IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

JAMES J. COTTER, JR., derivatively on behalf of Reading International, Inc., Appellant, v.	Electronically Filed Aug 30 2019 02:19 p.m Supreme Coult Beste No B75063 Consolidate Cleritio Case Nose Court 76981, 77648 & 77733
DOUGLAS MCEACHERN, EDWARD KANE, JUDY CODDING, WILLIAM GOULD, MICHAEL WROTNIAK, and nominal defendant READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., A NEVADA CORPORATION Respondents.	District Court Case No. A-15-719860-B Coordinated with: Case No. P-14-0824-42-E

Appeal (77648 & 76981)

Eighth Judicial District Court, Dept. XI The Honorable Elizabeth G. Gonzalez

JOINT APPENDIX TO OPENING BRIEFS FOR CASE NOS. 77648 & 76981 Volume XXV JA6059 – JA6301

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I am an employee of MORRIS LAW GROUP; I am familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing documents for mailing; that, in accordance therewith, I caused the following document to be e-served via the Supreme Court's electronic service process. I hereby certify that on the 28th day of August, 2019, a true and correct copy of the foregoing JOINT APPENDIX TO OPENING BRIEFS FOR CASE NOS.

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By: <u>/s/ Gabriela Mercado</u>

1	MR. KRUM: The week before is fine, Your Honor.
2	(Pause in the proceedings)
3	THE COURT: The week before is fine?
4	MR. KRUM: The week before is fine, Your Honor.
5	THE COURT: What day are you guys arguing in the
6	Supreme Court?
7	MR. TAYBACK: That's the 3rd.
8	THE COURT: 3rd. So do you want to come in on
9	MR. TAYBACK: 4th?
10	THE CLERK: [Inaudible].
11	THE COURT: No, I'm not seeing them on January 2,
12	you're seeing them on January 2.
13	How about on January 5 at 3:00 o'clock?
14	MR. TAYBACK: That's good. Thank you.
15	MR. KRUM: Perfect.
16	MR. FERRARIO: Thank you, Judge.
17	THE COURT: That will be your final pretrial
18	conference. At your final pretrial conference we're not going
19	to bring exhibits, because you're already going to deal with
20	that. But you are going to bring any jury instructions,
21	you're going to exchange your draft jury instructions. If you
22	have limiting instructions you think are appropriate, try and
23	have those, as well. And we're also going to deal with any
24	exhibits that you want in a notebook for the jury. The only
25	reason I suggest that is sometimes documents that we show on

screens aren't easily able to be seen by a juror. There's 1 2 contract documents and things you may want. If there are 3 selected items you want to have in a jury notebook, it will be 4 a single jury notebook. It will be not more than 3 inches. 5 So whatever we put in it has to fit in the 3 inches. And so if you have things you think you want included in that, we'll 6 7 talk about that. And you're going to -- I will make final 8 decisions on voir dire questions at that time. I encourage 9 you to exchange them a week ahead of time.

MR. KRUM: Your Honor, with respect to exhibits we have a date this week of Wednesday or Thursday for our exhibit list. I think in view of today's developments it would be a good idea to push that back to next week.

THE COURT: You guys need to get working on it.

MR. KRUM: No, we're working on it.

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THE COURT: It takes a lot longer than you think it does.

All right. Anything else that I missed?

MR. FERRARIO: There may be some utility to that,
Mark, in light of the rulings of the Court today, because the
complexion of the case has changed.

MR. KRUM: Well, that's -- we're working on it. We understand that, Your Honor. So may we have until Wednesday of next week you think, Mark?

MR. TAYBACK: Yeah, that's fine.

THE COURT: I still need to see representatives from those parties who remain in the case at the calendar call on December 18th. If you are out of town, I do not do call-ins for calendar calls, Mr. Krum, so just make sure Mr. Morris and Ms. Levin know whatever it is they need to say.

I am going to be asking you whether given the rulings I made today it has changed the estimate that you provided to me through Ms. Hendricks on December 4th as the amount of time for trial. Because I need to negotiate for space, and knowing the time that I need is important for me in my space negotiations.

MR. RHOW: Your Honor, sorry. One point of clarification as to Mr. Gould specifically. He is out of the case entirely?

THE COURT: Well, I granted the motion on the business judgment for him. My understanding is that is the only way that you would be involved, because there are no direct breach of contract claims against you. If there were other types of claims against you that were not protected by the business judgment rule, you might not be out. But I didn't see that in the briefing. But I don't know your case as well as you do.

MR. RHOW: Assuming that's the case, I just want to make sure that no one's going to sanction me if I don't show up.

THE COURT: Do you think you have any remaining 1 claims against Mr. Gould given my ruling today? 2 3 MR. KRUM: Your Honor, probably not. But I'll go back through it. 4 THE COURT: If you could communicate if you think 5 there are any, and then I'll have to handle that on a 6 7 supplemental motion practice. MR. RHOW: Understood, Your Honor. 8 9 THE COURT: Okay. So the people who I anticipate 10 will be here only in the capacity as witnesses would be -okay, I've got to go back to this list -- Kane, McEachern, 11 Gould, Codding, Wrotniak. That's all of them. So the people 12 13 who remain parties are Cotter, Cotter, Adams, and then Mr. Cotter. 14 15 MR. TAYBACK: Yes, Your Honor. I understand that. THE COURT: All right. So see you on the 18th. 16 Thank you, Your Honor. 17 MR. TAYBACK: 18 MR. KRUM: Thank you. 19 MR. EDWARDS: Your Honor --20 THE COURT: Yes, Jim. MR. EDWARDS: -- on the 2nd is local counsel going 21 22 to be here for the exhibits? Do you want local counsel here? 23 THE COURT: Counsel does not need to be here. can send paralegals. So local counsel does not need to come 24 25 sit through it if they don't want to.

MR. EDWARDS: Okay. THE COURT: But it may be helpful if local counsel is going to be intimately involved in the process of doing it for you to have someone here. But I leave that to work out with your people. Anything else? MS. HENDRICKS: Your Honor, on the exhibit list did we get an extra week, then, so we kind of work through these issues? THE COURT: I'm not involved in the exhibit list That's you guys on 2.67. I'm out of that. issue. MR. FERRARIO: Thank you, Your Honor. THE PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 12:00 NOON

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

AFFIRMATION

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

FLORENCE HOYT Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

FLORENCE M. HOYT, TRANSCRIBER

12/12/17

DATE

Steven D. Grierson **CLERK OF THE COURT** ORDR 1 COHEN|JOHNSON|PARKER|EDWARDS H. STAN JOHNSON, ESQ. 2 Nevada Bar No. 00265 sjohnson@cohenjohnson.com 3 375 E. Warm Springs Rd., Suite 104 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 4 Telephone: (702) 823-3500 Facsimile: (702) 823-3400 5 OUINN EMANUEL UROUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP 6 CHRISTOPHER TAYBACK, ESQ. California Bar No. 145532, pro hac vice 7 christayback@quinnemanuel.com MARSHALL M. SEARCY, ESQ. 8 California Bar No. 169269, pro hac vice marshallsearcy@quinnemanuel.com 9 865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017 10 Telephone: (213) 443-3000 11 Attorneys for Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, Edward Kane 12 Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak 13 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 14 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 15 Case No .: A-15-719860-B Dept. No.: 16 JAMES J. COTTER, JR. individually and derivatively on behalf of Reading P-14-082942-E 17 Case No .: International, Inc., Dept. No.: XI 18 Plaintiffs, Related and Coordinated Cases 19 BUSINESS COURT MARGARET COTTER, et al., 20 Defendants. ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS' AND 21 MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFF'S AND READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada 22 DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE corporation, 23 Judge: Hon. Elizabeth Gonzalez Nominal Defendant. 24 Date of Hearing: December 11, 2017 25 Time of Hearing: 8:30 a.m. 26

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THIS MATTER HAVING COME TO BE HEARD BEFORE the Court on December 11, 2017, Mark G. Krum, Steve Morris, and Akke Levin appearing for plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff"); James L. Edwards, Christopher Tayback, and Marshall M. Searcy III appearing for defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, Edward Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak (collectively, the "Individual Defendants"); Mark E. Ferrario and Kara B. Hendricks appearing for nominal defendant Reading International, Inc. ("RDI"); and Ekwan Rhow appearing for defendant William Gould ("Gould," together, with the Individual Defendants and RDI, "Defendants"), on the following motions:

- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 1) re: Plaintiff's Termination and Reinstatement Claims, and supplement thereto;
- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 2) re: The Issue of Director Independence, and supplement thereto;
- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 3) on Plaintiff's Claims Relating to the Purported Unsolicited Offer, and supplement thereto;
- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 5) on Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Appointment of Ellen Cotter as CEO, and supplement thereto;
- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 6) re: Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Estate's Option Exercise, the Appointment of Margaret Cotter, the Compensation Packages of Ellen Cotter and Margaret Cotter,

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and the Additional Compensation to Margaret Cotter and Gu	ıy
Adams, and supplement thereto;	

- Defendant Gould's Motion for Summary Judgment;
- Individual Defendants' Renewed Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony of Myron Steele Based on Supplemental Authority;
- Individual Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence
 That Is More Prejudicial Than Probative;
- Defendant Gould's Motion in Limine to Exclude Irrelevant Speculative Evidence;
- RDI's Motion to Redact Opposition to Plaintiff James J. Cotter,
 Jr.'s Motion in Limine No. 1 re: Advice of Counsel and File
 Exhibit "E" Under Seal;
- Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 1 re: Advice of Counsel;
- Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 2 re: the Submission of Merits-Related Evidence by Nominal Defendant Reading International, Inc.;
- Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 3 re: After-Acquired Evidence;
- Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibit 2 to Plaintiff James J. Cotter's Opposition to Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence That Is More Prejudicial Than Probative;
- Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibits 3-6, 8-9, 11-2 and to Redact Portions of Plaintiff's Supplemental Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Nos. 2 and 3 and Gould Summary Judgment Motion;

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- Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibits 7-11, and 15-17 to Plaintiff's Supplemental Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Nos. 2 and 5 and Gould Summary Judgment Motion; and
- Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibits 4 Through 11 to Plaintiff's Supplemental Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Nos. 2 and 6 and Gould Summary Judgment Motion.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 1) re: Plaintiff's Termination and Reinstatement Claims is GRANTED with respect to Defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak because there are no genuine issues of material fact related to the disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors, and is DENIED with respect to Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, and Guy Adams because there are genuine issues of material fact related to the disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 2) re: The Issue of Director Independence is GRANTED with respect to Defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak because there are no genuine issues of material fact related to the disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors, and is DENIED with respect to Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, and Guy Adams because there are genuine issues of material fact related to the disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 3) on Plaintiff's Claims Relating to the Purported Unsolicited Offer is GRANTED because of

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Plaintiff's failure to show damages related to an unenforceable, unsolicited, nonbinding offer. While Plaintiff at trial cannot claim any damages arising from Defendants' actions with respect to the Patton Vision indications of interest, Plaintiff may still attempt to use evidence regarding the Patton Vision indications to show a breach of fiduciary duty.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 5) on Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Appointment of Ellen Cotter as CEO is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 6) re: Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Estate's Option Exercise, the Appointment of Margaret Cotter, the Compensation Packages of Ellen Cotter and Margaret Cotter, and the Additional Compensation to Margaret Cotter and Guy Adams is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Defendant Gould's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT judgment in favor of Defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak is GRANTED on all claims asserted by Plaintiff.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Renewed Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony of Myron Steele Based on Supplemental Authority is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence That Is More Prejudicial Than Probative is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHERED ORDERED THAT Defendant Gould's Motion in Limine to Exclude Irrelevant Speculative Evidence is DENIED as

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premature, with the issues raised in the motion to be addressed at trial 1 based upon the relevant foundation laid. 2 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 1 re: Advice of Counsel is DENIED. 4 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion in Limine 5 No. 2 re: the Submission of Merits-Related Evidence by Nominal 6 Defendant Reading International, Inc. is DENIED. 7 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion in Limine 8 No. 3 re: After-Acquired Evidence is DENIED. However, to the extent that 9 Plaintiff's retention and use of Highpoint Associates and Derek Alderton is 10 admitted at trial, it will be admitted with an instruction limiting the

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT RDI's Motion to Redact Opposition to Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.'s Motion in Limine No. 1 re: Advice of Counsel and File Exhibit "E" Under Seal is GRANTED.

evidence solely to the issue of Plaintiff's suitability as President and CEO of

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motions to Seal and/or Redact are GRANTED.

DATED this 28 day of December , 2017. 6

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PREPARED AND SUBMITTED BY:

COHEN|JOHNSON|PARKER|EDWARDS

By: /s/ H. Stan Johnson

SULLIVAN, LLP

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CHRISTOPHER TAYBACK, ESQ. California Bar No. 145532, pro hac vice christayback@quinnemanuel.com MARSHALL M. SEARCY, ESQ. California Bar No. 169269, pro hac vice marshallsearcy@quinnemanuel.com 865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017 Telephone: (213) 443-3000

Attorneys for Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, Edward Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak

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CLERK OF THE COURT

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13	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
	James J. Cotter, Jr.	
14	D.LOTT.	DICT COLIDE
15		RICT COURT
_	CLARK CO	DUNTY, NEVADA
16	JAMES J. COTTER, JR.,) Case No. A-15-719860-B
	1	,

DA

derivatively on behalf of Reading) Dept. No. XI
International, Inc.,) -
	Coordinated with:
Plaintiff,)
v.) Case No. P-14-0824-42-E
AADGADEE COMMED ELLEN) Dept. No. XI
MARGARET COTTER, ELLEN)
COTTER, GUY ADAMS,) Jointly Administered
EDWARD KANE, DOUGLAS	MOTION STAY
McEACHERN, WILLIAM) \ AND
GOULD, JUDY CODDING,	(
MICHAEL WROTNIAK,	APPLICATION FOR ORDER
Defendante) SHORTENING TIME
Defendants.	(
And) }
READING INTERNATIONAL,	,
INC., a Nevada corporation,	Ó
Nominal Defendant.	Ó
1 Tolling Decement	Í

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Case Number: A-15-719860-B

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Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff") hereby moves the Court to stay this case pending filing and resolution of his forthcoming petition for writ of mandamus of the Court's impending order granting the individual defendants' motions for partial summary judgments Nos. 1 and 2 ("Partial MSJ Nos. 1 and 2") and William Gould's motion for summary judgment ("Gould MSJ"). Plaintiff further moves the Court under EDCR 2.26 for an Order shortening time to notice and hear this Motion.

MORRIS LAW GROUP

By: Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543 Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102 411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913 YURKO, SALVESEN & REMZ, P.C. 1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor Boston, MA 02108

Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.

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DECLARATION OF AKKE LEVIN IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME

I, Akke Levin, declare:

- I am an attorney with Morris Law Group, counsel for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this declaration except as to those stated on information and belief, which facts I have investigated and believe to be true. I would be competent to testify to them if called upon to do so.
- On December 11, 2017, the Court heard oral argument on 2. the individual defendants' Partial MSJs, Gould's MSJ, and some of the parties' motions in limine. The Court granted Partial MSJ No. 1 regarding Plaintiff's termination and reinstatement; Partial MSJ No. 2 regarding director independence; and Partial MSJ No. 3 regarding the unsolicited Patton Vision offer as to five of the eight defendants. The Court also granted defendant William Gould's MSJ on all claims. The Court further ruled in favor of Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak on all four of Plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claims asserted against them.
- 3. On December 18, Plaintiff submitted a motion for reconsideration of the Court's rulings on Partial MJS Nos. 1 and 2, Gould's MSJ, and the Court's dismissal of William Gould, Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak from the case.
- On December 21, 2017, Plaintiff submitted to the Court a proposed order on all the Court's December 11 rulings.
- 5. The Motion for Reconsideration is set for hearing on December 28, 2017.
- 6. Good cause exists under EDCR 2.26 to shorten the time for notice and hearing of this Motion to Stay. Trial is set to begin on January 8,

2018. If the Motion to Stay is set on the regular calendar, it would not be heard until after trial begins, which would defeat its purpose. Plaintiff proposes that the Court hears this Motion on December 28, 2017, the same day and time that the Court scheduled hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration.

- 7. This Motion is being served by the court's E-Service System to all counsel of record.
- 8. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct

Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102

ORDER SHORTENING TIME

On application of Akke Levin, counsel for plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr., and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the time for notice and hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification shall be, and it hereby is, shortened and shall be heard on shortened time on the day of

Decerber 2017, at the hour of

Judge Elizabeth Goff Gonzalez District Court Judge, Dept. 11

DATED: 28

18 DECEMBER 2017

I. INTRODUCTION

The Court on December 11, 2017 dismissed all Plaintiff's four claims against five of the eight defendants because the Court found there were no issues of material fact as to their disinterestedness and

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independence. The Court's rulings were based the individual defendants' Partial MSJ Nos. 1 and 2 and Gould's MSJ. Plaintiff is seeking reconsideration of this ruling. Plaintiff has prepared and will file—as soon as the Court enters an order on these rulings—a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to vacate the impending order on the motions for summary judgment to the extent the Court does not amend its December 11 rulings following the hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. A stay of this case pending the resolution of Plaintiff's Writ Petition is warranted under Renown Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 130 Nev. , 335 P.3d 199 (2014) and NRAP 8(c).

II. **ARGUMENT**

A. The Court Should Stay the Case to Permit Plaintiff to file a Writ Petition.

Plaintiff's writ petition is based, in part, on the Court's dismissal of all four claims against five defendants whereas the individual director defendants other than Gould had filed only motions for partial summary judgment on certain issues. In Renown Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct. -a case on point in which the district court found in favor of the plaintiff on two claims "even though the full merits of these claims were not specifically argued" in the motions or at the hearing—the district court "stayed the remainder of the case so that Renown could seek writ relief in [the Nevada Supreme Court]." 130 Nev. ____, ___, 335 P.3d 199, 201 (2014). Given the similarities of both cases (as more fully further discussed in Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration) the Court should likewise stay this case.

В. The Court Should Stay the Case Pending the Outcome of Plaintiff's Writ Petition.

A party may seek a stay of the proceedings in the district court pending the "resolution of a petition to the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals for an extraordinary writ." NRAP 8(a)(1)(A). The initial stay

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motion must be made in the district court. Id. "In deciding whether to issue a stay or injunction, the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals will generally consider the following factors: (1) whether the object of the appeal or writ petition will be defeated if the stay or injunction is denied; (2) whether appellant/petitioner will suffer irreparable or serious injury if the stay or injunction is denied; (3) whether respondent/real party in interest will suffer irreparable or serious injury if the stay or injunction is granted; and (4) whether appellant/petitioner is likely to prevail on the merits in the appeal or writ petition." NRAP 8(c). Not all factors have to weigh in the moving party's favor: some factors may be particularly strong and "counterbalance other weak factors." Mikohn Gaming Corp. v. McCrea, 120 Nev. 248, 251, 89 P.3d 36, 38 (2004). As discussed below, however, each of these factors weighs in Plaintiff's favor.

The Object of the Writ Petition Would be Defeated if the 1. Stay is Denied.

The object of Plaintiff's writ petition will be defeated if trial proceeds on January 8 against just three defendants when the result of a successful writ petition will require a second trial against all eight individual defendants. Cf. McCrea, 120 Nev. at 251, 89 P.3d at 39 (finding that the benefits of arbitration, including its purpose to avoid "longer time periods associated with litigation," would "likely be lost" if the appellant "had to simultaneously or sequentially proceed in both judicial and arbitral forums"). Thus, the first factor weighs in Plaintiff's favor.

Plaintiff Would Suffer Serious Harm Without a stay. 2.

As demonstrated in Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, the presumption under NRS 78.138 is rebuttable. If Plaintiff is not allowed to rebut the rebuttable presumption against the five dismissed director defendants at trial, Plaintiff will suffer severe harm at trial, because it

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deprives him of his right to present his case against the five dismissed director defendants to a jury.

3. Defendants would not Suffer Prejudice, much less Irreparable Harm, if a Stay is granted.

It would be in all the parties' interest—including defendants' interest— to stay the case and avoid a costly and time-consuming "do over" of the trial that is about to start if the Nevada Supreme Court vacates the district court's impending order. This factor therefore also weighs in Plaintiff's favor.

4. Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits.

Plaintiff is likely to prevail on one or more aspects of his Writ Petition, which seeks an order vacating the impending order on Partial MSJ Nos. 1 and 2, Gould's MSJ, and the Court's ruling to dismiss five of the director defendants from the case on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff did not get notice and an opportunity to be heard before all four claims were dismissed against these five defendants; (2) briefing on Gould's MSJ was still open; and (3) the Court's ruling deprived Plaintiff of the right to introduce evidence at trial to rebut the presumption that the acts and omissions of the five dismissed directors were protected by the business judgment rule.

In *Renown*, the Nevada Supreme Court granted the hospital's writ petition in similar circumstances. There, the district court found in favor of the plaintiff "on his breach of contract and intentional interference with contract claims, even though the full merits of these claims were not specifically argued in the cross-motions for summary judgment or at the hearing." 130 Nev. at ____, 335 P.3d at 202. The Nevada Supreme Court granted the writ petition because these claims were not mentioned anywhere "in the six summary judgment briefs" and Renown did not receive ten days notice and an opportunity to defend itself on those claims. *Id.*

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Similarly here, the director defendants other than Gould filed only motions for partial summary judgment on certain issues (not claims) and Plaintiff did not receive notice and an opportunity to defend himself before summary judgment was granted as to five defendants.

As to the third ground, Plaintiff raises a sound legal issue that is meritorious as well: the district court decided Plaintiff's fiduciary duty claims against five directors based solely on the grounds that Plaintiff had failed to raise a disputed issue of material fact regarding their disinterestedness or independence. This factor therefore also weighs in Plaintiff's favor.

III. **CONCLUSION**

For the reasons stated above, the Court should stay this action pending decision of the Writ Petition.

MORRIS LAW GROUP

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Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913 YURKO, SALVESEN & REMZ, P.C. 1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor Boston, MA 02108

Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.

MORRIS LAW GROUP

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D) and E.D.C.R. 8.05, I certify that I am an employee of MORRIS LAW GROUP and that on the date below, I cause the following document(s) to be served via the Court's Odyssey E-Filing System: MOTION TO STAY AND APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME to be served on all interested parties, as registered with the Court's E-Filing and E-Service System. The date and time of the electronic proof of service is in place of the date and place of deposit in the mail.

DATED this 1990 day of December, 2017.

An employee of Morris Law Group

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13	Attorneys for Plaintiff	×
14	James J. Cotter, Jr.	
	DISTR	ICT COURT
15	CLARK CO	UNTY, NEVADA
16	, , ,) Case No. A-15-719860-B
17	derivatively on behalf of Reading International, Inc.,) Dept. No. XI)
18		Coordinated with:
19	Plaintiff,) Case No. P-14-0824-42-E
20) Dept. No. XI
21	MARGARET COTTER, ELLEN COTTER, GUY ADAMS,)) Jointly Administered
22	EDWARD KANE, DOUGLAS)
23	McEACHERN, WILLIAM GOULD, JUDY CODDING,)) NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER
	MICHAEL WROTNIAK,) NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER
24		
25	Defendants.) }
26	and DEADING INTERNIATIONAL	
27	READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada corporation,))
28	Nominal Defendant.	Ś
)

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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an Order Regarding Defendants' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's and Defendants' Motions *in Limine* was entered by this Honorable Court on the 28th day of December, 2017. A copy of the Order is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

MORRIS LAW GROUP

By: /s/ Akke Levin
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Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102
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Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

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Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.

MORRIS LAW GROUP 411 E. BONNEVILLE AVE., STE. 360 · LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 8910

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D) and E.D.C.R. 8.05, I certify that I am an employee of MORRIS LAW GROUP and that on the date below, I cause the following document(s) to be served on all interested parties as registered with the Court's E-Filing/E-Service System: **NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER**. The date and time of the electronic proof of service is in place of the date and place of deposit in the mail.

DATED this 2017.

By: <u>/s/ Linda P. Daniel</u>
An employee of Morris Law Group

EXHIBIT A

			Electronically Filed 12/28/2017 4:22 PM Steven D. Grierson
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6	QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIV. CHRISTOPHER TAYBACK, ESQ.	AN, LLP	
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11	Attorneys for Defendants Margaret Cotter,	. 177	
12	Ellen Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, E Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak	dward Kane	
13			
14	EIGHTH JUDICIAL		OURT
15	CLARK COUN		A-15-719860-B
16	JAMES J. COTTER, JR. individually and		XI
17	derivatively on behalf of Reading International, Inc.,		P-14-082942-E XI
18	Plaintiffs,	Related and Co	pordinated Cases
19	v. MARGARET COTTER, et al.,	BUSINESS C	OURT
20	Defendants.	ODDED DEC	ARDING DEFENDANTS'
21	AND	MOTIONS FO	OR PARTIAL SUMMARY
22	READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada corporation,	JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFF'S AND DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE	
23 24	Nominal Defendant.	Judge:	Hon. Elizabeth Gonzalez
25		Date of Hearin Time of Hearin	ng: December 11, 2017 ng: 8:30 a.m.
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THIS MATTER HAVING COME TO BE HEARD BEFORE the Court on December 11, 2017, Mark G. Krum, Steve Morris, and Akke Levin appearing for plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff"); James L. Edwards, Christopher Tayback, and Marshall M. Searcy III appearing for defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, Edward Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak (collectively, the "Individual Defendants"); Mark E. Ferrario and Kara B. Hendricks appearing for nominal defendant Reading International, Inc. ("RDI"); and Ekwan Rhow appearing for defendant William Gould ("Gould," together, with the Individual Defendants and RDI, "Defendants"), on the following motions:

- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 1) re: Plaintiff's Termination and Reinstatement Claims, and supplement thereto;
- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 2) re: The Issue of Director Independence, and supplement thereto;
- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 3) on Plaintiff's Claims Relating to the Purported Unsolicited Offer, and supplement thereto;
- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 5) on Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Appointment of Ellen Cotter as CEO, and supplement thereto;
- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 6) re: Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Estate's Option Exercise, the Appointment of Margaret Cotter, the Compensation Packages of Ellen Cotter and Margaret Cotter,

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and the Additional Compensation to Margaret Cotter and Gu	ıy
Adams, and supplement thereto;	

- Defendant Gould's Motion for Summary Judgment;
- Individual Defendants' Renewed Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony of Myron Steele Based on Supplemental Authority;
- Individual Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence That Is More Prejudicial Than Probative;
- Defendant Gould's Motion in Limine to Exclude Irrelevant Speculative Evidence;
- RDI's Motion to Redact Opposition to Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Ir.'s Motion in Limine No. 1 re: Advice of Counsel and File Exhibit "E" Under Seal;
- Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 1 re: Advice of Counsel;
- Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 2 re: the Submission of Merits-Related Evidence by Nominal Defendant Reading International, Inc.;
- Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 3 re: After-Acquired Evidence;
- Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibit 2 to Plaintiff James J. Cotter's Opposition to Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence That Is More Prejudicial Than Probative;
- Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibits 3-6, 8-9, 11-2 and to Redact Portions of Plaintiff's Supplemental Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Nos. 2 and 3 and Gould Summary Judgment Motion;

- Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibits 7-11, and 15-17 to Plaintiff's Supplemental Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Nos. 2 and 5 and Gould Summary Judgment Motion; and
- Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibits 4 Through 11 to Plaintiff's Supplemental Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Nos. 2 and 6 and Gould Summary Judgment Motion.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 1) re: Plaintiff's Termination and Reinstatement Claims is GRANTED with respect to Defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak because there are no genuine issues of material fact related to the disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors, and is DENIED with respect to Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, and Guy Adams because there are genuine issues of material fact related to the disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 2) re: The Issue of Director Independence is GRANTED with respect to Defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak because there are no genuine issues of material fact related to the disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors, and is DENIED with respect to Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, and Guy Adams because there are genuine issues of material fact related to the disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 3) on Plaintiff's Claims
Relating to the Purported Unsolicited Offer is GRANTED because of

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Plaintiff's failure to show damages related to an unenforceable, unsolicited, nonbinding offer. While Plaintiff at trial cannot claim any damages arising from Defendants' actions with respect to the Patton Vision indications of interest, Plaintiff may still attempt to use evidence regarding the Patton Vision indications to show a breach of fiduciary duty.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 5) on Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Appointment of Ellen Cotter as CEO is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 6) re: Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Estate's Option Exercise, the Appointment of Margaret Cotter, the Compensation Packages of Ellen Cotter and Margaret Cotter, and the Additional Compensation to Margaret Cotter and Guy Adams is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Defendant Gould's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT judgment in favor of Defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak is GRANTED on all claims asserted by Plaintiff.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Renewed Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony of Myron Steele Based on Supplemental Authority is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence That Is More Prejudicial Than Probative is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHERED ORDERED THAT Defendant Gould's Motion in Limine to Exclude Irrelevant Speculative Evidence is DENIED as

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premature, with the issues raised in the motion to be addressed at trial based upon the relevant foundation laid.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 1 re: Advice of Counsel is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 2 re: the Submission of Merits-Related Evidence by Nominal Defendant Reading International, Inc. is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 3 re: After-Acquired Evidence is DENIED. However, to the extent that Plaintiff's retention and use of Highpoint Associates and Derek Alderton is admitted at trial, it will be admitted with an instruction limiting the evidence solely to the issue of Plaintiff's suitability as President and CEO of RDI.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT RDI's Motion to Redact Opposition to Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.'s Motion in Limine No. 1 re: Advice of Counsel and File Exhibit "E" Under Seal is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motions to Seal and/or Redact are GRANTED.

DATED this 28th day of December 2017. 6

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PREPARED AND SUBMITTED BY:

COHEN|JOHNSON|PARKER|EDWARDS

By: /s/ H. Stan Johnson

H. STAN JOHNSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 00265 sjohnson@cohenjohnson.com 375 E. Warm Springs Rd., Suite 104 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 Telephone: (702) 823-3500

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QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP

CHRISTOPHER TAYBACK, ESQ. California Bar No. 145532, pro hac vice christayback@quinnemanuel.com MARSHALL M. SEARCY, ESQ. California Bar No. 169269, pro hac vice marshallsearcy@quinnemanuel.com 865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017 Telephone: (213) 443-3000

Attorneys for Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, Edward Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak

Electronically Filed 12/29/2017 5:15 PM Steven D. Grierson MOT CLERK OF THE COURT 1 MORRIS LAW GROUP 2 Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543 Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102 3 411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 4 Telephone: (702) 474-9400 5 Facsimile: (702) 474-9422 Email: sm@morrislawgroup.com 6 Email: al@morrislawgroup.com 7 Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913 8 Yurko, Salvesen & Remz, P.C. 1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor 9 Boston, MA 02108 10 Telephone: (617) 723-6900 Facsimile: (617) 723-6905 11 Email: mkrum@bizlit.com 12 MASTER CALENDAR Attorneys for Plaintiff 13 James J. Cotter, Jr. 14 DISTRICT COURT 15 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 16) Case No. A-15-719860-B JAMES J. COTTER, JR., derivatively on behalf of Reading Dept. No. XI 17 International, Inc., Coordinated with: 18 Plaintiff, 19 Case No. P-14-0824-42-E Dept. No. XI 20 MARGARET COTTER, ELLEN 21 Jointly Administered COTTER, GUY ADAMS, EDWARD KANE, DOUGLAS 22 McEACHERN, WILLIAM MOTION FOR RULE 54(b) GOULD, JUDY CODDING, 23 CERTIFICATION AND STAY MICHAEL WROTNIAK, 24 AND Defendants. 25 APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME And 26 READING INTERNATIONAL, HRq: 01/04/18 27 INC., a Nevada corporation, @ 8:30mm. 28 Nominal Defendant.

12-29-17405ED1 4EVO

MORRIS LAW GROUP 411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 · Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 702/474-9400 · Fax 702/474-9422

Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff") hereby moves the Court on an emergency basis under Nev. R. Civ. P. 54(b) for an order certifying the portion of her December 28, 2017 Order that grants William Gould's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Gould MSJ"), grants defendants' motions for partial summary judgments Nos. 1 and 2 ("Partial MSJ Nos. 1 and 2") and dismisses defendants William Gould, Douglas McEachern, Edward Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak from the case as final. Plaintiff further moves the Court under EDCR 2.26 for an Order shortening time to notice and hear this Motion.

MORRIS LAW GROUP

By: Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543
Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102
411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913 YURKO, SALVESEN & REMZ, P.C. 1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor Boston, MA 02108

Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.

DECLARATION OF AKKE LEVIN IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME

I, Akke Levin, declare:

- 1. I am an attorney with Morris Law Group, counsel for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this declaration except as to those stated on information and belief, which facts I have investigated and believe to be true. I would be competent to testify to them if called upon to do so.
- 2. On December 11, 2017, the Court heard oral argument on the individual defendants' Partial MSJs, Gould's MSJ, and some of the parties' motions *in limine*. The Court granted Partial MSJ No. 1 regarding Plaintiff's termination and reinstatement; Partial MSJ No. 2 regarding director independence; and Partial MSJ No. 3 regarding the unsolicited Patton Vision offer as to five of the eight defendants. The Court also granted defendant William Gould's MSJ on all claims. The Court further ruled in favor of Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak on all Plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claims asserted against them.
- 3. On December 18, 2017, Plaintiff submitted a motion for reconsideration of the Court's rulings on Partial MJS Nos. 1 and 2, Gould's MSJ, and the Court's dismissal of William Gould, Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak from the case. Plaintiff also submitted a Motion to Stay on December 26, 2017.
- 4. During the December 28, 2017 hearing, the Court denied Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Stay.
- 5. On December 28, 2017, the Court signed the order on Gould's MSJ, the individual defendants' Partial MSJs, and the MILs ("Order").

	6. Good cause exists under EDCR 2.26 to shorten the time for
n	notice and hearing of this Motion for Rule 54(b) certification. Trial is set to
b	begin on January 8, 2018. The Court denied Plaintiff's Motion to Stay.
P	Plaintiff plans to seek immediate relief in the Nevada Supreme Court, but
tl	he form of relief—direct appeal or writ petition—depends on whether the
C	Court will certify portions of the order as final. If this Motion for Rule 54(b)
C	ertification is set on the regular calendar, it would not be heard until after
tı	rial begins. Plaintiff proposes a telephonic hearing with counsel on Friday
a	fternoon, December 29, 2017, so that Plaintiff may timely file his writ
p	petition or appeal immediately thereafter.

- This Motion is being served by the court's E-Service 7. System to all counsel of record.
- I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the 8. State of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct

Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102

MORRIS LAW GROUP

ORDER SHORTENING TIME

On application of Akke Levin, counsel for plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr., and good cause appearing,

> Judge Elizabeth Soff Sonzalez District Court Judge, Dept. 11

DATED: 29 Dec 17

MORRIS LAW GROUP E. BONNEVILLE AVE., STE. 360 · LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422

I. INTRODUCTION

The Court on December 11, 2017 dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims against five of the eight defendants because the Court found there were no issues of material fact as to their disinterestedness and independence. The Court's rulings were based the individual defendants' Partial MSJ Nos. 1 and 2 and Gould's MSJ. For the reasons stated below, the Court should certify as final its order (1) granting Gould's MSJ, (2) granting Partial MSJ Nos. 1 and 2, and (3) dismissing defendants William Gould, Douglas McEachern, Edward Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak. The Court should further stay the case pending Plaintiff's appeal. A proposed order is attached as **Exhibit 1**.

II. ARGUMENT

A. The Legal Basis for this Motion

NRCP 54 (b) provides, in relevant part:

(b) Judgment Involving Multiple Parties. When multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment

When "asked to certify a judgment based on the elimination of a party, [the district court] should first consider the prejudice to that party in being forced to wait to bring its appeal." *Mallin v. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 106 Nev. 606, 611, 797 P.2d 978, 981 (1990). "Second, the district court should consider the prejudice to the parties remaining below if the judgment is certified as final." *Id.* "[T]he fact that a decision by [the Nevada Supreme Court] will affect the decision below cannot be the deciding issue" and preclude a finding that there is no just reason to delay an appeal. *Id.* at 610, 797 P.2d at 981. "The district court should weigh the prejudice to the various parties and should certify a judgment as final in a 'parties' case if the

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prejudice to the eliminated party would be greater than the prejudice to the parties remaining below." Id. at 611, 797 P.2d at 981.

Plaintiff will be Severely Prejudiced If Required to Wait to Appeal.

Plaintiff will be severely prejudiced if required to wait to appeal, for a number of reasons.

First, as the remaining defendants have made clear, they will take the position that dismissal of this case as against the five individual director defendants severely limits the matters on which Plaintiff can base breach of fiduciary duty claims against the remaining defendants. In that regard, defendants have indicated that they will take the position that, with respect to any matter as to which a majority of the directors making or approving a decision have been dismissed by the Court, those matters alone may not serve as bases for breach of fiduciary duty claims against the remaining defendants. Any doubt that that is the position defendants intend to pursue is put to rest by Court Exhibit 1 to the December 28, 2018 hearing, which shows that the dismissed five director defendants intend to take action to formally ratify prior conduct as to which the remaining director defendants will not be able to show that a majority of the directors who made or approved the decision were disinterested and independent. For example, with respect to the 3-to-2 vote to terminate Plaintiff, the five dismissed director defendants intend to ratify that vote, and then allow the remaining defendants to argue that Adams' lack of independence does not matter and that the termination vote cannot serve as a basis for liability on his part. Thus, according to the remaining defendants, the Court's ruling dismissing the five director defendants effectively guts Plaintiff's case.

Second, as the remaining director defendants have previewed, they will take the position that dismissal of the case as against the five dismissed director defendants affects which party bears the burden of proof.

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With respect to matters as to which the Court has determined that the remaining defendants lacked disinterestedness, independence or both and therefore cannot invoke the statutory presumptions typically referred to as the business judgment rule, the remaining defendants will argue that the business judgment rule nevertheless applies because a majority of the directors who made or approved the challenged decision were found by the Court not to lack disinterestedness or independence and were dismissed. As to matters with respect to which they cannot show that a majority of the directors who made or approved the challenged decision were dismissed by the Court, the remaining defendants clearly intend to rely on the forthcoming ratification of those actions by the dismissed five director defendants. One example that illustrates this point is the 3-to-2 termination vote.

Third, and independent of the foregoing, Plaintiff is severely prejudiced because the jury is certain to be confused about why the same evidence showing breaches of fiduciary duty by a more than one director is introduced when fewer than all of the directors who engaged in such fiduciary breaches remained defendants. For example, as the Court has seen, the evidence will show clearly that Adams, Kane and McEachern threatened Plaintiff with termination if he did not resolve trust and estate disputes with his sisters on terms satisfactory to them. In particular, the evidence will show that at the board meeting adjourned in the early afternoon on May 29, 2015, the three told Plaintiff that the meeting would reconvene telephonically at 6:00 p.m. that evening and that they would vote to terminate him as President and CEO of RDI if he had not resolved the trust and estate disputes on terms satisfactory to his sisters. The likely and reasonable inferences jurors will draw from the fact that only Adams of the three remains a defendant is that extortionate conduct in furtherance of the

interests of the sisters, not the interests of RDI, is not a breach of fiduciary duty.

Fourth, plaintiff's ability to present this case, which arises from an ongoing course of breaches of loyalty by directors who consistently and repeatedly deferred to the wishes of the controlling shareholders rather than protecting only the interests of the Company, is severely impaired.

C. The Remaining Defendants Will not be Prejudiced if the Order Dismissing the Five is Certified.

On the other hand, the remaining defendants will not be prejudiced, much less severely prejudiced, if the Court grants the rule 54(b) certification Plaintiff requests. Presumably they will complain about delay, but delay does not compare to substantive prejudice and, as a practical matter, they lack standing to complain, having effectively stayed this case for approximately a year by their writ practice regarding discovery matters. Indeed, the only "prejudice" to which the remaining defendants can cite is the possible loss of the ability to defend the case against them based on the Court's ruling dismissing the five, which will be lost only if this case is stayed. In other words, the remaining defendants will suffer no actual prejudice, much less severe prejudice, if the Court grants rule 54(b) certification.

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III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court should grant this Motion and certify under Rule 54(b) as final its order (1) granting Gould's MSJ, (2) granting Partial MSJ Nos. 1 and 2; and (3) dismissing defendants William Gould, Douglas McEachern, Edward Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak, and stay the case pending Plaintiff's appeal.

MORRIS LAW GROUP

By: Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543 Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102 411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913 YURKO, SALVESEN & REMZ, P.C. 1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor Boston, MA 02108

Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.

f MORRIS LAW GROUP1 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 \cdot Las Vegas, Nevada 8910

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D) and E.D.C.R. 8.05, I certify that I am an employee of MORRIS LAW GROUP and that on the date below, I cause the following document(s) to be served on all interested parties, as registered with the Court's E-Filing and E-Service System:

MOTION FOR RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION AND STAY AND

APPLICATION FOR ORDER SHORTENING TIME. The date and time of the electronic proof of service is in place of the date and place of deposit in the mail.

DATED this 29th day of December, 2017.

By: /s/ Linda P. Daniel

An employee of Morris Law Group

Exhibit 1

MORRIS LAW GROUP 411 E. BONNEVILLE AVE., STE. 360 · LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422

	ORDR	
1	MORRIS LAW GROUP	
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8	Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913 Yurko, Salvesen & Remz, P.C.	
9	1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor	
10	Boston, MA 02108	
11	Telephone: (617) 723-6900 Facsimile: (617) 723-6905	
	Email: mkrum@bizlit.com	
12	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
13	James J. Cotter, Jr.	
14	Dietro	ICT COLIDT
15	DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA	
16) Case No. A-15-719860-B
17	derivatively on behalf of Reading) Dept. No. XI
18	International, Inc.,)) Coordinated with:
	Plaintiff,) Coordinated with.
19	v.) Case No. P-14-0824-42-E
20	MARGARET COTTER, ELLEN) Dept. No. XI \
21	COTTER, GUY ADAMS,)) Jointly Administered
22	EDWARD KANE, DOUGLAS) \ [PPOPOSED] OPDED CD ANTING
23	McEACHERN, WILLIAM GOULD, JUDY CODDING,) [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RULE
24	MICHAEL WROTNIAK,	54(b) CERTIFICATION AND STAY
	Defendants.) Date of Hearing: December, 2017
25	And	Time of Hearing:a.m./P.M.
26	READING INTERNATIONAL,	
27	INC., a Nevada corporation,	<i>)</i> }
28	Nominal Defendant.	ý)
)

MORRIS LAW GROUP

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THIS MATTER CAME BEFORE THE COURT on the Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification and Stay of plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff"). The Court, having considered any papers filed and arguments made in support of and in opposition to the Motion, and for good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification is GRANTED because Plaintiff will be severely prejudiced if required to wait to appeal and the remaining defendants will not be prejudiced if the Court's December 28, 2017 order dismissing defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak is certified.

The Court therefore finds and determines, under Nev. R. Civ. P. 54(b), that there is no just reason for delay and hereby directs entry of judgment as to defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak on all of Plaintiff's claims against them.

MORRIS LAW GROUP 411 E. BONNEVILLE AVE., STE. 360 - LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 - FAX 702/474-9422

1	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the case is stayed pending		
2	Plaintiff's appeal.		
3			
4	DATED this day of, 2017.		
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6			
7	THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ,		
8	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE		
9	Submitted by:		
10			
11	MORRIS LAW GROUP		
12	Bry /c/ Akka Lamin		
13	By: <u>/s/ Akke Levin</u> Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543		
14	Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102 411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360		
15	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101		
16	Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913		
17	YURKO, SALVESEN & REMZ, P.C. 1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor		
18	Boston, MA 02108		
19	Attorneys for Plaintiff		
20	James J. Cotter, Jr.		
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Electronically Filed 12/29/2017 11:27 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

TRAN

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
* * * * *

JAMES COTTER, JR.

CASE NO. A-15-719860-B

Plaintiff

A-16-735305-B P-14-082942-E

vs.

DEPT. NO. XI

MARGARET COTTER, et al.

•

Defendants .

Transcript of Proceedings

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BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

HEARING ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION FOR STAY

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 28, 2017

COURT RECORDER: TRANSCRIPTION BY:

JILL HAWKINS FLORENCE HOYT

District Court Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF: MARK G. KRUM, ESQ.

AKKE LEVIN, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANTS: H. STANLEY JOHNSON, ESQ.

MARSHALL M. SEARCY, ESQ. MARK E. FERRARIO, ESQ.

SHOSHANNA BANNETT, ESQ.

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 28, 2017, 9:02 A.M. 1 2 (Court was called to order) 3 THE COURT: Good morning. Mr. Ferrario, so kind of you to join us. 4 MR. FERRARIO: Wouldn't miss it. 5 THE COURT: You can sit down. 6 7 Mr. Ferrario called my staff yesterday to see if he could get out of coming to court. MR. FERRARIO: I just hinted. 10 THE COURT: So I have a motion for stay that was submitted on an OST, but it was submitted after 5:00 o'clock 11 12 on Tuesday, so we didn't get it in time to set it for this 1.3 morning. Does anyone have an objection to the motion for stay being heard after I hear the motion for reconsideration? 14 MR. SEARCY: No objection. 15 16 THE COURT: Okay. So we'll hear that this morning. 17 I'll have Dulce take care of whatever that means. But come on 18 up and let's do the motion. 19 (Pause in the proceedings) 2.0 THE COURT: Ms. Levin, I don't know what happens 21 after this, but I'm now handing it to Dulce, and you and Dulce talk after the hearing. 2.2 2.3 MS. LEVIN: The motion to stay? 24 THE COURT: Okay. You're up, Mr. Krum. 25 MR. KRUM: Thank you, Your Honor. Good morning.

The motion for reconsideration, as I trust you saw, raises three arguments. And I'll speak to the two principal arguments, the first of which is what we view as the error of granting a dismissal of the case when it wasn't sought. The second is what we view as the error of the application of the business judgment rule. The motion -- excuse me. The oppositions pretty much agree with us on how you handle this, and we just disagree about how it should have been handled.

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But before I speak to that, Your Honor, I note that there was some complaint about there wasn't any new evidence. I don't know if that's correct or not, but there is new evidence that we were not in a position to include in our motion because we just received it last night. And what it is, Your Honor, is that the five individuals with respect to whom you made a determination that there was no disputed issue of material fact --

THE COURT: Codding, Kane, Gould, Wrotniak, and McEachern.

MR. KRUM: Correct. Yeah. Those five individuals have apparently requested that the matter be added to a board meeting agenda tomorrow. And what they propose to do is to ratify the conduct of some of them and some of others as to matters, Your Honor, with respect to which you denied motions for summary judgment. So --

THE COURT: Mr. Krum, let me step back for a minute

just so we're clear. Because it may be that I communicated poorly when we were all here. I made a determination that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the interestedness of those five individuals. As a result, that means the direct claims against those individuals for personal liability was granted, because I did not make a finding that there was an interestedness on their part. I understand you may have issues with that from a factual standpoint, and we'll talk about that in a minute.

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The impact of that is that it doesn't affect the claims that you're making against the company. Because while you are arguing that there has been a breach of an agreement and other things related to the conduct of those individuals, as well, that doesn't preclude from making that argument. It simply precludes under the business judgment rule from obtaining personal liability against those five directors who I made a determination there was insufficient evidence to go forward given the business judgment rule.

So I'm just trying to make sure that we're clear on what I did. Because when I was reading your briefing I wasn't really sure that that came across.

MR. KRUM: Well, Your Honor, I think so. I think that we just have a disagreement.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. KRUM: And disagreement, Your Honor, not with --

so much with respect to the facts, but rather with respect to 1 the law and the application of the business judgment rule. 2 3 But may I finish this new evidence? THE COURT: Yes, please. 4 5 MR. KRUM: Because I think, Your Honor, this goes to 6 interestedness or --7 THE COURT: Ratification? 8 MR. KRUM: -- independence. Indeed it does, Your Honor, independence. 10 THE COURT: Okay. MR. KRUM: So here's what we have. 11 We have five 12 individuals who think they're out of the case now, and they're 13 prepared to take steps so that new evidence can be introduced 14 in the case against the other individual defendants. What 15 they're trying to do, Your Honor, is change the burden of 16 proof at trial we're supposed to commence on January 8th. 17 Because what they're going to say is that a majority of 18 disinterested and independent directors have ratified all 19 these actions and that Mr. Krum's argument that the remaining directors bear the burden of proof and so forth and so on 2.0 21 doesn't play anymore. And so what they're doing, Your Honor, 22 is creating an entire new fact set so the lawyers can try to 2.3 argue different legal standards apply. 2.4 Now, if I may, because I don't want to speak to the 25 particulars, it's easy to look at them. May I give this to

1 you? 2 THE COURT: Is it okay if I mark it as Court's 3 Exhibit 1, since you're getting a copy? That's acceptable, Your Honor, now that 4 MR. SEARCY: 5 I've got a copy. MR. KRUM: And it's stamped as confidential. 6 7 THE COURT: Court's Exhibit 1, please. 8 Okay. Since it's stamped as confidential because it apparently includes commercially sensitive information, I am 10 going to not talk about it specifically, but only in 11 generalities. How's that? 12 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. KRUM: 1.3 THE CLERK: So you want this sealed, Your Honor? THE COURT: It will be sealed. 14 THE CLERK: Thank you. 15 16 THE COURT: Thank you, Dulce. 17 So, Your Honor, the point of this action MR. KRUM: to date and action that's anticipated is that it shows -- it 18 evidences further the lack of independence of these persons 19 2.0 who are undertaking to ratify conduct you have found to be 2.1 such that it raises a triable issue of fact. So on the issue 22 of independence with respect to which we disagree, 2.3 respectfully, as to how that can be rebutted -- I mean, I 24 think I understood what you said, and the opposition takes the 25 position that reflects my understanding of what you said, that

we didn't show disinterestedness, actually was what you said, and therefore --

THE COURT: Lack of interestedness.

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MR. KRUM: Yeah. And therefore the rule applies and there's no liability. And I respectfully disagree. And we've talked past each other at some length at the last hearing where I kept talking about the evidence and you kept telling me I was talking about evidence of breach of fiduciary duty. And I don't intend to repeat that. But this, Your Honor, is new evidence. It is new evidence of a lack of independence. And that's without regard to the issue that what do we do now. These five people who are witnesses, based on your decision, are going to come in here and testify, we ratified the actions set out in pages 3(a) and (b) of the document that I handed to the Court. And these are matters that -- as to which you denied summary judgment. They're matters as to which equitable relief is sought, and they're going to argue to you, Judge, based on the actions of these five people you've found are independent the case is over, you can't grant equitable relief no matter whether you could before. So I --

THE COURT: Most people might say that's a little late in the game.

MR. KRUM: Well, I think it is, Your Honor. And so maybe I'm ahead of myself on the stay issue.

But -- so that's the new evidence that we learned -- I learned about 10:00 o'clock when I landed in LAX back on the 48 last night.

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So on the first issue, Your Honor, that was in our motion the Court granted summary judgment as to these five individuals and dismissed the case as to the claims for breach of the duty of care, breach of the duty of loyalty, and breach of the duty of candor.

Now, the only motion that sought summary judgment across the board was the one by Mr. Gould. And, of course, you know our point on that, and we talked about it at the last hearing. I'm not going to repeat myself.

The other ones were described as motions for partial summary judgment, and they were directed at specific issues. There wasn't a single one that said dismiss the case. And with respect to partial -- Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Number 2, which was the one -- that director interestedness, that didn't request dismissal, either. All that did was request a determination on that discrete issue. And, Your Honor, the business judgment rule is a evidentiary presumption, and we're entitled to rebut it, and we're entitled to do so by showing that they breached their fiduciary duties. I'm not going to go into that, because I'm already repeating myself.

The other thing I'd say, Your Honor, is at the

hearing in October of 2016 we had some discussion about the nature of these motions, and at page 83, line 8 to 12, you said, "It's not summary judgment, but, yeah, I understand you're asking for a pretrial ruling or a pretrial determination. But it's not supposed to be summary judgment on that kind of fact." And the fact that was raised by Mr. Tayback to which you responded was independence. And so that's why we understood we were supposed to provide these details. And then we get to the question of what's jury instruction going to be with respect to, for example, the abort CEO search.

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So, Your Honor, the last point on this independence issue, independence isn't required. You know, their duty of care claims can be made and brought regardless of whether there's independence or interest and so forth. And the same, by the way, is true for duty of candor claims. That issue really ties in with the duty of loyalty. So now the last comment on that is -- and this perhaps is why we seem to be talking past one another or perhaps I wasn't listening well, as the case may be -- breaches of the duty of loyalty are evidence of a lack of independence. It's -- the loyalty is supposed to be singular. It's supposed to be to the company. It's not supposed to be divvied up between the company and the controlling shareholders or any other party. And where it is -- where there's evidence that it is, that's evidence of a

lack of independence.

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So on the business judgment rule, Your Honor, I think we've covered that. We have a different view of what it means to have a director who is not -- does not lack independence and who is disinterested. All that means in our view is that the presumption applies, the three-part presumption, and that we can rebut it by evidencing any one of those three parts didn't happen. And the Shoen case talks about that and the cases we cited in the briefing, and so I'm not going to belabor that.

So I guess with that, unless you have questions, I'll stop.

THE COURT: I don't have any questions. Thank you.

MR. SEARCY: Your Honor, I'll try to be brief. The

plaintiff's claim that we didn't move on all the causes of

action is a red herring here. We moved on all the specific

breaches that were supposedly put at issue by plaintiff in

their causes of action, and in fact at the Court's direction

plaintiff identified the breaches that are at issue in their

supplemental briefing, and we moved on all of those issues.

With respect to Motion Number 2 that we filed, which went specifically to the issue of disinterestedness, that was clearly dispositive on all claims with respect to those directors, because it implicated the business judgment rule.

And those are set forth on page 6 of our opposition.

Issues in this case have been briefed extensively. They've had every opportunity to submit evidence on these issues, and they failed to come forward with any evidence that would show a lack of disinterestedness with respect to the directors on whom you've granted summary judgment, specifically Mr. Kane, Mr. McEachern, Mr. Wrotniak, and Ms. Codding. They haven't come forward with any evidence showing a beholdenness or some sort of self interest that is implicated in any of the transactions that are at issue in this case.

With respect to the new evidence that plaintiff has now come forward with --

THE COURT: Court Exhibit 1.

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MR. SEARCY: Court Exhibit 1. Thank you, Your Honor.

-- this simply demonstrates the problem with the reasoning of plaintiffs with respect to all of this.

Plaintiff disagrees with the decision of the board, therefore that somehow is supposed to be an indication of lack of disinterestedness. It doesn't work that way with the business judgment rule. He's got to come forward with evidence that shows that their reasoning, that their thought process was somehow impacted. He's failed to do that.

Your Honor, the motion for reconsideration should be denied.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Ms. Bannett.

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MS. BANNETT: Mr. Krum didn't address Mr. Gould specifically when he spoke, but, again, he did not point to any evidence that shows that Mr. Gould had a financial relationship with either of the Cotter sisters or that Mr. Gould had a close personal relationship with either of the Cotter sisters. And under the business judgment rule that is what is needed in order to rebut the presumption and move on to the next part of the case. It's not only what the Court has said, it's also what plaintiff's own expert witness said. That would be Chief Justice Steele from the Delaware Supreme Court, former Chief Justice. He found that there was no evidence that Mr. Gould was -- lacked independence or lacked disinterested and, as a result, he found that there is no basis for the claims against Mr. Gould to proceed. He did not apply his opinions about breaches of fiduciary duty to Mr. Gould, and he specifically excepted him from his opinions in this case.

If the Court has any questions about Mr. Gould -THE COURT: I don't have any questions. Thank you.
Mr. Ferrario, anything on behalf of the nominal
defendant?

MR. FERRARIO: No, Your Honor. Other than I think your ruling initially was correct and I think it should stand.

And I suspect that coming out of the meeting Friday, depending on what occurs, there may be some issues we may need to bring to Your Honor's attention at the pretrial conference set for next Friday. And I'm not saying this to be facetious. I have gone through Mr. Krum's complaint, participated in one of the calls, you know, dealing with the pretrial order, and I've gone through the pretrial order. And I really think it would be beneficial for the Court -- we're going to have a jury impaneled -- that at that pretrial conference that plaintiff articulate clearly what claims plaintiff believes he still has left.

THE COURT: I'm not there.

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MR. FERRARIO: Okay. I'm just --

THE COURT: That is technically part of what has to be in the pretrial order, though.

MR. FERRARIO: And, Judge, the pretrial order, Ms. Cowden and I have gotten into a number of arguments over the last couple days about what I heard coming out of the call and what's in the pretrial order. I think everybody was pressed due to the holidays. We got this in. I'm just going to encourage Your Honor at that pretrial conference, and it may be a somewhat unusual pretrial conference, that we have some delineation as to what the claims remaining actually are.

Because I don't think we -- my reading of it in light of the Court's ruling, there's very little, if anything, left to be

tried. And, again, there may be something occurring, and Mr.

Krum assumes certain things are going to happen. There may be something occurring on Friday that may provide some relief under Nevada Revised Statutes, NRS 78.140 in particular, and there may be something --

THE COURT: Little late for ratification. It's a little late for ratification, Mr. Ferrario.

MR. FERRARIO: Well, Your Honor -- and I anticipated you may say that. But keep in mind --

THE COURT: I've got a trial starting a week from Monday.

MR. FERRARIO: Your Honor, I understand that. But keep in mind because of how this unfolded and what happened with the motions for summary judgment until the Court ruled, any attempted ratification would have involved arguments by them as to lack of independence, that type stuff. So there has been a change in the tenor of the case. That's all I'm telling the Court. I'm just giving you a heads up. Lots of stuff going on. And looking forward to the pretrial conference.

THE COURT: Okay. Oh, swell.

Mr. Krum.

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MR. KRUM: Briefly, Your Honor. The assertion by Mr. Searcy that they moved on everything is incorrect. First, as we discussed last October, the manner in which the duty of

loyalty claim is pleaded, for example, is all this conduct collectively evidences a breach of the duty of loyalty.

That's the same thing as moving for summary judgment of the case, and they didn't do that, either.

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Second, Your Honor, they didn't even move on all the particular matters we identified as matters that we thought in and of themselves, not just with others, constituted or gave rise to breaches of fiduciary duty. And we've said this. And the first example is the first one, which is threat, the attempted extortion by Adams, Kane, and McEachern when they threatened plaintiff with termination if he didn't resolve his personal trust and estate disputes with his sisters on terms satisfactory to them.

As to the comments by counsel for Mr. Gould -- and I try to be descriptive, not disparaging -- reliefs a check-the-box analysis to the question of independence. It's not are they financially dependent and are they -- have thick-as-blood relations, yes, no, end of analysis.

THE COURT: Do they sleep on an air mattress in the Manhattan apartment and go visit.

MR. KRUM: I recall that conversation. And so the point is particularly important with respect to Mr. Gould, because we have, as we've described, an ongoing course of conscious -- a conscious decision not to do his job and to acquiesce to the wishes of the controlling shareholders.

And the last thing I want to say in reply is the characterization of Chief Justice Steele is misleading and in fact actually it's inaccurate. He answered a specific question that was in the nature of a hypothetical question that didn't go to anything beyond that. And because he didn't need to get to that second step for the purpose of his opinion, he didn't do it.

Unless you have questions, Your Honor, I have nothing further.

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THE COURT: I don't have any questions.

The motion for reconsideration is denied. I do not see -- although I've reviewed Court's Exhibit 1, I do not see any new information that would cause me to change my decision from a factual standpoint, and I have not been provided with any new legal analysis that would cause me to change my decision.

That takes me to the motion to stay.

MR. KRUM: Your Honor, on the motion to stay we have the same two principal issues, whether the Court committed error when it granted summary judgment and dismissed the case as to those individuals -- I'm not going to repeat that; you've read it, you've heard it -- on the second issue the question is one where I think we respectfully disagree with the Court and the defendants as to what the consequence is of a director being able to invoke the statute and the business

judgment rule. And in our view that's nothing more than the
-- than that the plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving
that the director didn't in fact do what he's presumed to do.

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And those are -- those are questions, Your Honor, along with a third one about viewing the evidence collectively that we're going to make the subject of a writ.

In terms of a stay what we have is the prospect of, in our view, Your Honor, trying substantially the same case without these five people as defendants, having an appeal with respect to them and whatever is appealed from the trial, and then, if we're successful, looking at a do over. If we're successful on any of these issues. And --

THE COURT: That's how it is on every time I grant partial summary judgment, Mr. Krum.

MR. KRUM: Understood, Your Honor. Understood. I think that -- we think, respectfully, these issues are particularly apt for review, but we'll see.

The other issue is what we just talked about with Exhibit 1. And, you know, we have people who are attempting to move the target, so to speak, and that puts us in a completely untenable position. As I explained earlier, they're going to introduce evidence -- they're going to seek to introduce evidence about something that happened -- actions they took based on a decision you made; they're going to argue, Your Honor, that that's a different --

THE COURT: After the pretrial order was submitted.

MR. KRUM: Well, they're going to argue, Your Honor, that there are different burdens of proof as a result of that.

And if --

THE COURT: I understand, Mr. Krum.

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MR. KRUM: If you don't let them do that, Your Honor, then they're going to preserve that for appeal. And so --

THE COURT: People preserve things for appeal every day in Department -- well, every Monday in Department 11.

MR. KRUM: Yeah. So that's all I have, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MR. SEARCY: Nothing from me, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The motion for stay is denied.

MR. KRUM: Well, Your Honor, we've submitted an order that I think we indicated in our cover letter was acceptable to the defendants except in one respect, and that single respect was that Mr. Gould's counsel initially objected, and the other individuals have joined, that we included once or twice in that order a sentence or phrase to the effect that Mr. Gould's summary judgment motion was set for January 8th. And our thinking was no more complicated than this. You can either sign the order as we submitted it, or you can interlineate that out and sign it. Because

otherwise it's a mutually acceptable order. And we'd like to 1 2 have that signed as quickly as possible. 3 THE COURT: If Cassandra was here, I would ask if we 4 had it. But she's not here. 5 MR. KRUM: We'll be happy to deliver another --6 THE COURT: Did you submit a competing order in Word 7 format the way I require it? MS. BANNETT: We didn't. We can do that if --9 THE COURT: Well, see, that creates a problem with 10 me getting Mr. Krum an order if you intend to submit a 11 competing order in Word format. 12 MS. BANNETT: We can do that. 13 MR. SEARCY: We'll take care of that today. 14 MR. KRUM: Actually, let us be helpful. We'll 15 submit ours in Word, and we'll have one with and one without. 16 They objected to objectionable language. 17 MR. SEARCY: That's certainly acceptable, Your 18 Honor. 19 THE COURT: That's perfect, as well. Either way you 2.0 Just so I have the two versions in Word so I can look 21 at them and make a decision which is the most appropriate. 22 MR. KRUM: Will do, Your Honor. 2.3 MS. LEVIN: And to who -- I'm sorry, Your Honor. Τo 24 who do we send it?

THE COURT: Send it to

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2 dept111c@clarkcountycourts.us. That's for my JEA and my law 3 clerk.

All right. So just so everybody remembers, I don't think Mr. Gould is going to be at issue given my ruling, so I think he will only be involved as a witness, so I'm not addressing these comments to Ms. Bannett.

Addressing them to you, Mr. Searcy. You know that Nevada counsel has to be present at your side the entire trial.

MR. SEARCY: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So someone from the Cohen firm has to be here sitting there with you doing whatever it is they have to do. So if there becomes an issue on our quirky Eighth Judicial District Court rules or other unusual procedures in Nevada, you can turn to them and say, hey, really, and we can deal with it then.

MR. SEARCY: He has been sending me notes throughout the entire hearing, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I know he has. I know. Well, and you've had Mr. Edwards some and you've had Mr. Johnson some, and, you know, it's not like you haven't had one of them. I'm just reminding you I'm not waiving it for the trial.

MR. SEARCY: Thank you, Your Honor. I understand.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else?

1 MR. KRUM: No, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Okay. When you meet with the IT folks 3 next week on Tuesday please make sure everything works. If there are concerns, I would rather know about the problems 5 soon. We are still working with the facility across the 6 street. 7 MR. FERRARIO: Are we meeting over there? 8 THE COURT: Well, I'm not in charge of that. That's Dulce. 10 THE CLERK: I think we're meeting in this courtroom, but I want to confirm with Brandi. [Inaudible]. 11 12 MR. FERRARIO: Whatever we do here will transfer 13 over there? 14 THE COURT: When Judge Bailess lets us. We are 15 serving at his pleasure. I don't have a courtroom. 16 MR. FERRARIO: If think if you say that like every 17 day on the record, some little --THE COURT: I have a meeting with County Management 18 19 next week. All right. What else? 2.0 MR. FERRARIO: I thought we were getting the big one 21 upstairs when they refurb it. 2.2 THE COURT: And when's that going to be, Mr. 23 Ferrario? How long do you think that construction project's 24 going to last? 25 MR. FERRARIO: I agree. Okay. That I do know.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? 1 2 MR. KRUM: No, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: All right. So, Mr. Krum, Ms. Levin, you're sending me the versions. I'm going to review them, I'm 4 5 going to sign one. We'll let you know which one is signed, and then you do what you've got to do with the Supreme Court 7 and ask them for the stay, because I've already denied it. 8 MR. KRUM: Understood. 9 THE COURT: And if they want to stay your trial, 10 they'll stay your trial. 11 Thanks, Your Honor. MR. KRUM: 12 MR. FERRARIO: Thank you, Your Honor. 13 MR. SEARCY: Thank you. 14 THE COURT: Otherwise I will have you guys visiting with Dulce on the 2nd and visiting with me on the 5th. 15 16 THE PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 9:31 A.M. 17 18 19 2.0 2.1 22 23 24 25

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

AFFIRMATION

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

FLORENCE HOYT
Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

Three M. Hoyf, TRANSCRIBER

12/28/17

DATE

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INTRODUCTION

At the hearing held on December 11, 2017, the Court determined that Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. failed to raise a genuine issue of triable fact as to the disinterestedness and/or independence of five of his fellow Reading International, Inc. ("RDI") directors: Michael Wrotniak, Judy Codding, Douglas McEachern, Edward Kane, and William Gould. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the Court's ruling, which the Individual Defendants opposed. At a hearing held on December 29, 2017, the Court denied Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and indicated that it would enter a written order later that day granting summary judgment in favor of Directors Wrotniak, Codding, McEachern, Kane, and Gould on all claims—which it subsequently did.

Immediately following the Court's denial of his motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff made an oral request for a stay pending his planned appeal of the Court's summary judgment order. Plaintiff argued that if a trial was held in the interim, the parties could face the prospect of multiple, conflicting appeals and "a do over" trial; Plaintiff also claimed that he would be prejudiced by certain legal and factual arguments that RDI and the Individual Defendants would make at trial in light of the Court's ruling. (*See* 12/29/17 Tr. at 18:23-20:17.) The Court denied Plaintiff's oral motion, noting that such risks occur any time a court grants partial summary judgment. (*Id.* at 19:18-19.) Instead, the Court emphasized its willingness to proceed with the scheduled trial starting on Monday, January 8, 2018, and to leave it to the Nevada Supreme Court to decide whether to stay the case pending Plaintiff's planned appeal. (*Id.* at 24:11-18.)

Following the conclusion of the December 29, 2017 hearing, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification and Stay. The Individual Defendants take no position as to the merits of Plaintiff's motion to the extent that he seeks certification pursuant to Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) that the Court's judgment is final as to Directors Wrotniak, Codding, McEachern, Kane, and Gould. To the extent that Plaintiff again seeks a stay, he does nothing more than repeat the same arguments he already has raised and the Court has rejected. Plaintiff's motion provides no valid reason to reconsider the Court's decision. Indeed, due to his myopic focus on the Rule 54(b) certification issue, Plaintiff does not address, let alone satisfy, the four-

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visit its earlier r

factor test governing stays pending appeal in Nevada. As set forth below, Plaintiff cannot meet any—let alone all—of the elements required for such a stay. There is no basis for the Court to revisit its earlier ruling. Plaintiff's motion for a stay should be denied.

ARGUMENT

In Nevada, courts are to consider four factors when evaluating a request to stay trial pending an appeal: (1) whether the object of the appeal or writ petition will be defeated if the stay is denied; (2) whether appellant/petitioner will suffer irreparable or serious injury if the stay is denied; (3) whether respondent/real party in interest will suffer irreparable or serious injury if the stay is granted; and (4) whether appellant/petitioner is likely to prevail on the merits in the appeal or writ petition. *See Hansen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct. In and For the Cnty. of Clark*, 116 Nev. 650, 657, 6 P.3d 982, 986 (2000); NRAP 8(c). As demonstrated below, Plaintiff cannot meet any of these requirements.

I. THE OBJECT OF PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL WILL NOT BE DEFEATED IF A STAY IS DENIED

The object of Plaintiff's appeal is to seek the view of another court as to whether Directors Wrotniak, Codding, McEachern, Kane, and Gould are disinterested and independent as a matter of law with respect to a series of RDI Board decisions that he has challenged. Plaintiff has not waived his claims against these Individual Defendants, nor will he do so if this case proceeds to trial in the near future. Indeed, after trial, Plaintiff will be able to combine his appeal as to the Court's independence ruling with any other issues that he may seek to contest. Absent the "waiver" of an entire issue or defense, courts in Nevada do not consider the object of an appeal to be defeated. *See Hansen*, 116 Nev. at 657-58, 6 P.3d at 986 (because party's jurisdictional challenge, rejected by the district court, was preserved and could eventually be heard on appeal, no waiver existed and thus the object of appeal was not defeated); *cf. Mikohn Gaming Corp. v. McCrea*, 120 Nev. 248, 253, 89 P.3d 36, 39 (2004) (granting stay because allowing case to proceed in district court rather than in an arbitration would defeat the object of appeal). Because the object of Plaintiff's appeal will be preserved even if the parties proceed to trial on January 8, 2018, the first factor suggests that a stay is not warranted.

II. PLAINTIFF WILL NOT SUFFER IRREPARABLE OR SERIOUS INJURY IF THE STAY IS DENIED

In his motion, Plaintiff asserts that he will be "severely prejudiced" absent a stay pending appeal because RDI and the Individual Defendants will likely use the Court's summary judgment ruling to make arguments at trial that are not favorable to his case, including that the business judgment rule applies to certain transactions approved or ratified by a majority of disinterested, independent directors or that the behavior of purportedly interested directors (such as Guy Adams) was consistent with the behavior of other, legally-independent directors. (*See* Mot. at 7-9.) Plaintiff further contends that costs and efficiency weighs in favor of a stay, as the possibility of a second trial will be avoided. (*Id.*)

Neither argument has merit. As the Court recognized at the December 29, 2017 hearing, Plaintiff's substantive objections to proceeding to trial are no different from any plaintiff who has lost on a partial summary judgment motion. Nevada does not provide disgruntled plaintiffs with an automatic stay and right of immediate appeal simply because some of the original claims or defendants are no longer in the case. That the Individual Defendants may take advantage of a favorable summary judgment ruling to make arguments at trial plainly available based on the record and under governing law is a fact of litigation, not irreparable or serious injury to Plaintiff. See Hansen, 116 Nev. at 658, 6 P.3d at 987 (noting that "irreparable harm is harm for which compensatory damages would be inadequate, such as the sale of a home at trustee's sale, because real property is unique"). For instance, while Plaintiff complains about the RDI Board's votes on December 29, 2017 to ratify both Plaintiff's termination and the exercise of a share purchase option held by the Estate of James J. Cotter, Sr. (see Mot. at 7), this is simply evidence that the RDI Board and its directors continue to take action; indeed, the Board has held scores of meetings and voted on numerous matters since the filing of Plaintiff's lawsuit. That the Board continues to move forward is not grounds for delay, rather it is a reason for moving on to trial. The legal effect of the Board's ratification decision, which is now accomplished, is clear under NRS 78.140 and the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp., 122 Nev. 621, 636, 137 P.3d 1171, 1181 (2006). Of course, there are other grounds for a defense verdict

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separate and apart from independence and/or ratification, and the fact that the Court's independence decision made Plaintiff's factually unsupportable case more difficult legally for him is not the kind of irreparable or undue injury that supports delay.

Plaintiff's related contention that a second trial will be avoided is mere "speculation," and courts have rejected the possibility that a "do over" may result following an appeal as a valid basis to stay a case. See Busey v. Richland Sch. Dist., No. 2:13-CV-5022-TOR, 2016 WL 8938423, at *4 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2016) (denying certification and stay pending appeal because plaintiff's argument that a second trial would be avoided was "speculative"); Hansen, 116 Nev. at 658, 6 P.3d at 986-87 (noting that appellant's argument that, absent a stay, it would be "required to participate 'needlessly' in the expense of . . . trial" is "neither irreparable nor serious" injury). Indeed, every appeal, whether before or after trial, raises the specter of a potential second trial. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the second factor required for a stay pending appeal.

III. THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS WILL SUFFER SERIOUS INJURY IF A STAY IS GRANTED

Admittedly, "a mere delay in pursuing . . . litigation" does not normally constitute irreparable injury or serious harm. Mikohn, 120 Nev. at 253, 89 P.3d at 39. However, the Nevada Supreme Court has recognized that, "in certain cases," it may, and that possibility "should be considered in the stay analysis." Id. In this case, where the parties are two-and-a-half years removed from Plaintiff's termination that started it all, the Individual Defendants are rightfully concerned that they may suffer irreparable or serious injury if a stay is granted and the case stalls on the very eve of trial.

Since June 2015, the Individual Defendants have been repeatedly smeared in the press by a serious of wild, unsupportable accusations made entirely out of vindictiveness by a divisive, poorly-performing CEO who threatened to "ruin them financially" even before they terminated him. Others (such as the T2 plaintiffs) have brought follow-on suits against the Individual Defendants based solely on Plaintiff's claims only to discover that they are without merit, and have exited the litigation by settling on favorable terms. Not only have Plaintiff's baseless

allegations threatened the professional reputations and livelihood of the Individual Defendants, they have seriously affected the business operations of RDI as it seeks to move beyond the turmoil fostered by Plaintiff. Indeed, given Plaintiff's (untenable) reinstatement demand, RDI continues to face great uncertainty regarding its permanent leadership.

In any lengthy litigation where delays have occurred, important witnesses may forget relevant facts or become unavailable. However, here, where the business operations of a company and the lives of its directors continue to be harmed because the board made an informed business judgment to do what it thought was best for the company and its stockholders, it makes sense to avoid further injury and proceed to the planned trial. This is also true because there are dispositive issues—other than directorial independence—to be tried that may moot any appeal by Plaintiff. For example, if Plaintiff cannot prove at trial that he would be a suitable CEO, then the injunctive relief he seeks is moot; if Plaintiff cannot establish damages to RDI at trial, then his entire case fails. There is no valid reason to delay resolution of these issues just to allow Plaintiff another chance to revisit the Court's independence determination, which may be mooted by what happens at trial.

IV. PLAINTIFF IS UNLIKELY TO PREVAIL ON THE MERITS OF HIS APPEAL

In his motion, Plaintiff has not argued, let alone established, that he is likely to prevail on the merits of his appeal. The Court's decision to award summary judgment in favor of Directors Wrotniak, Codding, McEachern, Kane, and Gould followed multiple rounds of summary judgment briefing and a year of additional discovery pursuant to Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), which the Court allowed to ensure that Plaintiff had been given a full and fair opportunity to try to prove his claims. The Court held multiple oral arguments on Plaintiff's claims prior to its decision, and repeatedly asked whether there were any additional facts that Plaintiff wanted the Court to consider in determining the independence/disinterestedness issue. Moreover, the Court considered—and rejected—Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration in which he attempted to reargue the issues on which he lost. Absent any indication that Plaintiff is likely to prevail on his appeal of the Court's considered ruling (which he is not), a stay pending appeal is entirely unwarranted.

CONCLUSION 1 2 For the reasons set forth above, the Individual Defendants respectfully request that the 3 Court deny Plaintiff's Motion to Stay this case pending appeal. The Individual Defendants take 4 no position on Plaintiff's request for certification under Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). 5 Dated: January 2, 2018 6 **COHENJOHNSONPARKEREDWARDS** 7 8 By: /s/ H. Stan Johnson H. STAN JOHNSON, ESQ. 9 Nevada Bar No. 00265 10 sjohnson@cohenjohnson.com 255 East Warm Springs Road, Suite 100 11 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 Telephone: (702) 823-3500 12 Facsimile: (702) 823-3400 13 **QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &** 14 SULLIVAN, LLP CHRISTOPHER TAYBACK, ESQ. 15 California Bar No. 145532, pro hac vice christayback@quinnemanuel.com 16 MARSHALL M. SEARCY, ESQ. 17 California Bar No. 169269, pro hac vice marshallsearcy@quinnemanuel.com 18 865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017 19 Telephone: (213) 443-3000 20 Attorneys for Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen 21 Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, Edward Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that, on January 2, 2018, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing

THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR

RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION AND STAY to be served on all interested parties, as
registered with the Court's E-Filing and E-Service System.

/s/ Sarah Gondek

An employee of Cohen|Johnson|Parker|Edwards

1 **JOIN** MARK E. FERRARIO, ESQ. 2 (NV Bar No. 1625) KARA B. HENDRICKS, ESQ. 3 (NV Bar No. 7743) TAMI D. COWDEN, ESQ. (NV Bar No. 8994) 4 GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 400 North 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 Telephone: (702) 792-3773 6 Facsimile: (702) 792-9002 7 Email: ferrariom@gtlaw.com hendricksk@gtlaw.com cowdent@gtlaw.com 8 Counsel for Reading International, Inc. 9 DISTRICT COURT 10 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 11 12 GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 400 North Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 Telephone (702) 792-3773 Fassimile (702) 792-2902 JAMES J. COTTER, JR., individually and Case No. A-15-719860-B Dept. No. XI 13 derivatively on behalf of Reading International, Inc., **Coordinated with:** 14 Plaintiff, Case No. P 14-082942-E 15 Dept. XI v. 16 MARGARET COTTER, et al, Case No. A-16-735305-B 17 Dept. XI Defendants. 18 In the Matter of the Estate of 19 JAMES J. COTTER, 20 Deceased. 21 JAMES J. COTTER, JR., 22 Plaintiff, 23 24 READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada corporation; DOES 1-100, and ROE 25 ENTITIES, 1-100, inclusive,

Defendants.

Electronically Filed 1/3/2018 2:37 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

READING INTERNATIONAL, INC.'S JOINDER TO THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS' **OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RULE 54(B) CERTIFICATION AND STAY**

HEARING

DATE: January 4, 2018 TIME: 8:30 A.M.

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Case Number: A-15-719860-B

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Nominal Defendant Reading International, Inc. ("RDI"), a Nevada corporation, by and through undersigned counsel of record, hereby submits its Joinder to *The Individual Defendants'* Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion For Rule 54(B) Certification And Stay. RDI joins in the arguments advanced on behalf of the Individual Defendants in their Motion. Additionally, RDI opposes the certification on the basis of the issues set forth in the attached memorandum of points and authorities.

DATED this 3rd day of January, 2018

GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP

By: /s/ Mark E. Ferrario
Mark E. Ferrario, Esq. (NBN. 1625)
Kara B. Hendricks, ESQ. (NBN 7743)
Tami D. Cowden, Esq. (NBN 8994)
3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 400N
Las Vegas, Nevada 89169
Counsel for Reading International, Inc.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

This Court should deny the Motion for Rule 54(b) certification. This Court recently determined that, as a matter of law, Directors Judy Codding, William Gould, Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, and Michael Wrotniak were independent of the influence of Ellen Cotter and Margaret Cotter. Thus, the ruling is a determination that acknowledges that a majority of RDI's Board of Directors is independent, and therefore, disinterested, as to nearly all of the decisions challenged by Cotter, Jr., This ruling has an inevitable effect on the rest of the litigation, presenting multiple grounds for ending this litigation in its entirety. Accordingly, it is reasonable to anticipate that there will be only a short time before there is a final judgment in this matter, mooting any need for a Rule 54(b) certification. Accordingly, the Motion should be denied.

FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS MOTION

As this Court is aware, Plaintiff filed this action after he was terminated from his position as President and CEO of RDI in June 2015. His original complaint alleged derivative claims

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against every other member of RDI's Board of Directors at the time, and also individual claims against both certain defendants and RDI. The primary relief sought by Plaintiff was his own reinstatement. Following motion practice, Plaintiff was required to file an amended complaint, which removed all individual claims, and left only the derivative claims. By the time the first amended complaint was filed, the composition of RDI's board of directors had changed, and Plaintiff included the new members of the Board of Directors as defendants in the derivative claims. However, the claims against a former board member, Timothy Storey, were dismissed. In mid-2016, Plaintiff was permitted to amend his complaint again, in the Second Amended Complaint, the derivative claims were again alleged against all other members of RDI's Board of Directors.

Based on the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs claims include four causes of action: 1) Breach of Fiduciary Duty of Care; 2) Breach of Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty; 3) Breach of Fiduciary Duty of Candor; and 4) Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty. The first three causes of action were alleged against all of the individual director defendants: Guy Adams, Judy Codding, Ellen Cotter, Margaret Cotter, William Gould, Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, and Michael Wrotniak. The fourth cause of action was alleged only against Ellen Cotter and Margaret Cotter.

On December 28, 2017, this Court entered an Order which granted summary judgment to Defendants Codding, Gould, Kane, McEachern, and Wrotniak, having determined that Plaintiff had failed to present evidence to show that there was 1) a material issue of fact as to the independence of these directors with respect to any Board decision made by them, and 2) a material issue of fact as to whether the presumption created by the business judgment rule had been rebutted. As a result of this ruling, there are only three remaining defendants: Guy Adams, Ellen Cotter, and Margaret Cotter. While RDI is a nominal defendant; Cotter, Jr. has not alleged any claims against the Company.

Facts Underlying the Claims

In the Pre-trial memorandum, Plaintiff recited the actions he claims constituted the

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breaches of fiduciary duty. See Pre-Trial Memorandum, pp. 3-9. Those actions consisted of the following:

- 1. The Termination of Cotter, Jr, and the related process and events (claimed relevant as to breach of the duty of care, duty of loyalty, and aiding and abetting).
- 2. Use of an Executive Committee (claimed relevant as to breach of they duty of care and duty of loyalty – however, no specific acts by the Executive Committee are cited).
- 3. Selection of Ellen Cotter as President and CEO of RDI, along with the process of the CEO search (claimed relevant as to breach of the duty of care, duty of loyalty, and aiding and abetting).
- 4. Making erroneous or materially misleading statements in board materials, such as agendas and minutes, and in public disclosures - the alleged misleading statements in public disclosures are all based on Plaintiff's claims that relevant facts were not included or misdescribed by not including motives that Plaintiff imputes to the Directors (claimed relevant as to breach of the duty of care, duty of loyalty, duty of candor)
- 5. Appointment of Directors Codding and Wrotniak (claimed relevant to breach of they duty of loyalty and aiding and abetting by Ellen Cotter and Margaret Cotter).
- Appointment of Margaret Cotter as Vice President of Real Estate Development, 6. and award of compensation to her (claimed relevant to the breach of the duty of loyalty, duty of care, aiding and abetting).
- 7. Awarding special compensation to Guy Adams (claimed relevant to the breach of they duty of loyalty, duty of care, aiding and abetting).
- 8. The authorization of the exercise of the 100,000 share option by the Estate of Cotter, Sr. (claimed relevant to breach of duty of loyalty, aiding and abetting)

Plaintiff had claimed the above actions had been taken by interested directors, based on the theory that all of the directors were beholden to Ellen Cotter and Margaret Cotter.

Effect of Court's Ruling as to Independent Directors

27 In addition to the actions listed here, Plaintiff had also asserted that the treatment of the expression of interest from 28 Patton Vision supported his claims; however, this Court determined that RDI suffered no harm from such treatment.

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The Defendants have always maintained that all of the above actions were taken by a majority of disinterested directors. With respect to the majority of the actions, this Court's December 28, 2017 order has confirmed Defendants' assertions. Specifically, the evidence shows the following actions were originally approved by a majority of Independent Directors:

- Selection of Ellen Cotter as President and CEO On January 8, 2016, the Board of Directors appointed Ellen Cotter President and CEO of RDI. This vote to select Ellen Cotter necessarily included acceptance of the Search Committee's recommendation, and thus, changes in the prior determination of criteria for selection and the cessation of a search for an outside CEO. Votes in favor: Adams, Codding, M. Cotter, Gould, Kane, McEachern, Wrotniak. Votes Opposed: J. Cotter. Abstention: E. Cotter. Discounting the purportedly interested votes of Adams and Margaret Cotter, the vote was 5-1 in favor. [Defendants Proposed Tr. Ex. 417].
- Appointment of Margaret Cotter as Vice President of Real Estate Development- On March 10, 2016, the Board of Directors voted on the appointment of Margaret Cotter to the position of Executive Vice President of Real Estate Development. The Votes in favor of such appointment included Adams, Codding, Gould, Kane, McEachern, Wrotniak. Ellen Cotter and Margaret Cotter did not participate in the Vote. James Cotter, Jr. abstained. Discounting the purported interested vote of Adams, the vote was 5-0 in favor. [Defendants Proposed Tr. Ex. 452]
- Appointment of Director Codding- On October 5, 2015, the Board of Directors met and voted on the appointment of Judy Codding to fill an open seat on the Board of Directors. The votes in favor of such appointment included Adams, Ellen Cotter, Margaret Cotter, Gould, Kane, and McEachern. James J. Cotter, Jr. voted against the appointment. Timothy Storey abstained. Discounting the votes of purportedly interested directors, the vote was 3-1-1 in favor. [Defendants Proposed Tr. Ex. 361]
- Appointment of Director Wrotniak-On October 12, 2015, the Board of Directors met and voted on the appointment of Michael Wrotniak to fill the seat vacated by the resignation of Tim Storey. The votes in favor of such appointment included Adams, Codding, Ellen

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Cotter, Margaret Cotter, Gould, Kane, and McEachern. James J. Cotter, Jr. voted against the appointment. Discounting the votes of purportedly interested directors, the vote was 4-1 in favor. [Defendants Proposed Tr. Ex. 372]

- Awarding special compensation to Adams- On March 10, 2016, the Board of Directors voted on the award of special compensation in the amount of \$50,000 to Guy Adams. The Votes in favor of such an award included Codding, Ellen Cotter, Margaret Cotter Gould, Kane, McEachern, Wrotniak. James Cotter, Jr. voted against the award. Discounting the purported interested vote of Ellen and Maragaret Cotter, the vote was 5-1 in favor. [Defendants Proposed Tr. Ex. 452].
- The authorization of the exercise of the 100,000 share option using Class A nonvoting stock by Cotter, Sr.'s Estate-The September 21, 2015 meeting of the Compensation and Stock Options Committee was attended by Committee members Edward Kane and Guy Adams. The James Cotter, Sr. Estate had requested permission to use Class A nonvoting common stock in the exercise of the Estate's option to purchase 100,000 shares of Class B voting common stock. Section 6.1.6.b. of the 1999 stock option plan gives discretion to the administrator of the plan to accept shares of common stock already owned by the optionee in payment of the option price. The Vote in favor of permitting the use of the Class A stock was made by Kane and Adams. There were no opposing votes. Discounting the purportedly "interested" vote by Adams, the vote was 1-0 in favor. [Defendants Proposed Tr. Ex. 356]
- Use of the Executive Committee- Plaintiff has not identified any specific action taken by RDI's Executive Committee which he claims is indicative of a breach of fiduciary duty. However, each action taken by the Executive Committee was taken with the approval of Edward Kane, who was a member of the Executive Committee, and whom this Court has determined to have been independent.
- SEC filings and press releases to the extent that Plaintiff claims SEC filings or press releases reporting the above actions were misleading based on failures to disclose purported interest of members of the board of directors (see SAC ¶ 101(d), (f), (g)),

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because the actions in question were approved by a majority of disinterested directors, a failure to disclose purported interests cannot be misleading.

Significantly, even without the votes of Guy Adams, Ellen Cotter and Margaret Cotter, each of the above actions passed by a majority vote and thus are not issues that should be considered by the jury. Moreover, each of the above actions by the RDI board of directors occurred subsequent to the filing of the initial complaint in this matter, in which Cotter, Jr. alleged, inter alia, that Directors Ellen Cotter, Margaret Cotter, and Guy Adams were motivated by interests other than the best interests of RDI in making their decisions. Accordingly, each of the above actions were undertaken with full knowledge of the lack of independence and the selfinterest that Cotter, Jr. attributed to Ellen Cotter, Margaret Cotter, and Guy Adams.

In addition to the above actions *originally* approved by a majority of independent directors, on December 29, 2017, the RDI Board of Directors met in a duly noticed meeting, and voted to ratify certain actions challenged by Cotter, Jr. Specifically, the RDI Board of Directors, of which a majority consists of Directors Codding, Gould, Kane, McEachern, and Wrotniak, voted to ratify the June 12, 2015 termination of Cotter, Jr. as President and CEO of RDI, as well as other actions approved by the board of directors related to such termination, as outlined in the Minutes of the Meetings of the Board of Directors for May 21, 2015, May 28, 2015 and June 12, 2015. Additionally, lest there be any doubt with respect to the approval of the exercise of the 100,000 stock option by Cotter, Sr.'s estate using Class A nonvoting stock by the Compensation Committee, the Board of Directors ratified that action as well. [See Ex. 1, Draft Minutes of December 29, 2017 RDI Board of Directors Meeting. Directors Codding, Gould, Kane, McEachern, and Wrotniak voted in favor of each of the actions. Director James Cotter, Jr. voted against. Directors Guy Adams, Ellen Cotter, and Margaret Cotter abstained. The votes in favor of each of these actions were 5-1-3.

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LEGAL ARGUMENT

DUE TO THIS COURT'S DECEMBER 28, 2017 ORDER, AND DUE TO THE I. RATIIFCATION OF ACTIONS TAKEN ON DECEMBER 29, 2017, THE REMAINING ISSUES IN THE CASE ARE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED IF NOT ENTIRELY ELIMINATED, AND THEREFORE, THERE IS JUST CAUSE TO DENY CERTIFICATION UNDER RULE 54.

The bulk of Plaintiff's claims were premised on the theory that all of RDI's directors (other than himself) were beholden to Ellen Cotter and Margaret Cotter, and therefore, unable to exercise their own independent judgment with respect to decision making on behalf of RDI. However, Cotter, Jr. was unable to present sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that five of the Directors - Codding, Gould, Kane, McEachern and Wrotniak actually lacked such independence. This Court's ruling as to the independence of these five directors has significant impact on the remaining issues in the case. Indeed, as shown below, the case should be dismissed for a lack of standing, or failing, that, summary judgment granted on all remaining issues. In either case, there is unlikely to be any significant delay prior to a final order being entered in this matter. Accordingly, the Motion for Rule 54(b) certification should be denied.

This Court's Determination that a Majority of the Directors are Α. Disinterested Requires Dismissal of the Suit for Failure of Demand.

This Court's determination that Directors Codding, Gould, Kane, McEachern, and Wrotniak are disinterested with respect to the decisions cited in the Second Amended Complaint establishes that such complaint must be dismissed for failure of demand. The futility of demand must be determined based on the board at the time an amended complaint has been filed. Braddock v. Zimmerman, 906 A.2d 776, 786 (Del. 2006). When a court determines that the allegations of purported interest are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to make demand, the Court must "later conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine, as a matter of law, whether the demand requirement nevertheless deprives the shareholder of his or her standing to sue." Shoen at 645, 137 P.3d at 1187, quoted by In re Amerco Derivative Litig., 127 Nev. 196, 222, 252 P.3d 681, 700 (2011). This Court's ruling on summary judgment has taken

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the place of such evidentiary hearing; Cotter, Jr. was unable to show that demand was futile. Accordingly, this Court's ruling establishes that Cotter, Jr. has no standing to proceed.

B. The Approval and/or or Ratification by a Majority of Disinterested Directors of Decisions Challenged By Cotter, Jr.'s Renders Such Decisions Immune From Scrutiny For Interest.

Pursuant to NRS 78.140(2)(a), any decision approved by a majority of disinterested directors who have knowledge of the facts that would create an interest in the decision by another director is not subject to being found void or voidable on the basis of the purported interest held by the director. Here, Plaintiff seeks to undo two decisions that have been ratified by the a majority of disinterested directors: the decision to terminate him from his position as President and CEO and the approval of the use of Class A stock in the exercise of an option for Blass B stock, based on his claim that Guy Adams was unable to exercise his independent judgment in voting in favor of both of these decisions. However, because of the ratification, any purported lack of independence of Mr. Adams is no longer relevant, and cannot justify voiding the actions.

C. The Approval and/or or Ratification by a Majority of Disinterested Directors of Decisions Challenged By Cotter, Jr. Entitles the Purported Interested Directors to the Protections of the Business Judgment Rule as to Such Decisions.

In *Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp.*, the Nevada Supreme court held that Nevada's business judgment rule applies to "valid interested director action." 122 Nev. 621, 636, 137 P.3d 1171, 1181 (2006). In so stating, the *Shoen* Court cited to NRS 78.140. Accordingly, if a transaction satisfies the requirements of that statute, it constitutes a "valid interested director action." As relevant here, that statute provides that a board action cannot be voided when:

The fact of the common directorship, office or financial interest is known to the board of directors or committee, and the directors or members of the committee, other than any common or interested directors or members of the committee, approve *or ratify the contract or transaction in good faith*.

NRS 78.140(2)(a).

Here, all members of the RDI Board of Directors have long been aware of Cotter, Jr.'s claims that the decisions of Ellen Cotter, Margaret Cotter, and Guy Adams are influenced by their own financial interests. Allegations of facts from which Cotter, Jr. infers self-interest were

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not only made at the time of Cotter, Jr.'s termination, but have also been included in every iteration of Cotter's Jr.'s complaints. See, e.g, SAC ¶¶ 1, 6, 21, 33,35,37, 48, 49, 64-71. Additionally, in the course of the ratification actions taken on December 29, 2017, the specific claims of self-interest made by Cotter, Jr. were noted by the Board.

With knowledge of such facts, and the inferences that Cotter, Jr. has drawn from them, Directors that this Court has determined are disinterested nevertheless voted to ratify decisions relating to the termination and the exercise of the 100,000 share option. As a result, pursuant to Shoen, the Remaining Defendants are entitled to the protections of the business judgment rule as to such transaction.

Significantly, nothing in NRS 78.140 places any deadline or time limitation upon ratification. The potential dispositive effect of such ratification occurring years after the challenged conduct has been acknowledged by the Nevada Supreme Court. See In re Amerco Derivative Litig., 127 Nev. at 217, 252 P.3d at 697, ns. 6 (to majority opinion) and 4(to dissent) (noting that a ratification that had apparently occurred in 2007, which date was after the remand of the Shoen decision, the precursor to the *In re Amerco* opinion, yet could still have a dispositive effect). Here, the ratification occurred one day after this Court executed the order finding the five Directors Independent. Since the effect of such ratification would not be acknowledged without a determination of the independence of those who ratified the conduct, any protests based on timing are defy logic.

Furthermore, as noted above, many of the actions claimed by Cotter, Jr. to indicate breaches of fiduciary duty were originally approved by directors that this Court has determined are disinterested. All such actions were taken subsequent to the filing of this action, and accordingly, with knowledge of the allegations of self-interest made against Defendants Ellen Cotter, Margaret Cotter, and Guy Adams. Accordingly, Defendants Ellen Cotter, Margaret Cotter, and Guy Adams are each entitled to the protections of the business judgment rule as to such actions as well.

As this Court has already determined the evidence proffered by Cotter, Jr. to overcome the presumption created by the business judgment rule was insufficient, judgment should be

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entered in favor of the Remaining Defendants on all claims.

D. Cotter, Jr. Cannot, as a Matter of Law, Prevail on a Claim of Breach of Fiduciary Duty Against the Remaining Defendants As Cotter, Jr. Cannot Establish Causation.

Even if, despite their clear entitlement, the remaining Defendants are not granted the protection of Nevada's business judgment rule, it would still be impossible for Cotter, Jr. to prevail on his claims for fiduciary duty. This is because Cotter, Jr. cannot show that any loss to RDI was proximately caused by any of the remaining Defendants. In Nevada, an essential element for a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is that the beneficiary of the duty suffer damages as a result of the purported breach. Foster v. Dingwall, 126 Nev. 56, 69, 227 P.3d 1042, 1051 (2010), citing Stalk v. Mushkin, 125 Nev. 21, 28, 199 P.3d 838, 843 (2009) ("fiduciary duty claim seeks damages for injuries that result from the tortious conduct of one who owes a duty to another by virtue of the fiduciary relationship"); see also, Fin. Am. Group, LLC v. CH Montrose, LLC, 127 Nev. 1133, 373 P.3d 913 (2011) (finding that causation is a required element for several causes of actions, including breach of fiduciary duty); see also Principles of Corp. Governance § 7.18 (1994); Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 431. Here, because a majority of disinterested directors voted in favor of the board actions cited by Cotter, Jr., the votes of the remaining Defendants were actually irrelevant to the passage of the actions. Accordingly, Cotter, Jr. cannot show that any action by the Remaining Defendants was the cause of any purported injury to RDI.

E. Cotter, Jr. Cannot Prevail on A Claim of Aiding and Abetting a Breach of Fiduciary Duty, as He Cannot Prevail on Any Claim for Breach against any Defendant.

Cotter, Jr. is unable to satisfy the elements for a claim of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty against Ellen or Margaret Cotter, as he cannot establish that any other Defendant is liable for a breach of fiduciary duty. In order to prevail on a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, Cotter, Jr. would have to show that (1) a fiduciary relationship exists, (2) the fiduciary breached the fiduciary relationship, (3) the third party knowingly participated in the breach, and (4) the breach of the fiduciary relationship resulted in damages. In re Amerco Derivative Litig., 127 Nev. 196, 225, 252 P.3d 681, 702 (2011). As shown above, Cotter, Jr.

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cannot prevail on a claim of breach of fiduciary duty against any director. Accordingly, he cannot prevail on a claim for aiding and abetting such a fiduciary breach.

CONCLUSION

As shown above, this Court's determination that a majority of RDI's directors were independent with respect to a majority of the decisions challenged by Cotter, Jr., coupled with the subsequent ratification of the remaining decisions challenged by Cotter, Jr., results in the negation of both Cotter, Jr.'s standing, and his substantive claims. Accordingly, there is unlikely to be any significant delay in the grant of a final judgment in this matter. Granting the motion for Rule 54(b) certification would result in piecemeal appellate review, which would be a waste of judicial resources.

For this reason, as well as those set forth in the Opposition presented by the Individual Director Defendants, the Motion for Rule 454(b) certification and for a stay should be denied.

DATED this 3rd day of January, 2018

GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP

By: /s/ Mark E. Ferrario

Mark E. Ferrario, Esq. (NBN. 1625) Kara B. Hendricks, ESQ. (NBN 7743) Tami D. Cowden, Esq. (NBN 8994) 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 400N Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 Counsel for Reading International, Inc.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D) and E.D.C.R. 8.05, I certify that on this day, I caused a true and correct copy of the forgoing RDI's Joinder to the Individual Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification and Stay to be filed and served via the Court's Wiznet E-Filing system on all registered and active parties. The date and time of the electronic proof of service is in place of the date and place of deposit in the mail.

DATED this 3rd day of January, 2018.

/s/ Andrea Lee Rosehill

An employee of GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP

Page 13 of 13

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1 **ERR** MARK E. FERRARIO, ESQ. (NV Bar No. 1625) 2 KARA B. HENDRICKS, ESQ. 3 (NV Bar No. 7743) TAMI D. COWDEN, ESQ. (NV Bar No. 8994) 4 GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 5 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 400 North Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 Telephone: (702) 792-3773 6 Facsimile: (702) 792-9002 Email: ferrariom@gtlaw.com 7 hendricksk@gtlaw.com cowdent@gtlaw.com 8

Counsel for Reading International, Inc.

JAMES J. COTTER, JR., individually and

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

derivatively on behalf of Reading
International, Inc.,

Plaintiff,

v.

MARGARET COTTER, et al,

Defendants.

In the Matter of the Estate of

JAMES J. COTTER,

Deceased.

JAMES J. COTTER, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a
Nevada corporation; DOES 1-100, and ROE

Case No. A-15-719860-B Dept. No. XI

Coordinated with:

Case No. P 14-082942-E Dept. XI

Case No. A-16-735305-B Dept. XI

ERRATA TO READING INTERNATIONAL, INC.'S JOINDER TO THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RULE 54(B) CERTIFICATION AND STAY

HEARING

DATE: January 4, 2018 TIME: 8:30 A.M.

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GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 400 North Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 Telephone (702) 792-3773 Fassimile (702) 792-2902

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ENTITIES, 1-100, inclusive,

Defendants.

Page 1 of 3

Case Number: A-15-719860-B

GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 73 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 400 North Las Veeas, Nevada 89169

Nominal Defendant Reading International, Inc. ("RDI"), a Nevada corporation, by and through undersigned counsel of record, respectfully submits the following errata to RDI's Joinder to the Individual Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification and Stay ("Joinder"). The Joinder, submitted for filing on January 3, 2018, inadvertently omitted Exhibit 1 referenced therein. Attached to this Errata is Exhibit 1 to the Joinder.

DATED this 3rd day of January, 2018

GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP

By: /s/ Mark E. Ferrario
Mark E. Ferrario, Esq. (NBN. 1625)
Kara B. Hendricks, ESQ. (NBN 7743)
Tami D. Cowden, Esq. (NBN 8994)
3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 400N
Las Vegas, Nevada 89169
Counsel for Reading International, Inc.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D) and E.D.C.R. 8.05, I certify that on this day, I caused a true and correct copy of the forgoing Errata to RDI's Joinder to the Individual Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification and Stay to be filed and served via the Court's Wiznet E-Filing system on all registered and active parties. The date and time of the electronic proof of service is in place of the date and place of deposit in the mail. DATED this 3rd day of January, 2018.

/s/ Andrea Lee Rosehill

An employee of GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP

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Reading International, Inc.

Minutes of the Board of Directors Meeting

December 29, 2017

A duly noticed and called special telephonic meeting of the Board of Directors ("Board") of Reading International, Inc. (the "Company"), was held on December 29, 2017. Participating by telephone conference were Chair, Chief Executive Officer and President Ellen Cotter; Vice-Chair and Executive Vice President-Real Estate Management and Development – NYC, Margaret Cotter, and Directors Guy Adams, Judy Codding, William Gould, Edward L. Kane, Douglas McEachern, Michael Wrotniak and James Cotter, Jr.

Participating at the invitation of the Chair were S. Craig Tompkins, Esq., General Counsel, who served as recording secretary for the meeting, and Michael J. Bonner, Esq., and Mark E. Ferrario, Esq., of Greenberg Traurig LLP, outside legal counsel to the company.

The notice of meeting and materials provided to each member of the Board ("Board Materials") are attached to these minutes as Exhibit A.

Call to Order

Chair Cotter, having taken a roll-call vote and verified that all of the participants could hear one another, called the meeting to order at approximately 9:35 a.m. (Pacific Time). Chair Cotter thanked the directors for accommodating the request for the special meeting. Chair Cotter reminded the directors that the Board's proceedings were confidential, and that the information shared should not be disclosed or traded upon. Chair Cotter next verified with the participants that the meeting was not being recorded by any of the participants and that there were no participants other than the individuals identified above participating on the call. Chair Cotter also confirmed with the participants that no additional participants would be added to the meeting without being introduced to the meeting.

<u>2017 Cash Compensation Expense – U.S. Based Personnel (including Ellen Cotter and Margaret Cotter)</u>

Chair Cotter gave a brief overview and directed the Board's attention to the Board Materials, including the report prepared by management for the Compensation and Stock Options Committee (the "Compensation Committee") and considered by the Compensation Committee at its meeting on December 28, 2017. Chair Cotter reported that the Compensation Committee had, following such consideration and discussion, during which various questions were asked of management, approved a bonus accrual in the amount of \$1.1 million, as set forth in the resolution adopted by the Compensation Committee that day and provided to the Board. The action is expected to save more than \$135,000 in taxes. Compensation Committee Chair Ed Kane verified the Compensation Committee's approval, and recommended to the full Board that the action by the Compensation Committee by ratified by the Board. Chair Kane expressed his thanks for the work done by the Reading staff and by Chair Cotter and other executives in putting together detailed data and information to prepare the Compensation Committee, especially in light of the fact that the Compensation Committee's approval was instigated by the

new tax reform bill just recently signed on December 22, 2017. Chair Cotter echoed Mr. Kane's comments regarding the work done by the Reading staff. It was further noted that Ellen Cotter and Margaret Cotter are likely recipients of the bonuses to be paid in 2018 pursuant to the accrual, but that the accrual was a general accrual and did not constitute an award to any given executive or employee.

Director James Cotter, Jr. objected on the basis that the Board's materials were only received one evening before the Board Meeting. Mr. Cotter stated that the volume of material sent made it unreasonable for him to adequately prepare for today's meeting. Chair Cotter responded that while she apologized for the timing, the tax reform bill had only been signed into law on December 22, 2017, which necessitated extensive work to prepare materials for the Compensation Committee on December 27, 2017. She noted that the Compensation Committee met in the late afternoon of December 28, 2017, and she believed that distribution of the materials prior to affording the Compensation Committee to review and comment upon such materials and to take action would not have been appropriate. No other director joined in Mr. Cotter's complaint.

Compensation Committee member Michael Wrotniak stated that the bonus accrual approved by the Compensation Committee was, in his view, on the conservative side. Director Codding also stated her similar view that the accrual was on the conservative side, and – as she understood it – was not intended to put a cap on the bonuses ultimately determined and paid in 2018.

After further discussion and upon motion made by Mr. Kane and seconded by Mr. Adams, the following resolution was adopted on a vote of eight directors in favor, one Director (Director James Cotter, Jr.) against (with Directors Ellen Cotter and Margaret Cotter voting in favor of the motion, based on the understanding that the setting of the accrual did not establish any entitlement on their part to receive any particular bonus payment):

WHEREAS, the Board having reviewed the Compensation's Committee approval of bonus accruals for US Personnel for 2017 Cash Compensation and the form of its resolution approved on December 28, 2017 ("Compensation Committee Resolution") and noting that such compensation may include bonus compensation to Ellen Cotter and Margaret Cotter in 2018, but did not constitute an award of any bonus amount to any executive of employee at this time;

Now, Therefore, Be It Hereby Resolved that the Compensation Committee Resolution is approved and ratified..

2017 Cash Compensation for Members of Special Independent Committee

Chair Kane reported that the Compensation Committee recommended at its December 28, 2017 meeting compensation for the members of the Special Independent Committee. Chair Kane asked Mr. Bonner to summarize the information considered. Mr. Bonner advised the Board that the Special Independent Committee was formed in early August 2017, had already held eight meetings, (in person and by telephone); that Chair Bill Gould had

met with certain potential advisors; and that certain of the meetings required the review of extensive materials by committee members.

Chair Kane reported that, to save consultant expenses, he had determined not to engage a compensation consultant for Special Independent Committee compensation, but had instead relied on information he had obtained, information obtained by Mr. Bonner from Willis Towers Watson, consideration of current fees paid to diretors serving on other Board Committees, and information derived from the "Reading International, Inc. Director Pay Assessment, dated January 27, 2016" which contained compensation data for certain special committees. Mr. Bonner advised that Willis Towers Watson had confirmed informally that the proposed fees were within the range of reasonable compensation for such committee members. Chair Cotter explained that the compensation was only with respect to services rendered in 2017, and was not intended to set a precendent for future compensation to be paid to the Special Independent Committee, as the Special Independent Committee was a limited purpose committee and not a standing committee of the Board.

The Compensation Committee's recommendation was discussed, and, upon motion made by Mr. Kane and seconded by Mr. Wrotniak (and abstentions from Mr. Gould, Mr. McEachern and Ms. Codding), the following resolution was adopted on a vote of five yes, and one no (Mr. Cotter, Jr. voting no):

BE IT HEREBY RESOLVED that recommendation of the Compensation Committee is accepted to pay 2017 compensation to the Special Committee as follows: William Gould, Chairman: \$20,000; Douglas McEachern and Judy Codding, members: \$15,000.

Request by a Majority of the Directors (Judy Codding, William Gould, Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern and Michael Wrotniak) for the Calling for a Special Meeting Pursuant to Reading International, Inc. Bylaws Section Article 2, Section 7

Chair Cotter turned the meeting over to Lead Independent Director William Gould. Mr. Gould explained that while the five directors who had made the request for the special meeting did not include Guy Adams, the five named directors continued to be of the belief that Director Adams is in fact an independent and disinterested director, and by not including him in their deliberations or their request were neither conceding nor waiving any argument that Director Adams is not, in fact, an independent director and a "disinterested director" for any purpose related to the matters being considerd today for ratification. Mr. Gould asked Mr. Bonner and Mr. Ferrario to make introductory comments. The five named directors expressed their high level of respect for Director Adams, and their confidence that he has acted in the best interests of the Company and not out of any personal self interest.

Mr. Bonner summarized the request for a special meeting at the behest of the five named Directors (Codding, Gould, Kane, McEachern and Wrotniak) pursuant to a letter dated December 27, 2017 delivered to the Chair, pursuant to the Company's Bylaws, Article 2, Section 7. Mr. Bonner also stated that the five requesting directors were the directors found to have been independent and disinterested and who were each dismissed as defendants by the December 11, 2017 ruling of the Nevada District Court in the derivative litigation.

Mr. Bonner stated that the agenda items to be considered were brought under Nevada Revised Statute Section 78.140, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B to these minutes. Mr. Bonner quoted from section 2(a) of NRS 78.140 for the record of the meeting.

Mr. Bonner briefed the Board of their fiduciary duties under Nevada law, including the duty of due care and the duty of loyalty.

In order to put the proposed ratification into perspective, Mr. Ferrario summarized the nature of the allegations by the plaintiff in the derivative action (specifically reading into the record the allegations relating to lack of independence of Director Adams) and referred the Directors to the Board Materials.

(a) Ratification of actions taken by Board members relating to the termination of James J. Cotter, Jr. as President and CEO, as such actions are outlined in the minutes of the Board Meetings held on May 21, 2015; May 29, 2015; and June 12, 2015.

Mr. Gould generally summarized the first issue for consideration, being ratification of the actions taken by Board members related to the termination of James J. Cotter, Jr. as President and CEO, as such actions are outlined in the minutes of the Board meetings held on May 21, 2015, May 29, 2015 and June 12, 2015. Mr. Gould stated that all members of the Board had been provided with copies of the referenced meeting minutes and other materials in the Board Materials. In addition, Mr. Gould stated that all directors, those who were members of the Board at the time of the termination of Mr. Cotter, and the two new directors who joined the Board after such termination (directors Codding and Wrotniak) through their involvement in the litigation, Board meetings and otherwise been privy to detailed information regarding the termination and the Board's reasons therefor. Mr. Gould inquired whether any Directors had any questions or comments based on the Board Materials or other information they had.

Director Judy Codding stated that she had thoroughly reviewed the Board Materials and had extensive knowledge about the Board's reasons for the termination of Mr. Cotter, Jr. She further stated that she had had ample opportunity to observe Mr. Cotter Jr.'s behavior and demeanor in Board meetings since she had joined the Board. Ms. Codding stated that in her view, Mr. Cotter, Jr. did not possess the knowledge, experience, ability, temperment or demeanor to be the chief executive officer of the Company, and believed that the actions taken by the Board to terminate him as CEO and President were appropriate.

Mr. Wrotniak also expressed his views that he had understood and appreciated the information provided in the Board Materials and concurred with Ms. Codding's comments. He stated that in his view, the Board had attempted to work with Mr. Cotter, Jr., but ultimately, in his view, had no alternative but to take the action that it did – termination of Mr. Cotter, Jr., as CEO and President.

There was a brief discussion of the Board Materials, including the fact that the "Highpoint Associates contract and invoice" had been included in the materials. Mr. Ferrario stated that this was to assist the Board in understanding information that had not been disclosed by Mr. Cotter, Jr. at the time of the May and June 2015 Board meetings, but which were subsequently learned in litigation discovery and that Board members might consider to be

relevant when considering whether or not to ratify the Board's decision to terminate Mr. Cotter, Jr., as CEO and President.

Mr. Gould inquired whether there were any other questions. Mr. McEachern made a motion, seconded by Ms. Codding, as follows:

BE IT HEREBY RESOLVED that that the Board ratifies the actions taken by the Company's Board members relating to the termination of James J. Cotter, Jr. as President and CEO as such actions are outlined in the minutes of the Board meetings held on May 21, 2015, May 29, 2015 and June 12, 2015.

Mr. Gould asked whether there was further discussion and invited Director Cotter, Jr. to provide his thoughts to the Board. Mr. Cotter, Jr. thanked Mr. Gould and expressed his view that the ratification items were solely designed for a litigation purpose and, accordingly, that there was no need for him to comment, although he objected fully and completely to any of the statements made in connection with the ratification vote and the substance thereunder. He stated that he felt there was no purpose to be served in going into an extensive discussion given what he believed to be the true purpose of today's ratification actions: to support the position of the Company and the Board in the ongoing Derivative Litigaiton.

The resolution was adopted by the following vote: In favor: Directors Codding, Gould, Kane, McEachern and Wrotniak; "Objecting"/no: James Cotter, Jr.; Abstaining: Directors Ellen Cotter, Margaret Cotter and Guy Adams.

(b) Ratification of the decision of the Compensation Committee, as outlined in the minutes of September 21, 2015 meeting of the Compensation Committee, to permit the Estate of James J. Cotter, Sr. to use Class A non-voting stock as the means of payment for the exercise of an option to purchase 100,000 shares of Class B voting stock of RDI

Mr. Gould introduced this agenda item and referred to the Board Materials and inquired whether there were any questions. Mr. Bonner briefly summarized certain of the information regarding the matter considered by the Compensation Committee in 2015, at which time the Compensation Committee had authorized the acceptance of Class A non-voting stock owned by the James J. Cotter, Sr. Estate to pay for exercise of an option to purchase 100,000 shares of the Company's Class B voting stock owned by the Estate. Mr. Bonner referred to the extensive record made by the Compensation Committee in 2015, and the fact that the acceptance of stock was within the discretion of the Compensation Committee as Administrators of the 1999 Stock Option Plan under which the stock option was granted.

Mr. Gould inquired whether there were any questions. Board members generally expressed their awareness of the information as well as their review of the Board Materials.

Mr. Cotter, Jr. once again expressed his continuing objection to any vote stating that he did not feel it necessary to go into any detail for his objections given his prior comments that these actions were being taken merely as a litigation device. Mr. Cotter stated that he did not agree with some of the "inaccurate" and "incorrect" statements made. To this, Director McEachern interjected that he believed that "no inaccurate or incorrect statements had been made." Director McEchern also noted his view that the allegations made by Mr. Cotter in this

regard had caused a waste of Company resources, as it was perfectly clear that neither the Cotter Estate nor Ellen and Margaret Cotter had gained any advantage from the transaction, given that the Cotter Estate could have sold Class A shares in the market and used the cash to exercise the option in question. He stated that he saw no harm to the Company nor any advantage to the Cotter Estate, Ellen Cotter or Margaret Cotter resulting from the action of the Compenation Committee of which Mr. Cotter, Jr., complained. Mr. Cotter responded that there was no sense in engaging in a debate, but that he did not agree with accuracy of a number of the statements made.

Upon motion duly made by Director McEachern and seconded by Director Wrotniak, the following resolution was adopted:

BE IT HEREBY RESOLVED that the Board ratifies the decision of the Compensation Committee of the Company, as outlined in the minutes of its September 21, 2015 meeting, to permit the Estate of James J. Cotter, Sr. to use Class A non-voting stock as the means of payment for the exercise of an option to purchase 100,000 shares of Class B voting stock of the Company.

The motion was approved as follows: In favor: Directors Codding, Gould, Kane, McEachern and Wrotniak; "Objecting"/no: James Cotter, Jr.; Abstaining: Ellen Cotter, Margaret Cotter and Guy Adams.

Next, it was note**d** without objection that the foregoing approved resolutions included authorization to take such other actions as may be necessary to accomplish the matters approved therein.

Lead Indempendent Director Gould returned the chair to Chair Cotter. Directors Judy Codding and Douglas McEachern each echoed comments made earlier by Director Kane and thanked Ellen Cotter in particular and the entire Reading staff who had sacrificed their personal time, vacation/ Christmas time to prepare the materials necessary for consideration of the compensation matters considered at the meeting. Chair Cotter thanked the Board members and joined in the comments thanking the staff.

Adjournment

*	rticipating in today's meeting. There was no further at approximately 10:25 a.m., Pacific Time.	r
Ellen M. Cotter, Chairman	S. Craig Tompkins, Recording Secretary	

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MDSM 1 MARK E. FERRARIO, ESQ. 2 (NV Bar No. 1625) KARA B. HENDRICKS, ESQ. (NV Bar No. 7743) TAMI D. COWDEN, ESQ. 3 4 (NV Bar No. 8994) GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway 5 Suite 400 North Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 6 Telephone: (702) 792-3773 Facsimile: (702) 792-9002 7 Email: ferrariom@gtlaw.com hendricksk@gtlaw.com 8 cowdent@gtlaw.com 9 Counsel for Reading International, Inc. 10 DISTRICT COURT 11 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 12 Case No. A-15-719860-B JAMES J. COTTER, JR., individually and 13 Dept. No. XI derivatively on behalf of Reading International, Inc., 14 Coordinated with: Plaintiff, 15 Case No. P 14-082942-E Dept. XI 16 v. Case No. A-16-735305-B MARGARET COTTER, et al, 17 Dept. XI Defendants. 18 In the Matter of the Estate of 19 20 JAMES J. COTTER, Deceased. 21 **MOTION TO DISMISS** JAMES J. COTTER, JR., 22 FOR FAILURE TO SHOW **DEMAND FUTILITY** Plaintiff, 23 Hearing Date: 1/8/18 24 v. Hearing Time: 8:30a.m. READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a 25 Nevada corporation; DOES 1-100, and ROE ENTITIES, 1-100, inclusive, 26 Defendants. 27 28 Page 1 of 9 LV 421038143v2

Case Number: A-15-719860-B

GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP
3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 400 North
Las Vegas, Nevald 89169
Telephone: (702) 792-3773
Excimite, 7437, 792-2017

Nominal Defendant Reading International, Inc. ("RDI"), a Nevada corporation, by and through its undersigned counsel of record, hereby moves this Court to dismiss this action due to the inability of Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. ("Cotter, Jr.") to prove his allegations of demand futility. This motion is based upon the files and records in this matter, the attached memorandum of authorities, and any argument allowed at the time of hearing.

DATED this 3rd day of January, 2018.

GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP

Mark E. Ferrario, Esq. (NBN 1625)
Kara B. Hendricks, Esq. (NBN 7743)
Tami D. Cowden, Esq. (NBN 8994)
3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 400N
Las Vegas, Nevada 89169
Counsel for Reading International, Inc.

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DECLARATION OF TAMI D. COWDEN, ESQ.

I, Tami D. Cowden, state and declare as follows:

- I am licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada. I am an attorney with the law 1. firm of Greenberg Traurig, LLP, counsel for Reading International, Inc. in this proceeding. I make this declaration based upon personal, firsthand knowledge. If called upon to testify as to the contents of this declaration, I am legally competent to testify to its contents.
- On December 28, 2017, this Court executed an order that determined, as a matter 2. of law, that RDI Directors Judy Codding, William Gould, Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, and Michael Wrotniak were independent.
- In so ruling, this Court found that Cotter, Jr. could not prove the allegations he 3. had made as to the purported interestedness of these directors. As a result, this Court has also determined that Cotter, Jr. cannot prove the allegations of demand futility that he had included in the various iterations of his complaint.
- This Court had previously determined that Cotter, Jr.'s allegations of 4. interestedness and demand futility had been sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
- Pursuant to Nevada law, the Court's determination as to the adequacy of the 5. pleading required the Court to subsequently determine, as a matter of law, whether the allegations of interestedness were proven.
- This Court's December 28, 2017 Order establishes that the allegations of 6. interestedness could not be proven.
- Accordingly, as Cotter, Jr.'s allegations of demand futility cannot be proven, he 7. does not have standing to maintain a derivative action, and it should therefore be dismissed as a matter of law.
- 8. Good cause exists to hear this motion on shortened time. Presenting this motion in the ordinary course would prevent the Court from ruling on the motion to dismiss prior to the scheduled trial date. Accordingly, grant of an order shortening time is appropriate.

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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on this 3rd day of January, 2018, at Las Vegas, Nevada.

Tanii D. Cowden, Esq.

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Page 5 of 9

GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 1773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 400 North Las Vegat, Neward 89169 Telephone: (702) 792-3773 Facsimile: (702) 792-9002

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

This Court's recent determination that, as a matter of law, Directors Judy Codding, William Gould, Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, and Michael Wrotniak establishes that the making of a demand to file an action against the remaining defendants would not have been futile. Accordingly, this action must be dismissed for lack of standing by Cotter, Jr. to maintain a derivative action on behalf of RDI.

FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS MOTION TO DISMISS

Cotter, Jr. first filed his complaint in this action on June 12, 2015. The original complaint combined both individual claims and claims brought derivatively on behalf of RDI. The Defendants for the derivative claims included RDI Directors Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, Guy Adams, Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, and Timothy Storey, with RDI as a Nominal Defendant. As relevant here, the individual directors moved to dismiss the derivative claims for a failure to make demand; RDI joined that motion. At a hearing on September 10, 2015, this Court determined that Cotter, Jr. had "adequately alleged demand futility and interestedness," but partially granted the motion to dismiss due to a failure to adequately plead damages. See Transcript, Sept. 10, 2015, 15:24-16:3.

Cotter, Jr. thereafter filed his First Amended Complaint, to which Defendants Judy Codding and Michael Wrotniak were added. On November 12, 2015, the Individual Director Defendants again filed motions to dismiss, including a failure to allege demand futility among the grounds. RDI moved to dismiss on additional grounds. This Court denied those motions in an order filed March 1, 2016, noting that the denial was without prejudice for the Defendants' rights to file motions for summary judgment. On May 6, 2016, Cotter, Jr. voluntarily dismissed Defendant Timothy Storey from the action. Cotter, Jr. subsequently sought leave, over the objection of Defendants, to file a Second Amended Complaint, again naming as defendants all of the members of RDI's Board of Directors, other than himself.

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Defendants William Gould and Timothy Storey filed such motion separately from the other defendants.

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On September 23, 2016, the Individual Directors (except for Director Gould) filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of the independence of each of them (save Gould). RDI joined that motion. Defendant Gould filed a motion for summary judgment, in which the issue of his independence was one of the claimed grounds. This Court denied those motions finding there were material issues of fact regarding the independence of the Directors. Those motions were subsequently renewed, however, and, as noted above, this Court granted them on December 28, 2017.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

THE DETERMINATION THAT A MAJORITY OF RDI'S DIRECTORS WERE INDEPENDENT ESTABLISHES THAT COTTER, JR. CANNOT PROVE HIS DEMAND FUTILITY ALLEGATIONS, REQUIRING DISMISSAL

This Court's determination that Directors Codding, Gould, Kane, McEachern, and Wrotniak are disinterested with respect to the decisions cited in the Second Amended Complaint establishes that such complaint must be dismissed for failure of demand.

Pursuant to NRCP 23.1, a plaintiff must allege efforts made to have the corporation file the action, or to show that the making of a demand to sue is futile. When a court determines that the allegations of purported interest of a majority of members of the board of directors are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to make demand, the court must "later conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine, as a matter of law, whether the demand requirement nevertheless deprives the shareholder of his or her standing to sue." In re Amerco Derivative Litig., 127 Nev. 196, 222, 252 P.3d 681, 700 (2011), quoting Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp., 122 Nev. 621, 636, 137 P.3d 1171, 1181 (2006). In fact, in In Re Amerco, the remand to the district court instructed the court to determine "whether demand was, in fact, futile." 127 Nev. at 222, 252 P.3d at 700.

Here, this Court's ruling on summary judgment has taken the place of such evidentiary hearing; Cotter, Jr. was unable to show that demand was futile. Accordingly, the matter should be dismissed. This is true regardless of which of the three iterations of the complaint the Court considers. the Court considers the time the initial complaint was filed, wherein the majority of

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the RDI Directors included William Gould, Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, and Timothy Storey, or if the Court considers the time of the filings of the First or Second Amended Complaints, wherein the majority of RDI's Board was comprised of Judy Codding, William Gould, Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern and Michael Wrotniak. Accordingly, a majority of RDI's Directors were independent as of the filing of each version of Cotter, Jr.'s complaint, and demand would not have been futile.

CONCLUSION

This Court has determined that a majority of RDI's Directors were independent with respect to the decisions challenged by Cotter, Jr. Therefore, none of these Directors faced liability based on Cotter, Jr.'s claims. Cotter, Jr. cannot prove his allegations that demand on the Board to file his claims was futile. Accordingly, Cotter, Jr. has no standing to serve as a plaintiff in this derivative action.

DATED this 3rd day of January, 2018.

GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP

Mark E. Ferrario, Esq. (NBN 1625) Kara B. Hendricks, Esq. (NBN 7743) Tami D. Cowden, Esq. (NBN 8994) 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 400N Las Vegas, Nevada 89169 Counsel for Reading International, Inc.

Page 8 of 9

LV 421038143v2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D) and E.D.C.R. 8.05, I certify that on this day, I caused a true and correct copy of the forgoing *Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Show Demand Futility* to be filed and served via the Court's Odyssey eFileNV Electronic Service system on all registered and active parties. The date and time of the electronic proof of service is in place of the date and place of deposit in the mail.

DATED this 3rd day of January, 2018.

An employee of GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP

Page 9 of 9

READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada corporation,

Nominal Defendant.

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Electronically Filed 1/3/2018 7:46 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT) Case No. A-15-719860-B Case No. P-14-0824-42-E REPLY IN SUPPORT OF **MOTION FOR RULE 54(b)** CERTIFICATION AND STAY

1/4/2018

8:30 a.m.

I. INTRODUCTION

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By his "Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification and Stay..." (the "Motion"), plaintiff James J Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff") sought a rule 54 (b) certification of the Court's rulings that included dismissing five director defendants from the case, and sought a stay of the case before the Court pending disposition by the Nevada Supreme Court of issues arising from the Court's rulings dismissing the five director defendants.

The three remaining individual defendants filed an opposition (the "Opposition") which took no position on the certification request and argued against the request for a stay, making two principal arguments. The first was that, notwithstanding their position that the Court's rulings "made Plaintiff's ... case [against them] more difficult legally," requiring Plaintiff to proceed to trial against them does not cause Plaintiff serious injury or defeat an object of Plaintiff's appeal. The second is that the remaining defendants are entitled to defend the case against them at trial by using newly created evidence, namely, the December 29, 2017 "ratification" by the five dismissed director defendants of the only issues the three contend remain, namely, Plaintiff's termination and the authorization of the 100,000 share option, because (they contend) that "ratification" was merely an ordinary course of business action by the (other five) RDI directors. In truth, the purported ratification is nothing less than an effort to change the evidence and burden of proof at trial and, ultimately, the results of the trial against the remaining three defendants. This too creates obvious prejudice of Plaintiff and, in the process, undermines at least one object of Plaintiff's appeal. In taking these positions, the Opposition shows that the Motion should be granted, both as to the certification sought and as to the stay sought, for the reasons described below.

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A. An Object of Plaintiff's Appeal Will be Defeated, and Plaintiff Will Suffer Serious Prejudice and Harm, if a Stay is Denied.

As Plaintiff demonstrated in the Motion, because of (i) what defendants maintain are the legal consequences of the Court's dismissal of the five director defendants on the case against the remaining three defendants and, separately, (ii) actions the five dismissed defendants took on December 29 to attempt to ratify conduct of the three remaining defendants which indisputably remains a subject of the trial, one of the objects of the relief Plaintiff seeks and will seek from the Nevada Supreme Court, to avert changes in the applicable legal standards and possibly the evidence that may be fatal to his case against the three defendants, will be defeated if a stay is denied. As Plaintiff also demonstrated, he will be severely prejudiced if a stay is denied.

For example, Plaintiff in the Motion first argued as follows:

"First, as the remaining defendants have made clear, they will take the position that dismissal of this case as against the five individual director defendants severely limits the matters on which Plaintiff can base breach of fiduciary duty claims against the remaining defendants. In that regard, defendants have indicated that they will take the position that, with respect to any matter as to which a majority of the directors making or approving a decision have been dismissed by the Court, those matters alone may not serve as bases for breach of fiduciary duty claims against the remaining defendants."

(Motion at 7:7–15.)

In the Motion. Plaintiff also argued as follows:

Second, as the remaining director defendants have previewed, they will take the position that dismissal of the case as against the five dismissed director defendants affects which party bears the burden of proof. With respect to matters as to which the Court has determined that the remaining defendants lacked disinterestedness, independence or both and

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therefore cannot invoke the statutory presumptions typically referred to as the business judgment rule, the remaining defendants will argue that the business judgment rule nevertheless applies because a majority of the directors who made or approved the challenged decision were found by the Court not to lack disinterestedness or independence and were dismissed.

(Motion at 7:27-8:7.)

In their Opposition, the remaining three defendants do not dispute the foregoing. On the contrary, they tacitly admit it, stating:

"[T]he fact that the Court's independence decision made Plaintiff's ... case more difficult legally for him is not the kind of irreparable or undue injury that supports delay."

(Opposition at 4:1–2.)

The Opposition's conclusion of no irreparable or undue injury does not follow from the admission of their position regarding the legal and practical consequence of the Court's rulings. Instead, the erroneous conclusion of no irreparable or undue injury is predicated on the erroneous premise that the sole object of Plaintiff's writ and appeal is limited to "seek[ing] review of another court as to whether [the dismissed five] are disinterested and independent as a matter of law..." (Opposition at 2:14–17) and that "Plaintiff's substantive objections to proceeding to trial [therefore] are no different from any plaintiff who has lost a partial summary judgment motion" (Opposition at 3:10–13). The individual defendants are mistaken, as the Motion shows.

The legal and practical consequences of the relief Plaintiff seeks and will seek from the Nevada Supreme Court are not limited to the dismissed five. It also concerns the remaining three defendants, as the Motion demonstrates and as the Opposition tacitly acknowledges. Simply put, the statement in the Opposition "that the Court's independence decision

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makes Plaintiff's ... case more difficult legally" is a backhanded way of admitting the individual defendants' position that the Court's ruling dismissing the five director defendants eliminates as to the remaining three defendants every issue in the case (except for the two with respect to which those defendants on December 29 took actions to change the evidence and legal standard at the trial of the remaining three defendants, which is discussed below). As the Opposition acknowledges (Opposition at 2:20–22), that is exactly what Nevada courts hold amounts to defeating the object of an appeal.

Separately, Plaintiff in the Motion also argued as follows:

As to matters with respect to which they cannot show that a majority of the directors who made or approved the challenged decision were dismissed by the Court, the remaining defendants clearly intend to rely on the forthcoming ratification of those actions by the dismissed five director defendants. One example that illustrates this point is the 3 to 2 termination vote.

(Motion at 8:8–13.)

Not only does the Opposition not dispute the foregoing, it affirmatively and boldly embraces it and previews the argument the three remaining defendants intend to make at trial, stating as follows:

"[] Plaintiff complains about the RDI Board's votes [meaning the vote of the five dismissed directors] on December 29, 2017 to ratify both Plaintiff's termination and the exercise of a share purchase option held by the Estate of James J Cotter, Sr.... The legal effect of the Board's ratification decision, which is now accomplished, is clear under NRS 78.140 and the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in *Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp.*, 122 Nev. 621, 636, 137 P.3d 1171, 1181 (2006)."

(Opposition at 3:19–28.)

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The foregoing is nothing less than an admission that the three remaining defendants, with the intervening assistance of the five dismissed defendants, intend to take advantage of the Court's rulings which are and will be the subject of review by the Nevada Supreme Court to alter the evidence proffered, to change the burden of proof applied and, ultimately, to change the results of the trial against the remaining three defendants. In taking that position, expressly in the Opposition, the three remaining defendants have made the case that proceeding with trial against them prior to resolution of the issues raised by the Court's rulings dismissing the five director defendants necessarily will require rulings by the Court at and/or before trial that will serve as additional bases for appeal by one side or both. Moreover, whether the recently created evidence should be admitted, and what it shows, are issues as to which Plaintiff will be required to take different positions than if the matters to be resolved by the Nevada Supreme Court were resolved first. As the foregoing illustrates, proceeding with trial under the circumstances puts the parties, Plaintiff in particular and the Court in some respects as well, in the position of "shooting at a moving target" and, in the process, severely prejudicing Plaintiff and undermining one of the objects of Plaintiff's writ and appeal.

II. **CONCLUSION**

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully submits that the Motion should be granted in all respects.

MORRIS LAW GROUP

By: <u>/s/ AKKE LEVIN</u> Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543 Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102 411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

MORRIS LAW GROUP

411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 · Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422 Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913 YURKO, SALVESEN & REMZ, P.C. 1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor Boston, MA 02108

Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.

m MORRIS~LAW~GROUP411 E. Bonneville Ave., STE. 360 · LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D) and E.D.C.R. 8.05, I certify that I am an employee of MORRIS LAW GROUP and that on the date below, I cause the following document(s) to be served via the Court's Odyssey E-Filing System: **REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION AND STAY**, to be served on all interested parties, as registered with the Court's E-Filing and E-Service System. The date and time of the electronic proof of service is in place of the date and place of deposit in the mail.

DATED this 3rd day of January, 2018.

By: <u>/s/ PATRICIA FERRUGIA</u>

MORRIS LAW GROUPE. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 \cdot Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 702/474-9400 \cdot Eax 702/474-9422

THIS MATTER CAME BEFORE THE COURT on the Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification and Stay of plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff"). The Court, having considered any papers filed and arguments made in support of and in opposition to the Motion, and for good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification is GRANTED because Plaintiff will be severely prejudiced if required to wait to appeal and the remaining defendants will not be prejudiced if the Court's December 28, 2017 order dismissing defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak is certified.

The Court therefore finds and determines, under Nev. R. Civ. P. 54(b), that there is no just reason for delay and hereby directs entry of judgment as to defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak on all of Plaintiff's claims against them.

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	not stayed pending Plaintiff's appeal.					
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9	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE					
10	Submitted by:					
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13	By: /s/ Akke Levin					
14	Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543					
15	Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102 411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360					
16	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101					
17	Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913					
18	YURKO, SALVESEN & REMZ, P.C.					
19	1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor Boston, MA 02108					
20	Attorneys for Plaintiff					
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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification and Stay was entered in this action on the 4th day of January, 2018.

A copy of the Order is attached as Exhibit 1.

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Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

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Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D) and E.D.C.R. 8.05, I certify that I am an employee of MORRIS LAW GROUP and that on the date below, I cause the following document(s) to be served via the Court's Odyssey E-Filing System: **NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER**, to be served on all interested parties, as registered with the Court's E-Filing and E-Service System. The date and time of the electronic proof of service is in place of the date and place of deposit in the mail.

Stan Johnson Cohen-Johnson, LLC 255 East Warm Springs Road, Ste. 110 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119

Christopher Tayback Marshall Searcy Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP 865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor Los Angeles, CA

Attorneys for /Defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak

Mark Ferrario Kara Hendricks Tami Cowden Greenberg Traurig, LLP 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway Suite 400 North Las Vegas, NV 89169

Attorneys for Nominal Defendant Reading International, Inc.

DATED this day of January, 2018.

Donald A. Lattin Carolyn K. Renner Maupin, Cox & LeGoy 4785 Caughlin Parkway Reno, Nevada 89519

Ekwan E. Rhow Shoshana E. Bannett Bird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert, Nessim, Drooks, Lincenberg & Rhow, P.C. 1875 Century Park East, 23rd Fl. Los Angeles, CA 90067-2561

Attorneys for Defendant William Gould

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EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 1

Case Number: A-15-719860-B

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THIS MATTER CAME BEFORE THE COURT on the Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification and Stay of plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff"). The Court, having considered any papers filed and arguments made in support of and in opposition to the Motion, and for good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification is GRANTED because Plaintiff will be severely prejudiced if required to wait to appeal and the remaining defendants will not be prejudiced if the Court's December 28, 2017 order dismissing defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak is certified.

The Court therefore finds and determines, under Nev. R. Civ. P. 54(b), that there is no just reason for delay and hereby directs entry of judgment as to defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak on all of Plaintiff's claims against them.

$\begin{array}{c} \mathbf{MORRIS\ LAW\ GROUP} \\ \textbf{411 E. Bonneville\ Ave.,\ STE.\ 360 \cdot Las\ Vegas,\ Nevada\ 89101} \\ \textbf{702/474-9400 \cdot FAX\ 702/474-9422} \end{array}$

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	9	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE				
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	17	Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913				
	18	YURKO, SALVESEN & REMZ, P.C. 1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor				
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This matter came before the Court on December 28, 2017 for hearing on plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.'s Motion to Stay and Motion for Reconsideration or Clarification of Ruling on Motions for [Partial] Summary judgment Nos. 1, 2, and 3 and Gould's Summary Judgment Motion ("Motion for Reconsideration"). Mark G. Krum and Akke Levin appeared for plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff"); Marshall M. Searcy III appeared for defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, Edward Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak; Mark E. Ferrario appeared for nominal defendant Reading International, Inc.; and Shoshana Bannett appeared for defendant William Gould ("Gould").

The Court, having considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Stay, having heard oral argument of the parties, having considered (sealed) Court Exhibit 1, and for good cause appearing:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. Although the Court reviewed Court Exhibit 1, the Court finds it was not provided with new factual information or new legal analysis that would cause the Court to change its decision on Motions for Partial Summary Judgment Nos. 1, 2, and Gould's Motion for Summary Judgment.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Stay is DENIED.

DATED this day of _____, 2018

THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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Submitted by:

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MORRIS LAW GROUP

By: <u>/s/ Akke Levin</u> Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543 Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102

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Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913 YURKO, SALVESEN & REMZ, P.C. 1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor Boston, MA 02108

Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.

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COHENJOHNSONPARKEREDWARDS 2 H. STAN JOHNSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 00265 sjohnson@cohenjohnson.com 3 375 E. Warm Springs Rd., Suite 104 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 4 Telephone: (702) 823-3500 Facsimile: (702) 823-3400 5 6 **OUINN EMANUEL UROUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP** CHRISTOPHER TAYBACK, ESQ. 7 California Bar No. 145532, pro hac vice christayback@quinnemanuel.com MARSHALL M. SEARCY, ESQ. 8 California Bar No. 169269, pro hac vice marshallsearcy@quinnemanuel.com 9 865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017 10 Telephone: (213) 443-3000 11 Attorneys for Defendants Margaret Cotter, 12 Ellen Cotter, and Guy Adams 13 EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 14 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 15 Case No .: A-15-719860-B Dept. No.: XI JAMES J. COTTER, JR. individually and 16 derivatively on behalf of Reading P-14-082942-E Case No .: 17 International, Inc., Dept. No.: XI 18 Plaintiff, Related and Coordinated Cases 19 MARGARET COTTER, et al., BUSINESS COURT Defendants. 20 THE REMAINING DIRECTOR AND 21 **DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR** READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 22 corporation, APPLICATION FOR ORDER 23 Nominal Defendant. SHORTENING TIME 24 Judge: Hon. Elizabeth Gonzalez 25 Date of Hearing: Time of Hearing: 26 27

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TO ALL PARTIES, COUNSEL, AND THE COURT:

Pursuant to Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56, Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, and Guy Adams (collectively, the "Remaining Director Defendants"), by and through their counsel of record, CohenlJohnsonlParkerlEdwards and Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, hereby submit this Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. The Remaining Director Defendants request that this matter be heard on an order shortening time.

This Motion is based upon the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of Noah S. Helpern, the pleadings and papers on file, and any oral argument that the time of a hearing on this motion.

Dated: January 3, 2018

COHENIJOHNSONIPARKERIEDWARDS

/s/ H. Stan Johnson

H. STAN JOHNSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 00265 sjohnson@cohenjohnson.com

255 East Warm Springs Road, Suite 100

Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 Telephone: (702) 823-3500

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QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP

CHRISTOPHER TAYBACK, ESQ. California Bar No. 145532, pro hac vice christayback@quinnemanuel.com MARSHALL M. SEARCY, ESQ. California Bar No. 169269, pro hac vice marshallsearcy@quinnemanuel.com 865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017

Telephone: (213) 443-3000

Attorneys for Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, and Guy Adams

ORDER SHORTENING TIME
It appearing to the satisfaction of the Court and good cause appearing therefor, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, and Guy Adams'
(collectively, "Remaining Director Defendants") Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law shall
be heard before the above-entitled Court in Department XI, on the day of
January, 2018 at
Dated this day of January, 2018
ENDED
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
PREPARED AND SUBMITTED BY:

COHENIJOHNSONIPARKERIEDWARDS

By: H. STAN JOHNSON, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 00265

sjohnson@cohenjohnson.com

255 East Warm Springs Road, Suite 100

Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 Telephone: (702) 823-3500 Facsimile: (702) 823-3400

I, Noah Helpern, state and declare as follows:

purpose of delay.

- 1. I am a member of the bar of the State of California, and am an attorney with Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP ("Quinn Emanuel"), attorneys for Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, and Guy Adams (the "Remaining Director Defendants"). I make this declaration based upon personal, firsthand knowledge, except where stated to be on information and belief, and as to that information, I believe it to be true. If called upon to testify as to the contents of this declaration (hereinafter referred to as "HD"), I am legally competent to testify to its contents in a court of law. This declaration is made in good faith and not for the
- Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the December 29, 2017
 Notice of Entry of the Court's December 28, 2017 Order Regarding Defendants' Motions for
 Partial Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's and Defendants' Motions in Limine.
- Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the draft Minutes of the Meeting of the Reading International, Inc. ("RDI") Board of Directors held on December 29, 2017, which remain subject to approval by the Board.
- 4. The Court's December 28, 2017 Order granted summary judgment in favor of RDI Directors William Gould, Douglas McEachern, Edward Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak on all claims following a determination that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to the disinterestedness and independence of each; the Court denied summary judgment, and left for trial, whether Directors Guy Adams, Ellen Cotter, and Margaret Cotter were disinterested and/or independent with respect to the transactions challenged by Plaintiff.
- 5. The Court's December 28, 2017 Order left only two transactions without the votes of a majority of legally disinterested, independent directors: (1) the actions taken by the Board up to and including Plaintiff's termination; and (2) the decision by RDI's Compensation Committee to allow the exercise of an option held by the Estate of James J. Cotter, Sr.
- On December 29, 2017, the RDI Board held a Special Meeting in which the five directors found by this Court to be legally disinterested and independent (Gould, McEachern,

Kane, Codding, and Wrotniak) reconsidered and ratified the Board's actions relating to

Plaintiff's termination and the stock option exercise. The Remaining Defendant Directors Guy Adams, Ellen Cotter, and Margaret Cotter did not vote on the resolutions adopted by the Board.

- 7. Pursuant to NRS 78.140(2)(a) and the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in *Shoen* v. SAC Holding Corp., 122 Nev. 621, 636, 137 P.3d 1171, 1181 (2006), Nevada's business judgment rule therefore applies to the Board's actions relating to Plaintiff's termination and the stock option exercise because those decisions were ratified by a majority of disinterested, independent directors.
- 8. Given that the business judgment presumption applies to all Board actions challenged by Plaintiff and it is beyond dispute that each decision was attributable to a rational business purpose, Plaintiff cannot sustain any of his breach of fiduciary duty claims against any of the Remaining Director Defendants. Judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's fiduciary duty claims should therefore be awarded to the Remaining Director Defendants.
- 9. Because Plaintiff cannot show a breach of fiduciary duty by any Defendant, he cannot establish the elements required for a cognizable aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claim. As such, his Fourth Cause of Action, asserted against Ellen and Margaret Cotter, also fails as a matter of law. Judgment on Plaintiff's aiding and abetting claim should therefore be awarded to Ellen and Margaret Cotter, leaving no actionable claims left for trial.
- 10. Good cause exists to hear this motion on shortened time. Presenting this motion in the ordinary course would prevent the Court from ruling on it prior to the scheduled trial date. Because this motion may moot the need for a trial, the grant of an order shortening time is appropriate.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on January 3, 2018, in Las Vegas, Nevada.

Ist Noah Helpern Wich Helpern Noah Helpern

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION

As a result of the Court's recent ruling, which granted summary judgment on all claims in favor of Reading International, Inc. ("RDI") Directors William Gould, Douglas McEachern, Edward Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak, all of the corporate "transactions" alleged by Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. to be actionable breaches of fiduciary duty were approved by a majority of disinterested, independent directors, save for two: (1) the actions taken by Board members leading up to and including the termination of Plaintiff as CEO and President of RDI; and (2) the RDI Compensation Committee's approval of the exercise of a stock option held by the Estate of James J. Cotter, Sr. With respect to those transactions, the outcome-determinative vote was cast by Director Guy Adams, and the Court concluded there were genuine issues of material fact as to his independence that precluded judgment as a matter of law in his favor.

Following the Court's decision, the full RDI Board convened a Special Meeting on December 29, 2017 at the request of the five disinterested, independent directors to reevaluate the two remaining transactions. Such reconsideration made logical sense, given that Plaintiff is asking that those Board decisions be re-reviewed through this litigation. This reexamination was also appropriate under NRS 78.140 and the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in *Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp.*, 122 Nev. 621, 636, 137 P.3d 1171, 1181 (2006), which provide that a transaction involving or depending on an interested director, such as—potentially—Mr. Adams, may become "valid" and subject to the business judgment rule following an informed ratification at any time.

After discussing Plaintiff's allegations as to the potential interestedness or non-independence of Mr. Adams, the independent directors addressed the challenged termination and stock option decisions at the Special Meeting. In doing so, they were informed by the Company's counsel, their own extensive knowledge of the applicable facts, their previous corporate board experience, and a further review of the contemporaneous RDI Board materials relevant to those decisions; the Board also allowed additional debate and comment. Ultimately, with Mr. Adams, Ellen Cotter, and Margaret Cotter not voting, the RDI Board voted 5-1 (with

stock option decision. With the RDI Board having met all of the legally-required criteria, Nevada's strong business judgment rule therefore applies to those "transactions," as it does to the other corporate decisions questioned by Plaintiff in this derivative suit. Because Plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claims cannot survive upon an application of Nevada's business judgment rule and his aiding and aiding breach of fiduciary duty claim also fails without a cognizable breach, judgment in favor of the Remaining Director Defendants as to all claims is fully warranted. No trial is necessary: all challenged actions have either been approved or ratified by a disinterested majority of directors, meaning that, as a matter of law, RDI has suffered no damage, and only damage to the Company is at issue in this derivative litigation.

only Plaintiff dissenting) to ratify Plaintiff's termination and the Compensation Committee's

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Court Granted Summary Judgment in Favor of Five Director Defendants on All Claims

Plaintiff filed his currently-operative Second Amended Complaint in this action on September 2, 2016, which asserts broad derivative claims for breach of the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, candor, and disclosure against the other eight current members of the Reading International, Inc. ("Reading") Board of Directors—Douglas McEachern, Edward Kane, William Gould, Judy Codding, Michael Wrotniak, Guy Adams, Ellen Cotter, and Margaret Cotter—as well as an additional claim for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty against Ellen and Margaret Cotter. (See Second Am. Compl. ("SAC") ¶¶ 173-200.) As Plaintiff subsequently clarified, his Second Amended Complaint identifies six "actions or transactions" by these RDI directors that he claimed were "independently entailing or constituting breaches of fiduciary duty": (1) the threat to terminate Plaintiff "if he did not resolve [the Cotter family] trust disputes"; (2) Plaintiff's actual termination; (3) the authorization of the exercise of the 100,000 share option to the Estate of James J. Cotter, Sr.; (4) the permanent CEO search, which resulted in Ellen Cotter's selection; (5) the decision to hire Margaret Cotter as Executive Vice President, Real Estate Development-New York; and (6) the Board's response to the indications of interest

presented by Patton Vision. (See, e.g., Pl.'s Opp'n to Ind. Defs.' Suppl. Mot. for Summ. J.

2 Nos. 1 & 2 at 5-6.)

In conformity with the case management schedule set forth by the Court, the Director Defendants moved for summary judgment on each of these issues, as well as generally as to all claims with respect to their independence and disinterestedness. At the hearing on the Director Defendants motions held on December 11, 2017, the Court determined that Plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of triable fact as to the disinterestedness and/or independence of Directors Wrotniak, Codding, McEachern, Kane, and Gould. In light of Nevada's strong business judgment rule and consistent with well-established law, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of these directors on all breach of fiduciary duty claims asserted by Plaintiff. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the Court's ruling, which the Director Defendants opposed. At a hearing held on December 28, 2017, the Court denied Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and indicated that it would enter a written order later that day granting summary judgment in favor of Directors Wrotniak, Codding, McEachern, Kane, and Gould on all claims—which it subsequently did. (See HD Ex. A (12/29/17 Notice of Entry of Order).)

B. A Majority of Independent, Disinterested RDI Directors Subsequently Ratified the Board's Decision to Terminate Plaintiff and the Compensation Committee's Decision to Permit the Exercise of a Share Purchase Option

Given the contours of the Court's summary judgment ruling, a majority of disinterested, independent RDI directors approved three of the transactions identified as "breaches" by Plaintiff, thereby triggering the application of Nevada's business judgment rule as to those decisions—the search for a permanent CEO of RDI, which culminated in the hiring of Ellen Cotter; the hiring of Margaret Cotter as Executive Vice President, Real Estate Development-New York; and the Board's decision not to further pursue the Patton Vision indication of interest after devoting two board meetings to the issue, hearing a management presentation on the Company's valuation, and discerning the intent of the controlling stockholders not to sell at that time.

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Discounting the votes of Guy Adams and Margaret Cotter, the selection of Ellen Cotter was approved by a vote of 5-1 (see Pl.'s Proposed Tr. Ex. 35); discounting the vote of Mr.

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Pogo.com, Inc., No. Civ. A. 18532-NC, 2002 WL 1358760, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 14, 2002) ("Only upon a showing by a challenger that raises a reasonable doubt as to the independence and/or disinterestedness of a majority of a company's directors who approved the challenged transaction will the presumption of director fealty which lies at the core of the business judgment rule be rebutted.") (citation omitted).

In contrast, the Court's order left the following RDI Board decisions without a majority

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of disinterested, independent RDI directors voting in favor: (1) Plaintiff's June 12, 2015 termination, which was approved by legally-independent directors McEachern and Kane, as well

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as Mr. Adams and the Cotter sisters, for whom independence/disinterestedness remains a jury

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question; and (2) the September 21, 2015 decision by RDI's Compensation Committee, consisting of legally-independent director Kane and director Adams, to approve the use of

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Class A Stock to pay the exercise price of an option held by the Estate of James J. Cotter, Sr.

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class A Stock to pay the exercise price of an option held by the Estate of James J. Cotter, Sr.

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issued a call on December 27, 2017 for a special meeting of the RDI Board pursuant to Article II,

After the Court's order, Directors Gould, Kane, McEachern, Codding, and Wrotniak

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Section 7 of the Company's Bylaws, which provides that "[u]pon the written request of a

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majority of the directors, the Chairman or Vice Chairman of the Board or the President shall call

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a special meeting of the Board to be held within two days of the receipt of such request."

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Neither Director Adams nor Ellen or Margaret Cotter participated in the calling of the special

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meeting. (See HD Ex. B (12/29/17 RDI Board Minutes) at 3.) As indicated on the agenda distributed in advance, the purpose of the special meeting was for the RDI Board to discuss

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Adams, the decision to hire Margaret Cotter was approved by a vote of 5-0 (*see* Pl.'s Proposed Tr. Ex. 207); and, discounting the votes of Mr. Adams and the Cotter sisters, the Board's response to the Patton Vision indication of interest was approved by a vote of 5-0. (*See* Pl.'s Proposed Tr. Ex. 387.) Other Board decisions periodically complained of by Plaintiff, but which—according to him—are not independently-actionable breaches, such as the appointments of Mr. Wrotniak and Ms. Codding as directors and the award of special compensation to Mr. Adams, were also taken by a majority of disinterested, independent directors. (*See id.*; *see also* Pl.'s Proposed Tr. Exs. 263, 380, 381.)

whether to reassess and potentially ratify the two decisions left at issue by the Court's summary judgment ruling—Plaintiff's termination and the share option exercise. (*Id.* at 3-4.)

The full RDI Board subsequently met on December 29, 2017. (*Id.*) Counsel for the Company was present, and updated the Board both on the status of this litigation as well as the content of Plaintiff's allegations as to why Mr. Adams was purportedly not "independent" with respect to the at-issue decisions. (*Id.*) Counsel further informed the Board as to the scope of NRS 78.140 ("Restrictions on Transactions Involving Interested Directors or Officers"), as well as the Board's fiduciary duties under Nevada law, including the duties of due care and loyalty. (*Id.* at 4.) Without conceding the independence or disinterestedness of any directors that remain as Defendants in this action, the RDI Board then proceeded to consider the actions taken leading up and including Plaintiff's termination, as well as the option decision. (*Id.* at 4-5.) Mr. Adams, as well as Margaret and Ellen Cotter, did not vote on either issue—leaving the discussion and ultimate decisions to the five disinterested, independent directors. (*Id.* at 4-6.)

1. The Ratification of Actions Taken by Board Members Relating to the Termination of Plaintiff as President and CEO of RDI

Following this introduction, Lead Independent Director Gould summarized the first issue for consideration: ratification of the actions taken by the Board members relating to the termination of Plaintiff as President and CEO of RDI, as such actions are outlined in the Minutes of the Board Meetings held on May 21, May 29, and June 12, 2015. (*Id.* at 4.) All directors were provided copies of the referenced Minutes. (*Id.*) In addition to their "thorough" review of the relevant Board materials, Directors Codding and Wrotniak, who were not yet members of the RDI Board at the time of Plaintiff's termination, stated that they were drawing on their "extensive knowledge about the Board's reasons for the termination of Mr. Cotter, Jr.," including their observations of Plaintiff's "behavior and demeanor in Board meetings" since each joined over two years ago. (*Id.*) Ms. Codding expressed her view that Plaintiff "did not possess the knowledge, ability or demeanor to be chief executive officer of the Company," an opinion with which Mr. Wrotniak concurred. (*Id.*) Discussion then ensued regarding the Board materials, including the fact that Plaintiff had retained an outside consultant, Highpoint Associates, to assist

him in his CEO duties—a fact that he did not disclose to the Board prior to his termination. (*Id.* at 4-5.)

Director McEachern then made a motion, seconded by Ms. Codding, as follows:

BE IT HEREBY RESOLVED that the Board ratifies the actions taken by the Company's board members relating to the termination of James J. Cotter, Jr. as President and CEO as such actions are outlined in the minutes of the Board meetings held on May 21, 2015, May 29, 2015, and June 12, 2015.

(*Id.* at 5.) After debate and further discussion, including an opportunity by Plaintiff to make comments, the proposed resolution was adopted by Directors Codding, Gould, Kane, McEachern, and Wrotniak, with Plaintiff casting the sole vote in opposition. (*Id.*) Plaintiff characterized the ratification as simply being a litigation device (*id.*), despite the fact that the five ratifying directors were no longer parties to his derivative litigation and have no personal stake in whether the litigation goes forward.

2. The Ratification of the Compensation Committee's Decision to Approve the Exercise of a Share Purchase Option Held by the Cotter, Sr. Estate

Director Gould then introduced the second issue for consideration: ratification of the September 21, 2015 decision by RDI's Compensation Committee to permit the Estate of James J. Cotter, Sr. to use Class A non-voting stock as the means of payment (as opposed to cash) for the exercise of an option to purchase 100,000 shares of Class B voting stock in RDI. (*Id.*) Counsel for the Company summarized the information regarding the matter considered by the Compensation Committee in 2015, including the fact that acceptance of stock was within the discretion of the Compensation Committee as Administrators of the 1999 Stock Option Plan under which the stock option was granted. (*Id.*) The disinterested, independent Board members then generally expressed their awareness of the information as well as their review of the relevant Board materials and Compensation Committee minutes, and opened the floor up for debate, including comment by Plaintiff. (*Id.*)

A motion was made and seconded, as follows:

BE IT HEREBY RESOLVED that the Board ratifies the decision of the Compensation Committee of the Company, as outlined in the minutes of its September 21, 2015 meeting, to permit the Estate of James J. Cotter, Sr. to use Class A non-voting

stock as the means of payment for the exercise of an option to purchase 100,000 shares of Class B voting stock of the Company.

(*Id.* at 6.) The proposed resolution was then adopted by Directors Codding, Gould, Kane, McEachern, and Wrotniak, with Plaintiff casting the sole vote in opposition. (*Id.*) Again, Plaintiff complained that the ratification vote was taken solely for a "litigation purpose" (*id.* at 5-6) despite the fact that the ratifying directors have no personal stake in any relevant litigation.

The Board then moved, without objection, that its resolutions include the "authorization to take such other actions as may be necessary to accomplish the matters approved herein." (*Id.* at 6.) Given the legal impact of the ratification of these previous decisions by a majority of disinterested, independent directors under NRS 78.140 and Nevada Supreme Court precedent, the Remaining Director Defendants now bring this Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law as to all claims asserted by Plaintiff.

ARGUMENT

I. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE APPLIES TO ALL DECISIONS COMPLAINED OF BY PLAINTIFF

NRS 78.140 provides, in relevant part, that a "transaction" by a Nevada corporation such as RDI "is not void or voidable" because an interested or non-independent director is present during a meeting or joins in a board resolution approving the transaction if "[t]he fact of the common directorship, office or financial interest is known to the board of directors or committee, and the directors or members of the committee, other than any common or interested directors or members of the committee, approve or *ratify* the contract or transaction in good faith." NRS 78.140(2)(a) (emphasis added). Citing NRS 78.140, the Nevada Supreme Court has made clear that the business judgment rule applies "in the context of *valid* interested director action, or the valid exercise of business judgment by disinterested directors in light of their fiduciary duties." *Shoen*, 122 Nev. at 636, 137 P.3d at 1181 (emphasis added).

Here, all of the requirements for the application of NRS 78.140, and thus the business judgment rule, are met with respect to the Board's actions relating to Plaintiff's termination and the approval of the contested option exercise. All members of the RDI Board have long been aware of Plaintiff's claims that Mr. Adams, Ellen Cotter, and Margaret Cotter are interested or

not independent in light of their financial interests. Plaintiff made such allegations at the time of his termination, and in every iteration of his complaints; indeed, Plaintiff has not alleged that Mr. Adams' purported conflicts were not "known," but rather that RDI's directors went forward in the face of these known conflicts. (See, e.g., SAC ¶¶ 1, 6, 21, 33, 35, 37, 48, 49, 64-71.) The RDI Board has also repeatedly discussed Plaintiff's allegations at various board meetings, including at the December 29, 2017 Special Meeting. (See HD Ex. B (12/29/17 RDI Board Minutes) at 3-4 (corporate counsel summarizing allegations of interestedness/non-independence against Director Adams).) Thus, the "fact" of the "financial interest" alleged by Plaintiff was certainly "known to the board of directors" at the time a majority of independent, disinterested directors made their ratification decisions on December 29, 2017, as required by NRS 78.140(2)(a).

Moreover, as required by NRS 78.140(2)(a), the RDI Board ratified each of the remaining challenged "transactions" by a 5-1 vote, counting only the votes of those directors whom this Court has determined to be disinterested and independent as a matter of law. (*See* HD Ex. B (12/29/17 RDI Board Minutes) at 5-6.) And the December 29, 2017 ratification vote was certainly "in good faith": the directors who were not present at the time these matters were initially decided, Mr. Wrotniak and Ms. Codding, made an effort to inform themselves of the relative merits of the decisions, including by reviewing contemporaneous materials and drawing on their personal knowledge gleaned in their two years of Board service; corporate counsel was present and advised the entire Board of its fiduciary duties under Nevada law, as well as the history of each decision; no ratifying director had a personal stake in the derivative litigation brought by Plaintiff; and discussion and debate occurred prior to the final votes, with all directors—including Plaintiff—afforded the chance to ask questions or make comments. (*See id.*) Accordingly, all of the preconditions necessary for a "valid interested director transaction" under NRS 78.140(2)(a), and thus the application of the business judgment rule under *Shoen*, are present.²

² In taking this ratification action and making this argument, the Remaining Director Defendants do not concede that Mr. Adams, Ellen Cotter, or Margaret Cotter are interested or not

upon ratification. In fact, the Nevada Supreme Court in In re Amerco Deriv. Litig., 127 Nev. 2 196, 252 P.3d 681 (2011), acknowledged that a ratification that occurred years after the 3 4 challenged conduct could have a potentially case-dispositive effect. See 127 Nev. at 217, 252 5 P.3d at 697, n. 6 (noting that a ratification that had apparently occurred in 2007, after the Shoen remand, could have had a dispositive effect, but refusing to reach the issue because it was raised 6 for the first time on appeal); see also id., 127 Nev. at 233, 252 P.3d at 707 n.4 (Pickering, J., 7 8 concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that "this issue is potentially dispositive in this 9 case"). Nor should a deadline be unilaterally imposed here, especially given that Plaintiff is 10 seeking injunctive relief to reverse his June 12, 2015 termination and to be forcibly reinstated as RDI's CEO and President; as such, it makes logical sense that the present RDI Board can still 11 12 reevaluate the actions leading up to and involving his termination, and either reverse or ratify the 13 earlier decisions.

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Here, because the RDI Board properly ratified the earlier termination and option approval actions in conformity with NRS 78.140, "valid interested director" transactions are present and the business judgment rule applies—as it does to those transactions that the Court has already

JUDGMENT ON ALL BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS IN FAVOR II. OF THE REMAINING DIRECTOR DEFENDANTS IS WARRANTED UNDER THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE

found to be the product of actions by a majority of disinterested, independent directors.

Significantly, nothing in the text of NRS 78.140 places any deadline or time limitation

In this litigation, Plaintiff has never contested that if the business judgment rule were to apply, his fiduciary duty claims would fail as a matter of law; instead, his entire argument has been that the business judgment rule does not apply. The business judgment rule is a "presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company." Shoen, 122 Nev. at 632, 137 P.3d at 1178-79 (citation omitted); see

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independent; rather, they continue to believe that Mr. Adams was not on both sides of any disputed transaction and satisfies the legal definition of a disinterested, independent director. Similarly, the Remaining Director Defendants do not concede the relevance of any independence/disinterestedness determination under Nevada law to any of the claims at issue. 2 3 4

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also NRS 78.138(3) (codifying the rule under Nevada law). "The business judgment rule postulates that if directors' actions can arguably be taken to have been done for the benefit of the corporation, then the directors are presumed to have been exercising their sound business judgment rather than to have been responding to self-interest motivation." Horwitz v. SW. Forest Indus., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1130, 1135 (D. Nev. 1985).

As the Nevada Supreme Court has stressed, "even a bad decision is generally protected by the business judgment rule" Shoen, 122 Nev. at 636, 137 P.3d at 1181, and the rule protects corporate decisions whenever they can be "attributed to any rational business purpose." Katz v. Chevron Corp., 22 Cal. App. 4th 1352, 1366 (1994). Courts have routinely found that the same concerns that animated the majority of RDI directors in their termination and share option decisions to be valid business judgments, immune from any claims under the operation of the business judgment rule. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 72-73 (Del. 2006) (fact that a company's CEO cannot "work well" with its directors or executives, and requires "close and constant supervision," is a valid basis for terminating the officer, and is a decision protected by the business judgment rule); Carlson v. Hallinan, 925 A.2d 506, 540 n.232 (Del. Ch. 2006) (where "the evidence indicated that Carlson was not effective in the role of President of CR and that he had important managerial shortcomings," "firing him could have fostered CR's welfare" and was thus protected by the business judgment rule); Franklin v. Tex. Int'l Petroleum Corp., 324 F. Supp. 808, 813 (W.D. La. 1971) (an officer's "inability to perform adequately" and lack of "experience, expertise, and proper degree of affability" are protected reasons under the business judgment rule for his or her termination).

In light of the Board's recent ratifications, all of the RDI Board transactions challenged by Plaintiff are protected by Nevada's strong business judgment rule. Because Plaintiff has not shown, and cannot establish, that the challenged transactions were not attributable to any rational business purpose, all of his breach of fiduciary duty claims are legally untenable. No trial on them is necessary. Judgment as a matter of law should be awarded to the Remaining Director Defendants on all breach of fiduciary duty claims.

III. ABSENT ANY COGNIZABLE BREACH, JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S AIDING AND ABETTING BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS IN FAVOR OF ELLEN AND MARGARET COTTER IS APPROPRIATE

In addition to his untenable breach of fiduciary duty claims against Mr. Adams, Ellen Cotter, and Margaret Cotter, Plaintiff has also asserted a claim against Ellen and Margaret Cotter for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, in which he contends that his sisters "solicited and aided and abetted the decisions and actions of" the other RDI Directors that he claims constituted breaches of his fiduciary duties. (See SAC ¶ 193-200.) In Nevada, "[a]iding and abetting the breach of a fiduciary duty has four required elements: (1) there must be a fiduciary relationship between the two parties, (2) that the fiduciary breached, (3) the defendant knowingly and substantially participated in or encouraged that breach, and (4) the plaintiff suffered damage as a result of the breach." Guilfoyle v. Olde Monmouth Stock Transfer Co., Inc., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 78, 335 P.3d 190, 198 (2014); see also In re Amerco Deriv. Litig., 127 Nev. at 225, 252 P.3d at 701 (same).

Given that the Court has awarded summary judgment to Directors Gould, Kane, McEachern, Codding, and Wrotniak on all breach of fiduciary duty claims against them, Plaintiff cannot sustain an "aiding and abetting" claim against Ellen and Margaret Cotter based on any of those directors' purported "breaches," as one cannot aid and abet a breach that does not exist.

See Lift Certification Co. v. Thomas, No. A521533, 2008 WL 8588925 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2008) (because "Thomas did not breach his duty of loyalty to his employer Lift, while he prepared to change employment and compete with Lift, . . . it is not legally possible for American Equipment to have committed the Tort of Civil Aiding and Abetting"); Manzo v. Rite Aid Corp., No. Civ. A. 18451-NC, 2002 WL 31926606, at *6 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 2002) ("Because the breach of fiduciary duty claims are dismissed with prejudice, the claim against KPMG for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty is similarly dismissed with prejudice."). With respect to Director Adams, the fact that a majority of disinterested, independent RDI directors has now either approved or ratified all challenged transactions involving Mr. Adams is further evidence that he did not commit any breach of fiduciary duty, since any bias he could even conceivably have obviously did not affect his actual decisions, which were fully consistent

with those of legally disinterested, independent directors. Moreover, the fact that Mr. Adams is only one of eight directors and he voted either along with a majority of disinterested directors or had his decisions ratified by a majority of such directors means that any purported "breach" by him did not cause any damages to RDI. Plaintiff's failure to show causal damages with respect to Mr. Adams, another required element, provides yet another reason why Plaintiff's aiding and abetting claim against Ellen and Margaret Cotter is unsustainable.³

Accordingly, judgment as a matter of law also should be awarded to Ellen and Margaret

Accordingly, judgment as a matter of law also should be awarded to Ellen and Margaret Cotter on Plaintiff's aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claim—leaving no viable claims for trial.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Remaining Director Defendants respectfully request that the Court grant their Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law.

Dated: January 3, 2018

COHENJOHNSONPARKEREDWARDS

By: /s/ H. Stan Johnson H. STAN JOHNSON, ESQ.

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³ Even separate from the fact that a majority of disinterested, independent directors approved or ratified the at-issue transactions, Plaintiff cannot show cognizable damages to RDI as a result of the conduct he has identified—as the Director Defendants have previously emphasized. (*See*, *e.g.*, Ind. Defs.' Mot. for Summ J. (No. 1) at 22-23; Ind. Defs.' Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 19-20; Ind. Defs.' Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (No. 1) at 17-19.)

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EXHIBIT A

MORRIS LAW GROUP 411 E. BONNEVILLE AVE., STE. 360 · LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 702/474-9400 · FAX 702/474-9422

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an Order Regarding Defendants'

Motions for Partial Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's and Defendants' Motions *in Limine* was entered by this Honorable Court on the 28th day of December, 2017. A copy of the Order is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

MORRIS LAW GROUP

By: /s/ Akke Levin
Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543
Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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MORRIS LAW GROUP

Pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D) and E.D.C.R. 8.05, I certify that I am an employee of MORRIS LAW GROUP and that on the date below, I cause the following document(s) to be served on all interested parties as registered with the Court's E-Filing/E-Service System: NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER. The date and time of the electronic proof of service is in place of the date and place of deposit in the mail.

DATED this Aday of December, 2017.

By: <u>/s/ Linda P. Daniel</u>
An employee of Morris Law Group

EXHIBIT A

				CLERK OF THE COURT
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	4.0	Ellen Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, E	dward Kane	
	12	Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak	dward Ranc	
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	17		Case No.: Dept. No.:	A-15-719860-B XI
ž	16	JAMES J. COTTER, JR. individually and	Dept. No	Ai
	17	derivatively on behalf of Reading	Case No.:	P-14-082942-E
		International, Inc.,	Dept. No.:	XI
	18	mr. 1. 100		
	1.2	Plaintiffs,	Related and C	oordinated Cases
	19	V.	DAIGHAIRGG C	OUDE
	20	MARGARET COTTER, et al.,	BUSINESS C	OURI
	20	Defendants.	ODDED DEC	ADDING DEFENDANTS
	21	AND		GARDING DEFENDANTS'
		DE LEDIC DIMEDILATIONAL BIG. N. I.	Total Control of the	OR PARTIAL SUMMARY
	22	READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada		AND PLAINTIFF'S AND
	00	corporation,	DEFENDAN	TS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE
	23	Nominal Defendant.	Judge:	Hon. Elizabeth Gonzalez
	24	Nominal Delendant.	Juuge.	Hon. Enzabeth Gonzalez
	2.		Date of Heari	ng: December 11, 2017
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Case Number: A-15-719860-B

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THIS MATTER HAVING COME TO BE HEARD BEFORE the Court on December 11, 2017, Mark G. Krum, Steve Morris, and Akke Levin appearing for plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. ("Plaintiff"); James L. Edwards, Christopher Tayback, and Marshall M. Searcy III appearing for defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, Edward Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak (collectively, the "Individual Defendants"); Mark E. Ferrario and Kara B. Hendricks appearing for nominal defendant Reading International, Inc. ("RDI"); and Ekwan Rhow appearing for defendant William Gould ("Gould," together, with the Individual Defendants and RDI, "Defendants"), on the following motions:

- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 1) re: Plaintiff's Termination and Reinstatement Claims, and supplement thereto;
- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 2) re: The Issue of Director Independence, and supplement thereto;
- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 3) on Plaintiff's Claims Relating to the Purported Unsolicited Offer, and supplement thereto;
- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 5) on Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Appointment of Ellen Cotter as CEO, and supplement thereto;
- Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 6) re: Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Estate's Option Exercise, the Appointment of Margaret Cotter, the Compensation Packages of Ellen Cotter and Margaret Cotter,

- Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibits 7-11, and 15-17 to Plaintiff's Supplemental Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Nos. 2 and 5 and Gould Summary Judgment Motion; and
- Plaintiff's Motion to Seal Exhibits 4 Through 11 to Plaintiff's Supplemental Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Nos. 2 and 6 and Gould Summary Judgment Motion.
 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants'

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 1) re: Plaintiff's Termination and Reinstatement Claims is GRANTED with respect to Defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak because there are no genuine issues of material fact related to the disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors, and is DENIED with respect to Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, and Guy Adams because there are genuine issues of material fact related to the disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 2) re: The Issue of Director Independence is GRANTED with respect to Defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak because there are no genuine issues of material fact related to the disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors, and is DENIED with respect to Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, and Guy Adams because there are genuine issues of material fact related to the disinterestedness and/or independence of those directors.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 3) on Plaintiff's Claims
Relating to the Purported Unsolicited Offer is GRANTED because of

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Plaintiff's failure to show damages related to an unenforceable, unsolicited, nonbinding offer. While Plaintiff at trial cannot claim any damages arising from Defendants' actions with respect to the Patton Vision indications of interest, Plaintiff may still attempt to use evidence regarding the Patton Vision indications to show a breach of fiduciary duty. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 5) on Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Appointment of Ellen Cotter as CEO is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (No. 6) re: Plaintiff's Claims Related to the Estate's Option Exercise, the Appointment of Margaret Cotter, the Compensation Packages of Ellen Cotter and Margaret Cotter, and the Additional Compensation to Margaret Cotter and Guy Adams is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Defendant Gould's Motion IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT judgment in favor of Defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak is GRANTED on all claims asserted by IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Renewed Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony of Myron Steele

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Individual Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence That Is More Prejudicial Than Probative is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHERED ORDERED THAT Defendant Gould's Motion in Limine to Exclude Irrelevant Speculative Evidence is DENIED as

1	premature, with the issues raised in the motion to be addressed at trial		
2	based upon the relevant foundation laid.		
3	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion in Limine		
4	No. 1 re: Advice of Counsel is DENIED.		
5	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion in Limine		
6	No. 2 re: the Submission of Merits-Related Evidence by Nominal		
7	Defendant Reading International, Inc. is DENIED.		
8	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion in Limine		
9	No. 3 re: After-Acquired Evidence is DENIED. However, to the extent that		
10	Plaintiff's retention and use of Highpoint Associates and Derek Alderton is		
11	admitted at trial, it will be admitted with an instruction limiting the		
12	evidence solely to the issue of Plaintiff's suitability as President and CEO of		
13	RDI.		
14	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT RDI's Motion to Redact		
15	Opposition to Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.'s Motion in Limine No. 1 re:		
16	Advice of Counsel and File Exhibit "E" Under Seal is GRANTED.		
17	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motions to Seal		
18	and/or Redact are GRANTED.		
19			
20	DATED this 28 day of December 2017.		
21	SIAN OS		
22	DISTRICT COURTIUDGE		
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1 PREPARED AND SUBMITTED BY: 2 COHEN|JOHNSON|PARKER|EDWARDS 3 4 By: /s/ H. Stan Johnson_ 5 H. STAN JOHNSON, ESQ. 6 Nevada Bar No. 00265 sjohnson@cohenjohnson.com 7 375 E. Warm Springs Rd., Suite 104 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 8 Telephone: (702) 823-3500 9 Facsimile: (702) 823-3400 10 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP 11 CHRISTOPHER TAYBACK, ESQ. California Bar No. 145532, pro hac vice 12 christayback@quinnemanuel.com 13 MARSHALL M. SEARCY, ESQ. California Bar No. 169269, pro hac vice 14 marshallsearcy@quinnemanuel.com 865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor 15 Los Angeles, CA 90017 Telephone: (213) 443-3000 16 17 Attorneys for Defendants Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, Douglas McEachern, Guy Adams, 18 Edward Kane, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 nn 7

EXHIBIT B

FILED UNDER SEAL

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1	OMD	CLERK OF THE COURT
2	MORRIS LAW GROUP Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543	Stemp. Du
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12	Attornove for Plaintiff	
13	Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.	
14		
15		ICT COURT
16		UNTY, NEVADA
	JAMES J. COTTER, JR., derivatively on behalf of Reading) Case No. A-15-719860-B) Dept. No. XI
17	International, Inc.,) Dept. 140. At
18) Coordinated with:
19	Plaintiff,)) Case No. P-14-0824-42-E
20	V.) Dept. No. XI
	MARGARET COTTER, ELLEN) ·
21	COTTER, GUY ADAMS,) Jointly Administered
22	EDWARD KANE, DOUGLAS McEACHERN, WILLIAM)) PLAINTIFF JAMES COTTER,
23	GOULD, JUDY CODDING,) JR.'S OPPOSITION TO
24	MICHAEL WROTNIAK,	READING INTERNATIONAL
	Defendants.	\ INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS
25	And	FOR FAILURE TO SHOW
26		DEMAND FUTILITY
27	READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada corporation,)) HEARING DATE: January 8, 2018
28	Nominal Defendant.) HEARING TIME: 8:30 a.m.

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Plaintiff James Cotter, Jr. respectfully submits this opposition to the "Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Show Demand Futility" (the "Motion") filed by nominal defendant Reading International, Inc. ("RDI") on or about January 3, 2018.

RDI's Motion argues that the Court's recent ruling that five RDI directors were not interested in certain matters that were the subject of motions for partial summary judgment and the dismissal of those directors from this action "establishes that the making of a demand to file an action against the remaining defendants would not have been futile [at the time it was made]." Motion at 6:2–5. The Motion is predicated on substantially the same legal error that Plaintiff respectfully submits the Court made in dismissing this action as against the five defendant directors and in denying Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, and is deficient on its face as a matter of law.

Contrary to what the Motion assumes, the demand futility analysis does not begin and end with interestedness and/or independence. In *Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp.*, 122 Nev. 621, 137 P.3d 1171 (2006), the Nevada Supreme Court adopted the two-prong test, originally established by the Delaware Supreme Court in Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), for assessing whether demand in a derivative action is excused on the ground of futility. If there is a reasonable doubt as to either the disinterestedness or independence of the directors or as to whether the challenged transaction was the product of a valid exercise of business judgment, demand should be excused. *Shoen*, 137 P.3d at 637-38 and n.43. See Plaintiff James J. Cotter Jr.'s Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Complaint, filed on August 27, 2015, at p. 10; Plaintiff James J. Cotter Jr.'s Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint Filed by Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, Guy Adams, Edward Kane and Douglas McEachern, filed on

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December 7, 2015, at p. 27. The Motion does not raise or argue, much less make a *prima facie* showing, that the second prong of the analysis is not met here.

In sum, contrary to the erroneous premise on which the Motion is based, the Court's determination that the five directors were disinterested is not sufficient to warrant dismissal on the grounds of demand futility (or otherwise). Because the Motion is based solely on the Court's determination that the five dismissed directors were disinterested, it should be denied.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, as well as the reasons stated in Plaintiff's prior briefs and evidence referenced herein, Plaintiff respectfully submits that the Motion should be denied.

MORRIS LAW GROUP

By: <u>/s/ STEVE MORRIS</u>

Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543 Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102 411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

l	CENTIFICATE OF SERVICE					
	Pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D) and E.D.C.R. 8.05, I certify					
	that I am an employee of MORRIS LAW GROUP and that on the date					
	below, I cause the following document(s) to be served via the Court's					
	Odyssey E-Filing System: PLAINTIFF JAMES COTTER, JR.'S					
	OPPOSITION TO READING INTERNATIONAL INC.'S MOTION TO					
	DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO SHOW DEMAND FUTILITY, to be served					
	on all interested parties, as registered with the Court's E-Filing and E-Service					
	System. The date and time of the electronic proof of service is in place of the					
	date and place of deposit in the mail.					
	Stan Johnson Cohen-Johnson, LLC 255 East Warm Springs Road, Ste. 110 Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 Christopher Tayback Marshall Searcy Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP 865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor Los Angeles, CA Attorneys for /Defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak Mark Ferrario	Donald A. Lattin Carolyn K. Renner Maupin, Cox & LeGoy 4785 Caughlin Parkway Reno, Nevada 89519 Ekwan E. Rhow Shoshana E. Bannett Bird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert, Nessim, Drooks, Lincenberg & Rhow, P.C. 1875 Century Park East, 23rd Fl. Los Angeles, CA 90067-2561 Attorneys for Defendant William Gould				
	Kara Hendricks Tami Cowden Greenberg Traurig, LLP 3773 Howard Hughes Parkway Suite 400 North Las Vegas, NV 89169	Gould				
	Attorneys for Nominal Defendant Reading International, Inc.					
	DATED this 5th day of January, 2018.					
ı	_ , ,					

By: <u>/s/ PATRICIA FERRUGIA</u>

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	OPPM MORRIS LAW GROUP Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543 Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102 411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Telephone: (702) 474-9400 Facsimile: (702) 474-9422 Email: sm@morrislawgroup.com Email: al@morrislawgroup.com Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913 Yurko, Salvesen & Remz, P.C. 1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor Boston, MA 02108 Telephone: (617) 723-6900 Facsimile: (617) 723-6905 Email: mkrum@bizlit.com	Electronically Filed 1/5/2018 6:25 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
13	Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.	
14 15		ICT COURT UNTY, NEVADA
16 17	JAMES J. COTTER, JR., derivatively on behalf of Reading International, Inc.,) Case No. A-15-719860-B) Dept. No. XI)
18	Plaintiff,) Coordinated with:
19	V.) Case No. P-14-0824-42-E
20 21	MARGARET COTTER, ELLEN COTTER, GUY ADAMS,) Dept. No. XI)) Jointly Administered
22	EDWARD KANE, DOUGLAS	
23	McEACHERN, WILLIAM GOULD, JUDY CODDING,) PLAINTIFF JAMES J. COTTER,) JR.'S OPPOSITION TO
24	MICHAEL WROTNIAK,	DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF
25	Defendants.	LAW
26	And)) DATE: JANUARY 8, 2018
27	READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada corporation,) TIME: 8:30 a.m.
28	Nominal Defendant.))
)

I. INTRODUCTION

On the eve of trial, more than three weeks after the Court ruled on Defendants' motions for partial summary judgment, and long after the deadline to file dispositive motions passed, Defendants filed their "Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law ("Motion for JMOL"). Defendants' Motion for JMOL should be denied because it is: (1) a disguised motion for summary judgment that should have been filed 45 days before the start of trial to give Plaintiff a fair opportunity to meaningfully respond; (2) based on new self-serving evidence raising questions as to which Plaintiff is entitled to discovery under Nev. R. Civ. P. 56(f); and (3) improper under Nev. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2), because it seeks judgment before Plaintiff has presented his case in chief, all while cutting off Plaintiff's right to gather evidence about the ratification to present in his case in chief in the first place.

Alternatively, if the Court is inclined to allow Defendants' ratification evidence, deny Plaintiff's request for Rule 56(f) discovery, and grant the Motion for JMOL after Plaintiff's case in chief, Plaintiff respectfully submits that the Court should dispose of the Motion for JMOL before empanelling a jury and commencing trial to avoid burdening prospective jurors and to avoid wasting the time and resources of the Court, the empanelled jurors, the parties, and their counsel in proceeding to trial on predisposed matters.

II. ARGUMENT

A. The Motion for JMOL is a Belated Motion for Summary Judgment.

Under Rule 50, a party may file a motion for judgment as a matter of law "during a trial by jury" and do so either "at the close of the evidence offered by the nonmoving party or at the close of the case." Nev. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1)-(2). Under Rule 56, a party may move for summary

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judgment if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Nev. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Summary judgment motions must be filed at least 10 days before the hearing. *Id*.

Although styled as a Motion for JMOL, and devoid of any reference to Rule 56, defendants seek judgment on all claims before trial starts and before Plaintiff has presented his case in chief: Defendants argue that "[n]o trial is necessary" on Plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claims because "all challenged actions have either been approved or ratified. . . . " Motion for JMOL at 2:8-10 ("No trial is necessary: all challenged actions have either been approved or ratified. . . . "); *id*. at 10:25 ("No trial on [Plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claims] is necessary"). The remaining defendants base their Motion on new evidence—the Board of Directors' December 29, 2017 meeting minutes—and argue that under the business judgment rule, the recent ratification by a majority of disinterested directors is dispositive on all of Plaintiff's remaining claims against them. See id. at 7–12 and Ex. B thereto.

This is just another way of saying that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the [defendants are] entitled to a judgment as a matter of law" now. Nev. R. Civ. P. 56(c). But motions for summary judgment were due to be filed no later than 45 days before trial. See Sept. 11, 2015 Business Court Order (§ II.B.). Defendants filed their Motion for JMOL less than two business days before trial. And because the Court granted Defendants' application for an order shortening time and set the Motion for hearing on January 8, 2018, Plaintiff is given less than two judicial days to respond. This deprives Plaintiff of his right to 10 days notice and a

Defendants knew the Court's rulings on their motions for partial summary judgment by December 11, 2017.

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meaningful opportunity to oppose the Motion. Nev. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (requiring motions for summary judgment to be served "at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing").

Plaintiff Is Entitled to Discovery Under Rule 56(f). В.

The Motion for JMOL introduces new alleged facts and evidence not disclosed until now—ratification during a special December 29, 2017 Board of Directors' meeting of decisions made in 2015. The Motion is based on unsigned board meeting minutes that remain to be approved by the Board. See Motion for JMOL, Ex. B at 6; Declaration of Noah Helpern, ¶ 3. The Motion argues—without support—that the December 29, 2017 special meeting was convened "at the request of the five disinterested, independent directors. . . . " Motion for JMOL at 1. Although the unsigned meeting minutes reference an alleged December 27, 2017 letter "delivered to the Chair" on behalf of these five directors, the letter is not attached to Mr. Helpern's declaration or to the draft meeting minutes.

Plaintiff is entitled to test these allegations and discover how this meeting and the alleged request by the "five disinterested, independent directors" came about. Rather than confirming these directors' disinterestedness and independence, the ratification, the timing of the ratification, and the manner in which it occurred raise issues of material fact as to the motivations of these five dismissed director defendants: Did they act in the best interest of the company or did they simply acquiesce in the desire of the Cotter sisters to further their position in this case? The alleged comments made by the five directors expressing "their high level of respect for Director [Guy] Adams and their confidence that he has acted in the best interests of the Company and not out of any personal self interest," Ex. B at 3, are self-serving and specious.

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C. The Motion For JMOL is Procedurally Improper and Seeks to Deprive Plaintiff of His Right to a Fair Trial.

Motions for judgment as a matter of law "during a trial by jury" can be made at "the close of the evidence offered by the nonmoving party . . ." Nev. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1)–(2). It is reversible error to grant judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a) before completion of Plaintiff's case. See Taft v. Steinberg, 637 P.2d 533, 534 (Nev. 1981) (reversing dismissal under former Nev. R. Civ. P. 41(b) "before the completion of the plaintiffs' case in chief").²

Here, Defendants not only seek a judgment before Plaintiff's presentation of his case in chief, but they seek to introduce new evidence and a new ratification issue into the case after the filing of the parties' pretrial order—all to the detriment of Plaintiff's right to a fair trial. As the Court already observed on December 28, when the Company's counsel told the Court that ratification may occur the next day:

THE COURT: Little late for ratification. It's a little late for ratification, Mr. Ferrario.

MR. FERRARIO: Well, Your Honor -- and I anticipated you may say that. But keep in mind --

THE COURT: I've got a trial starting a week from Monday. Dec. 28, 2017 Hearing Tr. at 16:10–15.

At the time this opposition is submitted—less than a full day before trial starts—Plaintiff does not even know if Defendants will be allowed to introduce evidence about ratification.³ If such evidence is allowed and trial proceeds on January 8, Plaintiff will have to present his case in chief based only on the self-serving "evidence" submitted to the

Rule 50(a), Nev. R. Civ. P., replaced the part of former Rule 41(b) which provided that a case could be dismissed for a plaintiff's failure "to prove a sufficient case for. . . . the jury." See Editor's Note to Nev. R. Civ. P. 50.

Any evidence regarding the December 29 2017 ratification should be excluded.

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Court at the eleventh hour. No doubt, Defendants would then renew their Motion for IMOL after the close of Plaintiff's curtailed case.

- Defendants' Argument Under NRS 78.140 is Flawed. D.
 - NRS 78.140 Does Not Serve as a Basis for "Ratification" of the Matters at Issue in This Case.

Defendants argue that "the business judgment rule applies to all decisions complained of by plaintiff," based on the premise that NRS 78.140 applies to all such matters and that that statutory provision (not NRS 78.138) embodies Nevada's business judgment rule. They are mistaken as a matter of law. NRS 78.140 provides in relevant part as follows:

NRS 78.140 Restrictions on transactions involving interested directors or officers; compensation of directors.

- 1. A contract or other transaction is not void or voidable solely because:
 - (a) The contract or transaction is between a corporation and:
 - (1) One or more of its directors or officers; or
- (2) Another corporation, firm or association in which one or more of its directors or officers are directors or officers or are financially interested;
 - (b) A common or interested director or officer:
- (1) Is present at the meeting of the board of directors or a committee thereof which authorizes or approves the contract or transaction; or
- (2) Joins in the signing of a written consent which authorizes or approves the contract or transaction pursuant to subsection 2 of NRS 78.315; or
- (c) The vote or votes of a common or interested director are counted for the purpose of authorizing or approving the contract or transaction,

if one of the circumstances specified in subsection 2 exists.

- The circumstances in which a contract or other transaction is not void or voidable pursuant to subsection 1 are:
- (a) The fact of the common directorship, office or financial interest is known to the board of directors or committee, and the directors or

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members of the committee, other than any common or interested directors or members of the committee, approve or ratify the contract or transaction in good faith.

NRS.78.140 (emphasis supplied).

NRS 78.140 is merely Nevada's version of the standard statutory modification of the common law rule that all interested director transactions are void. "A general common law presumption is that a director's or officer's conflict of interest can result in the voiding of a transaction." Keith Paul Bishop & Jeffrey P. Zucker, Bishop and Zucker on Nevada Corporations and Limited Liability Companies, § 8.16, 8-44-47 (2013). Nevada, like other states, has enacted a statutory safe harbor that protects certain conflict-of-interest transactions from being voided when certain protective measures have been taken, such as approval of the interested transaction by a disinterested majority of the board of directors. Nevada's statutory safe harbor is NRS 78.140. Id.

Contrary to what defendants argue, NRS 78.140 has no application here, by its terms, as the language of the statute on which they rely (italicized above), shows. First, the matters defendants attempt to transmogrify into classic interested director transactions of the type subject to NRS 78.140 are not a "contract or other transaction" between the Company and any director defendant. The actions of Adams, Kane and McEachern to threaten Plaintiff and, subsequently, to terminate him, do not entail the creation of any kind of "contract or transaction." The same is true with respect to the actions of Adams and Kane in authorizing the exercise of the 100,000 share option; that matter concerns their actionable conduct threatening plaintiff, not the creation of an option agreement. Thus, NRS 78.140 by its plain terms does not apply to the matters defendants argue have been "ratified."

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Moreover, even if NRS 78.140 was applicable to those matters and its requirements met, which is not the case, the only possible consequence would be that the "contract or other transaction is not void or voidable." As the foregoing reflects, NRS 78.140 is irrelevant to the question of whether the business judgment rule applies here, much less to whether one or more of the directors breached their fiduciary duties under NRS 78.138 in acting or failing to act with respect to the supposedly "ratified" matters.

> 2. **Defendants' Arguments Referencing the Business Judgment Rule Are Question-Begging Reconsideration** Requests Based on False Premises.

Defendants' second argument is little if anything more than a motion for reconsideration of the Court's denials of various motions for partial summary judgment. It is predicated on a straw-man argument based on demonstrably false premises. Defendants assert that "Plaintiff has never contested that if the business judgment rule were to apply, his fiduciary duty claims would fail a matter of law; instead, his entire argument has been that the business judgment rule does not apply." Motion at 9:20–22. Based on this straw man, defendants then posit that the business judgment rule applies and skip to the *non sequitur* that Plaintiff's "breach of fiduciary duty claims are legally untenable." *Id.* at 10:25. This is low-level sophistry.

As the countless legal briefs Plaintiff has filed in this case demonstrate, not only has Plaintiff contended that the business judgment rule does not apply, Plaintiff also has contended that were it to be apply, Plaintiff has rebutted it by showing breaches of fiduciary duty (that also entailed intentional misconduct). The legal platitudes that follow the straw man add nothing to this particular argument, which is nothing more than an exercise in question-begging.

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III. **CONCLUSION**

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For the reasons set out above, the Court should deny Defendants' Motion for JMOL as premature and procedurally improper. Alternatively, if the Court allows Defendants' ratification evidence, denies Plaintiff's request for Rule 56(f) discovery, and is inclined to grant the Motion for JMOL after Plaintiff's presentation of his case in chief, the Court should decide the Motion now to avoid putting the parties, the jurors, and the Court through the inconvenience and expense of jury selection and a partial trial.

MORRIS LAW GROUP

By: <u>/s/STEVE MORRIS</u> Steve Morris, Bar No. 1543 Akke Levin, Bar No. 9102 411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Mark G. Krum, Bar No. 10913 YURKO, SALVESEN & REMZ, P.C. 1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor Boston, MA 02108

Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D) and E.D.C.R. 8.05, I certify that I am an employee of MORRIS LAW GROUP and that on the date below, I cause the following document(s) to be served via the Court's Odyssey E-Filing System: **PLAINTIFF JAMES J. COTTER, JR.'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW**.

The date and time of the electronic proof of service is in place of the date and place of deposit in the mail.

DATED this 30th day of November, 2017.

By: <u>/s/ PATRICIA FERRUGIA</u>

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I, Mark Krum, declare:

- I am an attorney with Yurko, Salvesen & Remz, P.C., counsel for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. I make this declaration based upon personal knowledge, except where stated upon information and belief, and as to that information, I believe it to be true. If called upon to testify as the contents of this declaration, I am legally competent to testify to its contents in a court of law.
- 2. The Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law is predicated on the assumption that, because the Court found 5 directors to be disinterested for the purposes of the matters raised in partial summary judgment motions, that those 5 directors therefore are disinterested and independent for all purposes, or at least for the purposes of the purported ratifications supposedly provided at a December 29, 2017 Board of Directors meeting. Because that is a question of fact, and because the circumstances, including as evidenced in the so-called agenda and the draft minutes, neither of which have been authenticated, these activities on their face raise the question of whether some or all of those 5 individuals were in fact disinterested and were in fact independent with respect to their supposed activities that serve as the basis for the Motion, including the purported ratification of two prior activities that had not been approved by a majority of disinterested and independent directors.
- 3. The agenda recites that those 5 requested a special meeting to perform the supposed ratifications. The agenda on its face therefore shows that this was not ordinary course of activity by the 5 directors, but instead was extraordinary activity undertaken for some particular purpose at the time and in the manner it was undertaken. Plaintiff is entitled to discover what actually happened, because those facts will bear out or undermine the contention that a majority of the 5 were independent for the

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purposes of the supposed ratifications. For example, did any of the 5 actually individually request a special meeting to ratify certain conduct? Or were the 5 told by litigation counsel that a ratification was needed on an expedited basis for use in this case, for the benefit of the remaining 3 director defendants? The facts and circumstances of how this came to pass will provide evidence bearing upon the question of whether the activity in question was undertaken by a disinterested and independent majority acting, as their counsel repeatedly has said in the course of this litigation, with respect to ordinary course of business matters, or whether as former litigants they had personal interests, sentiments and/or agendas they were pursuing or, equally likely, that they acted hurriedly if not precipitously in an effort to enable defense counsel in this case to use their actions for litigation purposes in furtherance of the personal interests of the remaining 3 defendants.

- 4. The latter regard, it is noteworthy that first item in the draft minutes was a hurried decision, with respect to which board materials had been provided to directors only the day before, to approve a bonus accrual in the amount of \$1.1 million with respect to which "Ellen Cotter and Margaret Cotter are likely recipients of the bonuses to be paid in 2018."
- 5. The draft minutes that have not been authenticated but which supposedly evidence the purported ratification on which the Motion is based recite that the ratification was of actions "outlined in the minutes of the Board meetings held on May 21, 2015, May 29, 2015 and June 12, 2015." The draft minutes also recite that director Judy Codding "stated that she had thoroughly reviewed the Board Materials and had extensive knowledge about the board's reasons for the termination of [Plaintiff]." Both plaintiff and former director Timothy Storey have testified in this case that the board minutes in question contained inaccuracies. The defendants have testified

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that those board minutes, unlike other board minutes, were reviewed and revised by outside counsel. Directors Codding and Wrotniak were not members of the Board at the time and can only have become informed after the fact. If they relied simply on the so-called Board Materials, which consists principally of inaccurate, litigation oriented minutes, they could not have made an informed decision, and may well not have made one in good faith. Plaintiff is entitled to discovery to ascertain what they did and did not do and what they understood and did not understand. This information will bear upon the question of whether a disinterested majority approve the purported ratification.

6. The draft minutes contain countless statements that raise the questions of whether, if not on their face evidence the fact that, some or all of the 5 simply were acting to assist in the defense of the remaining 3 directors, rather than acting in the interest of the Company. For example, the board materials also contained documents from Highpoint Associates. As the Court will recall, these materials were unknown to the directors in May and June 2015 at the time Plaintiff was threatened with termination and then terminated. As the Court also will recall, defense counsel intends to misuse those documents to develop an argument that Plaintiff was unqualified and understood himself to be unqualified. So why were they in the board materials package for ratification purposes? Is that because one or more of the 5 independently knew about those documents and wanted to review them to make an informed decision? Or was it because they were provided by litigation counsel in furtherance of what was merely a litigation oriented exercise, in which some or all of the 5 were willing participants in an activity the primary if not sole purpose of which was to assist in the defense of this action as against the remaining 3 defendants?

- 7. Also by way of example, the draft minutes did not explain what materials were provided to and/or considered by the 5 to enable them to make an informed decision regarding the purported ratification made with respect to the exercise of the 100,000 share option. As the Court knows well from motion practice, there were bona fide issues calling into question whether the authorization could and should have been provided, and the draft minutes give no indication of what if anything any of the 5 did to inform themselves to make an informed decision about such issues. Whether they did so and, if they did anything, what they did, will evidence whether they were disinterested and acting independently, or not.
- 8. The foregoing is merely an illustrative description of specific facts Plaintiff anticipates discovering that will call into question whether the 5 were disinterested and independent for the purposes of the purported ratifications. For such reasons, Plaintiff requires and is entitled to document discovery and depositions of at least each of the 5 and, depending upon what the documents and the deposition testimony show, perhaps others.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 5th day of January, 2018.

Mark G. Krum

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D) and E.D.C.R. 8.05, I certify
that I am an employee of MORRIS LAW GROUP and that on the date
below, I cause the following document(s) to be served via the Court's
Odyssey E-Filing System: DECLARATION OF MARK KRUM IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF JAMES J. COTTER, JR.'S OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW,
to be served on all interested parties, as registered with the Court's E-Filing
and E-Service System. The date and time of the electronic proof of service is
in place of the date and place of deposit in the mail.

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DATED this 5th day of January, 2018

Electronically Filed 1/5/2018 12:49 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

TRAN

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA * * * * *

JAMES COTTER, JR.

. CASE NO. A 15 719860 B A 16 735305 B

Plaintiff P 14 082942 E

vs.

DEPT. NO. XI

MARGARET COTTER, et al.

Transcript of

Defendants . Proceedings

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION

THURSDAY, JANUARY 4, 2018

COURT RECORDER: TRANSCRIPTION BY:

JILL HAWKINS FLORENCE HOYT

District Court Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

Proceedings recorded by audio visual recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF: MARK G. KRUM, ESQ.

STEVE L. MORRIS, ESQ.

AKKE LEVIN, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANTS: SHOSHANA E. BANNETT, ESQ.

SHOSHANA E. BANNETT, ESQ. MARSHALL M. SEARCY, ESQ. JAMES L. EDWARDS, ESQ.

MARK E. FERRARIO, ESQ.

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, THURSDAY, JANUARY 4, 2018, 8:31 A.M. 1 2 (Court was called to order) 3 THE COURT: That takes me to Cotter. 4 MR. SEARCY: Good morning, Your Honor. It doesn't 5 appear that Mr. Ferrario's here yet. 6 THE COURT: So I'm not ready on Cotter, either, Oh. 7 huh? 8 MR. KRUM: We're ready, yes, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: So I'm not ready yet, either. quess I'll just here patiently waiting for all sides of any 10 11 case to be available. 12 (Pause in the proceedings) 13 THE COURT: Good morning. Counsel, I was given an order this morning denying plaintiff's motion to stay and 14 15 motion for reconsideration that appears to have been agreed to Is that accurate? 16 by all parties. 17 MR. SEARCY: That's accurate, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: Then I'm going to go ahead and sign. 19 Ms. Levin, you can pick it up up here, if you'd like. 20 So we've finished one item of business. That takes me to my second item of business, which relates to our trial 21 22 schedule. Dan has arranged for a courtroom here in the RJC 23 for jury selection because of the logistics related to getting jurors across the street to the Phoenix Building. So Judge 24 Denton is out of town for a couple of days next week, so we're 25

going to borrow his courtroom for those couple of days, but 1 2 only to pick the jury. So just be aware of that. And I 3 cannot start until 1:00, because I have a Business Court 4 settlement conference. MR. KRUM: Monday? 5 THE COURT: On Monday. 6 7 Okay. So let's go to the pending motion. 8 MR. FERRARIO: Your Honor, if we're on the administrative stuff, I was asked to ask you if we need to 9 submit original depos to the Court tomorrow --10 THE COURT: You do. 11 MR. FERRARIO: -- or should we do it on Day 1 of the 12 13 trial due to the courtroom uncertainty. MR. KRUM: Your Honor, we may have an issue with 14 that on account of the blizzard on the East Coast. Either we 15 16 will or we won't. 17 THE COURT: We're here in Las Vegas. There's not an 18 issue with a blizzard here. 19 MR. KRUM: Well, some of our originals need to come 20 out of my office. THE COURT: Okay. I only need the originals of 21 22 depositions you intend to use in lieu of live testimony, not 23 those you intend to use for impeachment purposes. 24 MR. KRUM: Understood.

Okay.

THE COURT:

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MR. FERRARIO: And where do you want us to deliver them tomorrow?

THE COURT: You're going to meet us at 2:00 o'clock for the final pretrial conference.

MR. FERRARIO: Oh. That's right. Okay. And where will be meeting?

THE COURT: We'll be in 10C, Judge Togliatti's courtroom. I don't have a courtroom of my own. I have a meeting at 11:00 o'clock about that. I'm not hopeful that that will result in any changes to my current situation, but, as you know, I don't have a courtroom. Since 2013 we've been down a courtroom.

MR. FERRARIO: Can you spread that on the record? I have one --

THE COURT: Just in case nobody knows.

MR. FERRARIO: I have one final question. Do you want us -- if a witness is unavailable and let's say Mr. Krum is going to present that witness through deposition, do you want to run the depo consistently and have ours just flow, or how do you want to deal with it?

THE COURT: It is my opinion, and I can be persuaded related to this, that it is easier for the jury to understand if all of that witness's testimony is presented at one time.

MR. FERRARIO: And I would agree with that.

THE COURT: But I am open to discussion with counsel

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about that if it is a problem, and those are part of the items
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    that are on my list to talk about with you tomorrow afternoon.
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              MR. KRUM: Is it 2:00 o'clock, Your Honor, or 3:00
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    o'clock?
              THE CLERK: 3:00 o'clock.
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              THE COURT: It's 3:00 o'clock.
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              MR. KRUM: Thank you.
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              THE COURT:
                         In Department 10 and 10C, where we are
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   borrowing a courtroom tomorrow.
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              MR. FERRARIO:
                             Thank you.
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              THE COURT: All right. Anything else before I go to
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    the motion?
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              Mr. Krum, it's your motion. Mr. Morris.
              MR. MORRIS: I do have one thing that's not on
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    calendar.
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              THE COURT: Okay.
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              MR. MORRIS: We were in the Supreme Court yesterday
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    on the writ, we argued the writ.
              THE COURT: Which writ?
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              MR. MORRIS: The one that arises out of the motion
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    to compel the production of emails between Mr. Krum and
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    Alexander Robertson that you decided --
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              THE COURT:
                         Many years ago.
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              MR. MORRIS: -- on September the 8th, 2016.
              THE COURT: Yes.
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MR. MORRIS: The court pointed out to us when we were arguing that they didn't have a written order on the motion to compel. What they have is what we have, and that is the minute order and the transcript. And Justice Gibbons discussed the absence of that order. Mr. Searcy didn't know that it was not in the record, and neither did I. But it turns out it isn't.

THE COURT: There isn't an order from that?

MR. MORRIS: No.

THE COURT: There's no order that was submitted from that?

MR. KRUM: I think, Your Honor, there was an order submitted, but not signed.

MR. MORRIS: In any event, we don't have that order. And Justice Gibbons said we could supplement the record after the argument, so I prepared an order that tracks your minute order and the transcript, denies the motion to compel for the reason you gave, I gave it to Mr. Searcy, and he now -- he's now saying that he wants some time to think about this and --

THE COURT: I don't get much time when the Supreme Court asks me to supplement the record. I usually get a couple of hours.

MR. SEARCY: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Occasionally they give me 30 days if it's a really big job.

MR. SEARCY: This situation is somewhat odd, though, Your Honor, in that we've had -- my recollection was certainly that there was a written order already submitted by the Court. And here what we're looking at is a written order approximately almost two years after the fact for the Court to sign.

THE COURT: Yes. That's a problem.

MR. SEARCY: And it is a problem, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But it's a problem for a number of reasons, and I just don't know which one it is, because it's been two years -- or a year and a half, year and a half.

MR. MORRIS: It was on September the 8th, 2016, not quite two years, a year and a half.

MR. SEARCY: So what I've said to Mr. Morris is I want to take a look at this, I want to take a look at the issue before we agree one way or the other on the order.

THE COURT: So let me ask you the question. Do you recall there being competing orders that were submitted on that issue?

MR. SEARCY: Your Honor, my recollection -- and apparently it's wrong, because I have looked at the record and I have not seen a written order.

THE COURT: So you think there's a written order, you just can't find it.

MR. SEARCY: I thought that there was one. But I

haven't found it. And I will note that in the appeal that was taken by the plaintiff in the case that it says in the first line that he is taking it from your oral order compelling documents. Again, though, it was my recollection that there was a written order. So we're looking for that. That's what the court asked us to supplement the record with, is the written order from [inaudible]. They're not asking for a new order.

THE COURT: Oh. An existing written order.

MR. SEARCY: Exactly.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SEARCY: They're not asking that -- they're not directing that the Court enter an order on this, because that raises its own set of issues. Certainly we would want to go back in the benefit of hindsight and the benefit of just having had an argument in front of the Supreme Court to add all sorts of things to the order to reflect the record.

THE COURT: If we enter an order, it's going to be based on what happened then, a year and a half ago. It's not going to be updated with what you think it should have now.

Mr. Morris, I'll take the order. I'm also going to research if we think we logged it out and perhaps it got lost. Because frequently after I sign an order it gets picked by a runner from a different law firm, and we never know what happens to it, and we have people a couple times a week that

have to resubmit orders because other runners picked up their 1 2 orders. 3 MR. MORRIS: The order we submitted is accompanied 4 by a copy of your minute order from that day, as well as the 5 transcript. 6 THE COURT: I'll look at it as soon as we get out of 7 here. 8 MR. MORRIS: Thank you. 9 THE COURT: Or after the bond calendar. MR. SEARCY: Thank you, Your Honor. 10 11 THE COURT: So any other items that aren't on my calendar this morning that you want to talk to me about? 12 13 MR. KRUM: One item of clarification about what we're supposed to do tomorrow, I guess, or Monday. Hard 14 15 copies of the exhibits --THE COURT: You do not need to bring hard copies of 16 17 the exhibits. Dulce's email said you don't need to worry 18 about the exhibit part because of your electronic exhibits 19 that you're using. 20 Right? 21 MR. KRUM: Thank you. 22 THE COURT: Anything else? Mr. Edwards. 23 MR. EDWARDS: We brought over a motion to stay, and 24 I don't know whether it was --25 THE COURT: I signed it. I set it for Monday at

1 8:30. 2 (Pause in the proceedings) 3 MR. EDWARDS: We did serve it [inaudible]. 4 THE COURT: Here you go, Mr. Edwards. 5 MR. EDWARDS: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Apparently I was holding onto it. 6 7 Next? Any other issues before I get to what's 8 actually on calendar this morning? 9 If we could go to our motion for Rule 54(b) certification and renewed motion for stay. 10 11 MR. KRUM: Thank you, Your Honor. So the 12 oppositions with respect to certification -- there was no 13 opposition from the individual defendants. They took no position. The opposition from the company made a compelling 14 15 case, in our view, as to why both an order of certification 16 should issue, as well as a stay. 17 Let me ask. Did you receive and have an opportunity 18 to review the brief reply we submitted? THE COURT: I did. 19 20 MR. KRUM: Okay. THE COURT: And I have notes on it that I'm going to 21 say at the end that will make Mr. Searcy curious. 22 23 MR. KRUM: So, Your Honor, according to the 24 defendants, our case is dead on arrival based on the rulings that you previously made. 25

THE COURT: I understand that's what your brief said.

MR. KRUM: Yes.

THE COURT: And I understand their brief sort of says that, too.

MR. KRUM: And to the point for the motions today, Your Honor, the individual defendants acknowledge that those rulings make our case against the remaining three defendants more difficult legally. Those are the words they used.

THE COURT: So can I cut to the chase. The defendants are not correct by indicating that they believe that the conduct of the disinterested directors will not be the subject of evidence before the jury for breach of fiduciary duty claims as to the remaining defendants. If you thought that, that was not what I said.

Okay. Next, Mr. Krum?

MR. KRUM: Yeah. Well, that's helpful, Your Honor. It leads me to another point I have, which is I think legally we're looking at potentially different standards. Assuming based on what you said we're not looking at different evidence, we nonetheless from the plaintiff's perspective are going to be required to make a different showing on account of your prior rulings. And this is why. There's no way to explain to a jury how it is that three people, two or three or more, as the case may be, but say, for example, with respect

to the 100,000 share option two people, Adams and Kane, with respect to what I succinctly characterize as extortion, in other words, the threat to terminate unless you settle. That would be three people, Adams, Kane, and McEachern. So we put on the evidence as you just described that all three of them breached their fiduciary duties. There's no --

THE COURT: Mr. Krum, we deal with that in every case, and we never explain to the jury while they're answering questions on the questionnaire or interrogatories as to only certain defendants. We just don't explain it. It's you don't explain it. You present the evidence, you give them the interrogatories, they answer them. That's part of the jury instructions.

MR. KRUM: Well, I'm getting there. The jury instruction is where I'm going on this. Bear with me. So how do we explain from plaintiff's perspective that three people who engaged in the same conduct, two of them are not defendants here?

THE COURT: You don't explain it. It's not your job.

MR. KRUM: No. And the jury instruction they're going to propose is effectively going to tell the jury that, well, those two people are the majority and therefore you can't rule against the remaining one. And so what we're going to do, Your Honor, is try a case where there is basically an

irrebuttable misimpression with which the jury will start.

And so on the stay issue what the defendants, all of them, really said, Your Honor, it was made pretty clear I think in the company -- so-called company opposition, they don't want a stay because they want this motion that they delivered yesterday, half of which is for reconsideration and issues they should take up with the Nevada Supreme Court and the other half of which is for summary judgment predicated on evidence they created six days ago, they want that --

THE COURT: That's not set till Monday at 8:30.

MR. KRUM: Monday at 8:30. Right. And so they want that to go forward, but they don't want -- they really don't want the case to go forward. And I understand why they say that, Your Honor. So we don't know, really, what the target is, except for it's moving. It's moved since the last ruling, and it may move again on Monday.

THE COURT: That's how litigation is, especially when you're right before trial.

MR. KRUM: Your Honor, I think that the point of that is two things.

THE COURT: Do you really want certification if I'm not going to grant a stay?

MR. KRUM: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you object to certification?

MR. SEARCY: No objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The certification is granted because of 1 2 all the claims related to the what I've determined to be 3 disinterested directors have been resolved. That does not 4 preclude from presenting evidence related to the conduct or 5 activities of those as it relates to other issues in your 6 case. All right. 7 MR. KRUM: Your Honor, we had an order that 8 anticipated --9 THE COURT: Granted in part? 10 MR. KRUM: -- granted in part. I thought we 11 distributed these, but perhaps not. What we did, Your Honor, 12 was it granted the certification motion --13 THE COURT: And denied the stay? Then it had check the box, grant the stay 14 MR. KRUM: 15 or deny the stay. 16 THE COURT: Okay. We were prepared for both eventualities. 17 MR. KRUM: 18 THE COURT: This one's not that. 19 This appears to be the wrong order, Mr. MR. SEARCY: 20 Krum. 21 THE COURT: This isn't that order. 22 MR. KRUM: I have the wrong order. Well, that's --23 my paralegal skills, and I once was one, have deteriorated. 24 So bear with me, Your Honor. I apologize. 25 Okay. The one that says what it should say.

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THE COURT: Mr. Edwards, I did say the other day
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    that you or someone from your firm is required to be here for
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    the entire trial.
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              MR. EDWARDS: Okay. We're prepared.
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              THE COURT: It doesn't have to be you. You can send
    [unintelligible].
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 7
              MR. EDWARDS: I've got a trial coming up
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    [inaudible].
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              THE COURT: I just need local issue so if there is
    an issue about the District Court Rules of the Eighth Judicial
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    Court or any of our unusual -- I will be able to turn Mr.
    Searcy to a local Nevada attorney who can answer his questions
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13
    before I yell at him.
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              MR. SEARCY: I appreciate the [inaudible], Your
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    Honor.
16
              THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Krum. Here's your order.
17
              All right. Next? 'Bye. See you tomorrow at 3:00.
18
              MR. FERRARIO: So I take it you did not want to hear
19
    the points we raised and you'll hear them Monday?
20
              THE COURT:
                          What?
21
              MR. FERRARIO: In our opposition.
22
              THE COURT: I heard your opposition.
23
    opposition primarily is there's nothing left to try, Judge.
24
              MR. FERRARIO: And the math.
25
              THE COURT: So we'll hear that Monday at 8:30. I
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was not going to set it on less than 36 hours' notice.
 1
 2
              MR. FERRARIO: No. I think that's good.
 3
              THE COURT: I know that we need one judicial day,
 4
   but some issues are a little more important.
 5
              MR. FERRARIO: Do we have a status check on Wynn on
 6
    Monday?
 7
                         Okay. You're coming tomorrow at 3:00.
              THE COURT:
 8
              MR. FERRARIO: No. I know. Do we have a status
 9
    check --
              THE COURT: And then you're coming Monday at 8:30.
10
11
              MR. FERRARIO: What about Monday --
              THE COURT: And then we're starting trial at 1:00
12
13
    Monday.
              MR. FERRARIO:
14
                             I know.
15
              THE COURT: I have 60 jurors coming.
                             I said the Wynn case.
16
              MR. FERRARIO:
17
              THE COURT: Oh. Yes. I have an 8:00 o'clock
18
    hearing on Monday on Wynn.
19
                      (Pause in the proceedings)
20
              THE COURT: Dulce says there's nothing on Wynn.
    sleep in, Mr. Ferrario. I'll see you at 8:30 instead of 8:00.
21
22
              Okay. Goodbye.
23
              MR. FERRARIO:
                             Thank you, Your Honor.
24
              MR. MORRIS: Thank you, Your Honor. Monday at 8:30?
             MR. KRUM: We're here Monday at 8:30, as well?
25
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THE COURT: Monday at 3:00 [sic] -- Monday at 8:30 two motions. They're both about the same issue of the ratification issue, and then we'll deal with it. Goodbye. MR. MORRIS: Thank you, Your Honor. THE PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 8:59 A.M.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

AFFIRMATION

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

FLORENCE HOYT Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

FLORENCE M. HOYT, TRANSCRIBER

1/4/18

DATE

Electronically Filed 1/10/2018 11:07 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

TRAN

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA * * * * *

JAMES COTTER, JR.

. CASE NO. A 15 719860 B A 16 735305 B

Plaintiff

P 14 082942 E

vs.

DEPT. NO. XI

MARGARET COTTER, et al.

Transcript of

Defendants .

Proceedings

.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE

MONDAY, JANUARY 8, 2018

COURT RECORDER: TRANSCRIPTION BY:

JILL HAWKINS FLORENCE HOYT

District Court Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

Proceedings recorded by audio visual recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF: MARK G. KRUM, ESQ.

STEVE L. MORRIS, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANTS: KEVIN JOHNSON, ESQ.

MARSHALL M. SEARCY, ESQ. CHRISTOPHER TAYBACK, ESQ.

MARK E. FERRARIO, ESQ.

TAMI COWDEN, ESQ.

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, MONDAY, JANUARY 8, 2018, 10:07 A.M.

(Proceedings 8:28 a.m. to 8:42 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. to 10:07

filed under seal. Hearing continued in open court as follows)

THE COURT: I have 10 minutes for your arguments.

MR. KRUM: So I'll talk with counsel about this matter after we do what we need to in the arguments so that we can take care of that and get out of the courtroom. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. I have a motion to dismiss for failure to show demand futility, and I have a motion for judgment as a matter of law --

Let everybody in now.

-- both which appear to be summary judgment motions, because they are asking me to look outside of the pleadings.

Can someone explain why these motions were not filed in the time required for summary judgment motions under my scheduling order?

MR. FERRARIO: Who do you want to go first?

THE COURT: It doesn't matter. They both have the same procedural issue.

MR. FERRARIO: Well, Your Honor, I addressed this briefly the other day. And I don't think there's any dispute as to this. Your ruling on the motions for summary judgment relating to the five now disinterested directors had what I would call a ripple effect. And so I don't think that we

would have been in a position to file the motion we filed, nor do I think that director defendants would have been in the position to file the motions they filed without the benefit of your order. So your order -- and I can see you're smiling, but we filed the motions, we filed motions before, and you said the record wasn't complete, go out and complete the -- we did all that. Then by the time they got decided, okay, we're now in December. So Your Honor appropriately considered the motions that were in front of you, and I'm not going to go through the numbers of them now, because, quite frankly, I don't remember them all, and concluded that five directors were now disinterested.

THE COURT: I determined there were no genuine issues of material fact --

MR. FERRARIO: Exactly.

THE COURT: -- without the interestedness of those directors. Different.

MR. FERRARIO: Right. And you gave -- and I want to make on the -- you gave Mr. Krum every opportunity at that hearing to convince you otherwise, and he had a full and fair opportunity to present to you in the record any facts that would controvert Your Honor's ruling. He didn't do that. Which that, from our perspective, is the equivalent -- it's equivalent to an evidentiary hearing. So having now the benefit of Your Honor's ruling, we went back and we looked at

certain things. One of the things we looked at under the statute in Nevada is the concept of ratification. And that's addressed more extensively in the directors' motion. We brought that to your attention last week.

The other thing that we looked at, and it's what the company filed based on, is the demand futility concept. Your Honor at the outset of the case determined that from the allegations of the complaint that sufficient information had been pled to excuse demand on the board. That was based on what was in the complaint.

We then go through discovery, and it was robust discovery, I must say. There were numerous depositions taken, thousands of pages of documents produced, and based upon a full and complete record Your Honor makes the determination that the five board members are not interested. That then raises the issue of whether or not demand should have been excused in the first place. Obviously, given your ruling, demand should not have been excused, okay. And if you look at whether you want to call them, as Ms. Cowden says, the Shane case, because she likes to pronounce it like Germans do, I call it Shoen, or you call it Amerco --

THE COURT: Because we know the family, Lynn's family.

MR. FERRARIO: Exactly. Whatever -- if you look at those cases, one thing they made clear is the review of demand

or demand futility doesn't stop at the beginning, it's a continual look. And that's quoted in both -- in <u>Shoen</u> and in <u>Amerco</u>. And so what we've had in effect is the evidentiary hearing on whether the directors were interested or could act independently. And that hearing didn't go in favor of the plaintiff. So at this stage demand should not have been excused. And plaintiff consequently lacks standing as a derivative plaintiff to bring this case. He would have presented this and still should present the demand to the board, which is comprised primarily now of independent, disinterested directors. That's what the law provides, that's what the <u>Shoen</u> and <u>Amerco</u> cases provide, and that's why we brought this motion, because we're relying on Your Honor's ruling, which we didn't have until a couple weeks ago. That's it.

THE COURT: So you believe waiting for the Court to decide some motions that had a required filing deadline is sufficient showing of good cause for the late filing of these two motions?

MR. FERRARIO: Well, I wouldn't phrase it that way.

I would phrase it that as we are standing here in front of you today dealing with an odd set of circumstances things evolve, okay. The case evolved. We didn't have the benefit of your ruling. We now have your ruling. And this is a follow-on motion related to that ruling. And you can say it's a motion

for summary judgment. I don't think that's an appropriate characterization. It's a motion to dismiss for demand futility. And so I think that the predicate for that motion was your order, and I don't think we're running afoul of the summary judgment deadline that you had, because it arose because of your order. And under Amerco and Shoen it says a motion can be filed any time. And so that's how I would characterize it. So we're not intentionally trying to go around your deadline for filing summary judgment motions in any way, shape --

THE COURT: Thank you.

Did someone want to respond on the procedural issue related to your motion for judgment as a matter of law?

MR. SEARCY: Yes, Your Honor. With respect to the procedural issue on several of the claims we actually did file a motion for summary judgment. So with respect to the appointment of Ellen Cotter as CEO, the appointment of Margaret Cotter to the position of executive vice president of real estate, we did file motions on those. And the byproduct of Your Honor's ruling on those is -- should necessarily be that because there were five disinterested directors who approved of those transactions, those transactions should be valid as a matter of law, Your Honor. So we did file in a timely fashion on those.

With respect to two other transactions, specifically

those are the termination of Jim Cotter, Jr., and with respect to the exercise of 100,000 shares, in those instances, Your Honor, based upon the ripple effect that Mr. Ferrario just described the board of directors got together, as they were allowed to do under Nevada Revised Statute 78.140(2)(a), which applies to interested director transactions, and they ratified those two transactions, using a majority of disinterested directors, specifically Mr. Kane, Mr. Gould, Mr. McEachern, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak. Those five directors approved of the two transactions that the Court has singled out as being a potential issue for this case and ratified them as they're allowed to under the law.

With respect to the timing issue, Your Honor, the Court has held -- and this is with respect to a Rule 50 motion, which would apply to a bench trial, as opposed to a jury trial --

THE COURT: This isn't a bench trial, Counsel. We're picking a jury starting at 1:00 o'clock unless I grant these motions.

MR. SEARCY: Understood, Your Honor. But my point

-- to distinguish that case, but to also explain the

importance of it here, in the <u>Charles Brown</u> case the court

held, if the plaintiff's not going to be able to prove their

case, if there's going to be a failure, as there is here,

because of the ratification under the applicable statute, then

that should be the end of the analysis. Here they're not going to be able to prove their case, because the transactions have been ratified by the disinterested directors, the five who this Court has held as a matter of law are disinterested. You found that there's no issue of fact on that, Your Honor, and they've ratified those two transactions.

And I would ask that to the extent that Mr. Cotter is allowed to receive some sort of continuance, then I'd ask for leave of the Court, if the Court really does think that this is an issue of a motion for summary judgment, then I'd ask for leave of the Court to be able to bring that motion, because this is now ripe for adjudication, there are no issues of fact here, this is a ratification that was done by a board of directors regarding transactions that you've examined and you've examined the relationship of those directors to those transactions. So there shouldn't be an issue of fact here.

So to the extent that the Court does not -- is not ready to consider this a motion for judgment as a matter of law, then I'd ask for leave to file a motion for summary judgment. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Searcy.

Mr. Krum, Mr. Morris, do you want to address the procedural issue?

MR. KRUM: Thank you, Your Honor. You're absolutely correct. These are not only untimely summary judgment

motions, but one of them is predicated upon evidence created on December 29th with respect to which not only is there an issue of fact, there should be discovery. So agree with Your Honor's assessment that they are untimely.

And the demand motion, Your Honor, they've made it, and they've made it in the only -- it's -- nothing has changed as they suggest it has, I don't think, Your Honor.

And you said just the procedural, so I won't go to the law.

THE COURT: Thank you. Now, Mr. Krum, in a minute

I'm going to ask you a question. So can you pull up the

opposition you emailed, because Cassandra didn't pull it in

the pile. I read it, but I don't remember the footnote number

I may refer to.

MR. KRUM: Which one, Your Honor?

THE COURT: The opposition you sent over the weekend to probably the motion for judgment as a matter of law. Mr. Morris did one, and you did one, I think.

MR. KRUM: I have it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Don't answer any questions yet.

So the motions both are denied without prejudice to renew if you should obtain leave of Court if there is not a proceeding today, because waiting for the Court to decide other motions is insufficient showing of good cause for late

filing of these two motions. If you thought you had a valid 1 2 basis for the filing of the motions as they are currently 3 presented, that should have been done prior to the date of the 4 summary judgment motion. With respect to Footnote -- is it 2 or 3 that talks 5 about the admissibility of evidence? 6 7 MR. KRUM: Footnote 3, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: So with respect to the issue raised in 9 Footnote 3 of Mr. Krum's opposition I am not ruling on that at 10 this time. I do have serious concerns about the appropriate disclosure of the factual evidence on which these motions are 11 12 based. 13 MR. FERRARIO: Well, Your Honor, as to the company's motion it's --14 15 THE COURT: That's the demand futility motion. MR. FERRARIO: -- based entirely on your order. 16 THE COURT: I'm aware of that, Mr. Ferrario. 17 18 MR. FERRARIO: And the only thing is would -- just 19 so the record's clear and it is under Shoen and Amerco --20 THE COURT: It isn't Shane, it's Shoen. 21 MR. FERRARIO: Shoen. Okay. 22 THE COURT: And it's not Amerco, it's Shoen II. 23 I know the Supreme Court wants to give it a new name, but 24 it's --

MR. FERRARIO: Okay. So what do you want to call

25

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it, Shoen and Shoen II?
 1
 2
              THE COURT: It's Shoen.
 3
              MR. FERRARIO: All right. Well, then there. You
 4
    got that Tami? It's Shoen from now on.
 5
              THE COURT:
                          They're Shoen. They're Shoen. Both
 6
           Ask Mr. Peek. They were his case.
    Shoen.
 7
              MR. FERRARIO: She keeps correcting me, and then --
 8
              THE COURT:
                         Yeah, she's wrong.
 9
              MR. FERRARIO: All right.
              THE COURT: Lynn Shoen. His name was Lynn Shoen.
10
11
              MR. FERRARIO:
                             Right.
              THE COURT: And her family is the family that was
12
13
    fighting.
                             That's right. Where is she now?
14
              MR. FERRARIO:
15
              THE COURT:
                          I believe there's some bar proceedings.
              MR. FERRARIO: Okay. What we're filing is what the
16
17
    statute provides. It's a motion to dismiss for failure to
18
    meet the requirements of Rule 23.
19
              THE COURT: Mr. Ferrario, I absolutely understand
20
    what you're filing.
              MR. FERRARIO: And I think the Shoen cases provide
21
22
    for that, Your Honor. And I don't know that it's fair --
23
              THE COURT: You think the Shoen case provides for
   you after the hearing of the summary judgment motions to go to
24
    the board, get a change or belief as to whether a futility
25
```

then exists or other action should occur, and then after all 1 2 of the pretrial disclosure deadlines are due then to make a 3 decision right before trial? 4 MR. FERRARIO: Let me --5 THE COURT: You think that's what Shoen says? MR. FERRARIO: I don't think that --6 7 THE COURT: No. I'm just trying to figure out. 8 you think --9 MR. FERRARIO: No, I don't think -- I don't think --THE COURT: -- that's what Shoen 1 or Shoen 2 says? 10 11 MR. FERRARIO: I don't think Shoen says that. THE COURT: Okay. 12 13 MR. FERRARIO: I think what Shoen says is -- and this is what we're doing. Shoen requires first of all demand 14 15 futility. You look at it like you did at the beginning as pled. We made a motion to dismiss on that. You made 16 17 conclusions based on what was pled. 18 THE COURT: At the time. MR. FERRARIO: At the time. Those conclusions then 19 20 changed with your order, okay. So with those changed conclusions we now know as a matter of law that demand should 21 not have been excused. If --23 THE COURT: That is not true, Mr. Ferrario. you know now is based on the facts elicited in discovery --24 25 MR. FERRARIO: Right.

THE COURT: -- and a briefing in this case I have made certain decisions as to whether there was a genuine issue of material fact related to interestedness. That's what you know. You don't know other stuff. That's what you know.

MR. FERRARIO: I understand. But the predicate for your ruling to excuse demand was that they were interested and not independent.

THE COURT: But there was an allegation that they were interested --

MR. FERRARIO: Exactly.

THE COURT: -- that was well founded.

MR. FERRARIO: And what <u>Shoen</u> does articulate, Your Honor, is that you can raise that issue during the course of the proceedings. And as we've articulated, in effect your ruling on summary judgment is -- supplanted the evidentiary hearing that was mentioned in <u>Shoen</u>.

THE COURT: That can be had in Shoen.

MR. FERRARIO: Exactly. And that's what we're --

THE COURT: You didn't request that in this case.

MR. FERRARIO: We didn't have to once you did -- once you made your ruling.

THE COURT: You never requested it for the four years or so we've been in litigation. Wait. We've only been in litigation three years. You didn't request it after the motion to dismiss was denied because it appeared the

allegations at that time were well founded. You never again requested or renewed that motion with a request for an evidentiary hearing.

MR. FERRARIO: You are correct, Your Honor. But what we did do, and as Your Honor recalls, at the beginning of this case there was a flurry of activity. The plaintiffs wanted injunctions, we were on an expedited schedule.

THE COURT: Absolutely.

MR. FERRARIO: The parties called time out and we pulled that injunction off, and then we set out to do discovery, which would have dealt with all of this, okay. I guess we could have had a separate track. But we dealt with this through the course of discovery. And I don't think that the fact that the issue materializes and the facts are crystallized and you have a decision right before trial that supports our argument regarding demand -- that that's somehow been waived. This is a predicate for a plaintiff to make, okay. You have to make demand or it has to be excused. Here it should not have been excused. That's what your ruling says, and that's why it runs afoul of Rule 23. It's a standing issue.

THE COURT: I understand.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ FERRARIO: And he lacks standing. And I just wanted to make that clear.

THE COURT: Sure. I appreciate you --

MR. FERRARIO: And my understanding of your comments were that if for some reason the case gets continued, if they get an affidavit that's sufficient, we can revisit these issues, correct, with a more complete record? Did I understand that correctly?

THE COURT: Then I would anticipate that you or Mr. Searcy would file a motion for leave to file a new motion for summary judgment and attach the draft motion. I would then

MR. FERRARIO: Thank you.

make a decision as to whether I wanted to hear it.

THE COURT: And it depends on a lot of timing issues, because I'd probably have to reopen discovery if I entertain these motions.

MR. FERRARIO: Understand. Thank you.

THE COURT: Anything else? All right. So I'll see you guys at 1:00 o'clock. We are in Courtroom 3D at 1:00 o'clock.

Mr. Krum, your opposition didn't hit Odyssey, which is why nobody could find it but me, which is why I had to ask you for the footnote number. So you may want to check to see if it got sent. Mr. Morris's did hit Odyssey.

MR. KRUM: Thank you, Your Honor. We will.

THE COURT: 1:00 o'clock, 3D.

THE PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 10:24 A.M.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

AFFIRMATION

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

FLORENCE HOYT Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

FLORENCE M. HOYT, TRANSCRIBER

1/9/18

DATE

Electronically Filed 1/10/2018 11:26 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

TRAN

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA * * * * *

JAMES COTTER, JR.

. CASE NO. A 15 719860 B A 16 735305 B

Plaintiff P 14 082942 E

vs.

DEPT. NO. XI

MARGARET COTTER, et al.

Transcript of Proceedings

Defendants .

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

JURY TRIAL - DAY 1

MONDAY, JANUARY 8, 2018

COURT RECORDER: TRANSCRIPTION BY:

JILL HAWKINS FLORENCE HOYT

District Court Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

Proceedings recorded by audio visual recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF: MARK G. KRUM, ESQ.

STEVE L. MORRIS, ESQ.

AKKE LEVIN, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANTS: KEVIN JOHNSON, ESQ.

MARSHALL M. SEARCY, ESQ. CHRISTOPHER TAYBACK, ESQ. MARK E. FERRARIO, ESQ. KARA B. HENDRICKS, ESQ. LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, MONDAY, JANUARY 8, 2018, 1:58 P.M.

(Proceedings 1:00 p.m. to 1:58 filed under separate cover)

(Prospective jurors are present)

THE COURT: You can sit down when you get to your chairs.

You can be seated.

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for waiting. I want to apologize for the time we had you waiting out in the hallway. My name is Elizabeth Gonzalez. I'm the presiding judge in Department 11. Welcome.

We had been addressing while you were waiting in the hallway a medical issue that had occurred with one of the witnesses in the case and whether that was going to cause us to delay the trial. I've just decided it is.

So, rather than have you wait around any more, I'm now going to excuse you and return you to Jury Services. I do not know if they will let you go home. I am hopeful they will, but thank you very much for your patience today. I've had to continue this trial based upon the medical issue of a witness. So thank you very much.

Dan, if you could help them get over to the third floor to Mariah.

(Jury discharged at 2:01 p.m.)

THE COURT: Okay. Now that we've finished that part of our day, let me go to the other parts of my day.

So, Mr. Ferrario and Mr. Tayback, you had both as part of your inquiry asked if there was a cost issue if your clients could seek any recompense for that. The answer is you can file whatever motions you think are appropriate.

And, Mr. Searcy, if you believe there's a written motion related to the qualifications of a class representative, you can, of course, file that.

With respect to the motions that I denied this morning because they were too late, let's talk about that issue. I indicated earlier today that if we were going to entertain those motions I was going to reopen discovery and allow discovery on the issues related to the matters that were addressed in those motions. Does anybody want to talk to me about that?

MR. FERRARIO: We absolutely want to bring those motions back. To the extent -- I personally don't think there's discovery needed on the demand futility motion, but to the extent you're willing to accommodate them I think they can certainly inquire into the ratification. I think there should be a limited discovery period opened and with appropriate limitations, limited to that ratification process. And then we can bring that to you on a more fulsome record.

THE COURT: Mr. Krum, Mr. Morris?

MR. FERRARIO: And we will renew the motion, as well, on the demand futility. As Ms. Cowden pointed out to me

when we were walking back to the war room, <u>Shoen</u> says "must," not "may." So I will -- I'll renew that and perhaps address the Court's comments more targeted. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Krum.

MR. KRUM: Well, Your Honor, obviously creating evidence for use in a case is an unusual circumstance, but obviously we're entitled to discovery if there's any possibility they're going to be allowed to use it.

In this particular case we have evidence that is predicated on a ruling that is subject of appeal, so we have multiple moving targets. And I think that, among other considerations that you'll probably describe to us or you may describe to us shortly, such as your schedule --

THE COURT: What schedule?

MR. KRUM: Yes. Exactly.

-- as well as the fact that we don't know -- I think to the extent we assume that seven weeks hence Mr. Cotter is good to go, so to speak, we'll have to see. So we have a lot of uncertainties. And I certainly disagree with any suggestion that we ought to have any expedited limited discovery period, because we're clearly going to have months and months and months before we're on track; right? You're not going to put us on trial in the middle of Wynn-Okada.

THE COURT: I was going to see if I could fit you into my March spot, because the Swarovski people claim they're

going to settle on Friday.

MR. KRUM: Okay. Well, that would be a familiar circumstance for us, Your Honor, that is rushing to complete discovery. So, look, if the point is that they don't object to discovery, we'll promptly propound the document requests, we'll collect documents such as they exist. I think it would be probably prudent to have a couple written requests, as well, to identify witnesses so that we don't waste the time of a deponent doing what we could do by way of an interrogatory identifying who knows about this, that and the other. And then we'll undertake to schedule the depositions.

THE COURT: So you're talking about a 75- to 90-day period basically, from what I heard.

MR. KRUM: I think it's at least 90 days, Your Honor, yes.

MR. FERRARIO: We -- there's no -- it should not be 90 days. We can get this done quickly. We're prepared to engage them. And if you want a 16.1 supplement, we'll supplement 16.1.

THE COURT: Well, if you intended to use it, one would have thought you would have already done a 16.1 supplement, Mr. Ferrario.

MR. FERRARIO: Your Honor, with all due respect, this happened very quickly over the holidays. And, you know, we're now here dealing with --

THE COURT: You told me about it before it was going to happen, so I would have thought that you would have filed a supplement before you did it.

MR. FERRARIO: We needed the written order. But we're here now. So I can tell you we'll supplement the 16.1, and they should have limited discovery on the ratification. There's no way it takes 75 or however many days. And if Your Honor's going to squeeze us in March --

THE COURT: I don't know that I can.

MR. FERRARIO: I already know what you have in March, okay, and I don't think it's looking real pretty, and it isn't looking pretty for me. So if we're going to squeeze in in March, let's get it done.

THE COURT: The trial starts in April, so I have other things I'm going to do in March besides get ready for trial in April.

MR. KRUM: March doesn't matter. Recall, Your Honor
-- and counsel know this -- I'm out of the country for in
excess of two weeks in March.

MR. FERRARIO: I get it. Okay. Well, then I don't know about that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FERRARIO: So I'm saying let's -- tell us to get discovery done way sooner than 75 days so we can get this back in front of you. So I would say --

THE COURT: Mr. Ferrario, where on earth would you put me -- put this case? Where -- if you were going to put it on my schedule, when would it be ready?

MR. FERRARIO: Your Honor, I wouldn't even hazard a guess. And that's what I told everybody last night when they asked me that. Because I suspect what you're going to tell us is you're going to tell us it's going to go after Wynn. And then what I'm going to ask you is could you please -- if Wynn happens to miraculously go away, could you plug us in during that time you had previously set. So that's what I was going to tell my client.

THE COURT: So, Mr. Krum, when in March are you out of the country?

MR. KRUM: I had this wrong previously, so let me look at the calendar. I believe, Your Honor, it's from the 8th of March through the 19th.

THE COURT: So that shoots my idea about March.

MR. FERRARIO: Yeah. That ruins March. So there's some other things.

THE COURT: I'm listening. I've got a week to listen now.

MR. FERRARIO: You 54(b)-ed some stuff. They're going to appeal it. The quicker we get decisions on this we may be able to make some decisions regarding writs and get these legal issues up in front of the Supreme Court. They're

going to consider what they want to appeal on the 54(b) stuff. So I'm committing to the Court, to opposing counsel -- and if Mr. Tayback or Mr. Searcy disagree, they're free to say so -- we're willing to get on an expedited schedule with Mr. Krum. There's no reason to delay this. We will identify -- and it's no secret who was involved in the ratification, it's the board members and the like. To the extent there are any documents, okay, other than what was referenced in the meetings and referenced in the minutes, which I think are -- we submitted drafts, we'll get the final, we'll produce all that stuff, okay. If Mr. Krum wants more information, he's free to ask, and then we'll deal with that.

But our -- we need to get these issues decided. This case has gone on. It has been a huge drain on everything.

THE COURT: Mr. Ferrario, the medical issue is one that Mr. Cotter had that is not inside your control. The ratification issue is clearly inside your client's control. So the issue about the timing is not one I'm going to be very sympathetic to at this point.

So I am vacating the trial. I am going to set a status check for resetting the trial on my March 2nd chambers calendar. At that time I would like a status report, hopefully joint, but, if not, separate, from all parties advising me as to the status of the discovery.

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I am opening discovery for a period not to exceed 75
 1
 2
    days. If the discovery on these limited issues for which I
 3
    have reopened it -- that's the ratification issue and the
 4
    demand futility issues that were raised in the motions I
 5
    denied for procedural reasons this morning. If you are unable
 6
    to be done with everything by the date of that status report,
 7
    you will have to file a motion to extend.
 8
              MR. KRUM: Your Honor, I have a question.
 9
    days --
              THE COURT:
                         Hold on.
10
11
              MR. KRUM:
                         Is actually 60 days for me.
              THE COURT: You're right. It's not quite 75.
12
13
              MR. KRUM:
                         So, I mean, what I have --
14
              THE COURT:
                         If you're not going to be able to finish
15
    in the 75 days, I need you to tell me in the March 2 status
16
    report.
17
              MR. KRUM:
                         No. I'm just pointing out that I'm
18
    actually -- okay.
19
              MR. FERRARIO: You're anticipating we will get done
20
    but for good cause within that period of time.
21
              THE COURT:
                          That is correct. That's why I'm saying
22
    75 days, not to exceed 75 days.
23
              MR. FERRARIO: All right.
24
              THE COURT: It's a month and a half.
              MR. FERRARIO: And, again, I'm not going to belabor
25
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this, but everything that we did was occasioned because of 1 2 Your Honor's ruling and it fell on right after the order was 3 signed and --4 THE COURT: Blaming me for your situation --5 I'm not blaming you. MR. FERRARIO: THE COURT: -- really doesn't help. 6 7 MR. FERRARIO: I'm not blaming you. 8 THE COURT: Anything else? 9 MR. KRUM: No, Your Honor. MR. FERRARIO: You set the -- I didn't blame you, 10 11 it's just that's what happened. THE COURT: That's what happens when judges decide. 12 13 Things are resolved. That's why the motions are usually near the end, because you have the factual information. But one 14 15 anticipates the parties will act in good faith during the term 16 of litigation and not wait until the judge decides. 17 Anything else? 18 MR. FERRARIO: Any implication we didn't ask in good 19 faith I would disagree with Your Honor. We did act in good 20 faith. Okay. Anything else? 21 THE COURT: 22 MR. FERRARIO: We filed the motions, you know. 23 then, you know -- look, we're here in an awkward situation. 24 We were ready to get this case done. 25 THE COURT: We were all ready to get this thing

1 done. 2 MR. FERRARIO: Okay. You were, obviously, and --3 THE COURT: And I was not convinced until I read the doctor's affidavit that indicated about the testing and things 4 5 he referred him to, because the delay between November 29th and when it was scheduled were of concern to me until I read 6 7 the doctor's declaration this afternoon. So --8 MR. FERRARIO: No. And it is -- that's an unusual 9 situation --THE COURT: 10 It is. 11 MR. FERRARIO: -- that we're unfortunately on the 12 outside looking --THE COURT: It's outside of all of our control. 13 Anything else? 14 15 Dulce wants you to take away --Can I stipulate to return the exhibit devices even 16 17 though some of them were already admitted? Or do you want me to keep them? 18 19 MR. FERRARIO: Yes. 20 MR. MORRIS: Yes. THE COURT: So Dulce's going to return your three 21 22 devices to each of you, your respective three devices. 23 have a receipt ready for you tomorrow. 24 MR. TAYBACK: And so that means we'll start over, nothing will have been admitted the next time we come back. 25

THE COURT: Correct. But hopefully it will be 1 2 easier when we get to the exhibit lists the next time, because 3 you will have done it before. 4 MR. TAYBACK: Hope so. 5 THE COURT: So we're also going to return the depos. 6 You will also have a receipt provided for each of you for your 7 depos to be picked up. 8 Anything else? All right. I am -- given the tone 9 of the doctor's declaration -- I had thought you could do a video deposition of Mr. Cotter if you needed to as part of 10 11 your process, but it does not appear to me that you probably 12 can. 13 MR. FERRARIO: Your Honor, we will not -- I would not impede Mr. Cotter's recovery with a deposition. 14 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 MR. FERRARIO: We will wait until he is --17 THE COURT: Better. 18 MR. FERRARIO: -- legit and we'll take it then if we 19 need to. 20 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? We'll be in 21 recess. 22 MR. KRUM: Thank you. 23 MR. MORRIS: Thank you, Your Honor. 24 THE PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 2:13 P.M.

25

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

AFFIRMATION

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

FLORENCE HOYT Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

FLORENCE M. HOYT, TRANSCRIBER

1/9/18

DATE

Electronically Filed

Please take notice that Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. hereby appeal
to the Supreme Court of Nevada and/or the Appeals Court of the State of
Nevada from:
1. The District Court's December 28, 2017 Order granting

1. The District Court's December 28, 2017 Order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak on all of Plaintiff's claims against them.

By Order dated January 4, 2018, the District Court certified its Order dismissing these five defendants as final under Nev. R. Civ. P. 54(b) and entered judgment in favor of them.

MORRIS LAW GROUP

By: /s/ Akke Levin
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Tami Cowden

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(D) and E.D.C.R. 8.05, I hereby certify that I am an employee of MORRIS LAW GROUP and that on the date below, I cause the following document(s) to be served via the Court's Odyssey E-Filing System: **NOTICE OF APPEAL**, to be served on all interested parties, as registered with the Court's E-Filing and E-Service System. The date and time of the electronic proof of service is in place of the date and place of deposit in the mail.

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Attorneys for Nominal Defendant Reading International, Inc.

DATED this 1st day of February, 2018.

By: <u>/s/ Linda P. Daniel</u>
An employee of Morris Law Group

4/18/2018 4:57 PM Steven D. Grierson **CLERK OF THE COURT** 1 **MCOM** Steve Morris (BN 1543) 2 Akke Levin (BN 9102) Morris Law Group 3 411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 Las Vegas, NV 89101 4 Mark G. Krum (BN 10913) Yurko, Salvesen & Remz, P.C. 5 1 Washington Mall, 11th Floor Boston, MA 02108 Tel: 617.723.6900 6 7 Fax: 617.723.6905 E-mail:mkrum@bizlit.com 8 9 Attorneys for plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. 10 11 DISTRICT COURT 12 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 13 JAMES J. COTTER, JR., derivatively on behalf CASE NO.: A-15-719860-B of Reading International, Inc., DEPT. NO. XI 14 Plaintiff, Coordinated with: 15 Case No. P-14-0824-42-E v. 16 Dept. No. XI MARGARET COTTER, ELLEN COTTER, 17 GUY ADAMS, EDWARD KANE, DOUGLAS Jointly Administered McEACHERN, WILLIAM GOULD, JUDY 18 CODDING, MICHAEL WROTNIAK and JAMES J. COTTER, JR.'S MOTION DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF 19 **DOCUMENTS AND PRIVILEGE LOG** Defendants. 20 AND APPLICATION FOR ORDER 21 And **SHORTENING TIME** 22 READING INTERNATIONAL, INC., a 23 Nevada corporation, 24 Nominal Defendant 25 26 27 04-18-18P92:09 RCVD 28

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Pursuant to N.R.C.P. 45 and EDCR 2.34, plaintiff James J. Cotter ("Plaintiff") hereby moves to compel William Gould ("Gould") to produce all nonprivileged documents responsive to the document requests in the subpoena served to Gould on behalf of Plaintiff, to log any and all responsive documents withheld based on claims of privilege, work product or both, to provide a written explanation of what happened to Gould's electronically stored information including emails ("ESI") (including for his assistant), which explanation must include, at a minimum, what ESI was lost, when the ESI was lost, how it was lost, what steps have been taken to recover it, what the results of recovery efforts have been and such other information as is necessary to enable Plaintiff to confer with an ESI specialist about the matters. Additionally, Plaintiff asks that the Court order Gould to appear for further deposition, should Plaintiff choose to depose him further after these matters are resolved.

Plaintiff further moves the court, under EDCR 2.26, for an order shortening the time for hearing this motion. This Motion is based upon the pleadings and papers on file, the declaration of Mark G. Krum, the exhibits attached hereto, the following memorandum of points and authorities, and any oral argument the Court may allow.

DATED this 18th day of April, 2018

Morris Law Group

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E-mail:mkrum@bizlit.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr.

1 ORDER SHORTENING TIME 2 It appearing to the satisfaction of the Court and good cause appearing therefor, 3 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the hearing on "James J. Cotter, Jr.'s Motion to Compel 4 Production of Documents and Privilege Log on Order Shortening Time" shall be heard before the 5 above-entitled Court in Department XI, before Judge Elizabeth Gonzalez on the 30 day of 6 2018, at Sam./p.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, at 7 the Regional Justice Center, 200 Lewis Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada 89155. 8 DATED this \ day of April, 2018 9 10 11 12 13 Respectfully submitted: 14 Morris Law Group 15 16 Steve Morris (BN 1543) 17 Akke Levin (BN 9102) Morris Law Group 18 411 E. Bonneville Ave., Ste. 360 Las Vegas, NV 89101 19 20 Mark G. Krum (BN 10913) Yurko, Salvesen & Remz, P.C. 21 One Washington Mall, 11th Floor Boston, MA 02108 22 Tel: 617.723.6900 Fax: 617.723.6905 23 E-mail:mkrum@bizlit.com 24 25 Attorneys for Plaintiff James J. Cotter, Jr. 26 27

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DECLARATION OF MARK G. KRUM IN SUPPORT OF ORDER SHORTENING TIME ON JAMES J. COTTER, JR.'S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS OR PRIVILEGE LOG

I, Mark G. Krum, Esq., being duly sworn, deposes and says that:

- 1. I am an attorney with the firm Yurko, Salvesen & Remz, P.C., attorneys for James J. Cotter, Jr., plaintiff in the captioned action ("Plaintiff").
- 2. I make this declaration based upon personal knowledge, except where stated to be upon information and belief, and as to that information, I believe it to be true. If called upon to testify as to the contents of this Declaration, I am legally competent to testify to the contents of this Declaration in a court of law.

Reason for Order Shortening Time

- 3. This motion to compel (the "Motion") is brought because William Gould, a member of the Reading International, Inc. ("RDI") board of directors and previously a defendant in this action, has failed to produce documents responsive to the subpoena served on him through his counsel, has failed to log documents withheld based on claims of privilege, has provided a privilege log that is inadequate on its face because it fails to show that, much less why, certain documents are claimed privileged and, finally, has failed to explain or substantiate the belated, cursory oral assertion of his counsel that his emails have been lost and not recovered.
- 4. Plaintiff respectfully submits that good cause exists to shorten time to hear this Motion because unless and until Plaintiff obtains the documents and information Gould is obligated to provide but has not provided, Plaintiff will not be able to timely complete the discovery on ratification, which—depending on Gould's supplemental production and log—may require Plaintiff to re-depose Gould.
 - 5. This Declaration is made in good faith and not for the purpose of delay.

Discovery Disputes and EDCR 2.34 Conference

- 6. On January 12, Plaintiff served Gould's counsel with a subpoena calling for the production of documents. (See Ex. 1 hereto.)
- 7. On January 25, Gould provided written responses to the document requests, standing on objections to only a single request based on stated confusion about what was