IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

DEANGELO CARROLL,

Appellant,

VS.

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent.

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MR. ERICSSON: Exactly. And that is what, to a lay jury, I think the confusion is. An alternative that I think would be accurate would be to say -- they want to keep that first line in is, A killing which has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt to be murder and which is -- and then add the rest of it. MR. DiGIACOMO: Well, that's not true either.

Judge, think about this --

THE COURT: Right, because then you're putting the cart before the horse.

MR. DiGIACOMO: Yeah.

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You're saying, well, we have to prove THE COURT: the murder, that it's a first-degree murder, but we can't use lying in wait to prove it. That's kind of what that says.

MR. DiGIACOMO: Yes. The definition of the term lying in wait is defined as a waiting and a watching for an opportune time to act together with a concealment by ambush or some other secret design to take the other person by surprise. That's the first part of lying in wait.

The lying in wait doesn't have to be for any particular time or duration but it's equivalent to premeditation and deliberation. To constitute murder by means of lying and wait, there must be an addition to the aforesaid conduct by the defendant, an intentional infliction upon the person killed of bodily harm involving a high degree of

probably that it will result in death and in which shows a 1 2 wanton disregard for human life. 3 So the first sentence, Murder which is immediately 4 preceded by lying in wait is murder of the first degree, could 5 be a killing which is preceded by -- immediately preceded by 6 lying in wait is murder of the first degree. It's irrelevant 7 because lying in wait is defined as having the intent to 8 substantially harm and/or wanton disregard for human life. 9 THE COURT: No --10 MR. DiGIACOMO: Or -- and --11 THE COURT: That's when -- that's not any lying in 12 wait, though. That's just -- oh, I see what you're saying. 13 MR. DiGIACOMO: Right. 14 THE COURT: You're looking at the second sentence. 15 MR. DiGIACOMO: Right. You have to have the 16 lying --17 THE COURT: The lying in wait need not continue for 18 any particular period of time such that -- oh, I think that 19 makes it more confusing, though. I don't like that. 20 MR. PESCI: The second sentence is what makes it. 21 Well, then it's better to make it the THE COURT: 22 way it is, I think, than a killing. 23 MR. DiGIACOMO: Right. No, I agree. 24 THE COURT: I think that's more ambiguous than --25 MR. DiGIACOMO: But, I mean, I'm just saying like KARR REPORTING, INC.

murder doesn't put the cart before the horse because theoretically any killing which is preceded by a --

THE COURT: Here's the problem: Your instructions don't have it as murder of the first degree so they don't know then, well, is a lying in wait murder murder of the second degree or some other kind of murder. So you have to have murder of the first degree by lying in wait because otherwise they're not going to know. They're going to say, oh, well, it was lying in wait murder, that must be second-degree murder or something else. And I'm assuming we've got second degree on our verdict form, so that's ambiguous, I think.

MR. ERICSSON: Well --

THE COURT: So, I mean, they have to be able to tell them this is murder of the first degree, not murder of the second degree or some other murder if that's their theory or one of their theories.

MR. ERICSSON: But again, getting back to, I think, what --

THE COURT: Do you see what I'm saying? Because otherwise the jury's not going to know what kind of murder it is.

MR. ERICSSON: Well, if we need to add the phase, murder in the first degree, that certainly can be added, but the instruction presented by the State, the first line does not include the full state of the law and it is confusing.

Base -- murder which is immediately preceded by lying in wait is murder of the first degree. That is not -- without coupling the requirements of the later paragraph three, that first line is not accurate and it needs to incorporate that.

MR. DiGIACOMO: The first line's the statute.

Murder which is murder of the first degree is any type of murder which is premeditated, deliberate or -- wilful, premeditated, deliberate or by means of lying in wait or by this -- I mean, the first line is just the statute.

Afterwards you define what the lying in wait is and require that the lying in wait be -- involved the intentional infliction upon the person killed, the bodily harm involving the high degree of likelihood. That is an absolute correct statement of the law. The first line is the statute. The rest of it just qualifies what the jury needs to know.

THE COURT: I think if you read it in its totality, it's clear what they're saying. I mean, like I said, you can't take out that murder is murder of the first degree if it's preceded by lying in wait because then, as I said, the jury isn't going to know what it is. So I think -- I don't know how you can make this better. Like I said, I think they're entitled to have clearly that murder in the first degree is -- can be murder by lying in wait. You know, we would say what I just said, murder in the first degree can be constituted by murder by lying in wait. I think that's worse

1 than the stature and my preference is if we can use the 2 language of the statute, we're better off using the language 3 of the statute than trying to tweak it because then --4 MR. DiGIACOMO: That will cause us some trouble. 5 THE COURT: We may not be right. So, you know, if 6 you want to think on that and come up with something else, but 7 so far everything we've suggested hasn't, in my view, been as 8 good as what this says. And like I said, if you read the 9 totality of the whole instruction -- I mean, if you look at 10 the third paragraph, To constitute murder by means of lying in 11 wait, there must be an addition to the conduct lying in wait, 12 the -- an intentional infliction. 13 MR. PESCI: Judge, if I could --14 THE COURT: Yeah. 15 MR. PESCI: I was going to say with your permission 16 if I could add -- we're not going to argue the first sentence 17 and say that's lying in wait. 18 THE COURT: Right. 19 MR. PESCI: We're going to utilize the second 20 paragraph which explains how it is lying in wait. 21 that's the concern that our argument will be that, we can tell 22 you now that's not what we're going to argue. 23 THE COURT: Yeah, I just don't think that it's 24 ambiguous so that the jury will get back there and think that, 25 oh, well, there's not this other requirement that they

intended, you know, to either cause, you know, great harm or killing or it has to be -- I mean, I think -- and again, we tell them not only is it in one instruction, but we tell them you have to read all the instructions together. So I think we're okay.

Other defense proposed or objections.

MR. ERICSSON: And, Your Honor, the other thing we didn't talk about that instruction on our proposed is the changes to the last paragraph which goes -- it more clearly articulates the --

THE COURT: All right. Yes.

MR. ERICSSON: —— which we believe more accurately articulates the Supreme Court's decision in Sharman, Bolden dealing with the mens rea requirements, and we're wanting to add the language that the defendant must intend to commit acts that are likely to cause death and show a wanton disregard for human life, again, just making it clear to the jury that they have to find this defendant, not some other person, that this defendant had that mens rea in order to be found guilty under this theory of liability.

MR. DiGIACOMO: Right. My first thing is: One, he changes the definition about the intentional infliction upon the person killed with bodily harm involving a high degree of probability which will result in death and which shows a wanton disregard for human life, but two things I would say.

He doesn't have to intend to commit the act. He just has to intend that the acts be committed --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. DiGIACOMO: -- first of all. Second of all, there's two different --

THE COURT: Yeah, I was going to say the same thing. It creates — this means the intent — this defendant had to intend to commit the acts, which isn't the state of the law, so that means — if you read this literally, that means the defendant had to lie in wait with his specific intent that he shoot or bludgeon or whatever he was going to do, the victim, not that he's lying in wait with his accomplice with the intention the accomplice will shoot or do whatever to the victim.

MR. DiGIACOMO: And it's pled in the alternative, by the way.

MR. ERICSSON: This language is -- and I've cited it on the second page there of the Coleman V State decision, 116

Nevada 687, and I'm quoting from the Court's decision where it is quoting --

THE COURT: Yeah, but that might just be specific to that particular case, meaning in that particular case the defendant who was lying in wait is the same defendant that, you know, pulled the trigger or did the stabbing or whatever caused the death.

MR. PESCI: Is it Chapman?

MR. DiGIACOMO: Well, it's Coleman, but -
THE COURT: It's Coleman, 116 Nevada 678.

MR. DiGIACOMO: Yeah, first-degree murder in the death of his live-in girlfriend's three-year-old son was sentenced to death. This case, while they addressed first degree murder, they're not giving us lying in wait instructions.

MR. ERICSSON: No, no, but they are talking about the specific instructions. This one where we had the lying in wait is first-degree murder. This Coleman case talks about child abuse striking it into first-degree murder where it lowers the wilful and other requirements normally for first-degree murder. So it's that same line of cases where the State had argued that you could lower the burden under the -- similar to the felony murder argument, that you don't have to show the mens rea. And Coleman says that under the statute that is applying the child abuse or --

THE COURT: Lying in wait.

MR. ERICSSON: -- in our case, the lying in wait that there has to be a showing of intent.

THE COURT: Which they have in their instruction and your instruction creates the obligation that this -- if you read it, it says the defendant had to have the mens rea that he do the killing, not the mens rea that somebody else be

there to do the killing.

Now, my understanding is that's not the state of the law, that he has to intend, oh, I'm going to kill this guy, oh, and then somebody else does it. I mean, that's what your instruction says.

MR. DiGIACOMO: And for the record, in Coleman, the issue in Coleman was that we used to not instruct on malice in child abuse cases. Not only are we instructing in malice in this particular case, and then they changed the statute so we no longer have to, but back then in Coleman you had — they said you have to instruct on malice. The definition — or one of the definitions of malice is included in the lying in wait which is intentional infliction upon the person killed of bodily harm and bodily — high degree of probability of death. That is malice.

So Coleman has nothing -- I don't think Coleman applies necessarily in this situation at all.

THE COURT: I think the instruction as offered by the State is an accurate statement of the law. The instruction offered by the defense, if read again, literally is an inaccurate statement of the law regarding lying in wait because, again, it creates a different obligation.

MR. ERICSSON: And if it requires adding in there a coconspirator -- that's what you're getting to --

THE COURT: Right.

| | MR. ERICSSON: IS the language that are in other |
|----|--|
| 2 | instructions that |
| 3 | THE COURT: He has to have intended to commit the |
| 4 | act. |
| 5 | MR. ERICSSON: Pardon me? |
| 6 | THE COURT: Right. The language that suggests that |
| 7 | person had to have intended to commit the act, which is wrong. |
| 8 | That's the language I think is wrong. We're saying the same |
| 9 | thing. I was just trying to enunciate it again, but |
| 10 | apparently not clarifying it. |
| 11 | I don't think that I mean, again, I think the |
| 12 | State's instruction's fine. |
| 13 | All right. Any other objections that we need to |
| 14 | address? |
| 15 | MR. ERICSSON: Yes, Your Honor. On the the |
| 16 | language of the fifth amended information |
| 17 | MR. DiGIACOMO: Which apparently has now been filed. |
| 18 | THE COURT: Right. It hasn't been filed? |
| 19 | MR. DiGIACOMO: It has apparently. |
| 20 | THE COURT: It has. |
| 21 | MR. ERICSSON: And it's just the page 3, the last |
| 22 | part of the last sentence, which starting at line 2 on |
| 23 | page 3 where each and every coconspirator's responsible not |
| 24 | only for the specific crime intended but also for the natural |
| 25 | and foreseeable general intent crimes, each and every |
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coconspirator, during the course of the conspiracy, we believe that that is confusing with the state of the law.

They're going to have to go through the general -those instructions that deal with that, but it is very easy
to -- for a jury to confuse the burden of proof that has to be
shown as to the intent, the frame of mind of the defendant in
this case.

MR. DiGIACOMO: Judge, we could have gone with the original information, but the original information was pled through Bolden and it said he's responsible for every crime of every coconspirator that's a natural foreseeable consequence of the conspiracy. So in the amended, to make it clear, he's only responsible for the specific intent crimes which he intended as well as the general intent crimes that show natural foreseeable consequences, which is what Bolden and Sharman say. So that's the only reason for that language in there.

But it's the information which you're going to tell this jury is but a method of charging and merely an allegation and so the actual instructions themselves on conspiracy in Sharman and Bolden are all appropriate statements of the law and I actually think two, three, four is the --

THE COURT: When do I tell them that?

MR. DiGIACOMO: -- a good appropriate statement of the law.

| 1 | What? |
|----|---|
| 2 | THE COURT: When do I tell them that? |
| 3 | MR. DiGIACOMO: What? |
| 4 | THE COURT: Oh, an information is just |
| 5 | MR. DiGIACOMO: Yeah, it's the very first line of |
| 6 | the of Instruction No. 2 or 3, which one says, An |
| 7 | information is but a formal method and is not any evidence of |
| 8 | guilt. |
| 9 | THE COURT: Right. That's the first line. Right. |
| 10 | Right. Right. |
| 11 | MR. DiGIACOMO: It's just a notice pleading. This |
| 12 | puts them on notice of our theory of liability. We can file |
| 13 | it at any time. We filed this just to clean up the record to |
| 14 | make sure that there was no I didn't want to put the |
| 15 | information in there that had a misstatement of the law so |
| 16 | I |
| 17 | THE COURT: Right. |
| 18 | MR. DiGIACOMO: put a clean one in there to have |
| 19 | a correct |
| 20 | THE COURT: Yeah. I mean, it's clear to me. It |
| 21 | says not only for the specific crime intended, general intent |
| 22 | crimes. |
| 23 | MR. ERICSSON: It's just our position that that adds |
| 24 | unnecessary confusion in this particular document, that the |
| 25 | details are spelled out in the instructions. |
| | |

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| 1 | MR. DiGIACOMO: By the way, that language is all in |
|----|--|
| 2 | there in response to a reversal that he got post Bolden for an |
| 3 | information that was pre-Bolden and they said that the |
| 4 | information should have the appropriate language tracking |
| 5 | Bolden and Sharman. And so that's it's an unpublished |
| 6 | opinion, but it happened to Mr. Pesci. He's had to try that |
| 7 | case |
| 8 | How many times now? |
| 9 | So it's the reason why we now put the proper |
| 10 | statement in the information. |
| 11 | THE COURT: Okay. Other objections? |
| 12 | MR. ERICSSON: I'm looking at my notes here. |
| 13 | THE COURT: I'm sorry. |
| 14 | MR. ERICSSON: I'm just looking at notes on |
| 15 | instructions that have been given in Hidalgo. |
| 16 | MR. DiGIACOMO: Are you guys going to ask for the |
| 17 | institutional right not to testify, yadee-yada-yada? |
| 18 | MR. BUNIN: Oh, yeah, I think we should put that in |
| 19 | there. |
| 20 | MR. DiGIACOMO: If you think you should, I'll have |
| 21 | one |
| 22 | THE COURT: Oh, you don't have one? |
| 23 | MR. DiGIACOMO: I have one in here. I don't have |
| 24 | THE COURT: I mean, you didn't put it in the packet? |
| 25 | MR. BUNIN: I think I prefer to use it. I do want |
| | KARR REPORTING, INC. 207 |

| 1 | to use it. |
|----|---|
| 2 | THE COURT: Okay. Just make sure we all remember to |
| 3 | include it. |
| 4 | And then are we is everyone good with the verdict |
| 5 | form? |
| 6 | MR. DiGIACOMO: The State is. |
| 7 | Dan and Tom, if we give this one, is are you all |
| 8 | right with it? It is a constitutional right of a defendant in |
| 9 | a criminal trial that he may not be compelled to testify; |
| 10 | thus, the decision |
| 11 | THE COURT: Thus, the decision on whether or not to |
| 12 | testify |
| 13 | MR. DiGIACOMO: the decision as to whether or not |
| 14 | he should testify is left to the defendant on the advice and |
| 15 | counsel of his attorney. You must not draw any inference of |
| 16 | guilt from the fact that he does not testify, nor should the |
| 17 | fact be discussed by you or enter into your deliberations in |
| 18 | any way. |
| 19 | Is that the one you guys want? |
| 20 | THE COURT: That's the one I like. |
| 21 | MR. DiGIACOMO: Do you want me to put in there |
| 22 | reasonable doubt somewhere around there? |
| 23 | THE COURT: I think that's where it should go. |
| 24 | Any other objections or anything else we need to |
| 25 | address on the record? |

1 MR. ERICSSON: Not that I'm aware of, Your Honor. 2 MR. DiGIACOMO: Not from the State, Judge. 3 want, I can number these and then e-mail them to Penny and 4 then she can just print them and then we'll copy them for 5 everybody. 6 THE COURT: I was going to suggest that. We would 7 number them today, but since we're missing one, we -- it's 8 stupid to just number half of them. 9 MR. DiGIACOMO: Well, I'll just sit here and do it 10 right now and just e-mail them. 11 THE COURT: Oh. 12 One more thing on the record, I guess. MR. BUNIN: 13 My client has been telling me, and he wanted me to address 14 this with Your Honor, that Juror No. 1 -- he said during most 15 of the testimony, direct testimony of Detective McGrath, was 16 asleep. I didn't realize it. I didn't notice it. 17 THE COURT: I didn't notice it either. 18 I did notice that Alternate No. 2 was MR. BUNIN: 19 asleep yesterday for what I noticed for about five or ten 20 minutes. 21 THE COURT: He wasn't asleep. He keeps closing his eyes because I noticed it for a few minutes and then I called 22 over to Jeff to make sure and then he opened his eyes right 23 24 away. So he was closing and opening his eyes. 25 MR. BUNIN: Okay.

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| 1 | THE COURT: And then Juror No. 1, she seemed pretty |
|----|---|
| 2 | alert to me, so I never noticed her dozing off at all. |
| 3 | MR. PESCI: I've been watching the whole time |
| 4 | [inaudible] and I haven't seen anybody doze off. Alternate |
| 5 | No. 2's eyes were closed, but that was it. |
| 6 | THE COURT: So has Juror No. 7's eyes have closed, |
| 7 | but I've been watching him and he always you know, they |
| 8 | close them for a few minutes, but I didn't see one. I mean, I |
| 9 | didn't notice specifically during Detective McGrath's |
| 10 | testimony. I will say that I've looked over at her in other |
| ll | points of the trial and she didn't appear to be sleeping so |
| L2 | MR. BUNIN: All right. |
| 13 | MR. ERICSSON: Your Honor, can we address scheduling |
| 14 | for next week, because we've got a couple of experts that |
| 15 | we're trying to juggle there? |
| 16 | THE COURT: We're not doing the penalty phase next |
| ١7 | week. |
| 18 | MR. ERICSSON: Oh, we're not. Okay. |
| 19 | MR. BUNIN: The Wednesday after Memorial Day is when |
| 20 | we would start? |
| 21 | THE COURT: Right, because we'll only have one day |
| 22 | to start it and we're not going to |
| 23 | MR. DiGIACOMO: Judge, Mr. Pesci may be doing that |
| 24 | by himself. I've been pulled. |
| 25 | THE COURT: Really? By who? |
| | |

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| 1 | MR. DiGIACOMO: Ms. Weckerly. I start a trial with |
|----|--|
| 2 | her and she's my boss so |
| 3 | THE COURT: It's not going to get moved? |
| 4 | MR. DiGIACOMO: I said she can pick the jury and |
| 5 | I can come here and do my penalty, and I won't tell you |
| 6 | exactly what she said, but I don't think that's happening. |
| 7 | MR. PESCI: What date is that, by the way? |
| 8 | MR. DiGIACOMO: That's the 2nd, June 2nd. |
| 9 | MR. PESCI: That's a problem because I've got a |
| 10 | trial starting on the 1st. |
| 11 | MR. DiGIACOMO: We'll work it out. Where there's a |
| 12 | will, there's a way. |
| 13 | MR. PESCI: We'll get it figured out. |
| 14 | THE COURT: All right. Anything else we need to put |
| 15 | on the record? |
| 16 | MR. ERICSSON: So 10:30 on Monday? |
| 17 | MR. DiGIACOMO: In about five more minutes we should |
| 18 | have these instructions to Penny. |
| 19 | (Court recessed at 4:33 p.m. until the following |
| 20 | day, Monday, May 24, 2010, at 10:30 a.m.) |
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ATTEST: I hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.

CIMBERLY LAWSON

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

ORIGINAL
DISTRICT COURT
ARK COUNTY, METERS

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,) CASE NO: C212667) DEPT NO: XXI

vs.

DEANGELO RESHAWN CARROLL) Transcript of) Proceedings

Defendant.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE VALERIE P. ADAIR, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

JURY TRIAL - DAY 6

MONDAY, MAY, 24, 2010

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE STATE:

MARC DIGIACOMO, ESQ.

Chief Deputy District Attorney

GIANCARLO PESCI, ESQ.

Chief Deputy District Attorney

FOR THE DEFENDANT: DANIEL M. BUNIN, ESQ.

THOMAS A. ERICSSON, ESQ

RECORDED BY JANIE OLSEN, COURT RECORDER TRANSCRIBED BY: KARReporting and Transcription Services

| 1 | LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, MONDAY, MAY 24, 2010, 10:35 A.M. |
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| 2 | (Court was called to order.) |
| 3 | (Outside the presence of the jury.) |
| 4 | MR. BUNIN: Before we bring them in, there's one |
| 5 | thing I'll need to do, okay? |
| 6 | THE COURT: It's what? |
| 7 | MR. BUNIN: Just letting you know before we bring |
| 8 | them in, there's one thing I want to do on the record. |
| 9 | THE COURT: Okay. Can we start I mean, it's |
| 10 | 10:30. |
| 11 | MR. BUNIN: I'm sorry. |
| 12 | THE COURT: It's not your fault. |
| 13 | THE MARSHAL: Are we ready to begin? |
| 14 | THE COURT: No, I need the people all here. It's |
| 15 | after 10:30, so I need the defendant out here in his chair and |
| 16 | I need Mr. Ericsson out here. |
| 17 | And before I bring the jurors in, Mr. Bunin, you |
| 18 | indicated there was something we need to put on the record. |
| 19 | MR. BUNIN: Yes. You know, I'm actually |
| 20 | concerned |
| 21 | THE CLERK: You need to wait for a second because |
| 22 | I'm doing something for the Judge, and I can't write |
| 23 | THE COURT: All right, yes. |
| 24 | MR. BUNIN: I want to make sure my instructions are |
| 25 | right, but I think there's two of them that we left in here |
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1 that absolutely didn't apply to this case, and I want to make 2 sure that I'm on the same page as everybody. 3 Is Instruction 38 the flight instruction? 4 MR. DIGIACOMO: Yes. 5 There's no evidence of flight in this MR. BUNIN: 6 I don't know why the instruction would be in there. 7 didn't run from the police. The only evidence they put on is 8 that the first time they saw him, Deangelo voluntarily spoke 9 to them, so I don't know why this instruction would be in 10 here. And I'm sorry I didn't notice it on Friday. 11 THE COURT: What's the relevance of flight? 12 MR. DIGIACOMO: The flight instruction actually says 13 if somebody flees after committing a crime, which his defense 14 is, I didn't want this to happen, he takes this guy, he flees 15 from the scene with this guy, and he takes him to go get paid. 16 They didn't object to it. It's clearly evidence of flight. 17 mean, he doesn't remain at the scene like, oh, my, God, my 18 friend's dead, so it's clearly an indication of his 19 consciousness of guilt. 20 Taking him to go get paid is not MR. BUNIN: 21 evidence of flight. 22 Well, I think -- I mean --THE COURT: 23 There's no --MR. BUNIN: 24 THE COURT: Typically, I think, flight, you know, if 25 they're apprehended by the police or they leave town or they

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quit their job and go into hiding, but technically, I mean, I guess, Mr. DiGiacomo, has a point. He could argue that if this really was a mistake or some kind of horrible accident, then he could have stayed, he could have called 9-1-1 and said, oh, my God, my friend just got shot. So to the extent they want to make that their theory, I mean, it does, I think, fit.

MR. BUNIN: But, you know, the evidence they put on says that KC shoots, starts yelling, gets in the car, threatening people, telling them, Get me out of this area, and then Deangelo drives off at that point. That's the evidence they put on with their witnesses.

THE COURT: Well, except --

MR. BUNIN: There's literally no evidence of flight. Nobody runs from the police. And their witness said that he voluntarily speaks to the detective the first time they see him when he goes to the club the very next day. You know, the flight instruction is obviously a prejudicial instruction and it belongs in other cases, but there's just no facts in this case to even imply that he ran from anyone.

THE COURT: Well, and if that's the case, in the jury's mind, then they'll disregard it. I mean, we tell them right now, just because we're giving you an instruction doesn't mean that, you know, we're accepting any theory.

Like I said, I mean, I think technically that he --

| 1 | I mean, the defense is, of course, he was being threatened by |
|----|---|
| 2 | KC, of course he's not going to stay and call 9-1-1 or try to |
| 3 | render assistance because it's obvious, you know, the victim |
| 4 | has already passed away at that point in time. But that's all |
| 5 | defense argument. So I think that there's enough to give a |
| 6 | flight instruction, again, you know |
| 7 | MR. BUNIN: The second one is Instruction 44, and |
| 8 | it's the fact that a witness has been convicted of a felony |
| 9 | instruction. I don't know why it would belong in this trial. |
| 10 | I don't want them to imply in some way or another even though |
| 11 | Deangelo didn't testify that that's who they're talking about |
| 12 | when they showed his tape for two and a half hours and |
| 13 | THE COURT: Who was |
| 14 | MR. DIGIACOMO: I apologize, Judge. I put that in |
| 15 | there with the belief that they were calling certain |
| 16 | witnesses |
| 17 | THE COURT: Okay. Let's take that one out. |
| 18 | MR. DIGIACOMO: and I never did take it out. |
| 19 | THE COURT: All right. So 45 becomes 44. |
| 20 | All right. Mr. Bunin, anything else we need to |
| 21 | MR. BUNIN: No, Your Honor. |
| 22 | MR. DIGIACOMO: Judge, do we formally settle the |
| 23 | instructions on the record? |
| 24 | THE COURT: I believe we did. |
| 25 | MR. DIGIACOMO: Okay. I just didn't recall on |
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Friday.

THE COURT: All right. And for the record -- yeah, we did everything else on the record.

And, Mr. Bunin, those are the only two in the packet that you objected to other ones that you wanted modified or slightly rewritten that the Court either adopted some of your suggestions or rejected your suggestions. In either event, the ones that you had proposed, the alternate instructions, have been made Court's exhibits and are a part of the record.

So for the record, again, everything else other than the one regarding flight, you're not objecting to any of those other than what's already on the record?

MR. BUNIN: That's correct.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else we need to do before we get the jury? All right. Would you just let Jeff know to bring them in?

(Jury reconvened at 10:41 a.m.)

THE COURT: All right. Court is now back in session. The record will reflect the presence of the State through the deputy district attorneys, the presence of the defendant, along with his counsel, the officers of the Court and the members of jury.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. As I told you before we took our weekend recess, the presentation of the evidence has been concluded. In a moment I'm going to read to

you the instructions on the law, which will be followed by the closing arguments from the lawyers. Because the State has the burden of proof in this particular case, as in all criminal cases, of course, they have the opportunity to both open and close the closing arguments.

It is important that I read these instructions exactly as they are written. I am precluded from trying to explain them or clarify them in my own words, so I will read them exactly as they're written. I cannot supplement them by trying to offer any kind of elucidation as to what they mean.

Additionally, you will have a number of copes of these written instructions back in the jury deliberation room with you when you deliberate, so should you wish to refer to the instructions, you will have an opportunity to do that during your deliberations.

Additionally, each instruction is numbered.

Sometimes I see jurors trying to write down the instructions.

It's obviously easier if you just write down the number for those instructions that you want to make particular note of or remind yourself to refer back to in the jury deliberation room.

All right. Instruction No. 1, Members of the jury, it is now my duty as judge to instruct you in the law that applies to this case. It is your duty as jurors to follow these instructions and to apply the rules of law to the facts

as you find them from the evidence.

You must not be concerned with the wisdom of any rule of law stated in these instructions. Regardless of any opinion you may have as to what the law ought to be, it would be a violation of your oath to base a verdict upon any other view of the law than that given in the instructions of the Court.

No. 2, If, in these instructions, any rule, direction or idea is repeated or stated in different ways, no emphasis thereon is intended by me and none may be inferred by you. For that reason, you are not to single out any certain sentence or any individual point or instruction and ignore the others, but you are to consider all the instructions as a whole and regard each in the light of all the others.

The order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative importance.

No. 3, An Information is but a formal method of accusing a person of a crime and is not of itself any evidence of his guilt and does not create any presumption or permit any inference of guilt.

In this case, it is charged in an Information that on or about the 19th day of May, 2005, the defendant, Deangelo Reshawn Carroll, having committed the crimes of conspiracy to commit murder, felony, NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193, 165; murder with use of a deadly weapon, felony, NRS 200.010, 200.030,

193.165; within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, contrary to the form, force and effect of statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Nevada.

Count 1, conspiracy to commit murder. Defendant,
Deangelo Reshawn Carroll, along with coconspirators Kenneth
Jay Counts, Anabel Espindola, Luis Alonso Hidalgo, III, and
Jayson Taoipu did, on or about May 19, 2005, then and there
meet with each other and/or Luis Hidalgo, Jr. and between
themselves and each of them with the other wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously conspire and agree to commit a
crime, to-wit: The murder of Timothy Jay Hadland, and in
furtherance of said conspiracy, the defendants and/or their
coconspirators did commit the act as set forth in Count 2,
said acts being incorporated by this reference as though fully
set forth herein.

Count 2, murder with use of a deadly weapon.

Defendant, Deangelo Reshawn Carroll, along with coconspirators Kenneth Jay Counts, Anabel Espindola, Luis Alonso Hidalgo,

III, and Jayson Taoipu did, on or about May 19, 2005, then and there wilfully, feloniously, without authority of law, and with premeditation and deliberation, and with malice aforethought, kill Timothy Jay Hadland, a human being, by shooting at and into the body and/or head of said Timothy Jay Hadland, with a deadly weapon, to-wit: A firearm, the

| detendant being flable under one of more of the following |
|--|
| theories of criminal liability, to-wit: One, by directly or |
| indirectly committing the acts with premeditation and |
| deliberation and/or lying in wait; and/or two, by aiding and |
| abetting the commission of the crime by, directly or |
| indirectly, counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, |
| inducing or otherwise procuring each other to commit the |
| crime, to-wit: By defendant Luis Hidalgo, III and/or Luis |
| Hidalgo, Jr. procuring defendant Deangelo Carroll to beat |
| and/or kill Timothy Jay Hadland; thereafter, defendant |
| Deangelo Carroll procuring Kenneth Counts and/or Jayson Taoipu |
| to shoot Timothy Hadland; thereafter, Deangelo Carroll and |
| Kenneth Counts and Jayson Taoipu did drive to location in the |
| same vehicle; thereafter, defendant Deangelo Carroll calling |
| victim Timothy Jay Hadland to the scene; thereafter, by |
| Kenneth Counts shooting Timothy Jay Hadland; and/or three, by |
| conspiring to commit the crime of battery and/or battery with |
| use of a deadly weapon and/or to kill Timothy Jay Hadland |
| whereby each and every coconspirator is responsible for not |
| only the specific crime intended but also for the natural and |
| foreseeable general intent crimes of each and every |
| coconspirator during the course and in furtherance of the |
| conspiracy. |

It is the duty of the jury to apply the rules of law contained in these instructions to the facts of the case and

determine whether or not the defendant is guilty of one or more of the offenses charged.

No. 4, in this case the defendant is accused in an Information alleging an open charge of murder. This charge includes and encompasses murder of the first degree, murder of the second degree and involuntary manslaughter.

No. 5, murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, either expressed or implied. The unlawful killing may be effected by any of the various means by which death may be occasioned.

No. 6, malice aforethought means the intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal cause or excuse or what the law considers adequate provocation. The condition of mind described as malice aforethought may arise from anger, hatred, revenge or from a particular ill will, spite or grudge toward the person killed. It may also arise from any unjustifiable or unlawful motive or purpose to injure another, proceeding from a heart fatally bent on mischief or with deckless — excuse me, reckless disregard of consequences and social duty.

Malice aforethought does not imply deliberation or the lapse of any considerable time between the malicious intention to injure another and the actual execution of the intent but denotes an unlawful purpose and design as opposed to accident and mischance.

No. 7, express malice is that deliberate intention

unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof.

Malice may be implied when no considerable provocation appears or when all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.

No. 8, murder of the first degree is murder which is perpetuate -- perpetrated, excuse me, by means of any kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing. All three elements, wilfulness, deliberation and premeditation, must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before an accused can be convicted of first-degree murder.

Wilfulness is the intent to kill. There need be no appreciable space of time between formation of the intent to kill and the act of killing.

Deliberation is the process of determining upon a course of action to kill as a result of thought, including weighing the reasons for and against the action and considering the consequences of the action.

A deliberate determination may be arrived at in a short period of time but in all cases the determination must not be formed in passion, or if formed in passion, it must be carried out after the there has been time for the passion to subside and deliberation to occurred. A mere unconsidered and rash impulse is not deliberate even though it includes the intent to kill.

Premeditation is a design, a determination to kill distinctly formed in the mind by the time of the killing.

Premeditation need not be for a day, an hour or even a minute. It may be as instantaneous as successive thoughts of the mind. For if the jury believes from the evidence that the act constituting the killing has been preceded by and has been the result of premeditation, no matter how rapidly the act follows the premeditation, it is premeditated.

No. 9, the law does not undertake to measure in units of time the length of the period during which the thought must be pondered before it can ripen into an intent to kill which is truly deliberate and premeditated. The time will vary with different individuals and under varying circumstances.

The true test is not duration of time but rather the extent of the reflection. A cold, calculated judgment and decision may be arrived at in a short period of time, but a mere unconsidered and rash impulse, even though it includes an intent to kill, is not deliberation and premeditation as will fix an unlawful killing as murder of the first degree.

No. 10, murder which is immediately preceded by lying in wait is murder of the first degree.

The term, lying in the wait, is defined as a waiting and watching for an opportune time to act, together with a concealment by ambush or some other secret design to take the

other person by surprise. The lying in wait need not continue for any particular period of time provided that its duration is such as to show a state of mind equivalent to premeditation or deliberation.

To constitute murder by means of lying in wait there must be, in addition to the aforesaid conduct by the defendant, an intentional infliction upon the person killed of bodily harm involving a high degree of probability that it will result in death and which shows a wonton disregard for human life.

No. 11, although your verdict must be unanimous as to the charge, you do not have to agree on the principle of guilt or theory of liability. Therefore, even if you cannot agree on whether the facts establish wilful, premeditated and deliberate murder or lying in wait or liability as a principle, an aider and abettor, or as a coconspirator, so long as all of you agree that the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt defendant's guilt of murder in the first degree, your verdict shall be murder of the first degree.

No. 12, all murder which is not murder of the first degree is murder of the second degree. Murder of the second degree is: One, murder with malice aforethought, but without the added mixture of premeditation and deliberation; or, two, an involuntary killing which occurs in the commission of an unlawful act which, in its consequences, naturally tends to

destroy the life of human being; or, three, an involuntary killing which is committed in the prosecution of a felonious intent.

No. 13, involuntary manslaughter is the killing of a human being without any intent to do so in the commission of an unlawful act or a lawful act which probably might produce such a consequences — consequence in an unlawful manner but where the involuntary killing occurs in the commission of an unlawful act which, in its consequences, naturally tends to destroy the life of a human being or is committed in the prosecution of a felonious intent, the offense is murder.

By definition, involuntary manslaughter does not include the use of a deadly weapon in conscious furtherance of a crime.

Battery resulting in substantial bodily harm and battery with use of a deadly weapon are felonies. A battery is a misdemeanor.

No. 14, a conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons for an unlawful purpose. To be guilty of conspiracy, a defendant must intend to commit or to aid in the commission of the specific crime agreed to. The crime is the agreement to do something unlawful. It does not matter whether it was successful or not.

A person who knowingly does any act to further the object of conspiracy or otherwise participates therein is

criminally liable as a conspirator. However, mere knowledge or approval of or acquiescence in the object and purpose of a conspiracy without an agreement to cooperate in achieving such object or purpose does not make one a party to conspiracy.

Conspiracy is seldom susceptible of direct proof and is usually established by inference from the conduct of the parties. In particular, a conspiracy may be supported by a coordinated series of acts in furtherance of the underlying offense sufficient to infer the existence of an agreement.

A conspiracy begins when two or more persons enter into agreement for an awful purpose. A conspiracy to commit a crime does not end upon the completion of the crime. The conspiracy continues until the coconspirators have successfully gotten away and concealed the crime.

No. 15, once a person joins a conspiracy, that person remains a member until he withdraws from it. A person can withdraw from a conspiracy by taking some positive action which disavowed or defeated the purpose of the conspiracy before the object or purpose was completed. It is not enough if the evidence shows that the defendant merely ceased his own activities in furtherance of the conspiracy.

The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not withdraw from the conspiracy.

No. 16, it is not necessary in proving a conspiracy

to show a meeting of the alleged conspirators in the making of an express or formal agreement. The formation and existence of a conspiracy may be inferred from all the circumstances tending to show the common intent and may be proved in the same way as any other fact may be proved, either by direct testimony of the fact or by circumstantial evidence or by both direct and circumstantial evidence.

No. 17, each member of a criminal conspiracy is liable for each act and bound by each declaration of every other member of the conspiracy if the act or the declaration is in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy.

The act of one conspirator pursuant to or in furtherance of the common design of the conspiracy is the act of all conspirators. Every conspirator is legally responsible for a specific intent crime of a coconspirator so long as the specific intent crime was intended by the defendant. A conspirator is also legally responsible for a general intent crime that follows as one of the probable and natural consequence of the object of the conspiracy even if it was not intended as part of the original plan and even if he was not present at the time of the commission of such act.

Specific intent is the intent to accomplish the precise act which the law prohibits. A general intent crime is one that does not require specific intent.

No. 18, murder in the first degree is a specific

intent crime. Defendant cannot be liable under conspiracy and/or aiding and abetting theory for first-degree murder for acts committed by a coconspirator unless defendant also had had a premeditated and deliberate specific intent to kill or to lie in wait.

Murder in the second degree may be a general intent crime. As such, defendant may be liable under conspiracy theory or aiding and abetting for murder of the second degree for acts committed by a coconspirator if the killing is one of the reasonably foreseeable, probable and natural consequences of the object of the conspiracy or the aiding and abetting.

No. 19, where two or more persons are accused of committing a crime together, their guilt may be established without proof that each person did every act constituting the offense charged.

All persons concerned in the commission of a crime who either directly and actively commit the act constituting the offense or who knowingly and with criminal intent aid and abet in its commission or, whether present or not, who advise and encourage its commission with the intent that the crime be committed are regarded by the law as principals in the crime thus committed and are equally guilty thereof.

A person aids and abets the commission of a crime if he knowingly and with criminal intent aids, promotes, encourages or instigates by act or advice or by act and advice

the commission of such crime with the intention that the crime be committed.

The State is not required to prove precisely which defendant actually committed the crime and which defendant aided and abetted.

No. 20, where several parties join together in a common design to commit any lawful act, each is criminally responsible for the reasonably foreseeable general intent crimes committed in furtherance of the common design. In contemplation of law as it relates to general intent crimes, the act of one is the act of all. Battery, battery resulting in substantial bodily harm and battery with a deadly weapon are general intent crimes. Second-degree murder can be a general intent crime.

Additionally, a coconspirator is guilty of the offenses he specifically intended to be committed. First-degree murder is a specific intent crime.

No. 21, you're instructed that if you find that the State has established that the defendant has committed conspiracy to commit murder, you shall select conspiracy to commit murder as your verdict. You may find the defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit a battery with a deadly weapon and/or battery resulting in substantial bodily harm, if: One, you have not found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of conspiracy to commit murder; and, two,

all 12 of you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant is guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit a battery with a deadly weapon and/or battery resulting in substantial bodily harm.

If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of conspiracy has been committed by the defendant but you have a reasonable doubt whether such conspiracy was to commit murder or battery with a deadly weapon or battery resulting in substantial bodily harm, you must give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict of conspiracy to commit a battery with a deadly weapon and/or battery resulting in substantial bodily harm.

No. 22, you are instructed that if you find that the State has established that the defendant has committed conspiracy to commit battery with a deadly weapon and/or battery resulting in substantial bodily harm, you shall select conspiracy to commit battery with a deadly weapon and/or battery resulting in substantial bodily harm as your verdict.

You may find the defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit a battery if: One, you have not found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of conspiracy to commit battery with deadly weapon and/or battery resulting in substantial bodily harm; and, two, all 12 of you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit a battery.

If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of conspiracy has been committed by the defendant but you have a reasonable doubt whether such conspiracy was to commit battery with a deadly weapon or battery resulting in substantial bodily harm or battery, you must give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict of conspiracy to commit a battery.

No. 23, battery means any wilful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another.

A battery which occurs with a deadly weapon is a felony.

A battery which results in a substantial bodily harm is a felony.

Substantial bodily harm means: One, bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ; or, two, prolonged physical pain.

A battery which occurs without a deadly weapon or does not result in substantial bodily harm is a misdemeanor.

No. 24, mere presence at the scene of a crime and knowledge that a crime is being committed are not sufficient to establish that the defendant aided and abetted the crime, unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is a participant and not merely a knowing spectator. However,

the presence of one at the commission of a crime of another is evidence which can be considered in determining whether or not he is guilty of aiding or abetting, as well as the defendant's presence, companionship and conduct before, during and after the participation in the criminal act.

No. 25, you are instructed that if you find that the State has established that the defendant has committed first-degree murder, you shall select first-degree murder as your verdict. The crime of first-degree murder includes the crime of second-degree murder. You may find the defendant guilty of second-degree murder if: One, you have not found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of murder of the first degree; and, two, all 12 of you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant is guilty of the crime of second-degree murder.

If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of murder has been committed by the defendant but you have a reasonable doubt whether such murder was of the first or of the second degree, you must give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict of murder of the second degree.

No. 26, you are instructed that if you find that the State has established that the defendant has committed murder, you shall select the degree -- I think this should be second-degree murder as your verdict. The crime of murder --

oh, I'm sorry. The degree of murder as your verdict. The crime of murder includes the crime of involuntary manslaughter. You may find the defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter murder if: One, you have not found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of murder; and, two, all 12 of you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant is guilty of the crime of involuntary manslaughter.

If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime has been committed by the defendant but you have a reasonable doubt whether such crime was murder or involuntary manslaughter, you must give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict of involuntary manslaughter.

No. 27, you are instructed that if you find a defendant guilty of murder of the first degree or murder of the second degree, you must also determine whether or not a deadly weapon was used in the commission of this crime.

No. 28, deadly weapon means any instrument which, if used in the ordinary manner contemplated by its design and construction will or is likely to cause substantial bodily harm or death, or any weapon, device, instrument, material or substance which, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used or threatened to be used is readily capable of causing substantial bodily harm or death.

You are instructed that a firearm is a deadly

weapon.

No. 29, if more than one person commits a crime and one of them uses a deadly weapon in the commission of that crime, each may be convicted of using the deadly weapon even though he did not personally himself use the weapon.

An unarmed offender uses a deadly weapon when the unarmed offender is liable for the offense, another person — liable to the offenses armed with and uses a deadly weapon in the commission of the offense and the unarmed offender had knowledge of the use of the deadly weapon.

No. 30, to constitute the crime charged, there must exist a union or joint operation of an act forbidden by law and an intent to do the act.

The intent with which an act is done is shown by the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.

Do not confuse intent with motive. Motive is what prompts a person to act. Intent refers only to the state of mind with which the act is done.

Motive is not an element of the crime charged and the State is not required to prove a motive on the part of the defendant in order to convict. However, you may consider evidence of motive or lack of motive as a circumstance in the case.

No. 31, the defendant is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This presumption places upon the State

the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every material element of the crime charged and that the defendant is the person who committed the offense.

No. 32, a reasonable doubt is one based on reason. It is not mere possible doubt but is such a doubt as would govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs of life. If the minds of the jurors, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, are in such a condition that they can say that they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, there is not a reasonable doubt. Doubt to be reasonable must be actual, not mere possibility or speculation.

If you have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty.

No. 33, it is the constitutional right of a defendant in a criminal trial that he may not be compelled to testify. Thus, the decision as to whether or not — as to whether he should testify is left to the defendant on the advice and counsel of his attorney. You must not draw any inference of guilt from the fact that he does not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your deliberations in any way.

No. 34, you are here to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant from the evidence in the case. You are not called upon to return a verdict as to the guilt or

innocence of any other person. So if the evidence in the case convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, you should so find, even though you may believe one or more persons are also guilty.

No. 35, in arriving at a verdict in this case as to whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty, the subject of penalty or punishment is not to be discussed or considered by you and should in no way influence your verdict. If your verdict is murder in the first degree, you will, at a later hearing, determine the issue of punishment.

No. 36, the evidence which you are to consider in this case consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits and any facts admitted or agreed to by counsel.

There are two types of evidence: Direct and circumstantial. Direct evidence is the testimony of a person who claims to have personal knowledge of the commission of the crime which has been charged, such as an eyewitness. Circumstantial evidence is the proof of a chain of facts and circumstances which tend to show the defendant is guilty or not guilty. The law makes no distinction between the weight to be given either direct or circumstantial evidence; therefore, all of the evidence in the case, including the circumstantial evidence, should be considered by you in arriving at your verdict.

Statements, arguments and opinions of counsel are

not evidence in the case; however, if the attorneys stipulate to the existence of a fact, you must accept the stipulation as evidence and regard that fact as proved.

You must not speculate to be true any insinuations suggested by a question asked a witness. A question is not evidence and may be considered only as it supplies meaning to the answer.

You must disregard any evidence to which an objection was sustained by the Court and any evidence ordered stricken by the Court.

Anything you may have seen or heard outside the court is not evidence and must also be disregarded.

No. 37, whenever there is slight evidence that a conspiracy existed and that the defendant was one of the members of the conspiracy, then the statements and acts by any person likewise a member may be considered by the jury as evidence in the case as to the defendant found to have been a member, even though the statements and acts may have occurred in the absence and without the knowledge of the defendant, provided such statements and acts were knowingly made and done during the continuance of such conspiracy and in furtherance of some object or purpose of the conspiracy.

This holds true even if the statement was made by the coconspirator prior to the time the defendant entered or withdrew from the conspiracy, so long as the coconspirator was

a member of the conspiracy at the time.

An adoptive admission is a statement in which a listener has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth.

No. 38, the flight of a person immediately after the commission of a crime or after he is accused of a crime is not sufficient in itself to establish his guilt but is a fact which, if proved, may be considered by you in light of all other proved facts in deciding the question of his guilt or innocence. Whether or not evidence of flight shows the consciousness of guilt and the significance to be attached to such a circumstance are matters for your deliberations.

No. 39, the conviction shall not be had on the testimony of an accomplice unless he is corroborated by other evidence which in itself and without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, and the corroboration shall not be sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.

An accomplice is hereby defined as one who is liable for prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given.

To be an accomplice, the person must have aided, promoted, encouraged or instigated by act or advice the commission of such offense with knowledge of the unlawful

purpose of the person who committed the offense.

No. 40, to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice, there must be evidence of some act or fact related to the offense which, if believed by itself and without any aid, interpretation or direction from the testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense charged.

However, it is not necessary that the evidence of the corroboration be sufficient in itself to establish every element of the offense charged or that it corroborate every fact to which the accomplice testifies.

In determining whether an accomplice has been corroborated, you must first assume the testimony of the accomplice has been removed from the case. You must then determine whether there is any remaining evidence which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.

If there is not such independent evidence which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, the testimony of the accomplice is not corroborated.

No. 41, the determination of whether someone is an accomplice is left to the jury to decide, unless the witness' own statement leaves no doubt that he is subject to prosecution for the charged crime.

No. 42, the accomplice corroboration rule is a separate and distinct legal requirement for the statements of

a coconspirator made in the course of and in furtherance of a conspiracy. When an accomplice testifies, their testimony must be corroborated. The other evidence in the case, including coconspirator statements in the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy, may be evidence utilized to establish the corroboration.

No. 43, the credibility or believability of a witness should be determined by his manner upon the stand, his relationship to the parties, his fears, motives, interests or feelings, his opportunity to have observed the matter to which he testified, the reasonableness of his statements and the strength or weakness of his recollections.

If you believe that a witness has lied about any material facts in the case, you may disregard the entire testimony of that witness or any portion of his testimony which is not proved by other evidence.

No. 44, a witness who has special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education in a particular science, profession or occupation is an expert witness. An expert witness may give his opinion as to any matter in which he is skilled.

You should consider such expert opinion and weigh the reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound, however, by such an opinion. Give it the weight to which you deem it entitled, whether that be great or slight, and you may

reject it if, in your judgment, the reasons given for it are unsound.

No. 45, although you are to consider only the evidence in the case in reaching a verdict, you must bring to the consideration of the evidence your everyday common sense and judgment as reasonable men and women. Thus, you are not limited solely to what you see and hear as the witnesses testify. You may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence which you feel are justified in the light of common experience, keeping in mind that such inferences should not be based on speculation or guess.

A verdict may never be influenced by sympathy, prejudice or public opinion. Your decision should be the product of sincere judgment and sound discretion in accordance with these rules of law.

No. 46, when you retire to consider your verdict, you must select one of your number to act as foreperson who will preside over your deliberation and will be your spokesperson here in court.

During your deliberation, you will have all the exhibits which were admitted into evidence, these written instructions and forms of verdict which have been prepared for your convenience.

Your verdict must be unanimous. As soon as you have agreed upon a verdict, have it signed and dated by your

foreperson and then return with it to this room. 1 2 No. 47, now you will listen to the arguments of counsel who will endeavor to aid you to reach a proper verdict 3 4 by refreshing in your minds the evidence and by showing the 5 application thereof to the law, but whatever counsel may say, 6 you will bear in mind that it is your duty to be governed in 7 your deliberation by the evidence as you understand it and 8 remember it to be and by the law as given you -- given to you 9 in these instructions for the sole, fixed and steadfast 10 purpose of doing equal and exact justice between the defendant 11 and the State of Nevada. 12 Ladies and gentlemen, that concludes the 13 instructions on the law. 14 Is the State ready to proceed? 15 MR. PESCI: Yes, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: All right. 17 MR. PESCI: Thank you. 18 STATE'S CLOSING ARGUMENT 19 MR. PESCI: Ladies and gentlemen, this was a hit. 20 And this was a hit not because I'm telling you that. You know 21 this was a hit because that's what the evidence told you, and 22 most of all: 23 (Audio played)

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MR. PESCI:

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you so. You have the evidence directly from the defendant's

You knew it was a hit because he told

mouth that this was, in fact, a hit. Make no mistake about it, there was talk about a beating, and we're going to get into that, but at the end of the day, it was a hit.

And keep this in mind: When you're thinking about whether it was a beating or a hit, if it truly was just a beating, a simple battery, the kind of beating where you're sending a message, how come it wasn't at the campsite? How come it was at a location where he was all alone? If it was just a beating where no one is really going to get hurt to the degree where it's lying in wait and murder, it could have happened with Paijit there.

Remember the two plans. Keep that in your mind, in the back of your head, because the location of where this happened was chosen by him, the defendant.

(Audio played)

MR. PESCI: At first he wanted us to beat him up.

Then he said he wanted TJ knocked off. That's the definition of taken care of, ladies and gentlemen, the hit that we just talked about and the defendant told you a minute ago. This isn't a simple battery. This isn't a beating. This is a killing.

(Audio played)

MR. PESCI: Do whatever it takes that's necessary to take him out, out at North Shore Road, not at the campsite.

If it's a battery, a simple battery, it's at the campsite

because, remember, if he's alone, do him; if he's with somebody, beat him.

Hurt bad, keep that in mind when we go into discussion about lying in wait. Do whatever it takes that's necessary.

Now, murder. Murder's the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. That's the definition of murder. Her Honor has gone through all these instructions. You'll have a packet with you, so when you go back in there you'll be able to look all these up.

Clearly there's been a killing and it's unlawful.

It's a human being. Even though TJ was left like road kill on the street, he was, in fact, a human being.

You saw the evidence, the way they came up on his body, and he was found there by Ismael Madrid and then when Officer Lafreniere got there and handed it over to the homicide detectives and the investigation went forward. Two shots to the head, a double tap to the head, a hit. It's the intentional doing of a wrongful act. That's what malice — a minute ago we just talked about an unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.

What is malice? It's the intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal cause, meaning some justification or excuse for what the law considers provocation. There's no excuse for this killing. This wasn't self-defense. He didn't

even see it coming. Now, don't confuse malice with what we're going to talk about a little bit later on. It does not imply deliberation or a lapse of any considerable time between a malicious intent to injure another in the actual execution of the intent. It denotes an lawful purpose. It's not the premeditation. We'll get to that.

Now, there are degrees of murder. There's first-degree murder, and first-degree murder, in order for it to exist, there's three things that have to be there. It's like making a cake. If you don't have the eggs, if you don't have the flour, if you don't have those necessary elements, you can't make a cake. For murder of the first degree, you have to have wilful, deliberate and a premeditated act.

So let's go through each one of those. What is wilful? What is the definition? It's the intent to kill.

Can it be clearer than, I want him taken out, I want a hit, and then the actual utilization of a firearm, the two shots to the head? That's clearly an intent to kill.

And there need be no appreciable space of time between the formation of the intent to kill and the act, but there's plenty of time in this case because the conversation and the formation of this intent happens back at the Palomino and it takes literally hours for this to be carried out because the defendant has to lure the defendant away from witnesses to an isolated location. There's lots of time.

And what is the second element? Deliberation. It's the process of determining upon a course of action to kill.

There is a course of action. Mr. H gives the order. Deangelo procures, obtains, goes and gets the shooter, and then

Deangelo lures the victim to the isolated location, delivers the shooter there, and then distracts the victim, his friend, so that Kenneth Counts can creep outside and shoot him.

That's a process of determining upon a course of action to kill.

And lastly, premeditation. It's a design with a determination to kill. There's clearly a determination, take him out. Take care of him. Now, premeditation may not be for a day, an hour or even a minute. It may be as instantaneous as successive thoughts of the mind. That's how fast premeditation can occur. And we've just discussed about how there's way more time of successive thoughts of the mind. There's all kinds of premeditation.

An order was given. The shooter was selected by Deangelo Carroll. The trap was set by Deangelo Carroll and the plan was executed. There's the wilful, deliberate, premeditated murder, ladies and gentlemen. That's first-degree murder.

But there's another way for you to determine that this is first-degree murder. Now, you've all come from wherever you live in the valley to this courthouse every day.

Maybe some of you took I15, maybe some of you took 95, surface streets, who knows. But you all got here every day for trial. This is the same thing with first-degree murder. Some of you can think it's wilful, deliberate and premeditated and come to the conclusion of first-degree murder, just like driving here in your different ways, or some of you can think that it's lying in wait. It's another theory. It's another way of getting here to the courthouse. It's another way of getting to first-degree murder. And we're going to talk about lying in wait.

It's a terminology that's spelled out here in this instruction. The term lying in wait is defined as a waiting and watching for an opportune time. Away from Paijit, away from witnesses, away from street lights even. To act together with a concealment by ambush or some other secret design to take the other person by surprise.

TJ never knew what was coming. He thought his friend called him out there so they could get together and smoke some weed. Deangelo knew exactly who he had in the car with him. He knew the order that had been given and he executed that order. And by doing so, this is, in fact, lying in wait. How much more secret could it get? Deangelo was the one that places the phone call to TJ to get him away from the campsite and chooses the location to meet.

In addition, for lying in wait, there has to be an

intentional infliction upon the person killed of bodily harm involving a high degree of probability that it will result in death. This is more -- for lying in wait, it has to be more than a simple battery. We've already talked about how we know it's more than a simple battery. We're going to go through that again.

But this is the kind of injury, where it says a degree of probability, a high degree of probability of death, and that shows a disregard, a wanton disregard for human life. Clearly setting this up out in the middle of nowhere, bringing people that actually shot and killed, not the bat and the trash bags, but we'll go through that analysis in a minute. Somebody with a gun shooting a person twice in the head is a high degree of probability that death will occur and clearly it is a wanton disregard for human life.

Well, let's say you think that it's a beating, it's the battery. Well, let's talk about that. What kind of battery is this? Little Lou calls Deangelo, from what Deangelo tells the police, and says, Bring two garbage bags and a baseball bat. A baseball bat, that's not a simple battery. That's not the kind of thing where you're going to smack somebody around and send them a message. What do you need trash bags for if you're going to use a baseball bat?

(Audio played)

MR. PESCI: So even with these two plans, and you've

heard from the recording Anabel talking about plan B, so let's keep in your mind plan A, kill; plan B, beat. All right. If plan B is beat, and if you think that truly Deangelo thought this was only going to be a beating, what kind of a beating was it? He just told you what kind of a beating it was. One in which the owner, the owner's son wanted a baseball bat and trash cans — trash bags utilized. Bring two black bags and a baseball bat.

(Audio played)

MR. PESCI: What kind of a beating are we talking about? He just said, pop a noodle. That's what the baseball bats all about, pop the noodle, his head, crack it open. Even if you think it's plan B, even if you think it's a beating, it's the beating of the degree of which there's a high degree of probability of death and disregard for life. So even in the best case scenario for the defendant that it was just supposed to be a beating, it's still first-degree murder, lying in wait.

(Audio played)

MR. PESCI: Went and got KC and KC did it, did it being the beating or the shooting, whichever way you want to look at it, but it is him being taken out. He understood, he just said, that it was more than just a beating. And then he goes on to say that they got KC, and KC did it, meaning took him out. Not, oh, he went crazy and he did his own thing and

decided to shoot him and I had no idea that was going to happen. He said KC did it.

Again, this is his testimony where he stated, he just said find somebody and get it done. I don't care what you all do, just make sure it's done tonight.

Back to the lying in wait, that other theory, that other way for you to get here to court each day, it's the discussions of garbage bags, baseball bat, knocking him out, hurt real bad, tell the dude to do whatever he felt was necessary to take TJ out. This was way more than a beating.

And, in fact, you know this because Deangelo tells the police about KC. Where's he from? From California. The defendant says okay. The defendant says, he's a bluff from California and, you know, I'm saying, dude -- dude don't play.

This defendant chose the person that doesn't play.

This defendant delivered the person that doesn't play to TJ,

knowing full well that KC doesn't play. He can't rely on this

concept that he never thought this was going to happen because

he himself told the police that KC doesn't play, he doesn't

mess around.

And then he goes on and explains even more about the conversation he had with KC and he says, I told him that my boss would pay him before, that my boss was willing to pay him to go take care of some people because he does stuff like that, and KC was like, as long as the money's right, then

he'll do it.

The defendant telling the police, in essence, he knew in advance what KC was willing and able to do, as long as the money's right.

We talked about the high degree of probability that death will ensue and the wanton disregard for life. They're both there. He's a first-degree murderer from wilful, deliberate and premeditated avenue and also from lying in wait.

So let's look at second-degree murder, because as the Judge explained, first-degree murder -- open murder as first degree and second degree.

Second degree is murder without the add mixture, without the presence of premeditation and deliberation. So if you think this was a killing and there wasn't premeditation, then it's second-degree murder. We've gone through the premeditation. Or it's an involuntary killing which occurs in the commission of an unlawful act which in its consequences naturally tends to destroy the life of a human being. There's nothing involuntary about this killing.

And even if there's some stretch of the imagination that you might think that there was, clearly, clearly, as we talked about lying in wait, lying in wait takes it out of second-degree murder. Lying in wait makes this not possible. If this had just happened, this explanation number two

happened without selecting the location, without taking away from the victim, without knowing who the person who doesn't play who's coming to the location and what was going to be done, it's not second degree. Plan A is to kill; plan B is to beat.

Now, whether you determine first or second-degree murder, you have to also determine that there — if there was a deadly weapon used. There's an instruction, a big long instruction, what is a deadly weapon. Focus at the very end. You're instructed that a firearm is a deadly weapon. There you go. It's a deadly weapon. And you know it's a deadly weapon from the way it killed TJ. Clearly it's a deadly weapon. So whatever your verdict is, deadly weapon is a part of your verdict because it was utilized.

Don't misunderstand or don't think that we have to actually find the deadly weapon. You heard from Mr. Krylo, the firearm's expert, that he looked at some weapons, and you'll remember those were recovered in some of the other searches, that didn't match that particular gun. We don't have to bring to court the actual murder weapon in order for you to determine that a deadly weapon was, in fact, utilized.

Now, you can also be responsible even though you're not the person who pulls the trigger. Deangelo Carroll's a first-degree murderer even though he didn't pull the trigger. And there's a couple of different avenues, a couple of

different ways to get to that conclusion. One is via conspiracy and the other is aiding and abetting. So we'll go through conspiracy and then aiding and abetting.

Now, he's actually charged with a count of conspiracy to commit murder. A conspiracy's an agreement or a mutual understanding between two or more persons to commit a crime. The defendant himself tells you that, that he met with Mr. H, and Mr. H said he wanted him taken care of; that he, Deangelo, was a part of that conspiracy; that he, Deangelo, went and got Kenneth Counts and then drove him out there. That's the conspiracy right there. That's the agreement.

Now, the crime is the agreement to do something unlawful. It does not matter whether he was successful or not. So let's say that Deangelo and Mr. H conspired to kill TJ and then something goes wrong out at the lake. Conspiracy to commit murder has already happened. It doesn't matter that the murder didn't actually occur. The crime of conspiracy is the planning, the discussing of that act. So he's guilty of the conspiracy to commit murder. And in this case, the murder actual occurred, so you don't even have to think about it in that sense.

Now, it's not necessary to show a meeting between the two parties, but in this case you've been told by the defendant that there was a beating, that he had the conversation between him and Mr. H, him and Little Lou, and

you can infer a formation or this conspiracy from evidence, direct and circumstantial, and think about that. In a minute we're going to go into the recordings that happened after the fact. There's circumstantial and direct evidence there that infers the earlier conspiracy.

In fact, you're going to hear it, and you've already heard it, where Little Lou actually asks the question of Deangelo, how much time does a conspiracy run? How could you be asking how much time a conspiracy runs if you're not a part of that conspiracy? Why would you even be worried about it?

Now, for a conspiracy, a person who knowingly does any act to further the object of the conspiracy or otherwise participates therein is criminally liable. So even though he did not pull the trigger, he's responsible, as long as he intends that the murder occur. And clearly he did because he knew who the person was he was bringing there.

And you remember they asked Rontae Zone, well, what did you do after this happened? I mean, did you say something? Did you think, wow, I can't believe this happened? Did you say something to the other people in the car? They were cross-examining him about that. And then when we got back and asked more questions of Rontae, I asked him, did Deangelo say, oh, I can't believe this happened? Did Deangelo turn to KC and say, what are you doing, that wasn't the plan? None of that. Because Deangelo knew what the plan was all

along, to shoot and kill.

Now, a conspiracy doesn't end with the crime, the actual killing, so the drive back to the Palomino, the payment at the Palomino, this is all still a part of the -- trying to hide it and cover it up. The conspiracy continues.

Now, each member of the conspiracy's liable for each act and bound by each declaration of every other member of the conspiracy if the act or the declaration is in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy. So when KC gets out, creeps around and shoots him, that is furthering the conspiracy. Deangelo's responsible with his distract, by keeping his attention so he doesn't see him coming, by calling him out there, by delivering him to that location for that when he intends that that killing occurs. Because within conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. They're responsible for those specific crimes that they intend to occur.

First degree murder is a specific intent crime. He had the specific intent for that murder to occur.

Now, there is also general intent crimes. You've heard a little bit about battery, battery with a deadly weapon, battery resulting in substantial bodily harm. Those are general intent crimes. They're short of the specific intent that there must exist for first-degree murder. So Deangelo's responsible for things that occur for a conspiracy to beat when it's a general intent crime. Those beatings are

general intent crimes. The reasonable foreseeable consequences of what occurs from that beating he's responsible for. So even if you think he only thought it was a beating, he knew what kind of beating it was going to be. He knew who was going to be administering the beating and he knew and was responsible for the foreseeable consequences.

So let's say -- let's say KC got out with a baseball bat and cocked him upside the head two times and TJ ends up dying from that. Deangelo's still responsible under that theory.

Now, what do you have to do to withdraw from a conspiracy? Is there somehow, some way that he withdrew from this? Once a person joins a conspiracy, that person remains a member until he withdraws from it. Now, how do you withdraw from it? A person can withdraw from a conspiracy by taking some positive action which disavows or defeats the person of the conspiracy. Hey, TJ, don't meet me. KC, don't get out, don't shoot him. Call the police, hey, police, I'm going out here, I can't do anything about this, I can't stop this train at this point, but there's going to be this thing that happens out at North Shore, come stop it. None of that. Now, that's under conspiracy.

Then there's aiding and abetting, another means by which he's responsible for the killing, even though he didn't pull the trigger. When two or more persons are accused of

committing a crime, their guilt may be established by proof that each person did every act, because they don't have to do every single act.

Now, he can either directly aid and abet in that crime or he can also be present but he has done things in furtherance of them. He's done things to help move it along, whether present or not, to advise and encourage in his commission with the intent the crime be committed. The same thing with conspiracy, for a specific intent crime, murder, there has to be the intent. Even though he's not the shooter, for him to be responsible, he has to have a specific intent that the murder occurred, which we've already established he does.

Now, what does it really mean to aid and abet? To knowingly and with criminal intent aids, promotes, encourages or instigates an act or advice in the commission of a crime. Call the victim out there. You see, why -- but for Deangelo Carroll, TJ's still alive. Because Mr. H didn't know how to get ahold of him. KC Counts didn't even know he existed. But for Deangelo Carroll making the phone call, TJ's alive. But for Deangelo choosing the isolated location, choosing the shooter who doesn't play and driving the shooter to the location and distracting his friend, this doesn't even happen. Those are all the acts that he did to aid, promote, encourage this murder, and that's how he's responsible for aiding and

abetting.

We talked about a minute ago although your verdict must be unanimous as to the charges, you do not have to agree on the principle of guilt. So some of you can think it's the premeditated, deliberated — wilful or premeditated. Some can think it's lying in wait. As long as you all get to the conclusion that it's first-degree murder, it doesn't matter which of those avenues you choose.

What's the evidence? What is it that you were presented with? He's found out there on the road. The police start to investigate. They find his car. They find a pneumatic tube. They find a cell phone and the Palomino cards. And the cell phone ties to Deangelo. Deangelo, they find out, works at the Palomino. The Palomino cards confirm his connection. They go to the Palomino.

At the Palomino, you have the people who were there, Mr. H, Luis Hidalgo, II, Little Lou, Luis Hidalgo, III, and Anabel Espindola, the owner that kind of manages. So when Deangelo's talking about Little Lou, it's this person here. When he's talking about Mr. H, it's here. And Ms. Anabel's the one down here at the bottom.

Deangelo is the conduit. He is the means by which this all happens. The order comes from the Palomino, goes through Deangelo, and from Deangelo it goes on to these individuals who are with him, Jayson Taoipu, Rontae Zone. He

takes those guys with him to go promote.

Now, remember, you heard that Jayson was supposed to shoot and Deangelo says that KC says, why didn't you shoot, to Jayson. Well, if this was just a beating and not a killing, why would KC be concerned if Jayson didn't shoot? He was concerned because Jayson was supposed to shoot because the plan was to kill. And that's the shooter that this defendant selected and utilized.

Kenneth Counts did, in fact, take care of TJ. And that "taken care of," the translation that you need to know is right on your screen, shot and kill.

What did Rontae say? Rontae says Deangelo Carroll told him that Mr. H wanted TJ taken care of. What did the defendant say in his statements? Deangelo got Kenneth Counts to take care of TJ. The defendant corroborates what Rontae says.

Well, what did Deangelo say in his statement? So he went and got KC, which I know KC from when I lived at my mom's house. So this is the whole conversation about him being knocked out, beat up, knocked off. And he went and got KC to do it.

Now, what do the recordings tell you about this whole plan and what the intent of the plan was?

(Audio played)

MR. PESCI: This is on May 23rd at Simone's

Autoplaza. The three people that are in the room -- that's

Little Lou saying, I told you you should take care of TJ. The

direct order couldn't be clearer. He was supposed to do it

himself, but he went and got KC.

What does Rontae say? Kenneth shot TJ twice in the head. And then Rontae tells you that detective -- I'm sorry, Rontae told the detective that Kenneth Counts used a .357 revolver to kill TJ.

What did Mr. Krylo tell you? That the bullet fragments recovered from TJ's body were indicative of a revolver. He couldn't definitively say that, but he said it's more likely a revolver and that the type of bullet is within this family that a .357 would come from.

What did Deangelo say to police? KC shot TJ twice in the head, corroborates Rontae. What kind of gun did KC use? Well, don't just listen to Rontae. Listen to the defendant. KC had — it was a chrome .357 with a black handle. It was a long extended barrel with pistol grip handle.

You know Rontae's right from what Deangelo says.

You know that there were no casings found out there and you heard that a revolver doesn't expend casings. They both tell you, the defendant and Rontae, that Kenneth was the shooter.

Rontae said that Kenneth Counts was paid for killing
TJ. That was Rontae's testimony. Deangelo says that Mr. H

told Anabel to give Deangelo the money and Deangelo gave it to Kenneth Counts, corroborating what Rontae said.

they go to do a search warrant at his house. He runs across the street and hides in another house up in the ceiling and they have to cut a hole in it to get him to get out, and on the ground are those Palomino cards, a cigar box and cash. And what do you have there? Kenneth Counts was found there with the cards underneath that hole. The Palomino cards had Deangelo's fingerprints and Kenneth Counts' fingerprints. Deangelo Carroll's fingerprints were on Palomino cards inside the second house, the house from which Kenneth ran out of, he left his house and went and ran to. That's where he was hiding. That's where the cards with his fingerprints were.

And those are those Palomino cards, the cash, and, in fact, you saw how the fingerprint expert, Fred Boyd, testified he looked at that photo, that these were the items that he was able to make those identifications on.

Rontae says KC was paid and left the Palomino Club in a taxi. Deangelo told police that KC was paid, left in a taxi, corroborating Rontae. What's even more, you had the gentleman come in, the taxi driver, Gary McWhorter, testified that he picked up an individual fitting Kenneth Counts' description and, you know, if you're concerned that maybe, in fact, it wasn't Kenneth Counts, what did Mr. McWhorter say?

That originally on the trip sheet he wouldn't give an exact location, that he had to have it in order to drive him there and that he ended up writing down two addresses because the address that originally Kenneth Counts gave to Mr. McWhorter was not the address at which he got out.

Plus, Kenneth Counts would try to hide where he was, where he actually lived, because he was dropped off in this area and he went -- you heard testimony from Mr. McWhorter he's dropped off and then walks through the yard, disappearing from his sight. But if you go through that area, this is, in fact, where the execution of the warrant was and the other house was where Kenneth lived.

Rontae said Deangelo slashed the tires to the white Chevy Astro van and dumped them in the trash. That's what Rontae testified to. What did Deangelo say to the police? Deangelo told the police he had changed the tires on the car and dumped them in — by the trash.

What did Detective Wildemann testify? That he found those tires in the trash and they were, in fact, as he described it, sliced. That's corroborating Rontae, corroborating Deangelo, and Deangelo corroborating Rontae.

Rontae said that he and Jay Jay went with Deangelo to Simone's Auto the day after the murder. Deangelo says the same thing, that they went there the day after. Rontae says that after speaking with Mr. H Deangelo talked to Rontae in

1 the bathroom and told Rontae to keep his mouth shut. 2 Curiously found inside Simone's Autoplaza is a note which has 3 written on it, maybe we are being under surveil, keep your 4 mouth shut. The actual physical evidence corroborating what 5 Rontae said, what Rontae said Deangelo said, and what Deangelo 6 told the police they said. 7 Now, let's listen to the recordings and see how that 8 further corroborates all the evidence. We know the first 9 day's the 23rd that he goes in with a recording device and 10 that originally it's Little Lou that he interacts with. 11 (Audio played) 12 MR. PESCI: Why are they whispering? Why worry 13 about whispering if there was no order from the Palomino, from 14 the owner, from the manager that Deangelo was an integral 15 part? 16 (Audio played) 17 MR. PESCI: Why check for a wire in hushed tones if 18 there was no order to kill TJ? What would be the need to do 19 that? 20 (Audio played) 21 Now, when Anabel says Luis, she's not MR. PESCI: 22 talking about Little Lou. She's talking about Mr. H. 23 two, three are in the room talking about Luis. This is the 24 "we." Every one of us loses. Why would they lose if they

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weren't a part of this conspiracy to murder him?

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(Audio played)

MR. PESCI: Why would Anabel be willing to pay money out of her own pocket if KC just went off on his own and did something crazy that was never a part of any plan? Why would she part with her own money if it wasn't, in fact, the original plan?

(Audio played)

MR. PESCI: Deangelo and Louie have to stick together because Deangelo and Louie are the people who created the order, executed the order, produced the individual to actually do the order. Those two have to stick together because of the fact that there is this crime, this conspiracy, this plan A.

(Audio played)

MR. PESCI: Okay. May 23rd, 2005, Anabel Espindola says, what we really wanted was for him to be beat up. Now, this is after they checked for a wire, and this is after they're all whispering and they're concerned they're under surveillance. So she's not saying, oh, no, yeah, we really intended to kill. She's backing off from that, but she clearly shows that there was an intent to do something to TJ. She says, what we really wanted was him just beat up. And we talked about earlier the kind of beating that this was, it's still first-degree murder because of lying in wait. So even if somehow, some way this was really just a beating, it's

still first-degree murder. 1 2 What -- what do you know from Anabel? What we 3 really wanted was for him to be beat up. It wasn't -- there 4 was never any other conversation. There wasn't any other 5 plan. You can infer, this is the direct versus circumstantial 6 evidence, the existence of Plan A. 7 (Audio played) Why would Luis, Mr. H, take care of 8 MR. PESCI: 9 somebody if Luis, Mr. H, never gave the order? And why would 10 Deangelo have to stay strong? 11 (Audio played) 12 MR. PESCI: Could you have KC kill them too, meaning 13 also, in addition, clearly indicating the prior intent and the 14 formation of an intent to kill TJ. Well, can you have KC take out those witnesses too? 15 16 (Audio played) 17 MR. PESCI: Little Lou says, utilize KC to kill the 18 witnesses Rontae and Jay Jay and then says, we can get KC 19 last. Take out the original shooter and the shooter will take 20 out the other witnesses so then nobody's left. (Audio played) 21 22 MR. PESCI: Total depend on Deangelo? Stick to your 23 story? 24 Ladies and gentlemen, the truth is not a story. 25 It's the truth. You don't have to stick to a story, and

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that's all going to depend on you based on the story you have 1 2 to stick to, further evidence of the existence of that plan 3 and that plan to kill. 4 (Audio played) 5 If we hold our ground and we don't say a MR. PESCI: Mr. H, even considering all of this, is so worried 6 thing. 7 that he's about to leave the business and take off, go in 8 Why would you go in exile for something you didn't do? 9 (Audio played) 10 MR. PESCI: Again, Little Lou telling Deangelo, I 11 told you to take care of it. 12 (Audio played) 13 To be the members of this conspiracy, we MR. PESCI: 14 need to keep our mouths shut, and if we have to communicate, 15 we're going to use a prepaid phone because we're whispering in a room checking for recording devices because, in fact, 16 17 they're all parties to this conspiracy to commit murder. 18 (Audio played) 19 MR. PESCI: Go buy rat poison. Put rat poison in 20 the marijuana, talking about Rontae and Jayson, what's to be 21 done to these individuals who are witnesses and can testify, 22 just like Rontae did. 23 (Audio played) 24 MR. PESCI: So if the marijuana doesn't work, then 25 you go with putting in some poison in a Tanqueray bottle. KARR REPORTING, INC.

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1 Remember, there was some liquor bottles inside the room, 2 brought one here to court, further evidence to corroborate 3 that as they're sitting in that very room saying, take the 4 liquor bottle, put poison in it. 5 (Audio played) 6 MR. PESCI: Anabel says, rat poison's not going to 7 work. 8 What's the defendant told by Little Lou? You know 9 what to do, just like he knew what to take care of meant. 10 (Audio played) 11 MR. PESCI: There is direct evidence of a conspiracy 12 by a coconspirator's own mouth, direct evidence. How much 13 time is a conspiracy? That's what Little Lou's asking 14 Deangelo. And then his coconspirator, Little Lou, is willing 15 to pay thousands of dollars to keep Deangelo happy because 16 they're all a party to this crime. 17 This is the second wire, much shorter. The second 18 wire, what have we got? 19 (Audio played) 20 MR. PESCI: The days passed and she's changed her 21 story from beat, because remember the recording we heard just 22 a few minutes ago where she said it was to beat him, now it's 23 to talk. There's been more time to worry about what it is 24 that Deangelo could do or what evidence could be gathered.

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That's why they're checking for recording devices and

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whispering and writing messages about keeping their mouths shut. So she's changed from, we told you to beat him, to now it's, oh, in fact, just talk to him.

(Audio played)

MR. PESCI: There it is again straight from a coconspirator's mouth, the existence of Plan A, because she's saying that she told him to go to Plan B. There is no Plan B without Plan A. Plan A is to kill.

Now, use your common sense, ladies and gentlemen.

At the end of the day, you'll go back there, and there's an instruction that literally tells you use your common sense.

When you use your common sense, it's very clear what, in fact, happened here. The defendant conspired to commit TJ and that he was, in fact, responsible for the killing of TJ.

Keep this in mind when you're doing -(Audio played)

MR. PESCI: Okay. This is May 20th. This is before the recordings. This is before Deangelo goes into Simone's to get those recordings that we just listened to. What did Deangelo say right there? Deangelo said, before any recordings even come into existence, because he hasn't even done it yet, Deangelo says that he goes and tells him that it happened, and Mr. H is like — and he was all, like, man, I just wanted him hurt. I was like, that ain't what you said.

May 20th Deangelo is telling Mr. H, who's trying to

back away from it, that's not what you said. That's not a script that he was given by police when he went in for the recording. Remember, there's this conversation or this idea that somehow when Deangelo goes in on the recordings and he gets that statement out, oh, wait a minute, Anabel, wait a minute, Mr. H, Little Lou, you said take him out, like that was somehow the promptings that the police had told Deangelo to use to get from the people inside.

No, ladies and gentlemen, because on May 20th, days before the recording's even happened, Deangelo, telling the police what actually happened, says that. It's not a script. It's not made up. It's not been fed to him by the police. You know that from listening to it from his own statement before the recordings even occur.

(Audio played)

MR. PESCI: This is how you know that the recordings are accurate. This is how you know that when, on the recording Deangelo speaks to them and they say that, it's, in fact, what they said because he's telling this to the police before the recordings even occur. So don't fall into the trap of thinking that everything that's incriminating that comes out of those recordings was just spoon fed through Deangelo by the cops. It is actually what happened.

At the end of the day, ladies and gentlemen, any way he tries to get out of it, the evidence is as follows:

1 (Audio played) 2 MR. PESCI: It was a hit. It was a killing. 3 guilty of conspiracy to commit murder, first-degree murder 4 with use of a deadly weapon. 5 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Pesci. 6 Why don't we just take a quick five or ten-minute 7 break before we move into the defense's closing statement. 8 And once again, ladies and gentlemen, during this 9 break, please don't discuss the case or do anything relating 10 to the case. 11 Notepads in your chairs and follow Officer Wooten 12 through the double doors. 13 (Court recessed at 12:06 p.m. until 12:15 p.m.) 14 (In the presence of the jury.) 15 THE COURT: All right. Court is now back in 16 The record will reflect the presence of the State, session. 17 the defendant and his counsel, officers of the Court and the 18 members of the jury. 19 Mr. Bunin, are you ready to proceed with your 20 closing statement? 21 MR. BUNIN: I am, Your Honor. Thank you. 22 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 23 DEFENDANT'S CLOSING ARGUMENT

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this case, what I want you to do is focus on three things,

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MR. BUNIN: Now that we've heard all the evidence in

because now that you've heard it all, you've really only heard three things that are important to you. You've heard three things that if you focus on them, you'll see that when you get your verdict forms, you're going to easily be able to eliminate a lot of your options.

As you go back for your deliberations, keep these three things in mind as you analyze each witness you've heard and as you analyze each piece of evidence presented by the prosecution in this case.

Now, these three things are: Specific intent, what specifically was in Deangelo Carroll's mind on the night of May 19th, 2005. If that has not been proven to you beyond a reasonable doubt, there are many options you the eliminate. So one is specific intent.

Two is corroboration. What parts of the statements, what part of the evidence the prosecution presented were corroborated? What corroboration is there specifically of what was in Deangelo Carroll's mind? So one is specific intent. Two is corroboration.

And three is something we talked about during jury selection, credibility. Because credibility certainly comes into play too so I'm going to have to talk about that.

Specific intent, corroboration, credibility. As you go through everything, please keep these three things in mind.

And I'm going to go through all of them with you and tell you

exactly what I mean.

This is a statement that's absolutely correct and it will be easy for you. If the prosecution did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Deangelo had the specific intent to kill, you cannot convict him of first-degree murder. There are other options and we're going to talk about it.

If the prosecution did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt, if you don't know beyond a reasonable doubt pursuant to these instructions what was in Deangelo's head, if the prosecution did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt exactly what Deangelo was thinking, then this statement is correct, you cannot convict him of first-degree murder. There are other options and we're going to talk about it.

Specific intent, that's what we're going to focus on. We're going to focus on this prosecution case. The case is about those three things, but it's tragically about something else and the defense does not discount this. This case is about Timothy Hadland. He should not have died. So I want to be clear as I go through what the defense has to tell you based on the evidence the prosecution presented in this case, the defense is not here to mislead you. We're not here to whitewash anything. The defense has never denied Timothy Hadland was murdered. It absolutely was murder. But he was not murdered by Deangelo Carroll. He was murdered by Kenneth Counts.

In fact, Mr. Ericsson, in his opening statement told you something that's pretty interesting and it's exactly true, that the prosecution and the defense agree on an awful lot of facts in this case. We agree on most of what was presented to you. What's the main one? The main thing the prosecution and the defense agree on is not in dispute. Kenneth Counts shot and killed Timothy Hadland. Absolutely agreed on by both parties.

What's another thing we agree on? Deangelo Carroll did not shoot Timothy Hadland or anybody else. The prosecution agrees, the defense agrees. Absolutely Mr. Ericsson told you we agree on these things in his opening and that's the evidence that you ended up hearing. Kenneth Counts committed murder and that's for another jury to decide, but he should be held accountable for it. Deangelo Carroll should be held accountable for what he did, but it is not murder.

In fact, we're not saying to you, oh, Deangelo
Carroll wasn't on the mountain that night. We're not saying
to you Deangelo wasn't up at Lake Mead, Deangelo Carroll
wasn't there. We're not saying, oh, I just — I didn't know
anything. We're not saying, like their star witness that they
called, Rontae Zone, oh, I didn't really do anything, I was
just along for the ride, it's not what the defense is saying
to you. Keep this in mind as I go through this evidence

because I really want you to pay attention to specific intent.

I'm going to say something that's absolutely true.

This is the defense. Deangelo Carroll is not innocent. He'll take responsibility for what he did. What he did was not murder. In fact, some of the witnesses in this case,

Detective Wildemann, other detectives said, look, a crime is committed, multiple defendants can be involved in a crime, but they're not all guilty of the same things. Some people can be guilty of some things, other people can be guilty of other things. We all agree Kenneth Counts is guilty of murder. But the prosecution, as I go through this, you're going to see came nowhere close to showing you beyond a reasonable doubt what was in Deangelo Carroll's head. They don't show you his specific intent.

And if you don't know Deangelo's specific intent, there's a whole bunch of instructions you have, I'm going to go through them with you, to tell you exactly what you must do. These instructions I'm going to read to you don't use the word may, don't use the word can. They tell you what you must do, which is find him guilty of things other than first-degree murder.

First-degree murder is a specific intent crime. If the prosecution did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt Deangelo's specific intent, you cannot find him guilty of first-degree murder. And also, he didn't commit first-degree

murder.

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In fact, they present evidence through a tape that they just played for you again, part of it, of a scheme to Now, they don't focus on this scheme to batter. focus on one snippet of something that Deangelo says during a statement to police, and we're going to talk about all that, but what they didn't mention once in their closing argument or, for that matter, in their opening is that over and over again, over and over again Deangelo says that he, Deangelo, never meant for Timothy to get killed. Yes, he says Mr. H may have wanted him to get killed. Yes, he says Mr. H may have wanted it to be a beating. There might be some inconsistent statements, but Deangelo makes it clear over and over again he never meant for him to get killed. I know there were inconsistent statements, but Deangelo says this.

Anabel, on the tape with that the prosecution presents to you, she's not presented as a witness but they present a tape of her words, and what she says is this was supposed to be a beating, and I'm going to get into that with you a little bit later.

Deangelo should be convicted of what he did. He conspired to batter a man. He conspired to hurt somebody. It turned into something worse and that's manslaughter. That's exactly what Deangelo Carroll should be convicted of. He should pay for what he did and you have options in here we're

going to go through, but this is manslaughter.

In fact, the law can't be more clear. You have all these instructions and I'm going to go through them with you, but the law is absolutely clear, and the Judge just read them off to you, not all killings are murder, period. That's absolutely correct. Not every time somebody is killed is it murder. That's number one.

Number two, not all murders are first degree.

There's more than one type of murder. The law, the courts,

Judge Adair, nobody is emphasizing one choice over another.

Nobody's saying to you, look, you have these choices but,

wink, nudge, one's the right choice. Every instruction read

to you is equally important in the law, every single one.

There's no one instruction that's not -- that's more important

than another. No one definition of what a killing is is

preferred over the other.

The only thing you have to do as a jury is determine beyond a reasonable doubt did the prosecution prove each and every element of the crime, and you have to look at what they proved and what they didn't prove and you have to pick and choose based on the instructions given to you by Judge Adair.

In other words, if they didn't prove beyond a reasonable doubt -- if they didn't prove beyond a reasonable doubt what was in Deangelo Carroll's head, then you cannot convict him of first-degree murder because that is a specific

intent crime.

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Now, I'm going to go through some of the witnesses with you that they called, some of the evidence that they presented. And I know the trial might have seemed long, but it was actually a fairly short trial, and I'll tell you part of the reasons why it was pretty short. It's because the defense chose to not cross-examine or to barely cross-examine many of the witnesses. Why? Because the witnesses we didn't spend any time on have nothing to do with Deangelo's specific intent, what was in his head. They don't corroborate anything that has to do with Deangelo's specific intent. They have nothing to do with specific intent, corroboration or credibility. So they were essentially a waste of time. You know, these witnesses -- just to make that clear, these witnesses were crime scene analysts, fingerprint people, ballistics people, the cab driver, the Nextel Sprint person, these were people that were all there telling you, look, Deangelo is among this group of people. Deangelo is over at the Lake. The defense has never denied it. But they tell you nothing about Deangelo's state of mind. So that's what you should focus on.

Without knowing what's in his head, without knowing his specific intent, he cannot be convicted of a specific intent crime. You have an instruction that says first-degree murder is a specific intent crime. That is an absolutely true

statement. There's no other definition that says that's not true. If you don't know his specific intent, he cannot be convicted of first-degree murder.

Now, the defense did spend time cross-examining certain witnesses, and there were a few of them. There was Rontae Zone, Detective Wildemann, and Detective McGrath.

That's where we spent some time. Because the evidence that the prosecution attempted to bring out from these witnesses were supposed to show you Deangelo's specific intent, and what they're trying to prove to you is Deangelo's specific intent of kill, that we — the prosecution is saying, we showed you beyond a reasonable doubt Deangelo intended to kill and nothing else. He intended to kill. There was no other option.

That's not what they showed. Both from evidence that came out on cross and direct examination, as I go through these witnesses, I want you to listen carefully and see if you can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt what was in Deangelo Carroll's head.

In fact, some evidence, at least some, from all three of these witnesses specifically corroborated Deangelo's specific intent to commit a battery, at least some evidence from all these witnesses. Maybe at least some evidence from all these witnesses corroborated other things the prosecution just talked about too. I'm going to talk about that, how

evidence from all three of these witnesses comes out all different directions and all the prosecution witnesses absolutely unequivocally agree that you heard evidence that corroborated that Deangelo intended to batter and not to kill.

And in the end when you get evidence like that, you have a prosecution that didn't prove anything beyond a reasonable doubt. All they did was throw a bunch of information at you and it all stuck in different areas of the board but they don't prove anything beyond a reasonable doubt. They just proved different versions of a statement given by Deangelo Carroll. And I'll explain what I mean by all that as I go through all these witnesses.

But keep in mind all of these witnesses, all of them, you're going to hear corroborating evidence that Deangelo intended to batter and not to kill.

Now, certainly Rontae's testimony has little to do with corroboration. It still has to do with corroboration, but it has an awful lot to do with credibility too. I'm going to start with him. He'll be my first. But overall, his testimony -- I don't know -- even know what words to use -- was shameful, disrespectful. It was a joke. And the prosecution chose to call this witness for you. They chose to call him as a witness and present their star witness. It was the only witness they have that was at the scene. This first significant witness of the trial doesn't tell you anything

about Deangelo's head. It was Rontae Zone and this was something they chose to put on the stand and swear under oath and talk to you. Let's talk about what he says.

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Before -- there's an instruction that I want you to take a look at when you're in the back. You're obviously supposed to take a look at them all, but I'm going to highlight this one, so if you'll remember this particular one. It's Instruction No. 43. 43 will deal with credibility.

43 tells you what to do when you get a witness that's absolutely incredible. It says, The credibility or believability of a witness should be determined by his manner upon the stand, his relationship to the parties, his fears, motives, interests or feelings, his opportunity to observe the matters in which he's testifying, the reasonableness of his statements and the strength or weakness of his recollection. But here's the best part of it. If you believe that a witness has lied, if you believe a witness has lied about any material fact in the case, you may disregard the entire testimony of that witness or any portion of his testimony which was not proved by other evidence. But it says or. In other words, if you think a person has lied about any material fact in this case, you absolutely can disregard his entire testimony. That's what this says to you and I have never seen a better instruction that applies to a person like Rontae Zone.

Let's look at Rontae. Again, it's the first witness

the prosecution called beyond just background, CSA, people saying, you know, what occurred at the scene. Through this witness, somehow they're going to attempt to tell you what's in Deangelo's mind, because if they can't tell you what's in Deangelo's mind, you must vote not guilty on first-degree murder.

Aside from the credibility instructions, there are Instructions 39 to 42 that deal with an accomplice, somebody who may be an accomplice. Now, I'm not going to read all of those to you right now, but I'm going to read one of them because it's like one line. Because the first thing you have to determine when looking at Rontae Zone is, is he an accomplice. Well, Instruction 41 says — there it is — now, says the determination of whether someone is an accomplice is not — is left for the jury to decide unless the witness' own statement leaves no doubt that he is subject to prosecution for the charged crime. So unless the witness leaves no doubt that he's subject to prosecution. Well, let's see what Rontae Zone said. The first thing Rontae Zone said — this is the first time I'm going to do this, but I want to read it exactly just so you have word for word what Rontae Zone said.

My question to Rontae Zone, think about accomplice testimony. Is he subject to prosecution?

My question: You're testifying here so you don't get charged with a crime?

Answer: Correct.

Question: You're testifying because if you didn't testify you'd be on the run?

Answer from Rontae: Correct.

My question: If you didn't testify, you'd be in the mix of this murder?

Answer: Correct.

My question: So by testifying, you won't get charged with murder?

Answer: Correct.

So like the Instruction No. 41 tells you, Rontae Zone tells you, I'm subject to prosecution for all this stuff and that's why I'm testifying. Rontae Zone's an accomplice.

You have accomplice instructions that you can review. I also want you to review it with the credibility instruction that I just talked about because in the end I think you're going to see you can disregard this person's entire testimony.

Now, remember, during jury selection I said to a bunch of you and probably most people that aren't here anymore, I said, how do you judge a person's credibility when they're on the stand, because it's a hard thing to do, to sit and look at somebody, and are you comfortable doing something like this. And here's a lot of the answers some of you gave. I think some of you here gave this answer.

You look at a person's demeanor. You look at their consistency of statements. You look at their incentive to lie. You listen for their ability to remember, maybe due to drug use. We also — you know, we already discussed incentive to testify. He just said, Yes, I'm here testifying because I don't want to be charged with murder. I'm here testifying because I don't want to face the death penalty. I don't think there's a bigger incentive to testify. That's number one.

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But number two, let's look at his demeanor. What was his attitude when he was on the stand? You got to see Rontae Zone. Was he combative? Did he calmly and legitimately answer questions, or did he try to fight? Did he try to go around some of his answers and not really answer questions? Here's some of the things he said. I'm not going to go through all of Rontae Zone because he's a waste of time, but let's go through some of it.

He said: I smoke pot all day, every day. He said, I smoked a blunt the day that he testify — the day of the incident. He said he smoked a blunt the day he testified, by the way. That was Wednesday of last week. So he gets up in the morning, he takes a cigar, he hollows it out, he fills it with pot. He smokes the entire blunt and then he comes over to court to testify for the prosecution. That's what Rontae Zone said Wednesday of last week.

So he testifies, I would submit to you, high, but he

had a blunt that morning and testified in the afternoon. He testified that he smoked pot all day the day of the incident in question. He testifies that he smoked a blunt on the van on the drive to Lake Mead. He testifies, I was high at the time of the incident. This is prosecution witness Rontae Zone.

And then I said, Rontae, you believe pot makes you smarter, don't you? And he said, I never said that. So like I had to do many times, I pulled out transcripts of a different time he testified under oath just like he was under oath last week and I said, Don't you remember being asked the exact same question and didn't you say at that other particular hearing, yes, pot makes me smarter? And then he said, Fine, it says it on the sheet of paper. Rontae lies under oath.

Rontae takes an oath last week and he says one thing. He takes an oath last year at a different trial and he says another thing on the exact same question. He lies under oath. Two statements, completely opposite, they both can't be true.

Is Rontae Zone the type of guy that's willing to lie under oath? Does Rontae Zone respect the oath that he swore when he sat down and said, I swear I'm going to tell the truth, jury, please believe me, I swear I'm about to tell you the truth? Does that mean anything to him as a prosecution

witness? Of course not. Look at what he said.

At first he testified under oath last week that, I did not lie to the police in order to protect myself. That's what he said last week. And then I had to get up and show him his testimony from the last time he testified under oath and he said, You know what, I did lie to the police to protect myself. Two statements, both can't be truth, both under oath.

I showed him under oath how he -- last week how he said, Yes, we went out promoting, Deangelo and I went out promoting the day of the incident. But the last time he testified, he absolutely unequivocally said, No, we didn't go promoting the day of the incident.

Without going through all of them, there's about five more where he said one thing under oath last week and I had to get up and show him a statement of word for word the exact question because, frankly, I purposefully asked him word for word the same question so if he answered it wrong, I could show him he said something different the time before. And he said it the exact opposite the time before. I could show you a half dozen times where he flat out lied under oath.

So then maybe a little flustered, I said, You know what, Rontae, word for word my next question was, As long as you don't get charged with murder, you don't care what answer you give in court, do you? And his answer, Why should I? I said, As long as you don't get charged with murder, you don't

care what you say in court? And Rontae says, Why should I?

The prosecution puts this witness on the stand in a murder case to try to convince you of anything. It's a joke. The prosecution wants you to use Rontae Zone's testimony to somehow convict Deangelo Carroll or anybody else of anything. Why should I? That's Rontae Zone. As long as he's not charged with murder, he doesn't care what he says in court, his words. We have to waste time on this guy.

Now, it's not really that surprising Rontae Zone answered that way, is it, because what else did he say? I said, Rontae, you don't even have any written agreement to tell the truth for the prosecution, do you? His answer, No, I don't have a written agreement to tell the truth. I said, Rontae, in the past, you were told by prosecutors that if you do the right thing, you won't get charged with murder. He said, Yep, that's what I was told. I said, Rontae, in the past you were told by detectives that if you, quote, do the right thing, you won't get charged with murder. Rontae said, Yep, that's what detectives told me.

And then Rontae comes to court last week and I guess he does the right thing, at least in Rontae's mind. He says whatever he needs to say to not get charged with a crime.

The prosecution has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. That's a difficult standard. That's in the instructions. You'll read it and see what it means. And they

use somebody like Rontae Zone. Why would they do that? This is their star witness. It's the only guy that's there. This is the only person they call that knows Deangelo Carroll. Why would they call a Rontae Zone? Because they have no case. They have no case to show you specific intent.

The prosecution has -- they have no evidence to show you what's in Deangelo's head, so in desperation you call a Rontae Zone. In fact, Rontae Zone testified seven times for the prosecution now. Rontae Zone testified that he was shown transcripts by the prosecution so he could remember what he said, not at this trial, but at other trials. They know this witness. They called this witness. This witness was an insult. It was an absolute insult with everything that has to do with our justice system. And he admitted it. I'll say anything I -- why should I? Why should I care? I'll say anything in court.

And this witness is supposed to corroborate something. Well, remember the defense is telling you that nothing is relevant in this trial unless it deals with specific intent and then corroboration about specific intent and credibility. Now, first-degree murder is a specific intent crime. The prosecution is trying to show specific intent through this witness and other witnesses, and we'll talk about that too. But if somehow you choose to take anything seriously that Rontae Zone said, well, I guess I'll

go through a little of it because the prosecution just stood there and said take seriously what Rontae Zone said and they showed you some statements of Rontae Zone so they're corroborated so they're believable. If they're corroborated, you should believe Rontae Zone. That was just part of the closing argument of the prosecution. So let's talk about some of the stuff that Rontae Zone says that they didn't talk about in their closing argument.

Why? Why would I talk about it? Because it has to do with specific intent. He corroborates specific intent not to kill, to batter. So if you're going to take anything this person says seriously, don't just pick and choose. Don't say — don't let the prosecution say, hey, he says stuff that corroborates what we need him to corroborate; therefore, it must be true, even though he may have said stuff that the defense needs to corroborate, so please ignore that. Don't let the prosecution get away with that and don't stand there and think, hey, defense, aren't you doing the same thing, aren't you saying just listen to when he corroborates the defense? We're not. I'm going to talk about that in detail with you.

If you get corroboration of two different stories, if two stories are corroborated, if two statements are corroborated, what don't you have? Sorry. What do you have? If two stories are corroborated, you have reasonable doubt.

The prosecution's job is to prove one story, and one story only, beyond a reasonable doubt, not two. They just stood up and said, listen to Rontae on the stuff that we -- that we think is true, and didn't mention that he corroborates other things. So let's go through some of that because they raised reasonable doubt.

What does Rontae say about what's in Deangelo's head? Rontae says that Deangelo used the words dealt with only. Rontae says there was no plan discussed whatsoever on the way to Lake Mead. Rontae says he never, ever saw KC, saw Kenneth Counts with a gun until right before Kenneth Counts shot, corroborated by other evidence on the prosecution. Rontae never saw KC with a gun when he — before he got in the van or while they were driving up. Rontae did not know KC had a gun, again, until right before the shooting. Rontae did not know what the plan was, if anything, once they got up there. Rontae did not know if KC ignored the plan and went off on his own and shot. That's what Rontae testified to.

Deangelo Carroll did not shoot Timothy Hadland.

That's what Rontae Zone said. Kenneth Counts shot Timothy Hadland. That's what Rontae Zone said. Deangelo Carroll didn't even carry a gun. That's what Rontae Zone said.

Deangelo Carroll looked shocked, was in shock when Kenneth Counts shot Timothy Hadland. That's what Rontae Zone said, also corroborated by other evidence in this case.

The prosecution tells you, look, Rontae corroborated what we need him to corroborate but please ignore the fact that he corroborated things that tend not to prove our case that not show reasonable doubt. That's what the prosecution just did in their closing when they talked about Rontae Zone. If you believe somehow anything this prosecution witness said, if you choose not to completely ignore him because of the Instruction 43 that I told you to look at which tells you you're allowed to ignore Rontae Zone, funny, don't ignore him, but please don't ignore half of what he said.

Don't let the prosecution with any witness get up here and say, hey, the specific intent to kill was corroborated, but ignore the fact the specific intent to batter was also corroborated. Keep this in mind when you get into the jury room. We're going to talk about this several times.

If the prosecution's evidence corroborates more than one version of events, then they create reasonable doubt. If the prosecution has to prove one event beyond a reasonable doubt and if their witness corroborates both, you have reasonable doubt. You have instructions that tell you what to do in that situation. I'm going to talk about it in detail later, but I'm going to hit one or two right now because they're important.

One is Instruction No. 21. It tells you what to do

when you're getting stories from both sides. It's the last paragraph in Instruction 21. It says, If you're convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of conspiracy has been committed by defendant but you have a reasonable doubt whether such conspiracy was to commit murder or battery with a deadly weapon or battery resulting in substantial bodily harm; in other words, the prosecution presents evidence that it could have been conspiracy to murder. The prosecution presents evidence that it could have been a conspiracy to batter. Well, now you don't know. Nothing's been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. So the only thing you're sure of is there's a conspiracy, but you don't know what was in Deangelo's head. You don't know which conspiracy it was.

So what do you do according to this instruction?

Let's see what it says. You must, not may, not can, not should, you must give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and return a verdict of conspiracy to commit battery with a deadly weapon or battery resulting in substantial bodily harm, must.

The next instruction is 22. It's just as important. If you were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of conspiracy has been committed by defendant but you have a reasonable doubt whether such conspiracy was battery with a deadly weapon, battery with substantial bodily harm or battery, in other words, the prosecution convinces you there

is a conspiracy, you had to pick battery because they didn't convince you beyond a reasonable doubt what the conspiracy was, the next question is, did they show for sure it was intended to be substantial bodily harm, did they show for sure it was intent to be with a weapon, or did they just show for sure it was intent to be battery, or did they not show any of them for sure. Because they presented evidence as to all three.

When you have a reasonable doubt as to all three but you know there was a conspiracy, the next line, you must, not may, not can, not should, you must give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict of conspiracy to commit battery.

And the last instruction for now, which is a little harder and a little wild, is 26. I want you to look at it carefully. If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime has been committed by the defendant but you have reasonable doubt whether such crime was murder or involuntary manslaughter, in other words, the prosecution's evidence shows corroboration could have been a murder, the prosecution's evidence shows corroboration — this could have been a manslaughter because if Deangelo only intended this to be a battery, just a battery, and he died as a result of somebody going off the plan, that's manslaughter. If there's evidence

of both and you're not sure which beyond a reasonable doubt, well, the instruction tells you what to do. You must, not can, not should, not may, but you must give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and return a verdict of involuntary manslaughter.

These instructions — there's not one that's more important than another. These are the ones that govern the rule of the case. This is how you're instructed by Judge Adair. And in a situation where the prosecution doesn't prove Deangelo's specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt, it tells you what you must do. You must find guilty of conspiracy to commit battery, you must find guilty of involuntary manslaughter.

I've wasted way too much time on Rontae Zone, so I'm going to end it with the last question I asked him and the last thing he said, not that I really need to go into any more overkill on Rontae Zone, but it's so ridiculous, I can't help myself. So here's what he said. My question is, You actually don't care what happens to Deangelo, you're here so you don't get charged with murder, right?

Answer: Correct.

That's Rontae Zone. That's a witness the prosecution chose to show you. And you can go back there and think about why this prosecution needed to bring in this witness. It's because they don't have evidence of Deangelo's

specific intent. They know it. They didn't prove it. They can't prove it, so they have to call a guy like Rontae Zone.

Let's talk about two witnesses, the only other two witnesses that testified about anything related to specific intent. They'll talk about corroboration of specific intent. We don't need to talk nearly as much about credibility because they're much more credible witnesses, and that's Detective Wildemann and Detective McGrath. These are the only two other witnesses the prosecution presented that have anything to do with specific intent and talk anything about corroboration as to what Deangelo's specific intent was. So let's look at them.

Well, both of them said that it's their job to determine what the truth is, if that's possible to determine. They said they're not on one side or another. We have no stake in this. It's our job to determine the truth, if we can do it. They said they want to make sure that the right people are charged with the right thing. They want to make sure the truth comes out and they can present that evidence to the prosecution and the prosecutor can decide how to charge people.

The witnesses agree -- well, these detectives, that in some cases where there are multiple people charged on the same crimes, not all of them are culpable for the same thing. Some should have been charged for some things, others should

have been charged with other things. Kenneth Counts should have been charged with murder. It has nothing to do with this jury. Kenneth Counts committed murder. The prosecution agrees and the defense agree. Deangelo Carroll should never have been charged with murder.

The detective said that a good way, one way to gather evidence is by talking to witnesses. The detective said that you have to use your judgment to determine what parts you hear are truthful, what parts might not be truthful, and they all agreed that the truth is, in the end, you can't know. Somebody's statement alone is just not enough. You can't know. So you want to get corroborating evidence. That's what they said.

In fact, they admit, like all of us in this room, they're not witnesses to what occurred. They don't know what happened. They just know what they learned by gathering the evidence and talking to the witnesses. They don't know the truth. They just do their best.

Sometimes you get inconsistent stories when you talk to a witness. That's what they said. Absolutely they did in this case. The defense isn't denying it. Ideally you compare different versions of what's said to other evidence in the case in an effort to corroborate a statement, so that's why I'm talking so much about corroboration and specific intent.

Now, here the detectives met Deangelo Carroll at the

Palomino Club the day after this occurred on May 20th, 2005. Deangelo, according to their testimony, volunteered to talk to them. And I'm going to make maybe a small point here about how exactly they chose to interrogate or interview, whichever word you want to use, but I don't think it's a significant point. There's a more important point that I'm going to make in a minute about why Deangelo maybe said different versions, but I think this has at least something to do with it, but the next part's probably a little more important.

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But they agree that they can interview you in a comfortable environment, at the club, at your house, like they did with other witnesses. They agreed they interviewed other witnesses in the Palomino Club and they recorded -- they audio recorded what they had to say. But instead, they chose to take Deangelo, put him in a police car, drive with two detectives, go to the homicide office, go to the interrogation room or the interview room, which you saw on film. There's a table in it. Deangelo is behind the table, between the table and the door. The prosecutors are between Deangelo and the door. Although reluctantly, the detectives admitted this can be an intimidating situation, although they really were more reluctant to admit that their purpose was to intimidate. I submit to you that it was, and that's not necessarily a bad thing. You know, they're doing their jobs. But in that situation, you can get into a

situation where there's confusion in the room.

Like I think it's pretty clear that no reasonable person in Deangelo's situation would think he can leave. In fact, he didn't even have his own car. He would have no way to get anywhere if he wanted to leave. But the detectives agreed a person absolutely would feel nervous, scared, intimidated, confused maybe when they're in a room in that situation. And everybody agreed that Detective Vaccaro used tactics that are certainly more aggressive than the tactics of Detective McGrath and Wildemann, and he used these tactics in a way that certainly are intended to maybe make you feel a little nervous. This is the testimony that came out.

I think these are minor points, but I think they're worth making. I'm going to talk about the more significant ones in a minute.

Also, a probably more minor point, but they chose not to read him his Miranda rights. I think there's a little bit of credibility issue when it came to Detective McGrath on this one point because these are good detectives trying to do a good job for the city, but I think when you look at their overall testimony, maybe they're trying to help the prosecution a little bit sometimes when they answer their questions. In fact, what I said to Detective McGrath, I said, The reason you didn't read him his Miranda rights is because you're concerned he might not answer your questions if you

read Miranda rights? He goes, No. I didn't read him his Miranda rights because he's not in custody. You don't read Miranda rights if you're not in custody. I said, Oh, well, was he ever in custody that night? Detective McGrath then said no. I said, But you read him his Miranda rights at some point during the interview.

So all I'm saying is maybe there's a little bit of bias when it came to the testimony, but I'm really not knocking these detectives. They're trying to do the best they can do. But he agreed -- he and the other detectives all agreed that they're very educated, very well trained, very experienced in interrogation tactics, and in a situation like this, they're very good at maybe getting people to say things, many different things trying to make excuses for themselves, say things that aren't true, say things that aren't true and then you start weeding it out. I mean, some people -- sometimes people make statements and confessions that simply aren't true. Sometimes they make statements that are true.

And, in fact, the prosecution read you an instruction, it's 46, about you don't leave your common sense at the door when you're a juror. You just don't leave your common sense at the door is basically what it says. Use your common sense. Of course, sometimes people are going to make mistakes, they're going to get confused, they're going to be manipulated, they're going to say things wrong.

So what happens? These prosecutors — the detectives said, look, we get statements from somebody.

Sometimes we get multiple statements from somebody, like they did here, so you want to try to find corroborating evidence to see which parts are correct and which ones are not correct.

Now, here's the more important one because I'm not whitewashing this. I'm not going to try to mislead. The defense does not want to deceive about why Deangelo also gave some statements that were not consistent in this confession to the police officer during this interrogation. Certainly the entirety of the situation, everything I just discussed, how he was there, why he was there, how they were talking to him has something to do with some of the confusion, but other parts of it were not confusion.

There's something else and there's something that we have never denied, and I've already said it once so I'm going to say it again because I want to be clear about why Deangelo gave a couple of different statements, at least part of the reason, because he's not innocent. Deangelo's not innocent in this. He's not. So what does Deangelo do?

Well, he does what the prosecution witnesses do,

Rontae Zone. He says things to the police that aren't true in

order to protect himself, just like somebody that they put on

the stand, had him raise his right hand and swear under oath

to tell you the truth, somebody that they trust to get on the

stand and tell the truth. Deangelo does the same thing as their witness. He knows he's not innocent, just like Rontae Zone knows he's not. So he tries to cover some tracks and make some excuses.

He gets manipulated. He is in a situation with experienced and more intelligent and more educated and extremely well trained detectives and he makes a lot of statements that are all over the place because Deangelo wants to protect himself. He's not innocent. He committed a crime. His crime is conspiracy with battery. His crime is manslaughter. He should pay for it and we're going to talk about why those are his crimes.

This is what -- but he knew. At this point Deangelo knew that he conspired to commit a battery. He also knew, as a result of this, somebody died. So when he spoke to these detectives, he knew he was in serious trouble because of what KC did, because KC didn't follow the plan. He committed the crime no matter what KC did, but it turned into something worse; plus, KC went off on his own and shot this person.

In fact, in the recorded statement that Deangelo makes, the recorded statement that they play for you, the recorded statement that Deangelo makes for the detectives and for the prosecution while cooperating with them, helping them get evidence and corroborating Deangelo's statement that this was supposed to be a battery, in that part of the statement,

he actually makes it clear. He says -- page 9, 15 to 18, and it just kind of shows you what was in Deangelo's head before he ever spoke to the police.

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Deangelo says, Look -- Deangelo says, They are going to fucking work deals for themselves. They're going to get me for sure because I was driving. They're going to get KC because he was the trigger man. They're not going to do anything else to the other guys because they're fucking snitches, talking about Rontae Zone, who was. Deangelo was right on all counts. Deangelo knew when he talked to the police he was in serious trouble. He conspired to commit a batterv. He drove this person up to the lake to commit a This person went off on his own and killed somebody. batterv. Deangelo knew he was in serious trouble. So I don't want you to think when I'm saying look at all aspects of the interrogation to figure out why different statements were made, I'm not whitewashing the fact that Deangelo's not innocent here. Just like their witness Rontae Zone, Deangelo tried to protect himself. Please keep that in mind when I talk about these witnesses.

But what happens? Well, all of the detectives testified that they used their skills to the best of their ability to maybe then try to bring out some truth. And after a two and a half hour interrogation, these experienced and skilled detectives end up bringing out one pretty clear

version of events. After using all of their skills and all of their techniques, something does come out. Not only do they get to the truth, but, in fact, much of the statement I'm about to talk about is corroborated by other evidence that the prosecution gives you. It's corroborated.

So after Detectives Wildemann and McGrath use all of their skills and they bring in Detective Vaccaro, who is their supervising detective, and he uses more aggressive tactics and he gets a version -- he gets a consistent version that Deangelo, through the time throughout, and ended very clearly that this was only supposed to be a battery. He pins him down to this. When the interrogation's finally near the end, this is what he says. A couple of things that are corroborated.

Number one, Deangelo says, Look, early on when you guys were speaking to me, I lied because I was trying to tell the story that Anabel and Little Lou told me to tell you.

Well, that's corroborated. On the tape that Deangelo made for the police that the prosecution just played for you, they say, Stick to your story. This is the story that they tell Deangelo to try to tell. He tries to stick to his story. He blows it. But he explains to the police, This is why I told the first version. These guys told me to tell it.

That statement that Deangelo makes to the police is true and is corroborated on that tape and, in fact, the detectives both testified that Deangelo corroborates the fact

that he tries to tell a story that Anabel and Little Lou told him to tell. That's number one.

Deangelo asks during the interrogation to call
Rontae and tell him to tell everything because it will prove
what he's saying is true, that this is supposed to be a
battery. That's corroborating. That's what Deangelo said.
Detective McGrath corroborates the fact that Deangelo said to
Rontae, right before Rontae spoke with the police, Tell the
truth or we're all going to jail. Detective McGrath says,
Yes, that's exactly what Deangelo Carroll said. It
corroborates that Deangelo knew the truth but saw some
problems because Deangelo knew this was only supposed to be a
battery. It was KC that went off and did the shooting.

Deangelo says over and over, after Detective Vaccaro starts interrogating Deangelo, that he never told KC that H said he wanted Timothy killed. Deangelo says several times, Look, Mr. H might have said this is supposed to be a killing, but I never told that to KC. He says that several times. Then that statement is corroborated on the tape that Deangelo makes for the police and for the prosecution.

In fact, a witness of the prosecution, the detective who testified, agreed that Deangelo corroborates the statement that he never told KC that H wanted Timothy Hadland dead.

This is corroborated by prosecution — witnesses of the prosecution evidence. He says over and over again he never

meant for Timothy to get shot. He just meant for him to get beat up. Deangelo says this over and over again. Even when Deangelo's saying, in some parts of this, yes, Mr. H may have wanted this to be a killing, but I never meant for him to get shot, I don't care what H wanted, I never meant for him to get killed, he makes it clear, I didn't mean for that to happen. H may have. I didn't mean to. And I didn't tell KC to do it.

Why is this important? Because through their witnesses and through other evidence the prosecution puts in, their corroborate this. They corroborate it. The detectives testified, yes, it was corroborated on the tape. The tape itself corroborates it when it shows you that the Deangelo — that Anabel says on the tape this was only supposed to be a beating, not a killing. This was only supposed to be a battery. The prosecution presents you evidence corroborating Deangelo's state of mind that this was only supposed to be a battery and nothing more.

Deangelo says to the police, I never saw a gun until Timothy got shot. Well, I guess that's corroborated by Rontae, if you want to believe anything Rontae says, but it's corroborated by other prosecution evidence. Deangelo says there's no conversation in the car whatsoever about what KC was going to do or what any plan was. That's corroborated by other evidence that the prosecution presented to you. He again says I never told KC that H wanted Timothy killed. This

is a consistent statement that Deangelo makes that is corroborated by other evidence that the prosecution presents to you. And over and over, he continues to say, I never meant for this person to get killed.

What was in Deangelo Carroll's head? All you're concerned about when you look at first-degree murder is specific intent. It's a specific intent crime. You must know beyond a reasonable doubt what was in Deangelo's head.

Deangelo says to the police, I never meant for this person to get killed, over and over, and then they present you other evidence beyond Deangelo's statement through witnesses and a separate tape that corroborates that Deangelo didn't mean and Anabel didn't mean and nobody meant, except maybe KC, for Timothy Hadland to get killed, all presented to you by the prosecution.

And then very significantly, because the prosecution tried to make a similar argument about, look, you saw statements that's even more credible than anything on these tapes because it's referring to a statement that Deangelo made before he ever spoke to the police and before he ever made the tape for the police. Well, here's another one, one that they didn't tell you about in their closing argument. Deangelo says to Ana -- to the police, I already told Anabel. So before he spoke to the police the next day, Deangelo says to the police, I already told Anabel KC just flipped out and shot

him.

So the first time Deangelo's interviewed, he says, I already told this to detectives, KC just flipped out -- I mean, I already told this to Anabel, KC just flipped out and shot this guy.

Then, after he cooperates with the police, he goes and talks to Anabel and he says to Anabel, I told you KC just went stupid and flipped out and shot this guy. I told you. In other words -- and Detective Wildemann testified to this -- that statement corroborates the fact that Deangelo, before he ever talked to the police and before he ever made this tape to the police, he had already told Anabel KC flipped out and shot this guy.

And then when he talks to Anabel, he says, I told you — he was referring back to a prior conversation, I already told you what happened. And does Anabel say, You never told me that? She doesn't at all. She doesn't at all. Deangelo does exactly what he tells the police he's going to do. He corroborates the fact that this was always supposed to be a beating and KC went off on his own and shot this guy.

Well, remember, these are prosecution witnesses testifying, a detective saying, yes, he corroborated the fact that he spoke to Anabel in advance. Yes, he corroborated the fact that he said to Anabel this was only supposed to be a beating. Yes, he corroborates the fact that it was only

supposed to be a beating because Anabel repeats, what are you talking about, this was only supposed to be a beating.

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The prosecution presents evidence to you that this was supposed to be a beating. And they also present evidence to other things, but they present corroborating evidence to you about what's in Deangelo's head, it's supposed to be a beating.

In fact, remember the opening statement of the prosecution where they played a couple of little three to five minute snippets of Deangelo Carroll's statement to the police? And in those snippets, he's saying some pretty damn good things that certainly are the prosecution's case, but what they don't tell you is that after a two and a half hour interrogation Deangelo said all of the things that I just said to you over and over again. In the opening, they've got these little snippets of a guy saying it's supposed to be a hit, but what they don't tell you is that an hour later, after three detectives use all their best interrogations tactics on and on and on, Deangelo consistently continues to say, H made a comment it was supposed to be a hit. I never wanted it to be a hit. For me, it was supposed to be a battery. I never told KC it was supposed to be -- it wasn't a battery. The guy went off and did this on his own. You didn't get that from the prosecution witness.

They also didn't tell you in their opening what the

detectives in the end, after Deangelo gets down to one clear version of events, confusion calms down, fear calms down, the tactics are absolutely working that these detectives are using, they don't tell you that Deangelo over and over again says it was just supposed to be a beating. Then the detectives say, How are you going to prove it? They don't mention that in their statement.

There's something else they don't mention, or in their close, that Deangelo gives two answers as to how he's going to prove it. One, he says, Test my hands. I didn't shoot anybody. Test my hands. And, in fact, they could have tested his hands. The detectives on the stand make some excuses as to why they didn't test his hands, but they certainly could have. Maybe they were concerned by testing his hands they would tend to prove his innocence, not his guilt, but they didn't test his hands.

But here's another reason they didn't test his hands, and again, it's because of something Mr. Ericsson said in his opening statement, that the prosecution and the defense agree on many things. One of them is that Deangelo Carroll never shot anybody. So, of course, his hands wouldn't have showed anything other than Deangelo didn't shoot anybody.

But what's more important about that statement?

What's something else that the prosecution and the defense now agree on? What's something else that we agree on? That

Deangelo Carroll was truthful in his initial response to, how are you going to prove this was -- you just attempted a battery? How are you going to prove you didn't do this? His first and distinctive answer, the prosecution and defense agree, is the truth, Test my hands. I didn't shoot anybody.

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And then immediately he gives another answer. What does he say? He says, I'll wear a wire to prove it. I'll put on a wire and I'll prove to you everything I just said to you is true, everything. So what does Deangelo offer to do?

Just to be clear, because it was not something that was ever made clear by the prosecution early on, he says, For you to prove my statement certainly, but for you, I will put on a wire, I will talk to coconspirators, I will make a tape for you, I'll make a tape for the prosecution. Whatever happens, happens, but I'll do this. Deangelo Carroll cooperated with the police. Deangelo Carroll helped with the investigation. Yes, certainly to prove his statement, part of the motive, absolutely. Deangelo wants to make sure the police know exactly what he did. He conspired to batter and he committed manslaughter. Deangelo may not have understood the law, but that's exactly what occurred. He knew he did wrong. He knew he'd have to pay. Sure. Sure, he has a motive to help. But there's other things that occurred, like it or not, because of Deangelo's help.

He got corroborating evidence about this fact that

he intended for this to be a battery. He got the police valuable information that they used. What do I mean? Well, Detective McGrath testified that without Deangelo Carroll they never would have had the extra charges on Little Lou for conspiring to kill witnesses, the whole thing with the rat poison. You know, they're playing these statements as if they're against Deangelo Carroll. Deangelo Carroll brought these statements out for the prosecutors, for the detectives and gave them the tapes. Here, see? See, everything I told you is true about these guys. See, my version, what I told you, what I'm telling you about, that I intended to commit a battery, it's true. Here, here are the tapes. See, I proved it to you. Let's talk about those — all these tapes.

Some of these were probably already shown to you by the prosecution, but, you know, first Detective McGrath says to Deangelo -- well, he testified on the stand that, I didn't tell Deangelo what to say when I went and made these tapes. I don't know if that's exactly right. But Detective McGrath says, look, I just told Deangelo to go in the room and he says Deangelo knew what he was going to have to do to prove his statement to me that this was supposed to be a battery. That's Detective McGrath's testimony. Deangelo knew what he needed to say to prove this was going to be a battery.

So Deangelo goes in the room and he talks to Anabel whose statements are presented to you by the prosecution.

They don't call her as a witness. They choose to present evidence from Anabel. Her statement from this tape, that's what they present to you. What does Anabel say? Because the prosecution, you know, makes this choice to just give you Anabel's statement, and Anabel's statements corroborate what Deangelo is saying about this was supposed to be a battery. In fact, this was undisputed. Anabel was recorded for the police by Deangelo. Anabel did not know she was being recorded. That's not disputed. She was concerned about being recorded. That's certainly not in dispute either. But once she made it — once she was comfortable that she was not being recorded, this is a person that spoke honestly.

Anabel, on tape, not knowing that she's being taped by Deangelo, is making statements that the prosecution wanted you to take seriously, and you should. These are very important statements and they absolutely create reasonable doubt. In fact, let's look at the first one.

Specifically Deangelo, using his own tactics, according to Detective McGrath, to get -- to corroborate the fact that this was supposed to be a battery and a battery only, so what did Deangelo say to Anabel? He says, Hey, what's done is done. He wanted it fucking taken care of and we took care of it.

Now, remember, Deangelo is using these words with a purpose, to get out -- he says, Look, it's only supposed to be

a batter, and he goes in, tells the police and says what he needs to say to make sure he can prove to the police, just like they ask him, how are you going to prove this is supposed to be a battery. So Deangelo says, What's done is done. You wanted him taken care of and we took care of him.

So what does Anabel do, the person who doesn't know she's being taped? She defines what taking care of means for you, because she has no idea she's being taped. Deangelo makes the statement knowing it's going to rile up Anabel because Deangelo knows what taken care of meant. It meant a battery. How do we know? What's Anabel say?

Next line. Why are you saying this shit? What we really wanted was him fucking beat up, if anything. We didn't want him fucking dead. This was the first day, the first tapes. The police say to Deangelo, How are you going to prove what you're telling me is true? The first thing he says is, Test my hands, I didn't shoot anybody. The prosecution agrees he's telling the truth. And then he immediately says, Put a tape on me. I'll prove to you that this was just supposed to be a beating.

So Deangelo beeps her. You told him we wanted to fucking take care of him — took care of him. She says, What are you talking about? Why are you saying this shit? We wanted him beat up, if anything. We didn't want him fucking dead.

The police say, How are you going to prove it?

Deangelo proved it. That's a truthful statement.

Now, the next thing — in fact, the words taken care of are now defined of. Taken care of means beat up. Anabel defines it for you on the tape where she doesn't know she's being taped. And Deangelo, without telling her what to say, simply says, We took care of him. What else is said to that? Trying to prove to the police that taken care of meant beat up. He doesn't. And the prosecution presents to you this evidence. They gave it to you, not the defense, they did.

Now, the prosecution tries over and over again to corroborate a version of events where Deangelo intended to kill. And they, you know, call Rontae Zone, and he gives his statement. They choose not to call Anabel. They just choose to present her statement on the tape as the prosecution evidence tells you what taken care of means. It means beat up. And I want you to keep that in mind. It's their evidence, not anybody else's.

What does that make this? This is manslaughter as to Deangelo. It's murder as to KC. And as to others, it's for other juries to decide. Your focus is on Deangelo and Deangelo only. For Deangelo, this is manslaughter. It's a crime. It's a serious crime. It's a crime where a man dies, and he has to pay for it. And that's what this jury should do, make Deangelo pay for what he did, not for things the

prosecution wants to prove but can't prove.

Now, there's another thing said by Deangelo that I talked about a minute ago, so I want to -- it's so important, I want to clarify it one last time. So this is what's said. Deangelo, on the same tape, when again he's trying to prove what he said to the police is true, in other words, this is what I mentioned earlier, Deangelo says to the police, I already told Anabel KC went crazy and did this on his own. I already said this.

Now, if that's true, that means before Deangelo ever spoke to police on May 20th and before he ever made these secret tapes on May 23rd and May 24th, he had already spoken to Anabel, and with nobody listening in and with no police influence, said, KC went crazy and did this on his own. If that's the case, this was supposed to be a beating and nothing more. This was supposed to be a battery.

So what does Deangelo say? Read it. He says, How are we going to call it quits? Fucking KC got -- fucking KC fucking got mad and fucking -- I told you he was fucking stupid -- went fucking stupid and fucking shot the dude, not really -- nothing we could fucking do about it. I told you he went stupid and shot the dude. There was nothing we could do about it.

In other words, he goes in and corroborates exactly what he said to the police officer, that he had already,

before he even knew that the police knew his name, told
Anabel, hey, this guy went off on his own and didn't follow
the plan. This was supposed to be a battery, yes. Well, KC
didn't do it and here we are. We're in trouble. He had
already said it.

Just like the prosecution in their closing argument showed you a statement and said that statement was made before anybody ever spoke to police, that's the most credible statement out there, I agree. That's a credible statement.

In fact, what does Anabel say? Does she immediately go? You can look at the tape. You have the transcript. Does she go, You never told me that? Huh-hu, nope. That's not what Anabel does. She just goes right on with the conversation because that's something Deangelo already told her. He had already told her in advance KC went crazy, KC shot the dude, there was nothing we could do about it. That's not why they went up there. They didn't go up there to do that. They made a dumb decision, like a decision to batter somebody. Sometimes stuff like this happens and when it does, well, now you're in more trouble than conspiracy to commit battery. Now you're also in trouble for manslaughter. It's a crime. It's a serious crime.

Now, one last thing that the detective testified — the detectives, on all these things I just talked about, agreed that Deangelo corroborated his statement that this was

supposed to be a battery by wearing a recording and doing it in the exact way that I just said. Every one of these witnesses, their witnesses testified, yes, it was corroborated. And he also corroborated it on this portion of the tape that he was told to tell a particular lie. I'm not going to read it to you again, but he was told to tell a lie. He tried to do it. He failed. And then he ended up telling the truth once the detectives were done interrogating him.

So in the end, the testimony of Detectives Wildemann and McGrath do more to create reasonable doubt than to prove it for the prosecution when it comes to first-degree murder.

The prosecution's case, in fact, doesn't anymore prove Deangelo intended to commit a battery than prove anything else. The prosecution's case creates reasonable doubt. Their witnesses agree, when I cross-examined them, that Deangelo corroborated, absolutely corroborated the statement he made where it was never supposed to be a killing, at least not in Deangelo's mind.

Specific intent, the intent to kill, that's what the prosecution has to prove.

Now, I know Deangelo made inconsistent statements. I mentioned this earlier. I know that the prosecution can say, okay, fine, he corroborated all those things. I know we didn't mention that he did, by the way, but he corroborated all those things, but he corroborated stuff for us too, stuff

we're trying to prove. I know that's true. The defense is not here denying it. The statement's all over the place, the corroboration elements are over the place.

In fact, Mr. DiGiacomo made that point very well for the defense when he did redirect examination on Detective McGrath. He got up and said, Well, in this part and this part and this part and this part, doesn't he corroborate this version of events, the version that the prosecution is telling you is true? And Detective McGrath beautifully said, Yes, he did.

But on my cross, he had just finished saying four different times that he also corroborates the version of events where it's supposed to be a battery, and my point that Mr. DiGiacomo made for me is that the prosecution witness corroborated both stories, telling different versions. And the prosecution's corroborating both and this is where the burden of the State, the burden of the prosecution becomes so important.

The prosecution has the burden. You're instructed as to this. They're the sole party of the burden. They, and they alone, have to show beyond a reasonable doubt not two stories that are corroborated, but one, one story and one story only. And if they don't show beyond a reasonable doubt one version and one version only — you have a bunch of instructions that I read that use the word must — you must find guilty of conspiracy to commit battery, you must find

guilty of manslaughter.

Now, I already ran through some of those instructions with you, you know, the instructions that talked about if the prosecution -- if you believe the things about a conspiracy, you don't know if it was a conspiracy to murder or intent to commit battery, you must pick battery.

The other instruction was if you know that there was a killing but you don't know if it was murder or you don't know if it was manslaughter, based on the evidence presented, you must pick manslaughter. Those are the instructions given to you. They are 21, 22 and 26. Those are the instructions, without me going through them again. So please look at them very carefully because when you see what these instructions are talking about, they all talk about Deangelo's specific intent and nothing more. I'm going to get to that again in a second, but just in the interest of trying to get to the end of it, I'm not going to go through those instructions again with you.

And I know I have been speaking a long time, but the defense has one shot to get up here and go through all this evidence with you, and one only. The prosecution has two.

They get up twice. You already heard the closing argument by Mr. Pesci. Now you're going to hear a rebuttal by Mr. DiGiacomo. It's because the State has the sole burden of proving their case, so they get to go first and they get to go

last. But unlike the prosecution, I have to cover everything in one shot. They can do it in two different statements, so I have to take a little bit longer than them, and I apologize for that.

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Also, I don't get to bet back up here and say, hey, don't let them equivocate. Don't let them shift sideways when they talk about the credibility of Rontae Zone. Don't let them shift sideways when they try to explain why their versions of events should be believed that are corroborated but the other version of events that are corroborated should be ignored. I can't get back up and talk about that, so please listen for it when you hear the final rebuttal.

So specific intent, specific intent is something that I continue to focus on, so I'm going to talk about just a couple more instructions. These are extremely important, and these again make it easy for you.

Specific intent, Instruction No. 18. Instruction 18, when you read it, takes care of a whole bunch of options. You can easily resolve the case. Murder in the first degree is a specific intent crime. Defendant cannot be liable under conspiracy or aiding and abetting for first-degree murder for acts committed by a coconspirator unless defendant also had a premeditated and deliberate specific intent to kill or lying in wait -- and we'll talk about lying in wait in a minute -- unless defendant had a premeditated and deliberate specific

intent to kill.

So under a direct theory, who did it? The prosecution's telling you Deangelo didn't do it. Ignore that part. They're telling you he did it either under a conspiracy theory or an aiding and abetting theory. This says, 18, murder is a specific intent crime. So he cannot be convicted of first-degree murder if somebody else did it unless they also prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt that Deangelo's specific intent was to kill, to kill.

This instruction resolves first-degree murder for you. There is none. They never showed what's in Deangelo's head beyond a reasonable doubt. In fact, they did more to show what's in his head as it pertains to battery than it does as it pertains to killing. They showed both sides. When they showed both, they didn't prove anything beyond a reasonable doubt.

Now, there's another instruction that's very important that I want you to look at. This is Instruction No. 10. It's the lying in wait instruction. [Inaudible]. Lying in wait talks about another theory of first-degree murder. In every circumstance, first-degree murder is a specific intent crime. You cannot convict anyone of first-degree murder unless they specifically -- unless you know what they specifically intended in their head before a killing. If you don't know, then your instruction says you

must, must choose something else. You cannot pick first-degree murder.

Lying in wait says — look, there's two paragraphs. The first talks about sitting somewhere to consider yourself [inaudible] and secret design to take somebody by surprise. Well, yes, the defense doesn't deny that Deangelo went up to the mountain and conspired to batter. And in order to [inaudible], it's a battery. So the first half of that definition is easy. The defense isn't denying these things. I'm not telling you to ignore some facts and just focus on others.

But the second part is just as easy as any other specific intent crime because the prosecution never proved what's in Deangelo's head. To constitute murder by means of lying in wait, there must be, in addition to the [inaudible] said conduct by defendant, an intentional infliction upon the person killed of bodily harm involving a high degree of probability that it will result in death. So an intentional infliction of harm involving a high degree of probability that it will result in death.

So did the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Deangelo not only intended to commit some sort of battery, some form of battery, but he specifically intended to be of such high degree that there's a substantial chance that there'll be death? Well, we can take care of this pretty

easily. The evidence of that was absolutely none. They point to Deangelo saying, H said hurt him bad. They point to somebody else saying, We wanted him hurt. They point to a lot of other evidence that says, We told you to beat him up, if that. We told you to talk to him, if that.

The prosecution's evidence is all over the place.

Don't let them circle two words, hurt bad, and say, well,
there it is, beyond a reasonable doubt, Deangelo knew that
this was going to be a beating that was so bad that it would
logically only lead to some sort of killing. Read this
instruction and follow the instruction. Unless they prove
beyond a reasonable doubt Deangelo's specific intent, if you
knew — only if you know exactly what was in his head beyond a
reasonable doubt can you convict of first-degree murder under
any theory, including lying in wait. That's absolutely the
law in this case. And if you do not believe they've proven to
you beyond a reasonable doubt Deangelo's specific intent, you
cannot convict him of first-degree murder.

Now, the first-degree murder instruction was put up by the prosecution. It's Instruction No. 8, but I disposed of all these arguments already, so I promise I'm winding down because all of these have to do with specific intent. It says you must prove a murder that is perpetrated by means of any kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, all three elements, all three, wilfulness, deliberation and

premeditation. All three have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before an accused can be convicted of first-degree murder. So I've made my point over and over about specific intent.

All three of those elements have to be met, all three of those elements have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It says that unless you knew he specifically intended to kill, there is no first-degree murder. That's what these elements say. That's what wilfulness means. That's what deliberation means. His specific intent to cause a killing, unless they prove that beyond a reasonable doubt, you can't have first-degree murder. So I've already talked about these they things.

Second-degree murder, in definition No. 12, I'm not going to spend a lot -- much time on either, because this is a manslaughter case. Second-degree murder is something that you should look at. Like all the other instructions, they're all equally important. All murder which is not murder in the first degree is second degree. Murder with malice aforethought but without the mixture of premeditation and deliberation is second-degree murder or an involuntary killing which occurs in the commission of an unlawful act which, as a consequence, naturally tends to destroy the life of a human being or an involuntary killing which was committed in the prosecution of a felonious intent.

There's a definition of malice, Instruction No. 7.

There's two types of malice, expressed and implied. Express is intent to kill. So without intent to kill, there's no expressed malice. Implied malice is a similar concept. Take a look at it and go through it. It doesn't particularly apply.

What you're going to look at is whether or not Deangelo's intent was felonious or whether Deangelo's intent caused something that naturally tends to kill. In other words, if Deangelo intended a battery, is that something that you would say, well, people naturally tend to die from a battery? Of course not. From a battery, from somebody -- what's supposed to be somebody getting beat up, that doesn't naturally lead towards death.

But you're also going to look at whether or not his intent was felonious and there are definitions in there of what a felony is. There's three battery options given. There is battery with substantial bodily harm. Did Deangelo intend the battery beyond a reasonable doubt to be so bad that there was intentional bodily harm? Did Deangelo intend the battery to be so bad that there would be a disfigurement or some long-term pain or something along those lines, or did Deangelo intend there to be a weapon used? Those are both felonies. Or did they just show that Deangelo intended that there be a battery? That's Instruction 26 that I talked about earlier.

If the prosecutors didn't prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he conspired to do any one of them -- in other words, if they present evidence that leads you all over the place, you must find him guilty of conspiracy to commit battery, which is all the evidence there was in this case. There's no details as to anything beyond conspiracy to commit battery.

The manslaughter definition absolutely applies.

There's Instruction No. 13 and it says involuntary

manslaughter is the killing of a human being without any

intent to do so in the commission of an unlawful act or lawful

act which probably might produce such consequence in an

unlawful manner. It talks about if you intended to commit a

felony, just like in the second-degree murder definition, and

then somebody dies as a natural consequence, that could be

second-degree murder. But that's a general intent crime, not

a specific intent crime.

But it also says if you do an unlawful act where you did not intend to kill but somebody dies, that is absolutely manslaughter. Beyond a reasonable doubt, Deangelo's goal was to hurt somebody, to commit a battery. That's what you know beyond a reasonable doubt. And that definition makes it absolutely clear. It's manslaughter.

KC's goal was to murder. He pulled out a gun and shot a man twice in the head. He killed him. But no evidence

was presented, none, that Deangelo intended to kill.

A little corroboration was presented that H maybe intended to kill. A lot of corroboration was presented that Deangelo didn't want Timothy dead or shot, but no evidence was presented that Deangelo wanted Timothy dead, that Deangelo intended to kill.

Don't give in to two two-minute snippets of a two and a half hour statement. Listen to what was corroborated in the second statement. Look at how Deangelo answered the police's question, how are you going to prove what you're saying, by proving it, by showing it was supposed to be a battery.

Every one of the prosecution witnesses agree nobody knew KC had a gun. Every one of the prosecution witnesses corroborated the fact that nobody new KC had a gun that night. Even Rontae does.

Also, all the prosecution witnesses confirm or corroborate that Deangelo was told to bring baseball bats and garbage bags, and then all the witnesses corroborate that Deangelo did not bring baseball bats and garbage bags. Zero evidence, none was presented, none.

The prosecution says, you know, they were going to pop his noodle with these bats and this is obviously one that's so bad that it arises to the level of lying in wait, and knew the guy was going to die, even if they didn't intend

to kill him, but they forget to mention to you that no prosecution witness offered any evidence that Deangelo listened to what he was told.

Everybody agrees someone calls, maybe Little Lou, and says, Bring baseball bats and garbage bags, but Deangelo had his own plan. He didn't intend to kill. He didn't. He didn't bring baseball bats. Every single bit of evidence presented to you by the prosecution confirms he didn't bring baseball bats. No evidence shows that he did, or garbage bags. Every bit of evidence by the prosecution shows that nobody saw a gun on KC, no one.

So when you talk about these options of, did he prove that he conspired to cause substantial bodily harm, well, he chose not to bring the bats. When they talk about the options of, did Deangelo conspire to do battery with a weapon, well, Deangelo didn't bring a weapon. He chose not to bring it and nobody knew that KC had a weapon.

So what are you left with? Conspiracy to commit battery and battery only. And that's what the prosecution evidence shows. They literally presented no evidence of anything else. If you can't show beyond a reasonable doubt whether it was battery with substantial harm or battery with a weapon or battery, you must convict of conspiracy to commit battery. That's what that statute says.

In fact, even a deadly weapon, you know, of course a

deadly weapon was used in the commission of this case, but you're to pick whether or not Deangelo used a deadly weapon. One of your options are first-degree murder with use of a deadly weapon, another one is first-degree murder, another is second-degree murder, another is second with use of a deadly weapon. I'm hoping you're just going to pick manslaughter and we don't have to worry about a deadly weapon, but if you do look at other options, deadly weapon is one of your choices.

In fact, the prosecution never proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Deangelo knew two things, two things that he has to know, that a deadly weapon was even brought up there, one; and that, two, it was going to be used. He had to have knowledge of the use of a deadly weapon. That's Instruction No. 29, or you cannot convict Deangelo of use of a deadly weapon.

So if the prosecution did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Deangelo knew that, one, KC had a gun; and, two, KC was going to use it, beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find not guilty on the with a deadly weapon portion in your verdict form.

And then, of course, all the prosecution evidence was the same. Rontae said he never saw a weapon on KC.

Deangelo said he didn't know KC had a weapon. Deangelo said to Anabel he didn't know KC had a weapon when he brought him.

Deangelo said to police he didn't know KC had a weapon.

Deangelo says over and over it was supposed to be a beating and not a killing, so even if he knew there was a weapon, even if you think he knew KC always carried a weapon, if it was just supposed to be a beating, he has to know beyond a reasonable doubt that KC was going to use the weapon too. So even on this section the prosecution's not proving beyond a reasonable doubt as to Deangelo that a deadly weapon was used.

Now, the last thing I want to say before I wrap up, because again, you know, the prosecution's about to get back up here and they're going to talk to you one more time and then make whatever final arguments they think they need to make at this point, but I can't get back up and comment on it, so here's what I want to leave you with. This is what I want you to really think about because this is the crux of the case, and it all deals with what I said, specific intent, corroboration.

I know Deangelo gave conflicting versions of events.

Unlike the prosecution, I'm telling you that he gave two

versions of events. I'm not harping on three lines of a two

and a half hour hearing. I'm talking about the entire

meeting. We know he gave conflicting versions of events, but

don't let the prosecution pick and choose the parts that they

like and say, see, we corroborated it, therefore, it's beyond

a reasonable doubt. Don't let them say, hey, any evidence

that you heard that happens to help the prosecution, please

take it into consideration, and any evidence that we presented to you that happens to help the defense, please ignore it.

Don't let them do that in any form of any good fancy argument.

Don't let them do it. It's disingenuous.

Hold them to the choices that they made with the witnesses that they called and the evidence that they presented and the way that they chose to present it. Hold them to this. And if you're thinking, like I said earlier, if you're thinking — aren't you doing the same thing, defense, aren't you saying there's two versions of events and please just take my events seriously? That's where I want to be clear. That's not what I'm doing. That's not. The defense has no burden, the prosecution does. We have none.

If the defense presents to you two versions of events that are corroborated, and all of their witnesses agree that it was corroborated, all of them, if they present evidence of two versions of events that are corroborated, then they have not met their burden. They have to show one thing beyond a reasonable doubt, Deangelo's specific intent. That's what they have to show. But if they say, here's evidence that specific intent was to kill, here's evidence that it was to beat really bad, here's evidence that it was to beat, here's evidence that it was to commit a minor battery and so forth, they've proven nothing, absolutely nothing. So it's disingenuous to say only look at the parts that help us and

ignore the stuff that doesn't. The defense isn't doing that.

The prosecution has a burden and the defense has none at all.

If they've corroborated two versions of an event, you must give Deangelo the benefit of the doubt. Look at instruction. You must give the benefit of the doubt and convict him of conspiracy to commit battery. That's what he did. You must give him the benefit of the doubt and convict him of manslaughter. That's what he did. No matter what they argue, their evidence is what shows you this. Their evidence leads to this.

Instructions 22 and 26, they use the word must, and I know you're going to go back and look at it, not can, not should, you must find guilty of these if it has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt which version of events is true.

now, in the end, I know I stood here for a long time, but this case is about three things, specific intent -- really that's all it's about -- corroboration and credibility. What corroboration was there, what's this Deangelo's head. When you deliberate, please think about any piece of evidence that you look at and say, does this tend to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Deangelo intended anything? Did they ever get into Deangelo's head and tell you what he intended? Did they really ever do it? Did Deangelo show you corroborating evidence through their evidence that maybe it

wasn't supposed to be a killing? Is there room for reasonable doubt? Of course there is.

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Ask why the prosecution called Rontae Zone when you go back there and talk about Rontae Zone. Please ask why, because there's no case for what's in Deangelo's head, so you have to put on somebody like that and hope it doesn't backfire.

You can think about why Anabel wasn't called. I'm not going to speculate as to what she would have said, except we know exactly what she would have said from the tape.

Beyond that, I'm not going to speculate. But you can think about what they choose to tell you, what they chose not to tell you, when they chose to tell it to you, and how. But they did chose to present to you Anabel Espindola, coconspirator, all on tape, and they chose to present it to you with Deangelo making this tape for the police, cooperating and saying that — maybe a personal, selfish motive — I will prove to you what I just said is true. Hey, Anabel we took care of him. What are you mad at? And Anabel says, It was supposed to be — what are you talking about? It was supposed to be a beating, not a killing. That's the evidence they presented to you.

What was in Deangelo's head? If look at the prosecution's case, you have no idea. First-degree murder is a specific intent crime. The State has not proven beyond a

reasonable doubt what Deangelo's specific intent was as it applies to a killing, as it applies to lying in wait, you must find him not guilty of first-degree murder.

Deangelo is guilty. He absolutely is guilty of something, and that's what we're asking you to do. Find him guilty of what he should have been charged with in the first place. He conspired to commit battery, commit a manslaughter. That's what your instructions tell you you must do. This is justice in this case. Other defendants will get their own justice, but as to Deangelo Carroll, that's justice. That's what he did.

Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Bunin.

Mr. DiGiacomo.

MR. DIGIACOMO: Thank you.

STATE'S REBUTTAL ARGUMENT

MR. DIGIACOMO: You know, every trial is about the truth, right? Just like the detective says, it's about the truth. Five years and five days later, Timothy Hadland, justice for Timothy Hadland, justice for executing your friend, is involuntary manslaughter. Well, first of all, Mr. Bunin, in his argument to you, I know he read you a couple of lines from the jury instructions, he kind of skipped over the law as it relates to involuntary manslaughter.

Because even if you were to believe absolutely

everything Mr. Bunin told you, absolutely every single word he told you, you missed the law. See, because when you commit a conspiracy to commit battery, the law tells you the exact same thing that Mr. Bunin did, because I wrote it down, and he went, well, something he said is true. Sometimes stuff like this happens, right? That's what he said. Hey, he meant to commit a battery and sometimes stuff like this happens. Well, the law says if you conspire to commit a battery and it's a natural and probable or foreseeable — that someone's going to die, you're already guilty of second-degree murder.

Don't make this a contest. They get up and say involuntary. We get up and say first-degree murder. You guys negotiate down the middle somewhere, second-degree murder.

As a matter of legal analysis alone, he can be guilty of nothing less than second-degree murder. But it would be a travesty of justice if you did anything less than the truth, the absolute truth.

Now, let's talk about what that truth is. I mean, because I'm standing up here five years and four days or five days later and I'm thinking to myself, oh, my God, I've got an hour confession from the defendant. And the defense attorney's arguing involuntary manslaughter. I've got a guy lying on the side of the road where the first shot entered the side of his face and came up to the side of his head just like he was standing this way facing the driver. And then the

second shot is angled sharply from his ear up to the top of his head as he put the cu de gra to his head.

And you say to yourself, oh, that's involuntary manslaughter because, hey, he didn't know. He didn't know that Kenneth Counts might do the shooting, despite the fact that he talked about it for an hour. He talked about it for an hour. How many criminal defendants — let me rephrase that. He says, believe my client is lying to the police when he says, they ordered me to kill him, so I killed him. What's his motivation for saying, yes, I'm guilty of first-degree murder to the police? Why does he falsely say that? Were they beating him with rubber hoses? Were they pulling out his fingernails at the time?

Detective Wildemann is sitting there having a conversation like you would have with somebody across your desk. It is a calm, cool, collected conversation. So let's talk about why it is Deangelo did what he did and then let's talk about there's not a single shred of corroboration of a battery. When Mr. Bunin says things to you, don't take what he says. In fact, don't take what I say, and don't take what Mr. Pesci says. Watch the tape, listen to the wires, go over the evidence and I challenge you to find a single shred of evidence that says that this case was going to be a beating.

And when you get to that point, you're not going to find a single shred of evidence. You will hear Anabel say, we

just wanted him beat, but Mr. Carroll, in his entire statement to the police, every time says they wanted him killed. What he says at one point, which is an hour and 48 minutes in, by the way, after he's agreed three times to wear a wire to prove it's a murder for hire, by the way, not, I'm wearing a wire to prove that I thought it was supposed to be a beating. He says, I'm going to wear a wire to prove this is a murder for hire. And then later -- and we'll talk about why he gets there later. He says, I just meant it to be a beating.

But then when Detective Wildemann confronts him about, what do you mean it was just a beating, you told me for an hour and a half that this was supposed to be a killing, you kept saying this is a killing, this is a killing, this is a killing, do you know what he says? Not, well, you know, KC went crazy. He goes well, no, actually I only wanted it to be a beating, but when I told Kenneth Counts, the black keystone gangster who will pop somebody's noodle if the money is right, a guy who just, quote, don't give a fuck, that guy, I said, Mr. H wants somebody dealt with, taken care of.

And go through the entire two hours and 34 minutes. Find yourself where in there Deangelo Carroll says, well, I told KC it was supposed to be a beating and he went crazy. Find in there in a single spot he says it. At one point he minimizes his behavior and he says, I only wanted it to be a beating, but this isn't about motive, what he wanted. It's

about what he did, what he knew, what he intended. He knew
Timothy Hadland was going to be killed. Whether he wanted to
do it or not do it, go back to the evidence.

Let's talk about Rontae Zone. Look, I wish I could pick my witnesses. I wish to God, Mother Theresa decided to get into a car with three other thugs to go out and commit a homicide. It doesn't happen very often. I don't get to choose them. Rontae Zone isn't my friend. Rontae Zone is his friend. And before we beat up on Rontae Zone too much or beat up on us for calling him, let's talk about a few things that we know about Rontae Zone.

They seem to imply that Mr. Pesci and myself should have charged Rontae Zone with murder or something else but Deangelo Carroll, he's innocent, was the words I heard. Okay. Go back to your instruction for a second and let's talk about Rontae Zone.

Look, Rontae Zone says, I was a knowing spectator, right? That's what he says. I knew it was going to happen, I didn't want to help, didn't really want to go, but I went anyways. I watched it happened. That's his story. Now, as a prosecutor, that may be wrong, that may not be true. They're suggesting I should prosecute him when I have an hour and a half confession of a guy that says it was a killing and they're up here arguing he's innocent.

What does Deangelo Carroll say to the police?

Rontae Zone had nothing to do with it. But I'm not telling you you should buy what Rontae Zone said on the stand. What I would suggest to you is what he said to the police when he had no time to manufacture a story with Mr. Carroll might be something that's relevant for you to look at, right? Because if the only thing he heard from Mr. Carroll was, you tell the truth or we're all going to jail, and then he gets driven down to the police station, what does he tell the police? Mr. H wanted the guy dealt with. It was going to be a murder. TJ was going to be shot. It wasn't a beating. It wasn't a robbery.

Jay Jay had a 22. Deangelo Carroll gave Jay Jay the 22.

What else does he say? That they drove back to the Palomino Club, that Kenneth Counts got paid \$6,000, but I got nothing, Jayson got nothing. What does Mr. Carroll say? He's got nothing. If this was just a beating, why is it that the story out of Rontae Zone's mouth — why does he say it's a murder for hire within moments of the cops first contacting him? I'm not telling you that what Rontae did from the stand was not despicable from every reasonable human being's point of view, but that's not the reason he gets called. He gets called because he couldn't have manufactured what he told the police that day that perfectly matches the story that Deangelo Carroll tells the police during that hour and a half, that

hour and 48 minutes before he finally goes, oh, wait, wait, I didn't mean for him to die. That's the reason that Rontae Zone gets call. Okay.

Well, what else do you have? Well, we've already talked about you have the two shots. You have the car exactly in position where the car should be. You have the sliding door open. You have Mr. Carroll speaking to the person when he gets shot, right? All of that corroborates the hour and 48 minutes before that he's talking about.

What else do you know? Mr. Carroll says this -okay. Let me start over. Mr. Carroll says, I had nothing to
do with this, the story that allegedly Anabel and Mr. H
provided him. I had nothing to do with this. I was making
these phone calls on my deck. My son was sick. I had nothing
to do with it.

Now, you've got to remember, though, the next statement he says to him is, okay, well, we're kind of smelling that maybe you're not telling us the truth, and then he says, okay, fine, I drove out there, but I never got a hold of him. So then they say, okay, well, that can't totally be true. Okay, fine, you know, it was a robbery. KC did it. So he's going to accuse KC of first-degree murder, capital murder. He was going to do a robbery, but then, you know, I didn't want him to, but he just killed the guy.

And then listen at the very end of his statement

because I don't want you to walk back there and just go, hey, he confessed, let's hit him for first-degree murder, let's move on. Actually, I want you to do a little search for the truth. What really happened? Because listening to what he says at the end of the first hour — it's about 40-some odd minutes in, 49 minutes or so in, they say, we got to take the van. And he says, well, I don't want anybody at work to know that I've told you guys anything. And they say, hey, look, I'm sorry, but we've got to take the van. I'm sorry. And then they leave the room and it's 20 minutes.

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And what's Deangelo Carroll thinking at that point, right? And I think there was some, you know, the elephant in Why is Deangelo Carroll charged with murder when he the room. was helping the police? Well, he committed murder, right. You know, TJ Hadland doesn't get justice because he happened That's the way it works? No. But he's sitting to confess. in his room and he's thinking. And he's thinking and he's thinking and the cops walk back in the room and there wasn't any pressure by the cops at that point. They walked back in the room and they say, hey, we're going to talk a little bit more. And he goes, well, there's a lot more to tell you. they say, well, yeah, we know you are. And they're still thinking about the -- KC and it's a robbery gone bad and all this other stuff. And what does he say?

Without prompting, it was a hit. Mr. H committed a

hit. Jay Jay, Rontae, he had nothing to do with it. What's he thinking in his mind at this point, right? He's thinking, uh-oh, they go take the van, they're going to realize that they're implicated and now I've got to be the first guy to the trough. That's what he's thinking.

And then he tells his story and then he's acting like, oh, well, you know — he doesn't really act like he's really upset his friend's dead, but he says it on other occasions. First he says, and I will suggest to you that this isn't the truth, he says the first contact he has, the first time he — that there's any conspiracy is Little Lou calling him. Now, he says it's on a walkie—talkie. You know from the records it's not. He is in his living room. It is on a phone. It's on a phone line. And he says, bring baseball bats and garbage bags.

And Mr. Bunin got up here and said every witness corroborates that. Actually, I can't think of a single witness that corroborates that. Rontae Zone said that didn't — he doesn't know anything about baseball bats and garbage bags and other witnesses we called don't know anything about baseball bats and garbage bags, but that's the first thing that was said, according to Mr. Carroll.

What do you know that's kind of a little strange?

You know that Rontae and Jayson are with Deangelo Carroll from
the moment that they start working between 5:00 and 6:00 at

night at the Palomino Club. You know it's daytime. You know that Deangelo Carroll has talked to Jayson and Rontae about dealing with a guy and you know he's provided a .22 caliber gun to Jayson Taoipu. And, weird, you know that Deangelo Carroll earlier that day, like he tells the police, has already seen Kenneth Counts.

And he didn't go over there in the white van and he didn't go over there with Rontae Zone. According to Mr. Carroll, he goes to see Kenneth Counts with Jayson Taoipu being driven by his uncle's girlfriend Felicia and he says to him, my boss wants somebody handled. He just got lucky that at 7:42 that night he gets a phone call going, hey, somebody — I want somebody handled? What, he just got lucky earlier in the day that he did that? It corroborates not just Rontae Zone, that the conversation happens earlier, but it also indicates that even when he's talking to the police after this initial interview, he's not being fully truthful to you.

And then you go back and look at the phone records. He's calling Anabel early in the afternoon, 2:00, 3:00 in the afternoon. He's calling Anabel again from his home phone. It's not them calling him. It's him calling them and having the conversation. This story of, we wanted TJ hurt, okay, within five minutes I walk out of the club, I go get Kenneth Counts and I drive out there to kill him, that's not the whole truth. Look at the statement and ask yourself what really

happened.

What else do you know? You know that Little Lou wants this guy done and you hear on the wire, he says, I told you to take care of TJ, and then you went off and got KC. What were you thinking? I told you. That was your job to go do that, right?

Well, what else does he say? Mr. Carroll says, I go in without Jayson and Rontae to the Palomino Club, and he's consistent on the story every time. At first he wanted him hurt real bad and then he told me, Do what it takes to knock him off, kill him. That's his story. And even later on when the entire statement is over, he never deviates from that. The order is to kill. That's it. That's all he says.

What else do you know? Despite what Mr. Bunin said, you can count four separate times before a minute and 48 where he acknowledges that he tells KC the order is a killing, four separate times. So let me get this straight. Deangelo Carroll, who's just an innocent guy, is going to manufacture a capital murder case against Little Lou, Anabel Espindola, KC Counts. He doesn't really implicate Jayson and Rontae. But you know what? He's really kind of innocent.

What does he say? He says, I didn't want to do it.

I didn't want it on my conscience so I went and got KC, one
time. He says another time that he wanted him knocked off and
he told me to tell dude whatever it is he needed to do to take

him out. So I went and got KC. He says it four separate times. And they ask him -- and I would dispute with some of the suggestion in this case that Detective Vaccaro gets him to change his story. Actually, Detective Vaccaro comes in the room, he says, how am I going to prove it. He says, I'll wear a wire. And what he offers to wear a wire for is that Kenneth Counts said, quote, I pop a -- and the word's noodle, if the money was right. It's still a killing at that point.

It's not until Detective Vaccaro says this, this only, that causes him to change his mind: So you're telling me that you loaded up a car with four thugs and you knew your friend was going to get killed out there and you lured your friend out there to that location and you drove the guys out there to kill? And at that moment you could see the look on Deangelo Carroll's face. Uh-oh, I'm no trouble. And then he starts trying to minimize his behavior, but even at the end of it, he even acknowledges he never told Kenneth Counts to beat him.

So then let's talk about the wires. Look, the suggestion from the defense was that there was something wrong with what the police were doing. Okay. Deangelo Carroll has just accused a business owner and two managers of a business — you may not like the business, but it's a business — of being involved in a capital murder for hire. That's what he's just done.

Now, the police could say, you know what, we're not going to go and investigate this any farther. We're just going to throw you in jail and we're just going to prosecute you for it, or they can do their job, which is to determine the truth. So when Mr. Carroll offers to wear the wire, what are they supposed to say, no, I'm sorry, you're going to be a defendant in this case so we're not going to put a wire on you? No, they do what any reasonable person does in investigating a case. They put a recording device on him and they send him in the room.

And Mr. Bunin repeatedly says that those recordings somehow prove that it's a beating. Really? Well, if that were true, why didn't Deangelo Carroll walk in and say, hey, you guys wanted this guy beat, I know KC went nuts, but look, we've got problems. That's not what he says. He says, You wanted him done, we did him. Now you're going to have to pay the consequences.

And Anabel's reaction is exactly what her reaction was when he told the police her action was. When he came back to that Palomino in his statement, and this never changes in his entire statement, he says, hey, KC shot, dude. Mr. H said, I just want him beat, and Deangelo Carroll says, that's not what you said. And Anabel doesn't want to pay the money and they order Anabel to go get the money.

Look, when she says on that recording, we just

wanted him beat, whether or not Anabel thought it was going to be a killing or not isn't really a question for this jury, but it's consistent with exactly what he said in his statement which is, that's not what you said. That in no way corroborates Deangelo Carroll.

And when they talk about, well, KC just went off on his own, find in there where he says, well, we were just going to beat the guy but then KC went nuts and he shot him. That's not what it says on the wire. Listen to the wire. He says, we were going to call it quits and KC went nuts and still shot the dude. He didn't say anything about a beating on there at all.

And listen to the rest of the recording of Anabel saying, not, we wanted a beat. Anabel was talking about, how could you be so stupid, you have that many eyes on your ass.

And, you know, why would you do that?

But most importantly is on the 24th because the 24th -- Mr. Bunin didn't even ask about it or didn't even talk about it. How is that possible if Deangelo Carroll's mind set was I just wanted a beating? Because what does he say to Anabel? Remember in his statement what he told the police was, Anabel called me when we were halfway out there and she said -- well, he says two things. First, in his first part of the statement, he says, after it was over, Anabel called me and said she just wanted him beat, but it was too late.

Remember that, when he says that to you -- or says that to the detectives?

And then later on when they're pinning him down on specifics, he says, I received a phone call from Anabel Espindola and she says, if he's alone, do him. If he's with anybody else, fuck him up and fuck up whoever he's with. That's what he says.

Now, go to the phone records and look at the phone records because the other thing he says is, you'll find that there's a borrowed cell phone call between myself and Anabel Espindola. Remember that? And his walkie-talkie doesn't work? And then you have Kenneth Counts' cell phone shortly before the murder making a phone call in to Anabel.

And remember what happens on the wire afterwards, right. It's not Deangelo saying -- or it's not Anabel saying, if he's with somebody -- or if he's alone, kill him. If he's with somebody, just beat him up. You learn from those wires it's actually Deangelo Carroll relaying that to Anabel. So what you're saying is if he's alone, you still want me to kill him? Her response to that is not, what are you talking about? Her response is -- and he says, you said yeah, and she says, I did not say yeah. Deangelo, I told you to go to plan B, and Deangelo starts pushing on. Yeah, and you said if he was with somebody else, I should just beat him. Deangelo, I told you to go to plan B. I tried to call you and tell you no. I told

| 1 | you no. |
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| 2 | And then you go to the phone records and you can see |
| 3 | exactly what happened in this case. He got the order to kill |
| 4 | which was if he's alone, kill him, and he did everything in |
| 5 | his power to make sure he was alone. And he collected Kenneth |
| 6 | Counts and he drove out there and he killed him. |
| 7 | And they want you to say justice for Timothy Hadland |
| 8 | is somehow an involuntary manslaughter like he pushed TJ and |
| 9 | he hit his head on the curb or he left a firearm around and |
| ro | some kid picked it up and shot himself. |
| L1 | MR. BUNIN: I object to that. That's an improper |
| 12 | THE COURT: All right. That's sustained. |
| L3 | MR. DIGIACOMO: Okay. He wants you to believe that |
| L4 | somehow it's just an accident. Oops, sorry, TJ. |
| 15 | MR. BUNIN: I object again too, Your Honor. |
| ۱6 | That's I know he's just making argument now, but that's |
| 17 | absolutely improper. It's not what was argued. |
| 18 | MR. DIGIACOMO: That's what involuntary is. It's an |
| 19 | accident. |
| 20 | MR. BUNIN: Now, that's absolutely out of line. |
| 21 | THE COURT: All right. |
| 22 | MR. BUNIN: I don't know if we need to approach, but |
| 23 | something I don't know if we need to have a separate |
| 24 | instruction now. |
| 25 | THE COURT: Already. No, I don't think we need a |

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separate instruction.

And, ladies and gentlemen, of course, you're reminded this is just Mr. DiGiacomo's commentary on what he thinks Mr. Bunin argued or what he remembers. It's your collective recollection of what Mr. Bunin said and what Mr. Bunin's argument is that should control when you think about this. But, of course, neither argument — or no one's argument is evidence. It's, you know, the testimony and the exhibits.

Go on, Mr. DiGiacomo.

MR. DIGIACOMO: Thank you.

That's involuntary manslaughter. It's an accident that happened in an unlawful manner. That's what he wants you to convict him of.

Ladies and gentlemen, I don't want you to just go back there and look at the tape and say, oh, he confessed so he must be guilty. I think it's your duty to go back there and look at the evidence. Go back there, go through the wire recording, go through the physical evidence. Ask yourself how he can't be guilty of a deadly weapon when you know he gave Jay Jay a .22. Ask yourself how he can be less than guilty of first-degree murder when he acknowledges and everybody acknowledges that the order was a killing. That's your duty.

And I submit to you that if the group of 12 of you go back to that room and actually look at the evidence in this

case, actually focus on the evidence, not what we're saying, look at what the evidence is, that you'll be able to determine the truth because there's at least one person in this room that knows that he intended to kill Timothy Hadland, and I submit to you that if you're doing your job, you'll come back here and you'll tell him that you know too.

Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. The clerk will now charge the officer to take charge of the jury.

(Officer sworn)

THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, in a minute, I'm going to have all 15 of you collect your belongings as well as your notepads and follow Officer Wooten through the rear of the courtroom.

As you may already have ascertained, a jury, criminal jury, is composed of 12 members. There are 15 of you. Three of you are the alternates. The alternates were predesignated as Jurors 13, 14, and 15.

Ms. Sorto-De-McGough, Mr. Rettinger, and
Ms. Rinaldi. I'd like all three of you to also exit the
courtroom and provide phone numbers where you could be
reached. If, God forbid, one of the regular jurors is not
able to fulfill their jury function, you will be called back.
For that reason, let me just state that the prohibition on
discussing the case or reading anything relating to any

subject matter with respect to the case or doing any independent research obviously still pertains and pertains until you've received a phone call from the marshal indicating that your service as a juror has been discharged. So until that time, obviously you are still considered a potential member of the jury and therefore that prohibition still applies.

Lunch is in the back for the members of the jury.

Obviously the alternates are also welcome to have lunch. The jury cannot begin deliberating until only the 12 of you are in the jury room without the presence of the alternate or any Court staff or anything like that.

Having said that, I'd like all of you, once again, to collect your belongings and follow Jeff through the rear door.

(Jury recessed to deliberate at 2:08 p.m.)

THE COURT: Lawyers, phone numbers where you can be reached.

The -- it may still be wrong, but I thought you were suggesting those were like the only ways you could get to an involuntary. That's why I sustained the objection. Response to your snotty comment?

MR. DIGIACOMO: What -- well, I was stunned when you said sustained.

THE COURT: That's why I wasn't saying it wasn't

involuntary -- right or wrong, that was my rationale. That --it sounded like that was the only things. (Court recessed at 2:09 p.m.) KARR REPORTING, INC.

ATTEST: I hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability.

KIMBERLY LAWSON

TRANSCRIBER

| 1 | INST | | |
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| 2 | FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. COMESTION | | |
| 3 | CLEPK OF THE SULTE 2:05 P | | |
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| 5 | DISTRICT COURT BY, JUNE HUSTED DEBUTY | | |
| 6 | DISTRICT COURT BY, DENISE HUSTED, DEPUTY CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA | | |
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| 8 | THE STATE OF NEVADA,) | | |
| 9 | Plaintiff, CASE NO: C212667 | | |
| 10 | -vs- S DEPT NO: XXI | | |
| 11 | DEANGELO RESHAWN CARROLL, | | |
| 12 | Defendant. | | |
| 13 | INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY (INSTRUCTION NO. I) | | |
| 14 | MEMBERS OF THE JURY: | | |
| 15 | It is now my duty as judge to instruct you in the law that applies to this case. It is | | |
| 16 | your duty as jurors to follow these instructions and to apply the rules of law to the facts as | | |
| 17 | you find them from the evidence. | | |
| 18 | You must not be concerned with the wisdom of any rule of law stated in thes | | |
| 19 | instructions. Regardless of any opinion you may have as to what the law ought to be, i | | |
| 20 | would be a violation of your oath to base a verdict upon any other view of the law than that | | |
| 21 | given in the instructions of the Court. | | |
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INSTRUCTION NO.__2_

If, in these instructions, any rule, direction or idea is repeated or stated in different ways, no emphasis thereon is intended by me and none may be inferred by you. For that reason, you are not to single out any certain sentence or any individual point or instruction and ignore the others, but you are to consider all the instructions as a whole and regard each in the light of all the others.

The order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative importance.

An Information is but a formal method of accusing a person of a crime and is not of itself any evidence of his guilt and does not create any presumption or permit any inference of guilt.

In this case, it is charged in an Information that on or about the 19th day of May, 2005, the Defendant, DEANGELO RESHAWN CARROLL, having committed the crimes of CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER (Felony - NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.165); MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (Felony - NRS 200.010, 200.030, 193.165), within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, contrary to the form, force and effect of statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Nevada,

COUNT 1 - CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER

Defendant DEANGELO RESHAWN CARROLL, along with co-conspirators KENNETH JAY COUNTS, ANABEL ESPINDOLA, LUIS ALONSO HIDALGO, III and JAYSON TAOIPU did, on or about May 19, 2005, then and there meet with each other and/or Luis Hildago, Jr. and between themselves, and each of them with the other, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously conspire and agree to commit a crime, to-wit: the murder of TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND, and in furtherance of said conspiracy, the Defendants and/or their co-conspirators, did commit the act as set forth in Count 2, said acts being incorporated by this reference as though fully set forth herein.

COUNT 2 - MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON

Defendant DEANGELO RESHAWN CARROLL, along with co-conspirators KENNETH JAY COUNTS, ANABEL ESPINDOLA, LUIS ALONSO HIDALGO, III and JAYSON TAOIPU did, on or about May 19, 2005, then and there wilfully, feloniously, without authority of law, and with premeditation and deliberation, and with malice aforethought, kill TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND, a human being, by shooting at and into the body and/or head of said TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND, with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm, the Defendant being liable under one or more of the following theories of criminal

liability, to-wit: (1) by directly or indirectly committing the acts with premeditation and deliberation and/or lying in wait; and/or (2) by aiding and abetting the commission of the crime by, directly or indirectly, counseling, encouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing or otherwise procuring each other to commit the crime, to-wit: by DEFENDANT Luis Hidalgo, III and/or Luis Hidalgo, Jr., procuring Defendant DEANGELO CARROLL to beat and/or kill TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND; thereafter, Defendant DEANGELO CARROLL procuring KENNETH COUNTS and/or JAYSON TAOIPU to shoot TIMOTHY HADLAND; thereafter, Defendant DEANGELO CARROLL and KENNETH COUNTS and JAYSON TAOIPU did drive to the location in the same vehicle; thereafter, Defendant DEANGELO CARROLL calling victim TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND to the scene; thereafter, by KENNETH COUNTS shooting TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND; and/or (3) by conspiring to commit the crime of battery and/or battery with use of a deadly weapon and/or to kill TIMOTHY JAY HADLAND whereby each and every co-conspirator is responsible for not only the specific crime intended, but also for the natural and forseeable general intent crimes of each and every co-conspirator during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.

It is the duty of the jury to apply the rules of law contained in these instructions to the facts of the case and determine whether or not the Defendant is guilty of one or more of the offenses charged.

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| INSTRUCTION NO | _4 |
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In this case the Defendant is accused in an Information alleging an open charge of murder. This charge includes and encompasses murder of the first degree, murder of the second degree and involuntary manslaughter.

| 1 | INSTRUCTION NO5 |
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| 2 | Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice aforethought, either |
| 3 | express or implied. The unlawful killing may be effected by any of the various means by |
| 4 | which death may be occasioned. |
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| INSTE | RUCTION | ON NO. | 66 |
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Malice aforethought means the intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal cause or excuse or what the law considers adequate provocation. The condition of mind described as malice aforethought may arise, from anger, hatred, revenge, or from particular ill will, spite or grudge toward the person killed. It may also arise from any unjustifiable or unlawful motive or purpose to injure another, proceeding from a heart fatally bent on mischief or with reckless disregard of consequences and social duty. Malice aforethought does not imply deliberation or the lapse of any considerable time between the malicious intention to injure another and the actual execution of the intent but denotes an unlawful purpose and design as opposed to accident and mischance.

| 1 | INSTRUCTION NO7 |
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| 2 | Express malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow |
| 3 | creature, which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof. |

Malice may be implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.

| INCTRI | CTION NO. | 8 |
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Murder of the first degree is murder which is perpetrated by means of any kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing. All three elements--willfulness, deliberation, and premeditation--must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before an accused can be convicted of first-degree murder.

Willfulness is the intent to kill. There need be no appreciable space of time between formation of the intent to kill and the act of killing.

Deliberation is the process of determining upon a course of action to kill as a result of thought, including weighing the reasons for and against the action and considering the consequences of the action.

A deliberate determination may be arrived at in a short period of time. But in all cases the determination must not be formed in passion, or if formed in passion, it must be carried out after there has been time for the passion to subside and deliberation to occur. A mere unconsidered and rash impulse is not deliberate, even though it includes the intent to kill.

Premeditation is a design, a determination to kill, distinctly formed in the mind by the time of the killing.

Premeditation need not be for a day, an hour, or even a minute. It may be as instantaneous as successive thoughts of the mind. For if the jury believes from the evidence that the act constituting the killing has been preceded by and has been the result of premeditation, no matter how rapidly the act follows the premeditation, it is premeditated.

| INSTRUCTION NO9 |
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The law does not undertake to measure in units of time the length of the period during which the thought must be pondered before it can ripen into an intent to kill which is truly deliberate and premeditated. The time will vary with different individuals and under varying circumstances.

The true test is not the duration of time, but rather the extent of the reflection. A cold, calculated judgment and decision may be arrived at in a short period of time, but a mere unconsidered and rash impulse, even though it includes an intent to kill, is not deliberation and premeditation as will fix an unlawful killing as murder of the first degree.

Murder which is immediately preceded by lying in wait is murder of the first degree.

The term "lying in wait" is defined as a waiting and watching for an opportune time to act, together with a concealment by ambush or some other secret design to take the other person by surprise. The lying in wait need not continue for any particular period of time provided that its duration is such as to show a state of mind equivalent to premeditation or deliberation.

To constitute murder by means of lying in wait there must be, in addition to the aforesaid conduct by the defendant, an intentional infliction upon the person killed of bodily harm involving a high degree of probability that it will result in death and which shows a wanton disregard for human life.

| 11131 RUCTION 11011 | INSTRUCTION NO11 | |
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Although your verdict must be unanimous as to the charge, you do not have to agree on the principle of guilt or theory of liability. Therefore, even if you cannot agree on whether the facts establish wilfull, premeditated and deliberate murder, or lying in wait, or liability as a principle, an aider and abettor or as a co-conspirator, so long as all of you agree that the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt Defendant's guilt of murder in the first degree, your verdict shall be Murder of the First Degree.

| INSTRUCTION NO. | 12 |
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All murder which is not Murder of the First Degree is Murder of the Second Degree.

Murder of the Second Degree is:

- 1. Murder with malice aforethought, but without the admixture of premeditation and deliberation, or
- 2. An involuntary killing which occurs in the commission of an unlawful act, which, in its consequences, naturally tends to destroy the life of a human being; or
 - 3. An involuntary killing which is committed in the prosecution of a felonious intent.

| INSTRUCTION NO. | 13 |
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Involuntary Manslaughter is the killing of a human being, without any intent to do so, in the commission of an unlawful act or a lawful act which probably might produce such a consequence in an unlawful manner; but where the involuntary killing occurs in the commission of an unlawful act, which, in its consequences, naturally tends to destroy the life of a human being, or is committed in the prosecution of a felonious intent, the offense is Murder.

By definition, involuntary manslaughter does not include the use of a deadly weapon in conscious furtherance of a crime.

Battery Resulting In Substantial Bodily Harm and Battery With Use of a Deadly Weapon are felonies. A Battery is a misdemeanor.

A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons for an unlawful purpose. To be guilty of conspiracy, a defendant must intend to commit, or to aid in the commission of, the specific crime agreed to. The crime is the agreement to do something unlawful; it does not matter whether it was successful or not.

A person who knowingly does any act to further the object of a conspiracy, or otherwise participates therein, is criminally liable as a conspirator. However, mere knowledge or approval of, or acquiescence in, the object and purpose of a conspiracy without an agreement to cooperate in achieving such object or purpose does not make one a party to conspiracy. Conspiracy is seldom susceptible of direct proof and is usually established by inference from the conduct of the parties. In particular, a conspiracy may be supported by a coordinated series of acts, in furtherance of the underlying offense, sufficient to infer the existence of an agreement.

A conspiracy begins when two or more persons enter into angreement for an unlawful purpose. A conspiracy to commit a crime does not end upon the completion of the crime. The conspiracy continues until the co-conspirators have successfully gotten away and concealed the crime.

| INSTRUCTION NO. | 15 |
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Once a person joins a conspiracy, that person remains a member until he withdraws from it. A person can withdraw from a conspiracy by taking some positive action which disavowed or defeated the purpose of the conspiracy before the object or purpose was completed. It is not enough if the evidence shows that the defendant merely ceased his own activities in furtherance of the conspiracy.

The state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant did not withdraw from the conspiracy.

| INSTRUCTION NO. $_$ | _16 |
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It is not necessary in proving a conspiracy to show a meeting of the alleged conspirators or the making of an express or formal agreement. The formation and existence of a conspiracy may be inferred from all circumstances tending to show the common intent and may be proved in the same way as any other fact may be proved, either by direct testimony of the fact or by circumstantial evidence, or by both direct and circumstantial evidence.

| INSTRUCTION NO. | 17 |
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Each member of a criminal conspiracy is liable for each act and bound by each declaration of every other member of the conspiracy if the act or the declaration is in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy.

The act of one conspirator pursuant to or in furtherance of the common design of the conspiracy is the act of all conspirators. Every conspirator is legally responsible for a specific intent crime of a co-conspirator so long as the specific intent crime was intended by the Defendant. A conspirator is also legally responsible for a general intent crime that follows as one of the probable and natural consequence of the object of the conspiracy even if it was not intended as part of the original plan and even if he was not present at the time of the commission of such act.

Specific intent is the intent to accomplish the precise act which the law prohibits. A general intent crime is one that does not require specific intent.

| INSTRU | JCTION | NO. | 18 |
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Murder in the First Degree is a specific intent crime. Defendant can not be liable under conspiracy and/or aiding and abetting theory for First Degree Murder for acts committed by a co-conspirator, unless, Defendant also had a premeditated and deliberate specific intent to kill or to lie in wait.

Murder in the Second Degree may be a general intent crime. As such, Defendant may be may liable under conspiracy theory or aiding and abetting theory for Murder of the Second Degree for acts committed by a co-conspirator if the killing is a one of the reasonably foreseeable probable and natural consequences of the object of the conspiracy or the aiding and abetting.

| INSTRUCTION NO. | 19 |
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Where two or more persons are accused of committing a crime together, their guilt may be established without proof that each personally did every act constituting the offense charged.

All persons concerned in the commission of a crime who either directly and actively commit the act constituting the offense or who knowingly and with criminal intent aid and abet in its commission or, whether present or not, who advise and encourage its commission, with the intent that the crime be committed, are regarded by the law as principals in the crime thus committed and are equally guilty thereof.

A person aids and abets the commission of a crime if he knowingly and with criminal intent aids, promotes, encourages or instigates by act or advice, or by act and advice, the commission of such crime with the intention that the crime be committed.

The State is not required to prove precisely which defendant actually committed the crime and which defendant aided and abetted.

| INSTRUCTION NO. 20 | STRUCTION NO20 |
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Where several parties join together in a common design to commit any lawful act, each is criminally responsible for the reasonably foreseeable general intent crimes committed furtherance of the common design. In contemplation of law, as it relates to general intent crimes, the act of one is the act of all. Battery, Battery Resulting In Substantial Bodily Harm and Battery With A Deadly Weapon are general intent crimes. Second Degree Murder can be a general intent crime.

Additionally, a co-conspirator is guilty of the offenses he specifically intended to be committed. First Degree Murder is a specific intent crime.

You are instructed that if you find that the State has established that the defendant has committed conspiracy to commit murder you shall select conspiracy to commit murder as your verdict. You may find the defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit a Battery With a Deadly Weapon and/or Battery Resulting in Substantial Bodily Harm if:

- 1. You have not found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty of conspiracy to commit murder, and
- 2. All twelve of you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant is guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit a Battery With a Deadly Weapon and/or Battery Resulting in Substantial Bodily Harm.

If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of conspiracy has been committed by the defendant, but you have a reasonable doubt whether such conspiracy was to commit murder or battery with a deadly weapon, or battery resulting in substantial bodily harm, you must give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict of conspiracy to commit a Battery With a Deadly Weapon and/or Battery Resulting in Substantial Bodily Harm.

You are instructed that if you find that the State has established that the defendant has committed conspiracy to commit Battery With a Deadly Weapon and/or Battery Resulting in Substantial Bodily Harm you shall select conspiracy to commit Battery With a Deadly Weapon and/or Battery Resulting in Substantial Bodily Harm as your verdict. You may find the defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit a Battery if:

- 1. You have not found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty of conspiracy to commit Battery With a Deadly Weapon and/or Battery Resulting in Substantial Bodily Harm, and
- 2. All twelve of you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant is guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit a Battery.

If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of conspiracy has been committed by the defendant, but you have a reasonable doubt whether such conspiracy was to commit battery with a deadly weapon, or battery resulting in substantial bodily harm, or battery you must give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict of conspiracy to commit a Battery.

Mere presence at the scene of the crime and knowledge that a crime is being committed are not sufficient to establish that the defendant aided and abetted the crime, unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is a participant and not merely a knowing spectator. However, the presence of one at the commission of a crime of another is evidence which can be considered in determining whether or not he is guilty of aiding or abetting, as well as the defendant's presence, companionship, and conduct before, during and after the participation in the criminal act.

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You are instructed that if you find that the State has established that the defendant has committed first degree murder you shall select first degree murder as your verdict. The crime of first degree murder includes the crime of second degree murder. You may find the defendant guilty of second degree murder if:

- 1. You have not found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty of murder of the first degree, and
- 2. All twelve of you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant is guilty of the crime of second degree murder.

If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of murder has been committed by the defendant, but you have a reasonable doubt whether such murder was of the first or of the second degree, you must give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict of murder of the second degree.

You are instructed that if you find that the State has established that the defendant has committed murder you shall select the degree murder as your verdict. The crime of murder includes the crime of involuntary manslaughter. You may find the defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter murder if:

- 1. You have not found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty of murder, and
- 2. All twelve of you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant is guilty of the crime of involuntary manslaughter.

If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime has been committed by the defendant, but you have a reasonable doubt whether such crime was murder or involuntary manslaughter, you must give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict of involuntary manslaughter.

You are instructed that if you find a defendant guilty of Murder of the First Degree, or Murder of the Second Degree, you must also determine whether or not a deadly weapon was used in the commission of this crime.

| INSTR | UCTION NO | O. 28 |
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| INSTR | UCTION NO | Э28 |

"Deadly weapon" means any instrument which, if used in the ordinary manner contemplated by its design and construction, will or is likely to cause substantial bodily harm or death; or, any weapon, device, instrument, material or substance which, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing substantial bodily harm or death.

You are instructed that a firearm is a deadly weapon.

INSTRUCTION NO. __29__

If more than one person commits a crime, and one of them uses a deadly weapon in the commission of that crime, each may be convicted of using the deadly weapon even though he did not personally himself use the weapon.

An unarmed offender "uses" a deadly weapon when the unarmed offender is liable the offense, another person liable to the offense is armed with and uses a deadly weapon in the commission of the offense, and the unarmed offender had knowledge of the use of the deadly weapon.

| INSTRUCTION NO3 | 0 |
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To constitute the crime charged, there must exist a union or joint operation of an act forbidden by law and an intent to do the act.

The intent with which an act is done is shown by the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.

Do not confuse intent with motive. Motive is what prompts a person to act. Intent refers only to the state of mind with which the act is done.

Motive is not an element of the crime charged and the State is not required to prove a motive on the part of the Defendant in order to convict. However, you may consider evidence of motive or lack of motive as a circumstance in the case.

| INICTRICATION NO. 21 | | |
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| | INSTRUCTION NO. | 31 |

The Defendant is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This presumption places upon the State the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every material element of the crime charged and that the Defendant is the person who committed the offense.

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A reasonable doubt is one based on reason. It is not mere possible doubt but is such a doubt as would govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs of life. If the minds of the jurors, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, are in such a condition that they can say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, there is not a reasonable doubt. Doubt to be reasonable must be actual, not mere possibility or speculation.

If you have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the Defendant, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty.

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It is a constitutional right of a defendant in a criminal trial that he may not be compelled to testify. Thus, the decision as to whether he should testify is left to the defendant on the advice and counsel of his attorney. You must not draw any inference of guilt from the fact that he does not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your deliberations in any way.

INSTRUCTION NO.__34___

You are here to determine the guilt or innocence of the Defendant from the evidence in the case. You are not called upon to return a verdict as to the guilt or innocence of any other person. So, if the evidence in the case convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the Defendant, you should so find, even though you may believe one or more persons are also guilty.

| INSTRUCTION | NO. | 35 |
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In arriving at a verdict in this case as to whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty, the subject of penalty or punishment is not to be discussed or considered by you and should in no way influence your verdict. If your verdice is Murder in the First Degree, you will, at a later hearing, determine the issue of penalty or punishment.

The evidence which you are to consider in this case consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits, and any facts admitted or agreed to by counsel.

There are two types of evidence; direct and circumstantial. Direct evidence is the testimony of a person who claims to have personal knowledge of the commission of the crime which has been charged, such as an eyewitness. Circumstantial evidence is the proof of a chain of facts and circumstances which tend to show whether the Defendant is guilty or not guilty. The law makes no distinction between the weight to be given either direct or circumstantial evidence. Therefore, all of the evidence in the case, including the circumstantial evidence, should be considered by you in arriving at your verdict.

Statements, arguments and opinions of counsel are not evidence in the case. However, if the attorneys stipulate to the existence of a fact, you must accept the stipulation as evidence and regard that fact as proved.

You must not speculate to be true any insinuations suggested by a question asked a witness. A question is not evidence and may be considered only as it supplies meaning to the answer.

You must disregard any evidence to which an objection was sustained by the court and any evidence ordered stricken by the court.

Anything you may have seen or heard outside the courtroom is not evidence and must also be disregarded.

| INSTRU | JCTION | NO. | 37 |
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Whenever there is slight evidence that a conspiracy existed, and that the defendant was one of the members of the conspiracy, then the statements and the acts by any person likewise a member may be considered by the jury as evidence in the case as to the defendant found to have been a member, even though the statements and acts may have occurred in the absence and without the knowledge of the defendant, provided such statements and acts were knowingly made and done during the continuance of such conspiracy, and in furtherance of some object or purpose of the conspiracy.

This holds true, even if the statement was made by the co-conspirator prior to the time the defendant entered, or withdrew from, the conspiracy, so long as the co-conspirator was a member of the conspiracy at the time.

An adoptive admission is a statement of which a listener has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth.

| INSTRUCTION NO. | 38 |
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The flight of a person immediately after the commission of a crime, or after he is accused of a crime, is not sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact which, if proved, may be considered by you in light of all other proved facts in deciding the question of his guilt or innocence. Whether or not evidence of flight shows a consciousness of guilt and the significance to be attached to such a circumstance are matters for your deliberation.

The conviction shall not be had on the testimony of an accomplice unless he is corroborated by other evidence which in itself, and without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration shall not be sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.

An accomplice is hereby defined as one who is liable for prosecution, for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given.

To be an accomplice, the person must have aided, promoted, encouraged, or instigated by act or advice the commission of such offense with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the person who committed the offense.

| INSTRI | JCTION | NO. | 40 |
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To corroborate the testimony of an accomplice there must be evidence of some act or fact related to the offense which, if believed, by itself and without any aid, interpretation or direction from the testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense charged.

However, it is not necessary that the evidence of the corroboration be sufficient in itself to establish every element of the offense charged, or that it corroborate every fact to which the accomplice testifies.

In determining whether an accomplice has been corroborated, you must first assume the testimony of the accomplice has been removed from the case. You must then determine whether there is any remaining evidence which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.

If there is not such independent evidence which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, the testimony of the accomplice is not corroborated.

| NSTRUCTION | NO | 41 |
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The determination of whether someone is an accomplice is left to the jury to decide, unless the witness' own statement leaves no doubt that he is subject to prosecution for the charged crime.

| INSTRUCTION NO. 42 | |
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The accomplice corroboration rule is a separate and distinct legal requirement from the statements of a co-conspirator made in the course of and in furtherance of a conspiracy. When an accomplice testifies, their testimony must be corroborated. The other evidence in the case, including co-conspirator statements in the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy, may be evidence utilized to establish the corroboration.

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INSTRUCTION NO.___43__

The credibility or believability of a witness should be determined by his manner upon the stand, his relationship to the parties, his fears, motives, interests or feelings, his opportunity to have observed the matter to which he testified, the reasonableness of his statements and the strength or weakness of his recollections.

If you believe that a witness has lied about any material fact in the case, you may disregard the entire testimony of that witness or any portion of his testimony which is not proved by other evidence.

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INSTRUCTION NO.

A witness who has special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education in a particular science, profession or occupation is an expert witness. An expert witness may give his opinion as to any matter in which he is skilled.

You should consider such expert opinion and weigh the reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound, however, by such an opinion. Give it the weight to which you deem it entitled, whether that be great or slight, and you may reject it, if, in your judgment, the reasons given for it are unsound.

Although you are to consider only the evidence in the case in reaching a verdict, you must bring to the consideration of the evidence your everyday common sense and judgment as reasonable men and women. Thus, you are not limited solely to what you see and hear as the witnesses testify. You may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence which you feel are justified in the light of common experience, keeping in mind that such inferences should not be based on speculation or guess.

A verdict may never be influenced by sympathy, prejudice or public opinion. Your decision should be the product of sincere judgment and sound discretion in accordance with these rules of law.

INSTRUCTION NO. _______

When you retire to consider your verdict, you must select one of your number to act as foreperson who will preside over your deliberation and will be your spokesperson here in court.

During your deliberation, you will have all the exhibits which were admitted into evidence, these written instructions and forms of verdict which have been prepared for your convenience.

Your verdict must be unanimous. As soon as you have agreed upon a verdict, have it signed and dated by your foreperson and then return with it to this room.

| INSTRUCTION | NO. | |
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Now you will listen to the arguments of counsel who will endeavor to aid you to reach a proper verdict by refreshing in your minds the evidence and by showing the application thereof to the law; but, whatever counsel may say, you will bear in mind that it is your duty to be governed in your deliberation by the evidence as you understand it and remember it to be and by the law as given to you in these instructions, with the sole, fixed and steadfast purpose of doing equal and exact justice between the Defendant and the State of Nevada.

| GIVEN: | | |
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| | DISTRICT JUDGE | |

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| 2 | ORIC'NAL MUZED IN OPEN COURT | | |
| 3 | OFFICE STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT | | |
| 4 | DISTRICT COURT | | |
| 5 | DISTRICT COURT | | |
| 6 | CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA Linese Husled | | |
| 7 | THE STATE OF NEVADA,) | | |
| 8 | Plaintiff, CASE NO: C212667 | | |
| 9 | -vs-) DEPT NO: XXI | | |
| 10 | DEANGELO RESHAWN CARROLL, | | |
| 11 | Defendant. | | |
| 12 |) | | |
| 13 | <u>VERDICT</u> | | |
| 14 | We, the jury in the above entitled case, find the Defendant DEANGELO RESHAWN | | |
| 15 | CARROLL, as follows: | | |
| 16 | COUNT 1 – CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER | | |
| 17 | (please check the appropriate box, select only one) | | |
| 18 | ✓ Guilty of Conspiracy To Commit Murder | | |
| 19 | ☐ Guilty of Conspiracy To Commit A Battery With A Deadly Weapon or | | |
| 20 | Battery Resulting In Substantial Bodily Harm | | |
| 21 | ☐ Guilty of Conspiracy To Commit A Battery | | |
| 22 | □ Not Guilty | | |
| 23 | | | |
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| 1 | We, the jury in the above entitled case, find the Defendant DEANGELO RESHAWN |
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| 2 | CARROLL, as follows: |
| 3 | <u>COUNT 2</u> – MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON |
| 4 | (please check the appropriate box, select only one) |
| 5 | Guilty of First Degree Murder With Use of a Deadly Weapon |
| 6 | ☐ Guilty of First Degree Murder |
| 7 | Guilty of Second Degree Murder With Use of a Deadly Weapon |
| 8 | ☐ Guilty of Second Degree Murder |
| 9 | ☐ Guilty of Involuntary Manslaughter |
| 10 | □ Not Guilty |
| 11 | |
| 12 | |
| 13 | DATED this 25 day of May, 2010 |
| 14 | Tools G. Fond |
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

| DEANGELO CARROLL, | |
|----------------------|------------------------------|
| Appellant, | |
| V. | Supreme Court Case No. 78081 |
| THE STATE OF NEVADA, | |
| Respondent. | |
| | l |

APPELLANT'S APPENDIX

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that this document was filed electronically with the Nevada Supreme Court on the 30th day of May, 2019. Electronic Service of the foregoing document shall be made in accordance with the Master Service List as follows:

Steven Wolfson, Clark County District Attorney's Office Aaron Ford, Nevada Attorney General Jamie J. Resch, Resch Law, PLLC d/b/a Conviction Solutions

Employee, Resch Law, PLLC d/b/a Conviction Solutions