IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

DERRICK POOLE,

Appellant,

Supreme Court Case No: 74808

V

District Court Case No.: A-16-737120-C

NEVADA AUTO DEALERSHIP INVESTMENTS LLC a Nevada Limited Liability Company d/b/a SAHARA CHRYSLER, JEEP, DODGE, and COREPOINTE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Respondents,

Appeal from the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County.

The Honorable Nancy Alff, District Court Judge

APPELLANT'S APPENDIX VOLUME 5

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		Motion to Retax and Settle Costs	
7	3/28/18	Judgment	1404-1405
7	3/28/18	Notice of Entry of Judgment	1406-1409

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3	I certify that the aforementioned is true and correct under penalty of perjury
4	under the laws of the state of Nevada.
5	Executed this 19th day of October, 2017.
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9	Derrick Poole
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EXHIBIT 8



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CLERK OF THE COURT

DCCR GEORGE O. WEST III [SBN 7951] Law Offices of George O. West III Consumer Attorneys Against Auto Fraud 10161 Park Run Drive, Suite 150 Las Vegas, NV 89145 gowesq@cox.net www.americasautofraudattorney.com (702) 318-6570 (702) 664-0459 [fax]

Attorney for Plaintiffs **DERRICK POOLE**

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, SAHARA

DERRICK POOLE,

Plaintiff.

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14 SAHARA AUTO DEALERSHIP INVEST-MENTS LLC a Nevada Limited Liability 15

Company d/b/a SAHARA CHRYSLER, JEEP, DODGE, WELLS FARGO DEALER SERVICES INC., COREPOINTE INSUR-ANCE COMPANY, and DOES 1 through 100,)

17 Inclusive,

Defendants.

CASE NO: A-16-737120-C

XXVII DEPT:

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

DATE:

September 27, 2017

TIME:

9:30 a.m.

1

Case Number: A-16-737120-C

I

APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff DERRICK POOLE: George O. West III, Law Offices of George O. West III, Consumer Attorneys Against Auto Fraud. AND Craig B. Friedberg, Esq., Law Offices of Craig Friedberg (co -counsel)

For Defendants SAHARA AUTO DEALERSHIP INVESTMENTS LLC d/b/a SAHARA CHRYSLER, JEEP DODGE and COREPOINT INSURANCE COMPANY: Jeff Bendavid, Moran, Brandon, Bendavid, Moran

For Defendant WELLS FARGO DEALER SERVICES INC: (no appearance), Nate Kanute, Snell & Wilmer

II <u>FINDINGS</u>

On September 1, 2017 Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendant SAHARA AUTO DEALERSHIP INVESTMENTS LLC's d/b/a SAHARA CHRYSLER, JEEP DODGE ("SAHARA") to Admit Requests for Admissions Without Qualification 2) Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Further Responses to Interrogatories and 3) Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Further Response to Requests to Production of Documents and to Compel Documents, came on for hearing on shortening time.

Defendant SAHARA's Motion for Protective Order also came on for hearing on shortening time.

Based on further supplemental responses served by Defendant regarding certain Requests for Admissions, Plaintiff filed a notice of change of status on September 22, 2017 with the Commissioner withdrawing Plaintiff's motion to compel with respect to interrogatories and requests for production of documents, as well as Plaintiff's previously notice of taking of depositions of certain employees from Defendant. However, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Unqualified Admissions from Defendant SAHARA with respect to request for admission numbers 9, 11, 12, 17, 22 an 23 through 32 remained on calendar.

A-16-737120-C Poole v Nevada Auto Dealership Investments Date of Hearing: September 27, 2017

III

RECOMMENDATIONS

IT IS RECOMMENDED:

Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendant SAHARA to Unconditionally Admit Requests for Admissions is *granted*. Defendant SAHARA shall submit supplemental responses to request for admission numbers 9, 11, 12, 17, 22, and 23 through 32. Defendant SAHARA shall either admit or deny the admission without the qualification "the document speaks for itself." Should a request seek a factual admission as to the content of a document attached to or identified in Plaintiff's requests, Defendant SAHARA may qualify the admission based only upon the that particular document referenced in the request should they want to do so, but shall not qualify any response to any request for admission with "the document speaks for itself." Sanctions are denied as to both sides.

Defendant shall provide supplemental responses consistent with these recommendations no later then October 13, 2017. Defendant SAHARA's counsel indicated on the record during the hearing that he would have supplemental responses to Plaintiff by close of business Monday, October 2, 2017.

Defendant SAHARA's Motion for Protective Order is most based upon Plaintiff stipulating to take the depositions at issue off calendar.

Plaintiff is prepare the proposed recommendations for review by all active parties and file such recommendations with the Commissioner within ten days.

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3	A-16-737120-C Poole v Nevada Auto Dealership Investments
4	Date of Hearing : September 27, 2017
5	NOTIFICIA
6	<u>NOTICE</u>
7	Pursuant to NRCP 16.1(d)(2), you are hereby notified you have five (5) days from
8	the date you receive this document within which to file written objections. The
9	Commissioner's Report is deemed received three (3) days after mailing to a party or the
10	
11	party's attorney, or three (3) days after the clerk of the court deposits a copy of the
12	Report in a folder of a party's lawyer in the Clerk's office. E.D.C.R. 2.34(f). A copy of the
13	foregoing Discovery Commissioner's Report was:
14	Mailed to Plaintiff/Defendant at the following address on the day
15	of; 20:
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19	Placed in the folder of counsel in the Clerk's office on the day of
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21	(f()) (2)
22	Electronically served counsel on OCtobac 30, 2017, Pursuant to
23 24	N.E.F.C.R. Rule 9.
25	-STEVEN D. GRIERSON
26	By: Vatelia F
27	Deputy Clerk-
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1	PROOF OF SERVICE
2	STATE OF NEVADA
3	COUNTY OF CLARK }
4	On January 15, 2018, I served the forgoing document(s) described as 1) PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEED AND
5	OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES ANI COSTS on interested party(ies) in this action by either fax and/or email, or by placing true and correct copy and/or original thereof addressed as follows:
7	JEFF BENDAVID, ESQ Moran, Brandon, Bendavid, Moran 630 South Fourth Street Las Vegas, NV 89101
9	j.bendavid@moranlawfirm.com
10 11	[] (BY FIRST CLASS MAIL) I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal service on that same day with first class postage thereon fully prepaid
12	at Las vegas, NV in the ordinary course of business.
13	[] (BY PERSONAL SERVICE) I delivered such envelope by hand to the office, and/or to the attorney listed as the addressee below.
14 15	[] (BY FAX SERVICE) Pursuant to consent under NRCP, Rule 5(b), I hereby certify that service of the aforementioned document(s) via facsimile, pursuant to EDCR Rule 7.26(a) as set forth herein.
16 17 18	[x] (BY EMAIL SERVICE) (Wiznet/email) Pursuant NRCP, Rule 5(b)(2)(D), and the EDCR on electronic service, I hereby certify that service of the aforementioned document(s) via email to pursuant to the relevant and pertinent provisions of EDCR and NRCP, as set forth herein.
19	Executed on this 15 th day of January, 2018
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21	<u>/s/ George O. West III</u> GEORGE O. WEST III
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JOINT APPENDIX 1249

Steven D. Grierson **CLERK OF THE COURT** RPLY 1 JEFFERY A. BENDAVID, ESQ. 2 Nevada Bar No. 6220 STEPHANIE J. SMITH, ESQ. 3 Nevada Bar No. 11280 MORAN BRANDON BENDAVID MORAN 4 630 South 4th Street 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 384-8424 6 j.bendavid@moranlawfirm.com s.smith@moranlawfirm.com 7 Attorney for Defendants, Nevada Auto 8 Dealership Investments LLC d/b/a Sahara Chrysler and Corepointe Insurance Co. 9 DISTRICT COURT 10 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 11 12 DERRICK POOLE, Case No.: A-16-737120-C 13 Plaintiff, Dept. No.: XXVII 14 v. DEFENDANT NEVADA AUTO 15 DEALERSHIP INVESTMENTS LLC'S NEVADA AUTO DEALERSHIP 16 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION INVESTMENTS LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company d/b/a SAHARA FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS 17 CHRYSLER; JEEP, DODGE, WELLS FARGO DEALER SERVICES INC., 18 COREPOINTE INSURANCE Hearing Date: February 1, 2018 19 COMPANY; and DOES 1 through 100, Hearing Time: 9:30 a.m. Inclusive. 20 Defendant. 21 22 23 COMES NOW, pursuant to the provisions of NRS §18.010 and NRS §18.020, 24 Defendant, NEVADA AUTO DEALERSHIP INVESTMENTS LLC d/b/a SAHARA 25 CHRYSLER JEEP DODGE RAM ("Defendant" and/or "Sahara Chrysler") by and through 26 its counsel of record, JEFFERY A. BENDAVID, ESQ., and STEPHANIE J. SMITH, ESQ., 27 28 MORAN BRANDON BENDAVID MORAN 630 SOUTH 41H STREET

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Phone:(702) 384-8424

FAX: (702) 384-6568

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JOINT APPENDIX 1250

of MORAN BRANDON BENDAVID MORAN, and hereby submits its Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to its Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs.

This Reply is made and based upon the Points and Authorities attached hereto, along with the underlying Motion and pleadings and papers on file herein, any declarations submitted herewith, and any oral argument the Court may allow at the time for hearing on this matter.

DATED this 25th day of January, 2018.

MORAN BRANDON BENDAVID MORAN

/s/ Jeffery A. Bendavid,

JEFFERY A. BENDAVID, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 6220

STEPHANIE J. SMITH, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 11280 630 South 4th Street

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

(702) 384-8424

Attorneys for Defendants, Nevada Auto Dealership Investments LLC d/b/a Sahara Chrysler and Corepointe Insurance Co.

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MORAN BRANDON BENDAVID MORAN

630 SOUTH 4TH STREET LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 PHONE:(702) 384-8424 FAX: (702) 384-6568

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Despite Plaintiff's claims that he is not trying to reargue his opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment he, in fact, attempts to do so. Plaintiff continuously fails to acknowledge that despite the allegations formulated by his retained counsel and hired expert, he suffered no damages of any kind. And, in fact, continuously utilized the Vehicle at issue well into litigation with no problems. Defendant is not claiming it should be awarded attorneys' fees based on the fact it won summary judgment, but on the facts and evidence of the record that demonstrate Plaintiff's claims were both legally and factually deficient, which was merely affirmed by the fact that Defendant prevailed on summary judgment. Further, despite engaging in no tortious conduct, Defendant proffered a fair and reasonable Offer of Judgment that Plaintiff unreasonably rejected, particularly due to his lack of any damages, and claims solely premised on the flawed conclusions of his retained expert. Plaintiff wanted compensation for purely hypothetical damages, that did not have an adequate legal basis and persisted because he had no other choice but to try to obtain money from a jury, after it was clear that his claims were not reasonable and unsupported by credible evidence.

II. <u>LEGAL ARGUMENT</u>

A. Defendant Should Be Awarded its Attorneys' Fees Pursuant to NRS 18. 18.010(2)(b) Because the Credible Actual Evidence Demonstrates that Plaintiff's Claims Were Brought and Maintained Without a Reasonable Basis.

Again, the underlying facts of this matter are simple, the Plaintiff purchased a truck and drove it without issue for multiple years and for thousands of miles, without a single repair or warranty claim. Only when, by Plaintiff's own admission, he tried to obtain an

MORAN BRANDON BENDAVID MORAN ATTORNEYS AT LAW

630 SOUTH 4TH STREET LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 PHONE:(702) 384-8424 FAX: (702) 384-6568 additional refinance, did he have any issue with his Vehicle. And, indeed, Plaintiff's own text messages evidence the purported basis of his claims that Defendant failed to disclose a "major" accident on the Vehicle. This fact was blatantly false as Plaintiff signed a CarFax clearly indicating that the Vehicle had been in an accident and that it had been towed as a result. All of Plaintiff's claims rest on the singular and legally unsupported assertion that somehow, despite no legal duty, Defendant should have disclosed every single replaced and/or repaired part on the subject Vehicle. This legal assertion simply is untrue, and Plaintiff's claims are not otherwise seeking to address any novel areas of law.

Plaintiff first puts forth five cases which he alleges supports denial of attorneys' fees for Defendant, however, Plaintiff's facts, no matter how many times he tries to repeat them are notably and significantly distinguishable from the cases he cites. For instance, in *Baldonado v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC*, the Court specifically stated that mater dealt with "law" that was "complex" and "unsettled." 124 Nev. 951, 968 (2008). Furthermore, the Court specifically noted that, "[D]etermining whether attorney fees should be awarded under *NRS 18.010(2)(b)* requires the court to inquire into the actual circumstances of the case, 'rather than a hypothetical set of facts favoring plaintiff's averments.' *Id. at 967-968*. And, that "*NRS 18.010(2)(b)* must be liberally construed in favor of awarding attorney fees whenever appropriate." *Id. at 968 (emphasis added)*.

Indeed, in other cases cited to by Plaintiff, the Court reversed awards because they found the awards to be premature, or that some of the claims and issues brought by the plaintiffs in those circumstances were "reasonable." See Kahn v. Morse & Mowbray, 121 Nev. 464 (2005), see also Bower v. Harrah's Laughlin, Inc., 125 Nev. 470 (2009). Here,

VB

MORAN BRANDON BENDAVID MORAN ATTORNEYS AT LAW

630 SOUTH 4TH STREET LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 PHONE:(702) 384-8424 FAX: (702) 384-6568 Plaintiff brought and maintained claims without credible evidence, even as it became glaringly apparent that his claims were without reasonable grounds.

Here, by Plaintiff's own admission he alleges he sought an attorney when he was informed by a wholly unconnected third-party insurer that the Vehicle had possibly been in a wreck with frame damage thus denying him a third refinance. See Exhibit A- Deposition excerpt of Derrick Poole, 23:4-12. However, at no time during discovery did Plaintiff identify this anonymous mystery insurance agent, and he did not provide any documentation he may have received from this denial of a refinance, indicating that the Vehicle had incurred actual frame damage. And, indeed, Plaintiff admitted that he was informed, at the time he purchased the Vehicle, that it had been in an accident. Exhibit A. Plaintiff also claimed he ran his own "Auto Check" report, that reflected some "frame" damage reported. See Exhibit A, However, Plaintiff testified to this only after his lawsuit had been filed and in litigation for over a year, and failed to provide any copy of the alleged "Auto Check" report on which he purportedly based his claims. In fact, Plaintiff changed the basis of the claims to try to fit within the statutes he brought suit under, because he affirmed that his claims were baseless. See generally, Complaint and First Amended Complaint.

Additionally, Plaintiff continued to utilize the subject Vehicle during the pendency of litigation. Indeed, there was no credible evidence that Defendant failed to comply any applicable statutory requirements as alleged by Plaintiff. In turn, because Plaintiff's statutory claims were groundless and lacking in credible evidence, so too were his equitable claims, as there was no separate basis for those claims, as conceded by Plaintiff at the time for hearing of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. *See Opposition*, 9:1-4.

To reiterate, Plaintiff knew that he did not suffer damages, as he continued to utilize the Vehicle without incident (minus an accident he independently was in). See generally, Motion for Summary Judgment and Exhibits thereto. Plaintiff knew he made no warranty claims, required no repairs, and did not otherwise have an issue with his Vehicle until he was allegedly unable to refinance it. Id. Plaintiff, at the time of filing his Complaint, and his First Amended Complaint, knew that he continued to drive the Vehicle even after his "expert" inspected it, and allegedly found "safety" issues. Id. Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's fees, tries to again argue that his claim was valid pursuant to the statute. See generally, Opposition. However, Plaintiff has produced no credible evidence, that Defendant conducted itself in any way contrary to either any applicable statutory requirements or even its own guarantees. Defendant always, undisputedly sold Plaintiff a Vehicle that had been in a previous accident, which it had inspected and subsequently certified as a Certified Pre-Owned Vehicle. See generally, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and Opposition thereto.

Accordingly, Plaintiff, through his retained legal counsel, knew that there was no credible evidence to bring a claim for statutory consumer fraud against Defendant. Plaintiff's conclusory and self-serving allegations do not constitute "credible evidence." When this Court analyzed the actual facts on record, they clearly showed that despite Plaintiff's protests and alleged claims, he still drove the Vehicle without incident. In fact, Plaintiff even testified he had not tried to sell his Vehicle or otherwise replace it. *See Exhibit A, 31*.

Plaintiff, in his Opposition has still failed to provide any actual statutory or other legal requirement for Defendant to disclose each and every repair and/or replacement part



630 South 4th Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Phone:(702) 384-8424 Fax: (702) 384-6568

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MORAN BRANDON BENDAVID MORAN

630 SOUTH 4TH STREET LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 PHONE:(702) 384-8424 FAX: (702) 384-6568 that the Vehicle may have had at the time Plaintiff purchased it. See generally, Opposition. Further, Plaintiff has still failed to acknowledge that he had any responsibility as a consumer that had purchased multiple trucks, to do any inquiry into the Vehicle itself. Including, utilizing the same exact means by which he was allegedly informed that there was a potential issue (again, Plaintiff produced no evidence of that information).

Again, NRS 18.020(2)(b) specifically instructs that, "[T]he court shall liberally construe the provisions of this paragraph in favor of awarding attorney's fees in all appropriate situations," and this Courts should award Defendant attorneys' fees under this legal basis. Plaintiff clearly continued to pursue claims and theories for deceptive trade practices on unreasonable grounds, despite no initial or subsequent evidence that any deceptive trade practices were actually engaged in by the Defendant, and continued on. Plaintiff even admitted that he had no knowledge of potentially repaired and/or replaced parts until after the commencement of litigation. Plaintiff attempts to frame Defendant's knowledge that the Vehicle had been in a previous accident from which it had been repaired by a third-party with authorization from an insurance agency as credible evidence that it engaged in a deceptive consumer trade practice. See Opposition, 13-15. However, Plaintiff failed to provide any credible actual evidence that Defendant knew or had knowledge that it should not have certified and/or sold the subject Vehicle as a Certified Pre-Owned Vehicle, and presented no credible evidence that Defendant otherwise withheld any "material" facts. See Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment and Exhibits thereto.

Plaintiff's later representations that he would not have purchased the Vehicle if he had been made aware of each and every part that had been allegedly "repaired" or "replaced" is disingenuous, because Plaintiff purchased the Vehicle with full knowledge of

the previous accident and testified that he did not know what multiple of the various purportedly "replaced" and/or "repaired" parts ever were. See Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff's self-serving conclusory allegations, opinions, and general advertising do not constitute "credible" evidence that fraud was perpetrated by Defendant no matter how many times Plaintiff tries to make it so. As such, Defendant should be awarded its reasonable attorneys' fees as detailed in the underlying motion for fees and costs, pursuant to NRS §18.010, 18.202(2)(b) et seq., of Two Hundred Eleven Thousand, Nine Hundred Eighty-Two Dollars and Fifty Cents (\$211,982.50). 1

В. Defendant is entitled to Reasonable Attorneys' Fees from the Time its Offer of Judgment was made Because the Beattie Factors Do Weigh in its Favor.

While Plaintiff's attorney contends he cannot adequately assess the reasonableness of Defendant's bills, Plaintiff does not contest the billing rate, the overall amount of time expended or the skill or quality of attorneys who worked on this matter. See generally, Opposition. This information was all available to Plaintiff in the sworn statement of Jeffery Bendavid, Esq., and attached to the underlying Motion. This is notable since all these factors weigh in favor of a finding of reasonability in Defendant's fee request. See Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat'l Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349 (1969).

When all of the factors are analyzed in assessing whether Defendant is entitled to attorneys' fees are assessed as a whole, they clearly support an award of attorneys' fees and costs for Defendant. As laid out previously, the Court is to evaluate four factors to assess whether an award of attorneys' fees after the rejection of an Offer of Judgment is merited. See Beattie v. Thomas, 99 Nev. 579 (1983). Those factors are: (1) whether the plaintiff's



Defendant still seeks its costs in this matter pursuant to NRS §18.020 and NRS 18.110 and NRCP 54 and 68, pursuant to the verified memorandum of costs and supplemental verified memorandum of costs.

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claim was brought in good faith; (2) whether the defendants' offer of judgment was reasonable and in good faith in both its timing and amount; (3) whether the plaintiff's decision to reject the offer and proceed to trial was grossly unreasonable or in bad faith; and (4) whether the fees sought by the offeror are reasonable and justified in amount. *Id*.

1. Plaintiff's Claims were Not Brought or Maintained in Good Faith.

As discussed herein, Plaintiff's claims were not brought or maintained on credible evidence or on a reasonable legal or factual basis. Plaintiff failed to actually provide any credible evidence and proffered only unsubstantiated "expert" opinion and speculation. Most notably, Plaintiff had no damages whatsoever, from the time he filed his Complaint through the pendency of this litigation. In fact, Plaintiff admits that after he allegedly found out about undisclosed damage, he did not even bother going into the dealership itself, but merely tried to exchange some texts with the salesperson. *See Exhibit A, 31*. Even more tellingly, Plaintiff at first denied having been disclosed any accident whatsoever, and then only after being reminded of the CarFax and his signature on it, changed his position that he should have been disclosed every single detail about the accident. *See Complaint and First Amended Complaint*. As such, the first *Beattie* factor weighs in favor of Defendant.

2. Defendant Made a Reasonable and Appropriately Timed Offer of Judgment in Good Faith.

The next two factors tend to intertwine, and both of those factors weigh heavily in favor of the Defendant. Plaintiff neglects to mention that additional settlement discussions had occurred prior to August 17, 2017, and even prior to when Defendant's current counsel substituted in officially. Here, Defendant's offer of judgment was reasonable and in good faith in both its timing and amount given its position after discovery had closed and in



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particular, given the fact that Plaintiff had not demonstrated any damages, or any other likelihood that he would prevail. See generally, Docket.

Here, Plaintiff's own submitted emails evidence that Defendant's offer of judgment in the amount of \$45,000.00 was more than fair and reasonable. Pursuant to Plaintiff's offer on September 25, 2017, he was willing to accept \$17, 345.74 to pay off the subject Vehicle, along with, of course, keeping it (that is because Plaintiff knew there was nothing wrong with the Vehicle). See Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. Acceptance of the \$45,000.00 Offer of Judgment would have resulted in a full pay off of Plaintiff's Vehicle, plus he would have retained the Vehicle pursuant to his own wishes, a more than equitable result considering Plaintiff suffered no damages. Acceptance also would have left a remaining \$27,654.26, for attorneys' fees and costs. Later, on October 2, 2017, Plaintiff was willing to accept \$14,500 along with keeping the Vehicle, thus leaving \$30,500.00 for attorneys' fees and costs. Id.

Plaintiff had no damages, he would have paid off his Vehicle, he would have retained possession and continued use of the Vehicle, which he already had during the pendency of litigation, as such it is clear that the only argument Plaintiff has for the Offer of Judgment being "unreasonable" is that his attorney would not have made enough profit. Importantly, the Offer of Judgment was made after Plaintiff was able to fully complete his discovery and prior to his counsel having to prepare and filing eighty-nine (89) pages of briefing to oppose Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. It is clear that if Plaintiff had accepted the Offer of Judgment, since he had no actual damages, he would have been

² Plaintiff's attorney is a solo practitioner and did not associate any counsel until August of 2017. Also, Craig Friedberg, Esq. was not present at any depositions.

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rewarded for bringing his claims, and his attorney would have been reimbursed his costs, along with being compensated. Plaintiff provided no case law which mandates a party's attorney must recover "all of their desired fees" for an offer of judgment to be reasonable. particularly since he did not prevail in his claims. This factor also weighs clearly in favor of Defendant recovering its attorneys' fees from the time of its Offer of Judgment.

3. Plaintiff's Rejection of the Offer of Judgment was Grossly Unreasonable and/or in Bad Faith Due to his Lack of Damages and Lack of Credible Evidence.

As discussed in analyzing the previous factor, "whether the plaintiff's decision to reject the offer and proceed to trial was grossly unreasonable or in bad faith" is also of consideration for this Court. Defendant served an Offer of Judgment on Plaintiff on October 5, 2017, and despite Plaintiff's representations that there were ongoing, Plaintiff never responded to the Offer of Judgment. Most notably, by September 25, 2017, Plaintiff's counsel demanded \$60,850.00 in attorneys' fees alone, and a total amount of, as he admits, \$87,272.44, to settle a case in which the Plaintiff sustained no actual damages. From the very commencement of Plaintiff's purportedly "good faith" settlement negotiations, his counsel made it abundantly clear that his fees were of paramount importance, and the "800 pound guerrilla." See Exhibit 1 to Opposition. This conduct effectively put an end to the settlement negotiations.

By Plaintiff's own contention his counter offer on September 5, 2017 was \$56,296.00, inclusive of all damages, fees and costs, a difference of \$11,296.00 from the ultimately rejected Offer of Judgment, one month later. See Opposition, 21:1-2. Plaintiff continuously neglects to mention he did not actually suffer any damages. The ultimate difference in all of the discussions is solely comprised of attorneys' fees. It is true that some

630 SOUTH 4TH STREET Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

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³ Plaintiff never made an offer of judgment.

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630 SOUTH 4TH STREET LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 PHONE:(702) 384-8424 FAX: (702) 384-6568 additional fees were incurred due to the fact that Defendant took Plaintiff's expert's deposition (and Plaintiff's counsel also chose to re-direct him for an hour of the just over 6 hour total, deposition). However, Plaintiff also chose to depose two additional people, serve additional notices for deposition (which he had ample opportunity to previously notice during actual open discovery), and further refused to stipulate to continue the time for trial which would have served to alleviate some fees and costs.⁴ Plaintiff did not suffer any monetary damages, as he purchased and utilized the Vehicle continuously (save for a wreck he was in during litigation).

Plaintiff's attorneys' fees were clearly the key factor in the rejection of the Offer of Judgment, a grossly unreasonable consideration even with a fee-shifting provision available to Plaintiff, again because Plaintiff had no damages. Indeed, Plaintiff's counsel said While Offers of Judgment are not meant "unfairly force" a plaintiff out of a legitimate claim, they are also not designed to necessitate a windfall to a plaintiff or his attorney. *See generally, Beattie, supra.* Plaintiff argues that with the fee-shifting provision of NRS 41.600, attorneys' fees should have been and were rightfully a key factor in the rejection of the Offer of Judgment. *See generally, Opposition,* 22-24. However, the statute provides only for "costs" and "reasonable" attorneys' fees. *NRS 41.600.* Here, there is no evidence provided that Plaintiff's counsel (even if they had prevailed at trial) would have been entitled to any amount of attorneys' fees, let alone the fees he was demanding. As such even taking into consideration the fact that there was a fee shifting provision in the statute under which Plaintiff brought his claims, this factor still weighs in favor of Defendant.

⁴ Plaintiff's counsel also refused to stipulate to extend discovery beyond its August 31, 2017 close date.

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4. Defendant's Attorneys' Fees are Reasonable and Justified in their Amount.

As reflected in the emails attached to Plaintiff's Opposition, the significant back and forth between the parties reflects the importance Plaintiff's counsel placed upon the attorneys' fees. See Exhibit 1 to Opposition. Initially, Plaintiff wanted to keep the Vehicle, and for it to be paid off (or to possibly get a new truck altogether). See Exhibit 1. This was even after he had gotten into a wreck with the subject Vehicle, and incurred thousands of dollars of damage to it. Throughout the negotiations, Plaintiff's counsel desired to act as though he had already won a verdict pursuant to NRS 41.600. Indeed, Plaintiff's counsel propounded the theory that despite not suffering damages, his client could only be made whole by obtaining all of this attorneys' fees. See Exhibit 1, September 5, 2017 email. The Parties, due to Plaintiff's unwillingness to compromise over his attorneys' fees, were then forced to incur additional costs to take more key depositions, most notable is the fact that it was Plaintiff's counsel who wanted to push ahead with those depositions while purportedly engaging in good faith negotiations. Defendant had no choice but to proceed with deposing Plaintiff's retained expert who was the crux of his entire case. However, as negotiations progressed Plaintiff's demand for his own monetary compensation decreased from his full payoff amount to \$14,500.00 while the attorneys' fees portion increased by \$17,774.00 on September 25. Plaintiff's conduct evidences, at the very least, a grossly unreasonable rejection of the Offer of Judgment, and the fees incurred by Defendant were reasonable.

Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 68(f)(2) is clear, "[I]f the offeree rejects an offer and fails to obtain a more favorable judgment, the offeree shall pay the offeror's post-offer costs [...] and reasonable attorney's fees, actually incurred by the offeror from the time of the

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630 SOUTH 4TH STREET LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 PHONE:(702) 384-8424 FAX: (702) 384-6568 offer. As such, at a minimum, Defendant should be awarded the reasonable attorneys' fees and costs from October 5, 2017 to the time of the entry of judgment. See NRCP 68(f)(2).

Defendant incurred exceedingly reasonable attorneys' fees in the amount of Sixty-Eight Thousand Two Hundred Eighty-Five Dollars (\$68,285.00) for 178.5 hours of work from October 5, 2017 to November 29, 2017. See Declaration of Jeffery Bendavid, attached to Motion. The Parties attempted to negotiate in August, September, and into October, 2017. The close of discovery was set for August 31, 2017, and dispositive motions were due to be filed on or before October 2, 2017, with the trial in this matter set for a stack commencing on November 13, 2017. Due to Plaintiff's refusal to continue trial and any associated dispositive motion or motion in limine dates, despite there being no other continuances or extensions of the close of discovery, Defendant was forced to file a Motion to Continue Trial, along with prepare all of its motions in limine and its motion for summary judgment in order to be timely. The Motion to Continue Trial was not heard until October 18, 2017, thus Defendant was also forced to proceed as if it were going to trial in November. Despite, reasonable offers from Defendant, Plaintiff's counsel refused to settle due to the amount fees and costs he purportedly incurred and wanted as part of any settlement. Id. The emails submitted by both sides clearly evidence this fact. Defendant was forced to continue to vigorously litigate this matter and commence preparing for trial after the service and subsequent rejection of its reasonable Offer of Judgment. Notably, and another fact which weighs in favor of Defendant, as to Plaintiff's grossly unreasonable rejection of the Offer of Judgment, is that Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on October 2, 2017, and served its Offer of Judgment on October 5, 2017. Therefore, Plaintiff had the full

advantage of seeing all of Defendant's position, arguments, and evidence detailing Plaintiff's factual and legal shortcomings.

Plaintiff's acceptance of this Offer of Judgment, or even continued settlement negotiations or an original stipulation to extend discovery or continue trial, would have avoided additional litigation and motion preparation. Most notably, Defendant's fees are exceedingly reasonable, because it had to respond and litigate accordingly to preserve its rights, to Plaintiff's 89 page opposition to its Motion for Summary Judgment, exclusive of his exhibits, and a 17-page long substantive declaration from his expert, along with a substantial hearing on the motion for summary judgment, itself. These fees are particularly reasonable as Defendant had to commence, and continue, preparing for trial leading up to the trial continuance as well.

In exercising its discretion to award attorneys' fees under NRCP 68, the Court must evaluate the following factors: (1) whether the plaintiff's claim was brought in good faith; (2) whether the offer of judgment was reasonable and in good faith in both its timing and amount; (3) whether the offeree's decision to reject the offer and proceed to trial was grossly unreasonable or in bad faith; and (4) whether the fees sought by the offeror are reasonable and justified in amount. Wynn v. Smith, 117 Nev. 6, 13, 16 P.3d 424, 428 (2001) (citing Beattie v. Thomas, 99 Nev. 579, 588-89, 668 P.2d 268, 274 (1983)).

As discussed herein, Plaintiff's claim was maintained without reasonableness, particularly when no actual credible evidence was proffered to substantiate his claims, and in light of the continuous fact that he sustained no damages, either monetarily or physically as he enjoyed the full use of the Vehicle during the time he had it. Defendant's Offer of Judgment was made in good faith, and after various settlement negotiations, and in an



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amount higher than any of its previously offered settlement amounts. See Exhibit 1 to Motion for Fees and Costs.

Defendant's fees are also reasonable in light of the fact that Plaintiff did not challenge any of the other factors necessary to assess the reasonability of the fees, except for his purported inability to evaluate all of the billing entries, which only plays a role in assessing one factor of reasonableness. Defendant has provided redacted billings with this Reply and unredacted ones for the Court to assess reasonableness, which Plaintiff has made clear he is challenging. See Exhibit B, attached hereto. Additionally, Plaintiff has a pending appeal, and as such, it would be inequitable for Defendant to have to reveal its full billings at this stage of the appeals process. See Docket. As such, any complete denial of fees would be inappropriate, and at most counsel would be entitled to examine the billings for reasonableness of entries. See Love v. Love, 114 Nev. 572, 582 (reversal of award and remand to district court to allow for unsealed review); see also, Golden Rd. Motor Inn, v. Islam, 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 49 (2016). Accordingly, all of the factors weigh heavily in favor of Defendant. See Wynn v. Smith, 117 Nev. 6, 13, 16 P.3d 424, 428 (2001) (citing Beattie v. Thomas, 99 Nev. 579, 588-89, 668 P.2d 268, 274 (1983)).

Accordingly, although Defendant is seeking all of its attorneys' fees incurred in the litigation of this matter, pursuant to NRCP 68, it should be awarded at least an amount of \$68,285.00 in attorneys' fees incurred from the time it made its rejected Offer of Judgment.

C. Defendant is Entitled to Costs Pursuant to NRS § 18.020 and/or NRCP 68.

Plaintiff did not oppose Defendant's argument that Defendant is entitled to all costs incurred in this matter pursuant to NRS §18.020(3), as set forth in the underlying Motion, in his Opposition hereto. Nor is there any dispute that Defendant is the prevailing party.



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Accordingly, NRS 18.020(3) dictates that Defendant should be permitted to recover its costs, as it provides, in pertinent part that costs, "must be allowed of course to the prevailing party against any adverse party against whom judgment is rendered, in the following cases...[I]n an action for the recovery of money or damages, where the plaintiff seeks to recover more than \$2,500." Therefore, as the prevailing party herein, Defendant is entitled to costs pursuant to NRS §18.020, and respectfully requests an award of costs of \$11,229.33 in actual necessary costs in this matter.

III. CONCLUSION

Defendant respectfully requests that this Court award Defendant an additional \$211,982.50 for 554.7 hours of work, or \$68,285.00, for fees and incurred after the Offer of Judgment, for successfully prevailing against Plaintiff, and an additional \$11,229.33 in costs.

DATED this 25th day of January, 2018.

MORAN BRANDON BENDAVID MORAN

/s/ Jeffery A. Bendavid, Esq.

JEFFERY A. BENDAVID, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 6220

STEPHANIE J. SMITH, ESQ.

Nevada Bar No. 11280 630 South Fourth Street Las Vegas, NV 89101 Attorneys for Defendant



MORAN BRANDON BENDAVID MORAN

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Exhibit "A"

Poole v. Nevada Auto Dealership Investments LLC, et al.

Deposition of: **Derrick Poole**

August 14, 2017



500 South Rancho Drive, Suite 8A Las Vegas, Nevada 89106 Telephone **702.474.6255** Facsimile 702.474.6257

www.westernreportingservices.com

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                          DISTRICT COURT
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                       CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
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     DERRICK POOLE,
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                   Plaintiff,
                                     )Case No. A-16-737120-C
 6
     vs.
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     NEVADA AUTO DEALERSHIP
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     INVESTMENTS LLC, a Nevada
     Limited Liability Company d/b/a)
     SAHARA CHRYSLER; JEEP, DODGE,
     WELLS FARGO DEALER SERVICES
10
     INC., COREPOINTE INSURANCE
     COMPANY; and DOES 1 through
     100, Inclusive,
11
12
                  Defendant.
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16
                   DEPOSITION OF DERRICK POOLE
17
                Taken on Monday, August 14, 2017
18
                           At 9:34 a.m.
                   At 630 South Fourth Street
19
20
                         Las Vegas, Nevada
21
22
23
24
     Reported by: Marnita J. Goddard, RPR, CCR No. 344
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- took a test drive. Do you recall what happened next?
- 2 A. During the test drive or after the test
- 3 drive?
- Q. Let's go with you during the test drive.
- 5 A. He basically talked up the vehicle.
- 6 Q. Okay. Anything in particular?
- 7 A. Talked about the CPO, about the safety
- 8 inspection that's done on it.
- 9 Q. Were you happy with the way the vehicle
- 10 drove?
- 11 A. Yeah.
- MR. WEST: Yes?
- 13 THE WITNESS: Yes. Sorry.
- Q. (BY MS. SMITH) Did you notice any issues?
- 15 A. Not that I knew of, no.
- Q. Then after the test drive was over?
- A. During the test drive, he had mentioned that
- 18 it was in a minor accident.
- 19 Q. Okay. Anything else about that conversation
- 20 that you can recall?
- 21 A. I asked him about it, but he said it was a
- 22 minor accident, that it was a CPO vehicle, and there
- 23 was nothing to worry about.
- Q. That was the only discussion that you had
- 25 about that?

- 1 took it to 215 Dodge for the oil change. Then they
- 2 did a -- what do you call it? -- alignment. Because I
- 3 got a really good coupon in the mail.
- Q. Now, you just referenced some kind of issue
- 5 discovered by you. Can you describe to me what you're
- 6 talking about?
- 7 A. The accident before, the extent of the
- 8 damage of the accident, I was told there was frame
- 9 damage.
- Q. Who told you that?
- 11 A. State Farm when I tried to refinance my
- 12 vehicle through State Farm.
- Q. So at what point in time did you try and
- 14 refinance your vehicle?
- 15 A. It was last year. I don't remember. I
- would say it was in May. I don't remember exactly
- when.
- Q. So approximately May of 2016?
- 19 A. Yes. I believe so. May have been April.
- Q. Can you describe to me the process that you
- 21 went through to try and refinance your vehicle?
- MR. WEST: Let me lodge an objection as to
- 23 time. Which finance, refinance?
- Q. (BY MS. SMITH) Had you previously tried to
- refinance your vehicle before April or May of 2016?

Poole v. Nevada Auto Dealership Investments LLC, et al.

- 1 Q. Do you still have that phone?
- 2 Α. I do. It's not with me, but I do.
- 3 Do you think you would be able to get copies Q.
- 4 of those text messages to your attorney?
- 5 MR. WEST: If he's got them, we'll produce
- 6 them.
- 7 THE WITNESS: If I have them.
- 8 Q. (BY MS. SMITH) All right. Hadn't seen
- 9 them.
- 10 Do you know what kind of phone it's on?
- 11 Α. IPhone.
- 12 Q. Just wondering, because they do have the
- 13 magical cloud.
- 14 Everything has the cloud.
- 15 Ο. So after you exchanged -- I don't know. How
- 16 many text messages with the salesperson?
- 17 I couldn't tell you. I don't know off the
- 18 top of my head. It was numerous ones over a couple
- 19 weeks.
- 20 At some point, did you stop communicating
- 21 with him?
- 22 Α. I believe he quit responding after I did the
- 23 AutoCheck report.
- 24 Did you send a copy of the AutoCheck report Q.
- 25 that you ran to anyone at the dealership?

Poole v. Nevada Auto Dealership Investments LLC, et al.

- preowned vehicle or anything to that extent?
- 2 A. No.
- Q. Did you yourself ever take it in to any
- 4 other dealership --
- 5 A. No.
- 6 Q. -- to do a buyback?
- 7 A. No, ma'am.
- Q. Have you, I'll say since the time you
- 9 purchased the vehicle, ever tried to sell it on your
- own to any third parties?
- 11 A. No, ma'am.
- 12 Q. Any particular reason?
- 13 A. I didn't have a reason to sell it subsequent
- to finding out about the accident of 2014.
- Q. Okay. And then -- I'm sorry, can you
- 16 clarify that?
- 17 A. I didn't try to trade it in or sell it to
- 18 anybody before I found out about the accident and I
- 19 haven't tried to since either. So I never have. I'm
- just making it clear that I didn't try to do it
- 21 beforehand or after.
- Q. Understand. Thank you.
- A. You are welcome.
- Q. Have you ever missed any of your payments on
- 25 the vehicle?

- 1 Q. Okay. You think that you ran the Carfax
- 2 around the same time as the AutoCheck.com?
- 3 A. Yes.
- Q. Do you know if you gave that to your
- 5 attorney?
- A. I don't recall. I don't know if I ever
- 7 printed it out, to be honest with you.
- Q. Does that get delivered by email?
- 9 A. I think it delivers, like, instantaneously
- on the screen. But I haven't done a lot of them; so I
- 11 don't know. It's been a few years.
- 12 Q. Have you ran Carfaxes previously for other
- vehicles?
- 14 A. Not that I recall.
- Q. What about AutoCheck.com reports?
- 16 A. I had never heard of it before State Farm
- 17 had recommended it.
- Q. So I think you testified that was something
- 19 you had to pay for?
- 20 A. Yes, it is.
- Q. Can you tell me a little bit about that
- 22 site?
- A. I honestly don't remember a lot about the
- 24 site. I guess you put in your information about the
- vehicle and it tells you about the history.

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I, Marnita J. Goddard, CCR No. 344, a Certified Court Reporter licensed by the State of Nevada, do hereby certify:

That I reported the deposition of the witness, DERRICK POOLE, commencing on Monday, August 14, 2017, at the hour of 9:34 a.m.;

That prior to being examined, the witness was by me first duly sworn to testify to the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; that I thereafter transcribed my related shorthand notes into typewriting and that the typewritten transcript of said deposition is a complete, true, and accurate record of testimony provided by the witness at said time.

I further certify (1) that I am not a relative or employee of an attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel involved in said action, nor a person financially interested in the action, and (2) that pursuant to NRCP 30(e), transcript review by the witness was requested.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand in my office in the County of Clark, State of Nevada, this Alachday of May 100.

Marnita J. Goddard, RPR, CCR No. 344

Exhibit "B"



John T. Moran, Jr Lew Brandon, Jr. Jeffery A. Bendavid J.T. Moran III Jus'tin W. Smerber

ADAMS, DAVIS
MATTHEW B. SIBERT
KRIS D. KLINGENSMITH
MATTHEW D. WHITTAKER
STEPHANIE J.SMITH

Page July 01, 20

Account No: Statement No:

12386-00£ 1803:

ATTN: Toni Naidoo toni@saharalasvegas.net

00/04/0046	140	Describes and restrict of the d. Consolaint in Describe Describe (4.0)	Rate	Hours	455.
06/01/2016	JAB	Receive and review of filed Complaint by Derrick Poole (1.0).	450.00	1.00	450.(
06/02/2016	JAB	Receive and review of deal jacket from client as to Derrick Poole transaction (1.2).	450.00	1.20	540.0
06/08/2016	JAB	Receive and review of correspondence from Surety Company (.2).	450.00	0.20	90.0
06/10/2016	JAB JAB	Review of issues raised by George West (.5). Telephone call with George West (.3).	450.00 450.00	0.50 0.30	225.¢ 135.¢
06/14/2016	JAB	Receive and review of correspondence and tender letter for surety Bond Holder (.2).	450.00	0.20	90.0
06/16/2016	JAB	Receive and review of demand for tender to surety bond (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.0
06/17/2016	JAB JAB	Exchange email communication with George West (.3).	450.00 450.00	0.30 0.40	135.0 180.0
06/20/2016	JAB	Receive and review of proposed Stipulation and Order for Arbitration and receive of numerous issues raised by George			
		West (.8).	450.00	0.80	360.0
06/21/2016	JAB	Telephone call with Brian Terry (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.0
	JAB JAB	Telephone call with George West (.4).	450.00 450.00	0.80 0.40	360.0 180.0
00/00/0040					
06/22/2016	JAB	Exchange email communication with Brian Terry and preparation of package of documents to Brian Terry (.6).	450.00	0.60	270.0
	JAB	(.8).	450.00	0.80	360.0
06/27/2016	JAB	Receive and review of information for Bond Company (.2).	450.00	0.20	90.0
06/28/2016	JAB	Receive and review of update request from .1).	450.00	0.10 8.40	45.0 3,780.0

Page

July 01, 20 20-12386 July 01, 20

Account No: Statement No:

No: 12386-00! No: 1803

Sahara Chrysler Jeep Dodge adv. Derrick Poole

Total amount of this bill

3,780.

Please Remit Balance Due

\$3,780.



JOHN T. MORAN, JR LEW BRANDON, JR. JEFFERY A. BENDAVID J.T. MORAN III JUSTIN W. SMERBER

ADAM S. DAVIS MATTHEW B. SIBERT KRIS D. KLINGENSMITH MATTHEW D. WHITTAKER STEPHANIE J. SMITH

> Page August 02, 20

12386-008 Account No:

Statement No:

ATTN: Toni Naidoo toni@saharalasvegas.net

07/05/2016	JAB JAB JAB	Exchange numerous emails with George West (.4). (.2).	<u>Rate</u> 450.00 450.00	Hours 0.40 0.20 0.50	180.(90.(225.(
07/07/2016	JAB JAB	Exchange email communications with counsel (.2). (.4).	450.00 450.00	0.20 0.40	90.(180.(
07/08/2016	JAB	Exchange email communication with counsel (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.(
07/11/2016	JAB JAB	Exchange email communication with George West and Brian Terry (.3). Receive and review of correspondence from counsel to Wells Fargo (.1).	450.00 450.00	0.10	135.(45.(
07/12/2016	JAB JAB	Exchange email communication with Daniel Payne and receive of update request from George West (.3).	450.00 450.00	0.30	135.C
07/17/2016	JAB	Exchange email communications with Daniel Payne and George West (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.0
07/19/2016	JAB	Receive and review of updates to inspections (.2).	450.00	0.20	90.0
07/23/2016	JAB	Exchange email communications with counsel (.2).	450.00	0.20	90.0
07/26/2016	JAB JAB JAB JAB	Exchange numerous emails with parties (.3). Telephone call with Norton Kaunte and Wells Fargo (.3). Exchange additional email communication with counsel (.2). Receive and review of numerous email communications between George West and Brian Terry (.3).	450.00 450.00 450.00	0.30 0.30 0.20 <u>0.30</u> 4.80	135.C 135.C 90.C 135.C 2,160.C

Page August 02, 20 b: 12386-00t

Account No: Statement No:

Sahara Chrysler Jeep Dodge adv. Derrick Poole

Total amount of this bill

2,160.

Previous Balance

\$3,780.

Please Remit Balance Due

\$5,940.0



JOHN T. MORAN, JR LEW BRANDON, JR. JEFFERY A. BENDAVID J.T. MORAN III JUSTIN W. SMERBER

ADAM S. DAVIS
MATTHEW B. SIBERT
KRIS D. KLINGENSMITH
MATTHEW D. WHITTAKER
STEPHANIE J. SMITH

September 01, 20

Account No: Statement No: 12386-005

00/04/0040	145		Rate	Hours	
08/01/2016	JAB	Receive and review of numerous email communications between George West and Brian Terry (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.0
	JAB JAB	Review of Stipulation and proposed issues of inspection of vehicle (.5). Review of draft and signed Stipulation of all parties and review of	450.00	0.50	225.0
	0, 10	additional communications between parties (.4).	450.00	0.40	180.0
08/03/2016	JAB	(.2).	450.00	0.20	90.0
08/25/2016	JAB JAB	Exchange email communications with Brian Terry regading status (.3). Receive and review of numerous email communications	450.00	0.30	135.C
	3/LD	between the parties (.4).	450.00	0.40	180.0
08/26/2016	JAB	Telephone call with Brian Terry (.2).	450.00	0.20	90.C 1,035.C
		Total amount of this bill			1,035.C
		Previous Balance			\$5,940.C
		Please Remit Balance Due			\$6,975.0



ATTN: Toni Naidoo

toni@saharalasvegas.net

JOHN T. MORAN, JR. LEW BRANDON, JR. JEFFERY A. BENDAVID J.T. MORAN III JUSTIN W. SMERBER

ADAM S. DAVIS MATTHEW B. SIBERT KRIS D. KLINGENSMITH MATTHEW D. WHITTAKER STEPHANIE J. SMITH

October 05, 20°

Account No:

12386-005

Statement No:

			Rate	Hours	
08/31/2016	JAB	Receive and review of Answer to Complaint filed by Wells Fargo (.4).	450.00	0.40	180.0
	JAB _.	Receive and review of Answer filed by Nevada Auto Dealerships Investments (.6).	450.00	0.60	270.0
09/06/2016	JAB	Exchange email communications with counsel (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.0
	JAB	Receive and review of Notice of Entry Case Conference (.2).	450.00	0.20	90.0
09/07/2016	JAB *	Review of numerous email communication with counsel (.2).	450.00	0.20	90.0
	JAB JAB	Exchange email communication with all counsel (.3). Receive and review of revised Notice of Early Case Conference	450.00	0.30	135.C
	UAD	(.3).	450.00	0.30	135.C
				2.30	1,035.0
		Total amount of this bill			1,035.0
		Previous Balance			\$6,975.C
		Payments			
09/14/2016		Payment ck#120472			-5,940.0
		Please Remit Balance Due			\$2,070.0



JOHN T. MORAN, JR LEW BRANDON, JR. JEFFERY A. BENDAVID J.T. MORAN JIL JUSTIN W. SMERBER

Adam S. Davis Matthew B. Sibert Kris D. Klingensmith Matthew D. Whittaker Stephanie J. Smith

> Page: November 03, 20'

Account No: Statement No:

12386-005 1819²

ATTN: Toni Naidoo toni@saharalasvegas.net

09/29/2016	JAB	Receive and review of demand from Wells Fargo (.3).	<u>Rate</u> 450.00	<u>Hours</u> 0.30	135.0
09/30/2016	JAB	(1.4).	450.00	1.40	630.C
10/03/2016	JAB JAB	Receive and review of Wells Fargo Initial Disclosures Pursuant to NRCP 16.1 (1.5). Review of issue raised by Wells Fargo and related matters (.8).	450.00 450.00		675.C 360.C
10/07/2016	JAB	- (8).	450.00	0.80	360.C
10/14/2016	JAB	Receive and review of Initial Discovery Requests Including Requests for Production of Documents; Requests for Admissions; and Requests for Interrogatories (1.5).	450.00	1.50 6	675.C
10/15/2016	JAB JAB	Receive and review of service of Plaintiff's First Set of Written Discovery; Written Interrogatories; and Written Requests for Production of Documents (1.6). Receive and review of Notice of 30 (b)(6) Notice (.8).	450.00 450.00		720.C 360.C
10/17/2016	JAB JAB	Receive and review of Notice of 30 (b)(o) Notice (.5). Receive and review of Joint Case Conference Report (.3). Continue with review of proposed written Discovery from Plaintiff including Interrogatories; Request for Production of Documents;	450.00		135.0
		and Request for Admissions (1.6).	450.00	1.60 7	720.0
10/18/2016	JAB	Review of 30(b)(6) deposition notice (.8).	450.00		360.0 130.0
		Total amount of this bill		5,1	130.0
		Previous Balance		v. \$2,0	070.0
		Please Remit Balance Due		\$7,2	200.0



JOHN T. MORAN, JR LEW BRANDON, JR. JEFFERY A. BENDAVIO J.T. MORAN IJI JUSTIN W. SMERBER

ADAM S. DAVIS MATTHEW B. SIBERT KRIS D. KLINGENSMITH MATTHEW D. WHITTAKER STEPHANIE J. SMITH

> Page: December 02, 20'

Account No: Statement No:

12386-005 1822€

ATTN: Toni Naidoo toni@saharalasvegas.net

11/02/2016	JAB	Review of [1.2].	<u>Rate</u> 450.00	<u>Hours</u> 1.20 540.(
11/04/2016	JAB JAB	Review of (.4). Review of (.4).	450.00 450.00	0.40 180.¢
11/07/2016	JAB JAB JAB	Receive and review of written discovery by Plaintiff (.8). Receive and review of Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant's Requests for Admissions (.8). Receive and review of Plaintiff's First Request for Production of Documents to Wells Fargo (.8).	450.00 450.00 450.00	0.80 360.C 0.80 360.C 0.80 360.C
11/10/2016	JAB JAB JAB	Receive and review of Plaintiff's First Supplement to NRCP 16.1 disclosures (.4). Receive and review of Plaintiff's Second set of Interrogatories to Defendant Sahara Chrysler Jeep Dodge (.3). Receive and review of Plaintiff's Second Request for Production of Documents (.2).	450.00 450.00 450.00	0.40 180.C 0.30 135.C 0.20 90.C
11/11/2016	JAB JAB	Receive and review of Plaintiff's Third Request for Production of Documents (.4) Receive and review of Plaintiff's Response to Requests for Production of Documents (.6).	450.00 450.00	0.40 180.C 0.60 270.C
11/14/2016	JAB JAB	Receive and review of First Amended 30(b)(6) Notice and Notice of Taking Deposition (.3). Receive and review of Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories (.8).	450.00 450.00	0.30 135.C 0.80 360.C
11/16/2016	JAB JAB	Receive and review of Defendant's Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Requests for Production of Documents (1.0). Review of 30(b)(6) Notice on topics for depositions (.5).	450.00 450.00	1.00 450.C 0.50 225.C

December 02, 20
Account No: 12386-008
Statement No: 1822

			Rate	Hours	
11/17/2016	JAB	Receive and review of Defendant's Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories (.4).	450.00	0.40	180.0
	JAB ⁻	Receive and review of First Amended Notice of Taking Deposition and Second Notice of Taking 30(b)(6) deposition (.2).	450.00	0.20	90.0
11/23/2016	JAB	Receive and review of Defendant's Second Supplemental Disclosure of documents pursuant to NRCP 16.1 (1.0).	450.00	1.00	450.0
	+			10.50	4,725.0
		Total amount of this bill			4,725.0
		Previous Balance			\$7,200.0
		Please Remit Balance Due			\$11,925.0



JOHN T. MORAN, JR LEW BRANDON, JR. JEFFERY A. BENDAVID J.T. MORAN III JUSTIN W. SMERBER

ADAM S. DAVIS
MATTHEW B. SIBERT
KRIS D. KLINGENSMITH
MATTHEW D. WHITTAKER
STEPHANIE J. SMITH

January 04, 20

Account No: Statement No: 12386-005

12/06/2016	JAB	Receive and review of Scheduling Order (.2).	Rate 450.00	Hours 0.20	90.0
12/09/2016	JAB	Receive and review of Wells Fargo's Response to Plaintiff's First Requests for Production of Documents (.6).	450.00	0.60	270.(
	JAB	Receive and review of Third Supplemental Disclosures Pursuant to NRCP 16.1 (.8).		0.80	360.0
		10 141(0) 10.1 (.3).	430.00	0.00	300.0
12/12/2016	JAB .	Receive and review of Plaintiff's Second Supplemental Disclosures of Documents (1.0).	450.00	1.00	450.0
12/14/2016	JAB	Receive and review of Subpoena Duces Tecum for Production		1 1 10	
12/14/2010	JAB	of Records (.6).	450.00	0.60	270.0
				3.20	1,440.0
		Total amount of this bill			1,440.0
		Previous Balance			\$11,925.C
		<u>Payments</u>			
12/30/2016		Payment ck#122157			-11,925.C
	-	Please Remit Balance Due			\$1,440.C



JOHN T. MORAN, JR LEW BRANDON, JR. JEFFERY A. BENDAVID J.T. MORAN III JUSTIN W. SMERBER

ADAM S. DAVIS
MATTHEW B. SIBERT
KRIS D. KLINGENSMITH
MATTHEW D. WHITTAKER
STEPHANIE J. SMITH

February 01, 201

Account No: Statement No:

12386-005

			Rate	Hours	
12/29/2016	JAB	Receive and review of Defendant's Fourth Supplemental Disclosures (.4).	450.00	0.40	180.0
01/05/2017	JAB	Receive and review of Defendant's Second set of Requests for Production of Documents (.4). Receive and review of Defendant's Second Set of Interrogatories	450.00	0.40	180.0
		(.6).	450.00	0.60	270.0
01/17/2017	JAB .	Receive and review of Plaintiff's Fourth Supplemental Disclosure of Documents and Witnesses pursuant to 16.1 (1.2).	450.00	1.20	540.C
01/23/2017	JAB	Receive and review of Notice of Taking Depositions (.2).	450.00	0.20	90.0
01/26/2017	JAB	Receive and review of Order Setting Civil Jury Trial (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.C
				3.10	1,395.C
		Total amount of this bill			1,395.0
		Previous Balance			\$1,440.C
		Please Remit Balance Due			\$2,835.0



Sahara Chrysler Jeep Dodge adv. Derrick Poole

Previous Balance

<u>Payments</u>

02/17/2017

Payment ck#122769

Please Remit Balance Due

JOHN T. MORAN, JR LEW BRANDON, JR. JEFFERY A. BENDAVID J.T. MORAN III JUSTIN W. SMERBER

ADAM S. DAVIS
MATTHEW B. SIBERT
KRIS D. KLINGENSMITH
MATTHEW D. WHITTAKER
STEPHANIE J. SMITH

Page: March 03, 20

\$2,835.0

-1,440.0

\$1,395.0

Account No: 12386-005

Statement No: 18342



JOHN T. MORAN, JR LEW BRANDON, JR. JEFFERY A. BENDAVID J.T. MORAN III JUSTIN W. SMERBER

ADAM S. DAVIS MATTHEW B. SIBERT KRIS D. KLINGENSMITH MATTHEW D. WHITTAKER STEPHANIE J. SMITH

Page: April 04, 20

Account No: Statement No:

12386-005 18390

ATTN: Toni Naidoo toni@saharalasvegas.net

03/17/2017	JAB JAB	Receive and review of Notice of Vacating Deposition (.2). Receive and review of Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint adding additional Causes of Action and related matters (1.5).	<u>Rate</u> 450.00 450.00	Hours 0.20 90.0
03/21/2017	JAB	Ravioni .8).	450.00	0.80 360.0
03/29/2017	JAB	Receive and review of Non Opposition to Motion to Amend (.2).	450.00	0.20 90.0 2.70 1,215.0
		Total amount of this bill		1,215.0
		Previous Balance		\$1,395.0
		<u>Payments</u>		
03/09/2017		Payment ck#123057		-1,395.C
		Please Remit Balance Due		\$1,215.C



JOHN T. MORAN, JR Lew Brandon, Jr. Jeffery A. Bendavid J.T. Moran III Justin W. Smerber

Adam S. Davis Matthew B. Sibert Kris D. Klingensmith Matthew D. Whittaker Stephanie J. Smith

Page:

May 01, 20

Account No: Statement No:

12386-005 1844i

ATTN: Toni Naidoo toni@saharalasvegas.net

			<u>Rate</u>	<u>Hours</u>
04/03/2017	JAB	Receive and review of Non Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend (.2).	450.00	0.20 90.(
04/18/2017	JAB	Receive and review of Order GRanting Motion to Amend (.2).	450.00	0.20 90.0 0.40 180.0
		Total amount of this bill		180.(
		Previous Balance		\$1,215.(
		<u>Payments</u>		
04/17/2017		Payment ck#123638		-1,215.0
				2400
		Please Remit Balance Due		<u>\$180.(</u>



JOHN T. MORAN, JR LEW BRANDON, JR. JEFFERY A. BENDAVID J.T. MORAN III JUSTIN W. SMERBER

ADAM S. DAVIS
MATTHEW B. SIBERT
KRIS D. KLINGENSMITH
MATTHEW D. WHITTAKER
STEPHANIE J. SMITH

Page: June 05, 20

Account No: Statement No:

une 05, 20 12386-005 1848

ATTN: Toni Naidoo toni@saharalasvegas.net

		٠			
05/08/2017	JAB	Receive and review of Plaintiff's Supplemental Responses to	<u>Rate</u>	Hours	
		First Set of Interrogatories (.8).	450.00	0.80	360.(
05/18/2017	JAB	Receive and review of Plaintiff's Fifth Supplemental Disclosure (1.2).	450.00	1.20	540.(
05/23/2017	JAB	1).	450.00	0.10	45.(
	JAB	Review of issues raised by counsel (.6).	450.00	0.60	270.(
05/24/2017	JAB	Telephone call with Brian Terry (.2).	450.00	0.20	90.(
05/25/2017	JAB	Review -			
	JAB	(.6).	450.00	0.60	270.0
		(.8).	450.00	0.80	360.0
	JAB •	.4).	450.00	0.40	180.0
05/30/2017	SJS	Review stipulation	350.00	0.60	210.C
	JAB	Receive and review of documents from Brian Terry and request for status (.8)	450.00	0.80	360.C
	JAB	1.5).	450.00		375.C
05/31/2017	JAB JAB	Exchange email communication with counsel and client (.3). Receive and review of correspondence from Brian Terry with	450.00	0.30	135.C
	07 (2	Substitution of Attorney (.2).	450.00	0.20	90.C
				8.10 3,5	585.C
		Total amount of this bill		3,5	585.0
		Previous Balance		\$1	180.0
		<u>Payments</u>			
06/01/2017		Payment ck#124426		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	180.0

Page: June 05, 20 Account No: 12386-005

Sahara Chrysler Jeep Dodge adv. Derrick Poole

Please Remit Balance Due

\$3,585.0



JOHN T. MORAN, JR LEW BRANDON, JR. JEFFERY A. BENDAVID J.T. MORAN III JUSTIN W. SMERBER

ADAM S. DAVIS
MATTHEW B. SIBERT
KRIS D. KLINGENSMITH
MATTHEW D. WHITTAKER
STEPHANIE J. SMITH

Page:

Account No: 1238 Statement No:

June 29, 201 12386-005 18516

ATTN: Toni Naidoo toni@saharalasvegas.net

06/02/2017	JAB JAB	Receive and review of correspondence for counsel (.2), Review of correspondence for counsel (.2).	<u>Rate</u> 450.00 450.00	<u>Hours</u> 0.20 0.20	90.C 90.C
06/05/2017	JAB JAB JAB	Exchange email communication with Brian Terry (.3). [.3).	450.00 450.00 450.00	0.30 0.30 0.80	135.C 135.C 360.C
06/07/2017	SJS SJS	Attend telephone call with Wells Fargo counsel RE::	350.00 350.00	0.20 0.20	70.C 70.C
	JAB JAB	Receive and review of complete file for Brian Terry (1.0). Telephone call with to Nathan Kanute counsel for Wells Fargo	450.00 450.00	1.00 0.30	450.C 135.C
	JAB	(.3). Review of pending matters and review (1.2).	450.00	1.20	540.C
06/08/2017	JAB	Review of (.8).	450.00	0.80	360.C
06/09/2017	JAB	Review of issue of experts due. Experts report of related matter (1.0).	450.00	1.00	450.C
06/12/2017	JAB JAB	Receive and review of plaintiff's initial expert disclosure (1.5).	450.00	1.50	675.C
	5	(1.6).	450,00	1.60	720.0
06/13/2017	JAB	Telephone call with B. Terry RE:: Exchange emails with B. Terry RE:: Review docket for FAC and additional filings. Review FAC. Review of documents from previous counsel for conference call. Receive and review of photos for plaintiff's expert report and related matter (.8). Continue with review of plaintiff's expert report (1.0)	350.00 350.00 350.00 350.00 350.00 450.00	0.20 0.30 0.40 0.30 0.70 0.80 1.00	70.C 105.C 140.C 105.C 245.C 360.C 450.C
06/14/2017	JAB	Receive and review for complete set of photos for plaintiff's expert (.8).	450.00	0.80	360.0

Page: June 29, 201 12386-005 18516

Account No: Statement No:

			Rate	Hours	
	JAB JAB	[1.2]. Receive and review of correspondence for Well's Fargo counsel	450.00	1.20	540.0
		(.2).	450.00	0.20	90.0
	JAB	Receive and review of Wells Fargo's joinder to expert report (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.0
06/15/2017	SJS	Review of Plaintiff's expert disclosure and report.	350.00	0.60	210.0
06/19/2017	SJS		350.00	0.30	105.0
	SIS		350.00	0.20	70.0
06/23/2017	JAB	Review of deal for Wells Fargo (.6).	450.00	0.60	270.0
	JAB	(1.2).	450.00	1.20	540.C
06/26/2017	JAB .				
		(.2).	450.00	0.20	90.0
06/27/2017	SJS		350.00	0.10	35.C
				19.00	8,200.C
		Expenses			
06/14/2017		Photocopy charges			1.3
		Total Expenses			1.3
		Total amount of this bill			8,201.3
		Previous Balance		The state of the s	\$3,585.0
		Please Remit Balance Due			\$11,786.3



JOHN T. MORAN, JR LEW BRANDON, JR. JEFFERY A. BENDAVID J.T. MORAN III JUSTIN W. SMERBER

ADAM S. DAVIS MATTHEW B. SIBERT KRIS D. KLINGENSMITH MATTHEW D. WHITTAKER STEPHANIE J. SMITH

Page:

August 01, 20'

Account No:

12386-005

Statement No:

ATTN: Toni Naidoo toni@saharalasvegas.net

			Rate	Hours	
07/03/2017	JAB	Receive and review of notices of taking deposition (.4).	450.00	0.40	180.0
07/05/2017	SJS	Telephone call with expert office RE:: rebuttal deadline.	350.00	0.20	70,0
	JAB	Exchange email communication with George West (.2).	450.00	0.20	90.0
07/07/2017	SJS JAB	Supplemental review of plaintiffs' expert report. Receive and review of Plaintiff's second set of interrogatories	350.00	0.90	315.C
	JAB	(1.4). Receive and review of Plaintiff's fourth request for production of	450.00	1.40	630.C
	JAB	drafts (.4). Receive and review of Plaintiff's first set of request for	450.00	0.40	180.C
	07.15	admissions (1.0).	450.00	1.00	450.C
07/10/2017	SJS		350.00	0.20	70,C
07/11/2017	SJS		350.00	0.10	35.0
07/12/2017	SJS	Review	350.00	1.10	385.0
	SJS		350.00	0.30	105.0
	SJS	Review of documents to send to expert	350.00	1.10	385.0
	SJS	Draft correspondence to client RE::	350.00	0.20	70.0
	SJS	Review discovery responses and objections.	350.00	0.90	315.0
	SJS	Review deposition notices.	350.00	0.20	70.0
	SJS		350.00	0.30	105.0
	SJS		350.00	0.90	315.0
	JAB	Receive and review of	450.00	1.20	540.0
	JAB	Exchange email communication with George West (.2).	450.00	0.20	90.0
07/13/2017	SJS .	Telephone call with B. Terry office RE::	350.00	0.30	105.0
	212	relephone call with B. Terry office RE	350.00	0.30	105.0
	SJS	Pavious Parann Most Knowledgeehle deposition transacint	350.00	1.10	385.0
	SJS	Review Person Most Knowledgeable deposition transcript.		1.10	305.0
			350.00	0.20	70.0
	JAB	Draft letter to client (.2).	450.00	0.20	90.0

Account No: Statement No:

	JAB	Begin drafting of Answer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint	Rate	Hours.	
		(1.6).	450.00	1.60	720.0
	JAB	Begin researching of	450.00	4.40	600 (
	JAB	(1.4).	450.00	1.40	630.(135.(
	JAB	Exchange email communications with George West (.3). Review of documents needed for expert review (1.4).	450.00 450.00	0.30 1.40	630.(
	JAB	Review of additional expert issues for Rebuttal Expert Disclosure	450.00	1.40	030.0
		(.8).	450.00	0.80	360.0
07/14/2017	SJS		350.00	0.90	315.0
	SJS -		350.00	0.30	105.0
	SJS				
	SJS		350.00	0.40	140.0
	212		350.00	0.20	70.0
	SJS	Supplemental deposition testimony review.	350.00	0.40	140.0
	SJS	Review finalized pleading for service.	350.00	0.20	70.0
	SJS	Neview infanzed pleading for service.	350.00	0.60	210.0
	JAB	(1.0).	450.00	1.00	450.0
	JAB	Receive and review of Amended Notices of Taking Depositions	400.00	1.00	400.0
		and email communication with George West (.4).	450.00	0.40	180.0
07/17/2017	SJS	Review of responses provided by Poole to previous discovery.	350.00	1.40	490.0
	JAB	Receive and review of correspondence from insurance company			
		(.1).	450.00	0.10	45.0
	JAB	(.8).	450.00	0.80	360.0
07/18/2017	JAB	Review edit of Answer to First Amended Complaint and			
		Affirmative Defenses (1.6).	450.00	1.60	720.0
07/19/2017	SJS		350.00	1.80	630.0
	SJS	Review of production and deposition testimony to prepare			- 4
	0.10	responses.	350.00	1.70	595.0
	SJS	Draft deposition notices for plaintiff and plaintiff expert depositions.	350.00	0.50	175.C
	SJS	Exchange emails with T. Naidoo RE:	350.00	0.20	70.0
	SJS	Draft correspondence to D. Poole RE:: status.	350.00	0.30	105.0
	SJS	Brain derreespondence to B. 1 dole N.E., diated.	350.00	0.30	105.C
	SJS	的对应性是对于特别的对应性的证明的			0.15.6
			350.00	0.90	315.0
	JAB	Review of Notices of Taking Depositions (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.0
	JAB	Exchange email communication with George West (.2).	450.00	0.20	90.0
07/20/2017	SJS	Draft email to G. West RE:: discovery.	350.00	0.10	35.0
0112012011	SJS	Review email exchange with G. West.	350.00	0.50	175.C
	SJS	Review notices regarding document service from plaintiffs.	350.00	0.40	140.C
	SJS	Review supplemental document production and responses from			
	500	plaintiffs.	350.00	1.40	490.C
	SJS	Supplemental drafting of	350.00	1.40	490.C
	000	Supplemental distance of			

1856

Statement No:

	JAB	Review of issues raised by George West (.4).	<u>Rate</u> 450.00	<u>Hours</u> 0.40	180.0
07/21/2017	SJS JAB JAB JAB	Review emails from G. West. Exchange numerous emails with George West (.3). Review of noticed deposition dates (.3). Review of issues with current depos needed (.5).	350.00 450.00 450.00 450.00	0.30 0.30 0.30 0.50	105.(135.(135.(225.(
07/24/2017	JAB JAB	Review, edit and revise (1.0). Review of issues with remaining discovery responses needed (.8).	450.00 450.00	1,00	450.(360.(
07/25/2017	SIS		350.00 350.00	2.10 1.40	735,(490,(
07/26/2017	JAB JAB	(1.4). (.5).	450.00 450.00	1.40 0.50 46.10	630.(225.(18,145.(
		Total amount of this bill Previous Balance		en e	18,145.(\$11,786.:
		Please Remit Balance Due			\$29,931.3



ATTN: Toni Naidoo

toni@saharalasvegas.net

JOHN T. MORAN, JR LEW BRANDON, JR. JEFFERY A. BENDAVID J.T. MORAN III JUSTIN W. SMERBER

ADAM S. DAVIS
MATTHEW B. SIBERT
KRIS D. KLINGENSMITH
MATTHEW D. WHITTAKER
STEPHANIE J. SMITH

Page:

September 06, 20

Account No:

12386-005

Statement No: 18621

			Rate	Hours	
07/27/2017	SJS		350.00	0.20	70.0
	SJS	Draft responses to request for production.	350.00	0.80	280.0
	SJS	Supplemental review of plaintiff's discovery responses.	350.00	1.80	630.0
07/28/2017	SJS	Review previous responses and objections to requests for			
	-	production.	350.00	1.20	420.0
	SJS	Research and analysis of	350.00	1.40	490.0
07/31/2017	JC	Research and review	4== 00		
	0.10		175.00	1.90	332.5
	SJS	Research and review additional	350.00	1.80	630.0
08/01/2017	SJS	(1997) · 100 · 10	350.00	1.60	560.0
	SJS		350.00	0.80	280.0
	JAB	Review of all finalize discovery responses to requests for	350.00	0.00	200.0
	OVD.	admissions; second set of interrogatories; and request for			- 402/4
		production of duties (1.2).	450.00	1.20	540.0
		production of daties (1.2).	400.00	1.20	0-10.c
08/02/2017	SJS	Telephone call with T. Naidoo.	350.00	0.20	70.0
	SJS	Review email from T. Naidoo.	350.00	0.10	35.0
	SJS -	Review notices for discovery.	350.00	0.30	105.C
	SJS	Review verification.	350.00	0.10	35.0
	JAB	Exchange email communication with George West (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.0
08/03/2017	JAB	Receive and review of Well Fargo's emails for tender of defense			
		and Indemnity (.8).	450.00	0.80	360.C
08/04/2017	JAB	Exchange email communication with George West (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.C
	JAB	Continue email communication exchange with counsel (.2).	450.00	0.20	90.C
00/07/0047	0.10				
08/07/2017	SJS		350.00	0.70	245.C
	JAB	Attend 2.34 conference with George West on discovery dispute	330.00		2 10.0
		(1.1.).	450.00	1.10	495.0
		Note: 1, 100 € 100			#850 F70 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50

			Rate	Hours	
	SJS	Review emails from G. WEst RE:: electronic service and Request for Admissions.	350,00	0.20	70.0
	JAB	Review of discovery issues in dispute with review of transcript of			
		PMK deposition (.8).	450.00	0.80	360.0
08/08/2017	SJS	Review association of counsel.	350.00	0.10	35.0
	JAB SJS	Receive and review of notice of association (.2). Review notice of association of counsel and review counsel	450.00	0.20	90.0
		information.	- 350.00	0.20	70.0
08/09/2017	JAB	Review of discovery issues raised by George West (.8).	450.00	0.80	360.0
	JAB	Draft email communication to George West (.2).	450.00	0.20	90.0
	JAB SJS	(.8).	450.00	0.80	360.0
	,		350.00	0.60	210.0
	SJS		350.00	0.40	140.0
08/10/2017	SJS	Revise responses to requests for admission.	350.00	0.40	140.0
08/11/2017	JAB ·	Exchange email communication with George West (.2). Review of numerous issues with upcoming deposition of Poole	450.00	0.20	90.0
	07 10	(.8).	450.00	0.80	360.0
	JAB	Telephone call with George West (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.C
	JAB	Review of numerous email communication between the parties			
		(.3).	450.00	0.30	135.C
	SJS	Review documents in preparation for D. Poole deposition.	350.00	1.90	665.C
	SJS	Review deposition questions for D. Poole.	350.00	0.70	245.C
			350.00	1.60	560.C
	JAB	Review of testimony from parties (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.C
08/13/2017	SJS	Review Plaintiff's sixth supplement and sixth supplement			
		corrected filings and notices.	350.00	0.40	140.C
	SJS	Supplement Poole deposition outline.	350.00	0.80	280.0
	SJS	Review notice of deposition served by Poole.	350.00	0.20	70.C
08/14/2017	SJS		350.00	0.20	70.0
	SJS	Supplemental preparation for deposition of D. Poole.	350.00	0.40	140.0
			350.00	0.30	105.0
	JAB _	Receive and review of notice of taking deposition (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.0
	JAB JAB	Review of numerous issues with deposition of plaintiff (.8). Finalize notices of taking depositions and subpoena to	450.00	0.80	360.0
		initial-party (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.0
	SJS	Take deposition of D. Poole. Review supplemental 16.1 by plaintiff, and corrected	350.00	3.20	1,120.0
	-	supplemental 16.1	350.00	0.30	105.0
	SJS	Supplemental 10.1.	350.00	0.20	70.0
	SJS	Draft subpoena and deposition notice to serve on D. Hinton.	350.00	0.40	140.0
	000	Dian supporta and deposition house to serve on D. Filliton.	000.00	5.10	. 10.0

	SJS		Rate	Hours	
	303		350.00	0.40	140.0
	JAB	Receive and review of plaintiff's sixth supplement (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.0
08/15/2017	SJS JAB	Draft meet and confer correspondence to G. West. Review, edit of revise of objective to plaintiff's deposition notice	- 350.00	0.40	140.0
	JVD	(.3).	450.00	0.30	135.(
	JAB	(.3).	450.00	0.20	90.0
	JAB	.2).	450.00	0.20	90.0
	JAB	Exchange email communication with George West (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.0
	SJS	Exolicing children with occing vest (.c).	350.00	0.30	105.0
	SJS		350.00	0.20	70.0
	SJS				
			350.00	0.50	175.0
08/16/2017	SJS	Exchange emails	350.00	0.20	70.0
	SJS	Review emails regarding 2.34 and discovery dispute.	350.00	0.30	105.0
	SJS	Telephone call	350.00	0.20	70.0
	SJS	Email to	350.00	0.20	70.0
	SJS	Exchange email with N. Grant.	350.00	0.20	70.0
	JAB	Review, edit and revise of amended supplement responses to			
		request for admissions (.4).	450.00	0.40	180.0
	JAB	Exchange email communication with George West (.2).	450.00	0.20	90.0
	JAB	Exchange numerous email iwth George West (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.0
	SJS	Review email from G. West.	350.00	0.10	35.0
	SJS			in the	
			350.00	0.40	140.0
	JAB	Review, edit and finalize answer to amended compliant (.8).	450.00	0.80	360.0
08/17/2017	SJS	Draft response to N. Grant RE::	350.00	0.10	35.0
	JAB	Conference call with George West (.4).	450.00	0.40	180.0
	JAB	Exchange email communication with George West (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.0
	SJS	Amend request for admissions responses.	350.00	0.40	140.0
	SJS		350.00	0.30	105.C
	SJS		350.00	0.30	105.C
	SJS				
	0.10		350.00	0.30	_ 105.0
	SJS		350.00	1.80	630.C
	SJS		350.00	0.40	140.C
	JAB	Receive and review of Wells Fargo dealer services answers to	330.00	0.40	140.0
		first amended complaint (.5).	450.00	0.50	225.C
08/18/2017	SJS	Draft continued deposition notice.	350.00	0.30	105.C
	SJS		350.00	1.60	560.C
	SJS	Review service of amended responses to requests for			
	2-2000	admissions.	350.00	0.10	35.C
	SJS	Review emails from G. West RE:: status and continuance of		1 . W	
		depositions.	350.00	0.20	70.C
				(Partie Salah	17 7

	JAB	Receive and review of information of issues raised by George	Rate	Hours	
	OND	West (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.0
	JAB		100.00	0.00	100.0
		(.3).	450.00	0.30	135.0
	SJS	Review served amended responses to Requests for Admissions.	350.00	0.10	35.0
			* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *	1000	
08/21/2017	SJS	Serve continued deposition notice for expert deposition.	350.00	0.20	70.0
	SJS	Telephone call RE:: transcript of depo.	350.00	0.10	35.0
	SJS	Review previous disclosures and prepare 5th supplemental			
	010	disclosure of documents and witnesses.	350.00	1.50	525.0
	SJS	Supplemental research	050.00	4 00	155.6
	IAD	Bossive and review of small communication of Coarse Mark	350.00	1.30	455.C
	JAB	Receive and review of email communication of George West (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.C
	JAB	Review of issues related to possible settlement of all claims (.8).	450.00	0.80	360.0
	SJS	Review email from G. West RE:: Scheduling.	350.00	0.10	35.0
	000	Noviow ciricum form of west their deficulting.	000.00	0.10	
08/22/2017	SJS				
			350.00	2.10	735.C
	SJS		350.00	0.40	140.C
	SJS				
			350.00	1.60	560.C
	SJS	Telephone call	350.00	0.20	70.C
	SJS	Supplemental edit RE:: 5th supplemental disclosure.	350.00	0.40	140.C
	JAB	Review, edit and review of NRCP 16.1 First Supplement of			
	LAD	discloser of draft (1.0).	450.00	1.00	450.C
	JAB	Receive and review of second amended notice of talking	450.00	0.00	105.0
		deposition (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.0
08/23/2017	SJS	Review second amended notice of deposition from plaintiff.	350.00	0.20	70.0
00/23/2017	JAB	(.8).	450.00	0.80	360.0
	JAB	Exchange email communication with George West (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.0
	0, 12	Exolating of the continuation with coolige troot (.c).	.00.00		(A () ()
08/24/2017	SJS	Review D. Poole deposition.	350.00	0.40	140.0
	SJS	Exchange emails with court reporter RE:: transcript delivery.	350.00	0.30	105.0
	SJS	Review plaintiff's 7th supplement.	350.00	0.60	210.0
	JAB	Receive and review of plaintiff's seventh supplement to NRCP			
		16.1 disclosure (.7).	450.00	0.70	315.0
	JAB	Exchange email communication with counsel (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.0
20070	V 1725			A POOL SEA	
08/25/2017	JAB		450.00	0.00	000.0
	145	(.8).	450.00	0.80	360.0
	JAB	(.8).	450.00	0.80	360.0
	JAB	Conference call with George West regarding resolution (.4).	450.00	0.40	180.0
08/28/2017	JAB	Exchange email communication with George West (.2).	450.00	0.20	90.0
0012012011	JAB	Receive and review of information for counsel (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.0
	0, 10	1,000.10 and 101101 of illionidates for obtained from			
08/29/2017	JAB	Exchange numerous emails with counsel (.3).	450.00	0.30	- 135.0
son. Chr. 44 Wilson & ToTOTO To	5200A SÃ-72	TO THE PARTY OF THE CONTROL OF THE		Usas William	

Page: September 06, 20⁻ Account No: 12386-005 Statement No: 18620

	JAB JAB	Exchange email communication with counsel (.2).		Rate 450.00 450.00	Hours 0.20 0.30	90.(135.(
08/30/2017	JAB	(.8).	ent.	450.00	0.80	360.0
	JAB	Exchange email with George West regarding settlement (.20.	taik	450.00	0.20	90.0
	*		•		67.70	25,722.5
		Expenses	#1 F/F			
07/31/2017		Lexis/ Nexis				29.4
08/15/2017	-	Wreck Check Car Scan Centers Deposition of Expert - One Hour Initial Payment (mlf)	•			350.0
08/16/2017		Clark County Clerk 1366034 Answer to First Amended Complaint (mlf)				3.5
08/25/2017		Lawyers Process Service Invoice # 43701				125.0
		Total Expenses	•			507.8
		Total amount of this bill				26,230.4
		Previous Balance	. 110.			\$29,931.3
		Payments				
08/25/2017 09/01/2017		Payment ck#125988 Payment ck#126057				-11,786.3 -18,145.0
03/01/2017		Total Payments	•		3.11	-29,931.3
		Please Remit Balance Due				\$26,230.4



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JOHN T. MORAN, JR LEW BRANDON, JR. JEFFERY A. BENDAVID J.T. MORAN III JUSTIN W. SMERBER

ADAM S. DAVIS
MATTHEW B. SIBERT
KRIS D. KLINGENSMITH
MATTHEW D. WHITTAKER
STEPHANIE J. SMITH

Page:

October 03, 20

Account No: Statement No:

12386-005 1866

ATTN: Toni Naidoo toni@saharalasvegas.net

09/01/2017	SJS -	Review upcoming deadlines.	<u>Rate</u> 350.00	Hours 0.30	105.0
09/05/2017	SJS SJS JAB JAB JAB	Exchange emails with G. West RE:: deposition scheduling. (.40. Conference call with George West regarding settlement (.5). Exchange numerous email communication between the parties (.5).	350.00 350.00 450.00 450.00	0.40 0.20 0.40 0.50	140.(70.(180.(225.(
	JAB JAB	(.4). Review of numerous email exchange between the parties (.3).	450.00 450.00	0.40 0.30	180.(135.(
09/06/2017	SIS SIS SIS SIS	Exchange emails with G. West RE:: scheduling.	350.00 350.00 350.00 350.00 350.00	1.10 0.40 0.90 1.60 1.80	385.(140.(315.(560.(630.(
09/07/2017	SJS SJS SJS SJS	Exchange emails with G. West RE:: depositions. Review amended deposition notice. Draft motion for protective order.	350.00 350.00 350.00 350.00	0.40 0.20 0.20 2.30	140.0 70.0 70.0 805.0
	SJS JAB JAB	Review, edit and revise of motion for protective order on order shortening (1.0). Review of exhibits for motion for protective order (.6).	350.00 350.00 450.00 450.00	1.60 1.00 0.60	560.C 450.C 270.C
09/08/2017	SJS SJS	Review amended deposition notice.	350.00 350.00 350.00	0.20 0.20 0.20	70.C 70.C 70.C
09/11/2017	SIS		350.00 350.00	0.10 0.30	35.C 105.C

Account No: 12386-006 Statement No: 1866

		•		* .	1 11
			Rate	Hours	
	SJS	Telephone call with N. Kanute RE:; deposition scheduling.	350.00	0.20	70.1
	SJS	relephone can with the francis file, deposition defrequing.	350.00	1.00	350.0
	SJS	Review Motion for Protective order on Order shortening time,	330.00	1.00	330.1
	333		050.00	0.40	
	0.10	signed and hearing date for service and filing.	350.00	0.40	140.0
	SJS	Exchange emails with G. West RE:: deposition scheduling.	350,00	0.20	70.0
	JAB	Exchange email communication with counsel (.2).	450.00	0.20	90.0
	JAB	Receive and review of plaintiff motion to counsel responses to			
		interrogatories with requests for production of drafts (1.4).	450.00	1,40	630.(
09/12/2017	SJS	Draft stipulation RE:: hearing and deposition.	350.00	0.40	140.0
	SJS	Review motion to compel filed by Plaintiff.	350.00	0.80	280.(
	SJS	Review "opposition" filed by Plaintiff.	350.00	0.10	35.(
	SJS	Exchange emails with B. Phillips RE::	550.55	0,10	55.0
	000	Exonating emails with b. I fillips IVE	350.00	0.20	70.0
	0.10	Pavious and evolutions amaila with C. West D.F. stimulation			
	SJS	Review and exchange emails with G. West RE:: stipulation.	350.00	0.40	140.0
	JAB	Exchange numerous email communication counsel (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.0
	JAB	Receive and review of plaintiff's opposition to motion for		•	
		protective order (.2).	450.00	0.20	90.0
	JAB	Review of proposal stipulation to counsel (.2).	450.00	0.20	90.0
09/13/2017	SJS	Review documents for deposition preparation.	350.00	0.40	140,0
		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	· - · -		
09/14/2017	SJS	Exchange email with G. West RE:: scheduling of motions.	350.00	0.20	70.0
	SJS		350.00	1.10	385.C
	SJS	SANGA A SECURIO DE PERO CONTROL DE PEROCE DE LA SECURIO DE LA CONTROL DE	350.00	0.60	210.C
	SJS	STREAM CONTROL OF THE			
			350.00	0.10	35.C
	SJS	Draft correspondence to chambers RE:: motion scheduling.	350.00	0.30	105.C
09/15/2017	SJS		350.00	0.30	105.C
00/10/2011	SJS		000.00	00.0	100.0
	000	Bigger Band der Germanner in der der der der der Bereiten der	350.00	0.10	- 35.C
	SJS			and the second s	
			350.00	0.80	280.C
	SJS	Section of the Control of the Contro	350.00	0.30	105.C
	JAB	(.3).	450.00	0.30	135.0
		Andrew Maria and Maria and Anni Roman Andrew and a construction of the Andrew School and Maria and Andrew A			
09/17/2017	SJS		350.00	0.10	35.0
09/18/2017	SJS		350.00	0.10	35.0
	SJS	Exchange emails with G. West RE:: deposition confirmation.	350.00	0.40	140.0
	SJS		350.00	1.10	385.0
	SJS		350.00	1.40	490.0
	SJS				
			350.00	1.20	420.0
		Asserting and the second of the Company of the Comp	000.00	1120	=120.0
09/19/2017	SJS	Review scheduling order and dates for motions and litigation.	350.00	0.50	175.0
W V 11	SJS	Attend deposition of N. Grant.	350.00	1.30	455.0
	SJS .	Autoria appointer of the Order	350.00	0.90	315.0
	000		.000,00	0.00	<i>J</i> 10.0
				and the second of the second	Agricultural and the second second

	SJS		<u>Rate</u>	Hours	
			350.00	1.90	665.(
	SJS		350.00	0.70	245.(
09/20/2017	AD	(.8).	350.00	0.80	280.(
	AD	(1.9).	350.00	1.90	665.(
	SJS		350.00	0.80	280.0
	SJS	Attend deposition of T. Spruell.	350.00	2.20	770.0
	SJS	Research	350.00	1.10	385.0
	300	1/escaron	350.00	1.40	490.0
	SJS		350.00	0.90	315.(
09/21/2017	AD				
		<u> </u>	350.00	0.60	210.0
	AD	[(.6).	350,00	0.60	210.0
	AD		350.00	1.20	420.0
	0.10	10 de 20 de (1.2).	350.00	1.70	595.C
	SJS SJS		350.00	1.10	385.C
	SJS		350.00	0.60	210.C
	JAB	Review of second amended responses to request for	330.00	0.00	210.0
	٥٨٥	admissions (.6).	450.00	0.60	270.0
	SJS		050.00	4.00	500.6
	SJS		350.00	1.60	560.0
	000		350.00	1.80	630.0
	SJS	Drafting of motion for summary judgment.	350.00	0.80	280.0
		•	000,00		
09/22/2017	AD	Review notes from review of expert materials and draft	350.00	1.70	595.0
	0.10	questions for expert testimony (1.7). Draft email to G. West RE:: motion to compel.	350.00	0.10	35.C
	SJS	Review of summary email issue raised by George West (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.C
	JAB JAB	Receive and review of notice of change of status on plaintiff's	430.00	0.30	100.0
		motion to complete and summary motion for protective order			
		(.4).	450.00	0.40	180.0
	JAB	Discussion with George West (.3). Review of issues with exchange email communication with	450.00	0.30	135.0
	JAB	_	450.00	0.40	180.0
	SJS	counsel (.4). Attend and take deposition of Plaintiff's expert R. Avellini.	350.00	6.10	2,135.C
	SJS	Attenu and take deposition of Flaintin's expert 17. Aveiling	350.00	1.10	385.C
	SJS	Drafting for motion for summary judgment.	350.00	0.90	315.C
	SJS	Review notice and status filed by plaintiff's counsel.	350.00	0.20	70.0
	SJS	Exchange emails with G. West RE:: motions to compel.	350.00	0.30	105.0
	SJS	Vacate motion for protective order.	350.00	0.20	70.0
	SJS	Continued preparation for deposition.	350.00	1.70	595.C
	-000	Committee proportion to topoution			

			Rate	<u>Hours</u>	
09/24/2017	SJS		350.00	1.30	455.(
09/25/2017	SJS	Review eighth supplement from plaintiff naming new witnesses.	350.00	0.20	70.0
	SJS	Draft correspondence regarding impropriety of new witnesses.	350.00	0.60	210.0
	SJS	Draft opposition to motion to compel Request for Admissions.	350.00	2.10	735.0
	SJS	Supplemental review of responses to requests for admissions.	350.00	0.70	245.0
	SJS	Exchange emails with Court reporters RE:: transcripts.	350,00	0.40	140.0
	SJS	Continued drafting of motion for summary judgment.	350.00	1.70	595.(
	SJS	Supplemental drafting of arguments for motions for summary			
		judgment,	350.00	1.60	560.(
	SJS	Drafting of additional arguments for motion for summary			
		judgment.	350.00	1.30	455.(
	JAB	Review, edit and draft opposition to plaintiff's motion to compel			
		additional responses (1.0).	450.00	1.00	450.(
	JAB	Review of draft settlement offer for George West (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.(
	JAB	Review of objection needed (.6)	450.00	0.60	270.0
	JAB	Receive and review of plaintiff's eight supplement disclosure of		4	
		documents with witnesses (.8).	450.00	0.80	360.0
09/26/2017	SJS	Revise opposition to motion to compel Request for Admissions			
	0.10	responses.	350.00	0.40	140.0
	SJS		350.00	1.40	490.0
	SJS				
			350.00	2.30	805.0
	SJS	Continued drafting of motion for summary judgment.	350.00	1.60	560.0
	SJS	Review scheduling order RE:: motions in limine and pretrial			
		deadlines.	350.00	0.30	105.0
	SJS	Review 8th supplement from plaintiff.	350.00	0.30	105.0
	JAB	Review and edit of finalized opposition to motion compel (.8).	450.00	0.80	360.0
	JAB	[.4),	450.00	0.40	180.0
	JAB	Review of outline of motion for summary judgement (1.5).	450.00	1.50	675,(
	JC		175.00	1.80	315.0
	1C		175.00	1.70	297.5
	JC		175.00	1.80	315.0
	SJS		170.00	1.00	010.0
	000		350.00	1.60	560.0
	JAB	(.8).	450.00	0.80	360.0
	JAB		400.00	0.00	
	OAD	[1.4].	450.00	1.40	630.0
09/27/2017	SJS				
JUIZITZULI	000		350.00	1.10	385.C
	SJS	Review of expert deposition transcript for motion to strike.	350.00	1.70	595.C
	JAB	Discussion with George West (.4).	450.00	0.40	180.C
	JAB	Review of numerous issues raised by court (.4).	450.00	0.40	180.C
	JAB	Telephone call with law clerk Department 22 (.2).	450.00	0.20	90.0

October 03, 20' Account No: 12386-005

Statement No:

Sahara Chrysler Jeep Dodge adv. Derrick Poole

			Rate	Hours	
	JAB	Begin review of revisions to draft motion for summary judgment			200
	1905	(1.4).	450.00	1.40	630.0
	JC SJS	Review of Draft Motion for Summary Judαment.	175.00	1.10	192.
			350.00	1.90	665.0
	SJS	Commence research and review of sources and authority for motion to strike.	350.00	1.80	630.(
	SJS	Review of documents and transcript for motion to strike.	350.00	1.90	665.0
	JAB	Attend hearing in front of discovery commissioner (1.0).	450.00	1.00	450.0
	JAB	Continue with reviews and analysis of needed motion in Limine	.00.00	5 3 4 1 1 1 4	7 741
	0710	and motion to strike (1.2).	450.00	1.20	540.0
				115.70	41,425.0
		Expenses			
00/40/0047		Olasti Ossarti Olasti			
09/12/2017		Clark County Clerk			3.5
00/05/0047		1483272 Certificate of Service (mlf)			5.0
09/25/2017		Huebner Court Reporting, Inc. Inv# 2259			796.0
09/25/2017		Huebner Court Reporting, Inc.			
		Inv# 2258			414.2
09/25/2017		Wreck Check Car Scan Centers Inv# 3521 (mlf)			1,470.0
		Total Expenses			2,683.7
		Total Expenses			2,000.7
		Total amount of this bill			44,108.7
					000 000 4
		Previous Balance			\$26,230.4
		Division Div			670 220 4
		Please Remit Balance Due		444 84	\$70,339.1



JOHN T. MORAN, JR LEW BRANDON, JR. JEFFERY A. BENDAVID J.T. MORAN III JUSTIN W. SMERBER

ADAM S. DAVIS MATTHEW B. SIBERT KRIS D. KLINGENSMITH MATTHEW D. WHITTAKER STEPHANIE J. SMITH

Page:

November 09, 201

Account No: 12386-005

Statement No:

ATTN: Toni Naidoo toni@saharalasvegas.net

Sahara Chrysler Jeep Dodge adv. Derrick Poole

00/00/0047	0.10		Rate	Hours 1.00	500.6
09/28/2017	SJS SJS	Draft motion to continue trial.	350.00 350.00	1.60 1.60	560.(560.(
	SJS	Draft motion in limine RE:: references to Consumer attorneys	350.00	1.40	490.0
	SJS	against auto fraud. Supplemental drafting on motion to strike expert.	350.00	1.40	630.0
	SJS	Additional citations and deposition transcript review and drafting.	350.00	1.90	665.0
	JC		175.00	1.80	315.0
	JC				
			175.00	1.90	332.5
	JC		175.00 175.00	1.60 1.10	280.(192.£
	JC JAB	Review of potential motions in limine. Continue with draft of motion for survey judgement (1.0).	450.00	1.10	450.6
	JAB	Exchanged communication with counsel (.3).	450.00	0.30	430.C 135.C
	JAB	Receive and review of drafts discovery order for George West	400.00	0.50	100.0
	0/\0	(.3).	450.00	0.30	135.0
	JAB	Receive and review of exchanged of numerous email		•	
		communications with George West (.4).	450.00	0.40	180.0
	JAB	Review of numerous actions needed with related matter (.8).	450.00	0.80	360.0
	JAB	Review and outline of numerous motion in Limine and to exclude	450.00	4.50 *	משר נ
		certain testimony and evidence (1.5).	450.00	1.50	675.(
09/29/2017	SJS				
			350.00	1.60	560.0
	SJS	Review of motion to strike.	350.00	1.40	490.0
	SJS	Prepare exhibits and revise citations to motion to strike expert.	350.00	1.80	630.0
	JC JC	2	175.00	1.20	210.0
	30		175.00	1.90	332.5
	JC		475 AA	4.00	0455
			175.00	1.80	315.0
	JC JAB	Review, edit and revise of draft motion to exclude exhibit report	175.00	1.90	332.5
	07 10	with expert testimony (1.6).	450.00	1.60	720.0
	JAB	Review, edit with revise draft motion to continue trial order			
		shortening time (.8).	450.00	0.80	360.0
					100

			Rate	Hours	
	JAB	[5).	450.00	0.50	225.0
	JAB	(.3).	450.00	0.30	135.1
	JAB	Meet and conference with George West (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.1
	JAB	Attend meeting and conference with George West (.6).	450.00	0.60	270.1
	JAB	Continue with revision and finalize draft motion to exclude			
		expert witnesses testimony and report (1.4).	450.00	1.40	630.0
	SJS	Supplemental edits and exhibits for motion for summary			
		judgment.	350.00	<mark>1.30</mark>	455.0
	SJS		350.00	1.80	630.0
	JAB	Review of draft Mot <mark>i</mark> on to Str <mark>i</mark> ke all Reference to Auto Fraud and		**	
		G <mark>eorge West's Law Firm (</mark> 1.0).	450,00	1.00	450.0
10/01/2017	SJS	Draft stipulation regarding motions in limine.	350.00	0.60	240.1
10/01/2017	SJS	Draft motion in limine no. 1 to preclude previously undisclosed	350.00	0,00	210.0
	333	witnesses.	350.00	4 20	4207
	SJS			1.20	420.0
	SJS	Draft motion in limine RE:: preclude frame damage.	350.00	1.30	455.0
	212	Draft Motion in limine to preclude safety opinion.	350.00	1.30	455.(
10/02/2017	SJS		350.00	0.20	70.0
	SJS	Draft email to G. West RE:: stipulation and order.	350.00	0.20	70.0
	SJS	Edit motion in limine stipulation.	350.00	0.10	35.0
	SJS	Supplemental revisions to motion for summary judgment.	350.00	1.60	560.0
	SJS	Draft revisions to four motions in limine.	350.00	1.60	560.0
	SJS	Review exhibits to motions in limine and prepare for filing:	350.00	0.60	210.0
	SJS	Review and prepare exhibits to motion for summary judgment.	350.00	1.70	595.0
	SJS	Review and edit citations and facts references.	350.00	1.10	385.(
	SJS	Supplemental revision and review of motion for summary	000.00	1.10	300.0
	000	judgment exhibits and excerpts.	350.00	1.20	420.0
	SJS	Draft motion in limine to preclude general consumer perception.	350.00	0.80	280.0
	SJS	Review filing notice and hearing date for motion for summary	330.00	0,00	200.0
	000	judgment.	350.00	0.10	35.0
	JAB	Continue with revisions to draft motion for summary judgment	330.00	0.10	55.0
	NAD.	(1.5).	450.00	1.50	675.0
	JAB	Exchange numerous email communication with counsel (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.0
	JAB	Telephone call with George West (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.0
	JAB	Exchange email communications with George West (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.0
	JAB	Receive and review of new offer for plaintiff on settlement (.3).	450.00	0.30	
	JAB	Review, edit and draft proposal stipulation on trial exclusions	450.00	0,30	135.0
	0, 10	(.6).	450.00	0.60	270.0
	JAB	Review, edit and finalize motion in Limine one on one striking	100.00	0.00	- A
	01 12	late disclosed witness (1,0).	450.00	4.4.1.00 ¹¹	450.C
	JAB	Review, edit and finalize motion in Limine two relating to frame	400.00	1.00	100.0
	0,10	damage to vehicle (.7).	450.00	0.70	315.C
	JAB	Review, edit and finalize in Limine three, relating to testimony on	-700.00	0.70	010.0
	Ų, (L	vehicle (.8).	450.00	0.80	360.C
	JAB	Review, edit and finalize motion in Limine four relating to	, 100,00	5.00	550.0
	() (L)	consumer expectation (.5).	450.00	0.50	225.C
	JAB	Review of issues relating to stipulation on hearing (.4).	450.00	0.40	180.C
	01 \L	Trement of foodoo rolating to supulation on floating ().		JTJ	100.0

Sahara Chrysler Jeep Dodge adv. Derrick Poole	Sahara	Chrysler	Jeep	Dodae	adv.	Derrick	Poole
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			Rate	Hours	
10/03/2017	SJS	Review filing confirmations and motion hearing dates.	350.00	0.40	140.0
	JAB	Exchange numerous email communications with counsel (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.0
	JAB *	Review of proposed stipulation for George West (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.0
	JAB	Review of numerous issues with request made by George West			
		(.4).	450.00	0.40	180.0
	SJS	Review email from chambers RE:: Order shortening time for			
		hearing.	350.00	0.10	35.0
	SJS -	Review email and proposed stipulation from G. West.	350.00	0.20	70.0
	SJS	Review email and invoice from G. West RE:: R. Avellini.	350.00	0.20	70.0
	SJS	Revise responses to first Request for Admissions to Plaintiff.	350.00	0.80	280.0
	SJS	Review updated CV for expert R. Avellini.	350.00	0.20	70.0
	SJS	Review of all deadlines for pretrial and potential deadlines for			
		motions and scheduling.	350.00	1.40	490.0
10/04/2017	JAB	Receive and review of proposal stipulation for George West (.3).	450.00	0.30	135.(
	JAB JAB	Review of trial subpoena for counsel (.4).	450.00	0.40	180.0
	JVD.	(.8).	450.00	0.80	360.0
	JAB	(.8).	450.00	0.80	360.0
	SJS	Review signed Order shortening time and service of motion to	100.00		000.0
		continue trial.	350.00	0.20	70.0
	SJS	Review G. West changes and email for stipulation on motions in			
		limine.	350.00	0.60	210.0
	SJS -	Finalize responses to requests for admissions, email G. West. Review Discovery Commissioner's Report and	- 350.00	0.20	70.0
	000	Recommendations and execute copy.	350.00	0.30	105.0
	SJS	Review of trial subpoenas issued by G. West.	350.00	0.60	210.0
	SJS	Review email from C. Friedberg RE:: stipulation and attachment.	350.00	0.40	140.0
	SJS	Review service of subpoena duces tecum and documents.	350.00	0.30	105.0
	JAB	Receive and review of proposed changes to agreed upon			
		stipulation to exclude certain evidence and testimony (.8).	450.00	0.80	360.0
10/05/2017	JAB	Exchange numerous email communication with George West			
10/00/2017	0710	(.3)	450.00	0.30	135.C
	JAB -	(.8).	450.00	0.80	360.0
	JAB	Review and analyze issues raised by George West (.5).	450.00	0.50	225.C
	JAB	Receive and review of subpoena Duces Team for trial (.4).	450.00	0.40	180.C
	SJS	Exchange emails with G. West RE:: Discovery Commissioner's			
		Report and Recommendations signature.	350.00	0.20	70.C
	SJS -	Review email exchange regarding stipulation to continue		5	
		hearing.	350.00	0.20	70.C
	SJS	Review email exchange RE::	350.00	0.20	70.C
	SJS	ACTION DAY IN CONTRACTOR	350.00	0.30	105.C
	SJS	Revise proposed order.	350.00	0.20	70.C
	SJS	Check minutes and court docket to determine if minutes posted.	350.00	0.10	35.C
	SJS	Review pre-trial requirements and initial preparation for 2.67.	350.00	1.70	595.C
				E TOTAL TERMINA	

Sahara Chrysler Jeep Dodge adv. Derrick Poole

		Rate	Hours	
10/06/2017 JA	B Exchange numerous email communication with George West			
	(.4)	450.00	0.40	180.0
SJ		350.00	0.20	70.0
		350.00	0.70	245.0
SJ	S Draft email to G. West RE:: invoice and payment to expert.	350.00	0.30	105.0
SJ		350.00	0.40	140.0
SJ		350.00	0.20	70.0
10/09/2017 SJ				
	information.	350.00	0.40	140.0
SJ.		350.00	0.20	70.(
	hearings on Defendant's motions.	350.00	0.20	70.0
SJ	S Review evidentiary stipulations.	350.00	0.40	140.0
SJ:		350.00	0.70	245.0
JAI JAI		450.00	0.40	180.0
07.11	stipulation (.8).	450.00	0.80	360.0
JAI		100.00		- 4
## W	district court filed by plaintiff (.5).	450.00	0.50	225.0
JAI		450.00	0.80	360.0
10/10/2017 SJ		350.00	0.20	70.0
SJ:		350.00	0.20	70.0
SJ		350.00	0.40	140.0
SJS		350.00	0.20	70.0
JAI		450.00	0.50	225.0
JAI		450.00	0.60	270.0
JA		450.00	0.60	270.0
JAE		450.00	0.30	135.0
10/11/2017 SJS	Review emails with trial subpoenas to / from G. West.	350.00	0.20	70.0
SJS		350.00	0.30	105.0
SJS		350.00	0.60	210.0
SJS		350.00	0.20	70.0
SJS		350.00	1.10	385.0
SJS		350.00	0.30	105.0
SJS		350.00	0.30	105.0
JAE	White District the second control of the sec	450.00	0.40	180.0
JAE			F. 54%	
373 17	relating to 2.67 conference (.2).	450.00	0.20	90.0
JAE		450.00	0.30	135.0
10/12/2017 SJS	Review emails from G. West and J. Bendavid RE:: rescheduling			
	and previous agreements.	350.00	0.50	175.C
SJS		350.00	0.30	105.0

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

DERRICK POOLE,

Appellant,

Supreme Court Case No: 74808

V

District Court Case No.: A-16-737120-C

NEVADA AUTO DEALERSHIP INVESTMENTS LLC a Nevada Limited Liability Company d/b/a SAHARA CHRYSLER, JEEP, DODGE, and COREPOINTE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Respondents,

Appeal from the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County.
The Honorable Nancy Alff, District Court Judge

APPELLANT'S APPENDIX VOLUME 5

Law Offices of George O. West III

Consumer Attorneys Against Auto Fraud
George O. West III Esq, State Bar No. 7951
10161 Park Run Drive, Suite 150
Las Vegas, NV 89145
Telephone: (702) 318-6570
Email: gowesq@cox.net

CRAIG B. FRIEDBERG [SBN 4606]
Law Offices of Craig B. Friedberg, Esq.
Craig B. Friedberg, Esq, State Bar. No. 4606
4760 S. Pecos Road, Suite 103
Las Vegas, NV 89121
Telephone: (702) 435-7968
Email: attcbf@cox.net

Attorneys for Appellant Derrick Poole

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4	11/12/17	Decision and Order Granting Defendants' Motion	845-848
		For Summary Judgment	
1	8/16/17	Defendants' Nevada Auto Dealership Investments	034-047
		LLC D/B/A Sahara Chrysler Jeep, Dodge and	
		Corepoint Insurance Co's Answer to First	
		Amended Complaint	
1	10/2/17	Defendants' Nevada Auto Dealership Investments	048-225
		LLC's and Corepoint Insurance Company's Motion	
		For Summary Judgment	
3	11/3/17	$\boldsymbol{\omega}$	644-750
		Filed by Plaintiff on Order Shortening Time	
4	11/3/17	Defendants' Motion to Strike Declaration of Rocco	751-783
		Avellini Attached to Plaintiff's Opposition on Order	
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5	12/19/17	Defendant's Nevada Auto Dealership Investment	869-1008
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4	10/0/1		066.060
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		Ram's Motion to Strike Fugitive Documents and	
		Motion to Strike the Declaration of Rocco Avillini	
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4	11/6/17	Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion to	784-789
		Strike Fugitive Documents on OST	
4	11/6/17	Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion To	790-844
		Strike Declaration of Rocco Avillini in Support	
		Of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion	
		For Summary Judgment	
5-6	1/15/18	Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion for	1120-1321
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2	10/20/17	Plaintiff's Response to Defendants Separate	304-310
		Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in	
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		To Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment	
5	12/28/17	Transcript of Proceedings (Defendants' Motion for	1051-1119
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		/	t.

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		Corepoint Insurance Co's Answer to First	
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		Judgment	
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_		Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment	
3	11/3/17	Defendants' Motion to Strike Fugitive Documents	644-750
		Filed by Plaintiff on Order Shortening Time	
4	11/3/17	Defendants' Motion to Strike Declaration of Rocco	751-783
		Avellini Attached to Plaintiff's Opposition on Order	
		Shortening Time	
4	11/6/17	1 1	784-789
		Strike Fugitive Documents on OST	
4	11/6/17	11	790-844
		Strike Declaration of Rocco Avillini in Support	
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		For Summary Judgment	

4	11/12/17	Decision and Order Granting Defendants' Motion	845-848
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4	12/9/17	Order Denying Defendant Nevada Auto Dealership	866-868
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		Motion to Strike the Declaration of Rocco Avillini	
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4-5	12/19/17	Defendant Nevada Auto Dealership Investment	869-1008
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5-6	1/15/18	Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion for	1120-1321
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6	1/25/18	Defendant Nevada Auto Dealership Investments	1322-1393
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6	3/9/18	Order Granting, in Part, Defendants' Motion for	1394-1397
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		Plaintiff's Motion to Retax Costs	
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		Motion to Retax and Settle Costs	
7	3/28/18	Judgment	1404-1405
7	3/28/18	Notice of Entry of Judgment	1406-1409

Electronically Filed 5/15/2017 8:45 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT **ACOM** GEORGE O. WEST III [SBN 7951] 1 Law Offices of George O. West III Consumer Attorneys Against Auto Fraud 10161 Park Run Drive, Suite 150 2 Las Vegas, NV 89145 3 Email: gowesq@cox.net Websites: www.caaaf.net 4 www.americasautofraudattorney.com (702) 318-6570 5 (702) 664-0459 [fax] 6 Attorney for Plaintiffs DERRICK POOLE 7 DISTRICT COURT 8 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 9 10 DERRICK POOLE, CASE NO: A-16-737120-C 11 DEPT: 12 Plaintiff, FIRST AMENDED **COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES** 13 AND EQUITABLE AND DECLARA-TORY RELIEF AND DEMAND FOR 14 JURY TRIAL v 15 Consumer Fraud/Deceptive Trade **Practices** 16 2. Rescission NEVADA AUTO DEALERSHIP INVEST-**Equitable Estoppel** 3. 17 MENTS LLC a Nevada Limited Liability Restitution/Unjust Enrichment 4. Company d/b/a SAHARA CHRYSLER, **Declaratory Relief** 18 5. JEEP, DODGE, WELLS FARGO DEALER Recovery under Auto Dealership Bond SERVICES INC., COREPOINTE INSUR-19 ANCE COMPANY, and DOES 1 through 100,) Inclusive, 20 [Lodged Concurrently with Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint] Defendants, 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1

Case Number: A-16-737120-C

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20

COMMON ALLEGATIONS

- 1. The true names or capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate, governmental or otherwise of the Defendants DOES 1 through 100, and each of them, are unknown to Plaintiff at this time, who therefore sue said Defendants by such When the true names and capacities of said Defendants are fictitious names. ascertained, Plaintiff will amend this Complaint accordingly. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon allege that each of the Defendants designated herein as a DOE was negligent or in some other manner responsible for the events and happenings herein referred to, and by their conduct caused injury and damages proximately thereby to Plaintiff, as herein after alleged, either through their own conduct or omissions, through the conduct or omissions of their agents, servants or employees, or due to their design, owning, engineering, promotion, recommending, advertising, supplying, supervising, manufacturing, installing, maintaining, fabricating, assembling, renting, leasing, inspection, sale, applying, distribution, servicing, ownership, repair, use, possession, management, control, construction or entrustment of the instrumentalities causing the injury or damages hereinafter alleged or in some other manner.
- 2. At all relevant times herein mentioned, Plaintiff is a resident of the State of Nevada, County of Clark.
- 3. At all relevant times herein mentioned, Defendant NEVADA AUTO DEALERSHIP INVESTMENT LLC d/b/a SAHARA CHRYSLER, JEEP DODGE ("SAHARA") limited liability company organized and existing under the laws of the State of Nevada and is authorized to conduct business in the State of Nevada, and is located in the City of Las Vegas State of Nevada, County of Clark, where the herein referenced Retail Installment Sales Contract ("RISC") was entered into, and the deceptive trade practices took place.

- 4. At all relevant times herein mentioned, Defendant WELLS FARGO DEALER SERVICES INC ("WFB") is believed to be a corporation organized and existing under the laws of California, and is authorized to do business in the State of Nevada, County of Clark, City of Las Vegas. Said Defendant was a previous "holder" and/or assignee of the Plaintiffs' Retail Installment Sale Contract ("RISC") a/k/a a "consumer credit contract," as hereinafter described, of which Plaintiff made payments to WFB based on the assignment of the RISC to WFB and it was WFB's capacity as a "holder" of the RISC in which those monthly payments were made, as hereinafter alleged.
- 5. At all relevant times herein mentioned, Defendant COREPOINTE INSURANCE COMPANY ("COREPOINTE") is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Michigan, and is authorized to do business in the State of Nevada, and was the bond company that issued and underwrote the licensing bond to Defendant SAHARA pursuant to the provisions of NRS 482.345.
- 6. At all relevant times herein mentioned, Defendant SAHARA was "dealer" and/or "new vehicle dealer" within the definition of NRS 482.020. Furthermore, at all relevant times, Plaintiff was a "consumer" as defined by 16 C.F.R. 433.1(b), and the RISC entered into between Plaintiff and SAHARA was a "purchase money loan" and "consumer credit contract" as defined by 16 C.F.R. 433.1(d) and (i).
- 7. On May 26, 2014, Plaintiff took delivery of and entered into a RISC a/k/a "consumer credit contract," with Defendant SAHARA for the financed purchase of a used 2013 certified pre-owed ("CPO") Ram 1500 Truck with 6,716 miles on it at time of sale ("vehicle"). The RISC called for Plaintiff to make 72 monthly payments in the amount of \$ 654.53. To date as of the filing of this Complaint, Plaintiff made all of his monthly payments to WFB, including payments under the initial RISC when the RISC was assigned to WFB from SAHARA shortly after Plaintiff purchased the vehicle from

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SAHARA. Plaintiff put down \$ 4,000.00 in trade for the vehicle, which was the agreed upon price of his trade in. After adding all other ancillary charges, including doc fees, gap insurance, tax, title, emissions and finance charges, and deducting the amount of the Plaintiff's trade in, the total aggregate amount of payments under the RISC was \$ 47,126.16. It is this amount Plaintiff was initially obligated to pay to Defendant WFB over the loan term under the RISC, per the hereinafter referenced assignment of the Plaintiffs' RISC from SAHARA to WFB.

8. Shortly after the RISC was entered into with the Plaintiff, Defendant SAHARA assigned Plaintiffs' RISC to Defendant WFB, wherein WFB then became the assignee and "holder" of said RISC (a/k/a consumer credit contract), as well as the secured party under Article 9 of the UCC, to whom Plaintiff are is under an obligation to pay the balance on the contract. Said RISC had the following express contractual term as part of said RISC's terms and conditions:

NOTICE: ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS **SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES** WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER.

It is noteworthy to point out that this language is mandated by 16 C.F.R. §§ 433.1 and 433.2, (commonly known as the FTC Holder Rule), to be in all consumer credit contracts' and therefore makes such terms and conditions a matter of state contract law. However it should be noted that Plaintiff has not plead a claim for relief based on the provisions of what is commonly known as the "FTC Holder Rule. These C.F.R. sections do not establish or confer a federal private claim for relief under their provisions. See infra. It has been widely held that the mere mention, reference or even reliance on the provisions of the "FTC Holder Rule" in a Complaint does not confer federal question jurisdiction. This is not only because such provisions do not create any type of private federal right of action, but the Plaintiff's underlying claims are solely based on state law. Plaintiff is merely using the FTC Holder Rule provisions solely for purposes of preserving and asserting state law claims and remedies against the subsequent assignee and/or "holder" of the RISC a/k/a a "consumer credit contract." See Walker Motors Sales, Inc. 162 F. Supp. 2d 786 (S.D. Ohio, 2000) [holding there is no private right of action under the "FTC Holder Rule" in an of itself without a state law derivative claim]; Glovier v. Barton Homes, LLC, 452 F. Supp. 2d 657, (W.D. La., 2006) [holding purchasers' action against holder did not arise under federal law for the Court to be able to be vested with federal-question jurisdiction, notwithstanding purchasers' reliance and mentioning of the FTC holder rule to bring in the assignee/holder]; Mathis vs Gibson 2008 WL 2330537 (D.S.C. 2008) [holding Federal District Court did not have federal question jurisdiction based on the assertion of state law claims, as permitted and preserved by the FTC Holder Rule, against a subsequent holder]; Frichhorn vs Lake County Chrysler 2006 WL 2970236 (N.D. Ohio, 2006) [holding a complaint's reference to the FTC Holder Rule either to

- 9. By virtue of said expressly agreed to contractual term, as integrated into the terms and conditions of the RISC, WFB, (the holder of the RISC), has contractually agreed to be subject to any and all defenses *and* claims that Plaintiff could assert against Defendant SAHARA (the seller) with respect to the vehicle while it was the holder of the original RISC between Plaintiff and SAHARA.
- 10. At all relevant times Defendants were the partners, joint ventures, agents, employees, managers, supervisors, related companies, and servants, of each and every other Defendant herein, and were acting at all times within the scope, purpose and authority of said partnership, joint venture, agency, employment, and with the knowledge, consent, permission, acquiescence and ratification of their co-Defendants.
- 11. At all relevant times Plaintiff has complied with all of the terms and conditions under her RISC, except those which have been excused based on the deceptive trade practices of Defendant SAHARA, as hereinafter alleged.

II

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF FOR DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES AS AGAINST DEFENDANTS SAHARA AND WFB ONLY

[NRS 41.600(e); Statutory Consumer Fraud]

12. Plaintiff herein incorporates by reference and herein realleges paragraphs 1 through 10.

provide the applicable standard of care or additional evidence of a state-law violation-does not create a federal question jurisdiction]; *Morales v. Medina v. Performance Auto. Grp., Inc.,* 841 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (E.D. Cal. 2012) [holding Federal removal jurisdiction could not be premised upon the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) "Holder Rule with respect to Plaintiff pursuing claims against the assignee which were based upon state law].

It should also be expressly noted that Plaintiff is not making any affirmative claim for relief or seeking any remedies, relief or damages under any federal statute or regulation, but rather is only mentioning any federal statutes and/or regulations as further evidence that **Defendant committed a deceptive trade practice under state law**, because a violation of a federal regulations or statue "relating to the sale of goods is" an independent and actionable deceptive trade practice under Nevada state law pursuant to the NDTPA and does not turn or seek to invoke any claim, remedies or actions based on the federal statute or regulation mentioned. **See NRS 598.0923(3)**.

- 13. At all relevant times, Defendant SAHARA represented to the Plaintiff, both orally and in writing, and held out, and displayed for sale and represented that the vehicle to the Plaintiff as a CPO Dodge Ram 1500. Pursuant to the Chrysler Dodge CPO Inspection Standards between the manufacturer and a franchised dealership who participates in the Chrysler/Dodge CPO program, for a vehicle to qualify for the CPO program, the franchised dealer (SAHARA), must undertake and successfully complete a rigorous and comprehensive multistep certification process before it can advertise, represent, display or sell a vehicle to the community as a Chrysler/Dodge CPO vehicle.
- One of these important steps, prior to advertising, displaying or selling a 14. Chrysler/Dodge CPO vehicle to the community is the strictly mandated requirement to have a Chrysler/Dodge certified technician conduct a comprehensive 125 point inspection on the vehicle, which also specifically includes and encompasses an inspection of the vehicle for any frame/unibody damage or other indicia or indications of a vehicle having been involved in significant prior collisions. Dealers are also required to run a Carfax on the vehicle. If these two critical steps are not undertaken by the dealership, a vehicle, including the Plaintiff's vehicle, cannot be advertised, displayed or listed for sale or actually sold as a Chrysler/Dodge "CPO" vehicle. Notwithstanding the content of any CarFax report, including the lack of any indication or an actual indication of a previous collision or accident to the vehicle on the Carfax report, SAHARA, at all times had an separate and independent duty to thoroughly inspect the vehicle to ensure it did not have any frame damage or other indicia that the vehicle had been in a significant collision or collisions, and to make full disclosure to any potential buyer regarding the findings on their inspection.

15. Furthermore, under Chrysler/Dodge's own standards involving CPO vehicles, any vehicle that has sustained any frame damage are automatically ineligible to be sold as a Chrysler/Dodge CPO vehicle. Furthermore, when a vehicle that is going to be sold as a CPO vehicle has sustained a significant previous collision damage, the nature and extent of that previous collision and the damage and repairs related to that collision would be abundantly clear to the dealer given the dealer's obligations to have all CPO vehicles go through Chrysler/Jeep's comprehensive inspection process with a Chrysler certified technician.

- 16. Given the extent the of damage caused by the previous collision/accident to the vehicle, the nature and extent of that previous collision damage and the extent of the repairs to the vehicle would been abundantly evident and discovered at time of SAHARA's comprehensive CPO inspection process. As a CPO vehicle, such marketing and selling of a CPO is to give the consumer the piece of mind that the vehicle does not have any previous significant collision and/or frame damage, and to further induce consumers within the community to purchase a CPO vehicle at a higher price as compared to a comparable non CPO vehicle.
- 17. Nevertheless, given the extremely negative stigma consumers attach to vehicles that have been in significant previous collisions, this important fact, which was known to SAHARA, prior to the vehicle's sale to the Plaintiff, (as hereinafter alleged), was statutorily required to still be clearly disclosed to any consumer at time of sale, including the nature and extent of the previous collision if it was known or should have been known by SAHARA, prior to the sale of the vehicle to the Plaintiff.
- 18. Indeed, one of the primary reasons for selling a Chrysler Dodge CPO vehicle is to reduce the consumer's perception of the risk involved with purchasing a used with respect to the vehicle having and/or suffering significant previous collisions

and/or previous accidents, and the perceived safety issues and diminished value to the vehicle that previous collisions can cause to a vehicle in the mind of the consumer, including the Plaintiff. The consumer's reasonable expectation when purchasing a certified pre owned vehicle is that it does not have any significant previous collisions or accidents or frame damage or other conditions that will diminish its safety or value, which would be material and important to any reasonable consumer purchasing a CPO used vehicle. This expectation on the part of the consumer is specifically created in the advertising materials, brochures and other information that is disseminated to the community with respect to buying piece of mind when purchasing a Chrysler/Dodge CPO vehicle, which includes Chrysler/Dodge CPO vehicles.

- 19. More specifically, it is advertised with respect Chrysler/Dodge CPO vehicles that:
 - A. When you have a Chrysler Group Certified Pre-Owned vehicle ("CPOV") you have far more then just a "used" vehicle. You have confidence. You have pride. You have a great vehicle that you can trust. You're certified.
 - B. Every Chrysler, Jeep, Dodge and Ram CPOV can be counted on to go the distance. Our CPO vehicles must pass a strident certification process that guarantees only the finest late model vehicles get certified. Every vehicle that passes is then subjected to a comprehensive 125 point inspection and a through reconditioning process using Authentic Mopar Parts.
 - C. What would you expect to pay to have a qualified technician give this vehicle such a thorough inspection?
 - D. Only the finest late model vehicles we have are going to be certified to begin with, so the [CPO] vehicles you are checking out on the lot are the best.
- 20. Moreover, a CPO vehicle, as compared to a comparable non CPO vehicle, will usually command and justify an increased selling price at least several hundreds of dollars higher then a comparable non CPO vehicle, sometimes more then \$ 1,500.00,

and consumer's are willing to pay that increased price for the piece of mind that is advertised to them about purchasing a Chrysler/Dodge CPO vehicle. Indeed, the aforementioned written and/or on line materials and advertisements which are disseminated to the community are there to provide a further inducement and incentive to the consumer to spend the extra money to purchase "piece of mind" and confidence with respect to a Chrysler/Dodge CPO certified vehicle.

- 21. On or about May 6, 2014, SAHARA acquired the vehicle from a private party. That private party informed and specifically told SAHARA's used car manager, Joshua Grant, that the vehicle had been in a previous collision in March of 2014, and also gave Mr. Grant a copy of the body shop repair order relating to the repairs that were undertaken on the vehicle as a result of the previous collision. The body shop estimate, which was in Mr. Grant's possession, indicated the vehicle had \$ 4,088.00 in previous collision damage, and also disclosed the nature and extent of the previous damage caused by the accident, based upon the parts and components that were identified on the repair order and replaced or repaired on the vehicle as a result of the previous collision.
- 22. That body shop estimate disclosed the following repairs to the vehicle, which included, but were not limited to: a replaced front from frame end bracket, a replaced radiator support, front bumper repaired, right inner and outer tie rods replaced, and the stabilizer link replaced, left front wheel repaired and left front quarter panel repainted.
- 23. After briefly doing an initial visual assessment and inspection on the vehicle on May 6, 2014, Mr. Grant, at that point, made the initial decision and undertook the initial steps to resell the vehicle as a CPO certified vehicle. On or about May 8, 2017, (three days after the car logged into SAHARA's inventory and given a stock number), the vehicle was brought into SAHARA's service department by Mr. Grant to undergo the

comprehensive CPO inspection process with one of their Chrysler certified technicians.

Mr. Grant did not inform anyone in the service department of the previous collision the vehicle was in or given the body shop estimate regarding the vehicle to anyone in the service department.

- 24. At the time of the technician's inspection, all of the aforementioned repairs and replaced parts and components to the vehicle that were present due to the previous collision the vehicle was involved in, and were all present and abundantly obvious to the trained eye, including SAHARA's certified technician. As part Chrysler/Dodge's comprehensive CPO inspection process, the technician is required to prepare and sign off on the comprehensive check list, which the technician did.
- 25. Notwithstanding, and knowing of and/or having should have known of all the aforementioned items being repaired or replaced on the vehicle, and also having a good idea of the nature and extent of the previous damage and collision to the vehicle, SAHARA's technician did not note any of these items were repaired or replaced, either in the specific enumerated items set forth on the report, or in the area where "additional information" could have been noted on the report. This, not withstanding that SAHARA's mechanic and SAHARA's used car manager actually knew of the nature and extent of the previous collision, and also knew the car was going to be resold to the community as a CPO vehicle.
- 26. During the sales process, the SAHARA's salesperson was explaining the many advantages of buying a CPO vehicle, one of which was the comprehensive safety inspection the vehicle undergoes. After the deal was negotiated in the sale's department, Plaintiff was then brought into the F & I department to sign all the closing documents. One of the documents Plaintiff was presented with was a Carfax that indicated the vehicle had been in a previous accident. Plaintiff inquired about the accident and was

concerned about the previous accident the vehicle had been involved in, which was not previously disclosed to him.

- 27. Plaintiff was then told that the vehicle had been through a comprehensive safety inspection and if the previous accident was serious or significant, it would not have been certified a CPO. Plaintiff was then presented and reviewed the CPO inspection report as well that was prepared by SAHARA's technician. Having been told the car had gone through a comprehensive inspection, having been assured that the accident was not significant, and not seeing any indication on the CPO inspection report of anything being replaced or repaired or damaged, Plaintiff's concerns regarding the accident were resolved and he went forward with the sale.
- 28. Plaintiff not being made aware of nature and extent of the previous collision and repairs to the vehicle, it was in approximately mid May of 2015, Plaintiff first became aware of the nature and extent of the undisclosed damage to the vehicle, of which SAHARA had actual knowledge of prior to the time of sale, and did not disclose to him.
- 29. This information would have been a material (important) fact any reasonable consumer, including the Plaintiff, would want to know about and would also deem important in making a decision to purchase a used vehicle, especially with respect to a CPO vehicle, given the purchase of a CPO vehicle is to take much of the risk out of purchasing a used vehicle vis-à-vis the vehicle being in a previous significant collision and/or having frame and/or unibody damage and excessive body damage. Had Plaintiff been informed of the nature and extent of the damage to the vehicle which was in the actual knowledge of SAHARA, he would not have purchased the vehicle and would not have entered into the RISC for the vehicle.

30. At all relevant times, SAHARA, as a vehicle dealer within this community
would know that any reasonable consumer, including the Plaintiff, associates a very
negative stigma to vehicles which have been in a previous collision or collisions, both as
to its safety and as to its value. Such a negative stigma is further heightened with respec
to a CPO vehicle given it is the consumer's expectation when purchasing a
Chrysler/Dodge certified vehicle that they are avoiding purchasing a vehicle that has any
such damage. Furthermore, Defendant SAHARA, as a vehicle dealership who sells
hundreds of CPO vehicles to the community, is fully aware of this expectation on the part
of the consumer when they choose to decide to purchase a Chrysler/Dodge CPO vehicle
The information known to SAHARA relating to the nature and extent of the previous
damage to the vehicle, in the mind of a reasonable consumer, would relate to the
vehicle's safety and/or dramatically diminished its value, and would be important in
making a determination in whether to purchase the vehicle. Consumers do not seek to
purchase vehicles, especially CPO vehicles, with an accident history, and if an accident is
disclosed to them and the dealer has actual knowledge of the nature and extent of that
previous collision, SAHARA had the obligation to make full and complete disclosure to
the Plaintiff relating to all information it had within its possession regarding the previous
collision and the nature and extend of that accident, as it would have been material to
Plaintiff's decision to purchase the vehicle.

- 31. Pursuant to NRS §§ 41.600(e), 598.0915, and 598.0923 Defendant SAHARA engaged in statutory consumer fraud/deceptive trade practices by knowingly engaging in certain prohibited conduct and/or omissions including but not limited to:
 - A. Making a false representation as to the source, sponsorship, approval *or certification* of goods for sale. [NRS 598.0915(2) and NRS 41.600(e)]

- B. Representing that goods for sale are of a particular standard, quality or grade if he knows or should know that they are of another standard, quality, grade, style or model. [NRS 598.0915(7) and NRS 41.600(2)(e)]
- C. Failing to disclose a material fact in connection with the sale of goods. [NRS 598.0923(2) and NRS 41.600(2)(e)]
- D. Violating a federal or state statute or regulation relating to the sale of goods. [NRS 598.0923(3) and NRS 41.600(2)(e)]²
- E. Making any other false representation in a transaction. [NRS 598.0915(15) and NRS 41.600(2)(e)]
- 32. As a direct and proximate cause the deceptive conduct and/or omissions, as herein alleged, Plaintiff has been damaged.
- Furthermore, Defendant SAHARA in engaging in the aforementioned 33. deceptive trade practices, has acted willfully, intentionally, maliciously and fraudulently, with intent to deceive and defraud the Plaintiff, with great recklessness and carelessness in total disregard of the consequences of their intentional actions upon Plaintiff, thereby entitling the Plaintiff to an additional award of damages in the nature of punitive and/or exemplary damages in a sum subject to proof at time of trial.

II

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF FOR RESCISSION OF CONTRACT AS AGAINST DEFENDANTS SAHARA AND WFB ONLY [NRS 41.600(3)(b) and Common Law]

- Plaintiffs herein incorporate by reference and hereby reallege paragraphs 1 34. through 32
- Based on the aforementioned deceptive trade practices, as herein alleged, 35. Plaintiff is entitled to rescission and/or cancellation of their RISC, (including WFB as

See 16 C.F.R. § 455.1(a)(1), a federal regulation relating to the sale of goods which states: "It is a deceptive act or practice for any used vehicle dealer when that dealer sells or offers for sale a used vehicle ... to misrepresent the mechanical condition of a used vehicle."

the assignee/holder of the RISC).

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THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF FOR EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AS AGAINST DEFENDANTS SAHARA AND WFB ONLY

[NRS 41.600(3)(b) and Common Law]

- 36. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference and herein realleges paragraphs

 1 through 35
- 37. At all relevant times herein mentioned, Defendant SAHARA was a franchised Chrysler/Dodge dealership and participant in the Chrysler/Dodge CPO program. By virtue of its status as a franchised Chrysler/Dodge dealer who was a participant in the Chrysler/Dodge CPO program, and given the rigorous undertakings and requirements the dealer has to go through to properly certify a Dodge as a CPO under the CPO program, SAHARA had vastly superior knowledge about the condition of the vehicle, as herein alleged. This was based on the purported mandatory CPO inspection undertaken on the vehicle, and as such had a duty to disclose the true and accurate condition of the vehicle to the Plaintiff, which SAHARA knew, or should have known about.
- 38. At all relevant times herein mentioned, Defendant SAHARA intended for the Plaintiff to act upon the Defendant's omissions/misrepresentations, (as herein alleged), in conducting the sale, delivery and inspection of the vehicle as a CPO vehicle, and Defendant SAHARA had a duty to speak given the dealer had superior knowledge with respect to the vehicle's condition based upon it's purported CPO inspection, which would have also had to have been conducted in accordance with Chrysler/Dodge's CPO standards involving CPO inspections.
- 39. At all relevant times herein mentioned, the Plaintiff was unaware of the vehicle's deficiencies as herein described. ₁Furthermore, Plaintiff detrimentally relied

and/or acted upon on Defendant's omissions with respect to the vehicle being a CPO vehicle.

40. Based on the aforementioned deceptive conduct and affirmative engagement in deceptive trade practices and/or consumer fraud, Defendant SAHARA has acted unconscionably and has unclean hands, and by virtue of said conduct, Defendants SAHARA and WFB, (as the initial assignee and previous "holder" of the RISC), are estopped from claiming the RISC is valid and/or otherwise enforceable, or any other subsequent contract with WFB involving the vehicle.

\mathbf{IV}

FORTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF FOR RESTITUTION/UNJUST ENRICHMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT SAHARA WFB ONLY

[NRS 41.600(3)(b) and Common Law]

- 41. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference and herein realleges paragraphs 1 through 40.
- 42. Based on the aforementioned deceptive trade practices, as herein alleged, Defendant SAHARA and WFB has been unjustly enriched to the detriment to the Plaintiff, and Plaintiffs are entitled to the return of his down (the agreed amount of his trade in), and monthly payments under the RISC, and said Defendants hold said funds as constructive trustee for the benefit of the Plaintiff.

\mathbf{v}

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF AS AGAINST DEFENDANT SAHARA AND WFB ONLY

- 43. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference and herein realleges paragraphs
 1 through 42
- 44. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiff and the Defendants with regard to the validity, enforceability and/or violability of the

aforementioned RISC entered into with SAHARA and then assigned to WFB, and Plaintiffs' right to Rescission and/or Restitution. Plaintiff contends the RISC is void ab initio and/or voidable and that they are entitled to rescission and restitution. Defendants contend the RISC is valid and enforceable and that Plaintiff is not entitled to Rescission and/or Restitution under the RISC, and that Plaintiff are still obligated to pay the remaining balance in the agreed upon monthly payments to WFB, under the initial RISC assigned to WFB and under any other subsequent contract entered into with WFB relating to the financing of the vehicle.

- 45. Plaintiff desires and seeks a judicial determination as to voidability and/or enforceability of the aforementioned RISC relating to the vehicle.
- 46. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time under the circumstances in order for the parties to be able to ascertain their rights, obligations and remedies under the aforementioned RISC.

VI

SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF FOR RECOVERY UNDER AUTO DEALERSHIP SURETY BOND AS AGAINST DEFENDANT COREPOINTE ONLY [NRS 482.345(7)]

- 47. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference and herein realleges paragraphs
 1 through 46
- 48. At all relevant times herein mentioned, Defendant COREPOINTE is the issuer of a dealership licensing surety bond issued to Defendant SAHARA pursuant to the licensing provisions of NRS 482.345, of which said bond was in effect at the time of the sale of the vehicle to the Plaintiff, as well as at the time this Complaint was filed.
- 49. Plaintiff, as alleged herein, has been damaged by the deceptive trade practices of Defendant SAHARA as set forth herein, who is a "dealer" as referenced and

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1	defined by	NRS 482.345, of which said damages or losses and equitable relief, as alleged
2	herein, wer	e all caused and/or necessitated by SAHARA's owners, principals, employees
3	and/or mai	nagers who were all working within the scope of their employment.
4	WH	EREFORE, Plaintiff, prays for judgment against Defendants, as follows:
5		On First Claim for Relief:
6		On First Claim for Rener:
_	1.	For actual damages,
7	2.	For exemplary damages as against SAHARA only, according to proof, and
8	3.	For prejudgment interest, and For all incidental/consequential losses and/or damages, and
9	4. 5.	For reasonable attorneys fees, and
	6.	For costs of suit incurred herein, and
10	7.	For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
11	,	, and the second
12		On Second Claim for Relief:
13	1.	For a judicial declaration estopping Defendant from enforcing the
	_	contract, and
14	2,	For reasonable attorneys fees, and
15	3. 4.	For costs of suit incurred herein, and For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
16	4 •	For such other and further rener as the court deems just and proper.
17		On Third Claim for Relief:
	1.	For a judicial declaration voiding/rescinding the RISC and for restitution
18		of all amounts tendered to Defendants, and;
19	2.	For all incidental/consequential losses and/or damages, and
20	3⋅	For reasonable attorneys fees, and
20	4.	For costs of suit incurred herein, and
21	5∙	For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
22		On Forth Claim for Relief:
23	1.	For restitution of all amounts paid to Defendants by Plaintiff, and
24	2.	For reasonable attorneys fees, and
ľ	3⋅	For costs of suit incurred herein, and
25	4.	For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
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27		
28		17
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1		On Fifth Claim for Relief:	
2	 For a judicial declaration estopping Defendants from asserting the RISC or 		
3		any other financing contract is valid or otherwise enforceable, and,	
4	3. 4.	For a judicial declaration rescinding the RISC, and, For a judicial declaration entitling Plaintiff to restitution, and	
•• 	5.	For all incidental losses and/or damages, and	
5	6.	For reasonable attorneys fees, and	
6	7.	For costs of suit incurred herein, and	
7	8.	For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.	
8		On Sixth Claim For Relief	
9	1.	For actual damages, and	
	2.	For prejudgment interest, and	
10	3.	For all incidental/consequential losses and/or damages, and	
11	4.	For reasonable attorneys fees, and	
12	5. 6.	For costs of suit incurred herein, and	
	0.	For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper	
13 14	PLAINTIFF HEREBY DEMANDS JURY		
15	Dated this	with down of March, and	
16	Dated this i	17 th day of March, 2017	
ĺ		By <u>/s/ George O. West III</u> GEORGE O. WEST III	
17		Attorney for Plaintiff	
18		DERRICK POOLE	
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EXHIBIT 4

Electronically Filed 10/21/2017 12:40 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT STAT GEORGE O. WEST III [SBN 7951] 1 Law Offices of George O. West III Consumer Attorneys Against Auto Fraud 2 10161 Park Run Drive, Suite 150 Las Vegas, NV 89145 3 gowesq@cox.net www.nevadasautofraudattorney.com 4 www.americasautofraudattorney.com (702) 664-1168 5 (702) 664-0459 [fax] 6 CRAIG B. FRIEDBERG [SBN 4601] Law Offices of Craig B. Friedberg, Esq. 7 4760 S. Pecos Road, Suite 103 Las Vegas, NV 89121 8 (702) 435-7968 Fax: (702) 946-0887 9 Email: attcbf@cox.net Website: www.consumerlaw.justia.net 10 Attorney for Plaintiffs 11 DERRICK POOLE 12 DISTRICT COURT 13 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 14 DERRICK POOLE, CASE NO: A-16-737120-C XXVII DEPT: 15 Plaintiff, PLAINTIFF'S SEPARATE STATE-16 MENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 17 **OPPOSITION** TO DEFENDANTS' **MOTION FOR SUMMARY** 18 JUDGMENT 19 DATE: November 9, 2017 NEVADA AUTO DEALERSHIP INVEST-20 MENTS LLC a Nevada Limited Liability TIME: 9:00 a.m. Company d/b/a SAHARA CHRYSLER. 21 JEEP, DODGE, WELLS FARGO DEALER Filed concurrently with: SERVICES INC., COREPOINTE INSUR-22 ANCE COMPANY, and DOES 1 through 100,) 1. Plaintiff's Exhibits in Opposition to Inclusive, 23 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment] Defendants. 24 2. Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 25 3. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts] 26 27 28

UNDISPUTED FACT SUPPORTING EVIDENCE 1 1. On May 5, 2014, a private third Exhibit 1 to Defendant's Motion 2 party by the name of Dale Hinton sold for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 5, Def's Resp. to RFA # 1; Exhibit 16, used 2013 Dodge Ram 1500 3 appraisal form. ("vehicle") to SAHARA bearing VIN 4 1C6RR6GT8DS558275 5 2. The person from SAHARA who was Exhibit 9; depo. of Grant 77: 11-25, 78: 6 personally engaged with and who and 7-19, 79: 3-9, 80: 17-25, 81: 1-8; 111: dealt with Mr. Hinton, and who 11-16; Exhibit 5, Def's RFA resp. to 7 Plntf's RFA Req. # 10 purchasing the vehicle from Mr. 8 Hinton on behalf of SAHARA was Joshua Grant, and was the one from 9 SAHARA who personally apprised the 10 vehicle 11 Exhibit 9; depo of Grant, 81: 21-25, 82; 3. On May 5, 2014, Mr. Hinton told 1-7, **84**: 5-14, **96**: 24-25, **97**: 1-8. ¹ 12 Joshua Grant the vehicle had been in a previous accident also gave an Allstate 13 Collision Estimate of Record ("ACE") 14 to Joshua Grant regarding the vehicle. 15 Exhibit 9: depo of Grant, 98: 13-23, 99: Joshua Grant thoroughly reviewed the ACE. 2-5. 16 17 5. SAHARA *admits* that the ACE Exhibit 2, ACE, Exhibit 7, Def's Resp. to involves a 2013 Dodge Ram 1500 with 18 Plntf's RFA # 9; Exhibit 21, Plntf's RFAs VIN 1C6RR6GT8DS558275 19 indicates that it was prepared on March 31, 2014 20 21 6. SAHARA admits that the ACE Exhibit 2, ACE; Exhibit 7, Def's Resp. to indicates the vehicle was in a 22 Plntf's RFA # 9; Exhibit 21, Plntf's RFAs collision/accident on March 26, 2014 23 Exhibit 9; depo of Grant, 84: 5-14, 7. The ACE received by Joshua Grant 24 Exhibit 2, ACE broke down what was actually 25 repaired on the vehicle and describes, reflects and itemizes the 26 Grant also authenticated the ACE nature and extent of the damage to the produced and shown to him at his deposition as 27 vehicle as a result of the previous the same ACE he was given on May 5, 2017. Exhibit 9, depo of Grant 98: 2-21 collision/accident. 28

8. SAHARA admits The ACE reflects 1 Exhibit 2, ACE; Exhibit 7, Def's Resp. the vehicle sustained \$4,088.70 in to Plntf's RFA # 31; Exhibit 21, Plntf's 2 property damage to the vehicle as a **RFAs** result of the 3 previous collision/accident 4 9. SAHARA admits the ACE reflects, 5 Exhibit 2, ACE Exhibit 7, Def's Resp. to among other items, that the vehicle had: Plntf's RFA # 17, 23-30; Exhibit 21, · a replaced right bumper bracket. 6 Plntf's RFAs · a repaired left front frame end bracket 7 a replaced front bumper. • a replaced radiator support. 8 • a replaced left outer and inner tie rod. • a replaced aftermarket left stabilizer link 9 a repaired front left wheel. a repainted left front fender 10 11 10. At the time Joshua Grant Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 17: 14-23, 18: purchased the vehicle from Mr. Hinton 11-14, 66: 2-4 12 on behalf of SAHARA, he was the 13 Director of SAHARA's Used Car Department and held that position at 14 that point for two and half years.² 15 11. As SAHARA's Director of Used Car 16 Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 25: 9-24 Sales Joshua Grant was in charge of that particular area and aspect of 17 SAHARA's business, as he was the 18 person who established and 19 instituted SAHARA's polices and practices within SAHARA's used car 20 department respect to: (1) the decision 21 to resell a vehicle as a certified pre owned ("CPO") to the community, (2) 22 the processes by which those policies were carried out, (3) the inspections 23 that occurred, and (4) the documents 24 that were generated by as a result of the CPO process. 25 26 Joshua Grant was also designated by SAHARA as their 30(b)(6) representative with respect to the CPO certification process, sales, 27 and required disclosures, polices and practices in a CPO sales etc.. See Ex. 15, notice of 30(b)(6) 28 depo. for SAHARA 2

1 2 3 4 5	12. As Director of SAHARA's Used Car Department, Joshua Grant was responsible for overseeing all of SAHARA's used car inventory, used car purchasing, used car wholesaling, used car pricing, used car advertisement and oversaw the used car mechanical operations.	Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 20: 8-15
7 8 9 10 11 12 13	13. As Director of SAHARA's Used Car Department, Joshua Grant would coordinate with SAHARA's service department with respect to the inspections undertaken on SAHARA's used vehicle inventory, including having a certified pre-owned inspection undertaken on the car that was going to be resold to the community as a CPO.	Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 20: 16-25, 21: 1-10
14 15 16 17 18 19	14. With respect to Joshua Grant "coordinating with the service department" involving CPO vehicles, he would bring the vehicle to the service department, give the keys and coordinate with the clerk in the service department with respect to the type of certification needed on the vehicle.	Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 21: 1-9
20 21 22 23	15. The policies and practices relating to CPO sales that Joshua Grant established put into place as Director of SAHARA's Used Car Department were never put in writing.	Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 25 : 25, 26 : 1-6
24 25 26 27	16. Joshua Grant, as the Director of SAHARA's Used Car Department, was the one from SAHARA who made the decision to resell the vehicle to the community as a Dodge CPO vehicle	Exhibit 9: depo of Grant 77: 11-17, 104: 25, 105: 1-10, 106: 18-23, 111: 1-16
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1	17. Prior to becoming the Director of	Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 19: 16-25,
2	SAHARA's Used Car Department, Joshua Grant was the Director of Used	20 : 1-5
3	Car Sales for Avondale Chrysler Jeep	
4	Dodge in Avondale Arizona, selling used Dodge vehicles to the community	
5	for nine (9) years, from 2004 through	
6	2013.	
7	18. Joshua Grant has been selling	Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 19: 16-25,
8	Dodge CPO vehicles to the community	20: 1
9	for over eleven (11) years and has been in the used car and vehicle dealership	
-	industry for 13 years.	
10	19. Joshua Grant has been involved in	
11	the sale of over 15,000 (thousand)	<i>Exhibit 9</i> , depo of Grant, 33 : 17-24, 34: 1-2
12	used vehicles to the community.	34
13	20. The vast majority of Joshua	Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 34: 8-15
14	Grant's expertise and experience	Eximote 9, depo of Grant, 34. 0-15
15	revolves around and emphasizes the sale of used vehicles to the community	
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17	21. According to Joshua Grant, based on his intimate familiarity and	Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 150 : 15-25, 151 : 1-8
18	experience in selling used vehicles to	131.10
19	the community, and in his capacity as the 30(b)(6) representative of	
20	SAHARA involving CPO vehicles,	
21	SAHARA agrees with, follows and subscribes to the advertising statement	
22	regarding the sale of Dodge CPO	
23	vehicles to the community that "our	
24	CPO vehicle must pass a strident certification process that	
	GUARANTEES only the finest	
25	late model vehicles get certified."	
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when purchasing a CPO vehicle.

Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 34: 16-25, 35: 1-8

Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 50: 5-22

trust are things that SAHARA wants to instill and engender into the mind of a consumer

Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 51: 4-13, 24-25, 52: 1-18

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Based Joshua 25. on 1 professional experience in selling over 2 15,000 used cars within the Dodge environment, including SAHARA, and 3 in his capacity as the 30(b)(6) 4 representative of SAHARA involving CPO vehicles. the things 5 consumer within the community 6 would view and associate with a Dodge CPO vehicle would be: (1) 7 value, (2) quality, (3) safety, (4) 8 competence, (5) assurance, (6) piece of mind and (7) trust 9 10 Based 26. on Joshua 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 them. 19 Joshua 27. Based on 20 21 22

Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 50: 23-25, 51:1-12

Grant's professional experience in selling over 15,000 used cars within the Dodge environment, including SAHARA, and in his capacity as the 30(b)(6) representative of SAHARA involving CPO vehicles, the buyer within the community has the expectation when buying a Dodge CPO vehicle that it has value, it has quality, it is safe, they have confidence and assurance in buying it, they have peace of mind, and they trust the dealership selling it to

Grant's

Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 52: 19-25, 53: 1-6

Grant's professional experience in selling over 15,000 used cars within the Dodge environment, including SAHARA, and in his capacity as the 30(b)(6) representative of SAHARA involving CPO vehicles, one of the reasons why CPO vehicles to through vehicle inspections is to ensure that SAHARA does not sell a vehicle that might be a safety hazard to the community.

Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 49: 7-19

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28. Based Joshua on Grant's Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 61: 7-19 1 professional experience with Dodge 2 CPO vehicles, and in his capacity as representative 30(b)(6) 3 SAHARA involving CPO vehicles, the 4 buyer within the community has a right to expect SAHARA is going 5 to always be truthful, honest and 6 accurate with them when it comes to the sale of a CPO vehicle. 7 8 Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 126: 10-25, 29 Based on Joshua Grant's 127: 1-12 professional experience in selling over 9 15,000 used cars within the Dodge 10 environment, including SAHARA, and in his capacity as the 30(b)(6) 11 representative of SAHARA involving 12 CPO vehicles, SAHARA has vastly superior knowledge about the 13 condition of a CPO vehicle as opposed to that of the consumer at time of sale. 14 15 Based Joshua 30. on Grant's Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 130: 6-14 professional experience in selling over 16 15,000 used cars within the Dodge 17 environment, including SAHARA, and in his capacity as the 30(b)(6) 18 representative of SAHARA involving 19 CPO vehicles, SAHARA considers it important for the car buyer to 20 make an informed choice when 21 purchase a CPO vehicle. 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7

Based Joshua on 1 31. professional experience in selling over 2 15,000 used cars within the Dodge environment, including SAHARA, and 3 in his capacity as the 30(b)(6) 4 representative of SAHARA involving CPO vehicles, to help ensure a buyer 5 within the community can make an 6 informed choice and educated decision, it is important for SAHARA 7 to be completely truthful, honest and 8 accurate with the car buyer to make full disclosure to the car buver who is 9 thinking of purchasing a CPO vehicle. 10 Based Joshua on 32. 11 12 13 14 15 16 ability or marketability 17 18 19 20 21

Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 131: 21-24, 132: 1-6, 133: 1-12.

Grant's professional experience with Dodge CPO vehicles, and in his capacity as the 30(b)(6) representative of SAHARA involving CPO vehicles, it is important for SAHARA to make full disclosure to a used car buyer involving things that might affect the vehicle's value, safety, desire-

Grant's

Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 65: 5-13, **130**: 8-13

33. According to Joshua Grant in his capacity as the 30(b)(6) representative of SAHARA involving CPO vehicles, and his experience in his capacity as Director of SAHARA's Used Car Department, the reason for SAHARA making full disclosure to the buyer within the community about things that might affect the vehicle's value, safety, desirability or marketability is because SAHARA prefers to be upfront, and honest as possible, legally, ethically and morally.

Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 65: 1-20

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1	34. Noah Grant, was the Finance and Insurance ("F & I") manager from	Exhibit 10, depo of N. Grant, 28: 10-16
2	SAHARA's who was responsible for	
3	preparing the closing documents with the Plaintiff relating to the vehicle.	
4	the Flamen relating to the venicle.	
5	35. Noah Grant began working for SAHARA after it first opened and held	Exhibit 10, depo of N. Grant, 13: 8-16
6	the F & I manager position for two	
7	years.	
8	36. Based on Noah Grant's vast and	Exhibit 10, depo of N. Grant, 16: 10-22
9	intimate experience in working within the Dodge dealership industry he has a	
10	good understanding of Dodge products,	
11	including the CPO program.	
12	37. Noah Grant, before coming to	Exhibit 10, depo of N. Grant, 17: 4-8
13	SAHARA, specifically received training and was in sales meeting involving the	
14	Dodge CPO program.	
15	38. Noah Grant had sold somewhere	Exhibit 10, depo of N. Grant, 20: 19-25,
16	between 500 to 1000 Dodge vehicles to	21 : 1-6
17	the community before becoming a F & I manager at SAHARA.	
18	39. Based upon Noah Grant's <i>intimate</i>	Exhibit 10, depo of N. Grant, 21: 7-14
19	familiarity and experience with	Exhibit 10, depo of N. Grant, 21. /-14
20	selling Dodge vehicles to the community, Noah Grant also acquired	
21	an understanding of what expectations	
22	were important to the consumer within the community when purchasing a used	
23	vehicle.	
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1	40. Based upon Noah Grant's sales	Exhibit 10, depo of N. Grant, 19: 16-25,
2	experience in the Dodge environment, he carried his sales experience with him	20: 1-4
3	into the F&I department with respect to	
4	a consumer's expectations involving Dodge CPO vehicles.	
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6	41. Based upon Noah Grant's experience in selling between 500 to	Exhibit 10, depo of N. Grant, 21: 15-19
7	1000 Dodge vehicles to the community,	, -
8	the things consumers within the community would consider important in	
9	purchasing a used vehicle would include	
10	safety 2) reliability and 3) affordability.	
11	40 Posed on Neels County	
12	42. Based on Noah Grant's experience in selling between 500 to 1000 Dodge	Exhibit 10, depo of N. Grant, 25: 8-18
13	vehicles to the community, because it	
14	would be important to disclose to the consumer a vehicle's accident history, it	
15	would be <u>equally important</u> to	
16	disclose to the consumer within the community the nature and	
17	extent of that accident IF the	
18	dealership KNEW of the nature and extent of the previous accident.	
	extent of the previous decident.	
19	43. Based on Noah Grant's experience in	Exhibit 10, depo of N. Grant, 26: 13-24,
20	selling between 500 to 1000 Dodge vehicles to the community, and his work	27 : 1-5; 31 : 20-25, 32 : 1-4
21	experience at SAHARA, if SAHARA had	
22	knowledge about the actual nature and extent of the accident, meaning	
23	they knew what parts were replaced and	
	mey knew what parts were replaced and	
24	repaired, the amount of previous	
24 25	 	
	repaired, the amount of previous accident damage, those facts would be important to disclose to a consumer who is buying a CPO	
25	repaired, the amount of previous accident damage, <u>those facts would</u> <u>be important to disclose to a</u>	

1	44. Based on Noah Grant's experience	Exhibit 10, depo of N. Grant, 29: 9-24,
2	in selling between 500 to 1000 Dodge vehicles to the community, and his	32 : 1-4
3	work experience at SAHARA, based on	
4	the way he closed deals, if he came into receipt of information that the CPO	
5	vehicle Mr. Poole was purchasing had	
6	\$4,088.70 in damage to it based upon a previous accident, Noah	
7	Grant would have disclosed this	
8	information to Mr. Poole if he had knowledge of it.	
9	naa knowleage oj ti.	
10	45. The reason why Noah Grant	Exhibit 10, depo of N. Grant, 29: 9-24,
11	would disclose to the consumer that a CPO had sustained \$4,008.70 in	32 : 1-9
,	previous is because such information	
12	might be important for the consumer to know based on safety concerns	
13	regarding the vehicle.	
14	46. Based on Noah Grant's experience	Exhibit 10, depo of N. Grant, 31: 20-25,
15	in selling between 500 to 1000 Dodge	32 : 1-4
16	vehicles to the community, and his work experience at SAHARA, because	
17	a consumer within the community	
18	might associate a safety issue with a previous accident, he believes that	
19	the nature and extent of that	
20	accident would also be	
21	important information to disclose to the buyer before they	
22	purchased the vehicle.	
23	47. Travis Spruell was the sales person	Exhibit 12, depo of Spruell, 45: 18-25,
24	involved in the Plaintiff's CPO vehicle	19: 1-4, Decl. of Plntf¶1.
25	sale transaction	
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48 Travis Spruell has been a vehicle sales person in the car dealership industry since the end of 2009, beginning of 2010 49. Since the beginning of 2010 Travis Spruell has sold used CPO vehicles at	Exhibit 12, depo of Spruell, 14: 24-25, 15:1-3
beginning of 2010 49. Since the beginning of 2010 Travis	
49. Since the beginning of 2010 Travis	
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	
_	Exhibit 12, depo of Spruell, 15: 6-18
local Ford, Chevrolet and Chrysler dealerships (SAHARA).	
50. Based on this experience in selling	Exhibit 12, depo of Spruell 23: 14-25
used vehicles to the community and	23. 14-25
talking with such consumers with respect to what might be important to	
a consumer would take into account in	
purchasing a used vehicle.	
51. Based on Travis Spruell's	Exhibit 12, depo of Spruell 26: 20-25,
-	27 : 1-2
might be concerned about a previous	
• • •	
always be truthful, honest and	
_	
mechanical condition and 3) its value.	
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	Spruell has sold used CPO vehicles at local Ford, Chevrolet and Chrysler dealerships (SAHARA). 50. Based on this experience in selling used vehicles to the community and talking with such consumers with respect to what might be important to them when purchasing a used car, a vehicle's safety would be something a consumer would take into account in purchasing a used vehicle. 51. Based on Travis Spruell's experience in selling CPO vehicles to the community, because a consumer might be concerned about a previous accident history when buying a used vehicle, it would be important to always be truthful, honest and accurate to disclose information and facts about: 1) safety, 2)

1	52. Based on Travis Spruell's	Exhibit 12, depo of Spruell 14: 24-25,
2	experience, in conjunction with what what sale what sale what sale what sale what sale with the conjunction with what	15 : 1 -3, 28 : 7-25, 29 : 1-5
3	him to do, Mr. Spruell believes that	
4	part of being truthful, honest and	
5	accurate with the consumer in giving full disclosures to them regarding	
6	information that might affect a	
7	vehicle's 1) safety, 2) mechanical condition and 3) its value, so that	
8	they can make an informed	
	decision in purchasing a used vehicle.	
9	53. Travis Spruell believes that it is	Exhibit 12, depo of Spruell, 32: 9-22
10	important as a vehicle sales person at SAHARA to always be truthful, honest	
11	and accurate, and it would be equally	
12	important to disclose the nature	
13	and extent of an accident to the consumer if the dealer had that	
14	information	
15	54. Based on Travis Spruell's experience	Exhibit to done of Compell 65, a or
16	in selling hundreds of certified CPO vehicles to the community, he believes	Exhibit 12, depo of Spruell, 65: 2-25, 66: 1-10, 70: 21-25, 71: 1-13, 21, 25, 72:
17	as a vehicle sales person, that if he knew	1-25, 73 : 1-4
18	that the accident reflected on a Carfax actually caused \$4,088.70 in damage	
19	to the vehicle, he would have disclosed this information to Mr.	
20	Poole in the normal course of selling a	
21	CPO vehicle at SAHARA.	
22	55. The reasons Mr. Spruell would have disclosed the \$4,088.70 in damage to	Exhibit 12, depo of Spruell, 65: 1-25
23	the vehicle to Mr. Poole is because that	66: 1-10 , 70 : 21-25 , 71 : 1-13
24	would be part of being truthful, honest and accurate to the consumer within the	
25	community to make full disclosure before they purchased the vehicle	
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60 SAHARA never specifically and/or 1 Exhibit 6; SAHARA's RFA resp. to Plnt'f RFA # 36, 37 and 38, Decl. of Plnt'f ¶ 4 explicitly informed or communicated to 2 the Plaintiff or gave him information at time of sale that the 3 vehicle had: 4 • a replaced right bumper bracket. 5 a repaired left front frame end bracket. a replaced front bumper. 6 a replaced radiator support. 7 • a replaced left outer and inner tie rod. • a replaced aftermarket left stabilizer link 8 • a repaired front left wheel. • a repainted left front fender. 9 61. When the previous accident was Decl. of Plntf's ¶ 2 10 brought to the Plaintiff's attention 11 during the sales process, Plaintiff specifically inquired about the 12 accident and was told by SAHARA's 13 sales person, Travis Spruell, that it was only a "minor" accident, that the vehicle 14 had been through their 15 comprehensive inspection, and that if the vehicle was in any significant 16 accident, they would not be selling the 17 vehicle to him. 18 62. SAHARA admits never specifically Exhibit 6, SAHARA's RFA resp. to Plnt'f 19 and/or explicitly informed RFA # 38, Decl. of Plnt'f ¶ 4 communicated to the Plaintiff or gave 20 him any information that the vehicle had sustained \$4,088.77 in previous 21 collision damage at time of sale. 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 15

1	63. SAHARA admits has no document		Exhibit 6, SAHARA's RFA resp. to Plnt'f
2	or record signed by the Plaintiff that specifically and/or explicitly discloses to		RFA # 36
3	the Plaintiff at time of sale that the		
4	vehicle_had:		
5	 a replaced right bumper bracket. a repaired left front end bracket. 		
	a replaced front bumper.a replaced radiator support.		
6	• a replaced left outer and inner tie rod.		
7	 a replaced aftermarket left stabilizer link a repaired front left wheel. 		
8	• a repainted left front fender.		
9	64 The information contained in the		Exhibit 2, ACE, Decl. of Plnt'f ¶ 5 & 6
10	64. The information contained in the ACE with respect to the monetary		Lambit 2, ACE, Deci. of Filler #5 & 0
11	damage and all the items that were		
12	replaced and/or repaired would have been important to the Plaintiff in		
13	making his decision purchasing the		
14	vehicle.		
	65. Had the ACE been disclosed to the		Exhibit 2, ACE, Decl. of Plnt'f ¶ 5
15	Plaintiff, he not only would not have		, , ,
16	purchased the vehicle, but he would not have purchased any vehicle from		
17	SAHARA.		
18			
19	66. Had the repaired or replaced items in fact # 63 been disclosed to the		Exhibit 2, ACE, Decl. of Plnt'f ¶ 5
20	Plaintiff in the CPO inspection report, he		
21	would not have purchased the vehicle		
22	and would not have done any business with SAHARA.		
23	<u>.</u>		
24	67. According to Joshua Grant in his capacity as the 30(b)(6) representative		Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 127: 20- 25, 128: 1; Decl. of Plntf. ¶ 3.
	of SAHARA involving CPO vehicles, a		
25	car buyer within the community <u>has</u> <u>every right to rely</u> on the contents		
26	and accuracy and truthfulness of a [CPO] vehicle inspection Ex. ³		
27	The report referenced in the testimony is		
28	the CPO check list/inspection report at Exhibit 3 to the Exhibits support Plaintiff's Opposition.	16	
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1 2	68. None of the repaired and/or replaced items on the ACE including the ones listed in undisputed fact number	Exhibit 2, ACE; Exhibit 3, CPO inspection report
3	63 are listed on SAHARA's CPO check	
4	list/inspection report, including on the second page under the heading	
5	"additional information"	
6	69. On May 8, 2014, (<i>only three days</i>	
7	after Joshua Grant entered the	Exhibit 5, SAHARA's Resp. to Plntf's
8	vehicle into SAHARA's inventory), the CPO inspection on the vehicle was	RFA # 2, # 4, and # 5.
9	undertaken by SAHARA's certified and	
10	trained technician and signed the CPO inspection report.	
11	-	
12	70. As part of his normal job duties within his department,, Joshua Grant,	Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 21: 1-9
13	as the Director of SAHARA's Used Car	
14	Department, was the one who was responsible for bringing vehicles over to	
15	SAHARA's service department for its 125 point CPO inspection.	
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17	71. The vehicle underwent the Dodge 125 comprehensive CPO inspection on	Exhibit 5, Def's resp. to Plntf's RFA Req.
18	May 8, 2014 (three days <i>after</i> Joshua Grant personally received the ACE in his	# 4, Exhibit 9; depo of Grant, 84 : 5-14, 96 : 24-25, 97 : 1-8
19	possession on May 5, 2014)	
20	72. At the time Joshua Grant, as	
21	Director of SAHARA's Used Car Sales	Exhibit 9; depo of Grant, 84: 5-14, 96:
22	Department, brought the vehicle to SAHARA's service department to	24-25, 97: 1-8, 98: 13-23, 99: 2-5;
23	undergo the CPO inspection, Joshua	Exhibit 2, ACE; Exhibit 5, Def's resp. to Plntf's RFA Req. # 1, # 7 and # 10.
24	Grant <i>knew</i> about the ACE, he <i>knew</i> the ACE's contents, and was the person	
25	who took personal possession of it on	
26	May 5, 2015 from Mr. Hinton, (three days earlier).	
27	aujo variicij.	
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1	73. Joshua Grant, as SAHARA's Director	
2	of Used Car Sales, personally made the decision to resell the vehicle to the	
3	community as a Dodge CPO.	
4	74. Joshua Grant, as Director of	Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 91 : 10-20
5	SAHARA's Used Car Sales Department,	, <u> </u>
6	had no policy or practice that if he personally had actual documentation of	
7	previous repairs undertaken on a vehicle	
8	which he personally made the decision to resell to the	
9	community as a CPO, that would	
10	NOT be important for him to pass	
11	that information onto the service department BEFORE the	
12	technician undertook his 125	
13	point CPO inspection.	
13	75. Joshua Grant, in his capacity as	
	SAHARA's Director of Used Car Sales, if he had specific, articulable, identifiable	Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 94: 7-19
15	information relating to an body shop	
16	estimate [ACE] that would reflect the nature and extent of the damage to the	
17	vehicle, <u>it was NOT something that</u>	
18	he would have considered giving the service department before the	
19	CPO inspection was done.	
20	76. Joshua Grant, in his capacity	
21	as SAHARA's Director of Used Car	Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 104: 6-11
22	Sales Department did NOT deem	
23	the nature and extent of a previous accident to a vehicle as	
24	being important in making the	
25	determination as to whether or not he would resell the vehicle to	
26	the community as a CPO vehicle.	
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1 2	77. Joshua Grant, as Director of SAHARA's Used Car Department, ran a		Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 99: 2-5, 19-21, 101 : 7-23. Exhibit 4, Carfax.
	Carfax on the vehicle on May 5, 2014		
3	78. As SAHARA's Director of Used Car		Exhibit 4; Carfax; Exhibit 9, depo of
5	sales, Joshua Grant had the Carfax in his possession and it indicated the vehicle		Grant, 102: 10-17.
6	was in an accident.		
7	79. The Carfax matches the vehicle		Exhibit 4, Carfax; Exhibit 2, ACE
8	make, model year and VIN of the Plaintiff's vehicle as reflected on the		
9	ACE		
10	80. It was NOT custom or practice for		Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 102:18-23
11	either Joshua Grantor or for SAHARA's Used Car Department to bring the		
12	Carfax over to the service department to		
13	allow them to look at it before they did their certified inspection		
14	-		- 1 1 2 2 2
15	81. Joshua Grant does not know or recall if he brought the Carfax		Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 102:18-25
16	involving the Plaintiff's vehicle to SAHARA's service department before		
17 18	they did their CPO inspection on the vehicle.		
19			
20	82. If SAHARA had prior knowledge of certain damage to a vehicle from a body		Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 134 : 13-22
21	shop estimate, SAHARA would NOT		
22	disclose the information on the body shop estimate [ACE] to the		
23	consumer buying a CPO vehicle.		
24			
25			
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27			
28		19	

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83. According to Jeff Grant, with respect to SAHARA making "full disclosure" to the about important facts that might affect a vehicle's safety or value, if a vehicle had a little over \$ 4,000.00 in damage, and damage to certain components, and if Jeff Grant had actual knowledge of something involving the nature and extent of the damage to the vehicle, SAHARA does NOT think information relating to the nature and extent of the accident should be communicated to the consumer purchasing a CPO vehicle, even if this information was in the dealers' knowledge.

Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 135: 20-25, 136: 1-14

84. If SAHARA had actual knowledge that certain components on a vehicle have been damaged, and that vehicle is going to be sold to the community as a CPO, and had knowledge of the type of information reflected on the [ACE], SAHARA does NOT believe that kind of information would be important to the buyer who is going to by CPO vehicle.

Exhibit 9, depo of Grant, 137: 3-12, 23-27, 139: 17-25, 140: 1-10

85. Ray Gongora, SAHARA's certified CPO technician who undertook the comprehensive 125 point CPO inspection on the vehicle considered the information on the ACE, based on his experience, to have been important information. and would have wanted to have the ACE in his possession before he undertook his CPO inspection.

Exhibit 11, depo of Gongora, 30: 10-15

[&]quot;Exhibit 2" referred to in Gongora's testimony was the ACE attached as Exhibit 2 to Plaintiff's Exhibits in Opposition to SAHARA's motion.

86. Ray Gongora has no recollection if he received the ACE from anyone at SAHARA regarding the vehicle. ⁵

87. Joshua Grant, Director of SAHARA's Used Car Department, who personally received the ACE from the previous owner of the vehicle, *has no recollection* of whether he gave the ACE to Ray Gongora, SAHARA's CPO technician.

88. According to Mr. Gongora, some of the things and components set forth in ACE *are the same* as those that would be covered by the CPO inspection report.

89. According to Mr. Gongora, had the received the ACE before he conducted the CPO inspection on the vehicle, he would have specifically looked at the different components that were listed on the ACE that overlapped the same components that are covered in the CPO inspection report, and believes that would be the prudent thing to do.

90. Because Joshua Grant, as Director of SAHARA's Used Cart Department, had actually received and had actual possession of the ACE on May 5, 2014, whether or not Mr. Grant gave the ACE to Mr. Gongora, SAHARA knew or should have known that the the left front wheel to the vehicle had been damaged and repaired as a result of the previous collision to the vehicle.

Exhibit 11, depo of Gongora, 31: 5-10

Exhibit 9; depo of Grant **92**: 18-25, 93: 1-10

Exhibit 11, depo of Gongora, 30: 4-9

Exhibit 11, depo of Gongora, 31: 11-21

Exhibit 2, ACE at pages 2 & 3 lines under heading "WHEELS" lines 29-34; Exhibit 9; depo of Grant, 84: 5-14, 96: 24-25, 97: 1-8; Exhibit 5, Def's resp. to Plntf's RFA Req. # 1, # 7 and # 10.

⁵ "Exhibit 2" referred to in Gongora's testimony was the ACE attached as Exhibit 2 to Plaintiff's Exhibits in Opposition to SAHARA's motion.

91. SAHARA's certified CPO technician who undertook the CPO inspection on the vehicle, (Ray Gongora), was trained to recognize the signs and/or indications of prior collision/ accident damage to a vehicle that was going to be resold to the community as a CPO vehicle.

Exhibit 5; Def's resp. to Plnt's RFA # 20.

92 The ACE clearly indicates the left front wheel as being "reconditioned" and that the wheel was sent out to be "rechromed," <u>or</u> the front left wheel was replaced with a "recycled" wheel. The definition of "RCY" in the ACE means "used parts."

Exhibit 2, ACE at pages 2 & 3 lines under heading "WHEELS" lines 29-34, Exhibit 7, Def's Resp. to Plntf's RFA # 29.

93. . Because Joshua Grant, as Director of SAHARA's Used Cart Department, had actually received and had actual possession of the ACE on May 5, 2014, SAHARA actually knew or should have known that the left front wheel was either "reconditioned" (meaning rechromed), or it was a recycled wheel.

Exhibit 2, ACE at pages 2 & 3 lines under heading "WHEELS" lines 29-34, Exhibit 7, Def's Resp. to Plntf's RFA # 29; Exhibit 9; depo of Grant, 84: 5-14, 96: 24-25, 97: 1-8;

94. According to Fiat Chrysler America ("FCA") official factory position statement regarding "reconditioned" wheels – reconditioned wheels are defined as those that have been "damaged," -- meaning bent, broken cracked or sustained some other physical damage.

Exhibit 8, FAC position statement, Decl. of Avillini \P 14.

	il de la companya de	
1	95. The FCA official factory position	Exhibit 8, FCA position statement
2	statement is clear regarding "reconditioned" wheels – "reconditioned"	
3	wheel is defined as wheels that have been	
4	"damaged," meaning bent, broken	
5	cracked or sustained some other physical damage, <u>CAN RESULT IN A</u>	
	SUDDEN CATASTROPHIC WHEEL	
6	FAILURE WHICH COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL AND RESULT	
7	IN INJURY OR DEATH.	
8	of Mana anadenalla EGA efficial	Elevanor w
9	96. More specifically, FCA official factory position statement states:	Exhibit 8, FCA position statement
10	"replating or chrome plated	
11	wheels, or chrome plating of original equipment is <u>NOT an</u>	
12	acceptable procedure as this may	
13	alter the mechanical properties	
14	does not allow refinishing of wheels	
15	under warranty.	
16	97. A photo of the left front chromed	Exhibit 14, photo of wheel, Decl. of
17	wheel to the vehicle produced and	Avillini ¶ 16, Exhibit 17, SAHARA's initial disclosures
18	identified by SAHARA in discovery, which was part of a group of photos	initial disclosures
19	showing the repairs and damage to the	
	vehicle as a result of the previous collision, shows a sizable chip taken	
20	out of the rim of the wheel as a	
21	result of the previous collision.	
22	98. A chip taken out the the edge of the	Exhibit 8, FCA position statement;
23	wheel meets the definition of damage	Exhibit 14, photo of left wheel of vehicle during time vehicle was being repaired,
24	under the FCA position statement on "reconditioned" wheels.	Decl. of Avillini ¶ 16.
25		
26		
27		
28		

1	99. The FCA position statement regarding "reconditioned" wheels	Exhibit 8, FAC position statement, Decl. of Avillini ¶ 15
2	would have or should have been	
3	known and/or easily accessible to SAHARA'S given SAHARA is factory	
4	authorized and franchised	
5	Chrysler/Dodge dealer.	
6	100. Given SAHARA's would have or	
7	should have known of the FCA official	Exhibit 2, ACE, Exhibit 8, FAC position statement, Decl. of Avillini ¶ 15
8	factory position statement regarding "reconditioned" wheels on Dodge	
9	vehicles, SAHARA also knew or	
10	should have known that the previous repair to the left front wheel on the	
11	vehicle did not meet factory repair	
12	specifications, and could not have been properly certified as a CPO vehicle.	
13	properly certified as a Cr o vehicle.	
14	101. Whether the left front wheel to the vehicle was repaired by being	Exhibit 2, ACE, Exhibit 8, FAC position
	vehicle was repaired by being "rechromed" or replaced with a "used"	statement, Decl. of Avillini ¶ 16
15	or "recycled" wheel, as clearly stated in	
16	the ACE, either one would not meet Chrysler/ Dodge Factory repair	
17	specifications.	
18	102. In addition to the wheel not being	D 1 C4 222 tom 0 D 121 to
19	repaired according to factory	Decl. of Avillini ¶¶ 19 & 20, Exhibit 22, Veh. Cond Rpt. of Avillini (w/o exhibits)
20	specifications, there were other repairs on the vehicle from the previous	
21	collision that were not repaired	
22	according to manufacturer specifications	
23	103. Because the vehicle did not meet	Decl. of Avillini ¶¶ 14- 20; Exhibit 22,
24	Chrysler/Dodge manufacturer repair	Veh. Cond Rpt. of Avillini (w/o exhibits)
25	specifications, the vehicle should never have been certified as a CPO by	
26	SAHARA or resold to the community a	
27	CPO vehicle by SAHARA.	
28		
		24

1	104. SAHARA <u>admits</u> it actually		Exhibit 9; depo of Grant, 84: 5-14, 96:
2	knew about the ACE and had it in its possession on May 5, 2014 when		24-25, 97 : 1-8; <i>Exhibit 2</i> , ACE; <i>Exhibit 5</i> , Def's Resp. to Plntf's RFA 1, 7, & 10
3	SAHARA entered the vehicle in their		0, = 000 000 p. 00 1 ==== 0 1 == 1, /, 00 10
4	inventory, as well as on May 8, 2014 when SAHARA undertook the CPO		
5	inspection on the vehicle and also on		
6	May 25, 2014 when SAHARA resold the vehicle to the Plaintiff as a CPO		
7	vehicle		
8	105. Because of the nature and extent		Decl. of Avillini ¶¶ 22 and 31, Exhibit 19,
9	of the previous collision/accident		Diminished Value Report of Avillini
10	damage, the vehicle sustained diminished value, causing the Plaintiff's		
11	vehicle at time of sale to worth substantially less on the day he		
12	purchased it from SAHARA before he		
13	even drove it off the lot.		
14	105A. The photos produced by SAHARA		Decl. of Avillini ¶ 16.
15	of the vehicle undergoing repairs and the damaged and replaced parts in those		Deci. of Notatine 10.
16	photos are entirely consistent with those		
17	reflected on the ACE and identify the same VIN number of the subject vehicle.		
18	·		
19	106. As part of the sale transaction involving the vehicle, SAHARA offered		Decl. of Plntf. ¶ 6, Exhibit 18, Plntf's
20	and Plaintiff accepted SAHARA giving		Retail Installment Sale Contract.
21	him \$ 4,000.00 for his trade in which went towards his down payment under		
22	his contract.		
23	107. Plaintiff never would have entered		
24	into the contract for the purchase of the		Decl. of Plntf. ¶ 5
25	vehicle had he been fully informed of the content of the ACE.		
26	108 Plaintiff has noid a summent total of		
27	108. Plaintiff has paid a current total of \$22,641.94 on the vehicle and has		Decl. of Plntf. ¶ 7
28	approximately \$16,766.11_left to pay.	25	
		25	ļ

1	109. Plaintiff has no expertise with Decl. of Plntf. ¶ 2
2	respect to vehicle, vehicle repair.
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	Dated this 19 th day of October, 2017
8	Dated this 19 day of October, 2017
9	
10	
11	By <u>/s/ George O. West III</u>
12	By <u>/s/ George O. West III</u> Law Offices of George O. West III Consumer Attorneys Against Auto Fraud Attorney for Plaintiff DERRICK POOLE
13	DERRICK POOLE
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1	PROOF OF SERVICE
2	STATE OF NEVADA)
<i>3</i>	COUNTY OF CLARK
5	On October 20, 2017, I served the forgoing document(s) described as 1) PLAINTIFF'S SEPARATE STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT on
6 7	interested party(ies) in this action by either fax and/or email, or by placing a true and correct copy and/or original thereof addressed as follows:
8	JEFF BENDAVID, ESQ Moran, Brandon, Bendavid, Moran
9	630 South Fourth Street Las Vegas, NV 89101
10	j.bendavid@moranlawfirm.com
11	NATHAN KANUTE, ESQ
12	Snell & Wilmer 3883 Howard Hughes Pkwy
13	Suite 1100 Lass Vegas, NV 89169
14	nkanute@swlaw.com
15 16	[] (BY FIRST CLASS MAIL) I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal service on that same day with first class postage thereon fully prepaid at Las Vegas, NV in the ordinary course of business.
17 18	[] (BY PERSONAL SERVICE) I delivered such envelope by hand to the office, and/or to the attorney listed as the addressee below.
19 20	[] (BY FAX SERVICE) Pursuant to consent under NRCP, Rule 5(b), I hereby certify that service of the aforementioned document(s) via facsimile, pursuant to EDCR Rule 7.26(a), as set forth herein.
21 22 23	[x] (BY EMAIL SERVICE) (Wiznet/email) Pursuant NRCP, Rule 5(b)(2)(D), and the EDCR on electronic service, I hereby certify that service of the aforementioned document(s) via email to pursuant to the relevant and pertinent provisions of EDCR and NRCP, as set forth herein.
24	Executed on this 20th day of October, 2017
25	
26	<u>/s/ George O. West III</u> GEORGE O. WEST III
27	
28	

EXHIBIT 5

Electronically Filed 11/27/2017 8:10 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

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DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

DERRICK POOLE

CASE NO.: A-16-737120-C

DEPT NO.: 27

PLAINTIFF(S)

NEVADA AUTO DEALERSHIP INVESTMENTS, LLC; WELLS FARGO DEALER SERVICES, INC.; COREPOINTE INSURANCE COMPANY

DEFENDANT(S)

<u>DECISION & ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT</u>

These matters having come on for hearing on November 9, 2017; George O. West III, Esq. and Craig B. Friedberg, Esq. appearing for Plaintiff Derrick Poole ("Poole"); Jeffery A. Bendavid, Esq. and Stephanie J. Smith, Esq. appearing for Defendants Nevada Auto Dealership Investments LLC d/b/a Sahara Chrysler, Jeep, Dodge, and Corepointe Insurance Company ("Defendant(s)"), and the Court having heard arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, COURT FINDS after review:

This case arises out of a sale of a Certified Pre-Owned ("CPO") truck purchased on or about May 26, 2014. Defendants Nevada Auto Dealership LLC and Corepointe Insurance Co. filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on October 2, 2017, and a hearing was held November 9, 2017. The Court took the matter under advisement and set a Status Check for November 21, 2017 for the Court to release a written decision.

When Plaintiff purchased his CPO 2013 Dodge Ram from Defendant, Defendant disclosed that the vehicle was in a prior accident. It is undisputed that Defendant produced a CarFax vehicle history report that listed the vehicle was in a prior accident, and the sales representative indicated the same. Plaintiff drove the vehicle for a year, at which point he discovered the vehicle had frame damage. Plaintiff kept driving the vehicle. Plaintiff now contends that Defendants' disclosure of the previous accident at the time of sale was insufficient because Defendants had an Allstate Collision Estimate of Record ("ACE") that stated the nature, extent, and repair cost of the damage from the previous collision.

Defendant moves for summary judgment under NRCP 56. "Summary judgment is appropriate under NRCP 56 when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits, if any, that are properly before the court demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 731, 121 P.3d 1026, 1031 (2005).

Plaintiff argues that each of his claims arise from Defendant's failure to disclose material facts, namely the nature and extent of the damage from the previous collision. Defendant contends that the material fact here is that the vehicle was in a prior accident, not the extent of the damage from that accident.

NRS 598.0923 only requires the disclosure of material facts. Here, the material fact is that the vehicle was in a prior accident. The duty to disclose under NRS 598.0923 does not extend to the entire effect of the accident, such as a price breakdown of every part and service provided as listed in the ACE. It is undisputed that Defendant disclosed the prior accident to Plaintiff. There is no indication in the record that Plaintiff inquired about the parts and services used to repair the vehicle as provided in the ACE, and such information was then withheld. Plaintiff relied on the

CPO report, which the undisputed evidence shows would only have notated frame damage if a repair, if any, was not up to standard.

To the extent Plaintiff argues Defendant made false representations as to the certification of truck, or that the truck was of a particular quality or standard, this argument is flawed. The vehicle went through and passed a 125-point Certified Pre-Owned Vehicle Inspection. Given this certification, Plaintiff cannot argue that Defendant misrepresented that the vehicle was CPO certified, as it was. The sufficiency of the CPO inspection standards is not at issue for this argument, but rather the fact that the vehicle was ultimately certified as pre-owned.

Plaintiff conceded at the hearing that if the claim for deceptive trade practices fails, the remaining claims for equitable relief must also fail. This Court agrees. Defendant disclosed the material facts about the vehicle, and Plaintiff purchased the vehicle, driving it for at least two years. Thus, there are no grounds to grant equitable relief for Plaintiff.

THEREFORE, COURT ORDERS for good cause appearing and after review Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. The hearing on Motions in Limine set for December 21, 2017 at 10:30 a.m. on Motions Calendar and the Jury Trial set to begin January 8, 2018 at 10:00 a.m. are hereby VACATED.

DATED November 22, 2017

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

nw / A1/5

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on or about the date signed I caused the foregoing document to be electronically served pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a) and 8.05(f) through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system, with the date and time of the electronic service substituted for the date and place of deposit in the mail to and/or by fax and mail to:

Jeffery Bendavid, Esq. Stephanie Smith, Esq. MORAN BRANDON BENDAVID MORAN

George West III, Esq. LAW OFFICES OF GEORGE O. WEST, III

Craig Friedberg, Esq.
LAW OFFICES OF CRAIG B. FRIEDBERG, ESQ.

Karen Lawrence

Judicial Executive Assistant

eurenol

EXHIBIT 6

Alistate Fire and Casualty Ins. Co.

SOUTHWEST AUTO-LAS VEGAS 222 S.Mill Ave Suite 511

Tempe, AZ 85281 Phone: (800) 347-4488

Claim #: Workfile ID:

000320887250001 afefebße

Estimate of Record

Written By: FRED CLINHINGHAM, 3/31/2014 9:27:34 AM Adjuster: CYNTHIA TRINIDAD, (702) 837-7123 Business

Impured: Type of Loss: **DALE HINTON**

Policy #:

000916685347

Claim #:

090320887250001

Point of Impact:

Collision

Date of Loss;

03/26/2014 12:00 PM

11 Left Front

Deductible:

500,00

Days to Repair:

Dwnen

DALE HINTON 9542 BORGATA BAY BLVD LAS VEGAS, NV 89147-8080 (702) 232-9622 Other

DALEHENTONOADL.COM

Inspection Location:

UNIVERSAL MOTORCARS 5588 SPRING MOUNTAIN RD LAS VEGAS, NV Repair Facility (702) 754-6774 Business

Appreiser Informations fred.cunningham@allstate.com

(702) 630-2292

Repair Facility: UNIVERSAL MOTORCARS 5588 SPRING MOUNTAIN RD LAS YEGAS, NV (702) 754-6774 Buildings

(702) 754-6043 Fax info@universally.com

VEHICLE

Year: Make: 2013 DCDG

Body Style:

GRAY Int: GRAY 4D PAI

License: LOS YYA

State:

Production Date: **Cdemeter:**

10/2012

Medel: RAM 1500 4X2 QUAD BIG HORN

Engine: 8-S.7L-FI

ww

LCGRRGGTBDSSSB275

Condition:

6632

TRANSMISSION

Automatic Transmission **POWER** Power Steering **Power Brakes Power Windows** Power Locks **Power Miners** Heated Mirrors **Power Driver Sent** DECOR **Dual Miners** Aftermarket Film Tint Console/Storage

Air Conditioning Intermittent Wisers Till Wheel **Circles Control** Keyless Estry Message Center Steering Wheel Touch Controls **Navigation System**

RADIO AM REGIO FM Radio Stareo Search/Seek

CD Player Auxiliary Audio Connection Satelite Radio SAFETY Drivers Side Air Bao Pastenger Air Bag Anti-Lock Brakes (4)

4 Wheel Disc Braices Traction Control Stability Control Front Side Impact Air Bags Head/Curtain Air Bogs Hands Free Device **Positraction**

SEATS Cloth Seats **Burket Scale**

Radining/Lounge Seats Retractable Seats WHERI C

20° Or Larger Whatis PAINT Clear Coat Paint Metallic Paint OTHER Fog Lamps California Emissions TRUCK

Power Rear Window Trailer libra Trafferino Packace Russing Boards/Side Steps

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CONVENIENCE

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Page 1

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Estimate of Record

2013 DODG RAM 1500 4X2 QUAD BIG HORN 4D P/U 8-5.7L-FI GRAY

Une		Oper	Description	Part Number	Qty	Extended Price \$		Paini
1	#		All Supplements Require Prior Allstate Approval		1	0.00	0,0	0.0
Z	•		Supplement Fex#866-487-5751 or Email AZ SUPPSZ@ALLSTATE.COM		1	0.00	0.0	0.0
3	FRONT BUN	4PER						
4			O/H bumper assy		a	0.00	2.6	0.0
5	**	Repl	RECOND Bumper derome w/o air suspension	68160853AB	1	585.00	Ind.	0.0
			NOTE: SALT LAKE CHRONE_AVAIL	ER KYLE.800-843-1956				
6			Add for fog tamps		0	0.00	0.4	0.0
7	⇔	Repl	Upper gover primed	68197697AA	1	169.00	Înci.	1.6
8			Add for Clear Coat		0	0.00	60	0.6
9		Rept	RT Comp bracket	681989R0AA	ï	ממם	ind.	0.0
10		Rept	RT Bumper bracket	68198981AA	1	239.00	Incl.	0.0
11		Rept	Lawer deflector vi/painted bumper	68033135AA	1	96.20	Incl.	9.0
12	,		Ropair L/F Frame end bracket		1	0.00	1.0	0.2
13		Repl	LT Upper cover Inner support	55277481AC	1	10.35	incl	0.0
14	GRILLE				•	10.00		414
15		rai	R&I grille assy		0	0.00	Ind.	0.0
16	FRORT LAN	PS	•		-			414
17		Repl	LT Hundlamp issay w/o must-beam	6809G439AC	1	190.60	Inci.	0.0
			NOTE: VERIFIED LAMP WITH PART	ON LAMP				
l\$			Alm headlemps		0	0.00	0.5	0.0
19	RADIATOR S	SUPPORT	•					•••
20		Repi	Radiator support	68197334AA	1	579.00	3.5	0.0
21	PENDER							
22		Repl	LT Fender liner	68110687AD	1	71.4S	0.5	0.0
23	•	Ros	LT Fender (STL)		0	0.00	3.5	2.6
			NOTE: PARTIAL REFINISH TO KEEP I	ROM HAVIGE TO BLEND	INTO DO	XOR		
24			Overlap Major Non-Adj, Panel		0	0.00	0.0	-0.2
25			Add for Clear Coat		D	0.03	0.0	0.5
26	*	Refn	Partial Relinish w/ Full Clear		Đ	0.00	0.0	-1.2
27		Repl	Namepiete "HEMI 5.7 LITER"	6814970BAA	ŧ	54.50	0.2	0.0
28			LT Protector		Ü	6.00	0.2	0.0
	Wheels				-			
30		RBI	LT/Front R&I wheel		0	0.00	m 0.1	0.0
	#	Subl	Tire Mount and Balance		1	15.00		0.0
31 32	2					80177		

NOTE: WHEEL REPAIR THRU SINCITY WHEELS & TIRES 255-8473 - WILL MAVE TO BE SEAT OUT TO BE

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Page 2

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						Cisim i Workfile 10	-		0003208877	25000 fefebi
			Estima	te of Record						
			2013 DODG RAM 1500 4X2 QU	AD BIG HORN 40 P/U B-	5.7L+T GF	ич				-
			RECHRONMED BY SINCITY AFTER W	HEEL REPAIR						
33	•	Repl	RCY LT/Front Whitel, alloy 20" code: WPK +25%	IUCSESZCAA	1	250.00	m	0.0		0.0
			NOTE: TAKE OFF WHEEL - INS QUAL	TYBAK AUTO OT # 767	77778CO-	233-9540				
34		Subi	Shipping cost on wheel	•	1	30.00	x	0.0		0.0
35	FRONT SUST				-		••	0.0	,	
76	44	Repl	A/M LT Stabilizer link	NCP2653022	1	95.11	m	0.5	M i	0.0
37	đ		Check stabilizer bar		1	0.00		0.0	••	0.0
38	Steering G	ear & (inkage		•	0.00		4.0	•	7.0
39		Repl	LT Outer tie rod	681R5640AA	1	54.50	m	Incl.	44 /	0.0
40		Repl	LT Inner tie rad	58165678AA	1	58.60		1.3	••	0.O
41	MISCELLANE				•	2000	111	4.3		J.U
42	**		A/M Cover Cur		1	5.00		0.3	,	0.0
Q.		Sust	2 Wheel Alignment		i	59.95	¥	0.0		0.D
44	ø		Wet Sund & Polish		i	3.00	•	0.7		D.C
			NOTE: 0.4 1st Pril + 0.3 en additi poly	1	•	3.00		U./	•	<i>J.</i> V
45	OTHER CHAR	625								
46	•		Towing		1	0.03				
				SUBTOTALS		2,823,66		15.4		.1

ESTIMATE TOTALS				
Category	Basis		Rate	Cost \$
Parts		******		2,418,71
Body Labor	13.6 ters	()	\$ 44,00 /hr	598.40
Paint Lither	4.1 for	@	\$ 44.00 /hr	190.40
Mechanicsi Labor	1.8 hrs	•	\$ 85.00 /hr	153.00
Paint Supplies	4.1 hrs	•	\$ 31.00 /6	127.10
Histelleneous			•	404.55
Subtratel				3,682.56
Sales Tax	\$ 2,545.81	4	8.1000 %	206-21
Yetai Cost of Repairs				4,058.77
Deductible				500.00
Total Adjustments				500.00
Net Cost of Repairs				3,588.77

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Ošim#; Workfile ID:

000320987250001 afefeb9a

Estimate of Record
2013 DODG RAM 1500 4KZ QUAD BIG HORN 4D P/U B-9.71-FI GRAY
######################################

ALLSTATE SUPPLEMENT REQUEST SHOP FORM
AZSUPPSZ@ALLSTATE.COM or FAX 1-866-487-5751
SUPPLEMENT REQUEST PROCESS INSTRUCTIONS: PLEASE FILL THIS FORM OUT COMPLETELY AND INCLUDE A WRITTEN SUPPLEMENT WITH ALL INVOICES THAT HAVE BEEN RECEIVED. YOU WILL BE CONTACTED WITHIN 24-48 HOURS.
1 CLAIM #
1 CLAIM #
2 ACLUATE:
4 SUPPLEMENT AMOUNT: \$
5 SHOP NAME:
6 SHOP ADDRESS:
/ 3nu/ Clit/Zip:
8 SHOP CONTACT: PHONE #:
3 STOP EMAIL ADDRESS:
10 VEH AT SHOP AND READY FOR INSPECTION? Y () N ()
11 VEHICLE TORN DOWN? Y () N ()
REASON FOR SUPPLEMENT:

THIS ESTIMATE IS BASED ON THE USE OF BODY PARTS FOR YOUR MOTOR VEHICLE WHICH WERE NOT MANUFACTURED FOR OR BY THE ORIGINAL MANUFACTURER OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE. ANY WARRANTIES PROVIDED FOR THESE BODY PARTS ARE PROVIDED BY THE MANUFACTURER OR DISTRIBUTOR OF THESE PARTS, NOT BY THE MANUFACTURER OF YOUR MOTOR VEHICLE, PLEASE CONTACT YOUR INSURER TO DETERMINE YOUR RIGHTS REGARDING THE USE OF SUCH BODY PARTS.

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Estimate of Record

2013 DODG RAM 1500 4X2 QUAD 816 HORN 40 P/U 8-5.7L-F1 GRAY

Estimate based on MOTOR CRASH ESTIMATING GUIDE. Unless otherwise noted all items are derived from the Guide DR3TM13, CCC Data Date 3/3/2014, and the parts selected are OEM-parts manufactured by the vehicles Original Equipment Manufacturer. OEM parts are available at OE/Vehide dealerships. OPT OEM (Optional OEM) or ALT OEM (Alternative OEM) parts are OEM parts that may be provided by or through alternate sources other than the OEM vehicle dealerships. OPT OEM or ALT OEM parts may reflect some specific, special, or unique pricing or discount. OPT OEM or ALT OEM parts may include "Blemished" parts provided by OEM's through OEM vehicle dealerships. Asterisk (*) or Double Asterisk (**) indicates that the parts and/or labor information provided by MOTOR may have been modified or may have come from an alternate data source. Title sign (~) items indicate MOTOR Not-Included Labor operations. The symbol (<>) indicates the refinish operation WILL NOT be performed as a separate procedure from the other panels in the estimate. Non-Original Equipment Manufacturer aftermarket parts are described as Non OEM or A/M. Used parts are described as LKQ, RCY, or USED. Reconditioned parts are described by National Auto Glass Specifications. Labor operation times listed on the line with the NAGS information are MOTOR suggested labor operation times. NAGS labor operation times are not included. Pound sign (#) items indicate manual entries.

Some 2014 vehicles contain minor changes from the previous year. For those vehicles, prior to receiving updated data from the vehicle manufacturer, labor and parts data from the previous year may be used. The CCC ONE estimator has a complete list of applicable vehicles. Parts numbers and prices should be confirmed with the local dealership.

The following is a list of additional abbreviations or symbols that may be used to describe work to be done or parts to be repaired or replaced:

SYMBOLS FOLLOWING PART PRICE:

m=MOTOR Mechanical component. s=MOTOR Structural component. T=Miscellaneous Taxed charge category. X=Miscellaneous Non-Taxed charge category.

SYMBOLS FOLLOWING LABOR:

D=Diagnostic labor category. E=Electrical labor category. F=Frame labor category. G=Glass labor category. M=Mechanical labor category. S=Structural labor category. (numbers) 1 through 4=User Defined Labor Categories.

OTHER SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS:

Adj.=Adjacent. Algn.=Align. ALU=Aluminum. A/M=Aftermarket part. Bind=Blend. 80R=Boron steel.

CAPA=Certified Automotive Parts Association. D&R=Disconnect and Reconnect. HSS=High Strength Steel.

HYD=Hydroformed Steel. Incl.=Included. LKQ=Like Kind and Quality. LT=Left. MAG=Magnesium. Non-Adj.=Non Adjacent. NSF=NSF International Certified Part. O/H=Overhaud. Qty=Quantity. Refn=Refinish. Repl=Replace.

R&I=Remove and Install. R&R=Remove and Replace. Rgr=Repair. RT=Right. SAS=Sandwiched Steel.

Sect=Section. Subi=Subiet. UHS=Uitra High Strength Steel. N=Note(s) associated with the estimate line.

CCC ONE Estimating - A product of CCC Information Services Inc.

The following is a list of abbreviations that may be used in COC ONE Estimating that are not part of the MOTOR CRASH ESTIMATING GUIDE:

BAR=Bureau of Automotive Repair. EPA=Environmental Protection Agency. NHTSA= National Highway Transportation and Safety Administration. PDR=Paintless Dent Repair. VIN=Vehicle Identification Number.

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Claim #; Workfile ID: 000320887250001 afefeb9a

Estimate of Record

2013 DODG RAM 1500 4X2 QUAD BIG HORN 4D P/U 8-5.7L-FI GRAY

IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE NAMED INSURANCE COMPANY'S CHOICE OF PARTS POLICY.

THIS ESTIMATE MAY LIST PARTS FOR USE IN THE REPAIR OF YOUR VEHICLE. THAT ARE MANUFACTURED BY A COMPANY OTHER THAN THE ORIGINAL MANUFACTURER OF YOUR VEHICLE. THESE PARTS ARE COMMONLY REFERRED TO AS AFTERMARKET PARTS OR COMPETITIVE PARTS, AND MAY INCLUDE COSMETIC OUTER BODY CRASH PARTS SUCH AS HOODS, FENDERS, BUMPER COVERS, ETC. THE INSURANCE COMPANY GUARANTEES THE FIT AND CORROSION RESISTANCE OF ANY AFTERMARKET/COMPETITIVE OUTER BODY CRASH PARTS THAT ARE LISTED ON THIS ESTIMATE AND ACTUALLY USED IN THE REPAIR OF YOUR VEHICLE FOR AS LONG AS YOU OWN IT. IF A PROBLEM DEVELOPS WITH THE FIT OR CORROSION RESISTANCE OF THESE PARTS, THEY WILL BE REPAIRED OR REPLACED AT THE INSURANCE COMPANY'S EXPENSE. THIS GUARANTEE IS LIMITED TO THE REPAIR OR REPLACEMENT OF THE PART. HOWEVER, IF YOU CHOOSE NOT TO USE ONE OR MORE OF THE AFTERMARKET/COMPETITIVE OUTER BODY CRASH PARTS THAT MAY BE LISTED ON THIS ESTIMATE IN THE REPAIR OF YOUR VEHICLE, THE INSURANCE COMPANY WILL SPECIFY THE USE OF ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER PARTS, EITHER NEW OR RECYCLED AT THE INSURANCE COMPANY'S OPTION, AT NO ADDITIONAL COST TO YOU. THE INSURANCE COMPANY DOES NOT SEPARATELY GUARANTEE THE PERFORMANCE OF ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER PARTS, AND MAKES NO REPRESENTATION ABOUT THE AVAILABILITY OF ANY MANUFACTURER'S GUARANTEE.

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Claim #; Workfile ID: 000326687256D01 afefeb9a

Estimate of Record

2013 DODG RAM 1500 4X2 QUAD 81G HORN 4D P/U 8-5.7L-F1 GRAY

ALTERNATE PARTS SUPPLIERS

Line	Supplier	Description	Mulaa
36	Hapa - PPPP	#NCP2653072	Price
	Preston Keenum	A/M LT Stabilizer link	\$ 55.11
	2999 CIRCLE 75 PARKWAY	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	
	ATLANTA GA 30339		
	(800) 538-5272		

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Estimate of Record

2013 DODG RAM 1510 4X2 QUAD BIG HORN 40 PAU 8-5.7L-FI GRAY

ALTERNATE PARTS USAGE

Year: 2013 Make: DODG Color:

GRAY INT. GRAY

COETURE: 105 YYA State:

Production Date: Odometen

10/2012 6632

Model: RAM 1500 (X2 QUAD BIG HORN

Body Style: Engino:

40 P/U 6-5.7t-FI

VIN: 1C6AR6GT8DSSS8275 Condition:

Alleman S. A.S.		
Albernate Part Type	# Of Available Parts	# Of Parts Sciented
Afternarket	15	- Trend addected
Coltonal OEM	•	, z
	1	0
Reconcilionezi	3	i , i
Recycled	•	

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EXHIBIT 7

DECLARATION OF DERRICK POOLE

STATE OF NEVADA)	
)	SS
COUNTY OF CLARK)	

I, Derrick Poole, hereby declare:

That I am the Plaintiff in this case and I have personal knowledge of the matters in this declaration, and if called as a witness I would and could competently testify:

- 1. That on May 26, 2014 I went to SAHARA Dodge to purchase a vehicle. When I arrived I was greeted by SAHARA' sales person. I believe his name was Travis. We took a test drive in a used Certified Pre Owned ("CPO") 2013 Dodge Ram Big Horn 1500 Quad Cab ("vehicle"). While I had not purchased a CPO vehicle before, I was generally aware and I believed that they had more value then an vehicle that was not certified. Travis had also indicated to me that CPO vehicles come with a 125 point safety inspection by their service department, that it comes with a Dodge warranty, Carfax, Sirius radio subscription, towing coverage, things that would not come with a non-CPO vehicle.
- 2. While we were taking the test drive Travis was talking more about the inspection their CPO vehicles go through. Everything seemed fine with the vehicle on the test drive. I looked like a clean vehicle to me. I have no specialized knowledge about vehicles or about seeing the signs of previous accident or collision damage. Travis then mentioned that the vehicle was in a previous "minor" accident. I became a little concerned about that then inquired about the accident. Travis then reiterated that it was only a "minor" accident, that the vehicle had passed the 125 point safety inspection, and that if the vehicle was in a significant accident, they would not be

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selling it to me and that there was nothing to worry about because it was a CPO vehicle. I was assured by Travis and I took him at his word. I was given assurance by Travis that the vehicle represented more value and quality than a non-certified CPO vehicle, and that it was safe because it passed the 125 point safety inspection by their service department, and I was given piece of mind in purchasing the vehicle.

- 3. After the test drive, we went back into the show room. We discussed price, my trade in, payments, those types of things. During the sales process Travis presented a Carfax to me. I briefly reviewed it, it indicated there was an accident. Having been told by Travis that the accident was only minor and that that it passed their safety inspection, I signed the Carfax. It is attached as Exhibit 4. Travis also presented me with a CPO check list. I reviewed that as well. I did not note anything out of the ordinary. It appeared to me that the vehicle passed their safety inspection and it was certified by the dealer. I also signed the CPO check list. It is attached as Exhibit 3.
- 4. After my case was filed, my attorney showed me an Allstate Collision Estimate ("ACE") that he had obtained from the dealership through the lawsuit. I was shocked to find this out and was further shocked to find out, based upon review of the Separate Statement my attorney prepared to oppose SAHARA's motion, that SAHARA's Director of Used Car Sales actually knew about and had the ACE in his possession. I was never told about, shown or given the ACE. I was never told or given any information contained in the ACE.
- 5, Based upon my review of the ACE, had I been given the ACE on the date of sale, I would not have purchased this vehicle. In fact, I would not have not done any business with Sahara because what is reflected on the ACE was in my mind essentially the opposite of what I was told about the accident by Travis. The ACE was something

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that would have been important to me to know about as a buyer of a used vehicle in making my decision to purchase this vehicle, especially given it was a CPO vehicle.

- 6. In reviewing the ACE, to me as a layman, I would not have characterized the previous accident as a "minor" accident in any sense of the word. \$4,088.70 in damage is not "minor" to me and it does not seem minor to me in looking at all the things that were repaired or replaced on the vehicle. To me, with all the things repaired or replaced on the vehicle, I would not feel I would be receiving the additional value in purchasing a CPO, and how would I know everything was fixed properly and that it was safe? To me, a repaired left front frame end bracket would be a potential safety issue to me. Even though I don't have any expertise in vehicles or vehicle repair, as a layman who is buying a used vehicle, anything involving or referring to repair of anything to do with the "frame" would be a red flag for me. If I was given the ACE at time of sale, as a layman purchasing a CPO vehicle, the first thing that would have come to my mind was how could this car have been certified as a Dodge CPO given the emphasis Travis was putting on as to how thorough and comprehensive their inspection process was, and how could it have passed their 125 point inspection? I would not have purchased the vehicle and would have walked away from the deal had I known about the ACE. A true and correct copy of my installment contract is attached as Exhibit 20. SAHARA gave me \$ 4,000.00 credit for my trade in towards my down payment on the CPO truck.
- 7. To date, I have paid \$ 22,641.94 in payments on the vehicle. \$ 16,766.11 is remaining on the balance.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

DERRICK POOLE,

Appellant,

 \mathbf{v}

NEVADA AUTO DEALERSHIP INVESTMENTS LLC a Nevada Limited Liability Company d/b/a SAHARA CHRYSLER, JEEP, DODGE, and COREPOINTE INSURANCE COMPANY, Supreme Court Case No: 74808 Electronically Filed Jun 18 2018 09:21 a.m. District Court Case lizabeth A. Brown A-16-737120-C Clerk of Supreme Court

Respondents,

Appeal from the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County.

The Honorable Nancy Alff, District Court Judge

APPELLANT'S APPENDIX VOLUME 5

Law Offices of George O. West III

Consumer Attorneys Against Auto Fraud
George O. West III Esq, State Bar No. 7951
10161 Park Run Drive, Suite 150
Las Vegas, NV 89145
Telephone: (702) 318-6570
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CRAIG B. FRIEDBERG [SBN 4606]
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Las Vegas, NV 89121
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Email: attcbf@cox.net

Attorneys for Appellant Derrick Poole

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car. He still would've been making payments on that car. So where is his damages? He had full use of that car, which they concede he would have to, yes, get full use of it.

So their other counterargument to these damages is what, Your Honor? Oh, it's diminishment of value. They said there's no evidence that it was actually priced. That's not true, Your Honor. The evidence is is that it was — the vehicle was sold as a CPO'd preowned vehicle that had a previous accident on it, and it was priced as such.

In fact, who doesn't have the evidence that it was actually priced too high? There's none. Here it is. Here's all the exhibits, all their documents, all their testimony. Where is — there's no document they've produced that says, oh, it was priced at this number, but if they had disclosed the Allstate report, it would've been priced at this number. There's absolutely no evidence in this case, in this summary judgment or these proceedings, in their 90 pages of briefing and the hundreds of pages of exhibits. There's nothing in there that says here's what it would've been worth had — had they disclosed the Allstate report to him, had they — had that and that — and that the price that they had it at did not price in the price of the accident. So there is no evidence. There is no material fact.

Your Honor, it is 100 percent speculation; 100 percent that they are saying that it was actually priced

too high. They're just saying it. Why? Because you can say it. I guess it's a matter of opinion. If you want to come up there and stand up here and say it's priced too high, say it's priced too high, but that's what plaintiff agreed to pay. People purchase cars all the time. We can't go with superior knowledge every time someone buys a car and says, well, the car dealer knew. Well, so did he. He knew all of those facts.

I said at the very beginning of my argument, Your Honor, that these facts will not change is that he went to the dealership. He hasn't incurred a single dollar of damages. He won't have any single dollar damages because he can't rescind the contract. They didn't address Skafeedie in their brief, and they didn't address Skafeedie in this courtroom because they can't, because what he's asking for is rescission.

Give him all his money back on his payments even though he drove the car for three years, put thousands of miles on it and didn't have a single repair claim. He has no loss of enjoyment use because he never even had to get a loaner car because there was nothing wrong with the truck, and there's still nothing wrong with the truck. So his damages are literally zero because he made his payments and drove his truck, and had he not purchased that car because they told him that, he would've purchased another car and "droven" that one and paid — and paid and made payments on it.

Now, the only evidence they can provide is saying

 well, the difference between the two cars would've been his damages. There's no evidence of that. There's no testimony of that. In fact, Your Honor, it's disingenuous to come and testify that he wouldn't have — he would've been so angry when he saw the Allstate report in May 2014 when he got back to the dealership from the test drive that he would've been so angry that they purchased a vehicle that had a previous accident on it; that they provide him their Allstate report, that he would've been so angry you would've never have bought a dealership — a car from them.

What he's saying is they should have done more material disclosure, and had they done the material disclosure at the time he would've been upset. That doesn't make any sense. It's an argument — it's, Your Honor, it's whimsy speculation. They're doing it. They're making these arguments for the pure purpose of trying to defeat summary judgment because they know that there's absolutely no legal duty past the duty and the actions that have taken place and that it was not material to disclose a \$4,000 damage that occurred on a car that was fully repaired before he purchased it, went through a hundred and twenty-five point inspection, was CPO'd, and he was provided all the warranties.

And he got the 100 full benefit and bargain of what he purchased, and if he found a problem with that wheel, he could have taken it in at any time and had it — and had it

1	replaced under his full warranty that he was provided which was
2	an additional warranty under that CPO. Your Honor, he is not
3	damaged. He has no damages. (Unintelligible) an entire trial
4	his damages would be zero, and damages is an element of the
5	deceptive trade practice.
6	Thank you.
7	THE COURT: Thank you both.
8	This is the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
9	I'm going to take it under advisement. It'll be on my chambers
10	calendar on November 21st. I just need to take another look
11	at NRS and a couple of the cases.
12	I thank you all for the briefs and the excellent
13	arguments today.
14	MR. BENDAVID: Thank you, Your Honor.
15	MR. WEST: Thank you, Your Honor. Have a good
16	weekend.
17	MR. BENDAVID: Your Honor, I feel like we went past
18	our 30 to 40 minutes.
19	THE COURT: You'll know on the you'll know on
20	the
21	MR. BENDAVID: I'm sorry.
22	THE COURT: You'll know on the 21st, and that will
23	determine whether or not your trial's going on December 8th.
24	MR. BENDAVID: Great.
25	MR. WEST: And you'll issue a minute order, Your

1	Honor?
2	THE COURT: I will. And I realize that that's a
3	little bit longer it's close to trial to have a decision.
4	I hope that's
5	MR. WEST: Sure.
6	THE COURT: Given the fact that you've just briefed
7	this, you should both be able to do an excellent job at trial
8	if the matter goes to trial.
9	MR. BENDAVID: Thank you, Your Honor.
10	MR. WEST: Thank you, Your Honor.
11	THE COURT: When I say both of you, it's not ignoring
12	cocounsel.
13	MR. BENDAVID: Thank you.
14	(Proceedings concluded 2:44 p.m.)
15	-000-
16	ATTEST: I do hereby certify that I have truly and correctly
17	transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled
18	case.
19	The Main walk
20	Dana P. Williams
21	Dana L. Williams Transcriber
22	
23	
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Electronically Filed 1/15/2018 8:01 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT **OPPS** GEORGE O. WEST III [SBN 7951] 1 Law Offices of George O. West III Consumer Attorneys Against Auto Fraud 2 10161 Park Run Drive, Suite 150 Las Vegas, NV 89145 3 Email: gowesq@cox.net www.americasautofraudattorney.com 4 (702) 318-6570 (702) 664-0459 [fax] 5 CRAIG B. FRIEDBERG [SBN 4606] 6 Law Offices of Craig B. Friedberg, Esq. 4760 S. Pecos Road, Suite 103 Las Vegas, NV 89121 7 (702) 435-7968 8 Fax: 1-702-825-8071 Email: attcbf@cox.net 9 Website: www.consumerlaw.justia.net 10 Attorneys for Plaintiff **DERRICK POOLE** 11 DISTRICT COURT 12 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 13 14 DERRICK POOLE, CASE NO: 15 A-16-737120-C DEPT: XXVII 16 Plaintiff, PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO **DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR** 17 ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 18 NEVADA AUTO DEALERSHIP INVEST-DATE: 19 February 1, 2018 MENTS LLC a Nevada Limited Liability Company d/b/a SAHARA CHRYSLER, 20 TIME: 9:30 a.m. JEEP, DODGE, WELLS FARGO DEALER SERVICES INC., COREPOINTE INSUR-To be heard concurrently with 21 ANCE COMPANY, and DOES 1 through 100.) Plaintiff's Motion to Retax Costs1 Inclusive. 22 Defendants, 23 24 25 26 27 28 **JOINT APPENDIX 1120**

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INTRODUCTION

A. FEES UNDER NRS 18.010(2)(b)

Defendants' motion for fees based on NRS 18.010(2)(b) is a gross overreach. There is no basis for any fee award pursuant to 18.010(2)(b). As borne out by all the evidence brought out in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment ("MSJ"), Plaintiff's claims were both legally and factually supportable. Essentially, Defendants' position is that the Plaintiff's claims were "groundless" because they prevailed on summary judgment, and that they are entitled to fees as a sanction pursuant to NRS 18.010(2)(b). Def's Mot. 8:25-27.

Plaintiff is **not** attempting, via this opposition, to reargue the grant of Defendants' MSJ, as the time to file a motion for reconsideration or under rules 59(e) or 60 has expired. Rather, Defendants' contention that Plaintiff's claims were frivolous, groundless and/or had no factual or legal support makes the allegations in the First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), in conjunction with the myriad of credible evidence presented in opposition to Defendants' MSJ, entirely germane and relevant to rebut Defendants' assertions. Plaintiff disagrees with the Court's grant of Defendants' MSJ, and the reasons for the grant, but the grant of Defendants' MSJ is **not** a basis for any fee award under 18.010(2)(b). There is no basis in this record for any findings that the Plaintiffs' claims lacked a factual or legal basis or were otherwise groundless simply because Defendants prevailed on their MSJ.

If this was the standard, then every party who prevailed on summary judgment would be entitled to fees under 18.010(2)(b). However, the granting of summary judgment does **not** equate, in and of itself, to a case being brought or maintained without reasonable grounds merely because the Defendant prevails on summary judgment. See Baldonado v.

Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 124 Nev. 951, 967–68, 194 P.3d 96, 106–07 (2008) [upholding trial court's denial of fees under 18.010(2)(b) holding that reasonably supportable claims, while not ultimately successful and dismissed on summary judgment, is not a grounds for a fee award under 18.010(2)(b)]; Rodriguez v. Primadonna Co., LLC, 125 Nev. 578, 588, 216 P.3d 793, 800 (2009) [same]; Kahn v. Morse & Mowbray, 121 Nev. 464, 479–80, 117 P.3d 227, 238 (2005) [same, but reversing court's grant of fees under 18.010(2)(b) after Defendant prevailed on summary judgment]; Bower v. Harrah's Laughlin, Inc., 125 Nev. 470, 493–94, 215 P.3d 709, 726 (2009) [same].

The standard for any award of fees under 18.010(2)(b) is not based upon the "grant" of a motion for summary judgment, it never has been. Rather, "to support a fee award under NRS 18.010(2)(b), there must be evidence in the record supporting the proposition that the complaint was brought or maintained without reasonable grounds or to harass the other party." Semenza v. Caughlin Crafted Homes, 111 Nev. 1089, 1095, 901 P.2d 684, 688 (1995) [reversing trial court's order granting fees under 18.010(2)(b)]. "A claim is groundless if the complaint contains allegations which are not supported by any credible evidence at trial." Id.

There are numerous unsupported and/or specious assertions in Defendants' motion about the purported "baseless" grounds for the action, including the Defendants' unfounded contention that Plaintiff had no damages, or that Plaintiff refused to engage in any meaningful or good faith settlement discussions; but the evidence brought out in the opposition, the Court's order granting Defendants MSJ, and the extensive good faith settlement negotiations that took place, (confirmed via email), do not bear out Defendant's assertions.

Def's Mot. 4:12, 5:21, 7:11, 10:6, 12:23, 13:4, 18:14.

Def's Mot. 4:6-7, 6:15-16, 11:12-13, 12:24-25, 13:3-6, 15:19, 18:26-27.

B. FEES UNDER NRCP 68

The second basis Defendants assert for fees is under Rule 68. First, on balance, under the factors set forth in *Beattie v. Thomas*, 99 Nev. 579, 588–89, 668 P.2d 268, 274 (1983), a discretionary fee award is not warranted in this case. ³ This is because Plaintiff's claims were made in good faith, and Plaintiff's rejection of Defendants' offer of judgment was not grossly unreasonable or in bad faith; especially given the Plaintiff's good faith and *extensive engagement* with the Defendants involving attempting settlement of this matter from mid-August 2017 through October 5, 2017. *See Exh 1; emails re: settlement negotiations*. Notwithstanding, three out of the four *Beatty* factors do *not* militate towards a discretionary award of fees under Rule 68 in favor of the Defendants.

Most significantly, Defendants cannot meet the fourth *Beattie* factor of whether Defendants' fees are "reasonable and justified." This is because defense counsel intentionally did not submit or attach any of their detailed and itemized time sheets to their motion, and have *continued to refuse* to produce unredacted time records despite Plaintiff's requests in writing to do so. As of January 15, 2018, nearly **four weeks** after their motion was filed, Defendants have not provided, and refuse to provide Plaintiff, with **any** time sheets, redacted or unredacted. *See Exhibit 2, emails re: billing records*.

Defendants' deliberate failure and/or refusal to attach any detailed and itemized time sheets not only precludes them from meeting their burden on their motion under Rule 54(d), but it also precludes the Court from undertaking its duty to determine the reasonableness and necessity of the time incurred, which is required under **both** Beattie,

The Beattie factors are: "(1) whether the plaintiffs claim was brought in good faith; (2) whether the defendants' offer of judgment was reasonable and in good faith in both its timing and amount; (3) whether the plaintiffs decision to reject the offer and proceed to trial was grossly unreasonable or in bad faith; and (4) whether the fees sought by the offeror are reasonable and justified in amount." Id.

supra, and Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat. Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969).⁴ Axiomatically, Defendants' intentional failure and refusal to submit unredacted itemized and detailed billing also prevents Plaintiff from having an adequate and fair opportunity to question the reasonableness and necessity of the time expended under **both** the Beatty and Brunzell factors.

The law is crystal clear on this issue. Under Rule 54(d), Beatty, and Brunzell, supra, the moving party has the burden of showing that their time was reasonable and necessary. Furthermore, when moving for statutory attorney's fees, a party is not entitled to seek fees while at the same time failing and/or refusing to produce or keep hidden from opposing counsel their detailed and itemized time billings, or attempt to submit them "in camera," which is what Defendants have attempted to do here. See Supplemental Declaration of Jeffery

The Brunzell factors are: (1) the qualities of the advocate: his ability, his training, education, experience, professional standing and skill; (2) the character of the work to be done: its difficulty, its intricacy, its importance, time and skill required, the responsibility imposed and the prominence and character of the parties where they affect the importance of the litigation; (3) the work actually performed by the lawyer: the time and skill, attention given to the work; (4) the result: whether the attorney was successful and what benefits were derived. Id.

Rule 54(d) entitled "timing and contents of motion" states in pertinent part: the motion must ... specify the judgment and the statute, rule, or other grounds entitling the movant to the award; state the amount sought or provide a fair estimate of it; and be supported by counsel's affidavit swearing that the fees were actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable, documentation concerning the amount of fees claimed, and points and authorities addressing appropriate factors to be considered by the court in deciding the motion. The time for filing the motion may not be extended by the court after it has expired.

Plaintiff requested the itemized billings from Defendants' counsel in writing, which existed as of December 19, 2015, the date of the filing of the motion, but Defendants' counsel has refused to produce them. See Exhibit 2, emails; and GOW decl..

See also Golden Rd. Motor Inn, Inc. v. Islam, 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 49, 376 P.3d 151, 160 (2016) [holding when a party moves for statutory fees under Rule 68, the opposing party is entitled, as a matter of due process, to review all the itemized and detailed billings of the moving party; and also holding that failing to do so is an abuse of discretion and directing on remand the production of all itemized billing records by the moving party, citing, Love v. Love, 114 Nev. 572, 582, 959 P.2d 523, 529 (1998),]; Love v. Love, 114 Nev. 572, 582, 959 P.2d 523, 529 (1998) [holding that the party moving for statutory fees is not allowed to submit their time billings in camera based on a claim of privilege because it is unfairly prejudicial to the opposing party because it precludes the opposing party from disputing the amount of fees and their legitimacy].

A. Bendavid in support of Defendants' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs, filed December 21, 2017, ¶¶ 4-5.

Additionally, counsel for the party claiming statutory fees also has the burden of proving their time was reasonable and necessary via submitting itemized time records which must be of sufficient detail to enable the court to fulfill its duty to determine with a high degree of certainty that such hours were actually and reasonably expended in the litigation, as to each lawyer, and how those hours were allotted to specific tasks. ⁶

II

DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ANY FEES UNDER 18.010(2)(b) BASED ON GROUNDLESS OR FRIVILOUS ACTIONS BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS HAD BOTH FACTUAL AND LEGAL SUPPORT

A. PLAINTIFF'S STATUTORY CLAIMS WERE NOT GROUNDLESS OR FRIVIOLOUS AS THERE WAS A REASONABLE BASIS TO BRING AND MAINTAIN THE ACTION

Defendants attempt to improperly recast the issue in terms of them prevailing on their MSJ, which is **not** the operative inquiry. Defendants contend there was a "lack of evidence substantiating Plaintiff's claims" and that Plaintiff "continued in his claims without reasonable grounds." However, the issue is not whether the Court saw it the Plaintiff's way on summary judgment. Rather, in considering "whether the claims pursued by the losing party against the prevailing party was based upon reasonable grounds" (*Rodriguez v. Primadonna Co., LLC*, 125 Nev. 578, 588, 216 P.3d 793, 800-

See Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, Johnson Cty., Kan., 157 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir. 1998); Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prod., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 553 (6th Cir. 2008); In re Pierce, 190 F.3d 586, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1999); C Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2007); Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 1988); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1995).

801 (2009) there must be a showing that the claims were "not supported by **any** credible evidence." Semenza, 111 Nev. At 1095, 901 P.2d at 688. Such an analysis depends upon the actual circumstances of the case." Id.

Our civil justice system allows for a defense verdict or the granting of summary judgment against a Plaintiff. However, if Plaintiff does not ultimately prevail, it does **not** ipso facto mean that Plaintiff's claims were "groundless," as Defendants contend. As long as Plaintiff's claims were reasonably supportable, even though ultimately not successful, there is **no** basis for an award of any fees under 18.010(2)(b), even if Plaintiff's claims were dismissed on summary judgment. Baldonado v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 124 Nev. 951, 967–68, 194 P.3d 96, 106–07 (2008).

Consequently, the issue is whether Plaintiff's statutory claims under 41.600(2)(e) were reasonably supportable. And based upon the FAC and the myriad of credible evidence produced in opposition to Defendants MSJ, they were. Moreover, nothing in the Court's Decision and Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("MSJ order) suggests, even implicitly, that Plaintiff's claims were brought or maintained without reasonable grounds or that Plaintiff's claims were not supported by credible evidence, or that Plaintiff suffered no damage. See MSJ order, attached hereto as Exhibit 5. ⁷

As set forth in the FAC, attached hereto as Exhibit 3, it was Plaintiff's contention, pursuant to NRS 598.0923(2), that merely disclosing that the Certified Pre-Owned ("CPO") 2013 Dodge Ram Truck at issue ("vehicle") was in a previous accident was **not** sufficient given the nature of a CPO sale, coupled with SAHARA DODGE's ("SAHARA")

Defendants throughout their brief contend Plaintiff never suffered any damages, but the court never made any such finding or ruling, and Plaintiff's separate statement clearly rebuts this contention. SS fact # 105-107.

actual, particularized and superior knowledge involving the precise nature and extent of the damage caused to the CPO vehicle by the previous accident. Most significantly, SAHARA conceded they had **vastly superior knowledge** of the condition of the vehicle at the time of sale. See Plaintiff's Separate Statement ("SS") in Opposition to Defendants MSJ, attached hereto as Exhibit 4, fact # 29.

Plaintiff also alleged in the FAC, that the information contained within the ACE would have been material (important) to a reasonable consumer in making a decision of whether or not to purchase a CPO vehicle, especially given the fact that a Dodge CPO vehicle, in the mind of the reasonable consumer, is of a superior quality as compared to a comparable non-CPO vehicle. See also Exhibit 4, SS fact # 23-26.

However, the Court interpreted the statutory duty of disclosure of "material facts" under NRS 598.0923(2) to "not extend to the entire effect of the accident" to the vehicle, and that disclosure that the vehicle was in a previous accident was "the" material fact that SAHARA was required to disclose with respect to the previous accident. Exhibit 5, MSJ Order 2:20-23. Plaintiff respects, but has a fundamental difference of opinion with the Court with respect to whether the information Sahara actually had in its possession regarding the cost, extent and itemization of the repairs made to the vehicle as a result of the pre-sale collision are "material facts in connection with the sale of goods" (NRS 598.0923(2)). Likewise, Plaintiff disagrees with the Court's finding that SAHARA's characterization of the pre-sale collision as only a "minor" accident and that if it was in a significant accident we would not be selling the vehicle to you, was not a

"material" misrepresentation made to Plaintiff to entice him to purchase the vehicle.⁸ But based on the facts alleged in the FAC, (Exhibit 3), and the corresponding evidentiary support for those facts set forth in Plaintiff's Separate Statement (Exhibit 4) that was presented in opposition to Defendant's MSJ, the grant of Defendants' MSJ cannot be equated as Plaintiff's claims having no reasonable basis in fact or in law.

Finally, it was the Court's view that because the vehicle underwent a CPO inspection by SAHARA, and the Plaintiff relied on the CPO inspection report, (of which it was the Court's view was only required to notate frame damage), there was no misrepresentation that the vehicle was a properly CPO certified vehicle. However, Plaintiff submitted an expert declaration, along with all supporting and foundational facts and other supporting evidence, that the vehicle should **not** have been certified as a Dodge CPO, and should not have passed the Dodge CPO inspection because the vehicle did not meet factory repair specifications. *SS fact # 101-103*. There was no lack of any credible evidence involving this contention either. ⁹

With respect to Plaintiff's related equitable claims, all of which were expressly authorized to be plead under 41.600(3)(b), they were all derivative of a violation of NRS 41.600(2)(e). NRS 41.600(2)(e) expressly incorporates the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("NDTPA"), of which any violation of the NDTPA is deemed to be

While Plaintiff made a specific inquiry about the nature of the accident when being initially informed that the vehicle was in just a "minor" accident, it was the Court's view that because the Plaintiff did not specifically "inquire about the parts and services used to repair as reflected in the ACE," Plaintiff's inquiry about the previous accident was not sufficient to then require SAHARA to disclose the particular information contained in the ACE. See, Exhibit 5, MSJ Order 2:24-26.

This is especially true given the Court specifically ruled that Mr. Avillini's declaration was properly submitted and admissible in denying Defendants' motion to exclude Mr. Avillini's declaration. See Order Denying Defendants' [] Motion to Strike Fugitive Documents and Motion to Strike Declaration of Rocco Avellini Attached to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed December 9, 2017, 2:9-13.

statutory consumer fraud. Consequently, Plaintiff voluntarily conceded at the hearing that if the Court were to grant summary judgment on Plaintiff's statutory 41.600 consumer fraud/deceptive trade practices claim, then Plaintiff's equitable claims would also fail. Contrary to Defendants' contention, Plaintiff's equitable claims were not groundless as they were expressly authorized to be plead for any violation of the NDTPA, under 41.600(3)(b).

B. THE FACTUAL LANDSCAPE OF THE CASE AND PLAINTIFF'S CORRESPONDING STATUTORY CLAIMS

As set forth the FAC at ¶ 31, (Exhibit 3), Plaintiff alleged that SAHARA engaged in violations of the NDTPA involving the Plaintiff's financed purchase of a CPO vehicle on May 26, 2014. Plaintiff alleged the following statutory violations:

- A. Failing to disclose a material fact in connection with the sale of goods. [NRS 598.0923(2) and NRS 41.600(2)(e)]
- B. Represented that goods for sale are of a particular standard, quality or grade if he knows or should know that they are of another standard, quality, grade, style or model. [NRS 598.0915(7) and NRS 41.600(2)(e)]
- C. Making a false representation as to the source, sponsorship, approval **or certification** of goods for sale. [NRS 598.0915(2) and NRS 41.600(e)]
- D. Making any other false representations in a transaction. [NRS 598.0915(15) and NRS 41.600(2)(e)]

The factual support for these claims was set forth in the FAC at paragraphs 19, and 21 through 30 which alleged:

- 19. More specifically, it is advertised with respect Chrysler/Dodge CPO vehicles that:
- A. When you have a Chrysler Group Certified Pre-Owned vehicle ("CPOV") you have far more than just a "used" vehicle. You have confidence. You have pride. You have a great vehicle that you can trust. You're certified.

- B. Every Chrysler, Jeep, Dodge and Ram CPOV can be counted on to go the distance. Our CPO vehicles must pass a strident certification process that guarantees only the finest late model vehicles get certified. Every vehicle that passes is then subjected to a comprehensive 125-point inspection and a through reconditioning process using Authentic Mopar Parts.
- C. What would you expect to pay to have a qualified technician give this vehicle such a thorough inspection?
- D. Only the finest late model vehicles we have are going to be certified to begin with, so the [CPO] vehicles you are checking out on the lot are the best.
- 21. On or about May 6, 2014, SAHARA acquired the vehicle from a private party. That private party informed and specifically told SAHARA's used car manager, Joshua Grant, that the vehicle had been in a previous collision in March of 2014, and also gave Mr. Grant a copy of the body shop repair order relating to the repairs that were undertaken on the vehicle as a result of the previous collision. The body shop estimate, which was in Mr. Grant's possession, indicated the vehicle had \$ 4,088.00 in previous collision damage, and also disclosed the nature and extent of the previous damage caused by the accident, based upon the parts and components that were identified on the repair order and replaced or repaired on the vehicle as a result of the previous collision.
- 22. That body shop estimate disclosed the following repairs to the vehicle, which included, but were not limited to: a replaced front frame end bracket, a replaced radiator support, front bumper repaired, right inner and outer tie rods replaced, and the stabilizer link replaced, left front wheel repaired and left front quarter panel repainted.
- 23. After briefly doing an initial visual assessment and inspection on the vehicle on May 6, 2014, Mr. Grant, at that point, made the initial decision and undertook the initial steps to resell the vehicle as a CPO certified vehicle. On or about May 8, 2017, (three days after the car logged into SAHARA's inventory and given a stock number), the vehicle was brought into SAHARA's service department by Mr. Grant to undergo the comprehensive CPO inspection process with one of their Chrysler certified technicians. Mr. Grant did not inform anyone in the service department of the previous collision the vehicle was in or given the body shop estimate regarding the vehicle to anyone in the service department.
- 24. At the time of the technician's inspection, all of the aforementioned repairs and replaced parts and components to the vehicle that were present due to the previous collision the vehicle was involved in, were all present and abundantly obvious to the trained eye, including SAHARA's certified technician. As part of Chrysler/Dodge's comprehensive CPO inspection process, the technician is required to prepare and sign off on the

25. Notwithstanding, and knowing of and/or having should have known of all the aforementioned items being repaired or replaced on the vehicle, and also having a good idea of the nature and extent of the previous damage and collision to the vehicle, SAHARA's technician did not note any of these items were repaired or replaced, either in the specific enumerated items set forth on the report, or in the area where "additional information" could have been noted on the report. This, notwithstanding that SAHARA's mechanic and SAHARA's used car manager actually knew of the nature and extent of the previous collision, and also knew the car was going to be resold to the community as a CPO vehicle.

- 26. During the sales process, the SAHARA's salesperson was explaining the many advantages of buying a CPO vehicle, one of which was the comprehensive safety inspection the vehicle undergoes. After the deal was negotiated in the sale's department, Plaintiff was then brought into the F & I department to sign all the closing documents. One of the documents Plaintiff was presented with was a Carfax that indicated the vehicle had been in a previous accident. Plaintiff inquired about the accident and was concerned about the previous accident the vehicle had been involved in, which was not previously disclosed to him.
- 27. Plaintiff was then told that the vehicle had been through a comprehensive safety inspection and if the previous accident was serious or significant, it would not have been certified a CPO. Plaintiff was then presented and reviewed the CPO inspection report as well that was prepared by SAHARA's technician. Having been told the car had gone through a comprehensive inspection, having been assured that the accident was not significant, and not seeing any indication on the CPO inspection report of anything being replaced or repaired or damaged, Plaintiff's concerns regarding the accident were resolved and he went forward with the sale.
- 28. Plaintiff not being made aware of nature and extent of the previous collision and repairs to the vehicle, it was in approximately mid-May of 2015, Plaintiff first became aware of the nature and extent of the undisclosed damage to the vehicle, of which SAHARA had actual knowledge of prior to the time of sale, and did not disclose to him.
- 29. This information would have been a material (important) fact any reasonable consumer, including the Plaintiff, would want to know about and would also deem important in making a decision to purchase a used vehicle, especially with respect to a CPO vehicle, given the purchase of a CPO vehicle is to take much of the risk out of purchasing a used vehicle vis-à-vis the vehicle being in a previous significant collision and/or having frame and/or unibody damage and excessive body damage. Had Plaintiff been informed of the nature and extent of the damage to the vehicle which

was in the actual knowledge of SAHARA, he would not have purchased the vehicle and would not have entered into the RISC for the vehicle.

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At all relevant times, SAHARA, as a vehicle dealer within this community, would know that any reasonable consumer, including the Plaintiff, associates a very negative stigma to vehicles which have been in a previous collision or collisions, both as to its safety and as to its value. Such a negative stigma is further heightened with respect to a CPO vehicle given it is the consumer's expectation when purchasing a Chrysler/Dodge certified vehicle that they are avoiding purchasing a vehicle that has any such damage. Furthermore, Defendant SAHARA, as a vehicle dealership who sells hundreds of CPO vehicles to the community, is fully aware of this expectation on the part of the consumer when they choose to decide to purchase a Chrysler/Dodge CPO vehicle. The information known to SAHARA relating to the nature and extent of the previous damage to the vehicle, in the mind of a reasonable consumer, would relate to the vehicle's safety and/or dramatically diminished its value, and would be important in making a determination in whether to purchase the vehicle. Consumers do not seek to purchase vehicles, especially CPO vehicles, with an accident history, and if an accident is disclosed to them and the dealer has actual knowledge of the nature and extent of that previous collision, SAHARA had the obligation to make full and complete disclosure to the Plaintiff relating to all information it had within its possession regarding the previous collision and the nature and extent of that accident, as it would have been material to Plaintiff's decision to purchase the vehicle.

C. THE MATERIAL FACTS AND CREDIBILE EVIDENCE THAT WAS PRESENTED IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MSJ

Keeping in mind the aforementioned factual allegations in the FAC, these facts were all supported by Plaintiff's Separate Statement ("SS") in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's MSJ, (Exhibit 4), along with all the corresponding admissible evidence, -- most of which was derived through the sworn testimony of SAHARA's own employees and 30(b)(6) representative. See Exhibit 4, SS.

1. SAHARA HAD ACTUAL, PARTICULARILZED AND SUPERIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE THAT WAS CAUSED BY THE PREVIOUS COLLISION INVOLVING THE PLAINTIFF'S CPO VEHICLE

Three weeks prior to Defendant SAHARA selling the vehicle to the Plaintiff, on May 5, 2014, SAHARA purchased the vehicle from a private third party. SS fact # 1. That

 condition, (4) vehicle condition and (5) price. SS fact # 22. SAHARA further conceded that it is important for SAHARA to make FULL DISCLOSURE to a used car buyer involving things that might affect the vehicle's (1) value, (2) safety, (3) desirability or (4) marketability. SS fact # 32.

SAHARA further conceded that the things consumers within the community associate with a CPO and what a CPO vehicle projects to the consumer are: (1) value, (2) quality, (3) safety, (4) competence, (5) assurance, (6) piece of mind and (7) trust, and that these are the very things that SAHARA wants to *instill and engender* into the mind of a consumer when purchasing a CPO vehicle. SS fact # 23-25.

SAHARA further conceded that the consumer within the community has the expectation when buying a Dodge CPO vehicle that it has: (1) value, (2) it has quality, (3) it is safe, (4) they have confidence and assurance in buying it, (5) they have peace of mind, and (6) they trust the dealership selling it to them. SS fact # 26. 12

A fact is "material" if it concerns a subject reasonably relevant to the transaction at issue and if a reasonable person would attach importance to that fact. See *Powers v. United Services Auto. Ass'n*, 114 Nev. 690, 962 P.2d 596 (1998) ("*Powers I*") and *Powers v. United Services Ass'n* 115 Nev. 38, 979 P.2d 1286 (1999) ("*Powers II*"). See also case citations in fn. 5 to Pntf's Opp. to Defs' MSJ set forth below.¹³

All of these material facts were testified to by SAHARA's 30(b)(6) representative (Josh Grant) involving Dodge CPO sales to the community.

See Totz v. Cont'l Du Page Acura, 236 Ill. App. 3d 891, 899, 602 N.E.2d 1374, 1379 (1992) [holding in statutory consumer fraud context that dealer's failure to disclose previously repaired damage and failure to disclose vehicle was in a previous severe wreck, which the dealer knew about, was a "material" fact in a used vehicle sale transaction], Brennan v. Kunzle, 154 P.3d 1094, rev'd on other grads, (Kan. App., 2007) [holding an undisclosed matter is "material," as element of fraud by silence, if it is one to which a reasonable man would attach importance in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question], Smith v. KNC Optical, Inc., 2009 WL 2581866 (Tex. App. Dallas, 2009) [reaffirming previous Texas Appellate opinions holding that a "material" fact for purposes of establishing material misrepresentation as element of fraud claim, means a reasonable person would attach

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Consequently, in this case, a "material" fact would have been an "important" fact that a reasonable consumer within the community would have attached importance to when purchasing a Dodge CPO vehicle, and would have influenced a CPO buyer's decision with respect to the purchase of a Dodge CPO vehicle.

3. PLAINTIFF PRESENTED CREDIBLE EVIDENCE THAT THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE ACE: (1) WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO A DODGE CPO PURCHASER, (2) SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISCLOSED TO THE PLAINTIFF, AND (3) PLAINTIFF ALSO WOULD HAVE FOUND THIS INFORMATION IMPORTANT IN MAKING A DECISION NOT TO PURCHASE THE VEHICLE

importance to and would be induced to act on the information in determining his choice of actions in the transaction in question], Weinstat v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 103 Cal. Rptr.3d 614 (Cal. App. 2010) [holding the issue of materiality, in a Deceptive Trade Practices cause of action based on fraudulent or deceptive practices, is whether a reasonable person would attach importance to the representation or nondisclosure in deciding how to proceed in the particular transaction], Brown v. Bennett, 136 S.W.3d 552 (Mo. App. W. Dist., 2004) [holding acts] to which a reasonable person might be expected to attach importance in making one's choice of action are material, for purposes of a fraud claim]; Inkel v. Pride Chevrolet-Pontiac, Inc., 945 A.2d 855 (Vt. 2008) [holding under Consumer Fraud Act, the question is what a reasonable person would regard a fact as important in making a decision to purchase Briggs v. American Nat. Property and Cas. Co., 209 P.3d 1181 (Colo.App., 2009) [holding undisclosed] "material," for purposes of a fraudulent concealment, facts misrepresentation by omission claim or consumer protection act claim, if the consumer's decision might have been different had the truth been disclosed], Carcano v. JBSS, LLC, 684 S.E.2d 41 (N.C. App., 2009). [holding a fact is a "material fact" if had it been known to the party, would have influenced that party's decision in making the contract at all], Casavant v. Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd., 919 N.E.2d 165 (Mass. App.) [holding that respect to nondisclosure under deceptive trade practices act determining whether the nondisclosure was a material fact depends on whether the plaintiff likely would have acted differently but for the nondisclosure], Dubey v. Public Storage, Inc., 918 N.E.2d 265 (Ill. App. 2009) [holding "material" fact for purposes of a claim for consumer fraud act and common law fraud is where a buyer would have acted differently knowing the information, or if it concerned the type of information upon which a buyer would be expected to rely in making a decision regarding the purchase of the product], Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 143 P.3d 283 (Utah 2006) [holding to be "material," the information with respect to fraudulent concealment action must be important, which, in turn, can be gauged by the degree to which the information could be expected to influence the judgment of a person buying property or assenting to a particular purchase price], Colaizzi v. Beck, 895 A.2d 36 (Pa. Super., 2006) rev'd on other grnds, [holding a misrepresentation is material, for purposes of establishing common law fraud, if it is of such character that if it had not been misrepresented, the transaction would not have been consummated].

It was not unreasonable for Plaintiff to bring and maintain the statutory claims presented in the FAC where SAHARA's own sales and F&I employees, who were directly involved in the sale of the Plaintiff's CPO vehicle, testified that had they known about the ACE, they would have considered that information to have been "important" (material) to a CPO consumer and it **should have been disclosed** to a potential buyer of a Dodge CPO vehicle, **including the Plaintiff**.

Travis Spruell, who was SAHARA's sales person involved in the sale of the vehicle to the Plaintiff, testified that he had no knowledge about the ACE. However, based upon his experience in selling hundreds of CPO vehicles to the community, Mr. Spruell testified:

- It would be important to disclose the <u>nature and extent</u> of a previous accident to the consumer, if the dealer had that information. SS fact # 53
- Had he been aware that there was \$4,088.70 in damage to the vehicle caused by a previous accident, he would have disclosed that information to Plaintiff. SS fact # 54.
- It would have been an important fact for a buyer of a Dodge CPO vehicle to know that the vehicle had sustained \$4,088.70 in damage prior to purchasing the vehicle. SS fact # 55.
- Had he been aware of the existence of the ACE, <u>Mr. Spruell would have</u> shown the ACE to the Plaintiff. SS fact # 57.

Noah Grant was SAHARA's F&I manager. He was responsible for preparing the closing documents on the Plaintiff's vehicle. He indicated he had no knowledge of the ACE; however, based on his experience in selling hundreds of Dodge vehicles to the community, he testified:

Because it was important to disclose a vehicle's accident history, it would
have been equally important to disclose to a consumer the nature
and extent of the previous accident, if the dealership knew of the nature
and extent of the previous accident. SS fact # 42.

- The actual nature and extent of a previous accident, (meaning the dealer knew what parts were replaced and repair and the amount of the previous accident damage), would have been important information to disclose to a buyer of a Dodge CPO vehicle. SS fact # 43 and 46.
- If Mr. Grant had knowledge that the CPO vehicle Mr. Poole was purchasing had \$4,088.70 in damage caused by a previous accident, <u>Mr. Grant would have disclosed that information to Plaintiff</u>. SS fact # 44.
- The reason why Mr. Grant would disclose to the consumer that a CPO vehicle had sustained \$4,088.70 in previous damage is because such information might be important for the consumer to know based on safety concerns regarding the vehicle. SS fact # 45.

Finally, the information reflected on the ACE would have been important to the Plaintiff in making a decision as to whether he would have purchased the vehicle in the first place. Had he known this information, he would <u>not</u> have purchased the vehicle and entered into the contract or even done any business with SAHARA. SS fact # 107 and Exhibit 7, Decl. of Plntf at ¶ 4-6 that was attached to Plntf's Opp. to Defs'MSJ.

4. PLAINTIFF PRESENTED CREDIBLE EVIDENCE THAT SAHARA: (1) NEVER DISCLOSED ANY OF THE SPECIFIC INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE ACE TO THE PLAINTIFF INVOLVING HIS CPO VEHICLE PURCHASE AND (2) SAHARA AFFIRMATIVELY MISREPRESENTED THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE PREVIOUS ACCIDENT

It was **undisputed** that SAHARA had actual knowledge of the specific particularized information involving nature and extent of the damage caused by the previous accident, and **never communicated** or disclosed any of the specific contents of the ACE to the Plaintiff at time of sale. SS fact # 3-5, 59, 60 & 62.

Plaintiff also affirmatively inquired with SAHARA's sales person, (Travis Spruell), about the accident after it was initially disclosed to Plaintiff by Mr. Spuell. Mr. Spruell told Plaintiff that it was just a "minor" accident, that it had gone through the 125 CPO safety inspection, and that if the vehicle had been in significant accident, SAHARA would not be selling the vehicle to him. SS fact # 61. This fact was uncontroverted

by SAHARA in either their MSJ or in their reply brief. The information contained on the ACE did not comport with the description of the collision as represented by Mr. Spruell to the Plaintiff. Ex. 6, ACE, and Ex. 7, Dec. of Plntf in Opp. to MSJ ¶ 2-6.

5. PLAINTIFF PRESENTED CREDIBLE EVIDENCE THAT THE VEHICLE SOLD TO THE PLAINTIFF: (1) DID <u>NOT</u> MEET CPO STANDARDS, (2) DID <u>NOT</u> MEET CHRSYSLER MANUFACTURING REPAIR SPECIFICATIONS, (3) SHOULD <u>NOT</u> HAVE BEEN SOLD AS A DODGE CPO VEHICLE AND (4) PLAINTIFF SUSTAINED DAMAGES

Plaintiff presented the declaration of Mr. Avillini, Plaintiff's auto expert in opposition to Defendants' MSJ. His opinions were ruled admissible by the Court. Mr. Avillini opined that the vehicle did **not** meet CPO standards and SAHARA should **not** have held out or sold the vehicle as a Dodge CPO. SS fact # 101-103. Furthermore, because of the nature and extent of the damage caused by the previous collision, as reflected on the ACE, the vehicle had sustained significant diminished value. SS fact # 105. Plaintiff would **not** have entered into the contract for the sale of the vehicle giving SAHARA \$4,000.00 down in trade, and would **not** have purchased a vehicle that was intrinsically worth several thousand dollars **less** because of the nature and extent of the previous accident that was never disclosed to the Plaintiff. SS fact # 106-107, and Exhibit 7, Decl. of Plntf at ¶ 2-6 that was attached to Plntf's Opp. to Defs' MSJ. Had Plaintiff been given the ACE, he never would have purchased the vehicle. SS fact # 106-107, and Exhibit 7, Decl. of Plntf at ¶ 2-6 that was attached to Plntf's Opp. to Defs' MSJ.

III

ON BALANCE THE BEATTIE FACTORS DO NOT MILITATE IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS FOR PURPOSES OF A DISCRETIONARY AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES UNDER RULE 68

As a threshold matter, while Rule 68 is designed to encourage settlement, it should not be used as a mechanism to unfairly force plaintiffs to forego legitimate claims. *Beattie, supra*. Furthermore no one factor under *Beattie* is outcome determinative, and each

factor should be given appropriate consideration. Yamaha Motor Co., U.S.A. v. Arnoult, 114 Nev. 233, 252 n. 16, 955 P.2d 661, 673 n. 16 (1998).

A. WHETHER PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS WERE BROUGHT IN GOOD FAITH

As set forth in section II, supra, given the claims and allegations plead in the FAC, all of which have ample and credible evidentiary support, as demonstrated by the evidence presented in Opposition to Defendant's MSJ, Plaintiff's claims were brought in good faith. Defendants' assertions that Plaintiff's claims lacked evidence, were unsubstantiated or were otherwise unsupported are not borne out by the record.

B. WHETHER DEFENDANTS' OFFER OF JUDGMENT WAS REASONABLE AND IN GOOD FAITH BOTH IN ITS TIMING AND AMOUNT

Given the extensive settlement negotiations that **both parties** engaged in from August 17, 2017 all the way through October 5, 2017, the relative amounts of the party's multiple offers and counter-offers that were exchanged during that time, (see Exhibit 1; emails), there is no real credible dispute that Defendants' lump sum offer of \$45,000.00, inclusive of all damages, attorney's fees and costs was not reasonable and in good faith. However, it is these same facts regarding settlement that militate <u>against</u> a finding that the third <u>Beattie</u> factor favors Defendants.

C. WHETHER PLAINTIFF'S DECISION TO REJECT THE OFFER WAS GROSSLY UNREASONABLE OR IN BAD FAITH

As Defendants point out in their motion, a court may consider offers of settlement in determining whether discretionary fees should be awarded under the statute. *Parodi* v. Budetti, 115 Nev. 236, 242, 984 P.2d 172, 176 (1999). Defendants portray Plaintiff as recalcitrant and entirely unwilling to engage in good faith settlement negotiations. This is simply not true and is not born out by the emails between counsel involving extensive settlement negotiations. *Exhibit 1*; settlement emails. Contrary to Defendants' assertions, settlement negotiations were not a "one way" street, as both parties were extensively

involved and pursuing settlement negotiations in this case between August 17, 2017 all the way through October 5, 2017. See Exhibit and GOW Decl. at ¶ 2.

Plaintiff did not ignore settlement, but the emails at Exhibit 1 demonstrate the Plaintiff openly pursued settlement possibilities with the Defendants. The further show that Plaintiff's counsel was continually communicating and following up with Defendants' counsel, and the parties exchanged multiple offers and counter-offers and had numerous conversations, both telephonically and in person, involving those offers and counter-offers. See Exhibit 1, 001-021 and GOW Decl. ¶ 2.

However, because this was a statutory consumer fraud claim brought under NRS 41.600, attorney's fees must be a topic of discussion as 41.600(3)(c) has a mandatory one-way attorney's fee shifting provision to a prevailing 41.600 claimant. Consequently, the topic of payment of reasonable attorney's fees and costs under a 41.600 consumer fraud claim is entirely proper and germane with respect to any settlement discussions and/or offers, and Plaintiff's and Defendant's counsel had many settlement discussions about this issue. See Decl. of GOW.

As set forth in more detail below and as confirmed by the settlement emails at Exhibit 1, after Defendants first offer was made in September 5, 2017, no allocation for any fees and costs, after consultation with the client, it was rejected. Later that same day, Plaintiff made his first counter-offer. This counter-offer required SAHARA to pay off the balance on the Plaintiff's vehicle in the amount of \$13,700.00, and Plaintiff would retain the vehicle and absorb the diminished value loss. Plaintiff has already paid over \$22,000.00 under the contract towards a vehicle that was worth several thousand less at time of sale because of the nature and extent of the previous collision. Plaintiff's offer also required SAHARA to pay reasonable fees and costs. At that time attorney's fees were a total of \$37,226.00, and costs were \$5,330.00, which were incurred over the course of

16 months of litigation. See Exhibit 1; 012. Plaintiff's counter-offer totaled \$56.296.00, which included all damages, fees and costs. Defendants offer of judgment was in the amount of \$45,000.00, which was also inclusive of all damages, fees and costs.

By no stretch was Plaintiff or his counsel ever "in the stratosphere" on settlement, or otherwise unrealistic, and was <u>at all times</u> negotiating good faith with respect to settlement in this case. See settlement emails at Exhibit 1.

Notwithstanding, Defendants contend that this case was attorney fee driven. It was not -- either with respect to Plaintiff including attorney's fees and costs in any demand, (given this was a mandatory statutory fee shifting case under 41.600), or with respect to their amount. Consequently, a short discussion about the reasons behind statutory attorney fee shifting under 41.600 would be germane at this point.

Under the American Rule, unless there is a rule, statute or contract, each side is to bare their own attorney's fees and costs. See *Smith v Crown Fin. Servs.* 111 Nev. 277, 281, 890 P. 2d 769 (1995). However, mandatory statutory fee shifting provisions, such as those found in Nevada's Consumer Fraud Statute, (NRS 41.600(3)(c)), are an exception to the American rule. Statutory fee shifting enables the consumer to venture out into the same legal market place as a financially superior Defendant, and retain an attorney of equal caliber and/or competency to take on consumer fraud cases of this type. The Legislative and public policy objectives behind consumer protection fee shifting statutes are clear, to discourage or otherwise eradicate certain conduct which the Legislature has found to be deleterious to both the consumer and business marketplace, and to enforce important statutory rights.

This private enforcement mechanism, effectuated through statutory fee shifting, not only significantly aids and complements public agencies that have very limited resources in which to enforce the NDTPA, but more importantly, the Legislature made the decision to *privately enforce* the provisions of the NDTPA via NRS 41.600(2)(e), so as to enable and ensure robust enforcement of its provisions relating to deceptive trade practices involved in the retail sales of goods to the community. However, what should not be lost on the Court is that, next to their home, the second most expensive and important purchase the overwhelming majority of consumers will make in their lifetime is with respect to their car, and most of these purchases *are financed*, *which was the situation in the instant case*.

The legislative and public policy objectives behind fee shifting statutes are clear. They are promulgated to ensure access to justice via the Courts by enabling persons (consumers) of limited means to retain the services of a competent attorney via statutory fee shifting, not only to vindicate the rights of the individual consumer, but to discourage or otherwise eradicate certain conduct which the Legislature has found to be deleterious to both the consumer and business marketplace. Indeed, a claim for consumer fraud/deceptive trade practices is a pure creature of statute wherein statutory fee shifting is an integral part of any claim or settlement made pursuant to 41.600.

On August 17, 2017, the parties agreed to a mutual stand down of noticed depositions in order to explore settlement possibilities, which included Plaintiff possibly financing the purchase of a new vehicle from SAHARA. Plaintiff also agreed to hold off on filing his motions to compel/ See Exhibit 1: 001.

On **September 5**, **2017**, after the mutual stand down, Defendants' first offer only encompassed a trade-in of Plaintiff's vehicle in exchange for a new comparable vehicle which gave the Plaintiff a \$21,000.00 positive equity position in the new vehicle, *but there*

was no allocation or payment of any fees or costs under NRS 41.600(3)(c). Consequently, this offer was rejected. See Exhibit 1; 011-012.

Later that same day, on **September 5, 2017**, Plaintiff made the counter offer set forth *supra*, -- \$13,700.00 for payoff on the vehicle, \$37,226.00 in fees and \$5,330.00 in costs. *See Exhibit 1; 012*.

Because Defendants did not accept Plaintiff's counter offer, both Defendant and Plaintiff went forward with their respective depositions, and Plaintiff prepared and filed his motions to compel, which Plaintiff prevailed on. Plaintiff also opposed SAHARA's motion for protective order on proper and timely noticed depositions of SAHARA's employees. Based on Plaintiff prevailing on his motion to compel supplemental RFA responses, Plaintiff took those depositions off calendar. See Exhibit 8; DCRR. However, fees and costs on both sides increased and did not remain static, which is the inherent nature of litigation as well as under statutory fee shifting, but the parties were still engaged in settlement negotiations. See Exhibit 1, emails, 012-021; GOW Decl. 15

On **September 25**, **2017**, Plaintiff submitted the following offer to settle: SAHARA pays the lender the balance owed on the vehicle in the amount of \$17,345.74 and Plaintiff keeps the vehicle (again absorbing the diminished value to the vehicle); reimburse Plaintiff for attorneys' fees incurred in the amount of \$60,840.00 and costs incurred in the amount of \$9,086.70. The total demand to settle the case was \$87,272.00. *Exhibit 1*, 015-016.

See Exhibit 8, DCRR.

Throughout September 2017 the additional time incurred, included, but was not limited to Defendant taking the deposition of Plaintiff's expert for almost seven (7) hours, in addition to two and half hours of deposition preparation time with his expert. Plaintiff took the depositions of two of SAHARA's employees and had to prepare to take those depositions. Plaintiff also had to prepare his Motion to Compel responses to RFAs and interrogatories and prepare and appear at the hearing, which he held off on as part of the August 2017 stand down, in addition to preparing his Opposition to SAHARA's Motion for Protective Order.

On **September 30, 2017,** SAHARA counter-offered with \$7,000.00 to the Plaintiff and \$20,000.00 for fees and costs for a total offer of 27,000.00. *Exhibit 1, 017*.

On **October 2, 2017,** Plaintiff rejected SAHARA's counter, and made the following offer. Pay Plaintiff \$14,500, and Plaintiff keeps the vehicle. Reimburse Plaintiff for attorneys' fees incurred in the amount of \$55,000.00 and \$9,086.70 in costs, for a total demand of \$78,586.00. *Exhibit 1, 018*;

On October 5, 2017, Defendants countered with \$9,000.00 to the Plaintiff and \$25,000.00 in fees and costs for a total offer of \$34,000.00. Exhibit 1, 019.

Later that same day, Plaintiff rejected Defendants' counter and stood on his previous counter-offer of October 2, 2017. *Exhibit 1; 019*. Soon after on that same day, October 5, 2017), Defendants propounded their lump sum offer of judgment for \$45,000.00. It was communicated to and discussed with the Plaintiff and was allowed expired by operation of law.

D. WHETHER THE FEES SOUGHT BY THE OFFEROR ARE REASONABLE AND JUSTIFIED IN AMOUNT ¹⁶

Defendants have not met their burden on this factor and Plaintiff is unable to adequately address this factor because Defendants have refused to provide any of their attorneys' time sheets to Plaintiff to review. Defendants are not allowed to move for fees and refuse to produce to opposing counsel their detailed billing statements. See Golden Road, Love and Rule 54(d), supra.

Defendants' counsel was very clear in his affidavit attached to Defendants' motion for fees. Detailed and itemized billing statements *existed* when they filed their motion on December 19, 2017, and he personally reviewed all of them, but they were *intentionally* not attached. This was not an oversight or a mistake. This was made

This is also an express factor under Bruzell in which Defendants also have the burden.

clear via a supplemental declaration from opposing counsel, filed on December 20, 2017, indicating that they would bring their itemized billing with them to the hearing, and give an unredacted copy to the Court, and a redacted copy to Plaintiff's counsel.

All Defendants' counsel did was state "total" hours without disclosing what exactly was done, when it was done, how much time each task took, what attorney was responsible for those tasks etc. Plaintiff's counsel requested in writing those billings to be produced in unredacted format, and Defendants refused this request. See Exhibit 2, emails. Defendants refusal to produce billing records is highly prejudicial to the Plaintiff, and Plaintiff's counsel has not had any opportunity to review those statements to question their "reasonableness and necessity" under both Beattie and Brunzell.

Consequently, the Court should either deny Defendants' motion for attorney's motion in its entirety, which it has the discretion to do, or continue the motion to give Plaintiff's counsel ample time to review and question those billings vis-à-vis any fees that were incurred after Defendants' Rule 68 offer of judgment. However the Court has ample information and evidence at this point in time to rule that Defendants are **not** entitled to any fee award based upon NRS 18.001(2)(b).

IV CONCLUSION

Based on the aforementioned, Defendants are not entitled to any fee award under NRS 18.010(2)(b). Nor are fees warranted under Rule 68, either because they are unwarranted under the *Beattie* factors, and/or because they have *refused* to submit their detailed billings when they were required to do in compliance with Nevada law in order to meet their burden.

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3	Dated this 23 rd day of December, 2018
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5	By <u>/s/ George O. West III</u> GEORGE O. WEST III
6	Law Offices of George O. West III Consumer Attorneys Against Auto Fraud Attorney for Plaintiff DERRICK POOLE
7	DERRICK POOLE
8	CRAIG B. FRIEDBERG
9	Law Offices of Craig B. Friedberg, Esq. Attorney for Plaintiff DERRICK POOLE
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	JOINT APPENDIX 1148

DECLARATION OF GEORGE O. WEST III

STATE OF NEVADA)

STATE OF NEVADA)

SS

COUNTY OF CLARK)

I, George O. West III, hereby declare:

That I am the attorney for the Plaintiff

That I am the attorney for the Plaintiff in this case, and I am admitted to practice law in all of the courts of the State of Nevada, and I have personal knowledge of the matters in this declaration, and if called as a witness I would and could competently testify:

- 1. That all of the exhibits referenced and identified in this opposition attached hereto are what they are purported to be.
- 2. In addition to the written settlement communications and negotiations reflected in the settlement emails at Exhibit 1, I had at least nine (9) conversations regarding settlement with Mr. Bendavid between August 2017 and October 2017. Four to five were over the phone and at least four (4) were *in person*, that occurred prior to the taking the depositions of Plaintiff's expert and SAHARA's employees at Mr. Bendavid's office, (all on different days), and two (2) outside of the court room, one of which Mr. Friedberg was also present. When we first began negotiations in mid-August, Mr. Bendavid inquired about what my fees and costs were. I indicated fees are just a little over \$37,000.00 and that costs were a little over \$5,000.00. The assertion that Plaintiff's counsel ignored settlement and did not engage in any good faith settlement discussions is simply not true and the emails at exhibit 1 contradict this contention.

I certify that the aforementioned is true and correct under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Nevada.

Executed this 15th day of January, 2018.

<u>/s/ George O. West III</u> George O. West III

EXHIBIT 1

From: Jeffery Bendavid < J.Bendavid@moranlawfirm.com>

Subject: RE: Our conversation today
Date: August 17, 2017 at 10:30:55 PM PDT
To: George West III <gowesg@cox.net>
Cc: Craig Friedberg <attcbf@cox.net>

Thanks George. Yes this summarizes what we discussed and we agree to extend the dates to September 15th. We will continue the expert depo for Wednesday of next week and continue with our settlement discussions. Talk to you soon.

Jeff Bendavid

From: George West III [mailto:gowesq@cox.net]
Sent: Thursday, August 17, 2017 8:15 PM

To: Jeffery Bendavid < <u>J.Bendavid@moranlawfirm.com</u>>

Cc: Craig Friedberg <attcbf@cox.net>
Subject: Our conversation today

Jeff.

This email will confirm our tel con today. I indicated I would inquire with my client with the possibility of purchasing a new dodge Ram from your client. If he is amenable to this, then the numbers have to be right. The outstanding balance is about 17k. Obviously we both agreed that has to be paid off by your client as part of any potential new purchase. You argued you client is entitled to depreciation for "reasonable use," I disagreed for the reasons stated. I will inquire with him about this possibility and if he is interested, then we can start discussing potential numbers on the vehicle which would. The truck has a little under 24k on it. That being said, there is still the issue of fees and costs, which as I said is the 800 pound guerrilla in the room and always is, but it may be moot if my client is not interested in purchasing a new truck from your client because of trust issues. In exchange, we agreed to a temporary stand down on both sides. You would take my expert's depo off which is set for next Wednesday and I would take the depos of the employees I have noticed on the 29th and the 30th off as well. We agreed to mutually extend the discovery cut off through September 15th and we also agreed to waive time to renotice the depos we have taken off and agree to renotice those on mutually agreeable dates. I agreed to hold off on my motions to compel through next Wednesday. Please confirm via email forthwith your agreement with this email on the discovery cut

extension and renoticing and taking of these depositions as I want to ensure we both are on the same page as we are both taking our respectively noticed depos off based upon our agreement.

George O. West III, Esq

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www.phoenixlemonlawattorney.com
www.arizonaslemonlawattorney.com

Admitted to Nevada, Arizona and California*

* Inactive in California

Subject:Poole

Date:Sun, 20 Aug 2017 20:05:36 -0700 **From:**George West <gowesq@cox.net>

To:Jeff Bendavid

<j.bendavid@moranlawfirm.com>
CC:Craig Friedberg <attcbf@cox.net>

Jeff I talked with my client today he is not opposed "in principle" to the idea of possibly settling in exchange for a new vehicle. However we need to talk about numbers will get back to you on that. The new truck would a 2017 ram 1500. Also the issue of attorneys fees as well I'll get back to you on that by Thursday as well. I'm in Phoenix through late Tuesday and buried on Wednesday when I get back. Preliminarily I will tell you that any settlement will have to involve pay off the outstanding balance which is approximately 17,000 appraising his current truck in very good condition assuming no accidents. Not black but bluebook. It's got about 23,500 on it. If your client wants to see it let us know. We're still a long way away from getting this done but I just wanted to call mery tell you that in principle he not averse to what we discussed but again it comes down to whether it works out for him on payments how much is given his trade pay off of the current balance and payment of attorneys fees and costs incurred to date.

Sent from my IPhone 6 Plus

Please forgive any typos or bad voice recognition

George O. West III, Esq

<u>Consumer Attorneys Against Auto Fraud</u>

10161 Park Run Drive

Subject:Poole

Date:Wed, 23 Aug 2017 17:06:27 -0700
From:George West III ≤gowesq@cox.net>
To:Jeffery Bendavid
≤j.bendavid@moranlawfirm.com>

Jeff

Give me a call on my cell regarding potential settlement. 702-278-5250

George O. West III, Esq

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Admitted to Nevada, Arizona and California*

* Inactive in California

Subject: Poole

Date:Thu, 24 Aug 2017 11:40:41 -0700 **From:**George West <gowesq@cox.net>

To: Jeff Bendavid

<j.bendavid@moranlawfirm.com>
CC:Craig Friedberg <attcbf@cox.net>

Jeff I'm slammed today I am dealing with getting my rental ready for a tenant and I've got contractors over and got to deal with that so can we talk tomorrow after 330 and I'll have some numbers for you on our side.

Sent from my IPhone 6 Plus

Please forgive any typos or bad voice recognition

George O. West III, Esq

Consumer Attorneys Against Auto Fraud

10161 Park Run Drive
Suite 150
Las Vegas, NV 89145

www.americasautofraudattorney.com

www.nevadasautofraudattorney.com

(702) 664-1168

(702) 664-0459 (Fax)

Subject:Poole

Date:Mon, 28 Aug 2017 12:39:06 -0700

From:George West III <u><gowesq@cox.net></u>

To: Jeffery Bendavid

<j.bendavid@moranlawfirm.com>

CC:Craig Friedberg <attcbf@cox.net>, Stephanie Smith <s.smith@moranlawfirm.com>

Jeff,

Just so you know, we need to get this wrapped up in principal by tomorrow close of biz and get the truck in, do the deal, get fees and costs agreed to, or we need to start looking at mutually convenient dates to renotice Mr. Avillini's depo, and Plaintiff's depositions and I need to finish up my motions to compel and get them on calendar. Please advise. Thx.

George O. West III, Esq

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(702) 664-0459 [fax]

Member of NACA, the National Association of Consumer Advocates, www.naca.net.

Admitted to Nevada, Arizona and California*

* Inactive in California

Subject:Poole

Date: Tue, 29 Aug 2017 18:23:13 -0700
From: George West III ≤gowesq@cox.net>
To: Jeffery Bendavid
≤j.bendavid@moranlawfirm.com>
CC: Craig Friedberg ≤attcbf@cox.net>

Jeff,

We did vehicle inspection today, credit ran, vehicle test drove. I think my client's credit score of 611 is going to be very difficult to get this done, but let us know so we can figure out if we are moving forward. Thx.

George O. West III, Esq

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Admitted to Nevada, Arizona and California*

* Inactive in California



Date:Thu, 31 Aug 2017 22:46:18 +0000

From: Jeffery Bendavid

<J.Bendavid@moranlawfirm.com>

To:George West square; cc:Craig Friedberg attcbf@cox.net cox.net cox.net cox.net cox.net square; attcbf@cox.net square; <a href="m

Hi George. We are going over it tomorrow with their people. I should have an offer over to you later tomorrow. Thanks.

Jeff Bendavid

From: George West [mailto:gowesq@cox.net]
Sent: Thursday, August 31, 2017 3:37 PM

To: Jeffery Bendavid <1.Bendavid@moranlawfirm.com>

Cc: Craig Friedberg <attcbf@cox.net>

Subject: Poole

Jeff I am in seminar all day today but we need to see if we can do this otherwise we need to reschedule those depos and I need to finish and get my motions to compei on calendar. Please advise thx

Sent from my iPhone 6 Plus

Please forgive any typos or bad voice recognition

George O. West III, Esq

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<u>www.americasautofraudattorney.com</u>

<u>www.nevadasautofraudattorney.com</u>

(702) 664-1168

(702) 664-0459 (Fav)

Subject: Re: Poole

Date:Sun, 3 Sep 2017 13:50:04 -0700

From:George West III <u><gowesq@cox.net></u>

To: Jeffery Bendavid

<J.Bendavid@moranlawfirm.com>
CC:Craig Friedberg <attcbf@cox.net>

Jeff never heard back on this. If we are going to try and get this done, then we need to have the hard numbers worked out **close of business Tuesday**, but again, I see financing as being the major obstacle, but we need to get this either worked out, or we need to get dates to put the depositions back on calendar asap, and I have to finish my motions to compel and get them filed on OST at this point. Thx for following up. Call me on my cell. Thx. Please advise.

On Aug 31, 2017, at 3:46 PM, Jeffery Bendavid < <u>J.Bendavid@moranlawfirm.com</u>> wrote:

Hi George. We are going over it tomorrow with their people. I should have an offer over to you later tomorrow. Thanks.

Jeff Bendavid

From: George West [mailto:gowesg@cox.net]
Sent: Thursday, August 31, 2017 3:37 PM
To: Jeffery Bendavid < J.Bendavid@moranlawfirm.com > Cc: Craig Friedberg < attcbf@cox.net > Subject: Poole

Jeff I am in seminar all day today but we need to see if we can do this otherwise we need to reschedule those depos and I need to finish and get my motions to compel on calendar. Please advise thx

SETTLEMENT EMAILS 009

. .

Subject:Poole

Date:Tue, 5 Sep 2017 10:24:50 -0700 **From:**George West <gowesq@cox.net>

To:Jeff Bendavid

<j.bendavid@moranlawfirm.com>
CC:Craig Friedberg <attcbf@cox.net>

Jeff, we need to get something worked out by close of business today or we need to put these Depp owes back on Calendar and I need to get my motions on Calendar so let's get this done or we need to move forward. My client is leaving town for a 10 day vacation on September 10 so if we're going to get this done this is the time if not no big deal let's just get the Depp on and move forward

Sent from my IPhone 6 Plus

Please forgive any typos or bad voice recognition

George O. West III, Esq

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(702) 664-1168

(702) 664-0459 (Fax)

SETTLEMENT EMAILS 010

. .

Subject:Re: Sahara Chrysler Jeep - Poole
Date:Tue, 5 Sep 2017 13:55:57 -0700
From:George West III <gowesq@cox.net>
To:Jeffery Bendavid
<J.Bendavid@moranlawfirm.com>
CC:Craig Friedberg <attcbf@cox.net>

Jeff,

Per our tel con today, your settlement proposal (package) does not provide for any fees and costs under 41.600(3). This is a fee shifting statute case, and in all fee shifting statute cases, including the hundreds I have done, there is always payment of a separate payment or benefit to the Plaintiff and a separate payment of fees and costs. That is the way it also shakes out at time of trial if Plaintiff prevails. Jury awards "x" amount in damages. Court then awards the fees separate from the damages awarded pursuant to a fee petition brought under 41.600(3). That is the way it has always been and that is the way it is always done in the hundreds of these auto fraud fee shifting cases I have done.

Your client is basically trying to skirt paying any fees as apart of any "settlement" and that is a non starter and my client is fully on board with this. If Plaintiff prevails, your client is looking at a one way mandatory fee shifting statute. Defendants pay fees in fee shifting cases and that is the expectation of my client and has been from the very beginning whether via settlement or after trial, because that is what he is entitled to under the law to be made whole. I indicated very clearly to you when you first wanted to explore settlement possibilities two weeks ago what fees and costs were. If my client prevails, he is entitled to a mandatory one way award of fees and

costs, and as you said, settlements are about trying to limit risk, but as I said, with no payment of fees and costs incurred, there is no settlement potential here. I made that clear to you during out conversation today and my client fully expects your client to pay those fees as part of any settlement.

I have communicated your client's offer to my client. It is rejected, without payment of reasonable fees and costs, there can be no settlement as he is not being made whole, which is what 41.600(3) contemplates with the mandatory fee shifting provision. Here is our counter. Your client pays off the balance on the truck 17.3k. My client keeps the truck. Your client also pays \$ 37,226 in fees calculated at \$ 450.00 and hour and \$ 5,330.62 in incurred costs. As you know fees will rise exponentially on both side once we get in trial most and proceed down that course beginning with the depos that were taken off will now need to be taken. That is the counter. It is open though close of business tomorrow. As I also mentioned, I will be getting some alternative dates for Mr. Avilini's depo for next week, please do the same with the employees I have previously noticed. I will be going forward with my motions to compel on on OST basis if we can't get this done by tomorrow.

On Sep 5, 2017, at 1:10 PM, Jeffery Bendavid <<u>J.Bendavid@moranlawfirm.com</u>> wrote:

Hi George. The following is confidential and protected settlement offer we made you today:

Your client has chosen a new 2017 truck, with a price of \$42,915.

Your client's current vehicle has a payoff of \$17,300.

My client willing to offer a settlement package to your client, and include it all in a "trade value", which will be \$37,915. So approximately a settlement value for this case in the amount of \$21K.

The following is how it would breakdown:

1. New Vehicle: \$42,915

2. Trade-in settlement value: \$37,915

3. Payoff of Vehicle to Well: \$17,300

4. Price of New Vehicle after trade: \$22,300

Under this proposal, your client would get a new vehicle for less amount then his old one, and \$21K in equity, which provides your client a great settlement package. Look forward to

moving our clients toward a settlement of this case.

Jeffery A. Bendavid, Esq.

dmage003.png>
630 SOUTH 4TH STREET | LAS VEGAS, NV 89101
PHONE: (702) 384-8424 | FAX: (702) 384-6568
MORANLAWFIRM.COM

The information contained in the electronic message is legally privileged and confidential under applicable law, and is intended only for the use of the individual or entity named above. If the recipient of this message is not the above-named intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, copy or disclosure of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify Moran Brandon Bendavid Moran at (702) 384-8424 and permanently delete the communication immediately without making any copy or distribution.

Subject:Poole

Date:Fri, 22 Sep 2017 21:37:53 -0700 **From:**George West III ≤gowesq@cox.net> **To:**Jeff Bendavid

<i.bendavid@moranlawfirm.com>
CC:Craig Friedberg <attcbf@cox.net>

Jeff,

In thinking about this more, I don't think we need a judge to settle this case, we can either do that among ourselves, otherwise we just try the case. Also we are too close to trial at this point to do a settlement conference. We need to get geared up for trial at this point, (at least Craig and I do), and we need to set up a 2.67 to go over exhibits, we need to do our final pre trial disclosures, etc... As I said, fees and costs have gone up significantly since August. I will get back to you on a new offer. We heard nothing from your client about our last counter which has expired. You can communicate it to your client and decide what they want to do. Again, there will be two components that comprise any settlement in light of the mandatory fee shifting. "x" amount to the client and "x" amount for fees and costs. No other way to do it. We will get you our offer this coming Monday or Tuesday.

George O. West III, Esq

Consumer Attorneys Against Auto Fraud

10161 Park Run Drive
Suite 150

Subject:Fwd: Poole
Date:Mon, 25 Sep 2017 13:49:07 -0700
From:George West III <gowesq@cox.net>
To:Jeff Bendavid
<j.bendavid@moranlawfirm.com>
CC:Craig Friedberg <attcbf@cox.net>

Jeff,

Per my previous email to you, after talking with my client, here is Plaintiff's offer to settle. As I mentioned to you before the depo of Mr. Avillini, fees and costs have gone up significantly since the last offer since the last offer and having a 6.2 hour depo of Mr. Avillini did not help. He still needs to get paid his outstanding fees of \$ 1,820.00 for his time and that is **separate** from this offer irrespective of whether we settle. The cost figure below does not include this amount as that is your client's responsibility to pay under the code. Mr. Avillini must be paid in full prior to any agreement being signed or any dismissal being filed, assuming we can arrive at a settlement.

There are the terms. Pay my client \$17,345.74, which is the balance owning on his truck. He keeps the truck along with absorbing diminished value based upon the undisclosed information given to him about the nature and extent of the accident as he would not have entered into the contract had he been told the information. He deals with the DV, but keeps the truck. If your client has not thought that this is not a viable punitive damage case, I would really think about that given the information acquired via discovery.

Pay fees in the amount of \$ 60,840 based on \$ 450.00 per hour. This is for time for both myself and Craig since he got formally associated

into the case. Pay costs in the amount of \$ 9,086.70. This includes costs for the recent depositions of Mr. Spruell and Grant and focus group (which is a recoverable cost). This offer will be open through close of business Friday, September 29, 2017 5:00 p.m.. It can only be accepted via email. Time is of the essence. I will draft settlement agreement for your review. No confidentiality. That is a non starter. I never advise any client to accept one as that is just an invitation to a second generation lawsuit and anyone can talk about any case that is part of any public record. No admission of liability, mutual release standard terms etc... Dismissal of action with prejudice. If accepted, settlement funds must be delivered to my office no later then October 6, 2017 by 4:30 p.m. Time is of the essence. The settlement check shall be made payable to "George O. West III Trust Account."

Please let us know what you clients want to do.



Hi George. This email is made under settlement negotiations. I have authority to email you this counter-offer. Without getting into all the specific details and arguments that have been made, my client is offering to pay Plaintiff, \$7,000, which he can do whatever he wants, pay down the note, or keep. Up to him. He keeps the truck. In addition, my client will pay \$20,000 in Plaintiff's attorneys fees and cost incurred in this matter. This of course does not include the expert fees that are presently due. Obviously, keeping the dialogue open is important. Let me know if you want to discuss the offer. Thanks. Talk to you soon.

Subject:Poole
Date:Mon, 2 Oct 2017 17:03:36 -0700
From:George West III ≤gowesq@cox.net>
To:Jeffery Bendavid
≤j.bendavid@moranlawfirm.com>,
Stephanie Smith
≤s.smith@moranlawfirm.com>
CC:Craig Friedberg ≤attcbf@cox.net>

Jeff,

We are reviewing the stip. We are going to make a couple of small changes making some of the evidentiary stips "mutual." I have discussed this matter with my client Plaintiff's counter to your counter is \$ 14,500 to my client, he keeps the car. \$ 55,000.00 in fees and \$ 9,086.70 in costs. The cost figure does not include the amount owed to Mr. Avillini for his deposition time that you office owes to him. This will be open through 5:00 p.m. October 5th.

George O. West III, Esq

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Las Vegas, NV 89145

(702) 664-1168

(702) 664-0459 [fax]

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www.naca.net.

SETTLEMENT EMAILS 018

Subject: Re: Poole

Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2017 14:53:01 -0700

From:George West III <gowesq@cox.net>

To: Jeffery Bendavid

<J.Bendavid@moranlawfirm.com>

CC:Craig Friedberg <attcbf@cox.net>, Stephanie Smith <s.smith@moranlawfirm.com>

Jeff,

I have spoken with my client and have forwarded your counter offer to him. It is rejected. Plaintiff stands on his last counter offer. It is open through 5:00 tomorrow.

Please forward the stip on your motions and please apprise of the status of payment of Mr. Avillini.

On Oct 5, 2017, at 2:22 PM, Jeffery Bendavid <J.Bendavid@moranlawfirm.com> wrote:

Hi George. I have spoken to my client and we are countering your recent offer. My client will offer \$9,000 to your client and \$25,000 in attorney's fees and cost. This again does not include the expert fees. Please advise as soon as possible so we can move this along. Thanks. Talk to you soon.

Jeff Bendavid

From: George West III [mailto:gowesq@cox.net]

Sent: Monday, October 2, 2017 5:04 PM

To: Jeffery Bendavid < J.Bendavid@moranlawfirm.com >; Stephanie Smith

<<u>s.smith@moranlawfirm.com</u>>

Cc: Craig Friedberg <attcbf@cox.net>

Subject:Poole
Date:Thu, 5 Oct 2017 17:16:09 -0700
From:George West III ≤gowesq@cox.net>
To:Jeffery Bendavid
≤j.bendavid@moranlawfirm.com>
CC:Craig Friedberg ≤attcbf@cox.net>,
Stephanie Smith
≤s.smith@moranlawfirm.com>

Jeff,

Received your OJ. Will communicate it to my client. In the meantime, this is my fourth request to return the stip to continue your motions. You indicated in both and email and tel con that you had no problem with continuing your motions to November 9th due to my unavailability. This is my last time asking, If I dont' get the stip back from you via email by close of business Monday October 9th, I will file my ex parte application with the Court to have them continued. This is my fourth request for payment of Mr. Avillini's fees to be paid for his deposition time. If I don't receive written confirmation via email that a check has been sent to Mr. Avillini by Monday October 9th, I will file my motion with the discovery commission compelling payment, with a request for sanctions for your continued failure to do so. Monday will be 17 days since his deposition. More then sufficient time has elapsed to him to be paid. I have requested this four times with no response. Please also mail your signature page to my office on the DCCR as I requested earlier today, if I don't get it then I will just file the DCCR with a cover letter indicating your office would not mail the signature page to me.

George O. West III, Esq

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www.phoenixlemonlawattorney.com
www.arizonaslemonlawattorney.com

Admitted to Nevada, Arizona and California*
* Inactive in California

From: George West gowesq@gmail.com &

Subject: Re: Poole

Date: January 10, 2018 at 3:43 PM

To: Stephanie Smith s.smith@moranlawfirm.com

Cc: Jeffery Bendavid j.bendavid@moranlawfirm.com, Craig Friedberg attcbf@cox.net



What exactly are you producing to be clear. At the very least you need to provide a privilege log for each separate redaction and show them to the court to make the call on that. So again, what exactly are your producing on Friday? The attorney client privilege is understood assuming what is in the billing records is specific enough to rise to a confidential communication, but work product would only apply to your mental thoughts and impressions and I don't know why such information would be on billing records. So again, please elucidate on this issue and on what is being produced.

On Jan 10, 2018, at 3:36 PM, Stephanie Smith <<u>s.smith@moranlawfirm.com</u>> wrote:

George- We appreciate your position in needing to see the invoices themselves, however, we are only willing to provide you with redacted ones in order to preserve attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product protections since you have filed your notice of appeal with the Supreme Court. I can get that to you by Friday. Thanks.

From: George West III [mailto:gowesq@cox.net]

Sent: Monday, January 8, 2018 7:50 PM

To: Jeffery Bendavid < J.Bendavid@moranlawfirm.com>

Cc: Craig Friedberg < attcbf@cox.net >; Stephanie Smith < s.smith@moranlawfirm.com >

Subject: Poole

Jeff,

You need to send us unredacted billings that are not privileged. The only privilege that could apply is atty client relating to specific and identifiable communications with your client involving a time entry *involving a specific topic*, not a general topic like discuss status or MSJ or tel con with client re strategy etc... Otherwise, it impairs and prejudices our ability to respond to the reasonableness of your fee petition. I look forward to receiving those by Wednesday they should be easy to get and email over. Thank you for your anticipated and immediate attention in this regard.

George O. West III, Esq Consumer Attorneys Against Auto Fraud 10161 Park Run Drive Suite 150 From: Jeffery Bendavid J.Bendavid@moranlawfirm.com &

Subject: RE: Poole

Date: January 10, 2018 at 3:57 PM

To: George West gowesq@gmail.com, Stephanie Smith s.smith@moranlawfirm.com

Cc: Craig Friedberg attcbf@cox.net



George. As Stephanie indicated, you will be receiving a copy of the redacted bills. At that time, you will see what you are getting. The time entry, the amounts and the biller will all be there. The actual detailed entry of the work done, will be redacted. The court will get an unredacted set to review in camera. Thanks.

Jeff Bendavid

From: George West [mailto:gowesq@gmail.com] Sent: Wednesday, January 10, 2018 3:43 PM

To: Stephanie Smith <s.smith@moranlawfirm.com>

Cc: Jeffery Bendavid <J.Bendavid@moranlawfirm.com>; Craig Friedberg <attcbf@cox.net>

Subject: Re: Poole

What exactly are you producing to be clear. At the very least you need to provide a privilege log for each separate redaction and show them to the court to make the call on that. So again, what exactly are your producing on Friday? The attorney client privilege is understood assuming what is in the billing records is specific enough to rise to a confidential communication, but work product would only apply to your mental thoughts and impressions and I don't know why such information would be on billing records. So again, please elucidate on this issue and on what is being produced.

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George- We appreciate your position in needing to see the invoices themselves, however, we are only willing to provide you with redacted ones in order to preserve attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product protections since you have filed your notice of appeal with the Supreme Court. I can get that to you by Friday. Thanks.

From: George West III [mailto:gowesq@cox.net]

Sent: Monday, January 8, 2018 7:50 PM

To: Jeffery Bendavid < <u>J.Bendavid@moranlawfirm.com</u>> **Cc:** Craig Friedberg < <u>attcbf@cox.net</u>>; Stephanie Smith

<s.smith@moranlawfirm.com>

Subject: Poole

Jeff,

You need to send us unredacted billings that are not privileged. The only privilege that could apply is atty client relating to specific and identifiable communications

EXHIBIT 3