS. LUZAICH: It won't be him any
14	His comment was just because it's a	14	longer.
15	capital case and in an abundance of caution and	15	THE COURT: That could be a problem.
16	because of Tabish Tabish has nothing to do with	16	MS. LUZAICH: It's my understanding
17	this case.	17	Mr Judge Villani will be taking over his case
18	Tabish was overturned for completely	18	load.
19	different reasons than we are seeking to bring in	19	MS. LUZAICH: That's true.
20	bad acts in this case.	20	THE COURT: He has been qualified to
21	THE COURT: The first individual, the	21	handle death cases? When did that occur?
22	indications of drowning; how does that go?	22	MR. PIKE: He's already been sworn in.
23	MS. LUZAICH: No.	23	THE COURT: Is he sitting?
24	She was strangled and she was in a	24	MR. PIKE: Yes. He was sworn in early
25	bathtub full of water so while the ultimate cause of	25	by Judge Hardcastle so he could start right away.
	10		12
1	death was called drowning she was obviously	1	The swearing in will not be for a while, but he's up
2	strangled as well.	2	and going.
3	That was a contributing factor to her	3	THE COURT: He's actually in Court
4	death, the coroner said.	4	doing the business of the Court?
5	THE COURT: This Court is going to	5	MR. PIKE: I was at the swearing in
6	consolidate these matters for trial. That moots the	6	ceremony.
7	motion.	7	MS. LUZAICH: The trial date in
8	The trial date of the 26th of	8	District Court VI is in October.
9	November, is there a dual date here?	9	MR. PIKE: I suggest we set a status
10	MS. LUZAICH: I don't believe so.	10	check in about 30 days. I'll file the motion if
11	THE COURT: No, I guess not. Its	11	you're denying my Motion in Limine.
12	second on stack.	12	THE COURT: I'm not.
13	The 26th of November, as far as I'm	13	Here is the problem. If I'm going to
14	concerned, is the date. The 20th of November is	14	allow this as a bad act, I'm going to have to have
15	calendar call.	15	testimony here to establish that it occurred through
16	Now, I have a question. Is Mr.	16	clear and convincing evidence.
17	Whipple involved in this or not?	17	That means I'll have two little trials
18	MR. PIKE: He is.	18	going on here. That doesn't appeal to me.
19	We'd ask it be consolidated in the	19	What I'm going to do is remand I'm
20	earlier case which is in Department VI. That's an	20	going to not make a decision in this matter
21	earlier number and Mr. Whipple is counsel in that	21	currently at this point.
22	Case. THE COURT: Wall let me hack up hack	22	I'm going to announce on the record that I consider this moot in that these cases should
23	THE COURT: Well, let me back up back	23	be consolidated.
24 25	up a minute. In all fairness, we should have Mr. Whipple here and have that as an accommodation,	25	You are correct, Ms. Luzaich. Judge
	9 sheets Page 9 to	OL I	113 08/25/2008 06:01:11 AM AA0151

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	Villani is going to have to make the	15	
1 2	Villani is going to have to make the decision,	1	
	because arguably I've got one case here.	2	
3	It makes sense to consolidate them.	3	
1	If he says no, then he's got his problem. I've got	4	1
5	mine, I suppose.	5	-
6	For judicial economy and for common	6	
7	sense it looks to me like they should be	7	ļ
8	consolidated. I'm going to make no decision in the	8	l
9	matter without prejudice, certainly.	9	j
10	We can bring it up as it may come down	10	
11	the pike.	11	
12	No offense, Mr. Pike.	12	
13	I'll remand this or I'll ask you,	13	
14	Ms. Luzaich or Mr. Pike or Mr. Patrick, but get it	14	
15	before Judge Villani as early as you can.	15	
16	To be fair to everybody we need to	16	
17	make a decision. You can place this back on	17	ľ
18	calendar at your pleasure, determining on what Judge	18	
19	Villani says.	19	
20		20	
21	ATTEST that this is a true and	21	
22	complete transcript of the proceedings.	22	
23		23	
24		24	
25	J.A. D'AMATO CCR 17	25	
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NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF COURT'S RULING

DATE OF HEARING: 11/15/07

TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 A.M.

COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by DAVID ROGER, District Attorney, through PAMELA WECKERLY, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and files this Notice of Motion and Motion For Clarification of Court's Ruling.

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CLERK OF THE COURT

This Motion is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if deemed necessary by this Honorable Court.

NOTICE OF HEARING

YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will bring the foregoing motion on for setting before the above entitled Court, in Department

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VII thereof, on Thursday, the 7th day of November, 2007, at the hour of 8:30 A.M., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard.

DATED this 31st day of October, 2007.

DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781

PAMELA WECKERLY
Chief Deputy District Attorney
Nevada Bar #006163

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Fact of Case C214390 in District Court XI

1. Marilee Coote

On May 3, 2005, Silver Pines Apartments employees discovered 45 year old Marilee Coote lying on her living room floor. Ms. Coote was a reliable employee of the Andre Agassi Center. When she did not arrive at work by 7:30 a.m., a co-worker became concerned and asked the apartment workers to do a welfare check. After the apartment employees discovered the body, they contacted the police.

Initially, paramedics arrived, but Ms. Coote was already deceased. Police followed. Ms. Coote was found lying on her living room floor, facing up and completely nude. Inside her belly button were ashes from burnt incense. The skin between her upper thighs and her pubic area was burned. Coote's apartment was locked, but her purse and keys were missing. Inside Coote's washing machine, police found personal photos, bills, and identification belonging to Coote. The items appeared to have been washed because they had a soap residue on them. In the bathtub, under ten inches of water, police found other items of

paperwork, a phone book, and jewelry boxes covered with a towel. The apartment was otherwise very neat and undisturbed.

The detectives initially did not view this incident as a homicide. Therefore, they documented the scene, but did not collect evidence. After conducting an autopsy, however, Dr. Knoblock concluded the Coote died as the result of strangulation. He also noted tearing of Coote's labia and anal area. Dr. Knoblock concluded that these tears were sustained antemortem. Coote also had contusions on her arms and forearms.

Ms. Coote was an acquaintance of defendant Norman Flowers's girlfriend, Mawusi Ragland, who also lived in the Silver Pines complex.

2. Juanita Curry

While various officers were in Coote's apartment during the morning of May 3, 2005, another resident of the complex, Juanita Curry, came in contact with the defendant, Norman Flowers. This occurred between 7:00 and 10:00 a.m. Curry also was an acquaintance of Flowers's girlfriend, Mawusi Ragland. Curry lived two floors below Coote. Curry noticed the police and paramedics going in and out of Coote's apartment. From apartment employees, Curry believed that Coote died of natural causes. Sometime that same morning, defendant Flowers knocked on Curry's door. He asked if he could use her phone. He said he was supposed to meet up with Mawusi that morning. She agreed and gave him the phone.

Curry is physically disabled and sometimes walks with a cane. Because of her compromised physical state, she was not comfortable allowing Flowers in her apartment, so she let him use her cordless phone in the doorway. After Flowers used the phone, he came back a few times later, each time with a new request. He asked to use the phone again. He asked for water. At one point, he asked to use her bathroom. She agreed, but when he went in the bathroom, she stepped out of the apartment. As she did so, he asked her to come in and help him find the bathroom light. She refused. When Flowers was at her doorstep, she also noticed that when the police walked back and forth, he would turn his head away. He commented, "the police make me nervous." During the final conversation in Curry's doorway, Flowers leaned down and tried to kiss Curry on the mouth. She turned away.

Curry observed Flowers walk across the parking lot to the doorway of resident Rena Gonzalez's apartment that morning. Curry left the complex a little before 11:00 in the morning. When she returned, she learned that the police also had discovered the body of resident Rena Gonzalez. She gave a statement to police and identified Mawusi's boyfriend as someone she saw in the area of Rena Gonzalez's apartment.

3. Rena Gonzalez

Officers learned of the homicide involving Rena Gonzalez at approximately 4:00 p.m. that same day. Rena Gonzalez's two daughters, the oldest of whom is seven years old, came home from school and found their mother on her knees leaning against her bed in her master bedroom. She was unresponsive. They ran and got their friend, Shayne. Shayne returned with them. They tried to remove a phone cord around Gonzalez's neck and called 911.

Gonzalez's apartment was clean and undisturbed with the exception of the following: a broken blue plastic hair comb and a single green sandal were both in the front hallway. Officers could not locate Gonzalez's purse or keys.

Gonzalez was at the foot of her bed, with her body bent at the waist. Her upper torso was on the bed with her face down and arms outstretched. A black phone cord and black lanyard were around her neck. She was dressed in shorts, which were slightly pulled down, and a shirt. She had the matching blue hairclip hanging from her hair and blood coming from her ear.

At autopsy, Dr. Simms noted extensive bruising to Gonzalez's breast, right arm and right leg. Dr. Simms concluded that Gonzalez died as a result of strangulation. He also noted tearing to her vaginal and anal area. Dr. Simms concluded that these injuries took place post-mortem.

Detectives learned that Rena Gonzalez was a close friend of Mawusi Ragland. In fact, the two women would trade off watching each other's children. They determined that Gonzalez had walked her daughters to the school bus the morning of the 3rd and would have returned home around 8:30 a.m. Rena Gonzalez did not work.

4. Mawusi Ragland

Mawusi Ragland also lived at the Silver Pines Apartments. She lived in the apartment across from Coote. She told detectives that approximately three weeks before the homicide, she and Flowers had gotten into an argument and had not spoken since. In the argument, Mawusi implied that she would socialize with other men. Mawusi had discussed Flowers with her friend Rena Gonzalez as well, although Flowers and Gonzalez had not met. According to Mawusi, Gonzalez advised her not to date Flowers.

When Mawusi returned home on the evening of May 3, she saw police vehicles. She was told her friend, Rena, had been murdered and that her other friend, Marilee, had died of natural causes. On her apartment door, Mawusi noticed a note. It was from Flowers. It stated that he tried to catch her before she went to work, but that it looked like he picked a bad day because "big shit is happening over here." He also asked if she had dated other men since their argument. Flowers called Mawusi that evening. She was very emotional and explained that both Marilee and Rena were dead. Flowers did not appear to be shocked upon hearing this news. She asked him to come over and help her through this difficult time. He told her he'd be right over. When Flowers did not arrive in the next 90 minutes, Mawusi called him to ask where he was. He said he had not left home because when tried to call her, she did not answer her phone. He also mentioned that he had seen Rena that morning and had a short conversation with her. Mawusi asked him what time he was at the complex and Flowers responded, "I didn't kill her."

After speaking with Mawusi, detectives interviewed Norman Flowers. Initially, he told officers that he had no contact with Marilee Coote on the morning of the murder. He said he had not seen her for months. He also explained that he met Rena Gonzalez several months earlier through Mawusi. He admitted that he had spoken with Rena that morning, but denied ever entering her apartment. Flowers agreed to provide a DNA sample.

Subsquently, Flowers's DNA sample was compared with swabs from Marilee Coote's sexual assault kit. Both vaginal and rectal swabs matched to Flowers. In addition, DNA was

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collected from the carpet area where Coote was laying, specifically, the carpet beneath her upper thighs. That sample also matched to Flowers.

Detectives interviewed Flowers again. He still maintained that he had never been in Gonzalez's apartment that morning. With regard to Marilee Coote, he first explained that he had had sex with her in the past, but not that day. Then, he acknowledged that he had sex with her he night before she died, but that she was alive and fine when he left. He denied having rough sex with her. Later in the interview, he claimed that he might have had rough sex with her, but that she was fine when he left. In a third interview, he said he did have rough sex with her, but that she was alive when he left. He also stated that there was a third man watching the two have sex. He said this man was a medium height, weight, and age black man, but he did not know his name. He claims this man remained in the apartment after he left. Thus, his latest claim was that the sex was consensual and another individual must have killed Coote.

DNA was found in Rena Gonzalez's rectal swabs. Flowers is excluded as the source of this DNA. In addition, DNA was found on the phone cord around Gonzalez's neck. He is excluded as the source of that DNA as well. The partial profiles obtained from Gonzalez's rectal swabs and the phone cord are consistent with a single male source and may be the product of laboratory transfer or contamination. Upon retesting, no indication of the partial male profile was present in the rectal swabs.

B. Facts of Instant Case C228755 Before This Court VII

Sheila Quarles

Less than two months prior to the murders of Marilee Coote and Rena Gonzalez, on March 24, 2005, Debra Quarles returned home from grocery shopping to her residence at 1001 North Pecos, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, and found her eighteen year old daughter, Sheila Quarles, unresponsive in a bathtub containing warm water. Debra had returned home at 2:30 in the afternoon. She was able to remove Sheila from the tub with the help of a neighbor who had helped her carry in groceries. Debra immediately called 911.

An autopsy later revealed that Sheila died from drowning. However, strangulation was a significant contributing factor to her death. Sheila also had multiple vertical lacerations on her introitus, evidence of a violent sexual assault.

Investigation revealed that Sheila spoke to her mother, Debra, at approximately 12:30 p.m. and her mother arrived home to find her dead at approximately 2:30 p.m. A stereo was also missing from the residence. In addition, detectives learned that Sheila was involved in a lesbian relationship with an individual named Quinise Toney.

At autopsy, investigators collected samples from Sheila's vagina. Those swabs contained a mixture of DNA which included semen. Quinise Toney was excluded as being a source of any of this DNA. Sheila Quarles was the major component of the DNA. The male portion of the DNA was entered into a DNA database. When Flowers's DNA sample was collected in connection with the May murders (Coote and Gonzalez), his profile was entered into the DNA database as well. After this entry, investigators were notified that Flowers's profile was consistent with part of the minor component DNA from Sheila Quarles's vaginal swabs. In fact, 99.9934 percent of the population is excluded as being a source of that DNA, but Flowers is not. There was an additional, unknown male contributor to the vaginal swabs of Sheila Quarles as well.

After detectives were notified of the DNA match, they recontacted Debra Quarles. Quarles explained that she knew and had actually dated Norman Flowers several months before the murder. She also explained that he would occasionally give her a ride home from her work at the time and that he knew her family members. Quarles said that just prior to the murder, she saw Flowers at her apartment complex. At that time, he explained that he was working in maintenance at the complex. After her daughter's murder, Quarles suffered from depression. Flowers offered to drive her to appointments with her therapist. On several occasions, Flowers inquired to Debra whether the police had figured out who had murdered her daughter.

The State moves to admit evidence of Flowers's subsequent murders and activity at the Silver Pines Apartment Complex in May in the instant murder case before this Court

concerning victim Sheila Quarles. Prior to this case being transferred to Department VII, the case was in Department XIV. At that time, the defense moved to preclude the State from introducing such evidence. The State opposed. Judge Mosley did not grant the defense motion, commented that all three cases should be consolidated, but did not clearly state that the State could affirmatively move to admit such evidence. Thus, the State files the instant motion for clarification.

ARGUMENT

As this Court is well aware, section 48.045(2) of the Nevada Revised Statutes provides:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

In applying NRS 48.045(2), courts must assess whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by a risk of prejudice. Significantly, however, courts have recognized a distinction between evidence that is incriminating versus evidence that is actually prejudicial. For instance, in <u>United States v. Harrison</u>, 679 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the prosecution presented evidence that the defendant had been engaged in drug dealing in the past over a period of time in order to establish motive, intent, preparation, and absence of mistake on his current drug charges. The court held that allowing the admission of the extrinsic evidence was proper. It explained:

There is nothing "unfair" in admitting direct evidence of the defendant's past acts by an eyewitness thereto that constituted substantive proof of the relevant intent alleged in the indictment. The intent with which a person commits an act on a given occasion can many times be best proven by testimony or evidence of his acts over a period of time prior thereto . . .

<u>Id</u>. at 948. Therefore, while certain evidence may increase the likelihood of conviction and thus be incriminating, such evidence may not unfairly cast the defendant in a bad light and therefore be prejudicial.

In the instant case, Flowers's subsequent conduct is admissible in the instant case. Evidence of the May murders would be admissible in a trial focusing on the March murder because such evidence would be relevant to identity, intent, and motive and vice versa. In Gallego v. State, 101 Nev. 782, 711 P.2d 856 (1985), the Nevada Supreme Court noted how a defendant's prior murders could be relevant in establishing a common plan, intent, identity, and motive in a subsequent murder case. In Gallego, the defendant was charged with kidnapping, assaulting, and killing two young women by bludgeoning them with a hammer. The trial court permitted the State to introduce evidence that Gallego had previously kidnapped two young women from a shopping mall and shot and killed them. Id. at 789, 711 P.2d at 861. On appeal, Gallego challenged the introduction of such evidence.

The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and introduction of the evidence on several grounds within NRS 48.045(2). The court noted that the evidence was relevant to Gallego's intent and motive, because both instances were prompted by a "sex slave" fantasy on the part of Gallego. The court also commented that the evidence was relevant because the prior murders were "not remote in time from the killings here considered" and that "substantial similarities" were shown to exist between the two events, suggesting that the evidence was relevant to issues of identity as well as a common scheme or plan. See id.

In another case, the Nevada Supreme Court has commented how a particular modus operandi to a crime can be relevant and admissible under NRS 48.045(2) when the identity of the perpetrator is at issue. The court has stated that modus operandi evidence is proper in "situations where a positive identification of the perpetrator has not been made, and the offered evidence establishes a signature crime so clear as to establish the identity of the person on trial." Mortensen v. State, 115 Nev. 273, 280, 986 P.2d 1105, 1110 (1999).

In the case of Flowers, all three victims were casual acquaintances of Flowers. All three were killed in their residences. All three were killed during daylight hours. In addition to being murdered, all three also had some minor property taken from them as well. More significantly, of course, all three were sexually assaulted prior to their deaths. The victims all had damage to their vaginal and/or anal areas substantiating the sexual assault charges.

All three victims were killed, at least in part, by means of strangulation. Admittedly, the cause of death for Sheila Quarles was a drowning; however, the strangulation was a significant contributing factor to the death. Certainly, the similarity of the three murders constitutes evidence of identity admissible under NRS 48.045(2).

In addition, evidence of the May 2005 killings is relevant to the March 2005 killing because it would constitute evidence of intent and lack of accident as well—also admissible under NRS 48.045(2). In Petrocelli v. State, 101 Nev. 46, 52, 692 P.2d 503, 508 (1985), reversed on other grounds by Petrocelli v. Angelone, 242 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2001), the Nevada Supreme Court explained how in a murder prosecution where defendant was claiming that a homicide was an accident, evidence of a prior killing committed by him which he also claimed was accidental was relevant and admissible under NRS 48.045(2).

In one of his interviews regarding the May killings, Flowers maintained that while he may have had sex with Marilee Coote, but he did not kill her. This, of course, occurred after he adamantly denied having sex with her at all. In any case, given that one possible defense available to Flowers is that he had consensual sex with Quarles and she somehow died during the encounter, evidence of the May 2005 killings is relevant to his intent during his encounter with Quarles and whether she consented to the sex. The fact that he subsequently—at a minimum—had at least one violent sexual encounter which resulted in vaginal trauma to victim Marilee Coote as well as her strangulation and death is evidence that Quarles's murder was intentional and not an accident. See id.

Finally, evidence of the May 2005 murders is relevant to the March 2005 murder in terms of the charged sexual assault counts. In one of several interviews with detectives, Flowers claimed that he had consensual intercourse with Marilee Coote, notwithstanding the trauma to her genital area. He mentioned that they may have engaged in "rough" sex at one point during his interview. This evidence would be relevant to the sexual assault trauma to Sheila Quarles and whether she consented to a sexual encounter with Flowers. In Williams v. State, 95 Nev. 830, 603, P.2d 694 (1979), a sexual assault victim testified that she met the defendant while discussing a possible job as his secretary. At some point, the defendant

offered her \$5000 for a "one night stand," but she refused. The defendant told her that he was trained in martial arts and demonstrated how he could injure her and then sexually assaulted her. The defendant maintained that the intercourse was consensual. The State presented the testimony of two prior victims, from incidents occurring nineteen months before the charged incident, who testified that they met the defendant through a job interview and were coerced into having sex with him after he demonstrated his karate knowledge. In affirming the admission of testimony regarding the prior incidents, the Nevada Supreme Court stated:

In the instant case, evidence of Williams' sexual misconduct with other persons was admitted as being relevant to prove his intent to have intercourse with the victim without her consent. This evidence was introduced after Williams admitted committing the act, but claimed to have done so with the victim's consent. By acknowledging the commission of the act but asserting his innocent intent by claiming consent as a defense, Williams himself placed in issue a necessary element of the offense and it was, therefore, proper for the prosecution to present the challenged evidence, which was relevant on the issue of intent, in order to rebut Williams' testimony on a point material to the establishment of his guilt.

Id. at 833.

Because Quarles was killed after she was sexually assaulted, the State must rely on circumstances and medical testimony to establish the lack of consent in the instant case. Consent is at issue because of the sexual assault charge itself, which requires lack of consent, and, like Williams, Flowers could affirmatively claim that the sexual encounter was consensual. Therefore, the subsequent conduct of Flowers in May 2005 is relevant.

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CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully asks this Court to allow the State to present evidence of May murders in its case-in-chief. DATED this 35t day of October, 2007. **DAVID ROGER** Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781 Nevada Bar #006163 CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION I hereby certify that service of MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF COURT'S RULING, was made this day of October, 2007, by facsimile transmission to: SPECIAL PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE 455-6273 BY /S/D.Daniels Employee of the District Attorney's Office

ORIGINAL



0001 1 DAVID M. SCHIECK SPECIAL PUBLIC DEFENDER Nevada Bar No. 0824 RANDALL H. PIKE 3 Deputy Special Public Defender Nevada Bar No. 1940 CLARK W. PATRICK **Deputy Special Public Defender** Nevada Bar No. 9451 330 South Third Street, Suite 800 Las Vegas, NV 89l55-2316 7 (702) 455-6265 Attorneys for Defendant 8

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CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA.

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VS.

Plaintiff.

NORMAN FLOWERS,

Defendant.

CASE NO. C228755

DEPT NO. VII

DATE OF HEARING: 11-7-07

TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 a.m.

OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF COURT'S RULING

COMES NOW, Defendant NORMAN KEITH FLOWERS, by and through his attorneys, DAVID M. SCHIECK, Special Public Defender, RANDALL H. PIKE, Assistant Special Public Defender, and CLARK W. PATRICK, Deputy Special Public Defender and hereby submits the following Points and Authorities in opposition to the State's Motion for Clarification of Court's Ruling.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

The State relies on Gallego v. State, 101 Nev. 782, 711 P.2d 856 (1985) and Mortensen v. State, 115 Nev. 273, 986 P.2d 1105 (1999), in their argument that the deaths of Marilee Coote and Rena Gonzalez somehow establish a common plan, intent, identity or motive in the death of Sheila Quarles. In Gallego, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the prior acts were relevant because they were "not remote in time" from the acts Gallego was on RECEIVED

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trial for, and there were "substantial similarities" between the acts, suggesting a common scheme or plan. <u>Gallego</u> at 789. In <u>Mortensen</u>, the Court discussed situations where the evidence "establishes a signature crime so clear as to establish the identity of the person on trial." Mortensen at 280.

In the instant matter, the events were forty-one (41) days apart. The Nevada Supreme Court has ruled that time frame is too far removed to be part of a common scheme or plan. As an example of what is "not remote in time" and substantially similar, see, Tillema v. State, 112 Nev. 266, 914 P.2d 605 (1996), the defendant was arrested for a burglary of a vehicle on May 29, 1993 and a burglary of a vehicle and a burglary of a store on June 16, 1993. Id. at 267. Because both crimes involved vehicles in casino parking garages and were seventeen days apart, they "evidenced a common scheme or plan." Id. at 268. Additionally, the store burglary was connected to the vehicle burglary because it was part of a "continuing course of conduct." Id. at 269, quoting NRS 173.115(2) and Rogers v. State, 101 Nev. 457, 465-66, 705 P.2d 664, 670 (1985). In the second incident, Tillema burglarized the van and then immediately walked into a store, where he committed another burglary, so the two incidents were connected. Id.

In <u>Floyd v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 156, 42 P.3d 249 (2002) the defendant was charged of sexually assaulting a woman at gunpoint inside an apartment and the subsequent shooting of five employees at a nearby supermarket. The Nevada Supreme Court held that the acts charged were at the very least 'connected together'." <u>Id</u>. at 156. The court explained that a connection existed because the counts relating to the subsequent act began only fifteen minutes after the counts relating to the first act had ended.

Similar victims and motives, however, are not necessarily part of a common scheme or plan. <u>Tabish v. State</u>, 119 Nev. Adv. Rep. 35, 72 P.3d 584 (2003). The State was trying to argue that events involving Leo Casey and events involving Ted Binion were properly joined, having in common greed, money and the Jean sand pit. <u>Id</u>. at 590. The State also emphasized the similarities between Leo Casey and Ted Binion. <u>Id</u>. The Nevada Supreme Court noted that "money and greed could be alleged as connections between a great many

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crimes and thus do not alone sufficiently connect the incidents." Id. That Court held that the incidents were too far apart in time (fifty days) and that the alleged connections did not demonstrate a common scheme or plan. Id. at 591.

Similarly, in Mitchell v. State, 105 Nev. 735, 782 P.2d 1340 (1989), incidents forty-five days apart were not considered part of the same transaction. Id. at 738. Additionally, the two offenses committed by that defendant were not part of a common plan. Id. The defendant was charged with grand larceny and sexual assault (the Petz charges) and sexual assault and murder (the Brown charges). Id. at 737. On two separate occasions, the defendant took two different women to the same bar, forty-five (45) days apart, and sexually assaulted them. Id. Our Supreme Court noted that taking two women dancing and then later assaulting them (on separate occasions) could not be considered a common plan, simply because the women were taken to the same bar. Id. at 738.

Contrary to Tillema, and Floyd, the offenses in the instant case did not occur in close temporal proximity. If a connection between separate acts can be argued to exist because of their relative proximity in time, then it is reasonable to expect that the existence of such a connection is diminished as the length of time between the acts increases. Here, the incidents were forty-one (41) days apart, so there was no "continuing course of conduct." The incidents in Tillema flowed one into the other. With forty-one (41) days between them, the incidents at bar were too far apart in time to be part of the same transaction. So while a connection may still remain between two acts after only fifteen minutes, extending that time more than threethousand fold would seem to extinguish such a connection, utterly.

Here, there was also no common scheme or plan, similar to Tabish and Mitchell. In both of those cases, there were similar motives and similar crimes; however, that was not enough to establish a common scheme or plan. Here, the only other common denominator, besides the defendant himself, is the possibility that the defendant knew all of the victims. Again, that is not enough to establish a common scheme or plan, and not even close to establishing a signature crime so clear as to establish the identity of the person on trial.. The victims were different, the incidents occurred in different locations, albeit two of the homicides occurred in

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the same apartment complex and were forty-one (41) days apart. One of the incidents allegedly involved a manual strangulation, one allegedly involved strangulation with a ligature, while the other allegedly involved a downing. Two of the women were nude and one was clothed. The three women had significantly different ages, Quarles was eighteen (18), Gonzalez was twenty-five (25) and Coote was forty-five (45). The women were of two different races. As for the alleged sexual assaults, Flowers' DNA was recovered from Marilee Coote, however Flowers admits to having "rough" consensual sex with Coote, and there was "unknown" male DNA that was also recovered from Coote. The DNA recovered from Rena Gonzalez excluded Flowers as the donor. And while Flowers' DNA was recovered from Sheila Quarles, again there was "unknown" male DNA also recovered. There is nothing connecting the three incidents.

The State contends that the defense in this case will be that Flowers and Quarles were having sex, and Quarles "somehow died during the encounter." This is a false statement. Whether or not Flowers had sex with Quarles or Coote, Flowers did not kill either of them. There is no evidence that Flowers and Gonzalez ever had sex, and no evidence that Flowers killed Gonzalez.

Following NRS 48.035(1) "Although relevant, evidence is not admissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues or of misleading the jury." It is clear in the case at the bar that allowing the State to cross-contaminate the cases against Flowers, whatever slight probative value the State hopes to gain, would be greatly outweighed by the unfair prejudice Flowers. Therefore, Flowers respectfully requests this Court to deny the State's motion.

CONCLUSION

Because the incidents were not part of the same transaction nor were they part of a common scheme or plan, and because of the significant time between the incidents, the

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Defendant respectfully requests that this Court denies the State's request to present evidence of the May incident in its case-in-chief in the instant matter.

DATED this $\underline{\psi}$ day of November, 2007.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:

DAVID M. SCHIECK SPECIAL PUBLIC DEFENDER

RANDY H. PIKE

Deputy Special Public Defender

CLARK W. PATRICK

Deputy Special Public Defender 330 South Third Street, 8th Floor

Las Vegas, NV 89l55-2316

(702) 455-6265

Attorneys for Defendant

RECEIPT OF COPY

RECEIPT OF COPY of the foregoing **OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF COURT'S RULING** is hereby acknowledged this <u>U</u> day of November, 2007.

DAVID ROGER

District Attorney

200 Lewis Avenue, 3rd Floor

Las Vegas, NV 89155

Attorney for Plaintiff

SPECIAL PUBLIC DEFENDER 28

CLARK COUNTY NEVADA

1 **TRAN** ORIGINAL FILED 2 JUL 30 2 05 PH '08 3 4 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADAERK OF 5 6 7 THE STATE OF NEVADA. 8 CASE#: C228755 Plaintiff, 9 DEPT. VII VS. 10 NORMAN KEITH FLOWERS aka 11 NORMAN HAROLD FLOWERS III, 12 Defendant. 13 BEFORE THE HONORABLE STEWART L. BELL, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 14 THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2007 15 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDING 16 STATE'S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF COURT'S RULING 17 APPEARANCES: 18 For the State: ELISSA LUZAICH, ESQ. 19 **Chief Deputy District Attorney** 20 PAMELA G. WECHERLY, ESQ. **Deputy District Attorney** 21 For the Defendant: CLARK W. PATRICK, ESQ. Deputy Special Public Defender RANDALL H. PIKE, ESQ. Assistant Special Public Defender RECORDED BY: RENEE VINCENT, COURT RECORDER

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THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2007 AT 8:42 A.M.

THE COURT: State of Nevada versus Norman Flowers, case C228755.

MR. PIKE: Judge, if we could go to the bottom of page 10 for Mr. Flowers?

Flowers present in custody. Mr. Pike --

MR. PATRICK: Mr. Patrick from the Special Public Defender's office.

THE COURT: Patrick.

MS. WECHERLY: Wecherly.

THE COURT: Pamela Wecherly. On you on -- this is Elissa Luzaich for the State.

This is State's motion for clarification of Court's ruling. Ms. Wecherly, enlighten me. I can't tell whether your motion is a request for reconsideration of the denial by Judge Bonaventure of consolidation or a request to allow bad acts to be admitted in a non consolidated case after a *Petrocelli* hearing. Which is it?

MS. WECHERLY: The second one.

THE COURT: Okay. Why shouldn't they, at least, have the *Petrocelli* hearing so that we can listen to the bad acts outside the presence of the jury and determine, in accordance with the three prongs of *Petrocelli*, whether they're admissible or not?

MR. PATRICK: Well that's what we were going to ask for today, Judge, was that this looked like to us a *Petrocelli*. That's why we had to do a request.

THE COURT: Well I couldn't tell. So -- okay. Then the motion -- the motion is granted to the extent that I will have a *Petrocelli* hearing. That doesn't mean that I will admit the bad acts. Obviously, I've got to see what evidence the State's got. I'm thinking that's going to take more than ten or fifteen minutes. Is it going to take a couple of hours?

MS. WECHERLY: Yes, Your Honor, because of the -- there's several witnesses in the case that occurred in May. So, I would think we'd probably put on about six or seven witnesses for the hearing alone.

THE COURT: Well can we get it in here before -- I mean, this next week or so?

MS. WECHERLY: No.

MR. PATRICK: Judge, we have some experts that we're going to want to call for this *Petrocelli* hearing, and because of that, we would -- we were going to be asking for a continuance. We'd like to -- we've talked to the State. We don't have a set time when we're all good for trial. But what we'd like to do is keep the calendar call next week to get -- that will give a chance to talk to the State and set a date when we can have this. But because of this *Petrocelli* hearing and some other things, we're not going to be ready to go this month.

MS. WECHERLY: That's fine, Your Honor, and whenever the Court wants to set the hearing, we can do it before trial or once we get our new trial date, just before it. But if you prefer to do it sooner --

THE COURT: But -- well a lot of times, what we do is just set aside a Friday morning --

MS. WECHERLY: Okay.

THE COURT: -- and take as long as we need to take and get it done. I think you're both better off doing it sooner or later because you're going to know how to prepare for your trial.

MR. PATRICK: That's fine, Judge.

THE COURT: So, you know, I wouldn't even mind doing it next Wednesday if you can get your witnesses in, but you can't; right?

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1	MR. PATRICK: Yeah, Judge.
2	MS. WECHERLY: I think
3	THE COURT: Fine. Let's do this. Mr. Flowers, is this all right with you, this
4	approach?
5	THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
6	THE COURT: All right. The Court will vacate the trial date of 11/26. We'll
7	keep the calendar call of 11/20 on not for purposes of calendar call, but it will be for
8	setting a new trial date and setting a Petrocelli hearing.
9	You guys get your calendars together and figure out what day for trial,
10	because once we set this again, it's going to be etched in stone. We're going unles
11	one of the five of us dies, and it will be going number one. So, let's just pick a date
12	that we all know is good and then plan on it and move forward.
13	MS. WECHERLY: Thank you, Judge.
14	THE COURT: All right.
15	MR. PATRICK: Thank you, Judge
16	MR. PIKE: Thank you.
17	
18	[Proceeding concluded at 8:45 a.m.]
19	
20	
21	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the
22	audio/video recording in the above-entitled case.
23	Pattera Statley
24	PATRICIA SLATTERY Court Recorder/Transcriber
25	

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FILED 1 0001 DAVID M. SCHIECK SPECIAL PUBLIC DEFENDER Nevada Bar No. 0824 RANDALL H. PIKE Deputy Special Public Defender Nevada Bar No. 1940 CLARK W. PATRICK 5 Deputy Special Public Defender Nevada Bar No. 9451 330 South Third Street, Suite 800 Las Vegas, NV 89155-2316 (702) 455-6265 7 Attorneys for Defendant 8 DISTRICT COURT 9 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 10 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 11 CASE NO. C228755 Plaintiff. DEPT. NO. VII 12 VS. 13 NORMAN FLOWERS. DATE OF HEARING: 8/1/2008 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 a.m. 14 Defendant. 15 BENCH BRIEF 16 COMES NOW, Defendant NORMAN KEITH FLOWERS, by and through his attorneys, 17 DAVID M. SCHIECK, Special Public Defender, RANDALL H. PIKE, Assistant Special Public 18 Defender, CLARK W. PATRICK, Deputy Special Public Defender and hereby submits the 19 following Bench Brief for the Evidentiary Hearing on August 1, 2008. 20 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 21 **FACTS** 22 A preliminary hearing was held in this matter, before the Honorable Justice of the Peace, 23 24 Tony L. Abbatangelo. The hearing was held over a three day period, June 23, 2005, July 18, 2005 and August 16, 2005. At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, Judge Abbatangelo 25 found insufficient evidence to bindover Flowers on the counts relating to Gonzales. Judge 26 Abbatangelo did however, find sufficient evidence to bindover Flowers on the charges relating 27 28 to Coote.

SPECIAL PUBLIC DEFENDER

CLARK COUNTY NEVADA

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Subsequently, the case was taken before the Grand Jury, because of the discovery of "new evidence." The new evidence was nothing more than the testimony of two snitches, Shawnta Robinson and George Dunlap. At the conclusion of testimony before the Grand Jury, Flowers was indicted on all counts in regards to Coote and all counts regarding Gonzales, which had been previously dismissed. Since the only new evidence presented to the Grand Jury was the testimony of the snitches, Flowers' indictment to the charges involving Gonzales was solely on that testimony. In other words, without the snitches, Flowers would not have been indicted on the Gonzales charges.

Thomas Wahl testified on the DNA evidence from the case. Wahl testified during both the preliminary hearing and the grand jury. In both proceedings, Wahl's testimony was consistent. Wahl was given the biological evidence to perform DNA testing.

Regarding Coote, Wahl was given a buccal swab from Flowers, the medical examiners kit from Coote and a piece of carpet recovered from Coote's apartment. There were sperm cells in both the vaginal and rectal swabs recovered from Coote. Both swabs contained sperm from a single donor. Wahl determined Flowers was the donor.

Wahl recovered DNA evidence from the carpet sample. The sample contained DNA from Coote, Flowers and an unknown person. Wahl was unable to determine if the third person was male or female.

As to Gonzales, Wahl was given several pieces of evidence to test, including the medical examiners kit from Gonzales, a buccal swab from Flowers, Gonzales' underwear, a burnt piece of paper, two cigarette butts, a phone cord and a cloth lanyard.

The underwear contained no sperm or semen, therefore Wahl did not process it further. Wahl did not recover any sperm cells from Gonzales' vaginal, rectal or cervical swabs. The vaginal swab had a weak positive for P-30 which indicates semen. The rectal swab was positive for a DNA mixture, that was a combination of Gonzales and an unknown male. Flowers was excluded as the male. The rectal swab was also negative for P-30.

The burnt paper was positive for Gonzales' DNA and an unknown male DNA. Flowers was excluded as the male donor. One cigarette butt (with no brand name) contained an unknown

male DNA. Flowers was excluded as the donor. The other cigarette butt (Marlboro) contained a major female DNA component and a minor male DNA component. Gonzales was not the female donor, and Flowers was not the male donor.

The cloth lanyard contained no DNA evidence. The phone cord contained DNA from a female donor and a male donor. The female donor was Gonzales. Flowers was excluded as the male donor.

Dr. Knoblock testified at the preliminary hearing that he performed the autopsy on Coote. His findings included that Coote's pubic hair had been singed, she had hemorrhaging with in the whites of her eyes, an abrasion behind her right ear and tears on her labia and anus. Dr. Knoblock also notices contusions on Coote's arms. Dr. Knoblock placed Coote's time of death between 9:00 p.m. and 3:00 a.m. the night before she was found. He determined the cause of death to be manual strangulation.

Dr. Knoblock testified that the tears in Coote's labia and anus were due to penetration. However, he could not determine if the penetration was from a penis or from a "marital aid" that was found in Coote's apartment. Dr. Knoblock could also not determine if the penetration was consensual or non-consensual. He agreed that the tearing could have happened during rough consensual sex.

Dr. Knoblock testified that the hemorrhages in Coote's eyes were indicative of strangulation. An examination of Coote's neck also showed hemorrhages in the underlying muscles, a further indication of strangulation. Dr. Knoblock further testified that there was no evidence that the strangulation was done with a ligature.

Dr. Simms testified at the preliminary hearing that he had performed the autopsy on Gonzales. His findings included ligature impressions on Gonzales' neck, several blunt force injuries, vaginal tears and to a lesser extent anal tears. He determined the cause of death to be strangulation with the use of a ligature.

The blunt force injuries to Gonzales included contusions to her right and left thighs, the front of her right knee, her left leg, the right side of her head, her upper arms and shoulders and her right and left breasts. Dr. Simms opined that the injuries came as the result of a struggle. Dr.

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Simms testified that the tears to the vaginal and anus were post-mortem.

Dr. Simms testified that Gonzales was strangled solely with the use of a ligature. He found no evidence of manual strangulation. He stated that he could tell the differences between manual and ligature strangulation during an autopsy.

During the grand jury testimony, Dr. Kubiczek testified regarding the autopsies on Coote and Gonzales. Dr. Kubiczek testified that he did not perform either autopsy, but was only testifying from the autopsy reports prepared by Dr. Knoblock and Dr. Sims.

As to Coote's autopsy, Dr. Kubiczek's testimony was consistent with Dr. Knoblock's testimony during the preliminary hearing. As to Gonzales' autopsy, Dr. Kubiczek's testimony was consistent with Dr. Simms testimony at the preliminary hearing, with a few exceptions.

Dr. Kubiczek characterized the injuries to Gonzales' vagina as discolorations, erosions and labial tears. He noted that at least one of the tears on her anus was a superficial skin tear, which was an artifact created during her autopsy. Dr. Kubiczek also noted that Gonzales' toxicology screen came back positive for marijuana use.

Monica Ramirez testified at the preliminary hearing that she was the manager of the Silver Pines Apartments. The apartment office received a telephone call at approximately 8:20 a.m. on May 3, 2005, regarding a welfare check on Coote. Ramirez went to Coote's apartment and knocked on the door. When no one answered she used a master key to enter Coote's apartment. Entry required unlocking the dead bolt on the door. The door had to be locked from the outside using a key. The key used was never recovered by the apartment complex. She found Coote on the floor and called 911.

Ramirez also testified before the grand jury. Her testimony was consistent, except she mentioned a maintenance worker named Cesar Hernandez. Hernandez did not currently work for the Silver Pines apartments at the time of the grand jury.

Mawusi Ragland testified during both the preliminary hearing and the grand jury. In both proceedings, Ragland's testimony was consistent.

Ragland lived in apartment 302, of the Silver Pines Apartments on May 3, 2005. Ragland knew Coote and socialized with her. Ragland knew Gonzales through their children. Ragland

had introduced Flowers to Coote in July 2004. Flowers helped Coote instal a VCR. Ragland thought Coote and Flowers had a sexual relationship. Ragland had never introduced Flowers to Gonzales and Flowers and Gonzales did not know each other.

Ragland had known Flowers for approximately thirteen years. They had been dating for ten months. Ragland and Flowers had a fight in April 2005. She had not heard from him until she found a note on her apartment door from Flowers on May 3, 2005.

On May 3, 2005, Ragland left for work between 7:15 a.m. and 7:30 a.m. Ragland returned home at approximately 7:00 p.m. When she returned home, the apartment complex was cordoned off with yellow police tape. As Ragland entered her apartment she found a note left by Flowers that day. There were calls from Flowers' sister's phone number on the caller ID on her telephone. Ragland called Flowers at approximately 8:22 p.m. and told him two of her friends had died that day. Ragland told Flowers that Coote had died of natural causes and that Gonzales had been killed. Ragland asked Flowers to come over to her apartment. Flowers did not go to Ragland's apartment.

Juanita Curry testified during both the preliminary hearing and the grand jury. In both proceedings, Curry's testimony was consistent.

Curry lived in apartment 102 in the Silver Pines Apartment complex in May 2005. She was friends with Ragland. When Curry was moving into her apartment, a male friend of Ragland's helped her move her stereo. She knew the man as "Keith."

On May 3, 2005, Curry had gotten out of bed at approximately 6:00 a.m. She noticed a fire truck and an ambulance outside her apartment at approximately 8:00 - 8:15 a.m. (She testified at the grand jury that the time was between 7:30 and 8:30 a.m.)

A man knocked on her door between 8:30 and 9:00 a.m. She did not recognize the man. The man told her he knew Ragland and that he had moved Curry's stereo for her. Curry then recognized the man as "Keith." Curry opened the door. Keith asked to use her phone. Curry gave him her phone and Keith made several calls. Curry then asked him in to wait for Ragland and offered him a chair. Keith stayed for a few minutes then got up to leave. As he was leaving, Keith attempted to "kiss" Curry.

Keith came back to Curry's apartment approximately thirty minutes later. He asked to use her telephone again. Curry allowed him to make a phone call. Keith then left and walked across the apartment complex. Curry saw Keith walk towards Gonzales' apartment, but did not see him enter any apartment.

Keith comes back to Curry's apartment and knocks on the door. Curry did not answer. Keith leaves. He comes back and knocks again. Curry answers and talks to him. Curry offers him a glass of water. Keith leaves. Keith later comes back again and asks Curry to use the bathroom. She allows him into her apartment to use the bathroom. When he is done he leaves.

At approximately 11:00 a.m. Curry leaves to go see her daughter. As Curry is leaving, Keith approaches her and asks to use her cell phone. Curry lets him make a call.

Curry returns to her apartment at approximately 2:30 p.m. Curry is getting ready to leave again at approximately 4:00 p.m. and notices that there is a fire truck and an ambulance in the apartment complex parking lot.

Donald Tremel testified during both the preliminary hearing and the grand jury. In both proceedings, Tremel's testimony was consistent.

Tremel is a homicide detective with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. He was assigned to investigate the death of Coote on May 3, 2005, at the Silver Pine Apartments. He arrived at the scene at approximately 10:00 a.m.

Upon entering Coote's apartment, Tremel saw Coote deceased on the living room floor. There were ashes from incense in her navel area, and her pubic hair had been singed. The television in the living room had a pay per view movie ready to be watched. The movie was an adult pornographic film.

In the bathroom of the apartment, Tremel noticed the tub full of water with papers and miscellaneous items in the water. The washing machine contained assorted miscellaneous items. The machine had been put through a wash cycle. Tremel noted no other disturbances in the apartment. Tremel was at Coote's apartment for approximately an hour and a half.

Tremel was called back to the Silver Pines Apartments at approximately 5:00 p.m. the same day to investigate the death of Gonzales. Tremel observed Gonzales deceased in the bed

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room, kneeling at the foot of the bed. Her pants were sagging, but were not pulled down. There was a ligature around her neck. Gonzales' apartment was clean, with no signs of being ransacked.

Tremel interrogated Flowers a total of three times. The first time was on May 4, 2005. Flowers was not given his Miranda rights, because he was not in custody.

Subsequently, Tremel received the DNA report from Wahl. The DNA report linked Flowers DNA to Coote, but not to Gonzales. Tremel arrested Flowers on June 7, 2005, and interrogated Flowers after giving Flowers his Miranda rights. Flowers admitted to a sporadic sexual relationship with Coote. Flowers told Tremel that Coote enjoyed rough sex. Flowers denied any contact with Gonzales.

Tremel testified during the preliminary hearing that the only link between Flowers and Gonzales was Curry's statement. Tremel also testified to the differences between the two cases, including: Coote was strangled manually, Gonzales was strangled with a ligature; Flowers had a sexual relationship with Coote, but not with Gonzales; Flowers' DNA was recovered in Coote's apartment, not in Gonzales'; Coote's body showed no signs of struggle, Gonzales' body did; Coote was found naked, Gonzales was fully clothed; Coote was found face up, Gonzales face down; Coote was in the living room, Gonzales in the bed room; Coote's apartment door was locked from the outside with a deadbolt, Gonzales' apartment door had been unlocked; Coote's apartment showed signs of a clean up effort, Gonzales' apartment did not.

Linda Ebbert testified only during the grand jury proceedings. Ebbert testified that she is a nurse trained to examine patients for sexual assault. Ebbert did not examine Coote or Gonzales. After reviewing photographs of Coote, Ebbert testified that the coroner had found tears to the labia and anus. After reviewing photographs of Gonzales, Ebbert testified that the coroner had found vaginal abrasions and tears in the rectum. Ebbert testified that she was unable to interpret the coroner's findings.

Ed Guenther testified only during the grand jury proceedings. Guenther is a crime scene analyst for the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. He works in the latent print unit of the forensic laboratory. Guenther examined latent prints from Coote's apartment and known

prints of Flowers. Guenther did not identify Flowers prints anywhere in Coote's apartment. However, Guenther did identify the prints of Marcine Carroll and Paco Hernandez from Coote's apartment.

Guenther also examined latent prints from Gonzales' apartment. Guenther did not identify Flowers prints inside Gonzales' apartment. However, Guenther did identify several prints from Randy Ureno. Ureno's prints were found in Gonzales' master bedroom and on the door jam leading into the master bedroom.

Jeffrey Smink testified only during the grand jury proceedings. Smink is a senior crime scene analyst for the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. Smink was assigned to process Coote's and Gonzales' apartments. He was assigned to assist in processing for latent prints, footwear impressions and search for evidence.

Smink testified that there were footwear impressions located in the planter area outside of Gonzales' apartment. He also noted that Gonzales' apartment was neat and orderly and that the exterior door had no evidence of damage.

Smink was also assigned to process Coote's apartment. Smink was assigned to take photographs, process for latent prints, process for bodily fluids, and impound evidence. Smink noted the items in the bathtub and washer. Smink located an area of possible body fluids on the carpet in the living room. A piece of the carpet was cut out and impounded.

Charity Green testified only during the grand jury proceedings. Green is a crime scene analyst for the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. Green was assigned to assist Smink with processing Coote's apartment. Green impounded a piece of carpeting from the apartment.

Randy Ureno testified only during the grand jury proceedings. Ureno was friends with Gonzales. Ureno and Gonzales were in a sexually active relationship. They engaged in anal intercourse. Ureno testified that he had not seen Gonzales for approximately a month prior to her death.

Shawnta Robinson testified only during the grand jury proceedings. Robinson is an inmate at the Clark County Detention Center. Robinson was in jail on three different cases. The first was for attempt battery constituting domestic violence and burglary. The second was for

burglary, batter constituting domestic violence third and child endangerment. The third was for burglary, battery with use of a deadly weapon, first degree kidnaping and battery constituting domestic violence third. He was housed in the same unit as Flowers.

Robinson testified that Flowers told him that Flowers was going to get away with murder in regards to a Hispanic lady. Flowers had gone to the lady's house to buy marijuana. Flowers and the Hispanic male, beat up the lady, the Hispanic male had sex with her and smothered her.

Robinson also testified that Flowers told him that Flowers and a Hispanic male went into the apartment of a black lady. Flowers needed money to repair his car. Flowers and the lady had sex, and the Hispanic male strangled the lady.

George Dunlap testified only during the grand jury proceedings. Dunlap is an inmate at the Clark County Detention Center. Dunlap was in jail on charges of first degree kidnaping, sexual assault of a minor under fourteen, lewdness with a child under fourteen, coercion and battery. Dunlap testified that he was providing testimony to favorably affect his case. Dunlap had three previous felony convictions. The convictions were for possession of a destructive device, possession of a stolen vehicle and possession of a concealed weapon. Dunlap has offered to provide information in three to four other cases with the expectation it would reflect favorably on his cases.

Dunlap knew Flowers from the Clark County Detention Center. Dunlap testified that Flowers told him that Flowers and a friend went to a black lady's apartment to get money. Flowers raped the lady and his friend strangled her. Flowers indicated he had known the lady.

Dunlap also testified that Flowers had told him about a Hispanic lady. Flowers and his friend asked if she would sell them marijuana. They went into the lady's apartment. Flowers and his friend fought with the lady. Flowers' friend raped the lady, and Flowers smothered her with a pillow.

Dunlap then testified that Flowers told him that Flowers needed an alibi so Flowers went to the apartment of an old black lady. Flowers asked the woman to use her phone, got a drink of water and left.

Dunlap testified that he was housed in the same unit as Flowers and Robinson. Dunlap,

Robinson and Flowers played dominoes together and talked. Dunlap testified that he had made notes of his conversations with Flowers. The District Attorneys office is in possession of the notes.

Charles Bell testified only during the grand jury proceedings. Bell testified at the request of Flowers. Bell is an inmate at the Clark County Detention Center. Bell is facing charges of burglary while in possession of a firearm, conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery with use of a deadly weapon, possession of stolen property and evading a police officer. Bell has previous convictions for attempt grand larceny, burglary and conspiracy to commit robbery. Bell and Flowers were cellmates. Bell had observed and overheard Flowers having conversations with other inmates. Bell testified that Flowers would never talk to other inmates regarding Flowers' case.

ARGUMENT

In the present case, the Court is being asked for a defacto joinder for emotional prejudicial impact purposes that will basically ensure a guilty verdict and a sentence of death. While under the guise of "other bad act" evidence, it is respectfully submitted that the finding of the District Court Judge in denying the actual joinder of the counts be considered. Basically, that the inclusion of information regarding additional murder is so overwhelmingly prejudicial that it would preclude a fair trial on the individual counts. See <u>Tabish v. State</u>, 119 Nev. 293, 2003 Nev. LEXIS 41 (Nev., July 14, 2003, Decided). A case wherein the defendants were charged with crimes 50 days apart, the theory that money gained from the first crime was needed to fund the business gained from the second crime was insufficient to warrant a single trial on all charges. The Court finding in that case that even if joinder would be permissible under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 173.115, a trial court should sever the offenses if the joinder is unfairly prejudicial.

Similarly, in the case of <u>Collman v. State</u>, 116 Nev. 687, 2000 Nev. LEXIS 93 (Nev., August 23, 2000, Decided), although the death sentence in that matter was upheld, the Court found Nev. Rev. Stat. § 48.045(2) prohibits the admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove a person's character, but such evidence may be admissible for other purposes. In order to determine admissibility of those acts, the district court must determine that: (1) the

incident is relevant to the crime charged; (2) the act is proven by clear and convincing evidence; and (3) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of 2 unfair prejudice. The decision to admit or exclude evidence rests within the trial court's 3 4 discretion, and the Nevada Supreme Court will not overturn that decision absent manifest error. In the present case, the "other bad acts" are not proven by "clear and convincing 5 evidence, and the additional counts of homicide clearly provide a danger of unfair and 6 7 overwhelming prejudice. 8 DATED: July 30, 2008. Respectfully submitted, 9 DAVID M. SCHIECK 10 SPECIAL PUBLIC DEFENDER 11 12 13 CLARK W. PATRICK 330 S. Third Street, Eighth Floor 14 Las Vegas, NV 89155 (702) 455-6265 15 Attorneys for Defendant 16 RECEIPT OF COPY 17 RECEIPT of a copy of the foregoing document is hereby acknowledged this day of July, 18 2008. 19 DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 20 21 22 200 Lewis Ave., 3rd Floor Las Vegas NV 89155 23 24 25 26 27 28

SPECIAL PUBLIC DEFENDER

CLARK COUNTY NEVADA

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OF SEN SANOS 1 **TRAN** 2 **DISTRICT COURT** 3 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 4 5 STATE OF NEVADA, 6 CASE NO. C228755 Plaintiff, 7 vs. DEPT. VII 8 NORMAN KEITH FLOWERS. 9 Defendant. 10 11 12 BEFORE THE HONORABLE STEWART L. BELL, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE FRIDAY, AUGUST 1, 2008 13 14 RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PETROCELLI HEARING AND 15 **ALL PENDING MOTIONS** 16 17 APPEARANCES: 18 For the State: ELISSA LUZAICH, ESQ. 19 Chief Deputy District Attorney PAM WECKERLY, ESQ. 20 **Deputy District Attorney** 21 For the Defendant: RANDALL H. PIKE, ESQ. 22 Special Public Defender 23 CLARK W. PATRICK, ESQ. Special Public Defender RECORDED BY: RENEE VINCENT, COURT RECORDER

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Friday, August 1, 2008 - 9:03 a.m.

THE COURT: This is for the *Petrocelli* hearing in Case Number C228755, State of Nevada versus Norman Flowers. Do you have any problem with him sitting at counsel table? Mr. Flowers, why don't you come down here and sit with your lawyers. Mr. Flowers is present along with Clark Patrick and Randy Pike, and Pam Weckerly and Lisa Luzaich for the State.

The record should reflect that I have read the preliminary hearing transcripts provided that relate to three homicides, the two cases, the case in this department and the case in -- the double case in Department XI. You know, I'm getting older. Those little four-to-a-page transcripts are real laborious.

MS. WECKERLY: So sorry.

THE COURT: No, that's all right. They're going to do it, but the bigger ones are a lot easier. But I have read them so I have a general idea of what the evidence is in all the cases. So, Ms. Weckerly, you're up.

MS. WECKERLY: Thank you, Your Honor. And the witness we have for testimony is Kristina Paulette.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PIKE: That's correct. And for purposes of the hearing today, we will stipulate to her training and expertise.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PIKE: So that that foundation need not be laid. We'll just direct questions to the DNA analysis.

THE COURT: No, I'm familiar with her. I mean, obviously a jury

1	would need to hear that. We don't. So	
2	THE CLERK: Could you please stand and raise your right hand.	
3	KRISTINA PAULETTE,	
4	having been first duly sworn as a witness, testified as follows:	
5	THE CLERK: Thank you. You may be seated.	
6	THE COURT: State your name, and spell your name for the court	
7	recorder.	
8	THE WITNESS: Kristina Paulette, K-r-i-s-t-i-n-a, P-a-u-l-e-t-t-e.	
9	THE COURT: Go ahead, Ms. Weckerly.	
10	MS. WECKERLY: Thank you. And, Your Honor, just one other thing:	
11	I believe Mr. Pike will stipulate that we don't need to go through what is DNA,	
12	sort of the windup because I'm sure it	
13	THE COURT: Got that.	
14	MS. WECKERLY: Okay.	
15	DIRECT EXAMINATION	
16	BY MS. WECKERLY:	
17	Q Ms. Paulette, you work as a DNA analyst for the Las Vegas	
18	Metropolitan Police Department?	
19	A I do.	
20	Q And in preparation for your testimony today, did you review	
21	DNA reports conducted by Tom Wahl and yourself associated with the	
22	suspect by the name of Norman Flowers?	
23	A I did.	
24	Q I'd like to start first with a victim in this case identified or	
25	actually in another case identified as Marilee Coot.	

1	Α	Okay.
2	a	And in that particular case, that DNA analysis was conducted
3	by Tom Wahl	; would that be correct?
4	A	Correct.
5	a	Okay. And my understanding is that DNA was detected in
6	vaginal and re	ectal swabs taken from the victim, Marilee Coot?
7	A	Correct.
8	a	And what were what are the findings with regard to her?
9	A	The source of the semen detected on the vaginal and rectal
10	swabs is Norman Flowers.	
11	a	Okay. In addition to those two swabs, was a swab or DNA
12	detected on a carpet stain removed from underneath the victim?	
13	A	It was.
14	a	And what were the findings with regard to that?
15	A	Norman was also the source of the DNA the semen detected
16	on the carpet stain.	
17	a	Okay. In addition, did Tom Wahl analyze swabs taken from a
18	victim identified as Rena Gonzalez?	
19	A	Yes.
20	a	And with regard to the vaginal swab taken from Rena Gonzalez
21	what was the	e finding?
22	A	It was semen positive; however, there were the DNA profile
23	came from th	nat was consistent with Ms. Gonzalez.
24	a	Okay. And what does I mean, what does that mean in terms
25	of your work	as a DNA analyst?

1	THE COURT: Hold on a second, Ms. Weckerly.	
2	[Off record.]	
3	THE COURT: I'm sorry, Ms. Weckerly. Go ahead.	
4	BY MS. WECKERLY:	
5	Q With regard to the vaginal swab of Rena Gonzalez, I think you	
6	said it tested positive for semen, but the DNA that was tested matched to	
7	herself?	
8	A Correct.	
9	Q Okay. So what does that mean in terms of DNA?	
10	A In that particular instance, there were no sperm heads actually	
11	detected. And in order to get a DNA profile from the male fraction, there have	
12	to be sperm heads present because that's what contains the DNA.	
13	Q Okay.	
14	A But actually the semen positive is a semen-specific protein that	
15	was detected on those swabs.	
16	Q Okay. So there was semen, but there's no way to type that	
17	DNA?	
18	A Correct.	
19	Q Okay. And the rectal swabs of Rena Gonzalez, what were the -	
20	what were the findings there from Mr. Wahl?	
21	A The rectal swabs, there was, in the epithelial fraction, which is	
22	just the female portion, it was consistent with Ms. Gonzalez. And in the	
23	sperm fraction, the major profile is consistent with Ms. Gonzalez, and then	
24	there's a minor DNA minor male DNA profile.	
25	Q And of that minor DNA profile, was Mr. Flowers excluded as	

1	being the source?		
2	А	He was.	
3	a	Okay. In addition, there's a third victim's DNA tied to Mr.	
4	Flowers, and	that's a victim by the name of Sheila Quarles?	
5	A	Correct.	
6	a	And were you the analyst who did the work on her case?	
7	A	I was.	
8	a	Okay. With regard to Sheila's vaginal swabs, what were your	
9	findings?		
10	A	On the vaginal swabs, I detected a mixture of DNA consistent	
11	with Ms. Quarles, and Mr. Flowers could not be excluded as a contributor.		
12	a	And were you able to determine or generate any kind of	
13	statistical frequency or percentage of the population that could be excluded?		
14	A	I was.	
15	a	And what was that finding?	
16	A	In approximately 99.9934 percent of individuals are excluded as	
17	possible contributors of that mixture of DNA.		
18	a	But not Mr. Flowers?	
19	A	Correct.	
20	a	With regard to Sheila Quarles' rectal swabs, what were your	
21	findings?		
22	A	They were semen negative.	
23	a	And is that the same situation where or, well, if they're	
24	semen negative, then obviously there's no sperm and no DNA?		
25	A	Correct.	
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1	a	Right. Okay. Now, at a later point in time, did detectives and
2	our office ask you to go back and look at the rectal swabs from Rena	
3	Gonzalez that	t were tested by Tom Wahl?
4	A	Yes, and, actually I misspoke on the last thing. The rectal
5	swabs were į	positive for the presence of semen in the Quarles case; however,
6	again, I could	not find sperm. So I wasn't able to do a DNA analysis on that.
7	a	Okay. With regard to Rena Gonzalez, did we ask you to go
8	back and lool	k at a remaining sample or the rectal swabs taken from her, and
9	have you retest that sample essentially?	
10	A	Yes.
11	Q.	And did you do that?
12	Α	I did.
13	a	What were your findings then?
14	A	I found that the DNA obtained from the rectal swab cutting was
15	consistent with Ms. Gonzalez, and there was no foreign DNA detected.	
16	٥	Okay. Now, based on that
17	THE COURT: What does that mean? The minor DNA profile excluding	
18	Flowers was not correct?	
19	THE V	VITNESS: Correct.
20	THE C	COURT: Okay.
21	BY MS. WECKERLY:	
22	a	And once you got that finding, did you take any steps to further
23	investigate how it was that Tom Wahl could've gotten that minor component	
24	finding?	
25	Α	I did. The first thing I did, because as any DNA analyst would

do, is if there's a foreign DNA present and it's not consistent with any other of the individuals that you're testing, you check to see if there's contamination, obviously. And the first thing you would do is go back and check the person, the analyst who actually performed the DNA analysis. And so I went back and checked Tom Wahl's DNA profile against to this profile and found that they were consistent.

Q Okay. So he could've been -- Tom Wahl could've been the foreign DNA in the original testing of the rectal swabs of Rena Gonzalez?

A That is correct. And since I went back and retested it and it was no longer there, that seems to be a pretty fair hypothesis.

Q Did you analyze any other items of evidence collected in the Rena Gonzalez case besides the rectal swabs?

A I did. I actually tested a piece of burnt rolling paper and a Marlboro -- Marlboro cigarette butt.

Q And were those both retested by you to see if you could find contamination?

A Yes. And those -- the underlying profiles in the original work that was done by Tom was also consistent with the other minor DNA profile, which was consistent with Tom. So when I went back and retested, I found -- I was unable to obtain a DNA profile from the burnt cigarette paper. There just wasn't enough left. And then on the Marlboro cigarette butt, I obtained a partial female profile, and there was no underlying male profile in that one either.

Q Again, suggesting possible contamination by the analyst, Mr. Wahl?

1	A Yes.	
2	MS. WECKERLY: Thank you. I'll pass the witness, Your Honor.	
3	THE COURT: Mr. Pike.	
4	MR. PIKE: Thank you.	
5	CROSS-EXAMINATION	
6	BY MR. PIKE:	
7	Q So in reference to the initial examination that was done by by	
8	Mr. Wahl, that was done locally here in Metro's lab?	
9	A Yes.	
10	Q Okay. And you're indicating that the source of contamination	
11	may have been from Mr. Wahl. Would that have been just because of	
12	procedures? How how would that happen?	
13	A It can happen in several steps. Obviously, when I went back	
14	and retested the evidence, there was no trace of him there. So he didn't	
15	actually contaminate the evidence. It was probably in the processing of the	
16	samples in which this contamination occurred.	
17	Q And that's that's kind of an indication of how sensitive the	
18	instrumentality that is used and how it may be affected by very small and	
19	microscopic contaminants; correct?	
20	A That's true.	
21	Q In there were two findings that or two statements that you	
22	made in reference to identifications. In relationship to the Marilee Coot, I	
23	believe you stated that the DNA was Mr. Flowers?	
24	A The semen, yes.	
25	Q The semen, right. Okay. As opposed to it could not be	

excluded. Is that based upon a database that is used by you?

- A It's based on a statistical calculation, yes.
- Q Okay. And statistical calculation is based upon the CODIS for the State of Nevada? For the United States? Which database are you using?

A It's based off of a program called PopStats that was developed by the FBI. It's their own database that they put together.

Q Okay. And that is a database that is -- that you use, but you don't have any personal -- I won't say knowledge. It's -- what training have you received in relationship to that?

A It's widely used in the DNA community, and I've been to several classes involving the PopStats, how to use the program and how to interpret the statistical data.

Q And -- but you don't have any personal control over that database that is used or the statistics that come to you? You just take -- take the matches, the number of alleles that match, and then you run it against that, and you get a statistical amount where you can say, This is what I -- this database makes it as a -- as a finding?

A It's a compilation of all the frequencies of the particular alleles at the locations we're looking at and how often they occur in the population. So I do enter a profile that I find a profile into this database and see how -- what the likelihood is that I would see that profile in the population.

Q And how many alleles did you need to match in relationship to the Coote case in order to make that determination? How many matched?

A There's no limit to the number that you can match or non-match because if you have a partial profile and it matches every location that you

have information for, you can enter those into a statistic because, obviously, the more information you have, the more narrowed down your scope is going to be. But in this particular instance, it was a 30 -- it would've been 15 loci, so 30 alleles were entered in. The 15 loci, plus the sex-determining gene,

- Q And of those how many matched?
- A All of them.
- Q Now, you don't have any personal knowledge about whether or not the FBI database has gone through and done any self-checking against the number of locis [sic] that may -- or loci -- which is correct?
 - A It's loci.
- Q Loci. Okay. The loci that may match in the population, and you don't have any personal knowledge of that, do you?
- A There are -- that's not what the database is set. The database is not saying --
- Q That's what I'm ask -- the question I'm asking you is, you don't have any personal knowledge whether or not they have self-checked the number of matches that may arise out of a population?
 - A I don't know that.

THE COURT: I think what she's saying is, if it was a population of 100,000, that 993 or -- I mean, 99,993 or 99,994 would be excluded. If it was a population of a million, then 999,000 would be excluded mathematically; right? You're not looking at any specific population; you're just saying statistically 99.9934 percent of any population is going to be excluded because they're not going to have one of those 15; they're going to have at least one of those 15 that doesn't match?

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1	THE	WITNESS: Well, that's in the mixture.
2	THE	COURT: Okay.
3	THE	WITNESS: In the mixture, it's slightly different.
4	THE	COURT: Okay.
5	THE	WITNESS: So just in a straight-up single-source profile where I
6	can pull ou	t a major profile or I just have that single-source profile, what the
7	database is	telling you is how likely it is that you're going to see that profile in
8	the popular	tion at all; not how likely that two profiles are going to match each
9	other. Tha	t's not what the statistic is saying.
10	BY MR. PI	KE:
11	a	I understand. And in one the one on Coote, there was a
12	probable ca	ause match where you had the the known donor, and you were
13	matching t	o a suspect, a scene?
14	A	In that particular case, Mr. Flowers was listed as a suspect. On
15	this particu	lar case, his bucal swab was submitted and then compared to the
16	evidence.	
17	٥	Okay. And that was a probable cause match as opposed to a
18	cold hit wh	nich was done on the Quarles matter?
19	A	Correct.
20	σ	And there's just different statistics, different ways that that
21	matters	that's determined in that case, as a probable cause as opposed to a
22	cold hit?	
23	A	No, it's processed the same way.
24	a	Oh.
25	A	Because I all I do is compare the evidence that I have to a
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there's no mistake in the data banking as you're processing samples. That confirmation step is done. Then I do a second confirmation to compare it to my DNA results in the case, so essentially there's two confirmations done.

THE COURT: Is it kind of like AFIS? You put a fingerprint in there, it gives you something to look at, but then you actually take the fingerprint of a potential suspect and the exemplar that you have and do the process just the same as if you had done it by not having gone through AFIS; you just had a person of interest and you made the comparison?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COURT: All right.

BY MR. PIKE:

Q And with that you're relying up CODIS to be self-checking. Are you familiar with Arizona where their CODIS system has -- has actually come up with ten different people that match the same or similar DNA profiles?

A I am familiar with that article, and it was similarities between their DNA profiles where there were nine locus matches. We're testing 15 loci, and of all -- when we entered this into CODIS, this was the only hit that we came back with. So there were no other even profiles that were close to being included into that particular mixture.

Q Well, how close were some? Did you check to see if they were 14 that matched?

A No, no, no, no, no.

Q That ten matched? That 13 matched? You didn't do that. You just said -- you're saying there weren't any that came even close to it, but all you were asked from what you testified was that the 15 matched and that

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Were you able to take -- you've indicated that you can request

through CODIS a certain criteria of matches in the loci area, and you looked for the highest level of match, so statistically it's higher? Is that -- would that be a fair statement?

A We don't look for a specific match criteria. It's -- we leave our CODIS -- everyone has their databases set up the same way, that it searches at a certain criteria to make sure that you're not getting -- you know. Because if you set your search criteria too low, you're going to get hundreds of samples that are consistent with things that you're looking at because it matches it one place or two places, and then you'd have so much data to review.

So we set to where it's kicking out legitimate matches or, you know, consistencies. And so I can't tell you as far as -- I mean, we don't go in there and, Hey, I'm going to search this at a really high level because I think that it's this guy. I mean, we don't change it. We leave it the same all the time.

Q Well, but you -- but you could change it. If you were going through and doing a -- with a contamination similar to what happened in the first case that we're discussing and this case, if you have a second male DNA, you could actually account for maybe some contamination, lower it down, the criteria down, and potentially do that as a search engine in order to possibly identify suspects that you could then give to the detective who may make a determination whether they're related to it, whether they're in prison, whether they're dead or whatever they are in CODIS, and you can use that actually as an investigative tool in order to locate a suspect?

A We do use CODIS as an investigative tool, yes.

A There were.

Q Did any of those come back positive or did they all come back negative for any foreign DNA from the deceased?

A There was no foreign DNA detected.

Q So with the identification of the semen positive and the protein identifier that indicates that there was semen present, but no DNA had through any of the spermatozoa or anything like that. Is there to your knowledge a manner in which you can examine or compare the nature of the protein from one person to the next — to another person to determine whether that protein matches?

A There is no protein matching, but there is Y-STR testing, which is a male specific test because it targets the Y chromosome. And in cases where there aren't spermatozoa present, occasionally -- and there is an indication of semen, obviously, it's possible that we could get a Y-STR DNA profile from that and make comparisons as we would with STR testing. However, it's not as sensitive -- well, actually, it is more sensitive, but statistically since the male chromosome is passed down from generation to generation unchanged, it would mean that anybody in the same male line would have the same Y-STR profile.

Q And that testing wasn't done in this case? It wasn't requested?

A It was not. We don't have that capability at our lab. It would have been sent out to an outsource lab.

Q Was there DNA to your knowledge in this case that was sent to an outsource lab for examination?

A I'm not aware of any.

Q Finally, in reference to the mixture of DNA that was located in the Quarles matter, was there any testing that was done or any confirmatory testing that could have been done to determine whether or not the DNA that was -- that was unmatched, the amount in the mixture was greater than that which actually matched to or came back as not excluding Norman Flowers?

THE COURT: I don't understand the question. Do you?

MR. PIKE: Okay.

THE WITNESS: No. Thank you.

BY MR. PIKE:

Q It is a long question. I apologize. Could you tell of the two males that are mixed together which -- which was larger and which was the smaller amount?

A Actually, it appeared to be about dead even, the mixture, so I can't tell.

Q And the DNA testing that you performed cannot generally tell you when that DNA may have been introduced into another person or how old that DNA is?

A It wasn't. The only thing about semen that's slightly different is obviously -- and there's been lots of papers written -- that after about 24 hours, the odds of actually getting a DNA profile from a vaginal swab or something like that, after -- if it's taken 24 hours after the assault or the sexual encounter decreases tremendously. Semen can be detected usually up to two, maybe three days depending on how active the person is, but -- so, I mean, you can make assumptions that it was within 24 or 36 hours that that semen was left.

Okay. And part of your training -- if I can ask you if this is a fair question. When there were two -- two male DNA's and two spermatazoas in this, could you possibly tell which was older based upon the activity or the movement of the semen?

Once the semen stain has dried, the semen become inactive. They're no longer -- they usually don't have the tails on them anymore, so they don't move, and when you mount them on the slide, they're completely static. So there is no motility or age or anything we can tell from them.

The motility or the ability to determine whether or not they are moving, whether it's an old DN -- or old spermatozoa or a newer one, is that affected by a refrigeration of a body prior to the collection of the sample, if

- When we get samples in the lab, they're never motile. I mean --
- I understand that.
- Okay.

But as part of your training, have you received any training about what is optimum to collect it, whether -- from a dead body, whether or not it's better to collect it prior to the time that the body is refrigerated and it should be collected prior to the time of the autopsy or prior to the refrigeration and holding the body over for a period and the time of an autopsy?

I don't actually collect DNA evidence in autopsies or anything of that nature. I do know about what's the best way to preserve evidence, what's not a great way to preserve evidence, but as far as refrigeration of a body or preservation of that such, I don't know.

Okay. And the statistical -- the statistical information that you Q

gathered from a probable cause hit as opposed to a cold hit is what allows you to in one case say it is his spermatozoa and then in another case say it does not exclude it?

A No, it has nothing to do with that. It's simply based on the -because there's a mixture in one and there is a single-source major profile in
the other, and because there's a major profile, I can do a random match
probability statistic on that, which gives me the 1 in 650 billion, which then
lets me assume identity.

In the mixture, I can only say that this person cannot be excluded, but this is how many -- this is the percentage of the population that can be excluded from -- being a contributor into this mixture. So in that particular instance, because I couldn't pull out a major profile, I can't do a random match probability stat, which means I can't assume identity.

Q So -- and of the two mixtures in the Quarles case, were you able to obtain a greater mixture for the as-yet unidentified DNA or were the matches of the same or similar quality?

A The -- I believe you're referring to the panties because there's also a mixture of the same two individuals on the panties, and -- [looking through documents]. Sorry. The mixture is relatively the same. It's a pretty even mixture of both male individuals.

- Q And that was in the panties on the Quarles case?
- A Yes.
- Q Was there any DNA that you observed on any other areas or any other items that were requested to examine on that case? On bed, bedding?

1	A	l wasn't a
2	bottle. I to	ook a swabbin
3	profile obt	ained from tha
4	the rest of	the items I
5	residue sw	ab, and both
6	a	And they
7	case that	you examined
8	evidence o	of the panties
9	was provid	ded to you fro
10	А	From the
11	a	Vaginal sv
12	MR	. PIKE: I don
13	TH	E COURT: Is
14	MR	. PIKE: Sorry
15	BY MR. PI	KE:
16	a	You indica
17	contamina	tion by duri
18	verification	n against his [
19	to	
20	A	To the un
21	a	No, not th
22	way on th	e testing to d
	11	

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sked to examine bedding. I examined a Gatorade ng from the mouth of the bottle, and the partial DNA at was actually consistent with Ms. Quarles. But all tested a beef and cheese snack and then a beefsteak of those were insufficient to yield DNA results.

only -- so the only physical evidence in the Quarles -- well, let me correct that and say, does the physical then have the same mixture that was found -- that m what you believe was obtained during the autopsy?

- vaginal swabs, yes.
- wabs. Okay.

t have any further questions.

that it?

y. I'm sorry. Just one more question.

- ated that you believe that there may have been a ng the processing of Mr. Wahl. Did you check -- do a DNA to determine whether or not that matched to -
 - known male in the other case?
- he unknown male in the other one. But was there a etermine whether or not that -- your suspicion that there may have been some contamination by Mr. Wahl's presence during that, is there any way to double check that to determine whether that's accurate or not?

1 THE COURT: I thought she said that she did, but she actually took 2 that and compared it to Tom Wahl, and it was consistent. Is that --3 THE WITNESS: By the retest --4 BY MR. PIKE: 5 \mathbf{O} Okay. 6 Well, the retesting -- no. Just looking at the data, it was Α 7 consistent with his profile, but I retested the items, and then there was no 8 underlying male, which leads me to believe that it, in fact, was him. So when 9 I reprocessed the samples, his DNA obviously wouldn't have been in my 10 samples because he didn't contaminate the actual original evidence. It was 11 the extracts or something along the way. We still should have extracts in the 12 lab that he worked, and I could go back and re-run those and confirm that I'm 13 getting the same profile that he got with the contamination still there. 14 But did you have his DNA to compare it to that so that you Q 15 believe it is his? 16 Α I did, yes. 17 MR. PIKE: All right. Thanks. 18 MS. WECKERLY: Just a couple of questions. 19 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 20 BY MS. WECKERLY: 21 You mentioned that when you enter unknown -- an unknown Q 22 DNA profile or a mixture into CODIS, there's a certain stringency that is sort 23 of a lab standard that's used; is that correct? 24 Α Yes.

-24-

Can you explain what you mean by that.

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1	А	There is you can do low stringency, mod stringency, which is
2	a medium-siz	ed stringency, and high stringency match. With a high
3	stringency m	atch, basically I would have to have one or more alleles at each
4	locus that m	atch that particular person. Now, if I drop it down to a moderate,
5	it would be I	ess
6	٥	Discriminating?
7	Α	Less discriminating, and then low, obviously, more
8	discriminatin	g than that.
9	a	But the mixture that was obtained from Sheila Quarles, it
10	wasn't just t	that one possible male profile that was entered into CODIS; the
11	mixture itself is entered into CODIS, and then CODIS comes back out and	
12	says, This po	erson, Norman Flowers, could be a source in that mixture?
13	Α	Correct.
14	a	Okay. And then after that, you look at the actual evidence and
15	at his actual	profile; you just don't depend on CODIS to spit out the right
16	result; you actually take his profile and compare it with the original evidence?	
17	Α	Correct.
18	a	In your analysis of the Sheila Quarles case, was Robert Lewis
19	excluded as	a source of this mixture in Sheila?
20	А	He was.
21	a	And that was done with a bucal swab sample from Robert
22	Lewis?	
23	Α	Correct.
24	a	And the mixture that was found in Sheila Quarles vaginally, and
25	then also yo	u mentioned on the underwear, was that a were those full male

1	profiles meaning there was information at each of the loci or was it like a
2	situation where you only had maybe three loci present on the sample?
3	A No. It was a mixture of the first mixture actually in the sperm
4	fraction was a mixture of Ms. Quarles and then two males.
5	Q Correct.
6	A And the second one from the panties was actually just the two
7	males, and in both instances, they were full profiles, the first, a mixture of
8	three people, the second, a mixture of two people.
9	Q Okay. And so when you have the full profile, but you're still in
10	a situation where you have a mixture, it's is it the fact of it being a mixture
11	that makes the statistical frequency less less discriminating than when you
12	have a single profile? Is it the fact that there's a mixture?
13	A Yes, because in your statistical calculation, instead of at every
14	location entering two alleles for a particular mixture, you're entering anywhere
15	from one to for four people it would be or two people it would be four at
16	the most. So instead of entering two at every location, you're actually
17	entering four, so obviously that makes the number
18	Q The numbers are going to
19	A be less discriminating, yes.
20	MS. WECKERLY: Thank you. I have nothing further.
21	THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Pike?
22	MR. PIKE: Oh, no. Yes. I'm sorry.
23	RECROSS-EXAMINATION
24	BY MR. PIKE:
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Were you ever asked to determine whether or not it matched an

MR. PIKE: The facts on that.

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not put evidence on in that case. She just said that it was relevant that, in

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her opinion, the --

THE COURT: Well, how can you -- under the law, how can you have it admitted without doing a *Petrocelli* hearing?

MS. LUZAICH: We hadn't gotten that far yet. A lot of the judges will say it's admitted pending your proving it up. She said it's admitted and then kind of just went on to the next issue. So I expect at some point --

THE COURT: That sounds --

MS. LUZAICH: -- there will be a *Petrocelli* hearing in Gonzalez' department.

THE COURT: Sounds to me like it's -- like if there isn't, it either won't be admitted or it'll be tried twice.

MS. LUZAICH: Well, no, it shouldn't impact. The Supreme Court has said that if we don't actually have the *Petrocelli* hearing, that's not fatal if there is sufficient evidence.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, sometimes -- for example, you know, even if you didn't have the hearing, if the evidence happens to be a judgment of conviction or something, it's pretty clear that that's clear and convincing or if -- whatever, but --

MS. LUZAICH: Well, right. And her -- her trial is after yours, so there will be, hopefully, a guilty verdict.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you -- then let me ask you this: How does the evidence, I guess, in the Coote case because I'm not -- are you seeking to introduce the evidence in the Coote and Gonzalez cases, which is the same case but two incidences, in the Quarles case?

MS. LUZAICH: Yes.

THE COURT: Right. How is that -- you know, I'm satisfied with the clear and convincing standard, but how is it relevant, how does the probative outweigh the prejudice, and what specifically in NRS 145.045 (2) does it go to prove other than general disposition?

MS. LUZAICH: Most specifically, it goes to intent and kind of like absence of mistake or accident or whatever. In this particular case, Sheila Quarles is an 18-year-old lesbian. She is actively involved in a lesbian relationship with Qunise Toney, who you just heard about. She was excluded. She is ill at the time. She has a urinary tract infection.

THE COURT: I read that, yes.

MS. LUZAICH: She is at home. There is conversation with her, with her mother and Qunise Toney --

THE COURT: Phone goes off.

MS. LUZAICH: Up until -- right. So there's a two-hour time window where there's no contact, and then she's found dead. When she is found dead, in her -- well, one, she is violently sexually assaulted as was the testimony of Dr. Simms at the Grand Jury; and, two, there is semen in her vagina. I would submit that --

THE COURT: By all accounts, it probably isn't there on a normal basis.

MS. LUZAICH: Exactly. So we have to prove what is the intent of the individual or individuals who deposited the semen in the vagina, especially in light of not only is there a violent sexual assault, but she is strangled as well and found underwater. You know, recognize that the actual cause of death is drowning, but the significant contributing factor is strangulation.

We cannot call Sheila Quarles to the stand to say, I did not consent, so we have to demonstrate it in another way, and specifically -- and I know the motion is not being heard at this moment. In their motion --

THE COURT: Well, can you demonstrate that by medical testimony of Dr. Simms?

MS. LUZAICH: Well, we can demonstrate it by the medical testimony of Dr. Simms, but the defense at this point has to be consent. And, in fact, in their motion they make a -- in one of the motions that the Court is going to hear in a moment, they actually make a comment about a consensual relationship between the Defendant and Sheila. She obviously can't take the stand and say it was not consensual. So the evidence that he has done it to Marilee Coote, that he has done it to Rena Gonzalez viscerates the consent argument of his or the lack of accident or whatever --

THE COURT: Do you think it makes a difference --

MS. LUZAICH: -- as well as demonstrates what --

THE COURT: Do you think it makes a difference that those two came afterwards?

MS. LUZAICH: No.

THE COURT: I mean, is this something that runs both ways or just one way? In other words --

MS. LUZAICH: I believe the case law says both ways, prior or subsequent bad acts are admissible. I mean, you can't use it to demonstrate that he's got bad character, but what he did before demonstrates what he might do now. But just the same, what he does in the future demonstrates just -- under the same theory what he would have done in the past.

THE COURT: So intent. It's there for intent.

MS. LUZAICH: Intent, lack of accident, mistake; to demonstrate not consensual. And I would submit that because he has taken the life of Sheila and caused her to not be able to take the stand -- and these are very similar. You know, she is found underwater in the tub. In Marilee Coote's situation --

THE COURT: The tub --

MS. LUZAICH: -- there is, again, the water and the stuff in there. In both Marilee Coote and Rena Gonzalez property is taken. From Sheila Quarles property is taken as well, her stereo and CD's and things of that nature. Marilee Coote and Rena Gonzalez both know the Defendant through somebody. Sheila Quarles knows the Defendant through her mother, who was previously dating him.

So the probative value of the evidence of Marilee Coote's murder and sexual assault and Rena Gonzalez' sexual assault is so huge that it is no way substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice, and that's what the standard is. It's not, is it prejudicial? I mean, all evidence is prejudicial, obviously.

THE COURT: Only inculpatory evidence is prejudicial.

MS. LUZAICH: Okay. That is true.

THE COURT: Exculpatory evidence is not prejudicial.

MS. LUZAICH: Only inculpatory evidence is prejudicial. But the standard the Court must find in order to exclude it is that the prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value, and in this situation, the probative value is just tremendous.

THE COURT: Mr. Patrick.

MR. PATRICK: Actually, Judge, there is absolutely zero probative value in letting this in. You know, to start off with saying that because in Coote's apartment there was a tubful of water and because Quarles was drowned that obviously shows intent is bizarre. I mean, there is absolutely no evidence that Coote was in that tub of water, no evidence that Coote was drowned. The differences in the three cases are astronomical. One was a drowning, one was manual strangulation, and one was strangulation by ligature.

THE COURT: I understand, but when you're talking about modus operandi, aren't we talking about the identity prong of 45 -- 48.045, that it's identity because in each case when the guy did the armed robbery wore a make of Bozo the Clown kind of thing? I mean, isn't that -- I mean, they're arguing it doesn't go to identity. They're saying that the sexual interaction was rape, and the way you know it was rape is there's rape, after rape, after rape.

MR. PATRICK: Well, that's not true. First of all, in the Gonzalez case, there's actually -- absolutely no evidence that Mr. Flowers was the one that had sex with her. In the Coote case --

THE COURT: That's true.

MR. PATRICK: -- we have somebody that he admits to having an ongoing sexual relationship with. And in the Quarles --

THE COURT: That would be an exculpatory statement by the Defendant not given in court that probably isn't coming in unless he takes the stand.

MR. PATRICK: Well, I understand that, but this is -- you know, a

further provider --

THE COURT: And I think that the carpet DNA is very damning. I mean, that isn't the same thing as, Yeah, I was over to her house yesterday. I mean, when you put the vaginal swab with the carpet under her, that's -- that's pretty powerful evidence that he was the guy there at the time that the -- of the last incident.

MR. PATRICK: Well, the carpet --

THE COURT: I'm not saying it is, but I'm saying, to me the carpet evidence is the strongest piece of evidence I've seen in any of these three cases.

MR. PATRICK: Yes, Judge. But also in the carpet evidence, there is evidence of another male. There's another male's DNA on that carpet, which is the same thing as with Ms. Quarles. There's two males had sex with Ms. Quarles prior to her death. Now, the fact that Mr. Flowers may be one of them because of the DNA evidence that they found, there's another one and --

THE COURT: Well, carpet evidence is in the Coote case, not the Quarles case.

MR. PATRICK: Well, I understand, but they're saying -- yeah. I mean, they're saying that Ms. Quarles had sex with two men before she died, and, according to the carpet evidence, with two male DNA's --

THE COURT: Probably the other way around, Mr. Patrick. Probably two men had sex with her before she died as opposed to she had sex with two men before she died.

MR. PATRICK: Well, it's the same thing in the -- in the Coote case.

On that carpet sample, there is two male DNA's.

THE COURT: So what would you conclude?

MS. LUZAICH: Well, actually not.

THE COURT: I didn't hear that. I heard there was, you know, a single male -- major profile or something and --

MR. PATRICK: No, there was other DNA on that carpet sample that was not --

MS. WECKERLY: There's one foreign allele that's foreign to all of them.

MR. PATRICK: Well --

MS. WECKERLY: But it's not necessarily male. That means there's one other speck of DNA in the carpet.

MR. PATRICK: Well, it's another person's DNA, whether it male or female. But the thing is, there's way more differences in these cases than there are -- you know, like I said, we can't even -- there's no evidence that Mr. Flowers ever had sex with Ms. Gonzalez.

THE COURT: Well, bad sex -- bad sex. Bad acts based upon commonality or modus operandi really only relates to the State saying, We're going to prove identity in this case by showing that the person that did these other cases where the M.O. was exactly the same is this guy. In other words, he gets caught in a third robbery with the Bozo the Clown mask kind of thing. They're not -- they're not saying that.

MR. PATRICK: But --

THE COURT: They're not saying that's the case. They're saying, We have other bad acts which show that any sex that was had with Quarles was non-consensual.

MR. PATRICK: They can't prove that.

THE COURT: Well, they're going to try to have to prove that. I mean, they've charged him sexual assault.

MR. PATRICK: But bringing in -- well, first of all, there's no proof that -- like I said, there's no proof that Mr. Flowers ever sexually assaulted Rena Gonzalez, so they can't use that. There's believable evidence because not just Mr. Flowers' words, but Ms. Ragland's words that she was suspecting that Mr. Flowers and Ms. Coote were having a sexual relationship. So that also shows that it's very possible that he did not have -- sexually assault Mrs. Coote. That sex could absolutely have been consensual, not by his words, but by the words of his ex-girlfriend. Ms. Quarles, we have no idea whether or not --

THE COURT: Wouldn't that be just speculation on her part?

MR. PATRICK: Well, this whole thing is speculation on the State's part, Judge. There's no -- and when we go to Quarles, there's no way to know whether the sex of either men that had sex with Ms. Quarles was consensual or not consensual. The whole --

THE COURT: Well, there's some ways to know. I mean, one way, if they don't win, is that the medical examiner and you've got Nurse Ebbert, who is going to say, Look, I've seen 10,000 of these cases, and when you have a tear here and a tear there, it ain't consensual, period. She's a pretty damn good witness. I've had her as a witness dozens of times.

MR. PATRICK: Well, there's also that, but there's also other consensual sex acts that could cause that kind of tearing, and I think that you can't say in a case where you have a witness who can't testify to say it was

-- I mean, you know, we may not practice it, but there's all kinds of fetishes and marital aids like the one that was found in Ms. Coote's apartment that would cause those exact same tears and damages even though the sex was consensual.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, that's -- that's what the Defense does, is point those things out. Whether that's a reasonable doubt or speculation, that's what the jury decides.

MR. PATRICK: Yeah. The other thing is, in looking at cases like *Tabish* where the time frame is just way too far to put this into any kind of intent or lack of mistake, we're talking several -- and that's part of the reason why this case wasn't joined when Judge Bonaventure had it. And I think going through the reasons that Judge Bonaventure had when he would not join these two cases is a lot of the very same reasons why the bad acts because all -- all this is is, since it can't be joined, the State is trying to get these bad acts in, which is a *de facto* joinder. If the jury listens to all three of these cases and all those bad acts, it's no different than Judge Bonaventure granting a joinder.

And all it's going to do is completely inflame the jury because when they look at the Quarles case by itself, there's some doubt. Maybe not to the height of reasonable doubt, but there is some doubt. If you put in the evidence from Gonzalez and Coote, that's going to erase any chance -- any doubt, any chance Norman will ever have of getting a fair trial on just the Quarles matter. And that's why Judge Bonaventure refused to join them, and I think it's the same reason why we cannot let these bad acts in.

It's hugely more prejudicial than probative. The minute the jury

hears anything about Gonzalez or Coote, they're going to convict Mr. Flowers on Quarles. There's no way around that, which is why we thought to keep the cases from being joined and why these bad acts shouldn't come in. and why Judge Bonaventure agreed that these cases shouldn't be joined.

If you let it in, we're going to do -- what we're going to end up doing is two trials, one here and one in Department XI. They're going to be exactly the same trial. They're going to be a month apart, but we're going to have to go through it twice because looking at the 9th Circuit, if joinder issues and severance issues are constitutional issues where Mr. Flowers, if needed, could have some play on an appeal issue. Bad acts is not. So if you let this in, we cannot agree to join the trials.

THE COURT: I don't care whether you join the trials. I'm just not going to --

MR. PATRICK: Well, I understand that, Judge, but --

THE COURT: That's a strategic decision the Defense has to make because, you know, when it's a death penalty case, if you try -- if both sides -- both judges let it in -- I'm not yet convinced. But if that were to happen, then you've got two juries that hear this evidence, and, you know, the State only has to hit one out of two to get the death penalty; whereas, one out of one is a lot tougher for the State.

MR. PATRICK: And that's why it's patently unfair, Judge, is because -- exactly that reason because the State is going to have two bites of the exact same apple.

THE COURT: Well, I'm saying -- I'm saying, if, in fact, Judge
Gonzalez rules that way, and it sounds like she's leaning there, and, in fact, I

were to, and I'm not sure I will yet, then if I were defending him, I might just try this case once and say, I understand I'm giving up something on these joinder issues, but at this juncture, Judge, I'll just stipulate. We'll try it all at once. That is a strategic decision a defense lawyer might want to make, and I probably would, but that doesn't mean that you would.

MR. PATRICK: Well, I think you're right, Judge. I think that there's -- and I think you're leaning the right way. The prejudice -- the prejudice --

THE COURT: I'm not -- I'm not leaning --

MR. PATRICK: Well --

THE COURT: I'm not leaning either way. What I'm saying right now is, Mr. Patrick, I'm not -- I'm not yet persuaded by the State. I'm not saying I'm leaning not to, but there is some evidence of intent, the medical evidence, the evidence of Nurse Ebbert, the stuff about this is what happens in terms of sexual assault; plus, you've got the woman strangled and drowned in a bathtub in a two-hour window. It is pretty unlikely that somebody came over and had consensual sex and then left, and then somebody else came over and had unconsen -- had no sex, just drowned her, whatever. I mean, pretty much the person that had sex with her killed her, and if he killed her, probably she wasn't having a good time with the sex either.

MR. PATRICK: Well, there's no evidence and the State cannot point out which one of those two semen deposits were placed first. It's very probable by your -- the way you just laid it out is that Mr. Flowers could've had consensual sex with her and left, and in that two-hour window, the second donor came in and raped and killed her.

THE COURT: I don't think so, Mr. Patrick. Given the fact that she

doesn't like sex with men and she likes sex with women, I don't think anybody had consensual sex with her. I mean, it may well have been that two defendants, only one of whom is now before the Court, went in there and had sex and raped her. That sounds like a very probable possibility.

MR. PATRICK: Okay. Well, that's still --

THE COURT: That's where we're at.

MR. PATRICK: That's still doesn't bring us to the intent part because, again, Gonzalez, we don't know who had sex with her, except for the fact we know it wasn't Mr. Flowers. Coote --

THE COURT: I don't think we know that yet. Based on what she testified today, I agree with the first part of your statement, we don't know had sex with her. I don't agree with the last part, that we know it isn't Mr. Flowers because what she said was, there was -- it was semen specific, but there were no sperm heads detected, and we need that for DNA, and we don't have anything. And after I went back, the only thing that seemed to be inconsistent with Mr. Flowers now turns out to be Mr. Wahl. So what we really have as to Gonzalez is nothing.

MR. PATRICK: Well, that's not --

THE COURT: We don't have anything that is inculpatory of Mr. Flowers, and we don't have anything that is exculpatory of Mr. Flowers.

MR. PATRICK: That's not entirely true, Judge, because they also did DNA on the ligatures that was around Ms. Gonzalez' neck, and the ligatures had Ms. Gonzalez' DNA on them. They also had a male's DNA on them that wasn't Mr. Flowers. There was no testimony today that that was retested, so we have to assume that it was retested, and it still comes out to be not Mr.

Flowers. Or that it wasn't retested, and we have to go with Mr. Wahl's report, which says it wasn't Mr. Flowers. So there is still evidence on Ms. Gonzalez that it wasn't Mr. Flowers who killed her.

Going back to Ms. Quarles, Ms. Quarles was sexually active not only with women, but with men. She was absolutely bisexual, and we have that from statements from several witnesses.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, Ms. Weckerly is obviously surprised to hear that.

MS. LUZAICH: So is Ms. Luzaich because none of them are in evidence.

THE COURT: Well, you were facing the other direction, but Pamela was facing me.

MR. PATRICK: Well, anyway, Judge, there's not enough here, and the --

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this, Mr. Patrick: You don't have to divulge your defense, but if your defense would be consent, then I think this probably makes a lot of sense that this does come in. But if you are asserting a defense of consent, then I'm not sure it would. In other words, I could see me making a ruling that says it doesn't come in in the State's case in chief until or unless you intimate or put on any evidence that there may have been some consent, in which case it all comes in. I think that is a third possibility.

I don't mean the Defendant necessarily has to take the stand and say that. I'm just saying if you ask Nurse Ebbert, Couldn't this have been consensual and blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, then it may come in to show 1 2 3

intent and lack of accident. I see that as a real possibility, but I don't -- I don't expect you to disclose your defense to me nor to the State.

I'm just saying you're arguing. I got to tell you, I'm not persuaded one way or the other yet. I'm listening. I'm just throwing out stuff. I see that as a possibility as opposed to it's all in or it's all out because if you don't take -- if you never even broach the possibility of consent, then maybe this coming in for the purposes of intent, maybe the prejudice does outweigh the probative value in that sense if you don't -- if you don't contest that issue or if you don't suggest that's a possibility.

MR. PIKE: That -- well, that --

THE COURT: I'm not telling -- Randy, you don't have to -- you don't have to tell me what it is or what you're doing, and I don't expect you to.

MR. PIKE: Right.

THE COURT: I'm just saying that is a way in weighing the probative and prejudice to just say hey, you know, if you think -- if you're going to suggest that this is consent in any manner by any question, then by putting this other stuff in, it would certainly have a lot of probative value as to intent. But if you aren't going to even make that suggestion, then maybe the probative isn't as effective as the prejudice.

MR. PIKE: And I think that in a kind way, Ms. Luzaich kind of pointed that out in reference to the manner in which it was brought in or ruled by Judge Gonzalez in that case as opposed to this case. The facts -- the facts are very different, the way it may be brought in, whether their statements. And if we open the door, then definitely it puts him in a position where they can exploit that. Unfortunately, that's happened to all of us as defense

attorneys on occasion.

But to come in and issue a blanket ruling at this point in time would be inappropriate because as the Court indicates, there's a number of scenarios that may make it very probative and -- and then the weighing test may be effected, and we may -- we may open the door, and we may --

THE COURT: Let me ask you this, Ms. Luzaich: I mean, if intent is the issue and you have, you know, some fairly good solid evidence on intent with your -- with your medical examiner and SAINT nurse, why wouldn't the probative outweigh the prejudice if you put that evidence on, and they never attack it; they never even suggest it, and they're not going to argue it?

MS. LUZAICH: Well, you know, it's not only the murder that he's charged with. He's charged with sexual assault.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. LUZAICH: We have the burden of proving not only that he strangled her and killed her and that he put his penis in her, but we have the burden of proving --

THE COURT: That it wasn't consensual.

MS. LUZAICH: -- that it was against her will.

THE COURT: And so what you have -- I mean, I'm just asking. What you have is, you have a medical examiner and you have a SAINT nurse who are going to say the vaginal injuries and stuff are consistent with sexual assault, and they are generally -- not 100 percent impossible -- but generally inconsistent with consensual sex.

Now, if they are not going to even say, well, it could be that they used a marital aid or they -- they're not even going to even suggest or

take the position that consent is a defense, they're not going to ask a question, they're not going to have the Defendant say it on the stand and they're not going to argue it in their argument, why doesn't then the prejudice outweigh the probative?

MS. LUZAICH: Well, I'm sorry. I just -- I don't see how they can possibly not mention the word "consent."

THE COURT: Well, they might not mention it if, in fact, they think that if by mentioning it, I then think the probative value of this outweighs the prejudice, and I say, Okay, if you say the word "marital aid," if you say the word "consent," if you even question the integrity of Ms. Ebbert or the doctor that pretty much this is a sexual assault, I'm going to let the Coote killing in and --

MS. LUZAICH: Well, but there's still -- there's a mixture of two different DNA's, and, unfortunately, try as we might to pick a very intelligent jury, we are not going to get a jury that is as intelligent as the Court.

THE COURT: Well, you might.

MS. LUZAICH: And a jury is going to see --

THE COURT: You might.

MS. LUZAICH: -- two different DNA's--

THE COURT: Probably on average they got me.

MS. LUZAICH: But they're still -- they're going to see two different DNA's in her vagina and very well can say that it wasn't -- that we didn't prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was him; that it could just very well have been the other person who did the violent part of it and did the killing. So, I mean, I do think that the probative value is huge in this case because

you know what? We have here three woman, all of whom were violently sexually assaulted --

THE COURT: Let me ask you a second question.

MS. LUZAICH: -- and strangled.

THE COURT: Let me ask you a second question: You would concede, would you not, that there isn't any DNA evidence that says he sexually assaulted Gonzalez?

MS. LUZAICH: Okay. There's no DNA evidence that links the Defendant to Rena Gonzalez --

THE COURT: Well, there's the fact that he was in --

MS. LUZAICH: You know, what, Judge? I've tried tons of sexual assault cases with no DNA.

THE COURT: I'm not saying that.

MS. LUZAICH: I don't need DNA.

THE COURT: I know that there's the neighbor, and he goes for the drink of water and all that stuff, and I know the jail testimony and all that stuff, but I'm saying as far as DNA evidence. So if it were the case that I thought that additional probative value was there and it outweighed the prejudice, why wouldn't -- why shouldn't it be the order that only the Coote case comes in? I.e., here's a woman who has the same kind of tearings, the same kind of problems, appears to have been sexually assaulted, appears to have been strangled, and it has some value, what is the -- what does the Gonzalez case add in terms of proving intent?

I mean, how is it the case that you can draw a line there and say, Well, okay, the Coote case, I can see pretty clear; I mean, this is him. I

mean, it's 100 percent him, and it's on the carpet. I mean, he did that one.

MS. LUZAICH: Well --

THE COURT: The Gonzalez case is him because two women and the same thing, you know, theory that he saw the -- him coming out -- she saw him coming out of the apartment. He's around there all day. You've got the jail stuff, but nothing --

MS. LUZAICH: I think that the Gonzalez case is more probative as well in this situation because it demonstrates the lengths to which Norman Flowers will go to avoid detection. You know, in Sheila, he --

THE COURT: Wait a minute. That ain't in 48.045. 48.054 says it comes in for proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence or mistake.

MS. LUZAICH: Motive, motive, avoid detection. I mean, you know, he rapes her --

THE COURT: Avoiding detection is not motive. Motive is why you commit the crime. Avoiding detection is why you run to California.

MS. LUZAICH: If the Court thinks that, you know, just Marilee Coote is more prejudicial -- or more probative and not --

THE COURT: We're just -- we're just talking here. I can see a whole bunch of possibilities. I would like to get the right ruling. I would like to make sure that Mr. Flowers has a fair trial and due process. I would like to think that if there is a decision that's favorable to the State, that the Supreme Court agrees with me. You know, my job is to try to apply the law in the way that the law is written. So I'm just talking.

I can see distinctions between Coote and Gonzalez. I mean,

you're talking about, you know, intent on the sexual assault. Well, again, if you bring in Coote, you've got, you know, similar vaginal findings. I think arguably similar. You've got -- I mean, it is him. That's the guy that did it. When you put it together, there isn't any doubt. You've got a similar manner of death.

MS. LUZAICH: Right.

THE COURT: But then when you bring in Gonzalez, why isn't that throwing gasoline on the fire where you tip the scales to the point that is extremely prejudicial without adding a lot of probative value because you can't show other than by inference that he's the person that raped Gonzalez?

MS. LUZAICH: Well, I mean, I disagree. I think that we can show circumstantial evidence is just as good as direct evidence. So I think that we can show and we can prove beyond a reasonable doubt --

THE COURT: Well, I think you may well -- in the trial --

MS. LUZAICH: -- but I don't have DNA.

THE COURT: In the trial in Department XI, I think you may well show it when you put all the stuff together and that he's in there and around and getting a drink of water and by the car and all that stuff, and even though they're a little bit inconsistent, what limited value the inmates have and two of the same -- you know.

Logically, to me, if I were the trier of fact, I wouldn't have any difficulty with it, but at the same time, it doesn't have the same clear-cut evidentiary value that the Coote would have. And when you pile a third murder on, fourth murder on, fifth murder on, each one becomes more prejudicial to the Defendant in terms of getting a fair shot on Quarles.

MS. LUZAICH: Right. I mean, if the Court believes that it's more fair to only allow Marilee Coote's incident into the Quarles case, obviously, we, you know, would accept that, and that's fine.

THE COURT: Ms. Luzaich --

MS. LUZAICH: However, if they bring in consent in any way, shape or form, I would submit that allows Gonzalez.

THE COURT: But here's the problem. Even -- well, why? I mean, again, they don't -- if you try the whole case and you bring in the neighbor on Gonzalez and you bring in the inmates and you bring in all that stuff, you know, you have something. But, you know, you can just bring in a detective and, you know, your medical examiner and your SAINT nurse on Coote and say, Hey, 50 days later, we found this woman who also has some nexus to this Defendant, you know, raped, and we can tell that by the -- we've got the DNA there that's 100 percent, and she was strangled.

MR: PATRICK: Judge, I think that's a little -- a little bit of that goes to the proffer that Mr. Pike was trying to address at the beginning. When we -- when we talked to the two snitches in prison, Shawnta Robinson said that his whole story came word for word from George Dunlap, and he told it to the police because he felt threatened by George Dunlap and that the only way that George Dunlap knew anything about Norman's case was that he happened to get ahold of Norman's discovery while they were in CCDC.

George Dunlap is a career snitch. He makes a living out of getting out of trouble by snitching on other cases. I think -- you know, and I think, again, maybe they put that out in the -- in the Gonzalez/Coote trial to try and get a --

THE COURT: Yeah, but --

MR. PATRICK: It has no place --

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THE COURT: I'm not -- what I'm saying is, you almost need that if this came in as bad acts to prove arguably that he did the Gonzalez one. But

I mean, you don't even talk about Gonzalez. You don't bring in

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to prove that he did the Coote one, you can put the DNA lady on who's going

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to testify anyway, you could put the coroner/medical examiner on who's going to testify anyway, Nurse Ebbert and the detective, and those four, without all

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that other crap or without even the fact that Gonzalez died may, you know,

the inmates, you don't bring in any of that because it doesn't got to that, but

they can say, Hey, by the way, we had a very similar rape and killing. She

was raped. She was strangled. It's 100 percent him, and, you know, he

knew -- he used to date the mother of Victim Number 1, and he dated a lady

that was a neighbor of and installed the stereo and blah, blah, blah of Victim

helps them in terms of intent because you've got the similar vaginal damage,

MR. PIKE: Well, the Court's interpretation and the concern over

bringing in Gonzalez, I think, is warranted, and as we're just talking through

this is all being learned counsel, hopefully, that if the Court is going to make a

decision that -- as far as identity or motive, if we open that door, then -- then

Number 2, and you don't even get to that other stuff. Well, that certainly

and it helps them somewhat on identity because you have 100 percent

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establish intent, and the evidence becomes irrelevant.

instead of 99.9934 percent. Where are we?

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it would make sense to allow it --25

THE COURT: Well, these are two different things I'm talking about

and the same thing.

MR. PIKE: Right.

THE COURT: One is, I'm saying I think the State wins, but it's cut off at Coote, and we don't get into the jail snitches or we don't get into Gonzalez and all the evidence and him hanging around. You can tie him to each of the victims. You can talk about the medical vaginal evidence. You can talk about the DNA, and, you know, the detective can talk about the similarities between the two and go no farther. That's one way to do it, and regardless of whether you open the door, don't bring in Gonzalez. I mean, if you want to talk about consent, tee it up.

The other thing I was talking about is, there is another way to look at it that says, okay, if it's only for intent, then if you don't dispute intent and -- I mean, if you come in say, in essence, Listen, we agree that she was raped, and so if you think Norman is the guy just because it's 99.9934, go ahead and convict him on the rape because there's no consent here, there's no need to put in those others. See what I'm saying?

MR. PIKE: Or -- or if the finding --

THE COURT: We're not -- we don't -- or I'm not suggesting there's any consent here, ladies and gentlemen.

MR. PIKE: No, but does the finding -- without the finding being of the rape, they would still have to establish the identity of the person who committed the sexual assault.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. PIKE: Right. Now, the -- which is different than just saying --

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THE COURT: I mean, what they have -- what they have on Flowers --

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what they have on Flowers is that he used to date the mother. He's been there, he knows his way around, and in a limited two-hour window, somebody got in and somebody did this and got out, very likely somebody that was let in because they knew the victim.

And, you know, it takes a little while to do this and to have sex and to fill the tub and to strangle and drown somebody, and they probably started right when the phone went dead, and it certainly ended before mom came home two hours later, and it's a 99.9934 percent chance it was Mr. Flowers, maybe, and somebody else. Maybe not. And that sort of is the mirror image or the opposite of saying that only six out of any 100,000 people could have done it, and, by the way, one of those happens to be the boyfriend of the ex-mother.

MS. LUZAICH: Ex-boyfriend of the mother.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MR. PIKE: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I find that as to intent and identity, the evidence in the Coote case is sufficiently similar and nexus in time and otherwise that it is admissible, particularly, in fact, that the DNA is 100 percent, and I will allow that to be admitted. As to the Gonzalez case, it is excluded without the DNA. And I'm not going to try that case, and I don't need the snitches, and I don't need any of that.

You can put on the Coote case to show intent and to show identity by talking to the detective about the similarities in the case, the nurse and the coroner/medical examiner about the way she died, the similarities in the vaginal tearing, and the DNA profile person, and then that's as far as the

State is going.

MR. PIKE: Thank you.

THE COURT: There's no open the door, nothing. You can -- I mean, since I've made that ruling, you can say anything you want, Randy, in terms of consent. It isn't going to stretch it, but they can do it whether you do it or not.

MR. PIKE: All right. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Motions.

MR. PIKE: We brought a motion in limine to admit the evidence of the Crimestopper's report. The State has filed an opposition in reference to that.

THE COURT: Yeah, you did. Actually, when you filed it originally, I was kind of intrigued because I thought if it was a report from the victim and she indicated some -- you know, some genuine afraidness of another individual, that you might come within it, but after they -- and I had written down, I need to see the report. Then Ms. Luzaich submitted something, and I had the report, and this is an anonymous third party that had -- I mean --

MR. PIKE: It's a hearsay statement from her to an anonymous third party that we can't find.

THE COURT: Yeah, but the theory of the catchall in hearsay is inherent credibility, that you find inherently credible something that is otherwise hearsay, and it's fair to bring it in. I mean, somebody is calling the police and talking to them directly, and they give this information to the police. I thought that had some real logic to it, and I might've given it to you. I didn't need to see the report. But an anonymous call has zero inherent credibility. Has zero.

Now, they did eliminate Mr. Robert Lewis. As a result of your questioning today, I'm sure by the time we get to trial, they will have also eliminated Mr. Anthony Lewis. But I can't grant that motion after Ms. Luzaich showed me the report because it just isn't what it seemed to me when I read your motion. It is some anonymous call. That couldn't be far from -- any farther from inherently credible. Okay. Now, you've got your motion on the DNA evidence. I've read it and understand --

MS. LUZAICH: You know, that was never served on us. I pulled it off the computer this morning, but --

THE COURT: That's all right.

MR. PIKE: I did. I think the testimony that we had here just indicated the nature of the way in which they took the sample, how she ran it, and she put everything together. And, in all candor, the Court, as I'm required to do, there was -- after I finished and filed the motion, then there was a -- I got notice of a ruling in California that dealt with this cold hit issue altogether.

THE COURT: And I think it would be different -- it may be different; maybe not -- but arguably different if all they did was run it, get the cold hit and say, That's our thing. It's like running somebody through AFIS and you're getting a name. But what happens is, that gives them a place to go.

Then they actually do the sample from the suspect against the -- against the unknown sample just like they take a print from AFIS, and they put it against the exemplar, so the testing is really the same. And it's kind of a like chicken and egg. If you have testing and then it comes up with Defendant X, and Defendant X lives in Hoboken, New Jersey, has never been to Vegas and has no nexus with anything, then you've got to say something

is wrong with this testing. But when you do testing and it comes up with a defendant who was at the scene on the day in questioning, off and on, hanging around, acting unusual, knows both of these women, da, da, da, da, da, what's the difference whether you have that and then examine his DNA and compare it directly or you examine his DNA, compare it directly, and you have it. I don't think there's any difference. I think that you might be right if they just did the one thing, but that's not what happened here.

MR. PIKE: No. And we've got the testimony, and she actually offered the testimony that it could not exclude on the one part where they could match the other one.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. PIKE: So she made the distinction, and I think so long as she sticks to that distinction, I disagree. Statistically, I don't think she should be able to come in and offer the statistics on the second one because there is the mixture, but she can say it did not exclude him.

THE COURT: I thought about -- I thought about that. And when I'm thinking about that, here's what occurs to me. What happens when a victim of a bar robbery goes to a physical lineup and says, It's the guy in the yellow tie; I'm 90 percent sure? Does that mean that they can't testify because they're not 100 percent sure? I mean, it seems to me it goes to weight, and both sides argue.

What if she says, Well, you know, it's -- you know, I'd bet my house that it's Norman Flowers, but I'm not allowed to as a scientist say that it is Norman Flowers. They're 99.9934 percent of the people that are excluded, so there aren't very many. And you can say, so, okay, if we have a

 population of, you know, 10,000 people in prison, there's going to be at least five or six people in the prison that are going to potentially be the same as them, and, you know, I think it just goes to weight.

I mean, I think that's what you can do, just like if somebody says, It's the guy in the yellow tie versus somebody saying, It's the guy in the yellow tie; I'm 90 percent sure of that. I think -- I think when you're getting into that category, it doesn't become excluded as a matter of law. It's just becomes a matter of weight, and you've got some ammunition, and Ms. Weckerly has got some ammunition.

MR. PIKE: But -- and she's relying upon a database of which she has received some information about, but doesn't have any personal knowledge about, so --

THE COURT: But you can -- you can apply this statistical number to any database. In other words, you can say, Okay, if we have a million people, there could be X that would be this. I mean, to me if I were defending him, I'd get -- I mean, there's ten, 12,000 people in prison. I'd say, Well, okay, so six people in the prison system. You know, I mean, that's your number. But it doesn't matter what database you apply it to. That's still the percentage of likelihood that it's Norman Flowers is pretty damn high because most of the people in that database will be excluded.

If you apply it to 100 people, it's Norman. You know, if you apply it to 1,000 people, there's -- it's still Norman. If you apply it to 10,000 people, now it's still Norman. But if you apply it 100,000 people, there might be another four or five that it could be. If you apply it to a million, it's starting to get up there to 40 or 50, but there's a million people, and those 40 or 50,

1	some of them might be living in China. Some might be living in India, you
2	
3	Anyway, you're a good lawyer. You know how to take what
4	you've got, but it just has to go to weight. It can't be the case that you can
5	say that that is so inherently unreliable that it doesn't have value, that a jury
6	can't hear it and that you can't argue it, and a jury can't make it just like an
7	identification where they're percentage sure. It's just got to be the case.
8	MR. PIKE: Thank you, Your Honor.
9	THE COURT: Okay.
10	MS. LUZAICH: Thank you.
11	THE COURT: So we're still dancing; right? We're thinking we're
12	going?
13	MS. LUZAICH: Oh, yeah.
14	MR. PIKE: Yes.
15	THE COURT: And how long is it going to take?
16	MS. WECKERLY: A week.
17	MS. LUZAICH: A week.
18	THE COURT: A week. And that includes penalty?
19	MS. LUZAICH: Well, no.
20	MR. PIKE: No.
21	MS. WECKERLY: Probably a week and a day then.
22	THE COURT: A week and a day? Do you have a lot of penalty
23	evidence or not so much?
24	MS. WECKERLY: Oh, yeah.
25	MS. LUZAICH: Yeah.

1	THE COURT: You do?
2	MS. LUZAICH: Uh-huh.
3	THE COURT: Norman's a bad guy?
4	MS. WECKERLY: Yeah.
5	MS. LUZAICH: A lot of priors.
6	THE COURT: Okay.
7	[Proceeding concluded at 10:30 a.m.]
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21	ATTEST: I hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the
22	audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.
23	Reneworcent
24	RENEE VINCENT, Transcriber District Court, Dept. VII
25	(702) 671-4339

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

No. 68140

Electronically Filed
Oct 05 2015 01:10 p.m.
Tracie K. Lindeman
Clerk of Supreme Court

NORMAN KEITH FLOWERS

Appellant,

VS.

THE STATE OF NEVADA

Respondent.

Appeal from a Denial of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction)

Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County

The Honorable Elizabeth Gonzalez, District Court Judge

District Court Case No. C228755

APPENDIX TO APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

VOLUME I

James A. Oronoz, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 6769 Oronoz & Ericsson LLC 700 South Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Telephone: (702) 878-2889 Facsimile: (702) 522-1542 Attorney for Norman Flowers

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VI	Appellant's Opening Brief, Filed December 21, 2009	AA1054
VI	Appellant's Reply Brief, Filed May 3, 2010	AA1170
I	Bench Brief, Filed July 30, 2008	AA0174
VI	Defendant's Opposition to State's Response and Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Petition for Writ Of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction), Filed November 14, 2012	AA1229
IV	Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions Not Used At Trial, Filed October 21, 2008	AA0688
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I	Indictment, Filed December 13, 2006	AA0084
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VI	Motion for New Trial Based Upon Newly Available Evidence, Specifically the Conviction of George Brass for Murder, Filed March 5, 2010	AA1151
I	Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence of Other Bad Acts and Motion to Confirm Counsel, Filed January 23, 2007	AA0120
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I	Notice of Intent to Seek Death Penalty, Filed January 11, 2007	AA0115
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¹ Although there appear to be two (2) transcripts labeled "3-B," one transcript is the October 17, 2008 morning session, and the second "3-B" transcript is the afternoon session. The court reporter labeled both sets of for October 17, 2008, as "3-B."

IV	Reporter's Transcript of Verdict Volume 6 Held, October 22, 2008	AA0797
VI	Respondent's Answering Brief, Filed February 19, 2010	AA1105
V	Special Verdict Mitigating Circumstances, Filed October 24, 2008	AA0970
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I	State's Opposition to Defendant's Motion in Limine To Preclude Evidence of Other Bad Acts and Motion To Confirm Counsel, Filed February 2, 2007	AA0132
VI	State's Renewed Response and Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction), Filed March 5, 2013	AA1273
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VII	Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction), Filed July 7, 2014	AA1293
I	Transcript of Proceeding, Held November 15, 2007	AA0170
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V	Verdict, Filed October 24, 2008	AA0972

V Verdict(s) Submitted to Jury but Returned Unsigned, AA0973 Filed October 24, 2008

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify and affirm that this document was filed electronically with the Nevada Supreme Court on October 5, 2015. Electronic Service of the foregoing document shall be made in accordance with the Master Service List as follows:

ADAM PAUL LAXALT Nevada Attorney General

STEVEN S. OWENS Chief Deputy District Attorney

BY <u>/s/ Rachael Stewart</u>
An Employee of Oronoz & Ericsson LLC

. 1	GRAND JURORS PRESENT ON DECEMBER 5, 2006:
· 2	
3	MARY JANE BURKHALTER, Foreman
4	DAREL BLUM, Deputy Foreman
5	KERRY DICESARE, Secretary
6	CASSANDRA MORISHITA, Assistant Secretary
7	GARY BUTCHER
8	MARY EVERBACK
9	PHILLIP FISCHBEIN
10	BILL FRITZ
11	ERNEST GOLLIHER
12	GLENN KENNARD
13	JOHN KREMER
14	PAUL KURZNOWSKI
15	KAY LONG
16	SHARRON NORTHINGTON
17	ANNETTE TSOULOGIANNIS
18	
19	Also present at the request of the Grand Jury:
20	Pamela Weckerly, Deputy District Attorney
21	Lisa Luzaich,
22	Chief Deputy District Attorney
23	
24	
25	

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LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 5, 2006

* * * * * *

DANETTE L. ANTONACCI,

having been first duly sworn to faithfully and accurately transcribe the following proceedings to the best of her ability.

MS. WECKERLY: Good afternoon. My name is Pam Weckerly, my co-counsel is Lisa Luzaich, we are here to present the State of Nevada versus Norman Flowers. That's Grand Jury case number 06AGJ103X. I believe you all have a copy of the proposed Indictment which we can mark as Exhibit 1. We'll be continuing the presentment of this case probably next week so we won't be asking you to deliberate on this case this afternoon.

In this proposed Indictment the State has charged burglary, murder, sexual assault and robbery. It's my understanding that this Grand Jury has been instructed on those crimes probably several times. Next week we'll read you the instructions just before we ask you to deliberate, but right now we'll start with the witnesses. The first witness is Dr. Simms.

THE FOREPERSON: Please remain standing and raise your right hand.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony 1 2 you are about to give upon the investigation now pending before this Grand Jury shall be the truth, the whole truth, 3 and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 4 5 DR. SIMMS: I do. 6 THE FOREPERSON: Please be seated. 7 You are advised that you are here today 8 to give testimony in an investigation pertaining to the 9 offenses of burglary, murder, sexual assault and robbery, 10 involving Norman Flowers. Do you understand this 11 advisement? 12 DR. SIMMS: Yes. 13 THE FOREPERSON: Would you please state your 14 first and last name and spell both for the record. 15 DR. SIMMS: My first name is Lary, L-a-r-y, my 16 last name is Simms, S-i-m-m-s. 17 THE FOREPERSON: Thank you. 18 19 LARY SIMMS, 20 having been first duly sworn by the Foreperson of the Grand 21 Jury to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 22 the truth, testified as follows: 23 24 /// /// 25

1 EXAMINATION 2 BY MS. WECKERLY: 3 4 And how are you employed, sir? 5 I'm a forensic pathologist at the Clark County Α 6 Coroner's Office. 7 And Dr. Simms, can you briefly explain your educational and professional background that allows you to 8 9 work in that capacity? Well, I went to medical school and I've been 10 11 in medicine close to twenty-eight years, been doing 12 autopsies for about fifteen. I went through special 13 training in pathology and also specialized training in forensic pathology. I'm board certified in anatomic 14 15 pathology, clinical pathology and forensic pathology and 16 I'm licensed in Nevada. 17 And I take it from that description you've 18 testified before as an expert in the Eighth Judicial 19 District Court? 20 Α That's correct. 21 0 And that would be in the area of forensic 22 pathology? 23 Α Correct. 24 Doctor, in preparation for your testimony this 25 afternoon, did you review an autopsy report that was dated

March the 25th, 2005, authored by Dr. Ronald Knobloch? 1 2 Α Yes. 3 0 And who is he? He was a forensic pathologist that was at our 4 Α office for, I think he was there about eighteen months and 5 6 he's, he went back into training for hemato-pathology and 7 he's working at Sunrise Hospital. 8 Q Is it the normal practice at the Clark County Coroner's Office for doctors to prepare a report once they 9 10 conduct an autopsy of an individual? 11 Α Yes. 12 And are photographs also taken in conjunction Q 13 with the preparation of the report? 14 Yes. 15 And have you reviewed the report and Q 16 photographs in preparation for your testimony today? 17 Α Yes. 18 And that would be of a decedent identified in Q 19 the report as Sheila Marie Quarles? 20 Α Yes. 21 Doctor, what were Dr. Knobloch's findings with 0 22 regard to the external examination, what injuries were 23 observed? 24 Well, he found a number of hemorrhages in her Α

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25

eyes, there was also some hemorrhages in the lower lip,

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there were a number of vaginal injuries, there was a contusion on her left abdomen, there was an abrasion on the back of her left knee, is all the external findings.

Q What were his findings after the internal examination?

A He found some hemorrhages on the back of the head on the right side, behind the voice box there were hemorrhages, and around the voice box and muscles on the neck there were a number of hemorrhages. And also in the muscles at the back of the neck, back of the spinal cord, there was a large area of hemorrhage.

Q Concentrating on the injuries that I think you described as sort of being in the neck and actually the head area, when you see findings such as those, what is that indicative of?

A Well, a pattern of hemorrhages in the eyes along with multiple hemorrhages in the neck is indicative of strangulation.

Q Are you able to tell if it's manual strangulation versus a ligature or is that, you're not able to tell that from reviewing this report?

A There was no ligature impressions so it wasn't that. There weren't any external fingernail injuries or oval bruises on the neck, so whether it was actually using the hands or whether it was using an arm bar or a chokehold

2 or a knee or things like that, there was definitely 1 2 compression on the neck but I can't really go any farther 3 than that. 4 Okay. And the injuries that you're describing in the head and the neck area, would they appear from your 5 review to have been contemporaneous with each other? 6 7 Definitely. Α 8 And at or near time of death? 0 Definitely. 9 Α 10 You also mentioned I think that there were 11 some injuries to this victim's genital or vaginal area. 12 Α Yes. 13 Can you describe what those were and what that 14 is indicative of? There were several lacerations in the back of 15 Α the vagina and there was hemorrhage in the picture that I 16 17 reviewed and that's indicative of a violent sexual assault. 18 0 And in your review of the picture, coupled with the description in the report, are you able to make 19 20 any kind of determination if the sexual assault was 21 postmortem or ante mortem? 22 Α Well, the photograph showed hemorrhage so that 23 would indicate it was ante mortem. 24 Before death?

25

Α

Before death.

1	Q Were there any other significant findings by
2	Dr. Knobloch in terms of the cause of death of this
3	individual?
4	A He found a frothy fluid in the airway which is
5	a soft sign of drowning and I think you put that together
6	with the way that the decedent was found and also believed
7	that drowning was a major cause of death.
8	Q And what was, what were Dr. Knobloch's
9	conclusions regarding the cause of death?
10	A He stated that the cause of death was drowning
11	and that strangulation was a significant contributing
12	condition.
13	Q Did he reach a conclusion regarding the manner
14	of death?
15	A Yes, homicide.
16	Q Based on your review of the photographs and
17	the report, do you concur with those conclusions?
18	A Definitely.
19	MS. WECKERLY: Thank you, sir.
20	I have no other questions of this
21	witness.
22	THE FOREPERSON: Questions?
23	By law these proceedings are secret and
24	you are prohibited from disclosing to anyone anything that
25	has transpired before us, including evidence and statements

presented to the Grand Jury, any event occurring or 1 2 statement made in the presence of the Grand Jury, and 3 information obtained by the Grand Jury. Failure to comply with this admonition 4 5 is a gross misdemeanor punishable by a year in the Clark 6 County Detention Center and a \$2,000 fine. In addition, 7 you may be held in contempt of court punishable by an 8 additional \$500 fine and 25 days in the Clark County Detention Center. 9 10 Do you understand this admonition? 11 THE WITNESS: Yes. 12 Thank you. You are excused. THE FOREPERSON: 13 MS. LUZAICH: The State's next witness is 14 going to be Qunise Toney. 15 THE FOREPERSON: Please remain standing, raise 16 your right hand. 17 Do you solemnly swear the testimony you 18 are about to give upon this investigation now pending before this Grand Jury shall be the truth, the whole truth, 19 20 and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 21 MS. TONEY: Yes. 22 THE FOREPERSON: Please be seated. 23 You are advised that you are here today 24 to give testimony in an investigation pertaining to the 25 offenses of burglary, murder, sexual assault and robbery,

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        1
             involving Norman Flowers. Do you understand this
        2
             advisement?
        3
                          MS. TONEY: Yes.
        4
                           THE FOREPERSON: Would you please state your
             first and last name and spell both for the record.
        5
        6
                          MS. TONEY: Qunise Toney. Q-u-n-i-s-e, Toney,
        7
             T-o-n-e-y.
        8
                           THE FOREPERSON:
                                            Thank you.
        9
       10
                                     QUNISE TONEY,
             having been first duly sworn by the Foreperson of the Grand
       11
       12
             Jury to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
             the truth, testified as follows:
       13
       14
       15
                                      EXAMINATION
       16
       17
             BY MS. LUZAICH:
       18
                           Qunise, do you know a lady named Sheila
                    0
             Quarles?
       19
       20
                    Α
                           I do.
       21
                           How did you know Sheila?
                    Q
       22
                    Α
                           We were dating.
       23
                           And do you know for about how long you knew
       24
             Sheila?
       25
                    Α
                           A year.
```

:				
2 1	Q	For about how long were you in a dating		
2	relationship?			
3	A	About seven, eight months.		
4	Q	Now did her mom know as far as you know that		
5	you were in	a dating relationship?		
6	A	Yeah.		
7	Q	Was her mom		
8	A	Well, I don't know. I just knew she used to		
9	always be wi	th me so I'm not sure she actually knew.		
10	Q	Was her mother not very happy with the sense		
11	of your rela	tionship?		
12	A	At first, no.		
13	Q	Okay. It took her a while to understand?		
14	A	Right.		
15	Q	And I'm going to ask you specifically, on		
16	March 23rd c	of 2005, a Wednesday, were you with Sheila?		
17	A	That evening, yes, I was.		
18	Q	Had you worked earlier that day, Wednesday?		
19	A	Yes.		
20	Q	What do you do?		
21	A	Paratransit, bus driver.		
22	Q	And about what hours do you work back then,		
23	did you work	:?		
24	A	If I can remember it was like six to six.		
25	Q	Six in the morning to		

<i>:</i>			
2 1		A	To six at night.
3,		Q	On Wednesday, March 23, 2005, did you pick
3	s	Sheila up who	en you finished work?
4		A	Yes.
5		Q	Where did you pick her up?
6		A	At her mother's house.
7		Q	Is that located at 1001 Pecos?
8		A	I believe, yes.
9		Q	Okay. And when you say her mother's house, is
10	t	hat actually	y an apartment?
11		A	Correct.
12		Q	Did you bring Sheila back to your home?
13		A	Yes.
14		Q	And were you and Sheila together all night
15	t	hat Wednesd	ay night?
16		A	Yes.
17		Q	And then did you take Sheila somewhere on
18	ı	Thursday?	
19		A	To her mother's house in the morning.
20		Q	About what time was it Thursday morning?
21		A	I don't know, 5:30, something like that.
22		Q	5:30, six o'clock maybe?
23		A	Yeah.
24		Q	Was that because you were going to work?
25	;	А	Correct.

;		
3 1	Q	Did Sheila have something going on that day?
° 2	A	Not that I know of.
3	Q	That was a bad question. Did she have an
4	issue?	
5	A	Like
6	Q	Was she working?
7	A	She was not at work at the time.
8	Q	Why was she not working?
9	A	She was sick, had a bladder infection I
10	believe.	
11	Q	Did she work Wednesday the 24th, or Thursday?
12	A	No.
13	Q	And was she planning on working Thursday the
14	25th 24th	, sorry, March 24th of 2005?
15	A	No.
16	Q	When you dropped her off at home, at her
17	mother's hom	e, did you then go to work?
18	A	Correct.
19	Q	And while you were at work did you have
20	occasion to	speak with Sheila throughout the course of the
21	day?	
22	A	Yes.
23	Q	How did you do that?
24	A	Cell phone.
25	Q	Did you talk to her one time or more than one

1	time?		
2		A	Periodically, more than once.
3		Q	Okay. And as you were with her Wednesday
4	night,	what v	was her mood?
5		A	She was fine, she was happy. We really didn't
6	see ead	ch othe	er because she was sick so she was at her mom's
7	house.		
8		Q	Thursday when you dropped her off how was her
9	mood?		
10		A	She was sleepy somewhat. She was fine.
11		Q	She wasn't depressed?
12		A	No.
13		Q	Sad, nothing like that?
14		A	No.
15		Q	And when you spoke to her throughout the
16	course	of the	e day, what time was it the last time you
17	actuall	ly spol	ke with Sheila on Thursday, March 24th?
18		A	Around my lunch break, about say twelve
19	somethi	ing to	one.
20		Q	Noonish?
21		A	Noon.
22		Q	As opposed to midnight?
23		A	Right.
24		Q	How did she sound when you talked to her?
25		A	Нарру.

Q	Did you hear anything in the background?
A	Music.
Q	Okay. And did you find out later that day
that somethi	ng had happened to Sheila?
A	Yes, I did.
Q	And what did you find out had happened to her?
A	She got killed.
Q	Okay. Had you, after you found that out did
you have occ	asion to talk to police officers a couple of
times?	
A	Yes.
Q	And while you were talking to police officers
did they ask	you for a sample of your DNA, like saliva?
A	Yes.
Q	Did you give it to them?
A	Yes.
Q	How did they do that?
A	Swab with, against my jaws.
Q	Like a Q-tip in your mouth kind of thing?
A	Yeah.
	MS. LUZAICH: Okay. Thank you.
	I have no more questions of Qunise.
Anybody?	
	THE FOREPERSON: Any questions?
	By law these proceedings are secret and
	A Q that somethic A Q A Q you have occurred times? A Q did they ask A Q A Q A Q A

1	you are prohibited from disclosing to anyone anything that
2	has transpired before us, including evidence and statements
3	presented to the Grand Jury, any event occurring or
4	statement made in the presence of the Grand Jury, and
5	information obtained by the Grand Jury.
6	Failure to comply with this admonition
7	is a gross misdemeanor punishable by a year in the Clark
8	County Detention Center and a \$2,000 fine. In addition,
9	you may be held in contempt of court punishable by an
10	additional \$500 fine and 25 days in the Clark County
11	Detention Center.
12	Do you understand this admonition?
13	THE WITNESS: Yes.
14	THE FOREPERSON: Thank you. You are excused.
15	MS. LUZAICH: Thank you Qunise.
16	THE FOREPERSON: Please remain standing and
17	raise your right hand.
18	Do you solemnly swear the testimony you
19	are about to give upon the investigation now pending before
20	this Grand Jury shall be the truth, the whole truth, and
21	nothing but the truth, so help you God?
22	MS. D. QUARLES: Yes.
23	THE FOREPERSON: Please be seated.
24	You are advised that you are here today
25	to give testimony in an investigation pertaining to the

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offenses of burglary, murder, sexual assault and robbery,
1
 2
     involving Norman Flowers. Do you understand this
     advisement?
 3
 4
                   MS. D. QUARLES:
                                    Yes.
 5
                   THE FOREPERSON:
                                    Would you please state your
 6
     first and last name and spell both for the record.
 7
                   MS. D. QUARLES: Debra, D-e-b-r-a, last name
 8
     Quarles, Q-u-a-r-l-e-s.
 9
                   THE FOREPERSON:
                                    Thank you.
10
11
                            DEBRA QUARLES,
12
     having been first duly sworn by the Foreperson of the Grand
13
     Jury to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
14
     the truth, testified as follows:
15
16
                              EXAMINATION
17
18
     BY MS. WECKERLY:
19
                  Miss Quarles, you are the mother of Sheila
            0
20
     Quarles?
21
                   Yes.
            Α
22
            Q
                   Back in March, like March the 24th of 2005,
23
     where were you living?
24
                   We were living at 1001 North Pecos, apartment
            Α
25
     63.
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<i>:</i>				
3	1		Q	And did your daughter Sheila live there as
Z	2	well?		
	3		A	Yes.
	4		Q	Anybody else live in that apartment with you
	5	two?		
	6		A	Yeah, my other children.
	7		Q	Okay. And what are their names?
	8		A	I have Marquid, M-a-r-q-u-i-d, Devrick,
	9	D-e-v-:	r-i-c-}	k, Miracle, M-i-r-a-c-l-e, and Xavier,
	10	X-a-v-:	i-e-r.	
	11		Q	And all of you lived in that apartment
	12	togethe	er?	
	13		A	Yes.
	14		Q	And how old was Sheila at that time?
4	15		A	Eighteen.
4	16		Q	On March the 24th of 2005, did you see your
	17	daught	er in t	the morning?
	18		A	Yes.
	19		Q	Had she stayed the night in the apartment or
	20	had she	e staye	ed elsewhere?
	21		A	She stayed elsewhere.
	22		Q	So she comes home in the morning of the 24th?
	23	<u> </u>	A	Yes.
	24		Q	Do you recall about what time it was that she
	25	came h	ome?	
		ı		

1	A Maybe like 6:30 because I was getting ready,
2	we were in passing of each other, she was knocking at the
3	door and I let her in, she ran to the bathroom.
4	Q You were getting ready to go to work?
5	A Yes.
6	Q Were you aware at that time if your daughter
7	had been sick or if she had been to the doctor recently?
8	A Yeah, she had been to the doctor. She was
9	sick. He said she had a kidney or a bladder infection and
10	she was on antibiotics.
11	Q Sheila comes home about 6:30 and you leave for
12	work sometime after that?
13	A Uh-huh.
14	Q Is that yes?
15	A Yes.
16	Q While you were at work did you ever
17	communicate with Sheila?
18	A Yes, I talked to her maybe like five or six
19	times because we did that daily, talked all the time on the
20	phone.
21	Q And that would be by phone?
22	A Yeah.
23	Q When was the last time that you think you
24	talked to her on the 24th?
25	A Maybe at, maybe going onto twelve o'clock or

1	around that	time. And when I was talking to her the phone
2	went dead an	d when it went dead I'm thinking the batteries
3	went out and	I called her on the cell phone, no answer, I
4	called the p	hone back and no answer, I'm thinking maybe the
5	phone is jus	t dead.
6	Q	As you were talking the phone just went out?
7	A	Yes.
8	Q	You said that was at about noon or so on the
9	24th?	·
10	A	Yes.
11	Q	And that was the last time you spoke to her?
12	A	Yes.
13	Q	Did you come home from work?
14	A	Yes.
15	Q	That night or that
16	A	That evening.
17	Q	What time was it?
18	A	Maybe about three something, maybe 3:10, 3:15,
19	because I on	ly work right up the street.
20	Q	In the afternoon I take it?
21	A	Yes.
22	Q	When you got home did you have to unlock
23	the	
24	Α.	No.
25	Q	the front door? It was open?

1		A	Yes.
2		Q	And what happened?
3		A	It was closed but I had to turn it to get in.
4		Q	The door was closed but you didn't have to
5	unlock	it wi	th a key?
6		A	Right.
7		Q	What happened as you entered your residence?
8		A	When I went in the house I called her name,
9	because	e I cal	lled her Pooka, Pooka, no answer, but I had
10	already	y calle	ed her prior to that outside for her to help me
11	with th	ne bag	s I had. So a neighbor was looking out
12	upstair	rs, I a	asked him to come help with me the bags and he
13	goes ye	eah.	
14		Q	Let me slow you down a little bit. You called
15	her by	the n	ickname
16		A	Pooka.
17		Q	How do you spell that?
18		A	P-o-o-k-a.
19		Q	So when you came home you had some bags and
20	package	es wit	n you?
21		A	Uh-huh.
22		Q	Is that yes?
23		A	Yes.
24		Q	And you open the door and you called her name?
25		A	Yeah.

1 Did you get any response? 0 2 No. Α 3 And you see a neighbor where? 0 4 Α When I, the parking lot is right here in front 5 of my apartments, when I look out to the left, he stayed 6 upstairs, and I asked him, can you help me with my bags, 7 and he said yes, he came downstairs, he got some of the 8 bags, he walked behind me, I take, open the door, go in, I 9 said Pooka, no answer. So I sit the bags to my right which 10 when you go around the corner I had something like a little 11 wet bag, I set the bags up there, he set the bags up there, 12 he's standing in there, I'm like Pooka, nobody. I look over to my left and it's just a blank wall and I'm like 13 14 something missing from over there, I'm talking to him because he's still standing in my house. 15 16 You're talking to your neighbor? 17 Α Yeah. I'm like something missing from over 18 there and I'm looking and I'm like somebody stole my 19 stereo. 20 Now explain that. What's this stereo that you're talking about that was missing? 21 22 Α I had just purchased a stereo maybe like, 23 maybe three days to a week. I had a stereo, it was, if you 24 just look at it it looks like a computer facing, but it was 25 about this big, about that tall, but when you pushed the

1	power button it lit up blue, and I had three disks in it,
2	three disk player.
3	Q You said about this big and about this tall.
4	For the record, because we're taking down the words you
5	say, when you say this big, are you talking about eighteen
6	inches or two feet?
7	A Yeah.
8	Q By what dimension?
9	A It might have been about eighteen and
10	eighteen.
11	Q Okay. And that's the actual stereo itself?
12	A That's the stereo itself. And then it came
13	down onto a stand, it had like a stand under it and the
14	legs went out like in a V.
15	Q Were there speakers?
16	A Yeah, it was two speakers. And the stereo was
17	glass, like in the front it had glass doors, when you push
18	it they automatically open back, and it has speakers. The
19	speakers probably was like two feet tall because I had them
20	sitting up on something and they also had the same stand up
21	under them that matched the stereo itself.
22	Q A V-shaped stand?
23	A Uh-huh.
24	Q Is that yes?
25	A Yes.

1	Q	And this stereo and the speakers were missing,
2	you noticed	that?
3	A	Right, right off.
4	Q	Okay. After you noticed that the stereo was
5	missing, wha	t did you do next?
6	A	I went around to my room, took my shoes off,
7	and I could	hear water dripping, drip, drip, so, but the
8	bathroom doo:	r is closed, I go to open the door and when I
9	open the door	r I could feel moisture, I'm thinking maybe my
10	baby was here	e and she left because I could still feel the
11	moisture from	m the shower or whatever, so I pull the shower
12	curtain back	to turn off the water and I found my baby.
13	Q	I know this is hard, where was your daughter?
14	A	In the tub of hot water.
15	Q	In the tub of hot water. Was she face up?
16	A	She was like this.
17	Q	And when you say like this
18	A	Face up.
19	Q	Face up?
20	A	Yes.
21	Q	Leaning back?
22	A	Yes.
23	Q	Was her head out of the water?
24	A	Yes.
25	Q	Could you tell like how far the water went up
	i e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

1	on her body?	
2	- A	Up here, because she was short.
3	Q	It went up above her chest?
4	A	Uh-huh. Yes.
5	Q	And did she respond when you called her name?
6	A	No. No.
7	Q	What did you do then?
8	A	I shook her, Pooka, and when I shook her she
9	went all the	way over to the side of the tub, and the
10		still in there and I asked him can you please
11		get her out of the water. He came in there
12	and helped me	
13	Q	Did you two get her out of the water?
14		Is that yes?
15	A	Yes.
16	Q	And once you two got her out of the water what
17	did you do ne	·
18	A	I ran outside and his sister, she called the
19		Another neighbor.
20	_	And after, I assume the police arrived at some
21	point after t	
22	A	And I put a dress like over her.
23	Q	You put something on to cover her?
24	A	Yes.
25	Q	Before the police got there?
1 3	×	action and bottom and cuere:

1 Α Yes. 2 And they got there and you gave them the Q information that you had talked to her during the day and 3 4 that sort of thing? 5 Α Yes. 6 MS. WECKERLY: Thank you. 7 I have no other questions of this 8 witness. 9 THE FOREPERSON: By law these proceedings are 10 secret and you are prohibited from disclosing to anyone anything that has transpired before us, including evidence 11 12 and statements presented to the Grand Jury, any event 13 occurring or statement made in the presence of the Grand 14 Jury, and information obtained by the Grand Jury. 15 Failure to comply with this admonition 16 is a gross misdemeanor punishable by a year in the Clark 17 County Detention Center and a \$2,000 fine. In addition, 18 you may be held in contempt of court punishable by an 19 additional \$500 fine and 25 days in the Clark County 20 Detention Center. 21 Do you understand this admonition? 22 THE WITNESS: Yes. 23 THE FOREPERSON: Thank you. You are excused. 24 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

The State is also going to call

MS. LUZAICH:

1	Detective Sherwood.
2	THE FOREPERSON: Please raise your right hand.
3	You do solemnly swear that the testimony
4	you are about to give upon the investigation now pending
5	before this Grand Jury shall be the truth, the whole truth,
6	and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
7	MR. SHERWOOD: I do.
8	THE FOREPERSON: Please be seated.
9	You are advised that you are here today
10	to give testimony in an investigation pertaining to the
11	offenses of burglary, murder, sexual assault and robbery,
12	involving Norman Flowers. Do you understand this
13	advisement?
14	MR. SHERWOOD: Yes.
15	THE FOREPERSON: Would you please state your
16	first and last name and spell both for the record.
17	MR. SHERWOOD: George Sherwood. G-e-o-r-g-e,
18	S-h-e-r-w-o-o-d.
19	THE FOREPERSON: Thank you.
20	
21	GEORGE SHERWOOD,
22	having been first duly sworn by the Foreperson of the Grand
23	Jury to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
24	the truth, testified as follows:
25	

1 EXAMINATION 2 3 BY MS. LUZAICH: 4 Sir, are you a police officer with the Las 0 5 Vegas Metropolitan Police Department? 6 Α Yes, I am. 7 0 How long have you been with Metro? 8 Α Just under eighteen years. 9 Where are you currently assigned? Q To the homicide section. 10 Α 11 0 How long have you been in homicide? 12 Approximately five and a half years. Α 13 And I'm going to direct your attention 14 specifically to March 24th of 2005. Were you assigned to 15 investigate a death at 1001 North Pecos, apartment number 16 63? 17 Α Yes, I was. 18 0 Is that here in Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada? 19 20 Α It is. 21 And did you actually go to the scene? 0 22 Yes, I did. Α 23 Did you go alone or did you go with others? Q 24 I went with my teammates which consists of Α 25 approximately five other detectives.

24

- 1 0 And is that the normal course of how an investigation might go involving a homicide? 2 3 Α Yes, it is. 4 Is that because some people need to 5 investigate the scene and others need to interview 6 witnesses, things of that nature? 7 That's correct. 8 And when you went there who was already 0 9 present? 10 When I arrived there initially patrol was Α 11 already present as were a couple of my teammates who had 12 beat me to the location. And when you say patrol was present, do they 13 14 get there and put up crime scene tape so that other people 15 won't come in and basically mess up your scene? 16 Α Yeah, they're the first responders. 17 handle the initial call for service, they respond to the 18 location, determine that it's special circumstances 19 surrounding the, in this case the death that occurred, and 20 then notified the homicide section which contacts each 21 detective individually and send us enroute to the specific 22 location. 23
 - Q And when you got there and went inside, did you see a young lady that you came to know was Sheila Quarles?

Yes, I did. 1 Α Where was she located when you went in? 2 Q 3 She was located in the bathroom area with her Α head what would be to the west and her feet basically 4 hanging over the bathtub to the east. 5 6 Okay. East west confuses me. So was her, 7 like the back of her body, the head up to here but on the 8 floor, and then her legs hanging over the tub? Α She was laying on her back with her head 9 10 closest to the bathroom entry door. 11 Was there anything on her? 12 There was a towel and a shirt that was later 13 determined was put over her by her mother upon finding her deceased. 14 15 And did you also find out that her mother had 0 moved the body before you got there? 16 17 Yes, I did. Α 18 And what about the tub, was there water in the Q 19 tub still when you got there? 20 Α There was water in the tub which was cool to 21 the touch. There was a wash rag which was being used as a 22 stopper in the tub. There was an additional wash rag, 23 yellow bandana and small container of lotion present in the 24 tub.

6.

25

0

And about what time was it that you arrived

1 and felt the water cool to the touch? 2 I was dispatched at 1510 hours which is 3:10 Α 3 p.m. and arrived at 3:38 p.m. Was it your understanding that it had been 4 0 5 awhile after her mom got there and found her before you 6 arrived? 7 Yes. 8 Did you walk around the apartment to determine 0 9 what if anything was awry? 10 Α Yes. 11 Q Did you do that with her mom? 12 Α At the conclusion of my scene documentation I did do that with the mother. We never bring anybody into 13 14 the scene while we're doing the scene documentation because 15 they could be a potential suspect and we don't want them to 16 see the scene as it appears to us. 17 And when you say you walked around to do your scene documentation, did you also have a crime scene 18 19 analyst with you to photograph the scene? 20 Α Yes, I did. 21 0 Did you cause the scene to be photographed 22 before anything other than Sheila's body was moved or 23 touched? 24 Yes. Α

6:

25

0

And that's to protect the integrity of what

you observed when you got there? 1 2 Α That's correct. 3 0 Did you also look around to see whether there was any type of forced entry? 4 5 Α I did. 6 What did you notice? I noticed that all of the windows to the 7 8 apartment were closed and in the locked position. Ι 9 noticed that the front door to the apartment had what 10 appeared to be damage on the inside of the doorjamb. The 11 damage did not appear to be fresh. There was no paint 12 chips, there was no sawdust, anything that would indicate 13 this was something recent. So it appeared that at some 14 point perhaps the door had been knocked in but not that 15 day. 16 Q Okay. Did you find anything that would 17 indicate on that day someone had forced entry? 18 Absolutely nothing. Α 19 Nothing on the doors, windows, nothing like 20 that? 21 Α No. 22 Did you notice anything else or -- well, did O 23 you come to find out that anything was missing? 24 Α Yes. 25 Q What was that?

6-

1	A We found out, and by we I mean myself and my
2	teammates, through our investigation, that there was a
3	recently purchased stereo by Debra Quarles which was
4	located in the northwest, or the left corner when you go
5	in, the left corner of the apartment, and it was brand new.
6	It was a three disk CD player with AM/FM radio, kind of the
7	stackable ones that you see, it was missing, the speakers
8	were missing, approximately forty CDs were missing, there
9	were a couple CDs that were obviously out of place and
10	there was some speaker wire present on the floor.
11	Q When you say obviously out of place, what do
12	you mean?
13	A We were told that the compact disks were kept
14	in a little carrier case and these were basically just kind
15	of thrown on top of the stereo, on top of the speaker which
16	housed the stereo.
17	Q In addition to documenting the scene, did you
18	cause neighbors and people in the area to be interviewed to
19	see if they had noticed anybody lurking or something of
20	that nature?
21	A Yes.
22	Q And the other detectives that were with you
23	would have done that?
24	A Yes. One of us, which in this case was
25	myself, was responsible for the scene, my teammates were

1 responsible for contacting and interviewing witnesses. And of the people that were interviewed, was 2 0 3 there somebody that was potentially a suspect that you 4 wanted interviewed and to get a DNA sample from? 5 Α Yes. Our team received information while enroute to the investigation that prior to our arrival a 6 7 black male subject was seen loitering about the area. 8 basically were pointed in the direction of an individual 9 named Robert Lewis who lived in the apartment complex. 10 Detective Long obtained a taped statement from Mr. Lewis 11 and a buccal swab kit. 12 0 When you say a buccal swab kit, what is that? A buccal swab kit is in this case an oral, 13 14 basically an oral swab that is done inside the mouth on 15 each side of the cheek and qum. It basically goes in and removes cell tissues so it can be compared at a later date. 16 17 Did you also discover that Sheila Quarles was 18 having a relationship with a lady named Qunise Toney? 19 Yes, I did. Α 20 And did you speak with her? 0 21 I spoke to Qunise Toney. Actually Detective 22 Wildemann interviewed Qunise Toney at the scene and relayed 23 the information that he received from her to me. I called 24 Qunise Toney at a later date to reinterview her to confirm 25 that her story was consistent.

1	Q Okay. And was she even considered a suspect
2	at a point?
3	A She was initially considered a suspect but
4	after both interviews, she was very up-front, very honest,
5	basically everything she told us we were able to prove to
6	be correct.
7	Q You were able to corroborate things that she
8	told you?
9	A Yes.
10	Q But did you still obtain a buccal swab from
11	her throughout your, during the course of your
12	investigation?
13	A Yes, we did.
14	Q And is the reason that you obtain buccal swabs
15	from individuals so that you could compare to any DNA
16	sample that may be found on or in Sheila Quarles?
17	A That's correct.
18	Q And in fact did you attend an autopsy
19	conducted on Sheila Quarles on March 25th of 2005?
20	A Yes, I did.
21	Q During the course of the autopsy did you
22	discover that there was something going in Sheila Quarles'
23	vagina?
24	A Yes.
25	Q Did you cause a sexual assault kit to be

1	obtained, that would be swabs taken from the vaginal and
2	rectal area of Sheila Quarles?
3	A Yes, I did.
4	Q And as the detective in this case did you
5	request that those swabs be compared with Qunise Toney and
6	Robert Lewis?
7	A Yes, I did.
8	Q Did you also develop an individual by the name
9	of Norman Flowers as a suspect?
10	A Yes, I did.
11	Q And did you cause a buccal sample from Norman
12	Flowers to be compared with the swabs that were taken from
13	Sheila Quarles?
14	A Yes.
15	MS.LUZAICH: Okay. Thank you.
16	I have no more questions of the
17	detective at this time.
18	THE FOREPERSON: Questions?
19	BY A JUROR:
20	Q Did any of the swabs match up with the
21	previous buccal swabs?
22	A JUROR: She doesn't know.
23	MS. LUZAICH: I'm sorry, with all due respect
24	to the members of the Grand Jury, this is something that
25	this witness can't answer. The DNA analyst will come in

25

next week and testify. 1 2 A JUROR: Okay. Thank you. THE FOREPERSON: By law these proceedings are 3 4 secret and you are prohibited from disclosing to anyone 5 anything that has transpired before us, including evidence 6 and statements presented to the Grand Jury, any event 7 occurring or statement made in the presence of the Grand 8 Jury, and information obtained by the Grand Jury. Failure to comply with this admonition 9 10 is a gross misdemeanor punishable by a year in the Clark County Detention Center and a \$2,000 fine. In addition, 11 you may be held in contempt of court punishable by an 12 13 additional \$500 fine and 25 days in the Clark County 14 Detention Center. 15 Do you understand this admonition? 16 THE WITNESS: Yes, I do. 17 THE FOREPERSON: Thank you. You are excused. 18 THE WITNESS: Thank you. I appreciate it. 19 MS. LUZAICH: Ladies and gentlemen, that's the 20 end of the presentment today. We'll come back next week 21 with some more witnesses and ask you to deliberate at that time. 22 23

(Proceedings adjourned at 2:05 p.m, to reconvene at a later, undetermined time.)

DANETTE L. ANTONACCI, C.C.R. 222 (702) 361-1947 VOLI AA0040

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE STATE OF NEVADA SS COUNTY OF CLARK I, Danette L. Antonacci, C.C.R. 222, do hereby certify that I took down in Shorthand (Stenotype) all of the proceedings had in the before-entitled matter at the time and place indicated and thereafter said shorthand notes were transcribed at and under my direction and supervision and that the foregoing transcript constitutes a full, true and accurate record of the proceedings had. Dated at Las Vegas, Nevada, December 5, 2006. Antonacci,

AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding
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filed in District Court Case number 06A9J103X
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Lantte actoracce 1-2-07 Signature Date
Danette L. Antonacci Print Name
Court reporter

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTFILED 1 2 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 2007 JAN -8 A 10: 06 **ORIGINAL** 3 BEFORE THE GRAND JURY IMPANELED BY THE AFORESA 4 DISTRICT COURT 5 6 7 THE STATE OF NEVADA, Case No. 06AGJ103X 8 C228755 Plaintiff, 9 -vs-10 NORMAN KEITH FLOWERS, aka 11 Norman Harold Flowers, III, Defendant. 12 13 14 Taken at Las Vegas, Nevada 15 Wednesday, December 13, 2006 16 8:29 a.m. 17 18 19 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 20 21 22 VOLUME 2 23 24 25 Reported by: Danette L. Antonacci, C.C.R. No. 222

1	GRAND JURORS PRESENT ON DECEMBER 13, 2006:
2	
3	MARY JANE BURKHALTER, Foreman
4	DAREL BLUM, Deputy Foreman
5	KERRY DICESARE, Secretary
6	CASSANDRA MORISHITA, Assistant Secretary
7	GARY BUTCHER
8	MARY EVERBACK
9	PHILLIP FISCHBEIN
10	BILL FRITZ
11	ERNEST GOLLIHER
12	GLENN KENNARD
13	JOHN KREMER
14	PAUL KURZNOWSKI
15	SHARRON NORTHINGTON
16	ANNETTE TSOULOGIANNIS
17	TYRONE YOUNG
18	·
19	Also present at the request of the Grand Jury:
20	Pamela Weckerly Deputy District Attorney
21	Liza Luzaich,
22	Chief Deputy District Attorney
23	
24	
25	

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1	<u>INDEX OF WITNESSES</u>	
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3	Examined	
4	DONALD TREMEL 7	
5	CHRISTINA PAULETTE 10,34	
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1 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 13, 2006 2 3 DANETTE L. ANTONACCI, 4 5 having been first duly sworn to faithfully 6 and accurately transcribe the following proceedings to the best of her ability. 8 THE FOREPERSON: Let the record reflect that I 9 10 have canvassed the waiting area and no one has appeared in response to the Notice of Intent to Seek Indictment. 11 12 MS. LUZAICH: Good morning. I am back this 13 morning, we're going to finish the presentation of the 14 State of Nevada versus Norman Flowers. We have three 15 witnesses and then we're going to instruct you and ask you 16 to deliberate. Does anybody have any questions before we 17 get started? 18 I see a hand. 19 A JUROR: Yeah. I wasn't here for I guess the 20 5th, but I read the transcript. MS. LUZAICH: You did. Okay. 21 Thank you very 22 much. 23 Everybody else, were you either here for 24 the first presentation or did you read the transcript? 25 I see every head going up and down.

1	And just so that you know we also have
2	an amended proposed Indictment. Do you guys have it?
3	Oh, I'm sorry. Will you mark at as 1A I
4	guess.
5	I'm just going to pass them around if
6	that's okay.
7	Can I call my first witness?
8	Nobody is saying no so I'm going to
9	anyway.
10	THE FOREPERSON: Please raise your right hand.
11	Do you solemnly swear the testimony you
12	are about to give upon the investigation now pending before
13	this Grand Jury shall be the truth, the whole truth, and
14	nothing but the truth, so help you God?
15	MR. TREMEL: I do.
16	THE FOREPERSON: Please be seated.
17	You are advised that you are here today
18	to give testimony in an investigation pertaining to the
19	offenses of burglary, murder, sexual assault and robbery,
20	involving Norman Keith Flowers. Do you understand this
21	advisement?
22	MR. TREMEL: Yes.
23	THE FOREPERSON: Would you please state your
24	first and last name and spell both for the record.
25	MR. TREMEL: Donald Tremel, D-o-n-a-l-d, last

1 name is T-r-e-m-e-l. 2 THE FOREPERSON: Thank you. 3 4 DONALD TREMEL, 5 having been first duly sworn by the Foreperson of the Grand 6 Jury to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 7 the truth, testified as follows: 8 9 EXAMINATION 10 11 BY MS. LUZAICH: 12 0 Sir, you are you a police officer with the Las 13 Vegas Metropolitan Police Department? 14 Α Yes, I am. 15 How long have you been with Metro? 0 16 Twenty-six years. Α 17 And where are you currently assigned? Q 18 Α Homicide. 19 Are you familiar with an individual known as Norman Keith Flowers? 20 21 Α I am. 22 And in your capacity as a detective in May of 23 2005, did you obtain a buccal swab from Norman Keith 24 Flowers? 25 Α I did.

Q	And did you bring a kit with you to do that?
A	Yes.
Q	And did you swab the inside of his mouth with
it?	
A	He did.
Q	Oh, he did, sorry. In your presence?
A	Yes.
Q	And did you then package it in a sealed
condition?	
A	Yes, I did.
Q	And did you book it into evidence?
A	I did.
	MS. LUZAICH: Thank you. I have no more
questions.	
	THE FOREPERSON: By law these proceedings are
secret and y	ou are prohibited from disclosing to anyone
anything tha	t has transpired before us, including evidence
and statemen	ts presented to the Grand Jury, any event
occurring or	statement made in the presence of the Grand
Jury, and in	formation obtained by the Grand Jury.
	Failure to comply with this admonition
is a gross m	isdemeanor punishable by a year in the Clark
County Deten	tion Center and a \$2,000 fine. In addition,
	A Q it? A Q A Q condition? A Q A Q anything tha and statemen occurring or Jury, and in

additional \$500 fine and 25 days in the Clark County

1	Detention Center.
2	Do you understand this admonition?
3	THE WITNESS: I do.
4	THE FOREPERSON: Thank you. You are excused.
5	THE WITNESS: Okay.
6	MS. LUZAICH: The State is going to call
7	Christina Paulette next.
8	THE FOREPERSON: Please remain standing, raise
9	your right hand.
10	Do you solemnly swear the testimony you
11	are about to give upon the investigation now pending before
12	this Grand Jury shall be the truth, the whole truth, and
13	nothing but the truth, so help you God?
14	MS. PAULETTE: I do.
15	THE FOREPERSON: Please be seated.
16	You are advised that you are here today
17	to give testimony in an investigation pertaining to the
18	offenses of burglary, murder, sexual assault and robbery,
19	involving Norman Keith Flowers. Do you understand this
20	advisement?
21	MS. PAULETTE: Yes, I do.
22	THE FOREPERSON: Would you please state your
23	first and last name and spell both for the record.
24	MS. PAULETTE: Christina Paulette,
25	C-h-r-i-s-t-i-n-a, P-a-u-l-e-t-t-e.

THE FOREPERSON: 1 Thank you. 2 3 CHRISTINA PAULETTE, having been first duly sworn by the Foreperson of the Grand 4 5 Jury to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, testified as follows: 6 7 8 EXAMINATION. 9 10 BY MS. WECKERLY: 11 How are you employed? I'm a criminalist with the Las Vegas 12 Α 13 Metropolitan Police Department forensic laboratory in the 14 biology DNA unit. 15 How long have you worked in that capacity? 0 16 Α I've been with Metro approximately a year and 17 a half. 18 And what's your educational background that 19 allows you to work in that job? 20 I received a bachelor's degree in biology from 21 the University of Texas. I then went onto the University 22 of Alabama at Burmingham where I received a master's degree 23 in forensic science with a concentration in DNA studies. 24 And have you testified before as an expert in the area of DNA analysis and comparison? 25

1	A Yes, I have.
2	Q And that would be in Las Vegas, Clark County?
3	A Yes, I have.
4	Q Okay. Can you explain to the members of the
5	Grand Jury just briefly what DNA is?
6	A Sure. DNA is a substance found in the body
7	that allows genetic information to be passed down from
8	generation to generation. Half of our DNA comes from our
9	moms and the other half comes from our dads and except for
10	identical twins we each have a unique DNA pattern.
11	Q What sort of substances have someone's or have
12	DNA in them?
13	A Any substance from the body can actually have
14	DNA in it, blood, saliva, semen, breast milk, any sort of
15	substance like that.
16	Q Okay. And what is meant by the term a genetic
17	profile?
18	A A genetic profile is basically the information
19	that we gather in scientific terms to determine what your
20	DNA pattern is basically.
21	Q Okay. So there is certain portions of
22	people's DNA that I assume among all human beings is common
23	and then there is a portion of the DNA that is unique among
24	individuals?
25	A Correct.

1	Q And I assume in the forensic setting you are
2	concentrating on the component of the DNA that is unique?
3	A Correct.
4	Q And differentiates people?
5	A Correct.
6	Q In the forensic setting how is DNA used in
7	terms of having a known sample and a questioned piece of
8	evidence or a questioned sample?
9	A What we do is any time we receive a piece of
10	evidence, we obtain a DNA profile from that, and then we
11	obtain a DNA profile from a person of interest, and then
12	once we have both of the profiles we compare them and see
13	whether or not they match or they do not match.
14	Q Okay. And when you're doing this comparison
15	it's at that portion of the DNA strand that is unique to
16	individuals?
17	A Correct.
18	Q And are there thirteen or fifteen loci on that
19	part?
20	A We're actually locking at fifteen specific
21	areas of DNA that are unique to the individual.
22	Q Okay. And on the basis of that comparison
23	someone is either included as a possible donor to the
24	questioned sample or excluded?
25	A Correct.

1	Q In this particular case were you asked to do
2	some DNA analysis involving a murder case with a victim by
3	the name of Sheila Quarles?
4	A Yes, I was.
5	Q And where was the sample, the questioned
6	sample obtained from that you were analyzing?
7	A The questioned sample that I was asked to
8	examine was from the vaginal swab of Sheila Quarles.
9	Q And was that obtained from the medical
10	examiner's kit at autopsy?
11	A May I refer to my notes?
12	Q Yes.
13	A Yes, it was.
14	Q And these were, this was a swab of her vaginal
15	area?
16	A Correct.
17	Q And were you able to detect DNA from those
18	swabs?
19	A Yes, I was.
20	Q And what were your findings in terms of what
21	you detected?
22	A I detected spermatozoa on the vaginal swabs
23	and then when I obtained a DNA profile I obtained a DNA
24	mixture.
25	Q And how is it that you're able to see in your

1 results that you have a mixture? 2 Α When we do the analysis, each of us at the 3 unique markers of DNA that we're looking at have two 4 alleles, one from our mom and one from our dad, and it is 5 possible to have the same allele, I could have a twelve 6 from my mom and a twelve from my dad, and so what happens, 7 if we see more than two at a particular allele and more 8 than one instance we know that we in fact have a mixture. So that means that at least two people 9 0 10 contributed to the DNA sample? 11 Correct. 12 In this particular case from the vaginal swabs Q of Sheila Quarles were you able to determine if there was a 13 14 major or minor component of the DNA? 15 Α 16 17 18 19 component of that DNA? 20 Correct. 21 0

There was a major component of the DNA and it belonged to or is consistent with Sheila Ouarles. So you had her known profile and compared it to the sample obtained from the autopsy and she's the major Now I want to talk about the minor component of the DNA. Are you able to, were you able to develop a genetic profile or get DNA information in terms of the minor component? Α Yes, I was.

25

22

23

1	Q	What were your findings?
2	А	There were two additional individuals and
3	Norman Flower	s is consistent with this DNA mixture, so when
4	I compared hi	s DNA profile reference standard to this
5	mixture he co	ould not be excluded.
6	Q	Okay. And when you say he could not be
7	excluded, is	there any kind of statistical calculation or
8	probability e	stimate that you're able to give the members
9	of the Grand	Jury regarding his profile being in that
10	sample?	•
11	A	Yes. 99.9934 percent of the population is
12	excluded from	this mixture.
13	Q	But he is not?
14	Α	He is not.
15	Q	His profile is consistent with the mixture?
16	A	Correct.
17	Q	And you mention as well that there is a third
18	individual be	sides the victim and Norman Flowers that is
19	also present	in that DNA?
20	А	Yes, there is.
21	Q	Were you able to identify who this person was
22	or who a poss	sible source of this DNA was?
23	А	No, I was not.
24		MS. WECKERLY: Thank you. I have no other
25	questions of	this witness.

1	THE FOREPERSON: Any questions?
2	BY A JUROR:
3	Q You said the third you can't, you have no idea
4	who the third person might be?
5	A Correct. Now if I were given a reference
6	standard from someone I could compare it to this mixture
7	and decide whether or not they were included or excluded,
8	but as of right now I don't have a reference standard to
9	include or exclude anyone from.
10	Q But there is a third?
11	A There is a third person.
12	Q Okay.
13	THE FOREPERSON: Any other questions?
14	By law these proceedings are secret and
15	you are prohibited from disclosing to anyone anything that
16	has transpired before us
17	MS. LUZAICH: Can we have one second? I'm
18	sorry.
19	MS. WECKERLY: Can I just ask one question of
20	this witness before we excuse her.
21	BY MS. WECKERLY:
22	Q Did you compare the known DNA profile of
23	Qunise Toney to the DNA sample that you obtained from the
24	vaginal area?
25	A Yes, I did.

1	Q Was she excluded as a possible donor?
2	A Yes, she was.
3	Q Did you also compare a known profile of an
4	individual by the name of Robert Lewis?
5	A Yes, I did.
6	Q What were your findings as regard to him in
7	terms of being a possible donor?
8	A He was also excluded.
9	MS. WECKERLY: Thank you.
10	That's it.
11	THE FOREPERSON: By law these proceedings are
12	secret and you are prohibited from disclosing to anyone
13	anything that has transpired before us, including evidence
14	and statements presented to the Grand Jury, any event
15	occurring or statement made in the presence of the Grand
16	Jury, and information obtained by the Grand Jury.
17	Failure to comply with this admonition
18	is a gross misdemeanor punishable by a year in the Clark
19	County Detention Center and a \$2,000 fine. In addition,
20	you may be held in contempt of court punishable by an
21	additional \$500 fine and 25 days in the Clark County
22	Detention Center.
23	Do you understand this admonition?
24	THE WITNESS: Yes, I do.
25	THE FOREPERSON: Thank you. You are excused.

1	MS. LUZAICH: And finally we're going to
2	recall Debra Quarles.
3	THE FOREPERSON: Please remain standing, raise
4	your right hand.
5	Do you solemnly swear the testimony you
6	are about to give upon the investigation now pending before
7	this Grand Jury shall be the truth, the whole truth, and
8	nothing but the truth, so help you God?
9	MS. QUARLES: Yes.
10	THE FOREPERSON: Please be seated.
11	You are advised that you are here today
12	to give testimony in an investigation pertaining to the
13	offenses of burglary, murder, sexual assault and robbery,
14	involving Norman Keith Flowers. Do you understand this
15	advisement?
16	MS. QUARLES: Yes.
17	THE FOREPERSON: Would you please state your
18	first and last name and spell both for the record.
19	MS. QUARLES: Debra, D-e-b-r-a, first name,
20	last name is Quarles, Q-u-a-r-l-e-s.
21	THE FOREPERSON: Thank you.
22	DEBRA QUARLES,
23	having been first duly sworn by the Foreperson of the Grand
24	Jury to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
25	the truth, testified as follows:

1		<u>EXAMINATION</u>
2		
3	BY MS. LUZAIO	CH:
4	Q	Debra, I know you testified last week and I'm
5	sorry to brin	ng you back. There are just a few things that
6	I would like	to ask you about.
7		Do you know an individual by the name of
8	Norman Keith	Flowers?
9	A	Yes.
10	Q	What name do you know him by?
11	A	Keith.
12	Q	And how did you know him?
13	A	He used to be my boyfriend.
14	Q	At what point in time?
15	A	Like 2004, in like the beginning of 2004.
16	Q	Okay. And would he take you home from work
17	A	Yes.
18	Q	on occasion?
19		Is that a yes?
20	A	Yes.
21	Q	And where did you work at the time?
22	A	Family Food Market, H Street, 1602.
23	Q	Were you still working there at the time of
24	the death of	your daughter?
25	A	Yes.

1	Q	After the death of your daughter did you, or,
2	I'm sorry, at	the time of the death of your daughter was
3	Keith your bo	oyfriend?
4	A	No.
5	Q	Had he not been your boyfriend for a long
6	period of tim	ne?
7	A	Right, he had not been.
8	Q	But you were you still friendly?
9	А	Yes.
10	Q	And he would take you home from work
11	periodically?	•
12	A	Yes.
13	Q	After Sheila's death did you come into contact
14	with Keith ac	gain?
15	A	Yes.
16	Q	And how long after her death?
17	A	Maybe a couple of weeks.
18	Q	And did you have a conversation with him about
19	how you were	feeling?
20	A	Yes. I told him did you hear what happened to
21	my baby, and	he said yeah, I heard what happened to Pooka.
22	Q	So he knew of Sheila?
23	A	Yeah.
24	Q	And did you talk about feelings in general and
25	something to	do about them?
	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	2 I'm sorry, at 3 Keith your bo 4 A

1	А	Yeah. He told me that his sister seen a
2	psychiatrist	and he would get the number and take me up
3	there to it.	And I went up there a couple of times but he
4	took me.	
5	Q	He took you to see the psychiatrist?
6	A	Yes.
7	Q	A couple of times?
8	Α	Yes.
9	Q	And while you were either driving did he
10	drive you the	ere?
11	A	Yes.
12	Q	And wait for you and drive you home?
13	A	Yes.
14	Q	And while you were either driving there or
15	driving home	did you have conversations with him about
16	A	No.
17	Q	what was going on?
18		Okay. Did there also come a time after
19	the death of	your daughter that he came to where you were
20	working?	
21	A	Yes.
22	Q	And did that happen one time or more than one
23	time?	
24	А	More than once.
25	Q	Did you have conversations with him about your

1	daughter?
2	A Yes.
3	Q And what were those conversations?
4	A He came up and he asked me how are you doing,
5	I said the same, and he hugged me, he said I'm sorry about
6	what happened to your daughter, that's messed up that
7	somebody did that to her, she didn't deserve that, she was
8	a nice little girl, do they got who did it, do they know
9	who did it, and I'm like no.
10	Q Did he ask you questions like that the one
11	time or more than one time?
12	A Every time he seen me he would ask me, well
13	did they get who did it, do they know anything. I'm like
14	no.
15	Q Okay. And I'm sorry, we had forgotten to ask
16	you earlier, when you were able to go back into the
17	apartment after the police were done with the apartment,
18	did you notice was your daughter's cell phone there?
19	A Her cell phone wasn't there, her jewelry
20	wasn't there, my stereo wasn't there.
21	Q Do you know did she have her cell phone
22	earlier in the day?
23	A Yes.
24	Q And it was gone after, you came back?
25	A Yes.

1	Q	Did you ever see the cell phone again?
2	A	No. Her bank card was missing also.
3	Q	Her bank card. Is that also called a debit
4	card?	
5	A	Yes.
6	Q	And have you seen the debit card since?
7	A	No.
8	Q	And I'm sorry, Debra, were you convicted of a
9	felony traff	icking in 1998?
10	A	Yes.
11		MS. WECKERLY: Okay. Thank you, Debra. I
12	have no more	questions.
13		THE FOREPERSON: Questions?
14	BY A JUROR:	
15	Q	Did Mr. Flowers have a key to your apartment?
16	A	No, ma'am, but he worked in my apartments as
17	maintenance.	
18	Q	Thank you.
19		THE FOREPERSON: Any other questions?
20	BY A JUROR:	
21	Q	Were there any withdrawals on the debit card
22	after it bec	ame missing?
23	A	I don't know.
24	Q	Thank you.
25	///	

1	BY A JUROR:
2	Q Did you cancel the card?
3	A No. But I told Mr the investigator, I
4	told him.
5	Q Thank you.
6	THE FOREPERSON: By law these proceedings are
7	secret and you are prohibited from disclosing to anyone
8	anything that has transpired before us, including evidence
9	and statements presented to the Grand Jury, any event
10	occurring or statement made in the presence of the Grand
11	Jury, and information obtained by the Grand Jury.
12	Failure to comply with this admonition
13	is a gross misdemeanor punishable by a year in the Clark
14	County Detention Center and a \$2,000 fine. In addition,
15	you may be held in contempt of court punishable by an
16	additional \$500 fine and 25 days in the Clark County
17	Detention Center.
18	Do you understand this admonition?
19	THE WITNESS: Yes.
20	THE FOREPERSON: Thank you. You may go.
21	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
22	MS. LUZAICH: Ladies and gentlemen, I have no
23	more witnesses. I know that you have in the past been
24	instructed regarding most of these crimes, but just in an
25	abundance of caution, I'm sorry, I'm going to instruct you

1 again.

1.2

As you can see from the proposed or the amended proposed Indictment the defendant is charged in Count 1 with burglary. A burglary occurs when someone enters a dwelling or a building with the intent to commit a crime on the inside. In this case we've charged it as with the intent to commit assault and/or battery and/or murder and/or robbery and/or a sexual assault.

The second count in this Indictment is murder. In this state murder is defined as the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, either express or implied. The unlawful killing may be affected by any of the various means by which death may be occasioned.

Malice aforethought is defined in this state as the intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal cause or excuse or what the law considers adequate provocation. The condition of the mind described as malice aforethought may arise not only from anger, hatred, revenge or from particular ill will, spite or grudge toward the person killed, but also may result from any unjustifiable or unlawful motive or purpose to injure another.

If you look at this Indictment you can see that the defendant is charged with what we would call a couple of theories of liability. The first one is a

willful, deliberate and premeditated murder. And that is, what the definition of first degree murder is here. In order to qualify for a first degree murder there are three elements which must be present. That is the killing must be willful, deliberate and premeditated.

1.2

Willfulness is defined as the intent to kill, although there need be no appreciable space of time between the formation of the intent to kill and the act of killing.

Deliberation is the process of determining upon a course of action to kill as a result of thought, including weighing the reasons for and against the action and considering the consequences of the action. A deliberate determination may be arrived at in a short period of time, but in all cases the determination must not be formed in passion, or if formed in passion it must be carried out after there has been time for the passion to subside and deliberation to occur. Mere unconsidered and rash impulse is not deliberate even though it includes the intent to kill.

Premeditation -- I'm sorry, I lost my train of thought -- is defined as a design, a determination to kill, distinctly formed in the mind by the time of the killing. It need not be for a day, an hour or even a minute, it may be as instantaneous as successive thoughts

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of the mind. If you believe from the evidence that the act constituting the killing has been premeditated by and has been the result of premeditation, no matter how rapidly the act follows premeditation, it is premeditated. State of Nevada the law does not undertake to measure in units of time the length of period during which the thought must be pondered before it can ripen into an intent to kill which is truly deliberate and premeditated. The time will vary with different individuals and under varying circumstances. The true test is not the duration of time but rather the extent of reflection. A cold, calculated judgment and decision may be arrived; at in a short period of time, but a mere unconsidered and rash impulse, even though it includes an intent to kill, is not deliberation and premeditation and that will not qualify as a first degree murder.

The second theory of murder which is alleged in our proposed Indictment is what is called felony murder. Felony murder occurs when someone is killed during the course of a dangerous felony, for instance sexual assault or a robbery. In this case we have alleged an alternate theory of liability other than first degree murder that is willful, deliberate and premeditated. That's first degree murder. That the victim in this case was killed during the perpetration of a sexual assault or a

burglary or a robbery. That is the second theory of liability that you can see.

There are two other aspects of the law in Count 2 of the proposed Indictment that are basically two other theories of liability. One of them is that the defendant is charged with directly committing the act. So what we say is that the defendant would be liable for these charges if he is the one who directly killed Sheila Quarles. The second theory of liability is what's called aiding and abetting and under the aiding and abetting theory, if two or more individuals commit a crime together and they encourage each other or assist each other during the commission of the crime, under the law each one is responsible for the act of the other if they commit those acts with the intent of helping the other person accomplish the killing.

Every person concerned in the commission of a felony, gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor, whether he or she directly commits the act constituting the offense or aids and abets in its commission, and whether present or absent, if they directly or indirectly counsel, encourage, hire, command, induce or otherwise procure another individual to commit a felony with the intent that the crime be accomplished is a principal and shall be punished as such.

The third theory of liability is what is known as conspiracy liability and that means if two or more persons conspire or make an agreement to commit a crime they've entered into what is known as a criminal conspiracy and they're liable for the acts of their fellow co-conspirators.

1.4

Each member of a criminal conspiracy is liable for each act and bound by each declaration of every other member of the conspiracy if the act or declaration is in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy. The act of one co-conspirator pursuant to or in furtherance of the common design of the conspiracy is the act of all co-conspirators, or conspirators, sorry about that. Each conspirator is legally responsible for an act of a co-conspirator that follows as one of the probable and natural consequences of the object of the conspiracy even if it was not intended as part of the original plan and even if he was not present at the time of the commission of the act.

What that instruction tells you, that if you enter into a conspiracy with another individual, you are responsible for the acts that he commits.

Count 3 in the amended proposed

Indictment is sexual assault. Sexual assault is when a
person subjects another individual to sexual penetration

1	against the victim's will or under conditions in which the	
2	perpetrator knows or should know that the victim is	
3	mentally or physically incapable of resisting or	
4	understanding the nature of his conduct.	
5	In Nevada sexual penetration means any	
6	intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person's body,	
7	or any object manipulated or inserted by a person into the	
8	genital opening of another person.	
9	Like the murder, Count 3, sexual assault	
10	is charged under the three principles of criminal	
11	liability. That the defendant either directly committed	
12	the sexual assault, that he aided and abetted another	
13	person by counseling, encouraging, commanding or procuring	
14	the other person to commit the act, or by conspiring with	
15	another person to commit the act.	
16	And then finally Count 4, robbery is the	
17	taking of the personal property of another by means of	
18	force or violence.	
19	Does anybody have any questions about	
20	the instructions?	
21	A JUROR: No.	
22	MS. LUZAICH: Everybody is shaking their heads	
23	no.	
24	With that we would ask you to	

deliberate.

25

1	A JUROR: Can I ask questions of her or not?
2	Can I ask you some questions?
3	MS. LUZAICH: I might not be able to answer
4	them but you can certainly ask.
5	A JUROR: Okay. Based on what's been
6	presented to us, I don't know who Robert Lewis is, no
7	fingerprints at the scene, cell phone records, no charges
8	against debit card, property disposition. You're asking me
9	to find against this man and I have no credible witnesses
10	that you say that his semen was in her vagina. We do
11	not know if that was consensual. Lots of young people
12	today are bi and so I am wondering
13	MS. LUZAICH: Okay. These are questions that
14	you might want to talk about during deliberations.
15	A JUROR: Okay. Fine.
16	(At this time, all persons, other than
17	members of the Grand Jury, exit the room at 8:57 a.m. and
18	return at 9:06 a.m.)
19	THE FOREPERSON: We have a question concerning
20	DNA. Are we able to recall her, Miss Paulette?
21	MS. WECKERLY: She left.
22	MS. LUZAICH: She's gone. She's back at Metro
23	participating in interviews. Is it a question that you
24	need answered before you can continue deliberations?
25	A JUROR: It has some bearing

1	THE FOREPERSON: It would help. Even if it		
2	could be done by phone call or if we could get that		
3	information.		
4	A JUROR: Cell phone.		
5	MS. LUZAICH: I don't know if we can do that.		
6	You know what, can you		
7	MS. WECKERLY: We'll try to get her back here.		
8	Isn't your session over today at eleven?		
9	A JUROR: We're going to be here this		
10	afternoon, aren't we?		
11	MS. LUZAICH: I'll see what I can do.		
12	A JUROR: Do you have any evidence from the		
13	detective that ties in the robbery?		
14	A JUROR: Fingerprints, anything?		
15	A JUROR: Anything that shows that he took the		
16	stereo, had something to do with the stereo?		
17	MS. LUZAICH: Well, I mean I can't answer that		
18	question but let me see		
19	A JUROR: Well		
20	MS. LUZAICH: I mean the evidence that you		
21	have is what you have. I'm going to see if I can get her		
22	on the phone.		
23	A JUROR: We don't want to let a guilty guy		
24	go.		
25	(Off the record.)		

		· ·
6	1	MS. WECKERLY: She's on her way back. I
	2	assume you'll start your other case and when she's here
	3	we'll bring her back in for your question.
7	4	A JUROR: That would be fine.
,	5	A JUROR: Thank you.
	6	
	7	(Recess at 9:20 alm.)
	8	μ·
	9	(Proceedings resumed at 9:45 a.m.)
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MS. WECKERLY: Okay. We're back on the	
record.	
It's our understanding that the members	
of the Grand Jury had at least one additional question for	
DNA analyst Christina Paulette and we recalled her and so	
you can, whatever the question is you can ask her.	
And you are still under oath, Miss	
Paulette.	
MS. PAULETTE: Okay.	
CHRISTINA PAULETTE,	
having been previously duly sworn by the Foreperson of the	
Grand Jury to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing	
but the truth, testified as follows:	
BY THE FOREPERSON:	
Q The question has been raised, the fact that	
you found a mixed DNA, obviously there was another person	
involved, could that have taken place at two different	
times?	
A It's possible, but based on the data that I	
obtained, due to the pretty much equal amount of minor	
profiles, because obviously Sheila was the major and there	
were two minor profiles, they're pretty even, and based on	

that data, because there was no degradation, I would say

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1 they happened close to the same time. 2 So it is not possible that the DNA from say Norman Flowers, like she could have had casual sex with him 3 three days before, and then this other, the mix that was 4 5 unidentified could have taken place at the time of the 6 sexual assault? It's possible but not likely. We've actually 7 Α done studies in our own lab to sort of see how long semen 8 9 would last in the vaginal vault and depending on what, 10 depending on the person, actually when it was deposited, 11 how active they are at the time that it was deposited, we 12 can usually detect semen up to three days, but really to get a DNA profile it's probably sooner than that. 13 14 THE FOREPERSON: Sharon, does that clarify 15 enough or --BY A JUROR: 16 17 And there is no way to determine the DNA, how 18 close to time of death or anything? 19 Α Not at all. It's a very non-clear cut 20 evidence. All we can say is it's there. 21 BY A JUROR: 22 Does the water do any damage to the DNA? 0 23 It can cause degradation in the DNA to where Α

we would get partial profiles. But as I said the DNA was

24

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not degraded whatsoever.

1 Q Is there any way to prove that the missing or the third DNA is male or female? 2 3 'I can't say a hundred percent whether or not it's male or female, but based on my experience in the way 4 5 that the data was arrived at it appears to be male. 6 But it doesn't register to Mr. Flowers? 7 Α No, it's an additional person. 8 And you have no idea of the source? 0 No, I do not. 9 Α BY A JUROR: 10 11 And she was submerged in water and that didn't 0 affect the DNA? 12 13 If she was submerged it would depend on how Α 14 she was submerged basically. You know I don't know if she 15 was hanging upside down or what the story is with that, but 16 water does in fact, it can degrade the samples, but really it just depends on her own physilogical make-up. 17 sure. I'm unable to tell. 18 BY A JUROR: 19 20 I have one other question. I know the coroner testified, this was obviously a violent struggle, she was 21 22 drowned, was there anything taken from under her nails or 23 anything that you might be able to use to test DNA on her 24 body that would give --

I don't think she can answer

MS. WECKERLY:

25

1	that question. She can only answer what	
2	A JUROR: About the vagina.	
3	MS. WECKERLY: About what she tested.	
4	BY A JUROR:	
5	Q There is no testimony about anything under her	
6	nails in the struggle? I know the coroner did not testify	
7	to anything about that.	
8	MS. WECKERLY: This witness can testify to the	
9	data that she got from the vaginal swabs and I don't	
10	believe she can testify to any additional data other than	
11	what she examined at this point.	
12	Can I ask one question?	
13	BY MS. WECKERLY:	
14	Q DNA degrades over time; is that correct?	
15	A Yes.	
16	Q Okay. And in this, and you mentioned that you	
17	can detect sperm at seventy-two hours, typically	
18	seventy-two hours before someone has died, or seventy-two	
19	hours after they've had sexual contact of some nature.	
20	Would that be correct?	
21	A I can detect semen. I can't always detet	
22	sperm. In this case I actually detected sperm.	
23	Q That would suggest it's on the more recent	
24	side?	
25	A Most likely, yes.	

1	Q And you had a full profile of the minor		
2	component DNA in this particular situation as well?		
3	A Yes, I did.		
4	Q And that would suggest that there was no		
5	degradation?		
6	A Not as far as I can tell.		
7	Q Is that indicative of a shorter time period?		
8	A Yes.		
9	MS. WECKERLY: Any other questions for the		
10	Grand Jury?		
11	THE FOREPERSON: Anyone else have any other		
12	questions?		
13	MS. WECKERLY: Okay. I just wanted to add		
14	well, actually we can excuse the witness. But if it's okay		
15	with you I just wanted to add one aspect to the Grand Jury		
16	instructions that Lisa read to you.		
17	MS. LUZAICH: We need to do that after she		
18	leaves.		
19	Thank you.		
20	THE FOREPERSON: Your admonition stands.		
21	THE WITNESS: Okay. Thank you.		
22	THE FOREPERSON: Thank you.		
23	MS. WECKERLY: The only thing I wanted to add		
24	in terms of the instructions, you were instructed on		
25	conspiracy liability. Those instructions still apply. The		

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only thing that you have to consider in addition to 1 conspiracy liability is that the members of the conspiracy have to act with the intent that the crime be committed and I don't know if we covered that or not. But obviously the object of the conspiracy has to be what crime they intended 6 to commit. And with that we'll leave you to deliberate. (At this time, all persons, other than members of the Grand Jury, exit the room at 9:51 a.m. and return at 9:54 a.m.) THE FOREPERSON: Miss District Attorney, by a vote of twelve or more Grand Jurors a true bill has been returned against Norman Keith Flowers charging the crimes of burglary, murder, sexual assault and robbery in Grand Jury case number 06AGJ103X. We instruct you to prepare an 15 Indictment in conformance with the proposed Indictment 16 previously submitted to us. 17 MS. WECKERLY: Thank you. We will. 18 MS. LUZAICH: Thank you. (Proceedings concluded.) 21 --00000--22 23 24

1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 2 3 STATE OF NEVADA SS COUNTY OF CLARK 4 5 6 I, Danette L. Antonacci, C.C.R. 222, do hereby 7 certify that I took down in Shorthand (Stenotype) all of 8 the proceedings had in the before-entitled matter at the 9 time and place indicated and thereafter said shorthand 10 notes were transcribed at and under my direction and 11 supervision and that the foregoing transcript constitutes a 12 full, true and accurate record of the proceedings had. 13 Dated at Las Vegas, Nevada, December 29, 2006. 14 15 16 Danette L. Antonacci, C.C.R. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

25

AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding		
(Title of Document)		
C 238755- filed in District Court Case number 06A 9 J 103X		
Does not contain the social security number of any person.		
-OR-		
Contains the social security number of a person as required by:		
A. A specific state or federal law, to wit:		
(State specific law)		
-or-		
B. For the administration of a public program or for an application for a federal or state grant.		
Laute autorace 1-2-07 Signature Date		
Danette L. Antonacci.		
Court reporter		

DPIGINAL

1	IND DAVID BOCER	FILED
2	DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781	"
3	PAMELA WECKERLY	DEC 13 3 02 111 00
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #006163 200 South Third Street	DEC 13 3 02 PM '06 Shing & Kanginer CLERK
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 455-4711	CLEKK
6	Attorney for Plaintiff	
7		
8	DISTRI	CT COURT
9	CLARK COU	JNTY, NEVADA
10	THE STATE OF NEVADA,)
11	Plaintiff,	
12	-vs-	Case No. C228755 Dept. No. XIV
13	NORMAN KEITH FLOWERS, aka Norman Harold Flowers, III,	Bopt. No. 741
14	#1179383	INDICTMENT
15	Defendant.	
16	Dorondune.	}
17		
18	STATE OF NEVADA) ss. COUNTY OF CLARK	
19		
20	The Defendant(s) above named, NORMAN KEITH FLOWERS, aka, Norman Harolo	
21	Flowers, III, accused by the Clark County Grand Jury of the crimes of BURGLARY	
22	(Felony - NRS 205.060); MURDER (F	Felony - NRS 200.010, 200.030); SEXUAL
23	ASSAULT (Felony - NRS 200.364, 200.366) and ROBBERY (Felony - NRS 200.380) committed at and within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, on or about the 24th day o	
24		
25	March, 2005, as follows:	
26	COUNT 1 - BURGLARY	
2 ₽	did then and there wilfully, unlawful	ly, and feloniously enter, with intent to commit
/ ONERR	assault or battery and/or a felony, to-wit: mu	order and/or robbery and/or sexual assault, that

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certain building occupied by SHEILA QUARLES, located at 1001 North Pecos #H-63, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada.

COUNT 2 - MURDER

2.1

did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, without authority of law, and with malice aforethought, kill SHEILA QUARLES, a human being, by manual strangulation with his hands and/or an unknown object, said killing having been (1) wilfull, deliberate and premeditated; and/or (2) committed during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of sexual assault as set forth in Count 3 and 4 and/or burglary as set forth in Count 1 and/or robbery as set forth in Count 4, said acts being incorporated herein by this reference as though fully set forth, said Defendant being responsible under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to-wit: (1) by Defendant directly committing the acts constituting the offenses, and/or (2) by aiding or abetting an unknown individual by counseling, encouraging, commanding or procuring the unknown individual to commit the offenses and/or (3) by conspiring with an unknown individual to commit said offenses.

COUNT 3 - SEXUAL ASSAULT

did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject SHEILA QUARLES, a female person, to sexual penetration, to-wit: sexual intercourse, by the said Defendant placing his penis and/or an unknown object into the genital opening of the said SHEILA QUARLES, against her will, said defendant being responsible under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to-wit: (1) by Defendant directly committing the act constituting the offense, and/or (2) by aiding and abetting an unknown individual by counseling, encouraging, commanding or procuring the unknown individual to commit the offense, and/or (3) by conspiring with an unknown individual to commit the said offense.

COUNT 4 – ROBBERY

did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take personal property: to-wit: a stereo and speakers, cell phone, and/or other personal property from the person of SHEILA QUARLES or in her presence, by means of force or violence, or fear of injury to, and

without the consent and against the will of the said SHEILA QUARLES, said Defendant being responsible under one or more of the following principles of criminal liability, to-wit: (1) by Defendant directly committing the acts constituting the offenses, and/or (2) by aiding or abetting an unknown individual by counseling, encouraging, commanding or procuring the unknown individual to commit the offenses and/or (3) by conspiring with an unknown individual to commit said offenses.

DATED this <u>13</u> day of December, 2006.

DAVID ROGER DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #002781

BY

Chief Deputy District Attorney

Nevada Bar #006163

ENDORSEMENT: A True Bill

Foreperson Clark County Grand Jury

1	Names of witnesses testifying before the Grand Jury:	
2	SIMMS, DR. LARY	C.C.M.E.
3	TONEY, QUNISE, C/O CCDA, SVU, 301 E. CLARK PLACE, LVN 89101	
4	SHERWOOD, GEORGE,	LVMPD P#3676
5	TREMEL, DONALD	LVMPD P#2038
6	QUARLES, DEBRA	C/O CCDA, MUV, 301 E. CLARK PL. LVN
7	PAULETTE, KRISTINA	C/O CCDA, MVU, 301 E. CLARK PL. LVN
8	Additional witnesses known to the Distri	ct Attorney at the time of filing this Indictment:
9	ADAMS, OFFICER	C.C.D.C.
10	ALBERT, BARBARA	LVMPD P#3108
11	ALBIETZ, D.	LVMPD P#4204
12	AYOTTE, RONALD	3110 PALMDALE LV NV
13	BAKER, SHANE	6650 E. RUSSELL #134 LV NV
14	BELL, BETTY	ADDRESS UNKNOWN
15	BEVILACQUA, A.	LVMPD P#6258
16	BOGUE, MERANDA	6650 E. RUSSELL LV NV
17	BRIAN, WAYNE	ADDRESS UNKNOWN
18	BUCZEK, J.	LVMPD P#3702
19	BURGESS, SHERRI LYNN	4624 LINDA AVE LV NV
20	CABRALES, A.	LVMPD P#2045
21	COOTE, CLATON	3200 MIDVALE DR #M-104 CORVALIS, OR
22	COURTRIGHT, JOHNATHAN	ADDRESS UNKNOWN
23	CRAW, MICHELINE	6650 E. RUSSELL LV NV
24	CURRY, JUANITA	6650 RUSSELL RD #102 LV NV
25	CURRY, SANDRA	ADDRESS UNKNOWN
26	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS	LVMPD COMMUNICATIONS
27	CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS	LVMPD RECORDS
28		

1	DELLACOURT, NINA	ADDRESS UNKNOWN
2	DUNLAP, GEORGE	C.C.D.C. INMATE
3	EBBERT, LINDA	UMC
4	ERDMAN, SHELLY	LVMPD P#7917
5	ESPLIN, CATHI JO	3110 PALMDALE LV NV
6	FIGUERA, C.	LVMPD P#3341
7	FRENCH, DET.	LVMPD P#375
8	GALLAGHER, E.	LVMPD P#5769
9	GONZALEZ, ANDY	ADDRESS UNKNOWN
10	GONZALEZ, LLOYD	1944 EVELYN AVE HND NV
11	GONZALEZ, PAULINE	216 VALLEY FORGE HND NV
12	GREEN, CHARITY	LVMPD P#7716
13	GROVER, B.	LVMPD P#4934
14	GUENTHER, EDWARD	LVMPD P#5891
15	HAGMEIER, WILLIAM	F.B.I.
16	HERNANDEZ, CESAR	6650 E. RUSSELL RD LV NV
17	HUGGINS, SHEILA	LVMPD P#3603
18	JACKSON, APRIL	6650 E. RUSSELL #144 LV NV
19	JARO, HELEN	ANDRE AGASSI COLLEGE PREP SCHOOL
20	JOHNSON, JAMES	ANDRE AGASSI COMPANY
21	KELLY, S.	LVMPD P#6836
22	KING, BARBARA	ADDRESS UNKNOWN
23	KNOBLOCK, RONALD	C.C.M.E.
24	LAMOUREUX, B.	LVMPD P#7716
25	LARSON, DEBRA	3110 PALMDALE AVE LV NV
26	LEEKE, OFFICER	C.C.D.C.
27	LUTZ, RICHARD	LVMPD P#1746
28	MANN, ANDREW	4481 LINDALE LV NV

1	MAUPIN, R.	LVMPD P#5923
2	MCGOWAN, BARBARA	9361 PARKDALE LV NV
3	MCGOWAN, CLAUD	9361 PARKDALE LV NV
4	MCGRAW, REANNA	ADDRESS UNKNOWN
5	MCKENNA, KATRINA	ADDRESS UNKNOWN
6	MCLAUGHLIN, RANDAL	LVMPD P#4170
7	MENDEZ, ANGELA	6650 E. RUSSELL LV NV
8	MENDEZ, VANESSA	6650 E. RUSSELL LV NV
9	MITCHELL, DENNIS	ANDRE AGASSI COMPANY
10	MOON, L.	C.C.M.E. #313
11	MOORE, KAREN	ADDRESS UNKNOWN
12	NELSON, WILLIAM	H.D.S.P. NDOC#48044
13	OSGOOD, ROGER	ADDRESS UNKNOWN
14	PARKER, MARCIA	6650 E. RUSSELL RD #242 LV NV
15	PAROLE OFFICER	NV DEPT P & P OFFICER FOR N. FLOWERS
16	PETERSON, DANIEL	LVMPD P#4034
17	PIRTLE, M.	LVMPD P#4017
18	RAGLAND, MAWUSI	6650 E. RUSSELL RD #302 LV NV
19	RAMIREZ, MONICA	6650 E. RUSSELL RD LV NV
20	REMBERT, RANZY	445 E. DESERT INN #5 LV NV
21	ROBERTS, OFFICER	LVMPD P#6644
22	ROBINSON, SHAWNTA	C.C.D.C. INMATE
23	ROWLAND, T.	LVMPD P#4178
24	RUTLE, M.	LVMPD P#4017
25	SCHELLBERG, PETER	LVMPD P#5413
26	SILVAS, CONNIE	3125 W. WARM SPRINGS LV NV
27	SMINK, JEFF	LVMPD
28	SMITH. B.	LVMPD P##4712

1	SMYTH, REBECKA	3189 GREENDALE LV NV
2	SPOOR, MONTE	LVMPD P#3856
3	THOMAS, KENDRA	6650 E. RUSSELL #201 LV NV
4	TURNER, ALICIA	ANDRE AGASSI COLLEGE PREP SCHOOL
5	URENO, RANDY	4750 E SHARA AVE LV NV
6	VILLAGRANA, WILLIAM	LVMPD P#8426
7	WAHL, THOMAS	LVMPD P#5019
8	WILLIAMS, ELWOOD	ADDRESS UNKNOWN
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		
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26	0.C.A.C.(1.0.2.W./D.C.E.(2.2.0.2.W./C.V./T.T.	
27	06AGJ103X/06F23792X/SVU LVMPD EV# 050324-1801 MURDER; ROBB; BURG; S/A - F	
28	MUKDEK; KUBB; BUKU; 5/A - F	

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0076 1 **DAVID ROGER** 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781 3 PAMELA WECKERLY Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #006163 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2211 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff

Shuley Blanagur

C228755

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

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10 THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

-vs-

NORMAN KEITH FLOWERS aka Norman Harold Flowers, III, #1179383

15

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE

Case No.

Dept No.

DATE OF HEARING: 1/17/07

TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 A.M.

COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, by DAVID ROGER, District Attorney, through PAMELA WECKERLY, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and files this Notice of Motion and Motion to Consolidate.

This Motion is made and based upon all the papers and pleadings on file herein, the attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if deemed necessary by this Honorable Court.

NOTICE OF HEARING

YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will bring the foregoing motion on for setting before the above entitled Court, in Department VI thereof, on Wednesday, the 17th day of January, 2007, at the hour of 8:30 o'clock a.m., or

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as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard.

DATED this 26th day of December, 2006.

DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781

BY /s/ PAMELA WECKERLY
PAMELA WECKERLY
Chief Deputy District Attorney
Nevada Bar #006163

STATEMENTS OF FACT

A. Fact of Case C in District Court VI

On May 3, 2005, Silver Pines Apartments employees discovered 45 year old Marilee Coote lying on her living room floor. Ms. Coote was a reliable employee of the Andre Agassi Center. When she did not arrive at work by 7:30 a.m., a co-worker became concerned and asked the apartment workers to do a welfare check. After the apartment employees discovered the body, they contacted the police.

Initially, paramedics arrived, but Ms. Coote was already deceased. Police followed. Ms. Coote was found lying on her living room floor, facing up and completely nude. Inside her belly button were ashes from burnt incense. The skin between her upper thighs and her pubic area was burned. Coote's apartment was locked, but her purse and keys were missing. Inside Coote's washing machine, police found personal photos, bills, and identification belonging to Coote. The items appeared to have been washed because they had a soap residue on them. In the bathtub, under ten inches of water, police found other items of paperwork, a phone book, and jewelry boxes covered with a towel. The apartment was otherwise very neat and undisturbed.

The detectives initially did not view this incident as a homicide. Therefore, they documented the scene, but did not collect evidence. After conducting an autopsy, however, Dr. Knoblock concluded the Coote died as the result of strangulation. He also noted tearing of Coote's labia and anal area. Dr. Knoblock concluded that these tears were sustained ante-

 mortem. Coote also had contusions on her arms and forearms.

While various officers were in Coote's apartment during the morning of May 3, 2005, another resident of the complex, Juanita Curry, came in contact with the defendant, Norman Flowers. This occurred between 7:00 and 10:00 a.m. Curry was an acquaintance of Flowers' girlfriend, Mawusi Ragland. Curry lived two floors below Coote. Curry noticed the police and paramedics going in and out of Coote's apartment. From apartment employees, Curry believed that Coote died of natural causes. Sometime that same morning, defendant Flowers knocked on Curry's door. He asked if he could use her phone. He said he was supposed to meet up with Mawusi that morning. She agreed and gave him the phone.

Curry is physically disabled and sometimes walks with a cane. Because of her compromised physical state, she was not comfortable allowing Flowers in her apartment, so she let him use her cordless phone in the doorway. After Flowers used the phone, he came back a few times later, each time with a new request. He asked to use the phone again. He asked for water. At one point, he asked to use her bathroom. She agreed, but when he went in the bathroom, she stepped out of the apartment. As she did so, he asked her to come in and help him find the bathroom light. She refused. When Flowers was at her doorstep, she also noticed that when the police walked back and forth, he would turn his head away. He commented, "the police make me nervous." During the final conversation in Curry's doorway, Flowers leaned down and tried to kiss Curry on the mouth. She turned away.

Curry observed Flowers walk across the parking lot to the doorway of Rena Gonzalez's apartment that morning. Curry left the complex a little before 11:00 in the morning. When she returned, she learned that the police had discovered the body of Rena Gonzalez. She gave a statement to police and identified Mawusi's boyfriend as someone she saw in the area of Rena Gonzalez's apartment.

Officers learned of the homicide involving Rena Gonzalez at approximately 4:00 p.m. Rena's Gonzelez's two daughters, the oldest of whom is seven years old, came home from school and found their mother on her knees leaning against her bed in her master bedroom. She was unresponsive. They ran and got their friend, Shayne. Shayne returned with them.

They tried to remove a phone cord around Gonzalez's neck and called 911.

Gonzalez's apartment was clean and undisturbed with the exception of the following: a broken blue plastic hair comb in the front hallway and a single green sandal were both in the front hallway. Officers could not locate Gonzalez's purse or keys.

Gonzalez was at the foot of her bed, with her body bent at the waist. Her upper torso was on the bed with her face down and arms outstretched. A black phone cord and black lanyard were around her neck. She was dressed in shorts, which were slightly pulled down, and a shirt. She had the matching blue hairclip hanging from her head and blood coming from her ear.

At autopsy, Dr. Simms noted extensive bruising to breast, right arm and right leg. Dr. Simms concluded that Gonzalez died as a result of strangulation. He also noted tearing to her vaginal and anal area. Dr. Simms concluded that these injuries took place post-mortem.

Detectives learned that Rena Gonzalez was a close friend of Mawusi Ragland. In fact, the two women would trade off watching each other's children. They determined that Gonzalez had walked her daughters to the school bus the morning of the 3rd and would have returned home around 8:30 a.m. Rena Gonzalez did not work.

Mawusi Ragland also lived at the Silver Pines Apartments. She lived in the apartment across from Coote. She told detectives that approximately three weeks before the homicide, she and Flowers had gotten into an argument and had not spoken since. In the argument, Mawusi implied that she would socialize with other men. Mawusi had discussed Flowers with her friend Rena Gonzalez as well, although Flowers and Gonzalez had not met. According to Mawusi, Gonzalez advised her not to date Flowers.

When Mawusi returned home on the evening of May 3, she saw police vehicles. She was told her friend, Rena, had been murdered and that her other friend, Marilee, had died of natural causes. On her apartment door, Mawusi noticed a note. It was from Flowers. It stated that he tried to catch her before she went to work, but that it looked like he picked a bad day because "big shit is happening over here." He also asked if she had dated other men since their argument. Flowers called Mawusi that evening. She was very emotional and

hearing this news. She asked him to come over and help her through this difficult time. He told her he'd be right over. When Flowers did not arrive in the next 90 minutes, Mawusi called him to ask where he was. He said he had not left home because when tried to call her, she did not answer her phone. He also mentioned that he had seen Rena that morning and had a short conversation with her. Mawusi asked him what time he was at the complex and Flowers responded, "I didn't kill her."

After speaking with Mawusi, detectives interviewed Norman Flowers. Initially, he

explained that both Marilee and Rena were dead. Flowers did not appear to be shocked upon

After speaking with Mawusi, detectives interviewed Norman Flowers. Initially, he told officers that he had no contact with Marilee Coote on the morning of the murder. He said he had not seen her for months. He also explained that he met Rena Gonzalez several months earlier through Mawusi. He admitted that he had spoken with Rena that morning, but denied ever entering her apartment. Flowers agreed to provide a DNA sample.

Subsequently, Flowers' DNA sample was compared with swabs from Marilee Coote's sexual assault kit. Both vaginal and rectal swabs matched to Flowers. In addition, DNA was collected from the carpet area where Coote was lying, specifically, the carpet beneath her upper thighs. That sample also matched to Flowers.

Detectives interviewed Flowers again. He still maintained that he had never been in Gonzalez's apartment that morning. With regard to Marilee Coote, he first explained that he had had sex with her in the past, but not that day. Then, he acknowledged that he had sex with her night before she died, but that she was alive and fine when he left. He denied having rough sex with her. Later in the interview, he claimed that he might have had rough sex with her, but that she was fine when he left. In a third interview, he said he did have rough sex with her, but that she was alive when he left. He also stated that there was a third man watching the two have sex. He said this man was a medium height, weight, and age black man, but he did not know his name. He claims this man remained in the apartment after he left. Thus, his latest claim was that the sex was consensual and another individual must have killed Coote.

DNA was found in Rena Gonzalez's rectal swabs. Flowers is excluded as the source

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 of this DNA. In addition, DNA was found on the phone cord around Gonzalez's neck. He is excluded as the source of that DNA as well.

B. Facts of Case C228755 in District Court XIV

Less than two months prior, on March 24, 2005, Debra Quarles returned home from grocery shopping to her residence at 1001 North Pecos, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, and found her eighteen year old daughter, Sheila Quarles unresponsive in a bathtub containing warm water. Debra had returned home at 2:30 in the afternoon. She was able to remove Sheila from the tub with the help of a neighbor who had helped her carry in groceries. Debra immediately called 911.

An autopsy later determined that Sheila died from drowning. However, strangulation was a significant contributing factor to her death. Sheila also had multiple vertical lacerations on her introitus, evidence of a violent sexual assault.

Investigation revealed that Sheila spoke to her mother, Debra, at approximately 12:30 p.m. and her mother arrived home to find her at approximately 2:30 p.m. In addition, detectives learned that Sheila was involved in a lesbian relationship with an individual named Quinise Toney.

At autopsy, investigators collected samples from Sheila's vagina. Those swabs contained a mixture of DNA which included semen. Quinise Toney was excluded as being a source of this DNA. Sheila Quarles was the major component of the DNA. The male portion of the DNA was entered into a DNA database. When Flowers' DNA was collected in the May murders, his profile was entered into the DNA database as well. After this entry, investigators were notified that Flowers' profile was consistent with part of the minor component DNA from Sheila Quarles' vaginal swabs. In fact, 99.9934 percent of the population is excluded as being a source of that DNA, but Flowers is not. There was an additional, unknown male contributor to the vaginal swabs of Sheila Quarles as well.

After detectives were notified of the DNA match, they recontacted Debra Quarles. Quarles explained that she knew and had actually dated Norman Flowers several months before the murder. She also explained that he would occasionally give her a ride to her work

at the time and that he knew her family members. Quarles said that just prior to the murder, she saw Flowers at her apartment complex. At that time, he explained that he was working in maintenance at the complex. After her daughter's murder, Quarles suffered from depression. Flowers offered to drive her to appointments with her therapist. On several occasions, Flowers inquired to Debra whether the police had figured out who had murdered her daughter.

The defense has suggested that Flowers will offer an alibi defense to the March 2005 crime.

The State moves to consolidate defendant's two cases.

<u>ARGUMENT</u>

The issue of consolidation lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Robins v. State, 106 Nev. 611, 789 P.2d 558 (1990); Mitchell v. State, 105 Nev. 735, 782 P.2d 1340 (1989). "Error resulting from misjoinder of charges is harmless unless the improperly joined charges had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict." Weber v. State, 121 Nev. 554, 119 P.3d 107, 119 (2005). Moreover, on appeal "the defendant carries the heavy burden of showing an abuse of discretion by the district court." Id. at 121. In exercising that discretion, courts consider potentially conflicting interests of judicial economy and efficiency of judicial administration, crowded court calendars, avoidance of multiple trials and possible prejudice to the defendant. See United States v. Fancher, 195 F. Supp. 634 (D. Conn.), affirmed, 319 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1963). However, to establish actual prejudice from joinder requires the defendant to demonstrate more than that severance might have made acquittal more likely. Weber, 119 P.3d at 121 It requires that the defendant demonstrate that the joinder may have prevented jurors from making a reliable judgment about guilt. See id. At 122

Nevada Revised Statute 174.155 states:

The court may order two or more indictments or information or both be tried together if the offenses, and the defendants if there is more than one, could have been joined in a single indictment or information. The procedure shall be

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the same as if the prosecution were under such single indictment or information.

Section 173.115 of the Nevada Revised Statutes provides:

Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are:

1. Based on the same act or transaction or

2. Based on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.

Finally, Eighth Judicial Court Rule 3.10 emphasizes the importance of judicial economy, providing:

(a) When an indictment or information is filed against a defendant who has other criminal cases pending in the court, the new case may be assigned directly to the department wherein a case against that defendant is already pending.

(b) Unless objected to by one of the judges concerned, criminal cases, writs or motions may be consolidated or reassigned to any department

for trial, settlement or other resolution.

This Court has defendant Flowers' first case set for trial in January 2007. As a capital case, it is likely to take longer to proceed to trial than a non-capital murder case and certainly other felony cases. Thus, the case will represent an imposition on the Court as well as members of a jury who will assess the facts of the case. Flowers' second case is set for trial in February 2007 in District Court XIV. It is also likely to be a capital case, meaning the same burdens will be placed on both the court and a potential jury hearing the case for a second time. Certainly, there is little question that consolidating the cases would be in the interests of judicial economy, court administration, and imposition of costs to the community.

Moreover, the Nevada Supreme Court has held that "if . . . evidence of one charge would be cross-admissible in evidence at a separate trial on another charge, then both charges may be tried together and need not be severed." Robins, 106 Nev. at 619, 798 P.2d at 563 (citing Mitchell v. State, 105 Nev. 735, 738, 782 P.2d 1340, 1342). In other words, joinder is proper when evidence from a separate case would be admissible by other means.

Section 48.045(2) of the Nevada Revised Statutes provides:

 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

In applying NRS 48.045(2), courts must assess whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by a risk of prejudice. Significantly, however, courts have recognized a distinction between evidence that is incriminating versus evidence that is actually prejudicial. For instance, in <u>United States v. Harrison</u>, 679 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the prosecution presented evidence that the defendant had been engaged in drug dealing in the past over a period of time in order to establish motive, intent, preparation, and absence of mistake on his current drug charges. The court held that allowing the extrinsic evidence was proper. It explained:

There is nothing "unfair" in admitting direct evidence of the defendant's past acts by an eyewitness thereto that constituted substantive proof of the relevant intent alleged in the indictment. The intent with which a person commits an act on a given occasion can many times be best proven by testimony or evidence of his acts over a period of time prior thereto...

Id. at 948.

Therefore, while certain evidence may increase the likelihood of conviction and thus be incriminating, such evidence may not unfairly cast the defendant in a bad light and therefore be prejudicial.

In the instant case, Flowers' two cases are cross-admissible. Evidence of the March murder would be admissible in a trial focusing on the May murders because such evidence would be relevant to identity, intent, and motive and vice versa. In <u>Gallego v. State</u>, 101 Nev. 782, 711 P.2d 856 (1985), the Nevada Supreme Court noted how a defendant's prior murders could be relevant in establishing a common plan, intent, identity, and motive in a subsequent murder case. In Gallego, the defendant was charged with kidnapping, assaulting, and killing two young women by bludgeoning them with a hammer. The trial court permitted the State to introduce evidence that Gallego had previously kidnapped two young women from a shopping mall and shot and killed them. <u>Id</u>. at 789, 711 P.2d at 861. On appeal, Gallego challenged the introduction of such evidence.

The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and introduction of the evidence on several grounds within NRS 48.045(2). The court noted that the evidence was relevant to Gallego's intent and motive, because both instances were prompted by a "sex slave" fantasy on the part of Gallego. The court also commented that the evidence was relevant because the prior murders were "not remote in time from the killings here considered" and that "substantial similarities" were shown to exist between the two events, suggesting that the evidence was relevant to issues of identity as well as a common scheme or plan. See id.

In other case, the Nevada Supreme Court has commented how a particular modus operandi to a crime can be relevant and admissible under NRS 48.045(2) when the identity of the perpetrator is at issue. The court has stated that modus operandi evidence is proper in "situations where a positive identification of the perpetrator has not been made, and the offered evidence establishes a signature crime so clear as to establish the identity of the person on trial." Mortensen v. State, 115 Nev. 273, 280, 986 P.2d 1105, 1110 (1999).

In the case of Flowers, all three victims were casual acquaintances of Flowers. All three were killed in their residences. All three were killed during daylight hours. In addition to being murdered, all three also had some minor property taken from them as well. More significantly, of course, all three were sexually assaulted prior to their deaths. The victims all had damage to their vaginal and/or anal areas substantiating the sexual assault charges. All three victims were killed by means of strangulation. Admittedly, the cause of death for Sheila Quarles was a drowning; however, the strangulation was a significant contributing factor to the death. Certainly, the similarity of the three murders constitutes evidence of identity admissible under NRS 48.045(2).

In addition, evidence of the March 2005 killing is relevant to the May 2005 killings because it would constitute evidence of intent and lack of accident as well which are also admissible under NRS 48.045(2). In <u>Petrocelli v. State</u>, 101 Nev. 46, 52, 692 P.2d 503, 508 (1985), reversed on other grounds by Petrocelli v. Angelone, 242 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2001), the Nevada Supreme Court explained how in a murder prosecution where defendant was claiming that a homicide was an accident, evidence of a prior killing committed by him

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which he also claimed was accidental was relevant and admissible under NRS 48.045(2).

In one of his interviews regarding the May killings, Flowers maintained that while he may have had sex with Marilee Coote, but he did not kill her. This, of course, occurred after he adamantly denied having sex with her at all. In any case, given that one possible defense available to Flowers is that he had consensual sex with Coote and she somehow died during the encounter, evidence of the March 2004 killing is relevant to his intent during his encounter with Coote. The fact that he previously had had a violent sexual encounter which resulted in vaginal trauma to victim Sheila Quarles as well as her strangulation and death is evidence that Coote's strangulation was intentional and not an accident. See id.

Finally, evidence of the March 2005 murder is relevant to the May 2005 murders in terms of the sexual assault counts. In one of several interviews with detectives, Flowers claimed that he had consensual intercourse with Marilee Coote, notwithstanding the trauma to her genital area. He mentioned that they may have engaged in "rough" sex at one point during his interview. Evidence of the sexual assault trauma to Sheila Quarles would be relevant to the issue of whether Coote consented to a sexual encounter with Flowers. In Williams v. State, 95 Nev. 830, 603, P.2d 694 (1979), a sexual assault victim testified that she met the defendant while discussing a possible job as his secretary. At some point, the defendant offered her \$5000 for a "one night stand," but she refused. The defendant told her that he was trained in martial arts and demonstrated what he could do to her and then sexually assaulted her. The defendant maintained that the intercourse was consensual. The State presented the testimony of two prior victims, from incidents occurring nineteen months before the charged incident, who testified that they met the defendant through a job interview and were coerced into having sex with him after he demonstrated his karate knowledge. In affirming the admission of testimony regarding the prior incidents, the Nevada Supreme Court stated:

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In the instant case, evidence of Williams' sexual misconduct with other persons was admitted as being relevant to prove his intent to have intercourse with the victim without her consent. This evidence was introduced after Williams admitted committing the act, but claimed to have done so with the victim's consent. By acknowledging the commission of the act but asserting

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his innocent intent by claiming consent as a defense, Williams himself placed in issue a necessary element of the offense and it was, therefore, proper for the prosecution to present the challenged evidence, which was relevant on the issue of intent, in order to rebut Williams' testimony on a point material to the establishment of his guilt.

Id. at 833.

Because all three victims were killed after they were sexually assaulted, the State must rely on circumstances and medical testimony to establish the lack of consent in the instant case. Nevertheless, like <u>Williams</u>, Flowers has put consent at issue because he claims that the sexual encounter with Marilee Coote was consensual. In maintaining that claim, Flowers makes relevant his prior conduct with Sheila Quarles who also was sexually assaulted by Flowers and subsequently killed.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully asks this Court to consolidate Flowers' two pending cases.

DATED this 26th day of December, 2006.

DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781

BY /s/ PAMELA WECKERLY
PAMELA WECKERLY
Chief Deputy District Attorney
Nevada Bar #006163

CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

I hereby certify that service of the above and forgoing, was made this __26th_ day of December, 2006, by facsimile transmission to:

SPECIAL PUBLIC DEFENDER FAX#455-6273

BY /s/ M. Beaird Employee of the District Attorney's Office

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Attornevs for Defendant

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff.

VS.

NORMAN FLOWERS.

Defendant.

CASE NO. C 216032 CASE NO. C228755

DATE OF HEARING: 1-44.

TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 a.m.

OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE

COMES NOW, Defendant NORMAN KEITH FLOWERS, by and through his attorneys. DAVID M. SCHIECK, Special Public Defender, RANDALL H. PIKE, Assistant Special Public Defender, and CLARK W. PATRICK, Deputy Special Public Defender and hereby submits the following Points and Authorities in opposition to the State's Motion to Consolidate Case No. C216032 and Case NO. C228755.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On June 7, 2005, a Criminal Complaint was filed in Justice Court charging Defendant NORMAN FLOWERS (hereinafter FLOWERS) with a single count of Murder (and other charges) on the alleged victim Marilee Coote. Approximately two weeks later, a Second Amended Criminal Complaint was filed charging FLOWERS with Murder (and other charges)

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alleging "this time" two (2) victims, Marilee Coote and Rena Gonzales.

On August 17, 2005, at the conclusion of FLOWERS' preliminary hearing, the Court dismissed all counts relating to victim Rena Gonzales. On August 29, 2005, an information was filed in District Court, Case Number C214390, charging Flowers with this single homicide (Marilee Coote).

At the initial Arraignment on August 30, 2005 FLOWERS appeared and pled "not guilty." In addition, FLOWERS asserted his Constitutional right to a speedy trial and the Court set a trial date of October 24, 2005. On the same day, counsel for FLOWERS received notice of the State's Intent to Seek and Indictment. Thereafter, on October 18, 2005 the State dismissed Case Number C214390, and FLOWERS was indicted in Case Number C216032 and charged with two (2) counts of homicide, alleged to have occurred on May 3, 2005.

On November 8, 2005, FLOWERS received a Notice of Intent to Seek Death Penalty containing aggravator number eight (8) which alleged, as a basis for seeking the death penalty, two or more convictions for murder.

FLOWERS has now been indicted under Case Number C228755 charging him with a third homicide that occurred March 24, 2005, forty-one days prior to the first two.

The State is requesting to consolidate Case Nos. C216032 and C228755, and the three homicides. This is improper under section 173.115 of the Nevada Revised Statutes as the cases do not arise from the same transaction nor constitute a common plan. Further, joinder would be more prejudicial than probative. Therefore, this Court should deny the State's request.

ARGUMENT

The Court should not consolidate the offenses which allegedly occurred on March 24, 2005 and May 3, 2005. Joinder is not proper as the events do not arise from the same transaction nor constitute a common plan. Further, joinder would be prejudicial to Defendant and result in a violation of due process.

TAL PUBLIC FENDER

Consolidation Should Not Be Granted Because the March 24, 2005 and May 3, 2005 Incidents Do Not Arise from a Common Transaction Nor Do They Comprise a Common Scheme

NRS 173.115 "Joinder of Offense" provides:

Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are:

- 1. Based on the same act or transaction; or
- 2. Based on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.

The policy behind joining offenses is judicial economy. <u>Honeycutt v. State</u>, 56 P.3d 362, 367, 118 Nev. Adv. Rep. 70 (2002). In the case at bar, the three incidents were not based on the same transaction, nor were they part of a common scheme or plan.

When offenses are factually similar and occur in close temporal proximity, they are properly joined. <u>Tillema v. State</u>, 112 Nev. 266, 914 P.2d 605 (1996). In <u>Tillema</u>, the defendant was arrested for a burglary of a vehicle on May 29, 1993 and a burglary of a vehicle and a burglary of a store on June 16, 1993. <u>Id</u>. at 267. Because both crimes involved vehicles in casino parking garages and were seventeen days apart, they "evidenced a common scheme or plan." <u>Id</u>. at 268. Additionally, the store burglary was connected to the vehicle burglary because it was part of a "continuing course of conduct." <u>Id</u>. at 269, *quoting* NRS 173.115(2) and <u>Rogers v. State</u>, 101 Nev. 457, 465-66, 705 P.2d 664, 670 (1985). In the second incident, Tillema burglarized the van and then immediately walked into a store, where he committed another burglary, so the two incidents were connected. <u>Id</u>.

Similar victims and motives, however, are not necessarily part of a common scheme or plan. <u>Tabish v. State</u>, 119 Nev. Adv. Rep. 35, 72 P.3d 584 (2003). The State was trying to argue that events involving Leo Casey and events involving Ted Binion were properly joined, having in common greed, money and the Jean sand pit. <u>Id</u>. at 590. The State also emphasized the similarities between Leo Casey and Ted Binion. <u>Id</u>. The Nevada Supreme Court noted that "money and greed could be alleged as connections between a great many

crimes and thus do not alone sufficiently connect the incidents." <u>Id</u>. That Court held that the incidents were too far apart in time (fifty days) and that the alleged connections did not demonstrate a common scheme or plan. <u>Id</u>. at 591.

Similarly, in <u>Mitchell v. State</u>, 105 Nev. 735, 782 P.2d 1340 (1989), incidents forty-five days apart were not considered part of the same transaction. <u>Id</u>. at 738. Additionally, the two offenses committed by that defendant were not part of a common plan. <u>Id</u>. The defendant was charged with grand larceny and sexual assault (the Petz charges) and sexual assault and murder (the Brown charges). <u>Id</u>. at 737. On two separate occasions, the defendant took two different women to the same bar, forty-five (45) days apart, and sexually assaulted them. <u>Id</u>. Our Supreme Court noted that taking two women dancing and then later assaulting them (on separate occasions) could not be considered a common plan, simply because the women were taken to the same bar. <u>Id</u>. at 738.

When considering joinder under NRS §173.115.2, it is useful to distinguish the facts of the case at hand with the facts of a case for which the Nevada Supreme Court found joinder permissible. In Floyd, the defendant argued that counts related to the sexual assault of a woman at gunpoint inside an apartment and the subsequent shooting of five employees at a nearby supermarket should be severed. However, the Nevada Supreme Court found that "joinder was proper because the acts charged were at the very least 'connected together'." Floyd v. State, 42 P.3d 249, 254 (2002). The court explained that a connection existed because the counts relating to the subsequent act began only fifteen minutes after the counts relating to the first act had ended.

Contrary to <u>Tillema</u>, and <u>Floyd</u>, the offenses in the instant case did not occur in close temporal proximity. If a connection between separate acts can be argued to exist because of their relative proximity in time, then it is reasonable to expect that the existence of such a connection is diminished as the length of time between the acts increases. Here, the incidents were forty-one (41) days apart, so there was no "continuing course of conduct." The incidents in <u>Tillema</u> flowed one into the other. With forty-one (41) days between them, the incidents at bar were too far apart in time to be part of the same transaction. So while a connection may

 still remain between two acts after only fifteen minutes, extending that time more than threethousand fold would seem to extinguish such a connection, utterly.

Here, there was also no common scheme or plan, similar to <u>Tabish</u> and <u>Mitchell</u>. In both of those cases, there were similar motives and similar crimes; however, that was not enough to establish a common scheme or plan. Here, the only other common denominator, besides the defendant himself, is the possibility that the defendant knew all of the victims. Again, that is not enough to establish a common scheme or plan. The victims were different, the incidents occurred in different locations, albeit two of the homicides occurred in the same apartment complex and were forty-one (41) days apart. One of the incidents allegedly involved a manual strangulation, one allegedly involved strangulation with a ligature, while the other allegedly involved a downing. As for the alleged sexual assaults, Flowers' DNA was recovered from Marilee Coote, however Flowers admits to having "rough" consensual sex with Coote, and there was "unknown" male DNA that was also recovered from Coote. The DNA recovered from Sheila Quarles, again there was "unknown" male DNA also recovered. There is nothing connecting the three incidents.

Because the incidents were not part of the same transaction, nor were they part of a common scheme or plan, the Defendant respectfully requests that this Court denies the State's request to consolidate the incidents of March 24, 2005 and May 3, 2005.

В.

Consolidation Should Not Be Granted Because the Evidence Is Not Cross-admissible

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that if evidence of one crime would be cross-admissible at a trial on another charge, the charges may be tried together. Mitchell v. State, 105 Nev. 735, 738, 782 P.2d 1340, 1342 (1989). In the case at bar, the evidence of one offense is not necessary in proving the other offense, nor is it necessary in providing the jury with a complete picture. The three offenses are not connected in any way and the evidence is not cross-admissible. Moreover, admitting the evidence of one offense in the trial of the

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other would be more prejudicial than probative. Mitchell, at 738, citing Berner v. State, 104 Nev. 695 (1988); and citing NRS 48.045(2). The evidence would essentially amount to evidence of prior bad acts. This type of evidence is not allowed to show that a defendant has the propensity to commit the crime. Middleton v. State, 114 Nev. 1089, 1108, 968 P.2d 296, 309 (1998). The State argues that the evidence would be cross-admissible because they can use evidence of one offense to show motive or intent, thus circumventing the propensity rule. NRS 48.045 (2004). However, that argument is tenuous, at best. Moreover, the prejudicial nature of the evidence far outweighs its probative value and the evidence is therefore not cross-admissible. See Tabish v. State, 73 P.3d 584, 593, citing Tinch v. State, 113 Nev. 1170, 1176, 946 P.2d 1061, 1064065 (1997).

The <u>Tabish</u> case is useful in understanding when evidence is not cross-admissible because the prejudicial value outweighs the probative value. The defendants were charged with the September 17, 1998 murder of Ted Binion, as well as the July 1998 kidnaping and beating of Leo Casey. <u>Tabish</u>, at 586. Defendant Tabish was convicted in both offenses. <u>Id.</u> Both defendants appealed their convictions, arguing, among other things, that the joinder of the offenses was improper. <u>Id.</u> at 589. The State argued that the evidence was cross-admissible for the purposes of showing motive, plan and identity. <u>Id.</u> at 593. Our Supreme Court disagreed. <u>Id.</u> The court noted that although the evidence could have been used to show motive, plan or identity, the prejudicial value of the evidence was far greater than the probative value. <u>Id.</u> The court further reasoned that the evidence would cause a "spillover effect." <u>Id.</u>

The same reasons that make joinder of the counts inappropriate, make the severance of the same counts appropriate. The controlling state statute which describes relief from prejudicial joinder is NRS §174.165, which states in part, "[i]f it appears that a defendant or the State of Nevada is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information, or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendant's or provide whatever other relief justice requires."

When counts are not related, "the court must assess the likelihood that a jury not

otherwise convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt of one or more of the charged offenses might permit the knowledge of the defendant's other criminal activity to tip the balance and convict him. If the court finds a likelihood that this may occur, severance should be granted." Floyd v. State, 118 Nev. 17, 42 P.3d 249 (2002), citing, People v. Bean, 46 Cal. 3d 919, 760 P.2d 996 (Cal. 1988).

This is exactly the danger the defendant faces in the instant case. The Defendant faces the risk of the jury accumulating evidence against him, as well as using evidence of one offense to infer propensity to commit a crime in the other offenses. The counts of each event are prejudicial in their nature and will be highly inflammatory to any jury. By joining the counts of each event, the State will be able to provide a circular argument, wherein the likelihood that the Defendant committed the offenses at one of the events is made more probable by the possibility that the Defendant committed the offenses at the other event. These are risks that the Defendant should not face in a trial where his liberty is at stake.

C.

Consolidation Should Not Be Granted Because a Heightened Standard of Review Is Required Due to the Fact the Death Penalty Is Being Sought

In a series of recent decisions, the California Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that in a capital case it will no longer tolerate the indiscriminate joining together of two murder charges, especially when the effect of the joinder is to give rise to the special circumstance allegation of multiple murder (see, People v. Johnson [1987] 43 Cal.3d 296, 309, n.5; People v. Smallwood [1986] 42Cal.3d; Williams v. Superior Court (1984] 36 Cal.3d 441).

In <u>Williams</u>, the Court ordered severance of two similar but unrelated murder charges and also set forth the standards for meaningful review of severance motions. In the course of its discussion, the Court emphasized:

"The final consideration in our analysis is that since one of the charged crimes is a capital offense, carrying the gravest possible consequences, the court must analyze the severance issue with a higher degree of scrutiny and care than is normally applied in a non-capital case. Even greater scrutiny is required in the instant matter, for it is the joinder itself which gives rise to the special circumstance allegation of multiple murder under Penal Code Section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3)." (36 Cal.3d at 454.)

In <u>Smallwood</u>, the Court reversed a death penalty case in its entirety solely on the basis that the trial court erred in denying defendant's pretrial motion to sever two murder counts. Citing <u>Williams</u>, the Court stressed "the fact that this case is a capital one, 'carrying the gravest possible consequences." (42 Cal.3d at 430.) The Court was highly critical of the trial court for ignoring that fact:

"This factor should have prompted the trial court to analyze the severance issue with a higher degree of scrutiny and care than is normally applied in a non-capital case. Here, the record demonstrates that the trial court ruled with virtually no scrutiny and care, denying a severance motion in the face of a clear showing of prejudice and despite the prosecutor's concession that no legitimate state goals would be served by joinder. Even if such an ill-considered ruling were justifiable in a less serious case, it was impermissible where questions of life and death were at stake." (Id., at 431.)

The Court acknowledged that in the past trial court rulings on severance motions "were typically accorded great deference." (<u>Id.</u>, at 425.) But Williams had drastically altered the law of severance in capital cases:

"Williams represented a major advance by announcing for the first time that reviewing courts must analyze realistically the prejudice which flows from joinder in light of all the circumstances of the individual case. Williams also directed reviewing courts to weigh any claimed benefits to the prosecution from joinder in order to determine whether such benefits are real or theoretical. No longer may a reviewing court merely recite a public policy favoring joinder or presume judicial economy to justify denial of severance. Put simply, the joinder law must never be used to deny a criminal defendant's fundamental right to due process and a fair trial." (Id., at 425.)

Finally, in <u>People v. Johnson</u>, *supra*, the Court briefly considered the effect of <u>Williams</u> on the retrial of a case in which the prosecutor had joined a capital murder case with a related non-capital rape charge. The Court concluded: "(a)s for prejudice, the inflammatory nature of the rape--a brutal cross-racial rape in a church--coupled with the fact that the murder is a capital offense, weigh heavily against a joint trial upon retrial." (43 Cal.3d at 309-310, n. 5.)

CONCLUSION

NORMAN FLOWERS respectfully requests that this Court deny the State's motion to consolidate because the three separate and distinct offenses are not part of the same

SPECIAL PUBLIC DEFENDER

CLARK COUNTY NEVADA

1	transaction or occurrence, are not part of a common scheme or plan, and as the evidence of		
2	one is not cross-admissible in the trial of the others,		
3	DATED this <u>2</u> day of December, 2006 .		
4	RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:		
5	DAVID M. SCHIECK SPECIAL PUBLIC DEFENDER		
6	A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A		
7	Jula A		
8	RANDY H. PIKE Deputy Special Public Defender		
9	CLARK W. PATRICK		
10	Deputy Special Public Defender 330 South Third Street, 8th Floor Las Vegas, NV 89l55-2316		
11	(702) 455-6265 Attorneys for Defendant		
12	DECEIPT OF COMY		
13	RECEIPT OF COPY		
14 15	RECEIPT OF COPY of the foregoing OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE is hereby acknowledged this 2 day of Desember, 2008.		
16	day of December, 2008.		
	$\rho \mathcal{O}$		
17 18	DAVID ROGER		
17	DAVID ROGER District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue, 3rd Floor		
17 18	District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue, 3rd Floor		
17 18 19	District Attorney		
17 18 19 20	District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue, 3rd Floor		
17 18 19 20 21	District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue, 3rd Floor Las Vegas, NV 89155 Attorney for Plaintiff		
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17 18 19 20 21 22 23	District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue, 3rd Floor Las Vegas, NV 89155 Attorney for Plaintiff		
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue, 3rd Floor Las Vegas, NV 89155 Attorney for Plaintiff		
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27	District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue, 3rd Floor Las Vegas, NV 89155 Attorney for Plaintiff		
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	District Attorney 200 Lewis Avenue, 3rd Floor Las Vegas, NV 89155 Attorney for Plaintiff		

SPECIAL PUBLIC DEFENDER

AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding $% \left(1\right) =\left(1\right) \left(1\right)$

	Opposition to Motion to Consolidate	
filed i	n or submitted for District Court Case numberC216032	
XX	Does not contain the social security number of any person.	
	-OR-	
	Contains the social security number of a person as required by:	
	A. A specific state or federal law, to wit:	
	-or-	
B. For the administration of a public program or for an application of a federal or state grant.		ition
	Signature 1/2/07 Date	
	CLARK W. PATRICK Print Name	
	DEPUTY SPECIAL PUBLIC DEFENDER Title	g to

AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding

Opposition to Motion to Consolidate filed in or submitted for District Court Case number <u>C2228755</u> XX Does not contain the social security number of any person. -OR-Contains the social security number of a person as required by: ____ A. A specific state or federal law, to wit: B. For the administration of a public program or for an application for a federal or state grant. CLARK W. PATRICK Print Name DEPUTY SPECIAL PUBLIC DEFENDER Title

1	NISD	Shuley Stano
2	DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney	GLERK (/
3	Nevada Bar #002781 PAMELA WECKERLY	
4	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #006163	
5	200 South Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2211	
6	(702) 455-4711 Attorney for Plaintiff	
7	DISTRICT COURT	
8	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA THE STATE OF NEVADA,	
9	Plaintiff, CASE NO:	C228755
10	-vs-	
11	Norman Harold Flowers,	XIV
12	#1179383)	
13	Defendant.	

NOTICE OF INTENT TO SEEK DEATH PENALTY

COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, through DAVID ROGER, Clark County District Attorney, by and through PAMELA WECKERLY, Chief Deputy District Attorney, pursuant to NRS 175.552 and NRS 200.033 and declares its intention to seek the death penalty at a penalty hearing. Furthermore, the State of Nevada discloses that it will present evidence of the following aggravating circumstances:

1. The murder was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment. (NRS 200.033(1)). To establish this aggravating circumstance, the State will present evidence from Flowers' parole officer and/or other witnesses and/or a certified copy of a Judgment of Conviction. In case C110585, Flowers was convicted of first degree arson. The Judgment of Conviction is dated May 28, 1993. In that case, he was sentenced to fifteen years in the Nevada Department of Prisons, making Flowers under sentence of imprisonment when he committed the instant offense in March 2005. Court documents regarding the conviction were attached to the Notice of Intent to Seek Death Penalty in Case No. C214390

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(which was consolidated into case C216032) and have previously been provided to the defense. The Notice in C214390 and the Notice filed in C216032 are also incorporated by reference.

- 2. The murder was committed by a person who has been convicted of a felony involving violence. (NRS 200.033 (2)). In case number C110585, Flowers was convicted of first degree arson. As previously mentioned, copies of court documents relevant to that case have been provided to the defense under Case Number C214390. To establish this aggravating circumstance, the State will rely on the following facts and evidence: on September 29, 1992, Claud and Barbara McGowan had left their residence on 9361 Parkdale at 7:30 am and had locked the doors. Around 12:00 p.m. a witness saw smoke coming from the residence and entered the residence to see if anyone was inside in need of assistance. This witness, Richard Mann, called the Fire Department. The Fire Department responded and extinguished the residential fire. Inside the residence bathroom, investigators found the McGowan's dog locked in the bathroom and deceased. Fire was set in south east bedroom in the corner. This fire took place in a residential neighborhood, thus threatening other individuals. Copies of relevant police reports regarding the incident have been provided to the defense and are incorporated by reference.
- 3. The murder was committed by a person who has been convicted of a felony involving violence. (NRS 200.033 (2)). In case number C109523, Flowers was convicted of robbery with use of a deadly weapon. To establish this aggravating circumstance, the State will rely on a certified copy of a Judgment of Conviction for this crime which has been provided to the defense and is incorporated by reference. In addition, the State will rely on the following facts: on October 10, 1992, Ranzy Rembert was approached by the defendant and another individual who claimed they were interested in test driving a vehicle. Rembert was working at The Car Store in Las Vegas, Clark County Nevada. After this conversation, Rembert, Flowers and a third individual got into a vehicle and left the car lot. After a while, the defendant and third individual pulled out a firearm and instructed Rembert to pull over, get out, and not look back. After Rembert exited the vehicle, the defendant and third

individual drove off. Copies of the police reports of this incident have been provided t the defense and are incorporated by reference.

- 4. The murder was committed while the person was engaged, in the commission of a robbery and the person charged killed the person murdered. (NRS 200.033 (4)). To establish this aggravating circumstance, the State will rely on testimony of Debra Quarles, the mother of victim Sheila Quarles. Debra Quarles will testify that she had previously purchased a stereo for her home. Debra Quarles noticed the stereo was missing at the same time she discovered that her daughter had been murdered. The State will present evidence that Sheila Quarles was home at the time of the murder and that she died as a result of drowning with strangulation being a significant contributing factor in order to establish the force or threat of force element of a robbery. This evidence will be in the form of testimony from a medical examiner and photographs from autopsy. The State also references and incorporates count four of the indictment which charges Flowers with robbing Sheila Quarles.
- 5. The person subjected the victim to nonconsensual sexual penetration immediately before the murder. (NRS 200.033 (13)). To establish this aggravating circumstance, the State will present the testimony of a medical examiner who will state that Sheila Quarles Coote sustained injuries to her vaginal area or introitus prior to death. This aggravating circumstance will also be proven with photographic evidence. The State also references counts three of the indictment which charges the defendant with sexual assault, one for placing his penis and/or an unknown object into the genital opening of Sheila Quarles against her will and/or aiding and abetting another individual in this crime. The State may call a sexual assault nurse examiner to explain how these types of injuries are indicative of sexual assault.
- 6. The murder was committed by a person who has been convicted of another murder and the provisions of subsection 12 do not otherwise apply to that murder. (NRS 200.033(2)(a). Assuming that case C216032 proceeds to trial before the instant case, defendant Flowers may be convicted of two counts of murder before this case proceeds to

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trial. Specifically, these convictions would be for the murder of Marilee Coote and Rena Gonzalez. The defense currently has all available discovery regarding that case where the State has alleged that defendant Flowers murdered Coote and Gonzalez on or about May 3, 2005. The State alleges that each murder, that of Coote and Gonzalez, would be a separate aggravating circumstance should those convictions occur.

- The murder was committed by a person who has been convicted of a felony 7. involving violence. (NRS 200.033 (2)). Assuming that case C216032 proceeds to trial before the instant case and defendant Flowers is convicted of sexually assaulting Marilee Coote and Rena Gonzalez, it will be the State's position that these convictions fall under this aggravating circumstance. In that case, defendant Flowers is charged with multiple counts of sexual assault. The defense has all discovery associated with that case. Additionally, the State alleges that if convictions occur involving each victim, they substantiate two different aggravating circumstance under this subheading.
- The murder was committed by a person who has been convicted of a felony involving violence. (NRS 200.033 (2)). Assuming case C216032 proceeds to trial before the instant case and defendant Flowers is convicted of robbing Marilee Coote and Rena Gonzalez, it will be the State's position that these convictions are prior violent felony convictions. In that case, Flowers is charged with robbing both victims in addition to murdering them. The defense has all discovery associated with that case. Additionally, the State alleges that if convictions occur involving those victims, they substantiate two different aggravating circumstances under this subheading.

DATED this <u>11th</u> day of January, 2007.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID ROGER Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #002781

/s/D. McDonald BY PAMELA WECKERLY Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #006163

1	CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION		
2	I hereby certify that service of Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty, was made		
3	this <u>11th</u> day of January, 2007, by facsimile transmission to:		
4			
5	SPECIAL PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE FAX #455-6273		
6	AND		
7 8	BRETT WHIPPLE, ESQ. FAX #895-7315		
9	/a/D. MaDanald		
10	/s/D. McDonald Secretary for the District Attorney's Office		
11	Office		
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FILED 0001 1 DAVID M. SCHIECK SPECIAL PUBLIC DEFENDER JAH 23 4 33 PH 07 Nevada Bar No. 0824 RANDALL H. PIKE Deputy Special Public Defender 4 Nevada Bar No. 1940 CLARK W. PATRICK Deputy Special Public Defender 5 Nevada Bar No. 9451 330 South Third Street, Suite 800 Las Vegas, NV 89l55-2316 (702) 455-6265 7 Attorneys for Defendant 8 DISTRICT COURT 9 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 10 THE STATE OF NEVADA. 11 CASE NO. C228755 DEPT. NO. XIV Plaintiff, 12 VS. 13 DATE OF HEARING: 2-5-07 NORMAN FLOWERS. TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 a.m. 14 Defendant. 9:00 am 15 16 AND MOTION TO CONFIRM COUNSEL 17 18 19

MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE OF OTHER BAD ACTS

COMES NOW, Defendant NORMAN KEITH FLOWERS, by and through his attorneys, DAVID M. SCHIECK, Special Public Defender, RANDALL H. PIKE, Assistant Special Public Defender, CLARK W. PATRICK, Deputy Special Public Defender and BRET WHIPPLE, ESQ. and hereby moves the Court for an Order to confirm Bret Whipple as lead counsel in the instant matter and to preclude evidence of other bad acts.

This motion is made and based upon the following Points and Authorities, and any argument of counsel at the time of hearing of this motion.

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SPECIAL PUBLIC

DEFENDER CLARK COUNTY

NOTICE OF MOTION

THE STATE OF NEVADA, Plaintiff; and TO:

TO: DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Plaintiff's attorneys:

YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will bring the foregoing Motion the hour of 9:00 a.m.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On June 7, 2005, a Criminal Complaint was filed in Justice Court charging Defendant NORMAN FLOWERS (hereinafter FLOWERS) with a single count of Murder (and other charges) on the alleged victim Marilee Coote. Approximately two weeks later, a Second Amended Criminal Complaint was filed charging FLOWERS with Murder (and other charges) alleging "this time" two (2) victims, Marilee Coote and Rena Gonzales.

On August 17, 2005, at the conclusion of FLOWERS' preliminary hearing, the Court dismissed all counts relating to victim Rena Gonzales. On August 29, 2005, an information was filed in District Court, Case Number C214390, charging Flowers with this single homicide (Marilee Coote).

At the initial Arraignment on August 30, 2005 FLOWERS appeared and pled "not quilty." In addition, FLOWERS asserted his Constitutional right to a speedy trial and the Court set a trial date of October 24, 2005. On the same day, counsel for FLOWERS received notice of the State's Intent to Seek and Indictment. Thereafter, on October 18, 2005 the State dismissed Case Number C214390, and FLOWERS was indicted in Case Number C216032 and charged with two (2) counts of homicide, alleged to have occurred on May 3, 2005.

On November 8, 2005, FLOWERS received a Notice of Intent to Seek Death Penalty containing aggravator number eight (8) which alleged, as a basis for seeking the death penalty, two or more convictions for murder.

FLOWERS has now been indicted under Case Number C228755 charging him with a third homicide that occurred March 24, 2005, forty-one days prior to the first two.

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While the matter was pending indictment on the third case, the Defendant brought two proper person motions to have the Special Public Defender's Office removed from representation in the case. The Hon. Judge Bonaventure appointed attorney Brett Whipple to assist regarding the third homicide which was then the subject of the indictment. Upon indictment, the matter was assigned to the instant department. This only presents a difficulty now that the State's motion to consolidate Case Nos. C216032 and C228755 was not granted in Department VI.

Accordingly, the Defendant, through counsel respectfully requests that this Honorable Court appoint Brett Whipple as lead counsel.

ARGUMENT

The Court has, the defense believes, appropriately denied the State's motion to consolidate the offenses which allegedly occurred on March 24, 2005 and May 3, 2005. Joinder is not proper as the events do not arise from the same transaction nor constitute a common plan. The Defense is left in an, as of yet, unresolved procedural nightmare. The State has announced that it would be bringing a motion to introduce the evidence of the alternate acts either during the guilt phase to establish identity and motive. In the alternative, the State has included within it's notice of intent to seek the death penalty it's desire to produce evidence of each case within the other.

As the Supreme Court has been definitive on the requirements of defense counsel to actively and thoroughly investigate any homicide which may be cross referenced within a trial, counsel for the defendant has been required to continue the trial on the May 3, 2005 case to complete the investigation. While attempting to coordinate with Mr. Whipple and use his investigation, it was determined that the most proper approach would be to bring motions in limine in both cases, determine the two Court's wishes and determine if the Defense must then resort to a drastic tactic of consolidation to minimize the unavoidable prejudice that cross admission would produce.

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IT WOULD BE PROPER TO APPOINT COUNSEL IN THIS MATTER

EDCR 7.40 provides in relevant portion as follows:

- "(b) Counsel in any case may be changed only:
 - (1) When a new attorney is to be substituted in place of the attorney withdrawing, by the written consent of both attorneys and the client, which must be filed with the court and served upon all parties or their attorneys who have appeared in the action, or
 - (2) When no attorney has been retained to replace the attorney withdrawing, by order of the court, granted upon written motion, and
 - (I) If the application is made by the attorney, the attorney must include in an affidavit the address, or last known address, at which the client may be served with notice of further proceedings taken in the case in the event the application for withdrawal is granted, and the telephone number, or last known telephone number, at which the client may be reached and the attorney must serve a copy of the application upon the client and all other parties to the action or their attorneys, or
- (c) No application for withdrawal or substitution may be granted if a delay of the trial or of the hearing of any other matter in the case would result"

In Brown v. Crayen, 424 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970) the Court stated:

"We think, however, that to compel one charged with grievous crime to undergo a trial with the assistance of an attorney with whom he has become embroiled in irreconcilable conflict is to deprive him of the effective assistance of any counsel whatsoever."

Brown, 424 F.2d at 1170.

Similarly in <u>United States v. Williams</u>, 594 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979) the Court found:

"Here, there was no finding, although a strong showing was made, on the issue of irreconcilable conflict, and the matter was called to the attention of the trial court well before the date of trial. Under the stated facts we find to exist here, the denial of appellant's motion for change of appointed counsel was error. As a result, appellant was deprived of his constitutionally guaranteed right to have the effective assistance of counsel at his trial."

Williams, 594 F.2d at 1261.

In reviewing the district court's exercise of discretion in denying a defendant's

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motion for substitution of counsel, the Court should consider the following three factors: (1) the extent of conflict between the defendant and counsel, (2) the adequacy of the court's inquiry into the defendant's complaint, and (3) the timeliness of the motion. <u>United States v. Gonzalez</u>, 113 F.3d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir. 1997). A district court abuses its discretion in denying such a motion if an irreconcilable conflict exists between the defendant and his counsel. <u>United States v. Moore</u>, 159 F.3d 1154, 1158 n.3 (9th Cir. 1998). If the relationship between lawyer and client completely collapses, the refusal to substitute new counsel violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. See, Brown, 424 F.2d at 1170.

In the instant case, Mr. Flowers has written correspondence indicating he desires current counsel to withdraw and alternate counsel be appointed. Based on the allegations made by Mr. Flowers, it is apparent that irreconcilable differences exist between counsel and client. Due to attorney-client privilege counsel has not attached the correspondence but upon request will present same for in-camera review to this Court.

In addition, this is a capital case. Mr. Flowers is not just charged with a "grievous crime" but is facing the death sentence. It is therefore imperative that he not be compelled to "undergo a trial with the assistance of an attorney with whom he has become embroiled in irreconcilable conflict". <u>Brown</u>, 424 F.2d at 1170.

EVIDENCE OF OTHER BAD ACTS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED IN A SEPARATE TRIAL DURING EITHER THE GUILT PHASE OR IN THE PENALTY PHASE

As a general proposition, evidence of prior crimes and other bad acts of a criminal defendant is inadmissible character evidence unless it falls within certain specific exceptions. See, NRS 48.045

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Reference to a prior criminal history of a defendant is reversible error. Witherow v. State, 104 Nev. 721, 765 P.2d 1153 (1988). The test for determining whether a reference to criminal history occurred is whether "a juror could reasonably infer from the facts presented that the accused had engaged in prior criminal activity." Manning v. Warden, 99 Nev. 82, 659 P.2d 847 (1983), citing Commonwealth v. Allen, 292 A.2d 373, 375 (Pa 1972).

This court in <u>Manning</u>, supra, detailed a number of different cases where in indirect references to prior acts were found to be references to criminal history. <u>See e.g. Gehrke v. State</u>, 96 Nev. 581, 613 P.2d 1028 (1980); <u>Reese v. State</u>, 95 Nev. 419, 596 P.2d 212 (1979); <u>Geary v. State</u>, 91 Nev. 784, 544 P.2d 417 (1975); <u>Founts v. State</u>, 87 Nev. 165, 483 P.2d 654 (1971). Most interestingly, the State in <u>Manning</u>, supra, conceded that in a majority of jurisdiction, an improper reference to criminal history is a violation of due process since it affects the presumption of innocence. <u>Id</u> at 87.

Many years ago this Court well summarized the position of Defendant Norman Flowers:

The danger of allowing prejudicious remarks and testimony during a trial is not confined to their momentary effect upon the juror. Trial tactics are influenced immeasurably. Counsel is forced to object and argue repeatedly. Defendant may be compelled to testify when it is his right not to do so. <u>Ibsen v. State</u>, 83 Nev. 42, 422 P.2d 543 (1967)

This reversal for a new trial is a hard burden to bear because Walker is a confirmed criminal. But it is a proud tradition of our system that every man, no matter who he may be, is guaranteed a fair trial. As stated by Chief Justice Traynor in People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905 at 912 (Cal. 1955) 'Thus, no matter how guilty a defendant might be or how outrageous his crime, he must not be deprived of a fair trial, and any action, official or otherwise, that would have that effect would not be tolerated.'

The requisites of a trial free of prejudicial atmosphere are too deeply implanted to require repetition; for when the death penalty is executed, its consequences are irretrievable. A fair trial therefore is a very minimal

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standard to require before its imposition."

Walker v. Fogliani, 83 Nev. 154, 157, 425 P.2d 794 (1983)

If the State desires to introduce evidence of other bad acts or criminal activity it is necessary for the Court to hold a hearing wherein it is the burden of the State to establish that: (1) the incident in relevant to the crime charged; (2) the act is proven by clear and convincing evidence; and (3) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. <u>Tinch v. State</u>, 113 Nev. 1170, 946 P.2d 1061 (1997). If the State intends to introduce any such evidence it is requested that a hearing be held outside the presence of the jury to determine if the evidence is properly admissible.

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that if evidence of one crime would be cross-admissible at a trial on another charge, the charges may be tried together. Mitchell v. State, 105 Nev. 735, 738, 782 P.2d 1340, 1342 (1989). In the case at bar, the evidence of one offense is not necessary in proving the other offense, nor is it necessary in providing the jury with a complete picture. The three offenses are not connected in any way and the evidence is not cross-admissible. Moreover, admitting the evidence of one offense in the trial of the other would be more prejudicial than probative. Mitchell, at 738, citing Berner v. State, 104 Nev. 695 (1988); and citing NRS 48.045(2). The evidence would essentially amount to evidence of prior bad acts. This type of evidence is not allowed to show that a defendant has the propensity to commit the crime. Middleton v. State, 114 Nev. 1089, 1108, 968 P.2d 296, 309 (1998). The State argues that the evidence would be cross-admissible because they can use evidence of one offense to show motive or intent, thus circumventing the propensity rule. NRS 48.045 (2004). However, that argument is

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tenuous, at best. Moreover, the prejudicial nature of the evidence far outweighs its probative value and the evidence is therefore not cross-admissible. See <u>Tabish v. State</u>, 73 P.3d 584, 593, citing <u>Tinch v. State</u>, 113 Nev. 1170, 1176, 946 P.2d 1061, 1064065 (1997).

The <u>Tabish</u> case is useful in understanding when evidence is not cross-admissible because the prejudicial value outweighs the probative value. The defendants were charged with the September 17, 1998 murder of Ted Binion, as well as the July 1998 kidnaping and beating of Leo Casey. <u>Tabish</u>, at 586. Defendant Tabish was convicted in both offenses. <u>Id</u>. Both defendants appealed their convictions, arguing, among other things, that the joinder of the offenses was improper. <u>Id</u>. at 589. The State argued that the evidence was cross-admissible for the purposes of showing motive, plan and identity. <u>Id</u>. at 593. Our Supreme Court disagreed. <u>Id</u>. The court noted that although the evidence could have been used to show motive, plan or identity, the prejudicial value of the evidence was far greater than the probative value. <u>Id</u>. The court further reasoned that the evidence would cause a "spillover effect." <u>Id</u>.

The same reasons that make joinder of the counts inappropriate, make the severance of the same counts appropriate. The controlling state statute which describes relief from prejudicial joinder is NRS §174.165, which states in part, "[i]f it appears that a defendant or the State of Nevada is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information, or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendant's or provide whatever other relief justice requires."

When counts are not related, "the court must assess the likelihood that a jury not

otherwise convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt of one or more of the charged offenses might permit the knowledge of the defendant's other criminal activity to tip the balance and convict him. If the court finds a likelihood that this may occur, severance should be granted." Floyd v. State, 118 Nev. 17, 42 P.3d 249 (2002), citing, People v. Bean, 46 Cal. 3d 919, 760 P.2d 996 (Cal. 1988).

This is exactly the danger the defendant faces in the instant case. The Defendant faces the risk of the jury accumulating evidence against him, as well as using evidence of one offense to infer propensity to commit a crime in the other offenses. The counts of each event are prejudicial in their nature and will be highly inflammatory to any jury. By joining the counts of each event, the State will be able to provide a circular argument, wherein the likelihood that the Defendant committed the offenses at one of the events is made more probable by the possibility that the Defendant committed the offenses at the other event. These are risks that the Defendant should not face in a trial where his liberty is at stake.

A "HEIGHTENED STANDARD OF REVIEW" IS REQUIRED DUE TO THE FACT THE DEATH PENALTY IS BEING SOUGHT

In a series of recent decisions, the California Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that in a capital case it will no longer tolerate the indiscriminate joining together of two murder charges, especially when the effect of the joinder is to give rise to the special circumstance allegation of multiple murder (see, People v. Johnson [1987] 43 Cal.3d 296, 309, n.5; People v. Smallwood [1986] 42Cal.3d; Williams v. Superior Court (1984] 36 Cal.3d 441).

In <u>Williams</u>, the Court ordered severance of two similar but unrelated murder charges and also set forth the standards for meaningful review of severance motions. In the course of its discussion, the Court emphasized:

"The final consideration in our analysis is that since one of the charged crimes is a capital offense, carrying the gravest possible consequences, the court must analyze the severance issue with a higher degree of scrutiny and care than is normally applied in a non-capital case. Even greater scrutiny is required in the instant matter, for it is the joinder itself which gives rise to the special circumstance allegation of multiple murder under Penal Code Section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3)." (36 Cal.3d at 454.)

In <u>Smallwood</u>, the Court reversed a death penalty case in its entirety solely on the basis that the trial court erred in denying defendant's pretrial motion to sever two murder counts. Citing <u>Williams</u>, the Court stressed "the fact that this case is a capital one, 'carrying the gravest possible consequences." (42 Cal.3d at 430.) The Court was highly critical of the trial court for ignoring that fact:

"This factor should have prompted the trial court to analyze the severance issue with a higher degree of scrutiny and care than is normally applied in a non-capital case. Here, the record demonstrates that the trial court ruled with virtually no scrutiny and care, denying a severance motion in the face of a clear showing of prejudice and despite the prosecutor's concession that no legitimate state goals would be served by joinder. Even if such an ill-considered ruling were justifiable in a less serious case, it was impermissible where questions of life and death were at stake." (Id., at 431.)

The Court acknowledged that in the past trial court rulings on severance motions "were typically accorded great deference." (<u>Id.</u>, at 425.) But Williams had drastically altered the law of severance in capital cases:

"Williams represented a major advance by announcing for the first time that reviewing courts must analyze realistically the prejudice which flows from joinder in light of all the circumstances of the individual case. Williams also directed reviewing courts to weigh any claimed benefits to the prosecution from joinder in order to determine whether such benefits are real or theoretical. No longer may a reviewing court merely recite a public policy favoring joinder or presume judicial economy to justify denial of severance. Put simply, the joinder law must never be used to deny a criminal defendant's fundamental right to due process and a fair trial." (Id., at 425.)

Finally, in <u>People v. Johnson</u>, *supra*, the Court briefly considered the effect of <u>Williams</u> on the retrial of a case in which the prosecutor had joined a capital murder case

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with a related non-capital rape charge. The Court concluded: "(a)s for prejudice, the inflammatory nature of the rape--a brutal cross-racial rape in a church--coupled with the fact that the murder is a capital offense, weigh heavily against a joint trial upon retrial." (43 Cal.3d at 309-310, n. 5.)

CONCLUSION

NORMAN FLOWERS respectfully requests that this Court confirm the appointment of Brett Whipple, Esq. as lead counsel and preclude the State from introducing evidience of the two murder cases during the prosecution of the other case.

DATED this 23 day of January, 2007.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:

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AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding Motion to Preclude

Evidence of Other Bad Acts and to Confirm Counsel filed in District Court Case number

C228755 does not contain the social security number of any person.

DATED: 1-23-07

SPECIAL PUBLIC DEFENDER

DAYID-M: SCHIECK

RANDY PIKE CLARK PATRICK
Attorneys for Flowers
330 S. Third Street, 8th Floor

Las Vegas NV 89155

SPECIAL PUBLIC

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8	DISTRICT COURT		
9		NTY, NEVADA	
10	THE STATE OF NEVADA,) (ASE NO: C220755	
11	Plaintiff,	CASE NO: C228755	
12	-VS-	DEPT NO: XIV	
13	NORMAN FLOWERS, #1179383		
14	Defendant.		
15	STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE		
16	EVIDENCE OF OTHER BAD ACTS AND MOTION TO CONFIRM COUNSEL		
17		ARING: 02/05/07	
18	TIME OF HEAD	RING: 9:00 A.M.	
19	COMES NOW, the State of Nevada, b	by DAVID ROGER, District Attorney, through	
20	LISA LUZAICH, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and hereby submits the attached Points		
21	and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant'	s Motion In Limine To Preclude Evidence Of	
22	Other Bad Acts And Motion To Comfirm Counsel.		
23	This Opposition is made and based up	oon all the papers and pleadings on file herein,	
24	the attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of		
25	hearing, if deemed necessary by this Honorable Court.		
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. The Facts of the Instant Case

On March 24, 2005, Debra Quarles returned home from grocery shopping to her residence at 1001 North Pecos, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, and found her eighteen year old daughter, Sheila Quarles unresponsive in a bathtub containing warm water. Debra had returned home at 2:30 in the afternoon. She was able to remove Sheila from the tub with the help of a neighbor who had helped her carry in groceries. Debra immediately called 911.

An autopsy later determined that Sheila died from drowning. However, strangulation was a significant contributing factor to her death. Sheila also had multiple vertical lacerations on her introitus, evidence of a violent sexual assault.

Investigation revealed that Sheila spoke to her mother, Debra, at approximately 12:30 p.m. and her mother arrived home to find her at approximately 2:30 p.m. In addition, detectives learned that Sheila was involved in a lesbian relationship with an individual named Quinise Toney.

At autopsy, investigators collected samples from Sheila's vagina. Those swabs contained a mixture of DNA which included semen. Quinise Toney was excluded as being a source of this DNA. Sheila Quarles was the major component of the DNA. The male portion of the DNA was entered into a DNA database. When Flowers' DNA was collected in the May murders, his profile was entered into the DNA database as well. After this entry, investigators were notified that Flowers' profile was consistent with part of the minor component DNA from Sheila Quarles' vaginal swabs. In fact, 99.9934 percent of the population is excluded as being a source of that DNA, but Flowers is not. There was an additional, unknown male contributor to the vaginal swabs of Sheila Quarles as well.

After detectives were notified of the DNA match, they recontacted Debra Quarles. Quarles explained that she knew and had actually dated Norman Flowers several months before the murder. She also explained that he would occasionally give her a ride to her work at the time, and that he knew her family members. Quarles said that just prior to the murder,

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her daughter.

B. Facts of Case C216032 in District Court VI

Approximately six (6) weeks after the murder of Sheila, on May 3, 2005, Silver Pines Apartments employees discovered 45-year-old Marilee Coote lying dead on her living room floor. Ms. Coote was a reliable employee of the Andre Agassi Center. When she did not arrive at work by 7:30 a.m., a co-worker became concerned and asked the apartment workers to do a welfare check. After the apartment employees discovered the body, they contacted the police.

she saw Flowers at her apartment complex. At that time, he explained that he was working

in maintenance at the complex. After her daughter's murder, Quarles suffered from

depression. Flowers offered to drive her to appointments with her therapist. On several

occasions, Flowers inquired to Debra whether the police had figured out who had murdered

Paramedics arrived, then police. Ms. Coote was found lying on her living room floor, facing up and completely nude. Inside her belly button were ashes from burnt incense. The skin between her upper thighs and her pubic area was burned. Coote's apartment was locked, but her purse and keys were missing. Inside Coote's washing machine, police found personal photos, bills, and identification belonging to Coote. The items appeared to have been washed because they had a soap residue on them. In the bathtub, under ten inches of water, police found other items of paperwork, a phone book, and jewelry boxes covered with a towel. The apartment was otherwise very neat and undisturbed.

The detectives initially did not view this incident as a homicide. Therefore, they documented the scene, but did not collect evidence. After conducting an autopsy, however, Dr. Knoblock concluded the Coote died as the result of strangulation. He also noted tearing of Coote's labia and anal area. Dr. Knoblock concluded that these tears were sustained antemortem. Coote also had contusions on her arms and forearms.

While various officers were in Coote's apartment during the morning of May 3, 2005, another resident of the complex, Juanita Curry, came in contact with the defendant, Norman Flowers. This occurred between 7:00 and 10:00 a.m. Curry was an acquaintance of

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27 28 Flowers' girlfriend, Mawusi Ragland. Curry lived two floors below Coote. Curry noticed the police and paramedics going in and out of Coote's apartment. From apartment employees, Curry believed that Coote died of natural causes. Sometime that same morning, defendant Flowers knocked on Curry's door. He asked if he could use her phone. He said he was supposed to meet up with Mawusi that morning. She agreed and gave him the phone.

Curry is physically disabled and sometimes walks with a cane. Because of her compromised physical state, she was not comfortable allowing Flowers in her apartment, so she let him use her cordless phone in the doorway. After Flowers used the phone, he came back a few times later, each time with a new request. He asked to use the phone again. He asked for water. At one point, he asked to use her bathroom. She agreed, but when he went in the bathroom, she stepped out of the apartment. As she did so, he asked her to come in and help him find the bathroom light. She refused. When Flowers was at her doorstep, she also noticed that when the police walked back and forth, he would turn his head away. He commented, "the police make me nervous." During the final conversation in Curry's doorway, Flowers leaned down and tried to kiss Curry on the mouth. She turned away.

Curry observed Flowers walk across the parking lot to the doorway of Rena Gonzalez's apartment several times that morning. Curry left the complex a little before 11:00 in the morning. When she returned, she learned that the police had discovered the body of Rena Gonzalez. She gave a statement to police and identified Mawusi's boyfriend as someone she saw in the area of Rena Gonzalez's apartment.

Officers learned of the homicide involving Rena Gonzalez at approximately 4:00 p.m. Rena's Gonzelez's two daughters, the oldest of whom is seven-years-old, came home from school and found their mother on her knees leaning against her bed in her master bedroom. She was unresponsive. They ran and got their friend, Shayne. Shayne returned with them. They tried to remove a phone cord around Gonzalez's neck and called 911.

Gonzalez's apartment was clean and undisturbed with the exception of the following: a broken blue plastic hair comb in the front hallway and a single green sandal were both in the front hallway. Officers could not locate Gonzalez's purse or keys.

Gonzalez was at the foot of her bed, with her body bent at the waist. Her upper torso was on the bed with her face down and arms outstretched. A black phone cord and black lanyard were around her neck. She was dressed in shorts, which were slightly pulled down, and a shirt. She had the matching blue hairclip hanging from her head and blood coming from her ear.

At autopsy, Dr. Simms noted extensive bruising to breast, right arm and right leg. Dr. Simms concluded that Gonzalez died as a result of strangulation. He also noted tearing to her vaginal and anal area. Dr. Simms concluded that these injuries took place post-mortem.

Detectives learned that Rena Gonzalez was a close friend of Mawusi Ragland. In fact, the two women would trade off watching each other's children. They determined that Gonzalez had walked her daughters to the school bus the morning of the 3rd and would have returned home around 8:30 a.m. Rena Gonzalez did not work.

Mawusi Ragland also lived at the Silver Pines Apartments. She lived in the apartment across from Coote. She told detectives that approximately three weeks before the homicide, she and Flowers had gotten into an argument and had not spoken since. In the argument, Mawusi implied that she would socialize with other men. Mawusi had discussed Flowers with her friend Rena Gonzalez as well, although Flowers and Gonzalez had not met. According to Mawusi, Gonzalez advised her not to date Flowers.

When Mawusi returned home on the evening of May 3, she saw police vehicles. She was told her friend, Rena, had been murdered and that her other friend, Marilee, had died of natural causes. On her apartment door, Mawusi noticed a note. It was from Flowers. It stated that he tried to catch her before she went to work, but that it looked like he picked a bad day because "big shit is happening over here." He also asked if she had dated other men since their argument. Flowers called Mawusi that evening. She was very emotional and explained that both Marilee and Rena were dead. Flowers did not appear to be shocked upon hearing this news. She asked him to come over and help her through this difficult time. He told her he'd be right over. When Flowers did not arrive in the next 90 minutes, Mawusi called him to ask where he was. He said he had not left home because when tried to call her,

she did not answer her phone. He also mentioned that he had seen Rena that morning and had a short conversation with her. Mawusi asked him what time he was at the complex and Flowers responded, "I didn't kill her."

After speaking with Mawusi, detectives interviewed Norman Flowers. Initially, he told officers that he had no contact with Marilee Coote on the morning of the murder. He said he had not seen her for months. He also explained that he met Rena Gonzalez several months earlier through Mawusi. He admitted that he had spoken with Rena that morning, but denied ever entering her apartment. Flowers agreed to provide a DNA sample.

Subsquently, Flowers' DNA sample was compared with swabs from Marilee Coote's sexual assault kit. Both vaginal and rectal swabs matched to Flowers. In addition, DNA was collected from the carpet area where Coote was lying, specifically, the carpet beneath her upper thighs. That sample also matched to Flowers.

Detectives interviewed Flowers again. He still maintained that he had never been in Gonzalez's apartment that morning. With regard to Marilee Coote, he first explained that he had had sex with her in the past, but not that day. Then, he acknowledged that he had sex with her night before she died, but that she was alive and fine when he left. He denied having rough sex with her. Later in the interview, he claimed that he might have had rough sex with her, but that she was fine when he left. In a third interview, he said he did have rough sex with her, but that she was alive when he left. He also stated that there was a third man watching the two have sex. He said this man was a medium height, weight, and age black man, but he did not know his name. He claims this man remained in the apartment after he left. Thus, his latest claim was that the sex was consensual and another individual must have killed Coote.

DNA was found in Rena Gonzalez's rectal swabs. Flowers is excluded as the source of this DNA. In addition, DNA was found on the phone cord around Gonzalez's neck. He is excluded as the source of that DNA as well.

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At a preliminary hearing, the State presented evidence of the homicides of both Coote and Gonzalez. On August 16, 2005, the Court held the defendant to answer on all charges relating to the death of Marilee Coote, but did not bind over the counts relating to the death of Rena Gonzalez. After the preliminary hearing, the State was informed that several inmates of the Clark County Detention Center had come forward with information regarding the defendant, Norman Flowers, and his statements relating to the death of Rena Gonzalez.

Knowing that the individuals had been represented by the public defenders office, the State immediately informed the defense that it was proceeding to the grand jury on the charges involving both Coote and Gonzalez.

On September 20, 2005, the State filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. On September 26, 2005, the Court appointed the Special Public Defender to represent the defendant due to the public defender's conflict of interest.

On October 13, 2005, the State presented evidence regarding the murders of both Marilee Coote and Rena Gonzalez to the Grand Jury. In addition to what had been presented at the preliminary hearing, two (2) detention center inmates, a sexual assault nurse examiner and a prior boyfriend of Rena Gonzalez testified.

Shawnta Robinson told the grand jury he was housed in a module with the defendant for a period of time, that they played dominoes together. He described how he "had conversations with [the defendant] like about what he did like every two to three days. He'd like kind of tell me like a little bit more, a little bit more." Robinson further described how the defendant "told me something about he went to court like on the 15th, 16th, something of, I think it was August," and the defendant said, "I feel I'm going to get away with this one."

After court that day, for the first time, the defendant spoke to Robinson about "the Hispanic lady." Previously, all the defendant had spoken to him about was "the black lady." The defendant then told Robinson that "hours later, after the first incident, he went, him and

¹ On Tuesday, August 16, 2005, the counts involving Rena Gonzalez were dismissed and the defendant was bound over on the charges involving Marilee Coote.

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this other person, went to go get some marijuana from this lady and before -- that's how he put it -- before they knew it he was beating her up and did her in. And this other person that was with him allegedly had sex with her and before he knew it he smothered her to death." The defendant also told Robinson that he went through the Hispanic lady's car.

After hearing this, Robinson contacted Det. Huggins. He told her what he knew and gave a taped statement.

George Dunlap testified before the grand jury at the request of the defense (the special public defender). Interestingly, he had offered to provide information for the district attorney for "probably three or four" other cases. The State did not take him up on his offer.

Dunlap told the grand jury that he first met the defendant when he was speaking to another inmate about how easy it is to beat a murder case; that the defendant heard him talking, came over and asked his advice on how to beat a murder case. They began talking and the defendant told Dunlap about "the black female, the first victim," and described what occurred. The defendant also told Dunlap about "the Mexican" woman, and how she saw the defendant coming out of "the black woman's apartment," that he and his friend went to talk to her and ask if she can sell them marijuana and she let them in. He described how, once inside there was a fight that ended up in the bedroom, that he pushed her head down while his friend raped her, that he put a pillow over her head to stop her from screaming. "[H]e said he killed her, but his friend killed the black woman. And all he did was have sex with the black woman but his friend had sex with the Mexican woman."

Dunlap was asked if he ever spoke with the defendant about Shawnta Robinson. He said that Robinson is "just another inmate housed in the same area that I was and Keith, we all played dominoes together all talked amongst each other. . . . Keith wanted me to testify on his behalf against Shawnta Robinson because he said Shawnta Robinson was going to testify against him and he needed to have somebody testify against Shawnta saying that they never spoke. But I told him, I said no, I can't do that because I know for a fact that you spoke and you also spoke to me, but he offered to pay me money, take care of me if I testified for him."