IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

QUINZALE MASON

Appellant,

Electronically Filed Jun 24 2019 03:10 p.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

V.

THE STATE OF NEVADA

Respondent.

CASE NO. 77623

Appeal from the Denial of a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County The Honorable Elliott A. Sattler, Department 10

APPELLANT'S APPENDIX

VOL. IV

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I, Lyn E. Beggs, Esq., am counsel for the Appellant in this matter, and that on this date I electronically filed the foregoing Appellant's Appendix with the Clerk of the Court by using the ECF system which will send a notice of filing to all parties pursuant to the master list:

Jennifer P. Noble, Chief Deputy District Attorney Washoe County District Attorney's Office P.O. Box 11130 Reno, NV 89520

Aaron Ford Nevada Attorney General 100 N. Carson Street Carson City, NV 89701

DATED this 24th day of June, 2019.

/s/ LYN E. BEGGS LYN E. BEGGS, ESQ. as we start to talk about the car. But there was testimony that's inconsistent amongst the people.

So let's start with Mr. Huey Stanley.

Mr. Holly and Delphine testified that he was standing by this brown car or gold car, however it's described, as it drove up into the parking lot. But Mr. Stanley said that Huey -- excuse me. Anthony was standing by his Blazer.

Now, this is a -- this is not perhaps in your mind initially going to be something that -- so two of the witnesses say Anthony Holly is here where I'm pointing with the tip of my pen where the car pulled up off of Patton Drive. Huey Stanley says his Blazer was parked over here on the other end of the building and Anthony Holly is standing over by the Blazer.

Now, this isn't remarkable testimony in and of itself, but it exemplifies how people see things and what witnesses do with the information that is lodged in their brain. Now, keep in mind this event was six months ago. And you'll hear me talk about the lapse of time in other contexts here, too.

I'm not saying that everybody has to have a perfect memory that goes under oath and testifies in a court of law, but if you're going consider the testimony

consistent and they're going to corroborate the State's case, you have to also consider these inconsistencies.

And that's one of them.

Mr. Huey said it was a brown car that pulled in there. And he later in his testimony, I'll concede -- "Well, it was gold. It was gold."

But here we have the passage of time again. And if these -- is it conceivable that these folks that live there in the neighborhood -- and Mr. Stanley is directly up above Delphine's apartment -- that they never talked about this incident ever again and they never said who did what and shared their stories about what was going on? Of course. It would be unnatural if they didn't ever speak about it again.

So when he said, "Well, it was a gold car, it was a gold car, you know, it wasn't brown," is he saying this because the other two said it was a gold car or somebody else said it was a gold car and that seems to be the thing that they should be talking about is a gold car because it fits the scenario that the State wants to present?

Well, let's talk about some other inconsistencies.

Mr. Stanley is sitting by his apartment door up on the second floor here. And it doesn't show it here,

perhaps because this roof extends over it, but there's a walkway there that he described and that he oftentimes sits outside his door in his chair enjoying the out of doors mostly because of his -- I think he said COPD.

And he sees the car drive up. But this was an unremarkable event. There was nothing that caused him any alarm or any other predisposition to be concerned about this car driving up in the driveway in this first parking spot here.

So he said a fellow got out of the car and disappeared underneath the walkway so he couldn't see him anymore. But he said -- here's what he said. And I brought this to his attention and, you know, he admitted he had said this at the preliminary hearing also. That when he got out of the car, the fellow got out of the car, he had one hand on the door and the other hand on the roof, but he never described what was in his hand on the roof or the hand that was touching the car. He said the hands were there. No gun.

And that's Mr. Stanley's version of what he observed when the car pulled in the parking lot and then the fellow disappeared underneath the walkway. He probably had a view of him for -- what? -- a second

perhaps. Not very much time to perceive somebody or anything for that matter.

And as you'll see, as time goes by, people have made different descriptions about the car, too. But one thing -- I will concede that one thing that they seem to be consistent on is they name Mr. Mason as the person who got out of that car. But let's talk about -- no witness there, whether it was Mr. Stanley, whether it was Anthony Holly or whether it was Delphine described him, the person that got out of the car, as having a hat on, let alone a red hat. None of them saw a hat.

Now, this is -- I'll tie this together when we talk about Mr. Maes later on. But nobody talked about a red hat, nor did they describe the shirt. If you recall -- I'll mention it now, because I'll talk a little more about Mr. Maes -- Mr. Maes said the person that pulled in the lot up on the other side of the street where he was moving somebody in had a white shirt on and a red cap. Then he said that same -- that same gold car went up the street.

Well, there's a couple other flaws in Mr. Maes's perception or testimony there that I'll discuss in a minute. But it's important to show that the three

people that testified that they saw Mr. Mason get out of that car and start shooting with a gun couldn't 2 describe his clothes. And remember when he got out of 3 the car, there wasn't -- this wasn't anything where the 4 adrenaline is rushing and your memory goes blank 5 because you just can't seem to get it together to 6 7 remember what it was because your mind is racing. Every human being has been through that same 8 9 experience.

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So there's no description of the clothes and there's no description of the hat, as Mr. Maes deliberately said this guy had a red cap on and a white shirt. So as we know from all the evidence that was gathered in this bag that they did the DNA test, there was no white shirt in there. It was a dark pullover shirt.

the car didn't pull in fast. It didn't come screeching around the corner and pull in there. description by Huey Stanley was it just pulled in and parked right in that first spot. Nobody thought anything about it. And that's consistent with them not thinking that there's any big deal when this car pulls in the parking lot.

So at that point in time there's nothing unusual

that's been perceived by Huey Stanley. The fellow goes underneath the walk and then he hears "boom, boom," at least two and maybe even more than that. I think he described somewhere around four, was his testimony, rounds went off and what he thought was a gun.

Now, what did -- this is where the testimony gets convoluted. He says that Anthony ran around the back of his Blazer. He said he tried to go in front, but if you recall, Huey Stanley said there was a barbecue there and he couldn't go in front of Mr. Stanley's Blazer that was parked right in this area here where the tip of my pen is. He couldn't go in front of it because there was a barbecue there. Yet Delphine testified that Anthony ran in front of that and then went around the corner and he fell twice doing it.

Now, those differences in testimony become important when you see what their perception is. And I'll tell you why. Mr. Huey said as soon as he heard the "boom, boom, boom," he hit the deck. He was down on the deck and crawling back in his apartment. So he's going through his door and he can't see what's going on. And he certainly isn't seeing where the shooter is shooting, because he can't even see the shooter. He actually admitted that.

So without seeing where the gunman is aiming, he doesn't know what's really going on down there. He hears the sounds.

And listen, I'm not trying to make fun of what went on here and I'm not trying to humiliate Mr. Stanley, but these perceptions and the misperceptions you're hearing about need to be dealt with in your deliberations.

So we have Anthony Holly. You know, Mr. Young talked about his prior felonies. Felonies are introduced in our courts of law for the purposes of impeachment. And impeachment means that this is kind of a dishonest person, he's not really to be trusted. And the testimony that he gives here now isn't worthy of your trust.

He says he saw the defendant, but he was standing here and a car pulled in from right here. Okay. If Mr. -- if Anthony Holly is standing up here where I'm pointing -- in this area where I'm pointing my pen, what do you see here? What am I circling with my pen?

So this car comes in from Patton in an area like this and parks. And according to Anthony Holly and Delphine, he's standing here right near the car. Now, he doesn't say that he looks in the car. When the car

pulls up, he says the window was down and he heard a click that he associated with the rack of a pistol on a gun.

And he said he immediately, immediately took off running. Yeah, he took off running. And which direction did he run? He ran -- according to Delphine he ran right in front of the building and then around the corner here. He fell a couple times. According to Huey Stanley he went around the Blazer, he was standing here to begin with, and then disappeared on this side of the property.

Well, if he's running in that direction, he can't be looking behind him. He's looking at where he's going as fast as he can. And, again, I'm not making fun of him, but I didn't see any eyes in the back of his head, and he couldn't see where that pistol was being aimed either. So far we have nobody that saw where this pistol is being aimed. I'll tie this together in a bit.

Well, let me mention it right now so I don't try to sound mysterious. Look, nobody -- Officer Kassebaum testified that he searched the area for impact, you know, bullet impact evidence. He found none, none in the wood structure, you know, none on the pavement.

And there was -- if you recall, I made a point of showing this retaining wall back up here. And if we look at -- this is Exhibit 7, by the way. The one I was just showing you -- I apologize -- was Exhibit 2. And these will be back in the jury room with you.

So this isn't a great picture, but it shows from the Patton Drive looking westbound through the parking lot. And if you recall, the building there is shown as the apartment building that they were in. And Delphine was down in this area sitting by her door with her child Cecelia. The car came in and parked right here. And Anthony Holly was running back toward the Blazer here in the background.

What's behind there? There's a big, tall, concrete block retaining wall. And what's on -- what's on the ground is pavement, albeit not in great condition. But Officer Kassebaum thought that, well, if there was -- you know, if the bullets were going to hit at a shallow angle, they would usually cause a linear scuff mark where they hit the pavement and bounced up. If bullets hit the concrete block back here, they're going to leave a mark. And you can all imagine this. When somebody is shooting, particularly with a moderately powered pistol like a 9 millimeter, it's going to leave

a mark somewhere.

There is no strike evidence anywhere shown here in this case, anywhere. The point is, where was that pistol pointed? Was the pistol pointed in the air? They couldn't find any strike marks anywhere, no ricochet marks, no nothing. So what is that particle in Cecelia's leg? The doctor didn't know. But I'll get there in a minute.

So we'll stay back on this particular photograph here. If Anthony Holly was running in the direction of this Blazer back here, you would think you would find a bullet hole in the Blazer, you would find a bullet hole in this retaining wall, you'd find a bullet hole or a ricochet off of these stairs, off of the building, but you don't.

Now, listen, Mr. Young wants you to ignore this mystery, that all of a sudden this particle ends up in Cecelia's leg, but it's important to understand -- and I'll tie this together with the instructions a little later on.

So Delphine, when she testified, no hat and she didn't describe any clothes either of whoever got out of that car and started shooting. Now, she said she didn't really pay any attention to what was going on

until Anthony started running.

Now, here's the peculiar thing. She stated that -- she said that she saw the person on the car and she says it's Mr. Mason, that the person shooting from the car was shooting at Anthony Holly. Now, I'll show you why you should seriously, seriously dispute this testimony in your deliberation.

If we go back to the State's Exhibit 2, Delphine is sitting by her door in this area right next to the wall, right next to her door. Anthony Holly, according to her testimony, is running from here in front of the building around this way. Or if you want to accept Huey Stanley's testimony, he is running this way and he goes around the Blazer and then down to the side of the building.

Delphine testifies that she saw Anthony Holly fall twice. Anthony Holly even testified that when he hit the stair, the stair rail, it caused him to fall. He actually fell twice according to Delphine. The bullet never struck him. If the shooter is shooting at Anthony Holly and he fell twice and he shot at him once on the ground, you certainly if he missed him would have seen a ricochet mark off of the asphalt. It's not there.

So back to Delphine, however. She says she's watching Anthony run this direction. If she's seeing Anthony run this direction and she's down here and she's seeing him go back here and she sees him fall, it's in this area where I'm making a little circle with my pen. I challenge you to watch him fall here, fall twice, by the way, and still have one eye cocked down here down the sidewalk to see where the shooter is shooting. It's virtually impossible. And she's not a chameleon where the eyes can diverge and look in all directions at the same time. Humans don't work that way. They can focus their eyes in parallel in one direction and that's it.

So Delphine either watched Anthony, which is the more trustworthy version, where she sees him fall and consistent with Anthony Holly's testimony that he fell first when he hit the stair rail, or she can see down toward Patton Drive. She can't be looking at the same time.

Now, consider this also. She said as soon as she heard the sound of the shots, she tried to cover her daughter who was sitting on the ground. That means she had to get on the ground and cover her daughter with her body. So how much could she actually see at that

point in time?

Why am I bringing this up? Do these people in this -- that happened to experience this thing at 2397 Patton Drive, did they all get together and talk about what happened and, of course, their stories congeal? I'm not saying they're bad people. Everybody talks about important events in their lives, and particularly remarkable events like this, they'll talk about it and they'll talk about it, but over a six-month period what becomes fact and what becomes something that somebody said that stuck in your head and you think, "Yeah, maybe that's the way it was, I saw the guy shooting at Anthony" -- but by her own testimony it's virtually impossible for her to see both.

As I mentioned, she's crouched over trying to protect Cecelia, but in fairness, it wasn't described exactly what she did, but she said she was bending over trying to protect Cecelia, but she certainly describes in fair detail the path that Anthony took.

Now, there's another thing that came over the 911 call that you heard for Huey Stanley. You'll have that in the evidence room. You can play it back there if you want. And this is something, if I recall, Mr. Maes stated too. He heard somebody screaming down there.

But over the 911 call they were saying, "They shot the baby. They shot the baby."

Well, what's wrong in that? It's not "He shot the baby." It's "They shot the baby."

Maybe a small difference now, but when you add up all of the inconsistencies in this entire scenario, it makes a big difference, because you have to take all these little things that seem like a minor chip around the edge, you know, of the piece of pie, but by the time you put them all together, the pie gets consumed by the inconsistencies, because it just couldn't be that way.

So let's talk about the car. This is the car that the State actually wants you to believe was driven by Mr. Mason that came up there and parked in that spot at 2297 Patton. You recall what Mr. Maes said about the rear window? Oh, maybe he did, maybe he didn't, but I'll tell you what he said. He said the rear window was busted out. The rear window is not busted out on there.

So with Mr. Maes we have somebody in a white shirt and a red cap in -- I'm going to use the polite term -- an unloved car. He called it a ghetto car and described it with the rear window punched out or broken

out.

As you can see here, the rear window is fine on this car. This is the one that was found in Sun Valley. That nexus really hasn't occurred yet in this case, but nonetheless, they find this car and they want it to be the car that drove up in front of that -- in front of that house, in front of the apartment building. So, therefore, that's what they expect you to believe, but it's not consistent with the testimony.

So if you -- Mr. Young emphasized that the car went around in the parking lot where Mr. Maes was, did a U-turn, headed up Patton Drive. And Mr. Maes actually, I think reluctantly, admitted that he couldn't actually see where it went because the trees were in the way, but he said maybe 10 or 12 seconds later he hears some gunshots.

So this is where you get into the instruction where you have circumstantial evidence. So they want you to believe that -- you know, that this is the same car that drove in, did the U-turn, but there's so many inconsistencies in it, you really can't consider this same gold car.

Mr. Maes didn't really give a make or mark of the car. This is a Hyundai Accent, you know, Eboni

Spurlock's car, the one that they want you to believe that was driven to the scene. So we have those inconsistencies there.

And let me show you -- again, this is Exhibit 14.

Do you remember what Delphine said about the left front? There was a big, huge, two-foot-in-diameter spot of black primer on that car that she said she saw.

Now, this -- look, this is -- that's really significant as far as the identity of this car, because you can see from this photograph on Exhibit 17, there's no black primer, there's nothing wrong with the -- she said it was on the left front -- the driver's side -- by the driver's side front wheel is what her exact testimony was. There's no primer there. So she's describing a car that's probably different.

I don't have any statistics on how many gold cars inhabit the United States, or even Reno, but they're really common. You see gold cars just about everywhere. And small gold cars are probably a lot more popular than large gold cars. So that's what we have, here is another misdescription of this car.

And they want to tag Mr. Mason with this, so they picked this car because they think he was driving it up there and got out and started shooting. But here's the

lack of information that they have regarding the car.

Nobody on the scene got the license plate. Nobody on the scene described the make or model of that car.

They did describe some dark tinted windows. Some of them say the windows were rolled down. So how did they know? Another inconsis -- that's an inconsistency, within an inconsistency.

So now we talk about what else was on the car that Detective Blas didn't do. Oh, by the way -- let me see if that photo is there. This is also very important. This is a feature of a car that would be easily describable by whoever perceived it to be there. And as this car pulled in -- as whatever car it was pulled in to the parking spot so that it could be perceived by Mr. Stanley and Delphine, nobody described the bumper this way. That's a very, very significant difference.

So what are all the flaws regarding the identity of this car? No license plate, you know, there's no make or model of the car that was described by Delphine or Mr. Stanley. They certainly would have noticed this bumper and been able to describe that, but that wasn't done. Nobody said anything about this bumper being that way.

The windows were supposedly rolled down. So how

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did they know that they were dark tinted? As you can see, as the camera looks in this thing with the sun shining down on it, you can't even see in the vehicle, even from the front window. You can see part of the dash there where I'm pointing my pen and that's it. Even look at the surrounding vehicles. It would be very, very difficult to perceive anyone in the driver's seat of that car.

Then you couple on the other side where I showed you the other picture of this car. There's no primer there as described by Delphine. It's not the same car. They want you to think it's the same car, but it's not. So they go about their investigation assuming that this is the car. And it is an assumption.

And by the way, we don't convict people in America based on assumptions. It's not what it's about. proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

So let's talk a little bit about Detective Blas and how they used this car to establish some continuity in the case. So what I'm showing you here is Exhibit 19 now.

THE COURT: Mr. Hylin, on the larger screen to your left -- I'm sorry -- to your immediate left there's a little button in the lower right-hand corner that will

take the red arrow off of the screen there.

MR. HYLIN: I'm sorry. I didn't see it was on there. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And, counsel, I don't mean to -- I'm not cutting your argument short.

We will be breaking for lunch in the next couple of minutes, ladies and gentlemen, just so you know.

MR. HYLIN: Do you want to do it now, Your Honor? That's fine.

THE COURT: It's certainly up to you, Mr. Hylin.

We started a little late. So, again, I'm not in any
way limiting the amount of time that you have to argue
your case. I just want to do it at a reasonable time
both for the convenience and comfort of the jury as
well as the parties. So maybe if we can -- if you want
to break now, we can do that.

MR. HYLIN: That's fine with me, Your Honor. I will just be starting into Detective Blas's testimony, so this is a good spot to break.

THE COURT: Okay. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I think it might be a good idea then to break. The case has not been submitted to you yet. Argument has begun. But you are not to discuss the case, so I need to read you the admonition again.

You are instructed not to discuss the case among yourselves or with anyone else or to form any conclusions concerning the case until it is submitted to you. You're not to read, look at or listen to any news media accounts relating to this case should there be any. You're not to form any opinion about the case until it is finally submitted to you.

Do not experiment or investigate. Do not visit the scene. Do not refer to any outside sources for instructions on the law. Rely only on the court for legal instruction.

Ladies and gentlemen, why don't we come back at approximately -- when I say "approximately," I immediately wish I hadn't said that. Why don't we back here at 1:15. That's going to give you a little bit of extra time for lunch, but I think that will give the appropriate amount of time both for you to go do the things you need to do and then we'll come back and conclude the closing arguments after the noon hour. So we'll be back, again, at 1:15 p.m.

Remember that admonition. You're not allowed to talk amongst yourself or with anyone else about the case because it is not submitted to you yet for consideration.

1 All rise for the jury.

(Outside the presence of the jury:)

THE COURT: Deputy Gray, did we order lunch already for the jurors?

DEPUTY GRAY: We have not.

THE COURT: Okay. Why don't we do that. We can order them lunch. I know that jury deliberations -- well, no, strike that. We're not going to do that, because they're going to be able to go out and do lunch on their own.

Be seated, everybody.

The nurse from the Washoe County Sheriff's Office is en route for Mr. Mason's medical needs, and so I did want to make sure that we took that break right around that period of time so Mr. Mason can get his insulin injection and also get his lunch and make sure that his physical needs are taken care of. And so we will be in recess until 1:15.

Deputy Gray, when the nurse comes, just have her assist Mr. Mason. I would request that Mr. Mason remain here in the courtroom at least briefly for the jurors to be able to clear the jury room if they need to so they do not see Mr. Mason being escorted in the company of the sheriff's office.

Anything else on behalf of the State, Mr. Young?

MR. YOUNG: No. Thank you.

THE COURT: On behalf of Mr. Mason, Mr. Hylin?

MR. HYLIN: No, Your Honor.

Yes.

THE COURT:

THE COURT: Just so the parties also know, it is my practice to release the alternate juror when the jury begins their deliberations unless there's no reason to have -- in this case it a female -- to have her remain.

Mr. Young, do you have any objection to that?

MR. YOUNG: When you say "release," as far as let
her leave the courtroom or the courthouse?

MR. YOUNG: I have no objection to that so long as she -- I know typically they at least provide a phone number in case she's needed to come back. But short of that, no, I have no objection.

THE COURT: If the parties have a strenuous objection, I can make the alternate remain here in the building. I don't have her remain here in this courtroom while her fellow jurors are deliberating, but she will remain in the building. But generally I like to let them go and I give them the admonition before they leave and then we also make sure that we've got a

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1	cell phone number where we can reach that person. So
2	if that is the framework, is that all right with the
3	State?
4	MR. YOUNG: For that I have no objection.
5	THE COURT: Mr. Hylin?
6	MR. HYLIN: That's fine with me, Your Honor.
7	THE COURT: Then that will be the process that we
8	will employ in this case. We'll be back on the record
9	at 1:15. Court is in recess.
10	(The lunch recess was taken.)
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RENO, NEVADA; WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 2015; 1:25 P.M.

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THE COURT: Will counsel stipulate to the presence

of the jury? Mr. Young.

MR. HYLIN: The State will.

THE COURT: Mr. Hylin?

MR. HYLIN: Yes, I will.

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, we'll go back on the record in the State of Nevada versus Quinzale

Mason, CR14-1830. Mr. Hylin will continue now with his closing argument.

Go ahead, Mr. Hylin.

MR. HYLIN: Thank you, Your Honor.

Good afternoon.

When I left off I was about ready to start talking about Detective Blas and his phase of the investigation when he's gathering the items out of the car. And the photo that was at issue is here. If you recall, this is the -- I'm sorry. This is Exhibit 19, by the way. All these things will be in the jury room and you'll be able to inspect them themselves.

Now, I asked a lot of questions of Detective Blas and a lot of the procedural stuff, too. But when you distill all this down, he found some items in this car

here which has been well established that it's Eboni Spurlock's car. That's essentially undisputed. In the glove box there they found the registration. She confirmed it's her car. So why would it be a shock that Mr. Mason's items are sitting in that car?

But one of the important things that Steve Gresko told you with the DNA is it doesn't tell you the time any of these items were put in that car, it doesn't tell you what time anything happened, it doesn't say when month-wise, year-wise, day-wise. DNA essentially shows that there's DNA, say, on the hat and the shirt. And they're in a car that was essentially the family car. Eboni used it most of the time when she went to work, but it was also driven by Mr. Mason. So it's no shock.

What the State wants you to do now is relate this back and say, "Oh, that's got to be the car that pulled in at the scene." But because of the discrepancies that I showed you before, it couldn't be the car.

There's no big two-foot primer mark as testified to by Delphine. Nobody described the bumper on this car. As I showed you in the other photograph, it's jobberywockey, it's been partially pried loose or at least loosened from its brackets. The back window

isn't out. The State wants you to just overlook all these inconsistencies in the car that pulled in that lot.

Well, you can't overlook the inconsistencies.

They're there. You know, they're the elephant in the parlor is the old legal term. And you have to get around that elephant in order to find that this is the car that was at that -- at 2397 Patton Drive. You can't do it.

So what they've done is gathered some of the items in here, did a DNA test on the hat particularly and said, "Bingo. This has got to be the car."

No, it doesn't have to be the car. It doesn't have the characteristics that were described by Mr. Maes or anybody there on the scene. You know, the only similarity is it was a small gold car. Small gold car. That's it. And that's why there's a huge discrepancy in the State's case.

So I'm not really making fun of Detective Blas, but they look for what they want to look for. And he found what he wanted to find. But when I started going over with him on some of the other items like, "Well, why didn't you swab the steering wheel? Why didn't you swab this?" and,

frankly, he came up with a bushel basketful of excuses.

Mostly he said, "Well, it deteriorates in the weather."

Well, there wasn't any weather. Nobody testified to any rain. Nobody testified about going through a car wash. Nobody testified to any of that sort of stuff. The fact of the matter is they collected this car from where it was parked out at Sun Valley.

By the way, perhaps if you would have swabbed all that stuff it would have told us who drove it out there, because, if you recall, Steve Gresko testified that the last driver of the car, particularly on the steering wheel, would probably wipe out the DNA from all the previous drivers. But because he didn't do those tests and he didn't do, you know, a thorough investigation, we'll never know now. We can't know. So that really doesn't inure in the favor of the State.

If the State is not going to do a proper investigation so that you nail all these little details down, don't give them credit for it. You can't give them credit for it.

So at any rate, when -- all I can say, we would have found out who drove the car out there. Mr. Young wants you to believe that it was Mr. Mason, but I'm telling you, you have not heard one scintilla of

evidence of who parked that car there. Not one. So it's not even logical to conclude that that car was parked there by Mr. Mason. It's rank speculation.

And let's go back to what I had said about the A word, assumption. It's an assumption. We don't convict on assumptions in this country. That's not the way it's done. We convict on reasonable -- if they have proved it beyond a reasonable doubt, which they have not.

Also, in this car they found no shell casing, they found no gun. I asked Detective Blas if he had -- you know, if he had done a gunshot residue test. It's called a GSR test in the investigative business. Well, he didn't even bother to think about it. But if somebody is shooting a gun near the car, near a human being, just like he said, "Well, I don't know. That gunshot residue can go quite a ways. It will get on somebody, you know, that's in the proximity."

Yeah, it will get on somebody in the proximity, but it will also get on the car and it will also get on Mr. Mason.

Did they do a gunshot residue of the clothes that they think that he was wearing that are in that little white bag that they collected? No, they did not. Is

it because -- did they intentionally not do a gunshot residue test on those clothes? That's a very, very serious question, very serious question, because that would have been a lot more conclusive if they would have come up with a gunshot residue on those clothes, but they didn't do a gunshot residue test.

They didn't do a gunshot residue test on the T-shirt, not on the hat. They didn't do it on the car. If you're shooting a gun over the top of the car or over the top of the hood, some of the gunshot residue and the gunshot powder will land on that car. Detective Blas even admitted that. But they didn't do that test. So now this is what we have.

We have the car that's in these exhibits that you've already seen that they want you to believe was the car that pulled up in front of that apartment. So either through investigative omission or investigative sleight of hand, this is what they're doing to you. They're trying to get you to believe that that car is this gold car when in the reality the gold car that was described by the people on the scene can't be this one. A very, very important fact.

Now, the airport trip. Detective Jenkins got an anonymous tip that mom was coming up. You know, this

is -- Valerie Stewart is Mr. Mason's mom. Got an anonymous tip. Well, anonymous tips I think are probably everywhere frowned upon. They're more akin to, you know, a cheesy rumor that goes around your place of employment, which are very dangerous items.

So they got an anonymous tip that mom was coming up from Phoenix to whisk Mr. Mason away and take him somewhere where he wouldn't be found. Well, first of all, that's not particularly bright, taking him down to mom's place in Phoenix. Don't you think somebody could fly down there or the Phoenix Police Department could investigate or if they had a warrant out for him they go collect him at Valerie Stewart's house in Phoenix?

Second of all, Valerie Stewart flew up here. You know, they're not going to hitchhike home and they didn't have a car to get home. So this anonymous tip has a lot of incredulity attached to it to begin with.

Now, I'm not faulting Detective Jenkins for following up on it, but the State touts Detective Jenkins as the truth teller, as the person that is going to verify this story to make it look like there was this grand plot, but, you see, nobody else except this anonymous tipster and Detective Jenkins has anything to say about going back to Phoenix. All the

rest of the testimony that we heard is he was going to turn himself in.

I know the State wants you now to view that as some sort of admission of guilt. But, you know, that's what the -- you know, the State, being all government entities that suspect somebody of a crime, either put out a warrant or they go searching for somebody. And if that suspect knows that they're a suspect and they start to flee the jurisdiction, that in itself is evidence of flight or a crime. That didn't occur in this instance.

Everybody in that car told them that "We're going to turn him in." And that's the proper thing to do, for a suspect to do, is go confront the authorities and clear his name. Instead he got arrested and taken to the hospital. But notwithstanding that, that is not evidence of guilt when a suspect goes to turn himself in.

There's been thousands of cases that collectively that everybody in this room would have either read in the newspaper or heard about on TV news where somebody is suspected of doing something and they just go turn themselves in at the police station. Perhaps they're interviewed by the police, perhaps not. But that's the

proper thing to do.

So now the State wants you to imbue Mr. Mason with a cloak of guilt because he went to turn himself in.

Well, that's not proper. Now, they never got there, so I guess the State can argue, "Well, I don't know. They were going to run." But there's no evidence of that.

The only evidence is that he was going to turn himself in.

Now, let's take the veracity of Detective Jenkins. She took the notes on her hand. The reason there's a big pregnant pause here is if you're setting up on the telephone and you're going to interview a suspect, what detective makes notes on their hand?

I had a question, why did Detective Jenkins call at 3 o'clock a.m. Well, all right, fine. That may be her shift. I didn't check the roster and I didn't subpoena anything from the Reno Police Department to show that she was or was not on shift that night. All right. Fine. She choose 3 a.m., an unusual time to be calling somebody, but the reality is that if she set up the call at 3 a.m., she's intentionally calling. And a professional detective would either have a laptop there making notes or they would have a pad and paper there making notes. Instead she says she made notes on her

hand. Not particularly credible.

But the thing that really destroys her credibility is that Ms. Gray testified on the stand that Mr. Mason called her the day before on August 8th to wish her a happy birthday. That was her birthday.

Now, you got to ask yourself, why would he call on the 9th after this incident would have happened to talk to her and say he shot a kid, but he's calling her to wish her a happy birthday? This just doesn't add up. And it was clear from the stand after I cross-examined Detective Jenkins that she had misinterpreted the call on the 8th to have occurred on the 9th and used that in her report and her testimony to bolster the idea that Ms. Gray had talked to Mr. Mason before Detective Jenkins had called when Ms. Gray made it clear as a bell that what she actually did was tell Detective Jenkins that, "Yeah, I talked to him yesterday. He called to wish me a happy birthday."

And she got it conflated and thought, "Okay. So he called before and gave you this information," which really wasn't the case.

Now, that really doesn't go to the core of this particular case. And there's a lot of things that occur in the case here that are peripheral, that are

collateral matters almost. And the fact that he was going to turn himself in is essentially a collateral matter.

But let's go back to Dr. Cinelli now. And I'm going -- this is going to lead into where I start talking about some of the instructions. Dr. Cinelli, who is a medical man, by the way, and no doubt very respectable -- he has an incredible resume. And he has a very, very admirable job doing the trauma surgery that he does. I want it understood that I'm in no way demeaning him. But when he's called into a courtroom on a forensic basis like this, he's not in his operating room, he's not in the ER, he's in a courtroom. And he has a job to do here.

And he was essentially subpoenaed by the State to tell you that his analysis would be that this would be a ricochet. But how can he possibly say that? He admitted on the stand that they never extracted the metal in there, they never tested the metal, if indeed it is metal.

You know, he says it looks on the x-ray like it's metal, but he made a contrast showing you the gold ring that the x-ray tech or whoever it was was holding little Cecelia's leg and this gold ring showed up real

bright like there was a light in it. And he used that as an example of how metal shows up. And then he points to the fragment, which is clearly bright. I'm not disputing that. It's not -- you know, I'm not saying that he's way off base saying this. But the critical part is that they don't know the chemical composition of that metal.

And if you don't know the chemical composition of the metal or even the physical appearance of the metal, you can't say it's a bullet fragment. And Dr. Cinelli was very careful not to say that that wasn't a bullet. As a matter of fact, I went into it, you know, a direct hit. If you notice in the Amended Information for the charge dealing with Cecelia, they say that the defendant shot Cecelia.

No, he didn't shoot Cecelia. He wasn't pointing the gun at Cecelia. Whoever was doing the shooting there wasn't pointing the gun at Cecelia, because he testified -- and he was familiar with firearms -- that if it was -- if it was a round that came out of that 9 millimeter, a metal round, it clearly would have gone through Cecelia's leg. And those bullets have enough force that it would even shear the bone and have gone through the bone if it would have hit the bone.

Now, he did characterize it as a higher velocity, but if you notice on those x-rays, you'll see that the fragment is stuck between the two bones and it may be touching them. It's a little bit difficult to tell from those x-rays. It may be touching those bones, but it could be a metal fragment from somewhere else.

Why is this important? Because it doesn't appear that this weapon from whomever was firing it was aimed. It certainly wasn't aimed at Cecelia. And it's really doubtful that it was aimed at Anthony Holly. There's no hits anywhere near where Anthony Holly was. There's no bullet strike, no bullets, you know.

So what's left to be concluded? That whoever was firing the firearm wasn't really pointing it where everybody assumes -- again, an assumption -- assumes that they're pointing that pistol. And that doesn't make any sense, because you can't find any evidence of the rounds hitting somewhere near it. It ranges from three to five shots being fired here. They found -- they only found two casings, but they never found any bullets whatsoever.

So if the bullets did hit something, they didn't see any evidence of it. And the piece of metal in Cecelia's leg is now a mystery. It's still there and

it's a mystery.

All right. So what's the big deal here? Carl, why are you making such a big deal out of this?

Well, let me take you through the logic that these instructions do. And I'll show you each individual one as we go along. This is Instruction No. 19. And I'll see if I can't zoom in a little bit here.

This is the two things that make up a criminal event in American law. And this is virtually every jurisdiction in the United States, including the federal jurisdiction. This is basic criminal law that every law student learns in his first semester.

"In every crime there must exist a union or joint operation of act and intent." In the law it's called an actus reus and the intent is called the mens rea. And the intent is the mental state that is required to exist before you can convict anybody of a crime in this country. There has to be that mental state, not just the act, not just the big "boom boom" that was testified to coming from the firearm, but there has to be -- you have to have beyond a reasonable doubt in your mind that whoever fired that pistol had the mental intent to commit the crime that's charged by the District Attorney's Office.

The burden is always upon the prosecution to prove both act and intent beyond a reasonable doubt. Well, there's not -- the act is the "boom, boom, boom." I don't think any witness was incredible enough so that you would conclude that it didn't sound like a firearm was being fired. It may be blanks or something else, but it was fired. But the criminal intent here is the issue that we're dealing with.

So the crime of battery, which you relate this back -- this is Instruction No. 23, by the way. "The crime of battery with a deadly weapon as set forth in Count I of the Amended Information" -- you'll have the Information in there -- "consists of the following elements: The defendant did willfully and unlawfully use force or violence upon the person of Cecelia M. with the use of a deadly weapon."

But, see, the use -- the use, force or violence upon the person of Cecelia M. is what they have to prove. They have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was the criminal intent to harm Cecelia with that deadly weapon.

Well, here's where the State -- well, let me put up Instruction No. 24 also which is the assault with a deadly weapon. This is in Count II. "The crime of

assault with a deadly weapon as set forth in Count II of the Amended Information consists of the following elements: That the defendant did, A, unlawfully attempt to use physical force against Anthony Holly or, B, intentionally place Anthony Holly in reasonable apprehension" --

Well, if you look in paragraph A, we still run into the same language, "unlawfully attempt to use physical force against Anthony Holly." The problem with that is if there was no aiming of the weapon at him, in other words, if there were shots in the air or shots somewhere elsewhere where they never find these rounds, they haven't established the criminal intent. And they can't establish it beyond a reasonable doubt because they don't have the evidence that those rounds were going where the State wants them to be to convict him of that crime delineated in A, in section A.

But that's not all there is to these. Not only have they not proved that intent, but what they want to do now, to get this back to Cecelia, is use the concept of transferred intent. I'm not going to read all this, but it's instruction 29 if you want to make a note of these and go through the analysis. It's instructions 19, 23, 24. And the transferred intent is instruction

29.

So transferred intent is a common law doctrine.

What do I mean by "common law"? Common law existed clear from hundreds and hundreds of years ago, perhaps even thousands of years ago. And this concept is as old as the hills. It's hundreds and hundreds of years old. It's not established necessarily by statute in all the jurisdictions. It's established in common law, however. And it has various breadth in the states, but in Nevada it's a very broad concept.

So what it does, as Mr. Young explained to you earlier -- and I know -- I'm not trying to bore you with specifics, but you're given the instructions and it's really important that you be able to analyze them according to how they tell you to do your analysis.

So this concept of transferred intent means that -and, you know, this is -- I'm going to explain the
weaknesses as we go along, that a piece of bullet -the State's theory is that a piece of bullet somehow
got cleaved off and went into Cecelia's leg while the
shooter was pointing the weapon and trying to hit
Anthony. Okay. That's it in a nutshell. Shooter
trying to hit Anthony; piece of bullet ends up in
Cecelia. They are claiming that the crime is complete

at that point against Cecelia through this doctrine of transferred intent. In other words, they take the intent that the shooter is trying to hit Anthony Holly and transfer it over to Cecelia, because if we use a standard criminal analysis -- this is why this doctrine exists -- somebody could go shoot at a bunch of other people, miss them, hit somebody in the background, kill them, and they fall over dead, but you couldn't convict them of the crime of hitting the bystander without the doctrine of transferred intent. That's why it exists. It's not unsensical to do this. But here's the way

the analysis works here. The same intent that it takes to convict on Count I for Cecelia is the same intent that they want to transfer from Anthony Holly over to Cecelia. If the aim can't be established and they can't establish a path of bullets that prove beyond a reasonable doubt that anybody, be it Mr. Mason or anybody else who had that pistol in their hand and shooting, if they can't prove beyond a reasonable doubt that intent was there for Anthony Holly, they can't use it against Cecelia. Can't use it.

And since they can't prove beyond a reasonable doubt that that weapon was being fired at Anthony, because there's no path of the bullet that they can

establish -- I'll tell you what a crime scene would look like. They would have little cones on the ground where each impact was and they would have little stickers on the wall and be taking pictures of -- let's say that concrete block retaining wall on the west side of the property there, they would have had a big 7 sticker, you know, on there with photos of where the chip came out and probably even perhaps pieces of the bullet. But they can't establish that. The bullets aren't anywhere and neither are the evidence of any bullets hitting anything around there.

And as for the piece of the particle in Cecelia's leg, they don't know that either. Now, it's a strange truth that Cecelia ends up with a particle in the leg, but that particle in the leg just with the gunshot is not enough to prove Count I beyond a reasonable doubt. They have to be able to prove that that shooter intended to hit Anthony, intended to batter Anthony, to transfer that intent to batter over to Cecelia. have not done so.

If I could have just a moment, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Certainly.

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MR. HYLIN: You know, Officer Koger got up there who was taking Mr. Mason away from the scene where he

was stopped there by the overpass of 395 and stated that Mr. Mason said, "I'm glad you didn't shoot me."
But I got to explain to you, that's not evidence of guilt. You know, if you got several police officers that are surrounding your car and you've got pistols, firearms pointed at you, and you're a suspect in a case, whether you're guilty or not, you're real glad they didn't open fire on you. And that's what that statement means. It's self-contained. It's not evidence of guilt. "Thank you for not shooting me."

Now, the other statement that Officer Koger exclaimed -- he says words to the effect -- and here I'm saying "to the effect" because that's basically what they were -- "I know what I did was violent and I didn't want you to shoot me."

Well, this is coming through Officer Koger how many hours after he wrote his report? And he didn't record it. Listen, I knew when I was asking those questions that Officer Koger wasn't just going to come up and say, "I'm a bad dog here. I didn't record it."

And what his explanation is is fairly simple. It's "Well, we're not required to have the recording device on."

Well, that may or may not be true. But if somebody

is saying some spontaneous statements, which started outside his car, by the way, outside the police unit, you know, he should have had that recording on. But it's not. So we have to take his word for it now.

And the State wants you to believe that Koger's rendition of what was said in that car is accurate, but all you have is that one person who didn't bother to record it and didn't bother to purify it by making sure that there was no doubt about -- or no doubts about his credibility. It could have been recorded and played for you. It was not.

I think I've covered just about everything else in my notes here. You know, I always close by saying this, but I really sincerely mean it. Sometimes lawyers are boring, sometimes they're obnoxious, sometimes they're arrogant, but most of all, they're out for their clients and what we do here is for our clients.

And I meant it when I started my voir dire. I explained that our system is always connected to our society through you folks. You're the ones that do this.

And our justice system, I can guarantee you, would

be far different, it would be far more like the things you find overseas in the continental system in Europe where those are closed systems and they thrive amongst themselves without input from the community.

And we really -- and I say "we." I mean we all have that same feelings that we thank you so very much for sitting here. But most importantly, my job is to make sure that the State -- to show you that the State did not prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt.

And I'm asking you to acquit my client, Mr. Mason.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Hylin.

Mr. Young, would you like rebuttal argument?

MR. YOUNG: Thank you.

Ladies and gentlemen, I'll be relatively brief in relation to my initial argument. I do, of course, want to address some of the things that were stated by Mr. Hylin and ask that you -- again, as I stated in my initial close, rather than focusing on what one witness says and is there a way to explain that away and then look at the second witness and is there a way to explain that away, and the third and the fourth and so on, consider all of the testimony and all of the evidence together and ask yourself does it flow and

does it make sense.

And what I would submit is once you do that -- and you don't look at items of evidence in a vacuum or in isolation -- is that it all does make sense and it's all very clear what happened on August 9th.

Now, Mr. Hylin spent some time discussing inconsistencies. And primarily those inconsistencies were about Mr. Holly's location when the shots were fired and a description of the car and the red hat, whether Mr. Holly was wearing a red hat.

Well, Mr. Holly's location -- again, if you recall Mr. Stanley's testimony, he was ducking and dodging in front of his -- well, Delphine's unit. And if you recall Delphine Martin and Mr. Holly's testimony, he was up near the front and then as he ran back was ducking and dodging.

Okay. Ask yourself again how significant that is.

And in doing that, consider the jury instructions. 11 talks about how credibility is your determination alone. I can't tell you whether to believe or disbelieve someone. Nobody can except for yourself. That's your job in this case as a juror. But it tells you how much credit should be given to somebody. You base that on a number of factors, and starting here

with character, conduct, manner upon the stand, fears, bias, impartiality, reasonableness or unreasonableness of their statements, strength or weakness of recollection, viewed in light of all the other facts in evidence. And that's all I'm asking you to do. Just consider it in conjunction with everything else.

Number 13 talks about specifically inconsistencies. This acknowledges what we all know, is that something might happen and people might see it a little bit differently. But that doesn't absolutely destroy what they say. And this tells you to look at is it an innocent misrecollection? Is it willful falsehood? Are they coming in and purposely testifying in a way falsely and, as this says, willfully falsely? Or is it just a vehicle pulls into the parking lot -- all three individuals know who he is, know the car. It's innocuous. He's there for a handful of seconds and then he starts firing.

And Delphine Martin says, "I'm scared for my kid.

I've never been in this before. I see blood on my
hands. I start hyperventilating."

The officer confirms that and says she's in no condition to talk. Huey Stanley hits the ground. Anthony Holly is running away.

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So are these discrepancies, if you want to call them that? Are they the subject of innocent error or willful falsehood as the instruction asks you to consider?

The car description. Now, Mr. Hylin made a couple of times a statement that Mr. Maes said the back window was broken out. You as the triers of fact determine if that evidence was ever admitted in this case. I submit that the only evidence of a broken back window was the black VW bug that picked up Mr. Holly and left the scene. There was no evidence admitted by Mr. Maes or otherwise that the gold sedan had a broken-out back window, none at all.

The bumper up front that was broken. No one testified to that. True. And Ms. Martin said there was some primer on the driver's side and the picture doesn't show that. True. Willful falsehood? Innocent error? Shooting.

If you find that those minor discrepancies is enough to cause you reasonable doubt, that's your right to do. I would submit it's not when you take it in conjunction with everything else.

Now, I'm going to try my best not to bounce around too much and I apologize if I do.

But as far as the gold car and Mr. Hylin -- you know, small gold cars are common. I'm not going to disagree with that. And there was no license plate number obtained and there was no make or model and there's no description of, again, this damage to the bumper. All true. But you even heard Ms. Spurlock talk about the license plate. I'm not sure what my own license plate number is.

So ask yourself, does it make sense that initially somebody pulling in the parking lot who they all recognize and know and then a shooting immediately happens, are they going to get the make and model when they all said, "I don't really know vehicles"? Are they going to get the license plate? Are they going to pay much attention to the small minutia or are they going to focus on the shots being fired?

And as Delphine clearly said confidently, without doubt, it was the defendant shooting at Anthony Holly. And how many gold cars are there out there that resemble the description of the car in question, are registered to Eboni Spurlock, is at the residence that morning but is gone at the time of the shooting and is located after the shooting abandoned out of view of the public within a few blocks of where the defendant is

located?

So did the State present anybody to say, as

Mr. Hylin pointed out, "Well, we know that it was the

defendant that drove the car there"? No. That would

be direct evidence. And you don't have that here. But

recall the snowy meadow example. How do we know that

vehicle that ended up in Sun Valley is the vehicle?

From all those facts. That's circumstantial evidence

that you may certainly consider in this case.

Now, there's no gun found. There was no GSR.

There was no swabs. Detective Blas explained why that wasn't done. There is a -- going on a 24-hour gap -- 23 hours between the shooting just around noon or noon 15 on the 9th and when the defendant is contacted later. Does it make sense to do GSR? Detective Blas said no. There's nothing rebut that. There's no evidence to rebut that assertion by Detective Blas.

Is there any reason to swab all the areas?

Detective Blas said no. And the same reason that

Mr. Hylin pointed out, that, well, you kind of expect
his clothes to be in there. You would also expect his

DNA to be in there. So would that tell us anything
when we know he drives that vehicle?

We heard that touch DNA is different than

biological. It's not guaranteed it's going to even leave anything anyway. And it's outside and the windows are -- a whole number of things.

So should it have been done? The testimony you heard was no, he didn't even second guess that. But even if it was, would it tell you anything different than what we already know?

Now, Mr. Hylin discussed the statements that the defendant made, "I was going to turn myself in," and that's not evidence of guilt. Okay. Again, you give that statement as much weight as you feel is appropriate. If you feel "I'm going to turn myself in" is consciously the defendant saying "I know what I did is wrong," fine. If you feel that a guy just turning himself in because he knows the police are looking for him, that's fine with me, too. But if Mr. Mason did not do anything wrong, if he was not involved in this shooting, he wouldn't make the additional statements that he did. He wouldn't say, "This has been messing me up." Would he?

He wouldn't say, "What I did was violent." And there's no recorder going because there was no intention to even speak with him. Contrary to what Mr. Hylin said, Officer Koger wasn't transporting him

anywhere. He just had him in the backseat of his car while REMSA was coming. And he makes these statements immediately.

So, again, if you want to fault Officer Koger for not initiating his recording device when he has no intention of even speaking with the defendant, that's your right to do. You can fault him if you'd like.

All I'm asking you to consider is he had no intention of speaking to him in the first place and he had no intention of asking him any questions. Is there any reason to activate a recorder?

Same with Detective Jenkins. Mr. Hylin said she was calling to interview a suspect. No, she wasn't. She was calling to try to find Quinzale Mason. And why was it 3 o'clock in the morning? Because what he had did just a few hours earlier was violent and they needed to find him and he was gone. And we know where he was. He was in a house in Sun Valley.

So is she supposed to wait until 8 a.m. to call?

No. She's trying to find out where he is. She's not interviewing a suspect. She's not planning on a long dialogue that she needs to take notes. And then

Ms. Gray starts making these comments. And, yeah, she wants to get him out of here.

Same as Mr. Koger. He initially said, "Well, words to the effect." If you recall, we stopped based on the objection. And I actually showed him his report to refresh his memory of the exact quotes he put in his report. The officers do reports to get accuracy of what was said. And that's what Detective Jenkins and Officer Koger did in this case.

Did she misinterpret what Ms. Gray said being the 8th? Of course not. Because on the 8th this crime had not even been committed yet. And on the 9th when he calls her, she's thinking, "Hey, he's calling me for my birthday." And they have a good relationship. You heard her testify, "I love my grandson." And she makes the comments that she would have not known other than him telling her.

Very briefly with Dr. Cinelli. And Mr. Hylin brought up, well, this is a courtroom, it's not his office. He was subpoenaed by the State to say ricochet bullets. Folks, if you feel that he said that on the State's behalf, again, that's you judging his credibility. But he is a person in the medical profession who treated Cecelia. And his opinion, his diagnosis per his testimony, was she suffered from a ricochet bullet. There is no evidence that was

introduced in this case to contradict that. There is none.

And when Mr. Hylin says, well, maybe it was blanks, well, that doesn't explain the metallic fragment in her leg. Dr. Cinelli was clear. His opinion: ricochet bullet. And we don't have bullet strikes. And it's, well, there's this concrete wall behind, which we saw in the picture, and there is asphalt and the like. Well, you heard some explanation about that, but you also saw the dirt embankment behind there as well.

Again, what I ask you to do is don't consider all these pieces in isolation. We know Cecelia suffered a penetrating wound. The evidence is clear on that. The only evidence as to what that wound is is a ricochet bullet which just so happens to be consistent with Anthony Holly running in the direction of where she was sitting with her mom.

All right. Just a few more points, ladies and gentlemen. As Mr. Hylin said, I too appreciate your time and attention in this case. Now, I'm almost done. There's a few more things I want to highlight.

The suggestion was made in Mr. Hylin's closing argument that over the last five months or whatever it's been since August 9th that the three people who

all identified Anthony -- excuse me -- Quinzale Mason as the person who got out of the car and ended up doing the shooting have had -- his words, have had time to congeal and make up their stories.

Well, again, like I mentioned in my first closing, all three gave statements to the police. Mr. Stanley, as he told you, did a written statement and spoke with the dispatcher on 911 immediately. Mr. Holly was gone and came back and spoke with officers, specifically Officer Kassebaum. Delphine Martin after going to the hospital and able to calm down spoke with Officer Stockwell when he responded the hospital.

So they all made statements back at the time that this occurred. So it's not that everyone was silent for the last five months and has all this time to talk about it. And on top of that, Delphine, you heard her say, she moved. Mr. Holly didn't want to even get involved.

So does it make sense that they would all get together and come up with this master plan of what happened and to frame Mr. Mason and say it was him and say that, "Yeah, he was shooting at Anthony Holly versus in the air?" That's for you to decide. But it doesn't make any sense.

And Mr. Hylin said, well, there's, you know -- if you recall this part of his argument, "Well, it was they, they, they," which means more than one person.

But where did we hear "they"? From the 911 call. And who said it? I'm going to play the call again for you, because it's important. But who said they drove up and shot the baby? That was Glorietta who Mr. Stanley said "wasn't outside with me because she had gone into the bathroom."

And even on the 911 call, you hear as she's passing the phone to Mr. Stanley who did see everything, or the majority of it at least, you even hear her say when she's transferring the phone to him, "Oh, I was coming out of the bathroom. I don't know what happened. I wasn't there."

When Mr. Stanley gets on the phone, immediately, this is as the shooting just finished and 911 is being called, before officers have even arrived, what does he say? "I know who it was. I know where he lives. He was the only person in the car. I saw the direction the car went."

Anything inconsistent from his testimony that he's had six months to manufacture in his head? No.

So let me play it for you. You listen to it. And,

1 again, listen to if even once Mr. Stanley uses the word "they," because he doesn't. Let me play it for you. 2 This is Exhibit 25. Again, I can't stress the timing 3 of this call, that shots were just fired. As you heard 4 from the testimony, Delphine is going into hysterics, 5 which makes sense, because her daughter was just shot. 6 7 And 911 is called immediately. And without any time to figure out what to say, this is initially what 8 9 Glorietta says and candidly doesn't know much and uses "they" and then it's passed over to Mr. Stanley. It's 10 consistent with what he testified to in this case. 11 12 (Exhibit 25 was played.) 13

MR. YOUNG: That's what was said immediately after the shots. Only one person. "I've seen him around. He lives up here."

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Then when Officer Lancaster pulls up, he points out the exact unit which matches, again, all the balance of the evidence which I'm not going to go through. Black male, beard. It all fits.

So, folks, I'm not -- I'm going to try not to take too much more of your time.

Again, the transferred intent with the battery. To be clear, the State does not need to show that

Mr. Mason intended or wanted to strike Cecelia.

Willfully using force or violence. The term

"willfully" here is described in instruction 27. It

even says there, "does not require in its meaning,

among other things, any intent to injure another." All

it says is "implies a purpose or willingness to commit

the act."

So he willfully is discharging a firearm. There's evidence that he is shooting the firearm at Mr. Holly as he's running away. We know that from Delphine Martin and all the circumstantial evidence. And in the course of that, Cecelia is hit. The transferred intent, that's all that is required for Count I.

For Count II, the assault with a deadly weapon, did attempt to use force against Anthony Holly. The evidence supports that. Or alternatively that he did intentionally place Mr. Holly in reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm. Racking the gun, getting out of the car, shooting a firearm as Mr. Holly is running way, that's satisfied as well.

And then, of course, for both Counts I and II, it has to be done with the use of a deadly weapon which, again, isn't really much in dispute here.

So, folks, I'm going to finish with this. I appreciate your time. This is instruction 30. This

has not yet been discussed, but I'm going to close with this. Let me read it first and then discuss it.

The top paragraph reads, "Although you are to consider only the evidence in the case in reaching a verdict, you must bring to the consideration of the evidence your everyday common sense and judgment as reasonable men and women. Thus, you are not limited solely to what you see and hear as the witnesses testify. You may draw reasonable inferences which you feel are justified by the evidence, keeping in mind that such inferences should not be based on speculation or guess."

So, folks, here's what this means. On Monday of this week all you came into court as prospective jurors. You were all selected to sit in this case as jurors. You check in and you come out of the jury room and you have stickers identifying yourself as jurors. Very shortly you're going to be released into the jury room to deliberate as jurors for this case. But what this instruction tells you, folks, is that prior to all of that, prior to this Monday when you began your jury service for this case, all of you have lived respectively your individual lives and all of you through the course of those lives have garnered common

sense as reasonable men and women.

And the law does not require you to shed that common sense. The law does not require you to ignore your common sense when you go into that jury room and deliberate.

So if you feel that I have failed to meet my burden of proof, then the defendant would be not guilty. But to do that, you have to disregard the three witnesses who all identified the defendant, you have to disregard all of the balance of the testimony of the vehicle not being on scene and being located in Sun Valley and being close to where the defendant was ultimately found and the statements that he made and everything else. But you would also have to disregard your common sense. Because when you look at the totality of the evidence, it's clear that it was the defendant who was the shooter. And it's clear that he was shooting at Anthony Holly. And it was clear in the course of that that Cecelia was struck by a -- as the doctor said, a ricochet bullet.

Use your common sense. Use that in conjunction with the evidence. And if you do that, I would submit that the conclusion to be reached is that the defendant is guilty of both counts.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Young. Mr. Young, would you mind moving the TV screen and the monitor, please. Thank you.

Ms. Clerk, if you could swear in Deputy Gray and his fellow deputies to take custody of the jury.

(The oath was administered.)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, in a moment I am going to send you back into the jury room where you will begin your deliberations. And I won't read you the jury admonition, because you now get to talk about the case, you get to discuss the facts, you get to review the instructions and the evidence and come to the conclusion that you come to.

The one person who will not be doing that is the alternate. We always have an alternate in every case. Sometimes we have more than one. Just in case one of your fellow jurors is unable to complete deliberations, we have that alternate who can come in and we would begin deliberations anew.

Ms. Vasquez, you're actually the alternate in this case, and so you will not be deliberating with your fellow jurors, but what I can tell you is that I have spoken to both attorneys and they've agreed to release you from the courthouse. So you'll be free to go about

your business, but you'll be the only person I have to read the admonition to one more time.

You're not allowed to discuss the case until the case is concluded. So you need to follow that admonition again. Give Deputy Gray your cell phone number or some way we can get ahold of you. And that way, once the case is over with, he'll call you and he'll let you know that the case is finished and then you can discuss it with anybody you want to. But I do appreciate your service. I know you've been paying close attention to these proceedings and I appreciate the fact that you served your community. You get the same credit for jury service if you're the alternate or if you're not the alternate. So thank you again for being here.

Ms. Vasquez, you are instructed not to discuss the case among yourselves -- well, among yourself. I don't know how you discuss it with yourself. But don't go talking to yourself about it, Ms. Vasquez.

You're not to discuss the case with anyone else or to form any conclusions concerning the case until it is submitted to you. You're not to read, look at or listen to any news media accounts relating to the case should there be any. You're not to form any opinion

about the case until it is finally submitted to you. 1 Do not experience or investigate. Do not visit the 2 scene. Do not refer to any outside sources for 3 instructions on the law. Rely only on the court for 4 legal instructions. 5 All rise for the alternate juror. 6 7 Okay. Everybody else can be seated. Once Deputy Gray comes back, then I'll send you 8 9 back into the jury room and you can begin your deliberations. So just one moment. 10 You will have, just so you know, the evidence and 11 everything else go back there with you. 12 Mr. Young, did you get the CD out of the computer? 13 14 MR. YOUNG: No. I'll do that right now. THE COURT: Deputy Gray, has Ms. Vasquez left? 15 16 DEPUTY GRAY: Not yet, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Just one moment then and then I'll excuse you for your deliberations. 18 19 All rise for the jury. (Outside the presence of the jury:) 20 21 THE COURT: Please be seated. The record will reflect that the jury has retired 22

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to the jury room. Informally prior to the resumption of the case after the lunch recess I discussed with

counsel the fact that Mr. Mason has dialysis scheduled this afternoon at approximately 3 o'clock. It is now 2:35, and so the jury will begin their deliberations, but it's reasonable to assume at some time in the near future that Mr. Mason will no longer be with us here in the courtroom.

The Court will allow the jury to continue their deliberations and we will wait on their call. However, we will not take the jury's verdict, assuming the jury comes to a conclusion, sometime after Mr. Mason leaves. The procedure that the Court will follow is that the jury will be brought back in, the verdicts will be taken by the clerk, and they will be kept locked by the court clerk until tomorrow morning when Mr. Mason will again join us.

Is that the process that the State agrees to, Mr. Young?

MR. YOUNG: I have no objection to that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Hylin?

MR. HYLIN: Yes, that's fine, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Assuming that that does occur, the jury then will be again given the admonition and they will be allowed to go home tonight. The Court does also

acknowledge that there may be the possibility that we have to go forward with Count III tomorrow. So we'll have the jury come back at 8:30 in the morning and we will take up whatever additional business we have to take up tomorrow.

Counsel, if you could please give Ms. White your cell phone number so we can get ahold of you. I like

Counsel, if you could please give Ms. White your cell phone number so we can get ahold of you. I like to keep people about no more than ten minutes away in case there are any questions for the jury. Thank you, counsel.

Court's in recess.

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(A recess was taken.)

(Within the presence of the jury:)

THE COURT: We'll go back on the record in CR14-1830, the State of Nevada versus Quinzale Mason. Mr. Mason is not present. His attorney, Mr. Hylin, is present. Mr. Young is here on behalf of the State of Nevada.

Mr. Young, do you stipulate to the presence of the jury less the alternate?

MR. YOUNG: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Same for you, Mr. Hylin?

MR. HYLIN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, who is your

foreperson?

JUROR CORNISH: I am.

THE COURT: Mr. Cornish. Have a seat, sir.

I want to let you know something that is going on.

As you can see, Mr. Mason is not with us. Mr. Mason
has some physical issues that needed attention, and so
he's not here today.

A defendant does have a right, a constitutional right, to be present when the verdict is returned in his case. It is approximately 10 minutes until 5:00. And so I won't be able to take your verdict today. But, Mr. Cornish, what I would like you to do is provide the packet of verdict forms to Deputy Gray. And he is going to provide them to me and I will place them in this envelope and then I will seal it. And we will not discuss the verdict until tomorrow.

I need you to come back at 8:30 a.m. tomorrow morning so we can return your verdict, whatever your verdict may have been.

So with that, I'll provide the jury instructions themselves to the clerk. And I apologize on behalf of Mr. -- well, I don't apologize on behalf of Mr. Mason. It's not his fault that he has some physical needs that need to be taken care of. But I want to thank you for

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your attention to this issue. I know that I told you it was going to be four days at the most. So we will be back tomorrow morning at 8:30 a.m. so Mr. Mason can be here. At that point I will open the envelope and then we will publish your verdict.

Now, what's very important is that you are now not discharged from the admonition. So when you do home, the jury admonition still applies. Your service is not over yet. I'll let you know when you're allowed to talk to your friends and family and to talk to each other. So it's important also to keep in mind when you come back tomorrow morning -- I know you've reached a decision on these charges, but you cannot discuss your decision with each other. All deliberations have to be conducted as a group. And so it would be inappropriate for one or two of you to come in tomorrow morning and start talking about your deliberations.

Does everybody understand that? I need to see everybody's head. Okay. So I've got positive nods from everybody.

One moment.

And I will tell you that this envelope tastes awful.

So the record will reflect that I have sealed the

envelope. I'll place my initials on the seal and date it. And I'll direct the clerk to maintain custody of the envelope. She'll lock it up so no one will have any access to it.

So, ladies and gentlemen, your work is almost finished. That's all I can tell you. I appreciate, again, the diligence that you've shown in these proceedings and I need you back here at 8:30 in the morning tomorrow. So when you go home, again, don't talk to anybody. Remember that.

You are instructed not to discuss this case among yourselves or with anyone else or to form any conclusions concerning the case until it is submitted to you. You are not to read, look at or listen to any new media accounts relating to this case should there be any. You're not to form any opinion about the case until it is finally submitted to you.

Do not experiment or investigate. Do not visit the scene. Do not refer to any outside sources for instructions on the law. Rely only on the court for legal instructions.

And remember, back here at 8:30 in the morning tomorrow and no discussion when you get together about what you did today. That portion of this case is not

over

All rise for the jury.

(Outside the presence of the jury:)

THE COURT: Please be seated.

The record will reflect that the jury has returned to the jury room. Counsel, my judicial assistant is preparing the jury instructions for Count III in the event that we'll need those instructions.

I can tell you I didn't look at the verdict forms when I stuck them in the envelope, so I have to idea what the jury's decision is in this case.

So if we could just stand by, I can let know what I did was simply take out a number of them that were duplicative of instructions that had been given initially. It is my intention to number the additional instructions and then give them the entire packet back, because they use the same instructions for the ex-felon in possession of a firearm in the bifurcated portion of these proceedings, so they get the whole packet back. There's no reason to put in certain instructions. So just relax for a moment.

Mr. Hylin and Mr. Young.

MR. HYLIN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

This will be off the record momentarily.

(A discussion was held off the record.)

THE COURT: Let's go back on the record. We'll go back on the record in CR14-1830. The record will reflect that we have remained in the courtroom since the jury has recessed and briefly discussed in an informal way the proposed jury instructions that will be given regarding being an ex-felon in possession of a firearm, or more accurately, being a felon in possession of a firearm.

The Court has four proposed jury instructions and verdict forms of not guilty and guilty for Count III of the Amended Information. The Court will number the instructions as follows: The instruction that begins "The Defendant Quinzale Mason" will be Instruction No. 33. "The elements of being a felon in possession of a firearm" will be 34. The instruction that says "you may consider all" is 35. And the instruction that says "both the defense and the State" will be 36.

The Court would note that in the informal meeting that we just had, the issue of a potential stipulation was discussed by the parties. Specifically there is the possibility that Mr. Mason will stipulate that he is a convicted felon. The Court would note that

Instruction No. 33 as it is currently numbered lists the offense that the defendant was convicted of as voluntary manslaughter with the use of a deadly weapon. However, the instruction that is numbered 36 discusses the contemplation of the parties that there may be a stipulation in the case, the stipulation being that Mr. Mason will simply stipulate to the jury that he is a convicted felon.

If Mr. Mason and the State enter into that stipulation, then the State will provide an alternate Instruction No. 33 that omits the language describing the nature of the offense in Clark County, Nevada. If, however, there is no stipulation, the Court will give Instruction No. 33 as it is currently written and the Court will remove Instruction No. 36. And so we will just wait on Mr. Mason's decision regarding that issue.

With that understanding, Mr. Young, do you have any additional instructions that you wish to offer regarding Count No. I?

MR. YOUNG: No. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And do you have any objection to the instructions that the Court has indicated that it will give?

MR. YOUNG: No. Thank you.

1 THE COURT: Mr. Hylin, on behalf of Mr. Mason, do 2 you have any additional instructions that you would 3 like to give? No, I do not, Your Honor. MR. HYLIN: 4 THE COURT: And do you have any objections to the 5 procedure that the Court just outlined regarding 6 7 instructions 33 and 36? MR. HYLIN: No. I concur, Your Honor. 8 9 THE COURT: All right. Then we will be in recess. The record will reflect that Mr. Mason was taken to the 10 Washoe County Sheriff's Office at approximately -- I 11 12 think it was about 3:15. Deputy, was it about 3:15? THE BAILIFF: Yes, Your Honor. 13 14 THE COURT: -- at approximately 3:15 in the 15 afternoon while the jury was deliberating so he could 16 receive his dialysis treatment. He will be back 17 tomorrow morning at 8:30 a.m. at which point we'll unseal the jury's verdicts and then we will decide how 18 19 we will proceed with these further issues. Anything else, Mr. Hylin? 20 Nothing, Your Honor. 21 MR. HYLIN: THE COURT: Mr. Young, anything else? 22

MR. YOUNG: No. Thank you, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Then I will return the entire packet of

jury instructions to the clerk and simply request that she hold on to those until tomorrow at 8:30. Court is in recess. The record will reflect that the jury instructions will also be locked with the jury verdicts in the court's-- and time I say "lockbox. MR. HYLIN: The magic box. THE COURT: I think of Al Gore when I say "lockbox." But they will be in the court's lockbox. And the record will also reflect that the bailiff, Deputy Gray, has returned all of the exhibits to the court clerk. Court is in recess. (The proceedings were adjourned at 5:07 p.m.) --000--

1 ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I, LORI URMSTON, Certified Court Reporter, in and for the State of Nevada, do hereby acknowledge:

That the foregoing proceedings were taken by me at the time and place therein set forth; that the proceedings were recorded stenographically by me and thereafter transcribed via computer under my supervision; that the foregoing is a true ROUGH DRAFT transcription of the proceedings to the best of my knowledge, skill and ability and has not been proofread, corrected or certified.

I further certify that I am not a relative nor an employee of any attorney or any of the parties, nor am I financially or otherwise interested in this action.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Nevada that the foregoing statements are true and correct.

DATED: At Reno, Nevada, this 6th day of May, 2015.

LORI URMSTON, CCR #51

LORI URMSTON, CCR #51

CASE NO. CR14-1830 **STATE OF NEVADA VS. QUINZALE MASON**

PAGE 1

DATE, JUDGE OFFICERS OF

COURT PRESENT APPEARANCES-HEARING

2/11/15 ONGOING JURY TRIAL

HONORABLE 8:30 a.m. – Court met with respective counsel and the Defendant informally in the

ELLIOTT A. courtroom, outside the presence of the jury, to discuss jury instructions. SATTLER 9:00 a.m. – Jury Instructions 1 thru 32 were settled on the record.

DEPT. NO. 10 State's counsel's refused instruction #1 was lodged with the Clerk.

M. White Defense counsel advised the Court that the Defendant will not be testifying, and he does not

(Clerk) have any additional witnesses or evidence to offer.

L. Urmston 9:28 a.m. – Court stood in recess.

(Reporter) 9:58 a.m. – Court reconvened. Court, respective counsel, Defendant and jury present.

COURT instructed the jury.

State's counsel presented closing arguments.

Defense counsel presented closing arguments. **COURT** admonished and excused the jury.

11:35 a.m. – Court stood in recess for lunch.

1:26 p.m. – Court reconvened. Court, respective counsel, Defendant and jury present.

Defense counsel continued presenting closing arguments.

State's counsel presented final closing arguments.

Deputy Gray sworn and charged with the jury.

Alternate juror, Brenda Vasquez, was given the juror admonition, thanked by the Court, and excused.

2:34 p.m. – Deliberations commenced.

COURT noted that the Defendant needs to leave the courthouse at approximately 3:00 p.m. today so he can receive dialysis treatment at the jail; therefore, if a verdict is reached after the Defendant has left for the day, the verdict forms will be sealed and locked for the evening, and the jury will be directed to return tomorrow morning so the verdict can be read.

2:37 p.m. – Court stood in recess.

4:33 p.m. – Verdict reached.

4:51 p.m. – Court reconvened. Court, respective counsel and jury present.

COURT advised the jury that the Defendant is not present in the courtroom as he required medical treatment; and he further advised the jury that their verdict will be sealed and locked for the evening, and they will need to return tomorrow, February 12, 2015 at 8:30 a.m., so the verdict can be read.

Foreperson, Robert Cornish, handed the verdict forms to Deputy Gray, who provided them to the Court; Court sealed the verdict forms in an envelope, and he initialed the seal.

COURT admonished and excused the jury for the evening.

Discussion ensued between the Court and respective counsel regarding the jury instructions as to Count III; the jury instructions for Count III were handed to respective counsel. *Court and respective counsel briefly discussed these jury instructions off the record.*

CASE NO. CR14-1830 **STATE OF NEVADA VS. QUINZALE MASON**

PAGE 2

DATE, JUDGE OFFICERS OF

COURT PRESENT APPEARANCES-HEARING

2/11/15 ONGOING JURY TRIAL

HONORABLE Jury Instructions 33, 34, 35 & 36 were settled on the record.

ELLIOTT A. **COURT** noted that there may be a potential stipulation regarding the Defendant's prior

SATTLER felony conviction, which may alter these instructions.

DEPT. NO. 10 **COURT** directed the Clerk to lock the sealed verdict forms, as well as the original packet of

M. White Jury Instructions, in the evidence locker.

(Clerk) 5:05 p.m. – Court stood in recess for the evening, to reconvene tomorrow, February 12, 2015

L. Urmston at 8:30 a.m.

(Reporter)

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Clerk of the Court
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2	PEGGY B. HOOGS, HOOGS REPORTING	GROUP		
3	435 Marsh Avenue Reno, Nevada 895			
4	(775) 327-4460 Court Reporter			
5				
6	SECOND JUDICI	AL DISTRICT CO	OURT OF THE ST	TATE OF NEVADA
7	IN	AND FOR THE C	COUNTY OF WASH	HOE
8	THE HONORAE	BLE ELLIOTT A.	SATTLER, DIS	TRICT JUDGE
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10	STATE OF NEVADA	,	Case No	o. CR14-1830
11	Pla	aintiff,	Dept. 1	No. 10
12	vs.			
13	QUINZALE MASON,			
14		fendant.		
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2				
3	FOR	THE PLAINTIFF:		
4		ZACH YOUNG, ESQ.	h	
5		Deputy District At 1 South Sierra Str	eet	
6		Reno, Nevada 89501		
7		MUD DECENDANT.		
8	FOR	THE DEFENDANT:		
9		CARL HYLIN, ESQ. Deputy Public Defe		
10		350 South Center S Reno, Nevada 89501		
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- 1 (The following proceedings were held outside
- 2 the presence of the jury.)
- 3 THE COURT: Let's go on the record in the
- 4 State of Nevada vs. Quinzale Mason, CR14-1830. Mr. Mason
- is present in court with his attorney, Mr. Hylin.
- 6 Mr. Young is here on behalf of the State of Nevada.
- 7 We're meeting outside of the presence of the jury.
- 8 Good morning to all of you.
- 9 Mr. Mason, last night after you were taken to
- 10 have your dialysis treatment, we left the jury
- 11 deliberating, and so they continued to deliberate, and
- 12 they came back at approximately 4:45 yesterday with a
- 13 verdict. I have not looked at the verdict forms. I
- 14 actually took them from the jury and sealed them in an
- 15 envelope. I have the envelope here with me, and so I
- 16 know that you wanted to be present when the jury came
- 17 back and returned the verdict, so we have not heard from
- 18 the jury yet regarding what the outcome of your case is.
- There is a possibility that we will go
- 20 forward with Count 3 of the Amended Information.
- 21 Mr. Mason, Count 3, as you know, is charging you with
- 22 being a felon in possession of a firearm. One of the
- 23 elements of that offense is that you are a convicted
- 24 felon. In order to prove that, what the State does is

- 1 they provide a certified copy of a prior criminal
- 2 conviction that is provided to the jury.
- 3 My understanding is that you have discussed
- 4 with your attorney the concept of stipulating to the fact
- 5 that you are simply a convicted felon and, therefore,
- 6 waiving the requirement for the State to produce the
- 7 certified copy of the prior criminal conviction.
- 8 You don't have an obligation to do that.
- 9 It's completely up to you whether or not you enter into a
- 10 stipulation with the State, but if you do stipulate,
- 11 you're waiving an element -- one of the elements of that
- 12 offense.
- Do you understand that?
- 14 THE DEFENDANT: Hold on.
- THE COURT: Okay.
- 16 (A discussion was held off the record.)
- 17 THE COURT: Mr. Mason, did you have an
- 18 opportunity to speak with Mr. Hylin and have any
- 19 questions about what I just told you answered?
- THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
- THE COURT: No, sir, or yes, sir?
- 22 THE DEFENDANT: I mean yeah. I understand
- 23 it, yeah.
- 24 THE COURT: You talked to Mr. Hylin, and he

- 1 was able to answer any questions you may have had about
- 2 that stipulation?
- 3 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
- 4 THE COURT: What you're doing by stipulating
- 5 is simply waiving that one element of the offense.
- 6 You're not waiving anything else. You're simply
- 7 acknowledging that you are a convicted felon, and so in
- 8 doing that, you and the State have agreed that the State
- 9 won't tell the jury what the offense is. It's just that
- 10 you're a convicted felon.
- Do you understand that?
- 12 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
- 13 THE COURT: Is that what you want to do? I
- just want you to understand if you don't want to do
- 15 that -- and, again, you have no obligation to do
- 16 so -- what will happen is the State will mark a certified
- 17 copy of the prior felony conviction and that will be
- 18 admitted, assuming it's constitutional.
- Mr. Hylin has told me he has already reviewed
- 20 it and it is constitutionally valid, and so that document
- 21 will go to the jury, and they'll see your prior felony
- 22 conviction for voluntary manslaughter with the use of a
- deadly weapon.
- So are you going to stipulate just that

- 1 you're a convicted weapon or do you want the State to
- 2 produce the certified copy of the criminal conviction?
- THE DEFENDANT: I'll stipulate, Your Honor.
- 4 THE COURT: I appreciate that.
- 5 MR. HYLIN: We are offering that, the defense
- 6 is, Your Honor, and that's pursuant to Edwards vs. State,
- 7 122 Nev. 378, a 2006 case, which follows Old Chief vs.
- 8 United States, 519 U.S. 172.
- 9 THE COURT: Then what the Court will do is
- 10 withdraw the previously marked Jury Instruction No. 33
- and instruct the clerk to mark "withdrawn" on that, and
- then this morning, Mr. Young provided a new Instruction
- No. 33, and I will number that right now, and that will
- 14 be read to the jury.
- 15 It is my intention this morning to call the
- 16 jury in to take their verdict, and then if the defendant
- was convicted of one or both of the felony offenses
- 18 alleged in Count I and II of the Amended Information,
- 19 what I will do then is inform the jury that they do have
- one additional task that they need to address. I will
- 21 read them the jury instructions, just the jury
- instructions that are new, 33 through 36, and I will send
- them back into the jury room to continue to deliberate,
- 24 and then we will wait on their return. And, again,

- 1 that's assuming that the defendant is found guilty of one
- or both of the offenses in the Amended Information.
- We will not have an opening statement, there
- 4 will be no additional evidence presented based on the
- 5 stipulation, and there will be, obviously, no closing
- 6 arguments presented.
- 7 Does anyone object to that procedure?
- 8 Mr. Young?
- 9 MR. YOUNG: I have no objection.
- 10 THE COURT: Mr. Hylin on behalf of Mr. Mason.
- 11 MR. HYLIN: I have no objection, Your Honor,
- 12 considering that all the evidence concerning Count 3 has
- 13 already been placed before the jury as far as the firearm
- is concerned.
- MR. YOUNG: Very briefly, it probably goes
- 16 without saying, but I am agreeing to the offer of the
- 17 stipulation for the --
- 18 THE COURT: I assumed as much based on our
- 19 conversations yesterday.
- 20 MR. YOUNG: It probably did not need to be
- 21 said, but for the record.
- 22 THE COURT: I like when it goes without
- 23 saying and then they say it anyway.
- MR. YOUNG: I do that every now and then.

- 1 THE COURT: All rise for the jury.
- 2 (The jury entered the courtroom.)
- 3 (The following proceedings were held outside
- 4 the presence of the jury.)
- 5 THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and
- 6 gentlemen.
- 7 Will counsel stipulate to the presence of the
- 8 jury less the alternate? Mr. Young?
- 9 MR. YOUNG: The State will, Your Honor.
- THE COURT: Mr. Hylin?
- MR. HYLIN: Yes.
- 12 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, as we
- discussed yesterday, Mr. Mason was not available when you
- 14 returned your verdict, and so, as you saw, I sealed your
- 15 verdicts in this envelope. Those of us who are old
- 16 enough to remember Johnny Carson, I feel like Karnick. I
- 17 have the envelope, and I can hold it up to my head and
- 18 tell you the answer.
- 19 What I will do now is unseal the envelope and
- 20 provide your verdict forms to the clerk so they may be
- 21 published.
- 22 Mr. Mason, generally I request the defendant
- 23 stand when the verdicts are read, but in your case I know
- 24 you have some problems with your legs, so you may remain

- 1 seated.
- THE CLERK: "In the Second Judicial District
- 3 Court in the State of Nevada in and for the County of
- 4 Washoe, the State of Nevada, plaintiff, vs. Quinzale
- 5 Mason, defendant, Case No. CR14-1830, Department No. 10,
- 6 Verdict: We, the jury in the above-entitled matter, find
- 7 the defendant Quinzale Mason guilty of Count I, battery
- 8 with a deadly weapon, dated this 11th day of February,
- 9 2015, Foreperson;
- "Verdict: We, the jury in the above-entitled
- 11 matter, find the defendant Quinzale Mason guilty of
- 12 Count II, assault with a deadly weapon, dated this 11th
- day of February, 2015, Foreperson."
- 14 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury,
- is this your verdict, so say you one, so say you all?
- 16 (Collective affirmation by the jury.)
- 17 THE COURT: Does either party wish to have
- 18 the jury polled? Mr. Hylin?
- MR. HYLIN: Yes, Your Honor.
- THE COURT: Miss Clerk, please poll the jury.
- 21 THE CLERK: Juror No. 1, is this your verdict
- 22 as read?
- JUROR NO. 1: Yes.
- 24 THE CLERK: Juror No. 2, is this your verdict

as read? 1 JUROR NO. 2: Yes. 3 THE CLERK: Juror No. 3, is this your verdict as read? 5 JUROR NO. 3: Yes. 6 THE CLERK: Juror No. 4, is this your verdict 7 as read? 8 JUROR NO. 4: Yes. THE CLERK: Juror No. 5, is this your verdict 9 10 as read? JUROR NO. 5: Yes. 11 12 THE CLERK: Juror No. 6, is this your verdict as read? 13 14 JUROR NO. 6: Yes. 15 THE CLERK: Juror No. 7, is this your verdict 16 as read? 17 JUROR NO. 7: Yes. THE CLERK: Juror No. 8, is this your verdict 18 as read? 19 20 JUROR NO. 8: Yes. THE CLERK: Juror No. 9, is this your verdict 21 22 as read? JUROR NO. 9: Yes. 23

THE CLERK: Juror No. 10, is this your

24

- verdict as read?
- JUROR NO. 10: Yes.
- 3 THE CLERK: Juror No. 11, is this your
- 4 verdict as read?
- JUROR NO. 11: Yes.
- THE CLERK: And Juror No. 12, is this your
- 7 verdict as read?
- JUROR NO. 12: Yes.
- 9 THE COURT: The jury's verdicts will be
- 10 entered as part of the record in this case.
- 11 Ladies and gentlemen, I've been slightly
- 12 disingenuous with you about your responsibilities.
- 13 Yesterday when I told you you would come back and we
- 14 would simply read the verdict to the defendant, that was
- 15 not completely accurate. It depended on what your
- 16 verdict was.
- 17 There was one additional charge contained in
- 18 the Amended Information. That charge was being a felon
- in possession of a firearm. The Nevada Supreme Court, in
- 20 a case by the name of Brown vs. State requires that we
- 21 bifurcate, which means we have two separate hearings or
- 22 trials, regarding an allegation of certain felony
- offenses, and then if there's an additional offense of
- being a felon in possession of a firearm.

- 1 So what the Supreme Court tells us we have to
- do, we have to hear that first offense first, and then
- 3 you come back and make a decision on the offense of being
- 4 a felon in possession of a firearm.
- 5 For that reason I have additional jury
- 6 instructions that I need to read you. There is one
- 7 additional task that you have, and that is, you must
- 8 determine if the defendant is guilty of being a felon in
- 9 possession of a firearm.
- 10 I'll read the jury instructions in a moment.
- 11 There are only four additional jury instructions, but
- what I want to emphasize to you is, all of the other jury
- instructions still apply in this case, so I'm going to
- 14 give you back the packet of jury instructions numbered 1
- through 32, and then there will be four additional
- instructions, Instructions 33 through 36, attached to
- them, and then there are two verdict forms, one guilty
- and one not guilty, for being a felon in possession of a
- 19 firearm.
- 20 As I told you when I instructed you
- 21 yesterday, you're not obligated to find the defendant
- 22 quilty of this or any offense. It is just one additional
- offense that the State has alleged. The State's burden
- is exactly the same. They must prove beyond a reasonable

- doubt that the defendant committed the offense of being a
- 2 felon in possession of a firearm. All the other jury
- 3 instructions apply and you're allowed to consider all of
- 4 the evidence that you have listened to in coming to a
- 5 conclusion whether or not the State has proven that
- 6 offense.
- 7 So what I'll do for you now is read you Jury
- 8 Instructions No. 33 through 36. I'm not going to give
- 9 you each a packet of these because it's very short.
- 10 (Jury instructions 33 through 36 were read to
- 11 the jury.)
- 12 THE COURT: So, ladies and gentlemen of the
- jury, I will direct that the Court provide you -- strike
- 14 that -- the clerk provide you with all of the exhibits
- again to aid in your deliberation should you need to
- 16 refer to any of them, I am providing you with a packet of
- original jury instructions so you may refer to them, and
- 18 we will await your decision.
- 19 All rise for the jury.
- 20 Again, there's no admonition again. Go back
- 21 and discuss the case.
- 22 Court's in recess.
- 23 (A recess was taken.)
- 24 (The jury entered the courtroom.)

- 1 THE COURT: Will counsel stipulate to the
- 2 presence of the jury? Mr. Hylin?
- MR. HYLIN: Yes, Your Honor.
- 4 THE COURT: Mr. Young?
- 5 MR. YOUNG: Yes.
- 6 THE COURT: Mr. Cornish, I've been informed
- 7 you have an additional verdict; correct?
- JURY FOREPERSON: Correct.
- 9 THE COURT: Would you provide that to Deputy
- 10 Gray.
- 11 The clerk will read the verdict regarding
- 12 Count III.
- 13 THE CLERK: "Verdict: We, the jury in the
- 14 above-entitled matter, find the defendant Quinzale Mason
- 15 guilty of Count III, being a felon in possession of a
- 16 firearm, dated this 12th date of February, 2014."
- 17 THE COURT: Is this your verdict, so say you
- one, so say you all?
- 19 (Collective affirmation by the jury.)
- THE COURT: Mr. Hylin, would you like the
- 21 jury polled?
- MR. HYLIN: Yes, I would.
- THE COURT: Why don't we poll the jury, then,
- 24 as to Count III.

THE CLERK: Juror No. 1, is this your verdict 1 2 as read? 3 JUROR NO. 1: Yes. THE CLERK: Juror No. 2? 4 5 JUROR NO. 2: Yes. 6 THE CLERK: Juror No. 3? 7 JUROR NO. 3: Yes. 8 THE CLERK: Juror No. 4? JUROR NO. 4: Yes. 9 THE CLERK: Juror No. 5? 10 11 JUROR NO. 5: Yes. 12 THE CLERK: Juror No. 6? 13 JUROR NO. 6: Yes. 14 THE CLERK: Juror No. 7? JUROR NO. 7: Yes. 15 THE CLERK: Juror No. 8? 16 17 JUROR NO. 8: Yes. THE CLERK: Juror No. 9? 18 JUROR NO. 9: Yes. 19 20 THE CLERK: Juror No. 10? JUROR NO. 10: Yes. 21 22 THE CLERK: Juror No. 11? JUROR NO. 11: Yes. 23 24 THE CLERK: Juror No. 12?

- 1 JUROR NO. 12: Yes.
- THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury,
- 3 now I'm not kidding. Your work here is finished. Thank
- 4 you very much for your service. I understand that it was
- 5 a little bit disjointed there the last couple of days,
- 6 yesterday and today, but it was just required based on
- 7 the nature of the case.
- 8 There's only a couple of things that I ask of
- 9 you at this point. One of them is that at the end of
- 10 every trial I have the jurors fill out a very brief
- 11 questionnaire. You're not obligated to do so, so if you
- don't want to, you don't have to. I can guarantee you I
- 13 review every single one of them.
- 14 The reason I have the questionnaire done is I
- want to know what I can do to make jury service for the
- 16 next 12 people sitting in the seats that you're sitting
- in better, so if you have suggestions in any way that I
- 18 can make the process better, please let me know. Some
- 19 people say we can give better coffee and we can make the
- 20 facilities a little bit better. I think that eventually
- 21 might have to be taken up with the county commission. We
- 22 might need a new building at some point.
- 23 So you as former jurors, if you have a strong
- feeling about the jury room, maybe at some point we can

- 1 take that up. I can't do anything about the facilities,
- 2 but if there is something about them that made you
- 3 uncomfortable, I need to know about it so we can address
- 4 that in the future.
- 5 The other thing I want to tell you is that
- 6 you are now completely free from the admonition. You can
- 7 talk to anybody that you want to about your jury service.
- 8 I can tell you, based on my past experience as a trial
- 9 attorney, that oftentimes it's helpful for the attorneys
- 10 to call the jurors and find out what it is that they did
- 11 well or areas possibly they can work on to improve.
- 12 There's nothing inappropriate about the attorneys or
- somebody from the attorneys' offices calling you and
- wanting to discuss the case with you, and so if that call
- does come, it's up to you whether or not you want to talk
- 16 to them or not. I'm not saying that you should or that
- 17 you have to. I know, as I said before, Mr. Young and
- 18 Mr. Hylin are both very courteous gentlemen, but if they
- 19 call and you want to talk to them, feel free to do so.
- 20 If you don't want to talk to them and you tell them that
- 21 and they persist, then you call me and I'll take care of
- 22 it for you, but I can't imagine that occurring.
- The last thing I'll tell you is, I do make it
- 24 a habit or a practice to meet with my fellow judges in my

- office after jury service. So Deputy Gray will let you
- 2 know, if you want to talk to me in my office about your
- 3 jury service or I can answer possibly any questions that
- 4 you may have had about the process or the way that we do
- 5 things, I'll be happy to meet with you once you've
- 6 collected your belongings and you may come back.
- 7 So just talk to Deputy Gray about that if
- 8 you'd like to do that. If I don't have the opportunity
- 9 to thank you in person under those circumstances, let me
- just one final time say thank you on behalf of your
- 11 community for the service that you provided this week.
- 12 Ladies and gentlemen, you will rise for the
- 13 jury.
- 14 (The jury exited the courtroom.)
- 15 THE COURT: The record will reflect the jury
- has retired to the jury room.
- Mr. Mason, we do need to prepare a
- 18 Presentence Investigation Report in your case, so,
- 19 Ms. Clerk, do we have a date for sentencing?
- MR. HYLIN: Your Honor, I was going to ask
- 21 that it be set in as close as possible. His medical
- 22 condition is deteriorating rapidly, and because of his
- incarceration, they took him off of the donor list for a
- 24 transplant.

- 1 THE COURT: Okay.
- MR. HYLIN: So, you know, it's become kind of
- 3 critical as far as that is concerned, so I know -- I know
- 4 what the parameters are with the Division, but I think
- 5 they can probably squeeze out a PSI earlier than the
- 6 normal routine, so I would ask that we could set in as
- 7 soon as possible.
- 8 THE COURT: Mr. Young, the prior criminal
- 9 conviction out of Las Vegas, what year was that?
- MR. YOUNG: 2006, I believe, Your Honor.
- 11 THE COURT: The only reason I ask is that we
- 12 can use a Presentence Investigation Report that's not
- less than five years old, but if it was outside that
- 14 window, then we do need to do a new Presentence
- 15 Investigation Report.
- 16 MR. YOUNG: The first judgment and conviction
- was December 18, '06, so going on nine years ago.
- 18 THE COURT: So we can't use that old PSI.
- 19 Ms. Clerk, if we could set a date as soon as
- 20 possible for Mr. Mason.
- Mr. Mason, we do have to do a Presentence
- 22 Investigation Report, and that usually takes about 45
- 23 days, but if we can set it maybe 30 days, then if the
- 24 Division can't do that, then I'll talk to them about it,

- 1 but I understand Mr. Mason's condition. I think
- 2 Mr. Hylin's request is a reasonable one.
- MR. HYLIN: Thank you, Your Honor.
- 4 THE CLERK: Mr. Hylin, would March
- 5 19th -- that's a Thursday -- that's a little bit over 30
- 6 days because February is a short month. Or March 17th?
- 7 MR. HYLIN: Either one is fine. The
- 8 Department 1 calendar is the same day, so what I'll have
- 9 to do is be in front of the calendar or trail it to the
- 10 end, but that should be fine.
- 11 THE COURT: We'll accommodate you one way or
- 12 the other, Mr. Hylin.
- Which day do you prefer, Thursday the 19th or
- 14 Tuesday the 17th, Saint Patrick's Day or the 19th.
- MR. HYLIN: Let's do it the 19th.
- 16 THE COURT: We'll set this for sentencing on
- 17 Thursday, March 19th at 8:30 a.m., and Mr. Hylin will
- 18 contact my staff and let them know if you want to go
- 19 first or last. It will be completely up to you,
- 20 Mr. Hylin, but we'll accommodate you.
- MR. HYLIN: Thank you, Your Honor.
- THE COURT: Mr. Mason, I'm going to order you
- 23 cooperate with the Division of Parole & Probation in the
- 24 preparation of a Presentence Investigation Report. I'm

Τ	also ordering you bring in \$25 on the day of your
2	sentencing. That's an administrative assessment fee that
3	I'll order in addition to anything else I do on that
4	date.
5	Do you understand that?
6	THE DEFENDANT: Am I supposed to have, like,
7	\$25 on my books for that?
8	THE COURT: Yeah. If you have \$25 on your
9	books, that would be great. If you don't or you can't
10	get it, I understand, but it is a requirement you pay a
11	\$25 administrative assessment fee.
12	Court's in recess.
13	(Proceedings concluded.)
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1	STATE OF NEVADA)) ss.
2	COUNTY OF WASHOE)
3	
4	I, PEGGY B. HOOGS, Certified Court Reporter
5	in and for the State of Nevada, do hereby certify:
6	That the foregoing proceedings were taken by
7	me at the time and place therein set forth; that the
8	proceedings were recorded stenographically by me and
9	thereafter transcribed via computer under my supervision;
10	that the foregoing is a ROUGH DRAFT transcription of the
11	proceedings and has not been proofread or certified.
12	I further certify that I am not a relative
13	nor an employee of any attorney or any of the parties,
14	nor am I financially or otherwise interested in this
15	action.
16	I declare under penalty of perjury under the
17	laws of the State of Nevada that the foregoing statements
18	are true and correct.
19	Dated this 6th day of May, 2015.
20	
21	/s/ Peggy B. Hoogs
22	Peggy B. Hoogs, CCR #160, RDR
23	

24

CASE NO. CR14-1830

STATE OF NEVADA VS. QUINZALE MASON

DATE, JUDGE PAGE 1

OFFICERS OF

COURT PRESENT APPEARANCES-HEARING

2/12/15 ONGOING JURY TRIAL

HONORABLE 8:45 a.m. – Court reconvened outside the presence of the jury. Court, respective counsel and

ELLIOTT A. Defendant present.

SATTLER Discussion ensued between the Court and respective counsel regarding jury instructions for

DEPT. NO. 10 Count III of the Amended Information.

M. White Defense counsel advised the Court that the Defendant will stipulate that he is a convicted (Clerk) felon, and he will waive his right to have the State provide a certified copy of his prior

P. Hoogs conviction.

(Reporter) Upon questioning by the Court, the Defendant stated that he does stipulate to being a

convicted felon.

COURT ORDERED: The current Jury Instruction #33 shall be withdrawn, and the modified version will be numbered as 33 and given to the jury.

Jury brought into the courtroom.

COURT unsealed the envelope that contained the verdict forms, and handed them to the Clerk.

Upon direction by the Court, the Clerk read the verdicts aloud:

<u>VERDICT</u>

We, the jury in the above-entitled matter, find the defendant, QUINZALE MASON, GUILTY of COUNT I. BATTERY WITH A DEADLY WEAPON.

VERDICT

We, the jury in the above-entitled matter, find the defendant, QUINZALE MASON, GUILTY of COUNT II. ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON.

Dated this 11th day of February, 2015.

/s/Robert Cornish

Foreperson

Defense counsel requested that the jury be polled by the Clerk.

Each juror answered in the affirmative to the question: "Are these your verdicts as read?" **COURT** advised the jury that they will now be directed to consider Count III of the Amended Information.

COURT read Jury Instructions 33, 34, 35 & 36 to the jury.

8:59 a.m. – Deliberations commenced; Court stood in recess.

9:20 a.m. – Court reconvened. Court, respective counsel, Defendant and jury present.

Upon direction by the Court, the Clerk read the verdict aloud:

VERDICT

We, the jury in the above-entitled matter, find the defendant, QUINZALE MASON, GUILTY of COUNT III. BEING A FELON IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM.

Dated this 12th day of February, 2015.

/s/Robert Cornish

Foreperson

Defense counsel requested that the jury be polled by the Clerk; each juror again answered in the affirmative.

CASE NO. CR14-1830 **STATE OF NEVADA VS. QUINZALE MASON**

PAGE 2

DATE, JUDGE OFFICERS OF

COURT PRESENT APPEARANCES-HEARING

2/12/15 **ONGOING JURY TRIAL**

HONORABLE **COURT** thanked and excused the jury.

ELLIOTT A. Defense counsel requested that sentencing be set as soon as possible due to the Defendant's

SATTLER deteriorating medical condition.

DEPT. NO. 10 **COURT** noted that the Division of Parole and Probation needs time to prepare a PSI, however a sentencing date within approximately 30 days would be reasonable in this case.

(Clerk) **COURT ORDERED:** Sentencing set for March 19, 2015 at 8:30 a.m.

P. Hoogs Defendant remanded to the custody of the Sheriff.

(Reporter)

Exhibits

Title: STATE OF NEVADA VS. QUINZALE MASON PLAINTIFF: STATE OF NEVADA DA: ZACH YOUNG, ESQ. DEFENDANT: QUINZALE MASON PD: CARL HYLIN, ESQ.

Case No: CR14-1830 Dept. No: 10 Clerk: M. WHITE Date: 2/6/15

Exhibit No.	Party	Description	Marked	Offered	Admitted
1	STATE	Overhead photo #1	2/6/15	No Obj.	2/9/15
2	STATE	Overhead photo #2	2/6/15	No Obj.	2/9/15
3	STATE	Overhead photo #3	2/6/15	No Obj.	2/10/15
4	STATE	Overhead photo #4	2/6/15	No Obj.	2/10/15
5	STATE	Scene photo #1	2/6/15	No Obj.	2/9/15
6	STATE	Scene photo #2	2/6/15	No Obj.	2/9/15
7	STATE	Scene photo #3	2/6/15	No Obj.	2/9/15
8	STATE	Scene photo #4	2/6/15	No Obj.	2/9/15
9	STATE	Scene photo #5	2/6/15	No Obj.	2/9/15
10	STATE	Scene photo #6	2/6/15	No Obj.	2/9/15
11	STATE	Victim photo #1	2/6/15	No Obj.	2/10/15
12	STATE	Victim photo #2	2/6/15	No Obj.	2/10/15
13	STATE	Vehicle photo – passenger side view	2/6/15	Obj; Overruled	2/10/15
14	STATE	Vehicle photo – driver's side view	2/6/15	Obj; Overruled	2/10/15
15	STATE	Vehicle photo – front view	2/6/15	Obj; Overruled	2/10/15
16	STATE	Vehicle photo – back license plate	2/6/15	Obj; Overruled	2/10/15
17	STATE	Vehicle photo – evidence seal	2/6/15	Obj; Overruled	2/10/15
18	STATE	Photo of DMV info	2/6/15	Obj; Overruled	2/10/15
19	STATE	Vehicle photo – interior	2/6/15	Obj; Overruled	2/10/15
20	STATE	Photo of items inside a plastic bag	2/6/15	Obj; Overruled	2/10/15

1

Print Date: 2/12/2015

Exhibits

Title: STATE OF NEVADA VS. QUINZALE MASON PLAINTIFF: STATE OF NEVADA DA: ZACH YOUNG, ESQ. DEFENDANT: QUINZALE MASON PD: CARL HYLIN, ESQ.

Case No: CR14-1830 Dept. No: 10 Clerk: M. WHITE Date: 2/6/15

Exhibit No.	Party	Description	Marked	Offered	Admitted
21	STATE	Photo of hat	2/6/15	Obj; Overruled	2/10/15
22	STATE	X-ray photo #1	2/6/15	No Obj.	2/10/15
23	STATE	X-ray photo #2	2/6/15	No Obj.	2/10/15
24	STATE	DMV Registration record	2/6/15	No Obj.	2/10/15
25	STATE	CD of 911 call	2/6/15	No Obj.	2/9/15
26	STATE	CD of power point presentation (demonstrative)	2/6/15		

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Print Date: 2/12/2015

1	CODE 4245	
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6	IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT	COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
7	IN AND FOR THE CO	DUNTY OF WASHOE.
8	* *	*
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	
10	Plaintiff,	
11	v,	Case No. CR14-1830
12	QUINZALE MASON,	Dept. No. 10
13	Defendant.	
14		_/
15	VERD	ICT
16	We, the jury in the above-	entitled matter, find the
17	defendant, QUINZALE MASON, GUILTY of	COUNT I. BATTERY WITH A DEADLY
18	WEAPON.	
19	DATED this 11th day of I	February, 2015.
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1	CODE 4245	
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6	IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT C	OURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
7	IN AND FOR THE COUN	NTY OF WASHOE.
8	* * *	
9	THE STATE OF NEVADA,	
10	Plaintiff,	
11	v.	Case No. CR14-1830
12	QUINZALE MASON,	Dept. No. 10
13	Defendant.	
14	/	
15	VERDIC	$\underline{\mathbf{T}}$
16	We, the jury in the above-en	ntitled matter, find the
17	defendant, QUINZALE MASON, GUILTY of	COUNT II. ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY
18	WEAPON.	
19	DATED this 1/th day of Feb	oruary, 2015.
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CODE 4245		
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IN THE SECOND	JUDICIAL DISTRICT	COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
	IN AND FOR THE COU	INTY OF WASHOE.
	* *	*
THE STATE OF NEVAD	Α,	
	Plaintiff,	Case No. CR14-1830
v.		Dept. No. D10
QUINZALE MASON,		**************************************
	Defendant.	
		/
3	VERDI	CT
We. the		entitled matter, find the
		COUNT III. BEING A FELON IN
POSSESSION OF A FI		
	nis 12th day of F	ehruaru 2015
DAIED	ils 701 day of it	ebruary, 2013.
		US Com
	FOREPE.	RSON
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27 28 IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE

STATE OF NEVADA,

QUINZALE MASON,

Plaintiff,

Case No. CR14-1830

VS.

Dept. No. 10

Defendant.

JUDGMENT

The Defendant, having been found guilty by a jury, and no sufficient cause being shown as to why judgment should not be pronounced against him, the Court rendered judgment as follows:

That Quinzale Mason is guilty of the crime of Battery With a Deadly Weapon, a violation of NRS 200.481 (2) (e), a felony, as charged in Count I of the Amended Information, and that he be punished by imprisonment in the Nevada Department of Corrections for the maximum term of one hundred twenty (120) months with the minimum parole eligibility of thirty-six (36) months, with credit for two hundred eighteen (218) days time served.

That Quinzale Mason is guilty of the crime of Assault With a Deadly Weapon, a violation of NRS 200.471, a felony, as charged in Count II of the Amended Information, and that he be punished by imprisonment in the Nevada Department of Corrections for the maximum term of sixty (60) months with the minimum parole eligibility of twenty-four (24) months, to be served consecutively to the sentence imposed for Count I, with credit for zero (0) days time served.

That Quinzale Mason is guilty of the crime of Being a Felon in Possession of a Firearm, a violation of NRS 202.360, a felony, as charged in Count III of the Amended Information, and that he be punished by imprisonment in the Nevada Department of Corrections for the maximum term of sixty (60) months with the minimum parole eligibility of twenty-four (24) months, to be served concurrently to the sentence imposed in Count II, with credit for zero (0) days time served.

It is further ordered that the Defendant shall pay the statutory Twenty-Five Dollar (\$25.00) administrative assessment fee; that he shall pay the Three Dollar (\$3.00) administrative assessment fee for obtaining a biological specimen and conducting a genetic marker analysis; and that he shall reimburse Washoe County in the amount of One Thousand Dollars (\$1,000.00) for legal services rendered.

It is further ordered that the fees are subject to removal from the Defendant's books at the Washoe County Jail and/or Nevada Department of Corrections.

Dated this _____ day of March, 2015. NUNC PRO TUNC to March 17, 2015.

DISTRICT HIDGE

- 132 Nev., Advance Opinion 42

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

QUINZALE MASON, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.

No. 67830

FILED

JUN 16 2016

Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, of battery with a deadly weapon, assault with a deadly weapon, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Elliott A. Sattler, Judge.

Affirmed and remanded with instruction.

Jeremy T. Bosler, Public Defender, and John Reese Petty, Chief Deputy Public Defender, Washoe County, for Appellant.

Adam Paul Laxalt, Attorney General, Carson City; Christopher J. Hicks, District Attorney, and Joseph R. Plater, Deputy District Attorney, Washoe County, for Respondent.

BEFORE HARDESTY, SAITTA and PICKERING, JJ.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

In this opinion, we address the mandatory duty of the district court judges under NRS 176.035(1) to pronounce the aggregate minimum

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

(O) 1947A (O)

16-M2827709

and maximum terms of imprisonment when imposing consecutive sentences for offenses committed on or after July 1, 2014.

Appellant Quinzale Mason fired several shots at another male outside an apartment building in August 2014; the bullets missed the male but a ricochet from one of the bullets hit and injured a girl nearby. Following a jury trial, Mason was convicted of battery with a deadly weapon as to the girl (count 1), assault with a deadly weapon as to the male (count 2), and being a felon in possession of a firearm (count 3). The district court imposed a prison term of 3 to 10 years for count 1, a consecutive prison term of 2 to 5 years for count 2, and a concurrent prison term of 2 to 5 years for count 3.

On appeal, Mason argues that the district court erred at sentencing by failing to pronounce the aggregate minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment as required by statute. NRS 176.035(1) provides in relevant part, "For offenses committed on or after July 1, 2014, if the court imposes the sentences to run consecutively, the court must pronounce the minimum and maximum aggregate terms of imprisonment." Here, the district court imposed consecutive sentences for

¹Mason's remaining contention—that the district court plainly erred in instructing the jury on the doctrine of transferred intent with respect to the battery count—lacks merit. The instruction did not relieve the State of its burden to prove that Mason willfully used force or violence upon the victim, the jury was properly instructed on the elements of battery and the definition of "willful," and sufficient evidence was adduced at trial to support the battery conviction. See NRS 200.481(1)(a). Accordingly, Mason fails to demonstrate plain error affecting his substantial rights. See Green v. State, 119 Nev. 542, 545, 80 P.3d 93, 95 (2003) (applying plain error analysis to unpreserved claims of instructional error).

offenses committed after July 1, 2014, but failed to state the minimum and maximum aggregate terms of imprisonment.

The district court's mandatory duty under NRS 176.035(1) to pronounce the aggregate terms of imprisonment in the judgment of conviction is of significant importance. The Legislature placed this statutory duty on district courts in an effort to simplify the sentence structure and, in turn, promote confidence in the criminal justice system and reduce confusion as to when an inmate is eligible for parole to the street. See Hearing on S.B. 71 Before the Assembly Judiciary Comm. 77th Leg. 5-6 (Nev., April 19, 2013). Whereas previously inmates had to be paroled from or expire a sentence before beginning to serve the next consecutive sentence, the effect of aggregating consecutive sentences is that inmates will now serve the minimum time for the total consecutive sentences before being eligible for a parole hearing. Id.Thus, the aggregation of consecutive sentences is a necessary step for the district court to take to apprise all parties, as well as the Department of Corrections and the public, as to when an inmate is actually eligible for parole. Accordingly, we conclude that it was error for the district court not to aggregate the sentences in the judgment of conviction but that error does not warrant a new sentencing hearing as it does not affect the sentences imposed for each offense.

Because Mason's arguments fail to demonstrate that his convictions or sentences are infirm, we affirm the judgment of conviction. However, we remand for the district court to correct the judgment of

(O) 1947A. CO

conviction to include the aggregate minimum and maximum terms of his consecutive sentences as required by NRS 176.035(1).²

Hardesty

Saitta

Pickering

²The corrected judgment of conviction should be entered nunc pro tunc to the original sentencing date of March 17, 2015.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

QUINZALE MASON, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. Supreme Court No. 67830 District Court Case No. CR141830

FILED

REMITTITUR

TO: Jacqueline Bryant, Washoe District Court Clerk

Pursuant to the rules of this court, enclosed are the following:

Certified copy of Judgment and Opinion/Order. Receipt for Remittitur.

DATE: July 11, 2016

Tracie Lindeman, Clerk of Court

By: July Wright Deputy Clerk

cc (without enclosures):

Hon. Elliott A. Sattler, District Judge Quinzale Mason Washoe County Public Defender Washoe County District Attorney Attorney General/Carson City

RECEIPT FOR REMITTITUR

Received of Tracie Lindeman, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, the REMITTITUR issued in the above-entitled cause, on

District Court Clerk

JUL 15 2016

TRACIE K. LINDEMAN
CLERK OF SUPREME COUPE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

QUINZALE MASON, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. **Supreme Court No. 67830** District Court Case No. CR141830

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

STATE OF NEVADA, ss.

I, Tracie Lindeman, the duly appointed and qualified Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, do hereby certify that the following is a full, true and correct copy of the Judgment in this matter.

JUDGMENT

The court being fully advised in the premises and the law, it is now ordered, adjudged and decreed, as follows:

"Affirmed and remanded with instructions."

Judgment, as quoted above, entered this 16th day of June, 2016.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have subscribed my name and affixed the seal of the Supreme Court at my Office in Carson City, Nevada this July 11, 2016.

Tracie Lindeman, Supreme Court Clerk

By: July Wright Deputy Clerk CR14-1830 DC-09900084039-231 STATE VS. QUINZALE MASON (D 19 Pages District Court 03/02/2017 09:31 AM Washoe County PROPERTY

Case No. <u>CR/4-/83</u>)
Dept. No. <u>/O</u>

2017 AM 9: 51

JACOUET ME BRYANT CLERKOF TOLL COURT BY

IN THE Second JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN AND FOR Washoe County

-000-

Quinzale Mason

Petitioner,

vs.

I. Baca, Warden

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (POST CONVICTION)

Evidentiary Heaving

INSTRUCTIONS:

- (1) This petition must be legibly handwritten or typewritten, signed by the petitioner and verified.
- (2) Additional pages are not permitted except where noted or with respect to the facts which you rely upon to support your grounds for relief. No citation of authorities need be furnished. If briefs or arguments are submitted, they should be submitted in the form of a separate memorandum.
- (3) If you want an attorney appointed, you must complete the Affidavit in Support of Request to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. You must have an authorized officer at the prison complete the certificate as to the amount of money and securities on deposit to your credit in any account in the institution.
- (4) You must name as respondent the person by whom you are confined or restrained. If you are in a specific institution of the department of prisons, name the warden or head of the institution. If you are not in a specific institution of the department but within its custody, name the director of the department of prisons.
- (5) You must include all grounds or claims for relief which you may have regarding your conviction or sentence. Failure to raise all grounds in this petition may preclude you from filing future petitions challenging your conviction and sentence.

- (6) You must allege specific facts supporting the claims in the petition you file seeking relief from any conviction or sentence. Failure to allege specific facts rather than just conclusions may cause your petition to be dismissed. If your petition contains a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, that claim will operate to waive the attorney-client privilege for the proceeding in which you claim your counsel was ineffective.
- (7) When the petition is fully completed, the original and one copy must be filed with the clerk of the state district court for the county in which you were convicted. One copy must be mailed to the respondent, one copy to the attorney general's office, and one copy to the district attorney of the county in which you were convicted or to the original prosecutor if you are challenging your original conviction or sentence. Copies must conform in all particulars to the original submitted for filing.

of the original submitted for filing.
PETITION
1. Name of institution and county in which you are
presently imprisoned or where and how you are presently
restrained of your liberty: Northern Nevada Correctional
Center - Carson City
2. Name and location of court which entered the judgment
of conviction under attack: Second Judicial District Court
Reno, Nes, - Washoe County
3. Date of judgment of conviction: 7-12-14-Amended
4. Case number: <u>CR14-1830</u>
5. (a) Length of sentence: Aggregate term of 180 Month
and minimum aggregate term 60 months
(b) If sentence is death, state any date upon which
execution is scheduled: NIA
6. Are you presently serving a sentence for a conviction
other than the conviction under attack in this motion?
Yes No
If "yes" list crime, case number and sentence being served at

this time:	KITA
8	9
7. Nature of offense involve challenged: Battery With a Deadly	Weapon, Assault With a
Deadly Weapon and Being a Felon in	Possession of a Firearm
8. What was your plea? (chec	
(a) Not Guilty	
(b) Guilty	
(c) Guilty but mentally ill _	
(d) Nolo Contendere	
9. If you entered a plea of o	guilty or guilty but mentally
ill to one count of an indictment or	
not guilty to another count of an in	dictment or information, or
if a plea of guilty or guilty but me	
give details:	NH
10. If you were found guilty a	fter a plea of not guilty,
was the finding made by: (check one)
(a) Jury (b) Judge wit	nout a jury
11. Did you testify at the tri	al? Yes No 🗸
12. Did you appeal from the jud	dgment of conviction?
Yes No	
13. If you did appeal, answer t	he following:
(a) Name of court: Nevada Sup	reme Court
(b) Case number or citation: 1	
(c) Result: Affirmed and rem	anded with instruction
(d) Date of result: June 16, 2	

14. If you did not appeal, explain briefly why you d	lid not
15. Other than a direct appeal from the judgment of	
conviction and sentence, have you previously filed any pet	itions
applications or motions with respect to this judgment in a	
court, state or federal? Yes No _/	
16. If your answer to No. 15 was "yes", give the follower	owing
information:	
(a) (1) Name of court:	
(2) Nature of proceedings:	/
	/
(3) Grounds raised:	
(4) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on yo	ur
petition, application or motion? Yes No	
(5) Result:	
(6) Date of result:	
(7) If known, citations of any written opinion of	- date
of orders entered pursuant to such result:	
(b) As to any second petition, application or motion,	give
he same information:	
(1) Name of court:	
(2) Nature of proceedings:	-

	(3) Grounds raised:		
-	(4) Did you receive ar	n evidentiary hearing on your	7
	application or motion?	/	
	(5) Result.		
((6) Date of result:		
(7) If known, citation	s of any written opinion or d	at
	entered pursuant to suc		-3/0
			_
		equent additional application	
		tion as above, list them on a	
separate sh	eet and attach.		
(d) D.	id you appeal to the h	ighest state or federal court	
		/ r action taken on any petition	
application			- /
(1	1) First petition, app	olication or motion?	
	Yes No	TISCOLON OF MOCION:	
/2	Citation or date of Second petition, ap		
12		plication or motion?	
	Yes No		
	Citation or date of		
(3) Third or subsequent	petitions, applications or	
motions?	Yes No		
	Citation or date of	decision:	
(e) If	you did not appeal from	om the adverse action on any	
petition, app	plication or motion, ex	kplain briefly why you did not	8.
You must rel	late specific facts in	response to this question.	•
		aper which is 8 1/2 by 11	
nenes attacn	led to the petition. Y	our response may not exceed	
	5		

five handwritten or typewritten pages in length.)
17. Has any ground being raised in this petition been
previously presented to this or any other court by way of
petition for habeas corpus, motion, application or any other
post-conviction proceeding? If so, identify:
(a) Which of the grounds is the same: <u>Ground One</u>
(b) The proceedings in which these grounds were raised:
Fast Track Statement-No. 67830
(c) Briefly explain why you are again raising these
grounds. (You must relate specific facts in response to this
question. Your response may be included on paper which is $8\ 1/2$
by 11 inches attached to the petition. Your response may not
exceed five handwritten or typewritten pages in length.)
Because there was insufficient evidence of the specific intent to
harm an intended victim, or to harm an unintended victim and frial (Contiet) 18. If any of the grounds listed in Nos. 23(a), (b), (c)
and (d), or listed on any additional pages you have attached,
were not previously presented in any other court, state or
federal, list briefly what grounds were not so presented, and
give your reasons for not presenting them. (You must relate
specific facts in response to this question. Your response may
be included on paper which is 8 1/2 by 11 inches attached to the
petition. Your response may not exceed five handwritten or
typewritten pages in length.) Ground two, three, Appellant

Coursel failed to consider rising these grounds on direct appea

1	Continue Paragraph 17(c)
2	
3	Information and Jury Instructions Nos. 29, 33, 34, 35 and
4	36.
5	
6	Continue Paragraph 18
7	however ineffective trial coursel is best raised in Peti-
8	tion For Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post Conviction).
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28	Page 6

19. Are you filing this petition more than 1 year following
the filing of the judgment of conviction or the filing of a
decision on direct appeal? If so, state briefly the reasons for
the delay. (You must relate specific facts in response to this
question. Your response may be included on paper which is 8 1/2
by 11 inches attached to the petition. Your response may not
exceed five handwritten or typewritten pages in length.)
No. This petition is being filed prior to one (1) year dead-
20. Do you have any petition or appeal now pending in any
court, either state or federal, as to the judgment under attack?
Yes V No
If yes, state what court and the case number:
21. Give the name of each attorney who represented you in the proceeding resulting in your conviction and on direct appeal: Carl F. Hylin, Esq., and John Reese Petty on Appeal.
22. Do you have any future sentences to serve after you complete the sentence imposed by the judgment under attack? Yes No
If yes, specify where and when it is to be served, if you know:
23. State concisely every ground on which you claim that
you are being held unlawfully. Summarize briefly the facts
supporting each ground. If necessary you may attach pages
stating additional grounds and facts supporting same.

(a) Ground one:

Petitioner's trial judge erred in instructing the jury on No. 29, "transferred intent" in relation to battery with a deadly weapon and, on Nos. 33,34,35 and 34 violating his 14th Amendment rights and Art. 1, X8 of the Nevada Constitution.

Supporting Facts:

ebruary, 2015, a trial in the matter of The osing statement

Supporting Facts: en, it says after impaner of the jury but before opening statement, and so we fly on point than judge committed prejudicial error law, battery with a deadly weapon and assault with a dead sterred intent is not appliable to deadly weapon or assault with a deadly weapon. Here (confinue 8B)

The sentence and judgment against Petitioner are void or voidable, because of prosecutorial misconduction filing Count III of the Amended Information in violation of the 5th, 4th, and 14th Amend-ments under the U.S. Constitution.

Supporting Facts:

14) Petitioner incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in Ground one inparagraphs I through 13, inclusive.

1	Supporting Facts:
2	dire, on February 9,2015 (see IJA1-4) (Amended Infor-
3	mation): 19) Under Nevada law arraignment shall be con-
4	ducted in open court and shall consist of reading the
5	indictment or information to the defendant or stating
6	the substance of the charge and calling on the defendant
7	to plead there to; NRS 174,015(1); 20) The State impermissibly
8	charged Mason with one type of conduct, i.e., Count 1, "a handgun,
9	by shooting Cecilia M. in her right leg. (IJA at 2, lines 2-3
10	Amended Information), but gained its conviction by separate
11	and different conduct; the State made no mention of the Doctrine
12	of Transferred Intent during its Opening Statement Granscript
13	p.p. 107-117); 21) The Nevada Supreme Court answered this is-
14	sue in a footnote. See Mason v. State, 132 Nev. advance opinion
15	42 n. 1 (2016) and Count 1 paragraphs 5-11, above
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Supporting Facts:

Petitioner incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in

	(b) Ground four:	
	Supporting Facts:	
		*
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-		
-		
NA		
7//		
	11	

1	Const Since
2	Ground five:
	NIA
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5	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
6	Supporting facts:
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23	N/A.
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WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that the court grant petitioner relief to which he may be entitled in this proceeding.

Day of February, 20/7.

Quinzale Mason

VERIFICATION

Under penalty of perjury, the undersigned declares that he is the petitioner named in the foregoing petition and knows the contents thereof; that the pleading is true of his own knowledge, except as to those matters stated on information and belief, and as to such matters he believes them to be true.

Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL

I do certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS to the below addresses on this 21th day of

February, 20 /2, by placing same into the hands of prison law library staff for posting in the U.S. Mail, pursuant to N.R.C.P. 5:

Clerk of the Court Second Judicial District Court 75 Court Street Reno, NV 89501

Washoe County Dist. Attorney Christoper J. Wicks, Dist. Atty. P.D. Box 11130 Reno, Net 89520

Signature of Petitioner In Pro Se

111

AFFIRMATION Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

Politica Fe
The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding Petition Fo
Writ Of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) (Title of Document)
filed in District Court Case number <u>CR14-1830</u>
Does not contain the social security number of any person.
-OR-
☐ Contains the social security number of a person as required by:
A. A specific state or federal law, to wit:
(State specific law)
-or-
B. For the administration of a public program or for an application for a federal or state grant.
Signature 2-17-17 Date
Print Name
Title

Electronically CR14-1830 2017-03-21 12:43:11 PM Jacqueline Bryant Clerk of the Court Transaction # 6009788

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THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE

QUINZALE MASON,

Petitioner,

Case No.: CR14-1830

V\$.

STATE OF NEVADA,

Dept No.:

10

Respondent.

RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL (POST CONVICTION)

The Petitioner having been granted Forma Pauperis Status, and District Court Judge Sattler having determined that there is a basis for the appointment of counsel and having referred the matter to the Administrator of the Court Appointed Counsel for selection of counsel for the Petitioner, the Administrator of the Court Appointed Counsel makes the following recommendation:

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Lyn E. Beggs, Esq., be appointed to represent Petitioner on this Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus. Said Counsel is to be paid pursuant to NRS 7.115 through NRS 7.165 by the State Public Defender in an amount recommended by the Administrator and approved by the Court.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's counsel have ten (10) days from the date of the Court's Order to designate what portions of the Court file counsel requests be provided to her by the Clerk of the Court;

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, if the newly appointed attorney

is not an electronic filer with the Second Judicial District Court, the Clerk of the Court shall provide a CD of all designations made by Petitioner's counsel within five (5) days of the designation. If the newly appointed attorney is an electronic filer with the Second Judicial District Court, the newly appointed attorney shall be placed as the attorney of record in case number CR14-1830.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Counsel have forty-five (45) days from the date of the receipt of the record within which to supplement the Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus or file a Notice indicating that the original Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus shall stand as filed;

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the State of Nevada be ordered to respond within forty-five (45) days from the date of filing and service by the Petitioner of the Petition to Supplement or Notice Of Nonsupplementation;

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Counsel for Petitioner and the State of Nevada be ordered to appear within fifteen (15) days of the final briefing before the Administrative Assistant in Department 10, of the Second Judicial District Court for the purpose of setting this case for hearing.

DATED this 14 day of _____, 2017.

ROBERT CASELL, ESQ., ADMINISTRATOR COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL

Pursuant to the Nevada Supreme Court Order in ADKT 411, and the Second Judicial District Court's Model Plan to address ADKT 411, good cause appearing and in the interest of justice,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the recommendations of the Administrator are hereby confirmed, approved and adopted. Lyn E. Beggs, Esq., shall be appointed to represent Petitioner on his Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus.

DATED this **21** day of **MARCH**, 2017.



FILED
Electronically
CR14-1830
2017-12-08 04:57:05 PM
Jacqueline Bryant
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 6431734 : swilliam

1 | CODE: 4100 Lyn E. Beggs 2 | Bar no. 6248 316 California Ave. #863 Reno, NV 89509 (775)432-1918 Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE

QUINZALE MASON

Petitioner,

Department No.: 10

vs.

STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent.

SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Comes now Petitioner, QUINZALE MASON ("Petitioner"), by and through his counsel of record and files his Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) pursuant to NRS 34.750. Petitioner incorporates his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction), filed March 2, 2017, by reference as though fully set forth herein.

GROUNDS FOR RELIEF

Petitioner was deprived of his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to effective assistance of counsel and due process of law under the United States Constitution as more fully described in the grounds below.

Procedural History

Petitioner was arrested on August 10, 2014 and charged via a Criminal Complaint filed August 13, 2014 with two counts Battery with a Deadly Weapon and one count Assault with a Deadly Weapon. An Amended Complaint was filed on October 20, 2014 adding one count of Being a Felon in Possession of a Firearm. A preliminary hearing was held on November 20, 2014 after which Petitioner was bound over to the District Court on all four counts.

An Information was filed in the District Court on November 24, 2014 containing the same counts as included in the Amended Complaint. Petitioner was arraigned on December 9, 2014 at which time he pleaded not guilty to the four counts contained in the Information and invoked his right to proceed to trial within sixty (60) days. A Motion to Bifurcate was filed by the State on January 20, 2015 to bifurcate the charge of Being a Felon in Possession of a Firearm to which defense counsel filed a non-opposition.

An Amended Information was filed on February 4, 2015 omitting one count of Battery with a Deadly Weapon. The Amended Information charged Petitioner with: Count I, Battery with a Deadly Weapon, a violation of NRS 200.481(2)(e); Count II, Assault with a Deadly Weapon, a violation of NRS 200.471; and Count III, Being a Felon in Possession of a Firearm, a violation of 202.360. A jury trial commenced on February 9, 2015 on Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint. After receiving a verdict of guilty on Counts I and II of the Amended Information, Count III was presented to the jury for consideration after Petitioner stipulated that he had a prior conviction and a verdict of guilty on Count III was issued by the jury.

A Judgment of Conviction was entered on March 17, 2015. Petitioner was sentenced to one hundred twenty (120) months in the Nevada Department of Corrections ("NDOC") with parole eligibility after thirty six (36) months with two hundred eighteen (218) days credit for time served

on Count I; on Count II, sixty (60) months in the NDOC with parole eligibility after twenty four (24) months to run consecutively with Count I; and on Count III, sixty (60) months in the NDOC with parole eligibility after twenty four (24) months to run concurrently with Count II.

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on April 15, 2015 and raised two issues on direct appeal; first, that the District Court erred in instructing the jury on transferred intent and second, that the District Court abused its discretion by not aggregating the consecutive counts as required by NRS 176.035(1). The Nevada Supreme Court issued its opinion on June 16, 2016 remanding the matter to the District Court for aggregation of the consecutive sentences. The Supreme Court addressed Petitioner's second ground regarding the jury instruction only in a footnote, noting that plain error analysis was appropriate as the issue had not been preserved and finding that Petitioner failed to show plain error affecting his substantial rights were affected by providing the jury instruction. Remittitur was issued on July 11, 2016 and filed in the District Court on July 14, 2016.

Petitioner timely filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (post-conviction) on March 2, 2017, contemporaneously with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. This Court granted Petitioner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and appointed counsel. The undersigned was appointed on March 21, 2017 and now files this Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (post-conviction) in accordance with NRS 39.750(3).

Statement of Facts

Petitioner was arrested on suspicion of battery with a deadly weapon and assault with a deadly weapon on August 10, 2014. On the morning of August 9, 2014, Petitioner and neighbor, Anthony Holly, along with others played a game of dice outside the apartment buildings where Petitioner and Mr. Holly resided. An argument allegedly arose during the game between Mr. Holly and Petitioner but the matter was dropped. Later that same morning, Mr. Holly was outside his

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apartment building as was his neighbor, Delphine Martin, and Ms. Martin's daughter, Cecelia. Mr. Holly was walking Ms. Martin's dog when a four door sedan drove into the parking area of the apartment buildings and parked. Allegedly the driver of the vehicle exited the vehicle and shot towards Mr. Holly who identified the individual as Petitioner. According to witnesses at the scene, two to three shots were heard but no one directly saw the driver fire a gun. Mr. Holly ran around the apartment building and did not incur any injuries. However, Cecelia, Ms. Martin's daughter suffered an injury to her leg and was found after medical examination to have a metal fragment in her leg that was assumed, but not definitively determined to be, a ricocheted bullet or fragment thereof

Law enforcement responded to the scene and based on statements made by Mr. Holly, Ms. Martin and another neighbor, identified Petitioner as the individual in the vehicle. Law enforcement commenced an investigation which resulted in a felony stop being made of a vehicle in which Petitioner was a passenger along with his girlfriend, her mother and Petitioner's mother. Petitioner was taken into custody. He was later charged as noted above.

Petitioner was represented by appointed counsel, Carl Hylin, during all trial court proceedings. After a multi-day, bifurcated jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty on the three counts contained in the Amended Complaint and was sentenced as discussed above.

GROUND ONE

Petitioner was denied his right to due process and the effective assistance of counsel under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution when his trial counsel failed to object to jury instruction #29 regarding transferred intent.

At the time of trial the State offered a jury instruction ultimately provided to the jury as jury instruction #29 regarding transferred intent. The instruction stated:

If an illegal and unintended act results from the intent to commit a crime, that act is also considered illegal. The doctrine of transferred intent is a theory of imputed liability. The intent to use force or violence against a certain person is transferred

or imputed to a different person where the different person is hit; this is so even where the different person is hit by mistake or inadvertence. The doctrine applies in any case where there is intent to commit a criminal act and the only difference between the actual result and the contemplated result is the nature of the personal injuries sustained.

The doctrine of transferred intent is applicable to all crimes where an unintended victim is harmed as a result of the intent to harm an intended victim, whether or not the intended victim is injured.

As discussed above, on direct appeal Petitioner argued that the District Court had erred in giving the transferred intent instruction. The Nevada Supreme Court in a footnote found the claim to be without merit stating that Petitioner "fails to demonstrate plain error affecting his substantial rights" citing to <u>Green v. State</u>, 119 Nev. 542, 545, 80 P.3d 93, 95 (2003), for the premise that an unpreserved objection to a jury instruction is review for plain error.

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are considered pursuant to the test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). Pursuant to Strickland, a petitioner must demonstrate that his or her counsel's performance was deficient, falling below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id.; see also Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1011-1012, 103 P.3d 25, 32 (2004). To establish prejudice based upon counsel's deficient performance, a petitioner must show that, but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. Id.. When a petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, he or she must establish the factual allegations that form the basis for his or her claim of ineffective assistance by a preponderance of the evidence. Id..

While the issue of the transferred intent instruction was well briefed on direct appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court was required to review the ground under a plain error evaluation due to the failure of trial counsel to object to the jury instruction. However, had trial counsel objected to the instruction and preserved the issue for appeal, the Supreme Court would have reviewed the District

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Court's decision for an abuse of discretion or judicial error. <u>Crawford v. State</u>, 121 Nev. 744, 121 P.3d 582 (2005). Petitioner contends that had trial counsel objected he could have placed on the record argument that the doctrine of transferred intent was not appropriate for the jury to be instructed in this matter and that the evidence presented at trial by the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner, the alleged assailant of Mr. Holly, had intent to commit battery on Mr. Holly, intent that the State argued was transferred when Cecelia was hit allegedly by ricochet from a bullet. This argument in turn could have been considered by the Supreme Court to determine whether there was judicial error in allowing the instruction to be presented to the jury.

Petitioner contends that his trial counsel's performance was deficient when he failed to object to jury instruction #29 and that counsel's error prejudiced Petitioner as the Nevada Supreme Court was required to review the claim under a plain error standard and accordingly has made the appropriate showing under *Strickland* to show that his counsel's performance was ineffective.

GROUND TWO

Petitioner was denied his right to due process and the effective assistance of counsel under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution when his trial counsel failed to properly investigate Petitioner's potential alibi witness.

Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges and invoked his right to proceed to trial within sixty days. Prior to trial, Mr. Hylin filed a Notice of Alibi Witness on January 16, 2015, providing minimal information to the District Court regarding a potential alibi witness, Cisco aka "Sko", however due to the minimal information, the State filed a Motion to Exclude Alibi Witness on February 5, 2015 for failure to provide adequate notice of the alibi witness under NRS 174.233. At the time of a Status Hearing held on February 6, 2015 the District Court granted the State's motion based on the failure of the defense to provide adequate notice information about the potential alibi witness.

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"Defense counsel has a duty 'to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.' State v. Love, 109 Nev. 1136, 1138, 865 P.2d 322, 323 (1993) citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066 (1984). Here, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel failed to make reasonable investigations into Petitioner's potential alibi witness. While Petitioner acknowledges that he was not able to provide his trial counsel with detailed information regarding Cisco's identity initially, he contends that he provided his counsel with enough detail about where he and Cisco were at the date and time at issue that would have allowed trial counsel, with the assistance of an investigator, to locate Cisco. Petitioner contends that his trial counsel's performance was deficient when he failed to further investigate his alibi witness. This prejudiced Petitioner by the resulting granting of the State's motion to exclude an alibi witness because of the failure to obtain further information regarding that witness. Petitioner was further prejudiced as the jury was not presented with the testimony of the potential alibi witness. Should the Court grant an evidentiary hearing on this issue, Petitioner will testify regarding the information he provided to his defense counsel to locate Cisco. Further, Petitioner will make every effort to locate Cisco's current whereabouts and present his testimony to the Court.

Accordingly, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to properly investigate Petitioner's alibi witness.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED

Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully submits that his due process rights and right to effective assistance of counsel under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution were violated as discussed above. A petitioner "is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only if he supports his claims with specific factual allegations that if true would entitled him to relief. The petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing if the factual allegations are belied

or repelled by the record." Thomas v. State 120 Nev. 37, 44, 83 P.3d 818, 823 (2004)(citing Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 686 P.2d 222 (1984)). Petitioner contends that he has supported his claims with factual allegations that are not belied by the record and accordingly requests relief in an evidentiary hearing to address the allegations herein and will request this honorable court to overturn his conviction subsequent to such an evidentiary hearing.

Lyn E. Beggs, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 6248 Attorney for Petitioner

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2 3 4 5 6	CASE NUMBER: CR14-1830 I certify that on the 8 th day of December, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court system which will send a notice of electronic filing to the following: Joseph R. Plater, III, Deputy District Attorney Washoe County District Attorney's Office
7 8 9	P.O. Box 11130 Reno, NV 89520
10 11 12	Lyn E. Beggs Lyn E. Beggs Nevada Bar No. 6248
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VERIFICATION

Pursuant to NRS 34.370(1)

The undersigned does herby verify that the contents of this Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are true and correct to the best of her knowledge and that the undersigned has been appointed by the District Court to represent Petitioner in this matter and that Petitioner has authorized counsel to file this Supplemental Petition on his behalf.

DATED this 8th day of December, 2017.

Lyn E. Beggs

Lyn E. Beggs Bar No. 6248 316 California Ave. #863 Reno, NV 89509 (775)432-1918 Attorney for Petitioner

AFFIRMATION

Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

The undersigned affirms that this Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post Conviction) and Exhibits does not contains the social security number of any person.

DATED this 8th day of December, 2017.

Lyn E. Beggs
Lyn E. Beggs

Lyn E. Beggs Bar No. 6248 316 California Ave. #863 Reno, NV 89509 (775)432-1918 Attorney for Petitioner

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Jacqueline Bryant
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 6475240 : csulezic

1 CODE No. 2300 CHRISTOPHER J. HICKS #7747 P. O. Box 11130 Reno, Nevada 89520-0027 (775) 328-3200 Attorney for Respondent

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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE

* * *

QUINZALE MASON,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. CR14-1830

I. BACA, WARDEN, Dept. No. 10

Respondent.

MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION AND SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (POST-CONVICTION)

A jury convicted petitioner of battery with a deadly weapon, assault with a deadly weapon, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction on June 16, 2016. On March 2, 2017, petitioner filed a timely post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Appointed counsel filed a supplemental petition on December 8, 2017. The State moves the Court to dismiss the petition and the supplemental petition.

Supplemental Petition

In the first claim of the supplemental petition, petitioner alleges his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Jury Instruction Number 29 regarding transferred intent. Petitioner's trial counsel did not object to the instruction at trial, but petitioner's

appellate counsel argued on appeal that this court erred in giving the instruction. *Mason v. State,* 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 42 (June 16, 2016). Specifically, petitioner's appellate counsel argued the instruction relieved the State of its burden of proving that petitioner willfully used force or violence upon the victim. *Id.* at n.1. The Supreme Court found petitioner's argument "lack[ed] merit," that the instruction did not relieve the State of its burden of proof, and "sufficient evidence was adduced at trial to support the battery conviction." *Id.*

The Nevada Supreme Court's holding—that petitioner's argument regarding Jury Instruction Number 29 "lacks merit" —is the law of the case. See Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 315, 535 P.2d 797, 798 (1975) (" 'The law of a first appeal is the law of the case on all subsequent appeals in which the facts are substantially the same.' ") (quoting Walker v. State, 85 Nev. 337, 343, 455 P.2d 34, 38 (1969)). Thus, the issue about the propriety of Jury Instruction Number 29 may not be litigated again. Id. To the extent petitioner advances a different argument about Jury Instruction Number 29, the law of the case doctrine bars that argument as well. Id. at 316, 535 P.2d at 799 ("The doctrine of the law of the case cannot be avoided by a more detailed and precisely focused argument subsequently made after reflection upon the previous proceedings.").

Petitioner also fails to identify what was wrong with Jury Instruction Number 29. He only contends that had "trial counsel objected he could have placed on the record argument that the doctrine of transferred intent was not appropriate for the jury to be instructed in this matter " (Supplemental Petition, 6). Because petitioner does not specify how the jury instruction was improper, he necessarily fails to show his counsel was deficient or that he suffered prejudice. *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense);

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Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 987, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107(1996). Petitioner is therefore not entitled to a hearing on this claim. *Nika v. State*, 124 Nev. 1272, 1300-01, 198 P.3d 839, 858 (2008) ("an evidentiary hearing is mandated only when a post-conviction petitioner asserts specific factual allegations that are not belied or repelled by the record and that, if true, would entitle him to relief.").

The only thing petitioner adds is that his counsel could have argued there was insufficient evidence that petitioner intended to batter Mr. Holly. But whether there was evidence beyond a reasonable doubt is not the standard for determining whether to give a jury instruction. *Weber v. State*, 121 Nev. 554, 581, 119 P.3d 107, 126 (2005) (A jury may properly receive an instruction regarding defendant's flight so long as it is supported by the evidence).

And this issue is precluded by the law of the case because the Nevada Supreme Court found that "sufficient evidence was adduced at trial to support the battery conviction." *Mason, supra*, n.1

In the second claim of the supplemental petition, petitioner asserts his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate petitioner's alibi witness. The Court should dismiss this claim because petitioner concedes he does not know where the alibi witness is or what he will testify to. Because petitioner fails to present facts that, if true, would warrant relief, the claim does not warrant a hearing.

Original Petition

First Claim

The first claim of the original petition asserts that this Court erred in instructing the jury in Jury Instruction Number 29 about transferred intent. This claim, as noted above, is barred by the law of the case, as the Nevada Supreme Court found that this Court gave the correct instruction.

As part of the first claim, petitioner also asserts this Court erred by permitting the State to introduce evidence of petitioner's prior conviction during *voir dire*. The State did not introduce petitioner's prior conviction during *voir dire* because evidence is not admitted at that time. Evidence is admitted during trial.

The claim is also barred because it could have been raised on direct appeal. *See* NRS 34.810(1)(b).

The record also shows that petitioner was not prejudiced, even if his prior conviction were referenced during *voir dire*. The transcript of *voir dire* was not transcribed; thus, it is not possible at this time to determine what the Court told the jury during *voir dire*. But the charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm was not submitted to the jury in the jury instructions or as a charge that the jury considered during the first trial. On February 11, 2014, the jury convicted petitioner of battery with a deadly weapon and assault with a deadly weapon. The jury then considered the separate charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm charge, and convicted petitioner the next day, February 12, 2014.

There is no evidence that the jury used the felon in possession of a firearm charge to convict petitioner of the other charges. Even if the Court had inadvertently referred to the felon in possession charge during *voir dire*, the jury was instructed to only consider evidence that had been admitted during trial in resolving the assault and battery charges against petitioner (Jury Instruction Numbers 5, 8, 22, 30). The jury is presumed to follow its instructions. *Summers v. State*, 122 Nev. 1326, 148 P.3d 778 (2006).

There was also overwhelming evidence of petitioner's guilt, as described below. Thus, to the extent the jury heard about the felon in possession of a firearm charge ///

during the first trial, the error was harmless. *See Williams v. State*, 121 Nev. 934, 948, 125 P.3d 627, 636 (2005) (Supreme Court will not overturn the judgment where an improperly admitted prior conviction was harmless error).

Second Claim

In the second claim petitioner asserts that the prosecutor never gave an official oath of office, and petitioner was never arraigned on the amended information. Even if these assertions are true, petitioner can show no prejudice.

Finally, petitioner again takes issue with transferred intent doctrine. The claim lacks merit, as the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the use of the doctrine on direct appeal.

Third Claim

Petitioner asserts his counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) argue at the end of trial that insufficient evidence supported the charges; (2) inform petitioner that the evidence did not meet the probable cause standard; (3) suppress petitioner's prior conviction for voluntary manslaughter with the use of a deadly weapon; and (4) subject the State's case to meaningful adversary testing.

The record repels the claims regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. At trial, the State proved that Anthony Holly (Holly) lived in the same apartment complex as Mason. Trial Transcript, February 9, 2015, p.90. On August, 9, 2014, Holly joined in on a game of craps with about "five or six" people, including Mason. *Id.* at 91-95. Holly got into a fight with Mason over the game. *Id.* at 51, 95-96. The fight did not get physical, and Holly left the area to continue on with his day. *Id.* at 96-97. A couple hours later, Holly was outside "playing with the neighbor's dog at the edge of the parking lot" when Mason pulled up in a car. *Id.* at 98. Mason said something like, "I got you now," or "I got yo ass," and Holly took off running. *Id.* at 98-99. Mason shot at Holly several

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times. *Id.* at 99-100, 101. There were several people in the area, including "two kids and their two dogs." *Id.* at 104.

Huey Paul Stanley, Jr. (Stanley) lived near Holly and Mason. *Id.* at 30-31; 37-39. Stanley was sitting outside with his wife watching Holly play with the neighbor's dog when he saw Mason park his car. *Id.* at 40-42. Stanley heard Mason say "'Ah-hah, I got you now'"; seconds later he heard gunshots—"pow, pow, pow'"—coming from Mason's direction. *Id.* at 45-45, 52. Stanley saw Holly "ducking, going back and forth trying to figure out which way to get out." *Id.* at 45-46. Stanley then heard his neighbor, Delphine Martin, "screaming that her baby got shot." *Id.* at 48.

Reno Police Officer Benjamin Lancaster arrived first on scene where he found a little girl, Cecilia M., who had been shot. *Id.* at 71-72, 74, 75. He could see "what looked like a gunshot wound to . . . her lower [] calf area of her right leg." *Id.* He wrapped the leg with gauze and applied pressure until medical personnel arrived. *Id.* He also found two 9 millimeter casings on scene. *Id.* at 83-84, 87; Trial Transcript, February 10, 2015, p.251.

At the hospital, Dr. Cinelli found that the "[d]istortion of the metal fragment[] [in Cecilia's leg was] typical with a ricochet." Trial Transcript, February 10, 2015, pp. 31, 34.

When police later arrested Mason, he stated he was on his way "to the station to turn [him]self in." *Id.*, 330, 339.

The evidence, therefore, shows that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdicts. The record repels petitioner's argument that his counsel failed to argue the evidence was insufficient to convict him (Trial Transcript, February 11, 2015, p. 52) (defense counsel arguing that "inconsistencies in the facts themselves . . . create reasonable doubt in this case."). Petitioner's counsel argued a number of

inconsistencies in the State's case, such as the witnesses' differing accounts regarding the color of Mr. Stanley's car. *Id.* at 53-54.

Petitioner's claims about his counsel's failure to suppress petitioner's prior conviction and to subject the State's case to meaningful adversary testing are wholly conclusory and do not warrant a hearing. That is, petitioner fails to allege specific facts about what his counsel should have done that would have changed the outcome of the trial.

Petitioner also alleges this Court issued four jury instructions, after the jury convicted him on the first two counts, that permitted the jury to convict him of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. It is not clear whether petitioner alleges this as a claim for relief. If it is meant to be a claim for relief, it fails to state a claim that warrants a hearing because it does not assert specific facts that, if true, would require the Court to grant petitioner relief. *See Nika v. State*, 124 Nev. 1272, 1300-01, 198 P.3d 839, 858 (2008) ("an evidentiary hearing is mandated only when a post-conviction petitioner asserts specific factual allegations that are not belied or repelled by the record and that, if true, would entitle him to relief.").

The Court should dismiss the petitions.

AFFIRMATION PURSUANT TO NRS 239B.030

The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain the social security number of any person.

DATED: January 10, 2018.

CHRISTOPHER J. HICKS District Attorney

By <u>/s/ JOSEPH R. PLATER</u> JOSEPH R. PLATER Appellate Deputy

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that this document was filed electronically with the Second Judicial District Court on January 10, 2018. Electronic Service of the foregoing document shall be made in accordance with the Master Service List as follows:

Lyn E. Beggs, Esq.

/s/ DESTINEE ALLEN DESTINEE ALLEN

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Jacqueline Bryant
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 6496734 : vviloria

1 | CODE: 2645 Lyn E. Beggs 2 | Bar no. 6248 316 California Ave. #863 Reno, NV 89509 (775)432-1918 Attorney for Petitioner

OUINZALE MASON

Petitioner,

STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent.

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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVAD.	A
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE	

Case No.: CR14-1830

Department No.: 10

OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION AND SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (POST-CONVICTION)
GROUNDS FOR RELIEF

Comes now Petitioner, QUINZALE MASON ("Petitioner"), by and through his counsel of record and files his Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Petition and Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) pursuant to NRS 34.750(4).

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Statement of Facts/Procedural History

Petitioner was convicted on March 17, 2015 of Battery with a Deadly Weapon, a violation of NRS 200.481(2)(e), Assault with a Deadly Weapon, a violation of NRS 200.471, and Being a Felon in Possession of a Firearm, a violation of 202.360 after a jury trial.

Petitioner filed a direct appeal subsequent to his conviction raising two issues. While one

issue resulted in a remand to the District Court regarding the aggregation of the consecutive sentences Petitioner had received, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction and Remittitur was issued on July 11, 2016 and filed in the District Court on July 14, 2016.

Petitioner then filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (post-conviction) on March 2, 2017 containing three primary grounds for relief with Ground Three containing four subparts. Pursuant to NRS 39.750(3), a Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (post-conviction) was filed on December 8, 2017 raising two grounds for relief. The State filed its Motion to Dismiss on January 10, 2018. Petitioner now files this Opposition to the State's Motion.

Argument

Supplemental Petition

Ground One: As to Ground One of the Supplemental Petition, the State argues that this ground is barred by the "law of the case" doctrine in that the Nevada Supreme Court addressed the ground in its Order affirming Petitioner's conviction.

Petitioner agrees with the State that his appellate counsel raised the issue on direct appeal, however it was raised in the context of error by the trial court to give the instruction. As noted in the Supplemental Petition, the Nevada Supreme Court found the claim to be without merit stating that Petitioner "fails to demonstrate plain error affecting his substantial rights" citing to <u>Green v. State</u>, 119 Nev. 542, 545, 80 P.3d 93, 95 (2003), for the premise that an unpreserved objection to a jury instruction is review for plain error.

In his Supplemental Petition, Petitioner has raised this issue as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are properly raised for the first time in a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus. <u>Pellegrini v. State</u>, 117 Nev. 860, 34 P.3d 519 (2001). As discussed in Petitioner's Supplemental Petition, Petitioner is raising an issue of

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ineffective assistance of counsel for trial counsel's failure to preserve the issue through an objection, resulting in the Nevada Supreme Court reviewing the matter for plain error only. Petitioner argues, that had his counsel objected, had the trial court still have given the instruction, on appeal the Nevada Supreme Court would have reviewed the District Court's decision for an abuse of discretion or judicial error. Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 121 P.3d 582 (2005). The Nevada Supreme Court in addressing the issue of the transferred intent jury instruction on direct appeal reviewed the issue not as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but rather solely on a plain error review of the trial court's provision of the instruction to the jury.

The State argues that Petitioner "fails to identify what was wrong with Jury Instruction Number 29" and thus has failed to show how his counsel's performance was deficient and what prejudice he suffered. Petitioner refers this Court to his Supplemental Petition in which he discusses those very issues. A petitioner "is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only if he supports his claims with specific factual allegations that if true would entitled him to relief. The petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing if the factual allegations are belied or repelled by the record." Thomas v. State 120 Nev. 37, 44, 83 P.3d 818, 823 (2004)(citing <u>Hargrove v. State</u>, 100 Nev. 498, 686 P.2d 222 (1984)). Petitioner contends he has raised a factual allegation that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Jury Instruction #29 thus has raised factual allegations not belied by the record. An evidentiary hearing is the appropriate venue to provide evidence to this Court as to what trial counsel could have argued regarding transferred intent jury instruction.

Ground Two: The State moves to dismiss this ground claiming that Petitioner has conceded "he does not know where the alibi witness is or what he will testify too." While Petitioner agrees that he has indicated he does not know the alibi witness's current whereabouts, he has not indicated that he does not know what he would testify to. Rather, Petition would expect Cisco, the alibi

witness, to testify as to Petitioner's whereabouts on the day at issue in the underlying case as initially indicated in the Notice of Alibi Witness filed in this matter by trial counsel on January 16, 2015.

Further, as to the current whereabouts of Cisco, NRS 34.780 provides that only after an evidentiary hearing is granted may a petitioner engage in discovery. Should this Court grant Petitioner and evidentiary hearing he shall motion the Court to approve the costs to engage an investigator to locate his alibi witness.

Original Petition

Ground One: As noted by the State, Ground One of the original petition focuses primarily on the issue of the transferred intent jury instruction which was more fully briefed in Ground One of the Supplemental Petition. Petitioner would reiterated the argument made above regarding why this ground should not be dismissed.

Additionally, as the State discusses, Petitioner raised an issue that his prior conviction was raised on voir dire, however the State notes that the transcript of the voir dire proceedings was not transcribed and therefore this cannot be verified. Petitioner moved for the production of this transcription which was prepared and filed by the court reporter on November 28, 2017. Petitioner would concede that the transcript of those proceedings does not indicate that the trial court referred to his prior convictions during voir dire and would submit this issue to the Court.

Ground Two: Petitioner would reiterate the argument raised in his Original Petition regarding this ground and would submit it to the Court for consideration.

Ground Three: As noted by the State, Petitioner raised four separate subparts in his Ground Three in his Original Petition. Petitioner reiterates the arguments set forth therein regarding Ground Three and would submit this ground to the Court for consideration.

Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court deny the State's Motion to Dismiss Petition and Supplemental Petition and grant Petitioner an evidentiary hearing in this matter.

AFFIRMATION

Pursuant to NRS 239B.030

The undersigned affirms that this Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post Conviction) and Exhibits does not contains the social security number of any person.

DATED this 23rd day of January, 2018.

Lyn E. Beggs

Lyn E. Beggs Bar No. 6248 316 California Ave. #863 Reno, NV 89509 (775)432-1918 Attorney for Petitioner

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2 3 4 5 6 7	CASE NUMBER: CR14-1830 I certify that on the 23 rd day of January, 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court system which will send a notice of electronic filing to the following: Joseph R. Plater, III, Deputy District Attorney Washoe County District Attorney's Office P.O. Box 11130 Reno, NV 89520
8	Keno, NV 89320
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10	Lyn E. Beggs Lyn E. Beggs
11	Nevada Bar No. 6248
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Clerk of the Court
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CASE NO. CR14-1830 **STATE OF NEVADA VS. QUINZALE MASON**

DATE, JUDGE OFFICERS OF

COURT PRESENT APPEARANCES-HEARING

5/25/18 HONORABLE ELLIOTT A. HEARING – STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION AND SUPPLEMENTAL PETITON FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (POST CONVICTION)

SATTLER
DEPT. NO. 10
M. Baker
(Clerk)
L. Urmston

(Reporter)

Deputy District Attorney Joseph R. Plater, III, was present on behalf of the State. Petitioner was present with counsel, Court Appointed Attorney Lyn E. Beggs.

COURT noted Defendant's Motion to Apply Statutory Credits to the Minimum Part of Sentence filed May 21, 2018; Defense counsel advised the Court her client would voluntarily withdraw the motion

COURT ORDERED: the motion withdrawn.

MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION AND SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (POST-CONVICTION).

COURT reviewed the procedural history of the case.

State's counsel presented argument in support of motion.

Petitioner's counsel presented argument in opposition of the motion.

COURT ORDERED: Grounds One, Two, & Three of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus are dismissed. Ground One of the Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is dismissed. State's counsel is to prepare the order and submit to the Court by June 15, 2018.

Parties are to schedule a hearing for oral arguments on Ground Two of the Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with Sheila Mansfield no later than June 1, 2018. Petitioner's counsel to provide notice/offer of proof to State's counsel regarding Ground Two by June 29, 2018.

Defendant remanded to the custody of Nevada Department of Corrections.

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Jacqueline Bryant
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 6718150

CODE No. 3370

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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE

* * *

QUINZALE MASON,

Petitioner,

v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Case No. CR14-1830 Dept. No. 10

Respondent.

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus and the State's motion to dismiss the petition.

A jury convicted petitioner of battery with a deadly weapon, assault with a deadly weapon, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. On March 24, 2015, this Court entered the judgement of conviction for all three offenses. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction on June 16, 2016. On March 2, 2017, petitioner filed a timely post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Appointed counsel filed a supplemental petition on December 8, 2017. The State moved the Court to dismiss the petition and the supplemental petition on January 10, 2018; petitioner opposed the motion on January 24, 2018; and the State replied to petitioner's opposition on January 31, 2018. The parties

appeared before the Court on May 25, 2018, and argued their respective positions regarding the State's motion to dismiss. Having considered the parties' briefs and arguments, the Court finds as follows.

Supplemental Petition

In the first claim of the supplemental petition, petitioner alleges his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Jury Instruction Number 29 regarding transferred intent. Jury Instruction Number 29 stated:

If an illegal and unintended act results from the intent to commit a crime, that act is also considered illegal. The doctrine of transferred intent is a theory of imputed liability. The intent to use force or violence against a certain person is transferred or imputed to a different person where the different person is hit; this is so even where the different person is hit by mistake or inadvertence. The doctrine applies in any case where there is intent to commit a criminal act and the only difference between the actual result and the contemplated result is the nature of the personal injuries sustained.

The doctrine of transferred intent is applicable to all crimes where an unintended victim is harmed as a result of the intent to harm an intended victim, whether or not the intended victim is injured.

Petitioner asserts the "the doctrine of transferred intent was not appropriate for the jury to be instructed in this matter and that the evidence presented at trial by the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner, the alleged assailant of Mr. Holly, had intent to commit battery on Mr. Holly, intent that the State argued was transferred when Cecelia was hit allegedly by ricochet from a bullet." (Supplemental Petition, 6).

Petitioner's trial counsel did not object to the instruction at trial, but petitioner's appellate counsel argued on appeal that this Court erred in giving the instruction. *Mason v. State*, 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 42 (June 16, 2016). Specifically, petitioner's appellate counsel argued the instruction relieved the State of its burden of proving that petitioner willfully used force or violence upon the victim. *Id.* at n.1. The Supreme Court found petitioner's argument "lack[ed] merit," that the instruction did not relieve the State of its burden of proof, and "sufficient evidence was adduced at trial to support the battery conviction." *Id.*

The Nevada Supreme Court's holding—that petitioner's argument regarding Jury Instruction Number 29 "lacks merit" and that the State presented sufficient evidence to convict petitioner of battery—is the law of the case. *See Hall v. State*, 91 Nev. 314, 315, 535 P.2d 797, 798 (1975) (" 'The law of a first appeal is the law of the case on all subsequent appeals in which the facts are substantially the same.' ") (*quoting Walker v. State*, 85 Nev. 337, 343, 455 P.2d 34, 38 (1969)). Thus, the issue about the propriety of Jury Instruction Number 29 may not be litigated again. *Id.* To the extent petitioner advances a different argument about Jury Instruction Number 29, the law of the case doctrine bars that argument as well. *Id.* at 316, 535 P.2d at 799 ("The doctrine of the law of the case cannot be avoided by a more detailed and precisely focused argument subsequently made after reflection upon the previous proceedings.").

Although the Nevada Supreme Court reviewed the correctness of Jury Instruction Number 29 under a plain error standard, prejudice is a component of that standard. See Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1190, 196 P.3d 465, 477 (2008) (when an error has not been preserved, the Court employs plain-error review where a party must show an error that is plain from a review of the record and that the error affected his or her substantial rights, by causing actual prejudice or a miscarriage of justice). Prejudice is also a component of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 987, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107(1996). Accordingly, the Supreme Court's finding that there was no prejudice under a plain error review also means that petitioner cannot show prejudice under a Strickland analysis of his ineffective assistance claim.

/// ///

The law of the case also forecloses petitioner's argument that there was insufficient evidence to convict petitioner of battery. The Supreme Court's finding that there was sufficient evidence to convict petitioner was independent of it plain error analysis. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the first claim of the supplemental petition.

In the second claim of the supplemental petition, petitioner asserts his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate petitioner's alibi witness. The Court grants a hearing on this claim. Petitioner must inform the State by June 29, 2018, of any alibi witness petitioner intends to present at the hearing on this claim, including the name, address, telephone number, and the specific testimony of that witness.

Original Petition

First Claim

The first claim of the original petition asserts the same claim as the first claim of the supplemental petition. It is denied for the same reason that the Court denies the first claim of the supplemental petition.

As part of the first claim in the original petition, petitioner also asserts this Court erred by permitting the State to introduce evidence of petitioner's prior conviction during *voir dire*. The record repels the claim. The transcript of the *voir dire* proceeding shows that no one referenced petitioner's prior conviction. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the claim. *See Colwell v. State*, 118 Nev. 807, 812, 59 P.3d 463, 467 (2002) ("The petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing if the record belies or repels the allegations.").

The claim is also barred because it could have been raised on direct appeal. *See* NRS 34.810(1)(b).

Furthermore, the charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm was not submitted to the jury in the jury instructions or as a charge that the jury considered during the first trial. On February 11, 2014, the jury convicted petitioner of battery with a deadly weapon and assault

with a deadly weapon. The jury then considered the separate charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm charge and convicted petitioner the next day, February 12, 2014.

There is no evidence that the jury used the felon in possession of a firearm charge to convict petitioner of the other charges. The jury was instructed to consider only evidence that had been admitted during trial in resolving the assault and battery charges against petitioner (Jury Instruction Numbers 5, 8, 22, 30). The jury is presumed to follow its instructions. Summers v. State, 122 Nev. 1326, 148 P.3d 778 (2006). And there was also overwhelming evidence of petitioner's guilt, as described below. Thus, even if the jury had heard about the felon in possession of a firearm charge, the error was harmless. See Williams v. State, 121 Nev. 934, 948, 125 P.3d 627, 636 (2005) (Supreme Court will not overturn the judgment where an improperly admitted prior conviction was harmless error).

Second Claim

In the second claim petitioner asserts that the prosecutor never gave an official oath, and petitioner was never arraigned on the amended information. The record repels petitioner's assertion that he was not arraigned on the amended information. The Court arraigned him on the amended information on February 6, 2015. Furthermore, petitioner can show no prejudice: he does not assert he was not on notice of all the charges, that he was deprived of a defense, or that he was prejudiced in some other way. The Court does not comprehend what petitioner means that the prosecutor never gave an official oath. Nevertheless, petitioner cannot show prejudice.

Petitioner also takes issue with transferred intent doctrine again. The Court has addressed that claim.

Third Claim

Petitioner asserts his counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) argue at the end of trial that insufficient evidence supported the charges; (2) inform petitioner that the evidence did not meet the probable cause standard; (3) suppress petitioner's prior conviction for voluntary

 manslaughter with the use of a deadly weapon; and (4) subject the State's case to meaningful adversary testing.

The record repels the idea that insufficient evidence supports the trial verdicts. At trial, the State proved that Anthony Holly (Holly) lived in the same apartment complex as Mason. Trial Transcript, February 9, 2015, p.90. On August, 9, 2014, Holly joined in on a game of craps with about "five or six" people, including Mason. *Id.* at 91-95. Holly got into a fight with Mason over the game. *Id.* at 51, 95-96. The fight did not get physical, and Holly left the area to continue on with his day. *Id.* at 96-97. A couple hours later, Holly was outside "playing with the neighbor's dog at the edge of the parking lot" when Mason pulled up in a car. *Id.* at 98. Mason said something like, "I got you now," or "I got yo ass," and Holly took off running. *Id.* at 98-99. Mason shot at Holly several times. *Id.* at 99-100, 101. There were several people in the area, including "two kids and their two dogs." *Id.* at 104.

Huey Paul Stanley, Jr. (Stanley) lived near Holly and Mason. *Id.* at 30-31; 37-39. Stanley was sitting outside with his wife watching Holly play with the neighbor's dog when he saw Mason park his car. *Id.* at 40-42. Stanley heard Mason say "Ah-hah, I got you now"; seconds later he heard gunshots—"pow, pow, pow"—coming from Mason's direction. *Id.* at 45-45. Stanley saw Holly "ducking, going back and forth trying to figure out which way to get out." *Id.* at 45-46. Stanley then heard his neighbor, Delphine Martin, "screaming that her baby got shot." *Id.* at 48.

Reno Police Officer Benjamin Lancaster arrived first on scene where he found a little girl, Cecilia M., who had been shot. *Id.* at 71-72, 74, 75. He could see "what looked like a gunshot wound to . . . her lower [] calf area of her right leg." *Id.* He wrapped the leg with gauze and applied pressure until medical personnel arrived. *Id.* He also found two 9 millimeter casings on scene. *Id.* at 83-84, 87; Trial Transcript, February 10, 2015, p.251.

At the hospital, Dr. Cinelli found that the "[d]istortion of the metal fragment[] [in Cecilia's leg was] typical with a ricochet." Trial Transcript, February 10, 2015, pp. 31, 34.

 When police later arrested Mason, he stated he was on his way "'to the station to turn [him]self in.'" *Id.*, 330, 339.

The evidence, therefore, shows that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdicts. The record repels petitioner's argument that his counsel failed to argue the evidence was insufficient to convict him (Trial Transcript, February 11, 2015, p. 52) (defense counsel arguing that "inconsistencies in the facts themselves . . . create reasonable doubt in this case."). Petitioner's counsel argued a number of inconsistencies in the State's case, such as the witnesses' differing accounts regarding the color of Mr. Stanley's car. *Id.* at 53-54.

Petitioner's claims about his counsel's failure to suppress petitioner's prior conviction and to subject the State's case to meaningful adversary testing are wholly conclusory and do not warrant a hearing. That is, petitioner fails to allege specific facts about what his counsel should have done that would have changed the outcome of the trial. The record also repels the claim. Petitioner's counsel, Carl Hylin, represented petitioner and examined witnesses and argued for petitioner's benefit.

Petitioner also alleges this Court issued four jury instructions, after the jury convicted him on the first two counts, that permitted the jury to convict him of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Petitioner's assertion fails to state a claim that warrants a hearing because it does not assert specific facts that, if true, would require the Court to grant petitioner relief. *See Nika v. State*, 124 Nev. 1272, 1300-01, 198 P.3d 839, 858 (2008) ("an evidentiary hearing is mandated only when a post-conviction petitioner asserts specific factual allegations that are not belied or repelled by the record and that, if true, would entitle him to relief.").

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Accordingly, the Court dismisses all of the claims of the original and the supplemental petitions, except for the second claim of the supplemental petition. An evidentiary hearing is set for August 17, 2018, at 1:30 p.m. to address the second claim.

DATED this _____ day of <u>June</u>, 2018.

ELLIOTT A. SATTLER DISTRICT JUDGE

1	CODE: 4185		
2	LORI URMSTON, CCR #51 Litigation Services		
3	151 Country Estates Circle Reno, Nevada 89511		
4	(775) 323-3411 Court Reporter		
5			
6	SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA		
7	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE		
8	HONORABLE ELLIOTT A. SATTLER, DISTRICT JUDGE		
9			
10	QUINZALE MASON,		
11	Petitioner, Case No. CR14-1830		
12	vs. Dept. No. 10		
13	THE STATE OF NEVADA,		
14	Respondent.		
15	,		
16	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS		
17	EVIDENTIARY HEARING		
18	Wednesday, October 31, 2018		
19	Reno, Nevada		
20			
21			
22			
23	Job No.: 506101		
24	Reported by: LORI URMSTON, CCR #51		
1			

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1		APPEARANCES:	Page 2
2	FOR THE PETITIONER:	LYN E. BEGGS, ESQ. Law Offices of Lyn E. Beg	as
3		316 California Avenue, #8 Reno, Nevada 89509	
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5	FOR THE RESPONDENT:	JOSEPH R. PLATER, III Deputy District Attorney	
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Page 4 RENO, NEVADA; WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 31, 2018; 9:04 A.M. 1 2 --000--This is CR14-1830, Quinzale Mason, the 3 THE COURT: 4 Petitioner, versus the State of Nevada. Mr. Mason is 5 present in court in custody. Good morning, Mr. Mason. 6 7 THE DEFENDANT: Good morning. THE COURT: Nice to see you again. 8 9 Ms. Beggs is here on his behalf. Good morning as well, Ms. Beggs. 10 11 MS. BEGGS: Good morning, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Mr. Plater is here on behalf of the 13 State of Nevada. Good morning, Mr. Plater. 14 15 MR. PLATER: Good morning, Judge. 16 THE COURT: This is the time set for an evidentiary 17 hearing regarding the petitioner's writ of habeas The Court has received and again reviewed the 18 19 March 2nd, 2017, file-stamped Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Post Conviction. Additionally, the Court 20 has received and again reviewed the December 8th, 2017, 21 22 file-stamped Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas 23 Corpus. The State had filed a motion to dismiss the 24

- Page 5
 1 petition and supplemental petition. The Court had a
- 2 hearing on May 25th of 2018 and granted the petition --
- 3 or, excuse me -- the State's request to dismiss most of
- 4 the grounds in the supplemental petition and all of the
- 5 grounds in the petition itself.
- 6 We are here today for an evidentiary hearing
- 7 regarding ground two of the supplemental petition. The
- 8 allegation in that ground is that the petitioner's
- 9 trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to
- 10 adequately investigate an alibi defense that Mr. Mason
- 11 claimed that he had.
- So are we ready to go forward this morning,
- 13 Ms. Beggs?
- MS. BEGGS: Yes, Your Honor, we are.
- 15 THE COURT: You may call your first witness.
- MS. BEGGS: Your Honor, I am going to invoke the
- 17 rule of exclusion. And my apologies to Mr. Hylin. I'm
- 18 going to call Mr. Neal as our first witness today.
- 19 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Hylin, good morning. Nice
- 20 to see you again.
- 21 MR. HYLIN: Good morning, Your Honor.
- 22 THE COURT: Mr. Hylin, I'm sure you're familiar
- 23 with the rule of exclusion. So if you could wait
- 24 outside while we hear testimony from other witnesses.

	Page 6
1	MR. HYLIN: Thank you, Your Honor.
2	MS. BEGGS: Mr. Mason's first witness would be
3	Cisco Neal.
4	THE CLERK: Please raise your right hand.
5	(The oath was administered.)
6	THE WITNESS: Yes.
7	THE CLERK: Okay. Just have a seat.
8	THE COURT: Good morning, sir. Can you please
9	state and spell your full name for me.
10	THE WITNESS: Cisco Neal, C-i-s-c-o, N-e-a-l.
11	THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Neal.
12	Go ahead, Ms. Beggs.
13	MS. BEGGS: Thank you.
14 15	CISCO NEAL, having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
16	DIRECT EXAMINATION
17	BY MS. BEGGS:
18	Q Good morning, Mr. Neal.
19	A Good morning.
20	Q Mr. Neal, where do you currently reside?
21	A Where do I work at?
22	Q Where do you currently live?
23	A Oh, I live right now in Boulder Creek.
24	Q What's your address?

		Page 7
1	A	4005 Moorpark Court.
2	Q	And I'm going to ask you just to slow down just
3	a littl	e tiny bit. Your voice doesn't carry a lot in
4	the cou	rtroom, so just so that we can all hear your
5	voice.	
6	Wha	it's your current occupation?
7	А	Forklift driver.
8	Q	And who do you work for?
9	А	Randa Logistics.
10	Q	Okay. And in 2014 where did you live?
11	А	Sun Valley what's it's called, the address?
12	Sun Val	ley we was just talking about it. I forgot
13	the add	lress. Cedar Lane.
14	Q	Would that be Lone Cedar Lane?
15	А	Yeah, Lone Cedar Lane. There you go.
16	Q	And in 2014 well, let me ask you this.
17	Mr. Nea	al, do you know Mr. Mason, Quinzale Mason?
18	А	Yes.
19	Q	And he's the gentleman sitting to my right?
20	А	Yes.
21	Q	And how do you know Mr. Mason?
22	A	From on line. We used to play video games and
23	everyth	ning together.
24	Q	Do you have any do you know anybody else

1	Page 8 that Mr. Mason knew in 2014?
2	A Ebony.
3	Q And who is Ebony?
4	A My cousin.
5	Q She's your cousin?
6	A Yes.
7	Q And when you say you played video games, did
8	you play them together? Were you
9	A He was we play on line.
10	THE COURT: Mr. Neal, I'm going to ask you to do a
11	couple of things. The first one is you talk really
12	fast.
13	THE WITNESS: I know. Everybody says that. I'm
14	sorry. I'm sorry about that.
15	THE COURT: So I'm going to ask you just to slow
16	down the pace of your speech. I'm exactly the same
17	way, so it's something that you and I share. That's
18	number one. Slow down just a bit.
19	And, number two, you can see that there are
20	actually two people here who are court reporters trying
21	to take down every single thing that you say, that I
22	say, that Ms. Beggs says. So let her finish her
23	question before you start to answer it
24	THE WITNESS: Okay.

Page 9 THE COURT: -- even if you think you know what the 1 2 end of the question is. Let her get the whole question out and then just take a split second to think about it 3 4 and then give your answer. And then she'll ask you 5 another question. 6 THE WITNESS: Okay. 7 THE COURT: Thank you, sir. BY MS. BEGGS: 8 9 Mr. Neal, is it fair to say you're a bit nervous this morning? 10 11 Not really. I'm all right. I just -- like I Α said, it's the way I talk, kind of fast. 12 13 Fair enough. Q 14 So going back to 2014, were there occasions when you would play video games with Mr. Mason in person? 15 16 Α Yes. 17 And where would that take place? Where would 0 you play --18 19 Α In my living room. In your living room? 20 0 21 Α Yes. 22 Q Would that be at your home in Sun Valley at the 23 time? 24 Α Yes.

_		Page 10
1	Q	In 2014 did you live alone?
2	А	No.
3	Q	Who did you live with?
4	А	My girlfriend, Olivia Kapell, and our kids.
5	Q	And how many kids did you have?
б	А	Four.
7	Q	Do you have.
8	A	I got four now, but we had three at the time.
9	Q	Okay. And how often would you and Mr. Mason
10	play vi	deo games?
11	А	Every day.
12	Q	Every day?
13	А	Yeah.
14	Q	And when would he come to your home?
15	А	Usually he get dropped off in the morning.
16	Q	Do you know how he got to your house?
17	А	Usually a friend, a bus or my cousin.
18	Q	Okay. And how would he get home?
19	А	Sometimes I would drop him off, but sometimes
20	he woul	d just stay the night with me because I would be
21	too tir	red to drop him off to his house.
22	Q	So how often would he stay the night?
23	A	I would say out of the week, two times out of
24	the wee	ek.
1		

Page 11 1 0 Okay. So fairly frequently? 2 Α Yeah. Now, Mr. Neal, if I asked you what you were 3 Q 4 doing on a specific day four years ago, do you think 5 you could tell me with any certainty? No. I would try. 6 Α 7 Okay. Do you -- I'm going to ask you to go 0 back in time. 8 9 Α Okay. Do you remember any occasions where Mr. Mason 10 0 11 was picked up at your home by Ebony and other 12 individuals? 13 Yes, it was his auntie and his mom. THE COURT: And what? 14 THE WITNESS: His auntie and his mom. 15 16 THE COURT: Oh, his auntie and his mom. 17 BY MS. BEGGS: And would that have been after he had spent the 18 19 night with you one night? 20 Α Yes. 21 Do you remember what kind of car Ebony drove? Q 22 Α No. I'm sorry. That's too long ago. 23 I can't remember. sorry. 24 Q That's all right.

- Page 12

 When Ebony and Mr. Mason's auntie and mother picked
- 2 him up, do you remember if that was summer or winter?
- 3 Do you remember kind of what time of the year it might
- 4 have been?
- 5 A I think it was probably the summer. I think
- 6 so.
- 7 Q Okay. Thank you. I have nothing further for
- 8 you, Mr. Neal. Actually, let me ask you one more
- 9 thing, Mr. Neal. I apologize.
- 10 A No problem.
- 11 Q The time that Mr. Mason was picked up by Ebony
- 12 and his other family members, was there anything unique
- 13 about that particular overnight visit with you that you
- 14 remember?
- 15 A No. It was the same thing we always do. We
- 16 used to just smoke and just play the video games and go
- 17 outside and play football and stuff like that. It was
- 18 just like a normal day like we always have.
- 19 Q So you don't remember any unusual circumstances
- 20 with Mr. Mason staying with you?
- 21 A No. The same thing, normal, stay the night and
- 22 smoke, we go get something to eat, come back, play
- 23 video games, take care of my kids, and that's it. He
- 24 helped me watch my kids sometimes. That's about it.

	Page 13
1	Q How old were your kids at the time?
2	A I think they was three, five and seven. I
3	think so.
4	Q So fairly young?
5	A Yeah.
6	Q Thank you. I have nothing further.
7	THE COURT: Cross-examination.
8	MR. PLATER: Well, Judge, can we deny the petition
9	now? That was nothing.
10	THE COURT: Well, she's not finished yet. So do
11	you want to cross-examine the witness, Mr. Plater? And
12	we're not Mr. Plater, I guess what I would say is
13	we're not to the point of argument yet. She's given
14	direct examination on Mr. Neal. Would you like to
15	cross-examine Mr. Neal?
16	MR. PLATER: Sure, Judge. We're here, so
17	CROSS-EXAMINATION
18	BY MR. PLATER:
19	Q Mr. Neal, this man, Mr. Mason, is your friend;
20	right?
21	A Yes.
22	Q When did you become friends?
23	A Like like four months before all this stuff
24	happened, like six months before all that.

	Page 14
1	Q Before what?
2	A Like four years ago.
3	Q Four years ago?
4	A Yeah.
5	Q 2014?
6	A No. Well, a little bit before, like 2013.
7	Q In 2013 you became friends?
8	A Yeah.
9	Q So I understand your testimony is that in 2014
10	you saw Mr. Mason virtually every day?
11	A Um-hum.
12	THE COURT: Is that a yes?
13	THE WITNESS: Yes.
14	THE COURT: You need to say yes or no.
15	THE WITNESS: Yes.
16	THE COURT: Thank you.
17	BY MR. PLATER:
18	Q So would that include the summer of 2014?
19	A Yeah. That's when he used to come over to my
20	house, yeah.
21	Q So is it fair to say that in June, July,
22	August, September of 2014 you saw Mr. Mason every
23	single day?
24	A Almost every day, every other day we used to

Page 15 1 play video games. We had nothing to do anyway, so 2 yeah. So almost every day but not every single day; 3 Q 4 right? 5 Α Um-hum. Certainly you can't remember what happened on a 6 Q 7 specific day in August 2014, can you? 8 No. 9 You can't say whether you were with Mr. Mason 0 or not on any particular day in August of 2014; is that 10 11 true? 12 Yeah, because he was coming over, I just can't Α 13 remember what day it was. 14 0 Okay. So at some point you became aware -well, let me back up. In 2014 you were living in 15 16 Sun Valley, Idaho? 17 Not Idaho, but, yeah, Lone Cedar, yeah. Α Sun Valley here --18 0 19 Α Yeah, Reno. -- in Nevada. 20 0 21 Okay. And where was Mr. Mason living? 22 Α I think he was staying with Ebony. 23 Ebony was who again? Q 24 Α My cousin.

	216
1	Page 16 Q Your cousin?
2	A Yeah.
3	Q So at some point you heard that Mr. Mason got
4	arrested; right?
5	A Yes.
6	Q And you knew what those charges were?
7	A Yes.
8	Q One was he shot a gun at a person and it hit a
9	little girl. Did you know that?
10	A My cousin told me, yeah.
11	Q You found out about that?
12	A Um-hum.
13	Q And would you say you found out about that
14	pretty quickly after it happened?
15	A Yes.
16	Q How soon did you find out about the fact that
17	Mr. Mason had just been arrested?
18	A That day, that day a couple hours after it
19	happened.
20	Q Okay. So when you found out, you knew that you
21	couldn't tell anybody, "Hey, that didn't happen because
22	Mason was at my house," could you?
23	A Yeah, because nobody called me, yeah, nobody
24	nobody called me and asked me nothing.

1	Page 17 Q Well, you knew Mason was in jail; right?
2	A Yeah.
3	Q You know where the jail is in Reno; right?
4	A Yes.
5	Q You know where Parr Boulevard is?
6	A Um-hum.
7	Q Did you ever go up and talk to him?
8	A Unh-unh.
9	Q Did you ever say, "Mason, I can be an alibi
10	witness for you"? You didn't do that, did you?
11	A No.
12	Q Did you
13	A Because a little bit after that we moved. We
14	moved from our place. Me and my girlfriend kind of
15	split up a little bit. There was a lot going on at the
16	time.
17	Q Did you know who his lawyer was?
18	A Unh-unh.
19	Q Did you ask him?
20	A Unh-unh.
21	THE COURT: Stop. Slow down just a little bit.
22	Mr. Neal, those last two responses that you gave were
23	not words. They were shaking your head in the negative
24	and making a sound. So you had said no to both of
1	

Page 18 1 Mr. Plater's two questions; correct? You shook your 2 head and made a sound that we as people often make when we're saying no. You didn't actually use a word. You 3 4 just kind of kept your mouth shut and -- I'm not even 5 going to try and put it on the record. So you're saying no, you didn't do those things? 6 7 THE WITNESS: No, I didn't do those things. THE COURT: Okay. You need to say yes or no. 8 9 I'm sorry. THE WITNESS: BY MR. PLATER: 10 11 Let me back up. You didn't go to the police and say, "Look, I know Mason didn't commit this crime, 12 13 because he was with me at the time somebody got shot," did you? 14 15 А No. 16 And you can't say that today; right? In other 0 17 words, you can't tell us under oath that Mr. Mason didn't shoot somebody on August 14th -- or August, I 18 19 think, 9th, 2014, because he was with you? You can't say that; right? 20 No, because I don't know what day it was. 21 22 can't remember what day, but I know that they picked -his auntie and my cousin and his mom picked him up the 23 24 same day he went to jail, though. I know that for

1	Page 19 sure.
2	Q You knew he had a gun; is that true?
3	A No.
4	Q You never saw him with a gun?
5	A No, never.
6	Q Do you have any felony convictions yourself
7	A Yeah.
8	Q say within the last ten years?
9	A No. I ain't been in trouble my daughter is
10	almost 14. I ain't been in trouble for 14 years. And
11	that was for like probation violation.
12	Q So I assume from everything that you've just
13	told us today that well, let me back up. Did you
14	know he went to trial?
15	A Yes.
16	Q Did you know that he was did you know at the
17	time I didn't phrase that question very well. You
18	knew he went to trial on this; right?
19	A Yes.
20	Q When did you find out he went to trial?
21	A A while ago. My cousin told me a while ago.
22	Q You didn't know he was in trial when the trial
23	was actually going on?
24	A No.

	Page 20
1	Q So you don't know when the trial happened?
2	A I didn't know the trial was happening. I
3	didn't know what day it started. I don't know nothing
4	about that.
5	MR. PLATER: That's all I have, Judge.
6	THE COURT: Thank you.
7	Redirect based on the cross-examination, Ms. Beggs.
8	MS. BEGGS: Yes. Thank you.
9	REDIRECT EXAMINATION
10	BY MS. BEGGS:
11	Q Mr. Neal, did you know Mr. Mason before he
12	started dating Ebony Spurlock?
13	A Yeah. On line, yeah.
14	Q On line?
15	A Yeah.
16	Q Did you ever meet him in person before he
17	started to date Ebony?
18	A No.
19	Q And did you find out about Mr. Mason's arrest
20	from Ebony?
21	A Yes.
22	Q Did you know any of the details of the
23	incident?
24	A Not really.
1	

Page 21 1 Okay. Did you know just generally what he was O accused of doing? 2 3 Α What he was accused of, yes. 4 Did you know specifically what date it Q 5 allegedly happened on? 6 Α No. 7 If I asked you to remember what you did on one day three or four months ago, do you think your 8 recollection would be better about that event than 9 something four years ago? 10 11 Well, my -- well, I smoke a lot of marijuana, 12 so I really don't remember a lot of stuff. 13 Okay. Fair enough. Q 14 Thank you. I have nothing further. THE COURT: Recross based on the redirect. 15 16 MR. PLATER: Thank you, Judge. 17 RECROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. PLATER: 18 19 I don't mean to pick at you, and you're not 0 going to get in trouble for this, but did I hear you 20 just say you were smoking a lot of marijuana? 21 22 Α Yeah. 23 Is that in 2014? Q 24 Α Well, that's for the last past ten years.

1	Q	Okay. And you said that having smoked Page 22
2	marijua	na has affected your memory; is that what
3	А	A little bit. It's made me forget a lot of
4	stuff,	because I got a lot of kids going on, I got a
5	lot of	family, I got a big family, so I got a lot of
6	stuff g	oing on.
7	Q	It takes the stress away?
8	А	Yes.
9	Q	I get it.
10	А	School, everything. There's just a lot of
11	stuff.	
12	Q	You're going to school?
13	А	I work. My kids are at school. So I be
14	helping	them with their homework and I do a lot of
15	stuff.	My girlfriend, she's always at work, so it's
16	just me	and the kids. When I get off work I got to
17	help the	em.
18	Q	So you're trying to be a good father?
19	А	Well, I've been a good father.
20	Q	So in 2014 were you smoking marijuana?
21	А	Yes.
22	Q	A lot?
23	А	Always, yes, same as like now.
24	Q	Like on a daily basis?

1	Page 23 A Yeah.
2	Q How much would you smoke?
3	A A quarter or half a day.
4	Q I don't know what that means. A quarter of a
5	lid? A half? An ounce?
6	A Half an ounce a day.
7	MR. PLATER: That's good enough, Judge. Thanks.
8	THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Neal. You may step
9	down. Thank you for being here today.
10	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
11	THE COURT: Do you have an additional witness that
12	you would like to call, Ms. Beggs, or witnesses?
13	MS. BEGGS: Mr. Hylin.
14	THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Neal. You're free to
15	go.
16	THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
17	THE COURT: Thank you.
18	(The oath was administered.)
19	THE WITNESS: I do.
20	THE CLERK: Okay. Just have a seat.
21	THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Hylin. Could you
22	please do us the courtesy of stating and spell your
23	full name.
24	THE WITNESS: Certainly, Your Honor. My name is

Page 24 1 Carl, C-a-r-l, last name is Hylin, H-y-l-i-n. 2 THE COURT: Go ahead, Ms. Beggs. 3 MS. BEGGS: Thank you. 4 CARL HYLIN, having been first duly sworn, was examined 5 and testified as follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION 6 7 BY MS. BEGGS: Good morning, Mr. Hylin. 8 0 9 Good morning. Α 10 Mr. Hylin, what is your current employment? Q 11 Α I'm sorry? 12 What is your current occupation? 13 Well, I'm retired. Α 14 Q And prior to retirement what did you do? 15 I was a chief deputy with the public defender's Α 16 office for Washoe County. 17 And were you employed by the public defender's 0 office in 2014? 18 19 Α Yes. 20 And at some point in 2014 do you recall being Q 21 assigned a case involving Mr. Quinzale Mason? 22 A Yes. 23 And is that the gentleman to my right? Q Yes, it is. 24 Α

1	Q	And do you recall in general what the charges
2	were or	what the general accusations were?
3	А	Well, the charges, if I recall right, were
4	battery	with a deadly weapon, assault with a deadly
5	weapon,	and I think there was an attempted murder there
6	too, but	I can't remember if that was ultimately
7	pursued	•
8	Q	Would it refresh your recollection to see the
9	Amended	Information?
10	A	Sure.
11	MS.	BEGGS: Your Honor, if I may approach.
12	THE	COURT: Go ahead.
13	BY MS. I	BEGGS:
14	Q	Does that refresh your recollection?
15	A	Yes.
16	Q	Do you recall what the charges were?
17	A	Yeah. The third charge, other than the assault
18	and the	battery with a deadly weapon, was ex-felon in
19	possess	ion of a firearm.
20	Q	And did the matter proceed to trial?
21	A	Yes, it did.
22	Q	And in preparing for trial did you discuss any
23	possible	e defenses with Mr. Mason?
24	A	Yeah, I discussed all the defenses with him

1	Page 26 which weren't great. You know, there was the State
2	had good solid witnesses that were going to be
3	difficult to impeach. A child was wounded during the
4	incident, so there's a lot more sympathy for the mother
5	and the child than and it makes it that much harder
6	to sympathize your client in front of the jury. So I
7	discussed all those with Mr. Mason.
8	I did file an alibi notice for a person that he
9	named to me as Sco who Mr. Mason explained would be
10	able to explain that he wasn't there on that scene at
11	the time of the incident. So we discussed that. We
12	never found Mr. Mason didn't know the full name or
13	address or any of the contact information for this
14	fellow named Sco. All we ever knew was Sco. And I
15	didn't know if that was a derivation of his last name,
16	first name, or whether it was just a nickname.
17	Q Did your notice of alibi witness also list him
18	as Cisco?
19	A That could be. He was commonly known as Sco,
20	so I guess Cisco, I guess.
21	Q Would it refresh your recollection to see
22	A No. I'm speculating as to where, you know
23	Q Where the Sco came from?
24	A Sure.

1	Page 27 Q Did Mr. Mason give you generally where Cisco
2	lived?
3	A No.
4	Q Did he provide you with a phone number?
5	A No.
6	Q Did he give you information regarding his
7	relationship with Cisco?
8	A Well, from what I recall, they weren't, you
9	know, fast friends. They were good acquaintances.
10	Because I kept asking Mr. Mason, well, you know, if my
11	investigator is going to find this fellow, he's going
12	to have to have some idea of where he lives, you know,
13	what time should he look for him or where does he work.
14	And I did there was an investigator assigned to do
15	that, but I never got any information back and was
16	unable to subpoena the fellow.
17	Q Okay. So there was no so you did have an
18	investigator attempt to locate this individual?
19	A Sure. Right.
20	Q Do you know what, if any, efforts were made to
21	figure out who this person was?
22	A Well, our investigative staff was extremely
23	busy, so the notes that we get from them are short and
24	concise, particularly in a situation like this where it

1	Page 28 would simply just state they were unable to find Sco.
2	So I filed the alibi notice, because we were, you know,
3	continuing to try and look for the fellow and never
4	found him. But, you know, the alibi notice has a
5	deadline by which it has to be filed. So in case we
6	found him close in to trial, we would be prepared to
7	present him.
8	Q Do you remember approximately when this case
9	went to trial?
10	A Well, it was probably 2014 or '15. I'm not
11	you know, it all kind of blurs. It was one of the last
12	full trials I did that I wasn't training somebody or
13	Q Does February sound familiar?
14	A February of
15	Q 2015.
16	A That's probably it, yeah.
17	Q And do you recall when the alleged incident
18	occurred?
19	A It was several months before that.
20	Q Okay. So you represented Mr. Mason at all
21	times during the trial?
22	A Correct.
23	Q And do you recall testimony and I won't ask
24	you to remember exact names or anything along those

1	lines, but do you remember testimony of law enforcement
2	officials regarding Mr. Mason being picked up at a
3	residence in Sun Valley?
4	A I remember that.
5	Q And do you remember if there was an address
6	given of where he was picked up?
7	A I'm pretty sure there was an address, although
8	I don't remember it.
9	Q Does an address on Lone Cedar sound familiar at
10	all?
11	A That sounds a little familiar. I believe it
12	was on the toward the eastern side of the Sun Valley
13	settlement, you know, the township there. His car was
14	not there in front of it, though.
15	Q Do you remember do you recall testimony that
16	he was picked up in a gold sedan?
17	A When they picked him up at that residence?
18	Q Yes.
19	A Yes, it was the car.
20	Q Do you know whose residence that was?
21	A No.
22	Q Did you do any inquiries as to whose residence
23	it was?
24	A In other words, did we interview the owner of

Page 30 1 the home or the occupant? 2 0 Yes. I honestly don't remember whether we -- it 3 4 would have been the investigator that would have 5 interviewed them. I did not myself, no. If that individual turned out to be Cisco, 0 6 7 would that surprise you? Yeah, if that's indeed the case, because 8 Yes. 9 all we ever got from Mr. Mason was Sco. Thank you. I have nothing further. 10 Q 11 THE COURT: Cross-examination. 12 CROSS-EXAMINATION 13 BY MR. PLATER: So, Mr. Hylin, I take it when you represented 14 0 Mr. Mason you went over the charges with him; right? 15 16 Α Correct. 17 You went over all the discovery the State had 0 provided you; right? 18 19 Α Yes. Was it your practice to leave the discovery 20 with your client or did you simply go over it with him? 21 22 Do you remember? 23 No, my practice was to copy all the police Α 24 reports and the lab results or whatever pertained to

Page 31 1 the case and leave it with him at the jail. So do you remember doing that in this case? 2 Independently, no, but that was -- I'm sure I 3 Α I had times where I had to sit with Mr. Mason and 4 5 go through the reports, so he would have a copy and I would have my file. 6 7 Do you recall whether the address that was just referenced to you being Lone Cedar was ever referenced 8 9 in any of the police reports or any of the discovery that you received? 10 11 Well, I would have to say if it's a standard police report, it was probably there, but I don't have 12 13 any independent recollection now of it. 14 0 Do you know whether -- did you go over the discovery with Mr. Mason? 15 16 Α Yes. 17 And you left him a copy of it according to your 0 18 memory --19 That was my practice. Α 20 -- of what your practice was at that time? And you also recalling going over it with him? 21 22 Α Correct. 23 So you would have also gone over all the Q 24 defenses to the three charges; right?