Electronically Filed 2/14/2019 11:05 AM Steven D. Grierson

DISTRICT LOURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

ROY MORADA,) CASE NO. A-18-782168-W

Petitioner,

Dept. No: VI

Electronically Filed Feb 25 2019 08:56 a.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

V.5.

ISIDOR BACA,

RESPONDENT NOTICE OF APPEAL NOTICE IS HEREBY BIVEN that: Roy morAgA, Thereby Appeals the Notice of entry of Findings of Fact, CONClusions of LAW AND Order Entered in by this court ON or About the, 5th day of Feb. 2019.

Dated this 10th day of Feb. 2019.

Respectfully Submitted, Roy Moraga = 31584 N. N. C.C. P.O. Box 2000 CARSON CitySNV 89702



ROY D. MORAGA # 31584

N. N.C.C. P.O. BOX 7000

CARSON City INV 8970A

TO MA STOCKEL DI SESSIN CREEK

hegal mail

LAS VEGAS , NEVADA 89155 200 Lewis Avers 3rd Floor Clerk of the court .. B94 01.#6300

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CLERK OF THE COURT

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK

ROY D. MORAGA,

Petitioner(s),

VS.

ISIDOR BACA,

Respondent(s),

Case No: A-18-782168-W

Dept No: VI

CASE APPEAL STATEMENT

- 1. Appellant(s): Roy Moraga
- 2. Judge: James Bixlar
- 3. Appellant(s): Roy Moraga

Counsel:

Roy Moraga #31584 P.O. Box 7000 Carson City, NV 89702

4. Respondent (s): Isidor Baca

Counsel:

Steven B. Wolfson, District Attorney 200 Lewis Ave. Las Vegas, NV 89155

1 2	 Appellant(s)'s Attorney Licensed in Nevada: N/A Permission Granted: N/A 		
3	Respondent(s)'s Attorney Licensed in Nevada: Yes Permission Granted: N/A		
4 5	6. Has Appellant Ever Been Represented by Appointed Counsel In District Court: No		
6	7. Appellant Represented by Appointed Counsel On Appeal: N/A		
7 8	8. Appellant Granted Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis**: N/A **Expires 1 year from date filed Appellant Filed Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis: Yes,		
9	Date Application(s) filed: October 1, 2018 9. Date Commenced in District Court: October 1, 2018		
10	10. Brief Description of the Nature of the Action: Civil Writ		
11 12	Type of Judgment or Order Being Appealed: Civil Writ of Habeas Corpus		
13	11. Previous Appeal: No		
14	Supreme Court Docket Number(s): N/A		
15	12. Child Custody or Visitation: N/A		
16	13. Possibility of Settlement: Unknown		
17	Dated This 20 day of February 2019.		
18	Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court		
19			
20 21	/s/ Amanda Hampton Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk		
22	200 Lewis Ave PO Box 551601		
23	Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-1601 (702) 671-0512		
24	(702) 071-0312		
25			
26	Day Mayara		
27	cc: Roy Moraga		
28			

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY **CASE NO. A-18-782168-W**

Roy Moraga, Plaintiff(s) Isidor Baca, Defendant(s)

Location: Department 6 Judicial Officer: Vacant, DC 6 Filed on: 10/01/2018 § §

Case Number History:

Cross-Reference Case A782168

Number:

CASE INFORMATION

Related Cases

89C092174 (Writ Related Case)

Statistical Closures

Other Manner of Disposition 01/31/2019

Case Type: Writ of Habeas Corpus

Status:

01/31/2019 Closed

DATE **CASE ASSIGNMENT**

Current Case Assignment

A-18-782168-W Case Number Department 6 Court Date Assigned 01/07/2019 Vacant, DC 6 Judicial Officer

PARTY INFORMATION

Lead Attorneys **Plaintiff** Moraga, Roy D

Pro Se

Defendant Baca, Isidor Sweetin, James R Retained

7026712699(W)

EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT DATE **INDEX**

EVENTS

10/01/2018

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Filed by: Plaintiff Moraga, Roy D

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post Conviction)

10/01/2018

Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis

Filed By: Plaintiff Moraga, Roy D

No Order Attached

10/04/2018 Trigger for Original Proceedings Packet

10/16/2018 Order for Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

11/09/2018 Motion for Appointment of Attorney

Filed By: Plaintiff Moraga, Roy D

Motion for Appointment of Counsel Pursuant to NRS 34.750

11/30/2018

State's Response to Defendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction)

12/26/2018

🚺 Reply

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY CASE NO. A-18-782168-W

	Filed by: Plaintiff Moraga, Roy D	ì
	Petitioner's Reply and Objection to State's Response to Habeas - Corpus	ì
01/31/2019	Order to Statistically Close Case Civil Order to Statistically Close Case	
01/31/2019	Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order	l
02/05/2019	Notice of Entry Notice of Entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order	
02/14/2019	Notice of Appeal Filed By: Plaintiff Moraga, Roy D Notice of Appeal	
02/20/2019	Case Appeal Statement	
	HEARINGS	ì
01/02/2019	Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Bixler, James)	ļ
	Denied;	ı
	Journal Entry Details: Defendant not present. Present on behalf of the State, Deputy District Attorney Brad Turner. Court noted the late reply to the State's opposition. Matter submitted on the pleadings by Mr. Turner. Court stated findings and ORDERED, Defendant's request for appointment of counsel DENIED, Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus DENIED; State to prepare the order. NDC;	

DISTRICT COURT CIVIL COVER SHEET

A-18-782168-W County, Nevada (Assigned by Clerk's Office) I. Party Information (provide both home and mailing addresses if different) Plaintiff(s) (pame/addess/phone); Defendant(s) (pame/afteress/phone) Attorney (name/address/phone): Attorney (name/address/phone); II. Nature of Controversy (please select the one most applicable filling type below) Civil Case Filing Types Real Property Torts Landlord/Tenant Negligence Other Torts Unlawful Detainer Auto Product Liability Premises Liability Other Landford/Tenant Intentional Misconduct Other Negligence Employment Ton Title to Property Malpractice Insurance Tort Judicial Foreclosure Other Title to Property Medical/Dental Other Tort Legal Other Real Property Condemnation/Eminent Domain Accounting Other Malpractice Other Real Property Judicial Review/Appeal Probate Construction Defect & Contract Probate (select case type and estate value) Construction Defect Judicial Review Chapter 40 Foreclosure Mediation Case Summary Administration Other Construction Defect General Administration Petition to Seal Records Special Administration Contract Case Mental Competency Set Aside Uniform Commercial Code Nevada State Agency Appeal Trust/Conservatoship Building and Construction Department of Motor Vehicle Insurance Carrier Worker's Compensation Other Probate Other Nevada State Agency Estate Value Commercial Instrument Over \$200,000 Collection of Accounts Appeal Other Between \$100,000 and \$200,000 Employment Contract Appeal from Lower Coun Under \$100,000 or Unknown Other Contract Other Judicial Review/Appeal Under \$2,500 Civil Writ Other Civil Filing CiVB Writ Other Civil Filing Writ of Habeas Corpus Writ of Prohibition Compromise of Minor's Claim Other Civil Writ TWrit of Mandamus Foreign Judgment Writ of Quo Warrant Other Civil Matters Business Court filings should be filed using the Business Court civil coversheet Signature offinitiating party or representative

See other side for family-related case filings.

A-18-782168-W CCS Civil Cover Sheet



ORIGINAL

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1/31/2019 4:35 PM
Steven D. Grierson
CLERK OF THE COURT

1 **FCCO** STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 JAMES R. SWEETIN Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #005144 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff

> DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff.

-VS-

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ROY MORAGA, #938554

Defendant.

CASE NO:

A-18-782168-W

89C092174

DEPT NO:

VI

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF

LAW AND ORDER

DATE OF HEARING: JANUARY 2, 2019 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 AM

THIS CAUSE having presented before the Honorable JAMES BIXLER, District Judge, on the 2nd day of January, 2019; Petitioner not being present, proceeding IN FORMA PAUPERIS; Respondent being represented by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, by and through ROBERT TURNER, Chief Deputy District Attorney; and having considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, arguments of counsel, and documents on file herein, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

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Case Number: A-18-782168-W

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 9, 1990, Roy Moraga (hereinafter "Defendant") was charged by way of Information with two (2) counts of Burglary (Felony – NRS 205.060) and two (2) counts of Sexual Assault (Felony – NRS 200.364, 200.366). On January 11, 1990, Defendant entered a plea of not guilty and his case proceeded to trial.

Defendant's jury trial began on March 12, 1990. On March 15, 1990, the jury found Defendant guilty of all counts. On June 4, 1990, the State filed a Notice of Motion to Amend Information in order to seek habitual treatment. On June 13, 1990, pursuant to an Amended Information filed the same day, Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under the "large" habitual criminal statute, NRS 207.010. Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on June 27, 1990. The Judgement of Conviction was filed on July 7, 1990.

On August 27, 1991, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction but remanded for the district court to resentence Defendant separately on the underlying counts rather than giving him a single life sentence under the habitual criminal statute. Remittitur issued on September 7, 1991.

On October 21, 1991, pursuant to the Nevada Supreme Court's Remand Order, the district court took notice of the felony convictions entered at Defendant's initial sentencing and resentenced Defendant to the following: as to Count I – ten (10) years in the Nevada Department of Corrections ("NDC"); as to Count II- ten (10) years in NDC consecutive to Count I; as to Count III – life imprisonment with parole eligibility beginning after five (5) years, consecutive to Count II; and as to Count IV – pursuant to NRS 201.010, life without the possibility of parole, consecutive to Count III. The Amended Judgement of Conviction was filed on November 13, 1991.¹

Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on October 30, 1991. On October 4, 1995, the Nevada Supreme Court dismissed Defendant's appeal. Remittitur issued on October 24, 1995.

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¹ A Second Amended Judgement of Conviction was filed on September 29, 1993, to reflect one hundred eighty (180) days credit for time served.

On February 20, 1996, Defendant filed his first Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction). The State filed its response on April 4, 1996. Defendant filed a Supplement on June 13, 1996. The State filed its response on June 27, 1996. On July 16, 1996, Defendant filed a Reply to the State's Response. On July 19, 1996, the district court denied Defendant's first Petition. On September 6, 1996, the district court filed its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. The Notice of Entry of Order was filed on September 20, 1996. Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on September 27, 1996.

On April 30, 1998, Defendant filed a Motion to Modify or in the Alternative Correct Illegal Sentence. The State filed an Opposition on May 8, 1998. On May 28, 1998, the district court entered an Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Modify or Correct Illegal Sentence. On June 13, 1998, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal from the Oder denying his motion.

On April 20, 1999, the Nevada Supreme Court consolidated the appeal from the orders denying Defendant's first Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Defendant's Motion to Modify Sentence or Correct Illegal Sentence. Both decisions were affirmed. Remittitur issued on May 18, 1999.

Defendant filed his second Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) on January 10, 2006. The State filed a Response and Motion to Dismiss on February 27, 2006. Defendant filed a Reply to the State's Response on May 24, 2006. On June 26, 2006, the district court denied Defendant's second Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The district court filed its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on February 8, 2007. Notice of Entry of Order was filed on February 13, 2007. On March 2, 2007, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal. On August 16, 2007, the Nevada Supreme Court issued an Order of Affirmance. Remittitur issued on September 11, 2007.

Defendant filed his third Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) on December 8, 2010, in Pershing County. The Petition was transferred to the Eighth Judicial District on April 29, 2011, but was filed under Case No. 11-A640265-W and did not immediately come before the court. Defendant filed a Supplement to his Petition on November 4, 2011. On March 14, 2012, Defendant filed a Motion for Judicial Action on his Petition. The

State filed an Opposition to this motion on March 23, 2012. On May 16, 2012, the State filed a Response and Motion to Dismiss Defendant's third Petition.

On July 16, 2012, the district court denied Defendant's third Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. On August 6, 2012, Defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider. The State filed an Opposition to Motion to Reconsider on August 9, 2012. On August 13, 2012, the district court issued a Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order denying Defendant's third Petition. A Notice of Entry of Order was filed on August 21, 2012. The district court issued an Order denying Defendant's Motion to Reconsider on October 5, 2012.

On September 17, 2012, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal from the order denying his third Petition. The Nevada Supreme Court issued an Order of Affirmance on July 13, 2013. Defendant filed a Petition for Rehearing on August 6, 2013. On September 25, 2013, the court denied Defendant's Petition for Rehearing.

Defendant filed his fourth Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion for Appointment of Counsel on August 14, 2013. The State responded on September 19, 2013. On October 21, 2013, the court denied Defendant's fourth Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order was issued on December 4, 2013. On December 16, 2013, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal from the order denying his fourth Petition. The Nevada Supreme Court issued an Order of Affirmance on April 10, 2014.

On October 1, 2018, Defendant filed the instants fifth Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The State responded on November 30, 2018. Defendant replied on December 26, 2018.

ANALYSIS

I. THIS PETITION IS PROCEDURALLY BARRED UNDER NRS 34.726(1).

Defendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is time barred with no good cause shown for delay. Pursuant to NRS 34.726(1):

Unless there is good cause shown for delay, a petition that challenges the validity of a judgment or sentence must be filed within 1 year of the entry of the judgment of conviction or, if an appeal has been taken from the judgment, within 1 year after the Supreme Court issues its

remittitur. For the purposes of this subsection, good cause for delay exists if the petitioner demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court:

- (a) That the delay is not the fault of the petitioner; and
- (b) That dismissal of the petition as untimely will unduly prejudice the petitioner.

(Emphasis added). The Supreme Court of Nevada has held that NRS 34.726 should be construed by its plain meaning. <u>Pellegrini v. State</u>, 117 Nev. 860, 873-74, 34 P.3d 519, 528 (2001). As per the language of the statute, the one-year time bar proscribed by NRS 34.726 begins to run from the date the judgment of conviction is filed or a remittitur from a timely direct appeal is filed. <u>Dickerson v. State</u>, 114 Nev. 1084, 1087, 967 P.2d 1132, 1133-34 (1998).

The one-year time limit for preparing petitions for post-conviction relief under NRS 34.726 is strictly applied. In <u>Gonzales v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 590, 596, 53 P.3d 901, 904 (2002), the Nevada Supreme Court rejected a habeas petition that was filed two days late despite evidence presented by the defendant that he purchased postage through the prison and mailed the Notice within the one-year time limit.

Furthermore, the Nevada Supreme Court has held that the district court has a duty to consider whether a defendant's post-conviction petition claims are procedurally barred. State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Riker), 121 Nev. 225, 231, 112 P.3d 1070, 1074 (2005). The Riker Court found that "[a]pplication of the statutory procedural default rules to post-conviction habeas petitions is mandatory," noting:

Habeas corpus petitions that are filed many years after conviction are an unreasonable burden on the criminal justice system. The necessity for a workable system dictates that there must exist a time when a criminal conviction is final.

<u>Id.</u> Additionally, the Court noted that procedural bars "cannot be ignored [by the district court] when properly raised by the State." <u>Id.</u> at 233, 112 P.3d at 1075. The Nevada Supreme Court has granted no discretion to the district courts regarding whether to apply the statutory procedural bars; the rules must be applied.

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Further, the entry of an Amended Judgement of Conviction does not automatically restart the statutory time limit for post-conviction claims. <u>Sullivan v. State</u>, 120 Nev. 537, 540-41, 96 P.3d 761, 764 (2204). Since the district court may amend the judgement of conviction at any time to correct a clerical error or an illegal sentence, "restarting the one-year time period for all purposes every time an amendment occurs would frustrate the purpose and spirit of NRS 34.726." <u>Id.</u> at 540, 96 P.3d at 764. Consequently, where a Petitioner is not challenging the proceedings related to an Amended Judgment of Conviction, the one-year time bar runs from the date on which the original Judgement of Conviction was entered or, if an appeal was taken from the original judgment, within one year after the appellate court issues its remittitur. <u>Id.</u> at 540, 96 P.3d at 764.

In the instant case, Defendant's Judgement of Conviction was filed on July 7, 1990. Defendant filed a direct appeal, and remittitur was issued on September 17, 1991. An Amended Judgement of Conviction was filed on November 13, 1991, and a Second Amended Judgement of Conviction was filed on September 29, 1993. Defendant appealed the Second Amended Judgement of Conviction, and remittitur issued on October 24, 1994. Appellant's instant Petition was not filed until October 1, 2018. This is more than one year after the Judgement of Conviction, the Amended Judgement of Conviction, and the Second Amended Judgement of Conviction. Consequently, it is not necessary to address the argument of whether the one-year period should flow from the date of the original judgment or the date of an amended judgement, as more than one year has passed since the entry of all. Absent a showing of good cause for this delay and undue prejudice, this Court finds Defendant's claim must be dismissed because of its tardy filing.

II. DEFENDANT'S FIFTH PETITION IS SUCCESSIVE

Defendant's Petition is also successive pursuant to NRS 34.810(2). The relevant portions of NRS 34.810 state:

2. A second or successive petition must be dismissed if the judge or justice determines that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and that the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge or justice finds that the failure

of the Defendant to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ.

- 3. Pursuant to subsections 1 and 2, the petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving specific facts that demonstrate:
- (a) Good cause for the petitioner's failure to present the claim or for presenting the claim again; and
- (b) Actual prejudice to the petitioner.

<u>Id</u>. This is Defendant's fifth Petition. Defendant has previously filed four other Petitions spanning from February 20, 1996, to August 14, 2013, regarding the same issues. All of these prior Petitions have either been denied or disposed of. Furthermore, Defendant has given no good cause for the delay, and has failed to demonstrate actual prejudice. As such, this Court finds this fifth Petition must be denied as successive.

III. DEFENDANT'S FIFTH PETITION IS BARRED BY LACHES

NRS 34.800 creates a rebuttable presumption of prejudice to the State if "[a] period exceeding five years between the filing of a judgment of conviction, an order imposing a sentence of imprisonment or a decision on direct appeal of a judgment of conviction and the filing of a petition challenging the validity of a judgment of conviction...." The statute also requires that the State plead laches, which the State does. NRS 34.800.

Defendant's Judgement of Conviction was filed on July 7, 1990. Defendant filed a direct appeal, and remittitur was issued on September 17, 1991. An Amended Judgement of Conviction was filed on November 13, 1991, and a Second Amended Judgement of Conviction was filed on September 29, 1993. Defendant appealed the Second Amended Judgement of Conviction, and remittitur issued on October 24, 1994. Since more than five years have elapsed from any given date, NRS 34.800 directly applies in this case and a presumption of prejudice to the State arises. Defendant does not rebut this presumption. Therefore, pursuant to NRS 34.800, this Court finds this Petition must be denied.

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IV. DEFENDANT HAS NOT PROVIDED GOOD CAUSE OR EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE TO OVERCOME THE PROCEDURAL BARS

A showing of good cause and prejudice may overcome procedural bars. "To establish good cause, Defendant must show that an impediment external to the defense prevented their compliance with the applicable procedural rule. A qualifying impediment might be shown where the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available at the time of default." Clem v. State, 119 Nev. 615, 621, 81 P.3d 521, 525 (2003) (emphasis added). The Court continued, "appellants cannot attempt to manufacture good cause[.]" Id. at 621, 81 P.3d at 526.

In order to establish prejudice, the defendant must show "not merely that the errors of [the proceedings] created the possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, in affecting the state proceedings with error of constitutional dimensions." Hogan v. Warden, 109 Nev. 952, 960, 860 P.2d 710, 716 (1993) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1596 (1982)). To find good cause there must be a "substantial reason; one that affords a legal excuse." Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 252, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003). Clearly, any delay in the filing of the petition must not be the fault of the petitioner. NRS 34.726(1)(a).

Where a petition is procedurally barred and the petitioner cannot demonstrate good cause, the district court may nevertheless reach the merits of any constitutional claims if the petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider those constitutional claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. <u>Lisle v. State</u>, 351 P.3d 725, 729-730 (2015), citing <u>Pellegrini v. State</u>, 117 Nev. 860, 887, 34 P.3d 519, 537 (2001). A fundamental miscarriage of justice requires "a colorable showing" that the petitioner "is actually innocent of the crime or is ineligible for the death penalty." <u>Id.</u> This generally requires the petitioner to present new evidence of his innocence. <u>House v. Bell</u>, 547 U.S. 518, 536-37, 126 S. Ct. 2064 (2006); <u>Schlup v. Delo</u>, 513 U.S. 298, 316, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995).

When claiming a fundamental miscarriage based on actual innocence, the petitioner "must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him absent a constitutional violation. <u>Crump v. State</u>, 2016 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 374, *9-10, citing

Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. at 887, 34 P.3d at 537 (2001). In this context, actual innocence means "factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency." Mitchell v. State, 122 Nev. 1269, 1273-74, 149 P.3d 33, 36 (2006).

In the instant case, Defendant failed to raise any issue of good cause for the untimely delay in filing his Petition. Instead Defendant asserts his actual innocence and cites to NRS 207.010 and Walker v. Deeds, 50 F.3d 670, 673 (9th Cir. 1995) to support his claim that he was wrongfully adjudicated a habitual criminal because nonviolent property crimes do not warrant harsh sanctions under the habitual criminal statute. Petition at 4. This argument was already rejected by the Nevada Supreme Court in Defendant's first Petition, and as such is barred from other review by the doctrine of the law of the case. "The law of the first appeal is law of the case on all subsequent appeals in which the facts are substantially the same." Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 315, 535 P.2d 797, 798 (1975) (quoting Walker v. State, 85 Nev. 337, 343, 455 P.2d 34, 38 (1969)). "The doctrine of the law of the case cannot be avoided by a more detailed and precisely focused argument subsequently made after reflection upon the previous proceedings." Hall, 91 Nev. at 316, 535 P.2d at 799. Under the law of the case doctrine, issues previously decided on direct appeal may not be reargued in a habeas petition. Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 34 P.3d 519 (2001) (citing McNelton v. State, 115 Nev. 396, 414-15, 990 P.2d 1263, 1275 (1999)).

In denying Defendant's first Post-Conviction Petition, the Nevada Supreme Court noted that the State adequately proved Defendant had three prior convictions and the district court was entitled to use these convictions for sentence enhancement purposes. See Order Dismissing Appeal 10/30/95. Additionally, the case Defendant cites to was decided after his sentencing and cannot be applied retroactively. Furthermore, Defendant has failed to provide any facts that would show he would be prejudiced by having to comply with the procedural time bar.

As such, Defendant cannot show good cause or actual prejudice and this Court finds this Petition must be denied.

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ORDER

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief shall be, and is, DENIED.

DATED this 28 day of January, 2019.

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565

BY

for

of Deputy District Attorney ada Bar #006526

hjc/SVU

Electronically Filed 2/5/2019 2:46 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

NEO

ROY MORAGA,

vs.

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Petitioner,

Respondent,

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Case No: A-18-782168-W

Dept No: VI

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on January 31, 2019, the court entered a decision or order in this matter, a true and correct copy of which is attached to this notice.

You may appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision or order of this court. If you wish to appeal, you must file a notice of appeal with the clerk of this court within thirty-three (33) days after the date this notice is mailed to you. This notice was mailed on February 5, 2019.

STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CLERK OF THE COURT

/s/ Debra Donaldson

Debra Donaldson, Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF E-SERVICE / MAILING

I hereby certify that <u>on this 5 day of February 2019</u>, I served a copy of this Notice of Entry on the following:

☑ By e-mail:

Clark County District Attorney's Office Attorney General's Office – Appellate Division-

☑ The United States mail addressed as follows:

Roy Moraga # 31584 P.O. Box 7000

Carson City, NV 89702

/s/ Debra Donaldson

Debra Donaldson, Deputy Clerk

Case Number: A-18-782168-W

ORIGINAL

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1/31/2019 4:35 PM
Steven D. Grierson
CLERK OF THE COURT

1 **FCCO** STEVEN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 JAMES R. SWEETIN Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #005144 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff

> DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff.

-VS-

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ROY MORAGA, #938554

Defendant.

CASE NO:

A-18-782168-W

89C092174

DEPT NO:

VI

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF

LAW AND ORDER

DATE OF HEARING: JANUARY 2, 2019 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 AM

THIS CAUSE having presented before the Honorable JAMES BIXLER, District Judge, on the 2nd day of January, 2019; Petitioner not being present, proceeding IN FORMA PAUPERIS; Respondent being represented by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, Clark County District Attorney, by and through ROBERT TURNER, Chief Deputy District Attorney; and having considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, arguments of counsel, and documents on file herein, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

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Case Number: A-18-782168-W

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 9, 1990, Roy Moraga (hereinafter "Defendant") was charged by way of Information with two (2) counts of Burglary (Felony – NRS 205.060) and two (2) counts of Sexual Assault (Felony – NRS 200.364, 200.366). On January 11, 1990, Defendant entered a plea of not guilty and his case proceeded to trial.

Defendant's jury trial began on March 12, 1990. On March 15, 1990, the jury found Defendant guilty of all counts. On June 4, 1990, the State filed a Notice of Motion to Amend Information in order to seek habitual treatment. On June 13, 1990, pursuant to an Amended Information filed the same day, Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under the "large" habitual criminal statute, NRS 207.010. Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on June 27, 1990. The Judgement of Conviction was filed on July 7, 1990.

On August 27, 1991, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction but remanded for the district court to resentence Defendant separately on the underlying counts rather than giving him a single life sentence under the habitual criminal statute. Remittitur issued on September 7, 1991.

On October 21, 1991, pursuant to the Nevada Supreme Court's Remand Order, the district court took notice of the felony convictions entered at Defendant's initial sentencing and resentenced Defendant to the following: as to Count I – ten (10) years in the Nevada Department of Corrections ("NDC"); as to Count II- ten (10) years in NDC consecutive to Count I; as to Count III – life imprisonment with parole eligibility beginning after five (5) years, consecutive to Count II; and as to Count IV – pursuant to NRS 201.010, life without the possibility of parole, consecutive to Count III. The Amended Judgement of Conviction was filed on November 13, 1991.¹

Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on October 30, 1991. On October 4, 1995, the Nevada Supreme Court dismissed Defendant's appeal. Remittitur issued on October 24, 1995.

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¹ A Second Amended Judgement of Conviction was filed on September 29, 1993, to reflect one hundred eighty (180) days credit for time served.

On February 20, 1996, Defendant filed his first Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction). The State filed its response on April 4, 1996. Defendant filed a Supplement on June 13, 1996. The State filed its response on June 27, 1996. On July 16, 1996, Defendant filed a Reply to the State's Response. On July 19, 1996, the district court denied Defendant's first Petition. On September 6, 1996, the district court filed its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. The Notice of Entry of Order was filed on September 20, 1996. Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on September 27, 1996.

On April 30, 1998, Defendant filed a Motion to Modify or in the Alternative Correct Illegal Sentence. The State filed an Opposition on May 8, 1998. On May 28, 1998, the district court entered an Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Modify or Correct Illegal Sentence. On June 13, 1998, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal from the Oder denying his motion.

On April 20, 1999, the Nevada Supreme Court consolidated the appeal from the orders denying Defendant's first Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Defendant's Motion to Modify Sentence or Correct Illegal Sentence. Both decisions were affirmed. Remittitur issued on May 18, 1999.

Defendant filed his second Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) on January 10, 2006. The State filed a Response and Motion to Dismiss on February 27, 2006. Defendant filed a Reply to the State's Response on May 24, 2006. On June 26, 2006, the district court denied Defendant's second Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The district court filed its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on February 8, 2007. Notice of Entry of Order was filed on February 13, 2007. On March 2, 2007, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal. On August 16, 2007, the Nevada Supreme Court issued an Order of Affirmance. Remittitur issued on September 11, 2007.

Defendant filed his third Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) on December 8, 2010, in Pershing County. The Petition was transferred to the Eighth Judicial District on April 29, 2011, but was filed under Case No. 11-A640265-W and did not immediately come before the court. Defendant filed a Supplement to his Petition on November 4, 2011. On March 14, 2012, Defendant filed a Motion for Judicial Action on his Petition. The

State filed an Opposition to this motion on March 23, 2012. On May 16, 2012, the State filed a Response and Motion to Dismiss Defendant's third Petition.

On July 16, 2012, the district court denied Defendant's third Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. On August 6, 2012, Defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider. The State filed an Opposition to Motion to Reconsider on August 9, 2012. On August 13, 2012, the district court issued a Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order denying Defendant's third Petition. A Notice of Entry of Order was filed on August 21, 2012. The district court issued an Order denying Defendant's Motion to Reconsider on October 5, 2012.

On September 17, 2012, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal from the order denying his third Petition. The Nevada Supreme Court issued an Order of Affirmance on July 13, 2013. Defendant filed a Petition for Rehearing on August 6, 2013. On September 25, 2013, the court denied Defendant's Petition for Rehearing.

Defendant filed his fourth Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion for Appointment of Counsel on August 14, 2013. The State responded on September 19, 2013. On October 21, 2013, the court denied Defendant's fourth Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order was issued on December 4, 2013. On December 16, 2013, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal from the order denying his fourth Petition. The Nevada Supreme Court issued an Order of Affirmance on April 10, 2014.

On October 1, 2018, Defendant filed the instants fifth Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The State responded on November 30, 2018. Defendant replied on December 26, 2018.

ANALYSIS

I. THIS PETITION IS PROCEDURALLY BARRED UNDER NRS 34.726(1).

Defendant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is time barred with no good cause shown for delay. Pursuant to NRS 34.726(1):

Unless there is good cause shown for delay, a petition that challenges the validity of a judgment or sentence must be filed within 1 year of the entry of the judgment of conviction or, if an appeal has been taken from the judgment, within 1 year after the Supreme Court issues its

remittitur. For the purposes of this subsection, good cause for delay exists if the petitioner demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court:

- (a) That the delay is not the fault of the petitioner; and
- (b) That dismissal of the petition as untimely will unduly prejudice the petitioner.

(Emphasis added). The Supreme Court of Nevada has held that NRS 34.726 should be construed by its plain meaning. <u>Pellegrini v. State</u>, 117 Nev. 860, 873-74, 34 P.3d 519, 528 (2001). As per the language of the statute, the one-year time bar proscribed by NRS 34.726 begins to run from the date the judgment of conviction is filed or a remittitur from a timely direct appeal is filed. <u>Dickerson v. State</u>, 114 Nev. 1084, 1087, 967 P.2d 1132, 1133-34 (1998).

The one-year time limit for preparing petitions for post-conviction relief under NRS 34.726 is strictly applied. In <u>Gonzales v. State</u>, 118 Nev. 590, 596, 53 P.3d 901, 904 (2002), the Nevada Supreme Court rejected a habeas petition that was filed two days late despite evidence presented by the defendant that he purchased postage through the prison and mailed the Notice within the one-year time limit.

Furthermore, the Nevada Supreme Court has held that the district court has a duty to consider whether a defendant's post-conviction petition claims are procedurally barred. State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Riker), 121 Nev. 225, 231, 112 P.3d 1070, 1074 (2005). The Riker Court found that "[a]pplication of the statutory procedural default rules to post-conviction habeas petitions is mandatory," noting:

Habeas corpus petitions that are filed many years after conviction are an unreasonable burden on the criminal justice system. The necessity for a workable system dictates that there must exist a time when a criminal conviction is final.

<u>Id.</u> Additionally, the Court noted that procedural bars "cannot be ignored [by the district court] when properly raised by the State." <u>Id.</u> at 233, 112 P.3d at 1075. The Nevada Supreme Court has granted no discretion to the district courts regarding whether to apply the statutory procedural bars; the rules must be applied.

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Further, the entry of an Amended Judgement of Conviction does not automatically restart the statutory time limit for post-conviction claims. <u>Sullivan v. State</u>, 120 Nev. 537, 540-41, 96 P.3d 761, 764 (2204). Since the district court may amend the judgement of conviction at any time to correct a clerical error or an illegal sentence, "restarting the one-year time period for all purposes every time an amendment occurs would frustrate the purpose and spirit of NRS 34.726." <u>Id.</u> at 540, 96 P.3d at 764. Consequently, where a Petitioner is not challenging the proceedings related to an Amended Judgment of Conviction, the one-year time bar runs from the date on which the original Judgement of Conviction was entered or, if an appeal was taken from the original judgment, within one year after the appellate court issues its remittitur. <u>Id.</u> at 540, 96 P.3d at 764.

In the instant case, Defendant's Judgement of Conviction was filed on July 7, 1990. Defendant filed a direct appeal, and remittitur was issued on September 17, 1991. An Amended Judgement of Conviction was filed on November 13, 1991, and a Second Amended Judgement of Conviction was filed on September 29, 1993. Defendant appealed the Second Amended Judgement of Conviction, and remittitur issued on October 24, 1994. Appellant's instant Petition was not filed until October 1, 2018. This is more than one year after the Judgement of Conviction, the Amended Judgement of Conviction, and the Second Amended Judgement of Conviction. Consequently, it is not necessary to address the argument of whether the one-year period should flow from the date of the original judgment or the date of an amended judgement, as more than one year has passed since the entry of all. Absent a showing of good cause for this delay and undue prejudice, this Court finds Defendant's claim must be dismissed because of its tardy filing.

II. DEFENDANT'S FIFTH PETITION IS SUCCESSIVE

Defendant's Petition is also successive pursuant to NRS 34.810(2). The relevant portions of NRS 34.810 state:

2. A second or successive petition must be dismissed if the judge or justice determines that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and that the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge or justice finds that the failure

of the Defendant to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ.

- 3. Pursuant to subsections 1 and 2, the petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving specific facts that demonstrate:
- (a) Good cause for the petitioner's failure to present the claim or for presenting the claim again; and
- (b) Actual prejudice to the petitioner.

<u>Id</u>. This is Defendant's fifth Petition. Defendant has previously filed four other Petitions spanning from February 20, 1996, to August 14, 2013, regarding the same issues. All of these prior Petitions have either been denied or disposed of. Furthermore, Defendant has given no good cause for the delay, and has failed to demonstrate actual prejudice. As such, this Court finds this fifth Petition must be denied as successive.

III. DEFENDANT'S FIFTH PETITION IS BARRED BY LACHES

NRS 34.800 creates a rebuttable presumption of prejudice to the State if "[a] period exceeding five years between the filing of a judgment of conviction, an order imposing a sentence of imprisonment or a decision on direct appeal of a judgment of conviction and the filing of a petition challenging the validity of a judgment of conviction...." The statute also requires that the State plead laches, which the State does. NRS 34.800.

Defendant's Judgement of Conviction was filed on July 7, 1990. Defendant filed a direct appeal, and remittitur was issued on September 17, 1991. An Amended Judgement of Conviction was filed on November 13, 1991, and a Second Amended Judgement of Conviction was filed on September 29, 1993. Defendant appealed the Second Amended Judgement of Conviction, and remittitur issued on October 24, 1994. Since more than five years have elapsed from any given date, NRS 34.800 directly applies in this case and a presumption of prejudice to the State arises. Defendant does not rebut this presumption. Therefore, pursuant to NRS 34.800, this Court finds this Petition must be denied.

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IV. DEFENDANT HAS NOT PROVIDED GOOD CAUSE OR EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE TO OVERCOME THE PROCEDURAL BARS

A showing of good cause and prejudice may overcome procedural bars. "To establish good cause, Defendant must show that an impediment external to the defense prevented their compliance with the applicable procedural rule. A qualifying impediment might be shown where the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available at the time of default." Clem v. State, 119 Nev. 615, 621, 81 P.3d 521, 525 (2003) (emphasis added). The Court continued, "appellants cannot attempt to manufacture good cause[.]" Id. at 621, 81 P.3d at 526.

In order to establish prejudice, the defendant must show "not merely that the errors of [the proceedings] created the possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, in affecting the state proceedings with error of constitutional dimensions." Hogan v. Warden, 109 Nev. 952, 960, 860 P.2d 710, 716 (1993) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1596 (1982)). To find good cause there must be a "substantial reason; one that affords a legal excuse." Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 252, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003). Clearly, any delay in the filing of the petition must not be the fault of the petitioner. NRS 34.726(1)(a).

Where a petition is procedurally barred and the petitioner cannot demonstrate good cause, the district court may nevertheless reach the merits of any constitutional claims if the petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider those constitutional claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. <u>Lisle v. State</u>, 351 P.3d 725, 729-730 (2015), citing <u>Pellegrini v. State</u>, 117 Nev. 860, 887, 34 P.3d 519, 537 (2001). A fundamental miscarriage of justice requires "a colorable showing" that the petitioner "is actually innocent of the crime or is ineligible for the death penalty." <u>Id.</u> This generally requires the petitioner to present new evidence of his innocence. <u>House v. Bell</u>, 547 U.S. 518, 536-37, 126 S. Ct. 2064 (2006); <u>Schlup v. Delo</u>, 513 U.S. 298, 316, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995).

When claiming a fundamental miscarriage based on actual innocence, the petitioner "must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him absent a constitutional violation. <u>Crump v. State</u>, 2016 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 374, *9-10, citing

Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. at 887, 34 P.3d at 537 (2001). In this context, actual innocence means "factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency." Mitchell v. State, 122 Nev. 1269, 1273-74, 149 P.3d 33, 36 (2006).

In the instant case, Defendant failed to raise any issue of good cause for the untimely delay in filing his Petition. Instead Defendant asserts his actual innocence and cites to NRS 207.010 and Walker v. Deeds, 50 F.3d 670, 673 (9th Cir. 1995) to support his claim that he was wrongfully adjudicated a habitual criminal because nonviolent property crimes do not warrant harsh sanctions under the habitual criminal statute. Petition at 4. This argument was already rejected by the Nevada Supreme Court in Defendant's first Petition, and as such is barred from other review by the doctrine of the law of the case. "The law of the first appeal is law of the case on all subsequent appeals in which the facts are substantially the same." Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 315, 535 P.2d 797, 798 (1975) (quoting Walker v. State, 85 Nev. 337, 343, 455 P.2d 34, 38 (1969)). "The doctrine of the law of the case cannot be avoided by a more detailed and precisely focused argument subsequently made after reflection upon the previous proceedings." Hall, 91 Nev. at 316, 535 P.2d at 799. Under the law of the case doctrine, issues previously decided on direct appeal may not be reargued in a habeas petition. Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 34 P.3d 519 (2001) (citing McNelton v. State, 115 Nev. 396, 414-15, 990 P.2d 1263, 1275 (1999)).

In denying Defendant's first Post-Conviction Petition, the Nevada Supreme Court noted that the State adequately proved Defendant had three prior convictions and the district court was entitled to use these convictions for sentence enhancement purposes. See Order Dismissing Appeal 10/30/95. Additionally, the case Defendant cites to was decided after his sentencing and cannot be applied retroactively. Furthermore, Defendant has failed to provide any facts that would show he would be prejudiced by having to comply with the procedural time bar.

As such, Defendant cannot show good cause or actual prejudice and this Court finds this Petition must be denied.

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ORDER

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief shall be, and is, DENIED.

DATED this 28 day of January, 2019.

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565

BY

for

of Deputy District Attorney ada Bar #006526

hjc/SVU

DISTRICT COURT **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Writ of Habeas Corpus

COURT MINUTES

January 02, 2019

A-18-782168-W

Roy Moraga, Plaintiff(s)

Isidor Baca, Defendant(s)

January 02, 2019

8:30 AM

Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus

HEARD BY: Bixler, James

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 10C

COURT CLERK: Keith Reed

RECORDER:

De'Awna Takas

REPORTER:

PARTIES PRESENT:

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- Defendant not present.

Present on behalf of the State, Deputy District Attorney Brad Turner. Court noted the late reply to the State's opposition. Matter submitted on the pleadings by Mr. Turner. Court stated findings and ORDERED, Defendant's request for appointment of counsel DENIED, Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus DENIED; State to prepare the order.

NDC

Certification of Copy

State of Nevada	}	SS:
County of Clark		

I, Steven D. Grierson, the Clerk of the Court of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, State of Nevada, does hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and correct copy of the hereinafter stated original document(s):

NOTICE OF APPEAL; CASE APPEAL STATEMENT; DISTRICT COURT DOCKET ENTRIES; CIVIL COVER SHEET; FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER; NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER; DISTRICT COURT MINUTES

ROY D. MORAGA,

Petitioner(s),

VS.

ISIDOR BACA.

Respondent(s),

now on file and of record in this office.

Case No: A-18-782168-W

Dept No: VI

IN WITNESS THEREOF, I have hereunto Set my hand and Affixed the seal of the Court at my office, Las Vegas, Nevada This 20 day of February 2019.

Steven D. Grierson, Clerk of the Court

Amanda Hampton, Deputy Clerk